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 II E> RARY 
 
 OF THE 
 U N IVLRSITY 
 Of ILLINOIS
 
 ? 
 
 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 By Sie JOHN LUBBOCK, Baet., M.P., F.E.S. 
 
 [From " The Daily News," April 15, 1884.] 
 
 The objects of the Proportional Eepresentation Society 
 are to secure a fair and just system of voting, under which 
 the majority of the electors would obtain the preponderance 
 of power, ; while at the same time the minority would secure 
 a fair hearing. Neither of these objects are effectually 
 provided for under the ordinary system of voting, which, 
 as I shall hope to show, is uncertain in its operation, and 
 may either, on the one hand, extinguish the minority, or 
 on the other, actually give it a majority of the represen- 
 tation. Mr. Goschen, who has never joined our Society, 
 in his speech on the second reading of the Franchise 
 Bill, urged with great force the desirability of Proportional 
 Eepresentation as a provision for the protection of minorities. 
 This, no doubt, is an important side, but it is only one 
 side of the question. Proportional Eepresentation is not 
 only a safeguard to the minority, but it is also a security 
 to the majority. Conservatives may look more to the 
 former, Liberals will naturally do so more to the latter 
 advantage. The advocates of mere majority voting, in 
 their anxiety to extinguish the minority, really endanger 
 the just preponderance of the majority ; in grasping at more 
 than is just they run the risk of losing even that to which 
 they are fairly entitled. 
 
 The Society was founded by a few gentlemen who met 
 together at 7, Clarges Street, shortly before the commence- 
 ment of the Session, A notice was then inserted in the 
 
 A
 
 ( 2 ) 
 
 papers, and a circular addressed to every Member of Par- 
 liament, the result of which was to elicit a most unexpected 
 amount of support, and a meeting was then held, at which, 
 after the election of officers, the following resolution was 
 unanimously adopted — viz. : " That, without prejudging how 
 far the principle may be subsequently carried out, it is in- 
 dispensable, as a first step towards securing the true repre- 
 sentation of the electors, that whenever a constituency 
 returns more than two Members, some form, of Propor- 
 tional Kepresentation should be adopted." The Society 
 then appointed a committee to obtain information as to the 
 different modes of voting which have been suggested or 
 are in use, and to report to a future meeting. At present, 
 in addition to other supporters, the Society comprises no 
 fewer than 180 Members of Parliament, 93 of whom are 
 Liberals. 
 
 We regard the ordinary system of voting as unsatis- 
 factory, because it does not fairly represent the com- 
 munities ; it does not secure a majority of representation 
 to a majority of the electors ; it tends to violent fluctuations 
 in the balance of political power, and renders the result of 
 a general election to a great extent a matter of chance. 
 
 I will first attempt to show that it does not fairly re- 
 present communities. My friend Mr. Lefevre and others 
 have argued that inequalities in one place are counter- 
 balanced by opposite inequalities in another. But this is 
 not so. Mr. Lefevre instanced the case of London. I am 
 not sure that this case bears out his view. Still, there are, 
 of course, such instances. But they are exceptional, and 
 the reverse is more often the case. In the contested elec- 
 tions of Kent, for instance, the Liberals polled 32,000 votes, 
 and the Conservatives 36,000, yet the Liberals only secured 
 two seats out of 18. If we take a much larger area — say, 
 the south-eastern counties, returning 99 Members to Par- 
 liament — the Liberals polled 96,000 votes, and the Con- 
 servatives 116,000, yet the Liberals only carried 15 seats, 
 and five of these were in three-cornered constituencies, so 
 that but for the limited application of Proportional 
 
 
 *-
 
 ( 3 ) 
 
 .Representation, they would have only secured 10 seats 
 of 99. 
 
 The next objection to the ordinary mode of voting is, 
 that it does not secure to the majority of the electors a 
 majority of the representation. Those who support it 
 appear to be under the delusion that if constituencies were 
 equalised the present mode of voting would — roughly, in- 
 deed, but surely — secure, that the majority of electors 
 would rule the country. But this is not so. It sounds 
 like a paradox, but it is nevertheless true, that a majority 
 of electors in every constituency is by no means the same 
 thing as a majority of all the electors. Suppose, for 
 instance, a community of 60,000 electors is divided into 
 three divisions, each containing 20,000, and that there are 
 35,000 Liberals and 25,000 Conservatives, the division 
 might be, and very likely would be, as follows : — 
 
 1st Division. 2nd Division. 3rd Division. 
 
