THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF ILLINOIS 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 ^875 
 v5j
 
 W''^ 
 
 ^i'-V'"'
 
 msm^^
 
 BANKING. 
 
 REASONS IN SUPPORT OF A RILL, 
 
 FOR RENDERING 
 
 COUNTRY BANKERS' CIRCULATION INVARIABLE, AND CONVERTIBLE 
 INTO A METALLIC CURRENCY, 
 
 AXD 
 
 dfor (©rantms %mntt^ to (JtfiartertDi 9SanRi5* 
 
 MOST RESPECTFULLY ADDRESSED TO 
 
 THE RIGHT HON. LORD ALTHORP, 
 
 CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE SECRET COMMITTEE, 
 
 APPOINTED BY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS IN SESSION 1832, 
 
 " To Inquire into the Expediency of Renewing the Charter of tlie Bank of England, and to Enquire into tlie 
 
 " System on which Banks of Issue in England and Wales are conducted." 
 
 By WILLIAM BROWNE, Esq. 
 
 TO WHICH ARE ADDED, 
 
 TABLES, 
 
 THE ADVANTAGE WHICH THE BANK OF ENGLAND ENJOYED OVliR COUNTRY BANKRRS ON 
 
 THE SCORE OF DUTY;— THE LOSS SUSTAINED BY THE REVENUE ON SEVEN 
 
 TEARS' BANK OF ENGLAND CIRCULATION : 
 
 THE BANK MODE OF COMPUTING THE DUTY ; 
 
 A COMPARI.SON AND RESULT OF WITHDRAWING THE SMALL NOTES, .\XD THE EFFECT OF THE 
 
 COMPOSITION ACT, 9 GEO. IV. CAP 23, FOR FOUR YEA US PRIOR TO 
 
 AND FOLLOWING THE PANIC OF 1 82o ; 
 
 ■"HE PROPORTION THE SMALL NOTES BORE TO THE LARGE, and Till: DUTY LOST THEREBY; 
 
 AND 
 
 '^ Balnttcc S^htet ot the iSattit of Cnglnn^ 
 
 PUBLISHED AUG. 10, 1832. 
 
 LONDON : ] 
 
 HATCHETT AND SON, PICCADILLY; F. WILSON AND J. CHAPPEL, ROYAL EXCHANGE; 
 J. R. KENNETT, GREAT QUEEN-STREET, LINCOLN'S INN FIELDS. 
 
 Printed by Joseph Roger ton, I'J, Old Botwell Cotirf, i i 
 
 1832. »t
 
 " Every syllable issued by the Governoi- of the Bank is a direct appeal to the people of England, 
 " against the continance of the Bank Charter, for a Single Day ! The Public Safety must not be 
 *' lost sight of, for the claims of any class of individuals. We ask, ought twenty-four Merchants, (we 
 '* believe the Secret Committee of the Bank does not exceed three,) to possess the power of raising or 
 " depressing prices ; of extending or contracting Private Credit; o{ driving gold from England; or 
 " forcing it suddenly back again ; of advancing t© the King's Ministers what sum they please ; of 
 " managing the business of the Bank, upon the ' Principles of a Politcal Concern V We affirm, that 
 " no power so awful, was ever before lodged in the hands of any Corporation, that has yet existed in 
 " in a Free Country ?"-^Times.
 
 
 TO 
 
 THE RIGHT HON. LORD ALTHORP, 
 
 CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE SECRET COMMITTIE TO ENQUIRE INTO THE 
 EXPEDIENCY OF RENEWING THE CHARTER OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND, &C. &C. 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Having had the honour to suhmit to the Lords of the 
 Treasury, " A Plan for the Regulation of Country Bank- 
 ers," but more especially the mode by wliich the extent of 
 the Paper Circulation of the United Kingdom, could be 
 accurately and speedily ascertained, (which suggestions 
 have partially been incorporated in the Act of the 9 Geo. 
 4, cap. 23, which enables Bankers to compound i'or 
 stamps,) I am encouraged to address your Lordship, 
 and most respectfully to submit to the consideration of 
 His Majesty's JNIinisters, the following reasons for estaV 
 lishing a New Currency, by yrhich the Bank Note circu- 
 lation might be placed on an invariable and solid basis, 
 and immediately convertible into a JNIetaDic Currency] at 
 least, during such a period, that no restriction be imposed 
 on the Bank of England. My plan will also combine the 
 means of/ enabling the Lords of the Treasury to ascertain 
 the extent of the Bank Note circulation of the United 
 Kingdom,j(distinguishing the circulation of Ireland and 
 Scotland, from that of England), at anytime when required, 
 within the short space of 10 or It days. Tliis will afford 
 a protection to the lower classes against severe loss to 
 which tliey are exposed, and who have no possible means 
 of guarding themselves against loss, or the option of refu- 
 sal. It will be tlie means of restoring confidenceto the agri- 
 cultural, manufacturing, and commercial districts; it will 
 facilitate tlie means of collecting the taxes, and of increas- 
 ing the Revenue, to an amount, 1 will not here venture to 
 state, and which miglit be improved in proportion to the 
 increased circul.ition, independent of collateral advan- 
 tages, such as duty on paj)er, postages, &c. &c., besides 
 securing to the aid of Government, the resources of the 
 country, in case of war, or any other emergency. 
 
 It would be presumptuous in any individual to intrude 
 on your Lordshii), tlieories not founded in practical expe- 
 rience. 
 
 The principle on which I have framed the measures I 
 have now the honor to propose, is, — the establisliment of 
 Chartered Banks, which have been recognised by tlie 
 most eminent financiers and statesmen of modern tinms 
 and have, in some degree, been tried, and proved of vita' 
 importance and advantage to tin? agricultural, ninnufac 
 turing, and trading interests of Scotland, where no com . 
 plaint of distress is heard, whilst England is over/ 
 whelmed. j 
 
 It is admitted that the Country Banking System forffis 
 a most imi>ortant and essential ])art of commercial econo- 
 my, and that it has been the jnedium of very extensive 
 pecuniary transactions throughout the country, on which 
 depended the. prosperity of the state ; and without which, 
 the public revenue could not have been collected, as I am 
 prepared to shew from accjuired experience as late Deputy 
 Receiver-General ft)r Somersetsliire ; which appointtnent 
 I held for ;"> years prior to the close of the late war, and b 
 3-ears subsequent thereto. During that period I collected 
 
 and paid into the Exchequer upwards of £2,447,000, and 
 without tlie co-operation of country bankers it could not 
 have been collected, or the quarterly payments ma.^. 
 regularly into the Exchequer, either during the war ... 
 since. 
 
 I cannot elucidate the advantages of the measure now 
 proposed, without alludins^ to some of the causes which 
 led to the withdrawal of the small Notes from circulation, 
 in April, 1829, instead of deferring that measure, as origi- 
 nally intended, until 1833,— which was no doubt accele- 
 rated by the exclusive privilege and monopoly of the 
 Bank of England. 
 
 The irresponsibility of the Directors of this establish- 
 ment for their conduct, and non-liability to any control- 
 ing power, proves a serious evil, inasmuch, as under 
 any circumstances of public distress, real or artificial, tlie 
 Directors uniformly work it to the advantage of the 
 Bank of England Company, and to the injury of tli 
 public ; for instance, during the Panic in December, 
 182.5, Bank Stock, shortly before, had been as high 
 as 233 per cent. ; on the day when Sir Peter Pole 
 and Co.'s house suspended payment, it was banged down 
 below 200 per cent., and so remained some time reduced 
 in price, hut not in value, during which large sales were 
 eflected, occasioned by tlie unavoidable distress brought 
 upon Country Bankers by their measures. 
 
 To these uncontrolled jiroceedings must be attributed 
 the greatest part, if not the whole of the distress, biink- 
 ruptcv, and ruin, brouglit on die country, from which (as 
 the numerous jietitions to the Legislature manifestly proves) 
 it lias never recovered. 
 
 JMany of tlie most resi>ectnble and wealthy Banking- 
 houses, during Uiis j>aiiic, were driven to the Ga- 
 zette. I believe 177 were reported in Parliament to 
 have suspended papieiit, (which must necessarily 
 have occasioned great I'.efalcation in the public re- 
 Wenue;) of this number, few have paid less than 
 /17s. r.d. in the pound, many 209., and a considerible 
 'number resumed their busmess, whilst some have paid oft 
 and wound up their ra,... >mii, aS-the reduc.-d luiinber ot 
 annual licenses shows. So .nironglv did the conduct ot 
 the Bank Directors openite on the minds of Country 
 r,ank.TS, that tliev av now living in dremi of the tepe- 
 tition of these disastrous rc^sults, wh.-never it may suit li.e 
 interest of these P.ank Directors to r-sort to it. uli.er.H, 
 in self-defence, are compelled to act with the utmost cir- 
 cumspection, c...isc.,uentfy to limit their <i.«cou«f« and 
 accommodation, and constrain their issues. J '"" ;^»--' ""^ 
 still is, one real cause of tlie distress whicb couUnues to 
 affect the country. „ , ■ c -•»«, in 
 
 Thedi.sasteisVhich attended the Banking Svstem in 
 Ireland, were greatly increased bv the c""rs.. pursued by 
 the Directors of the Bank of irel""'! in " l^"' " f 
 esfabli-shment. by withholding its retn. ar ""I'l''""" "J,^^^ 
 count, occasioned tlie Bloppate of C.l Banks, in
 
 which are now supplied by the Bank of Ireland branches, 
 and by the Provincial Chartered Bank and Joint-Stock 
 Companies. 
 
