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[AN NOT A MACHINE, 
 
 BUT 
 
 A RESPONSIBLE FREE AGENT. 
 
 BY THE 
 
 REV. C. A. ROW, M.A., 
 
 {Prebendary of St. Paul's^ 
 
 AUTHOR OF 
 
 “ Christian Evidence in Relation to Modern Thought,” 
 {Being the Bampton Lecture for 1877,) 
 
 * ^he Tesus o f the Evangelists,” et^. 
 
 THE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETY: 
 
 56, Paternoster Row; 65, St. Paul’s Churchyard; and 
 164, Piccadilly. 
 
Ji-tgumjent Trajot. 
 
 The appeal is made to comm on sense against the pre- 
 valent materialistic, necessitarian philosophy, theological 
 necessitarianism being excluded from the discussion. What 
 is meant by a free agent is explained, and the limits of 
 human freedom are defined. The necessitarian position, 
 that every thing in man is the result of the conjoint action of 
 ji iatter^ nd force , and therefore necessarily what his bodily 
 organization makes him, and nothing more is stated, and 
 that of the believers in man’s free agency is defined. JFree 
 agen cy is shown to be the ^rer.t-afiSrmntion of our co n. 
 sciousness. We are shown to have a power of originating 
 action. The validity of various objections is examined. 
 The truth of free agency is proved, from the universal 
 belief of civilized man, especially as it has been registered 
 in the structure of language and from an analysis of duty 
 as affirmed by conscience. Obligation must centre in a 
 Being external to ourselves. Both we ourselves who owe, 
 and the Being to whom we owe, must be possessed of a 
 moral natur e, i.e., both nQ^i^„be free agei^ 
 
 A summary of the testimony of the past experience of 
 mankind to free agency is given. Various materialistic 
 theories on the subject are refuted. The distinction be- 
 tween physical and moral agents, instinctively and 
 universally felt, is pointed out. The issues of the necessi- 
 tarian philosophy are indicated. The basis of moral 
 obligation according to this philosophy is examined, and 
 what would be the practical effects of utilitarianism, were 
 it generally accepted, set forth. The self-destructive charac- 
 ter of necessitarian philosophy, and the fact that God alone 
 can estimate the degree of re.?ponsibilitj^ attaching to each 
 individual are shown. The confidence is expressed that 
 '“^God will judge and act aright. 
 
\Yhou. 
 
 
 ^ MAN NOT A MACHINE, 
 
 BUT 
 
 A RESPONSIBLE FREE AGENT. 
 
 WIDESPREAD pEilosophy at the present no dis- 
 day affirms that there is no distinction between 
 
 material and 
 
 between the forces which energize in moral forces 
 
 ^ according to 
 
 the material and in the moral universe ; p^oSpbyl^ 
 but that both ^are alike subject to an iron law of 
 necessity. It teaches that man is the result of 
 the conjoint action of those necessary forces of 
 nature, by which his physical frame has been built 
 up, and of the surroundings in the midst of which 
 he is placed ; that he has no power of determining 
 ffiis own actions, but that they are determine 
 for hi m by the conditions of his birth_and his 
 ^ environm eiit ; that he cannot help acting in con- 
 ^formity with the impulse which happens to be the 
 <=4 strongest ; and that i f all th esa-conditions-could be- 
 '^pnrfpp.tly knowHj every antion nf p.vf^ry iT i dividw a l - 
 c ould he predicted beforehand . mih the same eer- 
 "=> ^intY as an a Hr^ne mer predicts tb^ ^^e^^ren ee of 
 
4 
 
 Man not a Machine, 
 
 If this ^.n nnl i psfi . 
 
 philosophy ' ^ 
 
 machine. 
 
 From this it follows, if this philosophy 
 he true, man/ ig ^ accoiint of tho realities of things, that 
 
 man is as much a machine as a steam engine ; and 
 that the hitherto accepted idea, that he is a free 
 agent and a responsible moral being, is a delusion. 
 
 As long as paradoxes of this kind are confined 
 to the closets of a few speculators, they may safely 
 be left to be dealt with by the common sense of 
 mankind ; but when they are loudly proclaimed on 
 the house-tops, as furnishing the true account of 
 the moral nature of man, upon the authority of a 
 number of well-known and imposing names in 
 philosophy and science, and a system of ethics is 
 erected on them, which is declared to be the destined 
 Gospel of the future, it is impossible any longer to 
 treat the subject with indifference, for it is only too 
 evident that if such views are generally embraced 
 as true they will not only be subversive of Chris- 
 tianity, but of the accepted principles of moral obli- 
 gation and of the very foundations on which society 
 rests. , Let us therefore inquire as briefly as we can 
 into their validity, not in terms of ^h philosophy,-- 
 but in such as will be intelligible to men of ordinary 
 understanding. But, inasmuch as great confusion 
 of thought has been introduced into this controversy 
 by a lax use of language, it will be necessary before 
 entering on the argument to lay down clearly what 
 we mean when we affirm that man is a free agent. 
 1. We mean that man is pot bound by the 
 
 Reason why 
 the subject 
 cannot be 
 treated with 
 indifference. 
 
 What is 
 meant by 
 the aflB.rm- 
 ation that 
 man is a 
 free agent. 
 
Blit a Resioonsihle Free Agent 
 
 b 
 
 law by which necessary agents are bound ; but that 
 he is an agent free to adopt, or to forbear adopting, 
 a particular course of action, according to the 
 dictates of his reason ; and that he is capable of 
 choosing between the different impulses and 
 motives which urge him to action, and of acting 
 on one, and of declining to act on others. This 
 power is what we mean when in philosophical 
 language we speak of the freedom of the will. 
 
 2. We affirm that man possesses a power of self- 
 determination, that the possession of such a power 
 by an agent is essential to constitute an action 
 Inoral ; and that without it there can be neither 
 morality nor responsibility. Our position is that 
 the universe consist s of twojajstQrs : one, consisting 
 of that injwhich necessary law reign^ and where 
 the agents cannot act otherwise than they do ; the 
 other, wh.emJhcy--ai^-c^ of exercising^choice^ 
 To the latter we attribute responsibility, to the 
 former none. 
 
 3. But as necessitarians urge that the doctrine 
 
 of the freedom of the will is equivalent to affirming 
 
 that man can act without a motive : that he has 
 - — ^ — * 
 
 a power of modifying his character according to 
 his pleasure; that he can pursue any course of 
 action he pleases ; and that it also subjects human 
 “action to the dominion of caprice, and even makes 
 man a creator of force, it becomes necessary to 
 lay down clearly the real position which is taken 
 
 He is free 
 to adopt or 
 not a 
 particular 
 course. 
 
 He possesses 
 the power 
 of self- 
 determina- 
 tion. 
 
 Allegations 
 of neces- 
 sitarians. 
 
6 
 
 Man not a Machine, 
 
 Limitationfl 
 of human 
 freedom. 
 
 Where 
 freedom 
 ceases re- 
 sponsibilitj 
 ceixses. 
 
 
 Different 
 kinds of 
 motives. 
 
 on all these points by those who affirm that man 
 is a free agent. 
 
 (1.) I observe that in affirming human freedom, 
 it is by no means intended to assert that this free- 
 dom is devoid of Jimitation^.— All that is intended 
 is, that within certain limits, man possesses such 
 an amount of freedom as is sufficient to constitute 
 him a r esponsible agent ; and that where his free-, 
 dom ceases, hj.s responsibility c eases also . What 
 we assert is, that we are capable of choosing between 
 different motives and impulses to action ; and that 
 we are under no constraining necessity to yield 
 to what is commonly called the strongest motive, 
 
 I which, in the language of this philosophy, really 
 means the impulse which, by its gratification, 
 would afford the greatest amount of pleasure. 
 We also affirm that the power of motives to act 
 on the will cannot be estimated by a common 
 measure, such as the amount of pleasure with 
 which the gratification of this or that impulse 
 is attended; but that motives differ not only in 
 intensity, but in kind, some appealing to the higher, 
 and some to the lower principles of our nature ; 
 that our reason is capable of discriminating between 
 these different classes of motives, and that our 
 power of volition enables us to choose the higher, 
 though the pleasure which attends their gratifica- 
 tion may be less, and to refuse to yield to the 
 lower, though the pleasure with which the gratifi- 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent 
 
 7 
 
 cation of tlieni would be attended, would be 
 greater. 
 
 (2.) Further, tbe affirmation of the freedom of the 
 will is by no means equivalent to the affirmation that 
 the will is capable of originating force ; all that it 
 affirms is, that it is capable of giving a direction to 
 forces already existing, by diverting them from one 
 direction, and turning them into another, in the 
 same manner as the pointsman acts, who does not 
 create force, but turns it into a particular direction. 
 We also affirm that an act of volition is the 
 invariable antecedent of all rational action ; that 
 our reason is capable of sitting in judgment on 
 the character of our actions, of concentrating our 
 attention on one set of motives, and of withdrawing 
 it from another, in accordance with its judgments, 
 thus rendering it possible for us to act on a 
 higher motive, in preference to a lower and — 
 in the sense above defined — a stronger one ; 
 and that our wills after adopting the decisions 
 of our judgments, are capable of calling into ac- 
 tivity, and of giving the proper direction to 
 those forces which are necessary to realize them 
 in action. Such an amount of freedom is ne- 
 cessary to constitute man a moraLand responsible 
 agent ; and this being sufficient, it is unnecessary 
 to claim more. 
 
 (3.) The affirmation that man is a free agent, is 
 by no means equivalent to the assertion that he can 
 
 The will 
 cannot 
 originate 
 force, but 
 only give 
 direction to 
 existing 
 forces. 
 
 An act of 
 volition the 
 invariable 
 antecedent 
 of rational 
 action 
 
 A free agent 
 does not 
 act without 
 a motive. 
 
8 
 
 Man not a Machine, 
 
 ■Without an 
 impulse the 
 mind 
 remains 
 passive. 
 
 Man is 
 under no 
 compulsion 
 to act in 
 this way or 
 that. 
 
 Solicitations 
 of our lower 
 appetites 
 may he 
 rejected. 
 
 act without a motive, i.e., without something im- 
 pelling him to action ; all that it asserts is, that we 
 possess a power of choosing between our different 
 impulses and motives. We fully concede that with- 
 out an impulse of some kind urging us to action, our 
 minds must continue passive. But our impulses 
 may be of the most divers kinds, and of different de- 
 grees of intensity, varying from those which instigate 
 us to the most disinterested acts of self-sacrifice, to 
 those which would impel us to the lowest forms of 
 sensual gratification. In affirming, therefore, the 
 freedom of the will, aU that we assert is, that man 
 possesses a power of choosing which of these classes 
 of impulses he will gratify; and that he can restrain 
 those which his reason rejects, and act on those 
 which it approves ; in a word, that he is under no 
 compulsion, as animals are, to yield merely to 
 the impulse which happens to be the strongest. 
 Yet we fully admit, that such is the strength of 
 the lower impulses of our nature, that they 
 frequently overhear the decisions of our reason. 
 But even here the principle of responsibility enters’; 
 for although the temptation may be strong, yet 
 until the power of self-control has been destroyed 
 by habitually yielding to it, we are conscious that 
 we possess the power of rejecting the solicitations of 
 our lower appetites, if it is our will so to do, and 
 that it is a matter of experience that we at times 
 actually do so. 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent. 
 
 9 
 
 An analysis of the mode in which temptation to 
 evil gets the better of a man before he becomes utterly 
 depraved, will make this plain. What is the course 
 which it pursues ? A desire for some gratification 
 presents itself to the mind. The question immedi- 
 ately arises, shall we yield to the solicitation ? Our 
 conscience and moral sense say no, for it is wrong 
 to do so. Our animal appetites say, it is pleasing, 
 and urge us to the gratification. Are we then 
 irresistibly impelled to yield to them? We all 
 know that we are not. It is true that if we con- 
 tinue contemplating the pleasure with which the 
 indulgence of the appetite would be attended, the 
 yielding to the temptation will be the certain con- 
 sequence. But if we cease to keep our minds fixed 
 on the pleasure, and by a resolute act of will con- 
 centrate our attention on the great law of duty, this 
 result need not follow. Such a power all of us 
 are conscious not only of possessing, but of having 
 actually exercised ; and as long as we continue to 
 exercise it, we are masters of our actions ; but if 
 we continue to contemplate the pleasure, and banish 
 out of our minds the law of duty, we fully admit 
 that the attempt to gratify the evil impulse is the 
 inevitable result. 
 
