^'■^ IT* A^^^'V..' y / ]{EFORM IN PARLIAfflNTARY BUSINESS. WILLIAM RATHBONE, M.P. 'Bcprinfed from the Fortnightly Review, by permission of the Prop7'ietors, for private circulation among Members of Parliament. LONDON : CHAPMAN & HALL, Limited, )1. HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, W.C 1881 REFOM m PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS. Amid the excitement caused by the condition of Ireland, by the complications of the Eastern Question, and by the critical state of affairs in Afghanistan and Africa, it may be difficult to induce men to give their attention to the necessity of amending the machinery and procedure of our Government and Legislature. But the attempt ought to be made ; and, for several reasons, I think it ought to be made now. The experience of late years sufficiently proves that it would be impossible for this Parliament to do the work which the country expects from it, unless the House of Commons increases its capacity for work, and diminishes opportunities for obstruction. Except the Extension of the County Franchise, which, on constitutional grounds, may have to be postponed tcf the eve of dissolution, there are no questions of serious constitutional change impending ; and the first working session of a new Parliament affords the best chance of obtaining amendment in matters, not sensational, but affecting vitally the welfare of the country. No thoughtful observer can doubt that, at this moment, the agricultural, manufacturing, financial, and consequently also political position of the country is in grave question, not to say peril. Our agriculture will require every practical amendment of the law, and of those habits which are fostered by law, to enable our farmers to compete successfully with America and other foreign countries. The severe competition to which our manufacturing industry is subjected renders it necessary that laws affecting the relations of labour to capital, or the health, comfort, and well-being of our working classes, should receive the most careful consideration ; while £20,000,000 of loss is infiicted annually upon the country by insolvency, much of which is due to defective bankruptcy legislation, which Parliament Las for years admitted, but found no time efficiently to revise. The diminishing respect felt in this country for the House of Commons is in itself evidence of the necessity for a better organization of the workers, and more methodical arrangement and division of the work to be done. And it would be unfair to deny that the failure of the late Government to carry even purely administrative reforms is in some degree to be attributed to the defects of our Departmental and REFOEM IN PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS. Parliamentary arrangements. Yet we go on leaving unchanged Departmental arrangements and forms of Parliamentary procedure, which might be suitable and adequate in a feudal or semi-barbarous time, but are utterly inadequate and insufficient to deal with the complicated wants of modern civilisation and the demands now made alike on the Executive and the Legislature. The House of Commons exercises a strange fascination on its members. In its atmosphere, after only a few years, extreme Radicals are apt to become idolaters of every effete custom, and to fight with passion for forms of power which practically deprive them of the reality of it. In the words of Sir T. Erskine May, " The true faith has not been unmixed with idolatry ; and to discontinue an old form was to cast down an idol."^ I have sat on the Committees on the business {i.e. the procedure) of the House of Commons during the last two Parliaments, and have seen the accustomed attitudes of men abso- lutely reversed. Speakers and officers of the House, and old and experienced Conservative Ministers, who might in these matters also have been expected to be Conservative, advocated alterations, which, on the other hand, were opposed by extreme men on both sides of the House, in whom the innate Conservatism of the British mind seemed to have concentrated itself on the defence of obsolete formalities. To the present House of Commons we may fairly look to remedy this state of things. It has been chosen under circumstances which should make it one of the most powerful instruments for safe, useful, and well-considered legislation we can ever hope to have. It was elected in an outburst of national feeling which led the country to choose as its representatives those in whose judgment it had con- fidence, without subjecting them to special tests which the electors patriotically kept in the background. It is a much more educated Parliament than the last. It contains a larger number than usual of clever men, of Liberal county members, and of practical men of all sorts, chosen, not for their wealth, but for their ability and principles — men, too, whose sense of the evils of the present system is not deadened by usage ; yet, if it be objected that these new members are deficient in experience, I reply that the wisest and most experienced authorities, such as the present and past Speakers, some Ministers of the Crown, and Sir Erskine May, agree with these new men who have come fresh from the people, who have to work our laws and feel their effects. Authority within and experience without alike assert the necessity for change. It must be apparent to any unprejudiced observer who has watched closely the conduct of the business of the country and of Parliament for many years past, that the relative importance of the (1) Edihburgh JRevieiv, vol. xcix. (1854), page 246. <<* ^ \ REFORM IN PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS. 5 different departments of State has materially changed even in the present century — that the arrangements of Parliament for transacting the business of the country are now unsuitable or inadequate to the work to be performed, and that there is consequently much waste of the time and of the power both of the Executive Government and of the Legislature. It could not be otherwise. Owing to the enormous increase that has taken place in the amount and variety of the duties expected from the Executive and from Parliament, no organization of the public departments (whether in respect to their strength or their relative importance), no forms of Parliamentary procedure which were adapted to the needs of the country even a few years ago, could fail to be inadequate now. To effect economy of time and increase of power by promptly removing the most obvious of these defects seems to me to be one of the most pressing objects which can occupy our attention. Improved arrangements are needed in order to prepare the way for the great measures that will come before the present Parliament. A new Parliament, in which a strong Government is supported by a powerful majority, made wise by recent lessons, is eminently capable of introducing the changes