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 J 
 
 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT
 
 KANT'S 
 
 KRITIK OF 
 
 TRANSLATED 
 WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES 
 
 BY 
 
 J. H. BERNARD, D.D. 
 
 FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, AND ARCHBISHOP KING'S LECTURER 
 IN DIVINITY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN 
 
 f.l^f^ 
 
 ILontion 
 
 MACMILLAN AND CO. 
 
 AND NEW YORK 
 1892 
 
 All rights reserved
 
 
 P 
 
 s 
 
 19^ 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Editor's Introduction . . . . .. xi 
 
 Preface ....... i 
 
 Introduction . . . . . .6 
 
 I. Of the division of Philosophy . . .6 
 
 II. Of the realm of Philosophy in general . . lo 
 
 /O III. Of the Kritik of Judgment as a means ot combining 
 
 the two parts of Philosophy into a whole . .13 
 
 ^ IV. Of Judgment as a faculty legislating a priori . .16 
 
 c:: V. The principle of the formal purposiveness of nature 
 
 is a transcendental principle of Judgment . .19 
 
 VI. Of the combination of the feeling of pleasure with 
 ^ the concept of the purposiveness of nature , .26 
 
 IQ VII. Of the jesthetical representation of the purposiveness of 
 
 nature . . . . . .29 
 
 IQ VIII. Of the logical representation of the purposiveness of 
 
 'q nature . . . . . -34 
 
 *2 IX. Of the connection of the legislation of Understanding 
 
 c5 with that of Reason by means of the Judgment . 38 
 
 First Part. — Kritik of the yEsthetical Judgment . . 43 
 
 First Division. — Analytic of the ^sthetical Judgment . 45 
 
 ■^ First Book.- — Analytic of the Beautiful . . .45 
 
 •aO First Moment of the judgment of taste, according to cjuality . 45 
 § I. The judgment of taste is sesthetical . . .45 
 
 § 2. The satisfaction which determines the judgment of 
 
 taste is disinterested . . . .46 
 
 •^ § 3. The satisfaction in the pleasant is bound up with 
 
 <M interest . . . .48 
 
 ^ § 4. The satisfaction in the good is bound up with interest 50
 
 VI CONTENTS 
 
 § 5. Comparision of the three specifically different kinds 
 
 of satisfaction . . . -53 
 
 5"^ri7«^/J/r'wt7//of the judgment of taste, viz. according toguaiitity 55 
 § 6. The Beautiful is that which apart from concepts is 
 
 represented as the object of a un iversal satisfaction . 55 
 § 7. Comparison of the Beautiful with the Pleasant and 
 
 the Good by means of the above characteristic . 57 
 
 § S. The universality of the satisfaction is represented in 
 
 a judgment of Taste only as subjective . . 59 
 
 § 9. Investigation of the question whether in a judgment 
 of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes or follows 
 the judging of the object . . .63 
 
 Third Moment of judgments of taste according to the relation 
 of the purposes which are brought into consideration 
 in them . . . . . .67 
 
 § 10. Of purposiveness in general . . . .67 
 
 § II. The judgment of taste has nothing at its basis but 
 the form of the purposiveness of an object (or of its 
 mode of representation) . . 69 
 
 §12. The judgment of taste rests on <?/!'«■(';/ grounds . 70 
 
 § 13. The pure judgment of taste is independent of charm 
 
 and emotion . . . .72 
 
 § 14. Elucidation by means of examples . . -73 
 
 § 1 5. The judgment of taste is quite independent of the 
 
 concept of perfection . . . -77 
 
 § 1 6. The judgment of taste, by which an object is declared 
 to be beautiful under the condition of a definite 
 concept, is not pure . . .81 
 
 §17. Of the Ideal of Beauty . . . .84 
 
 Fourth Moment of the judgment of taste, according to the 
 
 modality of the satisfaction in the object . .91 
 
 ,^ 18. What the modality in a judgment of taste is . 91 
 
 § 19. The subjective necessity which we ascribe to the 
 
 judgment of taste is conditioned . . .92 
 
 § 20. The condition of necessity which a judgment of 
 
 taste asserts is the Idea of a common sense 92 
 
 § 21. Have we ground for presupposing a common sense ? 93 
 
 %12. The necessity of the universal agreement that is 
 thought in a judgment of taste is a subjective 
 necessity, which is represented as objective under 
 the presupposition of a common sense . . 94
 
 CONTENTS vu 
 
 General remark on the first section of the Analytic . . 96 
 
 Second Book. — Analytic of the Subhme . . .101 
 
 § 23. Transition from the faculty which judges of the 
 
 Beautiful to that which judges of the Sublime . loi 
 
 § 24. Of the divisions of an investigation into the feeling of 
 
 the Subhme . . . . .105 
 
 A. — Of the Mathematically Sublime . . . .106 
 
 §25. Explanation of the term " Sublime " . .106 
 
 § 26. Of that estimation of the magnitude of natural things 
 
 which is requisite for the Idea of the Sublime . 1 10 
 
 § 27. Of the quality of the satisfaction in our judgments 
 
 upon the Sublime . . . . .119 
 
 B. — Of the Dynamically Sublime in Nature . . .123 
 
 §28. Of Nature regarded as Might . . .' 123 
 
 § 29. Of the modality of the judgment upon the sublime in 
 
 nature . . . . . .130 
 
 General re7nark upon the exposition of the gesthetical reflective 
 
 Judgment . . . . . .132 
 
 Z>^^z^f//c;/ of [pure] sesthetical judgments . . .150 
 
 § 30. The Deduction of sesthetical judgments on the objects 
 of nature must not be directed to what we call 
 Subhme in nature, but only to the Beautiful 
 
 § 31. Of the method of deduction of judgments of taste 
 
 § 32. First peculiarity of the judgment of taste 
 
 § 33. Second peculiarity of the judgment of taste . 
 
 § 34. There is no objective principle of taste possible 
 
 § 35. The principle of Taste is the subjective principle of 
 
 Judgment in general . . . .161 
 
 § 36. Of the problem of a Deduction of judgments of Taste 162 
 
 § 37. What is properly asserted a priori of an object in a 
 judgment of taste .... 
 
 §38. Deduction of judgments of taste 
 
 § 39. Of the communicability of a sensation 
 
 § 40. Of taste as a kind of sensus co7nniunis 
 
 § 41. Of the empirical interest in the Beautiful 
 
 § 42. Of the intellectual interest in the Beautiful . 
 
 § 43. Of Art in general .... 
 
 § 44. Of beautiful Art .... 
 
 § 45. Beautiful art is an art in so far as it seems like nature 187 
 
 §46. Beautiful art is the art of genius . . .188 
 
 150 
 
 152 
 154 
 157 
 159 
 
 164 
 165 
 167 
 169 
 
 173 
 176 
 
 183 
 185
 
 vnn 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 §47. 
 
 §48- 
 §49- 
 § SO- 
 
 §51. 
 
 §5-- 
 
 §53. 
 
 .^ 54. 
 
 Elucidation and confirmation of the above explanation 
 
 of Genius ..... 
 Of the relation of Genius to Taste 
 Of the faculties of the mind that constitute Genius 
 Of the combination of Taste with Genius in the product 
 
 of beautiful Art .... 
 Of the division of the beautiful arts . 
 Of the combination of beautiful arts in one and the 
 
 same product .... 
 
 Comparison of the respective assthetical worth of the 
 
 beautiful arts .... 
 
 Remark 
 
 Second Division. — Dialectic of the ^-Esthetical Judgment 
 
 .^55 
 
 § 56. Representation of the antinomy of Taste 
 
 § 57. Solution of the antinomy of Taste 
 
 .$ 58. Of the Idealism of the purposiveness of both Nature 
 and Art as the unique principle of the ssthetical 
 Judgment ..... 
 
 § 59. Of Beauty as the s>Tnbol of Moralit>- 
 
 § 60. Appendix. — Of the method of Taste 
 
 Second P.\rt. — Kritik of the Teleological Judgment 
 ?: 6 1 . Of the objective purposiveness of Nature 
 
 First Division. — Analytic of the Teleological Judgment 
 
 .^ 62. Of the objective purposiveness which is merely formal 
 
 as distinguished from that which is material 
 .^ 63. Of the relative, as distinguished fi-om the inner 
 
 purposiveness of nature 
 § 64. Of the peculiar character of things as natural purposes 
 § 65. Things regarded as natural purposes are organised 
 
 beings ..... 
 §■ 66. Of the principle of judging of internal purposiveness 
 
 in organised beings .... 
 
 § 67. Of the principle of the teleological judging of nature 
 
 in general as a system of purposes . 
 § 68. Of the principle of Teleolog>' as internal principle of 
 
 natural science 
 
 P.\GE 
 
 190 
 
 193 
 197 
 
 205 
 206 
 
 213 
 
 -15 
 220 
 
 229 
 
 229 
 230 
 231 
 
 241 
 Z48 
 
 259 
 262 
 
 262 
 
 268 
 272 
 
 -75 
 280 
 
 282 
 
 287
 
 CONTENTS IX 
 
 FACE 
 
 Second Division.— Dialectic of the Teleological Judgment . 292 
 § 69. WTiat is an antinomy of the Judgment ? . .292 
 
 §70. Representation of this antinomy . . . 293 
 
 § 71. Preliminary- to the solution of the above antinomy . 296 
 § 72. Of the different systems which deal with the purposive- 
 
 ness of Nature ..... 298 
 
 ^Tl. None of the above systems give what they pretend . 302 
 
 § 74. The reason that we cannot treat the concept of a 
 Technic of nature dogmatically is the fact that a 
 natural purpose is inexplicable . . . 306 
 
 § 75. The concept of an objective purposiveness of nature 
 is a critical principle of Reason for the reflective 
 Judgment ...... 309 
 
 § 76. Remark . . . . ■ l^l 
 
 %T]. Of the peculiarit)^ of the human Understanding by 
 means of which the concept of a natural purpose is 
 possible . . . . . -319 
 
 § 78. Of the union of the principle of the universal 
 mechanism of matter with the teleological principle 
 in the Technic of nature . . . .326 
 
 Appendix. — Methodology' of the Teleological Judgment . 334 
 
 § 79. Whether Teleology' must be treated as if it belonged to 
 
 the doctrine of nature .... 334 
 
 § 80. Of the necessary- subordination of the mechanical to 
 the teleological principle in the explanation of a 
 thing as a natural purpose . . . • o"^^ 
 
 § 81. Of the association of mechanism with the teleological 
 principle in the explanation of a natural purpose as a 
 natiu-al product ..... 342 
 
 § 82. Of the teleological system in the external relations of 
 
 organised beings ..... 346 
 
 § 83. Of the ultimate purpose of nature as a teleological 
 
 system ...... 352 
 
 § 84. Of the final purpose of the existence of a world, i.e. 
 
 of creation itself . . . . -359 
 
 §85. Of Physico-theologjf .... 362
 
 X CONTENTS 
 
 § 86. Of Ethico-theology ..... 370 
 
 g 87. Of the moral proof of the Being of God . 377 
 
 § 88. Limitation of the validity of the moral proof . . 384 
 
 § 89. Of the use of the moral argument . . . 392 
 
 § 90. Of the kind of belief in a teleological proof of the 
 
 Being of God . . . ' . . 395 
 
 ^ 91, Of the kind of belief produced by a practical faith 403 
 (J^/zfra/ r<?;«rtr^ on Teleology . . . .414
 
 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 
 
 There are not wanting indications that public in- 
 terest in the Critical Philosophy has been quickened 
 of recent days in these countries, as well as in 
 America. To lighten the toil of penetrating through 
 the wilderness of Kant's long sentences, the English 
 student has now many aids, which those who 
 began their studies fifteen or twenty years ago did 
 not enjoy. Translations, paraphrases, criticisms, 
 have been published in considerable numbers ; so 
 that if it is not yet true that " he who runs may 
 read," it may at least be said that a patient student 
 of ordinary industry and intelligence has his way 
 made plain before him. And yet the very number 
 of aids is dangerous. Whatever may be the value 
 of short and easy handbooks in other departments of 
 science, it is certain that no man will become a 
 philosopher, no man will even acquire a satisfactory 
 knowledge of the history of philosophy, without 
 personal and prolonged study of the ipsissima verba 
 of the great masters of human thought. " Above 
 all," said Schopenhauer, " my truth-seeking young 
 friends, beware of letting our professors tell you
 
 xii A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 what is contained in the Kritik of the Pure Reason " ; 
 and the advice has not become less wholesome with 
 the lapse of years. The fact, however, that many- 
 persons have not sufficient familiarity with German 
 to enable them to study German Philosophy in the 
 original with ease, makes translations an educa- 
 tional necessity ; and this translation of Kant's 
 Kritik of the faculty of Judgment has been under- 
 taken in the hope that it may promote a more 
 general study of that masterpiece. If any reader 
 wishes to follow Schopenhauer's advice, he has only 
 to omit the whole of this prefatory matter and 
 proceed at once to the Author's laborious Intro- 
 duction. 
 
 It is somewhat surprising that the Kritik of 
 Judgment has never yet been made accessible to 
 the English reader. Dr. Watson has indeed trans- 
 lated a few selected passages, so also has Dr. Caird 
 in his valuable account of the Kantian philosophy, 
 and I have found their renderincrs of considerable 
 service ; but the space devoted by both writers to 
 the Kritik of Judgment is very small in comparison 
 with that given to the Kritiks of Pure and Practical 
 Reason. And yet the work is not an unimportant 
 one. Kant himself regarded it as the coping-stone 
 of his critical edifice ; it even formed the point of 
 I departure for his successors, Fichte, Schelling and 
 ! Hegel, in the construction of their respective 
 systems. Possibly the reason of its comparative 
 neglect lies in its repulsive style. Kant was never 
 careful of style, and in his later years he became
 
 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION Xlll 
 
 more and more enthralled by those technicalities 
 and refined distinctions which deter so many from 
 the Critical Philosophy even in its earlier sections. 
 These "symmetrical architectonic amusements," as 
 Schopenhauer called them, encumber every page of 
 Kant's later writings, and they are a constant source 
 of embarrassment to his unhappy translator. For, 
 as every translator knows, no single word in one 
 language exactly covers any single word in another ; 
 and yet if Kant's distinctions are to be preserved it 
 is necessary to select with more or less arbitrariness 
 English equivalents for German technical terms, and 
 retain them all through. Instances of this will be 
 given later on ; I only remark here on the fact that 
 Kant's besetting sin of over-technicality is especi- 
 ally conspicuous in this treatise. 
 
 Another fault — an old fault of Kant — apparent 
 after reading even a few pages, is that repetitions 
 are very frequent of the same thought in but slightly 
 varied language. Arguments are repeated over and 
 over again until they become quite wearisome ; and 
 then when the reader's attention has flagged, and 
 he is glancing cursorily down the page, some im- , 
 portant new point is introduced without emphasis, 
 as if the author w^ere really anxious to keep his 
 meaning to himself at all hazards. A book written 
 in such fashion rarely attracts a wide circle of 
 readers. And yet, not only did Goethe think 
 highly of it, but it received a large measure of 
 attention in France as well as in Germany on its 
 first appearance. Originally published at Berlin in
 
 xiv KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 1790, a Second Edition was called for in 1793 ; and 
 a French translation was made by Imhoft" in 1796. 
 Other French versions are those by Keratry and 
 W'eyland in 1823, and by Barni in 1846. This 
 last I have had before me while performing my 
 task, but I have not found it of much service ; the 
 older French translations I have not seen. The 
 existence of these French versions, when taken in 
 connection with the absence until very recently of 
 any systematic account of the Kritik of Judgment 
 in English, may be perhaps explained by the lively 
 interest that was taken on the Continent in the 
 Philosophy of Art in the early part of the century ; 
 whereas scientific studies on this subject received 
 little attention in England during the same period. 
 
 The student of the Kritik of Pure Reason will 
 remember how closely, in his Transcendental Logic, 
 Kant follows the lines of the ordinary logic of the 
 schools. He finds his whole plan ready made for 
 him, as it were ; and he proceeds to work out the 
 metaphysical principles which underlie the process 
 of syllogistic reasoning. And as there are three 
 propositions in every syllogism, he points out that, 
 in correspondence with this triplicity,[_the higher 
 faculties of the soul may be regarded as threefold. 
 The Understanding or the faculty of concepts 
 gives us our major premiss, as it supplies us in 
 the first instance with a general notion. By means 
 of the Judgment we see that a particular case comes 
 under the general rule, and by the Reason we draw 
 our conclusion. / These, as three distinct move-
 
 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION xv 
 
 ments in the process of reasoning, are regarded by 
 Kant as indicating three distinct faculties, with 
 which the Analytic of Concepts, the Analytic of 
 Principles, and the Dialectic are respectively con- 
 cerned. The full significance of this important 
 classification does not seem, however, to have 
 occurred to Kant at the time, as we may see from 
 the order in which he wrote his great books.^ The 
 first problem which arrests the attention of all 
 modern philosophers is, of course, the problem of 
 knowledge, its conditions and its proper objects. 
 And in the Kritik of Pure Reason this is dis- 
 cussed, and the conclusion is reached that nature as 
 phenomenon is the only object of which we can 
 hope to acquire any exact knowledge. But it is 
 apparent that there are other problems which merit 
 consideration ; a complete philosophy includes prac- 
 tice as well as theory ; it has to do not only with 
 logic, but with life. And thus the Kritik of Practical 
 Reason was written, in which is unfolded the doctrine 
 of man's freedom standing in sharp contrast with the 
 necessity of natural law. Here, then, it seems at 
 first siofht as if we had covered the whole field of 
 human activity. For we have investigated the 
 sources of knowledge, and at the same time have 
 pointed out the conditions of practical life, and have 
 seen that the la\vs of freedom are just as true in their 
 own sphere as are the laws of nature. 
 
 1 Dr. Caird {Critical Philosophy of Kant, vol. ii. p. 406) has given 
 an instructive account of the gradual development in Kant's mind of 
 the main idea of the Kritik of Judgment.
 
 xvi A' A NT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 But as wc reflect on our mental states we find 
 that here no proper account has been given of the 
 phenomena oi feeling, which play so large a part in 
 experience. And this Kant saw before he had pro- 
 ceeded very far with the Kritik of Practical Reason ; 
 and in consequence he adopted a threefold classifi- 
 cation of the higher mental faculties based on that 
 given by previous psychologists. Knowledge, feel- 
 ing, desire, these are the three ultimate modes of 
 consciousness, of which the second has not yet been 
 described. And when we compare this with the 
 former triple division which we took up from the 
 Aristotelian logic, we see that the parallelism is 
 significant. ,' Understanding is par excellence the 
 faculty of knowledge, and Reason the faculty of 
 desire (these points are developed in Kant's 
 first two Kritiks). And this suggests that the 
 Judgment corresponds to the feeling of pleasure 
 and pain ; it occupies a position intermediate be- 
 tween Understanding and Reason, just as, roughly 
 speaking, the feeling of pleasure is intermediate 
 between our perception of an object and our desire 
 to possess it. 
 