 Liberals 17,000 9,000 9,000 
 
 Conservatives ... 3,000 11,000 11,000 
 
 20,000 20,000 20,000 
 
 And thus, though in a minority, the Conservatives would 
 actually return two members out of three. This is no 
 hypothetical case, but really happened in Switzerland, and 
 led to the revolution of 1846. 
 
 The ordinary mode of voting fails, therefore, in the 
 essential object of securing to the majority their fair in- 
 fluence. Of course, if the constituencies were sufficiently 
 numerous, then by the doctrine of probabilities these ine- 
 qualities might neutralise one another ; but this would only 
 occur if we had many thousand, instead of a few hundred 
 constituencies. The system of single seats has many great 
 recommendations, but it would not secure this particular 
 object. 
 
 In the next place, the present system renders the result 
 of a general election to a large extent a matter of chance. 
 In 1880 the Liberals carried over 90 seats by majorities of 
 less than a hundred ; in some cases by a mere handful
 
 ( 4 ) 
 
 of votes. Take, for instance, South Norfolk, which, we car- 
 ried by one vote ; Colchester, by two ; Buckingham and 
 Eye, by eight ; Worcester and Tewkesbury, by nine. "Five 
 hundred votes differently given might have left the Liberals 
 in a minority, and it is absurd to allow the destinies of 
 a great country to depend on so small a number of votes. 
 In the present Parliament we have 43 seats more than our 
 votes would have entitled us to, while in 1874 chances were 
 against us, and we had 56 too few. Thus in a House of 
 658 Members, chance has actually affected the balance of 
 parties to the extent of 100 votes out of 650 ; and this, I 
 need hardly point out, leads to violent fluctuation in the 
 balance of political power. In fact, under the ordinary 
 method of voting the minority may, at one election, have 
 far more than their due proportion of representation, while 
 at another, perhaps the very next, they may be almost 
 extinguished. 
 
 But if, even now, the ordinary mode of voting is open to 
 grave objections, and does not fairly represent the electors, 
 this will be still more the case under the new Eeform Bill. 
 Liverpool, according to its population, will be entitled to, 
 at least, six representatives. There is, I admit, much to 
 be said in favour of dividing it into wards. But if this is 
 not done, the City would return six Members as an un- 
 divided constituency. Now we know that political parties 
 are very nearly balanced in that city ; there are, perhaps, 
 32,000 Conservative and 31,000 Liberals, or vice versa — it is 
 difficult to say which, for at the last election the Liberals 
 had a majority, while at the preceding one the Conservatives 
 were victorious. Much depends on the Irish vote. Surely, 
 it is manifestly absurd to give the 32,000 electors six 
 Members, and leave the 31,000 altogether unrepresented. 
 
 Take, again, the case of Ireland. The Loyalists amount to 
 one-third of the population ; but, except in a very few places, 
 they would be everywhere outnumbered. They are justly en- 
 titled to at least 33 seats ; but, under the ordinary mode of 
 voting, it is estimated that they would not secure more than 
 half-a-dozen. To adopt a system under which one-third of
 
 ( 5 ) 
 
 the electors would be unrepresented, would, under any cir- 
 cumstances, be unjust ; but to devise a plan which places 
 undue power in the hands of those who wish to destroy the 
 union, and to silence those who desire to maintain the 
 integrity of the Empire, would be an act of madness. 
 
 But then we are gravely told that to advocate a just and 
 proportional system of representation is "but a new dis- 
 guise for the old distrust of the people." How can this be ? 
 Under Proportional Kepresentation the majority of the 
 electors must return a majority of the representatives. 
 The minority, indeed, would be secure of a hearing, but 
 the majority would rule. Next time we are told that we 
 show a distrust of the people, perhaps the speaker will 
 condescend to explain how. The fact is, that if there be 
 any distrust it is on the part of those who advocate an 
 unfair and unjust system. It is manifestly reasonable that 
 in any constituency the representatives should be in pro- 
 portion to the opinions of the electors. That, if in a 
 constituency returning six Members, two-thirds of the 
 electors are Liberals and one-third Conservatives, four of 
 the Members should be Liberals and two Conservatives. 
 If five-sixths are Liberals, five of the Members should be 
 Liberals. How does this show any mistrust of the people ? 
 It is clearly the fair and just system. If in such a con- 
 stituency one-third of the electors are Liberals it is surely 
 unjust that all the representatives should be Conservatives. 
 A system which, in such a case, would give 32,000 electors 
 six Members, and 31,000 none at all, is neither just nor 
 representative. 
 
