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 a I E) R.AR.Y 
 
 OF THE 
 U N IVLRSITY 
 or ILLI NOIS
 
 A ROMANCE OF WAR ; 
 
 OE, 
 
 HOW THE CASH GOES IN 
 CAMPAIGNING. 
 
 COMPILED FROM EVIDENCE GIVEN BEFORE 
 
 The Select Committee 
 On the recent Egyptiaii Campaign. 
 
 BY 
 
 CHAELES CAMEEON, M.D., LL.D., M.P. 
 
 PRICE ONE SHILLING. 
 
 LONDON : 
 BAILLIERE, TINDALL, and COX. 
 
 1884
 
 LONDON : 
 
 WITHERBY AND CO., PRINTERS, 
 
 325A, HIGH HOLBORN, W.C. ; 74, CORNHILL ; AND 
 
 Newman's court, cornhill, E.G.
 
 A ROMANCE OF WAR; 
 
 OK, 
 
 HOW THE CASH GOES IN CAMPAIGNING, 
 
 As I have mucli to say, I shall be very brief in stating my 
 reasons for writing this paper. The Eej^ort of the Proceedings 
 of the Select Committee appointed on my motion, in March last, 
 to enquire into the working of the Supply and Transport Services in 
 the Egyptian Campaign has not yet been published, but on the 
 25th July The Times printed a long contribution, "From a Corre- 
 spondent," professing to sum up the evidence so far as it has 
 gone. The writer's conclusion was that I had failed to make 
 out any case, " that with regard to failures in the working of 
 " the supply and transport services at the seat of war the 
 " evidence seemed to show that there was none," while on the 
 other hand " it seemed manifest that the expedition as a whole 
 " was, from a purely administrative point of view, a success." 
 
 From internal evidence it was clear to me that the communi- 
 cation was directly inspired by the War Office. It aj^peared to 
 me most undesirable in the j^ublic interest that, pending not 
 only the report of the Committee but the publication of the 
 evidence taken, this statement should be allowed to pass un- 
 challenged as an impartial summing-up of the case. I therefore 
 wrote to Tlie ^Imes traversing its conclusions and promising as 
 soon as Parliament rose to state in detail what some of the 
 principal transport and supply arrangements for the campaign
 
 • 4 
 
 were, and how they were carried out, so that the public might 
 judge for themselves as to the boasted " administrative success." 
 In fulfilment of that promise I now write. 
 
 As some failure is admitted in the case of the flour and hay 
 sent out to Egypt, I will commence with these items. 
 
 Flour. — Seventy days' supply for the entire force, of 
 American flour purchased through a firm of London brokers, 
 was sent out. A large quantity of similar flour shipped during 
 the China war had gone wrong, and abundant commissariat — not 
 to speak of Admiralty — experience had shown the impossibility 
 of relying on flour containing much moisture in hot climates. 
 American flour was nevertheless selected by the Acting Director of 
 Supplies and Transport contrary to the advice of the Commissary- 
 G-eneral at head- quarters. The first cargo was shipped on July 
 27th, 1882, and on August 31st Sir John Adye telegraphed home 
 that "it was utterly unfit for use, and was apparently never good." 
 A reply telegram, sent out on September 1st, stated that the bulk 
 samples had been that day examined, and were in perfect con- 
 dition. It was explained in evidence that the bulk samples were 
 examined by the brokers. There was no direct evidence on this 
 point, however, and the correspondence submitted does not bear 
 out the assertion, for a letter written by the brokers on Sep- 
 tember 7th, referring to a paragraph which had appeared in 
 The Times, makes no allusion to any recent inspection of 
 bulk samples, but states that the flour was thoroughly examined 
 before shipment, and was then in good condition. One thing 
 was made quite clear, viz., that neither the Director of Supplies 
 and Transport, the Director of Contracts, nor any ofiicial in their 
 ofiice, ever saw any of the bulk samples. The flour sent out 
 was of five different brands, and in the case of one only a sample 
 of a few ounces was submitted to the purchasing department. 
 The other four lots were purchased and sent out without any por- 
 tion of them whatever having been seen by any ofiicial of that 
 department. Everything — buying, packing and shipping — was 

 
 left entirely in the hands of a firm of private brokers paid by a 2 J 
 percent, commission on their purchases. On the 8th September, 
 a second shipment having in the meanwhile arrived, Sir 
 John Adye wrote home, " The flour from these ships (the 
 " * Osprey ' and * Empusa ') is utterly destroyed ; the greater 
 *' portion of it has arrived in hard, solid blocks, the whole con- 
 " tents of the sack being in many cases an unbroken lump." 
 Other witnesses stated that when the sacks were pulled off, in 
 many cases the flour remained standing like a solid pillar of 
 plaster of Paris. An attempt was made by breaking up and 
 sifting to utilize the flour, but the bread was uneatable, and 
 gave rise to many bitter recriminations recorded in the report of 
 Lord Morley's Committee, and the flour was ultimately sold for 
 making starch. Not till October 10th were sacks of the flour 
 ordered home for analysis, and when in March, 1883, they were 
 submitted for examination to Sir F. Abel, the bulk samples on 
 which the purchases had been made '' were not forthcoming," 
 and the minute sample of the first consignment which had been 
 lying about in the War Office, was in such a state that that 
 chemist refused to examine it. 
 
 That flour, properly selected and properly packed, can with- 
 stand the Egyptian climate was shown by the fact that 
 Australian and Navy flour sent out in September remained 
 perfectly good in February. 
 
 Hay. — Among the compressed hay purchased for the 
 expedition was 2372 tons, bought at a cost of d£20,592 from 
 Mr. Cussans, an army contractor in Liverpool. The hay was 
 purchased by that gentleman from upwards of 100 sources, so 
 that its quality naturally varied, but it was bought as " best 
 upland meadow hay," 1099 tons of this hay was sent out for 
 the use of English horses. The Commissary-General of the 
 expedition stated that he never saw a truss of this brand that 
 was not more or less damaged. His successor in Egypt said 
 that hundreds of the bales were filled with outside wrappers of
 
 6 
 
 hav, and that he saw issued bales containing pieces of brick, 
 stones, rubbish, and refuse straw rolled up into hard lumps. 
 The landing officer at Ismailia stated that he opened about 100 
 bale^ of the same hay per the " Osmanli," and found in many 
 of them lumps of whitish clay and roots weighing as much as a 
 pound and a half, and that " in some of the trusses the hay 
 " appeared to be made of old twisted ropes from the other 
 " trusses." Captain Lea stated, " it was the worst quality he 
 ** ever saw in his life." He thought it must have been grown 
 on low, marshy soil and flooded, as it contained sand and clay. 
 The principal veterinary surgeon described it as of "the most infa- 
 " mous quality," and composed in large part of " the wiry, pliable 
 " sort of hay used at home for packing china in hampers." And so 
 on. There was a consensus of evidence that it was not best 
 upland meadow hay, but contained rushes and lowland grasses. 
 Another 526 tons of this hay were sent out to Egypt for the use 
 of the Indian contingent. Complaints were received of its 
 quality, and when 150 tons of it which remained on hand at the 
 termination of operations was examined, with a view to being 
 taken over by the British Government, it was refused as being 
 " water meadow hay of a very inferior description." A third por- 
 tion of this hay was supplied for use in transports, and there were 
 complaints about it too. Another 556 tons, stored in Liverpool, 
 was on November 29th condemned by a Special Board as '* of 
 " inferior qualit}'', of lowland and water meadow growth, and 
 " deficient in feeding properties for troop-horses." This batch 
 was sold for £2 lis. 6d. per ton, realising a loss of .£3058, 
 besides cost of storage. In consequence of the capture of Cairo, 
 Mr. Cussans's last contract was cancelled and he received com- 
 pensation to the extent of .£1564. In adjusting this compen- 
 sation the Director of Contracts, according to his own statement, 
 " complimented Mr. Cussans on the way in which he had dt)ne 
 " his work, and said that they were all exceedingly obliged to 
 " him for the manner in which he had met the ser\'ice." Mr. 
 Cussans told us that he had no reason to believe that his hav
 
 had caused any dissatisf atioii -until he read in the newspapers the 
 statements made regarding it by witnesses before our committee. 
 So far as he was concerned he seems to have had no reason to 
 complain, for he confessed to a profit of about 30s. a ton (or 
 d£3500 on the contract), besides his ^£1500 of compensation; he 
 had been complimented by the Director of Contracts, and up to 
 the end of June last he enjoyed army contracts averaging ^1200 
 per month. 
 
 Supplies. — On behalf of the Office of Supplies and Transport, 
 it was urged that 50 separate stores were shipped by that depart- 
 ment, and only two proved bad. As a fact, 45 of the 50 were 
 supplied by the Admiralty, bought on the faith of some particular 
 trade mark or brand, or on aj^proval by the Medical Department. 
 Flour, hay, potatoes, oats and cheese, alone were purchased in the 
 open market on the sole responsibility of the Supply Department. 
 The flour and hay I have disposed of. The potatoes were apparent- 
 ly all right, but their total value was only =£174. There is a 
 dispute about the quality of the oats, and no samples were forth- 
 coming to decide the question, and the cheese, though good, did 
 not reach the troops till after they were in Cairo. 
 
 The Iron Eation. — One topic constantly coming before 
 the Committee was the Iron Ration. This, Colonel Tulloch 
 explained, was the name given by the Germans to the celebrated 
 erhswurst, or pea-soup sausage ration, which each G-erman 
 soldier is compelled to carry, which he is only permitted to 
 consume on an emergency and by order of a superior officer, 
 and which if he makes away with without permission he is 
 liable to be shot. Tinned erbsiourst and tinned tongues were 
 sent out to Egypt as an iron ration. They did not arrive till 
 September 8th, then they were carried on to Suez, and they were 
 not available for issue till we got to Cairo. Finally, of 9300 lbs. 
 of erbswitrst sent out only 4445 lbs. arrived fit for use, the
 
 8 
 
 other 4855 lbs., owing to faulty packing, being so damaged in 
 transit that they had to be condemned. 
 
 The Meat Contract. — Of the contracts submitted to the 
 Committee one of the clearest and most business-like was for 
 the supply of fresh meat to the Army. It was for a minimum 
 amount of 140,000 lbs. of meat per week, and was terminable at 
 any time after the 29th November, 1882, on a month's notice. 
 About the 19th September the G-eneral in Egypt, apparently 
 under a misapprehension on this point, ordered further supplies 
 to be stopped. On being informed of this, the Acting Surveyor- 
 General of Ordnance, by whose department the contract had 
 been made, instead of telegraphing back that the contract was 
 binding until November 29th, according to the Director of 
 Contracts " thought that he could do nothing but support the 
 decision of the General on the spot." The contractor was 
 written "to and lawyers called in, and finally the contract was 
 allowed to run on considerably beyond the date at which it was 
 terminable, but the result of the interruption was a large claim 
 on the part of the contractor, which wa,s not settled when the 
 Committee rose. The meat delivered under the contract is 
 described as good, though dear. 
 
