THE UNIVERSITY | 
 OF ILLINOIS ~~ fm 
 
 LIBRARY é 
 
 
 
 
 
 Cheodore GA. Rathbone, 
 F- 
 é Some 9 « ls ol 
 
 
 
 ‘4% 
 Wf 
 hi Ps 
 
 a 
 “ 
 x 
 
 
 
iy, 
 sie 
 
 Le 
 
 a 
 -— 
 oe 
 

 
‘SSAYS 
 
 CURRENCY 
 
 AND 
 
 CIRCULATION, 
 
 AND ON 
 
 THE INFLUENCE OF OUR PAPER SYSTEM ON THE INDUSTRY, 
 TRADE, AND REVENUE OF GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 BY JOHN ASHTON YATES. 
 
 
 
 LIVERPOOL: 
 
 PRINTED BY HARRIS AND CO. WATER-STREET, 
 FOR G. AND J. ROBINSON ; AND LONGMAN, REES AND CO. LONDON. 
 
 MDCCCXXVII, 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ges see Gi | 208 a pe But Oty 
 
 | a } 
 
 | | . 4 
 * : ‘aie Mee 
 ie ae ARAL 8 " > Ky | ade 9 a F, rit be wre a3 a? 
 
 
 
 | ‘3 
 2 PATIO PHAR AAR 
 hes nN ‘ie te CRE AG. | a, 
 - “ 4 . * R ¢ 
 ’ 1 } m Pay Pa 2 wh 
 ‘ ; ' gre Park oe yet F, \, 
 ‘ OUR Ais rR NORE rete rae ser aie se 4 
 7 s } q 
 f F ot > 
 eh wee te ; v4 ; me Fs 
 2 i » ° 
 j ig ’ MORTUTITAM tb. FAVOR TAT | 
 
 © 
 
 fs vie i aa) ot Acwr se Zhuana tab AWA BOG 
 Morea | tae” | RTCA AY CAA ane 4 i ve ene 
 
 ghey AAT OD Hk STE AL OO TAR 5 Ki fe 
 
 tie ea a 
 
 ~ 4 ; ‘ 
 
 \? 
 
 
 
23Si\3 Wo 
 
 1. BO 
 
 ia + 
 
 Rial estoy, ror . AX 
 
 TO 
 
 WILLIAM ROSCOE, Esq. 
 
 PRESIDENT, 
 AND 
 
 TO THE MEMBERS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 LITERARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 
 
 OF LIVERPOOL, 
 
 THESE ESSAYS, 
 
 READ DURING THE PRESENT SESSION AT THEIR ROOM, 
 
 THE ROYAL INSTITUTION, 
 
 ARE RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED, 
 
 243922 
 
dep 
 
 her wih nul 0 ind ‘ene 
 
 wha Spun 
 ae 
 
 conte wt ht 
 
 ys rai: 
 
 Uk ‘ 
 <p a 
 OS ifn 
 
 xf ESV A NRE SSG al SOR eas "ASSO 
 iene aby avd nek a herd eta eakermor a <te eag 
 
 Lieb Ya Bx ft eo bi WSU 
 
 ely’ wind} HO-ey ah ae 
 si RiGee. eo 
 
 ¥ 
 
 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 PREFACE wcsccosscccosevece ecccccscerscveccvcccccccscces cvccecccesessesecces i 
 ESSAY 
 I—OF ALTERATIONS IN THE QUANTITY OF CUR- 
 RENCY, AND THE RAPIDITY OF CIRCULATION......5 
 Changes tn the Rapidity of Circulation........sscccessesesseeseeses 12 
 Extraordinary Causes of Increase or Decrease in Rapidity 
 OP CH CUAGION,  <cvncsntesdovesansinusnasenssnsonnacavsucesescetntehs nai 18 
 Fluctuations increased by the Use of Paper Currency....+...000 27 
 I].—OF THE “ ECONOMICAL AND SECURE CURRENCY” 
 PROPOSED BY MR. RICARDO .......cccccseessecresssceesceess 40 
 I1].—OF THE EFFECTS OF AN INCREASE OR DECREASE 
 OF THE CURRENCY.......ccscccccsscccscsesscscseccscoscecess coces 56 
 
 Fluctuations in the Quantity of Currency in Great Britain ...61 
 
 Over-trading ...ccccccccccssersscrssceescsacoes sthenaasacdsctosaseusuqacavak vr. 
 Depreciation of the Currency ....+.++0+0 peneeness aeeuenati pitaewnawets 86 
 Effects of the late Revulsion in England ..ccccseceessesseerasoeerse 93 
 Scottish Bank Note Currency sree. gubtessvase <anats ba cabaie 101 
 
 I1V.—OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE PAPER SYSTEM ON 
 THE INDUSTRY, TRADE, AND REVENUE OF 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN ....... pibsnsdesenegssena Bptere cseqneencsvei tebe 108 
 Views of some popular Writers on this Subject ....scsosssseeres 115 
 
 APPENDIX eoccese evcceres eecercecsece / eoeeceesascsese ee oreescerocss eeeocercess 157 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 at ~ 4 : ‘oe : . / 
 * M , . wf tr, : 
 ‘ . a : ‘eo 
 
 , & se UREA tap ee ste oes swatig sya bienwunces fe of ehgeeeaeeene 
 
 ~) 4 4 ? 
 
 keane EL LUT AUD, RAT Mr eon 
 er Ae ee wor KAddoMG 12: | sh 
 
 RM OE se. ck eae er | Goku ra 
 
 de Vee tree apie AD wy fo we otk ot Tooaatan’ eras 
 Mie? : oh De + ay at La ry x4 aM md a yw ay 
 
 * “t y sad 
 
 |? Seale isda Pet : 
 Ye  - ‘ 8 
 
 ce 
 
 A ESL SAE anata ang vi iil a raha 
 
 1 UNE ARRON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Laan ee Hote tao “as noe 
 my rs \ r 
 tases = vyrete a 4 Ces eeeen Re | sui 
 , / ie aoe A oo 
 [%, ue wd ” cee "Dilan 
 $ se Ae oa i Bb Atk eee bbe ekbanedreael DEE ein ciph 38 [te eee 
 is won'es 4 . : 
 Av oo f ; L! / oP see ‘4 Utes an epin ape ite aes neha ivan “wpnyea 
 me. - SNS THEA Lo SRO Pe Wt 
 heh 
 ~ tear tbees ede te hh takers aes baa, ~~ we i a 
 Cen ea rs 
 ‘ . \ ef 
 F ’ 
 F apy: 04 eb «FE VES Fu A Che w'e BAS 4408 SKE ery’ } oie 
 nf a " sy) Wee G Bee yt 7th a es aa ae: SA SRY 
 e. ’ . ; ~ 
 EV ae Fe eee 
 ; we ee KG Dae 4 
 Vb Maa, AN iAg ane ¥: ij ah M 
 . . " i yh \ewe y 4 ! 148 eee ye ‘A aa wy, 
 ip ak, VaR OAS OAT 
 Haniel iWgy ors)” ais coy egg, 
 ‘ Te a wht Soy 
 ey i H HY Raa np keene Se Teva e a* ésipettes om ans a 
 : § ey yh aye V ie COS. AS 
 YY 7 
 
 r ae 4 b tf. 1} he ES, be 
 7 aye ey ee *' Sy 
 
 
 
 a ae mn 
 
 Ate ~ Petty TLE ie SOCCER Ke Kotor a onilanay 
 
 ‘ : * 
 
 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 THE principles of money, and particularly of 
 paper currency, have been more fully discussed in 
 this country during the last twenty years than in 
 any other age or country; yet some questions of 
 great importance remain unsettled, especially that 
 respecting the extent to which paper may be safely 
 and advantageously substituted for the precious 
 metals. The abstruse nature of these investiga- 
 tions renders them uninviting to general readers, 
 and few perhaps of the students of political econo- 
 my have had patience to read and digest the multi- 
 tude of essays, parliamentary reports, and regular 
 treatises that have appeared from time to time on 
 the question of the currency: but its vital impor- 
 tance has been so pressingly brought home to 
 the business of every man who has a stake in the 
 country, that its inierest ws still fresh and not 
 likely soon to decline. 
 
rH 
 
 Whilst men of the greatest practical wisdom 
 and expertence differ essentially as to the causes of 
 the violent fluctuations which have occurred in 
 the prices of commodities since the return of peace, 
 the most acute of our theoretical writers are 
 scarcely more agreed: the people at large are, 
 therefore, so perplexed by the differences and dis- 
 putes which have arisen, that they appear to 
 despair of arriving at any sound and certain 
 conclusions; and a large number, following the 
 authority of the practical writers, abandon all 
 hope of seeing the precious metals circulate again 
 and perform the functions which they used to per- 
 form in the days of our ancestors. 
 
 After explaining some principles affecting the 
 supply and circulation of money, the writer has — 
 endeavoured to shew, that the difficulties of recur- 
 ring to agold currency have been greatly exagge- 
 rated—and that Mr. Ricardo’s plan of “a safeand 
 economic currency does not possess the advantages 
 or the security which its able advocates have attri- 
 buted to wt ; that no system of paper, or mixed 
 currency of gold silver and paper, can sustain 
 prices of commodities at a higher range, or with 
 more equality than a gold currency; that greater 
 and more injurious fluctuations must occur in this 
 country, even with a gold currency, than in other 
 countrics, owing to our artificial regulations both 
 fiscal and commercial; but that these are much 
 
ill 
 
 aggravated by a paper currency, which necessarily 
 produces extraordinary speculation, and renders 
 the pursuils of agriculture, trade and commerce so 
 uncertain as to give them the character of gam- 
 bling rather than of regular industry. After in- 
 vestigating the circumstances attending the recent 
 Convulsions and disasters, and tracing their con. 
 nexton with the state of our currency, the author 
 examines the imputed influence of a metallic cir- 
 culation on taxation, and the remedies proposed 
 Sor alleviating the burdens that are alleged to 
 depress the productive industry and resources of 
 the country. 
 
 The writer is far from flattering himself that 
 he has done justice to these important inquiries. 
 They are so abstruse and difficult that few have 
 the ability or courage to investigate them, and 
 he does not presume to think he has done so 
 thoroughly ; but of he has succeeded in throwing 
 any new light upon them he shall feel satisfied, 
 although he may incur the charge of presumption 
 in opposing the theories of some political econo- 
 mists, whose talents and labours have acquired 
 for them a high and deserved reputation. 
 
 Liverpool, 1st March, 1827. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 wh cw Peis 
 hy he ane aS a b y Law Ne 
 hae BN S ; y 4 an " is 
 a at a 
 y ¥ . 
 7 * oy i ve nat 
 ‘ ¥ . e , § 2 tree . = 
 a3 ow a a Witte a.” 
 ‘C4 Rin 3 cas ne ne x 
 Rah ne ie a are 
 a + : whe a 
 he ; na : ; 1 he it { ae Ms Fy : Lt es : 
 4 - ‘ « oar al! oa 
 way as \ ia : i Rain, 
 . oy ; ay. <a 
 
 oR ae Ea, hs sgnas a ss rere RK : ow \ 
 AP. xe 1 SHUM Fan Et C The nh y fs 
 He es: WIT AW. NOY RUE a td c 
 : Sot x! ai é Si y sul ei tik ut 4 asl pan \ 
 
 a 
 
 P | ast JABS yj, seers ub ye. Ags cna 
 oAwoowe Wade Rsevgi |) 4 ep & vin bie 
 ee pamaciin’ Ose agree RAD 
 | “agen gtd aoanerehrgetity usted : oe | 
 
 oe er aCe Oe cr 
 . sroamesstieit shy ANB, YOM, erysteorayh nl bi 
 .@) Jokela, Gos i), tse ion ioe "9 
 1 J Ygn so wands haat res VUss | oo a3 
 ee apneloke can, aaah hy Laan 
 ahs avast A opave vad Ganon ore: a 
 Jao ype aeortoge a abstaiso han toate saga ae 
 Se aura genre, wen dsb aks sr vy Aaeygn es yevbalay en “3 ‘i 
 Joe date! qa oming tesa, Li. se | 
 “arte! Bato be: wa | asqeyiavs 
 aware whan AAA IOSO WIS Oslo: wine wale 4 
 Adayrestaaslaa\) indaty, geal, galas ve 
 sarndyeanaraavigy Anca tinh: oleate if 
 seabomaR WO EL ar, INTE OG, cos ait ohh 
 Bae tn iii onl crqnotigy yg diajob sa 
 1 ‘ yf aiOva phage vill sae. yu: “3 
 | Set DL lee aN Lin’ RRDRRR ADA cole nee be 
 7 Sa ei “ad serch 8 5 aed, ba one Mie, Leh lit ell 
 
 $ f ' 3 + 
 ee pede re Ra { bs &d My x pi Pate Soe: 
 
 < peda r i 
 
 ae ake wise BF MR iS sad by. er ob Ages i Ne 
 i + pein roy St andi) soe fi ah ae! yas yogi Z 
 
 ‘ 
 
 
 
L.—OF ALTERATIONS IN THE QUANTITY OF CURRENCY, 
 AND THE RAPIDITY OF CIRCULATION. 
 
 IT is unnecessary for the purposes of this 
 Essay to trace the origin and history of coined 
 money: it is known, that from a very early 
 period the precious metals, being found to 
 contain a great value in a small bulk, were 
 adopted as money in all civilized nations, so 
 that every person who had commodities to sell 
 was willing to take them in exchange. By 
 being mixed with a small portion of alloy, they 
 were rendered so durable as to retain, with 
 little diminution, the same quantity of the pure 
 metal which constituted their value; by being 
 divided into different shapes and sizes, their 
 exchangeable value in every country was easily 
 discerned by the eye; and by being stamped 
 at the government mint, their value was suflici- 
 ently guaranteed to prevent the necessity of 
 weighing and proving their quality every time 
 that a purchase was to be made. The money, 
 when thus coined, facilitated very much all the 
 transactions of barter, of which the trade of 
 the world consists; it not only enabled buyers 
 and sellers easily to settle their accounts in the 
 same country, but in the most distant civilized 
 B 
 
natiens with which the traders of each country 
 were connected, the nature of gold and silver 
 money being such, that it could be ascertained 
 by avery simple process what quantity of the 
 pure metal was contained in each piece, and the 
 quality of such pure gold or silver being found 
 to be exactly the same in whatever part of the 
 world it was produced. 
 
 Previous to the discovery of the mines of gold 
 and silver in Mexico and South America, the 
 precious metals so coined appeared to be little 
 liable to fluctuations in value. Since the supply, 
 however, was so greatly increased by the 
 working of the American mines, the value of 
 the precious metals decreased so much, that 
 the money price of most other commodities 
 has been érebled in the last 300 years; and since 
 these mines have become less productive, in 
 consequence of the revolutions in South Ame- 
 rica, it seems reasonable to conclude, that the 
 value of the precious metals may have increased 
 in some degree. Mr. Tooke appears to think 
 that the fall in the prices of commodities gene- 
 rally, which took place after the resumption of 
 cash payments in 1819, may be partly owing to 
 this cause. He has not, however, I think, 
 given very satisfactory reasons for this opinion ; 
 nor, perhaps, is it possible to prove any thing 
 either for or against the proposition. There 
 
was a stock of gold and silver in Europe in 
 1805 (as Mr. Humboldt estimated) to the 
 amount of about £360,000,000 sterling, (Re- 
 searches, B. 5, c. 11) and he estimated the 
 annual supply of gold and silver which Europe 
 received from America at the time when he 
 was writing (about 1805), to be about 43,500,000 
 piastres, from which he deducts for what flows 
 
 into Asia : 
 By the Levant trade - - 4 ‘millions. 
 By Cape of Good Hope - 17% do. 25,500,000 
 By Russia and Tobolski - 4 do. 
 Leaving about - - - 18,000,000 piastres, 
 
 (at 4s. 33d.), equals £3,780,000 sterling. 
 
 
 
 To this he adds for the produce of the mines of 
 Europe and Siberia about 4 million piastres, 
 making 22,000,000; and deducting from this 
 amount 64 millions for wear and loss, and used 
 for ornaments, there remain 15 million piastres 
 for the annual increase of gold and silver coin 
 in Europe, which is in sterling £3,200,000.— 
 Thus, if Mr. Humboldt’s statement be correct, 
 above one-half of all the gold and silver from 
 the mines of Europe and America went annually 
 into Asia; but it is known, that for many years 
 past the exports to Asia have much fallen off. 
 Since the year 1810, however, the supplies 
 from the American mines have fallen off ina 
 greater degree, and have for some years past 
 not been one-half of what they were in 1805. 
 It is, therefore, not improbable that the stock 
 
of gold and silver specie in Europe has de- 
 creased, though not in such a degree as to have 
 any material effect on prices. 
 
 It is reasonable to suppose, that the value of 
 money in Europe may have been increased 
 since the war, by the increased demand of the 
 different countries whose trade was suspended 
 during the war, and whose population, com- 
 merce, and riches have been on the increase 
 since the return of peace; but the increase of 
 credit, banking accommodations, and paper 
 money, arising from the same circumstances, 
 may have also supplied the place of specie to 
 an equal extent. It is well known, that in 
 Russia, Austria, and some other countries in 
 Germany, the greater part of the circulation 
 consists of paper currency. 
 
 In Storch’s Cours d’ Economie Politique, the 
 whole quantity of metallic currency in the six 
 principal states of Europe is only estimated at 
 140 millions, viz.— 
 
 Great Brita) ro i ao 
 
 yt ey pee Ree or | 
 SAID Wei al); See 
 PIStrip 07, teen's cae ie 
 Pragaia 2) oo). |. or een oe 
 Russin 3. ty |e 
 
 eee 
 
 140 
 
9 
 
 And in the article on ‘“ M/oney” in the Supple- 
 ment to the Encyclopedia Britannica, the specie 
 currency of the rest of Europe is supposed to 
 amount to two-thirds of the above sum, or 93 
 millions; but no data are given for this esti- 
 mate. Ifit were to be assumed as correct, it 
 would make the total amount of specie in Eu- 
 rope only 232 millions sterling. If we suppose 
 this to be the actual amount of specie currency 
 in Europe, and that it was 360 millions twenty 
 years since (as estimated by Humboldt), the 
 general prices of commodities would have been 
 gradually, but very considerably, falling, if their 
 quantity continued the same, unless the dimi- 
 nished quantity of gold and silver had been in 
 the mean time supplied by paper money, or the 
 existing currency had been rendered much more 
 effective by a more rapid circulation, or bya 
 great economy in the use of money consequent 
 on the extension of credit. We have good rea- 
 son, however, to believe, that since the return of 
 peace these causes have been in powerful oper- 
 ation, and that they will continue to act more 
 strongly every year as long as the peace of Eu- 
 rope is preserved. As far as we can judge by a 
 comparison of the present prices of the staple 
 articles of produce in Europe, with those which 
 were current before the war, there is no evi- 
 dence of any decided diminution in the cur- 
 
10 
 
 rency ; the prices of corn, wool and silk have, 
 indeed, rated lower, but those of all other 
 articles rule as high as they did twenty five or 
 thirty years since.* Vide Appendix (A.) 
 
 In Great Britain the fluctuations in the quan- 
 tity of specie have been so remarkable and 
 so rapid, that it is impossible to state the 
 amount with accuracy at any period since the 
 commencement of the war with France in 1793. 
 It is certain that above fifty million pounds have 
 been coined and put in circulation, but we have 
 seldom had more than ten or fifteen at any one 
 time in circulation, and sometimes the gold cur- 
 rency has entirely disappeared, not only during 
 the war, but since the return of peace. The 
 amount of gold and silver which has circulated at 
 different periods has never been precisely ascer- 
 tained ; but there is reason to think, that as our 
 trade has increased, there has not been an in- 
 crease in our currency by any means propor- 
 tioned to it. 
 
 The quantity of gold and silver coined in 
 Great Britain— 
 
 Ke fom 1659 to 17892 OPT 158,006 
 Pe ea a a 
 From 1794 to 1815, do. ~ 14,000,000 
 
 Krom 1816 to 1819, do. = 7,000,000 
 ( From 1816 to 1819, all Silver- 4,000,600 
 
 *The fall in the price of wool may be attributed to the great increase of 
 growth in Germany, and that of silk to its great increased production in India. 
 
if 
 
 From 1817 to 1825 about £33,000,000 of 
 gold and silver were coined, of which a large 
 portion was exported in the latter years. 
 
 In 1826 about £6,000,000 gold and silver. 
 
 N.B.—Of the coinage from 1760 to 1798, 153 
 millions were light gold recoined. 
 
 In i794 to 1797 the gold coin in circulation 
 has been estimated, on what appears to be the 
 best authority, at twenty million pounds; 
 which is what A. Smith supposes it to have been 
 when he wrote his “‘ Wealth of Nations.” 
 
 In 1810 the gold had almost all disappeared, 
 its place being supplied by bank notes. 
 
 To the quantity of gold currency in Great 
 Britain in 1795 to 1797, estimated at about 
 twenty millions, must be added the currency of 
 the Bank of England and of the country banks, 
 estimated at twenty to twenty-five millions, 
 making together about forty-five million pounds. 
 During the war there is reason to think the 
 whole currency generally exceeded sixty mil- 
 lions; but it rose and fell remarkably. Since 
 the peace it appears to have been equally liable 
 to fluctuations; and we have witnessed such 
 extraordinary and sudden alterations m the 
 value of commodities of domestic as well as 
 foreign production, that it has been impossible 
 for capitalists to calculate with more certainty 
 than during the war on the state of prices and 
 the prospects of markets. 
 
12 
 
 The public are now beginning to be convinced 
 that much of this uncertainty is to be attributed 
 to the alterations in the quantity of money; 
 and much has been written to illustrate this 
 proposition: but many of our popular writers 
 are unwilling to admit it, and some of the prin- 
 cipal writers on political economy still recom- 
 mend an adherence to paper currency (under 
 certain regulations) as more advantageous and 
 even more likely to be productive of steady 
 prices than a recurrence to a gold currency. 
 
 Changes in the Rapidity of Circulation. 
 
 It is the total quantity of money in any 
 country that determines what portion of that 
 quantity shall exchange for a certain portion of 
 commodities—in other words, what shall be 
 their money price. If the quantity of commo- 
 dities remains the same, and the rapidity of cir- 
 culation is neither increased nor diminished, 
 the quantity of money cannot increase or di- 
 minish without a corresponding diminution or 
 increase in its value, and a consequent and cor- 
 responding increase or diminution of the prices 
 of commodities. But the rapidity of circula- 
 tion varies so much, not only in different coun- 
 tries, but in the same country at different pe- 
 riods, according to the progress of civilization 
 and trade, that it deserves particular investiga- 
 
13 
 
 -stion. In the progress of wealth and im- 
 provement, increased trade requires a larger 
 amount of currency; but the circulation 
 of that currency becomes continually more 
 quick, and the circumstances which produce 
 increased rapidiy, and the effect of that in- 
 creased rapidity in diminishing the quantity 
 of money which will circulate in a country 
 without raising the prices, or in raising prices, 
 whilst the quantity of money remained the 
 same, have not been fully explained by any 
 writers on money. They say, that the quantity 
 of currency will vary in some degree with the 
 extent of trade, and that the improvements in 
 banking and other circumstances, affect the ve- 
 locity of its movement, and consequently its 
 effective force: but they have not examined 
 the causes of these changes with the attention 
 which is due to so important an inquiry. 
 
 The rapidity of circulation, even when all the 
 currency consists of gold and silver, varies ma- 
 terially in the same country at different periods. 
 The increase of banks causes money to circulate 
 much more quickly, because the bankers are 
 constantly receiving deposits from multitudes, 
 (who would, if these establishments did not 
 exist in their neighbourhood, keep their money 
 idle) and lending the same money to others who 
 wish to borrow it. In London the custom pre- 
 C 
 
14 
 
 vails almost universally of paying the smallest 
 sums, as well as the largest, by checks on 
 bankers: no bank commission being charged, 
 merchants and tradesmen adopt this plan, to 
 such an extent, in order to avoid the risk and 
 trouble of keeping and counting money, that 
 these cash orders circulate every day, to an 
 amount which would scarcely be credited by 
 any person who did not witness it. These 
 checks supply the place of a very large quantity 
 of money, moving frequently through many 
 hands before they are sent in for payment. In 
 provincial towns this system is not carried to 
 any great extent; but the desire which all 
 bankers feel to make the most interest of the 
 money deposited with them by capitalists, in- 
 duces them to lend it to such traders as they 
 consider safe, wherever banks are established ; 
 and the perfection of the banking system is so 
 great in countries where manufactures and 
 commerce are flourishing, and where a large 
 portion of the population is collected in towns, 
 that every hundred pounds of money may per- 
 form the same amount of exchanges that would 
 require a thousand pounds in an agricultural 
 country, and with a scattered and rural popula- - 
 tion. 
 
 As the banking system becomes more ex- 
 tended, the circulation of money increases in a 
 
15 
 
 surprising degree; wherever more is wanted 
 it is quickly provided, so that very little re- 
 mains unemployed either in the hands of bankers 
 or individuals. 
 
 _ The security and quickness of conveyance in- 
 creases the rapidity of circulation; how tedious, 
 expensive, and hazardous would be the trans- 
 mission of specie from one part of England to 
 another, if the roads were bad, and the convey- 
 ances slow: how easy it is to remit now com- 
 pared with what it was fifty years since, when it 
 cost ds, 10s, 15s, and 20s to get £100 conveyed 
 to London from the country. 
 
 The rapidity of circulation | is ‘also. much 
 affected by the use of bills of exchange; these 
 are not to be considered as a part of the 
 currency of a country, (for reasons which 
 will be assigned hereafter) but they have 
 the effect of economizing the circulation of 
 money very much, by settling accounts between 
 wholesale dealers in the same place, and at 
 distant places in the same country by bills or 
 orders on the metropolis, where the bulk of all 
 payments are made to center; and the economy 
 of specie is likewise greatly increased by the 
 credits which are given of 2, 4, or 6 months, 
 now common in every country of extensive 
 traffick. In the metropolis the system of the 
 clearing house economizes the use of money so 
 
16 
 
 much, that it is computed above four million 
 pounds of payments are made every day, by an 
 amount of specie and bank notes of less than 
 £250,000; forty or fifty of the principal bankers 
 meeting at a certain place, called the clearing 
 house, where the business of the day is con- 
 cluded, by each setting off with all the rest of 
 the bankers the checks and engagements which 
 are there produced, and then paying to each 
 other only the balances that appear to result from 
 such sets-off. Owing to these facilities for in- 
 creasing the rapidity of circulation, and econo- 
 mizing payments by credit and otherwise, it is 
 probable that in this country nearly the same 
 amount of currency may suffice for all the pur- 
 poses as was required thirty or forty years ago, 
 when the wealth, population, and trade of the 
 country were so much smaller than at present. 
 These causes operating with increased strength 
 as a nation becomes more extended and _ skilful. 
 in trade, and the system of banking is rendered 
 more perfect, ten millions of money may perform 
 at one period the same functions which required 
 fifteen millions at another period, so that the 
 prices of commodities may remain the same, al- 
 though the amount of money is so materially 
 diminished. Some commodities may be higher 
 and some lower, but the amount of the whole 
 may not be increased; in the progress of society 
 
17 
 
 the real prices of most articles of the raw pro- 
 duce of the land, as corn, cattle, &c. rise, whilst 
 almost all articles of manufacturing industry 
 become cheaper, for reasons which are explained 
 by Adam Smith, Ricardo, and other writers ; 
 but rich countries do not necessarily employ 
 an increase of money proportioned to their in- 
 creased wealth. Thus fifty millions may suffice 
 at the same period of time for a country like 
 England to carry on its immense traffick, to 
 circulate all the products of its high-priced agri- 
 cultural labour, to pay above a hundred million 
 pounds # annum to its artizans and manufac- 
 turers for wages, and to answer the government 
 demands of fifty-six millions for taxes; whilst 
 France, Spain, or Austria may require a much 
 larger amount, in proportion to their population, 
 although their trade, revenues, and wealth are 
 much smaller. It is generally believed, that 
 the currency of France amounts to 70 or 
 £80,000,000 sterling, principally silver, scarcely 
 any paper—the circulation of the notes of the 
 bank of France being-almost entirely confined 
 to Paris and the vicinity. 
 
 If a country in which this rapid circulation 
 has existed, for a certain period of time, de- 
 clines in its trade, owing to political or any 
 other causes, the same amount of currency 
 might remain, although the quantity of business 
 
18 
 
 should decrease materially ; so that there ap- 
 pears to be much less connection between the 
 wealth of a country, and its quantity of money, 
 than would at first view appear probable. 
 
 Extraordinary Causes of Increase or Decrease in 
 the Rapidity of Circulation. 
 
 But, in countries whose trade and prosperity 
 are in full vigour, circumstances sometimes occur 
 which diminish the rapidity of circulation, and 
 produce the effects of a scarcity of money for a 
 considerable length of time, although the actual 
 quantity of money remains the same. In such 
 countries a very large portion of all the trade is 
 carried on by credit; and when important 
 changes arise either in the political state of the 
 country or in its commercial relations, credit is 
 sometimes affected to such an extent as to pro- 
 duce a great scarcity of money: the real scarcity 
 is in such cases not so great as it appears to be; 
 but the circulation is impeded, and bankers, 
 merchants, manufacturers, and all kinds of 
 dealers think it prudent to keep a larger supply 
 than usual for their own wants, and are not dis- 
 posed to extend to their customers the credits 
 which they have been used to give. When 
 gluts are created of particular articles, or when 
 foreign markets are closed for such a period as 
 to paralize the export trade of the country, the 
 
19 
 
 merchant or manufacturer finding his ware- 
 houses filled, and the usual demand suspended, 
 abstains from producing or importing the custo- 
 mary quantities. The anticipation of a great 
 decline in the prices in such cases is generally 
 found to operate more strongly than the real 
 state of things justifies; the regular dealers 
 keeping out of the market as long as they can, 
 sales are forced at continually reduced prices, 
 and speculative capital is not generally invested 
 until the depression in prices is so great, and of 
 such long continuance, that the diminution of 
 supply is remarkable, and an increased con- 
 sumption is become very apparent. 
 
 Where manufacturers and commerce are ex- 
 tensive, new and extensive wants are frequently 
 created, and old ones as frequently decline: so 
 that periods occur where large numbers of la- 
 bourers, in particular manufactures, are deprived 
 of employment to such an extent, that they can 
 scarcely buy enough of food for their daily 
 support, and cannot afford to buy above one- 
 half or two-thirds their usual quantity of cloth- 
 ing and little luxuries; in such countries in- 
 stances are not unfrequent, when, owing to bad 
 crops and the deficient quantity of corn or other 
 goods of general consumption, the prices are so 
 much enhanced, that the consumption is dimin- 
 ished, and the circulation of money is less rapid 
 
20 
 
 between the consumers and the dealers, and 
 consequently between the dealers and pro- 
 ducers, or importers. In these cases the work- 
 men are partially employed by capitalists, and 
 they therefore do not frequent the shops of the 
 dealers as they used to do; the dealers find 
 their stocks hang on hand, and buy sparingly 
 from the manufacturers or importers :—these 
 last keep their goods or produce less, and the 
 whole circulation of the country is diminished. 
 In England this state of things has frequently 
 occurred since the return of peace, to such an 
 extent, that all trade appeared to be at a-stand, 
 and the general complaint was, that the money 
 had disappeared. During the continuance of 
 such stagnation, the money, if it consisted all of 
 gold and silver, could not. really be diminished, 
 but would be lying in considerable masses in- 
 active in the hands of bankers, and in smaller 
 portions in the hands of shopkeepers, dealers, 
 and private individuals. 
 
 It is not easy to say how ¢awation affects the 
 circulation generally : it must vary in different 
 countries according to the way in which taxes 
 are imposed: this question will be examined in 
 the latter part of this Essay, in which the effect 
 of taxation upon the prices of commodities in 
 this country will be investigated. Itis sufficient 
 in this part to shew how taxation impedes and 
 
21 
 
 changes the channels of circulation, and pro- 
 duces inconvenient fluctuations. If all taxes 
 were raised by an equal ad valorem rate on all the 
 productions of industry, both domestic and im- 
 ported, and on incomes arising from all realized 
 property, there appears no reason to think that 
 any material effect would be produced on circu- 
 lation: or if the taxes in any country were 
 raised by equal rates on imported merchandize, 
 as in the United States, where the merchant 
 only pays them as he receives them from the 
 consumers, no great influence would be pro- 
 duced on the circulation. But in general the 
 machinery of taxation is very complex ; and the 
 more so in proportion as it increases in its total 
 amount. It is obvious that in the ordinary mode 
 of taxation, by duties on particular commodities, 
 the direct effect is to draw money into that trade 
 which produces or deals in them. If a tax 
 of 20 # cent. were imposed upon all calicoes 
 in the loom, a large sum would be required in 
 addition to what is now employed in that manu- 
 facture, which must be drawn from all other 
 trades, and cause more or less a scarcity of 
 money, and an inability to afford the customary 
 credits to dealers throughout the country. If, 
 on the other hand, the duty on sugars, amount- 
 ing as in this country to nearly 100 #cent. on the 
 value, were to be reduced to 50 ¥ cent., a very 
 D 
 
22 
 
 considerable portion of the capital now em- 
 ployed in that trade, would be disengaged, 
 and would gradually find its way into other 
 channels of employment. 
 
 The effect of taxation will vary also accord- 
 ing to the mode in which the revenue is expend- 
 ed. If in foreign expenditure, as paying troops, 
 &c., the continual drain of money will be so 
 generally felt as to cause bankers and other 
 capitalists to be extraordinarily reserved and 
 cautious of lending money, so that the general 
 circulation will be impeded and languid. If the 
 larger portion of the revenue is applied to the 
 payment of the national creditors, the derange- 
 ment will be much less; because the capitalists, 
 finding that the greater part returns, through 
 the medium of national consumption, into the 
 hands of dealers, and is speedily distributed 
 again by that means to the different classes of 
 producers, can without imprudence make ad- 
 vances in the confidence of early reimburse- 
 ment. When the total amount of taxation has 
 remained settled and stationary for some years, 
 the circulation adapts itself to it, and the traders 
 and capitalists can make their calculations and 
 pecuniary arrangements accordingly : but it very 
 often happens that the taxation is either increas- 
 ing materially for purposes of war, or that it is 
 diminishing on the return of peace. These ~ 
 
23 
 
 changes in the total amount of revenue necessa- 
 rily have the effect (owing to the partial mode 
 in which taxes are imposed) of deranging the 
 distribution of the currency in the country, 
 and consequently affecting the rapidity of cir- 
 culation. 
 
 The measures of government have therefore a 
 powerful effect upon circulation, especially in 
 countries where taxation is heavy, and the fund- 
 ing system is resorted to extensively: the 
 periods when these operate most powerfully are 
 generally periods of war. The enormous sums 
 which were added to our national debt during 
 the last war no longer exist, (excepting in 
 figures)—they were all spent, and a large por- 
 tion in foreign parts, in subsidies, and payments 
 of our troops in Spain, America, &c. The same 
 twenty million pounds which were borrowed 
 and expended in 1814 were again borrowed and 
 expended in 1815, and every additional loan 
 seemed to increase the facility of raising another. 
 The profits which were derived from government 
 loans made stock-jobbing an important branch 
 of business at the commencement of last cen- 
 tury ; and every succeeding war this business 
 has employed an increasing portion of the money 
 of this country. Individuals are now never at a 
 loss for what they consider a safe depository of 
 their wealth—hoarding is never practised to any 
 
24 
 
 extent—and the miser, who used to hide his 
 money in chests and holes, now invests it in the 
 funds. Itis no sooner advanced to the govern- 
 ment than it is gradually transferred to a variety 
 of industrious individuals who employ it in trade. 
 Even when the loans are concluded, a large capi- 
 tal is constantly employed as a floating capital for 
 speculating in the funds: this sum is increased 
 when the regular trade of the country is dull, 
 and, on the contrary, it is diminished when the 
 trade of the country becomes more active. The 
 quarterly dividends now payable in Great 
 Britain, amounting to six or seven million 
 pounds, make a very large addition to the gene- 
 ral circulation, particularly in the metropolis, 
 at the periods of payment, and the preparation 
 for these payments causes a scarcity of money 
 for some time previous to these quarterly pay- 
 ments, though not to the extent that might be 
 expected from the large amount of the divi- 
 dends, because a large portion is immediately 
 reinvested in the funds.* 
 
 The effects of the funding system on the 
 money market are therefore various at differ- 
 ent periods. | When loans are contracted, 
 large sums are at first drawn to the metro- 
 polis, but a large portion is soon dispersed into 
 
 * See in the Appendix (B) the account of Bank of England notes circulating 
 in the beginning of January, April, July, and October. 
 
20 
 
 the country again: government issues exche- 
 quer bills to an immense amount, and makes 
 heavy calls on the bank of England in anticipa- 
 tion of the revenue; but a large portion of the 
 sums so borrowed is speedily disbursed in 
 paying for naval and military stores and muni- 
 tions, hire for transports, provisions for the 
 victualling board, &c.; so that the capitalists, 
 including fund jobbers and contractors, are 
 continually drawing back into their hands the 
 money which they had lent, in order to lend it 
 again to the chancellor of the exchequer. In this 
 country this system has heen accompanied, it is 
 true, by great issues of paper, and it is now ad- 
 mitted on all hands that this paper was much 
 depreciated ; but the same effects would have 
 been produced in kind, though not in degree, if 
 our currency had been confined to specie. The 
 circulation would have been at one time much 
 increased in rapidity, and at another much di- 
 minished ; and by that means the alternations 
 of high and low prices would have been pro- 
 duced : the effect of the great use of paper was 
 to cause prices to rise and fall much more than 
 they could have done without such use of paper. 
 Mr. Mushet, in his late publication on the 
 effects of our bank and. paper system, endea- 
 yours to prove, by a long and close train of 
 reasoning, and a careful examination of facts, 
 
26 
 
 that almost all the fluctuations in prices which 
 have taken place in this country in the last 20 
 years or more are to be attributed to an undue 
 increase and decrease in the amount of our 
 currency. He says, that ‘‘ general prices can- 
 not rise, unless the medium in which commodi- 
 ties are valued is altered ;” and resting with con- 
 fidence on the general soundness of this princi- 
 ple, he appears to me to carry it so far as to do 
 an injury to hisown argument. Mr. Tooke, on 
 the other hand, in his valuable work on high 
 and low prices, does not, I think, make suffi- 
 cient allowance for the effects produced on 
 prices by the fluctuations in the quantity of our 
 currency. If the circumstances which have 
 been pointed out in the preceding pages as 
 affecting the rapidity of circulation, and the 
 economy in the use of money by credit, be cor- 
 rect, they may account for much of the rise and 
 fall of prices, during the periods in question, 
 without attributing so much as Mr.Tooke does to 
 scarcities and gluts, or so much as Mr. Mushet 
 does to actual increase or decrease in the 
 amount of bank of England and country bank 
 notes. It appears to me clear, that in this 
 country we should always be liable to great 
 fluctuations in prices at different periods, even 
 although the quantity of currency did not vary 
 materially, and the quantity of commodities 
 
27 
 
 remained pretty uniform; but that the use of 
 paper is to aggravate such fluctuations exceed- 
 ingly. 
 
 Fluctuations increased by the Use of Paper 
 Currency. 
 
 Where a large part of the currency of a 
 country consists of bank notes, of such small 
 amounts as to supply the place of specie, the 
 quantity of money, as well as the rapidity of cir- 
 culation, will fluctuate more frequently and exten- 
 sively than if it consisted of the precious metals 
 only. During such periods of depression or 
 distress as have been referred to, the quantity 
 will diminish much more quickly than if the 
 whole consisted of a metallic currency: when 
 the money of any country is wholly metallic, 
 distress and dulness of trade cause the holders 
 to keep their money, or deposit it in safe hands 
 where they may make some interest for it, and 
 bring it to market as soon as possible. But if 
 composed largely of paper, the holders are 
 anxious to get rid of it, on account of some risk 
 which is always considered to belong to it, and 
 all bankers therefore make extraordinary pro- 
 vision for paying their notes; they hoard gold 
 in order to provide against the chance of a run, 
 and many of them are unwilling to put out new 
 notes, because they do not feel satisfied with 
 
28 
 
 the security of the bills which are offered for dis- 
 count; whilst many others who would perhaps 
 continue their issues, are unable to get out their 
 notes as they used to do, on account of the 
 public distrust of their stability. 
 