 But then it is sometimes said that though no doubt 
 Proportional Representation would be perfectly fair, if it 
 were general, it is unjust to the Liberal party that it should 
 have been applied in a few large places only. But what 
 are the facts? There are 13 constituencies in which the 
 proportional system (though in an inconvenient form) has 
 been adopted. Two of these — namely, Glasgow and Bir- 
 mingham — return three Liberals. In the other 11 the 
 representation is divided ; but while we have the two seats 
 
 A— 2
 
 ( 6 ) 
 
 in three cases, the Conservatives have the majority of 
 electors in eight. 
 
 There may be some doubt, perhaps, about one of these ; 
 but it is clear that the minority system has given us either 
 four or five seats more than we should otherwise have had. 
 Liberals have, therefore, from this point of view, certainly 
 nothing to complain of. 
 
 The next objection is that though the system may be 
 theoretically perfect, it is, in fact, impracticable. There 
 are, however, several modes of voting which give, more or 
 less completely, a fair proportional representation. Of 
 these the cumulative vote, the limited vote, the free list, 
 and the single transferable vote are the best known, and 
 the last-mentioned seems to be that which has the most 
 numerous supporters. Under the single transferable vote, 
 each elector would only have one vote ; but he would be 
 allowed to mark as many candidates as he pleased in the 
 order of his preference. Each voter, having one vote, 
 would put the numbers 1, 2, 3, &c, opposite the names of 
 the candidates, in the order of his preference for them. The 
 vote will be counted to the candidate against whose name 
 the figure 1 is placed ; but after any candidate has received 
 enough votes to secure his election the vote will be given to 
 the candidate marked number 2. The result would be that 
 each party would carry its best man ; while whichever 
 party was the stronger would also bring in its second can- 
 didate. This is surely as it should be, and Liverpool would* 
 under this system, be fairly represented. Under a system 
 of mere majority voting, on the contrary, the majority only, 
 not Liverpool, as a whole, would be represented. Let us 
 suppose, for instance, that two Liberals and two Con- 
 servatives were standing for three seats. Then each 
 Liberal would place 1 and 2 against the Liberal candidates 
 in the order of his preference. The Conservatives would do 
 the same, and the result would be that each party would 
 carry its strongest candidate, while whichever had the 
 majority would also bring in the second. Under this 
 system no dictation by agents or committees would be re-
 
 ( 7 ) 
 
 quired, and leading statesmen would be sure of election. 
 The system was recently tried by Mr. Arnold Forster in a 
 Board School, and it was found that the school children 
 understood it quite easily. Again, Mr. Bompas arranged 
 for our Society to have 20,000 voting papers filled up, and 
 then counted as they would be in an ordinary election. 
 This was done without any hitch or difficulty. 
 
 Those who may wish to join our Society are requested to 
 communicate with Mr. A. C. White, at 9, Bridge Street, 
 Westminster. We do not ask for money as a con- 
 dition of membership, but are, of course, grateful for any 
 donations. We maintain that Proportional Bepresentation 
 is the right, fair, and just system. It would free the 
 electors from the dictation of committees or caucuses ; it 
 would give to minorities a fair hearing ; and, lastly, by it, 
 and by it alone, you can secure to majorities their just 
 preponderance. If our opponents still deny this, we chal- 
 lenge them to point out the fallacy of our argument, and 
 until they do this we confidently claim for it the support of 
 all true Liberals. 
 
 [From " The Daily News," May 15th, 1884.] 
 
