LIBRARY AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN BOOKSTACKS CAPITAL AND INTEKEST BY EUGEN V. BCJHM-BAWEKK PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF INNSBRUCK TRANSLATED WITH A PREFACE AND ANALYSIS BY WILLIAM SMAKT, M.A. LECTURER ON POLITICAL ECONOMY IN QUEEN MARGARET COLLEGE GLASGOW NEW YORK BRENTANO'S 1922, TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE MY only reasons for writing a preface to a work so exhaustive, and "' xxvi ANAL YTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE M'Culloch finds that value is determined by labour alone, capital being only the product of previous labour ; includes profit among costs ; and at the same time defines profit as a surplus .... ... 97-98 His absurd illustrations of the cask of wine ; . . .99 of the two capitals in leather and wine ; of the timber. General untrustworthiness .... 100-102 M'Leod sees no problem ; considers profit self-explanatory and necessary . . . . . .103 His faith "in the formula of supply and demand . . 104 Gamier. Canard; " necessary " and " superfluous " labour . 105 Possible agreement of Canard with Turgot's theory . . 106 Droz makes saving an element of productive power, but devotes his attention chiefly to Contract interest . . . 107 BOOK II The Productivity Theories CHATTER I THE PRODUCTIVE POWER OF CAPITAL Apparent simplicity of the new explanation that Capital produces its own interest . . . . . .111 Real ambiguity of the word "productive," as () producing more goods, (ft) producing more value . . 112 (a) Physical Productivity ; Reseller's illustration . 113 (6) Value Productivity ; its two possible meanings . 113 Its usual meaning Capital produces more value than it has in itself . . . . . . .114 Conspectus of the four interpretations of " Capital is productive" 114 Danger of confusing these. The task assigned to productive power by the Productivity theories . . . 115 Restatement of the problem as essentially a problem of Surplus Value . . . . . . .116 Surplus Value may conceivably be explained from productive power by ascribing to capital (1) direct creation of value ; (2) direct creation of goods possessing surplus value, this value being assumed as self-explanatory; (3) direct creation of goods and indirect creation of surplus value . 117118 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xxvii PAGE Corresponding to these explanations are three groups of theories : (1) The Naive Productivity theory ; (2) the Indirect Pro- ductivity theories ; (3) the Use theories . 118-119 CHAPTER II THE NAIVE PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES J. B. Say their founder . . . . .120 Nature, Labour, and Capital are the factors of wealth, and, like rent and wage, interest is the price of a Productive Service 121-122 Adapting the problem to Say's terms we get two answers : (1) Capital directly creates surplus value, and takes that as its payment (thus making it a production problem) ; (2) the Service must be paid and prices must rise to cover the payment (thus a distribution problem) . . . 123-25 The development after Say . . . . .126 Schon and Riedel consider it self-evident that Capital must produce a "rent" or surplus . . . .127 Roscher, wavering between Natural and Loan interest, co- ordinates the Productivity and the Abstinence theory . 128-30 In France, Leroy-Beaulieu, in Italy, Scialoja, represent this theory . . . . . . .131 Criticism. Division of the theory into its two forms . . 132 The first form that capital directly produces value rests on the mere empirical observation that the employment of capital is followed by surplus value . . . .133 But to find the origin of value in production involves an erroneous theory of value . . . . .134 For value corresponds with costs only as goods are useful and scarce; ....... 135 and though production turns out valuable goods, it is not pro- duction that gives them value it is a cause, not the cause . 136 An application : if value does not arise in production, the other factor of production, labour, cannot confer it . . 137 The second form that the increased product must contain a surplus of value over the capital consumed is by no means self-evident . . . . . .138 Why should not the value of the capital rise to the value of its product, and surplus value vanish ? . . .139 Summary : failure of this theory in either form to explain Value, and therefore Surplus Value . . . .140 xxviii ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE It connects the undeniable fact that capital is productive, and that products of capitalist industry, as a rule, have value, with the phenomenon of surplus value which also appears in capitalist production, and capital is made the cause of surplus value . . . . . .141 CHAPTER III THE INDIRECT PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES These theories do not assume as self-evident that surplus value is bound up with increased quantity of products, but give reasons why it should be so. The conflicting accounts of these reasons, however, necessitate individual statement and criticism . . . . . .142 Lauderdale finds the source of profit in the power of capital to supplant labourers and appropriate their wage . 143-144 The familiar fact of such profit being usually less than such wages he explains by reference to competition . 144-145 But the share thus proved to go to capital is not interest at all, but gross return to capital ; and no proof is offered that net interest must remain after deduction of tear and wear 146-147 True, if there is no saving of labour there is no profit ; but it is as true that if there is no labour there is no profit . . 148 Malthus correctly states the nature of profit as the difference between the value of the advances and the value of products, but omits to ask the cause of this constant difference . 149 His most important contribution to the subject is the formal inclusion of profit among the Costs of Production . 150 a crude recognition of the fact, afterwards recognised, that there is another sacrifice in production besides labour . . 151 He does not, however, measure the rate of interest by the amount of sacrifice, but by the level of wage on the one side, and the level of prices on the other ; . . . 152 Not asking why there is a constant difference between these two, and having, at the same time, no better explanation of the level of price than Supply and Demand . . .153 Carey, a confused and blundering writer . . 154-155 His illustration of the axes .... 156158 In which he confuses (1) gross use with net use; (2) the cap- italist's proportion of the total return to capitalist production with the rate of interest ; i.e. confounds the return to capital with capital itself . . . . 159-160 Peshine Smith repeats all Carey's blunders with more than Carey's deliberation . . . . 161-164 Tinmen, a most careful investigator . . . . . 164 His genetical account of the growth of capital, origin of interest, and rate of interest . . . . 165-167 In which we find (1) labour, assisted by capital, obtaining a greater amount of products ; (2) this surplus composed of net interest and replacement of capital consumed ; (3) this excess production falling to the capitalist ; and (4) this plus of products regularly possessing a value greater than that of the real capital consumed . . . . 168-169 But no proof is offered for this last proposition, which assumes that capital has the power to reproduce its own value and leave something over . . . . .169 Now (1) why should not the value of capital rise till it becomes equal to the value of its products ; or (2) why should not competition of capitals increase till the claim of capital is reduced to its simple replacement ? . . . 170-171 Strasburger, writing in reply to Marx, defines profit as payment for natural powers, which, while in themselves gratuitous, are made available to production by capital only . 173-174 But in actual life how does the capitalist get paid for natural \ powers ? By selling the services of his capital at a higher price than the price of the labour embodied in the capital .. 175 This in three ways : (1) as Undertaker, getting a gross return greater than the value of the capital consumed ; (2) as Hirer- out, getting a payment greater than the labour value ; (3) as Seller of the capital itself, including all its services . . 176 But in this latter case also the natural powers here made available will raise the value of the capital above the payment of the labour which produced it. But if capital value rises proportionally with the value of its services (products), there is no interest, although natural powers have been paid for. If, on the other hand, competition presses down the capital value to the value of the labour embodied, it is evident there can be no claim for natural powers . 177-178 All then that Strasburger proves is that command over natural powers may increase the gross return to capital above what was paid to produce the capital. But whatever raises the value of products will raise the value of capital, and no explanation is thereby given of the constant difference between capital and products, which is interest 178-179 xxx ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS PAQB Summary : interest is the difference between the minuend (product) and the subtrahend (capital consumed), and, as the value of capital is bound up with the value of its products, productive power can only affect the one as it affects the other, leaving the difference between them unchanged, and the question of interest untouched . . . 179-180 BOOK III The Use Theories CHAPTER I THE USB OF CAPITAL The growing recognition of the identity betweeti value of product and value of means of production was bound to suggest that something had been overlooked among the sacrifices of production . . . . . .185 The new theory found this in the Use as distinct from the Substance of capital . . . . .186 Relation of this to the Productivity theories . . 186-187 CHAPTER II HISTORICAL STATEMENT Say's ambiguous account of the Services of capital . 188-189 Storch's perverted explanation . . . 190-191 Nebenius's eclectic suggestions . . . . . 192 Mario's brief epitome of Say . . . . .193 Hermann elaborates the fundamental conception of the inde- pendent " use " of goods. Distinguishing first between durable and transitory goods, he points out that the former, so long as they last, have a use which may be conceived as a good in itself, and may obtain an exchange value, called interest . . . . . . .194 But goods of transitory material, when combined and trans- formed by manufacture into durable goods, may also acquire this use. On this capability of affording an independent use he bases his conception of capital . . . .195 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xxxi PAGE In production, besides the sacrifices of existent wealth (material and tools), and besides labour (manual and intellectual), there is thus another sacrifice, the Uses of fixed and floating capital over the period of production. Immediately that any form of capital is engaged in production, the disposal of it in any other way is made impossible ; it enters, with its exchange value, into the product, and is suspended till the sale of the product. Thus what is paid for in the product is not simply the renunciation of the immediate consumption of wealth, but a new use, consisting in the holding together of the technical elements of the product . . . 196-198 Superiority of this to Say's outline. Some inconsistencies . 199 Hermann's views on the rate of profit. A product ultimately is a sum of labours and uses of capital. Thus all exchange is an exchange of labours and uses against other labours and uses, either direct or embodied in products. The rate of profit, then, depends on the amount of labours and uses obtainable for uses alone. If capital increases in amount more uses are offered, and the exchange, value of use against use is unchanged ; but, if labour is stationary, the exchange value of uses sinks in comparison with labour, and the rate of profit falls. If capital, again, increases in productiveness, the . result is the same, except that, f>r their reduced profits, the capitalists receive more means of enjoyment than they formerly obtained for their high profit . . . 200-201 Thus increasing productiveness lowers interest . . . 202 This application of the Use theory to explain the rat: of interest is certainly incorrect What his argument proves is the relation between total profit and total wage ; not between profit and parent capital .... 202-204 Hermann's views on productivity . . . .204 Bernhardi, Mangoldt, Mithoff ..... 205 Schaffle has two conceptions of Use : in his Gesellschaftlidie System, for the most part, we find the subjective conception, which connects it with the undertaker ; . . . 206 in his Ban imd Leben, the objective uses are " functions of goods " 207 Knies, although at one time adopting Galiani's conception of interest as part equivalent of parent loan, . . . 208 of late years, in Geld und Kredit, conceives of the Use as quite distinct from the good itself, the ft . bearer of the Use," and describes it as obtaining value as all goods obtain value by satisfying human needs . . . .209 c xxxii ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Menger, who represents the highest point of the Use theory, bases it on a complete theory of value. His great law : the value of goods of higher rank (means of production) is deter- mined by the value of goods of lower rank (products) 209-211 How then is the value of the product always higher than the value of the means of production ? . . . . 211 His answer : the production process requires the " disposal " over capital for periods of time. This disposal is, economically, the Use of capital ; it enters, as an economic good, into the value of the product, and is the source of value. Interest is thus a distribution, not a production problem . . 212 CHAPTER III PLAN OF CRITICISM The theses to be proved are : (1) that there is no independent use of capital as assumed ; (2) that, if there were such a use, it would not explain interest . . . .214 CHAPTER IV THE USE OF CAPITAL ACCORDING TO THE SAY-HERMANN SCHOOL Uncertainty in the various accounts given of the use. Defin- itions of Say, Hermann, Knies, Schaffle . . . 216 These definitions, in correspondence with popular usage, are divisible into two conceptions a subjective and an objective. Obviously it is the latter alone which corresponds with the character of the Use theory . . . .217 What then is the objective use of goods ? . . . 218 THE TRUE CONCEPTION OF THE USE OF GOODS The character of material "goods," as distinct from material " things," is that, in them, the working of the natural powers inherent in all matter permits of being directed to human advantage . . . . . .219 The function of goods, then, consists in the forth-putting of their available energy, and the use of goods consists in the receiv- ing of useful results from this forth-putting of energy . 220 ANALYTICAL TABLE Of CONTENTS xxxiii PAGE This is strictly an economic as well as a physical conception ; its application in regard to "ideal" goods . . 221-222 Material Services (Nutzleistungeri) an appropriate name for this function of goods ...... 223 Inferences from this conception. Every economic " good " must be capable of rendering material services, and ceases to be a good on the exhaustion of this capability . . . 224 But the number of services which a good may render varies. Perishable goods exhaust themselves at a single use ; durable goods only by successive acts or continuous service . . 225 In virtue of this the single use, or definable period of service, obtains economic independence apart from the body of the good, which remains capable of further uses . . 226 Finally, as material services constitute the economic substance of goods, it follows that the economic essence of the transfer of a good is the transfer of all its services, and that the value of a good contains the value of all its services . . 227 CHAPTER VI CRITICISM OP THE SAY-HERMANN CONCEPTION The Use of capital, according to this conception, is not identical with what we call Material Services. Its use is the basis of net interest ; ours of gross interest (in the case of durable goods) or the basis of the entire capital value (in the case of perishable goods) . . . . . .228 No use of goods other than their Material Services is conceivable 229 either in durable goods (illustration of the mill) or in perishable (illustration of the coals) . . . . .230 This will best be proved by showing that any other kind of use (1) is an unproved assumption, and (2) leads to untenable conclusions . . . . . .231 CHAPTER VII THE INDEPENDENT USE : AN UNPROVED ASSUMPTION " In all the reasoning by which the Use theorists thought they had proved the existence of this Use, an error or misunder- standing has crept in." Say's services productifs are nothing more than our Material Services, and cannot be the basis of net interest ...... So also Schaffle's " functions " of goods xxxiv ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Hermann introduces his independent use when speaking of dur- able goods the use which does not exhaust the good that renders it, and is accordingly capable of independent valua- tion (note that this is a gross use, and its payment is not interest) ....... 233 By analogy he finds a similar use in perishable goods, technically transformed into durable goods . . . .234 But this analogy does not hold : durable goods are immediately " used " when successively giving forth a part of their content ; perishable goods in each immediate use exhaust their entire content, and what Hermann calls a durable use in this latter case is a mediate use . . . . .235 Thus Hermann has drawn his parallel between the immediate use of a durable good and the mediate use of a perishable good 236-238 Kniea goes carefully into the question of the existence of an independent -use ; . . 239 finds that there are economical transfers, where the intention is to transfer a use and retain the good that bears the use ; and inquires if this does not hold also in the case of fungible goods . . . . . . . 240 His illustration of the loan of corn . . . .241 Where, by using Nutzung in a double sense, he actually assumes the very point at issue that there can be a use (Nutzung) of grain separate from its consumption (Verbrauch) . 242-244 Thus all the Use theorists first allude to the Material Services of capital, then note the successive services of durable goods as obtaining value independent of the good itself (the sum of the remaining services), and end by assuming a use and independent value in all goods, outside and independent of the use and value of the (undiminished) good from which they come ...... 245 CHAPTER VIII THE INDEPENDENT USE : ITS UNTENABLE CONCLUSIONS The usual assumption of this theory is the existence of a gross Nutzung (basis of hire) and a net Niitzung (basis of interest). Yet Nutzung is always taken as synonymous with Gebrauch . 247 But it is impossible to think of two simultaneous uses in every act by which a good renders its material services. If, then, the 'name of Use or Nutzung is rightly given to the gross iise, what is this net use ? 248-249 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xxxv PAGE If it exists, it must be part of the gross use, and interest is paid for something contained in the gross use. Now the gross use of a meal is its consumption. But if we repay the meal on the moment of its consumption, we pay no interest ; we only pay interest for the delay in replacing the meal. That is, we pay for something not contained in the gross use 250-251 Further absurdities involved . . . . .251 Summary of what has been proved . . . .252 CHAPTER IX THE INDEPENDENT USE : ITS ORIGIN IN LEGAL FICTION The need of fiction in jurisprudence . . . .253 The first fiction here -of the identity between fungible goods lent and those returned ..... 254 The second fiction that the goods replaced had themselves been used and not consumed ; hence usura, a durable use obtained from all goods ..... 254-255 Under the attack of the canonists on interest generally . . 255 the fiction attained a new importance as apparently affording the sole defence of interest, and, thanks to Salmasius, the fiction was proclaimed a fact . . . .256 Modern Political Economy turned this practical justification of interest into a theoretical one, and hence the Use theory . 256 The mistake has lain in considering that 100 replaced now, is the full equivalent of .100 lent a year ago, and interest an extra payment ..... 257-258 The true conception of the loan: it is a real exchange of present goods against future goods ; the capital replaced pltis interest is the full equivalent of the capital loaned . . . 259 CHAPTER X MENGER'S CONCEPTION OF USE " Disposal over goods for a period of time," as an independent good ....... 260 Its indirect proof : the existence of surplus value not otherwise accounted for ...... 261 Insufficiency of this : (l) surplus value can be explained other- wise ; (2) " disposal " for a period of time proved to have no existence beyond the capital value of goods 262-263 xxxvi ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER XI FINAL INSUFFICIENCY OF THE USE THEORY FADE Even if the independent use were admitted, it would not explain interest For the explanation of surplus value as caused by a new element, the use of capital, necessarily assumes that the value of capital in itself does not contain the value of this use. This, however, is disproved by the familiar fact, that if, in selling a commodity, any of its future uses are retained, the capital value of the commodity is reduced 264 Thus the use of capital is contained in the loan of the capital, and cannot explain a surplus value greater than, that capital 265 BOOK IV The Abstinence Theory CHAPTER I SENIOR'S STATEMENT OF THE THEORY The Labour Principle and its difficulties in accounting for interest. Is interest a wage for labour, or is it a cost of production along- side of labour ? . . . . . 269-270 Foreshadowings of the theory in Nebenius and Scrope . 271 Senior. Abstinence from unproductive use of wealth a third element in production. Like labour and natural agents, it enters into the costs or sacrifices of production, and demands compensation . . . . 272-273 CHAPTER II CRITICISM OF SENIOR Pierstorffs estimate much too severe . . .275 Lassalle notwithstanding, the very existence of capital requires postponement of immediate consumption, and this is con- sidered in price of products which cannot be obtained with- out postponement . . . . . .276 Yet interest and sacrifice by no means invariably correspond . 277 Principal defect of Senior's theory : that he represents interest as an independent sacrifice in addition to labour-sacrifice . 278 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xxxvii PAGE A concrete example : a rustic, choosing to fish instead of shoot or gather fruit, may estimate his sacrifice in terms, either of the labour undergone, or the gratification intermitted . 278 It is the same if, instead of fishing, he devotes his labour to obtain future results ; he cannot calculate the sacrifice of labour in addition to the sacrifice of abstinence . . 279 But must choose one or the other mode of calculation . . 279 This double calculation, however, is made by Senior . . 280 According to his theory, the sacrifice involved in a day's planting of potatoes is a day's labour plus a year's abstinence, while a day's harvesting of the same involves the sacrifice of a day's labour only. But if the potatoes I sowed yesterday are eaten by deer overnight, is my sacrifice a day's labour plus an infinite abstinence ? . . . 281-282 Speciousness of the argument. The misleading element is the consideration of time. Time is not a second independent sacrifice, but it determines the amount of the one sacrifice actually made. E.g. sacrifice, in the majority of economical cases, is estimated, not by (positive) pain, but by (negative) renunciation of alternative enjoyments . . . 282 Not so, however, as regards the sacrifice of labour, where some amount of positive pain is always present. Yet, as a rule, in civilised communities the methods of labour are so various that sacrifice is not estimated by its pain, but by its alterna- tive results. Now, of these results some are immediate, some take time ; the attraction of a present over a future result of labour, increases the estimate of the sacrifice made by those who devote themselves to the distant result. The sacrifice in terms of labour is the same; in terms of alternative results it is calculated by the greater of the alternatives intermitted 283-285 Reasons for the popularity of this theory. Cairnes, Cherbuliez, Wollemborg, Dietzel .... 286-287 CHAPTER III BASTIAT'S STATEMENT Delay or Privation as a service demanding payment . . 288 His statement inferior to Senior's in two respects (1) As confined to Contract interest, in the course of which he seems to suggest that the sacrifice spoken of is the sac- rifice of the productive use, not the postponement of needs 289-290 (2) In confounding interest with replacement of capital 291-293 xxxviii ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS BOOK V The Labour Theories THESE THEORIES AGREE IN EXPLAINING INTEREST AS WAGE OP THE CAPITALIST'S LABOUR The English Group PAGE Traces interest to that labour which produces capital . . 297 James Mill starts with the proposition that labour alone regulates value . .... 297 And defines profit as wage of indirect labour . . . 298 But as the labour formative of capital has been already paid, this must be an extra wage, and raises the question why such mediate labour should be more highly paid than immediate . 299 The French Group Courcelle's conception of the Labour of Saving : the conservation of capital requires effort of intellect and will, which is so far painful, and the return to this labour is interest . 300301 Not to speak of this being merely another way of putting Senior's theory, what correspondence is there between the painful ex- ertion of intellect and will and the so-called wage ? 302 And if interest is explained by these painful exertions, why does the borrower not get interest instead of paying it ? . 303-304 Cauwes, an eclectic follower of Courcelle . . 304-305 The German Group Its origin in a remark of Rodbertus . . . 305-306 expanded by Schaffle into the statement that interest is a remuneration for the office, now filled by private capitalists, of binding together production processes by means of capital 307 Wagner characterises the capitalist's saving and disposing activi- ties as labours, and constitutive elements of value . . 308 It is difficult to know whether these Katheder Socialists mean to give a theoretical explanation or a socio-political justifica- tion of interest ..... 308 Difference between the two illustrated by a parallel case ; land rent could not be explained by the original exertion of labour on the land 309 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xxxix PAGE but might be justified as a political measure of expediency 310 Similarly, the permission of interest may possibly be the most effective means to the accumulation and employment of national capital, and this may be a sound reason for its maintenance by society, but the capitalist's " labour " gives no economic explanation of what is, obviously, an income from ownership 311 It is impossible to doubt that interest is not a wage for labour . 312 BOOK VI The Exploitation Theory CHAPTER I HISTORICAL SURVEY The essence of the theory the exploitation from the labourer, by means of the wage contract, of the wealth which he exclusively produces . . . . .315 An inevitable consequence of the Labour- value theory . . 316 Preceding developments the acceptance of the Ricardian theory and the spread of capitalist production . . . 317 Sismondi, the writer of a transition period, . . . 318 states its main propositions, . . . . . 319 Vnt, illogically, justifies interest as founded on the original labour which produces capital . . . .320 Proudhon : all value being produced by labour, the labourer has a natural claim to his entire product, but this he ignor- antly gives up for a wage ..... 321 and cannot buy even his own product at what it cost him . 322 Rodbertus, a profound scientific investigator . . . 322 Lassalle, the most eloquent but least original . . . 323 Marx, the most important theorist after Rodbertus . . 323 Many writers adopt the Exploitation theory, but stop short at its consequences, as Guth and Duhring . . .324 Others ad. its ideas eclectically to their other theories, as James Mill and Schaffle ..... 325 The Katheder Socialists, again, accept the proposition, Labour is the sole source of value a proposition which, has had a singular history in economic theory . . . 325 Plan of criticism 326-327 xl ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER II RODBERTUS PAGE His starting-point : that goods, economically considered, are the products of labour alone . . . . . 328 The labourers accordingly have a just claim to the whole product, or its value ...... 329 But in the present system they receive only a part, the remainder going as rent (including land-rent, and profit) . . 330 Rent owes its existence to two facts : (1) that, thanks to the divi- sion of labour, each worker can produce a surplus ; (2) that the indispensable conditions to labour land and capital are private property, this necessitating a wage contract, which virtually restores the original condition of labour, slavery . 331 Thus all rent is exploitation, and under the iron law of wages its amount increases with the productivity of labour . 332 His confused statement of the division of amount exploited be- tween land-rent and profit .... 333-36 Nevertheless Rodbertus would not abolish rent . . 336 and would regard it as the salary for a social function . . 337 Criticism : the first proposition, that all goods, economically considered, are products of labour alone (suggesting the question, What is meant by " economically considered ?") . 337 is false, as proved by the fact that purely natural goods, if scarce, have economic value . . . . .338 The argument he advances, that labour is economically the only original power, and only original cost, implies that economy has nothing to do with other powers, or their results ; this rests on a quite arbitrary and narrow conception of economic conduct . . . . . . 339 Lastly, the limitation of labour to material manual labour does not need serious confutation .... 340 But to confute this first proposition is not, as Knies considered, to refute Rodbertus's entire interest theory . . 340-341 The second proposition, that the whole product or its value, should belong to the labourer who produces it, is, rightly understood, quite correct . . . .341 But as Rodbertus explains it, he would have the labourer now receive the entire future value of the product . . 342 Illustration of the steam-engine. Supposing that its value when completed is 550 ..... 342 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xli PAGE And that one labourer, working continuously for five years, pro- duces the engine ; the value of his first year's wage is not a fifth part of the value the engine will have when finished, but a much less sum say 100, which, with interest, will be the same as receiving 120 for his fifth year . . 343-344 But Rodbertus would have the value of the completed product spread proportionally over the five years of production, which would involve that the 550 was paid in two and a half years 345 Thus giving the individual labourer a value in wage which no undertaker could obtain for himself . . . 346 The same illustration : assuming the work divided among labourers working successively .... 347 Dividing what they produce as wage, as before the first receives 100, the last XI 20 .... 348-349 Assuming that the production is carried on under an outside undertaker, the labourers will receive exactly the same 350-351 The only undertaker that could make a higher wage payment is the State ....... 351 But this would not be a fulfilling, but a violation of Rodbertus's own proposition . . . . . .352 The third proposition, that labour alone regulates value, . 353 overlooks Ricardo's exception of those goods which require time for their production. , But this exception really con- tains the chief feature in natural interest . . 354-355 To neglect that is to assume the validity of one fixed law of value, by simply ignoring that there are others . . 356 A fourth criticism : Rodbertus's theory of land-rent is based on the statement that the amount of rent does not depend upon the amount of capital, but the amount of labour employed ; . 357 which would involve that capital bears a rate of profit varying from business to business . . . . .358 But Rodbertus himself lays down the law of the equalisation of profits under competition . . . . .359 This equalisation can only take place by alteration in the exchange value of products ..... 359-360 (unless we suppose it effected by alteration in wage, which is contradictory both of experience and Rodbertus's own iron law) ....... 361 and in this case what becomes of his law that goods exchange according to the labour incorporated in them ? . .361-362 Criticising the theory as a whole, even if it were granted that it explains the interest on that capital invested in wages, it will xlii ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE be found incapable of explaining interest on capital invested in materials ; this is easily proved where capital is large and workers few, as in pearl-stringing . . . 363-364 But most clearly by the good old illustration of the maturing wine ...... 364-365 CHAPTER III MARX His fundamental proposition that goods exchange solely accord- ing to the amount of labour spent in producing them. In exchange use-values are disregarded, and nothing remains to account for the equation of exchange but amount of labour 367-368 Value is measured by " socially necessary labour time " . . 369 His statement of the problem : Money transformed into com- modities retransforined into money, M C M' . . 370 This surplus value cannot originate in the circulation, nor yet outside of it . . . . . . 371 But among the commodities which the capitalist buys is one whose Use value is the source of Exchange value Labour Power. The value of labour power is regulated, like other commodities, by the labour time necessary for its reproduction 372 The capitalist, buying it at this price, is able to appropriate all the value produced beyond this ; i.e. in every minute over the "necessary labour time." Illustration of the spinner. All surplus value then is unpaid labour . . 373-374 Compared with Rodbertus's statement the most important point in Marx's work is the attempt to prove that all value rests on labour ...... 375 Adam Smith and Ricardo are generally claimed as authorities for this proposition, but on examination we shall find that they virtually did no more than assume it . . 375-376 Adam Smith, indeed, spoke of the equivalence of Value and Trouble, but with him it is merely a general remark, without any claim to scientific exactitude .... 377-80 Marx's argument restated : (l) the common element in exchange ; (2) this element is not the use value ; (3) it can only be labour ....... 381 As regards (2), the use value is never disregarded in exchange, but only the particular form the use assumes . 381-382 As regards (3), is there no other possible common element, such as scarcity ?...... 382 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xliii PAGE And in goods that exchange is there always labour ? . 383 But apart from deduction, experience only confirms the equivalence of labour and value in the case of one class of goods, and that a relatively insignificant one . . . . ' 383 Exceptions to the Labour principle-^- (1) Scarce goods (including land and patented goods) . 384 (2) Goods produced by skilled labour . . .384 (3) Goods abnormally badly paid . . . 385 (4) Even where value and labour correspond, the labour value is only the gravitation point . . . 386 (5) Goods that require greater advances of " previous " labour . . . . . . 386 Conclusions from these exceptions. Labour is one circumstance that affects value an intermediate not an ultimate cause . 387 Ricardo knew this, but, underestimating the exceptions, spoke of the labour principle as if it were practically universally valid ; it was his followers who formally gave it that extension. The Socialists not only declare that this law is universal, but demand the abolition of interest as contrary to it . . 388 Later on Marx falls into all Rodbertus's mistakes, such as claim- ing for the labourer in the present the future value of his product . . . . . . . 389 connecting exploitation and surplus value with wage capital alone, and neglecting to show how labour creates that value which accrues only in virtue of time . . . .390 Causes of this theory's popularity : (1) it appeals to the heart as well as to the head ; (2) the weakness of its critics . 391 BOOK VII Minor Systems CHAPTER I THE ECLECTICS Reasons for eclecticism on the interest problem . 395-396 Rossi uses Productivity and Abstinence theory alternately 397-399 Molinari, Leroy-Beaulieu, Roscher, Cossa . . . 400 Jevons, finding the function of capital in enabling the labourer to expend labour in advance, makes interest the difference between the product of labour assisted and that of labour unassisted by capital ..... 401 xliv ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE This is to identify surplus in products with surplus in value (Pro- ductivity theory), to correct which lie reckons the capitalist's abstinence among the costs of production (Abstinence theory) 402-403 His pregnant remarks on the effect of time on the valuation of anticipated pleasures and pains only excite our astonishment that he did not develop them into a systematic theory 403404 Read hesitates among Productivity, Abstinence, and Labour theories ....... 405 Gerstner, Cauwes . . . . . .406 Gamier, Hoffmann ...... 407 J. S. Mill includes profits among costs of production . . 408 and explains it not only by the Productivity and Abstinence theory, but by the Exploitation theory . . . 408-10 Schaffle, in his earlier writings, follows Hermann's Use theory ; in the Bau und Leben makes interest a functional income (Labour theory) ; and resolves all costs of production into labour (which practically amounts to an Exploitation theory) 411-412 CHAPTER II THE LATER FRUCTIFICATION THEORY Henry George's variation of Turgot's theory . . . 413 Criticising Bastiat's illustration, he indicates that the cause of interest is the active powers of nature, . . . 414 distinct from labour as being operative while the labourer sleeps. That all forms of capital produce interest George explains by the equalisation of profits . . . . .415 Thus interest "springs from the element of time," because dur- ing a year certain forms of capital produce fruit . . 416 This differs from Turgot's theory chiefly in bringing the source of surplus value within the sphere of capital finding it, not in land, but in certain naturally fruitful goods . . 416 Two decisive objections : (1) it is quite unscientific to say that the forces of nature are operative in one class of goods and not in another ; (2) he does not think it necessary to show how certain naturally fruitful goods produce surplus value . 417 over the value of labour and material consumed in co-operating with " vital powers " . . . . .418 His one attempt at explanation of surplus value that time con- stitutes an independent element in production seems to in- volve that the vegetative forces of nature can be monopolised, this bringing us back to Strasburger's Productivity theory 419-420 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xlv Conclusion PAGE Looking at all this tangle of theories, can we find the line of development ? Restatement of the problem as obviously a problem of distribution. What is it guides a portion of the stream of wealth into the hands of the capitalists ? There are three distinct answers . . . . .421 (1) That there are three sources of value, Nature, Labour, and Capital, and that from each source flows to its owner the value which comes from that source. This is the Naive Productivity theory, which makes interest a production problem . . . 422 (2) That the stream of wealth comes from labour alone, and is only diverted at its mouth by landlords and capitalists. This is the Exploitation theory, which makes it purely a distribution problem . . 422 (3) That thej-e are two or three springs, but one stream, and under the influences which create value the stream branches, till it empties into three separate kinds of income. This makes it peculiarly a problem of value ...... 423 As to (1), there is no power in any factor of production to create value ; it is not a simple problem of production . . . 423 As to (2), it is not first in the final distribution that a foreign element intrudes beside labour. The value of one good diverges from that of another according to the time required in production. The explanation of surplus value, then, is to be found in investigating the formation of value. The distribution in which products that require time as well as labour possess surplus value, is not to be explained by a snatch at the spoil, but by previous formations of value 424425 In order of merit, then, the Naive Productivity and the Ex- ploitation theories stand lowest . . . . 425 They do not even see the problem, and they both assume a theory of value which bases it on production . . 426 Next come those theories which use the external machinery of a theory of costs ; this has the disadvantage of explaining surplus value without direct reference to the wants and satisfactions in which value arises . . . .427 Highest stand those which recognise that interest is a problem of value, as in the higher forms of the Abstinence and Use theories, and particularly in Menger's statement . 427-428 The future work of interest theorists . . . 428 INTEODUCTION THE PROBLEM OF INTEREST IT is generally possible for any one who owns capital to obtain from it a permanent net income, called Interest. 1 This income is distinguished by certain notable character- istics. It owes its existence to no personal activity of the capitalist, and flows in to him even where he has not moved a finger in its making. Consequently it seems in a peculiar sense to spring from capital, or, to use a very old metaphor, to be begotten of it. It may be obtained from any capital, no matter what be the kind of goods of which the capital con- sists : from goods that are barren as well as from those that are naturally fruitful ; from perishable as well as from durable goods ; from goods that can be replaced and from goods that cannot be replaced ; from money as well as from commodities. And, finally, it flows in to the capitalist without ever exhausting the capital from which it comes, and- therefore without any necessary limit to its continuance. It is, if one may use such an expression about mundane things, capable of an everlasting life. Thus it is that the phenomenon of interest, as a whole, presents the remarkable picture of a lifeless thing producing an everlasting and inexhaustible supply of goods. And this 1 Many German economists use the word Kapitalrente as well as Kapitalzins. Sanders defines Rente as ' ' Einkiinfte die man als Nutzung von Grundstucken, Kapitalien, und Rechten bezieht." So Littre gives Rente as "Revenu annuel." The word occurs in Chaucer as equivalent of income : "For catel (chattels) hadden they ynough and rent." Canterbury Tales, Prologue, 1. 375. In English we still retain the word Rent instead of interest in a few cases outside of its special application to land. "W. S. B 2 THE PROBLEM OF INTEREST INTROD. remarkable phenomenon appears in economic life with' such perfect regularity that the very conception of capital has not infrequently been based on it. 1 Whence and why does the capitalist, without personally exerting himself, obtain this endless flow of wealth ? These words contain the theoretical problem of interest. When the actual facts of the relation between interest and capital, with all its essential characteristics, are described and fully explained, that problem will be solved. But the explana- tion must be complete both in compass and in depth. In compass, inasmuch as all forms and varieties of interest must be explained. In depth, inasmuch as the explanation must be carried without a break to the very limits of economical research : in other words, to those final, simple, and acknow- ledged facts with which economical explanation ends ; those facts which economics rests on, but does not profess to prove ; facts the explanation of which falls to the related sciences, particularly to psychology and natural science. From the theoretical problem of interest must be carefully distinguished the social and political problem. The theoretical problem asks why there is interest on capital. The social and political problem asks whether there should be interest on capital whether it is just, fair, useful, good, and whether it should be retained, modified, or abolished. While the theo- retical problem deals exclusively with the causes of interest, the social and political problem deals principally with its effects. And while the theoretical problem is only concerned about the true, the social and political problem devotes its attention first and foremost to the practical and the expedient. As distinct as the nature of the two problems is the character of the arguments that are used by each of them, and the strictness with which the arguments are used. In the one case the argument is concerned with' truth or falsehood, while in the other it is concerned for 'the most part with ex- pediency. To the question as to the 'causes of interest there can be only one answer, and its truth every one must recognise if the laws of thought are correctly applied. But whether 1 Thus Hermann in his Staatswirthschaftliche Untersuckungen, p. 211, defines capital as "Vermbgen, das seine Nutzung, wie ein immer neues Gut, fort- dauernd dem Bediirfniss darbietet, ohne an seinem Tauschwerth abzunehmen. " INTROD. ITS TWO BRANCHES interest is just, fair, and useful or not, necessarily remains to a great extent a matter of opinion. The most cogent argu- mentation on this point, though it may convince many who thought otherwise, will never convert all. Suppose, for instance, that by the soundest of reasoning it was shown to be prob- able that the abolition of interest would be immediately followed by a decline in the material welfare of the race, that argument will have no weight with the man who measures by a standard of his own, and counts material welfare a thing of no great importance perhaps for the reason that earthly life is but a short moment in comparison with eternity, and because the material wealth that interest ministers to will rather hinder than help man in attaining his eternal destiny. Prudence urgently demands that the two problems which are so fundamentally distinct should be kept sharply apart in scientific investigation. It cannot be denied that they stand in close relation with each other. Indeed it appears to me that there is no better way of coming to a correct decision on the question whether interest be a good thing, than by getting a proper knowledge of the causes which give rise to it. But we must remember that this connection only entitles us to bring together the results ; it does not justify us in confusing the investigations. Confusing these investigations will, in fact, endanger the correct solution of either problem, and that on several grounds. In the social and political question there naturally come into play all sorts of wishes, inclinations, and passions. If both problems are attempted at the same time, these will find entrance only too easily into the theoretical part of the inquiry, and there, in virtue of the real importance they have in their proper place, weigh, down one of the sccdes perhaps that very one which would have remained the lighter if nothing but grounds of reason had been put in the balance. What one wishes to believe, says an old and true proverb, that one easily believes. And if our judgment on the theoretical interest problem is perverted, it will naturally react and prejudice our judgment on the practical and political question. Considerations like these show that there is constant danger that an unjustifiable use may be made of arguments in themselves justifiable. The man who confuses the two prob- 4 THE PROBLEM OF INTEREST INTROD. lems, or perhaps mistakes the one for the other, and, looking at the matter in this way, forms one opinion upon both, will be apt to confuse the two groups of arguments also, and allow each of them an influence on his total judgment. He will let his judgment as to the causes of the phenomenon of interest be guided, to some extent, by principles of expediency' which is wholly and entirely bad ; and he will let his judgment as to the advantages of interest as an institution be, to some extent, directly guided by purely theoretical considerations which, at least, may be bad. In the case, e.g. where the two problems are mixed up, it might easily happen that one who sees that the existence of interest is attended by an increased return in the national production, will be disposed to agree with a theory which finds the cause of interest in a productive power of capital. Or it may happen that one comes to the theoretical conclusion that interest has its origin in the exploit- ation of the labourer, made possible by the relations of com- petition between labour and capital ; and on that account he may, without more ado, condemn the institution of interest, and advocate its abolition. The one is as illogical as the other. Whether the existence of interest be attended by results that are useful or harmful to the economical pro- duction of a people, has absolutely nothing to do with the question why interest exists ; and our knowledge of ttie source from which interest springs, in itself gives us no ground what- ever for deciding whether interest should be retained or abolished. Whatever be the source from which interest comes even if that source be a trifle muddy we have no right to decide for its abolition unless on the ground that the real interests of the people would be advanced thereby. In economical treatment this separation of the two distinct problems, which prudence suggests, has been neglected by many writers. But although this neglect has been the source of many error-, misunderstandings, and prejudices, we can scarcely complain of it, since it is the practical problem of interest that has jrought the theoretical problem and its scientific treatment to the front. Through the merging of the two problems into one, it is true, the theoretical problem has of necessity been worked at under circumstances which were not favourable for the discovery of truth. But without this merging INTROD. THE THEORETICAL PROBLEM 5 very many able writers would not have worked at it at all. It is all the more important that we profit in the future by such experiences of the past. The intentionally limited task to which I intend to devote myself in the following pages is that of writing a critical history of the theoretical problem of interest. I shall endeavour to set down in their historical development the scientific efforts made to discover the nature and origin of interest, and to submit to critical examination the various views which have been taken of it. As to opinions whether interest is just, useful, and commendable, I shall only include them in my statement so far as that is indispensable for getting at the theoretical substance that they contain. Notwithstanding this limitation of subject, there will be no lack of material for a critical history, either as regards the historical or as regards the critical part. A whole literature has been written on the subject of interest, and a literature which, in mere amount, is equalled by few of the departments of political economy, and by none in the variety of opinion it presents. Not one, nor two, nor three, but a round dozen of interest theories testify to the zeal with which economists have devoted themselves to the investigation of this remarkable problem. "Whether these exertions were quite as successful as they were zealous may with some reason be doubted. The fact is that, of the numerous views advanced as to the nature and origin of interest, no single one was able to obtain undivided assent. Each of them, as might be expected, had its circle of adherents, larger or smaller, who gave it the faith of full con- viction. But each of them omitted considerations enough to prevent its being accepted as a completely satisfactory theory. Still even those theories which could only unite weak minorities on their side showed themselves tenacious enough to resist extinction. And thus the present position of the theory ex- hibits a motley collection of the most conflicting opinions, no one of them strong enough to conquer, and no one of them willing to admit defeat ; the very number of them in- dicating to the impartial mind what a mass of error they must contain. 6 THE PROBLEM OF INTEREST INTROD. I venture to hope that the following pages may bring these scattered theories a little nearer to a point. Before I can apply myself to my proper task I must come to an understanding with my readers as to some conceptions and distinctions which we shall have to make frequent use of in the sequel. Of the many meanings which, in the unfortunate and in- congruous terminology of our science, have been given to the word Capital, I shall confine myself, in the course of this critical inquiry, to that in which capital signifies a complex of produced means of acquisition that is, a complex of goods that originate in a previous process of production, and are des- tined, not for immediate consumption, but to serve as means of acquiring further goods. Objects of immediate consumption, then, and land (as not produced) stand outside our conception of capital. I shall only justify my preference for this definition mean- time on two grounds of expediency. Firstly, by adopting it a certain harmony will be maintained, so far, at least, as termin- ology is concerned, with the majority of those writers whose views we shall have to state ; and secondly, this limitation of the conception of capital defines also most correctly the limits of the problem with which we mean to deal. 'It does not fall within our province to go into the theory of land rent. We have only to give the theoretical explanation of that acquisition of wealth which is derived from different complexes of goods, exclusive of land. The more complete development of the conception of capital I reserve for a future occasion. 1 Within this general conception of capital, further, there are two well-known shades of difference that require to be noted. There is the National conception of capital, which embraces the national means of economic acquisition, and only these ; and there is the Individual conception of capital, which includes everything that is a means to economic. acquisition in the hands of an individual that is to say. those goods by means of which an individual obtains wealth for himself, no matter whether the goods are, from the point of view of the national economy, 1 A promise now fulfilled by the publication of the Positive Theorie des Kapitalcs, Innsbruck, 13S9. W. S. INTROD. DEFINITIONS 7 means of acquisition or means of enjoyment, goods for pro- duction or goods for consumption. Thus, e.g. the books of a circulating library will fall under the individual conception of capital, but not under the national conception. The national conception, if we except those few objects of immediate con- sumption lent at interest to other countries, includes merely the produced means of production belonging to a country. In what follows we shall chiefly be concerned with the national conception of capital, and shall, as a rule, keep this before us when the word capital by itself is used. The income that flows from capital, sometimes called in German Rent of Capital, we shall simply call Interest. 1 Interest makes its appearance in many different forms. First of all, we must distinguish between Gross interest and Net interest. The expression gross interest covers a great many heterogeneous kinds of revenue, which only outwardly form a whole. It is the same thing as the gross return to the employment of capital ; and this gross return usually includes, besides the true interest, such things as part replacement of the substance of capital expended, compensation for all sorts of current costs, outlay on repairs, premiums for risk, and so on. Thus the Hire or Rent which an owner receives for the letting of a house is a Gross interest ; and if we wish to ascer- tain what we may call the true income of capital contained in it, we must deduct a certain proportion for the running costs of upkeep, and for the rebuilding of the house at such time as it falls into decay. Net interest, on the other hand, is just this true income of capital which appears after these heterogeneous elements are deducted from gross interest It is the explanation of Net interest with which the theory of interest naturally has to do. Next, a distinction must be drawn between Natural interest and Contract or Loan interest. In the hands of one who employs capital in production, the utility of his capital appears in the fact that the total product obtained by the assistance of the capital possesses, as a rule, a higher value than the total cost of the goods expended in the course of produc- 1 Kapitdlzins. The word ' ' Interest " in English does not require any addition. W. S. 8 THE PROBLEM OF INTEREST INTROD. tion. The excess of value constitutes the Profit of capital, or, as we shall call it, Natural interest. The owner of capital, however, frequently prefers to give up the chance of obtaining this natural interest, and to hand over the temporary use of the capital to another man against a fixed compensation. This compensation bears different names in common speech. It is called Hire, and sometimes Rent (in German Miethzins and Pachtzins) when the capital handed over consists of durable or lasting goods. It is generally called Interest when the capital consists of perishable or fungible goods. 1 All these kinds of compensation, however, may be appropriately grouped under the name of Contract interest or Loan interest. While, however, the conception of Loan interest is ex- ceedingly simple, that of Natural interest requires more close definition. It may with reason appear questionable if the entire profit realised by an undertaker from a process of pro- duction should be put to the account of his capital. 2 Un- doubtedly it should not be so where the undertaker has at the same time occupied the position of a worker in his own undertaking. Here there is no doubt that one part of the " profit " is simply the undertaker's wage for the work he has done. But even where he does not personally take part in the carrying out of the production, he yet contributes a certain amount of personal trouble in the shape of intellectual super- intendence say, in planning the business, or, at the least, in the act of will by which he devotes his means of pro- duction to a definite undertaking. The question now is whether, 1 "Es heisst Mieth-oder Pachtzins, wenn das liberlassene Kapital aus dauerbaren Giitern bestand. Es heisst Zinsen oder Interessen, wenn das Kapital aus verbrauchlichen oder vertretbaren Giitern bestand." I have translated the passage to suit our English usage of the words. The adjective " vertretbar " (for which the legal "fungible" is the only equivalent) indicates that the thing lent is not itself given back, but another of the same kind. Grain and money are the typical fungibles. W. S. 8 I think it advisable to translate Untcrnehmer and Uitiernelimung throughout by Undertaker and Undertaking. Rowland Hill, when he adapted Greensleaves to a psalm, said he did not see why the devil should have all the good tunes. Neither, in my opinion, should our science any longer deny itself these useful words, introduced by Adam Smith himself, simply because they are usually con- fined with us to one special branch of industry. W. S. INTROD. DEFINITIONS 9 in view of this, we should not distinguish two quotas in the total sum of profit realised *by the undertaking ; one quota to be considered as result of the capital contributed, a second quota to be considered as result of the undertaker's exertion. On this point opinions are divided. Most economists draw some such distinction. From the total profit obtained by the productive undertaking they regard one part as profit of capital, another as undertaker's profit. Of course it cannot be determined with mathematical exactitude, in each individual case, how much has been contributed to the making of the total profit by the objective factor, the capital, and how much by the personal factor, the undertaker's activity. Nevertheless we borrow a scale from outside, and divide off the two shares arithmetically. We find what in other circumstances a capital of definite amount generally yields. That is shown most simply by the usual rate of interest obtainable for a perfectly safe loan of capital. Then, of the total profit from the under- taking, that amount which would be enough to pay the usual rate of interest on the capital invested in it, is put down to capital, while the remainder is put to the account of the undertaker's activity as the profit of undertaking. For instance, if an undertaking in which a capital of 100, 000 is invested yields an annual profit of 9000, and if the cus- tomary rate of interest is 5 per cent, then 5000 will be considered as profit on capital, and the remaining 4000 as undertaker's profit. On the other hand, there are many, especially among the younger economists, who hold that such a division is inadmis- sible, and that the so-called undertaker's profit is homogeneous with the profit on capital. 1 This discussion forms the subject of an independent problem of no little difficulty the problem of Undertaker's Profit. The difficulties, however, which surround our special subject, the problem of interest, are so considerable that I do not feel it my duty to add to them by taking up another. I purposely refrain then from entering on any investigation, or giving any decision as to the problem of undertaker's profit. I shall only treat that as interest which 1 On the whole question see Pierstorff, Die Lchrc vom Untcrnchmergeunnn Berlin, 1875. 10 THE PROBLEM OF INTEREST INTROD. everybody recognises to be interest that is to say, the whole of contract interest, 1 and, of the " natural " profit of under- taking only so much as represents the rate of interest usually obtainable for capital employed in undertaking. The question whether the so-called undertaker's profit is a profit on capital or not I purposely leave open. Happily the circumstances are such that I can do so without prejudice to our investiga- tion ; for at the worst it is just those phenomena which we all recognise as interest that constitute the great majority, and contain the characteristic substance of the general interest problem. Thus we can investigate with certainty into the nature and origin of the phenomenon of interest without requir- ing to decide beforehand on the exact boundary-line between the two profits. I need scarcely say that, in these scanty remarks, I do not suppose myself to have given an exhaustive, or even a perfectly correct statement of the principles of the theory of capital. All that I have attempted to do is to lay down as briefly as possible a useful and certain terminology, on the basis of which we may have a common understanding in the critical and historical part of this work. 1 Of course only so far as it is net interest. BOOK I THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PKOBLEM CHAPTER I THE OPPOSITION TO INTEREST IN CLASSICAL AND MEDLEVAL TIMES IT has often been remarked that not only does our knowledge of interesting subjects gradually develop, but also our curiosity regarding these subjects. It is very rarely indeed that, when a phenomenon first attracts attention, it is seen in its full ex- tent, with all its constituent and peculiar details, and is then made the subject of one comprehensive inquiry. Much more frequently is it the case that attention is first attracted by some particularly striking instance, and it is only gradually that the less striking phenomena come to be recognised as belonging to the same group, and are included in the compass of the growing problem. This has been the case with the phenomenon of interest, i It first became the object of question only in the form of I Loan interest, and for full two thousand years the nature of I loan interest had been discussed and theorised on, before any one thought it necessary to put the other question which first gave the problem of interest its complete and proper range the question of the why and whence of Natural interest. It is quite intelligible why this should be so. What specially challenges attention about interest is that it has its source and spring, not in labour, but, as it were, in some bounteous mother-wealth. In loan interest, and specially in loan interest derived from sums of money that are by nature barren, this characteristic is so peculiarly noticeable that it must excite question even where no close attention has been given it. Natural interest, on the other hand, if not obtained 14 THE OPPOSITION TO INTEREST BOOK i through the labour, is certainly obtained under co-operation with the labour of the capitalist-undertaker ; and to superficial con- sideration labour and co-operation with labour are too easily confounded, or, at any rate, not kept sufficiently distinct. Thus we fail to recognise that there is in natural interest, as well as in loan interest, the strange element of acquisition of wealth without labour. Before this could be recognised, and thus before the interest problem could attain its proper compass, it was necessary that capital itself, and its employment in economic life, should take a much wider development, and that there should be some beginning of systematic investigation into the sources of this income. And this investigation could not be one that was content to point out the obvious and striking forms of the phenomenon, but one that would cast light on its more homely forms. But these conditions were only fulfilled some thousands of years after men had first expressed their wonder at loan interest " born of barren money." The history of the interest problem, therefore, begins with a very long period in which loan interest, or usury, alone is the subject of investigation. This period begins deep in ancient times, and reaches down to the eighteenth century of our era. It is occupied with the contention of two opposing doctrines : the elder of the two is hostile to interest; the later defends it. The course of the quarrel belongs to the history of civil- isation ; it is deeply interesting in itself, and has besides had an influence of the deepest importance. on the practical develop- ment of economic and legal life, of which we may see many traces even in our own day. But as regards the development of the theoretical interest problem, the whole period, notwith- standing ij:s length, and notwithstanding the great number of writers who flourished during it, is rather barren. Men were fighting, as we shall see, not for the centre of the problem, but for an outpost of it which, from a theoretical standpoint, was of comparatively subordinate importance. Theory was too much the bond servant of practice. People were concerned less to investigate the nature of loan interest for its own sake than to find in theory something that would help them to an opinion on the good or evil of interest, and would give that opinion a firm root in religious, moral, or economical grounds. Since, moreover, the most active time of the controversy coincided CHAP, i DISLIKE OF LOAN INTEREST 15 with the active time of scholasticism, it may be guessed that the knowledge of the nature of the subject by no means ran parallel with the number of the arguments and counter-argu- ments that were urged. I shall therefore not waste many words in describing these earliest phases in the development of our problem, and this all the more readily that there are already several treatises, and some of them excellent ones, relating to that period. In them the reader will find much more detail than need be introduced for our purpose, or would even be appropriate here. 1 We begin, then, with some account of the hostility to loan interest. Eoscher has well remarked that on the lower stages of economical development there regularly appears a lively dis- like to the taking of interest. Credit has still little place in production. Almost all loans are loans for consumption, and are, as a rule, loans to people in distress. The creditor is usually rich, the debtor poor ; and the former appears in the hateful light of a man who squeezes something from the little of the poor, in the shape of interest, to add it to his own superfluous wealth. It is not to be wondered at, then, that both the ancient world and the Christian Middle Ages were exceedingly unfavourable to usury ; for the ancient world, in spite of some few economical flights, had never developed very much of a credit system, and the Middle Ages, after the decay of the Eoman culture, found themselves, in industry as in so 1 From the abundant literature that treats of interest and usury in ancient times, may be specially mentioned the following : Bbhmer, Jus Ecclesiasticum Protestantium, Halle, 1736, vol. v. tit. 19. Rizy, Ueber Zinstaxen und Wuchergesetze, Vienna, 1859. "Wiskemann, Darstcllung der in Deutschland zur Zcit der Reformation herr- schenden national -okonomischcn Ansichten (Prize Essays of the Fiirstliche Jablonowski'sche Gesellschaft, vol. x. Leipzig, 1861). Laspeyres, Geschichte der volkioirthschaftlichen Ansichten der Niederldnder (vol. xi. of same Prize Essays, Leipzig, 1863). Neumann, Geschichte des Wvdiers in Dewtschland, Halle, 1865. Funk, Zins und Wucher, Tubingen, 1868. Knies, Der Kredit, part i., Berlin, 1876, p. 328, etc. Above all, the works of Endemann on the canon doctrine of economics, Die national -okonomischen Grunds'dtze der kanonistischen Lchre, Jena, 1863, and his Stvdien in der romanisch- kanonistischen Wirthschafts-und Rechtslehre, vol. i. Berlin, 1874 ; voL ii. 1883. 16 THE OPPOSITION TO INTEREST BOOK i many other things, thrown back to the circumstances of primi- tive times. In both periods this dislike has left documentary record. The hostile expressions of the ancient world are not few in number, but they are of trifling importance as regards development of theory. They consist partly of a number of legislative acts forbidding the taking of interest, some of them reaching back to a very early date, 1 partly of more or less incidental utterances of philosophic or philosophising writers. The legal prohibitions of interest may, of course, be taken as evidence of a strong and widespread conviction of the evils connected with its practice. But it can scarcely be said that they were founded on any distinct theory ; at any rate no such theory has been handed down to us. The philosophic writers, again like Plato, Aristotle, the two Catos, Cicero, Seneca, Plautus, and others usually touch on the subject too cursorily to give any foundation in theory for their unfavourable judgment. Moreover, the context often makes it doubtful whether they object to interest as such, or only to an excess of it ; and, in the former case, whether their objection is on the ground of a peculiar blot inherent in interest itself, or only because it usually favours the riches they despise. 2 1 E.g. the prohibition of interest by the Mosaic Code, which, however, only forbade lending at interest between Jews, not lending by Jews to strangers, Exodus xxii. 25 ; Leviticus xxv. 35-37 ; Deuteronomy xxiii. 19, 20. In Rome, after the Twelve Tables had permitted an Unciarum Foenus, the taking of interest between Roman citizens was entirely forbidden by the Lex Genucia, B.C. 322. Later, by the Lex Sempronia and the Lex Gabinia, the prohibition was extended to Socii and to those doing business with provincials. See also Knies, Der Kredit, part i. p. 328, etc., and the writers quoted there. 2 I may append some of the passages oftenest referred to. Plato in the Laws, p. 742, says : " No one shall deposit money with another whom he does not trust as a friend, nor shall he lend money upon interest." Aristotle, Nicho- machean Ethics, iv. 1 : " Such are all they who ply illiberal trades ; as those, for instance, who keep houses of ill-fame, and all persons of that class ; and usurers who lend out small sums at exorbitant rates : for all these take from improper sources, and take more than they ought." Cicero, De Officiis, ii. at end: " Ex quo genere comparationis illud est Catonis senis : a quo cum quaereretur, quid maxime in re familiari expediret, respondit, bene pascere. Quid secundum ? Satis bene pascere. Quid tertium ? Male pascere. Quid quartum ? Arare. . . . Et, cum ille, qui quaesierat, dixisset^ quid foenerari ? Turn Cato, quid hominem, inquit, occidere?" Cato, De Re Rustica : "Majores nostri sic habuerunt et ita in legibus posuerunt, furem dupli condemnare, foeneratorem quadrupli. Quanto pejorem civem existimarunt foeneratorem quam furem, hinc licet CHAP. I ARISTOTLE 17 One passage in ancient literature has, in my opinion, a direct value for the history of theory, inasmuch as it allows us to infer what really was the opinion of its author on the economic nature of interest ; that is, the often quoted passage in the first book of Aristotle's Politics. He there says : " Of the two sorts of money-making one, as I have just said, is a part of household management, the other is retail trade : the former necessary and honourable, the latter a kind of exchange which is justly censured ; for it is unnatural, and a / mode by which men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural use of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. And this term Usury (TOKO?), which means the birth of money from money, is applied to the breeding of money, because the offspring resembles the parent. W T herefore of all modes of making money this is the most unnatural " (Jowett's Translation, p. 19). What this positively amounts to may be summed up thus : money is by nature incapable of bearing fruit ; the lender's I gain therefore cannot come from the peculiar power of the / money ; it can only come from a defrauding of the borrower \ (err' d\\q\a)v eVru>). Interest is therefore a gain got by ; abuse and injustice. That the writers of old pagan times did not go more deeply into the question admits of a very simple explanation. The question was no longer a practical one. In course of time the authority of the state had become reconciled to the taking of interest. In Attica interest had for long been free from legal restriction. The universal empire of Rome, without formally rescinding those severe laws which entirely forbade the taking of interest, had first condoned, then formally sanc- tioned it by the institution of legal rates. 1 The fact was that existimarL" Plautus, Jlostellaria, Act iii scene 1 : "Videturne obsecro hercle idoneus, Danista qui sit? genus quod improbissimum est. . . . Nullnm edepol hodie genus est hominum tetrius, nee minus bono cum jure quam Danisticum." Seneca, De Benefidis, vii. 10 : "Quid enim ista sunt, quid foenus et calendarium et usura, nisi humanae cupiditatis extra naturam quaesita nomina ? . . . quid sunt istae tabellae, quid computationes, et venale tempus et sanguinolentae ceutesimae ? voluntaria mala ex constitution nostra pendentia, in quibus nihil est, quod snbici ocnlis, quod teneri manu possit, mania avaritiae somnia." 1 See also Knies, Der Kredit, L p. 330, etc. C vV <4>- THE OPPOSITION TO INTEREST BOOK i economical relations had become too complicated to find suffi- cient scope under a system naturally so limited as that of gratuitous credit. Merchants and practical men were, without exception, steadily on the side of interest. In such circum- stances, to write in favour of it was superfluous, to write against it was hopeless ; and it is a most significant indication of this state of matters that almost the only quarter in which interest was still censured and that in a resigned kind of way was in the works of the philosophical writers. The writers of the Christian Middle Ages had more occasion to treat the subject thoroughly. The dark days which preceded and followed the break up of the Roman Empire had brought a reaction in economical matters, which, in its turn, had the natural result of strengthening the old hostile feeling against interest. The peculiar spirit of Christianity worked in the same direction. The exploitation of poor debtors by rich creditors must have appeared in a peculiarly hateful light to one whose religion taught him to look upon gentleness and charity as among the greatest virtues, and to think littlf of the goods of this world. l>ut what had most influence was that, in the sacred writings of the New Testament, were found certain passages which, as usually interpreted, seemed to contain a direct divine prohibi- tion of the taking of interest. This was particularly true of the famous passage in Luke : " Lend, hoping for nothing again." l The powerful support which the spirit of the time, already hostile to interest, thus found in the express utterance of divine authority, gave it the po\ver once more to draw legislation to its side. The Christian Church lent its arm. Step by step it managed to introduce the prohibition into legislation. First the taking of interest was forbidden by the Church, and to the clergy only. Then it was forbidden the laity also, but still the prohibition only came from the Church. At last even the temporal legislation succumbed to the Church's influence, and gave its severe statutes the sanction of Roman law. 2 1 Luke vi. 35. On the true sense of this passage see Knies as before, p. 333, etc. - On the spn-ad of the prohibition of interest see Endemaun, National- i-/.-iniontl:}ic (rmiuhatee, p. 3, etc. ; Sfwtifti in der romanisch-kanonistischcn W irthsclutfts-und llr.chtsh-ln-c, p. 10, etc. CHAP, i REACTION FROM AUTHORITY 19 For fifteen hundred years this turn of affairs gave abundant support to those writers who were hostile to interest. The old pagan philosophers could fling their denunciations on the world without much proving, because they were neither inclined nor able to give them practical effect. As a " Platonic " utterance of the idealists their criticism had not sufficient weight in the world of practice to be either seriously opposed or seriously defended. But now the matter had again become practical. Once the Word of God was made victorious on earth, a hostility im- mediately showed itself, against which the righteousness of the new laws had to be defended. This task naturally fell to the theological and legal literature of the Church, and thus began a literary movement on the subject of loan interest which accompanied the canonist prohibition from its earliest rise far into the eighteenth century. About the twelfth century of our era is observable a note- worthy departure in the character of this literature. Before that century the controversy is mainly confined to the theo- logians, and even the way in which it is treated is essentially theological To prove the unrighteousness of loan interest appeal is made to God and His revelation, to passages of Holy Writ, to the commandments concerning charity, righteous- ness, and so on ; only rarely, and then in the most general terms, to legal and economical considerations. It is the fathers of the Church who express themselves most thoroughly on the subject, although even their treatment can scarcely be called thorough. 1 After the twelfth century, however, the discussion is con- ducted on a gradually broadening economic basis. To proofs from Eevelation are added appeals to the authority of revered fathers of the Church, to canonists and philosophers even pagan philosophers, to old and new laws, to deductions from the jus divinum, the jus humanum, and what is particularly important for us as touching the economic side of the matter to deductions from the jus naturcd.e. And now the lawyers begin to take a more active part in the movement alongside the theologians first the canon lawyers and then the legists. The very ample and careful attention which these writers gave to the subject is chiefly due to the fact that the prohi- 1 See below. 20 THE OPPOSITION TO INTEREST BOOK i bition of interest pressed more hardly as time went on, and required to be more strongly defended against the reaction of the trade it oppressed. The prohibition had originally been imposed in economical circumstances of such a nature that it was easily borne. Moreover, during its first hundred years the prohibition had so little command of external force, that where practical life felt itself hampered by the restraint it could disregard it without much danger. But later, as industiy and commerce grew, their increasing necessity for credit must have made the hampering effects of the prohibition increasingly vexatious. At the same time the prohibition became more felt as it extended to wider circles, and as its transgression was punished more severely. Thus it was inevitable that its collisions with the economical world should become much more numerous and much more serious. Its most natural ally, public opinion, which had originally given it the fullest support, began to withdraw from it. There was urgent need of assist- ance from theory, and this assistance was readily obtained from the growing science. 1 Of the two phases of the canonist writings on this subject, the first is almost without value for the history of theory. Its theologising and moralising do little more than simply express abhorrence of the taking of interest and appeal to authorities. 2 Of greater importance is the second phase, although neither as regards the number of its writers nor the very 1 See Endemann, Studien, pp. 11-13, 15, etc. 2 To give the reader some idea of the tone which the fathers of the Church adopted in dealing with the subject I append some of their most quoted passages. Lactantius, book vi. Divin. Inst. chap, xviii. says of a just man : " Pecuniae, si quam crediderit, non accipiet usuram : ut et beneficium sit incolume quod succurat necessitati, et abstineat se prorsus alieno in hoc enim genere officii debet suo esse contentus, quam oporteat alias ne proprio quidem parcere, ut bonum faciat. Plus autem accipere, quam dederit, injustum est. Quod qui facit, insidiatur quodam modo, ut ex alterius necessitate praedetur. " Ambrosius, De Bono Mortis, chap. xii. : "Si quis usuram acciperit, rapinam facit, vita non vivit." The same De Tobia, chap. iii. : "Taliasunt vestra, divites ! beneficia. Minus datis, il plus exigitis. Talis humanitas, ut spolietis etiam dum subvenitis. Foecundus vobis etiam pauper est ad quaestum. Usurarius est egenus, cogentibus nobis, habet quod reddat : quod impendat non habet. " So also chap. xiv. : "Ideo audiant quid lex dicat : Neque usuram, inquit, escarum accipies, neque omnium rerum." Chrysostom on Matthew xvii. Homily 56 : " Noli mihi dicere, quaeso, quid gaudet et gratiam habet, quod sibi foenore pecuniam colloces : id enim crudelitate tua coactus fecit. " Augustine on Psalm CHAP, i REACTION FROM AUTHORITY 21 imposing array of arguments they introduced. 1 For what originally emanated from the few was soon slavishly repeated by the many, and the stock of arguments collected by the earlier writers soon passed to the later as an heirloom that was above argument. But the greater number of these argu- ments are merely appeals to authority, or they are of a moral- ising character, or they are of no force whatever. Only a comparatively small number of them mostly deductions from the jus naturale can lay claim to any theoretical interest. If, even of these arguments, many should appear to a reader of to-day little calculated to convince anybody, it should not be forgotten that at that time it was not their office to con- vince. What man had to believe already stood fixed and fast. The all-efficient ground of conviction was the Word of God, which, as they understood it, had condemned interest. The rational arguments which were found to agree with the divine prohibition were scarcely more than a kind of flying buttress, which could afford to be the slighter that it had not to carry the main burden of proof. 2 I shall very shortly state those rational arguments that have an interest for us, and verify them by one or two quotations from such writers as have given them clear and practical expression. First of all, we meet with Aristotle's argument of the barrenness of money ; only that the theoretically important point of interest being ? parasite on the produce of other people's industry, is more sharply brought out by the canonists. Thus Gonzalez Tellez 3 : " So then, as money breeds no money, it is contrary to nature to take anything beyond the sum lent, and it may with more propriety be said that it is taken from industry than from money, for money certainly does not breed, as Aristotle cxxviii. : "Audent etiam foeneratores dicere, non habeo aliud nnde vivam. Hoc mihi et latro diceret, deprehensus in fauce : hoc et effractor diceret . . . et leno . . . et maleficus." The same (quoted in the Dccret. Grat. chap. i. Causa xiv. quaest. 3) : "Si plus quam dedisti expectas accipere foeneratores, et in hoc improbandus, non laudandus." 1 Moliuaeus, in a work that appeared in 1546, mentions a writer who had shortly before collected no less than twenty -five arguments against interest (Tract. Contract. No. 528). " See Endemann, Grundsdtze, pp. 12, 18. 3 Gommentaria perpetua in singulos textits quinque librorum Decretalium Grcgorii IX. v. chap. iii. ; De Usuris, v. chap. xix. No. 7. 22 THE OPPOSITION TO INTEREST BOOK i has related." And in still plainer terms Covarruvias l : " The fourth ground is that money brings forth no fruit from itself, nor gives birth to anything. On this account it- is inadmissible and unfair to take anything over and above the lent sum for the use of the same, since this is not so much taken from money, which brings forth no fruit, as from the industry of another." The consumption of money and of other kinds of lent goods furnished a second " natural right " argument. This is very clearly and fully put by Thomas Aquinas. He contends that there are certain things the use of which consists in the consumption of the articles themselves, such as grain and wine. On that account the use of these things cannot be sep- arated from the articles themselves, and if the use be transferred to any one the article itself must necessarily be transferred with it. When an article of this sort then is lent the property in it will always be transferred. Now it would evidently be unjust if a man should sell wine, and yet separate therefrom the use of the wine. In so doing he would either sell the same article twice, or he would sell something which did not exist. Exactly in the same way is it unjust for a man to lend things of this sort at interest. Here also he asks two prices for one article; he asks for replacement of a similar article and he asks a price for the use of the article, which we call interest or usury. Now as the use of money lies in its con- sumption or in its spending, it is inadmissible in itself, on the same grounds, to ask a price for the use of money. 2 According to this reasoning interest appears as a price filched or extorted for a thing that does not really exist, the separate and in- dependent " use " of consumable goods. A similar conclusion is arrived at by a third argument that recurs over and over again in stereotyped form. The goods lent pass over into the property of the debtor. There- fore the use of the goods for which the lender is paid interest is the use of another person's goods, and from that the lender 1 Variorum Rcsolutionum, Hi. chap. i. No. 5. 2 Summa totius Theologiae, ii. chap. ii. quaest. 78, art. 1. Similarly Covar- ruvias : " Accipere lucrum aliquod pro usu ipsius rei, et demum rem ipsam, iniquum est et prava commutatio, cum id quod non est pretio vendatur . . . aut enim creditor capit lucrum istud pro sorte, ergo bis capit ejus aestimationem, vel capit injustum sortis valorem. Si pro usu rei, is non potent seorsum a sorte aestimari, et sic bis sors ipsa venditur." CHAP. I THE FOUR CANON ARGUMENTS 23 cannot draw a profit without injustice. Thus Gonzalez Tellez : " For the creditor who makes a profit out of a thing belonging to another person enriches himself at the hurt of another." And still more sharply Vaconius Vacuna l : " Therefore he who gets fruit from that money, whether it be pieces of money or anything else, gets it from a thing which does not belong to him, and it is accordingly all the same as if he were to steal it." Lastly, in a very strange argument, first, I believe, incor- porated by Thomas Aquinas in the canonists' repertoire, interest is looked upon as the hypocritical and underhand price asked for a good common to all -namely, time. The usurers who receive more, by the amount of their interest, than they have given, seek a pretext to make the prohibited business appear a fair one. This pretext is offered them by time. They would have time recognised as the equivalent for which they receive the surplus income formed by the interest. That this is their intention is -evident from the fact that they raise or reduce their claim of interest according as the time for which a loan is given is long or short. But time is a common good that belongs to no one in particular, but is given to all equally by God. When, therefore, the usurer would charge a price for time, as though it were a good received from him, he defrauds his neighbour, to whom the time he sells already belongs as much as it does to him, the seller, and he defrauds God, for whose free gift he demands a price. 2 To sum up. In the eyes of the canonists loan interest is simply an income which the lender draws by fraud or force from the resources of the borrower. The lender is paid in interest for fruits which barren money cannot bear. He sells a " use " which does not exist, or a use which already belongs to the borrower. And finally, he sells time, which belongs to the borrower just as much as it does to the lender and to all men. In short, regard it as we may, interest always appears as a parasitic profit, extorted or filched from the defrauded borrower. This judgment was not applied to the interest that accrues from the lending of durable goods, such as houses, furniture, 1 Lib. i. Nov. Dcclar. Jus. Civ. chap. xiv. quoted in Bbhmer's Jus Eccles. Prot. Halle, 1736, p. 340. a Thomas Aquiuas, De Usuris, i. chap. iv. 24 THE OPPOSITION TO INTEREST BOOK i etc. Just as little did it affect the natural profit acquired by personal exertions. That this natural profit might be an income distinct from that due to the undertaker for his labour, was but little noticed, especially at the beginning of the period ; and, so far as it was noticed, little thought was given to it. At any rate the principle of this kind of profit was not chal- lenged. Thus, e.g. the canonist Zabarella l deplores the existence of loan interest on this ground among others, that the agri- culturists, looking for a " more certain " profit, would be tempted to put their money out at interest rather than employ it in production, and thus the food of the people would suffer, a line of thought which evidently sees nothing objectionable in the investment of capital in agriculture, and the profit drawn from that It was not even considered necessary that the owner of capital should employ it personally, if only he did not let the ownership of it out of his hands. Thus profit made from a sleeping partnership was, at least, not forbidden. 2 And the case where one entrusts another with a sum of money, but retains the ownership of it, is decided by the stern Thomas Aquinas in the words : that such an one may unhesitatingly appropriate the profit resulting from the sum of money. He need not want for a just title to it, " for he, as it were, receives the fruit of his own estate" not, as the holy Thomas carefully adds, a fruit that springs directly from the coins, but a fruit that springs from those things that have been obtained in just exchange for the coins. 3 Where, as not seldom occurs notwithstanding this, exception is taken to profit obtained by personal exertions, the exception is not so much to the profit as such, as to some concrete and objectionable manner of getting it : as, e.g. by business conducted in an avaricious or quite fraudulent way, or by forbidden traffic in money, and such like. 1 Secundo (usura est prohibits) ex fame, nam laborantes rustic! praedia colentes libentius ponerent pecuniam ad usuras, quam in laboratione, cum sit tutius lucrum, et sic non curarent homines seminare seu metere." See Endemann, Na- tional'Skonomische Grundsdize, p. 20. 2 Endemann, Studien, i. p. 361. * De Usuris, ii. chap. iv. qn. 1. CHAPTER II THE DEFENCE OF INTEREST FROM THE SIXTEENTH TILL THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY THE canon doctrine of interest had to all appearance reached its zenith sometime during the thirteenth century. Its prin- ciples held almost undisputed sway in legislation, temporal as well as spiritual Pope Clement V, at the Council of Vienna in 1311, could go so far as to threaten with excommuni- cation those secular magistrates who passed laws favourable to interest, or who did not repeal such laws, where already passed, within three months. 