 A Phantom Piee. — In organizing the campaign the 
 main reliance for transport on the line of communication had 
 been placed on the railway. Arabi might destroy the road, but 
 it would be easy to repair it, and rails, engines, and plant were 
 among the equipment sent out. It was known that the facilities 
 for landing at Ismailia were wretched, and a wooden pier 
 designed to be erected on sunk barges was constructed at Wool- 
 wich. It carried rails for through connection with the railway, 
 and was furnished with steam cranes and a big shear for lifting 
 heavy weights. Colonel Salmond, E.E., was ordered to inspect 
 it at Woolwich, and then to proceed to Ismailia to erect it. He 
 arrived at Ismailia per the " Viking," on August 21st, the day
 
 after the first troops landed, but the pier and appliances were 
 sent out by three other vessels, the last two of which reached 
 that port 15 and 18 days later respectively. By that time it 
 was too late. Other arrangements had been made ; the pier 
 was not erected, the cranes were not unloaded, and as for the big 
 shear one of its legs had been left behind. 
 
 Eailway Corps of Eoyal Engineers. — To repair and 
 utilize the railway a Eailway Corps of Engineers had 
 been organized in England. It was commanded by Colonel 
 Wallace, E.E., an officer of large railway experience. Some of 
 the other officers and men composing it seem to have possessed 
 special knowledge of different departments of railway work, but 
 the majority knew practically nothing beyond what they were 
 able to pick up in the course of a ten days' run on the London, 
 Chatham and Dover, and South-Eastern Eailways. Colonel 
 Wallace asked for 200 officers and men, but so many not being 
 available, he only got 100. He asked to have them supple- 
 mented by a corps of skilled civilians, but this was refused. 
 Colonel Wallace arrived at Ismailia with the first troops. The 
 most pressing work was the construction of a railway of 
 1000 yards between the railway station and the central landing 
 jetty. Five miles of rails had been sent out from England, but 
 as they did not arrive for several days afterwards, Colonel 
 Wallace had to seize a lot of light and faulty rails, which he 
 found lying in a depot of the Canal Company. The Eailway 
 Corps did not land till the 24th, so he was obliged to wait 
 many hours before he could get a fatigue party. The rails 
 being laid down. Colonel Wallace was ordered off to Suez, and 
 Colonel Salmond took up the work for two days, when the 
 Eailway Corps at length appeared. Meanwhile the aid of a 
 civilian contractor had been called in, and the railway was com- 
 pleted on the 27th. This 1000 yards of railway, completed 
 with the aid of a civilian contractor and civilian labour, took 
 five days to construct, or at the rate of 200 yards a day. The
 
 10 
 
 Railway Company of Engineers did not land till three days 
 after it liad been commenced, and it was still later before the 
 rails wMch they brought with them were available. Finally, 
 owing to defective material and construction, the railway was so 
 badly laid that not even the lightest engine could ever run 
 upon it, and all the traffic had to be worked by horses and 
 mules. 
 
 The Telegraph Corps. — " With a single line," said 
 Sir John Adye, " it is almost impossible to work without a 
 " telegraph." In order to be prepared for emergencies Great 
 Britain has for many years past kept up a special telegraph 
 corps of Eoyal Engineers. A company of this corps was 
 despatched to Egypt, but did not arrive till August 28th. 
 Meanwhile the engagements of El Magfar and Mashamah had 
 been fought, and on the day of the arrival of the corps at Ismailia 
 our troops at Kassassin sustained the most serious attack made 
 upon them during the war. Penduig the arrival of the telegraph 
 corps, Colonel Salmond had got together a few men from the 
 Engineers who understood something about telegraphy, and he 
 had discovered an Arab platelayer who he thought knew how to 
 solder wires and " make earth." " I took hold of a piece of 
 " copper and a piece of wire," said Colonel Salmond in his evi- 
 dence, " and pointed to the ground. He understood what was 
 " meant. I made him make a joint then and there, and I saw 
 *' that he understood what I meant." The Arab was sent 
 forward, and he repaired the wires which the Egyptians had 
 cut. Perfection could hardly be expected of a service so roughly 
 improvised, and the Principal Medical Officer complained that 
 when he sent down batches of sick and telegraphed their despatch 
 they frequently arrived before the telegrams, greatly to the dis- 
 turbance of his arrangements. 
 
 Locomotive Engines. — Four small engines were pur- 
 chased, in England, for the use of the expedition. They did
 
 11 
 
 not, however, arrive till a fortnight after the troops landed at 
 Ismailia. Others were purchased and requisitioned at Alexan- 
 dria, and went to Ismailia with the troops. The Admiralty 
 vessel " Eecovery," fitted with a crane to lift heavy weights, had 
 been arranged for to assist in landing these engines and other 
 weighty material, but she did not arrive for 11 days afterwards. 
 By what Colonel Wallace described as " a piece of great luck," 
 the line from Nefiche to Suez had been left open, and the engines 
 were sent on there. At Suez an antiquated floating derrick, worked 
 by belting instead of gearing, was secured. The small engines were 
 got out easily enough, but with the full-sized ones it was dangerous 
 work. The naval officer who conducted the operation described 
 it thus : — "Those two last engines were a heavy lift, and we had 
 " to screw the safety-valve of the crane's boiler before we could 
 '* stir them. The Arab stoker bolted when he saw the steam 
 " pressure go above 40 lbs., but we got it up to 52 with a trusty 
 ** English stoker, and out came the engines, * * * * I 
 *' think the man who sits on a safety-valve, and knows his own 
 " danger, desei'ves the Victoria Cross." With the third big 
 engine the crane broke down. « 
 
 Eegimental Teanspoet. — Each regiment on active ser- 
 vice is supposed to constitute a complete unit, and embraces 
 its own transport. The Egyptian is said to have been the first 
 campaign in which the regiments embarked with their regimental 
 transport generally complete. On the advance to El Magf ar, eight 
 miles from Ismailia, on August 24th, regimental transport was the 
 only transport relied on, for none of the Department transport had 
 disembarked, except a few horses and mules intended for the 
 medical services, but actually employed in dragging trucks on 
 the railway. None of the auxiliary transport had arrived, and 
 the canal (on which there were only a few native fruit boats 
 employed in supplying a detachment of troops at Nefiche) 
 had been ordered to be kept shut for fear of wasting 
 the precious water. Following the troops. Colonel Harrison, 
 
 ? 2
 
 12 
 
 Senior Staff Officer on the Line of Comimmication, found 
 that the regimental transport which was to have carried 
 the supplies, *' could not get along through the sand, and that 
 *' provisions and stores of all sorts were scattered along the road 
 " to lighten men and horses." " It was evident that if the 
 " troops were to maintain their position supplies must be sent 
 " up at once." The railway had been cut in two places, but 
 Colonel Harrison discovered that the Egyptians had dammed the 
 canal at El Magf ar, and thus afforded an unexpected deliverance 
 from the difficulty. After consultation with Lord Wolseley 
 Colonel Harrison galloped back to Ismailia, and, after consider- 
 able parley, got the Admiral to open the canal and place boats 
 on it, and so sent on provisions. This is an example of the 
 breakdown of the regimental transport at a most critical 
 juncture. The General's order was that three and a half 
 days' food should be carried with the advance, and Colonel 
 Harrison stated that on the faith of that order his department 
 " did not expect to have to send them anything for three days at 
 least." Accordingto Deputy Assistant Commissary- Q-eneral Baker 
 two days' provisions were placed in the regimental transport carts, 
 but when on the morning of the 25th the troops halted at 
 Mahuta, ten miles distant from Ismailia, the transport did not 
 come up till next day, and some was two days before it 
 rejoined the regiments. "The same thing," he added, *' more 
 *' or less happened on every occasion when reserve rations had to 
 *' be carried by the regimental transport." 
 
 The Departmental Teansport. — The Departmental or 
 Divisional Transport required to make each division a unit should 
 have marched along with it. 
 
 The first division landed on August 21st and 22nd. It was 
 not joined by any of its divisional transport till the 28th. The 
 cavalry division landed on August 22nd, and was not joined by 
 any of its divisional transport till September 4th. The second 
 division, which did not leave Ismailia till well on in September,
 
 was the only division wliicli marched with its divisional 
 transport. 
 
 The establishment of drivers and horses employed in the 
 departmental transport, kept as low as possible in time of 
 peace, is augmented in time of war. The men supplied for the 
 I)urpose, in the ca§e of the Egyptian campaign, were to a large 
 extent drawn from the infantry reserve, and militia recruits, 
 and knew nothing of riding or of horses. Captain Lea, 
 describing the march of his company from Woolwich to the 
 Albert Docks, stated that several of the men had to be put 
 upon the horses before they left with them, and several fell off 
 on the march, but happily they had no serious accident. The 
 heavy waggons sent out from England were useless, except in 
 towns. 
 
 Auxiliary Transport.— This was intended to consist 
 of 3600 pack mules, 1500 drivers, and 150 headmen. In order 
 to ensure that this number should be available arrangements 
 were made for the purchase of 3800 mules, and^ 800 more 
 belonging to Government in Natal were ordered to Egypt, 
 Besides these, 1000 extra were ordered later to make good 
 casualties. Altogether 5109 mules were bought at a cost of 
 o£131,290, exclusive, except in one instance, of freight, and 657 
 more were shipped at Natal. Of these 5766 animals only 2225 
 landed in Egypt before Tel-el-Kebir, but of that 2225, 758, part 
 of two lots purchased at Beyrout and Smyrna, were unfit for 
 work, and 246 were required to complete regimental and 
 divisional transport. Instead, therefore, of the 3600 animals 
 intended for auxiliary transport, only 1221 were ever available 
 for the purpose. Of these the first lot (about 300) did not 
 arrive at Ismailia till nine days after the troops had landed. 
 
