DOC. Y4.J89/1: P81/17(A) COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY Subcommittee No. 1 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STUDY OF POPULATION AND IMMIGRATION PROBLEMS l f- i' THE POPULATION OF THE U.S.S.R. i \ t f t 38-464 . t t J / 1 v- :: i <■ u a * r f!An8»J v ? iJi U.S. OFF WASHINGTON : 1964 liit LIBRARY 6F Tnt DEC 15 1964 pfERSITY fll ILUP 5 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY EMANUEL CELLER, New York, Chairman MICHAEL A. FEIGHAN, Ohio FRANK CHELF, Kentucky EDWIN E. WILLIS, Louisiana PETER W. RODINO, Jr., New Jersey E. L. FORRESTER, Georgia BYRON G. ROGERS, Colorado HAROLD D. DONOHUE, Massachusetts JACK BROOKS, Texas WILLIAM M. TUCK, Virginia ROBERT T. ASHMORE, South Carolina JOHN DOWDY, Texas BASIL L. WHITENER, North Carolina ROLAND V. LIBONATI, Illinois HERMAN TOLL, Pennsylvania ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, Wisconsin JACOB H. GILBERT, New York JAMES C. CORMAN, California WILLIAM L. ST. ONGE, Connecticut GEORGE F. SENNER, Jr., Arizona DON EDWARDS, California Bess E. Dick, Staff Director William R. Foley, General Counsel Walter M. Besterman, Legislative Assistant William P. Shattuck, Legislative Assis:ant Charles J. Zinn, Law Revision Counsel Murray Drabkin, Counsel Herbert Fuchs, Counsel William H. Copenhayer, Associate Counsel WILLIAM M. McCULLOCH, Ohio WILLIAM E. MILLER, New York RICHARD H. POFF, Virginia WILLIAM C. CRAMER, Florida ARCH A. MOORE, Jr., West Virginia GEORGE MEADER. Michigan JOHN V. LINDSAY, New York WILLIAM T. CAHILL, New Jersey GARNER E. SHRIVER, Kansas CLARK MacGREGOR, Minnesota CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland JAMES E. BROMWELL, Iowa CARLETON J. KING, New York PATRICK MINOR MARTIN, California Subcommittee No. 1 MICHAEL A. FEIGHAN, Ohio, Chairman FRANK CHELF,^Kentucky RICHARD H. POFF, Virginia PETER W. RODINO, Jr., New Jersey ARCH A. MOORE, Jr., West Virginia Walter M. Besterman, Legislative Assistant Garner J. Cline, Associate Counsel II UNIVERSITY O ILLINOIS LIBRARY AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN pOd . ' /f, tr?» CO fc OT) <0 *H C fc E bO bC cfl co co C H C g r-l C © r> 3 s o co c5 cc a cu p. If, V\ -I -3 -3 0-3 m N CN tH H O Mo O Q> fC r~- 1 '— t— n n c r- r— r— c— vo c— r \o 'OsO'O'O'inlA'LAtA • C i-l r-i rH O co co r-i>-p-r~-'0'0\/\V\-3c'''\c'c<\JCci O O r-- O \a O r-r-.r-t—M5'25'O'0v0 , -ov0'O'O'O'S'O'Ov0v0'O'O\r\vr\vr l \A •& cc W *H £? PS (£ g5S ! It TJ CO IS o •o e co co C T 3 P *H hO CO cs C *rl *, 3 S _ ,h co bi,-P -t-> ro O. n t> C H H B P c it 3c Tl o ® s o o s n &< pi < &, P, & rH \A NO \OCO rH -C? NO 0 \ 0 sr-*CNJ\nN 0 r-r^-OCJ-rr.^r-=rV\©\r-asC^ r-Nt^f^NCOCOcOcOCO Ova^ONOOsOCOHHHHWCNJf^ HHrlHHHHHHH n ■S3 cO P I CO g CO c s <0 ►'.o-o'Eh 5 c ^ Q co n N ® 5l O R O -P *D E. © «r< d fcQ«H © N O £8 a «h CNJ 3 £ & o 35 CD Cvj THE POPULATION OF THE U.S.S.R. 37 In fact, one can judge from the comparison in table 4, that the crude death rate tends to relate these countries inversely according to underlying age-specific mortality rates, i.e., those with a relatively low crude death rate tend to show a relatively low life expectancy and high infant mortality, whereas the reverse would be expected. 4 The explanation lies in the fact that the recent improvements in conditions affecting mortality in underdeveloped countries have taken place relatively quickly, through the use of antibiotics, etc., but that these populations, because of the short time involved, have remained rel¬ atively young in age distribution. The aging of the population that will ultimately follow improvements in age-specific mortality (coupled with lower fertility rates) has yet to take place. The more developed countries, on the other hand, where mortality and fertility have been relatively low for a number of years, now support a relatively old population, with consequent inflation of crude death rates. It can be inferred from this discussion and the experience of other countries suggested by the data in table 4, that age-specific mortality rates will continue to decline in the Soviet Union, at the same time that the crude death rate will probably rise. E. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION BY AGE AND SEX 5 1 . The distribution by age The pattern of change in the distribution of the population by age is related to the pattern of change in birth and death rates, as sum¬ marized above, and in particular to the incidence of the several national crises beginning with World War I. Declining birthrates in and of themselves bend to reduce the percentage of the population in the younger age groups and to raise accordingly the share in the older age groups. Declining infant mortality by itself tends to operate in the other direction; in other words, to have the same effect as a rise in the birthrate. General improvements in the conditions affecting mortality other than infant mortality tend to have a relatively minor influence on the age distribution of the (corresponding) population. Between the census of 1897 and 1939, changes in the distribution of the population by broad age groups were gradual and in the follow¬ ing directions: A declining proportion age 0 to 15, from 40.6 to 37.7 percent of the total; a rising proportion age 16 to 59 (the working ages), from 52.5 to 55.5 percent; and essentially no change in the pro¬ portion age 60 and over, from 6.8 to 6.9 percent. These changes seem to be dominated by the “abnormal” years of the period, includ¬ ing World War I, the civil war, and the early 1930’s. Except for these years, relatively high birthrates and gradually declining infant mortality tended to raise the proportion of young people in the population. The effect of World War II, if we compare 1939 with 1959, was to reduce sharply the proportion age 0 to 15, from 37.7 to 30.4 percent; to increase the proportion age 16 to 59, from 55.5 to 60.2 percent; and also to increase the proportion age 60 and over, from 6.9 to 9.4 per- * It must be kept in mind that the list of countries in table 4 does not include many of the countries of highest mortality (in Africa and Asia), because satisfactory data are not available. The notion of relatively high and relatively low in this discussion has meaning only with respect to the countries on the list. « This section of the paper is a somewhat modified version of the corresponding section of a paper by the present author on the Soviet labor force, appearing in A. Bergson and S. Kuznets, “Economic Trends in the Soviet Union” (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 51-53. 