THE BRITISH LABOR PARTY BY JOHN HALVOR LEEK A. B. James Millikin University, 1920 THESIS Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 1921 / TABLE OF COITEITTS Chapter Page. Chapter I. -Early Stages of the Movement: to 1906 1. Chapter II. -The Intermediate Period: 1906 to 1914 32. Chapter III. -The Lar and After. First Phase: Truce and Coalition 55. Second Phase: The Revival of the Labor Party 62. Third Phase: Contemporary Politics ....90. Bibliography 105 Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2015 I https://archive.org/details/britishlaborpartOOIeek 1 . CHAPTER I. -Early Stages of the Movement** to 1906. Fifty years or more ago, Y/alt Whitman, the poet of Democracy, wrote the following: "I expect to see the day when the like of the present personnel of the governments, Federal, State, municipal, military, and naval, will he looked upon with derision, and when qualified young mechanics and young men will reach Congress and other official stations, sent in their working costumes, fresh from their working benches and tools and returning to them again with dignity. The young fellows must prepare to do credit to this des- 1 . tiny, for the stuff is in them.” The forecast must have sounded wild and improbable when it was uttered, but to-day we have the spectacle of a group of sixty representatives of labor, most of whom have been 'actual working men, in the British House of Commons. Since the whole political labor movement in Great Britain has depended for its strength on the organized trades unions, it might be as well to begin a study of the former by outlining briefly the history of the latter. Trades unions, which the Webbs define as "continuous associations of wage-earners for the purpose of main- 2 . taining or improving the conditions of their v/orking lives", were under the old English common law considered illegal, as being con- spiracies, or combinations in restraint of trade, and such law was enforced from the time of Edy/ard I do wn to the days of George IV. But late in the XVIII Century the effects of the Industrial Revol- ution 7/ere such that not only v/as labor organization on a hitherto incredible scale rendered possible because of grouping of laborers 1. -Quo ted £y 17. Diack in the Arena for May, 1906, pp 476-480. 2. -Webb, S.and B. -History of Trade Unionism, Revised Ed., 1920, p.l. . 2 . around the factories, hut the sudden ascendancy and power of the employer was such as to make such combinations almost inevitable, in the interests of self defense. Consequently, just before the opening of the ZIZ Century, the trade union movement experienced a great impetus. It proved to be a bad time for such organization, for the excesses of the Prench Revolution had inspired in the English people a temporary panic and revulsion toward democratic movements; hence the legislation of 1799 and 1800, whereby the common la w against combinations, both of employers and employees, was reiterated emphatically, with heavy penalties provided for its infraction. However, the lav/ was so unequally enforced, persecu- tions of unjustified severity being balanced by open and unpunished violation, that insistent demand for reform led to the action of 1824, which v/ent to the opposite extreme and sanctioned all forms of combination without restriction. The following year, hov/ever, under pressure from the employing classes, Parliament reenacted the old la w in a modified form by declaring the common law nominal- ly in force while specifically exempting from prosecution associa- tions for the purpose of regulating hours or wages of labor. Thus for a number of years labor organizations held the anomalous position of being technically illegal but not subject to punish- ment. Such a position was, to say the least, precarious, and finally, continued agitation and periodic legislation culminated in the acts of 1871-1876, which specifically legalized trades unions and even went so far as to free them from possibility of suit. It was declared that no organization could be prosecuted for collect- ive action which would be legal if practiced by an individual. Meanwhile the movement had successfully weathered the revolu- . ■ Lwe . . . . 3 . tiogary period of 1830-1848 in European politics and had resisted the determined efforts of the Chartists to capture the unions for their own purposes. The movement had always been averse to politi- cal action, and following the collapse of the Chartists for a number of years the trades unionists placed their whole confidence in the strike as a means of attaining their ends. Indeed, however the idea may have originated, its practical origin is credited to a man not belonging to the laboring classes at all, John Stuart Mill, since it was at his suggestion that the experiment was first tried. The first avowedly labor candidature was that of George Jacob Holyoake, who made a campaign in 1857 in the Tower Hamlets Qonstituency . The strength of his effort was never really tested, however, since late in the campaign he withdrew in favor of the Liberal candidate. For several years following this effort there were several sporadic attempts at securing labor members in the House of Commons, but the first organized attempt was the for- mation of the London Workingmen 1 s Association in 1866. Its pur- poses were claimed at first to be simply industrial; indeed, favoring labor representation was the exception rather than the rule with the really influential labor organizations of those days; but the Association was finally induced to include labor represen- tation in its program following some much resented judicial decisions in 1867. Of course such pretensions could not but bring down upon the organization the wrath of the Conservative element throughout the country, and much angry rhetoric was expended upon this effort at so-called class legislation. Labor denied, however, that it was seeking special privileges, and discredited the class legislation 4 argument by pointing out in quite orthodox fashion that the Consti- tution did not recognize classes. Campaign expenses and payment of members were early difficulties, but it was finally decided that such constituencies as decided to run candidates would be willing to pay their representatives, if elected, The Association officially favored the extension of the suffrage to a residential and regis- tered manhood basis. Only three candidates ran under the auspices of the Association in 1868; and they polled but 4012 votes in all in the three constituencies of Warwick, Aylesbury, and Halifax. This was the first election after the reform of 1867, but no one of the 1 . three was elected. The failure of the Association was generally attributed to a lack of centralized control, and so, not at all daunted by the ill success of their first venture, the leaders of the movement pro- ceeded to reorganize their forces under the name of the Labor Rep- resentation League in the following year, ihe noteworthy feature of the new organization was the fact that its primary purpose was the election of labor representatives to Parliament. It is of interest to note that the movement protested against the possibility of British participation in the Pranco-Prussian War, which broke out in 1870. Generally, however, its attitude toward the Government was conciliatory, almost subservient. Its early efforts in local and bye-elections were fruitless, but in 1874 the political labor move- ment achieved its first signal success in the return of Thomas Burt for Morpeth and Alexander Macdonald for Stafford, both represent- ing miners' organizations. 1'his proved to be the climax of the League's career, however, for it declined in importance and finally disappeared, oignificant, however, was its protest, in 1876, of 1 * " Humphrey, A. W. , -History of Labor Representation, p.28. ♦ 5 . Queen Victoria's assumption of the title of impress. Meanwhile the trade union movement had held its first national Congress in 1868, and the meeting soon became an annual event, ihe Congress half-heartedly acquiesced in the attempt at direct repre- sentation of labor, but gave no appreciable aid to the organizations formed for that purpose. It appointed a Parliamentary Committee, whose functions were to influence the progress of legislation affecting the interests of labor in the nouse of Commons through lobbying, petitioning, or any other indirect means they might de- vise. But toward the idea of direct political action the Congress was but lukewarm. Just at this time, anyway, labor was in the midst of its fight for the legalization of trades unions, and it had little time or energy to spare for the representation project, and so Congress after Congress passed without anything definite being done in spite of the persistent efforts of a few leaders, cnee the safety of the trades unions was assured, the Congress adopted a more sympathetic attitude toward the problem, and urged upon its membership the desirability of working and voting for labor candi- dates. But no practical or financial aid was given for a number of years, there being at the time a prejudice against the use of trades union funds for such a purpose. Political action by working- men was discouragingly difficult at this time, anyway, for, it being before the Eeform Bill of 1884, there were registration dif- ficulties to be overcome; unmarried men were required to p&y the equivalent of a yearly rooming bill of fifty dollars; vrorkingmen were allowed to vote in the urban districts but not in the counties; and there was a delay of two years in voting involved in moving, which was especially hard on labor, since the fluctuating and 6 . uncertain conditions of employment made a permanent domicile 1 . almost impossible. The elections of 1880 had resulted in the return of both hurt and Macdonald, and yielded one further labor victory in the choice of henry hroadhurst for Stoke-on-xrent . his election marks the rise of a coalition movement known as Liberal-haborism, which was des- tined to flourish for some twenty years. Most of the labor leaders at this time were xdberals, and the alliance was a very natural one. The Liberal Party took a sympathetic vi ew toward the political labor movement, regarding it as a sort of left wing of its own organization. On this basis for many years it was customary for the majority of labor candidates to stand for election only where the Liberals conceded their strength and the justice of their claim; and for labor Members of Parliament to constitute a little group working in harmony with the Liberal Parliamentary g-'oup. indeed, some critics claim that during the '80’s in particular, labor was actually backward in agitation for political reform; that it tagged at the heels of Liberalism; that laissez faire was even trade union creed until about 1885. Such political agitation as was attempted by labor during this period was that of individual unions, working without coordination, and, at times, even at cross-purposes, and they v/ere successful only insofar as their aims coincided with 2 . those of the Liberal Party. The reforms of 1884 were both good and bad for the cause of labor representation. Of course they extended the labor vote, but they did away with the double constituencies, and it had been mainly in such districts that labor candidates had been campaigning. One new labor member was added to the contingent 1 . -Of . article by J. Keir Hardie in the Porum for August, 19007 pp. 726-733 . 2. Webb, op.cit., p. 368 et. seq. ■ 7 in the elections of 1885, and it is perhaps indicative of the grow- ing importance and prestige of the movement that workingmen were first appointed Justices of the Peace in that year, The appointees were Liberals, the appointments being secured through the influence of Broadhurst. As a matter of fact, the movement gained ground locally much more rapidly than it did in the national government. The attitude of the Trades Union Congress, meanwhile, had re- solved itself into the shape of an annual declaration in favor of labor representation, and nothing further; until in 1886 persistent efforts resulted in the appointment of a special committee to devise ways and means of promoting the project, in the following year, however, this body declared its independence of the Trades Union Congress and entered upon a separate existence as the Labor Electoral Association. It was a unifying organization promoting the interests of Liberal-Laborism. It was curiously inconsistent, how- ever, in that, although decidedly class bound, as was shown in its refusal to admit to its annual congresses any but actual manual workers, it refused to promote an independent labor organization and insisted on continuing the alliance with the Liberals. Perhaps that very dependence was its weakness, for it had neither a long nor an eventful existence, finally merging with the Liberal Party and disappearing about 1895. Probably the most significant political development of the ^O's, however, especially from the labor standpoint, was the sud- den revival and growth of Socialism. Since the collapse of the idealistic Socialism of Robert Owen and that Christian Socialistic movement with which the name of Charles Kingsley is connected. Socialism had been in a state of quiescence bordering on total ' ■ . , i.. ■ ““ ' 8 . eclipse. The influence of John Stuart Mill and William Morris and others, however, and the sudden and widespread popularity of nenry George's Progress and Poverty quickened it into n ew life, The organized movement "began with the democratic federation, in 1881, which had some Socialistic items in its program, hut v/as not wholly committed to that doctrine, The conversion of the body to a com- pletely Socialistic program was rapid, however, and two years later the name was changed to the oocial Democratic federation, and its attitude became more distinctly political, if not revolutionary. In 1884 there was a split in the ranks, and William Morris headed a new movement ¥/hich called itself the Socialist League, whose aims were less extreme and whose methods were educational rather than political. Its influence v/as never very ?/i despread, however, and the organization came to an end in 1890. The formation of the Christian Socialist Society extended the movement to the churches, and there were other lesser organizations, all of whom helped in spreading the propaganda and in popularizing the movement, though many of them were small and ephemeral. The most important of these early groups, however, and the one which has succeeded in maintaining an existence and extending its influence right down to the present day, was the fabian society, which took its name from the old foman general Quintus Pabius Maximus, who was noted for the extreme caution of his military tac- tics. The Pabian Society believed in the achievement of a Social- istic state through an evolutionary process, by means of education and propaganda. It has never been a very large organization from the standpoint of numbers, but it has contained in its membership some of the brightest intellectual lights of England, such, for ? 9 . instance, as George Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, Sidney and Beatrice Uebb, Graham Wallas, and others. It has published innumerable pam- phlets on Socialistic topics and has been instrumental in spreading abroad a clearer understanding and a better knowledge of the sub- ject throughout the nation. The now Socialism, as compared with the older, was emphatically more practical and scientific, and was inclined to state its pro- positions in terms of economic theory. Its significance to the labor movement was not at first apparent, for it did not start as a class movement, even though many of its extremer advocates did preach the class war. Although very naturally a large number of the early converts to the new theory were themselves trades union members, yet for a number of years those in authority in the Trades Union Congress were bitterly hostile to the movement. The Parlia- mentary Committee in particular opposed it. But one fact which favored the growth of Socialism in the labor ranks was that the skilled laborers, those who were dubbed the aristocratic trades unions, feeling their power and position to be better assured than that of some of their fellows, were rather inclined to hold themselves aloof in the matter of aid to the whole concerted labor movement; and the Socialists, playing strongly on that point, managed to make very substantial gains for their cause in the 1 . unskilled labor groups. Economic conditions, too, were favorable to the Socialistic propaganda, for the industrial depression which marked the middle '80’s brought unemployment and consequent suffer- ing which furnished the most effective sort of political capital. A few years later, too, when business had revived, there occurred l.-Webb, op.cit., p.588. , . 10 . a number of great strikes which strengthened the radical element. 1888 and 1889 were years of great expansion in the trades union movement, and the most significant part of it ?;as the formation of a number of unions of unskilled laborers, most of whom had hereto- fore been entirely outside the organized labor fold. The great London dock strike, for instance, led to the formation of strong unions of unskilled dock laborers, and that fact, coupled with the strong influence of the Socialist propaganda among the unskilled forecasted a change in the attitude of organized labor. Significant, too, was the extension of the trades union movement to what was known as the black-coated proletariat, or those who would be more easily recognized ih the American terminology, as the white collar men. The Union of Commercial Clerks and the National Union of Teachers both began their existence in 1890, and though they devel- oped rather slowly for a time, their beginning was a noteworthy sign of the times. Subsequently there have been formed Technicians' organizations, a Medico-Political Union, and Actors 1 Association, a National Union of Journalists, an insurance agents 1 organization 1 . and many others, even including civil service unions. The period just preceding the last decade of the XIX Century, then, was one of increasing solidarity and sympathy among the workers, and the progress of the Socialist element in the trades union organization turned its activities, which had threatened to be revolutionary, into constitutional channels. The deferential attitude assumed by the Trades Union Congress toward the Liberal Party, and the continuance of the Liberal -Labor coalition were extremely distasteful to the more militant of the l.-Webb, op.cit., p.503 et seq. . . ■ * 11 . Socialist labor leaders. By 1893 this new, aggressive group was practically in control of the Congress, hut it was unable to per- suade the body to make an actual appropriation for the purpose of electing to Parliament a body of labor representatives who should act in complete independence of either Liberals or Conservatives in the House of Commons. In 1889 the Scottish Labor Party had been formed at Glasgow, and it, together with a number of local indepen- dent labor associations which had sprung up all over England, participated in the election of 1892, which resulted in the return 1 . of twelve Liberal-Labor members and three Independents . Since that time the labor representation in the House has never fallen belo?/ ten men. In the following year a group of militant Socialists under the lead of J. Keir Eardie founded an organization which they called the Independent Labor Party, with two distinctive purposes: in the first place, its program v/as avowedly Socialistic; and in the second place, it proposed to be an entirely independent politi- 2 . cal unit. It aimed at a cooperative commonwealth, based on the socialization of land and capital; its methods were both education- al and political. Its membership, though overwhelmingly of trade unionists and laborers, was by no means confined to them; a fact which gave it a decided advantage over the more class-bound Liberal- Labor group. As a national party, its numbers have remained com- paratively small, but it has maintained a most vigorous propaganda 1. -Districts returning labor members: London and environs: Batter- sea, South Division of West Ham, Haggerston Division of Shoreditch, Horth-East Bethnal Green, East Division of Einsbury; urban dis- tricts: Middlesbrough, Morpeth; county districts: Horth-West Divi- sion of Uorfolk, Wansbeek Division of Ho r thumb er land, ITormanton Division of South-West Hiding of Yorkshire, Middle Division of Durham, Ince Division of South-West Lancashire; Ireland: West Division of Limerick, Ossory Division of Queen's County; wales: Hhondda Division of Glamorganshire. 