needed in the Executive, in its own procedure, and in the distribu- tion of duties between the Central and Local Governments. It would be impossible within the limits of this articla to attempt to consider the waste of power and the other evils, administrative as well as legislative, which result from adherence to antiquated and imperfect arrangements. The Ministry, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons sin and suffer alike in this respect. The great administrative departments of the State should be equal in pay and in dignity, so that men should be placed or removed solely with regard to their experience and fitness for the several departments, subject to no embarrassing considerations of dignity or promotion. If the sense of responsibility of the House of Lords were increased, so that it might be induced to debate the provisions of Bills, and not merely, as now, their principles, it might again worthily take its position as an effective and useful branch of the Legislature. But the most pressing question at present is how to improve the forms of procedure of the House of Commons. As representing more directly the people, it has appropriated to itself most of the work of legislation and much of the control and direction of the Executive Government, and yet has failed to make such arrangements as would enable it to perform efficiently, or even creditably, the duties thus undertaken. I therefore propose to confine this article I to the consideration of the duties and work of the House of Commons, I and of the suggestions that have been made for relieving it of some i of its work, and enabling it to do the remainder more creditably. i The House of Commons is the model on which most representative b REFORM IN PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS. assemblies have been formed ; and it would be mortifying if, from any want of care to adapt its procedure and forms to tlie work wbicb it has to do, it should fail worthily to fill that proud position. But, unfortunately, respect for the House of Commons is declining, and Acts of Parliament are constantly and severely criticised in no flattering terms, not only by the public, but by the judges who have to administer them. Moreover, the proceedings of the House are less fully and carefully reported in the newspapers, because those caterers for the public find that the debates excite less interest and are less read than was once the case. Even Members of Parliament hardly realise the vast increase which has taken place in its work. In former days they had to grant supplies for a population far less numerous and less wealthy than now, and to pass or amend compara- tively few Bills, such as were necessary for the simpler wants and the less extended Empire of the nation. Now they enact innume- rable Private Bills for railways and other undertakings, for dealing with the complicated modern requirements of Local Government, for the health and education of our people and for the regulation of their labour — work either altogether new or left formerly to individual action. Even as far back as 1854, Sir T. Erskine May mentions that there were no less than 30, 32, and even 33 Committees sitting on the same day for four or five hours in the morning, in which upwards of 200 members were engaged.^ Our colonies are extend- ing in all directions, and the affairs of India, which formerly came under the consideration of the House of Commons only on the renewal of the East India Company's Charter, are now directly under the control of the Imperial Government, and come annually before Parliament. The people, through their newspapers, are now so much better acquainted with foreign affairs than formerly that they have learnt to interfere actively in their conduct, and force on the Executive, through the House of Commons, questions and discussions on the Foreign Policy of the country ; and all this is in addition to the greatly increased call for public legislation which naturally arises from the active interest now taken by the bulk of the nation in politics. During the last Session of Parliament the questions addressed to Ministers, which precede the regular business of the day, often absorbed much of the most valuable time before dinner. Much of this increased work is ill done or is not done at all. The business accumulates, and, as the end of the Session approaches, the result of accumulated delays becomes conspicuous, and, in the words of Sir Erskine May : — " The Bills which have thus accumulated are either hurried through, at last, without proper consideration, and sent up, in the last fortnight, to the Lords, (1) Edinhnrgh Beview, vol. xcix. (1854), page 252. REFORM IN PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS. 7 who had been sitting for months with folded arms, or, after having occupied much time, and given occasion to numerous debates, are ultimately abandoned . . . and less vigihmce is exercised in controlling public expenditure than is devoted to the scrutiny of a Private Bill." Nothing exemplifies more clearly the evils of the present system than the method now adopted in drawing Bills. It will, I suppose, be admitted by every one that an Act of Parliament ought to be simple, precise, and easily understood by those who are to interpret or obey it. But instead of this clearness and simplicity being the primary object of the draftsman, it has become a necessary art so to draw Bills as to afibrd as little opportunity as possible for the insertion of amendments, often ill-considered and inconsistent, which destroy the very object sought for. Bills as drawn now do not state clearly on the face of them the full meaning of the law, but leave that to be gathered by reference to existing Acts of Parliament. To understand them it is, therefore, necessary to have a law library at one's elbow. And yet these are the laws which are to be executed by a busy and untrained magistracy, who are not professional lawyers, and to be understood and obeyed by the hard-working citizens of this busy country. *' The political difficulties of legislation in a popular assembly are sufficiently great ; but when to these are added a defective organization, ah insufficient division of labour, and indefinite facilities for obstructive debate, they can only be overcome by such struggles and sacrifices as ought not to be exacted of those who devote themselves to the public service." Surely it is worth while making some attempt to adapt our legisla- tive machinery to the increased wants of the country, to relieve the House of Commons of some of its work, and, by improved method and a better division of labour, to put it in a position wisely to govern this great, wealthy, and industrious country, and to regulate the affairs of its vast empire. The business of the House of Commons is to grant supplies, to discuss public measures so as to prepare for legislation, to legislate, to debate questions of foreign and other policy so as to enlighten the public, and to control, and, if necessary, practically dismiss the Executive Government. The remedies for the evils which impede its exercise of these important duties may be found in four direc- tions : — 1. The House may be relieved of some of its work. 2. The form of legislation may be improved by methods of drafting and revising Bills. 