38 THE POPULATION OF THE U.S.S.R. cent. Thus, in spite of war losses approaching 25 million persons among the adult population, the proportion of adults age 16 to 59 and 60 and over was a good deal higher in 1959 than 1939. The lower birthrates and higher infant mortality rates of the war out¬ weighed the effect of high military losses and excess civilian deaths. In the most recent years the growth of the population age 16 to 59 has been dominated by the entry of age groups born during the war, when the birth rate was low and infant mortality high. According to the estimates and projections of Brackett, the pattern of absolute increase of the population age 16 to 59 takes the following form: 6 Year: 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 Increase during year 2 , 400,000 1 , 900,000 1 , 600 , 000 200 , 000 - 600,000 - 400 , 000 700 , 000 1 , 200 , 000 1 , 200 , 000 1 , 600 , 000 1 , 600 , 000 One effect of these changes is a decline in the proportion of the population age 16 to 59 from 60.2 percent of the total in 1959 to about 57 percent in 1965. The distribution of the population by age groups after 1965 depends significantly on what is assumed with respect to fertility rates. The proportion of the population age 60 and over, however, will probably increase to one degree or another, and it is not unlikely that by 1975 it will be roughly equal to that in the United States at the present time. 2. The sex ratio It is statistically correct and undoubtedly valid in other respects to say that the burden of the Soviet revolution and the building of an industrialized Socialist state (if we include its defense in this category) fell much more heavily on males than females. At the time of the 1897 census there were approximately the same number of males as females in the population, or a sex ratio of 99 males per 100 females. By 1926, reflecting World War I and the civil war, there were 5 million fewer males than females, or a sex ratio of 94. By 1939, as a result of the conditions of the early 1930’s, there were 7 million fewer males than females, and the sex ratio had declined to 92, although under normal conditions it would have increased. The effect of World War II on the sex ratio in the Soviet population staggers the imagination. The 1959 census reports 114.8 million females and 94 million males, indicating an absolute deficit of 20.8 million males. By calculating backward according to published birth rates and certain assumptions with respect to the distribution of mortality by sex, it may be estimated that as of 1950 there were about 25 million fewer males than females in the adult population, for a sex ratio in the total population close to 80 males per 100 females. It mav be inferred from these and other estimates for 1950 7 that V/ 6 Brackett, loc. cit., p. 521. His figures actually refer to males age 16 to 59 and females age 16 to 54. 7 The method for these estimates of war losses is set forth in W. W. Eason, * ‘ The Soviet Population Today: An Analysis of the First Results of the 1959 Census," Foreign Affairs, vol. 37, No. 4, July 1959, pp. 603-604. THE POPULATION OF THE U.S.S.R. 39 population war losses of both a civilian and military nature were borne to a large degree by males. An estimated 45 million total war losses comprises 25 million persons who were alive in 1940 and who would not have died if there had not been a war, and 20 million persons who would have been born and survived. Of the 25 million excess deaths other than among infants, no more than 10 million can be accounted for as males in military service, leaving a total of 15 million excess civilian deaths, of which 11 million were males and 4 million females. The cause or combination of causes that might explain why three times as many males as females died outside the military service during and after the war, over and above the number who would have died under normal conditions, are considered elsewhere. 8 The male deficit is now confined to the population about 35 years of age and over. Barring war or other period of turmoil, the male deficit as a major social and economic problem should lessen. But the deficit will in all probability not be entirely eliminated, because in the Soviet Union as in other countries, even under peacetime conditions, life expectancy for females exceeds that for males. (See table 4.) II. The Implications of the Demographic Characteristics of Soviet Population Growth for Economic Development Interrelationships between demographic variables and economic and social factors call forth a wide range of analytical questions rele¬ vant to countries in various stages of economic development and with differing economic and political systems. In light of the particular objectives of economic development in the Soviet Union and the fact that development has already progressed rapidly, it will be appropriate if we take a relatively broad and sweeping view of the subject, in¬ cluding the past and present as well as the future. This will do some violence to the subtleties of many of the questions, and also force us to omit a number of questions altogether, but it will serve to keep the broad and basic dimensions of a