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 GREAT BRITAIN, 
 EGYPT, 
 
 THE SUEZ CANAL 
 
 BY 
 
 ADMIRAL THE HON. F. EGERTON, M.P. 
 
 W. RATHBONE, M.P. 
 
 C. M, NORWOOD, M.P. 
 
 Honlron : 
 
 CHAPMAN AND HALL, Limited, 
 
 II, Henrietta Street. 
 
 1884. 
 
 (f
 
 CHARLES DICKENS AND EVANS, CRYSTAL PALACK PRESS.
 
 EGYPT. THE SUEZ CANAL, 
 
 AND INDIA- 
 
 In the accompanying Papers, we have not touched upon the question 
 of the duties and responsibilities of England in Egypt. We have only 
 attempted to deal with the permanent interests • of England, commercial 
 and naval, in Egypt and the Suez Canal, and with their comparative value 
 to England and other countries as a means of transporting produce, soldiers, 
 and stores — a subject on which much ignorance and many misconceptions 
 exist. 
 
 F. EGERjrON, Vice-Admiral. 
 
 w. ratf:bone. 
 
 C. M. NOP.WOOD. 
 
 London, ^l/^ty, 1SS4.
 
 GREAT BRITAIN, EGYPT, 
 
 AND 
 
 THE SUEZ CANAL. 
 
 The Naval Aspect, 
 
 Considering the Suez Canal from the point of view of a 
 naval man, I think it clear that England may be drawn 
 into a dangerous position by too great reliance upon it, 
 especially, of course, in the case of a great majritime war, 
 but even in that of war with one maritime Power. And if 
 the Canal is an untrustworthy instrument in case of war, is 
 that a fact which is much to be regretted ? I think not. 
 If we accept its untrustworthiness as a fact, and make up 
 our minds to invest, probably a small percentage of what 
 some advisers would have us spend on " strengthening our 
 position in Egypt,'' on a well-considered increase of our 
 naval forces, and of such appliances at home and abroad 
 .as would enable us best to use them, I think the result 
 would be eminently beneficial for England. 
 
 Nobody disputes the advantages of the Canal in time 
 of peace, or for such operations as those of the Abyssinian 
 war, involving no international difficulties. But how would 
 it be under the circumstances of war with one or more 
 •maritime Powers ? Our naval and military authorities 
 
 A 2
 
 4 GREAT BRITAIN, EGYPT, AND THE SUEZ CANAL. 
 
 would, I think, be justified in great hesitation in trusting 
 the transit of store-ships, troop-ships, or even of small 
 vessels of war, to the dangers of the Mediterranean passage, 
 with its coasts affording points d'appin for the torpedo 
 vessels and armed cruisers of an enemy. And still less 
 might they think themselves entitled to venture any 
 considerable expedition into the culs de sac either of the 
 Mediterranean or of the Red Sea, in the uncertainty as to 
 whether on arrival at the isthmus it would find its road 
 clear, for I take it as indubitable that the Canal could be 
 blocked if a Power at war with us thought fit to do so. 
 Of course it may be urged that we ought to hold Egypt, 
 or at least so much of it as would ensure our passage. 
 That opens a political question which it is not my business 
 to discuss, but even were we so to decide, and act on the 
 decision, I doubt if even under that condition we could be 
 sure of our ability to secure the passage at all times ; and 
 though, no doubt, whatever might be the means taken for 
 blocking the Canal we could eventually clear it, the danger 
 consists in the suddenness with which the mischief might 
 be done at a critical moment. There is also the minor 
 point that we would be unwilling to use the Canal for 
 warlike purposes, such as the passage of ships of war, on 
 account of the international difficulties which might arise. 
 Our fleet, if only it be made strong enough for the purpose, 
 would be better employed in clearing the seas outside the 
 Canal than in guarding its passage. 
 
 F. EGERTON. 
 
 ^^\ 
 
 ^ UiUC ' 
 
 \ /
 
 The Political and Commercial Aspect, 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN AND THE SUEZ CANAL. 
 
 (Reprinted from the Fortnightly Review^ August, 1882.) 
 
 At this moment the attention of all Europe is fixed upon 
 the course of events in Egypt. The Egyptian policy of our 
 Government, a matter of deep interest to all the great States 
 of Europe, is doubly interesting to us, the citizens of the 
 United Kingdom. Men entertain different opinions as to 
 what that policy should be, but each would justify his 
 opinion by referring to the vital interests of our Empire in 
 the East. One question has been hotly discussed, the 
 question whether any special interest of England, apart 
 from the rest of Europe, binds us to follow the perilous 
 course entered on by Lord Salisbury, to continue his co- 
 partnership with France in the management of Egyptian 
 affairs, a course leading to impossible positions, a co- 
 partnership dangerous to international amity ; or whether 
 we are free to carry out a policy which, in the hands of 
 the Liberal Government, has elsewhere proved so successful, 
 the policy of settling those affairs in concert with the other 
 Powers of Europe, who are equally interested in them. The
 
 6 GREAT BRITAIN, EGYPT, AND 
 
 latter seems to me the calm, dignified policy of a nation 
 strong in its own position and in the consciousness of its 
 own power; the former seems the fussy and timorous 
 policy of a Government afraid of everybody, and, there- 
 fore, meddling with everything. 
 
 Most people seem to believe that we have in Egypt 
 a vital interest which we are bound, more than other 
 nations, to defend, in the free and unrestricted use of the 
 Suez Canal. Few seem disposed to question the doctrine 
 that the open passage through the Suez Canal is indis- 
 pensable to the commercial prosperity, to the political 
 greatness, and to the very integrity of the British Empire. 
 