 In 1797, the sudden contraction of circulation by the 
 Bank of England, occasioned the ruin of 70 Banks, and 
 in that year there were upwards of 1,'300 bankrupts — an 
 unprecedented number at that period. ]Mr. Pitt, then 
 Prime-Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer, created 
 5 millions of Exchequer Bills, which were issued to the 
 manufacturers, merchants, and agriculturists, on security, 
 and thus restored credit tliroughout the country. 
 
 In Scotland not a single Bank stopped payment during 
 the late Panic of 182 j-26, — this was owing to the char- 
 tered privileges in the constitution of their Banking Sys- 
 tem, There, the law allows chartered Banks to be estab- 
 ished, with a stipulated and fixed capital, and its mem- 
 bers uidimited in number ; in three Chartered Banks 
 there are 2,205 partners, and witli the remainder of 32 
 Banks, the numbers are 3,231 proprietors, varying ; in 
 three Banking Companies the number exceeds 100, six 
 between 20 and 100 : 17 short of 20 ; and thei-e are 133 
 Branch Banks, (vide the report of the Select Committee.) 
 And since the establishment of the Scotch Banks, there are 
 only 2 instances of failure, where the creditor did not get 
 the whole debt and interest.* 
 
 Your Lordship will pardon me for again adverting to 
 the Bank of England, but some facts are I believe un- ( 
 known to the Treasury— and 1 beg to state them : during 
 1824 and part of 1825, the Directors of the Bank 
 of England were acting oa most liberal principles, 
 and gave public notice that they would reduce the 
 rate of discount — that they would advance on es- 
 tates at 4 per cent., (and advanced I believe 
 ^1,400,000 on mortgage) ;— they took in stock to an un- 
 limited amount ; they extended their accommodation on 
 Bills beyond three months. All these measures had a 
 tendency to increase their business, consequently to im- 
 prove their circulation ; which is a source of no small 
 profit. The motives for this liberal conduct might be 
 traced to those principles which invariably regulate all 
 monopolists — viz., their interest. 
 
 On reference to their Returns of Notes issued out, ren- 
 dered to the Stamp Office, it appears that the Bank Notes 
 in circulation were — 
 On the 4th .Tan. 1823. . £16,379,530 
 
 {In July, 1824, it 
 was £21 660,973. 
 — See 1 ooke on 
 Currency, p. 42. 
 1st Jan. 1825 . . 20,756,948 
 Thus an increase on the Bank circulation was 
 effected in one year, viz. on 1st January, 1825, 
 over the corresponding period of 1824, of . . £3,526,149 
 
 And in 2 years it was increased 4,377,418 
 
 The Bank continued this course till towards June, 
 1825, when, by the indiscretion of a Bristol Bank, who 
 refused exchanging their notes for gold, a petition was 
 presented to the House of Commons ; this frightened the 
 Directors of two Bank uf j^itgiVuif, and from this and 
 other causes, they secretly, and suddenly, concerted mea- 
 sures to contract their issues, which had been carried to 
 great excess. They then rofused to take in stock, or 
 advance on land, — they refused the discount of respect- 
 able London Bankers' acceptances, and to advance on 
 their own accepted Bank Post Bills, — they refused dis- 
 count of bills of the date they previously advertised to do. 
 The country generally were totally ignorant of their plans, 
 and of the ulterior objects contemplated by their mancvu- 
 vres. All this was effected without any assignable cause 
 or pretext, and as the difficulties thus created increased, 
 they effected a saving of their gold by the stoppage of tlie 
 Country Banks. This unwarrantable course of procedure 
 enabled a certain great capitalist to reap an abundant har- 
 vest, at the expense of the unsuspecting and distressed 
 Banking Community. 
 
 • Mr. Maberly faileil, 1^32. 
 
 The Bank having extended its circulation 3J millions 
 and upwards, and encouraged speculation, and thus in- 
 fused a degree of confidence throughout the country, 
 now reduces its circulation 3.| millions in a few months, 
 and by the 15th December, 1825, (the day on which the 
 ftlansion House JMeeting took place) it is estimated, the 
 circulation of the Bank was further reduced two millions; 
 and thus they effected tlie stoppage of six or seven Lon- 
 don Banking Houses, in one short week. And, as before 
 observed, 177 Country Bankers sustained a temporary 
 suspension, or shared the same fate, and, in their train, 
 upwards of 3,300 bankrupts were Gazetted in one year. 
 It was this that completed the ruin of the country. These 
 proceedings rendered it necessary for the Bank of Eng- 
 land to establish their Branch Banks, and the Directors 
 unjustly reported by their Chairman, at a Quarterly Meet- 
 ing, that — " It was want of discretion in the Country 
 Bankers, which led them to adopt that measure." 
 
 While these restrictive operations of the Bank were 
 going on without legislative controul, the demand for di.s- 
 count increased on the Country Bankers, for as the Bank 
 refused to discount for London Bankers and merchants,, 
 the latter sent their Bills to Country Bankers, and there 
 got accommodated ; thus, Country Banker's issues, un- 
 naturally increased, in an inverse ratio to the Bank of 
 England contraction, as appeals by the Stamp Office 
 Returns of Stamps delivered out, and which exhibits a 
 progressive increase, as appears by the official returns to 
 Parliament. Stamps issued to Country Bankers, (vide 
 Report, Secret Committee) were as follows : — 
 In the 1st quarter ending 5th April, 1825, an 
 
 increase of the amount being £2,151,774 
 
 2nd quarter, ending 5th July 2,.i06,539 
 
 3rd quarter, ending 10th October . . . 2,155,754 
 But the 4th there was a decrease to £1,941,204. 
 
 Thus the greatest issue of Countiy Notes took place 
 during the period the Bank of England reduced theirs. 
 By such fluctuations, conducted with the strictest secrecy, 
 and uncontrouled by the Legislature, the Bank of Eng- 
 land can at pleasure, exercise and apply their mighty en- 
 gine, to subvert and destroy the best interest of the King- 
 dom, and might even presume to dictate to Government 
 itself, and unless such measures are resorted to, as shall 
 guarantee the Public from such direful consequences, 
 confidence will never revive, or the public credit be re- 
 stored. 
 
 The object of my Plan will be, to guard against the 
 imperfect and insecure ground, on which Country Ban- 
 kers issue paper ; and the injudicious manner in which 
 the Bank of England have been regulated, as to their 
 issues. It will, if adopted, be universally admitted, that 
 instead of Country circulation being the " worst," that it 
 is the best currency for invariability, whilst its converti- 
 bihtjr cannot be impeded, and failure will be impossible. 
 
 To effect this most salutary and beneficial object, is one 
 of the leading features of the measure I am now desirous 
 of submitting to your Lordship's consideration. 
 
 The next, and not less important object, in the Bill, I 
 propose, is to ascertain, at stated periods, or at any time 
 when required, an accurate account of the extent of the 
 Paper currency of the whole Kingdom, a subject upon 
 which the Chancellor of the Exchequer is reported to 
 have said, in the House of Commons, on the discussion of 
 the Small Note Bill, on the 3d June, 1828, that " One j 
 great defect attending the circulation of Small Notes in i 
 this country, appears to be, that no jneasure had ever been i 
 applied, with a view of ascertaining how far tliat circu- 
 lation extended. He was quite sure, for want of accu- 
 rate knowledge on this point, very many evils had arisen," 
 and he was necessarily driven to the Stamp Office Returns 
 for his estimate of the circulation, which every practical 
 man would say is certainly an erroneous data on which 
 to form even a conjecture. 
 
 Having foreseen the difficulty in which His Majesty's 
 Ministers were placed in 1825-26, and being aware of the 
 vast importance of the subject at the present time, I have 
 bestowed particular attention; and have already suggested
 
 the only practicable remedy, in the letters I had the 
 honor to address to the late Lord Liverpool, and to my 
 Lord Goderich, then Chancellor of the Exchecjuer, in 
 1826. It is true my suggestions have heen partiallij 
 adopted in the Composition Act of 9 Geo. 4, c. '23, but 
 neither the object recpiired by His INLijesty's jMinistors, 
 namely, the extent of the circulation, or contemplated by 
 me, has been attained, owing to the non-introduction of 
 the proper clauses. 
 
 With your Lordship's permission, I will again submit 
 my plans in detail, which I am convinced, by 3.T years 
 experience as a Banker, will be found to effect that desi- 
 rable object comj>letelv, and, if adopted by His JIajesty's 
 Government, I pledge my veracity to ascertain most aocu- 
 ratelv the Country Bank circulation ; in no other way than 
 that which I have proposed, can the extent of the Bank 
 Note circulation of England, Irehmd, and Scotland, be 
 correctly ascertained. 
 
 The amount of capital which I propose to be raised by 
 the Chartered Banks in England and Wales, allowing 
 one for each county, with collateral branches established 
 in populous districts and cities, I estimate at 6 millions ; 
 that sum is considered a sufficient capital, being about 10 
 per cent on the real property, as assessed under Schedule 
 A, in 181.5. Each county, it is presumed, would sub- 
 scribe its respective quotas on that scale. The total 
 amount of which was £52,000,000. 
 
 This 10 per cent, would amount to £5,200,000 
 
 To which I would add for extra capital viz. 
 
 Bristol, Manchester, and JNIanuiacturing 
 
 Counties 800,000 
 
 IMaking £6,000,000 
 
 as appears detailed in Schedule A, annexed to the pro- 
 posed Bill. 
 
 The Chancellor of the Exchequer, at the time before 
 referred to, (3rd .Tune, 1828) estimated the Country circu- 
 lation at £15,400,000: this included 2,400,000 small 
 Notes. 
 
