THE UNIVERSITY 4 • OF Illinois' LIBRARY 33Z B875 V.5 'BIMMRM LETTER TO THOMAS PAINE, IN REPLY TO HIS DECLINE AND FALL ©F THE ENGLISH SYSTEM OF FINANCE. BY DANIEL WAKEFIELD. LONDON: frinted for f, and c. rivington, no. 62, st. Paul's church-yard. 1796. LETTER, &c. IT was far from being my intention to have addrefled you in reply to your Decline and Fall of the Englifh Syftem of Finance, as I had flattered myfelf that more able advocates would have ftepped forward, and for the credit and profperity of their country, been willing to oc* cupy a fmall portion of their time in difproving the falfe conclufions you have drawn of the financial ftate of Britain. My expectations in this refpecl have been difappointed. The gentlemen who have pub- liflied ftriclures upon your work, have not, in my judgment, fatisfadorily proved the folvency of the Britilh government ; I fhall therefore, in this addrefs, endeavour to give you my opinion of the credit and refources of ray country ; which after an attentive examination, I am convinced are in -is flourifliing and profperous a condition as at any time lince the commencement of the funding fyftem. A 2 Your C 4 ] Your mode of reafoning on this fubjcdt re- quires that I (liould much more readily acknow- ledge your fhrevvdnefs and plaufibility than your honefty or your candour; for you cannot be con- fidered as exhibiting any fpecimcn of either, in repeatedly concealing thofe numerous and clTential fadls, by a fair difcuflion of which, your argu- ments would be refuted, the fallacy of your con- clufions demonflratcd, and your boaftfu-1 theorj-' totally overthrown. Your idea of a ratio to be applied to the pro- greflive increafe of the national expences, flruck me, I confefs, with its fpecioufnefs, and before Tefledion c:xn\e to my aid, I began to imagine that we were indeed, as your motto exprefsly fays, *' on the verge, nay in the very gulf of " bankruptcy," but a very little confideration convinced me otherwife, and pointed out the fallacy of your ratio. On referring to the works of thofe who have flated the amount of the na- tional debt in all its various ftages, I difcovered that though your device to mi (lead the unwary who trufted to the name of Paine, might be in- genious, yet that your mifreprefentation of the true amount of the Britifli funds at the periods you mention was not lefs apparent; and though I lamented your want of candour, I rejoiced for my country. It appeared to me favourably om^i- nous [S3 nous for the credit of Britain, that her enemies were driven to the neceflity of employing the engines of falfehood in their attacks. How is it pofTible for any perfon who refledls, to continue in the belief of your fuppofed ratio, \vhen even theory itfelf refutes it? Do not fome wars lad one year, fome two, three, four or more; are not fome wars fought at the extremities of the world, while others are contended at home? Arc not fome entered into with allies poor and exhaufled ; fome with allies whofe finances are in order, and fome without allies, as was the cafe in the American war? Can there, under cir- cumftances fo very different, fo oppofite, be any fimilarity, and can the expence on fuch unequal exertions bear any proportion ? But I will not wafle rny time in labouring to difprove your theories ; I will not, by anfwering with theory only, give any caufc for the difcontented to be gratified, the loyal to doubt, or the rich to de- fpond. I will oppofe you with facls equally ftubborn and notorious ; fads which you fliould have examined and have been acquainted with, before you had publickly attacked the credit of your country : had you examined firft, and Written afterwards, it would have faved your charader as a writer in the firft place, faved you as a man, the difgrace of being proved to A ^ have • C 6 ] have publifhcd what was falfc in the fccond; and in the third, if your malignity againft your country and its profperity was too powerful to be retrained, it would have enabled you with more fpecioufnefs, and perhaps fucccfs, to have endeavoured to undermine the well-grounded confidence repofed on the faith and credit of the Britifh govcrPxment. In the fiatements yon have given of the pub- lick debt at the conclufion of the different wars of the laft century, you pretend* to draw your . information from the juftly famed work of Dr. Adam Smith. As you have appealed to his au- thority I will be guided by it, and from his work fhall likewife be taken