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 Be | XVI APRIL 7, 1919 — No. 32 
 I, tered as second-class matter December 11, 1912, at the post office at Urbana, Illinois, under the Act of 
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 | The New Poland), °%, 
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 BY PeaP ter Gy ir 
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 PAUL V. B.| JONES Tx 
 
 Associate in History 
 
 
 
 Price 10 cents 
 
 PUBLISHED BY THE WAR COMMITTEE 
 OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 
 URBANA 
 
 
 
———., 
 
 THE NEW POLAND 
 
 In the year 1795 the “Republic” of Poland disappeared from the , 
 face of the earth. Despite her thousand years of independent existence, | 
 and an enviable record for remarkable achievement along many lines of % 
 human endeavor — political, religious, literary, artistic, and other — 
 this ancient state fell ingloriously, an inert, helpless victim, to the 
 merciless rapacity of her neighbors, Prussia, Russia and Austria, each 
 of them with vulture instincts but greedy enough for their sorry repast. 
 Despite the fact that Poland displayed some of her old time militancy, | | 
 and tried to fight to the last, she was not really conquered by her ene- 
 mies. She was simply “partitioned.” The shameful spoliation began 
 in the year 1772, under the able auspices of that ruthless autocrat, 
 Frederick IJ. With a blasphemous humor characteristic of his age, 
 this cynical Hohenzollern writes to his brother, Henry, on April 9, 1772, 
 as follows : ““The partition of Poland will unite three religions, the . 
 Catholic, the Orthodox, and the Protestant; Poland will thus be for | ‘ 
 us a sort of Holy Communion of which we shall all partake. If this 
 act does not bring salvation to our souls, it will at any rate contribute 
 considerably to the prosperity of our realm.” — An observation entirely | | 
 worthy of Voltaire himself! oe 
 
 Substantially a century and a half have elapsed since this grim 
 tragedy was begun, but who can read to-day, without recoil, that amaz- 
 ing manifesto addressed to the Poles by- Catherine II, announcing the 
 first partition, and inviting their assistance in this major operation on | 
 their own body politic and fatherland! Asserting as causes for so 
 drastic a procedure that turbulent Poland was a constant menace to | 
 the well-being of adjacent peoples and that these same neighboring 
 peoples had, each of them, old claims on parts of her territory, there- 
 fore, this terrible proclamation continues “...his Majesty the King | 
 of Prussia, her Majesty the Empress, Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, 
 
 } 
 
 
 
 and her Imperial Majesty of all the Russias, having mutually set forth 
 their rights and claims, and having come to an agreement, will each take 
 an equivalent of the district to which they lay claim, and will put them- 
 selves in effective possession of those portions of Poland which are 
 calculated to serve hereafter as the most natural and secure boundary 
 
 between them.” 
 Such was the preliminary move in this altogether shameful transac- 
 tion. A second operation, in 1793, lopped off additional segments of 
 2 | 
 
the then moribund state, while a third act of partition, in 1795, com- 
 pleted the work, concluding as clear-cut a drama of survival as was ever 
 played amid the political creations of men. , 
 
 Students of Polish history find the remarkable weaknesses directly 
 responsible for the ruin of this, one of Europe’s greatest states, in Poland 
 itself. Poland is a land of plains, with no really satisfactory frontiers, 
 thus inviting attack by any aggressive neighbor with predatory inclina- 
 tion; a land made through conquest, and ill pieced together, lacking 
 racial homogeneity with its Lithuanians, Ruthenians, and other peoples, 
 different, from the warrior Poles in language, religion, manners, and 
 customs, never really assimilated, always mindful of their one-time 
 independence and chafing to regain entire liberty; a land of two social 
 classes only —a proud, fighting, proprietary nobility, and, ultimately, 
 a degraded, utterly subservient, blackly ignorant serfdom with’ no 
 stabilizing middle stratum such as makes back-bone for most states; 
 a land, finally, with a political system as strangely and completely 
 decrepit as any deteriorated governmental machinery told of in human 
 history: a Republic with an elected monarch at its head, a kingship 
 reduced, through the jealous tear of possible royal power, on the part 
 of an independent nobility, to nonentity, to an empty manifest of rule, 
 grasped at now and again even by venturesome foreigners. Full as 
 serious a flaw as this was that curious /zberym veto, formerly a staunch 
 bulwark of their liberty for the nobles, now an abused institution, con- 
 stantly operated by these utterly selfish, utterly unpatriotic lords of the 
 land to thwart every act of the government. Some writers, noting the 
 dark havoc wrought for Poland by a state of affairs so bad and so long 
 enduring, affirm that the Poles deserved their fate; and these same 
 students, observing the seventeen odd political parties vigorously flour- 
 ishing in Poland to-day, gloomily shake their heads over this ruinous 
 twentieth century recrudescence of the ancient national malady — 
 assertive individuality and otherwise-mindedness — and assert that an 
 independent Poland ts an utter impossibility. 
 