 The believers in free agency therefore fully 
 concede that the repeated gratification of an evil 
 passion gradually destroys the moral sense, and 
 with it the power of resisting temptation. Of this 
 
 How 
 
 temptation 
 gets the 
 better of a 
 man. 
 
 How we 
 overcome it. 
 
 The moral 
 sense and 
 power of 
 resistance 
 destroyed by 
 the repeated 
 gratification 
 of evil 
 passion. 
 
10 
 
 Man not a Machine 
 
 The re- 
 sponsibility 
 of the self- 
 incapaci- 
 tated 
 
 accrued at 
 an earlier 
 stage. 
 
 A free 
 agent 
 cannot 
 modify his 
 character 
 at pleasure. 
 
 the habitual drunkard is a striking example. Such 
 a character may he said in a certain sense to have 
 ceased to he a free agent, and yet he is justly held 
 to be responsible. His responsibility, however, 
 accrued at an earlier stage, when, contrary to the 
 dictates of his conscience and moral sense, he 
 yielded to his gy^impulses, and thereby destroyed 
 his power of self-control. In such a case all that 
 is necessary for the believer in human freedom to 
 contend for is, that it was once in his power to 
 refuse to gratify his evil appetites ; and that if a 
 man has formed a habit which has become irre- 
 sistible, he is responsible for all the consequences 
 which it was in his power to have foreseen. In this 
 case, therefore, our position is that man possesses 
 such arL_amount of frpprlmrij fhnt.lLQ-i&.£hA maste£.j}f 
 his actions, until by bis own aeiJm- has destroyed 
 his power of self-oontild. What, therefore, we affirm 
 is, not that a man can act without a motive, but 
 that he can choose between one motive and another, 
 by concentrating his attention on one, and with- 
 drawing it from the other, and that he can do this 
 until by his own voluntary acts he has destroyed 
 his power of self-determination. 
 
 4. Nor is the assertion that man is a free agent 
 equivalent to the affirmation that it is in his power 
 to modify his character at his pleasure. Believers 
 in human freedom recognize the following facts, 
 which modify responsibility, hut do not destroy it. 
 
But a Eesponsible Free Agent 
 
 11 
 
 (1.) That the conditions under which we are born, 
 are wholly deterniined for us by a highe r pow er ; 
 and consequently, so far as our characters are deter- 
 mined by them, our responsibility is modified. 
 
 (2.) That we are horn with certain inherited 
 appetences and tendencies which are entirely in- 
 dependent of our choice ; and consequently, so far 
 as our actions are the inevitable results of these, we 
 are irresponsible. 
 
 (3.) That it is a matter of unquestionable fact that 
 men not only greatly vary in intellectual power, 
 but also in that fun damental grou nd work on 
 
 which th eir moral characters ■.ara.-.-Hub sequent ly 
 
 erected, some being from their earliest childhood 
 more inclined to good, and some to particular vices 
 than others ; consequently, so far as our actions 
 are directly influenced by these variations, it modifies 
 our responsibility as individuals. 
 
 (4.) That habits formed by ancestors are in some 
 mysterious way transmissible to their descendants, 
 not as formed habits, but as tendencies to particular 
 classes of actions, which tendencies act in a manner 
 somewhat analogous to instincts. This transmission, 
 however, is very far from being invariable ; and 
 in the present state of our knowledge, we are 
 entirely ignorant of the law in conformity with 
 which it acts. The fact, however, is undoubted, 
 that habits formed by parents, not unfrequently 
 appear as tendencies to particular classes of action 
 
 Facts which 
 modify re- 
 sponsibility. 
 
 Conditions 
 of birth. 
 
 Inherited 
 
 appetences 
 
 and 
 
 tendencies. 
 
 Variations 
 of moral 
 character. 
 
 Transmitt 0(1 
 habits. 
 
1.2 
 
 Mmi not a Machine, 
 
 The moral 
 atmosphere 
 in which 
 a man has 
 been born 
 and educated 
 exerts an in- 
 fluence on 
 his 
 
 character. 
 
 Habits of 
 evil. 
 
 Illustra- 
 
 tions. 
 
 Variations 
 of intellec- 
 tual 
 
 capacity. 
 
 in tlieir children ; and when this is so, in as far a& 
 they are quite independent of their choke, it modifies 
 responsibility. 
 
 (5.) A very important influence is exerted on the 
 character of the individual by the moral atmo- 
 sphere in which he lias been born and educated. 
 This fact frequently makes the precise degree of 
 responsibility which attaches to a particular person 
 a very complicated question. External circumstances 
 also of various kinds, such as climate, exert a certain 
 amount of influence on the formation of character. 
 These, therefore, as far as they are independent of 
 our choice, modify our responsibility. 
 
 (6.) The action of completely formed habits is 
 almost instinctive; and it is an unquestionable fact 
 that habits of evil, when fully formed, paralyze the 
 wilL In this case, therefore, although it is impos- 
 sible for human laws to recognize such qualifications 
 of responsibility (which can be only justly estimated 
 by the all-seeing eye), the degree of responsibility 
 for a particular act on the part of the individual, 
 is only in the degree in which he has contributed to 
 the formation of the habit by habitually yielding to 
 temptations which it was once in his power to resist. 
 
 A few illustrations will set the above positions 
 in a clear light. 
 
 It is unquestionable that men vary greatly in 
 intellectual capacity, and that over these variations 
 they exert no control. But our intellectual and 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent 
 
 13 
 
 moral being constitute a unity ; and the imper- 
 fections of our intellects affect our moral judgments, 
 and the actions which* are consequent on them. To 
 take an extreme case, insanity. There it is univer- 
 sally allowed that an intellectual defect renders the 
 subject of it irresponsible. Consequently, minor 
 degrees of this imperfection must modify our 
 responsibility in a corresponding ratio. Such im 
 perfections, being independent of our wills, are not 
 our sins, but our misfortunes. 
 
 Again, with respect to children. No one who 
 has made them the subject of careful observation, 
 can doubt that they are born with fundamental 
 differences of dispoMtion. Thus their tempers 
 greatly vary even in early infancy. To some it is 
 natural to speak the truth, others display an inherent" 
 tendency to falsehoods The same remark is true 
 with respect to a large number of other moral cha- 
 racteristics. Such tendencies manifest themselves 
 long before that stage of mental development is 
 attained which is necessary for constituting a man 
 a responsible moral agent. These facts we are bound 
 to recognize, and also the further fact that we have 
 had no share in implanting these tendencies in our- 
 selves. Consequently, as far as they have affected 
 the formation of our characters, we are irresponsible 
 for the influences which they exert. Yet while 
 they modify, they do not destroy responsibility ; for 
 every one of us is conscious that when our rational 
 
 Insanity 
 renders its 
 victim irre- 
 sponsible. 
 
 Differences 
 of dis- 
 position in 
 children. 
 
 Their early 
 manifest- 
 ation. 
 
 They modify 
 but do not 
 destroy re- 
 sponsibility 
 
14 
 
 Man not a Machine, 
 
 The power 
 of modifying 
 character 
 is the 
 exclusive 
 prerogative 
 of man. 
 
 Animals 
 unaided by 
 man are 
 incapable of 
 self-im- 
 provement. 
 
 Man is 
 responsible 
 for exerting 
 his power 
 of self-im* 
 
 E rovement, 
 ut not for 
 his primal y 
 instincts 
 and their 
 necessary 
 results. 
 
 faculties have attained to their full development, 
 we possess the power of modifying, and even of 
 controlling our primary impulses, by means of the 
 principle of habituation, a power which has been 
 exercised in numerous cases. 
 
 This power of modifying and of gradually 
 altering character is the exclusive prerogative of 
 man, and constitutes one of the great distinctions 
 between responsible and irresponsible living agents. 
 Animals cannot help acting on thei r impuls^e s ; 
 and are incapable by their own inherent powers 
 of modifying their instincts. say, by their 
 oion inherent powers, for whatever modifications 
 they are capable of, are acquired by a controlling 
 power which is exerted over them by man, and 
 not by a power which is inherent in themselves. 
 Thus all observation proves that an animal unaided 
 by man is incapable of self-improvement, of modi- 
 fying a natural tendency, or exerting a control 
 over its actions. But such a power we are all 
 conscious of possessing ; and many of us, of having 
 actually exerted. Man therefore possesses a power, 
 within certain limits, of modifying his character 
 and of regulating his actions. So far then as he 
 exerts, or neglects to exert this power, he is respon- 
 sible, both for his character and his conduct ; but 
 for his primary instincts, and for his character and 
 actions, as far as they are the necessary result of these 
 primary instincts, he can possess no responsibility. 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent. 
 
 15 
 
 The effect which external circumstances, and 
 the moral atmosphere in which men are horn and 
 educated, exert on our free agency, requires a few 
 additional observations. It is an undoubted fact 
 that a particul ar type of character is impressed on 
 different races of men, the outlines of which are 
 transmitted from generation to generation ; of this 
 the Negro race in Africa, the Bengalee in Asia, 
 and the Gallic in Europe, are striking examples. 
 Yet even this is b)^ no means uniform, but varies 
 within certain limits. It is no less true with 
 respect to the masses of mankind, that in the 
 moral atmosphere in which they have been born 
 and educated, they for the most part live and die. 
 But this, though for the most part true, is by no 
 means invariably so. Numerous instances un- 
 questionably have occurred, of men who have 
 elevated themselves above, or who have sunk 
 below, the condition of their birth and their en- 
 vironment. This proves_„that the results above 
 refer red to arejiot hrdughf about by &e ac tion of 
 a ne cessary law ; Jor, if this were so, they would 
 not happen for the most partj_b^k.inv_a £mh1y, lik e 
 the resu lts of the law of- gravitatiQn. Similarly, it 
 has been urged, that it can be proved by statistics, 
 that man is the creature of his surroundings ; and 
 that what we designate our wills, exert no power 
 in determining our actions. Thus, for example, it 
 is affirmed that the number of suicides which take 
 
 Race types 
 of character. 
 
 Variations. 
 
 The masses 
 of men live 
 and die in 
 the moral 
 atmosphere 
 in which they 
 have been 
 born and 
 educated. 
 
 Numerous 
 exceptions 
 prove that 
 this is not 
 the result of 
 the action of 
 a necessary 
 law. 
 
 The 
 
 argument 
 against free 
 agency from 
 statistics. 
 
16 
 
 Man not a Machine, 
 
 The in- 
 ference from 
 statistics 
 assumes the 
 point at 
 iBsue. 
 
 Free will not 
 capricious. 
 
 ■ Yearly 
 statistics not 
 identical as 
 they would 
 be if 
 
 necessary 
 law were 
 dominant in 
 human life. 
 
 place in a particular country, varies with the 
 population, and presents the same results year by 
 year ; that the same is true with respect to crimes 
 generally ; and that even the number of marriages, 
 — a matter, in which it is alleged that will ought 
 to exert great power — varies with the price of the 
 necessaries of life. Hence the inference has been 
 drawn, that our belief in free agency is a delusion. 
 
 This inference assumes the point at issue. The 
 statistics in question present us with the combined 
 result of our impulses, our wills, and of the in- 
 fluences which are exerted over us by external 
 circumstances. The argument owes all its plausi- 
 bility to the most incorrect assumption that the 
 believers in free agency affirm that the will acts at 
 hap-hazard, or by caprice. But further : the in- 
 ference itself is an incorrect deduction from the 
 facts, for although the numbers in question closely 
 approximate to each other from year to year, they 
 are by no means identical, which they ought to be, 
 if necessary law was the dominant power in human 
 life. The above arguments therefore wholly fail 
 to prove that man is not free to act, or to forbear 
 acting, within certain deflnite limits ; and no 
 rational believer in human freedom wishe s to 
 affirm that our power of self-determination is 
 devoid of limitations.^ 
 
 ^ I am here referring to the positions which have been set 
 forth by Mr. Buckle and other similar writers. 
 
But a Besponsible Free Agent. 
 
 17 
 
 Such are the facts of our moral nature as they 
 bear on the doctrine of free agency. It has been 
 necessary to set them thus definitely before the 
 reader, because the reasonings of necessitarians 
 owe no small portion of their plausibility to the 
 mis-statements of the views of their opponents. 
 The facts, as above explained we admit, but the in- 
 ferences which have been deduced from them we 
 deny. Our position is, that while they modify 
 responsibility, and render it difficult, even impos- 
 sible, for man to determine its precise amount in 
 numerous individual cases, they by no means 
 destroy it. We freely concede that man is not 
 able to do everything which he pleases — there are 
 limits to his freedom, and circumstances in the 
 formation of his character, over which he can exert 
 no control, which modify his responsibility ; but he 
 has a sufficient amount of freedom within these 
 limits to constitute him a free responsible agent. 
 
