h Congress 
 1st Session 
 
 NATE 
 
 
 Document 
 No. 506 
 
 *••••*• •• # \ 
 
 ALLEGED 
 
 DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS 
 OF UNITED STATES NAVA" 
 
 LETTERS AND PAPERS RELATING TO 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS 
 IN BATTLE SHIPS OF THE 
 UNITED STATES NAVY 
 
 PRESENTED BY MR. HALE 
 May 22, 1908. — Ordered to be printed 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
 1908 
 
3 ; 
 
 
 ~\JL/*y\ cl 
 ck m y m r\ 
 
r v i*y 
 
 X 
 
 xj’ 
 
 y* 
 
 a 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Page. 
 
 1. Letter of the Secretary of the Navy, dated May 19, 1908, transmitting com¬ 
 
 ments of the Board on Construction on the report of Rear-Admiral Evans, 
 
 U. S. Navy, dated March 6, 1908, and on the report of Naval Constructor 
 R. H. Robinson, TJ. S. Navy, dated March 4, 1908. 5 
 
 2. Letter of the Secretary of the Navy, dated March 9, 1908, referred to in 
 
 the above-noted letter of May 19, 1908. 6 
 
 3. Communication from the Board on Construction, dated May 19, 1908, sub¬ 
 
 mitting general comments upon the above-noted reports of Rear-Admiral 
 Evans and Naval Constructor Robinson. 9 
 
 4. Report of Rear-Admiral R. D. Evans, U. S. Navy, dated March 6, 1908.. 15 
 
 5. Report of Naval Constructor R. H. Robinson, TJ. S. Navy, dated March 
 
 4, 1908 . 31 
 
 6. Letter of the Secretary of the Navy, dated April 15, 1908, transmitting sup¬ 
 
 plementary statement of the Chief Constructor of April 13, 1908, con¬ 
 cerning alleged defects in battle ships of the United States Navy. 49 
 
 7. Supplementary statement of the Chief Constructor, dated April 13, 1908.. 50 
 
 8. Letter of Capt. R. R. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy, dated April 16, 1908. 59 
 
 9. Interview with Sir William White as published in the Boston Transcript 
 
 of April 21, 1908. 59 
 
 10. Editorial from the Scientific American of May 2, 1908, concerning Sir Wil¬ 
 
 liam White’s interview on the American Navy. 63 
 
 LI, Editorial from the Engineering News of April 16, 1908. 64 
 
 3 
 
 
 ^ro 3 
 
 \ 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2018 with funding from 
 
 University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign Alternates 
 
 https://archive.org/details/allegedstructuraOOhale 
 
Navy Dejpartm’en t . ’' 
 
 Washington, May 19, 1908. 
 
 My Dear Senator Hale: Referring to my letter of April 15, 1908, 
 ransmitting the supplementary statement of the Chief Constructor 
 a relation to certain alleged defects in battle ships of the United 
 Itates Navy, and the “ reports of Admiral Evans and Naval Con- 
 tructor Robinson concerning the behavior of vessels of the Atlantic 
 fleet during the voyage from Hampton Roads to Magdalena Bay,” 
 dso their comments for the information of the Department in con- 
 lection with future design work, etc., I beg to forward herewith the 
 general comment of the Board on Construction on the above-noted 
 •eports of Admiral Evans and Naval Constructor Robinson. 
 
 While there was much detailed criticism in the reports of Admiral 
 £vans and Naval Constructor Robinson above referred to, which 
 vould not under ordinary circumstances be published and which 
 vas intended solely for the information of the Department and its 
 bureaus, it is believed that the publication of these reports in their 
 entirety would not be prejudicial to the best interests of the service, 
 [f the criticisms contained in these reports are considered in con- 
 lection with the other reports submitted upon the same subject, 
 Re comments of the Board on Construction, and my letter of March 
 ), 1908, there should remain no doubt whatever in the minds of 
 mpartial critics that the battle ships of the United States Navy 
 ire equal, if not superior, to battle ships of foreign navies of cor¬ 
 responding date of design. 
 
 It should also be quite evident to those who are interested in the 
 general subject of ship design in the United States Navy that the 
 nevitable changes in naval material render quite valueless any 
 comparison on equal terms of battle ships of latest design with battle 
 Rips designed several years ago. It should likewise be quite evident 
 that in the latest designs the experience derived under actual service 
 conditions from battle ships of earlier date of design is fully utilized. 
 
 Having just returned from a personal inspection of the Atlantic 
 Battle Ship Fleet, and having had opportunity to converse with 
 some of the ranking officers of the fleet concerning those features 
 :>f ship design which have recently been in controversy, it is with 
 special satisfaction that I can reaffirm the Department’s views with 
 respect to the designs of the Delaware and Michigan classes set 
 forth in my letter of March 9, 1908, as well as other expressions of 
 opinion of the Department concerning the general character of the 
 vessels of our battle ship fleet. I therefore have no hesitancy in 
 fully concurring in the previously expressed opinions of some of the 
 
 o 
 
6 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 most eminent American and foreign authorities on war ship con¬ 
 struction, viz, that the battle ships of the United States Navy are 
 equal, and in some respects superior, to foreign battle ships of the 
 same period of design. 
 
 Very truly, yours, V. H. Metcalf, 
 
 Secretary. 
 
 Hon. EuGene Hale, 
 
 Chairman Committee on Naval Affairs, 
 
 United States Senate. 
 
 2 . 
 
 Letter from the Secretary of the Navy concerning development of designs 
 of naval vessels, with particular reference to the designs of the Dela¬ 
 ware and North Dakota. 
 
 Navy Department, March 9, 1908. 
 My Dear Senator Hale : Referring to my conversation with you 
 on Saturday, I consider it advisable that the Naval Committee should 
 be clearly advised as to the actual circumstances under which the 
 plans for the Delaware and North Dakota were officially approved by 
 the Department and the unanimity with which the salient features of 
 these vessels were approved by the board on construction, the special 
 board on designs, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and the 
 commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet. 
 
 As you may recall, the plans for these vessels were prepared in 
 competition with those submitted by naval architects not connected 
 with the Navy Department, this competition having been provided 
 for, specifically, by the act of Congress approved June 29, 1906. 
 
 After the designs had been thoroughly considered by the board on 
 construction (more than twenty tentative designs having been con¬ 
 sidered by that board preliminary to the selection of the one finally 
 approved), these plans and all other plans submitted to the Depart¬ 
 ment in competition were referred to a special board under the presi¬ 
 dency of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Hon. Truman H. 
 Newberry. The other members of this board were Rear-Admiral 
 Merrell, Captain Rodgers, and Captain Wainwright, who were at 
 that time members of the general board, the chief constructor, the 
 engineer in chief, and the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, so that 
 a majority of the members of the board had nothing whatever to do 
 with the designs of the vessel submitted by the board on construction. 
 
 The features of the various designs submitted were carefully exam¬ 
 ined by this board, and my predecessor, Mr. Secretary Bonaparte, 
 in his report for the fiscal year 1906, states as follows: 
 
 In accordance with the_ proviso attached to the last naval appropriation bill, the 
 plans for the battle ship authorized by the said bill are, simultaneously with this 
 report, transmitted to Congress. These plans were selected by a board of officers, 
 under the presidency of the Assistant Secretary, after a very careful consideration of 
 various designs submitted by different naval constructors in the United States and 
 one in England and by the board on construction of the Department. The type of 
 vessel selected has a length of 510 feet. In the language of the board: “ It will carry 
 as heavy armor and as powerful armament as any known vessel of its class; it will 
 have a speed which is believed to be the highest practicable for a vessel of this type 
 and class, in the present state of knowledge; it will have the highest practicable radius 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 t 
 
 of action, and can be built within the limit of cost fixed by the act of Congress. ’ ’ This 
 plan, therefore, complies in all respects, in the judgment of this highly competent 
 board, with the terms of the authorization, and the Department has no hesitation in 
 approving the report of the board. 
 
 In due course, the report of this special board and the approved 
 plans of the Delaware and North Dakota were transmitted to Congress, 
 and the naval appropriation bill approved March 2, 1907, contained 
 the following proviso: 
 
 That, for the purpose of further increasing the naval establishment of the United 
 States, the President is hereby authorized to have constructed, by contract or in navy- 
 yards, as hereinafter provided, one first-class battle ship to cost, exclusive of armor 
 and armament, not exceeding six million dollars, similar in all essential character¬ 
 istics, and additional to, the battle ship authorized by the act making appropriations 
 for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and 
 seven, plans and specifications for which last-named vessel have already been pre¬ 
 pared and submitted by the Secretary of the Navy for the information of Congress, 
 as required by the provisions of the aforesaid act. 
 
 It is thus obvious that the designs of these vessels received the 
 fullest consideration and were, in effect, approved by Congress. 
 
 Shortly after my assumption of the duties of Secretary of the 
 Navy, however, it was brought to my attention by an officer attached 
 to the general board that, in his opinion, the armor belt on the Dela¬ 
 ware and North Dakota should be raised 30 inches. This officer sub¬ 
 sequently made a formal statement to that effect. His communica¬ 
 tion was referred to the board on construction and was given most 
 careful consideration, and the board on construction promptly and 
 unanimously submitted its report recommending, in the most definite 
 terms, that no change whatever be made in the designs as approved, 
 since, in their judgment, the armor belt was properly placed. 
 
 The officer making the original statement that the location of the 
 armor belt was in error was permitted to see the report of the board 
 on construction and made rejoinder thereto. While the Department 
 had no doubt whatever as to the correctness of the judgment of the 
 board on construction in this instance, it was deemed advisable to 
 obtain the opinion of the then Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, 
 Rear-Admiral Brownson, and the present commander in chief of the 
 Atlantic Fleet, Rear-Admiral Evans. Rear-Admiral Brownson, after 
 carefully looking into the matter, stated specifically that the location 
 of the water-line belt armor of the Delaware and North Dakota, as 
 decided upon by the board on construction, was entirely correct, 
 and that, in his judgment, no change should be made. Rear-Admiral 
 Evans, who had previously made a statement that, in his judgment, 
 the armor belt was too low, entirely changed his mind after fully 
 considering the plans of those vessels, informing me, in effect, that 
 he had previously been misinformed as to conditions, and that after 
 actual examination he entirely approved of the armor protection of 
 the Delaware and North Dakota and its location as determined by the 
 board on construction. Admiral Evans, so I am informed, made 
 substantially the same statement to Rear-Admiral Converse, the 
 president of the board on construction, and to Rear-Admiral Capps, 
 the chief constructor, as he did to me in reference to his concurrence 
 in the opinion of the board on construction with respect to the loca¬ 
 tion of the water-line belt on the Delaware and North Dakota. 
 
 I also submitted the question of the location of the water-line 
 belt armor and armor protection of the Delaware and North Dakota 
 ^.0 many other officers of the service, and, with but one exception, they 
 
8 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 all informed me that these ships, namely, the Delaware and North 
 Dakota , were amply protected; in fact, better protected than the ships 
 of any other service, the only criticism being that if the water-line 
 belt armor was raised a few inches it would reduce the weight of the 
 armor and increase the carrying capacity of coal and ammunition, 
 an obviously impossible gain since all available space had already 
 been devoted to such purposes. 
 
 While the Department can not for one instant permit the assump¬ 
 tion that such vital questions affecting ship design can be determined 
 by popular vote among the officers of the service, and while the 
 Department is most strongly of the opinion that its highly trained and 
 legally appointed official advisers should have the dominating influ¬ 
 ence in all matters connected with the design of naval vessels, it 
 appears to me that in this question of the location of water-line 
 armor belt the Department has gone out of its way to obtain opinions 
 from the highest possible authorities among the seagoing branch of the 
 Navy, and that there is really no ground for further contention with 
 respect to the matter of the water-line belt armor on the Delaware 
 and North Dakota or on the South Carolina and Michigan, whose 
 armor belts are very similar in location and character. 
 
 It also seems proper in this connection to note that the officer 
 who has taken the most active interest in agitating this subject of 
 alleged erroneous location of water-line armor, originally recom¬ 
 mended in his letter of June 15, 1907, that the water-line belt be 
 raised 30 inches. In a subsequent letter he recommended that it be 
 raised 20 inches. In his recent testimony before your committee he 
 recommended that it be raised 10 inches. I think no better illustra¬ 
 tion could be had of the unreliable character of recommendations 
 of this kind, since the original proposition of 30 inches is, within 
 less than a year, reduced to 10 inches. 
 
 As the only point criticised in the designs of the Delaware class 
 is that of water-line armor distribution, and since this criticism has 
 been disposed of by the unanimous opinion of the most competent 
 authorities upon whom the Department must rely in matters of this 
 kind, I am convinced that there is no ground whatever for further 
 criticism or justification for any change m the essential seagoing and 
 military characteristics of the vessels of the Delaware class. 
 
 In view of my recent conversation with you, I think the above state¬ 
 ment very important, and request that it be laid before your com¬ 
 mittee at such time as you may consider proper. 
 
 I also deem it necessary to point out that practically none of the 
 unfavorable criticism which has recently been directed at certain 
 vessels of the United States Navy is applicable to battle ships designed 
 during the past four years, and, so far as concerns location of water¬ 
 line armor, is really inapplicable to those designed since the Virginia 
 class, the contracts for which were signed more than seven years ago. 
 The reports of Rear-Admiral Converse and the chief constructor 
 give extensive and detailed comparison between the battle ships of 
 the United States Navy and those of foreign navies of the same 
 period of design, and, after a careful perusal of these reports, I am 
 wholly convinced that the battle ships of the United States Navy are 
 in no sense inferior, type for type, in their own period of design to 
 those of any other nation in the world; but, on the contrary, I con¬ 
 cur in the opinion of certain foreign critics that our battle ships have 
 a certain measure of definite superiority. 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 9 
 
 In conclusion, and as indicating the character of work performed 
 by the board on construction, I invite your attention to the perform¬ 
 ance of a new type of vessel, whose designs were prepared by that 
 board. I refer to the recent trial of the U. S. S. Chester. This ves¬ 
 sel was designed to meet certain requirements of the general board 
 for a vessel of high speed and great endurance which could be used 
 for scouting purposes. The Chester, Birmingham, and Salem were, 
 in a measure, an answer to foreign vessels of that class which had been 
 designed tQ make 25 knots speed. The American designers insisted on 
 having a vessel sufficiently large to maintain a good average speed in 
 all ordinary weather, and that she should have a much larger coal 
 endurance than any foreign vessels of this type. In the recent official 
 trials the scout cruiser Chester maintained an average speed of 26.52 
 knots for four hours, and had in her bunkers during that trial an 
 amount of coal practically equal to that carried by the fastest foreign 
 scout cruisers when their bunkers were full, and the Chester actually 
 had on board during the trial three times the amount of coal carried 
 by the largest and fastest of her foreign rivals at the time of their 
 speed trials. 
 
 Very truly, yours, V. H. Metcalf, 
 
 Secretary. 
 
 Hon. Eugene Hale, 
 
 Chairman Committee on Naval Affairs, 
 
 United States Senate. 
 
 3 . 
 
 Navy Department, 
 
 Board on Construction, 
 
 Washington, May 19, 1908. 
 
 Sir: The Board on Construction has the honor to submit below 
 brief general comment upon the recent reports of Rear-Admiral 
 R. D. Evans, U. S. Navy, and Naval Constructor R. H. Robinson, 
 U. S. Navy, commenting upon the behavior of vessels of the Atlantic 
 Fleet during the passage from Hampton Roads to Magdalena Bay, 
 also inviting attention to various features of the vessels of the fleet, 
 for the information of the Department in connection with future 
 design work. 
 
 The Board has carefully considered the suggestions of Rear- 
 Admiral Evans and Naval Constructor Robinson, and finds itself in 
 general agreement with the very large majority of such suggestions. 
 As a matter of fact, however, the comments of the commander in 
 chief and the naval constructor attached to his staff were made upon 
 battle ships the most recent of which was designed more than six 
 years ago, and nearly all the criticisms made by them are therefore 
 inapplicable to battle ships recently designed. The comments here¬ 
 inafter made by the Board on Construction relate chiefly to the most 
 important features considered in the reports of Rear-Admiral Evans 
 and Naval Constructor Robinson. 
 
 homogeneity. 
 
 Views similar to those submitted by Admiral Evans and Naval 
 Constructor Robinson with respect to the necessity of homogeneity in 
 type of battle ships have long since been accepted as fundamentally 
 
10 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 correct by Navy Department officials responsible for new design work, 
 and, so far as legislative and other conditions have permitted, homoge¬ 
 neity of type has been given special consideration. Indeed, with the 
 sole exception of the Idaho and Mississippi, the designers of the Navy 
 Department, during the past seven years, have given special attention 
 to the desirability of homogeneity, as is fully evidenced by the fact 
 that there are five Virginias , six Connecticut^ , four Tennessees, and six 
 Colorados. The South Carolina and Michigan are, so far as concerns 
 maneuvering power, speed, and other characteristics, except battery 
 arrangement, capable of being placed in the same tactical group as the 
 vessels of the Connecticut class. The conditions under which the 
 South Carolina and Michigan were designed, the limitation imposed by 
 Congress upon their size, and the desirability of completing a group of 
 eight vessels of the same general maneuvering characteristics as the 
 Connecticut class, have already been brought to the attention of the 
 Department in various official communications. The conditions 
 under which the designs of the Delaware and North Dakota were devel¬ 
 oped are too well known to require further elaboration in this report. 
 The two battle ships authorized in this year’s appropriation bill, so 
 far as concerns maneuvering qualities, general arrangement of battery, 
 etc., will be quite similar to the Delaware and North Dakota, so that 
 these two battle ships and the two battle ships just authorized can be 
 considered as a group of four homogeneous vessels. 
 
 FREEBOARD. 
 
 It may be accepted as an axiom in the development of battle ships 
 that freeboard in excess of that absolutely required for seaworthiness 
 and the proper working of the battery is not only undesirable but a 
 definite disadvantage, as it increases the target area and raises the 
 center of gravity, making the vessel more liable to be hit, and consid¬ 
 erably decreasing the stability under damaged conditions. The in¬ 
 crease of length and speed of battle ships, and the fine lines forward 
 and aft, in conjunction with the concentration of weight near the 
 extremities of the latest battle ships, has made it advisable to increase 
 the height of freeboard forward. Even in this respect, however, 
 Japan, which has certainly had very considerable experience of fight¬ 
 ing under modern conditions, has, in its latest ships, adhered to a for¬ 
 ward freeboard of moderate height, the forward freeboard of the Aki 
 and Satsumai being reported as practically the same as our Connecticut 
 class. 
 
 HEIGHT OF BROADSIDE GUNS. 
 
 The comments with respect to the inability to fight the weather 
 broadside guns under certain conditions of weather are fully appreci¬ 
 ated, but it must be borne in mind that for ships now with the Atlantic 
 Fleet the broadside battery can not well be disposed in any other man¬ 
 ner than the one adopted—a disposition, be it noted, which is practi¬ 
 cally identical with that of the battle ships of England, Germany, and 
 Japan of the same period of design. 
 
 Indeed, the heights of the axes of the broadside guns of United 
 States battle ships are, as a rule, from 1 to 2 feet higher above water 
 than corresponding guns in British battle ships. The broadside 
 batteries of United States battle ships now in course of construction 
 are purely for torpedo defense, and as all available battery space 
 on the upper deck has been preempted by heavy gun turrets, any 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 11 
 
 other system of mounting than that adopted would be wholly im¬ 
 practicable. The location of guns of the secondary battery on top 
 of turrets was considered many years ago, and such a location has 
 several times been indicated on the plans of battle ships. So far, 
 however,no guns have been actually so mounted, since there is very 
 good reason to believe that they would not be available for repelling 
 torpedo boats after any general engagement on account of injuries 
 received in action. This matter was carefully considered in con¬ 
 nection with the designs of the South Carolina and Delaware classes, 
 and at that time the disadvantages of mounting guns on top of 
 turrets were believed to be greater than the advantages. 
 
 ARMOR AT BOW. 
 
 With fine bow lines and consequent small displacement of this 
 portion of the vessel, the devotion of any considerable amount of 
 weight to armor at the bows of battle ships has been considered 
 unnecessary, especially when the water-line armor is extended over 
 so great a proportion of the length of the ship as in the case of the 
 South Carolina and Michigan and Delaware and North Dakota. The 
 very great extension of the heavy water-line armor on these vessels 
 in connection with the transverse armored bulkheads and the ar¬ 
 mored deck forward of the side armor, and extensive compartmental 
 subdivision, with cofferdams filled with cellulose, is believed to pro¬ 
 vide a very much better protection to the buoyancy and would pre¬ 
 vent change trim of the vessel due to water-line damage in a much 
 more efficient degree than has been possible with the arrangement 
 previously adopted in the case of battle ships whose thin side armor 
 w T as continued to the bow. 
 
 LOCATION OF WATER-LINE ARMOR. 
 
 From the comments contained in the accompanying reports of 
 Rear-Admiral Evans and Naval Constructor Robinson it is obvious 
 that in the moderate weather experienced during the passage of the 
 fleet from Hampton Roads to Magdalena Bay there were numerous 
 occasions upon which the lower edge of the main armor belt was 
 exposed, and this under the unusually deep-laden condition of the 
 vessels of the fleet, some of these vessels carrying as much as 800 
 tons of fresh water in their double bottoms and having on board 
 large quantities of excess stores, ammunition, etc. Therefore the 
 statements in these reports as to the undesirability of raising the 
 lower edge of the belt armor, when taken in connection with the 
 very positive statement made in the communication of Captain 
 Ingersoll in his letter of April 16, 1908, fully confirm the Board in 
 its opinion, already expressed, as to the desirability of making no 
 change in the location of the lower edge of heavy water-line armor 
 belts of our battle ships, and certainly that the lower edge should 
 not be raised. The distribution of armored protection on battle 
 ships, like so many other questions relating to battle-ship design, is 
 necessarily a compromise, and the fundamental principles governing 
 such distribution which have heretofore been observed are, in the 
 opinion of the Board, entirely sound and should be adhered to in 
 the future. 
 
