Univ.of III. Library 51 c.A new York national Bank Presidents' Conspiracy Industry ana Property A HISTORY OF THE PANIC OF 1893. ITS ORGANIZA- TION AND METHODS The American Bimetallic Union 604 JOURNAL BUILDING Chicago, 111. THE NEW YORK NATIONAL BANK PRESIDENTS’ CONSPIRACY AGAINST INDUSTRY AND PROPERTY A HISTORY OF THE FANIC OF 1 893; ITS ORGANIZA- TION AND METHODS By J. W. SCHUCKERS Private Secretary to Salmon P Chase ; President Lincoln'’ s Secretary of the Treasury, during the Civil War, Croat PUBLISHED EY THE AMERICAN BIMETALLIC UNION 134 Monroe St., Chicago, III. Cppyright By J. W. Schuckers 1894 Newark, Nov. 20, 1895. Hon. Edward B. Light, Secretary American Bimetallic Union, 134 Monroe Street, Chicago, 111. Dear Sir: — My ‘History of the New York National Bank Presidents’ Conspiracy against Industry and Property,’ is a straightforward, unambiguous, wholly unrhetorical statement of the facts of the most infa- mous assault ever made by criminal men upon the public and private welfare of any people — outside of actual war. My earnest desire has been — my earnest desire now is — that the facts of that conspiracy shall be probed to the bottom, either by a commission of Congress or by the courts. It is not worth while to appeal to the New York courts. I do not know that it is worth while to appeal to Congress. What I do know is — that if ever an investigation is had, it will develop an infamy that will appall the people, and, as I hope, will move them to execute justice upon the National Bank assassins who in 1893 did so much evil. I am, Very truly yours, J. W. Schuckers. 5 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY i. My design in writing the following pages (originally in letters to my most excellent friend, Mr. Henry CareyBaird of Philadelphia) was to arouse the American people — if such a thing were possible; of which, how- ever, I was not sanguine — to the absolutely certain fact that a stupendous crime had been committed against them, a crime so wanton and infamous in its delibera- tion and methods that all should join to punish it if the public justice is worth preserving. The panic of 1893 was a colossal calamity that in- volved tens of thousands of men and women in com- mercial and industrial ruin; that involved hundreds of thousands — even millions of men and women — in loss and extreme mental and physical distress. My aim is to show that this destructive panic was the work of a deliberately determined conspiracy ; that this conspiracy originated in Wall Street; that it was organ- ized in Wall Street; that it was engineered from Wall Street — and that in its front, as the active agents in car- 7 8 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY rying it into execution, stood a score of lawless New York National Bank presidents, backed and supported by the entire Associated Banks of that city. I propose to present the facts and the proofs, and to these facts and proofs I ask the attention of the people. I will present them as briefly as possible. II. The presidential campaign of 1892 was waged practi- cally, upon a single issue — the tariff. The silver question was discussed incidentally only. “The fading out of the silver issue,” said the New York Evening Post , on the 15th of October, 1892, “is one of the unmistakable signs of the times. Hardly anybody talks about it now, except those engaged in the production of the metal.” But this was not a true statement. The fading out of the silver issue, if it had any meaning at all, meant simply that the party leaders on both sides had agreed upon a program, the outcome of which has been the repeal of the silver law of 1890, and the Senate tariff act — an act that was satisfactory to no party and to no section. III. The presidential preference of the New York bankers and brokers in 1892 was for Grover Cleveland. They gave a practically unanimous support to his candidacy — many of them abandoning their former party associ- ations in order to do so. Conspicuous instances of this abandonment were George G. Williams, president of the THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 9 Chemical National Bank, and George S. Coe, president of the American Exchange National; both old men, and life-long Republicans. These men did not become Dem- ocrats. They made no pretense of being Democrats, or that they had any sympathy whatever with the objects the Democratic party was seeking to accomplish. They were Cleveland Republicans; a political scab peculiar to Wall Street and like precincts. They were Cleveland Republicans because they expected to control Grover Cleveland to their own uses, as they subse- quently did, when they involved him and his administra- tion in their piratical scheme for panic and destruction of property. The alliance of Grover Cleveland with these malignant and criminal bankers was an unmitigated national ca- lamity, from the disastrous effects of which no Ameri- can of this generation will live to see a final recovery. IV. Immediately that the result of the presidential elec- tion was made known, the Associated National Banks and bankers of New York set up a terrific scream for the immediate unconditional repeal of the Sherman sil- ver law — the repeal of that law being the first step in their scheme for a reconstruction of the monetary sys- tem — a reconstruction intended to still further increase the power and control of the National Banks over the industry, the commerce and the property of the country. This scream was everywhere taken up by the Bank journals and the Bank politicians, and grew steadily in 10 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY fierceness and volume until, by the time of the meeting of the second session of the Fifty-second Congress, De- cember 6, 1892, the noise and clamor made by the aggre- gated National Bank confederates, their mercenaries and panderers — Administrative, Congressional and otherwise — filled the land to the practical exclusion of every other subject of political importance. y. Congress had scarcely met when theWall Street mem- bers began operations. Bills for the repeal of the silver law were promptly introduced into both House and Sen- ate. The friends of these bills were intolerant for in- stant action. They tried to shut off debate by forcing a rule for closure. But it was soon discovered that there was a large body of men not under the domination of the Wall Street ring who were determined upon a vigorous resistance. One of the most active of this Wall Street ring was John Sherman. As a matter of fact this man Sherman had promised, in writing, that if ten Democratic senators could be pledged to follow him, he would procure the repeal of the act before the end of the session. VI. There is every reason to believe that it was in some con- nection with this written promise of John Sherman’s that Grover Cleveland sent two agents to Washington — Messrs. Henry Villard and u Don” M. Dickinson— to threaten the use of the Federal patronage against those THE BANKERS 5 CONSPIRACY 11 Democratic members of Congress who preferred their principles, and the interests of their constituents, to the demands of the Wall Street combine. VII. Grover Cleveland was thrown into a state of great astonishment and high displeasure when it came to his knowledge that a distinct majority of the Democrats in Congress were opposed to the repeal. Mr. Cleveland de- sired that currency u reform”should take precedence over all other kinds of reform — of which he professed to have a large variety in stock — -and had resolved, immediately after his reelection in 1892, to make the unconditional repeal of the silver law, and fidelity to his policy of re- peal, the test of fidelity to himself and to his coming ad- ministration ; and, in pursuance of this resolve, that those Democratic members of Congress who did not conform to his wishes must stand aside — must take back seats; must expect no favors from him of any kind. His newspaper organs in New York City— the Herald and the Times , which were also organs of the banks — very evidently by inspiration, in elaborate editorial articles printed in both journals on the same day, declared that those Democratic congressmen who opposed the repeal must go into retire- ment. VIII. Mr. Cleveland’s first agent to the recalcitrant con- gressmen of his own party was a well-known New York financier, Mr. Henry Villard. Mr. Villard appeared in Washington on the 12th of January, 1893; and being 12 THE BANKERS 5 CONSPIRACY a man of business, as be himself said, lost no time after his arrival, but got immediately into communication with leading Democrats, who were instructed by him as to Mr. Grover Cleveland’s wishes and purposes about the silver law. He succeeded in getting the names of twelve Democratic senators, whD authorized him to say that they would vote for the repeal — presumably under Sherman’s lead. Mr. Villard made a list of these pliant senators, which he personally handed to Sherman. This list was afterward reinforced by the addition of three more names. Mr. Henry Villard’s efforts on this occasion were not confined to conferences with Sherman and the Democrat- ic senators, who were to be persuaded or dragooned into voting for the repeal. He had interviews with “leading Republican senators”— from which it is to be inferred that in all matters relating to the demands of Wall Street, Grover Cleveland and the leading Republican senators, particularly Sherman, were communicating through Mr. Villard, and were acting in union. Mr. Villard was in Washington five days, and was very active and industrious; even going so far as to confer with Speaker Crisp and others — members of the House Committee on Rules — with a view to a change in the pro- cedure of the House intended to restrict debate on the repeal bill. But Congress did not act. After waiting a fortnight Cleveland dispatched a sec- ond agent, Mr. Don Manuel Dickinson, of Michigan. Dickinson appears to have been clothed with more ex- THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 18 tensive powers than Henry Villard had been, and his advent at the Capitol was announced with correspond- ingly greater impressiveness. “Don Manuel Dickinson came to the city last night, ” said a Washington dispatch to the New York Herald , under date of February 1, 1898, “and has spent the day in consultation with the Democratic leaders. The repeal of the silver law never before received such an agitation. . . The word has gone out among Democrats that this act must be re- pealed at this session. . . Mr. Cleveland has it in his power to make matters very uncomfortable for certain silver Democrats. The question of the patronage will be an important one after March 4. . . The scare is pretty general. . . There is no doubt that this second expression of President-elect Cleveland will bear fruit. He gave his first intimation when Mr. Henry Villard came to the city and consulted with Democratic members of Congress. The second cannot be misunder- stood.” In the same number of the Herald that contained this dispatch there appeared an elaborate editorial article, evidently inspired either directly by Grover Cleveland or by one of his responsible agents. “As a party man,” said the writer of this article, “as an upholder of the regular organization, as a vindicator of the machine, Mr. Cleveland will stand on firm groundwhen he declares that every aspirant for office, patronage, favor or any consideration will be expected to line up for the repeal of the silver law.” 14 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY Dispatches and editorials of a like kind with those above quoted from the Herald appeared on the same day in the Times , another New York organ of Grover Cleve- land and the National Bank presidents. IX. But Dickinson’s mission was as unsuccessful as that of Villard, and the patronage scheme turned out an utter failure. No doubt there were Democrats base enough to be influenced by it, but the great body of the party — in the Fifty-second Congress at least — stood firmly to their principles. The end of the agitation for the session was reached when both Houses, by decisive votes — the Sen- ate on February 6 and the House on February 9— re- fused to consider bills for repeal. X. The failure of the missions of Henry Villard and D. M. Dickinson, and the consequent discovery by Grover Cleveland and the New York National Bank presidents that Cleveland’s control of the Democratic party in Congress was not what had been supposed, and the cer- tainty that a majority of the members of the Fifty- third Congress were hostile to a repeal of the silver law, except in exchange for a larger use of silver, involved one of two consequences — either an abandon- ment of any attempt to procure a repeal by the Fifty- third Congress, or a resort to new and extraordinary measures. XI. But neither Mr. Grover Cleveland nor the bankers THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 15 had the slightest idea of abandoning their crusade against the silver bill. On the contrary, the determin- ation, both of Cleveland and the National Bank presi- dents for the repeal had been intensified by their defeat in the Fifty-second Congress. They resolved upon a resort to new and extraordinary measures. These meas- ures may be summed up in a single sentence — a Na- tional Bank war upon the National Industries, Commerce and Property. XII. Soon after the second inauguration of Grover Cleve- land this project of a National Bank war upon the in- dustries and commerce of the country, in order to force the repeal of the silver law, was under discussion in Wall Street. This discussion crystallized early in April, if not even in March. The proof of this is a very re- markable statement publicly made on the 18th of April, by a responsible hand familiar with Wall Street, and undoubtedly derived from Wall Street sources. This is the most important of the “pre-Panic” statements, and is valuable in its relation to that series of secret Bank- arid-Cleveland conferences that proceeded in such swift succession between the 20th and 27th of April, inclu- sive, and to the rapid development of the panic imme- diately afterward. “It is supposed by many,” said the writer of this re- markable pre-Panic statement, “that President Cleve- land would be only too glad to have some financial trouble befall the country, because it would justify the 16 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY urgent appeal made in his behalf to the Democrats of the last Congress, and would support him in appealing to the next Congress, for proper legislation” (meaning by “proper legislation” a repeal of the silver law). “But,” continued this writer, “such an impression must do the president injustice. His relations to busi- ness men and business interests are such, and his knowledge of the effects of financial disaster upon the condition and happiness of the millions is so full, that he must be a man of exceedingly callous heart to re- gard with satisfaction a serious financial storm.” XIII. Those men who want trouble usually find means for making it, and we shall now see how immediately up- on the heels of the foregoing statement Grover Cleve- land and the New York National Bank presidents joined forces to create that financial trouble believed by them to be necessary to support an appeal to the Fifty-third Congress for the repeal of the silver law. “Financial trouble” was a mild phrase to cover that immense dis- turbance and disaster to the industry, the agriculture, the commerce, the property and the social order in- tended to be inflicted upon nearly seventy millions of unsuspecting people! that filled the land with loss, consternation and distress during the year beginning with and following the 27th of April, 1898. But this enormous prospective social and industrial disturbance and suffering did not in the least appal either the New York National Bank presidents or Grover Cleveland, THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 17 for they knew that of the bolts about to fall upon the country none would strike them ! XIV. What I allege in this pamphlet is a criminal conspi- racy between New York National and other bankers and certain Federal officers hereinafter named, which conspiracy had for its object deliberate extensive in jury to the agriculture, the industry, the commerce and the property of the American people, and to alarm and distress their minds — by banking operations — with a view to coerce them and their representatives in Con- gress to a particular act, to-wit: The repeal of the silver act of July 14, 1890; which conspiracy was act- ually carried into effect with the result intended. XV. What is criminal conspiracy? Criminal conspiracy is a corrupt combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to commit a crim- inal or unlawful act, or an act not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means, or an act which would tend to prejudice the public in general, io subvert justice, disturb the peace, injure public trade, affect public health or violate public policy; or any act, however innocent, by means neither criminal nor unlawful, where the tendency of the object would be to wrongfully coerce or oppress either the public or an individual. There can be no doubt, that by the common law, all 18 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY such confederacies as those described are highly crim- inal; and it is sufficient, to constitute the offense, if two or more persons, in any manner, through any con- trivance — positively or tacitly — come to a mutual understanding to accomplish a criminal or unlawful design; the gist of the offense being the fraudulent and corrupt combination with the intent that injury shall result. The agreement may be express or implied; the conspirators need not even be acquainted with each other, and it is not essential that any but the leading conspirator shall know the exact part which each is to perform. The common design is the essence of the crime of conspiracy, and it is not necessary to prove that the persons charged came together and actually agreed in terms to that design, and to pursue it by common means. If they pursued by their acts the same object often by the same means, one performing one part and another another part of the same, so as to complete it with a view to the attainment of that same object, the jury will be justified in the conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object. All confederates in a common design, of which the offense of conspiracy is a part, are principals; and all concerned in the execution of the common pur- pose are alike guilty. An accessory before the fact is one who, being absent at the time the crime is committed, yet procures, coun- sels, encourages, incites or commends another to com- mit the crime. THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 19 Conspiracy is a substantive offense, complete in itself, and is punishable at common law, although noth- ing has been done in execution of its purpose. The of- fense is complete when the confederacy is made; if overt acts are charged in the indictment, and are sustained by proof, such acts are matters of aggravation, or evi- dences of crime; for an overt act, wherever committed, is a renewal of the original conspiracy by all the con- spirators. The proof of conspiracy may be direct or circum- stantial; the joint assent of minds, like all other parts of a criminal case, may be established by an inference of the jury from the other facts proved. As a matter of fact, criminal conspiracies are mostly confederacies in which the parties are pledged or sworn to secrecy; and in such cases proof can only be made by the treach- ery of participants or by circumstantial evidence; whence it is that there is no occasion to prove the act- ual fact of the conspiracy; it may be collected from all the collateral circumstances of the case. (See English and American Encyclopedia of Law; Tomlin’s and Bouvier’s Law Dictionaries.) XVI. On the 11th of April, 1893, Grover Cleveland ap- pointed Conrad N. Jordan to be Assistant Treasurer of the United States, vice E. H Roberts, resigned. The sub-Treasury at New York is a highly important office. It is the great business establishment of the federal government — it is one of the Associated Banks 20 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY of New York; and the importance of its functions may be estimated when it is known that its aggregate re- ceipts and disbursements in the three fiscal years, 1891, 1892 and 1893, were more than seven and a half thou- sands of millions of dollars. Jordan’s appointment was a conspicuous departure from Grover Cleveland’s publicly announced purpose, that he would not reappoint ex-officeholders of his former administration. Of these Conrad N. Jordan was one. He had been United States Treasurer from June, 1885, to May, 1887, when he resigned to become President of the Western National Bank of New York, an institution organized principally by himself and Secretary Dan Manning, and of which Manning was president at the time of his death. But if Jordan’s appointment to be sub-Treasurer was in violation of one of Grover Cleveland’s principles of official action, it was strictly in line with another — that of his intended use of the federal patronage to force the repeal of the silver law. Jordan became — under his second appointment — one of the most active and efficient of the federal agents of that repeal. He became— under his second appointment — the confiden- tial intermediary between Grover Cleveland and the New York National Bank presidents in their joint- ope- rations for a National Bank war upon the national in- dustries, commerce and property; and doubtless, his selection was made, in part at least, with this function in view. He was well known to Grover Cleveland. In- THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 21 deed, he was Grover Cleveland’s personal friend, and the New York National Bank presidents had unani- mously joined in recommending him for the sub-Treas- ury. He was therefore satisfactory to the National Bank presidents and to the other bankers of New York. XVII. Jordan was confirmed on April 15. On the 20th and 21sfc he was in Washington with his bonds, which were duly approved. While in Washington at this time he had repeated interviews with Grover Cleveland, the character of which is easily to be inferred from what followed. It is enough to say, in this place, that from the hour that Jordan’s bonds were approved, events of supreme importance to the American people moved with an astonishing rapidity between Wall Street and the White House through the agency of this man. His mission as confidential mutual friend was brief, but was full of evil. Jordan returned from Washington to New York on Friday, April 21, and arrived in the latter city at about 5:30 in the afternoon. He went directly from the rail- way station to the Chase National Bank, 15 Nassau Street, where his coming was awaited by Henry W. Cannon, president of the Chase National, and J. Ed- ward Simmons, president of the Fourth National — two of the most restless and active of the ten or twelve par- ticularly restless and active men who constitute the controlling force in the Associated Banks, and who constitute also the “New York National Bank Ring.” 22 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY A short-, but certainly an important meeting took place between these three men, for as a consequence of it Cannon went to Washington on a midnight train. He arrived in that city on Saturday morning, April 22, and stayed there until Sunday afternoon, April 23, in the meantime “interviewing” with Grover Cleveland. It was alleged that he carried to Washington a propo- sition from the New York bankers, but “was disin- clined to talk,” and would not say what the bankers’ proposition was — whether it was for panic or something else; although he was willing to say, that “he believed his visit would bear fruit. ” In view of what passed betweQn Cleveland and the New York National Bank presidents within the next six or seven days, in all of which Cannon was most actively concerned, it is quite certain that his visit did bear fruit, such as it was. XVIII. Jordan was sworn into office Saturday morning, April 22. His first official or semi-official act, after taking the oath of office and then possession of the sub-Treas- ury, was to arrange a meeting with certain National Bank presidents in the afternoon; and a meeting took place accordingly in the Manager’s Room at the Clear- ing House — “Clearing House” being the high-sounding title of an office on the third floor of the Chase Nation- al Bank building, in which the daily balances due to and from the several banks belonging to the Clearing House are ascertained — an operation usually performed by inferior clerks, and effected in forty to sixty minutes. THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 23 The National Bank presidents who met Jordan on this occasion were George G. Williams, president of the Chemical National; Ebenezer K. Wright, president of the Park National; George F. Baker, president of the First National ; Edward H. Perkins, Jr., president of the Importers’ and Traders’ National; James T. Wood- ward, president of the Hanover National; R. M. Gal- loway, president of the Merchants’ National; and Wil- liam A. Nash, president of the Corn Exchange (a State) Bank. This meeting was said to have been informal, and its proceedings were secret; both Jordan and the bankers refusing to give any information about it. But it was an important meeting; one in which, for some reason, Grover Cleveland was so deeply interested that Jordan went to Washington on a late evening