 The issues of bank notes depending so much 
 on the state of credit, their circulation must be 
 peculiarly liable to be influenced by the hopes 
 and fears of the public who receive them, as 
 well as of the bankers who issue them, whereby 
 the state of the currency is rendered uncertain 
 and very liable to be affected by political events, 
 as well as by changes in the course of trade. 
 
 In proportion as the trade of any country in- 
 creases, the system of credit is generally found 
 to increase also; but the general use of paper 
 currency introduces the principle of credit into 
 every ramification of society: the bankers who 
 issue the paper not only lend the real capitals 
 which are deposited with them, but they lend 
 their own credit to tens of thousands of indivi- 
 duals who become possessors of their promis- 
 sory notes for £1 or £2 ; thus credit is no longer 
 confined to the larger dealings of trade, but the 
 whole of the retail business is dependant upon 
 it, and all the multifarious dealings of society 
 are grounded on mutual confidence. ‘When the 
 community is prosperous, every thing goes on 
 well with such a system. The paper of banks 
 
29 
 
 possessing little property circulates as freely 
 as that of rich bankers; the bankers’ notes cir- 
 culate every where more rapidly than cash, and 
 are generally preferred as being more convenient. 
 But the very principle of confidence and credit 
 on which this system is founded contains the 
 elements of its own instability. A war, or the 
 apprehension of a war, a bad harvest, civil com- 
 motions, or a few commercial or banking fail- 
 ures, are sufficient to shake it to the foundation. 
 The tie which united the community in mutual 
 support is suddenly broken ; it was strong when 
 it was held together by universal confidence, and 
 tied with the slender bands of good opinion and 
 faith ; but as soon as a single thread fails, the 
 whole cord appears to give way; universal dis- 
 trust and alarm succeed, and the circulation is 
 so suddenly checked, that the business of so- 
 ciety appears as if it were at astand. Thereis 
 a demand for specie, but it has disappeared ; 
 and the bankers, formerly so anxious to accom- 
 modate the traders, even of doubtful character 
 and stability, are unable or indisposed to dis- 
 count for the most substantial ; merchants of 
 undoubted property are compelled to suspend 
 their payments; and the effects of this state of 
 things recoiling on the bankers, the weakest 
 among them are ruined: then succeeds a ge- 
 neral panic amongst the multitude, who are 
 E 
 
30 
 
 holders of the small notes, and the failures 
 amongst bankers, merchants, and dealers be- 
 come more general. The quantity of currency, 
 in consequence of such a state of things, di- 
 minishes surprisingly. The bank of England 
 and the great bankers of the metropolis are ap- 
 plied to so urgently for specie, and the run on 
 them for it is so great, that a general want of 
 money and of confidence is soon felt there; this 
 disorder reacts upon the country, and universal 
 poverty and distress seem to pervade the com- 
 mercial community. 
 
 But if the general introduction of paper money 
 in the place of specie increase so very much the 
 fluctuations in the quantity of currency and in the 
 rapidity of its circulation, these effects will be 
 more remarkable if any particular company like 
 the Bank of England is invested by the govern- 
 ment with a monopoly of the paper circulation, 
 of the metropolis and a large district around it, 
 as well as with the receipt of the taxes, the 
 payment of the dividends on the funds, and the 
 management of the whole of the banking con- 
 cerns of the state. A company so constituted, 
 though really forming no essential part of the 
 executive or legislative government, possesses 
 in no trifling degree a practical share in the 
 powers of government, and from its extraor- 
 dinary influence over the money market may 
 
31 
 
 exercise a powerful control over the acts of the 
 Administration. The directors of such an es-. 
 tablishment, though composed of twenty-four 
 bankers and merchants, who are continually 
 changing, and have their own concerns to at- 
 tend to, become an imperium in imperio, which 
 generally forward, but sometimes thwart, the 
 measures of Government; and flattered by the 
 power which they possess over all the interests 
 of a great commercial country, will with even 
 the best intentions occasionally commit great 
 errors, and derange the currency in a way which, 
 is extremely injurious. All the bankers through- 
 out the country, and the mercantile world gene-, 
 rally look up to the Bank of England as a guide. 
 for the regulation of their own money concerns;, 
 country bankers extend or contract as the Bank 
 of England extends or contracts the circulation 
 of its notes; and, therefore, if the bank directors 
 make a mistake, the effects of it are greatly 
 increased, and the whole circulation of the 
 country is increased when it ought to be dimi- 
 nished, or diminished when it ought to be .in- 
 creased.—({See, for an illustration of these re- 
 marks, the observations of Mr. Ricardo, Mr. 
 Mushet, and Mr. Tooke, respecting the injudi- 
 cious conduct of the bank in 1823 to 1825, and 
 in Appendix (H) an extract from the protest, of 
 the bank directors against the measures pror 
 
32 
 
 posed in April, 1819, for returning to cash 
 payments. ) ; 
 
 .The use of paper money, moreover, renders 
 the circulation more wncertain than it would be 
 with gold, owing to the uncertainty as to the 
 way in which credit is affected by political or 
 other occurrences. 
 
 If large sums of gold are sent out of the 
 country to pay for imported corn after a bad 
 harvest, to pay our troops, or to subsidise foreign 
 nations, the natural effect is to make money 
 scarce, and to produce a general fall in the 
 prices of commodities; but in a country where 
 commerce and manufactures are very extensive, 
 and the whole circulation is metallic money, the 
 export of manufactures or other goods would 
 soon bring back the money; where, however, 
 the paper system is established, the quantity of 
 bank notes would increase as the precious 
 metals disappeared, if the general trade of the 
 country was in a flourishing state, and thus we 
 should be prevented for a long period of time 
 from getting them back by the usual course of 
 trade, because our prices would be unnaturally 
 sustained by the increased issues of notes, But if 
 a state of things existed in which confidence was 
 materially shaken, and credit consequently di- 
 minished, the export of. gold might create such 
 an alarm, that the bankers would not only de- 
 
33 
 
 cline issuing more notes, but would do all in 
 their power to collect gold and silver for the 
 purpose of answering any demands on them for 
 payment of their notes already running, or of 
 balances deposited in their hands. It is wncer- 
 taim what effect would be produced, under the 
 circumstances above referred to, upon the quan- 
 tity and circulation of a paper currency; and 
 still greater would be the uncertainty in any 
 great political change, as that of a war breaking 
 out, the effects of which upon the trade of the 
 country cannot be foreseen. 
 
 Thus it is that the extensive introduction of 
 paper money is calculated to produce a spirit of 
 gambling amongst bankers in their money trans- 
 actions, amongst farmers in their agricultural pur- 
 suits, and amongst manufacturers and merchants 
 in the various commodities in which they deal, 
 which leads to a derangement in the distribution 
 of capital, and to such vicissitudes in trade as 
 will at one time check circulation very much, 
 and diminish the quantity of currency, and give 
 them an extraordinary impulse at another. Pre- 
 vious to the late war the number of bankers in 
 England and Wales was only 250 to 300—in 
 1808 they had increased to about 750—in 1812 
 to 1814 to above 900—in the four succeeding 
 years they were so much diminished (chiefly 
 owing to failures), that in the year 1818 to 1819 
 
$4 
 
 the whole number was only about 600—since 
 then they increased so much, that in 1825 
 they were above 750, and it is known, that 
 in a very few months since that time about 100 
 of them failed. Had our currency been only 
 specie, it is probable the number of banks would 
 never have been much more than one-half of 
 what it has been: a large portion of them were 
 established merely in order to issue notes, and 
 the greater part of the failures amongst them 
 have been owing to their doing so with very in- 
 adequate capital. These could not have got 
 their notes into circulation without making 
 loans to adventurers of small means, who were 
 tempted like the bankers themselves to play 
 the high game of hazard: indeed the bankers 
 were frequently themselves large speculators in 
 land, mines, manufactures, &c., and advanced 
 their notes as wages to labourers, or to pay for 
 the first cost of mills, machinery, &c. Many 
 of these schemes failed—many also. succeeded. 
 It-is not our present object to enquire whether 
 the national wealth was increased or diminished 
 by this system; but it is obvious it had a ten- 
 dency to make trade and agriculture more 
 hazardous and fluctuating, and that it produced 
 great revolutions of property, and violent 
 changes in the currency. It has been main- 
 tained that the same speculation and overtrading 
 
30 
 
 might have existed with a metallic currency, 
 and we shall examine this question in another 
 part of this Essay. The only object at present 
 is to shew, that this spirit is very much encour- 
 aged by the general use of a paper currency 
 and that it produces, by a necessary reaction, 
 violent shocks and panics, which end in a 
 sudden contraction of currency and circulation. 
 
 A. singular effect of the general introduction 
 of paper currency is, that local notes are so 
 much confined to the immediate districts where 
 they are issued, that they may for a consider- 
 able length of time decrease in one particular 
 district, whilst they are stationary in the rest 
 of the country. Where an extensive trade 
 or manufacture is carried on in a particular 
 county, as that of iron is in Staffordshire or 
 Glamorganshire, and the wages are paid and 
 all the ordinary traffic carried on by the local 
 notes of the bankers; a temporary briskness of 
 that trade may cause an undue increase of the 
 currency, or a temporary depression in trade 
 may be unnecessarily aggravated by the 
 bankers who issue the notes designedly con- 
 tracting their issues either to answer selfish 
 purposes of their own, or from unwarrantable 
 apprehensions of loss. 
 
 A similar peculiarity attending the use of 
 paper money is, that it may increase in a large 
 
36 
 
 part of a country, whilst it diminishes in an- 
 other large part of the same country, and even 
 in the metropolis. When the currency of the 
 metropolis and of an extensive district is sup- 
 plied principally (as is the case in London and 
 Lancashire as well as the whole of Scotland) 
 by the notes of chartered banking companies 
 or joint-stock companies, whilst the rest of the 
 country is supplied almost entirely by Jocal 
 notes issued by a great number of bankers 
 whose circulation is confined to their respective 
 neighbourhoods or counties, it may happen that 
 the quantity of currency in the metropolis and 
 other places which depend on the chartered 
 banks, may diminish, whilst that of all the rest 
 of the country is perceptibly increasing. The 
 latter is very much confined to the traffic of 
 agricultural districts, never mixing with the 
 other description of currency; so that if com- 
 merce and manufactures are checked, whilst 
 agriculture continues in a thriving state, which 
 sometimes happens, the currency of the former 
 may diminish, whilst the latter keeps increasing, 
 and vice versa. This has been clearly proved in 
 the experience of the last ten years in Great 
 Britain. 
 
 The opinion of Mr. Ricardo, Mr. Horner, 
 and other writers on the bullion question in 
 1810, was, that the quantity of country bank 
 
37 
 
 notes depended almost entirely on the quantity 
 of bank of England notes; that as the latter 
 increased the former increased in a similar 
 ratio, and that the amount of country bank 
 notes decreased as the bank of England notes 
 decreased. It may be admitted, that the same 
 circumstances which lead to an increase of bank 
 of England. notes generally tend to promote an 
 increase of country notes; but there is no neces- 
 sary dependance of the one on the other to the 
 extent asserted by these writers. They say, if 
 an excess of paper be issued in a country dis- 
 trict, while the London circulation does not ex- 
 ceed its due proportion, there will be a local rise 
 of prices in that country district, but prices in 
 London will remain as before; the holders of the 
 country paper will then, they say, prefer buy- 
 ang in London where things are cheaper, and will 
 therefore return the country paper on thebank who 
 issued wt, demanding in lieu of tt bank of England 
 notes, and thus the excess of country paper is con- 
 tinually returned on the issuers for bank of Eng- 
 land notes ; and the quantity of the latter necessa- 
 rily and effectually limits the quantity of the 
 former. The local rise of prices in consequence 
 of an increased issue of country bank notes 
 must be enormous in order to bring corn or 
 iron from. London: to Glamorganshire or Staf- 
 fordshire; and as these two counties have the 
 F 
 
38 
 
 entire supply of all the iron consumed in Great 
 Britain, I see no reason why they cannot raise 
 their prices until the profits on making iron are 
 so. much increased beyond the ordinary rate of 
 profit in other trades, that the produce is 
 greatly increased, or until the consumption is 
 diminished—results which may not take place 
 for one or. two years or more. In like manner 
 when the woollen trade is brisk, an undue in- 
 crease may take place in Yorkshire in the amount 
 of local notes, without any increase in London or 
 other parts: the Yorkshiremen will be enabled 
 to buy more imported luxuries in London and 
 more commodities in other parts, and they will 
 also consume probably more of the produce 
 of the land of neighbouring districts; but 
 _ they will pay for all these things in York- 
 shire manufactures ultimately: they will not, 
 ‘as is alleged, exchange their local notes for bank 
 of England paper, and then go to the London 
 market to buy goods; dealers from all parts 
 supply them, taking the local notes in payment, 
 and giving them to other factors or dealers who 
 want to buy Yorkshire goods. 
 
 Although the irregularities which have been 
 described above are much promoted by the use 
 of paper, it is not to be denied that the same 
 effects might be experienced to some extent with 
 a metallic currency; in the long run paper 
 
39 
 
 money cannot circulate to a much larger amount 
 than specie, either in any particular country, or 
 in any particular district of any country: but 
 the use of paper produces at one time a redun- 
 dancy and at another a deficiency with a rapi 
 
 dity and to an extent which could not exist 
 with a metallic circulation. On this subject all 
 are agreed :—‘‘ It is in fact one of the most se- 
 rious inconveniences attached to the use of such 
 a species of paper currency as is supplied by 
 the country bankers of England, that it is ex- 
 tremely apt to be, on the one hand, suddenly 
 and unduly contracted in periods of revulsion, or 
 when the price of any large class of commodities 
 is on the decline; and that, on the other, it is 
 very apt to be as unduly enlarged in periods 
 when confidence is high and prices generally on 
 the advance. All persons are aware how vastly 
 the misery and distress occasioned by the heavy 
 fall of prices that took place subsequently to the 
 close of last war were aggravated by the failure 
 of so many of the English country banks.— 
 These failures had a double effect. They not 
 only spread irremediable ruin among those un- 
 fortunate individuals who had deposited their 
 money in their hands, but by lessening the 
 quantity of money in the country, they added 
 to its value, and thus rendered the fall of prices 
 much more considerable than it would other- 
 
40 
 
 wise have been. No sooner, however, has the. 
 country recovered from its former depressed. 
 state, than the country bankers are again adding 
 greatly to their issues. They have confidence 
 in the stability of the farmers and manufac- 
 turers, and the latter have confidence in them. 
 Not only do the old houses add to the number 
 of their notes in circulation, but new competi- 
 tors are every now and then coming into the 
 field, who, from a natural desire to get their 
 paper into circulation, are less scrupulous in 
 their investigations with respect to the circum- 
 stances of the applicants for loans.” 
 
 
 
 Il.—OF THE “ ECONOMICAL AND SECURE CURRENCY ” 
 PROPOSED BY MR. RICARDO. 
 
 Great as the alteration in the value of metal- 
 lic money has been, in consequence of the in-. 
 creased supply of gold and silver from the 
 American mines, no other commodities have 
 been found which so well answered the purposes 
 of money. ‘The precious metals have been de- 
 preciated very much, but it has been the gra- 
 dual and slow operation of 300 years; and if 
 they. should be now increasing in value, owing 
 
41 
 
 to the’ mines having in the last 20 years been 
 less productive, the alteration is scarcely per- 
 ceptible, and even very doubtful. A metallic 
 currency then is still the most convenient and 
 secure medium of exchange; it is the most con- 
 venient, because it contains the greatest value 
 in a small bulk, and consequently is easy of 
 transmission ; and it is the securest, because it 
 contains a known quantity of metal which is in 
 constant demand at its full cost of production. 
 But it is this last circumstance—the cost of a 
 metallic currency—which has been considered 
 by some eminent political economists as the 
 principal reason why the use of it should be 
 superseded by a paper currency, which they say, 
 provided the paper be accompanied by a clear 
 ability and liability to be exchanged for coin or 
 for bullion on demand, would enable us to dis- 
 pense with so costly an article as gold for money, 
 and allow us to exchange it for the purchase of 
 more useful commodities. ‘Their argument is, 
 that paper would be equally secure, and being 
 more portable, would be more convenient; and 
 they maintain, that if paper be at any time re- 
 duced below the value of the metal by over 
 issues, every holder of the paper would imme- 
 diately exchange it for coin or bullion, and thus 
 the issues would necessarily be reduced to the 
 same amount as would be in circulation if gold 
 
42 
 
 and silver were the only medium. of exchange, 
 They also propose, that if the issues of paper 
 be at any time reduced below the convenient 
 and proper amount, (which they admit might 
 be the case in periods of alarm arising from war, 
 or sudden changes in the state of trade, and of 
 which the bankers might avail themselves to 
 make a profit by buying gold) a remedy may be 
 applied by making it obligatory on the bankers 
 who issue notes to buy gold at a fixed price; 
 by these restrictions, they say, the value of the 
 notes might be kept steadily conformable to the 
 metallic standard, and the coin might be wholly 
 dispensed with. 
 
 _ We have seen how many changes may take 
 place in the value of money in a country when it 
 is metallic; that it does not remain as fixed as 
 would be desirable, and we have endeavoured 
 to shew how much greater these changes are 
 where paper forms a large portion of the cur- 
 rency. The advocates of paper currency, 
 however, maintain not only that paper would in 
 ordinary circumstances answer all the uses of 
 the metals, (if guarded by the precautions men- 
 tioned above) but that it would be less liable 
 to fluctuations in value, and that it would be pe- 
 culiarly useful in supplying the place of the 
 precious metals, when these are sent out of the 
 country on any extraordinary emergency (such 
 
43 
 
 as for the purchase of cornin years of scarcity, 
 
 or for paying troops, subsidies, &c. in periods 
 
 of foreign war); and that in those critical cir- 
 
 cumstances which occur occasionally, affecting 
 commercial credit, as civil commotions, paper 
 possesses an advantage over gold in not being 
 lable to be hoarded by the timid or the avari- 
 
 cious. Jn Mr. Ricardo’s “ Proposals for an eco- 
 
 nomical and secure Currency,” p. 8, is the fol- 
 lowing paragraph :—*‘ Amongst the advantages 
 
 of a paper over a metallic circulation, may be 
 reckoned, as not the least, the facility with which 
 
 it may be altered in quantity, as the wants of 
 commerce and temporary circumstances may re- 
 quire, enabling the desirable object of keeping 
 money at an uniform value to be, as far as it 
 ts otherwise practicable, securely and cheaply 
 attained.” 
 
 This facility with which a paper circulation 
 
 may be altered in quantity, as the wants of trade 
 and temporary circumstances require, appears 
 
 to me to be one of the greatest objections to it; 
 instead of promoting the <‘‘ desirable object of 
 keeping money at an uniform value,” it has a de- 
 cided tendency to produce the contrary effect. 
 From the definition and explanation given of the 
 nature and uses of money (in which Mr. Ricardo 
 and his school agree with those who deny their 
 conclusion as to the superiority of paper money) 
 
i 
 it follows, that it is of no consequence whether 
 the whole currency of the commercial world be 
 300 or 600 millions ; and that each country must 
 on the whole possess that share of the whole 
 mass of money which its trade requires. The 
 wants of trade, then, it will be conceded, will 
 draw to this country whatever money may be 
 required to carry on our trade both internal and 
 foreign, to whatever extent it may be carried on 
 from one period to another. : But if temporary 
 circumstances arise, which create a use or de- 
 mand for a greater quantity of money, the power 
 of satisfying that demand sooner than it would 
 be satisfied by the import of money from other 
 countries, or from the effects of more rapid cir- 
 culation at home, appears to me of very doubt- 
 ful utility. Ifan import of corn be wanted, it 
 may be obtained as fast as it is generally desir- 
 able by sending gold to buy it, which will be 
 got back in a reasonable time by the fall in ma- 
 nufactures and other exportable commodities ; 
 whereas, if paper is the only or the principal 
 money wn the country, we have no means of pur- 
 chasing a speedy supply of corn, for an increase 
 of paper will, by keeping up high prices of all 
 commodities, check the export trade in manufac- 
 tures, by which alone we must eventually pay 
 for the corn which is wanted. In the same 
 manner, if any great national object requires a 
 
45 
 
 foreign expenditure we cannot send out gold, but 
 if government borrow the money as usual, by an 
 issue of exchequer bills, this increases the 
 whole currency and raises prices, and so de- 
 ranges the course of trade; whereas, if we had 
 a gold currency, the gold would go as fast as it 
 was purchased by the exchequer bills, and the 
 fall in prices consequent on this would gradually 
 bring it back again. Mr. Ricardo’s statement 
 therefore, appears incorrect, and inconsistent 
 with his own principles. 
 
 The party who reason thus admit that it is 
 the actual amount of the gold and silver con- 
 tained in the coin, or the labour necessary to 
 produce and bring it to market, which consti- 
 tutes the value of money just as of any other 
 article; and, in short, that money is in all re- 
 spects a commodity which is bought and sold 
 like corn or any other merchandize. But, say 
 they, the bank notes, if made by law convertible 
 into specie or bullion, at the pleasure of the 
 holder, contain the guarantee or security for the 
 value, “and must therefore be considered in all 
 respects the same as the money itself, and cannot 
 ever become depreciated by over issues, so long as 
 they are convertible into money on demand.” 
 
 It appears as if the acute writers who main- 
 tain this doctrine had forgot that no paper cur- 
 rency which has ever been invented does contain 
 
 G 
 
46 
 
 a perfect security for its professed value, and 
 that it is the essential advantage of metallic cur- 
 rency that it contains 2m ztse/f a certain known 
 quantity of an article, gold or silver, which 
 is in constant demand in all parts of the civil- 
 ized world, not only to be used as money, 
 but for other purposes. A quarter-oz. of gold 
 or a sovereign is worth a hundred weight of 
 lead, or a certain quantity of any other commo- 
 dity, because it contains an ascertained weight 
 of pure gold, which cost as much labour to pro- 
 duce it as the lead cost; and because it pos- 
 sesses chemical and mechanical properties of 
 great importance in the arts of life, in which it 
 far surpasses both lead and all other metals; 
 but the bank note for one pound costs little or 
 nothing, and therefore has no real value ;. and 
 though it may buy a hundred weight of lead to- 
 day as well as the sovereign, it may not buy a 
 pound of lead the next week, because the bank 
 that issued it may lose the public confidence. 
 This difficulty is got over by those who recom- 
 mend paper money, by proposing, that all 
 bankers issuing notes shall be required to give 
 security in lands, or the public funds, to the 
 amount of two-thirds, or the whole value of the 
 notes which they issue; such security to be 
 available for the payment of them in case of 
 need, and to be for that purpose assigned to 
 
47 
 
 commissioners, appointed by government, who 
 are to be furnished with periodical accounts of 
 all notes issued by bankers. It would be diffi- 
 cult to regulate this system of securities in a 
 satisfactory manner ; for land fluctuates in value, 
 and the public funds still more so, both of them 
 from the vicissitudes of war and peace, and land 
 also from the rise or decay of particular places 
 and other causes; and even supposing complete 
 security could be given, all the uses of a safe 
 currency would not be insured, because the land 
 would not pay the notes immediately if the 
 banker had a run upon him; and if he failed, 
 those who happened to hold them would suffer 
 the usual inconveniences before they could get 
 the payment from the estates given as security. 
 
 In this scheme, however, the party who re- 
 commend it have not shewn how it would guard 
 -us from the effects of an unnecessary contraction 
 of currency in periods of revulsion and distress. 
 These effects have been fully pointed out in the 
 article on ‘‘ Banking,” in the Supplement to 
 the Encyclopedia Britannica, written by Mr. 
 M‘Culloch. But he has not explained how 
 these evils would be prevented by the guards 
 and checks which form a part of Mr. Ricardo’s 
 << Safe and Economical Currency:” this plan 
 provides, that the bank shall be bound to pur_ 
 -chase gold at a small reduction from the stand- 
 
48 
 
 ard price at which they are bound to sell it. 
 But this regulation will not prevent the country 
 bankers from greatly reducing the current 
 amount of their notes, in periods of distrust 
 and distress, to the inconvenience of the public, 
 whose only relief will still remain as at present 
 to be derived from an import of gold. 
 
 The advocates of Ricardo’s plan cannot deny 
 that bankers, whose profit depends so much on 
 the amount of their issues, will be as anxious as 
 ever to increase them when trade appears to 
 them flourishing, and as desirous to diminish 
 them when any unfavourable change occurs: 
 the machinery of the plan does not disqualify 
 them from doing this, nor is it provided with 
 any check or index to point out either to them 
 or to the public when the amount of currency is 
 redundant or deficient. Theincreased security 
 to the holders of the notes may prevent the 
 great evils to the working classes arising from 
 sudden panics, but it will not give more sagacity 
 and moderation to the merchants and bankers; 
 and whilst the facility of creating currency is so 
 great, the bankers will produce, and the traders 
 will employ it in an excessive quantity, and so 
 bring about those intermittent fevers in the 
 mercantile world which arise from too much 
 excitement. It is true, the proposed system 
 would throw the banking business more into 
 
49 
 
 the hands of men of real property, and more 
 caution would probably be the result; but the 
 bankers would be as likely to make mistakes as 
 the present set of bankers are, or as the direc- 
 tors of the bank of England, who, it is admitted, 
 have erred like their brethren in the country in 
 making large issues when they ought to have 
 drawn in, and in diminishing their issues when 
 they ought to have been liberal. If this view 
 be correct, what is the annual computed gain 
 arising from disengaging so much gold for the 
 purposes of productive industry, if even it 
 could be realised to the extent alleged, when 
 set in the balance against the national loss 
 which arises from those periodical revulsions, 
 which have been the fate of this country since 
 the return of peace. 
 
 If, however, this cumbrous and difficult sys- 
 tem of securities could be reduced to practice, 
 and the bankers were to acquiesce in it, (which 
 I think they would not from the inquisitorial 
 scrutiny that must accompany it, in addition to 
 the inconvenience and possible loss) I cannot 
 see how we should gain what is pretended by 
 the experiment of parting with the precious 
 metals for bank notes. The gold and silver are 
 not proposed to be divided amongst the mem- 
 bers of the community as good things of which 
 they have hitherto not had. the benefit; they will 
 
50 
 
 go away to other countries, and we are to have 
 promissory notes in lieu of them; we cannot keep 
 them both in circulation, and the notes (suppos- 
 ing them to be introduced on the secure basis 
 proposed by Mr. Ricardo, Mr. Mill, and Mr. 
 M‘Culloch) would gradually drive away all the 
 specie. This they admit ; and they say, “ Let 
 us part with such an expensive instrument as 
 gold in order to disengage it from its unpro- 
 ductive employment, and convert it into food, 
 tools, and the raw materials of production, in 
 order to increase the productive powers of the 
 country.” If we could obtain these advan- 
 tages, it might be worth our while to steal this 
 march on the rest of the world. If every indi- 
 vidual could provide himself with better clothing 
 or furniture, without paying for it, or orna- 
 ment his tables with an increased supply of. 
 plate, or if every labouring man could obtain an 
 increase in real wages, or if an increased number 
 of workmen could be employed, the proposed 
 advantages would be realised. But let us trace 
 the operation. The bankers have arranged their 
 securities, and they begin to issue their notes 
 in increased quantities ; they will not however, 
 give them without value in something; they 
 will discount bills, or purchase all the gold they 
 can, for they know from experience that the 
 increased issue of their notes will create a dee 
 
51 
 
 mand for gold for export, and that they can 
 make a profit of it. They may perhaps, how- 
 ever, get three, four, or five million pounds into 
 circulation before the gold begins to disappear. 
 This increase of circulation causes prices to rise 
 all through the country, and will bring in con- 
 sequently an increased import of oil, wine, cot- 
 ton, and many other useful and agreeable 
 commodities. But these will be paid for in the | 
 usual way by the importer, and he will make 
 the consumer pay for them in the usual way; 
 nay they will be paid for at higher prices; for 
 the millions of gold which, by the supposition, 
 will be set at liberty must raise the prices consi- 
 derably in all places from whence they are im- 
 ported, owing to the sudden and extensive in- 
 crease of currency and of demand. Having 
 raised prices abroad, by adding perhaps 5 to 10 
 4 cent. to the currency of Europe, we should 
 soon witness a corresponding increase of prices 
 in this country; but still the gold would con- 
 tinue to go out (to the detriment of our export 
 trade in manufactures, &c.), till we had disposed 
 of all our precious metals except what bankers 
 might deem it prudent to retain as reserves.— 
 The only consequences, as it appears to me, 
 would be, that a temporary impulse would be 
 given to production in foreign markets, and to 
 consumption as well as production at home; 
 
52 
 
 but I think these effects would only be tempo- 
 rary, for reasons which I shall presently assign. 
 Our warehouses would be over-stocked with 
 raw materials and foreign commodities; but 
 would the change add to our comforts and our 
 wealth, permanently, by increasing (as is alleged 
 in the hypothesis) our powers of production ? 
 Foreign nations would be drained of their stocks 
 of wine, oil, &c. but we could not: consume them 
 much more extensively than usual, (though we 
 might in some degree if prices fell owing to the 
 glut) and the glut would therefore prevent our 
 taking our customary supplies for an unusual 
 length of time. New wants are not suddenly 
 created ; and in order to gratify them the power 
 of purchasing must be increased. But by the 
 process of.our issuing 20 millions of paper, and 
 thus sending the gold out of the country, prices 
 of every thing must be enhanced in Europe, in 
 the proportion that this sum bears to the cur- 
 rency of Europe, and by a necessary conse- 
 quence prices in England must also be increased 
 in the same ratio. How then could the power 
 of consuming be increased permanently ? If it is 
 said, because wages would rise with the general 
 rise, the answer is evident, that the increased 
 wages would not enable the labourers to pur- 
 chase more bread or any other. comforts of life, 
 because every thing would be made dearer by 
 
53 
 
 the same causes which raised wages, and they 
 would have no motive to labour harder than be- 
 fore. The increase of wages also might enhance 
 the cost of production through Europe, so that 
 the increase of supply, and the new stimulus 
 given to production, would soon be checked.— 
 We have witnessed this process in the course of 
 the last few years in our trade with Europe and 
 America, to the great detriment of our mer- 
 ehants and manufacturers. Our gold went by 
 millions for three years successively, and we 
 had an immense increase of import ; but we ex- 
 perienced no corresponding increase in our con- 
 sumption of foreign commodities ; some increase 
 indeed was apparent for a time, but it was soon 
 checked, for prices rose so much that the con- 
 sumers were not able to take more than they 
 used todo. The impulse therefore which was 
 thus given to increased consumption and pro- 
 duction was speedily countervailed, and a dread- 
 ful reaction took place, for the impulse was not 
 founded on any sound principles, or on the 
 natural growth of industry and population. 
 
 It may be said by those who object to this 
 mode of reasoning, that it is not necessary that 
 the 20 millions of gold and silver should be dis- 
 posed of in the manner which I have supposed ; 
 that the principal part of it might be employed 
 m works of utility and productive industry at 
 
 H 
 
a4 
 
 home, and that whatever’ portion was sent 
 abroad might be exchanged for new objects of 
 utility or enjoyment; and that a large sum 
 might be employed, not as money, but (as gold 
 is frequently used) for melting into beautiful, 
 useful, and valuable works of art. It cannot be 
 denied, that if the government chose to buy up 
 the 20 millions of gold, (giving the notes of 
 the government bank instead) they might ex- 
 pend the store of gold thus acquired in the 
 employment of ingenious artificers in fabricating 
 works of art, which would add to the wealth 
 and splendour of. whomsoever the government 
 might give the enjoyment of them to; and. it 
 may also be admitted, that private bankers pur- 
 chasing. the gold in exchange for their own 
 promissory notes, might use much of the gold in 
 the same way ; it is certain, however, that either 
 government or private bankers would retain a 
 part (perhaps one-third, perhaps one-fourth only) 
 to answer the demands of holders of their notes, 
 who by the hypothesis are to have gold on de- 
 mand; and with regard to the other three- 
 fourths or two-thirds, it may safely be assumed, 
 that they will do with it what they think most 
 advantageous to themselves; they probably 
 might add to their stocks of gold and silver 
 utensils and ornaments, and thus cause more 
 plate to be manufactured; and the tables and 
 
56 
 
 ~ houses of the bankers would be ornamented and 
 enlarged, and probably their estates be improved 
 by more expensive tillage ; but the enriching of 
 the bankers, if it followed from the change, is not 
 the advantage contemplated by the advocates 
 of the plan. In fact, bankers and merchants 
 would buy the greater part of the gold coin now 
 in circulation, and each of them would dispose 
 of it as his own interest led him; the bankers 
 who would buy it, however, would not, forthe 
 most part, be those who issued the notes ; these 
 last would probably only buy enough to form a 
 reserve for occasional demands. The bulk of 
 the gold would find its way into the hands of 
 those merchants who are in the habit of traffick- 
 ing in gold, and they would find it for their 
 interest to export the greater part as before ex- 
 plained. If then it be asked, would not the 
 bankers who issued the new twenty millions of 
 paper be benefitted? the answer is, ‘‘undoubtedly 
 very much,” and they would be the parties 
 chiefly benefitted ; if they conducted their busi- 
 ness with prudence, they would gain 4 or 5 # 
 cent. interest on their notes, as far as_ they 
 exceeded the amount of their reserves of gold 
 and the expense of stamps, without losing the 
 rents of their estates. which were put into 
 pledge. Prices of all goods in England would 
 be raised, perhaps 5 # cent., the same as prices 
 
56 
 
 in the.rest of Europe to which our gold was sent, - 
 as explained above. But the partial.advantage 
 to the monied interest would not be accompa- 
 nied by any material advantage to the country, 
 and it would be attended by consequences of a 
 serious nature, viz. those which result from 
 fluctuations in the quantity of currency in the 
 world, and particularly from the alternate in- 
 crease and decrease of it in this particular coun; 
 try. These we will now endeavour to trace.* 
 
 III.—THE EFFECTS OF AN INCREASE OR DECREASE 
 OF THE CURRENCY. 
 
 An argument has been maintained by Mr. 
 Hume and some other writers since his time, 
 that an increase in the quantity of money in the 
 world produces favourable effects upon the in- 
 dustry and productive powers of mankind, and 
 consequently tends to increase the wealth of 
 nations. | 
 
 * In book 2, ch. ii. p. 434 to p. 437 of the ‘* Wealth of Nations,” this snb- 
 ject is touched upon in such a way as would lead the reader to think Adam 
 Smith entertained partly the same views,as Mr. Ricardo, with respect to the 
 advantage of parting with an expensive metallic circulation for the cheap currency 
 of paper. But the decided conclusion of all his interesting disquisitions on 
 money is in favour of a metallic circulation for the retail trade of every country. 
 
57 
 
 Mr. Mill has, I think, satisfactorily refuted 
 this opinion in the 12th Section of.his “ Ele-. 
 ments of Political Economy.” He says, “ the 
 agents of production are the commodities 
 themselves, not the price of them. They are 
 the food of the labourer, the tools and ma- 
 ‘chinery with which he works, and the raw 
 materials which he works upon; these are 
 not increased by the increase of money— How 
 then can there be more production ?” 
 
 The increase of the quantity of money raises 
 prices he admits; but he says, justly, that ex- 
 actly in proportion as the buyers raise prices, 
 by coming to market with an increased quantity 
 of money, they sink the value of money, and 
 buyers and sellers are speedily restored to the 
 same relative situation that they were previous 
 to: the increased quantity - which- the named 
 brought into the market. ok 
 
 It has indeed been maintained, with some ap- 
 pearance of truth, that (im general): wages do 
 not rise for a long time after the prices of com- 
 modities have risen; and that the power. of pro- 
 duction is consequently increasing during each 
 successive period of time in which prices are 
 rising, owing to the increase of gold and silver 
 ‘in the world; capitalists, itis asserted, having 
 more money can employ more labourers, and. are 
 induced to do so by the increased profits which 
 
58 
 
 they obtain on their products. But if we admit 
 as a general principle that the rate of wages de- 
 pends on the cost of maintaining the labourers 
 in the manner to which they are accustomed, 
 we must also admit that their food and clothing 
 must rise in price as well as other articles ; and 
 therefore if the quantity of labourers in the 
 market is not superabundant, the price of their 
 maintenance must advance in proportion. to 
 other things, though probably not for some little 
 time. | 
 
 It is possible that they may submit to live in 
 a poorer manner than they ‘have hitherto done, 
 in consequence of bad civil institutions or other 
 causes; but this degradation would not necessa- 
 rily be the. consequence of an increase in the 
 prices of all articles; on the contrary, the in- 
 ducement which it is said capitalists would have 
 to employ more labourers would tend to increase 
 the rate of wages. An important class of society 
 however would be much injured by the change, 
 viz., those who depend on fixed money annui- 
 ties, and land-owners whose incomes depend on 
 leases at fixed rents; debtors, under such cir- 
 cumstances, would be proportionably benefitted, 
 but the bulk of the community would not be so. 
 If they .had a greater quantity of money to ex- 
 _ pend they would find the prices of every thing 
 proportionally advanced, and they would: re- 
 
59 
 
 main in the same situation as they were. This 
 is the view which is maintained by Mr. Ricardo 
 and Mr. Mill; and 1 think their argument is 
 sound, assuming.that the money of the world 
 increases merely owing to the melting down of 
 plate, or that the existing stock raises prices 
 by acquiring greater rapidity of circulation. or 
 economy of its use, or by one country substi- 
 tuting paper for money, and thus throwing a 
 larger quantity into the other countries of the 
 world. But if the source from which the addi- 
 tions of money be derived is the discovery of new 
 mines, or the extension of old ones, so that many 
 more hands are employed in the extraction and 
 preparation of the metals, then we must admit 
 that the countries from which we draw that in- 
 crease of money would become customers to the 
 rest of the world for a proportionably increased 
 quantity: of manufactures and other things which 
 may aid to their comforts and enjoyments. In 
 Mexi:o the inhabitants have increased very 
 greatly in population and civilization in the last 
 200 years, and this is principally owing to the 
 value of the 4 or 5 millions of silver sent to Eu- 
 rope annually (for the Mexicans export little 
 else); and having scarcely any manufactures of 
 their own, they import from Europe to a large 
 amount all kinds of clothing, &c., and this de- 
 mand must certainly, as it becomes more exten- 
 
60 
 
 sive, give new stimulus to industry in Europe, 
 Gold and silver being commodities like all 
 others, and more universally and steadily in de+. 
 mand than all others, must at all times com- 
 mand in exchange an Increased quantity of other 
 things, proportioned to increased quantities 
 raised from the mines of the world. 
 
 The encrease of currency in the world is 
 not therefore an unmixed evil, though it ap- 
 pears to be injurious upon the whole; and 
 if we enquire into the probable effects of a 
 decrease, which may arise from an increased 
 expense of getting the precious metals and 
 bringing them to market, we shall find, that 
 confusion is equally produced in contracts— 
 some parties.being benefitted at the expense of 
 others; but that on the whole the community is 
 not benefitted. ‘At 
 
 The first effect of making money scarce is to 
 reduce prices generally, and to benefit an- 
 nuitants and land-owners who have let their 
 estates for terms of years on fixed leases; but 
 proportionally to injure the parties who had 
 entered into contracts previous to the alteration 
 in the quantity of money ; and in proportion as 
 the import of gold and silver from South Ame- 
 rica decreases, in the same degree must the ex- 
 port from Europe of the articles suited to the 
 consumption of the places where these metals 
 are procured decline in quantity and value. 
 
