710.1 M74u Studies in Land Economics Research Monograph No. i Richard T. Ely, Editor S. c Ohe Use of Deed Restrictions in Subdivision Development By Helen C. Monchow Published By The Institute for Research in Land Economics and Public Utilities 337 East Chicago Avenue CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 1928 IKE LIBRARY 0F1 UNlYERStir OF I! ILLINOIS HISTORICAL SURVEY LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN 710.1 M7^u iujkqis mxMki si ixoiB msTonrcAz Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2012 with funding from University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign http://www.archive.org/details/useofdeedrestricOOmonc c Uhe Use of Deed Restrictions in Subdivision Development By Helen C. Monchow Published By The Institute for Research in Land Economics and Public Utilities 337 East Chicago Avenue CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 1928 COPYRIGHT 1928 BY THE INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN LAND ECONOMICS & PUBLIC UTILITIES CHICAGO, ILLINOIS TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword ii Author's Preface iii Chapter I. Deed Restrictions in Controlling Land Development 1-7 II. The Developer's Plan as a Basis for Deed Restrictions 8-15 Chapter III. The Legal Aspects of Deed Restrictions 16-26 Chapter IV. Restrictive Clauses Concerning Type and Use of Structures and Lot Area 2 7~45 Chapter V. Other Clauses Dealing with Duration, Administration and Racial Re- strictions 46-71 \ Valuation of Deed Restrictions as a Control Device 7 2_ 78 Table of Dec Is Analyzed 79 Table of Cases Cited 81 Index 82 T 59541 FOREWORD With this study the Institute begins the publication of two series of research mono- graphs, one in the field of Land Economics and the other in Public Utility Economics. Heretofore, the results of research by members of the Institute staff have appeared in its own Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics, other periodicals and books. These series of research monographs form an intermediate way of publishing the results of its inves- tigations. The Journal appears quarterly and carries short articles. The books that have been published survey a considerably larger field. The research monographs will be media for certain phases of larger research projects more ample than those covered by Journal articles and yet more restricted than those in books. They will be published from time to time as the material ripens rather than regularly or periodically. Cooperative research is an established policy of the Institute. Although each individual is responsible for the research work that he does, he has full opportunity to confer with other members of the staff and obtain their suggestions and various points of view. The result is that each publication of the Institute of whatever length represents to a certain degree the combined efforts of the staff together with, in certain cases, the advice of informed persons not affiliated with the staff. This monograph is no exception to this policy. Richard T. Ely, Director, Institute for Research in Land Economics and Public Utilities. AUTHOR'S PREFACE From the standpoint of controlling development the pattern of our modern cities is determined largely by the activities of two groups, the realtors and the city planners. Each seeks to establish through legal means the plan it has conceived for the area in question. Thus city planning, zoning and subdivision control ordinances together with private con- tracts in the form of deed restrictions make up the composite of control under which our cities are growing up. This study of deed restrictions represents therefore only one phase of the larger subject of control over the development of urban land. approach is essentially economic rather than legal, although it has been necessary - some of the legal problems and their economic significance. The purpose has been to consider specific control provisions and to analyze their effect (i) upon the land actu- ally covered by the deed and (2) upon the relations between the conveyor and purchaser of e land, who are the parties to the contract. The broader implications of control through restrictions in deeds, i. e., their effect on the city pattern as a whole, have not been con- sidered. The writer has tried to keep in mind the seller and buyer of subdivision property and to analyze and evaluate these control devices in the light of the relations between the parties to that transaction. A further limitation, of course, lies in the relatively small number of deeds analyzed. However, the sample is fairly well scattered from the point of view of both geography and time and represents a wide range of control. In securing these deeds the writer is indebted to the National Association of Real Estate Boards for the use of material in its files, to Olm- sted Brothers, landscape architects, for supplying a copy of the charted summary of restric- tions on properties developed by them, and to the individual subdividers who sent sample deeds and other materials pertaining to their subdivision activities. The writer wishes spe- cially to thank Mr. Harry E. Smoot and Mr. Charles S. Ascher, who read the manuscript, lose parts dealing with the legal phases, but who are in no way responsible for pressed. Finally, appreciation is due various members of the Institute staff who have offered valuable suggestions and counsel. Helen C. Monchow Chicago, Illinois November, 1928 111 CHAPTER I Deed Restrictions in Controlling Land Development CHICAGO'S open lake front in the heart of the city is frequently admired. Yet this stretch of land >m Michigan Avenue eastward to the is opposite what is nearly the most valuable and intensively developed land The question naturally arises: How has this valuable lake front )een preserved from commercial use? : answer lies mainly in the ex- istence of restrictions drawn for the f the abutting property when was subdivided in 1836 and 1839. ♦he land between Michigan Avenue and the lake was marked on the "open ground, no building" and "public ground forever to remain vacant Since then these restric- s have been attacked repeatedly but unsuccessfully in the courts. In three decisions 1 the courts have upheld the trictions. Briefly stated, the judicial easoning was (1) that the owners of property are entitled to an junction against the use of the park for purposes other than those desig- nated in the original dedication; (2) :hat the restrictions apply not only to area referred to in the plat of the original subdivision but also to the land which has been added toward 1 (3) that legislation cannot divest a legal right set forth in the dedi- cation. ; 'ake front is an outstanding fthe effectiveness of this type ver land development, the firm legal status it has attained, and the eat influence it may exert on the v. Ward, 169 111. 392 (1897); B/i95o 20 yr. period with consent of owners of 65% area Freeman Sub'n Providence, R. I. To 1955 Gatewood Ga.dens R. C. Erskine & Co. Seattle, Wash. Great Neck Hills To 1940 Great Neck, L. I. Glen Oaks To 1973 20 yr. period with Guy M. Rush Los Angeles, Cal. consent of owners of J4 area Guilford To 1950 20 yr. period with Baltimore County, Md. consent of J :i own- ers To '950 Fred T. Wood Co. Oakland, Cal. Currier Inv. Co. Detroit, Mich. Highland Park Addition Krenn & Dato, Inc. Chicago, 111. To i960 Howard-Lincoln, etc., Sub'n. . . Krenn & Dato, Inc. Chicago, 111. To i960 Geo. R. Morris Org'n Baltimore, Md. Bills Realty Co. Chicago, 111. Kenilworlh HgMs. Subd'n Wittbold Realty Co. Chicago, 111. A. H. Kraus Co Chicago, 111. Perry Park, Colo. B. H. Laudermilk Co. Chicago, III. favor an interest which vests to a remote period. This attitude is in harmony with the economic point of view which recognizes the undesirability of the pres- ent tying the hands of the future. This principle is particularly significant in its application to transactions involving real estate because of the long-time effect of an individual's act when applied to land. In determining the exact period of the restrictions two major elements are to be considered: (1) the character of the proposed development and (2) the character and expected growth of the community of which the subdivision is a part. There are two aspects to the problem of the relation of the character of the development to the duration of the re- strictive covenants. The most important is to make sure that the restrictions shall continue in force long enough to estab- lish the character of the district. In other words, the minimum duration must cover the period of sale and the period required to see the major portion of the area built up. Some hold that this minimum duration is sufficient, arguing that the built-up area can maintain it- self sufficiently against encroaching uses. Others, however, favor a longer restric- tive period on the ground that the de- velopment should be protected during its probable life in the use for which it was originally designed. The latter posi- tion appears to be more logical, for it would seem that protection is most desir- able when the investment is complete. The intrusion of an inharmonious use into a built-up area would seem to be (Footnote 19 continued from page 57) indestructible interest. The second artificial meaning is an interest which will not vest to a remote period. This latter is the meaning which is attached to the term when the rule against perpetuities is spoken of;' (Gray, Perp. §140.) The author last cited considers it a matter of regret that the rule should not have been known as the rule against remoteness, rather than the rule as against perpetuities." ADMINISTRATIVE AND RACIAL CLAUSES 59 more serious than such intrusion into a comparatively unbuilt district. The second aspect has to do with the kind of development which it is proposed to create. It is impractical to put a 30- or 40-year term on restrictions in con- nection with a development for medium- priced homes. The improvements on such subdivisions cannot be expected to have as long a life as those in the high-priced developments. The rate of obsolescence is more rapid. Thus, the house may have deteriorated seri- ously in 25 years. But rather than spend a considerable amount on it the owner will let it continue to run down for the balance of the restriction period, par- ticularly if the type of use is likely to change at the end of the period. A rela- tion should therefore be established between the life of the improvement and the duration of the restriction. A more important factor in the de- termination of proper duration is the expected growth of the city. In a city which is growing rapidly it is obviously wise to restrict property for a shorter period than in a city of slov/er growth. Two results of failure to calculate dura- tion properly may be noted. From the point of view of the city unwise restric- tions may create blighted districts which stand in the way of the natural growth of the city. From the point of view of the owners of the restricted property, they may no longer supply the protec- tion which was their aim. If the city grows up around them and different uses come up to the very borders of the