train specially to make report of its proceedings. He went to the White House early on Sunday morning, and had a long conference with Grover Cleveland, at which Can- non was present. XIX. Jordan was extremely secretive in his movements at Washington on this occasion — taking a room at a hotel without registering; trying also to escape the observa- tion of the newspaper men, in which, however, he does not appear to have been wholly successful. Like Can- non, he would not talk; he refused to make any state- ment as to the object of his sudden reappearance at the Capitol within forty-eight hours after leaving it to take possession of his office in New York. But it was al- 24 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY ready observed that he was acting as the “confidential mutual friend” of Grover Cleveland and the New York bankers; and it was also observed that, for some unex- plained reason, a sudden excessive secrecy was being practiced as to matters between the Treasury and the New York bankers by all connected with the depart- ment, “Mr. Jordan,” said one who was watchful of passing events, “has become as secretive as Mr. Car- lisle.” XX. Jordan and Cannon left Washington in the afternoon, and arrived back at New York late in the evening of Sunday, April 23. Before leaving Washington, Jordan wired certain National Bank presidents to meet him at a private house uptown, immediately on his arrival; and to a man the National Bank presidents responded. The bankers present on this occasion were Henry W. Cannon, president of the Chase National Bank; J. Ed- ward Simmons, president of the Fourth National ; James T. Woodward, president of the Hanover National ; and Brayton Ives, president of the Western National. What took place at this meeting is known only to Con- rad N. Jordan and the participating National Bank presidents and their confederates, but it will be agreed that it must have been a matter of extreme interest, or of extreme urgency, or both, that led to this late Sun- day night council — and it goes without saying that this late Sunday night council was a consequence of the con- ference between Cannon, Jordan and Cleveland, at the THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 25 White House in Washington on Sunday morning. It was preliminary to a more important meeting of the bankers on the next day, as we shall now see. XXI. On Monday morning, April 24, Jordan was early at his office in the sub-Treasury. He had exceedingly im- portant business in hand; for his reappearance at his desk was followed by an immediate notification to Na- tional Bank presidents, to officers of trust and other com- panies, to members and representatives of the great and foreign banking houses, and to private bankers in and about Wall Street, that he desired them to meet him at the sub-Treasury. XXII. The bankers responded promptly; and from the hour that Wall Street opened for business that morning un- til after the lighting of lamps and gas in the evening, the sub-Treasurer’s office was filled with bankers com- ing and going, and in conference with each other and the sub-Treasurer, some of them coming and going twice. Conspicuous among these latter was George S. Coe, president of the American Exchange National Bank. XXIII. In fact, the New York National Bank presidents and their confederates were holding a general convention — divided into sections, so to speak; or conferences formal and informal. The formal conferences were between Jordan and the National Bank presidents; at 26 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY which, however, ex-Secretary of the Treasury Charles S. Fairchild was present a part of the time; and they lasted from half-past ten in the morning until nearly three in the afternoon — after which began a series of informal conferences, that lasted until late in the even- ing. XXIV. The early forenoon comers were the National Bank presidents with whose names the reader is already fa- miliar: Henry W. Cannon, president of the Chase Na- tional; J. Edward Simmons, president of the Fourth National; George S. Coe, president of the American Exchange National; Brayton Ives, president of the Western National; and Charles J. Canda, an ex-Sub- Treasurer at New York and a director in the Western Na- tional Bank. These men arrived at about half-past ten. Ex-Secretary Fairchild joined them at near twelve o’clock— and still later, at about one o’clock, other National Bank presidents came in. These were Ebenezer K. Wright, president of the Park National; George G. Williams, president of the Chemical National; Fred- erick D. Tappen, president of the Gallatin National; James Stillman, president of the National City Bank; James T. Woodward, president of the Hanover Nation- al; Edward H, Perkins, Jr., president of the Importers’ and Traders’ National; and George F. Baker, president of the First National. These National Bank presidents were closeted with Jordan until near three o’clock in the afternoon, when they retired. 27 THE BANKERS* CONSPIRACY They were succeeded by members or representatives of the great foreign banking houses, among them August Belmont, representative of the American business of N. M. Rothschild & Sons, London; next came a mem- ber of Speyer & Co., of the banking house of Speyer Brothers, London — followed by J. Hood Wright, of Drexel, Morgan & Co. Then came officers of Trust and other companies; among them one Trenholm, a former Comptroller of the Currency — and then members of private banking houses. In short, most of the financial magnates in and about Wall Street participated or were represented in this extraordinary convention at some time during the day or evening. It was in continuous session during a period of eight or nine hours; constantly changing in mem- bership, however, except as to Jordan, who was present from beginning to end. It was unprecedented in the history of “The Street,” and its most extraordinary feature was that every banker or other person participat- ing was pledged to secrecy; and the historic fact is , that the subject-matter of that convention is as completely buried in mystery now as it was the day it was held , and prob- ably it never will be known until it is wrung from the bankers in the Courts of Justice . The gravity of its con- clusions is indicated by the fact that they were that night sent to Grover Cleveland by special messenger. XXV. Although a veil of secrecy has been drawn over the THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY proceedings of this twenty-fourth of April convention by its members, it is not in the least difficult to pene- trate its motives. This Convention was called for the purpose of collecting the votes of the National , and other hankers in and about Wall Street , upon a proposition to assail the National Industry, Agriculture , Commerce , Property and Social Order of the American People , the assault to he engineered by the New York National Bank presidents , as the swiftest and surest means of coercing Congress and the country into a repeal of the Silver Law ; with the result , that the practi- cally unanimous vote of the hankers was favorable to that assault. XXVI. It is not conceivable, and it is in the highest degree improbable, that the nine National Bank presidents who met John G. Carlisle at the Williams House on April 27, would have entered upon so lawless and dan- gerous an enterprise as an industrial and commercial panic, after less than twenty minutes’ talk with Car- lisle on the subject, if they had not first been fully assured of the approval and cooperation of the whole Wall Street gang. This implies, of course, that arrange- ments for the proposed panic were made on April 24; and the promptness with which the National Bank presidents, who were to engineer it, began their opera- tions after the meeting with Carlisle on the 27th, is proof that the preliminary arrangements actually had THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 29 been made on the 24th. A further implication is that the conclusions of the convention were sent to Cleve- land for his approval; that he approved them, and that John G. Carlisle met the National Bank presidents at the Williams House on April 27 for the purpose of communicating that approval; the Secretary of the Treasury being the most responsible agent who could be selected. XXVII. On the 25th of April, John G. Carlisle wrote to Jordan that he would be in New York at 10:30 in the evening of the next day, and would meet the bankers, apparently, immediately on his arrival. This letter, which reached Jordan on the morning of the 26th, led to a conference at the sub-Treasury in the afternoon, between Jordan, J. Edward Simmons of the Fourth National Bank, George F. Baker of the First National, and Frederick D. Tappan of the Gallatin National, to arrange for a reception and meeting with Grover Clever land’s Envoy-Extraordinary on April 27. XXVIII. Thursday, April 27, was “Columbus Day,” — a bank and general holiday in New York; the day of the great international naval review, at which Grover Cleveland and his cabinet were to be present. This was a peculiar day upon which the Secretary of the Treasury and the National Bank presidents were to meet, but a partic- ularly convenient one for the purpose. 80 THE BANKERS 5 CONSPIRACY Grover Cleveland and his party — including Carlisle — arrived according to program at 10:80 in the even- ing of the 26th. Carlisle was met at the railway sta- tion by Charles J. Canda, who accompanied him to the Victoria Hotel, and remained with him until a late hour in the night. XXIX. About half-past four o’clock the next afternoon, — April 27 — the public exercises of the day being over, Mr. Carlisle was met at the Victoria Hotel by J. Edward Sim- mons. A carriage had been provided, in which Simmons and Carlisle were driven to the private residence of George G. Williams, president of the Chemical National Bank, where nine National Bank presidents were assembled — as follows: George G. Williams, president of the Chemical Na- tional Bank; Edward H. Perkins, Jr., president of the Importers’ and Traders’ National Bank; Frederick D, Tappon, president of the Gallatin National Bank (this man has been described as “The Bank Dictator of America;” a portentous title); James T. Woodward, president of the Hanover National Bank; Bray ton Ives, president of the Western National Bank; Henry W. Cannon, president of the Chase National Bank; George S. Coe, president of the American Exchange National Bank; W. W. Sherman, president of the Na- tional Bank of Commerce; J. Edward Simmons, presi- dent of the Fourth National Bank. Conrad N. Jordan and Charles J. Canda were also present THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 31 XXX. Carlisle and the National Bank presidents met each other with an effusive cordiality. There were mutual expressions of admiration and respect. The meeting was marked by the most cordial spirit on the part both of the Secretary and the New York bankers. . . The bankers recognized the difficulties of Mr. Carlisle’s posi- tion, and Carlisle, in his turn, thanked the bankers for their expressions of sympathy, and declared that they gave him more pleasure than anything that had hap- pened in a long time. These were extremely affecting preliminaries. XXXI. After they were over, “business” being in order, the National Bank presidents proposed an issue of bonds, with a view — as they professed — to protect the public credit, of which, it appears, these National Bank pres- idents are the self-constituted particular custodians and guardians. But the National Bank presidents per- fectly well knew, when they met the Secretary, that there was to be no issue of bonds; and their proposition for an issue was intended either as a blind for the pub- lic as to the motive of this conference, or because the New York National Bank presidents never come within ear-shot of a federal officer of any rank without an in- stant lunatic paroxysm for an issue of bonds. XXXII. Mr. Carlisle, in his reply to this proposition of the National Bank presidents, does not appear to have 32 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY dwelt at any great length on the matter of a . bond issue. He expressed his strong repugnance to an issue of bonds, and left it to be inferred that he looked upon an issue as a last resort. The subject-matter really in hand was the repeal of the silver law, and he expressed his opposition to any use of the government credit that might prove an impediment to repeal. As to the silver law, Mr. Carlisle was sufficiently hostile to it to satisfy even the malignant National Bank presidents. He assailed it with great bitterness. There was apparently no evil in the body-politic that he did not ascribe to the operation of that law. In fact, he denounced the whole body of the financial and currency laws, and declared