2. -Humphrey, op.cit, p. 135 et seq. 12 . and has exerted an influence on politics out of all proportion to its actual membership . The Independent Labor Party began its political career under most discouraging conditions. It put numerous candidates in the field for the elections of 1895, but all of them were defeated. Hot only that, but the total labor group was reduced from fifteen to twelve, and among those who lost their seats was Mr. Hardie, the leader of the new party. All parties, including even the Liberal- Labor group and the Trades Union Congress, united in the bitterest hostility to the new group. A less indomitable group than Hardie and his followers would have succumbed to such a situation, but the Independent Labor Party continued its activities undaunted. Increasing dissatisfaction with the Liberal regime, coupled with unemployment and bad industrial conditions in the f 90's strength- ened its forces, and gradually the breach which separated the movement from the Trades Union Congress was bridged; though it is but fair to say that the yielding was all on the part of the latter, for the Independents did not retreat an inch from their position. Probably the most influential factor in this change of front was several legal decisions rendered during this period which apparently threatened the hard-won immunity of trades unions, and which put an end to the political apathy of the Trades Union Congress and forced it into politics to protect itself. At any rate, after insistent agitation on the part of the more aggressive element, the Congress If 1899 finally passed an innocent-looking and apparently uneventful resolution which ran as follows*. "That this Congress, having regard to the decisions of former years, and with a view to securing a better representation of the interests , . ■ 13 . of labor in the House of Commons, hereby instructs the Parliamen- tary Committee to invite the cooperation of all Co-Operative, Socialistic, Trades Union, and Other working class organizations to jointly cooperate on lines mutually agreed upon in convening a special Congress of representatives from such of the above-named organizations as may be willing to take part to devise ways and means for the securing of an increased number of Labor Members in 1 . the next Parliament." The Parliamentary Committee, however, was not trusted with the next move. Delegates from the Independent Labor Party, the Social Democratic Federation, the Fabian Society, and the Trades Union Congress met and appointed Mr. J. Bamsay Macdonald to draft a con- stitution for the proposed organization. The resulting Labor Rep- resentation Committee proceeded to take advantage of the opportu- nity afforded it, and the very next year it proposed the formation of an independent group in the House of Commons, to hold the balance of power between the two existing parties, and to act with whatever side favored labor proposals and measures. An executive committee of twelve members was appointed to represent the inter- ests of the various cooperating organizations. Four years after its foundation, the Labor Representation Committee, though still retaining its trade union affiliations and backing, declared its independence of the Trades Union Congress and embarked on an inde- pendent career as a political entity. Its first difficulties were, of course, financial. Most trades unions were forbidden to spend any of their income for political purposes, and to change such a rule was a difficult matter. But the afore-mentioned legal en- 1. -Humphrey, op.cit., p. 143. . . ■ . c ; j • , . > • - , - 14 croachments on the position of labor made manifest the necessity for an organization of political offense and defense; so a campaign was at once started for funds. The proposition was necessarily de- layed because each union had to ballot on such a proposal separ- ately. Heretofore, each union had managed its own finances and campaigns, the labor members elected being really the representa- tives of their own unions rather than of labor as a whole. Host of the unions ultimately contributed voluntarily to the expenses of the Committee. At the Newcastle Conference of the Committee, in 1902, a separate fund was provided for by a levy of one penny per member per year. The political sagacity of the movement cannot be doubted. Hitherto, the weakness of the whole political labor cause had been that its advocates were split between the Liberals and the Conser- vatives, though the former party probably received the mass of their support. However, it had been impossible to swing the whole power of labor because of this dissension between partisan follow- ers of the two great parties. The new departure enabled them to come together on a compromise basis, whereby both sides forsook their former allegiance and threw their whole support to the side of labor. The political methods of the party were a curious mix- JU ture of decenralization and democracy on the one hand, and cen- tralization and somewhat autocratic control on the other. Each trade union or affiliated organization decided on the number of candidates whose campaign expenses and possible salary it thought it could afford to pay, and then chose the men it wished to run, as well as the constituencies for which they had decided to fight. These names were then forwarded to the labor Representation , , f . , f f 15 Committee, which usually approved the names and endorsed them as the official labor candidates in their respective districts; which meant that practically the whole weight of organized labor was 1 . pledged to the candidates so approved. The presence of the Inde- pendent Labor Party and the Pabian Society prevented the movement from becoming a purely class one, for, their membership containing considerable numbers of middle class representatives, they were at liberty to choose whomsoever they would to run as their candidates, and the trades unions pledged themselves to back them as impartial- ly as they did their Own candidates. Priction occasionally devel- oped, however, especially among the Trades Union members, who made several vain efforts to secure the exclusion of the Independent Labor Party and the Socialists. As an indication of the relative numerical strength of these two elements, it is interesting to note that in the eventful Congress of 1900 there were delegates from sixty-seven trades unions totalling 545,316 members, and three 2 . Socialistic parties having an aggregate membership of 22,861. In spite of the energy of its exponents, the new arrangement did not manifest any alarming strength in the elections of 1900. True, they contested a total of fifteen constituencies and polled a vote approximately five times as large as that of five years be- fore; but, even including the Liberal -Labor group, there were only two added to the total labor representation. There were, of course, offsetting factors in this campaign. In the first place, the Com- mittee had scarcely been formed ¥/hen it found itself right in the midst of a general election, for which it had very little time for 1 . -C f . article by J. Keir Hardie in the nineteenth Century for April, 1903, pp. 686-694. 2. -E. R. Pease, in the American Journal of sociology * or 560-5 61 ^ , ♦ c v •/ f r t ' 16 . preparation. In the second place, the election of 1900 took place during the South African war, and the labor candidates and members were outspoken in their condemnation of that war, declaring it to be imperialistic and unjustifiable; and naturally, v/ith the country in such a fever of patriotism as marked it at the time, men whose doctrines were so unpopular v/ith the great majority could scarcely ezpect an overwhelming victory. However, as the v/ar feeling sub- sided, resentment against the labor leaders on that score gradually disappeared. This fact was reflected in the bye-elections of 1902, in which three new labor members were added to the Parliamentary 1 . group. In reality, the war was not so much of a handicap to the movement as one might at first surmise, since it converted into out-and-out Labor Party men a number of radicals who had persisted in hanging on to the coat tails of the Liberal Party. The labor leaders stigmatized the Liberals as the commercial party, and claimed that its nature made inevitable an imperialism for the sake of world markets which would make it tend toward coalescing with Toryism. All candidates who ran under the auspices of the Labor Hepre- sentation Committee were required to pledge themselves to the program and constitution of their party, and the small group of independent labor members in the House were kept in unity by a ruling whereby they were obliged to abide by the decision of the Parliamentary group or resign. This strictness of discipline, to- gether v/ith a refusal to endorse candidates as Socialistic alien- ated the Social Democratic Federation, which withdrew its member- ship from the Committee. The Co-Operative movement was the only 1 . -Humphrey , op . cit . , p . ‘154 . 17 . other important radical or labor organization (with the exception of the Miners' Federation, which affiliated later) ?/hich was not included, however, it having never formally accepted the invitation to affiliate with the Committee. The Constitution of the Committee was revised in 1905, and in the new form was inserted that famous clause summarizing its objects and methods which has been so widely quoted: "1. The Labor Representation Committee is a Federation of Trades Unions, Trades Councils, the Independent Labor Party, and the Fabian Society. Co-Operative Societies are also eligible for membership . "2. Object: to secure, by united action, the election to Par- liament of candidates promoted, in the first instance, by an Affil- iated Society or Societies in the constituency, who undertake to form or join a distinct group in Parliament, with its own whips epid its own policy on Labor questions; to abstain strictly from iden- tifying themselves with or promoting the interests of any section of the Liberal or Conservative Party, and not to oppose any other candidate recognized by this Committee. All such candidates shall pledge themselves to accept the Constitution, to abide by the de- cisions of the Group in carrying out the aims of this Constitution or to resign; and to appear before their constituencies under the 1 . title of Labor candidates only." Such, then, was the organization that was destined to cause such surprise and alarm at the election of 1906. Thus far it had occasioned bpt little comment, and the stalwarts of both parties 1. -Quoted by J. Keir Hardie in the Forth American Review for August, 1903, pp-. £33-241. 18 . were inclined to treat it with a more or less good-natured toler- ance, regarding it as a temporary bubble on the sea of politics. Before proceeding to a consideration of that election wherein the Labor Party was to figure so conspicuously, however, it becomes necessary to turn aside for a moment to consider a certain court 1 . action known as the faff Vail Case, which was to become a potent political factor in the next election. During the year 1900 the employees of the faff Vail hailway Company called an unauthorized strike v/hich developed considerable violence and called into play a number of illegal and doubtful acts such as picketing. In spite of the adviee of the Company’s lawyers to the contrary, the General Manager brought suit for damages, not against the employees who had committed the unlawful acts, but against the national union to which they belonged, the Amalgama- ted Society of Railway Servants. Furthermore, he insisted on taming the case on appeal to the highest court in the land, the Law Lords. This body proceeded to hand down a very surprising decision, which completely reversed the precedent of twenty-five years and practically nullified what had generally supposed to be the will of Parliament itself, as expressed in the legislation of 1876. They admitted that the union was not a corporate body; and then they proceeded to state that it could, however, be sued in a cor- porate capacity for damages supposedly caused by the action of its officers. " the Trade Union could be sued in a cor- porate capacity for damages alleged to have been caused by the action of its officers, not merely from criminal acts, but also l.-A.C.426;70-L. J.K.B . -905; 85-L . T.-147 ; 17-T .L .R.-698 ; 65- J.P . -596 ; 50-W.R.-44. •fcv ’ 1 * . * . * 19 from unlawfully, though without the slightest criminality, causing 1 . loss to other persons." This was indeed a holt from the blue. At one stroke it destroyed the immunity which had been won with such difficulty in 1876; it jeopardized the Trades Union funds and put them at the mercy of any reactionary court, indeed, the union implicated in the Taff Vail case was compelled to pay some $120,000 in actual damages, the whole costs amounting to a total of approxi- mately $200,000, ; it practically scrapped the strike as a weapon either of offense or defense; it paralyzed the activities of the union officials, who feared to act because they might be made per- 2 . sonally liable for the deeds of the unions. The results of sueh a, momentous decision can scarcely be over- estimated. It gave a rude jolt to the complacency of the older and better established trades unions and jarred a number of others loose from their ancient prejudices against the independent labor movement. It converted the Labor Representation Committee into a compact and powerful political unit by adding strength of numbers to an already abundant supply of energy and ability. By 1902 -5 the number of affiliated trades unions had doubled, and by the end of 1906 it had been multiplied by three. It is a rare incentive that acts more strongly than that of self defense, and the unions in this crisis felt that they were indeed fighting for their very existence. The organization, once fully roused, gave an indication of their potential strength in the election Of 1906, not only in those constituencies where candidates of the Representation Commit- V. tee were actually running, but also in other districts, by inter- 1. -Y/ebb, S. and B. - History of Trade Unionism , p. 600 2 . - Ibid . t pp .600-604. 20 . rogating candidates as to their attitude toward the Taff "Vail de- cision, and voting accordingly. It may he said without exaggeration, I think, that the Taff Vail decision was the chief factor in the labor situation preceding the elections of 1906. It was Frederic Harrison who made the statement 11 The working class is the only 1 . class which is not a class. It is the nation." and the astonishing results achieved by the awakened labor movement almost prove the truth of his statement. It must not be overlooked, however, that there were other factors which contributed to the situation. The Conservative Party during its period of power had incurred a great deal of unpopular- ity, and its move to revive a preferential tariff gave the Liberals a rallying cry which they did not fail to avail themselves of. Moreover, the majority of the Liberals had apparently not noticed the fundamental change which had occurred in the purposes and methods of the labor movement, and still professed to look upon it, in spite of the protests and warnings of the labor men themselves, as a sort of left wing of their own party. There was still a con- siderable group of Liberal-Labor men in Parliament who maintained an attitude of independence toward the Labor Representation Com- mittee group and continued to vote with the Liberal Party. At any rate, all of the labor candidates, whether of the independents or of the Liberal-Labor group were thoroughgoing Free Traders, and since the Liberal Party had staked everything on the repudiation of protection at this election, they refused to risk the election of Tories in a number of districts where labor men were running by making it a three-cornered fight. That this was an important iac uor was afterwards pointed out by the Liberals themselves, who cirew . 21 . attention to the indisputable fact that of the successful labor candidates, very few were opposed by Liberals, whereas the great 1 . majority of those who were defeated had Liberal opposition. Indeed, one critic coined a striking phrase which no doubt had some truth in it when he referred to the labor triumph as mere "driftwood on 2 . the tide of Free Trade." Such, then, was the situation immediately preceding the general election of 1906. It was aggravated by the fact that the period following the South African War had been one of industrial depres- sion and widespread distress. There had been, for instance, in 1905 a cotton famine in Lancashire more serious serious than any which had occurred since the American Civil V/ar, and there had been large 3 . numbers of men out of ?/ork all over the country. Heedless to say the Labor Representation Committee made the most of their opportu- nities. They put in the field a total of fifty candidates and con- ducted a vigorous campaign in every contested constituency, appeal- ing to the people on the basis of: protection of trade union funds and legalization of strikes through legislation annulling the Taff Vail decision; free trade; a graduated income tax; woman suffrage; nationalization and secularization of education; local government home rule; relief of the unemployment situation; nationalization of 4. railways; and a number of other issues of lesser or local import. Mr. J. Heir Kardie, the leader of the Independent Labor Party, struck the keynote of the labor campaign when he declared in one of his election speeches that "The immediate object of the Labor Party 1. -Cf. an article by L. A. Atherley- Jones , II. P., in the nineteenth Century for October, 1906, pp. 576-586. 2 . - Ed inbur gfa R e v i ew for October, 1906, pp. 273-305. 3. -S. Brooks, in Harper ' s Weekly for October 24, 1903, p. 1698. 4. -W. Diack, in the Arena 1 2 3 4 for May, 1906, pp. 476-480. . 22 . is to create a driving force in politics which will overcome the inertia of politicians in regard to social reforms, and give the nation a strong, true lead along the paths which make for national righteousness. To see that children are properly fed and cared for; that the able are given an opportunity to work; and that comfort is brought into the life of the aged; are objects worth striving for. These things lie outside the domain of ordinary party politics, but 1 . they must be attended to if the nation is to be saved from decay." To the same man is credited the statement, in a different connec- tion, that "A Labor Party is the logical and inevitable outcome of a popular suffrage; the object of such a party cannot be any one particular reform with the accomplishment of which the motive for the party would disappear. It is an outward and visible sign of the determination of the disinherited democracy to have government of 2 . the people by the people and for the people." When the smoke of battle had cleared away, it was found that the Labor Representation Committee, which in that same year had definitely committed itself to the name of Labor Party, and will henceforth be referred to as such, had succeeded in electing a, total of twenty-nine out of its fifty candidates. In addition, ten Liberal -Labor men had been returned, and the Iliners* Pederation, which, though friendly to the Labor Party, still maintained its own independence and conducted its own campaigns, had elected a total of fourteen representatives; so that the aggregate of labor members, of all kinds, in the House of Commons, reached the rather impres- 1. -Quo ted by W. Diaek in the Arena for May, 1906, pp. 476-480. 2. -J. Keir Hardie in the nineteenth Century for January, 1906, pp. 12-24. f 23 . 1 . sive figure of fifty-three. The election was followed hy a perfect flood of comment in the current newspapers and magazines, and as much of it affords a pretty fair index to the attitude of the two older parties besides offering a very interesting study, it seems worth while to give some time to an analysis of it. Some of it seems to he mainly the expression of the spontaneous wrath called forth hy the entirely unexpected success of a party which had hitherto been looked upon with a rather tolerant contempt as being comparatively harmless. That attitude seems particularly to have marked the writings of the Conservative publicists, such remarks as the following excerpts from an article in Blackwood's Magazine being typical of the more extreme criticism: "Their egoism is insatiable. If they have any ambition beyond legislating for the profit of their own class, they have not yet revealed it." "What they demand is power without res- ponsibility." "If the Labor Party has its way, there would be no room in the state for any but manual workers." "Above all the friends of Labor are indifferent to the problems of empire. To them the Civis Bomanus makes no appeal. They will never rejoice that 1. -Districts returning Labor members: London and environs: Dept- ford, Woolwich, South Division of West Ham; urban districts: Bar- row-in-Purness , Blackburn, Bolton, Bradford, Chatham, Halifax, East Division of Leeds, Leicester, Uorth-East and South-West Div- isions of Manchester, ITewcastle-on-Tyne, Uorwich, Preston, St. Helens, Sunderland, Stockport, West Division of Wolverhampton; county districts: Barnard Castle Division of Durham, Clitheroe, Inee, Hewton, Westhoughton, and Gorton Divisions of Lancashire;Scot- land:Dundee, Blackfriars Division of Glasgow; Wales:Merthyr Tydvil. Districts in which Labor candidates were defeated: London and environs: Croydon; urban districts: Bordesley and East Divisions of Birmingham, Darlington, Dewsbury Gravesend, Grimsby. Huddersfield, South Division of Leeds, Kirks dale and West Toxteth Divisions of Liverpool, Monmouth Boroughs, Portsmouth, Stockton, Wakefield, York; county districts: Jarrow Division of Durham, Eccles Division.of Lancashire; Scotland: Camlachie Division of Glasgow, Govan Division of Lanarkshire; Ireland: Worth Division of Belfast. 24 . they are citizens of no mean city." "The rebellious natives of Ratal are as dear to our independent Democrats as the unemployed." And here is one that seems to reveal the spirit of the whole ar- ticle: "We suppose that a too frequent communication with the 1 . Liberal Party has corrupted the manners of a sturdier time." There is an evident failure on the part of this writer to think twice, if, indeed, he has thought at all. Llany of his statements are so absurd as to require no answer at all. At best, his charges are misleading half truths. The Labor candidates had repeatedly denied that they would legislate solely for class interests. The charge of coolness toward the empire is the truest one that was made, and yet it was unfairly expressed. The workers were loyal and patriotic Englishmen, but they regarded the imperialistic ambitions of the Conservative Party as unjustifiable chauvinism. There was much petty persecution Y/orthy of our most approved methods of American partisan politics, such, for instance, as the attempt to discredit the Independent Labor Party by alleging a hostility toY/ard religion among its members. The Pabian Society members were referred to as "Burgesses of wjiat is known as Bohemia”, whose purpose was "to spend other people ’s money and dragoon other 2 . people’s lives". The various organizations Y/hich had combined for the purpose of electing labor representatives were referred to as sham labor parties. And the difficulties of the Labor Party in steering a neutral course between the critics are apparent when we note here a critic who attacks it as demanding solely class and 1 . - Blackwood ’ s magazine , June, 1906, pp. 844-849. 2. -H. Vivian in the Port nightly Review for January, 1906, pp. 151-162. . - , 25 . 1 . selfish legislation, and there one who says the movement is all right so long as its representatives confine their attentions to 2 . social and industrial reform; here a critic who ridicules the idea of manual workers representing it in Parliament, and there one who attacks it for allowing anyone who is not a manual worker to run 3 . on its platform; here a critic who denounces the movement as 4. malignant, unadulterated Socialism, and there one who reproaches 5. it with having no program which goes "beyond that of Liberalism; and so forth. Yet there was much of the criticism which was well-founded, and some of it was positively constructive. As to the charge of Social- ism, certainly it is true that of the number elected, twenty-one of the Labor Party men were Socialists, as were six of the Liberal - 6 . Labor group and one of the miners. At the same time, the great majority of writers agreed as to the uniformly high type of ability of the men, and admitted that so far from being mere noisy agi- tators, they were generally extremely practical, business-like, and unrhetorical . Out of the total group of fifty-three, all but 7. ten were trade unionists. Some of the more thoughtful students of current politics pointed out the fact that there was no particular reason for surprise that seven-tenths of the electorate should 7. have succeeded in electing fifty-three representatives. 1. -Cf. article entitled Simple Egoism in Blackwood's Magazine for June, 1906, pp. 844-849. 2. -Cf. 17. H. Mallock's article on Political Powers of Labor in the nineteenth Century for August, 1906, pp. 202-214. 3. -and 4.-Cf. B. Taylor’s article on Laborism .in Parliament in the Fortnightly Beview for June, 1906, pp. 1115-1130. 5. -Cf. H. Vivian’s article on Pretended Labor Parties in the Fortnightly Review for January, 1906, pp. 151-162. 6. -17. Liack, op.citl (see note 4, page 21.) 7. -Uorth American Review for April, 1906, pp. 617-622. 