 An attempt, then, to demonstrate the fallacy of the 
 popular idea that through Egypt and the Suez Canal 
 Our enemies can strike at our mercantile greatness and 
 at our imperial power, is not likely to meet with a 
 favourable hearing. Yet I hope to show this, and 
 illustrate it from my own personal experience. And 
 if it can be done, it is worth trying to do it. For it 
 is of the utmost consequence that we should all under- 
 stand our real stake in the Suez Canal. This once 
 clearly understood, we shall not be liable to panic; 
 we shall not let ourselves be drawn into complications^, 
 wasteful of the blood of our citizens and the substance 
 of our country ; complications^ moreover, which constantly 
 expose us to the danger of becoming involved in a 
 European war. 
 
 I do not for a moment wish to depreciate the enormous
 
 THE SUEZ CANAL, 7 
 
 advantage which the Suez Canal has conferred upon 
 producers and consumers both in Asia and in Europe, 
 upon our fellow-subjects in India, and upon our own 
 people at home. The Suez Canal is one of the noblest 
 works of modern enterprise and modern science, and I 
 regret that any English statesman should have opposed 
 its construction. It has been of the utmost value to the 
 general commerce of the world. Its maintenance is, in 
 this sense, an interest common to all nations, and especially 
 to all commercial nations. But when people attempt 
 to make out that the formation of the Suez Canal 
 has in any way promoted our commercial prepon- 
 derance, or that our commercial preponderance could 
 be destroyed by its destruction, or that ^e are any 
 longer dependent on it for the rapid transfer of men and 
 material of war from England to India, it can be shown 
 from the actual results which have attended the opening 
 of the Canal, from the history of commerce, and from the 
 present power pi our commercial marine, that they are 
 mistaken. The Suez Canal has not improved the com- 
 mercial position of England relatively to that of other 
 Powers; it has done just the contrary. Let us ask, 
 What are already the established results of this great 
 work ? 
 
 Let us take a most important trade, the business of 
 supplying East India cotton to the manufacturers of the 
 Continent. I will give the history of East India cotton 
 intended for the supply of a, say, Austrian manufacturer
 
 8 GREAT BRITAIN, EGYPT, AND 
 
 some forty years ago and at the present time. At that 
 time cotton came down from the interior of India on 
 bullock-carts, each cart carrying four bales. A native 
 merchant, generally a Parsee, collected and assorted the 
 cotton, and shipped it under advances from an English 
 merchant in Bombay, who charged 2^ per cent, for 
 so doing. It was carried by an English wooden sailing 
 ship to England, consigned to an English merchant 
 in Liverpool or London, who stored it in an 
 English warehouse, insured it with an English assurance 
 company, and sold it with a commission of 2>^ per 
 cent, to another Liverpool or London merchant. The 
 latter purchased it under orders for, say, an Austrian 
 manufacturer, to whom he charged a further commission 
 of 2 per cent, for his trouble. Each of these merchants 
 received thus a handsome commission, and the English 
 warehouse owner, assurance company, and labourer were 
 in turn paid for their services. Then the cotton was 
 shipped on an English sailing ship or steam-vessel for 
 Trieste, whence it was finally forwarded for the manu- 
 facturer's use. 
 
 Now all these operations, profitable to English mer- 
 chants, shipowners, labourers, and others, have in most 
 cases ceased ; and the Austrian manufacturer can and does 
 contract with a Bombay house through its European agent 
 for the shipment direct from Bombay to Trieste of the 
 required bales of cotton. Some of this cotton, it is true, 
 is still carried by an English ship, but for a much shorter
 
 THE SUEZ CANAL. 9 
 
 distance and for a small fraction of the freight formerly 
 charged. I need not add that even for this fragment of 
 the old traffic the energetic Mediterranean shipowner 
 competes severely with the shipowner of our own 
 country. For the Mediterranean shipowner has the 
 advantage of being present in person at one end of 
 the voyage to watch with a master's eye the disburse- 
 ments, the condition of his vessels, and the conduct 
 and management of his captains and his crews. 
 
 What has been said of our Austrian competitor 
 holds no less true of all our other competitors on the 
 Continent. What has happened in the cotton trade 
 has happened in other trades. Tea, for instance, now 
 comes direct from China to Russia. In my •early days 
 London was the centre of the Eastern silk trade. The 
 silk of China and of India came to London, and was 
 thence distributed over Europe. Formerly this was one 
 of the most profitable branches of our business. Since 
 the opening of the Suez Canal, Lyons has succeeded 
 London as the capital market for the silk of the East. 
 But, with regard to silk, the Suez Canal perhaps did 
 no more than assist a process already begun. Being so 
 valuable an article, it was, to a considerable extent, 
 brought across the Isthmus previous to the opening of 
 the Canal. What Trieste and Lyons have gained at 
 the expense of London and Liverpool, that Havre, 
 Marseilles, and Odessa have gained too. To complain 
 of all this would be ridiculous. That it should be so
 
 lo GREAT BRITAIN, EGYPT, AND 
 
 is perfectly right. But it is also ridiculous to say in the 
 face of these facts that the opening of the Suez Canal 
 has specially benefited the commercial interests of 
 England as compared with other nations. On the con- 
 trary, it has favoured those nations at our expense, and 
 the freedom of the Canal means more to them than it 
 does to us. 
 