the necessity for their revision and reorganization — the beginning of which, he said, must be the early, uncon- ditional and absolute repeal of the silver law. XXXIII. There was nothing in the least new, or at all start- ling, in these views of Mr. Secretary Carlisle. The early and immediate unconditional repeal of the silver law had been a cry of the New York National Bank presidents, raised coincidently with the passage of the law; there had been but little or no intermission in its repetition since, and Grover Cleveland, both by persua- sions and threats, had attempted to force the repeal at the second session of the Fifty-second Congress. But the Secretary now made a statement so alarming, so atrocious and incendiary, that, if the National Bank presidents had been anything but what they were — THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 38 men of the most reckless purposes, with whom the pro- posal to commit an infamous outrage upon the people was already familiar— they would have assailed him with indignant protests and denunciations. XXXIV. But the West and the South, according to the Secre- tary, and as was the fact, were against the repeal of the silver law. They were so wedded to the use of silver that they would not consent to the repeal except in ex- change for free coinage. Grover Cleveland never would consent to free coinage. He was unalterably opposed to free coinage, and was resolved upon the repeal of the Sherman law with as little delay as possible. A 'prac- tical demonstration to the business men of the South and the West of the injurious effects of that law upon their trade and finances might be necessary to convert the fanat- ics of that section to vote for the repeal; and Grover Cleveland had come to the conclusion that if the object lesson of a panic, and the distress that monetary stringency would cause , were necessary to secure the repeal , the Administration icould do nothing to prevent it or to allay alarm. XXXV. It is not pretended that the foregoing were the exact words used by Mr. John G. Carlisle in his address to the National Bank presidents, but they convey very succinctly the substance of what he said; and in part at least — those with respect to the “object lesson of a pan- ic” — are so nearly his words that to distinguish them 34 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY would probably be difficult. By an object lesson was meant an attack by the New York National Bank presi- dents and their confederates, by banking operations, upon the industrial and commercial communities, and most particularly those of the South and West, with a design to disorganize credit, to explode banks, to shut down mills and factories, to bankrupt merchants, to produce, in short, by banking operations, so widespread and intolerable a state of business and social disorder and suffering among all classes, rich and poor, as to create pressure from every quarter for the repeal of the silver law — to which all these universal ills were to be systematically ascribed. XXXVI. This was the atrocious scheme of outrage and spolia- tion of the industrial, agricultural and commercial communities wrapped up in the proposed infamous “Object-Lesson.” XXXVII. Now, did any one of the nine National Bank presi- dents, or did Conrad N. Jordan or Charles J. Canda, show the least sign of astonishment, alarm, distress, or even surprise, when Mr. Carlisle made his astounding statement that a National Bank war upon the national prosperity was approved by Grover Cleveland? No. Did any one of the nine National Bank presidents, or did either Conrad N. Jordan or Charles J. Canda, make any protest, even the slightest, that a National THE BANKERS 5 CONSPIRACY 35 Bank war upon the industrial and commercial commu- nities would be an outrage immeasurably wicked, cruel, indefensible, infamous and criminal? No. Did any one of the nine National Bank presidents show or express any disinclination whatever to join in this proposed cruel, infamous and criminal National Bank war upon the industrial and commercial com- munities? No. On the contrary, the nine National-Bank presidents and Messrs. Conrad N. Jordan and Charles J. Canda were at the Williams House conference in the expecta* tion that Mr. Carlisle would make — at least in sub- stance — precisely the delivery that he did make. If any proof of this were needed, it is to be found in the fact that, within twenty-five minutes after that delivery was made, the conference broke up. There was great harmony. The Secretary of the Treasury, the nine Na- tional Bank presidents, and Messrs. Conrad N. Jordan and Charles J. Canda, were in perfect accord— they shook hands all round— and separated as effusively as' they had met. They understood each other perfectly, XXXVIII. This meeting lasted about one hour, and was the last of that series of extraordinary and unprecedented secret- bank conferences in New York, and confidential Bank- Cleveland communications between Wall Street and the White House, that had been in progress during THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY seven consecutive days. The motive for their contin- uance no longer existed. The preliminaries had all been arranged. The conclusion had been reached, and there would be no more meetings. XXXIX. An immense calamity now impended over the Amer- ican people; a calamity that was to break upon them within the next forty-eight hours. XL. Mr. Carlisle is said to have been exceedingly reticent about what had passed at the Williams ‘House meeting. He did not want to talk about it, either before it took place, or after it was over. He adopted a policy of excessive secrecy. He shrouded all his movements in mystery, and declined to see newspaper representatives. The National Bank presidents were not so reserved. Crafty, cowardly, contemptible and disloyal, in their partnership of evil — gratified at the prospect of mis- chief, but shrinking from its penalties, they promptly “squealed” to an extent that revealed their purpose to put the whole responsibility of their intended crime upon the shoulders of Grover Cleveland and his Sec- retary of the Treasury XLI. The National Bank presidents — everything being now arranged and understood — were eager for the assault; so eager that one of them, it is alleged, went directly from the Williams-House meeting to a telegraphic sta- THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 37 don in the near neighborhood, and began operations within thirty minutes after it had adjourned. It is en- tirely certain that within twenty hours the whole New York National Bank confederates were in action, with destructive effect. XLIL At the time of this meeting between the Secretary of the Treasury and the New York National Bank presi- dents, there was no sign of the coming industrial and commercial storm visible anywhere in the country; and it is the concurrent testimony of the commercial and industrial journals, of the mercantile agencies, and of important political men of both the great par- ties, during the Extraordinary Session of 1893, that the industry and traffic of the country were in a sound and conservative state. If low prices and small profits are a sign of soundness and conservatism, then the country undoubtedly was, on the 27th of April, 1893, in an eminently satisfactory condition. XLIII. But within one month after that meeting the New York National Bank presidents had made a startling change. That this change was not due to any of the ordinary conditions or casualties that, produce monetary storm, Grover Cleveland has voluntarily testified “Our unfortunate financial plight, ” said that person in a message sent by him to Congress at the opening of the Extraordinary Session, on August 7, 1893, “is not the result of untoward events, nor of conditions relat- 38 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY ing to our natural resources; nor is it traceable to any of the afflictions which frequently check national growth and prosperity.” Grover Cleveland made this statement without misgiving of any kind* — for he knew absolutely the facts whereof he spoke. “With plente- ous crops,” he continued, “with abundant promise of remunerative production and manufacture; with unusual invitation to safe investment, and with satisfac- tory assurance to business enterprise, suddenly finan- cial distrust and fear have sprung up on every side.” XLIV. Yes — by conspiracy and treason, financial distrust and fear had suddenly sprung up on every side! XLV. According to the bankers’ pregram, the projected object-lesson was to begin in New York City— in the Stock Exchange. It did so begin— and those conditions of activity and confidence that had prevailed in the Exchange at the close cf business on the 26th of April —the 27th being a bank and general holiday — were wholly reversed within forty-eight hours after the Wil- liams-House meeting had adjourned; so immediately — so instantly, indeed— did the conspiring National Bank presidents begin their work of outrage and ruin ! XL VI. But it was not until Monday, the 1st of May — four days after the Williams-House meeting — that the con- federated bankers showed their infamous, brutal teeth THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 39 in good earnest, when they made an attack upon Stock Exchange prices, that was kept up without relaxation for five successive days. May 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, were days of a continuous vindictive calling of loans; an extensive and merciless sacrifice of collaterals, and of heavy shrinkages in values, with resulting collapse and ruin to thousands of unfortunate borrowers. The 5th of May was a day of immense strain and danger, which, for some hours, was of the most threatening character —arrested, it was said, in part at least, by the inter- ference of W. K. Vanderbilt and Robert Goelet. The Herald , on May 6, devoted an entire page to a descrip- tion of the Stock Exchange as it exhibited itself on the 5th The Tribune of the same date, referring to the events of the 5th, said: u The enormous losses of the last week, the utter demoralization of buying power in the market, and the practical paralysis of credit, promised a liquidation that, unless stayed, would have swept them all off their feet.” XLVIX. On the 7th of May, the Tribune made this further statement: “The effort of the administration to bring the South and the West to a full realization of the inevitable consequences of compulsory purchases of silver bullion , has brought distress and perhaps ruin to many innocent per- sons' — but there is no reason to suppose that it will be re- laxed . ” No — there was no reason to suppose that the National Bank miscreants were going to relax their infamous system for even one moment. 40 THE BANKERS* CONSPIRACY XLVIII. While these operations were going on in New York, the withdrawal and restriction of credits had begun and were going forward elsewhere; and by means of that subtle telegraphy that goes from bank to bank and from city to city, preparations for the great storm, within ten days, extended from the Atlantic to the Pa- cific. The storm broke about the 9th of May by the sudden, unexpected explosion of several Western banks; and within forty days thereafter, the National Bank presidents and their confederates had created a state of universal excitement and consternation; a condition that illustrated, at the same moment, the enormous power of these National Bank miscreants — their abso- lute control of the National Banking institutions of the country — and the relentless, cold-blooded cruelty with which they put their power and control into action. XLIX. “There is no lack of pressure,” said the New York Tribune on the 22d of May — referring to the disas- trous course of events above described, and perfectly informed of the continued operations of the National Bank presidents to distress and ruin business men of the South and the West in order to force a repeal of the silver law — “there is no lack of pressure.” There was no lack of pressure, indeed. “Pressure” was visible everywhere in the hourly-increasing panic and prostra- tion of the country — in the midst of which the National THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 41 Bank presidents were steadily at work with a fierce brutality absolutely indescribable and wholly appalling — striking — striking — striking — L. On the seventh of June — six weeks after the Williams-House meeting — the New York Sun in its money article, said, among other things, that, “The presidents of the New York banks think that the so-called Object-Lesson has been carried far enough,” . . . and that . . . “they see nothing to be gained by a further shrinkage in values and unset- tling of credits.” LI. The National Bank presidents, secure in their mar- ble and granite castles in and about Wall Street, were of