<\4 D . 11 3 Ct- REMOTE 66tu 1st Congress, 1 l Session. SENATE. JRept. 176, Part 2. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. September 11, 1919.—Ordered to be printed. Mr. Hitchcock, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, sub¬ mitted the following o VIEWS OF THE MINORITY. [To accompany S. Doc. 51.] The undersigned members of the Foreign Relations Committee unite in urging the early ratification of the pending treaty of peace without amendments and without reservations. We deplore the long and unnecessary delay to which the treaty has been subjected while locked up in the committee whose majority decisions and recommendations were from the start a foregone con¬ clusion. They could have been made in July as well as in September and would have been the same. The industrial world is in ferment, the financial world in doubt, and commerce halts while this great delay in the peace settlement has been caused by the majority of a committee known to be out of harmony with the majority of the Senate and the majority the people. This is government by obstruction as well as by a minority. Our export trade already shows the undeniable effects of delay and doubt in treaty ratification and peace settlement. For the first seven months following the armistice our exports averaged almost seven hundred millions per month but in July tney fell to five hundred and seventy millions of dollars. Europe undoubtedly wants our products but can only take them in full quantity if our financial institutions provide the credit to bridge over the period necessar}^ to restore European industry to productiveness. This private credit can not and will not be furnished as long as the peace settlement is in doubt. Public credit has heretofore carried this great balance of trade. Since the armistice was signed our Government has advanced to European governments nearly tw r o and one-half billion dollars which was almost enough to cover the balance of trade during the eight months period. Our Government, however, has about reached the end of its authority given by Congress and will advance but little more. From n 2 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. now on, if we are to keep up our commerce with Europe, private enter¬ prise must furnish the credit to cover the trade balance till European industries get started and are able to pay us with their goods. Peace settlement delays and doubts paralyze this revival. If uncertainty continues depression is inevitable. The claim by the majority of this committee on page 3 of their report that we have exported over eleven million dollars worth of goods to Germany since the armistice and without a peace settlement is no doubt true. To other countries during the same period we ex¬ ported over five thousand million dollars worth. What was exported to Germany as stated by the majority report was practically nothing. It is only 14 cents worth of American products for each person in Germany in seven months or 2 cents per person per month, yet the majority report boasts of it as evidence of trade revival in spite of treaty delay. The same statesmen gravely assure us that their figures prove that it is a mere delusion to say we can not trade, with Germany till a peace settlement is made. Two cents per month per capita is hardly trading with Germany. Referring to the action of the majority of the committee, we unite in opposing and condemning the recommendations both as to textual amendments and as to proposed reservations. As far as the proposed textual amendments are concerned we see no reason to discuss their character at length. In our opinion they have no merit, but whether they be good, bad, or indifferent their adoption by the Senate can have no possible effect except to defeat the participation of the United States in the treaty. None of them could by any possibility be accepted even by the great nations associated with the United States in the war, and none of them could by any possibility be dictated to Germany. To adopt any one of them, therefore, is equivalent to rejecting the treaty. The suggestion on page 4 of the majority report that the peace conference is still in session in Paris and could consider any textual amendments to the treaty made by the Senate, and that German representatives could be brought to Paris for that purpose, indicates a total misconception of the situation. The peace conference has acted finally upon this treaty. Great Britain has ratified it, France is about to do so, and with the action of one other power it will in all human probability be in actual operation even before the Senate of the United States reaches a decision. Moreover, the peace con¬ ference possesses no further -power to “ bring German representa¬ tives to Paris.” The power of compulsion has been exhausted. Germany was told where to sign and when to sign and when to ratify, and Germany has closed the chapter by signing and by rati¬ fying. Germany can not be compelled to do anything more or dif¬ ferent with regard to this treaty by being confronted with an amended treaty whether once a month, day, or week. There must be a finality to ultimata in a treaty by compulsion. If an amended treaty is not signed b}^ Germany then it is in none of its parts bind¬ ing on her. To adopt an amendment or to reject the treaty means that the United States will sacrifice all of the concessions secured from Ger¬ many by a dictated peace. While these concessions are not so large as those which other nations associated with us secure in repara- TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. B tions, they are nevertheless of tremendous importance and could only he secured under a dictated peace. Among the concessions which the United States would sacrifice by the adoption of any amendment or the rejection of the treaty may be included the following: First. Germany’s acknowledgment of responsibility for the war and her promise to make restitution for damages resulting from it. Second. Germany’s promise to us in the treaty that she will not impose higher or other customs duties or charges on our goods than those charged to the most favored nation and will not prohibit or restrict or discriminate against imports directly or indirectly from our country. Third. Germany’s promise to us in the treaty that she will make no discrimination in German ports on shipping bearing our flag and that our shipping in German ports will be given as favorable treatment as German ships receive. Fourth. That for six months after the treaty goes into effect no customs duty will be levied against imports from the United States except the lowest duties that were in force for the first six months of 1914. - < Fifth. Germany’s agreement with us that the United States shall have the privilege of reviving such of the treaties with Germany as were in existence prior to the war as we may alone desire. Sixth. Germany’s promisa to us to restore the property of our citizens seized in Germany or to compensate the owners. Seventh. Germany’s very important agreement validating all acts by the United States and by the Alien Property Custodian by which we seized and proceeded to liquidate $800,000,000 worth of property in the United States belonging to German citizens. Eighth. Germany’s agreement that the proceeds of the sale of these propertu s may be used to compensate our citizens in Germany if Germany fails to do so, or to pay debts which