 It would be most unfair, however, to attribute exclu- 
 sively to the Suez Canal the disappearance of so many 
 intermediate agencies between the Indian producer and 
 the European consumer. At the present day there is in 
 all trades a tendency to bring the producer and the 
 consumer into more immediate connection. But what 
 the Suez Canal has done is to stimulate and accelerate 
 this tendency, and to transfer the remaining agency 
 between producer and consumer from England, once 
 the centre and depot of the commerce between Asia and 
 Europe, to the ports and cities of the Mediterranean. 
 
 A short historical retrospect will place this matter 
 in a clearer light, and may serve to show that the changes 
 in commerce which have followed upon the opening of 
 the Suez Canal are not accidental or irregular, but are 
 rather the first effects of causes which will operate in 
 the future constantly and with accumulated force. 
 
 The opening of the Suez Canal has exactly reversed 
 what took place when the route round the Cape of 
 Good Hope was substituted for the overland routes 
 between Europe and the East. These overland routes
 
 THE SUEZ CANAL. n 
 
 in the fourteenth century seem to have been principally 
 three. One of these routes passed through Egypt; 
 another ran through Bagdad and Tabreez to the ports 
 of Antloch and Seleucia ; whilst the third traversed the 
 highlands of Armenia and terminated at Trebizond. 
 Western Asia, although it had declined from its former 
 prosperity, was still rich, populous, and fairly well culti- 
 vated. Alexandria was then, what it has become once 
 more, a great emporium of Oriental merchandise, and 
 Constantinople was not inferior to Alexandria. From 
 the ports of Egypt and Asia Minor that merchandise 
 passed over to the West in the ships of Venice and 
 Genoa. From those cities it was distributed through 
 the Alpine passes to the Free Cities of Southern 
 Germany and the Rhine. In bulk, variety, and value, 
 it was insignificant indeed compared with the cargoes 
 that now pass through the Suez Canal. Yet how many 
 German and Italian cities owed to this toilsome Oriental 
 traffic their wealth and magnificence ? Professor Thorold 
 Rogers brings this out clearly in his most interesting 
 book on the " History of Agriculture and Prices in 
 England." He says : " In the fifteenth century such 
 towns as Nuremberg and Ratisbon, Mayence and 
 Cologne, were at the height of their opulence. The 
 waterway of the Rhine bears ineffaceable traces of the 
 wealth which was carried down it in the numerous 
 castles of the robber barons, the extirpation of whoixj 
 became the first object to which the resources of civilisa- 
 
 B 2
 
 12 GREAT BRITAIN, EGYPT, AND 
 
 tion were directed. The trade of the East enriched the 
 burghers of the Low Countries, till, after a long and 
 tedious transit, the abundant spices of the East, increased 
 in price a hundredfold by the tolls which rapacity exacted 
 and the profits which merchants imposed, were sold in 
 small parcels by the grocer or apothecary^ or purchased 
 in larger quantities by wealthy consumers, at the great 
 fair of Stourbridge or in the perpetual market of 
 London'' (Vol. iv., p. 654). 
 
 Then came a memorable revolution. Western Asia 
 was repeatedly ravaged by the Turkish and Tartar hordes. 
 In many rich, fertile, and famous countries the cultivated 
 lands returned to their primitive desolation ; great cities 
 shrank into miserable country towns, and the people sank 
 into an incurable and hopeless lethargy. The Christian 
 merchant found it more and more dangerous, less and less 
 profitable, to penetrate into the interior of Asia. At length 
 the Turkish conquerors reached the Bosphorus and the 
 Hellespont. The Greek Emperors gave place to the 
 Ottoman Sultans, and under their new masters the 
 Euxine and Asia Minor were closed to Christian com- 
 merce. From Constantinople the Ottomans spread their 
 conquests to the Danube on the one side, and the 
 Euphrates on the other. Finally Selim I. subdued 
 Mesopotamia, the holy cities of Arabia, and Egypt, 
 and stopped the last overland route a few years after 
 Vasco de Gama had discovered the passage round the
 
 THE SUEZ CANAL. 13 
 
 Cape of Good Hope. Professor Thorold Rogers has 
 shown with great fuhiess how Selim's conquest of Egypt 
 raised the price of almost every Oriental commodity 
 imported into Europe. The same conquest struck a 
 fatal blow at the greatness of many an Italian and 
 German city. From this epoch we may date the decline 
 of Venice, and Venice scarcely suffered more than 
 Ratisbon, Augsburg, and Nuremberg. There, for genera- 
 tions, many an untenanted palace, many a silent street, 
 reminded the traveller of that great change in the line 
 of Eastern commerce. 
 
 Then Portugal first, and afterwards England and 
 Holland, seized on the sea route to India, and on the 
 trafific of the East. England, who added to that rich 
 monopoly the Empire of India and of the seas, was 
 to Europe all that Venice and Genoa, Augsburg and 
 Nuremberg, had been ; and she was much more. But 
 the decline of the Ottoman Empire, followed by the 
 construction of the Suez Canal and of the Alpine tunnels, 
 has reopened the old path of commerce. The cities of 
 the Mediterranean are reviving. The Mediterranean 
 States have gained much and we have lost something, 
 even in the last few years ; and as time goes on they 
 will continue to gain and we to lose. Any one who 
 visited, as I did, the cities of Southern Europe forty 
 years ago, then cities of the dead, would hardly recognise 
 them now — all bustle, activity, and progress. But we
 
 14 GREAT BRITAIN, EGYPT, AND 
 
 must not forget that political freedom has had as much 
 effect as the return of Eastern commerce in the renewal 
 of their prosperity. 
 
