Univ.of 111. Library 51 3¥£7 ARGUMENT OF ! Hon. John M. Hall, BEFORE THE Judiciary Committee of the General Assembly OF CONNECTICUT, February SOtlr, 1895, IN BEHALF OF THE NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN AND HARTFORD RAILROAD. AGAINST DOUBLB TAXATION. ARGUMENT Hon. John M. Hall, BEFORE THE Judiciary Committee of the General Assembly OF CONNECTICUT, February 20th, 1895, IN BEHALF OF THE NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN AND HARTFORD RAILROAD, AGAINST double: taxation. Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen of the Committee : In presenting to you such suggestions as occur to me in favor of the petition which has just been read, I con- gratulate myself that I have the honor of addressing a Committee composed entirely of lawyers, and especially this Committee where the atmosphere is not entirely un- familiar to me, for I believe that on the six occasions when I have served in one branch or the other of the General Assembly, it was my privilege to sit as a member of this Committee at least five’times. Representing the supreme power of the State, making and unmaking Courts and Judges, administering both law and equity in the broadest sense, it is peculiarly the Com- mittee to investigate and determine the case we have in hand here to-day. The question involves the principles upon which the State levies its taxes upon railroad cor- porations, the laws which govern the administration of those principles, and the equities which should control the State in the exercise of its wide powers of taxation. The subject of railroad taxation, I venture to suggest, is one of those by-paths in legal lore to which the practicing lawyer seldom has his attention called. It hardly ever comes to the attention of the lawyer' in active practice, unless for some special reason his attention may have been inci- dentally called to it. While sitting as a member of this distinguished Com- mittee in 1881, which Committee was composed of such men as ex-Chief Justice Seymour, Judges Brewster, Harrison, ex-Gov. Morris, Hon. Charles E. Mitchell, David Booth, Judge Merriman, of Meriden, and Judge Northrop, of Mid- dletown, my attention was specially directed to this subject by a case which came before the Committee at that time, to which I desire to call your attention immediately, but before that I wish to say at the threshold of this discussion 3 that the basic principle underlying all taxation in Con- necticut has been from an immemorial past this: That Connecticut does not intend to exact from any person or corporation in this State, a tax upon property which lies wholly without its territorial limits, and this principle is embodied in Section 3830 of the General Statutes, which reads as follows: “ The list of any person need not include any property situated in another State, when it can be made satisfac- torily to appear to the Assessors that the same is fully assessed and taxed in such State, to the same extent as other like property owned by its citizens.” This was the principle before the days of steam rail- roads and has never been changed. It is grounded on justice and equity. The whole system of railroad taxation proceeds upon this same theory, that the State will tax only such portion of the property of a railroad as lies wholly within this State. In the language of Chief Justice Park in the case of the State of Connecticut vs. The Housatonic Railroad Company, found in 48 Conn., p. 53, “ These statutes seek to ascertain the value of the property of the railroad companies ‘lying wholly within this State devoted to railroad purposes, and to tax that value.’ ” When all the property of the railroad lies wholly within this State, the market value of all its capital stock and the par value of its funded and floating indebtedness represent the amount of the value of the railroad upon which taxation is levied. See Sections 3919 to 3933, inclusive, of the General Statutes, for the whole subject of railroad taxation. Now, in case a railroad lies partly within the State and partly without the State, Section 3921 provides that a tax of one per cent, upon the valuation shall be assessed only upon such portion of the whole valuation as the length of the road lying in the State bears to the entire length of the road, showing conclusively that the whole idea and purpose of the statutes upon this subject has been from the begin- ning to tax only such portion of the property as lies within the State. 