973.525 R72b cop. 2 ROSENBERG,//!** U ILL I NG OF PERRY'S THE F' LET ON LAKE ER I 18 I 2- 18 I 3 C 1 9 5c) II B RAR.Y OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS cof .2. 1UWWS MINUL SURVEY The Building of Perry's Fleet on Lake Erie, 1812-1813 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA PENNSYLVANIA HISTORICAL AND MUSEUM COMMISSION HARRISBURG • 1950 Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2012 with funding from University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign http://www.archive.org/details/buildingofperrysOOrose DANIEL DOBBINS THE BUILDING OF PERRY'S FLEET ON LAKE ERIE. 1812-1813 By MAX ROSENBERG COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA PENNSYLVANIA HISTORICAL AND MUSEUM COMMISSION HARRISBURG ■ 1950 THE PENNSYLVANIA HISTORICAL AND MUSEUM COMMISSION Charles J. Biddle, Chairman Frances Dorrance A. Atwater Kent, Jr. Thomas Murphy John W. Oliver Edgar T. Stevenson Charles G. Webb Richard Norris Williams, 2d Francis B. Haas, ex officio Superintendent of Public Instruction Donald A. Cadzow, Executive Director Sylvester K. Stevens, State Historian TRUSTEES— EX OFFICIO James H. Duff Governor of the Commonwealth Weldon B. Heyburn, Auditor General Charles R. Barber, State Treasurer TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Preface vn I. Why the Fleet Was Built 1 A. Causes of the War of 1812 2 B. Northwest Military Events 6 C. Fleet Construction Authorization 9 II. The Lake Erie Frontier 11 A. Urban Centers and Their Industrial Facilities 14 B. Communication and Transportation 16 III. The Builders of the Fleet 21 A. Daniel Dobbins 21 B. Ebenezer Crosby 23 C. Henry Eckford 23 D. Noah Brown 25 E. Oliver Hazard Perry 26 F. Others 28 IV. Manpower and Supplies 29 A. Early Administrative Difficulties 30 B. Workmen 34 C. Material 37 V. Chronology of the Fleet's Construction 47 A. Reports of Progress 47 B. Crossing the Bar 51 VI. Conclusion 53 Appendix I— The Five Vessels from Black Rock 55 Appendix II— The Legend of the Dupont Powder Train. . . 57 Notes 61 Bibliography 69 iii ILLUSTRATIONS Daniel Dobbins Frontispiece From an oil portrait in the collections of the Buffalo Historical Society Erie Harbor during the War of 1812 opposite page 47 From Benson J. Lossing, The Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812 Plan of Erie Harbor, 1814 opposite page 47 From Alfred T. Mahan, Sea Power in its Relation to the War of 1812 PREFACE With each ensuing major war in which the United States has par- ticipated, the logistical problems have become more complex. In its broadest form the term logistics signifies the total process by which the resources of a nation— material and human— are mobilized and directed toward the accomplishment of a military end. 1 This paper is an attempt to record an important operation during the War of 1812 with this view in mind. Numerous biographies have been written on the life of Oliver Hazard Perry, and the Battle of Lake Erie has been studied in the most minute detail as to the tactics and naval strategy employed. However, so far as is known, no one has made a study on the phase which was perhaps the most important to the success of the American plans in the Lake Erie area. That phase is the construction of the fleet. It is this particular part of the campaign upon which the emphasis has been placed— how the fleet was built. All contributing factors have been considered. They include the state of society within the area, its urban centers, its industrial facilities, and its transportation and communications de- velopment; where the workmen were obtained and how they were transported to the scene of building; the costs involved in its construc- tion; and the leaders who directed the work. It is, I hope, a complete treatment of the building of the fleet. Although many authors have covered one or more of the above- mentioned points, it has been done only as an incidental addition to their particular subject. None are without error of some kind— of dates, of orders, of sites, or of some other facts. Therefore, I have made extensive use of footnotes to substantiate statements which differ from other publications or for hitherto unpublished material. For the subject matter, research was done at many libraries. Grate- ful acknowledgment is now made to the librarians and their assistants for their kind cooperation. These include those at the Public Library and the Western Reserve Historical Society Library in Cleveland; the Public Library, the Grosvenor Library in Buffalo, and the library of the Buffalo Historical Society; the Erie Public Library and the library of the Erie County Historical Society; the library of the Craw- ford County Historical Society; the Carnegie Library in Pittsburgh and the library of the Western Pennsylvania Historical Society; the National Archives, and the Library of Congress in Washington, D. C; the United States Naval Academy Library in Annapolis; the University of Pennsylvania Library in Philadelphia; and, the E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Company Hall of Records in Wilmington. To Professor John W. Oliver, of the University of Pittsburgh, a deep sense of gratitude is felt. Throughout, Doctor Oliver continually advised, assisted, and helped plan the thesis. In addition, a warm ap- preciation is acknowledged for the opening of new vistas of inter- pretation in the field of American history, for which he was primarily responsible during one and a half years study under his tutelage. To Miss Gertrude E. King, humble thanks is given for reading the original draft and for making many helpful corrections and changes. Max Rosenberg viii I. WHY THE FLEET WAS BUILT It has been claimed that Benjamin Franklin, upon hearing of the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown, remarked that the Revolution- ary War was over— but that the real war for independence was yet to be fought. Although Franklin did not live to see the fulfillment of his prophecy, it did become a reality with the War of 1812. This war involved the original adversaries, Great Britain and the United States, but the issue was more than the struggle of two nations. It made known to the world at large that the United States regarded herself as free and sovereign and as a nation which must be treated and respected as such. The war, once and for all, established American independ- ence beyond all doubt. The causes of the War of 1812 are complicated, but it is not the purpose of this paper to discuss them at great length. Needless to say, the war was begun after some twenty years of conspiracies, plot- tings, bickerings, and insults among Great Britain, France and the United States. Unfortunately, the latter was almost inevitably the heaviest loser in all these schemings. The formulation of a solution to this state of continual crisis was begun with the election of 1810. Some seventy new members led by young, brash and daring men, were swept into Congressional office. Soon these were to bear the sobriquet of "The War Hawks." None had reached forty years of age, and some were not yet thirty. These men, who were to lead the fateful Twelfth Congress, included Henry Clay of Kentucky, William Lowndes, John C. Calhoun, David R. Williams, and Langdon Cheves of South Carolina, Felix Grundy of Tennessee, Peter B. Porter of New York, and Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky. They swept all opposition before them. Henry Clay, serv- ing his first term, was chosen Speaker of the House, a position of in- finitely more power than his successors hold today. To the important committees Clay appointed his cohorts— Porter, Calhoun, and Grundy on Foreign Relations; Williams on Military Affairs; Cheves on Naval Affairs; and Ezekiel Bacon and Cheves on Ways and Means. Who were these men who took up the cause of American honor, who sought confirmation for their rallying cry of "Free Trade and 1 2 BUILDING OF PERRY'S FLEET Sailors' Right!"