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L162 Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2021 with funding from University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign https://archive.org/details/riddleofrhinecheOOlefe_1 THE RIDDLE OF THE RHINE jy Oa wit tor ee ty , — a i eae ss) o Stet tk. i (ta: - ae THE UBRARY OF THe - 4 oa* a9a1g Sud y -Aep Aq way} 399}ap ued Ayre JoY}IOU ,,“PURT-S,URT-ON,, UI Bulag ‘pue 4yeroIre Aq o[qeAsasqo jOU IIe sati9}}eq ay} “Ysn4q YUM pasegnowes A]quymg ‘ur Snp Fey ‘reo 149] 9Y} UO AI9}7eq B YIM ‘punossa10} oy} Ut s10}9afoId Jo A19}3eq paze|dwos y I—aoLogfodd SNAATT AHL THE RIDDLE OF THE RHINE CHEMICAL STRATEGY IN PEACE AND WAR An account of the critical struggle for power and for the decisive war initiative. The cam- paign fostered by the great Rhine factories, and the pressing problems which they represent. A matter of pre-eminent public interest con- cerning the sincerity of disarmament, the future of warfare, and the stability of peace. BY VICTOR LEFEBURE Officer of the Order of the British Empire (Mil.) Chevalier de la Legion d’Honneur, Officer of the Crown of Italy Fellow of the Chemical Society, etc. WITH A PREFACE BY MARSHAL FOCH AND AN INTRODUCTION BY FIELD-MARSHAL SIR HENRY WILSON, Barr. Chief of the Imperial General Staff THE CHEMICAL FOUNDATION, INc. 85 BEAVER STREET NEW YORK CITY Published, 1923, , 4 By THE CHEMICAL FOUNDATION, ttc. % All Rights Reserved Printed in the United States of America PREFACE My motives in writing this book are sufficiently explained in the first chapter. The silence surround- ing the true facts of the chemical campaign, the tardy realisation of the real forces behind it in Ger- many, and our failure to grasp the significance of the matter in the Treaty, all pointed to the need for an early statement. More recently, this need has been emphasised by inaccurate public utterances on the matter, and by its vital importance for the full and fair treatment of certain legislative measures before Allied countries. A unique experience of chemical warfare in all its aspects, first with a combatant gas unit on the British front in France, then as Liaison Officer with France and other Allies on all Chemical Warfare and allied questions, has afforded me an exceptionally complete survey of the subject. Later post-armistice exper- ience in Paris, and the occupied territories, assisting Lord Moulton on various chemical questions in connection with the Treaty, and surveying the great chemical munition factories of the Rhine, has pro- vided a central view of the whole matter which can have been the privilege and opportunity of very few. Further, my association with the dye industry, since commencing this book, leaves me with a deep conviction of the critical importance for disarma- ment, of a world redistribution of organic chemical production. It is inevitable that such a step should benefit the growing organic chemical industries of 5 973336 Preface countries other than Germany, but this issue need not be shirked. ‘The importance of the matter is so vital that it eclipses all reproach that the dis- armament argument for the maintenance of the dye industry is used on selfish grounds. Such reproach cannot, in fairness, be heard unless it destroys the case which we have established. We are faced with the following alternatives. Safety demands strong organic chemical industries or cumbersome and burdensome chemical warfare establishments. The stability of future peace depends upon the former, and the extent to which we must establish, or can abandon, the latter depends entirely on the activity and success of those whose special duty it is to organise against war. A recent visit to America revealed the consider- able publicity and public interest surrounding chem- ical warfare, strengthening my conviction that the facts, now noised abroad, should be presented in their proper setting. They are supremely significant at the present time and for the future, hence the chapters which follow. V. LEFEBURE. HAMPSTEAD, October 12, 1920. PREFACE BY FIELD MARSHAL FOCH In 1918, chemical warfare had developed con- siderably in our army. Before 1914 Germany possessed chemical factories which permitted her to manufacture in great quantities chemicals used at the front, and to develop on a large scale this new form of fighting. The Allies, to retaliate, had to experiment and organise important centres for production. Only in this way, though starting late, were they able to put themselves in a position to supply the growing necessities of their armies. To-day, the ability for aviation to carry increasing weight furnishes a new method for abundantly spreading poison gases with the aid of stronger and stronger bombs, and to reach armies, the centres of population in the rear, or to render regions unin- habitable. | Chemical warfare is therefore in a condition to produce more formidable results over more extended areas. It is incontestable on the other hand that this growth will find an easy realisation in one country, Germany, addicted in times of peace, to wholesale manufacture of chemical products, which a simple modification in reactions can transform into war products. This country, deprived, partially at least, of its former methods of fighting, and its numerous forces of specially trained soldiers, regularly organised and 7 Preface by Field Marshal Foch strongly armed, will be more drawn toward the new systems of attack—that of chemical warfare. Chemical warfare must therefore enter into our future provisions and preparations, if we do not wish to experience some terrible surprises. The work of Major Lefebure gives an exact idea of the possibilities he finds to-day in Germany, and through them the dangers with which she threatens us. In this form it constitutes a warning, and infor- mation of the highest order, for the minds who remain anxious for the fate of their country con- fronted by the inefficience of the old fighting methods which the progress of industry out of date renders daily. | By sounding the alarm in both our countries, I find myself in company with my faithful friend Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. ‘This is an old habit, contracted by both of us, many years ago, which we still maintain at the present time to insure for our- selves once again, peace in the future. Together, we say, read this work of Major Lefebure. F, Focu. CONTENTS : PAGE CHAPTER I—ExpLanatTory The Riddle of the Rhine—A Critical Point in Dis- armament—Need for a Balanced View of Chemical Warfare—Some Preliminary Explanation—‘‘Poison Gas” a Misleading ‘Term—The French Physiological Classification—Asphyxiating Substances—Toxic Sub- stances—Lachrymators—Vesicant or Blistering Com- pounds—Sneezing or Sternutatory Substances—The Tactical Classification—Persistent Substances—Non- persistent Substances—Penetrants—Special Gas Weap- ons and Appliances—Gas Shell. . eda aha d AM Eee Ue CHAPTER II—TuE GerMan SurpRISE The First Cloud Gas Attack—The Element of Surprise —Lord Kitchener’s Protest—German Preparations— Research—Production—Field Preparations—German Opinion of Results—Germany Prompted by Production Monopoly—Standard Uses for Gas—Gas Shell—Fur- ther German Cloud Attacks—Hill 60—Origin of Ger- man Gas Shell—Early German Gas Shell~-A Success- ful Experiment—Lachrymators at Loos, 1915—The Flammenwerfer—German Phosgene Clouds—Gas and the Eastern Theatre—Conclusion. . ‘ ; : Nae + CHAPTER IJI—Tue Aturep Reaction The Need of Retaliation—First Signs—The Loos Attack, September, 1915—The Somme Battle, 1916— Reasons for British Cloud Gas Success—Our Casual- ties—Exhausting Preparations for Cloud Attack—The Livens Projector—British Gas Shell—German Gas Shell Development, 1916—Main Features of the Period. 48 CHAPTER IV—InNTENSIVE CHEMICAL Raion The Mustard Gas Surprise—Blue Cross—German Emphasis on Gas Shell—The German Projector—Ger- man Projector _Improvements—Dyes in Gas Shell— German Flame Projectors—Their Origin—Further Flame Development—The 1918 Offensive—Luden- dorff’s ‘Testimony—Preparations for Assault—Gas Defensive Flank at Armenti¢res—Fixed Gas Barrage at Kemmel—Percentage of Chemical Shell—Gas Re- Contents PAGE treat Tactics—General Hartley’s Analysis—Percent- age of German Gas Shell in Enemy Dumps—Forced Exhaustion of Stocks—Yperite, French Mustard Gas— Effect on German Gas Discipline—Allied Gas Statis- tics—Critical Importance of Rapid German Production. 66 CHAPTER V—CHEMICAL WARFARE ORGANISATIONS German _Research—Leverkusen—H6chst—Ludwigs- haven—Early Formulation of Policy—Movements of Personnel—German Simplicity of Organisation— German Organisation at the Front—The Gas Regi- ment—Early German Gas School—New Gas Regi- ments—Gas Shell Experts—Inspection of Protective Masks and Method—British Field Organisation— “Breach” Organisations—Central Laboratory—New Type of Casualty—Directorate of Gas Services— British Home Organisations—The Royal Society— Royal Society Chemical Sub-Committee—The Trench Warfare Department—Scientific Advisory Committee —Commercial Advisory Committee—Split Between Research and Supply—Munitions Inventions De- partment—Imperial College of Science—The Chem- ical Warfare Department—The Anti-Gas Department —Designs Committee—French Organisation—Italian Developments—Supply Organisations—British Supply Organisation—Allied Handicaps—The German Solu- tion — Departmental Difficulties — Allied Success Against Odds—Allied Lack of Vision in Production— British Lag in Organisation—French and American Characteristics—Inter-Allied Chemical Warfare Liai- son—Inter-Allied Supply—Nature of Chemical War- fare Research—Discovery of New Substances—Tech- nical Method of Preparation—Filling Problem—Pro- tection—Half Scale Investigation—T wo Classes of Re- search—Conclusion—The “Outer and Inner Lines.” . 85 CHAPTER VI—THE StruccLe For THE INITIATIVE Meaning of the Chemical Initiative—Controlling Fac- tors—Rapid Manufacture—Rapid Identification Essen- tial—Propaganda and Morale—Peculiar Peace-time Danger—War Fluctuations of Initiative—The Tense Protective Struggle—The German Mask—Enforced German Modifications—Shortage of Rubber—Gas Dis- cipline—Summary—New German Attempts—Yellow and Blue Cross—Yellow Cross—Blue Cross—‘“Partic- ulate” Clouds—Potential Production and Peace. . Il 10’ Contents PAGE CHAPTER VII—Review or Propuction Critical Importance of Production—Significance of the German Dye Industry—The Interessen Gemein- schaft—War Production 4 the I.G.—Allied Difficul- ties—Conclusion. : . 143 CHAPTER VIII—American DEVELOPMENTS Special Attention Justified—Special Value of American Opinion—Early American Activities—Field Activities —Special Difficulties—Edgewood Arsenal—Research— Production—Post-Armistice Developments—Views of General Fries—The Gas Cloud Inescapable—Impor- tance of Smoke—Casualty Percentages—Short Range Projectors—Vast Expansion in Personnel. . . . 173 CHAPTER IX—GerRMAN CHEMICAL PoLicy Origin of German Chemical Monopolies—German Chemical Commercial Policy—Evidence of the U. S. A. Alien Property Custodian—Pre-war American Situa- tion — German Price Cutting — Salicylic Acid — Full Line Forcing — Bribery and Corruption — German Patent Policy — Propaganda and Information — Espionage—Activities of the Dye Agencies—Manceu- vring Raw Materials—Chemical Exchange Association —Doctor Albert’s Letter—Dye Agency Information System—Dr. Albert on Chemical Warfare—The Moral Aspect—Report of the New York World—Ger- man Policy Regarding Dye Supplies to the U. $8. A— Professor Stieglitz’s Evidence—Ehrlich’s Discovery— Drugs and Medicinal Products—The German Monop- oly—National Health Insurance Commission—The Royal Society — Novocain — Beta-Eucaine — Photo- graphic Chemicals—War Activities of the I.G.—The Rhine Factories and the Armistice—War Mentality of the I.G.—German Attitude towards Inspection—The Rhine and Chaulny Contrast—German Revolution and the Industrial Leaders—The German Peace Delegation —Recent Signs of Government Interest—Nitrogen Fixation—The German Nitrogen Syndicate—Haber Process Prominent—The New German Dye Combine —Aggressive Nationalist Policy. . . . . . 186 CHAPTER X—Linss or Future DEVELOPMENT The Element of Speculation—Chemical Tactics and Strategy—New War Chemicals—“Camouflage” Chem- icals—Functions Hitherto Immune—Chemical Con- stitution and Physiological Action—Unsolved Prob- If Contents PAGE lems of Mustard Gas—A New Type of Obstacle— The ‘Persistent Lethal’? Substance—The Critical Range—The New No-Man’s-Land—The “Alert Gas Zone’—Gas and Aircraft—Protective Development —Individual Protection—Collective Protection—Con- CLUSION ee UN MRaaNe SUY SsH oae Vos en er CHAPTER XI—HuMANE or INHUMANE? Nature of Gas Casualties—Sargent’s Picture—Need fOr Sateouards. eR gee Wy Ce Oa sn op ee ee CHAPTER XII—CHEMICAL WARFARE AND DISARMA- MENT The Treaty of Versailles—German Information—Lim- itation of Armament—Report of the Hartley Mission —New Conceptions in Chemical Disarmament—Limi- tation Mechanical and Chemical—Tank Disarmament —Chemical Limitation—Research—Production—Me- chanical and Chemical Preparations for War—Recent Disarmament Proposals—The Covenant of the League Need for Guarantees—Viscount Grey, “Germany must. disarm first”—Suggested Methods—‘‘Vested Interests”—‘‘Handing Over” Inventions—Neglect of Chemical Disarmament in the Treaty... . . . 242 CONCLUSION—THE Treaty oF THE FuTuRE ... 264 12 ILLUSTRATIONS Tue Livens Projecror—lI. . . . . . . Frontispiece A completed battery of projectors in the foreground, with a battery on the left rear, half dug in. Suitably camouflaged with brush, the batteries are not observ- able by aircraft, and, being in ‘No-Man’s-Land,” neither party can detect them by day. FACING PAGE Typicat Gas SHELL Burstinc. . 2. SH Pee a SO Tue Livens Proyecror—lIl. . j i sn Ot A working party fitting electric we A adeakene bombs prior to discharge. “This work occurs at night. Tue Livens Proyector—Ill. ANS Be Rt OMT ee io Ne i I-xplosion of Livens bombs on the nieetiya SMOKE BARRAGE. ; . 181 Note the sharp curtain hich | is peat behind onic the infantry advance. 13 INTRODUCTION No one who has the welfare of the country at heart can fail to share Major Lefebure’s anxiety that a clear, accurate, and unbiased account of chemical warfare should be presented to the public, so that the many erroneous ideas now prevalent in regard to poison gas and its uses may be dispelled. The whole subject of chemical warfare is at present sub judice, and there is great danger that the future safety of this country may be jeopardised by the almost universal ignorance of the peculiarities and potentialities of this class of warfare. Recent publications in the Press have shown a tendency to deal with the subject on purely sentimental grounds, and attempts have been made to declare this form of warfare illegitimate without full and careful consideration of all the facts and their sig- nificance for the future. Major Lefebure has therefore attempted in his book to make it quite clear that no convention, guarantee, or disarmament safeguard will prevent an unscrupulous enemy from employing poison gas, especially if that enemy has discovered some new powerful agent, or possesses, as Germany does in her well-organised and strong chemical industry, a ready means for producing such chemicals in bulk at practically a moment’s notice; further, that the safety of this country makes it im- perative that the study and investigation of the sub- ject should be continued and that our chemical and 15 Introduction dye industry should be developed, so that when an emergency arises we may have the necessary facilities for supply ready to hand. It is not for me to express any opinion here either as to the desirability of using gas as a weapon or as to the possibility of preventing an enemy from using it. But I am convinced that a decision come to without full knowledge of the facts may involve grave danger and heavy preventable loss of life. I am further convinced that Major Lefebure, by his special knowledge and long experience as chemical liaison officer during the war, is well qualified to speak, and that his opinion is entitled to full con- sideration. For these reasons I think that his book - will do a much needed public service. I wish it every success, and the greatest possible number of readers. Henry WILSON, F.M. 16 CHAPTER I EXPLANATORY The Riddle of the Rhine.—The Great War chal- lenged our very existence. But with the tension re- leased, and the Allies victorious, the check to the German menace appears crushing and complete. Few realise that one formidable challenge has not been answered. Silently menacing, the chemical threat remains unrecognised. How, asks the reader, can this be? Are we not aware of the poison gas cam- paign? Indeed, we have not yet grasped the simple technical facts of the case, and these are merely the outward signs of a deep-rooted menace whose na- ture, activities, and potentialities are doubly impor- tant because so utterly unsuspected by those whom they most threaten. How many of us, for example, realise that the Germans relied mainly on gas for success in the great March assault of 1918, which threatened to influence the destinies of the world. Yet Ludendorff goes out of his way to tell us how much he counted upon it. How many understand that the 1918 hostilities were no longer a war of explosives. German guns were firing more than fifty per cent. of gas and war chemical. But a deep study of such war facts re- veals a much more significant matter. All are aware of the enormous national enter- prises built to fulfil our explosives programme. 17 The Riddle of the Rhine With mushroom-like growth chemical establishments of a magnitude hitherto unknown in England arose to meet our crying needs. What was the German equivalent, and where were the huge reservoirs of gas and war chemical which filled those countless shells? Krupp, of Essen, loomed large in the mind of every Allied citizen and soldier. There lay the sinews of war in the making. But the guns were useless without their message. Who provided it? A satisfactory answer to this question demands an examination of the great German I.G., the Inter- essen Gemeinschaft, the world power in organic chemical enterprise, whose monopoly existence threat- ened to turn the tide of war against us. ‘This or- ganisation emerges from the war with renewed and greater strength. Our splendid but improvised fac- tories drained the vital forces of the nation, and now lie idle, while German war chemical production fed new life blood and grafted new tissue to the great pre-war factories of the I.G., which, if she will, she can use against us in the future. I do not claim that this German combine has at present any direct economic or military policy against world peace. In any case, the facts must speak for them- selves. But the following pages will prove that the mere existence of the complete German monopoly, represented by the forces of the I.G., however free from suspicion might be the mentality and morals of those directing its activities, constitutes, in itself, a serious menace. It is, if you will, a monster camou- flaged floating mine in the troubled sea of world peace, which the forces of reconstruction have left unswept. ‘The existence of this giant monopoly raises vital military and economic questions, which are, indeed, ‘“The Riddle of the Rhine.” Impersonal Examination of Fact.—In a sound 18 Explanatory examination of the subject it becomes necessary to examine the activities of our former enemies very closely. Even adopting a mild view of the case, their reputation has not been unattacked, and is not left untarnished. We, however, have no desire to renew such attacks, but we wish our statement to be coldly reliable. National and international issues are at stake which require a background unprejudiced by war emotion. Placed in a similar predicament, in reporting to his Government of the methods of German economic aggression in the United States of America, Mr. Mitchell Palmer, the Alien Property Custodian, ex- pressed himself as follows: “T do not advocate any trade boycott out of spirit of revenge or in retaliation for injuries done to the United States. I do not want to continue the war after the war. I am for peace. I believe that the great overshadowing result which has come from this war is the assurance of peace almost everlasting amongst the peoples of the earth. I would help to make that an absolute certainty by refusing to permit Germany to prosecute a war after the war. The military arm of her war machine has been palsied by the tremendous hammering of the allied powers. But her territory was not invaded, and if she can get out of the war with her home territory intact, rebuild a stable government, and still have her foreign mar- kets subject to her exploitation, by means no less foul and unfair than those which she has employed on the field of battle, we shall not be safe from future onslaughts different in methods, but with the same purpose that moved her on that fateful day in July when she set out to conquer the world.” Ours is a fair standpoint. Let us know the facts of the chemical war into which Germany impelled us. 19 The Riddle of the Rhine Let us examine its mainsprings, in conception and action, see how far they can be explained in terms of pre-war Germany, and how far they remain ready to function in the much desired peace which they threaten. If the result be unpleasant, let us not hide our heads in the sand, but exercise a wise vigilance, choose what precautions are available and consistent with our plans for world peace. | A Critical Point in Disarmament.—Probably never before in the history of man has Disarmament figured as such a vitally urgent national and inter- national measure. Discussions and official utter- ances reveal a very disquieting tendency. When compared with the methods, armament and materials of the war in 1914, those of 1918 reveal basic changes which a hundred years of former peace could not have brought about. These developments are not merely of fact, but they represent the open- ing of new fields, visions of possibilities previously undreamed of by the practical soldier. By the con- centrated application of electricity, chemistry, and other sciences to war two dominating factors have emerged, whose importance to war, and danger for world peace, can only gain momentum with time. The scientific or technical initiative, the invention of a deadly new chemical, wireless-directed aeroplane, or other war appliance and their incidence on war through large scale production in the convertible in- — dustries of peace constitute a challenge which, if un- answered by practical schemes for world disarma- ment, will render the latter worse than useless, by aggravating the danger of sudden decisive attack in an otherwise disarmed world, There is a tendency to ignore this aspect of dis- armament. We appear to be thinking in terms of a world still organised for war on 1914 lines. ‘The 20 Explanatory disbanding of the German army and semi-military organisations, and the reduction of her artillery and small arms seem to occupy all our attention. Such, it might be urged, is the immediate need; we can leave the future to find answers to the other prob- lems. ‘This answer is dangerous, for it ignores the disarmament aspect of what is perhaps the most important development in the modern offensive cam- paign. We refer to poison gas or chemical warfare. This, the crux of all disarmament, is dealt with at some length in the chapters which follow. A curiously illogical attitude of mind has arisen in certain quarters. ‘There is a tendency among strong adherents to the ideal of world peace to regard them- selves as its sole possessors. Every thinking civilian and soldier must adhere to such an ideal; the only point at issue is the method of approaching it. The mere fact that a League of Nations is called into being to attain world peace implies recognition of the fact that a definite mechanism and definite meas- ures are required for the purpose; this is self-evident. There are those who, having established their League of Nations, feel that they can attain chem- ical peace by merely prohibiting chemical war, in other words, they expect their mechanism to achieve its object without functioning, to attain peace by its mere existence. Just as special measures are required to control disarmament in the older branches of war- fare, in the same way special measures, but not the same measures, are required to control the chemical peace. Chemical peace,guaranteed by a mere signa- ture is no peace at af In a recent Press utterance we find an appeal to prohibit chemical warfare and to “trust the general sentiment of the civilised world to say that the lesson has been learnt in that sense.” ‘“There is the League The Riddle of the Rhine of Nations to furnish that sentiment with a mouth- piece and a sanction.”” We agree, but to stop there is dangerous, the most important thing which it must furnish is a mechanism of control, a check, or guar- antee. [his question is one of the most important which confronts us for world peace. It merits the most careful consideration. Even responsible and relevant officials who admit that their League must do more than issue edicts, that their mechanism must function, are ignoring the specific technical aspect of the war methods whose use we wish to limit. ‘This matter will receive later attention. The following pages, therefore, are an attempt to represent the salient points in the development of chemical warfare, its causes, results, and future. Such an attempt cannot limit itself to merely British developments, and this is not a final detailed memoir of British chemical warfare. Further, in consider- ing the future, we examine another aspect of chem- ical warfare. Facts lead us to believe that it was purely the most open and obvious activity in a whole campaign of chemical aggression which had effective unity of conception and direction long before the war started. Need for a Balanced View of Chemical Warfare. —The facts of chemical warfare have probably been less ventilated than those of any other important war development. Yet no subject has aroused more general and intense feeling. ‘Tanks, aircraft, the different campaigns, enemy memoirs, and a variety of war subjects, have received a considerable meas- ure of publicity, some more than full measure. Grave questions are pending in which the chemical aspect of national defence is a prominent factor. However willing the individual concerned, he cannot 22 Explanatory make a sound judgment on the brief technical or popular garbled versions which have appeared. One searches in vain for balanced and detailed statements on the question. This may be due in no way to lack of intention, but to lack of opportunity. Therefore, no excuse is needed for this contribution, but rather an apology for the obscurity which has so far sur- rounded the subject. What is the cause of this emo- tional or almost hysterical background from which a clear definition of the matter is only now beginning to emerge? Circumstances are to blame; the first open act of chemical warfare decided the matter. This event, the first German cloud gas attack at Ypres, arriving at the peak of allied indignation against a series of German abuses, in particular with regard to the treatment of prisoners, left the world aghast at the new atrocity. Further, its use against entirely unprotected troops was particularly revolt- ing. The fact that such a cloud of chlorine would have passed the 1918 armies untouched behind their modern respirators, could not be known to, nor ap- preciated by the relatives of the 1915 casualties. But the emotion and indignation called forth by the first use of gas has survived a period of years, at the end of which the technical facts would no longer, of themselves, justify such feeling. We would hesitate to do anything which might dispel this emotional momentum were we not convinced that, unaccom- panied by knowledge, it becomes a very grave danger. If we felt that the announcement of an edict was sufficient to suppress chemical warfare we would gladly stimulate any public emotion to create such an edict. But therein lies the danger. Owing to certain technical peculiarities, which can be clearly revealed by examination of the facts, it is impossible to sup- press chemical warfare in this way. As well try to 23 The Riddle of the Rhine suppress disease by forbidding its recurrence. But we can take precaution against disease, and the fol- lowing examination will show clearly that we can take similar precautions against the otherwise per- manent menace of chemical war. Further, backed by such precautions, a powerful international edict has value. It is, therefore, our intention to present a reasoned account of the development of poison gas, or chemi- cal warfare, during the recent war. But to leave the matter there would be misleading and culpable, for, however interesting the simple facts of the chem- ical campaign, they owed their being to a combina- tion of forces, whose nature and significance for the future are infinitely more important. ‘The chief cause of the chemical war was an unsound and dan- gerous world distribution of industrial organic chem- ical forces. Unless some readjustment occurs, this will remain the ‘‘point faible” in world disarmament. We, therefore, propose to examine the relationships between chemical industry, war, and disarmament. Some Preliminary Explanation.—The chemistry of war, developed under the stress of the poison gas campaign, is of absorbing chemical and technical in- terest, but it has none the less a general appeal. When its apparently disconnected and formidable facts are revealed as an essential part of a tense struggle in which move and counter-move followed swiftly one upon the other, its appeal becomes much wider. ‘Therefore, in order not to confuse the main issue in the following chapters by entering upon tire- some definitions, it is proposed to conclude the pres- ent chapter by explaining, simply, a number of chem- ical warfare conceptions with which the expert is probably well acquainted. 24 Explanatory “Poison Gas” a Misleading Term.—Poison gas is a misleading term, and our subject is much better described as “chemical warfare.” Let us substan- tiate this by examining briefly the types of chemicals which were used. In the first place they were not all gases; the tendency during the war was towards the use of liquids and solids. Even the chemicals which appeared as gases on the field of battle were transported and projected as liquids, produced by compression. As the poison war developed, a large number of different chemicals became available for use by the opposing armies. These can be classified, either according to their tactical use, or according to their physiological effects on man. The British, French, American, and German armies all tended to the final adoption of a tactical classification, but the French emphasised the physio- logical side. Let us use their classification as a basis for a review of the chief chemicals concerned. The French Physiological Classification ;—As- phyxiating Substances; — Toxic Substances. — Chemicals or poison gases were either asphyxiating, toxic, lachrymatory, vesicant, or sternutatory. It is perfectly true that the asphyxiating and toxic sub- stances, used during the war, produced a higher per- centage of deaths than the other three classes, but the latter were responsible for many more casualties. The so-called asphyxiating gases produced their effect by producing lesions and congestion in the pulmonary system, causing death by suffocation. ‘The best known substances of this type was chlorine, employed in the liquid state in cylinders on the occasion of the first German gas attack, but the most formidable were phosgene (an important substance required in the manufacture of dyes), diphosgene, chlor-picrin, made from bleaching powder and picric acid, brom- 25 The Riddle of the Rhine acetone, which was also a powerful lachrymator, and diphenylchlorarsine, known as sneezing gas, the first sternutatory or sneezing compound to appear on the front in large quantities. The toxic compounds were so called because of their specific effect upon par- ticular parts of the organism such as, for example, the nervous system. The chief example, with regard to the military value of which there has been much dispute, was prussic, or hydrocyanic, acid. The French had definite evidence of the mortal effect of this compound upon German gunners, but it was doubted by other Allies whether French gas shell produced a sufficient concentration of gas to be of military value. It was a kill or cure compound, for recovery was rapid from any concentration which did not produce death. A prominent Cambridge physiologist, in the heat of the controversy on this matter, made a very brave and self-sacrificing experiment. He entered a cham- ber of prussic acid which was sufficiently concentrated to cause the death of other animals which were pres- ent. ‘They were removed in time, and he escaped because the concentration was not a mortal one for man. ‘[his was, in a sense, an experimentum crucis and, although it did not disprove the extreme danger of prussic acid, if employed in high concentrations, it showed, on the other hand, that it was difficult to gauge the military value by field experiments; battle results were necessary. “The Germans’ disappoint- ment with the use of arsenic compounds confirms this need for battle evidence. Lachrymators.—There is hardly need to dwell on the next class, the lachrymator. These com- pounds were employed on a large scale to produce temporary blindness by lachrymation, or weeping. We give later some interesting examples of their use 26 Explanatory on the front. It is an arresting thought that even as early as 1887 Professor Baeyer, the renowned organic chemist of Munich, in his lectures to ad- vanced students, included a reference to the military value of these compounds. Vesicant or Blistering Compounds.—It was the introduction of the fourth, the vesicant class, which revealed, more than any other enemy move, the great possibilities inherent in chemical warfare. These compounds, the chief of which was mustard gas, pro- duced vesicant, or skin burning, effects, which, al- though rarely mortal, were sufficient to put a man out of action for a number of months. Mustard gas resulted from pure scientific investigation as early as 1860. Victor Meyer, the famous German chemist, described the substance in 1884, indicating its skin- blistering effects. There is evidence of further in- vestigation in German laboratories a year before the outbreak of war, and whatever the motive for this work, we know that mustard gas must have received the early attention of the German War Office, for it was approved and in production early in 1917. Although the Medecin aide-major Chevalier of the French services drew attention to its importance in 1916, the French had no serious thought of using mustard gas, and did not realise its possibilities until the German battle experiment of July, 1917. It is not generally known, however, that other vesicant compounds were employed, notably some of the arsenic compounds, and the Germans were research- ing on substances of this nature which gave great promise of success. Mustard gas provides a striking example of the organic way in which chemical war- fare is bound up with the dye industry. The com- pounds required for its manufacture were those which had been made on a large scale by the I.G. for 27 The Riddle of the Rhine the production of indigo. World indigo monopoly meant possession of a potential mustard gas surprise on the outbreak of war. Sneezing or Sternutatory Substances.—The last class, the sternutatory substances, produced the fa- miliar sneezing effect which was accompanied by in- tense pain and irritation of the nose, throat, and respiratory channels. They were mostly arsenic com- pounds and were not only sternutatory but also toxic, producing the after effects of arsenic poisoning. The Tactical Classification—From the:-point of view of our account of chemical warfare, however, the physiological classification of these substances is not so important as the tactical and, indeed, once this grouping of the substances is understood, a profound knowledge of their chemical nature is not necessary. Persistent Substances.—Two main classes exist from the tactical point of view. ‘There are those ‘persistent’ substances which remain for a long time on the soil or on the object on which they are sprayed by shell, while retaining their dangerous effect. Mus- tard gas was the chief example, but some of the lachrymators were just as persistent. By their use it is possible to render ground uninhabitable or in- effective for military movement. The combination of the vesicant and persistent properties of mustard gas rendered it a powerful military factor. Non-Persistent Substances.—On the other hand, there are the relatively volatile substances, such as phosgene, which can be used immediately before an attack. The chief sternutatory compound, diphenyl- chlorarsine, although not volatile, could also be used in this way, for, being a solid and in a very finely pul- verised state, its presence on the ground was not a distinct danger, and it invited chemical decomposi- tion. 28 Explanatory Penetrants.—The Germans introduced an addi- tional tactical group. This comprised pulverised substances able to penetrate the mask on account of their existence as minute particles. The Germans expressed these tactical conceptions by their shell markings. The familiar Green Cross represented the slightly persistent, volatile, lethal compounds, such as phosgene and diphosgene. [The German gun- ner had no need to know the content of his gas shell so long as he could identify the cross. Yellow Cross, representing mustard gas, was the most highly persistent type. It is interesting to specu- late whether a new persistent compound, whose mili- tary value was due to some other property than the blistering, would have been grouped under Yel- low Cross. Logically, this should have been done. Blue Cross covered the arsenic group of compounds, which were non-persistent and were expected to pen- etrate the mask. So strong was this tactical con- ception that the Allies were on the verge of adopting a uniform shell marking based on this principle throughout their armies. Special Gas Weapons and Appliances.—It is a popular misconception that gas was only discharged from cylinders in huge clouds, or used as artillery shell. A number of special weapons developed, which were particularly adapted for gas. Thus, the Livens projector, which was a great Allied advance, produced a gas cloud a long distance from the point of discharge, while the Stokes and other short range guns were used for rapid fire of large numbers of gas shell. The primary conceptions with regard to protec- tion have been brought home to so many, through the fact that the mask was a part of the equipment of every soldier, that we need not dwell on them 29 The Riddle of the Rhine here. It is not generally realised, however, that every modification introduced by either side was a vital and direct counter to some enemy move planned to render the protection of the opponent ineffective. Gas Shell.—A word is necessary to define the use of gas shell. The point which must be realised is that gas, and in particular gas shell, fulfilled a spe- cial purpose in warfare, from which it was much more suitable than explosives. The use for neutralising batteries, cross roads, and rendering whole areas uninhabitable, is developed fully in our reference to the great German attacks in 1918. With this brief sketch to clear the ground, we can embark more freely upon the account of chem- ical warfare which follows. 30 OF 280g a9vf OF, JNICSaNd TIHHS2SV9 <1VOIdAL CHAPTER II THE GERMAN SURPRISE Ypres, April, 1915, to the Somme, August, 1916. The First Cloud Gas Attack.