SIGNIFICANT TENDENCIES IN RECENT STATE ADMINISTRATIVE 
 
 REORGANIZATION 
 
 BY 
 
 WILLIAM CORNELL CASEY 
 
 A. B. The James Millikin University, 1916 
 
 THESIS 
 
 SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
 FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL 
 SCIENCE IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
 OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, 
 
 1922 
 
 URBANA, ILLINOIS 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CL 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 
 
 THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
 
 1 HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY 
 
 BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR 
 
 Recommendation concurred in* 
 
 Committee 
 
 on 
 
 Final Examination* 
 
 \ 
 
 •Required for doctor’s degree but not for master's 
 
 / ' -! o O. O 1 
 4 • i>'o «./* 
 

 
 Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2016 
 
 https://archive.org/details/significanttendeOOcase 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 I-Introduction 
 
 II-Messages of the Governors 
 
 III-fteports of the Efficiency 
 and Economy Commissions 
 
 IV-Seseion Laws 
 
 V-Conclusions 
 
1 
 
 JF INTRODUCTION 
 
 To one who has elected to examine the almost interminable bibliogra- 
 phy of state administrative reorganization in the United States, there comes 
 a conviction that any additional pages of his must carry their own justifica- 
 tion in a distinct and novel purpose. On the other hand the voluminous char- 
 acter of these sources carries its own opportunity. From the numerous propos- 
 sals and counter proposals representing divergent views, and for the most 
 part confirmed by a variety of legislative acts as various as the common- 
 wealths which formulated them, there comes the inevitable question: Is this 
 
 administrative readjustment a random experimentation, or are fundamental prin- 
 ciples at work beneath it all— and if so, whither are they leading? 
 
 I have three convictions as to the chief purposes in any study of ad- 
 ministrative reorganization: 
 
 (1) That it should endeavor to determine either 
 the presence or absence, or the force or neg- 
 ligible qualities of certain discoverable 
 causes. Such a study would be valuable, even 
 though it should disclose no such causes; for 
 the variations, themselves, arising out of 
 random experimenting in some thirty-eight 
 commonwealths should serve the purpose in the 
 science of politics they serve in any science 
 in which the workable and desirable variations 
 are selected and propagated. 
 
 (2) That it should endeavor to determine with 
 

 
 
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reasonable preciseness these causes. 
 
 (3) That these causes are to be determined pri- 
 marily by a comparative study of a wide 
 range of specific particulars in accordance 
 with a few basic standards of appraisement. 
 
 I am aware of the healthy pessimism about such orderly processes which 
 these convictions imply in things political. Herbert Spencer's deduction 
 that a large proportion of th6 acts of Parliament have results, different 
 from those intended, has force to-day as when he wrote it. Even Thomas's 
 conviction that social and political evolution, rather than proceeding from 
 events designed, has been but a series of adjustments to crises as they 
 have arisen may be said to hold true in the political field more certainly 
 and for a longer time than in any other. But the circumstances surrounding 
 state administrative reorganization in the commonwealths, on the whole, are 
 novel in this respect: they represent a larger degree of expert investiga- 
 
 tion, analysis, classification, and application of findings by specialists 
 than that which generally characterizes readjustments •*> augmented in the 
 American commonwealths by the tangible, technical character of the results 
 which can be observed in the several commonwealths, and the opportunity for 
 a friendly exchange of findings by interested agencies in easy proximity. 
 
 In a word, I think it can be reasonably determined whether administra- 
 tive reorganization in the United States is distinctly cumulative, whether 
 the best features worthy of survival are to be found in the piecemeal re- 
 organization acts of 1921 in purer form than in the administrative codes, 
 say, enacted in the first flush of wholesale reorganization. Even were this 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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 not true, a study of tendencies in this field would be valuable though it 
 did nothing more than point out in what particulars the findings of special- 
 ists were disregarded in recent reorganization measures, to what extent, and 
 why* 
 
 The method back of this paper is purely inductive. I began with the 
 particulars of reorganization as found in the three chief sources: governors' 
 messages, investigations and reports of efficiency and economy commissions, 
 and the statutes themselves. My conclusions followed rather than preceded 
 this study. I should confess, however, to a leaning toward a policy of 
 piecemeal, gradual reorganization. But I should point cut also that such 
 a bias on my part tended to be offset by an opposite one in those advocates 
 of a more complete reorganization who often passed over very excellent fea- 
 tures and significant tendencies in piecemeal acts with some such criticism 
 as this of recent California legislation. "What was done in California in 
 1921 amounted to little more than a somewhat elaborate attempt to seem to 
 do something without doing it. So far as they go, the changes are in the 
 right direction, but they cover only a few services and make no drastic 
 changes as to these. A situation which demanded a radical operation has 
 been treated with a poultice."* To go behind such a criticism and others 
 like it in an endeavor to discover tendencies which when viewed in the 
 light of a general movement become extremely significant, represents the 
 method of this paper. It is, in other words, a search for those signif- 
 icant tendencies in recent state administrative reorganization which may 
 reveal certain fundamental principles or standards for the purpose of ap- 
 praisement. 
 
 1 Thomas H. Reed, "Administrative Consolidation in California," The 
 
 American Political Science Review , November, 1921. 
 

 
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 Take the writings of those executive agents themselves, the governors of 
 the commonwealths. It seems there is no one message nor group of them for any 
 single year which taken by itself could be said adequately to indicate these 
 fundamental principles or standards. Certainly Governor Brown of New Hamp- 
 shire in his message of 1921 gave little indication of such principles when 
 he said: M The departments are efficient and the institutions well managed. 
 
 I do not for the moment recommend any changes in their organization." Nor 
 was there any evidence of these principles in the action of Governor Miller 
 of New York who vetoed in 1921 a seemingly admirable consolidation plan. On 
 the other hand, there do seem to be evidences of certain principles at work 
 in the examples of those intrepid executives of Ohio, and Washington, who, 
 in the same year following the precedent set by the governors of Illinois, 
 Idaho, and Nebraska, belied any charge of executive complancy toward exist- 
 ing arrangements by the relatively sweeping administrative reorganization 
 acts they forced through. To a less emphatic degree, though not to be 
 underestimated, there is the example, finally, of those more conservative 
 governors of California, Pennsylvania, Missouri, Michigan, and Minnesota 
 whose piecemeal recommendations are even more comprehensive and effective 
 in the conspicuous features of reorganizations they bring about. 
 
 Take the recommendations of those expert commissions on efficiency and 
 economy in more than half the commonwealths who are utilizing them. What do 
 they show? What considerations shaped their proposals which the surface 
 variations do not reveal? If order and direction in administrative reorgani- 
 zation are to be found at all, is it reasonable to expect in these a consist- 
 ency of findings which will point the way? 
 
 And what of the legislative acts themselves? Varying as they do in 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 the score or more commonwealths where administrative systems have been mod- 
 ified in whole or in part, are there here, too, common principles at work 
 molding the course of events? In other words, is current administrative re- 
 organization in the American commonwealths a piecemeal, haphazard process, 
 or is it orderly, consistent, progressive— a movement which can be gauged, 
 whose causes can be discovered, whose bearings determined, and whose general 
 direction with reasonable certainty predicted? 
 
 following these general considerations, the paper fails into four parts: 
 Recent tendencies as revealed in 
 
 I- Mes sages of the Governors 
 
 II- Inveatigations and Reports of Efficiency and 
 Economy Commissions 
 
 III- Session Laws of the Commonwealths 
 
 IV- Conclusions 
 
 Since the search for tendencies called for a comparative method in point 
 of time as well as in the nature of the proposals themselves, I classified as 
 recent, those sources: governors' messages, reports of commissions, and ses- 
 
 sion laws issued since 1917. I endeavored to consult every such source as it 
 related to the general subjeot of administrative reorganization* In those 
 sources appearing before 1917, I felt that a study of a limited number of 
 type sources would serve the purpose of setting up a comparative basis* In 
 a series of exhibits or tabulations at the end, I am including detailed sur- 
 veys of findings. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
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 II-MESSAGES OF THE GOVERNORS 
 
 1 . 
 
 1. When Governor Cox in hie message of 1921 to the General Court of Massa- 
 chusetts recalled that twenty years before one of his predecessors had pre- 
 dicted a state tax of $2,000,000 unless strictest economy were practiced, 
 and then contrasted with that prediction the budget of $38,760,000 in the 
 first year of his own term,** he put his finger on an emergency which a decade 
 before had set in motion the first agencies for reorganization of the admin- 
 istrative departments of the American commonwealths. In other words, the 
 problem confronting the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1921 was 
 
 (1) A phenomenal increase in state expenditures 
 
 (2) A program of gradual assumption of new func- 
 tions which had definitely committed the 
 commonwealth to this unparalleled increase* 
 
 (3) The necessity of adjusting a relatively sta- 
 tionary income to the increased outgo* 
 
 (4) A correlation and effective supervision over 
 
 all departments of spending agencies before 
 
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 such adjustment would be possible. 
 
 What was true of Massachusetts in 1921 the messages of that year would 
 indicate to be true of the commonwealths quite generally, in that the same 
 
 1 pp. 5,6. 
 
 2 Governor Groesbeck of Michigan, 1921, reports that the taxes for 
 1919 and 1920 were almost double the highest amount ever previous- 
 ly collected for state purposes and yet a deficit of approximately 
 six million dollars remained at the close of the year 1920* He 
 points out that the capital outlay requests for 1922 alone (includ- 
 ing purchase of lands, new buildings, and equipment) will exceed 
 the total state tax for the year 1920. pp. 5, 6. 
 

 
 
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stress on fiscal arrangements appeared in the executive messages of thirty- 
 
 five of them. ^ It became the governors' problem of the first instance. Or 
 
 as Walter *’• Dodd, writing in the August, 1921, number of the Journal of the 
 
 American Bar Association states it: "The problems of state administrative 
 
 reorganisation are the most pressing ones in the field of state government, 
 
 for the administrative organization is the permanent machinery for doing the 
 
 state's work, and through the executive department the bulk of state expendi- 
 4 
 
 turee is made." 
 
 be it to the credit of the governors, that although working under the 
 classic limitations of state executive departments: short terms, a disin- 
 
 tegrated and decentralized administrative personnel, and relatively negative 
 relations with the legislative department, they have quite generally recog- 
 nized the problem and risen to it. During the legislative sessions of 1919 
 and 1921, governors in all but four of the commonwealths had attacked the 
 problem of reorganization. ^ General recommendations in this direction were 
 made by the governors of Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, 
 and Texas. In each of these states an efficiency and economy commission re- 
 port had previously been submitted. The governors of Maryland, Minnesota, 
 Nebraska, Ohio, and Washington in 1921 recommended administrative codes. Effi- 
 ciency and economy commissions were suggested in Connecticut, Florida, South 
 Dakota, and Virginia in the same year, while the governors of Delaware, Mas- 
 
 Governor Lake of Connecticut, 1921, submitted the following table 
 summarising the finances of the state for each year since 1917: 
 
 
 Expenditures 
 
 Receipts 
 
 Net Debt 
 
 1918 
 
 112,603,034.23 
 
 $15,189,326.87 
 
 $593,572.29 
 
 1919 
 
 10,179,605.47 
 
 8,014, 463. 55 
 
 798,959.71 
 
 1920 
 
 19,374,856.66 
 
 15,090,167.85 
 
 4,627,742.52 
 
 1921 
 
 
 Est . 
 
 6,500,000.00 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 sachusetts, and South Carolina transmitted reports of similar commissions 
 with recommendations for immediate adoption. The increasing concern of the 
 governors is indicated further in the message of the off year of 1922, which 
 call attention to the problem of reorganization in Maryland, New York, South 
 Carolina, and Virginia. 6 From this brief survey two facts stand out: 
 
 (1) The governors* efforts in the direction of 
 reorganization in one form or another have 
 extended to all but four of the commonwealths. 
 
 (2) The movement as evidenced in the recommenda- 
 tions was not confined to any one section: 
 witness the proposals for complete reorganiza- 
 tion in Maryland, Minnesota, Ohio, and Washing- 
 ton in 1921. 
 
 2, Another significant fact about the governors' messages in general seems 
 to be more and more a tendency on the part of the governor to assume the 
 positive role in suggesting changes. "Far more urgent than any other step 
 which might be taken towards economy and efficiency** said Governor Mabey in 
 1921 to the Utah legislature, **is the reorganization of your state adminis- 
 trative system. Zn the beginning the basic principle upon which the repub- 
 lic was founded was the preservation of order and the liberties of the peo- 
 ple through a balance between the executive, the legislative, and the judi- 
 
 3 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
 Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Mains, Mary- 
 land, Massachussetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, 
 Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North 
 Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
 South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming. 
 
 4 pp. 406, 407. 
 
 5 Kentucky, Louisiana, New Mexico, Tennessee. 
 

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 ci&l departments. As the country developed and life became more complex, 
 through discovery and invention, new burdens were cast upon the state. To 
 discharge these burdens, boards, bureaus, and commissions were created. 
 
 Since these bodies came into existence to suit certain definite needs, there 
 was little likelihood of any coordination of effort or unity of purpose. The 
 result was confusion, absurdity, chaos, duplication, overlapping of duties, 
 and division of responsibility. Utah is no exception to this rule. In the 
 twenty-four years since statehood, administrative agencies have multiplied 
 in bewildering confusion, until to-day there are more than forty of them. 
 
 They have been ushered into existence for every conceivable purpose, with 
 little thought as to the effect of their individual operation might have up- 
 on the state government as a whole. The evils following such a loose system 
 are apparent. Where there should be harmony, there is discord; where there 
 should be efficiency, there is incapacity and a slowing down of the machin- 
 ery of government. *rom the standpoint of economy, the situation is still 
 more vicious. Duplication is always expensive. It becomes more so when its 
 ramifications extend into every form of etate endeavor. What would seem 
 childish in a corporate body, through long practice has become a fixed and 
 almost uncriticised habit with ue. The sending of one man into a town to 
 visit a barber shop, while another may visit the same place the very same 
 day to look into the sanitary conditions of a hotel, is a case in point* A 
 solution of our difficulties can be found without radical changes in our pres- 
 ent administrative form. We have the machinery, what we need is a rearrange- 
 ment of it. Thia can be done by three simple operations. In the first place, 
 
 6 See Chart A of the Appendix 
 

 
 
 
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 those boards and commissions that are similar in function should be consol- 
 idated; secondly, there should be a definite fixed responsibility upon those 
 who preside over departments; and thirdly, the chief executive should be em- 
 
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 powered to exercise a more direct supervisory control. Governor Groesbeck 
 in 1921 addressed the Michigan legislature in this wise: "One of the first 
 things we should undertake is the correction of existing defects in our 
 state government. This can be accomplished only through revision of some of 
 our present laws. Experience has demonstrated that there are many inherent 
 weaknesses in our governmental system. As you are aware, there is a strong 
 public sentiment in favor of such changes as will guarantee an efficient, 
 economical, and well organized plan for handling state business, with direct 
 responsibility to the people. We have been committed to this reform both 
 individually and by party declarations. The best service we can render the 
 state is to place its business and financial affairs upon a basis that will 
 insure the accomplishment of the end so much desired. It is with a view of 
 aiding in this work that the following changes are suggested. . • . M Here 
 follows detailed plans for the reorganization of the agriculture, conserva- 
 tion, business, and labor agencies in their respective departments. 
 
 Reference to party platform obligations in Governor Groesbeck’s message 
 suggests something of the pronouncement of one who holds a mandate from the 
 people. In the same vein, Governor McRae thus addressed the Arkansas legis- 
 lature in 1921: "This brings me to a consideration of your obligations and 
 
 mine to the demands of the organized democracy of Arkansas. . • To quote the 
 language of the platform, 'We favor the enactment of legislation providing 
 
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 for the consolidation of offices, boards, and commissions where the duties 
 of the same are not inconsistent, and for the elimination of useless of- 
 fices, boards, and commissions.' From many stumps over this state I de- 
 clared for a similar reform, making this the paramount issue in my race for 
 governor, and I was nominated. Not one of my eight opponents, so far as I 
 know, declared himself in favor of retaining any of these useless offices. 
 Whenever and wherever the people have had opportunity to register their op- 
 position to these boards and commissions, they have done so. By every rule 
 
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 of representative government, we are bound to adhere to these demands." 
 
 There is an unmistakable conservatism on the other hand, which the 
 virility and grip of the statements of more aggressive advocates of admin- 
 istrative reform, among the governors, can not belie* It is a significant 
 fact that even in those states of California, Idaho, Michigan, Ohio, and 
 Washington, in which extensive reorganization was effected in 1921, there 
 was a notable tendency on the part of the governors concerned to caution 
 an evolutionary, rather than the more nearly complete consolidation of those 
 earlier codes of Idaho, Illinois, and Nebraska. In Ohio, where the most 
 comprehensive reorganization of 1921 took piece, we find Governor Cox thus 
 addressing the legislature of that same year: "If my experience, which cov- 
 
 ers a longer period of service than that rendered by any executive in the 
 history of the commonwealth, telle me any one conspicuous thing, it is the 
 need of simplication in government. It is never possible to work out ob- 
 viously necessary reforms in government with the same facility with which 
 
 8 pp. 6,7. 
 
12 
 
 they can be accomplished in business for the very simple reason that it would 
 be in the long run unwise and doubtless unsafe to confer an authority suffi- 
 ciently arbitrary for the purpose. Therefore the processes of governmental 
 improvement in a way are slow. Many changes which are patently practicable 
 and which would result in much good are defeated for the time because of an 
 opposition which is more partisan than sincere. There are so many blessings, 
 however, from a democracy in government that we must naturally expect at 
 least a small average of accruing advantages. . . It is my earnest hope 
 that the future will bring a further simplification of work and a centering 
 of responsibility. This would make for efficiency and enable the people 
 more intelligently to fix responsibility to say nothing of the facility which 
 would be afforded to apply in simple fashion the needed remedies.” 9 
 
 Expecially significant in view of the notable domination of Governor 
 Nathan L. Miller over the 1921 session of the New York legislature by whose 
 influence a bill to reorganize completely the state administration was throt- 
 tled in the lower house, are his own statements in the annual message of 
 that year which foreshadow that action: "Reference is commonly made to the 
 
 187 state departments as evidence of government depravity, but the state- 
 ment is grossly misleading. To secure that number, it is necessary to count 
 every institution with its local board, every park, monument, or historical 
 commission. The total amount of appropriations for such commissions is rel- 
 atively insignificant. No practical economy would result from such consol- 
 idation, but the state would sacrifice the interest and attention of those 
 
 9 pp. 5,6. 
 

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 who now serve on such commission without pay. There is no point in consol- 
 idating merely for the sake of reducing numbers. There is, however, much 
 overlapping and duplication of effort, which can and should be eliminated, 
 greater efficiency and economy oan be eecured by uniting and properly cor- 
 relating certain activities. The plan of organization of some departments 
 is unsound. That can be corrected. • . The advantage of statutory change 
 is that we ean proceed with caution, making such changes as experience shall 
 demonstrate to be in the public interest.*' 1 '® 
 
 In this connection it should be noted that two governors in 1921 ad- 
 dress their legislatures in renouncement of the formal reorganization move- 
 ment. "Of late there has been much loose talk about changes in the admin- 
 istration of state government," said Governor William L. Harding to the Iowa 
 legislature in 1921. "Agents, with a patent cu real 1, appear in the state at 
 least biennially with a new scheme, or schemes, to build over the state and 
 practically run the government without cost or friction. The only thing 
 lacking usually with this type of "doctor" is votes enough to get into of- 
 fice. It would be idle to say that there could not be improvement in the 
 condition of the state's business, for in fact, there is scarcely an admin- 
 istration that does not bring about improvement somewhere. • . If in due 
 humility a confession can be made, permit me to say, that four years ago, 
 when I came into office, I was confident that great saving could be accom- 
 plished by changes and consolidations in departments, and 1 purposed then 
 to do that very thing. I have been in close contact almost daily with ev- 
 
 10 pp. 28,29. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 ery department in and for the state government , and I say to you frankly now 
 many changes could be made; much re-arranging can be done, but if the activi- 
 ties that are being carried on are to be continued and as efficient as now, 
 you will find that the savings from ail the changes will be but negiligiole. 
 True, there are some overlappings in tne activities, but when the real facte 
 are understood, you will do as your predecessors, continue the work. . • The 
 thing I do wish to emphasize, is that this government, which you will find 
 here and the various agencies thereof, did not accidently happen. They are 
 the product of brain, and character, and patriotism, equal with that which 
 you bring to the service of the state. . • I grant you that there may be in 
 some of our sister states, need for change, but let me remind you that when 
 these sister states have made all their changes, they will not have reduced 
 in comparison with Iowa, for they but attempt what we did years ago when the 
 board of Control, the Executive Council, and Board of Education were adopted. 
 Through these three departments, most of the state’s taxes are expended, and 
 they are expended in an economical ana businesslike way.*’^ In much the same 
 vein are passages from the executive messages of Louisiana, New Mexico, and 
 Tennessee. 
 
 Within the limits of recommendations made by advanced advocates of ad- 
 ministrative reorganization and the reactionary position of the few obstruc- 
 tionists, there is the bulk of proposal of those governors whose recommenda- 
 tions for one reason or another are confined to changes in one or more groups 
 of correlated activities: finance, charities, labor, education, agriculture, 
 
 public lands, taxation, and banking. In some instances, there is an evident 
 intention to consummate by easy steps a complete reorganization along the 
 
 11 pp. 17,18. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
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 lines laid down by efficiency and economy commissions, but the consideration 
 
 of which the governor for politic reasons does not advocate in its entirety 
 
 for any one legislative session. In most instances, like that of Governor 
 
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 Miller of New York, the manifest purpose is to "proceed with caution."* 
 
 3. The recommendations of this majority group of executives have a special 
 significance in the development of the movement toward general reorganization 
 in the invariaole additional correlation and re-grouping of administrative 
 activities which the piecemeal creation of new so-called departments entails. 
 Especially is this true in the field of fiscal readjustments. It was the 
 Illinois Efficiency and Economy Committee in 1915 which observed that "One 
 of the most serious defects arising from the lack of correlation and effect- 
 ive supervision over the subordinate authorities is the absence of any satis- 
 factory budget of estimates as a basis for appropriations. The need for im- 
 provement in this respect was indicated in the act of the last General Assem- 
 bly creating the Legislative Reference Bureau, which imposed on that bureau 
 the duty of compiling estimates of appropriations. • • The State Constitu- 
 tion, in Article v, paragraph 7, provides that the governor at the commence- 
 ment of each regular session of the General Assembly shall 'present estimates 
 of the amount of money required to be raised by taxation for all purposes.' 
 
 So far as your committee is aware, no Governor has heretofore ever complied 
 with this important constitutional duty."^^ It is in explaining this seem- 
 ing negligence that the significant bearing which fiscal arrangements have 
 on correlation and supervision of subordinates is observed: "The failure 
 
 to do so has undoubtedly been due in the main to the fact that the exec- 
 
 12 Ibid. pp. 29 y 30. 
 
 13 Report of the Efficiency and Economy Committee (1915) pp. 22. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 utive authorities as organized have not offered the Governor the facilities 
 needed to perform this duty. Just as the number of minor offices and boards 
 under his nominal supervision prevents any effective control over their ac- 
 tion; so too it prevents any effective control over their actions; so too it 
 prevents any adequate examination of their requests for appropriations on 
 which the Governor can base his recommendations."^ 
 
 The same situation existing in Colorado was pointed out in the survey 
 report of a similar committee the following year in their finding "The pro- 
 vision requiring the Governor to present to the General Assembly estimates 
 of “money required to be raised by taxation by all purposes of the state" is 
 not complied with by the governor. 
 
 A survey of governors' messages since 1917 shows that recommendations 
 looking to a reorganization of fiscal agencies were invariably followed by 
 recommendations affecting other administrative activities in the order of 
 magnitude of their demands on the public treasury. In other words, the expe- 
 rience of the governors committed to but a partial reorganization really du- 
 plicated that of the Illinois committee already referred to. Quoting once 
 more from its report: “The resolution creating the committee (referring here 
 
 to itself) imposed on it two main duties: (1) to secure a more perfect sys- 
 
 tem of accounting; and (2) to propose a general reorganization and consolida- 
 tion of state offices, boards, and commissions. After due consideration the 
 committee agreed that the plan of administrative reorganization should precede 
 the introduction of a comprehensive system of accounting."^ 6 
 
 14 Ibid. 22, 23. 
 
 15 Report on a Survey of the Office of Go vernor of the State o f 
 Colorado. 
 
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 This conclusion of the Illinois Efficiency and Economy Committee seems 
 to be amply borne out by the experience of other commonwealths* In Alabama, 
 the governor's message of 1919 recommending a reorganisation of the fiscal 
 agencies was followed in 1921 by a specific plan for the immediate reorganiza- 
 tion of the public welfare agencies, and the formulation of plans for a gen- 
 eral administrative reorganisation. In Colorado, proposals for rearrange- 
 ments in the accounting system in 1919 carried a recommendation for a state 
 survey of executive departments. A fiscal report by the governor of Idaho, 
 1919, carried with it a specific plan for reorganising the labor agencies of 
 the state. In 1921, there followed the administrative code itself. In Mich- 
 igan, a fiscal emergency in 1921 was recognised by the governor who propos- 
 ed along with the plan for reorganizing agencies directly involved, plans 
 effecting correlation of conservation and public welfare agencies. * r An ad- 
 ministrative code was adopted by the Nebraska legislature in 1919, on the 
 proposal of the governor that a complete reorganization of the accounting 
 system be made. Finance and education received the attention of the New 
 Hampshire executive in 1919, and a general eurvey of all administrative a- 
 gencies was recommended by him in 1921. Governor Miller's aggressive attack 
 on the financial arrangements of New York's executive department in his mes- 
 sage of 1921 was accompanied by specific proposale for reorganizing the de- 
 
 16 The direct connection between a fiscal emergency and adminis- 
 trative reorganisation is pointed out by Governor Groesbeck in 
 hie message of 1921: "Before it is determined that more taxes 
 
 should be levied in the face of this stringent financial emer- 
 gency confronting the state, we should make a studious effort 
 to eliminate the last vestige of wastefulness in connection with 
 the administration. One of the first things we should undertake 
 is the correction of existing defects in our state government • • 
 
 As you are aware, there is a strong public sentiment in favor 
 

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 pertinents of agriculture and public works— and this in spite of his opposi- 
 tion to complete reorganisation that same year. Fiscal problems received 
 the major emphasis in the governor's message to the North Carolina legisla- 
 ture in 1919 , with a proposal in 1921 for a rather general reorganisation. 
 
 The appointment of an efficiency and economy commission in South Dakota in 
 1921 was recommended in connection with a detailed proposal for the adoption 
 of an executive budget. A budgetary survey in Texas in 1919 led to a gen- 
 eral plan of reorganisation of ail state agencies directly affected by the 
 new budget requirements. After a discussion of the "heavy burden of taxa- 
 tion" in his message of 1921, the governor of Utah proposed in the rather 
 emphatic terms already noted, a program of early reorganisation. The gov- 
 ernor's message to the Wyoming legislature in 1921 shows the same close par- 
 allel between an economy program, budget requirements, and the perfecting of 
 a "closer correlation and supervision of all state administrative agencies." 
 Indeed, no instance of an exception to this general rule could be found in 
 the governors' messages of 1919 and 1921.*® In this connection, there is an- 
 other fact worth noting: namely, the character of those functional agencies 
 
 for which a reorganisation is proposed along with suggested rearrangements 
 in the accounting systems. In Arisona, the governor's budgetary proposals 
 included a plan for reorganising labor and education agencies; charities in 
 Arkansas, 1921; charities and institutions in Georgia, 1919; labor in Idaho, 
 1919; agriculture in Kansas, 1921; labor in Mississippi, 1919; fish and game 
 in Montana, 1921; agriculture in Nebraska, 1921; charities in Nevada, 1919 
 
 of such changes as will guarantee an efficient, economical, and well 
 organised plan for handling state business." Here follows detailed 
 recommendations for reorganisation and consolidation of agricultural, 
 conservation, and industrial agencies of the state, pp. 8, 9. 
 
 17 pp. 23, 24. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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19 
 
 and 1921; agriculture and public works in New York, 1921; education in North 
 Dakota, 1919, and in Pennsylvania, 1921; charities in Texas, 1919* 
 
 The inference seems to be that not only considerations of economy and 
 the requirements of the budget dictated a correlation and reorganization of 
 administrative agencies, but likewise considerations of despatch and effect- 
 iveness in the administration of education, agriculture, and institutions for 
 
 19 
 
 wnich there had arisen a sharp public need and demand. 
 
 4. while the major object in a study of the governors' messages as they 
 bear on administrative reorganization should be to discover the governor's 
 own conception of his place in the state administrative system, one must re- 
 ally go to the reports of the several efficiency and economy commissions on 
 who se findings the governors in the main rely. Recommendations of governors 
 as they might relate to the short ballot, executive budget, or administra- 
 tive staff were only rarely found in the messages of 1919 and 1921. In a 
 number of instances, however, the governor's point of view was made plain 
 enough; in most instances it must be inferred from chance references as they 
 touch on the appointing power, overlapping terms of commissions, and those 
 other elective constitutional officers who share the executive power. 
 
 In other words, study of the messages yields only gleanings as they re- 
 late to the executive's own idea of a desirable status for himself, aut ev6n 
 these gleanings may carry broad implications, consider this excerpt from the 
 
 * 9 The following excerpt from the Michigan executive's message 1921 
 indicates the general nature of these considerations: "Agricul- 
 
 ture has in recent years rapidly developed as an organized in- 
 dustry. with this development new problems and new opportunities 
 

 
 
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20 
 
 1921 message of the Ohio governor: "There is absolutely no need of a state 
 
 treasurer as such. The check on disbursements is made by the auditor. The 
 responsibility in his and the disbursement of funds is more or lees a perfunc- 
 tory detail* This, of course, could easily be done in the auditor's office* 
 The attorney general is the legal adviser of the governor and of the state 
 departments, he should be appointed by the governor. In many states this 
 practice has ootained throughout the years. Would it not be possible to 
 deduce a fairly accurate principle for short ballot reform as it affects the 
 customary constitutionally elective officers of the state executive depart- 
 ment." Referring in another part of the same message to the subject of edu- 
 cation he notes: "Under the old order, the superintendent of public instruc- 
 
 tion was scarcely more than a statistical office. The office was elective. 
 Under the change, this was made an executive department. The state commis- 
 sioner of common schools is now appointed by the governor and he has been 
 given definite administrative authority. 
 
 In the same vein, Governor Goodrich in 1919 recommended that "the of- 
 fice of attorney general created by the legislature and made elective, should 
 be abolished as an elective office and tne governor authorized to appoint 
 the attorney general." His reasons are significant: "The constitution makes 
 
 it the duty of the governor to 'take care that the laws be faithfully execut- 
 ed* and he is held responsible for the efficient and economical conduct of 
 all administrative agencies of the state government. His power ought to e- 
 qual his responsibilities in this respect. Either the commissions appointed 
 
 for co-operative aid by national and state governments have arisen. 
 
 Any system of state government which does not include a department 
 
 organized and equipped to work with agricultural organizations, and 
 
* 
 
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 * 
 
 * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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21 
 
 by the governor must appoint their own attorneys at considerable additional 
 expense to the tax-payers, or they must depend for legal assistance and 
 counsel upon the attorney general whose office ae now constituted in an in- 
 dependent agency, wholly uncoordinated with these commissions, directly or 
 Indirectly. This would not result in a dangerous centralization of power. 
 
 It ie only an attempt to simplify government for the purpose of rendering it 
 
 22 
 
 more economical and efficient.** Probably the most outspoken of the gov- 
 ernor's opinions on the subject of the Short Ballot is that of Governor Chan- 
 ning H. Gox of Massachusetts in his message of 1921. "The chief interest 
 centers in the candidates for governor and for lieutenant governor, and pub- 
 lic discussion is confined largely to the candidates for these two offices. 
 
 In a larger way the people have come to look upon the governor as the head 
 of the government, and there ie a tendency to hold him responsible for the 
 conduct of the affairs of the departments of the state of ficials,— the sec- 
 retary, the treasurer, the auditor, and the attorney general,— then he ought 
 to be allowed to call men into those positions who will work in harmony with 
 him and who will adopt policies which bear his approval. The objection may 
 be raised that the attorney general is not alone the adviser of the governor 
 but of the legislature as well, and that sometimes the legislature might 
 desire independent advice, and that it ought not to be compelled to accept 
 legal opinions from the governor's appointee. It should be remembered, how- 
 ever, that each branch of the legislature has authority to require the opin- 
 ion of the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court upon important questions 
 
 with other states and the national government for the benefit of 
 the general public is certainly incomplete." pp. 7^ 8. 
 
 20 pp. 28, 29. 
 
 21 pp. 28 , 29. 
 

 
 
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 of lav, and upon solemn occasions. To the end that the direct primary sys- 
 tem may operate to the best advantage, and that the efficiency of the state 
 administration, I recommend that the constitution be amended so that the gov- 
 ernor be given the power to appoint the state offices— the secretary of the 
 
 commonwealth, the treasurer and receiver general, the auditor and the attor- 
 
 23 
 
 ney general— for the same term as his own.” In respect to the appointment 
 of the auditor, Governor McKelvie of Nebraska, who is quoted in another place, 
 may be said to present that more careful discrimination of certain governors 
 who would see vested in this financial agent a sphere of activity outside the 
 administration, and subject directly to the legislature who elects him or to 
 the electorate as a whole, as an effective method of legislative control over 
 the administration. An example of this also is Governor Miller's comment on 
 the sphere of the comptroller: "The comptroller is primarily an auditing of- 
 
 ficer, and in my judgment, an auditing office should not be converted into a 
 great administrative office. The Comptroller should undoubtedly audit both 
 revenues and expenditures. I think he should audit the books of all depart- 
 ment, and should be given broad powers of examination for the purpose of au- 
 
 24 
 
 dit. But I think he should not be charged with administration." 
 