61 
 
 Thus in every view of the subject the fluctu- 
 ations in the quantity of money in the world are 
 injurious on the whole; though capitalists may 
 be benefitted in consequence of the more early 
 and accurate intelligence which they, from their 
 daily occupations and habits acquire, respecting 
 all changes in prices and the state of the money 
 market. 
 
 Let us now consider the effects of an increase 
 and decrease of currency in this country, a ques- 
 tion of some moment, and on which much diver- 
 sity of opinion still exists. 
 
 Ofthe Fluctuations in the Quantity of Currency 
 in Great Britain. 
 
 In the first part of this Essay, the circum- 
 stances which accelerate or retard the circulation 
 of money were explained, and it was shewn 
 how considerably the rapidity of circulation 
 may vary in the same country, sometimes for 
 short periods, owing to changes of a temporary 
 nature, and sometimes permanently, owing to 
 the effect of fiscal or commercial regulations 
 and changes in the course of trade, or the mea- 
 sures of government. In pursuing the inquiry, 
 it appeared that the use of paper money is cal- 
 culated not only to increase the tendency to 
 violent and inconvenient changes in the rapidity 
 
 I 
 
62 
 
 of circulation, but also to produce greater fluc- 
 tuations in the quantity of money than would 
 be likely to occur if it was wholly composed of 
 gold. Witha metallic currency the increase or 
 decrease will be slow and gradual; but with 
 a paper currency it will be more quick and 
 violent; and it depends on so many circum- 
 stances which influence the hopes and fears of 
 the public who receive it, as well as the bankers 
 who create it, that the supply must be extremely 
 uncertain. If the trade of the country required 
 an additional quantity, the increase of their is- 
 sues would depend principally on the state of 
 credit at the time, and the bankers might: 
 actually diminish their issues at the very time 
 when they could increase them with safety, and 
 with advantage to themselves as well as to the 
 country, and vice versa. It is impossible to as- 
 certain at any time what is the exact amount of 
 money circulating in any country, and it is ex- 
 tremely difficult to say at any particular time 
 whether there is a deficiency or a redundancy ; 
 but in a country like this, where seven or eight 
 hundred bankers depend for a large portion of 
 their profits on the notes they issue, it may 
 be fairly presumed, that they. will generally err 
 on the side of too much when trade is brisk, 
 that the inevitable fluctuations in trade will be 
 attended by more violent fluctuations in the cur- 
 
63 
 
 rency than would take place if it were metallic ;. 
 and that these will react on the trade, and aggra- 
 vate the distress arising from other causes; ina 
 country where so much depends on credit, this 
 must be remarkably the case. It is, however, 
 very difficult to ascertain how far the fluctuations 
 in the currency are the cause, and how far they 
 are the effect of commercial shocks or revulsions. 
 If we examine those which have occurred in 
 this country, we shall find, although we may 
 doubt how far the distress was occasioned by the 
 changes in the currency, that these changes took 
 place to a much greater extené than they could 
 have done if the currency had consisted wholly 
 of specie, and that a great aggravation of losses 
 and sufferings was the consequence. 
 
 In the course of the enquiry we examined 
 the effect of substituting a paper for a specie 
 currency upon the industry and the produc- 
 tive powers of this country: it appeared, that 
 if twenty million pounds were so exchanged, 
 it would have the effect of raising prices in Eu- 
 rope probably 5 per cent. or more, because an 
 equal quantity of gold would necessarily flow 
 from this country into the general circulation of 
 Europe; our prices would also rise in the same 
 proportion, and we should, therefore, find em- 
 ployment for an increased currency to the same 
 extent. On the other hand it follows, that if 
 
64 
 
 we were to change our currency back again from 
 paper to gold, as we could only do it by drawing 
 just so much currency from the circulation 
 of Europe, prices in this country and in Europe 
 generally (and indeed throughout the world even- 
 tually) must decline just am the proportion that 
 the amount of paper cancelled in Great Britain 
 bears to the whole currency of Kurope, including 
 Great Britam. If the currency of Europe, in- 
 cluding this country, be three hundred millions, 
 and we exchange thirty millions of our notes for 
 gold and silver, the prices ought to fall about 10 
 per cent.; if we exchange fifteen millions, then 
 the fall in prices should be 5 per cent. It did 
 not appear, that any advantage to trade and in- 
 dustry could result from such changes, but that 
 great evils arose from the fluctuations in prices 
 incident to them. Beyond the amount indicated 
 above, itis impossible permanently to maintain 
 our increase of currency in this country by sub- 
 stituting paper for gold. There is no power 
 or property in paper, which will enable it to 
 circulate steadily and permanently in any coun- 
 try (if it be exchangeable for gold on demand) 
 to a larger amount than specie would do. A 
 paper currency will often tend to excess; but 
 this tendency will be soon counteracted by the 
 bankers who issue it being called on to give 
 gold for their notes: this may not take place 
 
65 
 
 for a year or two, or even a longer time, and 
 consumption as weil as production may go on 
 during this period of time increasing, and so ab- 
 sorb the increased currency; but, for the rea- 
 sons which have been before explained, this 
 state of things must end in a general derange- 
 ment of trade with the rest of the world, by a 
 glut of those articles which we import, and a 
 want of foreign demand for whatever we export. 
 As long as any gold remains in the country, it 
 will go out till our prices are reduced to their 
 proper level compared with those of other coun- 
 tries; andif all the gold is sent away, and the 
 currency still continues excessive, it will be ap- 
 parent by a derangement of the exchanges, and 
 the bank notes will continue to be taken in for 
 payment until the prices are reduced to their pro- 
 per level, compared with those of other countries. 
 The reduction will probably be carried, indeed, 
 for a time so far, that there will be a deficiency 
 of circulation, and a considerable importation of 
 gold will take place before trade recovers its 
 balance, and’prices of commodities are adjusted 
 at their proper level. This has been shewn to 
 be the natural and almost necessary conse- 
 quence of the use of paper money in a country 
 like this, where credit fluctuates so much, and 
 the regulations of trade and revenue are so 
 artificial and complex. There is a constant 
 
66 
 
 tendency to extremes. Twice since the return 
 ‘of peace has the whole trade of the country 
 been deranged, and the currency become alter- 
 nately redundant and deficient to an extreme 
 and injurious degree—to a degree which it 
 could not have been, if our currency had been 
 confined to the precious metals. 
 
 Passing over the long period from 1797 to 
 1818, during which the bank paper was not 
 convertible into coin or bullion, we will confine 
 our remarks to the circumstances which have 
 occurred to throw light on this subject since the 
 resumption of cash payments in 1819. 
 
 In the years 1821 to 1824 a large addition 
 was made to the specie currency of this country 
 by imports of gold: much of this went into the 
 coffers of the bank of England, where it had ac- 
 cumulated to the amount of above twelve mil- 
 lion pounds in 1824. A considerable portion of 
 it however was coined and went into circula- 
 tion ;* the quantity of paper currency was also 
 greatly increased in 1823, 1824, and 1825, so 
 
 * In 1821 it appears that £9,500,000 were coined in gold. 
 
 1822 F 5,250,000 4 
 1823 é 750,000 P 
 1824 4,000,000 P 
 heggeure , 4,500,000 F 
 
 £24,000,000 of which about four million 
 pounds were re-coinages of guineas into sovereigns; so that the bank of Eng- 
 Jand actually purchased about twenty million pounds of gold in 4 or 5 years.— 
 
 See Tables in Appendix. 
 
67 
 
 that the whole circulation of the country was in 
 these latter years much increased. The im- 
 portation of so much coin was partly the conse- 
 quence of a demand for it by the bank of Eng- 
 land, in order to carry Mr. Peel’s bill into 
 effect, and partly of a larger exportation than 
 usual of manufactures and other goods from this 
 ’ country, which arose from the low prices of 
 1820, 1821, and 1822, when the home trade of 
 the country was much depressed, and when the 
 quantity of bank of England, and more particu- 
 larly of country bank notes was diminished by 
 the declared necessity of preparing for cash pay- 
 ments in 1822, in conformity with the act of 1819. 
 In: the report of the secret committee on cash 
 payments in 1819, they say, they are inclined 
 to think the total amount of country bank notes 
 had been about £25,000,000 sterling, (report, 
 fol. 19) but some of the witnesses estimated it 
 much higher. The diminution in the circulation 
 of these notes in 1819, 1820, and i821, 1s esti- 
 mated by Mr. Mushet at 76 per cent. apparently 
 on good grounds.—See Appendix (C). 
 
 There are no data which enable us to ascer- 
 tain the precise increase to which the currency, 
 metallic as wellas paper, had attained in 1824 
 and 1825, but there is reason to think it was 40 
 per cent.: the consequence was a general in- 
 crease in 1823 to 1825 in the prices of all kinds 
 
68 
 
 of goods and of land, in wages, the public funds 
 and securities, and a fall in the interest of money 
 from 5 down to about 33 per cent. An unusual 
 impulse was thus given to manufacturing indus- 
 try ; agriculture seemed to flourish as much as 
 trade, and rents advanced: labourers were 
 every where fully employed, and money was 
 so abundant that the wildest schemes were 
 formed and eagerly embraced for employing 
 our superfluous wealth; we imported vastly 
 more than usual of many of the most important 
 articles of foreign growth. We did not, indeed, 
 retain all the gold which had been imported ; 
 about six million pounds of it were exported 
 again, because the issues of the country bankers 
 had increased so much since the act of 1822, 
 (passed at the instigation of the agricultural in- 
 terest, for the purpose of relieving the country 
 by a temporary relaxation of the act of 1819) 
 that the specie necessarily flowed back to the 
 Continent to restore the equilibrium of price 
 between this country and the other nations of 
 Europe which had been destroyed. The ex- 
 traordinary imports of 1825 were the -conse- 
 quence, being six million pounds more than 
 1824, whilst the exports were two million pounds 
 less than 1824. 
 
69 
 
 VALUE OF IMPORTS 
 
 Of the following Articles into Great Britain, calculated at the Offi." 
 cial Rates of Valuation, in the Years 1823, 1824 and 1825 :— 
 
 Increased Quan- 
 
 1823 1824 1825 {tity of 1825 above 
 1824. 
 
 
 
 
 
 SED CSS OE EEE ee ea eee | eee 
 
 £ py £ + 
 
 
 
 POTN. Wim ncechs hebesdecebdcebsesas scusdsce 168900} 222768} 398081) 70 % cent. 
 ES Saves stoeny vias casdcedesecsogares 138536] 235437] 331661; 50 4 
 Cochineal and Granilla.......ss00.eseceees 515615} 179167) 242738) 300 a 
 Corn, Grain, Meal, and Flour............ 41000} 456200/1128341/150 a 
 RAE satis Hater teed Smatp wings cow dahon deh 3 1082554)1455709|2076844| 33 aw 
 INdig 0.252.015. 0scccssesecsecesesceaeseeves one 957208} 667707} 895959, 30 u 
 Dp Omth a ae pcp vune ss dey oo ge dg wep ede 131272) 139101) 226527 60 w 
 DM erica cee cecenshescccs soscossss 5565] 10682) 92459950 
 Linens, Poreigns,.....00.200secses cee gee ees 24039} 23310! 34828) 50 « 
 Perec iv bee tee scqecacthact scosecsecses 114809} 115706} 210564; 60 # 
 RI AGEIMAR AS 65 chinp Cesneccckoccads cise, cesee 79| 110177| 380097300 a 
 seed, Flax and Lin........cccccccsccceeses 169606) 212284) 296420) 30° 
 RRR EEOWI ives sspccasstbesebesae( sated: 431570) 401583} 928245120 a 
 DUMIOIEE POTS ccsccccaeee cossccccccscecees 259839) 272279) 336109) 20 a 
 Tobacco...... Beata ass Oey <thaca aise sdenssieab 328322| 200788! 371576) 80 ou 
 Kaul UPS RLEES het SES Ree | 718151} 724808)1178930) 70 a4 
 We ee re ee ag dues 6241561)/4864788/7404445) 50 ov 
 Wobky) BICC Sos. ee SEEE. desc cesees 678524| 762735|1436831| 90 wv 
 
 Total Imports of 1825 63 million pounds more than 1824. 
 
 
 
 Though the exports of 1825 were 14 million 
 pounds less than 1824 in real quantity, they 
 were rather greater according to the declared 
 value of the exporters, the prices being so much 
 enhanced by the unnatural state of the currency. 
 See accounts in Appendix (D). 
 
 Official Value of IMrorts into Great Britain, and Exports from Great 
 Britain (excluding Jredand altogether). 
 
 Imports. Exports. 
 TELS: 000000 erercecenete £35, 850,000... ..csceeneeseresens eee £52,800,060 
 1B19 ...rcccoscesescascece 29 BOC, OU cvapapensve neesineesteeres 42,850,000 
 ¥B20 ....eescecssessennees BU, 600, OOD ee accel edenlee oon 48,340,000 
 BE2ZT) ...c0ccecces esceesese 30,000,000... cceserccsscnesecsedevods 50;700,000 
 TB 22 .uscvrreccccccecceees 29,500,000.......2cereee we escncescenes 52,800,000 
 A GZS acekevescscoe aceceecd 4,600,000... prnccacecceccec. sovesas 51,730,000 
 1824 ..rcccercsersccee +00-36,200, 000... .ccececersecscereecevers 58,000,000 
 1825 ....cccsccves 10000000425000,000 rererecceevreseessereveres 55,600,000 
 
70 
 
 In the year 1818 there was a large import of corn. 
 
 In the year 1820 to 1822 there was a large export of manufactures, owing to 
 our low prices, and the import of gold by the bank, &c. 
 
 N.B. The imports of gold and silver are not reported at the custom-house ; 
 if the quantity actually imported in 1819 to 1824 were included, the imports would 
 appear probably 20 or 25 4 cent. more than appears in the above accounts. 
 
 During a space of two to three years, whilst 
 this active state of trade continued, there did 
 not appear to be an over-production of any arti- 
 cles, the produce of our land, mines and manu- 
 factories, nor any over-supply of any articles 
 imported from other countries; consumption 
 seemed to keep pace with the increased supply: 
 let us here examine the cause of this phenome- 
 non. Ina rich country like this, where the arts 
 of life are highly cultivated, and where clothing, 
 fuel, and all kinds of manufactures are cheap, 
 the bulk of the people have become habituated 
 to a variety of comforts and indulgences in their 
 mode of living, which are unknown in poorer 
 countries, and of which a large portion are im- 
 ported ; by the bulk of the people, I mean, not 
 only the higher and middling classes, but a 
 great part of the artificers and workmen; even 
 the poorest labourers in the fields consume 
 many foreign articles, as tea, coffee, sugar, to- 
 bacco, &c. to a much ereater extent than the 
 same class do in other countries, where they are 
 mostly supported by the land on which they 
 work, and are clothed with domestic fabrics. 
 
71 
 
 In this artificial state of society, it may be ex- 
 pected, that when prices of domestic or foreign 
 commodities rise in consequence of deficient 
 supplies, the people will consume so much less 
 as to make trade dull, and that when articles 
 are plentiful and cheap, the consumption will be 
 considerably increased. Our’ revenue regula- 
 tions and corn laws promote these alternations 
 of briskness and dulness; and the excessive 
 taxation tends to increase them:—There is a 
 tendency to extreme fluctuations in prices and 
 consumption.” 
 
 * An article in No. 87 of the ‘* Edinburgh Review,” on ‘¢ Commercial 
 Revulsions,” explains very clearly how the restrictions which are imposed by 
 law on our trade with foreign countries aggravate the evils which arise from 
 natural causes when changes take place in the course of trade. The most 
 remarkable of these prejudicial restrictions are the Corn Laws: when we have 
 a bad harvest, so as to require an import of cern, the first effect is to drain us 
 of our spetie (for other goods cannot be produced in this country, nor markets 
 found abroad with sufficient quickness to supply the means of paying for the 
 required import of corn); if the paper system did not supply the place of the 
 gold on such occasions, we should experience a fall in general prices of all com- 
 modities, except corn, and our exports of manufactures would thereby be in- 
 creased so much that the export of specie would be checked. Butasit is, the 
 vacuum occasioned by the export of gold is soon filled by an increased issue of 
 bank of England and country notes, and prices keep up higher than they ought 
 to do. 
 
 On this point Mr. Tooke says in his pamphlet on the Currency, page 90— 
 «¢ Where a prohibition of import of articles of extensive consumption exists, 
 especially when that prohibition extends to so important an article as corn, an 
 interval of greater length may elapse before the level of a currency, which has 
 been disturbed by excess, can be restored, than where there is a perfect freedom 
 of trade. But it is probable that the excess could not have taken place at all, 
 and certainly not to the same extent if corn had been importable at a moderate 
 duty in 1823. The price would not have risen as it did, giving occasion, as has 
 been shewn, to an increased circulation of country paper; neither. would it 
 have been liable to the great fall, which after au interval of famine is, under the 
 
72° 
 
 If, however, when prices are gradually rising, 
 as they did in 1823 to 1625 after a long de- 
 pression, there be an increased quantity of the 
 circulating medium created by any cause, (such 
 as the increased confidence of the bankers in 
 issuing their notes, and in discounting the bills 
 or promissory notes of farmers, merchants and 
 manufacturers) the rise in prices will not neces- 
 sarily check consumption for a considerable 
 time, because the manufacturers and tradesmen 
 in all the towns are induced, by the great faci- 
 lity of getting money, to employ more labourers, 
 or at better wages, and it is invariably found, 
 that the work people spend almost the whole of 
 their wages as they receive them; and so in 
 the farming districts, the cultivators of the land 
 obtaining easy accommodation from their neigh- 
 bouring bankers, are encouraged to extend their 
 operations in various ways. The dealers and 
 shopkeepers, finding the same plenty of money, 
 and brisk sale of their commodities, increase 
 their stocks, and thus the circulation increases 
 so much between manufacturers or merchants 
 and dealers, and between dealers and consu- 
 mers, that a larger amount of currency appears 
 quite as essential as a small quantity did when 
 
 present system, inevitable. Our corn laws, therefore, besides all the other evils 
 
 which they produce, aggravate the fluctuations to which the value ef the cur- 
 rency is liable.” 
 
73 
 
 trade was depressed a short time previously. 
 Seven or eight hundred bankers, all anxious to 
 increase their profits by the circulation of their 
 notes, (many of them possessing very little real 
 capital) are easily persuaded that they are only 
 accommodating their issues to the wants of 
 trade in their respective vicinities; and they 
 are tempted to lend £1000 to an industrious 
 farmer to stock a farm, or £10,000 to a skilful 
 and enterprizing manufacturer to build new 
 works for spinning or weaving. In _ like 
 manner, the foreign merchants, perceiving an 
 increase in the consumption of the great sta- 
 ples of our manufactures, and of all articles of 
 luxury, and finding that they can obtain ready 
 discount for their bills, import and export to a 
 much greater extent. And to complete the 
 bustle thus created, by an apparently universal - 
 increase in wealth, the capitalists in the metro- 
 polis, and in the great places of trade, buy and 
 sell amongst each other on the fallacious idea of 
 scarcities ; and the gamblers on the Stock Ex- 
 change make the wildest speculations and in- 
 vestments in the loans and funds of foreign go- 
 vernments, all which promotes still more the 
 export trade, so that there appears to be a vast 
 increase of the demand for foreign goods at 
 home, and for our manufactures abroad. 
 
 In pages 105 to 110 of Mushet’s book on the 
 
74 
 
 Currency is an interesting argument on the 
 spirit of speculation, which he maintains is not 
 naturally a consequence of scarcity, as Mr. 
 Tooke had assumed and explained in his work 
 on high and low prices. Mr. Tooke says, “ the 
 circumstances which give rise to a spirit of spe- 
 culation and over-trading are scarcity, or, in 
 other words, deficiency of supply of some im- 
 portant article compared with the average con- 
 sumption, and the opening of new and extensive 
 markets, or in general of any new sources of 
 demand;” - and, “that a casual scarcity of 
 agricultural produce in particular most power- 
 fully contributes to a temporary increase of the 
 circulation of private paper.” Mr. Mushet ap- 
 pears to me to have successfully shewn, that 
 the connexion pointed out by Mr. Tooke does 
 not necessarily exist; although the facts in this 
 country, during the last twenty years, appear to 
 warrant Mr. Tooke’s statement, the conclusion 
 at which Mr. Mushet arrives is, I think, correct; 
 and this anomaly must be attributed to the un- 
 due excitement to speculation and consequent 
 misdirection given to mercantile operations, by 
 the effects of our paper currency system. 
 
 The spirit of speculation is nothing but the 
 desire of gain, leading to an extraordinary in- 
 vestment of money, in’ whatever articles are 
 most likely to yield a profit beyond the ordinary 
 
returns which the regular trade yields; and if 
 any commodity be depressed in price by an un- 
 usual supply, so that the future supply is likely 
 to be diminished, it is obvious the desire of gain 
 is as likely to lead to speculation in such an 
 article, as in one which is raised by scarcity to 
 such a price as tends to check the consumption 
 and increase the supply. Speculation therefore 
 may equally arise from superabundance as from 
 scarcity ; the best speculation in this country 
 was in 1822 when wheat was in abundance, 
 and sold at four shillings per bushel, and the 
 worst in 1818 when it was scarce, and so dear 
 as to produce a diminution of consumption and 
 increase of supply. The effect of the unhealthy 
 state of our currency, and the uncontrolled issue 
 of country paper, has been to encourage an 
 undue spirit of speculation at all times, and to 
 conceal from men of business a plain truth, 
 which would have been more easily perceived 
 if they had not had the power of creating money 
 almost ad libitum, viz. That when commodities 
 are cheap and abundant the consumption in- 
 creases ; and that, on the contrary, when they 
 are scarce and dear the consumption diminishes 
 according to the diminished means of the con- 
 sumers. | 
 When a bad harvest occurs in this country, 
 and prices begin to rise, the general consequence 
 
76 
 
 is, that the country banks issue their notes more 
 freely to the farmers, and prices are raised in a 
 degree which would not be if we had only a 
 gold currency. It does not necessarily follow 
 from a rise in the prices that any increase of 
 currency would be wanted to circulate the corn 
 trade, for the natural effect of an advance in 
 corn, like other articles, is to diminish the con- 
 sumption; and the quantity of corn being 
 smaller, the same amount would sutflice for 
 it. But admitting that more money might 
 be required, in the event of a rise in the 
 prices of corn, the natural consequence then 
 should be, that the consumption of some other 
 articles would be diminished, and by that means 
 money would be disengaged from some other 
 employment to be employed incorn. With the 
 paper system the evil of dearness of corn and 
 other produce of the soilis unnecessarily aggra- 
 vated by the increased issues of the country 
 bankers ; wages do not in general advance in 
 any degree proportioned to the advance in 
 prices of the necessaries of life, and the com- 
 munity suffer more or less; the diminished con- 
 sumption by and bye becomes apparent—the 
 farmers and corn factors are alarmed—and 
 prices, from having been unnecessarily elevated, 
 become in a short time unduly depressed. 
 
77 
 
 Of Over-trading. 
 
 It has been said, that it is not satisfactorily 
 proved that such effects as have been described 
 “are attributable to the increase of the cur- 
 rency, and that they may be all traced to the 
 spirit of gambling, and speculation, and over- 
 trading, which pervaded all classes in 1824 and 
 1825. This is a question which cannot be ab- 
 solutely decided by any demonstrative proofs 
 or reasoning; but it. may be satisfactorily 
 shewn, that the sudden increase of bank notes, 
 if it did not create, eatended the speculative spirit 
 so much, that without such extraordinary in- 
 crease these extravagant results could not have 
 followed. The efforts of the producers and 
 dealers could not have kept prices up for so long 
 a time as they did, if the consumers had not also 
 had their means increased in proportion at the 
 same time; and it may be clearly shewn, that 
 the increased incomes of the consumers were 
 founded upon the increased circulation of paper 
 money, and declined as this foundation failed. 
 There is every reason to think, that at the 
 end of the year. 1822, or the beginning of 1823, 
 the quantity of currency in Great Britain was 
 extremely small; it had gradually decreased 
 since 1818, (when it was very high) and it was 
 at the lowest about the latter end of 1822: from 
 L 
 
78 
 
 that time it increased so rapidly during the 
 next two years, that there was an increased cir- 
 culation on the whole, including specie and bank 
 notes, of about 40 per cent. in the beginning of 
 1825. By the returns in the Appendix (C) it ap- 
 pears, that the increase of country bankers’ 
 notes was from £12,000,000 to £19,000,000, 
 or £20,000,000 ; these consisted of £1, £2, and 
 £5 notes (vide Appendix) circulating almost 
 entirely amongst the consumers, shop-keepers, 
 and small dealers; the metallic circulation was 
 increased in the same period probably from 
 £7,000,000 or £8,000,000 to £14 or £15,000,000, 
 after deducting the quantity exported again, 
 The bank of England notes were at the same 
 time increased about £3,000,000 in notes of £5 
 chiefly.* It therefore appears, that the whole 
 currency which circulates the retail trade of the 
 country increased about 40 per cent. in two 
 years. Now it would have been impossible for 
 this extravagant increase to take place, if our 
 currency had been metallic; we could not have 
 obtained the specie requisite for this purpose 
 without exporting £10,000,000 or £12,000,000 
 more of manufactures and other goods than we 
 did, which would have been out of our power ; 
 we did actually export more in 1824 and 1825 
 than the usual quantity, and in order to make 
 such large additional exports pr*ses must have 
 * Viz. from £18,000,000 to £21,000,000.—See Appendix (B.) 
 
79 
 
 been lower than they were, and new markets 
 must have been found. If therefore the small 
 note act of 1822 had not been passed, our cir- 
 culation in 1825 would probably have been not 
 much above £45,000,000 altogether, (about five 
 millions increase on that of 1822) instead of 
 about £55,000,000 which it appears to have been. 
 The prices of goods would, with such a small 
 increase of money adapted to the retail trade of 
 the country, have risen much less than they did; 
 for commodities cannot be raised in price by 
 the will of the producers; the dealers will not 
 give them advanced prices, unless the consumers 
 can give a corresponding advance. In 1820 
 to 1823 indeed prices of most goods were so 
 low, that the producers did not generally rea- 
 lise fair profits, and there was every motive for 
 the dealers to increase their stocks, and for the 
 consumers, both in the foreign and home 
 markets, to consume more largely. The de- 
 mand was accordingly improving, and by degrees 
 the prices would have risen as the gold came in 
 But the issue of small notes increased the de- 
 mand suddenly and surprizingly ; this, with the 
 further augmentation in the currency, raised our 
 prices, and increased general production, which 
 by giving employment to a great number of 
 persons connected with our manufactures, (who 
 had been only partially employed) caused a 
 
80 
 
 further extension of the demand. Had the cur- 
 rency been left to increase by the natural im- 
 portation of gold, prices would have risen more 
 slowly and to a less extent : as it was, they rose 
 from an undue degree of depression to the op- 
 posite extreme, and this led to a violent re- 
 action. The process thus briefly traced requires 
 more particular examination. 
 
 The over-trading, of which so much has been 
 said, could not do much injury, nor become 
 very extensive, unless it were accompanied by 
 such an increase of the money for the retail 
 trade of the country as could not take place if 
 it were confined toa metallic currency. The 
 production and the consumption of the various 
 commodities of the world must be for the most 
 part equal ; if at any time one article is produced 
 in excess, the price generally falls so much that 
 the production is speedily checked. Though in 
 the case of some articles, the increased supply 
 is all consumed in consequence of the fall in the 
 prices, the general rule is, that prices quickly 
 fall below the rate which remunerates the pro- 
 ducer, and he produces less. In like manner the 
 whole consumption and supply of any particular 
 country are pretty exacily proportioned, and 
 over-trading cannot disturb them (without the 
 aid of paper money) to any very serious extent. 
 Manufacturers, and merchants, and dealers of 
 
81 
 
 call sorts may carry on their buying and selling 
 by means of bills, which are drawn on each other 
 at three, four, or six months’ date ; and by cir- 
 culating and renewing these bills, they may 
 raise the prices of their commodities ten or 
 twenty per cent. for a time, or produce ten or 
 twenty per cent. increased quantity; but the 
 advanced prices cannot be obtained from the 
 consumers, nor the increased quantity be dis- 
 posed of at the same price, unless the consumers 
 are provided with a proportionate increase of 
 money; nor can the goods be sold in foreign 
 markets without giving such foreigners a pro- 
 portionate advance in their preductions, and we 
 must sell our goods at the same prices in all 
 parts of the world as our rivals do who produce 
 the same in other countries. 
 
 The amount, therefore, for which all the goods 
 are sold is very much affected by the amount of 
 money circulating amongst the consumers, (mo- 
 dified, indeed, by the rapidity of its circulation) 
 but little by the amount of bills.* It isimportant 
 
 *A pamphlet has just appeared, by Mr. Burgess, of which one leading object 
 is to prove, that bills form a much more important part of our circulation than 
 bank of England or country bank notes.—He says in page 13, ‘¢ the circulation 
 of promissory notes and internal bills, payable after date, has never formed a 
 subject of inquiry, and has scarcely even been adverted to, in any of the pro- 
 ceedings respecting the currency. It might not have been known that there ex- 
 isted such a species of currency, or that it formed any considerable part of the 
 circulating medium of the country. Yet this part of the currency was performing 
 the functions of circulation as much as bank of England notes and country 
 
 bank notes, and its amount was upwards of ten times the amount of all the bank 
 of England notes.” 
 
82 
 
 to attend to this distinction, because some wri- 
 ters of much practical knowledge, as bankers and 
 
 Again in page 73, ‘* Ihave endeavoured to show, that netther gold coin, bank . 
 of England notes, nor country bank notes ts virtually our standard ; but that 
 bills of exchange alone form our standard. By knowing in what degree the 
 amount of this part of the circulation is plus or minus, from any given point, we 
 may ascertain, and by nothing else can we fully ascertain, the tendency to de- 
 preciation from excess, or the degree of approaching difficulty from contraction 
 of the circulating medium. It would appear, therefore, that we have committed 
 a great error, in attempting to destroy the effectiveness of country bankers, to 
 whom circumstances have eminently given the power to regulate this, our stand-— 
 ard; and who alone can, with the concurrence and judicious assistance of the » 
 government be enabled to regulate it best for the public interests.” 
 
 And in page 19, Mr. Burgess says, ‘* Bills above the value of ten pounds | 
 form now as completely a part of the currency as bank of England notes or 
 country bank notes. They are used to pay for minerals—for all kinds of raw 
 produce used in manufactures—for all the principal articles of food or clothing, | 
 and recently, in some cases, for mere labour. Ifa butcher in the north of Eng- 
 land buys cattle, he pays for them partly in these bills, and partly in country 
 bank notes. Ifa miller buys corn, or a mealman or baker flour, he does the 
 same. Ifa Yorkshire wool-buyer purchase wool of the farmers in his own county, 
 or in Northumberland or Lincolnshire, he pays for it partly in these bills, partly 
 in country bank notes; or sometimes wholly in one kind, sometimes wholly in 
 the other. In the manufacturing districts of Yorkshire and Lancashire, no man, 
 generally speaking, thinks of paying for any commodity above the value of ten 
 pounds, otherwise thanin a bill after date. This practice is now very general 
 throughout the northern and mid land counties, and is increasing in other parts. 
 Except in the north, however, these bills do not circulate generally or freely 
 amongst farmers and graziers; and where they do so circulate, those persons 
 have a great reluctance to take any but bills drawn by bankers upon bankers ; 
 this reluctance was increasing before the year 1825.” Again he says— 
 
 “¢ Although we are told by the very highest authority,” that ‘ it has been a 
 common artifice, practised by those who have written on paper-currency, to 
 confound paper-credit with paper-currency,’ the distinction appears to me to be 
 purely speculative. What is a bank post-bill? A bill for £100 payable after 
 date, which to-day is paid at Folkingham for wool, to-morrow at Melton for 
 horned cattle, the next at Leicester for sheep, and the succeeding day at Oundle 
 for bark, is as much a part of the circulating medium, representing the transfer 
 of commodities from hand to hand, asa bank note for £100 that performs the 
 same office in the same manner. Indeed, if this be an artifice, it appears to be 
 
 * Earl of Liverpool’s Letter to the King, page 220, 
 
83 
 
 merchants, have maintained that the amount of 
 bank notes and gold is worth little consider- 
 ation, being so trifling when compared with the 
 amount of bills in circulation. These writers 
 say truly, that for every million of gold, silver, 
 and bank notes, of £5 and under, (which are 
 nearly all that perform the same functions as 
 gold) there are always in existence six or eight 
 times as great an amount in bankers’ and mer- 
 cantile bills; but the conclusion which they 
 draw is fallacious, that prices therefore are in- 
 fluenced more by the amount of the bills than 
 by the amount of the cash and the notes. If 
 the bills were drawn for very small sums (say 
 under £5) the effect would be different ; but the 
 bills are seldom drawn for less than £20, £30 or 
 
 admitted, that we practise the same artifice, by confounding ‘ even the higher 
 sorts of paper-currency with the inferior sorts :’-—a bank of England note for 
 £50, with one for five pounds, which is indisputably true: the bank notes and 
 the bills are all paper credit and all paper currency.” Burgess on Currency. 
 
 The same mode of reasoning was adopted by Thornton, about thirty 
 years since, in his ‘+ Treatise on the Paper Credit of England,” and it has been 
 lately brought forward by Mr. Loydand other witnesses, before the Committee on 
 Scotch bank notes. Our townsman, Mr. B. A. Heywood, also maintained this 
 view in his pamphlet on the “¢ Circulation of Individual Credit.” 
 
 It is well known, that almost all the circulation of country notes consists of 
 one and two pounds, and five pound notes, very few being issued above that 
 amount ; of bank of England notes, there was till 1822 a large amount of five 
 pounds and under, frequently one-third or one-fourth of the whole, and another 
 one-fourth of ten pounds. In periods of brisk trade and extensive issues, the 
 small notes increased much more than the larger notes, and in periods of 
 contraction, the contrary was the case. The notes under five pounds, which 
 amounted in 1818 to seven million pounds, only amounted in 1822 to one 
 million.—See Appendix (B.) 
 
84 
 
 £50, the far greater amount of the whole for £100 
 to £500, and the rapidity of their circulation is 
 on the inverse ratio of their amounts. The bills 
 and bank notes of above £10 or £20 perform in- 
 deed a very large part, perhaps two: thirds, of all 
 transfers of goods between dealers and dealers, 
 or between the producers and importers and 
 the dealers ; this may be called the wholesale 
 trade of the country; but the retail trade, or 
 the sales to the consumers, are almost all made 
 for cash, or small notes of £1 and £2. These 
 latter therefore probably change twenty times 
 or more for once that the smallest bankers’ bills 
 change hands. If the currency of the country 
 were confined to gold and silver, the increase of 
 bankers’ and merchants’ bills (which may be so 
 easily created) could not produce any rapid and 
 undue increase of this currency; but when bank 
 notes of such small amounts as form the circula- 
 tion of the retail trade of the country are per- 
 mitted, the currency may be increased suddenly 
 and very extensively. The bankers discount 
 freely for the merchants and manufacturers, 
 who are thus easily enabled to pursue their 
 schemes of over-trading; money becomes more 
 plentiful amongst all classes; and bills and 
 bank notes act mutually in producing each 
 other, and in bringing about the effects which 
 have been described arising from too much cur- 
 
rency, which necessarily leads to a reaction, 
 and great evils arising from éoo Utile.* 
 
 * It appears that bills of exchange, (payable at two or three months after 
 date) which were first invented by the Lombard Jews in the twelfth century, to 
 settle balances due between remote parts of Italy or of European states, were in usa 
 long before promissory notes, payable on demand ; but that the use of the latter 
 followed as a natural consequence of the advantage found from the use of the 
 former. It is known that in some parts of England, within the memory of per- 
 sons now living, bills at two months’ date used to circulate for much smaller 
 amounts than they do at present: they have probably been disused in conse- 
 quence of the heavy stamp duty imposed upon them. Inasmuch as such bills, 
 or even the bills of the smallest amount now current, (say ten pounds to twenty 
 pounds) have enabled merchants and dealers to do their business with @ smaller 
 quantity of cash or promissory notes under five pounds, they may be said to 
 have supplied the place of money ; but it does not appear to me, that this consi- 
 deration invalidates the accuracy of the distinction made in the text. It was 
 pointed out by Adam Smith, but has not been noticed by late writers on money 
 as it deserves. That great writer suggested, as a protection to the retazl trade 
 of the country, that no bank uoies should be allowed to circulate below ten 
 pounds in London, and five pounds in the country. This restriction was adopt- 
 ed by our government about fifty years since, and it speedily put an end to an ex- 
 tensive circulation of notes as small as five shillings and ten shillings, which had 
 inundated some parts of the country both in Scotland and England. The bank 
 of England were soon afterwards allowed to issue notes of five pounds, the same 
 as the country bankers; and in 1797, on the suspension of cash payments, the 
 bank was first permitted to issue notes of one pound and two pounds. Since 
 then the amount of paper money in Great Britain went on increasing gradually, 
 and causing the gold to disappear till the end of the war, when all the gold that 
 remained was either hoarded by individuals, or kept as a reserve by the bank of 
 England, whose issues had more,than trebled in amount since the commencement 
 of the war in 1793. 
 
 If it be objected to the above mode of reasoning that it would follow as 
 a necessary consequence, that a bank of England note for one hundred 
 pounds or one thousand pounds is not to be considered as a part of the currency 
 of the country, I should say true, it cannot with propriety be soconsidered, for it 
 is too large to constitute a part of the retail circulation: it is a fact, that 
 such notes are, for the most part, lying inactive in the hands of bankers, 
 (a large portion of them, indeed, are really bills drawn at tenor twenty days after 
 date for the purpose of remitting to distant parts of the country) and they per- 
 form only the functions of bills of exchange ; they are not indeed attended with 
 any computation of interest, nor do they require the indorsements of all persons 
 
 M 
 
S6 
 
 Depreciation of the Currency. 
 
 The quantity of gold which was exported in 
 the year 1824, and the beginning of 1825, ap- 
 pears to have been about six millions, of which 
 ‘he greater part was exported in the spring of 
 1625 (see Appendix G.); this, however, did not 
 diminish the quantity of our circulation, for it 
 went entirely out of the coffers of the bank of 
 England, where a stock of gold had accumulated 
 in the depressed periods of 1820 to 1823 to the 
 amount of 12 to 15 millions. This extraordinary 
 demand for gold for export was not attended 
 by any marked derangement of the ex- 
 changes with any part of Europe, nor did the 
 market price of bullion exceed the mint price 
 (as was the case during the years 1810 to 1814, 
 when our paper currency was in excess); but 
 it is not to be inferred therefore that there was 
 no depreciation or excess of the whole currency 
 of this country, as compared with other coun- 
 tries. The continued export of gold on such 
 
 who receive and pay them, and the holder has no redress on the party from 
 whom he received them, in the event of the bank failing. These circumstances 
 however do not affect their character as a part of the circulating medium. If it 
 be asked, what then is the definition of paper currency, I should reply, all those 
 notes payable on demand which will perform all the functions of a metallic cur- 
 rency in the country where they are issued ; and if bills or bank notes are so large 
 that they do not answer the purposes of the retail as well as the wholesale trade, 
 they are not strictly a part of the circulation. (On this subject, see ‘¢ Wealth 
 of Nations,” book II. ch. 2, p. 485 to 490.) 
 