12 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 ELIMINATION OF BRIDGES. 
 
 The Board heartily concurs in the suggestion with respect to the 
 elimination of bridges and other top-hamper unnecessary for the 
 handling of the ship in action and under ordinary conditions of serv¬ 
 ice, and the designs of the Delaware and North Dakota, whose prin¬ 
 cipal characteristics were determined upon more than two years ago, 
 have fully embodied this principle. As a matter of fact, the desire 
 for additional bridges and top-hamper has come from officers of the 
 fleet rather than from designers, and it is only recently that officers 
 of the fleet appear to have fully realized the benefits which would 
 result from eliminating all bridges, deck erections, and unnecessary 
 weights of every description. 
 
 CONNING TOWERS AND FLAGSHIPS. 
 
 In the Delaware and North Dakota provision has already been 
 made for handling the ship from the conning tower, and the other 
 suggestions contained in the reports with respect to the fittings of 
 conning tower have already received and will continue to receive 
 the most careful consideration. For many years past the Board on 
 Construction and the bureaus concerned have recommended that 
 the number of flagships be reduced, and in view of the large number 
 of flagships already existing no battle ships designed during the past 
 four years have been fitted as flagships. The battle ships covered 
 by the current appropriation bill will, however, be designed as 
 flagships. 
 
 DOORS IN TRANSVERSE BULKHEADS. 
 
 With respect to the omission of doors below the protective deck 
 in main transverse water-tight bulkheads, the Board is of the opinion 
 that the United States Navy has taken the lead in such matters, the 
 designs of battle ships of four years ago embodying this principle, 
 which is now being generally adopted, so far as the Board is aware, 
 by foreign navies. It undoubtedly introduces an element of incon¬ 
 venience in visiting the various compartments of the vessel, but has 
 very great advantages in preserving the integrity of the vessel’s 
 water-tight subdivision. 
 
 TURRETS. 
 
 With respect to the comments concerning turrets and turret fit¬ 
 tings, it maybe noted that sighting hoods have been omitted from 
 the turrets of battle ships designed during the past four years. Pro¬ 
 vision has already been made to supply for the turrets of battle 
 ships now under construction turning gear of efficiency equal to that 
 referred to as having been installed on the Maine and Illinois. 
 Steps have also been taken to supply similar gear to vessels of the 
 fleet whenever such vessels are available for this installation. Pro¬ 
 vision has also been made in the turrets of vessels now under construc¬ 
 tion to obviate the “jumping off” criticised in the accompanying 
 reports. For the turrets of vessels now under construction provision 
 has been made to meet all reasonable requirements concerning ammu¬ 
 nition hoists, and the question of making changes in the ammunition 
 hoists of vessels of the fleet has also been fully considered by the 
 bureaus having cognizance of this matter. Provision has also been 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 13 
 
 made in the turrets of vessels now under construction to supplement 
 the gas-expelling device by air pressure in the turrets themselves. 
 Hand ammunition hoists have also been provided for the turrets of 
 vessels under construction. Consideration has been given to fitting 
 the tops of turrets so that they can be readily removed when necessity 
 therefor arises. 
 
 COAL CAPACITY. 
 
 Referring to the coal capacity of vessels of the fleet, it is unnecessary 
 in this connection to outline the conditions under which the coal 
 capacities of the various vessels now attached to the fleet were deter¬ 
 mined upon. Battle ships now under construction, and those de¬ 
 signed during recent years, have sufficient coal capacity to insure 
 the radius of action noted in the reports as desirable. In this con¬ 
 nection it is not unworthy of note that, of those battle ships now 
 attached to the fleet, the Alabama class, whose design was passed 
 upon by a special board, has the smallest coal capacity. 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS. 
 
 Experiments are now in progress to determine the efficiency of 
 elevated towers for fire-control stations; also as to the best arrange¬ 
 ment of bulkheads for giving efficient protection to the ship against 
 torpedo attack. 
 
 With respect to the standardization of machinery, the placing of 
 windlass engine, winches, and' other auxiliary machinery behind 
 armor, etc., the Board considers it only necessary to invite attention 
 to the fact that a large part of the apparatus connected with such 
 engines must necessarily be exposed, and that, while the placing 
 of the actuating machinery behind armor would probably be desirable, 
 it is in many respects impracticable. 
 
 With respect to the comments on ventilation, piping systems, inter¬ 
 connection of salt and fresh water systems, main and secondary 
 drains, scuppers, etc., the Board begs to note that all these criticisms 
 are inapplicable to recent designs, since in these designs the defects 
 commented upon in the reports have been corrected. 
 
 In concluding its brief comments upon the reports of Admiral 
 Evans and Naval Constructor Robinson the Board desires to invite 
 particular attention to the fact that some of the vessels of the present 
 Atlantic Fleet were designed more than twelve years ago, and those 
 of most recent design, viz, the Connecticut class, were designed about 
 six years ago. It is therefore entirely obvious that many of the 
 characteristics of battle ships now composing the Atlantic Fleet, 
 as well as their fittings and appliances, can not be expected to con¬ 
 form to the latest standard with respect to such matters, although 
 the Board is most decidedly of the opinion that they are fully equal, 
 and in some respects superior, to battle ships of corresponding dates 
 of design in other navies. It is also obvious that without an unwar¬ 
 ranted expenditure of money and a serious interference with fleet 
 drills, etc., by reason of the withdrawal of ships for long periods, it 
 is quite impracticable to bring the older vessels of the fleet up to 
 date in all their important features and fittings. So far, however, 
 as may be practicable changes are made from time to time to improve 
 the military efficiency of all ships in commission, and when vessels 
 of the fleet are laid up for general overhauling such extensive military 
 
14 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 and other changes are made as may appear to be warranted by the 
 conditions then existing. 
 
 In fact, naval material is subject to frequent change in character 
 and quality, and in order that the Department’s responsible de¬ 
 signers may incorporate in new designs such changes and alterations 
 in existing types of battle ships as actual experience in service may 
 have demonstrated to be necessary, careful record is kept of all such 
 desirable alterations and additions for subsequent use in connection 
 with new design work. The opinions of those who have had actual 
 experience in command of battle ships or who have served in other 
 less responsible capacities are also given full consideration. In the 
 last analysis, however, those directly responsible for the design of 
 vessels must use their best judgment, based upon practical experi¬ 
 ence with the vessels of our own Navy, as well as the developments 
 of naval design in foreign services. In so doing the experience of 
 the past indicates clearly that compromises must be made and that 
 the accepted design can never represent the ideal development of 
 any one feature without injuriously affecting the development of 
 other and equally important features. For this reason any finally 
 accepted design, while expressing the unanimous opinion of those 
 directly responsible, and who have given the matter the greatest con¬ 
 sideration, can never be expected to meet the unqualified approval 
 of all those who may have given the general subject of ship design 
 casual or even specific attention. 
 
 Finally, it seems well to point out that on account of the method 
 of making appropriation for battle ships in vogue during the 
 earlier part of the twelve-year period covered by the designs of the 
 vessels now composing the Atlantic Battle Ship Fleet five essentially 
 dissimilar designs of battle ships have been evolved, this being an 
 almost necessary consequence of a procedure which does not con¬ 
 template a continuous naval programme. 
 
 The Board on Construction is very much of the opinion that battle 
 ships should be built in “ classes,” with not less than four of prac¬ 
 tically the same type in each class. This opinion has been held by the 
 various members of the Board for many years, and it is hoped that in 
 all future programmes of battle ships for the United States Navy 
 the principle of building in groups of not less than four similar 
 vessels of a type will be adhered to. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 G. A. Converse, 
 
 Rear-Admiral. U. S. Navy , Retired , President of Board. 
 
 W. L. Capps, 
 
 Chief Constructor , U. S. Navy , 
 
 Chief of Bureau of Construction and Repair , Member. 
 
 N. E. Mason, 
 
 Chief of Bureau of Ordnance , Member. 
 
 Wm. S. Cowles, 
 
 Chief of Bureau of Equipment , Member. 
 
 A. F. Dixon, 
 
 Captain , TJ. S. Navy , 
 
 Acting Chief of Bureau of Steam Engineering , Member. 
 
 The Secretary of the Navy. 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 15 
 
 4 . 
 
 Office of Commander in Chief, 
 
 United States Atlantic Fleet, 
 
 U. S. S. Connecticut, Flagship, 
 
 At sea , en route to Magdalena Bay , March 6 , 1908. 
 
 Sir: 1 . I inclose herewith a report from Naval Constructor R. H. 
 Robinson, U. S. Navy, who has accompanied this fleet from Hampton 
 Roads to Magdalena Bay for the purpose of observing the fleet in 
 service. I recommend that this carefully prepared report be for¬ 
 warded to the Board on Construction, in order that the suggestions 
 contained in it may be made use of in future design and construction 
 and in any extensive overhauling of the old ships that may be under¬ 
 taken. 
 
 2. On January 6, 1908, at the suggestion of Naval Constructor 
 Robinson, I addressed a series of questions relating to ship’s design 
 and interior arrangement to each commanding officer, and a series of 
 questions to each head of department relating to matters under his 
 own cognizance. By my direction Naval Constructor Robinson made 
 a careful study of the replies to these queries and after a full con¬ 
 sideration of them prepared the accompanying report. The fact that 
 it is submitted by an officer of his high professional attainments and 
 general good judgment and open-mindedness, and is based on per¬ 
 sonal observations made during his zealous and untiring investiga¬ 
 tions during a long cruise with the battle-ship fleet, combined with 
 a digest of the opinions of a large number of seagoing officers, each 
 referring to matters in his own department, should give it great 
 weight, and I trust that the suggestions contained in it will receive 
 the full consideration which they deserve. 
 
 3. Except in one or two instances noted in this letter, I heartily 
 approve of the general opinions expressed by Naval Constructor 
 Robinson in his report and the recommendations made by him, but 
 so important do I consider some of the questions mentioned in his 
 report that a further expression of my views seems desirable. In 
 this letter I shall, therefore, discuss certain subjects covered by his 
 report in the same order in which they occur in that report. The 
 numbers set forth in the parentheses after each heading below refer 
 to the paragraphs of his report which touch upon the same subject. 
 
 HOMOGENEITY (5, 6, 7). 
 
 4. Nothing less than actual experience with a fleet of vessels in 
 service will adequately impress upon any person, officer or layman, 
 the importance of this quality as a common attribute of the vessels 
 of the fleet which are to act together. This cruise has particularly 
 accentuated the importance of homogeneity in units so far as regards 
 coal consumption and capacity, and steaming qualities, but few op¬ 
 portunities for tactical maneuvering have presented themselves, and 
 therefore the absolute necessity for homogeneity in other qualities 
 has not been so clearly brought out. These qualities must be pos¬ 
 sessed to the same degree by ships that are to maneuver successfully 
 together, and of them I would particularly designate certain features 
 which tactical maneuvers would plainly emphasize, but which, from 
 
16 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 present experience only, may be easily overlooked, and in regard to 
 which even sister ships sometimes differ widely. All ships in a fleet 
 can of course be assigned a standard helm angle, corresponding to a 
 standard tactical diameter, but the variations in their times of turn¬ 
 ing, and in transfer and advance (few turns are more than eight 
 points), is frequently sufficient to throw a perfect line into a very 
 imperfect and ragged column, or vice versa. The tactical defect 
 consists not merely in the difficulty (amounting almost to an impos¬ 
 sibility) of satisfactorily drilling a fleet of such ships, but in the fact 
 that in the probable maneuver of going from line into column before 
 an engagement (the fleet would open fire as soon as this change of 
 formation is completed) the formation may be broken to the extent 
 of having one ship blank the fire of others. How far it is practicable 
 to carry this homogeneity of tactical and steaming qualities must of 
 course depend on circumstances. (See par. 47, on propelling ma¬ 
 chinery, in Naval Constructor Robinson’s report, in this connec¬ 
 tion.) It is my duty at this time to strongly present the value of 
 this feature and to recommend that homogeneity of tactical and 
 steaming qualities be given to units of four vessels as a minimum, 
 but all ships of a class should be as nearly homogeneous in these par¬ 
 ticulars as practicable. (A special report will soon be made by me 
 on the bad effects on the fleet of the Maine's peculiar and inefficient 
 steaming qualities, which effects are so destructive of fleet efficiency 
 that I am compelled to urge her withdrawal from the fleet and the 
 general reconstruction of her boiler plant.) 
 
 5. Homogeneity in arc of fire is also important, but homogeneity in 
 the caliber of guns, design of turrets, fittings, etc., is only important 
 to the extent of simplifying ammunition supply, supply of spare 
 parts, etc., to a large fleet, and is therefore of secondary importance 
 as compared to the main question set forth above. 
 
 FREEBOARD AND HEIGHT OF GUN POSITIONS (9 to 15, inclusive). 
 
 6. Referring to the subject of freeboard, there is no question but 
 that the intermediate-battery guns of every vessel in this fleet are 
 too low for efficiency. When steaming at 10 knots, with an ordinary 
 trade wind anywhere forward of the beam, it is necessary for com¬ 
 fort and to prevent occasional flooding of the gun deck to keep the 
 weather guns secured, with shutters in place. Under such weather 
 conditions it would be possible to fire the guns, but the occasional 
 seas which would enter first one gun port, then another, would flood 
 the deck to such an extent, combined with the roll of the ship, to run 
 over the coamings of the hoists, flood the passages, wet the powder, 
 and would, in short, render the fighting of the guns impracticable. 
 Aside from this, these conditions, when action is not imminent, would 
 necessitate keeping shutters in place, thereby preventing training at 
 the guns, without which they would be of little use in battle. If 
 under the above conditions the speed were increased to 15 knots, the 
 guns could probably not be fired nor the shutters cleared away. 
 Under the above weather conditions the turret guns can nearly always 
 be fired at a 10-knot speed, but at 15 knots it is possible that some 
 difficulty would be encountered. 
 
 7. As future ships will have only turret guns in their main battery, 
 the point loses some of its importance, but a somewhat higher turret 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 17 
 
 gun forward would seem necessary to fight with full efficiency at 15 
 knots in a trade-wind sea, or at 10 or 12 knots in a somewhat heavier 
 sea than that which is ordinarily encountered in the trade belt. 
 
 LOCATION OF TORPEDO-DEFENSE GUNS ABOARD THE LATEST SHIPS (16 to 18, 
 
 inclusive). 
 
 8. In new ships the question of the height of broadside guns is 
 transformed into a consideration of the height of torpedo-defense 
 guns, and the fact that in case of a torpedo attack a commanding officer 
 is not at liberty to choose between the use of the weather or of the lee 
 battery renders it important that at least some of these guns be placed 
 high enough to be used efficiently in any sea in which a torpedo boat 
 or destroyer could operate. 
 
 9. In this connection the tops of the two higher turrets, suggested 
 by Lieutenant-Commander Upham, seem to be ideal positions for four 
 of these guns. A torpedo attack would usually either precede or fol¬ 
 low an engagement, or else would be an isolated attack unaccompanied 
 by a general engagement, and there would therefore be little proba¬ 
 bility that these guns would be required during a regular action. In 
 fact, in recommending this position for a portion of this battery it is 
 expected that these guns would not be used while the turret guns are 
 firing. When this is taken into consideration the question of ammuni¬ 
 tion supply is at once simplified, because it would be entirely practica¬ 
 ble to pass it up by hand. 
 
 10. The exceptional position thus offered aboard our new ships for 
 four guns with very large arcs of fire, and in a commanding position, 
 available for use at all times except during a general engagement, is 
 too valuable to be neglected. 
 
 11. These guns would probably be disabled in action; in fact, the 
 accounts of the battle of Tsushima indicate that nearly every second¬ 
 ary battery gun on certain ships (as would be natural to expect) was 
 so disabled. This, therefore, suggests the desirability of protecting 
 by armor or otherwise some torpedo-defense gun expressly for use 
 after an engagement. I therefore, in addition to recommending the 
 utilization of the tops of turrets for a portion of this battery, approve 
 the recommendation made by Naval Constructor Robinson that, if 
 practicable, a certain other portion of this battery be so mounted 
 that the guns would remain housed behind armor during action, and 
 would be available to be quickly thrown into battery and used to repel 
 an attack following an engagement. 
 
 armor belt (16 to 21, inclusive). 
 
 12. Judging from the figures contained in the several replies from 
 commanding officers which relate to this subject, it would appear that 
 better protection might have been afforded had these belts been origi¬ 
 nally placed between 6 inches and 1 foot higher; this on the theory 
 that the commanding officer would admit sufficient water before an ac¬ 
 tion to sink the belt to within about 18 inches above the water line, but 
 even this is open to question, for it has been noted that even when heavy 
 laden and in the smooth to moderate seas, which have thus far char¬ 
 acterized this cruise, the ships frequently expose their entire belt 
 
 S. Doc. 506, 60-1-2 
 
18 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 and the bottom plating beneath it. It must be remembered that even 
 a 5 or a 6 inch shell (of which there would be a great number) could 
 inflict a severe and dangerous injury if it struck below the belt, 
 while otherwise the water line, even with the belt entirely submerged, 
 is, on account of the casemate, armor, and coal, immune to all except 
 the heaviest projectiles. The fact is that under the sea conditions in 
 which battles may be fought a belt of 8 feet in width, if considered 
 alone, is too narrow to afford the desired protection, wherever it 
 may be placed; and the question becomes an academic discussion, 
 with certain arguments on each side. It is understood that on the 
 latest ships this question is of little import, as the citadel armor is 
 but 1 inch less in thickness than that on the water line, and for those 
 ships already built it is believed that if bridges are removed and 
 all weights which will be landed when war breaks out are taken into 
 consideration, the ship will rise the 6 or 12 inches which is believed 
 to be the maximum that it should be desired to raise them. 
 
 13. In this connection I desire to comment particularly on the dis¬ 
 position of armor on the bows of the ship. When a ship is steaming 
 even at 10 knots the armor at the stem is submerged 2 or 3 feet by the 
 bow wave, and at 15 knots to a much greater depth. There is ordi¬ 
 narily no armor above the water line in this part of the ship, thus 
 rendering it vulnerable to 5 or 6 inch shells, and if these enter, the 
 pitching and ascending would soon fill the decks forward with water, 
 put the ship down by the head, tend to expose her screws and rudder, 
 and render steering erratic. 
 
 14. The suggested curving the entire water-line belt up at the 
 bows and covering both sides in the forward portion of the ship, 
 say as far aft as frame 17, with 2 or 3 inch armor as protection against 
 smaller caliber shells, seems pertinent and worthy of consideration. 
 
 15. The importance of thorough protection of the steering gear 
 is suggested by Naval Constructor Robinson. The necessity of thor¬ 
 ough protection of all parts of this gear is accentuated by the fact 
 that several ships in the Russo-Japanese war were either defeated 
 or seriously injured by having their steering gear disabled. In every 
 “ soft-bowed ” ship the degree of protection to steering gear, when 
 she is down by the head as the result of injury forward, should be 
 carefully considered. 
 
 BRIDGES AND SUPERSTRUCTURE (22). 
 
 16. Except for the flagships on which an after bridge and an 
 emergency cabin is an essential, all flying bridges and after bridges 
 are unnecessary and are a menace in action. Under “ Conning tow¬ 
 ers ” I mention the nature of bridge which would be desirable for¬ 
 ward, viz, the present forward bridge with portable extension on 
 each end extending out to the side, the conning tower being used as 
 the habitual steering position, with a wheel on top and a rail around 
 the conning tower to afford a means of piloting the ship. The bridge 
 should preferably have a portable grating covering, and the chart 
 house either be subject to removal when war breaks out or located 
 farther from the conning tower, on account of fire in action. If 
 there were no flying bridge forward, none would be necessary aft, 
 and the lower bridge, if made large enough to accommodate the 
 signal staff of flag-officer, would then be adequate as the after bridge 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 W 
 
 of flagships. No stronger testimony against bridge in action can be 
 desired than the frequent allusions in accounts of recent battles to 
 the splinters, fires, and damage caused by their presence. 
 
 IT. I would recommend that one ship of each class only be fitted 
 as a flagship, the others of the class not to be so fitted. In this con¬ 
 nection, in order that space aboard ships which are not flagships be 
 not wasted, it is now time to decide, once for all, on a certain list of 
 ships to be used as flagships, fit them not only in regard to bridges, 
 but in all other respects for that duty, and remove bridges and reallot 
 space on the others. This would greatly increase the efficiency of 
 the fleet, all of which now carry much superfluous weight and much 
 unused space owing to their nearly all being fitted with flag-officers’ 
 accommodations. 
 
 CONNING TOWERS (23 to 26). 
 
 18. I am of the opinion that neither the present conning tower nor, 
 in toto, that recommended by any commanding officer in the fleet is 
 entirely adequate, though a number of recommendations embody 
 many features of what I consider the most efficient tower, and the 
 type suggested by Mr. Robinson meets my approval in all essential 
 particulars. 
 
 19. It is my opinion that this very important battle station should 
 be large enough to permit of its habitual use for steering the ship at 
 all times, as is the case in certain foreign navies; that it should be 
 elliptical in shape, extending athwartships far enough to permit a 
 clear view directly astern; and that, while for piloting a wheel should 
 be provided on top, the conning tower should be the only steering 
 station protected from the weather. It should thus become, as it 
 should be, the customary place from which the ship is maneuvered, 
 except when entering a harbor or going alongside of a dock. This 
 change would at once do away with the flying bridge and its inci¬ 
 dental hamper. On ships similar to the CConnecticut a portable ex¬ 
 tension to the lower bridge should be fitted, extending out to the 
 side, which would be unrigged at “ clear ship.” The conning tower 
 should be directly over the central station and connected to it by a 
 thick armored tube at least 3 feet in internal diameter in the clear, 
 in order to permit a man to pass through it. In the central station 
 all such gear as wheel, compass, helm indicator, etc., should be dupli¬ 
 cated, while the conning tower would require all gear necessary to the 
 habitual handling of the ship. The conning tower should have an 
 opening in the after side which can be closed with an armored dooT^ 
 otherwise the heavy plate formerly fitted is necessary, and this is un¬ 
 desirable both on account of its weight and the less protection it 
 affords. 
 