4 In the year 1880, the case of the State of Connecticut vs. The Housatonic Railroad Company, to which I have referred, and which was a case where the Housatonic Rail- road leased certain roads in Massachusetts and operated them by the Connecticut corporation, and claimed under the law then existing that it had the right to deduct for the pur- poses of taxation the value of these roads on the ground that they owned them, which was not literally true, because in fact they leased them, the Court held that in the absence of any statute whatever affecting leased lines out of the State they could not be regarded as the owners of the property, although in equity they ought not to pay the tax and, therefore, at the end of the decision they say : “ So far as the defendants’ stock has been increased in value by their interest in the Massachusetts roads, and so far as their floating debt has been increased by the making of permanent improvements along these roads, they ought to have the benefit of these facts in a proportional reduc- tion of their tax; and no doubt, if the matter was brought to the attention of the Legislature, a proper reduction would be made. But the Courts have no power to do equity in the matter.” See 48 Conn., p. 57. Here we have an express direction of the Supreme Court of Errors to the railroad company, defendant in that case, to bring their petition to this tribunal for a remedy and an abatement of the inequitable tax complained of. In 1881, therefore, acting upon the advice of the Supreme Court, the Housatonic Railroad Company brought their petition to the General Assembly for an abatement and remission of the taxes in question, and I had the honor, as a member of the Judiciary Committee, to hear that case, and it was unanimously determined by the Committee that the State of Connecticut could not, in honor, exact that tax from the Housatonic Railroad Company, and upon report of the Committee the judgment of the Court was set aside and the tax was remitted by the Legislature, and to prevent any further question of that kind, Section 3923 of the General Statutes was framed by that Committee and became a part of the General Statutes of the State. Section 3923 is as follows: 5 “ Every railroad company in this State, which holds by . lease or otherwise, a railroad in another State, which is not a part of its own road, shall state in its annual return, for the purposes of taxation, how much of its funded and floating debt was occasioned by, and how much of its capital stock was issued for any amount which has been expended by it in the construction or permanent improve- ment of such railroad in another State, or in the purchase of equipment for exclusive use thereon; and in computing the amount of tax to be paid by said company to this State, the amount of such funded or floating debt, and of such stock so occasioned or issued as aforesaid, shall be first deducted from the total amount of its funded and floating debt and stock.” I beg your careful examination of this statute, for under its provisions we claim, both as a matter of law and equity, that the prayer of our petition should be granted. This brings me at once to the consideration of the exact state of facts upon which our claim is based. On March i, 1893, The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company found its interests suddenly and dangerously confronted by the machinations of a railroad wrecker who had obtained control of certain large corporations in another state and threatened to control the Old Colony Railroad, which, as a terminal of the great New Haven system in Boston, had become an important factor to the prosperity of this great property. The danger was met as soon as it was thoroughly understood and as a result the Old Colony Railroad Company, lying within the states of Rhode Island and Massachusetts, leased itself to the Con- solidated Road on .the 1st day of March, 1893, and on the 1st day of July, 1893, the New Haven road took possession of this property and has ever since operated and now operates said railroad lying principally within the States of Rhode Island and Massachusetts, a very small portion being in Rhode Island, which lease was almost unanimously approved by the stockholders of both companies, as provided by the statute. No portion of said Old Colony Railroad lies in the State of Connecti- 6 cut and all the property of said Old Colony Railroad Com- pany is taxed in the States of Rhode Island and Massachu- setts under the statutes of those states, and since July i, 1893, under the provision of the lease of said Old Colony Railroad, the Consolidated Railroad has paid all the taxes levied upon said property by said States of Rhode Island and Massachusetts, and, while said lease is in force, is under a continuing obligation to pay all said taxes. In the State of Massachusetts where the stock is taxed, all the stock of the Old Colony Railroad is taxed. In the State of Rhode Island, which taxes the property locally in every town, all the property of the Old Colony Railroad lying in that State has been taxed and paid in full. To confirm these facts, if the Committee desires proof, we have with us to-day our Treasurer and Comptroller with the docu- ments to show this fact which is a very important one in the consideration of this case. So that every item of property belonging to the Old Colony Railroad Company is fully taxed in the States of Rhode Island and Massachu- setts, within which states it is wholly located, and under the obligations of the lease of the Old Colony Railroad Com- pany these taxes have been paid by The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company as they became due. Now, under the provision of the General Statutes of this State previous to 1889, The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company acquired by lease several railroad properties in this State and in 1889 the Legislature granted an amendment to its Charter