ARBITRATION AS APPLIED TO RAILWAY CORPORATIONS AND THEIR EMPLOYEES BY EDWARD A. MOSELEY Secretary of the Interstate Commerce Commission REPRINTED FROM “TRANSPORTATION” FOR SEPTEMBER, 1 893 Washington, D. C. Press of W. F. Roberts, 1421 G Street N. W. 1893 Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2018 with funding from University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign Alternates https://archive.org/details/arbitrationasapp00mose_0 ARBITRATION As Applied to Railroad Corporations and their Employees. By Edward A. Moserey.* The tendency of industrial progress is to concen¬ trate vast interests under common control, and the same conditions which have induced or compelled manufacturers and producers to sacrifice individual control and embrace the opportunity of combination have impelled labor to associate and organize for the protection and advancement of its interests. One result of this change from individual and independ¬ ent conduct to unity of action and common direction has been to broaden the effect of disputes between the two parties to such an extent that provision for their prompt and effectual settlement has become a public necessity and a public duty. What remedies will best accomplish this end is a question that has been agitating the ablest minds of Europe and Amer¬ ica for so long that many have come to look upon its solution as hopeless. It is possible that we shall be compelled to abandon all search for a plan that will speedily heal ruptures between wage-payers and wage-earners generally, and, taking the classes of X industrial pursuits separately, e. g., manufacture, mining, agriculture, etc., endeavor to provide such a method of settlement for labor disputes arising in O each as may seem best suited, after careful and pains- taking investigation, to the conditions of the par¬ ticular class of industry and the needs and rights of the parties. But whether in providing proper rem¬ edies we shall finally be forced into taking such specific and discriminating action or not, it is clear * Secretary of the Interstate Commerce Commission. ? 35741 4 and conceded that as to one branch of industry, namely, railway transportation, the interest of the public in all that pertains to railway management makes it a third party to controversies between rail¬ way companies and their employees, and eliminates from our consideration the difficult preliminary ques¬ tion whether any interference with the contractual rights of employer and employee is permissible at all. We have, therefore, full warrant for dealing directly and at once with labor questions arising on railways, and have only to determine upon and provide the most feasible and effectual plan of settlement. One proposed method is arbitration. Another is to require the parties to subscribe to specific condi¬ tions in written contracts and leave questions of per¬ formance arising therefrom to the courts. The defect in the latter suggestion is that it covers neither the real needs of labor nor the true interests of capital. Great strikes do not originate in breaches of contract. The prime cause of ‘ 1 the strike ” is the refusal of one side to comply with demands made by the other. It is plain, therefore, that written contracts, however specific, however stringent, would do little toward abolishing strikes and lock-outs, for contracts must terminate, and those relating to labor cannot for obvious reasons be made to extend over long periods. Such agreements may be useful as far as they go, but we must seek relief on broader lines than compulsory contracts and judicial decrees re¬ quiring specific performance. We must turn for light to the conditions which have changed the ap¬ propriate designation of a contest between capital and labor from that of an independent skirmish to a general engagement. The day of small things in most branches of the industrial world is past. Agri¬ culture, and that only because of its being insepar¬ ably connected with the rural home, stands alone as the one class of industry wherein the small holding is still the rule, notwithstanding the increasing power 5 and force of great farming enterprises, operates to decrease net returns and consequently the value of the ‘ ‘ homestead farm ’ ’ year after year. It matters little to labor how capital is owned; its vital interest lies in how it is applied. Compar¬ ing the present with fifty years ago and considering the increase in the amount of capital in connection with the number of those who engage in labor, it is probably safe to assume that wealth invested in pro¬ ductive enterprises is as much divided now as then. But while investment by the owners of capital in such enterprises is direct, their control of its appli¬ cation is mainly indirect, because of the almost uni¬ versal practice of massing industrial capital in the hands of corporations, thus operating enormously to decrease the number of employers in proportion to the employed. Therefore, while those who buy labor buy largely, the number of buyers being com¬ paratively few, they enjoy all those immense advan¬ tages which accrue to the large dealer and which not infrequently amount to the power of dictation. The extent of the consolidation of capital and the constantly increasing tendency to such consolida¬ tion is familiar history. Opposed to and made necessary by this is unity of action on the part of labor. Acting generally on the defensive, with each advance of capital toward greater aggregation, labor has become more compactly organized, and the grievance of a trade, or of those employed in a a trade in a particular region, or an individual workman, has come to be resented by labor gener¬ ally as a body and frequently been made the basis not only of a dispute and a strike but a succession of strikes involving more than one kind of employ¬ ment. Combinations of capital and organizations of labor are created for exactly the same purpose, the pro¬ tection and promotion of individual interests by col¬ lective action, and both are entitled to