3. Improvements may be introduced in the forms and pro- cedure of the House in discussing and passing Bills. 8 REFORM IN PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS. 4. The rules of debate may be amended so as to prevent un- necessary loss of time. First. — If tbe House were relieved of the Private Bill work done by its Committees at present, not only would that work be far less expensively and more efficiently done, but the powers of the House and the time of its members would be set free to do its public work far better and more carefully than it is performed at present. The Private Bill business of the House is enormously expensive to the country, and anything but satisfactory in its results. Again, in the words of Sir Erskine May : — • ' There are already too many Committees — they have too much to do — of necessity they do a great part of their business very ill. . . . No judicial training or experience, no special aptitude for business, or familiarity with the matters on which they are about to adjudicate, are expected of any member of the Committee, except perhaps the Chairman." The results are too notorious to require much exemplification. Absolute uncertainty as to what the decision of a Committee may be, constant conflict of decisions by different Committees, and on the same Bill, between Committees of the House of Commons and the House of Lords, immense increase of expenses and discouragement of useful enterprise, are the constant and inevitable results of the present system. ' ' We have been assured by an eminent railway engineer that the following conflict of decisions, upon the leading principles of railway legislation, actually occurred in a single week. The question to be tried by four different Com- mittees, sitting at the same time and in adjoining rooms, was this : — Which of two rival lines is to bo preferred — the shortest and most direct, or the more circuitous, which accommodates a larger population, more towns, and a greater traffic ? The first Committee preferred the shortest line ; the second, the more circuitous ; the third would sanction neither of the lines ; and the fourth decided in favour of both. And this anecdote, however exaggerated it may be, serves to illustrate one of the chief evils of the existing system. The Committees may be individually just ; but how is it possible for them to carry out any uniform principle of legislation ? " The work done by Private Bill Committees on Railway, Gas, Water Bills, &c., could be far better done by practised com- missioners, who might be sent down to the locality interested. The enormous expense now incurred by bringing great numbers of witnesses up to London would thus be saved. The House might still, if it pleased, reserve to itself the power of rejecting, on third reading. Bills thus reported upon ; but, as it would, of course, lay down beforehand the principles on which inquiries should proceed, and as the decisions of the commissioners would be far more consistent and REFORM IN PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS. 9 uniform than is possible under the present system, the necessity for such interference would be extremely rare. The evils arising from our present system of Private Bill legisla- tion would have been much greater but for the vigilance exercised by the Chairmen of Committees in the House of Commons, by Mr. Hickards, the Counsel to the Speaker, and by Lord Redesdale, in the House of Lords ; but even their vigilance cannot prevent occasional objectionable legislation, and, on the other hand, Lord Redesdale's intense Conservatism at times prevents much needed improvements. When Local Governing Bodies shall have been consolidated, im- proved, and strengthened, as they no doubt will during the present Parliament, the House might lay down general principles upon which Private Bill legislation should proceed, and leave the appli- cation of these principles to Local Bodies. Here again ultimate control might be retained by the House of Commons by an extension of the system of Provisional Orders in regard to such questions. Second. — Our legislation might be very much improved by a better system of drafting and revising amendments, and of revising Bills after they have been amended. Great improvements in the drafting of Bills have been introduced by Sir Henry Thring and others ; but, even in this respect, much requires to be done. In Sir Henry Thring the Government have had for many years a man apparently made of cast-steel, whose enthusiasm for his work no amount of over-work or discouragement can extinguish. He has been ably seconded by his assistants, but three or four Sir Henry Thrings would be required to do efficiently the work which he has or ought to have to do ; and to obtain the service of such men they ought, in dignity, position, and emolument, to be placed at least on a level with the judges who have to administer the laws of which the draftsmen are the artificers. The kind of ability necessary to enable a man to draft laws as Sir H. Thring drafts them is far rarer than the capacity required to qualify an ordinary judge to administer them. The staff of the drafting department should be sufficiently strong to enable it to revise amendments proposed, and Bills when amended, so that they shall not become, as they too often do, utter nonsense, or, still worse, increase the evils they are intended to abate. To draft a Bill, or amendments in it, properly, it is necessary to consider, not only the context of the Bill itself, but also the rest of the law, whether contained in statutes or in cases, which bears upon the subject. This may seem a truism, but it is habitually dis- regarded in our legislation. The evidence before the Committee of 1857 goes very fully into this question, and any one who will refer to that evidence will not fail to realise the importance and difficulty of the subject. Unfortunately the Committee, in view of the impending dissolution, made no formal report, but merely reported the evidence. 