26 . The Liberal element were especially cautious and discriminating in their criticism, for many of them, including their leaders, still hoped for cooperation and aid from the Labor group, and hesitated to offend them. Their arguments, therefore, were all directed toward promoting an alliance between the two forces. They claimed that the Labor Party represented either Socialists or trade unionists, and therefore were really not representative of all labor, since two million unionists could scarcely be called repre- sentative of one quarter of the total population. They also inti- mated that Labor might find it difficult to accomplish its ends through legislation, but here they were using a weapon ?/hich dan- gerously resembled a boomerang, for practically the only alterna- tive to Parliamentary procedure was direct action. The most serious, and at the same time the most justifiable charge brought forward by the Liberals, however, was that the Labor Party in the campaign of 1906 had no definite program. The policies enumerated above in connection with the Labor campaign were really but a compendium of the various platforms of the individual candidates, rather than a definite platform on which the Labor Party as a whole went to the polls. Indeed, the Labor Party particularly avoided committing itself to such a program at that time, and it probably displayed political wisdom in doing so. It was still in its formative period, and a program clashing or coinciding with various elements in the Liberal or Conservative programs might have alienated some of those Labor Party exponents whose allegiance had with difficulty been won over from the two older parties by the promise of absolute neutral- ity and independence, and whose new loyalty was at best a precari- ous one. It is true, therefore, that the Labor Party appealed to 1 27 . the electorate rather on the basi3 of labor representation than on a definite and distinctive program, and that their actual political convictions did not differ so very radically from those of the Liberal Party. There was this important difference between the position of the Labor members and that of the Liberals, however. Many of the Liberal H.P.’s, and Conservatives as well, were playing a game; they had made politics a career, and had to fit their actual deeds of legislation to the political expediency of the times, rather than to the platform on which they had been elected. The Labor members, on the other hand, considered politics merely as a means to an end, and were in deadly earnest. Critics claimed that the progress of social reform through legislation had demonstrated the fact that a separate Labor Party was unnecessary; but, curiously enough, it was generally the Labor members who were largely instru- mental in forcing the Liberal program through. And, though the programs of the two parties might be approximately the same, the emphasis was different. The Liberals emphasized the political as- pects; the Labor men, the social. Por instance, the Liberal regime of 1906 was bent on pushing a general Education Bill improving the quality and range of public education ; the Labor members were particularly insistent on what was apparently the minor detail of providing free meals for school children. Indeed, many of the more radical Liberals themselves conceded the importance of this point, as is evidenced in such remarks as the following by C . P. Masterman in the nineteenth Century for November, 1906: "The laborer in the country wants direct access to the land. The workman in the town wants better houses; more leisure; a fairer chance for his children; ' 28 some security against unemployment and old age. I think that if the Liberal Party fails to satisfy these demands it will dwindle and presently fall into impotence, as the Liberal Parties on the Con- tinent have dwindled and fallen into impotence; because they failed 1 . rightly to interpret the signs of the times." All this was mainly a priori argument, of course. By the end of 1906, when a year of Parliamentary experience with the new party had passed, the tenor of criticism had changed somewhat. The conciliatory attitude of the Liberals had disappeared com- pletely, once they had become convinced of the determination of the Labor men to be really independent, and many of them became nearly as bitter toward the new element as the Conservatives. Their early claim that there was dissension in the Labor ranks, because one-third of the Labor members refused to follow the lead of J. Keir Eardie, was really not true, however, for the Liberal- Labor group had never pretended to yield allegiance to the Labor Party group. It is true that a bit of acrimonious debate occurred between these two wings over the claim of the latter to the ex- clusive designation of Labor members. Yet the bitter charge of disloyalty hurled at the Labor men by the Liberals was rather absurd, considering the fact that the former had never professed allegiance to the Liberals, and had, indeed, on the contrary, repeatedly repudiated all party connections. The Labor Party men did succeed in making things very uncomfortable for the Liberal- Labor group, however, for by constantly threatening a division on important questions and thereby forcing the Liberal-Labor men and cabinet members to choose between their allegiance to the cause of Labor and their loyalty to the Qovernnent, they wielde d _a_pg^rgy 1 . -nineteenth Century for ITovember, 1906, pp. 706-718. very great influence. Indeed, Liberal-Labor ism practically went out of existence as a separate political entity with this Parlia- ment, for by the end of the year, the Labor Party members had succeeded in bridging the gap which had separated the two branches. An appraisal of the work of Liberal-Laborism is a difficult matter; on the one hand, the Liberal-Labor men had been consistent workers for the amendment of laws relating to trades unions, for the right of combination by workmen, for statutory regulation of coal mines, factories, and railways, for workmen's compensation, for the crea- tion of a Labor Department of the Board of Trade, for the estab- lishment of the Labor Gazette . for the increase of local government- al power; on the other hand, such an influential leader as Chamber- lain had declared in 1900, when the Liberal-Labor group was practically the only labor element in Parliament, that labor representation had done practically nothing to further the cause E. of social reform. And certainly it was partially dissatisfaction with the results so far achieved that led to the formation of an independent labor group. The actual achievements of the Labor Party group in Parliament were even more surprising than might have been expected from their astonishing show of strength at the polls. There were two reasons for this fact: first, the club held over the Government by reason of the Liberal-Labor group (because of the Government’s desire to maintain the Liberal-Labor group intact, the Labor Party forced a division whenever possible on issues which especially concerned them, and in a number of important cases succeeded in swinging the 1. -B. Taylor in the Fortnightly Review for January, 1906 pp. 151-16E. 2. -C. F. llasterman in the nineteenth Century ,pp .pit . ( 3ee notel,p..88 : . . 50 . Government to the Labor side, because of a fear of a split in the Liberal-Labor ranks); and second, the fact that many of the Liberal members had committed themselves during the course of the campaign to the labor side of important issues. Foremost among these was, of course, the question of the legal position of trades unions. She Government brought in a Trades Disputes Act which proved utterly unacceptable to the Labor members, and, to its astonishment, found itself forced to change the bill qnite radically, member after member of the Liberal majority explaining that he had promised his constituency to pass a bill which would.be satisfactory to Labor. It is not necessary to go into the details of this bill; suffice it to say that it restored the immunity which had supposedly been conferred by the legislation of 1871-76, by declaring that no civil action shall be entertained against a Trade Union in respect of any wrongful act committed by or on behalf of the Union. The Labor members almost succeeded in forcing through a bill to provide free meals for school children, also. Ordinarily the Labor men worked with the Government, but it was always on the basis of a bargain, in which they never failed to get their money’s worth. They were among the most active members in the House, bringing in bills for old age pensions to be paid from state funds, trades union rates for Government employees, recognition of trades unions by all Government departments, political enfranchisement of women, prevention of eviction of strikers from houses owned by employers, classing as undesirable aliens imported to break strikes, Y/orkmen's compensation, income tax reform, revision of procedure in the House of Commons, taxation of land values in Scotland, nationalization of canals, better conditions for Postal servants, and so forth. Their ' 31 . efficiency is evidenced by the fact that the Parliamentary Commit- tee of the Trades Union Congress, which had continued its lobbying right down to 1906, in spite of such labor representation as there had been, finally ceased its operations, ho doubt the Labor members rendered themselves rather obnoxious to some of the older members by their lack of respect for precedents, and by their extreme de- mocracy, but it was but natural to expect something of that kind. A Tory critic, for instance, remarked of a certain Labor member, "When he has been a little longer in the House, he will doubtless 1 . discover that tradition is nine-tenths of life". However, in spite of obstacles and lack of experience, the Party succeeded in making a very creditable record in its first session in the House of Commons . 1 . - Blackwood T s Ivlagas ine , op.cit.,(see llote 1, p. 25). . , ' . . CHAPTER II. The Intermediate Period: 1906 to 1914. During the eight years following the advent of the Labor Party in English politics in 1906, it can scarcely he said that the new group fulfilled either the best hopes of its advocates or the worst fears of its opponents. A great many people apparently vie re looking for the immediate inauguration of the Milennium, or something equal- ly revolutionary, and the fact that the Labor Party soon settled down into much the same humdrum parliamentary round as the t?/o older parties was a great disappointment to the more radical reformers. Politically the period was not one of tremendous activity, with the exception of the two general elections of 1910. The Labor group, through influential in the passage of the Trades Disputes Act, the Miners’ Eight Hours Act, the Trades Board Act, and other reforma- tive legislation, failed to force its will on the House of Commons. And in spite of their unflagging energy and activity, it really seems as if their power and influence declined somewhat as the fear inspired by their unexpected show of strength in 1906 gradually abated. The momentum of their early success, however, carried them successfully through several bye-elections before the reaction set in. The new party waged w ar relentlessly and without discrimination against both the older groups. A bye-election at Jarrow in 1907 resulted in the election of the Labor candidate, Pete Curran, in place of a Liberal. And again in 1909, in the Attercliffe Division of Sheffield, the Labor man, J. Pointer, replaced a Liberal. In the same year, J. 0. Hancock, Labor, w as elected for the constituency 33 . of Mid-Derbyshire, which had formerly been Liberal. In this latter case, however, it is but fair to state that the Liberal Party entered no candidate. While it is true that there were many more bye-elections in which the Labor Party was not successful, yet these victories are significant because they register a reversal of the vote of the constituency in the last general election; and because they demonstrate the force of the first onslaught of the Labor Party. They are further important in that they occurred while the movement as a whole was starting on a period of decline. It was not until 1912 that a Labor seat was lost at a bye-election, the loss occurring in the constituency of Hanley. The years inter- vening between the elections of 1910 and the war period were par- ticularly unfruitful for Labor candidates as far as bye-elections were concerned. The country sustained somewhat of a shock, however, in a bye-election occurring in the Colne Valley Division of York- shire in July 1907, which resulted in the choice of Victor Grayson, an unattached Socialist. By the end of the first year of parliamentary experience, the Labor Party group had effected a working agreement with the remnant of the Liberal -Labor group whereby all the Labor forces in the House cooperated with a fair degree of harmony. They held monthly meetings to determine the basis of common action on labor questions and agreed not to oppose each others' candidates. The Party consist ently championed the labor side of every question, and in cases not involving labor interests, took an independent position. In its direct appeal to the people, however, the Labor Party was at a decided disadvantage in those early days, in view of the fact that they controlled no daily paper of their own while the press of the 34 country was largely directed against them. Consequently, the Labor men were under the necessity of spreading their propaganda by word of mouth, which they proceeded to do with great energy and fervor, holding thousands of public meetings, and even utilizing the street corners. Uor did they allow their activities to lapse after the election of 1906. Meanwhile, the Conservatives, who had at first welcomed the independent Labor movement, as injuring the Liberals only, began to discover that there ¥/as desertion in their own ranks as well. They therefore took up the challenge of the Labor propa- ganda, and prepared to meet them on their own ground. Accordingly, they sent out all over the country what were called propaganda vans, small houses on wheels, in which the Conservative speakers visited every nook and corner of the land and addressed the people in hopes of counteracting the effects produced by the Labor soeak- 1 . ers. Indeed, the winter of 1907-1908 was a time of widespread in- terest in Labor policies and Socialistic doctrines. One of the most significant events during this period was the final affiliation of the Miners’ Federation with the Labor Party. This group, one of the strongest of the industrial groups in the country, was really the eraliest to secure representation in Parlia- ment, both Burt and Macdonald, the earliest Labor members, having been elected by miners’ organizations .From that time on, the miners had insisted on maintaining a separate political organization, and had run their own candidates. Even after the formation of the sup- posedly all-inclusive Labor Representation Committee in 1900, the Miners had insisted on retaining their independence. The movement l.-E. Porritt, The British Socialist Labor Party , in the Political Science Quarterly for September, 1908. 35 for federation with the Labor Party began within the miners' organ- ization itself. It grew slowly at first, probably because the miners had been so successful in their political efforts, but the election of 1906, demonstrating the remarkable strength of a com- paratively united labor movement, gave a decided impetus to the movement for affiliation, and the project finally achieved success in the annual conference of the Federation at Chester, in 1908, the vote on the question being 215,137 to 168,294. There was at this time, however, a total of fourteen miners' representatives who had been elected independently of the Labor Party in 1906, and on account of them, the Federation in affiliating stipulated that these men should not be called on to sign the party constitution except in case of another general election. They agreed, however, that should any candidates run in bye-elections, preceding the next general election, such candidates would be required to sign the constitution. The election of J. 0. Hancock, mentioned above, marked the first success of the miners after their affiliation with the Labor Party. Some of the older representatives of the miners had so long cooperated with the Liberal Party that such action on the part of the Federation was bound to develop trouble. The matter came to a head in 1909, when the Federation notified its representatives that if they desired reelection they must sign the Labor Party Constitu- tion. Burt, Fenwick, and Wilson, three of the best known and most influential of the labor M.P.'s, refused to do so. Burt had been in the House continuously since 1874, Fenwick since 1885, and Wilson since 1892, and to cast off these men nov/ because of their refusal to sign the Labor Party Constitution seemed like the grossest in- ■ , . 36 . gratitude. Therefore, in spite of thejr insubordination, these men received the loyal support of their constituencies in the elections of 1910, and were returned to Parliament, where they continued their association with the Labor Party, in spite of the fact that they v/ere thence forv/ard officially Liberals. Another event of similar import was the final extension of the Labor Party activities into Scotland. The Scottish Labor Party had preceded the British organization in point of time, but since 1900 had accomplished comparative little. There was a v/idespread feeling that the labor movement should be united throughout the Kingdom, and for that reason many desired that the stronger group should affiliate local labor organizations in Scotland. However, relations betv/een the two parties v/ere not all that might be wished, and because of the delicacy of the situation, the British party for a long time refrained from invading the territory and jurisdiction of the other group. Finally, in 1909, the difficulty was settled through the action of the Scottish Labor Party in officially decree- ing its own dissolution. The southern party then proceeded to affiliate the constituent societies of the Scottish party, and the labor movement had finally achieved unity throughout the island. Perhaps there was no field of operations in which the Labor Party met with less success and approval than that of foreign re- lations. At the very outset of their history they had strenuously opposed the Boer T .7ar, and they did not hesitate to do anything in their pov/er to embarrass the Government when they felt that its designs v/ere at all imperialistic or unworthy. On the other hand, they warmly supported any movement promising to strengthen inter- national peace and to make war impossible. The Party had officially ' • - 37 affiliated with the International Socialist and Labor bureau in 1904, and had been represented at each of its conferences since. Every effort was made to combat the growing undercurrent of hostil- ity between England and Germany which was beginning to make itself felt at this time. Resolutions were exchanged in 1908 with the Social Democratic Party of Germany deprecating the possibility of war, and again in the following year there was a friendly exchange of opinion between the two groups on the question of naval disarm- ament. Another matter which raised quite a furor throughout the country, though perhaps really of small importance, was the atti- tude of the Party tov/ard the proposed visit of the Czar of Russia to England, The Labor leaders on the floor of Parliament, through their pamphlets and publications, and in specially arranged protest meetings, registered their strenuous disapproval of the exchange of civilities with the head of a nation so flagrantly autocratic as Russia was at that time. I/hether or not their protest was ethically justifiable, it certainly v/as not expedient, for the country at large resented such an attempt as calculated to disturb the friend- ly relations existing between the two countries. In spite of the difficulties and failures and indiscreations of the new party in its first Parliament, however, it is a pleasure to record the opinion of such a well-known publicist as mr. i'. P. O'Connor, M.P., as follov/s: The Labor Party has profoundly influ- enced the present Louse of Commons more than it realizes itself, it is the sense that there is this power in the background, discon- tented, independent, hostile, that drives the Government, and that compels it always to keep legislation at the high speed v/hich it had reached at the present moment. I have my doubts v/hether Old 38 . Age pensions would have been introduced if it had not been for the existence of this Party; the gift has not been accepted with any special grace by the Labor men; but it is they, nevertheless, who 1 . probably forced it from the hands of the Government." Probably the most important event in the life of the Labor Party during this time was what is known as the Osborne Judgment. Walter Y. Osborne, a member of the Amalgamated Society of Hailway Servants, and a man who had achieved some prominence in his local union, had long objected to the compulsory Parliamentary levy because he felt that the money so secured was used to further the Socialist cause, which he strongly opposed. Finding himself unable to interfere with the course of events within the local union, he at last consulted a number of lawyers concerning the matter, and, in spite of the fact that they advised him against the proceeding, brought suit for injunction against the union to prevent it from using its funds for political purposes, contending the illegality of such action. Osborne lost his case in the Chancery Court, but he took it to the Court of Appeals, and there the decision of the lower court v/as reversed. The union then appealed the case to the Law Lords, which confirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, 2 . thus leaving the final victory with Osborne. The case was first instituted on July 22, 1908, and the final decision was rendered in December, 1909. Among the points settled in the final decision were the following: that henceforth trades unions were to be considered to be corporate bodies; that as such they could not do anything for which they were not incorporated; that the Trades Onion Act of 1876 1. -Labor Part?; Leaflet Ho. 1 - Labor and Politics T" 2. -Osborne vs. Amalgamated Society of Hailway servants, L. R., Ap. Cases 87,- 1910. . 