1 Nor were the laws inspired by the canon doctrine content with opposing interest in its naked and undisguised form ; by the aid of much ingenious casuistry they had even taken measures to prosecute it under many of the disguises by which the prohibition had been evaded. 2 Finally, literature no less than legislation fell under the sway of the canon doctrine, and for centuries not a trace of opposition to the principle of the prohibition dared show itself. There was only one opponent that the canon doctrine had never been entirely able to subdue, the economic practice of the people. In face of all the threatened penalties of earth and heaven, interest continued to be offered and taken ; parlly without disguise, partly under the manifold forms which the inventive spirit of the business classes had devised, and by which they slipped through the meshes of the prohibitionist la >vs in spite of all their casuistry. And the more flourishing the economical 1 Clem. c. un. de Jsuris, 6. 5. * See Endemann, Gr^ndsatzc, pp. 9, 21. 26 THE DEFENCE OF INTEREST BOOK i condition of a country the stronger was the reaction of practice against the dominant theory. In this battle victory remained with the more stubborn party, and that party was the one whose very existence was endangered by the prohibition. One of its first results, not marked by much outward circumstance, but actually of great importance, was obtained even when the canon doctrine was still, to all appearance, at the height of its authority. Too weak to hazard open war against the principle of prohibition, the business world yet managed to prevent its strict and complete legal enforcement, and to establish a number of exceptions some direct and some indirect. The following, among others, may be regarded as direct exceptions : the privileges of the Mons de Piete, the tolera- tion of other kinds of banks, and the very extensive indulgence shown to the usury practices of the Jews an indulgence which, here and there, was extended, at least by secular legislation, into a formal legal permission. 1 Of indirect exceptions there were : the buying of annuities, the taking of land in mortgage for lent money, the use of bills of exchange, partnership arrangements, and above all, the possi- bility of getting compensation from the borrower in the shape of intcresse on the deferred payment (damnum etnergetis ct hicrum cessans). Independent of this, the lender had had a claim to compensation in the shape of interessc, but only in the case of a culpable neglect (technically called mora) on the part of the borrower to fulfil his contract obligations ; and the existence and amount of the interesse had to be authen- ticated in each case. But now a step farther in this direction was taken, although under protest of the strict canonists, by the introduction of two contract clauses. Under one clause the borrower agreed beforehand that the lender should be released from the obligation of authenticating the borrower's mora ; and under the other a definite rate of interessc was agreed on in advance. Practically it came to this, that the loan was given nominally without interest, but that the creditor 1 The opinion very commonly held that the Jews were generally exempted from the Church's prohibition of interest is pronounced erroneous by the late and very complete work of Endemann (Studien, ii. p. 383, etc.) CHAP, ii COMPROMISE 27 actually received, under the name of interessc, a regular per- centage for the whole period of the loan, the borrower by a fiction being put in mora for that period. 1 Practical results like these had in the long run their effect on principles. To the observer of men and things it must in time have become questionable whether the obstinate and always increasing resistance of practical life really had its root, as the canonists affirmed, only in human wickedness and hardness of heart. Those who took the trouble to go more deeply into the techni- calities of business life must have seen that practice not only would not, but could not dispense with interest ; that interest being the soul of credit, where credit exists to any considerable extent interest cannot be prevented ; and that to suppress it would be to suppress nine-tenths of credit transactions. They must have seen, in a word, that, even in a half-developed system of economy, interest is an organic necessity. It was inevitable that the recognition of such facts that had for long been commonplaces among practical men, should in the end force its way into literary circles. The effects which it there exerted were various. One party remained unshaken in their theoretical convic- tion that loan interest was a parasitic profit, admitting of no defence before any strict tribunal; but they consented to a practical compromise with the imperfection of man, on which they laid the blame of its obstinate vitality. From the standpoint of an ideal order of society, interest could not be permitted, but men being so imperfect, it cannot conveniently be eradicated, and so it were better to allow it within certain limits. This was the view taken, among others, by several of the great reformers, e.g. as Zwingli, 2 by Luther in his later days (although earlier he had been a relentless enemy of usury), 3 and, with still greater reserve, by Melanchthon. 4 It had naturally a great effect on public opinion, and indirectly also on the later development of law, that such 1 Endemann, Stitdien, ii. pp. 243, 366. 2 Wiskemann, Darstellung dcr in Deutschland zur Zeit dcr Reformation hcrrschendcn national -bkonomischen Ansichten (Prize Essays of the Jablonow- ski'sche Society, vol. x. p. 71). 3 Wiskemann, p. 54. Neumann, Ocschichtc des Wuclwrs, p. 480, etc. 4 Wiskemann, p. 65. 28 THE DEFENCE OF INTEREST BOOK i influential men as these declared for tolerance in the matter. However, as they were guided in their conduct not by prin- ciples, but altogether by motives of expediency, their views have no deeper importance in the history of theory, and we need not pursue them farther. Another party of thinking and observing men went farther. Convinced by experience of the necessity of loan interest, they began to re-examine the theoretical foundations of the prohibi- tion, and finding that these would not bear investigation, they commenced to write in opposition to the canon doctrine, basing their opposition on principles. This movement becomes observ- able about the middle of the sixteenth century, gathers impetus and power in the course of the seventeenth, and towards its end obtains so distinct an ascendency that during the next hundred years it has only to do battle with a few isolated writers who still represent the canon doctrine. And towards the end of the eighteenth century if any one had professed to defend that doctrine with the old specific arguments, he would have been thought too eccentric to be taken seriously. The first combatants of the new schdol were the reformer Calvin and the French jurist Dumoulin (Carolus Molinaeus). Calvin has defined his attitude towards our question in a letter to his friend Oekolampadius. 1 In this letter he does not treat it comprehensively, but he is very decided. At the outset he rejects the usual authoritative foundation for the prohibition, and tries to show that, of the writings adduced in its support, some are to be understood in a different sense, and some have lost their validity through entire change of circumstances. 2 The proof from authority being thus disposed of, Calvin turns to the rational arguments usually given for the prohi- bition. Its strongest argument, that of the barrenness of money (pecunia non parit pecuniani), he finds of " little weight." It is with money as it is with a house or a field. The roof and walls of a house cannot, properly speaking, beget money, but when the use of the house is exchanged for money a legitimate 1 Ep. 383, in the collection of his letters and answers, Hanover, 1597. 2 "Ac primum nullo testimonio Scripturae mihi constat usuras omnino dam- natas esse. Ilia enim Christ! sententia qr,ae maxime obvia et aperta haberi solet : Mutuum dato uihil inde sperantes, male hue detorta est. . . . Lex vero Mosis politica cum sit, non tenemvir ilia ultra quam aequitas ferat atque humanitas. Nostra conjunctio hodie per omnia non respondet. ..." CHAP, ii CALVIN 29 money gain may be drawn from the house In the same way money can be made fruitful. When land is purchased for money, it is quite correct to think of the money as producing other sums of money in the shape of the yearly revenues from the land. Unemployed money is certainly barren, but the borrower does not let it lie unemployed. The borrower there- fore is not defrauded in having to pay interest. He pays it ex proventu, out of the gain that he makes with the money. But Calvin would have the whole question judged in a reasonable spirit, and he shows, by the following example, how the lender's claim of interest may, from this point of view, be well grounded. A rich man who has plenty of landed property and general income, but little ready money, applies for a money loan to one who is not so wealthy, but happens to have a great command over ready money. The lender could with the money purchase land for himself, or he could request that the land bought with his money be hypothecated to him till the debt is wiped out. If, instead of doing so, he contents himself with the interest, the fruit of the money, how should this be blameworthy when the much harder bargain is regarded as fair ? As Calvin vigorously expresses it, that were a childish game to play with God, " Et quid aliud est quam puerorum instar ludere cum Deo, cum de rebus ex verbis nudis, ac non ex eo quod inest in re ipsa judicatur." He concludes then that the taking of interest cannot be universally condemned. But neither is it to be universally permitted, but only so far as it does not run counter to fairness and charity. In carrying out this principle he lays down a number of exceptions in which interest is not to be allowed. The most noteworthy of these are : that no interest should be asked from men who are in urgent need ; that due considera- tion should be paid to the "poor brethren"; that the "welfare of the state " should be considered ; and that the maximum rate of interest established by the laws should in no case be exceeded. As Calvin is the first theologian, so Molinaeus is the first jurist to oppose the canon prohibition on theoretical grounds. Both writers agree in their principles, but the way in which they state them differs as widely as do their callings. Calvin 30 THE DEFENCE OF INTEREST BOOK i goes shortly and directly at what to him is the heart of the matter, without troubling himself to refute secondary objections. Thus he gets his convictions more from impressions he receives than from logical argument. Molinaeus, on the other hand, is inexhaustible in distinctions and casuistry. He is indefati- gable in pursuing his opponents in all their scholastic turnings and twistings, and takes the most elaborate pains to confute them formally and point by point. Moreover, although more cautious in expression than the impetuous Calvin, he is quite as frank, pithy, and straightforward. The principal deliverance of Molinaeus on the subject is the Tractatus Contraduum et Usurarutn redituumque pecunia Constitutorum, 1 published in 1546. The first part of it has a great resemblance, perhaps accidental, to Calvin's line of argument. After a few introductory definitions, he turns to the examination of the jus divinum, and finds that the relevant pas- sages of Holy Writ are misinterpreted. They are not intended to forbid the taking of interest in general, but only such interest as violates the laws of charity and brotherly lova And then he also introduces the effective illustration used by Calvin of the rich man who purchases land with borrowed money. 2 But further on the reasoning is much fuller than that of Calvin. He points out conclusively (No. 75) that in almost every loan there is an " interesse " of the creditor some injury caused or some use foregone, the compensation for which is just and economically necessary. This compensation is interest or usura, in the right and proper sense of the word. The laws of Justinian which allow interest, and only limit its amount, are consequently not to be considered unjust, but actually in the interest of the borrower, inasmuch as the payment of a moderate interest gives him the chance of making a greater profit (No. 76). Later (No. 528) Molinaeus passes under review the chief arguments of the canonists against interest, and completely refutes them by a running commentary. To the old objection of Thomas Aquinas, that the lender who takes interest either sells the same thing twice, or sells 1 Previous to this, in the same year, was published the Extricatio Labyrinihi dc co qiuxl Intei-cst, in which the question of interesse was freely handled, but no definite side taken on the interest question. See Endemann, Studicn, i. p. 63. a Tractatus, No. 10. CHAP, n MOLINAEUS 31 something that has no existence at all (vide p. 22), Molinaeus answers that the use of money is a thing independent of the capital sum, and consequently may be sold independently. We must not regard the first immediate spending of the money as its use : the use that follows the use of those goods that a man has acquired by means of the loaned money, or has got command over is also its use (Nos. 510, 530). If, further, it be maintained that, along with the money itself, its use also has passed over into the legal property of the borrower, and that lie therefore is paying in interest for his own property, Molinaeus answers (No. 530) that one is quite justified in selling another man's property if it be a debt due him, and that this is exactly the case with loans : " Usus pecuniae mi hi pure a te debitae est mihi pure a te debitus, ergo vel tibi vendere possum." Finally, to the argument of the natural barrenness of money Moliuaeus replies (No. 530) that the everyday experience of business life shows that the use of any considerable sum of money yields a service of no trifling importance, and that this service, even in legal language, is designated as the " fruit " of v money. To argue that money of itself can bring forth no fruit is not to the point, for even land brings forth nothing of itself without expense, exertion, and human industry. And quite in the same way does money when assisted by human effort bring forth notable fruits. The rest of the polemic against the canonists has little theoretical interest. On the basis of this comprehensive consideration of the sub- ject, Molinaeus ends by formulating his thesis (No. 535) : First of all, it is necessary and useful that a certain practice of taking interest be retained and permitted. The contrary opinion, that interest in itself is absolutely objectionable, is foolish, pernicious, and superstitious (Stulta ilia ct non minus perniciosa quam supcr- stitiosa opinio de usura dc se absoluta mala} (No. 534). In these words Molinaeus sets himself in the most direct opposition to the Church's doctrine. To modify them in some degree as a Catholic might be compelled to do from other considerations he makes certain practical concessions, without, however, yielding anything in principle. The most important of these is that, on grounds of expediency, and on account of prevailing abuses, he acquiesces for the present in the Church's 32 THE DEFENCE OF INTEREST BOOK i prohibition of interest pure and simple in the shape of un- disguised usury, wishing to retain only the milder and more humane form of annuities, which, however, he rightly looks on as a " true species of usury business." 1 The deliverances of Calvin and Molinaeus remained for a long time quite by themselves, and the reason of this is easily understood. To pronounce that to be right which the Church, the law, and the learned world had condemned with one voice, and opposed with arguments drawn from all sources, required not only a rare independence of intellect, but a rare strength of character which did not shrink from suspicion and persecution. The fate of the leaders in this movement showed clearly enough that there was cause for fear. Not to mention Calvin, who, indeed, had given the Catholic world quite other causes of offence, Molinaeus had much to suffer; he himself was exiled, and his book, carefully and moderately as it was written, was put on the Index. Nevertheless the book made its way, was read, repeated, and published again and again, and so scattered a seed destined to bear fruit in the end. 2 Passing over the immediate disciples of Calvin, who naturally agreed with the views of their master, there were few writers in the sixteenth century who ventured to argue in favour of interest on economical grounds. Among them may be specially mentioned the humanist Camerarius, 3 Bornitz, 4 and above all, Besold. Besold argues fully and ably against the canon doctrine in the dissertations entitled Questiones Aliquot de Usuris, (1598), the work with which he began his very prolific career 1 " Ea taxatio " (the fixing of a maximum rate which was attached to the principle of the permission of interest in Justinian's Code) "nunquam in se fuit iniqua. Sed ut tempore suo summa et absoluta, ita processu temporis propter abusum hominum nimis in quibusdam dissoluta et vaga inventa est, et omnino super foenore negociativo forma juris civilis incommoda et perniciosa debitoribus apparuit. Unde merito abrogata fuit, et alia tutior et commodior forma inventa, videlicet per abalienationem sortis, servata debitori libera facilitate luendi. Et haec forma nova, ut mitior et civilior, ita minus habet de ratione foenoris, propter alienationem sortis, quam forma juris civilis. Est tamen foenus large sumptum, et vera species negociationis foenoratoriae. . . ." (No. 536) 2 Endemann, Studien, i. p. 64, etc. Endemann, however, underrates the influence that Molinaeus had on the later development. See below. 3 In his notes on Aristotle's Politics ; see Roscher, Geschichte der National- Oekonomik in Deutschland, p. 54. 4 Roscher, ibid. p. 188. CHAP, ii BESOLD 33 as a writer. 1 He finds the origin of interest in the institutions of trade and commerce, in which money ceases to be barren. And as every man must be allowed to pursue his own advantage, so far as that is possible without injury to others, natural justice is not opposed to the taking of interest. Like Molinaeus, whom he often quotes with approval, he adduces on its behalf the analogy between the loan against interest and the hire against payment. The loan at interest stands to the loan not at interest in the same relation as the hire against payment which is perfectly allowable to the Leihe, where no payment is required (commodatum). He points out very well that the height of loan interest must at all times correspond with the height of natural interest, the latter indeed being the ground and source of the former ; and he maintains that, where, owing to the use of money, the current rate of profit is higher, a higher limit, of loan interest should be allowed (p. 32). Finally, he is as little impressed by the passages in Holy Writ which have been interpreted as forbidding interest (p. 38, etc.) as by the arguments of the " philosophers," considering these arguments very weak if one looks at the matter from the proper standpoint (p. 32). From this short abstract it will be seen that Betfold is a frank and able follower of Molinaeus. From Molinaeus indeed, as the numerous quotations show, he has taken the better part of his doctrine. 2 But it would be difficult to find in his writ- ings any advance on that author. 3 This is still more true of the great English philosopher Bacon, who wrote on the subject almost contemporaneously with Besold, He is not misled by the old ideas of the " unnaturalness " of interest. He has enough intellectual 1 Besold resumed the discussion later, in an enlarged and improved form, as he says, in another work, Vitae et Mortis Consideratio Politico, (1623), in which it occupies the fifth chapter of the first book. I had only this latter work at my disposal, and the quotations in the text are taken from it. 2 There is a long quotation even in the first chapter of the first book (p. 6). In the fifth chapter the quotations are numerous. 3 I think Roscher (Geschichte der National -Oekonomik, p. 201) does Besold too much honour when, in comparing him with Salmasius and Hugo Grotius, he gives him the honourable position of a forerunner on whom Salmasius has scarcely improved, and to whom Grotius is even inferior. Instead of Besold, who drew at second hand, Reseller should have named Molinaeus. Besold is not more original than Salmasius, and certainly less adroit and ingenious. D 34 THE DEFENCE OF INTEREST BOOK i freedom and apprehension of the needs of economic life to weigh impartially its advantages and disadvantages, and to pronounce interest an economical necessity. But nevertheless he gives it sufferance only on the ground of expediency. " Since of necessity men must give and take money on loan, and since they are so hard of heart (sintque tarn duro corde) that they will n r t *end it otherwise, there is nothing for it but that interest should be permitted." l In the course of the seventeenth century the new doctrine made great strides, particularly in the Netherlands. There the conditions were peculiarly favourable to its further development. During the political and religious troubles among which the young free state was born, men had learned to emancipate themselves from the shackles of a slavish following of authority. It happened too that the decaying theory of the fathers of the Church and of the scholastics nowhere came into sharper conflict with the needs of actual life than in the Netherlands, where a highly developed economy had created for itself a complete system of credit and banking ; where, consequently, transactions involving interest were common and regular; and where, moreover, temporal legislation, yielding to the pressure of practice, had long allowed the taking of interest. 2 In such circumstances a theory which pronounced interest to be a godless defrauding of the debtor was unnatural, and its continuance for any length of time was an impossibility. Hugo Grotius may be regarded as forerunner of the change. His attitude towards our subject is peculiarly nondescript. On the one hand, he clearly recognises that it is not possible to base the prohibition theoretically in natural right, as the canonists had done. He sees no force in the argument of the barrenness of money, for " houses also, and other things barren by nature, the skill of man has made productive." To the argument that the use of money, consisting as it does in being spent, cannot be separated from money itself, and therefore cannot be paid for independently, he finds an apt rejoinder ; and, speaking generally, the arguments which represent interest as contrary to natural right appear to him "not of a kind to compel 1 Sermones Fideles, cap. xxxix. (1597) - See Grotius, DC Jure Pacis ac Belli, book ii. chap. xii. p. 22. CHAP, ii GROTIUS, SALMASIUS 35 assent" (non talia ut a-ssensum cxtorqucanf). But, on the other hand, he considers the passages in Holy Writ forbidding interest to be undoubtedly binding. So that in his con- clusions he remains in principle at least on the side of the canonists. Practically he does resile from the principle of prohibition by allowing and approving of many kinds of com- pensation for loss, for renunciation of profit, for lender's trouble and risk, describing these as " of the nature of interest." l Thus Grotius takes a hesitating middle course between the old and the new doctrine. 2 Undecided views like these were speedily left behind. In a few years more others openly threw overboard not only the rational basis of the prohibition as he had done, but the prohibition itself. The decisive point was reached shortly before the year 1640. As if the barriers of long restraint had all been torn down in one day, a perfect flood of writings broke out in which interest was defended with the utmost vigour, and the flood did not fall till the prin- ciple of interest, in the Netherlands at least, had con- quered. In this abundant literature the first place, both in time and rank, was taken by the celebrated Claudius Salmasius. Of his writings, which from 1638 followed each other at short intervals, the most important are : De Usuris, 1638; De Modo Usurarum, 1639; De Foenore Trapezitico, 1640. To these may be added some shorter controversial writings that appeared under the pseudonym of Alexius a Massalia : Diatriba de Mutuo : mutuum esse alienationem, 1640. 3 These writings almost by 1 De Jure Pacis ac Belli, book ii. cap. xii. pp. 20, 21. 2 Thus it is not possible to regard Grotius as a pioneer of the new theory. This view, held among others by Neumann, Geschichtc dcs IVuchcrs in Deutschland, p. 499, and by Laspeyres, Geschichtc, pp. 10 and 257, is authorita- tively corrected by Endemann, Studien, I. p. 66, etc. 3 The list of writings in which our extremely prolific author expatiates on the subject of interest is by no means exhausted by the works mentioned in the text. There is, e.g. a Disquisitio de Mutuo, qua probatur non esse aliena- tioucm, of the year 1645, whose author signs with the initials S. D. B., a signature which points, as does the whole style of writing, to Salmasius (Dijonicus Burgundus). There is besides in the same year an anonymous writing, also undoubtedly traceable to Salmasius, Confutatio Diairibae de Mutuo tribus disputationibus xcittilatae, auctorc et preside Jo. Jacobo Visscmbachio, etc. Those named in the text, however, were the first to break ground. 36 THE DEFENCE OF INTEREST BOOK i themselves determined the direction and substance of the theory of interest for more than a hundred years, and even in the doctrine of to-day, as we shall see, we may recognise many of their after-effects. His doctrine therefore deserves a thorough consideration. The views of Salmasius on interest are put together most concisely and suggestively in the eighth chapter of his book De Usuris. He begins by giving his own theory. Interest is a payment for the use of sums of money lent. Lending belongs to that class of legal transactions in which the use of a thing is made over by its owner to another person. In the case where the article in question is not perishable, if the use that is transferred is not to be paid for, the legal transaction is a Commodatum : if it is to be paid for, the transaction is a Locatio or Conductio. In the case where the article in question is a perishable or a fungible thing, if the use is not to be paid for, it is a loan bearing no interest (mutuum) : if to be paid for, it is a loan at interest (foenus). The interest- bearing loan accordingly stands to the loan which bears no interest in exactly the same relation as the Locatio to the Commodatum, and is just as legitimate as it. 1 The only conceivable ground for judging differently about the allowableness of payment in the case of the Commodatum (where a non-perishable good, as a book or a slave, is lent) as compared with the Mutuum (where a fungible good, like corn or money, is lent) might be the different nature of the " use " in the two cases. In the circumstances of the latter where a perishable or fungible good is trans- ferred the use consists in one complete consumption ; and it might be objected that, in such a case the use of a thing could not be separated from the thing itself. But to this Salmasius answers : (1) Such an argument would lead as well to the condemning and abolition of the loan bearing no interest, inasmuch as it is impossible, in the case of a perishable thing, to transfer a " use," whose existence is denied, 1 "Quae res facit ex commodato locatum, eadem praestat, ut pro mutuo sit foenus, nempe merces. Qui earn in commodato probant, cur in mutuo improbent, nescio, nee ullam hujus diversitatis rationem video. Locatio aedium, vestis animalis, servi, agri, operae, opens, licita erit ; non erit foeneratio quae proprie locatio est pecuniae, tritici, hordei, vini, et aliarum hujusmodi specierum frugumque tarn arentium quam humidarum ? " CHAP, ii S ALMAS f US 37 even if no interest is asked for it. (2) On the contrary, the perishableness of loaned goods constitutes another reason why the loan should be paid. For in the case of the hire (locatio) the lender can take back his property at any moment, because he remains the owner of it. In the case of the loan he cannot do so, because his property is destroyed in the consumption. Consequently the lender of money suffers delays, anxieties, and losses, and by reason of these the claim of the loan to payment is even more consistent with fairness than that of the Commodatum. After thus stating his own position Salmasius devotes himself to refuting the arguments of his opponents point by point. As we read these refutations we begin to understand how Salmasius so brilliantly succeeded where Molinaeus a hundred years before had failed, in convincing his contem- poraries. They are extremely effective pieces of writing, indeed gems of sparkling polemic. The materials for them were, of course, in great part provided by his predecessors, principally by Molinaeus ; l but the happy manner in which Salmasius employs these materials, and the many pithy sallies with which he enriches them, places his polemic far above anything that had gone before. It may not be unwelcome to some of my readers to have 1 To prove the relation in which Salmasius stands to Molinaeus, it may not be superfluous, considering the explicit statement of Endemann (Studien, i. p. 65) that Salmasius does not quote Molinaeus, to establish the fact that such quotations do exist in considerable number. The list of authors appended to the works of Salmasius shows three quotations from Molinaeus for the book De Usuris, twelve for the De Mode Usurarum, and one for the DC Foenore Trapezitico. These quotations are principally taken from Molinaeus's chief work on the subject, the Contractus Contractuum et Usurarum. One of them (De Usuris, p. 21) refers directly to a passage which stands in the middle of the most pertinent of his writings ( Tractatus, No. 529. Nos. 528, etc., contain the statement and refutation of the arguments of the ancient philosophy and of the canonists against interest). There can, therefore, be no doubt that Salmasius accurately knew the writings of Molinaeus, and it is just as much beyond doubt as indeed his sub- stantial agreement would lead us to suspect that he has drawn from them. In the Confutatio Diatribae mentioned above (p. 36) it is said in one place (p. 290) that Salmasius at the time when, under the pseudonym of Alexis a Massalia, he wrote the Diatriba de Mutuo, was not acquainted with the similar writings of Molinaeus in his Tractatus de Usuris. But this expression must only relate to his ignorance of those quite special passages in which Molinaeus denies the nature of the loan as an alienation, or else, if what I have said be true, it is simple incorrect. 33 THE DEFENCE OF INTEREST BOOK i a few complete examples of Salmasius's style. They will serve to give a more accurate idea of the spirit in which people were accustomed to deal with our problem in the seventeenth century, and far into the eighteenth, and to make the reader better acquainted with a writer whom nowadays many quote, but few read. I therefore give below in his own words one or two passages from the polemic. 1 What follows has less bearing on the history of theory. First comes a long-winded, and, it must be confessed, for all its subtlety a very lame attempt to prove that in the loan there is no alienation of the thing lent a subject to which also the whole Diatriba de Mutuo is devoted. Then follows the reply to some of the arguments based by the canonists on fairness and expediency ; such as, that it is unfair to the borrower, who assumes the risk of the principal sum lent him, to burden 1 Salmasius begins with the argument of the improper double claim for one commodity. His opponents had contended that whatever was taken over and above the principal sum lent could only be taken either for the use of a thing which was already consumed that is for nothing at all or for the principal sum itself, in which case the same thing was sold twice. To this replies Salmasius : "Quae ridicula sunt, et nul'o negotio difflari possunt. Non enim pro sorte usnra exigitur, sed pro usu s by gradually widening circles of economists, and worked out by them with greater care ; in course of which it became divided into several branches marked by considerable divergence. Although attacked in many ways, chiefly from the socialist side, the Productivity theory has managed to hold its own. Indeed, at the present time the majority of such writers as are not entirely opposed to interest, acquiesce in one or other modification of this theory. The idea that capital produces its own interest, whether true or false, seems at least to be clear and simple. It might be expected, therefore, that the theories built on this funda- mental idea would be marked by a peculiar definiteness and transparency in their arguments. In this expectation, how- ever, we should be completely disappointed. Unhappily the most important conceptions connected with the Productivity theories suffer in an unusual degree from indistinctness and ambiguity; and this has been the abundant source of obscurity, - mistakes, confusion, and fallacious conclusions of every kind. These occur so frequently that it would be unwise to let the reader meet them without some preparation. Once embarked on a sea of individual statements, it would be impossible to find our reckoning. It seems then necessary to mark out distinctly, in a few introductory remarks, the ground we mean to cover in stating and criticising these theories. 112 THE PRODUCTIVE POWER OF CAPITAL BOOK n Two things here seem to stand particularly in need of clear statement. First, the meaning, or, more properly, the complex of meanings of the expression Productivity or Produc- tive Power of capital ; and second, the nature of the theoretic task assigned by these theories to this productivity. First, What is meant by saying, Capital is productive ? In its most common and weakest sense the expression may be taken to mean no more than this, that capital serves towards the production of goods, in opposition to the im- mediate satisfaction of needs. The predicate "productive," then, would only be applied to capital in the same sense as, in the usual classification of goods, we speak of " productive goods," in opposition to "goods for immediate consumption" (Genussgiiter). Indeed the smallest degree of productive effect would warrant the conferring of that predicate, even if the product should not attain to the value of the capital expended in making it. It is clear from the first that a pro- ductive power in this sense cannot possibly be the sufficient cause of interest. The adherents of those theories, then, must ascribe a stronger meaning to the term. Expressly or tacitly they understand it as meaning that, by the aid of capital, more is produced ; that capital is the cause of a particular productive surplus result. But this meaning also is subdivided. The words "to produce more" or "a productive surplus result" may mean one of two things. They may either mean that capital pro- duces more goods or more value, and these are in no way identical. To keep the two as distinct in name as they are in fact, I shall designate the capacity of capital to produce more goods as its " Physical Productivity " ; its capacity to pro- duce more value as its " Value Productivity." It is perhaps not unnecessary to say that, at the present stage, I leave it q\iite an open question whether capital actually possesses such capacities or not. I only mention the different meanings which may be given, and have been given, to the proposition " capital is productive." Physical productivity manifests itself in an increased quantity of products, or, it may be, in an improved quality of products. We may illustrate it by the well-known example CHAP, i CAPITAL IS PRODUCTIVE 113 given by Roscher: "Suppose a nation of fisher-folk, with, no private ownership in land and no capital, dweDing naked in caves, and living on fish caught by the hand in pools left by the ebbing tide. All the workers here may be supposed equal, and each man catches and eats three fish per day. But now one prudent man limits his consumption to two fish per day for 100 days, lays up in this way a stock of 100 fish, and makes use of this stock to enable him to apply his whole labour-power to the making of a boat and net. By the aid of this capital he catches from the first perhaps thirty fish a day." l Here the Physical Productivity of capital is manifested in the fact that the fisher, by the aid of capital, catches more fish than he would otherwise have caught thirty instead of three. Or, to put it quite correctly, a number somewhat under thirty. For the thirty fish which are now caught in a day are the result of more than one day's work. To calculate properly, we must add to the labour of catching fish a quota of the labour that was given to the making of boat and net. If, e.g. fifty days of labour have been required to make the boat and net, and the boat and net last for 100 days, then the 3000 fish which are caught in the 100 days appear as the result of 150 days' labour. The surplus of products, then, due to the employment of capital is represented for the whole period by 3000 -(150x3) = 3000 450 = 2550 fish, and for each single day by ^f^f 3 = 17 fish. In this surplus of products is manifested the physical productivity of capital. Now how would the Value Productivity of capital be manifested ? The expression " to produce more value," in its turn, is ambiguous, because the " more " may be measured by various standards. It may mean that, by the aid of capital, an amount of value is produced which is greater than the amount of value that could be produced without the aid of capital. To use our illustration : it may mean that the twenty fish caught in a day's labour by the aid of capital are of more value than the three fish which were got when no capital was employed. But the expression may also mean that, by the aid of capital, an amount of value is produced 1 Grundlagen der National- Oekonomie, tenth edition, 189. I 114 THE PRODU'CTIVE POWER OF CAPITAL BOOK n which is greater than the value of the capital itself ; in other words, that the capital gives a productive return greater than its own value, so that there remains a. surplus value over and above the value of the capital consumed in the production. To put it in terms of our illustration : the fisher equipped with boat and net in 100 days catches 2700 fish more than he would have caught without boat and net. These 2700 fish, consequently, are shown to be the (gross) return to the employment of capital. And, according to the present reading of the expression, these 2700 fish are of more value than the boat and net themselves ; so that after boat and net are worn out there still remains a surplus of value. Of these two possible meanings those writers who ascribe value productivity to capital have usually the latter in their mind. When, therefore, I use the expression "value produc- tivity" without any qualification, I shall mean by it the capacity of capital to produce a surplus of value over its own value. Thus for the apparently simple proposition that " capital is productive" we have found no less than four meanings clearly distinguishable from each other. To get a satisfactory conspectus let me place them once more in order. The proposition may signify four things : 1. Capital has the capacity of serving towards the pro- duction of goods. 2. Capital has the power of serving towards the production of more goods than could be produced without it. 3. Capital has the power of serving towards the production of more value than could be produced without it. 4. Capital has the power of producing more value than it has in itself. 1 1 It would be very easy to extend the above list. Thus physical produc- tivity might be shown to contain two varieties. The first, the only one con- sidered in the text, is where the capitalist process of production on the whole (that is, the preparatory production of the capital itself, and the production by the aid of the capital when made) has led to the production of more goods. But it may also happen that the first phase of the total process, the formation of capital, shows so large a deficit that the total capitalist production ends by showing no surplus ; while, all the same, the second phase taken by itself, the production by aid of the capital, produces a surplus in goods. Suppose, c. g. that the boat and net which last 100 days had required 2000 days for their production, then the fisher would receive for the use of boat and net which have cost in all CHAP, i CAPITAL IS PRODUCTIVE 115 It does not require to be said in so many words that ideas so different, even if they should chance to be called by the same name, should not be identified, still less substituted for one another in the course of argument. It should be self- evident, e.g. that, if one has proved that, speaking generally, capital has a capacity to serve towards the production of goods, or towards the production of more goods, he is not on that account warranted in holding it as proved that there is a power in capital to produce more value than could have been produced otherwise, or to .produce more value than the capital itself has. To substitute the latter conception for the former in the course of argument would evidently have the character of begging the question. However unnecessary this reminder should be, it must be given ; because, as we shall see, among the Productivity theorists nothing is more common than the arbitrary confusing of these conceptions. To come now to the second point, of which at this introductory stage I am very anxious to give a clear state- ment, the nature of the task assigned to the productive power of capital by the theories in question. This task may be very simply described in the words ; the Productivity theories propose to explain interest by the productive power of capital. But in these simple words lie many meanings which deserve more exact consideration. The subject of explanation is Interest on capital. Since there is no question that contract interest (loan interest) is founded in essential respects on natural interest, and can be easily dealt with in a secondary explanation, if this natural 2100 days of labour, only 100x30 = 3000 fish, while with the hand alone he could have caught in the same time 2100 x 30 = 6300 fish. On the other hand, if we look at the second phase by itself, then the capital, now in existence, of course shows itself " productive" ; with its help in 300 days the fisher catches 3000 fish ; without its help, only 300. If, on that account, we speak, even in this case, of a productive surplus result, and of a productive power of capital as, in fact, we usually do it is not without justification ; only the expression has quite a different and a much weaker meaning. Further, with the recognition of the productive power of capital is often bound up the additional meaning, that capital is an independent productive power ; not only the proximate cause of a productive effect, traceable in the last resort to the labour which produced the capital, but an element entirely independent of labour. . . . I have intentionally not gone into these varieties in the text, as I do not wish to burden the reader with distinctions of which, in the meantime at least, I do not intend to make any use. 116 THE PRODUCTIVE POWER OF CAPITAL BOOK n interest first be satisfactorily explained, the subject of explana- tion may be further limited to Natural Interest on capital The facts about natural interest may be shortly described as follows. Wherever capital is employed in production, experience shows that, in the normal course of things, the return, or share in the return, which the capital creates for its owner, has a greater value than the sum of the objects of capital consumed in obtaining it. This phenomenon appears both in those comparatively rare cases where capital alone has been concerned in the obtaining of a return, as, e.g. when new wine, by lying in store, becomes changed into matured and better wine, and in the much more common cases where capital co-operates with other factors of production, land and labour. For sufficient reasons that do not concern us here, men engaged in economic pursuits are accustomed to divide out the total product into separate shares, although it is made by undivided co-operation. To capital is ascribed one share as, its specific return; one share to nature as produce of the> ground, produce of mines, etc. ; one share, finally, to the labour that co-operates, as product of labour. 1 Now experience shows that that quota of the total product which falls to the share of capital that is, the gross return to capital is, as a rule, of more value than the capital expended in its attainment. Hence an excess of value a " surplus value " which remains in the hands of the owner of the capital, and constitutes Jiis natural interest. The theorist, then, who professes to explain interest must explain the emergence of Surplus Value. The problem, more 1 Whether the shares allotted, in practical economic life, to tho individual factors in production exactly correspond to the quota which each of them has produced in the total production, is a much disputed question that I cannot prejudge meantime. I hare, on that account, chosen to use in the text modes of expression that do not commit me to any view. Moreover it is to be noted that the phenomenon of surplus value takes place, not only between individual shares in the return as thus allotted, and the sources of return that correspond to them, but also, on the whole, between the goods brought forward and the goods that bring them forward. The totality of the means of production em- ployed in- making a product labour, capital, and use of land has, as a rule, a smaller exchange value than the product has when finished a circumstance that makes it difficult to trace the phenomenon of "surplus value" to mere relations of allotment inside the return. CHAP, i SURPLUS VALUE 117 exactly stated, will therefore run thus : Why is the gross return to capital invariably of more value than the portions of capital consumed in its attainment ? Or, in other words, Why is there a constant difference in value between the capital expended and its return ? l To take a step farther. This difference in value the Productivity theories think to explain, and ought to explain, by the productive power of capital. By the word " explain " I mean that they must show the productive power of capital to be the entirely sufficient cause of surplus value, and not merely name it as one condition among other unexplained conditions. To show that, without the productive power of capital, there could be no surplus value, does not explain surplus value any more than it would explain land-rent if we showed that, without the fruitfulness of the soil, there could be no land -rent; or than it would explain rain if we showed that water could not fall to the ground without the action of gravity. If surplus value is to be explained by the productive power of capital, it is necessary to prove or show in capital a productive power of such a kind that it is capable, either by itself or in conjunction with other factors (in which latter case the other factors must equally be included in the ex- planation), of being the entirely sufficient cause of the exist- ence of surplus value. It is conceivable that this condition might be fulfilled in any of three ways. 1. If it were proved or made evident that capital possesses in itself a power which directly makes for the creating of value, a power through which capital is. able, as it were, to breathe value like an economic soul into those goods which it assists, physically speaking, to make. This :s value productivity in the most literal and emphatic sense that could possibly be given it. 2. If it were proved or made evident that capital by its services helps towards the obtaining of more goods, or more useful goods; and if, at the same time, it was immediately evident that the more goods, or the better goods, must also be 1 On the putting of the problem see my Rcchte und Verhaltnisse, Innsbruck, 1881, p. 107, etc. 113 THE PRODUCTIVE POWER OF CAPITAL BOOK n of more value than the capital consumed in their production. This is physical productivity with surplus value as a self- explanatory result. 3. If it were proved or shown that capital by its services helps towards the obtaining of more goods, or more useful goods ; and if, at the same time, it were expressly proved that the more goods, or the better goods, must also be of more value than the capital consumed in their production, and why they should be of more value. This is physical productivity with surplus value expressly accounted for. These are, in my opinion, the only modes in which the productive power of capital can be taken as sufficient foundation for surplus value. Any appeal to that productive power outside these three modes can, in the nature of the case, have no explanatory force whatever. If, e.g. appeal is made to the physical productivity of capital, but if it is neither shown to be self-evident, nor expressly proved, that a surplus value accompanies the increased amount of goods, such a pro- ductive power would evidently not be an adequate cause of surplus value. The historical development of the actual productivity theories is not behind the above abstract schem'e of possible productivity theories in point of variety. Each of the possible types of explanation has found its representative in economical history. The great internal differences that exist between separate typical developments strongly suggest that, for pur- poses of statement and criticism, we should arrange the pro- ductivity theories in groups. The grouping will be based on our scheme, but will not follow it quite closely. Those productivity theories which follow the first two types have so much in common that they may conveniently be treated together ; while, within the third type, we find such important differences that a further division seems to be required. 1. Those productivity theories which claim for capital a direct value-producing power (first type), as well as those which start from the physical productivity of capital, but believe that the phenomenon of surplus value is self- evidently and neces- sarily bound up with it (second type), agree in this, that they derive surplus value immediately, and without explanatory middle term, from the asserted productive power. They CHAP, i THREE ACTUAL THEORIES 119 simply state that capital is productive ; adding, perhaps, a very superficial description of its productive efficiency, and hastily conclude by placing surplus value to the account of the asserted productive power. I shall group these together under the name of the Naive Productivity theories. The paucity of argument, which is one of their characteristics, is in many cases such that it is not even clear whether the author belongs to the first or the second type one more reason for grouping tendencies that merge into one another under one historical consideration. 2. Those theories which take their starting-point in the physical productivity of capital, but do not regard it as self- evident that quantity of products should be bound up with surplus in value, and accordingly consider it necessary to pursue their explanation into the sphere of value, I shall call the Indirect Productivity theories. They are distinguished by the fact that, to the assertion and illustration of the pro- ductive power of capital, they add a more or less successful line of argument to prove that this productive power must lead (and why it must lead) to the existence of a surplus value which falls to the capitalist. 3. From these latter, finally, branches off a group of theories which, like the others, connect themselves with physical productivity, but lay the emphasis of their explana- tion on the independent existence, efficiency, and sacrifice of the uses of capital. These I shall call the Use theories. In the productive power of capital they do certainly see a condition of surplus value, but not the principal cause of its existence. As then they do not altogether merit the name of productivity theories, I prefer to treat them separately, and devote to them a separate chapter. CHAPTER II THE NAIVE PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES THE founder of the Naive Productivity theories is J. B. Say. It is one of the most unsatisfactory parts of our task to state what are Say's views on the origin of interest. He is a master of polished and rounded sentences, and understands very well how to give all the appearance of clearness to his thoughts. But, as a matter of fact, he entirely fails to give definite and sharp expression to these thoughts, and the scattered observations which contain his interest theory exhibit, unfortunately, no trifling amount of contradiction. After careful consideration it seems to me impossible to interpret these observations as the outcome of one theory, which the writer had in his mind. Say hesitates between two theories ; he makes neither of them particularly clear ; but all the same the two are distinguishable. One of them is essentially a Naive Productivity theory ; the other contains the first germs of the Use theories. Thus, notwithstanding the obscurity of his views, Say takes a prominent position in the history of interest theories. He forms a kind of node from which spring two of the most important theoretical branches of our subject. Of Say's two chief works, the TraiU d' Economic Politique 1 and the Cours Complet d' Economic Politique Pratique, 2 it is on the former that we must rely almost exclusively for a statement of his views. The Cours Complet avoids suggestive expressions almost entirely. According to Say all goods come into existence through the co-operation of three factors nature (agents naturels), 1 Published 1803. I quote from the seventh edition, Paris. Guillaumin and Co., 1861. 2 Paris, 1828-29. CHAP, ii /. B. SA Y 1*21 capital, and human labour power (faeultt industri&lle). These factors appear as the productive funds from which all the wealth of a nation springs, and constitute its fortune} Goods, however, do not come into existence directly from these funds. Each fund produces, first of all, productive services, and from these services come the actual products. The productive services consist in an activity (action) or labour (travail) of the fund. The industrial fund renders its services through the labour of the producing man ; nature renders hers through the activity of natural powers, the work of the soil, the air, the water, the sun, etc. 2 But when we come to the productive services of capital, and ask how they are to be represented, the answer is less distinctly given. On one occasion in the Traitthe says vaguely enough : " It (capital) must, so to speak, work along with human activity, and it is this co-operation that I call the productive service of capital." 3 He promises, at the same time, to give a more exact exposi- tion later on of the productive working of capital, but in fulfilling this promise he limits himself to describing the transformations which capital undergoes in production. 4 Nor does the Cours Complet give any satisfactory idea of the labour of capital. It simply says, capital is set to work when one employs it in productive operations (On fait travailler un capital lorsqu'un I'emploie dans des operations productifs), i. p. 239. We learn only indirectly, from the comparisons he is continually drawing, that Say thinks of the labour of capital as being entirely of the same nature as the labour of man and of natural powers. We shall soon see the evil results of the vague manner in which Say applies the ambiguous word " service " to the co-operation of capital. There are certain natural agents that do not become private property, and these render their productive services gratuitously the sea, wind, physical and chemical changes of matter, etc. The services of the other factors human labour-power, capital, and appropriated natural agents (especially land) must be purchased from the persons who own them. The payment comes out of the value of the goods produced by these services, and this value is divided out among all those who have 1 Cours, i. p. 234, etc. 2 TraiU, p. 68, etc. Book i. iii. p. 67. 4 Book i. chap. x. 122 THE NAIVE PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n co-operated in its production by contributing tbe productive services of their respective funds. The proportion in which this value is divided out is determined entirely by the relation of the supply of and demand for the several kinds of services. The function of distributing is performed by the undertaker, who buys the services necessary to the production, and pays for them according to the state of the market. In this way the ' productive services receive a value, and this value is to be clearly distinguished from the value of the fund itself out of which they come. 1 Now these services form the true income (rdvenu) of their owners. They are what a fund actually yields to its owner. If he sells them, or, by way of production, changes them into products, it is only a change of form undergone by the income. But all income is of three kinds, corresponding to the triplicity of the productive services; it is partly income of labour, (profit de Vindiistrie), partly land-rent (profit du fonds de terre), partly profit on capital (profit or rtfvenu du capital). Between all three branches of income the analogy is as com- plete as it is between the different categories of productive service. 2 Each represents the price of a productive service, which the undertaker uses to create a product. In this Say has given a very plausible explanation of profit. Capital renders productive services ; the owner must be paid for these; the payment is profit. This plausibility is still further heightened by Say's favourite method of sup- porting his argument by the obvious comparison of interest with wage. Capital works just as man does ; its labour must receive its reward just as man's labour does ; interest on capital is a faithful copy of wages for labour. When we go deeper, however, the difficulties begin, and also the contradictions. If the productive services of capital are to be paid by an amount of value taken out of the value of the product, it is above all necessary that there be an amount of value in the product available for that purpose. The question immediately forces itself on us and it is a question to which in any case the interest theory is bound to give a decisive answer Why is there always that amount of value ? To put it concretely, 1 Traitt, pp. 72, 343, etc. 2 Cours, iv. p. 64. CHAP, ii SAY 12 J Where capital has co-operated in the making of a product, why does that product normally possess so much value that, after the other co-operating productive services, labour and use of land, are paid for at the market price, there remains over enough value to pay for the services of capital enough, indeed, to pay these services in direct proportion to the amount and the duration of the employment of capital ? Suppose a commodity requires for its production labour and use of laud to the value of 100, and suppose that it takes so long to make the commodity that the capital advanced to purchase those services (in this case 100) is not re- placed for a year, why is the commodity worth, not 100, but more say 105 ? And suppose another commodity has cost exactly the same amount for labour and use of land, but takes twice as long to make, why is it worth, not 100, nor 105, but 110 that being the sum with which it is possible adequately to pay for the productive services of the 100 of capital over two years ? l It will be easily seen that this is a way of putting the question of surplus value accommodated to Say's theory, and that it goes to the very heart of the interest problem. So far as Say has yet gone, the real problem has not been even touched, and we have yet to find what his solution is. When we ask what ground Say gives for the existence of this surplus value, we find that he does not express himself with the distinctness one could wish. His remarks may be divided into two groups, pretty sharply opposed to each other. In one group Say ascribes to capital a direct power of .creating value ; value exists because capital has created it, and the productive services of capital are remunerated because the surplus value necessary for this purpose is created. Here, then, the payment for the productive services of capital is the result of the existence of surplus value. In the second group Say exactly transposes the causal relation, by representing the payment of the services of capital as the cause, as the reason for the existence of surplus value. Products have value because, and only Because, the owners of 1 In this illustration, besides the expenditure for labour and use of land, I do not introduce any separate expenditure for substance of capital consumed, because, according to Say, that entirely resolves itself into expenditure for elementary productive services. 124 THE NAIVE PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n the productive services irom which they come obtain payment ; and products have a value high enough to leave over a profit for capital, because the co-operation of capital is not to be had for nothing. Omitting the numerous passages where Say speaks in a general way of a facultt productive and a pouvoir productif of capital, there falls within the first group a controversial note in the fourth chapter of the first book of his Traitt (p. 71). He has been arguing against Adam Smith, who, he says, has mistaken the productive power of capital when he ascribes the value created by means of capital to the labour by which capital itself was originally produced. Take the case of an oil mill. " Smith is mistaken," he says. " The product of this preceding labour is, if you will, the value of the mill itself; but the value that is daily produced by the mill is another and a quite new value ; just in the same way as the rented use of a piece of ground is a separate value from that of the piece of ground itself, and is a value which may be consumed without diminishing the value of the ground." And then he goes on : " If capital had not in itself a pro- ductive power, independent of the labour that has created it, how could it be that a capital, to all eternity, produces an income independent of the profit of the industrial activity which employs it ? " Capital, therefore, creates value, and its capability of doing so is the cause of profit. Similarly in another place : " The capital employed pays the services rendered, and the services rendered produce the value which replaces the capital employed." * In the second group I place first an expression which does not indeed directly refer to profit, but must by analogy be applied to it. " Those natural powers," says Say, " which are susceptible of appropriation become productive funds of value because they do not give their co-operation without payment." 2 Further, he constantly makes the price of products depend on the height of the remuneration paid to the productive services which have co-operated in their making. " A product will therefore be dearer just in proportion as its production requires, not only more productive services, but productive services that are more highly compensated. . . . The more 1 Book ii. chap. viii. 2, p. 395, note 1. 2 Book i. chap. iv. at end. CHAP, ii SA Y 125 lively the need that the consumers feel for the enjoyment of the product, the more abuudait the means of payment they possess ; and the higher the compensation that the sellers are able to demand for the productive services, the higher will go the price." l Finally, there is a decided expression of opinion in the beginning of the eighth chapter of book ii. on the subject of profit. " The impossibility of obtaining a product without the co-operation of a capital compels the consumers to pay for that product a price sufficient to allow the undertaker, who takes on himself the work of producing, to buy the services of that necessary instrument." This is in direct contradiction to the passage first quoted, where the payment of the capitalist was explained by the existence of the surplus value " created," for here the existence of the surplus value is explained by the unavoidable payment of the capitalist. It is in harmony with this latter conception, too, that Say conceives of profit as a constituent of the costs of production. 2 Contradictions like these are the perfectly natural result of the uncertainty shown by Say in his whole theory of value. He falls into Adam Smith and Ricardo's theory of costs quite as often as he argues against it. It is very significant of this uncertainty that Say in the passages already quoted (Traite, pp. 315, 316) derives the value of products from the value of the services which produce them ; and at another time (Traite, p. 338) he does quite the opposite, in deriving the value of the productive funds from the value of the products which are obtained from them (Leur valevr dcs fonds productifs vient done dc la valeur du produit qui pent en sortir), an important passage to which we shall return later. What has been said is perhaps sufficient to show that no injustice is done to Say in assuming that he had not himself any clear view as to the ultimate ground of interest, but hesitated between two opinions. According to the one opinion interest comes into existence because capital produces it ; ac- cording to the other, because " productive services of capital " are a constituent of cost, and require compensation. Between the two views there is a strong and real antag- onism, stronger than one would perhaps think at first sight. 1 Book ii. chap. i. p. 315, etc. - Traite, p. 395. 126 THE NAIVE PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n The one treats the phenomenon of interest as above all a problem of production ; the other treats it as a problem of distribution. The one finishes its explanation by referring simply to a fact of production : capital produces surplus value, therefore there is surplus value, and there is no occasion for further question. The other theory only rests by the way on the co-operation of capital in production, which it of course presupposes. It finds its centre of gravity, however, in the social formations of value aud price. By his first view, Say stands in the rank of the pure Productivity theorists; by his second he opens the series of the very interesting and important Use theories. Following the plan of statement indicated, I pass over Say's Use theory in the meantime, to consider the development taken by the Naive Productivity theory after him. Of development in the strict sense of the word we need scarcely speak. The most conspicuous feature of the Naive Productivity theories is the silence in which they pass over the causal relation between the productive power of capital and its asserted effect, the " surplus value " of products. Thus there is no substance to develop, and the historical course of these theories, therefore, is nothing but a somewhat monotonous series of variations on the simple idea that capital produces surplus value. No true development is to be looked for till the succeeding stage that of the Indirect Productivity theories. The Naive Productivity theory has found most of its ad- herents in Germany, and a few in France and Italy. The English economists whose bent does not seem favourable, generally speaking, to the theory of productivity, and who, moreover, possessed an Indirect Productivity theory ever since the time of Lord Lauderdale, have entirely passed over the naive phase. In Germany Say's catchword, the productivity of capital, quickly won acceptance. Although, in the first instance, no systematic interest theory was founded on it, it soon became customary to recognise capital as a third and independent factor in production, alongside of nature and labour, and to put the three branches of income rent of land, wages of CHAP, ii SCHON, RIEDEL 127 labour, and interest on capital in explanatory connection with the three factors of production. A few writers who do so in an undecided kind of wayv and add ideas taken from theories which trace interest to a different origin, have been already mentioned in the chapter on the Colourless theories. But it was not long before Say's conception was applied with more definiteness to the explanation of interest. The first to do so was Schon. 1 The explanation he gives is very short. He first claims for capital, in fairly modest words, the character of being a "third and distinct source of wealth, although an indirect source" (p. 47). But at the same time he considers it proved and evident that capital must produce a "rent." For " the produce belongs originally to those who co-operated towards its making" (p. 82), and "it is clear that the national produce must set aside as many distinct rents as there are categories of productive powers and instruments" (p. 87). Any further proof is, very characteristically, not considered necessary. Even the opportunity he gets when attacking Adam Smith does not draw from him any more detailed reason- ing for his own view. He contents himself with blaming Adam Smith, in general terms, for only considering the im- mediate workers as taking part in production, and overlooking the productive character of capital and land an oversight which led him into the mistake of thinking that the rent of capital has its cause in a curtailment of the wages of labour (p. 85). Eiedel gives the new doctrine with more detail and with greater distinctness. 2 He devotes to its statement a special paragraph to which he gives the title " Productivity of Capital," and in the course of this he expresses himself as follows : " The productivity which capital when employed universally possesses is manifest on observation of the fact that material values which have been employed, with a view to production, in aiding nature and labour, are, as a rule, not only replaced, but assist towards a surplus of material values, which surplus could not be brought into existence without them. . . . The product of capital is to be regarded as that which in any case results from an employment of capital towards the origination of 1 Neue Untcrsiichung dcr National-Ockonomie, Stuttgart and Tubingen, 1835. 2 Nativnal-Oekonomie odcr Volkswirthschaft, 1838. 128 THE NAIVE PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n material values, after deduction of the value of that assistance which nature and labour afford to the employment of capital. . . . It is always incorrect to ascribe the product of capital to the working forces of nature or labour which the capital needs in order that it may be employed. Capital is an independent force, as nature and labour are, and in most cases does not need them more than they need it" (i. 366). It is very significant that in this passage Eiedel finds the productive power of capital "manifest on observation" of excess of value. In his view it is so self-evident that surplus value and productive power belong inseparably to each other, that from the fact of surplus value he argues back to the productive power of capital as its only conceivable cause. We need not, therefore, be surprised that Eiedel considers that the existence of natural interest is amply accounted for when he simply mentions the catchword, " productivity of capital," and does not give any accurate explanation of it. But the writer who has done more than any other to popularise the Productivity theory in Germany is Wilhelm Roscher. This distinguished economist, whose most signal merits do not, I admit, lie in the sphere of acute theoretical research, has unfortunately given but little care to the systematic working out of the doctrine of interest. This shows itself, even on the surface, in many remarkable misconceptions and incongruities. Thus in 179 of his great. work 1 he defines interest as the price of the uses of capital, although evidently this definition only applies to contract and not to " natural " interest, which latter, however, Eoscher in the same paragraph calls a kind of interest on capital. Thus also in 148 he explains that the original amount of all branches of income " evidently " determines the contract amount of the same ; therefore also the amount of the natural interest on capital determines the amount of the contract interest. Notwithstand- ing this, in 183, when discussing the height of the interest rate, he makes its standard not natural interest but loan interest. He makes the price of the uses of capital depend on supply and demand " specially for circulating capitals " ; the demand again depends on the number and solvability 1 Grundlagen der National-Ockonomie, tenth edition, Stuttgart, 1873. CHAP, ii ROSCHER 129 of the borrowers, specially the non- capitalists, such as land- owners and labourers. So that from Koscher's statement it seems as if the height of interest were first determined by the relations of contract interest on the loan market, and then transferred to natural interest, in virtue of the law of equal- isation of interest over all kinds of employment; while ad- mittedly the very opposite relation holds good. Finally, in the theoretic part of his researches Roscher does not take up the most important question in point of theory, the origin of interest, but touches on it only slightly in his practical sup- plement on the politics of interest, where he discusses its legitimacy. To judge by the contents of the following observations, which are a medley of the Naive Productivity theory and of Senior's Abstinence theory, Roscher is an eclectic. In 189 he ascribes to capital " real productivity," and in the note to it he praises the Greek expression TO/CO?, the born, as " very appropriate." In a later note he argues warmly against Marx, and his " latest relapse into the old heresy of the non-pro- ductivity of capital"; adducing, as convincing proof of its productivity, such things as the increase in value of cigars, wine, cheese, etc., " which, through simple postponement of consumption, may obtain a considerably higher value both use value and exchange value without the slightest additional labour." In the same paragraph he illustrates this by the well-known example of the fisher who first catches three fish a day by hand, then saves up a stock of 100 fish, makes a boat and net while living on his stock, and thereafter catches thirty fish a day by the assistance of this capital. In all these instances Roscher's view evidently amounts to this, that capital directly produces surplus value by its own peculiar productive power ; and he does not trouble himself to look for any intricate explanation of its origin. I cannot, therefore, avoid classing him among the Naive Productivity theorists. As already pointed out, however, he has not kept exclu- sively to this view, but has formally and substantially co-ordinated the Abstinence theory with it. He names as a second and " undoubted " foundation of interest the " real sacrifice which resides in abstinence from the personal enjoyment of capital " ; K 130 THE NAIVE PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK H he calls special attention to the fact that, in the fixing of the price for the use of the boat, the 150 days' privatiou of the fisherman who saved w-ii.d be a weighty consideration ; and he says that interest might be called a payment for abstinence in the same way as the wage of labour is called a payment for industry. In other respects too there are many ill concealed contradictions. Among other things, it agrees very badly with the productive power of capital which Eoscher assumes to be self-evident, when in 183 he declares the "use value of capital to be in most cases synonymous with the skill of the labourer and the richness of the natural powers which are connected with it" Evidently the authority which the respected name of Koscher enjoys among German economists has stood him in good stead with his interest theory. If what I have said be correct, his theory has a very modest claim indeed to the cardinal theoretic virtues of unity, logic, and throughness ; yet it has met with acceptance and imitation in many quarters. 1 In France Say's Productivity theory obtained as much popularity as in Germany. It became unmistakably the fashionable theory, and even the violent attacks made on it after 1840 by the socialists, especially by Proudhon, did but little to prevent its spread. It is singular, however, that it was seldom accepted simpliciter by the French writers. Almost all. who adopted it added on elements taken from one or even more theories inconsistent with it. This was the case to name only a few of the most influential writers with Rossi and Molinari, with Josef Gamier, and quite lately with Cauwes and Leroy-Beaulieu. 1 I venture to pass over a goodly number of German writers who since Roscher'a time have simply repeated the doctrine of the productive power of capital, without adding anything to it. Of these Friedrich Kleinwachter may be mentioned as one who has worked at the doctrine, if not with much more success, at least with greater thoroughness and care. See "Beitrag zum Lehre vom Eapital" (Hildebrand's Jahrbucher, vol. ix. 1867, pp. 310-326, 369-421) and his con- tribution to Schonberg's Handbuch. In the same category may be put Schulze- Delitzsch. For his views, which, like Roscher's, are somewhat eclectic, and not free from contradictions, see his Kapitel zu einem Deutschen Arbeiterkatechismus, Leipzig, 1863, p. 24. In the German edition of 1884 there are three pages of criticism on Klein- wachter, which, by desire of Professor Bohm-Bawerk, I here omit. W. S. CHAP, ii LEROY-BEAULIEU, SCIALOJA 131 Since the Productivity theory experienced no essential change at the hands of these economists, I need not go into any detailed statement of their views, the less so that we shall meet the most prominent of them in a later chapter among the eclectics. I shall mention only one peculiarly strong statement of the last-named writer, for the purpose of showing how great a hold the Productivity theory has in French economics at the present day, in face of all the socialist criticism. In his Essai sur la Repartition des Richesscs, the most important French monograph on the distribution of wealth a book which has passed through two editions within two years Leroy- Beaulieu writes, " Capital begets capital; that is beyond question." And a little later he guards himself against being supposed to mean that capital begets interest only in some legal sense, or through the arbitrariness of laws : " It is so naturally and materially ; in this case laws have only copied nature " (pp. 234, 239). From the Italian literature of our subject I shall, finally, instead of a number of writers, only mention one ; but his method of treatment, with its simplicity in form and its obscurity in substance, may be taken as typical of the Naive Productivity theory the much read Scialoja. 1 This writer states that the factors of production, among which he reckons capital (p. 39), share with, or transfer to their products their own " virtual " or " potential " value, which rests on their capacity towards production ; and that, further, the share which each factor takes in the production of value is itself the standard for the division of the product among the co-operating factors. Thus in the distribution each factor receives as much value as it has created ; if, indeed, this share may not be fixed a priori in figures (p. 100). In conformity with this idea he then declares natural interest to be that " portion " of the total profit of undertaking " which represents the productive activity of capital during the period of the production " (p. 125). In turning now from statement to criticism, I must redis- tinguish between these two branches of the Naive Productivity theory which I put together for convenience of historical 1 PrincijA della Economia Sociale, Naples, 1840. 132 THE NAIVE PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n statement. It has been shown that all the views already examined agree in making surplus value result from the pro- ductive power of capital, without showing any reason why it should be so. But, as I have shown in last chapter, beneath this agreement in expression there may lie two essentially different ideas. The productive power of capital referred to may be understood, in the literal sense, as Value Productivity, as a capacity of capital to produce value directly; or it may be understood as Physical Productivity, a capacity of capital to produce a great quantity of goods or a special quality of goods, without further explanation of the existence of surplus value, it being regarded as perfectly self-evident that the great quantity of goods, or the special quality of goods, must contain a surplus of value. In stating their doctrine most of the Naive Productivity theorists are so sparing of words that it is more easy to say what they may have thought than what they actually did think ; and often we can only conjecture whether a writer holds the one view or the other. Thus Say's "productive power" equally admits of both interpretations. It is the same with Eiedel's "productivity." Scialoja and Klemwachter seem to incline more to the former; Eoscher, in his illustra- tion of the abundant take of fish, rather to the latter. In any case it is not of much importance to determine which of these views each writer holds : if we submit both views to criticism, each will get his due. The Naive Productivity theory, in both its forms, I con- sider very far from satisfying the demands, which we may reasonably make on a theory purporting to be a scientific explanation of interest. After the sharp critical attacks that have been directed against it from the side of the socialistic and the "socio- political" school, its inadequacy has been so generally felt, at least in German science, that in undertaking to prove this judgment I am almost afraid I may be thrashing a dead horse. Still it is a duty which I cannot shirk. The theories of which we are speaking have been treated with such a lack of thoroughness and such hastiness of judgment that, as critic, I must at least avoid a similar blunder. But my chief reason is that I mean to attack the Naive Productivity theory CHAP, ii CRITICISM 133 with arguments which are essentially different from the argu- ments of socialistic criticism, and seem to me to go more nearly to the heart of the matter. To begin with the first form. If we are expected to believe that interest owes its existence to a peculiar power in capital directed to the creating of value, the question must at once force itself upon us, What are the proofs that capital actually possesses such a power? An unproved assurance that it does so certainly cannot offer sufficient foundation for a serious scientific theory. If we run through the writings of the Naive Productivity theorists, we shall find in them a great many proofs of a physical productivity, but almost nothing that could be inter- preted as an attempt to prove that there is a direct value- creating power in capital They assert it, but they take no trouble to prove it; unless the fact that the productive em- ployment of capital is regularly followed by a surplus of value be advanced as a kind of empirical proof of the power of capital to produce value. Even this, however, is only men- tioned very cursorily. It is perhaps put most plainly by Say, when, in the passage above quoted, he asks how capital could to all eternity produce an independent income, if it did not possess an independent productive power ; and by Eiedel when he " recognises " the productive power of capital in the existence of surpluses of value. Now what is the worth of this empirical proof? Does the fact that capital when employed is regularly followed by the appearance of a surplus in value, actually contain a sufficient proof that capital possesses a power to create value ? It is quite certain that it does no such thing ; no more than the fact that, in the mountains during the summer months, a rise of the barometer regularly follows the appearance of snow is a sufficient proof that a magic power resides in the summer snow to force up the quicksilver a naive theory which one may sometimes hear from the lips of the mountaineers. The scientific blunder here made is obvious. A mere hypothesis is taken for a proved fact. In both cases there is, first of all, a certain observed connection of two facts, the cause of the facts being still unknown and being object of 134 THE NAIVE PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n inquiry. There are in both cases a great many conceivable causes for the effect in question. In both cases accordingly a great many hypotheses might be put forward as to the actual cause ; and it is only one among many possible hy- potheses when the rising barometer is accounted for by a specific power of the summer snow, or when the surplus value of products of capital is accounted for by a specific power in capital to create value. And it is all the more a mere hypothesis since nothing is known in other respects as to the existence of the " powers " referred to. They have only been postulated for the purpose of explaining the phenomenon in question. But the cases we have compared resemble each other not only in being examples of mere hypotheses, but in being examples of bad hypotheses. The credibility of a hypothesis depends on whether it finds support outside the state of matters which has suggested it; and, particularly, whether it is inherently probable. That this is not the case as regards the naive hypothesis of the mountaineer is well known, and therefore no educated man believes in the story that the rise of the column of quicksilver is caused by a mysterious power of the summer snow. But it is no better with the hypothesis of a value-creating power in capital. On the one hand it is supported by no single fact of importance from any other quarter it is an entirely unaccredited hypothesis ; and, on the other hand, it contradicts the nature of things it is an impossible hypothesis. Literally to ascribe to capital a power of producing value is thoroughly to misunderstand the essential nature of value, and thoroughly to misunderstand the essential nature of production. Value is not produced, and cannot be produced. What is produced is never anything but forms, shapes of material, combinations of material ; therefore things, goods. These goods can of course be goods of value, but they do not bring value with them ready made, as something inherent that accompanies production. They always receive it first from out- side from the wants and satisfactions of the economic world. Value grows, not out of the past of goods, but out of their future. It comes, not out of the workshop where goods come iato existence, but out of the wants which those goods will CHAP, ii CAPITAL DOES NOT CREATE VALUE 135 satisfy. Value cannot be forged like a hammer, nor woven like a sheet. If it could, our industries would be spared those frightful convulsions we call crises, which have no other cause than that quantities of products, in the manufacture of which no rule of art was omitted, cannot find the value expected. What production ran do is never anything more than to create goods, in the hope that, according to the anticipated relations of demand and supply, they will obtain value. It might be compared to the action of the bleacher. As the bleacher lays his linsn in the sunshine, so production puts forth its activity on things and in places where it may expect to obtain value as its result. But it no more creates value than the bleacher creates the sunshine. I do not think it necessary to collect more positive proofs in support of my proposition. It appears to me too self-evident to require them. But it is perhaps well to defend it against some considerations that at first sight but only at first sight seem to run counter to it. Thus the familiar fact that the value of goods stands in a certain connection, though not a very close or exact connection, with the cost of their production, may give the impression that the value of goods comes from circumstances of their pro- duction. But it must not be forgotten that this connection only holds under certain assumptions. One of these assump- tions is usually expressly stated in formulating the law that value depends on cost of production; while the other is usually tacitly assumed neither of them having anything at all to do with production. The first assumption is that the goods produced are useful ; and the second is that, as compared with the demand for them, they are scarce, and continue scarce. Now that these two circumstances, which stand so modestly in the background of the law of costs, and not the costs themselves, are the real and ruling determinants of value, may be very simply shown by the following. So long as costs are laid out in the production of things which are adequately useful and scarce so long, therefore, as the costs themselves are in harmony with the usefulness and scarcity of the goods so long do they remain in harmony with their value also, and appear to regulate it. On the other hand, so far as costs are laid out on things which are not 136 THE NAIVE PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n useful enough or scarce enough as, say, in the making of watches which will not go, or the raising of timber in districts where there is naturally a superfluity of wood, or the making more good watches than people want the value no longer covers the costs, and there is not even the appearance of things deriving their value from the circumstances of their production. Another plausible objection is this. We produce, it may be, in the first instance, goods only. But since without the production of goods there would be no value, it is evident that in the production of goods we bring value into the world also. When a man produces goods of the value of 1000, it is quite evident that he has occasioned the existence of 1000 of value which would never have existed without the pro- duction; and this appears to be a palpable proof of the correctness of the proposition that value also comes into existence through production. Certainly this proposition is so far correct, but in a quite different sense from that which is here given it. It is correct in the sense that production is a cause of value. It is not correct in the sense that production is the cause of value that is to say, it is not correct in the sense that the complex of causes entirely sufficient to account for the existence of value is to be found in the circumstances of production. Between these two senses lies a very great distinction, which may be better illustrated by an example. If a corn-field is turned up by a steam plough, it is indisputable that the steam plough is one cause of the grain produced, and at the same time is one cause of the value of the grain produced. But it is quite as indisputable that the emergence of value on the part of the grain is very far from being fully explained by saying that the steam plough has produced it. One cause of the existence of the grain, and at the same time of the value of the grain, was certainly the sunshine. But if the question were put why the quarter of corn possessed a value of thirty shillings, would anybody think it an adequate answer to say that the sunshine produced the value ? Or when the old problem is put, whether ideas are innate or acquired, who would decide that they were innate from the argument that, if man were not born there would be no ideas, and that, conse- quently, there is no doubt that birth is the cause of the ideas ? CHAP, ii NOR DOES LABOUR CREATE VALUE 137 And now to apply this to our present problem. Our productivity friends are wrong because they over-estimate their claim to be right If they had been content to speak of a value-creating power of capital in the sense that capital supplies one cause of the emergence of value, there would have been nothing to object to. Next to nothing indeed would have been done towards explaining surplus value. It would only be stating explicitly what scarcely required to be stated at all ; and in the nature of things our theorists would have been compelled to go on to explain the other and less obvious part -causes of surplus value. Instead of that, they imagine that they have given the cause of the existence of value. They assume that, in the words, " Capital, in virtue of its productive power, creates value or surplus value," they have given such a conclusive and complete explanation of its existence that no further explanation of any kind is needed, and in this they are grievously mis- taken. But from what has been said another important applica- tion may be drawn, and I give it here, although it is not directed against the Productivity theory. What is right for the one must be fair for the other ; and if capital can possess no value-creating power because value is not "created," on the same ground no other element of production, be it land or be it human labour, possesses such a power. This has escaped the notice of that numerous school which directs the sharpest weapons of its criticism against the assumption that land or capital have any value -creating power, only with greater emphasis to claim that very power for labour. 1 In my opinion those critics have only overturned one idol to set up another in its place. They have fought against one prejudice only to take up a narrower one. The privilege of creating value belongs as little to human labour as to any other factor. Labour, like capital, creates goods, and goods only ; and these goods wait for and obtain their value only from the economical relations which they are meant to serve. The fact that there is a certain amount of legitimate agree- ment between quantity of labour and value of product has 1 This view is widely accepted even outside the ranks of the Socialists proper. See, e.g. Pierstorff, Lehre vom Unternehmergewinn, p. 22. 