exactly the 6 same degree of recognition. They represent the two great interdependent and interacting forces of in¬ dustry. Overwhelming power in the hands of the first means unbearable oppression to the other, while extreme advantage conferred upon the latter would, if unwisely used, inflict ruin upon the former. Each side is governed by the dominant motive of self- interest, and they should be placed and kept upon equal footing. To do this full recognition of labor organizations is essential. A corporation which has brain and sinew for its capital should be regarded as similar, in a legal sense, to a joint stock concern with a paid up money capital. This much I believe is due to labor in any branch of industry. Custom has done much in this direction already, for scales of wages are not infrequently fixed between employ¬ ers and organizations to which the employees belong. The idea has also been partially crystalized into law by state legislatures and by Congress through the enactment of statutes providing for the incorporation of labor societies for purposes of improvement, ad¬ vancement, and protection of labor interests and in¬ dividual rights, even going so far as to specify regu¬ lation of wages and hours. But such construction of these laws by the courts as would authorize com¬ binations of labor to do that which the individual workman may lawfully do singly is lacking, and definite legislation would seem necessary to secure that end. Had the fully equipped labor corporation been an accomplished fact, with the right to treat with the mill owners in behalf of the men. the main fight would not have been over recognition of the labor organization and there is little doubt that the great strike and subsequent riot at Homestead, involving the loss of so many lives, would have been averted by submission of the matters in differ¬ ence to arbitration or by some other peaceful means of settlement; with the further result of avoiding the substitution of thousands of immigrating labor- 7 ers for those who, toiling there for years, had practical¬ ly consecrated themselves to the particular industry and reared their families with a view to their engag¬ ing in a steady, reliable and remunerative employ¬ ment, and even inheriting it. That contest had ser¬ ious effect upon the relation of employers and em¬ ployees throughout the land ; an effect which was manifested by smaller strikes, numerous disputes, threatening attitudes and mutual distrust. And the loss of business to the Carnegie mills caused by the widespread power of antagonistic labor employed in industries using iron products, and by general pop¬ ular sympathy with the men, must have been enormous. While much discussion of the relations of labor and capital generally should not be had in a paper limited to the consideration of a particular branch of industry, I cannot refrain from making some fur¬ ther observation upon this strike in the Carnegie mills. As before stated, a resort to arbitration would have averted the terrible disasters which ensued at Homestead and affected social order throughout the country. The course adopted had the usual result of transferring some phases of the contest to the courts ; and in this instance the cases presented for judicial determination were of a criminal char¬ acter. The original issue between the manufac¬ turers and the men was in no wise presented for settlement by these proceedings. It could not be. Whenever the aid of the courts is invoked by either employer or employee, the action must rest upon some grievance which the law takes cognizance of, and there is no law prohibiting employers from limiting the compensation of their workmen or dis¬ charging them from service, or which compels them to recognize labor organizations. The assertion that “the powers of a court of equity are as vast and its processes and procedures as elastic as all the changing emergencies of in- 8 creasingly complex business relations and the pro¬ tection of rights can demand,’ ’ while it may be con¬ ceded to be correct in a general sense, cannot be re¬ lied upon as pointing out a way of settling disputes which relate to employment, except where some breach of legal duty occurs. This is forcibly illus¬ trated by the recent trouble between the engineers and firemen and officers of the Toledo & Ann Arbor road. The fact that a strike of engineers and fire¬ men occurred on that road was merely an incident in the court proceedings which afterwards took place. The fact that notification by the Chief of the Brotherhood of Engineers to members that a ‘ ‘ strike was on” was alleged to have resulted in a refusal by engineers employed on other roads to move Toledo & Ann Arbor cars, and this was seized upon by the road as ground for legal proceedings. It was the effect of the action by the engineers and firemen and their chiefs which the courts took into account in allowing the temporary injunctions and deciding the proceedings for contempt. The funda¬ mental cause of the trouble—the dispute between the Ann Arbor road and its men—was not and could not have been considered by the courts with a view to settlement. The effect of the decisions subse¬ quently given was to create the mistaken belief in the popular mind that they settled the Ann Arbor strike in favor of the roads, though by many of those acquainted with the facts it is confidently asserted that the original wrong was entirely on the part of the management of the railroad company. Those decisions did nothing more than fine a man for con¬ tempt of court and treat of the Brotherhood’s Rule XII. They did not reach the core of the difficulty. An important point considered in those decisions is that the movement of interstate commerce over connecting lines was interfered with, and I do not cite the decision now with any purpose to dissent from the view of the duty of carriers in this respect 9 which was stated by the learned judges. On the contrary, I commend it. But is it not unfortunate that the emphatic assertion of this doctrine should be