—The critical factor of surprise in war was never nearer decisive success than on April 22nd, 1915. Of this, the occasion of the first German gas attack at Ypres, Field-Marshal Sir J. D. P. French stated: ‘Following a heavy bombardment, the enemy at- tacked the French Division at about 5 p.m., using asphyxiating gases for the first time. Aircraft re- ported that at about 5 p.m. thick yellow smoke had been seen issuing from the German trenches be- tween Langemarck and Bixschoote. What follows almost defies description. ‘The effect of these poison- ous gases was so virulent as to render the whole of the line held by the French Division mentioned above practically incapable of any action at all. It was at first impossible for any one to realise what had actually happened. The smoke and fumes hid everything from sight, and hundreds of men were thrown into a comatose or dying condition, and within an hour the whole position had to be aban- doned, together with about fifty guns. I wish par- ticularly to repudiate any idea of attaching the least blame to the French Division for this unfortunate incident.” 31 The Riddle of the Rhine The Element of Surprise-—The enemy just missed colossal success rendered possible by the use of an entirely new war method; one contrary to en- gagements entered into by them at the Hague Con- vention. There were elements in this first gas attack which were absent even from the situation created by our first use of tanks. Unfamiliarity amongst the troops, or the staff, for that matter, created an atmosphere of unparalleled confusion. Men at- tempted to protect themselves by burying their mouths and nostrils in the loose earth. Those chem- ists, on the spot, not immediately struck down, made frantic efforts to bring up supplies of any suitable and available chemical or material which might as- sist resistance and movement in the affected zone. Paying every homage to the heroic sacrifices and brave actions which characterised the Allied re- sistance, we cannot ignore the fact that morale must have been very severely shaken locally, and that a general disquiet and uneasiness must have per- meated the whole front until measures were known to be effectively in progress, not only for protection, but for retaliation. The enemy had but to exploit the attack fully to break through to the channel ports, but failed to do so. The master mind behind this new and deadly attack was not, let us remem- ber, that of a soldier. It was very strongly ru- moured that this monstrous conception and _ its execution were due to one or, at the most, two re- nowned German Professors. The first hammer blow in the enemy chemical campaign was a two- party conspiracy, led by world-famous scientists and the powerful I.G. with the German army uncon- vinced but expectant, little more than a willing dupe. 32 The German Surprise Lord Kitchener’s Protest.—In his spirited pro- test in the House of Lords, Lord Kitchener stated: ‘“The Germans have, in the last week, introduced a method of placing their opponents hors de combat by the use of asphyxiating and deleterious gases, and they employ these poisonous methods to pre- vail when their attack, according to the rules of war, might have otherwise failed. On this sub- ject I would remind your Lordships that Germany was a signatory to the following article in the Hague Convention: ‘‘*The Contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles the object of which is the dif- fusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.’ ” This protest circulated amongst neutrals prompted numerous attempts at vindication in the German Press. In several cases we find important newspapers arguing that the German attack was not contrary to the Hague Convention, while others admitted the breach, but claimed that the Germans merely followed Allied example. ‘The main techni- cal excuse was that the effect of the German gas was merely stupefying (Colniche Zeitung, June, 1915). It is incredible that the German nation was, or could allow itself to be, so hoodwinked. Scientific Ger- many was certainly aware of the true nature of the gases used. Even scientific neutrals in Berlin at the outbreak of war, and during the ensuing winter, were aware of the German poison gas work, which commenced, in an organised way, almost as soon as war broke out. The Germans have argued that they only entertained the idea of gas after Allied use. The facts revealed below are a suf- ficient answer. Whatever legal arguments may be 33 The Riddle of the Rhine involved, there is no doubt as to German intention. We do not wish to enter into a comprehensive examination of the legal aspect of the first use of cloud and shell gas by Germany. Whatever com- plicated arguments may turn upon the strict reading of a phrase in the records of the Hague Convention, we have no doubt whatever as to the desires and intentions of the Assembly, and we regard Germany (and the Allies) as morally engaged not to venture upon the series of chemical enterprises which she openly commenced with the Ypres cloud attack. The Versailles Treaty also renders fruitless any such discussion. Article 171, accepted by Germany, is deliberately based on her breach of International Convention. German Preparations.—A significant phrase oc- curs in the Field-Marshal’s despatch. ‘The brain power and thought which has evidently been at work before this unworthy method of making war reached the pitch of efficiency which has been dem- onstrated in its practice shows that the Germans must have harboured these designs for a long time.” This is a most important point. It was argued by many generous and fairminded people in April, 1915, that the German use of gas was the result of a sudden decision, only arrived at in a desperate effort to terminate the war. This point of view would give us maximum hope for the future. But the actual truth? What do we know about German preparations, and how far back do they date? Any preparations which occurred must have covered re- search on the compounds to be employed and on the protection required for the German troops, their training for the cloud attack and the design and production of the special appliances to be used. 34 The German Surprise Finally, the production of the chemicals themselves had to be faced. Research.—We have obtained an insight into the German research preparations, which leaves no doubt as to their intention. ‘There is evidence that the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute and the physico-chemical institute near by were employed for this purpose as early as August, 1914. Reliable authority exists for the statement that soon after this date they were working with cacodyl oxide and phosgene, both well known before the war for their very poison- ous nature, for use, it was believed, in hand gre- nades. Our quotations are from a statement by a neutral then working at the Institute. ‘We could hear the tests that Professor Haber was carrying out at the back of the Institute, with the military authorities, who in their steel-grey cars came to Haber’s Institute every morning.” ‘The work was pushed day and night, and many times I saw ac- tivity in the building at eleven o’clock in the eve- ning. It was common knowledge that Haber was pushing these men as hard as he could.” Sachur was Professor Haber’s assistant. ‘‘One morning there was a violent explosion in the room in which most of this war work was carried out. The room was instantly filled with dense clouds of arsenic oxide.” ‘The janitors began to clear the room by a hose and discovered Professor Sachur.” He was very badly hurt and died soon after. ‘After that accident I believe the work on cacodyl oxide and phosgene was suspended and I believe that work was carried out on chlorine or chlorine compounds.”’ “There were seven or eight men working in the In- stitute on these problems, but we heard nothing more until Haber went to the Battle of Ypres.” Rumours to this effect circulated in 1915. 35 The Riddle of the Rhine Production.—Preparations for production can easily be imagined. The Germans first used chlorine for cloud gas, and certain lachrymators for shell. The chlorine was readily available. At about this time British liquid chlorine capacity had a maximum daily output of about one ton, while along the Rhine alone the production was more than forty times greater. ‘he question of German chlorine produc- tion was, therefore, already solved. ‘The lachry- mators were mainly raw materials and intermedi- ates of the dye industry submitted to a process, the technique of which the German dye factories read- ily mastered. Here, again, production presented no real difficulties. Cylinders were also probably available from the industry. Field Preparations—There remains the last question of gas attack technique and personnel. Those of us who remember the difficulties involved in creating our own organisation in the summer of 1915 have no illusions on the question of German preparation. Giving the Germans every credit for their technical and military efficiency, some months must have been occupied in establishing and train- ing the special companies required, and in arriving at a satisfactory design for the discharge appliances. Schwarte’s book, Die Technik Im Weltkriege,*' tells us “specially organised and trained troops’ were required for the purpose. Prisoners taken later re- vealed the German methods. Gas officers and N.C.O.’s, after making a careful survey of the front line trench, organised the digging of deep narrow trenches at suitable places below the surface of the main trench, just underneath the parapet. ‘The heavy gas cylinders, weighing as much as ninety pounds, were carried to the front line by the un- ak Technik Im Weltkriege. Publisher: Mittler, Berlin, 1920. 3 The German Surprise fortunate infantry. The discharge valves were care- fully protected by domes which screwed on to the cylinder. The latter were introduced into the holes, tops flush with the trench bottom, and covered by a board on which reposed the ‘“‘Salzdecke,” a kind of long bag stuffed with some such material as peat moss and soaked in potash solution to absorb any slight gas leakages. Three layers of sandbags were built above the salzdecke to protect the cylinder from shell fragments and to form a firestep for the infantry. This concealed the cylinders so efh- ciently that, in our own trenches, I have often found - the new occupants of a sector ignorant of the pres- ence of gas cylinders under their own firesteps. On the favourable night the dome was removed and a lead pipe was connected to the cylinder and di- rected over the parapet into No Man’s Land, with the nozzle weighed down by a sandbag. ‘The pio- neers stood by the batteries of twenty cylinders each and let off the gas a fixed few minutes after a rocket signal, at which the infantry retired to leave the front line free for the pioneers, who not only ran the risk of gassing from defective appliances but were subjected to almost immediate violent bom- bardment from the opposing artillery. When sur- prise was complete artillery retaliation was very late in developing. ‘This gives a faint idea of the elaborate preparations required. ‘They must have been doubly arduous and lengthy on the very first occasion of cloud gas attack. German Opinion of Results.—We can now re- gard the chlorine attack of April 22, 1915, as the first and successful result of a huge German experi- ment on a new method of war, the pioneer work of which actually began at (if not before) the. out- break of war. Quoting again from Schwarte: S7 The Riddle of the Rhine ‘‘G.H.Q. considered the attack near Ypres to be a successful experiment. ‘The impression created was colossal and the result not inconsiderable, although it was not fully utilised from the tactical point of view. It was obvious that we had gained a great advantage; the enemy was not sufficiently prepared with defensive measures against gas.” Indeed, we were absolutely unprepared, so much so, that after the German attack nearly every household in Eng- land contributed to our first ineficient and impro- vised mask. Is not this suggestion of our prepara- tion a deliberate attempt to deceive the German pub- lic? ‘They seem to have been as easily hoodwinked on gas questions as on many others. Germany Prompted by Production Monopoly. —An important point arises. The Germans failed to exploit their initial success. ‘This is not very surprising. Whatever the opinion of the chemists behind the movement, the German General Staff must have retained the elements of precaution in its opinion. It could not have taken for granted the formidable success which the chemists proved justified in prophesying. ‘This being so, we can fairly assume that had there been very serious dif- ficulties in carrying out this huge war experiment it might never have materialised. Such difficulties might have been found in production. But as we have seen, the question of production was the most easily forged link in the chain of events which led to the use of poison gas by Germany. In other words, this monopoly in ease of production was an inducement to the Germans to proceed with their experiment. The earliest German cloud gas attacks estab- lished beyond a doubt the enormous value of gas against unprotected troops, in other words, its value 38 The German Surprise asa complete surprise. These conditions were again approached in the first German use of mustard gas. The most telling examples will probably be found in the future, unless the correct precautions are taken. The whole history of chemical warfare dur- ing the war was a struggle for this initiative, a struggle between gas protection and aggression. Standard Uses for Gas;—Gas Shell.—But gas found an important use besides that of strategic surprise. It became a standard weapon for certain clear and definite tactical purposes. (For some of these, indeed, the factor of local surprise was im- portant.) We refer to the specific use of gas shell for the neutralisation of batteries, roads, and areas, and to the use of cloud gas, prior to offensives for the production of casualties, and wearing down of reserves. The Ypres attack had not by any means established the use of gas for such purposes. There is no doubt that, from this point of view, the ex- perimental period carried on for many months. Naturally, in some respects, there was always an experimental element in the use of gas. Further German Cloud Attacks.—Two days after the first cloud gas attack the Germans launched a second against the Canadians, with similar results. Quoting from official despatches: ‘On the early morning of the 24th a violent outburst of gas against nearly the whole front was varied by heavy shell fire, and a most determined attack was delivered against our position east of Ypres. The real attack commenced at 2.45 a.m. A large proportion of the men were asleep, and the attack was too sudden to give them time to put on their respirators.” These latter were hurriedly improvised after the first Ypres attack. 39 The Riddle of the Rhine Hill 60.—Four more attacks occurred in May, notably in the region of Hill 60. ‘On May ist an- other attempt to recapture Hill 60 was supported by great volumes of asphyxiating gas which caused nearly all the men along a front of about 400 yards to be immediately struck down by its fumes.” “A second and more severe gas attack under much more favourable weather conditions enabled the enemy to recapture this position on May sth. ‘The en- emy owes his success in this last attack entirely to the use of asphyxiating gas.” “It was only a few days later that the means which have since proved so effective of counteracting these methods of mak- ing war were put into practice.” (Official des- patches, 1915.) The despatch further described how violent bombardments, the confusion and de- moralisation from the first great gas surprise, and subsequent almost daily gas attacks, prevented the proper reorganisation of the line in question. Origin of German Gas Shell.—After May a long period elapsed during which the Germans confined their war chemical activities on the front to the use of gas shell. Schwarte’s book describes their origin as follows:—‘‘The main idea which influ- enced the first construction of a German projectile containing chemicals (October, 1914) was that of adding to the charge an irritant substance, which would be pulverised by the explosion of the projec- tile, and would overwhelm the enemy with a cloud of dust. This cloud would hover in the air and have such an effect upon the mucous membranes that, for the time being, the enemy would be unable to fight in such an atmosphere. By altering the construction of the 10.5 c.m. universal shell for light field howitzers, the ‘N.1 projectile was created _ in the form of 10.5 c.m. shrapnel, the bullets of 40 The German Surprise which were embedded in a sternutatory powder (double salts of dianisidine) well stamped down, instead of an explosive. By means of the propelling charge and the grinding effect of the bullets, this powder was pulverised on explosion. The irrita- tion caused was not very intense, lasted only a short time and affected only a limited area and therefore it was of no importance in the field, but the initial step had been taken. Liquid irritants soon came to the front—xylyl bromide and xylylene dibromide— a mixture used later under the name of T. stuff, bromo-acetone and brominated methyl ethyl ketone, later introduced under the name of B. stuff and Bn. stuff.” During experiments they gave such improved re- sults in intensity, in power of lasting and of affecting an increased area, that practical results in the field were ensured. The use of these liquids in projectiles, however, was contrary to the accepted idea with re- gard to artillery, according to which liquid materials should not be used for ballistic reasons. Specially arranged shoots were required to prove that the pro- jectiles in use in the German Army could also be used from the ballistic point of view when filled with liquids. In this way the first effective German gas pro- jectile, the ‘I’. shell for heavy field howitzers, was evolved (January, 1915). Early German Gas Shell.—The first important use of German gas in shell was that of brominated and chlorinated organic compounds, T. and K. stuffs. Schwarte’s book tells us “‘the use of these projectiles was continually hampered by lack of understanding on the part of the troops which it was difficult to overcome. Inthe summer of 1915 it was practically in the Argonne alone that any considerable results 41 The Riddle of the Rhine were attained by the new projectiles.” And he de- scribes how the first elements of the new gas tactics were developed there. A Successful Experiment.—The development of the gas shell, the use of which, generally speaking, is independent of, but co-ordinated with, wind direc- tion, may have received stimulus from the fact that the prevailing wind, so important for cloud gas, fa- voured the Allies. It is clear that this period was an experimental one, but we know that by August, 1915, Geman military opinion had crystallised out to the extent of formulating certain rules, issued as Falkenhayn’s orders for the employment of gas shell. These early orders defined two types of shell, one persistent, for harassing purposes, and the other non- persistent, to be used immediately before an attack. They specified the number of shell to be used for a given task. But in this they were unsound and it is clear that the Germans had an exaggerated opinion of what could be achieved with a small number of shell. ‘They adhered too closely to high explosive practice. Various documents reveal the fact that the Germans were much more satisfied with their gas tactics than they would have been had they pos- sessed information with regard to our losses from their shell. They attached insufficient importance to the value of surprise and highly concentrated shoots, and had a mistaken idea of the actual specific aggres- sive value of their early types. Lachrymators at Loos, 1915.—Germany com- menced the manufacture of lachrymators, crude brominated xylene or brominated ketones, early in, or perhaps before 1915. ‘These substances caused great inconvenience through temporary blindness by lachrymation, but were not highly toxic. In June, 1915, however, they began to produce lethal gas for 42 The German Surprise shell. Falkenhayn’s orders for the use of gas shell, mentioned above, although they represent by no means the best final practice, were definite evidence that gas had come to stay with the Germans. The writer has vivid recollections of their use of lachry- mators in the Loos Battle. Batteries in the open, under the crest near the Lens road, were in position so that the wind direction practically enfiladed them, sweeping along from the direction of Le Rutoire farm. Gas from German shell, borne on the wind, was continually enveloping the line of batteries, but they remained in action. It was on this occasion while watching the bursting gas shells from the out- skirts of the mining village of Philosophe that Major-General Wing was killed outright by a high explosive shell. ‘These gas shells certainly did not achieve the results which the Germans expected, al- though they were not without effect. Demolished villages, the only shelter for troops in a desolate area, have been rendered uninhabitable for days by a concentrated lachrymator enemy shoot of less than one hour. Again, walking into gas “pockets” up a trench one has been stopped as by a fierce blow across the eyes, the lachrymatory effect was so piercing and sudden. The great inconvenience which was oc- casioned to parties engaged in the routine of trench warfare, on ration or engineering duties, and the effect on movement in the rear after an assault, taken cumulatively, represented a big military factor. The Flammenwerfer.—There can be no doubt that this period marks increasing German willingness to live up to their “blood and iron” theories of war, and, in July, 1915, another device with a considerable surprise value was used against us: the flame pro- jector, or the German flammenwerfer. Field-Mar- shal Sir John French signalled the entry of this new 43 The Riddle of the Rhine weapon as follows: ‘Since my last despatch a new device has been adopted by the enemy for driving burning liquid into our trenches with a strong jet. Thus supported, an attack was made on the trenches of the Second Army at Hooge, on the Menin Road, early on 30th July. Most of the infantry occupying these trenches were driven back, but their retirement was due far more to the surprise and temporary con- fusion caused by the burning liquid than to the actual damage inflicted. Gallant endeavours were made by repeated counter-attacks to recapture the lost section of trenches. These, however, proving unsuccessful and costly, a new line of trenches was consolidated a short distance farther back.”’ Although this weapon continued to be used right through the campaign, it did not exert that influence which first acquaintance with it might have led one to conclude. At the same time, there exists a mis- taken notion that the flame projector was a negligible quantity. This may be fairly true of the huge non- portable types, but it is certainly not true of the very efficient portable flame projector which was the form officially adopted by the German, and later by the French, armies. On a number of occasions Germany gained local successes purely owing to the momentary surprise effect of the flame projector, and the French made some use of it for clearing out captured trench systems over which successful waves of assault had passed. Further, the idea of flame projection is not without certain possibilities for war. German Phosgene Clouds.—Germany had by no means abandoned cloud gas, however. She had merely been planning to regain what the Ypres at- tacks had lost for her, the cloud gas initiative. We have seen how phosgene had occupied the attention of the German research organisation in the first 44 The German Surprise months of the war. Once alive to its great impor- tance, they must have strained all efforts to obtain an efficient method of using it at the front. Phos- gene was remarkable for its peculiar ‘‘delayed” effect. Relatively small quantities, inhaled and followed by vigorous or even normal exercise, led to sudden col- lapse and fatal effects sometimes more than twenty- four hours after the attack. The case of a German prisoner in a First Army raid after a British gas attack was often quoted on the front. He passed through the various Intelligence headquarters as far as the Army, explaining the feeble effect of the Brit- ish gas and his own complete recovery. But he died from delayed action within twenty-four hours of his last interrogation. ‘This effect imposed strict condi- tions of discipline, and men merely suspected of ex- posure to phosgene were compelled to report as serious casualties and carried as such even from the front line. The successful development of the phosgene cloud probably arrived too late for the Ypres attacks, and a variety of reasons must have led to the postpone- ment of its use until such time as it might once again give Germany the real initiative. Accordingly, on December 19, 1915, a formidable cloud gas attack was made on the north-east of the Ypres salient, using a mixture of phosgene and chlorine in a very high concentration. Fortunately, by this time we had established an anti-gas organisation, which had fore- stalled the production of cloud phosgene by special modifications in the British respirator. The condi- tions were similar to those of April 22nd, 1915. Instead of the first use of cloud gas, we had the first use of the new gas in highly concentrated cloud. In both cases the Germans reckoned on our lack of pro- tection, correctly in the first case, but incorrectly in 45 The Riddle of the Rhine the second. In both cases they were sure that great difficulties in production would meet our attempts at retaliation. In general this proved true, but in this case and increasingly throughout the war, they reck- oned without Allied adaptability. The French de- velopment of phosgene manufacture was indeed re- markable. Very interesting light is thrown on this attack by Major Barley, D.S.O., Chemical Adviser to the British Second Army. It appears that in November, 1915, the French captured a prisoner who had at- tended a gas school in one of the factories of the I.G. Here lecturers explained that a new gas was to be used against the British forces, many thousands of casualties were expected, and an attack would follow, which, correcting the errors of the effort at Ypres, would lead to the capture of the Channel ports. Efforts were at once made to obtain infor- mation on gas preparation by the Germans in front of the British sectors. In this way a sergeant-major was captured on the morning of December 16th, and he revealed the date and front on which the cylinders were installed. About 35,000 British troops were found to be in the direct line of the gas, but owing to the timely warning and to the protection which had recently been adopted, we experienced very few casualties. “(he Germans had prepared a huge in- fantry attack, and used a new type of gas shell on this occasion. German troops massing must have received huge casualties owing to our preparation and the failure of their gas attack. The last German cloud attack on the British front occurred on August 8, 1916. There were later attacks against the French, but the Germans were replacing the cloud method by other methods which they considered more suitable. ‘These will be dis- 46 The German Surprise cussed later on, when considering our own reaction against the chemical offensive. Gas and the Eastern Theatre.—The German sur- prise was not limited to activities on the Western front. In fact, apart from the first Ypres attack, -cloud gas probably reaped more casualties in the East against Russia. We learn from Schwarte’s book: ‘‘From reliable descriptions we know that our gas troops caused an unusual amount of damage to the enemy—especially in the East—with very little expenditure of effort. The special battalion formed by Austria-Hungary was, unfortunately, of no spe- cial importance for various reasons.”’ Had the nature of the Russian campaign been different, with a smaller front, and nearer critical objectives to the front of attack, we have no doubt that gas would have assumed enormous importance in the East. Russia, even more feebly organised for production than ourselves, would have been at a tremendous disadvantage, both from the point of view of protection and of the retention of satisfac- tory morale by retaliation. Conclusion.—This, then, was the period of the German surprise, during which the first big shock occurred, and which promised most success for fur- ther attempts owing to the lack of comprehensive protection by the Allies. Looking at the matter in a very broad way, ignoring the moral and legal as- pects of the case, we can describe this period as an example of brilliant chemical opportunism. Accord- ing to plan or otherwise, conditions for this experi- ment were ripe in Germany as in no other country. Overcoming whatever prejudices may have existed, the German authorities realised this, seized the op- portunity, and very nearly succeeded. 47 CHAPTER: tit THE ALLIED REACTION Loos, September, 1915, to Ypres, July, 1917. The Need of Retaliation.—The conclusive sign of the Allied reaction to the German poison gas attack appeared at the battle of Loos. ‘Owing to the re- peated use by the enemy of asphyxiating gas in their attacks on our positions,” says Field-Marshal French in his despatch of October 15, 1915, “I have been compelled to resort to similar methods, and a de- “tachment was organised for this purpose, which took part in the operations commencing on the 25th Sep- tember for the first time.’’ Five months thus elapsed before retaliation. From a military point of view their can be no doubt as to the wisdom, in fact the absolute necessity, of using gas in order to reply to the many German attacks of this nature. The ques- tion of morale was bound up in this retaliation. Had the Germans continued their chemical attacks in variety and extent as they did, and had it been real- ised that for some reason or other we were not able to retaliate in kind, none but the gravest conse- quences could have resulted with regard to morale.+ It must be remembered that the earlier use of cloud and shell gas by the Germans was of local incidence, when compared with its tremendous use along the whole of the front in the later stages of the war. 48 ‘ The Allied Reaction First Signs.—Our preparatory period was one of feverish, if somewhat unco-ordinated, activity. The production of a protective appliance, the gas mask, was vital. ‘This development will be considered later. Allied chemical warfare organisations arose, to become an important factor in the later stages of the war. The history of Allied gas organisation is one of the gradual recognition that chemical warfare represented a new weapon with new possibilities, new specific uses, and new requirements from the rear. Its beginnings are seen in the English and French Scientific Advisory Committees appointed to examine the new German method. One could always trace an element of reluctance, however, in Allied develop- ment, signs that each move was forced upon us by some new German surprise. We find the other ex- treme, the logical outcome of war experience, in the completely independent Chemical Warfare Service now actually adopted in the United States of Amer- ica. ‘This is dealt with in a separate chapter. The decision to retaliate once made, our difficulties commenced. We required gas, weapons, and meth- ods for its use, trained personnel, and the association of certain scientific with military standards without losing the field efficiency of the latter. The German staff found this in their co-operation with eminent scientists, notably Professor Haber. Without draw- ing invidious distinctions between pre-war military and public appreciation of chemical science in Eng- land and Germany, it would be merely untrue to state that the Germans were not in a position of advan- tage in this respect. However, chemical mobilisation and co-operation proceeded sufficiently rapidly to provide us with personnel and material for the Loos attack. The assembly and organisation of personnel oc- 49 The Riddle of the Rhine curred in three directions. In the first place the Royal Society had already begun to mobilise promi- nent scientists for other war purposes. In the second place, different formations in the field, realising the need for specialist treatment of the gas question, after the first German attack, created staff appoint- ments for certain chemists chosen from infantry regi- ments and other formations on the front. ‘Thirdly, men were collected at a depot in France to form the nucleus of the offensive gas troops. For this purpose chemists were specially enrolled and chosen men from infantry and other front line units were added. Early gas attacks and gas organisation did not ap- pear to justify the immobilisation of so much chemi- cal talent in the offensive gas troops, when chemists were needed all over England for munition produc- tion so vital to war. But later events justified the mobilisation and military training of these specialists. The expansion of the advisory and offensive organi- sations at the front necessitated a large number of officers, whose chemical training was of great value. It is dificult to see where they would have been found had they not been mobilised with the Special Com- panies. Moreover, their offensive and battle ex- perience gained with the latter was of great value. Six or seven weeks’ training witnessed the conversion of a few hundred men of the above type into one or two so called Special Companies. The spirit and work of these men in the Loos attack cannot be spoken of too highly. The Loos Attack, September, 1915.—The Field- Marshal bears testimony to its success as follows: ‘Although the enemy was known to have been pre- pared for such reprisals, our gas attack met with marked success, and produced a demoralising effect in some of the opposing units, of which ample eyi- 50 The Allied Reaction dence was forthcoming in the captured trenches. The men who undertook this work carried out their un- familiar duties during a heavy bombardment with conspicuous gallantry and coolness; and I feel con- fident in their ability to more than hold their own should the enemy again resort to this method of warfare.” There is evidence, however, that this early at- tack, inefficient as it appeared to be to participants, met with considerable success. Schwarte’s book tells us: “The English succeeded in releasing gas clouds on a large scale. Their success on this oc- casion was due to the fact that they took us by sur- prise. Our troops refused to believe in the danger and were not sufficiently adept in the use of defen- sive measures as prescribed by G.H.Q.” On the occasion of a cloud attack a few weeks later, at the storming of the Hohenzollern re- doubt, Sergeant-Major Dawson, in charge of a sec tor of gas emplacements in the front line trench, won the Victoria Cross. The German reply to our bombardment was very severe and under stress of it a battery of our cylinders, either through a direct hit or faulty connections, began to pour gas into our own trenches. In order to prevent panic and casualties among our own troops at this critical time, a few minutes before zero, the moment of as- sault, Sergeant-Major Dawson climbed on to the parapet under a hail of shell, rifle, and machine-gun fire, and, hauling up the cylinders in question, car- ried them to a safe distance into the poisoned at- mosphere of No Man’s Land and ensured their complete discharge by boring them with a rifle bul- let. In addition to the Hohenzollern attack cloud gas was used in December, 1915, in the region of Givenchy. gi The Riddle of the Rhine The Somme Battle, 1916.—My impression as an eyewitness and participator, however, was that the real British gas offensive began after, and as a re- sult of, the Loos experience. Material, organisa- tion, and numbers of personnel, both at the front and at home, co-operation with staffs and tactical conceptions all improved vastly in time to contribute largely to the efficiency of preparations for the Somme offensive in July, 1916. During the early months of 1916, a Special Brigade was created by expanding the four Special Companies, and the 4-inch Stokes mortar was adopted, training being vigorously pursued. As many as 110 cloud gas dis- charges, mainly of a phosgene mixture, occurred during the Somme battle, and evidence of their suc- cess is seen in German reports. ‘These successes were due not only to the magnitude of our opera- tions, but to the carefully developed cloud attack tactics which aimed at obtaining maximum results from the gas employed. ‘The factor of surprise governed all other considerations. Attacks oc- curred at night and depended for success upon the concentration of the maximum amount of gas in the given sector for a short, sharp discharge under the best wind conditions. ‘There is abundant evidence of our success in these attacks. Probably the most marked feature of the captured documents or of prisoners’ statements during the later stages of the Somme battle was the continual reference to the deadly effect of British cloud gas. The captured letter of a German soldier writing home stated: ‘Since the beginning of July an unparalleled slaugh- ter has been going on. Not a day passes but the English let off their gas waves at one place or an- other. I will give you only one instance of this gas; men 7 and 8 kilometres behind the front line §2 The Allied Reaction became unconscious from the tail of the gas cloud, and its effects are felt 12 kilometres behind the front. It is deadly stuff.”’ The accuracy of this reference to the lone range effect of our gas clouds is borne out in a number of other statements. For example, we learnt from a prisoner examined by the French: ‘The men were thrown into disorder and raised their masks because they were suffocated. Many fell in running to the rear; a number did not become ill until the next day. Vegetation was burnt up to a depth of 8 kilometres.’’ Again, prisoners taken at Maurepas stated that one of the English gas attacks was ef- fective 10 kilometres back. There are also marked references to the surprise nature of our gas attacks, which are an unconscious tribute to the successful tactical developments which have already been referred to, and also numerous other references to the ‘‘delayed’’ action of phos- gene. he prisoner mentioned above, taken at Maurepas, gave testimony that some were only taken ill after several days, and one died suddenly two days after, whilst writing a letter. One pris- oner, pointing to Les Ayettes on the map, stated that about the beginning of September when gas came over suddenly in the late evening, they thought it was from artillery fire because it was so sudden. No one was expecting gas and very few were carry- ing their masks. Another one stated: ‘The at- tack was a surprise and the cloud came over and passed fairly quickly. The whole thing did not occupy more than ten minutes.”’ More than thirty per cent. of the battalion was put out of action. Finally, to show what a serious imposition this constant cloud gas attack was upon the German Army, we will quote from the Special Correspondent 53 The Riddle of the Rhine of the Vossiches Zeitung. He said: “I devote a special chapter to this plague of our Somme war- riors. It is not only when systematic gas attacks are made that they have to struggle with this devil- ish and intangible foe.” He refers to the use of gas shell, and says: ‘This invisible and perilous spectre of the air threatens and lies in wait on all roads leading to the front.” In a despatch dated December 23rd, 1916, from Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, G.C.B., the situ- ation is ably summarised: ‘“The employment by, the enemy of gas and of liquid flame as weapons of offence compelled us not only to discover ways to protect our troops from their effects but also to devise means to make use of the same instruments of destruction. Great fertility of invention has been shown, and very great credit is due to the special personnel employed for the rapidity and success with which these new arms have been developed and perfected, and for the very great devotion to duty they have displayed in a difficult and dangerous service. ‘Che army owes its thanks to the chemists, physiologists, and physicists of the highest rank who devoted their energies to enable us to surpass the enemy in the use of a means of warfare which took the civilised world by surprise. Our own experience of the numerous experiments and trials necessary be- fore gas and flame could be used, of the prepara- tions which had to be made for their manufacture, and of the special training required for the per- sonnel employed, shows that the employment of such methods by the Germans was not the result of a desperate decision, but had been prepared for deliberately. ‘Since we have been compelled, in self-defence, to use similar methods, it is satisfactory to be able to 54 The Allied Reaction record, on the evidence of prisoners, of documents captured, and of our own observation, that the en- emy has suffered heavy casualties from our gas at- tacks, while the means of protection adopted by us have proved thoroughly effective.”’ One of the causes which leads to a lack of under- standing of the chemical weapon is the fact that the results of chemical attack are not, like those of a huge assault, obvious to the mere visual ob- server. A period of months often elapsed during the war before the immediate effect of a gas at- tack was known. It was inspiring to witness the assault of the 18th Division near Montauban on July 1st, 1916. But few realised the part played by the preparatory gas attacks in that and other sectors of the line, in weakening the numerical strength and battle morale of effective reserves. It is, therefore, of great interest to follow up a par- ticular case and to obtain a connected idea of the series of events associated with some particular attack. The early stages of the Somme battle were char- acterised by a number of cloud gas attacks which served the double purpose of a feint, and reducing the strength of available reserves. These attacks occurred chiefly along the part of the line north of the Somme battle zone, and they extended as far as the sea. One of them occurred on the 30th August, 1916, at Monchy, between Arras and Bapaume. About one thousand cylinders were dis- charged during the night. The usual careful or- ganisation preceded the attack and it is quite likely that it shared the advantage of surprise common to a large number of these attacks. Three German regiments were holding the line directly in front of the British sector concerned. Before December, 55 The Riddle of the Rhine 1916, the following reliable information was col- lected from prisoners and confirmed by cross-ex- amination. One Company of the 23rd regiment was in training and had no gas masks with it. ‘The gas came along quickly and about half the Com- pany were killed. After that there were more strin-’ gent rules about carrying masks. They had no recollection of a gas alarm being sounded. An- other man said that in his Company no special drill or training was being done, and a large number of men were put out of action through not being able to adjust their respirators in time. [here was no warning, although after this gas alarms were given by ringing church bells. Other prisoners, from the 63rd regiment, had such vivid recollections of the attack that they said: ‘“The effects of the English gas are said to be appalling.’ Collecting informa- tion from prisoners belonging to this or that Com- pany, and carefully checking by cross-examination, it is clear that this attack must have been responsible for many hundreds of casualties. Reasons for British Cloud Gas Success.—The fact that the British persisted with cloud gas attack and attained so much more success than the Germans, after the first surprise, was due to a curious combina- tion of causes, quite apart from the prevailing favourable wind. Our Casualties.—In the first place, we knew from bitter experience the deadly effect of a successfully operated cloud gas attack. We knew, for example, that in the first attack at Ypres there were more than 5000 dead with many more times that number of casualties. On the other hand, the Germans, left to speculate on our casualties, retained the conviction, from apparent non-success, that cloud gas was not a suitable form of preparation behind which to develop 56 The Allied Reaction big infantry attacks. Quoting from Schwarte: “Large gains of ground could hardly be attained by . means of an attack which followed the use of gas clouds, therefore such clouds were soon merely em- ployed as a means of injuring the enemy, and were not followed up by an attack.” This represented German policy, and it lacked vision. They did not realise that their difficulty was the method of form- ing the cloud, and that if a more mobile and long range method of cloud formation materialised, with correspondingly less dependence on wind direction, the object which they once sought and failed to attain would again be within their reach. Exhausting Preparations for Cloud Attack.— The second reason accounting for the relatively early cessation of German cloud attacks is one constantly referred to in the German war memoirs. It was the enormous mechanical and muscular effort required in preparing for such an attack. Few people realise what hours of agonised effort were involved in pre- paring and executing a cloud gas attack. The cylinders had to be in position in specially chosen em- placements in the front line within certain time limits. The “carrying in” could not be spread over an in- definite period and usually took from two to six nights, according to the magnitude of the attack and the local difficulties. Naturally, all the work occurred in the dark. Picture the amount of organisation and labour required to install 2000 cylinders on, say, a two mile front. These cylinders would have to be assembled at a number of points in the rear of the given line where the roads met the communication trenches. No horse or lorry transport could assemble at such points before dark, nor be left standing there after dawn. To carry this number of cylinders more than fifty lorries would be required 57 The Riddle of the Rhine or, say, perhaps, 90 G.S. wagons. All the points of assembly would be under possible enemy shell fire. These points would be normally in use for the un- loading of rations and trench engineering materials, etc., with which cylinder transport would have to be co-ordinated. Once arrived at the unloading points, parties had to be provided for unloading the lor- ries and for conveying the cylinders up to the front line trench. In a normally difficult trench system, for a carry of a mile to a mile and a half of com- munication trench, at least four men per cylinder are required to give the necessary margin for casualties and reliefs, etc. ‘This implies the organisation of more than 8000 officers and men for the installation, with a fundamental condition that only small groups of these men be assembled at any one point at any given time. ‘The installation of gas for an attack on this scale would have been a matter of vast and complicated organisation if there were no other activities in the trench system, and no enemy to harass the work. But to co-ordinate such an enterprise with the busy night life of the trench system and to leave the enemy unaware of your activities was a task which tried the patience, not only of the Special Companies, who organised, guided, and controlled these opera- tions, but much more so of the Infantry Brigades and Divisions whose dispositions were interfered with, and who had to provide the men for the work. Add to this even more acute difficulties. The front line trench is nothing but a series of traverses, thus to avoid the enfilade effect of shell and machine-gun fire. A straight trench is a death-trap. But to carry hundreds of pole-slung cylinders, already weighing as lead, round traverses on a dark night, is a feat re- quiring superhuman endurance. ‘Therefore many “carries” finished with a hundred yards ‘‘over the 58 The Allied Reaction top” through the parados wire, to the near locality of the appropriate emplacement in the front line. This last carry was critical; a false step, the clatter of falling metal, meant drawing the fire of some curious and alert German machine gunner. The sudden turning of darkness into day by enemy Very lights imposed instantaneous immobility. Yet all the time tired men were straining at their heavy burden and any moment a cylinder might be pierced by intentional or unaimed rifle fire. But the spirit of the infantry in this work, as in all they undertook, is to their everlasting credit. These tasks were an enemy challenge and they accepted it successfully, albeit with much cursing. The work was indeed beyond description and the country, colonial, and London troops expressed their opinion equally emphatically in their own peculiar way. Think again of the need of systematic wind observation along the whole front of attack, the dis- organisation and “gas alert’’ conditions imposed on the favourable night, the possibility of postponement, and we can only draw one conclusion. There must have been some imperative need or justification of cloud gas attack for the army to have encouraged or even tolerated its continuance. There is no difficulty in understanding why gas attack was so exceedingly unpopular among the staffs in the early stages of the war. Later, however, when they realised the enemy casualties that were being created by the gas, and what a large part it was taking in the war of attri- tion, the opposition and lack of appreciation van- ished. Further, when the projector arrived to produce similar effects with less demand upon in- fantry personnel, and less dependence on the wind, the whole tone of the army towards gas was changed, and it became almost popular. +9 The Riddle of the Rhine The peculiarity of cloud gas attack was the con- centration of all this effort of preparation within a few days. In terms of military efficiency, the amount of energy expended was fully justified by the casualties produced. We know that some of our cloud attacks were responsible on one night for many thousands of casualties, and the amount of artillery effort to give such a result would probably have been considerably larger. But under normal conditions of warfare, such artillery effort would have been ex- pended over a much longer period of time. The Livens Projector—The Somme offensive witnessed the use of a new British gas weapon which became of the utmost importance. ‘This was the mortar known as the Livens Projector. Its origin dates back many months, however, and is of con- siderable interest. A British engineer, Lt. Livens (afterwards Major, D.S.O., M.C.) of the Signal Corps, was inspired to constructive and aggressive thought on the gas question by a double motive. He quickly realised the tactical weakness of the German method at Ypres, once shorn of its vast initial possibilities of surprise. He saw the advantage of being able to command the point or locality of inci- dence of the cloud, instead of being limited to the actual trench front. Prompted by a direct personal interest in the huge loss sustained by the Lusitania outrage, he determined to find a practical outlet for his feelings by developing his views on the future of gas clouds. In a few months the general prin- ciples of the projector were defined and a crude specimen resulted. Caught up, however, in the gas organisation, preparations for the cloud attack at Loos absorbed all his attention and energies and the consequent reorganisation found him developing a - flammenwerfer and training a company for its use. 60 YE (IBRARY oh es UMIVERSHTY OF ILLINOIS ib Zz . , a = > = 1 : ; : ai i , cat % ' * : : j — 1 bl ~ - ‘ se): ~~ i ae. ‘ee 19 aspg a9nf of "JYSIU YB SINdIO YIOM styy, *asIvyostp 0} Jord squiog Ssunsn{pe pure spre] 91qWD9]9 Buy Ayied Suryiom y ‘TI—YOLOA{ONd SNAAIT AHL é ‘ : * : 6 ete : ; % é * é ; 5 ., hi 2 2 Pa 2 foreerecceny temerity ¢ ss . Pee, os The Allied Reaction It was really the Somme battle which gave him the first opportunity to carry his idea into offensive practice. This arose in front of High Wood, which was a veritable nest of German machine gunners in such a critical tactical position as to hold up our ad- vance in that region. ‘he huge stationary flammen- werfer had recently been used by Major Livens and his company against a strong point in front of Carnoy in the assault of July 1st. Here again the effect of flame was limited even more than that of cloud gas by dependence on a fixed emplacement. It was quickly grasped that the solution was to be found in the application of the projector principle to the use of oil for flame and a crude projector was de- vised for the emergency, using oil cans as mortars, burying them in the earth for two-thirds of their length and employing water cans as bombs. As soon as the possibilities of the weapon were seen its development was pressed. The usual Livens Projector consisted of a simple tube mortar or pro- jector closed at one end, and fitted with a charge box on which rested the projectile. By an electrical arrangement and suitable communications, large numbers, sometimes thousands, of these projectors could be discharged at a given moment. In this way quantities of gas, comparable with the huge tonnages employed in the normal stationary cloud attack, could be used to produce a cloud which would originate, as cloud, as far as a mile away from the point of dis- charge. In other words, the advantages of cloud attack could be used with a much smaller dependence on wind direction, and with a much greater factor of local surprise. Thus when the partially perfected and efficient weapon was used in large quantities dur- ing the British Arras offensive in April, 1917, the German Army was thrown into great consternation. 61 The Riddle of the Rhine But for the fact that protection had developed so strongly on both sides, the use of the Livens Pro- jector would have gone far towards a decision. The simplest way to illustrate the peculiar value of the projector will be to quote from one or two of the many Intelligence reports collected. Thus from a captured document dated July, 1917, be- longing to the 111th German Division, signed Von Busse, we have: ‘“The enemy has combined in this new process the advantages of gas clouds and gas shells. The density is equal to that of gas clouds, and the surprise effect of shell fire is also obtained. For the bombardment the latter part of the night is generally chosen, in a calm or light wind (the direction of the latter is immaterial). The enemy aims essentially at surprise. Our losses have been serious up to now, as he has succeeded, in the ma- jority of cases, in surprising us, and masks have often been put on too late. . . . As soon as a loud report like a mine is heard 1000-1500 metres away, give the gas alarm. It does not matter if several false alarms are given. Masks must not be taken off without orders from an officer. Men affected, even if ap- parently only slightly, must be treated as serious cases, laid flat, kept still, and taken back as soon as possible for medical treatment. Anti-gas officers and Company Commanders will go through a fresh course of training on the above principles.” ‘The influence of gas discipline is borne out by another captured statement that they could only attempt to ‘reduce their losses to a minimum by the strictest gas discipline.’’ Again, from a prisoner we learn that “every time a battalion goes into rest, masks are inspected and a lecture is delivered by the gas officer on British gas projectors, which are stated to be the most deadly form of warfare.’’ So great was 62 The Allied Reaction the impression formed by the introduction of the projector that uneasiness at the front was reflected later on in the Press. ‘Thus, quoting from reference to the military discussion before the main committee of the Reichstag. “Casualties from enemy poison gas admit on the whole of a favourable judgment, as the harm involved is only temporary, and in most cases no ill after-effects persist’ (Tdgliche Rund- schau, 24.4.18). “Cases of gas poisoning are not as a rule accompanied by harmful consequences, even though the treatment extends sometimes over a long period” (Vorwarts, 25.4.18). Based on the later mustard gas casualties these statements would have been more truthful. As it was, they afforded poor consolation to the German people. British Gas Shell.—The British first used shell gas as lachrymators, in trench mortar bombs, in small quantities, during the battle of the Somme, but for the first time, during the battle of Arras, 1917, our supplies of gas for shell were sufficient for extensive and effective use. Our success can be measured by the report dated April 11th, 1917, from the General Commanding the first German Army, on “Experi- ences in the Battle of Arras,” in which he says: ‘“The enemy made extensive use of gas ammunition against our front positions as well as against batteries.” ‘The fighting resistance of the men suffered considerably from wearing the mask for many hours.” Artillery activity seems to have been paralysed by the effects of the gas. In a general comparison of British and German methods of gas warfare,' General Hartley tells us “our methods improved rapidly during 1917. At first we neglected, almost entirely, the question of rate of firing, but we soon arrived at the method of *Journal of the Royal Artillery, February, 1920. 63 The Riddle of the Rhine crashes of lethal shell. These got the surprise con- centrations of gas which proved so effective, and we realised that the number of shells required to produce an effect was much bigger than we thought originally. At Messines gas was used in much the same way as at Arras.” German Gas Shell Development, 1916.—The main evidence of Allied reaction was to be found in the intensive development of cloud gas attacks, but during the same period the Germans, who appeared to be abandoning the use of cloud gas, were making steady efforts to regain their initiative by the compre- hensive development of shell gas. ‘Thus, to quote from General Hartley’s report to the British Associa- tion, “In the Summer of 1916 chlor-methyl-chloro- formate with toxic properties similar to those of phos- gene was used against us in large quantities during the battle of the Somme. Later this was replaced by tri- chlor-methyl-chloro-formate, a similar liquid, which was used until the end of the war as the well-known Green Cross shell filling. The use of phosgene in trench mortar bombs also began in 1916.” Many ~~ of those on the-front-in-1916 will remember the sur- prise gas shell attack of December of that year, on the Baudimont gate at Arras. We were fortunately let off lightly with little over 100 casualties, but the effect was to tighten up gas discipline all along the line. The appearance of the new substances repre- sented definite German progress and had definite mili- tary results, but they lost decisive value owing to the relative inefiiciency of German gas shell tactics. Consideration of the Allied reaction must include some reference to the appearance of the American Army in the field. The Americans during their more or less educational period gave serious attention to the gas question, and showed almost immediately, by 64 The Allied Reaction their preparations, that they attached enormous im- portance to the new weapon. Main Features of the Period.—It is difficult to generalise. But the following features appear to characterise the period under discussion. In the first place we see German policy tending towards the use of gas projectiles containing a variety of organic substances. Secondly, we have the British exploita- tion of cloud gas attack both in magnitude and method. The Livens Projector provides the third important feature. Fourthly, we note the somewhat tardy development of the British use of gas shell. A number of causes, no doubt, unite in responsibility for the above. But whether due to definitely framed policy on our part, or merely to the hard facts of the case, one important factor seems largely responsible. It is the relative ease of production by Germany as compared with ourselves. When German military opinion tended towards the development of gas shell, a variety of substances came quickly to hand, not only from German research sources, but in quantity from the dye factories. No such quick response could have met, or actually did meet, the demands of Allied military policy. Whatever ideas emanated from our research organisations, there was no quick means of converting them into German casualties. It is true that we could obtain chlorine and later phosgene in bulk and devote them to the exploita- tion of the older gas appliances in cloud methods. But British chemical supply was weak, owing to the absence of a strong organic chemical industry. In other words, German flexibility of supply meant flex- ibility in meeting the requirements of military policy, and, given sound military policy, this flexibility meant surprise, the essence of successful war. 65 CHAPTER IV INTENSIVE CHEMICAL WARFARE The chemical struggle became very intense in the Summer and Autumn of 1917. Projector attacks multiplied, the use of chemical shell increased on both sides, allied and enemy gas discipline was tight- ened up, officers and men acquired a kind of gas sense, a peculiar alertness towards gas. ‘The home front was strengthened in England and France by reinforced and sounder organisations, and by the vigorous steps taken by America. The Germans be- gan to reap the benefit of their gas shell policy. At the end of 1916, as a result of a review of the pro- duction situation, they had arrived at the so-called Hindenburg Programme. ‘This included a large out- put of gas for shell, and from its realisation the Ger- mans acquired a momentum which kept them ahead well into 1918. It is a very clear indication of the progress made by Germany in research, that the sudden expansion in manufacture required by the Hindenburg Programme found a number of new efficient war chemicals ready for production. The Mustard Gas Surprise.—The next big sur- prise came from Germany. Units in the line at Nieu- port and Ypres in July, 1917, were the first to ex- perience it. Some were sprinkled and some deluged with a new type of German shell chemical which, in many cases, evaded the British gas discipline, and mustard gas, unrecognised, caused many serious cas- Intensive Chemical Warfare ualties. Even those who wore the mask were at- tacked by the vesicant or blistering influence of the gas. [he matter is vividly expressed in a letter, given below, which I received from an ofhcer wounded in the Nieuport attack: —S “I was gassed by dichlor-diethyl sulphide, com- aly known as mustard stuff, on July 22nd. I was digging in (Livens Projectors), to fire on Lam- bartzyde. Going up we met a terrible strafe of H.E. and gas shells in Nieuport. When things quietened a little I went up with the three G.S. wagons, all that were left, and the carrying parties. I must say that the gas was clearly visible and had exactly the same smell as horseradish. It had no immediate effect on the eyes or throat. I suspected a delayed action and my party all put their masks on. “On arriving at the emplacement we met a very thick cloud of the same stuff drifting from the front line system. As it seemed to have no effect on the eyes I gave orders for all to put on their mouthpieces and noseclips so as to breathe none of the stuff, and we carried on. ‘Coming back we met another terrific gas shell attack on Nieuport. Next morning, myself, and all the eighty men we had up there were absolutely blind. The horrid stuff had a delayed action on the eyes, causing temporary blindness about seven hours after- wards. About 3000 were affected. One or two of our party never recovered their sight and died. The casualty clearing stations were crowded. On August 3rd, with my eyes still very bloodshot and weak and wearing blue glasses, I came home, and went into Millbank Hospital on August 15th.” & These early mustard gas attacks caused serious gaps amongst the troops assembling for the Northern offensives. The gas was distinctly a new departure. 67 f The Riddle of the Rhine Effective in low concentrations, with very little odour, and no immediate sign of discomfort or danger, very persistent, remaining on the ground for days, it caused huge casualties. Fortunately, its most fatal effects could be prevented by wearing a respirator, and only a very small proportion of mustard gas casualties were fatal. The insidious nature of the gas and the way in which it evaded the gas discipline is shown in the following example from an official report: ‘“‘A bat- tery was bombarded by the new gas shell from 10 p.m. to 12 midnight and from 1.30 to 3.30 on the night of 23rd-24th July. The shelling then ceased and at 6 a.m., when the battery had to carry out a shoot, the Battery Commander considered the air free from gas, and Box Respirators were accord- ingly removed. Shortly afterwards several men went sick from gas poisoning, including the Battery Commander. On previous nights they had been fired at with gas shell in the same way, but found it safe to remove Box Respirators after a couple of hours. On the occasion in question the air was very still and damp.” In another case an officer in the Boesinghe sector, during the gas bombardment on the night of the 22-23 July, adjusted the mouthpiece and nose-clip, but left the eyes uncovered. His eyes were seriously affected, but he had no lung symp- toms on the morning of the 24th. Mustard gas (or Yellow Cross, as it was called officially by the Germans) was the war gas par excellence for the purpose of causing casualties. In- deed, it produced nearly eight times more Allied casualties than all the various other kinds of German gas. It was used for preparation a considerable time before the attack, or during the attack, on local- 68 Intensive Chemical Warfare ities and objects with which the attackers would have no contact. Blue Cross.—Another new type, the German Blue Cross, was introduced about the same time. ‘This represented at different times diphenylchlorarsine, diphenylcyanarsine and other arsenic compounds. The Blue Cross compound was contained in a shell with high explosive. The enemy expected that the shell burst would create such a fine diffusion of the compound that it would penetrate our respirator mechanically, and then exercise its effects. These, violent irritation of the nose and throat, nausea and intense pain, would cause the removal of the respi- rator and allow other lethal gases to have full play. Fortunately, the German hopes of penetration were not realised, but they were, no doubt, continuing to develop the vast possibilities of the new method. German Emphasis on Gas Shell.—The Green Cross or lethal filling was another type of German gas shell. Green Cross covered such compounds as phosgene and chlor-methyl chloroformate. AIl- though these caused fewer casualties than mustard gas, they were relatively more fatal. Schwarte’s book tells us that, ‘‘After the introduction of the Green Cross shell in the summer of 1916, at Verdun over 100,000 gas shell were used to a single bom- bardment.”’ From the time of the first use of mustard gas until the terrific gas shell attack of March, 1918, the Germans persistently used their new types against us with considerable effect. Even when the period of surprise effect with mustard gas was over, the number of casualties caused by it was considerably greater than during the months when the Germans were firing only non-persistent lethal shell of the Green Cross type. The Germans regarded these 69 The Riddle of the Rhine shell gas developments as largely responsible for our failure to break through in the Autumn of 1917. The German Projector.—During this period they also developed a projector. ‘Their first use of it was again co-ordinated with an attempt at surprise. For- tunately, protection and gas discipline had reached such an efficient state that normal ‘alert’ conditions of the front line system were largely able to counter the use of this new device by Germany. ‘The first attack was against the French at Rechicourt on the night of December 5th-6th. On the night of December 1oth-11th, 1917, they fired several hundred projectiles on the Cambrai and Givenchy sectors of the British line. In both cases the gas bombs were fired almost simultaneously into a small area including our front and support lines. The bombs appeared to have been fired from the enemy support line, as observers state that they saw a sheet of flame run along this line, followed by a loud explosion. ‘The bombs, which emitted a trail of sparks, were seen in the air in large numbers and made a loud whirring noise. ‘They burst with a large detonation, producing a thick, white cloud. The dis- charge was followed immediately by a bombardment with H.E. shrapnel and gas shell, and a raid was attempted south of Givenchy. We learn that so strong was the gas discipline that in many cases res- pirators were adjusted before the arrival of the bombs, the resemblance to our projector attacks hav- ing been established at once. When this was done practically no casualties occurred. Again, to show the efficiency of British protection against projector gas, we learn from official reports that, “At one point five bombs burst in a trench without harming the occupants. It should be remembered that the British box respirator protects against very high con- 79 Intensive Chemical Warfare centrations of gas which pass at once through the German mask.’ Similar discharges were made against the French on two occasions in December, and against the Lens sector on December 30th. ‘The compounds used in the bombs were phosgene and a mixture of phosgene and chlorpicrin. These attacks increased in number during the ensuing months. German Projector Improvements.—The Ger- mans developed a longer range modification and would undoubtedly have exploited this weapon very considerably but for the trend of the campaign. The Allied advance in 1918 uncovered a number of enemy dumps. Amongst the most interesting was one which contained a number of a new type of pro- jector. A prisoner of the 37th pioneer gas battalion, cap- tured on August 26th, had said that they were to practise with a new type of projector with a range of 3 kilometres, the increased range being obtained by rifling the bore of the projector. He stated that the intention was to use the longer range weapons in conjunction with the old short range projector, using the new type to deal with the reserve positions. The capture of the dumps referred to above revealed the truth of his statement. “Two kinds of bombs were used, one containing H.E. and the other small pumice granules impregnated with phosgene. This was an ingenious attempt to produce a persistent but highly lethal gas by physical means, for hitherto the highly lethal gases had only been slightly persistent. The new projector had a calibre of 158 mm. and was termed the ‘‘Gaswerfer, 1918.’ ‘The impor- tance of this new projector cannot be overestimated. Its large scale use would, undoubtedly, have resulted in imposing stringent gas alert conditions at greater distances from the front line. 71 The Riddle of the Rhine Dyes in Gas Shell.—Another interesting German development of this period was the use of certain dyes or stains in gas shell. After gas bombardments in the winter of 1916-17, the snow was seen to be covered with coloured patches. ‘These coincided with the bursts of the shell. Analysis of the earth showed that the colour was due to the presence of an actual dyestuff. A number of explanations were advanced to account for the use of the colour, of which the most probable claimed its employment for the identification of affected localities several hours or even days after the bombardment. This was especially the case with persistent types. As the ex- plosive charge of chemical shell was feeble, some such means of identification was necessary. It may be that the Germans expected that troops advancing after such bombardments would be helped by the splashes of colour, and that these earlier attempts were purely experimental. German Flame Projectors——We have already referred to the use of flame projectors by the enemy, and a picturesque account of their development and use in the later stages of the campaign is found in an extract from the Hamburger Nachrichten of the gth of June, 1918: Their Origin —‘‘Our Flammenwerfer troops owe their origin to a mere incident. Their present com- mander, Major R., when an officer of the Reserve, received the order, during peace maneuvres, to hold a certain fort at all costs. During the sham fight, having employed all means at his disposal, he finally alarmed the fire brigade unit, which was under his orders as commander of the fort, and directed the water jets on the attacking force. Afterwards, dur- ing the criticism of operations in the presence of the Kaiser, he claimed that he had subjected the attackers 72 Intensive Chemical Warfare to streams of burning oil. The Kaiser thereupon inquired whether such a thing would be possible, and he received an answer in the affirmative. ‘‘Long series of experiments were necessary before Engineer L. succeeded in producing a combination of various oils, which mixture is projected as a flame on the enemy by means of present day Flammen- werfer. ‘Major R. occupied himself in peace time with fighting fire as commander of the Munich Fire Brigade. ‘The ‘Prince of Hades,’ as he is called by his ‘fire spouters,’ enjoys great popularity among his men as well as among the troops to whose assistance he may be called. He can look back on an important development of his units. Whereas in January, 1915, Flammenwerfer troops consisted of a group of 36 men, to-day they constitute a formation with special assault and bombing detachments, and are furnished with all requisites for independent action. In reading Army Communiques, we often find men- tion of these troops. If difficulty is experienced in clearing up an English or French Infantry nest, the ‘Prince of Hades’ appears with his hosts and smokes the enemy out. That conditions of membership of this unit hardly constitute a life insurance policy is obvious; nor is every man suitable. Special men who are physically adapted and who have given proof of keenness in assault are necessary for such work.” Further Flame Development.—Specimens of a very neat portable German Flammenwerfer were captured in August, 1917. It contained three essen- tial parts: a ring-shaped oil container surrounding a spherical vessel containing compressed nitrogen, which was used to expel the oil, and a flexible tube of rubber and canvas carrying the jet. The whole 1S The Riddle of the Rhine was arranged to be carried on the back. At about this time prisoners stated that men were transferred to the Flammenwerfer companies as a form of punishment. The Germans were fond of using the Flammen- werfer during counter-attacks and raids in which the morale factor is so important. Thus in September, 1918, in a raid against the British during our great offensive, the German raiding party was heralded by a shower of stick bombs and the Flammenwerfer men followed. The bombing party advanced under cover of these men, the smoke from the flame throw- ers acting as a screen. British experience was that the calm use of machine-gun fire soon put German flame throwers out of action, and it is clear that the Germans themselves realised this weakness of iso- lated flame attacks for, in one of their documents issued by German G.H.Q. in April, 1918, they said: ‘“Flammenwerfer have been usefully employed in combats against villages. “They must be engaged in great numbers and must fight in close liaison with the infantry, which helps them with the fire of its machine-guns and its grenades.”’ The 1918 Offensive.—Some idea of the impor- tance of these developments and of the scale on which they were exploited in the later campaigns of the war can be obtained by briefly examining the German plans for the use of gas in their 1918 of- fensive, and their execution: Die Technik im Welt kriege tells us: “During the big German attacks in 1918, gas was used against artillery and infantry in quantities which had never been seen before, and even in open warfare the troops were soon asking for gas.”’ The Yellow and Blue Cross shells first introduced into operation in July, 1917, were not incorporated 74 Intensive Chemical Warfare into comprehensive offensives until March, 1918. Owing to the exigencies of the campaign, the initial surprise value of these gases was subordinated to the later large scale use in the great offensive. In December, 1917, the German Army was instructed anew regarding the use of the new gas shell types for different military purposes, laying great stress on the use of non-persistent gas for the attack. Fortunately for us, the gas shells destined for this purpose were not relatively so efficient as the German persistent types, which were devoted to the more remote prep- aration for attack and to defensive purposes. ‘Their penetrating Blue Cross types were a comparative failure. Although plans emphasised the importance of this gas for the attack, facts later gave greater prominence to the use of the persistent Yellow Cross shell for defensive purposes in the great German retreat. Ludendorff’s Testimony.—Ludendorff, himself, emphasised the great importance which was attached to gas in this offensive. He says: ‘“‘And yet our artillery relied on gas for its effect, and that was de- pendent on the direction and strength of the wind. I had to rely on the forecast submitted to me at Ii a.m. by my meteorologist, Lieutenant Dr. Schmaus. Up till the morning of the 20th strength and direction were by no means very favourable; indeed, it seemed almost necessary to put off the attack. It would have been very hard to do. So I was very anxious to see what sort of report I should get. It was not strikingly favourable, but it did indicate that the attack was possible. At 12 noon the Army Groups were told that the programme would be carried out. Now it could no longer be stopped. Everything must run its course. G.H.Q. *My War Memories. Hutchinson & Co., 1919. 75 The Riddle of the Rhine higher commanders and troops had all done their duty. The rest was in the hands of fate, unfavour- able wind diminished the effectiveness of the gas, fog retarded our movements and prevented our su- perior training and leadership from reaping its full reward.” Preparations for Assault;—Gas Defensive at Armentieres.