 Intention and Eealization. — Up to the time when 
 the railway to the jetty was complete, and the first engine ran, a 
 period during which the whole trafiic had to be worked by horses
 
 14 
 
 and mules, only 255 horses and 123 mules, or 378 animals instead 
 of 4700, tlie establishment laid down for departmental and 
 auxiliary transport, had landed. Three days later, at the date 
 of the first through train to Kassassin, only 584 animals had 
 landed. All these animals belonged to the departmental 
 transport. Evidence was given that the 3600 auxiliary trans- 
 port animals were estimated for, not for the purpose of for- 
 warding supplies along the line of communication, but for dis- 
 tribution from the different depots, and as the first batch of 
 150 of these animals only left Ismailia on September 3rd, a 
 fortnight after the troops had landed, the public may judge 
 how far the coincidence of realization and intention justified 
 the boast of an " administrative success." 
 
 Government Mules at Natal. — The British Government 
 had between 1300 and 1400 mules on hand at Natal, and 
 were selling them off to reduce the Natal establishment to its 
 peace footing of 500. On July 5th, orders were telegraphed to 
 stop sales, with the view of utilizing the animals in Egypt. 
 Evidence was given that steamers for their transport could 
 easily have been chartered and fitted out at Durban, and that 
 that would have been the usual course. Instead of apj)lying to 
 their naval agent at Natal, the Admiralty, through a broker, entered 
 into negotiations with the "NottingHill," a vessel lying at Algoa 
 Eay laden with wool, wasted several days waiting for her to 
 arrange to get rid of her cargo, then chartered her at the rate 
 of d£4021 per month, paid her ^£3000 besides for expenses of 
 getting rid of cargo, and allowed her a weet, or close on another 
 dSlOOO, to discharge cargo and proceed to the Admiralty establish- 
 ment at Simon's Bay to refit. There she was refitted for mules,the 
 mangers being in many cases fixed up where the mules' tails were 
 to be. So much time was lost that instead of taking in forage 
 purchased for the purpose at Durban, where it would have had to 
 be embarked in lighters, she went to Cape Town for a fresh lot. 
 Small-pox was raging there, and when she got to Durban she
 
 15 
 
 was put into quarantine and further delay incurred. Finally 
 she loaded her mules, and on September 5th sailed for Egypt. 
 Small-pox broke out on the voyage, and she arrived at Aden, 
 five days from Suez, on September 21st, or eight days after 
 Tel-el-Kebir. At Aden she was intercepted and sent on to 
 Bombay, where her mules were sold to the Indian Grovemment 
 at prices ranging from £25 to ^£27 10s. per head. That Grovern- 
 ment seem to have driven anything but a hard bargain, as the 
 Secretary of State for War had authorized the sale of the 
 animals to them at £15 per head. But even the .£17,000 or 
 c£18,G00 paid by the Indian Treasury left John Bull but little 
 to congratulate himself on, for he had to pay d£13,159 for hire 
 of the " Netting Hill," besides cost of fitting out, forage, and 
 I know not how many thousand pounds for pay and maintenance 
 to Bombay and back of 212 drivers and 16 conductors hired for 
 six months at wages ranging from 4s. 6d. to 12s. 6d. per day. 
 
 The Beyrout and Smyrna Mules. — When it was resolved 
 to purchase mules in Ottoman territory on the Levant, 
 the Commissary-General at head- quarters, accompanied by the 
 Director of Supplies and Transport, waited upon the Surveyor- 
 General of Ordnance (Sir John Adye) to object on account, 
 amongst other reasons, of the danger of interference by the 
 Turkish Government. The objection was, however, overruled, 
 and on July 22nd the order was given to purchase. Seven 
 hundred mules were bought at Smyrna and 800 at Beyrout, at a 
 cost of .£36,950, including freight of the Smyrna lot to Port 
 Said. Of the Beyrout lot we have little information. They 
 were bought on a contract made with a Mr. Christian by the 
 General Ofiicer in Cyprus. The Porte laid an embargo on their 
 exportation, which was removed on September 4th. On Sep- 
 tember 9th, 498 of them were disembarked at Ismailia from the 
 " Assyrian Monarch," and on the 11th, a board appointed to 
 inspect them pronounced 344 unfit for immediate use. The rest 
 were disembarked on the 13th and 15th, by which time Tel-el- 
 Kebir had fallen.
 
 16 
 
 A Chapter of Accidents. — Major Carre was the officer sent 
 out to purchase the Smyrna mules, and a full history of his 
 misadventures is contained in a letter from himself, which 
 was laid before the Committee. He purchased a number of animals 
 which the veterinary sent out to advise him advised him to reject. 
 He accepted the offer of a room in the contractor's country 
 house, and left the branding irons in the charge of the con- 
 tractor's men. After considerable trouble from the Turkish 
 authorities, on August 23rd the embargo on the exportation of 
 the mules was removed. The embargo on the shipment of 
 muleteers continued, but Major Carre, under the circumstances, 
 " considered himself justified in disregarding a published order 
 " of the Sultan's, and secretly engaged men at Smyrna, who 
 ** were Turkish subjects, to accompany the mules, and placed 
 " them on board the hired ships * Pelayo ' and * Camerata.' " 
 These vessels lay within a mile and a half of the pier, and were 
 consequently in Turkish waters. The mules were embarked in 
 lighters by the contractor. On the 28th, when the shipment 
 commenced, " certain sums of money were paid to the Turkish 
 " authorities to allow the embarkation to proceed without 
 " molestation.'* On the following day there was some dispute, 
 and a company of soldiers in charge of an officer, who said he 
 was acting under orders, came upon the scene and arrested 
 some muleteers who were in the lighters. The officer wished 
 to search the vessels for Turkish subjects. This Major Carre 
 refused to allow, and, after some difficulty, persuaded him to 
 return with his prisoners to the Grovernor, whereupon, leaving 
 89 mules in the hands of the contractor, Major Carre at once 
 ordered the captains of the vessels to sail. Forage for the 
 mules had been previously embarked, but all the bran had 
 been placed on board one vessel and all the barley on 
 the other. The natives embarked turned out mutinous, 
 and it was with difficulty the mules were watered and 
 fed. Arrived at Port Said, the captains of the vessels re- 
 fused without a large extra payment to go on to Ismailia,
 
 17 
 
 and tlie mules were transhipped on board the ''Viking." 
 The muleteers continued mutinous, refused to work, and 
 attempted to escape by swimming ashore, and a certain number 
 of them got away. A naval guard was put on board, and boats 
 cruised round the ship by night and day. On the 6th and 7th 
 Se^Dtember the mules were disembarked at Ismailia. A lot of 
 them were thrown into the water to swim ashore, and the number 
 received was thirteen short of that tallied on board the " Viking " 
 at Port Said. Of the 602 landed the principal veterinary 
 surgeon reported only 186 fit for duty, and on September 
 11th (two days before Tel-el-Kebir) a board of officers 
 pronounced 414 unfit for immediate work. Sore backs, 
 wounds, catarrh and old age (18 to 25 years) are mentioned 
 as the principal causes of unfitness. As the mules stood 
 in the depot at Smyrna Major Carre declares them to have 
 been " as good a lot of transport mules as he had ever seen." He 
 can only account for the state in which they were landed at 
 Ismailia by the fact that they " were either suffering from the 
 " journey or else that the Turkish and Greek servants who 
 " brought the mules from the depot to the pier surreptitiously 
 *' changed the good ones for those rejected. He cannot state 
 *' that this was done, but his suspicions were raised when he heard 
 " some time after the Committee had assembled at Ismailia 
 " that mules had been found without brands on the feet, whilst 
 " every mule he passed was branded." 
 
 The opinion of Colonel Owen Lanyon, Commandant at the 
 Base, on the Beyrout and Smyrna consignments, is con- 
 tained in a minute dated September 12th, 1882, which 
 was laid before the Committee. — "It seems to me a very 
 " serious matter," he wrote, "that out of 1100 mules 
 " purchased for immediate use there should be 758 unfit for 
 " work when landed * * * We cannot sell them here, and 
 " they would not be worth the expense of sending to another 
 " market. Meanwhile they are a great expense and trouble to 
 *' the Government."
 
 18 
 
 As will be observed, this was written two days before the 
 fall of Cairo brought the war to the close. 
 
 Mules in British Territory. — Assistant Commissary- 
 General Elmes, who had charge of the Government depot of 
 mules at Natal before referred to, stated that besides 876 mules 
 above the number required to keep up his establishment, in 
 hand when the order was given to stop sales, he could easily 
 have bought 1000 more in that colony, and that there was always 
 plenty of steam transport available at or near Durban, and 
 facilities on the spot for fitting it up. 
 
 On July 26th enquiries were made at the request of Lord 
 "Wolseley as to whether the Indian Government could despatch 
 to Egypt 1500 efiicient mules or ponies, fully equipped, with 
 drivers and officers. On July 29th a reply was received from the 
 Viceroy that 1000 mules, with equipment and establishment, 
 could be got off after the Indian contingent. That contingent 
 arrived at Suez on August 22nd, but on August 10th a tele- 
 gram had been sent out stating that the mules were not wanted. 
 
 Drivers. — It was intended that 1500 drivers and 150 
 headmen, interpreters, and artificers should be provided for 
 the auxiliary transport. As a matter of fact, only 576 were 
 brought to Egypt. It was in the first place intended to have 
 got drivers from the Punjaub, but in consequence of the obvious 
 importance of obtaining men to whose language the mules 
 were accustomed, that idea was given up, and it was resolved to 
 hire drivers in the countries in which the animals were pur- 
 chased. Of the 576 drivers who arrived, some 200 were hired 
 in Cyprus. Orders had been given that they were not to be 
 paid more than 2s. per day, a sum which offered no inducement 
 to natives to engage. This difficulty, however, the officer who 
 hired them got over by promising 3s. from the date of embarka- 
 tion. At first they were not allowed rations, but as it was 
 found that without rations they could not be kept from desert-
 
 19 
 
 ing, a bread ration was finally sanctioned. The officer who 
 hired them understood that he was authorized to promise them 
 clothing, and they were engaged on this footing. It turned out 
 that clothing, though specially asked for by the Commissary- 
 General, had been disallowed by the Surveyor-G-eneral of 
 Ordnance (Sir John Adye), who, however, sanctioned the issue 
 of badges showing that the men belonged to our army. The 
 badges never arrived. In Egypt all other attempts to obtain 
 the promised clothing having failed, the men rebelled, and 
 sitting down refused to march through the burning sand unless 
 boots were supplied to them. This argument j)revailed, and 
 boots were issued. 
 
 When the Cyprus drivers landed at Ismailia there was 
 a great demand for labour. Some commissariat officers 
 were giving labourers as much as 6s. and 7s. a day, and the 
 drivers having nothing to distinguish them occasioned a great 
 deal of trouble by deserting to the more lucrative employment. 
 Finally, a civilian contractor, offering still higher wages — 8s. or 
 10s. a day — they deserted to him, and there was further trouble 
 in identifying and recovering them. 
 