 Having thus defined the positions which are 
 taken by the believers in the free agency of man, 
 it will be necessary to set before the reader those 
 of philosophical necessitarians whose theories we 
 are controverting. 
 
 Their position admits of being very briefly 
 strted. According to them, everything in man is 
 the result of the conjoint action of matter and 
 fo ce, and he is necessarily that which his bodily 
 organization makes him, and nothing more. They 
 
 Admitted 
 facts modify 
 but do not 
 destroy re- 
 sponsibility. 
 
 Man has 
 sufficient 
 freedom to 
 constitute 
 him a free 
 agent. 
 
 The position 
 of philo- 
 sophical 
 necessi- 
 tarians of 
 the present 
 day. 
 
J8 
 
 Man not a Machine, 
 
 Tlds philo- 
 sophy rests 
 on a priori 
 reasonings 
 and assump- 
 tions. 
 
 Free agency 
 the direct 
 affirmation 
 of our con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 Analysis of 
 our mental 
 acts before 
 engaging in 
 action. 
 
 contend, therefore, that as matter and force are 
 necessary agents, man, being their product, must 
 he a necessary agent. Otherwise it would he 
 possible for an agent to evolve out of itself 
 what was never in itself,, a position which we 
 readily admit is intrinsically absurd, for it is 
 obvious that necessary and free agency cannot 
 co-exist in the same subject. This philosophy, 
 therefore, let it be observed, rests not on facts, 
 but on assumptions and a 'priori reasonings ; and 
 on the strength of these, it calls on us to reject 
 the_clearest mtuitions of our consciou^ess,.. We, on 
 the contrary, contend that it contradicts the great 
 incts of human nature, and the pyppri- 
 
 ence of mankind. __ Let US, therefore, consider the 
 grounds on which the overwhelming majority of 
 the human race have in all ages believed, and still 
 continue to believe, themselves to be free, and not 
 necessary agents. 
 
 1. Our free agency is a direct affirmation of our 
 consciousness, we know th at we are free agents ; 
 in other words, we are~certain that when an impulse 
 to a particular course of action presents itself, it is 
 in our power to enter on it, or to forbear. A brief 
 analysis of our various mental acts, prior to our 
 engaging in action, will establish this beyond a 
 doubt. What then is the line of conduct which we 
 pursue ? When an impulse to engage in a course 
 of action presents itself, before we engage in it, we 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent. 
 
 19 
 
 deliberate on its desirability. If different impulses 
 present themselves, our reason sits in judgment on 
 their various suggestions, and pronounces in favour 
 of one and against others, according to its sense of 
 fitness. This act of judgment is followed by an 
 act of volition, in which we determine to adopt the 
 course of action to which our reason has assented. 
 Then it is, but not till then, that we set in motion 
 the secret springs of our activity, and attempt tc 
 carry the action thus determined on into execution. 
 Of all these processes our consciousness is direct ; 
 and each, and every one of them, we can verify for 
 ourselves by a careful observation of our own 
 minds. Every step in them, therefore, proves that 
 we are free, and not necessary agents, for the 
 idea that a necessary agent can either deliberate 
 or choose is an absurdity., Further : a necessary 
 agent is incapable of being tempted to break the 
 law of its being, on it temptations will not act ; but 
 although the moral law is the law of man^s being, 
 and that which his conscience tells him that he 
 ought to obey, he is capable of breaking it. Such 
 a power is only consistent with his being a free, 
 and not a necessary agent. 
 
 In opposition to this direct testimony of con- 
 sciousness, and as a set-off against it, necessitarians 
 affirm that our various motives admit of being 
 reduced to a common measure, viz., the pleasure 
 which their gratification gives, or the desire of each 
 
 Judgment of 
 our reason. 
 
 An act of 
 
 volition 
 
 follows 
 
 We are 
 conscious of 
 these 
 processes. 
 
 They prove 
 our freedom. 
 
 A necessary 
 agent cannot 
 break the 
 law of its 
 
 being. 
 
 The neces- 
 sitarian 
 contention. 
 
20 
 
 Man not a Machine, 
 
 The power 
 of motives 
 in propor- 
 tion to the 
 pleasure 
 anticipated 
 from their 
 gratification, 
 according to 
 necessi- 
 tarians. 
 
 This 
 
 philosophy 
 allows that 
 we have the 
 power of 
 choosing 
 some distant 
 good. 
 
 individual to realize his own greatest happi- 
 ness ; that motives do not differ in kind, but only 
 in degree ; and that their power to impel us to 
 action is in exact proportion to our sense of the 
 ultimate amount of pleasure which we think will 
 result from their gratification. Hence the inference 
 is drawn, that man cannot help acting on the 
 strongest motive, adopting that course of action 
 which seems to promise him the greatest amount 
 of pleasure ; for, in the language of this philosophy, 
 pleasure and happiness are identical. This being so, 
 it is urged that we deceive ourselves in imagining 
 that we exercise any real choice in determining 
 the course of our actions; but, on the contrary, 
 they are determined for us by the necessity of 
 acting on the strongest motive, with the generation 
 of which we have had nothing to do. 
 
 To this I reply, that even if we admit, for the 
 sake of argument, that all motives can be measured 
 by the common measure above referred to, still this 
 philosophy allows that we possess the power of 
 choosing some distant good, instead of giving way 
 to an impulse which urges us to a great and 
 immediate gratification. This alone is sufficient to 
 prove that we possess a power which is capable of 
 controlling our impulses and of choosing between 
 our motives, and that we are under no necessity of 
 yielding to the strongest. I say the strongest, 
 because it is an unquestionable fact in human 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent, 
 
 21 
 
 nature that the impulses which prompt us to im- 
 mediate indulgence are far more powerful factors 
 to excite us to action than the contemplation of 
 some distant good. Consequently, if the former 
 are to yield to the latter, this can only he effected 
 by the exertion of a powerful act of self-control. 
 It follows, therefore, that the possession of this 
 power, of which we all are conscious, proves that 
 within certain limits we are free agents, because 
 without freedom an act of self-control would be 
 impossible, for the two stand to each other in 
 as close a correlation as the concave and convex 
 of a circle. 
 
 But we deny the truth of the position that our 
 motives can be measured by the common principle 
 above referred to, and that their power to produce 
 action is in exact proportion to their intensity. On 
 the contrary, we maintain that motives differ in 
 kind as well as in degree, and that it is in our 
 power to follow the suggestions of a higher motive 
 of less, and to restrain a lower one, of greater 
 intensity. What, I ask, does the position against 
 which I am contending, invite us to believe ? This 
 and no other, viz., that the impulse which urges 
 the drunkard to his bottle, and that which urges the 
 martyr, out of regard to what he considers truth and 
 duty, to yield himself to a torturing death when 
 he could escape by an act of apostacy, can be 
 measured by the common measure of self-gratifica- 
 
 The 
 
 possession 
 of this 
 power 
 proves that 
 we are free 
 agents. 
 
 Motives 
 differ in 
 kind as well 
 as degree. 
 
 The 
 
 drunkard 
 and the 
 martyr 
 cannot be 
 measured 
 by the 
 common 
 measure of 
 self-grati- 
 fication. 
 
22 
 
 Man not a Machine 
 
 Objection 
 
 answered. 
 
 f Socrates bad 
 no certain 
 anticipation 
 of future 
 reward. 
 
 The thought 
 of happiness 
 does not 
 enter into 
 the mind of 
 the man who 
 saves 
 another’s 
 life at the 
 risk of his 
 own. 
 
 tion ; and that martyrdom is only one of the forms 
 of self-love, — for this is what the pursuit of the 
 greatest happiness really means. Such a position 
 the common sense of mankind will pronounce to 
 be incredible. 
 
 It has been urged, however, that the martyr 
 expects to be remunerated hereafter for his suffer- 
 ings here, and [consequently that after all he 
 is only pursuing his own greatest happiness. 
 But there have been self-sacrificers in the cause 
 of what they believed to be truth and duty, 
 who could see no prospect of reward in this 
 life, and who had no certain conviction of the 
 reality of one to come. Such was Socrates, who 
 although he entertained a strong hope that he 
 should survive the stroke of death, yet admitted 
 that he was devoid of a full assurance that he 
 would. The same is true of not a few who have had 
 no behef in a future state. Does it, I ask, enter 
 into the calculation of any one who leaps into the 
 water at the hazard of his life to save a man from 
 drowning, that he is realizing his greatest happiness 
 by the act either in this world or in the next ? He 
 may think it noble to do so : he may think it his 
 duty ; something within him says. You ought to 
 attempt to save that life at the hazard of your 
 own ; but a reference to his own greatest happiness 
 never enters into his thoughts. If it did, instead 
 of impelling him, it would deter him from the act. 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent 
 
 23 
 
 All human activity, it is true, originates in a desire 
 to gratify some impulse of our nature ; but it by 
 no means follows that that impulse is a desire 
 which terminates in self. If it did, self-sacrificers 
 would he few. 
 
 2. Our consciousness is direct that we possess 
 a power of originating action, and that we do 
 originate action whenever we exert an act of will, 
 or volition. It consists of two factors, the con- 
 sciousness of an I ’’ or Ego,'’ as an existing 
 entity, and that this I ” possesses the power of 
 self-determination. But our consciousness of the 
 I, or Ego, from which a sense of voluntary agency 
 is indispensable, involves the belief in the exist- 
 ence of something which is not self, whereas over 
 that which is non-self, our consciousness tells us 
 that we can exert no direct control. Further : 
 we possess a direct consciousness of willing to act, 
 and that on doing so, action follows ; and of tvilling 
 not to act, and the springs of our activity stand 
 motionless. Inasmuch, therefore, as no certainties 
 can he greater than these different presentations of 
 consciousness, it follows by inevitable necessity 
 that they prove that man is a free, and not a 
 necessary, agent. 
 
 But it has been objected that consciousness may 
 be, and frequently is, mistaken, and therefore that 
 its presentations are no certain guide to truth. To 
 this objection I reply by putting to those who urge 
 
 We are 
 conscious of 
 the power of 
 originating 
 action. 
 
 We are 
 conscious of 
 willing to 
 act or not to 
 act. 
 
 It is 
 objected 
 that con- 
 sciousness 
 may be 
 mistaken. 
 
24 
 
 Man not a Machine, 
 
 All 
 
 reasoned 
 truth rests 
 on some 
 atfirmadon 
 of our 
 conscious- 
 ness. 
 
 The denial 
 of the 
 validity of 
 truths which 
 do not admit 
 of proof 
 reduces all 
 human 
 knowledge 
 to a mass of 
 shapeless 
 ruins. 
 
 it the question, If the presentations of consciousness 
 are no guides to truth, what better guides do we 
 possess? For it is an indisputable fact that all 
 reasoned truth, whether it he inductive or deductive, 
 rests for its ultimate validity on some affirmation 
 of our consciousness. This is true alike of the 
 axioms of mathematics and of the information 
 which is furnished by our senses. To the latter, 
 consciousness is the sole witness ; and with respect 
 to the former, all truths which admit of proof must 
 he deduced from higher truths which do not admit 
 of proof, the truth of which is given in an act of 
 consciousness, in which we see the truth of the 
 affirmation in the clear light of intellectual vision; 
 and which, owing to the fundamental constitution 
 of our minds, we are incapable of believing to he 
 otherwise than true. The denial of the validity of 
 such truths therefore reduces the whole body of 
 human knowledge to a mass of shapeless ruins, 
 and renders it impossible to affirm of a single pro- 
 position that it is true or false ; for even the affirm- 
 ation that all human knowledge is invalid must 
 involve the assumption of some proposition, the 
 truth of which has no other foundation than the 
 validity of some presentation of our consciousness. 
 Of the truth of these, we are even more certain 
 than we are of the existence of an external world, 
 because our consciousness of the former is direct, 
 whereas our belief in the existence of the latter is 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent, 
 
 25 
 
 an inference from the former. Further, as all 
 knowledge which we derive from our senses 
 depends on the validity of their presentations, and 
 these can only be verified in an act of conscious- 
 ness, it follows, if the primary afiirmations of 
 consciousness above referred to are not trustworthy, 
 that all our knowledge of the external world must 
 be equally untrustworthy. I need hardly say that 
 such an affirmation saps the foundation on which 
 not only the whole of physical science, hut the 
 whole course of human life is built, and is there- 
 fore incredible. We affirm, therefore, that the 
 belief in our free agency rests on precisely the 
 same foundation as that of our highest certainties ; 
 and if the hehef in question is a delusion, all our 
 other certainties must also he equally delusions. 
 
