Limitation of Representation in the General Assembly of Illinois An Argument Against the Proposal Pending Before the Constitutional Convention ISSUED BY THE CITIZEN’S COMMITTEE FOR POPULAR REPRESENTATION UHIVERSITY OF ILLIUeiS LIBRAS? -— . - 1322 CHICAGO. JANUARY. 1922. OAK ST. HDSF Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2017 with funding from University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign Alternates https://archive.org/details/limitationofreprOOciti f the smaller counties. There are 102 counties in Illinois, and ;here is wide variation in population among these counties, rhe ratio for additional representation is 50,000, but 83 coun- ;ies have less than 50,000; 53 have less than 25,000, and 9 have ess than 10,000. To give each small county one representa- ive means a material over-representation of the small coun- ies. Fifty-six of the 102 counties in Illinois decreased in mpulation during the past ten years. Any suggestion that his may not work with complete fairness to the larger coun- ies in no way criticizes the smaller counties, many of which ire declining in population. Such a statement merely recog- lizes that the inhabitants of such counties are less numerous. It may be worth while to analyze briefly the actual effect of his plan by a comparison of representation of large and small counties under it. Under this plan Hardin County, with 7,533 nhabitants, has one representative, and so also has Lake bounty with 74,285. The three small counties of Calhoun, lardin and Putnam, with a combined population of less than !4,000, will have three representatives, whereas St. Clair, with .36,520, will also have three representatives. The counties 10 which have one or more additional representatives are not s seriously affected, however, as the counties having a popuh tion between 50,000 and 75,000. The table given below ind cates the eight counties having between 50,000 and 75,00 inhabitants, and one representative each, and presents in pai allel column for comparison, eight of the nine counties havin less than 10,000 inhabitants, and also having one represents tive each: Under 75,000—1 each Under 10,000—1 each Adams . . 62,188 Brown. . 9,33 Champaign ... . 56,959 Calhoun ... . 8,24 Franklin . . 57,293 Edwards ... . 9,43 Lake . . 74,285 Hardin .... . 7,53 McLean . . 70,107 Henderson . . 9,77 Macon. . 65,175 Pope. . 9,62 Macoupin. . 57,274 Putnam ... . 7,57 Williamson ... .61,092 Scott . . 9,48 It is readily seen from this table that in the first grou eight members represent 505,076 people, while in the secorn group eight members represent 71,008 people. A voter i Lake County has for representation in the House of Reprc sentatives about one-tenth of the effectiveness of a voter i: Hardin County. The proposed plan discriminates to a muc greater extent against the larger down-state counties than i does against Cook County. Under its terms the 11 large counties which get more than one representative have a com bined representation in the House of Representatives of 8 members, about 47 per cent of the total number, althoug: they have nearly two-thirds of the population of the Stat( It will thus be seen that the proposal of the Constitutions Convention discriminates permanently against Cook Count; in both houses of the General Assembly, and at the same tim discriminates to an even greater extent against the large! down-state counties in the House but not in the Senate. 11 The plan of limited representation is opposed to the funda¬ mental principles of American Government. Unsatisfactory conditions as to representation in a few other States consti¬ tute no argument in favor of the adoption of a bad plan by Illinois. In all but a few States the American Plan of equal representation exists for both houses, or for one of the two houses. It is argued that the county is an important political com¬ munity with an individuality of its own, and should be recog¬ nized in the representative system of the State irrespective of great variations in county population. In Illinois there has never been a constitutional recognition of a right in the county as such to representation irrespective of its popula¬ tion, although all of the constitutions of Illinois have required that representative districts be bounded by county lines ex¬ cept where a county is entitled to more than one district. It is urged that population is not and should not be the sole basis of representation, and that the various States of this country recognize and provide for geographical representa¬ tion in many cases without reference to population. The plan of geographical representation has a historical basis in New England, hut the failure to make adequate readjustment upon the basis of increasing population has led to a distinct over¬ representation of rural communities not only in the two New England States of Rhode Island and Connecticut, but also in Delaware and Maryland. In three of these States, there is in both houses of the legislature rural domination of the great urban communities. These States are not satisfactory illus¬ trations in favor of establishing such a system in the State of Illinois; for their politics has usually been unsatisfactory, and the rural domination of urban communities has resulted to the dissatisfaction not only of the cities, but of the State as a whole. In a number of other States a rule of territorial representa- tion works in such a manner as to give smaller geographical areas a distinct over-representation in one of the two houses of the legislature. In this manner the larger cities are dis¬ tinctly under-represented in one of the two houses, hut not in the other. Such a situation exists in New York, Missouri, Alabama, North