 Major Carre, who bought the mules in Smyrna, contracted 
 with Messrs. Gilchrist, Walker, and Co., of Constantinople, for 
 the hire of 366 Montenegrin muleteers and headmen. The 
 Turkish Government forbade their embarkation, and im- 
 prisoned them. We paid them an indemnity of d£835, and 
 there the transaction ended. 
 
 Drivers were hired in Malta. Notwithstanding the decision 
 of the Surveyor-General not to allow uniform, they were pro- 
 vided with clothing and sandals by direction of the military 
 authorities at home, and the only objection stated with regard 
 to them was that they knew nothing about mules. 
 
 Brivees feom British Dependencies. — A batch of 212 
 men was sent from Natal with the mules shipped from that 
 colony, but arrived late, went on to Bombay, and were sent
 
 20 
 
 back. They were hired locally, and received a six months' 
 engagement at 4s. 6d. to 5s. per day besides clothing. 
 
 As I have said, it was originally intended to hire drivers in 
 India, but that idea, for reasons before stated, was abandoned. 
 Subsequently the original intention Avas reverted to, and on 
 August 10th orders were sent out for the hire of 500 drivers 
 for service with the British Auxiliary Transport. They were 
 organized and sent off, but arrived after the war was over. 
 Their pay was a little over 10 rupees a month. 
 
 Useless Pack Saddles. — It had been arranged that 
 the pack saddles carried by the mules purchased for the 
 auxiliary transport should be bought along with them, so that 
 each mule should land with its equipment fitted and complete. 
 This arrangement was departed from, but between 1500 and 
 1600 Turkish and Syrian pack saddles purchased at £1 a-piece 
 were landed at Ismailia. The mode of fastening on the loads 
 being somewhat complicated they required skilled muleteers to 
 load them, and these being wanting the saddles were useless. 
 Some were carried from the ships and piled in heaj)S in the 
 camp, but were never used, and others were unloaded and sent 
 direct into store. Luckily, English pack saddles enough for the 
 mules received had been sent out from home. 
 
 Camels. — In the earlier arrangements for the campaign, 
 it was proposed to purchase camels for transport purposes at 
 Cyprus and Beyrout. Various witnesses gave evidence, that 
 camels would have been much preferable to mules in a country 
 like Egypt. Enormous numbers of camels were procured in 
 India for the Afghan War, and there are considerable numbers 
 of them in Cyprus, but these places were not resorted to. On 
 July 27, Admiral Hoskins was instructed to take steps for 
 hiring what camel transport could be hired in the neighbour- 
 hood of the Suez Canal. He at once reported that till the troops 
 arrived, the Bedouins were afraid to take service. Professor
 
 21 
 
 Palmer and Captain Gill were also sent on that mission to jnir- 
 chase camels from the Bedouins in which they lost their lives, 
 and on September 1st, Lord Wolselej telegrajjhed home from 
 Ismailia as follows : — " An army operating from this base could 
 " only be fed by a railway, a canal, or a host of camels, owing 
 " to the absence of roads and the great depth of sand. The 
 " obstruction to canal and railway caused by the enemy was 
 " considerable. Camels can only be obtained from Bedouins, 
 *' the assistance of some of whom I hope to secure shortly." 
 
 Meanwhile, on August 24th, Colonel TuUoch, of the Intelli- 
 gence Department, submitted an offer of 300 camels from a 
 Bedouin at Kantara, forty miles up the canal, and pointed out 
 that there were 200 Egyptian prisoners at Port Said, who were 
 all fellaheen, and quite understood camel driving. The offer 
 was refused, as Sir John Adye had decided that camels might be 
 hired, so that the services of their owners as drivers might be 
 secured, but must not be purchased. Colonel Tulloch, who cm- 
 ployed Egyptian prisoners as drivers for some camels which he 
 bought, found them faithful and trustworthy, dreading dismissal 
 to Arabi more than anything else. On August 25th another 
 offer of 1000 camels, at £l(j a head, was received from Syria 
 through Colonel Tulloch, but it, too, was refused for the same 
 reason. The first consignment of mules for auxiliary transport 
 was not landed for about a week afterwards. 
 
 Laboueeks. — Before starting for Egypt, the Commissary- 
 G-eneral with the expedition asked for 400 labourers to assist in 
 iinloading ships and other work in Egypt. The Surveyor- 
 General " did not altogether decline, but said that he would 
 " rather wait till they got out, till it was seen what would be 
 " required." Nevertheless, on July 26th, the Adjutant-General 
 telegraphed to Malta asking whether 300 labourers could be 
 hired there, and a reply was received that a limited number 
 might be engaged at 8s. a day, and recommending advertise- 
 ment. Apparently nothing further was done. Subsequently 
 
 D
 
 22 
 
 enquiries were made as to the possibility of hiring labourers at 
 Trieste. On August 12th the G-eneral at Alexandria telegraphed 
 asking result of action about labourers, and on the 14th he was 
 advised by wire that labourers were not procuralile at Malta, 
 and that no reply had been received from Trieste. 
 
 Labour at Ismailia. — ^Various officers gave evidence 
 as to the great scarcity of labour. The. majority spoke in 
 favour of civilian labour, objecting to military, on the ground 
 that fatigue parties are difficult to procure and not being paid 
 dislike the duty, and that they are changed so frequently that 
 they have no time to become acquainted with the work required 
 of them. As a matter of fact, labourers on the spot commanded 
 their own terms. Colonel Wallace, Director of Railways, 
 described his experience rather amusingly. He had " gangs of 
 " all sorts of scoundrels doing j)latelaying and that sort of 
 " work." Some of them he had brought from Alexandria, and 
 *' others came in from day to day to Ismailia to take service under 
 " three or four different officers, and try to put in an appearance 
 *' at pay time with each of them." " He used to consider himself 
 *' lucky when he could get them at 6s. per day, then the price 
 " went up to 10s., and he was told that the Commissariat men 
 *' and his fellows had all disappeared except one gang. He 
 " managed to keep some thirty or forty of these men, and they 
 *' used to come to him periodically for an increase of jDay, 
 "saying that the other departments were paying so much they 
 *' could not stop." Colonel Wallace had to pay as much as 8s. 
 a-day. Ultimately, after Cairo had been occupied, on September 
 16tli 320 Somah labourers arrived from Aden. 
 
 Faeriers. — Although the establishment of regimental 
 transport for each regiment included 49 animals, and the 
 auxiliary transport was to have consisted of 3600 animals, no 
 provision was made for shoeing them. An order had been 
 given that a certain number of artificers in each infantry regi-
 
 23 
 
 niciit sliould be instructed in shoeing, but it appeared that this 
 was a dead letter. Before starting for Egypt the Principal 
 Veterinary Surgeon of the expedition was given to understand 
 that a force of farriers would be sent out for the animals of the 
 auxiliary transport, but they never arrived, and the departmental 
 transport, having only its peace establishment of farriers, could 
 do nothing to assist. 
 
 Forge Carts. — In former wars, according to the Prin- 
 cipal Veterinary Surgeon of the expedition, it was customary for 
 coal and iron to be supplied to the farriers, who were required 
 to make horseshoes in the field. For this j^urpose they were 
 supplied with heavy forge carts which it required six horses to 
 draw along good roads. In Egypt, instead of adopting this 
 system, ready-made horseshoes were supplied. But the forge 
 carts were sent out nevertheless. In Egypt twelve horses had 
 to be harnessed to them ; but even that number could not get 
 them along, and finally they were sent up by railway. Light, 
 portable forges carried on a mule's back, according to the 
 Principal Veterinary Surgeon, would have answered every 
 purpose, but none were available. 
 
 Medical Transport. — "When the war was being arranged 
 for, a number of miiles which had been trained to carrv 
 cacolets or litters for the ambulance service, were taken 
 to assist in making up regimental transport. They were replaced 
 by untrained animals from the north of Spain. The ambulance 
 animals thus recruited, and consisting of 79 horses and 123 mules^ 
 landed at Ismaiha two days before any others and were at once ap- 
 T>ropriated for the all-important work of dragging trucks on the 
 railway. In anticipation of the battle of El Magfar on August 
 25th, Sir James Hanbury, the principal medical officer, applied for 
 other mules and got 1 5. They were untrained animals, and before 
 applying them to the purpose of carrying the wounded. Sir James 
 ordered a transport driver to mount one of them. " He shot him
 
 24 
 
 " over his head like a catapult." Sir James did not allow any 
 of the wounded to be placed upon those mules. Even stretchers 
 were not available on that occasion, for the eight stretchers per 
 regiment allowed were carried by the regimental transport, stuck 
 far behind in the sand. 
 
 The country j)aid £59,717 for hire and other charges 
 of the hospital and transport ship, "Carthage," besides ex- 
 penses of fitting her out as a hospital. Her pay commenced 
 on July 25th, and was at the rate of over £7500 per 
 month, or about ^250 per day. She was fitted out for 
 82 sick, 146 convalescents, and 20 officers in cabins. It did 
 not transpire how long it took to fit her out, but she arrived 
 at Malta on August 17th, and remained there twenty-six hours 
 coaling. She then proceeded to Alexandria, arriving after the 
 expedition had sailed, and remained there forty hours, and did 
 not arrive at Ismailia till the 25tli. She had three field 
 hospitals on board, but she was not unloaded till the 27tli or 
 28th, as Sir James Hanbury explained, " because there was no 
 " transx3ort." I need not recapitulate Sir James Hanbury's 
 tale. It may be summed up in two sentences — inability to move 
 forward field hospitals for want of transport, and army 
 hospital corps taken away from their proper duties to remedy 
 as far as they could the want of transport and labour. 
 
 Roundabout Routes. — The Household Cavalry, stationed in 
 London, embarked for Egypt at the Albert Docks, directly op- 
 posite Woolwich, from which place they drew their equipment. 
 The easiest mode of delivering it would have been to send it across 
 the river and place it on board the vessels in which they were to 
 go out. At first they were informed that this would be done, 
 but at the last moment they received notice that their equip- 
 ment would be handed to them in London. It was accordingly 
 sent up to London from Woolwich, and they had to cart it back 
 again on the other side of the river to the Albert Docks. 
 Cai)tain Knocker, Deputy Assistant Commissary-G-eneral,
 
 25 
 
 detailed a very similar exj^erience. The " Dacca/' which took 
 out part of his Commissariat Company, sailed from the Albert 
 Docks. Their stores and equipments were drawn from Wool- 
 wich. Instead, however, of these being sent across the river 
 and embarked at the Albert Docks, they were sent down to 
 Portsmouth and there put on board the *' Dacca." 
 