? They were the personification of the new generation of Americans found beyond the Appalachians and on the edge of the frontier who, for the first time, were making their voices heard in the conduct of our nation's policies. The war sentiment was fostered mainly by the South and West, sections of the country, which, while crying "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights!", had neither ships nor sailors. Strangely, New England, center for both the ships and the sailors, was most vehement in the opposition to a declaration of war. Logically, therefore, one must look elsewhere for other motivating factors. They were present in the western lands and the Indian problem. It was not so much that sea- men wanted freedom of the seas, as that the frontiersmen wanted free land, which could be obtained only at the expense of the Indians, the British Empire, and Spain. The West was beginning to feel crowded in 1812. The hunter and the pioneer farmer who forged the advances on the frontier found, or at least thought, their progress was impeded. The hunter opened new paths into the virgin lands. The pioneer farmer, following closely behind, cleared the land, quickly exhausted the soil, and moved on. They were followed by the true immigrant settler who bought the land and stayed. Thus, by 1812, Tennessee, Kentucky, and much of Ohio and Indiana were permanently settled. The hunter and the pioneer farmer could go no farther. True, there was much land to the west, virgin and unsettled, but the hunter and the pioneer farmer nonetheless considered themselves blocked, since it was not forest land. The pioneer of 1812 was a woodsman. His need of timber was great, for it was essential for building, fencing, and fuel. Illinois, In- diana, and the trans-Mississippi regions were regarded as useless, since they were prairie lands. Moreover, much of these lands was con- trolled by powerful tribes of Indians. Hence the land-hungry pioneers turned longingly to the forest lands still held by redskins in upper Illinois and Indiana, and to the Upper Canada regions along Lakes Huron, Erie, and Ontario, which were under British domination. A similar situation prevailed in the South where the Spanish and Indian lands in Florida, along the Gulf of Mexico and even as far distant as Texas were coveted. The result was continual strife with the Indians. Slowly, but steadily, the redman was pushed back and his holdings taken along a broad stretch from Ohio to Illinois. The retreat was forced— by kill- ings, by connivings, by oratory, and by whiskey. In the period between 1795 and 1809, the Indians parted with approximately forty-eight million acres. 1 WHY THE FLEET WAS BUILT 3 Then came a halt to this process. Tecumseh and the Prophet un- dertook a reform movement among the Indians. It was a reformation of sweeping scope. Morality, habits, religion did not escape their attention. The result was a powerful confederation. Fearing further growth and power, General William Henry Harrison, with the tacit approval of the War Department, forced hostilities upon them. On November 8, 1811, the Indians were defeated at Tippecanoe. The West, as a whole, believed that Britain was behind Tecumseh's confederacy. Undoubtedly, the British approved of the Indian or- ganization; but, on the other hand, it is doubtful that support went much beyond this approval. 2 However, people like to hear what they want to hear. This human weakness, strengthened by the desire for those fertile lands beyond the lakes, branded the British guilty along with the Indians. The West, thereby, profoundly believed that its safety could be insured only by the destruction of the British and Indian holdings. In June of 1812, the War Hawks, motivated primarily by the de- sire for the Indian and British lands, and using the popular slogan about the seas and the psychological device of respect for American integrity, demanded, and received, from President Madison a mes- sage requesting that a state of war be declared between the United States and the United Kingdom. The vote was 79 to 49 in the House; 19 to 13 in the Senate. On June 18, 1812, war was declared. Congress adjourned on July 6 without voting war taxes or provid- ing for any increase of the navy. A short war was expected; a rapid advance would be made into Canada where the inhabitants would welcome the American forces with open arms. 3 The United States has entered into a number of wars in its one hundred and sixty years as a nation. For none of these has she been prepared. And never was the United States less prepared than for the War of 1812. The army had been authorized a strength of fifty thousand by Congress in January, 1812; but, enlistments being few, it numbered less than ten thousand regulars and volunteers when the declaration of war came. 4 The navy, which had been neglected by Jefferson and Madison, consisted of sixteen frigates, corvettes, brigs and sloops, and one hundred and sixty-five gunboats. 5 The gun- boats had only one gun apiece and were virtually useless as weapons of war. Madison had few trained officers to select from the regular army. Appointments, by necessity, had to be made from outside its ranks. 4 BUILDING OF PERRY S FLEET American strategy, if it can be called such, was to sweep into Canada from the Niagara-Lake Ontario frontier and the Detroit-Lake Erie frontier. To carry out these plans Madison chose men who had had some war experience— thirty years previously! For the New York area, Henry Dearborn, deputy quartermaster-general in the War of Inde- pendence, was chosen. For the other area, William Hull was given command. Neither they nor the others appointed belonged to the regular service or had ever commanded a regiment in the face of an enemy. All were sixty years of age or thereabouts. The visions of suc- cess from that view should have looked dim indeed, especially in view of the fact that an able professional soldier, Isaac Brock, commanded the British forces. William Hull had been Governor of the Michigan Territory since 1805. In February, 1812, he was called to Washington for consultation in regard to the coming war. Through the month of March, discus- sions were held and plans made. On April 8, 1812, Hull was put in charge of military operations on the Detroit-Lake Erie frontier. 6 It was with reluctance that he accepted, for he much preferred to re- main in his civil post. During these discussions Hull had suggested the necessity of a naval force upon the Upper Lakes (Erie and Huron) . General Hull foresaw the importance of such a force. The area along the southern shore of Lake Erie was unsettled, marked by paths in- stead of roads, and infested with unfriendly Indians. At the far end of this territory was Detroit, designated as the center of operations for the conquest. To keep up a sufficient army would require many reinforcements and many supplies. Only the lake afforded the means to cope with these problems of logistics. Great Britain, similarly, would be hampered by the long distances through unsettled land and over unimproved roads. Thus it was realized that control of Lake Erie would be a decisive factor in the success or failure of either of the adversaries. At the time, American naval strength on the Upper Lakes con- sisted of one armed vessel, the Adams, and it was under the War Department jurisdiction. Unfortunately for himself and for the country, Hull did not adhere firmly to his views. It was finally agreed upon by Madison, Hull, and Secretary of War Eustis that it would be inexpedient to embark upon a shipbuilding program; that success would be achieved by a rapid advance into Canadian territory, thereby necessitating the surrender of the British Fleet upon the lake waters. 