138 THE NAIVE PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n its ground and reason in quite other things than a "value- creating" power in labour; in things which I have already suggested of course in the most cursory way in speaking of the incidental connection of value and costs. Labour does not and cannot give value. All these prejudices have been a deplorable hindrance to the development of theory. People were misled by them into settling with the most difficult problems of the science much too easily. If the formation of value was to be explained they followed up the chain of causes a little way often a very little way only to come to a stop at the false and prejudiced decision that capital or labour had created the value. Beyond this point they gave up looking for the true causes, and made no attempt to follow the problem into those depths where we first meet with its peculiar difficulties. To turn now to the second interpretation that may be given to the Naive Productivity theory. Here the productive power ascribed to capital is, in the first instance, to be under- stood as Physical Productivity only; that is a capacity of capital to assist in the production of more goods or better goods than could be obtained without its help. But it is assumed as self-evident that the increased product, besides replacing the costs of capital expended, must include a surplus of value. What is the force of this interpretation ? I grant at once that capital actually possesses the physi- cal productivity ascribed to it that is to say, by its assistance more goods can actually be produced than without it. 1 I will also grant although here the connection is not quite so binding that the greater amount of goods produced by the help of capital has more value than the smaller amount of goods produced without its help. But there is not one single feature in the whole circumstances to indicate that this greater amount of goods must be worth more than the 1 I purposely disclaim at this point any inquiry whether the physical productivity of capital thus conceded is an originating power in capital, or whether the productive results attained by the help of capital should not rather be put to the account of those productive powers through which capital itself originates ; particularly to the account of the labour which made the capital. I do this to avoiu diverting the discussion from that sphere where alone, in my opinion, the interest problem can be adequately solved, that of the theory of value. CHAP, ii NOR DOES LABOUR CREATE VALUE 139 capital consumed in its production, and it is this phenomenon of surplus value we have to explain. To put it in terms of Eoscher's familiar illustration, I at once admit and understand that, with the assistance of a boat and net, one may catch thirty fish a day, where without this capital one would only have caught three. I admit and understand, further, that the thirty fish are of more value than the three were. But that the thirty fish must be worth more than the proportion of boat and net worn out in catching them, is an assumption which, far from being self-evident, we are not in the least prepared for by the presuppositions of the case. If we did not know from experience that the value of the return to capital was regularly greater than the value of the substance of capital consumed, the Naive Productivity theory would not give us one single reason for looking on this as necessary. It might very well be quite otherwise. Why should a concrete capital that yields a great return not be highly valued on that account so highly that its capital value would be equal to the value of the abundant return that flows from it ? Why, e.g. should a boat and net which, during the time that they last, help to procure an extra return of 2700 fish, not be considered exactly equal in value to these 2700 fish? But in that case in all physical productivity there would be no surplus value. It is remarkable that, in certain of the most prominent representatives of the Naive Productivity theory, there are to be found statements which would lead us to expect such a result, viz. the absence of a surplus value. Some of our authors directly teach that the value of real capital has a tendency to adapt itself to the value of its product. Thus Say writes (Traitt, p. 338) that the value of the, productive funds springs from the value of the product which may come from them. Eiedel in 91 of his National-Oekonomie lays down in detail the proposition that " the value of means of production " therefore the value of concrete portions of capital- " depends substantially on their productive ability, or on a capacity assured them, in the unchanging principles of production, to perform a greater or less service in the producing of material values." And Koscher says in 149 of the Principles : " Moreover land has this in. common with other means of 140 THE NAIVE PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n production that its price is essentially conditioned by that of its product." What then, if, in accordance with these views, the value of real capital accommodates itself entirely to the value of the product, and becomes quite equal to it ? And why should it not ? But in that case where would be the surplus value ? l If then surplus value be actually bound up with the physical productivity of capital, the fact is certainly not self- evident ; and a theory which, without a word of explanation, takes that as self-evident has not done what we expect of a theory. To sum up. Whichever of the two meanings we give to the expression "productive power," the Naive Productivity theory breaks down. If it asserts a direct value-creating power in capital, it asserts what is impossible. There is no power in any element of production to infuse value immediately or necessarily into its products. A factor of production can never be an ad-j equate source of value. Wherever value makes its appearance it has its ultimate cause in the relations of human needs and satisfactions. Any tenable explanation of interest must go back to this ultimate source. But the hypothesis of value- creating power is an attempt to evade this last and most difficult part of the explanation by a quite untenable assump- tion. If, however, the writers we are discussing understand by productivity, merely physical productivity, then they are mis- taken in treating surplus value as an accompanying phenomenon that requires no explanation. In assuming that it is self- explanatory, and contributing no proof to the assumption, their theory leaves out the most important and difficult part of the explanation. It is, however, very easy to understand the strong adher- ence given to the Naive Productivity theory in spite of these defects. It is impossible to deny that at the first glance there is something exceedingly plausible about it. It is undeniable that capital helps to produce, and helps to produce "more." At the same time we know that, at the end of every production 1 See also on this point myRechte und Verhdltnisse, p. 104, etc. ; and particularly pp. 107-109. CHAP, ii FAILURE OF THE EXPLANATION HI in which capital takes part, there remains over a " surplus " to the undertaker, and that the amount of this surplus bears a regular proportion to the amount of capital expended, and to the duration of its expenditure. In these circumstances noth- ing really is more natural than to connect the existence of this surplus with the productive power that resides in capital. It would have been wonderful indeed if the Productivity theory had not been put forward. How long one remains under the influence of this theory depends on how soon one begins to reflect critically on the meaning of the word " productive." So long as one does not reflect, the theory appears to be an exact representation of facts. It is a theory which, one might say with Leroy-Beaulieu, " N'a fait ici que copier la nature." But when one does reflect, this same theory shows itself to be a web of dialectical sophistry, woven by the misuse of that ambiguous term, "Productive Surplus Result " of capital. That is why the Naive Productivity theory is, I might say, the predestinated interest theory of a primitive and half- matured condition of the science. But it is also predestinated to disappear so soon as the science ceases to be "naive." That up till the present day it is so widely accepted is not a matter on which modern political economy has any reason to con- gratulate itself. CHAPTER III THE INDIRECT PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES THE Indirect 1 Productivity theories agree with the Naive theories in placing the ultimate ground of interest in a productive power of capital But in the working out of this fundamental idea they show a twofold advance. First, they keep clear of the mysticism of " value-creating powers," and, remaining on solid ground of fact, they always mean physical productivity when they speak of the " productivity of capital." Second, they do not consider it to be self-evident that physical productiveness must be accompanied by surplus in value. They therefore insert a characteristic middle term, with the special function of giving reasons why the increased quantity of products must involve a surplus in value. Of course the scientific value of all such theories depends on whether the middle term will bear investigation or not; and since the writers of this group differ very considerably as regards this middle term, I shall be obliged in this chapter to state and criticise individual doctrines with much more minute- ness than was necessary in the case of the almost uniform naive theories. In doing so I certainly impose on myself and on my readers no small amount of trouble, but it is impossible to do otherwise without sacrificing honest and solid criticism. When a writer has anything particular to say, the honest critic must allow him to say it, and must answer him 1 I use the unsatisfactory word Indirect for the German Motivirte (reasoned or motivated). The place taken by philosophy in German culture allows the use of many philosophical terms in general literature that we could not employ in English without pedantry. Our political economy, as we are often told, must use the language of the market and the shop. W. S. CHAP, in LAUDERDALE 143 point by point : the particular must not be dismissed with a general phrase. The series of the Indirect Productivity theories begins with Lord Lauderdale. 1 In the theoretical history of interest Lauderdale has rather an important place. He recognises, as none of his predecessors did, that here is a great problem waiting on solution. He first states the problem formally and explicitly by asking, What is the nature of profit, and in what way does it originate ? His criticism on the few writers who had expressed them- selves on the subject of natural interest before his time is well weighed. And, finally, he is the first to put forward a connected and argued theory in the form of a theory, and not in the form of scattered observations. He begins by pronouncing capital, in opposition to Adam Smith, to be a third original source of wealth, the others being land and labour (p. 121). Later on he goes very thoroughly into consideration of the method of its working as a source of wealth (pp. 154-206) ; and here at the very first he recognises the importance and difficulty of the interest problem, and takes occasion, in a remarkable passage, to put the problem formally. 2 He is not satisfied with the views of his predecessors. He expressly rejects the doctrine of Locke and Adam Smith, who are inclined to derive interest from the increment of value which the worker produces by working with capital. He rejects also Turgot's doctrine, which, much too superficially, connects interest with the possibility of obtaining rent by the purchase of land. Lauderdale then formulates his own theory in these words : " In every instance where capital is so employed as to produce a profit it uniformly arises either from its supplanting a portion of labour, which would otherwise be performed by the hand of man, or from its performing a portion of labour, which is 1 An Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Public Wealth, Edinburgh, 1804. 2 "By what means capital or stock contributes towards wealth is not so apparent. What is the nature of the profit of stock, and how does it originate ? are questions the answers to which do not immediately suggest themselves. They are indeed questions that have seldom been discussed by those who have treated on political economy, and important as they are, they seem nowhere to have received a satisfactory solution " (p. 155). I may here note that Lauderdale, like Adam Smith and Ricardo, does not distinguish between interest proper and undertaker's profit, but groups both under the name of profit. 144 THE INDIRECT PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n beyond the reach of the personal exertion of man to accom- plish " (p. 161). In thus proclaiming the power of capital to supplant labourers as the cause of profit, Lauderdale refers, under a somewhat altered name, to the same thing as we have agreed to call the physical productivity of capital. For as a matter of fact Lauderdale himself, many times and with emphasis, calls capital "productive" and "producing," as on pp. 172, 177, 205. Still the chief question remains, In what way does profit originate from the power of capital to supplant labourers ? According to Lauderdale it is, that the owner of real capital l is able to secure for himself as his share, either wholly or at least in part, the wages of those workers who are replaced by the capital. " Supposing, for example," says Lauderdale, in one of the many illustrations by which he tries to establish the correctness of his theory, 2 " one man with a loom should be capable of making three pairs of stockings a day, and that it should require six knitters to perform the same work with equal elegance in the same time ; it is obvious that the proprietor of the loom might demand for making his three pairs of stock- ings the wages of five knitters, and that he would receive them ; because the consumer, by dealing with him rather than the knitters, would save in the purchase of the stockings the wages of one knitter" (p. 165). An objection obviously suggests itself which Lauderdale thus tries to weaken : " The small profit which the proprietors of machinery generally acquire, when compared with the wages of labour, which the machine supplants, may perhaps create a suspicion of the rectitude of this opinion. Some fire- engines, for instance, draw more water from a coal pit in one day than could be conveyed on the shoulders of 300 men, 1 Compounds like Kapitalstucke and KapitalgiUer I usually translate " Real Capital." W. S. 2 Lauderdale with great patience and thoroughness applies his theory to all possible employments of capital. He distinguishes five classes of such employ- ment building and obtaining machinery, home trade, foreign trade, agriculture, and " conducting circulation. " The illustration quoted in the text is from the first of these five divisions. I have chosen it because it most clearly illustrates the way in which Lauderdale puts before himself the connection of profit with the labour-replacing power of capital. CHAP, in LAUDERDALE 145 even assisted by the machinery of buckets ; and a fire-engine undoubtedly performs its labour at a much smaller expense than the amount of the wages of those whose labour it thus supplants. This is, in truth, the case with all machinery." This phenomenon, however, Lauderdale explains, should not mislead us. It simply arises from the fact that the profit obtainable for the use of any machine must be regu- lated by the universal regulator of prices, the relation of supply and demand. "The case of a patent, or exclusive privilege of the use of a machine . . . will tend further to illustrate this. " If such a privilege is given for the invention of a machine, which performs, by the labour of one man, a quantity of work that used to take the labour of four ; as the possession of the exclusive privilege prevents any competition in doing the work but what proceeds from the labour of the four workmen, their wages, as long as the patent continues, must obviously form the measure of the patentee's charge that is, to secure employment he has only to charge a little less than the wages of the labour which the machine supplants. But when the patent expires, other machines of the same nature are brought into competition ; and then his charge must be regulated on the same principle as every other, according to the abundance of machines, or (what is the same thing), according to the facility of procuring machines, in proportion to the demand for them." In this way Lauderdale thinks he has satisfactorily estab- lished that the cause and source of profit lies in a saving of labour, or of the wages of labour. Has he really succeeded in establishing this ? Has Lauderdale in the foregoing passages really explained the origin of interest ? A careful examination of his arguments will very soon enable us to answer this question in the negative. No fault can be found with the starting-point that he takes for his argument. It is to continue Lauderdale's own illustration quite correct to say that one man with a knitting loom may turn out as many stockings in a day as six hand knitters. It is quite correct, also, to say that, where the loom is an object of monopoly, its owner may easily secure for its L 146 THE INDIRECT PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n day's work the wage of five knitters, or, in the case of unlimited competition, of course a correspondingly less amount ; and thus, after deducting the wages of the man who tends the machine, there remains over as the owner's share four days' wages of labour under free competition, correspondingly less, but always something. Here it is shown that a share in value does really go to the capitalist. But this, share, thus proved to go to capital, is not the thing that was to be explained, the Net Interest or profit ; but only the gross return to the use of capital. The five wages which the capitalist secures, or the four wages that he retains after paying the man who attends to the machine, are the total income that he makes by the machine. In order to get the net profit contained in that income we must, evidently, deduct the wear and tear of the machine itself. But Lauderdale, who in the whole course of his reasoning is always looking to profit, has either overlooked this thus confusing gross and net interest or he considers it quite self-evident that, after deducting from gross interest a proportion for wear and tear, something remains over as net interest. In the first case he has made a distinct blunder ; in the second case he has assumed without proof that very point which is the most difficult, indeed the only difficult point to explain, that, after deduction from the gross return of capital of so much of the real capital as has been consumed, something must remain over as surplus value, and why it should remain over. In other words, he has not touched on the great question of the interest problem. As everything turns on this point, let me put it in its clearest light by means of figures. Suppose, for convenience, that the labourers get. a pound a week, and that the machine lasts a year before it is entirely worn out. Then the gross use of the machine for a year will be represented by 4x52 = 208. To ascertain the net interest contained in that we must evidently deduct the whole capital value of the machine now completely worn out by the year's work. How much will this capital value be ? This evidently is the crucial point. If the capital value is less than 208, there is a net interest over. If it is equal to, or higher than 208, there can be no interest or profit over. CHAP, in LAUDERDALE 147 Now on this decisive point Lauderdale has given neither proof nor even assumption. No feature of his theory prevents us assuming that the capital value of the machine amounts to fully 208. On the contrary, if, with Lauderdale, we think of the machine as an object of monopoly, there is a certain justification in expecting that its price will be very high. I grant that experience goes to show that machines and real capital in general, be their monopoly price forced up ever so high, never cost quite so much as they turn out. But this is only shown by experience, not by Lauderdale ; and by entirely shirking the explanation of that empirical fact he has left the heart of the interest problem untouched. In that variation of the illustration where Lauderdale assumes that unrestricted competition ensues, it is true that we might consider the value of the machine as fixed (relatively at least) by the amount of its cost of production. But here again we are met by the doubt as regards the other determining factor, the amount of the gross use. Say, e.g. that the machine lias cost 100, and that 100 is presumably its capital value, then whether there is any net interest over or not will depend on whether the daily gross return of the machine exceeds g- or not. Will it exceed that ? All that Lauder- dale says on this point is that the claim of the capitalist " must be regulated on the same principle as everything else," the relation of supply and demand. That is, he says nothing at all. And yet it was very necessary to say something, and, moreover, to prove what was said. For it is not in the least self-evident that the gross use is higher than the capital value of the machine, if that value is pressed down by free competi- tion to the amount of its cost. It is just where unrestricted competition prevails in the use of the machine, that it presses down the value of the products of capital also in this case, the stockings and thus presses down the gross return to the machine. Now, so long as the machine produces more than it costs, there remains a profit to the undertaker ; and the existence of a profit, one would think, will act as induce- ment to the further multiplication of the machines till such time as, through the increased competition, the extra profit entirely vanishes. Why should competition call a halt earlier? 148 THE INDIRECT PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n Why, e.g. should it call a halt at the time when the gross use of a machine which costs 100 has sunk to 110 or 105, w,hen a net interest of 10 per cent or 5 per cent is thereby assured ? This calls for a satisfactory explanation of its own, and Lauderdale has not said a word about it. His explanation has therefore shot beside the mark. What it actually explains is something that had no need of explanation, viz. the fact that capital gives a gross interest, a gross return. But what had great need of explanation, viz. the remainder of a net return in the gross return, remains as obscure as before. The test by which Lauderdale attempts to confirm the accuracy of his theory, and on which he lays great weight, will not do much to change our opinion. He shows that where a machine saves no labour where, e.g. the machine takes three days to make a pair of stockings, while the hand- worker does the same in two days there is no "profit." This, according to Lauderdale, is an evident proof that profit does come from the power of capital to replace labourers (p. 164). The reasoning is weak enough. It shows of course that the power of the machine to replace labour is an indispensable condition of the profit which is tolerably self-evident, since, if the machine had not this property, it would have no use at all, and would not even belong to the class we call " goods." But it is very far from showing that interest is fully explained by this power. By using a strictly analogous test he might have proved a totally opposite theory, viz. that profit comes from the activity of the workman who tends the machine. If nobody tends the machine it stands still, and if it stands still it never yields any profit. Consequently it is the work- man who creates the profit ! I have purposely taken the greater care in examining the blunders into which Lauderdale's method of explanation leads him, because the criticism applies not to Lauderdale alone, but to all those who, in trying to trace interest to the productivity of capital, have fallen into the same errors. And we shall see that the number of those who have thus been criticised in advance is not small, and embraces many a well-known name. CHAP, in MALTHUS 149 Lauderdale found his first important follower, though by no means his disciple, in Malthus. 1 With Lis usual love of exact definition Malthus has carefully stated the nature of profit. " The profits of capital consist of the difference between the value of the advances necessary to produce a commodity and the value of the commodity when produced" (p. 293 ; second edition, p. 262). "The rate of profit," he continues more exactly than euphoniously, " is the proportion which the difference between the value of the advances and the value of the commodity produced bears to the value of the advances, and it varies with the variations of the value of the advances compared with the value of the product." After expressions like these the question would seem to suggest itself, Why must there be this difference between the value of the advances and the value of the product ? Un- fortunately Malthus does not go on to put this question explicitly. He has given all his care to the inquiry as to the rate of interest, and has left only a few rather inadequate indications as to its origin. In the most complete of these Malthus, quite in the style of Lauderdale, points to the productive power of capital. " If by means of certain advances to the labourer of machinery, food, and materials previously collected, he can execute eight or ten times as much work as he could without such assistance, the person furnishing them might appear at first to be entitled to the difference between the powers of unassisted labour and the powers of labour so assisted. But the prices of commodities do not depend upon their intrinsic utility, but upon the supply and the demand. The increased powers of labour would naturally produce an increased supply of commodities ; their prices would consequently fall, and the remuneration for the capital advanced would soon be reduced to what was necessary, in the existing state of society, to bring the articles, to the production of which they were applied, to market. With regard to the labourers employed, as neither their exertions nor their skill would necessarily be much greater than if they had worked unassisted, their remuneration would be nearly the 1 Principles of Political Economy. London, 1820, third edition ; Pickering, 1836. 150 THE INDIRECT PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n same as before. ... It is not, therefore," continues Malthus, making his point of view more precise by a polemical remark, " quite correct to represent, as Adam Smith does, the profits of capital as a deduction from the produce of labour. They are only a fair remuneration for that part of the production con- tributed by the capitalist, estimated exactly in the same way as the contribution of the labourer" (p. 80). In this analysis the reader will have no difficulty in recognising the principal ideas of Lauderdale's Productivity theory, only put in a somewhat modified form and with some- what less precision. There is only one feature that points in another direction ; that is, the prominence if we may use so strong a word given to the fact that the pressure of competi- tion must always leave over a share to the capitalist as much as may be " necessary to bring the articles, to the produc- tion of which the capital was applied, to market." Malthus indeed has not said anything in further explanation of this new feature. But the fact of his mentioning it at all shows distinctly his feeling that, in the formation of profit, some- thing besides the productivity of capital must be concerned. The same idea comes out more forcibly in Malthus's direct statement that profit is a constituent part of the costs of production. 1 The formal enunciation of this proposition, to which Adam Smith and Eicardo inclined without explicit mention of it, 2 was, as things have turned out, a literary event of some importance. It started the stirring controversy which was carried on for some decades with great vigour, first in England, and then in other countries, and this controversy was, indirectly, of great use in developing the interest theory. For when economists were eagerly discussing whether profit should belong to the costs of production or not, they could scarcely avoid making a more thorough investigation into its nature and origin. The proposition that interest is a constituent portion of 1 Principles, p. 84, and many other places ; Definitions in Political Economy Nos. 40, 41. 2 A note which may be found in Ricardo's Principles at the end of 6, chap. i. (p. 30 of 1871 edition), has sometimes given the impression that Ricardo had by that time stated the above proposition explicitly. This, however, is not the case. He only suggested the idea to Malthus, who put it into words. See Wollenborg, Intorno al costo relativo di Produzione, Bologna, 1882, p. 26. CHAP, in MALTHUS 151 the costs of production is likely to be judged in an essentially different way by the theorist, and by the historian of theory. The former will pronounce it a gross mistake, as did Malthus's contemporary Torrens, and as lately Pierst&ff has done in harsh terms much too harsh, in my opinion. 1 Profit is not a sacrifice that production requires, but a share in its fruits. To pronounce it a sacrifice was only possible by a somewhat gross confusion of the national economic standpoint with the individual economic standpoint^ the standpoint of the indi- vidual undertaker who, of course, feels the paying out of interest on borrowed capital as a sacrifice. But still, even in this unfortunate form, there lies an idea which is full of significance, and which points beyond the inadequate Productivity theory; and this Malthus evidently had in his mind. It is the idea that the sacrifices of produc- tion are not exhausted in the labour which is employed in production, whether that labour be directly, or as embodied in real capital indirectly employed ; that beyond this there is a peculiar sacrifice demanded from the capitalist which equally demands its compensation. Malthus of course was not able to indicate more accurately the nature of this sacrifice. Yet in this somewhat unusual mention of profit as a constituent of costs the historian of theory will recognise an interesting middle course between Adam Smith's first suggestion, that the capitalist must have a profit, because otherwise he would have no interest in the accumulation of capital, and the more precise theories ; whether, with Say, these theories pronounce productive services to be a sacrifice demanding compensation and a constituent part of the costs of production, or, with Hermann, pronounce the use of capital to be that sacrifice, or, like Senior, find this sacrifice and cost in the capitalist's abstinence. In Malthus, indeed, the first notes of these more precise doctrines are yet too lightly sounded to drown the ruder explanation, which, like Lauderdale, he deduced from the productive power of capital. But that neither the one explanation nor the other really passed into a substantial theory is shown by his remarks on the rate of profit (p. 294). Instead of deriving the current rate of interest, as one would naturally have expected, from 1 Lehre vom Ujiternehmergeurinn, p. 24. 152 THE INDIRECT PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n the play of those same forces that bring interest into existence, he explains it as determined by influences of a different kind altogether ; by the height of wages on the one hand and the price of products on the other. He calculates in the following manner. Profit is the difference between the value of the costs advanced by the capitalist, and the value of the product. The rate of profit will, accordingly, be greater, the less the value of the costs and the greater the value of the product. But as the greatest and most important portion of the costs consist in wages of labour, we have as the two determinants which influence the rate of profit, the height of wages on the one hand and the price of products on the other. However logical this way of explanation seems to be, it is easy to show that it does riot, at any rate, go to the heart of the matter. To show what I mean, perhaps I may be allowed to make use of a comparison. Suppose we wish to name the cause that determines the distance between the car of a balloon and the balloon itself. It ii clear at the first glance that the cause is to be found in the length of the rope that fastens the car to the balloon. What should we say if some one were to conduct the investigation thus : the distance is equal to the difference in the absolute height of the balloon and of the car, and is therefore increased by everything that increases the absolute height of the balloon and diminishes the absolute height of the car; and is diminished by everything that diminishes the absolute height of the balloon and in- creases the Absolute height of the car ? And now the ex- plainer would call to the assistance of his explanation everything that could have any possible influence over the absolute eleva- tion of the balloon and of the car such as density of the atmosphere, weight of the covering of balloon and car, number of persons in the car, tenuity of the gases employed to fill it only omitting the length of the rope that tied the two ! And just in this way does Malthus act. In page after page of research he inquires why wages are high or low. He is never tired of controverting Eicardo, and proving that the difficulty or ease of production from land is not the only cause of a high or a low wage, but that the abundance of capital which accompanies the demand for labour has also its CHAP, in MALTHUS 153 influence on wage. In the same way he is never tired of asserting that the relation of supply and demand for products, by fixing their price higher or lower, is the cause of a high or a low profit. But he forgets to put the simplest question of all the question on which everything hinges, What power is it that keeps wage of labour and price of product apart in such a way that, no matter what be their absolute level, they leave a space between them which is filled up by profit ? Only once, and then very faintly even more faintly than Ricardo on a similar occasion does Mai thus hint at the existence of a power of this sort, when he remarks on p. 303 that the gradual diminution of the rate of profit must, in the long run, bring " the power and the will to accumulate capital " to a standstill But he does not make any more use of this element to explain the height of profit than did Ricardo. Finally, Malthus's explanation loses any force it had through the fact that, to determine the prices of products price being one of his two standard factors he cannot bring forward anything more substantial than the relation of supply and demand. 1 Here the theory finds a conclusion where it is, I grant incontrovertible, but where at the same time it ceases to say anything. That the rate of interest is influenced by the relation between the demand and the supply of certain goods is, considering the fact that interest is itself a price, or a difference in price, a little too obvious. 2 After Malthus the theory of the productive power of capital was only handed on in England by Read. 3 As Read, however, took elements from other theories, we shall have to speak of him again among the eclectics. But very similar views are to be found somewhat later in the writings of certain celebrated American economists, particularly Henry Carey and Peshine Smith. Carey 4 offers one of the very worst examples of confused 1 ". . . the latter case shows at once how much profits depend upon the prices of commodities, and upon the cause which determines these prices, namely, the supply compared with the demand" (p. 334). 2 I think I may pass over Malthus's wearisome and unfruitful controversy & gainst Ricardo's interest theory. It offers many weak points. Those who wish to read an accurate judgment on it will find it in Pierstorff, p. 23. 3 An Inquiry into the Natural Grounds of Right to Vendible Property or Wealth. Edinburgh, 1829. 4 His chief work is the Principles of Social Science, 1858. 154 THE INDIRECT PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n thinking on a subject where there has already been much con- fusion. What he says on interest is a tissue of incredibly clumsy and wanton mistakes ^mistakes of such a nature that it is almost inconceivable how they should ever have received any consideration in the scientific world. I should not express this opinion in such severe terms if it were not that Carey's interest theory even yet enjoys a reputation which I consider very ill deserved. It is one of those theories which, to my mind, cast discredit not only on their authors, but on the science that lets itself be seduced into credulous acceptance of them ; not so much that it errs as for the unpardonably blundering way in which it errs. Whether I speak too harshly of it or not let the reader judge. Carey has not given any abstract formulation to his views on the source of interest. Following his favourite plan of explaining economical phenomena by introducing simple situa- tions of Eobinson Crusoe life, he contents himself, in the present case, with giving a pictorial account of the origin of interest, so that we discover his opinion on its causes only by the characteristic features which he gives to imaginary transactions. It is from such pictures that we have to put together Carey's theory. He deals with our subject ostensibly in the forty -first chapter of his Principles, under the title, " Wages, Profit, and Interest" After a few introductory words the following picture occurs in the first paragraph : "Friday had no canoe, nor had he acquired the mental capital required for producing such an instrument. Had Crusoe owned one, and had Friday desired to borrow it, the former might thus have answered him " ' Fish abound at some little distance from the shore, whereas they are scarce in our immediate neighbourhood. Working without the help of my canoe, you will scarcely, with all your labour, obtain the food required for the preservation of life ; whereas, with it, you will, with half your time, take as many fish as will supply us both. Give me three-fourths of all you take, and you shall have the remainder for your services. This will secure you an abundant supply of food, leaving much of your time unoccupied, to be applied to giving yourself better shelter and better clothing.' CHAP, in CAREY 155 "Hard as this might seem, Friday would have accepted the offer, profiting by Crusoe's capital, though paying dearly for its use." Up to this point one can easily see that Carey's theory is a tolerably faithful copy of Lauderdale's. Like him Carey starts by making capital the cause of a productive surplus result. This forms the occasion for the capitalist receiving a price for the use of his capital, and this price as appears from many passages is without further examination identified by Carey, as it was by Lauderdale, with interest, although obviously it only represents the gross use of the capital It makes no difference that Carey, unlike Lauderdale, does not look on capital as an independent factor in production, but only as an instrument of production. The essential feature remains that the surplus result from the production, associated with the employment of capital, is put down as the cause of interest. But while Lauderdale is only open to the charge of having mixed up gross and net use, Carey plays fast and loose with a whole row of conceptions. Not only does he confuse net and gross use, but he confuses these two conceptions again witli real capital itself, and that not occasionally but consistently. That is to say, he deliberately identifies the causes of a high or low interest with the causes of a high or low value of real capital, and deduces the height of the interest rate from the height of the value of real capital. This almost incredible confusion of ideas shows itself in every passage where Carey treats of interest. For statement of his argument I shall use chap. vi. (on Value) and chap. xli. (on Wage, Profit, and Interest), where he expresses himself most connectedly on the subject. According to Carey's well-known theory of value, the value of all goods is measured by the amount of the costs required for their reproduction. Progressive economical development, which is simply man's progressive mastery over nature, enables man to replace the goods he needs at a steadily decreasing cost. This is true, among other things, of those tools that form man's capital ; capital shows, therefore, the tendency to fall steadily in value with the advance of civilisation. " The quantity of labour required for reproducing 156 THE INDIRECT PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n existing capital and for further extending the quantity of capital diminishes with every stage of progress. Past accumu- lations tend steadily to decline in value, labour rising not less steadily when compared with them" (iii. p. 130; so also i. chap. i. passim). Accompanying this and as result of the decrease in the value of capital comes a fall in the price paid for its use. This proposition is not actually stated by Carey ; he evidently thinks it too self-evident to require that, as indeed, rightly understood, it is, but it is assumed and referred to in his pictures of Crusoe's economical development. He relates how the owner of the first axe may have been able to demand for the loan of it more than half the wood that could be cut by it, while later, when better axes can be made at a cheaper price, a lower (relative) price is paid for their use (i. p. 193). On these preliminary facts, then, Carey builds his great law of interest ; that, with advancing economical civilisation, the rate of profit on capital that is, the rate of interest falls, while the absolute quantity of profit rises. The way in which Carey arrives at this law can only be adequately appreciated by reading his own words. The reader may there- fore pardon the somewhat lengthy quotation that follows. " Little as was the work that could be done with the help of an axe of stone, its service to the owner had been very great. It was therefore clear to him that the man to whom he lent it should pay him largely for its use. He could, too, as we readily see, well afford to do so. Cutting with it more wood in a day than without it he could cut in a month, he would profit by its help were he allowed but a tenth of his labour's products. Being permitted to retain a fourth, he finds his wages much increased, notwithstanding the large proportion claimed as profit by his neighbour capitalist. " The bronze axe being next obtained, and proving far more useful, its owner being asked to grant its use is now, however, required to recollect that not only had the produc- tiveness of labour greatly increased, but the quantity required to be given to the production of an axe had also greatly decreased, capital thus declining in its power over labour, as labour increased in its power for the reproduction of capital. He, therefore, limits himself to demanding two-thirds of the CHAP, in CAREl- 157 price of the more potent instrument, saying to the woodcutter : ' You can do twice as much work with this as you now do with our neighbour's stone axe ; and if I permit you to retain a third of the wood that is cut, your wages will still be doubled.' This arrangement being made, the comparative effects of the earlier and later distributions are as follows : Total Labourer's Capitalist's Product. Share. Share. First 4 . . 1 . . 3 Second . . 8 . 2'66 . . 5-33 " The reward of labour has more than doubled, as a con- sequence of the receipt of an increased proportion of an in- creased quantity. The capitalist's share has not quite doubled, he receiving a diminished proportion of an increased quantity. The position of the labourer, which had at first stood as only one to three, is now as one to two ; with great increase of power to accumulate, and thus to become himself a capitalist. With the substitution of mental for merely physical power, the tendency to equality becomes more and more developed. " The axe of iron next coming, a new distribution is required, the cost of reproduction having again diminished, while labour has again increased in its proportions as compared with capital. The new instrument cuts twice as much as had been cut by the one of bronze, and yet its owner finds himself compelled to be content with claiming half the product ; the following figures now presenting a comparative view of the several modes of distribution : Total. Labourer. Capitalist. First 4 . . 1 . . 3 Second 8 2'66 . . 5'33 Third . 16 . . 8 . . 8 " The axe of iron and steel now coming, the product is again doubled, with further diminution in the cost of repro- duction ; and now the capitalist is obliged to content himrelf with a less proportion, the distribution being as follows : Fourth . . 32 . . 19-20. . 12-80 " The labourer's share has increased, and, the total product having largely increased, the augmentation of his quantity is very great 158 THE INDIRECT PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n " That of the capitalist has diminished in proportion, but, the product having so much increased, this reduction of pro- portion has been accompanied by a large increase of quantity. Both thus profit greatly by the improvements that have been effected. With every further movement in the same direction the same results continue to be obtained the proportion of the labourer increasing with every increase in the productive- ness of effort the proportion of the capitalist as steadily diminishing, with constant increase of quantity and equally constant tendency towards equality among the various portions of which society is composed. . . . " Such is the great law governing the distribution of labour's products. Of all recorded in the book of science, it is perhaps the most beautiful, being, as it is, that one in virtue of which there is established a perfect harmony of real and true interests among the various classes of mankind" (iii. pp. 131-136). I beg the reader to stop for a moment at this point of the quotation, and to decide exactly what it is that Carey has up to this point asserted, and, if not strictly speaking proved, has at least made quite clear. The object of Carey's inquiry was the price paid for the use of the axe that is, its hire. The amount of this hire was compared with the amount of the total return which a worker could obtain by the help of the axe. The result of this comparison is the proposition that, with advanc- ing civilisation, the hire paid for capital forms an always decreasing proportion of that total return. This and nothing else is the substance of the law which Carey up till now has expounded and proved, and which he often abridges in the words, " The proportion of the capitalist falls." Let us hear Carey further. " That the law here given as regards the return to capital invested in axes is equally true in reference to all other descriptions of capital will be obvious to the reader upon slight reflection." He demonstrates its efficacy first in the reduction of the rent of old houses, on which there is nothing particular to remark, and then goes on. " So, too, with money. Brutus charged almost 5 per cent interest for its use, and in the days of Henry VIII the proportion allotted by law to the lender was 10. Since then it has steadily declined, 4 per cent having become so much the established rate in England that property is uniformly CHAP, in CAREY 159 estimated at twenty-five years' purchase of the rent ; so large, nevertheless, having been the increase in the powers of man that the present receiver of a twenty-fifth can command an amount of convenience and of comfort twice greater than could have been obtained by his predecessors who received a tenth. In this decline in the proportion charged for the use of capital we find the highest proof of man's improved condition " (iii. p. 135). In these words Carey has suddenly performed a bold volte- face. He speaks as if the proof adduced in the foregoing passages referred to the rate of interest, and thenceforth treats it as an established fact that the depreciation of the value of capital brings about a depreciation of the rate of interest ! x This change of front rests on as gross a piece of juggling as can well be imagined. In the whole course of the preceding argument Carey has never once mentioned the rate of interest, much less made it the subject of any proof. To apply the argument to the rate of interest Carey has now to make a double perversion of his conceptions first, of the conception of " use " ; second, of the conception of " proportion." In the course of his argument he has always employed the phrase " use of capital" in the sense of " gross use." He who hires out an axe sells its gross use ; the price which he receives for it is a hire or gross interest. But now all at once he employs the word use in the sense of net use, the use to which the net (money) interest corresponds. While the argument, therefore, was that gross interest has a tendency to fall (relatively), the conclusion drawn by Carey from his argument is that net use has this tendency. But the second perversion is ^en more gross. In the course of the argume ^ the word " proportion " had always referred to the relation between the amount of the interest and the total return to the labour done by the help of capital. But now, in his application of the argument, Carey interprets the word proportion as expressing a relation between the amount of the use and the value of the parent 1 E.g. iii. p. 119 : " The proportion of the capitalist (profit or interest, as the following lines show) declines because of the great economy of labour." P. 149 : "Decrease of the costs of reproduction and reduction of the rate of interest con- sequent on that," etc. 160 THE INDIRECT PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n capital in other words, the rate of interest. He speaks of a " proportion of 1 per cent," by which he does not mean as formerly 10 per cent of the return obtained by the assist- ance of the capital lent, but 10 p'er cent on the parent capital. And in the fall of the interest rate from 10 per cent to 4 per cent " the decline in the proportion charged for the use of capital " he sees a simple application of the law just proved, without a suspicion that the proportion spoken of earlier means something quite different from that now referred to. In case the reader may think that this criticism is mere hair -splitting, I would ask him to consider the following concrete illustration, which I adapt as closely as possible to Carey's line of argument. Suppose that with a steel axe a worker, in a year's time, can cut down 1000 trees. If only one such axe is to be had, and no other of the same kind can be made, its owner may ask and receive for the transference of its use a large part of the total return say one-half. Thanks to the monopoly, the capital value which the single axe obtains in these circum- stances will also be high ; it may, e.g. amount to the value of as many trunks as a man can fell with it in two years that is, 2000 trunks. The price of 500 trees which is paid for the year's use of the axe represents in this case a proportion of 50 per cent of the total yearly return, but a proportion of 2 5 per cent only of the value of the capital. This by itself proves that the two proportions are not identical ; but let us look further. Later on people learn to manufacture steel axes in any quantity desired. The capital value of the axes falls to the amount of the costs of reproduction at the time. Say that these costs are equal to eighteen days of labour ; then a steel axe will be worth about as much as fifty trees, since the felling of fifty trees also costs eighteen days' labour. Naturally if the owner lend the axe he will now be content to take a much smaller proportion of the 1000 trees that represent the year's work ; instead of receiving the half, as before, he now gets no more than a twentieth that is, fifty trees. These fifty trees represent, on the one hand, 5 per cent of the total return, and, on the other hand, 100 per cent of the capital value of the axe. CHAP, in CAREY 161 What does this prove ? The one proportion, 50 per cent of the gross, return, represented only 2 5 per cent of the capital value of the axe; the smaller proportion, 5 per cent of the total return, represents 100 per cent of the capital value. In other words, while the proportion of the total return fell to a tenth part of what it was at first, the rate of interest represented by this proportion rose fourfold. So little necessity is there that the proportions which Carey lightly confuses with one another should run parallel ; and so little does Carey's law of the " falling of the capitalist's proportion " show what he intended to show the course pursued by the rate of interest. It scarcely needs further proof that Carey's contribu- tions to the explanation of interest are entirely worthless. The peculiar problem of interest, the explanation why it is that the return falling to the share of capital is worth more than the capital consumed in obtaining it, is not even touched. That this sham-solution has, nevertheless, found admission into the writings of many most respectable economists of our own and other nations is a proof of the very small degree of thoroughness and discrimination with which, ' unfortunately, our most difficult subject is usually treated. Scarcely more correct if at all than Carey himself is his disciple E. Peshine Smith, whose Manual of Political Economy (1853) has lately obtained a wide circulation in Germany through Stopel's translation. Peshine Smith finds the origin of profit in a partnership between workman and capitalist. The object of the partner- ship is " to change the form, of the commodities contributed by the capitalist, and increase their value by combining them with a new infusion of labour." The return, " the new thing produced," is divided, and divided in such a way that the capitalist receives more than the replacement of the capital he has contributed, and so makes a profit. Smith obviously considers it self-evident that it must be so. For without taking the trouble of a formal explanation, he points out, in quite general terms, that the bargain must promote the interests of both, and that "both the capitalist and the labourer expect to derive their respective shares in the ad- M 162 THE INDIRECT PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n vantages of their partnership." Beyond this he simply appeals to the fact : " In point of fact, they do so, however long may be the series of transformations and exchanges before the division is made" (p. 77). A purely formal distinction of profit emerges according as, in the partnership, it is the capitalist or the labourer who takes the risk on himself. In the former case " the share in the product which the workman obtains is called wages ; and the difference in value between the materials as turned over to the workman, the food, raiment, shelter, etc., furnished to the workman in kind, or commuted in wages, the deterioration of the tools employed, and the finished product, is termed profits. If the workman takes the risk upon himself, that share which he gives to the capitalist, in addition to replacing the capital he had borrowed, is called rent" (p. 77). In this passage, where Smith speaks for the first time of profit, the superficial way in which he evades any deeper explanation of it clearly shows that he has not grasped his problem at all. Yet what he has said up till now, if not of much importance, is not incorrect. But even this modest praise cannot be given to what follows, where he goes on to examine the influences which the growth of capital exerts on the rate of profit. Here he copies faithfully not only Carey's method of statement and his final conclusions, but even all his mistakes and blunders. First of all, quite in Carey's style, he introduces a couple of economical pictures drawn from primitive conditions. A savage goes to the owner of a stone axe, and gets permission to use the axe under the condition that he builds one canoe for the owner of the axe, as well as one for himself. A genera- tion passes away, and copper axes are substituted, by the aid of which three times as much work can be done as by the stone axe. Of the six canoes that the worker now builds in the same time as formerly he built two, he may retain four for himself, while -two are claimed by the capitalist. The share of the labourer has thus increased both in proportion and in quantity ; that of the capitalist has also increased in quantity, but has decreased in relative proportion, it has fallen from a half to a third of the product. Finally, the celebrated " American axes " of the present day come into use. With CHAP, in PESHINE SMITH 163 them three times the work can now be done that used to be done by the copper axes, and of the eighteen canoes, or other products of labour, which the borrower of the axe can now make, he will have to pay four for the use of the axe, and fourteen are left him as the share of his labour. In this case again the share of the worker has proportionally advanced, and that of the capitalist diminished. Arrived at this point, Smith begins to apply his rules to modern economic life and ita forms. First, for the form of contract with the savage is substi- tuted the modern loan contract. " The cases we have put represent the capitalist agreeing to make a fixed payment out of the product of the capital which he entrusts to the labourer, and of the mechanical force of the latter. In so doing he runs a risk that the labourer may not exert himself to his full ability, and that the residue after payment of wages, upon which he depends for profits, may be less than he calculates. To insure himself against this contingency, he naturally seeks to bargain for less wages than he is confident that the earnest and honest exertion of the workman's strength would enable him to pay, without impairing his expected profit The workman, on the contrary, knowing what he can do, and unwilling to submit to any reduction, prefers to guarantee the profit which the capitalist desires, taking upon himself the risk that the product will leave a margin broad enough to provide for the wages which the capitalist is afraid to guarantee. The contract thus becomes one of hiring capital" (p. 80). The careful reader will remark that in these words not only is the new form of contract substituted for the old, to which there is no objection, but, quite unexpectedly, for the price of the use, which was the thing formerly mentioned, and which was a gross interest, is now substituted the "profit" (net interest), to which there are very serious objections. But Peshine Smith goes still farther. Without hesitation he substitutes for the proportion of the product the proportion of the parent capital, or the rate of interest. Carey had made this confusion blindly ; Smith makes it with all deliberation, which is more singular and more difficult to excuse. " Men reckon their gains by a comparison between what they pre- 164 THE INDIRECT PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n viously possessed and what is added to it The capitalist reckons his profits not by his proportion of the product which has been won by the combination with labour, but by the ratio which the increment bears to the previous stock. He says he has made so much per cent on his capital ; he rents it for so much per cent for a year. The difference is one of arithmetical notation, not of fact. When his proportion of the product is small, it being composed of the original capital and the increment, the ratio of the latter to the capital will also be small" (p. 82). That is to say, a small proportion of product and a small rate of interest are substantially identical, and only different arith- metical notations for the same thing. For judgment of this strange doctrine I need only refer the reader to the illus- tration already given when criticising Carey. We there saw that the half of the product may represent 25 per cent of the capital, and that a twentieth part of the product may represent 100 per cent of the capital. This does seem something more than a mere difference in arithmetical notation ! Substituting one term for another in this way, Smith is able, finally, to proclaim Carey's " great law " that as civilisa- tion advances the share of the capitalist that is, the rate of interest falls ; and to verify it by the historical fact that in rich countries the rate of interest does fall. At the same time liis own example illustrates how a tolerably true proposition may be deduced from very false reasoning. In favourable contrast to the shallowness of the American writer is the homely but conscientious and thorough-going way in which the German investigator, Von Thiinen, has dealt with our problem. 1 .Like Carey, Thiinen investigates the origin of interest genetically. He goes back to primitive economical relations, follows the first beginnings of the accumulation of capital, and inquires in what manner and by what methods capital comes into existence in these circumstances, as well as under what laws it develops. Before beginning the inquiry itself he is careful to put down with minute exactitude all the assumptions of 1 Der isolirte Stoat, second edition, Rostock, 1842-63. The page numbers quoted in the text refer to the first division of the second part (1850). CHAP, in THUNEN 165 fact with which he starts, as well as the terminology he means to use (pp. 74-90). This is valuable to Thiinen as an aid to literary self-control, and is a characteristic example of his conscientious thoroughness. From this introduction we find that Thiinen starts by supposing a people living in a latitude of tropical fruitfulness, equipped with all the capacity, knowledge, and skill of civil- isation, but still, so far, absolutely without capital, and without communication with other peoples ; so that the accumulation of capital must come from within, and not be influenced at all from outside. Land has as yet no exchange value. All men are equal in position, equally capable, and equally saving, and get their means of support from labour. The standard of value which Thiinen makes use of for the scope of his inquiry is the labourer's means of subsistence, taking as unit the hundredth part of the means of subsistence required by a labourer during a year. The year's need he calls s, the hundredth part he calls c; so that s = 100c. "Suppose," he begins (p. 90), "that the worker, if diligent and saving, can produce by his hands 10 per cent more than he requires for his necessary subsistence say llOc in the year. Then, after deducting what he must spend for his own support, there remains over lOc. " In the course, then, of ten years he may accumulate a store on which he can live for a year without working ; or he may for the one whole year devote his labour to the making of useful tools that is, to the creation of capital "Let us follow him now in the labour that creates the capital " With a hewn flint he manages to make wood into a bow and arrow. A fish bone serves for the arrow's point From the stalk of the plantain, or the fibrous covering of the cocoa- nut, he makes string or packthread ; the one he uses to string the bow, with the other he makes fishing nets. " In the following year he applies himself again to the pro- duction of means of subsistence, but he is now provided with bow, arrows, and nets ; with the help of those tools his work is much more remunerative, the product of his work much greater. " Suppose that in this way the result of his work, after de- ducting what he must spend to keep the tools in an equally 166 THE INDIRECT PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n good state, rises from 110 to 150c, then he can lay by in one year 50c, and he only needs to devote two years now to the production of the means of subsistence, when he is free again to spend a whole year in the making of bows and nets. " Now he himself can make no use of these, since the tools made in the previous year are sufficient for his needs ; but he can lend them to a worker who up till now has worked without capital. "This second worker has been producing llOc ; if then he is lent the capital, on which the labourer who made it has ex- pended a year's labour, his production, if he keeps up the value of the tools lent him and returns them, is 150C. 1 " The extra production got by means of capital amounts therefore to 40c. " This worker can consequently pay a rent of 40c for the borrowed capital, and this sum the worker who produced the capital draws in perpetuity for his one year's labour. " Here we have the origin and ground of interest, and its relation to capital. As the wages of labour are to the amount of rent which the same labour, if applied to the production of capital, creates, so is capital to interest. " In the present case the wage of a year's work is llOc; the rent brought in by the capital that is, the result of a year's labour is 40c. "The ratio therefore is llOc : 40c = 100 : 36'4, and the rate of interest is 3 6 '4 per cent." The passage that follows refers not so much to the origin as to the rate of interest, and I shall only make a brief abstract of such of the leading ideas as may illustrate Thunen's conception still further. According to Thiinen, as capital increases, its productive efficiency declines, each new increment of capital increasing 1 " But how can the object lent be kept and returned in equally good condition and equal in value ? This, I admit, does not hold in the case of individual objects, but it certainly does in the totality of objects lent within a nation. If, e.g. any one hires out one hundred buildings for one hundred years, under the condition that the hirer annually erects a new building, the hundred buildings do retain equal value in spite of the annual wear and tear. In this inquiry we must necessarily direct our attention to the whole, and if here only two persons are represented as dealing with one another, it is simply a picture by which we may make clear the movement that goes on simultaneously over the whole nation " (note by Thiinen). CHAP, in THVNEN 167 the product of human labour in a less degree than the capital formerly applied. If, e.g. the first capital increased the return to labour by 40c say from llOc to 150c the capital next applied may bring a further increase of only 36c, a third capital 32'4c, and so on. This on two grounds. 1. If the most efficient of the tools, machines, etc., which constitute capital, are to be had in sufficient quantity, then the further production of capital must be directed to tools of less efficiency. 2. In agriculture the increment to capital, if it every- where finds employment, leads to the cultivation of less fertile and less favourably situated lands, or to a more intensive cultivation that necessitates greater costs ; and in these cases the capital last employed brings a less rent than that formerly employed (p. 195, and more in detail, p. 93). In proportion as the extra return produced by the efficiency of capital declines, naturally the price that will and can be paid for the use of the capital transferred to the borrower also declines ; and since there cannot be alongside each other two different rates of interest one for the capital first applied and another for the capital applied later the interest on capital as a whole adjusts itself to " the use of that portion of capital which is last applied" (p. 100). In virtue of these circum- stances the rate of interest tends to sink with the increase of capital, and the reduction of rent that follows from this is to the advantage of the labourer, inasmuch as it raises the wage of his labour (p. 101). We see then that Thlinen very distinctly makes the pro- ductive efficiency of capital his starting-point. Not only is this productive efficiency the origin of interest, but the current degree of the efficiency exactly determines the rate of interest. Xow the value of this theory depends altogether on the way in which is explained the connection that exists between the greater productiveness of labour supported by capital and the obtaining of a surplus value by the owner of capital. Thlinen happily keeps clear of two dangerous pitfalls. He has no fiction of a value-creating power in capital; he only ascribes to it what it actually has, viz. the capacity to assist 168 THE INDIRECT PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n towards the production of more products in other words, physical productivity. And second, he has escaped the fatal confusion of gross and net interest. What he calls net interest, the 40, 36, 32'4c, etc., which the capitalist receives, is really net interest, it being expressly assumed (p. 91) that the debtor, over and above that interest, fully replaces the value of the capital. But by this very hypothesis Thiinen has laid his interest theory open to attack from another side. The connection of ideas which in Thiinen's theory leads from the physical productivity of capital to the obtaining of surplus value by the capitalist may be put as follows : 1. Labour supported by capital can obtain a greater amount of products. This assumption is undoubtedly correct 2. The plus, which is traceable to the employment of capital, is made up, in Thiinen's illustration, of two compo- nents : first, of the 40, 36, or 32'4c, which the capitalist receives in means of subsistence ; and second, of the replacement of the real capital consumed in the employment. It is the two components together that make up the gross return to the employment of capital. A little calculation will show that this important proposition, although not plainly stated by Thiinen, is really contained in his doctrine. According to Thiinen, a year's labour unassisted by capital produces llOc. A year's labour assisted by capital is sufficient, not only to renew the capital so far as it has experienced wear and tear, but to produce 150c besides. The difference of the two results, which represents the plus due the employment of capital, presents, therefore, as a fact 40c and the upkeep of the capital. Still it must be confessed that Thiinen has kept the existence of the second component very much in the back- ground not indeed mentioning it again except in two passages of p. 91, and entirely omitting to notice it in making out his later tables (pp. 98, 110, etc.) The exactness of these tables is thus marred in no slight degree. For it may be imagined that, when capitals representing six or ten years' labour are employed, the yearly labour spent in replacing them must absorb a considerable portion of the whole labour power of the user. 3. The excess production called forth by the employment CHAP, in THUNEN 169 of capital l ( = renewal -f- 40 or 36 or 32'4c, as the case may be) falls to the capitalist as such. This assumption of Thiinen's is, in. my opinion, on the whole correct, even if the war of prices may often modify the share of the capitalist in individual cases. 4. This gross production of capital that falls to the capital- ist is regularly more valuable than the real capital consumed in obtaining it, so that a net production, a net interest, an excess value remains. This proposition forms the natural conclusion to the chain of thought. Thiinen has not put it any more than the others in the form of a general theoretical proposition. It only appears in the fact that his illustration shows a regular surplus value in the amount received by the capitalist over the amount given out by him, and this of course seeing that the illustration chosen is meant to be a typical one comes pretty much to an express formulation of the theoretical proposition ; all the more so that Thiinen was bound to maintain and explain a permanent surplus value of the return to capital over the sacrifice of capital, if he meant to explain the interest which is this very surplus value. At this point we come to the last and the decisive stage in Thiinen's argument. Hitherto we have found nothing essential to object to, but just at this critical point the weakness of his theory betrays itself. When we ask, In what way does Thiinen explain and give reasons for the existence of this surplus value? it must be answered that he does not explain it, but assumes it. Indeed the decisive assumption has merely slipped in at that very insig- nificant passage where Thiinen says that the possession of a capital enables the worker to produce a surplus product of 40, 36, and so on, after deduction of what is necessary to give back the capital " in equally good condition " and " equal in value" If we look more closely at this apparently harmless pro- position, we find it to contain the assumption that capital possesses power (1) to reproduce itself and its own value, and (2) over and above that, to produce something more. If, as is here assumed, the product of capital is always a sum of which 1 To avoid misunderstandings I should emphasise that Thiinen assumes the surplus production of the capital last applied to be the standard for the whole amount of capital. 170 THE INDIRECT PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n one constituent alone is equal to the whole sacrifice of capital, then it needs no explanation that the whole sum must be worth more than that sacrifice, and Thiinen is quite right not to trouble with any further explanation. But the question is, Was Thiinen justified in assuming any such efficiency in capital ? To my mind this question must be answered distinctly in the negative. It is true that, in the concrete situation first supposed by Thiinen, that assumption may appear to us quite plausible. We find nothing at all out of place in assuming, not only that the hunter equipped with bow and arrows is able to bring down forty more head of game than he could without those weapons, but that he might also have time enough over to keep his bow and arrows in good condition, or to renew them ; so that his renewed capital was worth as much at the end of the year as it was at the beginning. But is it allowable for any one to make analogous suppositions in regard to a complicated condition of economical affairs that is, a condition in which capital is too various, and the division of labour too complete, to allow of the capital being renewed by the labourer who has been using it ? If this labourer must pay for the renewal of the capital, is it self-evident that the excess in products obtained by the help of the capital will exceed the costs of the renewal, or the value of the capital consumed ? Certainly not. There are, on the contrary, two conceivable possibilities by which the surplus value might be swept away. First, it is conceivable that the great productive utility assured by possession of the capital increases the economical estimate of this capital so much that its value comes up to the value of the expected product ; that, e.g. bows and arrows which, during the whole term of their existence, secure the obtaining of 100 head more of game become equal in value to the 100 head. In that case the hunter, in order to replace the weapons worn out, would be obliged to give to the maker of the weapons the whole surplus return of 100 head (or the value of the 100 head), and would retain nothing to pay surplus value or interest to the man who lent him the weapons. Or, second, it is conceivable that the competition in the making of weapons is so severe that it presses down their price CHAP, in THUNEN 171 below that very high economical estimate. But will this same competition not also, of necessity, press down the claims which the capitalist may impose when lending the weapons ? Lauder- dale has assumed such a pressure ; so has Carey ; and our experience of economical life leaves no doubt that such a pressure will be exerted. Now here we ask, as we did in the case of Lauderdale, Why should the pressure of competition on the capitalist's share never be so strong as to press down its value to the value of the capital itself ? Why is it that there is not so great a quantity of any particular form of capital produced and employed that its employment returns just enough to replace the capital and no more ? But if this were to happen, the surplus value, and with it the interest, would, in this case also, disappear. There are, in short, three possibilities in the relation between the value of the product of capital and the value of the capital that produces that product. Either the value of the product raises the value of the real capital to the level of its own value ; or, through competition, the value of the real capital brings down the value of the return to capital to its own value ; or, finally, the share of capital in the product remains steadily above the value of the real capital. Thlinen presupposes the third of these possibilities without either proving or explaining it ; and thus, instead of explaining the whole phenomenon which is ostensibly the subject of explanation, he has assumed it. Our final judgment must, therefore, be expressed as follows. Thlinen gives a more subtle, more consistent, more thorough version of the Productivity theory than any of his predecessors, but he too stumbles at the most critical step ; where the problem is to deduce surplus value from the physical pro- ductivity of capital, from the surplus in products, he includes among his assumptions the thing he has to explain. 1 1 Not to burden the statement in the text by more difficulties than I am compelled to bring before the reader, I shall put a few considerations supplementary to the above criticism as a note. Thiinen makes two essays which, possibly, may be interpreted as attempts to justify the above assumption, and thus to give a real explanation of interest. The first essay is the remark he very often makes (pp. Ill, 149), that capital obtains its highest rent when a certain amount of it has been laid out, and that rent sinks when that limit is overstepped ; so that capitalist producers have no interest in pushing their production beyond this point. It is possible to read this proposition as explanatory of the fact that 172 THE INDIRECT PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n Thiinen's method marks a high level of solid and well considered investigation. Unfortunately this level was not long maintained, even in the literature of his own nation. In his successors, Glaser 1 and Roesler, 2 who wrote on the the supply of capital can never be so great as to press down the net interest to zero. But this consideration of the totality of profits made by capitalists has no deciding influence, perhaps no influence at all on the action of individual capitalists ; it cannot, therefore, prevent the further growth of capital. Every one ascribes, and rightly ascribes, to the increase of capital formed by his own individual saving, an infinitely small effect on the height of the general interest rate. On the other hand, every one knows that this individual saving has a very notable effect in increasing the income that he individually gets in the shape of interest. For this reason every one who has the inclination, and who has the chance, will save, undisturbed by any such considerations ; just as every landowner improves his land and betters his methods of cultivation, even when he knows, as a matter of theory, that if all owners were to do the same it would necessarily be followed, if the state of population remain unchanged, by a fall in the price of products and, notwithstanding reduced costs, by a fall in rent. The second attempt might be found in Thiinen's note quoted above on p. 166, at that place where he speaks of the renewal of the capital by the borrower. There Thiinen points out that " in this inquiry we must necessarily direct our attention to the whole." It is conceivable that this warning might be taken as an attempt to prove that the phenomenon supposed in the text, where the user of capital renews it by his own labour, and beyond that obtains a surplus product, maintains its validity in all economic circumstances, provided the people as a whole be substituted for the individual. That is to say, even if the single individual cannot by his own personal labour renew the capital consumed by him, it will hold, as regards the whole people, that by the use of capital men are able to obtain a surplus product, and "besides, with a portion of the saved labour, to replace the capital consumed. In this line of thought, then, we might see a support of the objection I made in the text, where I pronounced Thiinen's hypothesis to be applicable only to the simplest cases, and to be inadmissible in complicated ones. I do not think that this warning to look at the wholes-was meant by Thiinen in the sense I have just indicated. But if it was, it does not take anything from the force of my objection. For in questions of distribution and the question of interest is a question of distribution it is not right in every circumstance to look at the whole. From the fact that society, as a whole, is able by the help of capital to renew this capital itself, and over and above that, to produce more products, it does not follow at all that there should be interest on capital. For this plus in products might just as well accrue to the labourers as surplus wage (they being certainly as indispensable to the obtaining of it as the capital) as to the capitalist in the shape of interest. The fact is that interest, as surplus value of individual return over individual expenditure of capital, depends on the individual always obtaining particular forms of capital at a price which is less than the value of the surplus product obtained by means of them. But the consideration of society as a whole will not by itself guarantee this to the individual ; at any rate it is not self-evident that it will do so. If it were so surely there would not be so many theories over a self-evident thing ! 1 Die allgemeine Wirthschaftslehre oder Nationtd-Oekonomie, Berlin, 1852. 2 Kritik der Lehre vom Arbeitslohn, 1861. Grundsatze der VoUcswirth- CHAP, in STRASBURGER 173 same lines, we see a distinct falling off in thoroughness of conception and strictness of method. In the interval, however, the Productivity theories had become the object of serious and weighty attacks. Rodbertus, in a quiet but effective criticism, had accused them of con- fusing questions of distribution and questions of production ; pointing out that, in assuming the portion of the total product called profit to be a specific product of capital, they had committed a petitio principii ; at the same time enunciating his own formula that the sole source of all wealth was labour. Then Lasalle and Marx had varied this theme, each in his own way ; the one with vehemence and wit, the other bluntly and ruthlessly. These attacks called out a reply from the camp of the Productivity theorists, and with this we shall conclude a chapter already too long. It comes from the pen of a still youthful scholar, but it commands our full consideration ; partly from the position of its author, who, as a member of the Staatswissenschaftliche Seminar in Jena, and therefore in close scientific relation with the leading representatives of the his- torical school in Germany, may well be taken as representing the views ruling in that school ; partly from the circumstances which called out that reply. For, as it was written with full knowledge of the weighty attacks which Marx in his great book had directed against the productivity of capital, and in refuta- tion of these attacks, we are justified in expecting it to contain the best and the most cogent that its author, after full critical consideration, was able to say in favour of the Pro- ductivity theory. The reply is to be found in two essays of K. Strasburger, published in 1871 in Hildebrand's Jahrbucher fur National- Oekonomie und Statistik. 1 The substance of his theory Strasburger has condensed in the second of these essays as follows : " Capital supplies natural powers which, while accessible to schaftslehre, 1864. Vorlesungen uber Volkswirthschafi, 1878. In the German edition Professor Bohm-Bawerk has devoted several pages to statement and criticism of these two writers ; but in the present edition he wishes me to omit them as of little importance. W. S. 1 " Zur Kritik der Lehre Marx' vom Kapitale " and "Kritik der Lehre vom Arbeitslohn," vols. xvi. and xvii. of above. 174 THE INDIRECT PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n every one, can often be applied to a definite production only by its help. Not every one possesses the means of subordi- nating those natural powers. The power of the man who works with a small capital is spent in doing things that are done for another man who is amply supplied with capital by natural powers. On this account the work of natural powers, if effected through the medium of capital, is no gift of nature; it is taken into account in exchange ; and lie who has no capital must give over the product of his own labour to the capitalist for the work of the natural powers. Capital, therefore, pro- duces values, but the role it plays in production is quite different from that played by labour." And a little farther on (p. 329) he says: "What has been already said will show how we understand the productivity of capital. Capital produces values inasmuch as it gets natural powers to do work which otherwise would have to be done by man. The productivity of. capital, therefore, rests upon its activity in production being distinct from that of living labour. We have said that the work of natural powers is considered in exchange as an equivalent of human labour. Marx main- tains the contrary. He thinks that, if one worker is assisted in his work by natural powers more than another, he creates more use values the quantity of his products is greater ; but that the action of the natural powers does not raise the exchange value of the commodities produced by him. For refutation of this view it is sufficient to remember what we have already noted above that it is not every one who possesses these means of subordinating natural powers ; those who possess no capital must buy its work by means of their own labour. Or if they work by the help of another man's capital, they must give over to him a share of the value produced. This share of the value newly produced is profit : the drawing of a certain income by the capitalist is founded on the nature of capital." If we condense the substance of this still further we get the following explanation. While it is true that natural powers are in themselves gratuitous, it is often only by the help of capital that they can be made of use. Now since capital is only available in limited quantity, its owners are able to obtain a payment for CHAP, in STRASBURGER 175 the co-operation of the natural powers thus made available. This payment is profit. Profit, therefore, is explained by the necessity of paying a price to the capitalists for the co-operation of natural powers. What success has this theory in explaining the phenomena under discussion ? Strasburger's premises may be readily conceded. I grant at once that many natural powers can only be utilised through the mediation of capital ; and I also grant that, the amount of capital being limited, the owner of it may be able to get paid for the co-operation of the natural powers thus made available. But what I cannot grant is, that these premises tell us anything at all of the origin of interest. It is a hasty and unreasoned assumption of Strasburger that the existence of interest follows from these premises, so long as these premises, in their very nature, lead to entirely different economical pheno- mena. It should not be difficult to expose Strasburger's mistake. Only one of two things is here possible : either capital can only be had in such a limited quantity that the capitalists can obtain a payment for the powers of nature made available ; or it can be had in unlimited quantity. Strasburger's theory assumes the former of these to be the case. Accepting this we ask, How does the capitalist, in practical business life, actually obtain payment for the natural powers ? It would be a hasty petitio principii to answer, Simply by pocketing the profit. A very little consideration will make it clear that, if interest comes from the payment of natural powers, it can only make its appearance as a secondary result of more complicated economical processes. That is to say, since natural powers reside in capital, it is obvious they can only be made use of at the same time as the services of capital are made use of. But, further, since capital has come into being through the expenditure of labour, and when used either perishes in a single use or wears itself out gradually, it is clear that, wherever the services of capital are made use of, the labour that is embedded in the capital must be paid for also. The payment for natural powers, therefore, can only accrue to the capitalist as a constituent portion of a gross return, which, over and above that payment, contains a second payment for expenditure of labour. 176 THE INDIRECT PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n To be still more exact. The economical process by which the capitalist receives payment for natural powers is the sale of the services of his capital at a higher price than that which represents the expenditure of labour made in producing the concrete capital in question. If, e.g. a machine which lasts for a year is made at the expenditure of 365 days of labour, and if the customary day's wage is half a crown, to sell the daily services of the machine for half a crown would only just pay for the labour embedded in the machine, and leave nothing over for the natural powers that it makes available. No payment for these natural powers emerges until the daily services of the machine are paid for by more than half a crown - say by 2s. 9d. Now this general process may take place under several different forms. One of these forms is when the owner of the capital uses it himself in production as an undertaker. In this first case, the payment of the total services of capital consists in that pro- portion of the product which remains over after deducting the other expenses of production, such as use of ground and direct labour. This constitutes the " gross return to capital." If this gross return, calculated by the day, amounts to 2s. 9d., and if 2s. 6d. only is required to pay for the labour which has created the capital used up in a day, the surplus of 3d. a day represents the payment for natural powers. It must not be taken for granted, however, that this surplus is profit on capital On that we shall decide later. In a second and more direct way, the services of capital may obtain payment by hiring. If our machine obtains a day's hire of 2s. 9d., in exactly the same way 2s. 6d. will represent the payment of the labour expended in making the machine, and the surplus of 3d. again represents the payment for natural powers. But there is still a third way in which a man may part with the services of capital that is, by parting with the capital itself; which, economically, amounts to a cumulative parting with all the services which that capital is able to perform. 1 Now in this case will the capitalist be content if he is compensated for the labour embedded in th,e machine? 