 On the nature of the appointing power, the governor of North Carolina in 
 his message of 1921 has this to say: "If you should adopt my recommendations 
 
 and create the offices of Bank Commissioner and Commissioner of Taxation and 
 Revenue, and follow the custom of allowing the governor to appoint, I most 
 earnestly suggest that you make their appointment at the pleasure of tne Gov- 
 ernor. I think it unwise to give officers appointed by the governor any fix- 
 ed term. They certainly ought not to go beyond the term of the governor ap- 
 
 22 pp. 6, 7. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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23 
 
 pointing them, and X oelieve it would make for strength and efficiency in the 
 executive branch of the government if all officers who are not elected by the 
 people were suoject to removal by the governor at will and without cause. Our 
 institutions are all in the hands of boards that are almost self-perpetuating. 
 The governor appoints a few each year, and if he desires to change the policy 
 of any institution it would be most difficult for him to do so. If the first 
 two or three members he appointed were not pretty firm men the management 
 would likely capture them against the governor’s policies before he could 
 make, in the next two or three years, other appointments which would enable 
 him to change the management of the institution. If the General Assembly sat 
 all the time it could exercise the executive arm of the government; but it 
 does not. As soon as it adjourns the smallest officer in this state appoint- 
 ed by the governor can defy him, and there is no power to move him until his 
 term expires. The constitution of the state places the supreme executive pow- 
 er of the state in the governor's office. I do not ask for any greater power 
 than the General Assembly has heretofore in recognition of the constitution 
 given the governor, but I do most earnestly ask that the power given the gov- 
 ernor shall oe given in a manner that will enable him to exercise it with en- 
 ergy and efficiency. The governor is looked upon by the people as the head 
 of the administration during his term, and the public hold him accountable 
 for the conduct of the officers appointed by the governor; and yet by the 
 Chine se- puzzle arrangement through which these boards are created and perpet- 
 uated, it is impossible for the governor to control them. During my term of 
 office I cannot, until near its close, under the present law, change the man- 
 
 23 pp. 29., 30. 
 
 24 pp. 21, 22. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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24 
 
 agement or policy, except through moral persuasion, in any department of the 
 state's government, or at any of ite institutiom. I think it would be most 
 wise to enact a general statute allowing the governor to call for the resigna- 
 tion and, if, not forthcoming, to remove any executive officer appointed by the 
 governor; and in the future no term should be fixed for appointive executive 
 officers. • . If the governor, the supreme head of the executive branch of the 
 government, ought to be removed every four years, it does seem to me that suo- 
 ordinate executive officers ought to go out with him and allow the governor's 
 successor the privilege of selecting his own helpers in administering the gov- 
 ernment during his term, and not confine his legal power to tying the hands of 
 his successor. ". And consistent with the terrible seriousness with which the 
 matter weighs on him he concludes, "These are my recommendations, and may 
 
 2 * 
 
 God's will about them be done in your honorable body as it is done in Heaven!" 
 
 This is the general burden of the recommendations concerning the appoint- 
 ing power of the governor as the executives of California, Idaho, Kansas, Mas- 
 sachusetts, Nebraska, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wyoming touch upon 
 it in their messages of 1919 and 1921 respectively. 
 
 One of the most noticeable tendencies of the messages of 1921 is the rath- 
 er detailed description , in a number of instances, of proposed new administra- 
 tive departments. Governors in other years in most instances were content to 
 suomit the proposals of efficiency and economy commissions working under their 
 direction. Typical of this newer development are those recommendations of Gov- 
 ernor Miller of New York and Governor Groesbeck of Michigan. Proposing a re- 
 
 25 pp. 9, 10 
 

 
 
 
 
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organization of the agriculture agencies , Governor Miller in 1921 writes: 
 
 25 
 
 M I think the present organization of the Agricultural Department unsound up* 
 
 on its face. The council of farms and markets may serve to keep the depart* 
 
 ment out of politics, end for that reason can properly be continued, but it 
 
 is not suited to discharge and should not be clothed with any administrative 
 
 functions whatever. There is no reason that I can perceive for a divided de* 
 
 partment, and I believe that economy and efficiency of administration will be 
 
 promoted by a single head to be appointed by the council of farms and markets 
 
 and I recommend that those changes be made." Then follows a detailed des* 
 
 cription of suggested correlation of existing agencies into bureaus and divi* 
 26 
 
 sions. Governor Groesbeck of Michigan in his plan for the same department 
 proposes a functional organization for the same department based on his ob* 
 servations of practices in other states: "When organized, it should include 
 in its operations the department of animal industry, the state veterinary 
 board, state apiary inspector, commissioner of immigration, geological sur* 
 vey, Michigan agricultural fair commission, inspection of nurseries and or* 
 cnards, agricultural division of the state department, and the inspection of 
 seeds, and fertilizers. M 
 
 In his message to the legislature in 1919, Governor W. D* Davis of Idaho 
 made the following general recommendation relative to reorganization of the 
 executive departments: "The executive and administrative departments of the 
 
 state should be divided into a small number of departments, the heads of 
 which, so far as the constitution permits, shall be directly responsible to 
 the governor. The functions of every officer, bureau, board, or commissions 
 
 26 pp. 25, 26. 
 

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 in the state should be assigned to one of these departments. The departments 
 should be subdivided where necessary into bureaus, the heads of which and the 
 subordinates under them being selected with view to their expert fitness and 
 qualifications for their respective positions. I further propose that the 
 heads of the several departments, including the constitutional elective of- 
 ficers, shall constitute a governor's cabinet or council, thereby furnishing 
 a vehicle through which all the departments of the state government can be 
 coordinated and correlated in their functions* " 
 
 Careful study of messages for 1919 and 1921 finds a practical agreement 
 in the main among the executives with the foregoing recommendations when this 
 factor of reorganization is touched on. There is a division of opinion about 
 the efficacy of unpaid boards. Governor McRae of Arkansas, in 1921, express- 
 es one point of view: "The claim made by many good people that an unpaid board 
 will not function promptly and properly, is not borne out by the history of 
 honorary boards, both in this and other states. The truth is, salaried 
 boards or commissions, do not as a rule, function harmoniously, and almost 
 without exception they are controlled or influenced by politics and politi- 
 cians. It is equally true that a better class of men and women are obtain- 
 
 28 
 
 able for service upon honorary boards than upon salaried boards." Governor 
 Edward I. Edwards in his message of 1920 presents the opposite point of view 
 concurred in by the larger proportion of governors who touch upon this mat- 
 ter. "It must be understood I make no criticism of the unselfish, patriotic 
 service furnished by many of the men and women serving upon some of the 
 
 27 pp. 14, 15 
 

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 boards in question— for they are not all compensated. But in the name of 
 real efficiency Z desire to record my protest against the further continuance 
 of such a system. . • The matters handled by them (unpaid boards) are of 
 great importance and involve large sums of money. Their proper treatment 
 should not depend upon the uncertain element of enthusiasm or patriotic im- 
 pulses of the state's agents, which necessarily leads, it seems to me, to 
 spasmodic and intermittent attention, contingent upon the private engagements 
 of the members of such boards. The discharge of the state's administrative 
 affaire should be in the hands of a reasonably small number of men, paid veil 
 for their service and from vhom attention to its business may be demanded by 
 the state as a matter of right, under the pain of dismissal for neglect. Bills 
 to accomplish part of that program have been introduced. They substitute a 
 paid board of five members for 166 persons, some of vhom are paid and some 
 are not."^ A unique variation from both of these positions is taken by Gov- 
 ernor Hardee of Florida in his message of 1921. Under a caption "Back to the 
 constitution" he says, "Like may of the other states of the union, ve are 
 fast becoming a 'commission ridden' people. I wish to call upon you to adopt 
 the policy of 'back to constitution.' In the creation of such commissions as 
 you may deem vise and expedient, let your creations be carved out of the Cab- 
 inet. Elected by the people, it is the sworn duty of a Cabinet officer to de- 
 vote all of his time and thought to the interest of the state. There is noth- 
 ing in the argument, so often advanced, that the cabinet officers are too 
 
 28 pp. 7, 8. 
 
 Governor Bartlett of wew Hampshire, 1919, recommended for the sever- 
 al institutions a board of visitors and advisers to bring about a 
 personal relation between the governor and council and the people 
 and to give a more humane touch to the management of the institu- 
 tions. pp. 16*17. 
 

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28 
 
 busy to give attention to the various matters that are placed under their 
 charge. They are at the seat of the state government all of the time, ready 
 and accessible for frequent meetings and conferences. In their acceesibil- 
 ity and their constant meetings there ie the greatest advantage of being able 
 to give attention to departmental matters incident to the various state activ- 
 ities, readily, speedily, and without delay." It is hardly necessary to 
 point out that this executive apparently minimized the legal relation which 
 exists between him and these so-called cabinet officers. There is no ev- 
 idence to show that any other executive in recent years does so minimize it 
 by making a similar recommendation. 
 
 On the other hand, Governor McKelvie of Nebraska who had actually work- 
 ed with such a "cabinet" resulting from the unique provision of the Nebraska 
 constitutent law forbidding the creation of executive agencies outside the 
 constitutional elective departments therein created, was the successful pro- 
 moter of a constitutional revision and subsequent administrative code which 
 placed large appointing power in the hands of the governor. Here are six 
 recommendations: 
 
 (1) The executive department should consist of a 
 governor, lieutenant-governor, and comptroller, 
 to be elected. 
 
 (2) The governor to be elected for a term of four 
 years, and not subject to re-election. 
 
 (3) A comptroller to serve as auditor and treasurer, 
 to be elected for a term of four years, and not 
 
 29 Journal of the Seventy-Sixth Senate of the State of New Jersey 
 pp. 394-398. 
 

 
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 subject to re-election. He could either be 
 elected by a direct vote of the people or by 
 the house of representatives* 
 
 (4) All appointments, aside from those having to 
 do with the office of comptroller, should be 
 made by the governor, with major appointments 
 to be confirmed by the Senate. The creation 
 of departments and the grouping of activities 
 with them to be left to the legislature. The 
 selection and term of service of minor employ- 
 ees to be subject to a limited civil service, 
 the provisions of which the legislature should 
 determine. 
 
 (5) There should be no boards, except those that 
 are quasi- judicial, and quasi-legislative, or 
 having to do with education* 
 
 (6) Provision may be made for the recall of any of 
 these officers, or the appointees under them, 
 upon the petition of a given percentage of 
 qualified electors. ^ 
 
 It is only when one comes to look into the detailed provisions of the 
 budgetary proposals, however, that the increasingly positive role assumed 
 by governors is so clearly evident. Governor Cornwell of West Virginia, in 
 1921, in a commonwealth heretofore conspicuous for the absence of any move 
 
 30 pp. 8, 9. 
 
 31 Message of 1919 pp. 24* 25. 
 

 
 
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 in the direction of either a survey of state agencies or proposals for con- 
 solidations, urges an amendment to the present budget law, placing the ini- 
 tial authority for the budget with the governor. Governor Carey, in 1921, 
 asks that the budget law be amended to provide that the governor- elect be 
 present at all budget hearings and that his resolutions rather them those of 
 the retiring governor be included* Governor Davis of Idaho in 1921 recom- 
 mends that the study and presentation of the budget be made one of the con- 
 tinuous duties of an officer directly under the control and supervision of 
 the governor. Governor Allen in the same year goes a step further than any 
 of these in proposing to regulate in a way the relations of the executive to 
 the legislature by proposing an amendment to the budget law not only to 
 provide for the centering of responsibility, but to stipulate the procedure 
 to be followed by the legislature in acting on the budgetary recommendations. 
 Governor Groesbeck of Michigan in the same year went one step further than 
 this and specified a significant restriction on legislative procedure in pro- 
 posing "that upward revision of items by the legislature should be limited 
 except for causes shown in specific cases." Governor Miller recommended 
 "the creation of a permanent organizationwith ample power to survey the work 
 of all departments, and not merely to compile estimates, but to revise them • 
 
 . • It should appoint a permanent budget staff, specially qualified for the 
 work, which, with ample power of examination, should, as directed by the 
 board, make surveys and studies of all the state's activities with a view of 
 introducing improved methods, eliminating waste and useless duplication, cor- 
 relating effort, standardizing positions of like grade and promoting effi- 
 ciency. Estimates should be filed with the budget bureau on a specified date, 
 
 32 pp. 13, 14 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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31 
 
 and under the direction of the board should be revised and tabulated for sub- 
 mission to the legislation." It should be noted in connection with this 
 carefully integrated administrative plan for budget making in New York as the 
 governor proposes it, that the question of a mixed legislative-executive a- 
 gency or a purely executive one to direct the work of the bureau seems immate- 
 rial to him. In this one respect he differs from the trend of executive pro- 
 posals for 1919 and 1921 in that the larger proportion of them emphatically 
 propose the executive budget, and as noted in one instance there is even the 
 proposal to restrict the upward legislative revision of this budget as sub- 
 mitted by the executive. 
 
 Finally, one lays aside thislatest governor’s message with a two- fold 
 impression: 
 
 (1) The uniformly emphatic quality of the gov- 
 ernors’ proposals* 
 
 (2) The striking identity of methods by which 
 
 the governors purpose to attain these objects* 
 
 But the most significant fact is the actual role of the governor him- 
 self, which vitalizes those proposals. This observation leads me to raise 
 the question as to whether the real trend of the reorganization movement is 
 not to be most precisely determined through a study of the governors* activ- 
 ities themselves, rather than of the administrative codes and enactments. 
 
 Their record as evidenced by the following accounts would seem to be convinc- 
 ing* 
 
 As early as 1910, Governor Hughes in his annual message to the legis- 
 lature recommended administrative reorganization and consolidation which 
 
 33 pp. 14, 15. 
 

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32 
 
 he said would "tend to promote efficiency in public office by increasing the 
 effectiveness of the voter and by diminishing the opportunities of the pol- 
 itical manipulators who take advantage of the multiplicity of elective of- 
 
 34 
 
 fices to perfect their scheme at the public expense." 
 
 furthermore, he believed that responsibility should be "centered in the 
 governor who should appoint a cabinet of administrative heads, accountable to 
 him and charged with the duties now devolved upon elective state offices*" A 
 rapid sequence of developments began: A resolution to amend the constitution 
 
 was introduced in the assembly of 1910 providing for the appointment of all 
 state officers except the governor and the lieutenant-governor. Although 
 the resolution failed to pass, the campaign toward consolidation was again 
 revived in 1921* In 1913, the legislature passed a bill establishing a de- 
 partment of efficiency and economy under a commission appointed by the gov- 
 ernor and confirmed by the senate for a term of five years. In 1915, this 
 commission issued a notable report of more than seven hundred pages. In 
 1914, both great political parties of the state took up the issue. "The 
 time has come to give the people control of the executive government," an- 
 nounced the democratic program of that year. "The responsibility should be 
 centered in the governor. He should have the absolute power of removal. The 
 various boards and commissions should be made subject to the control of the 
 governor." In 1915, a comprehensive scheme of reorganization was laid before 
 the constitutional convention of that year. Although the constitution was 
 defeated at the polls, the movement went steadily on, culminating in the plan 
 for complete reorganization of administrative departments in 1921. 35 Governor 
 
 34 pp. 18., 19. 
 
 35 This measure, it has already been noted, was defeated in the lower 
 house through the influence of the governor. 
 

 
 
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33 
 
 Deneen in his farewell message to the General Assembly of Illinois in 1913 
 suggested the creation of a commission for conducting an "investigation of 
 plans for the coordination of existing boards and commissions whose duties 
 overlap or are so similar as to permit of unification and reduction in num- 
 ber while improving their methods and the economy of their administration."^ 
 
 This was followed by a joint resolution of 1913 providing for a joint 
 commission of senators and representatives to "investigate all departments 
 of state government! including all boards, bureaus, and commissions." The 
 committee made a report in 1914 and it was published in 1915. In hie cam- 
 paign for election the following year, Governor Frank 0. Lowden made the re- 
 organization of the business of the state the chief plank in his platform, 
 nis election followed. His own words best give the description of the so- 
 called new role of the governor in recent state administrative reorganiza- 
 tion. "When the legislature met I undertook a complete reorganization of 
 the state wnich came under the duties of governor. Of course there was much 
 opposition by some of my political friends. They did not like to see these 
 attractive places given up. . . I appeared before the committees of the gen- 
 eral assembly and discussed with them at length the questions involved, and 
 before long there was complete cooperation between the general assembly and 
 myself, and to the credit of the legislature the result was the administra- 
 tive code." Incidentally, it should be noted that the Illinois law provid- 
 ed for the most comprehensive reorganization up to that time. Indeed, it 
 was the first instance of a general reorganisation of state administrative 
 
 36 pp. 24, 25. 
 
 37 Lowden: "Business Government," Saturday Evening Post, juarch 13, 
 
 1920, pp. 56. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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34 
 
 departments after a well worked out plan* 
 
 before 1916, Governor Morehead of Nebraska had asserted "that divided 
 authority and divided responsibility produce waste and inefficiency*" and 
 Governor Neville, his successor, held that "it is impossible to handle the 
 state's affairs in the efficient manner that would be demanded by any bus* 
 iness man in the conduct of his private transactions*" In 1913, the repub- 
 lican party wrote in its platform "We favor the enactment of a civil admin* 
 istrative code in this state? and Governor Samuel T* McKelvie, who was elec* 
 ted on this platform was enabled to approve a comprehensive administrative 
 code modelled after the Illinois plan, April 19, 1919* 
 
 Governor harry L* Davis made his campaign for nomination and election 
 in 1920 largely on a platform for state administrative reorganization. When 
 Governor Davis came into office, no specific work had been done upon a com* 
 prehensive single plan, and no details of a bill had been worked out. Yet 
 an act to establish an administrative code was approved by the governor 
 April 26, 1921. 
 
 Governor Hyde in Missouri made the consolidation of state administration 
 one of the foremost features of his legislative program. Seven distinct meas- 
 ures were introduced, of which all, except the one providing for a consolida- 
 tion of the boards governing the state teachers' colleges^ were passed. 
 
 In his message to the legislature in 1919, Governor W. D. Davis of Idaho 
 made a comprehensive set of recommendations for the reorganization of admin- 
 istrative agencies, and with no preliminary survey, save for that made by 
 governor himself, the legislature passed as an emergency measure under the 
 
* 
 
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35 
 
 constitution, the " administrative consolidation act H which went into effect 
 March 31 of that same year. 
 
 To Governor Louis F. Hart of Washington belongs the chief credit for the 
 enactment of a code on the main lines of those of Illinois and Nebraska. Upon 
 Governor Hart's suggestion the special session of the legislature of 1920 au- 
 thorized him to have such a code drawn to be presented to the regular session 
 of 1921. This code was enacted into law in 1921 with slight change. 
 
 In 1921, the governor- elect of Michigan, Mr. Alex J. Groesbeck, came to 
 the office with a reorganization program of his own. In spite of strong pol- 
 itical opposition, the first several provisions of a thorough reorganization 
 plan were enacted by a resisting legislature. 
 
 Add to these more comprehensive reorganization codes the single consol- 
 idation chapters of the 1919 and 1921 session laws of California, Colorado, 
 Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Hew Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
 South Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia, each of which is identical in time and 
 nature with the messages of the governors for the same years respectively, the 
 practical effects of the governors' messages seem to be pretty well establish- 
 ed. s8 
 
 6. A search for significant tendencies in recent state administrative re- 
 organization seems to require, therefore, that considerable stress be laid on 
 those tendencies as shown in the governors' messages. In other words, these 
 messages not only represent the executive point of view which determines so 
 largely what findings of the efficiency and economy commissions shall come to 
 

 
 
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36 
 
 their ultimate enactment in state laws, but also express that executive ini- 
 tiative and political prowess on which depends more and more the ultimate 
 character the administration is coming to assume* 
 
 A survey of the governors' messages of 1919 and 1921, therefore, seems 
 to disclose the following more recent tendencies: 
 
 (1) The practice of the legislature to order an effi- 
 ciency and economy survey of the administrative 
 agencies as the fiscal problems of the states 
 grow acute* 
 
 (2) The tendency of such surveys to lead to varying 
 degrees of reorganization of administrative de- 
 partments as a necessary first step in fiscal 
 retrenchment* 
 
 (3) The increasing practice of the legislature to 
 make the governor the chief repo3itary of respon- 
 sibility for the budget, with the resulting sharp 
 increase in the governor's prestige when fiscal 
 matters tend to transcend most others in the 
 minds of the electorate. 
 
 (4) The marked development of the parliamentary role 
 of the governor who i3 coming more and more to 
 follow up his initial proposals for reorganiza- 
 
 For a detailed account of the masterful role played by the governors 
 in the reorganization legislation of 1921 see the American Political 
 Review for August and November, 1921, pages 380 and 558 respectively. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 f 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 
 
 , *' 
 
 , 
 
 * 
 
 
 
 ‘ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tion and integration of administration with 
 the aggressive leadership of one who carries 
 a mandate from the people* 
 
 (5) The tendency of the governor to rely on ex* 
 pert commissions or staffs for specific plans 
 of administrative reorganization, with a 
 resulting identity in the several proposals 
 of governors relating to constitutional of- 
 ficers, the appointment, tenure, and correla- 
 tion of the activities of subordinates, and 
 the budget, from the rather casual references 
 of the governors in this connection, however, 
 the following more recent and significant rec- 
 ommendations in the messages of 1919 and 1921 
 stand out: 
 
 The attorney-general as a primary 
 agent of law enforcement and the 
 legal adviser of the governor and 
 of the state departments should be 
 appointed by the governor. 
 
 The functions of fiscal administra- 
 tion and audit should be sharply 
 distinguished. The chief auditing 
 officers should not be charged with 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 f 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 .■ ' 
 
 
 
38 
 
 purely administrative functions. 
 
 The terms of all discretionary admin- 
 istrative officers, both elective and 
 appointive should coincide with that 
 of the governor, wnich should be long 
 enough to admit of a sufficient degree 
 of continuity of executive policy. 
 
 Responsibility for the budget should be 
 fixed directly with the governor, with 
 all this implies of unhampered executive 
 discretion in revising estimates. 
 
 Since a more specific understanding of the proposals for integration sug- 
 gested in Number Five of the foregoing points is essential to any precise ap- 
 praisement of tendencies in recent state administrative reorganization, a study 
 of the findings of theef ficiency and economy commissions should logically fol- 
 low. Like the governors, then, let us turn to the reports of those other but 
 closely allied agencies of reorganization— the efficiency and economy commis- 
 sions of the several states. 
 

 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
 III -REPORTS OF THE EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY COMMISSIONS 
 
 1. In the invariable utilization of the so-called efficiency and economy 
 commissions as a necessary first step in state administrative reorganiza- 
 tion, there is, perhaps, the one most conspicuous feature of the whole re- 
 organization movement. Not in their honorary aspect as formal joint leg- 
 islative committees, but in their actual working role of sub-committees 
 of expert appraisers of administrative agencies, these commissions indeed 
 stand for a unique development in the field of government. In other words, 
 while the idea of legislative investigating committee is as old as rep- 
 resentative government itself, the practice of employing specialists to 
 devise needed readjustments in government structure and function is hard- 
 ly less recent than the state reorganization movement itself. We have 
 already noted the activity of the governor in recommending the appoint- 
 ment of these expert commissions, his usual concurrence in the general 
 nature of their findings, and his role in impressing those findings on 
 the character of the legislative acts themselves. It must surely fol- 
 low, therefore, that any study of significant recent tendencies in state 
 administrative reorganization in a search for underlying principles must 
 give special consideration to the work of these efficiency and economy 
 commissions. 
 
 Of legislative investigating committees there have been legion, but 
 the practice of employing these sub- committees of experts may be said to 
 have had its inception in the appointment of the special national exec- 
 utive staff in 1910, and of the Efficiency and Economy Commission in 1911 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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40 
 
 by President Taft of the national government. 1 Charged with the task of in- 
 vestigating the federal administrative agencies with a view to recommending 
 ways of "reducing and increasing the effectiveness" of the departments in- 
 volved, this committee prepared and submitted to the President 108 reports 
 looking to that end. It is with this action of the national government that 
 the state movement for administrative reorganization may be said to have 
 begun. The first move to appraise the organization and functions of state 
 government looking to reorganization was made in Wisconsin, 1911, when an 
 
 act was passed authorizing the State Board of Affairs to make such a prelim- 
 2 
 
 inary study. A few months later, in 1912, the General Court of Massachu- 
 setts authorized the appointment of a commission to study ways and means of 
 increasing the efficiency of the administration. Governor Deneen of Illinois 
 in his farewell message to the General Assembly in 1913 suggested the crea- 
 tion of a commission for conducting an "investigation of plans for the co- 
 ordination of existing boards and commissions whose duties overlap and are 
 so similar as to permit of unification and reduction in number while improv- 
 ing their methods and economy of administration." Following close upon 
 these two initial moves were the authorization of commissions in New Jereey, 
 1912, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, Pennsylvania, and 
 South Dakota, 1913; Louisiana, 1914; Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Indian- 
 a, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, 1915; Virginia, 1916; California, 1918; Del- 
 aware, Georgia, Montana, 1919; Arkansas, 1921. By the close of the legis- 
 lative sessions of 1922, thirty of the states had authorized commissions in 
 one form or another, while in most of the states, improvement in personnel 
 
 A detailed outline of the national administration as it was found to 
 exist, then, fills the major part of two large volumes in connection 
 

 
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41 
 
 and enlargement of jurisdiction were provided for in subsequent acts relat- 
 
 3 
 
 ing to commi88ions in twenty- four of the states. The roost recent of these 
 are to be found in the creations of special commissions in Massachusetts, 
 South Dakota, and Virginia, in 1921. before this year improvement in the 
 status of investigating commissions had been effected in New York, Minneso- 
 ta, and Ohio, there being three successive steps in as many years in New 
 York and Ohio, and two in Minnesota. 
 
 To Minnesota and Iowa, probably must go credit for the first comprehen- 
 sive surveys of state administrative agencies and reports in 1913. Two years 
 later the new York bureau of Municipal Research made an exhaustive study of 
 the organization of the New York state government with a plan for consolida- 
 tion, all set forth in a report of 417 pages exclusive of many charts. The 
 most comprehensive and voluminous of all the reports was that of the Illinois 
 Efficiency and Economy Commission in 1915 consisting of some 1050 pages. 
 
 With respect to personnel the commissions fall into three classes: 
 
 (1) The purely legislative investigating commit- 
 tees of Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, 
 
 Missouri, Mississippi, Nebraska, South Dakota, 
 and Texas. 
 
 (2) The formal joint legislative committees who 
 employed experts to conduct the actual work 
 
 with the recommendations of the Commission. There was no attempt at 
 description and analysis which so uniformly characterizes the reports 
 of the later state commissions. The Commission was a temporary body. 
 
 It performed its work without close consultation with men in the ac- 
 

 
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 * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 . 
 
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42 
 
 of investigating and preparing reports in 
 Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Mas-* 
 eachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon. 
 
 (2) Commissions of specialists authorized by 
 the legislature and appointed by the gov- 
 ernor directly in California and Arkansas. 
 
 Irrespective of constitution, however, all 
 three classes of commissions had recourse 
 to specialists in the branches of adminis- 
 tration affected. The purely legislative 
 investigating committee of Colorado, for 
 example, set up a staff organized under a 
 chief to care for the routine of the inves- 
 tigation, while in special assignments and 
 consultation the committee had recourse to 
 specialists, classified in the preliminary 
 acknowledgment of the report as certified 
 public accountants, surgeons and physicians, 
 political economists, and engineers. 
 
 The method of formal joint legislative committees is best shown in the 
 action of the Illinois Efficiency and Economy Committee which employed Dr. 
 
 tual service of the government. Partly as a result of this body, how- 
 ever, there was established in connection with the Civil Service Com- 
 mission, a division of efficiency. The report was sent to Congress 
 with his approval on June 27, 1912. It was printed as House Document 
 No. 854 of the Sixty-second Congress, second session (568 pages). 
 
43 
 
 John A* Fairlie, Professor of Political Science in the University of Illinois 
 to direct the survey and authorized him to employ such specialists as he 
 might need from time to time. The sub- commit tee elected by Professor Fairlie 
 was unique among all such committees in the large preponderance of full pro- 
 fessors from the state university on the investigating and consulting staff. 
 
 Of the twelve divisions of functional organization: Revenue and finance, 
 
 accounts, charitable and correctional institutions, educational administra- 
 tion, labor and mining, agriculture, public health, corporations, public 
 works, military affairs, ana civil service, ten were in charge of these men 
 from the state university staff. The two exceptions were a former secretary 
 of the Chicago commission on city expenditures, and a member of the Munic- 
 ipal Reference Bureau, Cincinnati, Ohio in charge of the divisions of Account- 
 ing administration and Public works respectively. In New York, Iowa, Ohio, 
 and Maryland the specialists employed ranged from staff members of the Munic- 
 ipal Reference Bureaus of New York City and Akron, Ohio, respectively, to 
 private firms of efficiency engineers like that of Griffenhagen and Asso- 
 ciates, Chicago, employed by the Maryland commission. 
 
 In the appointment of a commission of eleven members by Governor Steph- 
 ens, 1918, "to survey the activities of state government and report upon the 
 practicability of introducing economies in administration" there is rep- 
 resented the third type of investigating commission, comprising either a 
 
 2 
 
 Among the duties assigned to this Board were the following: "To in- 
 vestigate duplication of work of public bodies and the efficiency of 
 the organization and administration of such public bodies; formulate 
 plans for the greater coordination of such public bodies and the 
 improvement of the state administration in general. To prepare a 
 budget report. To publish reports and make recommendations to the 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 . 
 
 
 
 l 
 
 ’ 
 
 . 
 
 
 . 
 
 
44 
 
 mixed memoership of state officials and specialists, or a commission of spe- 
 cialists , or a commission of specialists exclusively. Governor Stephens 
 chose to combine the official point of view with that of specialists from 
 the outside by appointing on the commission, in addition to well known spe- 
 cialists, the state comptroller, attorney general, three members of the state 
 board of control and six citizens, one of whom was president of the Common- 
 wealth olub of California and another of whom was a former United States 
 senator. 
 
 An interesting variation from the main details of the foregoing three 
 methods of determining the personnel of commissions is that of Oregon. In 
 this state a concurrent resolution of the general assembly in 1917 provided 
 for a commission of seven members, composed of representative business men 
 of Oregon "to study state administration with a view to consolidation and 
 
 A 
 
 elimination of offices, boards, and commissions.** Three bankers, two law- 
 yers, one packer, and one realty broker were appointed and they in turn 
 employed or. J. W. Mathews, Professor of Political Science of the Univer- 
 sity of Illinois, as expert investigator. Here we have the first instance 
 of a substitution of the business men's point of view for the official 
 judgment of formal legislative commissions. A sharper deviation from the 
 general rule affecting the personnel of these commissions is the act of 
 Massachusetts General Court which in 1916 abolished the economy and effi- 
 
 legislature.’* * (Ch. 45, 1911). 
 
 o 
 
 * or a detailed account of "the state movement for efficiency and 
 economy" see a monograph bearing this title by Raymond Moley, pub- 
 
 lished by the New York Bureau of Municipal Research as "Bulletin 
 No. 90" (163 pages). 
 
45 
 
 ciency commission and transferred its powers to a supervisor of administration 
 who was authorized to organize a staff with the consent of the governor and 
 council* functioning not only as an investigating officer, the supervisor in 
 a series of annual reports has embodied the point of view of the impartial 
 investigator from the outside with that of a critic of the administration on 
 the governor's staff. 
 
 In a class somewhat apart from commissions selected solely for purposes 
 of investigation and recommendation, is the character of a state commission 
 on constitutional amendment and revision authorized by the Pennsylvania leg- 
 islature in 1919 to prepare a tentative draft of a constitution for submis- 
 sion to a proposed constitutional convention. Aside from its interest as 
 the first instance of such an idea applied to constitution making in general, 
 is its significance as a broader application of the mixed type of investiga- 
 ting commission. As appointed by the governor it consisted of twenty-three 
 men and two women, including lawyers, representatives of organized labor, a 
 college president, representatives of the agricultural and business interests 
 of the state, and representatives of large financial interests. Another in- 
 teresting fact in tnis connection was the provision for the personnel of the 
 constitutional convention itself. Under it, ninetj'-six delegates were to be 
 elected at large, and twenty-five delegates were to be appointed by the gov- 
 ernor who in turn announced that insofar as they would serve he would appoint 
 
 c 
 
 members of the preliminary commission. 
 
 4 
 
 A similar commission was that of Minnesota appointed by the governor 
 in 1913. This commission was composed of thirty members and rep- 
 resented the political and industrial interests of all sections of 
 the state. It appointed a staff consisting of a consulting statis- 
 

 
 
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46 
 
 Of an entirely different status, but none the less complete and effect- 
 ive were the activities of the California Taxpayers' Association culminating 
 in an unofficial plan for the "reorganization of the state government of Cal- 
 ifornia" published in their own periodical. For a period of six years the 
 association had devoted itself to a study of the problem of reorganization, 
 devoting much in their publications to the "analysis of existing conditions 
 and systems, on the financial side of state government." While no official 
 cognizance seems ever to have been taken of this voluntary association, a 
 committee on efficiency and economy being authorized by the legislature in 
 the same year the report appeared, its actual influence as a very detailed 
 and original analysis of functional organization of state activities is one 
 of the noteworthy contributions to the reorganization movement, its unof- 
 ficial character notwithstanding. 0 
 
 Another type of purely voluntary activity on the part of expert inve- 
 tigations is that of the National Municipal League, New York City. For a 
 number of years this organization through its official organ, the National 
 Municipal Review and a large variety of supplementary pamphlets has been a 
 pioneer agency in the field of municipal reform. State administrative re- 
 organization from its inception on a broader scalo a decade ago has had a 
 large share of the attention of this body. As a fitting method of summariz- 
 
 tician, Dr. E. Dana Durand, former director of the United States cen- 
 sus, a secretary, and a clerk. 
 