opinion, then, on the 7th of June, 1893, that their so-called Object-Lesson had been carried far enough, and that enough shrinkage of values and unsettling of credits had been effected to justify them in taking a brief rest from their infernal labors. They had pro- duced immense effects, as was witnessed in the paraly- sis of industry and commerce everywhere throughout the nation. They had exploded banks; they had closed mills and factories, until multitudes of men and women were out of employ — many of them hungry and a'l of them in distress — and they had bankrupted, and were bankrupt r? merchants and manufacturers on every side. The South and West were being educated! edu- 42 THE bankers’ conspiracy cated by disaster and ruin deliberately inflicted. The South and the West — the tributary sections — were being taught that they have a Master in Wall Street! LII. Apparently the National Bank anarchists were tired. But they were not. They were merely resting, if indeed they were even resting. Evidently the country was not yet ready for capitulation; there was much yet to be done before it was fully ripe for that projected extra session of Congress that was to score their victory over the rebellious South and West — and the bankers wrought on. Moreover, they were waiting for the ac- tion of British confederates. Lin. By the 30th of June the culmination had been reached. From that date onward to the middle of October, THE NEW YORK NATIONAL BANK PRES- IDENTS’ WAR UPON THE NATIONAL PROSPER- ITY was tremendously at its flood; raging in the South, the West and the Northwest with overwhelming force, and powerfully disturbing also the Middle, the Eastern and the Northeastern States — thus fulfilling, in all its parts, the Williams-House program. LIV. The condition of the country, on the 30th of June, was — as above stated — one of immense storm and stress; greatly aggravated, as respected the silver ques- tion, by a sudden blow from an unexpected quarter } PHE BANKERS* CONSPIRACY 48 This was the closure of the British-Indian Mints, by an order of the Indian Government on June 25, against the further free coinage of silver; and the fixing of a rate of British-Indian exchange, which had for its ob- ject a further depression in the price of silver bullion. LV. This attack upon silver by the British-Indian govern- ment — with which the people of India had absolutely nothing whatever to do; against which, indeed, they earnestly protested; with which ninety-nine hundredths of the British people had nothing to do, and which was opposed to the best interests both of Great Britain and her Indian Empire, as events have proved,— was re- ceived by Wall Street, its allies, its mercenaries and panderers, in Congress and out, with a yell of exul- tation. The Tribune announced the news in startling headlines: “A blow at silver values. The action of In- dia severely depresses the white metal, stimulating repeal sentiment. The silver men are dumb.” Some of the silver men were, indeed, stricken with a kind of paralysis; but does any man, in the possession of his senses, suppose that this closure of the Indian mints against silver was accidental at this time? That this action of the British confederates of Wall Street did stimulate, and was intended to stimulate, the repeal sentiment, admits of no doubt whatever. It was a part of the most extended conspiracy in the history of the nations. It was at this moment of storm and stress every- 44 THE BANKERS 5 CONSPIRACY where throughout the country, when the sudden unex- pected reinforcement of the New York National Bank assassins by their British allies was calculated power- fully to influence the public sentiment of the American people to their designs, that, on June 30, Grover Cleve- land issued his call for an Extraordinary Session of Congress, to meet on the 7th of August following — u To the end,” said that person, “that the people may be re- lieved through legislation (meaning the repeal of the silver law) from the present and impending danger and distress.” Congress met accordingly on the 7th of August, and after three months of hot debate and varying fortunes, passed an act for the repeal of the purchase clause of the silver law, which went into effect on November 1. THE CONSPIRACY IN ACTION. I. I have shown, in the preceding pages, how within fifteen hours after the meeting of Carlisle and the nine National Bank presidents- at the house of George G. Williams, on the afternoon of April 27, the conspiring National Bank presidents, on the next morning, April 28, made a terrific onslaught upon the New York Stock Exchange. I now propose a brief chronology, showing the progress of the devastation and ruin wrought by the assassin National Bankers; for the sake of consecu- tive statement, beginning with that attack, and ending on June 80, sixty-five days later; with a record of more than fifty banks and savings institutions wrecked by their operations between the 20th and 30th days (inclu- sive) of that month. II. This Williams-House meeting took place on Thurs- day, April 27, between half-past five and half-past six o’clock in the afternoon. On the next morning, Friday, April 28, the bank presidents attacked the New York Stock Exchange. The stock market, said the Tribune on April 30, during four days of the week, displayed remarkable strength 45 46 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY and courage, but the upward movement culminated on Friday morning — fifteen hours after the Williams- House meeting — and during the last two days, April 28 and 29, was reversed . April 30 was Sunday. Monday, Mayl — Four days after the Williams-House meeting: the National-Bank presidents renewed their attack upon the Exchange, by a vindictive calling of loans and refusal of credits. “This,” said the Times , “was a day of gloom and despondency on the Stock Exchange;” “a day of severe calling of loans by the banks; a day of heavy shrinkages.” Tuesday, May 2 — five days after the Williams-House meeting: “ The market,” said the Times , Continued to decline.” Wednesday, May 3 — six days after the Williams- House meeting: “The excitement ran high,” said the Times , “and scenes were enacted in the Stock Exchange characteristic of a day when the bottom appeared to have dropped out of half the market.” Thursday, May 4 — one week after the Williams-House meeting: “There was a further break,” said the Times. “and the excitement was even greater than on yester- day.” Friday, May 5 — eight days after the Williams-House meeting: “This,” said the Tribune , “was a day of terrible strain. The Stock Exchange trembled. . . . The enormous losses within the last week — the utter demoralization of buying-power in the market, and the THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 47 practical paralysis of credit, promised a liquidation that— unless stayed — would have carried them all off their feet.” The Herald , on May 6, devoted a whole page to the Stock Exchange as it appeared on the 5th. — Dispatches from Washington, printed in the Times , stated that “ Cleveland and Carlisle had heard of the ex- citement in the Stock Exchange with great composure. ” There was nothing in the least unexpected to them in the loss and ruin the assassin National Bank presidents were dealing among the brokers and their patrons. Saturday, May 9.— The confederated Bank presidents “let up” somewhat on this day, and “the worst,” it was said, “was over.” May 7 was Sunday. Tuesday, May 9.— Twelve days after the Williams- House meeting — A cordage factory in Brooklyn, as a consequence of the attack upon the Stock Exchange, was closed, and five hundred men, women, and young per- sons were suddenly thrown out of work. This was the first victory of the National Bank presidents over the working men, women and young people of the country. But it w r as not their last. Within sixty days multi- tudes were in idleness and distress; and daily, and al- most hourly, after the middle of July, the journals were filled with staring headlines announcing the tri- umphs of the National Bank presidents. Here are some of them taken from the Tribune : July 25. — “Pennsylvania mills suddenly closed.” July 26.— “Eastern factories shutting down. Work- men suffering from hunger.” 48 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY July 27. — “Feeding the hungry in Denver.” July 28. — “Sad news for working men. Thousands of them thrown out of work, or compelled to accept reduced wages.” July 29. — “Thousands of men out of work. Mills and mines closing all over the country.” July 30. — “Suspensions and curtailments in estab- lishments great and small.” August 2. — “Workmen everywhere depressed.” August 4. — “Fall River mills closed; 700,000 spindles idle.” “Destitute workmen in Cleveland.” This kind of quotations might be made sufficient to fill a volume. They w r ere delightful reading for the National Bank presidents, their allies and mercenaries — for every man, woman and youth, driven from labor to anxiety and want, was a new triumph for “sound finance.” III. It was upon this day, May 9, that the operations for injury to the South and West began to take effect, and to show themselves in the explosion of banks, and the failure or suspension of merchants, traders and manu- facturers, in various quarters. The chronology that follows is confined almost wholly to the effects on bank- ing institutions: Tuesday, May 9. — Twelve days after the Williams- House meeting. — The Chemical National Bank of Chi- cago failed. A Michigan Savings Bank failed. THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 49 Wednesday, May 10. — Thirteen days after the Wil- liams-House meeting. — The Columbia National Bank of Chicago and the Capital National Bank of Indian- apolis failed. A private bank in Wisconsin and another in Delaware failed. Thursday, May 11. — Two weeks after the Williams- House meeting.— Many banks closed their doors on this day — four State banks in Indiana and one in Georgia; eight private banks — four in Indiana, three in Ohio, and one in Wisconsin — thirteen in all — failed. May 13.— Three more private banks — one in Ohio, one in Indiana and one in Florida — failed. May 14. — Eight more banks gave way under sudden pressure: A private bank in Illinois, one in Colorado and another in Michigan; two State banks in Indiana, two in Minnesota, and one in South Carolina, closed their doors May 16.— A State bank in Indiana; a National Bank in Iowa; a private bank in Ohio and another in Indiana, failed. May 18.— The Exchange Bank, Bloomington, Illi- nois; the First National and the Oglethorpe National Banks, Brunswick, Georgia; the Evanston National, Evanston, Illinois; Citizens’ Bank, Minneapolis; two private banks in Michigan, a private bank in Indiana, and another in Illinois — nine in all — closed their doors. May 20. — A State bank in Georgia, a Loan and Trust Company in Minnesota, and two private banks in In- diana, failed. 50 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY May 22. — The National Bank of Elmira, New York, and a private bank in Michigan, failed. May 24. — The National Bank of Deposit, New York, failed. May 26. — A private bank in Michigan and another in Ohio; a State bank in Ohio and one in Georgia were forced under. May 80. — Two private banks in Iowa; one in Arkan- sas; a National Bank in Georgia, and two in Dakota closed their doors. IV. The record for twenty-one days in May — from the 9th to the 30th, inclusive — was sixty banks exploded in fourteen different states, stretching from Florida to Dakota! fifty-eight in the doomed sections — the South, the West and the Northwest. V. The record for June shows that in that month the number of banks exploded was twice that of May; which was partly due, however, to the extreme con- sternation and excitement that had now been created in all quarters of the country, and which led to a with- drawal of cash funds by bank depositors. VI. June 1. — A State bank in Wisconsin and a National Bank in Washington failed. June 2. — Two private banks — one in Illinois and one in Ohio — failed. THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 51 June 4. — “A crash in Chicago” — Meadowcroft Broth- ers failed. Two National Banks in North Dakota and a private bank in Illinois, failed. June 6. — Ten banks collapsed this day: An Ohio savings bank closed its doors. A National Bank in Texas. Three private banks— one in Michigan, one in Wisconsin and one in Washington— suspended. A sav- ings bank, three National banks, and a State bank, in Washington, were forced under. June 7. — Two State banks in Indiana; a savings bank in Ohio and another in Wisconsin; a private bank in Illinois and a State bank in Nebraska failed. June 9. — A private bank and two savings banks failed in Wisconsin; two private banks in Illinois and one in Alabama went down. June 10. — A State bank in Iowa; a private bank