1 See Knies, Kredit, part ii. pp. 34, 37. CHAP, in STRASBURGER 177 Will he not also demand a compensation for the natural powers that are made available by its use ? Of course he will. There is absolutely no ground to conceive why he should get paid for natural powers in the case of a successive parting with the machine's services, and not in the case of a cumulative parting with them ; especially when, with Stras- burger, we have assumed that the quantity of capital is so limited that he can compel such a payment. What form, then, will the payment for natural powers take in this case ? Quite naturally they will take this form : the price of the machine will rise above that amount which represents the customary payment of the labour employed in making the machine. Therefore, if the machine has cost 365 days of labour at 2s. 6d. a day, its purchase price will amount to more than 365 half-crowns. And since there is no reason why, in cumulative parting with the services of capital, natural powers should be paid for at a cheaper rate than in successive partings, we may, as in our former suppositions, assume in this case also a payment for natural powers at 10 per cent of the l-.jour payment. Consequently the capital price would be fixed at 365 + 36'5 = 401'5 half- crowns, or 50 : 3 : 9. Now what about interest under these suppositions ? There is no difficulty in answering this. The owner of the machine, who employs it in his own undertaking, or hires it out, draws 2s. 9d. a day for its services during the year which it lasts. That yields a total income of 365 x 2s. 9d. = 50 : 3 : 9. But since the machine itself is worn out through the year's use, and its capital value amounted to quite 50:3:9, there remains as surplus, as pure interest, nothing. Although, therefore, the capitalist has got paid for natural powers, there is no interest ; a clear proof that the cause of interest must lie in something else than payment for natural powers. An objection may very probably be made at this point. It may be said, It is not possible for the value of real capital to remain so high that its producers obtain in the price a premium for natural powers; in such a case the production of capital would be too remunerative, and would certainly call out a competition that, in the long run, would press down the value of the real capital to the value of the labour employed 178 THE INDIRECT PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n in its production. E.g. if a machine that had cost 365 days' labour should, in consequence of natural powers being made available by it, fetch a price of 50:3:9; then, supposing the usual wage in other employments to be 2s. 6d. a day, the labour directed to the making of such machines would be more remunerative than any other kind of labour ; as a consequence there would be a great rush into this branch of production, and the manufacture of those machines would be multiplied till the increased competition had pressed down their price to 365 half-crowns per machine. At the same time the advan- tage obtainable by the labourer from their use would be pressed down to the normal standard. I grant at once the possibility of such an occurrence. But I ask, on the other hand, If the machines have become so numerous, and competition so strong that their producer is glad to sell them at a bare compensation for his labour, and can calculate nothing for the use of the natural powers which he makes available, how should he, in hiring out these machines, or employing them himself, be able all at once to demand something for natural powers ? There is only one alternative. Either the machines are scarce enough to allow of a calculation for natural powers ; in which case their scarcity will serve as well in selling as in hiring, and the capital value of the machines will rise to the point of absorption of gross interest, if no other thing prevents it. Or the machines are made in such quantity that any calculation for natural powers is made impossible by the pressure of competition ; in which case it will be as true for the hiring as for the selling, and gross interest will fall till it is once more absorbed in the cost of replacement always supposing, again, that there is not some factor, outside of the payment for natural powers, which keeps the two quantities apart. Thus Strasburger, like many of his predecessors, has missed the very point which was to be explained. He shows, perhaps, why the gross interest which capital yields is high in our illustration, why the machine yields 2s. 9 d. instead of half-a- crown per day but he does not show why the value of the capital itself does not rise in the same proportion. He does not explain why a machine which yields 2s. 9d. per day for 365 days is .not valued at 365 X 2s. 9d. = 50:3:9, but CHAP, in STRASBURGER 179 only at 365 half -crowns = 4 7. But the writer who means to explain net interest must explain just this difference between the value of the capital itself and the sum of its total gross productiveness. It is characteristic of the Indirect Productivity theories that after almost seventy years' development they should end nearly at the same point as that from which they started. What Strasburger teaches in the year 1871 is in substance almost exactly what Lauderdale taught in 1804. The "power of capital to replace labourers," which power, on account of its scarcity and in the measure of its scarcity, enables the capitalist to obtain a payment, is only different in name from the natural powers which the possession of capital makes available, and which, equally in the measure of the scarcity of capital, compel a payment. Here as there is the same confounding of gross interest and capital value on the one side, and gross interest and net interest on the other ; the same misinterpretation of the true effects of premises assumed ; the same neglect of the true causes of the phenomenon under discussion. In this return to the starting-point is seen the whole barrenness of the development that lies between. This barrenness was no accident. It was not simply an unfortunate chance that no one found the Open Sesame which had the power to discover the mysterious origination of interest in the productivity of capital. It was rather that on the road to the truth a wrong turning had been taken. From the first it was a hopeless endeavour to explain interest wholly and entirely from a productive power of capital. It would be different if there were a power that could make value grow directly, as wheat grows from the field. But there is no such power. What the productive power can do is only to create a quantity of products, and perhaps at the same time to create a quantity of value, but never to create surplus value. Interest is a surplus, a remainder left when product of capital is the minuend and value of consumed capital is the sub- trahend. The productive power of capital may find its result in increasing the minuend. But so far as that goes it cannot increase the minuend without at the same time increasing the subtrahend in the same proportion. For the productive power 180 THE INDIRECT PRODUCTIVITY THEORIES BOOK n is undeniably the ground and measure of the value of the capital in which it resides. If with a particular form of capital one can produce nothing, that form of capital is worth nothing. If one can produce little with it, it is worth little ; if one can produce much with it, it is worth much, and so on ; always increasing in value as the value that can be produced by its help increases ; i.e. as the value of its product increases. And so, however great the productive power of capital may be, and however greatly it may increase the minuend, yet so far as it does so, the subtrahend is increased in the same proportion, and there is no remainder, no surplus of value. I may be allowed, in conclusion, one more comparison. If a log is thrown across a flooded stream the level of water below the log will be less than the level of water above the log. If it is asked why the water stands higher above the log than below, would any one think of the flood as the cause ? Of course not. For although that flood causes the water above the log to stand high, it tends at the same time, so far as that is concerned, to raise the level of the water below the log just as high. It is the cause of the water being " high " ; what causes it to stand " higher " is not the flood, but the log. Now what the flood is to the differences of level, the productive power of capital is to surplus value. It may be an adequate cause of the value of the product of capital being high, but it cannot be the adequate cause that the product is higher in value than the capital itself, seeing that it feeds and raises the level of the capital in the same way as it does that of the product. The true cause of the " plus " in this case also is a log, and a log which has not been so much as mentioned by the Productivity theories proper. It has been sought by other theories in various things ; sometimes in the sacrifice of a use, sometimes in the sacrifice of abstinence, sometimes in a sacrifice of work devoted to make capital, sometimes simply in the exploiting pressure of capitalist on labourer ; but so far as we have gone there has been no satis- factory recognition of its nature and action. 1 1 Many readers Eiay wonder why a writer who shows himself so very decidedly opposed to the Productivity theory, does not at all avail himself of the abundant and powerful support given by the socialist criticism ; in other words, why CHAP, in PRODUCTIVITY AND SURPLUS VALUE 181 I do not dismiss the theory with the argument that capital itself is the product of labour, and thus its productivity, whatever else it be, is not an originating power. The reason simply is that I attribute to this argument only a secondary importance in the theoretical explanation of interest. The state of the case seems to me to be as follows. No one will question that capita], once made, manifests a certain productive effect. A steam-engine, e.g. is in any case the cause of a certain productive result. The primary theoretic question suggested by this state of matters now is, Is that productive capacity of capital of capital made and ready the quite sufficient cause of interest ? If this question were answered in the affirmative, then of course, in the second place, would come the question whether the productive power of capital is an inde- pendent power of capital, or whether it is only derived from the labour which has produced the capital ; in other words, whether (manual) labour, through the medium of capital, should not be considered the true cause of interest. But having answered the first question in the negative, I have no occasion to enter on the secondary question, whether the productive power of capital is an originating power or not. Besides, in a later chapter I shall have the opportunity of taking a position on the latter question. BOOK El THE USE THEOEIES CHAPTEE I THE USE OF CAPITAL THE Use theories are an offshoot of the Productivity theories, but an offshoot which quickly grew into an independent life of its own. They attach themselves directly to that idea on which the Productivity theories proper got into difficulties, the idea that there is an exact causal connection between the value of pro- ducts and the value of their means of production. If, as economists began to recognise, the value of every product is, as a rule, identical with the value of the means of production expended in making it, then every attempt to explain surplus value by the productive power of capital must fail ; for the higher that power raises the value of the product, the higher must it raise the value of the capital itself as identical with it. The latter must follow the former with the fidelity of a shadow, and there should be no possibility of the slightest space between them. Nevertheless there is a space. This line of thought suggested almost of itself a new way of explanation. If, on the one hand, it is true that the value of every product is identical with the value of the means of production sacrificed in making it, and if, on the other hand, it is observed that, notwithstanding this, the product of capital is regularly greater than the value of the real capital thus sacrificed, the conviction almost forces itself on us that this real capital may not represent all the sacrifice that is made to obtain a product. Perhaps, besides this real capital, there is something else that must be expended at the same time ; a something which claims a part of the value of the product, the surplus value we are inquiring about. 186 THE USE OF CAPITAL BOOK HI This Something was sought and found. Indeed, we might say that more than one was found. Three distinct opinions were put forward as to its nature ; and out of the one funda- mental idea there grew three distinct theories the Use theory, the Abstinence theory, and the Labour theory. Of these the one that kept most closely by the Productivity theories, and indeed made its first appearance simply as an extension of them, is the Use theory. The fundamental idea of the Use theory is the following. Besides the substance of capital, the use (Gebrauch or Nutzung} of capital is an object of independent nature and of inde- pendent value. To obtain a return for capital it is not enough I to sacrifice substance of capital alone ; the use of the capital I employed must be sacrificed also during the period of the | production. Now since, as a matter of theory, the value of the product is equal to the sum of the values of the means of production spent in making it, and since, in conformity with this principle, the substance of capital and the use of capital, taken together, are equal to the value of the product, this product naturally must be greater than the value of the substance of capital by itself. In this way the phenomenon of surplus value is explained as being the share that falls to the part sacrifice, the " use of capital." This theory of course assumes that capital is productive, but less emphatically, and in a way that is quite free from ambiguity. It assumes that the accession of capital to a given amount of labour assists in obtaining a relatively greater product than labour, unsupported by capital, could obtain. It is not necessary, however, that the capitalist process of production on the whole, embracing as it does both the making and the employing of capital, should be profitable. If, e.g. a fisherman makes a net by 100 days' labour, and with the net catches 500 fish in the 100 days during which the net lasts, while another fisherman without any net has been able to catch three fish a day for the 200 days, evidently the total process has not been a profitable one. Notwithstanding the employ- ment of capital, only 500 fish have been caught by an outlay of 200 days' labour, while in the other case 600 fish have been caught. Nevertheless, according to the Use theory as also according to facts the net once made must bear CHAP, i ACCORDING TO THE USE THEORY 187 interest. For, once made, it helps to catch more fish than could be caught without a net, and this fact is sufficient to assure the surplus return of 200 fish being calculated as due to its assistance. But it is only calculated as such in association with its use. There will be ascribed, therefore, a part return of, perhaps 190 fish, or their value, to the substance of the net ; the remainder will be ascribed to the use of the net. Thus emerges a surplus value and an interest on capital. If this very moderate amount of physical productivity on the part of capital is sufficient, according to the Use theory, to cause surplus value, it is self-evident that this theory in no way assumes any direct value productivity; indeed, rightly understood, it really excludes it. The relation of the Use theories to the productive power of capital will not, however, be found stated so clearly in the writings of their representatives as I have thought neces- sary to state it. On the contrary, indeed, appeals to the productive power of capital long accompany the development of the Use theory proper, and we are very often left in doubt whether the author relies, for his explanation of surplus value, more on the productive power of capital or on the arguments peculiar to the Use theory. It is only gradually that the Use theories have cut themselves clear of this confusion with the Productivity theory, and developed in complete independence. 1 In what follows I mean, first, to show the historical development of the Use theories. Criticism of them I shall divide into two parts. Such critical remarks as refer simply to individual defects in individual theories I shall include at once with the historical statement. My critical estimate of the school as a whole will follow in a separate chapter. 1 The hesitating way in which many of the Use theorists have expressed themselves is to blame in great part for the fact that, up till now, so little, attention has been paid to the independent existence of these theories. Their representatives were usually classed with the adherents of the Productivity theories proper, and it was considered that the former had been confuted when only the latter had been. From what I have said above it will be seen that this is quite erroneous. The two groups of theories rest on essentially distinct principles. CHAPTEE II HISTORICAL STATEMENT THE development of the Use theory is associated for the most part with three names. J. B. Say first suggested it ; Hermann worked out the nature and essence of the Uses, and so put the theory on a firm foundation ; Menger gave it the most complete form of which, in my opinion, it is capable. All the writers that come between take one or other of these as their model, and although some of them are well worthy of attention, they are of secondary importance to those just mentioned. There are two things that strike us in looking over the list of these writers. The first is that, with the single excep- tion of Say, the working out of the Use theory has been done entirely by German science. And the other is that in Germany this theory seems to have attracted the marked preference of our most thorough and acute thinkers. At least we find represented here a remarkable number of the best names in German science. We have already considered at length the doctrine of Say, the founder of this school. 1 In his writings Productivity theory and Use theory grow up side by side ; so much so that neither seems to come before or be subordinate to the other ; and the historian of theory has no alternative but to consider Say as the representative of both theories. As basis for what follows I shall recapitulate very briefly the line of thought followed in such of his ideas as belong properly to the Use theory. The fund of productive capital provides productive services. 1 See above, p. 120. CHAP, ii SA Y 189 These services possess economical independence, and are the objects of independent valuation and sale. Now as these services are indispensable for production, and at the same time are not to be obtained from their owners without compensation, the prices of all products of capital, under the play of supply and demand, must adjust themselves in such a way that, over and above the compensation to the other factors in production, they contain the ordinary compensation for these productive services. Thus the " surplus value " of the products of capital, and with it interest, originates in the necessity of paying independently for this independent sacrifice in production, the " services of capital." The most signal weakness of this doctrine, apart from its being continually traversed by contradictory expressions of the Naive Productivity theory, lies, perhaps, in the confusion in which Say leaves the conception of productive services. A writer who makes the independent existence and remuneration of such services the axis on which his interest theory turns is, at least, bound to express himself clearly as to what should be understood by these terms. Not only has Say omitted to do this, as we have already seen, but the few indications that he does give point in an entirely wrong direction. From the analogy that Say repeatedly draws between the services of capital on the one hand, and human labour, as also the activity of the " natural fund," on the other, we might conclude that, by the services of capital, Say would -wish us to understand the putting in motion of the natural powers that reside in real capital; e.g. the physical actions of beasts of burden, of machines, the setting free of the heating power in coal, etc. But if this is what he means, then the whole argument is on the wrong track. For this putting in motion of natural powers is nothing else than what, in another place, I have called the " Material Services " (Nutzlcistungcn) of goods. 1 It is what our current science, with its unsuggestive and lamentably obscure vocabulary, has termed .the Nutzv.ng of capital, meaning the gross use of capital. It is this that is remunerated by the undiminished gross return sometimes called Hire. 2 In a word, it is the substance of gross interest, not of 1 See my Eechte und Verhaltnisse, p. 57. More exactly also below. It will be well to remember that the word Hire (Miethzins in Gorman) is 190 HISTORY OF THE USE THEORY BOOK in net interest, and it is net interest with which we are here concerned. If this is what Say actually meant by his services productifs, then his whole theory has missed the mark ; for it is only gross interest that emerges from the necessity of paying for productive services, not net interest ; and it is net interest that is the object of explanation. But if by the services productifs he meant anything else, he has left us absolutely in the dark regarding the nature of it, and the theory built on its existence is, to say the least of it, incomplete. In any case, then, Say's theory is not satisfactory. Yet it pointed out a new way which, when properly followed, led much nearer the heart of the interest problem than the barren Productivity theories had. The two writers who come next after Say can scarcely be said to have done much towards any such development. One of them, indeed, Storch, fell very far short of the point to which Say had brought the theory. Storch 1 professes to follow Say, and often quotes him, but he only takes Say's results. He does not use his argu- ment, and he has not supplied the want by one of his own. It is a characteristic symptom of the barren way in which Storch deals with our subject that he does not explain loan interest by natural interest, but natural by loan interest. He starts by saying (p. 212) that capital is a "source of production " although a secondary source along with nature and labour, the two primary sources of goods. The sources of production become sources of income inasmuch as they often belong to different persons; and they must first, through a loan contract be put at; the disposal of the person who unites them properly used of the lending of a durable article where the sum paid monthly or yearly includes wear and tear. If we pay 20s. a month for the hire of a piano, it is understood that the piano suffers so much by our use, and that the 20s. covers that deterioration. We are not expected to repair the damage done to the piano, nor to pay an extra sum for repairing it. That is to say, the 20s. per month is a gross interest, which includes the replacement of the capital. If in three years the music-seller gets 36 in hires for an ordinary piano, it is evident that this is far more than interest. The true interest (net interest) is found by deducting the capital value of the piano. Sky that that value was 30, and that in three years' time the piano is worn out ; then 6 is the interest obtained by the music-seller over a period of three years on H capital sum of 30. But this distinction, evident at a first glance in a concrete example, has been overlooked, as we see, by more than one economist. W. S. 1 Cours d' Economic Politique, vol. i. Paris, 1823. CHAP, ii STORCH 191 in productive co-operation. For this they receive remuneration, and this remuneration goes as income to the lender. "The price of a loaned piece of land is called rent; the price of loaned labour is called wages ; the price of a loaned capital is called sometimes interest, sometimes hire." * After Storch has thus given us to understand that lending out of productive powers is the regular way of getting an income, he adds, by way of postscript, that a man can obtain an income even if he himself employs the productive powers. " A man who cultivates his own garden at his own expense unites in his own hands the land, the labour and the capital Never- theless " (the word is significant of Storch's conception) " he draws from the first a land rent ; from the second a subsist- ence; from the third an interest on capital." The sale of his products must return him a value which is, at least, equiv- alent to the remuneration he would have got from the land, labour, and capital if he had lent them ; eptherwise he will stop cultivating the garden, and lend out his productive powers. 2 But why should it be possible for him to get a remuneration for the productive powers, particularly for the capital he lends ? Storch does not take much trouble to answer this question. "Since every man," he says on p. 266, "is compelled to eat before he can obtain a product, the poor man finds himself in dependence on the rich, and can neither live nor work if he does not receive from him some of the food already in exist- ence, which food he promises to replace when he has completed his product. These loans cannot ~be gratuitous, for, if they were, the advantage would be entirely on the side of the poor man, and the rich would have no interest whatever in making the bargain. To get the rich man's consent, then, it must be agreed that the owner of the accumulated surplus or capital draws a rent or a profit, and this rent will be in proportion to 1 These last words are .a quotation from Say. 2 Even in discussing the question of the rate of interest this perversion of the relation of natural and loan interest reappears. On p. 285 Storch makes interest determined by the proportion between the supply of the capitalists having capitals to lend, and of the undertakers wishing to hire these capitals. And on p. 286 he says that the rate of the income of those persons who themselves employ their productive powers -adapts itself to that rate which is determined by the demand and supply of loaned productive powers. 192 HISTORY OF THE USE THEORY BOOK in the amount of the capital advanced." This is an explanation which, in economical precision, leaves almost everything to be desired. Of a second follower of Say, Nebenius, it cannot at any rate be said that the theory received any harm at his hands. In his celebrated work on Public Credit, 1 Nebenius has devoted a brief consideration to our subject, and given a some- what eclectic explanation of it. In the main he follows Say's Use theory. He accepts his category of the productive services of capital, 2 and bases interest on the fact that these services obtain exchange value. But in course of the argument he brings out a new element, in pointing to " the painful priva- tions and exertions " 3 which the accumulation of capital requires. In the long run he shows ample agreement with the Productivity theory. Thus on one occasion he remarks that the hire which the borrower has to pay for a capital which he employs to advantage may be considered as the fruit of that capital itself (p. 21); and, on another occasion, he emphasises the fact that, " in the reciprocal valuation by which the hire is determined, it is the productive power of the capitals that forms the chief element" (p. 22). Nebenius, however, does not enter on any more exact explanation of his interest theory ; nor does he analyse the nature of the productive services of capital, obviously taking the category without question from Say. At this point I may mention a third writer who rose into prominence later writing long after Hermann but never got beyond Say's standpoint; Carl Mario, in his System der Wdtokonomie.* 1 Oeffcntliche Credit. I quote from the second edition, 1829. 2 See, e.g. pp. 19, 20. 3 "On the one hand, the necessity and the usefulness of capital for the busi- ness of production in its most multifarious forms, and on the other, the hardship of the privations to which we owe its accumulation ; these lie at the root of the exchange value of the services rendered by capital. They get their compensation in a share of the value of the products, to the production of which they have co- operated " (p. 19). "The services of oapital and of industry necessarily have an exchange value ; the former because capitals are only got through more or less painful privations or exertions, and people can be induced to undergo such only by getting an adequate share. ..." (p. 22) 4 Kassel, 1850-57. CHAP, ii NEBENIUS, MARLO 193 In striking contrast with the imposing plan of this work, and the supreme importance which, from its very nature, the interest problem should have had in it, is the extremely slight treatment which the problem actually received. One may search these bulky volumes in vain for any connected and thorough inquiry into the origin of interest ; indeed for any real interest theory at all. If it were not that Mario in the course of his polemic against his opponents particularly against the doctrine that labour is the sole source of value * had to some extent marked out his standpoint, what he said positively on the question of interest would not be enough to indicate, in the very slightest degree, what his opinions were, to say nothing of introducing the uninitiated to the nature of the problem. Mario's views are a mixture of Use and Productivity theories taken from Say. He recognises, with special emphasis on the necessity of their working together, 2 two sources of wealth natural power and labour power and from this comes his conception of capital as " perfected natural power." 3 Corresponding to the two sources of wealth are two kinds of income interest and wages. " Interest is the compensation for the productive or consumptive use of parent- wealth." "If we apply forms of wealth as instruments of work, they contribute to production, and so render us a service. If we apply them to purposes of consumption we not only con- sume the wealth itself, but also the service which it might have rendered if productively employed. If we employ wealth belonging to other people, we must compensate the owners for the productive service which it might have rendered. The com- pensation for this is variously called interest or rent. If we employ our own goods we ourselves draw the interest which they bear." 4 It is a poor epitome of Say's old theory. This unsatisfactory repetition of old arguments is still more wonderful when we consider that in the interval a very great stride had been taken towards the perfecting of the Use theory by Hermann's Staaiswiriscliaftliche+Unterswhungen, published in 1832. 1 i. sect. ii. p. 246, etc., and many other places. 2 ii. p. 214, and other places. * ii. p. 255. 4 ii. pp. 633, 660. 194 HISTORY OF THE USE THEORY BOOK in This work forms the second milestone in the development of the Use theory. Out of Say's scanty and contradictory suggestions which he accepts with flattering recognition l Hermann has built up a stately theory ; the same care ex- pended on its foundations as on its details. And it is of no small importance that this well-constructed theory has become a vital part of Hermann's entire system. It permeates the whole of his lengthy work from end to end. There is not a chapter in it where a considerable space is not given to its statement or application. There is not a passage in it where the author allows himself to be untrue to the position which his acceptance of the Use theory compels him to take. In what follows I can only briefly state the principal points of Hermann's theory, although it certainly deserves our more thorough acquaintance. In doing so I shall confine myself for the most part to the second edition of the Staatswirtschaft- licke Untersuchungcn (1874), in which the theory is substanti- ally unchanged, and is at the same time put more definitely and in a more complete shape. The foundation of Hermann's theory is his conception of the independent use of goods. Quite in contrast to Say, who tries to gloss over the nature of his services productifs with a few analogies and metaphors, Hermann takes all possible care in explaining his fundamental conception. He introduces it first in the theory of Goods, where he speaks of the different kinds of usefulness that goods have. " Usefulness may be transitory or it may be durable. It is partly the nature of the goods, partly the nature of the use that determines this point. Transitory, often momentary use- fulness belongs to freshly cooked food, and to many kinds of drink. The doing of a service has only a momentary use value, yet its result may be permanent, as is the case in tuition, in a physician's advice, etc. Land, dwellings, tools, books, money, have a durable use value. Their use, for the time that they last (called in German their Nutzung)? can be conceived of as a good in itself, and may obtain for itself an exchange value which we call interest." 1 See first edition, p. 270, in the note. 8 " Ihr Gebrauch wiihrend dessen sie fortbestehen, wird ihr Nutzung gennant," etc. CHAP, ii HERMANN 195 But not only are durable goods, but transitory and consum- able goods also, capable of affording a durable use. Since this proposition is of cardinal importance in Hermann's theory, I give his exposition of it in his own words : " Technical processes are able, throughout all the change and combination of the usefulness of goods, to preserve the sum of their exchange values undiminished, so that goods, although successively taking on new sha-pes, still continue unchanged in value. Iron ore, coal, labour, obtain, in the form of pig iron, a combined usefulness to which they all three contribute chemical and mechanical elements. If, then, the pig iron possesses the exchange value of the three exchange goods employed, the earlier sum of goods persists, bound up qualita- tively in the new usefulness, added together quantitatively in the exchange value. " To goods that are of transitory material, technical pro- cesses, through this change of form, add economical durability and permanence. This persistence of usefulness and of ex- change value which is given to goods otherwise transitory by technical change of form, is of the greatest economical import- ance. The amount of durable useful goods becomes thereby very much greater. Even goods of perishable material and of only temporary use, by constantly changing their shapes while retaining their exchange value, become re-created so that their use becomes lasting. Thus, as it is in the case of durable goods, so it is in the case of goods changing their form qualitatively, while retaining their exchange value ; this use may be conceived of as a good in itself, as a use (Nutzung} which may itself obtain exchange value." I shall return to this notable passage later on. Hermann then makes use of this analysis to introduce his conception of capital, which is based altogether on that of its use. " Lasting or durable goods, and perishable goods which retain their value while changing their shape, may thus be brought under one and the same conception ; they are the durable basis of a use which has exchange value. Such goods we call capital." l The bridge between these preliminary conceptions and 1 P. 111. Hermann of course does not always remain quite faithful to the conception here given. In this passage he calls the goods which form the basis 196 HISTORY OF THE USE THEORY BOOK in Hermann's interest theory proper is formed by the proposition that, in economic life, the uses of capital do regularly receive the exchange value, of which, as independent quantities, they are capable. Hermann does not treat this proposition with the emphasis adequate to its importance. Although everything further depends on it, he neither puts it formally, nor gives it any detailed explanation. Explanation, indeed, there is in plenty, but it is rather to be read between the lines than in them. It amounts to this, that the "uses" possess exchange value because they are economical goods a piece of informa- tion which is concise indeed, but may be accepted as satis- factory without further commentary. 1 His explanation of interest then proceeds as follows. In almost all productions uses of capital, possessing ex- change value, form an indispensable portion of the expenses of production. These expenses are made up of three parts : 1. Of the outlay of the undertaker that is, the expendi- ture of wealth previously existing ; as, for instance, principal, secondary, and auxiliary materials, his own labour and that of others, wear and tear of workshops, tools, etc. 2. Of the undertaker's active intelligence and care in the initiation and carrying on of the undertaking, etc. 3. Of the uses of fixed and floating capital necessary for the production all the time of their employment up till the sale of the product. 2 of a durable use capital ; but later on lie is fond of representing capital as something different from the goods as it were something hovering over them. Thus, c.ij. when he says on p. 605: "Above all we must distinguish the object in which a capital exhibits itself from the capital itself. Capital is the basis of a durable use which has definite exchange value ; it continues to exist undiminished so long as the use retains this value, and here it is all the same whether the goods which form the capital are useful simply as capital or in other ways that is, generally speaking, it is all the same in what form the capital exhibits itself." If the question be put, What then is capital, if it is not tlie substance of the goods in which it "exhibits" itself? it might be difficult enough to give a straightforward answer, and one that would not be simply play- ing with words. 1 Hermann evidently considers the exchange value of uses too self-evident to need any formal explanation from him. Even the extremely scanty explanation mentioned above is usually given only indirectly, although at the same time quite plainly ; thus when on p. 507 he says : " For the use of land the corn producer can obtain no compensation in price, so long as it is offered to any one in any quantity as a free gift." Pp. 312, etc., 412, etc. CHAP, ii HERMANN 197 Now since, economically, the price of the product must cover the total costs of production, that price must be high enough to cover " not only the outlays, but also the sacrifice that the undertaker makes in the uses of capital, as also in his intelligence and care ; " or, as it is usually expressed, over and above the compensation for outlays, the price must yield a profit (profit of capital and profit of undertaking). And more exactly explaining his idea, Hermann adds ; this profit " is by no means merely an advantage that comes by accident in the struggle that determines price." Rather we should say that profit is as much a compensation for goods possessing exchange value that are really sacrificed in the product as the outlays are. The only difference is that the undertaker makes these outlays in order to procure and hold together certain productive elements already existing, while the uses of the capital employed and his own superintendence of the business are new elements in the work, provided by himself during the production. He makes use of the outlays in order to obtain the highest possible remuneration for these new elements that he adds. " This remuneration is profit " (p. 3 1 4). To make this explanation of profit complete, one thing is still wanting ; it should be made clear how it is that, in pro- duction, there must be sacrifice of the uses of capital, besides that of the outlays of capital. This Hermann supplies in another place, where at the same time he points out, with great circumstantiality, that all products may ultimately be traced to exertions of labour and uses of capital. In doing so he makes some interesting statements about the character of the " use of goods," as he conceives of it, and it may be well to give this passage also in full. He is making an analysis of the sacrifices that are required for the procuring of salt fish. He enumerates labour of catch- ing, use and wear and tear of tools and boats, labour of pro- curing salt ; and again the use of all kinds of tools, casks, and so on. Then he breaks up the boat into wood, iron, cordage, labour, and use of tools ; the wood again, into use of the forest and labour ; the iron, into use of the mine, and so on. " But this succession of labours and uses does not exhaust the sum total of the sacrifices made in procuring salt fish. There must besides be taken into calculation the period of time during 198 HISTORY OF THE USE THEORY BOOK in which each element of exchange value is embodied in the product. For from that moment when a labour or a use is employed in the making of a product, the disposal of it in any other way is made impossible. Instead of being made use of in itself, it is simply made to co-operate in the making and delivery of the product to the consumers. To get a proper idea of this, it is to be remembered that labours and uses, so soon as they are employed in the making of a product, enter into floating capital quantitatively, as a constituent element, with the exchange value that they possessed at the time of their employment. With this value they become floating capital. But it is just this amount of value that a man ab- stains from using in any other way till the product is paid for by the buyer. As with the getting, working up, storing, and conveying, the floating capital grows through ever new labours and uses expended on it, it is itself wealth, the use of which is handed over to the consumers with every new accession of value up to the delivering over of the product to the buyer. And what must be paid for by the buyer is not simply the renunciation of that use which the undertaker might have made of the wealth for his own gratification. No ; it is actually a new and peculiar use which is handed over to him along with the wealth itself; the putting together and keeping together, the storing and keeping ready for use, of all the technical elements of the production, from the acquiring of its first basis in natural goods, on through all technical changes and commercial processes, till the product is handed over in the place, at the time and in the quantity desired. This holding together of the technical elements of the product is the service, the objective use of floating capital." ] If we compare the form which Hermann has given to the Use theory with the doctrine of Say, we find them alike in their rough outlines. Both recognise the existence of indepen- dent work done by capital. In the fact that capital is made use of in production, both see a sacrifice independent of and separate from the expenditure of the substance of capital. And both explain interest as the necessary compensation for this independent sacrifice. Still, Hermann's doctrine shows 1 P. 286, etc. CHAP, ii HERMANN 199 a substantial advance on Say's. Say had, in fact, given the mere outlines of a theory, inside which the most important features were left blank. His services productifs are nothing but an ambiguous name, and the very important consideration of how the sacrifice of these services constitutes an inde- pendent sacrifice in production independent, that is, of the substance of capital sacrificed is very much left to the reader's fancy. In trying, with true German thoroughness, to work out and make clear these two cardinal points, Hermann has definitely filled in the outlines he took from Say, and in doing so has given to the whole the rank of a solid theory. A negative merit in Hermann, not to be under estimated, is that he severely abstains from the secondary explanations (explaining interest by productivity) that are so offensive in Say. The expression " productivity " is perhaps as often in his mouth, but he uses it in a sense that, if not happy, is at least not misleading. 1 Hermann of course has not managed to keep his formula- tion of the Use theory free from all inconsistencies. In particular it remains doubtful, in his case also, what is the nature of the connection between the exchange value of the uses of capital and the price of the products of capital. Is the price of products high because the exchange value of uses is high ? Or, on the contrary, is the exchange value of the uses high because the price of products is high ? This point, over which Say falls into the wildest contradictions, 2 Hermann has not made entirely clear. In the passage given above, and in many others, he obviously inclines to the former view, and so represents the price of products as affected by the value of the uses of capital. 3 But at the same time there are many expressions which assume just the opposite. Thus (p. 296) he remarks that the determining of the price of products " is itself the first to react on the price of the labours and uses." And similarly on another occasion (p. 559) he ascribes a determining influence on the price of the incom- plete products, not to the constituent costs which have gone to create the incomplete product, but to the finished products 1 See below, p. 204. 3 See above, p. 125. 3 See also p. 560 : " The uses of capital are therefore a ground of the deter- mination of prices. " 200 HISTORY OF THE USE THEORY BOOK in which are their final result. It was reserved for Menger to make this difficult question entirely clear. Thus far we have looked only at Hermann's doctrine of the origin of interest. But we cannot pass over the quite peculiar views that he propounds on the causes of the different rates of interest. Hermann starts from the proposition already referred to, that " the total quantity of products," resolved into its simple constituents, is " a sum of labours and uses of capital." If we allow this, it becomes clear, in the next place, that all acts of exchange must consist in the exchange of labours and uses of capital possessed by one for labours and uses possessed by another, these labours and uses being either direct or em- bodied in products. Whatever, then, a man receives for his own labour in other people's labours and uses is the exchange value of labour, or wage ; and " whatever a man receives in the labours and uses of other men, when he offers his own uses for sale, forms the exchange value of these uses, or the profit of capital." The wages of labour and the profit of capital must therefore, between them, exhaust the total quantity of all products coming to market. 1 On what, then, depends the rate of profit; or, which is the same thing, the rate of the exchange value of the uses of capital ? First, naturally, on the amount of other people's labours and uses obtainable for these. But this itself depends again, for the most part, on the proportion in which the two participants in the total product, labour and uses of capital, are supplied and demanded as against each other. And of course every increase in the supply of labour tends to diminish wages and to raise profit ; and every increase in the supply of uses, to raise wages and lower profit. But, again, the supply of either of these two factors may be increased by two circumstances ; either by increase of the available amount or by increase of its productiveness. These circumstances act in the following way. " If the amount of capital increases, more uses are offered for sale, more equivalent values are sought for them. Now these equivalent values can only be labours or uses. So far 1 Under capital Hermann includes land. CHAP, ii HERMANN 201 as, in exchange for the increased uses, other uses of capital are demanded, a greater amount of equivalent values is actually disposable. Since then supply and demand are equally increased, the exchange value of the uses cannot alter. But if, as is here assumed, the quantity of labour, on the whole, is not increased, the owners of capital find, for the increased amount of uses which they seek to exchange against labour, only the amount of labour they got before that is, they get an unsatisfactory equivalent value. The exchange value of uses will therefore sink in comparison with labour ; with the same exertions, the labourer will buy more uses. In the exchange of use against use the capitalists now receive the same equivalent value as formerly, but in the exchange of uses against labour they receive less. The amount of profit, there- fore, in proportion to the total capital that is, the rate of profit must fall. The total quantity of goods produced is indeed increased, but the increase has been divided among capitalists and labourers. " If the 'productiveness of capital increases, or if in the same time it furnishes more means of satisfying needs, the owners of capital offer for sale more useful goods than before, and ask therefore for more equivalent values. They obtain these so far as each one seeks other uses in exchange for his own increased use. Here the supply has risen with the demand. The exchange value must therefore remain unaltered that is, the uses of equal capitals for equal times exchange with each other although the character of these uses as regards usefulness is higher than before. But under the assumption that labour is not increased, all the uses with which the capitalist wishes to buy labour do not obtain their former equivalent value ; this must raise the competitive demand for labour, and must lower the exchange value of uses as against labour. The labourers now receive more uses for the same amount of labour as before, and find themselves therefore better off; the owners of capital do not themselves enjoy the whole fruit of the increased pro- ductiveness of capital, but are compelled to share it with the workers. But the lowering of the exchange value of tire uses does not cause the owners of capital any loss, since the reduced value can obtain more means of enjoyment than the higher value formerly obtained." 202 HISTORY OF THE USE THEORY BOOK in On analogous grounds, which we need not further pursue, Hermann shows that the rate of profit rises if the amount or the productiveness of labour decreases. The most striking feature in this theory certainly is, that Hermann finds a reason for the decline of interest in the increase of the productive power of capital. In this he goes in direct opposition, on the one hand, to Eicardo and his school, who found the principal cause of the declining rate of interest in the decrease of the productiveness of capitals when driven to worse lands ; but, on the other hand, to the Produc- tivity theorists also, who, from the nature of their theory, were bound to accept a direct proportion between the degree of productivity and the rate of interest. 1 Whether the substance of Hermann's Use theory be tenable or not, I leave in the meantime an open question. But that Hermann's application of it to explain the height of the interest rate is not correct is, I think, demonstrable even at the present stage of our inquiries. It appears to me that, in this part of his doctrine, Her- mann has made too little distinction between two things that should have been kept very clearly distinct, the ratio between total profit and total wage, and the ratio between amount of profit and amount of capital, or the rate of interest. What Hermann has put forward admirably explains and proves a lowering or raising of total profit in proportion to wages of labour ; but that explains and proves nothing as regards the height of profit, or the rate of interest. The source of the oversight lies in this : the abstraction in other respects quite justifiable in virtue of which he sees nothing in products but" the labours and uses out of. which they come, Hermann has extended to the sphere of exchange value, where it should never have been applied. Accustomed to look on uses and labours as representatives of all goods, Hermann thought he might look at these representatives even where the matter at issue concerned the high or low exchange value of any one amount. He calculates thus : uses and labours are the representatives of all goods. Consequently if the use buys as many uses as before, but at the same time buys less labours, 1 E.g. Roscher, 183. Roesler, who accepts Hermann's results, although he ascribes them to somewhat different causes, is the only exception. CHAP. II HERMANN 203 its exchange value is evidently smaller. - Now this is not true. The exchange value of goods (in the sense of "power in exchange," which is the sense that Hermann always gives to the word) is measured, not only in the quantities of one or two definite kinds of goods that can be got in exchange for it, but in the average of all goods ; . among which, in this case, are to be counted all products, each product having equal rights with the goods called " labour " and with the goods called " use of capital." Thus exchange value is understood in practical life and in economics, and thus also it is understood by Hermann himself. On p. 432 he expressly declares: "Among such differences of the goods in which price is paid, the establishment of an average price, such as we desired for the fixing of ex- change value, is not to be thought of, but the conception of exchange value is not impossible on that account. It is arrived at by considering all the average prices which, in the same market, are paid for one good in all goods ; it is a series of comparisons of the same good against many other goods. We shall call the exchange value of a good, as thus determined, the ' real value ' of the good, to distinguish it from the average amount of the money prices, or the money value." Now it is not difficult to show that the power in exchange of the use of capital as against products moves in quite a differ- ent direction from its power in exchange against other uses and labours. For instance, if the productiveness of all uses and labours rises to exactly double, the power in exchange between uses and labours, as regards each other, is not disturbed ; on the other hand, the power in exchange of both as against the products which result from them is very seriously disturbed : it is, that is to say, doubled. As regards the rate of interest, the question obviously is, What is the proportion between the exchange power of the uses of capital and the exchange power of a quite definite class of product, viz. that real capital which furnishes the "use"? If the power in exchange of the use of a machine be twenty times less than the exchange power of the product machine, the use of the machine " buys " 10, while the machine itself obtains 200 as its equivalent value, and the proportion corre- sponds to a 5 per cent rate of interest. If the exchange value of the use of a machine again is only ten times less than that 204 HISTORY OF THE USE THEORY BOOK in of the product machine, the one buys 20 while the other buys 200, and the proportion corresponds to a 10 per cent rate of interest. Now there is no obvious ground for assuming that the exchange value of real capital is determined in a different way from the exchange value of other products, and, as we have seen, the exchange value of products as against the exchange value of uses, generally speaking, can be altered in another proportion than the exchange value between uses and labour as regards each other is altered. It follows then that the ratio between the power in exchange of the uses of capital and the power in exchange of real capital (in other words, the rate of interest) may take a different course from the proportion of exchange value between uses and labour. Hermann's rule therefore is not sufficiently proved. 1 In conclusion, let me say just a word on the position that Hermann assumes towards the " productivity of capital." I have already said that he often uses the expression, but never with the meaning given to it by the Productivitv theorv. O O t/ i- i/ He is so far from saying that interest is produced directly from capital, that he maintains high productive power to be a cause of the lowering of interest. He expressly guards himself also (p. 542) against being supposed to say that profit is a com- pensation for " dead use." He asserts that capital, to give its due results, demands " plan, care, superintendence, intellectual activity generally." For the rest, he has not himself attached any particularly clear conception to the expression "produc- tivity." He defines it in the words : " The totality of the ways in which capital is employed, and the relation of the product to the expenditure, constitute what is called the productivity of capital." 2 Does he mean by this the relation of the value of the product to the value of the expenditure ? If so, then high productivity would only accompany high interest, whereas high productivity certainly occasions low interest. Or does he mean the relation of the quantity of the product to the quantity of the expenditure ? But in economic life 1 A note which occurs here in the German edition is omitted by the author's instructions. W. S. - P. 541 ; p. 212 of first edition. CHAP, ii BERNHARDI, MANGOLDT, SCHAFFLE 205 quantity, speaking generally, is of no importance. Or does he mean the relation of the quantity of the product to the value of the expenditure ? But quantity on one side and value on the other are incommensurable. The fact of the matter, it appears to me, is that Hermann's definition will not stand strict interpretation. On the whole, it is just possible that he may have had in his mind a kind of physical productivity. In Germany many writers of note have accepted Hermann's Use theory, and given it their strong support. One very clear-headed follower of his is Bernhardi. 1 Without developing the theory any further, for he contents himself with quoting Hermann's doctrine incidentally, and expressing agreement with it, 2 he shows his originality and profound thinking by a number of fine criticisms, directed principally against the English school. 3 He has, too, a word of censure for the school that stands at the opposite extreme, the blind Productivity theorists, with their " strange contradiction " of ascribing to the dead tool an independent living activity (p. 307). Mangoldt again takes the same ground as Hermann, and diverges from him only in unimportant particulars. Thus he gives even less importance to the " productivity of capital " in the formation of interest. 4 He would go so far as abolish that expression as incorrect, although he does not scruple to use it himself " for the sake of brevity." 5 Thus, too, where Hermann puts the height of interest in inverse ratio to the productivity of capital, Mangoldt puts it in direct ratio ; indeed, he accepts Thlinen's formula, and puts it in direct ratio to the "last applied dose of capital." Similarly Mithoff, in his account of the economical dis- tribution of wealth, lately published in Schonberg's Handhuch? follows Hermann in all essential respects. Schaffle takes a peculiar position on the Use theory. One of the most prominent promoters of that critical movement 1 Versuch einer Kritik der Griinde die fur grosses und kleines Grundeigenthum angefiihrt werden, St. Petersburg, 1849. * E.g. p. 236, etc. 3 P. 306, etc. * Volkswirtschaftslehre, Stuttgart, 1868 ; particularly pp. 121, 137, 333. 445, etc. 5 Pp. 122, 432. * Schonberg's Handbuch, i. pp. 437, 484, etc. 206 HISTORY OF THE USE THEORY BOOK in which came into existence with the rise of scientific Socialism, Schaffle was one of the first to pass -through the fermentation of opinion which might have been expected when two such different conceptions encountered each other. This fermenta- tion has left very characteristic traces on his utterances on the subject of interest. I shall show later on that in Schaffle's writings may be found no less than three distinctly different methods of explaining interest. One of these belongs to the older, two to the later " critical " conception. The first of them falls within the group of the Use theories. In his first great work, the Gesdlschaftliehe System der menschlichen Wirtschaft, 1 Schaffle states his entire theory of interest according to the terminology of the Use theory. Profit of capital is with him a profit from the "use (Nutzung) of capital " : loan interest is a price paid for that use, and its rate depends on the supply and demand of the uses of loan capital : the uses are an independent element in cost, and so on. But there are unmistakable signs that he is not far from giving up the theory he 'professedly holds. He repeatedly gives the word " use " a signification very far from that attached to it by Hermann. He explains the use of capital as a " working" ( Wirkeri) of an economical subject by means of wealth ; as a " using " (Benutzung] of wealth for fruitful production ; as a " devoting," an " employment " of wealth, as a " service " of the undertaker expressions which would lead us to see in the Use, not so much a material element in production issuing from capital, -as a personal element proceeding from the undertaker. 2 This impression is, moreover, confirmed by the fact that Schaffle repeatedly speaks of profit as premium for an economical vocation. Further, he argues positively against the view that profit is a product of the use of capital contributed to the process of production (ii. p. 389). He charges Hermann with having coloured his the'ory too much by the idea of an independent productivity in capital (ii. p. 459). But, on the other hand, he often uses the word " use " in such a way that it can only be interpreted in the objective, and therefore in Hermann's sense ; as, e.g. when he speaks of the supply and demand of the uses of loan capital On one occasion he 1 Third edition, Tubingen, 1873. 2 Ges. System, third edition, i. p. 266 ; ii. p. 458, etc. CHAP, ii SCH'AFFLE, KNIES 207 explicitly admits that in the use, besides the personal element, there may be contained a material element, which he calls the Gebrauch of capital (ii. p. 458). And notwithstanding his condemnation of Hermann, he himself does not scruple now and then to ascribe " fruitfulness " to the use of capital. Thus he neither entirely accepts the ground of the Use theory nor entirely rejects it. Even in his later systematic work, the Bau und Leben des sozialen Korpers} Schaffle's views have not developed into a completely clear and consistent theory. While he has got beyond the old Use theory in one respect, in another he has come nearer to it. In the Bau und Leben he always looks upon interest as a " return to the use (Nutzwng) of capital," which use at all times maintains an economical value. In this he gives up the subjective meaning of use, and now treats it unambiguously as a purely objective element contributed by goods. He speaks of the uses as " functions of goods," as " equivalents of useful materials in living labour," as " living energies of impersonal social substance." Even in the socialist state this objective use would retain its independent value, and thereby preserve its capacity to yield interest. The phenomenon of interest can only disappear if, in the socialist state, the community, as sole owner of capital, should contribute the valuable use of capital gratuitously ; in which case the return from it would go to the advantage of the entire social body (iii. p. 491). On the other hand, Schaffle rather diverges from the old Use theory in not acknowledging the use of capital as an ultimate and original element in production, and in tracing all costs of production to labour alone (iii. pp. 273, 274). But in doing so he chances on another line of explanation, which I shall have to discuss at length in another connection. While these followers of Hermann have not developed his theory so much as broadened it, Knies may fairly claim to have improved it in some essential respects. He has made no change in its fundamental ideas, but he has given these fundamental ideas a much clearer and more unambiguous expression than Hermann himself gave them. That Hermann's theory was very much in want of such improvement was 1 Second edition, Tubingen, 1881. HISTORY OF THE USE THEORY BOOK in shown by the many misunderstandings of it. I have already remarked that Schaffle considered Hermann a Productivity theorist. Still more remarkable is it that Knies himself thought he saw in Hermann, not a forerunner, but an opponent. 1 Knies was not always a Use theorist. In his JErorterungen uber den Kredit? published in 1859, he looked on credit transactions as barter transactions, or, according to circumstances, buying transactions, in which what one party gives is given in the present, and what the other gives as equivalent is given in the future (p. 568). One of the ulterior results of this conception was that interest must not be looked on as an equivalent of a use transferred in the loan, but almost as Galiani had put it long before 3 as a part-equivalent of the parent loan itself. But since then Knies has expressly with- drawn this conception, -considering that there is no call for such an innovation, and that, on the contrary, there is much to deter one from accepting it. 4 Later still, in a fully argued- out analysis, he has expressed himself quite directly to the effect, that any consideration of the different values which present and future goods of the same class may possess on account of the greater urgency of immediate need is, though " not quite unfruitful," still distinctly insufficient to explain the principal point in the phenomenon of interest 5 In place of this, in his comprehensive work Odd und Kredit, Knies has laid down an unusually clear and thoroughly reasoned Use theory. 6 Although the purpose of this work only called for investiga- tion into Contract interest, Knies yet treats the subject from such a general standpoint that his views on Natural interest may easily be supplied from what he says on the other. In fundamental ideas he agrees with Hermann. Like him he conceives of the use (Nutzung) of a good as "that use 1 Knies, Geld und Kredit, ii. part ii. p. 35. See also Nasse's Recension in vol. xxxv. of the Jahrbiicher fur National- Oekonomie und Statistik, 1880, p. 94. a Zeitschrift fur die gesammte Staatswissenschaft, vol. xv. p. 559. 8 See above, p. 49. 4 Der Kredit, part i. p. 11. 8 Ibid. ii. p. 38. I may perhaps express the conjecture that the re- spected author was led to the above polemic by the contents of a work which I had written in his economical Seminar a few years before, and in which I had laid down the views contested. 6 Das Geld, Berlin, 1873. Der Kredit, part i. 1876 ; part ii. 1879. CHAP, ii KNIES, MENGER 209 (Gebravdi) which lasts through a period of time, and is limitable by moments of time " ; a use to be kept quite distinct from the good itself which is the " bearer of the use " ; and a use capable of economical independence. To the question which most concerns the Use theory, whether an independent use and its transfer are conceivable and practicable in the case of perishable goods, he devotes a searching inquiry, which ends with a distinct answer in the affirmative. 1 Another cardinal question of the Use theory is, whether and why the independent use of capital must possess an exchange value, and obtain a compensation in the form of interest. This question, as we have seen, Hermann does not leave without answer, but he has laid so little stress on the answer, and put it in such an insignificant form, that it has not unfrequently been quite overlooked. 2 In contrast to this, Knies has carefully reasoned it out, and concludes that " the emergence and the economical justification of a price for use, in the shape of interest, is founded on the same relation as that on which the price of material goods is founded." The use is an instrument for the satisfaction of human need just as much as the material good is ; it is an object that is " economically valuable and that is economically valued." 3 When I add that Knies has avoided not only any relapse into the Productivity theory, but even the very appearance of such a relapse, and that he has appended to his theory some very notable criticisms, particularly of the social- istic interest theory, I have said enough to point out how deeply Hermann's theory is indebted to a thinker equally distinguished for his acuteness and for the conscientiousness of his research. We now come to that writer who has put the Use theory into the most perfect form in which it could well be put Karl Menger, in his Gh'undsatze der Volkswirthschaftslehre* The superiority of Menger to all his predecessors consists in this, that he builds his interest theory on a much more complete theory of value, a theory which gives an elaborate and satisfactory answer to the very difficult question of the 1 Das Geld, pp. 61, 71, etc. I shall return to the details of this inquiry later on, when criticising the Use theory as a whole. 2 See above, p. 196. 3 Kredit, part ii. p. 33, and other places. 4 Vienna, 1871. P 210 HISTORY OF THE USE THEORY ROOK in relation between the value of products and that of their means of production. Does the value of a product depend on the value of its means of production, or does the value of the means of production depend on that of their product ? As regards this question economists up till Monger's time had been very much groping in the dark. It is true that a number of writers had occasionally used expressions to the effect that the value of the means of production was con- ditioned by the value of their anticipated product; as, for instance, Say, Eiedel, Hermann, Eoscher. 1 But these expres- sions were never put forward in the form of a general law, and still less in the form of an adequate logical argument. Moreover, as must have been noticed, expressions are to be found in these writers which indicate quite the opposite view ; and with this opposite view the great body of economic literature fully agrees in recognising as a fundamental law that the cost of goods determines their value. But so long as economists did not see clearly on this preliminary question, their treatment of the interest problem could scarcely be more than uncertain groping. How could any one possibly explain in clear outline a difference in value between two amounts expenditure of capital and product of capital if he did not even know on which side of the relation to seek for the cause, and on which side for the effect ? To Menger, then, belongs the great merit of having dis- tinctly answered this preliminary question. In doing so he has definitely and for all time indicated the point at which, and the direction in which, the interest problem is to be solved. His answer is this. The value of the means of pro- duction ("goods of higher rank," in his terminology) is determined always and without exception by the value of their products (" goods of lower rank "). He arrives at this conclusion by the following argument. 2 1 See above, pp. 139, 199. - I regret that I must deny myself the pleasure of introducing in this place more than the barest outlines of Monger's value theory. Holding as I do that his theory is among the most valuable and most certain acquisitions of modern economics, I feel that it cnnnot be at all adequately appreciated from any such sketch. In my next volume I shall have the opportunity of going more thoroughly into the subject. Meanwhile, for more exact information on the propositions CHAP, ii MENGER 211 Value is the importance " which concrete goods, or quantities of goods, receive for us through the fact that we are conscious of being dependent, for the satisfaction of our wants, on having these goods at our disposal." The amount of value that goods possess always depends on the importance of those wants, which depend for their satisfaction on our disposal over the goods in question. Since goods of " higher rank " (means of production) are only of service to us through the medium of those goods of "lower rank" (products) which result from them, it is clear that the means of production can only have an importance as regards the satisfaction of our wants so far as their products possess such an importance. If the only use of means of production were to consist in the making of valueless goods, these means of production could evidently in no way obtain value for us. Further, since that circle of wants the satisfaction of which is conditioned by a product is obviously identical with that circle of wants the satisfaction of which is conditioned by the sum of the means of production of the product, the degree of importance which a product possesses for' the satis- faction of our wants, and that which the sum of its means of production possesses, must be essentially identical. On those grounds the anticipated value of the product is the standard not only for the existence, but also for the amount of the value of its means of production. Finally, since the (subjective) value of goods is also the basis for their price, the price, or, as some people call it, the " economical value " of goods, is regulated by the same principle. This being the foundation, the interest problem assumes the following shape. A capital is nothing else than a sum of " complementary goods " of higher rank. Now if this sum derives its value from the value of its anticipated product, how is it that it never quite reaches that value, but is always less by a definite proportion ? Or, if it is true that the anticipated value of the product is the source and the measure of the value of its means of production, how is it that real capital is not valued as highly as its product? which I have given in very condensed form in the text, I must refer to Menger's own unusually luminous and convincing statement in the Grundsdtze, particu- larly p. 77 onward. 212 HISTORY OF THE USE THEORY BOOK HI To this Menger gives the following acute answer. 1 The transformation of means of production into products (or, shortly, Production) always demands a certain period of time, sometimes long, sometimes short. For the purposes of production it is necessary that a person should not only have the productive goods at his disposal for a single moment inside that period of time, but should retain them at his disposal and bind them together in the process of production over the whole period of time. One of the conditions of production, therefore, is this : the disposal over quantities of real capital during definite periods of time. .It is in this Disposal that Menger places the essential nature of the use of capital. The use of capital, or the disposal over capital, thus de- scribed, in so far as it is in demand and is not to be had in sufficient quantity, may now obtain a value, or, in other words, may become an economical good. When this happens, as is usually the case, then, over and above the other means of production employed in the making of a concrete product (over and above, e.g. the raw materials, auxiliary materials, labour, and so on), there enters into the sum of value contained in the anticipated product, the disposal over those goods that are required for the production, or the use of capital. And since, on that account, in this sum of value there must remain something for the economical good we have called " use of capital," the other means of production cannot account for the full amount of the value of the anticipated product. This is the origin of the difference in value between the concrete capital thrown into production and the product ; and this at the same time is the origin of interest. 2 In this doctrine of Menger the Use theory has at last attained to its full theoretical clearness and maturity. In it there is no falling back on old errors ; there is nothing that could even recall the old Productivity theories and their dangers ; and with that the interest problem has definitely passed from a production problem, which it is not, to a value problem, which it is. The value problem is, at the same time, so clearly and so sharply put, its outlines so happily filled in by the 1 Pp. 133-138. 2 Mataja in his Unternehmergcwinn (Vienna, 1884) is in substantial agree- ment with Menger. This valuable work, unfortunately, reached me too late to allow me to make any thorough use of it. CHAP, ii MENGER 213 exposition he gives of the value relation between product and meana of production, that Menger has not only distanced his predecessors in the Use theory, but has laid a permanent founda- tion on which all earnest work at the problem of interest must, for the future, be built. The work of the critic as regards Menger, therefore, is different from that as regards any of his predecessors. In considering the previous doctrines I have purposely laid on one side the question whether the fundamental principle of the Use theory was warranted or not. I have only examined them in the way of asking whether they presented this principle with more or less completeness, with more or less internal consistency and clearness. In fact, up till now I have, to some extent, tested the concrete Use theories by the ideal Use theory, but I have not tested the ideal Use theory itself. In the case of Menger, however, it is only this latter test that needs to be applied. As regards his theory only one critical question remains to be put, but that the most decisive one : Can the Use theory give us a satisfactory explanation of the interest problem ? I shall try to answer this question in such a way that it will not merely be a special criticism of Monger's formulation of the theory, but will warrant us in forming an opinion on the whole theoretical movement that reaches its highest development with Menger. In doing so I am conscious of having undertaken one of the most difficult tasks in criticism. Difficult through the general nature of the matter, which has for so many decades baffled the endeavours of the most prominent minds ; difficult, in particular, because I shall be compelled to oppose opinions put forward, after most careful consideration, by the best minds of our nation, and supported with most marvellous ingenuity ; difficult, finally, in this, that I shall be compelled to oppose ideas that were once vehemently contested in long past times, then won most brilliant victory over their opponents, and since then have been taught and believed in as dogmas. For what follows, then, I must particularly ask the reader to grant me an unbiassed hearing, patience, and attention. CHAPTEE III PLAN OF CRITICISM ALL the Use theories rest on the following assumption. Not only does real capital itself possess value, but there is a Use (Nutzun-g) of capital which exists as an independent economical good, possessing independent value ; and this latter value, together with the value of the capital, makes up the value of the product of capital. Now in opposition to this I maintain : 1. There is no independent "use of capital," such as is postulated by the Use theorists ; there can, therefore, be no independent value of the kind asserted, and the phenomenon of " surplus value " cannot thus be accounted for. The assumption is nothing but the product of a fiction which is in contradiction of actual fact. 1 2. Even if there were a " use of capital " of such a nature as is assumed by the Use theorists, the actual phenomena of interest would not be satisfactorily explained thereby. The Use theories, therefore, rest on a hypothesis which contradicts actual facts, and is, besides, insufficient to explain the phenomena in question. In proceeding to prove these two theses, I feel that I stand in a somewhat unfortunate position as regards the former. While the discussion of the second thesis opens up virgin soil, un- 1 To guard against a misunderstanding which I should very much deprecate, let me say in so many words that I have no intention of denying the existence of " uses of capital " in general. What I must deny is the existence of that special something which our theorists point to as the "use" of capital, and which they endow with a variety of attributes that, in my opinion, go against the nature of things. But this is anticipating.. CHAP, in PLAN OF CRITICISM 215 disturbed as yet by the strife of economists, the first seems to put me in the position of attacking a res judicata, a case long ago carried up through all courts, and long ago decided con- clusively against me. It is, indeed, essentially the same question as was in dispute centuries ago between the canonists and the defenders of loan interest. The canonists mainlined : P^perty in a thing includes all the uses that can d made f it ; there can, therefore, be no separate use which stands v atside the article and can be transferred in the loan along with it. The defenders of loan interest maintained that there was such an independent use. And Salmasius and his followers managed to support their views with such effectual arguments that the public opinion of the scientific world soon fell in with theirs, and that to-day we have but a smile for the " short-sighted pedantry " of these old canonists. Now fully conscious that I am laying myself open to the charge of eccentricity, I maintain that the much decried doctrine of the canonists was, all the same, right to this extent ; that the independent use of capital, which was the object of dispute, has no existence in reality. And I trust to succeed in proving that the judgment of the former courts in this literary process, however unanimously given, was in fact wrong. In the next few chapters, then, I hope to prove my first thesis that there is no " use of capital " of the kind postulated by the Use theorists. The first thing we have to do is of course to define the subject of discussion. What then is this Use, this Nutzuny, the independent existence of which is maintained by the Use theorists and denied by me ? As to the nature of the Use there is no agreement among the theorists themselves. Menger in particular gives an essen- tially different reading of the conception from that of his prede- cessors. In view of this I find it necessary to divide my inquiry into at least two parts, the first of which has to do with the conception given by the Say-Hermann school, while the second will deal with Monger's conception, CHAPTER IV THE USE OF CAPITAL ACCORDING TO THE SAY-HERMANN SCHOOL AMONG the writers of the Say-Hermann school there obtains no exact agreement in the description and definition of the Use. But this want of agreement appears to me traceable, not so much to any real difference of opinion about the subject, as to their common failure to give any clear account of its nature. They hesitate in their definitions, not because, they have different objects in view, but because, of the one object that all have in view, they have only uncertain vision. One proof of this lies in the fact that the individual Use theorists get into contra- diction with their own definitions almost as often as with those of their colleagues. In this chapter we shall gather together provisionally the more important readings of the conception. Say speaks of the " productive services " of capital, and defines them as a " labour " which capital performs. Hermann in one place (p. 109) defines the Nutzung of goods as their Gebrauch. He repeats this on p. Ill, where he says that the Gebrauch of goods of perishable material may be thought of as a good in itself, as a Nutzung. If Gebrauch here is simply identified with Nutzung, this is not the case in a passage on p. 125, where Hermann says that the Gebrauch is the employment of the Nutzung. On p. 287, finally, he explains " the holding together of the technical elements of the product" as the " service," the " objective Nutzung " of floating capital. Knies also identifies Gebrauch and Nutzung. 1 Schaffle in one place defines Nutzung as the "employment" of goods (Gesell. System, iii. p. 143); similarly on p. 266 as "acquisitive employment." On p. 267 he calls it "the 1 Geld, p. 61: " Nutzung =i\\z GebraucJi of a good lasting over a period of time, and limitable by moments of time. " CHAP, iv THE NUTZUNG 217 working of an economical subject by means of wealth, a using of wealth towards fruitful production." On the same page it is called a " devotion " of wealth to production ; with which it is a little inconsistent that, on the next page, he speaks of a devotion of the Nutzung of capital that is, of the devotion of a devotion. In the Bau und Leben, finally, Schaffle explains the uses in one place (iii. p. 258) as "functions of goods"; somewhat later (p. 259) as "equivalents of useful materials in living labour " ; while on p. 260 the Nutzung is defined as the " releasing of the utility (Nutzcri) from material goods." If we look more closely at this somewhat chequered array of definitions and explications we may see in them two in- terpretations of the conception of use, a subjective and an objective. These two interpretations correspond pretty exactly with the double sense in which the ^word Use or Nutzung is generally employed in ordinary speech. It indicates, on the one hand, the subjective activity of the one who uses, and is called in German indifferently Benutzung or Gebrauch in the subjective sense of that equally ambiguous word ; or, more significantly, GebrauchsJiandlung. And, on the other hand, it indicates an objective function of the goods that are used ; a service issuing from the goods. The subjec- tive interpretation appears vaguely in Hermann's identifica- tion of Nutzung and Gebrauch, and very strongly in Schaffle's earlier work. The objective interpretation distinctly predomi- nates with Say ; almost as distinctly with Hermann, who, indeed, in one place speaks explicitly of the " objective use " of capital ; and even Schaffle inclines to it in his latest work when he speaks of the use as a " function of goods." It is easy to see that of the two interpretations it is simply and solely the objective that accords with the character of the Use theory. For, taking it only on the most obvious grounds, it is absolutely impossible to give a subjective meaning to those uses of capital which the borrower buys from the lender, and pays with loan interest. These cannot be acts of use performed by the lender, for he does not perform any such. Nor can they be acts of use performed by the borrower, for, although he may intend to perform such actions, he does not of course require to buy his own actions from the lender. To speak, therefore, of a transference of the uses of capital in the loan, 218 THE NUTZUNG BOOK in has a meaning only if we understand by the word "uses" objective elements of use of some kind or other. I think, then, that I am justified in leaving out of account, as inconsistencies that contradict the spirit of their own theory, those subjective interpretations of use that are to be found sporadically in indi- vidual Use theorists, and in confining myself exclusively to the objective interpretations which have been adopted by the majority, and which, since Schaffle's change of front, are the only recognised interpretations. By Use, then, in the sense given it by the Say- Hermann school, we have to think of an objective useful element which proceeds from goods, and acquires independent economical existence as well as independent economical value. Now nothing can be more certain than that there are, in fact, certain objective useful services of goods that obtain economical independence, and may, not unfitly, be designated by the name of Uses (Nutzungeri). I have already, in another place, treated of these in detail, and done my utmost to de- scribe their true nature as exactly and thoroughly as possible. 1 Singularly enough, this attempt of mine stands almost alone in economic literature. I say " singularly enough " deliberately, for it does seem to me a very wonderful thing that, in a science which from beginning to end turns, as on its axis, on the satisfying of needs by means of goods, on the relation of use between men and goods, no inquiry has ever been made into the technical character of the use of goods. Or that, in a science where pages, chapters, even monographs have been written on many another conception, not a couple of lines should have been devoted to the definition or explanation of the fundamental conception " use of a good," and that the expression should be dragged into every theoretical research in all the confusion and ambiguity which it has in ordinary life. Since for our present purpose everything depends on us getting a reliable idea of the useful functions which goods serve, I must at this point go into the matter with some exactitude ; only begging the reader not to look on what follows as a digression, but as strictly germane to the subject. 2 1 See my Rechtc uiid Verhdltnisse vom Standpunkt-e der volkwirthscluiftlichen Giitcrlehrc, Innsbruck, 1881, p. 51. 2 I take the liberty in the next chapter of repeating, partly in the same words, the argument of my Rnshte und VerMltnissc, which was written some time ago with a view to the present work. CHAPTER V THE TRUE CONCEPTION OF THE USE OF GOODS ALL material goods (Sachyuter) are of use to mankind through the action of the natural powers that reside in them. They are a part of the material world, and for that reason all their working, including their useful working, must bear the character that working generally has in the material world ; it is a working of natural powers according to natural laws. What distinguishes the working of material goods from the working of other kinds of natural things, harmless or hurtful, is the single circumstance, that the results of such working admit of being directed towards the advantage of man, this direction also being under the rule of natural laws. That is to say, all things are endowed simply with working natural powers, but experience shows that these powers only admit of being directed to a definitely useful end, when the matter which possesses these powers has taken on certain forms that are favourable to them being so directed. All matter on the surface of the earth, for instance, among other forms of energy, possesses an amount of energy corresponding to its distance from the centre of the earth. But while men can do nothing with this form of energy when stored up in a mountain, that same energy is useful to them when the matter possessing it has taken on some form they wish that is, some form in which the energy is available ; say, that of a clock pendulum, or a paper weight, or a hammer. The energy of chemical affinity which carbon possesses is identical in every molecule of it. We get a direct economic utility, however, from the results of tin's energy only when the carbon has taken such forms as that of wood or coal ; not when it exists as part of one of the con- 220 TRUE CONCEPTION OF USE OF GOODS BOOK in stituents of the air. We may therefore say that the nature of material goods, as opposed to those material things that are not useful, is that they are such special forms of matter as admit of the natural powers they possess being directed to the advantage of man. From this follow two important inferences, of which one concerns the character of the useful functions of material goods, and the other concerns the character of the use (Gebraucli) of goods. The function of goods can consist in nothing else than in a giving off, or rendering up, or putting forth of power ; or, to use the terminology of physical science, the passing of energy into work. On the natural side it shows a complete parallelism with the character of the useful function performed by a manual labourer. In the same way as a porter or a navvy is of use, when he puts forth the natural power residing in his body in the form of rendering useful services, so are material goods of use through concrete forthputting of the natural powers inherent in them and capable of direction physically speaking, through the forthputting in work of the available forms of energy they possess. It is by the passing of available energy into work that the " use " of goods is obtained by man. 1 The use (Gfebrauck) of a thing then is realised in this way: man takes the peculiar forms of energy of the good at the proper time, supplies the conditions necessary to render them available where they previously existed in an unavailable form, and then brings these forms of energy into proper connection with that object in which the useful effect is to take place. For instance, in order to " use " the locomotive the stoker fills the boiler with water, applies heat, and thus obtains in an available form the heat energy of the steam, which is trans- ferred into energy of motion of the locomotive. This last- 1 ,I may remind the reader that, according to the scientific conception of energy energy being that quality the possession of which confers upon a body the power of doing work it may exist either as available or unavailable energy ; that is, the body may possess energy of which a use can be made, or it may possess energy of which no use can be made. Thus the storage of energy in certain material bodies in an unavailable form, and the change of this unavailable into available energy, by means of which work is done that has a direct influ- ence on the satisfaction of human wants, is just the physical conception applied to economics. W. S. CHAP, v THE MATERIAL SERVICES 221 named energy is then transferred by connection to the carriages that convey persons or goods. Or one brings a book into the necessary relation with his eye for the image, which is continu- ally being formed by reflection, to fall on the retina ; or brings the house which continually offers shelter into proper relation with his whole person. But any "use" of material goods which does not consist in the receiving from them of useful results due to their inherent powers or forms of energy, is absolutely unthinkable. I think I need have no fear of the propositions I have just advanced meeting with any scientific opposition. The conception laid down is no longer strange in our economic literature ; l and in the present state of the natural sciences the acceptance of it has indeed become a peremptory necessity. If by any chance it should be objected that this conception is one that belongs to the natural sciences and is not an economic one, I answer that in these questions economic science must leave the last word to natural science. The principle of the unity of all science demands it. Economic science does not explain the facts that belong to its province to the very bottom, any more than any other science does. It solves only one portion of the causal connection that binds together the pheno- mena of things, and leaves it to other sciences to carry the explanation farther. Not to mention other limiting sciences, the sphere of economic explanation lies between the sphere of psychological explanation on the one hand, and that of the natural sciences on the other. To give a concrete example. Economic science will explain thus far the cir- cumstance that bread has an exchange value : it will point out that bread is able to satisfy the want of sustenance, and that men have a tendency to ensure the satisfaction of their wants, if necessary by making a sacrifice. But that men have this tendency, and why they have it, is not explained by economic science but by psychology. To explain that men want sustenance and why, falls within the domain of physiology. Finally, it also falls within the sphere of 1 Schaffle, in particular, in the third volume of his Bau und Leben, very beautifully puts the same point of view. Schaffle, I may say, forms an honour- able exception among economists as regards this objectionable habit of not taking any trouble with the principles that regulate the working of goods. 