87 
 
 an extensive scale is itself a sufficient proof of 
 redundancy and depreciation: it was a redun- 
 dancy and depreciation of gold as well as paper 3. 
 the notes were always of the same value as the 
 gold, and would equally. be received in pay- 
 ment in this country; but their extravagant 
 amount raised the prices of all commodities 
 above the level of other countries, so that we 
 could no longer export them with advantage, 
 and geld was exported instead. Ifthe currency 
 had consisted of the precious metals only, this 
 obvious redundancy of currency could not have 
 existed for any length of time, for gold would 
 have been exported immediately ; and as its 
 place would not have been supplied with either 
 bank of England or country bank notes, gene- 
 ral prices of commodities could not have been 
 raised above their proper level. In a country 
 like this indeed, with our restrictions on foreign 
 trade, there might be some excess, even of 
 specie currency, on particular occasions ; when, 
 for instance, our extensive manufactures have 
 been suddenly further extended by a great im- 
 port of foreign corn: on the cessation of this 
 exciting cause, they will not immediately re- 
 turn to their former limit, and a glut of some 
 staple articles may continue so long as to im- 
 pede the regular channels of trade, without 
 however causing any great reduction in prices 
 
88 
 
 for some time; forced exportations are then 
 made, and we may thus receive an over-supply 
 .of other goods from foreign parts: all this will 
 in the end derange the exchanges, and it may 
 be some time before they adjust themselves.* 
 
 * In Mr. Tooke’s recent work on currency, he has explained why the ex- 
 changes are not affected by over-issues of paper in this country so quickly and 
 decidedly as to form a criterion to be always depended upon :— 
 
 *¢ The principal medium through which the exchanges are affected is that of 
 prices. Such of these as relate to objects of interchange with other countries, 
 if raised beyond the bullion prices of those countries, will induce an increased 
 importation and diminished exportation of those commodities. But it not un- 
 frequently requires an interval of some length, before the commodities which 
 are interchangeable with other countries are affected by an excess in the circu- 
 lation, in such a degree as to produce the effect of increased import, and 
 diminished export, &c.; and even that effect may not immediately operate on 
 the exchanges. There may be counteracting circumstances. ‘The excess may 
 have communicated itself, in an increased medium of credit, to the countries 
 with which we happen to have the greatest interchange ; and it has so hap- 
 pened, that, m some remarkable instances, this has been the case, as in 1818, 
 and very paiticularly in 179t. It is only upon the final liquidation, in gold, of 
 the engagements connected with the extension of this international circulation 
 of credit, that the effect one way or the other upon the exchanges is produced 3 
 and this effect will be so much more violent, as the previous miscalculation on 
 the value of the currency has been of Jong duration. 
 
 *¢ The effect of an extended circulation of paper and credit in a country like 
 this, in producing while ina state of increase an extension of credit in the places 
 abroad with, which we have the most considerable dealings, has hitherto been 
 overlooked, or not sufficiently attended to. Such extension of credit has a tem- 
 porary influence in raising or maintaining the price of commodities abroad, so as 
 to admit occasionally of an increased demand for exports from hence in the face 
 of rising prices; the demand in this case operating as one of the causes of the 
 rise. In more general terms, the extended credit given in times when confi- 
 dence prevails, by the merchants and manufacturers of this country to those 
 abroad, operates temporarily in reducing the value of the currency of those 
 parts. It is this circumstance which communicates the over-trading of this 
 country to places abroad, and when the revulsion happens produces a contrac- 
 tion of the circulation there, which temporarily diminishes the demand for 
 
 exports from hence, notwithstanding a contraction and fall of prices on this side.” 
 
89 
 
 We have explained the tendency which the 
 bank note circulation has to drive the specie out 
 of the country. This the advocates of paper 
 admit; but they do not consider it an evil al- 
 though we should have no currency but paper, 
 as they say our prices cannot be injuriously en- 
 hanced as long as the holders of the notes are 
 secured, and have the power of demanding 
 gold coin, or bullion. | Surely we have had 
 proof sufficient in the last four years, that a 
 currency consisting chiefly of paper may be 
 sometimes much too large, and at other times 
 too small, for very considerable periods of time, 
 although no material depreciation appears to 
 have taken place as compared with bullion or 
 with the currency of other countries. 
 
 The price of gold remained steadily at £3 17s 6d 
 to 9d per oz., and silver at 4s 1ld to 5s ' 
 per oz. during the whole of 1823 and 1824. 
 
 From January to June 1823......... Gold was...£3 17 9 
 “ DIET stesatess Silver.....0. 5s to 4s 1d 
 SINCE SU Yo LG 20 cccctassncesisscccansess GO svace sect £3 17 10 and £317 9 
 
 u u Rent acscccevcttersecce Silver ...0.. ds Id and 5s per oz. 
 
 The Exchange with Paris in 1823 to June 1824 25.50 to 25.90 
 July to December 1824 25.20 to 25.15 
 January to June 1825 25.15 to 25.10 
 July toDecember 1825 25.5 to 25.30 
 See Appendix (E.) 
 
 Thus the fall in the exchange was never 3 per 
 cent. below par, and that only for a short time. 
 But this is quite enough to pay the expenses of 
 
90 
 
 sending gold to France: indeed there may be 
 an export of it even when the exchange is at 
 par, because no goods will be exported until 
 they will pay the expenses, which are greater 
 on merchandize than upon specie, and gold is 
 exported much more promptly than any thing 
 else. 
 
 Much has been written on this subject to 
 shew that the variations in our foreign ex- 
 changes and bullion market follow closely the re- 
 dundancies or deficiencies in the currency, and 
 thereby constitute an infallible check on over- 
 issues or under-issues. But in the artificial 
 state of things existing in this country, and more 
 especially in periods of war, it clearly appears 
 that we may have an excess or a deficiency, 
 (without any material disturbance of the ex- 
 changes, or alteration in the prices of bullion) 
 attended with such fluctuations in prices 
 as are extremely inconvenient and injurious.— 
 All persons will admit, that the currency was 
 in excess for some time previous to the begin- 
 ning of 1826, when, besides a great increase in 
 the gold currency, the quantity of bank:of Eng- 
 land notes was 20 per cent., and country bank 
 notes 50 or 60 per cent. more than in 1822, and 
 yet no variation of any consequence took place 
 in the state of the exchanges, or the prices of 
 bullion ; and it is equally clear, that this excess 
 
91 
 
 has produced the opposite extreme during the 
 year 1826, of a currency so much diminished as 
 to be inadequate to perform the necessary ex- 
 changes of our internal trade. 
 
 The consequence of these fluctuations has 
 been a misdirection of capital, and a destruction 
 of property, such as probably never was expe- 
 rienced before in the same space of time in any 
 age or country. 
 
 It has been said by some able writers on the 
 currency, that another proof, in addition to that 
 derived from the state of the bullion market and 
 exchanges, of the currency not being depre- 
 ciated, is to be drawn from the circumstance of 
 the prices of agricultural produce not having 
 fallen in any degree proportioned to other com- 
 modities. They say, that prices of corn and 
 cattle did not rise in the spring of 1825, 30 or 
 oO per cent. in their prices, as other articles 
 did, nor fall at the end of the same year, as 
 other commodities did, below the level from 
 which they rose ; and therefore they infer, that 
 the currency had not been depreciated, for they 
 say if it had been, to the extent alleged, it must 
 have altered the prices of these equally with 
 all other commodities. (See Sir H. Parnell’s 
 Work on Currency.) In the artificial state of our 
 agriculture consequent on the corn laws, it is 
 impossible to draw any conclusions from the 
 
92 
 
 current rates at which corn and cattle sell in 
 any particular year. At one time there is an 
 extraordinary growth of corn following a season 
 of high prices, and prices go into the other 
 extreme for a year or two; at the same time 
 possibly the prices of meat have been much 
 depressed by an unusual supply ; and the quan- 
 tity of cattle slaughtered increases in conse- 
 quence so much, that there may be a deficient 
 supply for two or three years. Extreme fluc- 
 tuations are thus produced by causes totally un- 
 connected with the quantity of money. These 
 causes no doubt will affect them in the long run 
 equally with other commodities, but by n® 
 means so quickly. Amongst farmers and gra- 
 ziers the system of credit 1s much less exten- 
 sive than amongst manufacturers and merchants; 
 when credit sustains a shock, as it did in the end 
 of 1825, the mercantile class quickly -curtail 
 all their operations so much, that an immediate 
 effect is produced on the prices by the suspen- 
 sion of buying and selling on a large scale ; 
 and though consumption is perhaps going for- 
 ward as largely as before, there appears to be 
 no demand for any thing; the dealers are sup- 
 plying the consumers from the stocks which 
 they are in the habit of keeping to such an ex- 
 tent that they have no occasion to buy till they 
 think prices have fallen to the lowest point. It 
 
93 
 
 is not so with the farmers; their engagements 
 are not equally fixed, their credit is not so ex- 
 tended; and they are not so soon affected by 
 the changes which take place to derange the 
 manufacturing and mercantile pursuits. During 
 the last year the unprecedented drought may 
 account sufficiently for the prices of corn and 
 cattle having been kept up, and the severe 
 winter which has followed may cause cattle to 
 continue high for some time. But as the prices 
 of all agricultural produce rose gradually with 
 the increase of our country bank circulation, I 
 see no reason to doubt that they will decline 
 by degrees from the scale at which they stood 
 in 1825: Wheat has already declined from 69s, 
 which it was in March, 1825, to 54s per quarter. 
 
 Effects of the Revulsion in England. 
 
 As the increased production and consumption 
 of the various products of industry appeared 
 not to be permanently maintained in the world 
 at large, by an increase of the money of the 
 world, so it has been found from our own 
 experience that an extraordinary increase, in 
 any particular country, of the whole currency’ 
 (whether that consist of the precious metals only 
 or of a metallic and paper currency together) 
 
 cannot permanently add to the wealth of such 
 N 
 
94 
 
 country, though it may for a considerable time 
 give an extraordinary impulse to industry and 
 trade. For some time production increased at 
 home in 1824 and 1825, and our foreign trade 
 increased likewise, because prices of foreign 
 articles advanced generally in this country above 
 the relative prices in the rest of the world; this 
 caused the gold to go out of the country, and a 
 vast quantity of foreign goods to flow im, in order 
 to realize our high prices; which fora time en- 
 couraged foreigners to produce more; but it 
 soon became apparent that this seeming pros- 
 perity did not rest ona solid foundation. The rise 
 in prices prevented the increase of consumption 
 from being supported, and in proportion as the 
 advance had been rapid, the reaction was violent 
 _and the decline rapid also. The capitalists were 
 the first to suffer. In the metropolis, where the 
 excess of import in 1824 and 1825 had produced 
 a glut of silk, wool, and other important articles, 
 and where so much money had been invested 
 in absurd schemes and loans to the South Ame- 
 rican States, the crash was tremendous, as it 
 was sudden, amongst the bankers and others 
 who had been most closely connected with the 
 speculators. The panic quickly spread through 
 the country, and in three months nearly one 
 hundred bankers failed. In the great districts 
 of the manufactures the failures were some time 
 
95 
 
 in breaking out, but they were of longer conti- 
 nuance, and attended with more general dis- 
 tress; it was found that many large establish- 
 ments had been created and sustained by the 
 notes of the local bankers, who advanced them 
 to parties without any capital, and many of 
 these remain to this day shut up for want of 
 means to carry them on. Such sudden ruin 
 never was known to spread so widely and to fall 
 so heavily in a short space of time. In the farm- 
 ing districts indeed there has not yet appeared 
 the same general distress which existed in 1815 
 and 1816, and again in 1820 to 1822; but the 
 agriculturists also have felt and are now feeling 
 deeply the reverse, and this class will probably 
 be the last to recover. 
 
 In the conclusion of Mr. Tooke’s Work on the 
 _ Currency we find the following pointed observa- 
 tions on this subject :—‘‘ Of the misdirection, 
 which the artificial excitement to speculation, 
 incidental in so much greater a degree to a paper 
 than to a metallic currency, 1s calculated to give 
 to capital and industry, a memorable instance is 
 afforded by the transition which we have re- 
 cently experienced, and from the effects of which 
 we are still suffering. : 
 
 “If acomputation could be made of the losses 
 that have been sustained within the last two 
 years,—by the excess of prices paid to foreign 
 
96 
 
 countries for commodities, beyond what those 
 commodities are worth for home consumption 
 or exportation,—by the fluctuation in the de- 
 mand for labour, at one time elevating manufac- 
 turing wages beyond the rate which the eventual 
 price of the manufactured goods could afford, 
 and then depressing them so much, and throw- 
 ng so many workmen out of employ, as to occa- 
 ston an increased burden on the poor-rates,—by 
 loans to foreign states, which present no ade- 
 quate security for repayment,—by schemes, 
 which upon a large outlay, hold out no prospect 
 of any net profit,—by rendering the commodi- 
 ties produced with a view to the consumption 
 of particular classes of reduced value, —by the 
 diminished demand consequent upon the altered 
 condition of a large proportion of the individuals 
 constituting those classes—it would be found, I 
 suspect, to amount to an enormous sum. And 
 af the propartion of such losses, not only on the 
 recent occasion, but on many other similar 
 occasions which have occurred in our commer- 
 cial history for the last fifty years, as can be 
 fairly ascribed to the difference between a paper 
 and a metalle circulation, admitted of being ac- 
 curately computed, I am fully convinced that, as 
 a mere question of national wealth, the balance 
 of loss would be greatly against the former.” 
 
 It has been computed, that the loss sustained 
 
97 
 
 in this country on the article of cotton alone, 
 from the unwarranted advance which took place 
 in the prices in 1825, exceeded two and a half 
 million pounds. In a few months the prices 
 were trebled, and by the end of the year they 
 fell back to the point from which they started. 
 The advance was in that period of the year when 
 the bulk of our annual supply was imported 
 from America and other countries, so that it is 
 probable one-half of what has been lost in this 
 article by English merchants and manufacturers 
 has been gained by the growers and foreign 
 merchants. If our currency had been in a 
 sound state, a considerable advance would pro- 
 bably have taken place in this article, owing to 
 the general prevalence of a belief, founded on 
 the great diminution of stocks at the end of the 
 year 1824, that the consumption had overtaken 
 the supply; but I think it could not have gone 
 to one-half the extravagant length which it did. 
 The advance was so sudden.and extensive as to 
 check the home consumption and the foreign 
 demand in a degree which was never before ex- 
 perienced; but the decline followed it in so 
 short a space of time after the usual supplies 
 had been received from the places of growth, 
 that the community suffered comparatively lit- 
 tle by the speculation; the authors of it were 
 the principal sufferers, and with them the work- 
 
98 
 
 men who were thrown out of employ for some 
 time in the populous districts where this exten- 
 sive manufacture is carried on. | 
 The losses sustained by merchants and ma- 
 nufacturers in other important articles, as wool, 
 silk, &c. were not equally extensive in propor- 
 tion to the extent of their trades; but they 
 were exceedingly large, and it will probably re- 
 quire some years to repair them.* All persons 
 who were attentive to the operations of trade 
 in the year 1825 will recollect, that it wasa 
 prevalent opinion in the early part of that year, 
 that the prices of most commodities, both of do- 
 mestic and foreign production, had been unduly 
 and unnecessarily depressed in price, —that they 
 had for some time been selling below the cost 
 of production, and that the rise which took 
 place in the first instance was merely a natural 
 recovery from an unnatural state of depression. 
 Probably there was some ground for this opi- 
 nion; prices had-heen lower than had been 
 
 * The following ARTICLES were remarkably elevated and depressed in price 
 during the period in question :— 
 
 in 1825 in Feb. 1826. 
 
 Cotton, Bowed Georgia, fell from ...... ls. b3d. to Os. 74d. 
 Coffee, St. Domingo 1 ei pa $8 0 «a 50 0 
 * Sugar, Brown ...... Bihdeeeontdock 43 0 « 30 0 
 Saltpetre, Kast India Ws Aarern em tee 36.4 Ob ad 200 
 Spices, Mace, Ph) ee 1 | a a Ya 
 Nutmegs, H \tesacanmners 12 0 u AT | 
 Pepper, i: nbbbedsawome 0 9o0% 10..6 
 Silk, Reggio eT: th 17 A... dtinegth bial 
 
 Tobacco, V irginia (ord. & mid.) from... 0 64 u @ 34 
 
99 
 
 ever known in the experience of the present 
 generation, and the consumption of 1823 to 
 1825 appeared to be larger than usual, both at 
 home and in foreign markets, so that the stocks 
 of merchandise and manufactures generally 
 were found to be smaller than usuai at the 
 commencement of 1825.* 
 
 Those persons who deny that the undue in- 
 crease and consequent decrease of paper cur- 
 rency was the principal cause of the evils of the 
 late crisis allege, in confirmation of this opinion, 
 that similar distresses have taken place in France 
 and other countries when the currency was 
 entirely metallic; also that similar revulsions 
 and calamities occurred in Great Britain in 
 1793, when this country had no notes under 
 £5 either local or bank of England. It is impos- 
 sible to deny that some shocks have occurred 
 to the trade of France, and that the currency is 
 almost wholly metallic; but it is certain that the 
 French merchants attribute them to the commer- 
 cial convulsions in this country, and I think with 
 
 *It may be stated, as some apology for the speculators, that on examining the 
 accounts made up on the Ist of January, 1825, it was found, the stocks of 
 most of the staple articles of merchandise were smaller than usual, and that 
 there was every indication of a considerable increase of consumption in 1824. 
 In cotton this was remarkably the case; the quantity taken for home consumption 
 was 635,000 bags, which exceeded the import by 100,000 bags, and ‘surpassed 
 the consumption of any year before or since 1824: the stocks in the kingdom on 
 the Ist of January, 1825, were only 235,000 bags, which was. above 100,000 
 less than they had been on the average of the five preceding years ; and the 
 
 accounts from America (the great source of our supply) gave reason to expect 
 a much smaller import in 1825 than in past years, 
 
100 
 
 justice: the trade of England cannot be in the 
 state it has during the last 2 or 3 years, without 
 deeply affecting the trade of France as well as 
 many other countries; and we have shewn how 
 much the currency of other countries is directly 
 increased and decreased by the increase and 
 decrease of our own. If eight or ten million 
 pounds of gold are exported to France and 
 Holland during a period of two years, and then 
 brought back again in the two succeeding years: 
 it is clear that prices must be materially influ- 
 enced in those countries by the change, and that 
 trade would become brisk in the first, and dull 
 in the second period. But the impulse felt in 
 those countries was not nearly so remarkable, 
 nor the reaction so violent as in this country | 
 the whole number of failures having been very 
 few, and scarcely any of them bankers. As to 
 the comparison of the crisis of 1793 with that 
 of 1826 in this country, it must be admitted the 
 distress and panic of the former very much 
 resembled what we lately witnessed; but the 
 most authentic reports which can be found of — 
 the state of the country, and of the causes 
 which produced it, shew that the great increase 
 of country bankers in 1790 to 1793, and the im- 
 prudence and unbounded eagerness with which 
 they extended their issues, were considered the 
 principal causes of the ruin that followed.* 
 
 * See Chalmers’s Answer to Jasper Wilson. 
 
101 
 
 Of the Scottish Bank Note Currency. 
 
 The science of political economy is said to be 
 greedy of facts. If however facts are not well 
 digested, the avidity with which they are collec- 
 ted and devoured may injure the system instead 
 of supporting it. Appearances are often so falla- 
 cious in this study, and especially in what relates 
 to the operations of money, and still more of 
 those subtle inventions which are made to supply 
 its place, that we ought to exercise peculiar 
 caution in admitting, as the foundation of new 
 theories, facts which are not justified by gene- 
 ral experience and sound principles. Those 
 who propose to supply the place of gold and 
 silver with paper, refer to the case of Scotland, 
 as affording the evidence of long experience in 
 their favour; no extensive failures, they say, have 
 ever taken place there of joint stock banks who 
 issued notes, and all who understand the sys- 
 tem, they maintain, admit its safety and utility. 
 This assertion appears to me to have obtained 
 credence without due examination, and if it 
 really proved what is asserted, it would prove 
 too much; the conclusion would be, that joint 
 stock banks on the Scotch plan are so excel- 
 lent and safe, that none of the additional checks 
 proposed by Mr. Ricardo and Mr. M‘Culloch 
 are requisite; and yet these authors consider 
 
 Oo 
 
102 
 
 these additional checks indispensable. I cannot 
 help thinking that A. Smith has erred in ascrib- 
 ing so much of the advancement of Scotland in 
 agriculture and trade to the facilities afforded 
 by the banks in their cash accounts, and the 
 extensive circulation of their bank notes, and 
 that the rapid improvements which have taken 
 place are rather to be attributed to other 
 causes’; the good education, systematically im- 
 parted through the medium of a working body 
 of clergy to all classes, combined with the 
 characteristic industry, intelligence, and enter- 
 prize, for which the people are distinguished, 
 are sufficient to account for their rapid progress 
 in trade and manufactures, as well as in the 
 arts and sciences. But there is not‘any thing 
 in the Scotch banking system calculated to pre- 
 vent overtrading, injurious speculation, and the 
 same extravagant expansion and contraction of 
 currency which have existed in England; these 
 have accordingly existed to an equally injurious 
 extent amongst our northern neighbours; and 
 if a comparison were made, it would be found 
 that there have been as many and as extensive 
 mercantile failures in proportion to the extent 
 of trade; and that the great evil attending fluc- 
 tuation in trade, of large masses of workmen 
 being suddenly deprived of employment, has 
 existed equally in Scotland asin England. The 
 
103 
 
 Scotch banking system, it is admitted, is better 
 than that of England, and it is probable those 
 who are interested in the banks have found 
 greater benefit than if they had been conducted 
 as in England; but this is no reason why they 
 should be allowed to continue issues of small 
 note currency in any way different from that 
 which is to be adopted in England; and as the 
 managers adduce as a reason for their being 
 permitted to continue them the difficulty of 
 exchanging the amount now running into gold 
 in the space of two or three years, without 
 crippling the trade of the country, and bringing 
 down extensive ruin on themselves, it is only 
 a proof that they have been improvident like 
 other issuers of notes ; that although the system 
 has not ruined them, as it has the English 
 bankers, it has not been so profitable and ad- 
 vantageous either to them or the public as has 
 been pretended ; and that the system ought to 
 be changed as quickly as it can be done, with 
 the least evil to the community. 
 
 In the voluminous evidence given by the 
 Scotch bankers before the committees of both 
 Houses of Parliament in the session of 1826, 
 the only argument which they have brought 
 forward deserving of attention is that which 
 relates to their cash credits; it is noticed at 
 
104 . 
 
 some length in the reports of the Lords and of 
 the Commons.” 
 
 * Extract from Lords’ Report. 
 
 “¢ There is also one part of their system, which is stated by all the witnesses 
 (and in the opinion of the committee very justly stated) to have had the best 
 effects upon the people of Scotland, and particularly upon the middling and 
 poorer classes of society, in producing and encouragir g habits of frugality and 
 industry. The practice referred to is that of cash credits. Any person who 
 applies to a bank for a cash credit, is called upon to produce two or more competent 
 securities, who are jointly bound, and after a full inquiry into the character of the 
 applicant, the nature of his business, and the sufficiency of his securities, he is 
 allowed to open a credit, and to draw upon the bank for the whole of its amount, 
 or for such part as his daily transactions may require. ‘To the credit of this aca 
 count, he pays in such sums as he may not have occasion to use; and interest is 
 charged or credited upon the daily balance, as the case may be. From the faci- 
 lity which these cash credits give to all the small transactions of the country, 
 and from the opportunities which they afford to persons who begin business 
 with little or no capital, but their character, to employ profitably the minutest 
 products of their industry, it cannot be doubted that the most important advan- 
 tages are derived to the whole community; the advantage to the banks 
 who give these cash credits arises from the call which they continually produce 
 for the issue of their paper, and from the opportunity which they afford for the 
 profitable employment of part of their deposits. The banks are, indeed, so sensi- 
 ble that, in order to make this part of their business advantageous and secure, 
 it is necessary that their cash credits should (as they express ‘it) be frequently 
 operated upon, that they refuse to continue them unless this implied condition 
 be fulfilled. The total amount of their cash credits is stated by one witness to. 
 be five millions, of which the average amount advanced by the banks may be 
 one-third. | 
 
 «¢ The manner in which the practice of deposits on receipt is conducted tends 
 to produce the same desirable results. Sums to as low an amount as ten pounds 
 (and, in some instances, lower) are taken by the banks from the depositor, who 
 may claim them on demand. He receives an interest, usually about one per 
 cent. below the market rate. It is stated that these deposits are, to a great ex- 
 tent, left uncalled for from year to year, and that the depositors are in the habit 
 of adding, at the end of each year, to the interest then accrued, the amount of 
 their yearly savings ; that the sums thus gradually accumulated belong chiefly 
 to the labouring and industrious classes of the community, and that when such 
 accounts are closed, it is*generally for the purpose of enabling the depositors 
 either to purchase a house or to engage in business. 
 
105 
 
 That these cash credits are advantageous to 
 the trade and industry of the country is not 
 
 ‘¢ It is contended by all the persons engaged in banking in Scotland, that the 
 issue of one pound notes is essential to the continuance both of their cash credits 
 and of the branch banks established in the poorest and most remote districts: 
 Whether the discontinuance of one pound notes would necessarily operate to the 
 full extent which they apprehend, in either of these respects, may, perhaps, ad- 
 mit of doubt: but the apprehensions entertained on this head, by the persons 
 most immediately concerned, might, for a time at least, have nearly the same 
 effect as the actual necessity, and there is strong reason to believe that, if the 
 prohibition of one pound notes should not ultimately overturn the whole system, 
 it must, for a considerable time, materially affect it.” 
 
 Extract from Commons’ Report. 
 
 “Lastly, that the inducement to the Scotch banks to continue their branch 
 banks in many remote parts of the country, in which they now exist, would be 
 destroyed ; and that the whole system of deposits and cash credits would be most 
 materially affected, if the banks were compelled to forego the profit now derived 
 from the issue of notes below five pounds. . 
 
 *¢ For the opinions in de ail of the witnesses from Scotland, on these and other 
 points connected with the small note circulation in that country, your committee 
 must refer to the evidence annexed to this report. So far as the interests of 
 the bank of England are concerned, it will be seen that the directors of that bank, 
 who were examined before your committee, urge no objection to the continuance 
 of the present system in Scotland, provided that the paper circulation of Scotland 
 can be effectually restrained within the limits of that country. 
 
 «Upon a review of the evidence tendered to your committee, and forming their 
 judgment upon that evidence, your committee cannot advise that a law should 
 now be passed, prohibiting, from a period to be therein determined, the future 
 issue in Scotland of notes below five pounds. 
 
 «¢ There are, in the opinion of your committee, sufficient grounds in the experi- 
 ence of the past, for permitting another trial to be made of the compatibility of a 
 paper circulation in Scotland with a circulation of specie in this country. 
 
 “ Looking at the amount of notes current in Scotland below the value of five 
 pounds, and comparing it with the total amount of the paper currency of that 
 country, it is very difficult to foresee the consequences of a law which should 
 prohibit the future issue of notes constituting so large a proportion of the whole 
 circulation. , 
 
 “ Your committee are certainly not convinced that it would affect the cash credits 
 to the extent apprehended by some of the witnesses ; but they are unwilling, with- 
 
106 
 
 questioned; but the witnesses do not make it 
 apparent that they are more beneficial than any 
 other loans from bankers to traders, or that the 
 abolition of £1 and £2 notes would destroy this 
 system of accommodation. No doubt the object 
 of granting these cash credits is that the bank- 
 ers may get cut their small notes, and it is 
 curious to examine how their eager competition 
 for this purpose works; they say, that ‘it is 
 necessary these cash credits should be frequent- 
 ly operated upon, (as they express it) and that 
 they refuse to continue them unless this implied 
 condition be fulfilled.” The explanation of this 
 is, that the borrower must keep paying in, and 
 taking out money again; and it may be fairly 
 concluded, (though not stated by the witnesses) 
 that whilst all the money taken out is in the 
 small notes of the banker who lends, the money 
 brought in consists of any other notes or bills. 
 
 out stronger proof of necessity, to incur the risk of deranging, from any cause 
 whatever, asystem admirably calculated, in their opinion, to economize the use 
 of capital—to excite and cherish a spirit of useful enterprise—and even to pro- 
 mote the moral habits of the people, by the direct inducements which it holds 
 out to the maintenance of a character for industry, integrity, and prudence. 
 
 “At the same time that your committee recommend that the system of currency, 
 which has for so long a period prevailed in Scotland, should not under existing 
 circumstances be disturbed, they feel it to be their duty to add, that they have 
 formed their judgment upon a reference to the past, and upon the review of a 
 state of things which may hereafter be materially varied by the increasing wealth 
 and commerce of Scotland, by the rapid extension of her commercial intercourse 
 with England, and by the new circumstances that may affect that intercourse after 
 the re-establishment of metallic currency in this country.” 
 
107 
 
 Thus every cash credit creates a party, whose 
 business it is to co-operate with the banker in 
 getting his notes into circulation. If these 
 small notes were abolished, the cash credits 
 would be discontinued, or at least greatly dimi- 
 nished, if no advantage were to be derived by 
 the banker but the interest which he now 
 charges, and from which his whole profit is now 
 derived ; but it cannot be doubted that on a new 
 system they might be continued with advantage 
 to the banks as well as to the public; if a bank 
 commission was charged on every hundred 
 pounds operated upon, or turned over, (as 
 is done by the Liverpool bankers) probably 
 the same profit would on the whole be derived 
 from their business by the Scotch bankers, More 
 of that large portion of their capital and deposits 
 now vested in the funds would be brought into 
 circulation, and perhaps the interest which is now 
 allowed by the Scotch banks on deposits (estima- 
 ted by them to amount to nearly twenty million 
 pounds) would be reduced. The machinery of 
 their cash credits might be so much deranged 
 that they probably would not find it worth while 
 to continue to have branches, as they now have, 
 in the remotest districts, where a large number 
 of clerks or agents are supported by ‘‘operating” 
 the cash accounts ; but no one can for a moment 
 doubt that in whatever part of Scotland money 
 
108 
 
 was wanted for carrying on the customary trade 
 of the country, it would find its way there to the 
 same extent in gold as in paper. 3 
 
 PO IPL PILL OE DODO LE POL OLE POPO DOOD 
 
 IV.—INFLUENCE OF THE PAPER SYSTEM ON THE INDUSTRY, 
 TRADE, AND REVENUE OF GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 THE conclusions to be drawn from the pre- 
 ceding investigations may be briefly summed 
 up as follows. 
 
 That prices are much influenced in all coun. 
 tries by the increase or decrease of the rapidity 
 of circulation ; and that as any country advances 
 in civilization, commerce, and wealth, the quan- 
 tity of money necessary for its ordinary circu- 
 lation does not increase by any means in pro- 
 portion to such advancement; the exchanges 
 between the producers, importers, dealers, and 
 consumers being made with such increased faci- 
 lity by means of the improvement of the bank- 
 ing system, credits, bills, &c., thata large part 
 of the wholesale trade of such countries becomes 
 a mere system of set-off or barter. 
 
 That although an increase of the quantity of 
 money must have the direct effect of increasing 
 prices proportionately, if the circulation is not 
 
109 
 
 diminished in rapidity, yet if by a dull state of 
 trade, want of confidence, or other causes, the 
 rapidity of circulation is materially checked, a great 
 increase of money may take place without any 
 advance in prices. And on the same principle, 
 the quantity of money in a country may dimi- 
 nish materially without causing a fall in the 
 prices of commodities, when a brisk state of 
 trade and general confidence produce a more 
 rapid circulation than usual. 
 
 That great fluctuations in prices will occur in 
 any country of extensive traffic, large exports 
 of manufactures, and high taxation, even when 
 the currency is composed of the precious metals, 
 and that these irregularities are much aggravated 
 by laws which restrain and embarrass our inter- 
 course with foreign countries. 
 
 That in proportion as paper currency is intro- 
 ‘duced in the place of gold and silver, these 
 fluctuations are greatly increased, and that a: 
 powerful instrument is placed by this system 
 in the hands of bankers and money dealers, 
 with which they may derange the course of 
 trade, and injure the regular pursuits of indus- 
 try; without any compensating advantage even 
 to the monied interest, inasmuch as the paper 
 system throws a large portion of the banking 
 business into the hands of men of little capital. 
 
 That there is an inherent tendency in paper 
 
 P 
 
110 
 
 currency to become redundant, whereby real 
 capital is deprived of its value, and diverted 
 from its natural channels, the metallic money 
 is driven out of the country, and violent fluc- 
 tuations are produced 1 in our foreign, as sii as 
 our home trade. 
 
 That as the bankers who issue local notes are 
 frequently connected with establishments of 
 mines and manufactories in the districts where 
 their notes circulate,. they have it in their power 
 by a sudden expansion or contraction of the 
 circulating medium in those districts to raise or 
 depress prices locally in order to promote their 
 own advantage, by which the community is 
 frequently injured. 
 
 That the paper system is calculated to pro- 
 duce a spirit of gambling in every branch of 
 agriculture, commerce and manufactures ; which 
 deranges the regular course of trade, produces 
 extensive revolutions of property, and by pro- 
 moting extravagant speculation, discourages the 
 steady pursuits of industry. 
 
 The most determined advocates of paper cur- 
 rency will admit, that the fluctuations of prices 
 in this country have been almost as violent since 
 our paper currency was made convertible into 
 specie by law as before. Though the opinions 
 of good judges are divided as to the degree in 
 which these recent fluctuations are to be attri- 
 
iil 
 
 buted to the use of paper money; where so 
 much is hazarded by a perseverance in this 
 system, and so much injury is inflicted on the’ 
 mass of the community, (who cannot understand 
 the principles.of money, and who must receive 
 for wages, and the ordinary payments of their 
 daily traffic, the paper which is issued by 
 bankers) very obvious and indisputable improve- 
 ments ought to be made in our paper system if 
 itis to be continued. 
 
 The overtrading, which it is admitted on all 
 hands existed in the above period, might haye. 
 originated and been carried to a very prejudi- 
 cial extent without the paper system; but it 
 could not have gone to the ruinous length which 
 it attained, if the small currency which consti- 
 . tutes the retail trade of the country had not 
 (in consequence of the act passed in 1822, per- 
 mitting bankers to issue again their £1 and £2 
 notes) been greatly increased by the increase of 
 bank of England and local bank notes; because 
 the producers and importers of commodities 
 cannot in the long run dispose of them to the 
 consumers in larger quantities or at enhanced 
 prices, unless the consumers are provided with. 
 an increased amount of. money corresponding 
 with such increase of prices, or quantity of ' 
 commodities. | 
 
 The periodical revulsions and panics which oe- 
 
112 
 
 curred in 1810, in 1816 and in 1819, as well as in 
 1826, have been without parallel in their nature, 
 in the history of this or any other country, ex- 
 cepting perhaps the United States of America, 
 where the same system of paper currency has 
 prevailed ; and as there is no principle in trade 
 itself that leads to such calamities, and they 
 cannot be traced clearly to any other causes, 
 it is reasonable to regard them rather as the 
 result of a bad monetary system, than as 
 unavoidable evils, to which trade and commerce 
 are periodically incident. 
 
 ~ Nothing but benefits of the most unequivo- 
 cal nature (not merely as regards national 
 wealth, but security and strength) should in- 
 duce us to dispense with the use of those metals 
 which constitute the common measure of value 
 in the rest of the world; which benefits, those 
 who recommend a currency entirely composed 
 of paper have not made apparent. 
 
 These writers have not stated why the richest 
 country in the world, the country in which credit 
 is more extended than in any other, and which 
 produces annually the largest amount of export- 
 able productions, should be the first to throw 
 into disuse the two articles gold and silver, which 
 compose so large a portion of the commerce of 
 civilized nations, and of which Great Britain 
 can at any time procure apy quantity she may 
 
113 
 
 require for circulation, more easily than other 
 countries which are less opulent and less habi- 
 tuated to all kinds of manufacturing industry. 
 
 They have not pointed out how we should 
 carry on an advantageous trade with Mexico, 
 Peru, and other countries, where the precious 
 metals are principally produced and manufac- 
 tured; the principal part of the return from 
 which countries consists of these commodities 
 in payment for many millions in value of manu- 
 factured goods, which they now take princi- 
 pally from Great Britain. 
 
 They have not examined the consequences 
 which might result from other countries follow- 
 ing the example of this, if we adopted the plan 
 recommended by these writers ; but it is to be 
 feared, that if it was begun (even with effectual 
 checks) in this country, it would be imperfectly 
 adopted without such checks elsewhere ; and that 
 in periods of war in particular, the governments 
 of other countries would, from their connection 
 with and controul over it, derange the whole 
 monetary system of the commercial world ; and 
 that we should thereby experience many of those 
 evils which it is the professed object of the 
 proposed ‘‘ Economical and secure Currency ” 
 to obviate. 
 
 Their plan would not prevent the recurrence 
 of those shocks and revulsions in trade, arising 
 
114 
 
 from a redundant and deficient currency, which 
 have occurred since the return of peace, not 
 only producing great losses to bankers, mer- 
 chants, manufacturers, and all capitalists, but 
 inflicting grievous distress on the lower classes, 
 who suffer not merely directly from holding notes 
 of bankers and others who fail, but indirectly 
 to a larger extent by being suddenly thrown 
 out of work, and exposed to great alterations 
 in the prices of their labour. 
 
 In general the amount of our currency is very 
 small in proportion to our extensive traffic, 
 owing to the trade of the producers, merchants 
 and dealers being carried on universally by 
 a system of bills and credit, and the far greater 
 part of the wholesale dealings being settled with- 
 . out the intervention of money : but whenever 
 periods of depression occur, an extraordinary 
 demand for money arises for general trade, 
 which aggravates the depression, In such 
 times, with a currency composed wholly or 
 principally of paper, the quantity 1s greatly 
 diminished by the shock which credit has sus- 
 tained, and the retail trade of the country is 
 deprived of an adequate circulating medium 
 to an extent which could not be experienced 
 with a specie currency. 
 
 Whatever advantages may be derived fueling a 
 refined and universal system of credit in the 
 
115 
 
 wholesale trade of the country, it is not safe or 
 proper to permit the retail trade to rest on the 
 same foundation; and therefore the Legislature 
 are justified in prohibiting all bank notes for such 
 small amounts as constitute the ordinary circu- 
 lating medium between the dealers and con- 
 sumers; and if such prohibition is continued, the 
 consequence will be, that all bankers of real 
 capital will be benefitted, whilst the community 
 are protected. 
 
 Of the Views of some popular Writers 
 respecting our Currency. 
 