 Supposing 10 per cent to be subscribed on the esti- 
 mated value of the real estates in England and Wales, 
 say £5,200,000, and allowing each Chartered Bank to issue 
 paper for three times more tlian the subscribed capital, it 
 would produce a circulating currenc}'' of £15,600,000 ; and 
 this may be considered a fair ratio to estimate tlie amount 
 required, to which I would add, for the extra capital of 
 £800,000, which by 3 would give, say £2,400,000, making 
 together 18 millions. 
 
 I estimate £6,000,000 more will be added to the circu- 
 lating medium, being the amount of deposits to which 
 extent Notes might be issued. This would make 
 £24,000,000 to the i/.sc of the Manvfiictttret; Afiriculturht , 
 tind Trtuler, and I think this would be equal to the sum 
 required to carry on the operations of the country as re- 
 gards Local Hank Paper. I reckon, of tliis sum, the 
 JJankers would employ i or 5-8ths in Bank Chartered 
 Excheriuer Bills, (to be created) say 12 millions for 
 
 (£ ), I propose should be required to be vested in 
 
 Government Security, which should ncvtT fluctuate in 
 real value, the (jovernment being always bound to pay tlie 
 amount originally received, viz. at par., and for all taxes 
 and revenue of every description ; after a given date, 
 these Bills might be paid to, and received bv Receivers 
 or Collectors of Excise or Customs, and lleceiver-Gcne- 
 ral of Taxes. 
 
 The Bank Chartered Exchequer Bills to bear an inter- 
 est of li<l. per cent per dii-m, or about 2^ per cent, per 
 annum ; renewal at the ple;isure of the Government. 
 
 These means would furnish ^Ministers with a perma- 
 nent loan of twelve millions, renewable after tlie ex- 
 piration of a stipulated date, say ( ) moiitiis. 
 
 The revenue would thus be imi)roved by the duty pay- 
 able on the notes circulated, which estimated on the nr- 
 tual amount received for the last four years immediately 
 preceding January, 1826, will be found to be efjual to 
 "£348,672." — taking for granted the estimates of tlie late 
 
 Chancellor of the Exchinjuer to be correct on a circulation 
 under 20 millions. 
 
 I beg to enumerate ■Jome of the advantages to be de- 
 rived by the Goveriimmt. should it legalize Chartered 
 Banks on the principle, I propose ; it will restore confi- 
 dence and a circulatiiij; iuedium, show that Country Bank- 
 ers are of essential servitu to tlie revenue of the State as 
 well as to the tradiii<;- ini'rest ; in illustration thereof, 1 beg 
 to submit the followin;^' calculations as applicable to this 
 point alone : — 
 
 In 1825, the notes stumped amounted to the nominal 
 value of £8,755,309, The gross amount stamped in 
 fouryears following, viz. 1826, 1827, 1828 and 1829, was 
 £9,617,074, to which nuiy be added a trifling amount of 
 unstamped notes. 
 
 That the stamps issue to Countiy Bankers in Great 
 Britain, for the years 18'-'6, 1827, 1828 and 1829, were of 
 the following value. 
 
 Duty paid. 
 
 No. stamped. .£. £.' s". d. 
 
 Duty paid on 9/09G4 1/. notes 97(»,964 20.228 S 4 
 
 1122/94 ;. 6,613,970 70,1/4 12 fi 
 
 2I9I96 in 12,191,960 19,179 1.3 
 
 26940 2U 5.18,8011 2,694 
 
 5.^6 30 16,680 83 8 
 
 1528 5'J 76,400 3115 12 
 
 20S3 100 208,300 8S.i 5 G 
 
 Nominal amount of Xotes issued .£9,617,074dy..£113,550 19 4 
 
 The value of unstamped Notes and Bills of Ex- 
 
 Th.-infTP, for U'hii'li 7s nt^rrt, romnosition has hep 
 
 change, for which 7s porrt. composition has heen 
 
 paid uuder the 9th Geo. IV, c. 23, is on 1,219,629 4,268 12 
 
 Amount of four year's duty ... 117,818 
 The duty paid on Country Bankers' Notes alone, 
 exclusive of Stamps on Bills of Exchange in 
 1825, ending 5th of January, 1826, was in one 
 year ...... 121,976 
 
 The surplus revenue in \'*1'j, exceedine the re- 
 venue of the four suic-ciling years, by . ..£4,158 
 
 That during the last fmir years the duty on the Bankers' 
 Notes Stamjis alone, co.iipared with the four preceding 
 years, was £230,000 minus. I would most respect- 
 fully recommend for thi'>t' reasons the repeal of the 9 Geo. 
 IV, c. 23, and allow lliaikers to pay as formerly : but 
 pass an Act to ascertain the extent of the Country Bank 
 Note circulation. 
 
 I also beg to refer to the evidence taken by the Com- 
 mittee of Secrecy, in .March, 1797, as aftbrding ample 
 jiroof, particularly that of William Boyd, Esq., p. 'ib and 
 ?)9. And also to tin- Resolutions of a Committee of 
 Merchants on the suhjict of discounts, in the ajipendix, 
 p. 115. Also to tl)f lu'ports printed by order of the 
 House of Commons in lii-'6. 
 
 A certain portion of the intended capital it is proposed 
 shall be invested in Govi'rnment Securities for tlie benefit 
 of the Public, not to be alienated. 
 
 The amount vested in L.vchequer Bills would enable 
 Government to be- less dependent on the Bank of Eng- 
 land, and thus create a controuliog influence which they 
 do not now possess. 
 
 The Bank might be ctuJipcTfrrHo-nfeftto- the inforust on 
 the Debt owing by Govorniiient, from 3 per cent, to 'l\ 
 per cent., and thus stive upwards uf £73,000 per annum, 
 and save also £;',.'< >,(iOO i>er annum for management, 
 wliicli the i\ew Bank >vould do gratuitously. 
 
 It would bring aboii^ 52 Chartered Country I'anWs to 
 the aid of Government, to who-n it mitjht look for sup- 
 port in case of need, iiu-ad of (as in Mr- !'»" s time) 
 to only one Chartered Bink. 
 
 It will identify the National Currency willi the na- 
 tional credit, as Govemmeat will, to a certain eiunt. t>« 
 their Jebtors. 
 
 It %v...il.l, in ca.se of w«r, place the means and rri^urrr.. 
 of the country at the service, and under the protection o! 
 Ciovernnuriit. 
 
 It will give the Ministers periodically a knowlcdfe ol 
 the state of the afl^airs of the (han.red Banks, or, on an 
 emergency, similar to tlnit occasioned by the Uank <.i
 
 \ 
 
 6 
 
 England in February, 1797, the Goverment could with 
 safety, extend protection to a/i, without exclusion — with- 
 out risk —the benefits would alike extend to the whole 
 commercial establishments of the United Kingdom, while 
 it would unite the Government, the landed and monied 
 interest, in one indissoluble bond, and in war, defeat the 
 expectations of an invading- army. 
 
 The plan I propose for adoption will prevent another 
 Restriction Act from becoming necessary, by the confi- 
 dence placed in Chartered Banks, which otherwise must 
 inevitably be the case if the present system of Bank mo- 
 nopoly is allowed to exist, and Branch Banks, as now con- 
 stituted, are not suppressed ; for if the Bank of England 
 should be called on to pay specie, small notes must again 
 be resorted to, and the tragedies of 1793, 1797, 1804, 1810, 
 1816, and 1825-26, will be, to a certain extent, re- 
 acted ; for the Directors of the Bank of England will never 
 be satisfied until they are in possession of the whole circu- 
 lation of the country. 
 
 It will prevent large quantities of gold from being 
 hoarded, which is the invariable effect of panic ; to this 
 was attributed the drain on Country Banks in 1797, and 
 the subsequent years above stated^'and consequently and 
 ultimately on the Bank of England. The proposed mea- 
 sure will operate advantageously on subscribers to the 
 Chartered Banks, particularly on merchants in maritime 
 districts, who will instruct their captains and agents to 
 bring bullion to the country, seeing it is an article of mer- 
 chandise ; that it can be used as a deposit and valued upon 
 immediately. Merchants will import, when the Bank of 
 England will not ; it will thus prove a feeder to the Bank, 
 as the Customs, Excise and Taxes, will, more or less, be 
 paid in the precious metals. 
 
 The Merchant will not depend on the Bank of England 
 for discount; it will prevent alarm and distrust, and 
 induce timid persons to hold notes, instead of converting 
 them into gold. 
 
 It will compel the Bank of England to pursue a diffe- 
 rent line in conducting their fiiture business from that 
 adopted since 1795, particularly as to the quantity of dis- 
 counts, as the many Chartered Banks will afford facilities 
 for discount, and give a circulating medium adequate to 
 any increase in price of corn and cattle, or other mer- 
 chandize. 
 
 The Merchant and Manufacturers might always rely 
 for accommodation by discount, as the value of a certain 
 portion of the Export and Import trade require, which is 
 both reasonable and necessary, and this may be afforded 
 without risk. 
 
 As to the proposed Chartered Bank Exchequer Bills, they 
 should be made payable to order or in blank, as at pre- 
 sent, but in case of alarm and distrust by an Order in 
 Council, they, on emergency, (of which the Government 
 would be the sole judges) should be ordered to be circu- 
 lated, to supply the place of withdrawn Chartered Bank 
 Notes. After a while, the principle of Banking, and 
 operations of trade, would gradually restore the Note cir- 
 culation, and Chartered Exchequer Bills would find their 
 way to the Bank again. _ 
 
 Should small Notes oe lound Hereafter to be expedient 
 and necessary. Government might guarantee the value by 
 a stamp impression on the face of each Note, being in- 
 demnified by deposit of Chartered Exchequer Bills. 
 