 5 For a fuller consideration of this Commission see W. F. Dodd's "Leg- 
 islative Notes and Reviews" in the American Political Science Review 
 for November, 1921, p. 558. Particularly significant is his reference 
 to the governor's object in advocating the creating of the commission: 
 
 "Ho (the governor) believed that if the constitution was to be revised, 
 
47 
 
 ing their findings during tnis time, a committee on state government was 
 authorised to draft a progress report on a model state constitution for the 
 consideration of the national organization. As a result, a "Model State 
 Constitution" was presented by the committee, November 18, 1921, for the 
 consideration of the national meeting of the League held in Chicago on that 
 date. Although "subject to further amendment and improvement in draftman- 
 ship," the report presents a complete state constitution in thirteen parts 
 which may be said to embody the most desirable features of the reports of 
 expert investigators in the field of state government. While it is yet ear- 
 ly to estimate the influence of this recent and novel addition to the reports 
 of the efficiency and economy commissions, it is reasonable to assume that 
 no study of these agencies would be complete which did not take into account 
 
 7 
 
 the "Model State Constitution." 
 
 i^'rom this brief survey o>f legislative acts authorizing efficiency and 
 economy commissions and providing for tneir membership, three general prac- 
 tices or tendencies stand out as having a bearing on the exhaustiveness of 
 their investigations, the adequateness of their standards of appraisement 
 of administrative agencies, the practicability of their recommendations, and 
 the weight these recommendations might have on legislative bodies: 
 
 (1) The purely legislative investigating commit- 
 tees comprised of members from the two chambers 
 
 the convention charged with that duty, no matter how distinguished 
 the delegates, to do good work, must have the aid of the results of 
 a prior systematic study of the present constitution in the light 
 of modern thought and conditions. He also believed that the question 
 whether there should be a revision of the constitution was so impor- 
 tant, that before it was finally decided by the people, they should 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
48 
 
 for conducting inquiries, holding hearings, 
 and collecting evidence after the manner of 
 the Texas joint committee of 1917 give way 
 to commissions of specialists acting jointly 
 with or independently of official representa- 
 tives* Examples of this tendency are the 
 recent authorization of new specialist com- 
 missions in Arkansas, Colorado, Maryland, 
 Ohio, South Dakota, and Virginia* 
 
 (2) The formal legislative committees comprised 
 of official members who delegate the actual 
 work of investigating and recommendation to 
 specialist suo-committees give way to the 
 mixed commissions of official representatives 
 acting conjointly with specialists from the 
 outside. The obvious purpose of this newer 
 practice is to secure a combination of the 
 official point of view with that of special- 
 
 have the advice of the best commission which it was in his power to 
 create. 
 
 6 See "A Plan for Reorganization of State Government" in the January, 
 1919, number of the California Taxpayers * Journal pp. 20 and 21. 
 
 The following statement of explanation is significant: "This plan 
 
 has been prepared by the Taxpayers' Association of California, and 
 is offered for the benefit of all who may be interested in a fun- 
 damental reorganization calcukted to promote efficiency and economy. . 
 In performing this work the Taxpayers' Association has separated all 
 the individual functions now performed by each of the existing 
 agencies of state government, and then co-ordinated them in accor- 
 
49 
 
 ist8 from the outside in the interest of 
 practicable findings with the added weight 
 of those representatives from the legisla- 
 tive body on the committee who stand spons- 
 or for committee recommendations in the 
 debates over their enactment. Conspicuous 
 recent examples of this tendency are those 
 commissions of California and Ohio. In 
 this connection the certificate of trans- 
 mittal on the Ohio report is significant: 
 "Submitted (by Akron Bureau of Municipal 
 Research) to the Joint Committee on Admin- 
 istrative Reorganization and submitted by 
 the Committee to State officials and the 
 public for comment, suggestion, and crit- 
 icism before approval and adoption by the 
 committee. 
 
 (3) The acts creating joint legislative commit- 
 tees give way to broad grants authorizing 
 the governor to draw up such reorganization 
 plana or codes in any manner he may see fit, 
 
 dance with a definite functional classification. So far as the Associa- 
 tion is aware, no plan of reorganization, in any state, has heretofore 
 been worked out on the basis of the functional unit. In the absence of 
 such a base, no exact and thorough co-ordination, eliminating all con- 
 flicts and duplications, is possible. 
 

 
 1 
 
 
 ‘ 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 « 
 
 * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
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50 
 
 and submit them to the legislature. The 
 most notable examples of tnis newer tend- 
 ency are those of Minnesota, Michigan, 
 
 Missouri, and Washington, 1919 and 1921. 
 
 In the preparation of the Washington ad- 
 ministrative code the governor had the 
 assistance of an Attorney- General known 
 for his intimate knowledge of state govern- 
 ment and one other, an expert draftsman and 
 attorney of Seattle. 
 
 In other words, a comparative study of the reports and recommendations 
 of the efficiency and economy commissions as mixed groups of practical gov- 
 ernment officials and specialists from the outside may reasonably be expect- 
 ed to reveal tendencies and principles which represent (1) Exhaustive inves- 
 tigation, analysis, and selection, and (2) the necessary element of practic- 
 ability. 
 
 Z. In the reports of methods of investigation is revealed likewise the 
 true expert character of the commission. "The members of the Committee, by 
 reason of their service in the Forty-eight and preceding General Assemblies, 
 and particularly by reason of their service on appropriation committee, " 
 read the preliminary statement of the Illinois Efficiency and Economy Commit- 
 tee report, "were familiar with the lack of systematic organization among 
 
 n 
 
 See "Progress Report on a Model State Constitution" presented by the 
 Committee on State Government for the approval of Members of the 
 National Municipal League at Chicago, November 18, 1921. 
 

 
 
 
 
 t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ‘ 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
 numerous state oificers, boards, and commissions, and were aware that new 
 authorities might have been more effectively organized in connection with the 
 already existing departments. They were also acquainted with the confusion 
 resulting from this defective organization and with the difficulties of ex- 
 ercising adequate control over appropriations and expenditures. The Committee 
 believed, however, that it should have as a basis for its work a more thor- 
 ough and exact knowledge than was possessed by its members, of the existing 
 state offices, boards, and commissions, of the laws under which they operated, 
 and of their internal organization, appropriations, and work performed. After 
 making some preliminary study of the situation the Committee employed John A. 
 Fairlie, Professor of Political Science in the University of Illinois, as 
 Director of its investigational work ... In carrying out the investigations 
 expert assistants have been employed, from the staff of the University of 111"* 
 inois, from other universities and from those with practical experience in 
 similar investigations. Each division of the work has been in charge of some 
 one with special knowledge and fitness for the particular problem. In making 
 their investigations, the Director and other investigators have consulted free 
 ly with the state officers, boards, and commissions, and with other persons 
 and organizations affected by or interested in the working of such services. . 
 Following the publication of this preliminary report, a series of public hear- 
 ings was held by the committee in Chicago and Springfield, for the further con 
 sideration of the tentative plans. Notice of these hearings was sent to the 
 public press; and special notices were sent to the state officers, and to 
 organizations and individuals known to be interested in the work of particular 
 groups of authorities." The committee here lists eighty representative of- 
 

 
 
 
 
 
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 , 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . . 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
 ficais from the state departments called in from time to time for conference. 
 Concluding, it states: "It should be clearly understood that the work of the 
 
 Committee has not been undertaken with a view to the personal criticism ei- 
 ther of particular officials or of present or past administration. No single 
 official or administration can be held responsible for the existing condi- 
 tions as a whole. The fundamental difficulty lies in the defective organiza- 
 tion provided by law. So, too, the findings and recommendations of the com- 
 mittee are made without reference to any personal or political results; but 
 solely with reference to the inherent defects in the existing machinery and 
 plans for a permanent reorganization of the state administration on a basis 
 of efficiency and economy." 8 To the same end were the methods of the Ohio 
 commission as indicated in this quotation from the preliminary statement: 
 "Consideration of expedience have been a negligible factor in the formula- 
 tion of the following recommendations. The controlling thought has been to 
 devise the best possible plan of state reorganization after careful considera- 
 tion of all the available facts bearing upon the problem. Hundreds of let- 
 ters were written to former state officials, present state officials, civic, 
 professional, social, and business organizations and interested citizens for 
 the purpose of securing ideas and facts. Conferences were held with individ- 
 uals, state officials, and a few public hearings were conducted for the pur- 
 pose of securing additional information. In addition to the ideas and sug- 
 gestions which were received from citizens in Ohio, a large amount of valu- 
 able information was obtained from persons of wide experience in government- 
 al affairs in other states." The California commission writes: "A commu- 
 
 O 
 
 "Report of the Efficiency and Economy Committee (Illinois) p. 28. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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nication was sent to every state department, board, and commission, request- 
 ing that the committee be furnished with the following information: 
 
 (1) What are your powers, duties, and internal 
 organization as provided by law, and in 
 fact exercised? 
 
 (2) To what extent do the powers and duties 
 of your department overlap and duplicate 
 those of another? 
 
 (3) What changes, if any, do you believe could 
 be made in your department in order that 
 the work might be carried on most effective- 
 ly and in the most efficient and economical 
 manner? 
 
 (4) What other suggestions have you in mind 
 relating either to your own department or 
 to the state’s business as a whole, that 
 will make for a more efficient administra- 
 tion of the affairs of the state? 
 
 The various agencies of the state answered in great detail. After the 
 receipt by the committees of the replies, the sub-committees with associate 
 memoers held hearings in Sacramento, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, to which 
 were invited the representatives of the various boards, commissions, and 
 departments, together with those citizens who had expressed interest in the 
 subjects under discussion, and the general public. At the hearings the full- 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
 est and freest opportunity was given for the expressions of ideas and views, 
 
 9 
 
 to which full consideration was given later by the committee." 
 
 In the utilization of specialists, the California commission on the 
 testimony of its own report went far beyond any of the other thirty or more 
 commissions which followed in the main this general policy. The original 
 commission of eleven members was subdivided into five chief sub- commit tees: 
 legal service, finance, commerce and public utilities, public works and pro- 
 perties, thirty in agriculture and natux'al resources, twenty-two in labor, 
 twenty-one in education, thirty-one in public health, twenty-six in public 
 welfare, ten in civil service, and twelve in state defense, or a total of 
 221 professional and business specialists drawn from every walk of life. 
 
 From this brief survey of the methods of commissions as indicated in 
 preliminary pages of their reports, the following significant features in 
 their methods of procedure should be stressed as they bear also on the ex- 
 haustiveness, the authoritive character of the findings, and the practic- 
 ability of recommendations for legislative enactments: 
 
 (1) The direct participation of public officials 
 in the investigations of the commissions, (ei- 
 ther as members of the commission in Illinois, 
 
 Ohio, and California, or as conferees and 
 advisers in an associate capacity), in prac- 
 tically all the commissions, though on the 
 
 q 
 
 Report of the Committee on Efficiency and Economy of California, 
 
 March, 1919, p. 7. 
 
55 
 
 largest scale in California commission. 
 
 (2) The utilization of specialists from the state 
 at large either as members of the commission 
 or as associate members of sub- committees in 
 Illinois and ualifornia, especially. 
 
 (3) The securing of first hand information about 
 the conditions and problems of the administra- 
 tive agencies by inviting or summoning state 
 officials before the commission, or by request- 
 ing reports. 
 
 (4) The emphasis placed on public hearings in which 
 interested parties were privileged to partic- 
 ipate. 
 
 3. Jfrom the considerations of personnel and methods, we come next to the 
 analysis of conditions as the commissions found them in state administrative 
 departments. A striking note of uniformity runs through the findings as set 
 forth in the several reports. "The main points in the indictment may be brief- 
 ly summarized," writes the Illinois commission. "There is unnecessary duplica- 
 tion of positions and salaries; not only in the chief officers of each sep- 
 arate bureau or board, but still more in their staffs of clerks and employees. 
 But this is the smallest part of the loss. The work that is undertaken is not 
 well done; ana costs much more for the results ootained than with a more ef- 
 ficient organization. Supplies in many cases are purchased in small quantities 
 for each office or institution, which could be secured at lower prices if pur- 
 

 
 
 
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 . 
 
 ‘ 
 
 
 
 
 
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 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 . 
 
 
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 ’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 V i 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
 chased in larger quantities on contracts based on competitive bids, as is 
 done by the board of Administration for the charitable institutions. The 
 absence of definite correlation and cooperation between the most closely re- 
 lated offices, necessarily leads to loss and inefficient work. The only su- 
 pervision provided by law over most of the executive offices, boards, and 
 commissions, burdens the governor with a mass of unnecessary details which 
 no single individual can effectively handle, and at the same time does not 
 afford him either the time or the facilities for the proper determination of 
 the more important questions of administrative and legislative policy. The 
 present arrangements fail to provide the General Assembly with adequate in- 
 formation or advice to enable it to perform its work wisely, either in mak- 
 ing appropriations or in enacting substantive legislation. And while reports 
 are made and published, they are so numerous and poorly organized that the 
 general public fails to receive satisfactory information of the work that is 
 done, and has no satisfactory means for fixing responsibility, or of discrim- 
 inating between those officials who perform their work well and those who per- 
 form is poorly or not at all." 10 Out of this general condition, the commis- 
 sion points out, these results: overlapping functions, irregularity of re- 
 
 ports, ineffective correlation and supervision, a lack of standards of com- 
 pensation, imperfect accounts, and inadequate advice on legislation from the 
 executive departments. 
 
 Using these several '’counts" as a basis of comparison, one notes that 
 
 to 
 
 whereas in emphasizing the lack of correlation, the Illinois commission 
 points out the half-dozen boards dealing with agricultural interests, the 
 
 10 
 
 Illinois report, p. 24. 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 r 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 «* 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 . . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . . . . 
 
 
57 
 
 score of separate labor agencies, and the distribution of finance administra- 
 tion between various elective and appointive officials,^ the New York commis- 
 sion reports ten agencies for carrying on agricultural activities, seven for 
 finance, ten for charitable institutions, and eight local boards for as many 
 normal schools. Thirty- five agencies handle agriculture in Oregon, according 
 to its commission, eight labor, forty-three education, and twenty-one carry 
 on the activities of public works. The New Jersey commission found tnat 
 five distinct boards and bureaus controlled the oyster industry, that six 
 important commissions were engaged in conservation and developmental work, 
 
 and the control of one state prison was scattered among five different author- 
 13 
 
 ities. The California commission notes that nine departments acting sep- 
 arately carry on the agricultural activities of the state and concludes "that 
 California can not have a consistent agricultural policy" until a coordina- 
 tion is effected, continuing, it says, "There are no factors which are great- 
 er causes of inefficiency than decentralized and inadequate supervision and 
 14 
 
 review." The Illinois commission notes that the "division of the public 
 service in some fields has even affected the authority of the state officials, 
 provided by the constitution, where in some cases unrelated functions are 
 placed under th6 same official. The title of the auditor of public accounts 
 indicates that he should control the auditing of all public accounts in the 
 state; but his authority in this field is limited; on the other hand, he has 
 supervision over banks and building and loan associations, a function quite 
 
 ^Illinois report p. 29. 
 
 ~ 2 Report of the Reconstruction Commission on Retrenchment and Reorganiza- 
 .^tion in the State Government (1919) p. 6. 
 
 "Second Report of the Commission upon the Reorganization and Consolida- 
 tion of Different Departments of the State Government Whose Junctions 
 are Interralted (1914) p. 24. 
 

 
 
 
 
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LitSOKIfn 
 
 58 
 
 distinct from the audit of public accounts. The Virginia commission found 
 that the power of auditing their own expense accounts was vested in the state 
 board of education, department of agriculture, and kindred agencies. ^ Five 
 commissi ons not e the scattered offices, a type finding of which was that of 
 Illinois, where thirty state officials and commissions had offices in Chicago 
 at a cost for rent and other expenses of almost one hundred thousand dollars 
 a year. 
 
 No less vigorous is the commissions ' general attack on the lack of any 
 standards of compensation in state administration. The Oregon commission 
 asks: "Why should the members of the state board of chiropractic examiners 
 
 receive $10.00 per day, while the members of the state board of examiners 
 receive only $5.00 per day: Why should the secretary of the state fair board 
 
 receive $3,000 per annum, while the state dairy and food commissioner re- 
 ceives only $2,000 per annum?" The Virginia commission notes that the sal- 
 ary of the state superintendent who supervises the expenditure of millions 
 and the management of a very important government agency receives $3,500 a 
 year, while the division superintendent of the city of Richmond gets $4,999 
 a year. In the same vein the Illinois commission observes that the state 
 food commissioner of Illinois receives $3,600 a year while the more important 
 offices of the secretary of the state board of health receive only $3,500.“^ 
 Overlapping functions of the several departments receive special attention 
 
 ^California report p. 16. 
 15 
 
 6 
 
 .^Illinois report p. 23* 
 
 17 
 
 18 
 
 Report of the Commission on Economy and Efficiency (1918) p. 17. 
 Report of tne consolidation Commission (1918) p. 43. 
 
 Virginia report p. 34. 
 
 ^Illinois report p. 20. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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59 
 
 at the hands of all the commissions, particularly the departments of inspec- 
 tion from which representatives of special boards or commissions may each 
 visit th6 same place for different purposes, and generally issue conflict- 
 ing orders, a condition described at length by the New York Commission. w An- 
 other source of confusion in the operation of the numerous state departments 
 which the commissions invariably point out, is the complete absence of uni- 
 formity or regularity as to their reports. The Colorado commission makes 
 the most searching analysis of executive reports. In this connection it 
 finds: ’’Practically every state department makes an annual or biennial 
 
 printed report to the governor. These reports in the last biennial period 
 varied from seven pages to over 600 pages in size. There is no unformity 
 in contents. . . The contents of some of these reports are open to crit- 
 icism. The annual report of the board of health, for example, issued in 
 1916, of which 5,000 copies were printed, cost $878.00. There were 233 
 pages in the report, 120 pages of which were used in reprinting a compila- 
 tion of laws relating to the promotion of sanitation and health. These laws 
 have no place in an annual report. It is a matter of common knowledge that 
 department reports transmitted by the governor to the legislature each bien- 
 nial period are rarely utilized or read by the members of the house and sen- 
 21 
 
 ate." A similar analysis of each of twenty-two other department reports 
 follows and ends with the recommendation that the whole matter of reports 
 should be discretionary with the governor. The Illinois commission finds 
 "that the separate publication of reports for each minor office and the lack 
 of central control over the printing of such reports adds much to the expense 
 
 20 
 
 New York report p. 115. 
 
 ^Report on a Survey of the Office of Governor (no.l) (1916) p. 18. 
 

 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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60 
 
 22 
 
 of printing, whicn now amounts to over $500.00 for the biennium.' 
 
 The prevailing condition of ineffective supervision in state administra- 
 tion is given marked attention in all the reports. "It is a curious com- 
 mentary on our respect for logic," observes the hew York commission, "that 
 the article of the constitution which confers the executive power upon the 
 governor is followed by one which deprives him of a large part of it by creat- 
 ing a number of high executive officers elected by popular vote and almost 
 wholly independent of him in the conduct of executive business. As Governor 
 Hughes remarked in his second inaugural, after two years' experience in the 
 office: ‘While the governor represents the highest executive power in the 
 
 state, there is frequently observed a popular misapprehension as to its scope. 
 There is a wide domain over which he has no control, or slight control. '"The 
 fact is," the report continues, "that while the constitution provides for an 
 officer who is called the 'governor', only as a matter of declaration of 
 principle may he be said to be endowed with 'executive power.' . . Article V 
 is a hisorical accumulation, not a reasoned product of administrative science. 
 There is no consistent scheme for defining departmental limits. The powers 
 and duties of five important officers dignified by constitutional mention, 
 th6 secretary of state, comptroller, treasurer, attorney-general, and en- 
 gineer and surveyor, are left wholly undefined. . . One hundred and thirty- 
 eight years of political experience has demonstrated the inadequacy of mere 
 declarations to make a chief executive. . The fact is that the constitution 
 itself inhibits the development of a responsible chief executive. • • Provid- 
 ing no organization for a chief executive, the constitutional inhibition 
 
 22 
 
 Illinois report p. 21 
 

 
 
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61 
 
 against the expenditure of puolic moneys except pursuant to appropriations 
 has done the rest. Acting within these constitutional powers, the legisla- 
 ture has also failed to provide either organization or funds with which the 
 governor might build up staff agencies • . . furthermore, the legislature 
 has estaolished 140 different departmental officers and commissions having 
 administration duties with no provision for coordination and with little 
 possibility of executive direction and control.” Turning next to the gov- 
 ernor's power of appointment and removal, the commission continues: ”As has 
 
 been pointed out in other connections, no consistent principles have been 
 applied in the determination of what officers should be made independent of 
 the governor through popular election and what officers should be made sub- 
 ordinate to him through the exercise of the power of appointment, for instance 
 the state engineer and surveyor, an officer charged with duties which involve 
 those of officers appointed by the governor, is made elective by the consti- 
 tution, and an equally technical position, for which no qualifications are 
 established, that of superintendent of public works, is made appointive. The 
 governor's adviser on legal matters of great moment who is responsible in a 
 
 large measure for the enforcement of the law, the attorney general, is elect- 
 
 23 
 
 ed, while the superintendent of prisons is an appointive officer.” Carrying 
 the survey farther, the Commission finds that the methods of removal provided 
 by the constitution and the statutues as well were "confusing beyond measure.” 
 The constitution authorizes the removal of two officers by the governor, and 
 the suspension of a third. In the case of the removal of the superintendent 
 of public works, the governor must file a statement of causes with the sec- 
 
 Report of the New York State Constitutional Convention Commission 
 (1915) p. 95. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 X 
 
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62 
 
 retary of state. In the case of offices elected by statute, the commission 
 emphasizes here also great variation and inconsistency. 
 
 The most exhaustive study of this phase of the governor's power is that 
 of the Colorado commission. In a summary statement it points out the lack of 
 uniformity in the existing method of appointment by the governor in Colorado: 
 
 1. All appointments of officers on examining boards are made by the governor 
 without the consent of the senate, with the exception of the board of dental 
 examiners who are appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate. 
 
 2. Commissioners like those of state banks are appointed by the governor with 
 the approval of the senate, while the commissioner of mines and others are 
 appointed by the governor alone. 3. Whereas the state engineer is appointed 
 by the governor alone, the five irrigation engineers under him are appointed 
 by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate. Here follow a 
 dozen other similar citations of inconsistency in appointment provisions. ^ 
 
 In the same vein, the Oregon commission points out the three principal 
 ways of choosing state officials: election by the people, by appointment 
 
 of the governor, by appointment of the governor and other executive officers. 
 It notes thirteen principal elective executive officials; thirty-two boards 
 and commissions which elect their own secretaries entirely independently of 
 the governor; and sixteen other principal executive officials appointed by 
 other elective officers, also independently of the governor. Commenting on 
 this condition, the commission continues: "No efficient and businesslike 
 
 administration of state affairs in Oregon can be expressed unless some one 
 
 24 
 
 Colorado report p. 15. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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63 
 
 officer, who is fully responsiole to the people can control all the important 
 departments of the administration, with the possiole exception of the auditing 
 and treasury departments* The governor does not do so at present, however, 
 for three main reasons: (l) Because there are too many elective officers. (2) 
 
 because the administration is split up into too many departments for the gov- 
 ernor to exercise adequate control over them. (3) Because the appointing pow- 
 er is too often shared with other officials, boards, and commissions . • • 
 Instead of one governor, Oregon has a multitude of governors . . . There is no 
 logical reason inhering in the character of the position or the nature of the 
 duties why some officers should be elective and others appointive. Why should 
 the public service commissioners be elective while the industrial accident 
 commissioners and the highway commissioners are appointive! Why should the 
 labor commissioner be elective while the corporation commissioner is appoint- 
 ive!”^ 
 
 A degree of disintegration greater even than this of the Oregon execu- 
 tive, however, is revealed in the findings of the Delaware commission. It 
 was found in making the survey in that state that the administrative branch 
 of the government included one hundred seventeen separate agencies, which 
 were in many cases independent of each other and without any direct and 
 effective supervision by the governor* Of these agencies, the heads of six 
 were elected by the people, eighty-three appointed by the governor (in most 
 cases with the senate's approval) , two were appointed by the judges of the 
 superior court of the state, twelve by boards and administrative officers 
 other than the governor, and fourteen were ex-officio bodies. Fifty- four 
 
 25 
 
 Oregon report p. 9 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
 of the total number of agencies were headed by boards or commissions* In 
 addition to certain inherent defects which it points out, the commission 
 found that the board system of Delaware was so organized as to deprive the 
 governor of the control which he must have in order to be responsible for 
 the state's business. This was especially true since members had overlap- 
 ping terms, making it possible for the governor to chose only a minority dur- 
 ing his term. ?,e When we come to summarize, then, the findings of commis- 
 sions with respect to the impotency of the American state governor in the 
 matter of supervision, we find that a concensus of the reports shows: 
 
 (1) A so-called "chief" executive surrounded by a group 
 of constitutional, elective executive state officers 
 with a political relationship such that the governor 
 can actually exercise little supervision over them. 
 
 And as the Illinois commission points out, this lack 
 
 of control extends not only to their primary functions, 
 but also to other unrelated powers and duties imposed 
 on them by statute. 
 
 ( 2 ) A statutory organization of the executive department 
 with a preponderance of boards, officers, and commis- 
 sions usually appointive by the governor (with the 
 advice and consent of the senate), but in many cases 
 with terms so adjusted that he does not control the 
 appointment of individual officers or of a majority 
 of the members of boards. 
 
 26 
 
 Report and Recommendations of the Delaware State Survey Commission 
 (1920) p. 11* 
 

65 
 
 (3) Statutory as well as constitutional provisions for 
 appointment and removal whicft follow no consistent 
 principle of effective administrative control and 
 thereby remove important officers from even the 
 governor's nominal supervision. 
 
 (4) A multiplicity of separate offices, which, though 
 under the nominal supervision of the governor 
 through his power of appointment and removal, by 
 their very number makes impossible the exercise of 
 any adequate control. 
 
 4 finally, there logically follows from this lack of correlation and effect- 
 ive supervision, the Illinois commission points out, one of the most serious 
 defects of state government: namely, the absence of any satisfactory budget 
 
 of estimates as a basis of appropriation. In this connection the Commission 
 observes that although the constitution expressly provides that the governor 
 shall "present estimates of the amount of money required to be raised by taxa- 
 tion for all purposes" no governor had "heretofore ever complied with this 
 
 27 
 
 constitutional duty." The Commission concludes that the failure to do so 
 had undoubtedly been due in tne main to the fact that the executive author- 
 ities as organized had not afforded the governor the facilities he needed to 
 
 perform this duty. Identical with this finding is that of t«e Colorado Com- 
 ?8 
 
 mission. 4 The Mew York Commission sees the same direct relation between a 
 disintegrated executive and a sound system of finance and budget. Among oth- 
 er things it observes: "The present numerous independent agencies of the 
 
 ^Illinois report p. 22. 
 
 °Colorado report p. 24. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 state government make impossible wise planning in the distribution of public 
 expenditures among the several branches of the service; and they likewise 
 work against strict and effective control over the use of money and property •. 
 Where there are unlimited demands made by a hundred or more agencies, a scram- 
 ble ensues • . Even if the governor should be empowered to prepare the budg- 
 et of the state for legislative consideration, he could not do it effectively 
 under the present organization. A cabinet of a hundred and eighty or more 
 members is unthinkable and a cabinet is necessary to financial planning . • . 
 The more spigots there are in the barrel the more difficult it is to keep a 
 watch on them. There are too many streams and rivulets runnings out of New 
 York's treasury. Our present budget system instead of being the most effect- 
 ive instrument in the hands of the Executive for planning order and economy 
 in the work of all departments, has been the means of further scattering au- 
 
 29 
 
 thority and responsibility and of producing enormous waste in expenditures.' 
 
 The Massachusetts Commission draws a convincing conclusion in this connection 
 from the refusal of the governor in 1919 to take any of the responsibility for 
 the budget of that year. In transmitting the budget to the legislature he is 
 reported as saying, "The estimates for expenditures have been studied by the 
 supervisor of administration and his recommendations are embodied in the sum- 
 mary of financial statements submitted with the budget." In repeated ref- 
 erences to this budget, the Commission observes, the governor invariably 
 referred to the "recommendation of the supervisor of administration," assum- 
 ing no responsibility therefore, though the budget law requires the supervis- 
 or to prepare a budget for the governor "setting forth such recommendations 
 as the governor shall determine." As good and satisfactory reasons for the 
 
 29 
 
 New York report p. 29 
 

 
 
 
 
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 refuaai of the governor to assume any of the responsibility for the budget, 
 the Commission points out (1) That both an elected executive council and a 
 legislative organization and procedure prevent his leadership, while the 
 supervisor of administration who is charged with the duty of preparing the 
 estimates is responsible to a ten-headed executive, the "governor and coun- 
 cil." (2) A large part of the departmental estimates for special purposes 
 was filed too late to allow for the necessary revision before the supervisor 
 made recommendations for the governor's budget. (3) The tentative budget for 
 1919 was in the hands of the governor for only five days although it called 
 for an outlay of over thirty-five millions of dollars. The Commission then 
 reviews in detail the procedure by which, under the budget act, the House 
 Ways and Means Committee remade the budget which the governor submitted. In 
 approving the bill, the commission points out that the governor not only 
 "did not exercise his right to veto items in appropriation bills or to reduce 
 items, but accepted every change made by the legislature." A more striking 
 example of executive impotence could hardly be cited. In this same connec- 
 tion, the Illinois Commission observes: "With the existing lack of efficient 
 
 organization, both the Governor and the General Assembly fail to receive prop- 
 er information and advice as to needed legislation. The constitution provides 
 that the governor shall recommend to the General Assembly such measures as he 
 shall deem expedient, hut no machinery has been provided by which the rec- 
 ommendations and proposals for legislation from the numerous lists of of- 
 ficers, boards, and commissions can be carefully weighed and sifted by of- 
 ficals charged with responsibility over a large field of administration . • 
 
 30 "" 
 
 Cf. Cleveland and buck: "The budget and Responsible Government" p.226. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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68 
 
 As a result there is no harmonious legislative policy even formulated; and 
 the measures enacted not only lack coherence, but at times are passed at the 
 same session which contain directly contradictory provisions.” 0 
 
 In conclusion, two reports may well be quoted as representative of the 
 
 general conclusions of the Commissions with respect to the general situation 
 
 in state administrative departments as they found it. "Under the present 
 
 arrangements," writed the Illinois Commission, "while the general public is 
 
 deluged with printed reports, it fails to receive reliable information in 
 
 digestible form as to the conduct of the state administration, and is unable 
 
 to locate definite responsibility for negligence or misconduct in public 
 
 business. Public opinion usually considers the Governor responsible for the 
 
 conduct of the State government; but with the lack of effective executive 
 
 control over the subordinate officials this opinion is not fully justified. 
 
 At the same time, the popular conception of the Governor's responsibility, 
 
 in the opinion of this Committee, is based on a sound and just principle; 
 
 and the machinery of state administration should be so organized as to enable 
 
 32 
 
 this conception to be adequately realized." 
 
 "Such an inquiry," concludes the New York Commission, "reveals at the 
 outset the fact that we have attempted to secure responsible and efficient 
 government without utilizing the means which are known to be effective for 
 locating and enforcing responsibility, and have adopted methods for obtain- 
 ing efficiency which are repudiated in institutions, both public and private, 
 where efficiency obtains. We have sacrificed, perhaps unwittingly, honest 
 
 31 
 
 ^Illinois report p. 22. 
 
 32 Ibid. p. 24. 
 

 
 
 
 
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69 
 
 and efficient government to our fear of vesting power in the hands of our 
 puolic offices. No business, public as well as private, can be successful 
 if those who are in charge of it are not given powers commensurate with their 
 responsibilities. It may be that political expediency makes it desiraDle to 
 create such a confusion of offices, terms, and authorities as to prevent any 
 person or group from doing much harm (except where a party organization 
 controls all of them officially). If so, then the quest for honesty and ef- 
 ficiency all through the government is futile. Efficiency depends upon the 
 possession of adequate authority with means adapted to its effective ex- 
 ercise." 33 
 
 Out of this general appraisement of existing conditions in state exec- 
 utive departments, the following enumerated defects are noted as significant 
 in that they form the nucleus around which the efficiency reports were built 
 up: 
 
 (1) Unnecessary duplication of positions and salaries. 
 
 (2) Lack of correlation and cooperation in the work of 
 agencies carrying on similar or closely related 
 functions. 
 
 (3) Overlapping of functions even where there is no 
 direct duplication of work. 
 
 (4) Lack of equitable or logical rates of compensation. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 
 
 (5) Irregularity of reports. 
 
 (6) Lack of effective supervision and control over units 
 of related services and over the adminstration as a 
 whole. 
 
 (7) Lack of provisions for executive leadership in mat- 
 ters of economy through control of the budget. 
 
 (8) A large variety of methods of appointing administra- 
 tive officers so that no single agency can claim 
 complete authority. 
 
 (9) Overlapping terms in the same commission or board, 
 so that no new policies can be speedily adopted, 
 
 (10) Diversity in methods of removal and resulting ir- 
 responsibility of administrative agencies. 
 