 In consequence of the convulsions and dis- 
 tresses which have succeeded each other so 
 rapidly in the commercial world since the year 
 1819, an idea has been taken up and encourag- 
 ed by several popular writers, that this country 
 _ cannot return to cash payments (as it is termed) 
 or dispense with a paper currency, and conti- 
 nue to pay a sufficient amount of taxes to defray 
 the interest of the national debt, in addition to 
 the ordinary expenses of a peace establishment. 
 This opinion is advocated with much ability, not 
 only by theoretical writers such as Mr. Cob- 
 bett, Sir John Sinclair, Sir James Graham, and 
 Mr. Western, M. P. for Essex, (who in his 
 Pamphlet on the Currency, published in May, 
 
116 
 
 1826, argues in favor of “a material alteration 
 of the antient metallic standard,” upon nearly 
 the same grounds as those taken by Mr.Attwood) 
 but by men of great practical experience. In 
 Mr. Attwood’s Pamphlet, entitled, ‘‘7he late 
 Prosperity and Present Adversity Explamed,” he 
 prophecies the most ruinous consequences from 
 perseverance in the attempt to return effectu- 
 ally to cash payments. ‘The money of the 
 country,” he says, in page 25, ‘‘ will not be able 
 to discharge 100th part of the demands upon 
 it, andif men live at all it will be by universal 
 plunder. The Bank of England will be com- 
 pelled to stop payment, but it will not do so 
 probably till the distress and terror are so great 
 as to make a Bank restriction act perfectly une- 
 qual to the mighty task of propping the falling 
 fabric of society. But if the government should 
 think proper to abolish the metallic standard 
 altogether, or to reduce it greatly by alloy or 
 diminution of its weight, then indeed it is cer- 
 tain we can have nothing to fear :” and in page 
 43, he says, that ‘‘nothing short of reducing the 
 standard of gold to about one-half can secure 
 the country ;” that is, we must pass a law to 
 declare an ounce of gold to be worth, instead of 
 £3.:17s 103d, about £7 or £8; this, he says, will 
 injure no one, but enable us to pay our taxes 
 and flourish in our commerce as well as in:-our 
 
117 
 
 home trade. It is difficult to comprehend the 
 train of reasoning of these writers, but it is 
 evident they think. that great prosperity arose 
 during the war from our paper currency, and 
 that by a return to it we should resume our ca- 
 reer of wealth; that as taxation has rendered 
 every thing dear in this country, we cannot now 
 pay the existing rents or taxes without an 
 amount of currency to correspond with the war 
 prices ; and that as the national debt was con- 
 tracted in a depreciated currency, the interest 
 of it ought to be paid, and can only be paid in 
 the same. , 
 
 That such a measure would lighten the burden 
 of taxation, and of annuities and leases must be 
 admitted; but in the same degree it would in- 
 jure the fund holders, and all annuitants and 
 lessees, and all who depend on fixed incomes. 
 If therefore the country cannot pay the debts 
 which it has incurred, it would be better to 
 make a composition with the public creditor in 
 a direct and open manner instead of adopting 
 this evasive and indirect method. The mode of 
 doing it, recommended by these writers, is not 
 only making a bankrupt composition with the 
 fund holders, but adding a great injury to a 
 numerous body of persons who have entered 
 into engagements since the year 1819, (when 
 the law for resuming cash payments declared 
 
 Q 
 
118 
 
 that payments should be made according to the 
 old standard of £3. 17s 103d) who would be 
 plundered just in proportion as the currency 
 was depreciated, The bulk of the present fund 
 holders are not the same who lent the money to 
 the government during the war; but if there be 
 any reasonable doubt of their right to receive 
 the interest on the full amount, let the subject 
 be investigated by parliament, and a compro- 
 mise adjusted. This need not make it neces- 
 sary to alter the standard of value in the way 
 proposed, which can have no beneficial effect, 
 (other than the assumed one of lightening the 
 burden of taxation) nor any otherwise affect 
 the future course of trade. 
 
 But, say these reasoners, we cannot find gold 
 to enable us to return to cash payments ; we 
 have tried it, and we have been twice brought 
 to the brink of ruin by the experiment ; the 
 gold flies away speedily on the wings of com- 
 merce, and we cannot retain it in sufficient quan- 
 tities to answer the purposes of our extended 
 traffic internal and foreign; let us hold to the 
 system of paper, which answered every purpose 
 for twenty years, by which our wealth increas- 
 ed at the same time that we carried on vast 
 military operations during a war of unparalleled 
 expense, and which is as necessary now as it 
 was before, to enable us to carry on our exten- 
 
119 
 
 sive trade, and collect our immense revenue, 
 without impairmg our strength and resources. 
 
 It would lead us too far to consider here how 
 far the paper system contributed to the increase 
 of our power and wealth during the late war. 
 It must, I think, be admitted, that without that 
 paper system, we could not have carried on the 
 same extent of foreign expenditure year after 
 year that we did, certainly not without inflict- 
 ing a serious injury on our trade and commerce; 
 and as we could not have borrowed such im- 
 meuse sums for this purpose, we could not 
 have shifted off from our own shoulders to those 
 of succeeding generations so large a burden as 
 the loans and funding system have entailed. 
 But the charges of the war continue, and the 
 great demand for the productions of industry 
 which the war gave rise to has ceased, and we 
 cannot now avoid the consequences. Our prices 
 were reduced by the restoration of peace and 
 free intercourse with other countries to a level 
 with those of other countries, and they cannot 
 be raised above that level by any regulations 
 respecting our currency. We only injure our- 
 selves by attempting to accomplish this; and 
 there can be no good reason for persisting in the 
 attempt if it can be shewn,— 
 
 ].—That we can obtain an adequate supply of 
 gold exactly proportioned to our wealth and 
 
120 
 
 traffic, without impairing the capital or injuring 
 the agriculture, trade, and foreign commerce of 
 the country. 
 
 I].—That we cannot keep a larger amount of. 
 paper currency permanently in circulation than 
 of gold, and therefore cannot raise our prices 
 by any regulations respecting banks or paper 
 money. j 
 
 I11.—That our internal trade and foreign com- 
 merce can be carried on to more advantage with 
 gold than with paper currency. 
 
 {V.—That no plan can be devised for keeping 
 the prices of commodities higher than they 
 would -be with a gold currency, without an 
 alteration of the standard, and that more evil 
 than good would result from such alteration. 
 
 That these propositions are correct, will not 
 be difficult to make apparent to those who are 
 acquainted with the general principles of cur- 
 rency, and who have attended to the state of 
 this country, and the changes which have oc- 
 curred in the supplies of money in the last few 
 years. 
 
 1.—It is a great mistake to suppose that the 
 quantity of currency in this country, when com- 
 pared with that of France or of any other coun- 
 try, must bein the direct proportion that our 
 greater wealth and traffic bear to that of 
 other countries of Europe; the increased rapi- 
 
121 
 
 dity of circulation, and other circumstances 
 explained in the first part of this Essay, may 
 enable us to carry on our trade with a much 
 smaller amount of money, although our trade is 
 so much more extensive. The whole amount 
 which is required to carry on the trade of Great 
 Britain may be from fifty to sixty millions; but 
 the amount of gold which would be required to 
 supplant the circulation of bank notes below the 
 value of five pounds, (which are now gradually 
 paying off in consequence of the-law of 1826) 
 and to supply a fund for reserves to enable 
 bankers to pay their other notes when called 
 upon, would probably not amount to above 
 twenty to twenty-five million pounds. Of this 
 sum considerably above one-half is already in 
 the country, and the supply still continues to 
 arrive regularly from Europe as a necessary 
 result of the state of our trade, the glut in this 
 country of most imported articles (as before 
 explained) having caused prices of them to rate 
 so low as to check importation, and the prices 
 of our exportable commodities being so low as 
 to admit of our export trade continuing to 
 nearly the same extent as usual. Supposing 
 the amount of circulating or outstanding notes 
 of the country bankers under five pounds to be 
 at present six to seven million pounds, (which, I 
 believe, exceeds the fact) there can be no diffi- 
 
122 
 
 culty in our obtaining a supply of gold to this 
 extent in the course of this and the following 
 year; and the bank of England notes under five 
 pounds are already paid off within about half a 
 million. After the depression of 1819 to 1820, 
 we imported, it appears, in the space of three 
 or fuur years above twenty millions of gold, 
 chiefly from France and Holland, without pro- 
 ducing any perceptible scarcity of money, or 
 any material depression of the prices of com- 
 modities in those countries: when the bank 
 notes were again so plentifully poured forth, a 
 large amount of this gold was exported, and 
 English sovereigns circulated throughout Eu- 
 rope; but the tide is now again flowing into 
 this country, and it will soon supply the quan- 
 tity which may be required. The supplies 
 from the South American mines of both silver 
 and gold, there is reason to believe, are now 
 rather increasing; silver flows back from Asia 
 to Europe; and as the bulk of these supplies 
 comes to this country, they will of course remain 
 here until we have obtained an adequate stock. 
 No country in the world has the power of im- 
 porting the precious metals so easily as Great 
 Britain, because no country can so quickly pro- 
 duce a large amount of valuable manufactures 
 of cotton, iron, &c. at low prices, and suited to 
 the wants of all other countries, by the export 
 
123 
 
 of which, we may obtain, in any single year, 
 several millions in value of specie, in addition 
 to the amount of foreign commodities which our 
 consumption may require. This import cf spe- 
 cie may be attended with some loss to the 
 country, but it cannot be very considerable, for 
 the same reasons which were adduced in a former 
 part to shew how little we should gain by ex- 
 changing a metallic for a paper currency; this 
 loss, however, whatever it may be, has been 
 entirely occasioned by our own unwise and va- 
 cillating policy in not adhering to the principles 
 of currency fixed in 1819. By the legislative 
 interference of 1822, parliament invited the 
 bank of England, and all the country bankers: 
 to a renewal ofthe small note circulation, cer- 
 tainly for ten years ; and from what passed when 
 this change of system was adopted, it might 
 reasonably be inferred, that it was the opinion 
 of the legislature, that the recurrence to paper 
 was a measure which it might prove advisable to 
 perpetuate, as being calculated to relieve the 
 distress of the agriculturists, by raising the 
 prices of farming produce. It may be hoped 
 that the experience of the last four years has 
 opened the eyes of ministers to the fallacy of 
 this opinion. 
 
 2.—An opinion, however, still prevails with 
 many persons, that we can permanently keep a 
 larger amount of paper in circulation than of 
 
124 
 
 specie, and thus sustain our prices above the 
 level at which a gold currency would keep them. 
 In the preceding pages, I have endeavoured to 
 shew that this cannot be the case; that although 
 prices may be so raised for one or two years, or 
 possibly a longer time, they will fall again by the 
 natural effects of trade, as long as our paper is 
 convertible into specie bylaw. But it may be said, 
 why cannot we keep up prices.of those commo- 
 dities, like corn and other raw produce, which 
 are either not allowed to be imported excepting 
 on particular emergencies, or which are too 
 bulky to be imported from other countries, ex- 
 cepting at an enormous expense—why cannot 
 our znternal trade be carried on with a scale of 
 prices adapted to our peculiar situation, and 
 proportioned to our wealth, our expenditure, 
 and ‘our taxation? The answer to this is, that 
 we can do all this with gold just as well as with 
 paper, or better in the long run. (See on this 
 subject Smith’s Wealth of Nations, vol. I. b. 2, 
 c. 2, p. 448, and in other parts.) If, indeed, we 
 were to adopt an inconvertible paper currency, 
 there are no limits to which we may not raise 
 prices ; but the injustice and mischief to which 
 we should be exposed would be incalculable, 
 and the most important use of money would be 
 entirely destroyed, viz. its being'a steady mea- 
 sure of value. Our policy, as to the currency 
 and the corn laws, has.given some appearance 
 
of correctness to the opinion, that high prices 
 regularly accompany the use of paper, and low 
 prices that of gold. Prices of corn and other 
 produce of the land were extremely low in 1822, 
 owing to very abundant harvests and other 
 causes ; and because they rose in the following 
 years, when the paper currency was extended, 
 it is inferred that they would not have risen 
 without such paper currency. That they would 
 not have risen so much as they did is highly 
 probable, because they rose to prices which 
 could not be sustained permanently either with 
 paper or gold ; but there is nodoubt they would 
 have risen with a gold currency, as high as they 
 would have remained at steadily with a paper 
 currency, had we continued the paper system 
 perpetually. 
 
 It does not follow, that when our currency 
 -is made conformable to that of France, or other 
 countries whose prices are regulated by the 
 use of a metallic currency, our prices are to 
 correspond also. There are much more wealth 
 and real capital in this country, and the natural 
 effect of the progress of wealth and improve- 
 ment is to enhance the real prices of corn, cattle, 
 timber, and most sorts of raw produce, just as 
 it is to diminish the natural prices of almost 
 all sorts of manufactures. The reasons for 
 these two different effects being produced on 
 the prices of different commodities in the same 
 
 R 
 
126 
 
 country are satisfactorily explained by Adam 
 Smith, and have never been disputed by any 
 political economists. He likewise shews how 
 the fall in the prices of manufactures tends still 
 further to enhance the prices of land and most 
 kinds of produce of the land, and consequently 
 of rents. There is a natural progress in.all this 
 which cannot be accelerated by any artificial 
 regulations of currency; and all attempts to 
 force it will only, by producing unnaturally 
 high prices, give an undue impulse to agricul- 
 ture and trade, and so bring about the evil which 
 it was intended to avoid of unnecessarily low 
 prices. Our ancestors conceiving that the 
 wealth of a country consisted entirely of gold 
 and silver, did all that they could by severe 
 laws to accumulate money in the country, and it 
 is still highly penal in some countries to export 
 the precious metals; but all such laws have 
 proved utterly ineffectual. No more gold and 
 silver can be retained in circulation in any coun- 
 try than the state of its trade will advantage- 
 ously employ, and there is no quality in a paper 
 currency which will keep it in circulation toa 
 larger amount. It is probable, indeed, that if 
 gold were the only medium of circulation, it 
 would not amount to quite as much as the 
 amount of currency that would be in existence, 
 if it were principally composed of bank notes; 
 
127 
 
 because in the latter case, the bankers must keep 
 a certain proportion (perhaps one-fourth or one- 
 fifth) of gold or bank of England notes constantly 
 unemployed to answer unforeseen demands or 
 runs. Thus fifty millions of gold might answer 
 and keep prices at the same level as fifty-five to 
 sixty millions of paper, with a small portion of 
 gold; as the bank of England would keep a con- 
 siderable amount of gold for unforeseen contin- 
 gencies, and the country bankers would also 
 keep a considerable amount of either gold or 
 bank of England notes as reserves. It must 
 also be admitted, that as the whole amount of 
 currency in Europe would be somewhat in- 
 creased by the addition of whatever sum of gold 
 we might send thither by substituting paper for 
 gold, general prices here, as well as in Europe, 
 would be somewhat raised, and a small increase 
 of currency would, therefore, circulate in this 
 country, as it would in the rest of the world. 
 But it is said we cannot raise the revenue 
 with a metallic currency; that the fifty-six 
 million pounds of taxes which are now levied, 
 are equal to seventy million pounds whilst the 
 paper system was in force; and that if prices 
 were raised, taxation would be rendered less 
 oppressive. It would lead to a long enquiry to 
 examine the effects of taxation. on prices of 
 commodities in a country so highly taxed as this. 
 
128 
 
 It has been maintained by some writers on 
 political economy, that taxation has the effect 
 of raising the prices generally; Mr. M‘Cul- 
 loch appears to entertain this opinion, as ap- 
 pears from the following extract from his trea- 
 tise on taxation, in the Supplement to the En- 
 cyclopedia Britannica :—‘‘It is not easy to 
 trace the effects, on their price, of an equal 
 ad valorem duty on all commodities. Sucha 
 duty could not, it is obvious, at all affect their 
 values relatively to each other; and supposing 
 their quantity and the quantity of money in the 
 country to continue the same, it has been con- 
 tended that it could occasion no rise of prices. 
 But a very few words will be sufficient to shew the 
 Fallacy of this stuienent. The government must 
 receive the tax either in money or in goods. 
 Now suppose, for the sake of illustration, that 
 the duty is ten per cent., and that it is paid in 
 kind; in this case the supply of produce re- 
 maining in the market after the tax 1s paid being 
 diminished one-tenth, the purchasers will only 
 get nine-tenths of the commodities they previ- 
 ously got in return for the same quantity of 
 money, or, in other words, prices will rise ten 
 per cent. If the government receives the tax in 
 money, the result will be precisely similar. 
 The purchasers will still have to reimburse the 
 producers for the tax, or to pay them ten per 
 
129 
 
 cent. additional for their goods. For if this were 
 not really the case—if the purchasers who do 
 not directly pay the tax to government conti- 
 nued to get the same quantity of produce for 
 the same sum of money after its imposition as 
 before, there would be no cause in operation to 
 occasion the smallest diminution of individual 
 consumption ; and it is plainly impossible that 
 the tax could, in such circumstances, give the 
 government the means of obtaining an increased 
 share of the produce of the country, which is 
 absurd. Not only, therefore, is it certain that a 
 tax on a particular class of commodities will raise 
 their price ; but 2¢ 2s also certain that an equal ad 
 valorem duly on all commodities will, without any 
 merease of money, occasion an equal and univer- 
 sal rise of prices. The reai effect of every such 
 tax is to transfer a portion of the produce of 
 the industry of the country into the hands of 
 government, and consequently to cause a less 
 portion of that produce to come into the hands 
 of every individual vhose means of purchasing 
 are not increased. Such a rise of prices is 
 widely different from the rise which is occasi- 
 oned by an increase in the quantity of money. 
 When it is increased, prices rise, because more 
 money is given for the same quantity of goods; 
 but when an ad valorem duty is levied, prices 
 rise, because the same sum of money is given for 
 
130 
 
 a less quantity of goods, a portion of them hay- 
 ing been transferred to government.” 
 
 It is with deference that I differ from so high 
 an authority on this subject; but I cannot see 
 with him how “prices of commodities can be 
 raised universally (as he says) by an equal ad va- 
 lorem tax on all articles, without any increase of 
 money,” unless the money is made to circulate 
 more quickly in consequence of the tax; he 
 says, “the same quantity of money is given for a 
 less quantity of govds, a portion of them having 
 been transferred to government ;” but the money 
 which represents these goods is transferred to 
 the government also, and this money is employ- 
 ed by the functionaries of government and 
 receivers of taxes in the circulation of these 
 goods. 
 
 Taxation, though it raises the prices of 
 those articles which are taxed, cannot raise 
 the prices of all commodities; whatever form 
 it assumes it is simply a payment to the state 
 of a portion of the income of the country; 
 whether it be imposed on the landed produce, 
 or imported produce, or on manufactures, or on 
 all of these, (as is the case in this country) it 
 is still a deduction from the incomes of all the 
 consumers in proportion to their incomes. If 
 all taxes were paid directly by a poll rate on the 
 community, it will be admitted that no effect on 
 
13] 
 
 prices of commodities would be produced; but 
 this would be impracticable. Taxes are there- 
 fore laid on commodities in the producers or 
 dealers’ hands, and these parties become in fact 
 the tax gatherers ; they collect from ali the con- 
 sumers a certain portion of their incomes for 
 the state, and the same amount is distributed 
 again amongst the servants of government, who 
 by expending it, send back the money into the 
 channels of trade. 
 
 The real effect of taxes, therefore, is not 
 to raise prices; they have necessarily a ten- 
 dency to depress the prices, that is, the nett prices 
 independent of the tax, not only of the commo- 
 dity taxed, but of all other commodities; the 
 taxed articles must indeed be raised in prices 
 pro tanto in some degree proportioned to the tax 
 imposed, but the prices of the same articles inde- 
 pendent of the tax are reduced, together with all 
 other commodities which are not taxed. If taxes 
 were diminished on all articles, the real prices 
 would rise above what they were before worth 
 without the tax; and. if a new tax were imposed 
 on all articles, the prices would naturally fall 
 in somewhat a similar ratio, unless the incomes 
 of the consumers were increased. 
 
 . Taxation has been said to raise general prices 
 by increasing the rapidity of circulation, but this 
 cannot be correct; it increases the number of 
 
132 
 
 operations which the money of a country has to 
 perform, and this makes a larger amount of 
 money requisite, but it does not increase the 
 rapidity of circulation, and consequently does 
 not raise prices in that way. 
 
 If the whole quantity of goods in the country 
 is not increased by taxation, it is impossible 
 they can require a larger quantity of money to 
 circulate them. But if taxation has the effect, 
 which it frequently has, and which is its natural 
 effect if not carried to such a height as to paralize 
 the industry of the people of increasing the labour 
 and productive powers of the country, it may 
 produce such an increase of the whole quantity 
 of commodities as would require an increased 
 quantity of money to circulate them. If tax- 
 ation were reduced, it would not be a neces- 
 sary consequence that the productive power 
 of the country would be diminished ; the people 
 at large would probably consume a larger quan- 
 tity, for their means of consuming taxed articles 
 would be more or less increased, and their 
 productive power would remain the same as 
 at present. This is the only palliative which 
 can be applied to relieve us from the great. 
 evils which we suffer from excessive taxation ; 
 and there is no reason to doubt that reduction 
 in taxation might be carried much further than 
 it has been, without impairing the strength of 
 
133 
 
 the government, or hazarding the security of 
 the fund holders. 
 
 During the war prices of commodities gene- 
 rally were raised by the depreciation of the 
 currency consequent on our.vicious paper system, 
 and in a considerable degree also by the great 
 increase in the rapidity of circulation conse- 
 quent on the loans and government expenditure, 
 We cannot now expect the pressure of taxation to 
 be alleviated by these circumstances ; but since 
 the peace, a large portion of direct taxes, inclu- 
 ding the property tax, (which was the most op- 
 pressive as being really a tax on capital) have 
 been removed, and those which remain are 
 mostly taxes on consumption ; the consumption 
 however has been found to increase as prices 
 -have fallen; and whilst this is the case, it cannot 
 be said that the remaining taxes cannot be paid 
 as well as they were during the war, when 
 prices were so much higher. The producers 
 may suffer from the fall in prices, if this is 
 occasioned by excessive taxation, and produc- 
 tion may be checked in consequence ; but this 
 is another question, which we are not now 
 examining.* 
 
 * The producers and importers of highly taxed articles are affected by a rise 
 or fall in the general prices of commodities, such as results from fluctuations 
 jn the quantity of the circulating medium, to a degree which the producers of 
 other commodities do not experience. Take as an example the article of sugar, 
 which pays aduty forhome use of 27s # cwt. Inthespring of 1825 the merchant 
 sold his brown sugar to the dealer at 55s {” cwt. duty paid, leaving a nett price 
 
 s 
 
(134 
 
 3.—In the course of this enquiry we have 
 seen how materially our foreign as well as our 
 home trade are deranged by the fluctuations 
 which take place with a paper currency. The 
 use of gold would not prevent considerable 
 changes in the quantity of money, and the ra- 
 pidity of its circulation, especially whilst our 
 
 after deducting the duty of 28s ¥ cwt. ; in the summer of the same year the 
 price which the merchant got for the same quality was 70s % cwt., equal to 43s 
  cwt. without the duty. Thus, whilst the consumer paid 27 ¥ cent. advance in 
 the price of this article, (which was perhaps about the same advance as was 
 paid on many other articles) the merchant actually received a clear advantage of 
 50 47 cent. viz. 43s instead of 28s 4” cwt.! But the revulsion which took place 
 at ihe end of the same year brought prices of ‘commodities generally down again 
 to the level from which they rose: in the spring of 1826 prices of sugar were 
 the same as they had been 12 months before ; the consumer paid 55s instead of 
 70s, being a fall of 22 % cent., whilst the merchant only received 28s instead 
 of 43s Y cwt., which was a loss of 35 # cent. During the progress of these 
 extraordinary fluctuations, there was no remarkable change in the stock or the 
 supply of this article. For some time after prices rose, the consumption con- 
 tinued apparently without diminution; trade was active, all persons were em- 
 ployed, and there was plenty of money ; but in the fall of the year it was ap- 
 parent that the consumption was checked, money soon became scarce, and prices 
 fell. As soon as they had regained their low level, the consumption went on 
 as usual. 
 
 If the duty on sugar had been 100 % cent. ad valorem, the merchant would 
 have gained an advance in the nett price when prices rose of 25 4 cent. instead 
 of 50 # cent., and the government would have received the other 25 4 cent. 5 
 and when prices fell again the merchant would have lost only 175 ¥ cent., 
 instead of 35 # cent., and the revenue would have lost the remainder. By a 
 system of ad valorem duties, the producers and importers would not be subject 
 to such violent changes in the value of their commodities, as they are on the 
 plan of fixed rates by weight or tale; and if the ad valorem system were gene- 
 rally adopted, the prices of commodities generally would be more steady and 
 equable; the inducement to speculate would be diminished, and the portion of 
 the income of the nation which is taken for the use of the state would be more 
 proportioned than it is on the present system to the means of the people, both 
 in periods of excitement or depression, and in the ordinary state of regula 
 trade. ; 139% , 
 
135 
 
 corn Jaws and other restraints on our commer- 
 cial intercourse continue in their present unna- 
 tural state ; but the difficulties and shocks which 
 injure our trade would be much diminished by 
 the use of gold. 
 
 When we increase suddenly the quantity 
 of our paper currency, it appears that a pro- 
 portionate amount of gold is exported, which 
 checks the exports of our manufactures, and 
 raises the prices of produce in those coun- 
 tries of Europe with which we trade; and it is 
 extremely difficult for merchants to make their 
 calculations, and to ascertain with accuracy 
 either the prospect of supplies of foreign mer- 
 chandize or of profitable sales in this country: 
 Should the whole amount of gold in the coun- 
 try be sent abroad, and the plan of Mr. Ricardo’s 
 “safe and economical currency” be substituted, 
 so that all our currency was paper, the same 
 uncertainty in our commerce would continue. 
 In that event the quantity of our currency, and 
 its rapidity of circulation, would be at least as 
 liable to fluctuations as it is with the mixed 
 ~currency which we now use. Incase of a bad 
 harvest the bankers would increase their issues, 
 and thus by raising prices, prevent that export 
 which is necessary in order to obtain an import 
 of our corn on the best terms; and in those 
 periods of commercial changes when credit is 
 
136 
 
 checked, they would, as at present, diminish 
 their issues under the influence of unfounded 
 alarms. From the same causes the internal 
 trafic and industry of the country would be 
 more liable to irregularities: at one time an ex- 
 traordinary impulse would be given to agricul- 
 ture, and this would probably be followed by 
 an extraordinary and unnecessary depression. 
 It is obvious, that with a gold currency the 
 supply of money would be much more uniform 
 and steady in all ordinary states of trade; and 
 when an import of corn or any political emer- 
 gency drew a part of it out of the country, the 
 consequent fall in prices would speedily bring 
 it back again. This part of the question has 
 been fully discussed in the first part of this 
 Essay, as far as regards our foreign trade. But 
 it may be said that our home trade, would be 
 much encumbered by the universal use of gold: 
 no doubt if the great transactions which con- 
 stitute the wholesale trade of this nation were 
 to be carried on without the bills and large 
 bank notes which are now so largely used, great 
 imconvenience would be felt; but this has not 
 been recommended in this Essay, and I see no 
 reason for altering that part of our paper sys- 
 tem. If the notes under £5, which form the 
 retail. part of our circulation, be extinguished, 
 every important object will be obtained. 
 
(137 
 
 The power of forcing production and consump- 
 tion more rapidly than can be maintained by the 
 regular growth of capital industry and popula- 
 tion will be sufficiently checked, and all classes 
 will be constrained to exercise the useful virtues 
 of temperance and moderation in their pursuits 
 more than'they have done. 
 
 The establishments of branches of the bank 
 of England, and of joint stock banks (under the 
 sanction of the laws passed in 1826) will proha- 
 bly secure amore regular and steady supply of 
 money in the country, both paper and gold, 
 than we have had with the system of local 
 notes; and the dreadful evils, especially to the 
 poorer classes, which arise from the failures of 
 the country banks who issue notes, will be 
 much diminished. They will not, however, 
 have the effect of creating an increase of cur- 
 rency, such as will raise our prices above the 
 level of other countries, because the greatest 
 temptation to over-issues is removed by the 
 abolition of one pound and two pound notes, of 
 which no new ones can now be issued. - It 
 may be said, that the bankers may increase their 
 issues of five pound or ten pound notes; but 
 as the wages of labour and the daily traffic of 
 the country cannot be paid with these notes, 
 they would not remain in circulation if issued ; 
 forif the farmers and manufacturers took them, 
 they must get them exchanged for sovereigns 
 
138 
 
 at the bank of England offices, and those offices 
 would immediately present them for payment to 
 the banks who had issued them. : 
 
 It has been said, that the temptation to 
 hoard gold might produce great inconveni- 
 ence, and that we should thereby be more 
 exposed to fluctuations in the amount of mo- 
 ney, and consequently of prices, with gold 
 than with paper money. This appears to me a 
 trifling consideration; in periods of popular 
 commotions or general distrust, the dangers 
 and losses from a paper currency must always 
 exceed those which can arise from the use of 
 specie. During the period when our paper was 
 much depreciated, and the events of war pro- 
 duced a state of alarm in this country, a good 
 deal of gold was hoarded ; but, if the general 
 use of it were re-established, so that it consti- 
 tuted above one-half of the circulating medium, 
 few persons would be disposed to hoard to 
 any extent, because they would find that it was 
 always to be got in sufficient abundance. 
 
 An opinion is still entertained by many per- 
 sons, that the export of our manufactures must, 
 at no distant period, decline, or at least be very 
 much diminished, in consequence of our being 
 unable to continue to compete with the manu- 
 facturers of other countries, where taxation is 
 much lighter, and prices of provisions much 
 lower: this opinion was first expressed at the 
 
139 
 
 conclusion of the war, since which the works of 
 Ricardo, Mill and M‘Culloch on the Principles 
 of Political Economy have satisfactorily shewn, 
 that there are no good grounds for such appre- 
 hensions; and the experience of ten years, dur- 
 ing which our principal manufactures have con- 
 tinued to be exported in increasing quantities, 
 confirms the soundness of their views. It would 
 lead into too long a digression to discuss this 
 argument here, and it is not strictly a part of 
 the currency question (as the real prices of 
 provisions and wages cannot be permanently 
 raised or lowered by the use of one species of 
 currency rather than another) ; but no person can 
 entertain much doubt on this subject, who will 
 attentively read the7th chapter of Ricardo’s, the 
 Ath chapter and 17th section of Mill’s, and the 
 3rd part of the 6th section of Mr. M‘Culloch’s 
 works. | 
 
 4.—From the preceding train of reasoning 
 we are brought to the conclusion, that no con- 
 trivance can be made for raising the prices of 
 goods permanently above the range at which 
 they would stand with a gold currency, unless 
 we alter the standard of gold from £3. 17s. 104d. 
 per oz. to some higher price. We have shewn, 
 that no advantage would result to our trade or 
 agriculture if we could so raise prices of com- 
 modities ; but it will be interesting to examine 
 
140 
 
 the reasons alleged for altering the standard, 
 and what would be the effect of such a measure. 
 
 The letter, lately published in the papers, by 
 Sir John Sinclair, (of which an extract is given 
 in the note below*) exhibits a fair specimen of 
 the arguments which have been adduced for 
 
 * Extract from Sir J. Sinclair’s Letter, addressed to the Manufacturers, &c. 
 of Great Britain in 1826. 
 
 <¢ I most sincerely lament (he says) the deplorable state to which you. have 
 
 been unfortunately reduced, and the little prospect there is of any material alle. 
 viation of your present sufferings. I regret it the more, as so many among you 
 are inclined to attribute your distresses to wrong causes, when, in fact, the real 
 one is, ¢ the fatal change in the currency at the conclusion of the late war;—the 
 low price at which foreigners are now, by law, entitled to demand gold, in pay- 
 ment of the goods they send us, and the great alteration in the rate of our ex- 
 changes, in consequence thereof.’ The subject is abstruse; but the real effects 
 of the ruinous system that was adopted can now be so clearly proved, that it 
 can no longer be denied by any one, who dispassionately considers the existing 
 circumstances of the country, and compares them with its former state. 
 
 ‘¢ It has of late been observed, how anxious foreigners are to send us goods ; 
 
 and if they took our manufactures in return, the trade would be beneficial to 
 both. But unfortunately, when foreigners send their goods here, they are en- 
 titled, by law, to demand gold at so low a price as £3. 17s. 103d. per ounce. 
 The consequence is, that they either take gold in kind, or bills of exchange 
 valued at that price, having no inducement to take our manufactures ; for with 
 the gold they get from us they can purchase manufactures more advantageously 
 either at home or in their own neighbourhood, more especially since so many 
 new branches of industry have been established on the Continent, which may 
 thus be extended, by means of British capital, procured by the sale of grain and 
 other foreign commodities, paid for by us in gold. 
 
 ‘«¢ Hence the only chance there is of having your useful occupations re-esta- 
 blished—adequate wages given you—and your former prosperity restored—is, 
 to prevail on Parliament to increase the legal price of gold to £5 per ounce, 
 F oreigners would prefer our manufactures, if moderate ly charged, even to gold, 
 if they must pay a high price for it. In short, it should be laid down as a 
 principle not to be departed from, that gold ought always to be so high: in this 
 country as to discourage the importation, and thus to encourage the exporta- 
 tion, of manufactured goods. 
 
141 
 
 altering the standard of our currency; these 
 have been noticed in the preceding pages: in 
 
 «« The precious metals answer two purposes :—They are either a medium of 
 domestic circulation, or an article of foreign commerce. In the latter point of 
 view, it is essential that they should not be so low as to induce foreigners to 
 purchase them instead of goods, or that our own merchants should have an in- 
 terest in exporting them, from the great profits they would thence derive. It 
 was the high price of gold that rendered our manufactures so flourisheng during 
 the late war, and it ts its low price which has reduced them to thetr present state 
 of derression. 
 
 “¢ In fact, it is impossible to foresee to what a state this country may be re- 
 duced, if the present system of currency is continued. It encourages the impor- 
 tation of corn and other agricultural productions, to the ruin of our own 
 agricultural classes, because foreigners can get, in return, cheap gold. It pro- 
 motes the employment of foreign shipping, because foreigners get for their 
 freights cheap gold. It operates asa bounty of from 20 to 30 cent. on the 
 importation of foreign manufactures, as silk, gloves, &c. because foreigners get 
 in return cheap gold; and all the frightful calamities we suffered during the late 
 panic were entirely owing to the impossibility of procuring a sufficient quantity 
 of * cheap gold.’ Let the mint price of gold be raised correspondently with the 
 prices of other commodities, and none of these mischievous consequences can 
 again ensue. 
 
 <¢ If these observations are just, the agricultural, manufacturing, and other 
 productive classes, should unite in the strongest representations to government, 
 on the absolute necessity of making an immediate change of currency. 
 
 «¢ As to the proposed mode of your obtaining relief, that of importing corn, to 
 be paid for by exporting British manufactures ; without dwelling on the essen- 
 tial injury that it would do to your home market, the idea is quite delusive ; for 
 upon inquiry it appears, that hardly any of those vessels that brought us corn in 
 1818, or more recently, since the Order of Council admitting foreign importation, 
 have taken back, to any amount worth mentioniny, either British produce or 
 manufactures. If brought from other places, their sale would have taken place 
 at any rate, and did not arise from the importation of corn. 
 
 “© [ beg to add, that in a paper published by me, dated Lith July, 18290, the 
 present circumstances of the country were clearly prognosticated. The words I 
 then made use of were as follows:—‘ If we insist on a circulation in gold, we 
 must ruin our mantfactures and commerce. Gold cannot be brought into this 
 country, or will not long remain in it, unless the rate of exchange is in favour af 
 England, as it is called 3 and when the exchange is in favour of England, it tm- 
 poses a burden of from 20 to 30 4 cent. on our exported manufactures, under 
 the pressure of which it is not in the nature of things that they can prosper.’ 
 
 T 
 
142 
 
 order toexpose their fallacy completely, it would 
 be necessary to go into an examination of the 
 causes of the depression which is now existing, 
 and was experienced in 1816 and 1822 im agricul- 
 ture and trade, which would lead toa long poli- 
 tical disquisition, which is not the object of this 
 Essay. I trust what has been said is sufficient to 
 shew that we cannot make trade and agriculture 
 prosper steadily, by continuing the system of 
 tampering with our currency. But it has been 
 alleged, that the currency has been reformed by 
 the legislature in 1819, and again in 1826; and 
 what evidence, it is asked, is there that it is now 
 right? Why not fix the price of gold at five pounds 
 or six pounds the ounce, instead of £3.17s 102d? 
 Or why do we make gold our standard instead 
 of silver, which is the standard of the rest of 
 the world? May not gold be really worth more 
 at present than £3. 17s 103d ¢# ounce, which 
 was the rate it was fixed at above a century ago, 
 when prices of corn and other commodities were 
 much lower than at present ? May not the whole 
 supply of gold in the world be so much dimi- 
 nished, or the use of it for plate and ornaments 
 
 “¢ Tn fact, when British manufactures were sold during the war for £5. 10s, it 
 required only one ounce of gold in exchange for them; but when the price of 
 gold fell to £4, the very same quantity of British manufactures required nearly 
 ‘ one ounce and a half” of gold in exchange for them, and consequently this fall 
 
 of the price of gold necessarily occasioned a similar fall in the price of British 
 manufactures.” 
 
143 
 
 be so much increased that itis really worth five 
 pounds to six pounds ¢# ounce ? 
 
 It is a sufficient answer to these questions to 
 ' say that we can purchase at all times any quan- 
 tity of gold at £3. 17s 104d ¥ ounce, and there 
 is quite as much reason to think that silver has 
 risen in value as gold in the money market of 
 Europe. It has been stated before, that there 
 has perhaps been some enhancement of the 
 value of the precious metals in the last fifteen 
 years, owing to the revolutions in South Ame- 
 rica, where they are principally produced ; but 
 it is probable the falling off in the supply of silver 
 has been greater in proportion than in that of 
 gold. If however the supply of either had been 
 diminished materially, an obvious fall in the ge- 
 neral prices of commodities in the rest of the 
 world would be the consequence. It does not 
 however appear that prices are generally lower 
 in other countries than they have been for forty 
 or fifty years past, excepting during some periods 
 of the war from 1805 to 1813.* This may 
 indeed be attributed in some measure to the 
 more extended use of credit and of paper money, 
 consequent on the return of peace and renewed 
 confidence in the trading community of Europe; 
 the natural effect of which would be, by greater 
 economy in the use of gold and silver as cur- 
 
 * See table of comparative prices in Appendix ( A.) 
 
144 
 
 rency, to prevent prices from falling, even al- 
 though the actual.quantity of money should have 
 been sensibly diminished, or the quantity of 
 commodities increaséd by increased production. 
 In France the circulation of bank notes is almost 
 confined to Paris and the vicinity, and the quan- 
 tity of specie in that country is therefore very 
 large, perhaps one-fourth of ail the specie in 
 Europe; in Holland there is no paper money, 
 and very little in the South of Europe; but in 
 Austria, Russia, and several of the German 
 States, paper money circulates to a large 
 amount, by which a corresponding amount of 
 gold and silver is disengaged, and added to 
 the circulation of the rest of Europe.* 
 Whatever may be the present stock -of the 
 precious metals in the world however compared 
 with former periods, there is no evidence of the 
 relative value of gold and silver having been 
 materially altered, at least not since the com- 
 mencement of the present century; an ounce 
 of gold still exchanges for 143 to 15 ounces of 
 silver inall the states of Europe, as it did when 
 our standard was fixed about a century since ; 
 with an ounce of our standard gold we can pur- 
 chase about ]5 ounces of silver of the standard 
 fineness, and with 15 ounces of silver we can 
 
 * See note in the 4th volume of Storch’s Cours d’ Economie Politique, on the 
 paper money of different states of Europe. 
 
- 146 
 
 purchase one ounce of gold as easily as at any 
 former period to any extent that we may want 
 it; and whether we use one metal or the other 
 for our currency is quite immaterial as regards 
 prices. The late Lord Liverpool recommended 
 gold in his treatise on the Coins of the Realm in 
 1805, as the fittest standard for a rich country 
 hike Great Britain. Mr. Ricardo and Mr. M‘Cul- 
 loch incline to the opinion, that we should adopt 
 silver as our standard in preference to gold, prin- 
 cipally because it is the standard and principal 
 currency of the rest of Europe; but it has never 
 been maintained. by any political economist that 
 prices would be perceptibly affected by so doing; 
 all the difference resulting from the exchange 
 would be, that we should have a larger quantity 
 of silver in circulation, and that gold would be 
 current at its relative market value; and the 
 consequence of the increased use of silver 
 would be, that money would not circulate quite 
 so quickly. | 
 
 It has been seen, that in three or four years 
 we imported above twenty millions sterling in 
 gold; the greater part of this came from France, 
 (where it is rated at one to fifteen when com- 
 pared with silver) and yet itappears on the best 
 evidence, (that of the most eminent merchants 
 connected in trade with that country) that no 
 perceptible fall in prices of commodities took 
 
146 
 
 place there. Perhaps a temporary scarcity 
 might have been experienced ; but it would be 
 speedily supplied by the bankers and others 
 whose business it is to attend exclusively to the 
 money markets of Europe, bringing a new sup- 
 ply of gold from the other states of Europe. 
 The table given in the note below shews the 
 relative value of gold and silver, as fixed in the 
 principal states of Europe.* 
 
 At present silver is only a legal tender for 40s, 
 and it has been supposed that some advantage 
 would be derived from its being made a legal 
 tender for any amount, the same as gold, but it 
 is evident this could not have any material in-. 
 fluence on prices; and inconveniences would re- 
 sult from a double standard, which it is foreign 
 
 * Previous to the working of the mines in America, the proportionate value 
 of gold and silver was as one to eleven or twelve in Europe, which was nearly 
 the same as it had been in the time of the Romans. About the year 1600, it 
 was about one to twelve; before the year 1700, it rose to one to fourteen; in 
 England it was fixed at one to fourteen and a half in the reign of Charles I1., 
 and so it remained to arecent period. At present the proportion, in most of the 
 countries of Europe, is as one to fifteen.—See Storch’s Cours d’ Economie Poli- 
 tique, edited by J. B. Say, vol. If. p.165, &c. from which I extract the following 
 account of the relation between the value of gold and silver, viz.— 
 
 ‘¢ Le systeme monétaire des principaux états de ’ Europe suppose le rapport 
 entre la valeur de lor et de |’ argent comme il suit : 
 
 L’ Espagne comme 1 a 155 La Russie comme! a 15 
 L’Autriche uw la 1538, La Prusse » La ld 
 L’Angleterre » 1 a 154 L’Allemagnew 1 a 1414 
 La France «9 la ld Le Portugal » 1 a 133” 
 
 In Spain, which supplied Europe with silver, gold was valued higher than 
 in the other countries ; and in Portugal, which supplied Europe with gold from 
 Brazil, it was valued lower than in any other country. 
 