222 TRUE CONCEPTION OF USE OF GOODS BOOK in physiology to explain that bread is able to satisfy that want, and why it is able to do so, but physiology does not finish the explanation within its own sphere ; it has to call in assistance from the more general physical sciences. Now it is clear that all explanations given by economic science have a value only under this condition, that they are continuous with the related sciences. The explanations of economics cannot rest on anything that a science related to it is bound to declare untrue or impossible ; otherwise the thread of the explanation is broken from the first. It must on that account keep exactly in touch with the related sciences at the points where they limit it, and one such point is just this question as to the working of material goods. The one thing of which I have, perhaps, some reason to be afraid is, that the employment of this physical concep- tion in regard to a certain limited class of material goods, especially to the so-called "ideal goods," may be somewhat startling at the first glance to some readers. That, e.g. a fixed and stationary dwelling-house, a volume of poems, or a picture of Eaphael should be of use to us through the forthputting of inherent properties connected with one or other of the forms of energy, or, as we may shortly express it, the forthputting of its natural powers, may at first, I admit, be a little strange. Objections like these, however, which have their origin more in feeling than in understanding, may be removed by a single consideration. All the things that I have named enter into the relation which makes them " goods " only in virtue of the peculiar natural powers which they possess, and possess, indeed, in peculiar combination. That a house shelters and warms, is nothing else than a result of the forces of gravity, cohesion, and resistance, of impenetrability, of the non-conducting quality of building materials. That the thoughts and feelings of the poet reproduce themselves in us is mediated, in a directly physical way, by light, colour, and form of written characters ; and it is this physical part of the mediation which is the office of the book. There must of course have been a poet soul in whom ideas and feelings waked, and, again, it is only in a spirit and through spiritual forces that they can be reawakened ; but the way of spirit to spirit lies some little distance through the natural world, and over this distance even CHAP, v THE MATERIAL SERVICES 223 the spiritual must make use of the vehicle of natural powers. Such a natural vehicle is the book, the picture, the spoken word! Of themselves they give only a physical suggestion, nothing more ; the spiritual we give of our own on accepting the suggestion ; and if we are not prepared beforehand for a profitable acceptance of it, if we cannot read, or, reading, can- not understand, or cannot feel, it remains simply a physical suggestion. With- these explanations perhaps I may consider it established beyond question that material goods exert their economical use through the forthputting of the natural powers residing in them. The individual useful forthputtings of natural powers that are obtainable from material goods I propose to designate as " Material Services." l In itself, indeed, the word Use (Nufzung) would not be inappropriate, but to adopt it would be to surrender our conception to all the obscurity that now, un- fortunately, hangs over that ambiguous expression. 2 The conception of Material Services is, in my opinion, 1 I have already introduced this term Nutzleistung in my Rechte und Verlw.lt- nisse ; before that I used it in a work written in 1876 but not printed. It is employed by Kuies several times in the second portion of his KrecUt, but unfortunately in the same ambiguous sense in which on other occasions he uses the word Nutzung. NOTE BY TRANSLATOR. After much deliberation Material Service is the nearest rendering I can give to the word Nutzleistung, introduced by Professor Bohm-Bawerk. Every translator finds the difficulty of rendering scientific terms irom one language into another, but this difficulty is greater in political economy, where we are bound to use words " understanded of the people." The word Nutzlcistung is one of these happy combinations which, as compounded of two familiar words, do not strike a German as peculiar or clumsy, and are yet strict enough to satisfy scientific requirements. But our language does not admit of many sucli combinations the literal translation "use rendering" at once shows the impossibility in the present case and in a translation one does not feel justified in coining a new word. In ren- dering the word thus it becomes necessary to eliminate a note that follows in the German edition, where Professor Bohm-Bawerk congratulates himself on having escaped Say's services product if s, which might be objected to on the ground that " only a person, not a thing, can render services." The prefix " material " seems to me fairly to meet this objection, as the total expression now implies a service a forthputting of natural powers in the service of man rendered by a material object. W. S. 2 After this clause, in the German edition, come the words: "Und andererseits scheint mir der Name Nutzleistung in der That ausserordentiich pragnant zu sein : es sind im eigenstlichen Wortsinn niitzliche Krafteleistungen, die von den Sachgiitern ausgehen. " W. S. 224 TRUE CONCEPTION OF USE OF GOODS BOOK HI destined to be one of the most important elementary concep- tions in economic theory. In importance it does not come Behind the conception of the economic Good. 1 Unfortunately up till now it has received little attention and little develop- ment. From the nature of our task it is indispensable that we should repair this neglect, and follow out some of the more important relations into which the material services enter in economic life. First of all, it is clear that everything which would lay claim to the name of a " good " must be capable of rendering material services, and that, with the exhausting of this capa- bility, it ceases to have the quality of a good ; it falls out of the circle of " goods " back into the circle of simple "things." An exhaustion of this capability must not be thought of as an exhaustion of the capability to exert or to put forth energy in general ; for what we have called the " natural powers " of the material are as imperishable as the material itself. But although these powers or forms of energy never cease to exist in some form or other, they may very well cease to be available for material services in this way, that the original good, in the course of doing work, has undergone such a change, be it separation, dislocation, or uniting of its parts with other bodies, that, in its changed form, its energy is no longer available for human use. For instance, when the carbon of the wood burned in the blast furnace has combined with oxygen in the combustion process, its powers cannot again be employed to smelt iron, although these powers are constant, and continue to work according to natural laws. The broken pendulum retains its energy due to gravity just as it did before, but the loss of the pendulum form does not allow of this energy being directed to regulate the clock. The exhaustion of capability to render material services we are accustomed to call the using up or Consumption of goods. 1 It is unfortunate that in English economics we have devoted so little attention to this most elementary conception, on which Menger, in particular, has bestowed so much pains. The poverty of our scientific nomenclature shows this de- fect very markedly : the word "commodity" is really the only singular equivalent we have for the familiar and suggestive word "goods," although I personally have not scrupled to translate the German Gut by the English "good." There is, in- deed, reason for Mr. Ruskin's sarcasm that our most famous treatise on Wealth does not even define the meaning of the word "wealth." W. S. CHAP, v THE MATERIAL SERVICES 225 While all goods thus agree and must agree in this, that they have to render material services, they differ essentially from one another in the number of services that they have to render. On this rests the familiar division of goods into perishable and non-perishable, or better, into perishable and durable. 1 Many goods are of such a nature that, to render the uses peculiar to them, they must give forth their whole power, as it were, at a blow, in one more or less intense service, so that their first use quite exhausts their capability of service, and is their consumption. These are the so-called perishable goods, such as food, gun- powder, fuel, etc. Other goods, again, are, in their nature, capable of rendering a number of material services in the way of giving off these services successively, within a shorter or longer period of time ; and thus after a first, or even after many acts of use, they may retain their capability of rendering further services, and so retain their character of goods. These are the durable goods, such as clothing, houses, tools, precious stones, land, etc. Where a good successively gives off a number of material services, it may do so in one of two ways : either the services following each other evidently separate themselves from each other, as clearly marked single acts, in such a way that they are easily distinguished, limited, and counted, as, e.g. the single blows of a coining press, or the operations of the automatic printing press of a great newspaper; or they issue from the goods in unbroken, similar continuance, as, e.g. the shelter silently given over long periods of time by a dwelling-house. If, however, it is desired, in cases of this sort, to separate and divide the continuous amount of services and practical need often requires this the expedient is adopted that is generally taken in the dividing of continuous quantities: the dividing line that does not suggest itself in the phenomena under consideration is borrowed from some outside circumstance, e.g. from the lapse of a definite time; as when one delivers over to the hirer of a house the services to be rendered by the house during the year. Another essential feature that meets us in the analysis of 1 Even the so-called non-perishable goods are perishable, however gradually they perish. Q 226 TRUE CONCEPTION OF USE OF CAPITAL BOOK HI material services is their capability of obtaining complete eco- nomical independence. The source of this phenomenon is that in very many, indeed in most cases, the satisfaction of a con- crete human want does not demand the exhaustion of the entire useful content of a good, but only the rendering of a single material service. In virtue of this the single service in the first instance obtains an independent importance as regards the satisfaction of our wants, and then in practical economic life this independence is fully recognised. We give the recognition (1) wherever we make an independent estimate of the value of isolated services ; and (2) wherever we make them into independent objects of business transactions. This latter i.:<.ppens T ">en we sell or exchange single services, or groups of servi s, apart from the goods from which they proceed. Economical custom and law have created a number of forms in which this is effectuated. Among the most important of these I may name the relations of tenancy, of hire, and of the old commodatum ; l further, the institution of easements, of fee farm, of copyhold (emphyteusis and siqwrficies). A little considerac.on will convince us that, as a fact, all these forms of transaction agree in this, that one portion of the services of which a good is capable is divided off and transferred separately, while the rest of the anticipated services, be they many or few, remain with the ownership of the body of the good, in the hands of the owner of the good. 2 Finally, it is of great theoretic importance to determine the relations that exist between the material services and the goods from which they proceed. On this point I may put down three cardinal propositions, all of which appear to me so obvious that we may dispense here with any detailed proof of them ; more especially as I have gone thoroughly into the subject on another occasion. 3 1. It seems to me clear that we value and desire goods only on account of the material services that we expect from them. The services, as it were, form the economical substance 1 Not of the loan ; see below. - See also my Reclitc nnd Verhiiltnissc, p. 70, etc. 3 In my Re.t-.hte und Vcrluiltnissc, p. 60, where, in particular, I have stated the character of the material services as primary elements of our economic trans- actions, and have deduced the value of goods from the value of the material services. CHAP, v THE MATERIAL SERVICES 227 with which we have to do. The goods themselves form only the bodily shell. 2. It follows from the above, and appears to me equally beyond doubt, that, where entire goods are obtained and transferred, the economical substance of such transactions always lies in the acquisition and the transference of material services ; indeed of the totality of these services. The transference of the goods themselves constitutes only a form certainly a form that, in the nature of things, is very prominent, but still only an accom- panying and limiting form. To buy a good can mean nothing, economically speaking, but to buy all its material services. 1 3. From this, finally, comes the important conclusion that the value and price of a good is nothing else than the value and price of all its material services thrown together into a lump sum; and that accordingly the value and price of each individual service is contained in the value and price of the good itself. 2 Before going farther let me illustrate these three proposi- tions by a concrete example. I think all readers will agree with me when I say that a cloth manufacturer values and demands looms only because he expects to get from the looms the useful energies peculiar to them ; that not only when he hires a loom, but when he buys it, he looks, as a fact, to the acquisition of its services ; and that the ownership he acquires at the same time in the body of the machine only serves as greater security that he will obtain these services. Even if this owner- ship in point of law appears to be the primary thing, economically it is certainly only the secondary. And, lastly, it will be granted, I think, that the use which the whole machine renders is nothing else than the use of all its material services thrown together into one sum ; and that similarly the value and price of the whole machine is nothing else, and can be nothing else, than the value and price of all its material services thrown together into one sum. 1 This idea, though put somewhat differently, is explicitly recognised by Knies, Der Kredit, part ii. pp. 34, 77, 78. He expressly calls the selling price of a house the price of the permanent use of a house in opposition to the hire price, which is the price of the temporary uses of the same good. See also his Geld, p. 86. Schaffle too (Ban imd Leben, second edition, iii.) describes goods as "stores of useful energies" (p. 258). a For more exact statement, see my Reckte und Verhaltnisse, p. 64. CHAPTER VI CRITICISM OF THE SAY-HERMANN CONCEPTION HAVING, then, sufficiently explained the nature and the constitution of the use of goods, let us come back to the principal point under consideration the critical examination of the conception of " use " put forward by the Use theorists. And first we ask, May it not be the case that the Uses (Nutzungeri) of the Say-Hermann school are identical with our Material Services (Nutzleistungeri)? There can be no doubt that they are not identical. That something which the school in question calls "use" is intended to be the basis and the equivalent of net interest. The material services, on the contrary, are some- times (in the case of durable goods) the basis of gross interest, embracing the net interest and a part of the capital value itself; sometimes (in the case of perishable goods) the basis of the entire capital value. If I buy the material services of a dwelling-house, I pay a year's rent for the services of one year; this is a gross interest. If I buy the material services of a cwt. of coal, I pay, for the services of the single hour in which the coal burns to ashes, the whole capital value of the coal. On the other hand, what the Use theorists call "use" is paid for quite differently. The "use" that a cwt. of coal gives off during a whole year attains no higher price than, say, a twentieth part of the capital value of the coal Use and Material Service must, therefore, be two quite distinct amounts. From this, among other things, it is clear that those writers who defined and pointed out the existence of what we have called material services, under the idea that they were defining the basis of net interest, and pointing to it, were under a serious delusion. This criticism applies particularly CHAP, vi "NUTZUNGEN" AND "NUTZLEISTUNGEN" 229 to the services productifs of Say, and to Schaffle's earlier definitions of use. And now we come to the decisive question. If what the Use theorists called " uses " (Nutzungen) are anything else than the " material services " of goods, does their conception represent anything real ? Is it conceivable that between, beside, or among these material services we get some other useful thing from goods ? I can give no other answer to this question than the most emphatic No. And I think every one will be compelled to give this answer who admits that material goods are objects of the material world ; that material results cannot be produced other- wise than through manifestations of natural powers ; and that even the " utility " of a tiling is an activity. Granted these premises, none of which are likely to be opposed, it appears to me that no other kind of use in material goods is con- ceivable than that which comes through the forthputting of their peculiar natural powers that is, through the rendering of Material Services. But it is not even necessary to appeal to the logic of the natural sciences. I appeal simply to the common sense of the reader. Take an example or two to remind us of what we mean when we say that goods are "of use." A thrashing machine, there is no doubt, is of use economically in helping to thrash corn. How does it, how can it, render this use ? Not otherwise than through putting forth its mechanical powers one after another, till such time as the worn-out mechanism refuses to put forth any more power of the same kind. Can any reader picture to himself the effect that the thrashing machine exerts in separating the corn from the ear under any other form than that of a forthputting of mechanical power? Can he imagine one single use that the machine could exert in thrashing, not through putting forth of power, but through some other kind of Nutzung ? I doubt it very much. The thrashing machine either thrashes by putting forth its physical powers, or it does not thrash at all It would be useless too to attempt to make out another kind of use or Nvizung by pointing to different kinds of 230 CRITICISM OF SA Y-HERMANN USE BOOK in mediate uses that can be got from the thrashing machine. Our grain when thrashed is certainly worth more than it was before being thrashed, and the increment of value is a use we get from the machine. But it is easy to see that this is not a use in addition to the material services of the machine, but a use through these services ; that it is just the use of the machine. Take an exactly similar case. Suppose some one were to give me 5 0, and with it I were to buy myself a riding- horse. No one would say that I had received two presents 50 and a riding-horse. We have just as little right to conceive of the mediate use of the material services as a second and different useful service of the goods. 1 This becomes quite clear in the case of perishable goods. What do I get from a cwt. of coal ? The heat-creating powers that it gives off during combustion, and which I pay for by the capital price of the coal, and, beyond that, nothing abso- lutely nothing. And what I call my "use" of the coal consists in this, that I put these material services, as they issue from the coal, into connection with some one object in which I wish to effect a change through heat ; the use lasts as long as these services issue from the burning coal. And when I lend a man a cwt. of coal for a year, what does my debtor get from it ? Just the heat-creating power that issues from the coal during a couple of hours, and besides that, in this case also, nothing absolutely nothing. And his use of the coal likewise is exhausted in the same number of hours. It may perhaps be asked, Can he not, then, in virtue of the loan agreement, use the coal over a whole year? The owner, I admit, could have nothing to say against it, but nature has ; and nature says inexorably that the use shall be over in a couple of hours. What then remains of the contract is, that the debtor is obliged at the expiry of the year, but not till then, to replace the loan by another cwt. of coal. But it is surely a most extraordinary confusion of ideas. that the fact of a man having to give a cwt. of coal at the expiry of a year in place of another cwt. of coal that has been burnt, should be taken 1 A hair-splitting critic might perhaps point out that the possession of good machines assists the maker to secure, say, a good credit, a good name, good custom, etc. The careful reader will have no difficulty in answering such objections. To the same category belongs the " use through exchange." CHAP, vi "NUTZUNGEN" AND "NUTZLEISTUNGEN" 231 to mean that, in the burned cwt. of coal, there continues to exist an objective use for a whole year ! For any "use of goods," then, other than their natural material services, there is no room either in the world of fact or in the world of logical ideas. Possibly many readers will consider this analysis suffi- ciently convincing. But the matter is too important, and the antagonistic views too deeply rooted, to admit of it resting here ; and, accordingly, I shall try to bring forward still further evidence against the existence of the use postulated by the Use theorists. Of course the nature of my contention, as a negative one, does not allow of a positive proof. I cannot put before the mind the non-existence of a thing in the same way as I might put the existence of a tiling. Nevertheless there is no lack of decisive evidence on the point, and indeed it is offered by my opponents themselves. There are two criterions of a true proposition : that it is obtained by a correct process of reasoning, and that it leads to correct conclusions. In the case of the assertion we are combating the assertion that there is an independent use neither of these criterious applies, and what I mean to pro 1 * e now is this : 1. That in all the reasoning by which the Use theorists thought they had proved the existence of this Use, an error or a misunderstanding has crept in. 2. That the assumption of an Independent Use necessarily leads to conclusions that are untenable. After what has been already demonstrated, that there is no place for any objective Use or Nutzv.ng besides the Material Services, the proof of the above points should afford the fullest evidence that can be brought forward for my thesis. CHAPTEK VII THE INDEPENDENT USE : AN UNPROVED ASSUMPTION OF the prominent representatives of the Use theory, two have taken particular pains to prove the existence of an independent use, Hermann and Knies. I shall therefore make their argument the chief subject of critical examination. Besides these writers, however, the contribution made by Say, the Nestor of the Use theory, and by Schaffle, deserve our consideration. To begin with the last two writers, a few words will show the misunderstanding into which they have fallen. Say ascribes to capital the rendering of productive services, or, as he often expresses it, the rendering of " labour," and this labour is, according to him, the foundation of interest. The expressions Services and Labour may perhaps be objected to as more applicable to the actions of persons than of im- personal goods. But there is no doubt that Say is sub- stantially right; capital does perform "labour." It appears to me, however, just as much beyond doubt that the labour which capital actually performs consists in what I have called the Material Services of goods, and these form the foundation of gross interest, or, as the case may be, of the capital value of goods. Say appears quietly to assume that capital, besides these, gives off services distinct from what we have defined as the material services, and that such services may be the separate foundation of a net interest, but he does not give the slightest proof of it possibly because he had never remarked the chameleon-like ambiguity of his conception of the services productifs. Very much the same is true of Schaffle. I need not speak CHAP, vii CRITICISM: SAY, SCHAFFLE, HERMANN 233 of the subjective interpretations of his earlier work, which are inconsistent with the character of the Use theory, and which have been quietly withdrawn in the latest edition of his Bau und Lehen. In the later work, however, he calls goods " stores of useful energies" (iii. p. 258), and he calls uses "func- tions of goods," "equivalents of useful materials in living labour" (iii. pp. 258, 259), "living energies of impersonal social substance" (p. 313). This is all quite correct; but the function of goods, the forthputting of useful energies, is nothing else than our Material Services, and these, as we have shown, find their equivalent not in net interest, as Schaffle assumes, but in gross interest, or, in the case of perish- able goods, in their capital value. Say and Schaffle, therefore, have misunderstood what it was they had to prove, and their arguments are therefore entirely beside the mark. The way in which Hermann arrives at his independent " use " (Nutzung) has quite a psychological interest. His first introduction of the conception occurs when speaking of the use of durable goods. " Land, dwellings, tools, books, money, have durable use value. Their use, for the time that they last, may be conceived of as a good in itself, and may obtain for itself an exchange value which we call interest." l Here no special evidence is adduced for the existence of an independent use possessing an independent value, and indeed there is no need to prove it; every one knows that, as a fact, the use of a piece of ground, or the use of a house, can be independently valued and sold. But what must be emphasised is, that the thing which every reader will understand in this connection, and must understand, as use, is the gross use of durable goods ; the basis of rent in the case of land, of hire in the case of houses the same thing, in short, as we have called the material services of goods. Further, the independent existence of this " use " alongside of the good that renders the use, is only explained by the fact that the use in question does not exhaust the good itself. We are forced to admit that the use is something different from the good itself and independent of it, because the good continues to exist alongside it, in the sense that a portion of the use which it is capable of affording remains intact. 1 Staatsicirthschaftliche Untersuchungen, second edition, p. 109. 234 THE INDEPENDENT USE: UNPROVED BOOK in The second step that Hermann takes is to draw an analogy between the use of durable and the use of perishable goods, and to try to show that, in the case of the latter also, there is an independent use with independent value existing along- side the value of the good. He finds 1 that perishable goods, through technical change of form, preserve their usefulness, and although in changed shape, "may obtain permanence for their use." If, e.g. iron-ore, coal, and labour are transformed into pig iron, in being so transformed they contribute the chemical and mechanical elements for a new usefulness which emerges from their combination ; and if, in such case, the pig iron possesses the exchange value of the three goods of exchange employed in its making, then the former sum of goods persists, qualitatively bound up in the new usefulness, quantitatively added together in the exchange value. " But if in this way goods that are perishable are capable of a lasting use, then," continues Heraiann, " it is the same with goods that change their form qualitatively while retaining their exchange value, as it is with durable goods ; this use may be conceived of as a good in itself, as a use (Nutzuwj) which may itself obtain exchange value." In this Hermann has of course reached the goal he set before him, of proving that, even in perishable goods, there is a use which exists alongside of the good itself. Let us look, however, a little more closely at the basis of his argument. First of all, it should be noticed that the sole support of this demonstration is a conclusion drawn from analogy. The existence of an independent use in perishable goods can in no way appeal, like the use of durable goods, to the testimony of the senses, and to practical economic experience. No one has seen an independent use detaching itself from a perishable good. If we think that it is to be seen in the case of every loan inasmuch as a loan is nothing else than a transfer of the use of perishable goods, we are wrong ; here we do not see an independent use ; we only infer that there is one. What we see is simply that the borrower receives 100 at the begin- ning of the year, to give back at the end of it 105. That in this case 100 is given for the sum that was lent, and 5 for the use of the same, is not an immediate sensuous observation ; 1 P. llU, r-tc. See the quotation above, p. 194. CHAP, vii BY HERMANN 235 it is a construction put by us on our observation. At all events, where the existence of an independent use in perishable goods is in question, no appeal can be made to the case of the loan ; for so long as the existence of that independent use is questioned, of course the justification of interpreting the loan as a transfer of use must also be questioned, and to try to prove the one by the other is obviously begging the question. If, therefore, the " independent use of perishable goods " is to be anything more than an unproved assertion, it can only be through the force of the argument from analogy that Her- mann has introduced, not indeed in form but in substance, in the passage just quoted. The argument there is as follows : Durable goods are capable, as every one knows, of affording a use independent of the goods themselves ; if we look closely we can see that perishable goods, like durable goods, allow of a durable use ; consequently perishable goods are, and must be, capable of affording a use independent of the goods themselves. The conclusion thus drawn is false, for, as I shall prove immediately, the analogy fails just at the critical point. I admit at once that perishable goods, through technical change of form, really become capable of durable use. I grant that coal and iron ore are first used in the production of iron. I grant that the use which the iron then affords is nothing but a further result of the powers of those first things ; which first things are therefore used in the shape of iron for the second time, and again in the nail that is made out of the iron for the third time, and in the house which the nail helps to hold together for the fourth time ; that is to say, are used in a lasting way. Only it must be carefully noted that the durableness in this case rests on quite another ground, and possesses quite another character from that of durable goods properly so called. The durable gooJs are used over and over again in this way that, in each act of use, only a part of their useful content is exhausted, while another part is left un- disturbed for future acts of use. But the perish'able goods are used over and over again by exhausting the whole of them over and over again by exhausting the whole useful content of that form which the goods have at the time ; but since this useful content then takes on a new shape, the exhaustive use 236 THE INDEPENDENT USE: UNPROVED BOOK in is repeated in it again. The two kinds of use are as distinct as the continuous outflow of water from a reservoir is distinct from the continuous flow of water from one vessel to another and back again ; or, to take an example from the economical world, they are as distinct as the obtaining of successive pro- ceeds from selling land piece by piece is distinct from the obtaining of successive proceeds by spending the price of the whole piece of ground in a new purchase, and selling this new purchase over again. A few words more will bring out more sharply the halting nature of Hermann's analogy. Between the " durable use " which Hermann points out in perishable goods, and durable goods proper, there is really a perfect analogy, but Hermann, instead of drawing this parallel, has drawn another. We have here to do with one of those points in which the neglect that our science has been guilty of in regard to the conception of the " use of goods " has revenged itself on the science. If Hermann had more accurately examined the conception of use (Gebrauch) he would have perceived that under that name two very distinct things are coupled together things which, for want of a better expression, I shall distinguish as the immediate and mediate use of goods. The immediate use (the only one which perhaps has any claim to the name of " use ") consists in the receiving of the material services of a good. The mediate use (which perhaps it would be more proper not to call " use " at all) consists in receiving the material services of those other goods that only come into existence through the material services of the first " used " good ; then again the services of the goods that proceed from the material services of these latter goods, and so on. In other words, the " mediate use " consists in receiving the more distant members of that chain of causes and effects which takes its beginning in the first immediate use members that possibly go on evolving to the crack of doom. Now I should not like to say that it is exactly false to call the use of these distant results of a good a use of the good itself; in any case the two kinds of use have an entirely different character. If any one likes to call my riding on a horse a use of the hay that my horse has eaten, it is manifest, at all events, that this is an entirely different kind of use from CHAP, vii BY HERMANN 237 the immediate use of the hay, and in some essential respects is subject to totally different conditions. If we wish therefore to draw an analogy between the use of two goods, or of two kinds of goods, we must evidently confine ourselves strictly to similar kinds of use. We may compare the immediate use of one good with the immediate use of another, or the mediate use of one good with the mediate use of another; but not the immediate use of one good with the -mediate use of another, particularly if we wish to deduce further scientific conclusions from the comparison. It is here that Hermann has gone wrong. Durable goods as well as perishable goods permit of two kinds of use. Coal, a perishable good, has its immediate use in burning; its mediate use, as Hermann has quite correctly pointed out, in the use of the iron which is smelted by its aid. But this is the case also with every durable good. E.g. every spinning frame, besides its immediate use which consists in the pro- duction of yarn, has also a mediate use which consists in the use of the yarn for making cloth, in the use of cloth for making clothing, in the use of clothing itself, and so on. Now the proper comparison would obviously be between the immediate use of the durable goods and the momentary use of the perish- able goods, 1 or between the durable mediate use of the perishable and the similarly durable mediate use of the durable goods. But Hermann has made a mistake in the parallels ; he has drawn his analogy where there is really none between the immediate use of durable goods and the mediate use of the perishable ; misled by the circumstance that both kinds of use are " durable," and overlooking the fact that, in the two cases, this " durableness " rests on grounds that are utterly and entirely distinct. This much, I trust, has at all events been made clear by the present analysis, that the analogy whioh Hermann draws between the " durable " use of durable and of perishable goods is not complete. But beyond this it is easy to show that the dissimilarity comes in exactly at the critical point. Why is 1 To prove the appropriateness of this analogy we need only picture to our- selves the graduation of transition from the durable goods, such as land, precious stones, down through always less durable goods, as tools, furniture, clothes, linen, tapers, paper collars, and so on, till we come to the entirely perishable goods matches, food, drink, etc. 238 THE INDEPENDENT USE: UNPROVED BOOK in it that we can see in durable goods an independent use with an independent value by the side of the good itself? Not simply because the use is a durable one, but because the use that has already been made of the good leaves something over of the good, and of the value of the good; because in that portion of the immediate useful content that has been released and in the portion that is not yet released we Jiave two different things that exist beside each other, each of them having simultaneously an economic value of its own. But in the case of perishable goods the exact opposite of all this is the case. Here the use of the moment entirely exhausts the useful content of the form which the good had at the moment, and the value of this use is always identical with the entire value of the good itself. At no one moment have we two valuable things alongside of each other ; only one and the same valuable thing two times in succession. When we use coal and iron ore in making iron, we consume them ; for this use we pay the entire capital value of these goods, and 'not one atom of them is saved, or continues to exist and have an independent value beside and after this consumption. And it is just the same when the iron is consumed again for the making of nails. It is consumed ; the whole capital value of the iron is paid for it ; and not the smallest fragment of it continues to exist alongside. There never are in one single moment the thing and its use beside each other; only the things " coal and iron-ore," " iron," and " nails," after one, an- other, and through their successive use. But such being the case, it can be shown us neither by analogy nor in any other way how the " use " of a perishable article can attain to an existence and to a value independent of the article itself. The fact is, Hermann's analogical reasoning is no more correct than an argument like the following would be. From a great water tank in an hour's time I can draw off a gallon of water every second. Each of the 3600 gallons thus poured out has an independent existence of itself, and is a perfectly distinct thing ; distinct from the water -that has been drawn and from the water that remains in the tank. But suppose I have only one gallon of water, and go on pouring this from one vessel in to another ; as in the former case, a gallon of water is poured out every second for the space of an hour. CHAP, vii BY HERMANN AND KNIES 239 Therefore in this case also it must be 3600 independent gallons that are poured out from our vessels ! But, lastly, Hermann takes a third step, and resolves the use of durable goods into tw<- elements ; one element that alone deserves the name " use " (Gelrauch or Nutzung} and a second element which he calls " using up " (Abnutzung). I must confess that this last step reminds me very forcibly of the old anecdote of Munchausen, in which Munchausen lets himself down by a rope from the moon by always cutting the rope above his head, and knotting it again below him. Very much in the same way Hermann has at first treated of the whole (gross) use of durable goods as use (Nutzuiiy), till such time as he has based a conclusion from analogy on it, and through it has demonstrated a use in perishable goods also. No sooner has he got this length than he tears his primary conception of use in pieces, nowise disturbed by the fact that with it he destroys the peg to which he has attached his later conception of independent use, and that this conception now hangs in the air. I shall return later on to the further inconsistencies involved in this. In the meantime I content myself with saying that the contention which looks so fascinating at the first glance proves on closer examination to have no better support than a false analogy. It would be an obvious omission in my criticism if it were not to include the thorough and conscientious efforts of Knies on this subject. The work of this distinguished thinker has a twofold similarity to Hermann's doctrine ; like Hermann, his arguments are remarkably convincing at first sight, and this power they owe to an effective employment of analogies analogies, however, which, like those of Hermann, I feel bound to declare false. Knies chances on our subject when discussing the eco- nomical nature of the loan. He agrees with the view that the essence of the loan consists in a transfer of the use of the sum lent ; and when trying, with his usual carefulness, to find reasons for this conception, he is compelled to go into the question of the existence or non-existence of an independent use in perishable goods. 240 THE INDEPENDENT USE: UNPROVED BOOK in In some introductory considerations he starts from the idea that there are economical " transfers " which do not coincide with the transfer of the rights of property. The transferences of the simple use of goods seem to be of this sort. He goes on to note the distinction between perishable and non-perish- able goods, and then turns to a detailed consideration of the transfer of the uses of non-perishable goods a considera- tion which, with him as with Hermann, is made to serve as bridge to explain the delicate phenomena in the use of perishable goods. Here he puts down the distinction that must be drawn between the Nutzung as " that Gebrauch of a good which lasts over a period of time, and is measured by moments of time," and the good itself as the " bearer of the Nutzung." The economical principle of the transfers in question is that the intention is to transfer a Nutzung, but not the bearer of a Nutzung. But the nature of things necessitates that the transfer of the Nutzungen of goods always involves certain concessions in regard to the bearer of the Nutzung. The owner of a leased piece of ground, e.g. must, from physical considerations, deliver it over to the lessee, if the lessee is to get the use of it. The amount of these con- cessions, and the inevitable risk of loss as well as of deteriora- tion of the good which bears the use, vary just as things vary, and as the particular circumstances of the individual case vary. In hire, for instance, a certain amount of deteriora- tion, and the consent of the owner to this deterioration, are quite necessary. 1 Then, after explaining the meaning of the legal categories of fungible and non-fungible goods, Knies puts the following question (p. 71), Is it not then actually possible, must it not, indeed, be understood as the intention of a compact, that the use (Nutzung} of a fungible, and even of a perishable good should be transferred ? In this sentence Knies implicitly asks whether there is not an independent use of perishable goods. He answers the question by putting the following case. " A cwt. of corn is a fungible and perishable good of this kind. The owner, in certain circumstances, cannot part with this cwt, and is not inclined to exchange it, or sell it, perhaps 1 Oeld, p. 59, etc. CHAP, vii BY KNIES 241 because he is obliged to consume (verbrauchen), or wishes to consume it himself at the end of six months. But up till that date he does not need it. This being so he might of course very well allow himself to transfer the use (Gebrauch) of it to some one else for the next six months, if only at the expiry of that time he could get back his good. Say, then, that there is another man who desires the corn, but cannot barter for it or buy it. He will point out that he could not get any use (Nutzung) from the corn, as a perishable good, unless through the consumption ( Verbrauch) of the corn itself, say as seed ; but that he would be able to replace another cwt. from the harvest obtained by means of this use (Nutzung) transferred to him. The owner may find this perfectly satisfactory for his economical interests, since the transaction here refers to a fungible good. " In this statement there is not a particle of an idea con- taining anything at all impossible, far-fetched, or artificial. But such a transaction taken by itself that is, the transfer of a cwt. of corn under the condition of the borrower giving back a cwt. of corn at the end of six months belongs undoubtedly to those things that are called loans. ... In conformity with this we put the loan in the category of transfers of a Use (Nutzung) that is, of the use (Nutzung} of fungible goods which pass over into the control and for the use of the owner, and are replaced by a similar quantity. Naturally, in the case of the loan, it is of the greatest consequence to understand clearly that, how- ever liberal the concessions may Le as 'regards the 'bearer of the use, still it is not in the concessions that the principle of the transaction lies. Rather are these concessions always determined in conformity with the overruling necessity of obtain- ing the use at the time. And just on this account, in the. case of a perishable good, they are extended so far as to give the owner the power of consumption, while all the same there is even here no other principle in the matter than the trans- fer of a use. In the loan, therefore, the transfer of the right of property is unavoidable, but still only as an accompanying circumstance." I admit at once that these analyses are calculated to make an entirely convincing impression on one who does not look very closely into them. Not only has Knies shown unusual skill in drawing the analogy which the old opponents of the can- E 242 THE INDEPENDENT USE: UNPROVED BOOK m onists used to draw, between lease and hire on the one side and the loan on the other, but he has enriched it by a new and effective feature. For by the allusion he makes to the un- avoidable concessions, in regard to the " bearer of the use," that are made in the case of all transfers of use, he has managed to change the element that seemed completely to destroy the analogy between the loan and the hire (the complete transfer of the property in the goods lent) into a further support of it. If, however, we do not allow ourselves to be carried away by these brilliant analogies, but begin to reflect critically on them, we shall easily see that their admissibility, and witli it the strength of the proof, depends on an affirmative answer being given to a previous question. The previous question is, Whether in perishable goods there is any independ- ent use to transfer by way of loan ? And we shall look more exactly at the kind of evidence that Knies specially brings for- ward as regards this question a question that is the key to his whole theory of the loan. At this point I think we shall make the astonishing dis- covery that Knies has not said a word in proof of the existence, or even the conceivableness of an independent use, but has evaded the great difficulty of his theory by using the word Nutzung in a double sense. I shall try to show how he does so. On p. 61 he himself identifies the Nutzung of a good with its G-ebroMch. He knows besides (p. 61 again) that in perishable goods there is no other possible Gebrauch but a Verbrauch. He must, therefore, also know that in perishable goods the Nutzung is identical with the Ver'brauck. But, on the other hand, he uses the word Nutzung in stating the problem, and then in the concluding sentence " In conformity with this we put the loan in the category of transfers of a Nutzung " he evidently uses the word in a sense that is not identical with Vcrlrauch, but means a dur- able Nutzung. In the course of the passage quoted he mixes up step by step the Nutzung in the first sense with the Nut- zung in the second sense, till he arrives at this concluding sentence, where, from a number of propositions that are only correct if they refer to Nutzung in the first sense, is drawn the conclusion that there is a Nutzung in the second sense. The first proposition runs : " The owner, in certain circum- CHAP, vii BY KNIES 243 stances, cannot part with this cwt., and is not inclined to ex- change it, or sell it, perhaps because he is obliged to consume (verlrauchcn), or wishes to consume it himself at the end of six months. But up till that date he does not need it." In this proposition the kind of use that is thought of, and, in the nature of things, the only kind that can be thought of, is quite correctly indicated as the Vcrbrauch of the good. Then he continues : " He might of course very well allow him- self to transfer the Gebraucli of it to some one else for the next six months, if only at the expiry of that time he could get back his good." Here begins the ambiguity. What is the meaning of Gebrauch here ? Does it mean Vcrbrauch ? Or does it mean a kind of Nutzung that lasts over a period of six months ? Obviously the Gebrauch is conceivable only as the Vcrbrauch, but the words " Gebrauck for the next six months " are calcu- lated to suggest a durable Gebrauch, and with this begins the quid pro quo. Now follows the third proposition : " Say then that there another man who desires the corn, but cannot barter for it or buy it. He will point out that he could not get any Nut- zung from the corn, as a perishable good, unless through the Verbraucli of the corn itself, say as seed ; but that he would be able to replace another cwt. from the harvest obtained by means of this Nutzung transferred to him. The owner ma}' find this perfectly satisfactory for his economical interests, since the transaction here refers to a fungible good." This proposition contains the crowning confusion. Kaies makes the suitor for the loan point out distinctly that a Nutzung of perishable goods cannot be anything else than identical with their Vcrbrauch, but in the same breath he uses and places the words Nutzung and Vcrbrauck in such a way that the two conceptions are kept separate from one another, and appear not to be identical. He thus smuggles into his argument and the oftener he does it the less likely is it to be noticed the suggestion of a durable Nutzung in perish- able goods. Thus when it is said that the harvest is " obtained by means of this Nutzung transferred," one might quite well imagine that the Nutzgebrauch of the seed is here again only the same thing as the Nutzvcrbrauch which obtained the 244 THE INDEPENDENT USE: UNPROVED BOOK in harvest. But, thanks to the agreement of the " Nutzung trans- ferred " with the " transfer of the Nutzung" which we have been constantly hearing about, and which had meant the opposite of the " transfers of the bearer of the Nutzuny" we are forced involuntarily to think of a durable Nutzuny after the analogy of the Nutzung of durable goods. Any scruple we may have about the conceivableness of such a Nutzn.ng is the more easily silenced that we are told, at the same time, that through it the harvest is obtained that is, that something very real indeed is accomplished a proof of the existence of a Nutzuny which the reader, once caught in the tangle, naturally puts to the account of the " durable Nutzuny."' And now from this confused argument Knies draws hi? conclusions. After saying that " in this statement there is not a particle of an idea containing anything at all impos- sible, far-fetched, or artificial" which, indeed, if we grant his assumptions, is quite correct, but admits of no conclusion in favour of his thesis if, for the words Gcbrauch or Nntzung. we substitute in each ambiguous passage the word Nutzvcr- Irauch he draws the conclusion, Therefore the loan belongs to the class of transfers of a simple Nutzuny. This conclusion is simply fallacious. The thing he had to prove has not been proved. Nay, more ; the thing that was to be proved is introduced quietly in the deduction, as some- thing that had been assumed ; the Nutzung, in the peculiar sense attached to it, is spoken of as if it were a familiar fact, with- out one word being said in support of what was to be proved, the existence of such a Nutzung. But the difficulty of discovering this fundamental flaw in the argument is very much aggravated by two circumstances : first, that the false Nutzuny sails under the flag of the true Nutzung, and we for- get to protest against the existence of the so-called Nutzung, because, thanks to the dialectical skill of the author, we do not keep it separate and distinct from the true Nutzung, which unquestionably does exist ; and second, through the very naiveti- of the suggestion. That is to say, without in point of fact once entering on the problem whether a durable Nutzung in perish- able goods is conceivable or not, Knies represents the owner and the suitor for the loan as negotiating over the transfer of the Nutzung in a tone of certainty, which implies that the CHAP, vn BY ANY USE THEORIST 245 existence of the Nutzuny is beyond question, and the reader almost involuntarily shares in the certainty ! If we look back and compare the efforts that the writers of the Say -Hermann school have made to prove their peculiar Use of capital, we shall perceive, among all their difference of detail, a substantial agreement which is very suggestive. All the authors of that school, from Say to Knies, when they begin to speak of the use of capital, first of all allude to the material services which capital actually renders. Then under cover of this they get the reader to admit that the " use of capital " does really exist ; that it exists as an independent economic element, and even possesses an independent eco- nomical value. That this independence is not the independ- ence of a second whole beside the good itself, but only that of an independent and separable part of the content of the good, the rendering of the service being always attended by a diminution in the value of the good itself; and that the remuneration of this service is a gross interest all this is kept in the background. But no sooner have they got the length of recognising the " independent use of capital " than they substitute, for the true material services of capital (under cover of which they arrived at the independent use), the imaginary use of their own making, impute to it an independent value outside the full value of the good, and end by drawing away the true use that had served as a ladder for the false. This way of working is seen in Say and Schaffle only in a hasty and abbreviated form, in quietly changing what is the substance of gross interest into what is the substance of net interest; but Hermann and Knies work it out in complete detail before our eyes. Blunders like these show us how urgent is the necessity that the " revision of fundamental conceptions," so much desiderated, should even at this late date be applied to the apparently insignificant conception of the Use of goods. I have tried to do my part in giving a first contribution to it, and I believe that in the present chapter I have proved my first pro- position, that in all the reasoning by which the Use theorists of the Say-Hermann school thought they had proved the 246 THE INDEPENDENT USE: UNPROVED BOOK in existence of the asserted use, an error or a misunderstanding has crept in. Not only, however, is the assumption of that independent use absolutely unproved, but, as I mean to show in the next chapter, it leads necessarily to internal contradictions and untenable conclusions. CHAPTEE VIII THE INDEPENDENT USE : ITS UNTENABLE CONCLUSIONS IT is customary among the Use theorists, and even among others, 1 to make a distinction between a gross Nutzung, which is the basis of gross interest (rent or hire), and a net Nutzung, which is the basis of net interest. It is singular enough that we have all been in the habit of innocently repeating this distinction, without it ever occurring to any one that there was in it an irreconcilable contradiction. If we are to believe the unanimous assurance of our theorists, Nutzung should be taken as synonymous with Gebrauch in the objective sense of the word. Now, if there is a net and a gross Nutzung, are we to understand that there are two Nutzungen, two Gebrauche of- the same good not, it must be remembered, two successive or two alternative kinds of Gebrauch, but two simultaneous cumulative Gebrauche that 1 It is as well to put it in so many words that, in this polemic on the concep- tion of Use, I am in opposition, not only to the Use theorists properly so called, but to almost the entire literature of political economy. The conception of the Use of capital which I dispute is that commonly accepted since the day of Salmasius. Even writers who explain the origin of interest by quite different theories e.g. Roscher, by the Productivity theory ; or Senior, by the Abstinence theory ; or Courcelle - Seneuil or Wagner, by the Labour theory always conceive of loan interest as a remuneration for a transferred Use or Usage of capital, and occasionally they conceive even of natural interest as a result of the same use or usage. The only distinction between them and the Use theorists properly so called is this, that the former employ these expressions naively, using terms that have become popular, and do not trouble them- selves as to the premises and conclusions of the Use conception, which sometimes entirely contradict the rest of their interest theory ; while the Use theorists build their distinctive theory on the conclusions of that concep- tion. The almost universal acceptance of N the error I am opposing may further justify my prolixity. 248 THE INDEPENDENT USE: UNTENABLE BOOK in are obtained beside or in each other in every transaction, however elementary, where a Gebrauch enters ? That one good gives off two uses, the one after the other, can be understood. That one good permits of two kinds of use alternatively as wood for building and for burning can also be understood. It is quite conceivable even that one good should permit of two kinds of use simultaneously, the one beside the other, and that these furnish two distinct utilities ; e.g. that a picturesque rustic bridge should at once serve as medium of traffic, and as object of aesthetic satisfaction. But when I hire a house or a lodging, and make use of it for purposes of habitation, to imagine that in one and the same series of acts of use I am receiving and profiting by two different uses, a wider one for which I pay the whole hire, aud a narrower one for which I pay the net interest contained in the hire ; or to imagine that in every stroke of the pen that I put om paper, in every look that I throw on a picture, in every cut that I make with my knife, in short, in every use, however simple, that I get from a good, I get always two uses, in or beside each other ; this is in contradiction alike with the nature of things and with healthy common sense. If I look at a picture, or live in a house, I make one use of the picture or house ; and if in this connection I speak of two things, whether Gebrauch or Nutzung, I am giving a wrong name to one of them. To which of them do I give the wrong name ? On this point, again, the current view is a very strange one. The theorists we are speaking of certainly appear to have felt in some degree the impropriety of assuming two uses to exist alongside each other. For although as a rule they employ the word Nutzung to express two things, they sometimes make an attempt to put one of them out of sight. Indeed, the gross Nutzung is eliminated when it is split up into net Nutzung plus partial replacement of capital. Thus Koscher, whom we are justified in quoting as the representative of the current opinion, says : l " The Nutzung of a capital must not be confounded with its partial replacement. In house rent, for instance, over and above the payment for the Gebrauch of the house, there must be contained a sufficient sum for repairs, indeed 1 Grundlagen, tenth edition, p. 401, etc. CHAP, viir GKOSS AND NET USE 249 enough for the gradual accumulation of capital sufficient to put up a new building." It follows that the thing for which we pay net interest is in truth a Gebrauch, and it is erroneous and inaccurate to apply the name to that for which we pay gross interest. I do not believe that it would be possible to put the representatives of this wonderful view in a more embarrassing position than by challenging them to define what they mean by Gebi-auch, What else can it mean than the receiving or, if we like to give it an objective significance, the proffering of the Material Services of which a good is capable ? Or, if there is any objection to my expression, let us say " useful services " with Say, or "releasing of a use from material goods" or " receiving of useful effects " with Schaffle, or however else we like to put it. But define the word as we may, one thing appears to my mind beyond dispute. When A makes over to B a house for temporary habitation, and B inhabits it, then A has given over to B the Gebrauch of the house, and B has taken the Gebrauch of the house ; and if B pays anything for the Gebrauch, he does not pay a single penny of hire or rent for anything else than this ; that he may avail himself of the useful properties and powers of the house. In other words, he has paid for the Gebi-auch transferred to him, It may be said, Yes, perhaps so ; but has not B consumed a portion of the value of the house itself ? and if so, did he not get transferred to him a part of the value of the house itself, in addition to the use of the house ? One who would argue thus might be expected to hold the somewhat singular view that two aspects of one event are two events. The truth of the matter is that the hirer lias received the Gebrauch of the house, and only the Gebrauch ; but in using it, and through using it, he has diminished its value. He has received a " store of energies," from which he is at liberty to " release " so many ; he has done nothing but " release " or use them ; but, naturally, the value of the remainder of the energies has been diminished thereby: To construe that as meaning that the hirer has received two things alongside each other, Gebrauch and partial value of capital, appears to me very much as if, in buy- ing a fourth horse to match three he had already, a man were to consider it an acquisition of two separate things first, a horse, and second, the complement of the team of four ; and as 250 THE INDEPENDENT USE : UNTENABLE BOOK in if he were then to maintain that, of the 50 he paid, only one portion, say 25, was the price of the horse, while the remaining 2 5 was the price of the complement of the team ! It is the same thing as if one were to say of a workman who had put up the cross on the steeple and thereby finished the building of the steeple, that he had performed two acts first, had put up the cross, and second, had finished the building of the steeple ; and were further to say that, if the workman took an hour to do the whole job, not more than three-quarters of an hour were needed for the erection of the cross, since a part of the whole time expended, say a quarter of an hour, must be put to the account of the second act, the completion of the building of the steeple ! But if, notwithstanding all this, some one thinks that he sees in Gebrauch, not the gross Nutzung, but another something which is ill to define, let him say in what the Gebrauch of a meal consists. In eating ? It cannot be so, for that is a gross Nutzung, that swallows up the whole value of the capital, and of course we cannot confuse that with the true Gebrauch. But in what then does it consist ? In an aliquot part of eating ? or in something entirely different from eating ? I am glad to think that the duty of answering this question does not fall to me, but to the Use theorists. If, then, we are not to give the words Getoauch and Nutzung a meaning that is equally opposed to language and to life, to the representations of practice and of science, we cannot deny the gross Nutzung the property of being a true Nutzung. But if there cannot be two Nutzungen, and if in any case the gross Nutzung must be recognised as that which correctly conveys the conception of Nutzung, then there is no need to argue further against the net Nutzung of the Use theorists. But let us leave all that on one side, and confine our attention to the following. Whether the gross Nutzung be a true Nutzung or not, at any rate it is undoubtedly something. And the Use theorists would like to make out the net Nutzung to be something likewise. Now these two quantities, if they both actually exist, must at all events stand in some relation to each other. The net Nutzung must either be part of the gross Nutzung or it is no part of it ; there is no third course. Now let us see. If we look at durable goods it seems probable CHAP, vni GROSS AND NET USE 251 that the net Nutzung is a part of the gross ; for since the remuneration of the former, the net interest, is contained in the remuneration of the latter, the gross interest, so must also the first object of purchase be contained in the second, and be a part of it. This indeed even the Use theorists themselves maintain when they analyse the one sum of the gross Nutzung into net Nutzung plus partial replacement of capital. But look now at perishable goods. The net interest I pay in this case is not paid for their consumption ( Verbrauch}, for if, on the moment of the consumption, I replace the perishable goods by their fungible equivalent, I do not require to pay any interest. What I pay interest for is only the delay in the replacement of the equivalent ; that is, I pay it for something that is not contained in the consumption that most intense form of gross use but stands quite outside it. Are we to conclude then that the net Nutzung is at once part and not part of the gross Nutzung? How can the Use theorists explain this contradiction ? I might draw out to much greater length the number of riddles and contradictions into which the assumption of the independent Nutzung leads us. I might ask the Use theorists what, for instance, I should represent to myself as the ten years' Nutzung, or the ten years' Gebrauck, of the bottle of wine that I drank on the first day of the first year ? An existence it must have, for I can buy or sell it on a loan of from one to ten years. I might point out what a singular assumption it is, even verging on the ludicrous, that, on the moment when a good by its complete consumption actually ceases to be of use, it should really be only beginning to afford a perpetual use ; that one debtor, who at the end of a year pays back a bottle of wine he borrowed, has consumed less than another who only returns the bottle of wine at the end of ten years, inasmuch as the former has consumed the bottle of wine and its one year's use, the latter the bottle of wine and its ten years' use ; while all the time it is evident to everybody that both parties have obtained the same use from the bottle of wine, and that the obligation that emerges, to pay back another bottle of wine sooner or later, has absolutely nothing to do with the shorter or longer duration of the objective uses of the first bottle. But I think that more than enough has been said to carry conviction. 252 THE INDEPENDENT USE: UNTENABLE BOOK in To sum up, I consider that three things have been here proved. I think it has been proved, firstly, that the nature of goods, as material bearers of useful natural powers, precludes the con- ceivability of any Nutzung that does not consist in the forth- putting of their useful natural powers that is, any Nutzung that is not identical with what I have called the Material Services of goods those services being the basis not of net, but of gross interest ; or, in the case of perishable goods, their entire capital value. I think that it has been proved, secondly, that all attempts on the part of the Use theorists to demonstrate the existence or the conceivability of a net Nutzung different from the material services, are erroneous or based on a misunderstanding. I think it has been proved, thirdly, that the assumption of the net Nutzung postulated by the Use theorists necessarily leads to absurd and contradictory conclusions. I think, therefore, that I am entirely justified in maintaining that the net Nutzung, on the existence of which the Use theorists of the Say-Hermann school base their explanation of interest, does not in truth exist, but is only the product of a misleading fiction. But in what way did this remarkable fiction enter into our science ? And how came it to be taken for reality ? By recurring for a little to the history of the problem I hope to dispel any doubts that may linger in the minds of my readers ; and, in particular, I trust we may get an opportunity of estimat- ing at its true value any prejudice that might still linger as a consequence of the former victory of Salmasius's theory. CHAPTEE IX THE INDEPENDENT USE: ITS ORIGIN IN LEGAL FICTION WE have here to deal with one of those not uncommon cases where a fiction, originating in the sphere of law and originally used for practical legal purpose by people who were fully conscious of its fictitious character, has been transferred to the sphere of economics, and the consciousness of the fiction has been lost in the transfer. Jurisprudence has at all times required fictions. To make comparatively few and simple principles of law suffice for the whole varied actuality of legal life, jurisprudence is often compelled to look upon cases as quite similar with each other that in reality are not similar, but may be appropriately dealt with in practice as if they were so. It was in this way that the formulae fictitiac of the Roman civil process originated ; thus also the legal " persons." the res incorporates, and innumerable other fictions of the science of law. Now it sometimes happened that a fiction which had grown very venerable became in the end petrified into a thoroughly credited dogma. If for hundreds of years people had been accustomed to treat a thing, both in theory and practice, as if it really were essentially the same as something else, then, other circumstances being favourable, it might end in their quite forgetting that there was a fiction. So it is, as I have pointed out in another place, with the res incorporates of Roman law ; and so too it has been with the independent Nutzung of perishable and fungible goods. Let us follow, step by step, the course whereby the fiction became petrified into a dogma. There are some goods the individuality of which is of no 254 THE INDEPENDENT USE: ITS ORIGIN BOOK in importance, goods that are only taken account of by their kind and amount, quae fwndcre, nuviero, mcnsura cotisistunt. These are called in law fungible goods. 1 Since no importance attaches to their individuality, the replacing goods perfectly supply the place of the replaced goods. For certain purposes of practical legal life these goods could be treated without difficulty as identical. Particularly was this the case in such legal transactions as related to the giving away and getting back of fungible goods. Here it suggested itself as convenient to conceive of the giving back of an equal amount of fungible goods as a giving back of the very same goods ; in other words, to feign identity between the fungible goods given back and those given away. So far as I know, the old Koman sources of law do not put this fiction formally. They say quite correctly of it that, in the loan, tantundetn or idem genus, not simply idem is given back. But at any rate the fiction is there. If, e.g. the so-called depositum irregulare, where the depositary was allowed to employ on his own account the sum of money given over to his safe keeping, and to replace the deposit in other pieces of money, was treated as a depositum, 2 this construction can only be explained by supposing that the lawyers invoked the assistance of the fiction whereby the pieces of money replaced were considered identical with those given in for safe keeping. Modern jurisprudence has occasionally gone farther, and spoken explicitly of a " legal identity " between fungible goods. 3 From this first fiction it was but a step to a second. If it once came to be thought that, in the loan and in similar trans- actions, the same goods were given back that the debtor had received, the further idea was logically bound to follow, that the debtor had retained the goods lent him during the whole period of the loan, had kept them unbroken, and had used them unbroken ; that the use obtained from them was therefore a durable use; and that where interest was paid it was paid .just for this durable use. 1 The common German word is vertrctbar, which might be loosely translated here by "representative" or "replaceable." But the word "fungible" is per- haps worth adopting in English economics. "W. S. 2 See L. 31, Dig. loc. 19, 2, and L. 25, 1, Dig. dep. 16, 3. 3 Goldschmidt, Handbueh des Handelsrechtes, second edition, Stuttgart, 1883, vol. ii. part. i. p. 26 in the note. CHAP, ix IN LEGAL FICTION 255 This second step in the fiction the jurists did make. They knew quite well, to begin with, that they were only dealing with a fiction. They knew quite well that the goods given back are not identical with the goods received ; that the debtor does not hold and possess these goods during the whole period of the loan ; the fact being that, to attain the purpose of the loan, the debtor must, as a rule, very soon entirely part with the goods. Lastly, they knew quite well that, for the same reason, the debtor does not get any durable use out of the goods lent. But for the practical purposes and require- ments of both parties it was the same as if everything actually were what it pretended to be, and therefore the jurists could employ the fiction. They gave expression to this fiction in the sphere of their science when, on the ground of it, they confirmed the expression for loan interest that had already found a home in the speech of the people, usura, money paid for use ; when they taught that interest was paid for the use of the sum lent ; and when they made out a usufruct even in perishable goods. This usufruct of course was only a quasi-usufruct, the lawyers being quite aware that they were only dealing with a fiction. On one occasion they even expressed this pointedly, in correcting a legislative act that had given the fiction too realistic an expression. 1 Finally, after many centuries of teaching that the usura was money paid for use, and in an age when the better part of the living spirit of classical jurisprudence had fled, and had consequently been replaced by a greater reverence for trans- mitted formulas, the justification of loan interest was sharply attacked by the canonists. One of their strongest weapons was the discovery of this fiction in regard to the uses of perish- 1 Ulpian, it is well known, in Dig. vii. 5, L. 1, De usufructu carum rerum quae usu consumuntur vcl minuntur, quotes a decree of the Senate which established the bequeathing of a usufruct in perishable goods. On this Gaius remarks : " Quo senatus consulto non id effectum est, tit pecuniae ustifructus proprie esset ; nee enim naturalis ratio auctoritate senatus commutari potuit ; sed, remedio introducto, caepit quasi usufructus haberi." I do not agree with Knies (Geld, p. 75) that Gaius took exception simply to the formal flaw that there could only be a regular usufruct in goods belonging to another person, while the legatee holds the perishable goods left him as his own property, res suae. The appeal to the naturalis ratio could hardly have been made in order to rehabilitate a defective formal definition of usufruct ; it is infinitely more probable that it was made on behalf of a truth of nature that was seriously violated by the decree. 256 THE INDEPENDENT USE : ITS ORIGIN BOOK in able goods. For the rest, their argument appeared so convincing that one could scarcely see how loan interest was to be saved, if the premiss were granted that there is no such thing as an independent use of perishable goods. Thus the fiction all at once attained an importance it never had before. To believe in the actual existence of the usus was the same thing as to approve of interest ; not to believe in it seemed to force one to condemn it. To save interest in this dilemma, people were inclined to give the legal formula more honour than it deserved; and Salmasius and his followers exerted themselves to find reasons which would allow them to take the formula for the fact. The reasons they did find were just good enough to convince people eager to be convinced, as already won over by a demonstration that was in other respects excellent, that Salmasius, on the whole, had right on his side ; while his opponents, who were evidently wrong as regards the chief point, were suspected even on those points where they were occasionally right. So it happened not for the first, and certainly not for the last time that under the pressure of practical exigencies an abortive theory was born, and the old fiction of the lawyers proclaimed as fact. Thus it has remained ever since, at least in political economy. While the newer jurisprudence drew back for the most part from the doctrine of Salmasius, modern political economy has held by the old stock formula taken from the legal repertoire. In the seventeenth century the formula had served to support the practical justification of interest ; in the nineteenth it did as good service in affording a theoretical explanation of it, which people would have been embarrassed to get otherwise. This puzzling " surplus value " had to be explained. It appeared to hang in the air. Something was wanted to hang it from. And there, in the most welcome way, the old fiction offered itself. As beseemed its rising claims as a theory, it was dressed out in all sorts of new accessories, and so was worthy at last, under the name of Nutzung, to take the highest place of honour, and become the foundation stone of a theory of interest as distinctive as it is comprehensive. It may be the good fortune of these pages to break the spell under which the custom of centuries has laid our con- CHAP, ix IN LEGAL FICTION 257 ception. It may be that the net Nutzung of capital will be relegated finally to that domain from which it never should have emerged the domain of fiction, of metaphor, which, as Bastiat once remarked with only too much truth, has so often turned the science from the right path. With it many a deeply rooted conviction will have to be given up not the Use theory only, in the narrower and proper sense of the word, which makes the Nutzung the chief pillar in the explanation of interest, but a number of other convictions also, which are commonly accepted outside the rank of the Use theorists, and which employ that conception along with others. Among other things will go the favourite construction of the loan as a transfer of uses, as having its analogue in rent and hire. But what is to be put in its place ? To answer that does not, strictly speaking, belong to our present critical task ; it is a matter for the positive statement which I have reserved for the second volume of this work. It may, however, with some justice be expected that, when I assume the doctrine of the canonists as regards one of its principal points, I should at least indicate how we are to escape the obviously false conclusions of the canonists. Consequently I shall briefly indicate my own view on the nature of the loan ; of course under the reservation of return- ing to more exact treatment of it in my next volume, and meantime asking my readers to postpone their final verdict on my theory till such tune as I have stated it in detail, and connected it with the entire theory of interest. I may best take up the subject at the old canonist dispute. In my opinion the canonists alone were wrong in their conclusions, while both parties were wrong in the reasoning which led them to their conclusions. The canonists remained in the wrong, because they made only one mistake in their reasoning. Salmasius made two mistakes, but of these the second cancelled the harm done by the first, so that after a very tumultuous course his argument ended in reaching the truth. I explain this as follows : Both parties agree in regarding it as an axiom that the capital sum replaced on the expiry of the loan contract is the equivalent, and, indeed, is the exact and full equivalent, of the capital sum originally lent. Now this assumption is so false s 258 THE INDEPENDENT USE: ITS ORIGIN BOOK in that the wonder is how it has not long ago been exposed as a superstition. Every economist knows that the value of goods does not depend simply on their physical qualities, but, to a very great extent, on the circumstances under which they become available for the satisfaction of human needs. It is well known that goods of the same kind, e.g. grain, have a very different value in varying circumstances. Among the most important of the circumstances that influence the value of goods, outside of their physical constitution, are the time and place at which they become available. It would be very strange if goods of a definite kind had exactly the same value at all places where they might be found. It would be strange, for instance, if a cwt. of coal at the pit-brow had exactly the same value as a cwt. of coal at the railway terminus, and if that again had exactly the same value as a cwt. of coal at the fireside. Now it would be quite as strange if 100 which are at my disposal to-day should be exactly equivalent to 100 which I am to receive a year later, or ten or a hundred years later. On the contrary it is clear that, if one and the same quantity of goods falls to the disposal of an economical subject at different points of time, its economical position will, as a rule, come under a different influence, and, in conformity with that, the goods will obtain a different value. It is impossible to agree with Salmasius and the canonists, and assume it as a self-evident principle that there is a complete equivalence between the present goods given in loan and the goods of like number and kind returned at some distant period. Such an equivalence, on the contrary, can only be a very rare and accidental exception. It is very evident from what source both parties obtained the quite unscientific view of the equivalence between the sum of capital given out and that received back. It is from the old legal fiction of the identity between fungible goods of similar kind and number. If, on the strength of this fiction, the loan is conceived of as if it meant that the same 100, which the creditor advances to the debtor, is given back by the debtor to the creditor on the expiry of the loan, then of course this replacement must be looked on as entirely equivalent and just. It was the common mistake of the canonists and of their opponents that they fell into this trap laid for them in the CHAP, ix IN LEGAL FICTION 259 first part of the legal fiction. It was the sole mistake of the canonists and the first mistake of Salmasius. The further development was simply this : The canonists remained in error because this was their only mistake. Once they had made it they began at the wrong time to be sharp-sighted, and to expose the assumed independent use of the loaned goods as a fiction. With that fell away every support that could properly have been given to interest, and they were bound falsely, but logically to pronounce it wrong. But the first error that Salmasius had made, in the fiction of the identity between the capital received and the capital paid back, he rectified by a second ; he retained that fiction as regards the loan of money, and held that in this case the borrower possessed the " use " of the loaned goods all the time of the loan. The truth is in neither reading. The loan is a real exchange of present goods against future goods. For reasons that I shall give in detail in my second volume, present goods invariably possess a greater value than future goods of the same number and kind, and therefore a definite sum of present goods can, as a rule, only be purchased by a larger sum of future goods. Present goods possess an agio in future goods. This agio is interest. It is not a separate equivalent for a separate and durable use of the loaned goods, for that is incon- ceivable ; it is a part equivalent of the loaned sum, kept separate for practical reasons. The replacement of the capital + the interest constitutes the full equivalent. 1 1 The germs of this view, which I consider the only correct one, are to be found in Galiani (see above, p. 49), in Turg^t (see above, p. 56), and latterly in Knies, who, however, has since expressly withdrawn it as erroneous. CHAPTER X MENGER'S CONCEPTION OF USE UP till now my analyses have gone to prove that there is no independent use of goods of the kind conceived of by the Say-Hermann side of the Use theory, and by nearly all the economists of the present day in their train. It still remains to be proved that there cannot be an independent use even in that essentially different shape that Menger sought to give the conception. While the Say-Hermann school represented the " net use " as an objective element of use, separating itself from goods, Menger explains it as a Disposal ; indeed, as " a disposal over quantities of economical goods within a definite period of time." l This disposal being for economic subjects a means to better and more complete satisfaction of their wants, it acquires, according to Menger, the character of an independent good, which, on account of its relative scarcity, will usually be at the same time an economical good. 2 Now, to go no farther, it seems to be putting a very daring construction on things to say that the disposal over goods, that is, a relation to a good, is itself a good. I have on another occasion 3 stated at length the reasons for which I consider it 1 Grundsatze, p. 132, etc. - Ibid. p. 132, etc. 3 See my JKcchlc und Vcrhdltnissc, particularly p. 124. Sec also the acute remarks of H. Dietzel in the tract Dcr Ausgangspunkt der Sozialwirthschafts- Ichre und ihr Grundbcgriff (Tiibiuycr Zeitschrift fur die gcsammtc Staatswis- scnschaft, Jahrgany, 39), p. 78, etc. On the other hand, I cannot agree with Dietzel in some further criticisms that he makes on Menger on p. 52, etc. He has two objections to Monger's fundamental definition of economical goods as " those goods the available quantity of which is less than human need." First, he says, in trade generally we must recognise "the tendency to assimilate need and available quantity," on account of which "in every normal case " a CHAP, x DISPOSAL OVER GOODS 261 theoretically inadmissible to recognise relations as real Goods, in the sense given to that term by economic theory. These reasons, I believe, have the same validity as regards this " disposal " over goods. To maintain its position in face of these weighty deductive objections Monger's hypothesis must have some very strong and positive support. I doubt if it has sufficient support of this kind. The special character of my present contention prevents us from the first from obtaining any direct evidence, such as might be given by the senses, that " disposal " really is a good. The only thing we have to consider is whether the hypothesis is accredited by a consensus of sufficiently numerous and significant indirect supports. And this I must doubt. It appears to me that there is, distinctively, only one indirect support for it, and that is, the existence of a surplus value which is unexplained otherwise. As astronomers, from certain otherwise unexplained disturbances in the orbits of known planets, have concluded for the existence of disturbing and as yet unknown planetary bodies, so does Menger postulate number of the most important economical objects must fall out of the circle of economical goods. And second, he says, Monger's definition of his conception is not definite enough, and leaves room for all sort of things that have not the character of economical goods, such, for instance, as useful "technical knowledge." I onsider that both objections are based on a misunderstanding. As a matter of fact trade can never quite assimilate the available quantity of economical goods to the need for them ; it can of course meet the demand that has power to pay, but never the need. However commerce may flood a market with exchangeable goods, while it will very soon succeed in supplying the amount that people can buy, it will never supply all they wish to possess for the purpose of supplying their wants to the saturation point that point where the last and most insignificant wish is gratified. As to the second objection, Monger's definition seems to me to mark out the circle of economic goods both correctly and sufficiently. We must not overlook the fact that what determines the con- ception of the " good " has a share in determining the conception of the "economical good." Things like qualities, skill, rights, relations, cannot, I admit, be economical goods, even if tluy are only to be had in insufficient quantity, but that is because they are not true goods that is to say, they are not really effectual means of satisfying human wants, and at best can only be called so by a metaphor. But where we have true goods, such of them as are insufficient in quantity are at the same time economical goods. If, therefore, Menger, in some individual cases, does come into collision witli truth as I maintain he does in regard to the economical good "disposal" it is not because he has made a mistake in defining the attribute "economical," but only because he has occasion- ally treated the conception of the "good " a little too loosely. 262 MENGER'S CONCEPTION OF USE BOOK in the existence of a " bearer " of the surplus value which other- wise is unexplained. And since the disposal over quantities of goods for definite periods of time appears to him to stand in a regular connection with the emergence and the amount of surplus value, he does not hesitate to put forward the hypo- thesis that this disposal is the "bearer" sought for, and, as such, an independent good of independent nature. If the possibility of any other explanation had ever occurred to this distinguished thinker, I am persuaded that he would have withdrawn his hypothesis at once. Now is this one indirect point of support sufficient to prove that " disposal " is an independent good ? There are two reasons for answering this in the negative. The one is that the phenomena of surplus value can be ex- plained in an entirely satisfactory way without this hypothesis, and indeed can be explained on lines that Menger himself has laid down in his now classical theory of value ; the proof of this I hope to give in my next volume. But the following consideration is of itself, in my opinion, quite convincing. According to Monger's theory the loan is looked upon as a transference of disposal over goods. The longer then the period of the loan, the greater of course is the quantity of the transferred good, the disposal. In a loan for two years more disposal is transferred than in a loan for one year ; in a three years' loan more disposal than in a two years' loan ; in a hundred years' loan almost an unlimited amount of disposal is transferred. Finally, if the replacement of the capital is not only postponed for a very long time, but is altogether dispensed with, surely a quite infinite amount of disposal is transferred to the borrower. This, for instance, will be the case if goods are not lent, but given. We now ask in such a case, How much value is received by the one to whom the gift is made ? There can be no doubt that he receives as much value in capital as is possessed by the tiling given. And the value of the permanent disposal that inheres in the thing, and is presented along with it? Is evidently contained in the capital value of the thing itself. From which I draw the conclusion and I do not think I am perpetrating any fallacy in so concluding that if the plus, viz. the value of the permanently inhering disposal, CHAP, x DISPROVED 263 is contained in the capital value of the good itself, the minus contained in it, the temporary disposal over a good, must be contained in the value of the good itself. The temporary disposal, therefore, cannot be, as Menger assumes, an independent bearer of value alongside the value of the good in itself. 