sub- division, the character of the commu- nity may be practically ruined. This process may be called the obsolescence of restrictions. Extension of Restrictions The extension of the period of restric- tion consists of three elements: (1) the Table V. Duration of Restrictions {Continued) Name of Subdivision and Subdivider and Location Original Term Provisions for Extension Lake Shore Highlands Oakland, Cal. To 1950 20 yr. period with consent 65% of land 20 yrs. 20 yr. period Blair Home Co. Altoona, Pa. To 1965 Seattle, Wash. Maple Hill F. B. McKibbin Co. Lansing, Mich. Spokane, Wash. Little Rock, Ark. Krenn & Dato, Inc. Chicago, 111. To i960 To 1940 20 yr. period with consent of ma- jority Lake Wales, Fla. To 1930 R. C. Erskine & Co. Seattle, Wash. Newton Blvd. Sub'n Newton, Mass. To 1930 Oak Hill Village 30 yrs. Arnold Hartman Boston, Mass. Oyster Harbor, Inc F. W. Norris Co. Boston, Mass. Pacific Southwest Bank Los Angeles, Cal. To 1936 37 yrs. Los Angeles, Cal. consent of owners of Vi area Jemison & Co. Birmingham, Ala. Roland Park To i960 Baltimore County, Md. 33 yrs. Mason-McDuflfie Co. San Francisco, Cal. consent of owners of x /i area Louisville, Ky. New York City To 1920 Baltimore County, Md. To 2026 Van Sweringen Co. Cleveland, Ohio changed by con- sent of owners in block Calgary, Alberta Michigan Inv. Co. Detroit, Mich. To •945 6o DEED RESTRICTIONS IN SUBDIVISION DEVELOPMENT Table V. Duration of Restrictions {Continued) Name of Subdivision and Subdivider and Location Original Term Provisions for Extension R. C. Erskine & Co. Seattle, Wash. 25 yrs. 10 yr. period with consent of owners of 51% front ft. Whitcomb & Keller South Bend, Ind. Sunnyside City Housing Corp. New York City Tavern Acres No. Andover, Mass. To 1970 Tilden Realty Corp Utica, N. Y. Sunset Hill 25 yrs. J. C. Nichols Inv. Co. Kansas City, Mo. consent of owners of 51% front ft. To 1965 Victoria, B. C. To 1970 Wellesley, Mass. 15 yrs. Bowie & Trent San Benito, Tex. Vanderlip Sub'n Scarborough, N. Y. To 1945 With consent of 75% of owners To 1935 Vinsetta Land Co. Detroit, Mich. consent of owners of % area Los Angeles, Cal. 50 yrs. After 20 yrs. 60% Woodmar Realty Co. Hammond, Ind. frontage may ask abrogation To 1970 William Zelosky Chicago, 111. To 1 935 Van Alstine Land Co. Detroit, Mich. sent of owners of % lots length of the extension period; (2) the legal procedure involved in the exten- sion; and (3) the question of who has the power to make such extension. The most common length of the extension period is 20 years, with an occasional 10- or 25- year period mentioned. The legal pro- cedure usually involves the execution of a formal statement which sets forth the intention to continue the restrictions and which shall be filed with the recorder of deeds within a specified time before the expiration of the original term. Somewhat less uniform are the pro- visions with respect to the consent of the owners required for such a continuation. The necessary number is denned in various ways: the owners of a certain percentage of the front footage in the subdivision, the owners of a certain per- centage of the total area, or a certain percentage of all the owners. A typical restriction embodying these points follows: "At the end of this time, January 1, 1950, the above restrictions shall be extended for a period of twenty years from that date and thereafter for successive periods of twenty (20) years. On the date of expiration of each extension the restrictions may be removed, modified or altered for the whole or part of the restricted area, if one year prior to January i, 1950, and one year prior to the expiration of each extension, appropriate instruments in writing, consenting to the removal, modification or alteration of the restrictions, shall be signed, executed and acknowledged by the owners (including The Baker Estates, if they still retain the fee to one or more lots, but not including mort- gagees) of not less than two-thirds of the land included in said tract, exclusive of streets and parks intended for the general use of the owners of the land included in said tract; and provided, further, that any such removal may be made for the whole or part of above mentioned area, with the provision that in no case the area shall be less than the total frontage within a block on a certain street or avenue, and provided further, that such instrument shall be filed with the Recorder of Deeds of Blair County at least one year prior to the expiration of the first twenty-five (25) year period or any of the twenty (20) year periods afterward." 20 A restriction of this nature places the burden upon those lot owners who wish to alter the restrictions. In other words, the restriction provides for the auto- matic renewal of the covenants for 20- year periods unless provision for modifi- cation is made according to certain prescribed rules. But those lot owners who are desirous of making alterations are charged with the responsibility of 20 Alleghany Furnace, Baker Estates, Altoona, Pa. ADMINISTRATIVE AND RACIAL CLAUSES 61 initiating them. This method is most common and is advocated by such a well known developer as Mr. J. C. Nichols. Others, including Mr. Bouton, the de- veloper of Roland Park, advocate plac- ing the burden on those who wish to ex- tend the restrictions. An interesting proposal in connection with the whole problem of the duration of restrictive argeements is that pro- vision be made for the breaking of such restrictions upon consent of a majority of the owners. One objection to this pro- posal is that 51% is a rather small margin. Besides, although a majority of the owners may be ready to transfer their property to a higher use, the city or sur- rounding area may not be able to absorb at once or even within a reasonable time the total area of the subdivision which would be thrown open to the higher use by the vote of 51% of the lot owners. Furthermore, only a small part of the lot owners will be able to take advantage of the higher use and the others not so favorably situated will suffer as a result. In summarizing it should be empha- sized that no general rule can be laid down for determining the proper dura- tion of deed restrictions. This matter must be calculated for each individual subdivision in the light of the conditions which will influence its future. There are certain limits, however, within which this determination of proper duration will take place. The minimum length of the restrictions will be such as to in- sure approximately complete develop- ment of the tract. The subdivider must protect the area until its character is established. At the same time he does not want to preclude the transition of that property into a higher use when that use is economically advisable. Therefore, the maximum limit of the duration will be determined by the ex- pectancy of change in use. But the Table VI. Clauses Providing for Enforcement of Restrictions Name of Subdivision and Subdivider and Location By Whom What Means Alleghany Furnace Baker Estates Altoona, Pa. Run with land Remove or abate violation Ardmore J. R. Robertson & Co. Chicago, 111. Laudermilk Realty Co. Chicago, 111. Armour Hills J. C. Nichols Inv. Co.. Kansas City, Mo. Run with land. Injunction to prevent viola- tion Anchorage Heights Anchorage, Ky. G. R. Morris Org'n Baltimore, Md. Reserved by seller New Britain, Conn. Avon Center Estates . . . H. F. Bowse Cleveland, Ohio Run with land Entering to abate or by bill of equity Aspinwall Hill Sub'n Brookline, Mass. Belmont Country Club . A. T. Mcintosh Co. Chicago, 111. Run with land Barton Hills Ann Arbor, Mich. er's expense Fred T. Wood Co. Oakland, Cal. seller on viola- tion Beacon Falls, Conn. Boston, Mass. Bonnycastle Terrace. . . . Louisville, Ky. Enter to abate at owner's ex- pense Owners' Ass'n Thorpe Bros. Minneapolis, Minn. Brookline Hills Sub'n. . . Brookline, Mass. Entrance to abate or by law Cuyahoga View Heights. Hoiles & Hedden Co. Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio Run with land Seller may enter and abate at ex- pense of owner Colony Hills Springfield, Mass. er's expense Cityco Realty Co Baltimore, Md. Run with land By courts Locust Valley, L. I. Cushing's Island Casco Bay, Me. Run with land Hogel & Mawdsley Carmel, Cal. Devonshire Manor Annex Krenn & Dato, Inc. Chicago, 111. Seller and own- ers 62 DEED RESTRICTIONS IN SUBDIVISION DEVELOPMENT Table VI. Clauses Providing for Enforcement of Restrictions {Continued) Name of Subdivision and Subdivider and Location By Whom What Means Devonshire Manor Krenn & Dato, Inc. Chicago, 111. S. S. Berry Chicago, 111. Estudillo Estates Fred T. Wood Co. Oakland, Cal. I Reversion to seller Fairview Addition Chas. P. Gray Co. Chicago, 111. Run with land Fairway Section Thorpe Brothers Minneapolis, Minn. Forest Hills Gardens Sage Found'n Homes Long Island Seller and own- ers Seller may enter to abate Run with land Fred T. Wood Co. Oakland, Cal. ers' assn. may enter and abate Freeman Sub'n Providence, R. I. Gatewood Gardens R. C. Erskine & Co. Seattle, Wash. Run with land Great Neck Hills Great Neck, L. I. Glen Oaks Homes Assn. Run with land Guy M. Rush Los Angeles, Cal. seller or Assn. may abate Guilford Baltimore Co., Md. Run with land Fred T. Wood Co. Oakland, Cal. seller Harroun Park Sub'n. . . . Currier Inv. Co. Detroit, Mich. Highland Park Add'n . . . Krenn & Dato, Inc. Chicago, 111. Howard-Lincoln, etc. Add'n Sellers and own- ers Krenn & Dato, Inc. Chicago, 111. Geo. R. Morris Org'n. Baltimore, Md. Indian Hill Estates Bills Realty Co. Chicago, 111. Kenilworth Highlands Sub'n Wittbold Realty Co. Chicago, 111. A. H. Kraus Co Chicago, 111. Run with land Lake Wauconda Perry Park, Colo. Laudermilk Villa B. H. Laudermilk Co. Chicago, 111. determination of both of these limits constitutes a problem in forecasting and is subject to all the difficulties inherent in that process. A question might be raised as to whether modifications of restrictions would constitute valid grounds for not enforcing the remaining clauses. The consensus of opinion seems to be that, if the alteration did not impair the benefit of the scheme, the balance of the re- strictions would continue to be enforce- able. 21 The concept of privity estate is the foundation upon which such opinion rests. It also illustrates the importance which the courts attach to a general plan for improvement of the area. Enforcement of Restrictions This section divides itself logically into two parts: (i) the agencies by which the restrictions may be enforced and (2) the powers that may be employed in the enforcing process. First of all, the subdivider may reserve to himself the right to enforce the re- strictions, but this reservation is un- common. The disadvantage of such a provision is patent. The subdivider's interest ceases with the selling out of the subdivision and his departure removes the enforcing agent. The usual practice is to designate these restrictive agree- ments as covenants running with the land, thus making them enforceable by owners of the benefited land. A typical example of this type of provision reads as follows: "The herein enumerated restrictions, reser- vations, agreements and covenants shall be deemed as covenants and not as conditions hereof and shall run with the land and shall bind the Grantee, heirs, executors, adminis- trators and assigns . . . and the pro- visions herein contained shall bind and inure to the benefit of and be enforceable bv the 21 Sanjord v. Keer, (19"). N. J. F.q. 240, 8j Atl. 225 ADMINISTRATIVE AND RACIAL CLAUSES 63 Grantor and by the owner or owners, of any property in said Allotment, their legal repre- sentatives, heirs, executors and assigns, and failure of the Grantor or any property owner to enforce any of such restrictions, covenants provisions and agreements herein contained shall in no event be deemed a waiver of the right to do so thereafter." 