 20. I invite attention to the frequent casualties to personnel in 
 conning towers during the Russo-Japanese war, and therefore can 
 not agree with those officers who state that no top to the tower is 
 necessary. I consider a top essential both as to a protection against 
 gun fire, fragments of shell, etc., and against falling masts, etc. 
 The slits in the tower should be beveled out on the inside to give 
 a greater angle of vision through the same-sized orifice, and they 
 should be somewhat larger than at present, but not larger than 
 necessary to an unobstructed view, and not so large as to weaken the 
 
20 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 security of the top of the tower in case it should be hit. Stanchions 
 supporting the top would not give this strength, and are a menace. 
 It is further suggested that the slit be a little above the head of the 
 average man and a runway provided around inside so that only 
 those who must peep out would be exposed to splinters. For or¬ 
 dinary conditions a raised platform would be used by the helmsman, 
 and if necessary this could be used in battle. 
 
 21. A conning tower of this nature would be of real service. It 
 would also be large enough for the flag-officer (at present no armored 
 station is provided for him although in a modern engagement such 
 protection is of vital importance). Aside from the question of 
 saving this weight by combining the captain’s station with the one 
 required for the flag-officer, that officer should, in battle, be near 
 the captain of the flagship to facilitate transmission of his orders 
 to the vessel. The estimate of three additional people to accompany 
 the flag-officer is thought to be an adequate provision. 
 
 22. It would seem to be a w T ise further precaution to surround this 
 tower at a distance of some 6 feet by a 1-inch plate to act as an ex¬ 
 ploder of shell which hit it. This space could be utilized in peace as 
 a locker. It is also thought that a plenum ventilation connection 
 from below could be fitted so that in event of fire the smoke could be 
 kept out without closing the peepholes. 
 
 23. No apparatus should be in actual contact with the walls of the 
 conning tower. Woodwork, except of a temporary character, should 
 not be placed near the conning tower, on account of the danger of fire 
 in action, this danger being mainly the obscuring of vision by smoke, 
 or the driving away of personnel by smoke and heat, and not necessa¬ 
 rily of the destruction of gear. 
 
 TORPEDO DIRECTING STATIONS (2T and 28). 
 
 24. The location suggested for these stations by Naval Constructor 
 Robinson appear desirable, their only fault being in their protection. 
 In view of the fact that torpedoes will not be used until ships are at 
 comparatively short ranges, the thickness of the armor must be ma¬ 
 terially increased over that at present in use, as otherwise the stations 
 would probably be shot away before the time came to use them. 
 
 SHELL STOWAGE (29). 
 
 25. I concur in the belief that special rooms for the stowage of the 
 ordinary types of shell are unnecessary. 
 
 question of coal (30 to 33, inclusive, 35 and 3G). 
 
 26. With reference to the question of coaling, without entering into 
 details relating to any individual ship, I desire to invite attention to 
 the tactical importance of rapid coaling, whether from a lighter or 
 from a collier. This subject is of such importance as to merit the 
 most careful consideration in every feature, from bagging the coal 
 to its final trimming in the bunkers, and extends even to designing 
 the colliers with a view to their “ fitting ” the average battle ship, so 
 that the greatest number of men and hoists may work at the same 
 time. The question of landing coal bags on the gun deck, the men’s 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 21 
 
 living quarters, and messing apartment is one of importance, in that 
 if the use of it in coaling can be avoided it vastly increases their 
 comfort, but this is, nevertheless, subsidiary to the question of getting 
 the bunkers trimmed quickty. 
 
 27. The question of a ship’s ability to coal after an engagement 
 also deserves the most careful consideration. A method of accom¬ 
 plishing this is referred to by Naval Constructor Robinson and was 
 suggested by Lieutenant-Commander Bristol, and without entering 
 into its merits I desire to accentuate the importance of such a pro¬ 
 vision, for it is one on which the chase and final capture of an enemy 
 or even the immediate further taking part in the operations at hand 
 might depend. It therefore merits thought and study. 
 
 28. Referring to the question of bunker capacity, I agree with 
 Naval Constructor Robinson that a modern battle ship should have 
 an actual steaming radius at economical speed of 6,000 miles, allow¬ 
 ing for make-up feed and for a small margin of coal to be left on 
 arrival in port. In this connection it may be remarked that the varia¬ 
 ble performances of the ships of this fleet would indicate that this is 
 as much a question of economy in the design of the engines and 
 boilers as is the actual capacity of the bunkers. Results thus far, for 
 example, show that the Connecticut steams about 2.8 miles per ton, 
 while vessels of considerably less displacement can not exceed from 
 2.2 to 2.3. 
 
 29. Referring to economical speed itself, that is in itself an impor¬ 
 tant tactical feature. If without material sacrifice of other qualities 
 an economical speed of as much as 12 knots could be obtained, it 
 would greatly facilitate the movements of a fleet when making long 
 passages which demand the employment of economical speeds. Ex¬ 
 periments during this trip show that the economical speed of this 
 fleet is about 8 knots (excluding the Maine , which has no economical 
 speed and burns over 30 tons of coal a day in port), and I doubt if 
 even the Connecticut class would prove their most economical speed 
 to be much above that, although they have a large radius at 10 knots. 
 
 colliers (31 to 33 inclusive). 
 
 30. In connection with the subject of colliers, I respectfully call 
 attention to a report made to me by the present Chief of Staff, for¬ 
 warded with my approval under my indorsement of March 5, 1908, 
 which report meets my own views. I believed that the 14 knots speed 
 for such vessels, suggested in paragraph 32 of Naval Constructor 
 Robinson’s report, can not be attained wfithout sacrificing more im¬ 
 portant features in design. Of course the higher speed the better, 
 as is the case in any type of ship, but speed should not be attained 
 by sacrificing the ability to discharge coal into a battle ship expedi¬ 
 tiously. Although this is primarily a subject for the consideration 
 of ship designers, I believe 12 knots to be about the highest prac¬ 
 ticable speed for the type of collier that we must have. From our 
 experience on this trip I am convinced that it will take nearty twice 
 as long to coal the C onnecticut, for instance, from the Vestal and 
 Prometheus as it should, and as it would from a ship of less length 
 and with her hatches properly arranged. Those two colliers are 
 about the same length as the Connecticut, and as arranged it will be 
 
22 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN' BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 possible for the latter to coal from only one end at a time. This 
 defect is the result of an attempt to give these two colliers a high 
 speed, and, in my opinion, it is vital. 
 
 DOORS IN ENGINE AND FIRE ROOM BULKHEADS (34). 
 
 31. The omission of these doors is generally opposed by the engineer 
 officers of the fleet. Nevertheless it would undoubtedly add to the 
 safety of the ship, and I concur in Naval Constructor Robinson’s be¬ 
 lief that the engineer’s force would soon accommodate themselves to 
 the new conditions were the doors omitted. Their omission in future 
 designs from all war-ship bulkheads in the machinery spaces is there¬ 
 fore recommended. 
 
 FIRE-CONTROL MASTS (37). 
 
 32. These present masts, not having been designed for this pur¬ 
 pose, are not well adapted to fire control; aside from the excessive 
 vibration, which may tie a necessary evil, one shot, either direct or 
 ricochet, would bring them down. A cage-work mast especially con¬ 
 structed to resist being cut down and, so far as possible, to resist 
 vibration, would probably be satisfactory. 
 
 33. The cutting of the communications from the fire-control sta¬ 
 tion by a fragment of a shell in the recent English experiments with 
 the Hero suggests the advisability of running such communications 
 through a small armored tube extending from the spotter’s station 
 down to armor. This should be heavy enough to protect the wires, 
 etc., from fragments and splinters, even though it might not be prac¬ 
 ticable to make it a protection against direct impact. 
 
 SEARCHLIGHTS (37). 
 
 34. The searchlights aboard the ships of this fleet are not suitably 
 located. A searchlight on a bridge, or so located elsewhere that the 
 rays strike any part of the ship, is of little value. It is believed that, 
 so far as practicable, they should be in elevated positions and on the 
 center line of the ship. Further study and experiment with this 
 subject is an absolute essential. 
 
 tl t rrets (38 to 41, inclusive). 
 
 35. The turret-turning gear as mounted aboard the Maine is be¬ 
 lieved to be the best electric gear yet installed, and even that is 
 considered less satisfactory than the Williams-Jannev gear as in¬ 
 stalled aboard the Illinois , so far as experience of one year with the 
 latter indicates. The present turrets kick off ” during firing, in 
 some ships to an annoying extent, sufficient in fact to materially 
 decrease efficiency; and in some ships this increases materially during 
 the short string of shots allowed on target practice. This “ kicking 
 off ” has been minimized by rusting the disks and setting up as 
 hard as possible, in some cases to the extent of putting a wrench 
 on the nuts and training the turret against it. While these expedi¬ 
 ents in some cases practically remove the difficulty, they are accom¬ 
 panied by the danger of disabling the turret, and are at best a make- 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 23 
 
 shift to circumvent a difficulty which should, if possible, be corrected 
 in the design. 
 
 36. Unless the compressed-air system of loading turret guns 
 proves to be successful, the two-stage hoist is believed to be the 
 best, both regarding safety and rapidity, which now offers. 
 
 37. The question of placing turrets under air pressure to assist in 
 expelling gases is heartily approved. 
 
 38. I again invite attention to the importance of fitting adequate 
 means for hoisting turret ammunition by hand. The turret guns 
 can be trained, elevated, and loaded by hand, but burning out a 
 hoist motor now puts a turret gun out of commission. 
 
 funnels (42). 
 
 39. I concur in Naval Constructor Robinson’s recommendation as 
 to shortening funnels. 
 
 torpedo defense (43 to 46, inclusive). 
 
 40. The torpedo defense of all ships in our service is inadequate. 
 This matter has recently been made the subject of an exhaustive re¬ 
 port by the board to which Naval Constructor Robinson refers, but 
 I have not seen that report and therefore can not pass judgment upon 
 his references made herein to its contents. Except for the suggestions 
 already made relative to the best location of certain guns of the tor¬ 
 pedo-defense battery and for the statement that the searchlights are 
 at present not effectively located, I refrain from further remark. 
 
 PROPELLING MACHINERY (47). 
 
 41. While believing that the adoption of the turbine machinery 
 must soon come, I approve Naval Constructor Robinson’s remarks as 
 to the care which must be taken in adopting it not to sacrifice tactical 
 and maneuvering qualities that are essential to the proper handling 
 of ships, not only as a single vessel but as a unit in a fleet. 
 
 INTURNING SCREWS (48). 
 
 42. No words that can here be recorded can add to my already 
 often expressed opinion as to the enormity of the error committed 
 when ships were built with inturning screws. 
 
 43. I concur in Naval Constructor Robinson’s recommendations, 
 and most strongly urge that this engine be placed behind armor 
 or below the protective deck. All that was said under 44 coaling ” 
 with reference to the necessity of protecting the hoists and gear 
 apply even with increased force to the anchor engines. While the 
 wild-cats and shafting must probably remain exposed, it would seem 
 practicable to place the engine behind armor and bring the power to 
 the wild-cats by shafting. In time of war spare parts could be carried 
 to replace those portions of mechanism which must necessarily remain 
 exposed. 
 
 steering engine (50 to 52, inclusive). 
 
 44. Although in their replies to the queries put to them the com¬ 
 manding officers, as a rule, stated that the steering apparatus is sat¬ 
 isfactory, it is nevertheless a fact that some minor faults, usually in 
 
^>4 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 the transmission gear and not in the engine, are the most common 
 causes of the exhibition of the breakdown flag in the fleet. This has 
 occurred so often that I have called for a special report from each 
 commanding officer relative to every such failure aboard the ship 
 under his command occurring between Hampton Roads and Magda¬ 
 lena Bay. The statements in these reports will be tabulated when 
 received, and I will then make some further statements and recom¬ 
 mendations in regard to this most vital point. 
 
 45. The above facts, combined with the heating of some of the 
 after magazines, due to steam pipes in or near such magazines, are 
 the worst features of the present design, and Naval Constructor Rob¬ 
 inson’s remarks are approved. Some steps should be taken to over¬ 
 come both troubles, as unreliability of the transmission gear always 
 jeopardizes a ship when she is in close waters, and the heating of the 
 magazines is a serious menace to the ballastic qualities and stability 
 of the ammunition. 
 
 WINCHES. (53). 
 
 46. Naval Constructor Robinson’s remarks on the lack of the power 
 of the winches are correct. Although the winches perhaps now do 
 all that it was intended that they should, at the same time experience 
 has shown that if the fleet is to be efficient as a fighting force they must 
 meet the requirements that Naval Constructor Robinson lays down in 
 his report. Nothing short of that will answer, if the fleet is to spend 
 no more time in coaling than would be desirable in time of war. 
 In the consideration of this vital point it must be constantly borne 
 in mind that a fleet coaling is not, for the time so occupied, a fleet 
 in being, and that every hour that can be cut off from the time taken 
 to coal is an enormous gain in efficiency. This point should be re¬ 
 membered in the design of colliers also. 
 
 47. And again I desire to call attention to the necessity for getting 
 the operating apparatus for the winches behind armor or below the 
 protective deck, and for carrying spare parts in time of war to re¬ 
 place those that will inevitably be shot away, in order that the fleet 
 may coal rapidly after action and be at sea again as soon, or if pos¬ 
 sible sooner, than the enemy. 
 
 FANS FOR VENTILATION (54). 
 
 48. I concur in Naval Constructor Robinson’s remarks. 
 
 doors (55). 
 
 49. I concur in Naval Constructor Robinson’s remarks. 
 
 BOAT CRANES (56). 
 
 50. It is noted that out of the 16 executive officers 11 prefer the 
 crane, while 5 believe it to be a menace in action which its convenience 
 and facility of operation in peace does not counterbalance. The fact 
 that cranes are ideally adapted to their purpose under peace condi¬ 
 tions, and the fact that it is at times of primary importance to hoist 
 boats quickly, is fully recognized; but nevertheless they are such a 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 25 
 
 menace to the ship and to the guns and their crews during action that 
 I am of the opinion that some other method of hoisting boats is 
 necessary for battle efficiency. If, therefore, the choice rested be¬ 
 tween cranes or booms, I should be forced to recommend booms, but 
 I am informed that the collapsible crane suggested in the accompany¬ 
 ing report, which combines the desirable features of both systems, has 
 actually been designed. This would appear to be satisfactory. 
 
 ICE MACHINES (57). 
 
 51. I concur in Naval Constructor’s remarks. 
 
 piping systems (58 to 67, inclusive). 
 
 52. I concur in general with Naval Constructor Robinson’s re¬ 
 marks, especially in regard to the importance of having no inter¬ 
 communication between the fresh and salt water systems. It has 
 always been an open question whether the existence of such inter¬ 
 communication aboard the Connecticut was not the cause of the out¬ 
 break of a serious epidemic of typhoid fever aboard that vessel about 
 a year ago. 
 
 53. In regard to paragraph 63 of Naval Constructor Robinson’s 
 reports, relative to magazine floods, I have to state that in spite of 
 the fact that the majority of the ordnance officers of the fleet state 
 that the flooding arrangements are satisfactory, I am convinced that 
 as a quick safety precaution (that is, as a precaution which in an 
 emergency will act quickly enough to prevent disaster), the design 
 itself is unsatisfactory. The compartment should be deluged 
 rapidly, preferably from an overhead spray of generous capacity, 
 with a quick-opening valve, as was recommended by Lieutenant-Com¬ 
 mander Upham, Lieutenant-Commander Fullinwider, and by certain 
 other officers of the fleet, and which is referred to in Naval Con¬ 
 structor Robinson’s report as having been provided in latest ships. 
 It is believed that this is a feature in which improvement is urgently 
 needed. 
 
 SCUPPERS (68), VENTILATING SYSTEM (69), HEATING SYSTEM (70), 
 PLUMBING FIXTURES (71). 
 
 54. I concur in Naval Constructor Robinson's remarks. 
 
 INTERIOR SUBDIVISION AND ARRANGEMENT. (72 and following). 
 
 55. When discussing the question of assignment of space on board 
 a battle ship, one general criterion should govern, Adz., all features of 
 a ship which wdll be necessary during Avar, both before and after an 
 action, that can be reasonably placed behind armor, should be so 
 located. As mentioned above, coaling is one such feature, and the 
 essentials of coaling, both gear and winches, should if practicable be 
 protected; messing is another—the galleys must of necessity be above 
 decks, but the pantry should be behind armor; similarly as to the 
 armory, which should be so located that men could approach from 
 any direction and after receiving rifles return to the deck by another 
 route. The important feature of economical distribution of space 
 aboard ship is also frequently not given sufficient attention. 
 
26 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 STOREROOMS (74). 
 
 56. The Connecticut and Virginia classes of ships appear to have 
 inadequate storeroom capacity. The paymaster of the Connecticut 
 states that he can carry but one month’s provisions. This is believed 
 to be inadequate to war efficiency, as it is believed that every ship 
 should be capable, in an emergency, of stowing three months’ provi¬ 
 sions. 
 
 shops (75). 
 
 57. I concur in Naval Constructor Robinson’s remarks. 
 
 DYNAMO ROOMS (77). 
 
 58. The importance of electricity in a modern action renders it 
 desirable and prudent to install two widely separated dynamo rooms 
 even at a somewhat increased expense of installation. I approve of 
 the remarks of Naval Constructor Robinson on this subject, but in¬ 
 vite attention to the importance of absolutely guaranteeing to the 
 ship up to the last minute that supply of electrical power which is 
 her very life. 
 
 magazines (78 to 80, inclusive). 
 
 59. In view of the frequency of heating of magazines, which was 
 experienced in the fleet when passing through the Tropics, I recently 
 deemed it advisable to forward for the information of the Depart¬ 
 ment, in case of future designs, a considerable number of magazine- 
 temperature cards, 'which explain, in various cases, the causes of the 
 high temperatures reported. It was noted that the heating was 
 usually ascribed to near-by steam pipes. Particularly was this the 
 case with the steam pipe leading to the steering-engine room. It is 
 believed that with greater care devoted to this feature the magazines 
 will rarely rise above 95°, and that the temperatures in excess of 90° 
 will be experienced only in very hot weather. Therefore it is not 
 believed that magazine refrigeration is a necessitv. It would be a 
 very desirable feature, but it is thought that the accruing advantages 
 would probably not offset the increased weight and expense of 
 operation. 
 
 stowage of magazines. 
 
 60. The present stowage of magazines can not be regarded as 
 altogether satisfactory, for the reasons that— 
 
 (a) There are large quantities of wood in all magazines and shell 
 rooms. No wood whatever, nor anything else inflammable, should be 
 in a magazine, nor, so far as practicable, in immediate contact with 
 it. More than one instance is on record of charred wood in maga¬ 
 zines due to the heat in an adjoining apartment, and while danger 
 from this cause is remote, it exists, and such existence seems to be 
 entirely unnecessary. It is possible that explosions of magazines in 
 action may have been frequently due to fires in the immediate adja¬ 
 cent compartments, and hence the presence of combustible material 
 in such compartments should be forbidden, or reduced to a minimum, 
 or else the magazines should be protected by double bulkheads. These 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 27 
 
 double bulkheads should invariably separate magazines from coal 
 bunkers, and in this case means of artificial ventilation should be 
 supplied in the separating compartment. 
 
 (5) The space is frequently not used to the best advantage. When 
 preparing the fleet for the Pacific cruise one of my first thoughts 
 was, “ What amount of ammunition can we carry ? ” This question 
 would, in case of threatened hostilities, come all the more prominently 
 to the front. On requesting estimates I found the widest divergence 
 to exist, even among the ships of the same class, but in nearly every 
 case the replies stated that considerably more ammunition than the 
 habitual allowance could be carried, by certain minor changes in 
 stowage or arrangement. In view of the fact that extra ammunition 
 was not available, the subject was not carried further, but as this is a 
 question, and one of much importance, which will come up again at 
 the first prospect of war (for the present normal allowance for the 
 ships of the fleet is small), it is a subject which should be taken up 
 for all the ships as soon as possible and each magazine and shell 
 room arranged to hold its greatest capacity of ammunition in an 
 emergency. 
 
 AMMUNITION SUPPLY. 
 
 61. Naval Constructor Robinson only touches upon this subject 
 incidentally. It is an important one, and while it is believed that in 
 one or two instances ordnance officers have requested a supply in 
 excess of the actual demands, it is unquestionable that the ships now 
 in commission can only in special cases supply ammunition at the 
 various guns as rapidly as it can be fired. This is largely due to the 
 increase of the rapidity of fire since the ammunition-supply systems 
 were designed. It will be noted that the fact does not in all cases lie 
 only in the hoist itself, but frequently in the difficulties and interfer¬ 
 ence attendant on getting the ammunition to the hoist, as is the case 
 aboard the Maine. The ammunition-supply tests held after each 
 practice give the maximum rate of supply for ten minutes under the 
 most favorable circumstances, while the report of the target practice 
 each year shows the average rapidity of fire under the most favorable 
 circumstances. While undoubtedly the rapidity of fire in battle 
 would be materially reduced, as compared with that attained on 
 target practice, it must be remembered that the target practice score 
 is an average of all the pointers and not the maximum attainable; 
 and also that the supply test was made under the best conditions and 
 that it, too, would be reduced in rapidity of action. It would there¬ 
 fore seem reasonable to attempt to provide an ammunition-supply 
 system which, on a short test, would supply ammunition at a rate 
 equal to the average shots per minute on the record practice. If the 
 Bureau of Ordnance approves the recommendation made by Naval 
 Constructor Robinson in paragraph 29 of his report, that shell of or¬ 
 dinary type may be stowed in the open, the question of ammunition 
 stowage and supply will be greatly simplified. 
 
 hospital spaces (81 to 85, inclusive). 
 