 As a matter of fact it is highly probable that Poland could have 
 amended her vicious system, had the time been afforded. Eighteenth 
 century Poland, keenly aware of many of her problems, was indeed 
 striving quite vigorously to handle them; unfortunately for her, other 
 statecraft was at work, far stronger at the time than her own with its 
 depleted vitality: mighty, uncouth Russia with her irresistible surge 
 towards the attractive west, where alone chance for development seemed 
 to lie; vigorous, half barbarous Prussia, with her ragged, piecemeal 
 
 3 
 
snippets of territory, pointing for any dullard of a king an obvious policy 
 of consolidation — and Frederick II was as alert and unscrupulous a 
 monarch as ever growing state could desire. 
 
 Upon the annihilation of her state a strange chapter in Polish history 
 opens. Approximately 300,000 square miles of territory with an esti- 
 mated Polish population of 11,500,000 souls had been divided by Prus- 
 sia, Russia, and Austria. To cut up and apportion was one thing, to 
 assimilate, however, quite another accomplishment, as the three power- 
 ful and guilty states were to discover. The years from 1795 to 1914 
 mark in Polish annals a period during which those hapless people, exist- 
 ing perforce under three alien regimes, developed a more vivid national 
 sense than ever they had known before; and when in the fullness of time 
 the great war broke upon a horrified humanity, the Poles, Prussian, 
 Russian, and Austrian, knew to a man that their hour of deliverance 
 was at hand. 
 
 This strenghtening nationalism presents an interesting study. Of 
 the three groups of submerged Poles that under the Dual Monarchy 
 tared the best, and nearly attained, in late years at least, a complete 
 autonomy. On the other hand, the Poles under the iron heel of Prussia 
 endured most from their rulers, for, while the Russian autocracy was 
 by instinct cruelly brutal,.1t was too poorly organized to be perpetually 
 ruthless, and bore but fitfylly on its victims; whereas the highly organ- 
 ized Prussian regime followed practically from the beginning a consis- 
 tent policy of the sternest denaturalization or Germanization of the 
 Poles. | 
 
 Ex-chancellor von Bulow, an able exponent of the Bismarckian 
 theory in thisregard, well expresses the spirit and purpose of Prussia’s 
 policy as follows — “‘No concern for the Polish people must hinder us 
 from doing all we can to maintain and strengthen the German nationality 
 in the former Polish provinces. It is the duty and the right of the 
 government to see that the Germans do not get driven out of the east 
 of Germany by the. Poles. The object is, to protect, maintain, and 
 strengthen the German nationality among the Poles..... In the 
 struggle between nationalities one nation 1s the hammer.and the other 
 is the anvil, one is the victor and the other is the vanquished.” 
 
 To play her réle successfully in this awful smithy game, Prussia 
 fashioned for herself characteristic instruments; restrictions on the use 
 of the Polish language, German only passing current in the schools, 
 law-courts, public meetings, and finally in the church services; bans on 
 Polish songs and the Polish national dress; reservation of governmental 
 
 4 
 
offices for Germans or dependable Germanized Poles; and finally a 
 drastic policy of German colonization in the Polish provinces which 
 ultimately resulted in the harshest legislation, like those laws compelling 
 Poles to sell out their land to Germans, the whole unnatural process 
 heavily subsidized by the state. 
 
 And the Poles? So vigorously. did they react, once they caught the 
 tune, that before the Prussians were aware, this despised people matched 
 case-hardened steel to Junker iron, and von Bulow himself didn’t know 
 whether the state were hammer or anvil. Statements like the following 
 from the Polish press reflect the temper and purpose of these determined 
 Slavs after one hundred years’of Prussian control: ‘“‘To-morrow the 
 Kingdom of Prussia celebrates the second century of its existence. We 
 cannot manifest our joy, because Prussia’s power has been erected chiefly 
 upon the ruins of ancient Poland. Prussia’s history consists of a number 
 of conquests made by force and in accordance: with the old Prussian 
 principle revived by Bismarck, ‘might is better than right.’”’ And again, 
 this violent diatribe: “If one asks a Pole whether he would rather live 
 under German or under Russian rule his reply will be ‘I would rather a 
 hundred times have to do with Russians than with Germans, and the 
 Prussians are the worst of Germans.’... The Russian is our Slavonic 
 brother, and in his heart of hearts every Pole is glad if his brother is 
 prospering and when he can tell the world, “There you see our common 
 Slavonic blood’. The.more we hate the Prussians the more we love 
 the Russians.” Or, finally, this suggestive excerpt: ‘“‘Take heed, you 
 Polish women and Polish girls! Polish women and Polish girls are the 
 strongest protectors of our nationality. .... For a Polish woman 
 it is a disgrace to marry a German or to visit German places of amuse- 
 ment or German festivals. So long as the Polish wife watches over her 
 husband and takes care that he bears himself everywhere as a Pole, so 
 long as she watches over his home and preserves it as a stronghold of 
 Polonism, so long as a Polish Catholic newspaper is kept in it, and so 
 long as the Polish mother teaches her children to pray to God for our 
 beloved Poland in the Polish language, so long Poland’s enemies will 
 labor in vain.” 
 
