The Reorganization of a Department of the Government 
 By HON. GEORGE von. L. MEYER 
 
 Secretary of the Navy 
 
 ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT 
 
 The present organization in Washington, which was put into force 
 in the Navy Department in December, 1909, had for its main object 
 the establishment of a system which would enable the Secretary to 
 administer his office efficiently and economically, with the advice of 
 responsible expert advisers, insuring continuity of policy for the 
 future. For this reason the Department was divided into four logical 
 divisions, and for the head of each division an officer was selected 
 who was specially qualified for the duties assigned to him. These 
 divisions, as stated, were four in number, and may be summarized in 
 this way: The Division of Material furnishes the completed ship and 
 supplies her with stores, ready for the personnel. The Division of 
 Personnel then furnishes the officers and men necessary to man the 
 ship. The Division of Operations uses the product thus furnished to 
 perform the duties assigned to the fleet. The Division of Inspections 
 examines the results attained in the various fields of naval activity 
 and reports directly to the Secretary. 
 
 With the assistance of the Aids of these divisions, acting as the eyes 
 and ears of the Secretary, the work accomplished has resulted in 
 economy and efficiency. Economy is shown by the fact that the 
 effective material strength of the navy has been increased without 
 exceeding the current appropriations. Efficiency is shown by the 
 facility with which the business of the Department has been trans¬ 
 acted. 
 
 The navy yard is a military establishment existing solely for mili¬ 
 tary purposes. A part of the work—the largest part, if magnitude 
 be gauged by the amount of money expended—is industrial in its 
 character, but not in its object. 
 
 But yards cannot be scientifically managed to the greatest advan- 
 
 Rcad at the first meeting of the Efficiency Society, held in New York City, March 18 
 and 19, 1912. 
 
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tage so long as the Secretary is hampered by lack of power to use 
 the moneys appropriated to the best advantage. The yards must be 
 organized and managed so as to promote military efficiency, and it is 
 necessary that the yards produce results which will increase the mili¬ 
 tary value of the fleet, for the fleet is the Navy. 
 
 The problem which will have to be met when the canal is com¬ 
 pleted and the fleet is spending six months of the year on the Pacific 
 Ocean is the question of the consolidation of the navy yards. We 
 are at present embarrassed by a superfluous number of navy yards, 
 distributed along the Atlantic coast from Maine to Louisiana. This 
 calls for a vast amount of money to be expended for maintenance, 
 absolutely unnecessary to meet the actual requirements of the fleet. 
 But nothing can be accomplished in the abolition of needless navy 
 yards until public sentiment is aroused to the necessity of it, and 
 until it becomes so evident that local interests will be overcome by 
 public interest in meeting this question on broad, patriotic, business 
 principles. 
 
 Business principles have been applied to the navy, both ashore and 
 afloat, in so far as possible. Radical changes have been made where 
 the efficiency of the yards and ships would allow, and a progressive 
 policy of improvement has been consistently followed throughout this 
 administration. 
 
 stores 
 
 Consolidation of stores, simplification of accounts, separation of 
 the accounting from the shops and its consolidation under one officer, 
 increased accuracy in the reports of the cost of work, all these have 
 had a part in the production of a more economical and a more efficient 
 administration in the navy yards. 
 
 The same principles have been carried to the ships at sea where 
 all stores are under the care of one officer, the general storekeeper 
 of the ship. The different departments have been given a money allot¬ 
 ment for stores, the amount of which is less than the value of the 
 old allowance of stores in kind. 
 
 This consolidation of all supplies and the consequent economy in 
 storeroom space, maintaining one stock of supplies under the custody 
 of one officer, in lieu of five stocks under as many officers; the charg¬ 
 ing to the appropriation concerned, with only such quantities of sup¬ 
 plies as are actually used for the maintenance of each department, 
 and at the time such supplies are drawn for use; the separation of 
 the stock of supplies and the accounting for same, from those actually 
 
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being consumed; the consolidation and simplification of accounts, and 
 the relieving of line officers of a great volume of clerical work which 
 properly formed no part of their technical line duties; all these are 
 changes which have been wrought for economy and efficiency on ship¬ 
 board, and which indicate our policy toward a progressive administra¬ 
 tion, the ultimate aim of which is a high standard of production for 
 an economical outlay of capital. 
 
 GUNNERY 
 
 The principles of scientific management have been known and 
 practiced in the fleet for years. Recently it has been the cause of the 
 wonderful increase in the gunnery efficiency of the navy. 
 
 In the battle practices of recent years the competitive system has 
 given remarkable results. Officers drill and train their crews; every 
 man is carefully selected according to his physical and mental quali¬ 
 fications to do the duties at the gun; some are selected as gun pointers, 
 some as sight setters, and others as loaders and plug-men. Each indi¬ 
 vidual is tried repeatedly to see if he is best suited to the job at 
 hand. The result is that every man at a gun station is the man best 
 suited in every way, physically and temperamentally, for his par¬ 
 ticular duty. 
 