 From these considerations the following all- 
 important conclusion follows. All reasonings 
 which lead to conclusions which contradict the 
 primary affirmations of our consciousness must he 
 the result either of incorrect assumptions, or of 
 some error in the intellectual processes hy which 
 they have been deduced. Consequently, all those 
 processes of reasoning by which necessitarians 
 endeavour to prove that man is not a free agent 
 must be faulty somewhere ; because they lead to 
 conclusions which contradict the greatest of our 
 certainties, viz., the direct affirmations of our con- 
 sciousness. When, therefore, any one endeavours 
 
 If the 
 primary 
 affirmations 
 of con- 
 sciousness 
 are untrust- 
 worthy, all 
 our know- 
 ledge of the 
 external 
 world must 
 he equally 
 untrust- 
 worthy. 
 
 Belief in our 
 free agency 
 rests on the 
 same foun- 
 dation as 
 our highest 
 certainties. ^ 
 
 Conclusion, 
 
26 
 
 Man not a Machine, 
 
 The validity 
 of the 
 
 testimony of 
 conscious- 
 ness. 
 
 The appeal 
 lies to the 
 sound mind 
 
 to prove that our belief that we are free agents is 
 a delusion, ordinary men may with confidence 
 reply to the necessitarian philosopher, We are in- 
 adequate judges of your abstract and complicated 
 reasonings ; but of one thing we are certain, viz., 
 that your conclusions must be false, because they 
 contradict the clearest afiirmations of our con- 
 sciousness, of the truth of which we are as certain 
 as we are of our own existence, and far more 
 certain than we are of yours. Such an answer 
 will both approve itself to common sense, and stand 
 the test of a sound philosophy. 
 
 Let us now examine the vahdity of the objec- 
 tion above referred to, that our consciousness of 
 an object does not prove its real existence. What 
 then are the facts? for it is with facts and not 
 with abstractions that we have to deal. I fully 
 admit that our consciousness of an object does not 
 necessarily prove that it has an existence external 
 to the mind. It is an unquestionable fact that in 
 numerous cases of mental disease, the mind is 
 capable of presenting to itself images to which 
 there is no external reality corresponding. But 
 when reasoning on such a subject, the appeal lies, 
 not to what the mind does when diseased, but to 
 its action when sound. If it be asked. What is 
 the criterion of mental soundness, I answer, the 
 concurrent testimony of considerable numbers of 
 men. When numbers thus concur in affirming 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent. 
 
 27 
 
 that they perceive a particular object, we may 
 safely conclude that it is no figment of the imagi- 
 nation. But if it be urged that instances have 
 occurred where large numbers of enthusiasts have 
 been the prey of delusions of this description, then 
 the appeal lies to a still wider testimony, and 
 finally to that of ninety-nine hundredths of man- 
 kind. When this concurs, the conclusion must 
 be accepted as final. 
 
 But the subject which we are now considering 
 is independent of the question, whether the testi- 
 mony of consciousness proves the existence of ex- 
 ternal realities corresponding to its presentations. 
 In the present case we have only to do with in- 
 ternal facts; and respecting these its affirmations 
 are necessarily valid. This is true even of the 
 madman and the enthusiast, their mental eye really 
 perceives the objects which they believe that they 
 see. Their consciousness is not at fault ; but their 
 error consists in assigning to its presentations, an 
 existence external to their minds. But in the 
 case which we are considering, the testimony of 
 our consciousness to our free agency has nothing 
 to do with the existence of any thing external to 
 ourselves ; but it is strictly limited to testifying to 
 the truth of an internal fact, that internal fact 
 being the truth of its own perceptions. In a word, 
 it testifies to what it sees, perceives, and feels. To 
 all this, its testimony cannot but be valid. We 
 
 The con- 
 clusion that 
 must be 
 regarded as 
 final. 
 
 We have to 
 do with 
 internal 
 facts. 
 
 The testi- 
 mony of 
 conscious- 
 ness to our 
 free agency 
 has nothing 
 to do with 
 anything 
 external to 
 ourselves. 
 
^28 
 
 Man not a Machiney 
 
 The 
 
 structure of 
 language 
 hears 
 witness to 
 free agency 
 
 The necessi- 
 tarian is 
 compelled to 
 express 
 himself in 
 terms which 
 assume 
 what he 
 disputes in 
 arguing 
 against free 
 agency. 
 
 feel that we are free either to act or to forbear 
 acting. Consciousness here testifies to a fact of the 
 existence of which it is the one competent judge. 
 The possession of such a power constitutes us 
 responsible agents. 
 
 Next, let us consider the testimony which the 
 structure of language gives to the great truth of 
 man’s free agency. Whatever may have been the 
 original mode of communication among our primi- 
 tive ancestors, it is an admitted fact among philo- 
 logists that all existing languages, with the exception 
 of a few root words, have been gradually elaborated 
 by the human mind; and that in the course of 
 this elaboration they have passed through various 
 stages of development, of which their present forms 
 are the result, and furnish us with the history. 
 Language therefore constitutes a register of the 
 universal experience of mankind. As such, it 
 testifies to an all-important fact in this contro- 
 versy, that those who have invented and developed 
 its existing forms (the process was an unconscious 
 one) have been unanimous in believing themselves 
 to be free agents. So strongly has this belief im- 
 pressed itself on its structure that the necessitarian, 
 when he is engaged in arguing against free agency, 
 is compelled to express himself in terms which take 
 for granted the truth of the very thing which he 
 is attempting to dispute ; so completely has the 
 belief in free agency held possession of man’s entire 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent. 
 
 29 
 
 sphere of thought. If necessitarianism is true, it 
 will be necessary to reconstruct the forms of 
 language, to bring them into harmony with its 
 principles. A few examples of this its testimony 
 will sulEce as illustrations. 
 
 The conception involyed in the pronoun 
 assumes the existence of ourselves as conscious 
 self-determining agents. It is impossible to use 
 it in conjunction with any active verb without as- 
 suming this. What, I ask, do we mean, when we 
 use such expressions as “ I do this, or that,^^ or I 
 will do this, or that,” or I will forbear to do this, 
 or that ? It is evident that when we thus speak, 
 we conceive of ourselves as being self-determining 
 agents, and the voluntary causes of actions. Again, 
 when we use the pronoun my we conceive of 
 that being which we designate self ” ^ as the pos- 
 sessor of other things, which although most closely 
 connected with ourselves, are yet distinct from 
 ourselves. Thus we speak of our hands, our feet, 
 our bodies, and our understandings. What, I ask. 
 
 The pro- 
 noun “ I*’ 
 assumes our 
 existence as 
 self-deter- 
 mining 
 agents. 
 
 The 
 
 pronoun 
 “ my” 
 assumes that 
 we are 
 possessors of 
 things 
 distinct 
 from our- 
 selves. 
 
 ^ I do not here undertake to define the metaphysical elements 
 of self, or to determine how far these and various other things 
 may constitute elements in self. All that I wish to observe is, 
 that our ordinary consciousness affirms the existence of a sub- 
 stratum, in which those things exist, of which that conscious- 
 ness is capable of predicating “My.” This consciousness there- 
 fore affirms that something exists which we call “ourselves,” 
 which is distinct from that which we predicate “my,” or in 
 other words, that the self which possesses and the thing pos- 
 sessed cannot be identical. 
 
30 
 
 Man not a Machine^ 
 
 Mr. Mill 
 and Mr. 
 Spencer nse 
 language in- 
 volving a 
 direct con- 
 tradiction of 
 their own 
 positions. 
 
 What they 
 ought to 
 substitute 
 for the pro- 
 noun “ I.” 
 
 do such expressions mean? Obviously, that we 
 view the or Ego, as the possessor of these 
 things, and as the groundwork in which they sub- 
 sist. Even writers who, like Mr. Mill and Mr. 
 Spencer, deny the existence of free agency (for such 
 a denial is involved in the denial of the existence 
 of self as distinct from our ever varying acts of 
 consciousness), are obliged to use language which 
 involves an assumption which is directly contradic- 
 tory to their own positions. Thus they affirm that 
 what we are conscious of as ourselves, is nothing 
 more than the sum total of our consciousness at any 
 particular moment. But inasmuch as these con- 
 sciousnesses are in a state of perpetual change, it 
 follows, if ourselves and our different states of 
 consciousness are identical, that that which we 
 designate ourselves, can have no permanent exis- 
 tence. Yet they habitually speak of themselves as 
 conscious of the past and as originators of action 
 just like other men do. But further, it may be 
 justly asked. How is it possible that the ‘‘I,"' or 
 Ego, can be conscious of this or that, if the I is 
 nothing but the consciousness itself ; and that, too, 
 a consciousness in a condition of perpetual flux; and 
 which has no existence independent of it. Such 
 winters, to be consistent, ought to substitute in their 
 writings for the pronoun ‘‘ I/’ the following com- 
 plicated and cumbrous paraphrase, The sum total 
 of the consciousnesses at any particular moment, to 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent. 
 
 31 
 
 whicli the name of the writer is attached, does, 
 thinks, feels, or possesses this or that.” Common 
 sense will have no difficulty in perceiving, if such a 
 substitution were made, for example, in the writings 
 of Mr. Spencer, consisting as they do of between four 
 and five thousand pages, containing a large number 
 of very complicated scientific terms very difficult 
 to realize in definite thought, that it would have 
 the effect of making a philosophy, already suffi- 
 ciently cumbrous, a hundred times more cumbrous 
 still. Nay more, if his language were in all other 
 respects to be corrected, so as to make it an adequate 
 expression of his dogmas, it would make his writings 
 unintelligible to all, except those who are already 
 imbued with his principles, if even it would convey 
 any definite meaning to them. 
 
 The previous considerations therefore render it 
 certain that the fundamental groundwork of lan- 
 guage is based on the assumption that the I or 
 Ego is a self-determining agent, capable of voli- 
 tion and originating action. The contrary sup- 
 position involves the assumption that we are not 
 agents, but things ; not originators of action, hut 
 only capable of being acted on. If this is true 
 philosophy, it is false to say, I did this, or that, 
 the real fact being that something else did it ; for, 
 according to the theory I am combating, the I 
 has no existence other than the ever-changing 
 acts of consciousness, and is never active, hut is 
 
 The effect of 
 such a 
 substitution. 
 
 The ground- 
 work of 
 language 
 based on the 
 assumption 
 that the 
 Ego can will 
 and 
 
 ori^nate 
 
 action. 
 
32 
 
 Man not a Machine, 
 
 Another 
 set of terms 
 which testify 
 to the 
 •universal 
 belief of 
 mankind in 
 free agency. 
 
 We use the 
 expression 
 “ I -Hdll” to 
 denote 
 purpose and 
 firm deter- 
 mination. 
 
 always passive. This being so, it will be necessary, 
 if the language of the futuro is to be an accurate 
 expression of the realities of things, that it should 
 discontinue the use of every term which implies 
 that man is a voluntary cause of action, and sub- 
 stitute the passive for the active verb, besides 
 making other most important reforms in the struc- 
 ture of language. 
 
 Further: there is another set of terms, such 
 as I will, I can, I might, I could, I would, and 
 I ought, which testify to the universal belief of 
 mankind in their being free agents, and to their 
 possession of a power of self-determination. So 
 deeply are these terms incorporated, into the struc- 
 ture of language, that it is impossible to write a 
 paragraph of any length without using one or 
 more of them. What then do they tell us re- 
 specting the opinions of those by whom language 
 has been evolved ? Obviously that they were be- 
 lievers in their own free agency; for every one 
 of these terms assumes it, yet on the principles 
 of the necessitarian philosophy they are devoid 
 of meaning. Take, for example, the expression, 
 I will. We not only use it in reference to the 
 future, but to denote purpose and deliberate in- 
 tention, ^.6., that it is our pleasure and firm deter- 
 mination to do some particular act. All such 
 expressions would be meaningless, nay, misleading, 
 if we were impelled to action by a power over 
 
But a Responsible Free Acjent. 
 