 The English merchant is not so selfish as to complain 
 of a change which has benefited the producers and 
 consumers of the world. Instead of sitting down with 
 his hands before him, bemoaning his hard fate or living 
 upon a reduced trade, he has, as I shall indicate later 
 on, found out new trades, if not so profitable to in- 
 dividuals even more beneficial to mankind than those 
 which he has lost. 
 
 We shall be told, perhaps, to look at the immense 
 increase in the mercantile marine of England. That 
 increase has really had quite other causes. The inven- 
 tion of the compound steam-engine, which effected an 
 enormous saving of fuel, took place shortly before the 
 opening of the Suez Canal. One leaf out of the 
 experience of our own firm will serve to exemplify how 
 completely the carrying trade of the world was trans- 
 formed by this invention. A few years before the open- 
 ing of the Suez Canal we built and fitted with the 
 new compound engines a steamer intended for the 
 Alexandria trade. On her first voyage we found that, 
 with a consumption of fuel less by one-third, she carried 
 five hundred tons more of cargo than a steamer previously 
 built for the same trade. Such an economy of fuel 
 in proportion to cargo at once pointed to a revolution 
 in the carrying trade. It meant that in future all valuable
 
 THE SUEZ CANAL, 15 
 
 cargoes, at least, would be carried in iron steamers, not 
 as formerly, in wooden sailing ships. 
 
 Since the abolition of the Navigation Laws no ship- 
 owners in the world have been more energetic or enter- 
 prising than the British. Great Britain is the greatest iron 
 shipbuilding yard, and also the most active machine-shop, 
 in the world. London is the world's financial capital. To a 
 vigorous use of these advantages, and not to the construc- 
 tion of the Suez Canal, this country owes the unrivalled 
 development of her carrying trade. She has lost the large 
 profits derived from her former position as geographical 
 centre of the trade between Asia and Europe, but she has 
 found fresh trades and fresh industries. Instead of bringing 
 to England cotton and silk from India and (!hina to be 
 distributed over Europe, she brings millions of quarters of 
 grain grown by her subjects in India to feed her artisans 
 at home. Up to the present time she has even held 
 her own in the carrying trade between her Indian 
 possessions and the ports of the Mediterranean. Her 
 merchants have now lost many large profits once realised 
 by them, but she now has far more manufacturers, 
 merchants, and other traders who make moderate incomes. 
 Her political freedom, her freedom of trade, her enormous 
 capital, the energy, enterprise, and experience of her 
 ■citizens, have averted the fate which in similar circum- 
 stances overtook the great marts of mediaeval commerce. 
 And those beneficent Powers will continue to avert that 
 fate so long as her manufacturers, merchants, and other
 
 t6 great BRITAIN, EGYPT, AND 
 
 tradesmen retain their enterprise and integrity, her me- 
 chanical engineers their inventive skill, her artisans their 
 intelligence and industry. To these good qualities, and 
 to these fortunate circumstances, but not to the making 
 of the Suez Canal, she will owe her mercantile prosperity. 
 Had the Canal never been made she would have main- 
 tained that prosperity as fully and with less effort. It 
 is, therefore, as absurd for us to say, as it is undesirable 
 for foreigners to believe, that by closing the Canal they 
 can ruin the commerce of the United Kingdom. 
 
 Then as to the necessity to England of the Suez Canal 
 for the swift transport of men and munitions of war to 
 India, it would be most valuable, no doubt, in case of 
 mutiny in India unaccompanied by a European wan 
 But in case of any war in which a Mediterranean State 
 was concerned, I do not for a moment believe that the 
 Canal would be available. On this subject I would refer 
 to Mr. Caine's letter in the Daily News, and to Mr. 
 Norwood's full and carefully written letter to the Times 
 of the loth of July. In confirmation thereof I am advised 
 that there would be no difficulty in building transports 
 capable of performing the journey to Bombay by way 
 of the Cape in about thirty-one days, only four days 
 more than the time occupied by the steamers of the 
 Peninsular and Oriental Company in reaching the same 
 destination by way of the Canal. Our present troopships, 
 I believe, perform the shorter voyage in about thirty-one 
 days. The improved troopships would perform the
 
 THE SUEZ CANAL. 17 
 
 voyage through the Canal in shorter time, if no danger 
 or impediment lay in their course. But if we were at 
 war with a Mediterranean Power, they would be exposed 
 to such dangers in passing an enemy's shores through 
 those narrow seas^ they would be so much harassed by 
 gunboats and torpedo-vessels issuing from the enemy's 
 ports, that they would probably have to be placed under 
 convoys, which would counteract in point of speed any 
 advantage to be gained in going through the Canal. On 
 the other hand, while we control the high seas, such 
 swift and powerful transports would be dangerous to follow 
 and difficult to capture in mid-ocean, where our cruisers 
 would outnumber the cruisers of the enemy, and our ports 
 of refuge would be nearer than theirs. 
 