rapidly changing picture in view. Questions under the present heading concern the way in which demographic variables influence and modify the process of economic and social change and the formulation of policy. If we confine ourselves to those demographic characteristics of Soviet population growth summarized above—i.e., to the size and pattern of growth of the population and the distribution by age and sex—then the demographic variables may be thought of as exerting their influence on economic and social change largely through the medium of broad quantitative relationships between human resources and other re¬ sources in the production process. In oversimplified terms, it is a question of the relative supply of human resources vis-a-vis natural resources (including land) and capital resources, and of the changes in supply over time; and it is a question of the difference this makes for production and distribution and the achievement of rapid eco¬ nomic growth—given the nature of the economic and political system. By dealing with broad quantitative relationships, we are confining ourselves to only certain aspects of the human factor in economic development. Equally important are the “qualitative” aspects, embodied in levels of education and experience and the attitudes of the population toward work; the “locational” aspects, whereby the 8 Idem. 40 THE POPULATION OF THE U.S.S.R. population can be variously categorized by area, industry, occupation, etc.; and the “institutional” aspects, which determine the effectiveness with which human resources are joined to the production process on the job. We shall have occasion to touch on some of these “qualita¬ tive,” “locational” and “institutional” dimensions of the human contribution to economic development, but only insofar as they can be shown to be influenced by, or have an influence on, the demographic characteristics of the population in “quantitative” terms. A. PRESSURES OF POPULATION ON OTHER RESOURCES On the eve of rapid industrialization (1928), as we have indicated, the Soviet Union was relatively sparsely populated with respect to overall land area and realtively densely populated with respect to arable land, and the population was increasing at a relatively rapid rate. Discussion of the pressures of population on other resources, under these conditions, must deal with the question of both under¬ population and overpopulation, and also with the possibility of a population explosion. The elements of a population explosion, it should be noted, were present at the start of rapid industrialization: the death rate had already declined from about 30 per thousand at the end of the 19th century to about 20 per thousand in the late 1920’s; the birth rate was high and unchanged; and the rate of natural increase of the population was 2 percent or more, compared to 1.5 percent during the pre-Soviet period. If these trends had continued during rapid industrialization— and also if there had been no war—the rate of population increase might have reached 2.5 or 3 percent. Under these conditions, the population would now be more than 300 million, rather than some 223 million, and the age structure of the population would be inclined more toward the younger (unproductive) elements than has actually been the case. In fact, of course, the average rate of increase of the population (and labor force) since 1928 has been much lower than that projected on the basis of preindustrialization rates. Primarily because of World War II and the difficulties of the early 1930’s, but also because of a rela¬ tively greater secular decline in fertility rates than mortality rates, the average rate of population increase on comparable territory since 1928 has been about 0.8 percent per year. This is considerably below the natural rate of increase just before rapid industrialization (about 2 percent) and during the latter decades of the Imperial Russian period (about 1.5 percent). However, it is only slightly below the long-term average annual rate of about 1 percent since 1801, which takes into account all factors affecting population growth (including wars, etc.). Two conclusions follow from these statistics: (1) The Soviet Union has not experienced the population explosion that was inherent in the pattern of population growth just before rapid industrialization. (2) Nevertheless, population growth—despite wars and secular change—has been relatively dynamic compared to other countries of the world. In other words, the Soviet Union, as far as the demographic side of the picture is concerned, has been spared the pressures of persistent overpopulation with respect to arable land; and at the same time, THE POPULATION OF THE U.S.S.R. 41 prospects for population growth are such that the long-run objective of the development of the whole country will not be seriously cur¬ tailed by the constraints of underpopulation. Overpopulation with respect to rural or agricultural areas was po¬ tentially a serious problem in 1928, despite the fact that the Soviet Union as a whole is not densely populated, because arable land con¬ stitutes a relatively small fraction of total land area, and because there was already a surplus agricultural population of some 10 to 20 per¬ cent. 9 The fact that the rate of population growth declined after 1928 tended to reduce this surplus, or at least prevented it from becom¬ ing more serious, and thereby tended to remove one important obstacle to raising overall labor productivity. What would have happened if the population had increased after 1928 at the explosive rates of 2.5 to 3 percent per year? The pressure of human resources on arable land resources would have been greater; but whether this would have led to a radically different pattern of utilization of human resources is difficult to say. Even under present conditions—following the reduction of the