Carolina, South Carolina, New Jersey, Idaho, Vermont, Florida, Georgia, Montana and New Hampshire; and to a less extent in Pennsylvania, Iowa, Ohio, Kansas, Mississippi and Montana. It must be remembered, however, that these cases present illustrations of the under-representa¬ tion of urban communities in only one of the two houses, and in no way support arguments in favor of a permanent under¬ representation in both houses. Those desiring a limitation of representation in both houses appear to regard their case as supported by all instances of inequality in one house resulting from the representation of geographical areas. In this connection, the States of New York and Pennsyl¬ vania are most often referred to by those urging a constitu¬ tional limitation upon great cities in both houses of the Illi¬ nois General Assembly. In Pennsylvania there is a limitation in the State Senate which prevents the City of Philadelphia obtaining more than 8 senators. This city would, upon the basis of present population, be entitled to 10 Senators. How¬ ever, there is no discrimination in the House of Representa¬ tives of Pennsylvania. In New York there is a constitutional limitation to the ef¬ fect that no one county shall ever have more than one-third of the members of the State Senate, and that no two counties (or the territory thereof as organized in 1895) which are adjoin¬ ing or are separated only by public waters, may have more than one-half of all the Senators. Bronx County was organ¬ ized in 1915 out of a part of New York County, and is there¬ fore covered by this rule. New York City is composed of I five counties, and this constitutional provision forbids the three counties of New York, Bronx, and Kings, ever having 13 more than one-half of the Senate. New York excludes aliens in providing representation on the basis of population. The one discrimination against New York City in the New York State Senate is that which results from excluding aliens and from excluding the major fractions of the ratio of the Senate representation. The New York rule as to the State Senate permits three of five counties in New York City to have one- half of the Senators when entitled to that number, and im¬ poses no limitation upon the five counties together. The serious inequality which exists in one of the New Eng¬ land States (Rhode Island) with respect to both houses, and in three of the other New England States (Vermont, Connec¬ ticut and New Hampshire) with respect to one house, has developed largely because of the historical recognition of small units of local government. Readjustments made from time to time toward a system of greater equality have not remedied the serious and unfortunate conditions existing in these States. Not only is there no historical basis justifying the deliberate establishment of a similar inequality in Illinois, but the princi¬ ple of equal representation is a fundamental one, not only in Illinois constitutional history, but in the Ordinance of 1787, under which Illinois was first governed. This ordinance ex¬ pressly provided as a part of the articles of compact between the original States and the people and States in the Northwest Territory, that there should be ‘ ‘ a proportionate representation of the people in the legislature. ’ ’ Those who urge representa¬ tion upon the basis of geography rather than upon the basis of population as a fundamental principle of American consti¬ tutional government, appear to know more about such funda¬ mental principles than did the founders of this republic. 14 The proposal of the Constitutional Convention involves a permanent limitation. In connection with the proposal for the permanent restric¬ tion in both houses of the General Assembly, it should also be borne in mind that the Constitutional Convention will prob¬ ably propose that a new constitutional convention when as¬ sembled shall be composed of delegates elected from legisla¬ tive districts. The plan of permanently restricted represen¬ tation through the terms of the constitution also almost of necessity involves a plan of permanently restricting a ma¬ jority of the population with respect to changing that con¬ stitution through a convention. In this connection it may be worth while to call attention to the fact that even if New York had limited its greatest city in both houses of its legislature (which it did not) that limitation would not be so material as the limitation proposed in Illinois, because in New York the people vote automatically once each twenty years upon the question of assembling a constitutional convention. The plan in Illinois is to have a vote upon the holding of a consti¬ tutional convention taken as the result of legislative action, with the members of the convention elected from senatorial districts. Legislative proposal of constitutional amendments would, of course, be made by the two houses constituted upon the restrictive basis. Under the Illinois proposal, therefore, a limitation of representation once established is established for all time, irrespective of the growth of different portions of the State in population. One avowed purpose of the plan is to limit all industrial communities. It is urged that urban communities are radical and that they should therefore be limited in representation. This argu¬ ment applies to all of the urban communities of the State, and the proposed plan of representation in the House of Repre- 15 sentatives forbids representation of all larger counties in pro¬ portion to their population. It is not in accordance with the facts of American political history that radical movements originate chiefly in urban communities. It may be well to suggest that the Granger movement, the