illl»liaillilllll!IIIIIIII!IH^^^^^^ 
 
 I GOV. JOHN P. ALTGELD'S | 
 
 I PARDON OF THE ANARCHISTS | 
 
 I AND HIS MASTERLY | 
 
 I REVIEW OF THE | 
 
 I HAYM ARRET RIOT | 
 
 1 iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiy^ I 
 
 RX]PRIl>7a?Sr> FKOM LIFE 
 OF ALBERT R. PARSONS 
 
 LUCY E. PARSONS, Publisher 
 
 3130 NORTH TROY ST., CHICAGO, ILL. 
 
m/ 
 
 ^jmi. 
 
 
 ^*'*'*'^ir^niiiiii» " " 
 
Hllllllllllllllilllllllllllllllllll!!llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllliy^ 
 
 GOV. JOHN P. ALTGELD'S ] 
 
 t PARDON OF THE ANARCHISTS | 
 
 AND HIS MASTERLY | 
 
 REVIEW OF THE | 
 
 HAYMARKET RIOT | 
 
 iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiy^ I 
 
 REPRINTED FROM LIFE 
 OF ALBERT R. PARSONS 
 
 I LUCY E. PARSONS, Publisher | 
 
 I 3130 NORTH TROY ST., CHICAGO, ILL. ■ 
 
 iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiniiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiniiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiuiy 
 
PREFACE 
 
 In publishing the Pardon of Gov. J. P. Altgeld, I am actuated by the 
 sole desire to inform the public generally, and the present generation 
 particularly, regarding the Anarchists ' case. 
 
 The men who were hanged in Chicago on November the 11th, 1887, 
 the Anarchists, one of them my beloved husband, Albert E. Parsons, were 
 innocent of any crime. They were labor organizers of rare ability. 
 
 Gov. Altgeld pardoned the three men who were confined in Joliet 
 prison, because he believed their conviction was the result of the mob 's 
 demand, although the "mob was clothed in purple and fine linen,ii,from 
 Gov. Dunn's speech at the unveiling of Altgeld 's statue, in Lincoln Park, 
 Chicago. 
 
 Some time ago, I published the "Famous Speeches of the Chicago 
 Anarchists, in reply as to why the sentence of death should not be pro- 
 nounced upon them." These "Famous Speeches" have met with a large 
 sale, and I have the satisfaction to know that their publication has done 
 a great deal to enlighten the public mind as to the conspiracy and the 
 conspirators who sent my innocent husband and his comrades to the 
 gallows. As my life's work is to prove their innocence, I now ask the 
 public to carefully read these pages, especially as Altgeld had been 
 judge before he was elected governor, consequently, he could examine the 
 Anarchists' case, with a calm, clear, discriminating mind, and being just 
 and honest, he pronounced them, "Not Guilty," unconditionally releasing 
 the three men, who had not been judicially murdered. For this, noble, just 
 and humane act. Gov. Altgeld was hounded, abused, ostracized, and boy- 
 cotted, by the "mob in purple and fine linen," until he lost his splendid 
 property. Unity building, and other holdings, and from being a rich, hon- 
 ored citizen, and governor of the great State of Illinois, "The mob in 
 purple and fine linen ' ' forced him to die, practically a pauper. 
 
 Ten years after his death, the people, the plain common people, as- 
 sembled in beautiful Lincoln Park, and with uncovered heads, witnessed 
 the unveiling of the grand statue, and the beautiful group, representing 
 the working class, the class from whose loins the governor himself had 
 sprung, and who in his days of exaltation, he never forgot, or deserted. 
 He was a man before he was a politician. He was one of those rare characters 
 who could remain true to his high ideals in spite of politics. 
 
 So, now stands the statue of the immortal Altgeld, the Colossus, 
 looking out upon Lake Michigan, with that firm, placid expression upon 
 
PREFACE 
 
 the face, that the writer so often observed, when he, in his matchless 
 oratory, pleaded a better, juster future for the oppressed. Grouped around 
 his noble form, is a proletarian family, father, mother and child, closely 
 nestling under his outstretched protecting arm. 
 
 It is seldom that the artist can catch, as it were, the real character 
 of his subject sufficiently clearly to enable him to impress it upon lifeless 
 stone and metal, but Borglum, the designer, has shown his rare genius in 
 impressing upon cold impressionless bronze the most noble characteristics 
 of his subject, that of protecting the weak against the aggressions of the 
 strong. 
 
 When death laid his cold, icy grasp upon J. P. Altgeld, and declared that 
 time for him should be no more, Altgeld, at that very moment, was pleading 
 the cause of oppressed South ^Africa from the public platform, in Joliet, 
 111. ^0 he^eli as the hero falleth — unconquered! 
 
 Since Illinois was admitted as a sister state to the states of this 
 union, more than three-quarters of a century ago, many of her own sons 
 and other men have been elected to govern her, but only one, so far, 
 has she honored with a monument in the most beautiful park of her larg- 
 est city. John P. Altgeld, not one of her own sons, nor even a native 
 American, has this distinguishing honor. 
 
 Why? Because he, disregarding the blandishments of the "mob in 
 purple and fine linen," regardless of consequences, followed justice where 
 she led, and she led him to the prison doors of Joliet, where three inno- 
 cent laboring men were imprisoned. She seized his strong arm, back flew 
 bolts and bars, opened wide the doors, three working men are restored 
 to their families and their friends, — vindicated by their governor! And 
 the five, their co-defendants, who had been murdered five years previously, 
 were also vindicated! 
 
 In the years to come, children yet unborn, will make their pilgrimages 
 to Lincoln Park, to pay homage to the Governor, who had the courage 
 to stand up against the howls of the ' ' mob in purple and fine linen. ' ' 
 
 LUCY E. PAESONS. 
 Chicago, Illinois, September 8, 1915. 
 
ALTGELD'S REASONS 
 
 FOR PARDONING FIELDEN, NEEBE 
 
 AND SCHWAB 
 
ALTGELD'S REASONS FOR PARDONING FIELDEN, NEEBE AND 
 SCHWAB. 
 
 STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
 
 On the night of May 4, 1886, a public meeting was held on Haymarket 
 Square in Chicago; there were from 800 to 1,000 people present, nearly all 
 being laboring men. There had been trouble, growing out of the effort to 
 introduce an eight-hour day, resulting in some collisions with the police, in 
 one of which several laboring people were killed, and this meeting was called 
 as a protest against alleged police brutality. 
 
 The meeting was orderly and was attended by the mayor, who remained 
 until the crowd began to disperse, and then went away. As soon as Capt. 
 John Bonfield, of the police department, learned that the mayor had gone, he 
 took a detachment of police and hurried to the meeting for the purpose of 
 dispersing the few that remained, and as the police approached the place of 
 meeting a bomb was thrown by some unknown person, which exploded and 
 wounded many and killed several policemen, amwig the latter being one 
 Mathias Degan. A number of people were arrested, and after a time August 
 Spies, Albert R. Parsons, Louis Lingg, Michael Schwab, Samuel Fielden, 
 George Engel, Adolph Fischer and Oscar Neebe were indicted for the murder 
 of Mathias Degan. The prosecution could not discover who had thrown the 
 bomb and could not bring the really guilty man to justice, and, as some of the 
 men indicted were not at the Haymarket meeting and had nothing to do with 
 it, the prosecution was forced to proceed on the theory that the men indicted 
 were guilty of murder because it was claimed they had at various times in the 
 past uttered and printed incendiary and seditious language, practically 
 advising the killing of policemen, of Pinkerton men and others acting in that 
 capacity, and that they were therefore responsible for the murder of Mathias 
 Degan. The public was greatly excited, and after a prolonged trial all the 
 defendants were found guilty; Oscar Neebe was sentenced to fifteen years 
 imprisonment and all of the other defendants were sentenced to be hanged. 
 The case was carried to the Supreme Court and was there affirmed in the fall 
 of 1887. Soon thereafter Lingg committed suicide. The sentence of Fielden 
 and Schwab was commuted to imprisonment for life, and Parsons, Fischer, 
 Engel and Spies were hanged, and the petitioners now ask to have Neebe, 
 Fielden and Schwab set at liberty. 
 
 The several thousand merchants, bankers, judges, lawyers and other 
 prominent citizens of Chicago who have by petition, by letter and in other 
 
FOR PARDONING FIELDEN^ NEEBE AND SCHWAB. 287 
 
 ways urged executive clemency, mostly base their appeal on the ground that, 
 assuming the prisoners to be guilty, they have been punished enough ; but a 
 number of them who have examined the case more carefully and are more 
 familiar with the record and with the facts disclosed by the papers on file, 
 base their appeal on entirely different grounds. They assert : 
 
 First — That the jury which tried the case was a packed jury selected to 
 convict. 
 
 Second — That, according to the law as laid down by the Supreme Court, 
 both prior to and again since the trial of this case, the jurors, according to 
 their own answers, were not competent jurors, and the trial was therefore 
 not a legal trial. 
 