—For twelve days prior to their March assault the Germans used mustard gas over certain areas, and the non-persistent types for other localities. As an example of the first method, we can state that nearly 200,000 rounds of Yellow Cross shell were used on the 9th March, and caused us heavy casualties. The actual attack at once con- firmed our suspicions of enemy intention to break through on the territories which were not infected by the persistent mustard gas. In the second case, of the non-persistent types of Blue and Green Cross, bombardments of tremendous intensity occurred for several hours before the assault, on all defensive positions and organisations for several miles behind the front line. Millions of rounds must have been used. Although not without serious effect on the campaign, this furious gas attack did not fully justify expectations. The failure of mask penetration by the Blue Cross shell prevented the full possibilities of Green Cross coming into play. To illustrate the specific use of gas in this great offensive, and the organic way in which it was co-ordinated in the plan of attack, we quote from a recent statement by Gen- eral Hartley. Referring to the gas shelling imme- diately before the extension of the attack to the north of Lens on gth April, he explains, ‘“‘Between the 7th April and 9th April there was no gas shelling between the La Bassee Canal and Armentiéres, *Journal of the Royal Artillery, February, 1920. 76 Intensive Chemical Warfare while there was heavy Yellow Cross shelling imme- diately south of the Canal, and Armentieres had such a heavy bombardment that the gutters were running with mustard gas. This indicated the probability of an attack on the front held by the Portuguese, which occurred on gth April, Blue and Green Cross being used in the preliminary bombardment.” The Portuguese front lay between the two Yellow Cross regions. Fixed Gas Barrage at Kemmel.—Another most interesting example is also quoted, dealing with the shelling preceding the attack on Kemmel on 25th April. ‘This is an interesting case, as non-persistent Blue Cross shell were used within the objective and Yellow Cross just behind it, indicating that on 25th April the enemy did not intend to go beyond the line they gained.”’ Percentage of Chemical Shell.—Some idea of the importance which the Germans attached to their chemical ammunition, as distinct from explosives, can be gathered from the following extract from a captured order of the Seventh German Army, dated May 8th, 1918, giving the proportion of chemical shell to be used in the artillery preparation for the attack on the Aisne on 27th May, 1918. ‘“(a) Counter-battery and long range bombard- ments. For 7.7 c/m field guns, 10.5 c/m and 15 c/m howitzers and 10 c/m guns; Blue Cross 70%, Green Cross, 10%; H.E. 20%, long 15. c/m guns fire only H.E. (b) Bombardment of infantry positions. (1) Creeping Barrage. For 7.7 c/m field guns, 10.5 c/m and 15 c/m howitzers; Blue Cross 30%, Green 77 The Riddle of the Rhine Cross 10%, H.E. 60%, 21 c/m howitzers fire only H.E. (11) Box Barrage. For 7.7 c/m field guns, 10.5 c/m howitzers and 10 c/m guns; Blue Cross 60%, Green Cross 10%, H.E. 30%.” What more striking demonstration is needed than these extraordinarily high percentages? Gas Retreat Tactics;—General Hartley’s Analy- sis—No Yellow Cross shell were to be used in the bombardment, but, as mentioned above, there was a complete change of tactics in their retreat, during which they attempted to create a series of barriers by literally flooding areas with mustard gas. This defensive use of mustard gas was most impor- tant. Again, quoting General Hartley, ‘Yellow Cross shell were used much farther forward than previously, bombardments of the front line system and of forward posts were frequent, and possible assembly positions were also shelled with this gas. On more than one occasion when an attack was ex- pected the enemy attempted to create an impassable zone in front of our forward positions by means of mustard gas. ‘Their gas bombardments usually oc- curred on fronts where they had reason to fear an attack, with the idea of inflicting casualties in areas where troops might be massing. It was instructive to note how supplies of Yellow Cross shell were switched from the Third to the First Army front late in August when they became nervous about the latter sector. In Yellow Cross they had an extremely fine defensive weapon, which they did not use to the best advantage, for instance, they neglected its use on roads and did not hamper our communications nearly as much as they might have done. As our offensive 78 Intensive Chemical Warfare progressed their gas shelling became less organised, and one saw very clearly the superior value of a big gas bombardment as compared with a number of small ones. In the latter case it was usually possible to evacuate the contaminated ground and take up alternative positions, while in the case of a bombardment of a large area such as the Cambrai salient, the difficulty of doing so was greatly in- creased, and consequently casualties were higher. During our offensive it was not possible to exercise the same precautions against gas as during stationary warfare, and the casualties were increased on this account.”’ Percentage of German Gas Shell in Enemy Dumps.—A test of the importance attached by any army to the different types of ammunition which it uses can be made by examining the percentage of such types of shell in a number of ammunition dumps assembled behind the front line for some specific operation, or part of a campaign. An examination of German production from this point of view is very interesting, and also brings out a significant point. The normal establishment of a German divisional ammunition dump in July, 1918, contained about 50 per cent. of gas shell. The dumps captured later in the year contained from 30 per cent. to 40 per cent. These figures are significant, for they show how much importance the German Army attached to gas shell. When we think of the millions of shell and of the huge quantities of explosives turned out by our own factories to fill them, and when we realise that for a large number of gun calibres the Germans used as many shell filled with gas as with explosive, some idea of the importance of gas in the recent war and of its future possibilities can be obtained. Further, when we realise that the production of ex- 19 The Riddle of the Rhine plosives can be controlled and inspected during peace, but that no such control can exist for chemical war- fare products, the significance for the future stands revealed. Forced Exhaustion of Stocks.—It might be thought that the lower percentages found later on in the year were an indication of the decreasing impor- tance of chemical shell. Examining the case less superficially, however, we soon see that this lower percentage has an entirely different meaning. In the first place, we know that the German factories were still pressing on to their maximum output at the time of the Armistice. New units were being brought into operation. Secondly, we have seen how huge quantities of mustard gas were diverted to those particular German armies which were most threat- ened by the final Allied offensive, indicating that certain portions of the German front were being starved for chemical shell. The truth of the matter is that the Germans had accumulated enormous stocks for their great offensive and that they had expended these stocks at a greater rate than their factories could replace them. We learn from Schwarte’s book that, ‘Although the production of Yellow Cross almost reached 1000 tons a month, yet finally the possibilities of use and the amount required were so great that only a much increased monthly output would have been sufficient.” Yperite, French Mustard Gas.—During this period the volume of allied gas activities also in- creased considerably. But until June, 1918, our suc- cess was due to the development of more successful tactical methods rather than to any specific chemical surprise. Very great credit is due to the French for having 80 Intensive Chemical Warfare produced large quantities of mustard gas by the above date. | Judging from the German Intelligence Reports the surprise effect of the French production was almost as great as that obtained by the earlier Ger- man use. It again evaded the gas discipline of the troops, and we find the German staff laying enormous emphasis on this question, which was already very prominent in their general and operation orders. The occasion provided a very striking example of German belief in their absolute predominance in production. ‘They were largely justified in this be- lief, but it carried them too far. ‘They explained the use of mustard gas by the French as due to the use of German mustard gas obtained from “blind” German shell! Effect on German Gas Discipline.—British mus- tard gas was not in use in the field until September, 1918, but the French was a great success, and probably contributed to no small extent to the final allied suc- cess in the 1918 campaign. The French termed mustard gas “Yperite’” after Ypres, the place where it was first used. As far as such terms can be ap- plied to any weapon, Yperite arrived to spread panic and terror amongst the German formations. A document captured by the Sixth French Army shows that Yperite used on the 13th June against the 11th Bavarian Division was the chief cause of the precipi- tate retreat of this Division. The Seventh German Army refers to another bombardment on the 9th of June, in which the casualties exceeded five hun- dred. It is curious to note that although the Germans had so preached the superiority of their gases and gas methods, serious blows by the Allies found the German gas discipline unequal to them. It is no SI The Riddle of the Rhine exaggeration to say that the use of mustard gas by the French, and later by the British, and the British projector, produced, on each occasion, in the German ranks feelings allied to panic. This is re- flected in the many orders which have been captured from army and other headquarters enforcing and even appealing for gas discipline amongst the troops. Thus, almost immediately after the first French use, Ludendorff, chief of the German General Staff, issued a special detailed order on the subject, and the German document captured by the French can be taken as representative. ‘Our Yellow Cross has caused much damage to the enemy, formerly less protected than now. But as a natural sequence he had developed through it a gas discipline which can certainly be taken as model. On this account enemy troops have been able to cross, at once and without loss, areas which their artillery had just bombarded with gas. We also must train our troops to an ex- cellent standard of gas discipline if we expect to avoid the grave dangers which threaten the fighting forces of our army.” By the time of the Armistice France had produced nearly 2000 tons of mustard gas, British and American production was rapidly increasing, so that the output was attaining stupen- dous proportions. Some idea of the importance of chemical warfare in the campaigns of 1917-1918 can be obtained from the following figures: Allied Gas _ Statistics—Between November, 1917, and November, 1918, France produced more than five millions of her latest type of respirator. The British figure was probably higher. From April to November, 1918, the French filled nearly two and a half million shell with mustard gas. From the Ist of July, 1915, to the latter date more than seven- teen million gas shell were completed by the French. 82 Intensive Chemical Warfare In addition to these huge gas shell figures we must remember the chemical operations from projectors and as cloud gas. During the period the British averaged fifty large scale operations of this type per month, sometimes discharging monthly three hundred tons of gas. The total French production of chlorine and poison gas for chemical warfare approached 50,000 tons, a large proportion of which production occurred during 1917 and 1918. The British was of the same order, but German produc- tion was at least more than twice as high, showing what great use they made of gas shell. The huge American programme might have reduced the mar- gin, but no limits can be placed on German possibil- ities and elasticity in production. Critical Importance of Rapid German Produc- tion.—These figures are misleading inasmuch as they give no indication whatever of the relative difficulties and corresponding rapidity of action on both sides. As a general rule, where the German lag between the approval of a substance and its use in the field cov- ered weeks, our lag covered months. Owing to efh- cient production, chemical warfare was an infinitely more flexible weapon in German hands than in ours. This will be readily understood when we analyse, later, the methods of production of some of the chief German war gases. In general, German develop- ment of these complicated substances provided a series of examples of the ease and rapidity of produc- tion of organic substances by the dye industry. On the other hand, except in very few exceptional cases, British and French production, although we cast no reflection on the energy or skill of any concerned, was exceedingly slow and costly by comparison. ‘The Germans used mustard gas in July, 1917. We identi- fied it a few days afterwards. But the first fruits of 83 The Riddle of the Rhine allied production were not in the field for eleven months. British material was not used until a month or two before the Armistice. Further, in this case, we were convinced of the value of the substance almost from the first day of its use by the enemy. We will endeavour to throw light upon this in our review of production. The period of intensive chemical warfare may be regarded as the proof of the German experiment of 1915-1916. Shed of their trial nature, the chemical weapons played a logical and increasingly dominating part in the campaign. They were surely destined to play a much more prominent part had the period of stabilised warfare continued. Projector cloud gas would have assumed greater importance as a casualty producer. But we will leave such considerations for a future chapter. 84 CHAPTER V CHEMICAL WARFARE ORGANISATIONS We have no desire nor intention to give a detailed historical account of the above. The ramifications of Allied organisations were so numerous, the number of persons concerned so great, the sacrifices made so heavy, that only an exceedingly lengthy account could hope to do justice to individuals. In addition, such an account would not serve our purpose. We wish to show, as briefly as possible, how the different Allied organisations were bound up in an organic way with the campaign, how they compared with those of the enemy, and what lesson the comparison may contain for the future. Two facts stand out in such a comparison. We are struck with the extreme simplicity of the German organisations, as we know them, and the great com- plexity and multiplicity of the Allied departments as we saw them. We must admit from the beginning that we know least of the German home organisations for research and production, but our knowledge is sufficient to reveal their simplicity. The Inter-Allied Commission of Control may, and certainly should, obtain full information, but at present the matter stands as follows. German Research.—The Germans relied upon two main and very strong centres for research. They have already been indicated as the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, under the direction of Professor Haber, 85 The Riddle of the Rhine and the enormous research organisations of the I.G. There are various references to internal gas organisa- tion in captured documents. It appears that they received their final form late in 1917. A great gas school (Heeres-Gaschule) was instituted in Berlin where there were also central depots for anti-gas inspection and material. Rather earlier than this the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute was definitely appointed as the official research centre. The War Ministry had a chemical section named A.10, which dealt with gas questions. It is rumoured, and there is strong reason to believe, that the I.G. was largely staffed by officers of the Reserve before the war. Whatever their pre-war associations, if any, with the War Ministry, hostilities must have found them keenly alive to the possibilities of their unique research and organic chemical pro- ducing facilities. It is inconceivable that this military personnel should not have greatly assisted the I.G. in its operations, inventions and general assistance for the army. It appears that the subdivision of work left the direction of chemical research in Berlin, possibly at the above Institute, while the bulk of the work of preparing the new compounds, and developing manu- facturing processes for approved substances, occurred in the laboratories of the I.G. Leverkusen.—We know, for example, that a very large number of substances was produced at Lever- kusen and samples forwarded to Berlin, of which only a few were finally approved for production. ‘The physiological work and field tests were certainly as- sociated with the Berlin organisation, but it is not clear how much of this work occurred within the I.G. An Allied mission to Leverkusen reported as fol- lows :—‘‘It was emphatically stated that no means of testing the products were resorted to beyond inhala- 86 Chemical Warfare Organisations tion and testing the effect of the substances on the staff, but this statement must be accepted with re- serve.” ‘This is particularly so as we know that large numbers of respirator-drums had been made in this factory, and that a gas school existed at Leverkusen in I9IS. A member of another Allied mission was informed by one of the staff at Leverkusen that the authorities there were well aware of the difficulties in chemical warfare, apart from production, for they had some experience in the designing and testing of chemical shell. It may be that the German Government relied upon the I.G. for such work in the early stages of the chemical war, pending the development of official or- ganisation. When we remember, however, that at Leverkusen alone there was a staff of 1500 technical and commercial specialists, apart from thousands of workpeople, before the war, and that the latter were increased by 1500 during the war, we find it difficult to place a limit on the services which might have been rendered by this research centre alone. The opinion of the members of the Hartley Commission? was, that much thought and attention had been given to chem- ical warfare by the chemists of the Company. Hochst.—A great volume of chemical warfare research occurred also at Hochst. ‘The admission was made that the research department of the factory was continuously employed during the war on the preparation of substances suitable for chemical war- fare, many hundreds being prepared and sent to Berlin for examination. ‘The firm employed 300 academically trained chemists in peace time, but dur- ing the war many more were engaged, partly for *A post-armistice inter-allied mission of experts, to the Rhine chemical factories, March, 1919. The Riddle of the Rhine research and partly because all shell filling was carried out under the supervision of trained chemists.” Ludwigshafen.—The most influential branch of the I.G. was, undoubtedly, the Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik. It might have been expected, as they shared largely in production, that a considerable amount of chemical warfare research would occur at these works, but this was emphatically denied to Allied missions. It may be, however, that as the nitrogen fixation enterprise was developed there, re- quiring a large amount of technical development and control, this was considered a sufhicient contribution to the general cause. Early Formulation of Policy.—In examining what signs we have of the organisation and policy underlying chemical warfare research and production in Germany, we are struck by the fact that all the substances used with such dire effect against us during the war must have been approved for production by the Government at a relatively early date. The fol- lowing table, assembled from information supplied by the German factories, brings this point out very clearly. First Use War Chemical. Factory. Production Began. in the Field. Diphosgene Hochst Sept., 1916 Summer, 1915 (Green Cross) Leverkusen June, 1915 Mustard Gas’ Leverkusen Spring, 1917 July, 1917 (Yellow Cross) . Diphenyl- Hochst May, 1917 July, 1917 chlorarsine (Blue Cross) Diphenyl- Ro KA.? Feb., 1918 June, 1918 cyanarsine (Blue Cross) Ethyl-dichlor- Haéchst Aug., 1917 March, 1918 arsine (Blue Cross) 88 Chemical Warfare Organisations We have chosen the later products to establish the point, for it is self-evident for the earlier products, some of which were made before the war. Movements of Personnel.—The movements of German chemical personnel give us a clue as to the main tendencies in their chemical warfare policy. The factories were called upon to produce, as we have already shown, towards the end of 1914, but this production largely involved the use of substances already manufactured onacertain scale. Large scale production of the more advanced types of war chem- ical seems to have been directly stimulated by the Hindenburg programme, in connection with which the Companies withdrew large numbers of their skilled workers from the front. German Simplicity of Organisation—We can safely conclude from the above that Germany re- quired no cumbersome government mechanism for the preparation of new war chemicals, for the semi- industrial work in developing processes for approved substances, nor for their production. By relying on the I.G., the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, and probably some other organisation for field and physiological tests, Germany escaped the necessity for comprehen- sive government organisation, the development of which was such a handicap to Allied countries. It is certainly very suggestive that we only met, in the field, substances approved before the summer of 1917. It is with great interest and a certain amount of appre- hension that we speculate upon the research develop- ments after that period with which the war did not make us immediately acquainted. If this early period produced such effective results as mustard gas, Blue Cross compounds, and the different cloud substances, what hidden surprises were matured in the later period? ‘This feature of simplicity, of linking up a 89 The Riddle of the Rhine new war with an old peace, activity was paralleled somewhat in the field organisation. We have seen how Germany created special formations for cloud attacks, but for a time practically abandoned them, throwing most of her chemical warfare production into shell. In other words, she substituted a normal weapon, the artillery. We, on the other hand, largely impelled by the enforced simplicity of our production, tended more towards the development of special formations and special, weapons for cloud production, but with such success that the German Pioneer forma- tions, after being practically dropped, found a use in developing and using our new weapon, the Livens Projector. German Organisation at the Front;—The Gas Regiment.—It is probable that the earliest form of German organisation at the front consisted in the liaison between Professor Haber and the German G.H.Q. It will be remembered that Ludendorff, dis- cussing cloud and shell gas, refers to this co-operation, stating:! “Geheimrat Haber proved of valuable service in this connection with the use of gas.” It was also rumoured soon after the first German attack that the organisation and preparation of the latter were under the scientific guidance of this renowned Professor. The attack was carried out by the 35th and 36th Pioneer Regiments, each furnished with chemically trained officers who were specially detailed for gas warfare. The importance of protection was realised very early, and a gas school for officers of all armies was organised at Leverkusen for training in protection. We cannot but regard it as significant that Lever- kusen is also the site of the enormous Bayer? organic *My War Memories, page 338. *A branch of the great German dye combine, the Interessen Gemeinschaft, known as the I.G. 90 Chemical Warfare Organisations chemical works which played such a large part in poison gas production. The school dealt mainly with protection. | Early German Gas School.—Apparently, at the end of November, 1916, special gas staffs were created and attached provisionally to the head- quarters of formations entrusted with large scale gas operations. In addition, these staffs had the normal routine function of supervising inspection and instruc- tion in gas warfare at the front. At about this time each regiment or larger unit was given a gas officer (gasschutzoffizier) with similar duties to those out- lined above. In other words, the arrangement was generalised throughout the army. ‘This officer was assisted by non-commissioned officers and men spe- cially chosen for the purpose in the smaller units. The great need for these staffs is brought out in Ger- man official documents. New Gas Regiments;—Gas Shell Experts.—In 1917 two new Pioneer battalions, the 37th and 38th respectively, were created for the express purpose of carrying out projector attacks. “These developments in organisation, both advisory and combatant, led, at about this time, to the centralisation of the gas services at the front under a Kommandeur der Gas- truppen at G.H.Q. It would thus appear that the Germans achieved the centralisation of their gas services some months later than ourselves. Further developments in organisation, of which we are aware, were connected with two main tendencies in German gas warfare. In the first place, the vast employment of gas shell led the Germans to create special gas experts on the Divisional artillery staffs. We have this on the authority of an order by Ludendorff dated June 16th, 1918. ‘This gas shell expert was not necessarily an imported specialist, but was usually a gI The Riddle of the Rhine specially trained officer chosen from the staff in ques- tion. This was a very important move, for it gave the artillery a paternal interest in gas shell. This artillery specialist maintained a very close liaison with the Divisional Gas Officer. Inspection of Protective Masks and Method.— The second tendency was towards stricter protective standards and inspection. ‘The gas inspection centre at Berlin was given more responsibilities in the field and the protection of horses, dogs and carrier pigeons received great emphasis. British Field Organisation ;—“Breach” Organi- sations.—Our own field development followed very similar lines. The immediate need in April, 1915, was for organisations on the front to advise forma- tions on temporary methods of protection, to ascer- tain quickly the nature of any new German chemical attack, and to provide special means of examining the treatment of the new kind of casualty. These were ‘breach organisations,” so to speak, countering the immediate effects of enemy attacks while more com- prehensive and permanent cadres were created to absorb them. ‘The personnel of these breach organ- isations was largely composed of chemists already at the front who had in some cases taken part in the first German attacks. Efforts were soon on foot to mobilise British chemists for offensive purposes. So remote from the old army standards and training were the conceptions of the new scientific warfare, that there was no scientific cadre or outstanding scien- tific soldier to take over the direction and organisation of these matters at the front or at home. Accord- ingly, in June, 1915, Brigadier-General C. H. Foulkes, C.M.G., D.S.O. (then Major, R.E.) was given the difficult task of assembling and training an offensive gas formation, and acting as Gas Adviser 92 Chemical Warfare Organisations toG.H.Q. The Special Companies thus created have already been referred to in quotations from des- patches. In addition to this combatant personnel a number of specialists and advisory organisations came into being. Additional gas officers were appointed by various divisions, and chemical advisers by higher formations. Central Laboratory.—A central laboratory was instituted at G.H.Q. under the late Colonel W. Watson, C.M.G., F.R.S., which did particularly val- uable work in connection with the rapid identification of new enemy chemicals. With the development of gas shell, the chemical advisers included this subject in their province. Reference must also be made to the medical and physiological side. New Type of Casualty.—After the introduction of gas warfare the army was always faced with the possibility that some entirely new chemical would pro- duce a new type of casualty which would require spe- cial and sometimes unusual treatment. A new element was thus introduced into army medical work. The effects of a new gas used in large quantities on the front was often just as serious a threat to organisation as the sudden development of a strange epidemic. Reaction to meet these new conditions took the form of the development of medical research organisations at home, and of the appointment of a special medical and physiological advisory staff incorporated later in the Directorate of Gas Services. It was thus possible, after any enemy gas attack, and with little delay, to institute inquiries with regard to treatment of casual- ties, stimulate special investigations, and prepare for any reorganisation in personnel and equipment, and, in general, introduce satisfactory alert. conditions throughout the medical organisation along the whole of the Allied front. In this connection the effective 93 The Riddle of the Rhine liaison between the medical specialists of the British and French armies must be mentioned. Directorate of Gas Services——These various services were centralised in the Directorate of Gas Services, in the Spring of 1916, under Major- General H. F. Thuillier, C.B., C.M.G., R.E. It is interesting to note that although in their rear organ- isations for research and supply the French preceded us in the adoption of a logical symmetrical arrange- ment, yet in the field we were the first to produce the centralised chemical warfare service which was so essential. British Home Organisations;—The Royal So- ciety.— After the battle of the Marne, Germany rapidly realised the need for scientific and industrial mobilisation for the new stage into which the war had passed. Many signs and definite statements by Fal- kenhayn and others in authority have shown us how this realisation found outlet in various schemes for research and production. The need for scientific attention to various war problems was also realised in England, and found expression in the mobilisation of prominent scientists by the Royal Society, which constituted a number of committees to deal with specific activities and to assist various Ministries or administrative government departments in connection with scientific matters. Royal Society Chemical Sub-Committee.—The Chemical Sub-Committee included such prominent names as Lord Rayleigh, Sir William Ramsay and Sir Oliver Lodge. Retaliation, decided on early in May, 1915, was reflected in organisation. Lord Kitchener entrusted Colonel Jackson, C.M.G., R.E. (later Major-General Sir Louis Jackson, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., R.E.), then in charge of a fortification section of the War Office, with the task of examining 94 Chemical Warfare Organisations and taking action on the possibilities of retaliation, and a liaison with the above chemical committee of the Royal Society was soon established. Protection became a part of the duties of the Medical Services and was placed under the direct control of Colonel, afterwards Sir William Horrocks, who became chair- man of the specially appointed Anti-Gas Committee. Further, a little later, the Chemical Sub-Committee above referred to became an advisory body to Colo- nel Jackson. ‘This was the origin of the Chemical Warfare Department, but it was destined to pass through many difficult and hampering transforma- tions before reaching its final, more or less efficient and symmetrical form. The Trench Warfare Department.—With the formation of the Ministry of Munitions late in May, 1915, Colonel Jackson’s section was transferred to it. At this stage there was definite recognition of the absolute need of keeping chemical warfare research, design, and supply under one head. Probably this was the chief reason which prompted Lord Kitchener, then Secretary of State for War, to agree to the trans- ference of this section to another Ministry, and con- sent to the birth of the Trench Warfare Department. Scientific Advisory Committee ;—Commercial Advisory Committee.—Even at this stage activities were growing and government organisation was found necessary to cover such functions as in Ger- many were rendered unnecessary by the existence of the I.G. It became clear that the new department would require strong permanent scientific advice, and this was found in the formation of the Scientific Ad- visory Committee. This included the most active members of the former relevant Royal Society Com- mittee, amongst whom were Professor A. W. Cross- ley, the Secretary, and Professors H. B. Baker, J. F. 95 The Riddle of the Rhine Thorpe, and Sir George Beilby, all of whom rendered great services in the later development of this new branch of warfare. A parallel Commercial Advisory Committee was appointed, composed of representa- tives of some of the leading manufacturers of the country. Split Between Research and Supply.—We can- not follow in detail the many fluctuations experienced in the organisation of the department. ‘They repre- sent a constant struggle between a definitely expressed policy of centralisation and symmetry for supply and research, and circumstances imposed upon the depart- ment by the reorganisation and fusion of Ministries and departments. There were brief periods, notably at the commencement and in the final stages, when the desired centralised organisation was approached, but there were also periods when there was a complete split between research and supply with feeble and unsatisfactory liaison between the two. Speaking generally, the break between research and supply occurred in December, 1915, when the Trench War- fare Department was split up into two parts. ‘These were the Trench Warfare Research Department, in which was included the Scientific Advisory Commit- tee, and, shortly afterwards, changed its name to that of the Chemical Advisory Committee, and the Trench Warfare Supply Department. ‘The relationships between those two departments remained practically unchanged until the formation of the Chemical War- fare Department in October, 1917. This statement must be qualified, however, by a reference to the services rendered by Professor, later Sir John Cad- man, K.C.M.G., in bringing about this liaison, not only with supply in England, but also with that in France. During the early period the Royal Society Com- 96 Chemical Warfare Organisations mittee of Physiology became active and was later very closely co-ordinated with the Chemical Warfare Department, as the Chemical Warfare Medical Committee. Munitions Inventions . Department.—Another feature which is worthy of notice because it was com- mon to Allied organisations other than the British, and because it formed part of the slow realisation of the essential unity of chemical warfare activities, was the duplication of effort by the Munitions Inventions Department. Suggestions which could only have value when considered as part of the definitely di- rected chemical warfare policy were constantly raised with the Inventions Department, but this difficulty was overcome later by the growing importance of chemical warfare and the effecting of a liaison be- tween the two departments by Colonel Crossley. Imperial College of Science.—During the early period the Imperial College of Science rendered great services by assisting in research. It continued to do so during the rest of the war, but was later associated with a large number of British university chemical and scientific departments in pursuing a huge pro- gramme of chemical warfare research. We can only make passing reference to the development of the training and experimental grounds which formed such an important part in assisting decisions on chemical warfare policy. The Porton ground, however, was a model of its kind, a pioneer amongst Allied experi- mental grounds, and a tribute to the creative and ad- ministrative efforts of Lt.-Colonel Crossley, C.M.G., C.B.E., who was its commandant from its inception to the end of the war. The Chemical Warfare Department.—The grow- ing importance of chemical warfare, the vigorous chemical initiative assumed by Germany in the sum- 97 The Riddle of the Rhine mer of 1917, and various other reasons led to re- organisation of the Chemical Warfare services in this country in October, 1917, and the Chemical Warfare Department, under Major-General Thullier, for- merly Director of Gas Services, B.E.F., was consti- tuted. This reorganisation witnessed a great increase in research and other activities of the department and a still greater mobilisation of the chemists of the country. Although this change witnessed further cen- tralisation by the incorporation of the Anti-Gas Department, thereby settling once and for all the inherent association between offensive and defensive research, a fact which had been apparent to many long before, yet it still ignored the fundamental con- nection between offensive research and supply. This had been recognised in French organisation as early as 1915, yet we did not reach the ideal solution even at the end of the war. The Anti-Gas Department——We have men- tioned the origin of the Anti-Gas Department. Al- though separate in organisation from chemical warfare research, yet the remarkable work and per- sonality of the late Lt.-Colonel E. F. Harrison, C.M.G., overcame the disadvantages by energetic liaison and a great capacity for the internal organ- isation. General Hartley has paid a tribute which we cannot refrain from repeating: ‘‘Colonel Harrison was one of the great discoveries of the war. It is often stated that he was the inventor of the box respirator, but this he would have been the first to deny. His great merit was as an organiser. He gathered round him an enthusiastic group of young chemists and physicists, and the box respirator repre- sents the joint result of their researches, carried out under his inspiration and controlled by his admirable practicable judgment. He organised the manufacture 98 Chemical Warfare Organisations of the respirator on a large scale, and it is a great testimony to his foresight and energy that in spite of all the difficulties of production, the supplies prom- ised to France never failed. Fifty million respirators were produced by the department, and of these nine- teen million were box respirators.” Anti-gas research was at first centred in the R.A.M. College, Millbank, and from the beginning of 1917 in the Physiological Institute, University College, London. The work done in research and production not only protected the whole of the Brit- ish Army, but formed the backbone of American and a large part of Italian protection. Further, the sac- rifices made in connection with this work are not suf- ficiently known. Numbers of young scientists sacri- ficed their health and sometimes life, in carrying out the critical tests upon which the safety of millions of Englishmen and Allies depended. Designs Committee—-We cannot leave this branch of the subject without referring to the Chem- ical Warfare Designs Committee. An important trend in chemical warfare was its growing independ- ence of the normal weapons of war, and its special requirements when adapted for use with both the normal and newer types. ‘This tendency found ex- pression in the above Committee under the direction of Professor Jocelyn Field Thorpe. The develop- ment of satisfactory chemical shell was an enormous problem, and the importance of entirely new forms of the chemical weapon will be brought out in dealing with the limitation of armaments. French Organisation.