Greenback move¬ ment, the Populist movement, the Free Silver movement, and the Non-partisan League, originated in rural communities. All of these movements were termed radical by at least a large portion of the community. It is hardly necessary to point out that this argument is opposed to the whole principle of repub¬ lican government, under which the people are vested with power to govern themselves. It is unwise to base the permanent organization of govern¬ ment upon the desire to advance a particular reform, no mat¬ ter how important in itself that reform may be. Not only this, but the anti-saloon forces will strengthen themselves in Cook County, and accomplish the result at which they aim, through the abolition of cumulative voting, already agreed upon by the Constitutional Convention. From the standpoint of this particular movement, the proposed double limitation is unwise. It is urged that the members of the lower house of the Illi¬ nois General Assembly from Cook County have in a distinct majority been opposed to restrictions upon the liquor traffic, and that at the 1921 session of the Illinois General Assembly they were opposed to effective means for the enforcement of the Federal prohibition amendment. This argument proceeds upon the theological doctrine of “total depravity” and as¬ sumes that because the majority of the people of one portion of the State have not agreed with one particular matter of gov¬ ernmental policy, their influence in government should there¬ fore be reduced or withdrawn. The argument here goes only part way, and assumes that on account of the attitude of the 16 majority of Cook County members, the representation of Cook County should only be reduced; but pushed to its logical extreme it would lead to a complete denial of self-gov¬ ernment, or of any share in representation to Cook County in the Illinois General Assembly. The same argument may also be applied to a number of the larger down-state counties, rep¬ resentatives from which have also at various times been op¬ posed to prohibition measures. This argument bases the whole principle of self-government upon one issue, which is important, but which is not con¬ trolling from the standpoint of the permanent government of the State of Illinois. In earlier times we had despotisms, which determined according to their own discretion what was best for the people who were governed; but fortunately that condition of affairs is gone and will never be restored. The assumption that any one group of people can now determine what is best for the people of a great State for all time, is based upon precisely the same political theory as were the despotisms of the earlier days. To decide that a community is incompetent for representation or for effective representa¬ tion because a majority of its representatives in 1921 and in preceding years may have been on one side of a particular issue of governmental policy, is unwise and dangerous. To some extent the remainder of the State fears Cook County domination. Cook County members of the House and Senate have never been so united in their views as to domi¬ nate the two houses; but their possible domination, should Cook County have a majority of population, is prevented by limitation of representation in one of the two houses. To limit in both is to act unfairly, and permit domination of Cook County by the remainder of the State. It is urged that Cook County must not be permitted to gov¬ ern the State. But the prevention of the control of the State 17 Legislature by Cook County or by the other larger counties of the State is accomplished by limitation in one house of the General Assembly; and such a limitation affords an oppor¬ tunity for the recognition of the American principle of equal representation in the other. To limit Cook County representa¬ tion permanently in both houses and also to limit materially the representation of other large urban communities in one house, is substantially to say that these larger communities shall not be permitted to dominate the rest of the State, but may properly be dominated by the smaller communities. Those who favor a sharp limitation of Cook County repre¬ sentation in both houses of the General Assembly argue that a limitation merely in one house will cause frequent deadlocks between the two houses; and that if there is to be a limitation at all, limitation in both houses is logically and practically necessary. The argument that deadlocks will be occasioned unless there is a limitation in both houses is not borne out by fact. Those favoring such a double limitation argue on the one hand that this double limitation is necessary in order to avoid deadlocks; and argue on the other hand that Cook County will be sufficiently protected by its share in the election of a governor, who may by his veto occasion a complete dead¬ lock in legislation. If there is any validity in the argument that Cook County will elect the governor, such an election of the governor may produce a much more effective deadlock in legislation than any which is established by the application of a different rule of representation to the two houses. Not only this, but in the effort to limit Cook County repre¬ sentation an appeal is made to the example of the national government. In the national government each State is recog¬ nized as an equal unit in the Senate. In the House of Repre¬ sentatives the States are represented upon the basis of popu¬ lation, however, although there are two members out of more than 400 who represent constituencies not up to the established ratio of representation, under the provision that every State regardless of population shall have at least one representative. 