 5. i*rom this analysis of exisiting conditions and summary of findings, one 
 comes to that major part of the reports of commissions to find an even great- 
 er thoroughness in the constructive proposals presented. After an inten- 
 sive study of municipal and national administration in the United States, 
 those more important and original commissions, Illinois and New York, turned 
 to administrative organization in Great Britain and in the principal govern- 
 ments of the continent in a comparative search for practical standards. The 
 influence of this study is indicated in the statement of general principles 
 and purposes by the Illinois Commission: "In order to secure efficiency 
 
 and economy in the executive organization, the Committee proposes to apply 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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71 
 
 to the State services, so far as can be done under the present State constitu- 
 tion, the general principles followed in the organization of the executive 
 departments of the United States Government. These principles are also follow- 
 ed in the administrative organization of all the important governments in the 
 world, in the recent plans for the reorganization of State and municipal gov- 
 ernments in this country, and in large private business enterprises." The 
 most comprehensive report of a similar comparative study is that of the New 
 York Commission. As a result of this comparative study, the Commission 
 
 devotes some 100 pages to establishing certain workable, desirable principles 
 
 35 
 
 for appraisement of administration at home. 
 
 An example of this comparative method and of the critical tests develop- 
 ed and applied is its statement of three objections to the Illinois Code: 
 
 (1) "It (the code) fails to give the governor or rather 
 his chief administrative officers full and unhampered 
 authority in the appointment of a number of subor- 
 dinate officers. It is contrary to the principle of 
 responsibility to have a number of subordinate officers 
 
 o 
 
 appointed by the Governor with the approval of the 
 Senate. Such appointments should be made by the de- 
 partment heads after consultation with the governor. 
 
 (2) The code does not attempt to codify the existing laws 
 relating to administration. The old laws stand as 
 they were before the adoption of the code. Only the 
 
 34 
 
 Illinois report p. 27. 
 
 3 5 
 
 Report of the New York Reconstruction Commission p. 235. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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72 
 
 agencies through which their provisions are enforced 
 
 36 
 
 have been changed. 
 
 (3) It is not sufficiently comprehensive. It does not 
 
 include all the administrative agencies of the State." 
 
 In conclusion, however, the Commission observes: "Even with these short- 
 
 comings, the Illinois Administrative Code constitutes the first comprehensive 
 consolidation scheme enacted into law. It is a worthy example to other states 
 of what can be accomplished by statutory means in the bringing together of 
 
 scattered adminstrative agencies and their integration into a real administra- 
 37 
 
 tive system." 
 
 With a directness characteristic of the reports in general, the toew York 
 Commission goes straight to the element of expediency in the Illinois plan 
 and raises a question which must have divided every such expert body engaged 
 in this work: What considerations of expediency shall be permitted to modify 
 
 the logical administrative arrangements developed in accordance with sound 
 principles: That the several noteworthy commissions had debated this point 
 
 is clearly evidenced in the preliminary statement of guiding consderations 
 with which the majority of the reports begin: "It seems advisable, however, 
 
 to present here some of the general considerations underlying the proposed 
 plan as a whole," observes the Illinois Committee, "in order to make clear 
 tne main purposes of the Committee . • • This general plan has been prepared 
 with reference to the existing authorities and their present powers and du- 
 ties. There has been no attempt to formulate an ideal scheme of State act- 
 ivities, or to propose extensive changes in the suostantive law. . j*'or the 
 
 36 
 
 Ibid. p. 258. 
 

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73 
 
 most part provision is made for continuing the present services under what is 
 believed to be a more effective organization. Nor has a strictly uniform 
 plan of organization been proposed for each department or group of services, 
 such as characterizes the French system of administration. This might be 
 advisable in organizing an entirely new system; and may be worthy of considera- 
 tion at some time in the future, with the further development of State admin- 
 istration in Illinois. But some variations in the organization for different 
 purposes seems better suited to existing services and present conditions in 
 this State. . . From another point of view, the plans proposed also fall 
 between two possible extremes. While they call for a larger number of impor- 
 tant changes, they are not presented merely as a scheme for the distant 
 future. They have been framed with refexmce to present conditions in this 
 
 QC 
 
 State; and it is believed they are adapted to prompt adoption and execution."*" 
 
 In contrast to this position seems the policy of the Ohio Commission 
 indicated in its preliminary note: "Considerations of expediency have been 
 
 a negligible factor in the formulation of the following recommendations. The 
 controlling thought has been to devise the best possible plan of state re- 
 organization after careful consideration of all the available facts bearing 
 upon the problem." On the other hand, the New Jersey Commission in recount- 
 ing some of it 8 difficulties sets out the eternal human element involved, of 
 which it seems it wise to take account. "Whenever we have broached the sub- 
 ject of consolidation, we have been met by the statement that it is most 
 excellent, that it will result in economy and that it will promote effi- 
 
 'Ibid. p. 259 
 3b Illinois report p. 32 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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74 
 
 ciency. Usually, however, where the person with whom the discussion takes 
 place is a State official, while he is loud in his praises cf what can be 
 accomplished along such lines, he is, at the same time, strong in his denun- 
 ciation of the application of it to his particular department. In other 
 words, many of the departments, boards, and commissions admit that, from a 
 business standpoint, it is most admirable, but that it should hot be applied 
 to them, as they are most efficient in the administration of their particular 
 department. As exempli tying this sentiment, we have set forth this abstract 
 of a letter written by a member of one of the State commissions to a rep- 
 resentative State civic organization: 
 
 Dear Sir: I am in receipt of the notice from the * * * 
 
 informing me of the conference that has been called for 
 Tuesday, December 23rd, to consider the work of the 
 Economy and Efficiency Commission. It is a matter of 
 regret to me that I cannot attend the conference, but I 
 heartily concur in the recommendations of the Efficiency 
 Commission for the consolidation of certain homogeneous 
 departments and the elimination of existing duplication 
 of effort. However, I want to go on record as saying 
 that I am unalterably opposed to any move or recommenda- 
 tion that will disturb the work of the * * * Commission, 
 etc. 39 
 
 following the general trend of the emphasis which the commissions seem 
 to place in preliminary statements on considerations of practicability, one 
 
 39 
 
 new Jersey report (1914) p. 15. 
 
‘ 
 
 
 
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75 
 
 is led to believe that the experience of the New Jersey Commission was du- 
 plicated v/ith similar subsequent influence upon the reports made. Observes 
 the Iowa Commission: "We do not enter upon the field of speculative re- 
 
 organization, but simply undertake to establish a business management, taking 
 things as we find them. While the committee is in sympathy with many of the 
 proposed theoretical reforms in government, yet we have not considered it our 
 field to undertake to work out any of these, leaving that field to general 
 legislation. As a matter of fact, our work is not in conflict with any of 
 these, and is in harmony with some of them, but the reforms presented in this 
 report are essentially practical, not theoretical, in spirit. We ask that 
 the proposed reforms suggested by the committee shall be judged only by the 
 reports issued by tne committee and the measures proposed to be enacted in- 
 to law, as there are many things suggested in the report of the efficiency 
 engineers and in the discussion of these matters issued from other sources, 
 with which the committee is not wholly in sympathy and there are other sug- 
 gestions, while we may have believed them to be based upon sound judgment, 
 we have not deemed it wise to attempt to include in our recommendations for 
 present legislation . . . We wish to keep before the minds of the members of 
 the Iowa legislature the fact that this committee is approaching the considers* 
 tion of these problems from a very practical and conservative point of view. 
 
 It should be pointed out in the case of the Iowa commission that the initial 
 investigation and report was conducted by a sub-committee of experts whose 
 findings were the "dehumanized expert recommendations" of efficiency engineers, 
 The California Taxpayers' Association "wishes it to be understood: (1) That 
 
 40 
 
 Iowa report (1915) p. 7. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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76 
 
 this plan does not involve the elimination of any function now performed by 
 the state government . The elimination or addition of functions is a matter 
 for the legislature and the people. (2) This plan does not eliminate any 
 constitutional officer or board . The constitution should be amended to do 
 so in certain cases, but this, likewise, is a matter for the legislature and 
 the people. (3) This plan, in its entirety, can be adopted by the 1919 leg- 
 islature, by statutory enactment . There are no constitutional barriers, and 
 
 41 
 
 therefore no necessities for delay." The wisdom of a body like that of the 
 Taxpayers* Association, in attempting to forestall the rejection of their own 
 plan by emphasizing expediency, is better appreciated in the light of the pol- 
 icy of the Delaware mixed commission: "The Survey Commission has not attempt- 
 
 ed to follow the recommendations made by the New York Bureau of Municipal Re- 
 search. The recommendations of that Bureau, if put into practice in Delaware, 
 would create an administrative cabinet of nine departments of State, the 
 heads of which would be appointed by the Governor. It would abolish several 
 elective offices provided by Delaware's State Constitution. The Survey 
 does not enter into a discussion of the wisdom, per se , of such a form of 
 administrative government in the State of Delaware, but it clearly is not 
 only inadvisable but impossible at this time to call a State Constitutional 
 convention for the purpose of considering the recommendations made by the 
 New York Bureau of Municipal Research. It is equally inadvisable, from 
 the standpoint of practical results, to attempt to obtain the recommended 
 constitutional changes through the slow process of legislative proposals and 
 general elections, consequently, no recommendations herein embodied require 
 any other action than legislative enactment to make them effective. Further- 
 more, in our opinion, some of the recommendations of the New York Bureau of 
 
 41 “ ~ ■ " 
 
 California Taxpayers' Journal, January, 1919, p. 3. 
 
77 
 
 Municipal Research are not practical for Delaware at this time. We do not 
 decry upholding the ideal. Human progress is accomplished by moving onward 
 and upward toward the ideal; little human progress is achieved by violently 
 discarding everything that is imperfect and attempting over-night to sub- 
 stitute the perfect or ideal. One is growth and development; the other is 
 revolutionary. Institutions and governments which have proved their worth 
 and permanency are the results of growth rather than evolution. In the opin- 
 ion of the Survey Commission there is nothing to be gained by needlessly 
 setting at defiance the traditions of a conservative commonwealth, or at- 
 tempting to wrench from their foundations institutions which have served 
 this commonwealth for generations . • The recommendations herewith suggest 
 many modifications and changes, but we do not feel that anything herein 
 recommended does violence to any worthy tradition or calls for the abandon- 
 ment of any practice or method which is honored by merit and virture rather 
 
 42 
 
 than by time and custom." 
 
 In this study of a representative reports of commissions, it will be 
 noted that expediency came ultimately to play the dominant role in the rec- 
 ommendations finally submitted to the legislative body. In other words, (1) 
 Where the purely expert body like that of the efficiency engineers of Iowa, 
 or the Bureau of National Research of New York City was guided in its find- 
 ings by objective investigation and analysis solely, a mixed commission of 
 legislators or other government officials and a group of representative lay- 
 men, like that of Delaware, reviewed and modified such findings to meet the 
 political exigencies of the hour and place. (2) Where sub- commit tees of 
 experts worked in close conjunction with the legislative or citizen commis- 
 
 42 
 
 Delaware report (1920) p. 6 
 

 
 
 
 
 
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78 
 
 mission itself, practical considerations tended to modify the recommendations 
 of the expert investigators as in the case of Illinois. (3) Where a special 
 staff of investigators employed under the direct supervision and control of 
 the governor submitted to him a so-called non-political report, the governor 
 himself reviewed and revised the findings on grounds of expediency before 
 transmitting them to the legislature. It follows, therefore, that the 
 effective report, of that which ultimately reaches the legislative body tends 
 invariably to become the practical report, or the report into which there has 
 entered considerations of expediency. 
 
 fc. However, much or little the Commissions were influenced by considerations 
 of expediency, none was so committed one way or the other that it did not 
 deem a statement of the general considerations which had guided them indispen- 
 sable to the precise understanding of its recommendations. A general survey 
 of recommendations of the Commission, therefore, quite properly must begin 
 with a study of these guiding principles. "It seems advisable at the outset," 
 notes the Illinois Committee, "to present here some of the general considera- 
 tions underlying the proposed plan as a whole, in order to make clear the main 
 purposes of the Committee. In the first place this comprehensive scheme of 
 reorganization has been formulated in preference to a more limited plan deal- 
 ing only with some groups of offices and departments, in the belief that the 
 general survey is more likely to take all factors into consideration, while a 
 partial study might lead to proposals for the offices considered which would 
 conflict with the best arrangements for other offices not taken into considera* 
 tion. In the second place, this general plan has been prepared with reference 
 to the existing authorities and their present powers and duties. There has 
 
 43 *" * “ T 1 
 
 Cf. Messages of Governors Hart and Groesbeck of Washington and Michigan 
 
 respectively. Part I. 
 

 
 
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 79 
 
 been no attempt to formulate an ideal scheme of state activities, or to 
 propose extensive changes in the substantive law. In some cases where exist- 
 ing authorities seem to be clearly of no value, their abolition is recommended, 
 nut for the most part provision is made for continuing the present servies 
 under what it is believed to be a more effective organization. Nor has a 
 strictly uniform plan of organization been proposed for each department or 
 group of services, such as characterizes the trench system of administration. 
 The plans proposed include single officials for some purposes, and boards or 
 commissions for others. The number of boards, however, are much fewer at 
 present; and the boards proposed will be either composed of salaried members 
 giving full time to the service, or of unpaid members, with a few cases of 
 ex officio membership. . Nor does the Committee approve of statutory provisions 
 requiring the representation of more than one party on administrative boards 
 and commissions ... The purpose of the Committee has also been to propose 
 boards only for functions where consultation and consideration of several per- 
 sons is advisable; and single officials are recommended, in all cases to be 
 in charge of distinctly executive work. . • From another point of view, the 
 plans proposed also fall between two possible extremes. While they call for 
 a large number of important changes, they are not presented merely as a scheme 
 for the distant future. They have been framed with reference to present condi- 
 tions in this state; and it is believed they are adapted to prompt adoption 
 44 
 
 and execution." In much the same purpose, the New York Commission proposes: 
 
 N (l) A consolidation of all administrative departments, com- 
 missions, offices, boards and other agencies into a 
 small number of departments, each headed by a single 
 
 44 
 
 1 
 
 'Illinois report pp. 31,32. 
 

 
 
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 . , . 
 
 
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 f 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
officer, except departments where quasi-legislative and 
 quasi- judicial or inspectional and advisory functions 
 require a boards* 
 
 (2) The adoption of the principle that the governor is to be 
 held responsible for good administration and is to have 
 the power to choose the heads of departments who are to 
 const itutute his cabinet and who are to be held strictly 
 accountable to him through his power to appoint and remove 
 and through his leadership in budget preparation. This 
 involves among other things the reduction of the number 
 
 of elective administrative officers to two: the governor 
 
 and auditor. 
 
 (3) The extension of the term of the governor to four years 
 and the careful adjustment of the terms of department 
 heads with reference to the term of the governor. Except- 
 ing members of boards with overlapping terms, department 
 heads should have the same term as the governor. 
 
 (4) The grouping of related offices and work in each of the 
 several departments into appropriate divisions and bu- 
 reaus, responsibility for each branch of work to be 
 centralized in an accountable chief. 
 
 (5) A budget system vesting in the governor the full respon- 
 sibility for presenting to the legislature each year a 
 consolidated budget containing all expenditures which 
 

 • '' 11 ? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 
 
 in his opinion should be undertaken by the state, and 
 a proposed plan for obtaining the necessary revenues— 
 such a budget to represent the work of the governor and 
 his cabinet* 
 
 "In case a system is adopted which provides for a responsible executive,'* 
 note 3 the New York Commission in this connection, "the chief executive should 
 be provided with the following machinery: 
 
 (a) An executive officer or personnel for receiving reports, 
 issuing orders, and handling the routine work of the 
 chief executive* 
 
 (b) An executive council or cabinet made up of specialized 
 vice-governors or heads of functionally related admin- 
 istrative groups who will serve as 'line' advisers. 
 
 (c) 'Staff' agencies so organized and related to the chief 
 executive that he may refer any question, for inquiry 
 and report, to a detached expert or professional per- 
 sonnel who may also be relied on for preparation or 
 review of the budget and other proposals which are to 
 go before the legislature*" 
 
 The Iowa Commission states as the three elements of its plan of reorgan- 
 ization: efficiency, economy, and the fixing of responsibility for the pur- 
 
 46 
 
 pose of making the government more responsive to the will of the people. 
 
 With each bill submitted there was a brief explanation making clear of the 
 
 45 
 
 New York Reconstruction uommission report (1919) p. 11. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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82 
 
 application of the foregoing principle. In its initial summary of recommenda- 
 tions, the Oregon Commission proposes (1) That th6 governor appoint all heads 
 of state administrative departments under reorganized and consolidated admin- 
 istration. (2) That in making appointments the governor be privileged to act 
 in all cases without confirmation by the Senate. (3) That all minor officers 
 be chosen under civil service regulations. (4) That the governor be relieved 
 of membership on all state boards except constitutional boards. "In setting 
 forth the reorganization plan," reports the California Taxpayers' Association, 
 "the Association has recognized and sought to apply the following principles: 
 
 (1) Departments having to deal largely with matters of policy should be 
 controlled by boards, in order to insure the application of group judgment. 
 
 (2) Departments dealing with administrative and executive functions should be 
 under the direction of a single head, in order the better to centralize respon- 
 sibility for performance of function. (3) Policy-making departments controlled 
 by boards should be divisionally-organized, so as to centralize, in division 
 heads, responsibility for the performance of functions. (4) Boards presiding 
 over policy-determining departments should consist of the heads of the respect- 
 ive divisions falling within such departments. The heads of divisions are famil 
 iar with the practical phases of departmental work, and themselves direct it. 
 Their value, therefore, as members of a department board is increased. There is 
 no necessity for the appointment of boards otherwise constituted, as they tend 
 toward confusion, interference and loss of responsibility, and also increase 
 
 of pay roll. (5) All department heads and chiefs of divisions should be ap- 
 pointed by the governor and be directly responsible to him. Under the Con- 
 
 4 _Iowa report (1914) p. 5. 
 
 'Oregon report p. 11. 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 ■ 
 
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83 
 
 stitution there are a number of elective officers. These have been placed at 
 
 the heads of appropriate divisions. The matter of amending the constitution, 
 
 with respect to such officers, is a matter for determination in the future. 
 
 48 
 
 It rests with the legislature and the people. Special interest attaches it- 
 self to the report of the California commission when compared with that of the 
 Taxpayers* agency. "The important features of the recommended plan of re- 
 organization, " reads the California Commission report, "are the establishment 
 of certain principles which are essential to efficient governmental management. 
 These are: (1) centralization of responsibility. (2) Co-opex’ation of the 
 
 larger organization units. (3) Co-ordination of agencies which perform sim- 
 ilar or allied functions. These principles have been carried into the proposed 
 plan by: (1) The creation of a governor's cabinet, composed of departmental 
 
 executives appointed by him. (2) Insuring co-operation of various departments 
 by bringing their administrative officers together in an executive council. 
 
 (3) Placing in departments, under one executive head, those agencies which 
 perform similar or allied functions. The departmental units created are suffi- 
 ciently comprehensive to include such agencies as may from time to time be 
 established, because of the great diversity in the nature of the state's 
 
 activities the committee has found it impracticable to correlate all of them 
 
 49 
 
 into larger administrative units." 
 
 Compared with these earlier reports, one of the most recent, that of Ohio 
 Commission has special significance. "In formulating the plan for reorganiz- 
 ing the state government, the following principles have been followed: 
 
 (1) The governor, who is elected by the people, would be 
 
 48 
 
 California Taxpayers* Journal, January, 1919, p. 4. 
 ^California report (1919) p. 7. 
 

 
 
 
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84 
 
 the responsible head of the state government and would 
 possess power and authority commensurate with his respon- 
 sibility. The term of the governor would be extended 
 from two to four years and all department heads would 
 have the same term as governor except members of boards 
 with overlapping terms* 
 
 (2) The auditor, who is also elected by the people, would 
 constitute a continuing check upon the work of the 
 governor and his subordinates. The investigations of 
 the auditor would include not only financial audits, 
 but criticisms of operation and results. 
 
 (3) Departments and boards performing work of a similar 
 or related character would be grouped together into a 
 major department; the various functions would constitute 
 bureaus or divisions operated under an accountable chief 
 who would report to the head of the department. The de- 
 partment head would be directly responsible to the gov- 
 ernor. 
 
 (4) Departments having to do largely with matters of policy 
 would be controlled by boards in order to insure the 
 application of group judgment, boards would be retained 
 for the health department, industrial commission, public 
 utilities commissions, and state board of welfare. The 
 following methods are outlined for making the governor 
 the responsible head of the state government in fact 
 

 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 , , 
 
85 
 
 as well as in name: 
 
 (1) All department heads would be appointed by 
 the governor and be directly responsiole 
 to him without confirmation of the senate. 
 
 This involves an amendment to the constitu- 
 tion permitting the appointment of the sec- 
 retary of state, attorney-general, and 
 treasurer, by the governor. 
 
 (2) A reduction in the number of independent 
 departments, offices, boards, and commissions 
 is recommended. The numoer of elective of- 
 fices would be reduced from six to three and 
 the activities now performed by thirty- six 
 independent boards and commissions would be 
 combined into thirteen major departments. The 
 governor could be relieved of the necessity 
 of supervising and coordinating the work of 
 thirty- six departments, staff meetings of 
 department heads would become possible and 
 
 by this method, he could obtain a bird's-eye 
 
 50 
 
 view of all the state's activities." 
 
 The Minnesota commission set forth three subjects: administrative 
 
 consolidation, the merit system, and the adoption of a budget. A few special 
 functions were to be performed by the administrative agencies outside the six 
 executive departments estaolished, such as the civil Service Commission and 
 
86 
 
 the Tax commission. The constitutional officers were not affected by the re- 
 organization plan. There were two exceptions to the general rule that there 
 shall be a single head of each department appointed by the governor: finance 
 
 and education* In the former case the treasurer, who is a constitutional 
 officer elected by the people, was to be made acting head of the department. 
 
 In the latter case, the commission recommended two boards, the Regents of the 
 University and the new board of Education, the latter to have charge of all 
 other state educational work. The Commission claimed that in recommending 
 this form of organization it was following the general practice or custom of 
 treating education as independent of other functions of government* The direct- 
 ors of departments were to hold office at the pleasure of the governor and to 
 be responsible to him for the conduct of their departments, and were to consti- 
 tute the permanent staff. Advisory boards were attached to the departments of 
 labor and commerce, public domain, welfare and agriculture. These were to be 
 appointed by the governor with overlapping terms. * 
 
 The Delaware Commission because of the peculiar condition in that state 
 where fifty-four boards and commissions were exercising administrative powers, 
 indicated a general principle for reorganization in an initial four-fold crit- 
 icism of the board system: 
 
 (1) boards seldom show any real initiative, and therefore 
 business-like leadership in improving service is not 
 to be expected from them. They are a check upon good 
 work, not a spur to invention and activity. 
 
 (2) In addition to being a drag upon administration, boards 
 
 ■ ■ — I ■ i— 1 ■■ — m 
 
 j^Ohio report (1920) p. 7. 
 
 ^Minnesota report (1917) p. 9. 
 

 
 
 
 
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87 
 
 and commissions are so constructed that definite 
 responsibility for action or inaction cannot be 
 located. In fact, board government in general may 
 be regarded as a clever means of escaping account- 
 ability and consequently criticism or blame, hence 
 the board system appeals particularly to a certain 
 class of administrative officials vho wish to shift 
 responsibility from themselves. 
 
 (3) The board system tends to delay and inefficiency. 
 
 Boards, meeting as they do only periodically, can- 
 not exercise effective supervision and control. 
 
 (4) In addition to its inherent defects, the board 
 system of Delaware is so organized as to deprive 
 the governor of the control which he must have if 
 he is to be responsible for the state's business. 
 
 The board members usually have overlapping terms, 
 hence each governor may appoint only a minority. 
 
 Each board is therefore a government within it- 
 self. 
 
 In concluding, they observe that boards can be justified only when they 
 function in a quasi- judicial, quasi-legislative, or advisory capacity. Ad- 
 ministration or the execution of policies should not be entrusted to boards. 
 It should be done by individuals and not by boards. The Commission then 
 offers the following suggestions for reorganization: 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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88 
 
 •*(1) The governor should be the only elective administra- 
 tive officer in the state government. 
 
 (2) The governor should have the sole power to appoint 
 and remove all executive officers. To require the 
 consent of the senate is to make this power condi- 
 tional and to permit responsibility to be shifted. 
 
 (3) The responsibility for preparing the budget of the 
 state should be placed squarely on the governor. 
 
 (4) The office of lieutenant-governor should be abolished. 
 
 except in the case of succession to the governorship • 
 
 . . the lieutenant-governor plays an insignificant 
 
 role in Delaware. The senate should choose its own 
 
 presiding office . • • The secretary of state might 
 
 well be designated governor in case that office should 
 52 
 
 become vacant.” 
 
 The tendency to uniformity in basic proposals of the several types of 
 commissions is borne out by the following citation from the Maryland report 
 (1921) prepared by a private firm of efficiency engineers. "The plan rests 
 in part in the short ballot principle in that it proposes a reduction in the 
 number of elective officials . • • Kach major department is to be made up of 
 one or more bureaus and an administrative office. The latter would concen- 
 trate the administrative work of the department as a whole and would have 
 general control over the preparation of departmental estimates, and over- 
 
 52 
 
 Delaware report ^1920) p. 14. 
 
* 
 
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 ‘ 
 
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89 
 
 expenditures, cost accounting, and reports. The principle policy-determin- 
 ing and administrative officer for each department would be a 'director' ap- 
 pointed by the governor and removable at pleasure. The eleven directors 
 would all be members of the governor's cabinet . . . There would be one or 
 more 'permanent' executive officers in each department, one at the head of 
 each bureau ... In conjunction with the eleven executive departments and 
 the independent auditing office it is proposed to establish certain advisory 
 boards or councils whose function it would be to advise administrative of- 
 ficials and to assist in the formulation of policies. Each of these boards 
 would be an integral part of a departmental organization, but it is not in- 
 tended that it should have active part in administration. It should serve 
 a useful purpose, however, in situations where the judgment of more than one 
 person is valuable, and where the opinions of representatives of the general 
 public would tend to assure the government of the soundness of a given 
 proposal. Positions on such boards would be non-remunerative." The Commis- 
 sion then recommends with reference to these boards that they be placed in 
 the departments of finance, welfare, health, education, commerce, labor, 
 employment and registration.^ 
 
 The most recent recommendation relating to general principles underly- 
 ing administrative reorganization is sections 41-48 of the "Model State Con- 
 stitution" mentioned in another place. In general, the provisions are based 
 on the principle of concentrated executive power as found in the national 
 constitution. By the provisions of the "model" instrument, the executive 
 power of the state shall be vested in a governor, elected for a term of four 
 years. He is to appoint and remove heads of all executive departments, and 
 
 5 3 ’ ' ‘ 
 
 Report in The Organization and Administration of the State Government , 
 

 , 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
 all other officers and employees in the executive service are to be appointed 
 by the governor or by heads of executive departments as may be provided by 
 law. section 47 attempts to secure a close relationship between legislature 
 and governor by providing that M the governor and heads of executive depart- 
 ments shall be entitled to seats in the legislature , may introduce bills 
 
 54 
 
 therein, and take part in the discussion of measures, but shall not vote.** 
 
 The preliminary statements by the commissions of underlying principles, 
 therefore, show that the one basic consideration is the status of the gover- 
 nor. In a word, an explanation of a plan for reorganizing state government 
 invariably includes, as that of the Ohio report, an outline of methods for 
 "making the governor the responsible head of the state government in fact as 
 well as in name.'* In the whole series of reports where preliminary state- 
 ments of aims appear, not a single exception was to be found to this rule 
 wherever the recommendations of specialists had been incorporated in whole or 
 in part, common to all of them is the adoption at the outset of the principle 
 that the governor is to be held responsible for the administration of the 
 state. In other words, to design a strong, sole, executive leadership— *'a 
 leadership within the government which could be effective for directing and 
 improving the public service and at the same time could be reached and 
 controlled by the electorate and their representatives through their cons- 
 titutional power to control the purse"— seems the manifest intent of this 
 part of the reorganization scheme. 
 
 Reduced to working principles, the general provisions of the reports ae 
 they relate to the new status of the governor may be expressed as follows: 
 
 Maryland, crif fenhagen and Associates, ctd. Chicago, April 15, 1921, 
 
 54 P * 25# 
 
 "Progress Report on a Model State Constitution" by the Committee on 
 

 
 
 
 
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91 
 
 (1) no officer should be elected whose powers and duties 
 do not make him important enough to attract and secure 
 intensive and extensive popular interest, concern, and 
 scrutiny. 
 
 (2) Only those officers should be elected who have the 
 power to decide important questions of policy or who 
 are expected to assume leadership in the formulation 
 and execution of governmental programs. 
 
 (3) The number of officers elected at any one time should 
 be so limited that the policies and merits of each 
 may receive adequate and effective scrutiny by the 
 voters. 
 
 (4) The number of administrative departments should be 
 reduced to the smallest number consistent with the 
 general lines of functional grouping to secure 
 
 a-Effective supervision. 
 b-A Cabinet not too large for 
 consultation purposes. 
 
 (5) single heads appointed by the governor should be 
 charged with the administrative work of the several 
 departments. 
 
 (6) Boards ought not to be charged with administrative 
 duties. 
 
 State Government for the National Municipal League (1921) p. 8. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 
 
 (7) Boards consisting of members having experience in 
 work of departments to which they are attached may 
 be logically assigned for advisory or for quasi- 
 legislative and quasi- judicial functions in such 
 departments as Agriculture, Public Works, Public 
 Welfare, Public Health, and Education* 
 
 (8) Terms of department heads or other administrative 
 officers with discretionary powers should coincide 
 with that of the governor* 
 
 (9) Bureau and division heads should be appointed by 
 the governor or heads of departments. 
 
 (lOj A responsible chief executive should be provided 
 with the following staff machinery: 
 
 a- An executive officer or personnel for 
 receiving reports, and handling routine 
 work. 
 
 b-A Cabinet for consultation, 
 c-cetached staff experts or professional 
 personnel* 
 
 7 One of the most significant of the more recent tendencies in reorganiza- 
 tion disclosed by the Commissions is the new emphasis on the functional unit 
 as a basis for reorganization. Indeed, the California Taxpayers’ Association 
 Committee, to whose report we have already referred, takes pains to observe 
 in the introductory statement of their own plan, that "so far as the Associa- 
 
93 
 
 tion is aware, no plan of reorganization, in any state, has heretofore been 
 worked out on the basis of th6 functional unit." The new emphasis made in 
 their distinctly functional reorganization is indicated in a comment which 
 follows: "In the absence of such a base, no exact and thorough coordination, 
 
 eliminating all conflicts and duplications is possible. 
 
 The Association, however, is not wholly accurate. In Chapter IA of the 
 Report of the New York state constitutional convention commission (1915) a 
 proposal for reorganization of the administration proper is preceded by a 
 functional classification which forms the basis of a logical correlation of 
 activities in departments as well as a correlation of activities and of the 
 agencies which carry them into effect. The N6w York report begins with a 
 precise definition of administration as distinguished from politics. "The 
 word ’administration* is from a Latin verb, which means to manage , to ex- 
 ecute . Management has to do with the preparation, submission, approval, and 
 execution of plans. In a representative system the board is a part of manage- 
 ment to the extent that its approval is necessary. Otherwise management is 
 primarily an executive function. The problems of management fall into two 
 general classes corresponding to functions or activities of similar char- 
 acter, Yiz.: (1) those which have to do with the state or other institution 
 
 acting as a proprietor— activities of a kind that must be carried on no mat- 
 
 ter how extensive its functions; (2) those functions or activities in the 
 nature of services rendered to the public— things done in carrying out the 
 
 purposes for which the institution exists. The first of these will herein- 
 
 after be referred to as proprietary functions ; the second will be called in 
 
 55 , - . —~ 
 
 oalifornia Taxpayers* Journal, January, 1919, p. 1. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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 contradistinction public service functions . Each institution has its own 
 purpose and an organization and technique developed or to be developed suit- 
 ed to its work. Among the common proprietary functions or groups of activ- 
 ities are these: 
 
 (1) Obtaining and caring for the funds required, whether 
 raised as revenue or by borrowing* 
 
 (2) The employing and caring for the personnel needed on 
 the enterprise* 
 
 (3) Acquiring and caring for the supplies and equipment 
 and properties required to make the personnel effect- 
 ive. 
 
 (4) Paying the debts and current obligations of the govern- 
 ment* 
 
 The public service functions differ with each institution or enterprise* 
 Those which are carried on by the government of the state may be grouped as 
 follows: 
 
 (1) Military protection. 
 
 (2) Promotion of public education, art, science, and 
 recreation* 
 
 (3) Construction, operation, and maintenance of public 
 
 worke. 
 
 (4) Promotion of public health and safety. 
 
95 
 
 (5) Regulation of puolic service corporations. 
 
 (6) Promotion of agriculture and industry. 
 
 ( 7 ) Protection and promotion of the interests of 
 laDor. 
 
 (8) care and education of the dependent, defective, 
 
 56 
 
 and delinquent classes.* 4 
 
 Mere follows tabulated considerations under general heads: “General 
 Requirements of Organization for Administration, M "Principles Governing De- 
 termination as to Whether Executive uontrol Should be centralized," "Applica- 
 
 57 
 
 tion of General Principles to functional Groups.* 4 
 
 functional organization, therefore, was a basic consideration in the 
 more comprehensive reports, of which the New York findings are a fair example, 
 a number of years before the publication of the Taxpayers’ plan. Furthermore, 
 the Association, notes: "It has been rather common, in re-organization enter- 
 
 prises heretofore undertaken by states and municipalities to group officers, 
 boards, etc. which perform similar or somewhat similar functions; or officers, 
 boards, etc. whose main functions are similar; or to eliminate existing 
 boards, officers, etc. by transferring their functions in their entirety to 
 this or that group or department. Such work is regarded as a ’functional 
 reorganization;* but, as a matter of fact, it is not fundamentally functional , 
 because it does not deal with the individual function as the unit . (Italics 
 their ©wn)i° C Again the Association falls into error by too sweeping a gen- 
 eralization as the careful analysis of the recent reorganization measures in 
 
 56 wew York constitutional commission report (1915) p. 39. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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96 
 
 the states vill show. 
 