 /And so the Kritik of Judgment completes the 
 'whole undertaking of criticism ; its endeavour is to 
 show that there are a priori principles at the basis 
 of Judgment just as there are in the case of Under- 
 standing and of Reason ; that these principles, like 
 the principles of Reason, are not constitutive but 
 only regulative of experience, i.e. that they do not 
 teach us anything positive about the characteristics
 
 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION xvil 
 
 of objects, but only indicate the conditions under 
 which we find it necessary to view them ; and 
 lastly, that we are thus furnished with an a priori 
 philosophy of pleasure. 
 
 The fundamental principle underlying the pro- 
 cedure of the Judgment is seen to be that of the 
 purposiyeness of Nature ; nature is every w^here 
 adapted to ends or purposes, and thus constitutes 
 a ATocr/io?, a well-ordered whole. By this means, 
 nature is regarded by us as if its particular empirical 
 laws were not isolated and disparate, but connected 
 and in relation, deriving their unity in seeming 
 diversity from an intelligence which is at the source 
 of nature. It is only by the assumption of such a 
 principle that we can construe nature to ourselves ; 
 and the principle is then said to be a transcendental 
 condition of the exercise of our judging faculty, but 
 valid only for the reflective, not for the determinant 
 Judgment. It gives us pleasure to view nature in 
 this way ; just as the contemplation of chaos would 
 be painful. '\ 
 
 But this purposiveness may be only formal and ^ 
 subjective, or real and objective. In some cases the 
 purposiveness resides in the felt harmony and 
 accordance of the form of the object with the cog- 
 nitive faculties ; in others the form of the object is 
 judged to harmonise with the purpose in view in its 
 existence. That is to say, in the one case, we judge 
 the form of the object to be purposive, as in the 
 case of a flower, but could not explain any purpose 
 served by it ; in the other case we have a definite 
 
 b
 
 xviii AAXT'S £:JtITI£: OF JCDGMEXT 
 
 notion of what it is adapted for. In the former case 
 the aesthetical Judgment is brought to bear, in the 
 latter the teleological ; and it thus appears that the 
 Kritik of Judgment has two main divisions ; it treats 
 first of the philosophy of Taste, the Beautiful and 
 the Sublime in Nature : and secondly, of the Teleo- 
 losTV* of nature's workinor. It is a curious literar\' 
 parallel that S. Augustine hints {Con/essiofts iv. 15) 
 that he had written a book, De Pukhro et Apto, in 
 which these apparently distinct topics were com- 
 bined : "pulchrum esse, quod per se ipsum ; 
 aptum, autem, quod ad aliquid accommodatum 
 decereL" A beautiful object has no purpose 
 external to itself and the obser\-er ; but a useful 
 object ser\es further ends. Both, however, may be 
 brought under the higher categor}- of things that are 
 reckoned ^w/^tpj/r^ by the Judgment 
 
 We have here then, in the first place, a basis for 
 an a priori Philoscphy of Taste : and Kant works 
 out its details with great elaboration. He borrowed 
 little from the writings of his predecessors, but 
 struck out, as was ever his plan, a line of his own. 
 He quotes with approval from Burke's Treatise on 
 the ^ :€ arid Beautiful, which was accessible to 
 
 him in a German translation ; but is careful to 
 remark that it is as psycholog\% not as philosophy, 
 that Burke's work has value. He may have read 
 in addition Hutchesons Inquiry which had also 
 been translated into German ; and he was complete 
 master of Hume's opinions. O^ other writers on 
 Beauty, he only names Batteux and Lessing.
 
 EDITOR'S niTRCDCCTICJi- 
 
 ■mr 
 
 Batteux ; i 
 
 T7— ^ _U . ■>,_ 
 
 r ■m 
 
 rrencn wnter •:. r-z 
 
 . : •'» iiO udBU 
 
 attemct^I - . 
 
 ' :'^ arrai^enient oi ; 
 
 . _ _ m ^ 
 
 they may be £>ro«^ht: under Spac^ ' r. 
 
 : ' A liicC 
 
 re^jectnrelv, a mode <rf" dassiJE : 
 
 would 
 
 naturally apoe-' 
 
 :: KanL Ht ; 
 
 -m. 
 
 however, to L; 
 
 S-v^ r-L : ' ■ ■ ' -' " 
 
 -^ - . .- 
 
 on the subjfrt- 
 
 to ^- 
 
 r ' ' 
 
 IT ,-:- 
 
 
 - - . _ 
 
 . 
 
 
 - 
 
 (1.:- . -,r 
 
 -" • - ' . - ^--- ^ 
 
 -' -.;--. 
 
 IS accorcLiiLi;' tc 
 
 r : : ' : Sioil ; 1 
 
 - 
 
 had been - " 
 
 ; - - - _ 
 
 ' - . : ; : : : 
 
 as Hurch- - 
 
 Moses ::r- 
 
 - As :: 
 
 qmantity, the juf 
 
 
 
 r ------ ----■. ~ - 
 
 ^ — ^. ; ^ 
 
 satisfarriofi, al: 
 
 - it is ba^z - 
 
 'I i-:::i::t 
 
 concqpt. Ih- 
 
 --ivtrsilitv- is :-'y 
 
 subjective; 
 
 but still it is : - ^: 
 
 "t. _ -' - ~ 1 ; ~ _ "j^iii 
 
 sauiquemqme 
 
 vohtptas d:-r5 r. : 
 
 ------ - - - - - = — -= 
 
 1^ red by 
 
 a pure judgir - : 
 
 _: _ V. ^v5 ID 
 
 r£*,iium, the 
 
 rharartpri«;rir n- 
 
 ^L -"- — -- -- --- -- -- 
 
 - - -- _-_-. :_ 
 
 beiravs a pun 
 
 
 
 ~_ J..:; .... _. _^ 
 
 .:- ': ^Tz<ysiz. 
 
 The oleasure is 
 
 --ifiit 
 
 c' :-r :-t 
 
 ih:.: -.-'.:\z^. ■ -\:: 
 
 - " -— Wj/l^i^" 'i' -irt ~ 
 
 ----- ' ~ 
 
 y.\:/. :z. \\ C7 
 
 : -- -1 ~r -tr- hi 
 
 - -. '; z 
 
 Bv r ; isrinc:" 
 
 r r, : . 7 . .7 ~-7. ~ 
 
 -- ^ r . ~~ _ 
 
 beautv. whic^ v 
 
 : :-.r : "-...: V : i^ t5 
 
 : : H - : " - 
 
 sir Kant i-tz: 
 
 --- it - - - ; 
 
 - - ; ; - - t
 
 XX K'ANrS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 freedom of the pure judgment of taste from the 
 thraldom of concepts, 
 ^/ f Finally, the satisfaction afforded by the contem- 
 plation of a beautiful object is a necessary satisfaction. 
 This necessity is not, to be sure, theoretical like the 
 necessity attaching to the Law of Causality; nor is it a 
 practical necessity as is the need to assume the Moral 
 Law as the guiding principle of conduct. But it may 
 be called exemplary ; that is, we may set up our satis- 
 faction in a beautiful picture as setting an example 
 to be followed by others. It is plain, however, that 
 this can only be assumed under certain presupposi- 
 tions. 1 We must presuppose the idea of a sensus coni- 
 iminis or common sense in which all men share. As 
 knowledge admits of being communicated to others, 
 so also does the feeling for beauty. For the relation 
 between the cognitive faculties requisite for Taste 
 is also requisite for Intelligence or sound Under- 
 standing, and as we always presuppose the latter to 
 be the same in others as in ourselves, so may we 
 
 /presuppose the former. 
 / The analysis of the Sublime which follows that 
 j of the Beautiful is interesting and profound ; indeed 
 Schopenhauer regarded it as the best part of the 
 Kritik of the Aesthetical Judgment. ,^The general 
 characteristics of our judgments about the Sublime 
 are similar to those already laid down in the case 
 of the Beautiful ; but there are marked differences 
 in the two cases. If the pleasure taken in beauty 
 arises from a feeling of the purposiveness of the 
 object in its relation to the subject, that in sublimity
 
 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION xxi 
 
 rather expresses a purposiveness of the subject in 
 respect of the object. Nothing in nature is sub- 
 lime ; and the subHmity really resides in the mind 
 and there alone. Indeed, as true Beauty is found, 
 properly speaking, only in beauty of form, the idea 
 of sublimity is excited rather by those objects which 
 are formless and exhibit a violation of purpose. 
 
 A distinction not needed in the case of the 
 Beautiful becomes necessary when we proceed to 
 further analyse the Sublime. For in aesthetical S 
 judgments about the Beautiful the mind is in restful^ 
 contemplation ; but in the case of the Sublime a 
 mental movevient \'s> excited (pp. 105 and 120). This 
 movement, as it is pleasing, must involve a purposive- 
 ness in the harmony of the mental powers ; and the 
 purposiveness may be either in reference to the faculty 
 of cognition or to that of desire. In the former case 
 the sublime is called the Mathematical Sublime — the 
 sublime of mere magnitude — the absolutely great ; in 
 the latter it is the sublime of power, the Dynamically 
 Sublime. Gioberti, an Italian writer on the philo- 
 sophy of Taste, has pushed this distinction so far as 
 to find in it an explanation of the relation between 
 Beauty and Sublimity. " The dynamical Sublime," 
 he says, " creates the Beautiful ; the mathematical 
 Sublime contains it," a remark with w^hich probably 
 Kant would have no quarrel. 
 
 In both cases, however, we find that the feel- 
 ing of the Sublime awakens in us a feeling of 
 the supersensible destination of man, " The very 
 capacity of conceiving the sublime," he tells us,
 
 ■u 
 
 ^''^ 
 
 xxii A'ANT'S KKITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 " indicates a mental faculty that far surpasses 
 every standard of sense." And to explain the 
 necessity belonging to our judgments about the 
 sublime, Kant points out that as we find ourselves 
 compelled to postulate a scnstis comnmnis to account 
 for the agreement of men in their appreciation of 
 beautiful objects, so the principle underlying their 
 ^^ consent in judging of the sublime is "the presup- 
 position of the moral feeling in man." Thejeeling 
 of the sublimity of our own moral destination is the 
 necessary prerequisite for forming such judgments. 
 The connection between Beauty and Goodness in- 
 volved to a Greek in the double sense of the word 
 KoXov is developed by Kant with keen insight. To 
 feel interest in the beauty of Nature he regards 
 as a mark of a moral disposition, though he will not 
 admit that the same inference may be drawn as 
 to the character of the art connoisseur (§ 42). But 
 it is specially with reference to the connection be- 
 tween the capacity for appreciating the Sublime, and 
 the moral feeling, that the originality of Kant's treat- 
 ment becomes apparent. 
 
 The objects of nature, he continues, which we 
 call sublime, inspire us with a feeling of pain rather 
 than of pleasure ; as Lucretius has it — 
 
 Me quaedaiii divina voluptas 
 Percipit atquc horror. 
 
 But this " horror " must not inspire actual fear. 
 As no extraneous charm must mingle with the 
 satisfaction felt in a beautiful object, if the judg-
 
 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION xxiu 
 
 S /U h; .f^ 
 
 ment about beauty is to remain pure ; so in the ^"7. 
 case of the sublime we must not be afraid of the 
 object which y^et i n certa in aspects is fearful. 
 
 This conception of the feelings of sublimity 
 excited by the loneliness of an Alpine peak or the 
 grandeur of an earthquake is now a familiar one ; 
 but it was not so in Kant's day. Switzerland had 
 not then become the recreation-ground of Europe ; 
 and though natural beauty was a familiar topic with 
 poets and painters it was not generally recognised 
 that taste has also to do with the sublime. De 
 Saussure's Travels, Haller's poem Die Alpen, and 
 this work of Kant's mark the beginning of a new 
 epoch in our ways of looking at the sublime and 
 terrible aspects of Nature. And It is not a little 
 remarkable that the man who could write thus 
 feelingly about the emotions inspired by grand and 
 savage scenery, had never seen a mountain in 
 his life. The power and the insight of his 
 observations here are in marked contrast to the 
 poverty of some of his remarks about the character-) 
 istics of beauty. For instance, he puts forward the/w^a^ 
 curious doctrine that colour in a picture is only an 
 extraneous charm, and does not really add to the 
 beauty of the form delineated, nay rather distracts 
 the mind from it. His criticisms on this point, if) 
 sound, would make Flaxman a truer artist than 
 Titian or Paolo Veronese. But indeed his discussion 
 of Painting or Music is not very appreciative ; he 
 was, to the end, a creature of pure Reason. 
 
 Upon the analysis he gives of the Arts, little
 
 xxiv KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 need be said here. Fine Art is regarded as the 
 Art of Genius, " that innate mental disposition 
 through which Nature gives the rule to Art" ({:j 46). 
 Art dift'ers from Science in the absence of definite 
 concepts in the mind of the artist. It thus happens 
 that the great artist can rarely communicate his 
 methods ; indeed he cannot explain them even to 
 himself. Poeta nasciiur, non Jit ; and the same is 
 true in every form of fine art. Genius is, in short, 
 the faculty of presenting aesthetical Ideas ; an 
 aesthetical Idea being an intuition of the Imagina- 
 tion, to which no concept is adequate. And it 
 is by the excitation of such ineffable Ideas that a 
 great work of art affects us.J As Bacon tells us, 
 " that is the best part of Beauty which a picture 
 cannot express ; no, nor the first sight of the eye." 
 This characteristic of the artistic genius has been 
 noted by all who have thought upon art ; more is 
 present in its productions than can be perfectly 
 expressed in language. As Pliny said of Timanthus 
 the painter of Iphigenia, " In omnibus ejus operibus 
 intelligitur plus super quam pingitur." But this 
 genius requires to be kept in check by taste ; quite 
 in the spirit of the acocppoavvrj of the best Greek art, 
 Kant remarks that if in a work of art some feature 
 must be sacrificed, it is better to lose something of 
 genius than to violate the canons of taste. It is in 
 this self-mastery that "the sanity of true genius" 
 expresses itself. 
 
 The main question with which the Kritik of 
 Judgment is concerned is, of course, the question as
 
 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION xxv 
 
 to the purposiveness, the Zweckmcissigkeit, exhibited], xg^xw 
 by nature. That nature appears to be full of - 
 purpose is mere matter of fact. It displays pur- 
 posiveness in respect of our faculties of cognition, 
 in those of its phenomena which we designate 
 beautiful. And also in its organic products we 
 observe methods of operation which we can only 
 explain by describing them as processes in which 
 means are used to accomplish certain ends, as 
 processes that are purposive. Sin our observation 
 of natural phenomena, as Kuno Fischer puts it, we 
 judge their forms aesthetically, and their life teleo- 
 logically.^ ^ 
 
 As regards the first kind of Zweckmdssigkeit, 
 that which is ohne Zweck — the p urposiveness of a 
 beautiful object which does not seem to be direct ed 
 to any external end — there are two ways in which we 
 may account for it. We may either say that it was 
 actually designed to be beautiful by the Supreme 
 Force behind Nature, or we may say that purposive- 
 ness is not really resident in nature, but that our 
 perception of it is due to the subjective needs of our . 
 judging faculty. We have to contemplate beautiful 
 objects as z/"they were purposive, but they may not 
 be so in reality. And this latter idealistic doctrine is 
 what Kant falls back upon. He appeals in support 
 of it, to the phenomena of crystallisation (pp. 243 
 ^^^.), ,in which many very beautiful forms seem 
 to be produced by merely mechanical processes, i 
 The beauty of a rock crystal is apparently produced) 
 without any forethought on the part of nature, and
 
 xxvi A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 he urges that we are not justified in asserting 
 dogmatically that any laws distinct from those of 
 mechanism are needed to account for beauty in 
 other cases. Mechanism can do so much ; may it 
 not do all ? And he brinc^s forward as a considera- 
 tion which ought to settle the question, the fact that 
 in judging of beauty " we invariably seek its gauge 
 /// ourselves a pinori'' ; we do not learn from nature, 
 but from ourselves, what we are to find beautiful. 
 Mr. Kennedy in his Donnellan Lectures has here 
 pointed out several weak spots in Kant's armour. In 
 the first place, the fact that we seek the gauge of 
 beauty in our own mind "may be shown from his 
 own definition to be a necessary result of the very 
 nature of beauty." ^ For Kant tells us that the 
 aesthetical judgment about beauty always involves 
 "a reference of the representation to the subject" ; 
 and this applies equally to judgments about the 
 beautiful in Art and the beautiful in Nature. But 
 no one could maintain that from this definition it 
 follows that we are not compelled to postulate design 
 in the mind of the artist who paints a beautiful 
 picture. And thus as the fact that " we always seek 
 the gauge of beauty " in ourselves does not do away 
 with the belief in a designing mind when we are 
 contemplating works of art, it cannot be said to 
 exclude the belief in a Master Hand which moulded 
 the forms of Nature. As Cicero has it, nature is 
 " non artificiosa solum, sed plane artifex." But the 
 cogency of this reasoning, for the details of which I 
 
 1 Natural Theology and Modern Thought^ p. 158.
 
 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION xxvil 
 
 must refer the reader to Mr. Kennedy's pages, 
 becomes more apparent when we reflect on that 
 second form of purposiveness, viz. adaptation to 
 definite ends, with which we meet in the phenomena 
 of organic Hfe. 
 
 If we watch, e.g., the growth of a tree we per- 
 ceive that its various parts are not isolated and 
 unconnected, but that on the contrary they are only 
 possible by reference to the idea of the whole. Each 
 limb affects every other, and is reciprocally affected by 
 it ; in short "in such a product of nature every part not 
 only exists by means of the other parts, but is thought 
 as existing y^r//^^ sake <9/"the others and the whole " 
 (p. 277). The operations of nature in organised 
 bodies seem to be of an entirely different character 
 from mere mechanical processes ; we cannot construe 
 them to ourselves except under the hypothesis that 
 nature in them is working towards a designed end. 
 The distinction between nature's " Technic " or 
 purposive operation, and nature's Mechanism is 
 fundamental for the explanation of natural law. 
 The language of biology eloquently shows the 
 impossibility of eliminating at least the idea of 
 purpose from our investigations into the phenomena 
 of life, growth, and reproduction. And Kant dis- 
 misses with scant respect that cheap and easy 
 philosophy which would fain deny the distinctive- 
 ness of nature's purposive operation. A doctrine, 
 like that of Epicurus, in which every natural pheno- 
 menon is regarded as the result of the blind drifting 
 of atoms in accordance with purely mechanical laws,
 
 xxvili KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 really explains nothing, and least of all explains 
 that illusion in our teleological judgments which 
 leads us to assume purpose where really there is 
 none. 
 