18 There has substantially never been a clear alignment of Cook County representation against the representation of other communities of the State, and deadlocks are not likely to result between the two houses because of possible align¬ ment of this character in the future. Legislation which has been adopted, even prohibition legislation, has been carried by the aid of Cook County votes; and legislation which has been defeated has been defeated by the combina¬ tion of Cook County and down-state votes. No sectional issue now presents itself in the State of Illinois either in the two houses of the Illinois General Assembly or in the election of a governor. Unfair treatment of Cook County and of the other large urban communities of the State through constitutional provision will necessarily establish and maintain the sec¬ tional issue which has been raised in the Constitutional Con¬ vention. One argument for limitation of Cook County representation in the two houses is that the members from Cook County con¬ stitute an undivided unit and will vote as such, while there will be no such unity among the members from other parts of the State. Upon this basis it is contended that one-third of the members of the legislative body acting as a unit will have more than one-third of the influence in that body. It is well recognized that a stockholder in a corporation who owns one- third of the stock may ordinarily control the affairs of the corporation by voting his stock as a unit, if the other two- thirds of the stock is scattered among various owners. How¬ ever, no such situation presents itself or ever has presented itself in the Illinois General Assembly. There has never been a united control over Cook County members of such a char¬ acter as to cast the votes of Cook County in the two houses of the General Assembly as a unit. Cook County has had its periods of boss domination, just as have many counties and larger areas of territory in other parts of the State, but this domination has never extended to an undivided control over 19 Cook County representation in the two houses. Such a united action upon the part of Cook County representatives in the General Assembly, and such a political dominance over these representatives is out of the question under present condi¬ tions, and could only be forced as a means of necessary self- defense by an unfair discrimination which would compel unity among the Cook County members of the General Assembly and the permanent establishment of sectional lines to the dis¬ advantage of the State and of Cook County itself. The State of Illinois must preserve its unity as a State; and in preserving that unity as a State, its political future ought not to be overshadowed by an act of great political injustice, which will permanently establish lines of sectional division between the larger and the smaller communities. The pro¬ posal of the Constitutional Convention is of importance not merely for the present, but for the whole future of this State. APPENDIX. Representation in the 48 States. (Except where otherwise indicated, statements as to population refer to the United States Census of 1920) ALABAMA. CONSTITUTION OF 1901. The House now consists of 106 members, of whom each of the 67 counties must have at least 1. No county has less than 60 per cent of the population ratio, and only 2 have less than 75 per cent. There is no substantial dis¬ crimination necessary under the rule. The Senate consists of (not more than) 35 members, elected from as many districts, as nearly equal in population as may be, no county being divided between 2 districts. Under this rule no county can have more than 1 senator; upon a population basis one county would be entitled to 4 sena¬ tors; it can have but one. ARIZONA. CONSTITUTION OF 1912. The first apportionment is set up in the Constitution, to stand “until other¬ wise provided by law.” There is no rule for subsequent apportionments. ARKANSAS. CONSTITUTION OF 1874. The House consists of not more than 100 members, of whom each of the counties is entitled to at least one. No county has less than one-half the ratio, and only 13 have less than three-quarters. The rule involves no material discrimination in the House. The Senate consists of 35 members from as many districts, equal in population as nearly as practicable. CALIFORNIA. CONSTITUTION OF 1879. The House consists of 80 members and the Senate of 40, elected in each case from single member districts, as nearly equal in population as may be, regard being had to county lines. COLORADO. CONSTITUTION OF 1876. The legislature has full power to district the State, save that it may not divide counties and that it must use the population basis. Counties may be given any number of representatives and two or more counties may be united to form a single district. 22 CONNECTICUT. CONSTITUTION OF 1818 AND SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS. The House of Representatives, under an ancient rule which was merely continued by reference in the Constitution of 1818, and was slightly modi¬ fied in 1874 and 1876, consists of 262 members of whom 74 are elected by 74 towns each electing 1, and 188 by 94 towns each electing 2. Those electing 1 range in population from 266 up to 4,342, and those electing 2, from 257 up to 162,537. One elector in Union town of Tolland County has the same political weight as 630 in New Haven. New Haven, Hartford, Bridgeport, Waterbury, New Britain, Stanford, Meriden, Norwich, Norwalk, New Lon¬ don, Danbury, Middletown, Fairfield, Greenwich, Torrington, and Bristol, with 60 per cent of the population, have 32 members, or 12 1/5 per cent of the House. Forty-one other towns having each less than 1,000 population, and having all