7 May 25, 1812, found Hull assuming command of the militia as- sembled at Dayton, Ohio. One week later the march for Detroit was begun. It was to be an arduous trek of some two hundred miles, for WHY THE FLEET WAS BUILT most of the route was through unfriendly Indian territory. To add to the hardships, a road had to be cut and improved as the troops advanced. Nor was this all. The section around the Maumee River was swamps and marshes (The Black Swamp) and most unpleasant for foot troops. In three weeks, the army had pushed its way only seventy- five miles northward. On June 26, definite word of the declaration of war reached Hull. 8 It was decided that the heavy camp equipage be left behind, and the two thousand men hurried forward as rapidly as possible. The mouth of the Maumee River was reached four days later. Here Hull committed an unpardonable blunder. To save transportation, he loaded his personal baggage, hospital stores, entrenching tools, and a trunk containing his instructions and the muster-rolls of the army upon an unarmed schooner and dispatched it to Detroit. Hull thought that the British could not be in possession of the news about the war declaration and therefore, that the shipment would not be in danger. However, by June 30, the information had reached Maiden where the British forces were quartered. The schooner left July 1; the next day an armed British naval vessal captured it. Invaluable informa- tion was in enemy hands and incalculable harm was rendered the American forces. This was the first of many blunders that marred the campaign and gave Great Britain the initial successes. By July 5, General Hull had arrived in Detroit. Invasion prepara- tions were completed, and the Detroit River was crossed on July 12, 1812. The British forces, numerically inferior, fell back before the advancing Americans until they had reached the safety of Maiden. However, much to Hull's amazement and chagrin, the population did not meet the Americans with open arms and friendly greetings This required pause for thought, and the advance was halted. The expected cordiality of the people was to have made possible, in a large measure, a successful campaign regardless of the long and overstretched com- munications lines. Since the welcome had been unfriendly, no al- ternative other than remaining in the present positions was possible until the eastern prong of the attack materialized. This attack was to emanate from the Buffalo sector. However, the inefficient War Department had not carried out that portion of the plans. Thus, while Hull waited, the only force on the Niagara was a small group of state militia, without knowledge of Hull's expectations and without control from any United States Army officer. And General Dearborn did not even realize that the Niagara front was under his command. 9 D BUILDING OF PERRY S FLEET Hull continued to wait, each day growing more uncertain about his supplies, more anxious over his ever-growing sicklist, and more certain about his inability to capture Maiden. On August 3, he was in- formed of the surrender of Mackinac; August 7, dispatches told of British reinforcements being rushed from Lake Ontario; August 8, Tecumseh routed an Ohio regiment near the Maumee River and cap- tured the army mailbags. That evening, against the advice and wishes of militia Colonels Cass, Duncan, MacArthur and Findlay, Hull with- drew to Detroit. Here began another week of fearful waiting. Each day the Indians grew more ferocious in their activities and Hull grew more anxious; and each day made him feel more cut off from his line of communica- tions. His vacillating upon any program meant no progress. The militia was at the point of passive mutiny. The fear of Indian mas- sacre, especially of the women and children, haunted Hull. He was an old man without the energy, brashness, or confidence of youth. His mind was filled with thoughts of horror, not of plans. His position, under the duress of his thinking, was untenable. On August 16, two companies of Michigan militia deserted. At that point, Hull gave up the mental struggle and determined to surrender. Without battle, Detroit fell. On the day previous, Fort Dearborn (Chicago) was also taken. The last vestige of American authority on the western lakes and the surrounding area was gone. Instead of an easy conquest of Upper Canada, our frontier boundaries had been thrown back disastrously to the Wabash and the Maumee. Great doubt was felt whether even that line could be held against the incursions of the British and, especially, of the Indians. 10 When the war was begun, the most northern American military post was located at Mackinac (Michilimackinac) , a small island situ- ated where the waters of Lake Michigan flow into Lake Huron. The garrison numbered fifty-four men and three officers, being about one- third the strength reported necessary for the peace-time establishment by Mr. Jefferson's Secretary of War in 1801! Not far distant, about forty miles away, the British maintained a post. It too was on an island, St. Joseph's, between Lake Superior and Lake Huron. Immediately upon receipt of the declaration of war on June 28, General Brock, British Commander-in-Chief, dispatched a letter to St. Joseph's from Ft. George, near the Niagara River. It reached the post on July 15, 1812. Meanwhile, the American post had received no information whatsoever. The following day, Captain Charles WHY THE FLEET WAS BUILT 7 Roberts took about one thousand men, including 700 Indians, and by 3 A. M., July 17, had surrounded Mackinac. Lieutenant Porter Hanks could make but one decision. He surrendered his tiny and completely surprised garrison. At the time of the surrender, there was an American merchant ship, the Salina, at anchor off Mackinac. It was captained by one Daniel Dobbins, a resident of Presque Isle (or Erie) , who was there to pick up furs. Dobbins thought the surrender would mean the loss of his vessel, but Captain Roberts' terms of capitulation were of a most lenient nature. All soldiers were to be returned to the States on parole until such time as an exchange had been made; all merchant vessels were to remain in the possession of their respective owners; and all American citizens not taking an oath of allegiance to the British Crown were to "depart with their property from the island." 11 Since provisions were scarce, the paroled soldiers and all citizens refusing to take the oath were ordered to leave the island aboard the Salina and another schooner, the Mary. They were to proceed to Cleveland, Ohio, for disembarkment. The ships came down Lake Huron and entered the St. Clair River (between Lakes Huron and Erie) . Both shores, at the time, were in Hull's possession; so no trouble was encountered. Hull ordered them to shore and took com- mand of the vessels. Disregarding the terms of the Mackinac sur- render, the paroled prisoners of war were sent to the garrison, while the civilians were left to shift for themselves. All, of course, were recaptured two weeks later when Detroit fell. Among the British officers at Detroit was a Lieutenant-Colonel Rob- ert Nichols, whom Dobbins had known from pre-war days, both as a business friend and as a fellow Mason. From the Colonel, Dobbins solicited a pass which read: Permit Daniel Dobbins and Rufus Seth Reed to pass from here to Cleveland on board of boats dispatched with Prisoners of War. Detroit, August 17, 1812 Robert Nichols, Lt.