 Meanwhile, the Poles were doing something besides talking, and 
 nursing a deeply burned hatred. They learned thrift from their German 
 masters, formed remarkable co-operative organizations, and developed, 
 under the management of their priests who well understand their 
 people and their needs, an excellent banking system, conforming rigidly 
 to the very letter of the Prussian banking laws, and able to pay a slightly 
 
 Ss 
 
better rate of interest than the German banks. Thus they have sus- 
 tained themselves under the heavy economic pressure of the state. 
 In 1912, deposits in the co-operative organizations stood at the hand- 
 some figure of £46,970,354, as against £12,420,057 in 1900 — an amazing 
 development — while deposits in the Polish banks reached a total of 
 £6,150,000 in 1907, representing a per capita wealth of nearly $15. 
 
 Through the success of these co-operative organizations is reflected 
 that sturdy determination of the Polish peasant to get ahead — an 
 ambition envisioned nearly always in terms of land ownership. Helped 
 by his bank, and willing to assume a debt for land purchase he cannot 
 live mayhap to wipe out — glad to whittle down such a staggering obliga- 
 tion by long years of labor in the industrial regions of Western Germany 
 (Westphalia) separated from his family perhaps eight or ten years at a 
 time, he was. rapidly making his laborious goal, economic inde- 
 pendence. Whereas the Prussian State expended $170,000,000 
 to quarter Germans on Polish land, the Poles since 1896 have 
 secured fully 250,000 acres of land from the Germans, and in May of 
 1903 the Prussian Minister of Finance, Herr von Rheinbaben, com- 
 plained that in fifteen years the German population 1n Prussia diminished 
 by 630,000, while in five years as many as 300,000 Polish immigrants 
 had settled there! Von Btilow himself finally admitted that the scheme 
 for colonization had failed owing to the fact that the German was apt 
 to lose his nationality if not continually subsidized by the state, or even 
 in spite of such support, since he was always ready to dispose of his 
 land for a good figure, whereas the Pole “thought it shameful to sell 
 land to the Germans”’ and “‘held fast to the land.” : 
 
 Under these hard circumstances, the Prussian Poles, faithful to 
 human nature, have become the most Polish of the Poles. They have 
 benefited greatly from the rigid disciplining of their stern masters, and 
 now, chastened in temper, steadfast, thrifty and aggressive, they have 
 their reward: leadership in the new Poland must devolve on them — an 
 amazing retribution for Prussia! 
 
 This new Poland has come into being to-day by processes which it is 
 not possible to follow carefully now, through want of information on the 
 one hand, and lack of comprehension of such reports as are forthcoming 
 on the other. Therefore, a bare outline of what appear to be the 
 principle events in the intricate story must suffice here. 
 
 Despite the fact that from the outbreak of the war a bewildering 
 number of forces as well within the old Poland as over the rest of the 
 world — National Committees, Democratic Congresses, Armed Legions, 
 
 6 
 
Polish Bureaus, and the like — concentrated on the great objective, 
 Polish union and independence, the career of one man from 1914 to this 
 moment lends a remarkable coherence to the entire process. And thus 
 featuring in this great crisis in her history, the activity of Joseph Pilsud- 
 ski, Poland plays trufe to her great past in the narrative of which lie 
 revealed the beloved achievements of other national heroes like Sobieski 
 and Kosciusko. 
 
 Born at Vilna, in 1867, of noble Lithuanian-Polish stock, young 
 Pilsudski, while a student of medicine at the University of Kharkov, 
 became intensely interested in the social problems of Russian Poland — 
 too keenly interested indeed to suit the ever watchful, suspicious Rus- 
 sian police who in 1888 sent the vehement young fellow to Siberia. 
 Returned to his native land after five years of banishment, an aggressive 
 socialist, Pilsudski aided in the organization of that party among his 
 countrymen. Constrained always to dodge the police, now by so des- 
 perate a ruse as feigned insanity — a policy bringing him a year’s sojourn 
 in a mad-house — now by flight to England — he busily developed his 
 program: armed revolution against Czarist Russia. Efforts to further 
 Polish independence in this wise, like those abortive movements at the 
 time of the Russo-Japanese war, failed through inadequate support and 
 the opposing strength of a better organized party intensely hostile to 
 the Socialists, the National Democrats. 
 