 62. The medical officers of the fleet are unanimous in desiring to 
 have the sick bay on the upper deck, and that it may be more com¬ 
 modious, some of them even going so far as to compare sick bays 
 
28 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 with hospitals on shore. While realizing the desirability of showing 
 every consideration to the sick, it must be remembered that hospitals 
 are primarily for the accommodation of the sick, while a ship is 
 primarily for the accommodation of the well. When this fact is 
 considered, in connection with the multitudinous requirements for 
 available space on board ship, especially on the upper deck, I am of 
 the opinion that sick bays on vessels of this fleet are, as a rule, com¬ 
 modious in the extreme, and that it would be an injustice to the well 
 to permit a greater assignment of space for the possible comfort of 
 a large number of sick; and especially is this the case when really 
 sick patients are invariably transferred to a hospital at the first 
 opportunity. It is therefore recommended that no increase of space 
 be allotted to the sick bay aboard vessels of the fleet or other vessels 
 to be designed, and that the sick bay be not placed above the berth 
 deck, because of the necessity of reserving the space there for ship 
 use. It is important to efficiency that careful consideration be given 
 to the arrangement of the space at present allowed for the sick bay 
 with a view to having the most suitable accommodation practicable. 
 Referring to the provision of a “ dressing station,” mentioned in the 
 accompanying report, ships of the fleet habitually make use of the 
 junior officers" mess room and the chief petty officers’ quarters, which 
 appear satisfactory, except that in some cases proper facilities for 
 getting the wounded to them have not been provided: 
 
 GALLEYS, ETC. (86), GENERAL MESS PANTRY (87), BAKERY (88), SHIPS 
 
 WATER TANKS (89), MACHINERY SPACES AND ARRANGEMENTS (90), 
 
 engineer’s storerooms (91-92), general workshop (93). 
 
 63. I concur in Naval Constructor Robinson’s remarks. 
 
 LAUNDRY (94). 
 
 64. I disagree with Naval Constructor Robinson’s conclusion that 
 the laundry could well be omitted from a ship. His statement as to 
 the difference in the necessity for this fitting between a ship acting 
 singly and when with a large fleet is correct, but his final conclusion 
 is, in my opinion, wrong. If the service of the fleet during a winter 
 at Guantanamo be considered, it will at once be seen that officers 
 could have no clothing whatever washed from the time of leaving 
 the United States until returning thereto—a period of four to six 
 months. Similarly, on the present trip, some few officers have tried 
 to get clothes washed ashore, but even the few that have done so 
 have overcrowded the local facilities. Without laundries aboard the 
 ships practically no washing could have been done for the officers 
 since leaving Hampton Roads; many of them would have lost cloth¬ 
 ing in an effort to get it washed, and by the time we reached Callao, 
 a tropical port, probably no officer would have had any clothing fit 
 to be seen in which to appear at the many official functions that took 
 place there. The acceptance of Naval Constructor Robinson’s rec¬ 
 ommendation would simply mean that the officers of cruising ships 
 would live in deck-washed and rough-dried clothes three-quarters of 
 the time, and would never be fit to appear anywhere; or, as another 
 alternative, the fleet would have to visit good laundry ports at fre¬ 
 quent intervals and remain in them as long as the local laundries 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS , IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 29 
 
 chose to keep them there. While it is true that some difficulty is 
 experienced in getting good laundry operators aboard ship, at the 
 same time steady improvement in this particular may reasonably 
 be expected; and in spite of this trouble the work aboard ship during 
 this cruise has been at least as good, if not better, than that which 
 was done on shore. 
 
 CHAIN LOCKERS (95). 
 
 65. I concur in Naval Constructor Robinson’s remarks. 
 
 CENTRAL STATION AND FIRE-CONTROL SUBSTATIONS (96). 
 
 66. Naval Constructor Robinson’s remarks on this subject are 
 approved. I desire to invite special attention to the importance of 
 being able to steer from the central station in battle. With the com¬ 
 pass in that station near the dynamos, as is ordinarity the case, it is 
 now generally impracticable to even steady a ship by compass in that 
 station. A special report on substations will be submitted at an early 
 date. 
 
 COMPASS LOCATIONS (97 to 99). 
 
 67. The remarks in the preceding paragraph apply in part to one, 
 phase of this question. So far as standard and steering compasses 
 aboard our battle ships are concerned, there ;s no doubt that the 
 magnetic conditions which surround them are about as bad as could 
 well be contrived. This matter is an exceedingly serious one, and one 
 which, in my opinion, should be made the subject of special investiga¬ 
 tion by one or more officers who are particularly qualified in this 
 subject. 
 
 SHOWER SPACES (100) ; BATH ROOMS (101) ; CHART HOUSES AND EMER¬ 
 GENCY CABINS (102) ; MISCELLANEOUS FITTINGS (104, 105) ; LIFE 
 
 BUOYS (106) ; BAG RAILS, ETC. (107) ; GUN PORT SHUTTERS (108) ; 
 
 COALING BOOMS AND SPARS (109) ; NUTS AND BOLTS (HO, 111) ; HEAVY 
 
 STEEL BUCKLERS (112) ; HAWSE-PIPE BUCKLERS (113). 
 
 68. I concur in Naval Constructor Robinson’s remarks. 
 
 anchors (114). 
 
 69. I concur in the recommendation that only patent anchors be 
 carried. The question of carrying the anchor davit or crane forward 
 is probably one of weight as opposed to convenience. With the 
 modern anchor the davit is rarely necessary, but in case of a foul 
 anchor it is a great convenience. However, a pair of shear legs prop¬ 
 erly rigged would accomplish the same purpose, though at the ex¬ 
 pense of time and convenience. 
 
 LADDERS (115) ; SIDE LADDERS (116) ; WOOD FITTINGS (117) ; CHOCKS 
 (118) ; bitts (119) ; boat davits (120) ; boat cradles (121). 
 
 70. I concur in Naval Constructor Robinson’s remarks. 
 
30 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 SECONDARY AMMUNITION HOISTS AND CONVEYERS (122). 
 
 71. Subject to the remarks contained in paragraph 61 of this let¬ 
 ter, I concur in Naval Constructor Robinson’s remarks. 
 
 FURNITURE (123). 
 
 72. I concur in Naval Constructor Robinson's remarks. 
 
 boats (124). 
 
 73. I concur in Naval Constructor Robinson’s remarks. In regard 
 to the question of racing cutters my experience, both before and since 
 racing cutters were introduced, convinces me that they are exceed¬ 
 ingly desirable. It is important that they be exactly alike. Hereto¬ 
 fore there has been so much variation in their weight as to almost 
 defeat their object, but, general^ speaking, they have encouraged 
 racing and have minimized the stress heretofore laid upon the merits 
 of the particular boats, which resulted in extensive changes to the 
 regular boats or the purchase of special race boats. 
 
 ALLOWANCE OF STORES (125) ; CONDUIT (126) ; SHEATHING FOR INSULAT¬ 
 ING (127) ; air ports (128) ; waterway gratings (129); signal 
 
 LOCKERS (130) ; COAL BAGS AND GEAR (131) J HAMMOCKS (132) ; 
 
 TOILET FIXTURES (133) ; BOW T ORNAMENT (134) ; ASH CHUTES (135). 
 
 74. I concur in Naval Constructor Robinson’s remarks. 
 
 paint (136). 
 
 75. I agree with Naval Constructor Robinson that the present spar- 
 color paint is entirely unfit for the use to which it is put, for the 
 reason which he gives. I earnestly recommend that where spar color 
 is now employed such a blue gray as he has suggested may be sub¬ 
 stituted. 
 
 BATTLE LIGHTING CIRCUIT (137) ; INTERNAL DRAFT GAUGES (138) ; TAR¬ 
 PAULIN BATTENS (139) ; SAND AND WASH DECK GEAR LOCKERS (140); 
 
 POST-OFFICE (142); BOOKCASES (144). 
 
 76. I concur in Naval Constructor Robinson's remarks. 
 
 BATTALION LOCKERS (141) ; ABANDON SHIP LOCKERS (143). 
 
 77. These lockers are of great convenience, but are not absolutely 
 essential. Where no great gain would result from their abolition, I 
 recommend that they be retained, but where the space they occupy is 
 needed for other purposes they should go. 
 
 Very respectfully, R. D. Evans, 
 
 Rear-Admiral , U. S. Navy , 
 Commander in Chief United States Atlantic Fleet. 
 
 The Secretary of the Navy, 
 
 Navy Department , Washington , D. C. 
 
 (Through Bureau of Navigation.) 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 31 
 
 5 . 
 
 U. S. S. Connecticut, Flagship, 
 
 At sea , March h, 1908. 
 
 Sir: 1 . I have the honor to submit the following report for your 
 consideration and that of the Navy Department in connection with 
 matters of ship design, arrangements, and htt'h'&s-:— 
 
 2. The comments made herein are the results of observation and 
 inquiry on my part as to the ships of this fleet and frejfrconsideration 
 of opinions expressed by the various officer *of the fleet in reply to 
 the queries contained in your circular iettef No., 5,„ of ffanuary 6, 
 
 1908. i A ;:•/ 
 
 3. I have divided the items into two genera: headings: 
 
 (a) Items affecting the general character of ships and their salient 
 features. 
 
 (b) Items affecting the detail of internal arrangements and fittings 
 of battle ships of United States fleet. 
 
 4. The remarks submitted here have general application to new 
 design work, but, so far as the types of ships permit, also apply to 
 overhauling of existing ships when that is undertaken. 
 
 ITEMS AFFECTING THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF SHIPS AND THEIR SALIENT 
 
 FEATURES. 
 
 5. The desirability of homogeneity between vessels operating to¬ 
 gether has been impressed upon me. Such homogeneity should in¬ 
 clude economical speed and coal capacity from strategical considera¬ 
 tion, and turning and maneuvering qualities and arcs over which 
 guns may be brought to bear from tactical considerations. 
 
 6. That fittings and auxiliaries should be interchangeable is de¬ 
 sirable, but not so necessary as that the ships should be similar in the 
 above qualities. 
 
 7. To what extent absolute homogeneity should be carried is a 
 question open to argument, but I believe that units of four should be 
 the minimum and that in progressing from unit to unit the most 
 careful considerations should be given to the large questions of 
 endurance and maneuvering qualities, so that the various units may 
 be combined into a fleet whose operation is not impeded by the 
 weakness of a small part. 
 
 8. The excessive coal consumption of the Maine and the small coal 
 capacity of the Alabama and Illinois bring out these points. 
 
 9. In battle ships of considerable length and speeds, in any but 
 the smoothest sea, some water is taken on board forward with the 
 freeboards that exist in the vessels of this fleet. Ordinarily the 
 amount of water is not such as to prevent the use of bow turrets 
 under reasonable conditions. A flaring of the bow sections, omission 
 of excrescences, such as bill boards, bow sponsons, and, where possible, 
 increase of freeboard forward are advisable, and, if length and speed 
 are to be increased, imperative. Bow guns mounted similarly to 
 the forward 3-inch guns on the Connecticut class are useless under¬ 
 way at any speed in practically any sea. 
 
 10. The flukes of patent anchors when carried low down contribute 
 to this throwing of water and should be raised, as it is understood 
 to have been done on latest designs by making inclination of hawse 
 
32 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 pipes to horizontal much less. A low breakwater some distance 
 abaft the bow diagonally inclined to thwartship line and having 
 freeing ports of some size at sides would contribute to dryness. 
 
 11. I have seen no weather on this trip where 'turret guns would 
 be out of action, except so far as flying spray in a few cases might 
 affect the sights. Quarter-decks as low as the Maine type do not 
 appear desirable,, being frequently flooded by a quartering sea of 
 any size, though I have seen no weather on this trip to put the after 
 turret out of commission. 
 
 12. (funs mounted in broadside in positions corresponding to the 
 7-inch battery of the Connecticut are liable to be thrown out of ac¬ 
 tion on the weather side at any considerable speed under trade-wind 
 conditions, or, Worse, J dbe to water. 
 
 13. If the amount of water getting through the port is not suffi¬ 
 cient to cause serious trouble, it will, under these conditions, interfere 
 with drill, make the service of the gun difficult by making decks 
 slippery, and impair the use of the telescope. 
 
 14. The effect on the lee guns is much less but, due to refraction 
 from gases of gun in firing and its effect on sighting, the lee gauge is 
 probably the one that will be chosen and is certainly the best from 
 a gunnery standpoint. 
 
 15. With the present acceptation of the all-big-gun ship any bat¬ 
 tery likely to be on this deck in future will be for torpedo defense 
 only and would probably not be manned during the main action. 
 
 16. A torpedo attack may be expected from any direction and, if 
 it is to be repelled while the ship is steaming at some speed under 
 the conditions mentioned above, it would seem that some, at least, of 
 these torpedo-defense guns should be mounted higher than the gun- 
 deck level. 
 
 17. It is essential that such torpedo-defense guns be protected by 
 armor in order that they may not be expended in the action and may 
 be ready when wanted. To raise the whole torpedo-defense battery 
 and armor it properly is a difficult matter without raising the main 
 battery, which immediately affects the stability and causes increase 
 of beam and further complication. 
 
 18. It therefore seems that part of such guns should be kept on the 
 gun deck suitably protected, and a few might be mounted on tops of 
 turrets or in the high and exposed positions, or, if possible, a suitable 
 design of special quick-acting type of disappearing gun mount de¬ 
 veloped so that the torpedo-defense guns might be stowed behind 
 armor during the main action and quickly brought to battery after¬ 
 wards. 
 
 19. As to the much-vexed question of armor-belt location, the 
 weather and sea conditions of this trip have been unusually good, 
 but even under these conditions the bottom of the belt of the various 
 ships has been frequently visible, due to the pitching and rolling, and 
 it would seem that the location of the bottom of the belt was not 
 excessively low, as an injury below the belt would be much more 
 serious than one above it, and could be made by a shell of any caliber 
 when the bottom of the belt is exposed. 
 
 20. It is realized that the conditions, of loading of the various ves¬ 
 sels of the fleet were unusual, the single item of reserve feed water 
 ranging from 300 tons in several ships to as high as 800 tons in one 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 33 
 
 ship; in addition to which are unusual spare parts, target-practice 
 ammunition, etc. 
 
 21. It would hardly be denied by anyone that it is desirable to have 
 the greatest area and thickness of armor possible, and it would seem 
 that a belt starting at the level of the bottom of the present belt, and 
 made at the maximum width and thickness possible, at the same time 
 assigning proper protection to the turrets and gun emplacements, is 
 a reasonable compromise. Armor at the bow should be arranged 
 with regard to form of wave profile, unless the fineness of bow lines 
 and arrangement of internal subdivisions is such as to make excessive 
 trim and loss of stability from bow damages impossible. Similar 
 remarks apply to the stern, with the additional fact that protection 
 for the steering gear is imperative. 
 
 22. A reduction in the number and size of superstructures and 
 bridges should be made. One bridge forward of a generous size, at 
 about the level of conning tower floor, with no flying bridge, is de¬ 
 sirable, and a concentration of superstructure forward in the form of 
 a high bow and forecastle will tend to efficiency in many ways. The 
 present type of superstructure is undesirable. 
 
 23. The conning tower should have the fundamental requisite of 
 adequate protection and size and unobstructed view, and the dimen¬ 
 sions should be decided on with these features in view. Many of the 
 present towers have obstructions to view in the form of supports for 
 structures above the tower, boats, stacks, etc., many of which could 
 be removed with removal of bridge above. Access from the bottom 
 is necessary, but the door should be retained for use under ordinary 
 circumstances if we are to do what the consensus of opinion now 
 demands, namely, handle the ship from a bridge on the same level, 
 by using the wheel, etc., in the conning tower. 
 
 24. This tower should be of a size sufficient to accommodate the 
 captain, navigator, and three of four other men stationed at the 
 wheel, instruments, and voice tubes. For a flagship the question of 
 protection to the admiral and his staff is also involved. This brings 
 out the fact that decision should be made at time of design as to 
 Avhether the ship is to be used as a flagship or not. It is, ordinarily, 
 reasonably simple to make some sort of living provisions for the 
 admiral and his staff, though even that results in a makeshift if not 
 originally provided; but the question of battle station is another 
 matter. It does not appear desirable to make all battle ships flag¬ 
 ships, as has been the practice in the past, but certain ones will nat¬ 
 urally be required to be so fitted. 
 
 25. It seems that for ships so selected to serve as flagships a special 
 sized conning tower to accommodate the admiral and three of his 
 staff in addition to the ship’s people would be more efficient and 
 lighter than a separate signal station at the after end of the ship. 
 
 26. The type of tower at present fitted seems well suited, though 
 the peepholes should be made larger and the size and surroundings 
 of towers determined by the general considerations mentioned above. 
 
 TORPEDO DIRECTING STATIONS. 
 
 27. Any place reasonably high up and suitably protected forward 
 and aft. having a clear and unobstructed view over as great a part 
 
 S. Doc. 506, 60-1-3 
 
34 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 of the horizon as possible, will serve well as a torpedo-directing 
 station. 
 
 28. The present type on front of conning tower seems well for for¬ 
 ward station and an armored tube in center line aft, about where 
 present signal tower is placed, will serve well aft if the view is clear. 
 Such an after tower is not necessary if after tubes are not fitted. 
 The armor of this station should be thicker than is now the case. 
 
 29. From inquiry and observation I believe we have in the past 
 made a wrong assumption that all shell require closed rooms for 
 stowage. Provision for storage of intermediate and other shell in 
 passages, at base of hoists, in rear of guns, etc., will simplify the 
 problem of ammunition stowage and supply and give more space for 
 powder. This does not apply to fixed ammunition or to high ex¬ 
 plosive sensitive fuse shell, which should have separate storage. 
 
 30. The problem of coal is one that has confronted the fleet particu¬ 
 larly on this trip. The principal general difficulties experienced are 
 inaccessibility of bunker chutes (inherent in ships with side turrets 
 and superstructures), interference of deck fittings with thwartship 
 transportation, which may be removed, and inconvenient location of 
 chutes for delivery to bunkers, which should be guarded against in 
 the future. Chutes should be arranged to deliver in middle of 
 bunkers instead of at sides or corners. Some comments on the de¬ 
 tails of coaling booms and fittings are made under class B. 
 
 COLLIERS. 
 
 31. The colliers used on this trip were in most cases ordinary mer¬ 
 chant colliers, and are not altogether suited for naval purposes in 
 that when they come alongside their hatches do not fall abreast the 
 battle ship where the bunker chutes and coaling arrangements are 
 located. In all battle ships the bunkers are now and probably will 
 continue to be some distance from bow and stern. This, then, implies 
 that the collier’s hatches should be in the middle of her length, the 
 machinery being in the stern and the living spaces, etc., in the bow. 
 
 32. It is not believed that a speed of more than 12 to 14 knots is 
 necessary for the majority of colliers to serve the fleet. The type 
 of masts, booms, and winches on these colliers will serve. 
 
 33. The sides of the collier’s hatches should be smooth and free 
 from anything to catch or tear the bags. 
 
 34. It is the generally expressed sentiment of the engineer officers 
 of the fleet that through access within machinery spaces by doors 
 in bulkheads is essential to proper operation of the machinery. 
 It is unquestionably easier, but equally unquestionably is the fact 
 that it is more dangerous in laying open to possible bilging by sub¬ 
 marine mine or torpedo boat' the whole of the machinery space. 
 Foreign services have adopted the idea of no doors in the thwart- 
 ship bulkheads in machinery spaces and find it possible to operate 
 their machinery, and it is believed that doors in thwartship bulk¬ 
 heads should be omitted, but that doors in center-line bulkheads 
 when such are fitted are not objectionable. 
 
 COAL CAPACITY. 
 
 35. Should be sufficient to give a radius of action at economical 
 speed of 10 or 12 knots of at least 6,000 miles. 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 35 
 
 CONSUMPTION FOR ORDINARY PURPOSES. 
 
 36. Every endeavor should be made to procure machinery, both 
 main and auxiliary, of greater coal economy, and to install in a 
 manner best suited to economical working. 
 
 FIRE CONTROL PROVISIONS AND SEARCHLIGHTS. 
 
 37. The present type of masts is for modern purposes entirely 
 incorrect. It involves an excessive weight for the purpose with 
 inadequate return. The present spotter’s platform is supported 
 by a wooden pole which can be carried away by a single shot, direct 
 or ricochet. The wooden pole should be replaced by lattice masts 
 combining the function of supports for range-finder’s and spotter’s 
 platforms, and searchlights and signal yards, with a pole extension 
 for wireless aerial. 
 
 TURRETS. 
 
 38. The features of the present turret open to the most improve¬ 
 ment are (a) the sighting hood, (b) the turning gear speed, (c) the 
 jumping off of turret as guns fire, ( d ) the ammunition hoist, (a) 
 has been overcome by trunnion sights on South Carolina and Michi¬ 
 gan turrets, which sights are strongly recommended. ( b) has been 
 solved with reasonable satisfaction on two ships of the fleet, the 
 Maine , with the rotary compensator electric system, and the Illi¬ 
 nois , with the Williams hydraulic speed gear controlling a constant- 
 speed electric motor. Either of these will, so far as present experi¬ 
 ence goes, give suitable results. ( c) is a matter that should receive 
 careful consideration, as some of the present turrets jump the sights 
 entirely off the target in firing, (d) The turret ammunition hoist 
 of the present type necessarily involves an opening of some size for 
 the passage of the hoist rope. Either the pneumatic hoist under con¬ 
 struction for test or the two-stage hoist seem to present reasonable 
 
 solutions of this question. 
 
 39. In addition to the above, I believe that the turret should be kept 
 under air pressure to act as a gas-expelling device, and the port open¬ 
 ing closed by a suitable flexible cover serving as a means of excluding 
 water as well as retaining the air. 
 