 You lately did me the honour of inserting an article in 
 which I endeavoured to prove that the scrutin de liste 
 system of voting is uncertain in its operation, leads to 
 violent fluctuations in political power, and fails to secure in 
 Parliament a true representation of the people ; and that 
 under Proportional Bepresentation, on the contrary, the 
 House of Commons would be a true mirror of the country, 
 our leading statesmen would be certain of re-election, the 
 minority in the country would be sure of a hearing in the 
 House, and last, but not least, the majority would rule. I 
 ended by challenging contradiction on any one of these 
 statements ; and it is perhaps not too much to say that no 
 refutation has yet been attempted.
 
 ( 8 ) 
 
 Surely, then, a system which would secure such results, 
 which would give us a really representative Government, is 
 worth serious study. But if no refutation of our main posi- 
 tion has been attempted, there have been expressions of 
 opinion that our system is open to objection, mainly, I 
 think, on three grounds, as to each of which I should be 
 glad to say a few words, and I will take the letter signed 
 " An Official Liberal " as a type of many others. 
 
 The objections are — 1st, that it would put more power 
 into the hands of agents and caucuses ; 2ndly, that the 
 electors would not understand it ; 3rdly, that it is imprac- 
 ticable. As regards the first point, I will merely observe 
 that so far from placing more power in the hands of 
 caucuses and agents, the very reverse is the case. In fact, 
 one of the advantages of the system is just that it would 
 free the elector from dictation, and that is, I believe, the 
 true reason why our proposals have met with such bitter 
 opposition in certain quarters. The second objection is 
 that the electors would never be brought to understand the 
 system. Those who write and say that they cannot under- 
 stand the proposal shelter themselves (and very naturally) 
 under the veil of anonymous signatures. It would indeed 
 be humiliating openly to confess such extreme obtuseness. 
 Moreover, those who bring forward this argument seem to 
 forget that we have already two forms of proportional re- 
 presentation actually in operation in this country — namely, 
 the limited vote in the three-cornered constituencies, and 
 the cumulative vote in School Board elections. No one 
 ever alleged that the electors had any difficulty in under- 
 standing either of these, and we might, of course, adopt one 
 or the other of them, but many of us think that there is a 
 better system — namely, the single transferable vote. Now, 
 in considering the simplicity or complexity of any proposed 
 system we must draw a broad line between that which the 
 elector has to do, and that which devolves on the returning 
 officer. The first cannot be too simple. But as regards 
 the latter we are dealing with skilled and trained officials. 
 I shall, however, hope to show that the duty imposed even
 
 ( 9 ) 
 
 on them would be simple enough, and such as even an 
 average schoolboy would have no difficulty in carrying out. 
 First, then, let us deal with the elector only. It is pro- 
 posed that he should have one vote, but that he should be 
 able to indicate the order of preference. Let us suppose, 
 for instance, an election at Liverpool for three members, 
 and that two Liberals and two Conservatives were in the 
 field, each party endeavouring to secure two out of the 
 three seats. The elector would receive his ballot-paper, 
 say, as follows : — 
 
 Beown 
 
 Jones .... 
 Kobinson 
 Smith .... 
 
 All he would have to do would be to place 1 and 2 in the 
 vacant spaces opposite the names of the candidates in the 
 order of his preference. To say that this is beyond the com- 
 prehension of the average elector is really trifling. " An 
 Official Liberal " is presumably in favour of the Franchise 
 Bill, and surely any " capable citizen " who is fil to express 
 a voice on the affairs of the nation can be trusted to per- 
 form so simple an operation. 
 
 I now come to the third objection, namely, that the 
 system is impracticable. To that I oppose the conclu- 
 sive answer that it has been done over and over again 
 without hitch or difficulty. The instructions to the return- 
 ing officer would be somewhat as follows : 
 
 1. The returning officer shall first ascertain the total 
 number of votes given. By a sum in simple division he 
 can then ascertain how many votes are required to secure 
 the election of a candidate, and this number is called the 
 quota. 2. The returning officer shall declare all candi- 
 dates who have obtained the quota elected, and shall dis- 
 tribute the votes given for such candidate in excess of the 
 quota to the other candidates who have not been declared 
 elected in the order indicated by the voters. 3. This shall 
 be repeated till there are no candidates having more than 
 the quota.
 