 Whereas Pilsudski’s group — working-men, for the most part, are 
 described at that time (1904-1906) as more socialistic than national, 
 with a hatred for the Polish capitalistic, landholding element, akin to 
 their abhorrence of Russian autocracy, and with small respect for the 
 Church, the National Democrats, on the other hand, representing land- 
 holders, bourgeoisie, peasants, and like their opponents with a scattering 
 of intellectuals, were strongly national, but pro-Russian, with the hope 
 of securing an autonomous Poland. 
 
 This latter party, able, after the Revolutionary crisis following the 
 war with Japan, to control the Polish seats in the Duma, made his 
 home land too warm for Pilsudski, who forthwith migrated to that 
 stamping ground for disaffected Poles of all persuasions, Galicia. Here 
 through his organization of the Polish Legions, subsequently so famous, 
 this persevering patriot continued his revolutionary work. An original 
 group of these Legionaries, some 400 strong, mostly Russian Poles of 
 strongly anti-Russian sympathy, created a tremendous sensation, when, 
 in August, 1914, they boldly sallied across the Russian border. From 
 that time on, the Legions, supported by representatives of all Polish 
 
 7 
 
 
 
parties in Galicia, and by many Russian Poles, through an organization 
 known as the Supreme National Committee, made an attractive appeal 
 to all Polish patriots, even to the National Democrats, in whose hearts 
 the war had stirred vast hopes of independence. 
 
 The Central Powers were only too glad to work hand in hand with 
 the Legions, whose leaders, like Pilsudski, saw in such an unholy alliance 
 but opportunist means to a noble end. Russia appeared to them to be 
 the great enemy. Once get her out of the way, then were there time 
 enough to grapple with the next obstacle to Polish Independence. 
 Behold this arch-patriot then, become a Brigadier-General by order of 
 the venerable Franz Joseph; his Legions enrolled in the armies of the 
 Central Powers, all fighting the while, like tigers, winning iron crosses 
 with the best of them, in that hideous surging see-saw of those vast 
 hordes of men back and forth across Poland, ultimately establishing 
 German control over the devastated land in the fall of 1915. 
 
 Upon this success, Pilsudski became restless, anxious to secure 
 assurance of a free Poland from the triumphant Central Powers. ‘There- 
 fore, when the armies of the Central Powers were facing Brusilow’s 
 offensive in 1916, Pilsudski played a bold stroke. His purpose to resign 
 his command being thwarted by Austria’s refusal to accept the resigna- 
 tion, at a critical juncture he simply withdrew from the front with an 
 entire brigade. While this act cost him considerable prestige, it did 
 precipitate a crisis which was probably the greatest factor in forcing 
 the Central Powers to issue their decree of November 4, 1916, proclaim- 
 ing with flourish an independent Poland. 
 
 The manifesto was read in the Royal Palace at Warsaw on November 
 5, by Governor General von Beseler “‘in soldierly ringing tones,” and 
 then was re-read in Polish, by the Palace Commandant, Count Hutten- 
 Czapski. This act proclaimed that Russian Poland was to be a National 
 State in the form of an Hereditary Monarchy with a constitutional 
 government. For the time being, the Central Powers were to admin- 
 ister the new State, pending the gradual development of her proper 
 public institutions. Careful determination of the frontiers also could 
 only come later. Subsequently a provisional government was set up. 
 Its principal organs were an all-Polish Council of State of twenty-five 
 members, which in turn nominated an Executive Committee, the mem- 
 bers of which had ministerial functions. Pilsudski had a seat on the 
 minority Left in the Council, and also presided over the Army Com- 
 mittee. ; 
 
This regime was at best a makeshift arrangement, but, even so, it 
 endured too long to suit Pilsudski. Ordered to develop a Polish army 
 to fight with the Central Powers, the General refused unless he could 
 recelve assurances that such an army would operate under the direction 
 of a real National Polish Government. This was a mean impasse, and 
 when the Central Powers failed to yield his point, Pilsudski used his 
 popularity with his countrymen to hinder the formation of a Polish army. 
 
 Then came the Russian Revolution, with z¢s recognition of an Inde- 
 pendent Poland. Here at length was a capital opportunity to strike. 
 Under Pilsudski’s supervision an ultimatum was addressed to the 
 Central Powers by the Polish Council of State. Unfortunately, how- 
 ever, his colleagues on the Council were not of their leader’s fibre, and 
 unable to co-operate with them, he and the Left resigned. Next, as 
 another step against furthering the interests of the Central Powers, 
 Pilsudski began to disband his Legions. Nearly four-fifths of their 
 members refused to take the oath exacted from them by the Austro- 
 German governments. This was rebellion. The disaffected Legion- 
 aries, therefore, were interned, and Pilsudski, himself, was sent a pris- 
 oner to Magdeburg. 
 