22 Another agency of enforcement which is becoming increasingly important is the owners' association. The efficiency of such an organization as an enforcing agent depends, of course, upon the organization itself, i.e., whether it is an active or only a perfunctory body, whether it is legally constituted or an informal association. This question of organization and powers will be dis- cussed in a subsequent section. If it operates efficiently and thoroughly, it no doubt makes an excellent enforcing medium, for it represents the interests of the entire area and from the owners' point of view. The statement has been made that restrictive covenants should be enforce- able by the city. 23 The answer to the question of who may enforce restrictions lies in the answer to the question of who is the owner of the land benefited thereby. As a matter of law, only the owners of the benefited land have the powers of enforcing covenants. Certain restrictions, such as setbacks, might well be considered to be drawn for the benefit of the city. In fact, instances of this exist. Mr. Robert Whitten in response to fur- ther questioning about enforcement by a municipality cited instances in which "the Cleveland Planning Commission has in practice . . . required sub- dividers of residence property to place a building line on the subdivision plat and 22 Cuyahoga View Heights, Hoiles and Hedden, Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio. 23 See Robert Whitten, A Research into the Economics of Land Subdivisions (Syracuse: School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University and Regional Plan of New York and its Environs, 1927) p. 12. Table VI. Clauses Providing for Enforcement of Restrictions {Continued) Name of Subdivision and Subdivider and Location By Whom What Means Lake Shore Highlands . . Oakland, Cal. Right reserved by seller Run with land Seller may enter and abate Blair Home Co. Altoona, Pa. Licton Springs Pk Seattle, Wash. Seller may enter and abate Maple Hill Run with land P. B. McKibbin Co. Lansing, Mich. Spokane, Wash. Justin Matthews Co. . . . Little Rock, Ark. Milwaukee-Howard, Run with land Krenn & Dato, Inc. Chicago, 111. Mountain Lake Lake Wales, Fla. Enter and abate Morningside Heights . . . R. C. Erskine & Co. Seattle, Wash. Newton Blvd. Sub'n. . . . Newton, Mass. Oak Hill Village Arnold Hartman Boston, Mass. Remedies at law. Enter and abate F. W. Norris Co. Boston, Mass. Seller and own- ers Pacific Southwest Bank . Los Angeles, Cal. Reversion. Entry to abate Palos Verdes Estates . . . Los Angeles, Cal. Seller and own- ers Reversion to seller Jemison & Co. Birmingham, Ala. Seller Baltimore Co., Md. St. Francis Wood Mason-McDuffie Co. San Francisco, Cal. Run with land Seller may enter and abate Louisville, Ky. New York City Sudbrook Baltimore Co., Md. fio fine per day after notice to correct Shaker Heights Van Sweringen Co. Cleveland, Ohio Run with land Seller may enter and abate; re- entry for breach of condition Sunalta Calgary, Alberta S. Bloomfield Hghlds. . . Michigan Inv. Co. Detroit, Mich. Run with land 64 DEED RESTRICTIONS IN SUBDIVISION DEVELOPMENT Table VI. Clauses Providing for Enforcement of Restrictions {Continued) Name of Subdivision and Subdivider and Location By Whom What Means Sunrise Addition R. C. Erskine & Co. Seattle, Wash. Run with land Sunnymede Whitcomb & Keller South Bend, Ind. Run with land Sunnyside City Housing Corp. New York City Owners No. Andover, Mass. Tilden Realty Corp. Utica, N. Y. Sunset Hill Run with land J. C. Nichols Inv. Co. Kansas City, Mo. Victoria, B. C. Enter and abate at owner's ex- pense Owners Wellesley, Mass. Run with land Reversion Bowie & Trent San Benito, Tex. Vanderlip Sub'n Scarborough, N. Y. Vinsetta Park Sub'n. . . . Vinsetta Land Co. Detroit, Mich. Run with land Wagner-Thoreson Co. . . Los Angeles, Cal. Run with land Reversion in some cases; also re-entry Woodmar Woodmar Realty Co. Hammond, Ind. Owners Westchester William Zelosky Chicago, 111. Run with land Reversion Westwood Sub'n Van Alstine Land Co. Detroit, Mich. Run with land to state on the plat that the building lines were established for the benefit of the city as well as for the benefit of the in- dividual lot owners and that they were enforceable by the city as well as by the lot owners." These acts were "without any legal authority" and it is doubtful whether they would be upheld at law. Even though in the evolution of legal opinion courts should eventually sanc- tion such practice in these instances, the same principle would not be applicable to other restrictions such as those specifying single-family residences or all drives to be on the left side of the house. It is a fact, however, that municipalities do benefit from private restrictions through economies in improvement at least, even though they may not enforce these clauses. With respect to enforcement two methods are employed depending on whether the restriction is a covenant or a condition. As the reader will recall, in the case of covenants of the type discussed here the usual remedy is found in equity in the form of an in- junction to restrain the violation. This is the accepted procedure. Yet even in the restrictive agreements of some of the best subdivisions it is not uncom- mon to find an attempt on the part of the subdivider to go further in enforcing the restrictions. Frequently, under a clause headed "right to abate," he as- serts a right to enter the premises and abate the violation. "Violation of any restriction or condition or breach of any covenant or agreement herein contained shall give The Baker Estates, in addition to all other remedies, the right to enter upon the land upon or as to which such violation or breach consists, and summarily to abate and remove, at the ex- pense of the owner thereof, any erection, thing or condition that may exist thereon contrary to the intent and meaning of the provisions hereof; and The Baker Estates shall not thereby be deemed guilty or any manner of trespass for such entry, abate- ment or removal, nor be liable to any dam- ages occasioned thereby." 24 An attempt to act on the strength of such a provision, however, seems danger- ous, for the enforcing agent would prob- ably be liable for trespass. It may be useful as a basis for procedure after injunctive relief has been granted by the court. In the main, however, a clause of this sort appears rather as a gesture on 24 Alleghany Furnace, Baker Estates, Altoona, Pa. ADMINISTRATIVE AND RACIAL CLAUSES 65 the part of the subdivider than as a workable restriction. The matter of construing covenants and conditions was discussed in Chapter III. It is sufficient, therefore, at this point merely to reiter- ate that attempts to enforce restrictions by a reverter clause are likely to fail because the courts do not favor insecure titles which are involved in "conditions subsequent." However, certain circumstances justify the use of a condition and if the intention of the parties is clear the courts will sustain the restriction. It therefore behooves the subdivider to be cautious in the use of the reverter clause for such a clause gains weight from limited and well-considered use. In other words, a particularly important restriction, such as the prohibition of ownership and oc- cupancy by non-Caucasians, may well be designated as a condition subsequent; thus "It shall be an express condition in said deed that the premises herein described shall not be conveyed or leased by the grantee or any of the successors in title of the grantee, to any person who is not a Caucasian; that neither the premises herein described nor any of the improvements thereon shall be occupied by anyone who is not a Cau- casian; and that in the event that the premises herein described shall be conveyed or leased by the grantee or any of the suc- cessors in title of the grantee to any person who is not a Caucasian, or in the event that said premises or any improvements erected thereon shall at any time be occupied by a person who is not a Caucasian, the property herein described shall revert to the grantor in said deed free and clear from any claim of the grantee or the successors in title of the grantee, such reversion, however, to be sub- ject to any then existing encumbrance." 25 In addition to the critical attitude of the courts, an economic question may be raised with respect to the use of con- ditions. One of the subdivider's chief 25 Devonshire Manor, Krenn and Dato, Chicago, 111. aims is to dispose of his interest in the property as quickly as possible. He is usually very definite in his unwillingness to resell properties for his original pur- chasers. Therefore, it seems unlikely except in very urgent cases that he would be anxious to enforce a restriction which would bring the property back into his hands for resale. Furthermore, when the enforcing agent is an owners' association, problems may easily arise. For instance, how could such an organi- zation be constituted legally to enable it to receive title to a piece of property as a result of the operation of a reverter clause, for "reversion" implies return to the original grantor. In short, the great- est care should be taken when attempt- ing to enforce restrictive agreements by threat of reversion of title. Before leaving the matter of enforce- ment notice should be given to a clause frequently found which states that fail- ure to take action against violation of a covenant shall not be considered a waiver of the right to do so thereafter. This is an attempt to escape a charge of laches. The courts, however, seem in- clined to regard an omission of enforce- ment as acquiescence in the violation and therefore to refuse to grant relief in the future. 26 On the other hand, cases may be found where courts have handed down opposite rulings. 27 Maintenance Charges The purpose of maintenance charges is to secure funds for the general upkeep and to improve the appearance of the subdivision. They are an important ad- junct to the developer's plan. Such funds are particularly necessary for areas which are outside the corporate 26 Ocean City Assn. v. Chalfant, 65 N.J. F.q. 156, 55 Atl. 801 (1903). 27 Bacon v. Sandberg, 179 Mass. 396, 60 N. E. 936 (1901); also Zippv. Barker, 55 N.Y. Supp. 246 (1898). 