 Third — That the defendants were not proven to be guilty of the crime 
 charged in the indictment. 
 
 Fourth — That as to the defendant Neebe, the State's attorney had declared 
 at the close of the evidence that there was no case against him, and yet he 
 has been kept in prison all these years. 
 
 Fifth — That the trial judge was either so prejudiced against the defend- 
 ants, or else so determined to win the applause of a certain class in the com- 
 munity, that he could not and did not grant a fair trial. 
 
 Upon the question of having been punished enough, I will simply say that 
 if the defendants had a fair trial, and nothing has developed since to show 
 that they were not guilty of the crime charged in the indictment, then there 
 ought to be no executive interference, for no punishment under our laws could 
 then be too severe. Government must defend itself; life and property must 
 be protected, and law and order must be maintained; murder must be pun- 
 ished, and if the defendants are guilty of murder, either committed by their 
 own hand's or by some one else acting on their advice, then, if they have had 
 a fair trial, there should be in this case no executive interference. The soil 
 of America is not adopted to the growth of Anarchy. While our institutions 
 are not free from injustice, they are still the best that have yet been devised, 
 and therefore must be maintained. 
 
 I. WAS THE JURY PACKED? 
 
 The record of the trial shows that the jury in this case was not drawn in 
 the manner that juries usually are drawn; that is, instead of having a num- 
 ber of names drawn out of a box that contained many hundred names, as the 
 law contemplates shall be done in order to insure a fair jury and give neither 
 side the advantage, the trial judge appointed one Henry L. Ryce as a special 
 bailiff to go out arftl summon such men as he (Ryce) might select to act as 
 jurors. While this practice has been sustained in cases in which it did not 
 appear that either side had been prejudiced thereby, it is always a dangerous 
 practice, for it gives the bailiff absolute power to select a jury that will be 
 favorable to one side or the other. Counsel for the State, in their printed 
 
288 altgeld's reasons 
 
 brief, say that Ryce was appointed on motion of defendants. While it appears 
 that counsel for the defendants were in favor of having some one appointed, 
 the record has this entry : 
 
 "Mr. Grinnell (the State's attorney) suggested Mr. Ryce as special bailiff, 
 and he was accepted and appointed." B«t it makes no difference on whose 
 motion he was appointed if he did not select a fair jury. It is s-hown that he 
 boasted while selecting jurors that he was m-anaging this case; that these 
 fellows would hang as certain as death ; that he was calling such men as the 
 defendants would have to challenge peremptorily and waste their challenges 
 on, and that when their challenges were exhausted they would have to take 
 such men as the prosecution wanted. It appears from the recard of the trial 
 that the defendants were obliged to exhaust all of their peremptory challenges, 
 and they had to take a jury, almost every member of which stated frankly 
 that he was prejudiced against them. On page 133 of volume I of the record 
 it appears that when the panel was about twa-thirds full, counsel for defend- 
 ants called attention of the court to the fact that Ryce was sunwnoning only 
 prejudiced men, as shown by their examinations. Further: That he was 
 confining himself to particular classes ; i. c, clerks, merchants, manufacturers, 
 etc. Counsel for defendants then moved the court to stop this and direct 
 Ryce to summon the jurors from the body of the people; that is, from the 
 community at large, and not from particular classes ; but the court refused to 
 take any notice of the matter. 
 
 For the purpose of still further showing the misconduct of Bailiff Ryce 
 reference is made to the affidavit of Otis S. Favor. Mr. Favor is one of the 
 most reputable and honorable business men in Chicago ; he was himself sum- 
 moned by Ryce as a juror, but was so prejudiced against the defendants that 
 he had to be excused, and he abstained from making any affidavit before sen- 
 tence because the State's attorney had requested him not to make it, although 
 he stood ready to go into court and tell what he knew if the court wished him 
 tc do so, and he naturally supposed he would be sent for. But after the Su- 
 preme Court had passed on the case and some of the defendants were about 
 to be hanged he felt that an injustice was being done and he made the fol- 
 lowing affidavit : 
 
 State of Illinois, Cook County. — ss. : 
 
 Otis S. Favor, being duly sworn, on oath says that he is a citizen of the 
 United States and of the State of Illinois, residing in Chicago, and a merchant 
 doing business at Nos. 6 and 8 Wabash avenue, in the city of Chicago, in said 
 county. That he is very well acquainted with Henry L. Ryce, of Cook county, 
 Illinois, who acted as special bailiff in summoning jurors in the case of The 
 People, etc., vs. Spies et al., indictment for murder, tried in the Criminal 
 Court of Cook county, in the summer of 1886. That affiant was himself sum- 
 moned by said Ryce for a juror in said cause, but was challenged and excused 
 
FOR PARDONING FIELDEN, NEEBE AND SCHWAB. 269 
 
 therein because of his prejudice. That on several occasions in conversation 
 between affiant and said Ryce touching the summoning of the jurors by said 
 Ryce, and while said Ryce was so acting as special bailiff as aforesaid, said 
 Ryce said to this affiant and to other persons in affiant's presence, in sub- 
 stance and effect as follows, to-wit: "I (meaning said Ryce) am managing 
 this case (meaning this case against Spies et al.) and know what I am about. 
 Those fellows (meaning the defendants, Spies et al.) are going to be hanged as 
 certain as death. I am calling such men as the defendants will have to chal- 
 lenge peremptorily an-d waste their time and challenges. Then they will have 
 to take such men as the prosecution wants." That affiant has been very 
 reluctant to make any affidavit in this case, having no sympathy with Anarchy 
 nor relationship to or personal interest in the defendants or any of them, and 
 not being a Socialist, Communist or Anarchist ; but affiant has an interest as 
 a citizen, in the due administration of the law, and that no injustice should 
 be done under judicial procedure, and believes that jurors should not be 
 selected with reference to their known views or prejudices. Affiant further 
 says that his personal relations with said Ryce were at said time, and foi- 
 many years theretofore, had been most friendly and even intimate, and that 
 affiant is not prompted by any ill will toward any one in making this affidavit, 
 but solely by a sense of duty and a conviction of what is due to justice. 
 
 Affiant further says that about the beginning of October, 1886, when the 
 motion for a new trial was being argued in said cases before Judge Gary, and 
 when, as he was informed, application was made before Judge Gary for leave 
 to examine affiant in open court, touching the matters above stated, this affi- 
 ant went, upon request of State's Attorney Grinnell, to his office during the 
 noon recess of the court and there held an interview with said Grinnell, Mr. 
 Ingham and said Ryce, in the presence of several other persons, including 
 some police officers, where affiant repeated substantially the matters above 
 slated, and the said Ryce did not deny affiant's statements, and affiant said 
 he would have to testify thereto if summoned as a witness, but had refused to 
 make an affidavit thereto, and affiant was then and there asked and urged to 
 persist in his refusal and to make no affidavit. And affiant further saith not. 
 
 Otis S. Favor, 
 
 Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of November, A. D. 1887. 
 
 Julius Stern, 
 Notary Public in and for said County. 
 
 So far as shown no one connected with the State's attorney's office has 
 ever denied the statements of Mr. Favor as to what took place in that office, 
 although his affidavit was made in November, 1887. 
 
 As to Bailiff Ryce, it appears that he has made an affidavit in which he 
 denies that he made the statements sworn to by Mr. Favor, but unfortunately 
 for him, the record of the trial is against him, for it shows conclusively that 
 
290 ALTGELD S REASONS 
 
 he summoned only the class of men mentioned in Mr. Favor's affidavit. Ac- 
 cording to the record, 981 men were examined as to their qualifications as 
 jurors, and most of them vi^ere either employers, or men who had been pointed 
 out to the bailiff by their employer. The following, taken from the original 
 record of the trial, are fair specimens of the answers of nearly all the jurors, 
 except that in the following cases the court succeeded in getting the jurors to 
 say that they believed they could try the case fairly notwithstanding their 
 prejudices. 
 
 EXAMINATION OF JURORS. 
 
 William Neil, a manufacturer, was examined at length; stated that he 
 had heard and read about the Haymarket trouble, and believed enough of 
 what he had so heard and read to form an opinion as to the guilt of the de- 
 fendants, which he still entertained ; that he had expressed said opinion, and 
 then he added : "It would take pretty strong evidence to remove the impres- 
 sion that I now have. I could not dismiss it from my mind ; could not lay it 
 altogether aside during the trial. I believe my present opinion, based upon 
 what he had so heard and read to form an opinion as to the guilt of the de- 
 would influence me in determining and getting at a verdict." 
 
 He was challenged by the defendants on the ground of being prejudiced, 
 but the court then got him to say that he believed he could give a fair verdict 
 on whatever evidence he should hear, and thereupon the challenge was over- 
 ruled. 
 