in Georgia and another in Washington, failed June 12. — A State bank in Michigan and one in Utah; a private bank in Ohio and a private bank in Kansas, closed their doors. June 13, 14. — A savings bank in Nebraska, a sav- ings bank in Tennessee, a State bank in Washington, a State bank in Indiana, a State bank in California, and a private bank in Ohio, were forced under. June 15, 16. — U A Kansas bank goes down.” A Na- tional Bank in Iowa, and another in Ohio, failed. A State bank in Minnesota, a State bank in Ohio, a pri- vate bank in Kansas, and a private bank in Oregon, failed. U. OF fLL. LIB. 52 THE bankers’ conspiracy June 17, 19. — A savings bank in Tennessee ; two State banks in North Carolina; a State bank in California; two private banks, a National Bank and a State bank in Oregon, failed. June 20. — Nine banks was this day’s record. “A North Carolina bank suspends.” A private bank in Ohio and another in Oregon, failed. A savings bank in Tennessee; two State banks in California and a State bank in Minnesota, failed. Two National Banks in California went under. June 21, 22 —“Banks still shutting down.” “Pri- vate bankers at Buffalo assign.” Eleven California State banks and four California National Banks, sus- pended. A State bank in Missouri; a savings bank in Ohio; a private bank in New York and another in Pennsylvania, all stopped business. Twenty establish- ments in two days! June 23 — A National Bank in Indiana; a National Bank in California; a savings bank in California; a State bank in Minnesota, another in Ohio, a third in California, a fourth in New York, failed. June 24. — A State bank in Kansas; a National Bank in Washington, and a savings bank in California failed. June 26. — “More Western banks go under.” “An- other Buffalo bank suspends. ” A State bank in Cali- fornia, and another in New York, are closed. A private bank in Ohio; a private bank in Minnesota and an- other in Georgia, are forced under. — News was received of the closure of the Indian Mint against the free coin- THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 53 age of silver by orderof the British-Indian government; a movement clearly in confederation with the New York National Bank presidents’ panic operations against the silver in the United States. June 27, 28. — A private bank in Illinois; a private bank in Montana; three private banks in Minnesota and one in New York; a State bank in Minnesota; a State bank in Pennsylvania ; a Loan and Trust Company in Minnesota ; a Loan and Trust company in Iowa — ten in all — went down. June 30. — Three more banks close their doors; and Grover Cleveland called an Extraordinary Session of Congress to meet on August 7 following: “To the end,” as he alleged, “that the people might be relieved through legislation (meaning a repeal of the silver law) from the present and impending danger and distress.” VII. Without further pursuing in detail the daily effects of the New York National Bank presidents’ Na- tional Bank war upon the business and property of the country — which was continued with little or no abate- ment till the middle of October — the general results at the end of the year may be briefly summed up: Between April 27 — the day of the Williams-House meeting — and the 30th of December, 1893, a period of eight months, more than fifteen thousand bankruptcies and suspensions of commercial and industrial concerns and companies had taken place; and more than six hundred banking institutions and banking firms had 54 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY been seriously injured or were wholly ruined. The total amount involved in the bankruptcies and suspen- sions of all these firms, companies and institutions, during these eight months, was, roundly, Seven Hun- dred and Fifty Millions of Dollars! — a vast sum, that exceeded “the record” in any previous entire year in the history of the country by more than Five Hundred Millions of Dollars ! and that exceeded the bankruptcies and suspensions of 1892 by Six Hundred and Thirty- Five Millions! Twelve hundred millions of railroad property was during that period forced into the hands of receivers, and Wall Street looters. Three millions of men, women, and young persons, who were contentedly at work in the shops, factories and mills on the 27th of April, 1893, were out of work on the 1st of January, 1894; all of them in more or less anxiety and distress, and many of them hungry and suffering. What the whole sum of sacrifice by labor has been, by reason of the National Bank assassins’, war upon industry, it is impossible accurately to measure; but the New York Tribune said, on the 29th of April, 1894, that “labor had been compelled to sacrifice from its earnings, in one year, a sum about as great as the entire national debt created by a four years’ rebellion.” What the country lost in its whole business operations may be stated with approximate accuracy. In the eight months between April 27, 1893, and January 1, 1894, it had been diminished — as was shown by the Clearing House exchanges, as compared with the immediately preceding THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 55 period of eight months — by more than seven thousand millions of dollars! (and within fifteen months after the 27th of April, 1898, by more than ten thousand millions!) VIII. These were the immediately visible stupendous changes wrought in the business and social state of the American people, between the 27th of April and the 1st of January, 1894, by the New York National Bank assassins; changes without parallel in the history of any nation in a time of peace. If it were possible to present in any point of view the whole sum of the evil and loss wrought upon the people by those men, it would be an appalling spectacle. In proof of this, I call a competent witness — George G. Williams, pres- ident of the Chemical National Bank. At a meeting of New York bankers, in the manager’s office of the Clear- ing House, on the 19th of June 1894, which was not se- cret, this man made the astounding statement, that he believed seventy-five per cent of the manufacturing and commercial business of the country to be, at that mo- ment, in the balance between solvency and insolvency! IX. Resuming now the thread of the narrative of events consequent upon the operations of the National Bank assassins, Congress met on August 7, pursuant to Grover Cleveland’s summons, and that person submitted a message in which he said, among other things, that, 56 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY “The existence of an alarming and extraordinary business situation, involving the welfare and prosperity of all our people, has constrained me to call together in extra session the people’s representatives. . . . Our unfortunate financial plight is not the result of untoward events, nor of conditions related to our nat- ural resources; nor is it traceable to any of the afflic- tions which frequently check national growth and pros- perity. With plenteous crops, with abundant promise of remunerative production and manufacture, with unusual invitation to safe investment, and with satis- factory assurance to business enterprise, suddenly financial distrust and fear have sprung up on every side.” Grover Cleveland knew precisely whereof he spoke. Washington, August 11. — William L. Wilson, of West Virginia, an agent of Grover Cleveland’s, introduced into the House of Representatives a bill for the repeal of the purchase clause of the silver law, which, August 28, — Was passed by a vote of 289 yeas to 109 noes; 5 members not voting. Of the noes 85 were Dem- ocrats and Populists, and 24 were Republicans, and, August 29, — D. W. Voorhees, of Indiana, reported the House-bill in the Senate, with an amendment to the effect that the efforts of the Government should be steadily directed to a system of bimetallism that would maintain at all times the equal power of all dollars issued by the United States in the payment of debts. This bill was debated in the Senate during the whole of September and October. THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 57 X. October 20. — The repeal bill was passed in the Sen- ate by 48 yeas to 82 noes. Of the yeas 20 were Demo- crats and 23 were Republicans. Of the noes 19 were Democrats, 9 were Republicans and 4 were Populists, XI. November 1. — The House took up the Senate amend- ment, and passed it at 3:10 p. m. The bill was imme- diately sent to Grover Cleveland, and became law by his signature at 4:30 p. m. At this moment — 4:30 p. m., November 1, 1893 — the New York National Bank presidents were tri- umphantly in the ascendant. HAS THE COUNTRY LEARNED ANYTHING? I. The New York Tribune on the 25th of November, 1893, contained an editorial, under the caption “Credits and Currency,” the first sentence of which, referring to the monetary situation, as it then existed, ran thus: “The West should surely have learned something this year.” II. It is ardently to be hoped that all the sections, the West, the South and the East, bound together by the immensity and the uniformity of their losses and suffer- ings, surely learned in 1893 that they owe a common duly to themselves, to God, and to human nature; that the power for evil of the assassin New York National Bank presidents shall be broken and destroyed, once for all; that, to this end, it is necessary that the Na- tional Banking act shall be repealed, and that fatal union of banks and State that in 1893 was productive of so much social and industrial convulsion and suffer- ing, shall be wholly severed. III. Eleven names more or less constantly obtrude them- selves in the foregoing pages, the first half-dozen on 58 THE BANKERS 1 CONSPIRACY 59 every occasion. They are those of George G. Williams, president of the Chemical National Bank; Henry W. Cannon, president of the Chase National Bank; J. Edward Simmons, president of the Fourth National Bank; Brayton Ives, president of the Western National Bank; James T. Woodward, president of the Hanover National Bank; Edward H. Perkins, Jr., president of the Importers’ and Traders’ National Bank; Ebenezer K. Wright, president of the Park National Bank ; George F. Baker, president of the First National Bank; W. W. Sherman, president of the National Bank of Com- merce; George S. Coe, president of the American Ex- change National Bank, and Frederick D. Tappen, president of the Gallatin National Bank. These men in 1898 moved the whole National Banks, from Maine to California, as if they were but one institution, to the most infamous of purposes, and there was not a Na- tional Bank president or cashier anywhere, in any State, who was not as absolutely subject to the discipline of this New York National Bankarchy as if he were an enlisted soldier, with no volition but to obey. Like a huge devil-fish, its brutal, frightful, infamous head in New York City and its tentacles everywhere, this asso- ciation of National Bank presidents crushed and de- stroyed its victims, without pity and without remorse, from one end of the land to the other. IV. The most astounding spectacle in American civil his- tory is that of ten or twelve politically irresponsible 60 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY New York National Bank presidents, or some of their number — in confederacy with other New York bank officers and bankers — holding daily secret sessions in a federal building, in conjunction with a federal officer of high rank, and in confidential communication with the federal executive, and with a view to coerce Con- gress and the country to a particular line of policy wholly in their own interest and to increase their own power, planning to assail, and then afterward actually assailing, the public prosperity, by banking operations, whereby the credits, the industry, the agriculture, the commerce and the property of the country, were design- edly injured to an enormous extent, the public peace en- dangered, the public revenues greatly diminished, and immense losses and sufferings inflicted upon millions of helpless and unoffending citizens. V. It was by means of this criminal attack by the New York National Bank presidents upon the public pros- perity that the representatives of the people in the federal Congress were controlled and coerced into a course of action, which, otherwise, the Congress would not have consented to follow. VI. Are these National Bank conspirators and their con- federates, who in 1898 caused such enormous suffering and loss; who forced the federal legislature; who, with an equal malignity, assailed all ranks and all classes, THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 61 all conditions and all ages, rich and poor, men and women, old and young, the weak, the sick, the help- less and the indigent — who, in their brutality, spared none; who carried want and misery into a million of humble homes; who impaired or