66 DEED RESTRICTIONS IN SUBDIVISION DEVELOPMENT limits of a municipality and which there- fore must maintain all their own im- provements. The lists of items for which these funds are to be expended differ widely but the clause reproduced here will give an idea of the nature of the expenditures covered. "Whitcomb and Keller agree to pay their proper proportion into said fund for all the unsold lots and to apply the total fund aris- ing from said charge, as far as the same may be sufficient, toward the payment of the so- called Maintenance Expenses incurred for the following purposes: For lighting, improving and maintaining the streets and the parks and playgrounds, if any, maintained for the general use of owners and occupants of land included in said tract, including all grass and planted areas within the boundaries of such streets, parks and playgrounds; For caring for vacant and unimproved land, on which said Maintenance Charge is being paid, and removing the grass and weeds therefrom; For planting and caring for trees; For ex- penses incident to the examination and ap- proval of plans as herein provided, and to the enforcement of the restrictions, conditions, covenants, easements, charges and agree- ments herein contained; For taxes and assessments, if any, that may be levied by any public authority upon the parks and playgrounds now or hereafter opened, laid out or established for the gen- eral use of the owners of lots included in said tract; and For doing any and all other things that, in the opinion of Whitcomb and Keller may be of general benefit to the property own- ers." 28 The amounts and methods of assessing these charges also differ greatly. With respect to amounts, no generalization can be made. Such figures as one mill, two mills, three mills per square foot are found among the restrictions examined. In each case this amount is stated as the maximum which may be assessed during any" one year. The following quotation 28 Sunnymede, Whitcomb and Keller, South Bend, Ind. Table VII. Restrictive Clauses Pro- viding for Maintenance Charges Name of Subdivision and Subdivider and Location Amount By Whom Administered 20c per ioo sq. ft. (min- imum) Baker Estates Altoona, Pa. Later a commit- tee of 3 owners J. R. Robertson & Co. Chicago, 111. Arlington Park Laudermilk Realty Co. Chicago, 111. J. C. Nichols Inv. Co. Kansas City, Mo. Anchorage Heights Anchorage, Ky. Pro-rated Ashburton G. R. Morris Org'n. Baltimore, Md. Pro-rated New Britain, Conn. Avon Center Estates H. F. Bowse Cleveland, Ohio Aspinwall Hill Sub'n Brookline, Mass. Belmont Country Club A. T. Mcintosh Co. Chicago, III. Pro-rated Ann Arbor, Mich. owners Fred T. Wood Co. Oakland, Cal. Beacon Falls, Conn. Bonelli-Adams Co Boston, Mass. Bonnycastle Terrace Louisville, Ky. Equal on all lots Thorpe Bros. Minneapolis, Minn. i mill per sq. ft. Owners' Assn. Brookline Hills Sub'n Brookline, Mass. Cuvahoga View Heights Hoiles & Hedden Co. Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio Colony Hills ioc per ioo sq. ft. per yr. Springfield, Mass. Cityco Realty Co Baltimore, Md. Cravath Sub'n Locust Valley, L. I. Cushing's Island Casco Bay, Me. Hogle & Mawdsley Carmel, Cal. Devonshire Manor Annex. . . Krenn & Dato, Inc. Chicago, 111. ADMINISTRATIVE AND RACIAL CLAUSES 67 Table VII. Restrictive Clauses Pro- viding for Maintenance Charges {Continued) Name of Subdivision and Subdivider and Location Amount By Whom Administered Krenn & Dato, Inc. Chicago, 111. S. S. Berry Chicago, 111. Estudillo Estates Fred T. Wood Co. Oakland, Cal. Chas. P. Gray Co. Chicago, 111. Fairway Section Thorpe Brothers Minneapolis, Minn. 1 mill per sq. ft. Owners' Assn. Forest Hills Gardens Sage Foundation Homes Long Island 2 mills per sq. ft. Seller Fernside Fred T. Wood Co. Oakland, Cal. 1 mill per sq. ft. min. Owners' Assn. Providence, R. I. R. C. Erskine & Co. Seattle, Wash. Great Neck Hills $2 per lot to 1926 Great Neck, R. I. Glen Oaks Guy M. Rush Los Angeles, Cal. 3 mills per sq. ft. maximum Homes Assn. Guilford Baltimore County, Md. 20c per 100 sq. ft. maximum Gwin Unit Fred T. Wood Co. Oakland, Cal. Harroun Park Sub'n Currier Inv. Co. Detroit, Mich. $2 per lot per yr. Highland Park Add'n Krenn & Dato, Inc. Chicago, 111. Howard-Lincoln, etc., Add'n. Krenn & Dato, Inc. Chicago, 111. Geo. R. Morris Org'n. Baltimore, Md. Bills Realty Co. Chicago, 111. Kenilworth Hghlds. Sub'n.. . Wittbold Realty Co. Chicago, 111. A. H. Kraus Co Chicago, 111. Perry Park, Colo. owners B. H. Laudermilk Co. Chicago, 111. is fairly typical of the phraseology used in these restrictions: "All the land shown on said map entitled St. Francis Wood Extension No. 2, whether owned by Westgate Park Company or other- wise (except streets, parks, now or hereafter opened, laid out, or established, open spaces maintained for the general use of owners of property shown on said map, and land taken or sold for public improvement or uses) shall be subject to an annual charge, or assess- ment, of not to exceed five mills ($.005) per square foot of area. St. Francis Homes Association is hereby expressly delegated by Westgate Park Company with the sole authority to fix the rate per square foot of such charge or assessment (which shall in no event exceed five mills ($.005) and to expend for the purposes hereinafter specified the money paid in on such charges or assess- ments. The right to collect and enforce the collection of such charges or assessments is hereby retained by Westgate Park Company until said right is transferred by it to St. Francis Homes Association." 29 Lack of uniformity also exists with reference to the methods of assessment. Two methods predominate: the one, already referred to, of a definite charge per unit of measurement and the other a flat charge per lot per year. Further- more, the units of measurement vary, including frontage as a base or total number of square feet. Using either of these measurements as a base, this method of calculating the maintenance charge is superior to the flat rate. It distributes the burden more nearly in proportion to the benefits derived. A third method of figuring the main- tenance charge may be mentioned. This method uses the valuation fixed by the tax assessors as the base. This procedure has particular value when the sub- division is not within the corporate limits of a municipality and is therefore subject only to state and county taxes. As a safeguard it is usually best in such 29 St. Francis Wood, Mason-McDuffie Co., San Francisco. Cal. 68 DEED RESTRICTIONS IN SUBDIVISION DEVELOPMENT cases to insert a clause in the restriction to the effect that the maintenance charge shall not exceed the tax levied in some specified municipality in the state. The administration of these funds is another point to be considered. In a good many cases, such as the one quoted above, the subdivider reserves the power of collecting and expending the funds. On the other hand, numerous examples of the exercise of such powers by the owners' association are found. In fact, this duty is frequently one of the first responsibilities placed upon such organi- zations. When owners' associations have only a limited number of functions to perform, the administration of the main- tenance charges is usually one of them. From the legal point of view, these charges seem to rest on sound precedent. They are legally collectible and may be a legitimate lien upon the land. An opinion of a Missouri court illustrates the general attitude on this point. "From what has been said it must neces- sarily follow that the action of the Board of Clifton Heights in levying an assessment of five dollars on part of lot thirty-eight and three dollars on part of lot thirty-seven of which defendant was at that time the owner, under and by virtue of their powers and authority contained in said deed from Ken- nedy and Plunkett to Fry, Tebbetts and others, was a legal and valid assessment, and the judgment rendered in pursuance thereof, declaring the same to be a first lien upon the property owned by defendant, Annex Realty Company is a legal and valid judgment and should be affirmed." 30 The importance of considering main- tenance charges has not been sufficiently emphasized either in subdivision prac- tice or in the literature on subdivision activities. A recent tendency lias been noticed in the field of city planning to lay greaterjemphasis on the problem of Table VII. Restrictive Clauses Pro- viding for Maintenance Charges {Continued) 30 Stevens v. Annex Realty Company, 173 Mo. 511 (1900). Name of Subdivision and Subdivider and Location Amount By Whom Administered Lake Shore Highlands Oakland, Cal. Locust Hills Blair Home Co. Altoona, Pa. Licton Springs Pk. Seattle, Wash. 50c per front ft. per yr. minimum Maple Hill F. B. McKibbin Co. Lansing, Mich. Manito Park Spokane, Wash. Justin Matthews Co Little Rock, Ark. Milwaukee-Howard Sub'n ... Krenn & Dato, Inc. Chicago, 111. Mountain Lake Lake Wales, Fla. Pro- rated Morningside Heights R. C. Erskine & Co. Seattle, Wash. Newton Blvd. Sub'n Newton, Mass. Oak Hill Village Arnold Hartman Boston, Mass. F. W. N orris Co. Boston, Mass. Pacific Southwest Bank Los Angeles, Cal. Palos Verdes Estates Los Angeles, Cal. Set by Homes Ass'n Homes Ass'n Jemison & Co. Birmingham, Ala. Roland Park 25c per front ft. per year Baltimore County, Md. St. Francis Wood Mason-McDuffie Co. San Francisco, Cal. 5 mills per sq. ft. max. Seller until as- signed to Homes Ass'n Sackett Sub'n Louisville, Ky. New York City Sudbrook Baltimore County, Md. Van Sweringen Co. Cleveland, Ohio Calgary, Alberta S. Bloomfield Highlands Michigan Inv. Co. Detroit, Mich. 75^c per 100 sq. ft. to 1935 Sunrise Addition R. C. Erskine & Co. Seattle, Wash. ADMINISTRATIVE AND RACIAL CLAUSES 69 Table VII. Restrictive Clauses Pro- viding for Maintenance Charges {Continued) Name of Subdivision and Subdivider and Location Amount By Whom Administered Sunnymede Whitcomb & Keller South Bend, Ind. 15c per front ft. per year Seller Sunnyside City Housing Corp. New York City Payable un- til 1-1-1966 Tavern Acres No. Andover, Mass. Tilden Realty Corp Utica, N. Y. Sunset Hill . . Provisions in individual deeds or contracts J. C. Nichols Inv. Co. Kansas City, Mo. Uplands Victoria, B. C. 50c per front ft. minimum Uplands Wellesley, Mass. Bowie & Trent San Benito, Tex. Vanderlip Sub'n Scarborough, N. Y. Pro-rated Vinsetta Park Sub'n Vinsetta Land Co. Detroit, Mich. 1 mill per sq. ft. for 5 yra- Seller Los Angeles, Cal. Woodmar Realty Co. Hammond, Ind. Westchester William Zelosky Chicago, 111. Westwood Sub'n Van Alstine Land Co. Detroit, Mich. $1 per lot per yr. to • 925 Seller financing city plans. Many instances could be cited of elaborate city plans which have been drawn up during a flurry of planning enthusiasm but which are still on paper or, worse still, standing in a half-completed condition as a mockery to the planning idea. A similar situation exists with regard to some subdivisions. Almost any city can afford at least one example of a sub- division with crumbling entrance gates or parkways grown up in weeds because inadequate provision was made for their development or upkeep. Such things are poor business from the subdivider's point of view. They represent promises unkept and cause unfavorable reactions on the part of prospective purchasers of the last lots from which the developer expects to reap his profit. Recent awakening to the importance of the financial aspect of city planning augurs well for the future. It is to be hoped that a similar tendency will be found in the field of subdivision develop- ments. Purchasers of subdivision prop- erty should seek assurance that the plans proposed for the development will be carried out, at least in so far as the financial means for their execution are concerned. Miscellaneous Restrictions Two items remain to be discussed under this heading: the organization and powers of owners' associations and the matter of reference in deeds to zoning regulations. The formation of owners' associations to look after community affairs seems to be a comparatively new development, at least if the sample analyzed here may be considered representative. Of the older subdivisions referred to as the Olmsted group only one carried a provision for the formation of an association of lot owners and this one is a recent development, originating in 1922. 