10 REFORM IN PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS. We cannot expect our legislation to be consistent, effectual, or comprehensible until tbe drafting department of the Government is so organized and strengthened that it may be able to revise amend- ments proposed, and advise their proposers thereon, besides revising Bills after they have passed through Committee and been dealt with on report. Since I became a member of the House I never willinglr proposed an amendment of importance without having it first con- sidered by an able lawyer and draftsman as to its effect both upon the Bill and the existing law ; and experience has confirmed my opinion that our legislation must be blundering, confused, aad obscure until some provision be made for such professional advice and revision. I venture, moreover, to think that the time of ihe House of Commons would be largely saved, its legislation improved, and its dignity better secured, if, instead of having, as now, the draftsman of important Bills seated under the gallery, and the Minister in charge of the measure running every few minutes to consult him as to the effect of amendments proposed, while some member, or one of his colleagues, speaks against time to enable him to do so, the draftsman of the Bill were so far made an officer of the House as to be allowed during the passage of the Bill a seat at its table. He could thus advise those in charge of the Bill whether amendments proposed by private members were consistent with other parts of it or with the existing law which the Bill did not propose to repeal, or what, having regard to the existing law, would be the effect of such amendments. Third. — Several improvements in the forms of procedure have been suggested by those who have had most experience, and, in some cases, have been recommended by repeated resolutions of Committees appointed to report upon the business of the House. But, before mentioning them, it may be well to state the forms through which an ordinary Act of Parliament has to go before it passes the House of Commons. Leave has first to be obtained to introduce it, and it has to be read a first time ; but these are generally mere formal stages which are rarely opposed. Then comes the second reading, the stage at which it is generally understood that the principles of a measure should be discussed; but lor some years a custom has sprung up of debating these principles over again on the motion for going into Committee. This is sometimes a convenience as shorten- ing the debate on second reading ; but on the whole, I believe, it has been found that this practice not only wastes much of the time of the House, but, by spreading the discussion on the principles of a measure over two debates, makes it less complete and thorough. Then comes the Committee stage, when the Bill has either to go through Committee of the whole House, and be read clause by clause in order that amendments may, if necessary, be made, or to be first REFOKM IN PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS. 11 sent to a Select Committee. In this latter case it has still to pass through a Committee of the whole House, however thorough and satisfactory the work of the Select Committee may have been. When Bills are in Committee any Member may speak any number of times upon the same amendment. After it has passed through Committee the Bill is brought up on report, when it again is competent for any Member to move amendments on any clause ; but he can only speak once on the same amendment. Lastly, the Bill has to be read a third time and passed. Even at this stage full discussion may take place, and the Bill, or any part of it, may be referred back to Committee for amendment, or it may be rejected altogether. Now if the House really did what it professes to do, these forms would seem very complete for insuring at any rate careful legisla- tion. But the House does not and cannot do this ; and the only effect of the attempt to make the whole House carry every Bill through all these stages is that the greater part of the work is un- satisfactorily and ill done. Sir Erskine May, in giving evidence before the Select Committee of 1878, was asked the following question : — " If the House could be got into the habit of doing a quantity of its practical work by those Committees (Grand Committees or Select Committees, instead of by Committees of the whole House), would it not leave much more time than is available at the present for discussing those questions which the House reserves more especially for its own charge; and would not those Bills be turned out in a much more complete and workable form than they are now ? " To which he replied : — " That has been the ground on which I have ventured, on former occasions, to suggest some such system as a division of labour. I think it is a misfortune that the whole House, which is a very large body indeed, should be occupied in the discussion of every provision of every single Bill. There are certain classes of Bills which must be reserved for the consideration of the House itself, either as a House or as a Committee of the whole House ; but I should say that three-fourths of the Bills that come before Parliament, and certainly more than three-fourths of the Bills that are brought in by independent members, might be better discussed by such a Committee as I have sug- gested." 1 Most Bills, except a few of the principal measures in each Session, have to be hurried through Committee often in the early hours of the morning when few Members are present to attend to them ; and, while they are passing through Committee, their value is often destroyed by amendments suddenly suggested by Members coming in perhaps in the midst of the debate, who do not understand the subject, but propose amendments which occur to them on the spur of (1) Sehct Committee on Public Business (Parliamentary Paper 268 of 1878), pHge 25, Question 232, 12 REFORM IN PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS. the moment. Such amendments are sometimes hurriedly adopted by those in charge of the Bill to avoid provoking discussion which would be fatal to the progress of the measure in that Session. Sir Erskine May has proposed, that in place of carrying all Bills through Committee of the whole House, certain of them should be referred to Grand Committees selected from the House. He stated, in 1854, in the article from which I have already repeatedly quoted, his views on this point so clearly that I shall simply transcribe them : — *' The organization of such a plan might be attempted in the following manner : — The House should be divided into six Grand Committees, consisting of about 110 Members each, to whom would be added 15 or 20 Ministers and other leading Members, who would be nominated to serve upon all the Grand Committees. The Members would be distributed by a Committee of Selection, 8 abject to approval by the House, in such a manner as to secure an equal representation of political parties, interest, and classes in all the Committees ; and, at the same time, to maintain in each a preponderance of Members more particularly conversant with its peculiar department of business. Thus, the Grand Committee for Trade would comprise a large proportion of merchants and of the representatives of commercial constituencies ; and the Committee for Courts of Justice an ample complement of ' gentlemen of the long robe.' The constitution and functions of these several Committees would be different ; but all would be political representatives of the larger body from which they are drawn, and little Parliaments, as it were, in themselves. The province of one would probably be religion and ecclesiastical affairs ; of another, law and courts of justice ; of a third, trade, shipping, and manufactures ; of a fourth, local taxation and administration ; of a fifth. Colonial and Indian possessions ; and of a sixth, education and general purposes. " The first function of these Committees would be to consider the provisions of every Public Bill referred to them; and for that purpose their proceedings would be assimilated to those of a Committee of the whole House. Each Com- mittee should have assigned to it a chamber, arranged so as to admit of the distribution of parties, and to afford facilities for debate. It would be a novel experiment to admit the public and reporters to the deliberations of a Com- mittee ; but this would be an essential part of the proposed plan. The main object in view is to invest the deliberations of these Committees with as much importance as possible, and to delegate to them the discussion and, as far as possible, the decision of questions which now devolve wholly on the House. If this could be accomplished the labours of the House would be, to that extent, diminished. Perhaps the number of days in the week on which the House would sit might be diminished ; at all events, the length of the sittings might be curtailed, and the two or three hours after midnight, which now inflict so much fatigue and inconvenience upon busy Members, might be often spared. The tendency of such an arrangement would be to make the House a Court of Appeal, as it were, from its Grand Committees, rather than a Court of Primary Jurisdiction, in all legislative matters, as it is at present. It would determine the questions fit to be referred to its Committees, and would revise their decisions REFORM IN PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS. 13 if necessary, instead of undertaking to settle the details, as well as resolving the principles of all legislation. *• Other incidental advantages may be anticipated from the reference of Bills to Grand Committees. At present, the discussion of the clauses of a Bill is regarded, by the majority of Members, as a wearisome interruption to the more proper business of the House. Few Members take part in it ; and those who attend are impatient to proceed to other matters in which they are more interested. The Bills are, therefore, hastily amended, while Members who would be competent to assist in their revision meet with little encouragement in offering suggestions to an impatient audience. In a Grand Committee, whose deliberations offered no impediment to the j)rogress of business in the House, and whose proper duty it was to discuss the clauses of a Bill, a more careful revision of them might reasonably be expected. The majority of the Members would, probably, be interested in the subject of discussion ; and those who desired to offer their opinions would be heard without impatience. " A Grand Committee, indeed, would be an admirable school for Members, in which many excellent men of business, who are rarely heard in the House itself, would be able to render efficient service and to gain distinction for themselves by their knowledge and practical judgment. In each Grand Com- mittee the Government would be represented by its official Members who had charge of any Bill and by independent Members co-operating with them ; and the Opposition and other parties would have equal opportunities of advancing their own opinions. If their debates were published the public would also be fully informed of their proceedings and prepared to influence the ultimate decision of the House when their report should come under consideration. "The quorum of these Committees need not exceed 20, or at the utmost 25, which would be sufficient for the transaction of ordinary business, while questions of importance would attract a full attendance of Members. Their sittings might be conveniently held in the largest of the new Committee rooms, which could be fitted up for their accommodation, and, if necessary, enlarged by an encroachment upon adjoining rooms, many of which are of unnecessary dimensions. They would sit on certain days of the week in the morning, and, like other Committees, adjourn on the assembling of the House. ** It can scarcely be objected that a Grand Committee would be too limited to represent with fairness the general sentiments of the House so long as 40 Members out of 654 are held to be sufficient for all purposes of legislation. Nay, by the present rules of the House, even 20 Members, though opposed by 19, may bind the whole House to an irrevocable vote; nor, in less exceptional cases, does the final judgment of the House depend upon the aggregate numbers in a division. For example, in the last Session, Lord Robert Grosvenor's Attorneys' Certificate Duty Bill had been brought in by a considerable majority in a House consisting of 391 Members ; it was rejected on the second reading in a House of 293 Members only. And again, the fate of the Advertisement Duty affords a still more striking instance of the reversal of decisions by smaller numbers than those by which they were originally agreed to. On the 14th April, after one of the best speeches of the Session, Mr. Milner Gibson carried a resolution for the repeal of the Advertisement Duty in a full House of 374 Members (the respective numbers being 202 and 171). The Chancellor of the Exchequer, however, at a subsequent period, instead of adopting this vote as the expression of the will of the House, proposed a 14 REFORM IN PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS. reduction of the duty from eighteenpence to sixpence. This compromise was not accepted by Mr. Milner Gibson and his friends ; and on the 1st July the battle was renewed. The Government at first succeeded in carrying their pro- position by a majority of 10 only in a House of 213 (the numbers being 111 and 101), and reversed, for a time, the previous decision of 374 Members. Their triumph was brief. It was the night of a State ball at Buckingham Palace. The supporters of the Government hastened from the division lobby to the ball- room ; while their sturdier opponents, resolute of purpose and not much given to dancing — even if invited to dance — continued the fight in a thin House of 136 Members. It was now too late to rescind the previous vote directly ; but, being well skilled in fence, they succeeded in affirming by a majority of 9 (the numbers being 72 and 63) that the future Advertisement Duty should be £0 Os. Od ! After much consideration, the Government resolved not to disturb this determination ; and we are indebted to 72 Members and a Queen's