 The study of the time element of certain operations has been go¬ 
 ing on for years, and a marked decrease in the amount of time neces¬ 
 sary to perform these operations has resulted. 
 
 The first step was to make more rapid the work of each individual, 
 making his movements as simple and easy as possible, and making 
 them harmonious, so that there would be no interference. In order 
 to obtain these ends, each individual was first made to go through his 
 work slowly, so that accuracy and perfection of each operation were 
 obtained and unnecessary movements eliminated. This plan not only 
 insured perfection of detail, but unconsciously to himself each man 
 was training his muscles so that they would quickly respond to his 
 call and so that he would suffer the minimum of fatigue. As perfec¬ 
 tion of detail increased, speed was sought for, and each man’s work 
 was carefully timed by stop watch. 
 
 Having trained the muscles and developed the skill of the indi¬ 
 vidual, it became necessary to coordinate the work of the organization 
 as a whole. Exactly the same methods were employed as for the 
 training of the individuals; i. e., each part of the organization slowly 
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and precisely did the part of the work assigned it, and precision and 
 ease of operation were attained. 
 
 Every detail was timed by stop watch; for instance, it required 
 two and one-fifth seconds to open the breech of a 12-inch gun; one- 
 fifth of a second to put in primer; three and two-fifths seconds to 
 ram the projectile; four and one-fifth seconds to ram the powder; 
 three-fifths of a second to withdraw the loading tray, etc. 
 
 It is recognized that no man can work continuously during a long 
 period, especially when under great mental stress, but that each man 
 must have certain periods of rest in order to allow nature to build 
 up what has been torn down. In order to reduce the mental stress 
 to a minimum, drills are held frequently, so that although each man 
 must at all times be alert, the method of the performance of the 
 work becomes an ingrained habit, to a certain degree a second nature 
 with the man, and no conscious effort of the mind is required to per¬ 
 form each operation. The functions of the different members of a 
 turret crew are laid out so that even with the greatest possible rapidity 
 of fire each man must rest during a given part of the operation of 
 loading and firing a gun. For example, the trainer and pointer may 
 rest their eyes while the gun is being loaded, the plugman has no 
 duty to perform while the pointer and trainer are getting on the target 
 before firing, and while the projectile and powder are being loaded 
 into the gun, etc. 
 
 Having attained a high standard of speed in accurate firing of one 
 gun the drills are extended to the whole broadside of ten or twelve 
 turret guns. 
 
 The object sought is well indicated by the opening statement in 
 the “Rules for Battle Practice, 1911,” that “the measure of the battle 
 efficiency of any vessel is her ability to deliver the greatest number of 
 hits in the shortest possible time after the enemy is sighted, and with 
 the least expenditure of ammunition.” 
 
 The value of these methods is obvious. Not only do they serve 
 to attain economically scientific performance of all work done, but, 
 knowing the plans and details of any new vessel, they serve as a very 
 exact guide to the number of men necessary to man and fight her 
 efficiently. 
 
 As a result of practical management, the hitting power of the 
 fleet at long ranges has improved remarkably. 
 
 Conditions have varied from year to year, due to weather experi¬ 
 enced at different practices, changes in target area, and changes in 
 methods used. Within the last two or three years, the target has 
 
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been very much reduced in area, but even with this handicap, in the 
 spring battle practice of 1911 the 12-inch guns doubled the scores 
 made at the practices only six months previous. 
 
 With the improvement in gunnery has also come a marked im¬ 
 provement in preparedness for battle. The rules have been so drawn 
 as to direct thought toward what may be expected in an engagement. 
 Casualties have been simulated and unexpected difficulties have been 
 thrown in the way by the officers controlling the fire, so that they may 
 be able to meet all obstacles. 
 
 The methods for making the “approach” when about to engage 
 in battle have been studied and developed as a result of the various 
 battle plans laid down by the department for the actual firing of the 
 guns. 
 
 None of our vessels are now “smooth-water” ships. The depart¬ 
 ment has demanded that the training should be conducted on the 
 open sea, where the rolling and pitching require the most expert skill 
 on the part of the gunpointers in order to hit the target. Further, it 
 has been assumed that the ships may have to fight in the most unfa¬ 
 vorable weather, and, therefore, the rules for the battle practices have 
 required the ships to train for fighting in rain, snow, and foggy 
 weather, and generally when conditions are most unfavorable and ad¬ 
 verse. For these reasons, the officers and crews are prepared to meet 
 whatever may come up, and the ability to handle successfully the cas¬ 
 ualties that will probably be met in action is one of the most important 
 parts of the training. 
 