39. defined such activities; and that political action was not among such activities, and could not, therefore, "be practiced. The Osborne case was by no means a one-sided matter# there was , indeed, much to be said on either side. In explanation of the de- cision it should be made clear that the law merely interprets the surface language of documents, without trying to interpret the meaning Parliament might have had in its original formulation of them. Furthermore, the conception of a corporation had gradually changed the nineteenth Century. It had been the theory originally that a corporation is a persona f ict a which could only be created by a superior body. So many associations had sprung up, however, with all the characteristics and privileges of corporations, and yet lacking the official act of incorporation, that it is small wonder that the courts should say that they should be regarded as corporations. The situation was doubtless affected also by the theories of the English jurist Maitland, in his History of English Law (written in collaboration with Sir Frederick Pollock) and his Constitutional History of England . It must be admitted, too, that two of the three judges partici- pating in the decision of the Court of Appeals had been, but a short time before, members of the House of Commons, and Liberals of strong popular sympathies. It was argued that the Trades Union Act of 1906 had rendered the unions immune from all actions of wrong, either direct or through their officials, and that such dangerous liberty could not be expected to attach to any activity which a union might take up. The act simply went too far, and it v/as but natural that the courts would intervene to limit its scope. Some of justices also declared that the act of signing the Party Constitu- 40 tion was contrary to public policy in that it bound the individual to vote in accordance with the dictates of the group rather than according to his own best judgment. They held that such an agree- ment amounted to a practical disfranchisement of the minority. Objection to the Labor M.P. was also raised on the ground that he represented only his own trade union rather than the whole consti- tuency for which he was elected. Labor Party discipline, however, though formally more binding than that of the other two parties, v/as found to be, in reality, no more so. It is difficult to under- stand why a Labor member did not represent the Liberal and Conser- vative people in his constituency at least as well as the Liberal member represented the Labor and Conservative voters in his district. And surely public policy is a rather indefinite basis for a legal charge. The Act of 1876, around which the controversy raged, had de- fined a trade union in section 16 as "any combination, whether temporary or permanent, for regulating the relations between work- men and masters, or between w orkmen and workmen, or between masters and masters, or for imposing restrictive conditions on the conduct 1 . of an^ trade or business." The main contention on which the Osborne Judgment was based v/as that Parliament, in passing the Act of 1876, had intended to make a full and complete definition of trades unions, and that consequently any action not falling within the category of functions prescribed by the Act was forbidden to such unions. It cannot be denied that the Act makes no mention of poli- tical action on the part of unions, and therefore, by a strict interpretation of the law, such action was illegal. And yet at the 1 . -Webb , - History pf Trade Unionism , p. 617. . 41 . very time when the much-discussed Act was being passed there were two Labor members in the House, and one of these, Burt, was being paid for his services by union funds. Surely if Parliament had in- tended to exclude political action from the privileges of trades unions it would not have overlooked such a situation as that* In- deed, in their history preceding 1876 the unions had exercised many functions in addition to those mentioned in the Act, without objectionon the part of the Government. As far back as the time of the Chartist agitation, some unions had constituted themselves employers of labor, and had taxed their members in order to keep the work going; others had organized a political federation for the purpose of supporting Chartism* and trades unions had been by no means insignificant organizations then. Had Parliament intended to render such acts illegal it was inexcusably negligent in failing to mention them at all. Moreover, for more than thirty years, from the time of the passage of the Act down to the Osborne Judgment, the unions had exercised, without objection, many functions in addition to those specifically allowed. Indeed, so deeply rooted had become the tradition of the privileges and immunities of the unions that the legal experts first consulted by Osborne were, as I have said, emphatic in their belief that he had no case; and it was on prece- dent that the Court of Chancery decided the case against him. Approaching the question from another angle, the Labor men argued that the Court was construing the Act with undue strictness. Even if it were to be conceded, for the sake of argument, that Parliament had intended in 1876 to make an exclusive and inclusive catalog of the approved functions of trades unions, it was still open to question whether politics might not legitimately be con- ■ ■ . ■ 42 . sidered as a means to regulating industrial conditions. The Courts apparently gave but little consideration to the contention, however. In answer to the objection to the party solidarity clause of the Constitution, the Labor men pointed out the fact that in several instances, such as the Education, Temperance, and Finance bills, some Party members had voted in opposition to the majority, and had not been punished. And as for the Parliamentary levy on the trades union members, the Court was reminded that since the Govern- ment made no provision for the payment of Members of Parliament, Labor representatives, having no independent fortune, would be absolutely excluded except as their constituencies paid them a salary at least sufficient to take care of their ordinary living expenses. Moreover, when the financial policy of the Labor Party had first been formulated, expert legal opinion, almost without exception, sanctioned it. Trades unions could scarcely be expected to test every doubtful action and decide it by costly court proce- dure; delimitation of union functions should be the province of Parliament, not of the Courts. Nor was it possible strictly to separate political and industrial functions; they were very often combined, as in social legislation. The Osborne case is especially peculiar in that it seems to present three sides rather than two . The complainant, Osborne, seems to have occupied a position independent ana about half way between those of the unions and the courts. It is a matter of great difficulty to get at the exact truth in a case in which feeling ran so high and charges and counter charges flew so bewilderingly back and forth, and I shall not attempt to state the truth of the matter; but it seems but just at least to consider the position of Osborne J y C / 1 « ' , V. 45 . 1 . as he states it himself, for, whether or not he was merely a tool in the hands of the capitalists, his position was certainly a palusible one which probably represented the convictions of many an ardent and loyal trade unionist. The Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants had been one of the earliest of the large unions to affiliate with the Labor Party, but Mr. Richard Bell, who had been elected to Parliament as one of its representatives in 1900 had refused in 1906 to sign the Constitution of the Party because of its Socialistic tendencies. The Party, of course, refused to 2 . endorse him, but there v/as strong dissenting opinion as to its action within the Union, and among the objectors v/as Osborne. The solidarity rule of the Parliamentary Party v/as also resented. But Osborne and his friends, though a by no means inconsiderable group, were a minority in their Union, and were therefore helpless to interfere. The majority were intolerant with those v/ho did not agree with them, and threatened to expel non-conforming members and to confiscate their benefits, which they were undoubtedly in a position to do, if they chose, necessarily such a threat gave the majority a strangle hold on the others, for a man v/ill think a long time before he v/ill forfeit the savings of a lifetime. Osborne finally determined that in spite of the difficulties and the un- popularity that he realized v/ould attend such a course, the situa- tion was such that he must do whatever he could to remedy it. Court action, however, v/as a costly procedure, and since he had no money, he had first to raise the necessary funds through a news- paper appeal. The money v/as forthcoming when he had made clear his 1. -17. V. Osborne, My Case . London, Eveleigh Bash, 1910. 2. - He v/as reelected, hov/ever, as a Liberal-Labor candidate. . ' ■ 44 . case. He declared that the trades unions were not really voluntary organizations , and that the political methods used forced a great many of the members who were Liberals or Conservatives, or others who were bitterly opposed to Socialism, to contribute to a cause which they abhorred. The Party menifestoes, he claimed, were clear- ly Socialistic, and the group was represented in the Socialist Internationale. Majority rule was all right in its own sphere, but V that sphere must not be extended to include matters of religion or principle. On these bases Osborne made his appeal and won his case. The trades unionists, of course, attacked him bitterly, and charged him with being a tool in the hands of the employers; they claimed that capitalists furnished the necessary funds wherewith to carry on the case. On the other hand, Osborne offers to submit proof as to the source of every penny of money he received; and so the matter stands. It seemed at first that a more serious blow could scarcely have been aimed at the political aspirations of Labor than that involved in the Osborne Judgment. It invalidated the parliamentary levy, which was the essential basis of the political movement. Hot only that; it rendered illegal, if the decision was to be interpreted strictly, a great number of other activities which the unions had undertaken. The activities of the Trades Councils and the Trades Union Congress would have to stop. The educational interests of the unions, their scholarship funds for Buskin College, and so forth, and many other perfectly innocent and beneficial activities were technically illegal . Osborne himself had claimed that the decision would affect only the political activities, but if the judgmend is to be construed as strictly as it had construed the Act of 1876, 45 . all these other functions would have to he declared unlawful. As to the actual results in the months and years immediately following the event, there does not seem to he evident any very serious cur- tailment in the activities of the trades unions. As to the financial situation of the Lahoi* moevment, there seems to he some difference of opinion*, Oshorne claimed that the contributions of his own union fell off greatly, while the Labor men declared that the voluntary contributions were entirely satisfactory. However that may have been, the receipts of the Parliamentary fund of the Party do not 1 . indicate any very great falling off, as the following figures show: Income for Quarter ending Pounds s . d. September 30, 1908 581 19 March 31, 1909 1406 10 6 June 30, 1909 1298 7 6 Osborne Judgment, December, 1909 March 31, 1910 789 13 11 March 31 , 1911 963 1 10 September 30, 1911 1384 10 3 Probably the most important result was the feeling of bitterness that developed between the Labor Party and the two opposing parties because of the frank satisfaction of the Conservatives and the apparent indifference of the Liberals. On the whole, it seemed that the judgment, rather than weakening the Labor movement politically, tended to strengthen it. The first thought was, as it had been after the Taff Vail decision, redress through legislation, but the final decision of the Law Lords was made public just before the precipitation of a general election, and there was no opportunity of accomplishing anything immeidateiy. The Parliament elected in 1906 had made extensive promises to the country in the realm of social legislation, and in accordance l.-See the Quarterly Reports of the Labor Party for 1908-1912. , \ 46 . with its promises, had passed a number of acts such as those rela- ting to workmen’s compensation, child welfare, education reform, old age pensions, protection against unemployment and sweated labor, housing and land problems, and others. Naturally the Government could not embark upon such a program without incurring heavy expen- ditures, and it was necessary to look for new sources of revenue in order to meet the growing budget. Early in 1909, David Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer, introduced a budget bill which was considered radical in the extreme. Indirect taxes, since they fall most heavily, relatively, on the poorer classes, were kept at about the same rates, while direct taxes were levied at a much higher rate. Hates we re raised on luxuries, such as motor cars, and the super tax on incomes was steeply graduated; rates on death duties, or what we call inheritance taxes, were raised; but worst of all, from the standpoint of the aristocracy of the country, land and the unearned increment therein were subjected to a heavy duty. The Conservatives at once attacked the bill as Socialistic, claiming that rather than being a revenue measure, it really aimed at a re- distribution of wealth in the country, by taking from the rich in the form of taxes, and giving to the poor in the form of benefits from the social legislation which had been passed. The Labor Party members ?/ere, of course, enthusiastic advocates of the bill, and it passed the House of Commons v/ithout difficulty, although it encoun- tered a great deal of hostile criticism. In the House of Lords, the situation v/as different. Here the landed proprietors were in the overwhelming majority, and they regarded the budget as utterly unbearable. Shorn of much of their power as they had been, they had grown accustomed to agreeing with- 47 . out much opposition to most of the work of the House of Commons, hut this was too much. Technically the Lords had no right to inter- fere with a finance hill, hut they got around the difficulty hy declaring that this budget was, in its implications, much more than simply a finance hill, and demanded that the country express its opinion before they would agree to it. Their action, of course, necessitated a general election on the issue. The election of January, 1910, was precipitated rather suddenly, and the Labor Party was not as well prepared as it might have been had the appeal to the country come a little later. It was about this time that charges of a Liberal-Labor alliance began to be made by Conservative speakers. It would seem, however, that the Labor Party never had any official agreement with the Liberals, in spite of circumstances that looked very much like deliberate cooperation. Indeed, nearly all of the Labor Party's contests in the election were three-cornered affairs. Labor supported the Lloyd George budget because it had been voted for the purpose of carrying out social reform, and because they favored the principles of taxation it involved. It is true that the Labor Party did not enter as many candidates in the election as they had been expected to, but one reason for that fact was that they were simply not prepared for the situation. On the other hand, it is true that they conducted their campaign with a view to insuring the defeat of the Conservatives who had rejected the budget. In all, the Labor Party withdrew from the field a total of twenty-four candidates, its list being reduced from one hundred and two to seventy-eight . These withdrawals were made so as not to endanger the victory of the budget, eleven of them being in constituencies in which the Party had never campaigned 48 . 1 . "before, and the remainder in industrial centers. Of the seventy- eight Labor candidates who went to the polls in January, 1910, fourteen were Independent Labor Party men, two were Fabians, thirty-seven were trades unionists, and twenty-five were miners. These men fought in sixty-five single members and thirteen double constituencies. Of the sixty-five, twenty-seven were opposed by Liberals or Liberals and Conservatives, and thirty-eight were opposed by Conservatives. Nineteen former Liberal seati were en- 1 . danger ed. As a result of the election, forty Labor members were returned. This number was larger than the number of Labor Party men returned in the former election, but was less than the total of labor men in the last Parliament. Three new seats had been added, but nine old ones were lost. The Party confined its efforts to industrial and mining constituencies. It is noteworthy that the Party ran its first candidate in Ireland in this election. In spite of the rather disappointing showing of the Party in actual Parliamentary repre- sentation, the total vote polled in 1910 ?/as 499,011, as compared with 323,195 in 1906. The fact that the action of the House of Lords was the chief issue was a distinct disadvantage to Labor, inasmuch as it strengthened the Liberal cause in those constituen- cies where Labor was strongest. In this election the Anti-Socialist Union maintained a training school for speakers, and conducted an energetic propaganda. The social Democratic Federation, campaign- ing in complete independence of all other parties, elected one representative. A unique feature of the campaign was the effort of l.-E. Porritt, The British Labor Party . in the Political Science Quarterly for June, 1910. i 49 . the Conservatives to capture the labor vote by the formation of the Tory Democracy, which ran six candidates, none of whom were success- ful. The net result of the election was the retention of the Liber- als in power, but dependent on independent groups, such as the Labor Party and the Irish nationalists for sufficient support to continue them in office* and the consequent passage of the much-discussed 1 . Lloyd George budget. Incidentally the remnant of the Liberal-Labor group utterly disappeared. The Labor group in Parliament moved from the opposition benches to the Government side of the House; not because they intended to consolidate their strength with that of the Government, but simply because as a result of the election there was not sufficient room for them on the opposition side of the House. As for the other election, which occurred at the end of the year, it did not materially change the aspect of affairs; the Labor Party gained a couple of seats and brought up its total to forty- 2 . two . Of course the first thing sought by Labor under the new Govern- ment was legislation designed to nullify the effects of the Osborne Judgment. Winston Churchill, a Liberal member, brought in a bill so shaped as to meet Osborne's objections to the political methods of trades unions. It provided that union expenditure for political purposes should be made out of a separate fund, to which no member was to be forced to subscribe against his will. Refusal to subscribe was not to mitigate against the standing of the individual in the 1. -It is an interesting commentary on this much-discussed increment tax on land values that it turned out to be far less productive than its advocates had hoped, and was finally dropped with the consent of Lloyd George. 2. -Investigation of particular constituencies shows that the Party was particularly strong in Wales and Scotland, and in Durham, Lancashire, and Yorkshire in England. 1 / 50 . union. However, the hill was satisfactory neither to the Labor mem- bers nor to their opponents among the Liberals and Conservatives, and so it died a natural death. Several other attempts on similar lines were made in subsequent sessions, but nothing was done direct- ly to counteract the effects of the judgment. It seemed as if Labor had lost that almost hypnotic influence which had achieved such a speedy and far-reaching reversal of the Taff Vail situation in 1906. The new Parliament enacted one piece of legislation, neverthe- less, which had been agitated for many years past by Labor members; indeed, from the days of the Chartist movement, in 1848i I refer to the payment of Members of Parliament. The passage of the act was consummated without much reference to the situation produced by the Osborne Judgment, but there can be no doubt that that situation was influential in bringing the agitation to a head and forcing the action of Parliament. There was much display of fervid oratory on this question, for many of the members seemed to feel it to be an insult that they should be offered any remuneration for their ser- vices. Seventy M.P.'s declared they would not accept the proposed 1 . salary, and most of the others stated that they disliked the idea. However, in spite of the opposition, a bill was finally passed providing for the payment of an annual salary of four hundred pounds to Members of Parliament. In 1912 the Labor Party provided for the satisfaction of a long- felt want by establishing a daily Labor newspaper, which was to be known as the Daily Citizen . The possibility of such a move is large- ly traceable to the action of Parliament in providing for the pay- 1. -Baumann, A. A. f Law and the Labor Party . in the Fortnightly Review for October, 1911. 51 . ment of members, for the Party was enabled to divert a very sub- stantial part of what had been their Parliamentary fund to the necessary capitalisation of the new enterprise. The paper was not to be merely a means of spreading propaganda and Labor opinion, but was designed to be a full-fledged and up-to-date newspaper. There is no doubt the enterprise was a very valuable asset to the Party, but for a long time it maintained but a very precarious existence \ because of the insufficiency of its financial basis. Indeed, the period that intervened between the elections of 1910 and the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 was one of rather rough sledding for the Labor Party. It seems as if a good many of its earlier adherents had expected it to discover some immediate and potent panacea for social and industrial ills, and its failure to do so was held against it. Even many of those who were naturally sympathetic with the workers reproached the Party with lowering the political morality of the working man by holding out to him the prospect of power without responsibility. According to a friendly critic, the Labor representatives were sent to Parliament "for purposes which are specific and with definite tasks to perform, and not merely to be beneficent at large", the implication being that they represented their own group rather than the constituency for 1 . which they were elected. This same critic complained that the Party aimed at capturing the economic and political organization of society for its own advantages; that it stressed &ot citizenship but similarity of ecomomic conditions as the basis of unity; that the sacredness of the State was not sufficiently emphasized; that l.