 What is this functional principle they claim to have evolved! We give 
 
 their own statement: “The acceptance of each individual function performed 
 
 as a unit means that the reorganization which follows will of necessity be 
 
 fundamental and complete. The first operation called for by the acceptance 
 
 of this standard is a logical arrangement of the individual functions to be 
 
 performed by the state. The next step is to determine the existing agencies 
 
 performing these functions and the exact powers or duties imposed upon them 
 
 by the legislature in each instance. . The third operation calls for the 
 
 transfer, or distribution of each function properly classified, into a re- 
 
 59 
 
 organization, uomplete reorganization is the result . M 
 
 otill another inaccuracy, or better, over- statement of the Association 
 should be pointed out. complete coordination is never the result of reorgan- 
 ization on a functional basis. Such reorganization can hope only to approx- 
 imate “complete coordination.” There is always the difficulty, for example, 
 of definitely assigning the several phases of educational administration: 
 agricultural, vocational, sub-normal, etc. Shall agricultural education be 
 assigned to the agriculture department or to the department of education! 
 what aoout the claim of the labor department for control of certain aspects 
 of vocational training; of the welfare department to certain phases of sub- 
 normal education! what about the function of registering and licensing the 
 professions: Are these matters for the education department to administer 
 
 as in Illinois, or for a law enforcement department as in Idaho! Shall all 
 
 j?glbid. pp. 9C-93. 
 
 ^California Taxpayers* report, p. 4. 
 
 59 Ibid. p. 5. 
 

 
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97 
 
 public buildings be constructed and cared for by the department of works, or 
 by the several departments for whose purposes they must be carefully designed? 
 Shall inspection agencies be directed under a separate department, or shall 
 the labor inspectors be identified with the labor departments? In this connec- 
 tion where will you locate the factory inspectors between the rival claims of 
 labor and commerce and law enforcement departments? The functional basis per- 
 haps serves the best of all bases of reorganisation, but it still remains very 
 difficult to get a scheme of logical arrangement of departments with a special, 
 exclusive field for each. 
 
 With these limitations in mind, the search for such general functional 
 classi ficiation in the reports of uommissions should preclude any hasty assump- 
 tion as to what the results will show. 
 
 A comparison of the New York and the Taxpayers 1 functional classification 
 shows that whereas the former made a two-fold general classification under 
 proprietary and public service functions, the latter names them protective and 
 constructive functions, noth include fiscal, executory, and clerical activi- 
 ties under the first, but the Taxpayers' plan goes further and includes under 
 the same head those public welfare, public health, commerce, and charitable 
 functions which the New York plan classifies under public service. Under the 
 head, constructive , the Taxpayers* plan lists natural resources, including 
 agriculture, viticulture, horticulture, animal industries, mineral resources, 
 marine, harbors and rivers, highways, utilities, and buildings: reclamatory : 
 drainage and irrigation; and educational : scholastic and vocational, li- 
 braries, museums, institutes, lectures, publications, and expositions. In the 
 New York classification, these "constructive" functions are listed under pub- 
 

 
 
 
 
 
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98 
 
 lie services * In brief, the New York classification presents: (1) the state 
 equipping itself for service and (2) the state doing the things which contrib- 
 ute to the welfare of citizens. In other words, it distinguishes between those 
 activities that constitute the business side of public enterprise— the govern- 
 ment as proprietor, and the services, themselves, which it renders. The Tax- 
 payers' grouping, on the other hand, makes no such distinction; it considers 
 ail activities of the government services and classifies them according to 
 the nature of the services rendered. 
 
 The distinction becomes significant when functional groups are depart- 
 mentalized. The New York Commission points out the inherently business qual- 
 ity of the proprietary activities of government and deduces from prevailing 
 business practice the principle of single-headed administration and strict 
 accountability in administration. It follows, therefore: 
 
 "(1) There should be central executive or administrative 
 control over the functions of money-raising where- 
 ever and to the extent that the same revenue— paying 
 or money-lending constituency— is to be dealt with." 
 
 (2) The purchase and custody of supplies and equipment 
 should oe centrally controlled. 
 
 (3) Central control over disbursements is advantageous— 
 whether operated under a centralized or a decentralized 
 system of administration. 
 
 (4) There should be central control over the employment and 
 improvement of the personnel of public service. 6 ® 
 

 
 
 
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99 
 
 In other words, all the proprietary functions of government should be 
 under the direct control of a single executive, and all functional units with- 
 in the proprietary department should likewise be centrally controlled by bu- 
 reau or division chiefs appointed by the chief executive. Such a principle 
 precludes the usual elective officers: secretary of state, treasurer, attor- 
 
 ney-general, etc. “Unless the secretary of state is restored to the position 
 of secretary to the governor (as in colonial days) and made his appointee, 
 removable at will, the only excuse for retaining the office as a separate de- 
 partment, would be to make the secretary the head of the proprietary group. 
 
 The present working relation of the office of secretary of state has about 
 
 the same significance and relative importance as the vermiform appendix in 
 61 
 
 the human body. • • either the treasurer should be given executive duties 
 which correspond roughly to the headship of a department covering every phase 
 of administration of the proprietorship which is to be centrally controlled, 
 or he should be reduced to the position of a 'technical' head of a treasury 
 bureau in a proprietary branch of the service." . • If the provision is made 
 that the governor shall be the responsible head of the administration, the 
 assumption that the treasurer should be independent fails . • . mrther con- 
 firmation of this conclusion is found in the fact that this is the original 
 
 relation of the treasurer in every existing government which provides for a 
 
 62 
 
 responsible chief executive. In a special chapter, the commission deals 
 with the desired status of the comptroller as a purely audit officer outside 
 the administration. "One of the prime reasons for the establishment of rep- 
 resentative government was to call the executive to account for expenditures. • 
 
 ^^wew York constitutional commission report, p. 97. 
 
 6 Jlbid. p. 109. 
 
 62 Ibid. p. 88. 
 

 
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 - 
 
 
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loo 
 
 In some countries the king or his immediate representatives are required to 
 appear personally and make the statement with respect to expenditures under 
 past authorizations by the legislative body (audit by the legislative body as 
 a whole) . • . The next step • • was the appointment of an auditing committee 
 . • A third step was the creation of an auditing department or office, which 
 was made independent of the executive • • The independent auditor came to be 
 a comptroller of expenditures— a person who was in a position to prevent ir- 
 regularity and losses due to discoverable neglect or attempted diversion .... 
 
 At the present time v/e have an auditing office, established as a part of the 
 const itututional machinery for fixing and enforcing administrative respon- 
 sibility, and yet laboring under administrative duties assigned to it by 
 statute, the effect of which is to destroy the disinterestedness of its 
 audit and verification. Th6 author as an instrument for enforcing respon- 
 sibility has had turned over to him by an irresponsible representative gov- 
 ernment the very autocratic powers that the representative system was estab- 
 lished to correct, when these powers were exercised by the executive . ** The 
 Commission concludes: "It is essBntial that the comptroller, as the auditor- 
 
 general of the state be set aside and entirely isolated so that pressure may 
 
 not be brought to bear upon him to permit the office of the audit to be used 
 
 63 
 
 for ends that are inconsistent with its underlying purpose." 
 
 With no specific reference to general functional principles involved, 
 the Illinois commission, nevertheless, observes much the same logical correla- 
 ting of fiscal administration as that of New York. The one exception, and a 
 generally criticised one, is the recommendation of a comprehensive state 
 department of finance under the general supervision of a state finance commis- 
 
 63 Ibid. p. 89. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
101 
 
 sion. "This form of organization," the commission explains, "is proposed so 
 as to emurace the constitutional elective officers in the general system; 
 while by this method there is also given recognition to the opinion held by 
 some, that the final authority in such matters should not be entirely in the 
 hands of appointive officers." While the Illinois commission makes no such 
 sweeping recommendation for constitutional reorganization to eliminate the 
 elective executive officers of auditor and treasurer, for reasons already 
 noted, it does recognize the new York principle of strict functional correla- 
 tion with single-headed supervision in fiscal matters. In other words, each 
 member of the finance commission is given charge of a special division. The 
 state comptroller, is made chairman of the commission, and charged with the 
 preparation of a budget of revenues and expenditures for submission to the 
 governor, with supervision over salaries and other expenditures, with the 
 preparation and installation of accounts, and with inquiries into the business 
 methods of state officers and institutions. In this capacity he is almost 
 identical with chief finance officer on the immediate governor’s staff rec- 
 ommended in the wew York report. The auditor of public accounts, a constitu- 
 tional officer is retained to continue his present functions, which in Ill- 
 inois are exclusively those of audit, he compares favorably with the comptrol- 
 ler outside the administration recommended in New York. There is not, how- 
 ever, the logical discrimination between the purely accounting functions which 
 
 the «ew York report would place under the immediate control of the governor’s 
 64 
 
 staff* 
 
 The California commission establishes a department of accounts and ex- 
 penditures and a department of receipts and supplies under separate, single 
 directors, all under the immediate control of the governor. An independent 
 
 ^Illinois report p. 33. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 • V 
 
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102 
 
 board of finance is provided, composed of the directors of accounts and ex- 
 penditures, and of receipts and supplies, respectively, end the state 
 comptroller (a constitutional officer) , the chairman to be designated by the 
 governor, special functions of this body shall be: preparation of budget, 
 
 investment of state funds, count of money in treasury, corporation franchise 
 tax appeals, and recommendations of legislation where necessary to affect 
 modernization of state business methods.^ The following features of this 
 organization of finance should be noted: (1) functional correlation audit; 
 
 accounting; purchase and custody of supplies, equipment, etc*; (2) central 
 control over all fiscal activities as a whole, and over each correlated func- 
 tional group; (3) a governor's staff agency (Board of Finance); (4) An au- 
 ditor-general or comptroller outside the administration. 
 
 A more clearly functional organization, even, than this of California 
 are the proposals of the Ohio Commission. The auditor of state who is a 
 constitutional officer, elected for a term of four years, end hence outside 
 the administration, is retained. "Statutory changes are recommended limit- 
 ing the functions of the auditor to those of an auditing nature, transferring 
 to a new department, the department of finance, all those financial functions 
 which have to do with planning and spending, and specifying that the auditor 
 shall make operation as well as financial audits. "66 in explaining this 
 recommendation, the commission observes: "At present the auditor not only 
 
 audits all financial accounts, but handles the routine administrative func- 
 tions concerned with accounting, collection of revenues, expenditures, property 
 control and other financial transactions. No distinction now exists between 
 
 ^California report (1919) p. 21. 
 66 0hio report (1920) p. 10. 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 ■ 
 
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103 
 
 tne function of auditing and the function of bookkeeping and accounting. The 
 auditor is in the position of auditing his own work, which of course tends 
 to destroy the disinterestedness of his audit. The routine administrative 
 duties divert the energy of the auditor and his staff from the much needed 
 study and investigation of operation results." Then follows this most signif- 
 icant recommendation: "It is recommended that the auditor should be charged 
 
 only with the auditing function and that he be continued to be elected by the 
 people so that he may be independent of the whole executive government and be 
 free to criticise its performances when necessary." The most unique of all 
 the recent provisions relating to the auditor's office is then added: "In 
 
 addition to auditing the financial records with respect to accuracy and legal- 
 ity, he should be charged with the duty of ascertaining the wisdom, economy. 
 and effectiveness of expenditures; in other words, there is need for a contin- 
 uous independent, analytical study of operations and results accomplished by 
 the executive government. Provision should be made by law for the publica- 
 tion of the findings of the auditor so that these would be available to the 
 general assembly, the governor, and citizens." Then follows a proposal for 
 a specific transfer of fiscal administrative functions from the auditor, as 
 present constituted, to the department of finance. At the head of the finance 
 department is the director appointed by the governor to serve at his pleasure. 
 There is the provision "that all the administrative financial affairs of the 
 state now performed by several different offices and boards would be coor- 
 dinated and centralized in this department." The head of the department is 
 made the financial adviser to the governor on all matters of state finance. 
 
 The state treasurer, who is an elective officer under the constitution, is 
 made appointive officer under the director of finance. Within the department 
 
 67 Ibic. 15. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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104 
 
 the following centralized bureaus are set up: accounting, income and taxa- 
 
 tion, motor vehicle licenses, treasury, purchasing* 
 
 The most fitting citation to be found in summarizing the recent analysis 
 of fiscal functions by commissions, is this from the Maryland report: "In 
 
 finance organization two groups of activities should be recognized; the first 
 including activities involved in the financial transactions that are arranged 
 for and carried out as a part of the operation of the business; and the sec- 
 ond including the independent review and audit of the affairs of officials 
 responsible for such financial transactions. The audit should compel the en- 
 forcement of laws, regulations, and executive orders, and should ensure the 
 maintenance of adequate accounting and standards* 
 
 M It has come to be generally accepted as the consensus of authorities 
 
 that independent organization units should be set up to take care of these 
 
 two sides of financial administration, management of finance and accounting 
 
 on the one hand, and audit control on the other. The first of these should 
 
 be under the control of the executive. The organization dealing with the 
 
 enforcement of laws and regulations and checking the work of the other group 
 
 68 
 
 should have a measure of independence*" In addition, the Commission points 
 to a third group of fiscal activities as distinct, viz: the custody of funds 
 
 of the organization. The full development of an audit procedure, however, 
 and the creation of an independent reviewing and auditing office constitutes 
 a sufficient guarantee of the integrity of the treasurer and at the same time 
 makes possible a thorough and valuable control of the financial operations of 
 the organization. The Commission further states the principle of a central 
 
 68 Maryland report (1921) pp. 55, 56. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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105 
 
 department of finance, the chief of which should be responsiole to the chief 
 executive, tie should supervise all financial activities except those of 
 review and audit. It holds that there is no department of the government 
 which should so directly represent and carry out the powers of the governor 
 as the finance or treasury department. 
 
 The Commission then proposes the creation of an independent office of 
 audit and control outside of the executive departments to stand midway between 
 the executive and legislative branches of the government. Its head should be 
 responsible not to the governor, but directly responsiole to the general 
 assembly, coinciding with the unique provision of the Ohio report is its 
 further proposal to make the "operation" audit a distinct feature of the 
 work of the auditing office. 
 
 The importance of a discriminating functional organization could hardly 
 be made more evident than by contrasting this latest and best analysis of 
 fiscal administration in Maryland with that of the Taxpayers' Association to 
 which we have already referred. In the letter's report a board of five mem- 
 bers, is placed in charge of a finance department, three of whom are elect- 
 ive; two appointive. In other words, the entire finance administration is 
 put beyond the control of the governor in the hands of elective officials, 
 with no reference to functional purposes served. Again, within the depart- 
 ment itself, the state comptroller (elective) is indiscriminately given ad- 
 ministrative duties of collection and accounting, while the duties relating 
 to matters of taxation, revenue, disbursement, purchasing, and printing are 
 distributed among elective and appointing officers alike, just what the Tax- 
 payers' Committee proposes to effect through its functional organization 
 scheme is certainly not evident in this application to the most important 
 

 
 
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106 
 
 functional unit of all— the fiscal* 
 
 Another recent and discriminating financial organization is that devised 
 by the «ew York Reconstruction commission (1919). In a summary of recommenda- 
 tions it proposes: (1) The establishment of a department of audit and control 
 
 of which the comptroller, elected for a term equal in length to that of the 
 governor, will be the head. The fundamental duties of the comptroller are to 
 be outlined in the constitution in order to prevent the statutory assignment 
 to his department of purely administrative functions. The department is to 
 be required to perform only those functions which come within the category 
 of audit and control, and the numerous administrative duties now performed 
 by the comptroller's office are to be transferred to the administrative de- 
 partments. This department is not to receive budget estimates or to be 
 responsible for their compilation. (2) All functions not distinctly those 
 of audit and control, as the accrual and collection of revenues, will be 
 removed from the comptroller and given to administrative departments. Then 
 follows the recommendation for a department of taxation and finance within 
 the executive department. The head of the department is a commissioner ap- 
 pointed by the governor to serve his pleasure. An express provision is: 
 
 "The work of the department will include only those functions of the state 
 government which are essentially financial in character, i.e. the assessment, 
 equalization, levy, collection, management, and disbursement of public rev- 
 enues. The department is organized with five bureaus: Taxation and Revenue, 
 
 Motor vehicles, Treasury, Purchasing, Administration. All bureau heads are 
 to be appointed by the director of taxation and finance under competive civ- 
 
 r “' “ ' 11 ' " --- - - - - - , , 
 
 ’New York Reconstruction Commission report, p. 58. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ‘ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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107 
 
 il service rules. The head of the department a made chief of the bureau of 
 administration." 
 
 olosely related to the principles which underly the organization of 
 financial activities as a division of proprietary functions of government, 
 are those considerations with respect to the legal department. Again, the 
 New York Constitutional Commission is suggestive. "Given a political system 
 in which there is a real chief executive," it observes, "then the political 
 independence of the law office presents only vices with no offsetting virtues. 
 
 . • .When a matter comes before the executive he must first decide whether he 
 will assume responsibility for action without referring to the law office for 
 advice, or run the risk of an opinion which is adverse. . .And the disposition 
 of the officer is likely to be adverse. The reason is obvious. The law of- 
 ficer has no political or other responsibility in common with the executive. 
 
 . • The law office as at present organized is simply one of the great nega- 
 tive forces in government— a negative force that in its operation is respon- 
 sible for the construction of some of the most involved, unbusinesslike, 
 ludicrous practices which, in a system that provides only for divided powers 
 and no effective central control, continue to become more involved and un- 
 businesslike with each added legislative enactment. Laws made by detached 
 committees, procedures elaborated by detached bureaucracies; practices develop- 
 ed without controveraey by construction 'down the line'; situations arising 
 that could not be foreseen demanding a change in practice; proposals referred 
 to detached, irresponsible executives— irresponsible so long as they do not 
 make changes; references to a detached attorney-general to avoid executive 
 responsibility; the law officer for protection doing the same thing— these 
 

 
 
 
 
 
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 U, 
 
 
 
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108 
 
 are among the matters to be considered when deciding whether the constitution 
 should provide for a responsible chief executive, and a law officer who will 
 be constituted a general staff adviser." (p. 117.) 
 
 Four years later, the California commission recommends: "that the posi- 
 
 tion of special attorney for each of the following seven departments be abol- 
 ished, and that the legal service of the departments be performed in the 
 attorney-general '8 office: state board of health, commission in lunacy, cat- 
 
 tle protection board, board of harbor commissioners, market commission, min- 
 ing bureau, water commission. The state railroad commission and the indus- 
 trial accident commission exercise functions which are judicial or quasi- 
 judicial in nature and these commissions require full-time attorneys subject 
 to their exclusive control. Other attorneys employed by state departments 
 may be classified in three groups, those employed on full time because of the 
 volume of legal work required to be done; those employed because of the high- 
 ly specialized nature of the legal work of the particular department; and 
 those specially employed from time to time for the purpose of conducting 
 police court and other criminal prosecutions. In the opinion of the committee 
 efficiency would be impaired and expense increased if the present arrangement 
 were disturbed." (p. 19). 
 
 On this same point, the Ohio commission observes that "one question 
 which has aroused some discussion among students of government is that of the 
 relation of the attorney- general to the legal staffs of other departments. 
 
 i 
 
 This question is not an important one in Ohio because both in law and in fact 
 all the legal counsel employed in the several departments are under the super- 
 vision and control of the attorney-general. The law provided that no state 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
109 
 
 officer, board, or the head of a department or institution of the state shall 
 employ, or be represented by other counsel or attorneys-at-law. The trend of 
 judicial opinion in other states where the question has been raised is in 
 accord with the present situation in Ohio. It has come to be generally rec- 
 ognized that all the legal work of the state should be centralized under the 
 attorney-general.** On the point of selection, the Commission adds: **With 
 
 the attorney- general selected by the people and thus independent of the gov- 
 ernor, there exists a condition which might develop to seriously limit the 
 effective authority of the governor as the chief executive of the state. If 
 the elected attorney-general were of opposite political faith to the governor, 
 the situation might become embarrassing. In governmental activities, exec- 
 utive officials are circumscribed in their work by a mass of legal require- 
 ments and technicalities and if results are to be secured it is necessary 
 that the executive officer be guided through the maze of legal restrictions 
 by competent and sympathetic legal counsel (italics ours). . .Furthermore, 
 the plan of appointment by the executive works satisfactorily in the United 
 States department of Justice, in cities, and in is in operation in a few 
 states. . . It is recommended that the attorney-general of Ohio be appointed 
 by the governor and serve at his pleasure.” (p.15). 
 
 "As long as department heads are appointed by the governor and the attor- 
 ney-general is elected by the people,** points out the New York Commission, 
 
 "here will be some opposition to the centralization of the legal business of 
 the state. It has frequently happened that the attorney- general, being elect- 
 ed by the people, is of the opposite political faith to the governor. The 
 department head is often reluctant to call on the attorney-general of a differ- 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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110 
 
 ent party from his own for advice. This is the principal objection to having 
 all attorneys assigned to the various departments by an elected attorney- 
 general, and this objection will, of course, disappear with the appointment 
 of the attorney-general by the governor.** The Commission then makes the 
 following exception to the complete transfer of all law work to him; counsel 
 to the governor and to the quasi- judicial public service and industrial com- 
 missions. While the arguments that influenced the California Commission to 
 make further exceptions in the case of full time attorneys in the several 
 departments are noted, the report says: "It is obvious that if the whole 
 
 time of some attorneys is needed by some departments, the attorney-general 
 may assign deputies or special attorneys to these departments on full time.** 
 nut it points out: "the question as to the active assistance needed in pros- 
 
 ecuting cases for a department by representatives of the attorney-general 
 must necessarily be viewed from the point of view of the state as a whole. 
 
 The attorney-general should be responsible for all prosecutions and for de- 
 fending all actions and for his interpretations of the constitution and of 
 the laws.” (p.77). 
 
 8 , In the organization of the new legal department, the Commission provides 
 for the following bureaus: legal staff, bureau of police, courts of claims, 
 
 titles, finance and claims. The legal staff is to include all attorneys 
 
 c. 
 
 employed in the legal business of all departments. A fourth and final major 
 grouping within the proprietary functions of government, uniformly observed 
 in the more recent reports, are those activities of the administration which 
 relate to the employing and caring for the personnel. "According to the New 
 York Constitutional Commission, central control over the employment and im- 
 

 
 
 
 
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 ■ 
 
Ill 
 
 proveraent of the personnel of the public service should be established when- 
 ever and to whatever extent justice to a class of employees and individual 
 efficiency may be promoted through the use of a common agency.” For it 
 points out, “It is an advantage both to the executive and the public which 
 it served to provide a common agency for determining the fitness and qualifica- 
 tion of persons seeking employment, for providing common labor conditions 
 
 affecting promotions, transfers, discipline, health, compensation, sick leave, 
 
 70 
 
 vacations, retirement pensions, etc.” All of which would imply, the Commis- 
 sion shows, “that any quest, therefore, for responsible and efficient govern- 
 ment must go deeply into the establishment of: 
 
 (1) Proper tests for selecting official agents— eloction 
 or appointment# 
 
 \2) Tenures of office adapted to the ends sought. 
 
 (3) Adequate tests to be applied in determing the fitness 
 and qualifications of public servants. 
 
 (4) Satisfactory conditions governing the treatment, pro- 
 motion, and dismissal of public servants. 
 
 “The solution of these problems with reference to standards of respon- 
 siveness, responsibility, and efficiency,” the commission continues, has nev- 
 er been undertaken in a systematic and thorough manner by any convention or 
 other body of representatives in this state. . . On the contrary, temporary 
 expedients and partisan consideration have been too often the decisive fac- 
 
 70 
 
 
 New York constitution Commission (1915) report p. 92 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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112 
 
 tors in determing what officers should be elected, what officers should be 
 
 appointed, and what conditions should be attached to public employment. Where 
 
 attempts have been made to regulate the conditions of official employment in 
 
 the public interest, they have usually been negative in character— that is, 
 
 designed to prevent known evils, such as the so-called spoils system, rather 
 
 iJ71 
 
 than to promote efficiency. In establishing some standards, the Commission 
 points out that past experience may be reduced to conclusions to serve as guid- 
 ing principles: namely, that if governing agents are to be made responsible 
 for what they propose as well as what they do— for fidelity, for efficiency, 
 and for economy in the use of public powers and resources— then another prin- 
 ciple is “ that only such officers should be elected as are to act independent- 
 ly; that those who are are act as subordinates should be appointed .** (Italics 
 72 
 
 ours ) . 
 
 from the consideration of what officers shall be appointed, the commis- 
 sion comes to study the method of appointment as the problem of prime import- 
 ance. The underlying reason for appointing instead of electing administrative 
 officers, it points out, is to locate responsibility and make it enforcible. 
 Moreover, the appointing officer assumes responsibility for the proper conduct 
 of the appointee. 
 
 *'As in private employment,** quoting from the report, “the determination 
 of the qualifications and relative merits of persons who are available for 
 employment or already in the service, is of primary importance. The dif- 
 ficulty of forming any genuinely helpful rules for guidance is great, owing 
 
 '~Ibid. 31 
 72 
 
 Ibid. 33 
 
113 
 
 to the subtle human elements involved, Nevertheless there are certain general 
 principles that may serve to guide: 
 
 (1) Any metnods devised for determining ability and 
 fitness must be adapted to the methods of choice 
 imposed upon one who must make the selection. 
 
 ^2) It is necessary to differentiate between those 
 
 offices which are technical or routine in character 
 and t ho se which involve managerial discretion and 
 the settlement of important matters of policy. 
 
 (3) facilities should be afforded for the prompt remov- 
 al of persons who show infidelity or who by a prac- 
 tical test or record of work done have shown in- 
 capacity." 
 
 These principles, the Commission observes, reveal the following defects 
 in the average merit system: (1) It limits the judgment of comparative mer- 
 
 its to the results of "examinations particularly as there is an increasing 
 tendency to rely on educational and professional training. (2) It fails to 
 provide a proper basis for the advancement or promotion of employees after 
 selection. (3) It fails to provide a proper basis for dismissal or dis- 
 cipline of employees. In other words, "the uncertainty and injustice which 
 results . . • narrow and limit the outlook of civil servants who feel that 
 the civil service is not holding out pro per rewards for meritorious service. 
 
 As a result, a condition of stagnation and indifference prevails." 
 
 The function and purpose of a civil service department, thus presented, 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 f 
 
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114 
 
 "which would operate positively instead of negatively and be cooperative in 
 the development of better conditions for employees and better conditions for 
 employees and better conditions for the management raises the following ques- 
 tions of organization, according to the constitutional Commission: (1) 
 
 ‘Should this department be so developed that there would be a close working 
 relation between it and the officers charged with responsibility for prepar- 
 ing the budget, for making contracts for services other than personal, such 
 as repairs, construction, printing, etc. and for decisions on matters of ad- 
 ministrative law!' (2) 'What will be the means of correlating all these 
 activities dealing with proprietary matters— matters of finance, of purchase, 
 of employment, as well as the custodianship of funds and properties of the 
 stater' (3) 'Shall the branch handling employment be made a department and 
 
 the head given a place in the cabinet along with the attorney-general and 
 
 73 
 
 the finance officerT"* 
 
 The New York Reconstruction Commission in 1919 met these points, raised 
 by the Constitutional Commission, in the following summary of recommendations 
 for a department of civil service: 
 
 (1) There will be a department of civil servict. At 
 the head of the department there will be a chair- 
 man designated by the governor who will receive 
 an adequate salary and will be solely responsible 
 for all the administrative work of the commission. 
 
 There will be two additional commissioners on 
 part time who with the chairman will constitute 
 
 73 
 
 New York Constitution Commission report p. 97. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 a board which will meet once a week to pass on 
 quasi- judical and quasi- legislative matters* 
 
 (2) The work of the Commission will be divided between 
 
 two bureaus: administration, examinations. 
 
 (3) There will be a director in charge of each bureau 
 appointed by the head of the department. 
 
 (4) Salaries of ail positions in the department will 
 be such as to attract and hold competent persons 
 of broad education and experience* 
 
 (5) Bureaus will receive a large appropriation so that 
 adequate equipment and office machinery and methods 
 may be installed and maintained. 
 
 (6) There will be a Manager of personnel in each large 
 department of state government who will be in charge 
 of all civil service matters and who will develop 
 and administer a program covering labor turnover, 
 welfare activities, health, personal service, budget , 
 changes of status, i.e. promotions, transfers, dis- 
 charges, etc. 
 
 (7) The head of the department will be a member of the 
 governor's cabinet. 
 
 It should be noted, however, that the actual control over changes in 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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 personnel in the several departments, according to the proposal of the Commis- 
 sion, is lodged with the eureau of Administration, an independent staff agency 
 in the executive department. This bureau is charged with making a logical 
 classification of state employees based on duties and value of services, this 
 work to be done in cooperation with the civil service department. Positions 
 not of a policy-determining character are to be placed in the competitive 
 class directly under the control of the civil service department. A division 
 
 of pensions in the bureau of Administration will formulate and administer pen- 
 
 74 
 
 sion and retirement systems* 
 
 It should be noted also, in the New York plan that the seeming division 
 of responsibility for personnel between the staff agency and the civil service 
 department, is more nominal than actual, since both agencies are under the 
 direct control of the governor through his power of appointment and removal 
 of the chief officers. Such a division, however, does serve a purpose. The 
 more important appointees of the state government are supervised from the 
 governor’s immediate staff under his own personal supervision; appointees of 
 the grade of employees are supervised by an administrative agency not under 
 the governor’s direct control. This practice is in conformity with the gener- 
 al principle of relieving the chief executive of all matters of routine, even 
 as they affect the personnel of the administration, still another purpose is 
 served by such an arrangement as this provided by the New York Commission. The 
 executive staff agency views personnel from the standpoint of the administra- 
 tion as a whole. The administrative department of civil service will have 
 the departmental point of view, cooperation between the two agencies will 
 tend to result in the same relationship as exists between the cabinet as a 
 
 74” — " ~ """ 
 
 New York Reconstruction commission report p. 42. 
 

 
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 whole and an administrative department in an parliamentary government. 
 
 very similar to the New York plan with respect to personnel as a propri- 
 etary function of administration is that of the Ohio report. Here as in New 
 York a department of civil service is recommended, charged M with the adminis- 
 tration of the civil service laws which were passed in conformity with that 
 provision of the constitution which provides that appointment and promotion 
 shall be made according to merit and fitness to be ascertained, as far as 
 practicable, by competitive examination.” The Commission’s analysis of 
 prevailing conditions of personnel in Ohio government is very similar to that 
 of the New York agency. In addition, it observes "that at the present time 
 increased attention is being given to the methods of securing and holding 
 high grade experts in the public service. The excessive cost of labor turn- 
 over or the hiring and firing of employees indiscriminately, is realized as 
 never before and efforts are being made in both industry and public service 
 to reduce these costs. . . *rom an organization standpoint, the work of the 
 department of civil service is exactly comparable with the employment depart- 
 ment in industry; both are likened to the purchasing department, the differ- 
 ence being that the two former purchase personal service and the latter mate- 
 rial, supplies, and equipment.” The commission then notes that out of a 
 total expenditure of §25,000,000 for the state in 1919, §7,000,000, or one- 
 third was spent for personal service. The department as proposed in the Ohio 
 report "is organized under a single commissioner appointed by the governor, 
 to serve at his pleasure to replace the present commission of two members 
 appointed by the governor for terms of two years each. That the law specify 
 that this personal shall have knowledge and experience in employment methods 
 
 Ohio report p. 37. 
 
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 and personnel management. That a personnel board be created, composed of 
 
 department heads or their representatives to cooperate with the civil service 
 
 commissioner in the performance of quasi-legislative and quasi- judicial func- 
 76 
 
 tions. An alternate recommendation is that there be at the head of the 
 
 department of civil service a chairman appointed by the governor who would 
 receive an adequate salary and be responsible for the administrative work. 
 
 Two other additional commissioners would be appointed by the governor on a 
 part time basis, who with the chairman would constitute a board to pass on 
 quasi-legislative and quasi- judicial matters. These two additional commis- 
 
 nn 
 
 sioners would receive nominal salaries and traveling expenses. In justify- 
 ing the change from a commission controlled civil service department to a 
 single-head control, the report points out that the functions of such a de- 
 partment are chiefly administrative, hence would be performed more efficient- 
 ly by one man than by a commission. In devising a board for the department, 
 the report notes that by including as members, heads of some of the major 
 departments and the administrative head of the civil service which would be 
 valuable in many ways, especially in the work of drafting specifications, in 
 devising efficiency rating methods, and in creating a sense of obligation on 
 the part of all public employees to comply with the civil laws of the state. 
 
 While the Illinois Commission makes no recommendation for a reorganiza- 
 tion of the civil service in that state, it does analyze much in the same 
 way the existing arrangements. "The civil service laws have laid the founda- 
 tions of the merit system for the public service in the state; and the prin- 
 ciples of this system should be continued and strengthened . . yet these laws 
 
 76 Ibid. p. 38. 
 77 lbid. p. 39. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
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 are in some respects too rigid in their detailed provisions. The specific 
 enumeration of all exemptions in the statute is not entirely satisfactory. 
 t>om.e of the exemptions named . • are not justified . • More flexibility will 
 be secured by reducing the exemptions specified in the law, and providing a 
 limited authority to make other exemptions • . The bills recommended (by the 
 Commission) will extend the merit system to a considerable extent, and in 
 some case also provide that the governor shall have power to exempt positions 
 of administrative responsibility which it is impracticable to fill by compet- 
 itive examination. • .The authority of the state civil service commission 
 over the efficiency of the state administrative services. A continuous super- 
 vision over the efficiency of the state service is needed; and to be effect- 
 ive it should be exercised by a permanent state authority, with larger powers 
 than are now conferred to control salaries and other expenditures. . . This 
 work is more properly a part of the general system of financial control which 
 it is proposed to vest in the state comptroller, who should cooperate with 
 the civil service commission, as this commission is now required to co-op- 
 erate with the board of adminiet ration in the classification of positions and 
 salaries of state employees under that board.” Adoption of this latter 
 proposal would serve to offset the effect of their final recommendation that 
 the civil service commission be left outside the main executive departments. 
 