 40. Provision should be made for hoisting ammunition by hand 
 in addition to the hand-turning and hand-elevating gears now fitted. 
 
 41. The tops of turrets and the arrangements of gun mounts, etc., 
 should be so made that they may be easily removed and new guns 
 installed quickly as may be necessary in time of war. 
 
 SMOKESTACKS. 
 
 42. In the point of view of target and of interference with fire 
 control these stacks are too high, and it is believed they should be 
 reduced in height to the greatest extent possible commensurate with 
 suitable draft. 
 
 TORPEDO DEFENSES. 
 
 43. I am impressed with the fact of the apparent helplessness of 
 the fleet against a concentrated and energetic night attack by torpedo 
 boats. 
 
36 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 44. This subject was dealt with recently bv a special board of which 
 I had the honor to be a member. 
 
 45. The general conclusions of that board were that more destroyers 
 were needed, nets should be fitted, searchlights and torpedo defense 
 batteries rearranged, and, if experiments which were recommended 
 indicated the necessity, internal protection as part of the hull 
 structure. 
 
 46. I see no reason to modify the views expressed in the report of 
 that board, and I respectfully invite attention to that report as em¬ 
 bodying what in my opinion is necessary in that respect. 
 
 PROPELLING MACHINERY. 
 
 47. The necessity for wide radius of action for strategic pur¬ 
 poses and for fine control for station keeping in fleet tactical maneu¬ 
 vers require careful consideration in determining the type of pro¬ 
 pelling machinery, and a turbine installation which sacrificed these 
 two fundamentally essential elements is believed inferior to recip¬ 
 rocating machinery. 
 
 IN-TURNING SCREWS. 
 
 48. From observation of the length of time required in turning 
 and maneuvering, particularly from an anchorage, I think there can 
 be no doubt as to the superiority of out-turning screws. 
 
 Class B.— Items affecting the detail of internal arrangements and 
 ]fittings of battle ships. 
 
 ANCHOR WINDLASS. 
 
 49. Generally satisfactory in power and operation. It is believed 
 that the vertical spindle, horizontal wild-cat type, of late designs, is 
 preferable to the horizontal-spindle type now in the fleet, and it 
 would seem wise to put the driving mechanism behind adequate 
 protection, extending the spindle up as necessary, which with this 
 type is quite practicable. 
 
 STEERING ENGINE. 
 
 50. In general functions satisfactory as an engine, but the system 
 as a whole has two objections: 
 
 (a) The transmission by rope subject to loosening and stranding 
 and which is generally inaccessible. 
 
 (b) Heating of magazines by steering-engine steam pipes. The 
 development of the electric gear of the Tacoma type or placing the 
 engine in the engine room with extension of operating screw shaft 
 seem possible solutions of this difficulty. 
 
 51. Wire rope transmission when fitted should have the finest 
 flexible plow steel rope or the special hemp-covered steel rope, 
 which has given such good service on torpedo boats; it should be run 
 in large and easily accessible tubes, with generous slip couplings for 
 access. 
 
 52. Special care should be given to keys and pins of clutches and 
 bevel gears, which should be so located and fitted as not to be subject 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 37 
 
 to jarring out, shearing, or being tampered with by unauthorized 
 parties. 
 
 WINCHES. 
 
 53. Are in a number of cases deficient in power for modern coaling 
 operations requiring the simultaneous hoisting of four or more bags 
 of 800 pounds each, and constant running under rapidly varying 
 loads for periods of from twelve to twenty-four hours. If the driv¬ 
 ing motor could be located below decks and operated from above 
 they would be less liable to injury of action, and probably would be 
 available for coaling afterward, which might be essential. 
 
 FANS FOR VENTILATION. 
 
 54. Satisfactory, generally, in principle and operation, sometimes 
 defective in construction. Ventilation should be provided for spaces 
 corresponding to gun deck of Connecticut class, and something equiv¬ 
 alent to present coaling skylights for natural exhaust and light. It 
 is believed that all ventilation fans of considerable size should, when 
 possible, be mounted with axis of armature fore and aft. 
 
 DOORS. 
 
 55. The principle of the electric long-arm door seems good. The 
 pneumatic type of the Maine class is worse than useless and should 
 be removed. The electric type of the Connecticut class seems to have 
 one drawback of delicacy, but by care is kept in shape. The latter 
 models of this type will undoubtedly overcome many of the difficul¬ 
 ties with this door, but the power of motors should be increased. 
 With the exception of doors in machinery spaces and for access to 
 coal bunkers, the use of this system is not desirable. Heavy hatches 
 should be of the balanced type, for hand operation. 
 
 BOAT CRANES. 
 
 56. The generally expressed sentiment of the executive officers of 
 the fleet is that the boat cranes are preferable to booms. This is un¬ 
 doubtedly the case so far as ease of manipulation is concerned. They 
 are, however, believed to be a menace in action, and a collapsible 
 crane capable of lowering to deck would be a great advance, combin¬ 
 ing the ease of manipulation of the present cranes with reasonable 
 immunity from damage by falling weights. An arrangement for 
 singling the fall for use in coaling would be advantageous. 
 
 ICE MACHINES. 
 
 57. Two 2-ton ice machines, or at most one 2-ton and one 3-ton 
 machine should be ample capacity for the cold-storage requirements 
 and ice for a battle ship crew. Further installation is a waste of 
 weight, space, and coal. 
 
 PIPING SYSTEM. 
 
 58. ( a) Fire main is, as fitted in more recent ships, suitable as a 
 type. It should, however, in no case be used as a flushing system, 
 either for water-closets or ash chutes, and should be made of some 
 material less subject to continual breakdowns by corrosion than the 
 
38 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 present material. The lead-lined steel pipe fitted for experiment on 
 several ships is recommended. Trouble is experienced with gate 
 valves and with stems of valves exposed to salt water disintegrating. 
 
 (b) Flushing system is in principle suitable. Flushing of crew’s 
 head, if done by a separate pump, should have larger capacity and 
 greater reliability than obtains with electric installation now in¬ 
 stalled in the fleet, or otherwise be connected with the main system 
 from the fireroom and engine room pumps. No connection to con¬ 
 denser or distiller circulating water should be fitted, which condition 
 is understood to be fulfilled in late ships. 
 
 FRESH AND SALT WATER SYSTEMS. 
 
 59. Salt water connections to pantries are useless and should be 
 omitted. 
 
 60. Salt water shower connections should be to separate showers 
 and not interconnected with fresh water system. They are seldom 
 used and one for each bathroom is believed to be ample. 
 
 61. No interconnection by three-way plugs or cross leads between 
 fresh and salt water should be fitted. 
 
 62. Instead of having one gravity tank of considerable size for 
 fresh water, several tanks assigned to individual parts of ship will 
 permit accounting for the use of fresh water and consequent economy 
 of coal. 
 
 63. Magazine floods should be of sprinkler type, flooding from the 
 top down, as in latest designs, instead of from the bottom up, and 
 should be operated by a quick-acting valve and provision made that 
 valves may not be operated at any point intermediate between maga¬ 
 zine and protective deck plates. 
 
 64. Location of plugs should be made with great care with refer¬ 
 ence to greatest accessibility, with least disturbance of stowage facili¬ 
 ties and space. 
 
 DRAINAGE SYSTEM. 
 
 65. The secondary drain, which is used for the ordinary purposes 
 of the ship, is satisfactory. 
 
 66. The main drain, used for removing considerable bodies of 
 water, depends on the main condenser circulating pumps, which are 
 placed low down. 
 
 67. To use it, the injector must first be closed, and in doing this 
 the suction may be lost until the engine itself is flooded. The vertical 
 spindle electric motor compartment system used on the Russian Ret- 
 vizan seems a solution of this possible difficulty. In any case, the 
 locking arrangements to valves should be modified so that while 
 preserving some safety the pump can be sooner brought into use. 
 
 scuppers. 
 
 68. Generally satisfactory, except as to check, which does not always 
 function as a nonreturn. Tops and bridges should be connected to 
 ship’s scuppers, and all deck drains should be put at lowest point of 
 space to be drained. 
 
ALLEGED STKUCTTJRAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 39 
 
 VENTILATION SYSTEM. 
 
 69. On the latest ships, where systems are isolated between intact 
 watertight bulkheads, is generally satisfactory. Adjacent watertight 
 magazines should not connect through ventilation leads. A simple 
 form of cinder catcher may well be installed in leads to quarters and 
 engine-room spaces. Cowls of the standard type on forecastle and 
 quarterdeck may well be replaced by mushrooms with movable head 
 quickly closed. 
 
 HEATERS. 
 
 70. The number and weight of steam heaters is excessive. The com¬ 
 bined heating and ventilation system on the Vermont is highly spoken 
 of, is lighter, and better from a sanitary point of view, and strongly 
 recommended for future United States ships. 
 
 PLUMBING FIXTURES. 
 
 71. The late types are generally satisfactory. Fundamentally, 
 when possible, fittings and spaces requiring drainage should be at 
 least at height of present gun deck., (1) Tip basins of present type 
 are suitable and satisfactory for firemen, but buckets are preferable 
 for crew, with trough drainage. (2) Present system of trough 
 water-closets for crew, with continual flush, is satisfactory, but 
 wooden seats of present type should be discontinued in favor of par¬ 
 allel bearers for the buttocks, preferably of some nonporous material. 
 (3) The needle type of shower is unsuitable for. low spaces or for 
 salt water. (4) No lavatories should be fitted in water-closets or 
 bath spaces other than in individual bathroom for admiral, captain, 
 and executive. (5) A bathroom for executive officer should be pro¬ 
 vided. (6) A urinal should be fitted on the bridge. (7) Bath heat¬ 
 ers should not have both fresh and salt water connections. (8) A 
 urinal should be provided in bathroom spaces unless a urinal space 
 is immediately adjacent to the bathroom. (9) The provision of sep¬ 
 arate water-closets for venereal patients is recommended by many 
 medical officers, but it is doubted if the men would comply with any 
 such arrangement, and a certain number of seats may be marked out 
 for this in ordinary installation if necessity seems to indicate. 
 
 INTERNAL SUBDIVISION AND ARRANGEMENT. 
 
 72. Offices. Flag office of type, size, and furnishing of that on 
 Connecticut is generally suitable. Captain’s office of size and ar¬ 
 rangement of that on Connecticut is generally suitable. Executive 
 officer’s office of size and arrangement of that on C onnecticut is gen¬ 
 erally suitable. Engineer’s office of size and arrangement of that on 
 Connecticut is generally suitable. Paymaster’s office of Connecticut 
 is too small and is so pronounced on most of our battle ships. The 
 paymaster’s office should have two windows for paying off; a long, 
 high desk to take the rolls, desks for the paymaster and three writers 
 in addition, with usual spaces for files, blanks, safe, copying press, 
 etc. The use of the office as a sleeping space for the pay clerk or 
 yeoman is objectionable. The office should be near the executive 
 officer’s office. Ordnance office of Connecticut type is generally suit- 
 
40 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 able. Navigator’s office may well be combined with chart house and 
 emergency cabin. 
 
 73. In general, where practicable, offices should be located to have 
 natural light and air. The flag office and captain’s office in the 
 vicinity of the quarters of those officers. The executive officer’s office 
 should be on the main deck of vessels having superstructure or on gun 
 deck of one not so fitted and accessible to crew and near paymaster’s 
 office. The navigator’s office may well be in the chart house and the 
 ordnance office forward. The engineer’s office near engine room 
 access hatch. 
 
 STOREROOMS. 
 
 74. Storerooms are of course preferably rectilinear, but any reason¬ 
 able space may be used for stores and naturally would be. Suitable 
 provision should be made for access to and from such rooms by direct 
 leads from weather decks and to decks on which issuing room and gal¬ 
 leys are located. The triangular spaces between protective and berth 
 decks are very inaccessible, and, if practicable, should not be counted 
 in the regular available stowage space, particularly for food stores. 
 Storerooms having flat bottoms do Dot need wood floors in walking 
 spaces, and ordinarily, if anything at all is required, gratings will 
 suffice to keep stores from damage by dampness on decks. 
 
 SHOPS. 
 
 75. A separate carpenter’s shop as an inclosure is not necessary. 
 
 76. A separate blacksmith shop is desirable as permitting the 
 stowage of blacksmith’s tools and forges, pipe fitting tools, etc., which 
 are in constant use, in an accessible place. 
 
 DYNAMO ROOMS. 
 
 77. Two widely separate rooms are desirable if they can be arranged 
 without undue increase in complication of wiring, difficulty of opera¬ 
 tion, and weight. The advantages and disadvantages should be care¬ 
 fully weighed, and it is difficult to advance a positive opinion on the 
 subject without careful preliminary study of the details of wiring 
 in the two systems and other matters involved. 
 
 MAGAZINES. 
 
 78. After experience on this trip where the weather conditions 
 have ranged from extreme heat to considerable cold, I do not feel 
 that magazine refrigeration is necessary. A number of cases of heat 
 above 90° have been reported, but only a few above 95°; these few 
 directly traceable to metallic contact with hot steam pipes, etc. 
 
 79. The installation of such a system would involve considerable 
 weight and added complication. It is rightly urged that powder 
 should be kept at a uniform temperature, which would mean that if 
 a system were installed it should operate as a heating system in cold 
 weather and a refrigerating system in hot weather. It is believepl 
 that the disadvantages outweigh the advantages, an opinion in which 
 the ordnance officers of the fleet seem to concur. 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 41 
 
 80. Powder could well be stowed in built-in copper tubes, and shell 
 if stowed in shell rooms on inclines to facilitate handling to hoist by 
 gravity. 
 
 HOSPITAL SPACES. 
 
 81. For ordinary service the amount of space provided on the Con¬ 
 necticut class since alteration seems ample. 
 
 82. The operating room should be behind armor for use in battle, 
 and so that it will be available after battle. 
 
 88. Provision should be made for a surgeon’s examining room or 
 space to obtain some privacy for examinations, and a separate urinal, 
 lavatory, and shelves for treatment of venereal patients in addition 
 to the provision for toilet facilities now made. 
 
 84. The fittings of the type in sick bays and hospital places gen¬ 
 erally of Connecticut class are suitable, 
 
 85. Some space forward and aft suitably located behind armor 
 should be chosen as battle stations and ready access from battery 
 decks provided. These spaces should not be reserved for this pur¬ 
 pose solely, but should have running water available. 
 
 GALLEYS, ETC. 
 
 86. The galleys of the general type and location as fitted on the 
 Connecticut seem satisfactory. The provision of a separate butcher 
 shop is recommended by many officers, but the extension of the gal¬ 
 ley space with provision for hanging meat would seem to make all 
 necessary provision without the expenditure of additional weight and 
 space. It is so fitted on the Connecticut , and functions satisfactorily. 
 
 GENERAL MESS PANTRY. 
 
 87. The general arrangement and type on the Connecticut class is 
 suitable. The stowage of condiment boxes adjacent to this space 
 would probably result in saving of weight. Incidentally the condi¬ 
 ment boxes seem excessively and unnecessarily large and heavy. 
 
 BAKERY. 
 
 88. The size and arrangements provided on the Connecticut class 
 are suitable. It should, however, like the galley, be located with 
 reference to light and air and where it will not heat up valuable living 
 spaces surrounding it, and where it will not have an excessive tem¬ 
 perature itself. Forced ventilation is necessary and natural exhaust. 
 Ample stowage for bread after baking should also be made. 
 
 ship’s water tanks. 
 
 ♦ 
 
 89. Should form part of the ship’s structure and not be separate 
 tanks built in, which results in a waste of space and weight. 
 
 MACHINERY SPACES AND ARRANGEMENTS. 
 
 90. Ash ejectors: A desirable fitting, but would not do away at all 
 with necessity for present type of ash hoists. Ejectors are desirable 
 
42 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 when running forced draft, and if weight can be spared, should be 
 titted. If the type selected for the Delaware functions as it is claimed, 
 it seems to have many advantages over the type now fitted in several 
 of our ships. The present type of ash hoists should be fitted to 
 deliver on main deck and not through crew’s space. Overhead trol¬ 
 leys or special deck trucks for handling buckets are not necessary, 
 the ordinary form of baggage truck serving well. 
 
 STOREROOMS. 
 
 91. The engineer’s stores are an important asset on the ship and 
 ample provision should be made therefor, with issuing room for 
 waste, packing, tools, etc., immediately adjacent to engine room. 
 
 92. Bar metals and similar material may well be stored in the up¬ 
 take inclosures, but in such a manner as to be readily accessible and 
 removable for transportation to deck or workshop as required. 
 
 GENERAL WORKSHOP. 
 
 93. This is in continued use and as to size and the general arrange¬ 
 ment on the Connecticut is satisfactory. The question of handling 
 material to and from this shop is important, and the access should be 
 as easy as water-tight subdivision and location will permit. A large 
 amount of ordnance work requires to be done in this shop and the 
 selection and installation of machine tools should be made having 
 this requirement in view. 
 
 LAUNDRY. 
 
 94. This is an item about which there is some difference of opinion. 
 It is something which ships have done without for many years j is 
 expensive in water consumption; it is hard to get satisfactory op¬ 
 eratives, and its use is confined to officers. Considering the ship as 
 operating individually, its drawbacks would seem to be greater than 
 its advantage. Considering the fleet as a whole, the volume of work 
 to be done on shore is apt to overwhelm any but a place of consider¬ 
 able size. I am, however, of the opinion that the laundry is not a 
 military necessity and that it should be omitted, and washing done on 
 shore, as it has been in the past. When fitted it should not be low 
 down, should have ready and independent drainage, and good air 
 supply, with exhaust arrangements for taking off escaping steam. 
 
 CHAIN LOCKERS. 
 
 95. Should have chain pipes leading into middle of a more or less 
 square locker, and not into the end of a long narrow locker, so that 
 the tiering of the chain will be simplified. 
 
 CENTRAL STATION COMMUNICATION ROOMS AND FIRE-CONTROL BOOTHS. 
 
 96. The present system of fire control having been developed since 
 the design of any ship now in the fleet, it is perhaps not surprising 
 that these spaces on ships are more or less makeshifts. The construc¬ 
 tion as to size and sound-proofing of booths now in suits very well, 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 43 
 
 but in a new design they should be laid out in accordance with the fire- 
 control board’s report, and in so doing get the station for lower steer¬ 
 ing compass free from any stray fields of dynamos. 
 
 COMPASS LOCATIONS. 
 
 97. In the few ships of the fleet where it has been possible to com¬ 
 pensate properly the central station compass, which is generally not 
 possible on account of its proximity to the dynamos, it has been found 
 possible to maneuver the ship from this compass and therefore, if 
 suitable provision for locating the compass is made, its principle is 
 correct and valuable. 
 
 98. The steering engine room compass is entirely practicable. 
 
 99. A special study of the location of standard and deck compasses 
 as well should be made, as much trouble is experienced in the changes 
 in directive force due to movable masses of steel, heating of stacks, etc. 
 
 SHOWER SPACES. 
 
 100. Should be arranged so that after bathing there is space suffi¬ 
 cient to get away from shower head and dry down. 
 
 BATHROOMS. 
 
 101. Not more than two tubs for wardroom officers, one for junior 
 officers, and one for warrant officers should be fitted with not more 
 than four showers for wardroom officers, three for junior officers, two 
 for warrant officers, including those fitted over the tubs. 
 
 CHART HOUSES AND EMERGENCY CABINS. 
 
 102. With the commanding officer’s quarters forward, there seems 
 to be some doubt as to whether such an emergency cabin is necessary. 
 With the quarters aft, it is a necessity. 
 
 103. If it is provided, a similar space should be provided for the 
 navigator, the chart house being in front of the two spaces for offi¬ 
 cers, and the whole made as one structure. 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS FITTINGS. 
 
 104. Awnings may well be confined to those for quarter-deck and 
 forecastle and operating bridge. These should be rigged to haul out 
 to davits and stanchions so placed that all turret guns may be swung 
 without each time striking awning stanchions. 
 
 105. As this will probably result in very wide spacing of such 
 stanchions, rail stanchions should be independent and designed so 
 as to be easily struck. 
 
 LIFE BUOYS. 
 
 106. The forward life buoy as located on the Connecticut is useless. 
 It is so low that the sea washes it away. The after one is generally 
 allright, and if another one is to be provided it should well be located 
 about at after break of superstructure. 
 
44 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 BAG RESTS, ETC. 
 
 107. The general type of bag racks and ditty-box racks and lockers 
 on recent ships is O. K. 
 
 GUN-PORT SHUTTERS. 
 
 108. The circular type of gun-port shutter, with external bearing, 
 does not operate with entire satisfaction. I have asked for sugges¬ 
 tions from officers having these guns and shutters to operate, and have 
 endeavored to work out an improved scheme myself, but have not 
 succeeded without embodying some drawback more serious than the 
 present leaks. The shutters should be in parts small enough to be 
 readily handled and the details of fastening made with a view to 
 quick and accurate adjustment. 
 
 COALING BOOMS AND SPANS. 
 
 109. The general type and rigging of booms on the Connecticut , 
 Kansas , Vermont , and Louisiana is suitable. Trouble is experienced 
 in a few cases with weakness of booms and in a few cases with cutting 
 of boom bands and pinns into material of booms. Both these should 
 be provided against. The spread of backstays of post on cranes of 
 Connecticut should be greater. Where a coaling span can be rigged 
 it is found to be anvantageous, particularly for coaling from a collier, 
 and should be provided. 
 
 NUTS AND BOLTS. 
 
 110. Nuts and bolts in cabin gun ports should be of brass. 
 
 111. The number of different sizes on fittings such as air ports, 
 gun-port shutters, and hatches should be decreased so that one wrench 
 may serve where several are now required. 
 
 HEAVY STEEL BUCKLERS. 
 
 112. Heavy steel bucklers for 12 and 8 inch turrets are not used, 
 and may well be omitted, retaining the canvas and wood bucklers, 
 or a special type of canvas cover provided, acting as water excluder 
 and air retainer referred to above. 
 