surplus population in agriculture along the lines described—labor-intensive methods are still very much in evidence in agriculture, and productivity is lower than in many other comparable industrialized countries; and almost half of the total labor force is still in agriculture. If population growth had not declined, the surplus of manpower in agriculture might have required more drastic and far-reaching methods for its effective utilization toward the objective of rapid economic growth; and the period of time during which conditions of an abundance of manpower at relatively low levels of efficiency would have prevailed—a period only now coming to an end—would have been longer. On the other side of the coin, what of the elements of underpopula¬ tion with respect to overall land area during these years? Clearly, if Soviet policy had dictated the balanced development of the country as a whole from the earliest years of rapid industrialization, then human resources—as well as the basic components of social overhead (housing, etc.) necessary to support these resources in the more remote parts of the country—would have been in short supply. And the organizational and institutional arrangements necessary to carry out such a program of population migration and settlement would have been different (in kind as well as degree) from those which were ac¬ tually in effect. The fact is that population migration into eastern Siberia and the Soviet Far East, as well as Soviet central Asia, has been on a relatively modest scale during the first 30 years of rapid industrialization com¬ pared, for example, to the degree of rural-urban migration in the older areas of European Russia. (And a certain amount of what did take place resulted from the politically motivated transfers of the popula¬ tion and labor force during the late 1930’s, 1940’s, and early 1950’s, entailing living and working conditions that were far from adequate.) Only in recent years has the development of these underpopulated regions become a matter of some priority in national economic planning. • N. Baster, “Agricultural Overpopulation in the U.S.S.R.,” unpublished essay written for the certificate of the Russian Institute, Columbia University. According to the Soviet sources referred to in this essay, there was a surplus in agriculture with respect to production at the then existing levels of technology, assum¬ ing some full-time equivalent labor force as the number necessary for production. 42 THE POPULATION OF THE U.S.S.R. The demand for labor in these areas is now greater than at any time in the past—and will continue at a high rate. In the long run, and in the most basic sense, supply must come either from the transfer of manpower already employed in other areas of the country, or from the net increase in the total labor force, which is essentially synon¬ ymous with the net increase in the population of working ages. Whether supply is in fact forthcoming to these areas is dependent, of course, on much more than simple availability in quantitative terms; it is dependent on the whole range of policies and practices which affect labor mobility. The point is that dynamic population growth provides a heretofore underpopulated country with a greater range of alternatives in the joining of the supply of human resources to a rapidly increasing demand; or, in other words, it lessens the pressure to resort to radical changes in methods affecting labor utilization in order to release labor from existing jobs and areas. In this sense, a dynamic rate of natural increase of the population has the same implications for the ultimate development of the Soviet Union as a whole, that a high rate of population immigration did for the United States. It provides a growing manpower base neces¬ sary (but not sufficient) for the exploitation and utilization of a broad expanse of territory. To summarize this discussion of the pressure of population on other resources, we may note that the Soviet case presents a more complex and divergent set of circumstances than are usually found in one country. In one sense, the elements of overpopulation have been present; and in their attempts to reduce this pressure in the course of economic development, the Soviets have been aided by a rate of growth of the population well below that projected. In another sense, the country has been underpopulated, but by postponing, in effect, a serious attempt to develop the country as a whole, the Soviets have permitted the continuing increase in the population at substantial (if not excessive) rates to provide them with the necessary population base. The different implications of underpopulation and overpopulation for economic development must be understood. A relatively under¬ populated country, if it is to experience balanced economic growth over the country as a whole, must move the more quickly (a) to introduce capital intensive and laborsaving methods of production, involving high levels of technology; (6) to raise the quality of the labor force to levels implied by complex technology and organiza¬ tional forms; and (c) to develop more sophisticated methods of management, for the effective joining of human resources to the work process. A relatively overpopulated country is permitted different degrees of emphasis, direction, and timing, although the end result is in many respects the same. Initially it can rely on more labor intensive (and capital saving) methods of production; it can proceed with raising the quality of the labor force at a slower pace; and methods of management can, for the time being, be less efficient—all of this, essentially because the resource being “wasted” thereby (labor) is relatively cheap. In both cases, after sufficient passage of time, the process of eco¬ nomic development, through the growth of capital stock and tech¬ nology, and the resulting rise