31 But among the subdivisions referred to as the newer group a number of instances of this type of organization are found. In some instances the owners' asso- ciation (or homes association, improve- ment association, or community associa- tion, as it is variously called) is not formed until after a certain percentage of the lots in the subdivision has been sold. The theory behind this practice is that control by a single legal entity (the subdivider) is simpler and more efficient 31 Barton Hills, Ann Arbor, Mich. 7o DEED RESTRICTIONS IN SUBDIVISION DEVELOPMENT during the early stages of development. The argument is advanced to the effect that it is difficult to get a community organization to function when there are only a few scattered lot owners. On the other side is the argument that the sub- divider's interest weakens as his finan- cial burdens become less and he is tempted to let up on restrictions in order to dispose of the balance of his lots. In other words, the interest of the home owners' association is permanent as opposed to the temporary interest of the developer. Examining further the restrictions providing for the organization of a homes association after a certain portion of the lots is sold, it is found that the initiative for such organization originates some- times with the subdivider and sometimes with the lot owners. Quotations from two deeds will illustrate this point: "When eighty per cent. (80%) of the lots in said section have been sold, the Vendor, at its option, may organize an Improvement Association composed entirely of lot owners in said section and shall appoint a committee of four (4) owners in said section — one for a term of one (1) year, one for a term of two (2) years and one for a term of three (3) years, who shall be known as active mem- bers; and a fourth member who shall be known as an inactive member, who will automatically become an active member whenever a vacancy, from any cause what- soever, shall occur among its three active members. When such fourth member be- comes an active member, then the majority of the owners who are members of said Im- provement Association may appoint a lot owner as the inactive member to fill the vacancy of such fourth member; but in the event of the failure of such member of the Improvement Association to make such ap- pointment within thirty (30) days after such vacancy occurs, then the remaining three members of such committee shall have the power to appoint an owner of a lot in said section to fill such vacancy. All appoint- ments shall be made in writing and a record kept with said Association. The majority of said committee shall have the same power as if they had been named by the Vendor herein. This committee shall have the right of approval or disapproval as in this para- graph provided, and when so organized and operative, the Vendor herein shall be re- lieved and released from any and all lia- bility in connection with such duties." 32 "Should two-thirds of the lot owners of the Maple Hill Subdivision determine upon the formation of a Community Association to administer all affairs of the owners and occupants of said subdivision, then the owner of each lot shall become a member and take out one membership for each lot and have voting power in accordance therewith." 33 Both of these methods, however, seem inadequate, not only with respect to their origination but also with respect to their form of organization when similar provisions in the Palos Verdes agreement are examined. It is possible here only to summarize briefly the Palos Verdes method be- cause of its great length and detail. The Palos Verdes Homes Association 34 is an incorporated "non-stock, non-profit body under the laws of California." Its affairs are governed by a board of directors and each lot purchaser auto- matically becomes a member upon the receipt of his deed. The Association is charged with the enforcement of the restrictive covenants; together with the Art Jury it approves building plans as well as subdivision plans; it administers the maintenance charges; and is re- sponsible for the general improvement and upkeep of the subdivision. A somewhat different situation is pres- ent in the Shaker Heights development near Cleveland, Ohio. The area is an in- corporated village, and, while the sub- divider still retains many of his powers, the lot owners determine manv of their 32 Brown Section, Thorpe Bros., Minneapolis, Minn. 33 Maple Hill, F. B. McKibbin, Lansing, Mich. 34 See Protective Restrictions Palos Verdes Estates, Los Angeles County, California. Tract 7333 and Tract 8652, Montemalaga. ADMINISTRATIVE AND RACIAL CLAUSES 7i community affairs through the political organization. Associations of this type seem more nearly adequate to safeguard the inter- ests of the lot owners. Their success is de- pendent, however, upon the development of an active community spirit which is difficult both to develop and to maintain. Furthermore, they require considerable activity on the part of the lot owners, who do not as a rule wish to be bothered with details about their residential prop- erty. It would seem logical, therefore, that the changes to be expected in the mechanics of organization of the asso- ciation would be in the direction of greater simplicity. At any rate changes are sure to take place because home owners' associations are a relatively new creation. A final consideration is the reference in deeds to zoning ordinances which ex- ist at the time of development or which may be inaugurated at a future date. The purpose of such reference in the deed is largely to protect the developer against possible contingencies which may arise, for interactions do take place between deed restrictions and zoning regulations, as will be pointed out later. The usual form of such reference to zon- ing regulations is merely a statement to the effect that the lot purchaser takes title "subject to the following covenants, conditions and restrictions, including zoning and building ordinances." In concluding the discussion in Chap- ters IV and V it should be pointed out that the analysis has not been exhaustive. A number of other restrictions in addi- tion to those treated here are contained in these deeds. The purpose has been to confine attention to those restrictive clauses which exercise the greatest con- trol upon land development. Furthermore, it is not possible to de- duce any very satisfactory conclusions from this study as to which of these restrictions are most helpful in sales promotion or which of them are likely to arouse "sales resistance." Generali- zations on such matters are extremely difficult because conditions in local mar- kets vary so greatly. In some localities subdividers literally sell the restrictions themselves. The sales value of partic- ular restrictions is therefore better se- cured from subdividers who are familiar with local real estate conditions, as influ- enced by the psychology of the individ- ual buyers and by subdivision practice in that region. CHAPTER VI A Valuation of Deed Restrictions as a Control Device AS stated at the outset, deed re- strictions are important because they define and control the rela- tionships between the subdivider and the lot purchaser. These relationships are expressed in a transaction involving a piece of land, as a result of which both parties expect to receive certain desired returns. It is well, therefore, first to consider briefly what the subdivider and the lot purchaser are seeking from this transaction. Evaluation of restrictive agreements can then be made on the basis of whether or not they aid or hin- der the securing of these ends. For the purpose of arriving at the aims of the subdivider and the lot pur- chaser, two assumptions are made. It is assumed here that the subdivider is seeking, not merely to dispose of lots, but to lay the foundation for a com- munity of homes, what has been called here a "subdivision development." For the lot purchaser it is assumed that he is buying a lot for use as a home site, and not for speculative purposes. In the light of these assumptions three aims of the subdivider may be dis- tinguished. He is seeking (i) the highest possible prices for his lots consistent with (2) quick turnover of the subdi- vision property, and (3) a complete and economical development. The last item includes substantial and attractive struc- tures, protection against inharmonious uses both within and without the area, and economies of improvement. To say that the subdivider is seeking the highest possible price for his lots seems to beg the question. Yet there are certain rather definite limitations on the prices he may or should ask. His main consideration is not to set a price so high that, if reselling begins, it will undermine the balance of his sales. If the subdivider seeks both high prices and quick turnover, this seems at first thought equivalent to riding two horses in opposite directions at the same time, for higher prices tend to curtail effective demand. But the subdivider may at- tempt to avoid this result in two dif- ferent ways. After examining real estate market conditions he may figure that business is going to improve and he will thus be able to make quick sales while also securing relatively high prices. He has also another alternative. He may create a commodity which will have such a strong appeal to a specific income group that he will be able to dispose of his lots quickly at increased prices. In other words, although the increased price may cut down the general effective demand, the specialized character of the commodity may increase the demand of a particular income group and thus make it possible to secure high prices and quick turnover at the same time. The dif- ficulty of striking the proper balance to secure both these objectives is ob- vious. The lot purchaser would also like to profit from an increase in land values, although this may be a secondary con- sideration with him. Under the assump- tions stated, he is primarily concerned with securing the relative permanency of his investment, and its protection against the deteriorating influence of undesirable neighbors or inharmonious uses. Finally, he is seeking amenities for his home site, in the shape of at- tractive surroundings. EVALUATION OF RESTRICTIONS 73 How economically do restrictions in deeds secure these ends? The statement is often made that deed restrictions