 It has been urged by Kirchmann and others 
 that this distinction between Technic and Mechanism, 
 on which Kant lays so much stress, has been dis- 
 proved by the progress of modern science. The 
 doctrines, usually associated with the name of 
 Darwin, of Natural Selection and Survival of the 
 Fittest, quite sufficiently explain, it is said, on 
 mechanical principles the semblance of purpose with 
 which nature mocks us. The presence of order is 
 not due to any purpose behind the natural operation, 
 .but to the inevitable disappearance of the disorderly. 
 It would be absurd, of course, to claim for Kant 
 that he anticipated the Darwinian doctrines of 
 
 elopment ; and yet passages are not wanting in 
 ritings in which he takes a view of the con- 
 tinuity of species with which modern science would 
 have little fault to find. "Nature organises itself 
 and its organised products in every species, no 
 doubt after one general pattern but yet with suitable 
 deviations, which self-preservation demands accord- 
 ing to circumstances" (p. 279). "The analogy of 
 forms, which with all their differences seem to have 
 been produced according to a common original type, 
 strengthens our suspicions of an actual relationship 
 between them in their production from a common 
 parent, through the gradual approximation of one 
 animal genus to another — from those in which the 
 
 r tnat 
 Jli^devel 
 y/ i his w
 
 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION xxix 
 
 principle of purposes seems to be best authenticated, 
 2.e. from man, down to the polype and again from 
 this down to mosses and lichens, and finally to crude 
 matter. And so the w^hole Technic of nature, which 
 is so incomprehensible to us in organised beings 
 that we believe ourselves compelled to think a 
 different principle for it, seems to be derived from 
 matter and its powers according to mechanical laws 
 (like those by which it works in the formation of 
 crystals) " (p. 2iZl)- Such a theory he calls " a daring 
 venture of reason," and its coincidences with modern 
 science are real and striking. But he is careful to 
 add that such a theory, even if established, would 
 n®t eliminate purpose from the universe ; it would 
 indeed suggest that certain special processes having 
 the semblance of purpose may be elucidated on 
 mechanical principles, but on the whole, purposive 
 ©peration on the part of Mother Nature it would 
 still be needful to assume (p. 338). " No finite 
 Reason can hope to understand the production of 
 even a blade of grass by mere mechanical causes" 
 (p. 326). " It is absurd to hope that another Newton 
 will arise in the future who shall make comprehen- 
 sible by us the production of a blade of grass 
 accordinsf to natural laws which no desion has 
 •rdered" (p. 312). 
 
 Crude materialism thus affording no explanation 
 of the purposiveness in nature, we go on to ask 
 what other theories are logically possible. We may 
 dismiss at once the doctrine of Hylozoism, accord- 
 ing to which the purposes in nature are explained
 
 XXX A'ANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 in reference to a world-soul, which is the inner 
 principle of the material universe and constitutes its 
 life. For such a doctrine is self-contradictory, inas- 
 much as lifelessness, inertia, is the essential charac- 
 teristic of matter, and to talk of living matter is 
 absurd (p. 304). A much more plausible system is 
 that of Spinoza, who aimed at establishing the ideality 
 of the principle of natural purposes. He regarded 
 the world whole as a complex of manifold determi- 
 nations inhering in a single simple substance ; and 
 thus reduced our concepts of the purposive in nature 
 to our own consciousness of existing in an all-em- 
 bracing Being. But on reflection we see that this 
 does not so much explain as explain away the pur- 
 posiveness of nature ; it gives us an unity of inher- 
 ence in one Substance, but not an unity of causal 
 dependence on one Substance (p. 303). And this 
 latter would be necessary in order to explain the 
 unity of purpose which nature exhibits in its pheno- 
 menal working. Spinozism, therefore, does not give 
 what it pretends to give ; it puts us off with a vague 
 and unfruitful unity of ground, when what we seek 
 is an unity that shall itself contain the causes of the 
 differences manifest in nature. 
 
 We have left then as the only remaining possible 
 doctrine, Theism, which represents natural purposes 
 as produced in accordance with the Will and Design 
 of an Intelligent Author and Governor of Nature. 
 This theory is, in the first place, "superior to all 
 other grounds of explanation " (p. 305), for it gives 
 a full solution of the problem before us and enables
 
 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION xxxi 
 
 US to maintain the reality of the Zweckmdssigkeit of 
 nature. "Teleology finds the consummation of its 
 investigations only in Theology" (p. 311). To re- 
 present the world and the natural purposes therein 
 as produced by an intelligent Cause is "completely 
 satisfactory from every human point of view for 
 both the speculative and practical use of our Reason " 
 (p. 312). Thus the contemplation of natural pur- 
 poses, i.e. the common Argument from Design, 
 enables us to reach a highest Understanding as 
 Cause of the world "in accordance with the principles 
 of the reflective Judgment, i.e. in accordance with the 
 constitution of 02 w human faculty of cognition' (p. 
 
 416). 
 
 It is in this qualifying clause that Kant's nega- 
 tive attitude in respect of Theism betrays itself. 
 He regards it as a necessarv assumption for the 
 guidance of scientific investigation, no less than for 
 the practical needs of morals ; but he does not 
 admit that we can claim for it objective validity. 
 In the laneuaee of the Kritik of Pure Reason, the 
 Idea of God furnishes a regulative, not a constitutive 
 principle of Reason ; or as he prefers to put it in the 
 present work, it is valid only for the reflective, not 
 for the determinant Judgment. We are not justified, 
 Kant maintains, in asserting dogmatically that God 
 exists ; there is only permitted to us the limited 
 formula "We cannot otherwise conceive the pur- 
 posiveness which must lie at the basis of our cognition 
 of the internal possibility of many natural things, 
 than by representing it and the world in general as
 
 xxxii KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 produced by an intelligent cause, i.e. a God " (p. 
 
 We ask then, whence arises this impossibility of 
 objective statement ? It is in the true Kantian 
 spirit to assert that no synthetical proposition can 
 be made with reference to what lies above and 
 behind the world of sense ; but there is a difficulty 
 in carrying out this principle into details. Kant's 
 refusal to infer a designing Hand behind the appa- 
 rent order of nature is based, he tells us, on the fact 
 that the concept of a " natural purpose " is one that 
 cannot be justified to the speculative Reason. For 
 all we know it may only indicate our way of looking 
 at things, and may point to no corresponding object- 
 ive reality. That we are forced by the limited 
 nature of our faculties to view nature as working 
 towards ends, as purposive, does not prove that it is 
 really so. We cannot justify such pretended insight 
 into what is behind the veil. 
 
 It is to be observed, however, that precisely 
 similar arguments might be • urged against our 
 affirmation of purpose, design, will, as the spring of 
 the actions of other human beings.^ For let us 
 consider why it is that, mind being assumed as the 
 basis of our own individual consciousness, we go on 
 to attribute minds of like character to other men. 
 We see that the external behaviour of other men is 
 similar to our own, and that the most reasonable 
 way of accounting for such behaviour is to suppose 
 
 1 I reproduce here in part a paper read before the Victoria 
 Institute in April 1892.
 
 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION xxxiii 
 
 that they have minds like ourselves, that they are 
 possessed of an active and spontaneously energising 
 faculty, which is the seat of their personality. But 
 it is instructive to observe that neither on Kantian 
 principles nor on any other can we demonstrate 
 this ; to cross the chasm which separates one man's 
 personality from another's requires a venture of 
 faith just as emphatically as any theological formula, 
 I can by no means /r^^'^ to the determinant Judg- 
 ment that the complex of sensations which I con- 
 stantly experience, and which I call the Prime 
 Minister, is anything more than a well-ordered 
 machine. It is improbable that this is the case — 
 highly improbable ; but the falsity of such an hypo- 
 thesis cannot be proved in the same way that we 
 would prove the falsity of the assertion that two 
 and two make five. But then though the hypo- 
 thesis cannot be thus ruled out of court by demon- 
 stration of its absurdity, it is not the simplest 
 hypothesis, nor is it that one which best accounts 
 for the facts. The assumption, on the other hand, 
 that the men whom I meet every day have minds 
 like my own, perfectly accounts for all the facts, and 
 is a very simple assumption. It merely extends by 
 induction the sphere of a force which I already know 
 to exist. Or in other words, crude materialism not 
 giving me an intelligent account of my own indivi- 
 dual consciousness, I recognise mind, vov^, as a vera 
 causa, as something which really does produce effects 
 in the field of experience, and which therefore I may 
 legitimately put forward as the cause of those actions 
 
 c
 
 xxxiv KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 of Other men which externally so much resemble my 
 own. But, as has been said before, this argument, 
 though entirely convincing to any sane person, is not 
 demonstrative ; in Kantian language and on Kantian 
 principles the reasoning here used would seem to be 
 valid only for the reflective and not for the deter- 
 minant Judgment. If the principle of design or 
 conscious adaptation of means to ends be not a 
 constitutive principle of experience, but only a 
 regulative principle introduced to account for the 
 facts, what right have we to put it forward dog- 
 matically as affording an explanation of the actions 
 of other human beino^s ? 
 
 It cannot be said that Kant's attempted answer 
 to such a defence of the Design Argument is quite 
 conclusive. In § 90 of the Methodology (p. 309) he 
 pleads that though it is perfectly legitimate to argue 
 by analogy from our own minds to the minds of 
 other men, nay further, although we may conclude 
 from those actions of the lower animals which 
 display plan, that they are not, as Descartes alleged, 
 mere machines — yet it is not legitimate to conclude 
 from the apparent presence of design in the opera- 
 tions of nature that a conscious mind directs those 
 operations. For, he argues, that in comparing the 
 actions of men and the lower animals, or in comparing 
 the actions of one man with those of another, we are 
 not pressing our analogy beyond the limits of experi- 
 ence. Men and beasts alike are finite living beings, 
 subject to the limitations of finite existence ; and 
 hence the law which Qroverns the one series of
 
 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION XXXV 
 
 operations may be regarded by analogy as suffi- 
 ciently explaining the ot;her series. But the power 
 at the basis of Nature is utterly above definition or 
 comprehension, and we are going beyond our 
 legitimate province if we venture to ascribe to it a 
 mode of operation with which we are only conversant 
 in the case of beings subject to the conditions of 
 space and time. He urges in short that when 
 speaking about man and his mind we thoroughly 
 understand what we are talking about ; but in 
 speaking of the Mind of Deity we are dealing with 
 something of which we have no experience, and of 
 which therefore we have no right to predicate any- 
 thing. 
 
 But it is apparent that, as has been pointed out, 
 even when we infer the existence of another finite 
 mind from certain observed operations, we are 
 making an inference about something which is as 
 mysterious an x as anything can be. Mind is not a 
 thing that is subject to the laws and conditions of 
 the world of sense ; it is ''in the world but not of 
 the world." And so to infer the existence of the 
 mind of an) individual except myself is a quite 
 different kind of inference from that by which, for 
 example, we infer the presence of an electro-magnet 
 in a given field. The action of the latter we under- 
 stand to a large extent ; but we do not understand 
 the action of mind, M-hich yet we know from daily 
 experience of ourselves does produce effects in the 
 phenomenal world, often permanent and important 
 effects. Briefly, the action of mind upon matter
 
 xxxvi KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 (to use the ordinai^y phraseology for the sake of 
 clearness) is — we may«as^me for our present pur- 
 pose — an established fact. Hence the causality of 
 mind is a vera causa ; we bring it in to account for 
 the actions of other human beings, and by precisely 
 the same process of reasoning we invoke it to 
 explain the operations of nature. 
 
 And it is altogether beside the point to urge, as 
 Kant does incessantly, that in the latter case the intel- 
 ligence inferred is infinite ; in the former onXy finite. 
 All that the Design Argument undertakes to prove 
 is that mind lies at the basis of nature. It is quite 
 beyond its province to say whether this mind is 
 finite or infinite ; and thus Kant's criticisms on 
 p. 364 are somewhat wide of the mark. There is 
 always a difficulty in any argument which tries to 
 establish the operation of mind anywhere, for mind 
 cannot be seen or touched or felt ; but the difficulty 
 is not peculiar to that particular form of argument 
 with which theoloQ^ical interests are involved. 
 
 The real plausibility of this objection arises from 
 a vague idea, often present to us when we speak of 
 infinite wisdom or infinite intelligence, namely that 
 the epithet infinite in some way alters the meaning 
 of the attributes to which it is applied. But the 
 truth is that the word infinite, when applied to 
 wisdom or knowledge or any other intellectual or 
 moral quality, can only properly have reference to 
 the number of acts of wisdom or knowledge that we 
 suppose to have been performed. The only sense 
 in which we have any right to speak of infinite
 
 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION xxxvil 
 
 wisdom is that it is that which performs an infinite 
 number of wise acts. And so when we speak of 
 infinite intelligence, we have not the shghtest warrant, 
 either in logic or in common sense, for supposing 
 that such intelHgence is not similar in kind to that 
 finite intelligence which we know in man. 
 
 To understand Kant's attitude fully, we must 
 also take into consideration the great weight that 
 he attaches to the Moral Argument for the exist- 
 ence of God. The positive side of his teach- 
 ing on Theism is summed up in the following 
 sentence (p. 388): "For the theoretical reflective 
 Judgment physical Teleology sufficiently proves 
 from the purposes of Nature an intelligent world - 
 cause ; for the practical Judgment moral Teleology 
 establishes it by the concept of a final purpose, 
 which it is forced to ascribe to creation." That 
 side of his system which is akin to Agnosticism 
 finds expression in his determined refusal to admit 
 anything more than this. The existence of God is 
 for him a " thing of faith " ; and is not a fact of know- 
 ledge, strictly so called. " Faith " he holds (p. 409) 
 " is the moral attitude of Reason as to belief in 
 that which is unattainable by theoretical cognition. 
 It is therefore the permanent principle of the mind 
 to assume as true that which it is necessary to pre- 
 suppose as condition of the possibility of the highest 
 moral final purpose." As he says elsewhere (Intro- 
 duction to Logic, ix. p. 60), "That man is morally 
 unbelieving who does not accept that which, though 
 impossible to know, is morally necessary to suppose."
 
 xxxviii KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 And as far as he goes a Theist may agree with 
 him, and he has done yeoman's service to Theism by 
 his insistence on the absolute impossibihty of any 
 other working hypothesis as an explanation of the 
 phenomena of nature. But I have endeavoured to 
 indicate at what points he does not seem to me to 
 have gone as far as even his own declared principles 
 would justify him in going. If the existence of a 
 Supreme Mind be a " thing of faith," this may with 
 equal justice be said of the finite minds of the men 
 all around us ; and his attempt to show that the 
 argument' from analogy is here without foundation is 
 not convincinof. 
 
 Kant, however, in the Kritik of Judgment is 
 sadly fettered by the chains that he himself had 
 forged, and frequently chafes under the restraints 
 they impose. He indicates more than once a point 
 of view higher than that of the Kritik of Pure Reasort, 
 from which the phenomena of life and mind may be 
 contemplated. He had already hinted in that work 
 that the supersensible substrate of the ego and the 
 non-ego might be identical. " Both kinds of objects 
 differ from each other, not internally, but only so far 
 as the one appears external to the other ; possibly 
 what is at the basis of phenomenal matter as a thing 
 in itself may not be so heterogeneous after all as we 
 imagine." ^ This hypothesis which remains a bare 
 undeveloped possibility in the earlier work is put 
 forward as a positive doctrine in the Kritik of Judg- 
 ment. "There must," says Kant, "be a ground 
 
 ^ Kritik of Pure Reason. Dialectic, Bk. ii. chap. i. near the end.
 
 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION xxxix 
 
 of the iuiity of the supersensible, which lies at the 
 basis of nature, with that which the concept of 
 freedom practically contains " (Introduction, p. 12). 
 That is to say, he maintains that to explain the 
 phenomena of organic life and the purposiveness 
 of nature we must hold that the world of sense is not 
 disparate from and opposed to the world of thought, 
 but that nature is the development of fi'eedoni. The 
 connection of nature and freedom is suggested by, \^ 
 
 nay is involved in, the notion of natural adaptation : 
 and althouo^h we can arrive at no knowledg^e of the 
 supersensible substrate of both, yet such a common 
 ground there must be. This principle is the start- 
 ing point of the systems which followed that of Kant ; 
 and the philosophy of later Idealism is little more 
 than a development of the principle in its con- 
 sequences. 
 
 He approaches the same doctrine by a different 
 path in the Kritik of the Teleological Judgment 
 (§ 11)^ where he argues that the distinction between 
 the mechanical and the teleological working of 
 nature, upon which so much stress has been justly 
 laid, depends for its validity upon the peculiar char- 
 acter of our Understanding. When we give what 
 may be called a mechanical elucidation of any 
 natural phenomenon, we begin with its parts, and 
 from what we know of them we explain the whole. 
 But in the case of certain objects, e.g. organised 
 bodies, this cannot be done. In their case we can 
 only account for the parts by a reference to the 
 whole. Now, were it possible for us to perceive a 
 
 ^
 
 ^ 
 
 -J 
 
 xl KANT'S A' KIT! A' OF JUDGMENT 
 
 whole before its parts and derive the latter from the 
 former,' then an organism would be capable of being 
 understood and would be an object of knowledge in 
 the strictest sense. But our Understanding is not 
 able to do this, and its inadequacy for such a task 
 leads us to conceive the possibility of an Under- 
 standing, not discursive like ours, but intuitive, for 
 which knowledge of the whole would precede that 
 of the parts. " It is at least possible to consider the 
 material world as mere phenomenon, and to think 
 as its substrate something like a thing in itself 
 (which is not phenomenon), and to attach to this 
 a corresponding intellectual intuition. Thus there 
 would be, although incognisable by us, a supersensible 
 real ground for nature, to which we ourselves be- 
 long" (p. 325). Hence, although Mechanism and 
 Technic must not be confused and must ever stand 
 side by side in our scientific investigation of natural 
 law, yet must they be regarded as coalescing in a 
 single higher principle incognisable by us. The 
 ground of union is "the supersensible substrate of 
 nature of which we can determine nothing positively, 
 except th^it it is the being in itself of which we 
 merely know the phenomenon." Thus, then, it 
 appears that the whole force of Kant's main argu- 
 ment has proceeded upon an assumption, viz. the 
 permanent opposition between Sense and Under- 
 standing, which the progress of the argument has 
 shown to be unsound. " Kant seems," says Goethe,^ 
 
 1 Cf. Kuno Fischer, A Critique 0/ Kani, p. 142. 
 
 '■^ Quoted by Caird, Critical Philosophy of Kant, \ol. ii. p. 507,
 
 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION xli 
 
 " to have woven a certain element of irony into his 
 method. For, while at one time he seemed to be 
 bent on limiting our faculties of knowledge in the 
 narrowest way, at another time he pointed, as it 
 were with a side gesture, beyond the limits which 
 he himself had drawn." The fact of adaptation of 
 means to ends observable in nature seems to break 
 down the barrier between Nature and Freedom ; 
 and if we once relinquish the distinction between 
 Mechanism and Technic in the operations of nature 
 we are led to the Idea of an absolute Being, who 
 manifests Himself by action which, though necessary, 
 is yet the outcome of perfect freedom. 
 