made in a case where the obstruction to traffic was alleged to result from an employee’s act, while prior decisions of other courts in treating the same question have almost entirely freed carriers from any duty whatever in the matter of facilities for receiv¬ ing, forwarding, and delivering traffic to and from connecting lines? In other words, a section of the Interstate Commerce Act, the leading and plain pur¬ pose of which was to restrain the railroads from dis¬ criminating between connecting carriers in the hand¬ ling and forwarding of freight, has been appealed to for the purpose of suppressing a strike on the part of the employees, a purpose which was wholly foreign to the end had in view by the legislators who enacted the law. Another leading object of the act and those who secured its passage, to wit, securing just and reasonable rates, has apparently been defeated in large measure by strained judicial interpretations, that under the law several combined roads are for certain purposes one line and for certain other pur¬ poses distinct and separate lines, at the election of the roads themselves. These several decisions enable carriers to evade the plain provisions of the law in¬ tended for the protection of the public and at the same time invoke protection against their employees—a result clearly antagonistic to the spirit of the law and never contemplated by its framers. It may be said in this connection that great feel¬ ing was aroused among the people over a report that a district judge had received free transporta¬ tion by a carrier interested in order that he might issue the injunction prayed for by the carrier, and that this was accomplished at the private office of the complaining road without the knowledge of the men ; and the query arises, if a judge, who for the purpose of holding court, travels over his circuit in IO palace coaches on free passes furnished by roads that are parties to suits before him, is wholly un¬ biased (and freedom from bias was doubtless the case in this instance) and competent to preside impar¬ tially over the trial of such suits, whether a juror should be held unfit to perform his duty in an im¬ partial manner and the jury of which he is a mem¬ ber be discharged after a trial of long duration is almost concluded, simply because such juror had committed the impropriety of dining with a party to the case being tried ? In other words, whether or not the fact that a juror has during the progress of a suit dined with one of the parties should be held conclusively to have biased his mind in favor of such party as to a question of fact , when riding in palace coaches as the guest and at the expense of a rail¬ road party to a suit, while on the way to the trial, does not (as all fair-minded men will admit) in the least influence the mind of a learned judge in favor of such road as to a question of law involved in the litigation ? But these decisions, and that of Judge Speer, ren¬ dered about the same time, did, if their application is not carefully limited, strike a blow at what had been considered one of labor’s inalienable privileges, the right of a number of employees to leave their em¬ ploy in a body at a particular time. It was held that Rule XII of the Brotherhood is illegal because its operation would be certain to interfere with and retard the movement of interstate traffic, and that action un¬ der the rule would and does amount to a combina¬ tion or conspiracy in restraint of trade. Sudden enforcement of the rule by the Brotherhood might prevent transportation for the time being, and any well-founded construction of the law which insures the continuous carriage of traffic by railway carriers is to be upheld. The public is clearly entitled to demand that the flow of commerce shall be free from all restrictions, and in the matter of transporta- I tion common carriers are rightly held to a strict responsibility. It is equally clear that persons em - ployed by the carrier in the business of transporta¬ tion assume such limited responsibility as comes within the terms of their contract, and that they should not be permitted, either singly or collectively, to leave their employ without such warning to the carrier as will amount to reason¬ able notice of their intention so to do, thus affording the carrier fair opportunity to fill such impending vacancies in its working force. But notice given to a carrier by its engineers that on and after a certain date they will refuse to handle through traffic coming from or destined to a con¬ necting road is clear and distinct advice to that car¬ rier that if it will not consent to join in the refusal so to handle such traffic, except as local freight on its line, the contract of employment will terminate on the date mentioned ; and if the time allowed is reasonable, it would hardly seem equitable to hold that Rule XII so applied is illegal. No one will assert that the railway employee’s individual rights are impaired by the nature of his employment. He has only to fulfill his contract, always remembering that the public is a party thereto (entitled, however, to no more than reasonable treatment), and his re¬ sponsibility ends. It is no part of his agreement with the carrier or the public that he shall not leave his work until his place is filled. That burden is on the carrier, and it is only entitled to reasonable no¬ tice of a prospective vacancy. It is said in the case against Chief Arthur that the strike on the Ann Arbor road was lawful because it was a combination ‘ ‘ for the lawful purpose of sell¬ ing the labor of those engaged in it for the highest price obtainable and on the best terms ; ” but that the employees of the Take Shore and other roads were not dissatisfied with the terms of their employ¬ ment, and the act of these employees in combining 12 to withhold their labor from them for the purpose of injuring the Ann Arbor road was unlawful. And it is further stated that herein is found the difference between the .strike and the boycott. If the premises are correct, I