the fiatements I now oppofe to your falfe, though fpecious theory. * Mr. Paine, to fupport the application of his ratio, quotes Dr. Adam Smith, as faying that the expence ot" the war of 1756, was feventy-two millions and a quarter j on the contrary. Dr. Smith fays, that " during a war of nearly feven years con- '* tinuance, a new debt of more than feventy-five millions was ** contrai5^ed." Had this been a mere difference of calculation it might have pafled unnoticed, but when it is confidered that this quotation was made falfely, for the purpofe of fupportiirg a ratio he wifhed to impofe upon the world, it merits the fevereft cenfure; for what credit can be placed on the afTertions of a writer whofe very quotations are purpofely made erroneoufly, that they may fquare with his ratio, and that not only in this one inftance, but in many others can it alfo be proved to have been done, to aflift in accomplifhing the fame fmifter end. Whert C 7 ] When applying your ratio to the debts of Britain, you fay that the war of 1688 ending in 1697, left this country burthened with a debt of twenty-one millions and an half — it really anriounted to ^^2 1,5 15,743; you then proceeding to the application of your felf-invented ratio fay, that agreeable to its rules, the debt at the cortclufion of the war of 1702, ending in 1714* will be fifty-four millions ; the increafe to the national incumbrances being by your theory to amount to thirty-two millions and a quarter; it really amounted to ;{"37, 2 86,375, ^^^ ^^^^ total amount of the debt at the peace, was no more than /53,68i,076. Now will you not readily perceive by this fl^ement of fads taken from your favourite authority, that your ratio is, in the very beginning, erroneous and falfe ? But it is probable you thought a difference of little more than five millions too trifling, far too trifling to impede the giant ftrides you were haftily endeavouring to make towards the de- flrudlion of Britifh credit. Perhaps the fond afi^edtion which every inventor feels for his own difcoveries, hid from you the glaring abfurdity of the idea you introduced to the notice of the world. Having no fuch parental affeclion for your theory, I fliall treat it with A 4 lefs I 8 3 Icfs indulgence ; and bad it only been fupported by its own merits, I would on this firft difco* very of its inefficacy have abandoned it. Since, however, it has been offered to the world by Thomas Paine — fince your notoriety gives it a certain fort of celebrity, I will devote a few more pages to the examination of its pretenfions to infallibility ; and as you have brought your the- oretical calculations down to the pfefcnt time, fo will I follow you alfo down to the fame pe- riod* Proceeding then to the war of 1739, ending in 1748, which according to your theory Ihould have coft forty-eight millions, making the total of the publick debt one hundred and two mil- lions, the real increafe to the national debt from the war, was no more than ,^3 1,63 1,546, and the amount of the whole debt was only ^f 78, 293, 3 13. Thus is your theory falfe in its application to the three wars you have been plcafed to adduce as examples of its truth, for there is a difference between the fad: and your theory, in the ex-» pences of the war of 1739, of fixteen millions and a quarter. The difference, however, is ft ill greater in the amount of the debt left at the con- clufion of the war, for it is nearly twenty-four millions. The T 9 1 The next application of your theory, is to the war of 1754, ending in 1763. Agreeably to your theory, it fhould have coft feventy-two millions, and the publick debts fi^ould have amounted to one hundred and feventy-four mil- lions. Yet how different are the fads, and how falfe is the theory ! The real addition was only jr67,227,i34; and the national debt amounted at that time to no more than ^^146, 682, 844. The difference then between the fadls and your the- ory in the expences of the war is nearly five millions, and upwards of twenty-feven millions in the total amount of the national debt. The next war to which your theory is ap- plied is the American, beginning in the year I775> ^"d ending in 1783 : but here again will your ratio be found defcclive ; for by your theo- retical calculation, the v.ar fliould have coif one hundred and eight millions; and when concluded, lliould have left this country two hundred and eighty-two millions in debt. On the contrary, the war added only ;^i03, 21 1,829 