in the productivity of labor, serves to THE POPULATION OF THE U.S.S.R. 43 raise the economic value of human resources. As a continuing process in time, therefore, the costs of waste in the utilization of human resources become more apparent, and the need to develop enlightened manpower policies more urgent. Other things equal, the under¬ populated country in the course of economic development feels this pressure sooner than the overpopulated country-—because in the underpopulated country labor is initially scarce with respect to its utilization vis-a-vis natural resources and land. In the first decades of rapid economic development in the Soviet Union, the forces of overpopulation dominated those of under¬ population, because of the decision to focus the major share of eco¬ nomic activity in the western and southern parts of the country. The approach to manpower problems, therefore, reflected the relative abundance of human resources vis-a-vis capital and (arable) land resources, and the fact that labor was (economically) cheap. At the present time—-and looking to the future—-there is a growing awareness of the fact that labor is becoming more valuable as an economic resource. Its value is increasing as the natural result of the process of economic development, which effects basic changes in the proportionate relationships between human resources and other resources. An important and critical outcome of these changing forces is the reconsideration of manpower policies in the direction of utilizing the given labor force more effectively. B. IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION STRUCTURE We have suggested that in terms of overall quantitative relation- ships between human resources and other resources, Soviet economic development is presently passing through a fundamental stage of tran¬ sition—from a period in which human resources were relatively abun¬ dant and cheap, to a period in which the rising economic value of the human factor of production places a rising premium on the develop¬ ment of more sophisticated manpower policies. It is possible to see in the availability of abundant human resources (i.e., overpopulation) in the early decades of rapid industrialization, a particular benefit to Soviet planners. The benefit lies in the pos¬ sibility of postponing the development of a more enlightened man¬ power program designed to economize human resources. It enables the planners and administrators (and factory directors) to rely on sheer numbers of people—at low levels of efficiency—to supply the bulk of the human contribution to production, while concentrating attention on other problems attending the early phases of industrial¬ ization. It enables the planners to use the development of industry and the growth of the industrial labor force as much as a school for indoctrinating labor into the industrial way of life, as a contribution to raising current levels of productivity. In a closely related way, the structure of the population (and labor force) has also given the planners wider latitude to base development policies in the early decades on the use of mass labor at relatively low levels of efficiency. This may be seen if we briefly examine the dis¬ tribution of the labor force by agricultural and nonagricultural occu¬ pations, and the distribution of the population by age. 44 THE POPULATION OF THE U.S.S.R. 1. The distribution of the labor force by agricultural and nonagricultural occupations 10 From absolute data in table 5, and the percentage rates of increase in table 6, several observations may be made about the pattern of growth and redistribution of the labor force between agricultural and nonagricultural occupations in the Soviet Union and the United States. Table 5. — The labor force, by agricultural and nonagricultural occupations, U.S.S.R., 1925-59, and United States of America, 1820-1960 1 Date 2 U.S.S.R. 3 United States of America Labor force (in thousands) Percent Labor force (in thousands) Percent Total Nonagri¬ cultural Agricul¬ tural Nonagri¬ cultural Agricul¬ tural Total Nonagri¬ cultural Agricul¬ tural Nonagri¬ cultural Agricul¬ tural 1820. 2,881 3,932 5, 420 7, 697 10,533 12,925 17, 392 23,318 29,073 37,371 42,434 812 1,159 1,700 2,795 4,325 6,075 8,807 13,380 18,161 25,779 30,985 2,069 2,773 3, 720 4,902 6,208 6,850 8, 585 9, 938 10,912 11, 592 11,449 28.2 29.5 31.4 36.3 41.1 47.0 50.6 57.4 62.5 69.0 73.0 71.8 70.5 68.6 63.7 58.9 53.0 49.4 42.6 37.5 31.0 27.0 1830.. 1840. 1850.. 1860.. 1870. 1880.. 1890. 1900.. 1910.. 1920. 1925. 81,200 82,300 84, 500 84, 200 86,100 87, 400 89, 500 88,000 88, 600 88,800 89,100 89, 300 90,900 89, 600 89, 700 89, 800 100,800 (97, 000) 109,000 11,800 13.500 12,800 14, 500 15.500 16.400 18,100 21.400 24.100 26,000 25,900 27.100 28,600 32,600 34,700 34,800 40, 800 (43,000) 56,200 69,400 68, 800 71.700 69.700 70, 600 71, 000 71, 400 66, 600 64, 500 62,800 63.200 62.200 62,300 57,000 55, 000 55,000 60,000 (54,000) 52,800 14.5 16.4 15.1 17.2 18.0 18.8 20.2 24.3 27.2 29.3 29.1 30.3 31.5 36.4 38.7 38.8 40.5 44.3 51.6 85.5 83.6 84.9 82.8 82.0 81.2 79.8 75.7 72.8 70.7 70.9 69.7 68.5 63.6 61.3 61.2 59.5 55.7 48.4 1926. 1926 *. 1927.. 1928... 1929.. 1930.. 48,830 38,358 10, 472 78.6 21.4 1931. 1932.. 1933.. 1934_ 1935.. 1936.. 1937. 1938. 1939 4 ... 1940. 52,148 58,600 42,986 50,500 9,162 8,100 82.4 86.2 17.6 13.8 1950. 1959 4 . 1960. 71, 000 66,000 5,000 92.9 7.1 1 U.S.S.R. data for 1939 and 1959 are from table 9, below. Data for other years are from Eason, op. cit., appendix tables K-l and K-2, with “discrepancies in derivation” distributed between agricultural and nonagricultural categories in proportion to that implied for 1938 by the 1939 census data. United States data are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, “Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945” (Wash¬ ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 63, and “Statistical Abstract of the United States,” 1960, p. 91. 