 It should be noted, however, that even in the absence of any precise defini- 
 tion of functions and organization such as characterized the New York and Ohio 
 plans, the Illinois ooramission, committed as it was to build on existing 
 arrangements, does recognize: (1) Personnel as a proprietary function; (2) 
 
 The need of centralized control in the more flexible arrangements by which it 
 
 — — — " 
 
 Illinois report p. 72. 
 

 
 
 
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 proposes to give the governor greater discretion in control of exemptions; 
 
 (3) The need of a continuous supervision of the state service in its suggestion 
 of a permanent control from the office of comptroller; (4) Standardization of 
 salaries and employment methods by cooperative arrangements between the organs 
 of control: departments, civil service commission, and the comptroller's of- 
 
 fice. In the elaborate functional analysis of the Taxpayers* Association, 
 
 70 
 
 personnel as a matter for administrative organization is not mentioned. 
 
 The California commission, on the other hand, provides for the super- 
 vision of organization and investigation of the efficiency of administration 
 of state business and functions as a division of activity in the finance de- 
 partment under the director of receipts and supplies. Under its general 
 recommendations it proposes “that the present practice of setting salaries 
 by statute, so far as they refer to employees and officers other than heads 
 of departments and chief deputies, be discontinued." Such a recommendation 
 in effect provides for a standardization of salaries of all subordinate of- 
 ficials under the final supervision of a board of Finance in the finance de- 
 partment* cftarged with the preparation of the budget, as well as with the 
 duty of recommending legislation "where necessary to effect modernization of 
 state business methods." Since the directors of this department are under the 
 control of the governor at whose pleasure they serve, it may be held that the 
 California commission has recognized the more recent general principles under- 
 lying personnel administration in state government. 
 
 The most recent proposal for a department of personnel is that of the 
 Maryland commission in April, 1921. by its provisions, the selection, appoint- 
 ment, and removal of employees in the classified service of the state, are 
 
 70 ' " — — — — ‘ 
 
 Taxpayers* Journal pp. 20-21. 
 

 
 
 
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 vested in a department of employment and registration under a single director 
 appointed by the governor. Two divisions are specified in the report: admin- 
 istration and examination. A unique provision is that vesting in the division 
 of examinations, the additional duty of examining, licensing, and registering 
 eighteen trades and professions at present regulated by the state through as 
 many boards. In explaining this novel correlation, the commission points 
 out the very close relationship between the work of conducting examinations 
 for positions in the classified service of the state and the examination 
 procedure required in connection with vocational licensing. It shows that 
 
 much of the state organization and procedure can be used in common when the 
 
 81 
 
 two functions are grouped together* 
 
 A survey, therefore, of the more recent plans proposed by represent- 
 ative efficiency and economy commissions seems to confirm in the main the 
 principles of functional classification set up by the New York Constitution- 
 al Commission in 1915. In each of the plans considered the principle of 
 centralized control in functional groups, individually and collectively, 
 the correlation and integration of all proprietary matters as a whole gen- 
 erally prevailed. In other words, the oomraiesions, is providing for the ad- 
 ministration of finance, equipment and supplies, and personnel, indentified 
 this branch of government with a purely business enterprise and adopted a 
 managerial hierarchy. 
 
 9, With respect to organization for civil services which are rendered 
 directly to the public by the government, or the public service functions of 
 the New York classification, the desirability of central executive control 
 
 8 ®Ohio report p* 31 
 
 8 *Maryland report p. 53. 
 

 
 
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 is not so easily determined. There is the policy, for example, of decen- 
 tralizing executive control whenever and to the extent that independence of 
 action in the very nature of things is advantageous, i. e. where there is 
 no interdependence of working relations and no advantage can be gained 
 through subordination to a common executive though they may be under the same 
 legislative control* 52 Such a policy raises the question of: (1) The need of 
 eliciting the participation of disintered citizens serving on unpaid boards 
 who exercise powers of investigation, advice, and publicity. (2) The need 
 of placing legal authority in a particular officer most likely to develop a 
 sense of professional responsibility and pride in connection with the work of 
 such office. (3) The U3elessne3s of extending the power of any officer be- 
 yond the limits of what that officer can actually devote his time to. In 
 other words, for certain functions, di f fusion rather than concentration of 
 authority secures not only a more efficient but more democratic administra- 
 tion. (4) The need of continuity of policy in administrative departments 
 having work of a technical and regulation establishing character. Who shall 
 change with the governor is one of the serious problems in the organization 
 of public service activities. In brief, there is the need to discriminate 
 among those departments which should be administered by a single official 
 under the political control of the governor and those which require several- 
 membered commissions with overlapping terms, and those best administered by 
 a single officer appointed by large unpaid boards, and enjoying reasonable 
 security of tenure. 
 
 Such considerations as these have given rise to the widest conceivable 
 variation in classification and organization not only in existing arrange- 
 
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 ments in state governments, but in the reports of the expert commissions them- 
 selves. As far back as 1911, the so-cailed "Wisconsin Idea" was evolved by 
 a commission of experts from the state government, and since that time Wiscon- 
 sin has been foremost among the states in its advocacy of "government by com- 
 mission." The idea explained means simply the breaking up of the state ad- 
 ministration into independent offices and boards in hope of making the differ- 
 ent branches of state administration more serviceable to the people. In the 
 Wisconsin scheme, each main service branch, by act of the legislature, is 
 made independent by being placed under the management of a board or commission 
 The members of each public-ssrvice board are appointed for long and over- 
 lapping terms. The public functions administered by each board are supported 
 by continuing appropriations, thereby giving to them what amounts to a state 
 endowment. Thus established, each board undertakes to develop a more effi- 
 cient service by employment of staff experts. Later, in developing an offi- 
 cial means for giving balance and proportion to a state program a central 
 commission was created^-the state board of public affairs, to which was 
 assigned among other things the duty of preparing a budget. In this way the 
 experts devised for the central supervisory and inquisitorial function a 
 super-board of which the governor and certain members of the legislature were 
 members. ** 3 
 
 In so recent a proposal as the Maryland plan of 1921, the commission or 
 board is utilized in each of the eleven executive departments. While in no 
 case, is a board under the Maryland provisions vested with administrative 
 duties, it is maintained by the commission that "boards serve a useful pur- 
 pose in situations where the judgment of more than one person is valuable, 
 
 °Lf. McCarthy: "The Wisconsin Idea." 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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 and where the opinions of representatives of the general public would tend 
 
 84 
 
 to assure the government of the soundness of a given proposal." between 
 the Wisconsin and Maryland proposals there is sufficient range for widest 
 variations in plans for reorganization with respect to centralized or de- 
 centralized administration. For this reason, an analysis and proper alloca- 
 tion of service with reference to a centralized or decentralized control be- 
 come of prime importance in appraising any scheme of reorganization. For a 
 basic grouping of public services for administration one might well begin as 
 in the case of proprietary functions, with the classification of the New 
 York constitutional commission. According to the Commission these fall into 
 eight major divisions as follows: 
 
 (1) Agriculture and industry. 
 
 (2) Public works. 
 
 (3) Education. 
 
 (4) State institutions for the care of 
 delinquents, defectives, and depend- 
 ents. 
 
 (5) Public health. 
 
 (6) Industrial relations, 
 
 (7) Public utilities. 
 
 (8) banking and insurance. 33 
 
 junctions military in character are given a place midway between the 
 

 
 
 
 
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 proprietary and public service functions as having problems of a special 
 nature not applicable to either of the two major divisions. With but nomin- 
 al changes, the Reconstruction Commission of that state in 1919 accepted the 
 foregoing classification as the basis for major departments as follows: pub- 
 lic works; conservation; agriculture and markets; labor; education; health; 
 mental hygiene; charities and correction; public service commissions; bank- 
 ing and insurance. Major departments recommended for the proprietary class- 
 ification were: audit and control, taxation and finance, law, state, and 
 
 civil service. There should be noted (1) The clean cut demarcation between 
 proprietary and service functions in the departmental organization; (2) The 
 practical identity between major groupings of the basic classification and 
 the several departments. 
 
 Under the California plan, executive departments included: receipts and 
 supplies, accounts and expenditures, trade and corporations, public works, 
 agriculture, natural resources, labor, institutions, education, health, social 
 service. The first two named departments were broadly classified as finance 
 with major divisions, the heads of which were given a place in the governor's 
 cabinet. This is a unique variation among the recent plans in the organiza- 
 tion of fiscal agencies. An elective comptroller wa3 vested with exclusive 
 functions of auditing, responsible directly to the legislature. Welfare func- 
 tions were distributed among two departments, institutions and social service. No 
 clear lines of demarcation in function were followed in these two, institutions 
 being under the jurisdiction of the latter as well as the former. In general, 
 however, mental defectives were committed to the department of institutions, 
 while objects of charities and corrections were allocated to the department 
 
 ^Maryland report p. 27. 
 
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 of social service. In explaining its groupings, the commission notes: "The 
 coordination of agencies with allied functions in comprehensive departments 
 will do away with overlapping of duties and duplication of effort, and will 
 lessen the number of units to be supervised, thereby making review more ad- 
 equate and supervision more real. There are no factors which are greater 
 causes of inefficiency than decentralized control and inadequate supervision 
 and review." ' The group having to do with the regulation of financial in- 
 stitutions was left outside the main departments of banking, building and 
 loan supervision, and state insurance. Another group of agencies dealing 
 with professional standards, or the usual examining boards of the professions, 
 were likewise organized independently. In this connection the commission 
 observes: M The evidence gathered and the experience of other states have 
 
 convinced the committee that the consolidation of any one of these with either 
 of the others, or the inclusion of one or all in any other departmental group 
 is impractical." For the same reason, the civil service commission, state 
 library, military affairs, industrial accident commission, industrial wel- 
 fare commission, immigration and housing commission were left autonomous. 
 
 beventeen functional departments make up the recent Ohio recommendation 
 as follows: audit (independent), state, military affairs, law, finance,trade 
 
 and commerce, public works, agriculture, health, industrial commission, educa- 
 tion, welfare administration, board of welfare, civil service. An important 
 variation is the provision for welfare administration. All administrative 
 functions dealing with the three classes of states' wards: mental defect- 
 
 ives, delinquents, and dependents are centered in the department of welfare 
 
 85 New York constitution commission report p. 85. 
 
 88 New York Reconstruction commission report p. 27. 
 
 87 California report p. 27. 
 

 
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127 
 
 administration, while to the state board of welfare are given the duties of 
 
 visitation, investigation, and report, "for the purpose of checking up on 
 
 the work which is being done, and to report the fact 3 to the director, the 
 
 88 
 
 legislature, and the public." It is to have no connection with the manage- 
 ment of institutions, its chief function being analysis and criticism of pro- 
 grams and results, and constructive recommendations as to new policies and 
 programs which should be undertaken. A public utilities commission is left 
 independent outside the executive departments because "a public utilities 
 commission exercises both semi- judicial and administrative functions and a 
 several-headed control is justified . • • such a commission should not be 
 
 QQ 
 
 under the control of any other department ." w * 
 
 The most recent plan of departmental organization, that of Maryland, 
 includes eleven major departments as follows: administration, finance, law, 
 
 militia, welfare, health, education, public works, commerce, labor, employ- 
 ment and registration, with the office of state comptroller organized outside 
 the administration. "The allocation of state functions to major departments 
 should be along natural and practical lines that will bring together those 
 activities that relate to the same subject matter and that can be handled by 
 the same staff" is the statement of the commissions guiding principle. Its 
 recommendation stands for perhaps the most careful, untrammeled, and logical 
 grouping of all the plans. 
 
 A comparative study of the foregoing representative recent plan shows: 
 (1) Only nominal variation in the grouping of the propri- 
 etary functions. 
 
 88 0hio report p. 35 
 89 Ibid. p. 27. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 (2) The departments of health, education, public worke, 
 labor, commerce, and welfare of the service functions 
 common to all* 
 
 (3) variation in the department of welfare in California 
 and Ohio, illogical in the former, and on the basis 
 purely of administration and checking up in the latter* 
 
 (4) Public utilities outside a department in California and 
 Ohio. 
 
 A similar study of ten plans before 1919: Delaware, Illinois, Idaho, 
 
 Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon, and New York, 
 shows education as a distinct department in nine, health a department in 
 eight, public works in seven, agriculture in seven. Conspicuous service func- 
 tions like banking and insurance in New York, natural resources in Califor- 
 nia, and reclamation in Idaho led to their organization as distinct, separate 
 departments in those states, while in the dominantly agricultural states like 
 Minnesota, relatively negligible services of labor and commerce were organiz- 
 ed under one administrative staff. Other variations were due to a local sit- 
 uation in which the commissions were committed to utilizing certain existing 
 statutory agencies. In other states constitutional offices with constituent 
 functions left certain correlated functions to statutory offices or depart- 
 ments. 
 
 In this connection, however, certain exceptions should be noted which 
 indicate even in the more recent plans the difficulty of achieving a logical 
 arrangement of departments with a special, exclusive field for each. Aside 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 from the considerations of local conditions like those of reclamation in 
 Idaho and of expediency, like those of raised by constituent offices in Ill- 
 inois, there is the problem of allocating to the most appropriate departments 
 certain functions on the basis of the work to be done. Take, for example, 
 the reasons advanced by the Ohio Commission in its recent report for allocat- 
 ing the examining of professions to the proposed department of education. 
 
 "The time has come," it says, "when the public's interests, that is the inter- 
 ests of those who patronize these professions (accountancy, dentistry, med- 
 icine, nursing, optometry, pharmacy, veterinary, and embalming) should be 
 the primary consideration in making up examinations. It is for this reason 
 that it is suggested to abolish the present boards and to recognize the sol- 
 idarity of the state's interests and the educational motive which dominate 
 professional examinations by placing all this work under the direction of 
 the department of education • • • by coordinating this work under the depart- 
 ment of education the public purpose of all these professions would be em- 
 phasized. No person ought to be given the state's permission to practice 
 medicine who does not know the facts about modem preventive hygiene. A 
 dentist should know how teeth can be saved and the social importance and 
 moral obligation of saving teeth, as well as the mechanical technique of 
 repairing them. The reasons for not recommending the placing of these con- 
 solidated services in tne department of health are that this department must 
 secure the full cooperation of all practitioners, if it is to be successful. 
 This full cooperation would be difficult, if not impossible, if the state de- 
 partment of health were mixed up with a factional discussion of proposed new 
 standards for admission into the profession, and investigating charges 
 against individual practitioners, by recommending that this examining work 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 come under the department of education instead of a consolidated examining 
 
 board, it is hoped to secure all the advantages of concentration plus the 
 
 additional advantages of recognizing the state’s part in the admission of new 
 
 practitioners to professions which it licenses as part of its educational pro- 
 
 90 
 
 gram and aac countability.** 
 
 with the principle of state regulation the commissions are in hearty 
 agreement, but here the identity of conclusions ends. In one instance, the 
 Oregon commission allocated the administration of th6 function to public health 
 Idaho? in another, to law enforcement; and the Maryland commission, in still 
 another, in the most recent report departmentalizes it as a coordinate branch 
 of the department of employment and registration, uonsider their reasons: 
 
 **The multiplication of independent boards for each class of practitioners or 
 trade should be discouraged," notes the Oregon commission. "In case of the 
 health examining boards, this responsible state authority should be the state 
 health department, and a bureau of medical registration and licensure should 
 be created in this department to have charge of the clerical and administra- 
 tive work and the issuance of licenses now attended to by the various health 
 examining boards. The head of the bureau should be a deputy health director 
 appointed by the director of public health. A committee of three competent 
 members of each of the health professions should be employed by such deputy 
 director to hold examinations whenever necessary or advisable, just as the 
 
 state insurance commissioner employs actuaries to examine the affairs of 
 
 91 
 
 insurance companies." Now consider this proposal of the Maryland Commission: 
 "There is very close relationship between the work of conducting examinations 
 for positions in the classified service of the state and the examination pro- 
 cedure required in connection with vocational licensing, and much of the same 
 
 ^Oregon report p. SI 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 organization and procedure can be used in common if these two functions were 
 grouped together. Tne office and clerical work is closely related in ite 
 nature and a similar procedure will be required in holding either civil serv- 
 ice or vocational license examinations in various parts of the state. A sep- 
 arate department of registration can of course be established, but would 
 
 scarcely seem to be of equal importance with the other major departments pro- 
 
 . ..92 
 posed." 
 
 In contrast to all these proposals is that of the California commission 
 which would leave to function independently the group of state agencies which 
 deals with professional standards in: accountancy, architecture, medicine, 
 
 dentistry, optometry, embalming, pharmacy, veterinary medicine. Their rea- 
 son given is as follows: "In the opinion of the committee it is seriously 
 
 questionable whether or net increased efficiency in the functioning of these 
 
 various boards or reduced expense in their operation would be accomplished 
 
 93 
 
 by consolidating all of them in a single department." Other services, the 
 allocation of which varies in the several recent reports are: (1) agencies 
 
 concerned with the regulation of business— banking, insurance, building and 
 loan supervision, utilities, -variation due to the specialization required 
 for proper supervision. Recent plans like those of California and Ohio pro- 
 vide an autonomous agency for each outside executive departments, New York 
 builds a department staff around each one of them; while Maryland brings 
 them together into a single executive department of commerce with integrated 
 divisions. (2) agencies for inspectional purposes; (3) activities relating 
 to the dairy industry,— variation due to the claims of the health and the 
 agriculture departments:; (4) educational agencies— scholastic, vocational, 
 
 ■^Oregon report p. 91. 
 
 •‘'Maryland report (1921) p. 53 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 cultural* 
 
 10 An even greater source of variation, finally, in the organization of ser- 
 vice functions lies in the form of administrative structure itself. In the 
 plans referred to, four placed a board over the department of education, and 
 two in the same way organized the department of health. In at least one plan, 
 the departments of agriculture, labor, health, commerce and labor, corrections, 
 conservation, public utilities, and natural resources were so organized. In 
 addition, boards of varying types were recommened in a majority of plans for 
 at least three of the following departments: public works, labor, health, 
 
 institutions, conservation, agriculture, education, trade and commerce, and 
 public works. The Taxpayers* plan led with the six boards it prescribed as 
 heads of departments, and New York followed with five. Ohio organized two 
 departments under boards, California two, while Maryland recommended a eingle- 
 headed administration throughout. 
 
 The boards utilized also vary in the different plana. In general they 
 may be classified under four heads: (1) Those composed of the director, to- 
 
 gether with deputies or division chiefs within the department. These boards 
 are recommended primarily for quasi- judicial and quasi-legislative functions. 
 The Taxpayers' plan employs this type exclusively, and the Oregon plan 
 prefers it to all others for this purpose. (2) Advisory councils composed 
 of ex officio members of the administration. California, Ohio, and New York 
 plans employ these in labor, agriculture, and education. (3) Those composed 
 of professionals or specially interested individuals appointed by the governor 
 with overlapping tenures. Oregon, California, and New York recommends these 
 for trade and commerce, education, health, and labor respectively. (4) Those 
 
 go 1 i i - - ■ -i . , , . i ■ ■ 1 1 . 
 
 California report (1919) p. 17. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 composed of specially interested citizens to act primarily in an advisory 
 capacity, oalifcrnia, "ew York, Maryland, and Oregon utilize these quite 
 generally in such departments as institutions, agriculture, public works, and 
 conservation. The reasons advanced by the Commissions in recommending the 
 several types of boards as part of the administrative schemes have a partic- 
 ular significance in the democratic point of view they reveal. Unlike the 
 administrative ideal of centralized responsibility and efficiency so exclu- 
 sively adopted in the proprietary fields, the test here is the democracy of 
 the administration the diffusion of participation, and the concert of minds 
 in forming the administrative policy. The California report recommends that 
 “provision be made for the retention of local unpaid boards of managers for 
 welfare institutions, to serve as advisory and visiting boards and to form 
 
 connecting links between the state government, the institutions, and the 
 
 94 
 
 communities in which they are located.** In the same spirit it recommends 
 “that the governor be empowered to appoint a local unpaid trustee for each of 
 the memorial properties placed under the public works departments." The 
 flew York oommission provides that "in order to maintain local or special inter- 
 est and support, the present boards or associations will continue as boards of 
 
 96 
 
 trustees in the department of conservation." The Maryland report in rec- 
 ommending unpaid, advisory boards exclusively for the departments of welfare, 
 health, and education explains: "In conjunction with the eleven executive 
 
 departments and the independent auditing office, it is proposed to establish 
 certain advisory boards or councils whose function it would be to advise ad- 
 ministrative officials and to assist in the formulation of policies. Each of 
 
 otlbid p. 27. 
 
 '^Ibid p. 23. 
 
 96 Ibid. p. 22. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 « . ' 
 1 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 •> i . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 o 
 
 1 1 I -■ 1 ; 
 
 ■< 
 
 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 it. ft, tfj»' yUB 
 
 
 L. 
 
 
 
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 ■ • 
 
 ■ * 
 
134 
 
 these boards • . would serve a useful purpose, however, in situations where 
 the judgment of more than one person is valuable, and where the opinions of 
 representatives of the general public would tend to assure the government of 
 the soundness of a given proposal. Positions on such boards would be non- 
 remun erat ive . “ ^ 
 
 Even the Ohio commission which reduced to rather negative principle the 
 results of a very unsatisfactory experience with administrative boards in 
 that state, was led to substitute an advisory board for one which it proposes 
 to abolish ir. the department of welfare. "This board would have no admin- 
 istrative duties to perform," it explains, "but its duty would be to visit 
 and investigate state institutions for the purpose of checxing up on the work 
 
 which is being done by the department of welfare administration and report 
 
 98 
 
 the facts to the director, the legislature, and the public." 
 
 It remains for the Oregon report, finally, to formulate the statement 
 of the human welfare note which enters to modify the administration of ser- 
 vice functions. "A managing board, or officer over state charitable and 
 correctional institutions," it explains, "is sometimes inclined to look mere- 
 ly at the immediate financial aspect of the conduct of the institutions and 
 to make petty economies at the expense of the welfare of the inmates, while 
 possibly neglecting to some extent their proper care and cure. The largest 
 and most important economies in the management of the institutions can, in 
 the long run, be effected by a far-sighted policy of scientific treatment 
 and cure of the inmates, so as to retore them more quickly to normal member- 
 ship in society and thus to relieve the state the burden of their expense. 
 
 ^Maryland report (1921) p, 27. 
 
 ^Ohio report (1920) p. 36. 
 

 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
135 
 
 In order, therefore, to supply a corrective influence to the possibly too 
 narrow financial and business point of view of the managing officer and to 
 look after the proper care and welfare of the inmates, it is recommended that 
 there be created an advisory unpaid board of five members, appointed by the 
 governor, at least one of whom should be a woman, which should exercise pow- 
 ers of inspection, investigation and report with reference to the charitable 
 
 99 
 
 and correctional institutions.'* Considerations of board control in the 
 commissions* reports, therefore, are significant in this respect: They show 
 
 underlying human motives of democracy and welfare which must be taken into 
 account in any proposal for administration of service functions. 
 
 On the other hand, there is a recent tendency best defined in the pro- 
 vision of the Maryland report which makes “each of these advisory boards an 
 integral part of a departmental organization, but without intending that it 
 should have any active part in administration." After noting that of the 
 eighty-one permanent state agencies in Maryland, sixty-six were headed by 
 commissions and fifteen by a single individual, the report reviews the histor- 
 ical development in which this came about, with the observation that "in re- 
 cent years there has been a disposition on the part of the general assembly 
 to return to the 'one man* type of administration."^^ continuing, it ob- 
 serves: “Numerous factors enter into an appraisal of the effectiveness of 
 
 the work of the various departments of the state government, only one of them 
 being the type of organization involved. It is, therefore, impossible to 
 demonstrate such a general assertion as that those agencies headed by commis- 
 sions have been less successful than those headed by a single official. Never- 
 
 *’lbid p. 40. 
 
 ^^Maryland report (1921) p. 23 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
136 
 
 thelees, it is more than probable that where effective administrative work has 
 been accomplished by boards or commissions, it has been achieved in spite of, 
 rather than as a result of, that type of organization, and that still better 
 results would have been attained if responsibility had been definitely cent- 
 ered on a single individual." here the uommission sharply distinguished 
 between the board as a discretionary and as an administrative agency. It is 
 in the latter capacity that its weakness is inherent. Quoting from the report 
 we read: "The vocational examining boards furnish . • illustration of the 
 
 failure of the commission form as an administrative agency. Most of them 
 have neither offices nor employees, and it is difficult for license applicants 
 to locate them. Many of them keep no files or records of consequence and 
 their activity is generally proportionate to the amount of time and interest 
 which their secretaries can devote to the work. • • While a board may be nec- 
 essary in holding examinations, the administrative functions of these agencies 
 have been woefully neglected because of this type of organization.” Whereupon 
 the report proposes to transfer the board to an executive department where its 
 administrative work will be executed by an efficient permanent staff, leaving 
 the board itself free for the functions it was originally created to perform. 
 In the words of the Commission: "The modern tendency toward a functional 
 
 grouping of activities is evidenced by the recent establishment of the state 
 employment commission. The function of employment, common to all departments 
 and institutions, has been centralized with the result that these agencies 
 are relieved of administrative detail in this connection and are free to per- 
 form far more effective work in their own specialized fields. To point out 
 the advantages of a logical grouping and distribution of function in an 
 organization is merely to express in another way the present-day tendency 
 
137 
 
 toward specialization in all fields of human endeavor. In reassigning 
 functions to the board of agriculture, the Ohio commission in its recent 
 report explains much to the same effect: “The purpose of the large board 
 
 of ten memoers was to secure representation of the varied interests dealt 
 with by the department and to bring to bear upon the agricultural problems 
 of the state the advice and counsel of the leading agricultural and business 
 men of the state. This purpose is interfered with to some extent by requir- 
 ing these men to devote a considerable part of their time, when in session, 
 to routine executive duties such as the approval of appointments, promotion, 
 and dismissal of employes concerning v/hich the board has little knowledge, 
 little time, or opportunity to investigate and consequently must rely almost 
 wholly upon the decision of the secretary. It is obvious that an unpaid 
 board meeting monthly can act in an advisory capacity but cannot supervise 
 and coordinate the work of several departments, by the creation of an advis- 
 ory board the original purposes would be served and the department could func- 
 tion properly and effectively and assume the position which rightfully belongs 
 
 to it as one of the coordinate major departments of state government having a 
 
 102 
 
 representative on the governor's cabinet.” Again, referring to the welfare 
 board in maxing a similar proposal for its reconstitution, the commission ex- 
 plains: “It has failed in these services not because it did not want to help, 
 
 but because it was asked to do what boards and commissions seldom do, namely, 
 manage and administer as well as legislate. It has been no one member's duty 
 to look ahead for the entire many-sided problem. Even where one member has 
 special knowledge, he must defer to three others who lack his special knowl- 
 edge but who are compelled to go through the form of weighing his evidence 
 
 101 Ibid. p. 21. 
 
 102 0hio report (1920) p. 23 
 

 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 * 
 
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 B i ,; 1 11T** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
138 
 
 and challenging his recommendations* With such diffusion at the top, it has 
 
 naturally been impossible for the state to secure from trained subordinates 
 
 the service they could give were efficiency and initiative fostered and 
 
 103 
 
 compelled by an exacting head with a consistent cumulative policy." 
 
 Reduced to a working principle, therefore, this newer tendency may thus 
 be defined: 
 
 (1) *or administrative services, a strong, unifying central 
 control and direction. 
 
 (2) jj’or questions involving discretions and requiring delibera- 
 tion, a body of men. 
 
 The first consideration is essential to the effectiveness of administra- 
 tion and the second is an antidote for bureaucracy* The following tendencies, 
 finally, may be said to stand out from this study of functional organization 
 of service activities in the states as proposed by the efficiency commissions: 
 
 (1) no such general acceptance of a managerial heirarchy 
 as in the case of the so-called proprietary functions 
 where considerations of efficiency and responsibility 
 alone prevailed. 
 
 (2) A variation in the scope of departmental units such 
 as labor and commerce in Minnesota, reclamation in 
 Idaho, conservation and industries in New Jersey, and 
 banking in New York in an adaption to local or "texture" 
 needs. 
 
 ^0^1 bid. p. 35T 
 

 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
139 
 
 (3) A variation in the allocation of functions like registra” 
 tion, vocational education, and the dairy industry due to 
 the conflicting claim of the special interests involved, 
 such as the department of labor's claim to vocational 
 training supervision, etc. 
 
 (4) A variety of boards and commissions and of board control. 
 
 (6) The uniform utilization of the advisory boards from dem- 
 ocratic and welfare motivtP. 
 
 (6) An unmistakable tendency in the more recent plans toward 
 a further functional division between discretionary and 
 purely administrative duties in allocating service activ- 
 ities to boards and commissions. 
 
 cecause of the presence of subtle human motives, in brief, service admin- 
 istration even in the reports of efficiency commissions still presents a wide 
 range of variations in functional grouping and organization. 
 
 11 Reduced to tendencies and principles, in conclusion, this study of some 
 ten thousand pages of the more recent reports of efficiency and econony com- 
 missions in the American states may be summarized as follows: 
 
 (1) The tendency in recent years for relatively indifferent 
 legislative committees to give way to expert investigators. 
 
 (2) The increasingly uniform practice of efficiency experts in 
 government surveys to call into consultation professional 
 men as well as officials where their interests are involved. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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140 
 
 (3) The increasing practicability of the proposals of commis- 
 sions representing, as they are coming more and more to do, 
 the lay and official as well as the expert point of view. 
 
 (4) The identity of principles by which they evolve the new 
 status of governor as the responsible effective head of 
 administration, particularly in the proprietary functions. 
 
 (5) The identity of methods by which they incorporate the 
 principle of managerial hierarchy in the purely business 
 or proprietary activities of state governments. 
 
 (6) The marked conservatism with which they departmentalize, 
 allocate, and organize the service or welfare activities 
 of states— in other words, their uniform responsiveness 
 to the paramount considerations of democracy, human wel- 
 fare, and local or "texture” needs in all service admin- 
 istration. 
 
 Implied in the foregoing statement of tendencies are the more striking 
 proposals of: 
 
 A ballet of two for the executive department— the gover- 
 nor and comptroller. 
 
 Department heads appointed by the governor and directly 
 responsible to him without confirmation of the senate. 
 
 The creation of an administrative staff for the governor, 
 including expert and secretarial personnel outside the 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 ... 
 
 • I I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 
 
 
main departments 
 
 An independent auditor outside the administration, 
 responsible directly to the legislature, charged 
 exclusively with legal and operation audits. 
 
 A department of finance with special attention to 
 allocation of accounting, revenue, and budget func- 
 tions. 
 
 The executive budget with all it implies of absolute 
 integration of control within the administration, 
 participation in legislative hearings, public hear- 
 ings, item veto, and special emergency bills with 
 legislative responsibility for increase in the gover 
 nor's estimates. 
 
 A personnel department modelled on modern principles 
 
 A department of law under the direct control of the 
 governor. 
 
 a governor *8 cabinet uniformly adapted in size and 
 membership to purposes of consultation. 
 
 A legislative council as a continuous critic of the 
 administration. 
 
 Progressive separation of executive and routine func 
 tions in internal organization of administrative de- 
 
 partments 
 
142 
 
 Utilization of unpaid, advisory boards from democrat- 
 ic and welfare motives. 
 
 Retention of board control in and out of departments 
 with administrative centralization of non- discretionary 
 matters. 
 

 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 f" 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
143 
 
 IV- SESSION LAWS 
 
 In this section devoted primarily to a review of recent legislation, 
 a different method of analyzing the findings is followed. 
 
 Instead of a narrative statement of the findings after the manner of 
 the preceding sections, we propose in this part of the paper to let the acts 
 in the main speak for themselves. On the other hand, data from the session 
 laws are classified in the same order observed in the section dealing with 
 the reports of the efficiency and economy committees. In this way reference 
 will be facilitated, and the significance of recent legislation in the light 
 of expert recommendations, more readily perceived. This order is as follows: 
 
 1-General purpose of the reorganization acts as 
 indicated in representative enacting clauses. 
 
 ?,-Policy with respect to constitutional officers. 
 
 3-Governor's control of the administration. 
 
 (1) Appointment 
 
 (2) Fixing salaries of subordinates 
 
 (3) Organization of departments 
 
 (4) Special provisions relating to the 
 organization of departments 
 
 (5) Personnel 
 
 (6) Qualifications fixed by law 
 
 (7) Budget 
 
 4- Functional organization. 
 
 5- Boards and Commissions. 
 
 In this connection, referring again to the discussion of the efficiency 
 

 
 
 
 4 
 
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144 
 
 and economy commissions, those inevitable causes leading to reorganization 
 should be re-emphasized: 
 
 1- The inevitable coterminous expansion of population, 
 wealth, and the scope of government activity. 
 
 2- The increasing complexity and inefficiency of an 
 administrative system, hurriedly and illogically 
 planned. 
 
 3- The mounting costs of such an illogical system. 
 
 4- A fiscal emergency. 
 
 Multiplicity and diversity of boards represent the first-atage; a dis- 
 integrated, negative governmental system the second, — for the untrained law- 
 maker is bound by historical prejudices; a mounting state deficit, the third; 
 and a popular revolt, the fourth. 
 
 Recent legislative acts dealing with the organization of administration 
 represent all four stages. There are those scattering creations of un- 
 correlated agencies of the first stage; those ineffectual attempts at piece- 
 meal coordination of the second; the legislative budgets of the third; and 
 the efficiency and economy resolutions of the fourth. Any search for signif- 
 icant recent tendencies in the legislative acts themselves, therefore, log- 
 ically begins where the preliminary inevitable development s leave off, and 
 by this principle we propose to be guided in this part of the paper. 
 