 These arguments seem to me to have a conclusive 
 bearing on our present position. It is not necessary for 
 the protection of our commerce, it is not essential to 
 our communication with India, that we should entangle 
 ourselves in a partnership with any single State in Europe 
 for the protection of peculiarly English interests. Surely 
 the present Government were amply justified in hesitating 
 to intervene in Egypt, in alliance with a single Power, 
 at any rate, before asking, in the first instance, for the 
 help of a European concert. I hope that they will take 
 the first opportunity of liberating themselves altogether 
 from the false system engendered by the suspicious fears 
 of their predecessors, by a timidity which led to alternate 
 displays of rashness and weakness. Such partnerships
 
 18 GREAT BRITAIN, EGYPT, AND 
 
 can lead us in the future only where they have led us 
 in the past, into positions which no Government, however 
 able or well-disposed, can maintain with credit or escape 
 from without either national misunderstandings or the 
 sacrifice of British wealth and British lives. That which 
 is really a European interest should be provided for by 
 European concert. Our experience in the Crimea might 
 have prevented the late Government from entering on 
 such a course in conjunction with a country whose policy 
 Was, and still is, in a state of constant change and 
 uncertainty. 
 
 WILLIAM RATHBONE. 
 
 P.S. — May, 1884. The following passages, taken from 
 an article by Mr. Gladstone, which appeared in the 
 ''Nineteenth Century" (No. 6), for August, 1877, put 
 the permanent interests of England in this question so 
 clearly that they will be read with interest now : — 
 
 Lastly, that I myself approach the question (Mr. 
 Dicey's proposal that England should take possession of 
 the Delta of Egypt) under adverse prepossessions. It 
 is my firm conviction, derived, I think, from my political 
 ^pastors and masters/ and confirmed by the facts of 
 much experience, that, as a general rule, enlargements 
 of the Empire are for us an evil fraught with serious, 
 though possibly not with immediate danger. I do not
 
 THE SUEZ CANAL. 19 
 
 affirm that they can always be avoided ; but, that they 
 should never be accepted except under circumstances of a 
 strict and jealously examined necessity. I object to them 
 because they are rarely efifected except by means that are 
 more or less questionable, and that tend to compromise 
 British character in the judgment of the impartial world ; 
 a judgment, which I hope will grow from age to age more 
 and more operative in imposing moral restraint on the 
 proceedings of each particular State. I object to them, 
 because we already have our hands too full. We have 
 undertaken responsibilities of government such as never 
 were assumed before in the whole history of the world. 
 The cares of the governing body in the Roman Empire, 
 with its compact continuity of ground, were light in 
 comparison with the demands now made upon the 
 Parliament and Executive of the United Kingdom. 
 Claims made, and gallantly, or confidently at least, con- 
 fronted, yet not adequately met. We, who hail with 
 more than readiness annexations and other transactions 
 which extend and complicate our responsibilities abroad, 
 who are always ready for a new task, yet leave many of the 
 old tasks undone. Forty years have passed since it was 
 thought right to reform fundamentally our municipal 
 corporations ; but the Corporation of London, whose case 
 called out for change much more loudly than any other, 
 we have not yet had time or strength to touch. Our 
 currency, our local government, our liquor laws, portions 
 even of our taxation, remain in a state either positively 
 discreditable, or at the least inviting and demanding great 
 improvement ; but, for want of time and strength, we 
 cannot handle them. " For the romance of political travel 
 we are ready to scour the world, and yet of capital defect 
 in duties lying at our door we are not ashamed. 
 
 I protest upon another ground, which, if not more 
 broad and solid than the two foregoing grounds, is yet at 
 least more palpable. The most pacific of prudent men 
 must keep in his view the leading outlines of the condition
 
 20 GREAT BRITAIN, EGYPT, AND 
 
 which we shall have to accept in future wars. As regards 
 the strength, the spirit, the resources of the country, we 
 have nothing to fear. Largely dependent at other times 
 on timber, hemp, and metal of foreign origin for the 
 construction of our navy, we now find ourselves constituted, 
 by the great transition from wooden to iron ships, the 
 principal producers of the one indispensable raw material, 
 and the first ship manufacturers of the world. But one 
 subject remains, which fills me with a real alarm. It is 
 the fewness of our men. Ample in numbers to defend 
 our island-home, they are, with reference to the boundless 
 calls of our world-wide dominion, but as a few grains of 
 sand scattered thinly on a floor. Men talk of humiliation: 
 may we never be subjected to the humiliation of depen- 
 dence upon vicarious valour, bought dear and sold cheap 
 in the open market. Public extravagance does not with 
 us take the humour of overpay to our soldiers and our 
 sailors. In war time, we must ungrudgingly add (and it is 
 no easy matter) to the emoluments of the services. But 
 after we have done all that is possible, we shall not have 
 done enough. It will still remain an effort beyond, and 
 almost against. Nature, for some thirty millions of men 
 to bear in chief the burden of defending the countries 
 inhabited by near three hundred millions. We must not 
 flinch from the performance of our duty to those countries. 
 But neither let us, by puerile expedients, try to hide 
 from ourselves what it involves. To divest ourselves of 
 territory once acquired is very difficult. Where it is dis- 
 honourable, it cannot be thought of. Even where it is not, 
 it is likely to set in action some reasonable as well as 
 many unreasonable susceptibilities. If then we commit 
 an error in adding to territory, it is an error impossible 
 or difficult to cure. It fills me with surprise that the 
 disproportion between our population and our probable 
 duties in war is so little felt, especially (so far as I know) 
 by professional men, as a prudential restraint upon the 
 thirst of more territory. The surrender of the Ionian
 
 THE SUEZ CANAL. 21 
 
 Protectorate was not founded on a desire to husband our 
 military means ; but, even as estimated by that result, 
 it was one of the very best measures of our time. 
 Pp. 151, 152. 
 