-Col. 12 The story of the return to Cleveland can best be given by Dobbins himself. On ariving at Maiden, a gentleman named Boil, who lived at Maiden, (that I was acquainted with) and was un- der suspicion by the British, but happened to be present when Major Muir gave the order to the Indians and others, and offering a reward for me, dead or alive. He [Boil] 8 BUILDING OF PERRY S FLEET being afraid to give the news himself called on a Mr. David Stone and told him to find me imediately. He came to me and told me. I then took shelter in an old sunken gun boat with but little more room in the Hold where I was than to keep my head out of Water. I remained there un- till dark, when I found a frenchman passing with his canoe. I hired him to put me on board the Schooner Thames where I knew Gen. Cass was. [Cass was charged with the task of getting the paroled prisoners of war to Cleveland.] I made my situation known to him. He called a Capt. Saunders, who commanded a Volunteer Company from Ohio. [Because] some of his men [were] sick and some wounded, they had given him a sail boat. He was glad of the assistance I could render him. We started imediately. (It afterwards apeared that a complaint had been en- tered against me for Breach of parole, the person having seen me under arms at Detroit) . In this way I got safe to Cleveland. . . . 13 Cleveland was reached on August 22. Captain Saunders then de- stroyed the boat in accordance with British instructions. Dobbins, however, was able to find a small sailboat and continued on, arriving at Erie on August 24. Dobbins' news of the surrender of Detroit was the first that had reached Erie concerning that debacle. General David Meade, com- mander of the State militia for northwest Pennsylvania, immediately realized the gravity of the situation and requested Dobbins to make the journey to Washington and render a full report. Dobbins agreed to the general's wishes. On the same day (August 24) that Dobbins landed at Erie, Cass reached Cleveland. 14 He, with a companion, set off for Washington after completing the disembarking of the paroled soldiers. On the 28th of August, Cass arrived at Pittsburgh. 15 He paused shortly, then continued on for the nation's capital. Upon reaching Mercersburg, a few miles north of Hagerstown, Maryland, Cass became ill with fever. It was at this place that Dobbins, on his way to Washington, passed Cass. 16 Dobbins gave a full report at the Cabinet meeting held to discuss the events at Detroit. A few days later, when Cass had reached Wash- ington, both were called in and questioned closely upon the disastrous happenings of the Upper Lakes region. The outcome was an agree- ment that a naval force that could command Lake Erie was the prime requisite for any future campaign to retake the lost territory and, once again, attempt a sweep into Canada. WHY THE FLEET WAS BUILT 9 On September 11, 1812, Dobbins received a note from the Secretary of the Navy, Paul Hamilton, requesting his presence at a conference. Dobbins was by far the most completely informed person in Washing- ton concerning matters pertaining to Lake Erie. 17 At the conference, plans for a lake force were formulated. Dobbins named Erie as the best and only comparatively safe place for the fleet to be constructed. The Navy Department accepted this advice. Mr. Hamilton then gave Dob- bins the following instructions: You will proceed without delay to Presque Isle, on the Lake Erie, and there contract for on the best terms in your power, all the requisite timbers and other materials for building four gunboats agreeably to the dimensions which you will receive from Comm re Tingey; and if in your power you will contract for the building of those boats, but such contracts must be submitted to Comm re Chauncey, or the officer that may be appointed by him to command the naval forces on the Lake. # # # # To enable you to comply with the engagements you may make, you can draw on this Department for any sum not exceeding Two Thousand Dollars. Copies of all contracts you may make you will transmit to this Department. For Paul Hamilton C. W. Goldsborough 18 The following day, September 16, 1812, Mr. Dobbins received an ap- pointment as sailing master in the United States Navy. 19 Thus, the authorization was made for a fleet that was soon to bring world-wide fame to Oliver Hazard Perry and a glorious epic to the history of the United States. II. THE LAKE ERIE FRONTIER Captain Dobbins' orders called for the construction of four gun- boats. This later was increased by a further order for two brigs. In the present day, that does not seem very impressive. In World War II, many more than four gunboats were built at Erie. Any one of them outweighed the combined total of the 1813 fleet. It would seem that the Perry ships should have been a simple order for Ameri- can industry to fill. But this feat was very difficult. In fact, the con- struction of this tiny fleet upon the waters of Lake Erie would com- pare in hardship with most projects undertaken by the United States Navy for World War II. The invasion of Canada was a failure and Detroit, Mackinac, and Fort Dearborn had been surrendered for various reasons. Among the more important were: an unsettled and undeveloped land area with- out industrial facilities; no roads, or roads that were muddy paths; and water supply routes which went to the enemy uncontested. It added up to an army attempting to advance with long communica- tion lines and transportation routes so undeveloped and so uncertain that their value was well-nigh worthless. These conditions also pre- vailed in the area where the fleet of two brigs and four gunboats was to be built. Today, in that area, are located five urban centers of a highly industrial nature. They are Erie, where the vessels were built, Buf- falo, Cleveland, Meadville and Pittsburgh. They are closely knit together by networks of concrete roads, waterways, railroads, airways, telephones, telegraphy, and radio. Need for any material or informa- tion for any project can be filled with great rapidity. Unfortunately, in 1812, these industrial facilities were unavailable. Automotive vehicles, rail locomotives, and steamships were not yet known, or not sufficiently developed for practical use, while telephone, telegraph, air- planes and radio were inventions of the future. It is, therefore, of importance to investigate the communities within this area and ascertain what was there— to find out, if possible, why the Perry fleet was so successfully launched upon its brief, but glorious naval adven- ture. 11 12 BUILDING OF PERRY'S FLEET Erie, in 1812, was a tiny settlement hugging the shore-line of Presque Isle Bay. Although it had held an important spot in American his- tory since 1753 as a French or English military post, it could claim only seventeen years' existence as a civilian community. In 1795 Andrew Ellicott as Commissioner for the State laid out the town. Shortly thereafter, the first family arrived. During the short period before the war, the population grew to about four hundred, with an additional two hundred as "floaters." 