told not 25,000 people, 1.8 per cent of the population of the State, have 54 members, or 20^ per cent of the legislature. The 121 towns having each less than 5,000 people, and in all 206,775 out of the State’s population of 1,380,631, elect 169 representatives out of 262—15 per cent of the people elect 64 per cent of the Representatives. The Senate, under a rule adopted in 1901, may consist of not more than 36 members, and each county must have at least 1. Under the census of 1910 there have been 35 Senators. Under the census of 1920, and with 36 Senators, one county would have .7 of a ratio and one Senator; two coun¬ ties would have 1.25 and 1.37 of a ratio respectively and one Senator each; one county with 8.4 ratios might get 8 Senators, and four counties with 2, 3, 9, and 11 Senators respectively would each lose a minor fraction above a full final ratio. Thus, there is no substantial discrimination necessary in the Connecticut Senate under the Constitutional rule. DELAWARE. CONSTITUTION OF 1897. The House of Representatives consists of 35 members, elected from as many districts, each of which was definitely bounded in the Constitution of 1897, and may not be changed except as the districts in the City of Wil¬ mington may be enlarged by the annexation of territory to the city and adjoining districts consequently diminished. Ten districts are defined in each of Kent and Sussex Counties, 10 in Newcastle County outside of the City of Wilmington, and 5 within the City of Wilmington. Upon the 1890 census an apportionment by population would have entitled Kent County to 7 members, Sussex to 8, Newcastle outside Wilmington to 7, and Wilmington to 13. In 1920 such an apportionment would entitle Kent County to 5 mem¬ bers, Sussex to 7, Newcastle outside of Wilmington to 6, and Wilmington to 17. The State ratio in 1920 would be 6,371; but the average constituency in Kent County is 3,102; in Sussex 4,374; in Newcastle, outside Wilmington, 3,807; and in Wilmington 22,033. The Senate in Delaware consists of 17 members, from as many districts, definitely bounded, and unchangeable except as Wilmington City may annex adjoining territory. Kent and Sussex counties have each 5, Newcastle County outside of Wilmington has 5, and Wilmington 2. An equal appor- 23 tionment upon the 1890 census would have given Kent County 3, Sussex 4, Newcastle County outside of Wilmington 4, and Wilmington 6. Upon the 1920 census Kent would have 2, Sussex 3, Newcastle outside of Wilmington 3, and Wilmington 8. The State ratio would be 13,118; the average con¬ stituency in Kent is 6,205; in Sussex 8,748; in Newcastle outside of Wil¬ mington 7,614; and in Wilmington 55,084. FLORIDA. CONSTITUTION OF 1885. In the House each of the counties must have at least 1 member, and no one county may have more than 3. Eight counties have less than half the ratio of population. Two large counties which, together, would have 14 members upon a population basis are reduced to 6 under the rule. As to the Senate, the provision is that the legislature shall re-apportion every ten years, without specifying the basis of apportionment. GEORGIA. CONSTITUTION OF 1877—AMENDED 1920 AS TO HOUSE. The House now consists of 193 members, of whom the 8 largest coun¬ ties have each 3, the 30 next in size have each 2, and the remaining counties have 1 each. The 4 largest counties would, upon a population basis, be entitled to 32 members, and they get but 12. Fulton County (containing Atlanta) gets but 3 of the 16 to which her population would entitle her. Senators are apportioned according to population. IDAHO. CONSTITUTION OF 1890—AS AMENDED 1912. The House may consist of not more than three times as many members as the Senate has, or 132 members. Each of the 44 counties must have one member. The two smallest counties have each 50 per cent of the ratio upon a population basis; five others have from 60 to 90 per cent of a ratio only. Of the other counties which have one or more full ratios and a sur¬ plus of more than half, only three need be deprived of the additional mem¬ ber to which that surplus would otherwise entitle them. Only two members of 132 need come from constituencies which are over-represented as much as 100 per cent. The Senate consists of one member for each of the 44 counties. Of these, thirty represent counties having less than a proportionate ratio of population. Four counties have but 20 per cent of the ratio, and eight others have less than half. Ten counties have between one and two full ratios; three counties have almost three full ratios, and one has three and one- half ratios. One-fourth of the people in the 23 smallest counties elect a majority of the Senate; another fourth, in the four largest counties, elect but 1/11 of the Senate. It should be noted that between 1910 and 1920, a great many new counties were created, dividing and reducing other coun¬ ties. ILLINOIS. CONSTITUTION OF 1870. Both the House and Senate are to be apportioned each ten years upon a population basis. 