 Sothe situation stood near the middle of 1917. InSeptember of that 
 same year, it isassertedthat Austria sent Polish troops raised ostensibly 
 for a home army to the Italian front, whereupon the Polish Council of 
 State resigned. Then by another decree (September 12) the Austro- 
 German rulers promulgated a new constitution for Poland. According 
 to this instrument the principal organ of government was a Council of 
 Regency, whose personnel of three was appointed by the Central Powers; 
 this body had certain legislative functions; its decrees were to be counter- 
 signed by a Premier likewise under the control of the Central Empires; 
 with the Regency were to operate a Cabinet and a Council of State. 
 
 Meanwhile other forces were beginning to effect developments in 
 Poland. In March, 1915, Sir Edward Grey had proclaimed to the 
 world one of England’s ideals in these words: ‘‘We wish the nations of 
 Europe to be free to live their independent lives, working out their own 
 forms of government for themselves, and their own development, whether 
 they be great states or small states, in full liberty — that is our ideal.” 
 The Allies; however, so far asthey had a distinct Polish policy, shaped it 
 perforce with reference to their great eastern member. Thus, for 
 example, France had a secret agreement with Russia which recognized 
 Russia’s “complete liberty in establishing her western frontier.” There- 
 fore Russia’s open declaration proclaiming an autonomus Poland, issued 
 
 9 
 
 
 
by the Grand Duke Nicholas ‘shortly after the beginning of the war, 
 stood as the manifesto of Entente agreement as to Poland’s future down 
 to the time of Russia’s collapse. 
 
 After the Russian debacle it was necessary for the Entente Powers 
 to state anew their attitude towards Poland, and on January 8, 1918, 
 in his address to Congress embodying the ever famous “fourteen points,” 
 Mr. Wilson affirmed as his 13th article in a real peace program that 
 “An independent Polish State should be erected which should include 
 the territory inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should 
 be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose social and 
 economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed 
 by international agreement.’ ‘The clearest definition of a real future 
 status vouchsafed to the Poles-up to that date! The declaration of 
 Allied representatives at Versailles, on June 3, 1918, in favor of “‘a free 
 and independent Poland with access to the sea’? demonstrated sub- 
 stantial unanimity of intent among all the Entente Powers. These 
 manifesto had, all of them, a powerful reaction 1n Poland. 
 
 On June 26, M. Swiezuski, representing three-fourths of the elected 
 members of the Warsaw Council of State, and the “overwhelming 
 majority of Poles’ addressed the council on behalf of the Inter-Party 
 Club, concerning the Versailles declaration: 
 
 “At the same time,” said he, “when the entire world has recognized the Polish 
 question as an international problem and the Polish national and political aims as just, 
 and their realization as a condition of the new order of the world, an order based on right 
 and liberty; at the time when the solemn declaration [that of the Allies] by responsible 
 statesmen has given these aims positive and collective expression — at this moment 
 nothing has taken place on Polish territory to show that the powers which have to-day 
 the practical possibility of confirming their promises by deeds are guided by a real inten- 
 tion of restoring the Polish State.” ° 
 
 Subsequently the Inter-Party Club published the following declaration: “Taking 
 into consideration the declaration made after the meeting of the Prime Ministers of 
 France, England, and Italy . . . . the undersigned parties belonging to the Inter- 
 Party Club declare that the above statement will meet with a sincere response in the 
 souls of the Polish Nation, the Nation which during more than a century of slavery has 
 always longed for the restoration of Poland (censor) independent and united (censor).”’ 
 
 Indeed it was but a short step in this humor,(and one must remember 
 the perilous condition of the Central Powers at the time) to the demands 
 made by the Poles at a conference at German Headquarters in August, 
 1918, including a change in the administration, cessation of the joint 
 Austro-German control of the country, recognition of certain territorial 
 claims in Lithuania, access for Poland to the Baltic via Danzig, and the 
 like. This outspoken bid for independence, was presently followed by 
 the demand itself emanating from the Regency Council, that the new 
 
 10 
 
state must embrace all the territority inhabited by Poles. Subsequently 
 a separate manifesto, on October 13, by the Prussian Poles 
 asserted that “nothing but the union into one State of all peoples 
 living in Polish lands, a State which shall possess full rights, can 
 guarantee a lasting League of Nations.” 
 
 Such was the tense state of affairs when the collapse of the Central 
 Powers shook the world. From then on developments moved rapidly 
 in Poland, the three sections of which were now working practically 
 together. Pilsudski was released in Germany. Frail, nervous, bent 
 with ill health, but with all the old indomitable energy, he hastened 
 back to Poland where he refused to co-operate as Minister of War in a 
 weak Government of the National Democrats hastily formed by the 
 Regents. Soon afterwards that ephemeral creation fell, and the Re- 
 gency Council through two decrees of November 11 and 14, 1918, 
 pronounced the dissolution of its own body, and “‘in view of the threaten- 
 ing dangers from within and without” transferred the sovereign power 
 to Pilsudski, his dictatorship to endure until a National Government 
 could. be formed. 
 