1 1 If we put the illustration a little differently it may show more forcibly that the value of the disposal is contained in the value of the good. Suppose that A first lends B a thing for twenty years without interest presents him therefore with the good called " disposal for twenty years," and then, a couple of days after the loan contract is concluded, presents him with the thing itself. Here he has in two actions given away the twenty years' disposal and the thing itself. If the " disposal " were a thing of independent value in addition to the thing itself, the total value of the gift would obviously be greater than the value of the thing itself, which just as obviously is not the case. CHAPTEK XI FINAL INSUFFICIENCY OF THE USE THEORY IN Chapter III. I indicated that I proposed to maintain two theses. The first of these I think I may regard as proved, viz. that the use assumed by the Use theory as having an independent existence has really no existence at all. But even if it had, the actual phenomena of interest would not be sufficiently explained thereby. The proof of this second thesis will not require many words. The Use theory, in virtue of its special line of explanation, is led to make a distinction between a value which goods have in themselves, and a value which the use of goods has. In this it starts with the tacit assumption that the usual estimated value, or selling value of real capital, represents the value of the goods themselves, exclusive of the value of their use ; the explanation of surplus value being based on this very circumstance, that the value of the use joins itself, as a quite new element, to the value of the substance of capital, and that the two together make up the value of the product. But this assumption contradicts the actual phenomena of the economical world. It is well known that a bond only obtains a price equiva- lent to its full course value if it is provided with all the coupons belonging to it ; in other words, if the disposal over all its future "uses" to adopt the language of a Use theorist is transferred to the buyer at the same time with the bond. But if one of the coupons is missing, the buyer will always make a corresponding reduction in the price that he pays for the bond. An analogous experience occurs with all other goods. If, in selling an estate that otherwise would CHAP, xi USE WOULD NOT EXPLAIN INTEREST 265 have fetched 10,000, I retain the use of the estate for one or more years, or, if I sell another such estate which is burdened, perhaps in virtue of a legacy, with so many years' claim by a third party to its produce, there is no doubt that the price obtainable for the estate will fall below the amount of 10, 000 by a sum that corresponds to the "uses" retained, or claimed by the third party. These facts, which may be multiplied at will, in my opinion admit of being interpreted in only one way, that the usual estimated value or selling value of goods embraces not only the value of the "goods in themselves," but also that of their future " uses," supposing there are any such. But if this is so, then the " use " fails to explain the very thing which it was intended by the Use theory to explain. That theory would explain the fact that the value of a capital of 100 expands in its product to 105, by saying that a new and independent element of the value of 5 had been added to it. This explanation falls to the ground, as the Use theory must recognise, the moment it is seen that, in the capital value of 100, the future use itself has been considered and is contained. However unreservedly one may admit the existence of such uses, the riddle of surplus value is not read by them ; the form of the question is only a little changed. It will now run : How comes it that the value of the elements of a product of capital, viz. substance of capital and uses of capital, which before were worth together 100, expands in the course of the production to 105 ? The fact is, that instead of one riddle we have now two. The first, that given by the nature of the phenomena of every interest theory, runs : Why does the value of the elements expand by the amount of the surplus value ? To this the Use theory has added a second riddle of its own, In what way do the future " uses " of a good and the value of the " good in itself " together make up the present capital value of the good ? and no Use theorist has faced the difficulties of such a problem. Thus the Use theory ends by putting more problems than it started with. But if it has not had the good fortune to solve the interest problem, the Use theory has contributed more than any other to prepare the way towards it. While many other 266 FINAL INSUFFICIENCY OF USE THEORY BOOK in theories went wandering in ways that were quite unfruitful, the Use theory managed to gather together many an important piece of knowledge. I might compare it with some of the older theories of natural science ; with that combustion theory of ancient times that worked with the mystical element Phlogiston ; or with that older theory of heat that worked with a Warm Fluid. Phlogiston and warm fluid turned out to be fabulous essences, just as the " net use " turns out to be. But the symbol which in the meantime our theorists put in the place of the unknown something, helped in the same way as the x of our equations to discover a number of valuable relations and laws revolving about that unknown something. It did not point out the truth, but it helped to bring about its discovery. BOOK IV THE ABSTINENCE THEORY CHAPTEE I SENIOR'S STATEMENT OF THE THEORY N. W. SENIOR must be regarded as the founder of the Abstinence theory. It appeared first in his lectures delivered before the University of Oxford, and later in his Outlines of the Science of Political Economy* Rightly to estimate Senior's theory we must for a moment recall the position which the doctrine of interest held in England about the year 1830. The chief writers of the modern school of political economy, Adam Smith and Ricardo the former with less, the latter with greater distinctness had pronounced labour to be the only source of value. Logically carried out, this could leave no room for the phenomenon of interest. All the same, interest existed as a fact, and exerted an undeniable influence on the relative exchange value of goods. Adam Smith and Ricardo took notice of this exception to the " labour principle," without seriously trying either to reconcile the disturbing exception with the theory, or to explain it by an independent principle. Thus with them interest forms an unexplained and contradictory exception to their rule. This the succeeding generation of economical writers began to perceive, and they made the attempt to restore harmony between theory and practice. They did so in two different ways. One party sought to accommodate practice to theory. They held fast by the principle that labour alone creates value, and did their best to represent even interest as the result and wage of labour, in which, naturally, they were not very 1 Extracted from the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana, London, 1836. I quote from the fifth edition, London, 1863. 270 THE ABSTINENCE THEORY BOOK i successful. The most important representatives of this party are James Mill and M'Culloch. 1 The other party with more propriety tried to accommodate theory to fact. This they did in various ways. Lauderdale pronounced capital, as well as labour, to be productive, but his views found little acceptance among his countrymen. Ever since the time of Locke English economists were much too thoroughly acquainted with the idea that capital itself is the result of labour to be willing to recognise in it an independent productive power. Others again, with Malthus at their head, found a way of escape in explaining profit as a constituent part of the costs of production alongside of labour. Thus, formally at least, was the phenomenon of interest brought into harmony with the ruling theory of value. Costs, they said, regulate value. Interest is one of the costs. Consequently the value of products must be high enough to leave a profit to capital after labour has received its remuneration. It must be admitted that this explanation left substantially everything to be desired. It was too evident that profit was a surplus over the costs, and not a constituent part of them ; a result and not a sacrifice. Thus neither of the economic positions which were then taken on the theory of interest was quite satisfactory. Each had some adherents, but more opponents ; and these opponents found a welcome opening for attack in the sensible weaknesses of the doctrine. The opportunity was amply utilised. The one party was forced to see its assertion translated into the ridiculous statement that the increment of value which a cask of wine gets through lying in a cellar can be traced to labour. The other party was forced, by inexorable logic, to confess that a surplus is not an outlay. And while the two parties were thus at variance over the proper foundation of interest, a third party began to make itself heard, if only modestly at first, a party which explained interest as having no economical foundation, as being merely an injury to the labourer. 2 Amid this restless and barren surging of opinions came Senior, proclaiming a new principle of interest, viz. that interest is a reward for the capitalist's Abstinence. 1 See above, p. 97, and below, book vii. 2 Ever since Hodgskin's writings (1825). See below, book vi. CHAP, i NEBENIUS, SCROPE 271 Isolated statements expressing the same idea had indeed appeared frequently before Senior's time. We may see it fore- shadowed in the often recurring observation of Adam Smith and Kicardo that the capitalist must receive interest, because otherwise he would have no motive for the accumulation and preservation of capital ; as also in the nicfc opposition of " future profit" to "present enjoyment" in another part of Adam Smith's writings. 1 More distinct agreement is shown by Nebenius in Germany and Scrope in England. Nebenius found the explanation of the exchange value of the services of capital, among other things, in this, that capitals are only got through more or less painful privations or exertions, and that men can only be induced to undergo these by getting a corresponding advantage. But he does not discuss the idea any further, and shows himself in the main an adherent of a Use theory which shades into the Productivity theory. 2 Scrope puts the same idea still more directly. 3 After having explained that, over and above the replacement of the capital consumed in production, there must remain to the capitalist some surplus, because it would not be worth his while to spend his capital productively if he were to gain nothing by it, he explicitly declares (p. 146): "The profit obtained by ,the owner of capital from its productive employ- ment is to be viewed in the light of a compensation to him for abstaining for a time from the consumption of that portion of his property in personal gratification." In what follows it must be confessed that he treats the idea as if it was peculiarly " time " that was the object of the capitalist's sacrifice ; argues in a lively way against M'Culloch and James Mill, who had declared " time " to be only a word, an empty sound, which could do nothing, and was nothing ; and does not even hesitate to declare that time is a constituent part of the costs of pro- duction : " The cost of producing any article comprehends (1) the labour, capital, and time required to create and bring it to market" (p. 188), a strange falling off, which scarcely need be seriously discussed. Now this same idea, which his predecessors 'merely touched on, Senior has made the centre of a well-constructed theory of 1 See above, p. 71. 2 See above, p. 192. 3 Principles of Political Economy, London, 1833. 272 THE ABSTINENCE THEORY BOOK iv interest : and whatever we may think of the correctness of its conclusions, we cannot deny it this credit that, among the con- fused theories of that time, it was remarkable for its systematic grasp, its consistent logic, and the thorough manner in which it puts its materials to the best advantage. An epitome of the doctrine will confirm this judgment. Senior distinguishes between two " primary " instruments of production, labour and natural agents. But these cannot attain to complete efficiency if they are not supported by a third element. This third element Senior calls Abstinence, by which he means " the conduct of a person who either abstains from the unproductive use of what he can command, or designedly prefers the production of remote to that of immediate results" (p. 58). His explanation why he does not take the usual course of pronouncing capital to be the third element in production is rather ingenious. Capital is, he says, not a simple original instrument ; it is in most cases itself the result of the co-operation of labour, natural agents, and abstinence. Con- sequently, if. we wish to give a name to the peculiar element the element separate from the productive powers of labour and nature which becomes active in capital, and stands in the same relation to profit as labour stands to wage, we cannot name anything but abstinence (p. 59). Of the manner in which this element takes part in the accumulation of capital, and at the same time, indirectly, in the results of production, Senior repeatedly gives ample illus- trations. I give one of the shortest in his own words : " In an improved state of society the commonest tool is the result of the labour of previous years, perhaps of previous centuries. A carpenter's tools are among the simplest that occur to us. But what a sacrifice of present enjoyment must have been undergone by the capitalist who first opened the mine of which the carpenter's nails and hammer are the product ! How much labour directed to distant results must have been employed by those who formed the instruments with which the mine was worked ! In fact, when we consider that all tools, except the rude instruments of savage life, are themselves the product of earlier tools, we may conclude that there is not a nail among the many millions annually fabricated CHAP, i SENIOR'S STA TEMENT 273 in England which is not to a certain degree the product of some labour for the purpose of obtaining a distant result, or, in our nomenclature, of some abstinence undergone before the conquest, or perhaps before the Heptarchy" (p. 68). Now the " sacrifice, " which lies in the renunciation or postponement of enjoyment, demands indemnification. This indemnification consists in the profit of capital. But admitting this one must ask, In the economical world is the capitalist able to enforce what may be called his moral claim on indemni- fication ? To this important question Senior gives the answer in his theory of price. The exchange value of goods depends, according to Senior, partly on the usefulness of the goods, partly on the limitation of their supply. In the majority of goods (exception being made of those in which any natural monopoly comes into play) the limit of supply consists only in the difficulty of finding persons who are willing to submit to the costs necessary for making them. In so far as the costs of production determine the amount of supply they are the regulator of exchange value; and indeed chiefly in this way, that the costs of production of the buyer that is, the sacrifice with which the buyer could him- self produce or procure the goods constitute the " maximum of price," and the cost of production of the seller the " minimum of price." But these two limits approximate each other in the case of that majority of goods which come under free com- petition. In their case therefore the costs of production simply make up a sum that determines the value. But the costs of production consist of the sum of tlie labour and abstinence requisite for the production of goods. In this sentence we come to the theoretical connection between the doctrine of interest and that of price. If the sacrifice Abstinence is a constituent part of the costs of production, and these costs of production regulate value, the value of goods must always be great enough to leave a compensation for the abstinence. In this way the surplus value of products of capital, and with it natural interest on capital, is fornially explained. To this last exposition Senior adds a criticism of the interest theory of several of his predecessors which almost deserves to be called classical. He exposes among other things in a forcible T 274 THE ABSTINENCE TtfEORY BOOK iv way the blunder which Malthus had committed in putting profit among costs. But not content with criticising, he ex- plains very beautifully how Malthus had fallen into the mistake. Malthus had rightly perceived that, beyond the sacrifice of labour, there is another sacrifice made in production. But since there was no term by which to designate it, he had called the sacrifice by the name of its compensation, in the same way as many people call wage of labour (which is the compensation for the sacrifice of labour) a constituent part of cost, instead of calling the labour itself by that name. Torrens, again, who had already blamed Malthus for his mistake, had himself committed a sin of omission. He had rightly eliminated " profit " from the costs of production, but was himself quite unable to fill the gap. CHAPTER II CRITICISM OF SENIOR SINCE the first formulation which the Abstinence theory received from Senior is still the best, we shall be able to form a critical judgment on the whole subject most suitably by taking up Senior's theory. Before stating my own views, I think it advisable to mention certain other criticisms which have obtained a wide currency in our science, and in which, I believe, Senior's doctrine has been judged much too harshly. To begin with a late critique. Pierstorff, in his able Lehre vom Unternehrnerg&mnn, expresses himself in terms of extreme disapprobation of Senior's theory. He goes so far as to declare that Senior's way of looking at things, in contrast to that of his predecessors, indicates a degeneration, a renunciation of earnest scientific research; and charges him with having "substituted for the economical basis of phenomena an economical and social theory cut to suit his purpose " (p. 47). I must confess that I scarcely understand this expression of opinion, particularly as coming from a historian of theory who should know how to estimate excellence even when it is purely relative. Senior's theory of interest is infinitely superior to that of his predecessors in depth, systematic treatment, and scientific earnestness. The words " renunciation of earnest scientific research " into the interest problem might apply to the methods of such men as Eicardo or Malthus, M'Culloch or James Mill These writers sometimes do not put the problem at all ; sometimes solve it by an obvious petitio princi- pii ; sometimes solve it by peculiarly absurd methods. Even Lauderdale, whom Pierstorff unfortunately has not discussed, notwithstanding an earnest attempt at its solution, remains 276 THE ABSTINENCE THEORY: CRITICISM BOOK iv standing in the outer courts of the problem, and by a gross mis- understanding entirely fails to explain the interest phenomenon by his value theory. Unlike him, Senior, with deep insight, has recognised not only that there is a problem, but also the direction in which it is to be solved, and where the difficulties of the solution lie. Setting aside all sham solutions, he goes to the heart of the matter, to its foundation in the surplus value of products over expenditure of capital ; and if he has not found the whole truth, it certainly is not for want of scientific earnestness. One would have thought that the pointed and well weighed critical observations which Senior so plentifully intersperses with his text should have protected him from so harsh a judgment. Just as wide of the mark seem to me the well-known words in which Lassalle, twenty years ago, in his tumultu- ously eloquent but absurdly rhetorical way, jeered at Senior's doctrine: "The profit of capital is the 'wage of abstinence.' Happy, even priceless expression ! The ascetic millionaires of Europe ! Like Indian penitents or pillar saints they stand : on one leg, each on his column, with straining arm and pendu- lous body and pallid looks, holding a plate towards the people to collect the wages of their Abstinence. In their midst, towering up above all his fellows, as head penitent and ascetic, the Baron Eothschild ! This is the condition of society ! how could I ever so much misunderstand it ! " l This brilliant attack notwithstanding, I believe that there is a core of truth in Senior's, doctrine. It cannot be denied that the making, as well as the preservation of every capital, does demand an abstinence from or postponement of the gratification of the moment ; and it appears to me to admit of as little doubt that this postponement is considered in, and enhances the value of those products that, under capitalist production, cannot be obtained without more or less of such postponement. If, e.g. two commodities have required for their production exactly the same amount of labour, say 100 days, and that one commodity is ready for use immediately that the labour is finished, while the other say new wine must lie for a year ; experience certainly shows that the commodity which becomes ready for use later will stand higher in price 1 Kapital und Arbeit, Berlin, 1864, p. 110. CHAP, ii SACRIFICE OF POSTPONEMENT 277 than that which is ready at once, by something like the amount of interest on the capital expended. Now I have no doubt that the reason of this enhance- ment is nothing else than that there must be in this case a postponement of the gratification obtainable from the. labour performed. For if the commodity immediately ready for use and that ready later on were to stand equally high in value, everybody would prefer to employ his 100 days in that labour which pays its wages immediately. This tendency is bound to call forth an increased supply of the goods immediately ready for use, and this again must bring down their price as compared with that of the goods ready later on. And as the wages of labour have a tendency to equalise themselves over all branches of production, in the end there is assured to the producers of these later goods a plus over the normal payment of labour ; in other words, an interest on capital But it is just as certain and on this ground Lassalle is for the most part right as against Senior that the existence and the height of interest by no means invariably correspond with the existence and the height of a " sacrifice of abstinence." Interest, in exceptional cases, is received where there has been no indi- vidual sacrifice of abstinence. High interest is often got where the sacrifice of the abstinence is very trifling as in the case of Lassalle's millionaire and low interest is often got where the sacrifice entailed by the abstinence is very great. The hardly saved sovereign which the domestic servant puts in the savings bank bears, absolutely and relatively, less interest than the lightly spared thousands which the millionaire puts to fructify in debenture and mortgage funds. These phenomena fit badly into a theory which explains interest quite universally as a " wage of abstinence," and in the hands of a man who understood polemical rhetoric so well as Lassalle they only furnished so many pointed weapons of attack against that theory. After much consideration I am inclined to think that the actual defects from which Senior's theory suffers may be reduced to three. First, Senior has made too sweeping a generalisation on an idea quite right in itself, and has used it too much as a type. 278 THE ABSTINENCE THEORY: CRITICISM BOOK iv There is no doubt in my mind that the element, postponement of gratification, which Senior puts in the foreground, does as a fact exert a certain influence on the origination of interest. But that influence is neither so simple, nor so direct, nor so exclusive as to permit of interest being explained as merely a " wage of abstinence." More exact proof of this is not pos- sible here, and must be left for my second volume. Second, Senior has expressed that part of his theory which is substantially correct in a fashion at all events open to attack. I consider it a logical blunder to represent the renunciation or postponement of gratification, or abstinence, as a second independent sacrifice in addition to the labour sacri- ficed in production. Perhaps the best way of treating this somewhat difficult subject will be to put it in the form of a concrete example, and then try to grasp the principle. Take the case of a man living in the country who is con- sidering in what kind of labour he should employ his day. There are, perhaps, a hundred different courses open to him. To name only some of the simplest he could fish, or shoot, or gather fruit. All three kinds of employment agree in this, that their result follows immediately, even by the evening of the same work-day. Suppose that our country friend decides on fishing, and brings home at night three fish. What sacri- fice has it cost him to obtain them ? If we leave out of account the trifling wear and tear of the fishing gear, it has cost him evidently one day's work, and noth- ing else. It is possible, however, that he looks at this sacrifice from another point of view. It is possible that he measures it by the gratification he might have got if he had spent his work-day otherwise, which gratification he must now do with- out. He may calculate thus : If I had spent to-day in shoot- ing instead of fishing I might have shot three hares, and I must now do without the gratification obtainable from these. I believe that this way of reckoning sacrifice is not in- correct. Here the man simply looks at work as a means to an end, and taking no notice of the mean the primary sacri- fice of work fixes his attention on the end which was sacri- ficed through the mean. It is a method of calculation very common in economic life. Say that I have definitely set CHAP, n THE ALTERNATIVE SACRIFICE 279 aside 30 for expenditure, but am hesitating between two modes of spending it. In the end I make up my mind to spend it on a pleasure trip instead of the purchase of a Persian carpet. Evidently the real sacrifice which the pleasure trip will cost me may be represented under the form of the Persian carpet which I have to do without. In any case it appears to me obvious that, in reckoning the sacrifice made for any economic end, the direct sacrifice in means that sacrifice which is first made and the indirect sacrifice, which takes the shape of other kinds of advantage that might have been obtained in other circumstances by the means sacrificed, can be calculated only alternatively and never cumulatively. I may consider the sacrifice of my pleasure trip to be either the 30 which it has directly cost me, or the Persian carpet which it has indirectly cost me, but never as the 30 and the carpet. Just in the same way our rustic may consider, as the sacrifice which the catching of the three fish costs him, either the day's work directly expended, or the three hares indirectly sacrificed (or, say, the gratification he gets from eating them), but never the day's work and the gratification obtained through shooting the hares. I think is clear. But besides these occupations, which recompense him for his day's work at the end of the day, there are others open to our labourer which produce a result that cannot be enjoyed till a later date. He might, e.g. sow wheat, getting the produce of it after a year's time ; or he might plant fruit trees, from which he could have no return for ten years. Suppose he chooses the latter. If we again leave out of account the laud and the trifling wear and tear of tools, what has he sacrificed to obtain the fruit trees ? To me there seems no doubt about the answer. He has sacrificed a day's work, and nothing more. Or, if the indirect way of computation be preferred, instead of the day's work he may calculate the other kinds of gratification that might have been got by spending the day in other ways say the immediate enjoyment of three fish, or of three hares, or of a basket of fruit. But at all events it seems to me obvious in this case also, that, if the gratification which might have been got through the work is reckoned as sacrifice, then not the smallest portion of the work 280 THE ABSTINENCE THEORY: CRITICISM BOOK iv itself can be reckoned in the sacrifice ; while, if the work is reckoned as sacrifice, there cannot be added to that in the calculation the smallest fragment of the other kinds of enjoy- ment that were renounced. To do otherwise would be to make a double reckoning, which would be just as false as if the man in our former illustration had reckoned the cost of the pleasure trip as the 30 actually paid, and besides as the Persian carpet which he might have bought with the 30. It is a double calculation of this kind that Senior has made. He has not done so, I admit, in the gross way of calculating, in addition to the labour, the entire gratification he might have had from the labour; but in reckoning the postponement or abstinence from gratification independently of the labour he has gone farther than was allowable. For it is clear that in the sacrifice of labour is already included the sacrifice of the whole advantage that might have been got from employing the labour in other ways, the whole advantage, containing all the partial or secondary shades of advantage that may depend on the principal advantage. The man who sacri- fices 30 on a pleasure trip sacrifices, not in addition to but in the 30, both the Persian carpet that he might have bought with it and the satisfaction which he might have found in its possession ; sacrifices too, among other things, the special advan- tage he might have had in the durability of this possession, and the length of time over which the gratification was spread. And just in the same way the labourer who sacrifices one day of work of the year 1889 in the planting of trees, makes a saoii- fice, in and not in addition to, 'this day of work, not only of the three fish which he might have caught by the day's labour, but also of the peculiar enjoyment which he has, say, in a fish- dinner ; as also of the advantage which springs from the fact that he might have had this gratification in the year 1889. The special reckoning of the postponement of gratification, therefore, contains a double calculation. It is not perhaps too much to hope that most of my readers will agree with the foregoing arguments. Nevertheless I cannot consider the subject yet threshed out. There is no doubt that Senior's way of putting the matter has something very fascinating and persuasive about it, and if the case made use of in our illustration is put in a certain light favourable to CHAP, ii A DOUBLE CALCULATION 281 Senior's conception, the argument against me may appear absolutely convincing. This argument I have still to reckon with. Put parallel cases as follows. If I employ to-day in catching fish, these fish cost me one day of labour. That is clear. But if I employ to-day in planting fruit trees, which will not bear fruit for ten years' time, then not only have I " taken it out " of myself (to use a significant colloquialism) for a whole day, but, over and above that. I have to wait for ten years for any result from my labour, although that waiting perhaps costs me much self-denial and mental pain. Therefore it would seem that in this latter act I make a sacrifice which is more than a day of labour; it is the exertion and toil of one day, and besides that, the burden of postponing the result of my work for ten years. Plausible as this argument is, its basis is none the less fallacious. Let me first show, by following it out to some of its conclusions, that there is a fallacy, and then point out the source of the fallacy. Later on I shall have another opportunity of reviewing all that has been said and reducing it to principles. Imagine the following case. I work for a whole day at the planting of fruit trees in the expectation that they will bear fruit for me in ten years. In the night following comes a storm and entirely destroys the whole plantation. How great is the sacrifice which I have made, as it happens, in vain ? I think every one will say a lost day of work, and nothing more. And now I put the question, Is my sacrifice in any way greater that the storm does not come, and that the trees, without any further exertion on my part, bear fruit in ten years ? If I do a day's work and have to wait ten years to get a return from it, do I sacrifice more than if I do a day's work, and, by reason of the destructive storm, must wait to all eternity for its return ? It is impossible to make such an assertion. And yet Senior would have it so ; for while in the first case the sacrifice is stated to be a day's work and nothing more, in the second case it is a day's work plus a ten years' abstinence from its result ! What a singular position too, according to Senior's view, must the progression of sacrifice attain as the time of use recedes ! If labour immediately pays 282 THE ABSTINENCE THEORY: CRITICISM BOOK iv its own wages the sacrifice is only the labour expended. If it pays them in a year, the sacrifice is labour plus a year's abstinence. If it pays them in two years, the sacrifice is labour plus two years' abstinence. If it pays them twenty years afterwards, then the sacrifice grows to labour plus twenty years' abstinence. And if it never pays them at all ? Must not, then, the sacrifice of abstinence reach its highest conceivable point, infinity, and form the climax of the upward progression ? Oh no ! Here the sacrifice of abstinence sinks to zero ; the labour is the only thing counted as sacrifice, and the total sacrifice is not the greatest, but the least in the entire series ! I think that these conclusions plainly indicate that in all cases the only real sacrifice consists in the labour put forth, and that, if we thought ourselves compelled to acknowledge a second sacrifice besides that, viz. the postponement of gratification, we must have been misled by a specious presentation of the case. But I must confess that the mistake is one we are very apt to fall into. What is it that misleads us ? The source of it is simply this, that the element of Time is not really indifferent ; only it exerts its influence in a some- what different way from that imagined by Senior and by people generally. Instead of affording material for a second and inde- pendent sacrifice, its importance rather lies in determining the amount of the one sacrifice actually made. To make this quite clear I must run the risk of being a little tedious. The nature of all economic sacrifices that men make consists in some loss of wellbeing which they suffer ; and the amount of sacrifice is measured by the amount of this loss. It may be of two kinds : of a positive kind, where we inflict on ourselves positive injury, pain, or trouble ; or of a negative kind, where we do without a happiness or a satisfaction which we otherwise might have had. In the majority of economical sacrifices which we make to gain a definite useful end, the only question is about one of these kinds of loss, and here the calculation of the sacrifice undergone is very simple. If I lay out a sum of money, say 30, for any one useful end, my sacrifice is calculated simply by the gratification which I might have got by spending the 30 in other ways, and which I must now do without. CHAP, ii TWO WAYS OF CALCULATING SACRIFICE 283 It is otherwise with the sacrifice of labour. Labour presents two sides to economical consideration. On the one hand it is, in the experience of most men, an effort connected with an amount of positive pain, and on the other, it is a mean to the attainment of many kinds of enjoyment. There- fore the man who expends labour for a definite useful end makes on the one hand the positive sacrifice of pain, and on the other, the negative sacrifice of the other kinds of enjoy- ment that might have been obtained as results of the same labour. The question now is, Which is the correct way, in this case, of calculating the sacrifice made for the concrete useful end ? The point we have to consider is, What would have been the position as regards our pleasure and pain if we had not expended the labour with a view to this particular end, but had disposed of it in some other reasonable way ? The difference between the two evidently shows the loss of well- being which the attainment of 'our useful purpose costs us. If we make use of this method of estimating difference, we may very soon convince ourselves that the sacrifice made by labour is sometimes to be measured by the positive pain, sometimes by the negative loss of gratification, but never by both at once. The question then comes to this, Whether, if we had put forth the day's labour otherwise, we could have got a satisfaction greater than the pain which the one day's labour causes us, or not ? Suppose we feel the pain of a day's labour as an amount which may be indicated by the number 10. We actually employ the day in catching three fish, and these fish give us a gratification expressed by the number 15. And we ask what is the amount of sacrifice which the catching of the three fish costs us. What we shall have to decide is, whether, if we had not gone fishing, it would have been possible to us to get by a day's work another kind of satisfaction greater than the number 10. If no such possibility is open to us say that shooting would only bring us a gratification represented by the number 8, while the labour-pain was, as before, 10 then evidently we should either fish or remain idle. What our three fish cost us in this case is the labour-pain indicated by the number 10, which pain we have undergone for the sake of the fish, and which pain we would otherwise not have under- 284 THE ABSTINENCE THEORY: CRITICISM BOOK iv gone. There is no question here of any loss of other kinds of enjoyment, for the simple reason that we could not have got them. If, on the other hand, it is possible, by labouring for a day at other kinds of work, to get a gratification greater than the pain represented by the number 10 if we could, e.g. by a day's shooting obtain three hares of the value of 12, then it is quite reasonable to expect that we should not in any case remain idle, but possibly go shooting instead of fishing. What our fish really cost us now is not the positive labour-pain expressed by the number 10 for this we should have under- gone at any rate but the negative loss of an enjoyment which we might have had, indicated by the number 12. But of course we must never calculate the want of enjoyment and the pain of labour cumulatively; for if we had not preferred catching fish, we could not have spared ourselves the pain of labour and yet have had the gratification of shooting. And just as little, if we choose to fish, do we by that choice make a double sacrifice. What has been said gives us the materials for a general rule which practical men are in the habit -of applying with perfect confidence. It may be put in the following words. If we apply labour to a useful end, the sacrifice made in doing so is always to be reckoned to the account of that one of the two kinds of loss of wellbeing which is the greater in amount ; to labour-pain, if there is no kind of gratification in prospect which outweighs it; to gratification, where there is the possibility of such ; but never in both at the same time. And further, since in the economic life of to-day we have an infinite number of possibilities of turning our work to fruit- ful account, the first of these two cases almost never occurs. At the present time, then, we estimate by far the greater number of cases not by the pain of work, but by the profit or advantage we have renounced. Here we huve at last reached the point where we see the real influence of the element Time on the amount of the sacri- fice. It is a fact the grounds on which it rests do not con- cern us here that in circumstances otherwise equal we prefer a present enjoyment to a future. Consequently, if we have to choose between applying a means of satisfaction, say labour, to the satisfaction of a present want, and applying it towards CHAP, ii TRUE CALCULATION OF SACRIFICE 286 the satisfaction of a future want, the attraction of the immediate gratification will make it difficult to decide in favour of the future use. If, however, we do decide for the future use, in measuring the amount of sacrifice made for it by the greatness of the use foregone, the attraction of the moment which adheres to the use foregone will weigh down the scale, and make our sacrifice appear harder than it would otherwise have appeared. It is not that we make a second sacrifice in this. Whether we have to choose between two present or two future uses, or between a present and a future use, we always make the one sacrifice only, labour. But since, according to our analysis, we usually measure the amount of the sacrifice by the amount of the use foregone, the attraction of the earlier satisfaction is considered and has its influence on this valuation, and helps to make the calculation of the one, sacrifice higher than it would otherwise have been. This is the true state of the facts to which Senior in his theory gave a faulty construction. 1 The reader will, I trust, pardon me keeping him so long at this abstract discussion. From the point of theory, how- ever, it contains the weightiest arguments against a doctrine that must be taken seriously, a- doctrine which up till now has often been rejected, but never, in my opinion, refuted. For myself, I hold it the lesser evil to be over-scrupulous in inquiry before passing sentence, than to pass sentence without full inquiry. Lastly, the third fault of Senior's theory seems to me that he has made his interest theory part of a theory of value in which he explains the value of goods by their costs. Now, even admitting the correctness of this theory, the "la\\T of costs " avowedly holds only as regards one class of goods, those which can be reproduced in any quantity at will. In so 1 Even in that minority of cases where the sacrifice of labour is measured in pain of labour, the time element of postponement of gratification cannot form a second and independent sacrifice. For the pain of labour only enters into the valuation, as we have seen, when the pain in question is greater than any kind of use which can be got out of the labour, inclusive of all the attractions of the moment that may happen to be in it ; and when, consequently, the choice can only reasonably be thought of as lying between the concrete future uses, towards which the labour would actually be directed, and entire cessation from labour. Since there is here no question of any other kind of earlier enjoyment of goods, such an enjoyment cannot of course be, in any way, an element in the valuation of sacrifice. 286 THE ABSTINENCE THEORY: CRITICISM BOOK iv far, then, as Senior makes his theory of interest an integral part of a value theory which is merely partial, it can only be, in the most favourable circumstances, a partial interest theory. It might explain those profits that are made in the production of goods reproducible at will, but logically every other kind of profit would escape it altogether. Senior's Abstinence theory has obtained great popularity among those economists who are favourably disposed to interest. It seems to me, however, that this popularity has been due, not so much to its superiority as a theory, as that it came in the nick of time to support interest against the severe attacks that had been made on it. I draw this inference from the peculiar circumstance that the vast majority of its later advocates do not profess it exclusively, but only add elements of the Abstinence theory in an eclectic way to other theories favourable to interest. This is a line of conduct which points, on the one hand, to a certain undervaluing of the strength of its position as a theory ; its advocates do not hesitate to dis- credit it rather rudely by piling up along with it a great many heterogeneous and contradictory explanations. And, on the other hand, it points to a preference for that practical and political standpoint which is satisfied if only a sufficient number of reasons are brought forward to prove the legitimacy of interest, although it should be at the expense both of unity and logic. Thus we shall meet the majority of the followers of Senior among the eclectics. I may name, provisionally, among English economists, John Stuart Mill and the acute Jevons; among French writers, Rossi, Molinari, and Josef Gamier; among Germans, particularly Eoscher and his numerous follow- ing ; then Schiiz and Max Wirth. Among those writers who hold by the Abstinence theory pure and simple, I merely name the most prominent. Cairnes places himself essentially at Senior's standpoint in his spirited treatment of the costs of production. 1 The Swiss economist Cherbuliez 2 explains interest to be a remuneration for the " efforts of abstinence," and so stands on the boundary line 1 Some Leading Principles of Political Economy, 1874, chap. iii. Precis de la Science Economique, Paris, 1862 ; particularly vol. L pp. 161, 402, etc. CHAP, ii 77^ ECLECTIC FOLLOWERS 287 between the Abstinence theory and a peculiar variety of those Labour theories which we have to discuss in the next book. In Italian literature Wollemborg has lately followed the lead of Senior and Cairnes in acute inquiry into the nature of costs of production. 1 Among the Germans is Karl Dietzel, who, however, touches on the problem only occasionally and cursorily. 2 None of these writers have added any essentially new feature to Senior's Abstinence theory, and it is not necessary to go minutely into what they have said on the subject But I must make more careful mention of a writer whose theory made a great stir in its day, and maintains an important influence even yet ; I mean Frede'ric Bastiat. 1 Interne al Costo Relative di Produzione, etc., Bologna, 1882. 2 System der Staatsanleihen, Heidelberg, 1855, p. 48 : " The lender of capital bases his claim on compensation for the using of the capital transferred by him, first, on the fact that he has given up the chance of giving value to his own labour power by embodying it in the object ; and second, that he has refrained from consuming it, or its value, at once, in immediate enjoyment. This is the ground on which interest on capital rests ; the subject, however, has no further concern for us in this place." W- V ~- CHAPTER III BASTIAT'S STATEMENT BASTIAT'S much discussed theory of interest may be characterised as a copy of Senior's Abstinence theory forced into the forms of Bastiat's Value theory, and thereby much deteriorated. The fundamental thought in each is identical. The post- ponement of gratification, which Senior calls Abstinence, and Bastiat calls sometimes Delay, sometimes Privation, is a sacrifice demanding compensation. But beyond this they diverge from each other in some respects. Senior, who deduces the value of goods from their cost of production, simply says that this sacrifice is a constituent element of the costs, and is done with it. Bastiat, who bases the value of goods on " exchanged services," elevates the postponement also to the rank of a service. " Postponement in itself is a special service, since on him who postpones it imposes a sacrifice, and on him who desires it confers an advantage." l This service, according to the great law of society, which runs " service for service," must be specially paid. The payment takes place where the capitalist has borrowed his capital from another person by means of loan interest (inUret). But even outside of loan interest this service must be compensated ; for, speaking generally, every one who receives a satisfaction must also bear the collective burdens which its production requires, including the postponement. This post- ponement is looked upon as an " onerous circumstance," and 1 Harmonics Economiqncs (vol. vi. of complete works), third edition, Paris, 1855, p. 210. See also the pages immediately preceding, 207-209, and generally the whole of Chapter VII. CHAP, in BASTIATS STATEMENT 289 forms therefore, quite universally, an element in the valuation of the service, and at the same time in the formation of the value of goods. This is, in a few words, the substance of what Bastiat says with rhetorical diffuseness and copious repetitions. I called this doctrine a deteriorated copy of Senior's. If we put on one side all those defects that belong to Bastiat's interest theory not as such, but only in virtue of its being embodied in his value theory which to my mind is exceedingly faulty the deterioration shows itself chiefly in two respects. The first is that Bastiat confines his attention and his arguments almost entirely to a secondary point, the explanation of contract interest, and for that neglects the principal thing, the explanation of natural interest. Both in his Harmonies Ec&n&miques and in the monograph which he specially devoted to the interest problem, Capital et Rente, he is never tired of discoursing by the page on the interpretation and justification of loan interest. But he applies his theory to the explanation of natural interest only once, and then only in passing, in the passages already quoted (Harmonies, third edition, p. 213); and these leave a great deal to be desired in point of clearness and thoroughness. The results of this negligence make themselves felt principally in this, that the chief thing in the exposition of interest, the sacrifice of postponement, is not nearly so clearly put by Bastiat as by Senior; for when Bastiat opposes the owner of capital to the borrower of capital, the sacrifice which lie speaks of as made by the owner is generally that of doing without the productive use that meantime might have been made of the capital lent. 1 This has quite a good signification 1 "Si Ton penetre le fond des choses, on trouve qu'en ce cas le cedant se prive en faveur du cessionaire on d'une satisfaction immediate qu'il recule de plusieure annees, ou d'tm instrument de travail qui aurait augmente ses forces, fait concourir les agents naturels, et augmente, a sou profit, le rapport des satisfactions aux efforts" (vii. p. 209). "II ajourne la possibilite d'une production. . . . Je 1'emploierai pendant dix ans sous une forme productive " (xv. p. 445). So often in the tract Capital et Rente, e.g. p. 44. James, who has made a plane, and has now lent it to William for a year, makes this the ground for his claim of interest : " I expected some advantage from it, more work done and better paid, an improvement in my lot. I cannot lend you all that for nothing." U 290 THE ABSTINENCE THEORY BOOK iv if it means nothing more than what Salmasius had once tried to prove against the canonists, that, if by employing capital a man can make a natural profit, there is both reason and justification for claiming an interest on the capital when loaned. But to point to that sacrifice is evidently quite* inappropriate as an explanation of natural interest, and the phenomenon of interest in general is not satisfactorily explained thereby, the existence of natural interest being already assumed in it as a given fact. For the deeper explanation of interest it is evident that that other sacrifice on which Senior dwells is the only one that has any importance, the sacrifice that consists in postponing the satisfaction of needs. Now Bastiat of course speaks of this sacrifice also, but by confusing it with the former sacrifice he gets his doctrine into a tangle ; indeed it seems to me that he not only confuses his readers, but himself. At least there are to be found in his writings, especially in his Capital et Rente, not a few passages in which he starts with his Abstinence theory, but comes suspiciously near the standpoint of the Naive Productivity theorists. The course of explanation suggested, in the often quoted passage in the Harmonies, was to show how under capitalist production the surplus value of the product arises from the necessity of buyers of the product paying for the " onerous circumstance " of the postponement of gratification, as well as for the labour embodied in the product Instead of following out this line of explana- tion, he not unfrequently looks upon it as self-evident that capital, in virtue of the productive power that resides in it, must give its owner an " advantage," a " gain," an enhanced price, and a bettering of his lot ; in a word, a profit. 1 But that, as we know already, is not to explain interest, but to assume it. 1 Thus Bastiat in Capital et Rente, p. 40, assumes that the borrowed sack of corn puts the borrower in a position to produce a valeur superieurc. On p. 43 lie calls the reader's attention, in italics, to the fact that the "principle that is to solve the interest problem " is the power that resides in the tool to increase the productivity of labour. Again he says, on p. 46, " Nous pouvons conclure qu'il est dans la nature du capital de produire un interet." On p. 54, " L'outil met 1'emprunteur a nieme de faire des profits." Indeed it is the aim of the brochure, as we gather from the introduction to it, to defend the " productivity of capital " against the attacks of the socialists. CHAP, in BASTIATS STATEMENT 291 As a fact, Bastiat has often been accused of having entirely missed the chief point, the explanation of natural interest ; the accusation is not, I think, quite justified, but, as we can see, it is very easily explained. 1 This is the first point in which Bastiat's theory does not improve on Senior's. The second consists in a wonderful addition he makes. Besides the explanation of interest just stated, he gives another of so different a nature, and at the same time so evidently mistaken, that I cannot even make a guess as to how Bastiat saw any relation between it and his principal explanation. Every branch of production, he explains, is an aggregate of efforts. But between various efforts an important distinc- tion is to be drawn. One category of efforts is connected with services which we are presently engaged in rendering. A second category of efforts, on the other hand, is connected with an indefinite series of services. To the first category, for instance, belong the daily efforts of the water-carrier, which are directed immediately to the fetching of water ; or, in the sphere of agriculture, the labours of sowing, weeding, ploughing, harrowing, reaping, threshing, which are collectively directed to obtain a single harvest. To the sdcond category belongs the labour which the water-carrier expends in making his barrow and water cask ; which the farmer expends on his hedging, harrowing, draining, building, improvements generally : all those labours which, as the economists say, go to the formation of a fixed capital, and result in benefit to a whole series of consumers, or a whole series of harvests. 2 Bastiat now raises the question, How, according to the great law of " service for service," are these two categories of efforts to be estimated or rewarded ? As regards the first category, he finds this very simple. These services must be compensated, on the whole, by those who profit by them. But that does not apply in the case of the second category, those services which lead to the formation of a fixed capital ; for the number of those who profit by this capital is indefinite. If the producer were to get paid by the first consumers it would not be just ; for, in the first place, it is unreasonable that the 1 See, e.g. Rodbertus, Zur Seleuchtung, L p. 116, etc. ; Pierstorff, p. 202. 2 P. 214. 292 THE ABSTINENCE THEORY BOOK iv first consumers should pay for the last ; and in the second place, there must come a point of time when the producer would have at once the stock of capital not yet consumed, and also his compensation, which again involves an injustice. 1 Consequently, Bastiat concludes with a mighty logical salto mortale, the distribution among the indefinite series of con- sumers is only managed thus : the capital itself is not distributed, but the consumers are burdened with the interest of the capital instead a way of getting out of it which Bastiat explains to be the only conceivable one for the solution of the problem in question, 2 and one which, offered spon- taneously by the " ingenious natural mechanism of society," saves us the trouble of substituting an artificial mechanism in its place. 3 Thus Bastiat explains interest as the form in which an advance of capital is redistributed over a sum of products : " C'est la, c'est dans la repartition d'une avance sur la totalit^ des produits, qu'est le principe et la raison d'etre de 1'Interet" (vii. p. 205). It must have occurred to every one while reading these lines that, in this analysis, Bastiat has fallen into some errors almost inconceivably gross. It is, first, an error to say that it is not possible to distribute the capital itself over the purchasers. Every business man knows that it is possible ; and knows too that it is done, and how it is done. He simply calculates the probable duration of the capital laid out, and, on the basis of this calculation, charges every single period during which the capital is employed, and every single product, with a corresponding quota for wear and tear and replacement of the capital sum. When the purchasers pay the quota for replacement of the fixed capital in the price of the finished commodities, "the capital itself" is of course distributed over them. Perhaps not with absolute "justice," because there may be an error in the calculated duration of the capital, and in the calculated quota for wear and tear which is based on that ; but, on the average, the prices successively 1 P. 216. 2 ". . . et je dene qu'on puisse imaginer une tello repartition en dehors du mecanisme de 1'interet" (p. 217). 3 ' ' Reconnaissons done que le mecanisme social naturel est assez ingenieuz pour que nous puissions nous dispenser do lui substituer un mecanisme artificiel " (p. 216, at end). CHAP, in BASTIAT S STATEMENT 293 paid will, in any case, cover the capital sum that is to be replaced. And it is a second gross error to assume that the producers receive interest instead of receiving back the capital itself, which, he says, cannot be distributed. The fact is, as every one knows (1), that, in the quota for replacement, they receive back the capital itself, and (2) so long as a part of this capital lasts they receive interest besides. Interest, therefore, rests on an entirely distinct foundation from the replacement of capital. It is really difficult to understand how Bastiat could make a mistake in such simple and well-known matters. In conclusion, I may note in passing that Bastiat has borrowed his practical law of interest from Carey : the law that with the increase of capital the absolute share obtained by the capitalist in the total product increases, and the relative share diminishes. 1 In his attempts to prove this law which from the point of view of theory are quite worthless like Carey he carelessly confuses the conception of " percentage of total product " with the conception of " percentage on capital " (rate of interest). On the whole, Bastiat's interest theory seems to me to be quite unworthy of the reputation which ' it has, at least in certain circles, so long enjoyed. 1 P. 223. BOOK V THE LABOUR THEORIES CHAPTER I THE ENGLISH GKOUP UNDER the title of the Labour theories I group together a number of theories which agree in explaining interest as a wage for labour rendered by the capitalist. As to the nature of the "labour" which furnishes the basis for the capitalist's claim of wage there is very material divergence among the various views. Thus I am compelled to distinguish three independent groups of Labour theories, and as it happens that their respective circles -of adherents are marked out very much by nationality, I shall call them the English, the French, and the German group. The English writers, chiefly represented by James Mill and M'Culloch, explain interest by tracing it to that labour through which real capital itself comes into existence. James Mill l chances on the interest problem in his doc- trine of price. He has put down the proposition that the costs of production regulate the exchange value of goods (p. 93). At the first glance capital and labour are seen to be constituents of the cost of production. But on looking closer Mill sees that capital itself comes into existence through labour, and that all costs of production may be traced therefore to labour alone. Labour then is the sole regulator of the value of goods (p. 97). With this proposition, however, the well-known fact, dis- cussed already by Eicardo, that postponement also has an influence on the price of goods, does not appear to agree. If, for instance, in one and the same season a cask of wine and 1 Elements of Political Economy, third edition, London, 1826. I was not able, unfortunately, to get sight of the first edition of 1821. 298 ENGLISH LABOUR THEORIES BOOK v twenty sacks of meal L.ve been produced by the same amount of labour, they will of course, at the end of the season, have an equal exchange value. But if the owner of the wine lays it in a cellar and keeps it for a couple of years, the cask of wine will have more value than the twenty sacks of meal indeed, more value by the amount of two years' profit. Now, James Mill gets rid of this disturbance of his law by explaining profit itself as a wage of labour ; as a remuneration for indirect labour. " It is no solution to say that profits must be paid, because this only brings us to the question, Why must profits be paid ? To this there is no answer but one, that they are the remuneration for labour, labour not applied immediately to the commodity in question, but applied to it through the medium of other commodities, the produce of labour." This idea is more exactly elucidated by the following analysis. " A man has a machine, the produce of a hundred days' labour. In applying it the owner undoubtedly applies labour, though in a secondary sense, by applying that which could not have been had but through the medium of labour. This machine, let us suppose, is calculated to last exactly ten years. One-tenth of the fruit of a hundred days' labour is thus expended every year, which is the same thing in the view of cost and value as saying that ten days' labour has been expended. The owner is to be paid for the hundred days' labour which the machine costs him at the rate of so much per annum, that is, by an annuity for ten years equiva- lent to the original value of the machine. 1 It thus appears ('.) that profits are simply remuneration for labour. They may, indeed, without doing any violence to language (!), hardly even by a metaphor, be denominated wages ; the wages of that labour which is applied, not immediately by the hand, but mediately, by the instruments which the hand has produced. And if you may measure the amount of immediate labour by the amount of wages, you may measure the amount of secondary labour by that of the return to the capitalist." In this way James Mill thinks that he has satisfactorily 1 The author (as is evident from a parallel passage on p. 100) means annuities which replace the original value of the machine in ten years, and at the same time pay interest at the rate fixed by the condition of the market. CHAP, i JAMES MILL 299 explained interest, and at the same time maintained in its integrity his law that labour alone determines the value of goods. It is pretty obvious, however, that he has not succeeded in doing either. It may be allowed to pass that he calls capital " hoarded " labour ; that he calls the employment of capital employment of a mediate secondary labour; and that he considers the wearing out of the machine as a giving out of the hoarded labour by instalments. But why then is every instalment of hoarded labour paid by an annuity which contains more than the original value of that labour, namely, the original value plus the usual rate of interest thereon? Allowing that the remuneration of capital is the remuneration of mediate labour, why is the mediate labour paid at a higher rate than the immediate ; why does the latter receive the bare rate of wages while the former receives an annuity higher by the amount of the interest ? Mill does not solve this question. He takes the fact that a capital, according to the state of competition in the market, has equal value with a certain number of annual payments that already include the interest, and uses this fact as a fixed centre, as if he had not taken upon himself to explain the profit, and therefore also the extra profit, that is contained in the annuity. He says, I admit, in an explanatory tone, Profit is wage of labour. But he has a very false idea of the explanatory power of this phrase. It might perhaps be satisfactory if Mill could show that there is here a labour which has not yet received its normal wage, and will only receive it in the profit ; but it is in no way satisfactory to explain profit as an extra wage for a labour that has already been paid at the normal rate by means of the sum for amortisation contained in the annuities. It is always open to ask, Why should mediate labour be more highly paid than immediate labour ? And this is a question towards the solution of which Mill has given not the slightest hint. Moreover by this artificial construc- tion he even loses the advantage of remaining consistent with his Labour theory; for evidently the law that the amount of labour determines the price of all goods is rudely upset if a part of the price is traceable, not to the amount of the labour expended, but to the greater height of the wage 300 FRENCH LABOUR THEORIES BOOK v that it receives ! In this respect, therefore, Mill's theory comes considerably short of its professed object. A very similar theory was put forward by M'Culloch, in the first edition of his Principles of Political Economy (1825), but omitted in later editions. I have stated it already on an earlier occasion, and need add nothing more to that statement. 1 Finally, the same idea was given out cursorily by Read in England and Gerstner in Germany, but these writers we shall have to consider later on among the eclectics. THE FRENCH GROUP A second group of Labour theorists pronounce interest to be the wage of that labour which consists in the saving of capital (Travail tfEpargne). This theory is carried out most thoroughly by Courcelle-Seneuil. 2 According to Courcelle-Seneuil, there are two kinds of labour muscular labour and the labour of Saving (p. 85). The latter conception he expounds as follows. In order that a capital once made should be conserved, there is need of a continual effort of foresight and saving, in so far as, on the one hand, one looks to future needs, and, on the other hand, refrains from present enjoyment of capital with the view of being able to satisfy future needs by means of the capital thus saved. In this "labour" lies an act of intelligence the foresight, and an act of will the saving that " refrains from enjoyment for a given period of time." Of course, at the first glance, it appears singular to give to saving the name of Labour. But this impression, in the author's opinion, only arises from our usually looking too much at the material side of things. If we reflect dispassionately for a moment we will recognise that it is just as painful to a man to refrain from the consumption of an article when made, as to labour with his muscles and his intellect to obtain an article that he wishes ; and that it really requires a special un-natural exertion of intellect and will to maintain capital in 1 See above, p. 97. The doubtful honour of priority in this theory belongs to James Mill. 2 Trait^ thtorique et pratique d" Economic Politiqiie, i. Paris, 1858. CHAP, i COURCELLE-SENEUIL 301 existence an act of will which is contrary to the natural bias toward pleasure and idleness. After attempting to strengthen this line of argument by pointing to the habits of savages, the author concludes with this formal deliverance : " We consider then that saving is really, and not simply metaphorically, a form of industrial labour, and consequently a productive power. It demands an exertion which, it is true, is purely of a moral kind, but it is all the same painful. It has therefore as much right to the character of labour as an exertion of the muscles has." Now the labour of saving demands remuneration in the same way as muscular labour. While the latter is paid by the scdaire, the former obtains its payment in the shape of interest. The following passage explains the necessity of this, and shows in particular why the wage of the labour of saving must be a permanent one : " The desire, the temptation to con- sume, is a permanent force; its action can only be suspended by combating it with another force which, like itself, is permanent. It is clear that every one would consume as much as possible if he had no interest (sfl n'avait pas int^rSt) to abstain from consuming. He would cease to abstain from the moment that he ceased to have this interest, so that it must continue with- out interruption, in order that capitals may always be con- served. That is why we say that interest " (Pintttret : note the play upon words) " is the remuneration of this labour of saving and of conservation; without it capitals, whatever be their form, could not continue ; it is a necessary condition of industrial life" (p. 322). The height of this wage is regulated " according to the great law of supply and demand " ; it depends, on the one side, on the wish and the ability to expend a sum of capital reproductively ; and on the other, on the wish and the ability to save this sum. To my mind all the pains which its author has taken to represent the Labour of Saving as a real labour cannot efface the stamp of artificiality which this theory bears on its very face. The non- consuming of wealth a labour; the pocket- ing of interest by those who toil not nor spin, a suitable wage for work ; what a chance for any Lassalle who cares to play upon the impressions and emotions of the reader ! But, 302 FRENCH LABOUR THEORIES BOOK v instead of stating rhetorically that Courcelle is wrong, I prefer to show on rational grounds why he is wrong. First of all, it is clear that Courcelle's theory is only Senior's Abstinence theory clad in a slightly different dress. As a rule, where Senior says " abstinence," or " sacrifice of abstinence," Courcelle says " labour of abstinence," but really both writers make use of the one fundamental idea in the same way. Thus at the outset Courcelle's Labour theory is open to a great many of those objections raised to Senior's Abstinence theory, on the ground of which objections we have already pronounced that theory to be unsatisfactory. But further, the new form which Courcelle gives it is open to special objections of its own. It is quite correct to say that foresight and saving do cost a certain moral pain. But the presence, of labour in anything by which an income is obtained is far from justify- ing us in explaining that income as a wage of labour. To do so we must be able to show that the income is really obtained for the labour, and only in virtue of the labour. Now this will be best shown if we find that the income emerges where labour has been expended ; that it is wanting where there has been no labour ; that it is high where much of the labour has been expended, and low where little has been expended. But of any such harmony between the alleged cause of interest and the actual emergence of interest, it would be difficult to discover a trace. The man who carelessly cuts the coupons of 100,000, or gets his secretary to cut them, draws a "wage of labour" of 4000 or 5000. The man who, with actual pain of foresight and saving, has scraped together 50, and .put them in the savings bank, scarcely gets a couple of pounds for his " labour " ; while the man who, with as much pain, has saved 50, but cannot risk them out of his hand because of some claim that may be made on him at any moment, gets absolutely no wage at all. What is the reason of this ? Why are wages apportioned so differently differently as between individual classes of saving labourers ; differently as compared with the wage payment of muscular labour? What is the reason that the owner of 100,000 gets 5000 for his "year's labour"; that the manual labourer, who suffers pain and saves nothing, gets CHAP, i COURCELLE-SENEUIL 303 50 ; that the artisan, who suffers pain and saves 50 thereby, gets the sum of 52 for "muscular labour" and " labour of saving " together ? A theory which pronounces interest to be wages of labour must undertake to make its explanation more exact. Instead of this, the nice question of the rate of interest is simply dismissed by Courcelle with a general reference to the great law of supply and demand. Without meaning to be ironical, one might say that Courcelle would have had almost as much justification, theoretically speaking, if he had pronounced the bodily labour of pocketing the interest, or of cutting the coupons, to be the ground and basis of interest. These also are " labours " which the capitalist performs, and if it should be thought strange that, according to the law of supply and demand, this sort of labour is paid at such an unusually high rate, it is scarcely more strange than the fact we have just been considering that the intellectual labour of inheriting a million of money is annually paid by so many thousands of pounds. One might say of this latter kind of labour, So few people have the " wish and the ability " to lay up millions of capital, that, in the existing demand for capital, the wages of such people must be very high; and similarly it might be said of the former, So very few people have the " wish and the ability " to pocket thousands of pounds in interest. Of " wish " there will be no lack in either case; but of ability well, that rests in both cases principally on the fact of a person being so fortunate as to possess a million of capital ! If after what has been said a direct refutation of Courcelle's Labour theory still seems necessary, let me put the following case. A capitalist lends a manufacturer 100,000 at 5 per cent for a year. The manufacturer employs the 1 00,000 productively, and by doing so receives a profit of 6000. From this he deducts 5000 as interest due to the capitalist, and keeps 1000 as undertaker's profit to himself. According to Courcelle the 5000 which the capitalist receives are the wage for providing for future wants, and for the act of will which resists the temptation to consume the 100,000 immediately an act of will directed to the refraining from enjoyment. But has not the manufacturer performed exactly the same, or even a greater labour ? Was 304 FRENCH LABOUR THEORIES BOOK v the manufacturer, when he had the 100,000 in his hands, not tempted to consume it immediately ? Could he not, for instance, have squandered the capital, and gone through the bankruptcy court ? Has he then not also withstood the tempta- tion and asserted his will in refraining? Has he not by prudence and foresight done more than the capitalist to provide for future needs, in as much as he not only thought of future needs in general, but gave his stock of materials that positive treatment which changed them into products, and thus actually fitted them to satisfy human wants? And yet the capitalist for the labour of conserving his 100,000 receives 5000, and the manufacturer, who has performed the same intellectual and moral labour on the same 100,000 in still greater degree, gets nothing; for the 1000 which constitute his undertaker's profit are payment for quite another kind of activity. It may be objected that the manufacturer would not have dared to use the 100,000, seeing that it was not his property ; in his saving, therefore, there is no merit to deserve payment. But in this theory merit has nothing to do with the case. The wage of saving is great if only the sum saved and conserved be great, without the slightest consideration whether the conservation has demanded much moral striving or little. But that the debtor has actually conserved the 100,000, and has overcome the temptation to consume it, admits of no denial. Why then does he get no " wage of saving " ? To my mind there can be no doubt about the explanation of these facts. It is that people get interest, not because they work for it, but simply because they are owners. Interest is not an income from labour/but an income from ownership. Quite recently Courcelle-SeneuiTs theory has been, some- what timidly, followed by Cauwes. 1 This writer states it, but not as his sole interest theory, and not without certain clauses and turns of expression which show that he finds this conception of the " labour of saving " not quite beyond question. " Since the conservation of a capital presupposes an exertion of the will, and in many 1 Pricis du Cours d' Economic Politique, second edition, Paris, 1881, 1882. CHAP, i CAUWES 305 cases even industrial or financial combinations of some difficulty, one might say that it represents a veritable labour such as has sometimes, and not without justification, been called Travail cTJSpargne" (i. p. 183). And in another place Cauwes meets the doubt whether interest be due to the capitalist, since the loan costs no labour to justify the claim of interest, in the words : " In the loan, it may be, there is no labour; but the labour consists in the steadfast will to preserve the capital, and in the protracted abstinence from every act of gratification or consumption of the value represented by it. It is, if the expression does not seem too bizarre, a labour of saving that is paid by interest." * But besides this Cauwes brings forward other grounds for interest, particularly a state- ment of the productivity of capital, and thus we shall meet him again among the eclectics. A slight approach to Courcelle's Labour theory is to be found in a few other French writers ; as in Cherbuliez, 2 who pronounces interest to be wage for the " efforts of abstinence " ; and in Josef Gamier,' who gives a very parti-coloured explana- tion, in the course of which he uses the catchword " labour of saving." 3 But these last named do not carry the conception any farther. THE GERMAN GROUP The idea that in France afforded material for a very artificial and elaborate theory of interest has been made use of of course on freer lines by a prominent school of German economists, the Katheder Socialists, to use a term which has been acclimatised. 4 The Labour theory of the German Katheder Socialists is, however, only loosely connected with the French theory in having the same fundamental idea. Both in origin and in manner of development it is entirely independent. The origin of the German Labour theory may be found in a somewhat incidental remark that occurs in one of the 1 ii. p. 189 ; also i. p. 236. a See above, p. 286. 8 Traitt . 60, etc. - Erkliirtmij und AbhiJfc, ii. p. 160 ; similarly Sozialc Frayc, p. 69. :J Dfr Krcdit, pai't second, p. 69 : "What Rodbcrtus brings forward as his sole reason, vix. that ' labour is the only original power, and also the only original cost with which human economy is concerned,' is simply, in point of fact, untrue. What surprising blindness it is not to see that in the case of a landlord the effectual power of the soil in our limited fields could not be allowed ' to lie dead ' by uneconomic men, could not be wasted in growing weeds, etc. etc. So absurd an opinion would certainly in the long run justify any one in defending the proposition that the loss to a landlord of X acres, and the loss to a people's economy of Y square miles, represents no 'economical loss.'" 340 RODBERTUS'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi not the final motive for our economic conduct. In the last resort we deal economically with limited and toilsome labour because we should suffer loss of wellbeing by an uneconomic treatment. But exactly the same motive impels us to deal economically with every other useful thing which, as existing in a limited quantity, we could not want or lose without losing something of the enjoyment of life. It matters not whether it be an original power or not ; whether the thing has cost the joriginal power we call labour or not. Finally, the position taken by Eodbertus becomes entirely untenable when he adds that goods are to be regarded as the products of material manual labour alone. This principle would forbid even direct intellectual guidance of labour from being recognised as having any productive function, and would lead to an amount of internal contradiction and false conclusion that leaves no doubt of its incorrectness. This, however, has been shown by Knies in such a striking way that it would be mere superfluous iteration to dwell further on the point. 1 Thus in the very first proposition he has laid down Rodbertus comes into collision with fact. To be entirely just, however, I must here make one concession which Knies, as representing the Use theory, was unable to make. I admit that, in confuting this fundamental principle, the whole of Rodbertus's interest theory has not been confuted. The pro- position is wrong ; not, however, because it mistakes the part played by capital in the production of goods, but because it mistakes the part played by nature. I believe with Rodbertus that, if we consider the result of all the stages of production as a whole, capital cannot maintain an independent place among the costs of production. It is not exclusively " previous labour," as Rodbertus thinks, but it 1 See Knies, Dcr Kredit, part second, p. 64, etc. : " A man who wishes to ' produce ' coal must not simply dig ; he must dig in a particular place ; in thousands of places he may perform the same material operation of digging with- out any result whatever. But if the difficult and necessary work of finding the proper place is undertaken by a separate person, say a geologist ; if without some other and "intellectual power" no shaft is sunk, and so on, how can the 'economic' work be digging only ? When the choice of materials, the decision on the proportions of the ingredients, and such like, are made by another person than by him who rolls the pills, are we to say that the economical value of this material body, this medicine, is a product of nothing but the hand labour employed hi it?" CHAP, ii THE LABOURER'S CLAIM 341 is partly, and indeed, as a rule, it is principally "previous labour" ; for the rest, it is valuable natural power stored up for human purposes. Where natural power is conspicuous as in a pro- duction which, in all its stages, only makes use of free gifts of nature and of labour, or which makes use of such products as have themselves originated exclusively in free gifts of nature and in labour in such 'cases we could, indeed, say with Rodbertus that the goods, economically considered, are products of labour only. Since then Rodbertus's fundamental error does not refer to the role of capital, but only to that of nature, the inferences regard- ing the nature of profit on capital which he deduces are not necessarily false. It is only if essential errors appear as well in the development of his theory that we may reject these inferences as false. Now such errors there undoubtedly are. Not to make an unfair use of Rodbertus's first mistake, I shall, in the whole of the following examination, put all the hypotheses in such a way that the consequences of that mistake may be completely eliminated. I shall assume that all goods are produced only by the co-operation of labour and of free natural powers, and by the assistance exclusively of such objects of capital as have themselves originated only by the co-operation of labour and free natural powers, without the intervention of such natural gifts as possess exchange value. On this limited hypothesis it is possible for us to admit Rodbertus's fundamental proposition that goods, economically considered, cost labour alone. Let us now look farther. The next proposition of Rodbertus runs thus : that, accord- ing to nature and the " pure idea of justice," the whole product, or the whole value of the product, ought to belong without deduction to the labourer who produced it. In this pro- position also I fully concur. In my opinion no objection could be taken to its correctness and justice under the presupposition we have made. But I believe that Rodbertus, and all socialists with him, have a false idea of the actual results that flow from this true and just proposition, and are led by this mistake into desiring to establish a condition which does not really correspond with the principle, but contradicts it. It is remark- able that, in the many attempts at confutation that have been directed up till now against the Exploitation theory, this decisive point has been touched on only in the most superficial 342 RODBERTUS^S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi way, and never yet been placed in the proper light. ' It is on this account that I ask my readers to give some attention to the following argument ; all the more so as it is by no means easy. I shall first simply specify and then examine the blunder. The perfectly just proposition that the labourer should receive the entire value of his product may be understood to mean, either that the labourer should now receive the entire present value of his product, or should receive the entire future value of his product in the future. But Rodbertus and the socialists expound it as if it meant that the labourer should now receive the entire future value of his product, and they speak as if this were quite self-evident, and indeed the only possible explanation of the proposition. Let us illustrate the matter by a concrete example. Sup- pose that the production of a steam-engine costs five years of labour, and that the price which the completed engine fetches is 5 5 0. Suppose further, putting aside meanwhile the fact that such work would actually be divided among several persons, that a worker by his own continuous labour during five years makes the engine. We ask, What is due to him as wages in the light of the principle that to the labourer should belong his entire product, or the entire value of his product ? There cannot be a moment's doubt about the answer. The whole steam-engine belongs to him, or the whole of its price, 550. But at what time is this due to him ? There cannot be the slightest doubt about that either. Clearly it is due on the expiiy of five years. For of course he cannot get the steam-engine before it exists ; he cannot take possession of a value of 550 created by himself before it is created. He will, in this case, have to get his compensation according to the formula, The whole future product, or its whole future value, at a future period of time. But it very often happens that the labourer cannot or will not wait till his product be fully completed. Our labourer, for instance, at the expiry of a year, wishes to receive a part payment corresponding' to the time he has worked. The ques- tion is, How is this to be measured in accordance with the above proposition ? I do not think there can be a moment's doubt about the answer. The labourer has got his due if he CHAP, ii PRESENT WAGE FOR FUTURE PRODUCT m now receives the whole of what he has made up till now. Thus, for example, if up till now he has produced a heap of brass, iron, or steel, in the raw state, then he will receive his due if he is handed over just this entire heap of brass, iron, or steel, or the entire value which this heap of materials has, and of course the value which it has now. I do not think that any socialist whatever could have anything to object to in this conclusion. Now, how great will this value be in proportion to the value of the completed steam-engine ? This is a point on which a superficial thinker may easily make a mistake. The point is, the labourer has up till now performed a fifth part of the technical work which the production of the whole engine requires. Consequently, on a superficial glance, one is tempted to infer that his present product will possess a fifth part of the value of the whole product that is, a value of 110. On this view the labourer ought to receive a year's wage of 110. This, however, is incorrect. 110 are a fifth part of the value of a steam-engine when completed. But what the labourer has produced up till now is not a fifth part of an engine that is already completed, but only a fifth part of an engine that will not be completed till four years more have elapsed. And these are two different things; not different in virtue of a sophistical quibble, but different in very fact. The one -fifth part has a different value from the other so surely as, in the valuation of to-day, an entire and finished engine has a different value from an engine that will only be ready for use in four years ; so surely as, generally speaking, present goods have a different value in the present from future goods. That present goods, in the estimation of the present time, in which our economical transactions take place, have a higher value than future goods of the same kind and quality, is one of the most widely known and most important economic facts. In the second volume of this work I shall have to make thorough examination into the causes to which this fact owes its origin, into the many and various ways in which it shows itself, and into the no less many and various consequences to which it leads in economic life ; and that examination will be neither so 344 RQDBERTUS'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi easy nor so simple as the simplicity of the fundamental thought seems to promise. But in the meantime I think I may be allowed to appeal to the fact that present goods have a higher value than similar kinds of goods in the future, as one that is already put beyond dispute by the most ordinary experience of everyday life. If one were to give a thousand persons the choice whether they would rather take a gift of 100 to-day, or take it fifty years hence, surely all the thousand persons would prefer to take the 100 now. Or if one were to ask a thousand persons who wished a horse, and were disposed to give 100 for a good one, how much they would give now for a horse that they would only get possession of in ten or in fifty years, although as good an animal were guaranteed at that time, surely they would all name an infinitely smaller sum, if they named one at all ; and thereby they would surely prove that eve ybody considers present goods to be more valuable than future goods of the same kind. If this is so, that which has been made by our labourer in the first year, i.e. the fifth part of a steam-engine which is to be completed four years later, has not the entire value of a fifth part of an already completed engine, but has a smaller value. How much smaller ? That I cannot explain at present without anticipating my argument in a confusing way. Enough here to remark that it stands in a certain connection with the rate of interest usual in the country x a rate which is a matter of experience and with the remoteness of the period at which the whole product will be completed. If we assume the usual rate of interest to be 5 per cent, then the product of the first year's labour will, at the close of the year, be worth about 100. 