24 INDIANA. CONSTITUTION OF 1851. The House consists of 100 members, apportioned upon the basis of the number of male inhabitants as determined by State censuses each six years. The Senate consists of 50 members, chosen upon the same basis. IOWA. CONSTITUTION OF 1857—AMENDED 1904 AS TO HOUSE. The House consists of 108 members, of whom each of the 99 counties has 1, and each of the 9 largest counties has 1 additional. Upon a popula¬ tion basis, 1 county would be entitled to 7 members, 1 to 4, and 5 to 3. Each of these has 2. The Senate is apportioned according to population. KANSAS. CONSTITUTION OF 1859—AS AMENDED 1873. The House consists of 125 members, of whom each of the 105 counties is entitled to 1. Upon a population basis one county would have 9 mem¬ bers, another 6, two each 5, one 4, three each 3, nine each 2. Prom this group 19 must be taken to keep within the maximum of 125. The Senate is based on population. KENTUCKY. CONSTITUTION OF 1891. The House consists of 100 members. There are 120 counties. “Not more than two counties shall be joined together to form a Representative district; provided, in doing so the principles requiring every district to be as nearly equal in population as may be shall not be violated.” The Senate consists of 38 members, chosen from substantially equal districts. LOUISIANA. CONSTITUTION OF 1921. The House consisted of not more than 101 members, of whom each of the 63 parishes, and each of the 17 wards of New Orleans must have at least 1. Four parishes have less than half the ratio. No substantial discrim¬ ination is involved. The Senate is apportioned according to population. MAINE. CONSTITUTION OF 1819—AS AMENDED 1841 AS TO HOUSE. The House consists of 151 members, apportioned among the several counties according to population, exclusive of aliens and of Indians not taxed. The Senate has 31 members, apportioned according to population. MARYLAND. CONSTITUTION OF 1867—AS AMENDED 1901. House: Each of the 23 counties is given from two to six Representatives, according to a population schedule fixed by the Constitution. Baltimore City, which is not in any county, is divided into 4 districts, each of which elects as many Representatives as the largest county—24 in all. Under the 1920 census there are 107 members, of which number 6 counties have each 2; 6 counties have each 3; 5 have each 4; 3 have each 5; and 3 have each 6. Under an apportionment according to population, Baltimore would have 54 members; 8 counties would lose 2 each, and 14 would lose 1 each of what 25 they now have. A vote in Calvert County now has six times the weight of one in Baltimore City. Senate: Each county, and each of the 4 districts in Baltimore, elects one Senator. Upon a population basis Baltimore City should elect 14 of the 27, instead of 4; 4 of the counties have more than the full ratio; 7 have between 50 per cent and the full ratio. A Calvert County vote has the weight of 19 in Baltimore City. MASSACHUSETTS. CONSTITUTION OF 1780—AS AMENDED 1856. The House consists of 240 members. The apportionment is made among the several counties according to the relative number of legal voters as ascertained by a State census made each year ending in 5. The Senate consists of 40 members, to be elected from as many dis¬ tricts, “each district to contain, as nearly as may be, an equal number of legal voters, * * * and such districts shall be formed, as nearly as may be, without uniting two counties, or parts of two counties, into one district.” One county has but 3 per cent, one but 4 per cent, one but about 25 per cent, one 50 per cent, and one 70 per cent of the 1920 population ratio. All others have one full ratio or more. It is not necessary to give the very small counties a Senator each, but if that were done, no county would need to give up a Senator for whom it would have more than 7/10 of a ratio. There need be no substantial discrimination in either branch of the General Court. MICHIGAN. CONSTITUTION OF 1908. Both the House and Senate are apportioned according to population, with a reapportionment required each ten years. MINNESOTA. CONSTITUTION OF 1857. Both the House and Senate are apportioned according to population. MISSISSIPPI. CONSTITUTION OF 1890. The House consists of 133, of whom each of the 82 counties must have at least 1, and of whom a group of 23 designated counties must have at least 44, another group of 29 designated counties must have at least 44, and the remaining 30 counties must have at least 44. No county has less than 61 per cent of the ratio, and only 2 have less than 75 per cent. No serious dis¬ crimination is involved. The state was re-apportioned into senatorial districts by constitutional amendment in 1914. Re-apportionments are to be made by the legislature. MISSOURI. CONSTITUTION OF 1875. The number of members of the House is not fixed. The ratio is obtained by dividing the population of the State by 200. Each county has at least one representative and no more than one until it has 2 y 2 ratios; each having 2% or more, but not 4 ratios, 2; each having 4 or more, but not six, 3; each having 5 ratios, 4 representatives; and one additional representative for each additional 2 y 2 ratios. Seventeen of the 114 counties have less than 26 half ratio if members were apportioned acording to population under the 1920 census. St. Louis City would have 33 members under such an oppor- tionment, whereas it can have but 19; Jackson County, including Kansas City, can have but 10 of the 16 it would have; 4 other counties lose 1 each. The two largest have % of the population, and only 1/5 of the repre¬ sentatives. The Senate is apportioned according to population. MONTANA. CONSTITUTION OF 1889. The House consists of 108 members, apportioned to counties or to dis¬ tricts composed of counties, according to population. The Senate consists of one member for each county. At present eight counties would be enti¬ tled to sixteen additional members upon a straight population basis. NEBRASKA. CONSTITUTION OF 1875, AMENDED 1920. Both the House and Senate are apportioned according to population “excluding aliens.” NEVADA. CONSTITUTION OF 1864. Both the House and Senate are apportioned according to population. NEW MEXICO. CONSTITUTION OF 1912. Both the House and Senate are apportioned according to population. Districts may elect any number or may (as in first apportionment) overlap. NEW HAMPSHIRE. CONSTITUTION OF 1784—AS AMENDED 1878 