m.'^ mM I E) RARY OF THE U N 1VER5ITY or ILLl NOIS /i ON THE LAWS RELATING PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN. ARTHUR HOBHOITSE Q.C. (A Paper read at the. SocM Science Congress, Birmingham, October, 1868, MANCHESTER: ALEXANDER IRELAND & CO, 1870. THE PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN. THE thesis on which I have been requested to read a paper Nature of the to this assembly is, "Whether it is desirable to amend ^^"^^^^^.^^^^^ the present law, which gives the personal propei-ty and earnings altering the of a wife to her husband :" and I need hardly say that I am " about to maintain the affirmative of the question. To my mind it is abundantly clear that there should be an alteration of the law under discussion. But it must not be forgotten that we are speaking of a law probably coeval with the very beginnings of English society ; part of the common law, whose origin is lost in the darkness of antiquity, and which has been handed down to us as part and parcel of the institutions that have helped to preserve our liberties and to form our national character ; a law, moreover, that relates to the most necessary and sacred of all connexions, the union of man and wife, the root of the family, the origin and rudiment of all social stability and progress. No wonder if by all who are timid, by all who are superstitious, by the majoiity of those who obey sentiment rather than reason, and by many who possess a large share of reason and judgment, any alteration of such a law is regarded, accDrding to the character of the mind, with fear, with horror, with disgust, or with calm disapproval. It is of no use to dis- guise or to extenuate the difficulties which meet a reformer on the very threshold of such a subject as this. Again, I freely admit that upon those who ask for the alteration of any law lies the burthen of showing that it pro- duces mischief, and that the proposed novelty is likely to be more beneficial. The more venerable and ancient the law, the more widely ramified it is, the more closely it is connected with the deep foundations of society, the clearer and stronger should be the case shown for a change. Such is the burthen I now propose to discharge. And it will, I think, be found not only that there is a clear mischief to be remedied, not only is the remedy free from all reasonable apprehensions of evil, but that the importance of the law itself vanishes under closer examination ; that the law which is complained of, and which it is proposed to alter, is no essential part of the conjugal relation ; that it is an accident, an out- growth which changes of outward circumstances have swollen into unhealthy proportions ; that its removal will leave the substantial fabric of the marriage tie not merely unshaken, but strengthened. Definition of The first step is to place clearly before our eyes the nature the lawwhich ^^^ extent of the law which we desire to alter. Alarm and lion. prejudice are created by the idea that the general relations between husband and wife are struck at. That is not so. The thing struck at is the law which gives the property of the wife to the husband ; that is the common law, or the ancient customary traditional law of England. You must not suppose that this is the entire English law on the subject. The law is made up of ancient unwritten traditions, called the Common Law ; of other unwritten traditions introduced in more recent times by the Chancellors and called Equity, and of written statutes. It is only with the first of these departments, i.e., the common law, that we are dealing. For you will find, and I shall rely upon it very strongly in argument, that the Chancellors have made large encroachments on the domain of common law in this direction. What then says the common law ? First hear one of its greatest oracles. Lord Coke. " Marriage is an absolute gift by the wife of all chattels personals in possession in her own right, whether the husband survive the wife or no." (Go. Lit., 351 h.) And "if a man taketh to wife a woman seised in fee he gaineth by the inter- marriage an estate of freehold in her right." (Co. Lit., 351 a.) Now add to this that by a technicality peculiar to the English law all leasehold interests in land are of the nature of chattels personal, and it will be seen how unequally the law operates. For the wife obtains no interest in the husband's personal property. In his freehold property she has by common law wl^at is called her dower, i.e., if she survives him, a life I k interest in one-third of that property ; and even of that interest he can, under recent legislation, deprive her at his pleasure. If I were writing a legal treatise it would be necessary to introduce some modifications which are too trifling and tech- nical to find place here. I may state the common law as varied by the statute of dower with sufficient accuracy for the present purpose, by saying that, with the exception that he cannot make away with her freehold lands beyond the term of his own life, the husband has absolute dominion over all that property which, were the wife single, would be hers; and that he retains absolute dominion over all that was previously his own. That is the law which I desire to alter. I am not going to consume much time in arguing about Question of the abstract justice of such a bargain. Probably all of us have ^^^^.