—French development fol- lowed very similar lines. From April 28th, 1915, a Commission of military representatives and scientists was organised under General Curmer. This gave place in June to a 99 The Riddle of the Rhine Chemical Warfare Research Committee under M. Weiss, Directeur des Mines au Ministére des Traveaux Publics. In August, 1915, three special Committees were formed; one under M. Kling for problems from the front, whose organisation was responsible for a volume of exceedingly reliable iden- tifications of enemy chemicals of great use to the Allies; another under M. Moureu for offensive re- search, whose brilliant organic investigation charac- terised later French developments, and the other under M. Vincent, for research on protection. But, in the meantime, the importance of gas shell was im- pressed upon the French and, on the tst July, 1915, this organisation passed into M. Albert Thomas’s new Ministére de L’Artillerie et des Munitions. Manufacture passed into the hands of the Directeur du Materiel Chimique de Guerre. In September, 1915, these sections were centralised under General Ozil, attached to the same Ministry. General Ozil’s service was strongly supported by a number of em- inent French scientists, and achieved unusual suc- cess in the face of great practical difficulties. A very close liaison was maintained with the army, and the initiative, energy, and devotion of all con- cerned cannot be too highly praised. In production alone the difficulties were enormous. ‘There was no highly organised dye industry available. The pre- war German monopoly had seen to that. Elaborate organisations and continuous research work under dificult conditions were necessary to replace the smooth running normal activities of the great German dye combine. The salient points in French produc- tion are dealt with more fully in another chapter. In research and protection French activities were no less handicapped and just as creditable. The pro- tection of the French armies was largely achieved 100 Chemical Warfare Organisations through the genius and tireless industry of Professor Paul Lebeau. Quick to realise the need of retaliation against the new German weapon, the French developed their chemical offensive and defensive with characteristic élan and intuition. Contributing largely to Allied research, they took the lead in Inter-Allied co-opera- tion and liaison, and their activities in this field were due to much worthier causes than mere geographical position. Italian Development.—The Italians were alive to the importance of chemical warfare. World famous names such as those of Senator Paterno and Professor Villavecchia were associated with their organisation. Once again, however, although not lacking in invention and initiative, they were contin- ually hampered by production, which imposed such grave disadvantages upon them as to endanger seri- ously the success of their campaign. The success of the great German offensive against Italy in the autumn of 1917 was largely ascribed to the German use of gas of such types and in such amounts that the Italian protective appliances were outmanceuvred. Further, in spite of the offensive qualities of the Italian gas organisation under Col. Penna, lack of supplies prevented large scale gas retaliation, so essential in maintaining gas morale. Towards the end of the war, when the French and British production improved, and with the entry of America and the promise of supplies therefrom, it was possible to assist the Italians from Allied sources, and arrangements were made to supply them with the British Respirator, to assist them in the development of the Livens Projector, to supply large quantities of mustard and other gases, and to assist them in pro- duction. The use of the British box respirator was IOI The Riddle of the Rhine undoubtedly a great factor in repelling the Austrian offensive of June, 1918. ‘Their experimental fields and research organisations were particularly well staffed, and, backed by production, Italian chemical genius would have been capable of producing very serious results. Supply Organisations.—What a marked contrast between the organisation required for German and Allied chemical warfare production! Such organisa- tion implies cadres and arrangements for co-opera- tion with research organisations, for semi-scale work, commercial functions, priority, raw material supply, transport, and all their concomitants. In Germany, the self-contained dye industry simplified all these functions. The Government addressed itself to one producing organisation which was responsible for most of the relevant research. Whole Government departments were rendered unnecessary by this cen- tralised production. British Supply Organisation.—In England the situation was entirely different. Even before the advent of mustard gas the Government was com- pelled to apply to at least twenty contractors. The products required were foreign to the normal activi- ties of many of these. They required assistance in raw materials, transport, technical methods, either the result of the work of other factories or of re- search. The latter again involved complex official organisation, cumbrous even if efficiently carried out. This at once introduced difficulties. The centre of gravity of supply was in government offices instead of in the centres of production. Much depended upon the co-ordination of the official departments. Quite apart from the Government plants finally en- gaged in chemical warfare production, more than 102 Chemical Warfare Organisations fifty plants were used in private organisations, of which a very high percentage were entirely new. Allied Handicaps.—The functions of the allied Government supply departments were or should have been much more than those of an individual nego- tiating a contract. Owing to the fact that these were new plants, and that the products were foreign to the production of many of the firms concerned, two alter- natives had to be faced. Either the technical and service departments of each firm had to be consider- ably strengthened, or else a special organisation had to cover these functions by employing a considerable government technical and liaison personnel. For rea- sons of secrecy and general efficiency the latter pro- cedure evolved, but neither represented the ideal solution. The German Solution—This was the German arrangement in which these functions were all em- bodied in the centralised producing otganisation, the I.G. The German Government took the role of a pure contractor, the only additional function being the choice of product and method, a question of policy. This implied the existence of a Government experimental organisation, but purely for this pur- pose. Departmental Difficulties—The Allied task would have been much simpler if the only war weapon had been a chemical one, in which case an efficient organisation could have been decided upon at first, and need have suffered no very radical changes. As it was, however, the British supply organisation had to administer some seventy plants, which were really in private hands, and found its chief difficulties quite apart from the external perplexities of the problem. They arose in its relationships with other Govern- ment departments. 103 The Riddle of the Rhine Allied Success Against Odds.—Taking a broad view of the case, although nobody who knew the facts could regard our poison gas production with any- thing but dismay, except in a few cases, yet the main feeling was one of amazement that we succeeded as well as we did with these entirely new substances. The whole story of chemical warfare supply amongst the Allies is one of devoted effort by all concerned, against overwhelming odds, and although the level of results was poor compared with Germany, yet we find here and there brilliant examples of Allied adapt- ability and tenacity amongst which the French devel- opment of mustard gas stands pre-eminent. What we have already said about supply organisa- tion may be summed up in one sentence. The Ger- mans were already organised to produce. We had to create Government departments to administer a large number of plants in private hands, and they had to cope not only with the external difficulties of the situa- tion but with the almost overwhelming difficulties of internal organisation. ‘The checquered career of the British supply department provides a good example. The French and Americans suffered less than our- selves from these troubles, the latter having the bene- fit of the combined experience of the other Allies. Allied Lack of Vision in Production.—A survey of the earliest supply organisation of this country reveals another difficulty which later events have ob- scured. Few people realised the developments which chemical warfare would produce. The early pro- duction of chemicals for gas warfare was grouped under some such designation as trench warfare stores, and graded in order of importance, from the point of view of supply organisation with catapults and spring guns, flame projectors and body shields! It is no unfair criticism to state that hard facts rather 104 Chemical Warfare Organisations than vision forced the importance of chemical war- fare upon those responsible for munition production in the early stages of the war. Chemical warfare production remained under the Trench Warfare Sup- ply Department for many months, where it was one of ten Trench Warfare sections. The vicissitudes of trench warfare supply are too numerous and compli- cated to be dealt with here, but chemical warfare supply has suffered accordingly. British Lag in Organisation.—Examining Allied organisations, we find that the French and Ameri- cans approached this ideal solution more rapidly than ourselves, and we can trace in our own development a number of unsuccessful attempts to reach this central- ised control, although the last configuration, under the direction of Major-General H. F’. Thuillier, was the nearest approach. French organisation for sup- ply provides another example of their national char- acteristic of logical thinking and love of symmetry. As early as September, 1915, the French centralised their research organisation, the Inspection des Etudes et Expérience Chimiques, and their supply organisation, the Direction du Matériel Chimique de Guerre, in their Service Chimique de Guerre un- der General Oczil. French and American Characteristics—Their early concentration on gas shell shows that this sym- metrical organisation was due not only to the above characteristic but also to vision in war development. American supply organisation again provides evi- dence of the national characteristic. They had no I.G. but they had plenty of money and material, and the total of Allied experience in production. They therefore proceeded at once to build an enormous producing centre known as Edgewood Arsenal. We refer to this later. The tremendous potentialities of 105 The Riddle of the Rhine this Arsenal will readily be seen, although they did not become effective during the war. It would be poor testimony to the tremendous efforts and sacrifices made by the various firms and officials connected with chemical warfare to leave the matter at this stage, or to make a minute analysis of the different internal causes for lack of success. We may say that although the efforts of all concerned were beyond praise, yet they were so initially handi- capped that it was practically impossible even to approach the German efficiency. In France and Eng- land we were suffering from the faults of past years, our lack of attention to the application of science to industry. The Americans would also have suffered, for they were in the same plight, but they adopted the drastic solution of Edgewood Arsenal. As we show later, however, this solution was really only a very necessary and valuable attempt to treat the symptom rather than the disease. We cannot regard the problem as settled for any of these countries. If it is, then the outlook is very poor. Inter-Allied Chemical Warfare Liaison.—Chem- ical warfare offered, in theory, a splendid opportunity for co-ordination amongst the Allies. The new methods, unhampered by tradition, seemed, at first sight, admirably suited for exploitation against the enemy by an allied Generalissimo and staff. Co- ordination never reached this stage, although strong liaison organisations were developed. Inter-allied research conferences occurred periodically in Paris, where decisions for co-operation were taken after full discussion of allied work. The continuity of these relationships was maintained by an active secretariat on which each ally was represented. ‘The contact, so close between actual allied scientific workers in this field, became less evident in the application of their 106 Chemical Warfare Organisations results to field warfare, for several reasons. In the first place, close scientific contact in research was re- placed by the actual field realtionships of the armies, and, as is well known, the central inter-allied com- _mand did not materialise until the spring of 1918, and even then it was only possible to apply the new principle to the actual battlefield. The traditional differences between the methods of the different services of each ally still existed to a large extent, and they found expression in type of armament, equip- ment, and military standards, such as, for example, gun calibres and shell design, to which chemical war- fare had to conform. No inter-allied gas mask materialised, although this would have been of in- estimable advantage. Probably the example of most complete co-ordination occurred on the supply side, where absence of the above traditional difficulties and the crying need to make the most of available raw materials compelled a very close co-ordination. Inter-Allied Supply.— The writer was responsible for initiating, in 1917, an Inter-Allied Chemical Sup- ply Committee, whose function was to pool effectively the allied raw materials, and to arrange their distribu- tion in accordance with allied programmes, the ex- change of which implied a considerable step. Later this Committee became one of a number, similarly constituted, forming part of the Inter-Allied Muni- tions Council. Thinking over the difficulties of the inter-allied supply, now that the emergenices of the situation have passed, an important contrast emerges. After three years of war, and although protected by the powerful arm of the blockade, we were still resorting, for chemical warfare supply, to measures which, com- pared with the German methods, were complicated, clumsy, and inefficient. ‘This was, in a sense, forced 107 The Riddle of the Rhine upon us by the number of the allies, and the fact that they held the outer lines. But it is easily forgotten that Germany also had a number of allies, and that German supply organisation was sufficient to feed them all. Nature of Chemical Warfare Research.—So much has been vaguely said, and is vaguely known, about research in chemical warfare that a brief analysis will be of value. Discovery of New Substances.—Research for this purpose has a number of very distinct functions! The most obvious is the discovery of new substances. But there are others in connection with which research work represents a much greater volume. Very few new substances which found valuable application dur- ing the war were revealed by chemical warfare re- search. ‘[he bulk of the important substances were already known as such, although their importance for war was probably not realised. It is most important to emphasise the fact that even in the future, should there be no direct attempts to reveal new chemical warfare substances, they will undoubtedly arise as a normal outcome of research, even if, without excep- tion, every chemist in the world became a most pro- nounced pacifist. A valuable substance once dis- covered or decided upon, however, whole series of research investigations become necessary. Technical Method of. Preparation; — Filling Problem ;—Protection ;—Half-Scale Investigation. —The substance must be prepared in the most eff- cient manner for manufacture, which may not be the mode of its discovery. It must be used in shells, cylinders, or some other war chemical device. Each device represents a different filling problem, different difficulties with regard to contact of the war chemical and the envelope of the container. If a projectile is 108 Chemical Warfare Organisations in question the ballistics become of importance. More important than any of these, except production, is the question of protection. It is axiomatic that an army proposing to use a new offensive chemical must be protected against it. It may, therefore, be neces- sary to modify the existing mask or protective appli- ance, or to create an entirely new one. If research reveals the necessity for the latter course of action it may provide sufficient reason for abandoning the substance. In addition, according to productive dif_- culties, it may be necessary to undertake compre- hensive and very expensive research on half-scale methods for production. It is impossible in many cases to proceed directly from the laboratory process to large scale manufacture without serious risk of failure. Two Classes of Research.—Broadly, these re- search functions form two classes, those concerned with policy and approval of a substance and those concerned with work which follows automatically upon such approval. There must be, of course, a certain amount of overlapping and liaison between the two classes. Herein lay one of the great advantages enjoyed by the Germans. Their great producing organisation, the I.G., was able to take over automatically certain of these research functions, in particular all those with regard to preparation and production, even of protective appliances. The Government reserved what we have called the policy functions, and was responsible, we assume, for the mass of physiological and design research which must always precede ap- proval or a decision on policy. Signs were not lacking, further, that the I.G. was even employed on certain occasions for this latter type of research. 109 The Riddle of the Rhine Conclusion.—From the facts at our disposal there can be no doubt that the total material facilities at the disposal of the Allies for chemical warfare investiga- tion were considerably more extensive and expensive than those of Germany with the one notable exception of trained technical organic chemists. It is very doubtful whether the German field experiments were as largely provided for as those of the Allies. When we think of the French grounds at Versailles and Entressin, the British at Porton, the American grounds in France and in America, and the Italian organisations, there can hardly be any doubt that the total German facilities were much smaller. Under the actual circumstances of the war, however, it was difficult to develop more co-operation than was pos- sible by a very close liaison. The fact that all the experimental developments from these grounds re- quired special modification to meet the peculiar needs of artillery and other equipment for each ally, pre- vented the adoption of uniform types of projectile or other appliances. Even uniform shell marking was found impracticable. The “Outer and Inner Lines.”—The Allied situ- ation compelled the multiplication of cumbersome organisations in the different countries. Lack of a strong organic chemical industry placed each ally at a considerable disadvantage, compared with Ger- many, in the development of such organisations. Us- ing a strategic comparison, we can say that Germany not only possessed the “inner lines” in the chemical war, but an exceptionally efficient system to exploit them, in the shape of the great I.G. CHAPTER VI THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INITIATIVE Meaning of the Chemical Initiative—The Ger- man invasion of Belgium in 1914 was a direct appeal to the critical factor of surprise in war. By dis- regarding their pledge, a “scrap of paper,” they automatically introduced into this attack the ele- ments of military surprise. We, the enemy, were unprepared, and a complete rearrangement of dis- positions became necessary. A recent writer has admirably summarised the facts. ‘Germany began the war on the Western front before it was declared, and on 1-2 August, German cavalry crossed the French frontier between Lux- embourg and Switzerland at three points in the direction of Longwy, Luneville, and Belfort. But these were only feints designed to prolong the delusion that Germany would attack on the only front legitimately open to warfare and to delay the reconstruction of the French defence required to meet the real offensive. The reasons for German strategy were conclusive to the General Staff, and they were frankly explained by Bethmann-Hollweg to the British Ambassador. There was no time to lose if France was to be defeated before an effective Russian move, and time would be lost by a frontal *A. F. Pollard. A Short History of the Great War. Methuen, 1920, hit The Riddle of the Rhine attack. The best railways and roads from Berlin to Paris ran through Belgium; the Vosges protected more than half of the French frontier south of Luxembourg, Belfort defended the narrow gap between them and Switzerland, and even the wider thirty miles’ gap between the northern slopes of the Vosges and Luxembourg was too narrow for the deployment of Germany’s strength; the way was also barred by the elaborate fortifications of Verdun, Toul, and Nancy. Strategy pointed con- clusively to the Belgium route, and its advantages were clinched by the fact that France was relying on the illusory scrap of paper.” The first German cloud gas attack was the second attempt to gain the decisive initiative, by the un- authorised use of a surprise of an entirely different nature. Modern writers are at great pains to establish how the world war, although leaving the final function of the infantry unchanged, rendered them and their staff subservient to mass munition pro- duction. Mr. H. G. Wells explains this to the Kaiser in a delightful imaginary interview between that august person and an hypothetical manufac- turer.t Professor Pollard tells us how, when the first German surprise had failed, the war became ‘a test of endurance rather than generalship.”’ We will leave a clear field for any military challenge to such a point of view. Our objection is that it is not fully developed. ‘The war was still a test of generalship, that of directed production. ‘This war has shown, and future wars may unfortunately confirm, that the type and secrecy of production is as important as its volume. ‘There will still be the purely military surprise and manceuvre, but *Wear and the Future. Cassel, 1917. I1i2 The Struggle for the Initiative superimposed, co-ordinated, and sometimes pre-— dominant will appear the technical surprise, the result of the generalship of production. Such a surprise is achieved by the sudden intro- duction on a large scale of some entirely new war weapon, capable of achieving a strategic or tactical objective in an unsuspected manner. Although the general idea of this second type of surprise existed before the war, particularly in naval warfare, it required the coincidence of the Great European War and modern scientific develop- ment to demonstrate its great importance on land. Thus the first German gas attack found the opposing troops entirely unprotected, not merely through the absence of a mask, but in training and technical discipline. The case is quoted of an indignant gassed soldier who, in an early gas attack, when reproached for not protecting himself, there- upon opened his tunic and revealed a mask firmly tied round his chest! Itisa far cry from such a case to the inculcation of strict gas discipline into an army of millions. The attack reaped the corre- sponding results in casualties and morale. It found the opposing medical services unequipped, not only to treat the new type of casualty, but even to deter- mine its nature rapidly and efficiently. In short, it found the enemy utterly unprepared, either in theory or practice, to counter its effect. The im- portance of this second type of surprise lies in its peculiar potentialities. It may affect a given mil- itary result with an extraordinarily small expendi- ture of material, energy, and eventually human life, when compared with the older military weapons. Chemical warfare is a weapon, par excellence, to achieve this second type of a ETES, Therein lies its chief importance. 113 The Riddle of the Rhine As a result, the history of chemical warfare becomes one of continual attempts, on both sides, to achieve surprise and to counter it by some accurate forecast in protective methods. It is a struggle for the initiative. More than this, as the use of chemical warfare becomes an organic part of operations, as it did during the war, these operations become corre- spondingly dependent upon conditions imposed by the chemical campaign. One can imagine the case of an army unprotected against a new gas, aware that the enemy is ready to employ the latter, compelled to postpone some huge offensive until its protective methods were equal to countering the new chemical. General Fries, the American au- thority, states, in reference to mustard gas, and the Northern offensives in 1917: ‘“‘It is no dispar- agement of the British, nor of any one else, to say that they held up the date of their attack for two weeks pending further investigations into the effects of this new gas.’’ Ludendorff, referring to the German offensive in March, 1918, tells us, ‘Our artillery relied on gas for its effect. Up till the morning of the 20th strength and direction (of the wind) were by no means favourable, and it seemed almost necessary to put off the attack.” Such a point becomes of greater importance as the influence of other arms decreases. If we assume international arrangements for the limitation of other types of armament in the future, chemical warfare at once stands out as decisive. Controlling Factors;—Rapid Manufacture.— Certain well-defined factors hold a controlling posi- tion in the chemical initiative. Before any chem- ical discovery can be used for surprise on the front a second step must occur; this is large scale manu- I14 The Struggle for the Initiative facture. This period is vital to surprise. Success in chemical warfare is largely dependent on secrecy, which means achieving production in the shortest possible time, and this is particularly important at the commencement of hostilities. Throughout the war the Germans possessed this advantage and, in the future, unless certain steps are taken, it will be theirs again. A very simple example will suffice to show the importance of the combination of these two factors. Let us assume the not remote possi- bility that Germany had refrained from using poison gas until she had reached the stage of development which existed at the time of her 1918 offensive. There is little room for doubt that the big scale use of cloud attacks which would then have been avail- able, and of shell gas, in particular mustard gas, would have achieved decisive success. ‘he Allies would have been totally unprotected, the moral effect would have been enormous, and, even if we ignore the latter, the number of casualties would have produced a gap the size of which was only dependent on German wishes. Rapid Identification Essential—It is important to remember, however, that once a chemical cam- paign has commenced, certain factors may militate against any lengthy retention of the initiative by either party. Organisations develop whose func- tion is to ascertain the nature of new enemy chemical devices so that protective research and production can commence with the minimum delay. This assumes the existence of a protective appliance and organisation. The very efficient collaboration of the British Central Laboratory in France for the examination of new gas shell with the French organ- isation centred in Paris provides numerous examples of the functioning of this safeguard. No time was as The Riddle of the Rhine lost in identifying the nature of the various chemicals employed by Germany in her shell fillings. Speed was vital. ‘The use of a new type of chemical in shell, bomb, or other contrivance, in any sector of the front, on whatever scale, however small, was reported without delay. Then followed instanta- neous collection and examination, after which all front line formations, other formations, allies, and rear organisations were expeditiously warned. ‘The harmless trial flight of the few shell of a new type might be followed by the use of hundreds of thou- sands in a deadly attack one hundred miles away or on another allied front. Not only were captured offensive contrivances of value for this purpose, but the rapid examination of new enemy masks was of prime importance, for it could be assumed that the enemy would be protected against his own surprises in store for others. . Attempts to ascertain the enemy’s gas activities were not confined to examining captured material after their first use. Raids and artillery fire were both used to obtain intelligence regarding prepara- tions, or to break up the gas emplacements. The Germans have provided us with a particularly gallant and interesting attempt. Near Nieuport the front penetrated a region inundated by the Belgians during the desperate German offensives of 1914. ‘The trench system, winding through a mile or so of sand dunes, passed in a southeasterly direction through the marshy sector known as Lombartzyde. Here the bogged front lines were intersected by the Yser canal, the German front trench being some 80 yards away. Allied gas was installed in the Lombartzyde and neighbouring sectors ready for discharge on the first favourable opportunity. For some reason or 116 The Struggle for the Initiative other the Germans suspected this, and at night a raiding party swam down the ice cold Yser, and, negotiating the submerged wire, landed in the Allied support line. Stunning the sentry with a bomb which, fortunately, refused to explode, they proceeded to the front line to seek gas emplace- ments. Either through unexpected disturbance, or for some other reason, they were compelled to leave before completing their inspection, and suc- cessfully swam the Yser canal back to their own trenches. ‘This hazardous enterprise represents but one of many raids whose function it was to ascertain the presence of enemy gas. Propaganda and Morale.—Another factor in- tended to facilitate the attainment of the chemical initiative was the German use of propaganda. Rumours, reflected in the Press, were often current at the Front, at home, and in neutral countries, that some particularly fiendish chemical contrivance was about to be launched against the Allies by Ger- many. Thus, in January and February of 1916, vigorous propaganda activity of this kind in Swit- zerland preceded the great German offensive at Verdun. The new gas was heralded by fantastic stories. Certain death was threatened for all within one hundred yards of the shell burst. The origin of the report was traced to various sources. In one case rumours concerned a conscientious worker in a German factory, desirous of warning the French through Swiss friends, in other cases German sci- entists were reported to be influencing Francophile neutrals in order that they might warn the French. But an analysis of the propaganda reveals some- thing more than its sensational nature. ‘The infor- mation arrived at well-defined periods, which usually preceded the actual use of a new gas or chemical 117 The Riddle of the Rhine device by Germany. But when the actual effort is compared with the prophecy we find that in no case was there any real clue as to the nature of the gas. Thus, before the use of phosgene by the Germans at the end of 1915, definite reports reached the Allies regarding the projected use of at least ten new gases by Germany, which were described not only chemically, but as being colourless, odourless, powerful, blinding, and instantaneously deadly! No such volume of propaganda was experienced before the first German cloud attack at Ypres. Indeed, one would not have expected it, for the mere fact of the use of cloud gas was then new to war, and of military value. This propaganda was not without its effect, and, but for the excellent Allied gas discipline, would have been an effective precursor to the gas itself. Cases were not absent, at the Battle of Loos, for example, in which the German use of lachrymators found British soldiers so mentally unprepared, or rather let us say ‘‘ prepared”’ by propaganda, as to spread ridiculous rumours on the battlefield as to the all-powerful nature of the new German gas shell. These were, in fact, bursting a few yards away, with no more serious results than lachrymation and yom- iting. The extended use of shell gas by the Germans in the summer of 1916 was again preceded by inten- sive propaganda during the early months of that year, in which the promise of prussic acid was prom- inent. The influence of a name is very curious. Prussic acid probably accounted for fewer casualties than any other gas. ‘This fact became apparent with the increasing use of the French Vincennite, which contained prussic acid. Yet German propa- ganda redoubled its efforts as time went on to inspire fear in the Allied soldiers by the threat to use prussic 118 The Struggle for the Initiative acid. It is clear that armies cannot abandon gas discipline, and that an important factor in strength- ening this discipline is a wise distribution of gas knowledge. The use of mustard gas and newer shell gases in 1917 was again preceded by a burst of propaganda. In this period we find the first reference to long-range gas shell and aircraft gas bomb, and, curiously enough, a certain amount of propaganda with regard to a blinding chemical, which partially described mustard gas. As further confirmation of the General Staff origin of this propaganda we find that the 1918 outburst occurred two or three months earlier in the year than in 1917. ‘his was accounted for, no doubt, by its intended influence upon Allied morale in the great German offensive of early 1918. This last wave of propaganda includes one very interesting example. It is better known than other cases through its association with the International Red Cross at Geneva. This body represented in February, 1918, that Germany was about to use a really terrible gas which would have such disastrous effects that it was absolutely essential to make a last attempt to get both sides to abandon gas war- fare. The official wire reads as follows :—‘ Protest of International Red Cross against the use of Poison Gas. I have received private letter from Mon- sieur X., President of International Red Cross, which I think that I ought to lay before you. He says that Red Cross were induced to make protest by what they had heard of new gas Germans are preparing although Red Cross understands that the Allies are aware of the gas and are taking their pre- cautions. As they did not wish to draw an indict- ment of Germany they appealed to both groups of belligerents to pledge themselves not to use this 11g The Riddle of the Rhine weapon. Red Cross asks whether the Entente leaders through Inter-Allied Council at Versailles could not make a loud declaration which would reach the peoples of the Central Empires as well as their rulers, pledging themselves not to use such gas on condition that the two Emperors similarly bind themselves not to employ it. If the latter refuse, all the guilt will rest with them.” Although there can be no doubt that the International Red Cross and the Swiss involved in this move were absolutely bona fide, yet whoever was responsible for initiating the move on the German side played his hand very well. If, as actually occurred, the protest did not result in the cessation of gas hostilities, it still served its purpose as propaganda aimed at Allied morale. Knowing his dispositions for gas defence, and our own offensive preparations,’ it is probable that the enemy was willing to withdraw before being over- whelmed by Allied and American production. After three years of costly improvised production by the Allies, Germany could no longer securely enjoy the fruits of the initiative provided by the plants and factories of the I.G. Peculiar Peace-Time Danger.—There can be no doubt therefore that the mere contact of two armies during war acts as a check against the decisive use of chemical warfare, except in the very early stages. During peace this contact will be practically non- existent, and it would be possible for any country so to diverge in its lines of research and discovery that, given rapid means of production, it could repeat the German surprise of 1915, this time with decisive results. Should such a nation possess a monopoly in the means of rapid production, the world is practically at her mercy. Should she be prepared to break her word, the usual means of 120 The Struggle for the Initiative controlling disarmament are impotent against these developments. War Fluctuations of Initiative—lIn the light of the above remarks the fluctuations in the initiative during the recent war are very significant. ‘The first marked feature was the development of British and Allied protection to counter the enemy attacks which would presumably follow the first German use of cloud gas. Immediately after the German chemical surprise, and while the Allies were still undecided whether to retaliate, work proceeded feverishly on the development of some form of pro- tection for the hitherto unprotected soldier... In response to Lord Kitchener’s dramatic appeal to the women of England and France, masks were sent to France in sufficient quantity satis, a few days. They were of a very primitive type, and consisted of a pad of cotton wool impregnated with certain chemicals, to be held in place over the mouth, which was superseded, in May, by a very similar contriv- ance, slightly more efficient with regard to the length of time of protection. Dr. Haldane and certain other prominent chemists and physiologists worked on the different improvised types. With this feeble protection, or, in the first case, with none at all, our armies had to face the first German cloud gas attacks. The idea of the gas helmet which covered the whole head was brought to England by Captain Macpherson of the Newfoundland Corps, early in May. Suitably impregnated, it made satisfactory tests. The helmet type of respirator made of flannel was first tested in the Anti-Gas laboratories on May roth, 1915, and was a great success com- pared with previously suggested types. Arrange- ments for its manufacture were accordingly made, and this began in June, 1915. ‘This protective 121 The Riddle of the Rhine device consisted of a flannel helmet with a celluloid film eyepiece, and was called the hypo helmet. The fabric was impregnated with the same solution as the cotton waste pads described above, the dipping being carried out largely at Oxford Works, but partly in the Royal Army Clothing Department, Pimlico. Its manufacture was continued until Sep- tember, 1915, about two and a half millions being made in all. From June, 1915, we never really lost the initiative in the matter of defence, although, at different times, the struggle was very intense. It was this helmet, with the modified phenate im- pregnation, which, known as the P. helmet, formed the first line of defence against the probable employ- ment of phosgene by Germany. It became known as the ‘“Tube Helmet”? when fitted with a mouth- piece for exhaled air, and, in this form, countered the formidable enemy phosgene attack in December, 1915. The later addition of hexamine, suggested from Russia, greatly improved the efficiency against phosgene and led to the P.H. helmet, which was issued from January, 1916. It was not withdrawn until February, 1918, but in the later stages was used as a second line of defence. The magnitude of this manceuvring for protection can be judged from the facts that two and a half millions of hypo helmets, nine millions of P. helmets, and fourteen millions of P.H. helmets were issued during the cam- paign. There is no doubt that this early period, however, was a very costly experiment on the use of the different masks, the success of which involved the loss of numbers of men who were compelled, through reasons of supply or uncertain design, to use the less eficient types. In one case, for example, the trial of mica eyepieces rendered otherwise efficient masks 122 The Struggle for the Initiative absolutely useless by breaking, and caused losses. We cannot afford to repeat such experiments in future. Failure to develop protective appliances fatally implies large-scale experiments in future wars in which unnecessary loss of life is bound to occur. If steady research in peace can diminish this pos- sible loss, shall it be stopped? The urgency of these developments can be under- stood from a case quoted by General Hartley:! ‘A certain modification of the respirator was con- sidered necessary in France, and officers were sent home to explain what was needed. Within forty- eight hours of their arrival arrangements were made to modify the respirators, and within a few weeks the fighting troops had been re-equipped with the new pattern. Less than three months after the change had been recommended three attacks were made by the Germans which would certainly have had very serious consequences if our troops had not been in possession of the improved respirator, as the older pattern would not have withstood the con- centration of gas employed. This was only one of many changes that were made in the respirator to meet new developments.” How urgent was the need for these developments? It was vital. Here is a case showing frightful losses sustained by partially or inefficiently protected troops. Between May and July of 1915 the Ger- mans made at least three cloud gas attacks upon the Russians, immediately west of Warsaw. In all these attacks, taken together, gas was discharged for a total time of not more than one hour, and they were all practically from the same position, on a front of about six miles. ‘The affair seems relatively small, yet what was the result? ‘The Russians lost *Report before the British Association, 1919. 