ball for our present complete exemption from a tax, which nearly one-third of the House had previously failed in repealing. The luckless attorneys were the only class who suff'ered in this contest : for Mr. Gladstone, in surrendering the sixpence on advertisements, begged hard for the Certificate Duty as an equivalent ; and for this sixpence the opponents of ' taxes on knowledge ' con- sented to the sacrifice of their legal friends. " On numerous occasions, in every session, the Members present at a division are considerably less than 100, and a division with so many as 300 is comparatively rare. To refer again to the last Session for examples : out of 257 divisions there were 20 of less than 100 Members, 142 of more than 100 and less than 200, 53 of more than 200 and less than 300, and 39 only exceeding 300. The average number present in all the divisions was 201. *' In the presence of these statistics it will hardly be contended that Grand Committees will aff'ord an inadequate representation of the whole body of Members. In the House nothing can be more irregular and capricious than the attendance of Members, even when great questions are to be decided without further appeal, and it is notorious that the House is occasionally liable to clandestine surprises and ambuscades. The Grand Committees might pos- sibly be exposed to similar irregularities, but every vote would be open to revision by the House, and their minutes of proceedings and division lists would show how far they had paid attention to their duties and were entitled to support. " If the experiment of Grand Committees should prove successful in the case of Bills it might be extended to other descriptions of business with equal if not greater advantage. Bills relating to religion or trade, for instance, which are now required to originate in a Committee of the whole House, as well as other Bills, might conveniently be initiated in these Committees, by which means the House would be relieved of many preliminary discussions. With what alacrity would the House refer the questions of Maynooth and the Nunneries to the Grand Committee of Religion, how gladly consign intricate questions of law reform to the Grand Committee on Law and Courts of Justice. And while much pressure might thus be transferred from the House, many Members would have an opportunity of submitting their motions to Grand Committees who now wait hopelessly for a hearing in the House itself. " Care would naturally be taken to prevent Committees from withholding any matters from the consideration of the House. They would merely decide upon questions specifically referred to them, and their votes would be subject REFORM IN PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS. 15 to reversal. Nor would ministerial responsibility be diminished by this system. If the Committees were taken indiscriminately from the body of the House, the Government for the time being would ordinarily have a majority in each Committee, and if occasionally outvoted there, would assemble their forces in the House and refuse to adopt the report of the Committee." Again, in 1878, after 24 j^ears* additional experience as Clerk of the House of Commons, Sir T. Erskine May repeated, in his evidence before tlie Committee of tlie House of Commons on the business of the House, his recommendation of that system, and stated, in reply to Lord Hartington, that his plan might certainly be tried gradually.^ Another practical suggestion has been made which might, with great advantage, be applied to all measures not involving party considerations. The Committee of 1861 recommended : — ** That when a Public Bill has been committed to a Select Committee and reported to the House, the Bill, as amended, shall be appointed for considera- tion on a future day ; when, unless the House shall order the Bill generally or specially in respect to any particular clause or clauses thereof to be re-com- mitted to a Committee of the whole House, the Bill, after the consideration of the Eeport, may be ordered to be read a third time." ^ While the Committee of 1878, on page iii. of their Report, say :— ' * A proposal has also been considered by your Committee to the effect that Bills which have been referred to a Committee upstairs should not in all cases be re-committed to a Committee of the whole House. It does not appear to your Committee to be necessary to make any new order for the purpose of enabling the House to exercise its undoubted right of negativing or omitting the stage of Committee on a Bill in any case in which it may think it desirable to do so ; but they are of opinion that the 23i'actice may be conveniently reverted to in the case of Consolidation Bills, and of some others, after they have been examined by a Select Committee." ■ This recommendation was made on the authority of Sir John Pakington, who, I believe, originally proposed it, of two Speakers, of Sir T. Erskine May, and of other distinguished authorities. Both these suggestions are for the revival of old customs. Not only would they practically improve our legislation, but, in adopting them, the House would in no way part with any practical power. Bills could still be referred to Committees of the whole House, if thought desirable, and, even if this were not done, any Member would have power, on the Report, to move any amendment he might wish. By surrendering what is practically an empty form, the (1) Select Committee on PubHc Business (Parliamentary Paper 268 of 1878), page 26, question 242. (2) Select Committee. Business of the House (Parliamentary Paper 173 of 1861). Page 12. (3) Select Committee. Public Business (ParHamentarv Paper 268 of 1878), paffe iii. 16 REFORM IN PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS. House would secure mucli more time to attend to those measures of primary importance, the details of which it is desirable should be considered in Committee of the whole House ; while other measures, which are now hurried through Committee, would receive the careful attention of Members experienced and interested in the subjects dealt with. Nothing but the fanatical idolatry of obsolete forms, to which I have previously referred, could have prevented such prac- tical suggestions from being adopted years ago. Even if the House insists on retaining its Private Bill business, such arrangements would undoubtedly lighten and improve its labours ; but, of course, if it relieves itself of part of its Private Bill business, it would have still more time to devote to such Committees, and the work of legis- lation would be very different and very superior to what it is now. It has also been proposed that certain kinds of measures should be referred to Joint Committees of the two Houses. This course, which saves time and prevents work being done twice over, has been occasion- ally adopted, but by no means so often as would be advantageous. Another very important