 Provision should be made for a Chartered Banking 
 Company in London, to transact the business of the Coun- 
 try Banks, as it would be desirable that the specie which 
 would be useless in the Country Banks, should be de- 
 posited in the London Bank ; a large quantity of super- 
 fluous specie would be collected by these means, and 
 which should be returned if netessity required it. 
 
 The frauds by Fauntleroy, — the constant mis-applica- 
 tion of partnership funds by ,private partners, — against 
 which the laws afford no protection, suggests that it would 
 be imsafe to be without such a constituted Bank in Lon- 
 don. The last London Bankeifi who failed, Messrs. Fry's 
 and Chapman, were debtors to the Public upwards of 
 £400,000 ; they were £130,000 minus to the Bank credi- 
 
 tors, although each partner professed he had a surplus 
 private estate. Three Country Bankers are reported to 
 have proved £170,000 on their estate, vis. one for £90,000, 
 another for £45,000/, and a third for £35,000. liemming- 
 ham, Stephenson and Co., the month after f\iiled for 
 £425,000 ; and, as reported, the London Life Assurance 
 Company suffered to the extent of £39,000 stock, and 
 £12,000 cash balance. The private deficiencies of Ste- 
 phenson were immense. The failures of these two Banks 
 affected 47 other Country Banks, who kept cash accounts 
 with them, and sustained heavy losses. And the recent 
 failure of Sir T. Duckworth, Sir J. Moreland, and Co.'s 
 Bank, affords lulditional reasons for Legislative interference. 
 The stoppage of six or seven London Banking Houses 
 by the Bank of England, and which produced the panic 
 through the country in December, 1825-26, caused the 
 suspension of payment of 177 Banks ; thus upwards of 
 220 houses were involved in the short space of three years. 
 The Scotch and Irish Chartered Banks are evidence of 
 the utility of Joint Stock Companies. And by a recent 
 report of the 2d Annual Meeting of the Huddersfield 
 Banking Company, it appears the capital is £100,000, and 
 the subscribed capital £50,000 and they divided 6 per cent. 
 The Commercial Bank of Scotland, established in 1810, 
 subscribed a capital of £600,000, and they have divided 
 from six to eight per cent. ; its stock is at 50 per cent, pre- 
 mium, and its capital is accumulating by a reserved fund. 
 ^The Bank of Scotland and Royal Bank Stock, the Capital 
 is £1,500,000, bears from 90 to 140 per cent, premium. 
 
 The British Linen Company commenced with £100,000, 
 by its profits accumulating, or further subscription, the 
 capital doubled ; it has now a reserved fund amounting to 
 £300,000. It has a charter, and £1,500,000 capital, and 
 bears a premium of 200 per cent. 
 
 In Ireland, the Provincial Irish Bank derived much 
 benefit from private Banks, at starting many of them ap- 
 plied for agencies, the capital subscribed was £2,000,000, 
 viz., 20,000 shares of £100 each, and the Government 
 showed every readiness to co-operate in the measure. 
 The capital paid in, amounts to £500,000. 
 
 The Bank of Ireland was established in 1783, with a 
 capital of £600,000, four per cent, stock. In 1804, its 
 capital was £1,500,000; it has since added considerably 
 to its original capital by bonuses. 
 
 The Bank of England possessed a capital in 1816, of 
 £11,686,800 ; it paid 10 per cent, dividend during the 
 war, and about the 23rd of May, 1816, declared a bonus 
 of 25 per cent., amounting to three millions, which was 
 added to the capital, making it now £14,686,800 ; it 
 divides 8 per cent., and bears a premium of £99 to £lO() 
 per cent., but lately fell to 85 prem. 
 
 The late Lord Liverpool is reported to have said in the 
 House of Lords, 17th of February, 1826, in reference to 
 the Bank of England Charter and Country Bank Note 
 Acts, " That the present system of Banking Laws in this 
 country was the most absurd that ever was invented ; it 
 was in the teeth of all sound policy and common sense ; 
 there was one or two systems founded upon reason and 
 good policy, which might be adopted by Banks ; let them 
 liave a system of condition or security, so that the public 
 had a chance of being secure. In America one of these 
 systems was acted upon. In INIassachussetts, they had 
 twelve chartered Banks, and no others allowed ; the mo- 
 ment either was unable to pay their notes in specie, it was 
 dis-chartered. The other system was one of entire 
 liability, on which respectable Banks should be established, 
 composed of a number of wealthy individuals, or founded 
 on the principles of Joint Stock Companies. If Chartered 
 Banks were established, tliey would immediatelv absorb 
 the whole circulation of the country, by either of tljese 
 means security would be obtained." 
 
 The Marquis of Lansdowne is reported also to have 
 expressed his conviction of the necessity of a sound cir- 
 culation ; the convertibility of paper into cash should be 
 immediate, that the check to improper issues of paper 
 might be resorted to without delay. The lesson of the 
 past three years, taught the necessity of placing the entire
 
 currency on a broad metallic basis. He approved of the 
 measures of Lord Liverpool, the protection of tlie poor 
 classes should be a primary object. He hoped Banking 
 would be put on a more practical footing. He hoped tlie 
 Bank of England would not resist such alteration in its 
 charter, as without affecting its own rights, would substi- 
 tute a sound and secure system of Uanking, for an un- 
 sound and dangerous one. He bad no doubt on reflection 
 sucli would be tlie policy of the Bank and Parliament, that 
 in any alteration in the Bank charter, it would be enabled 
 to license Chartered Banks through the country, the 
 condition of whose charter of limited respoitsibilitij being the 
 annual publication of their accounts, all persons would tlien 
 have an opportunity of constant examination into the affairs 
 of tlie parties whom they trusted, and the country would 
 have the best system of Banking which commercial secu- 
 rity could desire. 
 
 The Earl of Lauderdale said he could not find six men, 
 or more, who were ready to embark their whole property 
 with the chance of dividing it to their last shilling, in case 
 of failure. 
 
 Lords Ellenborough, Bexley, and other Noble Lords, 
 are reported to have concurred in these sentiments, and 
 
 tlie late Lord Redesdale brought in a Bill, making it felony 
 in a private Banker abstracting the Bank funds toliis own 
 use, and a misdemeaiKirin any clerk assisting therein, but 
 it did not pass the Lords, I'urliament iiaving been prorogued. 
 In conclusion, I can confidently assert, that tlie 
 measures I propose to submit to the consideration of 
 bis iMajesty's JNlinisters, if carried into execution, will, in 
 a sliort time, establish an invariablt '.md convertible Bank 
 note circulation, as far as it is practicable or necessary, of 
 from oO to (>0 millions, and a revenue derivable tlierefrom, 
 of from £.>00,00() to .£iiOO,000 per annum ; a permanent 
 Loan to Government o( V2 millions or upwards ; a gua- 
 rantee to the poor against all losses from failure of Banks, 
 which will be impossilili', while rents and profits will be 
 restored to their natural maximum, and a stimulus will 
 thus be given to tlie energies of every class of the com- 
 munity in the country. Soliciting your Lordship's atten- 
 tion to the annexed TaMcs, 
 
 I have the honour to remain, mj' Lord, 
 
 Your Lordship's most obedient Servant, 
 London, } WILLUM BROWNE. . -:» 
 
 August,1832.i^? /(/^.,^,,r^^.^^^ > 
 
 /* •'■' ^ — ^ 
 
 POSTCRIPT. 
 
 Since the foregoing letter was sent to press, a portion 
 of the evidence taken by the Committee on the Bank of 
 England Charter has been published. In the " Account 
 of Coin and Bullion in the Fossessio7i of the Bank," it ap- 
 pears that on the 24th of Dec. 1825 (the week of the 
 panic) the liabilities of the Bank, including circulation 
 20 millions, amounted to £32,403,000 — its securities 
 to £35,378,000, of which only £426,000 was in 
 Coin, and £601,000 in Bullion ; and this was nine 
 days after the meeting of the Merchants and Bankers at 
 tiie Mansion House, where it was resolved, " To icith- 
 hold draivin^ on the Bank for Balances, and to paii in all 
 the Gold tiiey could collect." We also find, notwithstand- 
 ing this great efl^ort, that on the 28th Feb. 1826, the 
 Coin in the Bank was only Xn, 043, 000, and its Bullion 
 £1,415,000. Their circulation was #25.000,000 on 
 26lh Feb. 1826. " Coin" is a term for " .Specie," in 
 whicii only the Bank of England notes could be paid ; 
 
 Bullion is an article of exportable merchandize, not 
 applicable to the payment of Bank notes, any more than 
 the Country Bankers' acres of land, which on such emer- 
 gency is an unconvertible property, and although worth 
 £100 per acre, would not pay his five pound note when 
 demanded. 
 
 The " account," referred to above, also proves, that 
 as the Bank securities increased, in the same ratio did its 
 liabilities ; this latter consisted of notes sent into circu- 
 lation, and all vvhich securities for liabilities were pro- 
 ductive of Interest, minus only the interest lost on their 
 Coin and Bullion, wliirli are not " breeding" commodi- 
 ties, clearly demonstrating an rinjustijiable principle of 
 avarice, disgraceful to the character of a Banker. The 
 view taken by the Public Press, being confirmatory of the 
 foregoing statement, I have annexed a few extracts at 
 the end, highly interestincr, particularly to Bankers. 
 
 W. B. 
 
 BALANCE SHEET OF THE AFFAIRS OF THE 
 BANK OF ENGLAND. 
 