1 Though incorporated as a borough in 1805 with an area of one square mile, the town did not nearly approach that size. The built-up section consisted of some fifty or sixty structures, almost all of wood, grouped closely together near the Bay. The boundary, in terms of present day streets, extended from the lake front to Sixth Street, and from Parade to Peach Streets (roughly six city blocks by six city blocks). Industrial advance was practically nil. There were the usual grind- ing and saw mills, a blacksmith shop, and a tannery. In the main, live- lihoods were made as farmers, merchants, or sailors and wagoners for the lucrative salt trade. The factor that made Erie so favorable for the construction of the fleet was Presque Isle Peninsula. Starting about six miles west of the city, the semi-circular peninsula, very sandy and quite heavily timbered, juts out from shore and curves in a north-easterly direction for about five miles, almost touching the shoreline on the eastern side of the city. It is the only large natural harbor found on Lake Erie and serves as a superlative windbreak for ships. The bay area, approximately eight square miles, is sufficiently deep to take care of any of the lake boats. Probably the most important feature of the bay in 1812 was the bar and channel. Across the entrance was a sandy bar about a mile wide, extending from the tip of the peninsula to the lake shore. Usually the bar was submerged to a depth of only six feet. A narrow and winding channel, in which there were from five to nine feet of water, traversed this bar. At times, the channel depth decreased to as little as three or four feet. Only a skilled pilot completely familiar with the route of the channel could hope to enter into the harbor. Thus, while the fleet was being built, the British naval forces could watch the progress, but could not ap- proach near enough to destroy the naval yards. This brief review of Erie's facilities shows that it was ill-equipped for the undertaking of the project, except for the magnificent harbor and the unlimited supply of timber standing in the virgin forests surrounding the town. THE LAKE ERIE FRONTIER 13 Approximately one hundred miles from Erie was the town of Buf- falo. It too was a youthful community, numbering about five hundred people. Although four or five houses had been built near the mouth of Buffalo Creek by 1795, the date of founding was 1798. In that year Joseph Ellicott surveyed and laid out the future city for the Holland Land Company. By 1812, it numbered about one hundred frame houses and stores with a very few brick or stone structures, stretching mostly along Main Street. 2 John Melish, visiting Buffalo in 1811, said that "the town is as yet too new for the introduction of any man- ufactures, except those of a domestic kind." 3 The activities were very similar to those in Erie— farming, trading and sailoring. Buffalo, as described above, would apparently be of little value to the forthcoming work at Erie. But it did have some favorable aspects. Just two miles away was the tiny village of Black Rock, situ- ated at the mouth of Scajaguady Creek, a few miles down stream from where the waters of Lake Erie, flowing into Lake Ontario, forms the Niagara River. A government naval yard of a sort had been estab- lished near Black Rock. Limited supplies, shipped from Albany and Sackett's Harbor, accrued here. (Sackett's Harbor, the main naval base of the Great Lakes command, was situated at the east end of Lake Ontario.) Some of these supplies, plus five ships converted from traders to armed vessels, ultimately reached Erie. For the bulk of the necessary materials for the Erie fleet, sources had to be found elsewhere. Approximately one hundred miles to the west of Erie, another set- tlement, Cleveland, was just beginning to grow. A large tract of land, called the Western Reserve, had been reserved by Connecticut for its citizens. Through the center of this reserve winds the Cuyahoga River, which finally empties into Lake Erie. It was towards the mouth of the Cuyahoga that Moses Cleaveland brought the first party of fifty in 1796. Not all of the fifty finished the trip. A few stopped at the mouth of Conneaut Creek to begin a settlement there. The original group was further depleted by others stopping at the site of present day Ashtabula. Cleaveland laid out the city in much the manner that it now stands— the large Public Square with the streets leading from it. Cleaveland was recalled shortly thereafter, never to revisit the place that bears his name. Cleveland's growth was much less rapid than that of Buffalo or Erie. By 1812, it could boast of a population of a "little over 47 14 BUILDING OF PERRY'S FLEET souls." 4 There was a dearth of industrial facilities and of most supplies. To describe this deficiency best, it need only be noted that a hospital built for Hull's sick, who were transferred from Detroit to Cleveland after the surrender, was made without a nail or a screw! Any expecta- tion for assistance for the fleet from this quarter might be considered futile. 5 Meadville, in 1812, must have resembled a far western settlement. It is described as a town where "tame Indians, trappers, raftsmen, boatmen, and countrymen, made it [a] colorful and sometimes tur- bulent place." 6 Located on French Creek opposite the mouth of the Cussewago, the site was first occupied in 1788 by David Meade. Driven out by Indians, the settlers temporarily returned in 1792 and perma- nently in 1795; at which time the town was surveyed and named after Meade. At the time of the conflict, the population of Meadville was about five hundred people. 7 Their livelihood was made from the lucrative salt and lumber trade, and as farmers and merchants. Industrial ad- vancement here did not go beyond the usual grist and sawmills. The construction of the fleet could not profit greatly from this bus- tling community. One hundred and thirty miles from the newly-founded ship yards at Erie was Pittsburgh. This place had played a major role in the unfolding of American history. Situated as it is, at the confluence of the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers, its strategic importance was early realized and a war fought over its possession. Highly important previous to Revolutionary War, the site attained a still more important position after the war's conclusion. The close of the war saw the beginning of a huge stream of immigration across the Appalachians into the Ohio Valley. As the influx grew larger, Pittsburgh grew larger, for it was located where land transportation was abandoned for the passage down the Ohio River to Kentucky, Ohio, and Indiana. Pittsburgh became the "gateway to the West," where one bought and stocked up before the plunge into the wilder- ness beyond. This peculiar position had made of Pittsburgh a comparatively large city— larger than any two others in the surrounding area. Recognizing that most of the immigrants' goods could be made there for far less than the cost of bringing the goods from the East, entrepreneurs and artisans flocked to "the Point." In 1810, Pittsburgh numbered 4,768, THE LAKE ERIE FRONTIER 15 and by the opening of the War of 1812 the figure had risen to about six thousand. 8 Manufactories of all kinds were introduced by the artisan and the entrepreneur. The total ran well over a hundred places. There were foundries, cotton and fulling mills, ropewalks, glassworks, shops for many types of metals, steam engine works, steam mills for grinding and sawing, shipyards, and numerous others. Huge warehouses and merchant stores abounded in great numbers and were abundantly supplied. Already the Pittsburgh of 1812-15 resembled the Pittsburgh of today in many ways. Present were the characteristics which per- sonify it— numerous industries, confident entrepreneurs, and bustling land and water transportation. James Riddle in his First Directory of Pittsburgh, (1815) , wrote: "Few places can boast of more useful improvements in manufactures and the mechanical arts than Pittsburgh. It has been justly and em- phatically styled 'The Birmingham of America.' " 9 Another traveler states that ". . . the whole town presents a smoky appearance [from the prodigious use of coal] . . . Here one may see the surprising prog- ress, which the people of this country are making in mechanics of almost every kind, both as it respects invention and workmanship." 