^^^^ lately read with interest an argument by an eloquent lady to prove the natural equality of the sexes of mankind. I pass by that question entirely. I will assume, with that lady's opponents, who, be it observed, are the same class of thinkers that oppose any alteration of the law of property, that men in general are superior to women in general in moral and intel- lectual, as they are in muscular, force. Let us say that they have stronger bodies, stronger understandings, and stronger wills. Should the law then, on this account, throw all its protection round the stronger party at the expense of the weaker ] Those who insist most eagerly on the superior strength of men ought to feel most keenly the inequality of the law. It is idle to say that it ought to be left to the stronger to act for the common interests of the two. As long as their interests are really in common no question will arise, whatever the state of the law may be. But it cannot be denied that, in point of fact, the interests of many married couples do, in many cases, diverge. I want to know why, in such cases, the whole weight of the law should, so far as regards property, be on the side of the one who already has enormous practical advantages by reason of his superior strength. If we are to discuss the question as an abstract one, I have a right to press the argument at least thus far against all opponents, that the law being plainly and on the face of it unequal, they are bound to show why this inequality is not also injustice. If the^ say that the parties to the bargain are 6 Thia argument rests on an appeal to facts First class of facts. Marriage Settlements, Second class of facts. Operation of the Court of Chancery, unequal in personal characteristics, I reply that the personal inequality does not remove the injustice, but aggravates it. But, after all, the discussion of questions of abstract justice is always unsatisfactory, because the canons by which people decide such questions differ very widely. I prefer to appeal to facts ; and 1 now ask not what is the abstract justice or abstract expediency of the case, but what do people in this country practically believe to be just and expedient in the particular instances affecting themselves 1 Bearing on this question, we find two broad and significant classes of phenomena. First, we find that persons on the eve of marriage make special contracts about their property in every case in which they have property enough to bear the expense of the proceeding, and in which tlie marriage is a deliberate open step taken with the assent and advice of their friends j and, moreover, that these special contracts invariably set aside the rules of the common law by giving to the wife large powers over property which that law would vest entirely in the husband. Why do they do this 1 If the law is good, that the husband, being the stronger, should be complete master over the whole property of both, why do the wife's friends always force him, and his wife too, to forego the benefit of that law 1 Of the thousands of marriage settlements which are made every year, every one bears conclusive testimony that the parties to it believe that the rule of the common law is not just or expedient. Bemember, I am not saying that this universal practice proves of itself that the lav/ is bad : what it proves is that the large class who make marriage settlements think the law bad. This is the first class of phenomena ; now for the second. I mentioned before that the law is made up partly of the unwritten traditions of the Courts of Chancery, which we call Equity. As property increased, and its arrangements became more complicated, the old simple rules and maxims of the common law were found insufficient for the questions which pressed for solution, and large provinces of human transactions were in effect' outlawed. Hence arose, by steps not easy to trace, the jurisdiction of the Chancellors, who were men of much greater range of knowledge than the Common Law Judges. The knowledge of the latter was confined to the old English and Norman rules, which sufficed for the simj^ler state of society that had passed away ; while the Chancellors, who, before the Reformation, were usually Ecclesiastics, had a know- ledge of the later Roman law — a law framed for, and suited to, a complex ^nd civilized society. Gradually a very large portion of transactions relating to property fell under the jurisdiction of Chancery, which, as to many important matters, reversed the rules of the common law. And it may be stated with truth that whenever such conflict of jurisprudence took place, the Court of Chancery was abrogating an antiquated and barbarous law, and substituting for it a civilized one adapted to the wants of a wealthy and active community. Now, there are few departments of common law more encroached on by the Court of Chancery than that which regulates the property of husband and wife. In the first place, the ordinary marriage settlement could not operate but for the Court of Chancery ; for the wife takes property through the medium of trustees, and trusts are invisible to, and unknown by, courts of law, but are enforced in Chancery. In the second place, the Court of Chancery recognised the validity of contracts between husband and wife ; and made him a trustee of property for his wife if he was bound by express contract or by circumstances to be such. In the thii-d place, the Court refused to give the husband any assistance towards recovering the wife's property in the hands of a third person, without