to the na- tional debt J the total amount of which, at the commencement of the peace, was no mere than ^,^239,1 54,880 *. The difference then between • Mr. Morgan makes it amount to upwards of two hundred and fifty millions; but his ftatement, like other of his calcu- lations, is much over eftiroated. your [ "0 D your ratio and the fad, is nearly five millions in the expenccs of the war; and in the total amount of the national incumbrances, it amounts to the enormous fum of forty-two millions and three quarters ; a fum, I fliould imagine, fuffi- cient to convince the mofl fanguine of your ad- mirers, that you have cither written on a fub- jed:, with which you were by no means fuffici- ently acquainted, or elfc, that for the fmifter purpofe of overthrowing the credit of your country, you have knowingly miftated facts, and concealed the truth. The talk of expofing the incfficacy of your ratio is now drawing to a conclufion; and I have only to examine the ap- plication of your theory to the prefent War. You calculate it to coft one hundred and fixty- two millions, prediding that the national bur- thens will, at the conclulion of the war, amounc to four hundred and forty-four millions. As the account you have given of the finances of this country has been (from what caufe you beft know] fo falfe and erroneous; your pre- tenfions to the infallibility of a prophet may juftly be doubted, and before I allow you the merit of being able to afcertain, by your ratio, the expence of the war in which we are now en- gaged, I will ftate a few fimple fads, draw a few plain and unambiguous conclufions, and then fugged fuggeft to you, the propriety of recalling youf idle boaft of having difcovered an infallible rule of calculation, to afcertain thfe expence of every- fiicceeding war in which Britain fliall in future be engaged, and by which you have ventured to limit the exiftence of the funding fyftem in this country. The war has now Lifted three years and a half, during which time, debts have been con- rradied to the amount of about ninety millions ; it fhould, however, be recollected, that the ex- pences of the prefent year are provided for, and that therefore a war, which for extent of opera- tion and greatnefs of exertion has never before been equalled, has coft in four years, no more than ninety millions, out of which fum, we have aflifted the deranged finances of the vari- ous princes, compofmg the grand alliance againft France, have increafed our navy to a magnitude which will enable us to cope with all the marl* time power of Europe; and that while making' exertions hitherto thought beyond our ftrength, we have difcovered no fymptoms of either an exhaufted treafury or of worn-out refources, for we have continued in the redudion of the na- tional debt, as begun before the war ; and not only fo, but have alfo provided for the liquida- tion of every new loan, and for the difcharge of ^ every every new debt incurred lince its commence- ment ; while our enemy, on the other hand, has been bankrupt, ruined and exhaufted. Returning from this digrefTion to the exami- nation of your theory, fuppofe, though it is far from probable, that the war fliould lall: two years longer, and even for the fake of allowing you every advantage, I will eftimatc the an- nual expence, during its continuance, by the preceding four years ; we fhall then only have incurred an increafe to our incumbrances, of one hundred and thirty-five millions. But it is far from being likely, that it will continue fo long, and it is dill more unlikely that any future year of it fhould coft fo much as the former ones, for we have now lelTened the extent of our operations ; and from the annihilation of the French navy, our exertions by fea are ne- celTarily lefs expenftve, and we have now no army on the continent, which has always proved the mofl expenfive part of the wars in which this country has ever engaged. Admitting then all that I have done, there ftill exifts a differ- ence of twenty-feven millions between your theory and the ellimated expence of the war> •which of the two it is moft likely to be, time tnuft decide, but which appears moft probable 1 hefitate not to fay, for your concluiion is drawn from [ '3 ] from a theory (hewn to be falfc, while my cftl- rnate is grounded on facts and experience *. Thus then is the examination of your ratio terminated, and its inefficacy proved, though introduced by a pompous and egotiftical attempt of its