agree with this view ; but are they ? Were the employees of the Lake Shore road and others connecting with the Ann Arbor line satisfied with the terms of their employment ? The engineers on all these lines belonged to a “ brotherhood ’ ’ legally organized for the protection and advancement of their interests, and the members of the organization had of their own free will and inclination established rules and by-laws and appointed officers to execute them. These members had agreed in effect that, in case of a “ legal strike ” of engineers upon a road, they would not be satisfied with the terms of their employment on connecting roads if their duties con¬ sisted in hauling cars in which the road on which the strike occurred was interested; and Arthur, the Chief, was by virture of his office required to give notice of the strike. All this hardly seems to come within the term ‘ ‘ boycott.” Whether the engineers on the Lake Shore and other roads gave proper notice of their dissatisfaction with the changed conditions of their employment is another question, and one which I need not here discuss; but that Rule XII properly applied operates as a boycott I do not admit. Any one engineer working on the Lake Shore might law¬ fully have quit work under his contract at any time after his run was complete, and allege as a reason his dissatisfaction with the terms of an employment which compelled him to haul the cars of a road whereon his biethren were engaged in a strike. If he can lawfully do this, what just grounds exist for restraining the chief of his organization from carry¬ ing out the will of himself and fellow members by notifying members of the organization when cause for dissatisfaction with their employment has arisen, and to act according to rules which they them- 13 selves have established? The legal maxim “that every man shall so use his own as not to injure the rights and property of another,” cannot fairly be ap¬ plied so as to compel men to remain an undue length of time in distasteful employment, or to prevent them from using all reasonable means to have that em¬ ployment made congenial or more profitable. My purpose here is not to criticise the decision rendered by Judge Taft upon the facts set out in the Ann Arbor case, but to draw therefrom the distinc¬ tion between legal and illegal acts of men in combi¬ nation. The decision of Judge Billings in March last affords another illustration of this, because, while he was undoubtedly right in holding that the strike should not have included intimidation and violence whereby other workmen were deterred from entering into employment, he did not distinctly up¬ hold the right of the men to act in concert in an orderly way for the purpose of securing better pay. Whether or not it was proper to include in such concert of action all the employed in the City of New Orleans need not be discussed here ; perhaps it was not. But the provocation to such action must be deemed severe if the statement in the call for the strike was true, namely, that the board of trade, merchants, boss draymen and weighers claimed to represent the entire employing power of the city, and asserted that they would not recognize unions or labor organizations in connection with their business, and would endeavor to prevent all employers from either employing or recognizing union men. If the conclusion of the Court that the acts of the New Orleans workmen constituted a combination in restraint of trade in violation of the anti-trust law is a correct construction of that law, it would seem that the joint action of employers in that city .was j ust as clearly a combination in re¬ straint of labor. But I do not believe, if the question is ever cleanly x 4 presented to the courts, that the anti-trust law will be held to apply to labor organizations. There never was any need of so construing that law. Before its passage the revised statutes already contained com¬ prehensive provisions against conspiracy. The law against trusts was not directed against labor unions; it was intended to restrain the establishment of op¬ pressive combinations by those who, by reason of ownership, control the commerce of the country, and who by combination might perpetuate not temporary but continuing hardships upon the people. This law, in a word, was not calculated to repress the furtherance of individual rights even through col¬ lective action, but was designed to prevent increased prices and business monopoly. Another considera¬ tion arising out of a construction of the anti-trust law by Judge Riner of the United States District Court of Kansas is worthy of note. The ruling was that Congress did not intend to include interstate common carriers under the provisions of that law. If this is sound, and an unlawful restraint of trade cannot be brought about by a combination of carriers, it follows that a combination of these carriers’ em¬ ployees cannot be brought under the statute’s ban. This court says the anti-trust law does not include every sort of combination ; Judge Billings and others say it does. Which court has made a mistake ? When the object had in view is lawful, the re¬ straint of trade may be an unavoidable incident of a strike of railway employees, but it is not the object. In such cases there is no wilful intent. It is a gross perversion of the law against trusts and monopolies to attempt to apply it in favor of rail" way corporations against their employees engaged in the attempt to maintain their mutual rights. It is turning against the people a weapon which was designed for their protection. The recent decision of Judge Mitchell at St. Paul supports the view contended for in this paper. i5 He decides that any man, unless under contract obligation, or unless his employment charges him with some public duty, has a right to refuse to work for or deal with any man or class of men he sees fit, and this right which one man may exercise singly any number of men may exercise jointly, and make simultaneous declaration of their choice. The court further says : ‘ ‘ This is the age of asso¬ ciations and unions in all departments of labor and business, for purposes of mutual benefit and protec¬ tion. Confined to their proper limits, they are not only lawful, but laudable. Carried beyond these limits they are liable to become dangerous agencies of wrong and oppression. Beyond what limits these combinations can go without interfering with the legal rights of others is a problem which the courts will doubtless be frequently called to pass upon. ’ ’ The Legislature of Michigan also acted in accord¬ ance with this view by adding the following ex¬ ceptive clause to a law intended to protect railroad and other corporations and individuals from con¬ spiracy, malice, etc. : “ Section 9276. This act shall not be construed to apply to cases of persons voluntarily quitting the employment of any railroad company or such other corporation, firm, or individual, whether by concert of action or otherwise.” (See Howell’s Annotated Statutes of 1882, Michigan.) The trend of public sentiment is also shown by the passage last year by the Ohio Legislature of the “ Llewellyn Law,” which is otherwise entitled “An act to protect employees and guarantee their right to belong to labor organizations,” and makes violation thereof punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both. Whatever may be practicable in the way of main¬ taining the reciprocal relations of labor and capital generally, in my view two things are indispensable to the prevention of strikes on railways. One is the full recognition of railway labor societies as corpora- i6 tions. The other is the settlement of disputes be¬ tween railway employer and railway employees by means of compulsory arbitration between the men represented by their labor corporation as one party and the stockholders of the company represented by the railway corporation as the other party. We then obtain that equality of power and force which compels the essential requisites of friendly relation, respect, consideration, and forbearance. Disputes between employers and employees can be satisfactorily adjusted only upon the basis of fair concession and mutual advantage. The strict rules of law are wholly inapplicable to such controversies, and so far the only plan which appears to offer a solution of the difficulty is arbitration It is not conceded to be practicable to compel the parties engaged in productive enterprises to accept arbitra¬ tion, but that objection loses all its force when it is proposed to limit it to those engaged in railway transportation. The power of Congress to regulate commerce, including its transportation and the in¬ strumentalities employed therein, is too well settled to need argument or citation of authority. The propriety of this form of procedure is clearly recognized in the federal statutes. A law of Congress approved October i, 1888, is entitled as follows : ‘ ‘ An act to create boards of arbitration or commis¬ sions for settling controversies and differences be¬ tween railroad corporations or other common car¬ riers engaged in interstate and territorial transporta¬ tion of property or passengers and their employees. (Sup. to Rev. Stat. p. 622.). And its declared pur¬ pose is to settle “differences or controversies’’ which “may hinder, impede, obstruct, interrupt or affect such transportation of property or passengers.’’ It provides, if the parties agree thereto, for the appointment of one arbitrator by each of the two parties, and for the selection of a third by the two thus chosen. The matters in dispute are to be sub- 17 mitted to the arbitrators at the nearest practicable place to that at which the difficulty originated, and the parties are to be fully heard and have the right to be represented by counsel. It is further provided that the fees and compensation of arbitrators (ten dollars a day) and those of clerks, stenographers, marshals and witnesses, are to be examined and certified by the United States District Judge and paid by and through the Treasury Department; but the maximum cost of any investigation shall not exceed $5,000. Additional arbitration is pro¬ vided for in the law by the appointment of two com¬ missioners by the President, who together with the Commissioner of Labor shall constitute a temporary commission for the adjustment of any such diffi¬ culty, and the President may upon his own motion, or upon the application of one of the parties, or upon the application of the Executive of the State, tender the services of such a commission. Congress also recognized the right of labor to organize and become incorporated for protection and advancement by enacting the statue of June 29, 1886, entitled ‘‘An act to authorize the incorporation of National Trades Unions,” and some of the purposes for which such a union is authorized are the regula¬ tion of wages and the hours and conditions of labor, and the protection of individual rights in the prose¬ cution of their trade or trades. Fifteen States also have provided for the settlement of labor disputes by arbitration, while ten States recognize by law labor organizations. * It is clearly demonstrated, therefore, that labor has now a legal right to organize and combine and be represented through a common head, and that railway companies and their employees already have an arbitration procedure provided for them in case they see fit to embrace it. But additional legisla¬ tion, which will give labor corporations full power to act for the men and which will make arbitration * See tables A and B following this article. 