destroyed the fortunes of thousands even of the rich; who enormously dimin- ished the National wealth; who, in fifteen months, decreased the active business of the country, when com- pared with an equal immediately preceding period, by more than ten thousand millions of dollars — figures four-tenths greater than the whole cost of the civil war; the sum of whose evil no man can measure, the end of whose evil no man can foresee — are the conspirators who have done all this to escape the penalty of their crime? VII. If ever there was an instance in our history when iron-handed punishment should be dealt relentlessly upon criminal men, it is in this instance. VIII. u Justice to One and All” is the heading of an editor- ial article in the New York Tribune of July 21, 1894, which demands the punishment of the leaders in the Pullman strike. But the conspiring New York Na- tional Bank presidents and their confederates are di- rectly responsible for that strike. I call George M. Pullman as my witness. “A little more than a year ago,” said Pullman in his statement to the public, printed in the New York Tribune of July 14, 1893, 62 THE BANKERS* CONSPIRACY “the car shops at Pullman were in a most prosperous condition; work was plenty, wages were high, and the condition of the employes is indicated by the fact that the local savings bank had of savings deposits nearly $700,000 — of which nearly all was the property of the employes. Our pay rolls for that year show an aver- age earning of over $600 per annum for every person — man, woman, or youth — on the roll. Then came the great panic and depression of last summer. Many customers stopped negotiations and canceled orders, and our working force had to be reduced from nearly 6,000 to about 2,000 in November. The business de- pression existing throughout the country had naturally resulted in a wage depression, and the only hope of getting orders was by bidding for work at prices as low as, or lower than, could be made by other shops, and this, of course, necessitated a reduction in the wages of the employes at Pullman.” IX. “Justice to One and All” is the demand of the Trib- une and “Offenders Who Must Not Escape” is the caption of an editorial article in the New York Even- ing Post of July 20, 1894, which demands the punish- ment of the Pullman strike leaders, and even of men who justify in writing or by speech the lawfulness of strikes and boycotts. “Justice to One and All”- is the demand of every right-minded citizen, and among the “Offenders Who Must Not Escape” are the conspiring New York National Bank presidents and their confed- THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY 68 erates of every degree and station. “This is obviously no time,” said the Tribune in its article of July 21, “to advise a relaxation of the rigors of the law.” Un- doubtedly the law must be rigidly administered, but what have the Tribune and the Evening Post to say about the conspiring New York National Bank pres- idents? Will they help me in my effort to bring them to justice? THE MOTIVE OF THE CONSPIRACY. The National Bank presidents were playing for enor- mous stakes. What those stakes were is developed in the so-called “Baltimore Plan of Currency Reform” — which was invented in New York, but was put forward by Baltimore confederates to avoid the stench of Wall Street. If this Baltimore plan or its equivalent had succeeded or does succeed, it would have been, or will be, equiv- alent to a free gift by the Federal Government to the NationalBanks of Three Hundred and Fifty Millions of paper dollars, at the very lowest possible estimate. The share of this enormous plunder going to the New York gang will be not less than Forty Millions. It was indispensable to the success of this scheme that the silver Jaw should be gotten out of the way, for so long as that law was on the statute-book this 64 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY Wall-Street-Baltimore plan was not possible; nor any plan of its kind The silver law was gotten out of the way by the infa- mous means I have described. The attempt to get rid of it by a threatened use of the federal patronage was a contemptible failure, but the Conspiracy for Panic was a stupendous success, whether considered in its relation to the enormous total of property destroyed or the im- measurable sum of mental and physical suffering in- flicted, or to its rapid subjugation of Congress to the most important step in the National Bankers’ pro- gram for power and plunder. The enactment of the “Baltimore plan,” or its equiv- alent, would be an intolerable outrage. It is the duty of Congress not to reward crime, but to punish it. The Conspiracy for Panic should be probed to its bottom, to the end that the facts shall be made known, and that every man connected with it — from the highest to the lowest — shall be as relentlessly punished as the bankers were relentless in their assault upon the well-being of the country. ADDENDUM BY THE PUBLISHERS. In directing the attention of the American people to the startling narrative contained in the foregoing pages, the National Bimetallic Union is actuated by no feel- ing of hostility to banks, as such. They are agencies of the utmost importance in modern business, and are en- titled to both encouragement and protection in every proper way. But, while properly conducted banks are most valua- ble aids to legitimate industry, it is not to be fairly denied that they can also be converted into instruments of the gravest injustice and wrong. Not long since the Michigan State grange very naively declared in one of its resolutions that the troubles of our financial situation are not so much that the govern- ment is in the banking business, as that the banks are in the government business. Those hard-headed farmers may not be very thor- oughly informed as to the merits of Kaffir stocks or the course of London exchange, but in that simple expres- sion they have stated the relation of the National Banks to American politics about as accurately as it can be done. But the reader must not lose sight of the fact that there are bankers and — bankers. 65 66 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY There are “big bankers” and there are “little bankers.” There are bankers in New York, and there are bankers elsewhere. There are bankers in our Eastern cities who are so closely connected with London finances, that they are English rather than American in their sentiments, and the opinions of a few London financiers count for more with them than the combined judgment of seventy millions of American people. The lack of patriotism among those engaged in fi- nancial transactions abroad has been frequently re- marked. It was observed in 1776 and again in 1812. It received fresh emphasis when President Cleveland’s Venezuelan message sent the fires of American patriot- ism flashing from ocean to ocean and from Lake Supe- rior to the Mexican Gulf. Almost the only note of dis- cord came from Mr. Cleveland’s friends in Wall Street, and strange to say, prominent among the objectors are found George G. Williams and J. Edward Simmons, two of the most active of the National Bank presidents named by Mr. Scliuckers. Such men would swallow the American Eagle plum- age and all, rather than cross the pathway of English ambition. The “almighty dollar, ’’especially if it be a gold one, has a wonderful effect upon the opinions of some men. But this is a digression. There are bankers who are heavily interested in the loaning of English capital in America, and they are generally located in Wall Street. ADDENDUM BY THE PUBLISHERS There are those on both continents who have attained such a position that they can select and practically monopolize the most valuable securities in the world, as for example, the bonded indebtedness of powerful and solvent nations, such as the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany. No matter what the general condition of business, or how much poverty and suffering may exist among the masses of the people, there is practically no danger of these securities de- preciating below the point of safety. On the contrary, they are more likely to appreciate, because as business becomes depressed and unprofitable, gilt-edged securi- ties come into greater demand as investments. This is shown by the circumstance that a United States bond bearing but 4 per cent interest stands away above par at times when the manufacturer, the mer- chant and the farmer find it almost impossible to bor- row money upon any terms. To the classes of securities mentioned above, may be added those of rich States and municipalities. Those of strong and advantageously situated corporations might also be included, and possibly some others will suggest themselves to the mind of the reader. It should be perfectly manifest that bankers who are engaged in no productive enterprises, and whose business consists exclusively of loaning money on the basis of securities the failure of which is almost im- possible, are directly benefited by an appreciation of money; that is, an increase of its purchasing power, 68 the bankers’ conspiracy which simply means a cheapening of those things which are bought and sold. As Bertram Currie, one of the English delegates to the Brussels Conference, has remarked: “Low prices benefit me,” Certainly they do. And they benefit all others w 7 ho are similarly situated If a man’s wealth is all in money , and prices fall one- half, it makes him just twice as rich as he was before. But there are bankers not so favorably situated as the Rothschilds and the Curries in England, and the great National Bankers named by Mr. Schuckers in his book. They are scattered all over the country. They are en- gaged in the business of money lending, it is true, but they have to take such securities as they can get. They are largely dependent for success upon the prosperity of the communities in which they are respectively lo- cated. In many cases their banking is merely auxiliary to other business, and while up to a certain point they are benefited by a rise in the purchasing power of the money which they collect on loans, they are injured to a much greater extent by the shrinkage of other values. In short, when their business is considered in its en- tirety, their interests will be found, not on the side of the great banking houses of Europe and America, but upon the side of the people as a body. It is v r ell for the reader to keep this distinction con- stantly in mind when dealing w T ith the facts and con- clusions set forth by Mr. Schuckers. Nevertheless, it cannot be truthfully denied that with ADDENDUM BY THE PUBLISHERS 69 only rare exceptions the National Bankers are in perfect harmony on the money question, A few great bankers have undertaken to dictate the finances of the world for their own advantage, and the most of the small bankers have followed the lead of the great ones as a band of sheep follow the bell wether. This is partly owing to the propensity of men engaged in the same business to follow the same lines of thought, partly to the ambition of small bankers to be placed in the same category with the world’s great financiers, and partly owing to the still more persuasive fact that in a vast number of cases the smaller banks are com- pletely in the power of the great ones. Without bestowing much thought upon the subject themselves, a large proportion of the manufacturers and merchants take their cue from the bankers, so that the bulk of the capital is solidly massed together, on purely monetary questions. And yet the interests of these different classes are by no means identical. On thecontrary,thereareall sorts of differences and antag- onisms. Every man, every firm, every corporation en- gaged in production is benefited by rising prices, rather than falling. The same is true of the merchant, for business, as a rule, is always more profitable on a rising than on a falling market. Of course there are exceptions. If a large number of small tradesmen can be crowded out, and the business concentrated into a few gigantic concerns, those concerns will prosper. 