author to place himfelf on a level with the immortal Newton. And I will now diredt my pen to the refutation of your flimfy compa- rifon of the duration of the French and Britifli fyftems of finance, between which no more fimilarity fublifts than there does between the falfenefs of your ratio and the truth of the fadls I have oppofed to it. Taking as a foundation your own vifionary eftimate of the amount of circulating bank pa- per to be (ixty millions, I will proceed to ex- pofe the fallacy of your alfertion, that " let *' financiers diverfify fyflems of credit as they " will, it is neverthelefs true, that every fyftem " of credit is a fyflem of paper money; two ex- *' periments have already been had upon paper " money; the one in America, and the other *' in France : in both thofe cafes, the whole ** capital, which in America was called conti- *' nental money, and in France aflignats, ap- * The reader is requefted to turn to the table at the end of the work, where he will at one view difcover the whole of Mr, Paine's errors* " peared C 14 1 pcared in circulation ; the confequence of which was, that the quantity became fo enor- mous, and fo difproportioned to the quantity of population, and to the objeds upon which it could be employed, that the market, if I may fo exprefs it, was glutted with it, and the value of it fell; between five and fix years determined thofe experiments : the fame fate would have happened to gold and filver, could gold and filver have been iflhed in the fame abundant manner as paper had been, and confined within the country as paper al- ways is, by having no circulation out of it; or to fpeak on a larger fcale, the fame thing would happen in the world, could the world be glutted with gold and filver, as America and France have been with paper*." " The Englifh fyftem differs from that of America and France in this one particular, that its capital is kept out of fight, that is, that it does not appear in circulation. Were the whole capital of the national debt, which at the time I write this, is almoft four hun- dred millions flcrling, to be emitted in ailig- nats or bills, and that whole quantity put • Mr. Paine certainly forgets that gold and filver have an in- herent value in thenifelves, which paper neither does, nor caa ever poflcfs, into t '5 ] into circulation, as was done in America and in France, thofe Englifh affignats or bills would fink in value, as thofe of America and France have done, and that in a' greater de- gree, becaufe the quantity of them would be more difproportioned to the quantity of po- pulation in England, than was the cafe in either of the other two countries. A nomi- nal pound flerling in fuch bills would not be worth one penny." *' But though the Englifli fyflem by thus keeping the capital out of fight, is preferved from hafty deflrudion, as in the cafe of Ame- rica and France, it neverthelefs approaches to the fame fate, and will arrive at it with the fame certainty, though by a flower pro- grefs. The difference is altogether in the degree of fpeed, by which the two fyflems approach their fate, which to fpeak in round numbers, is as twenty to one, that is the Englifh fyftem : that of funding the capital inftead of ifluing it, contains within itfelf a capacity of enduring twenty times longer than the fyftem adopted by America and France; and at the end of that time it will arrive at the fame common grave, the potter's field of paper money." '* The C -6 ] f* The datum I take for this proportion of ** twenty to one, is the difFerence between the *• capital and the intercft at five per cent * i *' twenty times the intereft is equal to the ca- '* pital. The accumulation of paper money in " England is in proportion to the accumulation " of the intereft upon eyery hew loan,.and thcre- ** fore the progrefs to diftblution is twenty '* times flower than if the capital were to be ** emitted and put into circulation immediately^ ** every twenty years of the Englifh fyftem is *' equal to one year of the French and Americarl ?' fyftems. t" Unlefs you can prove that an emiflion of pa- per is annually made, to the amount of the in- tereft. of the debt funded, your theory convidls itfelf of abfurdity. The monied market can * The reader is rcquefted tp obfcrve Mr. Paine's perverfion of fad^s, while thus eftimating the duration of" the Englifh fyftem of finance, for how could he have been ignorant that the great amount of the national debt confifts of the three