whereby it might exchange its stock for the stock of said several leased lines in certain proportions to be determined by a commit- tee appointed by the Governor. This amendment affected lines wholly or partly within this State. In 1893 another amendment was made to the Charter allowing the same exchange of its stock for the stock of any lease line loca- ted wholly in an adjoining state. Acting under this authority The New York, New Haven and Hartford Rail- road Company exchanged before September 30, 1893, 34,515 shares of its stock for 38,350 shares of Old Colony stock in 7 the proportion of ten shares of Old Colony stock for nine shares of New York, New Haven and Hartford stock. These shares of stock so issued by the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company in exchange for Old Colony stock were issued solely for the prop- erty of a leased road lying wholly without this State and said New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad became thereby an equitable tenant in common or joint owner with the other stockholders of the Old Colony Railroad after payment of its debts, and its interest and owner- ship in that property is represented by said 34,5 15 shares of its capital stock so issued in exchange for the stock of the Old Colony Railroad. Among the earliest of the duties which were assigned me after my official connection with the Consolidated Road was the supervision of making up its returns for taxation, and the question at once arose as to what dis- position should be made of the 34,515 shares issued in exchange for Old Colony Stock. It was a new question, for it was the first return to be made under the lease of the Old Colony Road. Upon consulting the Massachusetts statutes and by correspondence with the Tax Department of that State it appeared that the whole stock of the Old Colony Road must be taxed in Massachusetts. The authorities there claimed, and justly, that no abatement could or would be made by Massachusetts on account of the Old Colony stock exchanged for New York, New Haven and Hartford stock, because the stock still existed and under the laws of Massachusetts was still taxable in that State, and that Connecticut ought to abate the tax on the New York, New Haven and Hartford stock which had been issued only in exchange for the Old Colony stock. We made our returns therefore to the Board of Equaliza- tion, claiming an exemption of these shares, but the Board said that, while they considered that our claim was just and equitable and that we were evidently the victims of double taxation, and it was unjust for the State to exact this tax, yet under the strict letter of the statute, they could not relieve us. In taking this position, I believe the Board was mistaken. I am confident that any fair con- struction of Section 3923 clearly exempts these shares from taxation. May I be pardoned for turning the atten- tion of the Committee for a moment to a few familiar principles which should govern in the construction of statutes of this character ? 1st. To arrive at the true meaning of a statute, it is necessary to take a broad, general view of the whole act so as to get an exact conception of its aim, scope and object. Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes Sec. 27. The true meaning of a statute is discerned not merely from its words but also by comparison with other parts of the act, by reference to previous legislation upon the same subject, and by ascertaining the cause and occasion of the passage of the act and the purpose intended to be accom- plished. City of Middletown vs. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 62 Conn., p. 496. Applying these standards of interpretation, can anyone doubt for a moment the object and purpose of the Legis- lature in passing the act of i88r, now Section 3923 of the General Statutes? Its sole object and purpose was to exempt from taxation all railroad property lying in another State leased and operated by any railroad com- pany in this State. It admits of no other interpreta- tion and the history of the statute and the cause and occa- sion of its passage was solely and only to protect from double taxation any railroad company in this State which operated under lease a railroad company in another State. While I am aware that in a few jurisdictions in the United States and elsewhere, it is held that statutes imposing public burdens in the form of taxes are to be strictly con- strued, yet, in many more cases the decisions of the United States Courts hold clearly that a liberal construction should be given to such statutes, but whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, nowhere has the law upon this subject been more fairly and justly expounded than by our Supreme Court. In the case of Hubbard vs. Brainard, 35 Conn., p. 568, a Middletown case involving a pure question of taxes, with which, doubtless, the House Chairman is 9 familiar, Chief Justice Butler in giving the opinion of the Court, laid down the rule for the construction of acts of this character as follows : “ The parties are at- issue in respect to the rule of con- struction which should be applied to the act under which the assessment is made. We have no difficulty as