70 THE BANKERS 7 CONSPIRACY Speaking generally, rising prices are good for those engaged in production and trade, falling prices are good for those whose business is exclusively, or chiefly, money lending, and who are so situated that they can control the securities in which they deal. Taking these facts as a starting point, it is easy to see why the tremendous power of the great banks is being constantly exerted to bring about an appreciation of money. When we consider that money can only be appre- ciated— that is, made dearer— by reducing or limiting its quantity, the reason for their unyielding hostility to silver becomes as plain as day. The fact that Alfred de Rothschild made a proposi- tion in the Brussels Conference, for the utilization of silver to a limited extent, does not in the slightest mili- tate against this view. His action was a simple recog- nition of the fact that it was not safe to carry the onslaught upon silver too far, because it might lead to so fearful a destruction of property values, and so much suffering among the people, as to light the fires of a revolution that would destroy even the “money kings” themselves. Mr. Schuckers presents an array of facts and coinci- dences which makes it impossible to resist the conclu- sion, that the National Bank presidents whom he names, in conjunction with the President of the United States, Secretary Carlisle, and Assistant Treasurer Jor- dan, deliberately entered into a conspiracy to precipi- ADDENDUM BY THE PUBLISHERS 71 tate a panic upon the country, in order to force the repeal of the “Sherman Law.” The motive for this conspiracy, if there was one, was plain. Without a single exception these men were in favor of what they call “sound money;” that is, dear money — money a dollar of which will buy a large amount of other people’s property, and which is all the time increasing in its purchasing power. They were op- posed to the “Sherman Law” because it was adding about $4,000,000 to the currency each month, thus in a measure, at least, preventing the operation of their favorite policy of constantly appreciating the standard by which property in general is valued. The opportunity was propitious. A constant fall of prices ha$ been going on for about twenty years, and the paying power of debtors had been tremendously weakened. When prices are down to the lowest living point, it is a very easy matter for the creditor to force the debtor to the walk By withholding credit from their subordinate banks the latter were driven to the necessity of doing the same with their patrons, and thus a pressure begun in New York would extend over the entire country, but more especially into the South and West, the sections which needed coercing, A combination between the banks and the President was almost certain to be successful. The “Sherman Law” once repealed, the silver men could not take an- other step for the restoration of the bimetallic system in the United States, without a complete political rev- 72 THE BANKERS 5 CONSPIRACY olution which would give them both houses of Con- gress and the executive as well. Mr. Schuckers has pointed out graphically and power- fully the steps by which this conspiracy Anally suc- ceeded If we had the minute information necessary to enable us to do so, we could add nothing to the force of his statement. It ought, though, to be impressed indelibly upon the minds of all classes of readers that in the consumma- tion of this scheme, something like 600 banks and thousands of business men were ruined. Thousands of factories were closed. Millions of people were thrown out of employment, and suffering stalked broadcast through the land. And while this was going on the great banks speciAed by Mr. Schuckers stood securely behind their impregna- ble fortiAcations, unshaken by the storm. Of course those who were engaged in the work of forcing the repeal of the silver purchase law, ascribed the panic to the law itself. This, however, will not bear analysis. It was claimed that the addition of so much silver to the currency had created a want of conAdence which led to the panic. Had this been true, the “want of conAdence” would have shown itself with reference to this particular kind of money, and it so happens that the “Sherman notes,” and the silver dollars at times during that panic, actu- ally commanded a premium. ADDENDUM BY THE PUBLISHERS 78 The idea of people having no confidence in money and at the same time paying a premium for it, is one that will not address itself very forcibly to the average mind. The manifestations of the panic were altogether at variance with the alleged cause. It was essentially a money panic. All kinds of money were locked up and withdrawn from circulation, mak- ing it impossible for business men to pay their debts, with the calamitous results so vividly portrayed by Mr. Sch uckers. But whatever may be thought as to the fact of the alleged conspiracy, it should be obvious to every intel- ligent and thoughtful person that there is no com- munity of interest whatever between the great banks of New York, with their European connections, and the smaller banks that are scattered far and wide over the country. As before suggested, the great banks are directly in- terested in appreciating money, which makes it harder for the debtor to meet his obligations. Unless it be carried to the length of forcing the country into a rev- olution, they can always protect themselves. They do this, however, at the expense of others, and not, unfre- quently they emerge from a great financial storm richer than ever before. The extraordinary percentage of failures among the Western and Southern banks should be proof to the most skeptical that their interests are with the pro- ducers, and not with the great Eastern banks. 74 THE BANKERS’ CONSPIRACY If the people of those sections could have turned their property, either real or personal, into money at fair prices, they could have met their obligations at their local banks. ' Then the latter would have had no difficulty in responding to every demand upon them from whatever quarter. Is it not about time for the thousands of small bankers and the hundreds of thousands of business men in the United States to break the thralldom that binds them to the golden chariot of a few gigantic banking houses in New York and London? A little reflection should convince them that this gorgeous chariot is, after all, in but too many cases a veritable juggernaut for them. Whenever their inter- ests require it, the so-called “money kings” will crush the smaller banker, the manufacturer and the merchant as unpityingly as the Carthagenian “Moloch” ever rolled a babe into the flames. If these classes will calmly, intelligently and impar- tially study the questions involved in the great “battle of the standards, ” they will no longer blindly follow the lead of a few men whose interests are wholly at variance with those of productive industry. Let them ignore, if they will, the crude arguments of a host of ill-informed writers on both sides, and go direct to the best and highest sources of information. Let them read and ponder well the proceedings of the Paris international monetary conference of 1878. Let them note the significant words of the learned Dr. ADDENDUM BY THE PUBLISHERS 75 Bruch, a Swedish delegate to that conference, referring to the interests of the United States: “Mr. Broch recognized that the United States had a great interest in having other countries make equal use of the two metals for their monetary circulation and give equally to both the legal-tender character. The United States fear that if the States still subjected to the regime of paper money resume specie payments with the single gold standard this will immediately pro- duce the double consequence of augmenting in a high degree the value of gold and of depreciating that of pro- ducts of every kind; a result which, from their point of view, as a great producing country and as a great debtor state, would, in fact, present disadvantages. The United States have a heavy debt, and it must be ad- mitted that a rise of gold would, with one blow, aggra- vate the weight of the debt.” The appreciation of gold depreciates the value of our products, and aggravates the weight of our debt, says this gentleman, who was himself a pronounced advo- cate of the gold standard. Let them read the report of the Royal Commission of England upon the gold and silver question, — a com- mission consisting of six gold monometallists and six bimetallists. Let them read the testimony, embodying the best thought on both sides of the question, that was laid be fore that commission. Let them then take up the proceedings of the Brus- 76 THE BANKERS 5 CONSPIRACY sels conference, and compare the arguments of Mr. de Rothschild, Sir Charles Fremantle, Bertram Currie and Sir Rivers Wilson on the gold side, with those of Sir William Houldsworth, Sir Guilford Molesworth, Mr. Allard, Dr. Andrews and John P. Jones on the side of bimetallism, — let them do these things and there can be no doubt as to their conclusion. They will find that the leading advocates of the gold standard take a position that is merely one of negation. In many cases they concede that industrial conditions are unnatural and unsatisfactory, but they offer no scheme of relief which presents even a glimmer of hope. As their arguments are purely negative, so their pro- posed course is one of inaction. Their principal argu- ment, that the great fall in prices and consequent busi- ness depression is the result of overproduction, is one that casts a shadow over the entire human family. If overproduction is the cause of the trouble, reduced pro- dution must be the remedy. What does such a remedy mean to more than a thousand millions of men and women whose daily bread depends upon their daily toil? On the other hand, the bimetallist not only denies the alleged overproduction, but he effectually disproves it. He conclusively demonstrates that the material conditions which beset us, date from the demonetiza- tion of silver in 1873, and with inexorable logic he shows that they are the natural result of the apprecia- tion of gold. The works referred to above are easily within reach of every banker and business man in America. ADDENDUM BY THE PUBLISHERS 77 If these men will but follow the course here suggested, the senseless catch phrases so familiar to us all, such as “sound money,” “honest money, ” “50-cent dollars,” and the like, will cease to warp the judgments of men, and the strange spectacle will no longer be presented of bankers, manufaturers and merchants marching in almost solid phalanx to the support of a policy diamet- rically opposed to the interests of the most of them, and subversive of true prosperity in the United States. THE END. These Hard Times . . . hereiore and how Long? A KEY TO THE FINANCIAL SITUATION. By REV. J. C. ELLIOT. This book discusses, in a scholarly manner, the uses of money, change of unit, effect on property, rise of gold, stability of silver, growth of wealth, supply of gold and silver, mines and prosperity, profits of mining, effect on character and nation, international agree- ment, greater security, National Banks, and arguments for a gold basis. The demand exhausted the first edition; since when, the author has revised and strengthened this book, and it is to-day the most interesting and instructive book on the monetary question, for its price. In the preface, the author says: “This book is the result of studies undertaken solely for the purpose of discovering, if possible, the mysterious cause of the de- pressed times. I have no personal interest in the question, and so far as I know, I am free from party bias of any kind. If the reader has a logical mind, and will read this book through, he will be led irresistibly, as I have been, to the belief that our trouble is mone- tary, and that there should be a change in our financial policy.” Price 25 cents. With the NATIONAL BIMETALLIST, $1.15. Published and for sale by the AMERICAN BIMETALLIC UNION, 134 Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois. 78 THE BANKER’S DREAM. BY THOMAS. H. PROCTOR. Part I. of this book is fiction based on fact. Part II. is a dream written two years ago. This dream or vision gives a detailed description of the develop- ment, unfolding and realization of the coming struggle of this nation. It is so prophetic of what has and is daily occurring, that it must interest and start a new train of thought in the mind of the reader, be he ever so skeptical, rich or poor. The Financial Review of Chicago reviews this book in a five column article by John M. Batchelor, and says every American should read it. The Medical World says the book is written by a high minded and earnest lover of humanity, and is a serious warning against the calamities that will soon overtake us if we continue in our present financial and govern- mental course. The Philadelphia Item says it is the book of the cen- tury. The Bayonne Budget says it is the most interesting of all books that have been published on the monetary question. Get the book and read it. Living Issues says every friend of honest money should read this book. The Cotton Plant says: It is readable and instruct- ive. The Vineland Independent says: The rich men should read this book before it is too late to apply the needed legislation. The Shoe and Leather Facts says: The work is likely to be widely read by persons of every political school of thought. Price 25 cents, or with the NATIONAL BIMET- ALLIST for one year, $1.15. Address all orders to THE AMERICAN BIMETALLIC UNION, 134 Monroe Street, Chicago, 111. 79