per cents, and that the trifling capital of the four and five per cent^ will be liquidated in the courfe of a few years ? Thus then; even allowing his abfurd conclufion of its diflblution being in proportion to the difference between the capital and its in- tereft, infiead of twenty, it will be thirty-^hree to one. + The wifh to prevent its being fuppofed that Mr. Paine's argument was mifreprefcnted, is a fuiRcient apology for the kngth oC this cxtrad. never E 17 ] uevcr'be dcprefled by the amoynt (hpwever large) of the funded debt, it can only feel itfelf burthened by an cmilTion of paper bearing no in* tered, and as eafily transferable as calh to a fuffigient extent, tobaniihthe confidence at pre^ fent given to the notes of the b.an,k of England. But this is noc likely to be the cafe, Cpr Ame- rican continental money amounted toroore tha^ the value of its annual rental, taken at twentjf years purchafe, before it began to be at any con-i fidcrable difcount, and the french affignats cgn-* tinued to enjoy the publick confi^ience, and tQ pafs at par, long after they amounted to the value of the national rental. Admitting then, for the fake of the iirgum^i)t^ that bank notes are emilTions of government, to pay the intcreft of the debts they have contr^Kr^edi (than which nothing can be more ^Ife^ yq^ will find that in an hundred years, which is nearly the age of the funding fyftem in this country, th^t no more than fixty millions of b*nk paper have accumulated *i and that during * This h Mr. Paine's own afiertion, and allpwe4 opiy bec^jj/g ^0 data can be taken, from which the amount of bank nom emitted, can with any certainty be eftimated ; though at thg facoe time the reader is cautioned againft concluding from thit aflenion, being calculated upoq, that ihereis (\^ty millions «f £ bank [ "8 ] this period, more than three hundred and fixty millions has been paid as intereft on the national incumbrances. Now proceeding in this reafon- ing on fa6ls, we have feen, as before ftated, that in America and France, a fum equal to the value of the annual rental may be thrown into circulation without experiencing depreciation. *rhe annual rental of this country is twenty mil- lions, which at twenty years purchafe, amounts to four hundred millions : fhould then the bank find themfclves under the ncceflity of emitting notes in the fame proportion as they have hitherto done, the Britilh fyftem of finance night (with- out tranfgreffing the bounds of theory) be pro J nounced likely to laft, even fix hundred years before the monied market would be overftocked by the amount, or the paper itfelf experience a. material deprelTion. I will, however, view its probable ftability in another light, for you have certainly prefump- tuoufly aflerted that the Britifh fyfiem of credit is to that of America and France, as twenty to 6ne; but in this I widely differ, and give as a bank paper in circulation, for there is every reafon to believe that the amount is very much exaggerated ; indeed no data can be more difputable, for Mr. Paine, while he affumes the faft, forgets the immenfe circulation of private paper, and the un- Kmited emiffions of country banks, reafon. C ^9 J reafon, that in the coiirfe of the hundred years of the funding fyftem, no more than fixty mil- lions of paper have been emitted by the bank, yet upwards of three hundred and fixty millions of intcreft have been paid on the public funds ; therefore, if we proceed in the fame proportion, if even we liquidate no more of the principal, and continue increafing the national debt with the fame rapidity we have hitherto done, the liability of the Britifli credit, is to that of Ame- rica and France, not as twenty, but as an hun- dred and twenty to one. When you advanced the falfe affertion of the Britifh fyfiem of credit being to that of America and France as twenty to one, you proceeded with your fuppofcd analogy, by faying, that as they had laftcd only five years, fo in this proportion the Briti(h fyfiem muft break up in an hundred years ; and as it had already lafted this hundred years, its diiTolution is near at hand. Allowing even that this analogy does exifl, yet as it has been iliewn to be not as twenty, but as an hun- dred and twenty to one, the BritiHi fyfiem might poflibly extend to a period as long as that I have recently fuppofed. Here I will make a few obfervations on the revenue of the country, for to me it appears, that it is not the amount of the