 Dr, the Bank of Ent'lnnd. 
 Bank Capital (.£14,686,800) lent to Oovernmcnt. 
 To Bank Circulation, viz. : — 
 
 Bank Notes anil Post Bills issued ^20.000,000 
 
 Balance due to Deposit Account 6,ooii,oo0 
 
 .£26,000,000 
 
 Ditto due to Public Department? and 
 
 Pulilic Bodies 1,150,000 
 
 Total Debits 27,1.50,000 
 
 •Surplus of Profit* (undivided) 2,«50,(iO0 
 
 ^£■30,000,000 
 Contra. Cr. 
 
 By value of .585.740/. per Annum Pension Annuities 
 expiring 5th April, 1867, at 18J vcars' purchase ... .£1 1 .Ofli'.flOO 
 
 Exchequer Bills ' 4,000,000 
 
 Ditto, issued to cover Deficiencies of Public Revenue 5.oo(l.o00 
 
 Bills Discounted l.odo.WiO 
 
 Loans to Public Companies, Corporations, &c 1,500,000 
 
 Mortgages 1, 400.000 
 
 Cash and Bullion 6,000,000 
 
 Aug. 10, 1832. ^.30 000.000 
 
 ANNUAL DIVIDEND OR PROFIT AMOUNT OF 
 THE BANK OF ENGLAND. 
 Payments mai>k nv the Bank. 
 
 1. To Dividend Annuallv paid on the Capital Stock, 
 
 viz. 8/. per cent, on il.OSC.SlKl/ £1.174,000 
 
 2. J^alarics, Pension".., Clerks, and House Expi'nces, 
 
 loss by Koigeries. &o. &c 203,000 
 
 3. Composition paid to (."vernment in lieu of Stamp 
 
 Duty '""W 
 
 • • w*^* ■ i.4'i;.o(>o 
 
 Balance, being iUri»u» Annual Profit -"•^'^ 
 
 .£1,467.000 
 Reckiits 
 
 1. Three per Com. i. ■reived Rnniially from Govern- 
 
 mentonlheCapiinl iVi,--'- •^""•®"<* 
 
 2. Pour per Cent, on elcTen millions invested In Pen- ^^^^ ^^^ 
 
 sion Annuity • ■ ■ ; 'iii'ooo 
 
 3. Interest on tive niiilinns Excliei|OtT unit -„',,«, 
 
 4. Ditto ..n I).-nci.n.y Bills • ••;• • ' -^^ 
 
 5. Jlonev received from Ocnornmcnt for .Managemeni 
 
 of thi- Pol)!!"- Bebt *in'iKM> 
 
 6. Discount received on BUI* of Kxchange *^-""" 
 
 7. Interests on .Mortgages ;,"":, t- Ao'ivm 
 
 8. Do. on I,<.Bn. to Public Companies Corpor»tlon.,«cc. 60.000 
 
 9. Ditto on lKinn« for short pcri'd* • ' 
 
 X1.4';7.0 •»
 
 8 
 
 An account of the Annual Circulation of Country Bankers in England, and the amount of Duty paid by them 
 for seven years, viz. — from 1819 to 1825, both inclusive; also the Annual Amount of the Bank of England 
 Circulation, and the duty paid by them for the same period, showing the loss Government sustained by the 
 Bank Charter, comparing the Duty compounded for in liea of Stamps, with the Duties paid for Stamps by 
 Country Bankers. 
 
 Years. 
 
 Circulation 
 of country 
 bankers, as 
 certaiu'dfrom 
 the returns 
 Notes 
 
 stamped. 
 
 1819 
 20 
 21 
 22 
 23 
 24 
 25 
 
 of try 
 
 £ 
 4465092 
 3493901 
 443S548 
 4293164 
 4479448 
 6274069 
 8755309 
 
 Duty paid at 
 the stamp of- 
 fice by coun- 
 bankers. 
 
 The duty paid 
 perl 000/. was 
 equal to the 
 following 
 rates. 
 
 £ s. d, 
 
 64754 
 
 54238 
 
 69252 
 
 64124 
 
 67303 
 
 95267 
 
 121976 
 4 frac 
 
 Total of 
 
 7 years. 36199531 536918 103 12 6 
 
 £ s. d. 
 
 14 10 
 
 15 10 
 15 12 
 
 14 18 6 
 
 15 
 14 3 6 
 13 18 6 
 
 Account ofj 
 the excess of\ 
 \duty paid by| 
 Jcountrybank- 
 |ers, as com- 
 ipared with the 
 Bank of Eng- 
 land. 
 
 Account of 
 the excess of 
 duty paid on 
 cciuntry cir- 
 culation over 
 that of the 
 Bank of Eng- 
 land. 
 
 The Bank of England only pay a compo-l 
 sition of 3,500Z. per million, that is 3L 10s. 
 per 1,000/., with six months credit, while the 
 fractions under 500,000/. are not subject to 
 any duty ; yet country bankers pay to the 
 very pound, and before their notes are deli- 
 vered from the Stamp Office. 
 
 £ 
 11 
 12 
 12 
 11 
 
 11 10 
 10 13 
 10 8 
 
 79 2 6 
 
 £ s. d. 
 
 49505 
 
 42-221 
 
 54085 
 
 49423 
 
 51900 
 
 73901 
 
 91967 
 
 413002 
 
 Theave-") 
 ragefor7 Ul71361 
 years is J 
 To which add the 
 amount of bankers' 
 licences per annum 
 
 The Annual 
 Amount of Reve- 
 nue paidby country 
 bankers for the 7 
 years as above is 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Average per 
 lOOOZ. 
 
 £ s. d. 
 76702 
 
 26000 
 
 102702 
 
 £ s. d. 
 14 16 
 
 5 10 
 
 20 6 
 
 N.B. The advantages derived by the re-"^ 
 venue on country bankers' notes and li- | 
 cences on a circulation of only 5171000Z. )■ 
 per annum, beyond what was paid by the j 
 Bank of England for the same amount isj 
 For the 7 years, no less than .£ 
 
 Average ol 
 excess. 
 
 Average ex- 
 cess. 
 
 jf s. d. 
 11 6 01 
 
 Licence to 
 be added. 
 
 59000/ per an. 
 26000/peran. 
 
 Total excess. 
 85000/. 
 
 85,000 
 
 413,000 
 
 per annum. 
 
 Years. 
 
 Circulation 
 of the Bank 
 of England, 
 from Returns 
 made to Par 
 liament. 
 
 Annual Duty, 
 paid as com- 
 position is 
 3,500/. per 
 million, or 
 70s.per 1000/, 
 and 6 months 
 credit. 
 
 The duty paid 
 
 per 1000/. is 
 
 3/. 10s. Od 
 
 Country Bankers would 
 
 have paid on this circulation 
 
 at 3/. 10s. Od. per 1000/., 
 
 the following sums. 
 
 Supposing the Bank of 
 
 England to have been 
 
 charged to the Duty paid 
 
 by Country Bankers for 
 
 Stamps, the following 
 
 would have been the result. 
 
 The Increase 
 
 duty at 
 
 11/. 6s. Od. 
 
 Total of Du- 
 ties payable 
 by Country 
 JBankers. 
 
 1819 
 20 
 21 
 22 
 23 
 24 
 25 
 
 24697000 
 23692000 
 19632000 
 17772000 
 20500000 
 18500000 
 lf£>OOSc»- 
 
 143793000 
 
 The Average circula- 
 tion of the Bank of 
 England for 7 Years, 
 was 
 
 20542000 
 
 £ s. d 
 
 85750 
 
 82250 
 
 68250 
 
 61250 
 
 71750 
 
 64750 
 
 ■5550S 
 
 £ S. d. 
 3 10 
 
 3 10 
 3 10 
 3 10 
 3 10 
 3 10 
 3 10 
 
 £ 
 86439 
 82922 
 68712 
 62202 
 71750 
 64 "750 
 66500 
 
 £ 
 
 271667 
 284304 
 237547 
 203044 
 235750 
 197487 
 198075 
 
 . d 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 £ 
 358106 
 367226 
 306259 
 265246 
 307500 
 262237 
 264575 
 
 s. d 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 500500 
 
 The Average 
 
 of annual du 
 
 ty paid for 
 
 these 7 years, 
 
 was 
 
 71500/. 
 
 503275 
 
 1627874 2131149 
 
 Deduct for Composition actually paid by the Bank of 1 ,„ 
 England on their Circulation for 7 Years J" ^""'^OO 
 
 The Loss of Revenue during these 7 Years, as com- 
 pared with the Duties which Country Bankers 
 would have paid, and if chartered Banks are estab- 
 
 ■ ' ■■ "" — — -s-jg" ' " lished, I estimate they will, hereafter, pay is 
 
 To which must be added the Annual sum paid by the 
 Country Bankers for their Licences, say 26000/. 
 
 per Annum for 7 Years J 
 
 Thus the Government, by the Bank Charter, suffered a Total loss of Revenue for 7 Years, estimated at 1,812,649 
 
 The Annual Loss showed by the above scale is. . 232,949/. 
 Ditto. Annual Licences 26,000/. 
 
 1,630,649 
 
 182,000 
 
 The Aggregate Annual Loss to the Revenue is .f 258,949 o 
 
 K^ A copy of the above Calculations was sent to each Member of the Secret Committee on the Bauk Charter, 23d July, 1832.
 
 An Account of the Average Amount of Circulation on a 3-qrs, Calculation, on which the Bank of Kiigland paid 
 Composition in lit u of ^^tanip Duties, from Weekly Keturiis, from 9th April, 18-25, to 5th April, 182H. 
 
 The amount of C'ompositioii naiii by the 
 Bank of Kngland under 55 Geo. ad, cap. 
 184, is £3,500 per million. 
 