8 of disputes arising in railway work a compulsory process in case such disputes cannot be settled by negotiation, is necessary. To make arbitration effective and just, the arbi¬ trators should be drawn from the vicinage and with particular reference to the particular case. A man who knows nothing about the work involved is not qualified to decide the question. When the matter in controversy involves how many hours a man should work, what pay he should receive, or any of the questions which cause dispute between the em¬ ployer and the employee, those questions should be considered by men familiar with the particular em¬ ployment under consideration as well as with the needs and situation of the employer. Such well in¬ formed persons are to be found in every locality, and when questions arise between employer and employees they are best qualified to decide what concessions are fair and what will redound to the mutual ad¬ vantage of the parties. As a rule men who hold office for life or a defined term are unfit for such positions. A person to be a good arbitrator must be directly responsible in every case. Men who hold definite terms of office are placed in a position where they regard mankind as divided into classes, and they have, too often, but the instincts and the sympathies of their “ class.” The ultra-conservative man, the man whose whole interest lies in maintaining the present order of things, is prone to look through the closed window of his richly furnished apartment, and in this refracted light and perverted view to imagine that he sees in the workman passing by with blouse and dinner pail a member of ‘ ‘ the dan¬ gerous classes.” Arbitrators, on the other hand, should be men who know no class, but who represent the great sovereign whole. The utmost publicity should be given to such awards, and to attain this end the law regulating arbitration might contain provision for a report by all boards of arbitration of 19 the awards made by them to the executive head of the government and for the formal and official pro¬ mulgation by him of all awards so made. Moreover, questions arising between employer and employee demand the most prompt method of set¬ tlement ; and pending final settlement the relations existing at the time the disputes arose should be main¬ tained and the parties should bear their grievances patiently during that period and rely upon just and proper revision and adjustment by the board of arbitration Another requisite is that the arbitra¬ tors should be permitted to provide for a continu¬ ance of the employment for a reasonable time after the award is made, and the parties should agree beforehand to be bound thereby. The writer, while a member of the Massachusetts Legislature, in 1886, introduced an arbitration bill which contained all these features. As above stated, the objection is often urged that boards of arbitration generally are not clothed with power to enforce their awards. True, in one sense they have no such power,—that is to say, not the vis¬ ible, material power of a writ of execution backed by sheriff or marshal ; but even then the award would impress the moral sense of the community and would in most cases be self-executory. And this is a distinguishing mark of the glory of our civiliza¬ tion and our form of government. President Cleveland, in calling the attention of Congress to the subject of labor disputes, recom¬ mended legislation which resulted in the “Arbitra¬ tion Law ” above mentioned. In his special message of April 22, 1886, he said: ‘ ‘ If such a Commission (of arbitration) were fairly organized, the risk of a loss of popular support and sympathy resulting from a refusal to submit to so peaceful an instrumentality would constrain both parties to such disputes to invoke its interference and abide by its decision. >j< >5c :jc 20 ‘ ‘ If the usefulness of such a Commission is doubted because it might lack power to enforce its decisions, much encouragement is derived from the conceded good that has been accomplished by the railroad commissions which have been organized in many of the States, which, having little more than advisory power, have exerted a most salutary influence in the settlement of disputes between conflicting in¬ terests.” But so far as the .settlement of disputes in which the public has direct interest is concerned, like those arising in the course of railway employment, Con¬ gress unquestionably has power to compel arbitra¬ tion. The tendency of Congress to recognize labor associations has already been shown. It is but a step further to provide that organizations of railway employees shall, when disputes arise with railway managers, file approved bonds with designated of¬ ficials for and in behalf of the men, that they will abide by the decision of the board of arbitration; that the railway corporations shall likewise file sim¬ ilar bonds; and that awards made under such condi¬ tions shall be enforcible in the courts. The further objection urged against arbitration, that the indi¬ vidual employee is pecuniarily irresponsible, would by this method be removed. L,et the men join the organization and let the organization treat with the corporation. Most men who go to law know more of their cases than the lawyers they employ, but how few will enter into a law suit without an attorney to present the cause ! It is quite as necessary to the workingman to have an advocate. He is so handi¬ capped by his subordinate position that he can neither lucidly nor concisely state his case, what he deems his wrongs to be, nor the redress he asks. The environment of the railway official is enough to abash him. It puts him ill at ease and discon¬ certs him. In the palmy days of the Reading road I knew a man, the head of a large business, coming 21 from a long distance on important business, to sit three days in the ante-room of the palatial office of the president of the road before he had even an opportunity for a five-minute interview. Would not an employee be thoroughly demoralized under such conditions? Even men familiar with official life are often embarassed in the presence of authority or power, no matter how brave both morally and physically they may be. It is largely a matter of habit. The railroad employee is brought too little in contact with his superior officers He must have an advocate who has the power and influence of men and money behind him, such men, as I may say, as are the present leaders of existing rail¬ way labor organizations. When a man’s income has put him beyond the