 Kant, however, though he approaches such a 
 position more than once, can never be said to have 
 risen to it. He deprecates unceasingly the attempt 
 to combine principles of nature with the principles 
 of freedom as a task beyond the modest capacity of 
 human reason ; and while strenuously insisting on 
 the practical force of the Moral iVrgument for the 
 Being of God, which is found in the witness of 
 man's conscience, will not admit that it can in any 
 w^ay be regarded as strengthening the theoreti- 
 cal arguments adduced by Teleology. The two 
 lines of proof, he holds, are quite distinct ; and 
 nothing but confusion and intellectual disaster can 
 result from the effort to combine them. The moral 
 proof stands by itself, and it needs no such crutches 
 as the argument from Design can offer. But, as 
 
 who reiterates this criticism all through his account of Kant's 
 teaching.
 
 xlii A' A NT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 Mr. Kennedy has pointed out in his acute criticism ^ 
 of the Kantian doctrine of Theism, it would not be 
 possible to combine a theoretical disbelief in God 
 with a frank acceptance of the practical belief of 
 His existence borne in upon us by the Moral Law. 
 Kant himself admits this : "A dogmatical tmbelief,'' 
 he says (p. 411), "cannot subsist together with a 
 moral maxim dominant in the mental attitude." 
 That is, though the theoretical argument be incom- 
 plete, we cannot reject the conclusion to which it 
 leads, for this is confirmed by the moral necessities of 
 conscience. 
 
 Kant's position, then, seems to come to this, 
 that thoucjh he never doubts the existence of 
 God, he has very grave doubts that He can be 
 vj theoretically known by man. That he is, is certain ; 
 what he is, we cannot determine. It is a position 
 not dissimilar to current Agnostic doctrines ; and as 
 long as the antithesis between Sense and Under- 
 standing, between Matter and Mind, is insisted 
 upon as expressing a real and abiding truth, Kant's 
 reasoning can hardly be refuted with completeness. 
 No doubt it may be urged that since the practical 
 and theoretical arguments both arrive at the same 
 conclusion, the cogency of our reasoning in the 
 latter should confirm our trust in the former. But 
 true conclusions may sometimes seem to follow 
 from quite insufficient premises ; and Kant is thus 
 justified in demanding that each argument shall 
 be submitted to independent tests. I have en- 
 
 1 Natural Theology and Modem Thought, p. 241.
 
 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION xliii 
 
 deavoured to show above that he has not treated 
 the theoretical Hne of reasoning quite fairly, and that 
 he has underestimated its force ; but its value as an 
 a7'gimient is not increased by showing that another 
 entirely different process of thought leads to the 
 same result. And that the witness of conscience 
 affords the most powerful and convincing argument 
 for the existence of a Supreme Being, the source of 
 law as of love, is a simple matter of experience. 
 Induction, syllogism, analogy, do not really generate 
 belief in God, though they may serve to justify to 
 reason a faith that we already possess. The poet 
 has the truth of it : 
 
 Wer Gott nicht fiihlt in alien Lebenskreisen, 
 Dem werdet Ihr Ihn nicht beweisen mit Beweisen. 
 
 I give at the end of this Introduction a Glossary 
 of the chief philosophical terms used by Kant ; I 
 have tried to render them by the same English 
 equivalents all through the work, in order to pre- 
 serve, as far as may be, the exactness of expression 
 in the original. I am conscious that this makes the 
 translation clumsy in many places, but have thought 
 it best to sacrifice elegance to precision. This 
 course is the more necessary to adopt, as Kant 
 cannot be understood unless his nice verbal distinc- 
 tions be attended to. Thus real means quite a 
 different thing from zmrklich ; Hang from Neigttng ; 
 Ruhrtmg from Affekt or Leidenschaft ; Anschaiiung 
 from Empfindung or Wahrnehmung ; Endzweck from
 
 xliv KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 Ictzter Zwcck; Idee from Vorstelhing\ Eigerischaft 
 from Attribut or Beschaffenheit ; Scliranke from 
 Grenze ; iiberj'eden from iiberzeiigen, etc. I am not 
 satisfied with "gratification" and "grief" as the 
 EngHsh equivalents for Vergjiiigen and Schmerz ; but 
 it is necessary to distinguish these words from Lnst 
 and Unhist, and "mental pleasure," "mental pain," 
 which would nearly hit the sense, are awkward. 
 Again, the constant rendering of scJion by beautiful 
 involves the expression " beautiful art " instead of the 
 more usual phrase "fine art." Pztrposive is an ugly 
 word, but it has come into use lately ; and its employ- 
 ment enables us to preserve the connection between 
 Zweck and zweckmdssig. I have printed Jiidgment 
 with a capital letter when it signifies the faeiiliy, 
 with a small initial when it signifies the act, of 
 judging. And in like manner I distinguish Objckt 
 from Gegenstand, by printing the word " Object " 
 when it represents the former with a large initial. 
 
 The text I have followed is, in the main, that 
 printed by Hartenstein ; but occasionally Rosenkranz 
 preserves the better reading. All important variants 
 between the First and Second Editions have been 
 indicated at the foot of the page. A few notes have 
 been added, which are enclosed in square brackets, 
 to distinguish them from those which formed part of 
 the original work. I have in general quoted Kant's 
 Introd2iction to Logic and Kritik of Practical Reason 
 in Dr. Abbott's translations. 
 
 My best thanks are due to Rev. J. H. Kennedy 
 and Mr. F. Purser for much valuable aid durinof
 
 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION xlv 
 
 the passage of this translation through the press. 
 And I am under even greater obligations to ]\Ir. 
 IMahaffy, who was good enough to read through 
 the whole of the proof; by his acute and learned 
 criticisms many errors have been avoided. Others 
 I have no doubt still remain, but for these I must 
 be accounted alone responsible. 
 
 J. H. Bernard. 
 
 Trinity College, Dublin, 
 May 24, 1892.
 
 GLOSSARY OF KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL 
 
 TERMS 
 
 Absicht ; design. 
 Achtung ; respect. 
 Affekt ; affectio)i. 
 Angenehm ; pleasant. 
 Anschauung ; i?ituition. 
 Attribut ; attribute. 
 Aufklarung ; e?iHghteninent. 
 
 Begehr ; desire. 
 
 Begriff; C07icept. 
 
 Beschafifenheit ; constitution or 
 
 characteristic. 
 Bestimmen ; to determine. 
 
 Darstellen ; to present. 
 Dasein ; presence or being. 
 
 Eigenschaft ; property. 
 Empfindung ; sensation. 
 Endzweck ; filial pii7pose. 
 Erkenntniss ; cognition or know- 
 ledge. 
 Erklarung ; explaiiation. 
 Erscheinung ; phenomenon. 
 Existenz ; existence. 
 
 Fiirwahrhalten ; belief, 
 
 Gebiet ; realm, 
 Gefiihl ; feeling. 
 Gegen stand ; object. 
 Geist ; spirit. 
 Geniessen ; enjoyment. 
 Geschicklichkeit ; skill. 
 Geschmack ; Taste. 
 
 Gesetzmassigkeit ; 
 
 law. 
 Gewalt 
 Glaube 
 Grenze 
 
 co7iforniity to 
 
 domi7iion or autho7'ity. 
 faith. 
 bound. 
 
 Grundsatz ; funda7ne7ital proposi- 
 tio7i ox p7-i7iciple. 
 
 Hang ; prope7isio7i. 
 
 Idee ; Idea. 
 
 Leidenschaft ; passio7i. 
 
 Letzter Zweck ; ultimate purpose. 
 
 Lust ; pleasure. 
 
 Meinen ; opinion. 
 
 Neigung ; incli7tatio7i. 
 
 Objekt ; Object. 
 
 Prinzip ; pri7iciple. 
 
 Real ; real. 
 Reich ; ki/igdo/zi. 
 Reiz ; chari/i. 
 Riihrung ; €7notio7t. 
 
 Schein ; illusioft, 
 Schmerz ; grief 
 Schon ; beautiful, 
 Schranke ; //;«//. 
 Schwarmerei ; fanaticis77i. 
 Seele : soid.
 
 xlviii 
 
 GLOSSARY 
 
 Ueberreden ; to persuade. 
 Ueberschwanglich ; transcertdent. 
 Ueberzeugen ; to convince. 
 Unlust ; pain. 
 Urtheil ; judgment. 
 Urtheilskraft ; Judgment. 
 
 \'erbindung ; combination. 
 \'ergnugen ; gratification. 
 Verkniipfung ; connection. 
 Vermogen ; faculty. 
 Vernunft ; Reason. 
 \'emunftelei ; sophistry or subtlety. 
 V^erstand ; Understanding or in- 
 telligence. 
 
 Vorstellung ; representation. 
 
 Wahmehmung ; perception. 
 Wesen ; being. 
 Willkiihr ; elective ivitl. 
 Wirklich ; actual. 
 Wohlgefallen ; satisfaction. 
 
 Zufriedenheit ; contentment. 
 Zweck ; purpose. 
 Zweckmassig ; purposive. 
 Zweckverbindung; purposive com- 
 bination^ etc.
 
 PREFACE 
 
 We may call the faculty of cognition from prin- 
 ciples a pi'iori, pure Reason, and the inquiry into its 
 possibility and bounds generally the Kritik of pure 
 Reason, although by this faculty we only understand 
 Reason in its theoretical employment, as it appears 
 under that name in the former work ; w^ithout wish- 
 ing to inquire into its faculty, as practical Reason, 
 according to its special principles. That [Kritik] 
 goes merely into our faculty of knowing things a 
 priori, and busies itself therefore only with the 
 cognitive faculty to the exclusion of the feeling of 
 pleasure and pain and the faculty of desire ; and of \rf^^*''^^ 
 the coo^nitive faculties it only concerns itself with 
 Understanding, according to its principles a prio7'i, 
 to the exclusion oi Judgment and Reason (as faculties 
 alike belonging to theoretical cognition), because it 
 is found in the sequel that no other cognitive faculty 
 but the Understanding can furnish constitutive prin- 
 ciples of cognition a priori. The Kritik, then, 
 ..'hich sifts them all, as regards the share which 
 each of the other faculties might pretend to have in 
 the unmixed possession of knowledge from its own 
 peculiar root, leaves nothing but what the Under- 
 standing prescribes a priori as law for nature as 
 the complex of phenomena (whose form also is 
 given a p7'iori). It relegates all other pure con- 
 
 B
 
 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 cepts under Ideas, which are transcendent for our 
 theoretical faculty of cognition, but are not there- 
 fore useless or to be dispensed with. For they 
 serve as regulative principles ; partly to check the 
 dangerous pretensions of Understanding, as if it 
 (because it can furnish a priori the conditions of 
 the possibility of all things which it can know) had 
 thereby confined within these bounds the possibility 
 of all things in general ; and partly to lead it to 
 the consideration of nature according to a principle 
 of completeness, although it can never attain to 
 this, and thus to further the final design of all 
 knowledo^e. 
 
 It was then properly the Understanding which 
 has its special realm in the cognitive faculty, so 
 far as it contains constitutive principles of cogni- 
 tion a priori, which by the Kritik, generall)^ called 
 the Kritik of pure Reason, was to be placed in 
 certain but sole possession against all other com- 
 petitors. And so also to Reason, which contains con- 
 stitutive principles a priori nowhere except simply 
 in respect of the facility of desire, should be as- 
 signed its place in the Kritik of practical Reason. 
 
 Whether now the Judgment, which in the order 
 of our cognitive faculties forms a mediating link 
 \ between Understanding and Reason, has also 
 
 '\./X principles a p7^iori for itself; whether these are 
 _ r y constitutive or merely regulative (thus pointing 
 
 ^"^^v ' ^ out no special realm); and whether they give a 
 
 T / rule a priori to the feeling of pleasure and pain, 
 
 as the mediating link between the cognitive faculty 
 and the faculty of desire (just as the Understanding 
 prescribes laws a priori to the first. Reason to 
 the second) ; these are the questions with which 
 the present Kritik of Judgment is concerned.
 
 PREFACE 
 
 A Kritik of pure Reason, i.e. of our faculty of 
 judging a p7'iori according to principles, would be 
 incomplete, if the Judgment, which as a cognitive 
 faculty also makes claim to such principles, were 
 not treated as a particular part of it ; although its 
 principles in a system of pure Philosophy need 
 form no particular part between the theoretical 
 and the practical, but can be annexed when needful 
 to one or both as occasion requires. For if such 
 a system is one day to be completed under the 
 gen eral name of Metaph ysic (which it is possible 
 to achieve quite completely, and which is supremely 
 important for the use of Reason in every reference), 
 <^the soil for the edifice must be explored- by Kritik 
 as deep down as the foun^dation of the faculty of 
 principles independent of experience, in order that 
 it may sink in no part, for this would inevitably / 
 brino^ about the downfall of the whole. 
 
 We can easily infer from the nature of the 
 Judgment (whose right use is so necessarily and 
 so universally requisite, that by the name of sound 
 Understanding nothing else but this faculty is 
 meant), that it must be attended with great diffi- 
 culties to find a principle peculiar to it ; (some such 
 it must contain a prio7'i in itself, for otherwise it 
 would not be set apart by the commonest Kritik as 
 a special cognitive faculty). This principle must 
 jiot be derived a prioji from concepts, for these /_jj^^f- 
 belong to the Understanding, and Judgment is only ^^^j 
 concerned with their application. It m*ust, therefore, 
 furnish of itself a concept, through which, properly\ 
 speaking, no thing is cognised, but which only serves 
 as a rule, though not an objective one to which it 
 can adapt its judgment ; because for this latter 
 another faculty of Judgment would be requisite,
 
 /CAN^T'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 in order to be able to distinguish whether [any 
 given case] is or is not the case for the rule. 
 
 This perplexity about a principle (whether it is 
 subjective or objective) presents itself mainly in 
 those judgments that we call cesthetical, which concern 
 the Beautiful and the Sublime of Nature or of Art. 
 And, nevertheless, the critical investigation of a 
 principle of Judgment in these is the most important 
 part of a Kritik of this faculty. For although they 
 do not by themselves contribute to the knowledge 
 of things, yet they belong to the cognitive faculty 
 alone, and p oint to an immediate i:efexence-£i£-this 
 facuJjLy to the feeling of pleasure or pain according 
 to some principle a pnori ;->Avithout confusing this 
 with what may be the determining ground of the 
 faculty of desire, which has its principles a priori in 
 concepts of Reason. — In the logical judging of 
 nature, experience exhibits a conformity to law in 
 things, to the understanding or to the explanation of 
 which the general concept of the sensible does not 
 attain ; here the Judgment can only derive from itself 
 a principle of the reference of the natural thing to the 
 unknowable supersensible (a principle which it must 
 only use from its own point of view for the cognition 
 of nature). And so, though in this case such a 
 principle a priori can and must be applied to the 
 cognition of the beings of the world, and opens out 
 at the same time prospects which are advantageous 
 for the practical Reason, yet it has no immediate 
 reference to t*he feeling of pleasure and pain. But 
 this reference is precisely the puzzle in the principle 
 of Judgment, which renders a special section 
 for this faculty necessary in the Kritik ; since the 
 logical judging according to concepts (from which 
 an immediate inference can never be drawn to
 
 PREFACE 
 
 the feeling of pleasure and pain) along with their 
 critical limitation, has at all events been capable of 
 being appended to the theoretical part of Philosophy. 
 
 The examination of the faculty of taste, as the 
 sesthetical Judgment, is not here planned in reference 
 to the formation or the culture of taste (for this will 
 take its course in the future as in the past without 
 any such investigations), but merely in a tran- 
 scendental point of view. Hence, I trust that as 
 regards the deficiency of the former purpose it will 
 be judged with indulgence, though in the latter 
 point of view it must be prepared for the severest 
 scrutiny. But I hope that the great difficulty of 
 solving a problem so involved by nature may serve 
 as excuse for some hardly avoidable obscurity in 
 its solution, if onlv it be clearlv established that the 
 principle is correctly stated. I grant that the mode 
 of deriving the phenomena of the Judgment from 
 it has not all the clearness which mig^ht be rio^htlv 
 demanded elsewhere, viz., in the case of cognition 
 according to concepts ; but I believe that I have 
 attained to it in the second part of this work. 
 
 Here then I end my whole critical undertaking. 
 I shall proceed without delay to the doctrinal [part] 
 in order to profit, as far as is possible, by the more 
 favourable moments of my increasing years. It is 
 obvious that in this [part] there will be no special 
 -r^ection for the Judgment, because in respect of this 
 faculty Kritik serves instead of Theory ; but, accord- 
 ing to the division of Philosophy (and also of pure 
 Philosophy) into theoretical and practical, the INIeta- 
 physic of Nature and of Morals will complete the 
 undertaking.
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 I. OF THE DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 We proceed quite correctly if, as usual, we divide 
 Philosophy, as containing the principles of the 
 rational cognition of things by means of concepts 
 (not merely, as logic does, principles of the form of 
 thought in general without distinction of objects), 
 into theoretical 2iT\.di practical. But then the concepts, 
 which furnish their object to the principles of this 
 rational cognition, must be specifically distinct ; 
 otherwise they would not justify a division, which 
 always presupposes a contrast between the principles 
 of the rational coo^nition belong-ing;- to the different 
 parts of a science. 
 
 Now there are only t wo kinds of concep ts, and 
 these admit as many distinct principles of the 
 possibility of their objects, viz., natural concepts 
 and the concept of freedom. The former render 
 possible theoretical cognition according to principles 
 a priori', the latter in respect of this theoretical 
 cognition only supplies in itself a negative principle 
 (that of mere contrast), but on the other hand it 
 furnishes fundamental propositions which extend the 
 sphere of the determination of the will and are 
 therefore called practical. Thus Philosophy is 
 correctly divided into two parts, quite distinct in
 
 § I INTRODUCTION 7 
 
 their principles ; the theoretical part or Natural '^ 'f^^iMfiA^ / 
 Philosophy, and the practical part or Moral Philo- i%lfiMu (j 
 sophy (for that is the name given to the practical / t 
 
 legislation of Reason in accordance with the concept " 
 
 of freedom). But up to the present a gross misuse 
 of these expressions has prevailed, both in the 
 division of the different principles and consequently 
 also of Philosophy itself. For what is practical 
 according to natural concepts has been identified 
 with the practical according to the concept of free- 
 dom ; and so with the like titles, ' theoretical ' and 
 * practical ' Philosophy, a division has been made, 
 by which in fact nothing has been divided (for both 
 parts might in such case have principles of the same 
 kind). 
 
 ThejAT^ill, r egarded as the faculty of desire , is in^^^/ j^^ 
 fact one of the many natural causes in the world, viz., . ^^^-^ , ,Q 
 that cause which acts in accordance with concepts. / 
 
 All that is represented as possible (or necessary) by ^4<4M **w*4 ^^ 
 means of a will is called practically possible (orj ^^-uc^u^. 
 necessary) ; as distinguished from the physical possi- / 
 
 bility or necessity of an effect,, whose cause is not 
 determined to causality by concepts (but in lifeless 
 matter by mechanism and in animals by instinct). 
 Here, in respect of the practical, it is left undeter- 
 mined whether the concept which gives the rule to 
 the causality of the will, is a natural concept or a 
 concept of freedom. 
 