 H. F. Chandler, in the stationery business with Skeen, Stuart & Co., said : 
 "1 was pointed out to the deputy sheriff by my employer to be summoned as 
 a juror." He then stated that he had read and talked about the Haymarket 
 trouble, and had formed and frequently expressed an opinion as to the guilt 
 of the defendants, and that he believed the statements he had read and heard. 
 He was asked: 
 
 Q. Is that a decided opinion as to the guilt of the defendants? 
 
 A. It is a decided opinion ; yes, sir. 
 
 Q. Your mind is pretty well made up now as to their guilt or innocence? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. Would it be hard to change your opinion, 
 
 A. It might be hard; I cannot say. I don't know whether it would be 
 hard or not. 
 
 He was challenged by the defendants on the ground of being prejudiced. 
 Then the court took him in hand and examined him at some length, and got 
 him to state that he believed he could try the case fairly. Then the challenge 
 was overruled. 
 
 F. L. Wilson: Am a manufacturer. Am prejudiced and have formed and 
 expressed an opinion ; that opinion would influence me in rendering a verdict. 
 
 He was challenged for cause, but was then examined by the court. 
 
 Q. Are you conscious in your own mind of any wish or desire that there 
 
FOR PARDONING FIELDEN, NEEBE AND SCHWAB. 29I 
 
 should be evidence produced in this trial which should prove some of these 
 rnen, or any of them, to be guilty? 
 
 A. Well, I think I have. 
 
 Being further pressed by the court, he said that the only feeling he had 
 against the defendants was based upon having taken it for granted that what 
 he read about them was, in the main, true; that he believed that sitting as a 
 juror the effect of the evidence either for or against the defendants would be 
 increased or diminished by what he had heard or read about the case. Then 
 on being still further pressed by the court, he finally said : "Well, I feel that 
 I hope that the guilty one will be discovered or punished — not necessarily 
 these mjen." 
 
 Q. Are you conscious of any other wish or desire about the matter than 
 that the actual truth may be discovered? 
 
 A. I don't think I am. 
 
 Thereupon the challenge was overruled. 
 
 George N. Porter, grocer, testified that he had formed and expressed an 
 opinion as to the guilt of the defendants, and that this opinion he thought, 
 would bias his judgment; he would try to go by the evidence, but what he 
 had read would have a great deal to do with his verdict; his mind, he said, 
 was certainly biased now, and that it would take a great deal of evidence to 
 change it. He was challenged for cause by the defendants ; was examined by 
 the court and said: 
 
 "I think what I have heard and read before I came into court would have 
 some influence with me." But the court finally got him to say he believed he 
 could fairly and impartially try the case and render a verdict according to law 
 and evidence, and that he would try to do so. Thereupon the court overruled 
 the challenge for cause. Then he was asked some more questions by defend- 
 ants' counsel, and among other things said: 
 
 "Why, we have talked about it there a great many times and I have always 
 expressed my opinion. I believe what I have read in the papers ; believe that 
 the parties are guilty. I would try to go by the evidence, but in this case it 
 would be awful hard work for me to do it." 
 
 He was challenged a second time on the ground of being prejudiced; was 
 then again taken in hand by the court and examined at length, and finally 
 again said he believed he could try the case fairly on the evidence, when the 
 challenge for cause was overruled for the second time. 
 
 H. N. Smith, hardware merchant, stated among other things that he was 
 prejudiced and had quite a decided opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the 
 defendants; that he had expressed his opinion and stil) entertained it, and 
 candidly stated that he was afraid he would listen a little more attentively to 
 the testimony which concurred with his opinion than the testimony on the 
 other side; that some of the policemen injured were personal friends of his. 
 He was asked these questions: 
 
292 ALTGELD S REASONS 
 
 Q. That is, you would be willing to have your opinion strengthened, and 
 hate very much to have it dissolved? 
 
 A. I would. 
 
 Q. Under these circumstances do you think that you could render a fair 
 and impartial verdict? 
 
 A. I don't think I could. 
 
 Q, You think you would be prejudiced? 
 
 A. I think I would be, because my feelings are very bitter. 
 
 Q. Would your prejudice in any way influence you in coming at an opin- 
 ion, in arriving at a verdict? 
 
 A. I think it would. 
 
 He was challenged on the ground of being prejudiced, was interrogated at 
 length by the court, and was brought to say he believed he could try the case 
 fairly on the evidence produced in court. Then the challenge was overruled. 
 
 Leonard Gould, wholesale grocer, was examined at length ; said he had a 
 decided prejudice against the defendants. Among other things, he said: "I 
 really don't know that I could do the case justice; if I was to sit on the case I 
 should just give my undivided attention to the evidence and calculate to be 
 governed by that." He was challenged for cause and the challenge overruled. 
 He was then asked the question over again, whether he could render an impar- 
 tial verdict based upon the evidence alone, that would be produced in court, 
 and he answered: "Well, I answered that, as far as I could answer it." 
 
 Q. You say you don't know that you can answer that, either yes or no? 
 
 A. No, I don't know that I can. 
 
 Thereupon the court proceeded to examine him, endeavoring to get him 
 to state that he believed he could try the case fairly upon the evidence that 
 was produced in court, part of the examination being as follows : 
 
 Q. Now, do you believe that you can — that you have sufficiently reflected 
 tipon it — so as to examine your own mind, that you can fairly and impartially 
 determine the guilt or innocence of the defendants? 
 
 A. That is a difficult question for me to answer. 
 
 Q. Well, make up your mind as to whether you can render, fairly and 
 impartially render, a verdict in accordance with the law and the evidence. 
 Most men in business possibly have not gone through a metaphysical examina- 
 tion so as to be prepared to answer a question of this kind. 
 
 A. Judge, I don't believe I can answer that question. 
 
 Q. Can you answer whether you believe you know? 
 
 A. Ifl had to do that I should do the best I could. 
 
 Q. The question is whether you believe you could or not. I suppose, 
 Mr. Gould, that you know the law is that no man is to be convicted of any 
 oflfense with which he is charged, unless the evidence proves that he is guilty 
 beyond a reasonable doubt? 
 
 A. That is true. 
 
FOR PARDONING FIELDEN, NEEBE AND SCHWAB. 293 
 
 Q. The evidence heard in this case in court? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
 Q. Do you believe that you can render a verdict in accordance with 
 the law? 
 
 A. Well, I don't know that I could. 
 
 Q. Do you believe that you can't — if you don't know of any reason why 
 you cannot, do you believe that you can't? 
 
 A. I cannot answer that question. 
 
 Q. Have you a belief one way or other as to whether you can or cannot? 
 Not whether you are going to do it, but do you believe you cannot? That 
 is the only thing. You are not required to state what is going to happen next 
 week or week after, but what do you believe about yourself, whether you can 
 or can't. 
 
 A. I am about where I was when I started. 
 
 Some more questions were asked and Mr. Gould answered-. 
 
 Well, I believe I have gone just as far as I can in reply to that question. 
 
 Q. This question, naked and simple in itself is, do you believe that you 
 can fairly and impartially render a verdict in the case in accordance with the 
 law and evidence? 
 
 A. I believe I could. 
 
 Having finally badgered the juror into giving this last answer, the court 
 desisted. The defendants' counsel asked: 
 
 Do you believe you can do so, uninfluenced by any prejudice or opinion 
 which you now have? 
 
 A. You bring it at a point that I object to and I do not feel competent 
 to answer. 
 
 Thereupon the juror was challenged a second time for cause, and the 
 challenge was overruled. 
 
 James H. Walker, dry goods merchant, stated that he had formed and 
 expressed an opinion as to the guilt of defendants; that he was prejudiced, 
 and that his prejudice would handicap him. 
 
 Q. Considering all prejudice and all opinions you have, if the testimony 
 was equally balanced, would you decide one way or the other in accordance 
 with that opinion or your prejudice? 
 
 A. If the testimony was equally balanced I should hold my present 
 opinion, sir. 
 
 Q. Assuming that your present opinion is, that you believe the defend- 
 ants guilty, would you believe your present opinion would warrant you in 
 convicting them? 
 
 A. I presume it would. 
 
 Q. Well, you believe it would; that is your present belief, is it? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 He was challenged on the ground of prejudice. 
 
294 altgeld's reasons 
 
 The court then examined him at length, and finally asked: 
 
 Q. Do you believe that you can sit here and fairly and impartially make 
 up your mind, from the evidence, whether that evidence proves that they are 
 guilty beyond a reasonable doubt or not? 
 
 A. I think I could, but I should believe that I was a little handicapped 
 in my judgment, sir. 
 
 Thereupon the court, in the presence of the jurors not yet examined, 
 remarked : 
 
 Well, that is a sufficient qualification for a juror in the case; of course, 
 the more a man feels that he is handicapped the more he will be guarded 
 against it. 
 
 W. B. Allen, wholesale rubber business, stated among other things : 
 
 Q. I will ask you whether what you have formed from what you have 
 read and heard is a slight impression, or an opinion, or a conviction. 
 