capital of our B 2 debt. [ 20 ] debt, or the quantity of paper in circulation which is likely to undermine the confidence re- pofed in, and deftroy the credit of the Britifli government, but that the exigence of the fund- ing fyftem depends, and that wholly, on the power of government to impofe, and the ability df the people to pay taxes fufficient to raife a re- venue capable of paying the intereft of the funded debt, and of devoting a certain fum pro- greflivcly increafmg, to the difcharge of the prin- cipal. You allow that taxes can always be raifcd to the amount of a quarter of the circulation, whe- ther that circulation conlifls of fpccie or of paper, provided the paper is not depreciated. In a former part of this letter I fliew you from the example of other countries, that paper might be ifllied to the amount of the value of the an- fiUal rental, without being depreciated, and alfo at the fame time ftated, that the value of the Britifli rental was four hundred millions. Permit me here then to eftimate, that as in an hundred yca'rS our taxes have increafed about twenty millions*, fo in the fame proportion it will be fix hundred from the commencement * At the revolution, the revenue was nearly three millions, iind is now about twenty .three. of [ 2. ] of the funding fyflern before the taxes .wiU amount to a quarter of the then circulation. When I fir ft began to calculate on the dat^ which you allowed, I little imagined that ii) three totally different modes of confidering th^ fubjedl, the conclutions would have exactly agreed, and I am gratified in perceiving that the eftimates I have made of the duration of the Britifli credit, the {lability of the Britifh funds, and the extent of the Britifh refources, arc fupported by the correfponding conclufions of three calculations, raifed from data by your- fclf not only allowed, but defended with the utmoft force of your ability. Thus reafoning from premifes admitted by yourfelf, I draw a widely different conclufion, and have the pleafure of being able confidently to alTert, that the Britifh fyflem of finance, fo far from being in its decline, is not yet arrived to maturity ; that fo far from its being likely to bankrupt our government within twenty years, that there is no reafonable data upon which to go, whereby its difTolution can be calculated to take place for fome centuries to come *. Lpn§ before * The reader is requeued to recoiled that thefe conclufions might be drawn from the ralh aflertions of thofe who have aU tacked the Britilh credit, and that though |he author ha« m^dc B 3 thefe [ " ] before "\vhich time, if the able and energetic meafuresof ourprefent ad mini ft ration arcfleadily purfued, the whole of the Britilh debts will be paid off, and the nation freed from its incum- brances *. In thefe eftimates, he has not done it under the idea that the Britifh fyftem of finance will endure fix hundrrd years and no longer ; nor yet, that it muft neceffarily endure fo long. This is far from being the inference he wifhcs to draw ; he fimply wilhes to expofe to the world the wanton and fpecious attack of Mr. Paine ; and it occurred to him, that nothing would fo efFeflually fhew the fallacy of Mr. Paine's affertions and conclufions, as a calculation made from his own premifes, afcertaining the fol- vency of the Britilh government, and incontrovertibly proving (as much as theory and figures from fuch foundations could) its {lability. Having effeded this defign, the author leaves to his readers individually to draw their own conclufions from thefe eftimates, which have fully anfwered his view, if they ferve to render fufpicious or expofe to ridicule, this malignant attack on the profperity of the country. * A cafual reader of Mr. Paine would conclude, that though we have progreffively accumulated our debts for the laft century, no provifion had been made for their liquidation: far, however, is this from being the cafe, for befides the million (now in« creafed to ^1,872,200) annually appropriated for that purpofc, there has been one per cent on the amount of every new loan, provided for its difcharge ; and even the defponding Mr. Mor- gan is obliged to allow, that this provifion will difcharge every debt contrafted during the war, within thirfy-feven years. Where then is the threatened ruin, which makes the friend of his country defpair? it can only exift in the imaginations of theorifis, while [ 23 ] In this refutation of your predidlion,- 1 have