suggestion has been made with a view to improving our legislation. It has been proposed that on very difficult and intricate questions, the House should in the first instance proceed, as it has occasionally done with admirable effect, by resolu- tion. In the adoption of such a course, the Ministry would embody in resolutions, instead of in a Bill, the principles which they would be held responsible for proposing, and the resolutions should be so drawn as to furnish an outline of the main features of legislation on which they invite discussion. The information elicited in debate on the resolutions from Members practically acquainted with the details of the subject would be in the hands of the Ministers and of the draftsmen instructed by them before instead of after the drawing of the BiU. These resolutions not being confined entirely to the principles of the measure, but extended to the main features of the practical mode in which it was intended to carry out those principles, it has been further suggested that the discussion on the resolutions might to a certain extent be made to take the place of discussion in Committee, and the Minister and draftsman might then have the responsibility thrown upon them of carrying out the intention of the House of Commons in a clear and consistent form. I believe the suggestion originally came from Mr. J. Stuart Mill that the House should have the power, at the request of the Ministry, to vote a Bill as a whole, safeguards being provided against hasty legislation. The vote to deal with a Bill by such a method would be taken on first reading, when the question would be debated fully and public attention drawn to it, and the details criticised. Suggestions would be made to the Minister in charge of the Bill by Members of the House of Commons, both durinsr and after debate. After a reasonable REFORM IN PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS. 17 time for making such suggestions had elapsed, the Minister would reprint the Bill in the form in which he intended finally to take the sense of the House upon it ; and, after it had been debated and approved of on second reading and left for a further time before the House and the country, the Bill would be read a third time and passed on the responsibility of the Minister as to its being consistent in form and in harmony with other legislation. This arrangement is advocated on the grounds that it would prolong the time devoted by the country and the House to the consideration of a measure, and give the country more opportunity of expressing an opinion upon its provisions, which are now often so altered at the last moment that no opportunity is given for doing so. It would diminish the time actually spent by Parliament in passing it, for, though a longer time would elapse between the introduction and final passing of a measure, this would be secured, not by prolonging the debates, but by prolonging the intervals between the stages. It would leave on the Government the undivided responsibility of details, which the House, as a whole, cannot effectually deal with, while the Govern- ment would not lose the benefit of the advice of individual Members as to details, as they would communicate their opinions and sugges- tions personally and directly to the Government during the intervals between the first and second reading, when the Government were revising the details, before going for the second reading. On such a subject as the Licensing Laws this course would facilitate wise legis- lation. The Bills would not be drawn on vague ideas of what the country or the House wanted, for the discussion on the resolution would have brought a vast amount of practical intelligence to bear upon the question, and would have given to those who have to draw the Bills immense assistance in coming to a practical and consistent conclusion. This, again, is a recurrence to old and very wise principles of procedure. It has been further suggested that where a Bill has passed one House of Parliament, but has not, for want of time, been properly discussed in the other House, it should be taken up, in the following Session, at the stage at which it was left. It is not likely that such a plan would be adopted without giving to either House the power of reconsidering its previous decision. The Select Committee of the House of Lords, in 1861, recommended with reference to such Bills : — "That on a resolution being moved, that it is expedient again to pass, and to send to the other House for its concurronce, any such Bill, the question shall be put whether the House will agree to the same, and on such resolution being agreed to the Bill to which it relates shall be forthwith sent to the other House for its concurrence, without any further question being put or any debate allowed." ^ (1) Select Committee (House of Lords) on Public Business (Parhamentary Paper 123 of 1861), page iv. 18 REFORM IN PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS. Fourth. — I now come to tlie subject wliicli has excited most atten- tion lately, namely, the necessity for improvement in those rules of debate and forms of the House which give undue facilities to Members who wish to obstruct its proceedings. Improvements in the rules of debate and in the forms of the House which regulates its pro- cedure are at once the most difficult branch of the subject, and the branch which presses the most urgently for decision. It would of course be better for the dignity of Parliament that no stringent laws on this subject should be required, and that mutual courtesy and forbearance should make the House a law unto itself; but this unfortunately has ceased to be the case. There are a few Members who avowedly seek to make legislation impossible and Parliament contemptible, and they have for their assistants certain members of the Conservative Party, whose reckless love of mischief has made them accomplices in anarchy. Obstruction, which originated, as they would be proud to avow, with Mr. Lowther, Mr. T. Collins, and Mr. Cavendish-Bentinck, aided by some distinguished members of their party, has become, in the hands of Mr. Parnell and Mr. Biggar, a scientific art. They were enabled to learn their lesson by the connivance of the House during the passage of Mr. Cross's Prisons Bill, which was detested by the county members, though, owing to the bribe of public money which it gave from the Imperial Exchequer in aid of local rates, they did not dare openly to oppose it. Many of those concerned have, no doubt, repented ere now in sackcloth and ashes. The House now owes it to its own dignity and character and to the country to let it be known and felt that, however unwillingly, it is prepared, should the necessity continue, to put down with a strong hand proceedings which make, and are avowedly intended to make. Parliamentary Government ridiculous if not impossible. In 1848 this question was