 But the last distinction is essential. For if the 
 concept which determines the causality [of the will] 
 is a natural concept, then the principles are techni- 
 cally practical ; whereas, if it is a concept of freedom 
 they are morally practical. And as the division 
 of a rational science depends on the distinction 
 between objects whose cognition needs distinct
 
 8 KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT §i 
 
 principles, the former will belong to theoretical Philo- 
 sophy (doctrine of Nature), but the latter alone 
 will constitute the second part, viz., practical Philo- 
 sophy (doctrine of Morals). 
 
 All technically practical rules (/.<?. the rules of art 
 and skill generally, or of sagacity regarded as skill 
 in exercising an influence over men and their wills), 
 so far as their principles rest on concepts, must be 
 reckoned only as corollaries to theoretical Philosophy. 
 For they concern only the possibility of things ac- 
 co cling to natural concepts, to which belong not 
 only the means which are to be met with in nature, 
 but also the wull itself (as a faculty of desire and 
 consequently a natural faculty), so far as it can be 
 determined conformably to these rules by natural 
 motives. However, practical rules of this kind are 
 not called laws (like physical laws), but only pre- 
 cepts ; because the will does not stand merely under 
 the natural concept, but also under the concept of 
 freedom, in relation to which its principles are called 
 laws. These with their consequences alone consti- 
 tute the second or practical part of Philosophy. 
 
 The solution of the problems of pure geometry 
 does not belong to a particular part of the science ; 
 mensuration does not deserve the name of practical, 
 in contrast to pure geometry, as a second part of 
 geometry in general ; and just as little ought the 
 mechanical or chemical art of experiment or obser- 
 vation to be reckoned as a practical part of the 
 doctrine of Nature. Just as little, in fine, ought 
 housekeeping, farming, statesmanship, the art of 
 conversation, the prescribing of diet, the universal 
 doctrine of happiness itself, or the curbing of the 
 inclinations and checking of the affections for the 
 sake of happiness, to be reckoned as practical Philo-
 
 § 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 sophy, or taken to constitute the second part of 
 Philosophy in general. For all these contain only 
 rules of skill (and are consequently only technically 
 practical) for bringing about an effect that is possible 
 according to the natural concepts of causes and 
 effects, which, since they belong to theoretical Philo- 
 sophy, are subject to those precepts as mere corol- 
 laries from it (viz., natural science), and can there- 
 fore claim no place in a special Philosophy called 
 practical. On the other hand, the morally practical 
 precepts, which are altogether based on the concept 
 of freedom to the complete exclusion of the natural 
 determining grounds of the will, constitute a quite 
 special class. These, like the rules which nature 
 obeys, are called simply laws, but they do not, like 
 them, rest on sensuous conditions but on a super- 
 sensible principle ; and accordingly they require for 
 themselves a quite different part of Philosophy, 
 called practical, corresponding to its theoretical part. 
 We hence see that a complex of practical pre- 
 cepts given by Philosophy does not constitute a 
 distinct part of Philosophy, as opposed to the theo- 
 retical part, because these precepts are practical ; for 
 they might be that, even if their principles were 
 derived altogether from the theoretical cognition of 
 nature (as technically practical rules). [A distinct 
 branch of Philosophy is constituted only] if their 
 principle, as it is not borrowed from the natural 
 concept which is always sensuously conditioned, 
 rests on the supersensible, which alone makes the 
 concept of freedom cognisable by formal laws. 
 These precepts are then morally practical, i.e. not 
 merely precepts or rules in this or that aspect, but, 
 without any preceding reference to purposes and 
 designs, are laws.
 
 lo KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT % ii 
 
 II. OF THE REALM OF PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL 
 
 So far as our concepts have a prioTi application, 
 so far extends the use of our cognitive faculty accord- 
 ing to principles, and with it Philosophy. 
 
 But the complex of all objects, to which those 
 concepts are referred, in order to bring about a 
 knowledge of them where it is possible, may be sub- 
 divided according to the adequacy or inadequacy of 
 our [cognitive] faculty with this design. 
 
 Concepts, so far as they are referred to objects, 
 independently of the possibility or impossibility of 
 the cognition of these objects, have their field which 
 is determined merely according to the relation that 
 their Object has to our cognitive faculty in general. 
 The part of this field in which knowledge is possible 
 for us is a ground or territory {territoriuni) for these 
 concepts and the requisite cognitive faculty. The 
 part of this territory, where they are legislative, is 
 the realm {ditio) of these concepts and of the corre- 
 sponding cognitive faculties. Empirical concepts 
 have, therefore, their territory in nature, as the com- 
 plex of all objects of sense, but no realm, only a 
 dwelling-place {domicilmni) ; for though they are 
 produced in conformity to law they are not legisla- 
 tive, but the rules based on them are empirical and 
 consequently contingent. 
 
 Our whole cognitive faculty has two realms, that 
 of natural concepts and that of the concept of free- 
 dom ; for through both it is legislative a p7nori. In 
 accordance with this. Philosophy is divided into 
 theoretical and practical. But the territory to which 
 its realm extends and in which its legislation is 
 exercised, is always only the complex of objects of 
 all possible experience, so long as they are taken for
 
 §11 INTRODUCTION ii 
 
 nothing more than mere phenomena ; for otherwise 
 no legislation of the Understanding in respect of 
 them is conceivable. 
 
 C Leg islation through natural concep ts is carried 
 on by means of the Understanding and is theoretical. 
 Legislati on through the ro n'"<^p<" nf fi-ppHnm is carried 
 on by the Reason and is merely practical. It is only 
 in the practical [sphere] that the Reason can be/ 
 legislative ; in respect of theoretical cognition (of 
 nature) it can merely (as acquainted with law by the 
 Understanding) deduce from given laws conse- 
 quences which always remain within [the limits of] 
 nature. But on the other hand, Reason is not 
 always therefore legislative, where there are practical 
 rules, for they may be only technically practical. ^ 
 
 Understanding and Reason exercise, therefore, 
 two di stinct legislations on one and the same 
 territory of experience, without prejudice to each 
 other. The concept of freedom as little disturbs 
 the legislation of nature, as the natural concept in- 
 fluences the legislation through the former. — The 
 possibility of at least thinking without contradiction 
 the co-existence of both legislations, and of the cor- 
 responding faculties in the same subject, has been 
 shown in the Kritik of pure Reason ; whilst it has 
 annulled the objections to this [theory] by exposing 
 the dialectical illusion which they contain. 
 
 These two different realms then do not limit 
 each other in their legislation, though they per- 
 petually do so in the world of sense. That they 
 do not constitute one realm, arises from this, that 
 the natural concept represents its objects in intuition, 
 not as things in themselves, but as mere phenomena ; 
 the concept of freedom, on the other hand, repre- 
 sents in its Object a thing in itself, but not in
 
 12 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT § ii 
 
 intuition. Hence, neither of them can furnish 
 a theoretical knowledge of its Object (or even of 
 the thinking subject) as a thing in itself; this would 
 be the supersensible, the Idea of which we must 
 indeed make the basis of the possibility of all these 
 objects of experience, but which we can never extend 
 or elevate into a coQ^nition. 
 
 There is, then, an unbounded but also inacces- 
 sible field for our whole cognitive faculty — the field 
 of the supersensible — wherein we find no territory, 
 and, therefore, can have in it, for theoretical cogni- 
 tion, no realm either for concepts of Understanding 
 or Reason. - This field we must indeed occupy with 
 Ideas on behalf of the theoretical as well as the 
 practical use of Reason, but we can supply to them 
 in reference to the laws [arising] from the concept 
 of freedom no other than practical reality, by which 
 our theoretical cocrnition is not extended in the 
 slightest degree towards the supersensible. 
 
 Now even if an immeasurable gulf is fixed 
 between the sensible realm of the concept of nature 
 and the supersensible realm of the concept of freedom, 
 so that no transition is possible from the first to 
 the second (by means of the theoretical use of 
 Reason), just as if they were two different worlds 
 of which the first could have no influence upon 
 the second, yet the second is meant to have an in- 
 fluence upon the first. The concept of freedom is 
 meant to actualise in the world of sense the purpose 
 proposed by its laws, and consequently nature must 
 be so thought that the conformity to law of its form, 
 at least harmonises with the possibility of the 
 purposes to be effected in it according to laws of 
 y- freedom. — There must, therefore, be a ground of 
 the unity of the supersensible, which lies at the
 
 §111 INTRODUCTION 13 
 
 basis of nature, with that which the concept of 
 freedom practically contains ; and the concept of 
 this ground, although it does not attain either 
 theoretically or practically to a knowledge of the 
 same, and hence has no peculiar realm, nevertheless 
 makes possible the transition from the mode of 
 thought according to the principles of the one to 
 that according to the principles of the other. 
 
 III. OF THE KRITIK OF JUDGMENT AS A MEANS OF 
 COMBINING THE TWO PARTS OF PHILOSOPHY INTO 
 A WHOLE. 
 
 The Kritik of the cognitive faculties, as regards 
 what they can furnish a priori, has properly speaking 
 no realm in respect of Objects, because it is not a 
 doctrine, but only has to investigate whether and 
 how, in accordance with the state of these faculties, a 
 doctrine is possible by their means. Its field extends 
 to all their pretensions, in order to confine them 
 within their leoitimate bounds. But what cannot 
 enter into the division of Philosophy may yet enter, 
 as a chief part, into the Kritik of the pure faculty of 
 cognition in general, viz., if it contains principles 
 which are available neither for theoretical nor for 
 practical use. 
 
 The natural concepts, which contain the ground 
 of all theoretical knowledge a priori, rest on the 
 legislation of the Understanding. — The concept of 
 freedom, which contains the ground of all sensuously- 
 unconditioned practical precepts a priori, rests on 
 the legislation of the Reason. Both faculties, there- 
 fore, besides being capable of application as regards 
 their logical form to principles of whatever origin, 
 have also as regards their content, their special
 
 14 K'ANrS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT § in 
 
 legislations above which there is no other {a priori) ; 
 and hence the division of Philosophy into theoretical 
 and practical is justified. 
 
 But in the family of the s upreme cognitiv e 
 f aculties the re is a middle-term between the Under- 
 / standing and the Reason. This is \ki^ Judgment, of 
 which we have cause for supposing according to 
 analogy that it may contain in itself, if not a special 
 legislation, yet a special principle of its own to be 
 sought according to laws, though merely subjective 
 a priori. This principle, even if it have no field 
 of objects as its realm, yet may have somewhere a 
 territory with a certain character, for which no other 
 principle can be valid. 
 
 But besides (to judge by analogy) there is a 
 new ground for bringing the Judgment into con- 
 nection with another arrangement of our repre- 
 sentative faculties, which seems to be of even 
 greater importance than that of its relationship 
 with the family of the cognitive faculties. For all 
 faculties or capacities of the soul can be reduced to 
 three, which cannot be any further derived from one 
 common ground: 'Oi\^ faculty of knoivledge, \\v^ feel- 
 ing of pleasure and pain, and \.\\& faculty of desire} 
 
 ' If we have cause for supposing that concepts which we use as 
 empirical principles stand in relationship with the pure cognitive 
 faculty a prio7i, it is profitable, because of this reference, to seek for 
 them a transcendental definition ; i.e., a definition through pure cate- 
 gories, so far as these by themselves adequately furnish the distinction 
 of the concept in question from others. We here follow the example 
 of the mathematician who leaves undetermined the empirical data of 
 his problem, and only brings their relation in their pure synthesis 
 under the concepts of pure Arithmetic, and thus generalises the solu- 
 tion. Objection has been brought against a similar procedure of 
 mine (cf. the Preface to the Kritik of Practical Reason, Abbot fs Tr-ans- 
 latiou, p. 94), and my definition of the faculty of desire has been 
 found fault with, viz., that it is [the being's] faculty of becoming by 
 means of its representations the cause of the actuality of the objects of 
 these representations ; for the desires might be mere cravings, and by
 
 §Tii INTRODUCTION 15 
 
 For the faculty of knowledge the Understanding is 
 alone legislative, if (as must happen when it is con- 
 sidered by itself without confusion with the faculty 
 of desire) this faculty is referred to nature as the 
 faculty of theoretical knowledge ; for in respect of 
 nature (as phenomenon) it is alone possible for us 
 to give laws by means of natural concepts a priori, 
 i.e. by pure concepts of Understanding. — For the 
 faculty of desire, as a supreme faculty according to 
 the concept of freedom, the Reason (in which alone 
 
 means of these alone eveiy one is convinced the Object cannot be 
 produced. — But this proves nothing more than that there are desires 
 in man, by which he is in contradiction with himself. For here 
 he strives for the production of the Object by means of the representa- 
 tion alone, from which he can expect no result, because he is con- 
 scious that his mechanical powers (if I may so call those which are 
 not psychological) which must be determined by that representation to 
 bring about the Object (mediately) are either not competent, or even 
 tend towards what is impossible ; e.g., to reverse the past {O viihi 
 p7-ate7-itos . . . etc.), or to annihilate in the impatience of expecta- 
 tion the interval before the wished for moment. — Although in such 
 fantastic desires we are conscious of the inadequacy (or even the 
 unsuitability) of our representations for being causes of their objects, 
 yet their reference as causes, and consequently the representation of 
 their causality, is contained in every ivish ; and this is peculiarly 
 evident if the wish is an affection or lorging. For these [longings] 
 by their dilatation and contraction of the heart and consequent ex- 
 haustion of powers, prove that these powers are continually kept on 
 the stretch by representations, but that they perpetually let the mind, 
 having regard to the impossibility [of the desire], fall back in e.x- 
 haustion. Even prayers [offered up] to avert great and (as far as one 
 can see) unavoidable evils, and many superstitious means for attain- 
 ing in a natural way impossible purposes, point to the causal reference 
 of representations to their Objects ; a reference which cannot at all be 
 checked by the consciousness of the inadequacy of the effort to pro- 
 duce the effect. — As to why there should be in our nature this pro- 
 pensity to desires which are consciously vain, that is an anthropologico- 
 teleological problem. It seems that if we were not determined to the 
 application of our powers before we were assured of the adequacy of 
 our faculties to produce an Object, these powers would remain in great 
 part unused. For we commonly learn to know our powers only by 
 first making trial of them. This deception in the case of vain wishes 
 is then only the consequence of a benevolent ordinance in our nature. 
 [This note was added by Kant in the Second Edition.]
 
 1 6 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT § iv 
 
 this concept has a place) is alone a p7'iori\^^\^7sX\v&. 
 Now between the faculties of knowledge and desire 
 there is the feeling of pleasure, just as the Judgment 
 mediates between the Understanding and the 
 Reason. We may therefore suppose provisionally 
 that the Judgment likewise contains in itself an a 
 priori principle. And as pleasure or pain is neces- 
 sarily combined with the faculty of desire (either 
 preceding this principle as in the lower desires, or 
 following it as in the higher, when the desire is 
 determined by the moral law), we may also suppose 
 that the Judgment will bring about a transition from 
 the pure faculty of knowledge, the realm of natural 
 concepts, to the realm of the concept of freedom, 
 just as in its logical use it makes possible the transi- 
 tion from Understanding to Reason. 
 
 Although, then, Philosophy can be divided only 
 into two main parts, the theoretical and the practical, 
 and although all that we may be able to say of the 
 special principles of Judgment must be counted as 
 belonging in it to the theoretical part, i.e., to rational 
 cognition in accordance with natural concepts ; yet 
 the Kritik of pure Reason, which must decide all 
 this, as regards the possibility of the system before 
 undertaking it, consists of three parts : the Kritik of 
 pure Understanding, of pure Judgment, and of pure 
 Reason, which faculties are called pure because they 
 are legislative a priori. 
 
 IV. OF JUDGMENT AS A FACULTY LEGISLATING 
 
 A PRIORI 
 
 Judgment in general is the faculty of thinking 
 the particular as contained under the Universal. If 
 the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) be
 
 ? IV INTRODUCTION 17 
 
 given, the Judgment which subsumes the particular 
 under it (even if, as transcendental Judgment, it 
 furnishes, a priori, the conditions in conformity with 
 which subsumption under that universal is alone pos- 
 sible) is determinant. But if only the particular be 
 given for which the universal has to be found, the 
 Judgment is merely refiective. 
 
 The determinant Judgment only subsumes under 
 universal transcendental laws given by the Under- 
 standing ; the law is marked out for it, a priori, and 
 it has therefore no need to seek a law for itself 
 in order to be able to subordinate the particular in 
 nature to the universal. — But the forms of nature 
 are so manifold, and there are so many modifica- 
 tions of the universal transcendental natural con- 
 cepts left undetermined by the laws given, a pi'ioiH, 
 by the pure Understanding, — because these only 
 concern the possibility of a nature in general (as an 
 object of sense), — that there must be laws for these 
 [forms] also. These, as empirical, may be contingent 
 from the point of view oi our Understanding, and yet, 
 if they are to be called laws (as the concept of a 
 nature requires), they must be regarded as necessary 
 in virtue of a principle of the unity of the manifold, 
 though it be unknown to us, — The reflective Judg- 
 ment, which is obliged to ascend from the particular 
 in nature to the universal, requires on that account 
 a principle that it cannot borrow from experience, 
 because its function is to establish the unity of all 
 empirical principles under higher ones, and hence 
 to establish the possibility of their systematic sub- 
 ordination. Such a transcendental principle, then, 
 the reflective Judgment can only give as a law from 
 and to itself It cannot derive it from outside 
 (because then it would be the determinant Judg- 
 
 c
 
 iS A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT § iv 
 
 ment), nor can it prescribe it to nature, because 
 reflection upon the laws of nature adjusts itself by 
 nature, and not nature by the conditions according 
 to which we attempt to arrive at a concept of it which 
 is quite contingent in respect of nature. 
 
 This principle can be no other than the follow- 
 ing : As universal laws of nature have their ground 
 in our Understanding, which prescribes them to 
 nature (although only according to the universal 
 concept of it as nature) ; so particular empirical laws, 
 in respect of what is in them left undetermined by 
 these universal laws, must be considered in accord- 
 ance with such a unity as they would have if an 
 Understanding (although not our Understanding) 
 had furnished them to our cognitive faculties, so as 
 to make possible a system of experience according 
 to particular laws of nature. Not as if, in this 
 way, such an Understanding must be assumed as 
 actual (for it is only our reflective Judgment to 
 which this Idea serves as a principle — for reflecting, 
 not for determining) ; but this faculty thus gives a 
 law only to itself and not to nature. 
 