2 Therefore, according to the proposition that the labourer ought to receive his whole product, or its whole value, the wages due him for the first year's labour will amount to the sum of 100. If, notwithstanding the above deductions, any one should 1 Of course I do not mean to put forward the rate of interest as the cause of the smaller valuation of future goods. I know quite well that interest and rate of interest can only be a result of this primary phenomenon. I am not here ex- plaining but only depicting facts. The appropriateness of these figures, which seem strange at the first glance, will be seen immediately. CHAP, ii PRESENT WAGE FOR FUTURE PRODUCT 345 have the impression that this sum is too small, let me offer the following for his consideration. No one will doubt that the labourer gets his full rights if at the end of five years he receives the entire steam-engine, or the whole value of 550. Let us calculate then for comparison's sake what would be the value of the part- wage anticipated as above at the end of the fifth year ? The 100 which the labourer has received at the end of the first year can be put out at interest for the next four years that is, till the end of the fifth year ; at the rate of 5 per cent (without calculating compound interest), the 100 may therefore increase by 20 this course being open even to the wage-paid labourer. Thus, it is clear, the 100 paid at the end of the first year are equivalent to 120 at the end of the fifth. If the labourer then, for the fifth part of the tech- nical labour, receives 100 at the end of a year, clearly he is paid according to a scale which puts him in as favourable a position as if he had received 550 for the whole labour at the expiry of five years. But what do Eodbertus and the socialists suppose to be the application of the principle that the labourer should receive the whole value of his product ? They would have the whole value that the completed engine will have at the end of the process of production applied to the payment of wages, but they would have this payment not made at the conclusion of the whole production, but spread proportionally over the whole course of the labour. We should consider well what that 'means. It means 'that the labourer in our example, through this averaging of the part payments, is to receive in two and a half years the whole of the 550 which will be the value of the completed steam-engine at the end of five years. I must confess that I consider it absolutely impossible to base this claim on these premises. How should it be according to nature, and founded on the pure idea of justice, that any one should receive at the end of two and a half years a whole that he will only have produced in five years ? It is so little " according to nature," that, on the contrary, in the nature of things it could not be done. It could not be done even if the labourer were released from all the shackles of the much- abused wage-contract, and put in the most favourable position 346 RODBERTUS'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi that can be conceived that of undertaker in his own right. As labourer-undertaker he will certainly receive the whole of the 550, but not before they are produced; that is to say, not till the end of the five years. And how can that which the very nature of things denies to the undertaker himself be accomplished, in the name of the pure idea of justice, through the contract of wages ? To give the matter its proper expression, what the socialists would have is, that the labourers, by means of the wage -contract, should get more, than they have made; more than they could get if they were undertakers on their own account ; and more than they produce for the undertaker with whom they conclude the wage -contract. What they have created, and what they have just claim on, is the 550 at the end of the five years. But the 550 at the end of two and a half years which the socialists claim for them is more ; if the interest stand at 5 per cent it is about as much as 620 at the end of five years. And this difference of value is not, as might be thought, a result of social institutions which have created interest and fixed it at 5 per cent institu- tions that might be combated. It is a direct result of the fact that the life of all of us plays itself out in time ; that to-day with its wants and cares comes before to-morrow ; and that none of us is sure of the day after to-morrow. It is not only the capitalist greedy of profit, it is every labourer as well, nay, every human being that makes this distinction of value between present and future. How the labourer would cry out that he was defrauded if, instead of the 20s. which are due him for his week's wage to-day, one were to offer him 20s. a year hence ! And that which is not a matter of indifference to the labourer is to be a matter of indifference to the undertaker ! He is to give 550 at the end of two and a half years for the 550 which he is to receive, in the form of the completed product, only at the end of five years. That is neither just nor natural. What is just and natural is I willingly ac- knowledge it again that the labourer should receive the whole value, the 550, at the end of five years. If he cannot or will not wait five years, yet he should, all the same, have the value of his product ; but of course the present value of his present product. This value, however, will require to be less than the CHAP, ii PRESENT WAGE FOR FUTURE PRODUCT 347 corresponding proportion of the future value of the product of the technical labour, because in the economic world the law holds that the present value of future goods is less than that of present goods, a law that owes its existence to no social or political institution, but directly to the nature of men and the nature of things. If prolixity may ever be excused, it is in this instance, where we have to confute a doctrine with issues so extremely serious as the socialist Exploitation theory. Therefore at the risk of being wearisome to many of my readers I shall put a second concrete case, which, I hope, will afford me an oppor- tunity of pointing out still more convincingly the blunders of the socialists. In our first illustration we took no account of the division of labour. Let us now vary the hypothesis in such a way that at this point it will come nearer to the reality of economic life. Suppose then that, in the making of the engine, five dif- ferent workers take separate parts, each contributing one year's labour. One labourer obtains, say, by mining, the need- ful iron ore ; the second smelts it ; the third transforms the iron into steel ; the fourth takes the steel and manufactures the separate constituent parts ; and finally the fifth gives the parts their necessary connection, and in general puts the finishing touches to the work. As each succeeding labourer in this case, by the very nature of things, can only begin his work when his predecessors have finished jbheirs, the five years' work of our labourers cannot be performed simultaneously but only successively. Thus the making of the engine will take five years just as in the first illustration. The value of the completed engine remains, as before, 550. According to the proposition that the labourer is to receive the entire value of his product, how much will each of the five partners be able to claim for what he has done ? Let us try to answer this question first on the assumption that the claims of wages are to be adjusted, without the inter- vention of an outside undertaker, solely among the labourers themselves ; the product obtained is to be divided simply among the five labourers. In this case two things are certain. 348 RODBERTUS'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi First, a division can only take place after five years, be- cause before that date there is nothing suitable for division. For if one were now to give away in payment of wages to individuals, say the brass and iron which had been secured during the first two years, the raw material for the next stage of the work would be wanting. It is abundantly clear that the product acquired in the first years is necessarily with- drawn from any earlier division, and must remain bound up in the production till the close. Second, it is certain that a total value of 550 will have to be divided among the five labourers. In what proportion will it be divided ? Certainly not, as one might easily think at the first hasty glance, into equal parts. For this would be distinctly to favour those labourers whose labour comes at a later stage of the total production, in comparison with their colleagues who were employed in the earlier stages. The labourer who com- pleted the engine would receive for his year's labour 110 immediately on the conclusion of his work ; the labourer who turned out the separate constituent portions of the engine would receive the same sum, but must wait on his payment for a whole year after the completion of his year's labour; while that labourer who procured the ore would not receive the same amount of wages till four years after he had done his share of the work. As such a delay could not possibly be indifferent to the partners, every one would wish to undertake the final labour (which has not to suffer any postponement of wage), and nobody would be willing to take the preparatory stages. To find labourers to take the preparatory stages then, the labourers of the final stages would be compelled to grant to their colleagues who prepared the work a larger share in the final value of the product, as compensation for the postponement. The amount of this larger share would be regulated, partly by the period of the postponement, partly by the amount of differ- ence that subsists between the valuation of present and the valuation of future goods, a difference which would depend on the economic circumstances of our little society, and on its level of culture. If this difference, for instance, amounted to 5 per cent per annum, the shares of the five labourers would graduate in the following manner : CHAP, ii PRESENT WAGE FOR FUTURE PRODUCT 349 The first labourer employed, who has to wait for his pay- ment four years after the conclusion of his year's work, receives at the end of the fifth year . 120 The second, who has to wait three years . . . 115 The third, who waits two years . . . . 110 The fourth, who waits one year . . . .105 The last, who receives his wages immediately on the con- clusion of his labour 100 Total 550 That all the labourers should receive the same amount of 110 is only conceivable on the assumption that the difference of time is of no importance whatever to them, and that they find themselves quite as well paid with the 110, which they receive three or four years after, as if they had received the 1 1 immediately on the conclusion of their labour. But I need scarcely emphasise that such an assumption never corresponds with fact, and never can. That they should each receive 1 1 immediately on tlie accomplishment of their labour is, if a third party do not step in, altogether impossible. It is well worth the trouble, in passing, to draw particular attention to one circumstance. I believe no one will find the above scheme of distribution unjust. Above all, as the labourers divide their own product among themselves alone, there cannot be any question of injustice on the part of a capitalist -undertaker. And yet that labourer who has per- formed the second last fifth part of the work does not receive the full fifth part of the final value of the product, but only 105 ; and the last labourer of all receives only 100. Now assume, as is generally the case in actual fact, that the labourers cannot or will not wait for their wage till the very end of the production of the engine, and that they enter into a negotiation with an undertaker, with the view of obtain- ing a wage from him immediately on the performance of their labour, in return for which he is to become the owner of the final product. Assume, further, that this undertaker is a perfectly just and disinterested man, who is far from making use of the position into which the labourers are possibly forced, to usuriously depress their claim of wages; and let us ask, On what conditions will the wage-contract be concluded under such circumstances ? 350 RODBERTUS'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi The question is tolerably easy to answer. Clearly the labourers will be perfectly justly treated if the undertaker offers them as wage the sums which they would have received as parts of the division, if they had been producing on their own account. This principle gives us first a firm standing ground for one labourer, namely, for the last. This labourer would in the former case have received 100 immediately after the accomplishment of his labour. This 100, therefore, to be perfectly just, the undertaker must now offer him. For the remaining labourers the above principle gives no immediate indication. The wages in this case are not paid at the same time as they would have been in the case of the division, and the sums paid in the former case cannot afford a direct standard. But we have another standing ground. As all five labourers have performed an equal amount towards the accomplishment of the work, in justice an equal wage is due to them ; and where every labourer is to be paid immediately on the performance of his labour, this wage will be expressed by an equal amount. Therefore, in justice, all five labourers, at the end of their year's labour, will receive each 100. If this seems too little, let me refer to the following simple calculation, which will demonstrate that the labourers receive quite the same value in this case as they would have received had they divided the whole product among themselves alone, in which case, as we have seen, the justice of the division would have been beyond question. Labourer No. 5 receives, in the case of division, 100 immediately after the year's labour; in the case of the wage- contract he receives the same sum at the same time. Labourer No. 4 receives, in the case of division, 105 a year after the termination of the year's labour ; in the case of the wage-contract 100 immediately after the labour. If, in the latter case, he lets this sum lie at interest for a year he will be in exactly the same position as he would have been in the case of division; he will be in possession of 105 one year after the conclusion of his labour. Worker No. 3 receives, in the case of division, 110 two years after the termination of his labour; in the wage-contract, 1 at once, which sum, placed at interest for two years, will increase to 110. CHAP, it PRESENT WAGE FOR FUTURE PRODUCT 351 And in the same way, finally, the 100 which the first and second labourers receive are, with the addition of the respective 'interests, quite equivalent to the 120 and the 115 which, in the case of division, these two labourers would have received respectively four and three years after the conclusion of their labour. But if each single wage under the contract is equal to the corresponding quota under the division, of course the sum of the wages must also be equal to the sum of the division quotas; the sum of 500 which the undertaker pays to the labourers immediately on the completion of their work is entirely equal in value to the 550 which, in the other case, would have been divided among the labourers at the end of the fifth year. A higher wage payment, e.g. to pay the year's labour at 110 each labourer,, is only conceivable in one of two cases ; either if that which is not indifferent to the labourers, namely, the difference of time, were completely indifferent to the undertaker ; or if the undertaker were willing to make a gift to the labourers of the difference in value between a present 110 and a future 110. Neither the one nor the other is to be expected of private undertakers, at least as a rule ; nor do they deserve the slightest reproach on that account, and, least of all, the reproach of injustice, exploitation, or robbery. There is only one personage from whom the labourers could expect such a treatment the State. For on the one hand, the state, as a permanently existing entity, is not bound to pay as much regard to the difference of time in the outgoing and replacing of goods as the short-lived individual. And on the other hand, the state, whose end is the welfare of the whole, can, if it is a question of the welfare of a great number of the members, quit the strict standpoint of service and counter- service, and, instead of bargaining, may give. So then it certainly is conceivable that the state but certainly only the state assuming the function of a gigantic undertaker of pro- duction, might offer to the labourers as wage the full future value of their future product at once, that is, immediately after the accomplishment of their labour. Whether the state ought to do this, by which, in the view 352 RODBERTUS'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi of Socialism, the social question would be practically solved, is a question of propriety which I have no intention of entering on at this moment. But this must be repeated with all emphasis : if the socialist state pays down at once, as wages to the labourer, the whole future value of his product, it is not a fulfilment of the fundamental law that the labourer should receive the value of his product as wages, but a departure from it on social and political grounds. And such a proceed- ing would not be the bringing back of a state of things that was in itself natural, or in accordance with the pure idea of justice, a state of things only temporarily disturbed by the exploiting greed of the capitalists. It would be an artificial* interference, with the intention of making something possible which, in the natural course of things, was not possible, and of making it possible by means of a disguised continuous gift from the magnanimous commonwealth state to its poorer members. And now a brief practical application. It is easy to recognise that the method of payment which I have just now described in our illustration is that which actually does obtain in our economic world. In it the full final value of the product of labour is not divided as wages, but only a smaller sum ; this smaller sum, however, being divided at an earlier period of time. Now, so long as the total sum of the wages spread over the course of the production is not less than the final value of the finished product by more than is necessary to make up the difference in the valuation of present as compared with future goods in other words, so long as the sum of the wages does not differ from the final value of the product by more than the amount of the interest customary in the country no curtailment is made on the claims that the workers have on the whole value of their product. They receive their whole product according to its valuation at the point of time in which tJiey receive their wages. Only in so far as the total wages diifer from the final value of the product by more than the amount of interest customary in the country, can there be, under the circumstances, any real exploitation of the labourers. 1 1 More exact criticism on this head I postpone till my second volume. To protect myself against misunderstandings, however, and particularly against the CHAP, ii VALUE NOT REGULATED BY LABOUR 353 To return to Rodbertus. The second, and most distinct blunder of which I have accused him in the foregoing, is that he interprets the proposition I have conceded (the labourer is to receive the whole value of his product) in an unwarrantable and illogical manner, as if it meant that the labourer is to receive now the whole value which his completed product will have at some future time. If we inquire how it was that Rodbertus fell into this mistake, we shall find that the cause of it was another mistake, this being the third important error in the Exploitation theoiy. It is that he starts with the assumption that the value of goods is regulated solely by the amount of labour which their production has cost. If this were correct, then the first product, in which is embodied the labour of one year, must now possess a full fifth part of the value which the com- pleted product, in which is embodied five years of labour, will possess. In this case the claim of the labourer to receive as wages a full fifth part of that completed value would be justified. But this assumption, as Rodbertus puts it, is un- doubtedly false. To prove this I need not question in the least the theoretical validity of Ricardo's celebrated theory, that labour is the source and measure of all value. I need only point out the existence of a distinct exception to this law, noticed by Ricardo himself and discussed by him in detail in a separate chapter, but, strangely enough, passed imputation of considering undertaking profit to be a " profit of plunder " when it exceeds the usual rate of interest, I may add a short note. In the total difference, between value of product and wages expended, which falls to the undertaker, there may possibly be four constituents, essentially different from each other. 1. A premium for risk, to provide against the danger of the production turn- ing out badly. Rightly measured, this will, on an average of years, be spent in covering actual losses, and this of course involves no curtailment of the labourer. 2. A payment for the undertaker's own labour. This of course is equally unobjectionable, and in certain circumstances, as in the using of a new invention of the undertaker, may be very highly assessed without any injustice being done to the labourer. 3. The compensation referred to in the text, viz. the compensation for difference of time between the wage payment and the realising of the final product, this being afforded by the customary interest. 4. The undertaker may possibly get an additional profit by taking advantage of the necessitous condition of the labourers to usuriously force down their wages. Of these four constituents only the latter involves' any violation of the principle that the labourer should receive the whole value of his product. 2 A 354 RODBERTUS'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi over without notice by Rodbertus. This exception is found in the fact that, of two goods which have cost an equal amount of labour to produce, that one obtains a higher exchange value the completion of which demands the greater advances of previous labour, or the longer period of time. Ricardo notices this fact in a characteristic manner. He declares (S 4 X O of the first chapter of his Principles) that " the principle that the quantity of labour employed in the production of goods regulates their relative value, suffers a considerable modification by the employment of machinery and other fixed and durable capital," and further, in 5, "on account of the unequal durability of capital, and of the unequal rapidity with which, it is returned to its owner." That is to say, in a production where much fixed capital is used, or fixed capital of a greater durability, or where the time of turn -over on which the floating capital is paid back to the undertaker is longer, the goods made have a higher exchange value than goods' which have cost an equal amount of labour, but into the production of which the elements just named do not enter, or enter in a lesser degree, indeed an exchange value which is higher by the amount of the profit which the undertaker expects to obtain. That this exception to the law of labour- value noticed by Ricardo really exists cannot be questioned, even by the most zealous advocates of that law. Just as little can it be questioned that, under certain circumstances, the consideration of the post- ponement may have even a greater influence on the value of goods than the consideration of the amount of labour-costs. I may remind the reader, for example, of the value of an old wine that has been stored up for scores of years, or of a hundred years old tree in the forest. But on that exception hangs a tale. It does not require any great penetration to see that the principal feature of natural interest on capital is really involved in it. For when, on the division of the value, those goods that require for their production an advance of foregoing labour show a surplus of exchange value, it is just this surplus that remains in the hands of the capitalist-under- taker as profit. If this difference of value did not exist natural interest on capital would not exist either. This CHAP, it THE GREAT EXCEPTION 355 difference of value makes it possible, contains it, is identical with it. Nothing is more easily demonstrated than this, if any proof is wanted of so obvious a fact Supposing each of three goods requires for its making a year's labour, but a different length of time over which the labour is advanced. The first good requires only one year's advance of the year's labour; the second a ten years' advance ; the third a twenty years' advance. Under these circumstances the exchange value of the first good will, and must be, sufficient to cover the wages of a year's labour, and, beyond that, one year's interest on the advanced labour. It is perfectly clear that the same exchange value cannot be sufficient to cover the wages of a year's labour, and a ten or twenty years' interest on the ten or twenty years' advance of labour as well. That interest can only be covered if and because the exchange value of the second and third good is correspondingly higher than that of the first good, although all three have cost an equal amount of labour. The difference of exchange value is clearly the source from which the ten and twenty years' interest flows, and the only source from which it can flow. Thus this exception to the law of labour-value is nothing less than the chief feature in natural interest on capital Any one who would explain natural interest must, in the first place, explain this ; without an. explanation of the exception here can be no explanation of the problem of interest. Now if, notwithstanding, in treatises on interest this exception is ignored, not to say denied, it is as gross a blunder as could well be conceived. "When Eodbertus ignores the exception, it means nothing else than ignoring the chief part of what he ought to have explained. Nor can one excuse Rodbertus's blunder by saying that he did not intend to lay down a rule which should hold in actual life, but only a hypothetical assumption by which he might carry through his abstract inquiries more easily and more correctly. It is true that Eodbertus, in some passages of his writings, does clothe the proposition, that the value of all goods is determined by their labour costs, in the form of a simple hypothesis. 1 But, firstly, there are many passages 1 E.g. Soziale Frage, pp. 44, 107. 356 RODBERTUS' S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi where Rodbertus expresses his conviction that his principle of value also holds in actual economic life. 1 And, secondly, a man may not assume anything that he likes, even as a simple hypothesis. That is to say, even in a purely hypothetical assumption, one may omit only such circumstances of actual fact as are irrelevant to the question under examination. But what is to be said for a theoretical inquiry into interest which at the critical point leaves out the existence of the most important feature ; which gets rid of the principal part of what it had to explain with a " let us assume" ? On one point it may be admitted that Rodbertus is right : if we wish to discover a principle like that of land-rent or interest, we must " not let value dance up and down " ; 2 we must assume the validity of a fixed law of value. But is it not also a fixed law of value that goods which require a longer time between the expenditure of labour and their completion have, ceteris paribus, a higher value ? And is not this law of value of fundamental importance in relation to the phenomenon of interest ? And yet it is to be left out of account like an irregular accident of the circumstances of the market ! 3 1 Soziale Frage, pp. 113, 147. Erkldrung und Abhilfe, i. p. 123. In the latter Rodbertus says : " If the value of agricultural and manufacturing product is regulated by the labour incorporated in it, as always happens on the whole, even where commerce is free," etc. * Ibid. p. iii. n. 3 The above was written before the publication of Rodbertus's posthumous work, Capital, in 1884. In it Rodbertus takes an exceedingly strange position towards our question, a position which calls rather for a strengthening than a modification of the above criticism. He strongly emphasises the point that the law of labour value is not an exact law, but simply a law that determines the point towards which value will gravitate (p. 6, etc.) He even owns in as many words that, on account of the undertaker's claim on profit, a constant divergence takes place between the actual value of the goods and their value as measured by labour (p. 11, etc.) -Only he makes the extent of this concession much too trifling when he assumes that the deviation obtains only in the relations of the different stages of production of one and the same good ; and that the deviation does not obtain in the case of all the stages of production as a whole. That is, if the making of a good is divided into several sections of production, of which each section develops into a separate trade, according to Rodbertus the value of the separate product which is made in each individual section cannot remain in exact correspondence with the quantity of labour expended on it ; because the undertakers of the later stages of production have to make a greater outlay -for material, and therefore a greater expenditure of capital, and on that account have to calculate on a higher profit, which higher profit can only be provided by a relatively higher value of the product in question. CHAP, ii OMISSIONS AND CONTRADICTIONS 357 This singular omission is not without result. On the first result I have already touched. In overlooking the in- fluence of time upon the value of products, Kodbertus could not avoid falling into the mistake of confounding the claim of the labourer to the whole present value of his product with the claim to its future value. Some other consequences we shall encounter shortly. A fourth criticism which I have to make on Eodbertus is, that his doctrine contradicts itself in important points. His entire theory of land-rent is based upon the repeatedly and emphatically expressed proposition that the absolute However correct this is, it is clear that it does not go far enough. The divergence of the actual value of goods from the quantity of labour expended does not take place only between the fore-products of one good in relation to each other, in such a way that, in the course of the various stages of production, it cancels itself again through reciprocal compensation, and so the final result of all the stages of production, the goods ready for consumption, obeys the law of labour-value. On the contrary, the amount and the duration of the advance of capital definitively forces the value of all goods away from exact correspondence with their labour costs. To illustrate. Say that the production of a commodity requiring ninety days for its manufacture is divided into three stages of thirty days' labour in each. Rodbertus would say that the product of the first thirty days' labour might only attain the value of twenty-five days' labour, while the second thirty attained the value of thirty days', and the third thirty of thirty-five days' labour. But on the whole the final value of the product would be equal to ninety days' labour. But it U u*ttcr of common experience that, in normal successive production, the value of su<>h a commodity will increase during the three stages by a definite amount, say 30 + 31 +32, and that the final product will be equal to, say, ninety-three days of labour ; i.e. a value greater than the value of the labour incorporated in it by the amount of the customary interest. Besides this, Rodbertus deserves the severest censure that, in spite of his own admission, he always persists in developing the law of the distribution of all goods in wages and rent under the theoretical hypothesis that all goods possess "normal value " ; that is, a value that corresponds to their labour costs. He thinks he is justified in doing this because the ' ' normal value, in regard to the derivation both of rent in general and of land-rent and capital-rent in particular, is the least captious ; it alone does not quietly beg the question, and assume what was first to be explained by it, as every value does in which is included before- hand an element for rent." Here Rodbertus is grievously mistaken. He begs the question quite as im- properly as any of his opponents ever did ; only in an opposite way. His opponents, by their assumptions, have begged the question of the existence of interest. Rodbertus has begged the question of its non-existence. In taking no notice of the constant divergence from " normal value " (which divergence gives natural interest its source and its nourishment), he himself altogether abstracts the chief feature in the phenomenon of interest 358 RODBERTUS'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi amount of " rent " to be gained in a production does not depend upon the amount of the capital employed, but exclusively upon the amount of labour connected with the production. Supposing that in a certain industrial production for ex- ample, in a shoemaking business ten labourers are employed. Each labourer produces per year a product of the value of 100. The necessary maintenance which he receives as wages claims 50 of this sum. Thus, whether the capital employed be large or small, the year's rent (as we shall call it with Eodbertus) drawn by the undertaker will amount to 500. If the capital employed amounts, say to 1000, namely, 500 for wages of labour and 500 for material, then the rent will make up 50 per cent of the capital. If in another production, say a jeweller's business, ten labourers likewise are employed, then, under the assumption that the value of products is regulated by the amount of labour incorporated in them, they also will produce another yearly product of 100 each, of which the half falls to them as wages, while the other half falls to the undertaker as rent. But as in this case the material, the gold, represents a considerably higher value than the leather of the shoemaking business, the total rent of 500 is distributed over a far larger business capital. Assume that the jeweller's capital amounts to 20,000, 500 for wages and 19,500 for material, then the rent of 500 will only show a 2^ per cent interest on the business capital. Both examples are carried out entirely on the lines of Eodbertus's theory. As in almost every " manufacture " the proportion between the number of the (directly and indirectly) employed labourers and the amount of business capital employed is different, it follows that, in almost every manufacture, business capital must bear interest at the most various possible rates. Now even Rodbertus does not venture to maintain that this is really the case in everyday life. On the contrary, in a remark- able passage in his theory of land-rent, he assumes that, in virtue of the competition of capitals over the whole field of manufacture, an equal rate of profit will become established. I will give the passage in his own words. After remarking that the rent derived from manufacture is considered wholly CHAP, ii CONTRADICTIONS 359 as profit on capital, since here it is exclusively wealth in the form of capital that is employed, he goes on to say : " This, further, will give a rate of profit which will tend to the equalisation of profits, and according to this rate, therefore, must be calculated that profit which, as one part of the rent falling to the raw product, accrues to the capital required for agriculture. For if, in consequence of the universal presence of value in exchange, there now exists a homonymous standard for indicating the ratio between return and resources, this standard, in the case of the portion of rent accruing to the capital employed in manufacture, also serves to indicate the ratio between profit and capital. In other words, it will be right to say that the profit in any trade amounts to ten per cent of the capital employed. This rate will then furnish a standard for the equalisation of profits. In whatever trade this rate indicates a higher profit, competition will cause increased investment of capital, and thereby cause a universal tendency towards the equalising of profits. Similarly no one will invest capital where he does not expect profit correspond- ing to this rate." It will repay us to look more closely into this passage. Rodbertus speaks of competition as that factor which will establish a uniform rate of profit over the field of manufacture. In what manner it will do so is only slightly indicated by him. He assumes that every rate of profit which is higher than the average level is reduced to the average by an increase of the supply of capital ; and we may supplement this by saying that every lower rate of profit is raised to the average level by the flowing off of capital. Let us continue a little farther the consideration of the process from the point at which Rodbertus breaks off. In what manner can an increased supply of capital level down the abnormally high rate of profit ? Clearly in this way; that with the increased capital the production of the particular article is increased, and through the increase of supply the exchange value of the product is lowered till such time as after deduct- ing the wages of labour, it only leaves the usual rate of profit as rent. In our above example of the shoemaking business we might evidently have pictured to ourselves the levelling down of the abnormal rate of profit of 50 per cent to the 360 RODBERTUS'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi average rate of 5 per cent in the following manner. Attracted by the high rate of profit of 5 per cent, a great many persons will go into the shoemaking business. At the same time those who have been engaged in producing will extend their business. Thus the supply of shoes is increased, and their price and exchange value reduced. This process will continue till such time as the exchange value of the year's product of ten labourers in the shoemaking trade is reduced from 1000 to 550. Then the undertaker, after deducting 500 for necessary wages, has only 50 over as rent, which, distributed over a business capital of 1000, shows interest at the usual rate of 5 per cent. On reaching this point the exchange value of shoes will require to remain fixed if the profit in the shoemaking trade is not to become abnormal again, in which case a repetition of the process of levelling down would ensue. On the same analogy, if the rate of profit in the jeweller's trade be under the average, say 2^ per cent, it will be raised to 5 per cent in this way. The profit in jewellery being so small, its manufacture will be curtailed, the supply of jewellery thereby reduced and its exchange value raised, till such time as the additional product of ten labourers in the jewellery trade reaches an exchange value of 1500. There now remain to the undertaker, after deducting 500 for necessary wages, 1000 as rent, this being interest on the business capital of 20,000 at the usual rate of 5 per cent. Thus is reached the resting-point at which the exchange value of jewellery, as in the former example the exchange value of shoes, may remain steady. Before going farther I shall, by looking at the matter from another side, make entirely clear the important point that the levelling of abnormal profits cannot take place without a steady alteration in the exchange value of the products concerned. If the exchange value of the products were to remain un- altered, then an insufficient rate of profit could only be raised to the normal level if the difference were made up at the cost of the labourers' necessary wages. For example, if the .product of ten labourers in the jewellery manufacture retained without ' CHAP, ii CONTRADICTIONS labour expended, then evidently a levelling up of the rate of profit to 5 per cent-that is, an increase in the amount of profit from 500 to 1000 is only conceivable if the wages which the ten labourers have hitherto received were wholly withdrawn, and the entire product handed over to the capitalist as profit. To say nothing of the fact that such a supposition contains in itself a simple impossibility, I nee merely point out that it is equally opposed to experience and to Rodbertus's own theory. It is contrary to experience; for experience shows that the usual effect of a restriction of supply in7ny branch of production is not a depression of the wages of labour, but a raising of the prices of product *** experience does not bear witness that the wages of labour in such trr-des as require a large investment of capital, stand eTntially lower than in other trades-which would nece^anly the caL if the demand for a higher profit bad to be me from wa-es instead of from prices of product And it is als< cTntrarvto Eodbertus's own theory. For that theory assumes that the labourers in the long run always receive the amoun of the necessary costs of their maintenance as wages, a la which would be sensibly violated by this kind of equalisation It is just as easy to show conversely that, if the value of the products remained unaltered, a limitation of profits could only take place by raising the wages of the labourers in the trades concerned above the normal scale, which again, as we have said, is contrary to experience and to Rodbertus's own theory I may venture then to claim that I have described the process of the equalisation of profits in accordance with fa 3ts and in accordance with Rodbertus's own hypothesis, when I assume that the return of profits to their normal level is brought about by means of a steady alteration m he exchange value of the products concerned. But ] year's product of ten labourers in the shoemaking trade has an exchange value of 550, and the year's product of ten labourers in the jewellery trade has an exchange value of 1 5 00 and it must be so if the equalisation of pro! assumed by Rodbertus always takes place, what becomes of his assumption that products exchange according to 1 labour incorporated in them? And if, from the employment of the same amount of labour, there result in the one 362 RODBERTUS' S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi 50, in the other 1000 as rent, what becomes, further, of the doctrine that the amount of rent to be obtained in a pro- duction is not regulated by the amount of capital employed, but only by the amount of labour performed in it ? The contradiction in which Rodbertus has involved himself here is as obvious as it is insoluble. Either products do really exchange, in the long run, in proportion to the labour incor- porated in them, and the amount of rent in a production is really regulated by the amount of labour employed in it, in which case an equalisation of profits is impossible ; or there is an equalisation of the profits of capital, in which case it is impossible that products should continue to exchange in pro- portion to the labour incorporated in them, and that the amount of labour spent should be the only thing that determines the amount of rent obtainable. Rodbertus must have noticed this very evident contradiction if he had only devoted a little real reflection to the manner in which profits become equalised, instead of dismissing the subject in the most superficial way with his phrase about the equalising effect of competition. But we are not done with criticism. The whole explana- tion of land -rent, which, with Rodbertus, is so intimately connected with the explanation of interest, is based upon an inconsistency so striking that the author's carelessness in not observing it is almost inconceivable. There are only two possibilities here: either, as the effect of competition, an equalisation of profits does take place, or it does not. Assume first that it does take place. What justifica- tion has Rodbertus for supposing that the equalisation will certainly embrace the whole sphere of manufacture, but will come to a halt, as if spellbound, at the boundary of raw pro- duction ? If agriculture promises an attractive profit why should not more capital flow to it ? why should not more land be cultivated, or the land be more intensively cultivated, or cultivated by more improved methods, till the exchange value of raw products comes into correspondence with the increased capital now devoted to agriculture, and yields to it also no more than the common rate of profit ? If the " law " that the amount of rent is not regulated by the outlay of capital, but only by the amount of labour expended, has not prevented equalisation in manufacture, how could it prevent it in raw CHAP. II CRITICISED AS A WHOLE production? But what in that case would become of the constant surplus over the usual rate of profit, the land-rent ? Or assume that an equalisation does not take place. In that case there being no universal rate of profit, then in agriculture, as in everything else, there is no definite rule as to how much "rent" one may calculate as profit of capital. And, finally, there is no division line between capital and rent of land. Therefore, in either case, whether an equalisation of pro does take place or does not, Rodbertus's theory of land-rent hangs in the air There is contradiction upon contradiction, and that, moreover, not in trifles, but in the fundamental doctrines of the theory. My criticism has hitherto been directed to the individual parts of Rodbertus's theory. I may conclude by putting the theory as a whole to the test. If correct, it must be competent to give a satisfactory explanation of the pheno- menon of interest as presented in actual economic life, and moreover, of all the essential forms in which it presents itself. If it cannot do so, it is self-condemned ; it is not correct I now maintain, and shall attempt to prove, that although Rodbertus's Exploitation theory might possibly account for the interest borne by that part of capital which is invested in wages it is absolutely impossible for it to explain the interest on that part of capital which is invested in the materials of manufacture. Let the reader judge. A jeweller whose chief business it is to make strings, ot pearls, employs annually five labourers to make strings to the value of 100,000, and sells them on an average in a years time He will accordingly have a capital of 100,000 con- stantlv invested in pearls, which, at the usual rate of interest, must "yield him a clear annual profit of 5000. We now ask, How is it to be explained that he gets this income? Rodbertus answers, Interest on capital is a profit of plunder, got by curtailing the natural and just wages of labour. Wages of what labour ? Of the five labourers who sorted and strung the pearls ? That cannot well be ; for if, by curtailing the just wages of the five labourers, one could gain 5000, then the iust wages of these labourers must, in any case, have amounted to more than 5000. That is to say, these wages must have 364 RODBERTUS'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi amounted, in any case, to more than 1000 per man, a height of just wages that can hardly be taken seriously, especially as the business of sorting and stringing pearls is very little above the character of unskilled labour. But let us look a little farther. Perhaps it is the labourers of an earlier stage of production from the product of whose labour the jeweller obtains his stolen profit ; say the pearl- fishers. But the jeweller has not coine into contact at all with these labourers, for he buys his pearls direct from an undertaker of pearl-fishing, or from a middleman ; he has therefore had no opportunity whatever of deducting from the pearl-fishers a part of their product, or a part of the value of their product. But perhaps the undertaker of pearl-fishing has done so instead of him, so that the jeweller's profit originates in a deduction which the undertaker of the pearl-fishing has made from the wages of his labourers. That, however, is im- possible ; for clearly the jeweller would make his profit even if the undertaker of the pearl-fishing had made no deduction what- ever from the wages of his labourers. Even if this latter under- taker were to divide among his labourers as wages the whole 100,000 that the pearls so obtained are worth the whole 10 0,0 he receives from the jeweller as purchase money then it only comes to this, that he makes no profit. It in no wise follows that the jeweller loses his profit. For to the jeweller it is a matter of complete indifference how this purchase money which he pays is distributed, so long as the price is not raised. Whatever then be the flights of our fancy, we shall seek in vain for the labourers from whose just wages the jeweller's profit of 5000 could possibly have been withheld. Perhaps, however, even after this illustration there may be some readers still unconvinced. Perhaps they may think it certainly a little strange that the labour of the five pearl stringers should be the source from which the jeweller can exploit so considerable a profit as 5000, but yet not quite inconceivable. Let me therefore bring forward another and still more striking illustration, a good old example by which many an interest theory has already been tested and found false. The owner, of a vineyard has harvested a cask of good young wine. Immediately after the vintage it has an exchange value of 10. He lets the wine lie undisturbed in the cellar, and CHAP. II CRITICISED AS A WHOLE 365 after a dozen years the wine, now of course an old wine, has an exchange value of 20. This is a well-known fact. The difference of 10 faUs to the owner of the wine as interest on the capital contained in the wine. Now who are the labourers that are exploited by this profit of capital ? During the storage there has been no further labour expended on the wine. The only conceivable thing is that the exploitation has been at the expense of those labourers who produced the new wine. The owner of the vineyard has paid them too small a wage. But I ask, How much ought he in justice" to have paid them as wage?. Even if he pays them the entire 10, which was the value of the new wine at the time of harvest, there stills remains to him the increment in value of 10, which Kodbertus brands as profit of plunder. Indeed even if he pays them 12 or 15 as wages, the accu- sation of plundering will still hang over him ; he will only be free from it if he has paid the full 20. Now can any one seriously ask that 20 should be paid as " just wages of labour " for a product that is not worth more than 10 ? Does the owner know beforehand whether the product will ever be worth 20 ? Is it not possible that he might be forced, con- trary to his original intention, to use or to .sell the wine before the expiry of twelve years? And would he not then have paid 20*for a product that was never worth more than 10 or perhaps 12 ? And then, how is he to pay the labourers who produce that other new wine which he sells at once for 10? Is he to pay them also 20 ? Then he will be ruined. Or only 10 ? Then different labourers will receive different wages for precisely similar work, which again is unjust ; not to mention the fact that a man cannot very well know beforehand whose product it is that will be sold at once, and whose stored up for a dozen years. But still further. Even a 20 wage for a cask of new wine would not be enough to protect the vine-grower from the accusation of robbery ; for he might let the wine lie in the cellar twenty-four years instead of twelve, and then it would be worth not 2 but 40. Is he then, justly speaking, bound to pay the labourers who, twenty-four years before that, have produced the wine, 40 instead of 10 ? The idea is too absurd. But if he pays them only 10 or 20, then he makes 368 RODBERTUS^S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi a profit on capital, and Kodbertus declares that he has curtailed the labourer's just wage by keeping back a part of the value of his product ! I scarcely think any one will venture to maintain that the cases of interest which have been brought forward, and the numerous cases analogous to them, are explained by Eodbertus's theory. But a theory which has failed to explain any important part of the phenomena to be explained cannot be the true one, and so this final examination brings us to the same result as the detailed criticism which preceded it might lead us to expect. Rodbertus's Exploitation theory is, in its foundation and in its conclusions, wrong ; it is in contradiction with itself and with the circumstances of actual life. The nature of my critical task is such that, in the foregoing pages, I could not choose but confine myself to one side that of pointing out the errors into which Rodbertus had fallen. I consider it due to the memory of this distinguished man to acknowledge, in equally candid terms, his conspicuous merits as regards the development of the theory of political economy. Unfortunately, to dwell on these lies beyond the limits of my present task. CHAPTER III MAKX MARX 1 starts from the proposition that the exchange value 2 of all goods is regulated entirely by the amount of labour which their production costs. He lays much more emphasis on this proposition than does Rodbertus. While Rodbertus only mentions it incidentally, in the course of Ms argument as it were, and puts it very often in the shape of a hypothetical assumption without wasting any words in its proof, Marx makes it his fundamental principle, and goes thoroughly into statement and explication. To be just to the peculiar dia- lectical style of the author I must give the essential parts of the theory in his own words. " The utility of a thing gives it a value in use. But this utility is not something in the air. It is limited by the pro- perties of the commodity, and has no existence apart from that commodity. The commodity itself, the iron, corn, or diamond, is therefore a use value or good. . . . Use values constitute the matter of wealth, whatever be their social form. In the social form we are about to consider they constitute at the same time the material substratum of exchange value. Exchange value in the first instance presents itself as the quantitative 1 Zur Kritik der politischen-Oekonomie, Berlin, 1859. Das Kapital, Kritik der politischen-Oekoiwmic, vol. i. first edition, Hamburg, 1867 ; second edition, 1872. English translation by Moore and Aveling, Sonnenschein, 1887. 1 quote from Das Kapital as the book in which Marx stated his views last and most in detail. On Marx also Knies has made some very valuable criticisms, of which I make frequent use in the sequel. Most of the other attempts to criticise and refute Marx's work are so far below that of Knies in value that I have not found it useful to refer to them. 2 With Marx simply called Value. 368 MARX'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi relation, the proportion in which use values of one kind are exchanged for those of another kind, a relation constantly changing with time and place. Hence exchange value seems to be something accidental and purely relative, and an intrinsic value in exchange seems a contradiction in terms. Let us look at the matter more closely. " A single commodity, e.g. a quarter of wheat, exchanges with other articles in the most varying proportions. Still its exchange value remains unaltered, whether expressed in X boot-blacking, Y silk, or Z money. It must therefore have a content distinct from those various forms of expression. Now let us take two commodities, wheat and iron. Whatever be the proportion in which they are exchangeable, it can always be represented by an equation, in which a given quantity of wheat appears as equal to a certain quantity of iron. For instance, 1 quarter wheat = 1 cwt. of iron. What does this equation tell us ? It tells us that there is a common element of equal amount in two different things in a quarter of wheat and in a cwt. of iron. The two things are therefore equal to a third, which in itself is neither the one nor the other. Each of the two, so far as it is an exchange value, must therefore be reducible to that third. . . . This common element cannot be a geometrical, physical, chemical, or other natural property of the commodities. Their physical properties only come into con- sideration so far as they make the commodities useful ; that is, make them use values! But, on the other hand, the exchange relation of goods evidently involves our disregarding their use value. Within this relation one use value counts for just as much as any other, provided only it be present in due proportion. Or, as old Barbon says, " one sort of wares is as good as another if the value be equal." There is no difference or distinction in things of equal value. One hundred pounds' worth of lead or iron is of as great a value as one hundred pounds' worth of silver and gold." As use values, commodities are, first and foremost, of different qualities ; as exchange values they can only be of different quantities, and contain therefore not an atom of use value. " If then we disregard the use value of commodities, they have only one common property left, that of being products of labour. But even as the product of labour they have changed SOCIALL Y NECLSSAR Y LABOUR in our hand. For if we disregard the use value of a commodity, we disregard also the special material constituents and shapes which rive it a use value. It is no longer a table, a house, yarn or any other useful thing. All its sensible qualities have disappeared. Nor is it any longer the product of the labour of the joiner, the mason, the spinner, or of any othe distinct kind of productive labour. With the useful character of the products of labour disappears the useful character of the labours embodied in them, and also the different concrete forms, of these labours; they are no longer distinguished from -each other, but are all reduced to equal human labour, abstract human labour. Consider now what is left. It is nothing but the same immaterial objectivity, a mere congelation of homogeneous human labour, i.e. of labour power expended without regard to the form of its expenditure. All that these things now tell us is that human labour was expended in their production, that human labour is stored up in them ; as crystals of this common social substance they are Values. ... A use value or good, therefore, only has a value because abstract human labour is objectified or materialised in it." As labour is the source of all value, so, Marx continues, the amount of the value of all goods is measured by the quantity of labour contained in them, or in labour time But not by that particular labour time which the individual who made the good might find necessary, but by the "socially necessary labour time." This Marx explains as the "labour time required to produce a use value under the conditions of production that are socially normal at the time, and with the socially necessary degree of skill and intensity of labour.' is only the quantity of socially necessary labour, or the labour time socially necessary for the making of a use value, that determines the amount of the value. " The single commodity here is to be counted as the average sample of its class. Commodities, therefore, in which equally great amounts of labour are contained, or which could be made in the same labour time, have the same amount of value. The value of one commodity is to the value of every other commodity as the labour time necessary to the production of the one is to the labour time necessary to the production of the other. ... As values all 2 B 370 MARX'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi commodities are only definite amounts of congealed labour time." 1 Later on I shall try to estimate the value of these funda- mental principles which Marx puts forward on the subject of value. In the meantime I go on to his theory of interest. Marx finds the problem of interest in the following phenomenon. The usual circulation of commodities carried on by the medium of exchange, money, proceeds in this way : one man sells the commodity which he possesses for money, in order to buy with the money another commodity which he requires for his own purposes. This course of circulation may be expressed by the formula, Commodity Money Commodity. The starting point and the finishing point of the circulation is a commodity, though the two commodities be of different kinds. " But by the side of this form of exchange we find another and specifically different form, namely, Money Commodity Money; the transformation of money into a commodity and the transformation back again of the commodity into money buy- ing in order to sell. Money that in its movement describes this circulation becomes capital, and is already capital when it is dedicated to be used in this way. ... In the simple circulation of commodities the two extremes have the same economic form. They are both commodities. They are also of the same value. But they are qualitatively different use values, as, for instance, wheat and clothes. The essence of the movement consists in the exchange of those products in which the labour of society is embodied. It is different with the circulation M C M. At the first glance it looks as if it were meaningless, because tautological. Both extremes have the same economic form. They are both money, and therefore not qualitatively different use values, for money is but the converted form of commodities in which their different use values are lost. First to exchange 1 for wool, and then to exchange the same wool again for 100 that is, in a roundabout way to exchange money for money, like for like seems a transaction as purposeless as it is absurd. One sum of money can only be distinguished from another snm of money by its amount. The process M C M does not owe its character therefore to any qualitative difference 1 Das Kapital, second edition, p. 10, etc. CHAP, in SURPLUS VALUE 371 between its extremes, since they are both money, but only to this quantitative difference. At the end of the process more money is withdrawn from the circulation than was thrown in at the beginning. The wool bought for 100 is sold again, that is to say, for 100 + 10, or 110. The complete form of this process therefore is M C M', where M' = M + AM; that is, the sum originally advanced plus an increment. This increment, or surplus over original value, I call Surplus Value (Mehrwerth}. The value originally advanced, therefore, not only remains during the circulation, but changes in amount; adds to itself a surplus value, or makes itself value. And this movement changes it into capital" (p. 132). " To buy in order to sell, or, to put it more fully, to buy in order to sell at a higher price, M C M 7 , seems indeed the peculiar form characteristic of one kind of capital only, merchant capital. But industrial capital also is money that changes itself into commodities, and by the sale of these commodities changes back into more money. Acts which take place outside the sphere of circulation, between the buying and the selling, do not make any alteration in the form of the movement. Finally, in interest bearing capital the circulation M c M ' presents itself in an abridged form, shows its result without any mediation, en style lapidaire so to speak, as M M'; i.e. money which is equal to more money, value which is greater than itself" (p. 138). Whence then comes the surplus value ? Marx works out the problem dialectically. First he declares that the surplus value can neither originate in the fact that the capitalist, as buyer, buys commodities regularly under their value, nor in the fact that the capitalist, as seller, sells them regularly over their value. It cannot therefore originate in the circulation. But neither can it originate out- side the circulation. For "outside the circulation the owner of the commodity only stands related to his own commodity. As regards its value the relation is limited to this, that the commodity contains a quantity of the owner's own labour measured by definite social laws. This quantity of labour is expressed in the amount of the value of the commodity pro- duced/and, since the amount of the value is expressed in money, the quantity of labour is expressed in a price, say 10. But 372 MARX'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi the owner's labour does not represent itself in the value of the commodity and in a surplus over its own value in a price of 10, which is at the same time a price of 11 in a value which is greater than itself ! The owner of a commodity can by his labour produce value, but not value that evolves itself. He can raise the value of a commodity by adding new value to that which is there already, through new labour ; as, e.g. in making boots out of leather. The same material has now more value, because it contains a greater amount of labour. The boot then has more value than the leather, but the value of the leather remains as it was. It has not evolved itself; it has not added a surplus value to itself during the making of the boot" (p. 150). And now the problem stands as follows : " Our money owner, who is yet only a capitalist in the grub stage, must buy the commodities at their value, must sell them at their value, and yet at the end of the process must draw out more money than he put in. The bursting of the grub into the butterfly must take place in the sphere of circulation, and not in the sphere of circulation. These are the conditions of the problem. Hie Ehodus, hie salta !" (p. 150). The solution Marx finds in this, that there is one commodity whose use value possesses the peculiar quality of being the source of exchange value. This commodity is the capacity of labour, or Labour Power. It is offered -for sale on the market under the double condition that the labourer is personally free, for otherwise it would not be his labour power that would be on sale, but his entire person as a slave ; and that the labourer is deprived of " all things necessary for the realising of his labour power," for otherwise he would prefer to produce on his own account, and to offer his products instead of his labour power for sale. It is by trading in this commodity that the capitalist receives the surplus value. In the following way. The value of the commodity, labour power, like that of all other commodities, is regulated by the labour time necessary for its reproduction ; that is, in this case, by the labour time that is necessary to produce as much means of subsistence as are required for the maintenance of the labourer. Say, for instance, that, to produce the necessary means of subsistence CHAP, in UNPAID LABOUR 373 for one day, a social labour time of six hours is necessary, and assume that this same labour time is embodied in three shillings of money, then the labour power of one day is to be bought for three shillings. If the capitalist has completed this purchase, the use value of the labour power belongs to him, and he realises it by getting the labourer to work for him. If he were to get him to work only so many hours per day as are incorporated in the labour power itself, and as must have been paid in the buying of the same, no surplus value would emerge. For, according to the assumption, six hours of labour cannot put into the product in which they are incorporated any greater value than three shillings, and so much the capitalist has paid as wage. But this is not the way in which capitalists act. Even if they have bought the labour power for a price that only corresponds to six hours' labour time, they get the worker to labour the whole day for them. And now, in the product made during this day, there are more hours of labour in- corporated than the capitalist was obliged to pay for; he has consequently a greater value than the wage he has paid, and the difference is the "surplus value" that falls to the capitalist. To take an example. Suppose that a worker can in six hours spin 10 Ibs. of Wool into yarn. Suppose that this wool for its own production has required twenty hours of labour, and possesses, accordingly, a value of 10s. Suppose, further, that during the six hours of spinning the spinner uses up so much of his tools as corresponds to the labour of four hours, and represents consequently a value of 2s. The total value of the means of production consumed in the spinning will amount to 12s., corresponding to twenty-four hours' labour. In the spinning process the wool " absorbs " other six hours of labour ; the yarn spun is therefore, on the whole, the product of thirty hours of labour, and will have in conformity a value of 15s. Under the assumption that the capitalist gets the hired labourer to work only six hours in the day, the making of the yarn has cost the capitalist quite 15s. 10s. for wool; 2s. for wear and tear of tools ; 3s. for wage of labour. There is no surplus value here. Quite otherwise is it if the capitalist gets the labourer to work twelve hours a day for him. In twelve hours the labourer works up 20 Ibs. of wool, in which previously 374 MARX'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi forty hours of labour have been incorporated, and which, consequently, are worth 20s.; further he uses up in tools the product of eight hours' labour, of the value of 4s. ; but during a day he adds to the raw material twelve hours' labour, that is, a new value of 6s. And now the balance-sheet stands as follows : The yarn produced during a day has cost in all sixty hours' labour; it has therefore a value of 30s. The outlays of the capitalist amounted to 20s. for wool, 4s. for wear and tear of tools, and 3s. for wage ; in all, therefore, only 2 7s. There remains now a " surplus value " of 3s. Surplus value therefore, according to Marx, is a con- sequence of the capitalist getting the labourer to work a part of the day for him without paying for it. In the labourer's work day two portions may be distinguished. In the first part, the " necessary labour time," the worker produces the means of his own maintenance, or the value of that maintenance ; for this part of his labour he receives an equivalent in wage. During the second portion, the " surplus labour time," he is " exploited " ; he produces " surplus value " without receiving any equivalent whatever for it. 1 " Capital is therefore not merely a command over labour, as Adam Smith calls it. It is essentially a command over unpaid labour. All surplus value, in whatever particular form it may after- wards crystallise itself, be it profit, interest, rent, or any other, is in substance only the material shape of unpaid labour. The secret of the power of capital to evolve value is found in its disposal over a definite quantity of the unpaid labour of others" (p. 554). In this statement the careful reader will have recognised if partly in a somewhat altered dress all the essential propositions combined by Eodbertus in his theory of interest : the doctrine that the value of goods is measured by quantity of labour ; that labour alone creates all value ; that in the loan contract the worker receives less value than he creates, and that necessity compels him to acquiesce in this ; that the capitalist appropriates the surplus to himself; and that consequently the profit so obtained has the character of plunder from the produce of the labour of others. 1 Das Kapital, p. 205, etc. CHAP, in RODBERTUS AND MARX 375 On account of the substantial agreement of both theories, or, to speak more correctly, of both ways of formulating the same theory, almost everything that I have adduced against Eodbertus's doctrine has equal force against Marx. I may therefore limit myself now to some supplementary remarks that I consider necessary ; partly for the purpose of adapting my criticism in particular places to Marx's peculiar statement of the theory, partly also for dealing with some new matter introduced by Marx. Of this by far the most important is the attempt to prove the proposition that all value rests on labour, instead of merely asserting it. In criticising Eodbertus I laid as little emphasis on that proposition as he had done. I was content to point out some undoubted exceptions to it, but I did not go to the root of the matter. In the case of Marx I neither can nor will intermit this. It is true that in doing so I venture on a field already traversed many a time, and by distinguished writers. I can scarcely hope then to bring forward much that is new. But in a book which has for its subject the critical statement of theories of interest, it would ill become me to avoid the thorough criticism of a proposition which has been placed at the head of one of the most important of these theories, as its most important fundamental principle. And, unfortunately, the present position of our science is not such that it can be considered superfluous once more to undertake this task. Although this proposition is, in truth, nothing more than a fallacy once perpetrated by a great man, and repeated ever since by a credulous crowd, in our day it is like to be accepted in widening circles as a kind of gospel. For the doctrine that the value of all goods depends upon labour, the proud names of Adam Smith and Eicardo have usually been claimed both as authors and authorities. This is correct; but it is not altogether correct. The doctrine is to be found in the writings of both; but Adam Smith now and then contradicts it, 1 and Eicardp so narrows the 1 e.g. when in the fifth chapter of the second book he says of the farmer: "Not only his labouring servants, but his labouring cattle are productive labourers ; " and further, " In agriculture too Nature labours along with man, and though her labour costs no expense, its produce has its value as well as that of the most expensive workmen." See also Knies, Der Kredit, part H. p. 62. 376 MARX'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi sphere within which it is valid, and surrounds it with such important exceptions, that it is scarcely justifiable to assert that he has represented labour as the universal and the exclusive principle of value. He begins his Principles with the express assertion that the exchange value of goods has its origin in two sources in their scarcity and in the quantity of labour that their production has cost. Certain goods, such as rare statues and paintings, get their value exclusively from the former source, and it is only the value of those goods that can be multiplied, without any assignable limit, by labour, which is determined by the amount of labour they cost. These latter, indeed, in Ricardo's opinion, constitute "by far the greatest part of those goods which are the objects of desire " ; but even in regard to them Ricardo finds himself compelled to a further limitation. He has to admit that, even in their case, the exchange value is not determined exclusively by labour; that time also the time elapsing between the advancing of the labour and the realising of the finished product has a considerable influence on it. 1 It appears then that neither Adam Smith nor Ricardo have stated the principle that stands in their name in such an unqualified way as they generally get credit for. Still, to a certain extent, they have stated it, and we have to inquire on what grounds they did so. On seeking to answer this question we shall make a remarkable discovery. It is that neither Adam Smith nor Ricardo have given any reason for this principle, but simply asserted its validity as something self - explanatory. The celebrated passage in Adam Smith, which Ricardo afterwards verbally adopted in his own doctrine, runs thus : " The real price of everything, what everything really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. What everything is really worth to the man who has acquired it, and who wants to dispose of it, or exchange it for some- thing else, is the toil and trouble which it can save to himself, and which it can impose upon other people." 2 Let us pause here a moment. The tone in which Adam 1 See above, p. 354, and Knies as before, p. 60, etc. 2 Wealth of Nations, book i. chap. v. (p. 13 of M'Culloch's edition) ; Ricardo, Principles, chap. i. CHAP, in VALUE AND TROUBLE 377 Smith speaks signifies that the truth of these words must be immediately obvious. But is it really obvious ? Are value and trouble really so closely related that the very concep- tion of them at once carries conviction that trouble is the ground of value ? I do not think any unprejudiced person will maintain this. That I have given myself trouble about a thing is one fact; that the thing is worth the trouble is another and a different fact ; and that the two facts do not always go hand in hand is too well confirmed by experience for any doubt about it to be possible. It is confirmed .by every one of the innumerable cases in which, from want of technical skill, or from unsuccessful speculation, or simply from ill-luck, labour is every day being followed by a valueless result. But not less is it confirmed by every one of the numerous cases where little trouble is rewarded with high gains ; such as the occupation of a piece of land, the finding of a precious stone, the discovery of a gold mine. But not to mention cases that may be considered as exceptions from the regular course of things, it is a fact, as indubitable as it is perfectly normal, that the same amount of labour exerted by different persons has a quite different value. The result of one month's labour on the part of a famous artist is, quite regularly, a hundred times more valuable than the same period of labour on the part of a common carpenter. How could that be possible if trouble were really the principle of value ? How could it be possible if, in virtue of some immediate psychological connection, we were forced to base our estimate of value on the consideration of toil and trouble, and only on that consideration ? l Or perhaps it is that nature is so 1 Adam Smith gets rid of the difficulty mentioned in the text as follows : " If the one species of labour requires an uncommon degree of dexterity and ingenuity, the esteem which men have for such talents will naturally give a value to their produce superior to what would be due to the time employed about it. Such talents can seldom be acquired, but in consequence of long application and the superior value of their produce may frequently be more than a reasonable com- pensation for the time and labour which must be spent in acquiring them " (book i. chap, vi.) The insufficiency of this explanation is obvious. In the first place, it is clear .that the higher value of the products of exceptionally skilled men rests on a quite different foundation from the "esteem which men have for such talents." How many poets and scholars does the public leave to starve in spite of the very high esteem which it pays to their talents, and how many unscrupulous speculators has it rewarded for their adroitness by hundreds of thousands, although it 378 MARX'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi aristocratic that its psychological laws force our spirit to reckon the trouble of a skilled artist a hundred times more valuable than the more modest trouble of a carpenter ! I think that any one who reflects for a little, instead of blindly taking it on trust, will be convinced that there is no immediately obvious and essential connection between trouble and value, such as the passage in Adam Smith seems to assume. But does the passage actually refer to exchange value, as has been tacitly assumed ? I do not think that any one who reads it with unprejudiced eye can maintain that either. The passage applies neither to exchange value, nor to use value, nor to any other kind of value in the strict scientific sense. The fact is as shown by the employment of the expression " worth " instead of value that in this case Adam Smith has used the word in that very wide and vague sense which it has in everyday speech. And this is very significant. Feel- ing involuntarily that, at the bar of strictly scientific reflection, his proposition could not be admitted, he turns to the loose impressions of everyday life, and makes use of the ill-defined expressions of everyday life, with a result, as experience has shown, very much to be deplored in the interests of the science. Finally, how little the whole passage can lay claim to scientific exactitude is shown by the fact that, even in the few words that compose it, there is a contradiction. In one breath he claims for two things the distinctive property of being the principle of " real " value : first, for the trouble that a man can save himself through the possession of a good ; second, for the trouble that a man can impose upon other people. But these are two quantities which, as every one knows, are not absolutely identical. Under the regime of the division of labour, the trouble which I personally would be obliged to undergo to obtain possession of a thing I desired is usually much greater than the trouble with which a labourer technically trained produces it. Which of these two troubles, the " saved " has no esteem whatever for their "talents"! But suppose esteem were the foundation of value, in that case the law that value depends on trouble would evidently not be confirmed but violated. If, again, in the second of the above sentences, Adam Smith attempts to trace that higher value to the trouble ex- pended in acquiring the dexterity, by his insertion of the word "frequently " he confesses that it will not hold in all cases. The contradiction therefore remains. CHAP, in VALUE AND TROUBLE 379 or the "imposed," are we to understand as determining the real value ? In short, the celebrated passage where our old master Adam Smith introduces the Labour Principle into the theory of value is as far as possible from being the great and well grounded scientific principle it has usually been considered. It does not of itself carry conviction. It is not supported by a particle of evidence. It has the slovenly dress and the slovenly character of a popular expression. Finally, it con- tradicts itself. That, notwithstanding this, it found general acceptance is due, in my opinion, to the coincidence of two circumstances ; first, that an Adam Smith said it, and, second, that he said it without adducing any evidence for it. If Adam Smith had but addressed a single word in its proof to the intelligence of his readers, instead of simply appealing to their immediate impressions, they would have insisted upon putting the evidence before the bar of their intelligence, and then the absence of all real argument would infallibly have shown itself. It is only by taking people by surprise that such propositions can win acceptance. Let us see what Adam Smith, and after him, Kicardo, says further. " Labour was the first price the original purchase money that was paid for all things." This proposition is comparatively inoffensive, but it has no bearing on the principle of value. " In that early and rude state of society which precedes both the accumulation of stock and the appropriation of land, the proportion between the quantities of labour necessary for acquiring different objects seems to be the only circumstance which can afford any rule for exchanging them for one another. If, among a nation of hunters, for example, it usually cost twice the labour to kill a beaver which it does to kill a deer, one beaver should naturally exchange for or be worth two deer. It is natural that what is usually the produce of two days' or two hours' labour should be worth double of what is usually the produce of one day's or one hour's labour." In these words also we shall look in vain for any trace of a rational basis for the doctrine. Adam Smith simply says, "seems to be the only circumstance," " should naturally," " it is natural," and so on, but throughout he leaves it to the reader to convince 380 MARX 'S EXPLOITA TION THEOR Y BOOK vi himself of the " naturalness " of such judgments a task, be it remarked in passing, that the critical reader will not find easy. For if it is " natural " that the exchange of products should be regulated exclusively by the proportion of labour time that their attainment costs, it must also be natural that, for instance, any uncommon species of butterfly, or any rare edible frog, should be worth, " among a nation of hunters " ten times more than a deer, inasmuch as a man might spend ten days in looking for the former, while he could capture the latter usually by one day's labour. But the " naturalness " of this proportion would scarcely be obvious to everybody ! The result of these considerations may, I think, be summed up as follows. Adam Smith and Ricardo have asserted that labour is the principle of the value of goods simply as an axiom, and without giving any evidence for it. Consequently any one who would maintain this principle must not look to Adam Smith and Ricardo as guaranteeing its truth, but must seek for some other and independent basis of proof. Now it is a very remarkable fact that of later writers scarcely any one has done so. The men who in other respects sifted the old-fashioned doctrine inside and out with their destructive criticism, with whom no proposition, however vener- able with age, was secure from being put once more in question and tested, these very men have not uttered a word in criticism of the weightiest principle that they borrowed from the old doctrine. From Ricardo to Rodbertus, from Sismondi to Lassalle, the name of Adam Smith is the only guarantee thought necessary for this doctrine. No writer adds anything of his own but repeated asseverations that the proposition is true, incontrovertible, indubitable ; there is no real attempt to prove its truth, to meet objections, to remove doubts. The despisers of proof from authority content themselves with appealing to authority ; the sworn foes of unproved assumptions and assertions content themselves with assuming and asserting O O Only a very few representatives of the Labour Value theory form any exception to this rule ; one of these few, however, is Marx. An economist looking for a real confirmation of the principle in question might proceed in one of two directions ; he might either attempt to develop the proof from grounds involved in its very statement, or he might deduce it from experience. CHAP, in THE COMMON ELEMENT IN EXCHANGE 381 Marx has taken the former course, with a result on which the reader may presently form his own opinion. I have already quoted in Marx's own words the passages relative to the subject. The line of argument divides itself clearly into three steps. First step. Since in exchange two goods are made equal to one another, there must be a common element of similar quantity in the two. and in this common element must reside the principle of Exchange value. Second step. This common element cannot be the Use value, for in the exchange of goods the use value is disregarded. Third step. If the use value of commodities be disregarded there remains in them only one common property that of being products of labour. Consequently, so runs the conclusion, Labour is the principle of value ; or, as Marx says, the use value, or "good," only has a value because human labour is made objective in it, is materialised in it. I have seldom read anytliing to equal this for bad reasoning and carelessness in drawing conclusions. The first step may pass, but the second step can only be maintained by a logical fallacy of the grossest kind. The use value cannot be the common element because it is " obviously disregarded in the exchange relations of commodities, for " I quote literally " within the exchange relations one use value counts for just as much as any other, if only it is to be had in the proper proportion." What would Marx have said to the following argument ? In an opera company there are three celebrated singers a tenor, a bass, and a baritone and these have each a salary of 1000. The question is asked, What is the common circum- stance on account of which their salaries are made equal ? And I answer, In the question of salary one good voice counts for just as much as any other a good tenor for as much as a good bass or a good baritone provided only it is to be had in proper proportion ; consequently in the question of salary the good voice is evidently disregarded, and the good voice cannot be the cause of the good salary. The fallaciousness of this argument is clear. But it is just as clear that Marx's conclusion, from which this is exactly copied, is not a whit more correct. Both commit the same fallacy. 382 MARX'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi They confuse the disregarding of a genus with the disregarding of the specific forms in which this genus manifests itself. In our illustration the circumstance which is of no account as regards the question of salary is evidently only the special form which the good voice assumes, whether tenor, bass, or baritone. It is by no means the good voice in general. And just so is it with the exchange relations of commodities. The special forms under which use value may appear, whether the use be for food, clothing, shelter, or any other thing, is of course disregarded ; but the use value of the commodity in general is never dis- regarded. Marx might have seen that we do not absolutely disregard use value from the fact that there can be no exchange value where there is not a use value a fact which Marx himself is repeatedly forced to admit 1 But still worse fallacies are involved in the third step of the demonstration. If the use value of commodities is dis- regarded, says Marx, there remains in them only one common property that of being products of labour. Is this true ? Is there only one property ? In goods that have exchange value, for instance, is there not also the property of being scarce in proportion to the demand ? Or that they are objects of demand and supply ? Or that they are appropriated ? Or that they are natural products? For that they are products of nature just as they are products of labour no one declares more plainly than Marx himself, when in one place he says, " Commodities are combinations of two elements, natural material and labour ; " or when he incidentally quotes Petty's expression about material wealth, " Labour is its father and the earth its mother." ' 2 Now why, I ask, may not the principle of value reside in any one of these common properties, as well as in the property of being the product of labour ? For in support of this latter proposition Marx hasjiot adduced the smallest positive argument. His sole argument is the negative one, that the use value, thus happily disregarded and out of the way, is not the principle of exchange value. But does not this negative argument apply 1 For instance, in p. 15 at the end : " Finally, nothing can be valuable without being an object of use. If it is useless the labour contained in it is also useless ; it does not count as labour (sic), and therefore confers no value." Knies has already drawn attention to the logical blunder here criticised (Das Geld, Berlin, 1873, p. 123, etc.) 2 Das Kapital, p. 17 etc. CHAP. HI LABOUR NOT THE COMMON ELEMENT 383 with equal force to all the other common properties overlooked by Marx ? Wantonness in assertion and carelessness in reason- ing cannot go much farther. But this is not all Is it even true that in all goods possessing exchange value there is this common property of \ being the product of labour ? Is virgin soil a product of labour ? I Or a gold mine ? Or a natural seam of coal ? And yet, as ' every one knows, these often have a very high exchange value. But how can an element that does not enter at all into one class of goods possessing exchange value be put forward .as the common universal principle of exchange value ? How Marx would have lashed any of his opponents who had been guilty of such logic ! l Without doing Marx any wrong then we shall here take the liberty of saying that his attempt to prove the truth of his principle deductively has completely fallen through. If the proposition that the value of all goods rests on labour is neither an axiom nor capably of proof by deduction, there still remains at least one possibility in its favour ; it may be capable of demonstration by experience. To give Marx every chance we shall look at this possibility also. What is the testimony of experience ? Experience shows that the exchange value of goods stands in proportion to that amount of labour which their production costs only in the case of one class of goods, and even then only approximately. Well known as this should be, considering that the facts on which it rests are so familiar, it is very seldom estimated at its proper value. Of course everybody, including the socialist writers, agrees that experience does not entirely con- firm the Labour Principle. It is commonly imagined, however, that the cases in which actual facts confirm the labour principle form the rule, and that the cases which contradict the principle form a relatively insignificant exception. This view is very erroneous, and to correct it once and for all I shall put to- gether in groups the exceptions by which experience proves the labour principle to be limited in economic life. We shall see that the exceptions so much preponderate that they scarcely leave any room for the rule. 1. From the scope .of the Labour Principle are excepted 1 See also on the subject Knies, Das Geld, p. 121. 384 MARX'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi all " scarce " goods that, from actual or legal hindrances, cannot be reproduced at all, or can be reproduced only in limited amount. Ricardo names, by way of example, rare statues and pictures, scarce books and coins, wines of a peculiar quality, and adds the remark that such goods form only a very small proportion of the goods daily exchanged in the market. If, however, we consider that to this category belongs the whole of the land, and, further, those numerous goods in the production of which patents, copyright, and trade secrets come into play, it will be found that the extent of these " exceptions " is by no means inconsiderable. 1 2. All goods that are produced not by common, but by skilled labour, form an exception. Although in the day's pro- duct of a sculptor, a skilled joiner, a violin-maker, an engineer, and so on, no more labour be incorporated than in the day's product of a common labourer or a factory operative, the former has a greater exchange value, and often a many times greater exchange value. The adherents of the labour value theory have of course not been able to overlook this exception. Some- times they mention it, but in such a way as to suggest that it does not form a real exception, but only a little variation that yet comes under the rule. Marx, for instance, adopts the ex- pedient of reckoning skilled labour as a multiplex of common labour. "Complicated labour," he says (p. 19), "counts only as strengthened, or rather multiplied, simple labour, so that a smaller quantity of complicated labour is equal to a greater quantity of simple labour. Experience shows that this reduc- tion is constantly made. A commodity may be the product of the most complicated labour; its value makes it equal to the product of simple labour, and represents therefore only a definite quantity of simple labour." The naivety of this theoretical juggle is almost stupefying. That a day's labour of a sculptor may be considered equal to five days' labour of a miner in many respects for instance, in money valuation there can be no doubt. But that twelve hours' labour of a sculptor actually are sixty hours' common labour no one will maintain. Now in questions of theory for instance, in the question of the principle of value it is not a matter of what fictions men may set up, but of what actually is. 1 See also Knies, Kredit, part ii. p. 61. CHAP, in EXCEPTIONS TO LABOUR PRINCIPLE 385 For theory the day's production of the sculptor is, and remains, the product of one day's labour, and if a good which is the pro- duct of one day's labour is worth as much as another which is the product of five days' labour, men may invent what fictions they please ; there is here an exception from the rule asserted, that the exchange value of goods is regulated by the amount of human labour incorporated in them. Suppose that a railway generally graduates its tariff according to the distances travelled by persons and goods, but, as regards one part of the line in which the working expenses are peculiarly heavy, arranges that each mile shall count as two, can it be maintained that the length of the distances is really the exclusive principle in fixing the railway tariff ? Certainly not ; by a fiction it is assumed to be so, but in truth the application of that principle is limited by another consideration, the character of the distances. Similarly we cannot preserve the theoretical unity of the labour principle by any such fiction. Not to carry the matter further, I may say that this second exception embraces a considerable proportion of all bought and sold goods. In one respect, strictly speaking, we might say that almost all goods belong to it. For into the production of almost every good there enters some skilled labour labour of an inventor, of a manager, of a pioneer, or some such labour and this raises the value of the good a little above the level which would have been determined if the quantity of labour had been the only consideration. 