 In the competitive battle firing, the conditions are made just as 
 severe as those that would obtain in actual action. The firing vessel 
 has no knowledge of the course, speed, and distance of the target 
 vessel. All the information she has is that somewhere on the horizon, 
 at a distance of 10 miles or more, is a column of smoke which marks 
 the target vessel at which she is to shoot. She steams toward it at 
 her best speed and opens fire at whatever range she chooses; but the 
 value of hitting at long ranges is vitally impressed on her by the 
 amount that is added to or subtracted from her score for the shots 
 that hit beyond 12,000 yards or under that mark. 
 
 The whole firing is over in four minutes and the ship has no other 
 chance to make good, if she fails in this. No excuses are accepted 
 for failure of guns to fire, for breakdowns of any character, or for 
 any faults of the personnel or material. 
 
 As evidence of the value of competition in gunnery, a comparison 
 is made with the fighting efficiency of the vessels during the Spanish- 
 
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American war and at the present writing. The percentage of hits in 
 1898 was 3 y 2 with the large guns firing about once in five minutes at 
 short range. The percentage of hits in the recent firing at the San 
 Marcos was 33 1-3, the range being 10,000 yards and the present rate 
 of firing a single 12-inch gun being about ten shots in five minutes. 
 This rather overestimates the work at Santiago and underestimates 
 the work to-day. A roughly drawn comparison shows that we are 
 about 1,200 times better in gunnery efficiency than we were at 
 Santiago. 
 
 The policy now for the competitive training for battle is that it 
 shall begin on the date of commission, and no excuses are accepted 
 for being unprepared should the department at any time require the 
 ships to fire at a day’s notice. 
 
 ENGINEERING 
 
 All ships in the fleet are now placed on a competitive basis in engi¬ 
 neering. This has resulted in such improved efficiency and economy 
 that the Atlantic fleet, for instance, now burns less coal per knot in 
 steaming at 12 knots than it did at 10 knots’ speed during the much 
 discussed trip around the world. Ships now in almost all cases con¬ 
 tinue to exceed on full power trials their trial trip speed, and with 
 greater economy in coal and oil. 
 
 These results were produced by the most energetic attention to 
 duty, in which losses and wastes were eradicated in boilers, engines, 
 and auxiliaries, as indeed they must be if a ship is to take a creditable 
 stand in the engineering competition. A constant stream of detailed 
 information on design and operation exists between ships and the 
 department and between department and ships, so that officers may 
 readily benefit by the experience of others; that good organization 
 and sound practices may become standardized, and that methods of 
 doubtful expediency may be brought under widespread discussion. 
 
 That such interest in engineering matters would result in a gen¬ 
 eral desire on the part of officers for more complete engineering edu¬ 
 cation was easily foreseen. The establishment of the School of Marine 
 Engineering at Annapolis, as a post-graduate course, in collaboration 
 with the Engineering Experiment Station at that place, opened up 
 this avenue, and met with instant recognition from the service. This 
 school, only three years old, has already proved its value, and its 
 bearing on engineering efficiency is assured. Aside from its educa- 
 
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tional value, the Engineering Experiment Station, also at Annapolis, 
 has resulted in large economies. 
 
 Nor is the practical engineering education of the enlisted force 
 forgotten, there being schools for machinists and coppersmiths at 
 Charleston, S. C., and at San Francisco, an oil-fuel burning test plant 
 and school at Philadelphia, and an electrical and a radio-telegraph 
 school at New York. 
 
 Repair initiative, resulting in a vessel’s self-sustaining qualification, 
 has received great impetus during the last few years. Ships will never 
 be entirely self-sustaining, this being limited both by necessary lack 
 of large repair facilities and by the short periods of time possible to 
 allow for repairs and alterations. Large savings in time and money in 
 repair work are now the order of the day, and ships undertake their 
 own repairs as a matter of pride and as a matter of course. The 
 well-known resourcefulness of the American mechanic is a large ele¬ 
 ment in this. 
 
 The United States Navy has every reason to be encouraged by its 
 engineering prospects, and to feel assured that it is on the right track 
 to efficiency. The duties and responsibilities of line and engineer offi¬ 
 cers, brought about by the amalgamation enactment in 1899, which 
 caused such wide comment and doubt in the naval world, at home 
 and abroad, are accepted in our navy with enthusiasm. Already its 
 results are said to be 25 per cent, better, measured in fuel economy, 
 than those of one of the large navies; and in our own Navy conditions 
 have greatly improved, and, furthermore, are constantly improving. 
 That we are not distinctly in first place in advancement is probably 
 traceable at present to our present national tendency to be behind in 
 experimental and research work, in which the Germans notably lead; 
 but that this feature is receiving attention by the whole country is 
 well known, and great improvements along this line may be confi¬ 
 dently expected. 
 