seriously under the consideration of the House of Commons ; and evidence was taken by a Committee of the House, not only from its own officers but from foreign statesmen, M. Guizot having given evidence on the French and Mr. E. Curtis, of New York, on the American system. The report and evidence of that Committee are well worthy of study. Sir T. Erskine May, in the article to which I have so often had occasion to refer, says : — "As the rules of the British Parliament were adopted in the United States and in France, it is not without instruction to observe the modifications which the experience of these countries has suggested. So early as 1794 the American House of Eepresentatives had discovered the inconveniences arising out of debates upon questions of adjournment; and the prohibition of them, which was then found necessary, has ever since been acquiesced in. In like manner the House of Eepresentatives, having found by experience that the power of a small minority to insist upon a division is objectionable, will not per- mit any division to take place unless one-fifth of the Members present concur in REFORM IN PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS. 19 requiring it. The experience of the French Chamber of Deputies had led them to a similar conclusion ; and a scrutin secret could only be insisted upon (except in certain cases) by the requisition of twenty Members. It will be for the House of Commons to consider how far restrictions of a similar character are necessary or desirable." "In America by means of Hhe previous question,' and in France by la cloture, the majority were empowered to determine, by a vote, that a debate should at once be brought to a conclusion. This coercion of the minority into silence has been quietly submitted to in America from 1789 to the present time ; and in France it was borne, with equal patience, from 1814 until Louis Napoleon imposed silence upon majorities as well as minorities by a cmip d'etat.'" Sir T. Erskine May adds : — "In case, however, the question of la cloture should come under considera- tion, we are able to offer — what will be much more persuasive with the House of Commons than any argument — a precedent. On the 9th of May, 1604, ' upon Sir Eowland Litton's offer to speak in this matter, resolved, no more should speak.' " The following is taken from the exaimination of M. Guizot by the Select Committee of 1848 : — •' Q. With the existence of the power of cloture, is it your opinion that all subjects have been amply and fairly debated ? " ''A. Yes, it is quite my opinion. I never knew in the Chamber of Depu- ties a debate which did not last sufficiently long." '' Q. Do you think that without some power of closing debates, the public business in your Chamber could have been conducted satisfactorily ? " " ^4. I think not. I think the cloture in our chamber was an indispensable power ; calling to mind what has passed of late years, I do not recollect any serious and honest complaint against the cloture^ ^ Mr. Curtis, of New York, who was examined both as to closing the debate by the adoption of the previous question and the limita- tion of the length of speeches, speaking of the rule that no speech should exceed one hour, says : — "It has greatly facilitated business. It has improved the quality of the speeches ; public opinion is decidedly in its favour. The best proof of this is^ that, as these rules are adopted only from session to session, and there have been changes of party since they were adopted, both parties have in turn adopted these rules and acted upon them. The most intelligent and experienced gentlemen of the country approve of them, both the previous question and the one -hour rule." - "Mr. J. Randall, a counsel, practising in the Federal Courts of the United States, in the City of Philadelphia, confirmed Mr. Curtis' statements, ex- pressed an opinion that ' previous question ' and ' the one-hour rule ' have worked well. At first the one-hour rule was much opposed, but it has worked (1) Report Select Committee on Public Business (Parliamentary Paper 3'** of 18C1, page V.) /2'l Ibirl. nagfi vi. 20 EEFORM IN PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS. well ; it has fought its way into public favour, and has the support not only of the members of the House, but of the people at large." ^ It is not necessary to go at length into the question of the "cloture,''^ as it has been dealt with in several recent articles — especially one by Lord Sherbrooke. I only desire to show here that, should it be necessary to adopt the Frencli cloture or the Ame- rican " previous question " for a time, the experience of those countries shows that neither has been fatal to freedom of debate. For I have been reluctantly brought to the conviction that, for one or two sessions at least (I hope not more), it will be necessary to take means of vindicating the honour and usefulness of Parliament from the attacks of those who would destroy both. Without going into detail, I may say that the House of Commons bas the power to pass in one sitting any measure on which a large majority is really intent, even if it should be necessary to pass such a measure en bloc by surrendering for a time the power of amendment or debate. Another mode of obtaining more time or improved quality of work was suggested by Mr. Disraeli, and recommended by the Com- mittee of the House of Commons which sat in 1871 — " That it is desirable that Parliament should assemble at a period of the year not later than the last week in November." It was, of course, intended that, in such case, Parliament should be prorogued in June ; and it was hoped that a great deal of non-contentious business might be initiated and considerably advanced before Christmas. It is certain that the adoption of a vigorous month's work in winter, instead of a month's lassitude in July, would produce vastly better results in legislation, to say nothing of the health of the workers ; and, as was urged on the Committee by a great Conservative statesman, if any great public question required the attendance for a time of sporting county members, "their patriotism would no doubt lead them to make the necessary sacrifice, and if not, well, I suppose, we should have to manage to get on without them." Some limit will probably have to be put on the power of moving adjournments, the most efficient engine of obstruction, and the one which has been most unscrupulously used. If much of the Private Bill Committee business of the House of Commons were otherwise arranged for, it might be possible for the House to meet earlier in the day and adjourn earlier at night, the business being so arranged as to consult as much as possible the con- venience of the legal and other members of the House who might have other business to attend to. William Rathbone. (1) Report Select Committee on Pubhc Business (Parliamentary Paper f*ff of 1861, page vi.)