 A. It is a decided conviction. 
 
 Q. You have made up your mind as to whether these men are guilty or 
 innocent ? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. It would be difficult to change that conviction, or impossible, perhaps? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. It would be impossible to change your conviction? 
 
 A. It would be hard to change my conviction. 
 
 He was challenged for cause by defendants. Then he was examined by 
 the court at length and finally brought to the point of saying that he could 
 try the case fairly and impartially, and would do so. Then the challenge for 
 cause was overruled. 
 
 H. L. Anderson was examined at length, and stated that he had formed 
 and expressed an opinion, still held it, was prejudiced, but that he could lay 
 aside his prejudices and grant a fair trial upon the evidence. On being fur- 
 ther examined, he said that some of the policemen injured were friends of his 
 and he had talked with them fully. He had formed an unqualified opinion as 
 to the guilt or innocence of the defendants, which he regarded as deep-seated, 
 a firm conviction that these defendants, or some of them, were guilty. He 
 was challenged on the ground of prejudice, but the challenge was overruled. 
 
 M. D. Flavin, in the marble business. He had read and talked about the 
 Haymarket trouble, and had formed and expressed an opinion as to the guilt 
 or innocence of the defendants, which he still held and which was very strong ; 
 further, that one of the officers killed at the Haymarket was a relative of his, 
 although the relationship was distant, but on account of this relationship his 
 feelings were perhaps different from what they would have been, and occa- 
 sioned a very strong opinion as to the guilt of the defendants, and that he had 
 stated to others that he believed what he had heard and read about the mat- 
 ter. He was challenged on the ground of prejudice, and then stated, in answer 
 
FOR PARDONING FIELDEN, NEEBE AND SCHWAB. 295 
 
 to a question from the prosecution, that he believed that he could give a fair 
 and impartial verdict, when the challenge was overruled. 
 
 THE TWELVE WHO TRIED THE CASE. 
 
 The twelve jurors whom the defendants were finally forced to accept, 
 after the challenges were exhausted, were of the same general character as the 
 others, and a number of them stated candidly that they were so prejudiced 
 that they could not try the case fairly, but each, when examined by the court, 
 was finally induced to say that he believed he could try the case fairly upon 
 the evidences that was produced in court alone. For example: 
 
 Theodore Denker, one of the twelve : "Am shipping clerk for Henry W. 
 King & Co. I have read and talked about the Haymarket tragedy, and have 
 formed and expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defend- 
 ants of the crime charged in the indictment. I believe what I read and heard, 
 and still entertain that opinion." 
 
 Q. Is that opinion such as to prevent you from rendering an impartial 
 verdict in the case, sitting as a juror, under the testimony and the law? 
 
 A. I think it is. 
 
 He was challenged for cause on the ground of prejudice. Then the State's 
 attorney and the court examined him and finally got him to say that he 
 believed he could try the case fairly on the law and the evidence, and the 
 challenge was overruled. He was then asked further questions by the de- 
 fendants' counsel, and said : 
 
 "I have formed an opinion as to the guilt of the defendants and have 
 expressed it. We conversed about the matter in the business house and J ex- 
 pressed my opinion there; expressed my opinion quite frequently. My mind 
 was made up from what I read and I did not hesitate to speak about it." 
 
 Q. Would you feel yourself in any way governed or bound in listening 
 to the testimony and determining it upon the pre-judgment of the case that 
 you had expressed to others before? 
 
 A. Well, that is a pretty hard question to answer. 
 
 He then stated to the court that he had not expressed an opinion as to 
 the truth of the reports he had read, and finally stated that he believed he 
 could try the case fairly on the evidence. 
 
 John B. Greiner, another one of the twelve : "Am a clerk for the North- 
 western railroad. I have heard and read about the killing of Degan, at the 
 Haymarket, on May 4, last, and have formed an opinion as to the guilt or 
 innocence of the defendants now on trial for that crime. It is evident that 
 the defendants are connected with that aflfair from their being there." 
 
 Q. You regard that as evidence? 
 
 A. Well, I don't know exactly. Of course I would expect that it con- 
 nected them or they would not be here. 
 
296 altgeld's reasons 
 
 Q. So, then, the opinion that you now have has reference to the guilt or 
 innocence of some of these men, or all of them? 
 
 A. Certainly. 
 
 Q. Now, is that opinion one that would influence your verdict if you 
 should be selected as a juror to try the case? 
 
 A, I certainly think it would afifect it to some extent; I don't see how it 
 could be otherwise. 
 
 He further stated that there had been a strike in the freight department 
 of the Northwestern road, which affected the department he was in. After 
 some further examination he stated that he thought he could try the case 
 fairly on the evidence, and was then held to be competent. 
 
 G. W. Adams, also one of the twelve: "Am a traveling salesman; have 
 been an employer of painters. I read and talked about the Haymarket trouble 
 and formed an opinion as to the nature and character of the crime committed 
 there. I conversed freely with my friends about the matter." 
 
 Q. Did you form an opinion at the time that the defendants were con- 
 nected with or responsible for the commission of that crime? 
 
 A. I thought some of them were interested in it ; yes. 
 
 Q. And you still think so? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
 Q. Nothing has transpired in the interval to change your mind at all, I 
 suppose. 
 
 A. No, sir. 
 
 Q. You say some of them; that is, in the newspaper accounts that you 
 read, the names of some of the defendants were referred to? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 After further examination he testified that he thought he could try the 
 case fairly on the evidence. 
 
 H. T. Sanford, another one of the twelve; Clerk for the Northwestern 
 railroad, in the freight auditor's office: 
 
 Q. Have you an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendants of 
 the murder of Mathias J. Degan? 
 
 A. I have. 
 
 Q. From all that you have heard and that you have read, have you an 
 opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendants of throwing the bomb ? 
 
 A. Yes, sir; I have. 
 
 Q. Have you a prejudice against Socialists and Communists? 
 
 A. Yes, sir; a decided prejudice. 
 
 Q. Do you believe that that prejudice would influence your verdict in 
 this case? 
 
 A. Well, as I know so little about it, it is a pretty hard question to 
 answer. I have an opinion in my own mind that the defendants encouraged 
 the throwing of that bomb. 
 
FOR PARDONING FIELDEN, NEEBE AND SCHWAB. 297 
 
 Challenged on the ground of prejudice. 
 
 On further examination, stated he believed he could try the case fairly 
 upon the evidence, and the challenge for cause was overruled. 
 
 Upon the whole, therefore, considering the facts brought to light since 
 the trial, as well as the record of the trial and the answers of the jurors as 
 given therein, it is clearly shown that, while the counsel for defendants agreed 
 to it, Ryce was appointed special bailiff at the suggestion of the State's attor- 
 ney, and that he did summon a prejudiced jury which he believed would hang 
 the defendants ; and further, that the fact that Ryce was summoning only that 
 kind of men was brought to the attention of the court before the panel was 
 full, and it was asked to stop it, but refused to pay any attention to the mat- 
 ter, but permitted Ryce to go on, and then forced the defendants to go to 
 trial before this jury. 
 
 While no collusion is proven between the judge and the State's attorney, 
 it is clearly shown that after the verdict and while a motion for a new trial 
 was pending, a charge was filed in court that Ryce had packed the jury, and 
 that the attorney for the State got Mr. Favor to refuse to make an affidavit 
 bearing on this point, which the defendants could use, and then the court 
 refused to take any notice of it unless the affidavit was obtained, although it 
 was informed that Mr. Favor would not make an affidavit, but stood ready to 
 come into court and make a full statement if the court desired him to do so. 
 
 These facts alone would call for executive interference, especially as Mr. 
 Favor's affidavit was not before the Supreme Court at the time it considered 
 the case. 
 
 RECENT DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT AS TO COMPETENCY OF JITRORS. 
 II. 
 