 38 
 
 which, we could exert no control. Moreover^ a 
 determined act of volition is capable of exerting 
 such a power that it can overhear the strongest 
 of our natural impulses. To enable a man to rule 
 his fellows a strong will is indispensable. Similar 
 observations are applicable to the other terms. 
 Every one of them implies the consciousness of a 
 power to act or to forbear acting. If, then, the 
 necessitarian philosophy is a true account of the 
 actualities of things, all men in all ages must have 
 been the prey of one of the greatest and most 
 incredible of delusions. 
 
 But the term, I ought, is so intimately con- 
 nected with our conscience and moral nature, that 
 it requires a separate consideration, owing to the 
 fact that this controversy has been thrown into 
 the utmost confusion by being mixed up with a 
 variety of theories which have been propounded 
 respecting the mode of their origination. Once 
 more, therefore, I must ask the reader to observe, 
 that in this discussion we have nothing to do with 
 the question how these faculties may have origi- 
 nated. We are concerned only with what our 
 consciousness testifies to existing facts, which will 
 still be facts, whatever may have been the origin 
 of our moral nature, even if it could be proved 
 (which it certainly has not), that the original pro- 
 genitor of man was some brutal ancestor. Further: 
 our opponents are in the constant habit of ap- 
 
 If necessi- 
 tarianism is 
 true, men 
 in all ages 
 must have 
 been the 
 prey of in- 
 credible 
 delusion. 
 
 The term 
 ‘T ought.’* 
 
 We have 
 nothing to 
 do with the 
 origin of our 
 faculties in 
 this dis- 
 cussion. 
 
34 
 
 Man not a Machine, 
 
 The appeal 
 is made to 
 to civilized 
 man. 
 
 The 
 
 meaning of 
 the term “ I 
 ought.’* 
 
 pealing to man in a savage state ; and they urge 
 that savage man is devoid of such a conception as 
 I ought/’ and possesses no trace of a conscience. 
 Many of the assertions which have been made on 
 this subject have now been proved to he inaccurate ; 
 but in this discussion let it be observed that the 
 appeal lies, not to imperfect man, hut to man 
 in the full condition of his development as 
 man, i,e., to civilized man. Whatever, then, 
 may be the condition of savages with respect to the 
 conception of duty or oughtness, it is an indis- 
 putable fact that it is one which is possessed by 
 all men who are in a state of civilization, account 
 for its origin as we may. The only question, 
 therefore, which concerns us in this controversy is, 
 what do the conscience and moral sense of civilized 
 man testify to existing fact ? This is the real point 
 at issue, and we must not allow our attention to 
 be diverted from it. 
 
 What, then, do we mean when we say, 
 ought?” We affirm that it is right to act in this 
 or that particular manner ; and that it is wrong 
 not to do so. We are, in fact, presented with an 
 alternative, a right and a wrong course of action. 
 When, therefore, conscience says, ‘‘You ought,” 
 it decides in favour of one of these alternatives, 
 and for the rejection of the other. But the being 
 which is capable of choosing between two alter- 
 natives must be a free agent. Further: the con- 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent. 
 
 30 
 
 ception ‘'I ought, involves the contemplation of 
 an ideal, which the Ego seeks to realize, and feels 
 that it is bound to attempt to realize, hut which it 
 has the power of forbearing to do. The conception 
 of oughtness therefore announces a law which we 
 feel to be binding on ourselves, and creates in us a 
 sense of demerit if we fail to comply with its demands. 
 Further : when conscience announces this law, it 
 makes no reference to the opinions of others, hut 
 sternly affirms, You ought so to do, though the 
 whole world is against you. It utters its commands 
 irrespective of all consequences, and even if the 
 thought occurs, ‘‘ This is a hard saying ; who can 
 hear it ? it refuses to relax the command, and 
 visits the transgressor with a feeling of dissatis- 
 faction. It simply says, You owe it to do this ; 
 and whatever hope may be suggested by reason as 
 a consequence of obedience, it does not even make 
 the command less stern by adding the promise. 
 This do, and thou shalt live.^’ Every step in 
 this process therefore proves that we are free, and 
 not necessary agents. 
 
 Next, let us analyse what is given in the kin- 
 dred affirmation of conscience when it utters the 
 command. It is your duty to do, or to forbear 
 doing, this or that. Observe : it does not say, It 
 •is expedient so to do,^^ or that it is pleasant, or 
 that it will promote your highest happiness, or 
 that obedience will not involve a painful act of 
 
 The 
 
 conception 
 announces a 
 binding law. 
 
 Conscience 
 utters its 
 commands 
 irrespective 
 of conse- 
 quences. 
 
 The signifi- 
 cance of 
 duty. 
 
36 
 
 Man not a Machine, 
 
 We do not 
 owe duty to 
 ourselve's. 
 
 Obligation 
 must centre 
 ill a Being 
 who is 
 external to 
 ourselves, 
 w'ho, like 
 ourselves, 
 must be a 
 free agent. 
 
 Conclusion. 
 
 The 
 testimony of 
 legislation. 
 
 self-sacrifice ; but irrespective of all such consider- 
 ations, and despite of all consequences, it says, It 
 is your duty,^’ ie., you owe it to do this, or that. 
 To whom then do we owe it ? Not to ourselves ; 
 for to owe a duty to ourselves is no real indebted- 
 ness, but a figure of speech. To owe a thing to 
 ourselves bears a close resemblance to taking money 
 from one pocket and putting it into another. The 
 obligation, therefore, must centre in a Being who 
 is external to ourselves. But we can owe nothing 
 to a stock, a stone, or any kind of necessary agent ; 
 nor can a necessary agent owe anything to us. It 
 follows, therefore, that both ourselves who owe, and 
 the Being to whom we owe, must he possessed of a 
 moral nature, i,e.y that both must be free agents. 
 The idea of duty, therefore, advances a step beyond 
 that of oughtness, and proclaims the existence of 
 a God, who is not a mere force, but a moral being 
 to whom man is ultimately responsible. 
 
 Our conclusion therefore is, the idea of duty 
 involves that of obligation ; the idea of obligation, 
 responsibility ; the idea of responsibility, a power 
 of self-determination ; and a power of self-deter- 
 mination, a freedom within certain limits to act 
 or to forbear acting ; for without this freedom 
 obligation, responsibility, and a power of self- 
 determination are inconceivable. 
 
 Equally decisive is the testimony given by the 
 whole course of legislation to the universality of 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent 
 
 37 
 
 the belief that man is a free agent. All just 
 legislation is based on the assumption of this truth. 
 It looks not merely to the external act, but to the 
 motive of the agent. Did the agent intend to do 
 the act, or was it a mere accident over which he 
 could exert no control ? Thus the same result 
 produced with intention may be the foulest of 
 crimes ; but if without intention, it is no crime, 
 but a misadventure. Let us take an example : a 
 man is found dead with a fractured skull. If the 
 wound was inflicted with intention, and if the 
 person who inflicted it knew what he was doing, 
 the law pronounces the act murder ; but if without 
 intention, or knowledge, it is an accident. The 
 same principle is also universally acted on in 
 private life. All men naturally raise a cry of 
 injustice for punishing a man for what he could 
 not help doing, or for what he did in ignorance or 
 without intention ; and however injurious the act 
 may be to us personally, as soon as we are con- 
 vinced that it was unintentional, our anger (which 
 is really a desire to punish a wrong-doer for the 
 wrong which he has inflicted) ceases. So likewise 
 is it with respect to an act of one deranged. We 
 put him under restraint for the purpose of pre- 
 venting him from doing further mischief, but to 
 punish him would be an outrage. In like manner 
 we act with respect to animals. They are governed 
 simply by impulse, and are incapable of rational 
 
 All just 
 legislation 
 is based on 
 the 
 
 assumption 
 of man's 
 free agency. 
 
 Illustration. 
 
 The 
 
 principle 
 acted on in 
 private life. 
 
 We do not 
 punish the 
 deranged for 
 their acts. 
 
38 
 
 Man not a Machine, 
 
 No one 
 punishes a 
 noxious 
 animal. 
 
 A noxious 
 man is held 
 responsible. 
 
 Free agency 
 or the 
 
 absence of it 
 constitutes 
 the differ- 
 ence. 
 
 The 
 
 testimony of 
 the past 
 experience 
 of civilized 
 man sum- 
 marised. 
 
 choice. We therefore refuse to hold them re- 
 sponsible, however mischievous they may be. A 
 noxious animal we kill to save ourselves and others 
 from future danger, but no one thinks of punishing 
 it as a responsible agent. But a noxious man 
 we hold responsible ; as such, we attach to him 
 blame, and deem him justly deserving of punish- 
 ment. What, I ask, is the reason of the different 
 point of view with which we contemplate the same 
 outward result, according as we view it as brought 
 about with, or without, intention ? The only 
 possible answer is, the possession or the non- 
 possession of free agency : for intention involves 
 freedom to act or to forbear acting ; and without 
 it, it is destitute of meaning. 
 
 The testimony of the past experience of civilized 
 man to our free agency may be briefly summarised 
 thus : No freedom, no responsibility ; no responsi- 
 bility, no obligation ; no obligation, no sense of 
 duty ; no sense of duty, no morality ; no morality, 
 no distinction between right and wrong. If one 
 link on this chain fails, all sense of obligation 
 ceases : the idea involved in the conception ‘‘ I 
 ought is a delusion ; duty is nothing but the 
 necessity of yielding obedience to the strongest, 
 i.e,^ one whose sole claim to command is the power 
 to punish us for disobedience, and human society 
 becomes a mass of hopeless confusion. 
 
 Such are the facts to which the consciousness 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent 
 
 39 
 
 and the conscience of civilized man have testified 
 in every age. What, I ask, have necessitarians to 
 set against them ? I answer, not a single fact, 
 but a number of theories respecting the origin of 
 the facts, of a priori assumptions, which are in- 
 capable of verification, and of deductive reasonings 
 founded upon them. But what is the value of 
 such reasonings and assumptions when they come 
 into collision with the primary facts of conscious- 
 ness? We answer, in the words of a well-known 
 phrase, ‘^So much the worse for the theories and 
 the assumptions.'’^ But if we are to accept the 
 positions of necessitarians, civilized man, through- 
 out all the ages of his existence, has been feeding 
 on a delusion ; and the fundamental groundwork 
 of his thoughts, and the laws which have regulated 
 his conduct, have been based upon a falsehood. 
 Is this, I ask, credible ? What, then, is the course 
 which reason suggests when theories and reason- 
 ings such as those above referred to lead to 
 conclusions which contradict the primary intuitions 
 of our consciousness ? Surely it is not to doubt 
 the validity of our intuitions, but to question the 
 truth of the assumptions, and the vahdity of the 
 reasonings. Let us apply this principle to some 
 of the most important of the theories and the 
 reasonings of necessitarians. 
 
 The chief ground on which they affirm that our 
 consciousness of free agency is a delusion is the 
 
 Necessi- 
 tarians have 
 only a priori 
 assumptions 
 to set 
 
 against the 
 facts. 
 
 The course 
 suggested by 
 reason in the 
 circum- 
 stances. 
 
 Necessi- 
 tarian 
 theories and 
 reasonings. 
 
40 
 
 Man not a Machine, 
 
 The chief 
 assumption 
 of the 
 necessi- 
 tarians. 
 
 The 
 
 inference 
 
 drawn. 
 
 assumption that nothing exists in the universe but 
 matter and force ; and that these, by their combined 
 action, have evolved^ every thing which exists, 
 including man and his moral nature. From this the 
 inference is drawn that man must be a necessary 
 ageut, because matter and force are necessary 
 agents ; and it is impossible that a thing can evolve 
 out of itself, what was never in itself. The truth 
 of this last position we fully admit ; but as the 
 highest certitudes of consciousness affirm that we 
 are free agents — certitudes than which we have 
 
 ^ The term “evolution” as it is ordinarily used both in 
 scientific and popular language, involves a very serious am- 
 biguity. Its real meaning is “a rolling out from.” Conse- 
 quently, it is only possible to evolve out of a thing, some 
 thing or quality which was originally in it, either in an active 
 or passive state. Accretions, therefore, to a thing, are incor- 
 rectly spoken of as evolutions from that thing. But all growth, 
 whether of vegetables or animals, involves an accretion to the 
 original seed, Le., an introduction into it of something foreign to 
 its nature, which it possesses the power of incorporating iuto its 
 own substance. Such processes, therefore, are incorrectly de- 
 signated evolutions. Thus scientific men are in the habit of 
 speaking of one thing being produced out of another by a process 
 which they designate evolution. Thus nothing is more common 
 than the affirmation that man has been evolved out of some 
 lower animal ; and that by a process of this kind everything 
 which has life has been produced during the indefinite ages of 
 the past. But in cases like this, where extreme accuracy of 
 thought is necessary, the expression is misleading ; for even on 
 the principles of the purest materialism, the original germs of 
 life cannot by any possibility have evolved out of themselves all 
 the forms of living things, which have existed in the past, or 
 which exist in the present, except by the aid of a principle 
 wholly different from evolution, viz., that of accretion and 
 assimilation. 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent 
 
 41 
 
 no greater certainty — it follows that the theory 
 that man is nothing but the outcome of matter and 
 force must be false. Or to put the same truth in 
 a positive form, man must be the production of a 
 force which is intelligent and free, i,e,^ a Being 
 must exist, who is distinct from the material 
 universe, who is the author of the intellectual and 
 moral nature of man. 
 