 MODERN MANAGEMENT AND EFFICIENCY 
 
 So-called scientific management is an evolution and not an inven¬ 
 tion. The pressure of competition and the growth of large corpora¬ 
 tions has forced a scientific examination of all business methods, and 
 naturally we have certain acknowledged experts in modern manage¬ 
 ment who are fully acquainted with the theory, and some of the prac¬ 
 tice, of methods necessary to produce both economy and efficiency in 
 many branches of modern business. 
 
 There are two portions of the theory that are essentially new: 
 
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the formation of a thinking or planning branch in the administrative 
 body, one that advises and does not execute; and second, the direct 
 instruction of the workman through each motion that makes up his 
 daily work. 
 
 The formation of a staff that advises but does not execute was 
 first worked out in the armies of the world, and the German general 
 staff is an example of it in the highest state of efficiency. The fail¬ 
 ures of this principle can generally be traced to attempts to combine 
 staff and executive functions. 
 
 I have endeavored to create such a branch in the navy department 
 at Washington by taking four experienced officers as aids to advise 
 me in questions of administration of the fleet, of the personnel, of 
 the material, and of inspection, the four natural divisions of the mili¬ 
 tary work of the department. 
 
 The aids plan and advise me, and the approved plans are executed 
 by the commanders of the fleet and the chiefs of the several bureaus. 
 
 The second portion of modern scientific management is the in¬ 
 struction of the men so as to save unnecessary work and promote effi¬ 
 ciency after a careful consideration of the operations performed by 
 the mechanic rather than leaving each mechanic to use his special 
 tools as developed by his own skill from inherited knowledge. This, 
 with the bonus system for good work, I found had already been 
 adopted in the fleet. The planning board was represented by the 
 director of target practice and engineering competitions, and the men 
 were carefully selected in accordance with the requirements of their 
 work, and all unnecessary motions were eliminated. The work in 
 turrets and in engine and fire rooms was scientifically studied, and 
 increased efficiency resulted. 
 
 A board of scientific management experts, on visiting the fleet, 
 stated that the battleships were the finest examples of scientific effi¬ 
 ciency that they had ever seen. 
 
 The adoption of like plans in the navy yards presents many diffi¬ 
 culties. The nature of the work there is largely repair work and the 
 time of completion may be at times more important than the cost of 
 the work. I have given and am giving the problem much considera¬ 
 tion, and the yards will eventually be brought to as high a state of 
 efficiency as is consistent with military necessities. 
 
 To further this, I visited England, primarily for the purpose of 
 examining into the systems of organization and methods employed in 
 the English dockyards and in the leading shipbuilding establishments 
 of Great Britain. 
 
 8-8 
 
I found at the works of Messrs. Vickers, Limited, at Barrow-in- 
 Furness, a most efficient and simple system of management, contain¬ 
 ing a hull division and a machinery division. 
 
 The greatest percentage of increased efficiency seemed to have 
 been attained by broad effects in systematization and in securing the 
 cheerful cooperation of workmen toward best results, through proper 
 recognition of their initiative and more efficient effort. In order to 
 obtain still greater coordination, I have appointed a director of navy 
 yards to advise me on all such questions. 
 
 The present practice of giving seagoing officers experience at navy 
 yards and in shops aids materially in keeping the vessels of the fleet 
 ready for action, for this experience enables them to make repairs to 
 machinery, etc., with the ship’s force, and thus keep ships away from 
 the yards, except for the larger repairs. This principle of giving offi¬ 
 cers shop experience in navy yards on the machinery they care for 
 and keep in repair at sea is of great importance, because in time of 
 actual war ships must be kept on the battle line and kept in working 
 order by their own officers and men. No battleship can then be spared 
 from the fleet. 
 
 '‘Economy” is a much-abused word; it is often used as a synonym 
 for “parsimony”; light expenditures are frequently called “economical 
 expenditures.” No idea could be further from the truth. True 
 economy is almost synonymous with efficiency. 
 
 The closer competition of modern business forces scientific man¬ 
 agement on all who would not be left behind in the race. The em¬ 
 ployers must submit to greater overhead charges for the sake of in¬ 
 creased economy in other directions, and they must deal fairly with 
 their men in the matter of a bonus for extra work accomplished; and 
 the employees must agree to give up their claim that all of a like rate 
 in the same trade must receive equal compensation. 
 
 In conclusion, I desire to quote from a preliminary report of the 
 Committee on Labor of the House of Representatives, made June 24, 
 1911, which says, in part: 
 
 “If energy is wasted in any form in our industries or in any of the 
 departments of the Government, the elimination of the conditions 
 producing the waste would be beneficial alike to employer and em¬ 
 ployee, to the Government and to the people. Their elimination would 
 have the same effect as the introduction of a labor-saving device. 
 No protest has been received from any source against the elimination 
 of wasted energy.” 
 
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