 The second point argued seems to me to be equally conclusive. In the case 
 of the People vs. Coughlin, known as the Cronin case, recently decided, the 
 Supreme Court, in a remarkably able and comprehensive review of the law on 
 this subject, says, among other things: 
 
 "The holdings of this and other courts is substantially uniform, that where 
 it is once clearly shown that there exists in the mind of the juror, at the time 
 he is called to the jury box, a fixed and positive opinion as to the merits of 
 the case, or as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant he is called to try. 
 his statement that, notwithstanding such opinion, he can render a fair and im- 
 partial verdict according to the law and evidence, has little, if any, tendency 
 to establish his impartiality. This is so because the juror who has sworn to 
 have in his mind a fixed and positive opinion as to the guilt or innocence of 
 the accused, is not impartial, as a matter of fact. * * * 
 
 "It is difficult to see how, after a juror has avowed a fixed and settled opin- 
 ion as to the prisoner's guilt, a court can be legally satisfied of the truth of his 
 
298 altgeld's reasons 
 
 answer that he can render a fair and impartial verdict, or find therefrom that 
 he has the qualification of impartiality, as required by the constitution. * * * * 
 
 "Under such circumstances, it is idle to inquire of the jurors whether they 
 can return just and impartial verdicts. The more clear and positive were their 
 impressions of guilt, the more certain they may be that they can act impar- 
 tially in condemning the guilty party. They go into the box in a state of mind 
 that is well calculated to give a color of guilt to all evidence, and if the ac- 
 cused escapes conviction, it will not be because the evidence has not estab- 
 lished guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but because an accused party con- 
 demned in advance, and called upon to exculpate himself before a prejudiced 
 tribunal, has succeeded in doing so. * * * * 
 
 "To try a cause by such a jury is to authorize men, who state that they will 
 lean in their finding against one of the parties, unjustly to' determine the 
 rights of others, and it will be no difficult task to predict, even before the evi- 
 dence was heard, the verdict that would be rendered. Nor can it be said that 
 instructions from the court would correct the bias of the jurors who swear 
 they incline in favor of one of the litigants. * * * 
 
 "Bontecou (one of the jurors in the Cronin case), it is true, was brought to 
 make answer that he could render a fair and impartial verdict in accordance 
 with the law and the evidence, but that result was reached only after a singu- 
 larly argumentative and persuasive cross-examination by the court, in which 
 the right of every person accused of crime to an impartial trial and to the pre- 
 sumption of innocence until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the 
 duty of every citizen, when summoned as a juror, to lay aside all opinions and 
 prejudices and accord the accused such a trial, was set forth and descanted 
 upon at length, and in which the intimation was very clearly made that a juror 
 who could not do this was recreant to his duty as a man and a citizen. Under 
 pressure of this sort of cross-examination, Bontecou seems to have been 
 finally brought to make answer in such a way as to profess an ability to sit as 
 an impartial juror, and on his so answering he was pronounced competent 
 and the challenge as to him was overruled. Whatever may be the weight or- 
 dinarily due to statements of this character of jurors, their value as evidence 
 is in no small degree impaired in this case by the mode in which they were, in 
 a certain sense, forced from the mouth of the juror. The theory seemed to be, 
 that if a juror could in any way be brought to answer that he could sit as an 
 impartial juror, that declaration of itself rendered him competent. Such a 
 view, if it was entertained, was a total misconception of the law. * * * 
 
 "It requires no profound knowledge of human nature to know that with 
 srdinary men opinions and prejudices are not amenable to the power of the 
 will, however honest the intention of the party may be to put them aside. They 
 are likely to remain in the mind of the juror in spite of all his efiforts to get 
 rid of them, warping and giving direction to his judgment, coloring the facts 
 as they are developed by the evidence, and exerting an influence more or less 
 
FOR PARDONING FIELDEN, NEEBE AND SCHWAB. 299 
 
 potent, though it be unconsciously to the juror himself, an the final result of 
 his deliberations. To compel a person accused of a crime to be tried by a 
 juror who has prejudiced his case is not a fair trial. Nor should a defendant 
 be compelled to rely, as his security for the impartiality of the jurors by whom 
 he is to be tried, upon the restraining and controlling influence upon the juror's 
 mind of his oath to render a true verdict according to the law and the evi- 
 dence. His impartiality should appear before he is permitted to take the oath. 
 If he is not impartial then, his oath cannot be relied upon to make him so. In 
 the terse and expressive language of Lord Coke, already quoted, the jury 
 should 'stand indifferent as he stands unsworn.' " 
 
 Applying the law as here laid down in the Cronin case to the answers of the 
 jurors above given in the present case, it is very apparent that most of the 
 jurors were incompetent because they were not impartial, for nearly all of them 
 candidly stated that they were prejudiced against the defendants, and believed 
 them guilty before hearing the evidence, and the mere fact th^t the judge suc- 
 ceeded, by a singula''ly suggestive examination, in getting them to state that 
 they believed they could try the case fairly fair on the evidence, did not make 
 them competent. 
 
 It is true that this case was before the Supreme Court, and that court al- 
 lowed the verdict to stand; and it is also true that in the opinion of the ma- 
 jority of the court in the Cronin case, an effort is made to distinguish that 
 case from this one ; but it is evident that the court did not have the record of 
 this case before it when it tried to make the distinction, and the opinion of the 
 minority of the court in the Cronin case expressly refers to this case as being 
 exactly like that one, so far as relates to the competency of the jurors. The 
 answers of the jurors were almost identical and the examinations were the 
 same. The very things which the Supreme Court held to be fatal errors in 
 the Cronin c'ase, constituted the entire fabric of this case, so far as relates to 
 the competency of the jury. In fact, the trial judge in the Cronm case was 
 guided by the rule laid down in this case, yet the Supreme Court reversed the 
 Cronin case because two of the jurors were held to be incompetent, each hav- 
 ing testified that he had read and talked about the case, and had formed and 
 expressed an opinion as to the guilt of the defendants ; that he was prejudiced ; 
 that he believed what he had read, and that his prejudice might influence his 
 verdict; that his prejudice amounted to a conviction on the subject of the guilt 
 or innocence of the defendants; but each finally said that he could and would 
 try the case fairly on the evidence alone, etc. 
 
 A careful comparison of the examination of these two jurors with that of 
 many of the jurors in this case shows that a number of the jurors expressed 
 themselves, if anything, more strongly against the defendants than these two 
 did; and what is still more, one of those summoned, Mr. M. D. Flavin, in this 
 case, testified not only that he had read and talked about the case, and had 
 formed and expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defend- 
 
300 ALTGELD S REASONS 
 
 ants, that he was bitterly prejudiced, but further, that he was related to one of 
 the men who were killed, and that for that reason he felt more strongly against 
 the defendants than he otherwise might, yet he was held to be competent on 
 his mere statement that he believed he could try the case fairly on the evidence. 
 No matter what the defendants were charged with they were entitled to a 
 fair trial, and no greater danger could possibly threaten our institutions than 
 to have the courts of justice run wild or give way to popular clamor ; and- when 
 the trial judge in this case ruled that a relative of one of the men who was 
 killed was a competent juror, and this after the man had candidly stated that 
 he was deeply prejudiced, and that his relationship caused him to feel more 
 strongly than he otherwise might ; and when, in scores of instances, he ruled 
 that men who candidly declared that they believed the defendants to be guilty, 
 that this was a deep conviction and would influence their verdict, and that it 
 would require strong evidence to convince them that the defendants were inno- 
 cent; when in all these instances the trial judge ruled that these men were 
 competent jurors, simp-ly because they had, under his adroit manipulation, been 
 led to say that they believed they could try the case fairly on the evidence, 
 then the proceedings lost all semblance of a fair trial. 
 
 III. DOES THE PROOF SHOW GUILT f 
 
 The State has never discovered who it was that threw the bomb which 
 killed the policeman, and the evidence does not show any connection whatever 
 between the defendants and the man who did throw it. The trial judge, in 
 overruling the motion for a new hearing, and again, recently in a magazine 
 article, used this language: 
 
 "The conviction has not gone on the grofund that they did have actually any 
 personal participation in the particular act which caused the death of Began, 
 but the conviction proceeds upon the ground that they had generally, by 
 speech and print, advised large classes of the people, not particular indi- 
 dividuals, but large classes, to commit murder, and had left the commission, 
 the time and place and when, to the individual will and whim or caprice, or 
 whatever it may be, of each individual man who listened to their advice, and 
 that in consequence of that advice, in pursuance of that advice, and influenced 
 by that advice, somebody not known did throw the bomb that caused Degan's 
 death. Now, if this is not a correct principle of the law, then the defendants 
 of course are entitled to a new trial. This case is without a precedent ; there 
 is no example in the law books of a case of this sort." 
 
 The judge certainly told the truth when he stated that this case was with- 
 out a precedent, and that no example could be found in the law books to susw 
 tain the law as above laid down. For, in all the centuries during which gov- 
 ernment has been maintained among men, and crime has been punished, no 
 judge in a civilized country has ever laid down such a rule before. The peti- 
 tioners claim that it was laid down in this case simply because the prosecu- 
 
FOR PARDONING FIELDEN^ NEEBE AND SCHWAB. 30I 
 
 tion, not having discovered the real criminal, would otherwise not have been 
 able to convict anybody; that this course was then taken to appease the fury 
 of the public, and that the judgment was allowed to stand for the same reason. 
 I will not discuss this. But taking the law as above laid down, it was neces- 
 sary under it to prove, and that beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person 
 committing the violent deed had at least heard or read the advice given to the 
 masses, for until he either heard or read it he did not receive it, and if he did 
 not receive it, he did not commit the violent act in pursuance of that advice ; 
 and it is here that the case for the State fails ; with all his apparent eagerness 
 to force conviction in court, and his efforts in defending his course since the 
 trial, the judge, speaking on this point in his magazine article, makes this 
 statement: "It is probably true that Rudolph Schnaubelt threw the bomb," 
 which statement is merely a surmise and is all that is known about it, and is 
 certainly not sufficient to convict eight meii on. In fact, until the State proves 
 from whose hands the bomb came, it is impossible to show any connection 
 between the man who threw it and these defendants. 
 