 The above reply is equally applicable to the 
 reasonings of the Agnostic, who, although not a 
 theoretical, is a moral atheist, i.e.y while he admits 
 that the belief in the existence of a first cause of 
 the universe is a necessity of thought, he empties 
 this concession of the smallest moral value by 
 proclaiming that it is impossible to afiirm anything 
 respecting the real nature of this cause ; that our 
 knowledge is strictly limited to matter, its laws, 
 and necessary forces, and that every thing in man 
 is the outcome of their conjoint action. 
 
 Another theory has been propounded in support 
 of the same position, that our various mental 
 phenomena are modes of motion ; and inasmuch 
 as all motion is under the dominion of necessary 
 law, that all the phenomena of mind must be 
 necessary also ; and consequently free agency can 
 have no real existence. 
 
 With respect to these theories (for they are 
 theories, and nothing more), I shall only observe 
 that our conception of matter and its phenomena, 
 
 The theoiy 
 that man is 
 nothing hnt 
 the outcome 
 of matter 
 and force is 
 false. 
 
 The moral 
 atheism of 
 the Agnostic 
 is met by the 
 same 
 
 reasoning. 
 
 The theory 
 
 that our 
 
 various 
 
 mental 
 
 phenomena 
 
 are modes of 
 
 motion. 
 
42 
 
 Man not a Machine, 
 
 Our con- 
 ception of 
 matter and 
 mind and 
 their 
 
 phenomena 
 at opposite 
 poles of 
 thought. 
 
 Mental 
 functions 
 designated 
 intellectual 
 separated 
 by an im- 
 passable 
 gulf from 
 sensations. 
 
 and our conception of mind and its phenomena, 
 occupy opposite poles of thought, which no in- 
 genuity of philosophers or scientists has succeeded 
 in bridging over. Although all sensations are the 
 results of motions, yet it is an undoubted fact that 
 no human being has succeeded in translating a 
 motion into a sensation, or even in conceiving the 
 possibility of doing so. In like manner an im- 
 passable gulf separates sensations from those mental 
 functions which we designate intellectual ; and one 
 equally wide, separates both motions, sensations, 
 and acts, purely intellectual, from those which we 
 designate moral. Until the one can be translated 
 into the other, and the gulf which separates the 
 one class of conceptions from the other be bridged 
 over, it will be sufficient to say with respect to the 
 positions in question, Not proven ; and we need not 
 trouble ourselves with the plea so often urged by 
 theorisers of all kinds, whenever they find them- 
 selves in difficulties, that although science has not 
 yet succeeded in bridging over the different gulfs 
 to which I have alluded, it will certainly do so at 
 some period of the future. Our concern, I repeat 
 it, is not with prophecies, nor with tendencies, but 
 with actual present facts. Such facts are the pre- 
 sentations of consciousness above referred to ; and 
 until the above positions are proved to have a more 
 substantial basis on which to rest than hopes, 
 conjectures, and abstract theories, it is absurd 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent 
 
 43 
 
 to ask us to believe that we are living on de- 
 lusions. 
 
 Further: some eminent men of science affirm 
 that thought is a function of the brain, and nothing 
 more. Assuming this position to be true, they 
 urge that inasmuch as the brain is nothing but 
 a mass of organized matter, and matter and its 
 motions are subject to necessary laws, whatever 
 results from their combined action, i.e., all the 
 phenomena of mind, must be equally necessary ; 
 and consequently free agency has no real existence. 
 
 But the premises do not justify the conclusion. 
 Assuming all that physiologists affirm to have been 
 proved, what does it amount to ? This, and no 
 more : that as we are at present constituted, the 
 brain is the organ of thought, that every thought 
 involves a corresponding movement in the brain ; 
 that within the limits of human experience, where- 
 ever a brain does not exist, thought is not ; and 
 wherever the brain is imperfect, thought is im- 
 perfect; and that mind can neither be made visible, 
 weighed, or measured by the most delicate instru- 
 ment which man has succeeded in inventing. All 
 this may be conceded, yet it by no means proves 
 that mind is a function of the brain, or that it and 
 the hrain are identical. All that it really proves 
 is, that in the constitution of things which come 
 under our observation, mind uses the brain as its 
 instrument, and that mind and brain are so in- 
 
 The theory 
 that 
 
 thought is a 
 function of 
 the brain. 
 
 According tc 
 it the 
 
 phenomena 
 of mind are 
 necessary. 
 
 The 
 
 identity of 
 mind and 
 brain not 
 proved. 
 
44 
 
 Man not a Machine,, 
 
 The 
 
 testimony of 
 conscious- 
 ness to 
 man’s free 
 agency not 
 invalidated 
 by the 
 discoveries 
 of physiolo- 
 gists 
 
 respecting 
 the nature 
 and 
 
 f^mctions of 
 the brain. 
 
 The theory 
 that atoms 
 capable of 
 intelligence 
 and self-de- 
 termination 
 exist. 
 
 timately correlated, that the mind cannot act with- 
 out the brain. But it totally fails to prove that 
 mind has no existence apart from the brain, or 
 that under a different constitution of things it 
 cannot act without one. Still less does it afford 
 the smallest pretext for affirming that the in- 
 numerable adaptations with which the universe 
 abounds, and the order which reigns throughout 
 it, do not prove the existence of a mind which is 
 capable of acting apart from all material limita- 
 tions. This being so, it follows that there is nothing 
 in the discoveries of physiologists respecting the 
 nature and functions of the brain, which invalidates 
 the testimony of consciousness to man^s free agency, 
 and his possession of a power of self-determination. 
 
 The last position which requires notice is the 
 affirmation that the atoms, out of which all things 
 have been evolved, contain in themselves the 
 principles of life, intelligence, and freedom ; or to 
 state the same idea in the words of a well-known 
 scientist, that matter contains in itself the potency 
 of all things. We are therefore asked to accept 
 as the foundation of a sound philosophy of man the 
 astounding proposition, that a class of atoms exist 
 which are capable of intelligence and seK- deter- 
 mination ; or else, if as units they are devoid of 
 these powers, they are capable of producing such 
 results when in combination, of which they were 
 utterly destitute when out of combination, ie., all 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent, 
 
 4^ 
 
 existing intelligence and morality. This theory is 
 a theory pure and simple; without a single fact 
 on which to rest, for not even the author of it 
 pretends that an atom or a molecule of this kind 
 has ever come within the range of his experience. 
 With respect to it, the common sense of mankind 
 will concur in thinking that atoms and molecules^ 
 which possess in themselves intelligence or free- 
 dom, or which are capable of evolving out of 
 themselves in combination qualities of which they 
 were utterly destitute when out of combination, 
 must be very singular products of nature. Nay, 
 it is impossible that they can have been such 
 products, for, according to the theories of those 
 against whose principles I am contending, such 
 atoms must have been self -existent; for if they had 
 a beginning, a Being must exist who originated 
 them. This Being therefore, unless he was capable 
 of imparting to them the qualities of freedom and 
 intelligence, while he himself was bound by the 
 iron law of necessity, must have possessed con- 
 sciousness, free agency, and intelligence ; and conse- 
 quently must be the Author of these qualities as they 
 exist in man. Further, as a free agent is a nobler 
 being than a necessary agent (for to the latter we 
 never assign praise or blame), if man is the pro- 
 duction of a necessary agent, that necessary agent 
 has been capable of producing a being greater and 
 nobler than itself. But it will be unnecessary to 
 
 No atom or 
 molecule of 
 the kind has 
 ever been 
 discovered. 
 
 Such atoms 
 must have 
 been self- 
 existent. 
 
 Their 
 Creator 
 must have 
 possessed 
 conscious- 
 ness, free 
 agency, and 
 intelligence, 
 and he the 
 Author 
 of these 
 qualities in 
 man. 
 
Man not a Machine, 
 
 4^0 
 
 discuss this theorj^ further, for it practically concedes 
 the point for which we are contending, viz., the 
 existence of free agency and a power of self- 
 determination, either in atoms, molecules, or in 
 their results in combination. 
 
 The Once more : the distinction which all men instinc- 
 
 distinction 
 
 feit^et^een between physical and moral agents, and 
 
 morhTagents between physical and moral laws, constitutes an 
 mails overwhelming proof that man is a free, and not a 
 free agent, agent. A physical agent cannot break 
 
 the law of its being : it acts as it does because it 
 cannot help so acting ; it is always trustworthy, it 
 never yields to temptation, it never lies. Thus a 
 piece of iron can only act in the same way, and 
 will only act in the same way for ever under 
 similar circumstances. Its actions, therefore, 
 focm an order of phenomena which never varies, 
 which order we designate their law. Moral 
 agents, on the contrary, act in conformity with a 
 Differences law of a wholly different character. Moral law, 
 
 between 
 
 physical and it obsorvod, is not the order of events as they 
 
 moral law. ' •' 
 
 actually are in the moral world, but the order of 
 events as they ought to be. It contemplates an 
 ideal, up to which the moral agent ought to act ; 
 and its conception involves the idea of an authority 
 which has a right to command. At the back of 
 physical laws there is force, and force only ; at the 
 back of moral law is not force, but authority. A 
 physical law can he broken neither by a physical 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent. 
 
 47 
 
 nor a moral agent ; a moral law can be broken by 
 a moral agent. Physical agents can be neither 
 persuaded nor tempted, nothing can divert them 
 from their course but the action of superior force. 
 Moral agents are precisely the reverse. Physical 
 agents cannot impress their will on one another, 
 for they have no will to impress. A moral agent 
 can issue an order which another moral agent will 
 feel it his duty to obey ; but to all orders physical 
 agents are deaf. But while no moral agent can 
 violate the law of a physical agent, or induce it to 
 violate its own law, it is capable by an act of its 
 will, within certain limits, of diverting the course 
 which a physical agent would pursue if left to 
 itself, and making it do his pleasure. Thus for 
 example, iron has been made man’s obedient ser- 
 vant without once violating the law of its action. 
 A piece of iron left to itself will not float, but man, 
 without either violating or suspending its laws, can 
 make it float ; man cannot walk across the ocean, 
 but he can construct an iron vessel which will 
 carry him to the most distant lands, and make this 
 unintelligent machine obedient to his will. Similarly 
 electricity can neither hear, think, nor speak; if 
 you ask it to convey a message for you, it will be 
 deaf to your most earnest entreaty, yet man can 
 so impress his will upon it as to make it his most 
 faithful servant, and influence the actions of 
 moral agents; and although moral agents when 
 
 Differences 
 between 
 physical and 
 moral 
 agents. 
 
 Examples. 
 
48 
 
 Ma)% not a Machine, 
 
 Pliysicai 
 agents can 
 be made 
 the instru- 
 ments of 
 man’s will. 
 
 The 
 
 influence of 
 will the 
 most potent 
 agency in 
 human 
 affairs. 
 
 separated from one another by thousands of miles 
 cannot produce the smallest effect on one another, 
 yet hy using this unintelligent force as the instru- 
 ment of his pleasure, a man can so affect other 
 moral agents at this remote distance within a few 
 minutes as may kindle a war which may last for j 
 years, and sacrifice lives hy thousands. Number- ! 
 less similar instances might he adduced, in which i 
 man makes physical agents the instruments of 
 effectuating his will by diverting their forces into 
 a direction different from that which they would 
 pursue if they were left to themselves ; nay more, 
 he can even make them the agents of his will and the 
 memorials of his existence long after he has passed 
 from this earthly scene, and even the instruments 
 of handing down to future generations the image 
 of himself: what he thought, and what he did. 
 So far, therefore, is it from being true that the 
 influence of will is inappreciable, as necessitarians 
 affirm, it is not only the most potent of all human 
 agencies in the affairs of man, but it is capable of 
 producing wholly different results in nature from 
 those which its forces would have effected if they 
 had been allowed to pursue their own course un- 
 modified by man. In a word, moral agents have 
 transformed the appearance of the globe, and have 
 made it wholly different from what it would have 
 been if its various physical agents had been left to 
 pursue the course of their own undirected action. 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent, 
 
 49 
 
 What then do these and innumerable similar facts 
 prove ? I answer that man is a free, and not a 
 necessary agent; that he is a self-determining 
 cause of action, and not a machine which only 
 differs from ordinary machines in that he is a 
 machine possessed of life. 
 