 The excellent temper of the now all-powerful patriot may be judged 
 from his own statement to the people issued likewise on November 14, 
 upon the assumption of his great responsibility — ‘“‘Upon my return 
 from Germany,” this frank manifesto reads, “I found the country in a 
 most chaotic state in the face of exceedingly difficult tasks, for the 
 performance of which the nation must reveal its best organizing abilities. 
 In my conversations with the representatives of almost all the political 
 ‘parties in Poland, I found to my delight that the great majority share 
 my opinion that the new Government should not only rest on democratic 
 foundations, but be composed in a considerable porportion of representa- 
 tives of the rural and urban masses..... 
 
 The new Cabinet, set up under the direction of Andrew Moraczewski 
 as Premier was described by Moraczeswki himself towards the end of 
 Pecemmer. 1913; as 2.0a truly national one,” but in almost dat 
 contradiction to this statement stand the assertions of many Poles, and 
 others apparently in a position to know, that the new regime was 
 -decidedly Socialistic. However this all may have been, Pilsudski 
 presently faced a grievous difficulty on the score of his government’s 
 -composition. At eleven o’clock on the night of January 1, 1919, Ignace 
 _Jan Paderewski, renowned the world over as the greatest living pianist, 
 and also more recently known as a vigorous Polish patriot, arrived in 
 ‘Warsaw. According to the press dispatches Paderewski upon his 
 
 11 
 
arrival was greeted with wild enthusiasm. The newspapers expressed 
 the hope that he would be able to strengthen the patriotic elements in 
 Poland and “undo the efforts of those who have been working towards 
 disorder.” ‘‘The Maire predicts that his arrival will precipitate certain 
 changes in the Ministry which the Conservatives desire, so that they 
 may secure full recognition from the Allies.” 
 
 As a matter of fact, Paderewski represented a powerful element 
 among the Poles — the Conservative, or National Democratic group. 
 The principal organ of this party after the establishment of German 
 control over Russian Poland was the so-called Polish National Com- 
 mittee at Paris, under the Presidency of M. Roman Dmowski, a power- 
 ful and in many respects a very able man. 
 
 The energetic efforts of this Committee in the Allied capitals and 
 at Washington, in the summer and fall of 1918, secured from the Allies. 
 and from the United States recognition of the Polish National army, 
 under the supreme political authority of the Polish National Committee 
 as an associated force, co-belligerent, the product of a belligerent State, 
 acts again, which aroused high enthusiasm among Poles everywhere. 
 
 What, however, of Paderewski? Allin America to-day know his. 
 zeal on behalf of a beloved cause — united and free Poland. A remark- 
 able series of ““benefit concerts,” interspersed with eloquent addresses,, 
 and the writing and publication of excellent articles—these activities, 
 together with the expenditure of his personal fortune, bear true witness. 
 to a sincere devotion on behalf of this lofty ideal. After more than 
 three years of such yeoman’s service, Paderewski left America, on 
 November 23, 1918, for England, arriving.at Warsaw, finally, as ob- 
 served, on New Year’s Day, 1919. 
 
 He himself declares that he carried with him a power of attorney 
 to act for all the Polish Committees in the United States, representing 
 some 4,000,000 Poles, also that he was empowered to make loans to the 
 Polish Government. It is alleged, furthermore, that full authority was. 
 conferred upon him by Austrian and Prussian Poles “through legally 
 organized organs of Polish opinion which had been created by regularly 
 appointed delegate conventions in both territories” to speak and act 
 for them, and that he bore messages from the Allies to the effect that 
 the Pilsudski Government was not to be recognized, as it represented 
 less than one-tenth of the people. 
 
 Despite such powerful assets, however, the accomplishment of 
 Paderewski’s purpose, namely the organization of a coalition Govern- 
 ment in Poland which should be more broadly representative of all. 
 
 12 
 
parties there, was a difficult task. Both of the great leaders were 
 apparently suspicious of each other’s motives; Pilsudski, too, was fearful 
 lest any readjustment of the government at such a critical time should 
 precipitate a revolution. Unfortunately a modus vivendi was not ex- 
 pedited by an abortive attempt on the part of Conservatives and 
 Liberals, under the leadership of Count Eustache Sapieha, to overthrow 
 _ the Pilsudski regime by force, on January 5: a hazardous undertaking 
 ‘at best, and entirely thwarted by the loyalty of the troops, with ludicrous 
 and very disconcerting developments for the perpetrators. 
 