 Now the concept of an Object, so far as it con- 
 tains the ground of the actuality of this Object, is the 
 purpose ; and the agreement of a thing with that 
 constitution of things, which is only possible accord- 
 ing to purposes, is called the purposiveiiess of its 
 form. Thus the principle of Judgment, in respect 
 of the form of things of nature under empirical laws 
 generally, is \\\^ purposiveiiess of nature in its variety. 
 That is, nature is represented by means of this con- 
 cept, as if an Understanding contained the ground 
 of the unity of the variety of its empirical laws. 
 
 The purposiveness of nature is therefore a par- 
 ticular concept, a priori, which has its origin solely
 
 § V INTRODUCTION 19 
 
 in _the reflective Judgment. For we cannot ascribe 
 to natural products anything like a reference of 
 nature in them to purposes ; we can only use this 
 concept to reflect upon such products in respect of 
 the connection of phenomena which is given in them 
 according to empirical laws. This concept is also 
 quite different from practical purposiveness (in 
 human art or in morals), though it is certainly 
 thought according to the analogy of these last. - 
 
 V. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FORMAL PURPOSIVENESS 
 OF NATURE IS A TRANSCENDENTAL PRINCIPLE 
 OF JUDGMENT. 
 
 A transcendental principle is one by means of 
 which is represented, a priori, the universal condi- 
 tion under which alone things can be in general 
 Objects of our cognition. On the other hand, a 
 principle is called metaphysical if it represents the 
 «/r/<9rz condition under which alone Objects, whose 
 concept must be empirically given, can be further 
 determined a priori. Thus the principle of the 
 cognition' of bodies as substances, and as changeable 
 substances, is transcendental, if thereby it is asserted 
 that their changes must have a cause ; it is meta- 
 physical if it asserts that their changes must have an 
 external cause. For in the former case bodies need 
 only be thought by means of ontological predicates 
 (pure concepts of Understanding), e.g., substance, 
 in order to cognise the proposition a priori; but in 
 the latter case the empirical concept of a body (as a 
 movable thing in space) must lie at the basis of the 
 proposition, although once this basis has been laid 
 down, it may be seen completely a priori that this 
 latter predicate (motion only by external causes)
 
 20 KANT S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT §v 
 
 belongs to body. — Thus, as I shall presently show, 
 the principle of the purposiveness of nature (in the 
 manifoldness of its empirical laws) is a transcenden- 
 tal principle. For the concept of Objects, so far as 
 they are thought as standing under this principle, is 
 only the pure concept of objects of possible empirical 
 cognition in general and contains nothing empirical. 
 On the other hand, the principle of practical pur- 
 posiveness, which must be thought in the Idea of the 
 detemnination of a free luill, is a metaphysical prin- 
 ciple ; because the concept of a faculty of desire as 
 a will must be given empirically {i.e. does not belong 
 to transcendental predicates). Both principles are, 
 however, not empirical, but a prioi'i ; because for 
 the combination of the predicate with the empirical 
 concept of the subject of their judgments no further 
 experience is needed, but it can be apprehended 
 completely a priori. 
 
 That the concept of a purposiveness of nature 
 belongs to transcendental principles can be sufficiently 
 seen from the maxims of the Judgment, which lie 
 at the basis of the investigation of nature a priori, 
 and yet do not go further than the possibility of 
 experience, and consequently of the cognition of 
 nature — not indeed nature in general, but nature 
 as determined through a variety of particular laws. 
 These maxims present themselves in the course 
 of this science often enough, though in a scattered 
 way, as sentences of metaphysical wisdom, whose 
 necessity we cannot demonstrate from concepts. 
 " Nature takes the shortest way {lex parsimonice) ; 
 at the same time it makes no leaps, either in the 
 course of its changes or in the juxta-position of 
 specifically different forms {lex contimti in natiird) ; 
 its great variety in empirical laws is yet unity
 
 § V INTRODUCTION 21 
 
 under a few principles i^principia prceter necessitatevi 
 non sunt vmltiplicaiida),'' etc. 
 
 If we propose to set forth the origin of these 
 fundamental propositions and try it by the psycho- 
 logical method, we violate their sense. For they 
 do not tell us what happens, i.e. by what rule our 
 cognitive powers actually operate, and how we 
 judge, but how we ought to judge ; and this logical 
 objective necessity does not emerge if the principles 
 are merely empirical. Hence that purposiveness 
 of nature for our cognitive faculties and their use, 
 which is plainly apparent from them, is a transcen- 
 dental principle of judgments, and needs therefore 
 also a Transcendental Deduction, by means of which 
 the ground for so judging must be sought in the 
 sources of cognition a priori. 
 
 We find in the grounds of the possibility of an 
 experience in the very first place something neces- 
 sary, viz., the universal laws without which nature 
 in general (as an object of sense) cannot be thought ; 
 and these rest upon the Categories, applied to the 
 formal conditions of all intuition possible for us, 
 so far as it is also given a priori. Now under these 
 laws the Judgment is determinant, for it has nothing 
 to do but to subsume under given laws. For 
 example, the Understanding says that every change 
 has its cause (universal law of nature) ; the tran- 
 scendental Judgment has nothing further to do than 
 to supply a priori the condition of subsumption 
 under the concept of the Understanding placed 
 before it, i.e. the succession [in time] of the deter- 
 minations of one and the same thing. For nature 
 in general (as an object of possible experience) that 
 law is cognised as absolutely necessary. — But 
 now the objects of empirical cognition are deter-
 
 22 KAiVrS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT S v 
 
 mined in many other ways than by that formal time- 
 condition, or, at least as far as we can judge a 
 prioi'i, are determinable. Hence specifically dif- 
 ferent natures can be causes in an infinite variety 
 of ways, as well as in virtue of what they have 
 in common as belonging to nature in general ; and 
 each of these modes must (in accordance with the 
 concept of a cause in general) have its rule, which 
 is a law and therefore brings necessity with it, al- 
 though we do not at all comprehend this necessity, 
 in virtue of the constitution and the limitations of 
 our cosfnitive faculties. We must therefore think 
 in nature, in respect of its merely empirical laws, 
 a possibility of infinitely various empirical laws, 
 which are, as far as our insight goes, contingent 
 (cannot be cognised a priori), and in respect of 
 which we judge nature, according to empirical laws 
 and the possibility of the unity of experience (as 
 a system according to empirical laws), to be con- 
 tingent. But such an unity must be necessarily 
 presupposed and assumed, for otherwise there would 
 be no thoroughgoing connection of empirical cogni- 
 tions in a whole of experience. The universal laws 
 of nature no doubt furnish such a connection of 
 things according to their kind as things of nature 
 in general, but not specifically, as such particular 
 beings of nature. Hence the Judgment must 
 assume for its special use this principle a priori, 
 that what in the particular (empirical) laws of nature 
 is from the human point of view contingent, yet 
 contains an unity of law in the combination of its 
 manifold into an' experience possible in itself — an 
 unity not indeed to be fathomed by us, but yet think- 
 able. Consequently as the unity of law in a com- 
 bination, which we cognise as contingent in itself,
 
 § V INTR OD UCTION 
 
 although in conformity with a necessary design (a 
 need) of Understanding, is represented as the pur- 
 posiveness of Objects (here of nature) ; so must the 
 Judgment, which in respect of things under possible 
 (not yet discovered) empirical laws is merely reflec- 
 tion, think of nature in respect of the latter accord- 
 ing to 2. principle of ptirposiveness for our cognitive 
 faculty, which then is expressed in the above 
 maxims of the Judgment. This transcendental 
 concept of a purposiveness of nature is neither a 
 natural concept nor a concept of freedom, because it 
 ascribes nothing to the Object (of nature), but only 
 represents the peculiar way in which we must 
 proceed in reflection upon the objects of nature 
 in reference to a thoroughly connected experience, 
 and is consequently a subjective principle (maxim) 
 of the Judgment. Hence, as if it were a lucky 
 chance favouring our design, we are rejoiced (pro- 
 perly speaking, relieved of a want), if we meet with 
 such systematic unity under merely empirical laws ; 
 although we must necessarily assume that there 
 is such a unity without our comprehending it or 
 being able to prove it. 
 
 In order to convince ourselves of the correctness 
 of this Deduction of the concept before us, and the 
 necessity of assuming it as a transcendental principle 
 of cognition, just consider the magnitude of the 
 problem. The problem, which lies a prioid in our 
 Understanding, is to make a connected experience 
 out of given perceptions of a nature containing at all 
 events an infinite variety of empirical laws. The 
 Understanding is, no doubt, in possession a priori 
 of universal laws of nature, without which nature 
 could not be an object of experience ; but it needs 
 in addition a certain order of nature in its particular
 
 24 KANrS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT §v 
 
 rules, which can only be empirically known and 
 which are, as regards the Understanding, contingent. 
 These rules, without which we could not proceed 
 from the universal analogy of a possible experience 
 in general to the particular, must be thought by it 
 as laws {i.e. as necessary), for otherwise they would 
 not constitute an order of nature ; although their 
 necessity can never be cognised or comprehended 
 by it. ^Although, therefore, the Understanding 
 can determine nothing a priori in respect of Objects, 
 it must, in order to trace out these empirical so-called 
 laws, place at the basis of all reflection upon Objects 
 an a priori principle, viz., that a cognisable order 
 of nature is possible in accordance with these laws^ 
 The following propositions express some such prin- 
 ciple. There is in nature a subordination of genera 
 and species comprehensible by us. Each one 
 approximates to some other according to a common 
 principle, so that a transition from one to another and 
 so on to a higher genus may be possible. Though 
 it seems at the outset unavoidable for our Under- 
 standing to assume different kinds of causality for 
 the specific differences of natural operations, yet 
 these different kinds may stand under a small 
 number of principles, with the investigation of which 
 we have to busy ourselves. This harmony of 
 nature with our cognitive faculty is presupposed 
 a priori by the Judgment, on behalf of its reflection 
 upon nature in accordance with its empirical laws ; 
 whilst the Understanding at the same time cognises 
 it objectively as contingent, and it is only the Judg- 
 ment that ascribes it to nature as a transcendental 
 purposiveness (in relation to the cognitive faculty of 
 the subject). For without this presupposition we 
 should have no order of nature in accordance with
 
 8v INTRODUCTION 25 
 
 empirical laws, and consequently no guiding thread 
 for an experience ordered by these in all their variety, 
 or for an investigation of them. 
 
 For it might easily be thought that, in spite of 
 all the uniformity of natural things according to the 
 universal laws, without which we should not have 
 the form of an empirical cognition in general, the 
 specific variety of the empirical laws of nature in- 
 cluding their effects might yet be so great, that it 
 would be impossible for our Understanding, to 
 detect in nature a comprehensible order ; to divide 
 its products into genera and species, so as to use 
 the principles which explain and make intelligible 
 one for the explanation and comprehension of 
 another ; or out of such confused material (strictly 
 we should say, so infinitely various and not to be 
 measured by our faculty of comprehension) to make 
 a connected experience. 
 
 /The Judgment has therefore also in itself a" 
 principle a pj'iori of the possibility of nature, but 
 only in a subjective aspec^ by which it prescribes, 
 not to nature (autonomy), but to itself (heautonomy) 
 a law for its reflection upon nature. This we might 
 call the law of the specification of nature in respect 
 of its empirical laws. The Judgment does not 
 cognise this a prio7'i in nature, but assumes it on 
 behalf of a natural order cognisable by our Under- 
 standinQ; in the division which it makes of the 
 universal laws of nature when it wishes to subordinate 
 to these the variety of particular laws. If then we 
 say that nature specifies its universal laws according 
 to the principles of purposiveness for our cognitive 
 faculty, i.e. in accordance with the necessary business 
 of the human Understanding of finding the universal 
 for the particular which perception offers it, and again
 
 26 A' A NT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT S vi 
 
 of finding connection for the diverse (which how- 
 ever is a universal for each species) in the unity of 
 a principle, — we thus neither prescribe to nature a 
 law, nor do we learn one from it by observation 
 (although such a principle may be confirmed by this 
 means). For it is not a principle of the determinant 
 but merely of the reflective Judgment. We only 
 require that, be nature disposed as it may as regards 
 its universal laws, investigation into its empirical 
 laws may be carried on in accordance with that prin- 
 ciple and the maxims founded thereon, because it is 
 only so far as that holds that we can make any 
 progress with the use of our Understanding in 
 experience, or gain knowledge. 
 
 VI. OF THE COMBINATION OF THE FEELING OF 
 PLEASURE WITH THE CONCEPT OF THE PUR- 
 POSIVENESS OF NATURE. 
 
 The conceived harmony of nature in the variety 
 of its particular laws with our need of finding 
 universality of principles for it, must be judged as 
 contingent in respect of our insight, but yet at the 
 same time as indispensable for the needs of our 
 Understanding, and consequently as a purposiveness 
 by which nature is harmonised with our design, 
 which, however, has only knowledge for its aim. 
 The universal laws of the Understanding, which 
 are at the same time laws of nature, are just as 
 necessary (although arising from spontaneity) as the 
 material laws of motion. Their jDro'duction pre- 
 supposes no design on the ^^art of our cognitive 
 faculty, because it is only by means of them that 
 we, in the first place, attain a concept of what the 
 cognition of things (of nature) is, and attribute them
 
 § VI INTRODUCTION 
 
 necessarily to nature as Object of our cognition in 
 general. But, so far as we can see, it is contingent 
 that the order of nature according to its particular 
 laws, in all its variety and heterogeneity possibly at 
 least transcending our comprehension, should be 
 actually conformable to these [laws]. The discovery 
 of this [order] is the business of the Understanding 
 which is designedly borne towards a necessary 
 purpose, viz., the bringing of unity of principles into 
 nature, which purpose then the Judgment must 
 ascribe to nature, because the Understandinof cannot 
 here prescribe any law to it. 
 
 The attainment of that design is bound up with 
 the feeling of pleasure, and since the condition of this 
 attainment is a representation a priori, — as here a 
 principle for the reflective Judgment in general, — 
 therefore the feeling of pleasure is determined by a 
 ground a priori and valid for every man, and that 
 merely by the reference of the Object to the cognitive 
 faculty, the concept of purposiveness here not having 
 the least reference to the faculty of desire. It is thus 
 quite distinguished from all practical purposiveness 
 of nature. 
 
 In fact, although from the agreement of per^^ 
 ceptions with laws in accordance with universal 
 natural concepts (the categories), we do not and 
 cannot find in ourselves the slightest effect upon the 
 feeling of pleasure, because the Understanding 
 necessarily proceeds according to its nature without 
 any design ; yet, on the other hand, the discovery 
 that two or 'more empirical heterogeneous laws of 
 nature may be combined under one principle com- 
 prehending them both, is the ground of a very 
 marked pleasure, often even of an admiration, which 
 does not cease, though we may be already quite
 
 A 
 
 28 KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT % vi 
 
 familiar with the objects of itj We no longer find, it 
 is true, any marked pleasure in the comprehensibility 
 of nature and in the unity of its divisions into genera 
 and species, by which all empirical concepts are 
 possible, through which we cognise it according to 
 ^ its particular laws. But jthis ple ai^iirehas certainly 
 been present at one time, and it is onlyHecaTise the 
 
 rnrijn-|r)j-|pc;f nvprnil£I!.r'" ^v'^"Ih hpl7iTpr>c.>^;] ilM-»Ml-T-innf 
 
 i t th at it is ijraduallv co nfoun ded with mere coQ^nition 
 
 s 
 
 and no lon ger arrests particular attention! THere is 
 then something in our judgmenls upon nature which 
 makes us attentive to its purposiveness for our Under- 
 standing — an endeavour to bring, where possible, its 
 dissimilar laws under higher ones, though still always 
 empirical — and thus, if successful, makes us feel plea- 
 sure in that harmony of these with our cognitive 
 faculty, which harmony we regard as merely contin- 
 gent. \£>n the other hand, a representation of nature 
 would altogether displease, by which it should be 
 foretold to us that in the smallest investio^ation 
 beyond the commonest experience we should meet 
 with a heterogeneity of its laws, which would make the 
 union of its particular laws under universal empirical 
 laws impossible for our Understanding^ For this 
 would contradict the principle of the subjectively- 
 purposive specification of nature in its genera, and 
 also of our reflective Judgment in respect of such 
 principle. 
 
 This presupposition of the Judgment is, however, 
 at the same time so indeterminate as to how far that 
 ideal purposiveness of nature for our cognitive 
 faculty should be extended, that if we were told that 
 a deeper or wider knowledge of nature derived from 
 observation must lead at last to a variety of laws, 
 which no human Understandino- could reduce to a
 
 § VII INTRODUCTION 29 
 
 principle, we should at once acquiesce. But still 
 we more gladly listen to one who offers hope that 
 the more we know nature internally, and can compare 
 it with external members now unknown to us, the 
 more simple shall we find it in its principles, and that 
 the fijrther our experience reaches the more uniform 
 shall we find it amid the apparent heterogeneity of 
 its empirical laws. For it is a mandate of our 
 Judgment to proceed according to the principle of 
 the harmony of nature with our cognitive faculty so 
 far as that reaches, without deciding (because it is 
 not the determinant Judgment which gives us this 
 rule) whether or not it is bounded anywhere. For 
 although in respect of the rational use of our cognitive 
 faculty we can determine such bounds, this is not 
 possible in the empirical field. ^ 
 
 VII. OF THE ^:STHETICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE 
 PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE, 
 
 jThat which in the representation of an Objects 
 is merely subjective, i.e. which decides its reference \ Jt-^-'- 
 to the subject, not to the object, is its sesthetical 
 character ; but that which serves or can be used j 
 for the determination of the object (for cognition), 
 is its logical validity.J In the cognition of an object 
 of sense both references present themselves, j In 
 the sense - representation of external things the^ 
 quality of space wherein we intuite them is the 
 merely subjective [element] of my representation 
 (by which it remains undecided what they may be in 
 themselves as Objects), on account of which reference 
 the object is thought thereby merely as phenomenon. 
 But space, notwithstanding its merely subjective 
 quality, is at the same time an ingredient in the
 
 30 KANrS KKITIK OF JUDGMENT % vii 
 
 cognition of things as phenomena. Sensation, again 
 {i.e. external sensation), expresses the merely sub- 
 jective [element] of our representations of external 
 things, but it is also the proper material (reale) of 
 them (by which something existing is given), just 
 as space is the mere form a priori of the possibility 
 of their intuition. Nevertheless, however, sensation 
 is also employed in the cognition of external Objects. 
 But the subjective [element] in a representation 
 /which cannot be an ingredient of cognition, is the 
 plcasiLre or pain which is bound up with it ii for 
 through it I cognise nothing in the object of the 
 representation, although it may be the effect of some 
 cognition. Now the purposiveness of a thing, so far 
 as it is represented in perception, is no characteristic 
 of the Object itself (for such cannot be perceived). 
 although it may be inferred from a cognition of 
 things. The purposiveness, therefore, which pre- 
 cedes the cognition of an Object, and which, even 
 without our wishing to use the representation of it 
 for cognition, is, at the same time, immediately 
 bound up with it, is that subjective [element] which 
 cannot be an ingredient in cognition. Hence the 
 object is only called purposive, when its representa- 
 tion is immediately combined with the feeling of 
 pleasure ; and this very representation is an sesthetical 
 representation of purposiveness. — We have only 
 to ask whether there is, in general, such a representa- 
 tion of purposiveness. 
 