Germany or Germans owe to American citizens, or to pay American prewar claims against Germany for property destroyed and lives taken similar to the losses because of the destruction of the Lusitania. Ninth. Germany’s agreement that she will compensate her own citizens for property, patents, and other things belonging to them in the. United State s seized during the war by our Government. Tenth. Germany’s agreement that no claim can be made against the United States in respect to the use or sale during the war by our Government, or by persons acting for our Government, of any rights in industrial, literary, or artistic property, including patents. Eleventh. Germany’s agreement that the United States shall retain over 500,000 tons of German shipping seized in American ports which much more than compensate us for shipping lost during the war: Twelfth. We would lose our membership on the reparations com¬ mission which will be the most powerful international body ever created and which will have enormous control over the trade and commerce of Germany with the rest of the world for years to come. It not only supervises the use of German economic resources and the payment of reparations, but it can restrict or expand Germany’s imports and distribute much of her desirable exports including dyes. In no way can the United States assure itself against dis- 4 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. crimination in German imports and financial policies unless we have a member upon this great reparations commission. These are some, but by no means all of the valuable concessions, which the United States would inevitably sacrifice by failing to ratify the treaty. This failure would be just as complete if we adopt an amendment to it as if wo rejected the treaty absolutely. In either event, we would find ourselves at the end of the war, it is true, but without any peace or terms of peace with Germany. We would have abandoned our disgusted associates and we would be reduced to the necessity of seeking a negotiated peace with an angry Germany on such terms as she would be willing to accord. We are, therefore, without any qualification, against amendments. We are aware that the claim has been set up that one of the pro¬ posed amendments which relates only to the league of nations does not require the assent of Germany. This is based on the fact that Germany is not yet a member of the league of nations and may not be for several years. The answer is, however, that the league covenant is a part of the treaty, and the league which is mentioned in many places in the treaty has much to do with German affairs even though Germany is not a member. Germany, in agreeing to the treaty, has assented to the provisions of the covenant, and one of the provisions is that it can only be amended by the action of the league, which has not yet started, ratified by all the members of the council, which has not yet organized, as well as by a majority of the members of the assembly. It is obvious, therefore, if it is to be amended in any other way Germany’s assent will be just as necessary as to any other article of the treaty. RESERVATIONS. The reservations proposed by the majority of this committee are of such a character as at once betray their authorship. They are the work of Senators organized for the purpose of destroying the league and if possible defeating this treaty. Their phraseology is such as make this purpose plain. They are in no sense interpretative reservations to be used to make clear language in the treaty that might be considered doubtful, but they are so framed as to receive the support of Senators who desire the defeat of the treaty. While mas¬ querading in the guise of reservations they aie in fact altera tionsyjof the treaty. They have all the vices of amendments and the addi¬ tional vice of pretending to be what they are not. Presented as parts of the resolution to ratify the treaty they would in fact, if adopted, result in its defeat. All of them apply to the league of nations section of the treaty. Those who oppose the league of nations realize that it is invincible on a square fight and they hope to destroy it by this indirection. The league of nations has stood the test of world-wide criticism and unlimited attack. It stands to-day as the only hope for world peace. After all the assaults of many months its purposes and provisions stand out clearly defined, unaffected by criticism, and unyielding to attack. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 5 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. The league of nations proposes to organize the nations of the world for peace whereas they have always heretofore been organized for war. It proposes to establish the rule of international justice in place of force. It proposes to make a war of conquest impossible by uniting all nations against the offender. It is the first international arrangement ever made by which small and weak nations are given the organized strength of the world for protection. It is a covenant between many nations by which each agrees not to do certain things which in the past have produced wars and to do many things which have been found to preserve the peace. It is a working plan for the gradual reduction of armament by all members simultaneously in proper proportion and by agreement. It sets up arbitration as a friendly method of adjusting disputes and inquiry when arbitration is not agreed to. In both cases it pro¬ vides a cooling-off period of nine months during which the differences may be adjusted. It preserves the territorial integrity and political independence of each member and leaves to each the exercise of its sovereign rights as a nation. It will save the world from wars and preparations for wars. It will reduce armies and navies and taxes. It will help to remove the discontent with government in all countries by making government beneficent and devoting its revenues to constructive rather than to destructive purposes. It is the only plan proposed to redeem the world from war, pesti¬ lence and famine. The only one by which a stricken world can be redeemed from the disasters of the late war and the dangers of impending international chaos. Those who dally and delay as they seek with microscopes to find some petty flaw in its structure have nothing themselves to propose. They have appealed to every prejudice and resorted to every desperate method of attack to de¬ stroy this great international effort to establish peace, but they suggest nothing in its place. They denounce the public demand for energetic action as “clamor.” They rail at the President who with the representatives of many other nations has devoted months of hard work to a great constructive effort to settle the terms and reorganize the world for peace. Finally, unable to stem the tide of public demand for the league of nations they resort to so-called reservations in the hope that they can destroy by indirection what they have found unassailable by direct attack. We renew our recommendation that the work of the peace con¬ ference be confirmed, the will of the people fulfilled, and the peace of the world advanced by the ratification of this treaty—‘ ‘ the best hope of the world”—even if like all human instrumentalities it be not divinely perfect in every detail. Gilbert M. Hitchcock. John Sharp Williams. Claude A. Swanson. Atlee Pomerene. Marcus A. Smith. Key Pittman. o