AND 1889. The House consists of 1 member for each town, place, or city ward having 600 inhabitants; 2 for those having 1,800; and so on, using 1,200 as a mean increasing number. Those having fewer than 600 inhabitants send repre¬ sentatives a proportionate part of the time. Under this rule about 100 of the 200 such places (approximately) are entitled to send one or more repre¬ sentatives to every session. The New Hampshire plan gives a large and cumbersome House, with more than 400 members (the largest in this coun¬ try), and maintains a dominance of the rural towns. The Senate consists of 24 members, apportioned to as many districts, according to direct taxes P aid - ii —t: s NEW JERSEY. CONSTITUTION OF 1844. The House may not exceed 60 in number, and each of the 21 counties must have 1 member. Three counties have only 40 per cent, 45 per cent and 47 per cent, respectively, of the proportionate ratio of population; 1 has 60 per cent, 1 has 80 per cent, 2 have each 90 per cent, and 1 has 95 per cent. Only 4 counties have one or more full ratios and a surplus of more than half, 3 have 1.6 ratios each, 1 has 3.6 ratios. None of these could be given a member for the surplus. But no county need lose a member for which it has a full ratio. The Senate consists of 1 member from each of the 21 counties. Nine counties have less than half of the proportionate ratio of population, 2 have 27 each 4 times, and 1 has almost twice the ratio. One-sixth of the people, in the 11 smallest counties, elect a majority of the Senate; two-fifths of the people in the two largest counties do not elect one-tenth; a majority of the people in the 4 largest counties elect but one-fifth of the Senate. NEW YORK. CONSTITUTION OF 1894. The House consists of 150 members, of whom each of the 62 counties has one, except that Hamilton County is attached to Fulton. The apportion¬ ment is to be made as nearly as may be according to citizen population (excluding aliens), of the several counties as determined by State censuses taken in the years whose numbers end in 5. Under the apportionment fol¬ lowing the census of 1915 the five counties constituting the City of New York have 62 members, whereas their citizen population would have given them 71 under a simple apportionment. Every other large county had as many members as it is entitled to upon its citizen population. The giving of representation to each county thus leads to some discrimination against New York City. The Senate ratio is 1/50 of the citizen population. “If any county having three or more Senators at the time of any apportionment shall be entitled on such ratio to an additional Senator or Senators, such additional Senator or Senators shall be given to such county in addition to the fifty Senators, and the whole number of Senators shall be increased to that extent.” No one county may have more than 1/3 of the Senators, and no 2 counties or the territory thereof as organized in 1894, which are contiguous or separated only by public waters, shall together have more than half the Senators. The rule thus permits three counties in the City of New York to elect half of the Senate when their citizen population entitles them to do so, and the City of New York in that case could have as many more than half as the growing counties of Queens and Richmond have ratios of citizens. The apportionment of 1917, on the 1915 census, gave 22 Senators to the four largest of the counties in New York City, and united the fifth with a very small county which is outside of the city. The city as a whole would have been entitled to 23 Senators upon the basis of citizen population. Neither the one-third nor the one-half limitation has yet operated to limit New York City. NORTH CAROLINA. CONSTITUTION OF 1876. The House consists of 120 members, of whom each of the 100 counties must have at least 1. Thirteen counties have each less than half of the ratio. Twenty-eight counties, which would, upon the basis of population, have each 1, 2 or 3 additional members, in total 37, must lose 17 of such additional members. Giving each county at least one representative, there¬ fore, discriminates against the more populous counties. The Senate is apportioned to districts according to population, excluding aliens and Indians not taxed. NORTH DAKOTA. CONSTITUTION OF 1889. Both the House and Senate are apportioned according to population. 28 OHIO. CONSTITUTION OF 1851—AS AMENDED 1903. The House ratio is 1/100 of the population of the state. Each county has at least 1. Each county having 1 and % ratios has two; thereafter addi¬ tional members are given only for full ratios, except that members are allowed for 1, 2, 3, or 4 sessions of the decennium, proportionate to the size of the surplus. Upon a straight population basis, one county which gets 16 would get 20, two which get 4 each would get 6, one would get 5 instead of 4, and three would get 4 each instead of 3 as under the rule. In a House of about 125 members, the discrimination against any one county is relatively small. The Senate is apportioned to districts according to population. OKLAHOMA. CONSTITUTION OF 1907. The House ratio is 1/100 of the population of the state. Every county having half the ratio is given a representative, every county with 1% ratios 2, and thereafter full time members are given for full ratios only, surpluses of fifths entitling the county to send members to certain sessions each decennium. No county may participate in the election of more than seven representatives. Under the census of 1920 two counties fall short of half the ratio, and are to be attached to other counties. No county is now entitled on the basis of its population to elect more than five and a fraction