in- crease the value of the restricted prop- erty. But is this unqualifiedly true? It does seem to be true, if the restrictions are carefully drawn, for the early years during which the restrictions are in operation; the assurance of protection against inharmonious uses is a market- able quality, having a distinct value. Or this increased value of restricted property may arise from the scarcity of properties of this class. But whether the added value is the result of increased utility arising out of greater desirability or whether it is a scarcity phenomenon makes little difference. The subdivider is concerned with the increased value as such and is satisfied that deed restric- tions contribute to that value. The case of the lot purchaser is dif- ferent. He hopes for increased value in the future, when the property shifts to a higher use. For him, then, deed re- strictions may be an obstacle, par- ticularly if they are drawn for too long a period. In order to secure the in- creased value desired by the lot pur- chaser it is necessary that the restriction be drawn in such a way as to strike the proper balance between a maximum of amenities and a minimum of injury through precluded uses in the future. Because of the great difficulties in- volved in establishing their proper dura- tion, deed restrictions may work against the securing of an increased value from . change of use. Furthermore, restrictive clauses tend to reduce the speculative element in subdivision property because they establish specified uses of the land for definite periods of time and thus preclude immediate turnover for another use. Finally, a restriction which has been broken may hamper sale of the property. The clause remains on record to confront the prospective purchaser even though it may long since have become a dead letter. It thus impairs the marketability of the property. In short, deed restrictions are more im- portant to the lot purchaser from the point of view of stabilizing both the use and value of his lot than of enhancing its value. This, after all, is the important consideration when the assumption is made, as here, that he purchases for use and not for speculation. The subdivider's second aim is rapid turnover. Restrictive covenants may both help and hinder him here. In the first place, comprehensive restrictions applied to a subdivision may tend to reduce the number of purchasers who are available for that property. The ap- peal is likely to be to a smaller group. However, other important factors enter into the consideration. The condition of the local market is of prime im- portance. If there is a dearth of sub- division property of the class which is being created under restrictions, then the limiting effect of these agreements might not be felt. In this case the re- strictive clauses may promote more rapid turnover. Paralleling this aim of the subdivider is the desire of the lot owner for protec- tion of his investment. He seeks pro- tection first against undesirable neigh- bors and here he must rely upon deed restrictions alone, for only by contrac- tual agreements of this kind can such protection be secured. Secondly, he seeks protection against inharmonious uses and deed restrictions are only partially successful for this purpose. The potential inclusiveness of restrictive clauses can give him greater protection within the subdivision than he can se- cure from any other means of control. But deed restrictions control only a limited area and inharmonious uses en- 74 DEED RESTRICTIONS IN SUBDIVISION DEVELOPMENT croaching to the very boundaries of the subdivision may cast their shadows within its borders. For securing perma- nency of in vestment, restrictions properly drawn may be said to be adequate. The lot owner is usually concerned only with a period corresponding to the span of his own life and, as stated previously, it is possible for restrictive clauses to secure protection for at least a generation. This point should, of course, be considered in relation to the problem of the duration period and its connection with the growth of the community as a whole. Protection of investment also involves problems of enforcement. One of the weaknesses of restrictions has been the fact that their enforcement has de- pended upon private initiative. If individuals were lax in assuming re- sponsibility, enforcement suffered. The weakness of the subdivider as the en- forcing agent was mentioned previously as another illustration of the inadequacy of deed restrictions to protect the in- vestment. The increasing use of legally constituted home owners' associations promises to reduce these weaknesses supposed to be inherent in restrictive clauses. Finally, in connection with the in- vestment aspect is the consideration of the effect of deed restrictions on borrow- ing. The presence of conditions subse- quent in deeds is frequently an obstacle to the owner who wishes to borrow with the lot as security. Some insurance com- panies are especially particular on this point and often will not lend money upon property so restricted because they regard the title as too insecure. This is especially true in cases where the insurance company is in a distant city and does not know the local situation with regard to the property to be mort- gaged. Restrictive covenants, on the other hand, may or may not be obstacles to borrowing. Banks and insurance companies are beginning to take precau- tions against lending on property which does not comply strictly with the regu- lations set forth in its deed, but when these covenants are carefully observed, they seem to be no hindrance to bor- rowing. With respect to the third aims of both the subdivider and the lot purchaser — complete and economical development and amenities, respectively — there can be little doubt as to the effectiveness of deed restrictions in securing these ends. From the point of view of the subdivider careful observance of well-framed agree- ments will result in good development in the early stages which may help in the rapid disposal of the balance of the lots, wherein the profit for the developer lies. It is generally said that the returns from the sale of the last fourth of the lots constitute the profits to the subdivider. The returns from the sale of the first three-fourths are required to meet the expenses of the development process. From the point of view of the lot pur- chaser the adaptability of deed restric- tions to fit particular situations affords opportunity for securing the maximum amenities which a given site is capable of producing. Deed Restrictions and Zoning Compared No discussion of deed restrictions is complete without at least some com- parison of them with zoning regulations. It is not proposed to go into this ques- tion exhaustively here but only to make a few comparisons and indicate briefly some of the relationships between the two forms of control. Such a comparison, however, intro- duces a new element. Up to this point deed restrictions have been evaluated only in terms of their effect upon rela- tionships between the subdivider and EVALUATION OF RESTRICTIONS 75 the lot purchaser. To compare them with zoning it is necessary to take a public point of view, instead of the point of view of the limited group concerned in the transaction. The differences between the two methods of control are more or less familiar and may be gone over hastily. The fact that zoning comprehends a larger area than do restrictive cove- nants is obvious, as are certain marked advantages accruing from systematic control as well as from this larger sphere of influence. But the very fact that zoning does deal with large areas creates serious problems. The mapping of use districts requires the utmost care on the part of zoning authorities, particularly where one district borders on another. In such cases the drafters of the zone plan should scrutinize each step lest they lay themselves open to the charge of arbitrary action. The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Nectow v. The City of Cambridge, Massa- chusetts 1 emphasized this point again. Zoning control, while recognized by the courts to be legitimate and desirable, must be applied with painstaking care lest it be attacked as an unreasonable exercise of the police power. Even though it does deal with relatively large areas, the details of its application are very important, particularly in border line cases. A second point of comparison be- tween zoning and restrictive covenants in deeds is their relative flexibility. Deed restrictions are said to be rigid because they endure for a specified length of time. It should be recalled in this connection that in addition to the provisions stating the duration of the restriction the conveyances usually con- tain two other clauses of equal impor- 1 No. 509, U. S. Sup. Ct.; 72 L. ed.; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. (Decided May 14, 1928). tance: one providing for its extension if desired by a certain proportion of the lot owners and the other providing for annullment of the restrictions on con- sent of the lot owners. 2 In other words, the same instrument which states the life of the restrictive clauses provides for their modification. The courts also may supply flexibility to the operation of deed restrictions by upholding or re- fusing to uphold deed restrictions ac- cording to conditions prevailing in the district in question. In short, deed re- strictions are not the ironclad rules they are often accused of being. Zoning regu- lations, on the other hand, are said to be flexible as a result of certain dis- cretionary powers resting in the board of appeals or legislative powers residing in the city council. But this very amendibility of zoning ordinances may constitute a weakness, particularly if it is a loophole for political manipulation. Moreover, there is the difficult problem of amending a comprehensive scheme, at the same time keeping its compre- hensive character. Flexibility may, however, be used in a different sense, adaptability to individ- ual situations. In that sense deed re- strictions are unquestionably more flex- ible than zoning. Instead of consisting of blanket regulations applicable to all properties alike as zoning must be, re- strictive clauses may be adapted to dif- ferent kinds of developments. Many or few may be the restrictions included in a deed according to the type of development desired. Zoning, on the other hand, supplies uniform rules for each type of use district and because of this limitation we may expect deed re- strictions to continue as important in- struments supplementing and refining the zone classifications. On the point of extensivity deed re- 2 See pp. 59-62. 7 6 DEED RESTRICTIONS IN SUBDIVISION DEVELOPMENT strictions have a distinct advantage over zoning, for they may include several types of regulations which are at present barred to zoning. Racial segregation and control of the aesthetics of private developments are the two most important items in this connection. But more important than the dif- ferences between deed restrictions and zoning are the relationships between them, for they are frequently found in operation at the same time and on the same piece of property. The statement has been made that "No private restrictions need ever refer to zoning, nor need any zoning ordinance ever refer to private restrictions. They are entirely separate and apart. Courts will not usually listen to the private restrictions in trying a zoning case, nor to the zoning regu- lations in trying a private restrictions case. They go hand in hand with each other and never conflict." 