 In other words, legislative acts represented in these findings fall in- 
 to five classes: 
 
 i 
 

 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) Those effecting a general reorganization of admin- 
 istrative departments: Nebraska, Ohio, Idaho, 
 
 Washington, Massachusetts* 
 
 (2) Those providing a partial reorganization: Missouri, 
 Michigan, California. 
 
 (3) Those establishing isolated but well organized 
 
 departmental groupings: Indiana, Pennsylvania, 
 
 Utah, Minnesota, West Virginia. 
 
 (4) Those unclassified specific provisions which affect 
 the status of the administrative agencies in a 
 conspicuous way* 
 
 (5) Those authorizing the executive budget. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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 4 
 
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146 
 
 1-General purposes as indicated in representative enacting clauses: 
 
 "The supreme power of the state is vested in the governor who 
 is expressly charged with the duty of seeing that the laws are faith- 
 fully executed. In order that he may exercise a portion of the author- 
 ity so vested and in addition to the powers now conferred upon him by 
 law, civil administrative departments are hereby created, through the 
 instrumentality of which the governor is authorized to exercise the 
 functions in this chapter assigned to each department.”^ 
 
 ”In order that the governor may exercise the supreme executive 
 
 power of the state vested in him by the constitution and adequately 
 
 perform his constitutional duty to see that tho laws are faithfully 
 
 executed, the administrative functions are organized as provided in 
 2 
 
 this chapter.” 
 
 "That in the enactment of this law it is hereby declared to be 
 the intent and purpose of the federal assembly to effectually pro- 
 vide for the concentration of authority, with reference to the 
 management, and the co-ordination of ths activities of the several 
 agencies or branches of the state government to which this act ap- 
 plies, to the end that state revenues may be conserved and a higher 
 standard of efficiency obtained in the administration of the laws 
 to which this act refers." 
 
 "The fact that there are now too many departments in the state 
 government, and the fact that the consolidation of the departments 
 
 };Idahc . Session laws, 1921, Ch. 8. 
 
 ^Ohio. Session laws, 1921, H. B. 249. 
 
 3 Mi ssouri, Session laws, 1921, Ch. 5. 
 

 
 . 
 
 . 
 
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 - ' 
 
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 , 
 
 ’ 
 
 
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 ■* 
 
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147 
 
 herein mentioned will contribute to efficiency and economy, creates 
 
 4 
 
 an emergency and an imperative public necessity." 
 
 "An act to • . promote efficiency, order, and economy in the 
 administration of the government of the stats." 6 
 
 "The civil administration of the laws is hereby vested in the 
 governor. For the purpose of aiding the governor in the execution 
 and administration of the law, the executive administration work 
 shall be divided into the several departments enumerated in Section 
 2 of this article." 6 
 
 "It is the policy of this state to vest in the governor the 
 civil administration of the laws of the state and for the purpose 
 of aiding the governor in the execution and administration of the 
 laws and to divide the executive and administrative work into de- 
 
 7 
 
 partments as provided by law."' 
 
 4 
 
 Texas. Session laws, 1921, Ch. 10. 
 ^Washington. Session laws, 1921. 
 ^Nebraska. Session laws, 1919. 
 "California. Session laws, 1921, Ch. 602. 
 
*. 
 
148 
 
 2-Policy with reapect to constitutional officers: 
 
 State superintendent of public instruction made ex officio 
 director of department of education; really executive officer 
 
 Q 
 
 of the board of education in charge of text books. 
 
 Resolution proposing amendment to constitution for the 
 appointment of state superintendent of public instruction leav- 
 ing term of office, duties, and compensation to be prescribed 
 by law.^ 
 
 Commissioner of education of new statutory department shall 
 perform duties hitherto required by law of the state superintend- 
 ent, a constitutional officer. All functions vested by law in 
 the state superintendent transferred to commissioner of education.^ 
 
 All executive and administrative officers except the governor, 
 lieutenant-governor, treasurer, and secretary of state are made 
 subject to merger or consolidation by the legislature; this pro- 
 vision in spite of the fact that the number of constitutional of- 
 ficers were actually increased in the new constitution.^ 
 
 Constitutional officers head respective departments created 
 for them.^ 2 
 
 Commissioner of immigration, labor, and statistics made head 
 of the department of the same name— a constitutional office, ap- 
 pointed by governor and senate. Only exception in Idaho code to 
 
 |lbid. Ch. 502. 
 
 .^Indiana. Session laws, Ch. 296. 
 iU :vlinnesota. Session laws, Ch. 334. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 u 
 
 
 > 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 
 « 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 * 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 . 
 
 ' 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
general rule of appointment by governor alone for indefinite 
 term. ^ 
 
 Superintendent of public instruction to be appointed by 
 governor and senate. ^ 
 
 Educational work of the state consolidated under state 
 superintendent of public instruction as director of the depart- 
 ment; superintendent of public works made director of the de- 
 
 15 
 
 partment of public works. 
 
 Creation of an administrative board composed of constitu- 
 tional officers and heads of departments to correlate the whole 
 
 16 
 
 work of administration. 
 
 Administrative committees of three members each, composed 
 of elective state officers to perform respective duties: state 
 equalization, state finance, state highway, state capitol, state 
 library, etc* 1-7 
 
 ^Louisiana, Cont. Amend. 1921. 
 ^Massachusetts, Session laws, 1919, Ch. 350. 
 JJIdaho, S. L. 1919. 
 
 ’’^Tennessee, S. L. 1919, Ch. 11. 
 l5 0hio. S. L. 1921. 
 
 ^Michigan. S. L. 1921, No. 389. 
 
 ^Washington. S. L. 1921. 
 
• , ' 
 
 » , , ■ s 
 
 
 
 
 
150 
 
 3-Governors’ control of administration 
 
 (1) Appointment 
 
 Heads of departments 
 
 a- Appointed by governor with advice and consent of senate. 
 
 Massachusetts 
 Michigan 
 Minnesota 
 Nebraska 
 New York 
 Pennsylvania 
 Vermont 
 Washington 
 West Virginia 
 
 * Approval of council, independent 
 elective body of nine members. 
 
 b-Appointed by governor alone. 
 
 California 
 
 Colorado 
 
 *Idaho 
 
 Indiana 
 
 Montana 
 
 Commissioner of immigration, a 
 constitutional officer appointed 
 by governor with consent of sen- 
 ate. 
 
 c-Both methods. 
 
 Minnesota 
 
 Chiefs of bureaus and divisions 
 
 a- Appointed by director or head of the department with 
 approval of governor. 
 
 California 
 
 Indiana 
 
 Michigan 
 

151 
 
 Missouri 
 
 Pennsylvania 
 
 Vermont 
 
 •* ** Approval state administrative 
 board. 
 
 b-Appointed by director alone. 
 
 Colorado 
 Massachusetts 
 Minnesota 
 New York 
 *0hio 
 
 Washington 
 
 *Chief of division of banks ap- 
 pointed by governor. 
 
 c-Appointed by governor alone. 
 
 Idaho 
 
 Nebraska 
 
 Tenure of heads of departments 
 
 a-Hold office during pleasure of governor. 
 
 Cali fornia 
 
 Colorado 
 
 Idaho 
 
 Michigan 
 
 Missouri 
 
 Ohio 
 
 Utah 
 
 b-Specified term of four years. 
 
 Indiana 
 
 •^Massachusetts 
 Minnesota 
 Nebraska 
 ■^Pennsylvania 
 Vermont 
 West Virginia 
 
 *3-5 years. 
 
 **2 years. 
 

 
 
 
 
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 * 
 
 . 
 
 ■ ' 
 
 . 
 
152 
 
 c-Removal by governor for cause. 
 
 Indiana 
 
 Tennessee 
 
 Minnesota 
 
 (2) Fixing salaries of heads of departments. 
 
 a-Fixed by governor. 
 
 Missouri 
 
 Washington 
 
 b- Fixed by law. 
 
 California 
 
 Colorado 
 
 Indiana 
 
 Massachusetts 
 
 Minnesota 
 
 Missouri 
 
 Montana 
 
 Nebraska 
 
 New York 
 
 Pennsylvania 
 
 Utah 
 
 West Virginia 
 
 (3) Organization of departments. 
 
 Power to create, abolish, or recombine bureaus and divisions . 
 
 a- Cabinet 
 
 Washington 
 
 b-Head of department with approval of governor. 
 
 California 
 
 Colorado 
 
 .'Idaho 
 
 Indiana 
 
 JNebraska 
 
 Pennsylvania* 
 
 Massachusett s** 
 
153 
 
 ^Approval advisory council. 
 **Approval of governor and council. 
 .'Limited to personnel* 
 
 c-Head of department alone. 
 
 *Idaho 
 
 Minnesota 
 
 ♦♦Michigan 
 
 ♦With exceptions. 
 
 ♦♦Labor department only. 
 
 Power to fix salaries of subordinates , 
 a- Cabinet . 
 
 Washington 
 
 b-Head of department with approval of governor. 
 
 Indiana 
 
 Idaho 
 
 **Massachu setts 
 ♦Montana 
 Pennsylvania 
 **Utah 
 
 ♦Approval board of examiners. 
 
 ♦* Approval of governor and council. 
 
 c-H9ad of department alone* 
 
 Minnesota 
 
 ♦Ohio 
 
 ♦Subject to civil service probisions. 
 
 d-Governor . 
 
 Nebraska 
 

 
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154 
 
 (4) Special provisions relating to the organization of departments. 
 
 Heads of bureaus may create new bureaus in addition 
 to those prescribed by law; each officer, board, and com- 
 mission having supervision and control of a state depart- 
 ment may employ a person to serve under such officer 
 board, or commission in a confidential capacity, and such 
 employment shall be exempt from civil service laws.^ 
 
 Commissioner of labor in newly created department 
 
 may appoint such heads of divisions, bureaus, etc. as 
 
 necessary^ may transfer or abolish, or even consolidate 
 
 19 
 
 such divisions, bureaus, etc. 
 
 Director of department shall have authority to con- 
 solidate any two or more bureaus created in his department, 
 reduce the number or create new bureaus therein; with 
 
 20 
 
 consent of governor may create advisory boards when needed. 
 
 The head of each department, subject to the approval 
 of the governor shall have power to arrange and classify the 
 work of the department, and to consolidate, abolish, or create 
 divisions thereof. So far as consistent with the law the head 
 of each department may adopt such rules and regulations as may 
 be necessary to govern the activities of the department and 
 may assign to each of the officers and employees thereof such 
 
 ■^Massachusetts. S. L. 1919, Ch. 350. 
 
 19 New York S. L. 1921, Ch. 50. 
 
 20 0hio S. L. 1921. 
 

 
 
 * . ■ ■ ' > 
 
 i>. V . 
 
 
 
 
155 
 
 duties and labors as he may see fit. And he may, from time 
 to time for the betterment of the public service, reassign 
 to any and all employees under the chief of any division 
 such duties as he may see fit; he shall have the right to 
 inspect books and records and to hear complaints, administer 
 oaths, certify to all official acts, and to issue subpoenas 
 for the attendance of witness and the production of papers, 
 books, accounts, documents, and testimony in any inquiry, 
 investigation, hearing or proceeding pertinent or material 
 thereto to any part of the state. * 
 
 Total number of employees and appointees under new 
 consolidation act shall not be larger than the number of 
 
 appointees employed by the several boards before consolida- 
 
 A . 22 
 tion. 
 
 Members of conservation commission given powers to 
 execute and serve warrants and processes issued by any 
 justice of peace or any council having jurisdiction under 
 any provisions of the act creating it. Granted power of 
 eminent domain. 
 
 In all cases where a question arises between depart- 
 ments or officers or boards thereof as to their respective 
 jurisdiction or powers, or where departments, officers, or 
 
 21Nebraska S« L. 
 ^-Missouri S. L. 
 ■^Indiana, S. L. 
 
 1919; California S. L. 1921 
 1921, S. B. 434. 
 
 1919, Ch. 238. 
 

 
 
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boards issue conflicting orders or making conflicting rules 
 and regulations, the governor and council shall on appeal 
 of any such department or person affected thereby, have 
 jurisdiction to determine the question, and to order any 
 such order, rule, or regulation amended or annulled: provid- 
 ed that nothing herein contained shall be construed to 
 deprive any person of the right to pursue any other lawful 
 remedy. The time when such appeal may be taken shall be 
 fixed by the governor and council. Governor shall have 
 power to appoint such deputies, assistants, employees, 
 clerical help as shall be necessary or essential to the 
 economical but efficient and proper enforcement and admin- 
 istration of the laws of the state, and shall at the same 
 time fix the salaries of such appointees and prescribe 
 their duties. Appointees may be required to serve in one 
 or more departments and may be transferred from one de- 
 partment to another from time to time; secretaries of de- 
 partments shall devise a practical and working basis for 
 
 cooperation and coordination of work, eliminating duplica- 
 
 24 
 
 tion and overlapping functions. 
 
 (5) Personnel. 
 
 a-Staff agency. 
 
 The governor's cabinet of ten heads of 
 departments to systematize and unify 
 duties of the various departments of 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 ■ • 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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157 
 
 state government; to classify subordinate 
 officers, departments, institutions; to 
 determine salaries and compensation of 
 subordinate officers and employees, to 
 authorize any institution, state officer 
 or department of state government to incur 
 liabilities to carry on their work until 
 meeting of legislature; department of ef- 
 ficiency to make efficiency surveys of all 
 state departments and institutions; to 
 prepare and recommend to administrative 
 
 board a system of classification, salaries 
 
 25 
 
 compensation for all subordinate officers 
 
 The department of finance to investigate 
 duplication of work of departments and the 
 efficiency of the organization, and administra- 
 tion of departments, and to formulate and put 
 into effect plans for the better co-operation 
 of departments, and the coordination of work, 
 eliminating duplication and overlapping of 
 functions; director of finance appointed by 
 governor and holds office at his pleasure.' - 
 
 (6) Qualifications fixed by law. 
 
 ^Nebraska, S. L. 1919. 
 
 ^Washington, s* L. 1921. 
 
 26 Utah S. L. 1921 Ch. 127. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
158 
 
 Director of Commerce and superintendent of 
 insurance must not have any official connection 
 with an insurance company; chief of division of 
 examination and licensing in department of educa- 
 tion must not be affiliated with any college or 
 school of medicine, or of pharmacy, dentistry, 
 nursing, optometry, embalming, either as teacher, 
 officer, stockholder; superintendent of highways 
 must be civil engineer of at least five years 
 experience in construction and maintenance of 
 highways; director of agriculture must be person 
 actively identified with agriculture; director 
 
 of health must be physician skilled in sanitary 
 27 
 
 science. Chief of division of examining and 
 licensing in department of education mu3t not 
 be affiliated with schools, societies, represent- 
 ed by any class of applicants; director of com- 
 merce and superintendent of insurance must not 
 have any official connection with an insurance 
 company. 
 
 Director of banking shall have had at least 
 
 three years practical experience in a general 
 
 28 
 
 banking business. 
 
 Highway engineer must be thirty- five years 
 
 ~27 
 
 Ohio S. L. 1921 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 . 
 
 
old; mu3t have had five years practical exper- 
 ience in making public highways; must be a 
 
 graduate and licensed engineer with at least 
 
 29 
 
 ten year 8 experience. 
 
 Commissioner of health department must 
 hold degree of doctor of public health or its 
 
 30 
 
 equivalent; must have had five years experience. 
 
 One member of conservation commission must 
 
 be appointed by governor from a list of persons 
 
 31 
 
 nominated by Indiana Academy of Science. 
 
 The board of agriculture advisers shall be 
 composed of representative citizens engaged in 
 various agricultural pursuits throughout the 
 state, not excluding representatives of the agri- 
 cultural press and of the state agricultural sta- 
 tion; neither the commissioner of commerce and 
 industry nor any director in his department shall 
 be the owner of or financially interested in any 
 banking or insurance corporation subject to the 
 supervision of the department; the commissioner 
 of commerce and industry shall have had at least 
 five years' practical experience in the banking 
 business, or shall have served for a like period 
 in the banking department of this or some other 
 
 2 ®Missouri S. L. 1921. S. B. 434. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
state; administrative officers in the department 
 of law enforcement shall hold a license or 
 certificate to exercise any of the professions, 
 trades, or occupations regulated or licensed by 
 the department. Commissioner of public invest- 
 ments 3hall have had at least five gears’ exper- 
 ience in the banking or investment business; 
 the public health adviser shall be a person ex- 
 perienced in the practice of public health and 
 sanitation and authorized under the laws of this 
 state to practice medicine and surgery; the 
 director of highways shall be a civil engineer 
 of not less than five years’ experience in road 
 building; the director of water resources shall 
 be a hydraulic engineer with not less than five 
 
 years' experience in the practice of irrigation 
 32 
 
 engineering. 
 
 Superintendent of public safety shall be 
 at least thirty years old and not more than 
 fifty-five. 
 
 Commissioner of geology and forestry and 
 his deputy must be graduates of some standard 
 
 29 Colorado. S. L. 1921. Ch. 136. 
 30 Michigan, 1921, No. 146. 
 
 31 Indiana, S. L. 1919, Ch. 60. 
 
 33 Idaho S. L. 1919. 
 
 33 West Virginia S. L. 1921, Ch. 100. 
 
161 
 
 34 
 
 school of geology and forestry* 
 
 Supervisor of highways at head of division 
 of highways in public works department shall be 
 experienced constructing highway engineer; super- 
 visor of purchasing must have had practical exper- 
 ience in commercial pursuits; director of public 
 health must be experienced physician; supervisor 
 of fisheries must have practical knowledge of 
 fish propagation; the state dietician shall be 
 
 35 
 
 a member of the faculty of the state university. 
 
 Secretary of agriculture shall be a graduate 
 of a recognized veterinary college and shall have 
 been engaged in veterinary work for a period of 
 not less than five years after graduation; direct- 
 or of bureau of plant industry shall be qualified 
 by scientific training and practical experience in 
 entomology and plant pathology; director of bureau 
 of chemistry shall be graduate of recognized COl- 
 
 O/r 
 
 lege and shall have specialized in chemistry. 
 
 Commissioner of education appointed by state 
 board of education shall possess educational attain- 
 ment and breadth of experience in the administration 
 of public education and of finances pertaining there- 
 
 ^Kentucky. S. L. 1218, Ch. 35. 
 
 ^Washington. S. L. 1921. 
 
 ^Pennsylvania. S. L. 1921, Ch. 101. 
 

 . 
 
 > 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 . 
 
 ; 
 
 . - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 < 
 
 
 
162 
 
 to; commissioner of drainage and waters shall 
 be a practical drainage engineer experienced in 
 drainage and hydraulic engineering of high 
 standing and recognized ability; state board of 
 education must consist of five representative 
 citizens of the state. ^ 
 
 Principal vocation of at least three members 
 of the board of agriculture (six members) shall 
 be agriculture; physicians, pathologists, and 
 psychiatrists of the department of mental diseases 
 shall be exempt from the civil service law, and 
 th6 rules and regulations made thereunder; two 
 associate commissioners in department of labor 
 and industries shall be a representative of labor 
 and employers of labor respectively." 
 
 Board of health of ten members, all of whom 
 shall be legally qualified practitioners, includ- 
 ing an osteopath, homeopath, eclectic, and allo- 
 path, chosen from lists of five names for each 
 vacancy, furnished by associations of such schools 
 or systems as are entitled to membership.*" 
 
 a-Salaries of heads of departments. 
 
 Agri culture 
 
 *3600 Idaho 
 4000 Utah 
 4500 Minnesota 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 ✓ 
 
 
 , 
 
 , 
 
 * 
 
 . 
 
 
 ) . . i K 
 
 
 
 
 
163 
 
 5000 Massachusetts and Michigan 
 *5000 Nebraska 
 *6500 Ohio 
 6000 Pennslyvania 
 
 *Uniform for all departments. 
 
 Public health 
 
 4500 Michigan 
 
 Eduation 
 
 5000 Minnesota 
 7500 Massachusetts 
 
 Public works 
 
 7500 Massachusetts 
 10000 California 
 
 Conservation 
 
 4000 Indiana 
 5000 Michigan 
 
 Finance 
 
 5000 California, Missouri 
 and Utah 
 
 Public Welfare 
 
 4000 California 
 6000 Massachusetts 
 10000 Pennsylvania 
 
 Labor 
 
 3000 Missouri 
 4500 Minnesota 
 7500 Massachusetts 
 8000 New York 
 
 ^Minnesota. S« L. 1921 Ch. 334. 
 ^Massachusett s. S. L. 1S19. 
 

 . 
 
 
 
 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 
 ! 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 r . . 
 
 
 
 « . 
 
164 
 
 (7) Budget* 
 
 A state budget commission composed of governor, attorney- 
 general and state auditor; legislature will not alter budget 
 bills except to strike out or reduce items therein, unless by 
 a vote of two-thirds of the members elected in both houses; 
 neither house will consider any other appropriation except an 
 emergency measure for emergency expense of legislature until 
 budget has been finally acted on by both houses; additional 
 
 AO 
 
 appropriations in separate bills of single items. 
 
 Bureau of budgets and accounts established in department 
 
 of finance, governor may alter division at pleasure. Director 
 
 41 
 
 appointed by governor. 
 
 Governor may request estimates; must hold public hearings; 
 governor may revise ,— increase or decrease— any estimate sub- 
 mitted, except those of judiciary and general assembly, but 
 must indicate reasons in report to general assembly; standing 
 committee in each house in open session may require attendance 
 of responsible executive officers; governor or representative 
 has right to be present; general assembly may increase, decrease, 
 or eliminate item^— but neither house shall consider further or 
 special appropriations except in case of emergency; total budget 
 appropriations may not be increased in aggregate to a point where 
 
 Kentucky. S. L. 1918, Ch. 65. 
 
 40 
 
 Alabama. S. L. 1919, No* 31. 
 41 California. S. L. 1921, Ch. 6C2. 
 
165 
 
 they will exceed the state revenue from all sources as establish- 
 ed in the budget; additional appropriations must be embodied in 
 separate bills called "supplementary appropriation bill" which 
 shall designate the source of the money called for by the appropria- 
 tion; transfer of allotments by spending agencies may be made on 
 written request to governor, state treasurer, and state auditor, 
 
 two of whom may approve; the "governor shall be chief budget of- 
 
 42 
 
 ficer of the state of Delaware." 
 
 Budget bill to be prepared by state examiner of state board 
 of accounts, an office already in existence and filled by appointee 
 of governor; requests of various departments to be filed with him 
 from which he compiles budget for submission to governor, contain- 
 ing requests and his recommendations for each item; public hear- 
 ings provided for in open sessions of the legislature; no restric- 
 
 43 
 
 tion on legislature's power to revise items up or down. 
 
 Governor the chief budget officer with assistance of the de- 
 partment of finance; governor to provide for public hearings and 
 shall require attendance of all civil executive officers; to sub- 
 mit to legislature with amount therein recommended by him, the 
 estimated revenues from taxation and other sources, and the es- 
 timate of amount required to be raised by taxation; to present to 
 each presiding officer of the general assembly a budget bill with 
 
 42 
 
 Delaware. S. L. 1921, Ch. 26. 
 
 43 
 
 Indiana. S. L. 1919, Ch. 149. 
 
 
166 
 
 items clearly itemized; legislative committees in public hear- 
 ings may summon civil executive officers; governor or represent- 
 ative to have right to sit at these hearings; legislature may 
 increase or decrease items in budget bill, but neither house to 
 consider further or special appropriations except in case of 
 emergency, which fact to be clearly stated in the bill therefor, 
 until budget bill finally acted on by both houses; all bills 
 introduced in either house to be itemized in accordance with the 
 
 A4 
 
 classification used in the budget;* budget bureau created in de- 
 partment of finance. 
 
 Every appropriation bill to be either a ’’Budget Bill” or a 
 
 "Supplementary Appropriation Bill;” compiling board authorized 
 
 to include recommendations in budget, instead of making it a 
 
 45 
 
 mere compilation of requests as before, 
 
 A depart ment of budget which in addition to compilation of 
 budget has duties of former tax commissioner and has supervision 
 over purchasing and printing; department headed by a commissioner 
 of budget appointed by the governor; two bureaus: purchase and 
 
 taxation; may approve or disapprove estimates but not to alter 
 them; to submit estimates to governor with his own estimates in 
 writing; may make recommendations in interest of economy and ef- 
 
 Ag 
 
 ficiency; governor to submit budget to legislature. 
 
 Secretary of finance to examine all department estimates; 
 
 44 Idaho. S, L, 1919. Amend. S. L. 1921, 
 
 45 Montana. S, L. 1921, Ch. 47. 
 
 46 Miseouri. S. L. 1921, Ch. 434. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 r 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 i »■ 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
167 
 
 to file with governor his recommendations as to each item 
 contained in the budget; governor may raise, lower, or reject 
 any requested appropriation or item; must give reasons there- 
 for in transmitting budget to legislature; legislature not 
 to make appropriation in excess of the items recommended in 
 budget unless by three-fifths vote of each house of legislature; 
 items or recommendations therein contained may be rejected or 
 decreased in amount; governor may not veto items increased by 
 a three-fifths vote, (constitutional provision); close control 
 over expenditures provided for; department may investigate at 
 any time as to whether appropriations are being economically 
 
 used; before money becomes available, quarterly estimates to 
 
 47 
 
 be approved by governor. 
 
 Legislature may amend general appropriation bills by in- 
 creasing items therein relating to judicial department; not 
 otherwise to alter or amend budget bill, except to strike out 
 or reduce items therein; legislature not to enact any other 
 appropriation bill except on recommendation of governor; all 
 additional appropriation bills to be embodied in separate bill, 
 
 48 
 
 limiting to some single work, subject, or purpose therein stated.' 
 
 General assembly may increase or decrease items in budget 
 bill; all appropriation bills in addition to budget bill must 
 be passed after enactment of budget bill, except in emergency, 
 and money for additional bills must be in treasury unless a 
 
 ^Nebraska. S. L. 1921, Ch. 210. 
 
 48 
 
 New Mexico. 1921. Constitutional Amendment, 
 49 North Carolina, S. L. 1919, Ch. 29. 
 
 Res. No. 
 
 6 . 
 

 
 
 
 t 
 
 ; 
 
 
 
 * ' 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . „ . 
 
 . 
 
 . • 
 
 
special tax for that purpose i9 levied in bill making the 
 4 9 
 
 appropriation. 
 
 Budget board to transmit copies of estimates and rec- 
 ommendations to secretary of state, who in turn is to trans- 
 mit it with original estimates of requirements to governor; 
 
 board composed of governor, secretary of state, treasurer, 
 
 SO 
 
 auditor-general. 
 
 Budget to be prepared by finance commission and depart- 
 ment of efficiency; department of efficiency empowered to 
 survey all public offices and institutions with a view to 
 their more economical administration; to compile daily ex- 
 penditure of these departments from which the basic state- 
 ment for th6 budget is to be prepared; budget is finally 
 referred to finance committee (formerly called board of 
 finance) composed of governor, treasurer, and auditor; 
 fifteen percent of total appropriation for department to 
 be held as reserve, no part to be expended without affirma- 
 tive vote of administrative board. 51 
 
 50 0regon. S. L. 1921, Ch. 22 
 Washington. S. L. 1921. 
 
169 
 
 4-Functional organization 
 
 (1) Number of department s 
 
 Complete reorganization 
 
 6 ^Nebraska 
 
 8 Ohio 
 
 9 Idaho 
 
 10 Washington 
 15 ^Massachusetts 
 
 Partial reorganization 
 
 3 Missouri 
 5 Michigan 
 
 7 California 
 
 ^Reorganization limited by number of constitutional bodies 
 ■^Constitution provides that there be not more than twenty 
 departments 
 
 (2) Functional departments 
 
 Public works 
 
 California, Idaho, Massachusetts 
 Nebraska, Ohio, Washington 
 
 Conservation and 
 development 
 
 Indiana, Michigan, Massachusetts 
 Washington 
 
 Agriculture 
 
 California, Idaho, Massachusetts 
 Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
 Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
 Washington 
 
 Finance 
 
 California, Idaho, Missouri 
 Nebraska, Ohio, Utah 
 
 Edu cation 
 
 California, Massachusetts, Min* 
 nesota, Ohio 
 
 Public Welfare 
 
 California, Idaho, Massachusetts 
 Michigan, Nebraska. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
170 
 
 Labor 
 
 Massachusetts, Minnesota, Michigan 
 Nebraska, New York, Missouri, Ohio, 
 Washington 
 
 Commerce 
 
 Idaho, Ohio, Nebraska 
 
 Public safety 
 
 Massachusetts, Michigan, Pennsylvania 
 West Virginia 
 
 Health 
 
 Massachusetts, Ohio 
 
 Banking 
 
 Indiana, Pennsylvania 
 
 Business control 
 
 Washington 
 
 Efficiency 
 
 do 
 
 Taxation and examin- 
 ation 
 
 do 
 
 Licenses 
 
 do 
 
 Fisheries and game 
 
 do 
 
 Immigration, labor, end 
 
 statistics 
 
 Idaho 
 
 Law enforcement 
 
 do 
 
 Public investments 
 
 do 
 
 Reclamation 
 
 do 
 
 Banking and insurance 
 
 Massachusetts 
 
 Civil service and 
 registration 
 
 do 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I ■ , 
 
 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 
 . 
 
 . 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
171 
 
 Industrial accidents 
 
 Massachusetts 
 
 Mental diseases 
 
 do 
 
 Corrections 
 
 do 
 
 Labor and industries 
 
 do 
 
 Civil service 
 
 California 
 
 Institutions 
 
 do 
 
 Bu dget 
 
 Missouri 
 
 Drainage and waters 
 
 Minnesota 
 
 (3) Departmental grouping of functions by states 
 Agriculture 
 
 Markets 
 
 California, Idaho, Michigan, 
 Minnesota, Pennsylvania 
 
 Plant industry 
 
 California, Idaho, Ohio, 
 Pennsylvania 
 
 Dairy and livestock 
 
 Massachusetts, Ohio, Washington 
 
 Animal industry 
 
 California, Idaho, Ohio, Penn- 
 sylvania 
 
 Foods 
 
 Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington 
 
 Fairs 
 
 Idaho, Massachusetts, Ohio 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 . 
 
 
 
172 
 
 Statistics 
 
 Minnesota, Pennsylvania 
 
 Agricultural chemistry 
 
 California, Pennsylvania 
 
 Weights and measures 
 
 California, Washington, Idaho 
 
 Horticulture 
 
 Washington 
 
 Feeds 
 
 do 
 
 Drugs and oils 
 
 do 
 
 Fish and game 
 
 Ohio 
 
 Plant pest control 
 
 Massachusetts 
 
 Ornithology 
 
 do 
 
 Reclamation 
 
 do 
 
 Soil survey 
 
 do 
 
 To investigate fraudulent 
 advertisements pertaining 
 to colonization and settle- 
 ment Idaho 
 
 Public works 
 
 
 Highways 
 
 California, Idaho, Massachusetts, 
 Ohio, Washington 
 
 Engineering 
 
 California, Ohio 
 
 Architecture 
 
 California, Ohio 
 

 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 < 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
nHKBHHarai 
 
 173 
 
 Water rights 
 
 California, Massachusetts 
 
 Land settlement 
 
 California, Massachusetts 
 
 Purchase real estate 
 
 Ohio 
 
 Motor vehicles 
 
 Massachusetts 
 
 Transportation 
 
 Washington 
 
 Public utilities 
 Conservation and development 
 
 Washington 
 
 Forestry 
 
 Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
 Washington 
 
 Geology 
 
 Indian^ Michigan, Washington 
 
 Fish and game 
 
 Indiana, Michigan, Massachusetts 
 
 Land and waters 
 
 Indiana, Michigan 
 
 Reclamation 
 
 Washington 
 
 Hydraulics 
 
 do 
 
 Entomology 
 
 do 
 
 Engineering 
 
 do 
 
 Animal industry 
 Education 
 
 Massachusetts 
 
 Libraries 
 
 California, Massachusetts, Ohio 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 .. 
 
 
 , 
 
 , 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . ' . 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Professional licensing 
 
 Ohio 
 
 Film censorship 
 Education of aliens 
 Education of blind 
 Finance 
 
 General accounting 
 Budget making 
 Purchasing 
 Printing 
 Motor vehicles 
 
 Custody buildings and grounds 
 Supervision of banks 
 Supervision buildings and loans 
 Public welfare 
 
 Public health adviser 
 Aid and relief 
 Child guardianship 
 
 do 
 
 Massachusetts 
 
 do 
 
 California, Ohio 
 do 
 do 
 do 
 
 California 
 
 do 
 
 Missouri 
 
 Missouri 
 
 Idaho 
 
 Massachusetts 
 
 do 
 
 Juvenile training 
 
 do 
 

 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 * • 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
175 
 
 Lunacy 
 
 Pennsylvania 
 
 Prison labor 
 
 do 
 
 Charities 
 
 Labor or industrial relations 
 
 do 
 
 Labor statistics 
 
 California, Massachusetts, Min- 
 nesota, Ohio 
 
 Safety 
 
 California, Minnesota, Washington 
 
 Workmen's compensation 
 
 Minnesota, Ohio 
 
 Mediation and arbitration 
 
 Minnesota, Massachusetts 
 
 7/omen and children 
 
 do 
 
 Boiler inspection 
 
 do 
 
 Employment 
 
 do 
 
 Immigration 
 
 California 
 
 Industrial welfare 
 
 do 
 
 Factory inspection 
 
 Ohio 
 
 Mines 
 
 Commerce 
 
 Ohio 
 
 Insurance 
 
 Ohio 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 176 
 
 Inspector buildings and loans 
 
 Ohio 
 
 
 Inspector of 
 
 oils 
 
 do 
 
 
 Public utilities 
 
 do 
 
 
 Banking 
 
 
 Idaho 
 
 
 (4) Comparative study of the departmental groupings of the more important 
 functions. 
 