 Candles for Oil Lamps. — In the departmental report 
 of Commissary-General Sir Edward Morris, drawn up at the 
 end of the war, there occurred this paragraph : — 
 
 *' Candles are very preferable to oil for general purposes of 
 " lighting, but the equipment of lamps and lanterns should be 
 " allowed to suit. If you issue to a man an oil lamp he 
 " naturally expects to receive the oil." 
 
 Asked as to the meaning of this paragraph. Sir Edward 
 stated that one department had sent out the candles and another 
 the oil lamps. The following day the Assistant-Director of 
 Supplies brought up a lantern and showed how, by taking out 
 the mechanism which supported the wick, a candle could be fitted 
 into it. Sir Edward Morris replied that the lamp produced 
 was a distinguishing lantern, used as a sign at the tents of 
 general officers, and that he referred to the globular 
 brass lamps issued to the troops. On a later day a store- 
 keeper from Woolwich was brought up to exhibit the lamp 
 referred to, and demonstrate the frivolous nature of the ob- 
 jection. He showed how by cutting a piece out of one side of the 
 bottom of a candle and removing the holder of the wick of the 
 lamp, the candle could be fixed in the oil reservoir. The defence 
 appeared to be complete, when one of the members of the Com- 
 mittee suggested that the candle should be lighted and the 
 lamp put together. It was then found that the flame and all 
 but a couple of inches of the candle were swallowed up in the 
 brass chimney with which the glass globe of the lamp was 
 surmounted. The candle, emitting a dense smoke, burned within 
 the chimney about two hours before any of its flame was visible,
 
 26 
 
 and by the time the light became fully disclosed only about an 
 inch of candle remained. These lamps were intended for the 
 use of men engaged in outdoor work at night. 
 
 Branding Irons. — It was intended to establish a mule 
 depot at Cyprus, and the Commissary-G-eneral, before the 
 departure of the officer who was to take charge of the depot, 
 sent in a demand for branding irons to the Ordnance Depart- 
 ment, informing them that a certain officer at Woolwich could 
 show them exactly what was wanted. That officer was not 
 referred to, and, no branding irons being forthcoming, the 
 officer sent to Cyprus got them made by his farrier. The 
 correspondence on the subject was not, however, lost sight of, 
 and this year, while the Committee was sitting, patterns of 
 branding irons were submitted by the Ordnance Department to 
 the Commissariat for approval. They were produced before the 
 Committee. An iron to brand a figure or a broad arrow should, 
 of course, be open at the back, so that only the outline of the 
 number or design intended to be marked on the animal may be 
 burnt. The patterns which after nearly two years' consideration 
 had been submitted by the Ordnance Department, had the 
 broad arrow and numbers slightly raised upon solid backs, so 
 that when heated they would have produced on any animal to 
 which they were applied a huge burn, in which no trace of the 
 figure or broad arrow would be visible. 
 
 A Tell-tale Telegram. — A quantity of hay purchased 
 in the West of England for the expedition was sent to 
 Woolwich to be pressed. On July 27th Mr. Blunt, Senior 
 Commissariat Officer at Woolwich, telegraphed as follows: — 
 " None of the West of England hay come in is good enough for 
 " pressing. Our hydraulic press must stop to-morrow for want of 
 " hay. I have therefore purchased forty tons from Underwood at 
 " £S 10s., bands excluded. Underwood will give £5 for the thirty 
 " tonsof West hay as it stands." This telegram was addressed to the
 
 Director of Supplies and Transport, and by him passed on to 
 the Director of Contracts for remarks. The Director of Con- 
 tracts wrote on the back as follows : — " One of the objects of 
 " buying and having the inspection in the Western District 
 *' was that the excessive rigour of the Woolwich inspection 
 *' might be avoided. I do not think the A.C.G." (that is, Mr. 
 Blunt) " would pass any of the hay that has been pressed 
 " elsewhere. Will you make it clear that he is to press the hay 
 *' as it comes ? " The telegram with this endorsation was appa- 
 rently laid on a table on which the Director of Supplies and 
 Transport was drafting answers to letters submitted to him, 
 and a clerk, taking it up with the correspondence, mistook the 
 remarks on the back of the telegram for an answer. Procuring 
 a telegraph form, therefore, he copied the remarks and wired 
 them as a message from the Director of Supplies and Transport 
 to Mr. Blunt. That gentleman, naturally rather surprised on 
 its receipt, telegraphed back that he could not undertake 
 the responsibility of passing the hay, and did not quite 
 understand the message. Attention being thus called to 
 the mistake, a reply was sent, ordering the telegram to be 
 cancelled. 
 
 A quantity of the West of England hay having been con- 
 demned, I got the Committee to order the correspondence relating 
 to the subject. It was produced, but without the telegrams I 
 have quoted, and of the existence of which I was aware. Their 
 suppression was explained on the ground that they were 
 properly departmental minutes; but however applicable that 
 term might be to one of the telegrams, it was certainly not 
 applicable to either of those in which the Commissariat Officer 
 at Woolwich expressed his opinion of the hay sent in. A Board 
 held on the hay pronounced it " not best upland meadow hay of 
 " last year's growth, and not in the primest condition ; " and 
 stated their opinion " that the purchaser had either purchased 
 " inferior hay, or he had not taken the necessary steps to ensure 
 " the safe delivery of the purchase."
 
 28 
 
 Financial Control and Audit. — This hay was con- 
 demned and re-sold, and the public bore the loss. That loss 
 was only a trifle, apparently between .£100 and d£200, besides 
 freight to Woolwich ; but it is noteworthy that, owing to the 
 technical fact that the hay had never been "received into charge,'^ 
 it was the sole case that came before the Committee in which the 
 Exchequer and Audit Department asked for an explanation of 
 any loss incurred through the condemnation of stores after 
 purchase. Even in this case the explanation given was partial, 
 as it omitted the proportionately heavy loss on railway freight. 
 
 This seems to Tiave teen the solitary instance in connection ivith 
 the Campaign in which anybody was called to account for any- 
 thing. 
 
 Review. — I have not attempted to exhaust the evidence 
 laid before the Select Committee as to the chaotic state in which 
 the Egyptian Campaign found our system of supply and trans- 
 port. I have said nothing about the conflicting evidence as to 
 responsibility, or blame bandied about from official to official, 
 and department to department. I have said nothing about 
 the absolute want of organization of the auxiliary transport, 
 the looseness of some of the contracts, nor the system of trans- 
 port by sea, for which the country paid over =£860,000 for hire 
 of vessels, besides a large sum extra for freights. I have said 
 nothing about the difficulties experienced by myself in extracting 
 certain items of information, and the apparent impossibility of 
 getting others which with an efficient system of accounts would 
 have been readily forthcoming. I have suggested no plan of 
 reform. The Committee, in reporting the evidence to the House, 
 has asked for re- appointment. It will be for them to deal with 
 these matters, and, if they think proper, to apportion praise or 
 blame to individuals and departments. I have contented myself 
 with putting into connected shape certain easily intelligible facts 
 which have been laid before Parliament in the evidence taken.
 
 29 
 
 The Answer to my Case. — Tlie answer to my case has 
 been made in evidence given by Sir Jolin Adye, wlio was first the 
 Surveyor- General of Ordnance ministerially responsi])le for all 
 the arrangements at home, and afterwards Chief of the Staff in 
 Egypt. It has been repeated in the official communication to The 
 Times, to which I have before referred. That answer consists in 
 the general assertion that no transport could have kept pace with 
 Lord Wolseley's rapid advance ; that any inconvenience that may 
 have occurred was due to military exigencies and unforeseen com- 
 plications with the Ottoman Government ; and that, in the words 
 of the communication to The Times, there were no failures of the 
 working of the Supply and Transport Services at the seat of war, 
 while from an administrative point of view the expedition was a 
 success. In support of this view the one specific fact adduced 
 is that the time which Lord Wolseley calculated as necessary 
 for the occupation of Cairo was fifty-six days from the 21st July, 
 ^882, and that that occupation was actually accomplished in 
 fifty-five. 
 
 A Double-edged Argument. — It seems to iifle that tins 
 fact tells strongly in support of a very different conclusion. 
 It shows at least that the end of the campaign was not 
 appreciably accelerated before what was anticipated from the 
 first. It incontestably proves that all arrangements made with 
 a view to the campaign, which resulted in deliveries in Egypt 
 after Cairo was occupied, must be regarded as utter failures. 
 It shows that all arrangements carried out in such a manner as 
 to be unavailable at Ismailia (the place from the beginning 
 intended as the base of oj^erations) in time to permit an army 
 of 20,000 to land, fight at least one decisive battle, and reach 
 Cairo on Sei^tember 15th, must be regarded as having completely 
 broken down. 
 
 The arrival of a landing pier barely a week before that date 
 can scarcely be excused on the ground of military exigencies 
 The conveyance at a cost of some ^820,000 of a lot of mules,
 
 30 
 
 trained, equipped, and in possession of G-overnment months 
 before preparations commenced, from tlie Cape of Good Hope to 
 Aden, five days from Ismailia, a week after the capture of Cairo, 
 can ha,rdly be called an administrative success. As to mules 
 intended as reserve, we have nothing to do with them, but the 
 fact that of 3600 of these animals intended for distribution of 
 supplies from depots, and costing, without freight or forage, over 
 ^90,000, not one-third were available for the purpose for which 
 they were intended when Cairo fell, can scarcely be looked upon as 
 successful administration. The fact that of 1650 muleteers and 
 headmen intended to be hired in Malta, Cyprus, Italy, Turkey, 
 and elsewhere, not 600 ever came to hand, and the fact that 
 500 at last ordered from India landed, or, if not countermanded, 
 might have done so, after the war was over, does not to an out- 
 sider look very like a success. Nor does the fact that the Iron 
 Eation intended for the campaign was first available at Cairo. 
 The dispatch of seventy days' supply of unsuitable flour, and the 
 way in which it was gone about, can hardly be said to have had 
 anything to do with military exigencies, nor can the purchase of 
 .£20,000 worth of hay, worse than useless for the purposes of a 
 campaign. As to unforeseen difficulties in Ottoman territories, 
 where the G-overnment imprisoned or threatened to imprison 
 everyone who had anything to do with us, it hardly 
 required a prophet to foresee them, and they were not 
 unforeseen by the Commissary- General when he formally 
 protested against our relying on Turkey at all. The world was 
 open to us ; our own Colonies and dependencies lay scattered 
 over every portion of the globe, and what right had we de- 
 liberately to select Turkey, whose attitude on the Egyptian 
 question the whole world knew, to lend ourselves to the corrup- 
 tion of her officials and to carry off her subjects in open 
 violation of her laws? It may be said that the seizure of 
 Ismailia was precipitated by circumstances, and occurred earlier 
 than was originally contemplated. That is possible, and we 
 have no direct evidence on the point, but it could not have been
 
 31 
 
 precipitated by many days, for every military and naval pre- 
 paration had been made when the event occurred. The plea, 
 however, has not been urged, and we may be tolerably certain 
 that could it have been sustained it would not have been so long 
 concealed. 
 