 Again, on page 158 : 
 
 Reverting to Egypt, I observe that Mr. Dicey dwells on 
 the smallness of the territory. This smallness, he says, 
 makes it absolutely impossible for two rival Governments 
 to be within its limits. He proposes, however, all along, 
 that we shall have, as far as it reaches locally, a supreme 
 control in Governments; for we are to hold secure military 
 possession, to keep down the taxes, and to check oppres- 
 sion. Yet he also proposes that the sphere of our com- 
 manding influence is to be confined to the Delta. There 
 appear to be here some inconsistencies. Of what use 
 is military command within the Delta for the custody of 
 the Canal .-* And is not the dualism of Government, once 
 renounced, also resumed .-* But I am not acting as a 
 critic. What I seek to impress is, that territorial questions 
 are not to be disposed of by arbitrary limits ; that we 
 cannot enjoy the luxury of taking Egyptian soil by 
 pinches. We may seize an Aden and a Perim, where 
 there is no already formed community of inhabitants, and 
 circumscribe a tract at will. But our first site in Egypt, 
 be it by larceny or be it by emption, will be the almost 
 certain ^^<g of a North African Empire, that will grow and 
 grow until another Victoria and another Albert, titles of 
 the lake-sources of the White Nile, come within our 
 borders ; and till we finally join hands across the Equator 
 with Natal and Cape Town, to say nothing of the 
 Transvaal and the Orange River on the south^ or of
 
 22 GREAT BRITAIN, EGYPT, AND 
 
 Abyssinia or Zanzibar to be swallowed by way of viaticum 
 on our journey. And then, with a great empire in each of 
 the four quarters of the world, and with the whole new or 
 fifth quarter to ourselves, we may be territorially content, 
 but less than ever at our ease ; for if agitators and 
 alarmists can now find at almost every spot * British 
 interests ' to bewilder and disquiet us, their quest will 
 then be all the wider, in proportion as the excepted points 
 will be the fewer. 
 
 Egypt proper is indeed a small country. Our most 
 recent and most comprehensive informant, Mr. M^Coan, 
 fixing its boundary at the First Cataract, points out that 
 the French, in 1798, found a cultivable surface of only 
 9,600 square miles, since extended to 11,350. It cannot 
 be allowable to suppose one portion of this tract under 
 our supreme controlling authority, and another free from 
 it. Moreover, it is vain to disguise that we shall have 
 the entire responsibility of the government, if we have 
 any of it at all. Mr. Dicey says we must prevent in- 
 tolerable oppression. I hold that we shall have to deal 
 with all oppression, tolerable or not ; and there- 
 fore and beyond all things with the entire taxation 
 of the country, which is the fountain-head of the op- 
 pression, both tolerable and intolerable. In an Egypt 
 controlled and developed by us, every detail of the 
 popular life and state will be familiar to the English 
 and the European eye. It will not be shielded by re- 
 moteness, as is even now the interior of our Indian 
 communities ; it is nowhere, so to speak, out of sight of 
 the Nile. We cannot, as in our free colonies, divest 
 ourselves of direct responsibility through the gift of 
 self-government. If we could, the problem, simplified 
 in one aspect, would be complicated in another ; for who 
 can say what would be the opinion of a self-governing 
 Egypt on the question whether it would go to seek a 
 master in the British Isles, or whether it would prefer 
 an independent domesticated ruler^ identified with its
 
 THE SUEZ CANAL. 
 
 23 
 
 religion, not alien to its race, and rooted already by 
 blood in the recent traditions of its resurrection and its 
 growth ? Be it the Foreign Secretary^ or be it the 
 Colonial Secretary, or be it an Egyptian Secretary of 
 State, manufactured ad hoc^ I cannot envy him his 
 prospective charge : and though he would give certainty 
 and finality (as the Russians everywhere do) to the 
 abolition of slavery, and would import a multitude of 
 improvements under the eye of our Parliament, and 
 stimulated by its interpellations and debates, I am far 
 from being entirely sure that the action of our popular 
 system might not prove greatly too vivid and direct to 
 please the sheiks and the fellaheen, even while it might 
 profit them. 
 
 And again, on page 160: 
 
 Viewing all these facts, I, for one, am inclined, on 
 prudential grounds, to say, * Hands off/ 
 
 But if this be so with reference to the confined area 
 of Egypt proper, much more must we be moved to abstain 
 when we consider that Egypt proper is not alone in 
 question. The rulers of a narrow country have striven 
 hard to extend their authority over a space proportioned 
 to its primeval dignity, and to the day when it contended 
 with Assyria for the empire of the world. From the 
 seat of their recognised dominion, they have directed the 
 eye and stretched out the arm over all Nubia to Dongola, 
 and beyond it into the Beled-es-Soudan, or Country of 
 the Blacks, which reaches without a boundary away beyond 
 Abyssinia, and as far as the frontier of Zanzibar. It 
 is a territory, says M'Coan, five times larger than that 
 ruled by the Pharaohs, the Ptolemies, and the Caliphs ; for
 
 24 GREAT BRITAIN, EGYPT, AND THE SUEZ CANAL. 
 
 administrative purposes it already touches Gondokoro ; 
 and a glance at the map will show that from this point 
 to the Mediterranean we have a reach of nearly 2,000 
 miles, with an area, according to M'Coan, more than 
 twice that of the Austrian Empire. The population of 
 Egypt proper approaches six millions, and that of Nubia 
 and the Upper Nile is taken at ten to eleven millions. 
 Now, as relations of some kind have been contracted 
 by the Khedive with this vast region and large population, 
 the questions must press upon us with relentless force, 
 first, whether, to protect a few score miles of canal, 
 we are to take the charge of 2000 miles of territory; 
 and if not, then, secondly, at what point and by what 
 process we are to quash the relations of superiority 
 and subordination already formed, and to repudiate the 
 obligations they entail ?
 