 It is further shown that the mass of matter contained in the record and 
 quoted at length in the judge's magazine article, showing the use of seditious 
 and incendiary language, amounts to but little when its source is considered. 
 The two papers in which articles appeared at intervals during years, were 
 obscure little sheets, having scarcely any circulation, and the articles them- 
 selves were written at times of great public excitement, when an element in 
 the community claimed to have been outraged ; and the same is true of the 
 speeches made by the defendants and others ; the apparently seditious utter- 
 ances were such as are always heard when men imagine that they have been 
 wronged, or are excited or partially intoxicated ; and the talk of a gigantic 
 Anarchistic conspiracy is not believed by the then chief of police, as will be 
 shown hereafter, and it is not entitled to serious notice, in view of the fact 
 that, while Chicago had nearly a million inhabitants, the meetings held on 
 the lake front on Sundays during the summer, by these agitators, rarely had 
 fifty people present, and the most of these went from mere curiosity, while 
 the meetings held indoors, during the winter, were still smaller. The meet- 
 ings held from time to time by the masses of the laboring people, must not 
 be confounded with the meetings above named, although in times of excite- 
 ment and trouble much violent talk was indulged in by irresponsible parties; 
 which was forgotten when the excitement was over. 
 
 Again, it is shown here that the bomb was, in all probability, thrown by 
 some one seeking personal revenge ; that a course had been pursued by the 
 authorities which would naturally cause this ; that for a number of years prior 
 to the Haymarket affair there had been labor troubles, and in several cases a 
 number of laboring people, guilty of no offense, had been shot down in cold 
 blood by Pinkerton men, and none of the murderers were brought to justice. 
 The evidence taken at coroners' inquests and presented here, shows that in at 
 
302 ALTGELD S REASONS 
 
 least two cases men were fired on and killed when tlrey were running away, 
 and there was consequently no occasion to shoot, yet nobody was punished; 
 that in Chicago there had been a number of strikes in which some o-f the 
 police not only took sides against the men, tfut without any authority of law 
 invaded and broke up peaceable meetings, and in scores of cases brutally 
 clubbed people who were guilty of no offense whatever. Reference is made to 
 the opinion of the late Judge McAllister, in the case of the Harmonia Asfsocia- 
 tion of Joiners against Brenan, et al., reported in the Chicago Legal News. 
 Among other things, Judge McAllister says: 
 
 "The facts established by a large number of witnesses, and without any 
 opposing evidence, are, that this society, having leased Turner Hall, on Wei^t 
 Twelfth street, for the ptirpose, held a meeting in the forenoon of said day, in 
 said hall, composed of from 200 to 300 individuals, most of whom were jooir- 
 neymen cabinet-makers engaged in the several branches of the manufacture 
 of furniture in Chicago, but some of those in attendance were the proprietors 
 in that business, or the delegates sent by them. The object of the meeting 
 was to obtain a conference of the journeymen with such proprietors, or their 
 authorized delegates, with the view of endeavoring to secure an increase of 
 the price or diminution of the hours of labor. The attendants were wholly 
 unarmed, and the meeting was perfectly peaceable and orderly, and while the 
 people were sitting quietly, with their backs toward the entrance hall, with a 
 few persons on the stage in front of them, and all engaged merely in the busi- 
 ness fo.r which they had assembled, a force of from fifteen to twenty policemen 
 came suddenly into the hall, having a policeman's club in one hand and a 
 revolver in the other, and making no pause to determine the actual character 
 of the meeting, they immediately shouted: 'Get out of here, you damned 
 sons-of-bitches,' and began beating the people with their clubs, and some of 
 them actually firing their revolvers. One young man was shot through the 
 back of the head and killed. But to complete the atrocity of the affair on the 
 part of the officers engaged in it, when the people hastened to make their 
 escape from the assembly room, they found policemen stationed on either side 
 of the stairway leading from the hall down to the street, who applied their 
 clubs to them as they passed, seemingly with all the violence practicable 
 under the circumstances. 
 
 "Mr. Jacob Beiersdorf, who was a manufacturer of furniture, employing 
 some 200 men, had been invited to the meeting and came, but as he was about 
 to enter the place where it was held, an inoffensive old man, doing nothing 
 unlawful, was stricken down at his feet by a policeman's club. 
 
 "These general facts were established by an overwhelming mass of testi- 
 mony, and for the purpose of the questions in the case, it is needless to go 
 farther into detail. 
 
 "The chief political right of the citizen in our government, based upon 
 
FOR PARDONING FIELDEN_, NEEBE AND SCHWAB. 303 
 
 the popular will as regulated by law, is the right of suffrage, but to that right 
 two others are auxiliary and of almost equal importance : 
 
 "First: The right of free speech and of a free press. 
 
 "Second: The right of the people to assemble in a peaceable manner to 
 consult for the common good. 
 
 "These are among the fundamental principles of government and guar- 
 anteed by our constitution. Section 17, article 2, of the bill of rights, declares : 
 'The people have a right to assemble in a peaceable manner to consult for the 
 common good, to make known their opinions to their representatives, and 
 apply for redress of grievances.' Jurists do not regard these declarations of 
 the bill of rights as creating or conferring the rights, but as a guarantee against 
 their deprivation or infringement by any of the powers or agencies of the gov- 
 ernment. The rights themselves are regarded as the natural and inalienable 
 rights belonging to every individual, or as political, and based upon or arising 
 from principles inherent in the very nature of a system of free government. 
 
 "The right of the people to assemble in a peaceable manner to consult for 
 the common good, being a constitutional right, it can be exercised and en- 
 joyed within the scope and the spirit of that provision of the constitution, 
 independently of every other power of the State government. 
 
 "Judge Cooley, in his excellent work on 'Torts,' speaking (p. 296) of 
 remedies for the invasion of political rights, says : 'When a meeting for any 
 lawful purpose is actually called and held, one who goes there with the pur- 
 pose to disturb and break it up, and commits disorder to that end, is a 
 trespasser upon the rights of those who, for a time, have control of the place 
 of meeting. If several unite in the disorder it may be a criminal riot.' " 
 
 So much for Judge McAllister. 
 
 Now, it is shown that no attention was paid to the judge's decision; that 
 peaceable meetings were invaded and broken up, and inoffensive people were 
 clubbed ; that in 1885 there was a strike at the McCormick Reaper Factory, 
 on account of a reduction of wages, and some Pinkerton men, while on their 
 way there, were hooted at by some people on the street, when they fired into 
 the crowd and fatally wounded several people who had taken no part in any 
 disturbance ; that four of the Pinkerton men were indicted for this murder by 
 the grand jury, but that the prosecuting officers apparently took no interest in 
 the case, and allowed it to be continued a number of times, until the witnesses 
 were sworn out, and in the end the murderers went free. 
 
 It is shown that various attempts were made to bring to justice the men 
 who wore the uniform of the law while violating it, but all to no avail ; that the 
 laboring people found the prisons always open to receive them, but the courts 
 of justice were practically closed to them ; that the prosecuting officers vied 
 with each other in hunting them down, but were deaf to their appeals ; that in 
 the spring of 1886 there were more labor disturbances in the city, and particu- 
 larly at the McCormick factory; that under the leadership of Capt. Bonfield 
 
304 altgeld's reasons 
 
 the brutalities of the previous year were even exceeded. Some affidavit and 
 other evidence is offered on this point, which I cannot give for want of space. 
 It appears that this was the year of the eight hour agitation, and efforts were 
 made to secure an eight hour day about May i, and that a number of laboring 
 men standing, not on the street, but on a vacant lot, were quietly discussing the 
 situation in regard to the movement, when suddenly a large body of police, 
 under orders from Bonfield, charged on them and began to club them; that 
 some of the men, angered at the unprovoked assault, at first resisted, but were 
 soon dispersed ; that some of the police fired on the men while they were run- 
 ning and wounded a large number who were already 100 feet or more away 
 and were running as fast as they could ; that at least four of the number so 
 shot down died; that this was wanton and unprovoked murder, but there was 
 not even so much as an investigation. 
 
 WAS IT AN ACT OF PERSONAL REVENGE? 
 
 While some men may tamely submit to being clubbed and seeing their 
 brothers shot down, there are some who will resent it, and will nurture a 
 spirit of hatred and seek revenge for themselves, and the occurrences that pre- 
 ceded the Haymarket tragedy indicate that the bomb was thrown by some one 
 who, instead of acting on the advice of anybody, was simply seeking personal 
 revenge for having been clubbed, a-nd that Capt. Bonfield is the man who is 
 really responsible for the death of the police officers. 
 