 "The Eapid Dash Forward." — The argument that the 
 rapid dash forward disconcerted transport arrangements may 
 be a good one in the case of transport which had arrived 
 while the rapid dash forward was being made. That period 
 however, closed when Kassassin was occupied on August 26th, 
 and on that date the regimental transport was still incomplete, 
 a mere fraction of the Departmental Transport, and none of the 
 auxiliary, had arrived at Ismailia, or was in a position to 
 outstrip. At that date, too, and for long after, the vessel to 
 lift out the engines had not arrived, the locomotives purchased 
 in England had not arrived, the rails sent out had hardly been 
 got at, and the efficiency of the transport from the base, such 
 as it was, was still further impaired by the fact tl^^t it was not 
 placed under the orders of the General of the Line of Com- 
 munication till a week after the occupation of Kassassin. 
 
 A WOKD FOR THE COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT. — There 
 
 is a word of explanation which, in justice to one depart- 
 ment, ought not to be longer delayed. Many of the facts which 
 I have narrated having already, in a fragmentary form, tran- 
 spired in connection with an enquiry into the working of the 
 Commissariat and Transport Services, a large portion of the 
 public has not unnaturally jumped to the conclusion that the 
 Commissariat and Transport Department of the Army was to 
 blame for every shortcoming disclosed. How far that depart- 
 ment may be censured or commended by the Select Committee 
 I cannot of course say, but this I can say, that it had nothing, 
 or next to nothing, to do with any of the occurrences detailed 
 above. The Commissariat Department, for example, had nothing
 
 32 
 
 to do v/ith the selection of flour, wliicli was made contrary to 
 tlie advice of its Chief. The much- abused hay was certainly 
 purchased subject to inspection by a Commissariat officer, but 
 it was little more than a nominal inspection, and was arranged 
 for by another department without any consultation with the 
 Office of the Commissary-General. The purchase of transport 
 animals does not fall within the province of the Commissariat 
 Department, and though the Commissary-G-eneral, having had 
 considerable experience in the matter, tendered his advice, it 
 was disregarded. He was indeed responsible for the personnel 
 of his corj)s ; but his request for labour was disregarded, and 
 the moment it was decided to hire foreign drivers in the countries 
 where the mules were to be jourchased, though his responsibility 
 continued his liberty of action was gone. His department had 
 nothing to do with the selection of carts or shipment of stores, 
 or in fact anything except estimating the estabhshment required 
 for the campaign, which would doubtless have been sufficient 
 had it arrived. The responsibility of the Commissary-General 
 with the expedition did not commence till he landed in Egypt ; 
 and when, having received intimation of his appointment, he 
 busied himself with suggestions and demands, he was given to 
 understand that his interference was not desiredo The uniform 
 complaint of the officers of the Commissariat and Transport 
 Department is — that under the existing system, in time of war 
 they are debarred from performing the duties to which they are 
 trained in time of peace, and are blamed for the miscarriage of 
 supply and transport arrangements in carrying out which they 
 have had no voice. 
 
 The Lesson of the Campaign. — It appears to me 
 that the result, which I have described, of so many costly 
 arrangements, occurring as they did in a campaign where we 
 were unopposed by sea, and feebly opposed on land, where the 
 enemy left us a waterway which they might easily have drained, 
 and a railway that they might at least have compelled us to
 
 33 
 
 re-lay — it appears to me that these results ought to teach us a 
 lesson. If, disregarding that lesson, we should find ourselves 
 brought into conflict with an enemy a little more nearly our 
 match, and a little less apathetic or scrupulous* as to his means 
 of defence, we should run no small risk of receiving another 
 lesson such as it would be impossible to disregard. In Egypt it 
 was simply a question of wasted treasure and minor privations. 
 In Europe it would probably be a c[uestion of life or death. 
 Little time is afforded in modern warfare to make up for the 
 consequences of early blundering, and the destiny of more than 
 one great nation has been settled within fifty-six days. 
 
 A National Question. — The efficiency of our military 
 administration is a national and not a party question. If any 
 one imagines that, had a different political party been in power, 
 the" Egyptian campaign would have been differently administered 
 from home, let him read what is appended to this pamphlet 
 regarding the Afghan war. That was conducted under a Con- 
 servative Cabinet, as the Egyptian vuider a Liberal one ; and if 
 the reader can find anything to be proud of in the "transport and 
 Supply arrangements of either campaign as compared with the 
 other, I envy him his powers of discrimination. Whatever 
 Grovernment is in power in nine cases out of ten becomes the 
 passive administrator of whatever vicious system it may find in 
 operation. Ministerial life is too short for the majority of 
 Ministers to grapple with reforms, however much required, 
 unless they are forced to do so by public opinion. That the 
 facts set forth in the foregoing pages may have some effect in 
 helping to frame public opinion is my hope. If not, they may 
 at least prove interesting to John Bull as showing why his little 
 wars are so costly and how his money goes. 
 
 * As an instance of the extreme scrupulousness of tlie Egyptian commander. 
 Colonel Tulloch, Chief of the Intelligence Department, told the Committee that Arahi 
 had made arrangements to cut the canal. " but there was a sheik who came down from 
 •'Upper Egypt and told Arahi that he had no business to cut the Sweetwater Canal, 
 " as it was contrary to the principles of the Mahomedan religion to deprive human 
 " beings of their food, and it was owing to that sheik that he never cut the canal."— 
 Answer 5998.
 
 34 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 HOW THE MONEY WENT IN THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 The following letter, which appeared in The Times of April i6th, 
 1882, explains itself : — 
 
 Sir, — At a moment when this country is about to pay India another half- 
 million of her ;i^5,ooo,ooo contribution towards the expenses of the Afghan 
 War, and when Ministers and ex-Ministers are wrangling as to the correct 
 method of making the payment, it may possibly be of interest to the long- 
 suffering British taxpayer to learn how his millions went. 
 
 Since I failed to secure an inquiry at the hands of a Select Committee of 
 the House of Commons into the working of the Indian Commissariat and 
 Transport service in the Afghan War, I have obtained copies of the "Ad- 
 ministration Reports of the Indian Commissariat Department " for the official 
 years 1878-9 and 1879-80. They were, of course, not meant to be made 
 public, but as I am convinced that no reform will ever be obtained without 
 full publicity, and as I am under no pledge of secrecy with respect to them, I 
 beg to lay before your readers a few of the facts which they disclose, which 
 will at least help to show how a large portion of the expense towards which 
 this country is still contributing was incurred. 
 
 To indicate the importance of the department to which the reports refer, I 
 shall commence by stating that the money drawn by it for departmental pur- 
 poses during the two years in question amounted to no less a sum than 
 113,399,252 rupees, or say ;^i 1,000,000 sterling. The amount in inefficient 
 balance or unadjusted in executive offices at the end of the official year 
 1879-80 was 10,325,939 rupees, or say ;i^i, 000,000. "This sum," says the 
 Commissary-General (Colonel Willes), "will give some idea of the unavoid- 
 able state of the cash accounts of officers, though it gives none of the amount 
 of work either done inefficiently or not done at all. ... I trust it may be 
 found when the time comes for closing the outstandings that nothing worse 
 than delay and confusion have resulted from the excessive drain caused by the
 
 35 
 
 war on the department in all its branches, but that many an agent is making a 
 fine harvest out of the war owing to the want of proper supervision is un- 
 deniable. . . . Once get a mass of arrears in any office and it becomes a 
 paradise for dishonest clerks, who exist in every office, who have a horror of 
 speedy adjustment of accounts, and whose sole object is to make frivolous and 
 petty objections." 
 
 Now who was to blame for the state of things which the Commissary- 
 General thus forcibly condemns ? No person, of course — the system, as with 
 ourselves, of divided responsibility and general cross-purposes. To under- 
 stand this it is necessary to revert to the beginning of the war as set forth in 
 these reports. 
 
 Shortly before Sir H. Norman left India Colonel Willes had called his 
 attention to the utterly inefficient state of the Commissariat and Transport 
 Department, and pointed out the inevitable consequences should war break 
 out. Sir Henry's reply was, *' Wait till war does break out, and then see how 
 we will shell out the money ; you will have everything you want then." To 
 which the Commissary-General answered, " It will then be too late." When 
 the Afghan War broke out, according to the Commissary-General, his depart- 
 ment was "on the most limited peace scale, quite insufficient even for that.'* 
 In August, foreseeing the probability of hostilities, the Commander-in-Chief 
 urged the Commissary-General to be communicated with, with a view of 
 making preparations, but the Government refused its permission, and an 
 invaluable opportunity was lost. Six weeks later Colonel Willes was told 
 to prepare. The first step was to obtain from the agaiy officers to 
 supplement the department. On going to the Adjutant-General to arrange 
 for this, that officer * ' expressed his surprise, and stated that the whole 
 question of transport had been settled, and the officers for the duty detailed." 
 He expressed more surprise when he learnt that the Commissary-General had 
 never been consulted on the subject by the Quartermaster-General, who had 
 drawn up the scheme. The Commissary-General thereupon appealed to 
 the Military Member of Council, who had also heard nothing of the arrange- 
 ment, and who summarily cancelled it. 
 
 This occurred at the end of September, 1878, on the very eve of the war. 
 With such a commencement it was hardly likely that things would work 
 smoothly. With General Biddulph's column some 6000 camels, which it was 
 intended should go no further than Dadur, and thence return to Mithankote to 
 form a train, were carried on to Quetta, "and kept there, though not required, 
 against the remonstrance of the senior commissariat officer, Colonel Lane. 
 At Quetta there was no food for the large number of camels, which simply 
 starved and died in enormous numbers. . . . Had they been at once returned, 
 vast numbers would have been saved," and been available for services for 
 which they were urgently required. Again, an order reached the Commissary- 
 General from the Quartermaster-General on the i8th of October, 1878, to the 
 effect that General Stewart's column was to march on the ist of November,
 
 36 
 
 "though at the time there was not a single animal available, and I (Colonel 
 Willes) was never asked if the means of moving this force existed. Event- 
 ually the order was cancelled and the column was sent on by rail." 
 