 HAWSE-PIPE BUCKLERS. 
 
 113. Hawse-pipe bucklers are seldom used now and, with the 
 greater inclination of hawse pipe recommended, may be omitted. 
 
 ANCHORS. 
 
 114. Only patent anchors should be fitted, and anchor cranes may 
 be omitted, or at most only one fitted. 
 
 LADDERS. 
 
 115. If a ladder as light as the Stanwood tread ladder can be 
 designed with a closed tread, it would be desirable. The present type 
 is dirty and undesirable for barefooted men. 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 45 
 
 SIDE LADDERS. 
 
 116. Side ladders should be of ash. as teak is too brittle, and 
 should have a heavy rubbing strip of pine on the outboard side of 
 present type. 
 
 WOOD FITTINGS. 
 
 117. Wood fittings should be reduced. Bottoms, where necessary 
 to fit at all in storeroom, should be made portable so as to permit 
 cleaning behind. Wood shutters on magazine and storeroom floors 
 should be omitted where such floors are flat, and all wood fittings in 
 magazines omitted. 
 
 CHOCKS. 
 
 118. Chocks should be made with greater swallow and with larger 
 radius to prevent the short nip on hawsers given by present type. 
 One specially large swallow chock aft and one forward should be 
 fitted for towing purposes with a large radius of bearing. 
 
 BITTS. 
 
 119. The bitts fitted on late ships are generally satisfactory. One 
 set of the larger size on each side forward, suitably placed with ref¬ 
 erence to towing chock, and a similar set each side aft should be fitted 
 with proper intermediate bitts elsewhere. 
 
 BOAT DAVITS. 
 
 120. Boat davits of present type are generally satisfactory, but 
 should be provided only for lifeboats and dingeys, and should be 
 fitted with lowering gear so that they can be quickly and easily 
 struck. 
 
 BOAT CRADLES. 
 
 121. Generally are of satisfactory type. Deck fittings on decks 
 used for coaling should be made removable, so that decks may be 
 flushed for purpose of trucking. Bearing pads for 50-foot boats 
 should be broader and turn-buckle stronger than in case of these boats 
 fitted on Connecticut. Stowage of boats on skids, which are remov¬ 
 able in time of action, is suggested. 
 
 SECONDARY AMMUNITION HOISTS AND CONVEYORS. 
 
 122. The variable-speed arrangement most recently provided, hav¬ 
 ing a maximum speed equal to the maximum rate of fire of guns, will 
 be a decided improvement. The hoisting and delivery of ammuni¬ 
 tion in horizontal position when possible will tend to efficiency. 
 Sending up powder tanks which have to be disposed of seems an 
 undesirable way if suitably rigid bag can be obtained. 
 
 FURNITURE. 
 
 128. Metallic furniture is recommended. The omission of foot 
 tubs and carling boxes, the provision of a special drawer to take the 
 
46 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 place of carling box, and the fitting of a wardrobe so that a reason¬ 
 able number of coats and trousers in hangers may be accommodated. 
 Wardroom chairs should have backs modified so that buttons of the 
 dress coat do not foul. Lockers, bookcases, and sideboards should 
 have spring catches to all swinging doors. 
 
 BOATS. 
 
 124. Exclusive of boats required for staff purposes, the following 
 seems a suitable outfit: One 50-foot steamer; two 40-foot steamers; 
 two 36-foot sailing launches, with reliable gasoline engines for aux¬ 
 iliary purposes; two 30-foot cutters; one racing cutter; two whale¬ 
 boats for lifeboats (one fitted as gig), and one wherry or dingey. 
 
 ALLOWANCE. 
 
 125. In the matter of shellac, there is a general agreement as to its 
 insufficiency, in which opinion I concur. It should, be increased 50 
 per cent. An extension of the amount allowed in some other items 
 and reduction of still others seems desirable, though it seems an open 
 question as to whether the ships should be expected to carry at one 
 time all the items allowed for a considerable period, and a system of 
 credits permitting a ship wherever she may be to draw up to a cer¬ 
 tain amount, as required, would probably reduce the requirements as 
 to carrying an excessive amount. 
 
 CONDUIT. 
 
 126. The use of conduit to the extent heretofore practiced is to be 
 deplored; except where the wire is exposed to mechanical injury con¬ 
 duit were better omitted, as is constantly evidenced in service. A 
 recent limitation of the use is a step forward. 
 
 SHEATHING FOR INSULATION. 
 
 127. On the most recent ships seems to fulfill its intended func¬ 
 tion satisfactorily and should be provided, as now, for spaces exposed 
 to extreme heat or cold. Suitable hand-holes for examination behind 
 such sheathing and behind mantlet plates are desirable. 
 
 AIR PORTS. 
 
 128. Some trouble with breakage of glasses has been experienced, 
 indicating an uneven strain due to two-dog ports. It is suggested 
 that a three-dog port might be designed, giving a more even bearing. 
 This port should not use hinge as a point of closure. 
 
 WATERWAY GRATINGS. 
 
 129. Should be omitted except in wake of gangways and leads¬ 
 man’s platforms. 
 
 SIGNAL LOCKERS. 
 
 130. Latest developed type as fitted on after-bridge of Connecticut 
 seems satisfactory. 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 47 
 
 COAL BAGS AND GEAR. 
 
 131. Stowage for these should be provided, including shovels, 
 blocks, and gear, in a suitable space in the hold or in part of one of 
 the coal bunkers and an inclosed direct trunk to weather deck pro¬ 
 vided. This provision is recommended so that the gear may not be 
 expended in action, cause trouble by fire, or scatter dirt through the 
 living spaces when handling to and from place of stowage. 
 
 HAMMOCKS. 
 
 132. Many years ago hammocks were stowed along the rail for 
 two reasons: One to prevent splinters, and the other because this 
 stowage did not interfere with other things. Neither reason gen¬ 
 erally obtains now, and there is a further drawback that hammocks 
 so stowed are liable to ignition from exploding shell and cause 
 trouble from smoke. Stowage behind armor where easily accessible 
 for serving out and stowage is desirable. 
 
 TOILET FIXTURES. 
 
 133. The stateroom toilet fixtures of most recent ships are of very 
 suitable type. 
 
 BOW ORNAMENT. 
 
 134. This is a fitting heavy, expensive, and serving no other pur¬ 
 pose than decoration, and should be omiited, or reduced to some¬ 
 thing smaller than is generally fitted. The Kansas has a very suit¬ 
 able type. 
 
 ASH CHUTES. 
 
 135. Should extend to upper deck. 
 
 PAINT. 
 
 136. The spar color paint now used for upper works is not a de¬ 
 sirable paint. It has no body, quickly washes away, and will not 
 stand scrubbing. I recommend the use of a blue-gray paint in its 
 place, believing that the color is more suitable and that with the 
 constituents required for such a color a more durable paint may be 
 obtained. 
 
 BATTLE LIGHTING CIRCUIT. 
 
 137. It would seem that an arrangement of such circuits should 
 be made so that the lights behind armor and below protective deck 
 where they can not show from outside may burn freely in battle, as 
 it is essential that these places be well lighted at such times. 
 
 INTERNAL DRAFT GAUGES. 
 
 138. Where suitably located are very desirable. 
 
48 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 TARPAULIN BATTENS. 
 
 139. I believe tarpaulin battens should be fitted to all gun-deck 
 hatches on ships having a gun-deck battery unless metal covers are 
 fitted. The number of gratings for hatches may be materially 
 reduced with advantage. 
 
 SAND AND WASH DECK GEAR LOCKERS. 
 
 140. Should be located high up in convenient locations and dis¬ 
 tributed to various parts of ship so as to be readily accessible for 
 use in peace times and so that the gear may be thrown overboard 
 in time of war. 
 
 BATTALION LOCKERS. 
 
 141. Are not believed to be necessary. The use of the ship’s com¬ 
 pany as a landing party in the case of a battle ship is probably so 
 remote a contingency that due warning would be had so that the 
 stowage of such gear in a regular storeroom below would serve all 
 purposes. 
 
 POST-OFFICE. 
 
 142. The provision of a set of pigeonholes adjacent to or part of 
 canteen (one pigeonhole for each initial letter) will facilitate dis¬ 
 tribution of mail. 
 
 ABANDON SHIP LOCKERS. 
 
 143. I do not believe that special provision for those above decks 
 is necessary. There are not enough boats to abandon ship now and 
 the provision of special lockers seems to cause unnecessary and un¬ 
 warranted use of space above decks, where they might be stowed in 
 a suitable storeroom below with straight lead to weather deck. 
 
 BOOKCASES. 
 
 144. The present type of, generally O. K., but should be so con¬ 
 structed as to be readily and quickly thrown overboard. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 R. H. Eobinson, 
 
 Naval Constructor, U. S. Navy.. 
 
 The Commander in Chief United States Atlantic Fleet, 
 
 U. 8. 8. C onnecticut, Flagship. 
 
 [First indorsement.] 
 
 Respectfully forwarded to the Navy Department in connection 
 with my letter No. 639, of this date. 
 
 R. D. Evans, 
 
 Rear-Admiral , TJ. 8. Navy , 
 Commander in Chief United States Atlantic Fleet. 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 49 
 
 6 . 
 
 Letter of the Secretary of the Navy transmitting supplementary 
 statement of the Chief Constructor of the Navy in relation to al¬ 
 leged structural defects in battle ships. 
 
 Navy Department, 
 
 Washington, April 15 , 1908. 
 
 My Dear Senator Hale : There is forwarded herewith the supple¬ 
 mentary statement of the Chief Constructor in relation to certain 
 alleged defects in battle ships of the United States Navy. The De¬ 
 partment’s letter to you. under date of March 9, 1908, fully expressed 
 its views concerning this subject, and subsequent report received from 
 the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet and the naval con¬ 
 structor attached to his staff has strengthed the conviction which I 
 previously entertained with respect to the location of water-line 
 armor, height of freeboard, height of gun axes, etc. Admiral Evans 
 in his recent report makes allusion to the inability to fight the broad¬ 
 side guns under certain conditions of w r eather, and states that such 
 guns are not high enough for efficiency under all cpnditions. This 
 criticism is likewise applicable to the majority of broadside guns 
 of battle ships of all navies wherever such guns are mounted below 
 the main deck, as in the case of the British, Japanese, and German 
 navies. It may be remarked, in passing, that such a location is the 
 only available one for the majority of guns of the intermediate bat¬ 
 tery on all battle ships built or building, and in the United States 
 Navy the height of such secondary battery guns above the water is 
 somewhat greater than the height of similarly located guns in the 
 majority of battle ships of the British, German, and Japanese navies. 
 In our battle ships of the Delaware and South Carolina classes now 
 in course of construction this criticism concerning intermediate bat¬ 
 tery guns has little force, inasmuch as the main battery is concen¬ 
 trated in heavy guns mounted in turrets on the upper decks, the inter¬ 
 mediate battery being required solely for defense against torpedo- 
 boat destroyers and torpedo boats. 
 
 In view of the misunderstanding which seems to exist in some 
 quarters as to the degree of responsibility of Admiral Converse and 
 the Chief Constructor for alleged defects in battle ships now attached 
 to the Atlantic Fleet, it seems proper for me to emphasize defi¬ 
 nitely the fact that neither Admiral Converse nor Admiral Capps 
 had any responsibilty whatever for the designs of battle ships now 
 in active service, and therefore the exhaustive reports of those officers 
 concerning alleged defects in naval materiel should be accepted 
 without qualification as being the impartial report of officers who 
 have no personal responsibility for the designs • of the ships of the 
 fleet recently under criticism, but whose official position gives them 
 unusual opportunity to know all the facts pertaining to the method 
 of developing designs of those vessels and the good results which 
 have so far been obtained in their subsequent construction. 
 
 There are also forwarded herewith, for the information of your 
 committee, copies of the recent reports of Admiral Evans and Naval 
 Constructor Iiobinson concerning the behavior of vessels of the At¬ 
 lantic Fleet during the passage from Hampton Roads to Magdalena 
 
 S. Doc. 506, 60-1 - 4 
 
50 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 Bay, also their comment for the information of the Department in 
 connection with future design work. Practically all of the criticism 
 contained in these reports had already been discounted and disposed 
 of in the designs of the Delaware and North Dakota class. Although 
 detailed comment upon the above-noted report is now in course of 
 preparation by the Board on Construction, I have deemed it advis¬ 
 able to forward the report at this time for the general information 
 of the committee, although it is my opinion that they should not 
 be published, and certainly not in advance of the preparation of the 
 detailed comments thereon. 
 
 Very truly, yours, 
 
 Y. H. Metcalf, 
 
 Secretary. 
 
 Hon. Eugene Hale, 
 
 Chairman Committee on Naval Affairs , 
 
 United States Senate. 
 
 7 . 
 
 Supplemental statement of the Chief Constructor of the Navy in 
 relation to alleged defects in naval vessels. 
 
 Bureau of Construction and Repair, 
 
 Navy Department, 
 
 W ashington, D. C., April 13, 1908. 
 
 Sir : In conformity with the request of the committee, I have the 
 honor to submit the following supplemental statement concerning 
 certain matters relating to naval materiel. In order that this state¬ 
 ment may be as brief as possible, no attempt will be made to cover 
 ground which has already been fully covered, except where further 
 comment may appear to be necessary for the complete and compre¬ 
 hensive disposition of such criticism as may not have been already 
 disposed of. No attempt will be made to traverse in detail the evi¬ 
 dence of critics who have appeared before the committee, since it is 
 understood that this is not desired. Failure, therefore to take note 
 of such criticism should not be construed as indicating that such criti¬ 
 cism is founded on fact. 
 
 It also appears to be desirable, at the very beginning of this supple¬ 
 mentary statement, to emphasize the fact that practically all pf the 
 criticism to which our battle ships have recently been subjected is 
 directed against completed vessels, and does not apply to any material 
 extent to vessels which have been designed during the past four years. 
 The only criticism directed at the vessels of the Delaumre class, for 
 instance, is that affecting the submergence of the lower edge of the 
 main water-line belt armor, and the original criticism with respect 
 to the location of this armor has been so materially modified as to be 
 negligible, and would appear to have been fully and completely dis¬ 
 posed of by the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the chairman of 
 the Senate naval committee under date of March 9, 1908, and by sub¬ 
 sequent specific comment of Admiral Evans, commander in chief of 
 the Atlantic Fleet, in his letter of March 6, 1908. 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 51 
 
 The location of the water-line belt armor on the South Carolina 
 and Michigan being practically identical with that of similar armor 
 on the Delaware and North Dakota , the disposition of such criticism 
 with respect to the Delaware necessarily includes the South Carolina 
 and Michigan. 
 
 It is true that the freeboard forward on the South Carolina is 
 lower than that on the Delaware , and the freeboard aft is one deck 
 height less than the after freeboard on the Delaware. It should be 
 specifically noted, however, that the South Carolina and Michigan 
 were designed to meet the specific provision of the act of Congress 
 for the most powerful battle ship on a trial displacement of 16,000 
 tons. That the designers of the South Carolina and Michigan met 
 these requirements of Congress in a most satisfactory manner would 
 seem to be fully proved by the unusually commendatory comments 
 concerning this design, which have appeared in foreign publications 
 already quoted in the Chief Constructor’s special report of February 
 14,1908, and by specific and direct approval of seagoing officers of our 
 own Navy. A recent evaluation (prepared by a foreign naval 
 officer) of the fighting strength of battle ships of the principal navies 
 of the world ascribes to the South Carolina the maximum fighting 
 efficiency of any ship'considered, the U. S. S. South Carolina being 
 placed as No. 1, with the! British Dreadnought No. 2. This will 
 doubtless be considered by certain critics as a too partial judgment of 
 the good points of the South Carolina as compared with the Dread¬ 
 nought. It is well to remember, however, that the broadside battery 
 of the South Carolina is equal to that of the Dreadnought , the target 
 area is less, and the armor protection unquestionably greater, the 
 points of inferiority being those of speed, and, in a heavy seaway, a 
 freeboard which would place the South Carolina at a slight disad¬ 
 vantage as compared with the Dreadnought. 
 
 With regard to the freeboard of the South Carolina , it should be 
 noted that the freeboard forward is practically identical with that 
 of the latest Japanese battle ships, and also almost identical with that 
 of battle ships of the highest freeboard now attached to the Atlantic 
 Battle Ship Fleet. It is also equal, or superior, to that of all battle 
 ships of the Japanese navy which participated in the battle of the 
 Sea of Japan, and is approximately equal to the freeboard of the 
 large majority of the battle ships of the British navy designed prior 
 to 1905. The freeboard aft is in conformity with the design of bat¬ 
 tle ship most highly approved by the Walker board in 1896, also by 
 the General Board in 1903 and 1904, so that the general features of 
 the South Carolina class, so far as concerns freeboard, both forward 
 and aft, would appear to have met with the entire approval of some 
 of the most distinguished officers (seagoing) of the United States 
 Navy. 
 
 The battery arrangements of the South Carolina and Delaware 
 classes are such as to give the maximum broadside fire for the heavy 
 guns, and in this respect these vessels have a distinct advantage over 
 foreign battle ships whose battery arrangement has been developed 
 on different lines. 
 
 In view of the very complete data already submitted for the con¬ 
 sideration of your committee, it does not appear to be necessary to 
 devote further attention to the characteristics of the South Carolina 
 and Delaware classes. 
 
52 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 With respect to the general criticisms which have been made con- 
 . cerning the disposition of water-line belt armor, freeboard, height 
 of gun axes, etc., on battle ships now attached to the fleet, it would 
 seem that the committee had already been fully advised as to the 
 facts. It appears, however, that there are those who lay special stress 
 upon the insufficient height of the after heavy guns of vessels of the 
 Iowa , Alabama , Maine , Mississippi , and South Carolina classes, and 
 who claim that that feature of those vessels is gravely in error. In 
 this connection it seems only necessary to invite attention to the fact 
 that the Walker board in 1896 specially commended the arrangement 
 of freeboard on the Iowa , and for the battle ships then under con¬ 
 sideration by that board recommended that— 
 
 They should have high freeboard forward and low freeboard aft. substantially 
 like the Iowa 
 
 Also, the General Board, in a communication dated December 15, 
 1903, in which it set forth the characteristics which should be em¬ 
 bodied in battle ships of about 16,000 tons, stated specifically that 
 they should— 
 
 Have high freeboard forward. In this respect the Iowa type impresses favor¬ 
 ably. 
 
 It is worthy of note that all the military and seagoing character¬ 
 istics of each battle ship built for the United States Navy have 
 been passed upon by a board of officers a majority of whose mem¬ 
 bers belong to the seagoing branch of the Navy, and that the de¬ 
 signs of each battle ship are approved by the Secretary of the Navy 
 before advertisement for their construction is made. 
 
 It may also be noted that officers who have commanded vessels 
 of this type have reported that all the guns of the main battery 
 could be fought in any weather in which battles are likely to be 
 fought. Reports have also been recently received from the com¬ 
 mander in chief of the Atlantic Battle Ship Fleet and the naval 
 constructor attached to his staff which state that while a somewhat 
 higher turret gun forward would be desirable to fight with full 
 efficiency at 15 knots in a trade-wind sea, no weather was encoun¬ 
 tered on the recent voyage of the Atlantic Fleet where turret guns 
 would be out of action, except so far as flying spray in a few cases 
 might have affected the gun sights, this last condition, however, being 
 one which a few additional feet freeboard forward would not 
 remedy. 
 
 The report of the Chief Constructor of February 14, 1908, and the 
 appendixes thereto, which are part of the testimony before your com¬ 
 mittee, give in considerable detail the principal characteristics of the 
 battle ships of the United States Navy, as well as those of typical 
 battle ships of foreign navies. The heights of freeboard, heights of 
 gun axes, and location of water-line armor therein set forth were de¬ 
 termined with the greatest accuracy possible, and, subject to the cor¬ 
 rection of minor errors, principally typographical, the data therein 
 contained is believed to be as accurate as can be determined from the 
 information accessible to the Navy Department and its bureaus and 
 officers. 
 
 The tables above referred to show that the battle ships now in 
 commission in the United States Navy are in no sense at a disadvan¬ 
 tage as to freeboard, gun heights, and arrangement of armor as com¬ 
 pared with vessels of the principal foreign navies. 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 53 
 
 As distinctly stated, the data given in the tables was for the “ de¬ 
 signed ” displacement, in as much as the most accurate information 
 available concerning foreign ships was based upon that displacement. 
 The “ deep load ” characteristics for battle ships of our own and 
 foreign services would vary in approximately the same degree as 
 those given for the “ designed ” displacement in the table. 
 
 It is believed that in certain foreign designs full allowance of am¬ 
 munition and stores is provided, instead of the two-thirds allowance 
 provided for American vessels, but this would not ordinarily involve 
 a difference in draft, freeboard, etc., of more than 4 inches. On the 
 other hand, the coal carried at designed displacement in the very 
 large majority of foreign battle ships is no greater than that carried 
 by battle ships of the United States Navy, and is in many cases less, 
 as is fully set forth in the table given in Appendix A. 
 
 It should also be noted that any attempt to determine the over¬ 
 drafts of vessels by taking the recorded “ log ” drafts and making 
 allowance for the difference between the actual coal reported on board 
 and the coal provided to be carried on the designed displacement is 
 entirely misleading and inaccurate. Such a method, as ordinarily 
 carried out, involves errors due to inaccuracies in the recorded log 
 draft; errors due to differences in density of water; errors due to 
 failure to take into consideration the actual stores, ammunition, etc., 
 on board; errors due to inaccurate log reports as to coal actually on 
 board; failure to take into account the excess water in trimming 
 tanks, double bottoms, etc.—this last-named item alone on certain 
 battle ships of the Atlantic Fleet during the recent voyage to the 
 Pacific coast having involved as much as 500 to 800 tons additional 
 weight. Any estimate of overdraft, therefore, based upon the draft 
 of the ship and the amount of coal on board, as recorded in the log, 
 would seem to be too obviously inaccurate to require further comment. 
 