 The Aspects of the Question as altered by 
 Improvements in Steam Navigation, 
 
 THE SUEZ CANAL. 
 To the Editor of " The ThnesT 
 
 Sir, 
 
 In the debate on Mr. Chaplin's motion for the 
 
 adjournment of the House, on the 22nd ult., I expressed 
 the opinion that the popular estimate as to the vital 
 importance of the Suez Canal, especially with reference 
 to our hold upon India, is much exaggerated ; and I 
 cited the remarkable progress made in marine engineer- 
 ing the past year or two, as having materially reduced 
 the advantage hitherto possessed by the Canal over the 
 Cape route. The importance, at the present moment, 
 of a correct appreciation of our position in reference to 
 this question, induces me to ask your permission to 
 •state my views in some detail, though I shall do so as 
 •concisely as I can. 
 
 Of the great commercial convenience of the Canal 
 Toute, especially to Indian ports, there can be but one 
 opinion. The large saving it effects will be seen by
 
 26 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN, EGYPT, AND 
 
 the following statement of comparative distances from 
 London, in nautical miles : — 
 
 
 Via Canal. 
 
 Via Cape. 
 
 Bombay .... 
 Madras .... 
 Calcutta .... 
 Singapore . . . 
 
 6,330 
 7,330 
 7,950 
 8,345 
 
 10,595 
 10,830 
 
 11,450 
 11,670 
 
 This route has the further advantage of frequent 
 ports of call where bunkers can be replenished — viz. 
 Gibraltar, Malta^ Port Said, Aden, and Colombo, which 
 enables steamers of comparatively small size and power 
 to convey cargoes at a viiniimim cost. The result has 
 been a vast increase in our steam tonnage, and a 
 diversion to the Canal route of the great bulk of our 
 Eastern traffic, so that of the total tonnage passing 
 the Canal In 1881 — 4,143,683 tons — British merchant 
 shipping represents no less than 3,371,058 tons. Our 
 relief troopships and other Government vessels also 
 used the Canal to the extent of 72,126 tons. The 
 time occupied at present by the Peninsular and Oriental 
 Company's steamers from Gravesend to Bombay is 
 27 days, to Madras 33 days, and to Calcutta 37 days, 
 and their steaming is about 11 knots. The British 
 India Company^s steamers are timed to make the 
 passage to Calcutta, calling at Colombo and Madras, 
 in 40 days : but the average speed of the ordinary
 
 THE SUEZ CANAL. 27 
 
 cargo boats using the Canal does not exceed a 
 continuous steaming of 9 knots, and the length of the 
 passages made by them is proportionately increased. 
 
 Our troopships, I estimate, will occupy fully 10 per 
 cent, more time than the P. and O. service above 
 referred to. 
 
 The question of interest, as it seems to me in the 
 present condition of affairs in Egypt, is this : Assuming 
 that the Canal be no longer available to our merchant 
 steamers and transports, what would be the effect on 
 our national interests .'* My reply is, that the disloca- 
 tion of existing arrangements would entail considerable 
 inconvenience and loss upon individuals. Bombay 
 would lose much of the importance she now possesses 
 from her position on the west coast — the conveyance 
 of merchandise would occupy a longer period, and 
 rates of freight, at the outset especially, would be 
 somewhat enhanced — though there would be a partial 
 set-off against the increased consumption of fuel, wages 
 and interest on capital, in the saving of the heavy 
 toll levied by the Canal, amounting (with pilotage and 
 light dues) to nearly lis. per net registered ton. It 
 should not be forgotten that the average time occupied 
 in the passage is two days, and it occasionally happens 
 that a delay of three or four days arises from the 
 grounding of vessels in the Canal. 
 
 In my opinion, however, the inconvenience and loss 
 just named would not be of any serious or permanent
 
 28 GREAT BRITAIN, EGYPT, AA'D 
 
 character; traffic would adjust itself to the altered 
 circumstance with marvellous rapidity; and there can 
 be no question that our existing mercantile marine 
 and our building yards were never so capable of 
 responding to the call that would be made upon 
 them. 
 
 We possess a fine fleet of sailing vessels, a portion 
 of which is now employed in the conveyance of India 
 produce by the Cape. Their number could be readily 
 increased by a transfer from the Australian trades, which 
 are not at present very profitable. 
 
 The more bulky and less costly products of India, 
 such as grain and seed, and the coal and iron exported 
 from hence do not require very rapid conveyance ; and it 
 not unfrequently happens that lastage by sailing vessels 
 is quoted in Calcutta at the same rate as by ordinary 
 cargo steamers. The smaller and less powerful steamers 
 now using the Canal would probably be transferred to 
 other trades ; but by far the greater number are competent 
 to perform the passage (calling at the Cape, and, if needful, 
 at St. Vincent) ; and they would be reinforced by the 
 unprecedentedly large number of cargo steamers of large 
 carrying capacity now being constructed for private owners 
 with a primary view to the American grain trade. 
 