10 With these facilities, it is natural to suppose that Pittsburgh would be considered the main base of supply for the Perry fleet. Plans were made to use Pittsburgh for just that purpose. However, while this city did play an important role in the construction, its supply per- formance did not reach the magnitude that had been expected, not because of the city's inability to produce but because of other varied and unavoidable circumstances. The five places described above were the large centers of the area surrounding the site of the naval yards. Some of these had supplies and materials which were essential to the success of the project. But this, in turn, raised another highly important question. The materials were available, but how were they to be transported to the place of use? The success or failure of the completion of the Lake Erie force hinged greatly on this factor. If the necessary material could be trans- ported to the site of construction, the major problem would be re- moved. Ordinarily, within the United States, such a situation can be solved without too much hardship. However, the area in question was still in the settlement stage, resulting in a transportation prob- lem of wide scope. Erie was so situated that it could be served by three modes of trans- portation. Firstly, there were the land routes which connected the 16 BUILDING OF PERRY'S FLEET town with Pittsburgh and Meadville to the south, and Buffalo to the east. Secondly, there was Lake Erie which served as a convenient means of exchange with Buffalo, and through Buffalo with the East. The third possible avenue of supply was the Allegheny River-French Creek waterway from Pittsburgh to Water ford, just fourteen miles distant from Erie. With these three possible routes, communication and transportation would seem both adequate and convenient. Never- theless, they were both inadequate and inconvenient. From Erie, roads branched out toward Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Cleve- land and even to the mountainous sections of central Pennsylvania. To Buffalo, two roads had been marked out, one in 1805, the other in the following year. Both were in use, but only when absolutely neces- sary, for neither was more than a path through the forest or along the lake shore. The time spent traveling and the hardships endured were incredible. The journey from Erie to Buffalo by land was much dreaded even to the completion of the railroad; previous to 1815 or 1820 it was absolutely dangerous. Travelers find- ing the land road through Cattaraugus woods almost impas- sable for wagons, would be induced, if the weather was not very boisterous, to pass around the point of rock projecting into the lake. Many fatal instances are recorded of persons unacquainted with the country being overwhelmed by the waves. The nature of the soil through the woods would scarcely admit of a good road, and a journey once made was scarcely forgotten, for passengers felt that then and there, they escaped narrowly with their lives. 11 Dobbins in April, 1813, attempted to bring three pieces of ordnance from Buffalo. I started from Buffalo with three pieces but got through with pnly one. . . . After a most perilous expedition oweing to the bad state of the roads, freshets in the streams, and washing away of bridges, breaking through the ice etc., etc. . . . 12 Mail delivery from Buffalo was made only once a week, the trip usually taking a full day. Simeon Dunn, who had the position of Perry's personal messenger, notes in his diary that his trips took from seventeen hours to one and one-half days, depending upon the weather and creeks. 13 During the winter Erie was practically cut off from Buf- falo, although sleighs did occasionally make the journey, mainly on the lake. The roads between Erie and Pittsburgh were little better. The route between the two points followed fairly closely present day THE LAKE ERIE FRONTIER 17 Route 19 to Meadville. From here, the road went along the east side of French Creek into Franklin. From Franklin the road went in a southwesterly direction into Pittsburgh. A ferry had to be em- ployed in entering the city inasmuch as no structure yet bridged the Allegheny. Oliver Hazard Perry left for Pittsburgh on the thirty-first of March, 1813, and returned ten days later. Of that week-and-a-half period, six of the days were consumed in travel. Harm Jan Huidekoper, a very influential leader and resident of Meadville, in a reminiscent letter to his son-in-law wrote that ". . . the roads, being common country roads, were soon so cut by the heavy hauling on them as to become nearly impassable." 14 Noah Brown, master builder of the fleet, in a statement made after the war, remarks that "the roads were so bad that I had almost finished the fleet before any [supplies] arrived at Erie." 15 As early as November, 1812, before wagons were hauling supplies to the fleet, the editor of the Crawford Messenger warned his readers of a probable shut-down caused by the "bad state of roads" exhausting his stock of paper. 16 Mail between the two communities was delivered once weekly via Franklin and Meadville. This service was started in 1801. Delivery took between three and four days. Adding the time spent in receiv- ing the mail from Washington, usually about three days, the very least time in which any order or information could be forwarded to the naval yards was a week. Overland hauling was unsatisfactory for a very simple reason. Although western Pennsylvania was covered by a net- work of roads by 1812, it cannot be said that they provided satisfactory avenues of travel and transportation. In gen- eral the roads . . . were not constructed; they were merely 'opened'— that is, the trees were cut down and stumps were grubbed out. Sometimes a little digging was done on side hills and in passes, swampy places were filled with logs laid crosswise with a little dirt on top of them, and crude wooden bridges were constructed over some of the smaller streams. Little effort appears to have been made to avoid steep inclines, and culverts were practically unknown. Road maintenance consisted merely of the removal of fallen trees and the dumping of dirt into mudholes and washouts. . . . A trip over almost any of the roads with a wagon or a car- riage was a difficult and hazardous experience, especially in the winter or spring. In the wet season, parts of the main roads appeared to be bottomless, and it is reported that wagoners sometimes spent three successive nights at the same tavern while working their wagons through a boggy section. 17 18 BUILDING OF PERRY'S FLEET Practically all hauling was done by four-wheeled vehicles known as Conestoga wagons. Developed previous to the French and Indian War in Lancaster County, this wagon had supplanted the pack horse and cart in trans-Allegheny freighting by the end of the eighteenth century. The wagon had a peculiar shape, being built "bellied," or high at each end in order to keep the load from slipping forward or back in the extremely rough roads or on the numerous uphill climbs and downhill descents. The length of the body was usually sixteen feet, while the overall length was about twenty-four feet. The wagon was capable of carrying between one and two tons, depending on u\e difficulty of the trip to be made. A special breed of horses, developed in the same region, were used to pull the mammoth wagons, six-horse teams usually being required. The black and gray horses were ex- tremely large and powerful. Though very slow, the Conestoga wagon capably filled the great need for the transportation of sizable loads of material over long distances on the almost worthless roads of the early 1800's. 18 Lake Erie, previous to the beginning of the war, had supplied the most accessible and most convenient means of travel and transporta- tion between Erie and Buffalo. With favorable winds the journey could be made in less than a day. But Lake Erie is a treacherous and dangerous body of water. Storms descend upon it without warning, the waters become very choppy, and the water level along the shores is lowered to a considerable extent. Only the most skillful and ex- perienced sailors could venture upon it with a feeling of safety. The lake's utility was also limited because of its being open to navigation for approximately six months out of a year. By November or December it was a hazardous undertaking to attempt to sail the lake; more usually, ice had already formed. The break-up of the frozen lake did not begin until April or May, and it was not uncommon for the lake to have ice until June. In 1813, the break- ing up of the ice had begun about April 10. 