-H. Jones, Corruption of the Citizenship of the Workingman . in the Hibbert Journal for October, 1911. - 52. it appealed to a selfish retaliation for past wrongs, and lacked idealism and a real faith in the people; together with much more to the same effect. There was much of such unfavorable comment in the influential journals and magazines of the time. From a position of comparative prestige and power in 1906, the Party seemed to have fallen into disrepute and feebleness in 1912 and 1913. These years, it is true, we re a time of great industrial unrest, with continual strikes and threat of strikes. Real wages had fallen off from twelve to fifteen 1 . per cent, from 1900 to 1912, and it was charged that the Labor Party had done nothing to remedy the situation. The mass of the Labor men were reproached with being subservient to the Liberal Government, which, in spite of the commercial prosperity of its tenure of office, found labor worse off in 1913 than when it had begun its work. The Labor group, it was charged, had no homogeneity, and its leaders had, through their elevation to Parliament, lost contact with the workmen themselves. Much of the social legislation which had been passed, such, for instance, as compulsory arbitration and the Insurance Act, had been in a great many instances, detrimental to the cause of the trades unions. These critics further urged that the inability of the Parliamentary group to formulate a constructive program, and their failure to achieve anything very definite had been the cause of the rapid spread of Syndicalism among the trades unionists. Establishment of the Government Labor Exchanges, sup- ported by the Labor Party, had broken down the trades union mono- poly of the labor market; the Workmen's Compensation Act had tended l.-J. M. Kennedy, Eai lure of the Labor Party , in the Fortnightly Review for February, 1910. 53. to exclude older men from employment; and so forth, _ad inf ini turn . There is such a volume of this sort of criticism that it is impossible to consider it at great length. Much of it was directed against the Socialistic objectives of the Party, which had been defined at its Conference at Hull in 1908 as follows: "That in the opinion of this Conference the time has arrived when the Labor Party should have as a definite object the socialization of the means of production, distribution, and exchange, to be controlled by a Democratic State in the interests of the entire community, and the complete emancipation of Labor from the domination of Capitalism and Landlordism with the establishment of social and economic equal- ity between the sexes." Hot all the comment was so disparaging, however. Most observers admitted the sincerity and efficiency of the Labor members in the House, and many were inclined to agree that the movement had been, on the whole, a good thing. The ratio of the working population of the country to the remainder was estimated as high as fifteen to 1 . one, and one apologist in the Westminster Review declared that the grievances of Labor were practically the grievances of the whole nation, adding "The real aim of the Labor Movement is to work for a state of social life in which each man will have free scope for the development of his faculties, and yet be free from the exploit- ation which under the present system is bad alike for the Individual and for Society"; and again, "Poverty, where there is sufficient for all, is an anachronism, and the best energies of mankind cannot possibly be exerted so long as the overwhelming mass of the people 1. -Maurice Hewlett, The Labor Party and the Future . in the Fortnightly Review for October, 1913. . . ' ' 54 . 1 . are almost wholly occupied in securing an animal existence.” The potential strength of the Labor Party continued to grow in spite of dissatisfaction and adverse criticism. The trades unions, on which the Party relied for strength, had increased in total 2 . membership from 2,113,806 in 1906 to 3,987,115 in 1913. Of course not all these can be considered as members of the Labor Party, since there were still some of the smaller unions which had not affiliated with the Party. In addition to the trades union membership, there were the Socialist societies, whose membership had increased, at a 3. rough estimate, from about 20,000 in 1906 to about 35,000 in 1913. Luting the period, therefore, it can be said that the potential strength of the movement had approximately doubled. 1. -R. 0. Lavis, The Labor Movement; a psychological study . in the Westminster Revie?/ for June, 1907. 2. -Webb, History of Trade Unionism . Appendix VI, p. 750. 3. -Humphrey, A. 7/., A History of Labor Representation . Appendix IV, p. 196. ‘ 55 . CHAPTER I II. -The War and After. First Phase: Truce and Coalition. The months immediately preceding the outbreak of war in 1914 were a time of constantly increasing industrial unrest. The politi- cal labor movement seemed to have lost the confidence of its own constituency, and was fast approaching a state of practical impoten- cy to remedy the industrial situation. Disappointment at the failure of the Labor Party to bring about an immediate Utopia in living con- ditions had turned the thoughts of great numbers of the more radical of the working classes into channels of Syndicalism, and direct, rather than Parliamentary action, was much favored. From 1911 to 1914 there had occurred a series of great strikes; in July, 1914, a serious strike in the building industry was just closing, and trou- ble was brewing in the mines, on the railways, and in the engineer- ing and other trades. Indeed, it seemed as if the industrial situa- tion was moving inevitably toward a grand crisis, and it is impos- sible to conjecture what might have been the economic and political complexion of Great Britain at this day, had it not been for the sudden precipitation of the Great T .7ar. In view of the strong Socialist element in it, and its inter- national affiliations, the stand of the Labor Party with regard to the war was, to say the least, problematical. Its leaders had densed the growing hostility between the British and German nations in the preceding years, and had done their best to avert difficul- ties by exchanging messages of good will, and trying to reach an understanding. During those anxious latter days of July, both the ' I , * ,v| . i lh Labor Party and the British Section of the Internationale demanded that the Government do its utmost to prevent a European war, and insisted further, that if the war were inevitable, Britain had no business in it, and should remain neutral. On Sunday, August 2, a great anti-war demonstration was held in Trafalgar Square under the auspices of the British Section of the International, J. Heir Hardie Arthur Henderson, Will Thorne, and George Lansbury being the prin- ciple speakers. This meeting confirmed the decision of the two afore-mentioned bodies with respect to England's position. Germany's attitude toward Belgium and Sir Edward Grey's speech in the House of Commons changed the aspect of affairs, however, and England was plunged suddenly into the war. It was scarcely to be expected that a party embracing so wide a range of opinion as the Labor group would maintain a united front on such an issue as the war. The extreme right, including such men as Mr. Will Crooks, were among the first to declare for war. On the other hand, ardent internationalists such as Bamsay Macdonald strongly opposed the war and insisted that the country maintain its neutrality. Indeed, Macdonald's position nearly cost him his posi- 1 . tion in public life. It soon became evident that probably five- sixths of the Labor M.P.'s and nine-tenths of the Party membership 2 . favored English participation in the war, and Macdonald consequently resigned the Party leadership. John Burns, former Liberal-Labor man, quietly dropped out of public life as a result of his opposition to 1 . the war, and it looked as if Macdonald was destined to do likewise. Arthur Henderson assumed the Party leadership. But, in spite of his 1. -G. D. H. Cole, Labour in War Time . p. 30. 2. -Webb, S. and B., History of Trade Unionism , p. 690 57 . ■belief that the war should have heen avoided, Macdonald maintained that since England was in, she should carry the matter through to a successful conclusion. As he wrote to the Mayor of Leicester, in connection with a recruiting campaign, "Should an opportunity arise to enable me to appeal to the pure love of country which I know is a rare sentiment in all our hearts keeping it clear of thoughts which I believe to be alien to real patriotism I shall gladly take that opportunity. If need be I shall make it for myself. I want the serious men of the Trade Union, the Brotherhood, and similar movements to face their duty. To such men it is enough to say ’England has need of you’ ; to say it in the right way. They will gather to her aid. They will protect her, and when the war is over they will see to it that the policies and conditions that make it will go like the mists of a plague and the 1 . shadows of a pestilence." The great mass of Trade Unionists stood solidly behind the Government. The Fabians, according to their traditions, took the situation philosophically and resolved to make the best of it. The most important section of the Labor Party to take a definitely anti- war stand was the Independent Labor Party. This group, typified by such men as Macdonald and Eobert Smillie, the head of the Miners' Federation, stood consistently throughout the war for peace by negotiation. The consensus of opinion within the Party is pretty well conveyed by the following excerpt from the report of the Par- liamentary Party for 1914: "The opinion of the majority of the Party, after several meetings to consider the situation, crystal- lized into a conviction that under the circumstances it was l.-Cole, op. cit., p. 52. 58 . 1 . impossible for thie country to have remained neutral." In a further 2 . statement, issued in October, 1914, it was declared that Labor had stood for peace, and had made special efforts for peace with Ger- many; but it was recognized that peace was impossible in this case, since a German victory would mean the death of democracy in Europe. And even Ramsay Macdonald declared in a letter to the Morning Post that ’’Among other things, they could not make peace until Belgium 5. was freed and compensated for the evil she had suffered." Under the domination of its more moderate leadership, then, the Labor Party entered into a political truce with the Liberal and Conservative parties whereby all bye-elections would be held without contest, the party in power in the constituency returning its ov/n candidate. This truce was continued until the end of 1916, when the Labor Party declared that the other parties had tried to import extraneous and unacceptable conditions into the agreement. The spirit of the agreement was generally observed for eighteen months longer, in spite of the fact that the written agreement was discon- tinued. The Party accepted the decision of its executive in this matter only with great reluctance, however, and in several instances conducted insurgent campaigns without official authorization. A bye- election at Salford resulted in the election of the Labor candidate, Ben Willett, on a pro-war basis, and this success probably encour- aged further efforts. In two cases, however (Keighley and Y/ansbeck) , the Labor candidates, running without executive authorization, and on a peace by negotiation platform, were defeated. Robert Smillie declared that the truce weakened Labor, and gave it as his opinion 1. -A. W. Humphrey, British Labor Movement and the .. : ar . in the Political Science Quarterly for March, 1917, pp. 1-27. 2. -Cf. Liberal Magazine for 1914, pp. 703-705. 3. -Quoted in the Liberal Magazine for 1915, p. 265. 59 . that Labor would, have won the Uansbeck election with the official aid of the Labor Party. Arthur Henderson declared, fairly enough, that either the truce would have to be observed, or the executive should be relieved of responsibility in the matter. The political truce amounted practically to merging the Party individuality with the Government. But the Party went even further when the Liberal Government was succeeded by the Hirst Coalition Government, in 1915. In the redistribution of offices, Hr. Asquith appointed Mr. Henderson, the leader of the Labor Party, to the Presidency of the Board of Education, and Mr. G. H. Barnes was made Minister of Pensions. Under the Second Coalition Government, which was formed by Lloyd George the following year, Henderson was made Paymaster-General , and a member of the 17 ar Cabinet; Barnes was continued in his position; John Hodge was made Minister of Labor; and W. Brace, G. H. Roberts, and James Parker were appointed to minor offices. Such participation was opposed to the fundamental princi- ples of the Party, and was severely criticized, not only by the anti-war minority, but also by many who supported the war. The Party also cooperated, in the early days of the war, in a Parliamentary recruiting campaign, in which the Government and the Opposition ?/orked together under the terms of the party truce. This proposal also caused a great deal of disagreement and discussion within the Party, but the national executive finally sanctioned the action of the Parliamentary Party, and Mr. Arthur Henderson became one of the Presidents of the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, other Labor appointees being James Parker, 3?. 17. Goldstone, and J. Pointer. whether or not participation in the Coalition Government was advisable under the circumstances, there were some, at least, who 60 • had no doubts in the matter: the extremists of the left bitterly opposed the project, and have consistently declared from that day to this that the action weakened the political position of Labor. From the very outset, war exigencies were such as to make it evident that the hard-won rights and privileges of Labor would have to be modified considerably, at least during the war period. The Govern- ment tried to institute an industrial truce for the avoidance of strikes during the war, and the Parliamentary Labor Party enjoined its observance upon its constituent bodies. The truce was observed only for a period of about six months, however, for strikes broke out again in 1915, and were more or less prevalent throughout the remainder of the war, in spite of such legislation as the various Munitions of War Acts and Defense of the Kealm Acts, which not only involved a considerable curtailment of personal liberty, but also imposed what was practically compulsory arbitration as to wages. The Government also instituted a policy of what was known as the dilution of labor, which involved the introduction of women and unskilled, non-union labor in trades formerly controlled by the unionists. Both sides agreed, however, as to the necessity of much of this legislation, though it is now generally admitted that the extension of working hours went too far. On the other hand, however, the war was a time when there was plenty of work for all at abnor- mally high wages (for the rise in prices did not overtake the rise in wages until late in the war) . In some of these matters, the Labor Party felt it its duty to protest against the action of the Government, though for the most part it acquiesced. The greatest difficulty occurred over the matter of conscription, which was proposed by the Government in 1915. ' - 61 . Practically all sections of the labor movement, whether right or left, were outspoken in their criticism of the principle of compul- sory military service. ' Indeed, the Party had entered the Parliamen- tary Recruiting Campaign in hopes that the success of the voluntary system would make conscription unnecessary. Even the conservative Trades Union Congress opposed the idea, but after a representative labor group had been addressed on the subject by Lord Kitchener, they formed a committee to aid the Government, though still reiter- ating their position with regard to the principle involved. Arthur Henderson, when finally convinced that the move was inevitable, agreed to the proposal with reluctance, stipulating that the Govern- ment should not continue the policy beyond the war nor use the powers thus conferred upon them against the masses in industrial disputes. The Rational Registration Act was finally passed in August 1915, with the I. L. P. men and three other Labor men opposing it. This Act was merely the prelude to the actual conscription measure, which v/as not decided on until after Christmas. The final bill was passed with eleven Labor men opposing it on the second reading, and u five on the third, with two pairing. A second military service act v/as passed four months later, practically without opposition, fhe Labor Party still continued to condemn the act, though they refused to agitate for its repeal. Labor was, indeed, politically futile, almost subservient, during the earlier stages of the war. The Party seemed to have lost the power of thought and independent action. A spirit of chauvinism seemed to have replaced the breadth of international view v/hich had formerly characterized the Party. Eor instance, when Samuel Gompers suggested holding an international trades union congress coincident ■ ' .. - » i*wm. . 62 . with the official peace conference to protect the interests of labor, the Birmingham Conference of the Trades Union Congress (1916) 1 . voted down the project hy 1,486,000 to 723,000. Will Thorne, M.P., welcomed the suggestion for an Inter-Allied Conference, but de- clared absurd the idea of including enemy delegates. The Bail?/ Citizen , which had been founded with such high hopes in 1912, finally ceased publication after a short and troubled existence, in 1915. V/hen the encroachments of the Government on labor rights went unendurably far and the Party w as stung to protest, its members were taunted with pacifism and defeatism. Practically the only encour- aging event in those days was the affiliation of the British Social- 2 . ist Party with the Labor Party in January, 1916. This accession was supposed to add about ten thousand members, but the group was split shortly afterward , the right wing, under the leadership of the veteran Hyndman forming the national Socialist Party. As late as 1916 the Labor Party refused to consider problems of peace, lest such discussion be considered disloyal. The Scottish section re- mained more independent; its executive refused to join in the re- cruiting campaign, denounced the military service acts, and called for a meeting of the Internationale; but its attitude was not characteristic of the mass of the Party. Second Phase: The Revival of the Labor Party. It was not until 1917 and 1918 that Labor experienced a reawa- kening and began to express itself once more. The factor which turned the tide (or was at least instrumental) was the Russian 1. -Kellogg and Gleason, British Labor and the Bar, pp. 19-20. In these conferences, each vote represents one thousand members. 2. - A. 17. Humphrey, British Labor Movement and the Var, in the Political Science Quarterly for Liar eh , 1917. 63 . Revolution, for it was the Kerensky government which precipitated the project of the Inter -Allied Socialist Conference at Stockholm, for the purpose of discussing war aims, which caused such a furor in Allied political circles. There had "been an Inter -Allied Social- ist Conference in London in February, 1915, hut it had done little 1 . beyond condemning the treatment of Belgium, Poland, and Servia. Since that time, such conferences for the purpose of discussing war aims had been frowned on by the Allied governments, as savoring of pacifism, and that idea had been reflected in the overwhelming sentiment of the Labor Party and the Trades Union Congress. Shortly after the Revolution, however, Henderson was dispatched to Russia by Lloyd George for the purpose of investigating conditions and bringing about the most efficient cooperation with the new govern- ment. He was even authorised to remain as ambassador, if he saw fit, 2 . at a salary of $40,000 a year. Henderson had at first opposed the idea of the Stockholm Conference, but after conferring with Keren- sky and investigating conditions in Russia, he decided that the conference would be productive of good results. He saw that the Russian government was on a rather unstable foundation, and that in order to insure its hearty support of the war it would be necessary to make very definite the aims for which the Allied nations were fighting. It 7/as also hoped that an appeal such as the conference v/ould doubtless make to the workers of Austria and Germany would lead to a revolt against the autocratic governments of the Central PoY/ers. Henderson felt further that it v/ould be very unwise to allow/ the Russian delegates to meet v/ith those from the Central 1. -Kellogg and Gleason, op. cit., p. 76. 2. -3. and B. Webb, op. cit., p. 694. 64. powers without the presence of any counteracting forces, such as would he supplied hy Allied representatives. Henderson returned from Russia, therefore, thoroughly converted to the idea of the conference. The Government had originally "been rather favorably inclined toward the project, but in the meanwhile the French, Italian, and American governments had registered their strong disapproval of the scheme, and had peremptorily refused pass-: ports to their delegates. Lloyd George veered around and did like- wise, and Henderson, charged with breach of faith as a member of the bar Cabinet, resigned (Barnes and the other Labor men remaining in the ministry, however). Meanwhile a Party Conference, called at ■ Central Hall, Westminster , London, on August 10, 1917, had, under the influence of Henderson, decided by a vote of 1,846,000 to 1 . 550,000 to send delegates to Stockholm. The vote records the first victory of the left wing since 1914. Henderson's resignation marks the beginning of his restoration to the real leadership of the Party. As a member of the I7ar Cabinet, he had been the Parliamentary leader of his Party, but there had been a constantly v/idening breach between the Labor men in the Government and the great mass of the workers. But Henderson, appear- in the light of the martyred champion of Labor's cause, and freed from the restrictions imposed by his position in the Government, made a powerful appeal. The change that took place in the labor movement as a whole was very striking. In January, 1917, the Manchester Conference of the Labor Party had gone on record as opposing any such scheme as the Stockholm conference; in March of the same year, the invitation of the Lutch-Scandinavian Committee 1. -Kellogg and Gleason, op', cit., p. 12. 65 » had been refused; and to the announcement that the Russian Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies had invited all Socialist and labor movements to a conference to adopt a general working class policy, no response was made. A committee was appointed to visit Russia, hut it never left England. All the more remarkable, then, was the reversal in opinion registered in the August conference under the influence of Henderson. Even the Blackpool Conference of the Trades Union Congress, the most conservative constituent element of the labor movement, expressed its disapproval of the course adopted by the Government by the overwhelming vote of 2,849,000 to 1 . 