to the rule applicable in such cases. “A law imposing a tax is not to be construed strictly, because it takes money or property in invitum (although its provisions are for that reason to be strictly executed), for it is taken as a share of a necessary public burden; not liberally like laws intended to effect directly some great public object; but ‘ fairly ’ for the Government and ‘justly ’ for the citizens; and so as to carry out the intention of the Legislature, gathered from the language used, read in con- nection with the general purpose of the law, and the nature of the property on which the tax is imposed, and of the legal relation of the tax payer to it.” “A construction of a statute which subjects property to double taxation should always be avoided if practicable.” Osborn vs. Railroad, 40 Conn., p. 491. See also Savings Bank vs. Nashua, 46 N. H., p. 389. “ It is a fundamental principle in taxation that the same property shall not be subject to a double tax payable by the same party either directly or indirectly.” Applying these righteous rules of construction, laid down by our own Supreme Court, to Section 3923, it seems to me that the Committee must find that our claims for exemp- tion under the provision of this section are clearly within the intention of the Legislature when it passed the act of 1881. We have here a railroad company, holding by lease a railroad in another State which is not part of its own road. We find that it has issued stock expressly and only for the purpose of exchanging such stock for the stock of said leased road. Under this statute it is perfectly clear that if the 34,515 shares so issued had been issued for the express purpose of constructing the Old Colony Railroad, or any part thereof, no question 10 could be raised under the most strict construction of the statute. It is true that the shares of stock in question were not issued for the direct purpose of constructing the Old Colony Railroad in Massachusetts, but what differ- ence can it make in ascertaining whether the property taxed is within or without State lines, whether the com- pany paid the contractors who made the improvements or the stockholders who paid the contractors ? This stock so issued represents money expended on a leased railroad in Massachusetts and represents nothing else. If that por- tion of the property of the Old Colony Railroad is not represented in this issue of the New York, New Haven and Hartford stock, it is represented in nothing. It comes, therefore, as it seems to me, clearly within the intent and purpose of this statute under any fair and rea- sonable construction that can be given. The petitioners therefore should have the benefit of their investment in untaxable property out of the State whereby its invest- ment may be treated as capital stock issued for the con- struction of a leased line. The Board of Equalization should have so construed this statute as to carry out the fair intent and purpose of the Legislature that passed it, and, in failing so to do, in my judgment, committed an error. The construction for which I contend, can alone prevent a gross injustice to the largest revenue producing corporation the State posesses. The State of Connecticut, in 1881, when it passed Sec- tion 3923 of the statutes, practically decided this case, by holding that stock or bonds of a railroad corporation in this State, which represented and stood for railroad property in another State, ought not to be taxed. It is only a peculiar, technical omission in the letter of the statute of 1881 which gives the State Board of Equaliza- tion an excuse for saying that the letter of the statute calls for the payment of the tax in this case. But what is the legal position of the State? Can it maintain a suit successfully against the Railroad Com- pany in our own Supreme Court, or in the Supreme Court of the United States ? 11 ♦ U, OF lit U& Railroads are real estate, and should be taxed in accordance with the rules governing taxation of real estate, provided the law taxes the property, and there is no doubt that in Connecticut our railroad tax is a tax on property and not a tax on the corporation as such, or its franchises. Property of corporations, if taxed as property, should be taxed the same as the property of private individuals, and therefore its real property should be taxable where it lies. See Cooley on Taxation, 2d Edition, p. 377. Baldwin vs. Trustees, 37 Mass., 369. People vs. McLean, 80 New York, 254. Real estate within the State taxed under local laws must be taxed as a general rule only in the town for town pur- poses, county for county purposes, school district for school purposes, in which the real estate lies. By the same rule the real estate of an individual or corporation can only be taxed for such purposes in the State where it lies. See Ham vs. Sawyer, 36 Me., 37. Rowe vs. Blakeslee, n Conn. 479. People vs. Pearis, et al, 37 Cal., 259. The General Assembly of the State cannot authorize a municipal corporation to tax for its own local purposes, lands lying beyond the property limits of such munici- pality. Wells vs. City of Weston. 22 Mo., 385. Cooley on Taxation, 2d Edition, pp. 159-163. Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, page 500. It is clear that if a State cannot authorize a municipal corporation to tax for its own purpose, lands beyond the limits of the municipality, then the State itself cannot tax lands or real estate outside of its jurisdiction for such purposes. The Supreme Court of the United States almost invari- ably holds that the construction which the highest Court of the State puts upon its own constitution or laws, will be 12 followed by the Supreme Court of the United States in determining what construction should be put upon the same constitution or laws. If the Supreme Court of Connecti- cut had treated our steam railroad tax as a tax upon fran- chise returned upon property, then the State of Connecti- cut might possibly maintain a suit against the New York and New Haven Railroad for the Old Colony taxes. But our Court has settled this action in the case of Nichols vs. The New Haven & Northampton Co., 42 Conn., pp. 103, 1 19, where it holds in the strongest terms that our steam railroad tax is a tax upon property. This decision was strongly re-affirmed in the case of the State vs. The Housatonic Railroad Co., 48 Conn., pp. 44 and 53. So far as our Court is concerned, Connecticut is tied up to the doctrine that this is a property tax. The foregoing doctrine, is fully supported by the fol- lowing cases : Northern Central Railroad Co. vs. Jackson, 7 Wallace, 262, 267, 268. The State Tax on Foreign Bond, 15 Wallace, 300, 318, 320, etc. Home Insurance Co. vs. New York, 134 U. S., 594, 601, 602, 606. State vs. Stonewall, Insurance Co., 89 Ala., 335. Commonwealth vs. Standard Oil Co., 101 Pa. St. Reports, U9, 147. It is apparent from these authorities that the State of Connecticut can be thoroughly beaten upon the legal issue in the Supreme Court of the United States, unless the Court is prepared to reverse the whole current of its deci- sions for the last thirty years. If, therefore, the State should refuse to correct the mistake in its laws at the present time, or should attempt to push the suit now pend- ing against the Railroad Company to collect this illegal and unconstitutional tax, I am confident it will meet defeat in the Courts, and incur large costs and expenses of litiga- tion. But, even if the Committee should adopt a different con- struction of the statute and the law, from that which I claim 13 to be proper and reasonable, there is yet another method by which the injustice of double taxation may still be avoided under the provisions of the company’s Charter, which gave the company power to exchange these shares for the shares of leased lines. The amendment of the company’s Charter, passed in 1889, shows clearly that the Legislature intended to guard against double taxation of exchanged shares by relieving the company from taxation of the stock of its leased lines. See Special Laws, Vol. X. p. 1298, par. 3. This section then applied only to leased lines wholly or partly within this State, but in 1893, the provision of that amendment was made to apply to leased lines located wholly in adjoining States. See Special Laws 1893, p. 343. Now if the company cannot get from the State the ben- efit which it gets from the exemption of the property of its leased lines in the State out of the exchange of its shares for shares of a leased line in an adjacent State, because those lines do not pay taxes here at all, is it not perfectly clear that the benefit should be given to the com- pany in the way indicated by treating the shares of its capital stock issued to represent property in Massachusetts as shares to be deducted from its capital stock to be valued for taxation of property in Connecticut? The company, as I have said before, is virtually an equitable owner of one- third of the property of the Old Colony Railroad, after paying debts and the muniment of its title to that property is these exchanged shares, and they make a title as good as the title made by a deed, and the issue of the company’s own stock for them represents the title which these exchanged shares of the Old Colony represented and nothing else. Unless the Consolidated road is relieved, the inevitable result follows that it is forced to pay taxes on its property out of the State, as it cannot include its leased line mileage or a part of the mileage of its road in getting at the proportion of its property which Connec- ticut may tax. No fair-minded citizen of Connecticut would approve such an injustice to any corporation or individual. So that under the provisions of our Charter 14 we claim a guarantee of immunity from taxation upon such shares of our stock as were issued exclusively for the shares of the stock of any leased line out of the State. If the Committee should still disagree with me, which I cannot conceive, as to the effect of the chartered rights of this company in protecting them from this proposed taxa- tion, it is still in the power of this Committee to exercise the equitable powers, which from our earliest history has reposed in this General Court, to protect the petitioner from the injustice and unconstitutionality of double taxa- tion. Previous to the adoption of our Constitution this was the General Court wherein all equitable remedies were