3 But experience and recent court de- cisions do not support this statement. Deed restrictions may affect zoning regulations and vice versa. The interrelation is evidenced first in the fact that both zoning ordinances and deed restrictions frequently mention the other form of control. Typical of the deed restrictions referring to zoning is the clause stating that "the above described property shall also be subject to building and zoning ordinances now in force or to be put in force." 4 Zoning ordinances, on the other hand, often state that they do not annul or abrogate any covenant or agreement"' but some are more specific in their pronounce- ments, and emphasize the interrelation between zoning and deed restrictions. 3 E. M. Bassett, Discussion, Planning Problems, Papers and Discussions, National Conference on City Planning, 1926, p. 71. 4 Arthur T. Mcintosh, Belmont Country Club Addition, Chicago, 111. 6 Kramer v. Nelson, 189 Wis. 560 (1926); Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364 at 371 (1907). For example, the Zoning Commission Act for the District of Columbia con- tains the following: "This act shall not abrogate or annul any easements, covenants or other agreements between parties: Provided, however, that as to all future building construction or use of premises where this Act or any orders or regulations adopted under the authority thereof impose a greater restriction upon the use of buildings or premises or upon height of buildings, or requires larger open spaces than are imposed or required by existing law, regulations, or permits, or by such easements, covenant, or agreements, the provision of this act and of the orders and regulations made thereunder shall control." 6 But more important than the fact of interrelation is the question of what rules are being worked out with respect to the dominance of one form or the other. The litigated cases in which such rules will be evolved are still too few to afford any conclusive statements but certain facts and tendencies are worthy of note. Take the case of an area which has been developed as a high-class residential district as the result of carefully drawn deed restrictions. It is not uncommon for framers of zoning ordinances to respect this development in their plans whenever possible. In one case the zoning authorities went even further. On the theory that property owners who have long complied with restrictions as to residential use deserve protection the drafters of the zone plan extended the residential area to include land not originally restricted to that use. A permit to build an apartment on this additional residential land was then re- fused on the ground that it would con- stitute a nuisance to those who had built in accordance with the restrictions. 7 This is a case of a zoning ordinance 6 Quoted in Castleman v. .-fvignone, 56 D. C. App. 253, at 259, (1926). 7 Minkus v. Pond, 326 111. 467, 158 N. E. 121 (1927). EVALUATION OF RESTRICTIONS 77 supporting and extending the plan in- augurated under deed restrictions. Much more difficult are the problems where the standards of the two control devices are different. When the zoning ordinance establishes higher standards than the restrictive covenants, no par- ticular problem is involved, for in that case the ordinance is meeting no dif- ferent situation than it does in applica- tion to unrestricted properties. 8 But a very different situation exists when the deed restrictions are more severe than zoning regulations. Can a zoning ordinance legalize a lower use of the property than that permitted by the restrictive agreement? Does the classi- fication of property for business use by a zoning ordinance require the owners thereof so to use it? The consensus of opinion in the few recent cases avail- able on the question is negative. A leading case is that of Ludgate v. Somer- vi//e 9 . Both plaintiff and defendant owned lots in a subdivision restricted to residential use. Subsequently a zoning ordinance was enacted which permitted business of certain kinds in this district. The defendant wanted to erect a filling station on his property and the plaintiff sought an injunction on the ground that it violated the restriction. Three points in the opinion reveal the attitude of the court. The character of the district was one consideration. The injunction was granted mainly on the ground that the character of the district had not so changed as to make the operation of the restrictive covenant inequitable. A New York court in a case 10 decided a year previously had refused an injunc- tion against the erection of a business building on a site restricted to resi- dential use. Various grounds were 8 See n. 7. 9 121 Ore. 643, 256 Pac. 1043 (1927). 10 Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co., 244 N. Y. 22 (1926). cited, including the fact that the re- striction had but two more years to run and that the plaintiff's gain would not be at all commensurate with the defend- ant's loss because the character of the district had so changed that enforce- ment of the restriction would not re- store the original condition of the neigh- borhood. This matter of the "character of the district" is one of the focal points about which disputes between zoning ordinances and deed restrictions will probably revolve. The courts examine carefully the present circumstances in the area in question and on this basis decide whether a change in use is desir- able. In general it may be said that the courts are not likely to encourage more rapid change from one use to another than would take place in the normal course of events. A second consideration in the Lud- gate v. Somerville opinion involved the relation of police power regulations to existing lawful agreements. The court stated that "the police power is not to be exercised to thwart or nullify lawful agreements which in no way operate to the detriment of the public welfare." 11 A similar statement is found in an Illi- nois case. "Notwithstanding said ordinance the owners of said lots have the constitutional right to make use of them in accordance with such restrictions, so long as they do not endanger or threaten the safety, health and comfort or general welfare of the public." 12 The third point of significance in the Oregon opinion is the statement to the effect that restrictive agreements give the property owner rights which cannot be divested by such legislation as a zoning ordinance. Here again an inter- esting parallel is found, this time in a Massachusetts opinion which states that 11 Supra n. 9 at 1045. 12 Gordon v. Caldwell, 235 111. App. 170 (1924). 78 DEED RESTRICTIONS IN SUBDIVISION DEVELOPMENT the zoning law cannot constitutionally relieve land within the district covered by it from lawful restrictions affecting its use . . . 13 Although the evidence is scanty, the conclusion may be reached from the cases cited that the courts consider restrictive covenants as creating property rights which are enforceable so long as they do not contravene the public welfare and are not inequitable in their operation. The legal problems involved in the relationship between zoning and deed restrictions are only just coming to the fore. 14 Zoning is still in the experimental 13 Vorenberz v. Bunnell. 257 Mass. 399, 153 N. E. 884, at 887 (1926). 14 See M. T. Van Hecke, "Zoning Ordinances and Restrictions in Deeds", 37 Yale Law Journal 407-425 (February, 1928). This article, which is written from the zoning point of view, is an able discussion of the uses to which each of these control devices may be put, the administrative methods of each and the effect of one upon the other. stage. Its relation to deed restrictions and other older forms of control has still to be worked out. The significance of the relatively new device, the subdivi- sion control ordinance, is not yet clear. It may be that such ordinances will afford the means of adjustment between the various devices for regulating the development of urban areas. The fact remains, however, that deed restrictions seem likely to continue for some time to be an important force in controlling the development of urban land. They constitute a control device which is available to all and which is adaptable to a variety of situations. But more important is the established legal status of deed restrictions. The at- titude of the courts is fairly clearly de- fined in all jurisdictions, and subdividers and purchasers are familiar with this method of control and feel confident of its permanency and soundness. TABLE OF DEEDS ANALYZED Alleghany Furnace, Baker Estates, Altoona, Pa. Ardmore, J. R. Robertson & Co., Chicago, 111. Arlington Park, Bert H. Laudermilk Realty Ass'n, Chicago, 111. Armour Hills, J. C. Nichols Inv. Co., Kansas City, Mo. Anchorage Heights, Anchorage, Ky. Ashburton, G. R. Morris Org'n., Baltimore, Md. Andrews Subdivision, New Britain, Conn. Avon Center Estates, H. F. Bowse, Cleve- land, Ohio. Aspinwall Hill Subdivision, Brookline, Mass. Barton Hills, Ann Arbor, Mich. Best Manor, Fred T. Wood Co., Oakland, Cal. Beacon Falls, Beacon Falls, Conn. Belmont Country Club, A. T. Mcintosh Co., Chicago, 111. Bonelli-Adams Co., Boston, Mass. Bonnycastle Terrace, Louisville, Ky. Brown Section, Thorpe Bros., Minneapolis, Minn. Brookline Hills Subdivision, Brookline, Cityco Mass. Realty Co., Baltimore, Md. Cuyahoga View Heights, Hoiles & Hedden Co., Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio. Colony Hills, Springfield, Mass. Cravath Subdivision, Locust Valley, L. I. Cushings Island, Casco Bay, Me. Deven Heights, Hogle and Mawdsley, Car- mel, Cal. Devonshire Manor Annex, Krenn & Dato, Inc., Chicago, 111. Devonshire Manor, Krenn & Dato, Inc., Chicago, 111. Diana Gardens, S. S. Berry, Chicago, 111. Estudillo Estates, Fred T. Wood Co., Oak- land, Cal. Fairview Addition, Chas. P. Gray Co., Chi- cago, 111. Fairway Section, Thorpe Bros., Minneapo- lis, Minn. Forest Hills Gardens, Sage Foundation Homes, L. I. Fernside, Fred T. Wood Co., Oakland, Cal. Freeman Subdivision, Providence, R. I. Gatewood Gardens, R. C. Erskine & Co., Seattle, Wash. Great Neck Hills, Great Neck, L. I. Glen Oaks, Guy M. Rush, Los Angeles, Cal. Guilford, Baltimore County, Md. Gwin Unit, Fred T. Wood Co., Oakland, Cal. Harroun Park Subdivision, Currier Invest- ment Co., Detroit, Mich. Highland Park Addition, Krenn & Dato, Inc., Chicago, 111. Howard-Lincoln Subdivision, Krenn & Dato, Inc., Chicago, 111. Hunting Ridge, Geo. R. Morris Org'n., Bal- timore, Md. Indian Hill Estates, Bills Realty Co., Chi- cago, 111. Kenilworth Highlands Subdivision, Wittbold Realty Co., Chicago, 111. A. H. Kraus Co., Chicago, 111. Lake Wauconda, Perry Park, Colo. Laudermilk Villa, Bert H. Laudermilk Realty Ass'n, Chicago, 111. Lake Shore Highlands, Oakland, Cal. Locust Hills, Blair Home Co., Altoona, Pa. Licton