 It is also shown that the character of the Haymarket meeting sustains this 
 view. The evidence shows there were only 800 to 1,000 people present, and 
 that it was a peaceable and orderly meeting; that the mayor of the city was 
 present and saw nothing out of the way, and that he remained until the crowd 
 began to disperse, the meeting being practically over, and the crowd engaged 
 in dispersing when he left ; that had the police remained away for twenty 
 minutes more there would have been nobody left there, but as soon as Bonfield 
 had learned that the mayor had left, he could not resist the temptation to 
 have some more people clubbed, and went up with a detachment of police to 
 disperse the meeting; and that on the appearance of the police the bomb was 
 thrown by some unknown person, and several innocent and faithful officers, 
 who were simply obeying an uncalled for order of their superior, were killed. All 
 of these facts tend to show the improbability of the theory of the prosecution 
 that the bomb was thrown as a result of a conspiracy on the part of the defend- 
 ants to commit murder; if the theory of the prosecution were correct, there 
 would have been many more bombs thrown ; and the fact that only one was 
 thrown shows that it was an act of personal revenge. 
 
 It is further shown here, that much of the evidence given at the trial was a 
 pure fabrication ; that some of the prominent police officials, in their zeal, not 
 only terrorized ignorant men by throwing them into prison and threatening 
 them with torture if they refused to swear to anything desired, but that they 
 
FOR PARDONING FIELDEN, NEEBE AND SCHWAB. 305 
 
 offered money and employment to those who would consent to do this. Fur- 
 ther, that they deliberately planned to have fictitious conspiracies formed in 
 order that they might get the glory of discovering them. In addition to the 
 evidence in the record of some witnesses who swore that they had Been paid 
 small sums of money, etc., several documents are here referred to. 
 
 First, an interview with Capt. Ebersold, published in the Chicago Daily 
 News, May 10, 1889. 
 
 CHIEF OF POLICE EBERSOLd's STATEMENT. 
 
 Ebersold was chief of the police of Chicago at the time of the Haymarket 
 trouble, and for a long time before and thereafter, so that he was in a position 
 to know what was going on, and his utterances upon this point are therefore 
 important. Among other things he says: 
 
 "It was my policy to quiet matters down as soon as possible after the 4th of 
 May. The general unsettled state of things was an injury to Chicago. 
 
 "On the other hand, Capt. Schaack wanted to keep things stirring. He 
 wanted bombs to be found here, there, all around, everywhere. I thought 
 people would He down and sleep better if they were not afraid that their homes 
 would be blown to pieces any minute. But this man Schaack, this little boy 
 who must have glory or his heart would be broken, wanted none of that pol- 
 icy. Now, here is something the public does not know. After we got the An- 
 archist societies broken up, Schaack wanted to send out men to again organize 
 new societies right away. You see what this would do. He wanted to keep 
 the thing boiling — keep himself prominent before the public. Well, I sat 
 down on that ; I didn't believe in such work, and of course Schaack didn't 
 like it. 
 
 "After I heard all that, I began to think there was, perhaps, not so much to 
 all this Anarchist business as they claimed, and I believe I was right. Schaack 
 thinks he knew all about those Anarchists. Why, I knew more at that time 
 than he knows today about them. I was following them closely. As soon as 
 Schaack began to get some notoriety, however, he was spoiled." 
 
 This is a most important statement, when a chief of police, who has been 
 watching the Anarchists closely, says that he was convinced that there was not 
 so much in all their Anarchist business as was claimed, and that a police cap- 
 tain wanted to send out men to have other conspiracies formed, in order to get 
 the credit of discovering them, and keep the public excited; it throws a flood 
 of light on the whole situation and destroys the force of much of the testimony 
 introduced at the trial. 
 
 For, if there has been any such extensive conspiracy as the prosecution 
 claims, the police would have soon discovered it. No chief of police could dis- 
 cover a determination on the part of an individual, or even a number of sepa- 
 rate individuals, to have personal revenge for having been maltreated, nor could 
 any chief discover a determination by any such individual to kill the next police- 
 
3o6 altgeld's reasons 
 
 man who might assault him. Consequently, the fact that the police did not 
 discover any conspiracy before the Haymarket affair, shows almost conclu- 
 sively that no such extensive combination could have existed. 
 * * * 
 I will simply say in conclusion, on this branch of the case, that the facts 
 tend to show that the bomb was thrown as an act of personal revenge, and that 
 the prosecution has never discovered who threw it, and the evidence utterly 
 fails to show that the man who did throw it ever heard or read a word coming 
 from the defendants ; consequently it fails to show that he acted on any advice 
 given by them. And if he did not act on or hear any advice coming from the 
 defendants, either in speeches or through the press, then there was no case 
 against them, even under the law as laid down by Judge Gary. 
 
 FIELDEN AND SCHWAB. 
 
 At the trial a number of detectives and members of the police swore that 
 the defendant, Fielden, at the Haymarket meeting, made threats to kill, urging 
 his hearers to do their duty as he would do his, just as the policemen were 
 coming up ; and one policeman swears that Fielden drew a revolver and fired at 
 the police while he was standing on the wagon and before the bomb was 
 thrown, while some of the others testified that he first climbed down off the 
 wagon and fired while standing by a wheel. On the other hand, it was proven 
 by a number of witnesses, and by facts and circumstances, that this evidence 
 must be absolutely untrue. A number of newspaper reporters, who testified on 
 the part of the State, said that they were standing near Fielden — much nearer 
 than the police were — and heard all that was said and saw what was done ; 
 that they had been sent there for that purpose, and that Fielden did not make 
 any such threats as the police swore to, and that he did not use a revolver. A 
 number of other men who were near, too, and some of them on the wagon on 
 which Fielden stood at the time, swear to the same thing. Fielden himself 
 swears that he did not make any such threats as the police swore to, and fur- 
 ther, that he never had or used a revolver in his life. But if there were any 
 doubt about the fact that the evidence charging Fielden with having used a 
 revolver as unworthy of credit, it is removed by Judge Gary and State's Attor- 
 ney Grinnell. On November 8, 1887, when the question of commuting the death 
 sentence as to Fielden was before the governor, Judge Gary wrote a long letter 
 in regard to the case in which, in speaking of Fielden, he, among other things, 
 says : "There is in the nature and private character of the man a love of jus- 
 tice, an impatience at undeserved sufferings. * * * * In his own private 
 life he was the honest, industrious and peaceful laboring man. In what he 
 said in court before sentence he was respectful and decorous. His language 
 and conduct since have been irreproachable. As there is no evidence that he 
 knew of any preparation to do the specific act of throwing the bomb that killed 
 
FOR PARDONING FIELDEN, NEEBE AND SCHWAB. 3O7 
 
 Degan, he does not understand even now that general advice to large masses 
 to do violence makes him responsible for the violence done by reason of that 
 advice. * * * In short, he was more a misguided enthusiast than a 
 criminal conscious of the horrible nature and effect of his teachings and of his 
 responsibility therefor." 
 
 The State's attorney appended the foregoing letter, beginning as follows: 
 "While endorsing and approving the foregoing statement by Judge Gary, I 
 wish to add thereto the suggestion, * * * that Schwab's conduct during the 
 trial, and when addressing the court before sentence, like Fielden's, was decor- 
 ous, respectful to the law and commendable. * * * It is further my desire 
 to say that I believe that Schwab was the pliant, weak tool of a stronger will 
 and more designing persons. Schwab seems to be friendless." 
 
 If what Judge Gary says about Fielden is true ; if Fielden has "a natural 
 love of justice and in his private life was the honest, industrious and peaceable 
 laboring man," then Fielden's testimony is entitled to credit, and when he says 
 that he did not do the things the police charge him with doing, and that he 
 never had or used a revolver in his life, it is probably true, especially as he was 
 corroborated by a number of creditable and disinterested witnesses. 
 
 Again, if Fielden did the things the police charged him with doing, if he 
 fired on them as they swear, then be was not a mere misguided enthusiast, who 
 was to be held only for the consequences of his teachings ; and if either Judge 
 Gary or State's Attorney Grinnell had placed any reliance on the evidence of 
 the police on this point, they would have written a different kind of a letter to 
 the then executive. 
 
 In the fall of 1887, a number of the most prominent business men of Chi- 
 cago met to consult whether or not to ask executive clemency for any of the 
 condemned men. Mr. Grinnell was present and made a speech, in which, in re- 
 ferring to this evidence, he said that he had serious doubts whether Fielden 
 had a revolver on that occasion, or whether indeed Fielden ever had one. 
 
 Yet, in arguing the case before the Supreme Court, the previous spring, 
 much stress was placed by the State on the evidence relating to what Fielden 
 did at the Haymarket meeting, and that court was misled into attaching great 
 importance to it. 
 
 It is now clear that there is no case made out against Fielden for anything 
 he did on that night, and, as heretofore shown, in order to hold him and the 
 other defendants for the consequences and effects of having given pernicious 
 and criminal advice to large masses to commit violence, whether orally, in 
 speeches, or in print, it must be shown that the person committing the vio- 
 lence had read or heard the advice : for, until he had heard or read it, he did 
 not receive it and if he never received the advice, it cannot be said that he 
 acted en it. 
 
3o8 altgeld's reasons 
 
 state's attorney on neebe's innocence. 
 