giving her the opportunity of claiming to have it settled for the benefit of herself and her children. And it allowed wives to institute suits for the purpose of asserting this claim with respect to all property accrued to them and outstanding in the hands of third persons. This is called the wife's equity to a settlement. We have, then, the testimony of the most enlightened English lawyers, of those who adapted the law to the progress of events, and made it tolerable by a civilised community, that the common law rale of giving all the wife's property to the husband is a bad rule, to be violated whenever there is property enough to admit of the intervention: of trustees, or of the Court of Chancery itself. wives. Changes of There is also this to be observed, that the rule against stances have^' ^^^^^^^ *^^® richer classes and the Court of Chancery have made the entered such practical protests, was not for centuries after its common law , ■, -,• i , • i i -it bear more establishment SO onerous as social and economical changes ^i^l"^ °^ afterwards made it. In our early history, leaseholds for years did not exist, and personal chattels were almost confined to flocks and herds, household goods, and such like perishable commodities. But it is with respect to personal chattels that the common law bears so hardly on the wife ; with respect to freehold property — in early times the great bulk of property — it is better, though still admitting of improvement. Question Having thus shown what is that common law whick should whether the j^g altered, and how it is set aside by the wealthier classes and nnmrnrvTi laW " common actually works the Court of Chancery, I pass to the most important question of all. Have we evidence that the common law works ill ? If not, we need not trouble ourselves to alter it. There is plenty of work to be done in the world before we need occupy our time and strength in clearing away mere eyesores and anomalies. I intimated before that the existence of a private practice contrary to the law demonstrates nothing positive as to the nature of the law itself, but only that certain persons think it ill-adapted to their case. The practice of the Chancery lawyers is a more general expression of the same opinion, for they apply their doctrines to all cases falling within their power. But the question of questions is this, whether there is evidence that rich people and Chancery lawyers are right in thinking that the common law works ill. The evidence ^ wish, for the honour of human nature, that this question proves that it could be answered in the neojative. I wish it could be shown does. ° that those who have departed from the common law have done so in the mere pride of their hearts, or wantonness of their fancies. But that cannot be. I will not dwell on my own very limited knowledge beyond observing, that it is rare to find a person who does not know at least one case of hardship and wrong directly traceable to the rule of law. But full evidence has now been taken before the late parliamentary committee. Witnesses have been examined who have the fullest opportunities of seeing from different points of view and in different places the domestic life of the poorer classes, and the working on a large scale of the rules which govern it. Two witnesses are clergymen in charge of populous London parishes, one is a London police magistrate, one the clerk of the Liverpool magistrates, one a lady acting as district visitor in Belfast, one a manufacturer employing female labour largely in Nottingham. They all unite in saying that the law works visible mischief; they tell ils tales of wives plundered by worthless and dissipated husbands, of their inability to obtain payment of legacies due to them, because the executors are afraid of the husbands' legal rights, of their savings being drawn from the places of deposit, of their furniture, and even their clothes, being taken to provide for their husbands' sensual enjoyments. And the Jaw protects and encourages him in all this ! The selfish, hardened man may console himself by reflecting that he is only doing what he will with his own ; the timid, cowed wife is still further disheartened by knowing that her husband is within his legal right. It may indeed be true that, to some very far advanced in The visible brutality and lawlessness, the fact of the propei-ty belonging to ^^'^ ^J"? the wife would make no difierence ; they might still take it the law. by force though not their own. But independently of the circumstances that the wife could, and often would, protect her ])roperty, if really made hers, from any husband, it cannot be and is not true that the majority of men, though self-indulgent and cruel in their selfishness, would I not be slower to take what is not legally their own than they are to take what is. It must be that the wife would be inspi- rited and the husband discouraged if the support of the law were shifted from the stronger side to the weaker. With every disposition to pay respect to the views of oppo- nents, I confess to a difficulty in extending that toleration to the suggestion that the evils complained of are the result, not of the law, bat of the incurable vice of husbands. Doubtless there are bad husbands, as there are bad wives ; and they all wrong their consorts by wasting property and in other ways. And it may be true that there is no social phenomenon for which one single cause alone can be assigned. But if