147 
 
 to our purpose to enquire into. Those who are 
 curious to see the merits of this discussion may 
 consult Mr. Ricardo’s and Mr. Mill’s works on 
 the Principles of Political Economy, and a good 
 summary of it may be found in the article on 
 “Money” in the Supplement to the Encyclo- 
 peedia Britannica. It appears that Sir W. Petty, 
 Mr.. Locke, and Mr. Harris, as well as the late 
 Lord Liverpool, all agreed in the opinion, which 
 is supported by recent writers on this subject, 
 that the money which is to be the standard 
 measure of value should be of one metal only. 
 In most of the states of Europe great altera- 
 tions have been made in the value of money at 
 different times, either by adulterating the cur- 
 rent coins, or by raising their denomination: 
 these have generally been the arbitrary acts of 
 government in order to discharge their debts ; 
 in this country, however, there has been 
 evinced in the last few years a considerable 
 disposition amongst the landowners and aristo- 
 cracy, as well as some of the trading part of the 
 community, to urge the government to do the 
 same thing, contrary to their better judgment. 
 (See, in Appendix, petition from Liverpool to 
 Parliament in 1820, and Sir J. Graham’s 
 pamphlet, published in 1826, entitled “ Corn 
 and Currency.”) Unfortunately the deprecia- 
 tion in our currency which took place to a great 
 
148 
 
 ‘extent in 1807 to 1816, in consequence of the 
 bank restriction act of 1797, afforded some pre- 
 text for entertaining this proposition at the close 
 of the war, inasmuch as a vast amount of en- 
 gagements were entered into during a space of 
 seven or eight years when the currency was de- 
 preciated from 15 to 25 per cent. But in the 
 year 1817 to 1819 this depreciation was done 
 away with; the renewed intercourse with Eu- 
 rope brought us back to the old standard with- 
 out any interference of government, and the 
 return to cash-payments and the regular stand- 
 ard was as complete for two years before the 
 passing of Mr. Peel’s billin 1819, as it has been 
 since. Our currency has now remained on a par 
 with the rest of Europe for a period of above 
 ten years; new and extensive contracts have 
 been formed upon the faith of it; and if an at- 
 tempt were made now to alter the standard, on 
 the alleged ground of doing justice to those who 
 have suffered from the depreciation which oc- 
 curred during the war, and of relieving the 
 country from the burden of the debt incurred 
 during that depreciation, it would lead to the 
 utter subversion of all confidence; and upon the 
 very principles on which such an adjustment is 
 supported by those who have recommended it, 
 a second robbery would be perpetrated, and a 
 mass of injustice would be inflicted on one set 
 
149 
 
 of individuals, infinitely greater than the alleged 
 injustice to another set, which it is pretended 
 would be remedied; inasmuch as the standard; 
 if it was unadvisedly departed from by the ope- 
 ration of the Bank Restriction Act of 1797, was 
 advisedly re-established in 1819, and restored 
 to its original value by the solemn decision of 
 the legislature after a full enquiry.* 
 
 * The following Observations on this Subject are taken from Mr. M‘Culloch’s 
 excellent Article on Money in Supplement to the Encyclopedia Britannica. 
 
 «¢ Every objection which it was possible to make to the degradation of the 
 standard in 1819 must apply with tenfold force to the scheme for degrading it in 
 1821 ; while, on the other hand, allthe arguments that could have been urged in 
 favour of the measure at the former period must now be proportionably weakened. 
 Two years more have been afforded for the completion of those’ arrangements 
 which had been begun in 1817 and 1818; and an immense variety of new con- 
 tracts and engagements have been entered into, exclusively with reference to 
 the present value of money. A fresh reduction of the standard would vitiate all 
 these engagements, and plunge us anew into that confusion and embarrassment 
 from which we have now nearly escaped. We should again witness the most 
 per nicious subversion of private fortunes. Debtors would again be enriched at 
 the expense of their creditors; the ignorant and unwary would again become 
 the prey of the cunning and crafty ; and capitalists would be eager to transfer 
 their stock from a country where it would be impossible to lend it, except at the 
 
 risk of getting it repaid in a depreciated currency.” 
 
 The following Remarks, on Sir J. Graham’s Proposition to tax the Funds 
 and Annuities, are taken from the last Number of the Westminster Re- 
 view, and appear to me to contain a complete Answer to every thing lke 
 Argument which has been urged on this Subject. 
 
 * Jn all that can be said about the currency, nothing is material to the ques- 
 tion, but the two alterations in its value: first, from a higher to a lower; 
 secondly, from a lower to a higher value. The first alteration followed the 
 suspension of cash payments in 1797. Paper was issued in such quantity as 
 materially to reduce the value of the currency. In 1797 the nation had a great 
 debt, all contracted when the currency was of full value. When the value of 
 the currency was reduced, the interest of this debt was paid in the degraded. 
 currency. So far the national creditor was defrauded. He got less than his due. 
 
 U 
 
150 
 
 The effect of altering our standard from 
 £3. 17s 103d to £5 the ounce, as proposed by 
 
 ‘¢ During the period of the depreciation, a great amount of new debt was 
 contracted. This was contracted in the depreciated currency. Whenthe value 
 of the currency was raised by the return to cash payments, the interest of this 
 debt was paid in a currency more valuable than that in which the loans were 
 advanced. * On this account,’ say the landlords, * 30 % cent. should be de- 
 ducted trom the interest of the national debt.’ 
 
 <¢ But, first of all, if we make from the last portion of the debt a deduction 
 equal to the increased value of the currency, we shall, of course, perform a 
 similar act of justice with regard to the former part, which, during the whole 
 period of depreciation, received less interest than ought to have been paid for it. 
 The amount of what we should have to pay in that case has been accurately 
 computed by Mr. Mushet, and the result exhibited in a set of very valuable 
 tables. The fact is, that the annuity we should have to pay in perpetuity to the 
 first set of creditors, as an equivalent for their loss, would be greater than the 
 annual deduction which could be made from the annuities of the second class. 
 The creditors, taken as a whole, have a demand upon the nation for loss, on ac- 
 count of changes in the currency. The nation has no demand upon them on 
 account of over-payment. 
 
 «¢ There is another view of the case, which will be of great importance as 
 
 often as equity and morality are deemed elements in the calculation. The loans 
 which were made duriny the period of depreciation were made by open compe- 
 tition, and of course were as favourable to the government as the circumstances 
 of the times, all taken together, would permit. If any of the favourable circum- 
 stances had been taken away, the terms of the loans would have been less 
 favourable. If any had been added, they would have been more. 
 - ¢ During the whole time of these loans, it was the law of England, by an 
 express act of Parliament—not considered as words without a meaning—not 
 regarded as a case of legislative fraud, but an enactment of the highest import- 
 ance, that payments in cash should be resumed six months after the termination 
 of the war. Unquestionably this resumption was as much a part of the terms 
 of each of those loans, as the amount of stock which was to be given for the 
 money advanced. It is false, therefore, to say that the holders of such stock 
 are not entitled to the payment of their interest in the reformed currency. 
 They are entitled to it. It was part of their bargain. 
 
 «¢ The attempts to give this ¢ equitable adjustment,” as they are pleased to 
 call it, a show of equity, failing totally, it stands in its true colours, ‘an act of 
 bare spoliation. Some of the highest names in Parliament have implicitly cor 
 fessed as much. It was an event, they said, greatly to be deprecated; it was 
 to be avoided, if possible; but then necessity has no law, except its own; and 
 they pedantically quoted the law jargon of nemo tenetur ad impossibile. ° | 
 
151 
 
 Sir John Sinclair, would be the same as making 
 a law that 20s should pass for 25s, £80 for £100, 
 or that one-fifth part of old debts and engage- 
 ments should be cancelled ; of course the public 
 who pay thirty million pounds annually to the 
 fundholders would continue to pay the same 
 nominal amount, but the real amount would be 
 diminished in the same proportion. The rights 
 and obligations of public bodies and communities 
 of men ought to be treated on the same princi- 
 ples of equity that serve to guide the conduct of 
 individuals ; but such is the imperfection of our 
 nature, that a party or class of men will often 
 act towards another body or class of men with- 
 out any apparent sense of injury, ina way which 
 would excite universal disapprobation if prac- 
 tised between man and man. 
 
 If, however, the denomination of our standard 
 
 «« There is in this language a singular union of folly and atrocity. Anact of 
 confiscation, more extensive than was almost ever perpetrated by the injustice 
 of hostile factions in the fury of a civil war, is proposed to be founded, in a state 
 of profound tranquillity, on an assumption, the absurdity of which may he made 
 visible to a child. 
 
 <¢ At the present moment the annual produce of the country, leaving out the 
 portion unavoidably consumed by the labourer, is divided, in certain proportions, 
 amony the landlords, the capitalists, and the national creditors. Can there ever 
 be an impossibility of so doing it? Can less than the due share ever be given 
 to one of those classes, to any other end than to enrich the other two at that 
 one’s expense ? 
 
 <¢ Impossibility! When, in common justice, is this plea held valid on the 
 part of a private debtor? Only when the whole of his property transferred to 
 his creditors will not pay his debts. To allege impossibility, then, on the. part. 
 of the people of England, is the most impudent of all pretences.” 
 
was raised, as is proposed, the party who advo- 
 cate it would be disappointed in their expecta- 
 tion as to the relief which it would afford in re- 
 gard to taxation. The amount of all taxes 
 which are levied by a fixed rate on the quantity 
 of articles consumed would indeed be more 
 easily paid, because the nominal prices of all 
 commodities would be raised; but all the taxes 
 levied by an ad valorem rate, such as those on 
 stamps, cotton, tea, &c. would rise with the 
 nominal value of these articles; and as the go- 
 vernment functionaries would find their salaries 
 and their means of supporting expensive estab- 
 lishments, civil and military, diminished in pro- 
 portion to the diminished value of money, they 
 would not find it difficult to induce a parliament 
 which would sanction such depreciation, to 
 make an advance in their salaries, and in the 
 rate of taxation generally, corresponding to it. 
 A political consequence would result from such 
 a tampering with our engagements, which many 
 persons would regard as a benefit, viz. that in 
 future it would be very difficult for government 
 to borrow money; the expenses of future wars 
 would be paid by those who engaged in them, 
 and the nation could not shift off the burden of 
 its extravagance by impawning the income and 
 property of future generations. 
 
 ee 
 
153 
 
 It is not to be inferred, from the views taken 
 in the preceding pages, that the writer attri- 
 butes the great shocks which have deranged 
 our domestic and foreign trade since the return 
 of peace to one cause only, viz. that connected 
 with our bad system of currency. A large 
 portion must be attributed to the excessive tax- 
 ation which presses too heavily on the produc- 
 tive powers of industry—to the corn laws, 
 which not only produce the effect of a great 
 addition to taxation, but have the effect of 
 creating great alternations in our foreign trade, 
 and consequent vicissitudes in manufacturing 
 as well as agricultural pursuits—to our laws 
 for regulating the use and interest of money, 
 which prevent capitalists from lending money 
 at its real value when it is most wanted, and 
 thus aggravate the evils of revulsions in trade, 
 and to other fiscal and commercial restraints 
 necessarily resulting from our highly taxed 
 and artificial situation. But the state of our 
 currency will alone account for that degree 
 and description of distress and fluctuation in 
 property which we have lately witnessed. 
 
 The Bank Restriction Act of 1797 ought per- 
 haps to be considered as the origin of all this 
 evil; for to this measure is to be attributed the 
 artificial_and unnatural value given to land and 
 all property and produce during the war which 
 
154 
 
 deranged. the sober calculations of regular 
 industry ; and whatever may be traced by one 
 party to the act of 1819 for resuming cash 
 payments, and to the shock which confidence 
 sustained from the parliamentary enquiry into 
 the expediency of that measure ; whatever may 
 be referred by another to the act of 1822 for 
 introducing again the small notes; whatever 
 may be attributed by a third to the spirit of 
 overtrading and speculation; all must now ad- 
 mit, that the legislative measure of 1797 laid 
 the foundation for the pecuniary embarrass- 
 ments which we deplore. 
 
 That fatal act, by investing a banking corpo- 
 ration with the prerogative of regulating the 
 monetary concerns of the nation, rendered the 
 whole trade of the country dependant on a 
 system of paper credit, fluctuating with the 
 opinions and feelings of the bank directors, who 
 were thus led to consider themselves the guar- 
 dians of this branch of national policy.—(See 
 in Appendix (K.) their protest against the plan 
 for resuming cash payments in 1819.) 
 
 Reared upon this foundation, our paper sys- 
 tem, whilst supporting the wasteful expen- 
 diture of the war, caused that successive ad- 
 vance in prices of all real and moveable pro- 
 perty, and of the wages of labour, which 
 made apparent prosperity result from the war, 
 
155 
 
 contrary to all previous experience. Excessive 
 taxation seemed to be no longer an evil. All 
 branches of industry flourished as long as the 
 prices of commodities continued to rise.. The 
 return to cash payments when peace came was 
 therefore the pinching time; after submitting to 
 it for three years, our legislators vainly con- 
 ceived they could remove the pressure by re- 
 laxing the act of 1819, and thus increasing the 
 currency ; a temporary and unstable prosperity 
 was the result, our prospects being at the 
 same time brightened by the recognition of 
 South American independence, by a rapid in- 
 crease of exports to those vast regions, fostered 
 by loans and large investments in mining spe- 
 culation, and also by a solid increase of our 
 trade with India and other parts of the world. 
 The nation is now brought back to the state 
 in which it was left by the act of 1819; our 
 population has increased, though there is reason 
 to fear the means of the great mass are dimi- 
 nished by the excessive pressure of taxation 
 (since the consumption of those articles which 
 constitute the chief support of the people does 
 not appear to have kept pace with the increase 
 of their numbers); our capital and resources 
 are, perhaps, a little impaired, but they are 
 fully adequate to the support of our agriculture, 
 manufactures and commerce; our trade has been 
 
156 
 
 freed from many shackles which encumbered it ; 
 many errors in our commercial policy have been 
 corrected ; and by a rigid economy and wise 
 administration of our resources, with a steady 
 adherence to a sound system of currency, 
 we may sustain our burdens, and gradually 
 re-establish our prosperity on a more solid 
 foundation. 
 
 SD eI, 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 (A. 
 
 Comparative Prices of the Staple Articles of the Growth and Pro- 
 duce of Europe before and during the war, (taken from Mr. 
 Tooke’s work on High and Low Prices) and of the same Articles 
 since the war, (taken from the London Price Current.) 
 
 Average Prices in ; » jAverage Prices in 
 
 the ten years of rucnate an Oe the six years of 
 me . 9} P, ”, 
 
 Peace, from 1788 from 1803 to 1812 Peace, from 1819 
 
 
 
 to 1792. * jro 1824, 
 Ashes, Dantzig, % cwt...... 27s .tod3ls 4Is to 45s |30s to 34s 
 Butter, Dutch, do. ..... 54s to 55s 95s  tol07s |60s to tds 
 Brandy, French, # gal...... 3s 8dto 4s 8s 6dto 10s | 3s 3d to 3s 9d 
 Flax, Russian,  cwt....... 4Is to 43s 85s to 88s [40s to 44s 
 Hemp, do. LOY Weave 27s ~=to 29s 69s to 71s |30s to 33s 
 Iron, do.  ton........./14¢ to 14d ds} 15/10sto 191 |122 to 132 
 Oil, Olive,  tun......... 4ll to 421 672 to Jill |42/ to 4til 
 — Whale, do. .«...... 201 to 222 33t to B5l (22f ~~ to 24 
 Seeds, Flax, 4% qr....ccccees. 36s to 42s 665 to 7Jtls 48s to 45s 
 — Clover,  cwt........ 36s to 63s 43s to 92s 30s to60s 
 Silk, Reggio, Y tb.......... 22s 6d to 24s 6d) 28s to 25s |13s to lds 
 Tar, Swedish, # bl.......... lis tol7s 35s to 37s |l6s to 18s 
 Tallow, Russian, ? cwt..../43s to 44s 75s to 77s |40s to 45s 
 Timber, Memel, # load.....40s to45s {140s tolls (45s to 50s 
 Wheat, Dantzig, P qr...... 34s ~— to 48s 58s to 95s |33s_ to 40s 
 Wool, Seville, @ Ib... 953d to 2s Gd] 3s 10d to 6s 6d! Is fdto Qs 
 
 
 
 N. B.—The prices of all these articles are stated without the duties. It is 
 almost unnecessary to observe, that although the prices quoted are those of the 
 London market, they represent, with sufficient accuracy, the relative prices of 
 the markets of Europe, at least in the two periods of peace. 
 
 From these comparative tables it will be seen, that the prices since the peace 
 are fully as high (excepting the articles of wheat, wool, and silk) as they were 
 in 1783 to 1792 before the war began; the very low prices of wheat may be at- 
 tributed to the increased quantity produced during the war for the English, 
 French, and Spanish markets, the demand for which markets has been compa- 
 ratively trifling since the termination of the war. The low prices of wool may 
 be accounted for from the great increase in the growth of this article in Saxony 
 and other parts of Germany; and the fall in the price of silk may in like manner 
 be owing to the greatly extended production of this article in India. 
 
 x 
 
158 
 
 (B.)—No. 1. 
 
 BANK OF ENGLAND CIRCULATION. 
 
 An Account of the Circulation of the Bank of England Notes during 
 the under-mentioned Periods. 
 
 Total. Of which 
 
 under £5. 
 1792 February 25.......:... BEL Bn RRB A Sr Hoe £11,149,809 none 
 AUZUBE. 25 ses recccccoerccscoes caseseqetuenctesth 11,006,969 “ 
 1799 F CDIOREY Ailsccascscoces crssubenccesonsssemaracuas 11,428,381 u 
 August  26...ccccccccccccscccescrccscesccescrors 10,838,214 a 
 1794: Fébraary: ZOteseres eaety cessteees ses nenescrenene 10,697,924 “ 
 AlgUst  26.,..cccccccoresccecessevevecsesceseee 10,628,220 “ 
 1796 sPebrudry 20... ..--ncgscctdncsteceksesercscdebese 13,539,163 " 
 ANUS TS ZO ieskens aaetasactecentorsvessuree yao ME EN Bes ” 
 1796 February 26.............. De cavacetasenantecaemens 10,909,694 “ 
 August: 26... crcccccccesssrcccrsccsscsscnecseses 9,531,335 u 
 1797 From January to June inclusive..........£10,821,574 
 July to December uu eeeeee ons 11,218,084 ‘ 1,483,740 
 1798 January to June ED Ulensoorshl 12,954,685 1,526,890 
 July to December 1 —eseweeeeee 12,204,547 \ ant 
 1799 January to June GL Eadvccssovac 13,374,874 
 July to December tt —easseeveee 13,525,714 } 1,500,000 
 1800 January to June Tie eb acsceee 15,009,457 
 July to December 1 asseeeneee 15,311,824 } 1,700,000 
 1801 January to June MU kdacatls othe 16,184,249 
 July to December 4 —esasaeseee 15,487,555 ‘2,400,000 
 1802 January to June TE devcecoues 16,284,052 
 July to December 4 — g.ssesenee 16,571,726 \ 2,900,000 
 1803 January to June of kideac aa wade 15,967,094 
 July to December 4 o..esseeee 17,043,440 ‘3,200,000 
 1804 January to June ee debris chee 17,623,680 
 July to December 7 se seseeee 17,192,440 } 4,500,000 
 1805 January to Jure Wie ckenee seco Ads ed lade 
 Sad to December us — eeoeee vere 16,480,713 } 4,500,000 
 1806 anuary to June whee taht .2s 16,941,887 
 July to December x saseseosas 16,641,761 \ 4,250,000 
 1807 January to June wi Wheecebakess 16,724,348 
 July to December v— cssseseues 16,687,438 } 4,000,000 
 1808 January to June wih eiedhwictat 6,953,787 
 July to December ys seeeeeeeee 17,303,512 } 4,000,000 
 1809 January to June Fo We sdeddene 214,026 
 July to December ip sssssseees 19,641,640 } 4,409,000 
 1810 January to June wit: tyeagesusss 20,894,441 
 July toDecember 6 cnn, 2471887605 } 6000,000 
 1811 January to June ket te ats -- 23,471,297 9 
 
 July to December u eecressere 23,094,046 j 7200,000 
 
159 
 
 1812 From January to June inclusive..........£23,123,140 
 
 July to December | sss seer : 23,351,496 } 7,600,000 
 1813 January to June i Meneteeseus 23,938,693 
 
 July to December  — sesesseses 24,107,445 17,700,000 
 1814 January to June Wf Wests woaens 25,511,012 ) 
 
 July to December 4 saseeeeeee 28,291,832 f 8,300,000 
 1815 January to June Bi Beet ieaes 27,155,824 
 
 July to December 4 —easeeeeeee 26,618,213 }-9,100,000 
 1816 January to June OY eavnsy ase 26,468,283 
 
 July to December uy — eseveerere 26,681,398 $91 00,000 
 1817 January to June M A. beabasvnte 27,339,768 } 
 
 July to December 4 — seseeeeeee 29,210,035 5 8,000,000 
 1818 January to June falas BRA 27,954,558 
 
 als td December iat wicaacal 36487859 ¢ 72900,000 
 1819 January to June FP SE, Seer 25,593.223 
 
 July to December®\ gi !csssccsde 94°607,407 ¥ 72300,000 
 1820 January to June Wr | Scveesees 23,928,315 
 
 July to December 4 ..eeeeeee 23,': 92,301 17,000,000 
 1821 January to June WU Na psaaes 23,522,693—6,500,000 
 
 July to December ys eae eearese 19,632,664—2,000,000 
 1822 January to June Hv Wedtgetves 17,953,075—1,500,000 
 
 July to December ese. seaeee 17,772,717— 750,000 
 EAN OLE 5 shied avs axcnec senses oncusocssatasases 18,500,000— 
 1824 DEM cadcvdisucet cattsa cee sovateesscateeasses 20,100,000— 
 1825 #P OT In THe 'SPTiNg Cc iccccpeowvesenvowess 21,000,000— 
 
 In the Autumn .....ccccccesceeseeee 16,000,000— 
 
 The returns since 1825 have not been made to Parliament; but it is known 
 that the issues rather increased in 1826; and that the amount of Bank of 
 England Notes out in March, 1827, was£21,000,000, of which the Notes under 
 £5 amounted to about £700,000. 
 
160 
 (B.\—No. 2. 
 
 An Account of the Bank Notes in Circulation on. the 1st and 15th 
 1819, inclusive, shewing the Amount of Small Notes in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Excecding ‘Exceeding 
 £2) & not! 30 & not 
 exceeding |exceeding 
 £30. £50. 
 
 Exceeding 
 Notes Notes Notes £10 & not 
 
 
 
 £ 
 June 1.....- 7,269,150] 3,130,790! 3,814,700) 1,873,080 
 —  Lb.....| 7,238,910] 3,114,260| 3,799,030) 1,841,970] 641,190) 1,899,170 
 649,750) 1,885,590 
 678,650) 2,008,340 
 
 671,450} 1,976,320 
 660,180} 1,930,190 
 
 631,400) 1,844,440 
 622,730) 1,789,580 
 
 621,200] 1,771,820 
 632,410) 1,813,940 
 
 Joly Lo... 7,306,380] 3,141,680| 3,816,090) 1,861,400 
 maids i Eh: 7,511,300) 3,245,350) 3,976,140) 1,965,530 
 
 August _1...| 7,677,100] 3,286,700] 4,006,820) 1,951,910 
 —°  1d.| 7,587,810] 3,240,270] 3,960,320) 1,916,000 
 
 Sept. 1...... 7,498,491! 3,164,190) 3,842,250 1,856,070 
 —  15....| 7,413,840] 3,112,580] 3,766,410) 1,819,210 
 
 October _1..| 7,407,650) 3,077,850) 3,744,080] 1,815,800 
 —  145..| 7,540,890) 3,103,360! 3,771,600) 1,850,080 
 
 20.860| 3,802,720) 1,832,100 
 55,390| 3,727,230) 1,816,840 
 
 1 
 0 
 011,270) 3,651,920! 1,758,100 
 ,951,630) 3,582,710, 1,716,640 
 
 Novr. 1..... 7,618,780 
 
 3, 
 | 3 619,430) 1,805,340 
 — —1d...| 7,492,830] 3 
 3 
 2 
 
 617,630) 1,783,460 
 
 609,950! 1,741,990 
 594,590) 1,694,370 
 
 Dec. 1......| 7,883,930 
 — lod... 7,269,120 
 
 January _1..| 7,348,860) 2,946,680 
 — 15..| 7,559,410) 3,072,430 
 
 February 1) 7,583,140} 3,109,610) 
 ae 15| 7,419,440} 3,053,920) 3,678,930) 1,797,110 
 
 591,090) 1,650,090 
 626,400, 1,806,830 
 
 631,970) 1,832,130 
 610,030} 1,771,660 
 
 597,930} 1,729,960 
 586,590} 1,680,350 
 
 593,470] 1.679,340 
 609,020} 1,742,850 
 
 594,510) 1,725,280 
 594,330) 1.685,560 
 
 2,520} 1,686,680 
 2,110, 1,819,400 
 
 
 
 March 1...| 7.327.310] 3,003,910) 3,588,780, 1,749,780 
 —  15...| 7,266,300| 2,976,020) 3,527,510, 1,705,300 
 
 April 1.....| 7,168.960] 2,977,810) 3,513,640! 1,711,150 
 — 15.....| 7,301,190 3,054,230] 3,611,870) 1,764,870 
 
 
 
 May _1......| 7,307,850 3,058,000) 3,597,330) 1,744,400 
 — ~ 15......| 7,289,850] 3,064,330, 3,586,440 1,728,470 
 
 From 1820 to 1824 inclusive, the amount of all the Bank of England Notes 
 guently as low as sixteen to eighteen million pounds; the quantity of Notes 
 
16] 
 
 days of each month, from the 1st of June, 1818, to the 15th May, 
 circulation. 
 
 
 
 Exceeding BudcedtnalHiosedtie Exceeding/Exceeding | % 
 £50 & not} L100 and| £200 and|€300 and) #40 & not 
 exceeding jnotexceed|notexceed|notexceed|exceeding 
 
 £100. 
 
 
 
 £ 
 1,452,420 
 1,395,920 
 
 1,388,520 
 1,467,920 
 
 1,421,820 
 1,368,420 
 
 1,291,840 
 1,275,920 
 
 1,285,520 
 1,338,620 
 
 1,348,120 
 1,322,920 
 
 1,290,720 
 1,237,220 
 1,207,720 
 1,322,420 
 
 1,319,420 
 1,271,320 
 
 1,241,820 
 1,169,920 
 
 1,187,520 
 1,239,220 
 
 1,219,220 
 1,189,920 
 
 £ 
 573,590 
 546,190 
 
 522,790 
 560,920 
 532,390 
 516,790 
 
 494,190 
 491,590 
 
 479,990 
 515,590 
 
 501,590 
 510,190 
 
 512,790 
 459,390 
 501,390 
 535,590 
 
 504,790 
 479,590 
 
 477,590 
 434,790 
 
 461,390 
 495,390 
 
 491,990 
 462,990 
 
 £ 
 492,720 
 460,620 
 
 445,920 
 528,420 
 
 436,620 
 441,120 
 
 423,720 
 440,820 
 
 438,120 
 505,320 
 
 476,220 
 477,120 
 
 490,920 
 424,020 
 487,020 
 511,020 
 
 456,120 
 421,620 
 
 390,420 
 374,520 
 
 439,320 
 454,020 
 
 442,620 
 404,220 
 
 
 
 ing £200. ling €300. jing £500. |41000. 
 
 (Ce ee Re ee 
 
 £ 
 500,400 
 494,400 
 
 468,900 
 536,900 
 
 450,900 
 440,400 
 
 423,400 
 435,900 
 
 489,400 
 510,900 
 
 450,900 
 458,900 
 
 458,900 
 424,400 
 499,900 
 499,900 
 
 424,900 
 433,900 
 389,400 
 361,400 
 
 449,400 
 501,900 
 
 456,900 
 459,90u 
 
 3,262,460 
 2,974,140 
 
 3,260,080 
 5,939,090 
 
 2,847,720 
 2,847,290 
 
 
 
 3,162,850 
 2,406,846 
 
 3,569,350 
 5,118,300 
 
 3,377,600 
 3,163,160 
 
 4,203,660 
 3,777,780 
 4,010,720 
 4,149,480 
 2,602,340 
 2,830,070 
 2,886,580 
 2,811,300 
 
 3,308,820 
 4,782,060 
 
 3,961,720 
 3,801,350 
 
 
 
 s 
 a) 
 © 
 »v 
 Y 
 tal 
 <a] 
 
 £1000 
 
 
 
 sa th 
 
 4 
 tT] 
 
 iu 
 
 u“ 
 
 Bank 
 Post Bills. 
 
 . 
 
 1,657,020 
 1,579,150 
 
 1,541,900 
 1,672,840 
 
 1,748,120 
 1,695,090 
 
 1,630,910 
 1,633,230 
 
 1,579,550 
 1,627,380 
 
 1,673,110 
 1,600,830 
 
 1,564,880 
 1,529,750 
 1,484,170 
 1,630,130 
 
 1,743,940 
 1,690,830 
 
 1,607,890) 
 
 1,594,610 
 
 1,577,560 
 1,606,180 
 
 1,578,220 
 
 1,534,070 
 
 
 
 
 
 Aggregate 
 Amount. 
 
 wenatetrmrer ene Se) 
 
 £ 
 26,616,820 
 25,985,450 
 
 26,283,000 
 30,091,400 
 
 27,007,870 
 26,603,880 
 
 26,263,750 
 25,708,650 
 
 26,280,330 
 28,328,390 
 
 26,626,770 
 26,026,500 
 
 26,679,030 
 25,661,570 
 25,956,840 
 27,255,110 
 
 25,792,070 
 25,458,420 
 
 24,991,370 
 24,488,610 
 
 25,068,380 
 27,162,800 
 
 26,178,040 
 25,801,430 
 
 in circulation was only from eighteen to twenty million pounds, and it was fre- 
 under £5 was in the same period reduced from seven millions to £700,000. 
 
162 
 
 (B.)—No. 3. 
 
 An Account of the Number of Bank Notes and Bank Post Bills, 
 of each denomination, issued in the year 1792. 
 
 Notes of| Number. Amount. 
 
 eae ewe 
 
 
 
 4 £ 
 1,000 40,000] 40,000,000 
 500 12,200} 6,100,000 
 300 19,3501 5,805,000 
 200 23,800} 4,760,000 
 100 51,850] 5,185,000 
 50 56,750) 2,837,500 
 40 34,800} 1,342,000 
 30 40,550] 1,216,500) - 
 25 34,700 867,500 
 20 133,900| 2,678,000 
 15 52,300 784,500 
 
 10 | ° 319,100 3,191,000 
 
 
 
 (No. 819,300 £74,817,000 
 
 A Calculation, as far as it can be made out, with a view to ascertain 
 the number of days that a Bank Note of each denomination re= 
 mained in Circulation in the year 1792. 
 
 Ai Bank, NGte Of... ..0csevescvaeapeetoce £6. pee 236 days. 
 HRPOE, | skins cctoevacstesantecuce Dt, Kaudevccenscsseves 114 
 Dl RR eee ey DO vides gene ces teeesca 209 a 
 REP TOIAG | oen oc cicovgeseriad verdes TB. dewegeniwdess evacie 74 on 
 RATER. - wiiecne ccccny setpnavesite BO... cco peedeess avters 95 4 
 Mi sp ME cope a conenans didwane tee AG ci ccgunsciesssetane 65 4 
 Mais MME ds doth antineetimeccnt Bk vccakeeakeaecheces 124 wu 
 ie AMIS. vs + Sg LO nan: eaten cscnatass 64 4 
 WAY. Pes ochevertasete heh cock es DUO  chacotsaths cscs pera | tet 
 Bh (thy DAM ans woe adeady ao lap canna DUO veescappates dsweces ook en 
 Pa by Ve aaa a Sarees Se TAI. none sSuhieScosevenss 24 4 
 
163 
 
 (B.)—No. 3 continued. 
 
 An Account of the Number of Bank Notes and Bank Post Bills, of 
 each denomination, issued in the year 1818. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Number. Amount. — 
 £ 
 Upwards of...1000.......s.s00es.0 330| uncertain. 
 ON) eS oe 1000....... tn os 112,040 112,040,000 
 SUD sesivecdetis whens 32,116 16,058,000 
 OT cere perro 531 212,400 
 Ei RN 48,802 14,640,600 
 1 pe led a 65,054 13,010,800 
 De hose ng sth eethas 131,016 13,101,600 
 REP ccash bids dies 877 78,630 
 +11 a ee we 1,624 124,920 
 Fee orcas 2 a 1,651 115,570 
 a a ol 2.540 152,400 
 BOSS. Soh su Sine 184,885 9,244,250 
 pt ape Fe 99,747 3,989,880 
 11 eR bE 123,893 3,716,790 
 need 63,957 1,598,925 
 Bllitakieueh saeoctasy 303,574 6,071,480 
 116 ie oa RRA LE 68,903 1,013,545 
 Delp sdussdocedces¥ en? 1,998,314 10,098,314 
 TE inchsanesotuie 1,577,644 7,888,220 
 thes best etacins 996,019 1,992,038 
 Be kau ryaednunh Aili 17,297,571 17,297 571 
 No. 22,211,091; £232,450,933 
 Sane Re-issued........ 174,000 348,000 
 Beli Siesese D6. Se tie cnt 3,286,000 3,286,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 —- ees See 
 
 No. 25,671,091} £236,084,933 
 
 A Calculation, as far as it can be made out, with a view to ascertain 
 the number of days that a Bank Note, of each denomination, re- 
 mained in Circulation in the year 1818. 
 
 A Bank Note of...... af bet remains 147 daysx £1 = 147 
 Debi iam aivicone Biases vee yin 2 294 
 Wa A cecess Poccces o 148 oa 5 ©6740 
 Hg nae eovnes Te) | « I137 « 10 1370 
 Poo ER aecase Occ, sve " 66 4 15 990 
 Ai cian ensns ey: Soe oe lot e 20 2420 
 a cweN A Mele a's 4.cea Debstcoee u 43 4 25 1075 
 Oe eee BOew. oe u 55 on 30 ©1650 
 Se, mel sevens 40...... ry 38 ou 40 1520 
 Paka ved woecss BTU hates n PEON: 50 3600 
 pi -memtpe sevens 100... 555 i" 49 4 100 4900 
 PURE A wens 5 072200.22.5. r 18 ou 200 3600 
 ee a ee TCL 300...... u 14 300 4200 
 Wat Py teste SON, cco. 14 os 500 7,000 
 “ svete LOO0..508 Sw 13 4 1000 13,000 
 
 —_ -——————"_ Average 
 
 2298)46,506(22 days. 
 
164 
 
 (B.)—No. 4. 
 
 An Account of the amount of Bankers’ Notes circulating in Scot- 
 land, shewing the highest and lowest amount in the years 1814, 
 1821, 1823, 1824 and 1825; and also of the amount in Circula- 
 tion at the latest period in 1826, to which the account can be 
 made up; distinguishing the amount of Notes under £5 from 
 
 those of £5 and upwards. 
 
 
 
 * £5 and Under £5. | Total. 
 
 4 Upwards. 
 
 749,093} 1,198,490 1,947,583 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Highest Amount, B-o.-e+-| «616/905 "987,008, 1,603,913 
 Totala..ddevin ...| 1,865,998) 2,185,498, 3,551,496 
 
 ——— gee yee ass 
 
 509,361] 1,047,717, 1,557,078 
 
 Lowest Amount, B eeeeses eoee *398,945 *820,607 1,219,552 
 
 
 
 Totalssscssseceeeeeee| 908,306) 1,868,324) 2,776,630 
 
 
 
 1821. 
 
 £5 and 
 (iavarae Under £5. | Total. 
 
 ; 527,310) 1,074,818) 1,802,128 
 Highest Amount, B......0+++ *582,225|  *860,406) 1,442,631 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Paths. aes ee 1,309,535] 1,935.224) 3,244,759 
 546,908] 907,009! 1,453,917 
 Lowest Amount, B cccccccccoes *416,235) *691),293 1,106,528 
 Totulac: Seulectipiua od 963,143| 1,597,302] 2,560,445 
 1823. 
 £5 and 
 Upwards. Under £5.| Total. 
 781,865) 1,156,583! 1,938,448} 
 
 Highest Amount, Bi ewane "614.525 *909,039 135237564 
 Totals.ecssesseesseeeree| 1,396,390, 2,065,622) 3,462,012 
 
 
 
 
 
 —— + 
 
 571,390, 968,754! 1,540,144 
 Lowest Amount, Diccensneayhen *435,215 *737,877 1,173,092 
 
 
 
 Totalss.sccsseseeeseeee] 1,006,605! 1,706,631] 2,713,236 
 
O 
 
 16 
 
 (B.)—No. 4 continued. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1824. 
 
 tiprorde Under £5.| “Total. || 
 
 Highest 969,751) 1,309,036, 2,278,787, 
 Amount *731,445 6887 ,400) 1,718,901 
 Totals...| 1,701,146] 2,296,492) 3,997,688) 
 Lowest } p| _ 626,120! 1,018,999) 1,645,119 
 Kieth | *469.070| *745,826, 1,214,896 
 Totals...| 1,095,190] 1,764,825) 2,860,015 
 
 Amount of Notes at present 
 
 1825. 
 
 £5 and 
 
 Upwards. Under 2. 
 
 
 
 1,118,896! 1,572,828 
 #§27,825|* 1,163,663 
 
 
 
 1,946,721 
 752,461 
 *570,990 
 
 1,323,451 
 
 2,736,491 
 1,200,025 
 910,623 
 
 2,110,648 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 in Circulation. 
 
 
 
 Total. 
 
 
 
 2,691,724 
 1,991,488 
 
 4,683,212 
 
 
 
 1,952,486 
 1,481,613 
 
 3,434,099 
 
 
 
 Amount of Banks which have made the 
 Return......ccseecsceceecsaceeceeteceeee ees adecongihe 
 
 Three of the Banks who have made Returns 
 have omitted to state the Amount of their pre- 
 sent Circulation. The Amount of their Ag- 
 gregate Circulation, during 1825, was 
 
 At the highest 311,646 
 At the lowest 248,441 
 
 The Average of these two sums is therefore 
 taken as the probable Amount of their present 
 Circulationi.c,.ccsscces eee se Dae tsecear«encates odencaae cas 
 
 seeeececsors 
 
 
 
 Probable Amount at present in Circulation 
 Two of the Banking Companies in Scotland 
 have made no Return whatever. 
 