123 The Riddle of the Rhine not less than 5000 dead on the field, and their total casualties were of the order of 25,000 officers andmen. A Siberian regiment had, before the last attack, a ration strength of about forty officers and 4000 men. This was reduced by a twenty minutes gas discharge to four officers and four hundred men. No other weapon could have reproduced, under the most favourable conditions for its use, in as many days, what gas was able to do in as many minutes. Although our protection had countered the later German attacks with cloud gas, yet it threatened to fail to meet the situation created by the use of a variety of organic chemicals in shell. In order to counter the use of lachrymatory compounds by the enemy, compounds which penetrated the helmet insufficiently to cause serious casualties but sufh- ciently to hamper the individual by lachrymation, goggles were introduced in which the eyes were protected by rims of rubber sponge. This remedied the weakness of the P.H. helmet and produced the P.H.G. helmet, of which more than one and a half millions were issued during 1916-1917. Towards the end of 1915 the standard protection was the P. and P.H. helmet, but the use of lachry- mators compelled us to use the P.H.G. Even this helmet was not satisfactory against the high concen- trations of phosgene or lachrymators, and after much research the opinion gained ground that further development must be on other lines. In addition, the need for a more general form of protection was emphasised by the German adoption of a mask of cartridge design. In other words, the fabric of the helmet, or facial portion of the mask, was made impermeable, and the filtration of the poisoned air occurred through a cartridge, or filtering box, attached to the fabric in the form of a snout. The 124 The Struggle for the Initiative cartridge provided a much greater protective range and capacity. It was clear that such German pro- tection was evidence of their plans for the further use of gas. he new German cartridge mask ap- peared in the autumn of 1915. Doctor H. Pick, reviewing German protective measures in Schwarte’s book, enumerates the various desiderata of the ideal mask and explains, ‘It was only our early recog- nition of these requirements which gave us an adyan- tage over the enemy from the first in the sphere of defensive measures against gas, and which spared us from having to undertake radical alterations in the apparatus as the English, French, and Russians had to do more than once.”” This early adoption of a comprehensive view on protection by Germany is a testimony to both German thoroughness and their definite intention to proceed with a vigorous chem- ical war. The latter is not mere inference, for it is borne out by the dates at which they commenced production in their dye factories. Further, even if the German cartridge mask was only decided upon after Loos, which is not probable, our feeble reply in that battle would hardly have justified such a radical advance in protection. It was thus forecasted that not only would new ranges of compounds be employed which it would be most difficult to counter individually, but aggressive methods would arise, either entirely new or modi- fications of the cloud method, which would enable much higher concentrations to be obtained than those in evidence hitherto. Accordingly the first type of the well-known British Box Respirator was designed, giving a big capacity of highly efficient filtering material, or granule, contained in a canister, with an improved face-piece and breathing arrange- ments. Without going into details, it may be said 126 The Riddle of the Rhine that Colonel Harrison and Major Lambert were associated with a number of other enthusiastic workers in developing the Box Respirator. Here again the question of chemical supply threat- ened to influence our retention of the initiative. Without going into the development of the granule in the respirator, the supply of potassium perman- ganate was of prime importance, and the country was woefully deficient in the production of this sub- stance. [he determined efforts of British manu- facturers overcame this difficulty. It was now pos- sible to work on general lines for the improvement of this canister to increase its protective range, and to modify the canister specifically in accordance with intelligence as to what the enemy had recently done or was about to do. In this way, and suc- cessively, the army was successfully protected against the higher concentrations employed and the newer substances introduced. ‘The issue of the large Box Respirator commenced in February, 1916. It was replaced by the small Box Respirator which came out in August, 1916, and of which over sixteen millions had been issued before the signing of the Armistice. At one time over a quarter of a million small Box Respirators were produced weekly. The chief mod- ifications were the use of a smaller box or canister, the margin of protection being unnecessarily large in the former type. It became necessary in the spring of 1917 to pro- vide more efficient protection against irritating smokes which tended to penetrate the respirator as minute particles, and the first form consisted in the use of two layers of cotton wadding in the canister of the small Box Respirator. The use of Blue Cross compounds by Germany in the summer of 1917 ren- dered this matter more urgent, and a special filter 126 The Struggle for the Initiative jacket was designed which fitted round the Small Box Respirator. A million were made and sent to France. Developments proceeded on these lines. Altogether, more than fifty million masks and respirators of dif- ferent kinds were manufactured by the British Anti-Gas Department for our own and Allied armies. We thus have some idea of the importance of pro- tection in chemical warfare and of the absolutely imperative need of deciding whether or no work on protection must go on. ‘There can be no doubt as to the answer to this question. It is not only in the interest of the army, whether a League of Nations or a national army, but also in those of the civil population. The Tense Protective Struggle—PFew people realise how the development of Allied and enemy gas masks and protective measures was forced upon each side in a number of critical steps. At each of these, had research and production been unequal to the task, the armies would have found themselves more uncovered and exposed than if the whole trench and dug-out system had been suddenly rendered unusable in some peculiar way, thus removing cover from high explosive and shrapnel, rifle, and machine-gun fire. The army has an apt expression. An officer or man parading incompletely equipped is dubbed “half naked.” ‘To be within reach of enemy gas without a mask was true nakedness. A modern army without a gas mask is much more helpless and beaten than one without boots. More than this, it must be clearly understood that a gas mask of efficient design and production will remain of very little use unless, supported by comprehensive research which, itself, gains enormously in efficiency if related to enemy offensive activities. 127 The Riddle of the Rhine The German Mask.—Consider the German mask for amoment. We have seen how Germany adopted the canister drum or cartridge form before any of the other belligerents, and in good time to protect her own men against their own use of phosgene, at the end of 1915. Indeed, Germany probably held up the use of phosgene until her own protection against it was developed, although Schwarte’s book claims that the German mask issue in 1915 was mainly a pro- tection against chlorine. The filling consisted of some such material as powdered pumice-stone sat- urated with a solution of potash, and powdered over with fine absorbent charcoal in order to pro- tect against organic irritants and phosgene. ‘hese were the familiar one-layer drums. Then came the British concentrated cloud gas offensive in the sum- mer of 1916, which undoubtedly found the German mask unequal to some of the higher concentrations which were obtained under most favourable condi- tions. The Gas Officer of the Sixth German Army stated in a document issued in November, 1916: ‘Considerable losses were caused by the gas attacks which have taken place latterly. ‘The casualties were mainly due to the men being surprised in dug- outs, to the neglect of gas discipline, masks not being at hand, to faulty masks, and to the use of old patsern drums which could not afford protection against the type of gas employed by the enemy.’— (The italics are our own.—V. Evidence is found in the introduction of the German three-layer drum in the autumn of 1916. An army does not undertake the manufacture of millions of new appliances without very good reason. This new drum was specially aimed at phosgene protection. The middle layer consisted of granulated absorbent charcoal, which had the 128 The Struggle for the Initiative property of absorbing large quantities of organic irritants and phosgene. In the three-layer drum the latter gas was adequately guarded against for most field purposes, although we have reason to believe that the German staff was always appre- hensive, and German soldiers suspicious of the actual penetration of their mask obtained in the immediate locality of projector discharges. Dr. Pick explains in Schwarte’s book what is already well known, that the charcoal layer has a wide, ‘‘non-specific effect, and it retains almost all materials of which the molecular weight is not too small, even if very strongly neutral in character (as, for example, chlorpicrin).’’ He goes on to say “the progressive development of gas warfare led to the use of these very materials, whilst substances with acid properties, such as chlorine, fell more and more into disuse. The three-layer drum went through all sorts of changes in consequence. When the use of chlorpicrin mixtures gained in importance in 1917, the layer of charcoal was increased at the expense of the other two layers. This stage of development ended in 1918, when the other layers were done away with altogether, and the entire three sets were filled with ‘A’ charcoal.” ‘“ ‘A’ charcoal was a particularly efficient form. We learn from the same source that the increased protection against phosgene was very welcome to the Germans in view of the danger arising from gas projector attacks. Further, the capacity for absorption of the German charcoal was never equalled by any of foreign pro- duction.” This was certainly true for the greater part of the war. But Dr. Pick continues, in a sen- tence which is full of significance: ‘In consequence of the high quality of the drum’s absorption, we were able to carry on to the end of the war with a drum of 129 The Riddle of the Rhine relatively small proportions.” This point is so important as to demand further explanation. Enforced German Modifications.—The most im- portant disadvantage of a gas mask is its resistance to breathing. Men undertaking arduous and dan- gerous duties in the presence of gas must wear a mask, but they cannot undertake these duties if their breathing is seriously interfered with. ‘This is particularly so in trench engineering and in the heavy work of the artillery. Now the resistance depends, for a given type of filling, upon the area of the cross-section of the drum. Breathing will be easier through a very large area than through a very small one. The British appliance was a frank admission that, with its filling, a large drum was necessary, so large that the weight of it could not be borne by the mask itself, but by attachment to the chest, the actual mask being connected with the drum or box by a flexible rubber tube. But the Germans adopted from the beginning a form of protective appliance in which the drum or cartridge was attached to and supported by the mask. In other words, their development was limited by the weight of their drum, unless they completely changed their type on British lines. It is quite clear that they realised this, for Doctor Pick tells us, referring to the large size of the British box: ‘‘ For this reason the weight of the box is so great that it is no longer possible to attach it directly to the mask. It is, therefore, carried on the chest and joined to the mouthpiece of the mask by a flexible tube.” The development of British cloud gas compelled the Germans so to modify their filling that the resistance to breathing increased considerably. They countered this, however, by introducing an exceed- ingly active charcoal, realising that the weight of 130 The Struggle for the Initiative their drum had already reached the limit possible with that type of apparatus, and that they could not, therefore, get better breathing capacity by increasing its size. When, however, the Blue Cross compounds were introduced, it was necessary for both armies to take special precautions. These precautions involved introducing a layer of filtering material into the canister or drum. Dr. Pick tells us: “When the material of the Blue Cross type became of greater importance, a supplementary apparatus had to be issued. A thin disc filter prepared by a special method from threads of cotton was fastened to the tube of the drum by means of a spring lid. This arrangement provided adequate protection against materials of the Blue Cross type used by the enemy, as, for instance, stannic chloride, whilst the German Blue Cross gas, which was more penetrating, was only retained to a moderate degree.”’ This is a direct admission that, in order to counter the Allied use of Blue Cross gas, further filtering arrangements would have been necessary. But the resistance to breathing of the German apparatus was already strained to the utmost. It is exceedingly improb- able that the Germans, having already reached the limit of size of the canister or drum, and being unable to obtain better breathing by increase in size, could have introduced any such device without carrying their resistance beyond the possible limit. In other words, the use of Blue Cross by the Allies would have compelled them to adopt the British type of appa- ratus, that is, a bigger box supported by the chest and connected to the mask by a flexible rubber tube. This would have led them into an impasse. Shortage of Rubber.—We know how, in the be- ginning of 1917, they were compelled to substitute leather in the substance of the mask. Dr. Pick igi The Riddle of the Rhine admits that this was due to lack of raw material, rubber, and there are many other signs that this was so. Although leather was not altogether a bad substi- tute for this purpose, rubber would have been essen- tial for the flexible tube, and the millions required to refit the army would have completely broken the German rubber resources. Many facts, including their feverish development of synthetic rubber, small quantities of which they obtained at enormous cost, goto prove this conclusion. The submarine, Deutsch- land, returning to Germany in 1916, from its historic trip to America, carried shipments of the most sorely needed commodities, including large quantities of raw rubber. Stringent measures were adopted later to collect waste rubber and prevent its use for such purposes as billiard tables and tyres for private vehicles. ‘The first naval expedition to Baltic ports after the Armistice found the hospitals in a pitiable plight for lack of rubber. “The Germans were being driven into an impossible position. In other words, the Allies, by a proper use of Blue Cross compounds, could have regained the gas initiative. There is no doubt that they were within a few months of doing so. Once again we see the importance of production. Lack of raw materials for protective purposes was endangering the German position, but delay in offensive production by the Allies re- moved that danger. Although their pressing need was obvious, the Blue Cross arsenic compounds were not available. The chemical war involves manceuvr- ing for position just as definitely as the older forms, but in it production, formerly a routine activity, assumes critical strategic importance. Gas Discipline.—This constant vigilance against enemy surprise imposed more conditions upon the troops than the permanent adoption of a protective 132 YHE UiBRARY OF (hk UHIVERSITY OF LLMNOIS (ca cat tiaaataeeemete aetna EET asng aavf of, “dATJIA[qGo ay} UO SqWIOY SsUaATT JO UOISOTdx7] ITI—YOLOA(ONd SNAAIT AHL Bir ws, The Struggle for the Initiative appliance which, in itself, was a very big thing. Given the mask, the army had to be taught how and when to use it. A gas sense had to be developed which ensured rapid use of the mask at the right time with the least hampering of operations. Gas dis- cipline thus became one of the most important fea- tures of general training, a feature which can never be abandoned by the armies of civilised nations in the future without disastrous results. This discipline, like all other protective work, was dependent in its nature and intensity upon the struggle for the initia- tive. One example out of many is found in the numerous German Army Orders which followed our introduction of the Livens projector. This weapon gave the possibility of much higher concentrations at much greater ranges from the front line than were formerly possible and for a time German gas dis- cipline was severely shaken, and the staffs had to react violently to meet the situation. The intro- duction of this weapon, in fact, was the first clear case of the gaining of the chemical initiative by the Allies. A telegram from German General Head- quarters stated: ‘Ihe English have achieved con- siderable success by firing gas mines simultaneously from a considerable number of projectors on to one point. Casualties occurred because the gas was fired without warning, and because its concentration was so great that a single breath would incapacitate a man.”’ This is a further example of the fact that the decisive initiative was very difficult to obtain after two years of war, whereas by the same means it would have been ensured at the commencement. The general development of German protection was a partial safeguard, but the value of the weapon could be seen from the fact that an order was issued 133 The Riddle of the Rhine for all German working parties to wear gas masks when within 1000 yards of the front line on nights not obviously unsuitable for Allied gas discharges. It is difficult to exaggerate the military importance of such an imposition. Summary.—We have thus covered a period, the main features of which were attempts at the cloud initiative by Germany and our rapid and successful protective reaction. The conditions surrounding the first attack were entirely peculiar. The complete surprise attending it could only be repeated at the commencement of another war. It failed for entirely different reasons from those which prevented the decisive use of phosgene by the Germans. But our reaction carried us further, and we developed the final form of cloud gas attack, the Livens pro- jector, which, in its turn, taxed the German protec- tion to the utmost, and threatened to overcome it. History repeated itself with a vengeance in this protective struggle. Two attempts at the cloud initiative, the German phosgene attempt and the Livens projector, were both partially successful. Had either of those attempts shared the surprise of April 22nd, 1915, their success would have been many times greater. It was contact on the battle front that developed a protective appliance and organisation, by giving us an insight into enemy appliances and _ projects. We cannot emphasise too strongly the significance of this for the future. Apart from remote excep- tions, contact will be entirely absent. We can have no guarantee whatever that new devices will be revealed, either between nations or to a central body. Suppose the Germans had been more fully aware of the possibilities of cloud gas, and, realising the dependence of their one method upon wind 134 The Struggle for the Initiative direction and caprice, had developed our method of producing cloud at a distance. The combinations of the two methods at Ypres could hardly have left a margin of chance for failure. ‘This is a feeble example of what may occur. | New German Attempts.—By this time it was not easy to see how either side could obtain a decisive surprise by the use of chemicals aimed at the respira- tory system. It appeared very difficult to penetrate the different forms of respirators by conditions obtainable in the field. Professor F. P. Kirschbaum, writing on gas war- fare, in Schwarte’s book, reveals how Germany counted on obtaining the gas initiative against the French at Verdun. He explains how the decision to use Green Cross on a large scale coincided with certain modifications in the design of the German gas shell, which made its large-scale manufacture much simpler and more rapid. ‘The manufacture of Green Cross,”’ he also tells us, ‘“‘was assured in the special progress in technical chemistry, and the output was adequate,” and goes on to explain, ‘“The first use of per stuff! found the enemy unprepared with any suitable protection. The French had equipped their troops with protection against chlo- rine, but had provided no protection against phos- gene,’—‘‘the results of Green Cross ammunition were recognised by the troops. During the big operations before Verdun, however, the enemy did their very utmost to substitute the gas mask M2 for the respirator XTX. Gas mask M2 was a protection against Green Cross. For this reason Green Cross ammunition alone could not be expected to have an effect, as soon as the enemy carried out defensive measures by means of gas mask M2 or *Diphosgene or Green Cross constituents. 135 The Riddle of the Rhine some better apparatus. This reverse spurred on the Germans to renewed efforts.’ The writer pro- ceeds to explain how in 1916 these efforts resulted in finding two important substitutes, mustard gas or Yellow Cross and the arsenic compounds of the Blue Cross type. Yellow and Blue Cross.—The Germans had, somewhat hastily, laid aside their cloud activities. But they were very keenly pursuing sanother line, the development of shell gas. Thus, in July, 1917, they made two distinct attempts to regain their initiative by the use of shell gas, and were very largely successful in one case. Werefer tothe Yellow and Blue Cross shell, containing mustard gas and diphenyl-chlorarsine respectively. Captain Geyer, writing in Schwarte’s book, relates: ‘‘Gas was used to a much greater extent, over 100,000 shells to a bombardment after the introduction of the Green Cross shell in the summer of 1916 at Ver- dun. From that time the use of gas became much more varied as the number of types of guns firing gas projectiles was increased, field guns having also been provided with gas projectiles. The most tre- mendous advance in the use of gas by the artillery, and indeed in the use of gas in general, came in the summer of 1917 with the introduction of the three elements, Green, Yellow, and Blue, one after another. ‘This introduced the most varied possibil- ities of employing gas, which were utilised to the full in many places on the front during the successful defensive operations of 1917, above all in Flanders and at Verdun. The hardly perceptible poisoning of an area by means of Yellow Cross shell and the surprise gas attack became two of the new regula- tion methods of using gas.”’ 136 — en ee ee ee ee The Struggle for the Initiative Yellow Cross.—The respirator afforded complete protection against the attacks of mustard gas on the respiratory system, but this gas evaded protection in other ways. In the first place, its early unfamiliar- ity evaded the gas discipline of the Allies, and it was not realised in many cases that the respirator was necessary. This was speedily corrected, but its second line of attack was not easily, and never finally countered. We refer to its vesicant action. Mus- tard gas could produce severe blistering and skin wounds in such slight concentrations, even through clothing, that it was a tremendous casualty producer, putting men out of action for several weeks or months, with a very low rate of mortality. Used in large quantities against an entirely unprotected army, its results might well have been decisive. ~~ This was the first example of chemical attack upon a new function. We had too readily assumed that gas, or chemical attack, would be restricted to the respiratory system, or to the eyes. We had assumed that if our mask protection was ahead of enemy respiratory attacks our situation was safe. Mustard gas was a rude awakening. It was impos- sible to protect fully against mustard gas, unless we protected the whole body, and it was never possible to do this during the war without too seriously influ- encing the movements of the soldier. Blue Cross.—The Blue Cross Shell was a delib- erate attempt to pierce the respirator. It repre- sented to the German mind such an advance of aggression over protection that the effect on the enemy would be almost as if he were entirely unpro- tected. Some idea of the German estimate of its importance can be found in the following quotation from Captain Geyer: ‘The search for new irritants in the sphere of arsenic combinations led to the dis- 137 The Riddle of the Rhine covery of a series of effective substances. In view of the obvious importance of highly irritant com- pounds capable of existing in a very finely divided, pulverised, or particulate form, research was made in the domain of little volatile substances with boiling © points up to 400°. ‘This led to the astonishing dis- covery that diphenylarsenious chloride when scat- tered would penetrate all gas masks then in use, even the German, practically unweakened, and would have serious irritant effects on the wearers. This discovery could only be explained by the sup- position that the irritant works in the form of par- ticles which it is difficult to keep back by means of a respirator, even a completely protecting respirator, such as the German and English gas masks were at that time. Further analysis showed that the mix- ture of air and gas examined revealed a concentra- tion of gas greatly in excess of the point of satura- tion for the vapour given off by this stuff. Finally, ultra microscopic examination showed the existence of smoke particles. A new type of fighting material had been discovered.” He also tells us how, following this discovery, production rose to 600 tons monthly, and used up all the arsenic obtainable in Germany. The Allies were fully alive to the importance of this matter, and we have already explained that, had they been in possession of large quantities of Blue Cross compounds, they might have forced German pro- tection into an impossible position. No better example could be found of the immense superiority enjoyed by Germany owing to her flexible and efh- cient producing organisation. Captain Geyer goes on to explain how the military value of these pro- jectiles was considerable, and, therefore, the monthly production reached a figure of over one million shell. 138 The Struggle for the Initiative We have already emphasised the question of design in chemical warfare, and its importance is borne out by the comparative failure of these German projec- tiles. Geyer explains how only minute particles less than 1/10,000 of a millimetre in diameter are of any use to penetrate a mask, and he develops the difficulties experienced by Germany in obtaining such fine pulverisation without decomposing the substance. He explains the difficulties which they had in arriving at a suitable shell, and their unsuc- cessful struggle to overcome the necessity of a glass container, which, he says, demanded ‘‘a considerable advance in the technical work of shell production.’ This attempt at the chemical initiative by the use of Blue Cross illustrates another method of attack. Geyer says, “Blue and Green Cross ammu- nition were used simultaneously in the field—called coloured cross (Buntkreuz) in order, by the use of Blue Cross, to force the enemy to remove gas masks, whereby they exposed themselves to the poisonous effects of Green Cross. Matters seldom reached that point, however, for as soon as the enemy realised the effect of ‘coloured cross’ ammunition, they withdrew troops which were being bombarded with it from their positions to a zone beyond the range of artillery fire. The English in particular had tried to protect the troops against the effects of dipheny]l- arsenious chloride, and of diphenylarsenious cyanide (which followed it and was even more effective) by the use of filters made of woollen material and wad- ding. They were to a great extent technically suc- cessful, but the most effective defensive apparatus, the ‘jacket’ to the box, was unsatisfactory from the military point of view, as the troops could only make a limited use of it owing to the difficulty of breathing or suffocation which it occasioned.” 139 The Riddle of the Rhine The reference to the withdrawal of troops is a picturesque misrepresentation. The relative inef- ficiency of the German shell rendered this unneces- sary. In addition, as Captain Geyer explains, our troops were specially protected in anticipation of the use of particulate clouds. An examination of our protective device by the Germans obviously led them to believe that resistance to breathing was too great for the protective appliance to be practicable. But here the exceptional gas discipline of the British troops became effective. There is no doubt that the new mask was worn just as constantly and satis- factorily as the old. Captain Geyer’s remarks are also interesting from a point of view to which we have already referred: they show how much this question of resistance to breathing was exercising the minds of those responsible for German protection. “Particulate” Clouds.—The principle of particu- late clouds was not entirely new, both sides having used smoke combined with lethal gases with the object of forcing the removal of the respirator. It was thought that the particulate form of the smoke would penetrate a respirator designed purely to hold up vapours and gases. ‘The reasoning was perfectly sound. It was only a question of using the right smoke in the right way. There were good grounds to believe that such substances would penetrate the respirator, and either produce a casualty or compel the removal of the respirator by the paroxysms pro- duced, to allow some lethal gas to complete the work on the unprotected soldier. Fortunately for us, these objectives were not attained, but this was rather due to some hitch or miscalculation in the German preparations than to any inherent impossibility. After this period, although chemical warfare 140 ee ee ee ee ee ee ee d | : The Struggle for the Initiative became increasingly an organic part of German (and Allied) operations, yet there is no serious field evi- dence of a deliberate attempt at the gas initiative. It must be remembered, however, that gas figured very largely indeed in the March, 1918, attempt, by Germany, to regain the general initiative. It 1s stated authoritatively, for example, that in July, 1918, the German Divisional Ammunition Dump contained normally 50 per cent. of gas shell and, in the preparation, in May, 1918, for German attacks | on the Aisne, artillery programmes included as much as 80 per cent. gas shell for certain objectives. Potential Production and Peace.—Enough has been said to show the general nature of the chemical warfare struggle. The question of the chemical Initiative is vital at the commencement of hostilities. Unless, then, we completely rule out any possibility whatever of a future war, it is vital for that occa: sion. We have indicated sufficiently clearly the factors upon which such initiative depends, to show the critical importance of manufacturing capacity, and protective preparedness. A further quotation from Schwarte’s book is very much to the point. It tells us: “Whilst on our side only a few gases were intro- duced, but with successful results, the use of gas by the enemy presents quite another picture. We know of no less than twenty-five gases used by the enemy, and of fifteen types of gas projectile used by the French alone, and we know, from ‘blind’ (dud) shells which have been found, what they contain. The only effective gases amongst them were phosgene and dichlorodiethyl sulphide. ‘The other substances are harmless preparations, used most probably for purposes of camouflage, a method I4I The Riddle of the Rhine highly esteemed by the enemy, but which did not enter into the question with us, owing to the capacity of our chemical industry for the production of effective materials.” This is true to a considerable extent. Our de- pendence on improvised and relatively inefficient production imposed conditions upon Allied policy, whereas, in Germany, they had but to command a _ flexible and highly efficient producing machine. The world movement towards disarmament will hardly countenance the maintenance of permanent chemical arsenals. In the face of war experience and further research developments the laborious war improvisation of these arsenals will not save us as it did in the last struggle. Any nation devoid of the means of production invites enemy chemical aggression and is helpless against it. This, and the need to keep abreast of chemical warfare develop- ment—particularly in protection—are the chief lessons of the struggle for the chemical initiative. 142 SS | | . : CHAPTER VII REVIEW OF PRODUCTION Critical Importance of Production.—Our analysis of the struggle for the initiative reveals the critical importance of production. In the chemical more than in any other form of warfare, production has a tactical and strategic importance and functions as an organic part of the offensive scheme. A tendency in modern war is to displace the incidence of initiative towards the rear. Staffs cannot leave the discov- eries of the technical workshop or scientific laboratory out of their calculations, for their sudden introduc- tion into a campaign may have more influence on its result than the massing of a million men with their arms and equipment for a surprise assault. ‘The use of a new war device may shake the opposing formations more than the most cunningly devised attack of this sort. When, after the first brilliant assault on the Somme on July rst, we began to lose men, material, and the initiative, in an endless series of local attacks, we were even then regaining it by the home devel- opment of the tank. Even before the colossal German effort was frustrated by the first Marne battle and the development of trench warfare, the German laboratories were within an ace of regaining the initiative by their work on cloud gas. After the lull in their gas attacks, when the Germans sought to gain the initiative and a decision by the 143 The Riddle of the Rhine use of phosgene, the quiet work of our defensive organisations at home had completely countered the move weeks before. But in all these cases the counter idea could not become effective without large-scale production. This was absolutely fundamental. Had we taken six years to produce the first type of tank, had the Germans failed to manufacture mustard gas within a period of years instead of succeeding in weeks, and had the box respirator taken longer to produce, all the brilliant thinking and research underlying these developments would have had practically no influence on the campaign, for they would have had no incidence upon it. We could go on multi- plying examples. But what is the conclusion? From this rapid development of methods a new principle emerges. ‘The initiative no longer remains the sole property of the staffs unless we enlarge the staff conception. Vital moves can be engineered from a point very remote in organisation and dis- tance from the G.H.Q. of armies in the field. But there is a critical step between the invention and its effect on military initiative. This is production, which for these newer methods becomes an organic part of the campaign. But the future is our chief preoccupation. What would be the supreme characteristics of the early stages of a future war? It would be distinguished by attempts of belligerents to win immediate and decisive success by large scale use of various types of surprise. Three factors would be pre-eminent, the nature of the idea or invention, the magnitude on which it is employed, and its actual time of incidence, that is, the delay between the actual declaration of war and its use. Now the invention is of no use whatever without the last two factors, 144 Review of Production which are entirely dependent on production. When, in 1917, the Allied staffs pressed repeatedly for gases with which to reply to German Yellow Cross, their urgent representations met with no _ satis- factory response until nearly a year had elapsed. This was not due to lack of invention, for we had simply to copy the German discovery. Failure to meet the crying demands of the Front was due to delay in production. Any eventual chemical surprise will, under genuine conditions of disarmament, depend on peace industry, for no such conditions will tolerate the existence of huge military arsenals. We have already indicated the type of peace-time industry par excellence, which can rapidly and silently mobilise for war. It is the organic chemical industry. Therefore, whatever the war may have taught us as to the value of chem- ical industry, its importance from the point of view of a future war is magnified many times. The surprise factor is responsible. ‘The next war will only commence once, however long it may drag on, and it is to the start that all efforts of a nation plan- ning war will be directed. It is, therefore, of impor- tance to examine in detail the development of chem- ical production during the recent war. A close examination is of more than historical significance, and should provide answers to certain vital questions. German chemical industry was the critical factor in this new method of war which almost led to our downfall. How did the activities of this industry compare with our own production? To this an answer is attempted below, but graver questions follow. Was our inferior position due to more than a combination of normal economic conditions, and were we the victims of a considered policy? If so, who directed it, and when did it 145 The Riddle of the Rhine first give evidence of activity? An answer to these questions will be attempted in a later chapter. Significance of the German Dye Industry.