administered. Under our Constitution, the power of the General Assembly to administer equity still remains and has always been freely exercised to prevent irreparable wrong. No other provision exists for an appeal to any other tri- bunal from the doings of the Board of Equalization. Here and here alone relief can be granted. That the wrong exists is admitted. The Board of Equalization, to which this matter came in their official capacity, agree that this proposed tax upon these shares in question is inequitable and unjust. They are here to-day to say that it is a tax that, in justice and equity, ought not to be enforced. The recently elected Board of Equalization, who have also had their attention called to this matter, and with their counsel have carefully examined it, are also here to say to you that the enforcement of this tax would be a wrong and an injustice. Can a clearer case, therefore, be made before any tribunal for equitable relief, than that which is now presented for your consideration ? Can you hesitate for a moment in granting the relief the petitioner demands ? The great corporation, with whose management I have the honor to be identified, is not here asking for a donation from the State. It is here as the humblest citizen of Connecticut might come asking from the sovereign power relief from an injustice. It makes no claim to the fact that, in 1893, it paid into the Treasury of this State by .itself and the lines it controls, the sum of $537,39 8 -°4, and, in 1894, the sum of $551,140.06, 15 exclusive of the taxes now in question. It makes no claim to the fact that it pays one-third of the entire taxes of the State, and soon will pay much more, for it pays these taxes willing^ because they are just under the law. It recognizes and acts upon the principle that whatever min- isters to the prosperity of the State and its people minis- ters to its own prosperity, but it does and it will protest against and will resist by all lawful means the imposition of any tax imposing upon it a tax not levied upon any other individual or corporation in the State. It cannot believe that the State of Connecticut will deal so un- fairly with its largest tax payer. This good old State cannot afford to be niggardly and oppressive in its exactions and, in honor and justice, cannot touch one penny of this tax in question. Did you ever think that the so-called Consolidated Road is but a private corporation so far as its ownership and internal manage- ment is concerned? That its stock is held by our great charitable and educational institutions, by your savings banks and-trust companies, by your life and fire insurance companies and is the sole income of thousands of widows and orphans and that the administration of its affairs is a sacred trust, and that whenever and wherever the State lays its burden upon this corporation it is casting it directly upon these stockholders whose interests must suffer precisely as the burden is increased? But not only that, it is bad policy for the State, for it tends to lessen the market value of the stock and thus decreases the amount upon which the State can levy its tax and therefore to lessen the amount the State will receive from this company in taxes. Let the farmers and business men of this Legislature remember that if no town in Connecticut is taxed to-day it is because the large corporations of the State are bearing the entire expense of the State government. It is a homely adage but a very wise precaution “not to kill the goose that lays the golden egg.” Let them further remember that our Supreme Court has expressly found that the taxes upon the property of 16 steam railroads is already higher than that upon other property, and I believe higher in proportion than upon other corporations.. In Osborn vs. R. R. Co. 40 Conn. p. 494, Carpenter J. says: “The tax imposed upon the railroad company is a searching one. Nothing escapes its grasp. The market value of the stock includes not only all its property but all its rights and franchises, including all its advantages and facilities for earning money. To that value is added the amount of its funded and floating debt, with no deduction except the amount of cash on hand. On the other hand, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact — and presumptively the Legislature did not — that real estate pretty uniformly goes into the tax list at much less than its real value. The same is true to a considerable extent of personal property, while a large amount of personal property escapes taxation altogether. No man’s faculty is taxed directly or indirectly, and deductions are allowed on account of indebtedness. We think therefore it is safe to assume that taxation upon railroad property is considerably above the aver- age rate of taxation throughout the State. We do not complain of this as unjust , but surely courts should not be eager to adopt a con- struction which will increase rather than diminish , the inequality of taxation .” The imposition of this tax impairs to its extent the future prosperity of this great company. It is a severe reflection upon the policy of the company in acquiring the control of the Old Colony Railroad under its lease. The Old Colony lease