 If pleasure is bound up with the mere apprehen- 
 sion (apprehensio) of the form of an object of in- 
 tuition, without reference to a concept for a definite 
 cognition, then the representation is thereby not 
 referred to the Object, but simply to the subject ; 
 and the pleasure can express nothing else than
 
 § VII INTRODUCTION 31 
 
 its harmony with the cognitive faculties which come 
 into play in the reflective Judgment, and so far as 
 they are in play ; and hence can only express a 
 subjective formal purposiveness of the Object. For 
 that apprehension of forms in the Imagination can 
 never take place without the reflective Judgment, 
 though undesignedly, at least comparing them with 
 its faculty of referring intuitions to concepts. If 
 now in this comparison the Imagination (as the 
 faculty of a priori intuitions) is placed by means 
 of a given representation undesignedly in agree- 
 ment with the Understanding, as the faculty of ^^-^ 
 concepts, and thus a feeling of pleasure is aroused, ,,nV^ 
 the object must then be regarded as purposjve for ^' ^ 
 the reflective Judgment. Such a judgment )is an 
 aesthetical judgment upon the purposiveness of the 
 Object, which does not base itself upon any present 
 concept of the object, nor does it furnish any such. 
 In the case of an object whose form (not the matter 
 of its representation, or sensation), in the mere 
 reflection upon it (without reference to any concept 
 to be obtained of it), is judged as the ground of 
 a pleasure in the representation of such an Object, 
 this pleasure is judged as bound up with the re- 
 presentation necessarily ; and, consequently, not only J 
 for the subject which apprehends this form, but for 
 every judging being in general. The object is then 
 called beautiful ; and the faculty of judging by 
 means of such a pleasure (and, consequently, with 
 universal validity) is called Taste. For since 
 the ground of the pleasure is placed merely in the 
 form of the object for reflection in general — and, 
 consequently, in no sensation of the object, and 
 also without reference to any concept which any- 
 where involves design — it is only the conformity
 
 32 A'ANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT % vii 
 
 to law in the empirical use of the Judgment in 
 general (unity of the Imagination with the Under- 
 standing) in the subject, with which the representa- 
 tion of the Object in reflection, whose conditions 
 are universally valid a priori, harmonises. And 
 since this harmony of the object with the faculties 
 of the subject is [only] contingent, it brings about the 
 representation of its purposiveness [only] in respect 
 of the cognitive faculties of the subject. 
 
 Here now is a pleasure, which, like all pleasure 
 or pain that is not produced through the concept of 
 freedom {i.e. through the preceding determination 
 of the higher faculties of desire by pure Reason) ; 
 can never be comprehended from concepts, as neces- 
 sarily bound up with the representation of an object. 
 It must always be cognised as combined with this 
 only by means of reflective perception ; and, con- 
 sequently, like all empirical judgments, it can declare 
 no objective necessity and lay claim to no a priori 
 validity. But the judgment of taste also claims, 
 as every other empirical judgment does, to be valid 
 for all men ; and in spite of its inner contingency 
 this is always possible. The strange and irregular 
 thing is that it is not an empirical concept, but a 
 feeling of pleasure (consequently not a concept at 
 all), which by the judgment of taste is attributed to 
 every one, just as if it were a predicate bound up 
 with the cognition of the Object, and which is con- 
 nected with the representation thereof. 
 
 A singular judgment of experience, e.g., when 
 we perceive a moveable drop of water in an ice- 
 crystal, may justly claim that every other person 
 should find it the same ; because we have formed 
 this judgment, according to the universal conditions 
 of the determinant faculty of Judgment, under the
 
 § VII INTRODUCTION 33 
 
 laws of a possible experience in general. Just in 
 the same way he who feels pleasure in the mere 
 reflection upon the form of an object without respect 
 to any concept, although this judgment be empirical 
 and singular, justly claims the agreement of all 
 men ; because the ground of this pleasure is found 
 in the universal, although subjective, condition of 
 reflective judgments, viz., the purposive harmony 
 of an object (whether a product of nature or of 
 art) with the mutual relations of the cognitive 
 faculties (the Imagination and the Understanding), ^ 
 a harmony which is requisite for every empirical 
 cognition. The pleasure, therefore, in the judgment >C' 
 
 of taste is dependent on an empirical representation, 
 and cannot be bound up a pj'iori with any concept 
 (we cannot determine a priori what object is or 
 is not according to taste ; that we must find out 
 by experiment). But the pleasure is the determin- 
 ing ground of this judgment only because we are 
 conscious that it rests merely on reflection and on 
 the universal though only subjective conditions of 
 the harmony of that reflection with the cognition 
 of Objects in general, for which the form of the 
 Object is purposive. 
 
 Thus the reason why judgments of taste accord- 
 ing to their possibility are subjected to a Kritik 
 is that they presuppose a principle a priori, although 
 this principle is neither one of cognition for the 
 Understanding nor of practice for the Will, and 
 therefore is not in any way determinant a priori. 
 
 Susceptibility to pleasure from reflection upon 
 the forms of things (of Nature as well as of Art), 
 indicates not only a purposiveness of the Objects 
 in relation to the reflective Judgment, conformably 
 to the concept of nature in the subject ; but also 
 
 D
 
 34 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUD GiMENT § v 1 1 1 
 
 conversely a purposiveness of the subject in respect 
 of the objects according to their form or even their 
 formlessness, in virtue of the concept of freedom. 
 Hence the eesthetical judgment is not only related 
 as a judgment of taste to the beautiful, but also 
 as springing from a spiritual feeling is related to 
 the stiblime ; and thus the Kritik of the aesthetical 
 Judgment must be divided into two corresponding 
 sections. 
 
 VIII. OF THE LOGICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE 
 PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE 
 
 Purposiveness may be represented in an object 
 given in experience on a merely subjective ground, 
 as the harmony of its form, — in the apprehension 
 {apprehensio) of it prior to any concept, — with the 
 cognitive faculties, in order to unite the intuition 
 with concepts for a cognition generally. Or it 
 may be represented objectively as the harmony 
 of the form of the object with the possibility of the 
 thing itself, according to a concept of it which 
 precedes and contains the ground of this form. 
 We have seen that the representation of purposive- 
 ness of the first kind rests on the immediate 
 pleasure in the form of the object in the mere 
 reflection upon it. But the representation of pur- 
 posiveness of the second kind, since it refers the 
 form of the Object, not to the cognitive faculties 
 of the subject in the apprehension of it, but to a 
 definite cognition of the object under a given concept, 
 has nothing to do with a feeling of pleasure in 
 things, but only with the Understanding in its judg- 
 ment upon them. If the concept of an object is 
 given, the business of the Judgment in the use of 
 the concept for cognition consists in presentation
 
 § VIII INTR0DUC2I0N 35 
 
 {exi^ibitio), i.e. in setting a corresponding intuition 
 beside the concept. This may take place either 
 through our own Imagination, as in Art when we 
 realise a preconceived concept of an object which 
 is a purpose of ours ; or through Nature in its Technic 
 (as in organised bodies) when we supply to it our con- 
 cept of its purpose in order to judge of its products. 
 In the latter case it is not merely the p2irposiveness 
 of nature in the form of the thing that is represented, 
 but this its product is represented as a natural 
 purpose. — Although our concept of a subjective 
 purposiveness of nature in its forms according to 
 empirical laws is not a concept of the Object, 
 but only a principle of the Judgment for furnish- 
 ing itself with concepts amid the immense variety 
 of nature (and thus being able to ascertain its own 
 position), yet we thus ascribe to nature as it 
 were a regard to our cognitive faculty according 
 to the analogy of purpose. Thus we can regard 
 natural beatity as the presentation of the concept 
 of the formal (merely subjective) purposiveness, 
 and natural purposes as the presentation of the 
 concept of a real (objective) purposiveness. The 
 former of these we judge of by Taste (aesthetical, by 
 the medium of the feeling of pleasure), the latter 
 by Understanding and Reason (logical, according 
 to concepts). 
 
 On this is based the division of the Kritik of 
 Judgment into the Kritik of cEsthetical and of teleo- 
 logical Judgment. By the first we understand the 
 faculty of judging of the formal purposiveness (other- 
 wise called subjective) of Nature by means of the 
 feeling of pleasure or pain ; by the second the faculty 
 of judging its real (objective) purposiveness by 
 means of Understanding and Reason.
 
 36 KANTS KRiriK OF JUDGMENT § vm 
 
 In a Kritik of Judgment the part containing the 
 Ksthetical Judgment is essential, because this alone 
 contains a principle which the Judgment places quite 
 a priori at the basis of its reflection upon nature ; 
 viz., the principle of a formal purposiveness of nature, 
 according to its particular (empirical) laws, for our 
 cognitive faculty, without which the Understanding 
 could not find itself in nature. On the other hand no 
 reason a priori could be specified, — and even the 
 possibility of a reason would not be apparent from 
 the concept of nature as an object of experience 
 whether general or particular, — why there should be 
 objective purposes of nature, i.e. things which are 
 only possible as natural purposes ; but the Judg- 
 ment, without containing such a principle a priori in 
 itself, in given cases (of certain products), in order 
 to make use of the concept of purposes on behalf 
 of Reason, would only contain the rule according 
 to which that transcendental principle already has 
 prepared the Understanding to apply to nature the 
 concept of a purpose (at least as regards its form). 
 
 But the transcendental principle which represents 
 a purposiveness of nature (in subjective reference to 
 our cognitive faculty) in the form of a thing as a 
 principle by which we judge of nature, leaves it 
 quite undetermined where and in what cases I have 
 to judge of a product according to a principle of 
 purposiveness, and not rather according to universal 
 natural laws. It leaves it to the ^i-///^?//-:^/ Judgment 
 to decide by taste the harmony of » this product (of 
 its form) with our cognitive faculty (so far as this 
 decision rests not on any agreement with concepts 
 but on feeling). On the other hand, the Judgment 
 teleologically employed furnishes conditions deter- 
 minately under which something {e.g. an organised
 
 §viii INTRODUCTION 37 
 
 body) is to be judged according to the Idea of a 
 purpose of nature ; but it can adduce no fundamental 
 proposition from the concept of nature as an object 
 of experience authorising it to ascribe to nature a 
 priori a. reference, to purposes, or even indeterminately 
 to assume this of such products in actual experience. 
 The reason of this is that we must have many 
 particular experiences, and consider them under the 
 unity of their principle, in order to be able to cognise, 
 even empirically, objective purposiveness in a certain 
 object. — -The aesthetical Judgment is therefore a"" 
 special faculty for judging of things according to a 
 rule, but not according to concepts. The teleo- 
 logical Judgment is not a special faculty, but only 
 the reflective Judgment in general, so far as it 
 proceeds, as it always does in theoretical cognition, 
 according to concepts ; but in respect of certain 
 objects of nature according to special principles, viz., 
 of a merely reflective Judgment, and not of a Judg- 
 ment that determines Objects. Thus as regards its 
 application it belongs to the theoretical part of Philo- 
 sophy ; and on account of its special principles which 
 are not determinant, as they must be in Doctrine, 
 it must constitute a special part of Kritik. On 
 the other hand, the aesthetical Judgment contributes 
 nothing towards the knowledge of its objects, and 
 thus must be reckoned as belono-inor to the Kritik 
 of the judging subject and its cognitive faculties, 
 on/y so far as they are susceptible of a priori 
 principles, of whatever other use (theoretical oi 
 practical) they may be. This is the propaedeutic 
 of all Philosophy.
 
 38 KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT % ix 
 
 IX. OF THE CONNECTION OF THE LEGISLATION OF UN- 
 DERSTANDING WITH THAT OF REASON BY MEANS 
 OF THE JUDGMENT 
 
 The Understanding legislates a priori for nature 
 as an Object of sense — for a theoretical knowledge 
 of it in a possible experience. Reason legislates a 
 priori for freedom and its peculiar causality ; as the 
 supersensible in the subject, for an unconditioned 
 practical knowledge. The realm of the natural 
 concept under the one legislation and that of the 
 concept of freedom under the other are entirely 
 removed from all mutual influence which they might 
 have on one another (each according to its funda- 
 mental laws) by the great gulf that separates the 
 supersensible from phenomena. The concept of 
 freedom determines nothing in respect of the 
 theoretical cognition of nature ; and the natural con- 
 cept determines nothing in respect of the practical 
 laws of freedom. So far then it is not possible to 
 throw a bridee from the one realm to the other. 
 But although the determining grounds of causality 
 according to the concept of freedom (and the 
 practical rules which it contains) are not resident 
 in nature, and the sensible cannot determine the 
 supersensible in the subject, yet this is possible 
 conversely (not, to be sure, in respect of the cogni- 
 tion of nature, but as regards the effects of the super- 
 sensible upon the sensible). This in fact is involved 
 in the concept of a causality through freedom, the 
 effect of which is to take place in the world accord- 
 ing to Its formal laws. The w^ord cause, of course, 
 when used of the supersensible only signifies the 
 groiuid which determines the causality of natural
 
 § IX INTRODUCTION 39 
 
 things to an effect in accordance with their proper 
 natural laws, although harmoniously with the formal 
 principle of the laws of Reason. Although the 
 possibility of this cannot be comprehended, yet the 
 objection of a contradiction alleged to be found in 
 it can be sufficiently answered.^ — The effect in 
 accordance with the concept of freedom is the final 
 purpose which (or its phenomenon in the world of 
 sense) ought to exist ; and the condition of the 
 possibility of this is presupposed in nature (in the 
 nature of the subject as a sensible being, that is, as 
 man). The Judgment presupposes this a priori 
 and without reference to the practical ; and thus 
 furnishes the mediating concept between the con- 
 cepts of nature and that of freedom. It makes\ 
 possible the transition from the conformity to law 
 in accordance with the former to the final purpose 
 in accordance with the latter, and this by the con- 
 cept of a purposiveness of nature. For thus is 
 cognised the possibility of the final purpose which 
 alone can be actualised in nature in harmony with 
 its laws. ^ 
 
 The Understanding by the possibility of its a 
 
 1 One of the various pretended contradictions in this whole 
 distinction of the causahty of nature from that of freedom is this. 
 It is objected that if I speak of obstacles which nature opposes to 
 causality according to (moral) laws of freedom or of the assistajtce it 
 aftords, I am admitting an influence of the former upon the latter. 
 But if we try to understand what has been said, this misinterpreta- 
 tion is very easy to avoid. The opposition or assistance is not 
 between nature and freedom, but between the former as phenomenon 
 and the effects of the latter as phenomena in the world of sense. 
 The causality of freedom itself (of pure and practical Reason) is the 
 causality of a natural cause subordinated to nature {i.e. of the 
 subject considered as man and therefore as phenomenon). The 
 intelligible, which is thought under freedom, contains the ground of 
 the ■determination of this [natural cause] in a further inexplicable way 
 (just as that intelligible does which constitutes the supersensible sub- 
 strate of nature).
 
 40 K ANTS KKITIK OF JUDGMENT Six 
 
 pi'iori laws for nature, gives a proof that nature is 
 only cognised by us as phenomenon ; and implies 
 at the same time that it has a supersensible sub- 
 strate, though it leaves this quite midetermined. 
 The Judgment by its a priori principle for the 
 judging of nature according to its possible particular 
 laws, makes the supersensible substrate (both in 
 us and without us) determinable by means of the 
 intellectual faculty. But the Reason by its practical 
 a priori law determines it; and thus the Judgment 
 makes possible the transition from the realm of the 
 natural concept to that of the concept of freedom. 
 
 As regards the faculties of the soul in cjeneral, 
 in their higher aspect, as containing an autonomy ; 
 the Understandinor is that which contains the con- 
 stitutive principles a priori for the cognitive faculty 
 (the theoretical cognition of nature). For iho. feeling 
 of pleasure and pain there is the Judgment, indepen- 
 dently of concepts and sensations which relate to the 
 determination of the faculty of desire and can thus 
 be immediately practical. For the faculty of desire 
 there is the Reason w hich is practical without 
 the mediation of any pleasure wdt atev er. It deter- 
 mines for the faculty of desire, as a superior faculty, 
 the final purpose which carries with it the pure 
 intellectual satisfaction in the Object. ^ — The con- 
 cept formed by Judgment of a purposiveness of 
 nature belongs to natural concepts, but only as 
 a regulative principle of the cognitive faculty ; 
 although the a^sthetical judgment upon certain 
 objects (of Nature or Art) which occasions it is, in 
 respect of the feeling of pleasure or pain, a 
 constitutive principle. The spontaneity in the play 
 of the cognitive faculties, the harmony of which 
 contains the ground of this pleasure, makes the
 
 §IX 
 
 INTR OD UCTION 
 
 41 
 
 above concept [of the purposiveness of nature] fit to 
 be the mediating hnk between the realm of the 
 natural concept and that of the concept of freedom 
 in its effects ; whilst at the same time it promotes 
 the sensibility of the mind to moral feeling. — The 
 following table may facilitate the review of all the 
 higher faculties according to their systematic unity. ^ 
 
 All the faculties of the mind 
 
 Cognitive faculties. Faculties of desire. 
 
 Feeling of pleasure and pain. 
 
 Cognitive faculties 
 Understanding. Judgment. 
 
 A priori pri7iciples 
 Conformity to law. Purposiveness. 
 
 Application to 
 Nature. Art. Freedom 
 
 Reason. 
 Final purpose. 
 
 ^ It has been thought a doubtful point that my divisions in pure 
 Philosophy should always be threefold. But that lies in the nature 
 of the thing. If there is to be an a priori division it must be either 
 analytical, according to the law of contradiction, which is always 
 twofold {qt/odlibet ens est aut A aut non A) ; or it is synthetical. 
 And if in this latter case it is to be derived from a priori concepts 
 (not as in Mathematic from the intuition corresponding to the 
 concept), the division inust necessarily be trichotomy. For according 
 to what is requisite for synthetical unity in general there must be 
 (i) a condition, (2) a conditioned, and (3) the coac£pt \vhich -arises 
 from the union of the conditioned with its condition. 
 