 
 
 £5 and 
 
 Upwards Under £5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total. 
 
 
 
 1,034,013] 1,748.163] 2,782,176 
 
 *91,730| *155,089 
 
 
 
 1,125,743 
 
 *104,085, *175,992 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 246,819 
 
 
 
 1,903,252] 3,028,995 
 
 280,087 
 
 
 
 1,229,838} 2,079,244] 3,309,082 
 
 B.—The Panks have not all returned their circulation, d?stinguishing the Notes 
 under and above £5. Where that distinction has not been made, the propor- 
 tions have been estimated by a computation framed upon those which have 
 been returned by the Banks who did make the distinction, and the result is 
 stated in red znk.—[ Where the red ink occurs we have prefixed an aste- 
 
 rism.*]} 
 
 Y 
 
166 
 
 (C.\—No. 1. 
 
 Country Bankers’ Notes.—An Account shewing the Number and 
 each quarter of a year, from 5th January, 1820, to 5th January, 
 the same period in Great Britain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Not exceed«|Exceeding 11)/Exceeding 2l)Exceeding 51 
 ing £1 Is.—|ls & not ex-|2s & not ex-jds & not ex- 
 (Stamp 5d) |ceeding 2/ 2s,}ceeding 5/ ds.|ceeding 10/. 
 (Stamp 10d) |(Stamp 1s3d)|(Stamp 1s9d) 
 
 —_— 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Value Value Value 
 No. fat at | NO tarse | NO Jat 107 
 
 L £ £ 
 4500} 9000) 51606|258030) 13787] 13780 
 5500} 11000} 52223}261115| 81598/114980 
 4700} 9400) 51038]255190} 13294)132940 
 7481} 14962) 48806|244080) 10601/106010 
 
 Quarter | 
 Ended 5th April, 1820..... 
 bth July. cise. 
 10th October. .... 
 5th January, 1821.}505781 |50578) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5th April, u 
 5th J uly, u 
 10th October, « {622464)622464 
 5th January, 1822./689117|689117 
 
 710} 14020} 58721|293605) 13882|138820 
 7210} 14420] 58168/290840) 11739|117390 
 3960] 7920) 66060 |330300) 11203}112030) 
 2000} 4000) 71890/359450| 14402) 144020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5th April, un —1338784)318784 
 5th July, uw 1330535|830535 
 10th October wu |623880/623880 
 5th January, 1823./615760/615760 
 
 8000) 6000) 63446|317230| 20684/206840 
 2500} 5000} 40907|204535| 9180) 91800 
 
 " uw | 74740/3873700) 15768)15768 
 6200} 12400] 88120/440600} 19400]154000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 400877 |400877 
 442078}442078 
 607107|607 107 
 519696|519696 
 
 5th April, a 
 5th July, u 
 10th October, wu 
 5th January, 1824. 
 
 1890} 3600} 67105/335525| 17241]172410 
 6811} 13622} 66161|330805| 16624/166240 
 2500} 5000} 66027/330135) 17187|171870 
 13999} 27998) 73891/369455) 23180)231800 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4000} 8000/122583/612915| 41854/418540 
 1000] 2000) 88502}442510) 25182/251820 
 2300} 4600/101809}509045) 23499)234990 
 14200} 28400/129218)646090| 40661/406610 
 
 5th April uw (5710411571041 
 bth suly” uw 1557885 |557885 
 10th October — « _ |745582|745582 
 5th January, 1825.|627341|62734) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 698304}698304 
 
 82172)782172 
 97 1844/97 1844) 
 720157|720157 
 
 5000} 10000/126768/633840| 53759|537590) 
 18511} 37022) 16656, |832835) 40123'40128 
 6000} 1200)/152316/761580) 28400|284000, 
 10000} 20000| 112295/561475} 35951|359510 
 
 5th April, Hu 
 Sth July, “ 
 10th October, a 
 5th January, 1826. 
 
 
 
 oS] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
167 
 
 Value of Country Bankers’ Notes, of each description, stamped in 
 1826, and the total value of the whole stamped in each year during 
 
 
 
 Exceeding j|Exceeding |Exceeding |Exceeding 
 
 101 & not ex- 201 & not ex-/30l & a ex: 4 a el 
 ceeding 201. |ceeding 301. {ceeding 50/. |ceeding 100J. 
 (Stamp 2s) | (Stamp 3s) | (Stamp 5s) |(Stamp 8s 6d) Total Value. 
 
 a 
 
 Value Value Valee Value 
 Nos fara] NO | at 30d No lat soz] N° fat dou 
 
 -_—_——— | | - | ——__—_ | | | | re 
 
 3 £ £ 
 1660) 33200) oa elon i ” 400) 10000 801596 
 1590} 31800} a " 20 | 1000) 40) 64000 831047 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1298) 25960} u 5 | 2500 20} +2000 946385 
 2702) 54040] “ 1 71) u 924873 
 Total for the 
 
 year 1820.. 3493901 
 1610] 32200) =» " 8 400} ou " 984715 
 1650} 33000} 50] 1500) 70] 3500) ua u 894022 
 4358] 87160| » ry 1 50} 600} 60000) 1219924 
 3120) 62400] » a | 338 | 16900}. 1000!100000} 1875887 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total for the 
 year 1821.. 264438548 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3161) 63220] 4 u 10 500} 610} 61000 973574 
 2050) 41000} 100} 3000) 12 600) 4 " 676470 
 1800) 36000 " * 50) " " 1191310 
 6745}134900} u 183 | 9150} 4501 45000}, 1451810 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total for the 
 year 1822.. #4293164 
 
 
 
 
 
 _—_—_— 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1641) 32820) a» " 2 100 20} 2000 947352 
 2250) 45000} 199 | 5970} 80 | 4000; 450) 45000) = 1052715 
 2171} 43420) ” 120 | 6000} 422) 422 1205732 
 3811) 70220) on " 90 450} 6001 500001 1273669 
 
 Total for the ———-_———_- 
 year 1823.. #4479448 
 
 eed 
 
 
 
 
 
 449%) 89980) u -80 | 4000) 401] 40100) 1744576 
 1405) 28100) on " 33 | W650} 1010}101000) 13884965 
 6791}135820| 14 420 294 |} 14700} 450{ 45000) 1696157 
 9494)189880| " 121 6050 " " 1904371 
 
 Total for the 
 year 1824.. €6724069 
 
 
 
 70959219180; 12 860} 50 | 2505) 500) 50000) 2151774 ‘ 
 
 17914]358280; " 160 | 8000)  §&70} 87000) 2506039 
 5914}118280) u 101 | 5v50 30} 3000) 2155754 
 
 11605} 282100) u 70 | 3500) 4451 445001 1941240 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total for the 
 year 1825. , 8755507 
 
 
 
168 
 
 (C.)\—No. 2. 
 
 COUNTRY BANK NOTE CIRCULATION. 
 
 The Amount in Value of Bank Notes for which Stamps were issued 
 
 from the Stamp-office to Country Bankers in the under-mentioned 
 years. 
 
 TBO. .bscsr those dot Vepactnietsust Setiaa'h Svea £10517519 
 LSTA pa ticsenersdsbonesonenens tsded aren 8792433 
 15.) 9-0) Reale Rt cote, et 10577134 
 ELE We rater, OUR by A MIRE oo Be 12615509 
 DAY (das Gia sedi tWa haeccacstir tales 10773375 
 BAI; sen gate atblrths: hotssesbsc teste n 7624949 
 MeL Dicbs upess Lacihvoukahew Upp dalabes gti 6423466 
 TNF o--scaite qgeryeedst one bes ales beens 9075958 
 14 tae HS 2 ean bree? 12316868 
 POI 6 ohsoisondhaondstWidnel Orv ono 0 aod 5640313 
 TH80 Lateral Leear et Pen 3574894 
 FO Mapas On & MO Sa a 4587582 
 TELL, sean rne seinsesieaasiers lag oO. eh 4317341 
 PE EE Ee oleh me A 4457589 
 RODALMUAN TOY ME Ae Pte ead 6793367 
 RANG. sh aise + Lae bi batihee 8756145 
 
 [From Returns furnished to Parliament. } 
 
169 
 
 (C.)—No. 3. 
 
 The Average Circulation of the Country Banks in the under-mentioned 
 years, obtained by adding the Value of Notes for which Stamps 
 were issued to Country Bankers for three years together. 
 
 Previously to 1815 Notes were not re-issuable by law after they 
 had run three years ; hut in that year the limitation to three years 
 was done away,—it having been calculated that bank notes would 
 not last longer than three years upon the average. 
 
 1812... 000. ceeeee eeececenssvoveccccs secoscacces £29887086 
 USED.» . cs ecavenccss Gd ecnsddigns secqesaas oeecsceee 31989176 
 BM hc oder test denser sates toes ta davestenves s<s2sr 33966018 
 1 to) i Beeeeprere Cor sunerocsacsnwcheguadecesdusteels 31013833 
 1816.5. <eces Goes ereocecece Se eccvcecocesstecscass - 24821790 
 DB] Fecasvsee’ ber dteadiwedsdelede aeSersancncastaee 23124373 
 Di liiscaavceseleedtranhecswnsasdeaceivaeever seas te 27816202 
 1819... .cce0s. SsusteerwishetsessecéecedseseeiTees 27033139 
 RtrMhs a5 eb anade> <actaspaaruane vans <ntaenasitaanes 21532075 
 D2 ie crecong eh < dh sed na nennnte desc ecaaisaSostains 13802789 
 1022......800% Xo oes eeddsels debedeedsccsanewesvavs 12479817 
 Udit ss osc gevaculebn cavenspsres<ssnosssavave besans 13362512 
 LRA se dccnci wns wus uawarpicus vn ive ua capsaeedanece 15568297 
 
 EGO cacircararedecedetcsrbascctccvecesectess cesta 20005771 d 
 
 (C.)\—No. 4. 
 
 Amount of the different kinds of Notes for which Stamps were issued 
 to Country Bankers in 1817. 
 
 
 
 
 
 CONG HINT IN OTER Sores sacs a cecesecescsarreches £2953920 
 Two SUAS IS het S IM eee ess 99946 
 Five UW paw ecerccrccseeseeescesesenes 30861 0 
 Ten Be et etactscccssccesesae Qeeloedees 2043540 
 Twenty SB sevnes'eccdececsacsencven dua 728580 
 “Chitty  , eosgedonnes daaagemomedaretiecs 13230 
 Fifty pe! een, fas TCI IA gras ss 12750 
 One Hundred Wide coems tach More sonly< 137100 
 
 9075958 
 
 {Lords’ Report in 1819, on Bank resuming Cash Payments. } 
 
170 
 
 (D.)—No. I. 
 
 TRADE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. 
 
 An Account of the Value of all Imports into, and of all Exports 
 from, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (exclu- 
 sive of the Trade between Great Britain and Ireland reciprocally. ) 
 
 Value of Exportsfrom the United Kingdom, |Value ef the 
 
 Value of Im- Calculated at the Official Rates of Produce and 
 
 ports into the Valuation. Manufactures 
 Years End-|United King- ‘ of the United 
 ing 5th Jan- |dom, calculat- Kingdom, Ex- 
 uary. ed at the Offi-|produce and ported there- 
 
 cial Rates of|Manuf. Foreign and from, accord- 
 Valuation. owe A TIRE, Colonial Mer-|Total Exports.ling to the Real 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ia chandize. and Declared 
 eingnee: Value thereof. 
 
 & s d & sia #£ peers! F--f s {id £ ec 
 
 T8943 Se erst 35798707 5 0!48804372 18 1) 8603904 Y 152408277 7 2135453048 13 6 
 | bey ds Rr 37552935 7 1!48735551 2 65,10204785 6 4'58940836 8 9/38396300 37 3 
 1826........ 144137482 6 0147166020 2 11! 9169494 8 356325514 11 ‘2/38877388 7 6 
 
 TRADE OF GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 An Account of the Value, as calculated at the Official Rates, of all 
 Imports into, and of all Exports from, Great Britain, shewing the 
 
 Trade with Foreign Parts separately from the Trade with Ire- 
 land. 
 
 Value of the 
 
 Value of Exports from Great Britain, caleu-|Produce and 
 
 Value of Im-| lated at the Official Rates of Valuation. {Manufactures 
 ports into Gt. 
 
 
 
 of the United 
 Years End-|Britain, calcu- Kingdom, Ex- 
 ing Oth Jan-llated at the ported from Gt 
 uary. Official Rates|produce and Britain, ac- 
 
 of Valuation. {Manufactures |Ho!eign and cording to the 
 
 : : Colonial Mer-}Total Exports.|Real and De- 
 Ringo chandize. clared Value 
 thereof. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 LL s 
 1624. ........|34591264 9 
 1825. .........,/86146448 0 
 1826 ..... .0..J42089678 4 
 
 d d £ Bay atl #£ 6 .. wet £ gs @ 
 0/43144466 1 6} 8588995 18 0/5173346) 19 634691124 8 10 
 (| 48030086 11 4/10188596 9 2/54218633 0 6137573918 0 0 
 2'46468281 7 2) 9155305 5 0(55623586 12 2380837738 4 7 
 
171 
 
 (D.)—No. 1 continued. 
 
 TRADE OF GREAT BRITAIN WITH IRELAND. 
 
 
 
 Value of the 
 Produce and 
 
 Manufactures 
 of the United 
 Kingdom, Ex- 
 
 Value of Exports from Great Britain, stead 
 Value of Im-j lated at the Official Rates of Valuation. 
 ports into Gt. 
 Years End-| Britain, calcu 
 ing oth Jan-jlated at the ported trom Gt 
 uary- Official Rates! Produce and Forlgh and Britain, ac- 
 of Valuation. /Manufactures Colonial Mer-|Total Exports. cording to the 
 
 
 
 of the United : Real and De- 
 Kingdom. _|Chandize. clared Value 
 thereof. 
 
 
 
 ee eee 
 ee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 L is” nh L s d cg s d £ s d £ s d 
 1824........} 5821036 1 11] 3141825 11 0} 1359376 6 5] 4501201 17 5] 3488591 0 8 
 1825.... ... .| 5OYIIGL 5 0) 3688570 6 4| 1318069 0 8} 5006689 7 0} 4261113 11 10 
 1826.... .....' 6044973 5 91 3837386 11 7! 1437708 17 10) 5275045 9 5 4962751 8 10 
 
 TRADE OF GREAT BRITAIN WITH ALL PARTS. 
 
 
 
 Value of the 
 Produce and 
 Manufactures 
 of the United 
 Kingdom, ex- 
 orted fram Gt 
 Britain, ac- 
 
 cording to the 
 Real and De- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Value of Exports from Great Britain, calca- 
 lated at the Official Rates of Valuation. 
 Value of ey 
 
 orts into Gt. 
 Years End- Britain, calcu- 
 ing oth Jan- lated at the 
 uary. Official Rates Produce and Foreign an 
 
 d 
 é i Manufactures , : ; 
 of Valuation. of the United|©olonial Mer-|Total Exports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Kingdom. chandize. clared Value 
 thereof. 
 #& y, d £ s d ft s d £ s £ sd 
 1824.. ......./40412300 10 1146286291 12 6! 9948372 4 5|56234663 16 11|38179715 9 6 
 T825.2.2.2; ..- 41737609 5 0/51718606 17 811506665 9 10/68225272 7 641835031 11 10 
 
 1826...........49134251 9 11150305617 18 9{10593014 2 lul60898632 1 7143046524 13 5 
 
 ‘ 
 
(D.)\—No. 2. 
 
 Value of Imports to Great Britain, from all parts except Ireland, 
 at the Official Rates of Valuation. 
 
 Species of Imports. 
 
 Ashes, Pearl and Pot......... 
 Barilla and Alkali...........00. 
 Bark, Oak and ta Tree... 
 
 — Quercitron... hep 
 Borakfesenc iNew cacectusersesceee 
 
 
 
 Camphire wevane etdeoulie dds deck 
 Cassia Lignea......ccssseeee ove 
 CheeS@irtesticccccantsccacon te. 
 COINNATHON Gs case ccertccescecaes 
 C\GVERosonssheppecdes cbaveaseaecee 
 Cochineal and Granilla....... 
 
 Copper, unwrought, in bricks 
 and pigs...... secessecesecevees 
 
 Corn, Gree Meal and Flour 
 Cortex Peruvianus............ 
 Cotton Manufactures of In- 
 
 Dye and Hardwoods, Fustic 
 —Logwood 
 Mahogany 
 Elephants” Pedth sc. sbaseetas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5. 
 Fish, Cod, &c. of New- 
 POUTCIBNG 5702. se.cevcdadnees 
 
 
 
 
 
 Senegal......sssseceeseeee 
 Hemp, Undressed... esses 
 Hides, Raw and Tanned.. 
 
 
 
 [ndig....eecee ses ceeeeeeceeeee oe 
 TrON 1 ParSiacccecsetasccesecets 
 Tsinglass.....secerseserssseceees 
 Juniper ELTICS.«.cdsacteveecest 
 Lead, Pig 
 Lemons and Oranges... 
 Linens, Foreign......sseseeeee 
 Liquorice Juice.....sssseeseeee 
 Mace ccsccctaccccnscrceshestlcsses 
 Madder and Madder Roots.. 
 Mélasses cserec.csccsteavecncsses 
 Nutmegs...ccccsscsceseesserees ve 
 
 
 
 Years Ending 5th January, 
 
 
 
 
 
 299 112 
 
 
 
 
 
 1824. 1825. 1826. 
 £ s : s £ ae | 
 14192 1 24579 5 15566 14 9 
 7381 17 #13663 4 25578 2 6 
 380004 12 347315 15 313958 10 1 
 202630 4 70501 6 65910 1 11 
 218140 11 199574 211} 198649 8 2 
 5176 2 841} 15 1 7454 910 
 81164 18 154748 0 6758 17 0 
 75427 1 82070 311] 100193 5 0 
 32051 19 31639 91 37745 8 1 
 168900 11 222767 14 398080 18 11 
 4989 0 17678 16 4:46 13. 6 
 20779 19 47939 2 39674 6 10 
 138535 12 235436 16 331660 19 2 
 180159 16 76211 6 85128 14 0 
 50085 7 96853 01 23038 5 O 
 315615 2 179167 10 0} 242738 3 6 
 32019 4 61540 9 7| 67905 2 9 
 2754861 9 3108605 13 3} 3237980 1 3 
 160185 13 9749 10 9| 4674315 0 
 33726 18 36673 14 10] 41837 4 7 
 41000 5 451290 7 4) 1128341 10 7 
 10862 8 24819 7 6) 3579410 O 
 336515 2 494098 12 6) 37199413 2 
 5929 13 40595 810) 3528712 2 
 103411 3 134305 410) 131803 6.1 
 45832 16 41831 8 7} 51835 0 6 
 175098 17 219011 O 1| 245112 6 6 
 115744 10 172553 14 9} 113085 18 9 
 19568 1] 32275 17 0| 36202 3 7 
 9451 10 14278 8 7| 14741 14 2 
 15134 3 45939 17 10} 6218417 4 
 1082553 17 55709 10 11) 2078844 9 8 
 26667 5 43866 11 10} 29890 11 Oo 
 41164 3 53350 10 4! 49663 12 6 
 34125 11 47434 1 3) 4857717 .8 
 6722 7 24218 7 2| 27916 511 
 542845 J 464980 12 0| 49192419 3 
 75628 4 888982 15 5} 876362 16 2 
 5853 10 3832 0 0 7330 12 6 
 957208 10 667706 19 11} 895959 10 9 
 131272 3 139100 16 10) 22652611 4 
 21187 12 14731 10 4) 19522 4 9 
 24183 0 9728 2 10 7256 9 8 
 5564 12 10682 811) 92459 3 0 
 57589 15 54796 13 3) «56036 2 6 
 24039 6 23309 13 11] 3482714 5 
 34999 0 32578 2 2 9645 5 O 
 2983 2 17961 17 6| 45227 13 1 
 475053 6 §29893 a , 572316 8 6 
 126341 19 158590 236116 7 4 
 16687 12 9 36694 2 0 
 
(D.)—No. 2 continued. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Species of Imports. | (824, 
 Cre 
 Oil, Castor.......recccscrerses «| 10689 0 
 of Olives....cecccccceee «| 114808 12 
 DERM EWI Folk cesicc ade dvesesens 66493 9 
 Train and Blubber....... 541637 7 
 Pepper..eee secsescsecsereese vee | 100213 14 
 Pimento ........ sesssdeeent Kedea 63328 11 
 Pitch and Tar.......ceecececees 122091 10 
 Quicksilver ......cc.sescccoreee 78 12 
 Rags for Paper ......sssseeee. 32756 8 
 WA crTTIM Nhs oc csiceccds secvanead 135893 10 
 RhWpard ioe ieccccnsess de saitoecs 38388 2 
 Bice ..d<ccesees- ced cane Th svewtle bap 91085 2 
 Salt petre ..sc2.cecccnccocees spice” *98476 '°3 
 Seeds, Clover .......secceceeees 18082 14 
 Flax and Linseed . 169605 16 
 Rape .reccceeeeeeceeees 16992 4 
 SWGMAC! soe sdeccadess ccs ssecce ccs 30977 9 
 Silk, Raw .......scsccocesseseee| 1067265 0 
 TERPOWE os cdscate cece denee 431569 19 
 Manufactures of India| 108595 12 
 Skins and Furs ...sssccscccces 259838 11 
 GidltS ...cccscccccceccsceees ane 9950 16 
 Spelter Ee css vain otokeaterses 256831 14 
 Spirits, Brandy .. seeeees| 349613 12 
 Geneva é.:cisiecosvess 19367 2 
 iis See ere 428298 3 
 Suyar, Raw.....-ccccsersceeeees 5477419 6 
 TM OWesdasieisssvesssessd0e aeu.| 849549 15 
 ye el eS be Ray 2904688 14 
 Timber, Deals and Deal 
 MRMIB) Cord ted cas ani beeseceddope 69912 3 
 Masts and Spars.. peti 18 
 MILAVGH se ctckccatcese 5101 8 
 dete A TDET, Pir é..i. 376777 li 
 and Plank 
 Oe a a ee 32682 7 
 of thes Sorts Oe 62986 13 
 Tobacco «..... Kegdoverts| Oa0aah 12 
 Turpentine, Common Pe Sess 141520 19 
 Wax, Bees’s..ccesccssccesccoeet 33713 5 
 WALES) ees cgesvedeccosescies 163140 9 
 WV WRT ee aia es cachccdececbvccces 748150 16 
 Wool, Cotton ......ceccccsscess 6241561 1 
 woe SESBOBPES. cies cc ccet wovcue 678523 17 
 Woollen Manufactures (in- 
 cluding Carpets)........+.4. 26060 14 
 Yarn, Linen, Raw ............ 317242 9 
 All other Articles ............ 1403836 16 
 
 ‘Total Official Value of Im- 
 
 om all Parts (except 
 
 Es 
 
 74409 
 425246 
 1.46713 
 
 65914 
 127523 
 110177 
 
 33050 
 112561 
 
 33435 
 
 96935 
 56453 
 212283 
 74563 
 40741 
 1464993 
 401582 
 119621 
 272279 
 7983 
 459932 
 296355 
 30158 
 419675 
 5733021 
 794000 
 3168198 
 
 80578 
 109574 
 46959 
 413996 
 
 
 
 A4536 
 12234 
 200788 
 186108 
 21561 
 87346 
 724807 
 4864788 
 762734 
 
 10} 71618 
 \| 336374 
 4} 1691466 
 
 waS> S&S SPenesnonoreSRPNOSTMHMAAMEhRENW ORK OOSeA 
 
 — 
 met CO OO 
 
 Fee eae terse SAeu1 264 99 Se 
 
 Ireland) Peeeeevessesecesece 
 
 Z 
 
 | 
 
 129532. 
 
 Ss 
 
 18 
 
 — 
 NSD RNS NS CONIS 
 
 load aealland 
 com c$ 
 
 — 
 
 -_ 
 mec SVN ONDmDoOou 
 
 — 
 
 d 
 
 36592 19 6 
 115705 10 10 
 
 | 
 
 
 
 dame pore 
 weectar~ SH Oe SNE SE AOPRASOON HSC RDN OOS HON 
 
 oe VS on eK S 
 
 bobs 
 
 2025406 15 
 
 
 
 042 
 
 Years ending oth January, 
 
 1825. 
 
 1826. 
 £ 
 25734 | 
 210564 
 85411 
 314952 
 $2013 
 40223 13 
 91322 18 
 330096 12 
 41335 0 
 121631 18 
 33046 8 
 61283 19 
 56582 4 
 87174 18 
 296419 11 
 61078 14 
 30434 11 
 1410769 14 
 928245 7 
 124216 9 
 336109 6 
 10779 11 
 577792 18 
 246709 15 
 30869 6 
 342893 2 
 5055655 6 
 1180205 6 
 2934871 13 
 
 105260 3 
 142483 15 
 49982 11 
 503735 16 
 
 act ha D 
 
 75621 13 
 101634 13 
 371875 1s 
 140485 19 
 27937 1 
 66617 18 
 1178930 4 
 7404444 17 
 1436830 12 
 
 62943 4 
 326130 2 
 
 563678 4 
 
 
 
 — 
 ONO ROI wor 
 
 I 
 oe 
 ee 
 
 COrNAOk ASO RH HOS 
 
 NaS ChRAYNRWe RES 
 
174 
 
 (D.)—No. 2. 
 
 continued. 
 
 Value of the Produce and Manufactures of the United Kingdom, 
 
 exported from Great Britain to 
 
 all Parts, (except Ireland) calcu- 
 
 lated at the Official Rates of Valuation. 
 
 Species of Exports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1824. 
 £ 
 Ali. S2utdb sce caerestre. ducest 79068 
 Apparel, Slops & Neg. CIng.| 397449 
 Arms and Ammunition.......| 213422 
 Bacon and Hams .«......cseeee 28838 
 Beef and Pork, salted......... 97534 
 Beer and Ale ...23...vessdpaces 65956 
 Books, printed.......s.sesserees 33982 
 Brass & Copper Manufacts.| 957414 
 Bread and Biscuit .........60+ 97701 
 Butter and Cheese .........00. 64877 
 Cabinet & Upholstery Ware| 71187 
 Coals and Culm ..... tchieae 216683 
 Cordage 7ie iis. da. std aeates 74002 
 Corn, Grain, Meal and Flour} 29573 
 Cotton Manufactures .......+. 24117548 
 Var ee Pe 2425418 
 Earthenware of all sorts...... $2003 
 Fish of all sorts ......ccecccees 262273 
 Glass of all sorts......ssecseees 143822 
 Haberdashery and Millinery} 21226 
 Hardwares and Cutlery...... 527227 
 Hats, Beaver and Felt .. ...} 205320 
 ~ of all other sorts......- 13179 
 TOPS. syalte sr cncsnerseasenbous 21557 
 Hlorsesiys Aiecscscdivcdesossecade 17327 
 Iron & Steel, wrght & unwrt| 1203872 
 Lead and Shot......scccseseeees 117446 
 Leather, wrought & unwrt.| 126979 
 Do. Saddlery and Harness.| __ 88230 
 Linen Manufactures ......... 2654098 
 Machinery and Mill-work...| 157845 
 Mathemat. and Opt. Insts...| 19040 
 Musical Instruments. ........ 48408 
 Oil, ‘rain, Greenld. Fishery} _ 29564 
 Painters’ Colours ...0..... ...| 184828 
 Plate, Plated ware, Jewel- 
 lery and Watches....... e-| 203806 
 Galtier cae bisees meeen is toccwers 269392 
 Saltpetre, British refined ... 75431 
 Seeds, of all sorts ....... widis 7401 
 Silk Manufactures ..........+. 140320 
 Soap and Candles ........ we...| 167523 
 Stationery, of all sorts ...... 150916 
 ‘Sugar, refined{......sseseeeenere 1125786 
 Tin, unwrought .......s..s000 94659 
 Tin and Pewter Wares, and 
 Tine det eB.) joxbbcesdce seat 229128 
 Tobacco and Snuff, British 
 Manufactured ...sseccovsnees 1559 
 Umbrellas and Parasols......| 34409 
 W haldbitierectrescarcrcsstesetes 15227 
 Woollen Manufactures ...... 5589788 
 All other Articles .... .... vee| 740684 
 
 Total Official Value of the ) 
 Produce and Manufac- 
 tures of the United King- bcs 
 dom, exported fiom 45144466 
 
 Great Britain toall pug 
 
 (except Ireland) ...+00++ 
 
 Years endiny 5th January, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1825. 1826. 
 s ad be gona | a rreg a 
 1 3 7302.16. 2 4089 1 4 
 5 3] 435848 6 5] 457097 14 10 
 4 2) 311715 15 -1|. 375182 3 1 
 9 lu} 29230 110! 22137 1 4 
 7 6| 97030 0 7| 73486 8 1 
 16 4| 4813610 I} 49343 8 5 
 7 6| 32094 1111] 30352 19 2 
 4 2) 54021219 8| 405249 8 8 
 12 3] 3365917 3! 1296015 9 
 1 2) 56423 9.5) 62677. 9 4 
 0 6| 71318 5 10|. 74644 2 0 
 17 10| 235778 2 10) 265864 0 10 
 410) 98444 5 10} 10072712 4 
 5 2) 14692 5 9] 11698 16 9 
 18 9/27170107 19 11126598872 9 0 
 19 6) 2984329 10 1| 2897705 17 8 
 13 8] 93128 0 9| 95184 14 0 
 14 2| 195527 9 6] 178430 9 9 
 8 1] 181325 12 9) 128768 2 3 
 14 0} 26281 14 1] 30511 12 9 
 6 6| 604045 10 8| 629957 17 10 
 15 3] 189456 18 6] 215090 2 4 
 1 6] 1261419 8 2141313 2 
 2:-3 3122 2 2 1867 14 6 
 16 O| 17502 10 O| 15542 10 oO 
 6 0} 1125626 9 3) 1106576 4 7 
 12 10} 116396 19 10] 90259 19 2 
 16 6) 142442 3 2] 13316010 & 
 7 6 110983 19 2) 107782 10.11 
 3 1} 3283402 17. 0| 2709766 18 10 
 12 10) 12964314 6] 21937619 1 
 12 0} 248341611] 31328 6 2 
 11 0} 62471 12 10] 68170 ls 7 
 8 1| 11297 2 7 8454 14 0 
 8 1} 134982 19 10] 129307 10 5 
 14 5} 197737 4 6] 22032015 7 
 12 6} 229100 12 8] 277992 0 & 
 19 2} 59030 1 1] 51493 5 6 
 1 8 7162 9 4| 607719 2 
 15 4| 159647 10 6] 150834 6 6& 
 15 2| 153104 19 0] 17707616 5 
 5 7| 164907 15 5] 181151 10 2 
 19 6| 1058811 7 10| 895778 4 4 
 8 3 131482 11 8] 119518 1 ¢ 
 11 9} 253656 8 11) 205527 12 4 
 211 2506 18 6 1628 1 
 13 0| 4438414 4! 35620 ig . 
 7 3} 30992 9 1) 13744 2 2 
 13 1i} 6150937 2 1] 5925574 1 1 
 2 3) 805161 14 7| 849962 6 3 
 
 2 6 
 
 | 
 
 48030036 11 4'46468281 7 2 
 
17 
 
 (D.)\—No. 2 continued. 
 
 9) 
 
 Value of Foreign and Colonial Merchandize exported from Great 
 Britain to all Parts except Ireland, calculated at the Official 
 
 Rates of Valuation. 
 
 Species of Exports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Years Ending 5th January, 
 1824. 
 
 1824. 
 £ s 
 DPR eiaes -ocdsceacesseeess 2317 17 
 Ashes, Pearl and Pot......... 13699 18 
 Barilla and Alkali...... ...... 823 8 
 Cassia Lignea......-s.seeseeeee 26055 6 
 RII TAAINISHII vac ain Seue obs s a tndsce cine 104588 15 
 NE aca geds chek cae an ucs 28909 2 
 Cochineal and Granilla.......} 62256 7 
 Ca Me ndpiys cada nasenchants 26792 § 
 SS aye ee .....| 1871042 3 
 Copper, unwr. bricks & pigs. 128882 8 
 Corn, Grain, Meal & Flour.| 257997 12 
 Cortex Peruvianus............ 7319 7 
 Cotton, Manufacts. of India| 780206 19 
 Do. of Europe, &Xc.......50.. 1146 14 
 Carrantsscrrsncce s0eseccnevernes| 15298 8 
 Dyewoods, Fustic.......-00+. 2353 15 
 Logwood......... 121144 5 
 Fish, Cod, &c. Newfoundld.| 14886 5 
 Blax, Rough......sessesseeeens 21007 9 
 Hemp, Rough... .-sseceeseres 9221 | 6 
 Hides, Raw and Tanned..... 71072. 3 
 Indigo... .seceeeseeeees Peentargias 533771 8 
 Tron IN Baxs...-.-ccccsecesecaess 37823 9 
 Lead, Pigsss.se-sssssesseeseeees 4477 3 
 Linens, Foreign......+0.sscses ean 5 
 MRT eke lveonsp hacks sop | 88429 11 
 Nutmegs-coresceevesseerssceeens 32197 15 
 Gia, GE ees saesa Sis onassopuxs 39207 13 
 eT al Gi etamadar ee? es dasiogs'ans 8417 10 
 Pepperecsceeeeeseereeserserens | 279853 13 
 Tea ich Open cose ao9$:) <¢as-esane 53826 MH 
 FAISIDS wcvccceccsecscerssarcecsens 4977 12 
 Tee cad caiakiies nes 5:8 sn Katpad 78596 1 
 Saltpetre, Rough...eesseseesens 63640 19 
 Silk, Raw and Throwan....... 13800 17 
 __ Manufactures of India...) 249735 16 
 Skins and Furs...ss--ee. se 32824 8 
 Gpelter-s-scecerseeseersereeceeens 248397 J2 
 Spirits, Brandy..-cccrceseseeeee 171269 10 
 EE RONG VAs. wiess deeseedses 60489 6 
 EE 2 IS eos ti 
 re W cccvcccceccescese eves 72 ) 
 ee Bl aE 74991 18 
 FFE aPC Oli aan dss seme ss spesenees 197431 35 
 WIGS s..ccccees ac See Casts 14885 9 
 Wool, Cotton......se0see Pe 707311 18 
 ——— SHEEP'S -osrecsesesrscones 12618 3 
 Woollen Manufactures (in- 
 cluding Carpets)... 3900 18 
 All other Articles.......ssee 642060 3 
 
 
 
 Total Official Value of Fo- 
 reign and Colonial Mer- 
 chandize exported from | 
 Great Britain to all 
 Parts (except Ireland) J 
 
 
 
 poe 
 
 d 
 6 
 6 
 4 
 0) 
 0 
 fi 
 6 
 ] 
 6 
 ] 
 6 
 0 
 7 
 4 
 7 
 1 
 0 
 0 
 & 
 z 
 0 
 8 
 0 
 1 
 9 
 0 
 0 
 1 
 
 = 
 
 3 
 8 
 
 8 
 il 
 I 
 5 
 
 0 
 ll 
 
 | 
 
 0 
 8 
 5 
 0 
 0 
 ] 
 0 
 7 
 6 
 10 
 4 
 7 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 £ 
 2607 
 41360 
 1894 
 55965 
 146231 
 69821 
 
 163170 
 
 28502 
 
 2463909 ° 
 
 160104 
 110735 
 1545) 
 771767 
 26972 
 28751 
 6433 
 80011 
 35887 
 24632 
 1014 
 148544 
 535925 
 45841 
 1}242 
 2578 
 31227 
 32885 
 11336 
 5425 
 158348 
 67416 
 1185] 
 92617 
 113340 
 3705 
 235407 
 59513 
 403400 
 186340 
 94429 
 573397 
 917670 
 , 93898 
 169116 
 202952 
 903938 
 29013 
 
 64871 
 742038 
 
 $588995 18 010188596 
 
 Ss 
 
 2 
 
 12 | 
 
 —~ 
 
 — 
 “NAR Cr ONIDSH OC 
 
 alae —a 
 OSPOON SOO ws 
 
 — 
 mm OS 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 AISCeeanwoernsweh poe 
 
 12 
 
 £ 
 3309 
 36129 
 5360 
 27806 
 100106 
 3219 
 106844 
 §5293 
 1708621 
 29935 
 77257 
 22878 
 618634 
 29915 
 
 — 
 Scorch a 
 
 9541 
 95798 
 48847 
 16087 
 
 3871 
 
 186202 
 741953 
 87724 
 54823 
 
 2459 
 15261 
 11566 
 16855 
 
 1080 
 
 180165 
 39616 
 
 SNOWOUASewese 
 
 — 
 
 pen 
 SHWONeoRBOonenqown-e 
 
 52895 
 113254 
 139400 
 144538 
 
 43412 
 
 805614 
 175326 
 
 85739 
 438075 
 605751 
 
 67531 
 
 54848 
 190334 
 
 1160201 
 
 46662 
 
 — ~ — 
 SPOemweunsotecs 
 
 —_ 
 bet OT _~_oOo— 
 
 4562 
 955950 
 
 3542 1 
 
 39494, 
 
 1826. 
 
 — 
 Loo PI) 
 
 b 
 
 18 
 () 
 
 — 
 me SNIO De kW OOMDSeNSA 
 
 _— 
 
 — i 
 Se SCORTOMAAGSSOSHNSCUANSCSCONSGSNOGHa 
 
 ms 
 
 — 
 
 —" 
 eS NOow 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 9155305 
 
176 
 
 (D.)—No. 2 continued. 
 
 Value of the Produce and Manufactures of the United Kingdom, 
 exported from Great Britain to all Parts, (except Ireland) ac- 
 cording to the Real and Declared Value thereof. 
 