 Description of Notes, ave- 
 rage for the Year 1827. 
 
 Bank Notes 
 
 Bank Post Bills 
 
 Bills drawn by the Branch j 
 Banks J 
 
 Total. . . . 
 
 Amount of Circula- 
 tion. 
 
 19,178,582 8 
 2,122,405 10 
 
 16,530 3 
 
 d. 
 
 14 
 
 iT 
 
 2^ 
 
 21,317,5is 
 
 Fraction. 
 
 Total amount of Composition 
 
 .\ccording to the rate of Duty paid byCoun 
 try Bankers, as illustrated in the annexed 
 account, the Averaece for 7 ytiirs being 
 14Z. 16s. Od. per 1000/., it would have 
 amounted to 
 
 Which occasioned a loss of Revenne on 
 this single year of 
 
 Duty paid to 
 Revenue. 
 
 the 
 
 ■£. s. 
 
 66,125 4 
 
 7,317 15 
 
 56 19 
 
 d. 
 7i 
 6 
 
 '1 
 
 73,500 
 
 315,491 12 
 
 241,991 12 
 
 The following results are deduced from the foregoing statements and estimates on a seven years average: — 
 
 That the Country Bankers' circulation was at that period about one-fourth of that of the Bank of England. 
 
 That the Country Circulation paid a duty on 5,171,000/. annually of no less than 20/. 6s. per 1,000, amounting to 
 102,700/. per annum, while the Bank of England, on a circulation of 20,542,000/., paid only 3/. 10s. per 1,000 ; 
 amounting only to 71,500/. per annum, which, according to this estimate, is about 570/. to 575/. for every 100/. paid by 
 the Bank of England, or equal to 5,000/. to 5,700/. for every 1,000/. paid by the Bank. 
 
 That displacing Country Bankers and substituting Bank of England Branch Banks, was an injudicious monopoly, 
 whereby the Revenue was diminished in proportion to the extent of that measure, by diminishing the circulating medium, 
 at that time so highly productive to the Revenue, while the Bank of England was comparatively unproductive. 
 
 That the same beneficial results to the Revenue and to the country arising from Country Banking Circulation cannot 
 be secured unless the Legislature extend to England the same advantages which they have afforded to Scotland and Ireland, 
 and that Chartered Banks be established, unlimited in number and restricted in responsibility, with a "well secured one- 
 pound note circulation, and returns made to Government either monthly or quarterly on oath, as may be required. 
 
 COUNTRY BANK NOTES. 
 
 Comparison and Results shewing the Loss of Duty by the withdrawal of Small Notes, and the operation of tlie Ac^ 
 of thp 9th Geo. W ., c. ^.S, callt'd the Composition Act. 
 
 .£ s. d. £ 8. d. 
 
 In 1822, 23, 24, 25— The amount of duty 
 
 paid on Notes Stamped was 348,673 3 The total nominal value of notes stamped 1 ___-. _„ 
 
 (This was preceding the panic of 1825,26, in 1822-23-24-25 was ^ .i.J,»ui,yyu 
 
 which occasioned, first, the London Ban- 
 kers, and, consequently, the Country Ban- 
 kers, to stop payment.) 
 In 1826, 27, 28, 29— The amount of duty 
 
 paid was only 113,550 19 4 The total nominal value of notes stamped 1 _ ^,„ „,, 
 
 iu 1826-27-28-29 was / ».o' /,"/■* " 
 
 The loss in duty on these four years is. .. . -i'235,122 11 And during this period the amount of 
 
 notes issued w as less than the four for- 
 mer years by 14,184,916 
 
 Aga'nst this loss of Duty, £4,268 12s. Od., is the amount estimated to be receivtil under 9 Geo. IV., c. 23, taking the 
 Duty to he on £1,219,629, at 7s. per cent. ; but as these amounts include A'o/c* ami liill** of Exchange, which are not 
 distinguished iu the account sent to the Stamp Office, and as only 3s. 6d. per cent, is cli:irgeable on Bills of Kxchange, 
 while 7s. is chargeable on Notes, it is impossible to arrive at the actual Duty paid mi e:u-li, or to ascertain what pro- 
 portion, re-issuable Notes bears to the Bills of Exchange. In the next returns to I'arliamcnt, it would be advisable to 
 have this objection removed. 
 
 X 8. d. 
 
 Comparison and results — In 1S25, the amount of re-issuable Notes was 8,755,309/., the l iity pa id there- 
 on for one year was ' r?"'. . r. '21 ,«)7fi 19 O 
 
 For the /e;ur succeeding years, viz., 1826, 27, 28, 29, the amount was 9,617,074/., aud tin Duty paid was 1 13,550 19 4 
 
 The Notes issued being only 862,765/. excess on four years, while the Duty was less by 8,425 19 8 
 
 Giving the advantage of the whole Duty on Bills of Exchange as above 4,268 3 
 
 The Duty on Bankers Notes for four years, viz., 1826, 27, 28, 29, was less productive than the Duty 
 
 received for 1825, by the sum of. 4,157 16 8 
 
 While the Circulating Medium is lessened in this period, as above stated. 14,184,91"/., of which n very considerable 
 portion would have rrniaiiird out, for the use of Tradi-rx, the Bunk of iMitrlaud Direr'ors li.ive now reduced their cir- 
 culation to about 16,000,000/., which during the above-named four years, averaged about iy,o00,000/. 

 
 10 
 
 n Account shewing tbe different proportion* of Country H-.ink Notes issued iroiu the iitump Office, and circulated 
 in Ens-land as compared with the nominul aggregate amount of Notes Stamped for the Country Bankers' Circula- 
 lation Also the proportions of Duty paid on the different classes of Notes as compared with the aggregate 
 amount of Duty so paid, the whole being for seven years immediately precedmg the panic of 18'2d, 26, viz., from 
 
 amount of T)uty so p 
 
 1819 to lfs'i.5, both inclusive 
 
 'Ihe proportion of 1/. and 21 
 notes stamped for Country 
 Hankers, as compared with 
 the aggregate amount is 
 sued ; also the duty paid 
 thereon. 
 
 Years. 
 
 1S19 
 1820 
 1821 
 1822 
 1823 
 182-i 
 1825 
 
 Propor- 
 tion of 
 
 Notes 
 Stampt. 
 
 Propor- 
 tion of 
 Duty 
 Paid. 
 
 3-7ths. 
 
 i 
 
 i 
 3-7ths. 
 4-9ths. 
 5-8ths. 
 4-7ths. 
 
 3-5ths. 
 2-3rds. 
 2-3rds. 
 5-8ths. 
 5-8ths. 
 5-8ths. 
 7-13ths. 
 
 Notes above ll. & 
 2Z.,&Duty Paid 
 thereon. 
 
 Propor- 
 tion of 
 Notes 
 Stampt. 
 
 Propor- 
 tion of 
 Duty 
 Paid. 
 
 4-7ths. 
 
 i 
 
 4-7ths. 
 5-9ths. 
 :?-8ths. 
 3-7ths. 
 
 2-5ths. 
 
 l-3rd. 
 
 l-3rd. 
 
 3-8ths. 
 
 3-8ths. 
 
 3-8ths. 
 
 6-13ths, 
 
 Notes consisting 
 of 1/., 2/., and 
 5/., and Duty 
 Paid thereon, 
 
 Propor- 
 tion of 
 Notes 
 
 Stampt. 
 
 7-lOths 
 3-4ths. 
 4-5ths. 
 3-4ths. 
 3-4ths. 
 3-4ths. 
 3-4ths. 
 
 Propor- 
 tion of 
 Duty 
 Paid. 
 
 6-7ths. 
 
 9-lOths. 
 
 9-lOths 
 
 7-Sths. 
 
 7-8ths. 
 
 7-8ths. 
 
 5-6ths. 
 
 Notes above the 
 value of One 
 2l., and 5?., viz 
 lOl. & upwards 
 and Duty Paid 
 thereon. 
 
 Propor- 
 tion of 
 Notes 
 
 Stampt. 
 
 3-lOths, 
 
 l-4th. 
 
 l-5th. 
 
 l-4th. 
 
 l-4th. 
 
 l-4th. 
 
 l-4th. 
 
 Propor- 
 tion of 
 Duty 
 Paid. 
 
 l-7th. 
 
 1-lOth. 
 
 1-lOth. 
 
 l-8th. 
 
 l-8th. 
 
 l-8th. 
 
 l-6th. 
 
 Copies of Returns made from 
 the Stamp Office to Parlia- 
 ment for the Years 1819 to 
 1825, 
 
 The aggregate 
 nominal amount 
 
 of Country 
 Notes Stampt 
 
 4,465,092 
 3,493,901 
 4,438,548 
 4,293,164 
 4,479,448 
 6,274,069 
 8,755,309 
 
 .£36,199,531 
 
 Nominal amount 
 
 of Notes 
 Stamped in se- 
 ven Years. 
 
 The aggregate 
 
 amount of Duty 
 
 Paid on Notes 
 
 Stampt. 
 
 64,754 
 54,238 
 69,252 
 64,124 
 67,303 
 95,267 
 121,976 
 Fraction 4 
 
 .i536,9i8 
 
 Duty actually 
 Paid on Notes 
 Stamped in se- 
 ven Years. 
 
 EXTRACT FROM " GUARDIAN AND PUBLIC LEDGER." 
 
