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 BY 
 
 OSCAR S. STRAUS 
 
 Former Ambassador and member of the 
 Permanent Court of Arbitration 
 at the Hague 
 
 Publication No. 018 
 
 Reprinted from AmeriCa'h I nterehth ah Affbctkh nv the European War 
 Vol. LX of Tuf. Annals of the 
 American Academy of Political and Social Science 
 Philadelphia, July, 1015 
 
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 AMERICA’S POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION 
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 'ieprinted from The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
 Science, Philadelphia, July, 1915. 
 
 Publication No. 918. 
 
 
 AMERICA’S POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE 
 WORLD’S PEACE 
 
 By Oscar S. Straus, 
 
 Former Ambassador and member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the 
 
 Hague. 
 
 Any discussion of America’s possible contribution to the world’s 
 peace must at this time, in the nature of things, be purely speculative 
 and hypothetical. Whether this war will end by the decided vic¬ 
 tory of the one side or the other, or whether it will be prolonged to a 
 state of exhaustion, or whether, before such a state is reached and in 
 recognition of the probability that such will be the result, the war¬ 
 ring nations may come together by their representatives in con¬ 
 ference to arrange for the conclusion of the' war and for plans to 
 secure by negotiation what they may have failed to secure at the 
 cannon’s mouth—these are questions surrounded with so much 
 uncertainty at the present time that no one is justified in forming a 
 definite conclusion. 
 
 President Wilson and his administration, animated by the high 
 and noble desire to conserve the moral influence of our country as a 
 mediator and peace-maker, have made and are making every effort 
 to maintain not only a strict attitude of neutrality, but also a spirit 
 of impartiality on the part of our people. To quote the President’s 
 words from his recent address to the members of the Associated 
 Press: 
 
 ~~s> 
 
 r Let us think of America before we think of Europe, in order that America 
 may be fit to be Europe’s friend when the day of tested friendship comes. The 
 . test of friendship is not now sympathy with the one side or the other, but 
 - getting ready to help both sides when the struggle is over. 
 
 And yet with all this effort on the part of our government, 
 p^which has been consistently urged by the President and followed 
 since the beginning of the war and sometimes in the face of severe 
 provocation, our government’s attitude has been misinterpreted, as 
 is evidenced by the press not only in Germany but likewise in Great 
 P Britain and in the other belligerent countries. This misinterpreta¬ 
 tion, fault-finding and even reproof have been officially expressed in a 
 
 1 
 
 317515 
 
2 
 
 The Annals of the American Academy 
 
 
 statement authoritatively given out a short time ago by the German 
 ambassador, protesting against our not observing our neutral obli¬ 
 gations. Utterances in some of the leading British papers would 
 indicate that our attitude of neutrality likewise does not satisfy 
 public opinion in that country. 
 
 I refer to these facts because the attitude and the disposition 
 toward us of the belligerent nations will have a direct bearing upon 
 what contribution we may be invited or permitted to make in aiding 
 in the establishment of peace among the warring nations and in the 
 development of plans for securing the permanent peace of the 
 world. 
 
 There is yet another important consideration which we shall 
 have to determine for ourselves before it will be possible fdr us to 
 have a part or take a part in devising plans for the peace of the 
 world. The American traditional policy has been expressed in two 
 important state papers, in Washington’s farewell address, and in 
 President Monroe’s message to Congress, which state papers have a 
 prestige and authority second only to the Declaration of Indepen¬ 
 dence and the Constitution of the United States. Washington, in 
 his farewell address, stated that Europe had “a set of primary 
 interests which to us have none or very remote relations. ” His 
 thought was, that it was the course of wisdom so far as possible to 
 disassociate America from the ordinary vicissitudes of European 
 politics. 
 
 Monroe, in his message, amplified the Washington policy as the 
 changed circumstances and the immediate necessities demanded, 
 by reminding the powers of the Holy Alliance of our policy in regard 
 to European nations, that we would not interfere in their internal 
 concern, and that we would not regard their interference in the 
 affairs of the government of the states on the American continent 
 with indifference. This American policy in its double form was 
 annexed to the signatures of the American delegates to the Hague 
 convention, and was spread on the minutes of the conference, and 
 as such recognized by the nations of the world. 
 
 The question, therefore, naturally arises: has America the 
 right to demand participation in the conferences of the belligerent 
 nations following the present war, for the purposes of arranging for 
 the future peace of the world? Another question presents itself: 
 even if we should not have the right, and in the event that we should 
 
America and the World’s Peace 
 
 3 
 
 be invited by the belligerent nations as the leading neutral power to 
 participate in such a conference, can we do so without impliedly, if 
 not expressly, relinquishing our traditional attitude of exclusive 
 control over purely American questions? 
 
 This contingency will bring to the foreground the consideration, 
 if not the wisdom, of a further extension if not a reversing of the 
 American traditional policy as outlined by Washington when he 
 said : 
 
 The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extend¬ 
 ing our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as 
 possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled 
 with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. 
 