2 Dates are midyear except census dates. 2 Territory for 1925-39 is Soviet as of early 1939, and for 1940-60, present territory. 4 Census dates. 10 This section of the paper is a somewhat modified version of the corresponding section of a paper by the present author on the Soviet labor force, appearing in Bergson and Kuznets, op. cit., pp. 76-80. THE POPULATION OF THE U.S.S.R. 45 Table 6. —Average annual 'percentage rates of increase of the nonagricultural labor force , selected periods, U.S.S.R., 1926-59 , and United States of America, 1820- 1960 i U.S.S.R.: 1926-39 _ 8 . 7 1940-50 _ . 5 1950-59 _ 3 . 0 1926-34 _ 9 . 2 1934-39 _ 7 . 7 United States of America: 1820-30 _ 3 . 6 1830-40 _ 3 . 9 1840-50 _ 5 . 1 1850-60 _ 4 . 4 1 Derived from data in table 5. United States of America—Con. 1860-70 _ 3.4 1870-80 _ 3 . 8 1880-90 _ 4.3 1890-1900 _ 3 . 1 1900-10 _ 3 . 6 1910-20 _ 1 . 9 1920-30 _ 2 . 2 1930-40 _ 1 . 2 1940-50 _ 1 . 2 1950-60 _ 1.9 (а) The overall rate of increase of the nonagricultural labor force since 1928 appears relatively high, but it shows wide variation among the various subperiods. The rate of increase of 8.7 percent per year between 1928 and 1939 is greater than for any 10-year period in the United States since 1820. On the other hand, the rate of 3 percent per year between 1950 and 1959 is less than in the United States for any decade before about 1910. The increase of only 0.5 percent per year between 1940 and 1950, of course, reflects the war. (б) The percentage distribution of the labor force between agri¬ cultural and nonagricultural occupations has also changed more rapidly than in other countries. Restricting the comparison to countries where the preindustrialization data indicate a proportion of the population in agricultural occupations of 70 percent or more (in 1928 in the Soviet Union it was 82 percent), using 10-year intervals, and beginning with the earliest data available for the other countries, the proportion of the labor force in agricultural occupations declined to below 50 percent in the course of 3 decades in the Soviet Union, but took 4 decades for Sweden, 5 for the United States, 6 for Japan, and 10 for France. 11 (c) Despite the rapid rates of change away from agriculture in overall terms, only during 1930-33, 1936-37, and 1940-50 was there an absolute decline in the agricultural labor force. The first of these periods is associated with the collectivization drive, food shortages, and population losses, and may also reflect the increase in the num¬ ber of children attending primary school. The decline between 1936 and 1937 appears in the collective farm labor force and is largely unexplained, except perhaps by the political events of the time. The decline between 1940 and 1950 is related to the war, and if annual data were available the decline might be restricted to a shorter time period. In the other years, i.e., for 1925-29, 1934-36, 1937-39, and 1950- 59, the absolute change in the agricultural labor force was negligible. This trend during normal years raises some questions as to the forces at work under Soviet conditions in the fulfillment of demands for nonagricultural labor out of agricultural labor reserves. Even allow¬ ing for an increase in cropped plowland of about 20 percent between ii S. Kuznets, “Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations: II. Industrial Distribution of National Product and Labor Force,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, supplement to vol. V, No. 4, July 1957, pp. 82 ff. 46 the population of the u.s.s.r. 1932 and 1937 and 30 percent (on comparable territory) between 1940 and 1959, the fact that the increase in the nonagricultural labor force for most years since 1928 could be provided essentially out of the net increase in the total labor force, does not present the image of an economy sorely pressed to find manpower resources for redistribu¬ tion in the direction of nonagricultural employment. And even after 30 years, including wartime population losses, 48 percent of the total labor force (and 53 percent of the civilian labor force) remains in agricultural employment. The explanation lies essentially in the fact that the proportion of the labor force in agricultural occupations at the start of rapid indus¬ trialization was so high (82 percent). The underlying relationship is, that— for a given rate of growth of the total labor force—the higher the proportion of the labor force in agriculture, the greater can be the percentage increase in the nonagricultural labor force for a given change in the agricultural labor force. Take the case where the total labor force increases by 1.5 percent per year, and the agricultural labor force remains constant. In this case, if we assume for illustrative purposes that the agricultural labor force is, successively, 85, 50, and 15 percent of the total, then the possible percentage increase in the nonagricultural labor force declines sharply: Possible annual 'percentage increase ...... , . , , , , i in nonagricultural Agricultural labor force percent of total: labor force 85 percent_ 10. 0 50 percent_ 3. 0 15 percent_ 1. 