was a lease most beneficial to the State of Connecticut It has steadied and strengthened our own corporation so that it will always be able to command a business which will keep it in such order as to afford first class facilities to all the people of Connecticut, for Connecticut is and al ways will be, while the prosperity of this corporation con- tinues and its broad policy is enforced, the great highway over which must travel the additional volume of business which that lease has forever insured. Better and more frequent train service, cheaper rates of freight and fare, better facilities for the merchant and manufacturer, are 7 made possible only by the vast volume of business which this lease has insured. Coal, iron and raw materials, and the products of the West and South are brought to the doors of every citizen of Connecticut over the best con- structed railway on this continent, at a cheaper rate than ever before. Can it be the policy of Connecticut to place a single obstacle in the way of the broad policy of a cor- poration which directly and indirectly, is bringing pros- perity to the hundreds of towns and cities that have sprung into existence along its lines and to the people of the entire State whether traversed by its lines or not ? In transportation the price at which freight and passen- gers can be reasonably transported, depends largely upon the volume dealt with. The more certain the future busi- ness of any road can be made by its control of connections the greater the volume of business which can be controlled, and the cheaper or better or both, will be the facilities that can be furnished the public. All this has been accom- plished by the policy heretofore adopted and still pursued by the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Com- pany. Marvellous as has been the growth of this great corporation, the child of Connecticut, it is far from that stalwart growth that awaits it, if Connecticut is wise in its legislation and policy towards it. The imposition of this tax is a menace to its future progress and it seems to me cannot be justified by any intelligent man who examines this question. The press of the State so far as I have observed, are unanimous in advocating the relief which the petitioner asks here to-day. It may be suggested to this Committee, and it is a fact which I ought in fairness to bring to their attention, that a suit was commenced by the late Treasurer against this petitioner, to collect the tax in question. It is fair, however, to say that before that suit was begun, this petition was brought to this, the highest tribunal in the State, in pursuance of the recom- mendation of the Supreme Court in the Housatonic case for relief, so that this Committee cannot fairly wave off the petitioner and say that this case is pending in court, because this General Assembly had original jurisdic- 18 tion in this case before any suit was brought in the Supe- rior Court, and I trust that no such suggestion as this will be entertained by this Committee. It may be suggested that the Treasury of the State is in such condition that this amount, which is very small in comparison to the large tax this company yearly pays into the State Treasury, ought to be col- lected even though it may not be equitable and just. Such a suggestion as that, I am sure every man on this Committee would spurn with indignation. The State of Connecticut can never be so poor as know- ingly to levy and collect an unjust, inequitable and illegal tax from any of its citizens or corporations. It never has been guilty of such gross injustice, and it never inten- tionally will be. In reading the petition you will observe that it calls for an amendment to Section 3923 of the Gen- eral Statutes, in order that this question may not arise again with any future Board of Equalization. I have pre- pared a bill which I now submit to you, adding two or three lines to the General Statutes, and providing that this statute shall apply to the returns of any railroad company heretofore made for the years 1893 and 1894, which I believe, if you accept, will cover the claims of our petition. The remission of the tax asked for affects only the tax for 1893 and 1894 upon the shares of stock issued by the petitioner solely for the stock of the old Colony road before December 19th, 1893, when the time for such ex- change expired. In closing, allow me to Thank you, gentlemen, for your patience in listening so long to this somewhat dry discus- sion. I assure you that nothing but the importance of the question to the corporation I represent, would excuse or justify it, but considered from our standpoint it is to us a most important matter. I am confident that your examin- ation of this question will convince each of you as it has every other intelligent person to whom it has been pre- sented, so far as I am aware, of the absolute justice and integrity of the claim we make for a remission of the tax involved. 19 Hall, K Joha Manning Argument before the Judiciary committee of the general assembly of Connecticut, February 20th, 1895, in behalf of the New York, New ^aven and Hartford railroad against double taxation. 3457 New York Central & Hudson River R.R / c c r'L-'YX <