fear of want, any further increase adds less to his happiness than he thought it would before he got it ; and the pleasure derived from the increase is chiefly the pleasure of conscious power. How much more desirable the position of the leader of a great industrial army, who has earned the confidence and affection of those around him ! He has more of those things for which wealth is really to be desired than if he had accumulated a large fortune. More honorable, more earnestly to be striven for, is his position than that of the admiral of a fleet or the general of an army, whose business is destruction, or of the leader or head of a great syndicate or trust. All tendencies, as before stated, are toward col¬ lective ownership and collective action, through the result of free choice by each individual of that line of conduct which, after careful deliberation, seems best suited for attaining his ends, whether they are selfish or unselfish. I know it may be urged that by this organization and combination of labor in¬ dividualism is destroyed. But there are only two forces in this bargain between employer and em- 22 ployee. Justice must be the desire on both sides ; or one side must be as powerful as the other. Unless selfish interests are put aside, power must be matched against power. If the employees act individually, they divide their forces against themselves and for¬ feit all hope of a successful issue of the contest. When laborers are scarce and employers are seek - ing men and not men employment, this does not apply. But now every day the ability of the in¬ dividual to choose his employer in any particular calling is vanishing. If he would pursue his handi¬ craft he must accept employment from a yearly lessening number of individuals or corporations. The only way in which he may protect himself is through combined action with his fellow-craftsmen. When disputes arise between employer and em¬ ployee each side feels the force of public opinion and criticism and strives to put itself right with the pub¬ lic and convince it that the quarrel is the fault of the other party. In this effort how handicapped in every way is the railway employee ! A strike in¬ conveniences and interferes with the public. A man who cannot have himself or his goods transported is not likely to look into the merits of the matter; he is ready to denounce the striker. The public is too often prejudiced in its view of a strike, because it does not know the circumstances out of which the differences grew. The public gets its information from the newspaper, whose editor and publisher may be influenced by the large advertising patronage of the corporation, etc., and give little heed to any other view of the case than that which the corpora¬ tion desires them to take. Without venturing upon a statement in relation to the railway strikes which have occurred in our country, it is sufficient to give the result of the Scot¬ tish railway strike of 1890, when there was a com¬ plete paralysis of all industry. Over 100,000 persons other than strikers were thrown out of employment 23 as a consequence of the railway strike. Steel works, engineering works, ship-building works, and cotton mills shut down for want of coal and material. The scarcity of coal affected most seriously and bore most heavily upon the poorer people. The public loss and inconvenience was incalculable ; the retail price of coal doubled. Trade left Scottish ports, and mer¬ chants bought their goods elsewhere. Such a ca¬ lamity might overtake our own country. Can the efforts of the legislator be better directed than towards a solution of this question, towards devising some method of treating, in a just, amicable, and satis¬ factory manner, these disputes so liable at any time to arise ? It is for the common good, ‘ ‘ the general welfare,” of all interests, that arbitration in matters of railway employment may be provided. May we not look forward to the time when the almost waste product of the higher abilities that are latent among railroad employees will be availed of in the directories of the corporations ? The running and switching of railway trains is a semi-public as well as a most hazardous employ, ment. Such trains carry our persons and our pro¬ perty ; they are the actual agencies by which car¬ riers exercise their delegated public functions, and any occurrences which derange or tend to derange the proper and equal service which the people are entitled to demand become matters of public con¬ cern. Stories of the fidelity, the heroism and the sacrifices of railway train employees constitute thrilling chronicles of daily occurrence. Those heroic attributes are even shown in the dry field of comparative statistics. During the year ending with June, .1891, 531,183,998 passengers were car¬ ried by the railroads in the United States, on which 784,285 persons were employed in their operation. In the same year 293 passengers were killed, and 2,972 passengers injured, or one passenger was killed for every 1,811,642 carried, and one passen- 24 ger injured for every 178,604 carried ; while for the same period 2660 employees were killed and 26,140 were injured ; or one was killed for every 296 em¬ ployed, and one injured for every 30 employed ! Congress has recently passed a humane law in the interest of the railway employee, providing for the adoption of a uniform system of coupling cars, and for other safety appliances; and that law was’ in¬ tended to protect employees as far as possible from injury and death. Why should not Congress, by making arbitration compulsory, now provide for the protection of their livelihood as well ? This is es¬ pecially appropriate and feasible when the fact is considered that such a disposition of railway labor disputes is eminently fair, is practically certain to result in just awards, and will be for the interest of the employer as well as of the employed. The conductors, the engineers, the firemen, yard¬ men, brakemen, and switchmen all contribute, not their manual labor only, but their brains, their j udg- ment, and, as statistics show, their lives too often, as against the mere money of the stockholders. Are they not, then, entitled to consideration and protec¬ tion ? The law affords no remedy; the courts, as at present constituted, have no power to deal with the real question. Further legislation is necessary. To the broad principle of arbitration we must look for ultimate relief ! To the importance of the ques¬ tions involved and to the urgent need of an adequate remedy we can no longer shut our eyes with safety. Edward A. Moseley. Recognition by Law of Labor Organizations. A TABLE SHOWING WHAT STATES HAVE BY STAT¬ UTE RECOGNIZED AS LAWFUL THE RIGHT OF EMPLOYEES TO ASSOCIATE, UNITE OR COMBINE. STATES. i. United States. (Ch. 567, Sec. 1, 1885-*86.) 