Springs Park, Seattle, Wash. Maple Hill, F. B. McKibbin Co., Lansing, Mich. Manito Park, Spokane, Wash. Justin Matthews Co., Little Rock, Ark. Milwaukee -Howard -Harlem Subdivision, Krenn & Dato, Inc., Chicago, 111. Mountain Lake, Lake Wales, Florida Morningside Heights, R. C. Erskine & Co., Seattle, Wash. Newton Blvd. Subdivision, Newton, Mass. Oak Hill Village, Arnold Hartman, Boston, Mass. Oyster Harbor, Inc., F. W. Norris Co., Bos- ton, Mass. Pacific Southwest Bank, Los Angeles, Cal. Palos Verdes Estates, Los Angeles, Cal. Redmont Park, Jemison & Co., Birmingham, Ala. Roland Park, Baltimore County, Md. St. Francis Wood, Mason-McDuffie Co., San Francisco, Cal. Sackett Subdivision, Louisville, Ky. Scarsdale Estates, New York City Sudbrook, Baltimore County, Md. Shaker Heights, Van Sweringen Co., Cleve- land, Ohio Sunalta, Calgary, Alberta Sunrise Addition, R. C. Erskine & Co., Se- attle, Wash. Sunnymede, Whitcomb & Keller, South Bend, Ind. Sunnyside, City Housing Corp., New York City Tavern Acres, N. Andover, Mass. 8o DEED RESTRICTIONS IN SUBDIVISION DEVELOPMENT Tilden Realty Corp., Utica, N. Y. S. Bloomfield Highlands, Michigan Inv. Co., Detroit, Mich. Sunset Hill, ]. C. Nichols Inv. Co., Kansas City, Mo. Uplands, Victoria, B. C. Uplands, Wellesley, Mass. Valencia Park, Bowie & Trent, San Benito, Tex. Vanderlip Subdivision, Scarborough, N. Y. Vinsetta Park Subdivision, Vinsetta Land Co., Detroit, Mich. Wagner-Thoreson Co., Los Angeles, Cal. Woodmar, Woodmar Realtv Co., Hammond, Ind. Westchester, William Zelosky, Chicago, 111. Westwood Subdivision, Van Alstine Land Co., Detroit, Mich. TABLE OF CASES CITED Allen v. City of Detroit, 167 Mich. 464 (191 1) Anderson v. Stewart, 285 111. 605 (191 8) Bacon v. Sandberg, 179 Mass. 396, 60 N. E. 93 (1901) Berry man v. Hotel Savoy Co., 160 Cal. 559 (1911) Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917) Castleman v. Avignone, 56 App. D. C. 253 (1926) Columbia College v. Thatcher, 87 N. Y. 311 (1882) Cooperative Vineyards Co. v. Ft. Stockton Irrigated Lands Co., 158 S. W. 1191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1 913) Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323, 70 L. ed. 969 (1925) Cornell v. Colorado Springs Co., 100 U. S. 55 (1879) Curtis v. Rubin, 244 111. 88 (1910) Druecker v. McLaughlin, 235 111. 367, 85 N. E. 647 (1908) Easterbrook v. Hebrew L. Orphan Soc, 85 Conn. 289 (1912) Eckhartv. Irons, 128 111. 568 (1889) Erichsen v. Tapert, 172 Mich. 457 (191 2) Ewersten v. Gerstenberg, 186 111. 344 (1900) Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co., 244 N. Y. 22 (1926) Fry^ v. Partridge, 82 111. 267 (1876) Godley v. Weisman, 113 Minn. 1 (1916) Gordon v. Caldwell, 235 111. App. 170 (1924) Harmon v. Burow, 263 Pa. 188 (191 9) Henderson v. Champion, 83 N. J. Eq. 554, 91 Atl. 332 (1914) Highland Realty Co. v. Groves, 130 Ky. 374, 113 S. W. 420 (1908) Hutchinson v. JJlrich, 145 111. 336 (1893) Jackson v. Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496 (1892) Janss Investment Co. v. Walden, 196 Cal. 753, 239 Pac. 34 (1925) Johnson v. //^jj, 126 Ind. 298 (1890) Johnson v. Jones, 244 Pa. St. 386 (1914) JoweJ v. Northwest Real Estate Co., 149 Md. 271, 131 Atl. 446 (1925) Jones v. PotV Huron Engine Co., 171 III. 502 (1898) jW;/ v. Robinson, 41 Colo. 222 (1907) Killien v. Goodman, 229 Mich. 393 (1924) Kneip v. Schroeder, 255 111. 621 (191 2) iCofA v. Streuter, 232 111. 594 (1908) Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, (191 8) Kramer v. Nelson, 189 Wis. 560 (1926) Landsberg v. Rosenwasser, 124 N. Y. App. Div. 559 (1928) Leonard v. Hotel Majestic Co., 17 N. Y. Misc. 229, 40 N. Y. Supp. 1044 (1896) Library Neighborhood Assn. v. Goosen, 229 Mich. 89 (1924) Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596 (1920) Ludgate v. Somerville, ill Ore. 643, 256 Pac. 1043 (1927) McCusker v. Goode, 185 Mass. 607 (1904) McNeil v. Gary, 40 App. D. C. 397 (1913) McNichol v. Townsend, 73 N. J. Eq. 276 (1907) Melson v. Ormsby, 169 la. 522 (191 5) Minard v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co., 139 Fed. 60 (1905) Minkus v. Pond, 326 111. 467, 158 N. E. 121 (1927) Mitchell v. Leavitt, 30 Conn. 587 (1862) Moore v. Curry, 176 Mich. 456; 142 N. W. 839 (1913) Nee tow v. City of Cambridge, Mass., No. 509 U. S. Sup. Ct., 72 L. ed., 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. (Decided May 14, 1928) Ocean City Assn. v. Chalfant, 65 N. J. Eq. 156, 55 Atl. 801 (1903) Page v. Murray, 46 N. J. Eq. 325 (1890) Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 624 (1922) Peabody Heights Co. v. Willson, 82 Md. 186 (1895) Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373 (1925) Post v. Weil, 115 N. Y. 361 (1889) Randall v. Atlanta Adv. Serv., 159 Ga. 217 (1924) River Bank Imp. Co. v. Bancroft, 209 Mass. 217, 95 N. E. 216 (1911) Sanford v. Keer, 80 N. J. Eq. 240, 83 Atl. 225 (1912) Schoonmaker v. Hecksher, 171 N. Y. App Div. 148, 157 N. Y. Supp. 75 (1916) Sharp v. Ropes, no Mass. 381 (1872) Simpson v. Mikkelsen, 196 111. 575 (1902) Skinner v. Shepard, 130 Mass. 180 (1881) Stevens v. Annex Realty Co., 173 Mo. 511 (1900) Summers v. Beeler, 90 Md. 475 (1899) ^aw iStfW/ v. Rose, 260 111. 401 (1913) Vorenberg v. Bunnell, ic,-j Mass. 399, 153 N. E. 884 (1926) Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364 (1907) Wiegman v. Kusel, 270 111. 520 (191 5) Wood v. Stehrer, 119 Md. 143, 86 Atl. 128 (1912) Wright v. Pjrimmer, 99 Neb. 447 (1916) Zinn v. Sidler, 268 Mo. 680 (1916) Zipp v. Barker, 55 N. Y. Supp. 246 (1898) INDEX A Abatement of restrictions, right to 64 Administration of restrictions see Building plans, Duration, Enforcement, Ex- tension, Maintenance charges Alienation validity of restraints on 46 see also Racial restrictions Alterations, approval of . 35 Apartment uses see Residential uses Architectural control 12, 36, 37 Area restrictions further Subdivision 44, 45 percentage of lot area covered 44 size of lots 12, 44, 45 Art jury 36 Assignment of powers 55 B Borrowing, affected by restrictions 74 Building codes 7 Building lines classifications of 38 importance of 37 location of outbuildings 43 platting of 12 setback 38 Building plans, approval of 34 administration of 35~3^> as selling asset 35 compared with architectural control 37 legality 36 Business uses see Commercial uses Chicago lake front, restrictions on 1 Commercial uses location 1 1-12 prohibition of 32 Community Associations see Owners' Associations Community features effect of type of development 10 interior parkways 13 plan for I3~i4 recreational areas II, 13, 14 school sites 13 Condition subsequent distinguished from covenant 18-19 method of drafting 19-20 when to use 20, 65 see also Remedies Control of urban development need for 3-4 purposes of 4-5 see also Planning Cost of buildings 37 Courts attitude toward restrictions 19, 25 see also Enforcement Covenant distinguished from condition 18-19 when to use 19, 65 see also Remedies Covenants running with the land 20 D Damages see Remedies Deed definition 16 essential parts 17 provisions regarding zoning 70 Deed restrictions compared with zoning 74 _ 78 methods of imposing 14 release of 24 right to impose 17 see also Control of urban development; Courts; Zoning Developer's plan as basis of restrictions 14 defined 8 factors conditioning 9-10 items in 10-14 significance in city plan 8 survey as prerequisite 9 Duration of restrictions average duration 56 determination of 57 - 59> 61 effect on land values 73 see also Extension of restrictions Easements 13, 43, 52 Enforcement considerations in changing character of district 23-24 covenant or condition 1 8-20 doctrine of notice 21 effect of general plan 23 intention of parties 23 privity of contract 22, 25 privity of estate 22,25 right of 22, 62-64 see also Remedies Equitable easements 25 Extention of restrictions 60-61 Garages see Outbuildings Golf courses see Community features, recreational areas H Height of buildings Homes' Associations see Owners' Associations •36,37 INDEX 83 1 sociations see Owners' Associations Improvements important • nning. . . . provisions for installation. . Injun; see Remedies see also Enforcement Interior parkways see Community features Interpretation oi restrictions see Courts; Enf. rcement ...13 52,53 L 65 Land characteristics of 4-5 production ot, defined 3 ling see Planning Land uses distribution of 11 ommercial uses; Residential uses Land values affected b; duration of restrictions 73 effect of planning 12 stabilization of 5 Legal aspects summarized 24-26 see also Courts; Enforcement Location of subdivision, effect on plan 9, 10 Lots um area 45 minimum frontage 44 see also Area restrictions M Maintenance charges 66-67 bounds subdividing, statutory prohibi- tion. 7 of restrictions 54-55, 62 Mortgages see Borro . Multi-family uses see Residential uses N Notice, doctrine of 21 see also Enforcement uisances, restrictions on 27 O gality of restrictions on 49 I rictions on 23 Owner! :>ns duties 35, 67, 70 organization of 68 Ownership, restraints on see Alienation Parks imunity features, recreational areas Planning city development of 2-3 sets minimum standards 7 subdivision development of 2—3 supplementing city planning 6 see also Developer's plan Playgrounds see Community features, recreational areas Privity of contract 22, 25 see also Enforcement Privity of estate 22, 25 see also Enforcement Protection of investment by restrictions 73, 74 see also Land values R Racial restrictions constitutionality 47 form of restriction 51 geographical distribution 50 prevalence 46 Recording of restrictions 20 Recreational areas see Community features Re-entry see Remedies see also Enforcement Releasing restrictions methods of 24 results of 61 Remedies at law re-entry 18, 19, 65 damages 18,19 in equity injunction 1 8, 1 9, 64 see also Enforcement Residential uses apartments, location 12 multi-family residences, location 12 single-family residences definition of 32 location 12 Relation of subdivision to adjacent area, effect on plan 9-10 Reversion of title see Remedies S School sites see Community features Selection of area, effect on plan 9, 10 Setback see Building lines Single-family uses see Residential uses Streets joining subdivision to adjacent area 11 within subdivision 11 see also Building lines Subdivider aims in sale of land 72 in enforcement of restrictions 62, 64 powers 54 Subdivision, distinguished from "subdivision devel- opment" 8 8 4 DEED RESTRICTIONS IN SUBDIVISION DEVELOPMENT Subdivision control ordinances as working rules 7 development of 78 T Time limit for building, restrictions on 34 Topography, effect on developer's plan 9 Transportation effect on developer's plan 9 importance in control 3 U Urbanization, rate of as need for land control 3 Utilities see Improvements V Value see Land Values Violation of restrictions 61, 73 modification as grounds for 54, 55 see also Enforcement W Working rules of subdividers z Zoning contrasted with restrictions 74 ordinances as working rules 7 ordinances referred to in deeds 70 relation to developer's plan 10 jLINOIS historical survey ILLINOIS HISTORICAL SURVEY ILLINOIS HISTORICAL SURVEY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS-URBANA 710.1M74U C001 THE USE OF DEED RESTRICTIONS IN SUBDIVIS 3 0112 025317659