 And then, just as the Journalistic Prophets everywhere were getting 
 up a lachrymose unison “‘ We told you so” — the horizon cleared. After 
 all, on the deeper issue—an independent, united Poland — both 
 patriots were agreed; the threatening dangers to the nascent State 
 likewise urged compromise, which both Pilsudski and Paderewski say 
 they desired. Therefore, about the middle of January, Paderewski’s 
 plan for the formation of a new Ministry, representing Russian, Prus- 
 sian, and Austrian Poland, began to materialize. In fact, Pilsudski 
 signed an agreement to reorganize the Government at midnight on 
 January 16, while the new Ministry, then in formation, was definitely 
 announced on January 19, Paderewski being the Premier and holding 
 the portfolio for foreign affairs, while Pilsudski remained still “head”’ 
 of the Nation and Commander-in-Chief of the army. 
 
 Complete recognition of this new provisional Government by the 
 United States was officially announced on January 22, this brisk act 
 being re-inforced by a similar Allied pronouncement on February 21. 
 Meanwhile, the elections for a Polish Constituent Assembly, held late 
 in January, gave Paderewski’s party a considerable victory, the National 
 Democrats claiming ninety-one seats out of two hundred odd in the 
 first meeting of the Assembly, held February 9. 
 
 Such, then, is the coalition Government in Poland which is now 
 grappling with a great round of decidedly baffling and dangerous prob- 
 lems, intensely interesting, but too detailed and intricate for even survey 
 consideration here. Among these problems, however, the question of 
 new Poland’s frontiers, while all told the most perplexing, is of such. 
 vast importance to the entire world, as well as to Poland, that a brief 
 consideration of its principal features is essential in concluding this 
 narrative. 
 
 It is not difficult to ascertain the desires of leading Poles everywhere, 
 in regard to this all-important matter; they have expressed themselves 
 fully; and to the great jeopardy of their best interests, forces among 
 
 13 
 
them have gone out to secure what they desire, quite on their own ad- 
 vices, it appears. Even before the armistice was signed, Poles and Ruthe- 
 nians flew to arms over the disposition of Lemberg and Eastern Galicia, 
 and they are still fighting. Since November 11, the world at large 
 has been following sympathetically, or with irate disapproval, the alter- 
 nate advance and retreat of Polish forces at all points of the compass 
 about their distracted land, not only in bitter contest with Germans in 
 the Prussian Polish provinces of East Prussia, Posen, and Silesia, to 
 the north and northwest, and in Lithuania to the northeast, but also 
 with the newly liberated Czecho-Slovaks on their southwestern border, 
 where the tiny region of Teschen, with its coal fields, is in hot dispute 
 between the two peoples. There 1s also conflict with Bolshevik Russians 
 wherever the two encounter, and under cover of this Red bugaboo, 
 new Poland announces that at the request of, the President of the new 
 Lithuanian Republic, Poland has taken over “provisionally” the admin- 
 istration of Lithuania. 
 
 Thus the impetuous energy of ai Poles forges a fiery circuit of Mars 
 about them welded complete and fast but for that uncongenial segment 
 in the due north — the Baltic Sea! And for the most part this militant 
 aggressiveness 1s on behalf of that “large, strong Poland,” economically 
 independent, capable of sustaining the powerful forces which must in 
 future be brought to bear on a buffer state so strategically placed — 
 nay, in the magnified imaginations of the truly far-visioned, a state 
 virile enough to assume henceforth great Russia’s mighty réle as leader 
 of the Slavic peoples! 
 
 More specifically, what of the New Poland as the now dominant 
 party group would have it? Paderewski himself expresses the opinion 
 of a very large number of his fellow-countrymen when he writes as 
 follows:—‘‘The interests of peace require a large, powerful, and eco- 
 nomically independent Poland. This can be attained through a com- 
 plete union of all provinces once belonging to the Polish crown. Only 
 a Poland with access to the sea through Danzig will be able to maintain 
 direct. relations with England, France, and America.... And only 
 with the mines of Silesia, her ancient province, will Poland be able to 
 acquire economic independence of Germany, to support her surplus 
 population, and to check excessive emigration..... A New Poland 
 should be a continuation of that which she has been, otherwise she can- 
 not find again the ideal which she has in her own soul. If one should 
 plan to cut out a certain part of the former Poland to make a new one, 
 if instead of erasing the artificial confines, one should only modify their 
 
 14 
 
f 
 
 direction, it would be creating irredentism which would fatally lead to 
 4 new crisis. If we are to have a lasting and durable peace, we must 
 reunite in the New Poland all the Polish land.” 
 