 When the Treaty of Gandamak was signed, it may interest the British 
 taxpayer to know that some ;i^25,ooo maunds of stores — a bazaar maund is 
 82lb. — were presented to the Ameer. " The whole of the carriage when it 
 returned to India, whether camels, mules, or ponies, was completely exhausted, 
 and very few, even after long rest, were again fit for any work. It was 
 evident that the work, climate, want of supervision, and limited and un- 
 suitable food had completely broken down the whole of the transport of the 
 army." " It has been ascertained that during the whole of the past winter, 
 when transport animals were being passed up from Peshawur to Jhelum, they 
 seldom got their full allowance of food." They were, in fact, under charge of 
 utterly unreliable men, " sometimes chuprassies at five rupees a month," who 
 starved them and plundered the Government. The gear supplied for the 
 mules and ponies proved "very unsuitable." "The state of the Peshawur 
 cantonments, consequent on the enormous number of dead animals lying about, 
 threatened a serious outbreak of sickness," and "the sick transport throughout 
 the whole campaign was unsatisfactory." So much for the first phase of the 
 war. 
 
 " As at the commencement of the first campaign," writes the Commissary- 
 General, "so to the very end, there was the same strain on the department to 
 provide the necessary carriage," which owing to the enormous demand and 
 mortality and the necessity for sending back the sick and weakly animals from 
 the Khyber, rendering it an almost hopeless task to provide the means of moving 
 the troops and feeding them. . . . In reality, as regards the transport, 
 the army was worse off at the commencement of the second, than the first 
 campaign." The existing transport was "thoroughly used up," and it was 
 necessary to go to distant provinces for fresh animals. The difficulties were 
 overcome, but at enormous expense. A depot was established at Jhelum at a 
 cost of 45 lakhs of rupees — ^450,000. There were many ponies from all 
 parts sent up to Jhelum quite unsuited for transport work, and the expense 
 thus incurred unnecessarily was very great. ... In many instances it is 
 impossible to imagine how the weedy, miserable creatures were selected." As 
 usual, the pony gear was "found faulty in every respect," and the pack-saddle 
 made up at great expense according to standard patterns was "generally 
 altered at Jhelum to meet Captain Wintle's views." The Bombay Government 
 having much spare carriage available in Scinde, ' ' was good enough to place 
 some of it at the disposal of the Bengal Commissariat." In the lot were 262 
 camels, which arrived at Jhelum in such miserable condition that 146 died, 
 two were shot, 12 sold, and only 102 went to the front. " I saw a telegram 
 to SirM. Kennedy," writes Colonel Willes, "in reply to one of his, comment- 
 ing on the unnecessary expense of sending such sickly animals, stating that 
 they would have died if kept in Scinde. They had better have done so."
 
 37 
 
 The carts, 586 in number, were of various builds. " The wheels were generally 
 very bad, and when those deemed fit for use were passed to Peshawur they fell 
 to pieces in great numbers on the road." 
 
 It had been decided to institute a cart train for Jhelum, and an offer was 
 made by the acting Commissioner of Patna to supply 1500 carts with bullocks 
 in a very short time at 150 rupees each. Although Commissary-General 
 Willes objected that Patna carts were not suitable for the work required, and 
 his opinion was fortified by the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal and the 
 Commissioner of Patna, the off'er was accepted. "On arrival the carts were 
 found to be totally unsuited for the work required of them. Indeed, they 
 seemed to be absolutely rotten and worthless, and proving so useless caused 
 the first delay in completing the military transport train, as carts and bullocks 
 had to be purchased in the Punjab, and the arrangements commenced de novo.''* 
 The camels were placed in charge of ignorant attendants, " and until these 
 became accustomed to their work the state into which camels fell, from 
 neglect and ignorance, was absolutely horrible, such sores as were found on the 
 animals being noisome in the extreme." Again, we are told the attendants 
 sent with the camels *' were badly paid, and often not paid at all. They were 
 only anxious to be freed from a disagreeable service, and consequently 
 neglected the animals, hoping that when they died or became useless they 
 would be free to return home." In my recent speech on the subject, which 
 you were good enough to report, I gave from another and equally reliable 
 source details of the atrocious mismanagement and cruelty to which the 90,000 
 camels and other baggage and slaughter animals, estimated \p have died in 
 the war, were subjected, and I need not dwell longer on this subject. There 
 is, however, another matter to which attention should be called. In October, 
 1878, the Commissary-General suggested "that the Adjutant- General should 
 submit, for the sanction of the Government, proposals for the audit of the 
 accounts of commissariat field charges, and more especially as regards relaxa- 
 tion of the ordinary rules of audit." He desired, as he elsewhere explained, 
 that field account offices should be established ; that the rules as regards 
 vouchers, easy to obtain in time of peace, but often impossible to procure in 
 the field, should be relaxed ; and that legitimate payments, concerning which 
 there could be no doubt, should be looked into speedily, and accounts settled 
 with as little delay as possible. He was backed up by Colonels Sibley and 
 Brand, who based their arguments on the experience of past campaigns, in 
 which, as Colonel Brand remarked, till the campaign was over no accounts 
 were attempted, opening thus the door for various forms of false charges, 
 false rates, fictitious purchases, short credits," &c. The Commissary-General's 
 proposal, he tells us, " met with determined opposition from the Account and 
 Military Department at Calcutta," and he only succeeded in getting it (or, 
 rather, a portion of it) sanctioned by an appeal to the Viceroy in Council. 
 Even then the accounts fell, as we have seen, much into arrear, "owing to the 
 majority of the permanent clerks being withdrawn from the field, and the
 
 38 
 
 offices left in charge of officers totally ignorant of commissariat accounts, and 
 the duty to all of whom was most disagreeable, because the pay was only 150 
 rupees and the responsibility excessive." 
 
 The officers employed generally objected, and in some cases earnestly 
 protested against being put to the work, and apparently with good cause — for 
 one of them, at the date of Colonel Willes's report, found that he could not 
 retire, having 20 lakhs (,t^200j000) to his debit. Yet, vidien there was such an 
 urgent demand for skilled clerks, says Colonel Willes, " I notice that a mass 
 of statistics has been issued by the Examiner of Commissariat Accounts with 
 his annual report for 1878-9, reviewing the cost of various articles, such as 
 fowls, eggs, grain, at one station as compared with another, which must 
 have required a large number of clerks to work out. When lakhs, if not 
 crores, of rupees were being spent on account of the war, I would submit," 
 he adds, "that the preparation of such statistics might well have ceased, and 
 the clerks been sent to various account and executive offices, where their 
 services, being experienced men, would have been invaluable, and have, in a 
 great measure, prevented the arrears which accumulated." These arrears, as 
 I have already stated, on Colonel Willes's authority, amounted to over 
 10,000,000 rupees, and afforded "a fine harvest for many an agent" and 
 "dishonest clerk." As an example of the working at cross purposes which 
 prevailed in this, as in other matters, I will only add that, according to the 
 Commissary-General, "an attempt was apparently made, shortly after the 
 establishm.ent of the account offices of the first campaign, to represent that the 
 plan had not worked satisfactorily ! " that he was ordered to furnish certain 
 information to the Examiner of Commissariat Accounts at Umballa; that 
 he replied, furnishing the information requested, and suggested that the 
 Accountant-General, Military Department, should inspect certain field account 
 offices, with a view to placing matters on such a footing as would expedite the 
 adjustment of accounts. To his report he had no reply, and, though the 
 Government approved the Accountant-General making the inspection, "what 
 his report may have been," says the Commissary-General, "I am not aware, 
 but the result of his action was never communicated to me. " 
 
 When I moved for a Committee to inquire into the working of the 
 transport in the Afghan War I gave abundant evidence of the extent to which 
 its breakdown impeded the movement of our troops, the horrible cruelty 
 inflicted upon the transport animals, and the enormous waste of public money 
 involved. I was told that the matter had been looked into, that its importance 
 was recognized, and that there was no danger of any similar breakdown in 
 future. Private information from a well-informed quarter leads me entirely to 
 doubt this comfortable assurance, the more so as I find from Colonel Willes's 
 reports that before the outbreak of the Afghan War he had in vain, and in many 
 cases repeatedly, pressed for reform of a number of these defects in the system 
 which our subsequent experience so disastrously revealed. Something has been 
 done, of course, but nothing that can effectually remedy the deplorable state of
 
 39 
 
 matters disclosed in the report of Principal Veterinary Surgeon Collins, which 
 lies in a pigeon-hole in the War Office, or the administration reports of 
 Commissary-General Willes, from which I have given a few extracts above. 
 It is all very well to vote so many millions of British money to assist India to 
 bear the extravagant cost of the Afghan War, but I cannot help believing that 
 we should be rendering her, and ourselves as well, a much more real and 
 permanent service were we to insist upon a thorough investigation of the dis- 
 graceful state of matters which the long-concealed reports of Sir M. Kennedy, 
 Mr. Collins, and Colonel Willes proved to to have existed, with a view to the 
 radical reform of a "system" of commissariat and transport so extravagant, so 
 unreliable, and so full of peril. 
 
 Yours most obediently, 
 CHARLES CAMERON, M.P. for Glasgow. 
 
 The following, extracted from " Hansard's Parliamentary 
 Debates," is tliat portion of my epeecli in moving for the 
 appointment of a Select Committee referred to in the foregoing 
 letter to the " Times ^''^ which relates to the mismanagement of 
 the Afghan War. I reprmt it, as it deals with a part of the 
 subject not touched on in the letter, viz. : the wholesale and 
 atrocious cruelty to transport animals which disgraced that war. 
 
 He (Dr. Cameron) now came to the Afghan War. Telegraphing from 
 Simla in June, 1879, The Times Correspondent said — 
 
 •' It is earnestly to be hoped that the successful tennination of the campaign may not 
 prevent the fullest enquiry into the causes of mismanagement so discreditable and so 
 dangerous. The Khyber Force was," he adds, " for some time so lielpless, owing to the want 
 of transport, that they could not have advanced to Cabul if Yakoob Khan had defied us," 
 
 In March of the same year, 1879, an officer of high rank in our Army, in 
 a private letter which he held in his hand, wrote — 
 
 "There is no doubt about the fact, which will come out some day, that the Candahar 
 Force under General Stewart could not get on farther than Candahar owing to the great 
 mortality among the transport animals." 
 