—At the end of 1914 the nation began to realise what it meant to be at the mercy of the German dye monop- oly. Apart from the immediate economic war dis- advantages, the variety and sinister peace ramif- cations of this monopoly had not been clearly revealed. Mr. Runciman, then President of the Board of Trade, stated with regard to the dye in- dustry: “The inquiries of the Government have led them to the conclusion that the excessive de- pendence of this country on a single foreign country for materials of such vital importance to the industry in which millions of our workpeople were employed, constitutes a permanent danger which can only be remedied by a combined national effort on a scale which requires and justifies an exceptional measure of State encouragement.’’ Measures were defined later. In the debate in the House of Commons in Feb- ruary, 1915, on the aniline dye industry, a member prominent in the discussion, referring to ‘taking sides on the question of Free Trade,” stated that, “It was a great pity that this should occur when the attention of the House is occupied with regard to matters connected with the war,’ and proceeded to draw a comparison between the national importance of the manufacture of dyes and that of lead pencils. Fortunately he prefaced his remarks by explaining his ignorance of the ‘technical matters involved in this aniline dye industry.’ ‘These are two out of many references to the pressure due to the absence of German dyes, which illustrate the purely economic grounds on which the issue was being discussed, on 146 Review of Production the one hand, and reveal the prevailing ignorance of its importance on the other. Exactly one month later came the first German gas shock. Such statements as the above tempt us to ask who, at this time, realised the common source of the direct military and indirect economic attack. It can hardly be doubted that the existence of the German dye factories was largely responsible for the first German use of gas on the front. We have already seen how, from the first month of the war, the chemical weapon was the subject of definite research. Falkenhayn leaves us in no doubt as to the chief factor which finally determined its use. Referring to difficulties of production, he says, “Only those who held responsible posts in the German G.H.Q. in the winter of 1914-15 . . . can form any estimate of the difficulty which had to be overcome at that time. ‘The adjustment of science and engineering . . . took place almost noiselessly, so that they were accomplished before the enemy quite knew what was happening. Particular stress was laid upon the promotion of the production of munitions . . . as well as the development of gas as a means of warfare.” Referring to protective methods of trench warfare, he continues, ‘‘Where one party had gained time . . . the ordinary meth- ods of attack often failed completely. A weapon had, therefore, to be found which was superior to them but which would not excessively tax the lim- ited capacity of German war industry in its pro- duction. Such a weapon existed in gas.” The Germans had themselves shown us where this production occurred, and Ludendorff supple- ments our information by telling us how he dis- cussed the supply of war material with Herr Duis- burg and Herr Krupp von Bohlen in Halbach, 147 The Riddle of the Rhine ‘whom I had asked to join the train”’ in the autumn of 1916. The former was the Chairman of the LG., the great dye combine. Those producing a new weapon of war must always consider the possibilities possessed by their opponents to exploit the same weapon after the first shock. For the Germans the answer was obvious. ‘The Allies would be held at a material disadvantage for months, if not years. Without the means of production available in Germany, we are not at all convinced that the gas experiment would have been made, and had it not been made, and its formidable success revealed, Germany’s hes- itation to use this new weapon would probably have carried the day. This, at least, is the most generous point of view. In other words, the German poison gas experiment owed a large part of its initial momentum to ease of production by a monopoly. The combination of this factor with the willingness to use gas led to the great experiment. ‘The future may again provide this combination, unless the monopoly is removed. Following up this line of thought, we can see how tempting was the German course of action. Falkenhayn has told us what a violent strain was imposed upon Germany by the stabilisation of the Western Front early in 1915. The tension between the Great General Headquarters and the Home Goy- ernment was already in evidence, and would have caused difficulty in attaining suitable home and liaison organisations, in particular with regard to supply. We can well understand this when we remember the drastic changes which occurred in our own ministries and departments. But what organ- isation was required for chemical warfare supply? Very little! Quoting from the report of the Hartley 148 Review of Production Mission to the chemical factories in the occupied zone, we know that when the Government wished to produce a new gas ‘‘a conference with the various firms was held at Berlin to determine how manu- facture should be subdivided in order to use the existing plant to the best advantage.’ The firms referred to were the constituent members of the highly organised I.G. There was no need to create a clumsy and complicated organisation with an eficient one existing in the I.G. ready to meet the Government demands. ‘The path could not have been smoother. Ludendorff states in his memoirs that the Hindenburg programme made a special feature of gas production. Increased supply of explosives was also provided for. He says: ‘We aimed at approximately doubling the previous pro- duction.” And again: “Gas production, too, had to keep pace with the increased output of ammuni- tion. ‘The discharge of gas from cylinders was used less and less. ‘The use of gas shells increased cor- respondingly.’’ ‘This programme represented a de- termined effort to speed up munitions production in the autumn of 1916. It included not only gas but explosives, both of which could be supplied by the I.G. Explosives demanded oleum, nitric acid, and nitrating plants, which already existed, standardised, in the factories of the dye combine. The unusual speed with which standard dye-producing plant was converted for the production of explosives is in- stanced in the operation of a T.N.T. plant at Lever- kusen, producing 250 tons per month. The conver- sion only took six weeks. The factories of the I.G. supplied a considerable proportion of the high explo- sives used by Germany. In the field of chemical warfare the relationship between war and peace production was even more 149 The Riddle of the Rhine intimate. Chemical warfare products are closely allied and in some cases almost identical with the finished organic chemicals and intermediates pro- duced by the dye industry. ‘Therefore, in most cases, even when the suggestion of the new chemical may come from a research organisation entirely apart from the dye research laboratories, the prod- ucts fall automatically into the class handled by the dye industry. Is there any doubt that the I.G. was a terribly effective arsenal for the mass production of the older war chemicals, explosives, and the newer types, poison gases? Is there even a shadow of exagger- ation in our claims? ‘There may be those who would see a speedy resumption of friendship with Germany at all costs, regardless of the honourable settling of her debts, regardless of her disarmament and due reparation for wrongs committed. Can even such concoct material to whitewash the mili- tary front of the I.G.? If they would, they must explain away these facts. The plants of the I.G. produced more than two thousand tons of explosives per week, at their average pre-war rate. This is an enormous quan- tity. How can we best visualise it? In view of the chapters on Disarmament which follow, we will use the following comparison. ‘The Treaty of Ver- sailles allows Germany to hold a stock of about half a million shell of different stated calibres. How much explosive will these shell require? ‘They could be filled by less than two days’ explosives pro- duction of the L.G. at its average war rate. Between two and three million shell could be filled by the result of a week’s production in this organisation. Further, the average rate of poison gas production within the I.G. was at least three thousand tons per 150 Review of Production month, sufficient to fill more than two million shell of Treaty calibres. Unless drastic action has been taken, the bulk of this capacity will remain, and Germany will be able to produce enough poison gas in a week to fill the Treaty stock of shell; this in a country where the manufacture and use of such sub- stances are specially prohibited. It is appropriate at this stage -to describe as briefly as possible the origin and composition of this great German combination, the Interessen Gemein- schaft, known as the I.G. There is no need to go into the gradual self-neglect, and the eventual root- ing out by Germany, of the dye-producing industry in other countries, notably England, France, and America. The Interessen Gemeinschaft——By the end of the nineteenth century the manufacture of dyes on a large scale was concentrated almost exclusively in six great firms. These were the Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik, Ludwigshafen on the Rhine, known as the Badische; the Farbenfabriken vorm. Friedr. Bayer & Co., in Leverkusen, known as Bayer; Aktien-Gesellschaft fiir Anilin-Fabrikation in Berlin; Farbwerke vorm. Meister Lucius & Brin- ing in Hochst am Main, referred to as Hochst; Leo- pold Cassella G.m.b.H. in Frankfort; and Kalle & Co., Aktien-Gesellschaft in Biebrich. Each of these six great companies had attained enormous proportions long before the war. Only two other concerns had carried on manufacture on a comparable scale. These were the Chemische Fabrik Greisheim-Elektron of Frankfort A.M., a company which has absorbed a number of smaller manufacturers, and the Chemische Fabriken vormals Weiler-ter Meer, Uerdingen. The position of all these establishments, with 151 The Riddle of the Rhine one single exception, along the Rhine and its trib- utaries is well known. Their growth has been illus- trated in their own prospectuses. Hdéchst was organised in 1863 and started with five workmen. In 1912 it employed 7680 workmen, 374 foremen, 307 academically trained chemists, and 74 highly qualified engineers. ‘The works of the Badische, which was organised in 1865, covered, in 1914, 500 acres, with a water front of a mile and half on the Rhine. There were 100 acres of buildings, 11,000 workmen, and the company was capitalised at fifty-four million marks. The establishment of Bayer was on a scale entirely comparable. Quoting from an official American report,* ““Griesheim Elek- tron, prior to the war, had enormous works chiefly devoted to the manufacture of electrolytic chemicals and became an important factor in the dyestuff business only within recent years, when by absorp- tion of the Oehler Works and the Chemikalien Werke Griesheim, its colour production reached a scale approaching that of the larger houses.” This move on the part of the Griesheim Elektron is inter- esting as an example of the general tendency which has characterised the development of the German dye industry. This firm, producing inorganic mater- ials and intermediates, absorbed the Oehler Works in order to find an independent outlet for its inter- mediate products, thus becoming directly interested in dyestuffs production. This move towards inde- pendence in the whole range of products involved is referred to elsewhere, owing to the manner in which it simplified German production for chemical war- fare. Combination, however, did not cease in the cre- ation of these enormous establishments. The cartel * Alien Property Custodian’s Report, 1919. 152 Review of Production fever raged here as in other German industries. By 1904. two immense combinations had been formed in the dyestuff industry. One of these comprised Bayer, Badische, and Berlin; the other Hochst, Cassella, and Kalle. ‘By pooling profits, by so arranging capitalisation that each company held stock in the other companies of its own cartel, and by other familiar means, the risks incident to the enormous expansion of the business and the immense increases of export trade were minimised. The centripetal tendency, however, did not stop here. In 1916, the two pre-existing cartels were combined with Griesheim Elektron, Weilerter Meer, and vari- ous smaller companies in one gigantic cartel, repre- senting a nationalisation of the entire German dye and pharmaceutical industry.” The combination was extremely close. Profits of the companies were pooled, and after being ascertained each year on common principles were divided according to agreed percentages. ach factory maintained an_inde- pendent administration, but they kept each other informed as to processes and experiences. “There was also an agreement that in order to circumvent tariff obstacles in other countries materials were to be produced outside of Germany by common action and at common expense whenever and wherever desirable. | “At the time of the formation of this enormous organisation the capitalisation of each of the prin- cipal component companies was largely increased. Hochst, Badische, and Bayer each increased their capitalisation by 36,000,000 marks, bringing the capital of each up to 90,000,000 marks.” ‘Berlin increased its capital from 19,800,000 to 33,000,000 marks. Other increases brought the total nominal capital of the group to over 383,000,000 marks. For 153 The Riddle of the Rhine many years a large part of the enormous profits of these concerns has been put back into the works with the result indicated by the stock quotations. The real capitalisation is thus much greater than this nominal figure. In fact, it is estimated that the actual investment in the works comprising the cartel is not less than $400,000,000. It cannot be doubted that this enormous engine of commercial warfare has been created expressly for the expected war after the war, and that it is intended to undertake still more efficiently and on a larger scale the various methods by which German attacks upon all compe- tition were carried on.”’ Two additional features must be indicated. A policy to which we have referred was most actively followed, aiming at complete independence and self-sufficiency in all matters relevant to production, especially regarding raw materials. We mention later how the war has strengthened the strong pre- war position of the I.G. in heavy chemicals needed as raw materials for the intermediates and finished dyes. Recent information reveals a further widening of their basis of operation, including a strong hold on the electro-chemical industry and on the new syn- thetic processes from carbide, for acetic acid and the other products normally obtained by wood dis- tillation. Again, the policy of the I.G. appears to have moved towards more complete unity since the war. Exchanges of directing personnel and of cap- ital amongst the branches have been recorded for which the term “‘cartel” is no longer a fair descrip- tion. In addition, considerable increases in capital have occurred which not only reveal the vision and activity of the I.G. but which indicate its close con- tact with the German Government. With such an 154 Review of Production organisation in existence and with the complete liaison which had developed between the directors and the German Government for other purposes than chemical warfare, and in agreement with the pater- nal policy adopted by the latter towards this chemi- cal industry, production became simplicity itself. War Production by the I.G.—Let us, therefore, examine in some detail the actual production of war gases and chemicals by the I.G. In order to obtain an idea regarding ease of production, we will later make a comparison with the magnitude and rapidity of that of the Allies. From the point of view of this statement, there are two main classes of production, that in which the majority of the steps involved were actual processes employed for the manufacture of some dye, pharmaceutical or other chemical product, and, in the second place, that in which no such coincidence occurred, but in which the general technique developed, and the varieties of existing plant covered the needs of the case. Without stretching the point, every war chemical employed came easily under one of these two categories. In order to assist the less technical reader, we will consider the production of the chief war chemicals in the order in which they appeared against us on the front. Chlorine.—This important raw material, used in a variety of operations, notably for the production of indigo and sulphur black, two highly important dyes, was produced along the Rhine before the war to the extent of nearly forty tons a day. The only serious expansion required for war was an increase of already existing plant at the large factory of Ludwigshaven. The following table of pro- duction illustrates the point: 155 The Riddle of the Rhine CHLORINE (Metric Tons PER Day) 1914 1918 LlSVErkUSen isco sida iavk cs bi) eee gaia 20; | 20 FIO CHSts ho ibs Gi econ thea eta 4. 8 Hod wigsta tent ue ek Gall, aa 13 35 Wo tal ie esa Al aia eae a7 63 Chlorine was important, not only as a raw material for most of the known chemical warfare products, but also, in the liquid form, for cloud attack. Owing to the development of protection, the use of liquid chlorine for the latter purpose became obsolete. Phosgene.—This was produced in considerable quantity before the war at Leverkusen and Lud- wigshafen, leading to many exceedingly important dyes, amongst the most commonly used at present being the brilliant acid fast cotton scarlets so largely used in England. More expansion of plant was necessitated. At Leverkusen the existing plant can produce at least thirty tons a month, and we learn ‘the plant remains intact ready for use.” At Ludwigshafen the capacity was considerably higher, amounting to 600 tons per month. As production was commenced before the war, there were no dif- ficulties in developing the process, expansion alone being necessary. A ylyl Bromide.—This was one of the early lach- rymators, and was produced at Leverkusen in a plant with a maximum monthly output of sixty tons. Production began, according to a statement on the works, in March, 1915. Its ease can be judged from the fact that this compound was used almost as soon as the first chlorine cloud attack at Ypres. The Germans undoubtedly attached considerable importance to their brominated lachrymators. In 156 Review of Production this connection their persistent efforts to retain the bromine monopoly with their Stassfurt product and to crush the American industry before the war are significant. [he success of these efforts certainly placed us in a difficult situation during the war, both with regard to production of drugs and lachrymators. German bromine was associated with potash in the Stassfurt mineral deposits, whereas the Ameri- can product was produced from numerous salt springs and rock salt mines. Although Germany had not succeeded in crushing the American industry, yet the outbreak of war found her in a predominant position, for her two chief opponents, France and England, were cut off from their supplies, which were German; and American production was of little use, owing to the great excess of demand over supply, and the manipulation of output by German agents in America. A possible source of bromine existed in the French Tunisian salt lagoons, whose pre-war exploitation had been considered by an Austrian combination. The French wisely devel- oped a Tunisian bromine industry sufficient for their own needs, and, on different occasions, supplied us with small quantities. But the development of such an enterprise in time of war was a severe handicap. Diphosgene or Trichlormethyl Chloroformate.— This substance was toxic, a lachrymator, and slightly persistent. It attained a maximum monthly output of 300 tons at Leverkusen, and about 250 tons at Hochst. This was not a simple compound to make, and had no direct relationship with the stable product of the peace-time industry. At the same time, it provides an example of the way in which general technique developed by the industry was 1$7 The Riddle of the Rhine rapidly used to master the new process. In par- ticular their method of lining reaction vessels was of value here. The reaction occurs in two stages by the production of methyl formate and its subsequent chlorination. The methyl-formate plant was part of an existing installation, but the chlorination and distillation plant were specially installed. Chlorpicrin—This was mixed with diphosgene and used in the familiar Green Cross shell. The production was very readily mastered and attained the rate of 200 tons per month. Picric acid, chlorine, and lime were required, all three being normal raw materials or products of the industry. At Hochst no new plant was installed, the manufacture being carried out in the synthetic indigo plant. Phenylcarbylamine Chloride-——This was used in German chemical shell, and was not particularly effective against us, although produced in large quantities by the Germans, in vessels used in peace time for a very common intermediate, monochlor- benzene. The ease of production of this substance may account for its use in large quantities by the Germans, in order to increase their gas shell pro- gramme. Mustard Gas or Dichlordiethyl Sulphide —This was prepared in four stages: (1) Preparation of Ethylene—by heating alcohol with an aluminium oxide catalyst.at 400° C. (2) Preparation of Ethylene-chlor-hydrin, by passing ethylene and carbon dioxide into a Io per cent. solution of bleaching powder at a temperature below zero centigrade, and subsequent concentration of the prod- uct to a 20 per cent. solution. (3) Conversion of the chlor-hydrin into thio- 158 Review of Production diglycol by treatment with sodium sul- phide. (4) Conversion of the thiodiglycol into mustard gas (dichlordiethyl-sulphide), using gas- eous hydrochloric acid. The thiodiglycol was produced at Ludwigshafen and provides one of the best examples of the adaptation of the German dye works for the purpose of produc- ing war chemical. ‘Technically, ethylene is a fairly dificult gas to produce in large quantities, but, for the Ludwigshafen works, these difficulties were a thing of the past. There were twelve big units be- fore the war, and, by the time of the Armistice, these had been increased to seventy-two in connection with mustard gas manufacture. In a similar way, the number of the units for chlorhydrin, the next step, was increased from three to eighteen. These two processes had all been worked out very thoroughly in connection with the production of indigo. These new plants were identical with the peace-time units. The expansion was a mere question of repetition requiring no new designs or experiments and risking no failure or delay. Success was assured. The last step, the production of thiodiglycol, occurred in the causticising house, to which no substantial altera- tions or additions appear to have been made for the purpose. As sodium sulphide is used in large quan- tities as a raw material in the dye industry, and was already produced within the I.G., no difficulty was presented in connection with its supply. The thiodiglycol was forwarded to two other factories, one of which was Leverkusen, where 300 tons of mustard gas were produced monthly. The reaction between thiodiglycol and hydrochloric acid was one which required very considerable care. 159 The Riddle of the Rhine At one stage of the war the Allies viewed with much misgiving the possibility of having to adopt this method. But the technique of the German dye industry solved this as satisfactorily and as steadily as other chemical warfare problems, bringing its technical experience to bear on the different diffi- culties involved. Diphenychlorarsine —This was the earliest and main constituent of the familiar Blue Cross shell. It was prepared in four stages: (1) The preparation of phenyl arsinic acid. (2) The conversion of the above to phenyl ar- senious oxide. (3) The conversion of the latter into diphenyl arsinic acid. (4) The conversion of the latter into diphenyl- chlor-arsine. This is another example of a highly complicated product which might have presented great diffi- culties of production, but the problem of whose manufacture was solved, almost automatically, by the German organisation. The first step, that of the manufacture of phenyl arsinic acid, was carried out at Ludwigshafen in one of the existing azo dye sheds without any alteration of plant, just as a new azo dye might have been produced in the same shed. It is believed that another dye factory also produced this substance. At Ludwigshafen the conversion to diphenyl arsinic acid occurred. ‘This was again carried out in the azo colour shed, with no more modification than that involved in passing from one azo dye to another. This chemical mobilisation of a huge dye unit was, and could still be, practically invisible in opera- tion. Not only was the process practically the same 160 Review of Production as azo dye production, but, as the compounds were not particularly poisonous in the intermediate stages, there was no risk to the workers, and no need to violate secrecy by indicating special precautions. The final stage, the preparation of diphenyl- chlorarsine, the actual Blue Cross shell constituent, occurred at Hochst, which also carried out the first three stages, already outlined as occurring at Ludwigshafen and Leverkusen. The last stage was a simple one and was carried out in plant and build- ings previously used for peace purposes. The other substances employed provide further examples of this ease of production. Ethyl-dichlor- arsine was produced in homogeneously lead-lined vessels, identical with those used for diphosgene. Dichlor-methyl-ether presented difficulties which were solved by applying the German method of using tiled vessels. The part played by the I.G. in the German chem- ical warfare organisation has already been outlined, and we have seen how the German Government was content simply to place its demands before the directors of the dye combine. The latter were left to choose the process and exploit it by making the best use of their organisation, which was done after reviewing the plant at their disposal in the different branches. An interesting feature of the production of war chemicals by the I.G. is thus revealed by examining the actual locality of the separate opera- tions leading to any one of the individual poison gases. The attached table shows us how the pro- duction of any particular war chemical involved a number of stages, each of which occurred in a dif- ferent factory. ‘The directors of the I.G. simply chose a particular plant in a particular factory which was most suited for the operation concerned. ‘They 161 The Riddle of the Rhine Re an ORC en AL TREEI GE VS om eee ] FIRST STAGE RAW WAR CHEMICAL MATERIALS FROM THE LG. PROCESS FACTORY Phenyl Carbylamine 1. Aniline Condensation of aniline|Kalle Chloride 2. Chlorine with carbon bisul- 3. Caustic phide to phenyldithio- soda carbamic acid Mustard Gas 1. Carbon Preparation of Ethyl-|Ludwigs- | dioxide lene from Alcohol hafen 2. Bleaching powder 3. Sodium sulphide 4. Hydro- chloric acid Diphenylchlorarsine 1. Aniline Conversion of Diazo-|Ludwigs- 2. Sodium benzene to Phenylar-| hafen nitrite sinic acid Kalle 3. Sodium Hochst bisulphite 4. Sodium hydrate 5. Sulphur dioxide 6. Hydro- chloric acid Ethyl-dichlorarsine 1. Ethyl Production of Ethylar-|Ludwigs- chloride sinic acid from Ethyl| hafen 2. Caustic chloride soda | 3. Sulphur | dioxide H | 4. Hydro- chloric ¢ acid gas ¥. 5. Iodine 4 Po NRA oe EEA Dy Pca Ma We AE OIE ee) SE ee Re tee Sym-dichlor-methyl- 1. Chlorsul- |Production of Formal-|Mainz | ether phonic dehyde from Methyl|Héchst a acid alcohol 2. Sulphuric i acid | 162 Review of Production | | SECOND STAGE THIRD STAGE FOURTH STAGE | PROCESS FACTORY PROCESS FACTORY PROCESS FACTORY ‘(Conversion of Kalle {Chlorination of |Héchst _ Phenyldithio- Phenyl Mus- | carbamic acid tard Oil giving to Phenyl Mus- Phenyl Carby- tard Oil by lamine Chlo- zinc chloride ride ‘Conversion of Lud- |Conversion of Lud- {Conversion of |Lever- | Ethylene into | wigs- | Chlorhydrin wigs- | Thiodiglycol | kusen | Ethylene hafen | to Thio-di- hafen | to Mustard Chlorhydrin glycol Gas | Reduction of Lever- Conversion to Lever- |Reduction of A.G.F.A, | Phenyl arsinic | kusen Diphenylar- kusen | Diphenylar- \Héchst | acid to Phenyl | and sinic acid by and sinic acid to arsenious oxide] Hochst| treatment Hochst] Diphenyl- with Diazo chlor-arsine | benzene by Sulphur | dioxide in HCI solution | rn ere ec oe ety Lp Reduction of Lud- |Conversion of Hochst | Ethyl arsinic | wigs- | Ethyl_arseni- | acid to Ethyl | hafen | ous Oxide to | arsenious oxide Ethyl dichlor- by sulphur arsine by | dioxide HCl and iodine aversion of Hochst | paraformalde- . hyde to sym dichlor methyl ether by means of chlorsul- phonic acid Pn cS EEE EEE aa) ON Ww cia The Riddle of the Rhine aimed at the minimum conversion, and in a number of cases none was required. The above analysis can leave us with no doubt in our minds that the organic chemical industry is the logical place for eficient chemical warfare production. It cannot leave us unconvinced as to the vital importance of the dye industry in national defence. Allied Difficulties—Our own production was nothing but a series of slow and relatively inefficient improvisations. We have already referred to the fluctuations in chemical warfare organisation for research and supply during the war. These added to the difficulties of the supply department, just as they did to its complement, the research depart- ment. Only great patriotic endeavour could have made possible the relative success achieved, not only by the departments, but in particular by the firms with whom they were called upon to co-ordinate. We wanted mustard gas, and realised its need in July, 1917. Research work began almost from that date, yet successful large scale production did not materialise in England until more than a year later. We must admit, however, that the French were in a position to use their product on the front in July, 1918. Let us examine some of our difh- culties. The first efforts were directed towards the process by which, as we eventually ascertained, the Germans produced the whole of their mustard gas. The actual chemical laboratory details of the process presented no serious obstacle, but difficulties multi- plied as soon as we attempted large scale work. We wanted ethylene-monochlor-hydrin. Some work had been done on this during the war for the National Health Insurance Commissioners in connection with the production of novocain. Half scale work 164 i a oy ll ‘ Review of Production had occurred at the works of a Midland chemical firm, and experience so gained was freely offered and used in a scheme for the large scale production of mustard gas by the co-operation of a number of big chemical manufacturers. Pressing requests for the material were continually coming from G.H.Q., the programmes outlined being more and more ambi- tious. We had to reproduce the result of years of German effort spent in developing their monochlor- hydrin process for indigo. As a consequence, large sums of money were expended on the process, al- though it never eventually operated. Its difficulties, and other reasons, led us to research on other and more direct methods which the French were also in- vestigating. The successful outcome of this early re- search was due, in particular, to Sir William Pope and those associated with him in the work. The process was so promising that the long and cumber- some chlor-hydrin method was abandoned. As a result our five or six months’ work on the German method meant so much time lost. The new direct, sulphur monochloride method was taken up actively and several private firms attempted to develop the small scale manufacture. The work was dangerous. Lack of that highly developed organic chemical technique, which was practically a German monop- oly, rendered the task much more dangerous than it would have been if undertaken by one of the I.G. factories. The French, realising the importance of the new methods, spared nothing in their attempts to develop them. Their casualties multiplied at the works, but the only reply was to put the factories concerned under the same régime as the front, and the staffs were strengthened by well-chosen military person- nel. The French realised the nature of their task, 165 The Riddle of the Rhine and organised for it. When the difficulties of pro- duction were pointed out in August, 1917, in the British Ministry of Munitions, reports were in- stanced that the Germans had used forced labour. The French in their production at Rousillon, on the Rhone, employed volunteer German prisoners. It was a curious contrast to see mingling together amongst the producing plants representatives of the American, Italian, and British Missions, with French oficers, French technical men, and German prison- ers. The latter appeared to be perfectly satisfied in their work. They were used for certain limited pur- poses, such as handling raw materials, and were not, as a rule, exposed to the dangerous operations against which the French struggled so heroically and successfully. It was as though a small section of the front had been transferred to the heart of France. We saw the minister visiting a factory and pinning the Legion of Honour on to the breast of a worker blinded by yperite. We saw messages of congratu- lation from the front to the factories themselves. The morale was wonderful. As a result, the French mastered the technical difficulties of mustard gas production and shell filling by June, 1918. ‘They shared information with us, but the race had started neck and neck, and it was impossible to discard completely the large plants to which we were already committed. Without disparaging our own efforts, we must pay a tribute to the achievement of the French yperite producing and filling factories. It is impossible to give personal credit in this matter without going beyond our scope, and we can only draw general comparisons. But we must draw attention to the following. The German factories passed with ease to mustard gas production by a process which, compared with the final Allied 166 Review of Production method, was clumsy and complicated, but which suited their pre-war plant. Their policy was, therefore, sound from the point of view of the cam- paign. The Allies experienced great difficulty and danger in attaining large scale manufacture with a simpler process. The same self-sacrificing zeal and patriotic en- deavour was shown in this country, but we were handicapped in mustard gas production by the ener- getic way in which we had pressed forward the indus- trial realisation of the monochlor-hydrin method. The French, less committed in terms of plant and finance, could more readily adjust their energy, materials, and money to the new method. It must not be forgotten, also, that, at this period, chemical warfare supply organisation was experiencing cer- tain critical changes which could not but reflect upon our efficiency. Here again the earlier centralisation of research and production by France was a great factor in her favour. Our difficulties with phosgene, and in particular with the arsenic compounds described above, were of the same nature, involving us in casualties, great expenditure, and little success, when compared with German production. The great need for these arsenic compounds was realised as early as Feb- ruary, 1918, and investigations began even at that date, but they had not appeared in the field by the time of the Armistice. Whatever mistakes we may have made locally during the war, they are small compared with the big mistake which was respon- sible for our comparative failure in chemical war- fare production. We were almost completely lack- ing in organic chemical industrial experience. It is interesting to note that the activities of those elements of organic chemical industry which did 167 The Riddle of the Rhine exist in France and England fully justified the conclusions we have drawn. ‘Thus, although enter- ing late into the field of chemical warfare produc- tion, Doctor Herbert Levinstein, Professor A. G. Green, and their collaborators of the firm of Levin- stein Limited were able to develop rapidly a suc- cessful industrial mustard gas process which was of considerable assistance to England and America. This work, both in research and production, de- serves the greatest credit. Again, the dye factories were called upon much earlier to assist in French production and were of considerable assistance. It would be well at this juncture to review very briefly the other war activities of our own dye indus- tries. [he outbreak of war found them by no means inactive. In this country, for example, our own dye factories were able to keep pace with the increasing demand for dyes created by the rapid mobilisation of military and naval equipment. In particular the rapid large-scale production of indigo by the Levinstein firm, at Ellesmere Port, was a considerable achievement. In addition, the new State-aided enterprise at Huddersfield was largely diverted to explosives production, and rendered very valuable services in the supply of Tetry]l, T.N.T., synthetic phenol, picric acid, and oleum. For such reasons, the need for essential dyes, and the use of dye capacity for explosives, the important part which the rapidly expanding industry could have played in chemical warfare production was not recognised quickly enough by the relevant au- thorities. This is not surprising, for the war sig- nificance of the German dye industry was not fully realised until the Armistice. It required the Hartley Mission to drive this fact home. When, however, the brilliant researches, referred to above, on the 168 Review of Production mustard gas method had decided our policy, the dye factory of Levinstein Limited vigorously con- verted the process into a technical success, and what was still a laboratory reaction in the spring of 1917 became a successful manufacturing process in July of that year. Released from its war responsibilities at the time of the Armistice, the British industry developed so rapidly that Lord Moulton, in a speech to the Colour Users Association on November 28th, 1919, stated: ‘‘A few months before the war broke out England produced only one-tenth of the dyes she needed, but the amount which I am informed we shall be able to turn out at the end of this year would, in weight, be within one-fifth of the amount which England used before the war.” But the Allies were not only in difficulties with regard to the lack of suitable peace-time plant, and industrial organic chemical experience—they were hindered at almost every turn by difficulties with regard to raw materials and intermediates, the products of other chemical manufacture. They had to create a liquid chlorine industry. In April, 1915, the only liquid chlorine plant in England was in the hands of the firm of Castner Kellner, whose maximum output was not more than a few tons per day. Increase in capacity was rendered necessary by chemical warfare developments. Chlorine was a raw material for mustard gas and practically every important substance employed in chemical warfare including bleaching powder. Tremendous tonnages of bleach were involved in the manufacture of chlor- picrin and for use as an antidote against mustard gas on the front. We refer elsewhere to the develop- ing use of bleach in order to create lanes for troops and transport through areas infected by mustard 169 The Riddle of the Rhine gas. A very simple calculation will show what quan- tities would be required for such an operation. It is true that, as regards chlorine, we were more fav- ourably situated than France, and forwarded her considerable supplies in exchange for phosgene. This chlorine was essential for phosgene production. New plants were brought into being at different places, largely through the energy and experience of the above-mentioned firm, but so great was the demand that it finally became necessary, in order to protect the trade users and war interests at the same time, to institute a control of chlorine. More than 20,000 tons of liquid chlorine were produced under the ad- ministration of the supply department concerned. When we consider the effort which such an increase in production must have involved, and the fact that expansions occurring did not do so under the steady and well-regulated influence of a simple demand, but were continually being modified to meet expan- sions or diminutions of programme, we can realise what a great advantage was possessed by the Ger- mans owing to their large initial experience and pro- duction. We have no hesitation in stating that great credit is due to the old Trench Warfare Supply Depart- ment and the firms with which it was in contact, notably the one referred to above, in connection with the Loos attack. But for them, we would not have been in a position to retaliate, even at that date. The Allied lachrymator campaign was terribly handicapped by lack of bromine. ‘The French per- formed the phenomenal task of creating a bromine industry in Tunis, the development of which reads like a romance. Apparently this industry is dying out, and German predominance in bromine is again asserted. 