91,000. It is significant that the same Will Thorne who had, some eighteen months before, characterized as "absurd" a plan to have "delegates from Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria at a confer- ence that was to advise our plenipotentiaries upon the terms of 2 . peace" was the man who seconded Smillie's resolution, from the Parliamentary Committee, that the Trades Union Congress assist and take part in an inter - belligerent conference. Host of the negative votes on the proposition can be traced to the Sailors' and Eiremens' Union, v/hich had suffered so heavily from the submarine activities of the Germans that they had become the most implacable of bitter- enders, and announced, through their President, Havelock Wilson, that they would refuse to convey such an expedition as the proposed one to Stockholm. They also prevented Ramsay Macdonald from making rj • a proposed trip to Russia. 1. -Hellogg and Gleason, op. cit., p. 16. 2. -Ibid.; p. 20. 3. -Inasmuch as the Union took this action on their own initiative, without consulting the Government, it is especially interest- ing as savoring of syndicalism, on the part of one of the most conservative of unions; had a union taken such a position in contravention of the Government's wishes, a most interesting situation would have arisen. 66 • Having taken issue with the Government over the Stockholm pro- ject, Labor, not daunted by its apparent defeat, turned its energies to securing Inter-Allied Labor agreement on the terms of peace. These efforts marked the beginning of a period of renewed activity which continued on into and through 1918, and which not only lifted the political labor movement out of the condition of impotence into which it had fallen, but brought it to a plane of achievement to which it had not theretofore attained. As a prelude to securing Inter-Allied agreement on war aims, it was of course essential that British Labor be brought to agree on a program. The task was under- taken by the national Executive of the Labor Party and the Parlia- mentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress, under the direction of Arthur Henderson, who had the sanction of the British Government. The result of their labors was the publication of a remarkable 1 . document known as the Memorandum on war Jims, which v/as presented to the Westminster Conference of the Labor Party and passed by a 2 . vote of 2,132,000 to 1,164,000. Five days later it was approved by a Joint Conference of the Labor Party and the Trades Union Congress, and thereby secured the stamp of approval of the whole British labor movement. Inasmuch as this document became the basis of President Wilson's subsequent fourteen points, it is perhaps worth while to examine the paper in detail. The pronouncement begins with a declaration to the effect that Labor's aim is to secure a lasting peace for the v/orld. It goes on to state that war must be eliminated by the democratization of nations; by the suppression of imperialism and secret diplomacy; by 1. -A. Henderson, The Aims of Labour , Appendix I. 2. -Kellogg and Gleason, op. cit., p. 51. . 67 the abolition of compulsory military service everywhere; by the limitation of armaments and the nationalization of the armament industry; and by the formation of a League of Nations with compul- sory powers. It demands as a basis of peace that there shall be no conquests; that Belgium shall be restored; that Alsace-Lorraine shall exercise • self-determination by means of a plebiscite; that there shall be a Special International Commission to settle the Balkan difficulties on the basis of self-determination; that the purely Italian districts in the neighborhood of the head of the Adriatic Sea shall be turned over to Italy; that Palestine shall be made an independent Jewish state; that Constantinople shall be a neutralised free port, and the freed Turkish provinces shall be administered under the League of Nations; that the conquered African colonies shall be likewise managed, and eventually formed into a state; and deals with international problems of lesser import in the same spirit. The Memorandum denounces any she erne of economic warfare after the consummation of peace, and declares for free trade except as protection may be necessary to safeguard the interests of the masses. As to domestic affairs, the statement favors the con- tinuation of Government retention of control of commodities until war shortage and emergencies are a thing of the past; demands that action be taken to prevent unemployment, and suggests that public works anticipated in the near future be begun immediately upon the cessation of hostilities in order that work may be provided for the demobilized troops. It concludes with a statement that all nations should aid in the reitoration of the devastated regions, even to the peasants' homes; and insists that the charges of atrocities so freely made during the war be tried, and appropriate awards and 68 . punishments meted out. The Allied governments finally agreed to, and furnished the necessary passports for, an Inter-Allied Labor and .Socialist Confer- ence which convened at London, February 20-24, 1918. There was much opposition to such a meeting, probably the strongest voices in condemnation of it being raised in America. After the United States had entered the war, the American Federation of Labor, under the leadership of Samuel Gompers, which had formerly been engaged in efforts to bring about inter-belligerent conferences, became the most violently nationalistic labor movement to be found in any of the Allied nations, and they, in particular, were outspoken in their opposition to any consideration uf war aims and peace terms before a military victory had been achieved. As a matter of fact, however, it would seem that most of the critics of the movement misunderstood the theory underlying the attempt of British labor. Arthur Henderson, who had several sons in the war, was no pacifist; but he saw, as President V/ilson did also, that the military offen- sive could be rendered more effective if backed up by a moral and political one. From the entrance of the United States into the war, President Uilson had been trying to detach the German people from their Junker leadership by distinguishing between the government and the people; and in the month preceding the Inter-Allied Confer- ence he had issued his note embodying the famous Fourteen Points; but no one had considered it as a particularly pacifist move, though it had undoubtedly discussed peace terms. What Arthur Hender- son and the Labor Party men associated with him we re trying to do was of the same nature . The adoption of well-defined war aims by the representatives of the most democratic interests of the Allied 69 . nations was a clever lit of propaganda well calculated to offset the misrepresentations of the German military leaders to their people concerning Allied intentions. Moreover, the scheme was de- signed to make even the military offensive more effective; for in 1917 and 1918, when war-weariness was "beginning to affect the nations, and labor was "becoming increasingly restive and ill-satis- fied, such an agreement acted as an incentive to renewed effort. The Belgian Socialist, Vandervelde, repudiated the charge of pacifism in a speech at the London Conference in the following words: "But we have more to do than to congratulate ourselves on the achievement of the Russian Revolution; we must also draw lessons from its failures. The great lesson is that democracy was committing an irretrievable mistake by throwing away its arms before militarism had been defeated, whilst holding the olive branch in one hand, we have to hold the sword in the other. We have been forced to take up the sword as the only means of defense. Y/e must not forget that if we are able to assemble here, it is because the British navy holds the seas, and the millions of Allied soldiers maintain the line. If the German offensive were to succeed the resolutions we pass would be mere 'scraps of paper' and of no more value than the bank notes of the Russian state bank. If our soldiers are able to throw back the attack with which we are threatened, we shall have the glorious opportunity of taking a leading part in the effort that can be made to attain a just and democratic peace.” And Vandervelde pretty fairly expressed the opinion of the conference. The confer- ence finally adopted a memorandum on war aims based in all essential points on the document passed by British labor two months before. I. -Kellogg and Gleason, op., cit., p. 75. 70. Henderson summed up the idea of the conference at its final session in these words: "As I understand the position of Allied labor, it is this: We seek a victory; hut we do not seek a victory of a militarist or diplomatic nature. We seek a triumph for great principles and noble ideals. We are not influenced by imperialist ambitions or selfish national interests. We seek a victory; but it must be a victory for international moral and spiritual forces, finding its expression based on the inalienable rights of common humanity. By the acceptance of the amended war aims, the Inter- Allied Conference has declared that, whilst we are unprepared to continue the conflict for an imperialistic peace for the Allies, neither would we consent to the acceptance of terms which would mean a German militarist peace. We have made our declarations of policy in good faith, repudiating all deceit and cunning. We shall refuse to countenance any attempt by either group of belligerents to defeat the principle for which we stand. We shall oppose any unscrupulous application of these principles to any particular cases in which any country may be interested. We shall continue to press our case against all opposition, whether it be internal or external, in order that we may eventually secure that constructive democratic peace so essential to social and economic peace the 1 . v/orld over." Thus did British labor contribute at once to the hastening of peace, and the more effective prosecution of the war. And through the months that followed it continued to exert its influence to insure a just peace and a speedy one. It is but fair to say, though, that during the dark days stretching bet ween March and July, when 1. -Kellogg and Gleason, op', cit., p. 79. 71 . it looked as though the German armies might break through the Allied line and reach Paris, the Party exerted its energies rather toward increased military resistance than in discussion of peace terms. For instance, in April the executive of the Party passed the following resolution: "Resolved, That the national Executive of the Labor Party places on record its deep sense of gratitude for, and admiration of, the heroic resistance offered by our armies in the field to the terrible onslaughts of the enemy during the recent offensive. Such magnificent courage and resolution so consistent with the best British traditions imposes an imperative obligation upon all sections of the country to assist by their skill, energy, or sub- stance to carry on the great work of liberation in which our armies are engaged in order that our joint efforts may eventually result in the final overthrow of militarism and secure for the world a 1 . lasting and democratic peace." A second Inter-Allied Labor and Socialist Conference was held in London on September 17, 18, and 19, and in this meeting even Samuel Gompers and an American delegation participated, together with British, French, Italian, Serbian, and Greek delegations. The convention gave unanimous endorsement to President Wilson* fourteen propositions, and steered a straight course between the extremists both on the right and on the left. And throughout these conferences, and others I have not mentioned, the moderating, steadying influence was Henderson. A second manifestation of the reviving energy of Labor was the promulgation of an extensive and elaborate reconstruction program. 1 ‘-Kellogg and Gleason * op. cit., p. 95 . • • * - - .«* . . 7 72 . In the Allied nations there had been much talk of the problems that must be met v/hen the war ended, but nothing very definite had been 1 . done in preparation for that time. The report was drafted by the Executive Committee of the Labor Party and first submitted to the annual conference of the Party at Nottingham, January 23-25, 1918, 2 . under the title of Labor and the Hew Social Order . The pamphlet at once attracted widespread attention, and was extensively quoted and copied throughout the Allied nations. It was reprinted as a supple- ment to the New Republic in the United States, and was partially embodied in the platforms in many of the fall elections. So import- ant and far-reaching v/as this document also, that it is necessary to summarize its provisions. The report begins with a quotation from the Japanese statesman, Count Okuma, to the effect that the war signalizes the collapse of the existing industrial civilization; society must be entirely re- constructed; hope is expressed that political and industrial indi- vidualism has been forever downed; the new order must be based on fraternal cooperative production. The four essential elements of the new social order, referred to as the four pillars of the house, are summarized as follows: a. Universal enforcement of the national minimum. b. The democratic control of industry. c. The revolution in national finance. d. The surplus wealth for the common good. By the national minimum, Labor means securing to all, in good 1. -The British Government did, indeed, appoint a Ministry of Re- construction, but its work was inadequate to the exigencies of the situation. 2. -A. Henderson, op. cit., Appendix II. 73 . times or bad, the requisites of a healthy life and worthy citizen- ship; employment must he assured to all, and there must he some form of social insurance; the administration of existing social legisla- tion must he improved, and a national minimum wage of thirty shil- lings a week is suggested for the present. The report refers to the dangers attendant upon demobilization; reminds the Government that Labor had some time before called upon the Government to declare its demobilization policy, and had received no answer; suggests that those men engaged in the most essential industries be released first. Labor insists that unemployment be avoided, and accuses the Government and the Liberal and Conservative parties with evading this issue entirely. Employment problems, declares the document, should be handled through the trades unions and the Employment Exchanges, the latter to be jointly controlled by employers and trades unionists. The standard of living must not be lowered; the pre-war trades union privileges must be restored, and the Government is reminded of its pledge. The rates of real wages should hot be lowered, and the Government, as an employer, should set the example in this regard. Again the idea is advanced that the Government, in order to prevent unemployment, should utilize public works and the Government service to regulate the demand for labor. In order to take care of the labor that will be released by demobilization, the following are suggested: rehousing, extension of educational work, both in building and in a vocational way, roads and light railv/ays, unification and reorganization of the railway and canal system, afforestation, reclamation of land, development and better equipment of ports and harbors, access to land by cooperative small holdings. In addition it is suggested that the school-leaving age be raised to f - . 74 . sixteen; that the number of scholarships and bursaries for higher education be increased; that the hours of labor of young people be shortened; and that the forty- eight hour week be adopted as the national standard for adult workers wherever practicable. As for the unemployable, they should be cared for by social insurance, the cost of which should be borne partly by the Government; poor laws and private charity cannot be longer tolerated. As to the democratic control of industry: The report states that democracy means effective personal freedom; it demands that the Military Service Acts (conscription) be repealed at the earliest possible opportunity; supplementary to the present state of politi- cal democracy, it stands for " complete adult suffrage, with not more than a three months' residential qualification, for effective provisions for absent electors to vote, for absolutely eoual rights for both sexes, for the same freedom to exercise civic rights for the 'common soldier' as for the officer, for Shorter Parliaments, for the complete Abolition of the House of Lords, and for a most strenuous opposition to any new Second Chamber, whether elected or not, having in it any element of Heredity or Privilege, or of the 1 . control of the House of Commons by any Party or Class. 11 But the Labor Party demands industrial, as well as political, democracy, implying the elimination of the private capitalist, service to be for the community only. It is stated that increased production will only be secured by common ownership of the means of production, and a demand is made for nationalization, as soon as possible, of land, railways, mines, electrical power, a national Service of Communi- cation and Transport, and, ultimately, insurance. It is suggested l.-A. Henderson, op. c it .,• Appendix II, p. 99. * « ' - . ■ ~ , - * 75 . thet the liquor business be taken from the hands of individuals, and deparate districts be given the privilege of local option on the question of license. The Party advocates the municipalization of all local utilities, among which it includes the following: land, housing, town planning, parks, libraries, music, recreation, milk supply, in addition to those activities usually included under the head of public utilities. On the point of financial reform: There is to be no protective tariff; indirect taxation shall be limited to luxuries, and neces- saries shall not be taxed; the scope of sumptuary taxation shall be extended, however. There shall be direct and steeply graduated of surplus income and inheritances, the former to be assessed by families. A direct capital levy is suggested for the payment of war debts. The excess profits tax shall shall be continued "in an appropriate form", though its application to Cooperative Societies shall be stopped. The unearned increment shall be reached by direct taxation of land values. Surplus income above the standard of liv- ing shall not go to the building up of individual fortunes, but will provide Society's capital needs and care for those who cannot aid in production, and for the cultural advancement of the 7/hole communi ty . Under the heading of The Street of To-I.lorrow the report then discusses in a general way some international problems; there shall be home rule for the British Empire; the idea of an Imperial Senate is definitely repudiated; the principle of self-determination of nations is reiterated; there shall be no economic war; secret diplomacy and alliances shall be abolished, and a League of Nations with super -national authority, together with an International ^-ign 76 . Court for the settlement of disputes, and an International Legis- lature, shall be set up. The report concludes with a plea that the Labor Party base its advance upon Science and Knowledge, stating that Good Will without Knowledge is warmth without light, while both are essential to progress. The pronouncement became increasingly important as time went on, not only because of the international attention it attracted, but because it became practically the Party platform at the next general election, and is still extensively referred to. Its prin- ciples are clearly Socialistic, and show that the Party had travel- ed a long way since its inception in 1900. The report was, of course, roundly condemned as well as praised, the nature of the comment depending on the source. The following excerpt from an article in the nineteenth C entury expresses pretty well the bitter- ness of some of the adverse comment that greeted the report: " It has evidently been written by a Pabian doctrinaire and perhaps touched up here and there by a Labor leader in order to adapt it to the manual workers’ point of view The most painful passage ..of the Report as a whole is the evident object of stirring up class war by the use of catchwords calculated 1 . to deceived because never defined.” But aside from the virtues or failings of the Report itself, it cannot be denied that it made such an appeal to the labor v/orld of Britain as had not been made, probably, since its first attempt at politics. The Memorandum on V/ar Aims and Labor and the Hew Social. Order, indeed, mark a new departure in the political labor move- ment; heretofore one of the truest and most general criticisms l.-Lord Sydenham of Combe, , The Peril of Socialism , in the nineteenth Centur;; for March, 1918, 77 . directed against the Labor Party had been that it had no specific program of its own; here we find it, in the midst of war, at a time when the other political parties seemed dazed and incapable of ex- pression, promulgating a most complete and far-reaching program, outlining not only the general principles of their political creed, but also applying them in more or less detail to the domestic and international problems of the day. There was, however, a third important document marking the re- juvenation of the Party. The organization of the group had been for a long time unsatisfactory. The constitution provided for member- ship either on a basis of trade union membership, or affiliation v/ith one or other of the Socialist bodies connected with the Party. Such a restriction meant that many middle class and professional well-wishers of the movement were excluded from the Party except as they might join one of the Socialist bodies, which maiy of these people were unwilling to do. This matter was one of especial impor- tance because many of those so excluded were of the so-called in- tellectual class, and were capable of rendering the movement great aid if they could be put in a position to do so. Moreover, when this matter was under particular discussion (in the fall of 1917) it was believed that franchise reform was imminent, and it was necessary that the Party make some provision to capture its share of the millions of new voters who would owe their privilege in no small degree to the efforts of the Labor group. As a. matter of fact, the Representation of the People Act, which granted woman suffrage ( and it is but fair to remark that the Labor Party, as A. Lawrence 1 . Lowell says, was the only group which had favored the movement when l.-A. Lawrence Lowell, The. Government of England , Vol.II, p. 216. « I , I II . 'I I 78 . it had been unpopular) and greatly extended male suffrage, besides making some changes in the constituencies and slightly increasing the number of representatives in the House of Commons, was passed by Parliament early in 1918, and resulted in a total increase in the electorate of about thirteen millions. Inconsideration of these facts, then, the Party adopted at its conference in London on February 21, 1918, a new constitution designed to widen the scope of its membership and to make the most of the situation created by the new franchise act. It is true that some of the most active of the local Labor Parties, such as those of Woolwich and Blackburn, had for some time been accepting the aid of those who were not manual workers, but their example was not widely followed. The main features of the new 1 . constitution were as follows: membership was to be based, as before, on the affiliated societies, and on membership in local Labor Parties, where such members subscribed to the Constitution and Program of the Party. There follows a section outlining the Party objectives, which have already been discussed. As to the Party program, it is specified that it shall be decided on by the Party Conference, by a two-thirds majority; the national Executive and the Parliamentary Party shall define the issues before every general election. "It shall be the duty of every Parliamentary representative of the Party to be guided by the decisions of the meetings of such Parliamentary representatives, with a view to giving effect to the decisions of the Party Conference as to the 2 . General Programme of the Party." The work of the Party shall be in 1. -Kellogg and Gleason, op. cit.. Appendix III. 2. -Ibid., p. 239. 