19 In the years under consideration the utility of the lake was further impaired by the conditions imposed by the state of the war. In the initial stage of the struggle, the Americans had between twelve and eighteen unarmed vessels on Lake Erie. Many of these had been captured during the early weeks of war, and the remainder had been forced to seek safety at Black Rock, Cleveland, or Erie. Until THE LAKE ERIE FRONTIER 19 September, 1813, the British naval force of some six vessels patrolled Lake Erie uncontested. Only an occasional vessel attempted to slip through the blockade. Thus, much of the ease and availability af- forded by Lake Erie as a means of transportation was negated or rendered useless. The other waterway, and by far the best for the prevailing situa- tion, was the Allegheny River-French Creek system to Waterford, from Pittsburgh. Used by the Indians, this means had been adopted by the first white men as the best practical route between Lake Erie and the Ohio River. The French had constructed a chain of forts for protection of this important waterway, and the English and Amer- icans, with the passing years, depended more and more upon it for travel and trade. The volume of traffic was large, especially from the salt trade from western New York and the lumber trade from around Meadville and Warren. The distance between Pittsburgh and Waterford by water is con- siderably greater than that of the overland roads between the two places. However, the comparative ease with which larger freight loads could be moved more than compensated for the great difference in distance. The season for shipping was usually limited to the spring and fall, at which times there was a sufficient water depth. This was especially true of French Creek. During the dry season, French Creek to Waterford could be navigated only by canoe, while in the best periods boats carrying twenty tons were able to reach the town. In the down-stream traffic both rafts and keelboats were used. How- ever, for the reverse trade only a keelboat could be employed. The keelboats were "constructed like a whale boat, sharp at both ends; their length . . . about 70 feet, breadth 10 feet, and they are rowed by two oars at each end. These boats will carry about 20 tons. . . ." 20 The keelboatmen were as distinct a class as the Conestoga wagoners. Rough and unruly, they were recruited from the wildest elements of the population, for an up-stream trip was a most laborious and difficult task. "Keelmen not unfrequently at that day had their hide flayed and raw as a poor draught horse long galled by the harness." 21 In the year of the battle, unusually high water in the Allegheny River and in French Creek enabled their use through the early months of the summer. ... it was remarked by those well qualified to judge, that without this fortunate circumstance, this extraordinary 20 BUILDING OF PERRY'S FLEET rise, the squadron could not have been built, as it would have been impossible to transport the ordnance and nec- essary equipment overland. . . . 22 After the keelboat reached Waterford, an overland journey of four- teen miles to Erie remained. A road between the two points had been built when the French began their southward move toward the Ohio. It was excellently constructed, but during the sixty-year period before the War of 1812 it had greatly deteriorated because of much use and no maintenance. The road was from two to five miles wide at various places, diversified with stumps, logs, logheaps, and very deep mud- holes. It was not unusual for a load of salt or provisions, drawn by four to six oxen, to be four days in traveling the fourteen miles, although the average time en route was usually two days. Old French Road, as it is called today, was relegated to a sec- ondary position by the Erie and Waterford Turnpike. The salt trade had increased by such leaps and bounds that an improved road was of the greatest necessity. In 1805, a company was formed and under- took the project. The road was less direct and on higher ground than the French Road, primarily to accommodate the farmers who were stockholders. Four years later the road was opened for traffic. Accord- ing to a contemporary newspaper account: The manner of making this road has been different from the other turnpike roads in this state; the timber has been cleared off to the width of one hundred feet; thirty feet grubbed, and twenty feet in the center of which has been dug and the clay thrown up, raising the middle from eighteen inches to two feet higher than the sides; deep ditches are dug on each side to carry off the water, which leaves the part travelled on so solid that very little im- pression is made on it by the heaviest teams. 23 The time of a journey was greatly cut, freightage costs decreased by two-thirds (even with the toll) , and loads five times greater than heretofore could be drawn with the same number of animals. 24 The combination of the Allegheny-French Creek waterway with the Erie and Waterford Turnpike was by far the most advantageous to the naval builders at Erie. It not only was the most convenient and least dangerous to use, but the terminals of it were located most strategically— Pittsburgh, as the source of Eastern and home-manufac- tured material; and Erie, as the utilizer of those supplies. III. THE BUILDERS OF THE FLEET Many men planned and took part in the creation of the fleet. A compilation of their names would make a long and interesting list. However, five come to the front when considering the personnel of the group. Each has a varying degree of renown, graduating from "world-wide" to "virtually unknown." Yet each undertook and achieved success in some integral phase of the building of "the fleet in the forest." These men include: Oliver Hazard Perry, famous the world over for the Battle of Lake Erie; Henry Eckford, Noah Brown, and Daniel Dobbins, known only within a certain locale or within a spe- cific field of endeavor; and Ebenezer Crosby, known only to those who study with great detail the preparatory phase of the Lake Erie fleet. What type of men composed the leadership? What abilities did they have and what was their part in the successful consummation of the project? Daniel Dobbins has been previously introduced as the special mes- senger dispatched by General Meade to the authorities in Washington to render an "eyewitness" report of the surrender of Detroit. Because of his intimate knowledge of the lake regions, Dobbins had been invited to the conferences in which the program of ship building was resolved. His choice of the site for the construction of the vessels was accepted and, in addition, Dobbins was commissioned a sailing- master in the United States Navy with authority to begin the execu- tion of the plans. Dobbins had been born, near Lewistown, Mifflin County, Pennsyl- vania, on July 5, 1776. When nineteen, he left home, walking to Erie County. At Colt's Station, fourteen miles southeast of Erie, he found employment with Judah Colt, an agent for the Pennsylvania Popula- tion Company. On July 1, 1796, Dobbins made his first trip to Erie, remaining there for the rest of his life. Why he chose to stay in this tiny hamlet of four houses, Dobbins did not say and his papers are silent on the point. It is not unlikely though, that his liking for the lake was a major factor. By 1800, he had become known as one of the best navigators upon the lake. In 1803, Dobbins was master of his own vessel. Trips were made all over Lake Erie and into Lake Huron, carrying salt, whiskey, furs, and other home and food products. 