members. The Senate is apportioned according to population. OREGON. CONSTITUTION OF 1857. The House may not exceed 60 members and any county having half the ratio shall have one representative. Under the 1920 census, 13 of the 26 counties have less than half the ratio. The Senate may not exceed 30 members and any county having half the ratio is given one senator. Eighteen counties fall short of one-half the ratio. The rule involves slight discrimination against Multnomah county. PENNSYLVANIA. CONSTITUTION OF 1873. The number of members in the House is not fixed. The ratio is ob¬ tained by dividing the population of the state by 200. Each county is given at least 1 member. Counties with surpluses of more than half of a ratio are given an additional member for such surpluses above 1, 2, 3, and 4 full ratios only; thereafter any surpluses are lost. Under this rule, 12 of the 67 counties have less than half the ratio, and 14 have more than half but less than the full ratio. Philadelphia has 41.8 ratios, and may have 41 mem¬ bers, out of 207. The Senate consists of 50 members, of whom no one county may have more than 1/6. Philadelphia has 10.4 ratios, and so must lose 2 to which her population would entitle her. 29 RHODE ISLAND. CONSTITUTION OF 1842-AMENDMENT 1909 AS TO HOUSE. The House may not have more than 100 members and each town or city must have one member. No town or city may have more than % of the House. Under an apportionment proportionate to population, 13 of 39 towns and cities would have less than half the ratio; 9 would have from y 2 to 1 full ratio. If each of these were given at least 1, and the rest as many as their populations entitle them to under the ratio, the House would consist of 106 members, of which Providence would have 39. As it is, Providence can have no more than 25 in a total of 100. The Senate consists of 39 members, 1 from each town or city. Eighteen of these have less than % of the ratio upon a population basis; 4 have between % and y 2 ; 7 have y 2 or more and less than the full ratio. Provi¬ dence, with 15.33 ratios; Pawtucket, with 4.15 ratios; Woonsocket with 2.6 ratios; Newport and Cranston each with 1.95 ratios, and Central Falls with 1.6 ratios, have each 1 senator only. West Greenwich has but 2% of a ratio, but has a senator; a vote there has 647 times the weight of one in Providence. SOUTH CAROLINA. CONSTITUTION OF 1895. The House consists of 124 members, of whom each of the 46 counties must have at least 1. Only one county has less than a full ratio, and it has 72%. The Senate consists of 46 members, 1 from each county. Upon a popula¬ tion basis, 1 county has 3 ratios, 1 has 2.55 ratios, 4 have from 1 y 2 to 2 y 2 ratios, 37 have from y 2 to 1 y 2 ratios, and only 3 have less than half of a ratio. The discrimination diminishes the 14 members to which population would entitle the six largest counties to 6. SOUTH DAKOTA. CONSTITUTION OF 1889. Both the House and Senate are apportioned according to population, ex¬ cluding Indians not taxed and soldiers and officers of the United States Army and Navy. TENNESSEE. CONSTITUTION OF 1870. The House consists of 99 members, apportioned to counties or districts composed of counties according to the number of qualified voters as deter¬ mined by a special decennial enumeration. Any county having two-thirds of the ratio is given a member. Under the 1920 population 38 of the 96 counties fall short of the required number. The rule involves no discrimina¬ tions. Senators are apportioned upon the basis of the number of quali¬ fied voters. TEXAS. CONSTITUTION OF 1876. The House is apportioned according to population. The Senate con¬ sists of 31 members and no county may have more than one senator. There are 253 counties, of which but 4 have as much as the full ratio; the two largest have 1.3 and 1.4 ratios respectively. The rule involves no dis¬ crimination. 30 UTAH. CONSTITUTION OF 1895. The House may not exceed 90 in number and each of the 29 counties must have at least one member. This rule involves no serious discrim¬ ination. The Senate is apportioned according to population. VERMONT. CONSTITUTION OF 1793. The House consists of one member from each inhabited town, of which there are about 250. Upon a population basis the 27 largest towns would be entitled to about 105 members, instead of their 27. Here the discrimina¬ tion, which has been accentuated by the decline in the population of most of the towns, is quite severe. The Senate consists of not more than 30 members, and each of the 14 counties must have at least 1. But only one county has less than a full ratio, and only two counties each lose a senator to which fractional sur¬ pluses would otherwise entitle them. There is no substantial discrimina¬ tion here. VIRGINIA. CONSTITUTION OF 1902. No rule of apportionment is laid down by the constitution. WASHINGTON. CONSTITUTION OF 1889. Both the House and Senate are apportioned according to population. WEST VIRGINIA. CONSTITUTION OF 1872. The House may have as many members as the Legislature may fix, and any county having less than 3/5 of the representative ratio may be attached to a contiguous county. For some years each county has had at least one member, but no real discrimination need result. The Senate is apportioned according to population. WISCONSIN. CONSTITUTION OF 1848—AMENDED 1910 AS TO HOUSE. Both the House and Senate are apportioned according to population. WYOMING. CONSTITUTION OF 1889. House and Senate may have as many members as the legislature may determine, so long as each county is given one senator and one representa¬ tive, and the House is not less than twice nor more than three times as numerous as the Senate. ,137 BARNARD & MILLER PRINT, CHICAGO.