79 . charge of the Conference, which shall meet once a year, and at other times as convened hy the national Executive. The Conference shall consist of delegates from affiliated societies on the "basis of one for every thousand paid-up members represented; and of representatives from the local Labor Parties according to the number of Parliamentary representatives returned by the constituen- cy of the party; and of delegates at the rate of one each from Trades Councils affiliated to the Party prior to November 1, 1917. The National Executive shall consist of twenty-three members, to be elected by the Conference; shall be responsible for the Party work and shall cooperate with the Parliamentary Party for the purpose of furthering the Party program. Party candidates must be approved by the National Executive and must appear on a Labor platform only; they shall be aided in their campaign by the Executive, and shall received financial aid to cover their campaign expenses according to the size of the constituency they happen to be contesting. The last section deals with the matter of Party finance, which is on a basis of twopence per member of affiliated organizations, with special arrangements for Trades Councils and local Labor Parties. This last point was, indeed, the most difficult one of all. The matter of expansion could have been cairied out without difficulty had it not been necessary to retain the Trades Union basis as fund- amental because of its financial assistance .Hence the outcome was more or less of a compromise between radical bodies such as the Independent Labor Party, which had long been agitating for the admission of all workers "by hand or brain" , rather tnan the re- striction of the movement to manual workers, and the conservative Trades Unions, which preferred to keep the Party on its original 80 . trade union "basis. The Fabians were also influential in the change. Many have argued that "by its action the Party threw out the old class war doctrine of the orthodox Socialists "by permitting the affiliation of petit "bourgeois intellectuals. The Party hoped, also, to secure the aid of the Cooperative movement, which had first entered politics in 1917 as a protest against the action of the Government in attempting to apply the excess profits tax to their earnings. The Cooperatives, in declaring their intentions of running candidates for Parliament, made no mention of party affil- iation, "but it was generally understood that the majority of them would "be labor men, since the whole Cooperative movement was largely a working class undertaking. The new constitution had been originally adopted as far back as October, 1917, by the Party Executive, whose action was approved by the Conference. The first National Executive elected under the provisions of the new constitution was chosen at the June, 1918, Conference, and the personnel was as follows: Of the twenty-two members (excluding the Treasurer, Ramsay Macdonald), thirteen were representatives of Trades Unions or other affiliated organizations; five were from local Labor Parties; and four were women. The Inde- pendent Labor Party had lost its right to separate representation; but it is noteworthy that of those elected, two were at the time members of the I. L. P. Executive, and one was an ex-member of that body; one of the women was Mrs. Philip Snowden, and the Treasurer was a member of the Independents , showing that that group had by no means its influence, even though deprived of separate represen- 1 . tation. 1. -Kellogg and Gleason, op. cit., p. 257. 81 . Women had become increasingly important in the industrial and political affairs of the nation during the war years. Prom 1910 the number of women workers enrolled in trades unions had increased 1 . from 129,074 to 556,965, and this number had practically doubled during the war. And yet the trades unionists were but a small section of the total of working w omen, who had increased in number nearly a million and a half during the war. ITaturally the Labor Party spread its net to capture the votes of these women who had recently been franchised; had, indeed, taken them into partnership long before the nation had done so. The local Labor Parties had organized women’s auxiliaries, and women delegates had appeared in national gatherings, especially among the more radical groups, such as the Independent Labor Party. In 1918 the Trades Union Congress elected Margaret Bondfield, who was already a member of the Execu- tive of the I. L. P. to membership on its Parliamentary Committee. The election of Dr. Ethel Bentham, Mary Macarthur, Mrs. Philip Snowden, and Susan Lawrence to the Executive of the Labor Party has already been mentioned. In addition to appearing at the national conferences, women often held conferences in conjunction with those held by the men. Thus at the Southport Conference of the Labor Party, the women convened a day earlier than the remainder of the Conference, and held a session, one hundred and fifty-four strong, under the leadership of Susan Lawrence. The Women's Labor League was formed to assist in the formation of women's sections of local Labor Parties, and its organ, Labor Women was taken over by the Party. Yet in spite of these efforts, it is interesting to note the impressions of an American eye-witness, who admitted "I must leave l.-A. Gleason, What the Workers Want , p. 259 82 . it as my impression of half a dozen labor conferences that women as 1 . yet with difficulty gain a hearing." The potential strength of the labor movement had increased greatly during the war. During the five year period 1914-1919, the trades unions had practically doubled their membership. There had been the accession of the British Socialist Party in 1916, and there had been some gains from the Cooperatives in 1917 (much of the membership of the Cooperative movement had, of course, been already affiliated with the Labor Party). The membership of the Independent Labor Party had also doubled, and its propaganda was becoming con- stantly more effective and influential. At the twenty-sixth annual conference of this body at Leicester in March, 1918, it was an- nounced that one hundred and fifty-three new branches had been established, and there had been a gain of fifty per cent, in mem- 2 . bership during the year which had just closed. Another matter which tended to strengthen the political movement was the final repudiation of the political truce. At every labor conference this truce was the object of attack from the left wing. As a matter of fact, it had not been officially subscribed to by the Party since the end of 1916, but it had been observed with the exception of two or three instances already alluded to. Labor members still retained their position in the Ministry, though there was a constantly widening gulf between several of them and their labor constituencies. At the time of the Bottingham Conference of the Labor Party, in January, 1918, there were eight labor leaders in the ministry, and G. IT. Barnes was in the Cabinet. At this 1. -A. Gleason, op. cit., p. 107. 2 . -Kellogg and Gleason, op. cit., p. 216. 85. conference there was voiced the first menacing demand that the Labor members resign from the ministry on questions of policy. But the moderating influence of Arthur Henderson was sufficient to hold the forces of the conference together and to sidetrack the resolu- tion calling for the break-up of the Coalition. But the move for separation from the Government was a determined one, based on the feeling that the policy of the Labor Party had become widely di- vergent from that of the Government. Party members did not care to be responsible for war aims and reconstruction plans openly avowed by reactionary elements in the Government. But even the extremists moved slowly because of the uncertainty of the political situation, and put the soft pedal on their propaganda during the spring and early summer days of German menace. The agitation against the continuance of the political truce came to a head in the June Conference. But even then the Party did not insist on the Labor members leaving the Government; it merely made a formal declaration of its subsequent freedom in elections. The resolution was brought forward by the national Executive, and read as follows: "That this Conference of the Labor Party accepts the recommen- dation of the Party Executive that the existence of the political 1 . truce should be no longer recognized." The actual vote on the proposition was 1,704,000 for, and 2 . 951,000 against, registering a majority of 755,000. This conference, too, was dominated by the more moderate element, such as Henderson, Thomas, and Clynes. The latter had been reelected to the executive 1. -Kellogg and Gleason, op. cit., p. 113. 2. -Ibid., p. 119. I 84 . of the Labor Party by a vote of over two millions. He had, at the death of Lord Rhondda, become the Pood Controller of Great Britain. Relative to the truce, he voiced the attitude of the Conference when he declared that its termination did not mean any lessening support of the Government in the war, but was necessary to allow Labor to exert the strength it had newly acquired under the reform bill. As a matter of fact, the Labor members of the Cabinet were not called out by the Party until three days after the signing of the Armistice, on the eve of the general election. Barnes, who had become estranged from the labor movement during his years of Government service, and had been defeated for the Labor Party nom- ination in his own constituency, refused to obey the summons, joined the Lloyd George coalition permanently, and was dropped by the Party. Clynes, on the other hand, though he opposed the resolu- tion, nevertheless obeyed it, and campaigned for Labor in the election. Three other Labor members followed the example of Barnes, namely: G. H. Roberts, John Hodge, and J. G. ITardle; the rest obeyed the Party dictum and withdrew. There were, of course, many divergent elements at work during these troubled days. Though 1917 and 1918 were, on the whole, times of rapid expansion and growing popularity for the movement, yet it required cool leadership and real tact for Henderson, Clynes, and Thomas to steer a neutral course between Macdonald, Snowden, and Smillie on the extreme left, and Havelock Wilson, Barnes, and Roberts on the right, without losing the discordant elements. The moderates were not altogether successful, as we have seen; but they did remarkably well considering the difficulties with which they had to deal. It was inevitable that some divisions would crop out 85 . which could not he fused again. Of these was the British Workers’ League, an organization formed by the most chauvinistic and reac- tionary elements in the labor movement. The group was formed during the war ostensibly to promote cooperation with the Government, but it did its utmost to combat the steady movement of the Labor Party toward the left, and v/as, accordingly, regarded by that group as what might be termed a counter-revolutionary body. Some of the more radical organs, such as the London Hat ion and the Herald , for in- stance, even charged the group with being financed by capitalist funds, for the purpose of hindering the real labor movement. The League declared against Free Trade, and proposed a modified capital- ism on the basis of a minimum wage after the war, besides attack- ing the leadership of Sidney Webb and Arthur Henderson in the Labor Party. The organization was founded by Victor Fisher, a former member of the Social, Democratic Federation, and enrolled several well-known labor leaders among its earlier followers. When it revealed its real nature, however, by attacking the war aims memorandum and by announcing that it would run candidates in opposi- tion to Labor Party men in some constituencies in the coming election, most of the Labor men who had been attracted to it with- drew their membership. At the ITottingham Conference of the Labor Party it seemed to be the general opinion that one could not well belong to the Party and the League at the same time. Smillie 1 . referred to the Workers' League as a "black-leg organization", and the house signified its approval by applause. In the spring of 1918 another apparent split occurred in the Party; or at least a movement which the hostile publicists were 1. -Kellogg and Gleason, op. cit., p. 55. 86 . pleased to call a split. The movement was headed by J. B. Williams, head of the Amalgamated Musicians’ Union, who issued a circular advocating a trade union party, to he under the exclusive control of the Trades Union Congress. One such circular was signed hy twenty trades union officials and members, two of them being mem- bers of the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress. A joint meeting of the Parliamentary Committee and the Labor Party Executive replied to their propaganda in the following resolution*. "That this Joint Meeting of the Parliamentary Committee and Labor Party Executive, having considered the circular issued by J. B. Williams and signed by certain trade union officials, wherein an appeal is made for the formation of a Trade Union Labor Party which, in our opinion, is calculated to disrupt a movement built up by years of sacrifice, calls upon those responsible to immeidately discontinue such action, and trusts no further stept will be neces- sary to enforce what loyalty our movement has a right to expect from those holding such responsible positions "The Executive Committee holds very strongly that no worse service could be rendered to the movement under present circumstan- ces than that any attempt should be made to disrupt either the 1 . political or industrial forces of labor " Havelock Wilson was an easy convert to the new movement, and he and Williams proceeded to organize a meeting at Caxton Hall, Westminster (v/hich was reported to have been attended by four hun- dred people) for the purpose of repudiating the breaking of the truce and advancing the cause of the new movement. This body, it is 1. -Kellogg and Gleason, op. cit., p. 258. 87 . true, managed maintain its existence through the December elections, and was more or less successful, but inasmuch as neither Williams, Wilson, nor W. J. Davis (Amalgamated Brass Workers), nor their respective unions had been affiliated with the Labor Party, they could not, strictly speaking, comprise a split in the Party. The Tories were glad to hail it as a real party, but Liberal and Radical groups minimized its importance. The group carried on an active propaganda, however, and by the end of August they announced that they had distributed a million and a half copies of their party manifesto. The group advocated a five year boycott of Germany after the war, and Havelock Wilson announced to the Trades Union Congress at Derby in September that he had secured a total of 550,000 declarations among members of the fighting forces favoring such a boycott, among them being 152,000 trades unionists. His proposal was discarded by the Congress, however, without much dis- cussion. The new body finally adopted the name of national Democra- tic and Labor Party, and entered the general election under that title. These were, then, in brief, the main events in Labor's career leading up to the election of 1918: the Stockholm conference, publication of the Memorandum on War Aims and Labor and the Hew Social Order , the adoption of a new constitution, organization of the women's movement, and the appearance of rival labor organiza- tions.The general election, which should have come not later than the end of 1915, had been several times postponed by the Govern- ment because of the country T s dislike of engaging in the distrac- tions and political quarrels incident to a campaign while the war continued. The election was finally set for December, 1918. Mean- 88 . while, all forces had realized that it could not he postponed much longer, and had been preparing for the contest. It had been an- nounced at the June Conference that the Party would contest a total of four hundred seats in the coming election. She Party had to face a new political formation, headed by Lloyd George, a most astute politician. It was generally understood beforehand that the Coal- ition premier would make the most of his record as the man who had piloted the nation successfully through the war, and would appeal to the voters on the basis of patriotism, with reference to the pacifism and defeatism of the Labor Party. Por, as the forces lined up before the election, it became evident that Labor would be the most important single independent element. She Conservatives prac- tically dominated the Coalition, and were whole-heartedly for its continuance; the Liberals were split, half of them throwing in their 3-ot with the Coalition, and the remainder following the independent leadership of Mr . Asquith. In view of these facts, it is little wonder that Labor was con- siderably disappointed in the results of the election. Phe contest was fought while pride in the nation’s successful emergence from the war was still high, and while people were still praising Lloyd George as the war leader, and it was only too easy to remember the attitude of Macdonald, Snowden, and other labor leaders who had favored peace by negotiation. Phe result of the election was an overwhelming victory for the Coalition, the Labor Party running a total of three hundred and sixty-one candidates, and returning a total of fifty-nine members. P'he total vote in the election was 9,690,109, of which Labor polled 2,575,222, or about one-fourth. Phe vote of the rival organization, the National Democratic Party, ■ i - 89 . 1 . was 161,521. further analysis makes out a rather more hopeful case for Labor. The remnant of the Liberals, under the leadership of Mr. Asquith, secured less than half as many representatives as the Labor Party, which thereupon became the most numerous minority party in the House, and were officially designated as His Majesty's Opposi- 2 . tion. Unfortunately, among those who went down under the avalanche of anti-pacifist votes were the most experienced and able parlia- mentarians in the Party, such as Henderson, Macdonald, Snowden, W. C. Anderson, and E. W. Jowett. Henderson has since regained his seat at a bye-election, but Macdonald, one of the original leaders of the Party, has not, up to the present, succeeded in getting into the House, though he has Since made the effort at bye-elections. The total vote, which was around ten millions, was only about half of the estimated potential maximum under the new franchise lav;. Of these, Labor polled roughly one-fourth, and should have had, it was estimated, on a proportional basis, at least one hundred and twenty-five representatives. P'he Coalition, polling not greatly in excess of fifty per cent, of the total vote, secured an overwhelming majority in the House. One other element which might have been a 1 . -Districts in; which the Labor candidate lost by a majority of less than one thousand were as follows: London and environs: Poplar Division of Bow and Bromley, Stepney Division of Whitechapel and St. George's; urban communities: Barrow-in- Furness, East Division of Bradford, East Division of Leyton, Rossendale, Hanley Division of Stoke-on-Trent, South Division of Tottenham; county districts: Camborne Division of Cornwall, Consett, Durham, and Sedgefield Divisions of Durham, Horth- East Division of Derbyshire, St. Albans Division of Hertford- shire, Earmworth Division of Lancashire, King's Lynn Division of Norfolk , Peterborough Division of Northamptonshire, Erome Division of Somerset, Cleveland and Sowerby Divisions of York- shire; Scotland: Dundee, Shettleston Division of Glasgow, Bothwell Division of Lanarkshire. Total, twenty-three . 2. -S. and B. Webb, op. cit., p. 699. 90 . potent factor in the election, though just what its effect would have "been it is useless to conjecture, is the fact that only a very small percentage of the soldier vote was cast. As for the national Democratic and Labor Party, it ran a total of thirty candidates and secured some ten seats, their greatest success consisting in their president’s defeat of Arthur Henderson. Third Phase: Contemporary Politics. The events which have transpired since the Armistice and the last general election seem confused and somewhat contradictory. During the past thirty months the fortunes of Labor politically have fluctuated rather violently. The immediate result of the election was, very naturally, a feeling of injustice and disappointment over the results of the election; it was felt that there was something very radically wrong with a system in which one party polled a vote five-eighths as large as that of another, and only secured one- eighth as many representatives. For a time Labor seemed to lose interest in the political situation, and was agsin attracted by the possibility of using direct industrial action in order to attain its ends. Its attentions were devoted rather more to foreign affairs than had been the case in the past. A rapid review of its stand in particular instances will perhaps serve to make clear the general principles lying' back of its attitude toward foreign relations: As for Germany, the Labor Party took the stand that the war was a thing of the past, and that the best thing for all concerned was a restoration of good feeling and a complete renewal of economic relations with the defeated nation. The Southport Conference of the Labor Party (1919) heartily applauded a speech of Hamsay Macdonald's 91. in which he demanded a real league of nations providing for a mem- hership for Germany; and passed an anti-blockade resolution with 1 . only one dissenting vote. Several of the most interesting of the developments in the Labor situation have arisen out of the Russian Revolution and the condi- tions to which it has given rise. The first crisis occurred in the summer of 1919, over the issue of English participation in the Allied aid for counter-revolutionary forces in Russia. The extreme position was well stated at the Southport Conference by Heil Maclean, M.P., as follows: ■ "Ho war has been declared on Russia. Ho war credits have been voted. The war is unconstitutional on the part of the Government. We are in the war because 1,600 millions of British capital is in- vested in Russia. Three Cabinet ministers. Sir Eric Ged&es, Austen Chamberlain, and Walter Long, have money invested in Russia, and wish Xoltchak to win. Our troops use weapong made by British arm- ament firms who have money invested in Russia, the Birmingham Small Arms Company among them. In the House of Commons men who call the Labor Party Bolshevik hold shares in Russian companies, and allow the boys of the working class to be sent to fight for their capital. The dowager Empress of Russia can enter this country without difficulty, but labor's two delegates from Prance are turned back. As between the Czarist, Xoltchak, and Bolshevik regime, I stand by the Bolshevik regime. So I call on Labor to assist those of us who are in the House of Commons, who wish to 2 . withdraw out troops." 