 " By the evidence, now undergoing the process of 
 being j)rinted, a most extraordinary exposition is given 
 of the financial operations of the Bank and the govern- 
 ment, which led to the panic in 1825, and the sup- 
 pression of small notes in 1826. Lord Liverpool, it 
 will be recollected, was prime minister at that period, 
 and the present illustrious Lord Goderich Chancellor 
 of the Exchequer. When the panic had worked its 
 devastation, every one was anxious to learn what had 
 caused it. The ministerial explanalion was at length 
 given, and it amounted to this, namely, that undue 
 speculation had been encouraged, and the cvrrency de- 
 ranged, by the artful and dishonest practices of the 
 country bankers. This was a grave and serious charge, 
 which many persons believed to be well founded ; and 
 as a proof that ministers wished the public to adopt their 
 belief, they instantly consigned the offending parties to 
 ruin. The majority survived the blow thus aimed at 
 their credit ; but upwards of a hundred less prepared, 
 were compelled to stop patjment, encounter the dishonour, 
 and bear with the calumny, although many of them were 
 in possession of property and securities equal to forty 
 shillings in the pound. 
 
 ' ♦ The country bankers indignantly denied the charge, 
 retaliated upon the government, boldly accused his 
 Majesty's ministers of being the sole authors of the 
 paiiic.and, in order to est^^tJ.'^'^ t^ii-Charge, demanded 
 an inquiry into the affairs o\ the Bank of England. 
 From that time to this, it has only been a war of o\n 
 nion — the evidence could not be procured— </ie Bank 
 kept its secret, and the Governinent theirs. 
 
 " Now, however, at this late hour, the truth, like 
 murder, has come out ! The^evidence, now about to 
 see the light, gives us a most instructive history of 
 that memorable period. But in order to render it in- 
 telligible we must go back from 1826 to 1822. 
 
 "The year 1822 was one of great distress. The 
 agricultural party, then more powerful than at pre- 
 sent, were bombarding the Treasury with strong and 
 angry remonstrances. The farmers were on the brink 
 of ruin. The impending change in the currency had 
 taken effect— prices were unusually low, cattle were 
 unsaleable, rents could not be paid. In this dilcmnja 
 
 the government of Lord Liverpool applied to the Bank 
 for advice and assistance. After much deliberation, 
 it was resolved to avert the effects of the Currency 
 Bill, and increase the amount of circulating money by 
 an increased issue of Bank paper. Four millions were 
 applied to this purpose. The Bank bought Exchequer 
 Bills, discounted most freely, and negociated loans, un- 
 der the .ipecial direction of the government, so that m 
 
 1823 not less than four millions had been added to the 
 circulation. Let it not for a moment be forgotten that 
 this increased issue of paper was forced upon the 
 Bank by the Liverpool administration. The effect of 
 it was salutary in the highest degree. It answered 
 the expectation of all parties. The gloom was speedily 
 dispersed— industry revived— prices rose- the ware- 
 houses were cleared of their manufactures, and before 
 
 1824 the nation was restored to a most desirable state 
 of prosperity. In the beginning of 1825 the prospe- 
 rity of the country had still further advanced. In the 
 spring of that year, Mr. Robinson, now Lord Gode- 
 rich, submitted his famous budget, and told us that 
 all the interests of the empire were in a flourishing 
 condition— that the demand was greater than the sup- 
 ply—that the laborer was happy and contented, and 
 the sunshine of prosperity beaming upon us, ' through 
 the portals of our ancient institutions.' 
 
 " About the month of August, however, in that fa- 
 mous year, the Bank l)j;j;an to feel alarmed for the 
 consetpiences. The exchanges had turned against us — 
 the mania of specitlation raged— foreign loans were con- 
 tracted— and the coffers of the Bank began to exhibit a 
 beggarly account of empty boxes. In short, the gold 
 was fast leaving "the country. It is in evidence, as 
 will hereafter appear, that in the month of September, 
 1825, the whole amount of Bullion in the Bank—a■^d by 
 bullion we mean coined and uncoined gold and silver 
 of every sort— did not exceed i^l ,300,000. In this 
 dilemma the Directors consulted the Ministers, ap- 
 prised them of their apprehensions, and intimated the 
 course which necessity, policy, and self-preservation 
 imposed upon them. They sold Exchequer Bills to a 
 large amount — to so large an amount that they fell to 
 5s. discount. Government were bound to relieve the
 
 11 
 
 Jianli: by taking up at lea^t six millions of these bills, 
 and the usual period for doing so had arrived. The 
 payment was deferred for a week ; andat last //<e^o?ie»-w- 
 ment were compelled to declare that they vcre unable 
 to meet them. Here, then, was a struggle — remem- 
 ber, reader, all this in evidence — whether the govern- 
 ment or the Bank should first commit an act of insol- 
 vency. Had the Bank purchased these Bills, without 
 diminishing their discounts to an equal amount, their 
 ruin would have been inevitable ; and had the govern- 
 ment been compelled to receive them, they must have 
 stopped payment. The Ministers first compelled the 
 Bank to increase its issues, and when these irere return- 
 ing upon them, and their gold disappearing, the govern- 
 ment not only refused to assist them, but further 
 compelled them to re-purchase those very bills for 
 which the government could not provide. The conse- 
 quences were that, in order to meet the necessities of the 
 ministry, the Bank was obliged to withdraw six millions 
 of money fimn the busiiiess and trading circulation of 
 the country. 
 
 " But this was not the worst part of the transaction. 
 When the Bank had drained the country, and been 
 drained herself, in order to meet the exigencies of the 
 government, and was reduced to the most helpless 
 state, the [ministers refused to afford her even the 
 slightest relief. It is a fact — stated in evidence by a 
 Director — that in November, or the beginning of Decem- 
 ber, 1825, the Bank coffers rvere so exhausted — so ' mise- 
 rably loiv,' — that the amount of coined and micoined gold 
 and silver did not exceed One Hundred Thousand 
 Pounds ! She was drained to her last sixpence almost — 
 the panic was at its height — her doors were besieged 
 by applicants from all parts of the country imploring 
 assistance. The most undoubted securities were offered 
 for a small supply of gold iti any shape, or silver in any 
 shape, but none had she to spare. 
 
 " At this last crisis, when six hours more of the mn 
 would have compelled them to close their doors, the 
 Directors made another appeal to the government. 
 They depicted their desperate condition — detailed the 
 embarrassment of all classes — the tide of ruin that 
 
 was rolling over the count nj, and demanded a temporary 
 suspension of cash payments. This was positively re- 
 fused. Mr. Huskisson was consulted, and gave them 
 this advice, — ' Stick vp,' said that great statesman, 
 ' a paper on the doors of the Bank, intimating your situ- 
 ation, and informing t lie public, that although you cannot 
 pay in gold for theprenent, yet that in the course of a 
 few weeks you will be fully prepared to meet all de- 
 mands! ! /' 
 
 " We pledge ourselves that these are, as nearly as 
 possible, the precise words uttered by Mr. Huskisson. 
 The artful advice was indignantly rejected by the Di- 
 rectors. They had one resource left, but one which 
 they had never contemplated taking advantage of; and 
 one withal which it was fortunate for them the law 
 still permitted them to employ. They had a s-upply of 
 unused one pound notes. They issued these — lent them 
 to the country bankers— a.nd by means of these con- 
 demned notes, and these alone, they preserved their own 
 credit, and saved the country. 
 
 " Here, then, the wickedness of the government in 
 1825 and in 1826 is rendered apparent. They first 
 force upon the Bank the payment of bills which they 
 themselves could not meet, and drain the country to 
 preserve their own credit— they, in order to save 
 themselves from ruin, attempt to involve the Bank in 
 ruin ; and when both are extricated, almost by a 
 miracle, they turn round with shameless eflFrontery, 
 and charge the consequenees of their own perfidy and 
 folly to the account of the country bankers ! From 
 the evidence which has transpired before this Secret 
 Committee — the evidence of Bank Directors, and 
 others of undoubted credibility, and which will be in 
 every man's hands before many days— from this evi- 
 dence, we say, we have no hesitation in asserting, 
 that the ministry of Lord Goderich were the sole au- 
 thors of the measures which led to the panic of 1825, 
 and the sole authors of the calamitous consequences 
 which followed — the effects of which the nation still 
 feels, and will continue to labor under, till a far dif- 
 ferent kind of policy is pursued from that at present 
 in operation." 
 
 EXTRACT FROM " THE COURIER." 
 
 Th« first step towards the amendment of our existing 
 monetary system, it to ascertain where the principal evil 
 of it lies. Let any man take the evidence of tiie wit- 
 nesses examined by the Bank Committee, and judge for 
 himself. In the table of the quantity of bullion held by 
 the Bank of England at diflerent consecutive periods, and 
 of Its concomitant liabilities, it will be seen that the em- 
 barrassments of 1816, the convulsion of 1822, and the 
 panic of 1825, were clearly owing to the contraction of 
 the circulation on the part of the Bank. 
 
 From 1797 to the present time, the country has been 
 unceasingly exposed to th« disastrous operation of the 
 unavoidable fluctuations of the issues of the Bank of 
 England. 
 
 In 1816, general and severe distress prevailed through- 
 out the country. 
 
 In 1816, the amount of the circulating medium was 
 prospectively reduced by th« Bank in anticipation of 
 Peel's Bill. 
 
 In 1817 and 1818 the distress generally ceased. 
 
 And why 1 because 
 
 In 1817 and 1818, Pkll's Bill being suspended, the 
 circulation was increased. 
 
 In 1819, 1820, 1821, and 1822, the country was again 
 plunged into a state of extreme distress. 
 
 In 1818 was passed Peel's Bill, enforcing the return 
 of a bullion circulation in 1823; and obliging the Bank 
 to reduce its circulation in preparation for payments in 
 metals. This^reduction of the circulation continued till 
 1822. 
 