 ( io ) 
 
 So far as Proportional Kepresentation is concerned we 
 might stop here. There is, however, one other evil under 
 the present mode of voting which our system enables us, if 
 thought desirable, to neutralise — that, namely, which arises 
 when too many candidates of one party insist on coming 
 forward. All that would be necessary would be the follow- 
 ing two additional clauses, which, however, is, I repeat, 
 no necessary part of our system. 
 
 4. If the number of candidates still exceed by more than 
 one the number of vacancies, the returning officer shall 
 declare the candidate then having the least number of votes 
 not elected, and shall distribute the votes given for him to 
 the other candidates not already declared elected, according 
 to the directions, if any, given by the voter, commencing 
 with the voting paper having the lowest registered number. 
 The returning officer shall declare elected any candidate 
 whose votes during such distribution reach the quota. 
 5. This shall be repeated until the number of candidates 
 exceeds by one only the number of vacancies. The return- 
 ing officer shall then declare the candidates having the 
 largest number of votes elected. 
 
 This will not seem complex to any one who will compare 
 it with the duties imposed on corresponding officials under 
 other Acts of Parliament. 
 
 One point still remains to be dealt with. It is alleged 
 that under this system the selection of the votes to be dis- 
 tributed introduces an element of chance. But in the first 
 place I must observe that there need be no elements of 
 chance in the actual votes transferred. I believe, indeed, 
 that in so large a number of votes as we shall have to 
 deal with it would be practically fair to take simply the 
 votes last counted. As a matter of fact, however, the 
 voting papers being numbered, in our experimental elec- 
 tion we took the voting papers bearing the highest num- 
 bers, i.e., those last filled up. I should myself pre- 
 fer in a real election to take those bearing the lowest 
 numbers. In either case nothing would be left to the 
 returning officer. But what is the extent of the chance ?
 
 ( 11 ) 
 
 It has been calculated out by Mr. Andrae, and again 
 independently by Mr. Parker Smith. Suppose a can- 
 didate A has a surplus to be distributed, and that the 
 second votes were given equally between B and C. If the 
 surplus is 4,000 the average difference between B and C, 
 supposing the papers to be taken at random, would not 
 exceed 1] votes. The chances are 2,000 to 1 that neither 
 would gain nor lose more that 60 votes. For all practical 
 purposes therefore this can hardly be urged as a serious 
 objection to the system. 
 
 We do not, however, allege that the system is perfect. 
 On the contrary, we frankly admit that there is an element 
 of chance, though to an infinitesimal extent, not indeed in 
 the counting but in the result. But does not chance enter 
 to some extent into all the events of life ? Are there no 
 chances in the present system of voting ? Even in this 
 respect we maintain that our system need fear no com- 
 parison. Moreover, it must be remembered that the 
 element of chance, microscopical as it is, lies not 
 between candidates of different parties, but between 
 two almost equally acceptable candidates belonging to the 
 same party. For instance, in the case I have taken above, 
 a vast majority of the surplus votes taken from the first 
 Liberal candidate would be given to the second. In all 
 ordinary elections the votes split between a Liberal and a 
 Conservative are a very small minority of the whole. But 
 if between two candidates there is very little to choose, and 
 the electors are all but evenly divided, then, from a national 
 point of view, it cannot much matter which comes in ; and, 
 indeed, under any system of voting, the result would be 
 very much a matter of chance. Without, then, denying the 
 existence of an infinitesimal element of chance in the 
 system, as in all other affairs of life, I must say de mini- 
 mis non curat lex. 
 
 Moreover, I must once more repeat that proportional 
 representation does not stand or fall by the single transfer- 
 able vote system. Many of us think it the best, but the 
 Free List has influential supporters, while the Limited
 
 ( 12 ) 
 
 vote and the Cumulative vote are already in opera- 
 tion. They have some inconveniences which might, I 
 think, be remedied; but at any rate they do give us, though 
 somewhat roughly, a fair representation. For my own 
 part, however, I think it has been already shown that 
 there is not only no insuperable, but no substantial, diffi- 
 culty in the matter; and I trust that Great Britain, the 
 mother of Parliaments, may once more take the lead among 
 the great nations of the world by securing for herself a 
 House of Commons which shall really represent the 
 nation. 
 
 Published by the Proportional Representation Society^ 
 Palace Chambers, Westminster.
 
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