3. The number of exceptions is increased by those goods not, it is true, a very important class that are produced by abnormally badly paid labour. For reasons that need not be discussed here, wages remain constantly under the minimum of subsistence in certain branches of production ; for instance, in certain women's industries, such as sewing, embroidering, and knitting. The products of these employments have thus an abnormally low value. There is, for instance, nothing unusual in the product of three days' labour on the part of a white seam worker only fetching as much as the product of two days' labour on the part of a factory worker. All the exceptions mentioned hitherto take the form of exempting certain groups of goods altogether from the law of labour value, and therefore tend to narrow the sphere- of that 2 c 386 MARX'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi law's validity. The only goods then left to the action of the law are those goods which can be produced at will, without any limit- ations, and which at the same time require nothing but un- skilled labour for their production. But even in this contracted sphere the law of labour value does not rule absolutely. There are some further exceptions that go a great way to break down its strictness. 4. A fourth exception to the Labour Principle may be found in the familiar and universally admitted phenomenon that even those goods, in which exchange value entirely corresponds with the labour costs, do not show this correspondence at every moment. By the fluctuations of supply and demand their ex- change value is put sometimes above, sometimes below the level corresponding to the amount of labour incorporated in them. The amount of labour only indicates the point towards which exchange value gravitates, not any fixed point of value. This exception, too, the socialist adherents of the labour principle seem to me to make too light of. They mention it indeed, but they treat it as a little transitory irregularity, the existence of which does not interfere with the great " law " of exchange value. But it is undeniable that these irregularities are just so many cases where exchange value is regulated by other determinants than the amount of labour costs. They might at all events have suggested the inquiry whether there is not perhaps a more universal principle of exchange value, to which might be trace- able, not only the regular formations of value, but also those formations which, from the standpoint of the labour theory, appear to be " irregular." But we should look in vain for any such inquiry among the theorists of this school. 5. Apart from these momentary fluctuations, it is clear that in the following case the exchange value of goods con- stantly diverges, and that not inconsiderably, from the level indicated by the quantity of labour incorporated in them. Of two goods which cost exactly the same amount of social average labour to produce, that one maintains a higher exchange value the production of which requires the greater advance of " pre- vious " labour. Ricardo, as we saw, in two sections of the first chapter of his Principles, has spoken in detail of this ex- ception from the labour principle. Eodbertus and Marx ignore, without expressly denying it; indeed they could not very CHAP, in LABOUR PRINCIPLE ENTIRELY INADEQUATE 387 well do so ; for that an oak-tree of a hundred years possesses a higher value than corresponds to the half minute's labour required in planting the seed is too well known to be success- fully disputed. To sum up. The asserted " law " that the value of goods is regulated by the amount of the labour incorporated in them, does not hold at all in the case of a very considerable proportion of goods ; in the case of the others, does not hold always, and never holds exactly. These are the facts of experience with which the value theorists have to reckon. What conclusions can an unprejudiced theorist draw from such facts ? Certainly not the conclusion that the origin and measure of all value is to be ascribed exclusively to labour. Such a conclusion would be very like deducing the law. All electricity is caused by friction, from the experience that electricity is produced in many ways, and is very often produced by friction. On the other hand, the conclusion might very well be drawn that expenditure of labour is one circumstance which exerts a powerful influence on the value of many goods; always re- membering that labour is not an ultimate cause for an ultimate cause must be common to all the phenomena of value but a particular and intermediate cause. It would not be difficult to find a deductive proof of such an influence, though no deductive proof could be given of the more thoroughgoing principle. And, further, it may be very inter- esting and very important accurately to trace the influence of labour on the value of goods, and to express the results in the form of laws. Only in doing so we must keep before us the fact that these will be only particular laws of value not affecting the universal nature of value. To use a comparison. The law that formulates the influence of labour on the exchange value of goods will stand to the universal law of value in the same relation as the law, The west wind brings rain, stands to a universal theory of rain. West wind is a very general intermediate cause of rain, just as expenditure of labour is a very general intermediate cause of value ; but the ultimate cause of rain is as little the west wind as that of value is the expended labour. Ricardo himself only went a very little way over the 388 MARX'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi proper limits. As I have shown, he knew right well that his law of value was only a particular law ; he knew, for instance, that the value of scarce goods rests on quite another principle. He only erred in so far as he very much over-estimated the extent to which his law is valid, and practically ascribed to it a validity almost universal. The consequence is that, later on, he forgot almost entirely the little exceptions he had rightly made but too little considered at the beginning of his work, and often spoke of his law as if it were really a universal law of value. It was his shortsighted followers who first fell into the scarcely conceivable blunder of deliberately and absolutely representing labour as the universal principle of value. I say, the scarcely conceivable blunder, for really it is not easy to understand how men trained in theoretical research could, after mature consideration, maintain a principle for which they could find such slight support. They could find no argument for it in the nature of things, for that shows no necessary connection whatever between value and labour; nor in ex- perience, for experience shows, on the contrary, that value for the most part does not correspond with labour expended ; nor, finally, even in authority, for the authorities appealed to had never maintained the principle with that pretentious univer- sality now given it. And this principle, entirely unfounded as it is, the socialist adherents of the Exploitation theory do not maintain as something unessential, as some innocent bit of system building ; they put it in the forefront of practical claims of the most aggressive description. They maintain the law that the value of all commodities rests on the labour time in- corporated in them, in order that the next moment they may attack, as " opposed to law," " unnatural," and " unjust," all formations of value that do not harmonise with this " law," such as the difference in value that falls as surplus to the capitalist and demand their abolition. Thus they first ignore the exceptions in order to proclaim their law of value as universal. And, after thus assuming its universality, they again draw attention to the exceptions in order to brand them as offences against the law. This kind of arguing is very much as if one were to assume that there are many foolish people in the world, and to ignore that there are also many CHAP, in REPEATS RODBERTUS'S MISTAKES wise ones ; and thus coming to the " universally valid law " that " all men are foolish," should demand the extirpation of the wise on the ground that their existence is obviously " contrary to law " ! I have criticised the law of Labour Value with all the severity that a doctrine so utterly false seemed to me to deserve. It may be that my criticism also is open to many objections. But one thing at any rate seems to me certain : earnest writers concerned to find out the truth will not in future venture to content themselves with asserting the law of labour value as has been hitherto done. lu future any one who thinks that he can maintain this law will first of all be obliged to supply what his predecessors have omitted a proof that can be taken seriously. Not quotations from authorities ; not protesting and dogmatising phrases ; but a proof that earnestly and conscientiously goes into the essence of the matter. On such a basis no one will be more ready and willing to continue the discussion than myself. To return to Marx. Sharing in Ivodbertus's mistaken idea that the value of all goods rests on labour, he falls later on into almost all the mistakes of which I have accused Rodbertus. Shut up in his labour theory Marx, too, fails to grasp the idea that Time also has an influence on value. On one occasion he says expressly that, as regards the value of a commodity, it is all the same whether a part of the labour of making it be expended at a much earlier point of time or not. 1 Consequently he does not observe that there is all the differ- ence in the world whether the labourer receives the final value of the product at the end of the whole process of production, or receives it a couple of months or years earlier ; and he repeats Eodbertus's mistake of claiming now, in the name of justice, the value of the finished product as it will be tlun. Another point to be noted is that, in business capital, Marx distinguishes two portions ; of which one, in his pecu- liar terminology called Variable capital, is advanced for the wages of labour; the other, which he calls Constant capital, is advanced for the means of production. And Marx 1 P. 17.'. 390 MARX'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi maintains that only the amount of the variable capital has any influence on the quantity of surplus value obtainable, 1 the amount of the constant capital being in this respect of no account. 2 But in this Marx, like Rodbertus before him, falls into contradiction with facts ; for facts show, on the contrary, that, under the working of the law of assimilation of profits, the amount of surplus value obtained stands, over the whole field, in direct proportion to the amount of the total capital- variable and constant together that has been expended. It is singular that Marx himself became aware of the fact that there was a contradiction here, 3 and found it necessary for the sake of his solution to promise to deal with it later on. 4 But the promise was never kept, and indeed could not be kept. Finally, Marx's theory, taken as a whole, was as powerless as Rodbertus's to give an answer even approximately satis- factory to one important part of the interest phenomena. At what hour of the labour day does the labourer begin to create the surplus value that the wine obtains, say between the fifth and the tenth year of its lying in the cellar ? Or is it, seriously speaking, nothing but robbery nothing but the exploitation of unpaid labour when the worker who sticks the acorn in the ground is not paid the full 20 that the oak will be worth some day when, without further labour of man, it has grown into a tree ? Perhaps I need not go farther. If what I have said is true, the socialist Exploitation theory, as represented by its two most distinguished adherents, is not only incorrect, but, in theoretical value, even takes one of the lowest places among interest theories. However serious the fallacies we may meet among the representatives of some of the other theories, I scarcely think that anywhere else are to be found 1 "The rate of surplus value and the value of labour power being given, the amounts of surplus value produced are in direct ratio with the amounts of variable capital advanced. . . . The value and the degree of exploitation of labour power being equal, the amounts of value and surplus value produced by various capitals stand in direct ratio with the amounts of the variable constituent of these capitals ; that is, of those constituents which are converted into living labour power " (p. 311, etc.) - " The value of these contributory means of production may rise, fall, ivmain unchanged, be little or much, it remains without any influence whatever in producing surplus value " (p. 312). 3 Pp. 204, 312. < Pp. 312, 542 at end. CHAP, in REASONS FOR ITS POPULARITY 391 together so great a number of the worst fallacies wanton, unproved assumption, self-contradiction, and blindness to facts. The socialists are able critics, but exceedingly weak theorists. The world would long ago have come to this conclusion if the opposite party had chanced to have had in its service a pen as keen and cutting as that of Lassalle and as slashing as that of Marx. That in spite of its inherent weakness the Exploitation theory found, and still finds, so much credence, is due, in my opinion, to the coincidence of two circumstances. The first is that it has shifted the struggle to a sphere where appeal is usually made to the heart as well as to the head. What we wish to believe we readily believe. The condition of the labouring classes is indeed most pitiful ; every philanthropist must wish that it were bettered. Many profits do in fact flow from an impure spring ; every philanthropist must wish that such springs were dried up. In considering a theory whose conclusions incline to raise the claims of the poor, and to depress the claims of the rich, a theory which agrees partly, or it may be entirely, with the wishes of his heart, many a one will be prejudiced in its favour from the first, and will relax a great deal of the critical severity that, in other circumstances, he would have shown in examining its scientific basis. And it need scarcely be said that theories such as these have a strong attraction for the masses. Their concern is not with criticism ; they simply follow the line of their own wishes. They believe in the Exploitation theory because it is agreeable to them, and although it is false ; and they would believe in it even if its theoretical argument were much worse than it is. A second circumstance that helped to spread the theory was the weakness of its opponents. So long as the scientific opposition to it was led chiefly by men who adhered to the Abstinence theory, the Productivity theory, or the Labour theory of a Bastiat or M'Culloch, a Eoscher or Strasburger, the battle could net go badly for the socialists. From positions so faultily chosen these men could not strike at the real weaknesses of Socialism ; it was not too difficult to repel their lame attacks, and to follow the fighters triumphantly into their 392 MARX'S EXPLOITATION THEORY BOOK vi own camp. This the socialists were strong enough to do, with as much success as skill. If many socialistic writers have won an abiding place in the history of economic science, it is due to the strength and cleverness with which they managed to destroy so many flourishing and deeply-rooted erroneous doctrines. This is the service, and almost the only service, which Socialism has rendered to our science. To put truth in the place of error was beyond the power of the Exploitation theorists even more than it was beyond the power of their much abused opponents. BOOK VII MINOR SYSTEMS CHAPTER I THE ECLECTICS THE difficulties which the interest problem presented to the science of political economy are reflected, perhaps, nowhere more significantly than in the fact, that most economic writers of our century did not form any definite opinion on the indefiniteness took a different shape somewhere about the year 1830. Before that date those who were undecided and at that time there were many such simply avoided entering on the interest problem. They come under. that category which I have called the Colourless school Later on, when the problem had become a common subject o scientific discussion, this was no longer possible. Economist were obliged to own to an opinion, and those w;ho could not come to a decision of their own became eclectics Interest theories were put forward in abundance. Wnters who neither could nor would make one for themselves, nor decic exclusively on one of those already made, would choose from two or three or more heterogeneous theories the parts that suited them, and weave them into what generally proved rather badly connected whole. Or, without even trying obtain the appearance of a whole, they would in the course of their writings employ sometimes one, sometimes another theory, as suited best for the purposes they might happe. have in view. , , It need not be said that an eclecticism on which the cardinal duty of the theorist, logical consistency, sat so lightly, does not indicate any very high degree of theoretical excellence. Still here also, as with the Colourless theorists, among many 396 THE ECLECTICS BOOK VH men of secondary importauce we meet with a few writers of the first rank. Nor is this to be wondered at. The develop- ment of the theory had been so peculiar that, for capable writers especially, the temptation to become eclectic must have been almost overpowering. There were so many heterogeneous theories in existence that one might be pardoned for thinking it impossible that there should be any more. A critical mind, indeed, could not find any one of them entirely satis- factory. But neither could the fact be ignored that in many of them there was at least a kernel of truth. The Productivity theory as a whole, for instance, was certainly unsatisfactory, but no unprejudiced person could help feeling that the exist- ence of interest must have something to do with the greater return obtained by capitalist production, or, as it was generally called, the productivity of capital. Or, granted that a complete explanation of interest was not to be found in the " abstinence of the capitalist," it could scarcely be denied that the privation which saving usually costs is not a thing altogether without influence on the fact and on the amount of interest. In such circumstances nothing was more natural than that economists should try to piece together the fragments of truth from different theories. This tendency was strengthened by the fact that the social and political question of interest, as well as the theoretical, was now before the public ; and many a writer, in his eagerness to justify the existence of interest, preferred to give up the unity of his theory rather than cease heaping together arguments in its favour. As might be expected, the fragments of truth thus collected remained, at the hands of the eclectics, nothing but fragments, their rough edges grating against each other and stubbornly resisting all attempts to work them into a homogeneous whole. There are many ways in which eclecticism has combined the various interest theories. The greatest preference has 'been shown towards a combination of those two theories that came nearest the truth, the Productivity and the Abstinence theory. Among the numerous writers who follow this direction Kossi deserves to be mentioned at some length ; partly because his rendering of the Productivity theory is not without a certain originality ; partly because he may serve as a type of the illogical method usual among the eclectics. 397 In his Cours d' Economic Politiqi^ Rossi makes use of the Productivity and the Abstinence theories alternately, without making any attempt to weld the two into one organic theory On the whole, on those occasions when he makes general mention of the phenomenon of interest and its origin, he follows the Abstinence theory ; while in details, particularly in the inquiry as to the rate of interest, he prefers to follow the Productivity theory. To prove this I may put down m the order of their statement the most important passages, without taking more pains than the author has done to make them consistent with each 'other. In the traditionary way Rossi recognises capital as a iactor in production by the side of labour and land. In return for its co-operation it requires a compensation profit, question why this is so, the answer is given provisionally m the mystic words, which seem to point rather to the Productivity theory " on the same grounds and by the same title as labour (p 93) More definitely, and here distinctly according to the Abstinence theory, Rossi expresses himself in the summary to the third lecture of the third volume : " The capitalist demands the compensation due to the privation which he imposes on himself" (iii p 32). In the course of the following lecture he develops this idea more carefully. First of all, he blames Malthus for putting profit, which certainly is not an expense but an income of the capitalist, among the costs of production,- a criticism, however, which he might have first taken to him- self, since in the sixth lecture of the first volume he has formally, and in the most explicit manner, enumerated the profit of capital among the costs of production. 2 The true constituent of cost which he puts in the place of profit is, "capitahsed savin" (I'dpargne capitalize), the non-consumption and the productive employment of goods over which the capitalist has command. Later too we find repeated allusions (e.g. in. pp. 261, 291) to the capitalist's renunciation of enjoyment as a factor in the origination of profit. If up to this point Rossi has shown himself for the most part an Abstinence theorist, from the second half of the third 1 Fourth edition, Paris, 1865. s "The costs of production are made up of (1) the recompense to t workers ; (2) the profits of the capitalist," etc. (p. 93) 398 THE ECLECTICS BOOK vn volume onwards we come upon expressions, at first occasionally and then frequently, which show that Eossi had also come under the influence of the popular Productivity theory. He begins in somewhat vague terms by bringing profit into con- nection with the circumstance that " capitals contribute to production" (iii. p. 258). A little later (p. 340) he says quite distinctly, " Profit is the compensation due to productive power" no longer, be it observed, to privation. Finally, the rate of interest is explained at great length by the pro- ductivity of capital. He regards it as " natural " that the capitalist should receive for his shafe in the product as much as his capital has produced in it, and that will be much if the productive power of capital is great, little if the productive power of capital is little. Thus Kossi arrives at the law that the natural height of profit is in proportion to the productive power of capital. He develops this law first in the case where production requires capital alone in its operations, the factor labour being left out of account as vanishingly small and only the use value of the product being taken into consideration. Under these assumptions he finds it evident that if, for instance, the employment of a spade on a definite piece of ground, after replacing the capital laid out, procures twenty bushels of grain as profit, the employment of a more efficient capital, say a plough, on the same piece of land, after fully replacing the capital, will bring in more profit, say sixty bushels, " because a capital of greater productive power has been employed." But the same natural principle obtains in the complicated relations of our actual economic life. There also it is " natural " that the capitalist should share the product with the labourers in the ratio of the productive power of his capital to the productive power of the labourers. If, in a production that has hitherto employed a hundred workers, a machine is introduced which replaces the power of fifty workers, the capitalist has a natural claim to one-half the total product, or the wage of fifty labourers. This natural relation is only disturbed by one thing ; that the capitalist plays a double role. Not only does he contribute his capital to the common co-operation, but he connects with that a second business, the buying of labour. In virtue of the former, he would always receive the natural profit that corre- 399 CHAP. I spends to the productive power of capital, and that alone. But in buying labour sometimes cheap, sometimes dear, he may either increase his natural profit at the expense of the natural waae of labour, or may give up a portion of his profit to the advantaoe of the labourers. Thus if the fifty workers displaced by the machine compete with those left in employment and depress the wages of labour, it may be that the capitalist buys the labour of the fifty still employed for a less share of the total return than would naturally fall to them according to the ratio of their productive power to the productive power of capital Say that he buys their labour for 40 per cent instead of 50'per cent of the total product, a profit of 10 per cent is added to the natural profit on capital. But this, although usually classed with profit on capital, is in its nature entirely foreign to it, and should be looked on as a profit made by the buying of labour. It is not the natural profit on capital, but this foreign addition that causes an antagonism between capital and labour, and it is only in the case of this addition that the principle of wages falling as profits increase and vice versd has any validity. The natural and true profit on capital leaves wages untouched, and depends altogether on the productive power of capital (lecture iii. pp. 21, 22). After all that has been said in former chapters en the Productivity theories, we may well dispense with any thorough and detailed criticism of such views. I shall merely point out one monstrous conclusion that follows logically from Rossi's theory. According to him all the surplus returns obtained by the introduction and improvement of machinery, or from the development of capital in general, must to all eternity wholly and entirely flow into the pockets of the capital, without the labourer getting any share whatever in the advantages of these improvements ; for those surplus returns are due to the increased productive power of capital, and their result forms the " natural " share of the capitalist ! 1 On the same lines as Kossi, and contributing nothing new, we meet among French writers Molinari 2 and Leroy- i See also the sharp but most pertinent criticism of Pierstorff, Lehre vom Untemchmergeurinn, p. 93, etc. * Covrs d'Ecviomie Politique, second edition, Paris, 1863. His Productivity theory is similar to that of Say (e.g. "interest is a compensation for the productive 400 THE ECLECTICS BOOK vn Beaulieu, 1 aud among Germans Eoscher, with his followers Schiiz and Max Wirth. 2 Among Italian economists who follow the same eclectic lines may be mentioned Cossa. Unfortunately this admirable writer, in his monograph on the conception of capital, 3 has not extended his researches to the question of interest, and we have to go by the very scanty hints that occur in his well- known Elementi di Economia Politico,* From it one would judge Cossa to be an eclectic ; yet his way of speaking, as if interpreting the ordinary doctrines, appears to me evidently to betray that he has some critical scruples about them. Thus while looking on interest as compensation for the " productive service" of capital (p. 119), he refuses to recognise this service as a primary factor in production, and only allows it the place of a secondary or derivative instrument. 6 Again, like the Abstinence theorists, he puts " privations " among the costs of production (p. 65), but in the theory of interest he adopts a tone which seems to imply that this did not express his own conviction, but only that of other people. 6 The most interesting of those eclectic systems that combine the Abstinence and the Productivity conceptions I consider to be that of Jevons, with which I shall finish consideration of this group. 7 service of capital," L p. 302). His Abstinence theory (1,289,293,800) is par- ticularly unsatisfactory on account of the peculiar meaning he gives to the conception of "privation." He means by it what the capitalist may suffer on account of the capital sunk in production not being available for the satisfaction of pressing wants which may possibly arise in the meantime. Surely a very unsuitable foundation for a universal theory of interest ! 1 Essai sur la Repartition des Richesses, second edition, Paris, 1885. See particularly pp. 236 (Abstinence theory), 233, 238 (Productivity theory) ; see also above, p. 131. 2 On Roscher, see above, p. 129, Schiiz, Grundsatze der National-Ockonomie, Tubingen, 1843 ; particularly pp. 70, 285, 296, etc. Max Wirth, Grundziige der National-Oekonomie, third edition, i. p. 324 ; fifth edition, i. 327. See further Huhn, Allgemeine Volkswirthscfiaftslehre, Leipzig, 1862, p. 204 ; H. Bischof, Grundziige eines Systems der National-Oekonomik, Graz, 1876, p. 459, and particularly note on p. 465 ; Schiilze - Delitzpch, Kapitel zu einem deutschen Arleiterkatechismus, pp. 23, 27, 28, etc. 3 La Nosione del Capitate, in the Saggi di Econoniia Politica, Mailand, 1878, p. 155. 4 Sixth edition, 1883. 8 P. 34, and more at length in the Saggi. 6 "The elements of interest are two: first, compensation for the non-use of capital, or, as some say, for its formation, and for its productive service " (p. 119). 7 Theory of Political Economy, second edition, London, 1879. CHAP, i COSSA, JEVONS 401 Jevons begins by giving a very clear statement of the economic function of capital, in which he steers clear of the mysticism of any particular " productive power." The function of capital he finds simply in this, that it enables us to expend labour in advance. It assists men to surmount the difficulty caused by the time that elapses between the beginning and the end of a work. It makes possible an infinite number of im- provements in the production of those goods the manufacture of which necessarily depends upon the lengthening of the interval between the moment when labour is exerted and the moment when the work is finished. All such improvements are limited by the use of capital, and in making these improvements possible lies the great and almost the only use of capital. 1 This being the foundation, Jevons explains interest as follows. He assumes that every extension of time between employment of labour and enjoyment of result makes it possible to obtain a greater product with the same amount of labour. The difference between the product that would have been obtained in the shorter period, and the greater product that may be obtained when the time is extended, forms the profit of that capital by the investing of which the lengthening of the interval has been made possible. If we call the shorter interval t, and the longer interval made possible by au additional investment of capital t + A/, and further, the pro- duct obtainable by a definite quantity of labour in the shorter interval Yt, then by hypothesis the product obtainable in the longer interval will be correspondingly greater; that is F( + A/). The difference of these two quantities F(< + A/) Yt is profit. To ascertain the rate of interest represented by this amount of prolit we must calculate the profit on that amount of capital by which the extension of the time was made possible. If Yt is the invested capital, then this is the amount of produce that could have been obtained on the expiry of f, without any additional investment. The duration of the additional investment is A*. The whole amount of the additional investment is therefore represented in the product = (Yt . AO- Dividing the above increment of produce by the latter amount, the rule of interest appears thus 402 THE ECLECTICS BOOK vn F(< + A/) - t 1 ~~AT~ < ~FD- The more abundantly a coun-try is supplied with capital, the greater is the product F obtainable without any new investment of capital ; the greater also is the capital on which the profit made by additional extension of time is calculated, and the less is the rate of interest corresponding to that profit. Hence the tendency of interest to fall with advancing prosperity. Since, further, all capitals tend to receive a similar rate of interest, they must all be content to take that lowest rate obtained by the additional capital last invested. Thus the advantage conferred on production by the last addition of capital determines the height of the usual rate of interest in the country. The resemblance of this line of thought to that of the German Thiinen is obvious. It presents the same weak points to criticism. Like Thiinen, Jevons too lightly identi- fies the " surplus in products " with the " surplus in value." What his statement seems actually to point to is an " increment of produce " due to the assistance of the last increment of capital. But that this surplus in produce indicates at the same time a surplus in value over the capital consumed in the investment, Jevons has nowhere proved. To illustrate by a concrete case. It is easy to understand that a man employing imperfect, but quickly made machinery, may produce in a year's time 1000 pieces of a particular class of goods, and by employing machinery which is more perfect, but takes longer to make, may produce in the same time 1200 pieces of the goods. But there is nothing here to show that the difference of 200 pieces must be a net surplus in value. Two things might prevent its being so. (1) It might be that the more perfect machinery to which the increment of 200 pieces is due should obtain so high a value on account of this capability that the increment of 200 pieces is absorbed by the amount set aside for depreciation. (2) It is conceivable that the new method of production, which gives these good results, might be employed so extensively that the increased supply of pro- 1 P. 266. Jevons puts the same formula in other ways that need not be specified here. CHAP. I JEVONS 403 ducts would press down the value of the present 1200 pieces to the same level as the former 1000 pieces. In neither case would there be any surplus value. Jevons, therefore, has here fallen into the old error of the Productivity theo- rists, and mechanically translated the surplus in products, which everybody would grant, into a surplus in value. Of course in his system there are attempts at explanation of this difference of value. But he has not brought these attempts into connection with his Productivity theory ; they do not complete that theory, but traverse it. One of these attempts is where he accepts parts of the Abstinence theory. Jevons quotes Senior with approval ; he explains what Senior called "abstinence" as that "temporary sacrifice of enjoyment that is essential to the existence of capital," or as the capitalist's " endurance of want " ; and he gives formula for calculating the amount of the sacrifice of abstinence (p. 253, etc.) He reckons this abstinence some- times indeed, writing loosely, he reckons even interest among the costs of production ; and in one place he expressly speaks of the capitalist's income as " compensation for abstinence and risk" (p. 295). Jevons has some very interesting remarks on the effect of time on the valuation of needs and satisfactions. He points out that we anticipate future pleasures and pains, the prospect of future pleasure being already felt as anticipated pleasure. But the intensity of the anticipated pleasure is always less than that of the future pleasure itself, and depends on two factors the intensity of the pleasure anticipated, and the time that intervenes before the emergence of the pleasure (p. 36, etc.) Somewhat strangely Jevons holds that the distinction we thus make in immediate valuation between a present and a future enjoyment is, rightly considered, unjusti- fiable. It rests only, he says, on an intellectual error, or an error of natural disposition ; and, properly speaking, time should have no such influence. All the same, on account of the imperfection of human nature, it is a fact that " a future feeling is always less influential than a present one" (p. "78). Now Jevons is quite correct in saying that this power of anticipation must exert a far-reaching influence in economics, for, among other things, all accumulation of capital depends 404 THE ECLECTICS BOOK vn upon it (p. 37). But, unfortunately, he is satisfied with throwing out suggestions of the most general description, and applying them quite fragmentarily. 1 He fails to develop the idea, or to give it any fruitful application to the theory of income and value. This omission is the more surprising that there are some features in his interest theory which strongly suggested the possibility of making a very good use of the element of time in the explanation of interest. With more emphasis than any one before him, he had asserted the role played by time in the function of capital. The next step evidently would have been to inquire whether the difference of time might not also exert an immediate influence on the valuation of the product of capital, of such a kind that the difference of value, on which interest is founded, might be explained by it. Instead of this Jevons, as we have seen, persists in the old method of explaining interest simply by the difference in the quantity of the product. Still more obvious, probably, would it have been to connect his other conception of " abstinence " with the difference that we make in the estimation of present and future enjoyments, and to account for the sacrifice that lies in the postponement of enjoyment by that lesser valuation of the future utility. But Jevons gives no positive expression to this. Indeed, indirectly, he even excludes it ; for, as we have seen, on the one hand he pronounces the lesser valuation to be a simple error caused by the imperfection of our nature, and, on the other hand, he pronounces the abstinence to be a real and true sacrifice, viz. the continuance in the (painful) state of need. Thus there is no reciprocal fructification between the many interesting and acute ideas that Jevons throws out regarding our subject ; and Jevons himself remains an eclectic of genius perhaps, but still an eclectic. A second group of eclectics add on ideas taken from the Labour theory in one or other of its varieties. First may be 1 Thus, on one occasion, he says that, under the influence of this element of time, in the case of the distribution of a stock of goods in the present and in the future, " less commodity will be consigned to future days in some proportion to the intervening time " (p. 79). CHAP, i JEVONS, READ 405 mentioned Read, 1 whose work, appearing as it did at the period when English economic literature on the subject of interest was most confused, shows a peculiarly inconsistent heaping together of opinions. He begins by laying the greatest emphasis on the independent productive power of capital, regarding the existence of which power he has no doubt. "How absurd," he exclaims on one occasion (p. 83), "must it appear to contend that labour produces all, and is the only source of wealth, as if capital produced nothing, and was not a real and distinct source of wealth also ! ' And a little farther on he finishes an exposition of what capital does in certain branches of production by saying, quite in the spirit of the Productivity theory, that everything remaining over, after payment of the workers who co-operate in the work, " may fairly be claimed as the produce and reward of capital." Later stall, however, he sees the matter in an essentially different light. He now puts in the foreground the fact that capital itself comes into existence through labour and saving, and builds on that an explanation of interest, half in the spirit of James Mill's Labour theory, &nd half in that of Senior's Abstinence theory. " The person who has laboured before, and not consumed but saved the produce of his labour, and which produce is now applied to assist another labourer in the work of production, is entitled to his profit or interest (which is the reward for labour that is past, and for saving and preserving the fruits of that labour) as much as the present labourer is entitled to his wages, which is the reward for his more recent labour" (p. 310). That eclectic hesitation of this kind must result in all sorts of contradictions goes without saying. Thus in this latter passage Bead himself resolves capital into previous labour, although earlier he had protested against this in the most stubborn way. 2 Thus too he explains profit to be wage for previous labour, while in a previous passage 3 he had blamed M'Culloch most severely for effacing the distinction between the conception of profit and that of wage. With Read may be appropriately classed the German econo- 1 An Inquiry into the Natural Grounds of Bight to Vendible Property or Wealth, Edinburgh, 1829. a P. 131, and generally all through the argument against Godwin, and the anonymous tract " Labour Defended." 3 Note to p. 247. 406 THE ECLECTICS BOOK vn mist Gerstner. The " familiar question " whether capital by itself, and independently of the other two sources of goods, is productive, he answers in the affirmative. He believes that the part played in the production of the total product by the instrument of production we call capital, can be determined with mathematical exactitude, and without more ado looks upon this share as the " rent in the total profit that is due to capital." 1 With this frank and concise Pro- ductivity theory, however, Gerstner combines certain points of agreement with James Mill's Labour theory; as when (p. 20) he defines the instruments of production as "a kind of anticipation of labour," and on that basis calls " the rent of capital that falls to the instruments of production the supple- mentary wage for previously performed labour" (p. 23). But, like Eead, he gives no thought to the question that naturally suggests itself, whether in that case the previously performed labour has not previously received its wages from the capital value of the capital, and why, over and above that, it still gets an eternal contribution in the shape of interest. To the same division of the eclectics belong the French economists Cauwes 2 and Joseph Gamier. I have already pointed out 3 how Cauwes, with some reser- vation, shows himself an adherent of Courcelle Seneuil's Labour theory. But at the same time he puts forward a number of views that have their origin in the Productivity theory. Arguing against the socialists he ascribes to capital an indepen- dent " active role " in production by the side of labour (i. p. 235). In the "productivity of capital" he finds what determines the current rate of loan interest. 4 Finally, he derives the existence of "surplus value " from the productivity of capital in a passage, where he bases the explanation of interest on the fact that we are indebted to the productive employ- ment of capital for a " certain surplus value." 5 1 Beitrag zur Lehre vom Kapital, Erlangcn, 1857, pp. 16, 22, etc. Precis d' Economic Politique, second edition, Paris, 1881. ' See above, p. 304. 4 ' ' The principle then is that the rate of interest is a direct consequence of the productivity of capital" (ii. p. 110). 5 " We saw that the real value of interest depended on the productive em- ployment given to capital ; since a certain surplus value is due to capital, interest is one part of that surplus value presumably fixic tiforfait (without consideration CHAP, i GARNIER, MILL 407 In Joseph Gamier l we find the elements of no less than three different theories eclectically combined. The basis of his views is Say's Productivity theory, from which he even revived and adopted the feature long ago rejected by criticism ; that of reckoning interest among the costs of production. 2 Then, in imitation of Bastiat, he calls the " privation " which the lender of the capital suffers through the alienation of it, the justi- fication of interest. Finally, he declares that interest invites and compensates the " labour of saving." 3 All the eclectics hitherto mentioned combine a number of theories which, if they do not agree in the character of their arguments, at least agree in the practical results at which these arguments arrive. That is to say, they combine theories which are favourable to interest. But, strangely enough, there are some writers who, with one or more theories favourable to interest, combine elements of the theory hostile to it, the Exploitation theory. Thus J. G. Hoffmann lays down a peculiar theory that, on one side, is favourable to interest, and explains it as the remuneration of certain labours in the public service performed by the capitalists. 4 But, on the other side, he distinctly rejects the Productivity theory, which was then fashionable, speaking of it as a delusion to think " that in the dead mass of capital or land there dwell forces of acquisition " (p. 588); and in blunt terms declares that in taking interest the capitalist takes to himself the fruit of other people's labour. " Capital," he says, " can be employed for the promotion of one's own labour, or for the promotion of other people's. In the latter case a hire is due the owner for it, and this hire can only be paid from the fruit of labour. This hire, this interest, has so far the nature of land-rent that, like it, it comes to the receiver from the fruit of other people's labour" (p. 576). Still more striking is the combination of opposed opinions in J. S. Mill. It has often been remarked that Mill takes a of gain or loss) which the lender receives for the service rendered by him " (ii. p. 189). 1 Traite (f Economic Politique, eighth edition, Paris, 1880. 2 P. 47. * P. 522. 4 Kleine Schriften staatswirthschaftlichen Inhalts, Berlin, 1843, p. 566. See above, p. 312. 408 THE ECLECTICS BOOK vn middle position between two very strongly diverging ten- dencies of political economy the so-culled Manchester school on the one side, and Socialism on the other. It is easy to understand that such a compromise cannot, as a rule, be favourable to the construction of a complete and organic system least of all in that sphere where the chief struggle of socialism and capitalism is being fought out, the theory of interest. The fact is that Mill's theory of interest has got into such u tangle that it would be a serious wrong to this distin- guished thinker were we to determine his scientific position in political economy by this very unsuccessful part of his work. As Mill constructed his system in the main on the economical views of Eicardo, he adopted, among others, the principle that labour is the chief source of all value. But this principle is traversed by the actual existence of interest. Mill consequently modified it in the way of making the value of goods determined by their costs of production, instead of by labour in general. Among these costs of production, besides labour which constitutes " so much the principal element as to be very nearly the whole," he finds room for profit, and gives it an independent position. Profit with him is the second con- stant element in costs. 1 That Mill should have fallen into the old mistake of Mal- thus, and described a surplus as a sacrifice, is all the more wonderful that in English political economy it had already been criticised, severely and forcibly, both by Torrens and Senior. But whence comes profit ? Instead of one, Mill gives three inconsistent answers to this question. In these the Productivity theory has the smallest share, and it is only in isolated passages, and with all manner of reser- vations, that Mill tends in this direction. First, he explains with a certain hesitation that capital is the third independent factor in production. Of course capital itself is the product of labour; its efficiency in production is therefore that of labour in an indirect shape. Nevertheless he finds that it " requires to be specified separately." 2 In no less involved terms does he express himself on the kindred question whether capital 1 Principles, book iii. chap. iv. 1, 4, 6 ; chap. vi. 1, No. 8, etc. 8 Book i. chap. vii. 1. CHAP, i /. 5. MILL 409 possesses independent productivity. " We often speak of the ' productive powers of capital.' This expression is not literally correct. The only productive powers are those of labour and natural agents ; or if any portion of capital can by a stretch of language be said to have a productive power of its own, it is only tools and machinery which, like wind and water, may be said to co-operate with labour. The food of labourers and the materials of production have no productive power." l Thus tools are really productive, while raw materials are not a distinction as startling as it is untenable. Much more decisive is his profession of Senior's Abstinence theory. It forms, as it were, Mill's official theory on interest. It appears explicitly and completely in the chapter devoted to profit, and is often appealed to afterwards in the course of the work. " As the wages of the labourer are the remuneration of labour," says Mill in the fifteenth chapter of the second book of his Principles, "so the profits of the capitalist are prqperly, accord- ing to Mr. Senior's well-chosen expression, the remuneration of abstinence. They are what he gains by forbearing to con- sume his capital for his own uses, and allowing it to be con- sumed by productive labourers for their uses. For this forbearance he requires a recompense." And as distinctly in another place : " In our analysis of the requisites of production we found that there is another necessary element in it besides labour. There is also capital; and this being the result of abstinence, the produce or its value must be sufficient to remunerate not only all the labour required, but the abstinence of all the persons by whom the remuneration of the different classes of labourers was, advanced. The return for abstinence is profit." 2 But besides this, in the same chapter, under the heading of profit, Mill brings forward yet a third theory : " The cause of profit," he says in the fifth paragraph, " is that labour pro- duces more than is required for its support The reason why agricultural capital yields a profit is because human beings can grow more food than is necessary to feed them while it is being grown, including the time occupied in constructing the tools, and making all. other needful preparations; from which it is a consequence that if a capitalist undertakes to feed the 1 Book v. 1. Book iii. chap. iv. 4. 410 THE ECLECTICS BOOK VH labourers on condition of receiving the produce, he has some of it remaining for himself after replacing his advances. To vary the form of the theorem : the reason why capital yields a profit is because food, clothing, materials, and tools last longer than the time which was required to produce them ; so that if a capitalist supplies a party of labourers with these things, on condition of receiving all they produce, they will, in addition to reproducing their own necessaries and instru- ments, have a portion of their time remaining to work for the capitalist." Here the cause of profit is found, not in a pro- ductive power of capital, nor in the necessity of compensating the capitalist's abstinence as a special sacrifice, but simply in this, that "labour produces more than is required for its support " ; that " the workers have a portion of their time remaining to work for the capitalist " : in a word, profit is explained according to the Exploitation theory, as an appro- priation by the capitalist of the surplus value created by labour. A similar middle course, on the boundary line between Capitalism and Socialism, is taken by the German Katheder Socialists. The result in this case also is not seldom an eclecticism, but it is an eclecticism which ends more in agree- ment with the Exploitation theory than was the case with MilL I shall only mention here the Katheder Socialist whom we have already met repeatedly in the course of this work, Schaffle. In those writings of Schaffle where he treats of our subject three clear and distinct currents of thought may be traced. In the first Schaffle follows Hermann's Use theory, which he weakens as a theory by the subjective colouring he gives to the conception of Use so bringing it nearer to the second of his theories. The first current predominates in the Gesellschaftliche System der nwnschlichcn Wirthschaft, and has left evident traces even in the Bau und Leben. 1 The second current takes the direction of making interest a kind of pro- fessional income, an income which is drawn by the capitalist for certain services he renders. This conception, which had already appeared in the Gesellschaftliche System, is explicitly confirmed in the Bau und Lebcn. 2 But, finally, by the side of 1 See above, p. 206. 2 See above, p. 306. CHAP, i SCHAFFLE 411 this in the Bau und Leben there appear numerous approxima- tions to the socialist Exploitation theory. The chief of these is the resolution of all the costs of production into labour. While in the Gesellschaftliche System l Schaffle had still recognised the uses of wealth as an independent and element- ary factor in cost besides labour, he now says : " Costs have two constituents : expenditure of personal goods through the putting forth of labour, and expenditure of capital But the latter costs also can be traced back to labour costs, for the productive expenditure of real goods may be reduced to a sum of labours expended at earlier periods ; all costs, therefore, may be considered as costs of labour." 2 If thus the labour which the production of goods costs is the only economic sacrifice that requires to be considered, it is but a step farther to claim the whole result of production for those who have made this sacrifice. Thus Schaffle repeatedly gives us to understand (e.g. iii. p. 313, etc.) that he considers the ideal economic distribution of goods to be the division to the members of the community accord- ing to work done. In the present day of course the realisation of this ideal is still prevented by all kinds of hindrances ; among others, by the fact that wealth as capital serves as an instrument of appropriation partly an illegal and immoral appropriation, partly a legal and moral appro- priation of the product of labour.^ This appropriation of surplus value by the capitalists Schaffle does not condemn unconditionally ; he would let it continue as a temporary and artificial arrangement so long as we are not able to replace the " economic service of private capital by a more perfect public organisation, established by law, and less 'greedy of surplus value.'" 4 But notwithstanding this opportunist toleration, Schaffle often brings forward in blunt terms the dogma of the Exploi- tation theory, that interest is a robbery of the product of other people's labour. Thus, in immediate continuation of these words, he says : " All the same the speculative, in- dividualistic organisation of business is not the non plus ultra 1 i. pp. 258, 268, 271, etc. 2 Bau und Leben, iii. p. 273, etc. 3 iii. p. 266, etc. 4 iii. p. 423. See also iii. pp. 330, 386, 428, etc. 412 THE ECLECTICS BOOK VII of the history of economics. It serves a social purpose only indirectly. It is immediately directed, not to the highest net utility of the whole, but to the greatest acquisition of the means of production by private owners, and towards procuring for the families of the capitalists the highest life of enjoyment. The possession of the means of production, movable and im- movable, is made use of to appropriate from the produce of the national labour as much as possible. Proudhon has already put it in full critical evidence that capital forestalls labour in a hundred different forms. The only share of which the wage labourer is assured is the share that an upright beast of burden, endowed with reason, and therefore incapable of being reduced to simple animal wants, finds necessary to sustain him in the condition of life in which he has been placed by circumstances that are historical this condition itself being necessary to allow of the capitalist's competition." CHAPTER II THE LATER FRUCTIFICATION THEORY I HAVE pointed to the wide spread of eclecticism as a symptom of the unsatisfactory position of the economical doctrine of interest. Our economists select elements out of many theories, when and because no one of the existing theories is found sufficient. A second symptom that points in the same direction is the fact that, in spite of the great number of existing theories, there is no check to the literature of the subject. Ever since scientific Socialism brought scepticism to bear on the old school of opinions there has been no lustrum, and in the latter lustrum no year, in which some new interest theory has not seen the light of day. So far as these have retained at least some principles of the older explanations, and have varied them only in the way of carrying out the original principles more strictly, I have tried to classify them according to the prevailing tendencies they show, and have included them in the statement of preceding chapters. But some recent attempts strike out a way of their own, 1 and one of them seems remarkable enough to call for fuller notice, that of the American writer, Henry George. From its likeness in fundamental ideas to Turgot's Fructification theory, it may be appropriately called the Later Fructification theory. George's 2 interest theory occurs in the course of a polemic against Bastiat and his weU-known illustration of the lending 1 By desire of the author I here omit, as of little interest to English readers i statement and criticism of Schellwien's theory (Die Arbeit mwL ihr RecU, Berlin,' 1882, p. 195, etc.), which occupies pp. 477-486 of the German edition. W. S. - Progress and Poverty. Kegan Paul, 1885. 414 THE LATER FRUCTIFICATION THEORY BOOK vn of the plane. A carpenter James has made a plane for his own use, but lends it for a year to another carpenter William. At the end of the year he is not content with getting back an equally good plane, because this would not compensate him for the loss of the advantage he might have had from the use of the plane during the year, and on that account he asks in addition a new plank as interest. Bastiat had explained and justified the payment of the plank by showing that William obtains "the power which exists in the tool to increase the productiveness of labour." l This explanation of interest from the productivity of capital George does not consider valid, for various reasons which do not concern us here, and then proceeds as follows : " And I am inclined to think that if all wealth consisted of such things as planes, and all production was such as that of carpenters that is to say, if wealth con- sisted but of the inert matter of the universe, and production of working up this inert matter into different shapes that interest would be but the robbery of industry, and could not long exist. . . . But all wealth is not of the nature of planes or planks, or money, nor is all production merely the turning into other things of the inert matter of the universe. It is true that if I put away money it will not increase. But suppose instead I put away wine. At the end of a year I will have an increased value, for the wine will have improved in quality. Or suppose that in a country adapted to them I set out bees ; at the end of a year I will have more swarms of bees, and the honey which they have made. Or supposing, where there is a range, I turn out sheep, or hogs, or cattle ; at the end of the year I will, upon the average, also have an increase. Now what gives the increase in these cases is something which, though it generally requires labour to utilise it, is yet distinct and separable from labour the active power of nature; the principle of growth, of reproduction, which everywhere characterises all the forms of that mysterious thing or condition which we call life. And it seems to me that it is this that is the cause of interest, or the increase of capital over and above that due to labour." The fact that, for the utilisation of the productive forces of nature, labour also is necessary, and that, consequently, the 1 Capital et Rente. See above, p. 289. CHAP, ii HENRY GEORGE 415 produce of agriculture, for instance, is in a certain sense a produce of labour, is not sufficient to obliterate the essential difference that exists, according to George, between the different modes of production. In such modes of production as consist " merely of changing the form or place of matter, as planing boards or mining coal, labour alone is the efficient cause. . . . When labour stops production stops. When the carpenter drops his plane as the sun sets, the increase of value which he with his plane is producing ceases until he begins his labour again the following morning. When the factory bell rings for closing, when the mine is shut down, production ends until work is resumed. The intervening time, so far as regards production, might as well be blotted out The lapse of days, the change of seasons, is no element in the production that depends solely on the amount of labour expended." But in the other modes of pro- duction " which avail themselves of the reproductive forces of nature time is an element The seed in the ground germinates and grows while the farmer sleeps or ploughs the fields." l So far George has shown how certain naturally fruitful kinds of capital bear interest But, as every one knows, all kinds of capital, even those that are naturally unfruitful, pro- duce interest George explains this simply from the efficiency of the law of equalisation of profits. "No one would keep capital in one form when it could be changed into a more advantageous form. . . . And so in any circle of exchange the power of increase which the reproductive or vital force of nature gives to some species of capital must average with all ; and he who lends or uses in exchange money or planes or bricks or clothing, is not deprived of the power to obtain an increase any more than if he had lent, or put to a reproductive use, so much capital in a form capable of increase." To return to Bastiat's illustration : the reason why William at the end of the year should return to James more than an equally good plane, does not rest in the increased power " which the tool gives to labour," for "that is not an element . . . but it 1 Parallel with the "vital forces of nature," according to George, works also ' ' the utilisation of the variations in the forces of nature and of man by exchange." This too leads to "an increase which somewhat resembles that produced by the vital forces ofnpture" (p. 129). But I need not here enter into a more exact exposition of t! is somewhat obscure element, since George himself ascribes to it only a secondary role in the origination of interest. 416 THE LATER FRUCTIFICATION THEORY BOOK vn springs from the element of time the difference of a year be- tween the lending and return of the plane. Now if the view is confined to the illustration, there is nothing to suggest how this element should operate, for a plane at the end of the year has no greater value than at the beginning. But if we sub- stitute for the plane a calf, it is clearly to be seen that to put James in as good a position as if he had not lent, William at the end of the year must return not a calf, but a cow. Or if we suppose that the ten days' labour had been devoted to planting corn, it is evident that James would not have been fully recompensed if at the end of the year he had received simply so much planted corn, for during the year the planted corn would have germinated and grown and multiplied ; so, if the plane had been devoted to exchange, it might during the year have been turned over several times, each increase yielding an increase to James. ... In the last analysis the advantage which is given by the lapse of time springs from the generative force of nature and the varying powers of nature and of man." The resemblance of all this to Turgot's Fructification theory is obvious. Both start with the idea that in certain kinds of goods there resides, as a natural endowment, the ability to bring forth an increment of value ; and both demonstrate that, under the influence of exchange transactions and the efforts of economic men to get possession of this most remunerative fructification, the endowment must artificially become the general property of all kinds of goods. They differ only in that Turgot places the source of the increment of value quite outside of capital, in rent -bearing land, while George seeks it inside the sphere of capital, in certain naturally fruitful kinds of goods. This difference avoids the weightiest objection that we had to urge against Turgot. Turgot had left unexplained how it is possible to purchase, for a relatively small sum of capital, land which yields successively an infinite sum of rent, and to secure the advantage of an enduring fructification for un- fruitful capital. With George, on the other hand, it seems to need no proof that unfruitful wealth is exchanged in equal ratio with fruitful. For since the latter can be produced in ;iny quantity at will, the possibility of increasing the supply CHAP. II HENRY GEORGE 417 of such goods will not permit of their enjoying a higher level of price than the unfruitful goods that cost as much to produce. On the other hand, George's theory is open to two other criticisms, which are, I think, decisive. First, the separation of production into two groups, in one of which the vital forces of nature form a distinct element in addition to labour, while in the other they do not, is entirely untenable. George here repeats in a somewhat altered form the old mistake of the physiocrats, who would not allow that nature co-operates in the work of production except in one single branch of it, agriculture. The natural sciences have long a^o told us that the co-operation of nature is universal. All our production rests on the fact that, by the application of natural forces, we put imperishable matter into useful forms. Whether the natural power of which we avail ourselves in this be vegetative or inorganic, mechanical or chemical, makes no difference whatever in the relation in which natural power stands to our labour. It is quite unscientific to say that, in production by means of a plane, " labour alone is the efiicient cause." The muscular movement of the man who planes would be of very little use if the natural powers and properties of the steel edge of the plane did not come to his assistance. Is it even true that, on account of the character of plank planing as a " simple change of form or place of the material," nature in this case can do nothing without labour ? Can we not fasten the plane into an automatic machine, and get it driven by the force of a stream ; and will not the plane, untiring, con- tinue the production even when the carpenter sleeps ? What more does nature do in the growing of grain ? Second, George has not explained that prior phenomenon of interest by which he seeks to explain all the other phenomena. He says all kinds of goods must bear interest because they can be exchanged for seed-corn, cattle, or wine and these bear an interest. But why do these bear an interest .' Many a reader will perhaps think, at the first glance, as George himself evidently thinks, that it is self-evident. It is evident that the ten grains of wheat, into which the one grain has multiplied itself, are worth more than .the one grain of wheat that was sown; that the grown-up cow is worth more than the calf out of which it grew. (Duly it would 2 E 418 THE LATER FRUCTIFICATION THEORY HOOK vn be well to consider that it is not a matter of ten grains simply growing out of one grain. The action of cultivated land, and a certain expenditure of labour, have had a share in it. And that ten grains are worth more than one grain + the action of the ground and -f the labour expended, is obviously not self- evident. Just as little is it simply self-evident that the cow is worth more than the calf + the fodder which it has consumed during its growth -f the labour which its rearing demanded. And yet it is only under these conditions that interest can fall to the share of the grain of wheat, or to the calf. Indeed, even in the case of wine which improves in lying, it is not by any means self-evident that the wine which has grown better is of more value than the inferior and unripe wine. For in our method of valuing the goods which we possess we follow unhesitatingly the principle of anticipating future use. 1 We do not estimate the value of our goods according to the use at least we do not value them only according to the use which they bring us at the moment, but also according to that use which they will bring us in the future. We ascribe to the field, which for the moment lies useless in fallow, a value with regard to the crop which it will bring us by and by. We give a value even now to the scattered bricks, beams, nails, clamps, etc., which bring us no use when in that condition, in consideration of the use they will afford us when put together at some future time in the shape of a house. We value the fermenting must, which, as such, we cannot make any use of, because we know that by and by it will be serviceable wine. And so might we also value the unripe wine, which we know will become excellent wine after lying, by the .amount of use which it will give us as matured wine. But if we ascribe to it here and now a value corresponding to that future use, there remains no room for an in- crease of value, and for interest. And why should we not ? And if we do not ascribe such a value, or not quite such a value, the cause is certainly not to be found, as George imagines, in the productive powers of nature which the wine possesses. For that there are vital forces of nature in the fermenting must, which in itself is even hurtful, or in the unripe wine, which of itself is of little use ; and that these vital forces i 80, etc. See my remarks on "Computation of Wealth " in Eecktc vnd Verhdltnisse, p. -n CHAP. II HENRY GEORGE 419 tend to the furnishing of a costly product, can, in the nature of things, only afford a ground for valuing the goods which con- tain these precious forces at a high figure, not at a low one. If, nevertheless, we value them at a relatively low figure, we do it not because of their containing useful natural forces, but in spite of it. The surplus value of the products of nature, which George appeals to, is therefore not self-evident. George makes one attempt to explain this surplus value, though it must be called a very lame one. He says that time, as well as labour, constitutes an independent element in its production. But is this really an explanation, or is it an evasion of the explanation ? How comes the person who throws a seed of corn into the earth to get compensation, out of the value of the product, not only for his labour but also for the time that the seed has lain in the ground and <*rown ? Is time then the object of a monopoly ? Such an argument almost tempts one to recall the naive words of the old canonist, that time is a good common to all, to the debtor as to the creditor, to the producer as to the consumer. Of course George did not mean time, but the vegetative powers of nature actually working during time. But how should the producer manage to get himself paid for these vegetative forces of nature by a special surplus value in the product ? Are, then, these natural powers objects of a monopoly ? Are they not rather accessible to every man who owns a seed of corn ? And cannot every one put himself in possession of a seed of corn ? Since the production of seed-corn can be indefinitely augmented by labour, would the amount of corn not be steadily increased so long as a monopoly of the natural forces immanent in the grain made its possession appeal- peculiarly advantageous? And would not, on that account, the supply inevitably increase till the extra profit due to that monopoly was absorbed, and the production of corn became no more remunerative than any other kind of production ? The careful reader will note that in this discussion we have come back into the same groove of ideas into which we were brought by our criticism of Strasburger's Productivity theory. 1 In this part of his work George has under-estimated the interest problem in the same way as Strasburger did, only 1 See above, p. 178. 420 THE LATER FRUCTIFICATION THEORY BOOK vn to a greater extent and with still greater naivety. Both hastily conclude that the powers of nature are the cause of interest. But Strasburger at least made an attempt to investigate exactly the alleged causal connection between the two, and to follow it out in detail. George, on the contrary, gives us nothing but assertions which take for granted that, in certain productions, time is an " element." It is certainly not in this superficial way that the great problem is to be solved. CONCLUSION. OUR attention has been too long fixed on individual theories. Let us, in conclusion, consider the subject as a whole. We have seen the rise of a motley array of interest theories. We have considered them all carefully and tested them thoroughly. No one of them contains the whole truth. Are they on that account quite fruitless ? Taken all together, do they form nothing but a chaos of contradiction and error, that leaves us no nearer the truth than when we started ? Is it not rather the case that, through the tangle of contradictory theories, there runs a line of development which, if it has not itself led to the truth, has at least pointed the way in which truth is to be found ? And how runs the line of this development ? I cannot better introduce the answer to this last question than by asking my readers once more to put clearly before their minds the substance of our problem. What really is the problem of interest ? The problem is to discover and state the causes which guide into the hands of the capitalists a portion of the stream- of goods annually flowing out of the national production. There can be no question then that the interest problem is a problem of distribution. But in what part of the stream is it that the current branches off into different arms ? On this point the historical development of theory has brought to light three essentially distinct views, and these views have led to three as distinct fundamental conceptions of the whole problem. Let us keep for a moment to the figure of the stream : it will serve very well to illustrate the subject. The source 42^ CONCLUSION represents the production of goods ; the mouth the ultimate division into incomes whereby human needs are satisfied ; the course of the stream represents that stage between source and ultimate division where goods pass from hand to hand in economic transactions, and receive their value by human estimation. Now the three views are the following. One view has it that the capitalist's share is already separated out from the first. Three distinct sources nature, labour, and capital each in Virtue of its inherent productive power, bring forth a definite quantity of goods, with a definite quantity of value, and just the same amount of value as lias flowed from each source is discharged into the income of those persons who own the source. It is not so much one stream as three streams, that flow together for a long time in the same bed. But their waters do not mingle, and at the mouth they divide again in the same proportion as when they came out of the separate sources. This view transfers the whole explanation to the source of wealth ; it treats the problem of interest as a problem of production. It is the view of the Naive Productivity theories. The second view is directly opposed to the first. It finds the division first and exclusively in the discharge. There is only one source, labour. Out of it pours the whole stream of wealth, one and undivided. Even the course of the stream is undivided ; in the value of goods there is nothing to prepare the way for a division of them among different participants, for all value is measured simply by labour. It is just at the mouth, just where the stream of wealth is about to pour out, and should pour out into the income of the workers who produce it, that, from each side, the owners of land and the owners of capital thrust out a dam into the stream, and forcibly divert a part of the current into their own property. This is the view of the socialist Exploitation theory. It denies interest any previous history in the earlier stages of the career of wealth. It sees in it simply the result of an inorganic, accidental, and violent taking. It treats the problem as purely one of distribution or division in the most offensive sense of the word. The third view lies midway between the two. According to it there are two, perhaps even three springs in the source THREE CONCEPTIONS OF THE PROBLEM 423 out of which flows the undivided stream of wealth. But in its course this stream conies under the influences that create value, and under these influences it immediately begins to branch asunder again. That is to say, in their calculation of use values (and of exchange values based on these) men put a value on the importance they attach to various goods and classes of goods, taking into consideration the amount and intensity of their needs on the one hand, and the quantity of means available to satisfy them on the other, and thus come to make division between goods and goods; they raise one kind and lower another. Thus emerge complicated differences of level, complicated tensions and attractions, under the influ- ence of which the stream of goods is gradually forced asunder into three branches, of which each has its particular mouth. The one mouth discharges yito the income of the owners of the land ; the second into that of the workers ; the third into that of the capitalists. But these three branches are neither identical with the two or three springs, nor do they even correspond with them in force. What decides the force of each branch at its mouth is not the strength of each spring at its source, but the amount which the formation of values has forced from the united stream into each of the three branches. This then is the view in which all the remaining theories of interest agree. They find the final division already sug- gested in the stage of the formation of values, and therefore they consider it their duty to carry back their theory into this sphere. They supplement and widen out the distribution problem of interest into a problem of value. Which of these three fundamental conceptions is the right one ? To any moderate and candid observer the answer cannot remain doubtful. It certainly is not the first view. Not only is coital not an original source of wealth, since it is at all times the fruit of nature and labour, but, as we have suffi- ciently proved, there is no power whatever in a factor of production to turn out its physical products with a definite value attached to them. In the production of goods neither value in general, nor surplus value in particular, nor interest on capital comes ready-made into the world. The problem of interest is not a simple problem of production. 424 CONCLUSION But neither can the second conception be the correct one. The facts are against it. It is not for the first time in the dis- tribution of goods, but before that, in the formation of value, that a foreign element intrudes itself by the side of labour. An oak tree a hundred years old, which during its long growth has only required the attention of a single day's labour, has a hundred times higher value than the chair which another day's labour has made out of a pair of boards. In this case the oak trunk, the product of one day's labour, does not at once become a hundred times more valuable than the chair which costs one day's labour. But day by day, year by year, the growing value of the oak diverges from the value of the chair. And as it is with the value of the oak, so is it with the value of all those products the production of which costs, not only labour, but time. Now it is the same quiet and stubborn working forces as, step by step, separated the value of the oak from that of the chair, that have at the same time produced interest on capital. These forces, effective long before goods come to division, have marked out the future limiting line between wage of labour and interest on capital. For labour can be paid on no other principle than " like wages for like work." But if the value of goods produced by similar labour becomes dissimilar through the action of these forces, the similar level of wages can- not everywhere be maintained and coincide with the dissimilar rise in the value of goods. It is only the value of goods not thus favoured that falls in level, and is appropriated by the general rate of wages which it determines. All goods that are favoured rise above this level in proportion as they have been favoured by the formation of value, and could not be appro- priated by the general rate of wages. When then the final division comes, after all the workers have received like wages for like work, these favoured goods must of themselves leave something over which the capitalist can and may appropriate. They leave this something over, not because at the last moment the capitalist, by his sudden snatch at the spoil, artificially forces down the level of wages under the level of the value of goods, but because, long previously, the tendencies of the forma- tion of value had raised the value of those goods which cost labour and time above the value of those other goods which FUNDAMENTALLY A PROBLEM OF VALUE 425 cost only labour producing its result at once ; the value of which latter labour, as it must be sufficient to satisfy the labour of its production, forms at the same time the standard for the general rate of wages. So speak the facts. The conclusions which they force us to draw are clear. The problem of interest is a problem of distribution. But the distribution has a previous history, and must be explained by that previous history. The sums of wealth do not start away from each other on a sudden ; the diverging lines which they follow were quietly and gradu- ally cut out in previous stages of their career. Whoever wishes really to understand the distribution, and truly to ex- plain it, must go back to the origin of the quiet but distinct grooving of these lines of division, and this will lead him to the sphere of value. This is where the principal work is to be done in the explanation of interest. Whoever treats the pro- blem as a simple problem of production breaks off his explana- tion before he has come to the principal point. Whoever treats it as a problem of distribution, and distribution only, begins it after the principal point is passed. It is only the economist who undertakes to clear up those remarkable rises and falls of value, where the rises are surplus value, who can hope, in explaining them, to explain interest in a really scientific way. The interest problem in its last resort is a problem of value. If we keep this in view we shall easily find the order of merit into which these various* groups of theories fall, and we shall ascertain where runs the upward line of the development. Two theories have entirely mistaken the character of the interest problem; together the one forming the counterpart of the other- they constitute the lowest step in the develop- ment. These are the Naive Trod activity theory and the socialist Exploitation theory. It may seem strange to mention these two in the same breath. How widely the two diverge in the results at which they arrive! How much superior the adherents of the Exploitation theory consider their arguments to the naive assumptions of the Productivity theorists ! How proudly they proclaim their own advanced critical attitude ! The association, however, is justified. First, the two theories agree in what they do not do. Neither of them touches on the 426 CONCLUSION distinctive problem. Neither of them wastes words in explaining those peculiar waves which are thrown up by the value of goods, and out of which surplus value conies. The Productivity theory contents itself with saying, in regard to these waves of value, that they have been produced. The Exploitation theory, almost more culpably, does not even notice them ; for it they do not exist; for it, however the facts of the economical world may run contrary, the level of the value of goods agrees simply with the level of the labour expended on them. But not only negations, but positive ideas bind these two theories more closely together than could well be believed. They are in truth fruit of one and the same bough ; children of one and the same naive 'assumption that value grows out of production like the blade out of the field. This assumption lias an important history of its own in economic literature. In constantly changing shapes it has, for a hundred and thirty years, ruled our science, and by forcing the explanation of the fundamental phenomenon in a wrong direction has hindered its progress. First it appears in the physiocrat doctrine that land creates all surplus of value by its own fruitfulness. Adam Smith took the strength away from the assumption. Eicardo entirely uprooted it. But, before the first phenomenal form of it had quite disappeared, Say introduced it for a seeond time into the science in a new and extended form. Instead of the one productive power of the physiocrats appear three productive powers, which produce values and surplus values exactly in the same way as formerly the physiocrats had produced the produit net. Under this form the assumption held the science under its ban for ten long decades. At length the spell was broken, for the most part through the passionate but praiseworthy criticism of the socialist theorists. But still its tough vitality asserted itself. Giving up the form, not the substance, it managed to save itself under a new disguise, and by a strange freak of fortune found its new home in the writings of those who had most bitterly opposed it, the Socialists. The value-creating powers were gone ; the value-creating power of labour remained, and with it the : olcl fatal weakness that, instead of the subtle syntheses of the formation of value which should be the work and the pride of our science to unravel, there was nothing left RANK OF THE VARIOUS THEORIES 427 but a stout assumption, or, so 'far as an assumption would not pass, a still more stout denial. Thus the naive theory of the Productivity of capital and the emancipated theory of the socialists are twin systems. So far as the latter aspires to be a critical theory, well and good ; it is really so ; but it is also obviously a naive doctrine. It criticises one naive extreme only to fall into an opposite extreme that is no less naive. It is nothing else than the long-delayed counterpart of the Naive Productivity theory. In comparison with it the remaining theories of interest may take credit to themselves for standing a step higher. They seek for the solution of the interest problem on the ground where the solution is really to be found, the ground of value. The respective merits of these theories, however, are different. Those which seek to explain interest by the external machinery of the theory of costs have to carry a heavy handicap in the assumption that value grows out of produc- tion. Their explanation always leaves something over to explain. Just as certain as is the fact that the fundamental forces which set in motion all economical efforts of men are their interests, egoistic or altruistic, so certain is it that no explanation of the economical phenomena can be satisfactory where the threads of explanation do not reach back unbroken to these fundamental and undoubted forces. This is why the cost theories fail. In thinking that they find the principle of value, of that guide and universal intermediate motive of human economical affairs, not in a relation to human welfare, but in a dry fact of the external history of the manufacture of goods, in the technical conditions of their production, they follow the thread of explanation into a cid-de-sac, from which it is impossible to find a way to the psychological interest- motive to which every satisfactory explanation must go back. This condemnation applies to the majority of the interest theories we have been considering, however different the individual theories may have been. Lastly, one step higher in rank stand those theories which have quite cut themselves adrift from the old superstition that the value of goods comes from their past instead of from their future. These theories know what they wish to explain, and in what direction the explanation is to be sought. If they 428 CONCLUSION have, notwithstanding, not discovered the entire truth, it is rather the result of accident ; while their predecessors, cut off from the right way of its seeking by a wall of assumption, sought it in a wrong direction, and so sought it in vain. The higher step of the development is indicated in certain' indi- vidual formulations of the Abstinence theory, but principally in the later Use theories ; and here it is the theory of Menger which, to my mind, appears the highest point of the development \\p till now. And that not because his positive solution is the most complete, but because his statement of the problem is the most complete two things, of which, as is often the case, the second may perhaps be more important and more difficult than the first. On the foundation thus laid I shall try to find for the vexed problem a solution which invents nothing and assumes nothing, but simply and truly attempts to deduce the pheno- mena of the formation of interest from the simplest natural and psychological principles of our science. I may just mention the element which seems to me to involve the whole truth. It is the influence of Time on human valuation of goods. To expand this proposition must be the task of the second and positive part of my work. INDEX OF AUTHORS MENTIONED Where reference is given to several passages the principal ones are indicated by black figures. ALEXIUS a Massalia, 35, 37. Ambrosius, 20. Aquinas, 22, 2:5, 24. Aristotle, 16, 17, 48. Augustine, 20. BACON, 33, 43. Barbeyrac, 40. Bastiat, 288, 391, 407, 413, 415. Beccaria, 51. Benthnm, 47. Bernhar.li, 96, 205. Resold, 32. Bischof, 400. Bodiuus, 52. Bohmer, 15, 23, 40. Bornitz, 32. Boxhorn, 40. Biisch, 317. CAIRNES, 286. Calvin, 28, 64. Camerarius, 32. Canard, 105. Cancrin, 81. Carey, 153, 293. Cato, 16. Cauwes, 130, 304, 406. Chalmers, 102. Cherbuliez, 286, 305. Child, 44. Chrysostom, 20. Cicero, 16. Concilia, 49. Coiitzen, 41. Cossa, 400. Courcelle-Seneuil, 247, 300, 406. Covarruvias, 22. Culpepper, 43. DIKTZEL, H., 260. Dietzel, K., 287. Droz, 107. Diiliring, 324. Dumoulin (see Molinaeus). EISF.LF.N, 86. Endemann, 15, 18, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 32, 37, 41, 59. FOUBONXAIS, 42, 49. Fulda, 86. Funk, 15, 57, 59. GAIUS, 255. Galiani, 48, 49, 56, 208, 259. Gamier, G., 105. Gamier, J., 130, 286, 305, 407. Genovesi, 50. George, 65, 413. Gerstner, 300, 406. Glaser, 172. Godwin, 405. Goldschmidt, 254. Graswinckel, 40. Grotius, 33, 34. Guth, 324. HELD, 318. Hermann, 188, 193, 207, 210, 216, 233, 245, 325, 410. Hodgskin, 270, 318. Hoffmann, 312, 407. Hufeland, 81. Huhn, 400. Hume, 47, 58, 59, 60. 430 INDEX JAKOB, 85. Jevous, 286, 400. Jones, 102. Justi, 41, 58. KLEINWACHTEII, 130, 132. Kloppenburg, 40. Knies, 15, 16, 17, 18, 207, 216, 223, 227, 239, 245, 255, 259, 339, 340, 367, 375, 383, 384. Kozak, 328. Kraus, 81. LACTANTIUS, 20. Laspeyres, 15, 35, 40. Lassalle, 173, 276, 323. Lauderdale, 111, 143, 179, 270, 275. Law, 52, 58. Leibnitz, 41. Leroy-Beaulieu, 131, 141, 399. Locke, 44, 58, 60, 270, 317. Lotz, 83, 316. Lucder, 81. Luther, 27. M'CuLLOCH, 97, 270, 271, 275, 300, 391, 405. M'Leod, 102. Maffei, 48. Malthus, 96, 149, 270, 274, 275, 408. Mangoldt, 205. Mavesius, 40. Mario, 192. Marx, 173, 174, 323, 325, 326, 367. Mataja, 212. Melanchthon, 27. Melon, 52. Monger, 188, 209, 260, 428. Mercier de la Riviere, 62. Mill, James, 270, 271, 275, 297, 300, 320, 405, 406. Mill, John Stuart, 286, 325, 407. Mirabeau, 63, 62. Mithoff, 205. Molinaeus (Dumoulin), 20, 28, 29, 33. 37, 58. Molinari, 57, 130, 286, 399. Montesquieu, 52. Murhard, 81. NASSE, 208. Nebenius, 192, 271. Neumann, 15, 35, 41. Noodt, 40. North, 44. PETTY, 382. Pierstorff, 9, 71, 91, 137, 151, 275, 399. Plato, 16. Platter, 71, 74. Plautus, 16, 17. Politz, 81. Potliier, 62, 57. Proudhon, 130, 321, 325. Pufendorf, 41. QUESNAY, 62. RAU, 86. Read, 153, 300, 406. Ricardo, 87, 150, 202, 269, 271, 275, 297, 312, 316, 320, 321, 339, 353, 354, 376, 386, 408, 426. Riedel, 127, 132, 139, 210. Rizy, 15. Rodbertus, 173, 291, 306, 322, 325, 326, 328, 374, 389, 390. Roesler, 172, 202. Iloscher, 15, 32, 33, 41, 44, 59, 113, 128, 132, 139, 202, 210, 247, 248, 286, 391, 400. Rossi, 130, 286, 397. SALMASIUS, 33, 36, 58, 59, 215, 247, 256, 259. Sartorius, 81. Say, J. B., 85, 104, 111, 120, 132, 139, 188, 193, 194, 198, 210, 229, 232, 245, 249, 325, 407. Schaffle, 206, 216, 221, 227, 229, 232, 245, 249, 306, 325, 337, 410. Schanz, 43. Schelhvien, 413. Schmalz, 81. Schon, 137. Schulze-Delitzsch, 400. Schiiz, 286, 400. Scialoja, 131, 132. Scrope, 271. Seneca, 16, 17. Senior, 87, 247, 269, 271, 302, 325, 403, 405, 408, 409. Seuter, 81. Sismondi, 318. Sivers, 63. Smith, Adam, 70, 86, 87, 90, 91, 102, 124, 127, 269, 271, 312, 316, 318, 320, 325, 339, 376, 426. Smith, Peshiue, 153, 161. Soden, 82, 316. Sonnenfels, 42, 58, 59, 317. Steuart, 46, 58, 59, 317. Storch, 190. Strasburger, 173, 391, 419. INDEX 431 TELLEZ, 21, 23. Thunen, 164, 205, 402. Torrens, 96, 151, 274, 408. Turgot, 64, 61, 78, 259, 413, 41b. ULPIAN, 255. VACOXICS Vacnna, 23. Vasco, 48, 50, 51. WAGNER, 247, 308, 311. Whately, 102. Wirth, 286, 400. Wiskemann, 15, 27. Wollemborg, 150, 287. ZABARELLA 24. Zwingli, 27. THE END 96 04/ " 31731 ns? 13 - UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS-URBANA