argued from your own vague and indefinite afler- tions : but if you rcfled: on the emifllons of pa- per by the bank, you will quickly find that not {o much as one lingle folitary note has been iflued for the payment of the dividends on the funds. For if you will trouble yourfelf to ex- amine any authentic account of the revenue an- nually received fince the commencement of the funding fyftem, and of its application, you will perceive that taxes to the amount of the intereft on the national debt have been always raifed, and that in no one period has government been I'cduced to the neceility of emitting paper to fup- ply the deficiency. You will perceive your aflertions, that this " fecond debt (that contained in bank notes) *' has in a great meafure been incurred to " pay the intereft on the firft debt ; fo that *' in fadl, little or no real intereft has been paid ** by government ;" that ** the whole has been " dclufton and fraud;" that ^'government firft " contraded a debt in the form of loans to one ** clafs of people, and then run clandeftinely *• into debt with another clafs, by means of while the country is thus enabled to limit the exiftence of her incumbrances by the creation of a fund, whofe operation muft, wilhin a fpecific period, relieve her burthens. B 4 " bank C 24 ] ^' bank notes to pay the intereft;" that •* go- •* vernrtient a6ted of itfelf, in contracfting the *' firft debt, and made a machine of the bank to ■^** cbnttaft the fetond/' to be falfe. And you tntift, lat the fame time, perceive, that not the ifmalleft analogy fubfifls between the Englifh, f'rench, and American fyftems ; for the one "funds its debt, raifes a revenue to pay the in- tereft, and by degrees the principal : the others 'trhit the whole principal into circulation, pay HO intereft, and redeem nothing. How any iimilarity can exift in circumflances fo oppofite, To totally different'' I am at a lofs to imagine. However fmall your eftimation with the pub- lick may be for wifdom, as a politician, and lionefly as a financier, it cannot be fufpefted that you were ignorant of this elfential difference : indeed, the reafon why you conceal it is obvious; you yourfelf difclofe it, when laying, " that '** every cafe of a failure in finances fince the "** fyffem of paper began, has produ<:cd a revo- ** lution in government, either total or partial. "•* A failure in the finances of France produce(i *' the French revolution ; a failure in the finances '" of the aflignats broke up the revolutionary " government, and produced theprefent French *' conftitution i a failure- in the finances of the .J * which, there is none; be-^ tween that paper, the currency of which is optional. C 27 ] optional, and that the receipt of which is forced j between that paper which forms the monied tranfadions of fpeculatifls, and that which is forcibly introduced into the common occurrences of life as a fubftitute for fpecie ; between that paper, which it is known will be funded, and that, which it is equally known will be depre- ciated ; between that paper, -v hofe fecurity is of an hundred years ftanding, and that whofe fe- curity has not exifted an hundred months ; whofe vilionarv credit, founded in robbery and ex^ tortion, has been fliakcn by a ruinous depre- ciation, and a deftrudivc bankruptcy. Thus have I fhewn that there fubfifts not the fmallefl: trace of fimilarity between the funded debt of Britain, and the paper of either America or France ; and that the unfunded debt of this country bears no refemblance, either in its origin, or progrefs, to the French afilgnats. Having finifhed my examination of, and re- ply to your attack on the (lability of the Britifh funds ; and having concluded fuch a defence of them as will, I truft, dertroy the baneful ten- dency of your unfounded afiertions and invi- dious remarks ; I fliould ghdly have been ex- cufed the unpleafant tafk of treating you as one M'ho, in the purfuit of his objed (whatever may be C =3 ] be his prctcnfions to pubUck virtue) adopts the Machiavclian principle of politics, which direds that to gain your end, no acceflary means, how- ever infamous, are to be negleded: for not con- tented with a wanton attack on the credit of your country; you have alfo, with the fame malignant fpirit which has ever diftinguifncd your publick condu6t towards Britain, attempted to undermine the confidence repofed in the bank ; and by the overthrow of this great commercial engine, in- volve the