 The question that would present itself, have not the world 
 relations and the interdependent interests of nations since Wash¬ 
 ington’s admonition was given, become so closely and intimately 
 related so that our duty to other nations as well as our own “en¬ 
 lightened self-interests” make it imperative upon us not to “stop,” 
 but to unite with the nations of the world in such a policy, be it by 
 international agreement, by entering into a league with the leading 
 nations of the world, or by becoming a member of a world federa¬ 
 tion, or by uniting in such a joint arrangement, as in the wisdom of 
 nations may be determined upon as the most practical and effective 
 for the establishment and maintenance of the peace of the world? 
 
 From generation to generation we have been making radical 
 changes in our internal policies, and notably in the direction of the 
 enlargement of the powers of the central government. The Inter¬ 
 state Commerce Laws and the Federal Reserve Act are themselves 
 distinct evidences of those changes. A nation cannot remain sta¬ 
 tionary any more in its national than in its international relation¬ 
 ship and policy. “New occasions teach new duties.” 
 
 It is not improbable that the outgrowth of this war will affect 
 the future policies not only of the belligerent nations but of neutral 
 nations as well. Norman Angell says that if we do not mix in 
 European affairs, Europe will mix in our affairs, and that the day 
 of isolation for us, whether we like it or not, is over. He may be 
 right. It is much easier for a country when it is small in population 
 and in interests to remain aloof, than when it becomes one of the 
 great powers of the world. Our country with its population of a 
 hundred million and its expanded world commerce is too large a 
 
4 
 
 The Annals of the American Academy 
 
 factor to stand aloof from world questions. In the event of a 
 league or confederation of the leading nations, for us to separate 
 ourselves by refusing to assume our share of responsibility mignt 
 conflict with our national interests and our international duties and 
 have the result of placing ourselves in opposition to the world 
 policies of the new world-state. In such an event, would it not be 
 better for such a world-state as well as for ourselves to form a 
 part of such a state and help to shape its policies as one of the im¬ 
 portant constituent members, than to conserve our traditional pol¬ 
 icies and stand aloof? 
 
 These are questions that not unlikely, I might say, very prob¬ 
 ably, will present themselves to the American government at the 
 outcome of the present war or even before, in contributing its 
 mediatory offices in bringing the war to a conclusion. 
 
 Our country has as deep a concern, not only morally, but 
 economically and industrially, in the peace of the world as any one 
 of the larger nations. A war such as this, or upon such a consider¬ 
 able scale, affects under the changed economic and commercial 
 conditions and relationships of modern times the neutral nations 
 only to a lesser degree than the nations actually at war. And, 
 therefore, have we not the right and is it not our duty to cooperate 
 to the fullest of our power in the perfection and the maintenance of 
 a plan for the preservation of peace? 
 
 It is to be hoped that the extreme suffering and sacrifice that 
 this war entails may have the compensation of developing supreme 
 wisdom on the part of the nations. The nations of the world, to 
 be at peace, must develop a broader patriotism as distinguished 
 frQm a national jingoism, a more'enlightened sense of justice which 
 does not preach one gospel on one side of a national border and a 
 different or opposite gospel on the other side. In other words, so 
 long as the standards of national justice and international justice 
 are not in consonance but on different levels, and in many respects 
 directly opposed to one another, the security for peace must largely 
 depend upon the doctrine of might. Until the international con¬ 
 science is brought under the majesty of the law, there can be no 
 permanent security for international peace. 
 
 Perhaps the most guiding and impressive contribution that 
 America can make to the world’s peace is the successful experiment 
 and example of its federated union of forty-eight separate common- 
 

 America and the World’s Peace 5 
 
 wealths, which affords to the world a striking illustration that its 
 preservation is due to the fact that behind the right of each one of 
 these commonwealths, the smallest as well as the largest, stands the 
 united might of all. This greatest of all wars, involving directly 
 nearly two-thirds of the population of the world, is a glaring and 
 ghastly evidence that international relationship has to be recon¬ 
 structed, that the plans heretofore devised, of nations standing 
 alone or separating themselves into two or three great divisions 
 under dual or triple alliances and ententes, have lamentably broken 
 down, and instead of lessening the area and the horrors of war, have 
 had the opposite result and drawn nations into war that otherwise 
 would have remained at peace. 
 
 Therefore, the federation or league of all the states in the Amer¬ 
 ican union embodies the ideal, if not the plan, for a universal league 
 or federation of the nations as the surest and safest guarantee for 
 securing the permanent peace of the world. In such a federation 
 power will be needed, not for aggression but to prevent aggression. 
 Power will be needed, not to promote the selfish ends of individual 
 nations but to curb them. Power will be needed, not for making 
 war but for repressing war, for maintaining peace. Power will be 
 needed, not for breaking treaties but for maintaining them; and 
 this power must not be vested in one, but in all the nations. 
 
 \ 
 
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