 The belief in necessitarianism therefore is founded 
 on theories, assumptions, and abstract reasoning, 
 versus facts ; the belief in free agency is founded 
 on facts, versus theories, assumptions, and abstract 
 reasonings. ^Necessitarianism is the belief of the 
 speculator only as long as he continues in his 
 study ; hut the moment he enters the active world, 
 he feels himself compelled to think, talk, and act 
 on the assumption that he is a free agent, and the 
 doctrine that man is a machine is felt to he a 
 practical falsehood. It was said hy an eminent 
 Roman that he wondered, when two augurs met 
 each other in the street, that they did not hurst 
 out laughing in one another’s faces, so ridiculous 
 was their art. We may almost wonder that two 
 necessitarians do not do the same when they meet 
 one another in practical life ; hut human credulity 
 knows no bottom. 
 
 But the necessitarian philosophy involves issues 
 of the most profound importance. If it is true, 
 no God exists of whose existence man need take 
 thought, there is no intelligent or moral govern- 
 ment of the universe, but all things are directed 
 E 
 
 The facts 
 prove that 
 man is a 
 self-de- 
 termining 
 cause of 
 action. 
 
 The 
 
 necessitarian 
 compelled to 
 think, talk, 
 and act in 
 the world 
 on the 
 assumption 
 that he is 
 a free agent 
 
 Issues of the 
 necessitarian 
 philosophy. 
 
50 
 
 Man not a Machine, 
 
 If this 
 philosophy 
 he true iron 
 law prevails 
 and there is 
 no future 
 retribution. 
 
 Pessimistic 
 character 
 of necessi- 
 tarianism. 
 
 Ly an iron law of necessity, and by that concur- 
 rence of forces modifying one another’s action, 
 which in common language is designated chance: 
 and no future existence for man in which the im- 
 perfections of the present moral order of things may 
 be remedied hereafter, and the prosperous sinner 
 be called to account for his conduct here. It 
 will doubtless be urged that it is our duty to 
 pursue truth to whatever consequences it may lead, 
 to face them boldly; and not to take refvige in 
 such a delusion as satisfied a thinker of the ancient 
 world who avowed that if man perished at the 
 stroke of death, and the hope of immortality was 
 a delusion, he wished never to be set free from 
 that delusion as long as he lived. But most men 
 will be of opinion that if pessimism is true (and 
 necessitarianism is pessimism), it is useless to talk 
 of the duty of pursuing truth ; and that the wisest 
 thing for man is to make the best of his little day, 
 and die; and if delusions can help him to enjoy 
 it, so much the better, for the discovery of necessi- 
 tarian truth will add to the certainty of suffering 
 and dying, the pain of anticipating it. But we 
 go further, and contend that if necessitarianism 
 thus shakes to their foundation the principles of 
 moral obligation on which society is based (as 
 we are persuaded that it does) ; if it teaches 
 that this ordered universe is the result of the 
 action of unintelligent forces; that it has no 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent 
 
 51 
 
 moral governor, and by consequence no moral 
 order ; and that the successful villain, whose 
 astuteness has enabled him throughout life to 
 evade the penalties which society would have in- 
 flicted on him, and the suffering and self-sacrificing 
 saint will alike after the stroke of death sleep the 
 sleep of unconsciousness, and be undisturbed by 
 their works following them ; that consequences 
 such as these form one of the strongest reasons 
 for believing that the theory is untrue. To us, 
 and we think to all men who are not blinded by 
 a theory, it will be simply unbelievable that a 
 universe in which order and adjustments prevail 
 to the degree in which they unquestionably prevail 
 in the physical universe, should be destitute of 
 moral adjustments, a moral order, and a moral 
 force, which is capable of enforcing obedience to 
 moral law, and of punishing transgressors for its 
 violation; for nothing can be more certain than 
 that neither of these can exist, if it will be alike 
 to the evil and the good, after each has passed 
 away from this earthly scene. If this be so, philo- 
 sophers may preach what they please in defence of 
 virtuous actions; but the overwhelming majority 
 of mankind will draw the conclusion that the 
 best practical rule of life will be to gratify one’s 
 own tastes (be they what they may) while it 
 is possible to do so ; and not to decline present 
 gratification in the hope of the enjoyment of 
 
 The con- 
 sequences 
 form the 
 strongest 
 reason for 
 believing the 
 theory to be 
 untrue. 
 
 It is un- 
 believable 
 that such a 
 universe as 
 this should 
 be destitute 
 of moral 
 order. 
 
62 
 
 Man not a Machine, 
 
 The neces- 
 sitarian 
 foundation 
 of moral 
 obligation is 
 utilitarian- 
 ism. 
 
 It knows 
 nothing of 
 a Creator, of 
 moral law, 
 of human 
 brotherhood, 
 or a voice of 
 conscience. 
 
 a greater though, distant good, when owing to 
 the uncertainty of life’s duration, it is more 
 than doubtful whether they shall live to realize 
 it, and with the certainty that when life is ended, 
 both the good and the bad will alike sleep the 
 sleep of unconsciousness. If averages form a 
 ground on which to base moral action, they prove 
 that the number of those who live to realize their 
 calculations, hopes, and expectations is compara- 
 tively small. 
 
 The ultimate foundation on which the necessi- 
 tarian philosophy rests moral obligation is the prin- 
 ciple of utilitarianism, or that course of action 
 which is fitted to realize the greatest happiness of the 
 individual. It knows nothing of a Creator, to whom 
 is due love and service from the creature ; nothing 
 of a moral law, founded on His essential nature, 
 and on man’s relationship to Him; nothing of a 
 moral governor, who cares for righteousness, and 
 who is prepared to enforce it ; nothing of human 
 brotherhood, founded on man’s relation to God, 
 as a common Father; nothing of a voice of con- 
 science, which is capable of speaking authoritatively 
 and saying. This it is your duty to do ; from this 
 it is your duty to forbear, despite of all con- 
 sequences which may happen to yourself ; nothing 
 of a future state, in which man shall be rewarded 
 or punished for his conduct here. On the contrary, 
 according to its pronouncements, the consequences 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent 
 
 53 
 
 of actions, be they good or be they bad, are con- 
 fined to tbis present life ; beyond it, the good have 
 nothing to hope, and the bad have nothing to fear. 
 All other foundations of moral obligation it dis- 
 misses as no better than old wives’ fables. 
 
 Utilitarianism, therefore, or the pursuit of our 
 greatest happiness, viewed as a standard of moral 
 obligation, resolves right, i.e.^ virtuous conduct, into 
 a calculation of consequences. According to this 
 theory, each individual is compelled to pursue that 
 line of conduct which in his opinion will conduce 
 to his greatest happiness, which will afford him 
 the greatest amount of pleasure. But inasmuch as 
 there is no higher authority to appeal to than the 
 taste of the individual, and the degree of his in- 
 sight into the future consequences of his actions, 
 opinions may, and do differ widely as to the line of 
 conduct which will realize this result. The utili- 
 tarian philosopher affirms that the effort to realize 
 the happiness of others is the one only certain road 
 of realizing the happiness of ourselves. This makes 
 virtuous conduct simply a matter of accurate cal- 
 culation and good taste ; and vicious conduct the 
 reverse. But the overwhelming majority of man- 
 kind think very differently ; and all that this 
 philosophy can do is to hope for their gradual 
 enlightenment. A small number of select indi- 
 viduals may accept the utilitarian standard, and 
 try to live by it; but there is no reason why 
 
 utilitarian- 
 ism resolves 
 virtuous 
 conduct into 
 a calculation 
 of conse- 
 quences. 
 
 The 
 
 utilitarian 
 road to 
 happiness. 
 
64 
 
 Man not a Machine, 
 
 Practical 
 ellect of 
 utilitarian- 
 »sm. 
 
 According to 
 it, it is a 
 man’s 
 misfortune, 
 not his sin, 
 to be I ad. 
 
 men who are endowed with a less accurate power 
 of calculating the contingencies of the future should 
 not arrive at a different conclusion ; and inasmuch 
 as each individual is responsible to himself alone, 
 and there is no hereafter to be the subject of hope 
 or dread, why a man should not arrive at the con- 
 clusion that the most certain way of realizing one’s 
 own happiness amid the chances of this uncertain 
 world is to make the best of life’s little day by 
 grasping at present gratification, each according to 
 his tastes, — the contemplative man in contempla- 
 tion ; the elevated man in what he considers great 
 and noble; the average man in the ordinary pleasures 
 of life ; and the sensualist in sensual indulgence ; or 
 to express the same idea in language borrowed from 
 the Apostle, let us each, according to our respective 
 tastes, eat and drink ; for to-morrow we die.” 
 
 According, therefore, to the principles of this 
 philosophy, for a man to be a bad man is neither 
 his sin, nor his crime, but his misfortune. It is 
 simply, to start with a taste for a particular class 
 of pleasures, and in addition to be a bad calculator 
 of the consequences which will follow from thei? 
 indulgence. If right conduct is the pursuit of a 
 course of action which a man believes will realize 
 his own greatest happiness, it cannot be denied 
 that the immoral man seeks to realize this, only he 
 mistakes the way of doing it, and is a bad calculator 
 of the means by which it can be realized. His tastes 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent. 
 
 55 
 
 lead him to desire present gratification without 
 any regard of the source from which it comes ; 
 and his powers of calculation are so defective that 
 he is unable to assure himself of the truth of what 
 the utilitarian philosopher affirms, viz., that he will 
 realize his greatest happiness by denying his appe- 
 tites, instead of gratifying them; or by pursuing 
 what is more elevated, rather than by yielding to 
 his passions. But in good truth, if the only test 
 of virtue is actions which tend to realize our 
 greatest happiness, and if the test of happiness 
 is pleasure, then it is in vain to talk of actions or 
 of pleasures more or less elevated than others, for 
 in that case all can be estimated by one standard 
 only, viz., the amount of pleasure which they yield 
 to the individual. Bad taste, therefore, and a bad 
 power of calculation are the only fault of him whom 
 men have concurred to designate a bad man ; or it 
 may he a want of power to pursue what he is con- 
 vinced in his understanding is a greater, though 
 distant good, at the expense of present gratification, 
 of self-denial, and it may he of present suffering. 
 But all this is his misfortune, and not his sin. 
 
 What, I ask, will he the. effect of persuading 
 the masses of mankind that the only distinction 
 between actions as good or bad is their tendency 
 to realize the greatest happiness of the individual, 
 and through the individual of the race; and 
 that the foundations on which moral obligation 
 
 Bad taste 
 and bad 
 power of 
 calculation 
 the only- 
 faults of a 
 bad man, 
 according to 
 it. 
 
 Conse- 
 quences 
 of per- 
 suading men 
 to accept tho 
 utilitarian 
 standard. 
 
56 
 
 Man not a Machine^ 
 
 The 
 
 testimony of 
 experience. 
 