 The amount of tonnage now in process of construction, 
 under Lloyd's supervision, is considerably upwards of 
 1,000,000 tons. Passengers and valuable merchandise 
 would continue to be conveyed by the Peninsular and
 
 THE SUEZ CANAL. 29 
 
 Oriental Company, the British India, the Ducal, and other 
 lines ; and it must not be overlooked that the Union and 
 Donald Currie Companies carry on a regular and efficient 
 service to the Cape^ which might readily be extended to 
 India. All these companies have recently added powerful 
 new vessels to their fleets, and it is probable that the 
 Peninsular and Oriental Company's boats, the Rome and 
 the Carthage^ of 5,013 tons gross and 5,000 effective horse- 
 power, and the Ballarat and Parramatta, of 4,700 tons 
 gross and 4,000 effective horse-power, now building, would 
 make the passage in about 36 days to Bombay, and 38 
 or 39 days to Calcutta, including coaling at the Cape. 
 
 There yet remain to be added to the list of our 
 resources the very important fleet of Transatlantic steamers 
 belonging to Liverpool, capable of steaming 14 or 16 
 knots, to some of which recourse could be had in case 
 of need, and also the supply of new and improved vessels 
 which our building yards are capable of producing within 
 a comparatively short period. This brings me to the 
 most important national consideration involved in the 
 closing of the Canal, and that to which I specially referred 
 in my remarks in the House — viz. the conveyance of 
 mails and troops. 
 
 The mail and express passenger service to India is 
 performed now, as it was prior to the construction of 
 the Canal, by express trains to Brindisi, thence by steamer 
 to Alexandria, joining the Peninsular and Oriental boat 
 at Suez, and reaching Bombay in 18 days from London.
 
 *30 GREAT BRITAIN, EGYPT, AND 
 
 This service is not in any way dependent on the Canal, 
 and can be carried on with the assent of the de facto 
 Government of Egypt for the time being (and providing 
 that there is no political obstacle to the passage over the 
 Continent to and from Brindisi), even should the passage 
 of the Canal be closed. 
 
 The movement for an accelerated packet service to 
 the United States, originated by the construction of the 
 steamship Arizona by Messrs. John Elder and Co., of 
 Glasgow, for the Guion line in 1879, has led to the 
 production, within the past twelve months, of ocean 
 steamships of a size and speed previously unknown ; and 
 through the enterprise of Liverpool owners, carried into 
 effect by the skill of naval architects and engineers on 
 the banks of the Clyde, the practicability of continuous 
 ocean steaming of 17 and even 18 knots per hour is placed 
 beyond dispute. 
 
 It may seem invidious to single out two or three from 
 the many fine steamers recently acquired by our great 
 companies, but to illustrate my meaning I will instance 
 the Alaska, of the Guion line, built by Elders, 6,932 tons 
 gross ; Servia, of the Cunard line, built by Thomson, 
 7,392 tons gross ; City of Rome, of the Inman line, built 
 by Barrow Company, 8,415 tons gross. 
 
 I have before me the particulars of the Alaska's 
 performances. Her last voyage from Sandy Hook to 
 Queenstown was made in 6 days 22 hours, and from 
 Queenstown in 7 days 2 hours, or a continuous speed of
 
 THE SUEZ CANAL. 31 
 
 upwards of 400 nautical miles per day. It is no secret, 
 I believe, that the builders of the Alaska are constructing 
 a vessel to eclipse even her performances. The Oregon 
 is to be 500 feet between perpendiculars, 54 feet beam, 
 and about 40 feet moulded depth, indicated H.P. 13,000; 
 consumption about 220 tons per day on very full steaming, 
 and, with 20 days' coal supply, she will have large 
 capacity for troops, horses, stores, &c. Should the Oregon, 
 like her elder sisters, the Arizona and Alaska, fulfil in 
 practice the anticipation of her constructors, she would 
 be able to carry troops from Plymouth to Bombay in 24 
 days, and to Calcutta in about 26 days, allowing for 
 coaling at the Cape, which experience has shown can be 
 effected at the rate of about 120 tons per hour. This 
 would be considerably less time than is now occupied by 
 Her Majesty's transports, or the P. and O. Company's 
 service, via the Canal, and only a week more than the 
 Overland Mail. 
 
 Vessels of this class are necessarily costly to construct 
 and expensive to work. For mercantile purposes they 
 could be remunerative only on a passenger line of import- 
 ance, or when aided by a postal subsidy, and it is not to 
 be expected that private individuals would venture on the 
 outlay on a mere chance of eventualities, more or less 
 remote. But the acquisition of a fleet of highly-powered 
 transports, in addition to, or in substitution for, the obsolete 
 vessels we now possess (which have done excellently good 
 service in their day), would be a wise provision on the part
 
 32 GREAT BRITAIN, EGYPT, AND THE SUEZ CANAL. 
 
 of our Government, and could be effected at an expenditure 
 which would be a bagatelle in comparison with the sense 
 of relief from the international complications and difficulties 
 (and possible waste of blood and treasure) to which an 
 exaggerated estimate of the value of the Canal exposes us. 
 England won her Indian Empire and conducted her vast 
 commerce until 1869 by the great ocean highway; and I 
 am convinced that, with reasonable precautions, she is now 
 equally able to retain them by the same route. 
 
 I need scarcely add that the saving of distance by the 
 Canal is lessened to ports to the eastward of Singapore, 
 until at Melbourne the distance from England is the same 
 by either route. 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 C. M. NORWOOD. 
 
 House of Commons, July sth, 1882. 
 
 CHARLES DICKENS AND EVANS, CRYSTAL PALACE PRESS.
 
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