1 21 22 BUILDING OF PERRY'S FLEET Although he was highly skillful as a navigator, it is doubtful that Dobbins had had much experience building vessels. It is definite that he had knowledge in refitting and renovating boats, as he personally supervised the rebuilding of the schooner Salina— purchased jointly by him and Rufus Seth Reed in 1809. 2 Therefore, the project assigned him must have been accepted with grave misgivings, but with a grim determination to see it through. His every action upon his return to Erie indicates that feeling. With untiring effort, Dobbins planned and schemed to get the construction underway against almost unsur- mountable odds. He travelled far and ceaslessly for supplies, substi- tuted whenever and wherever possible for those things so short in supply, and sought and hired labor personnel where available. He undertook a control of the town economy, since Erie was in the throes of a boom. The presence of hundreds of State militia, stationed on the edge of the town, had skyrocketed prices. Dobbins set up prices for board, for food supplies and for whiskey. The task required effort far beyond the call of duty. Fortunately, assistance gradually arrived. At Black Rock, Dobbins found a shipwright capable of taking charge of the shipyard and work- men. Five months after the beginning of work, a master shipbuilder arrived from New York. For the first time, really professional guid- ance in the technical aspects was at hand. Finally, a few weeks later, Perry reached Erie and took over the general supervision of the whole project. Dobbins continued on as advisor, supply officer and purchasing agent. Being so well acquainted with the surrounding country, he was able to ferret out essential material and facilitate its transporta- tion to the base. When pilots were badly needed, Dobbins was expected to get them. Great credit must be given him. Strangely enough, the man so much responsible for the success of the building did not participate in the Battle of Lake Erie. Dobbins commanded the Ohio, the tenth vessel of the fleet. Generally, this vessel is ignored inasmuch as it did not take part in the actual battle. A few days previous to the engagement, Perry dispatched the Ohio to Erie for food and munitions. While it was absent, the battle occurred. In 1814, when the prize money list was published and shares announced, Dobbins' name was omitted. He felt quite in- dignant, believing that a part was rightfully his for the magnificent service rendered. Claims were made for a sailingmaster's share, but Dobbins could receive no satisfaction. Finally, by the petition of in- fluential friends in the navy and in Washington, the Secretary of the THE BUILDERS OF THE FLEET 23 Navy granted Dobbins a share of the prize money. However, Dobbins failed to receive one of the swords presented by Congress to all com- missioned officers in the Battle of Lake Erie. 3 The master shipwright whom Dobbins hired to relieve him of some of the shipyard duties was Ebenezer Crosby. Virtually no information can be found about Crosby. In the contract made between Dobbins and the shipwright the fact that he was a resident of Niagara County, New York is noted. 4 Crosby was an integral cog in the managerial direc- tion. From the time that he was employed on November 3, 1812, until March, 1813, Crosby supervised and worked on the actual physi- cal construction of the gunboats. This enabled Dobbins to give his attention to the other innumerable problems confronting the under- taking. Moreover, it is likely that Crosby was responsible, along with Dobbins, for the design of the gunboats. Dobbins, in a report to Lieutenant Angus at Black Rock, wrote, "I would have sent you a draft [of the gunboat] but Mr. Crosby has been so busy he has had no time to draw 'em. He has Drawn one to work by which looks well and I think will answer the purpose well." 5 Crosby continued to work at the shipyards after he was replaced by Noah Brown in March, 1813. His name appears on the payroll until June, 1813. From that time, Crosby seems to have disappeared completely from the pages of his- tory. On the last day of December, 1812, Captain Isaac Chauncey, com- mander of all the American naval forces on the Upper Lakes, arrived at Erie on a winter tour of inspection. Accompanying Chauncey was his chief ship designer and builder, Henry Eckford. Both left on the following day, never to return again to the Erie naval base. Never- theless, the one day stay meant many alterations in the work going on at that place. For these changes Eckford was mainly responsible. Henry Eckford was born in Irvine, Scotland, on March 12, 1775. At the age of sixteen he immigrated to Quebec, Canada, where he be- gan the study of ship designing and building in the yards of his uncle, John Black. In five years, Eckford had learned his craft from his relative and left to seek his fame and fortune in New York City. Eckford did not have to wait long, for by 1800, he had his own ship- yard on the East River near the Brooklyn Navy Yard. Eckford's reputation grew rapidly; his designing innovations and rigging ar- rangements soon had the Eckford-built ship surpassing those of rivals in stability, speed, and capacity. 6 In September, 1812, Secretary of Navy Paul Hamilton selected Isaac Chauncey as the person to gain control of Lakes Ontario, Erie, Huron, 24 BUILDING OF PERRY'S FLEET and the others, if necessary. Previous to the receipt of the orders, Chauncey had been a very efficient and energetic officer-in-charge at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. Knowing Eckford's ability for building as well as designing, Chauncey hired him as his chief designer and con- structor. During the war period, Eckford handled accounts for ships, supplies, and payrolls to a value of several million dollars. Being Chauncey's "right-hand" man, Eckford was usually stationed at Sackett's Harbor and carried on his main activities from this head- quarters, chiefly for the Lake Ontario fleet, in somewhat similar straits as that on Lake Erie. Chauncey and Eckford thought that the gunboats being built at Erie would not be sufficiently large. However, progress on two of the boats had so advanced that alteration was impossible. The other two, not yet begun, were re-designed by Eckford. More important, orders were given for the construction of a brig; later the orders were in- creased to call for two brigs. Eckford, of course, drew up the de- signs for the two brigs. This was a special problem, since a brig was much larger than a gunboat, and consideration of the bar with its small water depth at the entrance of the bay had to be taken into account. If the brig were made with the conventional lines, it might well have to be abandoned because of the lack of sufficient water. Eckford sketched plans for a vessel having an extremely shallow draught, resolving the problem with characteristic ease. Eckford designed four of the six vessels built at Erie. Further service on his part included the refurbishing and the outfitting of five boats in the tiny naval yard at Black Rock. These five vessels later evaded the British blockade and joined the fleet in Erie. Three were used in the battle; one, the Ohio, missed the engagement because of Dob- bins' trip for provisions; and the other was condemned as unfit for combat. Thus, Eckford had a substantial role in the building or out- fitting of seven of the nine boats to engage in combat. For his outstanding work during the thirty-year period from 1800 to 1830, and especially during the War of 1812, James Fenimore Cooper called him "undoubtedly a man of genius." 7 Noah Brown was perhaps most responsible for the physical work done on the boats at Erie. He was born in Salem County, New