we have a system from which certain effects may be expected, and we ffind those effects in abundance, it is mere perversity to argue fthat the effects are not the fruits of the system, but of some- [thing else. We all know that arbitrary power is liable to be 10 abused ; we give arbitrary and plenary power to liusbands over their wives' property ; we find a substantial number of them grossly misusing that property ; what sense is there then in attributing the misuse to any cause but the possession of the power 1 White men have a tendency to despise negroes, and will probably to some extent misuse them when strong enough ; but what would be thought of the man who should argue that the cruelties and indignities commonly heaped upon negro slaves by bad masters were not the result of the slave laws, but of the inherent relations between white men and black 1 It is beyond controversy that evil not only exists under the law, but flows directly and visibly from the law. In fact, we What then are the facts that we have before us 'i On one^forrich^'*^' *^® ^^® ^^^® ^® hsive a law working in one direction and giving and one for the woman's property to the man. On the other side we have another law and a right of private contract, unlimited in principle, in practice limited by the amount of property, both working in the contrary direction, and setting up the woman as independent of the man. We have two laws warring with one another. Moreover, the dividing line between them is the dividing line between rich and poor. The poor cannot afford the costly luxury of marriage settlements, and the operations of the Court of Chancery are in the upper air, far above their heads. But can this be right ? Can it be well to have two contradictory laws, one for the rich and the other for the poor? If the gifts of the wife's property to the husband be an indispensable part of the marriage contract, the practice of the wealthier classes and of the Court of Chancery is wrong, and should be forbidden ; if that practice is right, then the common law is wrong. Conclusion in That there should be some change then appears to me to change,^^ admit of demonstration. It only remains to decide in which direction the change shall be. And here it is difficult to doubt when the case is once understood. On the common law grave and mischievous consequences are affiliated ; of the opposite law there is no complaint, and the classes who enjoy it have now for a very long series of years shown a steady disposition, not to relax, but to extend its operation. Unless, therefore, there is some objection not included in the scope of the foregoing observations, the conclusion is irresistible, that the portion of 11 the law wLich ought to be altered is that law which gives to the husband the property of the wife. And this leads me to the consideration of the various objec- Wives should tions which are made to the alteration proposed : a consideration become abso- . . lute owners of which the time allotted to me will render much more cursory property. than I could wish. But before dealing with them, I will make one remark which may save some misapprehension. The pre- cise nature of the change to be made is not the thesis before the meeting, and it would be a misuse of your valuable time if I were to go into it. But I have dwelt so much in argu- ment on settlements made by contract and by the Court of Chancery, that it might be suj^posed I aim at settling all pro- perties in the same way. That is not so. I think that the system of settlements has worked great good, as between husband and wife, because it has more or less abrogated the bad rule of the common law. But as between husband and wife on the one side, and more remote interests on the other, I doubt the wisdom of the ordinary settlements ; and at all events they are wholly inapplicable to small properties and to earnings. Without arguing the matter in any detail, I say that those arrangements of property seem to me the best which leave each adult generation freest to deal with it, and that the best change in this case is the shortest and the simplest, viz., to make married women, in the absence of contract, free and absolute owners of their own property. That objections should spring up to such a change as we are objections discussing is a matter of course. As in this world we have considered, nothing good without its defects, so we have no bad thing without its good points. Partly from this cause, partly from the pervading habit of confounding that to which we are accustomed with the eternal principles of right, partly from indolence and fear of the unknown, there is nothing esta- blished for which reasons are not found. I have not had the advantage of seeing any detailed or mebhodical statement of the objections to altering the law. Such as I state here I have picked up partly from newspaper articles, partly from the line of examination adopted in com- mittee by those hostile to the pending Bill. I must take what I have found j and I will give a specific answer to each, premising, however, that there is one general, and as I think conclusive, answer to them all. 12 1. That wives First, it is said that if married women liave property they might go to must be responsible for debts, must be liable to lawsuits and prison. -^ , ' to imprisonment, and it is asked with some triumph whether it w^ould be good for a family that the mother should go to gaol. The answer is obvious. Imprisonment ^;