 In 1823 the distress was ciiecked, and its pressure sus- 
 pended till 1825. 
 
 In 1822 Lord Londonderry checked the operation of 
 Peel's Bill, so as to suspetd its operation for three years. 
 
 At the end of the three years, — the latest period to 
 which the death-blow of Pake's Bill to the industry and 
 the welfare of the country was suspended, — came the 
 grand crash, in 1825, which iius been distinguished as 
 the year of tiie panic. .Vn«; what has been the condition 
 of the country since ? What, but a series of dislurlw 
 ances, insurrections, sarkiOis of towns, rural burnings ; 
 in short, a state of irritalie discontent ever verging on 
 outbreaking and insurrcctioli. 
 
 The alternation •-^•' ' ''"tT'^BM and checks to the 
 operations of industry pro( %ce>( hy tbe fluctuating issues 
 of the Bank of England, h /iWoduced a general feeling 
 of the otal insecuiity and liaiird of all mercantile, manu- 
 facturing, and agricultuijif transactions. Capital lies 
 dormant for want of confiti^ncc in its distribution. No 
 care, no judgment, no precaution, has lH?en able to guard 
 against the sudden ilepreciitions and losses resulting from 
 a fluctuating amount of the circulating medium, of tii« 
 sudden increase or diminution of which no one has been 
 able to form even a conjecture. Hence has arisen the 
 general stagnation of every brancU of trade, the deaith of 
 employment, and the inadequate wages of labor. A 
 financial cholera has been j)aralyzing all the operations of 
 industry, and has kept the body politic in a slate of un- 
 ceasing and terrible convulsion. 
 
 A 
 
 A
 
 12 
 
 EXTRACT FROM "THE MARK LANE EXPRESS'" CORRESPONDENT, AGRICOL^. 
 
 In Mr. Palmer's evidence, we have the reluctant admis- 
 sion of what every writer of common sense has constantly 
 insisted upon, namely — that the alternate contractions and 
 expansions of the Bank issues, have always produced a 
 corresponding depression and rise in prices. The most 
 important question we meet with touching this part of the 
 subject, is the following : " Must not the alterations 
 which take place in your extension or contraction of your 
 circulation, keep the prices in this country in a state of 
 constant change and revolution 1" Answer — " If there 
 be frequent contractions and expansions, there inay be 
 frequent fluctuations of prices." J/" there be — much mis- 
 chief (as well as virtue) in an if. Now, if Mr. Palmer's 
 mind be not made up as to this point, and that he still 
 lacks conviction of the Bank of England having been one 
 of the great auxiliary causes (Peel's Bill of course being 
 the primary one) I beg to refer him to the first four, (as 
 well as several subsequent numbers) of your journal, in 
 which I have demonstrated, from authority which defies 
 contradiction, that from the middle of last century to the 
 first quarter of the present, the frequent contraction of the 
 bank issues always brought with it national calamity, while 
 the subsequent expansion has invariably produced a con- 
 trary effect. 
 
 But in Mr. Ward's evidence there is one question, the 
 reply to which is extremely valuable, as establishing this 
 position in reference to Agriculture. Mr. Ward is re- 
 minded of the decision of the Government in 1822 — that 
 sunless year in the farmer's calendar — when an additional 
 4,000,000 of bank notes were put into circulation with a 
 view to revive speculation and restore the prosj)erity of 
 the country ; and is asked whether he did not consider that 
 by such an increase much good effects would result ? Mr. 
 Ward says — " I recollect distinctly many of the circum- 
 stances referred to. Government had at that time received 
 many complaints relating to the agricultural distress, and 
 the depression of prices ; and I think the price of wheat 
 was at one time as low as 37s., [per quarter], the average 
 for the year was as low as about 43s. My own opinion is, 
 that whatever circumstances were in operation, one if the 
 most unfavorable circumstances that occasioned the low prices, 
 was the very low state of the aggregate currency of the coun- 
 try. I stated in my former examination, that the amount 
 of country notes which had been at 20,000,000, had be- 
 come reduced in one year to 16,000,000, and had been 
 then reduced to 11,000,000 ; and by the year 1821, it had 
 been reduced to 7,000,000 sterling: the consequence was, 
 that not only prices were low, but that a disinclination to 
 transact business, and a great deal of positive evil existed ; 
 and I think the agriculturists had a clear right to complain 
 of that circumstance. I think Government had a clear 
 right to restore the pi-ices, in some degree to relieve them 
 from that depression, and I do not know any other means 
 by which it could be done, than by giving them at least 
 as good a currency, as full a currency, as was legitimate 
 in connexion with the laws relating to currency. When 
 the season of 1822 arrived, I think it was a very wise 
 measure to try to stimulate prices ; I believe that mode- 
 rate speculation itself 's^a.^od ratlier than an evil ; but 
 that the difficulty is in re^Jil'r w§ tl^e degree. If persons, 
 when once speculation isseta^-going, carry it to a prepos- 
 terous extent, they must iikel the consequences of it ; but 
 1 do consider it beneficial tt w'le country that there should 
 be a certain degree of enteipirise ; and there was a great 
 want of what I should call pi legitimate degree of enter- 
 prise at that period, and a depression of price in conse- 
 quence, of which I think tbs parties were entitled to ask 
 for relief." 
 
 Now I am aware it has been asserted by some, that the 
 country bankers, by the largo reductions occasionally made 
 in their circulation, mainly contributed to the ruinous 
 depression in prices, and consequent pressure on industry, 
 which have occurred at different periods. But, in order 
 to see how far this imputation is sustainable, let us, for a 
 moment, contemplate the situation of this class of traders 
 at particular epochs, and I tbink we shall discover that 
 they were not deserving of the reproach. | 
 
 Witliout going farther back, it may sufllice to state, tliat 
 by the 55th Geo. 111., c. 6, one pound notes had been 
 continued until 25th March, 1826 ; that by the 56th Geo. 
 III., c. 21, (1816,) one-pound notes were allowed to 
 circulate " until two years after the resumption of cash pay- 
 ments by the Bank of England ;" and by the 3d Geo. IV., 
 c. 70, the circulation of one-pound notes was continued 
 until the 5th of January, 1833. Now, the country bankers, 
 relying on the good f'aitli of Parliament, tnd on tlie 
 avowed intentions of his Majesty's Government, namely, 
 that the 5th of January, 1833, would he the final period 
 for the circulation of one-)iound notes, made their arrange- 
 ments accordingly. 
 
 This, be it remembered, was the state of the law until 
 the end of 1825. Country bankers, of course, continued 
 to issue one-pound notes in their respective districts, as 
 the trade of those districts required, always keeping in 
 view the period (January, 1833), when, according to Act 
 of Parliament, they were no longer to be issued. But in 
 February, 1826, to the great dismay and surprise of the 
 provincial bankers — His Majesty's Ministers announced 
 it to be their intention to shorten the period for issuing one- 
 pound notes, from 1833 to 1829 ! Country bankers were 
 in no way consulted upon this occasion. No Parlia- 
 mentary inquiry was entered upon to ascertain whether 
 the waiits of the public would be interfeied with, or the 
 regular employment of the people interrupted by such a 
 sudden alteration— or whether a supply of gold could be 
 ensured equal to the amount of notes to be withdrawn in 
 England and Wales. , The period of 1829, however, being 
 thus fixed upon by his Majesty's ministers, those country 
 bankers who had not a sufficient quantity of stamps by 
 them to keep up their issues until that period, applied 
 to the Stamp Office for the needful supply. But here an 
 unexpected impediment was raised against their applica- 
 tion. His Majesty's ministers, by an official letter ad- 
 dressed to the Commissioners of Stamps, forbade them to 
 issue any stamps for one-pound notes to any country banker 
 whatsoever ; thus anticipating, on their own responsibility, 
 the prohibition intended to be included in their Act of 
 Parliament. 
 
 By this extraordinary proceeding, country bankers were 
 severally placed in different relative situations. Those 
 who had by them a sufficient stock of stamps, were en- 
 abled to prepare to issue one-pound notes until 1829 — 
 whilst those who had relied upon the law of tlie land as 
 it previously stood, to procure, as occasion might require, 
 the needful supply of stamps were disabled from making any 
 further issues ; at the same time the New Act of Parlia- 
 ment made it lawful for all country bankers mdiscrjminate- 
 ly to continue the issuuig of one-pound notes until 1829. 
 ihe nnural consequence of thus "tampering with the 
 currency," and the harsh proceedings of these ministers 
 was, to precipitate thepayment of one-pound notes, and in- 
 deed notes of all amounts. But what rendered this state 
 of things more oppressive to the country banker was, 
 the culpable negligence of the Government in not ensuring 
 an adequate supply of gold to be given in exchange for 
 the notes thus driven in upon their respective issuers. 
 Nay, it is notorious to all connected with banking busi- 
 ness at that period, that when some of the country bank- 
 ers who were possessed of the most ample funds in Bank 
 of England notes, applied to the Bank of England for 
 gold in exchange for them, they were informed that the Di- 
 rectors had nM gold enough to take them up ! The Bank 
 Directors, moreover, informed the London bankers of their 
 inability to pay all their notes in gold, and requested that 
 country bankers might be prevailed upon to take small 
 bank notes into the country, and not press them for gold. 
 All this, be it remembered, was passing at the very time 
 when the law required the Bank Directors equally with 
 the country bankers to pay all their notes in gold on 
 demand. I'he country bankers exercised the most honor- 
 able forbearance towards the Bank of England, and took 
 their small notes instead of gold. 
 
 Printed by Joseph Rogerson, Old Boswell Court, London.
 
 
 
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