 The actual overdraft of vessels of the United States Navy, as com¬ 
 pared with their designed drafts, are carefully and accurately deter¬ 
 mined immediately after delivery of the vessels to the Government, 
 so that the errors noted in the preceding paragraph are entirely 
 eliminated. Accurate data so obtained shows that of the battle ships 
 now attached to the Atlantic Fleet the Virginia had the greatest over¬ 
 draft, as compared with her designed draft, the overdraft in the case 
 of the Virginia being 11 inches. The maximum overdraft of the other 
 vessels of the Virginia class was 9J inches. The overdraft of the five 
 vessels of the Connecticut class varied from 4^ to 6 inches. The 
 overdraft of the other seven battle ships of the fleet was 3J inches for 
 the Alabama , 3f inches for the Missouri, and 6 inches for the Ohio, 
 7£ inches for the Kearsarge, Kentucky , and Illinois , and 9f inches 
 for the Maine. 
 
 As noted in previous reports and testimony, the overdrafts of 
 United States battle ships were largely due to changes and additions 
 which were made after the approval of the designs, and, in many 
 instances, after the actual construction of the vessels had been ad¬ 
 vanced to a considerable extent; and where there were differences in 
 overdrafts on sister ships these differences were largely attributable 
 to difference in type of boilers and details of machinery installation. 
 
 Before dismissing the subject of overdrafts of battle ships it is 
 worthy of special note that the last three battle ships completed, 
 namely, the New Hampshire, Idaho, and Mississippi, have been con- 
 
54 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 structed quite within the designed estimate of weight, so that those 
 vessels will be slightly underdraft instead of overdraft. In explana¬ 
 tion of this condition it is merely necessary to state that the develop¬ 
 ment of details and the changes authorized on those vessels subse¬ 
 quent to the approval of the designs were such as to not materially 
 increase the displacement of the vessels. 
 
 The completion of battle ships, or any other class of ships, within 
 the “ designed ” displacement is almost entirely a question of adher¬ 
 ing to the original features of design. If radical changes are made 
 in this design, involving large additional weight, overdraft for the 
 completed vessel must inevitably be expected. 
 
 In view of the foregoing statements and the mass of evidence 
 already offered concerning the location of water-line armor on bat¬ 
 tle ships, it would seem quite unnecessary to dwell further upon this 
 phase of recent naval criticism, so that I will dismiss it by quoting 
 the following extract from the latest communication on this subject, 
 contained in a letter addressed to the Secretary of the Navy by the 
 commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet under date of March 17, 
 1908: 
 
 Even with smooth seas and practically no wind the swell at times caused, 
 such rolling and pitching as to expose the lower portion of the armor belt even 
 at heavy load, hence the lower limit of armor should not be raised. 
 
 (Italicizing not author’s.) 
 
 The above is too definite and conclusive to require any comment 
 other than that those vessels were, in many instances, heavily over¬ 
 laden, and the lower edge of the armor was therefore immersed in 
 many cases more than 7 feet. 
 
 FREEBOARD AND GUN HEIGHTS. 
 
 The data already submitted to the committee with respect to free¬ 
 board, both on our own and foreign battle ships, would seem to be 
 quite sufficient to preclude the necessity of making extensive allusion 
 thereto in this supplementary statement. The present tendency in 
 battle-ship design is to concentrate the heavy battery in turrets 
 mounted upon the upper deck, and, for our latest vessels, those of 
 the Delaware class, to have a freeboard forward one deck height 
 higher than was formerly the case. The major part of the inter¬ 
 mediate battery for torpedo defense must of necessity be mounted 
 “ between decks.” 
 
 The tables already submitted give accurate data concerning the 
 freeboard, gun heights, etc., of United States and typical foreign 
 battle ships, and the most casual inspection of such tables indicates 
 that the United States is at no disadvantage with respect to free¬ 
 board and gun heights as compared with battle ships of foreign 
 navies. The low freeboard aft on certain United States battle ships 
 has already been considered and disposed of and requires no further 
 attention. 
 
 It is worthy of note that an officer who has only recently returned 
 from Japan, and who has had unusual opportunity to communicate 
 with Japanese naval officers, confirms the statement previously 
 made that the most recent design of Japanese battle ships provides 
 for a moderate freeboard, approximately equal to that of the Con¬ 
 necticut class, and that for designs in prospect, which contemplate 
 a vessel even larger, the Japanese have no intention of increasing 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 55 
 
 their height of freeboard. The latest design of battle ship in the 
 United States Navy, it may be noted, has more than 5 feet greater 
 freeboard forward than the latest designed Japanese battle ship. 
 
 TRIAL TRIPS OF NAVAL VESSELS. 
 
 Judging from questions asked by various members of the com¬ 
 mittee, and the replies thereto by witnesses, there would seem to be a 
 very imperfect understanding in the minds of many as to the con¬ 
 tract requirements for trial trips of naval vessels and the rigor with 
 which such contract requirements are enforced. At the request of 
 the committee there are hereto attached a copy of the contract for the 
 Delaware and a copy of the contract for the Louisiana . (Appen¬ 
 dixes B and C.) 
 
 Allusion having been made during the progress of this investiga¬ 
 tion to the practice of the Navy Department of giving bonuses for 
 speed in excess of the contract requirements, it should be noted that 
 the contracts for naval vessels have contained no provision for the 
 granting of a speed bonus since January, 1894—more than fourteen 
 years ago. None of the battle ships now attached to the Atlantic 
 Fleet were subject to bonuses for speed in excess of the contract re¬ 
 quirements. 
 
 It would also appear that there are those who believe that naval 
 vessels never attain in actual service the speed called for by the con¬ 
 tracts for those vessels. As a matter of fact, not only is the contract 
 speed of United States naval vessels attained during the official 
 trial, under the rigidly enforced conditions specifically provided in 
 the contract, but with boilers and machinery in good condition and 
 with clean bottoms the “ contract speed ” has been attained in actual 
 service by a large number of naval vessels when much more heavily 
 loaded than they were during their contract trials. With hull and 
 machinery in the condition just indicated, and engines developing 
 the horsepower which was actually obtained on their trial trips, the 
 majority of the United States battle ships could attain their contract 
 speed with all stores on board and bunkers full of coal. The Min¬ 
 nesota, a representative of the five most recently designed battle 
 ships now attached to the Atlantic Fleet, has since her delivery to the 
 Government, and with a naval crew, exceeded by more than eight- 
 tenths of a knot the speed required bjr the contract—and this with all 
 stores and ammunition on board and bunkers nearly full of coal. 
 
 As a matter of fact, the contract trials of vessels built for the United 
 States Navy are most carefully conducted, the vessels being loaded 
 to such a draft that the mean displacement during the official trial 
 will be that required by the contract. Judging by reports contained 
 in scientific journals, many vessels of the British navy have been tried 
 at a displacement considerably less than their designed displacement. 
 Such a condition has never obtained in the contract trials of United 
 States naval vessels, and should a United States naval vessel, when 
 subjected to trial, be lacking in any portion of the armor, armament, 
 outfit, fittings, ammunition, stores, etc., allowance therefor is made by 
 the addition of an equivalent weight of water in the double bottoms or 
 trimming tanks or by placing an additional allowance of coal in the 
 bunkers. 
 
 So far as the designer is concerned, there would be no difficulty 
 whatever in having the contract trials conducted at a deep-load dis- 
 
56 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 placement, with all stores and ammunition on board and the bunkers 
 full of coal, rather than at a less displacement, with a certain pro¬ 
 portion of stores and ammunition on board and an arbitrary amount 
 of coal in the bunkers. If such a method should be adopted, however, 
 the Navy Department would not derive any benefit therefrom, since 
 allowance would necessarily be made for the anticipated decrease in 
 speed which such an increase in displacement would involve. More¬ 
 over, the data so obtained would not be comparable wfith that ob¬ 
 tained from similar vessels previously tried in the United States 
 Navy, as well as in foreign navies, and in any comparison resulting 
 therefrom the vessels of the United States Navy, when tried at their 
 deep-load displacement, would appear at a disadvantage as compared 
 with foreign vessels tried at a displacement considerably less than the 
 deep-load displacement. 
 
 It is worthy of special note, however, that the difference in speed 
 due to the difference in displacement of the vessel at trial load and 
 deep load would not be the “ 2 or 3 knots ” mentioned in the tes¬ 
 timony before the committee. As a matter of fact, for battle ships 
 now attached to the United States Atlantic Fleet, as well as those in 
 course of construction, the speed at deep-load displacement, with all 
 stores, ammunition etc., on board, and bunkers full of coal, would 
 rarely be as much as one-third of a knot below that at the trial dis¬ 
 placement when the engines were developing the same horsepower. 
 This reduction of one-third of a knot in speed would be approxi¬ 
 mately the maximum and would only occur at high speeds. At low 
 speeds the reduction, due to increase in displacement, would be pro¬ 
 portionately less, the horsepower, of course, being assumed to remain 
 the same at the trial and deep-load displacements. 
 
 In this supplementary statement I have merely attempted to bring 
 out more clearly facts which would assist the committee in arriving 
 at correct conclusions concerning the characteristics of battle ships 
 of the United States Navy and the conditions under which their 
 designs have been developed. The somewhat extensive allusion that 
 has been made in previous reports and in the testimony to foreign 
 practice, and especially to the case of the Royal Sovereign , was 
 deemed necessary in order that the committee might fully understand 
 foreign procedure in such matters. The case of the Royal Sovereign 
 was given particular prominence on account of the very extensive 
 technical criticism which the designs of that vessel received. The 
 comment contained in the report of the Chief Constructor, of Febru¬ 
 ary 14, 1908, and the diagrams and tables thereto attached should 
 leave no possible doubt in the mind of anyone as to the characteristics 
 which it was desired to specially emphasize in connection with the 
 consideration of the designs of the Royal Sovereign class. These 
 were obviously “ height of freeboard,” “ height of gun axes,” and 
 “ location of the lower edge of the water-line belt armor.” That the 
 vessels of the Alabama , Maine , Idaho , and South Carolina classes had 
 low freeboard aft had no particular bearing upon the case, especially 
 since the fact that these vessels had a low freebroad aft was fully 
 set forth in the tables. Nor was it a matter requiring special note 
 that the upper belt armor of certain groups of battle ships in the 
 British navy was of the same thickness as the lower belt armor, 
 especially when 12 battle ships in the British navy whose upper 
 belt was of the same thickness as the lower belt had main water-line 
 armor whose maximum thickness was just equal to or less than the 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 57 
 
 upper belt armor of the Vermont class. All the pertinent facts in 
 the case were fully set forth in the text or the tabular statements; 
 and unless the text of the report had been extended to quite unjustifi¬ 
 able length, it had to be assumed that those who may desire to indulge 
 in criticism will take the trouble to look over the tabular data and 
 appendices as well as the body of any report whenever in doubt as to 
 the exact meaning of the text. 
 
 In conclusion, I beg to repeat the brief summary statement con¬ 
 tained on pages 70 and 71 of the Chief Constructor’s hearing before 
 the Senate Naval Committee on Senate bill No. 3335, as follows: 
 
 To make a very brief summary of tlie salient points of this morning’s bearing, 
 I should like to state that the principal subjects of criticism, so far as they 
 concern the Bureau of Construction and Repair, were the “ height of freeboard,” 
 the “ height of gun axes,” and the “ distribution of water-line belt armor.” 
 
 I showed, I think, conclusively, and made reference to reports and previous 
 hearings, that these three subjects have already been given the most serious 
 consideration not only in our own, but in foreign navies; that a very eminent 
 Board of Admiralty, fortified by the unanimous opinion of some of the most 
 distinguishd officers of the British navy, had fully passed upon these subjects; 
 that an equally conspicuous board in our own service, presided over by the 
 late Admiral John G. Walker, had in 1896 given a most positive statement as 
 to the essential characteristics of a battle ship, making specific comment con¬ 
 cerning “freeboard,” “gun heights,” and location of water-line armor belt; 
 that the General Board of the Navy, as recently as 1903-4, had still further re¬ 
 enforced previous service opinion as to the freeboard requisite in a battle ship 
 and had named the Iowa as a type which impressed favorably; the Iowa, be 
 it noted, having less freeboard than any of the battle ships of the present 
 Atlantic Fleet except the Kearsarge and Kentucky, also that the question of 
 distribution of water-line armor had been given the most careful consideration 
 in connection with each design of battle ship developed; that the designs of 
 all United States battle ships were passed upon by the Board on Construction, 
 the majority of whose members were seagoing officers; that at all times the 
 Construction Bureau of the Navy Department has been in the closest touch 
 with the seagoing element of the service; that the officers of the construction 
 corps are selected from specially qualified officers of the line, are then given 
 additional instruction in naval architecture, and ultimately transferred to 
 the construction-corps, full details as to the method of selection and subsequent 
 training being given in the special reports heretofore alluded to; that all of 
 the ships of the British navy and the Japanese navy, with the exception of 
 the latest type, the Dreadnought, and possibly the Majesties, had approximately 
 the same height of freeboard, height of gun axes, etc., as American vessels 
 of approximately the same date; that the Japanese battle ships engaged in the 
 battle of the Sea of Japan were designed and built in England and followed 
 in their design the British school, having moderate freeboard; that the Japan¬ 
 ese battle ships in the battle of the Sea of Japan appeared to have no difficulty 
 whatever in fighting their batteries to great advantage in spite of the character 
 of the weather, which was described by Mr. Reuterdahl himself as being 
 “nearly a gale.” 
 
 There seems, therefore, no possible escape from the conclusion that the “free¬ 
 boards,” “ heights of gun axes,” “ water-line distribution of armor,” etc., of 
 battle ships of the United States Navy have been based upon the best possible 
 judgment of representative officers of the seagoing branch of our own and for¬ 
 eign service, and that the battle ships of the United States Navy are in these 
 respects fully equal to similar vessels in the British and Japanese navies. 
 
 The most recent information received from the commander in 
 chief of the Atlantic Fleet, from the naval constructor attached to 
 his staff, and from an officer who has recently returned from an in¬ 
 spection of certain foreign dockyards fully convinces me of the ac¬ 
 curacy of statements heretofore made in my reports and the testi¬ 
 mony before the committees of Congress concerning the general ex¬ 
 cellence of battle ships of the United States Navy, not only as re¬ 
 gards vessels in course of construction, but those in commission and 
 
58 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 attached to the Atlantic Fleet, due allowance being made, of course, 
 for those developments in naval materiel subsequent to the com¬ 
 pletion of certain battle ships now in active service. 
 
 There are attached hereto, as requested by the committee, copies 
 of the contracts for the Delaware and Louisiana , a copy of the report 
 of the Board of which Admiral J. G. Walker, U. S. Navy, was presi¬ 
 dent, submitted to the Navy Department under date of May 18, 1896, 
 and a copy of the report of the special turret board; also tabular 
 statement giving lengths and widths of side armor on United States 
 battle ships. 
 
 Very respectfully, W. L. Capps, 
 
 Chief Constructor , U. S. Navy , 
 
 Chief of Bureau. 
 
 Hon. Eugene Hale, 
 
 Chairman Committee on Naval Affairs , 
 
 United States Senate. 
 
 (Through Secretary of the Navy.) 
 
 [Appendix to accompany supplemental report of Chief Constructor of the Navy, dated 
 
 April 13, 1908.] 
 
 Table of normal coal and full coal for United States and various foreign battle 
 
 ships. 
 
 Nation and ship. 
 
 Displace¬ 
 
 ment. 
 
 Normal 
 
 coal. 
 
 Full coal. 
 
 Per cent 
 of full 
 coal. 
 
 United States: 
 
 
 
 
 
 Delaware (2 vessels)_ 
 
 20,000 
 
 1,000 
 
 2,500 
 
 40.0 
 
 Michigan (2 vessels)_ j 
 
 16,000 
 
 900 
 
 2,200 
 
 40.9 
 
 Kansas (4 vessels)._ __ . 
 
 16,000 
 
 900 
 
 2,200 
 
 40.9 
 
 Idaho (2 vessels) _ _ 
 
 13,000 
 
 600 
 
 1,750 
 
 34.3 
 
 Connecticut (2 vessels) _ _ 
 
 16,000 
 
 900 
 
 2,200 
 
 40.9 
 
 New Jersey (5 vessels)_ _ _ J 
 
 14,948 
 
 900 
 
 1,900 
 
 47.4 
 
 Maine (3 vessels). _ 
 
 12,500 
 
 1,000 
 
 2,000 
 
 50.0 
 
 Alabama (3 vessels)_ _ 
 
 11,552 
 
 11,500 
 
 850 
 
 1,200 
 
 66.7 
 
 Kearsarge (2 vessels)__ 
 
 410 
 
 1,210 
 
 33.9 
 
 Tow a 
 
 11,410 
 
 625 
 
 1,780 
 
 35.1 
 
 Indiana (3 vessels)_ _ 
 
 10,288 
 
 400 
 
 1,800 
 
 22.2 
 
 England: 
 
 
 
 
 
 St. Vincent (3 vessels)- 
 
 19,250 
 
 900 
 
 2,700 
 
 33.0 
 
 Bellerophon (3 vessels)_ 
 
 18,600 
 
 900 
 
 2,700 
 
 33.0 
 
 Lord Nelson (2 vessels) __ 
 
 16,500 
 
 900 
 
 2,500 
 
 36.0 
 
 King Edward (8 vessels)... _ 
 
 16,350 
 
 950 
 
 2,150 
 
 44.0 
 
 Stviftshure (2 vessels)_ 
 
 11,800 
 
 800 
 
 2,000 
 
 40.0 
 
 Duncan (5 vessels)__ 
 
 14,000 
 
 900 
 
 2,000 
 
 45.0 
 
 London (3 vessels)_ ._ _ ..._ 
 
 15,000 
 
 900 
 
 2,100 
 
 43.0 
 
 Formidable (3 vessels)___ 
 
 15,000 
 
 900 
 
 2,200 
 
 41.0 
 
 Canopus (6 vessels)_’ 
 
 13,000 
 
 800 
 
 1,850 
 
 43.0 
 
 Majestic (9 vessels)_ _ 
 
 14,900 
 
 900 
 
 2,200 
 
 41.0 
 
 Royal Sovereign (7 vessels)- 
 
 14,100 
 
 900 
 
 1,800 
 
 50.0 
 
 France: 
 
 
 
 
 
 Liberte (4 vessels)_ 
 
 13,865 
 
 905 
 
 1,825 
 
 49.5 
 
 Danton (6 vessels)_ 
 
 18,400 
 
 965 
 
 2,052 
 
 47.0 
 
 Republique (2 vessels) ___ 
 
 14,635 
 
 905 
 
 1,825 
 
 49.5 
 
 Suffren_ 
 
 12,530 
 
 1,100 
 
 1,820 
 
 60.0 
 
 Gaulois (3 vessels)--- 
 
 11,108 
 
 680 
 
 1,100 
 
 62.0 
 
 Bouvet_ _ _— 
 
 12,000 
 
 620 
 
 800 
 
 78.0 
 
 Japan: 
 
 
 
 
 25.0 
 
 Aki (2 vessels) _ 
 
 19,800 
 
 750 
 
 3,000 
 
 Katori (2 vessels)_ 
 
 16,400 
 
 750 
 
 2,100 
 
 36.0 
 
 Mikasa.. ______. 
 
 15,300 
 
 700 
 
 1,600 
 
 44.0 
 
 Shikishima (2 vessels)- 
 
 15,200 
 
 13,300 
 
 700 
 
 1,550 
 
 45.0 
 
 Iwami °__ __ 
 
 600 
 
 1,200 
 
 50.0 
 
 Germany: 
 
 
 
 1,650 
 
 50.0 
 
 Braunschweig (5 vessels)_ _ 
 
 13,200 
 
 700 
 
 Deutschland (5 vessels) __ _ 
 
 13,200 
 
 850 
 
 1,700 
 
 44.0 
 
 Wittlesback (5 vessels)__ _ 
 
 11,830 
 
 650 
 
 1,750 
 
 47.0 
 
 Kaiser Class (5 vessels) __ 
 
 11,150 
 
 10,060 
 
 650 
 
 1,050 
 
 62.0 
 
 Brandenburg .. . ____ __ 
 
 600 
 
 1,050 
 
 57.0 
 
 a Ex-Russian Orel. 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 59 
 
 8 . 
 
 Department or the Navy, 
 
 General Board, 
 
 Washing ton, April 16 , 1908. 
 
 Sir: In accordance with the instructions contained in your letter 
 of the 14th instant, No. 26000-6, to submit a brief communication 
 embodying the substance of the statements with respect to the loca¬ 
 tion of the water-line armor on our battle ships and the general 
 excellence of our battle ships, as made to you in conversation, I have 
 the honor to submit the following: 
 
 1. During the recent voyage of the Atlantic Fleet it was observed 
 on many occasions in the moderate seas which were met with, par¬ 
 ticularly in the trade-wind sea from Trinidad to Rio de Janeiro, 
 that the whole of the armor belts below the water line on the ships of 
 the fleet was exposed. In discussion of this fact with other officers 
 of the fleet it was the consensus of opinion, so far as I know it, that 
 the position of the lower limit of the armor belts should not be 
 raised for the reason that if in a moderate trade-wind sea the lower 
 edge of the armor belt is exposed, the damage possible by a shot 
 under the armor belt would be enormously greater than a much 
 heavier projectile could inflict striking above the water-line belt. 
 That is to say, that the protection afforded by the present width of 
 armor belt in its present position is greater than if it were raised. 
 
 2. The exposure of the lower edge of the armor belt was notice¬ 
 able even when the ships were deeply laden with coal and stores, as 
 well as with double bottoms filled with fresh feed water for boilers. 
 
 3. In my opinion our ships, class for class and of corresponding 
 date of construction, are the equals of the ships of any other nation, 
 and in many respects the superiors. They are as well protected by 
 armor, have rather more offensive power, are as fast, and have as 
 great a steaming radius as ships of the same date and class in other 
 navies. 
 