2. Colorado. (Acts 1889, p. 92.) 3. Iowa. (Acts 1886, Ch. 71.) 4. Louisiana. (Act 50, 1890.) FOR WHAT PURPOSES. Becoming more skillful and efficient workers, the promo¬ tion of intelligence, the eleva¬ tion of character, the regulation of wages and the hours and con¬ ditions of labor, the protection of individual rights in the prosecution of trades, the rais¬ ing of funds for the benefit of sick, disabled or unemployed members, or the families of deceased members, or for any other object for which work¬ ing people may lawfully com¬ bine. To advise or encourage any person or persons to enter into any combination in relation to entering into or remaining in the employment of any person or corporation, or in relation to the amount of wages to be paid for labor, or for regulating the hours of labor, or for pro¬ curing of fair and just treat¬ ment for employees, or for aid¬ ing and protecting their wel¬ fare and interests in any other manner. For the regulation, by lawful means of prices of labor, of hours’ work, and other matters pertaining to industrial pur¬ suits. Allows Trades Unions and Knights of Labor Assemblies or lodges, or similar institu¬ tions, to be incorporated. 26 STATES. FOR WHAT PURPOSES. (5. Massachusetts. (Acts 1888, Ch. 134.) 6. Michigan. (Acts 1885, No. 145.) 7. New Jersey. (Acts 1889, Ch’s 73 and 187.) 8. New York. (Acts 1887, Ch. 63.) 9. North Carolina. (Acts 1887, Ch. 145.) 10. North Dakota. (Acts 1890, Ch. 46.) 11. Ohio. (Act 1893, ‘ ‘Llewellyn Law. ”) 12. Wyoming. (Con., Art. 16, Sec. 10.) (R. S. 1887, T. 7, Sec. 589 and 590.) Permits incorporations of labor organizations for the purpose of improving in any lawful manner the condition of any employees in trades and employments, as to em¬ ployment, education, temper¬ ance, morality, or social inter¬ course, and by paying benefits to members when sick. For the improvement of so. cial and material interests, the regulation of wages, the laws and conditions of employment, the protection of rights in the prosecution of trades and asso¬ ciations, the collection and pay¬ ment of funds for the benefit of sick, disabled, and unemployed members, the securing of bene¬ fits to families of deceased mem¬ bers, and for such other objects of material benefit and protec¬ tion. For protecting trade-marks of trade unions, and for incor¬ poration of building associa¬ tions of organized labor. For purposes of arbitrating disputes with employers. For the protection of labor¬ ers employed by stevedores. Allowed to be incorporated for the lawful purposes for which they were organized. To protect employees and guarantee their right to belong to labor organizations. For purposes of arbitration ; allow assemblies of Knights of Labor to be incorporated, and permits organizations of mutual and co-operative associations. ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES. 03 f-M q s w 4 4 Q W 5? H <1 Q « 4 4 <1 Q »4 <1 > Q Q ? 4 4 S3 « 5Q Q W # 03 W P$ P O JH fUj Ft 4 4 S 13 g 4 d w 13 be £ 4 4 13 ^ 03 ^d 4 > PQ ’G' m d d co a 43 cO e» Hi -T 3 > d O O S d S £ bJO d 4 o *« o'H £ | ai d 43 O 4 a,^ d 3 d 4 o l—I a, o £ d d 03 13 ^ r 2 0 P*+J 3 3 13 03 P d u . 43 © 13 ■■ 43 03 fl ■* « . o d ? _ 4 bj 04 o d 13 d o m 0 4 4 n ^ 13 a © o a, 13 43 u "rt © S £ <2 n •r- 13 03 03 ^ £d £ aS as t-h 03 d cd 4 jb .*§■ 'S 2' 5 g- 13 6 4 A * H y d . k. d b 43 .. 6 ° o J* •So ^ « 03 « rH ^ A CO O 03 SfS'S d 5 bJO 13 $$ &-S 1 * 5,9 Is g He «? ^ > oS i3 5 o 03 d .3 03 > <+^ o ° K* 4-» a g a; G S*.s d O CO d 4» bd rO VO P P^ « >>£ ts 2 S 3 1!b P cd -*-» ,— +- 1 O td+j o 12 CJ (U OftJft ’ <+H 4^ 3 o o £ ft rn a cn a 33.2.2 3.23 « 0^2 S’S 02 P- ft Q 42 1) +j co O .4 ^ rO <8 c3 2 j2 ° fc u > 0) O ft o o o _, A- 'W o o 1> 4-> 13) 1) cd C O -ft .2 be a cd (D cd ja cd boP V o O ^ o cd *-■ 3 f (D I ~ C/3 s O c /2 P o »- tj ,1 £ 3 c o H 3 ii ii boo 5 S at« 33; t: p v- Id c3 «.-g PC Ph cd ,p O cd Jh ’ en ? P 4-> '3 3 ^ O ^ «3 , s i.g’S S H £3<£ o rt 2 2 c3 S p a p U H 4J +- 1 SH % > > Cfi ft 5 h -*- 1 TO K 02 d; _4 ^ ^ p^5 ^_, 3 Ph s d> «$+* g 2 ^'8 111 *iS a, SPSS'S P D ►> 'ft cd ^ O u P O +j cd o -2 _ cfl ft d cd a cd .. P^ a Ph cd P^ft ft cn a S ^-g a o a OJ oJ P P ft ft £! ri i) a a S3 cd cd 2 . 1) •3& ^ & 5 d) Ph n .2 § ^ d> 2 >> o T2 3 § 2 a dJ 4 Jh a oj H-> ^ cd .ft a ‘d ^>5 33 *3 ^ 02 OJ 3, bo C/5 £ o z, u a a p BJ « >■ ^ 1) 4-1 ■a p ^a <§3 i-i cd £0 2 ^ P bo 2 -a 8.5.ij ft D D O oft ft o +3 cd s-i t+. ,—1 1) O U“§ ft t^*a H-» 02 o rri d2 2 x p o of rj 2 bog 3 d cd cn 1) CU S >id P »h p 5 ^ ii'oP 12 a a ft 02 d 2 cd +J 1) ^ 5-1 p « rn *5 5 a ^,5 3 o tno 2 p 0 Ph . 1-1 a; 5-i Ij ^ }-< ^ 23 0 § w d2 ^ dJ fl O 1—1 •«-< g d 12 Oh cd ft nj 02 M H ad* S8 O o< 12 o bO- 3 S CD •c 3 bo J M B t/2 M a -— ■N tn CJ rO ft CftH < > ON GO 00 VO O' Q 43 iT^ u ft ^00 0 Sc£ •da cd3i^3 .50 c? 0 0 Si a . oto C/2 tn ; Si l«s*S >• « OG cK 10. 11. (N O H3 Vh „ x .O ji* u.2 6 ^ r& X « fa ^ 7 gJ £ 0^0 r—« Cd i-H n (U ft l^SH's^S'S ij,D , Jh +-■ }_ O cn ft « ft ft ft -(-> tj P ft ft a.^ g O ^ <4-1 +J CO <]j , t U -4-J - J—< +j 4 h O •fa O ft 6 -ft fa tu ft -ft _ „ ^{H ft ft o M (0 -P j3 Pft’cU fa-’ ^ *> ° W) j 3 «‘S « C .5 2 ft £.5 - aJft O -fa H ft o ft 53 « ft a» 5 biC ~ x ft ft u •^ft 8 ijCs a! 8 3 * .fa . fa ft ^ Pft c n £ 15 ft C/5 c S3 * o X 3-1 ,U tu bft j- -ft cu ISigi . OC cO 00 ft > t bJO