 Mr. Charles Williams, an experienced war correspondent, in his notes on 
 the first portion of the Afghan War, said that, in consequence of the im-
 
 40 
 
 possibility of bringing up food for the Kurrum Column, the Native troops had 
 to be put upon half rations — 
 
 " Seven hundred camels died in a week, and in less than a month it eame about that this 
 column could neither feed itself nor move back for food for want of transport. Nor was it 
 much better," he added, " with General Biddulph's column ; and it is a matter of fact that 
 General Lacey's brigade was kept oscillating on the road between Candahar and Giriskh in 
 this wise — when provisions reached it from Candahar it moved towards Giriskh, three or four 
 marches. As they were consumed, and the camels died, the brigade fell back towards 
 Candahar until it met another convoy, when it resumed its march. And this was repeated 
 not merely once or twice. ' 
 
 In his work on the Afghan War, Mr. Duke had published a letter from 
 General Roberts, in which that officer wrote — " In the Kurrum Pass our great 
 difficulty was want of transport ; " and if he were to quote from the work of 
 Mr. Howard Hensman he might multiply evidence to the same effect. The 
 history of the whole campaign was, however, summed up by a well-informed 
 officer, who had written to him (Dr. Cameron) in this single sentence — "Over 
 and over again our columns could not move for want of transport." Had they 
 been in this condition in the presence of a daring and enterprising foe, the 
 inability of the troops to move must certainly have led to disaster. He would 
 not argue the question as to whether camels were the proper animals to employ 
 in such a campaign ; but, evidently, if used, only strong adult camels should 
 have been relied upon for such service. But that was very far from being the 
 system adopted by the Indian Department. Baby camels, camels incapacitated 
 from age, ponies barely able to drag their own carcases through the campaign, 
 were all bought up for the Transport Service. 
 
 "Anything more atrocious than the cruelty and neglect culminating in such tremendous 
 losses as occurred in the Afghan Campaign I have never heard or read of. " 
 
 These were the words of an officer of great experience, and thoroughly well 
 entitled to speak on the subject. 
 
 "Putting aside," he continued, "the horrid cruelty, the direct loss must have been 
 immense ; but the indirect loss will be felt in the agricultural districts from which the animals 
 were drawn for long years to come." 
 
 And in this connection Mr. Charles Williams mentioned that, in the opinion 
 
 of the civil authorities in Scinde, one third of the available animals in Scinde 
 
 were used up in the first phase of the Afghan War, And the officer from whom 
 
 he was quoting went on to say — 
 
 " Veterinary science in the Afghan, as in the Egyptian Campaign, was utterly ignored 
 by the Indian authorities. There was no veterinary organization — nothing but the grossest 
 mismanagement as far as animals were concerned. 
 
 The Indian authorities entertained the utmost contempt for the dictates of 
 veterinary science, and the result was that they neutralized in Afghanistan and 
 afterwards in Egypt the elaborate precautions we took with the animals 
 intended for the Transport Service of our troops. The letter from Simla 
 already referred to contained the following words : — 
 
 "I forward by this mail Civtl and Military Gazette of 19th March, 1879. It will give 
 you an idea of the fearful mortality among the camels at the front, and really we cannot be 
 surprised at the loss. I have been fighting for sanction for administrative veterinary oflScers 
 to be posted with the various columns at the front ; but the Government will not sanction the
 
 41 
 
 expense. However, acts are cropping up showing the grossest neglect— or, rather, I should 
 call it rascality. Steele reports that out of 70 camels he examined lying dead at Quetta 26 
 were but two years old. Mr. Edwards, veterinary surgeon, reports that many of the female 
 camels were with calf, and died of slipping their calves. Thousands of animals have died from 
 neglect, ignorance, and rascality. The officers of the Transport have been chiefly taken from 
 Infantry regiments, and are ignorant to a degree upon all subjects pertaining to animals. I 
 have reported all this officially, and there is sure to be an investigation, and Government is 
 sure to burke the whole thing." 
 
 From that extract it would appear that the facts had all been officially reported, 
 and if the Committee were granted, he should be able to prove, by means of 
 the Reports, the facts he had stated. The Report had, of course, been burked, 
 as it was predicted it would be. He wanted the facts brought to light for the 
 sake of the efficiency of the Service, because India was going on pursuing the 
 even tenour of her way ; and on the first occasion on which our troops had to 
 co-operate with Indian troops, if let alone, she was sure to land us in some 
 mess. He now came to the cruelty and waste. If the House thought the 
 statements he had to make were incredible — and to his mind they were so 
 horrible as to make him wish to be able to believe they were incredible — all 
 he could say was that if he got the committee he undertook to prove every one 
 of them. In the Kurrum column, of 6000 animals, 40 per cent, were re- 
 ported as either too young, too old, or in other respects so physically incapable 
 of performing the work of the campaign that it was sheer waste of public 
 money to buy them. Everywhere the veterinary surgeons reported the same 
 thing as to the large number of unfit animals purchased for the Transport 
 Service in the Afghan campaign. Of a batch of 400 ponies inspected at 
 Jhelum, 395 were condemned as utterly unfit for the work. Again and again 
 he found it reported that when animals had been purchased under proper 
 veterinary supervision, the fact that they had been so purchased was at once 
 apparent, and among them the number of rejections for unfitness for work was 
 not more than 5 per cent. But the Indian authorities treated veterinary 
 opinions with the most profound contempt. They held, he was told, that the 
 requirements of the veterinary surgeons were far too high, and maintained 
 that what they wanted was baggage animals that could carry a load of so 
 many pounds weight. Accordingly, they loaded the wretched animals, in- 
 cluding the condemned ponies, and sent the 395 to the front with the rest. 
 The result was that the miserable brutes died by the way, and we lost not 
 only the money expended in purchasing them, but also the loads they carried. 
 Anything more cruel than sending on animals unfit for such service was to 
 him inconceivable. They stood as so many animals of burden on paper ; but 
 we lost both the animals and their loads. 
 
 No improvement in this state of things took place as the war went on, 
 and it was estimated by competent authorities that in the two phases of the 
 Afghan campaign no fewer than 6o,cx)o animals and 30,cxx) other baggage 
 and slaughter animals died ; and of these it was estimated that at least one 
 half died because they were utterly unfit for the work for which they were 
 bought. He did not know the exact value of the animals thus purchased, but 
 taking the camels at ;^20 a-head, the loss sustained in camels alone must have
 
 42 
 
 been upwards of ;^500,ooo sterling, and the cost, directly and indirectly, to 
 the British taxpayer in beasts and material, including the loss caused by the 
 delays from the breakdown of the transport, must have amounted to many 
 times that sum. And now he came to the cruelty, and he ventured to say 
 that any man with the smallest feelings of humanity would shudder at the 
 barest recital of it. From every quarter it was described as having been simply 
 atrocious. The transport animals -were in charge of ignorant native salootries 
 or farriers. Infectious diseases were rife amongst the animals, and no pre- 
 cautions were taken to prevent their spread. Animals suffering from rinder- 
 pest, scabies, glanders, and pleuro-pneumonia were beaten forward with the 
 rest without any precaution taken to separate them, and the consequence was 
 that every elephant in the Kurrum column got the foot-and-mouth disease, and 
 in some cases the soles of their feet sloughed off, carrying the nails with them. 
 No provision was made for shoeing animals ; and at a dozen stations visited by 
 one veterinary officer there were no shoes, no nails, no workmen. No care 
 was taken to prevent sore backs ; there were no dressings, no medicines, no 
 instruments. It was with difficulty veterinary surgeons could get sacking to 
 put over wounds to keep off the flies. At Quetta, out of 15,000 animals, 80 
 per cent, of the ponies and 20 per cent, of the mules suffered from sore backs. 
 At Cabul there were 1700 cases of sore backs. Hon. Members might think 
 it absurd to make so much fuss about sore backs ; but the sore backs to which 
 he referred were such as, by their extent and foetor, sickened even the most 
 experienced veterinary surgeons — backs on which the packs had eaten through 
 the muscles and laid bare the ribs beneath. Sore backs swarming with 
 maggots, backs in camels in which the sores had laid bare the spinous pro- 
 cesses of the vertebrze, and in which the tissues were so infiltrated with 
 purulent matter that when, to put them out of pain, the wretched beasts were 
 shot, the coverings of the back gave way with the shock of the animal's fall, 
 ejecting the foetid contents to a considerable distance. Such a state of things 
 might seem incredible, but if he were granted the committee he asked for, he 
 would be prepared to prove that what he had said was literally true. It 
 might be said such cases were rare ; they were not rare, they were common. 
 From everywhere he had the same testimony. One gentleman going through 
 the Bolan Pass counted as many as 300 dead camels on one side, and 200 on 
 the other, and saw many others dying, and the ravens picking out their eyes 
 while they were yet alive. He could multiply instances of this kind, but 
 would content himself with one wholesale case. Between October and 
 December, 1880, 2000 animals were sent to Sherawak to pick up. Of course 
 there was no veterinary surgeon in attendance. In the month of March the 
 animals that survived were sold by auction. They numbered but 10 or 15 ; 
 all the rest were rotting in the valley. The same mismanagement existed 
 from the beginning to the end of the Afghan War, and the same mismanage- 
 ment was repeated in connection with the Egyptian War. Among the wit- 
 nesses as to the cause of the Afghan breakdown was General Showers, who
 
 43 
 
 ascribed the failure in the transport arrangements as largely to the absence of 
 all administrative veterinary control. He said — 
 
 " The fact of there having been no administrative veterinary officer with any of the 
 columns will hardly be credited." 
 
 Since this report the Indian Government, so little economical in many 
 other affairs, had been guilty of the economy of cutting down their veterinary 
 staff one-third — from 70 to 46. When they sent their contingent to Egypt, 
 there were only four veterinary surgeons attached to it. Tv.-o of these went 
 on with the troops, and two only remained with the transport, which embraced 
 6000 or 7000 animals. In our British forces we considered it necessary to 
 send one veterinary surgeon for every 250 or 300 animals. The result of this 
 Indian arrangement was that glanders was introduced into Egypt once, and 
 rinderpest on two separate occasions, despite elaborate precautions by our own 
 Veterinary Department. He did not propose to offer any suggestions as to 
 how this state of things should be remedied. He could, if necessary, quote a 
 number of what appeared to be common-sense suggestions that had been 
 made ; but it was his opinion that what was above all things required was a 
 knowledge of the facts and of the extent of the evil. If the committee he 
 asked for was appointed, it would have no difficulty in finding numbers of 
 competent men to make suggestions ; and he would very much rather trust to 
 the common sense of a committee of the House of Commons for a reform of 
 the evils which he had endeavoured to expose, than trust the matter to the 
 consideration of a departmental committee of experts.
 
 ^ iV*!^*"^