 Y Ending 5th J. 
 Species of Exports. | ——rs —— 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1024. ] 1826. | 1826. 
 & s d ee s d £ s ad 
 Alum... sgeei dontenakatSzsmesOnl 4789 9 0| 419012 4 289117 5 
 Apparel, Slops, & Ney.Cing.| 397449 5 3) 435848 6 5) 457097 14 10 
 Arms and Ammunition.......| 2738282 11 9} 354171 13 3) 526212 0 0 
 Bacon and Hams.........e000 28889 0 10; 28015 2 3) 2706419 8 
 Beef and Pork, salted........ 125143 0 3 158624 5.10) 136591 11 5 
 Beer and Ale........ccsessseree 238519 10 10; 177808 17 2) 184312 6 6 
 Books, Printed.........00.0+ ..| 121304 12 0) 121293 011) 135088 1 g 
 Brass & Copper Manufacts.| 543618 3 5) 624489 8 0) 484410 4 1 
 Bread and Biscuit...... seeeeee] 63225 0 1) 42859 5 3) 172438 9 6 
 Butter and Cheese..........06 152788 13 1} 141978 6 7) 189799 13 9 
 Cabinet & Upholstery wares.| 71187 0 0| 71318 5 10| 74644 2 0 
 Coals and Culm.....csseseees 100594 6 2) 114083 9 6) 132813 6 4 
 Cordipge’s ccivescins ches chet tae] 145185 13 3) 183463 15 7) 205489 10 10 
 Corn, Grain, Meal & Flour.| 62800 1 4) 40099 17 2) 35667 5 8 
 Cotton Manufactures.........[138751414 14 1115240006 2 7/15034138 15 10 
 YA -ansvebecagteseiteg 2625946 14 4) 3135496 8 7) 3206729 4 4 
 Earthenware, of all sorts....., 398438 10 10) 399548 11 10, 384919 10 3 
 Fish, of all sorts.......0000+++ 237085 4 5) 170367 10 9 202280 0 4 
 Glass, of all sorts.......+.00+ 604038 12 8) 546225 16 8) 592563 4 2 
 Haberdashery and Millinery; 272619 0 10) 306817 8 11) 399558 3 1 
 Hardwares and Cutlery...... 1074684 9 10) 1202865 0 8) 1392293 4 4 
 Hats, Beaver and Felt....... 224531 14 7| 228852 18 3! 264769 12 6 
 of all other sorts...... 19417 11 0; 19389 14 10; 29022 14 4 
 FA Gcies. | secesecneesarddeneaxee thse? 12453 17 6) 483415 6) — 3439 16 0 
 HOrseS...secceeccecsceessveeeeee| OO131 J 0} 69194 18 6) 72094 1 0 
 Iron & Steel, wrght & unwrt 878518 6 9 851113 0 11) 1048210 15 5 
 Wyead and SHOl....cgse<tsooosen) ania : arab : + rs 94 3.0 
 Leather, wrought and unwrt|  °U1U | poate: 332544 8 7 
 Do. Saddlery and Harness.| 88230 7 6) 110083 19 2) 1077862 10 11 
 Linen Manufactures........... 2095574 7 10) 2442439 18 9) 2130705 18 11 
 Machinery & Mill Work....| 167545 12 10) 129643 14 6; 212376 19 1 
 Mathemat. & Opt. Insts..... 19040 12 0) 24834 16 11) 31328 6 2 
 Musical Instruments......... 48408 11 0| 62471 12 10, 68170 18 7 
 Oil, Train, Greenld. Fishery} _33309 17 3} 13416 17 6) 12656 14 10 
 Painters’ Colours.........cee0- 134328 8 1, 184982 19 10) 129307 10 5 
 . Plated ware, Jeweller 
 Mand Watchestcrco| 210031 6 3} 201912 1 3} 295083 7 5 
 ARR | 1 RR tl eae “" , Yes M : em 18 10 
 Itpetre, British Refined...}  § 825 6 0 
 Soda, oF all MOTUS yon colesty sn 6609 15 3 6461 11 9 6206 2 5 
 Silk Manufactures..........00 390879 11 7| 442581 17 2) 296677 13 0 
 Soap and Candles..........+.+ 183136 2 2) 161918 14 8 185562 2 7 
 Stationery, of all sorts........ 150916 5 7| 164907 15 5) 181151 10 2 
 Sugar, Refined...csseesseee | 886916 10 1/ 730830 6 9 778938 0 9 
 Tin, Unwrought........0.00.0 127774 16 4) 150852 5 1) 148302 10 10 
 Tin and Pewter Wares 
 Ste tee "an" 231128 16 0) 255104 7 3) 207390 0 4 
 obacco and Snuff, Briti 
 pie ine iat nie ta Mr ir 16155 18 6| 2142716 1| 18123 10 6 
 Umbrellas and Parasols...... 34409 13 0; 44084 14 4) 3562015 38 
 Whalebone....ss.sesesseeeescee 23162 14 0} 3575913 3 23168 10 0 
 Woollen Manufactures....... 5634136 16 6) 6041845 12 4 6193775 2 3 
 All other Articles....... pat) 1001459 5 0) 1036518 3 6) 1128374 18 0 
 Total Real or Declared) 
 Value of the Produce & | 
 Manufactures. of the U- | 
 nited Kingdom, export. | 24691124 8 1037573918 8 038083773 4 7 
 
 | 
 
 all Parts (except Ire- 
 
 ed from Gt. Britain to 
 land). 
 
London 3 
 
 177 
 
 (E.) 
 Exchanges with Paris, and Price of 3 per Cent. Consols, from 
 January, 1819, to January, 1827. 
 
 The Par of Exchange with Paris is 25 francs and 25 centimes 
 pound sterling, and the expense of sending gold from Paris to 
 
 to + per cent. Consequently, when the Exchange is 
 
 25.20, and under, gold will be sent to Paris; when 25.35, and 
 upwards, it will be sent from Paris to London. 
 
 
 
 Exchange on Paris, 
 
 3 days’ sight. 
 
 
 
 1819, 
 
 1820, 
 
 1821, 
 
 1822, 
 
 January 1......23.45 
 Feb. Bn iedte 23.30 
 March 2...... 23.50 
 April I......23,824 
 May 4s: Bh. 23.95 
 June _i...... 24.75 
 July Devt ees 24.85 
 August 3...... 24.95 
 Sept. 3...... 25. 
 October 1...... 25.45 
 IN owe © Bk..f.. 24.85 
 Dec. Puswaie 24.90 
 January 4... ..24.85 
 Feb. | Bee 24.924 
 March 33...... 25.074 
 Apel ) 21.0%. 25.35 
 May  30...... 25.55 
 June’ B3.%.. 25.45 
 July 4...4-.20.60 
 August 8...... 25.55 
 Rept. )}..5:. 25.60 
 Octoberl0...... 25.60 
 INGYs XS sehee's 25.60 
 Dec. Ba ae 25.55 
 January 9.,....25.60 
 Feb. ae 25.65 
 March 13......25.60 
 April 3...... 25.65 
 May 18...... 25.90 
 June ae 25.75 
 July 13....,.25.70 
 August 3...... 25.50 
 sept. yo Isis 25.55 
 October 5...... 25.65 
 Noy. i 954... 25.55 
 Dec. 4:5..6 25.55 
 January 4...... 25.424 
 Feb. hh... fe 25.25 
 March 12...... 25.20 
 April): <2 2%,. 25.50 
 May  4......25.10 
 June Ae: 25.30 
 July ZosccseadoO0 
 
 | Price of 
 
 3 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
 
 
 1823, 
 
 1824, 
 
 1826, 
 
 
 
 Exchange on Paris, 
 3 days’ sight. 
 
 August 23.. ... 25.45 
 Sept. 24...... 25.50 
 October 11......25.50 
 OVe. lDiseess 25.35 
 Dec. Dccuass 25.40 
 January 3... .. 25.50 
 Bec « E hecy cat 25.35 
 March 27...... 25.70 
 April 29......25.75 
 EY ay HES 25.80 
 June RAAB 25.80 
 Jul rE tad a 25.795 
 August 12...... 25.80 
 Sept. 30...... 25.7p 
 October 7...... 25.80 
 January 9......25.50 
 ae Ad wate 25.45 
 March 238...... 25.55 
 April 9......25.40 
 May "J1..;... 25.35 
 DHNEE access: 25.45 
 July 13......25.20 
 August 3......25.10 
 Sept. 10......25 25 
 Octoberl2...... 25.20 
 UNIOV ewe ee ounces 25.10 
 Dec. Levees 25.15 
 January ...... 25.5 
 Webern Wetec. 25.10 
 March’ ...... 25.10 
 PIE). ssneae 25.5 
 May ee 
 TU Sa 25.10 
 OMIT OT eeaens 25.10 
 AIO ESE kas cas 25.0 
 Sept. 24.12 
 October ...... 25.20 
 OE even 25.30 
 PRES. sontes 2570 
 POET on hep an 25.70 
 October ...... 25.70 
 Dea a aete: 25.60 
 
 Price of 
 3 per Cent. 
 Consols. 
 
178 
 
 Comparative Statement of the Prices of the following Articles, in 
 the Years 1823, 1824, 1825, and 1826. 
 
 
 
 Prices 1824. | Prices 1825. | Prices 1826, 
 (In Bond.) | (In Bona.) 
 
 Prices 1823. 
 ARTICLES. (In Bond.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Lowest. | Highest.}Lowest .| Highest. Hignontede Lowest |Highest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8d |'s @)|‘sid'|'s idles: d'| 4) dileGutd.| sone 
 
 Cochineal, Spanish...-. ..-.se0e+-.20 0 [24 0/19 0|20 0 [26 U0 /19 0 14 0/16 0 
 Coffee, St. Domingo. ......... .... (82 0 |112 0 [58 0 |75 0 (88 0 [56 0 50 0 |52 0 
 Cotton, Bowed Georgia.. ......s.0es 0 83 0 103}0 9] 0 931 63/0 93] 0 63] 0 73 
 Bengal and Surat.. .. ....| 9 63) 0 83) 0 63} 0 83/1 13)0 63.0 5|0 58 
 Indigo, East India.............. ..| 9 9j12 0/9 0[15 0/16 0/12 0/10 Oj11 O 
 SC sil s|\£ si s\¥ s|\H s\S 8 |€ 8 
 
 Tron, British... ..ccccsetbescecses cee] O OFZ) OF BYD. 1s O18 "O110> 0 OM TORnp 
 Lead wBritishs, sry eereie ccs toes tnsissen 22 10 |23 10 |23 0 |23 10 [380 10 |22 10 20 0 /20 16 
 sd |%s a") ag: is) Gis) d | 8 d jseueetesed 
 
 Saltpetre, East India............ ...|24 9 |89 © [20 0 /23 0 |86 0 [24 6 [21 0 )22 0 
 Spices, (Ciniamone-.-..+cesnonececess 6 8|8 3/6 817 6/113 6/7 6/7 0/8 0 
 MACE, sour. sceness costa Oak cas 5 2/6 3)4 8/510/18 0/5 6/6 0/6 6 
 moms NULIN ERS. cccewie: toceoescosvens 3 1,856") 2) 8 15 (8 1FO1S" 6 | Soi g 
 Pepper, black.........e.0-+641 0 53! 0 73/0 53) 0 63/0 9310 6/ © 43/0 5 
 
 Sugar, B. P. Gaz. Remsctt vide 10 es 23\20 2/34 53/45 2 136 11430 0 133 0 
 Havannanh, ar. eeiagee 0 48 0/40 0 |44 0/157 0 144 0 [42 0/44 O 
 
 Silk, REEZIONc. ssceesees secteccnecy nfl oO MOMOMLD 16 0117 0 }12 © Ka 0 }12 0 
 pms PC NITMA, AW ct cavessnacic ss cere’ 20 0 22 20 0/21 0 |28 0 120 0117 U {18 0 
 2s\@ s|\€ s|\€ sl€ s|# s|€& s|# 8 
 
 Spelters... <cccecccoscccscecscce eeens] O O | 0.10 120,10 /30 Osl4b 15 12620 \20seGrIZ1 LO 
 s d/s djs djs d/s d|s djs djs d 
 
 Tallow, St. Petersburgh, Y. C.......|31 0 |87 0 /3t 6/34 6 143 0 [31 33 0 |86 0 
 Tobacco, Virginia, ord. and mid..| 0 23 0 £3) 0 23/0 54) 0 64/0 4/06 33/0 34 
 0/7 O 
 
 
 
 Wool, German, fine...............|6 6;8 616 6/9 6)9 6/6 i 
 
179 
 
 (F.)—Continued. 
 
 Annual Average Prices of Wheat for 12 Years previous to 1815. 
 
 
 
 d 
 Year ended.......+. THOS"... rye 7 ee | Per Quarter. 
 Seth diuibencentene VEO 4s ise? es 60 5 
 ( SSEMAURTIITLIZG 9 tAverage of 6 Years, 72s. 244 
 El Paes Ly ae ei 
 erene Ah!..! Lea 78 il 
 CN ED, ee TID cca cae tt aoe 96 5 
 ” BEET Us swig oe bee 108 3 
 = a een WORE: 8h. 28 <S 
 era ite 122 8 | Average A et gs A RS. 
 Seth ks Tee os: bd pee et 106 6 
 Pe aa er eee BOLE waaay doesn 72 1 
 Average of 12 Years......ssseceeee 85 4 
 
 Annual Average Prices of Wheat for 12 Years, from 1815 to 1826, 
 
 
 
 both inclusive. 
 d 
 Year ended......... PERG ek cs 63 8 Per Quarter. 
 Babee yt TGA en..: 7 2| 
 eeeese eve 81 eeeeeereases 
 2c oiig Tis gf Average of 6 Years, 74s. 2d, 
 " 4 LOG etvene 42 3 
 Boks bs cd 18a Re 65 10 
 u eteaates LBD A wrens - 
 Fe aan ae LO 22 sicncescees 43 3 
 Pee a PORS 28. 23.61 _- 
 Sta ren 182445. 848: 62g rAverage of 6 Years, 55s. Od. 
 “07a Se B23 eseseen 66 6| 
 ED a cccs aes LS Re 56 ilJ 
 Average of 12 Years........sseeee 64 11 
 
 Average of first 6 Weeks of 1827,......seccecssees 0003S. 60. 
 
180 
 
 (G.)—No. 1. 
 
 An Account of the Quantity of Gold and Silver exported and 
 imported, and the Countries to or from, as far as the same can be 
 ascertained and made out, in each Year since the Ist of January, 
 1810, to the 1st of January, 1825. 
 
 Years ending 
 5th January, 
 
 
 
 1815 
 1816 
 1817 
 1818 
 1819 
 1820 
 
 
 
 
 
 1821 
 1822 
 1823 
 1824 
 1825 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total Quantity of Gold in Bars, or otherwise, exported from the 
 United Kingdom. 
 
 Gold Foreign British Foreign British |Total Export 
 Bullion. | Gold Coin. | Gold Coin.|Gold Plate.;Gold Plate.| of Gold. 
 Ozs. dwt:| Ozs. dwts| Ozs. dwts| Ozs. dwts| Ozs. dwts Ozs. dwts 
 40835 12| 246976 9 1... aver f 309 16} 288121 17 
 51012 3) 294309 8 ae st 729 1} 346050 12 
 
 Saree 10797 15 eee 905 7 11703 2 
 57569 5) 116277 17 re 2576 0} 176423 2 
 57437 9] 78770 12 eee sad 1768 3) 137976 4 
 15937 17; 69140 1 5763 8 5 2381 16 93223 2 
 
 Facet BOUAdLELO 3172 5 5967 4 39570 19 
 
 181 0} 13618 1 Sor pees 29 19 13829 0 
 57218 17| 79478 2) 147555 18 24 19; 284277 16 
 87022 0} 111351 8) 98000 90 ee thtnees 102 7} 296475 15 
 241840 4 128403 7) 764109 12) ies 53 8 1184407 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Years ending 
 5th January, 
 
 | 
 
 1824 
 1825 
 
 
 
 The Exports of Gold principally to France and Holland. 
 
 Total Quantity of Silver in Bars, or otherwise, exported from the 
 
 Silver Bullion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ozs. dwts 
 
 296582 15 
 
 37195 0 
 
 195119 0 
 1300746 15 
 9205636 17 
 658100 0 
 
 523162 10 
 
 335929 10 
 7980315 10 
 
 1611331 15 
 2516680 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 United Kingdom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 tee ~ a fm ~ ° 
 = poems fh: = Si iz 
 wae As B 3 nd as Pir 
 e.8 a5 x 3 Pe "a 
 BO go a cre = me Bd 
 5 s 5 aes °° Cina 
 ied fac) 7 aa) eS fo) 
 Ozs. dwts|Oz. dts.|/Oz. dts.| Ozs. dwts| Ozs.  dwts| Odzs. 
 | 2305409 18}... seejeos .| 97941 5} 2699933 18} 29000 
 6263640 12]...  seoleee ---/121052 9 642188 113300000 
 | 6468839 16)... ...| 422 0.149703 2) 6814083 :8 3730000 
 6878838 0)... -| 195 0)142991 1) 8322770 1614320000 
 8425905 10}... ...!.. (145824 417777366 1114220000 
 | 6546358 |... ...| 300 0151328 0, 7356086 0'6140000 
 4828398 12}... ...je0. .-/198906 4) 5550467 62980000 
 4162782 10}... ...| 250 0155195 17, 4674157 17; 822000 
 6565506 8}... ...} 40 0112389 16 14658251 14) 435000 
 10056922 5}... ...} 600 9155164 1611724019 5 300000 
 6069051 Of... ...)2201 0118045 14, 8705977 14) 155000 
 
 
 
 The Exports of Silver principally to France, Italy, Germany, and Russia. 
 
 No Account of the Importation of Gold and Silver Bullion, and Coin, can be 
 rendered, these Articles being allowed to be landed without entry at the Custom- 
 house, by the Act, 27 Geo. I]. cap. 13, sec. 12. 
 
Isl 
 
 (G.)—No. 2. 
 
 An Account, shewing the quantities of Silver aud Gold.Coin and 
 Bars exported from England to foreign countries, in the three 
 months between 5th April and 1st July, 1825, as nearly as the 
 
 same can be made up, from the bills of entry at the Custom- 
 house in London. 
 
 
 
 Silver and Gold), Foreign 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 To what Places Exported. Gold C coke 1 Coin, or Silver 
 oe Bars mixed. Coin. 
 F c pare Oz. Oz. 
 , ; (jF.Coin 2000 
 April’ 6, Jamaica..... areiee seat age Bullion 40000 \ re 800000 
 BRS WIGPROUET CAM iccdcee vcaashebseie | « _ 30000 
 PLP MaraS, ci... nsese)) sakdtscce «acte| ee. Cain 5000 
 uw 13, Miramichi... ... ey ee 5 _ _ 10000 
 te RG rMRICRILOUTI > thes lel sses nbcodt eos _ 4000 
 @ 6 SCalaie. 3. )) 8 yt AE shea a ote ‘|Brit. Coin 25000 . 
 u 18, Ditto.. BR eieltaldligemoeatd eeee.'ss "| Ditto 25000 
 uw 18, New-York.. Etdiema. chintiste s aii 10000 
 un 18, Rotterdam... Sp axe et tan's's sec 2 Ce & Bars 23200 — 
 u 21, Van Dieman’s Land.. .. ... ..-. -- _ 2420 
 a“ 22, ASE See Lae Cer ae ee ee oe — ee 11000 
 MMAR OLLCTOA TY. pec! sa ees ers © siacas scare 10000 
 MP maT ELA IOUT oe <« sc0s se cascves doves oh] BLIGe Coin 20000 
 Merete GUAYTH ss .c00 geccse«.edorseseser | F OLEIEN 2200 
 uw 27, Rotterdam........ . (British 5000 
 A 25,0. ANG Calais, .ccssn.cooa's "\Ditto 3U0U0 
 n 30, Rotterdam... ... —_ 20000) > - 
 w =680, New-York.... . _ _ 10000 
 May 2, ee — 30000 
 uw 4,’ Madeira .......+.0s ane —_ _ 2000 
 7) 4, Hamburgh... ne ee. re ANG. bas). QoUU 
 MME IORGCtCIO AI. 2's ccecasccsse, assert © - 30000 
 Wag New=¥ OTK: wisssdenyasitiegociaesss. = Lo 10000 
 n AG; + eee sae ace he ase Pd and = Foreign 10000 
 w 10, Malta.. cid Sopdet acne aie — = 300 
 nu 47, New- York.. Samais attcon's avaacdaedte ss Ae _ — 10000 : 
 uw 17, New South Wales. . BS ak — _ 3006 
 un + 20, | OES Se RRR HN aoe 50000 _- 150000 
 " 23, Rotterdam..... Hat eines aahines set ~ 82000 
 Mime ONC WE YOLK. s oscatevscertocae seat, es —_ 10000 
 BEER DELATADUIEN ws obee'eshbeateosecieseeiss 800 — L 
 Se Le MOtterda nts. se civec ds os coke ee oe — — 45000 
 Mie VE PDIGAEIUIS \.,..000¢2e006 05 a0oe8 _ _ 10000 
 “ De AIVATADGtieccevesce: ices cecces one IF. Coin 1750 
 “ AIMVOLLEP GAT Ge chas sseeces neti eescas .|Ditto 70000 
 4, Ditto. ..rccccecece seeeeee (British — S0000 os 
 ete 4.3 Status. af — _ 27000 
 u 4, colalt ROME AEE oaleulesr acu esene © 4 ae _ _ 98300 
 u 4, New tleans ... yee: F. Coin 2 i 
 “ 4, ee Roarare? dessescs! bee setts as Bullion 2000 ' e ae eer 
 au WA ELOCLCLOATIN, © «sinc ohesigerascceel oo tte): _ oreign = «/ p 
 " NIP PANLCRAITOTIAswees ecditiuage  codeceesa A —_ 25000 = 200000 
 " 3 ee ce teaes ore <2 Jepestes ae (et COIN 5 
 " 1) Rotterdam . BOCA AE ASE ED _ Dixto 150000 61000 
 gO 13; Ditto: ates ie SURE Peseta cake _ 30000} * 
 Nf. 13; Amsterdam....c...+ Ristas oe oa _ 20000 
 MA De ELOLECTQAI.us4)ers asses cette cv ys British 350\B. & F. 200000 : 
 BEG New-Y OF 5) cae cusses PEM oft 8 — _ 10000 
 HEL GSONIAGEITAL fy cc's es sense’ cs pete cats — _ dU0U 
 w 16, Hamburgh....,............. «(Bars For. 4200 ees 
 Pee NIAOCIIAs osc. tee +s oe “gdnne bats = A 13732 
 MPPIOLs NEBCelTAse cs scree cli Sako iccbeeee _ = 200 
 PMMA ROLECIOATN 4.5 cicices ptcceces sense ns[ COM §20)B. and F. 150000 
 prea les Amsterdam : ., f covessvsh cade sue —_ ) — 30000 
 w 20, BP EOS sits star sis ye yee Rie _ Ditto 40000 
 Me PTVOCLCIGAUI ss v6 ccc «oes nays e.coegOlG 1800) Ditto 20100 
 ua - 27, Ditto. Bet iach ou ce te Poet etree _ 200000 
 uw =6.28, ~ New- (ee voavuqeawe — -— 10060 
 o/s 380, Halifax, N. SBe oe ee CFs vere sere see 200) — 500 
 NOUS saa eciveiersisgette.ces eo Oz. 420329) Oz. JIVOU0 Oz 1340202 
 
 2A 
 
182 
 
 Abstract of the preceding Statement. 
 
 
 
 Oz. Oz. Oz. 
 
 Holland and the Netherlands........ 156870) 999009) 136000 
 WIT ANGE essen cicccs cscccetcetoresccoscsh 100000; — - 98300 
 Jamaica and South America.......... 85950)  — 1106000 
 Italy and the Levant............ses06 50000; — 354200) 
 Madeira and East Indies............. 4000) — 44152! 
 North America.......+« eveweaee onwaeded DOO —~ vere 85500) 
 Hamburgh ......cscsscceesceccssrecncrees 29300; — 27000 
 
 Totalsisscersssaactys tienes 426320, 999000} 1845252! 
 
 The Sterling Value of this three months’ Export may be estimated thus—viz. 
 
 
 
 426320 oz. gold, at £3 17s 10d per 02Z......0s.seceeeeerees 
 100000 oz. ditto ditto sd bvabouthew } £2148000 
 899000 oz. silver, at 5s peri0z..2..us Bele . . 
 1845252 oz. ditto ditto dee. Ake: Sir ee \ 686030 
 Altogether in three months......+....0+0 £2834030 
 
 or at the rate of nearly £1000000 a-month. 
 
 Of this amount there was exported 
 £1059000....... dekestacstestt in the month of April. 
 
 360000....... PARES ee " May. 
 DLS |: See ee Hu June. 
 
183 
 
 (H.) 
 
 Alterations with respect to Weight and Fineness, 
 and Comparative Value of Gold and Silver, in Great Britain. 
 
 
 
 _ 
 
 
 
 last 500 years in the ratio of 99 to 32, and Gold Coins nearly as 33 to 1. 
 
 Years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 1066) O47 
 1280)... 
 1344 
 1349 
 1356 
 142] 
 1464 
 1465 
 1470 
 1482 
 1527)... 
 1543) 19 
 1545} 6 
 1546, 4 
 1549) 4 
 1551 5 
 1560) 4] 
 1600 
 1604 
 1626 
 1666 
 1717 
 1816 
 1821) 
 
 
 
 
 
 Vineness. 
 
 SILVER. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 dwts. 
 2 
 
 WO OD OD OO OF OO OO CE OF GO BO BD DD RD BO DD DO DD Re ee et ee ee eh 
 
 — 
 
 MAAN NM NHN SNWNAADONOSSSSN DOW ee 
 
 <_< 
 
 Lb. Troy 
 Coined into 
 
 
 
 ecocerocoecoooescooreoeooaeo ar fo 
 
 | 
 i 
 
 B 
 E 
 k 
 
 
 
 GOLD. 
 
 Lb. Tro 
 Fineness. Coined he 
 Grains. CARES ya 
 23 34 mau 
 
 14 18 
 cee [hoo 
 ae ieee tT AD 
 Ril  cecdl (ae ott 
 Pe a Ree: ala 
 snake een ee 
 Alt in ht oe. UO 
 Bo ke hed O 
 23... | 20:16 
 22 ... | 30 0 
 20 ...| 30 0 
 9204.87 134 0 
 23 34 34 0 
 Satie oo Ue 
 23 3s 36 10 
 22 +0 | 33 10 
 
 41 0 
 
 44 10 
 
 46 14 
 
 46 14 
 
 46 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Senoceoeoocoecococoocoossosons' 
 fmt eet famed feet fred bed fom Sere frst: fort fd fed fed fos od fed fd fd fms nd fd ces 
 
 Comparative Value 
 
 * Wars of Edward IV. adulteration. 
 <¢ By which it appears that Silver Coins have diminished in value during the 
 
 of fine 
 Gold and Silver. 
 
 
 
 i>) 
 t 
 
 — 
 > 
 
 9 G9 BO OT OD OD eS et SCO OS et me ee 0 DD 
 
 
 
 In 
 
 the same period the Silver Coins of France and Spain have been debased in the 
 ratio of about 17 to 1.” 
 
184 
 
 (I.) 
 
 To the Honourable the COMMONS of the United Kingdom of Great 
 
 Britain and Ireland in Parliament assembled. 
 
 
 
 THE PETITION OF THE UNDERSIGNED MERCHANTS AND 
 OTHERS OF THE TOWN OF LIVERPOOL, 
 
 ‘¢ HUMBLY SHOWETH, 
 
 ‘¢ THAT it is necessary for the purposes of internal and Foreign 
 trade, that a standard measure of value should be adopted in every country. 
 
 *¢ That because they are less liable to variation in value than any other com- 
 modity, the precious metals have been fixed upon as the most eligible standard ; 
 and therefore each nation has given to its com a certain denomination, and a 
 specific weight and fineness. ‘That the price of any article, in any country, 
 means nothing more than a certain number of such denominations ; and it is on 
 this basis that the value of money and of property is ascertained all over the 
 civilized world. 
 
 ‘¢ That for the security of property, it is highly expedient that the standard 
 should not be changed, inasmuch as it forms the basis of all contracts, and can 
 never be altered without injustice either to the payer or payee. 
 
 ‘¢ That in opposition to these principles, an act was passed in 1797, which 
 virtually abrogated the ancient standard of this realm, and changed the value of 
 the whole currency, by exempting the Governor end Company of the Bank of 
 England from the liability to pay coin for their notes, when called upon to do so 
 by the holder. 
 
 ‘¢ That this act, commonly called the Bank Restriction Act, was confirmed at 
 divers times, and continued in full force till the 2nd July, 1819. 
 
 *¢ That within this time, but more particularly from 1800 to 1819, the high 
 market price of Gold indicated a considerable depreciation in the value of the 
 currency. r 
 
 ‘¢ That it appears, that from 1800 to 1810, the depreciation fluctuated between 
 5 and 15 per cent. and that for a period of about three years, 1811 to 1814, it 
 fluctuated between 20 and 32 per cent. 
 
 *¢ That in 1615 the depreciation averaged about 14 per cent. and your Peti-_ 
 tioners conceive that the average of the remaining term cannot be taken at less 
 than 5 per cent. 
 
 ** Your Petitioners further represent, that within this period, when the ' 
 ancient standard was suspended, and'this great depreciation existed, a very large 
 proportion of the National Debt was contracted. 
 
 *¢ ‘That all transactions within this period, between private individuals, were 
 founded on this depreciated currency, and that property of all descriptions created 
 and transferred, adjusted itself accordingly. 
 
 ‘¢ Phat on the 2nd July, 1819, when depreciation still existed, and when the 
 revenue of the country was notoriously inadequate to its expenditure, an act was 
 passed to restore progressively the whole currency of the Kingdom to the ancient 
 standard of value. 
 
 ‘* Your Petitioners cannot refrain from stating, that the inquiry which led to 
 this determination on the part of your Honourable House, seemed rather 
 directed to the capability of the Bank to pay its notes in specie, than to the capa- 
 bility of the country to sustain such a derangement and loss of property, and to 
 meet, at the same time, its fixed and positive engagements with the public crediton, 
 
185 
 
 “© That there can be no doubt that the ancient standard may be resumed, if all 
 considerations as to the consequences be disregarded; but your Petitioners 
 humbly submit, that the attempt to restore it has already created great distress, 
 and that a further prosecution of the plan will produce a greater mass of suffering 
 than was ever Mrodnced by any other measure ; and that greater injustice will 
 be done towards individuals, and ultimately to the public creditor, than by any 
 plan of state policy which has hitherto been pursued in these Kingdoms. 
 
 *¢ Your Petitioners beg leave to state, in support of this opinion, that since 
 
 this act passed, the trade, the commerce, the agriculture, and the manufactures 
 of this country, have suffered grievous depression; that, with some few excep. 
 tions, they are still declining, and are still unprofitable ; that a diminution of im- 
 ports and exports has not been attended with those beneficial results which a 
 cessation from over-tradinz was expected to produce, that a considerable pro- 
 portion of the mechanics and labouring husbandmen, in different parts of the 
 Kingdom, are either without work, or without wages sufficient for the sustenance 
 of lite; that the Poor’s Rates are oppressive, and cannot generally be diminished 
 without endangering the peace and safety of the country; and finally, that 
 preperty of nearly every description is still lessening in value. 
 _ * Your Petitioners are not ignorant that periods of great depression have 
 existed, even when the currency was depreciated; but they believe that the de-. 
 pression which has continued for the last two years has been greatly aggravated 
 by the forced contraction of currency and credit. 
 
 *¢ That your Petitioners find no consolation in the fact of the market price of 
 Gold having fallen to the ancient standard ; it is no relief to them that the public 
 may possibly supply any further excessive diminution of the issues of the 
 Bank, by purchasing and coining Gold; on the contrary, they feel themselves 
 bound by the previous state of the currency, and by this state of things, to dis- 
 charge their debts at a higher rate than they contracted for, inasmuch as that 
 when gold was high, the price of land and all commodities was high, and that 
 now gold has fallen, land and commodities have fallen also, yet their engage- 
 ments continue the same, and the extent and nature of these engagements they 
 beg leave to recite. 
 
 *¢ ‘They conceive, that of all the existing contracts, except such as arise out of 
 commerce, and expire on short credits, the major part has been made between 
 1787 and 18195 that the proportion of lands, houses, and other property mort- 
 gaged, and subject to charges for portions and annuities, is as three-fourths to 
 the whole, and as one-half to the value; that the average term of takings at 
 rack rent may be considered five years; and further, that bonds, annuities, 
 salaries, and pensions, still remain in operation. 
 
 ‘¢ That as yet only a small proportion of the leases taken has expired; that 
 as yet very few foreclosures have been made, and but few securities have been 
 put in force; but your Petitioners conceive that the struggle against difficulties 
 cannot, by a very numerous class of persons, be supported much longer, and that 
 property to an immense amount must then be brought to market, and to such an 
 extent as to produce a further decline in the value of all the rest: and they are 
 borne out in this conclusion by the facts, that the Bank has not yet resumed 
 cash payments, and that property generally has not resumed the level of the 
 years preceding 1797. 
 
 ‘«¢ That after all, the public debt, which must be considered as a Mortgage on 
 the whole property of the Kingdom, still remains, and presses upon the people 
 with accumulated force. - 
 
 «¢ That this, then, is the situation of the Country, after a twenty-two years’ 
 war and suspension of the ancient standard, cannot in substance be denied ; and 
 your Petitioners look in vain for the benefits which the wisdom of your Honour- 
 able House doubtless meditated in the act for the resumption of that standard ; 
 they sce in that measure an attempt to remedy the mischief caused by a departure 
 from fixed principles, by sacrificing the property of many to the advantage of a 
 few, and for no other purpose, as your Petitioners conceive, than to re-establish 
 a standard to which comparatively few contracts have any reference. 
 
 ‘¢ ‘that this perilous state of affairs requires immediate consideration, no doubt 
 can be entertained, and your Petitioners humbly submit, that hitherto no ade- 
 quate remedy has been proposed. 
 
186 
 
 «¢ That they have heard ofa plan for paying off part of the National Debt by a 
 contribution from property ; that they have also heard of a plan for reducing the 
 interest of the said Debt; but your Petitioners humbly conceive that neither of 
 these plans, if just, would afford them sufficient relief, because they consider, 
 that the private engagements of individuals one towards another far exceed 
 in amount the engagements of the people with the public creditor, and therefore, 
 that whatever plan be adopted with reference to the Public Debt, ought as an 
 act of obvious and common justice to be applied to all private contracts. 
 
 ‘¢ That your Petitioners are aware that the opening of all private contracts, 
 and of the contracts with the public creditor, for the purpose of exact adjustment, 
 according to the value of the currency in which each was made, would be a mea- 
 sure attended with great and insuperable difficulties. 
 
 «¢ That the object of every Government must be to administer justice to all its 
 subjects, and where exact justice cannot be done, the general good must be con- 
 sulted by some measure of approximation. 
 
 ‘¢ Your Petitioners, therefore, humbly beg leave to approach your Honourable 
 House, for the purpose of stating their opinion, that the general interest of the 
 community requires an immediate lowering of the Standard of the Realm, as 
 calculated to lead to the only practicable remedy for those difficulties in which 
 the people of this country have been involved, by the abandonment of the ancient 
 standard in 1797, and by the attempt now making: to restore it. 
 
 ‘¢ In suggesting this measure to the consideration of your Honourable House, 
 your Petitioners declare their deep regret that any circumstances whatever 
 should have rendered such recommendation necessary, inasmuch as they regard 
 the right to alter the standard, as one of the most questionable prerogatives of 
 the Crown, and one of the last resources of an embarrassed nation. 
 
 «© Your Petitioners do not consider that this measure alone will rescue the 
 country from all its difficulties; on the contrary, they believe that nothing less 
 than the application of this plan, combined with retrenchment, and the adoption 
 of a wiser system of commercial policy, can restore to it those advantages to 
 which its skill, capital, and industry so justly entitle it. 
 
 ‘¢ Your Petitioners, therefore, pray, that your Honourable House will imme- 
 diately take into consideration the propriety of making such alteration in the act 
 of the 2nd July, 1819, as shall enable debtors to discharge their engagements in 
 a currency corresponding in some degree with the value of that in which they 
 were contracted. And further, your Petitioners pray, that such part of that act 
 as relates to the liability of the Bank to pay in Specie, may be repealed, and that 
 payments in Bullion may be substituted, at such a standard as the wisdom of 
 your Honourable House shall deem meet. 
 
 *¢ And your Petitioners will ever pray.” 
 
 LIVERPOOL, 2nd March, 1821. 
 
187 
 CK.) 
 
 The following is an Extract from the Protest made by the Directors of the Bank 
 of England against the measures proposed in April, 1819, for a return to Cash 
 Payments :— 
 
 «¢ The Directors of the Bank think it right to observe to His Majesty’s Min- 
 isters, that being engaged to pay on demand their Notes in statutable Coin, at 
 the mint price of £3 17s 104d an ounce, they ought to be the last persons who 
 should object to any measure calculated to effect that end ; but as it is incum- 
 bent on them to consider the effect of any measure to be adopted, as operating 
 upon the general issue of their Notes, by which all the private Banks are regu 
 lated, and of which the whole currency, exclusive of the Notes of private 
 Bankers, is composed, they feel themselves obliged, by the new situation in 
 which they have been placed by the Restriction Act of 1797, to bear in mind, 
 not less their duties to the Establishment over which they preside, than their 
 duties to the Community at large, whose interests in a pecuniary and commercial 
 relation have in a great degree been confided to thetr discretion. 
 
 “¢ The Directors being thus obliged to extend their views, and embrace the 
 interests of the whole Community, in their consideration of this measure, cannot 
 but feel a repugnance, however involuntary, to pledge themselves in approbation 
 of a System, which, tn their opinion, in all tts great tendencies and operations, 
 concerns the Country in general more than the emmediate interests of the Bank 
 alone. 
 
 ¢¢ It is not certainly a part of the regular duty of the Bank, under its original 
 institution, to enter into the general views of Policy, by which this great Km- 
 pire is to be governed, in all its Commercial and Pecuniary transactions, which 
 exclusively belong to the Administration, to Parliament, and to the Community 
 at large; noris it the province of the Bank to expound the principles by which 
 these views ought to be regulated. Its peculiar and appropriate duty is the 
 management of the concerns of the Banking Establishment, as connected with 
 the payment of the Interest of the National Debt, the lodgments consigned to 
 its care, and the ordinary Advances it has been accustomed to make to Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 *¢ But when the Directors are now called upon, in the new situation in which 
 they are placed by the Restriction Act, to procure a Fund for supporting the 
 whole National Currency, either in Bullion or in Coin, and when it is proposed 
 that they should effect this measure within a given period, by regulating the 
 market price of Gold by a limitation of the amount of the Issue of Bank Notes 
 (with whatever distress such limitation may be attended to individuals or the 
 community at large); they feel it their bownden and tmperious duty to rtate 
 their sentements thus explicitly, in the first instance to His Majesty’s Ministers, 
 on this subject, that a tacit consent and concurrence at this juncture may not, 
 at some future period, be construed into a previous implied sanction on their 
 part, of a System, which they cannot but consider fraught with very grcat un- 
 certainty and risk. 
 
 “+ It is impossible for them to decide beforehand what shall be the course of 
 events for the next two, much less for the next four years ; they have no right 
 to haxard a flattering conjecture, for which they have not real grounds, in which 
 they may be disappointed, and for which they may be considered responsible.— 
 They cannot venture to advise an unrelenting continuance of pecuniary pres- 
 sures upon the Commercial world, of which tt is impossible for them either to 
 Sorsee or estimate the consequences. 
 
 *¢ The Directors have already submitted to the House of Lords the expediency 
 of the Bank paying its Notes in Bullion at the market price of the day, with a 
 view of seeing how far favourable Commercial balances may operate in restoring 
 the former order of things, of which they might take advantage: And witha 
 similar view they have proposed, that Government should repay the Bank a con- 
 siderable part of the sums that have been advanced upon Exchequer Bills, 
 
188 
 
 *¢ These two measures would allow time for a correct judgment to be formed 
 upon the state of the Bullion market, and upon the real result of those changes, 
 which the late war may have produced, in all its consequences, of increased 
 public Debt, increased ‘Taxes, increased Prices, and altered Relations, as to In- 
 terest, Capital, and Commercial Dealings with the Continent; and how far the 
 alterations thus produced are temporary or permanent ; and to what extent, and 
 in what degree they operate. 
 
 *¢ It was the desiyn of the Directors, in pursuance of the before-mentioned two 
 Measures, to take advantage of every circumstance which could enable the 
 Bank to extend its purchases of Bullion, as far as a legitimate consideration of 
 the ordinary wants of the Nation, for a sufficient Currency, could possibly war- 
 rant. Beyond this point they do not consider themselves justified in going upon 
 any opinion, conjecture, or speculation, merety their own; and when a system 
 is recommended, which seems to take away from the Bank any thing like a dis- 
 cretionary consideration of the necessities and distresses of the Commercial 
 world; if the Directors withhold their previous consent, it is not from a want 
 of deference to His Majesty’s Government, or to the opinions of the Committees 
 of the two Houses of Parliament, but solely from a serious feeling, that they 
 have no right whatever to invest themselves of their own accord with the respon- 
 sibility of countenancing a Measure in which the whole Community is so deeply 
 involved ; and possibly to compromise the universal Interests of the Empire in 
 all the relations of Agriculture, Manufacture, Commerce, and Revenue, by a 
 seeming acquiescence or declared approbation on the part of the Directors of the 
 Bank of England.” 
 
 {The whole document was presented to the House of Commons on the 20th 
 May, 1819.] 
 
 FINIS. 
 
 PRINTED BY HARRIS AND CO. WATER-STREET, LIVERPOOL. 
 

 

 
 en aT Bags ot} 
 
 » ie Dat 
 
 
 
 Om 
 
 ? 
 ee ip 
 
 
 
adorn. 
 < 
 
 SAE ace 
 > 
 
 
 
MU 
 
 
 
 30112