 Can such a Poland as is here envisioned be re-established? Emphat- 
 ically no! Not if the now classic norm of President Wilson be used as 
 the gauge in rehabilitation. Founded strictly on the basis of massed 
 majority Polish population the New Poland would constitute a country 
 toughly one-third the size of Poland at the time of the first partition. 
 Or, in terms of Russian-Prussian-Austrian political geography, such a 
 new State of Poland would include the so-called Congress Kingdom of 
 Poland, Russian since 1815, Western Galicia and a small part of 
 Silesia, formerly Austrian, together with territory formerly Prussian — 
 the southern part of East Prussia, a considerable area, the heart of West 
 Prussia (but without the land about the mouth of the Vistula, conse- 
 quently without Danzig), by far the largest part of Posen, and a section 
 of upper Silesia. This more modest Poland would not include any such 
 large number of other nationals.as Paderewski’s state must control if 
 it were established, all of which aliens are determined to be independent, 
 and strong enough to breed a considerable amount of trouble if their 
 desires for separate statehood are thwarted. | 
 
 Furthermore, the re-establishment of an indisputably Polish Poland - 
 will be difficult enough to erect and maintain. One resultant alone, 
 the separation of German East Prussia from the mother country, presents 
 a very grave menace for the future — to say nothing of the threat 
 involved in the violent German opposition to the loss of any Prussian 
 territory whatever, Polish or not. Paderewski calls East Prussia the 
 centre and stronghold of Hohenzollern support, and tho it is German he 
 says, ‘...to lop this limb from the German body-politic, would be a 
 political surgery of the highest order. Until that major operation is 
 performed, we can hardly hope to witness any true democratization of 
 the German system.” He proposes to perform this operation by unit- 
 ing West Prussia together with Danzig to Poland, and suggests several 
 proposals for the future status of isolated East Prussia. It might be 
 erected into a small independent Republic, “connected to Poland by 
 a customs union, and amply safe-guarded as to its administrative integ- 
 rity,’ or it might be united to Poland on the basis of home rule. 
 
 What an assumption of inordinate responsibility for Poland this 
 solution of the problem would involve! Paderewski, with all respect 
 for his great enthusiasm, fails to recollect that under the best of cir- 
 
 ; 15 
 
| 
 
 | 
 
 | 
 cumstances 75,000,000 Germans versus 22,000,000 Poles nee become a 
 most sinister ratio! 
 
 Finally, in view of these considerations, what shall be 2a for fs | 
 mounting ambitions of the Polish leaders, surely not desirable in their } 
 entirety? Indeed their glorious vision of a mighty Poland is very } 
 comprehensible. A proud race, capable of the best achievement, so | 
 long submerged, has turned the while for solace and bright hope’s sake { 
 to an ardent study of its ancient, more auspicious past. Polish leaders 
 well know what old Poland was. How can the new-born State be 
 less than the old! | 
 
 This sentimental force is obviously strong in their calculations; 
 but these are shaped again, and colored by many other forces, less worthy 
 perhaps, but vigorously insistent, notwithstanding. Since the partitions 
 all the Poles built up instinctively a powerful strength of opposition 
 against their oppressors; suddenly the dominant alien Governments | 
 are crashed down, and forthwith the unrestrained tide of long-pent 
 Polish rancor breaks like a devastating flood sweeping all before it, Ba 
 scarce to be checked. : 
 
 Again, Polish patriots, without exception, declare that they file | 
 in their country ““black with famine and utter destruction” the near and | 
 constant menace of Bolshevism, a terror to them all with their vehement 
 Catholicism and their peasant lust for land ownership; this real danger 
 from their point of view seems to them to warrant the large armies and 
 the Allied support which they so insistently demand. 
 
 Lastly, purely selfish interests play also their lusty réle. Wealthy { ie 
 Polish landlords in Lithuania and East Galicia, heretofore the dominant #ig 
 
 class in a peasant population, see with dismay their all on the brink of i 
 ruin in the developing independence of these regions. a 
 
 Surely when these elemental currents are sounded, and it is baaae' icine 
 
 in mind that by no means all of the Poles are carried away by them, 
 
 unthought, harsh criticism of this truly great but threatened and be- a 
 
 wildered people dies on the lips. Poland to-day, like all of the new-born ian 
 nations of Europe, must have the unselfish support and firm guidance of AH 
 a sympathetic world. Only a true League of Nations can guarantee #MMnMy 
 her that beneficent future of which her peculiar genius is so eminently Pt 
 
 deserving! 
 
 In this paper free use has been made of materials taken chiefly from the following! : siait 
 sources:—New York Times, London Times; The New Europe and Current History }Wi 
 (documents and articles) the British magazines, especially the excellent articles by jue 
 
 O. de L. in The Contemporary and by J. E. Baker in the Nineteenth Century, and } 
 modern books on Poland like the compact little volume by W. A. Phillips in the Home § 
 University Library. >. 
 
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS- 
 
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