country in ruin and bankruptcy. For- tunately, your attack made on ground, the moll: untenable, has failed ; and even jour own party fee that they muft no longergivc faith to the aflertions of one who has worn out the very web of credibi- lity. The view with which you fay, that " a ftop- *' page of payment at the bank is not a new thing, " for Smith, in his Wealth of Nations, book 2, *' chap. 2, fays, that in the year 1696, exchequer " bills fell forty, fifty, and fixty per cent; bank " notes twenty per cent, and the bank ftopt pay- *' ment;" and that " which happened in 1696, */ may happen again in 1796," is fufficiently ob- vious. A plain ftatement of the remark of Dr. Adam Smith is a fufficient refutation of the infe- rence you draw; for who cannot perceive, that; though " during the great recoixiage of filvcr " which C ^9 J ^' v/hich was going on at that time, the bank ** thought proper to difcontinue the payment of ** its notes, which necelTarily occafioned their ^•' difcredit." That this was caufed, not by the want of capita!, not by infolvency, but that it arofo from the temporary want of fpecie ; though at the time there was bullion and other fecuritie^ fufficient to anfwcr the demand ; and does hot the fact bear out the aficrtion, that the bank has never been infolvent, for as foon as the rccoin- age was over, did it not go on with renovated credit? And though there hasfmce been one or two hard runs on the bank, though its credit was attacked by a flrongly cemented confpiracy, for the pufpofe of deltroying the well-grounded confidence it had obtained, and was aided by the march of an army into the very centre of the kingdom, though the government then exifted in the moft perilous uncertainty: yet. what was the rcfulr ? the mercantile intereft knew, that if by thefe machinations the bank Ihould fail, that inevitable ruin would fall upon themfelvcs* This Convidlion roufed them, and a publick agree- ment was entered into for its fupport. For though, as you fneeringly fay, reduced to 'the ncceflity of paying in fix-pences, yet the com-r mercial, and mofl: refpetftable part of the people were confident of its folvency, and this. conti» dence, [ JO ] dcncc, experience has fully julVified. From that period to the prefent time, the bank has neither fuffcrcd a diminution of its credit, nor have its operations been cramped by the fetters of an in- creafing infolvency. - For the purpofe of fupporting your attack, you enter into llrange and curious kind of rea- foning, to fhevv that the bank docs not polTefs two millions of fpecie, and that therefore as your aflertion, no doubt, is true, of its having iflued notes to the amount of lixty millions, that it cannot pay ten-pence in the pound, fhould payment be demanded. The coin of the country is calculated from data, taken from the mint, to amount to twenty millions; what portion the bank polfefTes, no individuals, (the diredors ex- cepted) either of this, or any other country can be informed ; one may eftimate it as fuits his argument, another as it fuits his. It is of little confequence what cftimates are formed of it, unlefs thofe eftimates are founded on fomething befides mere theory j and as it is impoflible to obtain a knowledge of the faft, I, fliall decline entering into the difcuflion ; and fhall therefore, as I have done in the fimilar cafe of the amount of bank notes in circulation, build my argument on your own afiertion; for if, from the affert ions of its enemies, its folvency is proved : how rnuch more [ 3> ] more would it be fnewn if the (aSis were made publick? On your unprecedented mode of endeavouring to prove the infolvency of the bank, you feera to banifn from your calculation the various fe- ciiritics in which they have invelled ihcir im- menfe property. While ue hear of its being m advance to government many millions — while we are informed of the extent of its difcounts — and while we know the large amount of its property in the funds, we cannot conclutie that it is infolvent ; fuch an infolvency would in- deed be unprecedented. For who can difcover in a concern which makes the immenfe profit of a million* annually, any trace of an approach- ing bankruptcy ? Before allov/ing your unfupported conclufion of the infolvency of the bank, I would requcit you to refle> CO O _o .2 'H^ c o c o « V*- O J3 -M ^ > O oo VO in O CO VO On hi o H 4J OS "* s bo CO VO Th VO t-4 o ^ _C t1- r>. 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