7 Thus, in the early years of rapid industrialization (1938-39), even though the total labor force increased slowly (0.5 percent per year), a relatively rapid rate of increase in the nonagricultural labor force took place (8.7 percent per year) with a relatively modest decline in the agricultural labor force (1.8 percent per year). At the present time, when the proportion of the labor force in agriculture is about 50 percent and the total labor force is increasing at about 1.5 percent per year, a much smaller rate of increase of the nonagricultural labor force (3 percent per year) is taking place at the same time that the agricultural labor force is remaining about constant. In the future a rate of increase of 3 percent per year in the non¬ agricultural labor force can be maintained only if there is an absolute decline in the agricultural labor force. (It will be seen that such a decline took place in the United States after about 1910.) If the Soviets intend to maintain the 3-percent rate—a rate that has been in effect, on the average, since 1950 and is projected to 1970 in con¬ nection with the achievement of the first 10 years of the 20-year program of the Communist Party—then the problem of raising labor productivity on the farms, in order to release labor for industry, will become much more serious than it has ever been in the past. Beginning about 1970—when the proportion of the labor force in agricultural occupations drops to 40 percent or less (approximating the United States about 1895)—we can expect the pressures on the Soviets to raise labor productivity through measures increasing the efficiency with which labor is allocated and utilized on the job, to become a matter of the highest priority. THE POPULATION OF THE U.S.S.R. 47 3. The age distribution of the population There are essentially two ways in which the pattern of change in the age distribution of the Soviet population has tended to affect economic development. The first is derived from the persistence of a relatively large propor¬ tion of the population in the working ages—compared to the decline in the proportion that would have taken place if rates of population growth projected in 1928 had taken place. By this shift in age structure, the productive elements in the population have increased in relation to the nonproductive. The result has been to reduce the pressure of consumption on production and to enable a higher rate of investment (nonconsumption) than otherwise would have been the case. The second implication of age distribution for economic growth concerns the immediate postwar period. Certainly the catastrophic losses among the adult population during the war must be regarded first and foremost as an irreparable cost to the cause of economic development and progress, not to mention the cost to humanity. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that in an important sense the purely economic impact of these losses was cushioned by the fact that immediately after the war there moved into the working ages the age cohorts born during the period beginning about 1928. For much of this period, until 1940, the birthrate was high and infant mortality was declining, and the people born at that time, because of their age, were spared some of the special hazards of wartime. As a result, during the period from the war until about 1957, the total labor force increased more rapidly than at any time in the past. This exceptional increase in the labor force after the war—in the form of individuals many of whom had been denied proper education during the war—provided Soviet planners with a substantial reservoir of labor with which to carry out the reconstruction of the economy. It made it possible also to postpone any substantial reforms in policies and practices affecting the efficiency of utilization of manpower. In other words, methods in the manpower field continued to be those developed during the 1930’s, in the context of an abundant supply of labor. It was not until the late 1950’s, with the temporary but sharp decline in the rate of increase of the labor force, due to the entry of the war babies into the working ages, that the Soviet began to give serious attention to reform in manpower policies. Such reform was necessi¬ tated by long-run considerations of effective economic development; but the timing of the reform was not unrelated to the pattern of change in the age distribution of the population. III. Soviet Policies Affecting the Demographic Characteristics of Population Growth As we examine the changes in the pattern of population growth described in section I of this paper, we are necessarily struck with the broad similarity between Soviet experience and that of other indus¬ trializing countries: the declining death rate in response to a broad program of public health and medical care and the dissemination of knowledge; and the declining birth rate, reflecting deliberate family planning, apparently in response to changing attitudes brought about by urbanization, education, and related economic and social pressures. 48 THE POPULATION OF THE U.S.S.R. It is probably correct to say that Soviet experience, although resembling that of other countries in broad outline, has been telescoped in time. The death rate fell rapidly after World War II in response to a substantial program designed with this objective in mind. And the birthrate has declined more rapidly than in some other countries because the transformation of institutions, the development of mass education—in short, the industrialization of the country—has taken place more rapidly. It is unfortunate that most of what we are able to say about the effects of economic and social change on the pattern of Soviet popu¬ lation growth must be by analogy with other developing countries. The Soviets have given us very little in the way of substantial analysis of the factors affecting population change in their society. It is true that there is considerable discussion in the Soviet literature of the “socialist law of population”; and there is some expectation that in future years Soviet demographers will attempt to formulate such a “law” on a comprehensive scale, solidly anchored in reliable statistics. Up to the present time, however, discussions of the “law” have almost nothing to say, for example, about the reasons for the decline in the birth rate. The discussions are confined to (1) the decline in mortality rates, especially infant mortality, (2) the results of efforts to educate the population and to