 Service 
 
 De partment 
 
 States 
 
 
 Budget 
 
 Finance 
 
 California, Ohio, 
 Nebraska 
 
 Utah, 
 
 
 Ef ficiency 
 
 Washington 
 
 
 
 Governor 
 
 Idaho 
 
 
 
 Administrative 
 
 Board 
 
 Michigan 
 
 
 
 ^Budget 
 
 Missouri 
 
 
 Banking 
 
 Commerce 
 
 Idaho, Ohio 
 
 
 
 Finance 
 
 Missouri 
 
 
 
 Taxation and 
 Examination 
 
 Washington 
 
 
 
 * Banking 
 
 Indiana, Massachusetts 
 
 Purchasing 
 
 Finance 
 
 California, Ohio, 
 
 Utah 
 
 
 Business control 
 
 Washington 
 
 
 
 Administrative 
 
 board 
 
 Michigan 
 
 
 
 Budget 
 
 Missouri 
 
 
 
 ■^Purchasing 
 
 Montana 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 
 . . . 
 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
177 
 
 Dairy and livestock 
 
 Agri culture 
 
 California, Idaho, 
 Michigan, Ohio, Washing' 
 ton 
 
 Public utilities 
 
 Public works 
 
 Washington 
 
 
 Commerce 
 
 Ohio 
 
 
 ^Public utilities 
 
 Massachusetts 
 
 Highways 
 
 Public works 
 
 California, Idaho, 
 Massachusetts, Ohio, 
 Washington 
 
 Geological survey 
 
 ^Conservation and 
 development 
 
 Indiana, Michigan, 
 Washington 
 
 Taxation 
 
 Budget 
 
 Indiana 
 
 
 Finance 
 
 Ohio 
 
 
 ^Taxation and 
 examination 
 
 Massachusetts, Washing- 
 ton 
 
 Forestry 
 
 Conservation and 
 development 
 
 Indiana, Michigan, 
 Washington 
 
 Reclamation 
 
 Conservation 
 
 Washington 
 
 
 Public works 
 
 California 
 
 
 *Reclamation 
 
 Idaho 
 
 Institutions 
 
 Public welfare 
 
 Michigan, Pennsylvania 
 
 
 ■^Institutions 
 
 California 
 
 Engineering 
 
 Public works 
 
 California 
 
 
 Highways 
 
 Ohio 
 
 
 Conservation 
 
 Indiana 
 
 Immigration 
 
 Agriculture 
 
 Michigan 
 
 
 Labor 
 
 Cali fornia 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 f 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examination and 
 
 Law enforcement 
 
 Idaho 
 
 regi stration 
 
 Education 
 
 Ohio, California 
 
 
 Civil service and 
 registration 
 
 Massachusetts 
 
179 
 
 5-Board9 and commissions 
 (1) Types 
 
 Boards composed of advisers outside department having 
 general knowledge of the activity, for rule making. 
 
 Local boards of trustees of charitable institutions 
 
 retained as advisers board of review for quasi- judicial 
 
 functions relating to irrigation to be appointed by director 
 
 of public works; industrial welfare commission, commission 
 
 of immigration and housing, bureau of labor statistics 
 
 combined in one department, each autonomous with a common 
 
 administrative staff; also licensing boards in department 
 53 
 
 of education. 
 
 Boards intact for quasi- judical functions, parts of 
 respective departments for administrative matters; commis- 
 sions retained in departments, the head of which acts as 
 secretary. Advisory boards may be created by department 
 heads with consent of governor. 
 
 Advisory commission optional with commissioner of 
 banking and to be appointed by him. 
 
 Commissioner of labor shall appoint referees at sal- 
 
 C.C 
 
 ary fixed by commissioner. 
 
 ^Washington S. L. 1921. 
 
 53 Califcrnia S. L. 1921, Ch. 602. 
 
 54 0hio S. L. 1921. New York S. L. 1921, Ch. 50. 
 ^Pennsylvania S. L. 1921, Ch. 130. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 • ' • . 
 
 . 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 ■ . 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 . . 
 
 
 
 
 . • . 
 
 
Directors of divisions in departments tc act as 
 
 advisory council for head of the department; director 
 
 of civil service and director of registration to act as 
 
 57 
 
 board affecting department as a whole. 
 
 Non-salaried local board for each of four groups 
 
 of state institutions under the general supervision of 
 
 58 
 
 the department of welfare. 
 
 Board of agriculture advisers in department of agri- 
 culture to advise executive officers of department of 
 their own request; to recommend on its own initiative, 
 policies and practices which the executives duly consider 
 
 Department board composed of director and division 
 chiefs to head and decide all matters of sufficient import- 
 ance to require their joint action. 60 
 
 Commissioner of department of labor and industries 
 and chiefs of divisions may appoint committees on which 
 employees and employers shall be represented, to inves- 
 tigate and recommend rules and regulations, and to change 
 
 existing rules and regulations within the scope of powers 
 
 61 
 
 and duties of the department. 
 
 Advisory council to commissioner of conservation made 
 up of chiefs of three divisions. 62 
 
 66 Minnesota. S. L. 1921, Ch. 81. 
 
 ^Massachusetts. S. L. 1919, Ch. 350. 
 
 Minnesota. S. L. 1921, Ch. 163. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 , 
 
 
 , 
 
 ' 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 . . - 
 
 . - . 
 
 ' 
 
 - 
 
 . . - 
 
 
 
 
 
Unpaid commission in department of conservation of 
 
 seven members; advisory council department of health, 
 
 gq 
 
 five members appointed by governor. 
 
 Unpaid advisory board in state highway department, 
 seven members. ^ 
 
 Unpaid board of agricultural advisers in department 
 of agriculture of nine members to recommend on its own 
 initiative, policies and practices which the executive 
 officers shall duly consider. It is to investigate work 
 of department, and may require information from all of- 
 ficers. ^ 
 
 Unpaid welfare commission of nine members, three to 
 
 be ex officio; commissioner of public welfare, labor, 
 
 and health, the remaining six to be appointed by the gov- 
 66 
 
 ernor. 
 
 Unpaid advisory board in department of health to be 
 67 
 
 appointed by director. 
 
 Advisory board of six members in department of ed- 
 ucation appointed by the governor, two members shall be 
 women and one shall be appointed from among the teachers 
 
 Idaho. S. L. 1919. 
 
 ^Washington. S. L. 1921. 
 
 ^Massachusetts. 1919. Ch. 350; New York. S. L. 1921, 
 Ch. 50. 
 
 ^Massachusetts. S. L. 1919, Ch. 350 
 ^Michigan. So L. 1921, Ch. 146 
 ^Colorado. So L. 1921, Ch. 136 
 65 Idaho. S. L. 1919. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 * 
 
 
 
 . , 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 . , 
 
 
 - , , 
 
 . 
 
 . . 
 
 
 . 
 
 ■ < 
 
 . 
 
 , . 
 
 * 
 
 . . - 
 
 
182 
 
 of the commonwealth; unpaid advisory council in the de- 
 
 68 
 
 partment of education on negro education. 
 
 Department council of labor made up of one represent- 
 ative from each of the four commissions retained in the 
 69 
 
 department • 
 
 A tax commission of three commissioners, with complete 
 administrative control vested in the chairman appointed by 
 the governor; a department of labor consisting of a com- 
 mission of three members with administrative power vested 
 in the industrial commissioner at its head, appointed by 
 
 the governor; commissioner 
 most matters pertaining to 
 
 (2) Board Control 
 
 Heads of departments 
 
 Education 
 Health 
 Conservation 
 Labor 
 
 Finance 
 
 to sit with the commission in 
 the department?® 
 
 Minnesota 
 Kentucky, Ohio 
 Indiana 
 
 Michigan, Minnesota, New York, 
 California 
 
 California 
 
 ^'Pennsylvania. S. L. 1921, Ch. 425 
 
 ^Ghio. S* L. 1921; Massachusetts. S. L. 1919, Ch. 250. 
 ^West Virginia. S. L. 1921, Ch. 2. 
 
 ^California. S. L. 1921, Ch. 602. 
 
 70 Michigan. S. L. 1921 
 

 
 
 • 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 r 
 
 
183 
 
 Associated with departments 
 judicial functions. 
 
 for advisory, rule making, or 
 
 Education 
 
 California, Missouri, Kentucky, 
 Massachusetts, Ohio, Tennessee, 
 West Virginia 
 
 Public welfare 
 
 Massachusetts, Michigan, Penn- 
 sylvania 
 
 Labor 
 
 California, Michigan, Minnesota, 
 New York, Massachusetts, Ohio, 
 Utah, Washington 
 
 Commerce 
 
 Ohio 
 
 Public works 
 
 Ohio, California 
 
 Finance 
 
 Ohio 
 
 Health 
 
 Ohio, Michigan 
 
 Agriculture 
 
 Idaho 
 
 Conservation 
 
 Michigan 
 
 Single-head control of departments 
 
 Education 
 
 California, Massachusetts, Nebras- 
 ka, Ohio Tennessee 
 
 Health 
 
 Massachusetts, Ohio, Washington 
 
 Conservation 
 
 Massachusetts, Michigan, Washington 
 
 Public welfare 
 
 Idaho, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
 Nebraska, Pennsylvania, California 
 
 Labor 
 
 Massachusetts, Nebraska, Washington 
 
 Finance 
 
 Idaho, Missouri, Ohio, Utah 
 
 Agriculture 
 
 California, Idaho, Massachusetts, 
 Michigan, Nebraska, Minnesota, Ohio, 
 Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington 
 
 Public works 
 
 California, Washington, Nebraska 
 
Public safety 
 
 Michigan 
 
 Commerce 
 
 Nebraska 
 

185 
 
 V-CONCLUSIONS 
 
 With the data thus arranged in a somewhat orderly form, we are now 
 ready to deal with the question stated at the outset: 
 
 Is administrative reorganization in the American states a random exper- 
 imentation or are fundamental, discoverable processes at work beneath it 
 all? After an analysis of some ten thousand pages of representative state 
 documents, one lays aside the latest message, the latest efficiency and econ- 
 omy report, and the latest session law of the states with a cumulative find- 
 ing re-enforced by each succeeding page. There is a set of causes molding 
 the processes of reorganization— definite and irresistible— forces that 
 brought a representative government in the beginning, and are now destined 
 to bring a more integrated, efficient, responsible administration in a rec- 
 ent and even more vital emergency. I refer to the fiscal problem of the 
 American commonwealths. It is found in the first and the latest of the gov- 
 ernors* messages of these last two years, it determines even the titles as 
 well as the findings of groups of expert investigators, and it reads like a 
 veritable new bill of rights in the enacting paragraphs of the recent con- 
 solidation acts themselves. In other words to make outgo fit income is a 
 very old problem, but to make income fit unparalleled, but inevitable in- 
 creases in outgo, this is a new and striking emergency confronting the 
 states. Which is to say, the resisting, irate taxpayer has come to court. 
 Dynasties unheedful of him in the past, fell; King John of England alert at 
 Runnymede, gave him a people’s parliament. It remains for the American com- 
 monwealths, behind whom are seven centuries of traditions of representative 
 government to purge that parliament of extravagances on demand. This final 
 

 \± 
 
 f 
 
 , 
 
 
 . . 
 
 
 • 
 
 , 
 
 . . 
 
 I . • 
 
 . 
 
 ... , 
 
 . , 
 
 * 
 
 , 
 
 • •' 
 
 ' 
 
186 
 
 consideration brings us to the core of the whole reorganization movement. 
 
 The reorganization movement began with great increase of expense; that in- 
 crease was inevitable. The earliest government we know anything about set up 
 at the people's expense instruments of their common defense; the modern 
 state must license its practiVners and perform a hundred similar services 
 in a new kind of defense which a complex, more interdependent social struc- 
 ture makes necessary. As a result the most striking fact of political 
 development in the last half century, and particularly the last decade has 
 been this steady, inevitable increase in the government's activities. As 
 early as 1904, a Nebraska legislator pointed out that whereas in that state 
 seven administrative agencies were ample for all its work in 1875, over 117 
 were the objects of distinct appropriations in the finance bill he opposed 
 just twenty-nine years later. But even earlier than this in 1897, the 
 president of the state bar association referring to these same agencies, 
 declared: "While many of these boards are necessary, yet the increase is 
 
 surprising, and indicates a tendency to multiply the tax-eaters at the 
 expense of the taxpayers." In other words, whereas the total tax bill of 
 all the commonwealths in 1910 was 300 , 000,000 in 1920 it exceeded 700,000,000. 
 Or to take the specific case of Michigan alone, the contemplated outlay for 
 but the one biennium of 1920-22 exceeded the amount raised by taxation for 
 all purposes in 1918. And finally, to meet the unparalleled fiscal demands 
 of 1920, there i3 a system of taxation designed primarily for those simpler 
 needs of the nineteenth century. 
 
 More pregnant than this situation, however, and fraught with signif- 
 icance for the reorganization movement itself, is the striking identity of 
 expedients proposed for meeting it. Totally absent from the documents of 
 

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 the governors or the expert investigators themselves, is a suggestion of that 
 simplest alternative--the curtailment of services. Faced with the grievous 
 stringency to which we have already referred, the governor of Massachusetts 
 said to the general court: "The commonwealth is doing a fine work in the care 
 of the sick, the insane, the helpless, the feeble-minded, the delinquent, and 
 for the convenience and comfort of all. Her institutions command the admira- 
 tion of all observers. We must continue in this well-doing.” "We have no 
 proposals to make for curtailing the services of California," reported the 
 efficiency commission o f that state, "the recommendations submitted embody 
 fundamental principles of government, which when put into force, will not on- 
 ly make for immediate improvement in the administration of the state’s affairs, 
 but will be the foundation upon which any future expansion of the state's 
 activities may rest. " Similarly, there are absent proposals of ways and means 
 for immediate increase of the revenues. Not what is the state doing, but how , 
 became the chief consideration. Not academic discussions as to the province 
 of government, but considerations of efficiency and economy in the administra- 
 tion of generally accepted services came to be the one expedient proposed, 
 strikingly identical throughout the commonwealths. In thi3 emergency and gen- 
 eral concert of opinion on ways of meeting, the efficiency and economy move- 
 ment was born. The integrated, successful business corporation became the 
 radiant point of prestige. Tested principles of the managerial hierarchy 
 displaced historical prejudices and their corallaries, checks and balances, 
 in the focus of official attention, and reorganization set in. With the 
 advent of efficiency and economy experts, the second phase of the reorganiza- 
 tion movements begins. Spasmodic attempts at consolidation began long before, 
 it is true, really as far back as 1363 when the commonwealth of Massachusetts 
 

 
 
 
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 combined her charitable agencies in the interest of efficiency, but all such 
 attempts were hectic, piecemeal, and illogical. Unable to keep pace with 
 the unprecedented accrual of activities, the best the earlier legislatures 
 could do was a makeshift best— the creation of a new board to administer 
 each new activity. Functional correlation is a problem for experts, and as 
 we have seen it troubles even them. On the other hand, principles of ad- 
 ministration are definite and logical. These the investigator brought with 
 him. In the light of these, as we have seen, he went straight to the root 
 of the trouble. "The resolution creating the Committee," reported the Ill- 
 inois Efficiency and Economy Committee, "imposed on it two main duties: (l) 
 to create a more perfect system of accounting; and (2) to propose a general 
 reorganization and consolidation of state offices, boards, and commissions. 
 "After due consideration," it significantly concludes, "the Committee agreed 
 that the plan of administrative reorganization should precede the introduc- 
 tion of a comprehensive system of accounting. The latter is necessarily 
 dependent on the system of organization." The Commission build6d greater 
 than even it, perhaps, could know • . Simultaneously with the enunciation 
 of such a principle in Illinois, the efficiency advocate in every common- 
 wealth where the financial stringency was most sharply felt, re-enforced 
 it. The principle became the opening wedge in a situation ripe for it. Huge 
 deficits, mounting debts, revelations of administrative excesses and extrav- 
 agance, an aroused, aggressive public opinion, and the inevitable effi- 
 ciency plank in the party platforms, gave to a constitutionally nominal chief 
 executive, the mandate which for over a century had been illogically denied 
 him— a mandate which be it to his credit he unhesitatingly accepted. The 
 governor, more generally, more emphatically in the last five years than in 
 

 
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189 
 
 the one hundred years preceding, became the people's spokesman. "From many 
 stumps over this state," declared Governor McRae of Aj.kansas, "I declared 
 for retrenchment and administrative reform, making this the paramount issue 
 in my race for governor, and I was nominated. Not one of my eight opponents, 
 so far as I know, declared himself on these issues. Wherever and whenever 
 the people have had opportunity to register their opposition to administrative 
 extravagance, they have done so. By every rule of representative government, 
 we are bound to adhere to these demands." There was no mistaking the new role 
 of the governor. In a score of states where legislative importence was never 
 so sharply obvious as against the background of a mounting state debt, it was 
 the governor who rose with the occasion, and assumed virile, vigorous charge. 
 The people had spoken. They demanded retrenchment. They had turned to him. 
 The people in their collective capacity were not so concerned with the method; 
 they presumed to know nothing about it. What they did demand was action, 
 immediate and effective, and for it they looked to the governor. In the 
 focus of an intolerant public attention, r6-enforced by the demands of the 
 governors, nominal, and perfunctory legislative "investigating committees" 
 invariably gave way to the disinterested, exhaustive findings of the experts. 
 If the legislatures were indifferent, there was the ready ear of the governor. 
 Under his influence, purely technical findings were merged with the practical 
 official point of view. Sometimes, a bit impatient, either as Governor Groes- 
 beck of Michigan, Hart of Washington, or Mills* of New York, the more tedious 
 processes of exhaustive analysis were laid aside temporarily for the piece- 
 meal expedients they forced through. But v/hatever the expedient for the 
 moment, the consistent, appreciative advocate of the efficiency and economy 
 commissions was the governor. From the first he recommended them, and when 
 they were appointed, he championed them. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 With the advent of thG governor himself, therefore, in his actual, 
 parliamentary role, state administrative reorganization may be held to have 
 entered its latest and most significant phase. For in the last analysis, 
 always it is the executive initiative and political prowess on which depends 
 more and more the ultimate character the administration is coming to assume. 
 Through his leadership, bulky expert appraisements of administration and 
 recommendations relating thereto, become the specific definitions of the 
 enacting clauses of administrative codes lik6 those of Illinois, Idaho, 
 Nebraska, Ohio, and Washington. The efficiency or expert personnel of the 
 investigating committees, through his influence, opens in this latest phase 
 of the movement to scores of professional, lay, and official participants, 
 whose interests are involved. Committee sessions expand into public hear- 
 ings; paper reorganization is laid aside for the technical analysis of 
 pulsing human motives. Above all, the governor himself becomes th6 tangible 
 inspiration of a status they create for him, which transcends anything the 
 administrative department of an American state has yet known. There is noth- 
 ing in the managerial hierarchy which commends itself to a commission seek- 
 ing to harmonize human welfare needs with administration in a staff to assist 
 him. 
 
 It has been the wise commission therefore, but politically wiser gov- 
 ernors who in these latter days are coming more and more to temper the ideal 
 of administrative efficiency with those broader considerations of democracy 
 and welfare. There is the need, for instance, of eliciting the participation 
 of disinterested citizens serving on unpaid boards, exercising powers of 
 investigation, advice, and publicity. There is the need of placing legal 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 authority and responsibility in a particular officer most likely to develop 
 a sense of professional responsibility and pride in connection with the work 
 of such an office. There are those influential citizens, further, who doubt 
 whether either popular government or efficient government is most likely to 
 be advanced by placing the health or public welfare director under the control 
 of a central administrative officer, or by subjecting unpaid commissions 
 supplied to welfare departments for correcting the "possibly. too narrow 
 and business point of view of the managing officer" to interference by still 
 other central administrative officers. In other words, in the administration 
 of government services, as distinguished from services for profits purely, 
 there is the eternal question of diffusion rather than concentration of 
 authority in the interest of not only a more efficient but a more democratic 
 administration. When the later day mixed efficiency commissions, influenced 
 by the public hearings they came more and more to hold, and under the domin- 
 ant leadership of the governor himself, cut the Gordian knot between the 
 managerial plan of the business corporation and administrative charts of 
 their reports, the most significant discriminating element set in. There 
 was a sharp differentiation between the administrative organization for the 
 government in the things it did , and for the government in getting itself 
 ready to do them. In other words, planning the managerial hierarchy for 
 proprietary agencies, on the one hand and thoroughly diluting and democratiz- 
 ing that same hierarchy to serve human welfare needs, on the other, is the 
 most significant tendency in recent state administrative reorganization. 
 
 In the first flush of expert investigation, analysis, and recommendation 
 in this reorganization, the prestige of the business corporation exerted a 
 

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102 
 
 powerful influence over the advocates of administrative reform. With an 
 impetuosity a trifle American, a clean sweep was made of existing administrat- 
 ive agencies. The test of the effectiveness of a reorganization in any state, 
 regardless of local or texture problems came to be th6 number of existing 
 agencies abolished or consolidated, and the degree of integration of the ad- 
 ministrative agencies. It was a test of form, not of personnel, a vision of 
 a balanced pen-j-and-^ink chart, not of an adaptation to functional differences. 
 Agencies that had served democratic needs for a hundred years, like the 
 aldermanic government of the cities^were summarily dispensed with in many 
 instances, notwith standing that English and continental experience with those 
 same agencies serving similar needs ha3 been a satisfactory one. 
 
 In the significant calm after the precipitous efforts of the incipient 
 years, reorganization goes steadily on, but it is partial rather than complete, 
 conservative rather than iconoclastic. The fiscal emergency is more serious 
 than ever, the governors never more aggressive, and more efficiency investiga- 
 tions v/ere never at one time so uniformly, exhaustively at work. But the 
 purposes seem to be more discriminating, the leadership more reflective. And 
 finally, when we have examined the more recent laws as a whole and noted their 
 commendable significant provisions, can it not be accurately held that they 
 show steady, convincing progress toward the desired status of administrative 
 agencies in the commonwealth? It must be so. All those powerful forces of 
 fiscal strain and vigorous, practicable leadership which have worked revolu- 
 tionary changes in strongest governments of the past have been with us in the 
 administrative reorganization movement— but with the novel yet thoroughly 
 tested element of expert investigation, analysis, and recommendation in addi- 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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193 
 
 tion. 
 
 There is always the question of standards and tests, however. Before 
 we appraise the recent tendencies, we must settle the question of what we 
 want. If one critic sees in chapter 602 of the California laws of 1921 on- 
 ly a "hesitating” step toward reorganisation, and another sees in some of 
 its provisions conspicuous achievement, why, the definition of the test applied 
 in both cases must precede final judgment of the act. In other words, if 
 administrative efficiency without regatd to functions or to the needs of 
 those on whom it operates is the thing desired, the California act is less 
 than "hesitating," it is negligible. But if, on the other hand, the test 
 first carefully discriminates between that administration which has to do 
 with perfecting the administrative staff itself, and that which actually 
 reaches the people as a service function; second, if the test demands of 
 the former, primarily a technical efficiency through a hierarchical organiza- 
 tion, but holds in the latter to the principle of democracy and adaption to 
 human needs as the first requisite, why, then, the California provisions are 
 really notable. 
 
 But even then, such a test applied to a single chapter of the session 
 laws of a single year in a single state is manifestly inadequate, either for 
 gauging the movement in California, or the general trend of tendencies in 
 the whole field of administrative reorganization. It is only when the pro- 
 visions of the act of any one commonwealth are studied in the light of test- 
 ed practices in the majority of them, that an appraisement really becomes 
 significant. It is only as it sends into the general stream of workable 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 experiences its own individual contribution and draws from that same stream 
 the tested experiences most adaptable to its own local problems and needs 
 that the legislation of the several states has been weighted in the considera- 
 tions which have entered into this study. In the light of this larger test 
 not only California, but Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Pennsylvania, New 
 York, and Utah with their piecemeal reorganizations are coordinate in the 
 year just closed. The administrative principles which may be assembled from 
 the act 8 of these states taken collectively, must confirm the claim that 
 coming from the experiences of such states as these there is the inevitable 
 new state executive,--not the traditional business executive, but the people's 
 leader— dominant , responsive, flexible— a strategist and a humanitarian, with 
 an administrative accompaniment adapted to his purposes. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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195 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 1-Booke 
 
 Allen, W.H. Efficient democracy. 1907 
 
 Buck, A. E. Mudget making Appleton 1921 
 
 Crennan, Charles Holloway. Survey of state executive 
 organization. (Thesis, Ph. D. ) Princeton 
 
 Holcombe, Arthur N. State government in the United States 
 Macmillan 1916 
 
 Mathews, J.M. Principles of American state administration 
 Appleton 1917 
 
 Cleveland and Buck The budget and responsible 
 government. Macmillan 1920 
 
 Willoughby ,W.F. Movement for budgetary reforms in the 
 states. New York. Appleton 1918 (Institute 
 for government research) 
 
 Weber, Gustavus A. Organized efforts for the improvement 
 of methods of administration in the United States 
 Appleton 1919 (Institute for government research) 
 
 Fairlie,J.A. National administration in the United 
 States. Macmillan 1915 
 
 2-Pericdicals 
 
 State af fairs(1919-20) Political science quarterly. 
 Record of political events. September 1920 
 Supplement p.71 
 
 Buck,A.E. Administrative consolidation of state depart- 
 ments. National municipal review. November 1919 
 p.639 
 
 Kelso, R.W. Functional state service ;how Massachusetts 
 
 has consolidated her state government. Survey .August 
 1920. p.745 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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196 
 
 Davis, D.W. How administrative consolidation is working in 
 
 Idaho. National municipal review November 1919 p 615 
 
 Mathews, J.M. Administrative reorganization in Illinois. 
 
 National Municipal review Supplement , November 1920 p739 
 
 Fairlio,J.A. The executive in the model state constitution 
 National municipal review. April, 1921 p226 
 
 Douglas, J.R. Research activities of departments of state 
 
 government of California in relation to the movement 
 for reorganization. National research council bulletin 
 no. 137 p 289 
 
 Chase, H. T. Kansas general manager plan. National Municipal 
 Review, 1918. p384-387 
 
 Crenner, C. H. A survey of state executive organizations and 
 a plan of reorganization. 1916. 
 
 Davis, D. W. How administrative reorganization is working in 
 Idaho. National Municipal Review. 1919 p615-62Q 
 
 Dodd, W. F. The consolidation of government organization. 
 American Municipal Review. 1917 p. 413-414 
 
 Lowden, F. 0. Business Government. Saturday Evening Post. 
 1920. pl65 , 166 ,169 . 
 
 McKelvie, S. R. A responsible form of government. Nebraska's 
 new civil administrative code. American Review of 
 Reviews. 1920. p.295-298 
 
 Moxey, C. C. The Delaware Survey. National Municipal Review. 
 1919. p223-225 
 
 Dodd, W. F. Notes on State Administrative Reorganization. 
 
 American Political Science Review. August, 1921. p556 
 
 3- Pamphlet s 
 
 Bell, F. F. Costs of state government. Pamphlet. Legislative 
 reference bureau 1916. 46pp. 
 
 Moley, Raymond. State movement for efficiency and economy 
 bureau of Municipal Research, New York. Bulletin 90, 
 October 1917 
 
 Powell, F. W. Recent movement for state budget reform Bureau 
 of Municipal Research, New York Bulletin 91, November, 
 1917 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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197 
 
 Reorganization of the government departments. Pamphlet. 
 American association of engineers, Chicago. 
 
 August, 1921. (A suggestive plan for grouping 
 engineering activities to effect economies and 
 an answer to the chief of engineers of the U.S. 
 array. ) 
 
 Tax association plan of reorganization. Tax Payers' 
 
 Journal. March 13, 1919. p.3-6 
 
 Waters, C. C. State Commissions on economy and efficiency. 
 Providence, R. I. E. L. Freeman, 1915. (Rhode 
 Island State Library, Legislative Reference 
 Bureau; Bulletin No. 7, 1915.) 
 
 Haines, Charles Grove. University of Texas Bulletin. The 
 Movement for the Reorganization of State Admin- 
 istration 
 
 Galbrsath, C. B. Report on Administrative Reorganization in 
 Other States (than Ohio). 
 
 Croly, H. State Political Reorganization. American Political 
 Science Association Proceedings. 1911. pl22-135 
 
 Massachusetts report on state administration and expenditures 
 by Stone and Webster Construction Company, January, 
 1922, House no. 900 
 
 U'Ren, W. S. State political reorganization. The American 
 Political Science Association Proceedings. 1911. 
 pl36-139 
 
 Dodd, W. F. State Administrative Reorganization. Journal of 
 the American Bar Association. August, 1921. p6 02 
 
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198 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 4 -St ate Documents 
 
 Alabama 
 
 Legislative Investigating Committee. 
 
 Report 1915. 
 
 Act to Create State Board of Control andEoonomy, approved 
 February 13, 1919. 
 
 Arkansas 
 
 Proposed plans for administration reorganization. D. Y. 
 Thomas 1921. 
 
 California 
 
 Commission on Efficiency and Economy 
 Report to governor. March 12, 1919. 
 
 Colorado 
 
 The Colorado tax commission and revenue system of Colorado, 
 by R. J. Haig. 
 
 A revision of the highway law6 of the state, by A. N. John- 
 son . 
 
 Special report 1916. 
 
 Report on a survey of the administration of public service, 
 functions relating to regulation and supervision of labor. 
 Report on a survey of the office of auditor of state and 
 of the office of public examiner. 
 
 Report on the care of dependents, delinquents and defectives, 
 by Samuel W. Hamilton, Walter L. Tredway, Alexander Johnson. 
 Report on a survey of the state auditing board. 
 
 Connecticut 
 
 Commission on the consolidation of state commissions and the 
 reorganization of the public health laws. 
 
 Report, 1915. 
 
 Jelaware 
 
 ^egis^gti^ 0 gurvey cormrdttee, reports and recommendations. 
 Idaho 
 
 Administration Consolidation Law. Approved, February 19, 1919 
 
 Illinois 
 
 Efficiency and economy committee. Preliminary report, June 18, 
 1914. Final report, 1915. 
 
 The civil administrative code of the state of Illinois, 1917. 
 
 Iowa 
 
 Consolidation report of the efficiency engineers, filed in 
 the secretary of state's office, March 24, 1914. 
 
 Report of Quail & Parker, efficiency engineers, relating to 
 the state department of agriculture, state fair management 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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199 
 
 and passes. 
 
 Report providing for reorganization of state government with 
 notes to bill introduced. 
 
 Reorganization Bill. Senate file No. 519. Senate Journal 1915. 
 Kansas 
 
 Partial report, 1916. The penal, charitable, and other institu- 
 tions of Kansas. The state education institutions. Economy and 
 efficiency report of Senator J.D. Joseph, (Minorjtiy report, 1916) 
 State Board of Administration. Report 1918. 
 
 Business manager. Report 1918. 
 
 Economy and efficient report of I. D. Joseph, senate member of 
 efficienty and economy commission. 76 pages. 
 
 Maryland 
 
 Commission on efficiency and economy. 
 
 Maryland. Report in re The Organization and Administration of 
 the state government Part II. April 15, 1921. 66 p. (Griffen- 
 
 hagen and associates, Chicago.) 
 
 Report of Dr. Frank J. Goodrow, chairman and member of effi- 
 ciency and economy commission. By H. S. Chase & Company on 
 inefficiency and extravagance in various departments and offices. 
 January 17, 1916, 51 p. '16. 
 
 Massachusetts 
 
 Commission on efficiency and economy. 
 
 Supervisor of administration report 1916, 1917, 1918. 
 
 Governor and Council. Specification and rules for the class- 
 ification of personal service of the commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
 1918. 
 
 Act to organize in departments the executive ansi administrative 
 functions of the commonwealth. Approved July 23, 1919. 
 
 Supervisor of administration annual report 1918 (Pub. doc. No. 
 
 119) 24 p. '19. 
 
 Annual report 1916 (Pub. doc. No. 119) 22 p. '17. 
 
 Annual report 1915 (Pub. doc. No. 96) 304 p. '16. 
 
 Minnesota 
 
 Efficiency and Economy Commission. Preliminary report May 25,1914. 
 Final rpport, November 1914. 
 
 Commission on reorganization of civil administration. 
 
 Report of commission on reorganization of civil administration 
 appropriation by governor. Inaugural message of Gov. Bromquest 
 to legislature Jamary 1917. 
 
 Nebraska 
 
 Civil Administrative Code. Approved April 19, 1919. 
 
 New Jersey 
 
 Economy and Efficiency Commission. Report 1912, 1914, 1915, 1916, 
 1917. 
 

200 
 
 North Dakota 
 
 Board of Administration. First annual report for period 
 July 26, 1919-Cctober 31, 1919. 140 p. 
 
 Reconstruction commission. Report, 1919. 
 
 New York 
 
 Report New York Constitutional Commission 1915 
 Reconstruction commission. Retrenchment commission. Draft 
 on retrenchment and reorganization prepared for consideration 
 at public hearing. September 24, 1919. 410 pages. 1919. 
 
 Hall of Records. 
 
 Reconstruction committee draft of summary. September 24, 1919. 
 44 pages, 1919. Hall of Records. 
 
 Recommendation of sweeping reorganization of state government. 
 1919. 
 
 Ohio 
 
 Joint committee on administrative reorganization. Preliminary 
 report 1919. 
 
 Report on summary of recommendations for administrative re- 
 organization of Ohio state government (D. C. Sowers) 1920 
 
 Oregon 
 
 Consolidation commission. Report, 1918. Final report, 1919. 
 Pennsylvania 
 
 Efficiency and economy commission. Report, 1914. 
 
 Rhode Island 
 
 Legislative reference bureaus. Facts concerning special 
 committees and commissions of Rhode Island. 1911-1921. 24 
 
 pages, May 31, 1921. 
 
 Wisconsin 
 
 Report submitted to the civil service commission: Departmental 
 organization and efficiency of state employees. i 9 i 8 .