 The villain 
 escapes if 
 astute 
 enough to 
 avoid 
 detection. 
 
 have hitherto been supposed to rest, are no better 
 than a quagmire ? Past experience proves that to 
 this question there can be only one answer, viz., 
 that each man will consider himself to be entitled 
 to do what he lists, provided he has sufficient 
 astuteness to enable him to avoid the penalties 
 which society would inflict upon him for the breach 
 of its laws, for, according to the principles against 
 which I am contending, the greatest sinner has 
 nothing to fear beyond the grave ; and society can 
 only deal with him while he lives. If, therefore, 
 a viUain is sufficiently astute to avoid detection 
 (and many villains are thus astute), he need fear 
 no qualms of conscience ; all that he has done has 
 been, that he has done as best he could to realize 
 what according to the light which was in him he con- 
 sidered to be his own greatest happiness, and this 
 he has succeeded in accomplishing. The means by 
 which he has effected it are a pure matter of in- 
 difference ; and when a successful life of crime has 
 come to a termination, this philosophy assures him 
 that his sleep of unconsciousness will be equally 
 undisturbed as that of a Howard or a St. Paul. 
 Truly, if these principles represent the reahties of 
 things, the holy, the good, and the self-sacriflcing are 
 of all men the most foolish and the most miserable 
 But another important consequence follows. 
 Full well it may be asked, if necessitarianism is 
 true, what right has society to inflict penalties 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent. 
 
 for the violation of its laws ? The transgressor of 
 them may justly urge, I have only done what I 
 could not help doing, i.e.y I have acted on the 
 most powerful motive, which in my case was the 
 desire of a present gratification, which seemed to 
 me to promise a far greater degree of happiness 
 than by exercising a painful restraint to realize 
 some distant but uncertain good, which owing to 
 the uncertainty of life I may never live to enjoy. 
 I am no philosopher or profound calculator ; and 
 whatever such may preach, it seems to me to be 
 wiser to act on the old adage, A bird in the hand 
 is worth two in the bush.” The only answer which 
 society can return is. Strength is right, and right 
 is strength. I have strength, and by the right of 
 strength I deal with every violator of my laws^ 
 and with every one who infiicts on me an incon- 
 venience. I deal with transgressors as I deal with 
 noxious animals. Some, if convenient, I restrain ; 
 on others I inflict pain ; others, if more convenient 
 to me, I kill. My sole object is to free myself 
 from the inconveniences which you occasion ; and 
 to effect this I seek to render it less pleasurable to 
 you to violate my laws than to observe them. 
 
 But the utilitarian principle of altruism, or that 
 the realization of the greatest happiness of the 
 greatest number will be attended with the reali- 
 zation of the greatest happiness of self is no new 
 discovery. It is neither more nor less than one of 
 
 57 
 
 The system 
 deprives 
 society of 
 the right to 
 inflict 
 penalties 
 for breach 
 of laws. 
 
 It can only 
 deal with 
 them as 
 noxious 
 animals. 
 
 Altruism no 
 new 
 
 discovery. 
 
58 
 
 Man not a Machine, 
 
 Utilitarian- 
 ism has 
 divested 
 Christian 
 law of all 
 moral 
 power. 
 
 How is 
 altruism 
 to he 
 
 generated 1 
 
 The shifts 
 ,jf u tili- 
 cari anism. 
 
 the old laws of the kingdom of God, but deprived of 
 all the sanctions by which it can be enforced. Yet 
 we are invited to believe that altruism is a great 
 improvement on the now worn-out Christian law. 
 “ Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine 
 heart, mind, soul, and strength ; ” and, consequent on 
 this, “ thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself ; 
 and on the new commandment, to love one another 
 as Christ has loved us. All that the utilitarian 
 philosopher has really effected is, to divest these 
 commandments of all moral power, by proclaiming 
 that there is no God whom we need regard, no 
 Christ to love, and no hereafter to fear. 
 
 But if this philosophy is the sole foundation on 
 which morality is to he based, I ask, how is this 
 principle of altruism to be generated ? It cannot 
 be generated by invoking the principle of evolution, 
 for it is one of its fundamental principles that 
 primitive man was altogether selfish, and that 
 everything in civilized man which is not so is an 
 after-growth. How, then, can the disinterested 
 love of others he evolved out of a being whose one 
 distinguishing characteristic is pure love of self ? 
 Many are the shifts to which utilitarianism has 
 recourse, such as the family, and the tribal feeling; 
 but it may be justly asked, whence came these ? 
 How did they originate in a being whose moral 
 constitution, if he had any, was selfishness pure and 
 simple. The truth must be spoken ; unless it is 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent. 
 
 59 
 
 possible to evolve out of a thing that which was 
 never in it; if altruism is to be generated in a 
 being, of whom love of self is the one distinguishing 
 moral characteristic, recourse must be had to a power 
 different from evolution ; for if evolution goes on 
 evolving for endless ages, selfishness can never 
 generate sacrifice of self. Such a power Christianity 
 affirms that it possesses ; but it is this very power 
 which the utilitarian philosophy ignores. What 
 has it to substitute in its place ? This, and nothing 
 more, the aphorism, that the pursuit of the hap- 
 piness of others for its own sake is the most 
 noble of human pursuits. But what right has 
 the utilitarian to talk of the more or less noble 
 in action, when the only distinction between 
 virtuous and vicious actions is their tendency to 
 realize pleasure or pain. Cordially will Christians 
 assent to the truth of altruism, wffien it is once 
 admitted that there is a God, who is the moral 
 Governor of the universe, and a future state of 
 retribution ; but this is the very thing which utili- 
 tarianism refuses to admit into its calculations. 
 Yet if the calculation be limited to the results of 
 actions in this life, not only will it be a matter of 
 extreme difficulty accurately to balance the plea- 
 sures with which the effort to realize the happiness 
 of others is attended, against those which follow 
 the indulgence of the passions which terminate in 
 self, but the final result wil^ be extremely doubtful, 
 
 Christianity 
 possesses the 
 power which 
 utilitarian- 
 ism ignores. 
 
 Christians 
 will accept 
 the truth of 
 altruism 
 when it is 
 admitted 
 that there is 
 a God and a 
 future 
 state of 
 retribution 
 
60 
 
 Man not a Machine, 
 
 A beautiful 
 theory for 
 the study, 
 but not for 
 the hard 
 world of 
 fact. 
 
 It has no 
 substitute 
 for the 
 moral power 
 of Christi- 
 anity which 
 it rejects. 
 
 and will in no small degree be dependent on tbe 
 taste of tbe individual. But this is not all ; for 
 even if the balance should be ultimately pronounced 
 to be in favour of acting on the principle of 
 altruism, so intricate would be the calculation, and 
 so doubtful its results, that it would leave it 
 destitute of a moral power sufficient to outweigh 
 those impulses which urge the overwhelming 
 majority of mankind to prefer present gratification 
 to the chance of greater, but more distant good. 
 One thing is certain ; not one in a hundred thousand 
 of mankind has been induced to act on this principle 
 during the ages of the past. It may be a beautiful 
 theory as long as the philosopher confines himself 
 to his study ; but as soon as he issues into the hard 
 world of fact, it is felt to be powerless to act on 
 the masses of mankind. Philosophers may assure 
 us that if only men will yield themselves to their 
 guidance it will realize a millennium. This we 
 shall not dispute ; for it is the fundamental prin- 
 ciple of Christianity that mutual Pve is the highest 
 happiness of man ; but under the utilitarian 
 system the difficulty consists in making this “if’' 
 a reality, because it renounces the whole of that 
 mighty moral power which Christianity brings to 
 bear on the human heart, and has nothing to 
 substitute for it but the results of an uncertain cal- 
 culation, which may vary according to the tastes 
 of the individual. 
 
But a Responsible Free Agent 
 
 61 
 
 The utilitarian system of morality, therefore, 
 reduces virtue and vice to a matter of calculation. 
 Its moral, holy, and good man (if such terms 
 have any right to a place in its vocabulary), is 
 nothing but a good calculator of the consequences 
 of actions, and who has sufficient strength of will 
 to act on his calculations, notwithstanding all the 
 solicitations of his passions to the contrary. Its 
 immoral man, on the contrary, is a bad calculator, 
 or one who, if he calculates rightly, is unable to 
 resist the force of temptation. As a system of 
 morality, therefore, it can recognize neither crime nor 
 sin. What in the ordinary language of mankind 
 is designated moral wickedness, in accordance with 
 its principles, is nothing more than the misfortune 
 of possessing a had taste, and imperfect power of 
 calculating the consequences of actions. If a man 
 can see his way, therefore, to avoid the penalties 
 which society would inflict upon him for the viola- 
 tion of its laws, and if the result of his calculation 
 is that he will realize his own greatest happiness 
 by the practice of villainy and fraud, what, I ask, 
 is to hinder him from so doing ? All other moral 
 considerations being swept away under the teachings 
 of this philosophy, does not such a successful villain 
 almost realize the standard of utilitarian virtue? 
 or if not virtue, who can blame him ? for he has 
 only done what seemed to him to be best fitted to 
 realize his own greatest good. 
 
 The good 
 man of 
 utilitarian- 
 ism is a good 
 calculator of 
 the con- 
 sequences of 
 actions. 
 
 Moral 
 wickedness, 
 according to 
 it, is only the 
 misfortune 
 of having 
 a had taste, 
 and 
 
 imperfect 
 power of 
 calculating 
 the con- 
 sequences of 
 actions. 
 
 The 
 
 successful 
 villain 
 realizes 
 the standard 
 of utilitarian 
 virtue. 
 
62 
 
 Man not a Machine, 
 
 What 
 
 necessitarian 
 
 philosophy- 
 
 sweeps 
 
 away. 
 
 Its moral 
 edifice is 
 built on 
 a foundation 
 of sand. 
 
 It is 
 
 compelled to 
 assume the 
 truth of 
 that which 
 it is its 
 fundamental 
 principle to 
 deny. 
 
 The position of things, therefore, stands thus. 
 The necessitarian philosophy sweeps away free 
 agency in man, and the power of self-determina- 
 tion ; undermines the foundations on which existing 
 systems of moral obligation are based, and thus 
 destroys every moral power which can be exerted on 
 man for good. Having effected this destruction, — a 
 destruction so great that even some of those who 
 have aided in effecting it have expressed alarm at 
 the immediate consequences with which it may be 
 attended — an attempt has been made to erect a 
 moral edifice on the principles of utilitarianism. 
 But this, as we have proved, is a building erected 
 on the sand, being a system destitute of all moral 
 power to influence the masses of mankind. What, 
 I ask, will they care about the condition of posterity 
 some million years hence, when they have ceased 
 from conscious existence ? for even utilitarians 
 admit that their promised millennium will only be 
 realized at some indefinitely remote period of the 
 future, when the personal consciousness of the 
 generation now living, and of numbers yet to come 
 has been swallowed up in the mighty To iray. Yet 
 even in doing this the necessitarian philosophy is 
 compelled to commit an act of suicide, viz., to 
 assume the truth of that which it is its funda- 
 mental principle to deny. This it does whenever 
 it affirms that it is a duty to pursue a more 
 distant good, rather than a present gratification ; for 
 
Bvbt a Responsible Free Agent. 
 
 (vi 
 
 this act involves choice ; choice involves freedom ; 
 and freedom, before the course of action chosen can 
 become effect, involves an act of volition and self- 
 determination. Man, therefore, on its own showing 
 is a free agent. True it is that man cannot estimate 
 the precise degree of responsibility which attaches 
 to his brother man, — the question is one far too 
 complicated for our finite understandings ; but the 
 Judge of all the earth can, for He not only knows 
 all the conditions of the case, but can penetrate to 
 the secrets of the heart ; and we may feel confident 
 that He who has implanted the sense of rectitude 
 and justice in our moral nature, will Himself 
 certainly judge in conformity with that which is 
 right and just. ‘‘Shall not the Judge of all the 
 earth do right ? 
 
 But, as I have observed above, the boasted 
 altruism of modern anti-Christian philosophy is no 
 new discovery, being neither more nor less than 
 the old commandment, “ Thou shalt love thy 
 neighbour as thyself,’’ divested of the sanctions by 
 which it was enforced. But even the old command- 
 ment was “ weak through the flesh,” and was 
 incapable of imparting a spiritual power adequate 
 to overcome the evil which exists in man. What, 
 I ask, has altruism done to remedy this defect? 
 The answer must he. All that it has done has been 
 to remove the imperfect supports on which the 
 old commandment rested. As a spiritual power 
 
 Man is, 
 on its o’vn 
 showing, 
 a free agent. 
 
 God only- 
 can 
 
 estimate 
 the degree of 
 individual 
 responsi- 
 bility, 
 and do 
 right. 
 
64 Man not a Machiney hut a Besponsible Free Agent. 
 
 it is, and ever must be, powerless. But such a 
 power it is the express end and purpose of Chris- 
 tianity to supply. “ 0 wretched man that I am ! 
 who shall deliver me out of the body of this 
 death ? has been, and ever must be, the cry both 
 of the Legalist and the Altruist in their strivings 
 to realize the commandment. But Christianity 
 returns the answer, ‘‘I thank God through Jesus 
 Christ our Lord. . . . The law of the spirit of life 
 in Christ Jesus made me free from the law of 
 sin and death. For what the law could not do, 
 in that it was weak through the flesh, God, sending 
 His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and as 
 an offering for sin, condemned sin in the flesh : 
 that the ordinance of the law might be fulfilled 
 in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the 
 Spirit.^^ 1 
 
 ^ Rom. vii. 24, 25 ; viii. 2-4. (Revised Version. 
 
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