 At the conclusion of the evidence for the State, the Hon. Carter H. Harri- 
 son, then mayor of Chicago, and F. S.Winston, then corporation counsel for Chi- 
 cago, were in the court room and had a conversation with Mr. Grinnell, the 
 State's attorney, in regard to the evidence against Neebe, in which conversa- 
 tion, according to Mr. Harrison and Mr. Winston, the State's attorney said 
 that he did not think he had a case against Neebe, and that he wanted to dis- 
 miss him, but was dissuaded from doing so by his associate attorneys, who 
 feared that such a step might influence the jury in favor of the other de- 
 fendants. 
 
 Mr. Harrison, in a letter among other things, said : "I was present in the 
 court room when the State closed its case. The attorney for Neebe moved his 
 discharge on the ground that there was no evidence to hold him on. The 
 State's attorney, Mr. Julius S. Grinnell, and Mr, Fred S. Winston, corporation 
 counsel for the city, and myseff, were in earnest conversation when the motion 
 was made. Mr. Grinnell stated to us that he did not think there was sufficient 
 testimony to convfct Neebe. I thereupon earnestly advised him, as the repre- 
 sentative of the State, to dismiss the case as to Neebe, and, if I remember 
 rightly, he was seriously thinking of doing so, but, on consultation with his as- 
 sistants, and on their advice, he determined not to do so, lest it would have an 
 injurious effect on the case as against the other prisoners. * * * * I 
 took the position that such discharge, being clearly justified by the testimony, 
 would not prejudice the case as to the others." 
 
 Mr. Winston adds the following to Mr. Harrison's letter : 
 
 March 21, 1889. 
 
 I concur in the statement of Mr. Harrison ; I never believed there was suf- 
 ficient evidence to convict Mr. Neebe, and so stated during the trial. 
 
 F. S. Winston. 
 
 In January, iSgo, Mr. Grinnell wrote a letter to Gov. Fifer, denying that 
 he had ever made any such statement as that mentioned by Mr. Harrison and 
 Mr. Winston ; also that he did believe Neebe guilty ; that Mr. Harrison sug- 
 gested the dismissal of the case as to Neebe ; and further, that he would not 
 have been surprised if Mr. Harrison had made a similar suggestion as to 
 others, and then he says : "I said to Mr. Harrison at that time, substantially, 
 that I was afraid that the jury might not think the testimony presented in the 
 case sufficient to convict Neebe, but that it was in their province to pass 
 upon it." 
 
 Now, if the statement of Messrs. Harrison and Winston is true, then Grin- 
 nell should not have allowed Neebe to be sent to the penitentiary, and even if 
 we assume that both Mr. Harrison and Mr. Winston are mistaken, and that 
 Mr. Grinnell simply used the language he now says he used, then the case 
 
FOR PARDONING FIELDEN^ NEEBE AND SCHWAB. 309 
 
 must have seemed very weak to him. If, with a jury prejudiced to start with, 
 a judge pressing for conviction, and amid the almost irresistible fury with 
 which the trial was conducted, he still was afraid the jury might not think 
 the testimony in the case was sufficient to convict Neebe, then the testimony 
 must have seemed very weak to him, no matter what he may now protest 
 about it. 
 
 When the motion to dismiss the case as to Neebe was made, defendants' 
 counsel asked that the jury might be permitted to retire while the motion was 
 being argued, but the court refused to permit this, and kept the jury present 
 where it could hear all that the court had to say ; then when the argument on 
 the motion was begun by defendants' counsel, the court did not wait to hear 
 from the attorneys for the State, but at once proceeded to argue the points 
 itself with the attorneys for the defendants, so that while the attorney for the 
 State made no argument on the motion, twenty-five pages of the record are 
 filled with the colloquy or sparring that took place between the court and the 
 counsel for the defendants, the court in the presence of the jury making insin- 
 uations as to what inference might be drawn by the jury from the fact that 
 Neebe owned a little stock in a paper called the Arbeiter-Zeitung and had 
 been seen there, although he took no part in the management until after the 
 Haymarket troubles, it appearing that the Arbeiter-Zeitung had published 
 some very seditious articles, with which, however, Neebe had nothing to do. 
 Finally one of the counsel for the defendants said : "I expected that the rep- 
 resentatives of the State might say something, but as your honor saves them 
 that trouble, you will excuse me if I reply briefly to the suggestions you have 
 made." Some other remarks were made by the court, seriously affecting the 
 whole case and prejudicial to the defendants, and then referring to Neebe, the 
 court said : 
 
 "Whether he had anything to do with the dissemination of advice to com- 
 mit murder is, I think, a debatable question which the jury ought to pass on." 
 Finally the motion was overruled. Now, with all the eagerness shown by the 
 court to convict Neebe, it must have regarded the evidence against him as 
 very weak, otherwise it would not have made this admission, for if it was a 
 debatable question whether the evidence tended to show guilt, then that evi- 
 dence must have been far from being conclusive upon the question as to 
 whether he was actually guilty; this being so, the verdict should not have been 
 allowed to stand, because the law requires that a man shall be proven to be 
 guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before he can be convicted of criminal of- 
 fense. I have examined all of the evidence against Neebe with care, and it ut- 
 terly fails to prove even the shadow of a case against him. Some of the other 
 defendants were guilty of using seditious language, but even this cannot be 
 said of Neebe. 
 
3IO ALTGELD S REASONS 
 
 PREJUDICE OR SUBSERVIENCY OF JUDGEw 
 
 It is further charged, with much bitterness, by those who speak for the pris- 
 oners, that the record of this case shows that the judge conducted the trial 
 with malicious ferocity, and forced eight men to be tried together; that in 
 cross-examining the State's witnesses, he confined counsel to the specific points 
 touched on by the State, while in the cross-examination of the defendants' 
 witnesses he permitted the State's Attorney to go into all manner of subjects 
 entirely foreign to the matters on which the witnesses were examined in chief; 
 also, that every ruling throughout the long trial on any contested point, was 
 in favor of the State ; and further, that page after page of the record contains 
 insinuating remarks of the judge, made in the hearing of the jury, and with 
 the evident intent of bringing the jury to his way of thinking; that these 
 speeches, coming from the court, were much more damaging than any speeches 
 from the State's Attorney could possibly have been; that the State's Attorney 
 often took his cue from the judge's remarks; that the judge's magazine article 
 recently published, although written nearly six years after the trial, is yet full 
 of venom ; that, pretending to simply review the case, he had to drag into his 
 article a letter written by an excited woman to a newspaper after the trial was 
 over, and which therefore had nothing to do with the case, and was put into 
 the article simply to create a prejudice against the woman, as well as against 
 the dead and the living ; and that, not content with this, he, in the same article, 
 makes an insinuating attack on one of the lawyers for the defense, not for any- 
 thing done at the trial, but because more than a year after the trial, when 
 some of the defendants had been hung, he ventured to express a few kind, if 
 erroneous, sentiments over the graves of his dead clients, whom he at least be- 
 lieved to be innocent. It is urged that such ferocity of subserviency is with- 
 out a parallel in all history; that even Jeffries in England, contented himself 
 ■With hanging his victims, and did not stoop to berate them after death. 
 
 These charges are of a personal character, and while they seem to be sus- 
 tained by the record of the trial and the papers before me, and tend to show 
 the trial was not fair, I do not care to discuss this feature of the case any far- 
 ther, because it is not necessary. I am convinced that it is clearly my duty 
 to act in this case for the reasons already given, and I, therefore, grant an 
 absolute pardon to Samuel Fielden, Oscar Neebe, and Michael Schwab, this 
 26th day of June, 1893. John P. Altgeld. 
 
 Governor of Illinois. 
 
HX 
 
l,Sl[«l[«l[5IGg[51^l5iP^^K|[51^[g|ig|p|P[aPi5i;«li«l!5]!51151i^W^[51^[g|[a[Kligiliai]l][5^ 
 
 |3| II 
 
 n n 
 
 I Life of Albert R. Parsons i 
 
 (THIRD EDITION.) i 
 
 m 
 Containing his editorials, speeches, auto biography H 
 
 and much other interesting matter. Price ^1.50, postage |j 
 
 I5c. i 
 
 LUCY E. PARSONS 
 
 (his widow) 
 PUBLISHER 
 
 3130 N. Troy Street Chicago III. | 
 
 ailllglgiaiSlllSlllllHiigigigiiisiigiiiiiiSgiiiiaiiagiigiHjigisiigigiHiiiiaiasiiis 
 
 The Famous Speeches 
 
 of the Chicago Anarchists | 
 
 When asked if they had anything 
 to say why sentence of death 
 should not be passed upon them, 
 delivered in court, October, 7, 8, 9, 
 1886— 6th Edition. Price 30 cents. 
 
 POSTAGE 5 CENTS 
 
 LUCY E. PARSONS 
 
 PUBLISHER 
 
 3130 N. Troy Street Chicago, 111. i