raise the quality of the labor force, and (3) the existence of conditions of full employment and the “right to work.” It is a discussion, for the most part, of those developments under the broad heading of “population” that can be clearly traced to State policies and programs. Certainly these are important achievements, directly linked to some of the unique characteristics of the Soviet system, based on the centralized planning of economic development and embodying a scale of values which looks toward the ultimate satisfaction of all material needs. But questions of education and full employment comprise a “population problem” only in the broadest sense of the term. In the end we are left with the fact that the most interesting, and, in a sense, the most important, question of a narrowly demo¬ graphic nature is left unanswered in the Soviet literature; namely, how the pattern of fertility under Soviet industrialization is to be explained. In the absence of a uniquely Soviet explanation for what has happened, we are left to conclude that the birth rate has declined for essentially the same combination of reasons found in other develop¬ ing countries. But if the Soviets have not offered their own analysis of basic demographic phenomena, can we also say that there is nothing that can be called a Soviet population policy? Is there not a set of prin¬ ciples, laws, regulations, etc., designed in particular to influence fertility rates? The answer is that there are policies—and practices receiving Government support—which obviously affect fertility rates. Can we say that these policies and practices taken together form a con¬ sistent set of principles designed to affect fertility? (1) On the one hand, there is a continuing program to give financial and other support to mothers with many children, and also to bring THE POPULATION OF THE U.S.S.R. 49 them social recognition. One objective of this program is to encourage parents to have more children. On the other hand, contraceptive devices are readily available in drugstores. They are inexpensive— and the quality is not high by the best U.S. standards—but they are made available to those who desire to limit the size of families. (2) On the one hand, Soviet leaders call for the rapid increase of the population of the country, and Soviet planning provides for assist¬ ance in the form of nurseries, etc., to mothers who would have children and still participate in the labor force. On the other hand, free abortions are provided in state clinics; and although the objective of the reintroduction of this program a few years ago was to curtail the harmful effects of illegal abortions, nevertheless it is well known that abortions provide a major means of contraception to Soviet families. (3) On the one hand, Soviet demographers and other strongly criticize so-called neo-Malthusians in the West who propose that edu¬ cation for birth control be introduced in underdeveloped countries as a means for solving the “population dilemma’’ (whereby high rates of growth of the population and changes in age distribution operate to confound attempts to raise per capita productivity). On the other hand, it is alleged to be the major premise of the Soviet approach to population problems in their own country, to let the family decide how many children to have and to provide families with alternative means according to their decision. Two questions follow: How can we explain the contradictions in present policies? Can we expect a more consistent policy to emerge in the future? The answer to the first question is that, in a sense, what we have just summarized is not as contradictory as it may sound at first reading. The final principle set forth in the summary is really a central idea to which all the other considerations can be logically related. That is, if the family is really accepted as the decisionmaking unit—- subject to indirect, but not particularly overpowering, influences— then encouragement and financial support to mothers with many chil¬ dren; the availability of abortions and contraceptive devices; and the provision of nurseries, etc., are all means to carry out the decision made by the family. Even the argument against the neo-Malthusians can be construed as an argument to let the family make up its own mind— according to its own traditions, etc.—without being “educated” one way or another, particularly by outsiders. The only difficulty with concluding that the Soviets really have something like an internally consistent population policy after all is that the Soviets do not present it as such and with any degree of elaboration. All of the parts of the “policy” are present as we have summarized them, but the common, unifying theme of the “family” is not stressed or elaborated in the Soviet literature—probably because of the desire to stress “social” factors. 50 THE POPULATION OF THE U.S.S.R. If we accept the idea that the Soviets really have a consistent popu¬ lation policy after all, then the second question really becomes this: Can we expect policy in the future to be oriented toward a specific objective; for example, toward increasing fertility rates? Probably not, in the sense of bringing substantial pressure—not to mention controls—to bear in order to achieve the objective. One can foresee, that—as housing and other conditions permit parents to care ade¬ quately for more children and as the possibilities for developing the country as a whole become more real and immediate—Soviet families will be encouraged to have more children. Financial and other sup¬ port in this direction may also be strengthened. But that the Soviets will institute a system of controls designed to carry out a positive policy of population expansion, seems, at this juncture, to be un¬ likely. o UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS-URBANA 0112 061971500 3 0112 027595872