1. -A. Gleason, op. cit., pp. 92-95. 2. -Ibid., pp. 98-99. 92 . The Conference voted for direct action on the Russian situation, 1 . if necessary, hy a total of 1,893,000 to 935,000. The Conference also called for immediate cessation of Allied operations in Russia, and instructed their Executive to confer with the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress "with a view to effective action "being taken to force these demands hy the unreserved use of 2 . their political and industrial power". The moderate element, inclu- ding Clynes and Henderson, opposed the use of direct action, reminding the Conference that minority violence is a dangerous precedent to he set hy a body which hopes in the near future to form a Government. Another serious situation developed a year later, in connection with the Polish war. Previous to this event, however, in the spring of 1920, the Labor Party had sent a commission to Russia which had, upon its return, recommended that British Labor demand the removal of the blockade, the cessation of intervention schemes, the resto- ration of communication, and unconditional recognition of the 3. Soviet Government by England. In spite of its sympathetic attitude toward Russia, the Labor Party cannot be said to be Bolshevist. Its leaders have practically all repudiated the extremes of the Bolshevik doctrines. The Inde- pendent Labor Party, on the extreme left, had refused, at its 1920 Conference at Glasgow, to affiliate with the Moscow Internationale 4 . by a vote of 472 to 206. Both Snowden and Macdonald, leaders of the 1. -A Gleason, op, cit., p. 105. 2. -J. 3. Firth, Labor and the State . in the Fortnightly Review for August, 1919, pp. 187-200. S.-Cf. article British Labor Reports on Russia , in the Ration for July 10, 1920, p. 53. 4.-Y. Fisher, Where Is Labor Going? in the nineteenth Century for May , 1920, pp. 916-928. 93 left wing, were opposed to violent revolution and proletarian dic- tatorship. The British Socialist Party is the only constituent body to which the epithet of Bolshevik can he applied with any degree of justice, and its total membership is only about two thousand. The Labor Party as a whole still adheres to the Second Internationale . But to return to the Russian situation: In midsummer of 1920, when the Poles were being forced back toward Warsaw in a precipitate retreat, and there was considerable talk of Allied intervention to save them from disaster, Labor again took action. The Labor leaders agreed with the Allied governments that an independent Poland was essential, but they deniec. that Poland was in danger. A joint labor conference was again convened, and again the problem of direct action came up. The conference approved direct action in case of emergency, even Thomas and Clynes, the moderate leaders, concurring in the use of the weapon, except as concerned domestic issues. The conference passed the following resolution: "That the Council of Action is hereby authorized to take any steps that may be necessary to give effect to the decisions of this conference and the declared policy of the Trade union ana Labor Movement. "The conference also recommends that the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress should raise a special fund to meet the financial requirements of the Council of Action and for this purpose impose a levy equal to a half-penny per member upon affiliated 1 . organizations as and when required." 1*-V. Pisher, Labor Evolution and Social Revolution , in the lineteenth Century for October, 1920, pp. 595-606. 94 . The threat implied in the institution of a Council of Action was never put to the test, for Polish fortunes of war took a sudden turn for the “better, and Allied intervention was unnecessary. Critics disagree, of course, as to the potency of Labor's warning. Defenders of the Government claim that the Party was fighting enemies that did not exist, inasmuch as Lloyd George had no inten- tions of committing the nation to war with Russia. Harold Laski , on the other hand, declared that Labor had averted war with Russia by its action, Laski admitted that direct action was constitutional usurpation, but declared that no one any longer respected Parlia- 1 . ment . These instances are typical of the spirit of Labor in foreign affairs. The Party has at the present time a very able Advisory Committee on International Relations, and is exceptionally well- informed. They have not relied on haphazard sources of information, but have usually dispatched their own investigating commissions, so that they might have first-hand, dependable knowledge of conditions in foreign nations. Their attitude toward imperial problems has been similarly open-minded and disinterested. They have advocated home rule for India and virtual independence for Egypt. The Irish problem, naturally, presented rather greater difficulties. Labor members have always favored Irish home rule, ever since the question was first seriously agitated, thirty-five years ago. In the crisis of 1918, when the Government wished to pass a simul- taneous home rule-conscription bill for Ireland, the Labor members had objected. J. H. Thomas made a visit to Ireland to investigate l.-H. J. Laski, British Labor and Direct Action , in the Hat ion for September 11, 1920, pp. 291-292. , ' 4 95 . conditions for himself, and returned favoring home rule, hut not at the price of conscription. Some two years later, the Labor Party 1 . sent to Ireland a Commission, consisting of Arthur Henderson, William Anderson, and H. S. Lindsay. These men took the stand that partition would furnish no remedy for Ireland’s ills, and suggested instead a full Dominion self-government, -with protection for minor- ities; defense and foreign affairs to he taken care of hy an Imperial Parliament; the form of government to he chosen hy a Con- stituent Assembly, representing all the people, elected on a basis of proportional representation. They disclaimed all responsibility on the part of Labor for the state of affairs in Ireland. Acting on the report of its Commission, the Party reiterated its belief in self-determination, but stated its belief that there should be at least a link between Ireland and England. The Party did not go quite so far as the Commission in their recommendations, but de- clared rather for a constitution to be conferred upon Ireland, not to be subject to change for an agreed number of years. It would seem from this that not even Labor could bring itself to contem- plate with equanimity the prospect of an independent Ireland. A special conference of the Trades Union Congress in July, 1920, de- clared by a large majority, for direct action to force the Govern- ment to change its Irish policy, but nothing seems to have come of 2 . the matter. The Westminster Conference of the Labor Party, meeting December 29, 1920, passed a resolution on Ireland, calling for judicial inquiry of reprisals, and condemned Sinn Eein outrages and 1. -Cf. article, Ireland and British Labor . in the Hat ion for April 10, 1920, p. 450. 2. -G. D. H. Cole, Bri tish Labor Hesitates , in the ITew Republic for September ? 29 , 1920, .pp. 121-125. ■ ' $ t • . 96. 1 . and reprisals both. In domestic affairs the past few months have added greatly to the strength of the labor movement, at least as far as its trades union basis is concerned. The trades union movement is now estima- ted to have a total membership of upwards of six millions, which, considering the families of the men, represents roughly half the population of Great Britain. The actual paid-up membership of the Labor Party as announced at the June Conference, in 1919, totalled 3,015,129, 7/hich represented a net gain of a half million over the 2 . m vote registered by the Party six months before. The trades unions furnished ninety-nine per cent, of the membership, the, Socialist societies aggregating 52,720 members (a large number of these being likewise trades unionists). At the Scarborough Conference, a year later, the Party membership 7/as estimated at 3,500,000, represent- 3. ing a further gain of a half million during the intervening year. By that time the Party was organized in nine-tenths of the five hundred and eighty constituencies, and had three hundred candidates in readiness for the next general election, with a probability of running five hundred altogether. nevertheless, Labor was politically v/eak during this period. Its successes were due largely to the natural swing of the political pendulum, and to the v/idespread discontent with the existing Govern- ment. The Parliamentary group representing the Party was the weak- est in political ability that had as yet sat in the House of Com- mons, deprived as they were by the fortunes of the election, of 1 . - Labour Gazette for January, 1921, p. 10. 2. -A. Gleason, op. cit., pp. 251-252. 3 . -Y/ebb , S., British Labor in Conference , in the ITew Republic for August’ 11, 1920, pp. 307-309. 97 . their leaders. The Parliament of 1919 was a great disappointment to Labor. Luring that year and the year following there occurred a number of strikes in the country. The causes of unrest we re numer- ous: dissatisfaction over the unfair result of the election of 1918, Lloyd George's attack on the Labor men as Bolshevists, unemploy- ment, the Government's reversion to an individualistic policy, the fact that there seemed to be no definite policy of demobilization, continuance of conscription, failure of the Government to withdraw war restrictions soon enough, delay and evasion on the question of 1 . nationalization of railways, profiteering, and war restlessness. The tendency toward the left was strongly evident in these days. The movement in favor of direct industrial action has already been noticed; it grew in strength until it finally received the sanction not only of the Labor Party, but even of the more slowly moving Trades Union Congress, as regards certai n foreign problems : in domestic affairs the moderate, constitutional influence of Henderson, Clynes, and Thomas kept direct action out of the program of Labor. Efforts at industrial reform were redoubled, in spite of the Government's unfavorable attitude. Foremost among these efforts was the institution of the Sankey Coal Commission. Phis Commission differed from its predecessors in that it was a statutory commission rather than a Royal Commission. As Lloyd George himself said, "A royal commission would not anSY/er the purpose; it v/ould not have the necessary powers . We have decided to have a statutory commission with authority of Parliament behind it, with the same power as now rests in a court of justice." The Government v/as pledged to make its 1. -A. Gleason, op. cit., pp. 251-252. 2. -Ibid, p. 40. 98 . findings lav; on wages and hours. The Commission compelled some of the leading capitalists of the country to. give evidence vefore it as to prices and profits. The miners' cause was in the hands of three miners, Robert Smillie, Herbert Smith, and Prank Hodges, and three expert advisers, Sidney Webb, Sir Leo Chiozza Honey, and R. H. Tawney; and even Conservative organs admitted, with annoyance, that their case was much more efficiently presented than was that of the capitalists, who v/ere represented by three coal owners, J. T. Porgie, R. W. Cooper, and Evan Williams, and their three advisers, Arthur Balfour, Sir Arthur Buckram, and Sir Thomas Roy den. Hr. Justice Sankey, in charge of the Commission, eventually threw in his 1 . ballot with the miners, and the resultant report not only made re- commendations on hours and wages, but came out strongly for nation- 2 . alization. Lloyd George has since refused to be bound by that section of the report, and Labor now has it as one of its objectives to force the Government to take that stand. Lloyd George was also, at one time, quite favorable to the project of the nationalization of railways, but he also retreatec from that position. 1. -Por Report of the Sankey Commission, see A. Gleason, op. cit.. Appendix, Section 4, p. 422 et sec. 2. -It must be remembered that the term na tionalization now has a somewhat different connotation from what it formerly had. nationalization, in the sense in which British Labor uses the term, does not mean simply state socialistic ownership and bureaucratic control of the mines, but means rather that the actual title to the properties is vested in the state, while control is in the hands of the miners themselves. Of late there has arisen another term in connection with coal disputes, pooling of profits, which means virtually operating the coal industry as a unit as far as profits are concerned, so that wages will not be regulated, as they have been in the past, by the amount that the least produc- tive mine can afford to pay, but rather by the average; the workers also hope by this method to eliminate the tremendous differential profits accruing to the owners of the most pro- ductive properties under the individualistic scheme at present in vogue . v_0 99 . labor's reform efforts in other directions seem to have made but little impression as yet. It has repeatedly proclaimed its position on financial reform, but the Government is not very likely to take action on it for some time to come. As to the franchise, the Party, though elated over the reform of 1918, would prefer further changes, with greater leniency in the matter of residence requirements, since labor is necessarily a more or less mobile element of the population. While the study of bye-elections may afford a rather uncertain basis for prediction, still it must be admitted that those which have occurred since 1918 at least demonstrate the growing unpopu- larity of the Coalition Government. In the first seventeen bye-elec- tions since the general election, the Coalition vote has totalled 136,917, or forty-three per cent, of the total vote; the anti- Coalition vote has been 178,186, or fifty-seven per cent. In these elections the Coalition has lost sis seats. Ten independent Liber- als competed, with an average vote of 6,024; sixteen Coalition candidates averaged 8,558; and the twelve Labor candidates who ran 1 . had an average vote of 9,482. The Labor Party would have contested a greater number of these elections had it not been for a shortage of funds. As it was, Labor increased its representation to sixty- two. In the most recent months, however, the Party seems to have lost some of its popularity. The inability of the former leaders, such as Macdonald and Snowden, to regain their seats, is a dis- couraging sign. The most recent defeat of Macdonald in the bye- election at Woolwich, which had for a long time been a Labor strong- l.-S. Webb, Portent of Spen Valiev . in the ITem Republic for February 4, 1920, pp. 285-288. ' . - 100 . hold, indicates that a great many people still remember with resent- ment the pacifist attitude of several of the Labor Party's ablest leaders during the war. And even so sympathetic a critic as kt. 1 . Harold Laski , writing from London less than six months ago, gave it as his opinion that the movement is just at present on the de- cline, as compared w ith that it had been one year previously. A Labor Government, according to this observer, instead of being the likely successor to the present Government, will probably not arrive for ten years yet. The reasons he gives for the situation are as follows: the impotence of the Labor M.P.'s, their inex- pertness in debate, and their apparent indifference; the fact that the wrong men have been chosen to lead Labor; the aggressive counter-offensive of capitalism; and the fact that Labor has no effective official organ. The future of the British Labor Party looks cloudy and uncer- tain. It se~ms probable that the time will come when there will be a Labor Government, but whether that time will be 1925 or 1950 it is, of course , impossible to forecast. At the present time, it seems doubtful whether the gains due to the new form of organization adopted in 1918 are not somewhat offset by a loss of solidarity. J. E. Thomas recently complained that the Labor Party could no longer command the loyalty of its own members. The present Y/eakness of the Party seems to lie in the problem of organization, and in the question of finances. It may be said that both the strength and the weakness of the l.-H. J. Laski, British Labor ' s future , in the Survey for February 26, 1921, pp . 7S5-75&. 101 . political labor movement is its trade union basis. Of course the trades unions furnish the great organized mass of voters; but politically they are slow moving and jealous of their own preroga- tives. They prefer to run their own candidates for election, rather than to vote for some middle class intellectual or Socialist on the Labor ticket; which is entirely within their rights, of course, but unfortunately for the cause of Labor, they usually select one of their trades union officials, President or Secretary, and these men, in many eases, have no particular ability. Moreover, the unions, in many cases, retain these men in their executive rela- tionship to their unions, and so their attentions and activities are divided between their two duties, instead of being concentrated toward securing the greatest efficiency in the House'. They dare not resign their union offices, not only because it would tend to es- trange them from their constituencies, but also because these offices carry with them a salary, and most of the Labor M.P.'s are so situated financially that they cannot afford to rely on their po itical fortunes for a livelihood. Moreover, the executive author- ity of the labor movement has been so split up betv/een the three bodies, the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress, the national Executive of the Labor Party, and the Parliamentary Party, that considerable confusion of policy and lack of harmony and cooperation between them has resulted, in spite of the forma- tion of a Joint Board to coordinate their efforts. Another serious weakness which seriously hampers the effective- ness of the Party is its lack of sufficient funds. The sums afforded by the comparatively insignificant levy of twopence per member per year are entirely inadequate to supply the needs of a national 102 . party which proposes to contest practically every constituency in the country in the next general election. The number of candidates entered in the 1918 election had to he cut down, the number of bye-elections contested was curtailed, and recently Sidney '7 ebb has written that it is probable that funds will be insufficient to finance the number of candidates that the Party wishes to run in the next general election. The Scarborough Conference of the Party 1 . in 1920 raised the affiliation fee of the Party fifty per cent. Some have hoped that the accession of the Cooperative movement might mean the possibility of drawing upon their large financial reserves for political purposes, but this seems to be a rather remote possibility, and it must be admitted that the financial problem is a serious one which shows no signs of solution as yet. Another weakness charged to the account of Labor is that the Party lacks the requisite leadership to conduct a Government, should the verdict of the polls call upon them to do so. Just at present this point seems to be worked mainly by Liberal publicists who are anxious to arrange a new Liberal-Labor alliance, in which the Liberal Party would furnish the necessary leadership, to be swept into power on the Labor vote. But it would seem that there is plenty of effective and able leadership in the Labor movement, provided only that labor can be persuaded to select the right men. \ It seems especially unlikely that Labor, having attained its present strength unaided, would novr consent to share the fruits of a political victory with the Liberal Party. A general realignment of political forces in the country is probable, however, before l.-S. Y/ebb, British Labor in Conference , in the Hew Republic for August 11, 1920, pp . 507-309. 103 . another general election occurs. On the whole, the British Labor Party seems to have been a stimulating, clarifying influence in British politics of the last twenty years. Labor has formed a very real interest group, as compared with the older political parties of the nineteenth Cen- tury. There are those, of course, who claim that it is purely a class movement; it would seem that recent reorganizations would go far to refute such a charge, but even if it were admitted, the Labor Party might retort that all government is more or less class rule, whether the ruling influence be recognized or not. The Party had become increasingly Socialistic, it is true; but the charge of Socialism is not in itself an argument; and even the most anti-Socialistic who yet subscribe to the principles of democracy and majority rule cannot conscientiously charge with malice and perfidy a majority which proceeds, by regular, constitutional procedure, to enforce a program with which we may disagree. And, though the British do not initiate their reforms suddenly and with violence, it must be admitted that the availability of the consti- tutional weapon was a powerful offsetting influence to the growth of syndicalism and the idea of direct industrial action. Even now the struggle between the two modes of procedure rages, and it is to be sincerely hoped that the next election, however it may go, will at least reflect the opinion of the country with greater justice than did the last one, in order that the extremists may be deprived of the apparent justification for direct action that they are using so effectively to-day. The labor movement in Great Britain is better organized politically and industrially than anywhere else in the world; it is well within the range of possibilities that 104 . within the next few years Great Britain may have a Labor Govern- ment; hut it is well to remember that in the past, as it has been admitted to power, Labor has adopted a more moderate and cautious tone; her most moderate leaders to-day are constitutionalists; in view of these facts, therefore, and considering the British genius for compromise and reform by degrees, there is little reason to fear, in the eventuality of a Labor Government, any violent over- turning of existing institutions, but rather we may expect a steady, gradual process of reform which shall in time bring about far- reaching and fundamental changes in the social and political status of the country. 105 . BIBLIOGRAPHY. I. Source Material. House of Lords: Lav/ Reports, Appeal Cases. The Labour Gazette, London. 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