 4. In conclusion, I beg to emphasize my belief that our ships are 
 as efficient in design and construction as those of the same date in 
 other navies. 
 
 Very respectfully, R. R. Ingersoll, 
 
 Captain , United States Navy. 
 
 The Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 9 . 
 
 [Boston Evening Transcript, Tuesday, April 21, 1908.] 
 
 AMERICAN NAVY SECOND-SIR WILLIAM HENRY WHITE PAYS TRIBUTE. 
 
 Sir William Henry White, K. C. B., F. R. S., was in Boston yes¬ 
 terday and last evening attended a dinner at the Tavern Club, ten¬ 
 dered him by Josiah B. Millet, at which prominent naval officers of 
 Boston were present. Sir William was for nearly twenty years, or 
 up to 1902, the responsible designer of all British war ships, and in 
 knowledge of naval construction he is not surpassed by any man in 
 
60 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 the world. He is also deeply interested in American naval affairs 
 and naval officers. Rear-Admiral F. T. Bowles, former Chief Con¬ 
 structor, United States Navy, and now president of the Fore River 
 Engine Company, and Rear-Admiral Capps, present Chief Con¬ 
 structor, were both his pupils in naval construction. It was this 
 interest in our naval programme that induced Sir William to reply 
 at length to a reporter’s questions regarding the faults in our Navy 
 as outlined by Henry Reuterdahl in McClures Magazine. He plunged 
 at once in medias res: 
 
 Reuterdahl says in his article that the American ships are greatly inferior to 
 foreign ships. He says that the thick armor in the water-line region, called 
 the armor belt, is the life of the ship, and that, in the American ships, is only 
 6 to 9 inches above the water when they are loaded up for sea, while in foreign 
 ships the corresponding belt armor is better placed. And he speaks of the 
 British Dreadnought as being in every way superior, as far as belt armor 
 defense is concerned, to the American ships. 
 
 Now, I say he is all wrong as to his facts. The American ships, when they 
 are floating at what is called their normal water line in still water and upright, 
 have their belt armor about 2§ to 3 feet above that water line. You see that 
 is the hypothetical water line—when the ship has certain weights on board, 
 not representing her full load. The American official reports show that when 
 the ships of the American Navy are fully laden they are about 27 inches deeper 
 than that. And then the thick armor belt in the region of that water line 
 still is about from 6 to 9 inches above water. So far Reuterdahl is correct. 
 But he is absolutely wrong in regard to the Dreadnought's thick armor belt. 
 When the Dreadnought is fully laden she is drawing from 4 to 4| feet more 
 than at her normal water line, and her thick armor belt is then a foot to 18 
 inches below water, and she is left with a height of armor only 4 to 4£ feet 
 above the surface in still water. 
 
 The American ships when fully laden are about 27 inches deeper than at the 
 normal line. The Dreadnought is 4 to 4^ feet deeper—about twice. The Amer¬ 
 ican ships fully laden have their thick armor belt 6 to 9 inches still above water. 
 The English ship has her corresponding thick armor a foot to 18 inches below 
 water. And the English ship’s defense on the sides is then restricted to armor 
 that rises 4 to 4^ feet above water and is only 8 inches thick. The American 
 ships of the Connecticut class have on their sides, for a considerable portion of 
 their length, a vertical armor corresponding to the 8-inch armor of the Dread¬ 
 nought —it may be a little less than 8 inches—extending 16 feet above water. 
 So that as far as the Dreadnought and the Connecticut are concerned, the 
 Connecticut is better protected above the water line. 
 
 Now, this belt armor, in my opinion, is only a fetich. If the ship is upright 
 and at rest in still water, and you have that thick armor belt at the water line, 
 that portion of the ship would be of course well protected. But that portion, 
 as a matter of fact, is the most difficult to hit. If the shots fall ever so little 
 short, they will ricochet and turn up. If they are high in elevation, of course 
 they will pass over the thick armor belt. 
 
 That water line is never the real water line when the ship is at sea. If the 
 ship is moving, the waves formed by her motion in still water will bury that 
 thick armor—that water line. If there are waves passing the ship, they rise 
 above that thick armor. If the ship heels over ever so little, this belt goes under 
 water, no matter where it is placed. 
 
 These considerations led me twenty years ago to recommend to the English 
 Admiralty that they should abolish the thick armor. And my design, which was 
 used exclusively for a period of sixteen years, made the armor a uniform thick¬ 
 ness from the main deck down. 
 
 My first designs which were accepted had the thick water-line belt. But in 
 1888 I recommended the other course. In the Royal Sovereign class the armor 
 rose about 9 to 10 feet above the normal water line and about feet below. 
 That is to say, the side armor was 15 to 16 feet in width. Naval opinion of 
 that day was exactly that which Reuterdahl now holds. And so we had armor 
 at the water line 10 inches thick and that went 3 feet above the water line. For 
 the rest of the height it was 5 inches thick. 
 
 Previously there was no armor above the belt. The armor was all at the 
 water line. The Germans have built ships within the last twelve years like 
 that—simply a belt and no side armor above. 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 61 
 
 What I wanted to do was, instead of having a 10-inch armor belt at the water 
 line and a 5-inch armor above that, to distribute that weight uniformly over 
 the same area. And in the Majestic class—which was the original of all mod¬ 
 ern battle ships, and which I designed about 1893—I was allowed to make the 
 armor on the hull uniformly 9 inches thick, and did so. So that there is a wall 
 armor of the same depth as in the Royal Sovereign class and of the same weight, 
 but it had a uniform thickness of 9 inches all the way up. 
 
 We have followed that design in England until the Dreadnought was built, 
 and of course with her I had nothing to do. In the Dreadnought they revert to 
 the thick water-line belt, which, as I have said, at the normal line extends 
 about 2i to 3 feet above still water, and when the ship is deep laden 1 to 1£ 
 feet under water. That is to say, they go back to the arrangement which was 
 abandoned fifteen years ago. 
 
 This argument about the water-line belt being the life of the ship is all 
 humbug, because you don't know where the water line is. Directly she burns 
 out coal, or uses up stores, or does anything to diminish her draft, that water 
 line changes. And directly you put in water, or the ship heels over, or moves 
 through the water, it changes. 
 
 When you go to sea, you may have the ship rolling so that her armor comes 
 wholly out of water. You never go to sea with the fleet without seeing large 
 portions of the unarmored bottoms of the ships. 
 
 The fundamental error is in making such a fetich of the water-line belt. 
 What you want to do is to get all the vertical height of armor you can on the 
 side above the belt, or water line. And then when you have fixed on your limit 
 of weight this must also be considered. All experience proves that the chance 
 of damage to the hull of the ship increases with its height above water. 
 
 In the battle of Tsushimi it was not the armored sides of the Russian ships 
 that suffered, but their superstructures. The ships were not sunk by perfora¬ 
 tion of their armor, but by the perforation of their thin sides above the armor 
 and the entrance of water into the upper parts of the ships. 
 
 If the armor of the Russian ships had been the same as the armor of the 
 Connecticut, what would have been the result? 
 
 It would have been vastly better for the ships. This is the point. The Rus¬ 
 sian ships had a smaller armored area above the water than the Connecticut. 
 Therefore they could stand battering less. And the Dreadnought has less ar¬ 
 mored area above the water than the Connecticut, taking both ships at deep 
 draft. 
 
 When people talk, as Reuterdahl does, about the Dreadnought being such a 
 superior yessel to the Connecticut in the defense, they ignore the small vertical 
 height of armor when the ships are at deep draft. 
 
 Does not the Connecticut answer all Reuterdahl’s requirements as expressed 
 
 in his criticisms? 
 
 No. What he says is that the life of the ship depends upon the water-line belt. 
 If you admit that premise, then his argument is all right. He says a 6-inch 
 armor above the water-line belt might be of some value, but would be quite 
 secondary. I say that all experience proves that the increase in the vertical 
 expansion above water of the side armor is of fundamental importance in en¬ 
 abling the ship to stand battering. 
 
 There are plenty of instances in the case of the Russian ships in the war with 
 Japan where the armor, according to all formulae, should have been penetrated 
 and was not penetrated. And the Russians, w'ho may be supposed to know 
 what happened, have in their later designs extended the area of the armor 
 enormously and reduced the thickness. That has been their answer to it. 
 
 What reasons were given by the British Admiralty for reverting to an aban¬ 
 doned type of armor in the case of the Dreadnought? 
 
 They decided to have an armament of ten 12-inch guns. They had therefore 
 to provide a great weight of armor for the redoubts in which these great guns 
 and their turntables are placed. That was a necessity, you see, to protect the 
 armament. Then they found that, with a given size of ship, with a given total 
 weight of armor available, they could not continue to protect so large an area 
 on the side. 
 
 With the Connecticut or the King Edward arrangement, your armor serves 
 two purposes—it protects the battery in which you place year smaller guns, 
 and also serves to maintain buoyancy and stability by being on the side of 
 the ship. 
 
 If you have to put in 12-inch guns, you must protect with armor the towers 
 in which they are placed. In the Connecticut or King Edward there are four 
 
62 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 12-inch guns; therefore you have two towers. But when you get ten 12-inch 
 guns, as in the Dreadnought or the North Dakota, you are obliged to take 
 armor from the sides and put it on the towers. 
 
 The total depth of armor on the Dreadnought along the side is about 13? to 
 14 feet, a little less than before. And, again, the reversion to the thicker 
 water-line belt means you have to concentrate weight there—a thing to which 
 I have always taken exception. I think that is going back to a fallacy; it is 
 a mistake. And you know they have not continued to use the same thickness 
 of belt line in the later ships of the Dreadnought class. They have kept the 
 8 inches above, but have less than 11 inches below. In other words, the differ¬ 
 ence between the upper and belt armor is less in the later ships. 
 
 There is another thing which Mr. Reuterdahl criticised, and that is’the direct 
 hoists from the magazines to the rear of the guns. Taking it as a matter of 
 fact again, if you were to take all the armored ships of the world at the present 
 time on the effective lists you would find the very great majority of them with 
 nothing but direct hoists. It is not peculiar to American ships at all. 
 
 Now, I have been reading the testimony given at that investigation in Wash¬ 
 ington, and from that it appears perfectly clear that the accidents that have 
 happened are only indirectly associated with the direct hoist. The primary 
 cause of accident has nothing to do with the hoist. 
 
 Having said that, I ought to say that I am the man who brought out the 
 broken hoist—that is, lifting the ammunition up a certain height from the 
 magazines into an ammunition room and there transferring it to another hoist 
 not in a direct line. I did that nearly twenty years ago, but I did not do it be¬ 
 cause of the danger of the direct hoist. When you have a direct hoist from 
 the magazine up to the rear of the guns, which may be 50 feet if the gun is 
 placed high, it takes an appreciable amount of time to lift the charge from the 
 magazine to the gun before you can load. Now, I said if I could put in two 
 stages, one that would bring the ammunition to within 6 or 7 feet of the gun, 
 and then a second set of men, who had nothing to do with the first operation, 
 to lift it the remaining distance to the gun, I could save considerable time. 
 That is the reason I did that, and not because of any danger. 
 
 The inexperience of the men and the conditions of target practice are to 
 blame. As long as you give the prize to the men who fire the most ammunition 
 in a given time, or hit the target most frequently in a given time, they will 
 play that game. But you will remember that the Japanese admirals, Fushimi 
 and Togo, gave orders that that practice was not to be followed. 
 
 In the battle of the 10th of August outside Port Arthur the Japanese fired 
 away nearly all their ammunition, and were only saved by the merest good 
 fortune. And they were not able to follow up the Russians because they did 
 not have reserve ammunition. 
 
 Now, as to the freeboard and height of guns above water, all I need say 
 about that is that the facts are again not in Mr. Reuterdahl’s favor. 
 
 It is quite true that in the swifter cruisers of the British navy I introduced 
 a high forecastle, because they were going to drive hard and fast against the 
 sea. But in the battle ships I kept along at a steady height of freeboard and 
 of guns above water, and that was practically maintained all the time I was 
 there, because it was proved to be enough by experience at sea. 
 
 There are two requirements. There is the maintenance of speed. That de¬ 
 mands a high bow, whether it is an Atlantic liner or a battle ship. Then there 
 is the fighting power in a seaway. And of course there you never wanf to 
 place your guns higher than you are obliged to, because by raising them you 
 raise your center of gravity and reduce your stability accordingly. 
 
 Reuterdahl’s contention is that the existing American ships are disadvan¬ 
 tageous^ situated as compared with European vessels. I say that is not so. 
 The cruisers in your Navy have not such great height of freeboard forward as 
 I have given to our cruisers, but in that respect it is not a question of power, 
 but simply a question of the maintenance of speed at sea. 
 
 There is one thing more that I should like to say, and I think it is vital. I 
 have known the American Navy from the start. It is not generally known that 
 the modern American Navy started with the purchase of two of my designs 
 from Armstrong’s. That was in 1885. From those designs the Charleston 
 and the Baltimore were built. 
 
 The first thing I want to say in thjs connection is that you have in those men 
 naval architects as capable as any, in my judgment, in the world, because they 
 have been properly trained, and besides they are picked men. 
 
 The second thing I want to say is that your shipbuilding yards are quite 
 equal to any we have in their equipment and management and all that. They 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 63 
 
 have come later and they have the advantage of all the accumulated experience 
 we have had to go upon. And there is American ingenuity at the back of all 
 that on the mechanical side. 
 
 And the result is that, in my opinion, you have a fleet that, ship for ship, 
 comparing the ships designed at a given date—and that is the only fair com¬ 
 parison—is equal to anything the world contains. And next to the British 
 navy I think your Navy is the best in the world. 
 
 These wholesale criticisms and severe condemnation are not justified. There 
 is no ship that you can not criticise, but criticism to be of value must be the re¬ 
 sult of experience. No one would want to avoid that kind of criticism. But 
 what I do say is that these are not subjects that can be proper] y discussed in 
 the public press or in magazine articles. They must be dealt with dispassion¬ 
 ately and quietly. 
 
 10. 
 
 [Scientific American, New York, Saturday, May 2, 1908.] 
 
 SIR WILLIAM WHITE ON THE AMERICAN NAVY. 
 
 In the course of a recent converastion with Sir William White the 
 editor of the Scientific American asked the distinguished naval archi¬ 
 tect for his estimate of the relative value of the ships of the United- 
 States Navy compared with those of the leading navies of the world. 
 He replied that if a comparison were made of ships of the same date 
 and the same type, he considered that the United States vessels were 
 the equals of any war ships afloat. 
 
 Now, the value of this approval lies in the fact that Sir William has 
 had a more intimate and extended experience in the design of modern 
 war ships than any living naval architect. For a period of about 
 twenty years he was the chief constructor of the British navy. What 
 Ericsson was to the low-freeboard, coast-defense monitor White is to 
 the modern, high-freeboard seagoing battle ship; and in the Royal 
 Sovereign he introduced a type wliich, for two decades, has formed, 
 in most of its essential features, the standard battle ship for the lead¬ 
 ing navies of the world. In his active career he has designed a 
 greater number of battle ships and cruisers ♦probably than any three 
 naval architects combined. 
 
 Sir William informed us that he had followed the Senate investiga¬ 
 tion of the supposed defects in our ships with much interest and that 
 he disagreed with the charges as originally stated in the Reuterdahl 
 article. Taking the case of the Dreadnought , which was cited as an 
 instance of how our own ships should have been armored, but were 
 not, he made the startling statement that whereas, at full load, the 
 American ships are depressed on an average 27 inches below the nom¬ 
 inal flotation line, the Dreadnought , when so loaded, was depressed 
 from 4 to 4J feet; and that whereas at full load the American ships 
 show from 6 to 9 inches of the thick belt above the water, the English 
 ship has the corresponding belt from a foot to a foot and a half be¬ 
 low water. He further stated that whereas in the fully loaded con¬ 
 dition the Dreadnought shows only 4 to 4J feet of 8-inch side armor, 
 the Connecticut and class show from 15 to 16 feet of 7-inch side armor 
 above the water. Therefore, he considered, as well he may, that the 
 Connecticut is better protected than the Dreadnought. 
 
 Even more disastrous to the critics of our Navy were the comments 
 of Sir William on the question of the direct versus the interrupted 
 
64 
 
 ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 
 
 hoist. Mr. Reuterdahl and others have stated time and again that 
 the direct hoist, giving direct communication from the handling-room 
 floor to the breech of the gun, is a type of construction peculiar to our 
 own Navy, which is full of danger; and they have urged that it 
 should have been abandoned long ago in favor of the interrupted 
 hoist, which, according to them, was introduced in foreign navies to 
 avoid the dangers inherent in the direct hoist. Thus, Mr. Reuterdahl 
 in his recent letter to the New York Sun, referred to in another col¬ 
 umn, states that there is not in any foreign turret a hoist of the type 
 we use. Now. upon this point no one is so qualified to speak as Sir 
 William, for he informs us that it was he himself who designed the 
 interrupted hoist nearly twenty years ago—the critics have told us 
 that this was a comparatively modern improvement, w^hich our slow- 
 moving Department has refused to adopt—and that he did not design 
 it because the interrupted hoist was less dangerous, but because he 
 believed it would secure a faster service of ammunition to the guns. 
 He stated furthermore that the majority of the armored ships of the 
 world make use of the direct hoist, and that it is in no sense peculiar 
 to the United States Navy. 
 
 And thus once more are the fallacies and the absurd exaggerations 
 of this ill-advised onslaught upon our Navy shown to be not only 
 baseless, but positively absurd—this time by one who is at once the 
 foremost naval architect of the day and an outside critic of unques¬ 
 tioned impartiality. Let us hope that with this final and truly comic 
 pricking of the “ open hoist ” turret bubble, the American public will 
 be granted a well-earned repose. 
 
 11 . 
 
 [Engineering News, April 16, 1908—A journal of civil, mechanical, mining, and 
 electrical engineering, published every Thursday by The Engineering News 
 Publishing Company, 220 Broadway, New York.] 
 
 For three months past, following the publication of a sensational 
 magazine article, the press has been filled with criticisms of the 
 United States Navy. We have not thought it worth while to give 
 space to any of the voluminous discussion. To those who could see 
 beneath the surface it has been evident that these criticisms of the 
 Navy and of our naval vessels originated partly from a desire to 
 make political capital, partly from the desire to make money by ex¬ 
 ploiting sensational articles in the press, and partly from some 
 jealousy and prejudice inside the Navy Department. Eliminate all 
 these, and there still remains doubtless some fair and reasonable 
 criticism in all that has been uttered, but it has been so buried out 
 of sight in the torrent of destructive slander and vituperation that it 
 might better have been postponed to a more suitable season. 
 
 No one supposes that the Navy organization is perfect. Doubtless 
 it is true that the different bureaus do work more or less at cross¬ 
 purposes, but we hear exactly the same complaint of lack of depart¬ 
 mental cooperation from inside prominent railway and industrial 
 corporations. Human nature is not materially different in the Navy 
 and out of the Navy. 
 
 No one supposes,” either, that any battle ship or other naval vessel 
 is perfect. Far from it. The modern naval vessel is in its design 
 
ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN BATTLE SHIPS. 65 
 
 a compromise and must be, absolutely, from the necessities of the 
 case. Of course, the line officer wants his vessel to have more and 
 bigger guns, thicker and wider and longer armor belt, higher speed, 
 greater coal capacity, more roomy quarters for its crew. The naval 
 designer has to take a certain limited number of tons displacement 
 and provide as much speed and armor and offensive power and all 
 the rest as the conditions permit. 
 
 A large part of the criticisms which have been aimed at our battle 
 ships and their designers during the past few months have referred 
 to the location of the armor belts. It has been repeated over and over 
 again that the armor belts were too low, that the tops of the belts 
 were under water when the ships were ready for sea with all coal 
 and stores on board; and the naval designers have been called im¬ 
 practicable theorists, ignoramuses, bureaucrats, and various other un¬ 
 complimentary names. 
 
 This sort of criticism reads well in the pages of a popular maga¬ 
 zine, and perhaps it will make good political campaign documents, 
 but when it is examined with a little practical knowledge, how puerile 
 it appears. 
 
 A ship may have to fight a battle when its coal and stores are nearly 
 exhausted and it stands high out of the water in consequence. The 
 battle of Santiago was fought under exactly those conditions. Again, 
 there can be no certainty that battles will be fought in smooth water, 
 and in a seaway all ships roll more or less. The critics who have been 
 barking themselves hoarse against our naval vessels have been vocif¬ 
 erous in their assertions that Admiral Evans himself “ had it in ” 
 for the designers who had placed the armor belts so low. It was 
 freely asserted that when he arrived, after completing the cruise 
 around the South American continent, he would add the weight of his 
 authority on the side of the critics. But when he at last arrived and 
 the impatient reporters sought to draw him out on the armor-belt 
 question, u Fighting Bob ” assured them that while he would be glad 
 to have the top of the armor belt raised so as to give more protection, 
 on the other hand the vessels of his fleet often rolled until the bottom 
 of the armor belt was raised above the water line. 
 
 And so, as Mr. Dooley says, there you are! There is absolutely not 
 a shred of evidence in all that has been published, so far as we have 
 seen, to show that our naval designers have not done the best possible 
 within the necessary limitations. They appreciate, what the general 
 public and possibly the naval critics do not, that every inch the armor 
 belt is raised materially affects the stability of the vessel. They ap¬ 
 preciate, what the critics of the Navy apparently do not, that while 
 higher armor belts, higher freeboard, and higher batteries might have 
 possible advantages, the first duty of a designer is to guard the sta¬ 
 bility of his vessel. A battle ship must be safe against capsizing in 
 any ocean storm. Besides this, if a higher armor belt so decreased 
 stability as to cause greater rolling, the vessel might expose still more 
 of her bottom below the armor to the enemy’s guns when fighting in 
 a seaway. 
 
 O 
 
 S. Doc. 506, 60-1