170 , , \ F : Review of Production French mustard gas production, for which they made such huge sacrifices, was threatened by the lack of carbon-tetra-chloride, and examples can be multiplied. The Germans were in a very different position. The development of their dye industry had followed the policy of absolute independence of external chemical industry. This independence was acquired either by the absorption of other enter- prises or by the definite development of processes and plant for raw materials and intermediates. In every case the war has strengthened these factories for the manufacture of these products. In 1918 they produced nearly thirty times as much ammonia as in 1914, three times as much nitric acid, fifty per cent. as much again of sulphuric acid, and twice as much liquid chlorine. ‘This was not purely a commercial question. Our lack of such products was due to the fact that the Allies, in pre-war times, possessed few or feeble industries whose consump- tion would stimulate the production of these raw materials. hey lacked these industries because of a blameworthy disregard for the fundamental im- portance of science, and particularly chemical science, in industry. Conclusion.—We have shown how, during the war, chemical warfare proved its surprise value and how manufacture figured repeatedly as a critical factor. We have also shown how the importance of production is magnified from the point of view of the future. The only logical conclusion is that the country which does not possess a strong dye indus- try, or enormously comprehensive and expensive chemical arsenals, cannot hope to escape serious mil- itary results, possibly defeat, from enemy chemical surprises. he situation is aggravated by the fact that this critical producing capacity exists as a 171 The Riddle of the Rhine monopoly in the hands of Germany. No patriotic and thinking person can, therefore, conclude other- wise than to encourage the creation of dye indus- tries in countries other than Germany, particularly in our own. It is true, however, that patriotic sentiment and political views do not always lead to the same solution. But we must insist that there can be no two opinions on the national defence aspect of this question, and any political forces opposing the logical outcome of patriotic sentiment in this case are incurring an exceedingly grave responsibility. Further, there is a definite tendency to obscure the whole issue by inaccurate thinking. When we find a Member of Parliament seriously discussing disarmament, endeavouring to deal with the matter in detail, and yet classing gas as one of those meth- ods of warfare in connection with which production can be easily prevented, we can only stand in amaze- ment before our traditional fault, deliberate side- tracking of expert guidance. When we realise that it was not until after the Armistice that the Hartley Commission opened our eyes to the war importance of the German dye industry, we see how blind a nation may be in matters vital to its defence. From the point of view of results on the front, for which all were working, the German dye facto- ries, when considered as a war weapon, were as much in advance of Allied improvised plants as a military quick-firing gun is ahead of the old muzzle-loader. Further, for progressive and flexible organic chemical production, some such difference will always exist between the modern dye industry and factories or arsenals improvised or maintained to meet specific emergencies. * The Flaw in the Covenant and the Remedy, Major David Da- vies, M.P. 172 CHAPTER VIII AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS Special Attention Justified;—Special Value of American Opinion.—Various reasons prompt us to pay special attention to the development of chemical warfare by the United States of America. In the preceding chapters we have attempted a more or less connected account of its development during the campaign. Such an account must necessarily make constant reference to French and British develop- ments. But American preparations, although on a colossal scale, were not in time to influence the cam- paign seriously and directly. Therefore, purely for the symmetry of our account, special reference should be made to America. But a more serious rea- son is to be found in the great importance attached by America to this branch of warfare. As everybody knows, the arrival of the American troops in large numbers was preceded by an educational period, during which American staffs, officers, and men be- came acquainted with Allied staffs, operations, and methods on the Western Front. They were less biased by military tradition, and not under the same necessity as the European Allies to organise in an improvised way for different violent emergencies. Their opinions of war methods on the Western Front are, therefore, of great interest. Chemical warfare at once assumed a place of prime importance in their schemes, receiving a stimu- 173 The Riddle of the Rhine lus and a momentum which, rather than losing force during peace, appears to have gathered intensity. There was at first no particular background of emo- tion, or desire for specific retaliation in this Ameri- can development. It was purely a question of decid- ing on technical grounds the relative importance of different methods of warfare. Solid facts deter- mined the matter later. We have it on the best au- thority that 75,000 out of the total 275,000 Ameri- can casualties were due to gas. Early American Activities —The earliest Ameri- can activities consisted in attaching various officers to the British formations in France and to the French research and producing organisations centred in Paris. A period ensued of remarkably rapid and eflicient assimilation of the best developments in al- lied chemical warfare. Two American gas compan- ies were attached to ours for instruction in the first month of 1918, and they assisted in several gas at- tacks on the British front. Field Activities——In a sense the development of chemical warfare organisations by the Americans was deprived of its promised success. The Allies re- gained the general and final offensive before Ameri- can plans matured. But if the latter were prevented from participating in various types of cloud and stationary attack along the front, yet the coincidence of their organisation with the development of more open warfare gave them an opportunity, which they readily seized, to demonstrate the possibilities of mobile chemical attack. Two gas companies, known as the 30th Engineers, were assembled, partially trained, and embarked for France at the end of 1917; [hey entered upon a course of training with the British Special Brigade R.E. while further units were being organised in America. ‘The projector at- 174 American Developments tracted the Americans, and they were ready, as Gen- eral Fries informs us, to launch a big projector gas attack, when Marshal Foch’s counter attack disor- ganised the front concerned. ‘They then turned their attention to the use of the four-inch Stokes mortar in an attempt to neutralise the German machine-gun nests, using phosphorus for smoke and thermit shell, and continued to assist the infantry either by taking part in the preparations for attack or in subsequent operations. Special Difficulties—The great length of the American lines of communication led them to de- velop certain research and experimental organisations near to the front. These had to deal with the “‘short range’ problems, those of immediate importance, without referring them back to America. The 3000 miles of ocean represented a necessary loss of con- tact which prevented the home workers, however willing, from fully realising the needs of the prob- lems concerned. Accordingly a strong experimental station, Hanlon Field, was developed near Chau- mont, and a well-equipped laboratory was estab- lished at Puteaux, near Paris. Edgewood Arsenal.—The organisations devel- oped in America were of very great interest. The American officers in the field, through their contact with the British and French, realised early that we were extended to the utmost in the matter of produc- tion, that our demands and programmes were far ahead of our output, and that they could not reason- ably expect serious help from us, either with regard to the results or the material means of production. They, therefore, made surveys of our methods and wisely determined to concentrate on production in America. As a result, they developed the phenom- enal chemical warfare arsenal of Edgewood. Had 175 The Riddle of the Rhine the war lasted longer, there can be no doubt that this centre of production would have represented one of the most important contributions by America to the world war. Probably had production been conceived on a smaller scale, however, its results would have materialised sooner and produced greater actual in- fluence. A few facts with regard to Edgewood suflice to confirm its potentialities. We learn’ that the arsenal organisation comprised a huge chlorine plant, prob- ably the largest in the world, various chemical plants for the manufacture of the chief chemical warfare substances adopted by the European belligerents, and shell-filling plant capable of filling a total of more than 200,000 shell and bomb daily. Research.—Supporting this production, and in connection with the other branches of chemical war- fare, a tremendous research organisation developed which, with the exception of the combined research facilities of the I.G.? was probably the largest re- search organisation ever assembled for one specific object. It grew until it contained 1200 technical men and 700 service assistants, and we are told that its work covered exhaustive research on more than 4000 different materials. Nor were the Americans less ambitious on protection. Wisely adopting the British Box Respirator during the early stages, they made vigorous attempts at the same time, with con- siderable success, to develop a form of their own. Production.—An American opinion on the im- | portance of Edgewood Arsenal at the time of the Armistice is worth quoting. ‘‘Here is a mammoth plant, constructed in record time, efficiently manned, * Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, January, 1919. “The great German organic chemical combine. _ *Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, January, 1919. 176 ao ae Re a ee ee DA ee — American Developments capable of an enormous output of toxic material, and just reaching its full possibilities of death-dealing at the moment when news is hourly expected of the signing of the Armistice. What a pity we did not possess this great engine of war from the day Ameri- can troops first sailed for France, for, had we been so prepared, how many of our boys who ‘have gone West’ could have returned for the welcome home! Shall we forget this lesson of preparedness? Is this great plant to be scrapped? Possibly wise heads may find a solution of the problem which will add this great resource to American chemical industry, at the same time preserving its value to the nation as a greater asset, in case of future war, than a standing army.” Although mainly dependent on Edgewood Arse- nal for their war schemes, it is perfectly clear that the Americans realised that theirs was not the ideal way, in fact was a very wasteful and inefficient way to produce poison gases or chemical warfare sub- stances. Indeed, even during the war, in spite of their huge arsenal they established contact with va- rious American chemical producers. At the present time, except in connection with its use for emergen- cies during the next few years, this huge source of production at Edgewood must be regarded as an un- necessary burden upon the State. To be of any use, it requires costly maintenance. It is only capable of producing a limited number of organic substances. Some of these are likely to become obsolete as time goes on. This reliance upon a huge fixed arsenal is not only out of accord with any international scheme for disarmament, but it is altogether too ponderous, and not sufficiently flexible for reliance in future emergencies. This is fully realised in America. Gen- eral Fries, addressing the American Chemical So- 177. The Riddle of the Rhine ciety, said: ‘“The magnificent plant at Edgewood may soon be a thing of the past. We do not believe the Government should attempt to manufacture poi- sonous gases on a huge scale.’’ He explains how, by reliance upon normal chemical industry, ‘“We believe we can build up more quickly and to a greater extent than by any other method the necessary large output of poisonous gases required in a war with a first-class Power.” Referring to the mobilisation of industry for this purpose, he says: ‘‘We believe that if this is done satisfactorily it will be one of the greatest pos- sible guarantees of future peace.” Post-Armistice Developments.—But perhaps the most interesting and significant aspect of American chemical warfare development concerns what has occurred since the Armistice. Valuable and success- ful attempts have been made to educate not only the public but also political leaders to its real meaning. No one examining the American daily and scientific press, or reading the records of the various Govern- ment Committees on the proposed bills of chemical, or chemical warfare, interest can doubt that the Americans are probably as a whole much more alive to the importance of this matter than any other ally. Discussions on the Longworth Bill and on the new chemical warfare service have provided full ventila- tion for the facts of the case, in their proper setting. It was a striking contrast to land in America early in 1920 and find New York plastered with recruiting posters setting forth the various reasons why Ameri- cans should join their Chemical Warfare Service. It was not only a sign of American methods but also one of their appreciation of the importance of the matter. ‘This is amply borne out by their final step in reconstruction during the last few months. A sep- arate Chemical Warfare Service has been reorgan- 178 — ee ee - a | . i q { American Developments ised,in America in such a way as to give it a position of independence equivalent to that of the older branches of the service. The specific possibilities in the development of this form of warfare are ac- knowledged by the action of the American Congress, and this result is very largely due to the creation of an intelligently informed political and public opinion. Large grants of money have been placed at the dis- posal of the new Chemical Warfare Service, and its research facilities promise to equal the war establish- ments of the older services of other Allied countries. Views of General Fries.—In view of the creation of this independent Chemical Warfare Service in America and of its importance when measured in terms of financial and material facilities, it is of in- terest to summarise some of the views already ex- pressed by General Fries,1 the head of the new service. With regard to the general function of chemical warfare, he tells us: “In the first place, chemical warfare is a complete science in itself. No other invention since that of gunpowder has made so profound a change in warfare as gas is making, or will make, in the future. ‘To-day there are only four really distinct arms of the Service, viz.: the Infantry, the Artillery, Avia- tion, and Chemical Warfare. All other forms of warfare are a combination, more or less complete, of these. The gases, smoke, and incendiary materials that make up chemical warfare are used to a greater or lesser extent by other arms, but wherever gas is used it compels precautionary measures that are found in no other branch of the Service. “Considering its power, it has no equal. Physical vigour is one of the greatest assets in any army. Gas, used properly and in quantities that will be eas- * Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, 1920. 179 The Riddle of the Rhine ily obtainable in future wars, will make the wearing of the mask a continuous affair for all troops within two to five miles of the front line, and in certain places for many miles beyond. If it never killed a man, the reduction in physical vigour, and, therefore, in efficiency of an army forced at all times to wear masks, would amount to at least 25 per cent., equiva- lent to disabling a quarter of a million men out of an army of a million.” The Gas Cloud Inescapable.—He goes on to ex- plain some of the more specific military needs which can be met by chemical means, and refers independ- ently to a point which the Germans have mentioned repeatedly in their memoirs. “One great reason why chemical warfare will continue is that it fills a long- felt want on the part of the soldier, that of shooting successfully around a stump or rock. The gas cloud is inescapable. It sweeps over and into everything in its path. No trench is too deep for it, no dug-out, unless hermetically sealed, is safe from it. Night and darkness only heighten its effect. It is the only weapon that is as effective in a fog or in the inky blackness of a moonless night as in the most brilliant sunshine. Only the mask and the training that go with it protect. Terror, confusion, lack of discipline and control are fatal.” Importance of Smoke.—General Fries is insistent on the future importance of smoke in warfare: ‘‘Chemical warfare includes gas, smoke, and incen- diary materials, and they can’t well be subdivided. As before stated, all the early gas attacks were in the form of clouds. ‘The value of that cloud, not only for carrying gas but for screening purposes, began to be realised in the fall of 1917. Clouds of smoke may or may not be poisonous, and they will or will not be poisonous, at the will of the one producing the smoke. 180 oe a oe ¢ i . f ‘t iv q ¥ PGE bibs aR} OF The UANERSTY GF iLLiNois ISl aang anf of, ‘gouvApe AIZULIUL OY} YOIYM pulyod ‘poulsoy st YIM urezIND dieys 9y} 9ON ‘AOVaAAVA ANOWS American Developments For that reason every cloud of smoke in the future must be looked upon as possibly containing some deadly form of gas. When you consider this for a moment, you can realise the tremendous possibilities for ingenuity that gas and smoke afford the attacker. “The American, trained for 300 years in meeting nature on her great plains and in her vast forests, was early appealed to by this side of chemical war- fare. As early as November 3, 1917, the United States was urged, in a cablegram from the Chemical Wartare Service in France, to push the development of a large phosphorous supply for use in smokes. Not only were the early intuitions of the value of gas borne out by later events, but to-day the future of smoke appears greater still. The battle-field of the future will be covered with smoke—not the all-per- vading black smoke of the battles of the Civil War and of earlier wars before smokeless powder came into use, but a field covered with dots and patches of smoke, big and little, here and there and everywhere. ‘Every man who has hunted ducks and been caught in a dense fog with ducks quacking all round, and who has tried to get ducks by firing at the quack in the fog, can realise the difficulty of hitting a man on the battle- field when you cannot see him, and have only a quack, or less, by which to locate him. The smoke will be generated in candles of two or three-pound cans that can be thrown out in front of trenches; by knapsacks that can be carried and which will give off dense white smoke in large volume for many minutes; by grenades which, while they may be thrown by hand, will gen- erally be fired from rifles; by artillery shells reaching ten, fifteen, twenty miles back of the main battle line; and finally, from aeroplane bombs whose radius of action is limited only by the size of the earth. And thus smoke becomes one of the great elements of war 181 The Riddle of the Rhine in the future. It is more or less wholly protective in its nature, but as it costs more and takes longer to train a man in the various problems involved in mod- ern war than ever before in this history of the world, it is worth while taking every precaution to protect him, once you have him trained.” Casualty Percentages.—He also brings out very clearly the unique possibility possessed by gas war- fare of increasing its military efficiency, while de- creasing its relative atrocity: ‘The death rate in the first gas attack was prob- ably in the neighbourhood of 35 per cent. of all casualties—and everybody in front of the wave was a casualty. With the development of masks and training in the use of the mask and in taking advan- tage of the ground, the death rate fell. At the same time the total number of casualties fell, but not at all in the same ratio as the decrease in the death rate. From a probable death rate of 35 per cent. ‘in the first attack it fell to 24 per cent., then to 18 per cent., and, as gas attacks by artillery became general, to 6 per cent., and finally, with the extended use of mus- tard gas, the rate fell to 2.5 per cent. or less.”’ Again referring to casualties, he gives us the startling fact that 75,000 out of the 275,000 Ameri- can casualties were caused by gas, “‘And yet,” he says ‘the Germans used it in a halting, comparatively feeble manner.”’ Short Range Projectors.—Very much alive to the future of the short-range projectors developed in connection with gas warfare, he tells us, ‘“The Gas Regiment in the St. Mihiel battle fired on the Cote des Esparges one hundred of these high explosive bombs at the zero hour on the morning of the attack. That hill, famous for its strength through four years of struggle between the French and Germans, dis- 182 : | : | | American Developments appeared completely as an enemy standpoint. Noth- ing remained but torn and broken barbed wire, bits of concrete pill-boxes, and trenches filled with debris, and a few scattered fragments of clothing. ‘The gas troops will, in the future, handle all short-range methods of firing gas, smoke, or high explosive. They will deliver the greatest quantities of material possible up to ranges of a mile and a half or a mile and three-quarters. So effective and so efh- cient are these short-range methods of projection that the No-Man’s-Land of the future will be the width covered by these projectors and mortars. They can’t, and never will, compete with the artillery, where range and great accuracy are the most impor- tant factors. The efficiency of artillery gas shell or artillery smoke or high explosive shell is only one: fifth that of the projector. Hence, for economy and efficiency, the artillery will be used to fire gas, smoke, high explosive, and incendiary materials only at ranges beyond those reached by the gas troops.” Again, showing how the American authorities were seized with the importance of the matter, we read: Vast Expansion in Personnel.—"'So greatly were these possibilities appreciated in the summer of 1918 that the number of gas troops authorised for use against the Germans was increased from six com- panies to fifty-four. Back of all this, however, was the productive capacity of the United States, which ensured that those troops would be able to fight day and night, summer, winter, and fall, until the war was over. No wonder the German quit—it was time, and he knew it.” And in conclusion General Fries tells us: ‘The universal adoption of gas warfare on sea and land and in the air, combined with its persistent quality, will make that nation able to produce and 183 The Riddle of the Rhine use gas in the largest quantity superior in war to any other nation on the globe. The United States can reach that position and maintain it, and I believe that we are going to get such encouragement from the War Department that we can do it. I feel sure that the army appreciates the value of chemical war- fare, and that it appreciates also the value of the chemists to chemical warfare. ‘So long as there is any danger of other nations continuing these methods of warfare, research and experiment in chemical warfare must be pursued. Research must not only be directed towards the gases and apparatus likely to be employed in the future, but also towards protection against all possible gases. [raining in the use of gas will be confined to appropriate branches, but training in defensive measures will include the whole army. ‘‘We must continue our studies of what is known as chemical warfare. No nation has renounced the use of poison gases as the result of the Peace Con- ference. There are nations whose word we could not respect if they did renounce it. It is essential to study the offensive side of chemical warfare if we are to be prepared for defence. The great importance of adequate defensive appliances arises from the fact that preparations for the offensive use of gas can be made in peace-time with great secrecy, and may have far-reaching and even fatal results in the early stages of a war. ee . For these reasons it is necessary to make adequate provision for research, experiment, and design in connection with war material. It is equally necessary to avoid overlap, duplication of effort, and the setting up of military institutions for scientific research which can better be done by existing civil institutions.” 184 American Developments He also quotes from a statement from General Debeney, Director of the French College of War- Fare: ‘Should war begin now, aviation, and especially gas, would play one of the most important parts. The progress of aviation would make the rear of each front, and very far in rear, extremely danger- ous, and the progress of chemistry would permit the use of gas on zones of such an extent as cannot be imagined. ‘Making gas is naturally rapidly done, because all the manufacturers of chemical product—still so numerous in Germany—can be requisitioned, but to make airplanes is much slower. “The defence against gas seems to be more dificult than against airplanes. I believe that against airplanes, the anti-aircraft artillery is suscep- tible of making rapid progress, and perhaps in that very instance gas will be one of the best ways, if with appropriate shells the air can be poisoned all around the attacking airplanes. “Tt would be much more effective to create, for example, a sphere of poisoned air a mile round the airplane, instead of trying to hit the machine directly with bits of the shell.” British, French, and even German opinion, while not underestimating the importance of the matter, may not agree in an unqualified way with all the above statements. But we claim that they show vision in a branch of war which, on account of its scientific basis, may, more than any other, speedily prove the visionary a true prophet. 185 CHAPTER IX GERMAN CHEMICAL POLICY The preceding account of chemical warfare leaves the impression of a successful Allied struggle against persistently unfavourable circumstances. We were constantly compelled to accelerate to attain the pace set by the enemy. There were exceptions, undoubt- edly, but in the main Germany kept ahead in the chemical struggle. So far, in examining the root of our troubles, we have been content to refer to the existence of the I.G., to describe its chemical warfare activities, and to indicate, briefly, its unique power to produce large quantities of organic chemical products at short notice. [he close connection between the German dye industry and chemical warfare is now well recog- nised in official circles, and, to some extent, by the general public. Its belated exposure was almost entirely due to the facts revealed by the Inter-Allied Mission to the German chemical factories some months after the Armistice. But the situation thus revealed was not created in a day, nor by chance. Indeed, one of the military features of industrial chemical development in the I.G. has already been traced to pre-war activities. I refer to the Haber process for the production of synthetic ammonia. It would be short-sighted policy to accept the set of conditions against which we strug- gled, and to explain them in terms of the I.G., with- out looking more closely into the pre-war activities 186 German Chemical Policy of this organisation. Such an examination may reveal the basic forces which determined our inferior position in chemical warfare at the outbreak of war. It is true that we can explain away our inferiority by referring to the German breach of faith, which auto- matically created conditions for which we were un- prepared. This is a comfortable solution. But had chemical warfare been a strongly developed and ac- cepted method of war before the outbreak of hos- tilities, would we then have been prepared? ‘The records of the past, before April, 1915, must be consulted to answer this question. We may find that our position is due to more than a mere negative attitude, to more than our simple neglect of the organic chemical industry. It may be that there were forces which definitely exploited this national char- acteristic to our disadvantage. ‘The pre-war policy and activities of the I.G. must be examined from this point of view. In no country has such an investiga- tion been more complete than in America, and official statements have been issued by the American Alien Property Custodian! which throw a flood of light on the.pre-war activities of the constituent branches of the 1.G. They conclusively reveal the existence of a carefully directed German chemical policy mak- ing for world domination in the organic chemical industry, which greatly hampered the military effec- tiveness of other countries, and directly strengthened the military resources of Germany. On broad lines, the pre-war and war activities of the I.G. produced the same result as an attempt to strangle the eco- nomic life of possible opponents, enfeebling their resistance to the subsequent delivery of a hammer blow designed to take maximum advantage of the * Alien Property Custodian Report, Washington. Government Printing Office, 1919. 187 The Riddle of the Rhine situation thus created. Twenty years or more under the régime of a forceful economic policy, not with- out its sinister aspects, prepared the ground by weak- ening us in the concentrated chemical warfare which, ensued. The success of this policy manceuvred us into such a position that we barely escaped defeat under the hammer blows of German chemical aggres- sion. This, in fact, appears to have been the German conception of modern war in its relation to industry, and American reports have shown that it was carried through with typical thoroughness by familiar German methods. Origin of German Chemical Monopolies.—The completeness of our organic chemical deficiencies, and the thorough way in which we had failed to develop organic chemical industries, creates such a sharp impression, when thrown into relief by the outbreak of war, that we are led to inquire into the methods by which these monopolies were established. Let us admit, without any further delay, that Germany owed the origin and assertion of these monopolies in part to her scientific development, fostered by a vigorous policy of applying scientific research to industrial enterprise. So far as her success depended upon such factors, it merits our unqualified admiration and envy. But stimulating these developments was a very definite general and commercial policy which requires close examination. German Chemical Commercial Policy ;—Evi- dence of the U.S.A. Alien Property Custodian.— Giving every credit to German initiative and thor- oughness in the application of science to industry, we are still prompted to inquire how this monopoly came to be so complete. We can rely on more than mere rumour, when examining the commercial methods of the great I.G. The American Alien 188 Se mine | : German Chemical Policy Property Custodian, Mr. Mitchell Palmer, and, later, Mr. Francis P. Garvan, had occasion and op- portunity to make minute examination of the German dye agencies in America in connection with general investigations on the reorganisation of alien prop- erty. Their revelations truly merit the term, show- ing remarkably clearly the unity of conception, de- termination of purpose, and co-operation with the German Government which characterised the policy of the I.G. Pre-war American Situation.—Let us briefly con- sider the relevant aspects of the pre-war American situation. According to fairly well-known facts, confirmed by the reports of the two American oficials mentioned above, the American pre-war organic chemical industry consisted of little more than a series of small assembling plants. Although enormous supplies of coal-tar products were avail- able, yet the dye intermediates derived from them were not made in America, but imported from Ger- many. After various attempts to establish the dye industry, it seeemd, at one time, about 1880, to have definitely taken root, but, within the space of five years, there were only four dye producing establish- ments remaining. German Price-cutting; — Salicylic Acid. — In every instance the manufacture was almost immedi- ately brought to an end by German price-cutting. The same source reveals the direct and indirect methods used by Germany to prevent, at all costs, the development of an independent organic chemical industry. There are many pointed examples of the direct method, and we will glance at the case of salicylic acid. This is a very important chemical, used not only for certain important drugs but also as in intermediate for dyes and photographic chem- 189 The Riddle of the Rhine icals. In 1903 the United States possessed five manufacturers of this product. In ten years’ time three of these had failed, and one of the survivors was a mere branch of a German house. During this fatal ten years, the product was being sold in that country at a price twenty-five per cent. lower than in Germany. The manipulation of the prices of the other products of the German monopoly enabled them, by such methods, to maintain it. Many other examples, including such important products as bro- mine, oxalic acid, and aniline, could be quoted to show the results of the German price-cutting policy. The direct significance of bromine for chemical war- fare must be borne in mind. Full Line Forcing.—Besides directly attacking the production of raw materials and intermediates, the Germans used an indirect method which has been described as ‘“‘full line forcing.”” They were the sole producers of certain specialties, such as alizarine colours, anthracene colours, and synthetic indigo. These were indispensable to the textile manufac- turers, and by refusing to supply them, except to houses which would buy their other supplies from German manufacturers, the latter could squeeze out home producers of simple dyes, however efficient their production. Bribery and Corruption;—German Patent Pol- icy.— The dyeing industry was peculiarly susceptible to corruption. It was so simple for the head dyer of a mill to show a partiality for dyes from any par- ticular source of supply. The American Alien Prop- erty Custodian very frankly tells ust: “The methods of the great German houses in carrying on their business in this country were from the first honeycombed with corruption. Bribery of dyers was * Alien Property Custodian Report, 1919, p. 34. 190 German Chemical Policy carried on almost universally on a large scale. So extensive was this corruption that I came across only one American consumer that had escaped its ill effects.’ Such were hardly the methods of decent commercial competition, although it appears that the strong patriotic sense of the German was able to justify, in his own eyes, what might be regarded as reprehensible methods. This is not a question of bringing up old reproaches, but merely of coldly examining facts. We have already referred to their patent policy, whereby thousands of patents were taken out, the only value of many of them being to cramp the productive initiative of possible rivals. Professor Stieglitz explains how the German patents were useless in developing large scale manufacture. ‘The patent protects the product, but does not reveal the method.” Sir William Pope has also brought out this point, showing how the Germans use thou- sands of bogus patents to protect their chemical in- dustry. He tells us,1 “In fact, some German patents are drawn up for the purpose of discouraging investi- gation by more practical methods; thus, any one who attempted to repeat the method for manufacturing a dyestuff protected by Salzman & Kruger in the Ger- man patent No. 12,096 would be pretty certain to kill himself during the operation.” Propaganda and Information ;—EHspionage ;— Activities of the Dye Agencies.—But another method which was used in this commercial offensive, to which we must draw further attention, dealt with propaganda and information. In his comprehensive report, the American Alien Property Custodian ex- amines a number of large industries and reveals how the German interest in these industries through their * Science and the Nation.