 2 
 
 V'
 
 I 
 
 THE KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 PART I 
 KRITIK OF THE tESTHETICAL JUDGMENT
 
 FIRST DIVISION 
 
 ANALYTIC OF THE ^STHETICAL JUDGMENT 
 
 FIRST BOOK 
 
 ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 
 
 FIRST MOMENT 
 
 OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE ^ ACCORDING TO QUALITY 
 
 ^ I. The judgment of taste is cesthctical 
 
 In order to distinguish whether anything is 
 beautiful or not, we refer the representation not 
 by the Understanding to the Object for cognition, 
 but by the Imagination (perhaps in conjunction 
 with the Understanding) to the subject, and its 
 feehng of pleasure or pain. The judgment of tast e 
 is therefore not a judgment of cognitio n, and is 
 consequently not l ogical but sesthe tical, by which we 
 understand that whose determining ground can be r 
 
 1 The definition of taste which is laid down here is that it is the "T 
 faculty of judging of the beautiful. But the analysis of judgments of 
 taste must show what is required in order to call an object beautiful. 
 The moments, to which this Judgment has regard in its reflection, I 
 have sought in accordance with the guidance of the logical functions 
 of judgment (for in a judgment of taste a reference to the Under- 
 standing is always involved). I have considered the moment of 
 quality first, because the sesthetical judgment upon the beautiful first 
 pays attention to it.
 
 y 
 
 46 KANT'S KRlTlk' OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 no otJicr than subjective. Every reference of repre- 
 sentations, even that of sensations, may be objective 
 (and then it signifies the real [element] of an em- 
 pirical representation) ; save only the reference to the 
 feeling of pleasure and pain, by which nothing in 
 the Object is signified, but through which there is 
 a feeling in the subject, as it is affected by the 
 representation. 
 
 -^ To apprehend a regular, purposive building by 
 means of one's cognitive faculty (whether in a clear 
 or a confused way of representation) is something 
 quite different from being conscious of this repre- 
 sentation as connected with the sensation of 
 satisfaction. Here the representation is altogether 
 referred to the subject and to its feeling of life, under 
 the name of the feeling of pleasure or pain. This 
 establishes a quite separate faculty of distinction 
 and of judgment, adding nothing to cognition, but 
 only comparing the given representation in the 
 subject with the whole faculty of representations, of 
 which the mind is conscious in the feeling of its 
 [state. Given r pprf^'^'"'t^p^''^'''g '" a judgment xan 
 Lbe__£mpiric4J (consequently, cesthetical) ; but the 
 fjudgment which is formed by means of them is 
 /logical, provided they are referred in the judgment to 
 uhe Object. Conversely, if the given representa- 
 tions are rational, but are referred in a judgment 
 /simply to the subject (to its feeling), the judgment 
 ns so far always sesthetical. 
 
 § 2. The satisfaction wJiicJi determines tJie 
 jndgnient of taste is disintei'ested 
 
 The satisfaction which we combine with the 
 representation of the existence of an object is called
 
 d'v. I § 2 DISINTERESTED SATISFACTION 47 
 
 interest. Such satisfaction always has reference to 
 the faculty of desire, either as its determining ground 
 or as necessarily connected with its determining 
 ground. ^Now when the question is if a thing is 
 beautiful, we do not want to know whether anything 
 depends or can depend on the existence of the thing 
 either for myself or for any one else, but how we 
 judge it by mere observation (intuition or reflection).^ 
 If any one asks me if I find that palace beautiful 
 which I see before me, I may answer : I do not like 
 things of that kind which are made merely t o be 
 stared at. Or I can answer like that Iroquois 
 SacJiem who was pleased in Paris by nothing more 
 than by the cook-shops. Or again after the manner 
 of Roussemt I may rebuke the vanity of the great 
 who waste the sweat of the people on such super- 
 fluous things. In fine I could easily convince myself 
 that if I found myself on an uninhabited island with- 
 out the hope of ever again coming among men, and 
 could conjure up just such a splendid building by 
 my mere wish, I should not even give myself the 
 trouble if I had a sufficiently comfortable hut. This 
 may all be admitted and approved ; but we are not now 
 talking of this. We wish only to know if this mere 
 representation of the object is accompanied in me 
 with satisfaction, however indifferent I may be as 
 regards the existence of the object of this representa- 
 tion. We easily see that in saying it is beaittifiil 
 and in showing that I have taste, I am concerned, not 
 wjjth that i n which I depend on the existence of th e 
 object, but with that which I make out of this re- -1 
 presentation in myself. Every one must admit that^ 
 a judgem ent about beauty, in which the least inter e^tj 
 mingles, is very partial and is not a pure judgm ent) 
 of taste. We must not be in the least prejudiced in
 
 48 KANTS KRiriK OF JUDCMENT parti 
 
 favour of the existence of the things, but be quite 
 indifferent in this respect, in order to play the judge 
 in things of taste. 
 
 We cannot, however, better elucidate this pro- 
 position, which is of capital importance, than by 
 contrasting the pure disinterested^ satisfaction in 
 judgments of taste, with that which is bound up with 
 an interest, especially if we can at the same time be 
 certain that there are no other kinds of interest than 
 those which are to be now specified. 
 
 § 3. The satisfaction in the pleasant is bound 
 tip with interest 
 
 That which pleases the senses in sensation is 
 PLEASANT. Here the opportunity presents itself of 
 censuring a very common confusion of the double 
 sense which the word sensation can have, and of 
 calling attention to it. All satisfaction (it is said or 
 thought) is itself sensation (of a pleasure). Con- 
 sequently everything that pleases is pleasant because 
 it pleases (and according to its different degrees or 
 its relations to other pleasant sensations it is agree- 
 able, lovely, delightful, enjoyable, etc.) But if this 
 be admitted, then impressions of Sense which 
 determine the inclination, fundamental propositions 
 of Reason which determine the Will, mere reflective 
 forms of intuition which determine the Judgment, 
 are quite the same, as regards the effect upon the 
 feeling of pleasure. For this would be pleasantness 
 
 1 A judgment upon an object of satisfaction may be quite dis- 
 interesfed, but yet very interesii)ig, i.e. not based upon an interest, but 
 bringing an interest with it ; of this kind are all pure moral judg- 
 ments. Judgments of taste, however, do not in themselves establish 
 any interest. Only in society is it interesting to have taste : the 
 reason of this will be shown in the sequel.
 
 Div. I § 3 INTEREST IN THE PLEASANT 49 
 
 in the sensation of one's state, and since in the 
 end all the operations of our faculties must issue in 
 the practical and unite in it as their goal, we could 
 suppose no other way of estimating things and their 
 worth than that which consists in the gratification 
 that they promise. It is of no consequence at all 
 how this is attained, and since then the choice of 
 means alone could make a difference, men could 
 indeed blame one another for stupidity and in- 
 discretion, but never for baseness and wickedness. 
 For thus they all, each according to his own way of 
 seeing things, seek one goal, that is, gratification. 
 
 If a determination of the feeling of pleasure or 
 pain is called sensation, this expression signifies 
 something quite different from what I mean when I 
 call the representation of a thing (by sense, as a 
 receptivity belonging to the cognitive faculty) 
 sensation. For in the latter case the representation 
 is referred to the ObjectriTTTTre^fcrrrner isimply to the 
 subject, and is available Torirno cognitToirwKarever, 
 not even for that by which the subject£^7£?£££itself 
 
 In the aBove e!ucidtlL'f6rr"vve uncreistand by the 
 word sensation, an objective representation of sense ; 
 and in order to avoid misinterpretation, we shall call 
 that, which must always remain merely subjective 
 and can constitute absolutely no representation of 
 an object, by the ordinary term "feeling." The 
 green colour of the meadows belongs to objective 
 sensation, as a perception of an object of sense ; the 
 pleasantness of this belongs to siibjective sensation 
 by which no object is represented, i.e. to feeling, 
 by which the object is considered as an Object of 
 satisfaction (which does not furnish a cognition of it). 
 
 Now that a judgment about an object, by which 
 I describe it as pleasant, expresses an interest in it, 
 
 E
 
 50 KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 is plain from the fact that by sensation it excites a 
 desire for objects of that kind ; consequently the 
 satisfaction presupposes not the mere judgment 
 about it, but the relation of its existence to my state, 
 so far as this is affected by such an Object. Hence 
 we do not merely say of the pleasant, it pleases ; but, 
 it gratifies. I give to it no mere assent, but inclina- 
 tion is aroused by it ; and in the case of what is 
 pleasant in the most lively fashion, there is no judg- 
 ment at all upon the character of the Object, for 
 those [persons] who always lay themselves out for 
 enjoyment (for that is the word describing intense 
 gratification) would fain dispense with all judgment. 
 
 § 4. TJie satisfaction in the good is bowid np 
 
 zuith interest 
 
 Whatever by means of Reason pleases through 
 the mere concept is good. That which pleases only 
 as a means we call good for something (the useful) ; 
 but that which pleases for itself is good in itself. In 
 both there is always involved the concept of a 
 purpose, and consequently the relation of Reason to 
 the (at least possible) volition, and thus a satisfaction 
 in tho. presence of an Object or an action, i.e. some 
 kind of interest. 
 
 jwirM. /^t -t^^^' ^^ order to find anything good, I must always 
 " Tvnow what sort of a thing the object ought to be, i.e. 
 I must have a concept of it. But there is no need 
 of this, to find a thing beautiful. Flowers, free 
 delineations, outlines intertwined with one another 
 without design and called [conventional] foliage, 
 have no meaning, depend on no definite concept, 
 and yet they please. v^The satisfac tion in the beauti- 
 ful must depend on the reflection upon an object.
 
 Div. I §4 THE PLEASANT AND THE GOOD 51 
 
 leading to any concept (however indefinite) ; and it 
 is thus distinguished from the pleasant which rests 
 entirely upon sensation.^ 
 
 It is true, the Pleasant seems in many cases to r^ 7" ^ n 
 be the same as the Good. Thus people are t-^wi*' ^ n 
 accustomed to say that all gratification (especially if^^ «^ 
 it lasts) is good in itself; which is very much the 
 same as to say that lasting pleasure and the good 
 are the same. But we can soon see that this is 
 merely a confusion of words ; for the concepts 
 which properly belong to these expressions can 
 in no way be interchanged. The pleasant, which, 
 as such, represents the object simply in relation 
 to Sense, must first be brought by the concept of 
 a purpose under principles of Reason, in order to 
 call it good, as an object of the Will. But that there 
 is [involved] a quite different relation to satisfaction 
 in calling that which gratifies at the same time good, 
 may be seen from the fact that in the case of the 
 good the question always is, whether it is mediately 
 or immediately good (useful or good in itself) ; but ^ 
 on the contrary in the case of the pleasant there can ^ 
 be no question about this at all, for the w ord alwavs 
 s ignifies something which i 2l£aS £S immediat ely. (The 
 same is applicable to what I call beautiful.) 
 
 Even in common speech men distinguish the 
 Pleasant from the Good. Of a dish which stimulates 
 the taste by spices and other condiments we say un- 
 hesitatingly that it is pleasant, though it is at the 
 same time admitted not to be good ; for though it im- 
 mediately delights the senses, yet mediately, i.e. con- 
 sidered by Reason which looks to the after results, 
 it displeases. Even in the judging of health we may 
 notice this distinction. It is immediately pleasant 
 to every one possessing it (at least negatively, i.e. as 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 UNIVFR9ITV nr MnMO«^
 
 52 KANT'S KRiriK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 the absence of all bodily pains). But in order to say 
 that it is good, it must be considered by Reason 
 with reference to purposes ; viz., that it is a state 
 which makes us fit for all our business. Finally in 
 respect of happiness every one believes himself 
 entided to describe the greatest sum of the pleasant- 
 ness of life (as regards both their number and their 
 duration) as a true, even as the highest, good. 
 However Reason is opposed to this. Pleasantness 
 is enjoyment. And if we were concerned with this 
 alone, it would be foolish to be scrupulous as regards 
 the means which procure it for us, or [to care] 
 whether it is obtained passively by the bounty of 
 nature or by our own activity and work. But 
 Reason can never be persuaded that the existence 
 of a man who merely lives for enjoyment (however 
 busy he may be in this point of view), has a worth 
 in itself; even if he at the same time is conducive as 
 a means to the best enjoyment of others, and shares 
 in all their gratifications by sympathy. Only what 
 he does, without reference to enjoyment, in full 
 freedom and independendy of what nature can pro- 
 cure for him passively, gives an [absolute^] worth to 
 his presence [in the world] as the existence of a 
 person ; and happiness, with the whole abundance of 
 its pleasures, is far from being an unconditioned good." 
 However, notwithstanding all this difference be- 
 tween the pleasant and the good, they both agree 
 in this that they are always bound up with an 
 interest in their object ; so are not only the pleasant 
 
 1 [Second Edition.] 
 
 - An obligation to enjoyment is a manifest absurdity. Thus the 
 obUgation to all actions which have merely enjoyment for their aim 
 can only be a pretended one ; however spiritually it may be con- 
 ceived (or decked out), even if it is a mystical, or so-called heavenly, 
 enjoyment.
 
 Div. I ? 5 THREE KINDS OF SATISFACTION 53 
 
 (§ 3), and the mediate good (the useful) which is pleas- 
 ing as a means towards pleasantness somewhere, but 
 also that which is good absolutely and in every aspect, 
 viz., moral good, which brings with it the highest 
 interest. For the good is the Object of will {i.e. of 
 a faculty of desire determined by Reason). But to 
 wish for something, and to have a satisfaction in its 
 existence, i.e. to take an interest in it, are identical. 
 
 § 5. Comparison of the three specifically different 
 kinds of satisfaction 
 
 The p leasant and the good have both a reference 
 to the faculty of desire ; and they bring with them — 
 the former a satisfaction pathologically conditioned 
 (by impulses, stimuli) — the latter a pure practical 
 satisfaction, which is determined not merely by the 
 representation of the object, but also by the repre- 
 sented connection of the subject with the existence 
 of the object. [It is not merely the object that 
 pleases, but also its existence.^] On the other hand, 
 the judgment of taste is merely contenplative ; i.e. y 
 it is a judgment which, indifferent as regards the 
 existence of an object, compares its character with 
 the feeling of pleasure and pain. But this con- 
 templation itself is not directed to concepts ; for 
 the judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment ^ 
 (either theoretical or practical), and thus is not 
 based on concepts, nor has it concepts as its purpose. 
 
 The Pleasant, the Beautiful, and the Good, desig- 
 nate then, three different relations of representa- 
 tions to the feeling of pleasure and pain, in reference 
 to which we distinguish from each other objects or / 
 methods of representing them. And the expressions 
 
 ^ [Second Edition.]
 
 54 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part I 
 
 corresponding to each, by which we mark our com- 
 placency in them, are not the same. ^ That which 
 GRATIFIES a man is called pleasant ; that which 
 merely pleases him is beautiful; that which is 
 ESTEEMED [or approved^^^ by him, i.e. that to which 
 he accords an objective worth, is good. /Pleasantness 
 concerns irrational animals also ; but Beauty only 
 concerns men, i.e. animal, but still rational, beings — 
 not merely q2td rational {e.g. spirits), but qiui animal 
 also ; and the Good concerns every rational being 
 in general. This is a proposition which can only 
 be completely established and explained in the 
 sequel. We may say that of all these three kinds 
 of satisfaction, that of taste in the Beautiful is alone 
 a disinterested and/rr^ satisfaction ; for no interest, 
 either of Sense or of Reason, here forces our assent. 
 Hence we may say of satisfaction that it is related 
 in the three aforesaid cases to inclination, \.o favou?', 
 or to respect. Now favour is the only free satis- 
 faction. An object of inclination, and one that is 
 proposed to our desire by a law of Reason, leave us 
 no freedom in forming for ourselves anywhere an 
 object of pleasure. All interest presupposes or 
 generates a want ; and, as the determining ground 
 of assent, it leaves the judgment about the object 
 no lonorer free. 
 
 As regards the interest of inclination in the case 
 of the Pleasant, every one says that hunger is the 
 best sauce, and everything that is eatable is relished 
 by people with a healthy appetite ; and thus a satis- 
 faction of this sort shows no choice directed by 
 taste. It is only when the want is appeased that we 
 can distinguish which of many men has or has 
 not taste. In the same way there may be manners 
 
 ^ [Second Edition.]
 
 Div. I § 6 TASTE AND BEAUTY 55 
 
 (conduct) without virtue, politeness without good- 
 will, decorum without modesty, etc. For where 
 the moral law speaks there is no longer, objectively, 
 a free choice as regards what is to be done ; and to 
 display taste in its fulfilment (or in judging of 
 another's fulfilment of it) is something quite 
 different from manifesting the moral attitude of 
 thought. For this involves a command and 
 generates a want, whilst moral taste only plays with 
 the objects of satisfaction, without attaching itself to 
 one of them. 
 
 EXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL RESULTING 
 FROM THE FIRST MOMENT 
 
 Taste is the faculty of judging of an object or a 
 method of representing it by a n entirely disintereste d 
 satisfaction or dissatisfa ction. The object of such 
 satisfaction is called dean t if n/} 
 
 \ 
 
 SECOND MOMENT 
 
 OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE, VIZ., ACCORDING TO 
 
 QUANTITY 
 
 § 6. The beantiful is tJiat zuhieh apart from concepts 
 is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction 
 
 This explanation of the beautiful can be derived 
 
 1 [Uebenveg points out {Hist, of Phil., ii. 528, Eng. Trans.) that 
 Mendelssohn had already called attention to the disinterestedness of 
 our satisfaction in the Beautiful. " It appears," says Mendelssohn, 
 " to be a particular mark of the beautiful, that it is contemplated with 
 quiet satisfaction, that it pleases, even though it be not in our 
 possession, and even though we be never so far removed from the 
 desire to put it to our use." But, of course, as Uebenveg remarks, 
 Kant's conception of disinterestedness extends far beyond the idea of 
 merely not desiring to possess the object.]
 
 56 KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT j>art i 
 
 from the preceding explanation of it as the object of 
 an entirely disinterested satisfaction. For the fact 
 of which every one is conscious, that the satisfaction 
 is for him quite disinterested, implies in his judg- 
 ment a ground of satisfaction for all men. For 
 since it does not rest on any inclination of the 
 subject (nor upon any other premeditated interest), 
 but since the person who judges feels himself quite 
 free as regards the satisfaction which he attaches to 
 the object, he cannot find the ground of this satisfac- 
 tion in any private conditions connected with his 
 J own subject ; and hence it must be regarded as 
 grounded on what he can presuppose in every other 
 person. Consequently he must believe that he has 
 reason for attributing a similar satisfaction to every 
 one. He will therefore speak of the beautiful, as if 
 beauty were a characteristic of the object and the 
 judgment logical (constituting a cognition of the 
 Object by means of concepts of it) ; although it is 
 only eesthetical and involves merely a reference of 
 the representation of the object to the subject. For 
 ^ it has this similarity to a logical judgment that we 
 / can presuppose its validity for all men. But this 
 j universality cannot arise from concepts ; for from 
 concepts there is no transition to the feeling of 
 ; pleasure or pain (except in pure practical laws, 
 ^' which bring an interest with them such as is not 
 ; bound up with the pure judgment of taste). Conse- 
 quently the judgment of taste, accompanied with the 
 consciousness of separation from all interest, inust 
 claim validity for every man, without this universality 
 depending on Objects. That is, there must be 
 bound up with it a title to subjective universality.
 
 \ 
 
 Div. I § 7 UNIVERSAL SATISFACTION IN BEAUTY 57 
 
 § 7. Comparison of the Beautiful ivitk the Pleasant 
 and the Good by means of the above characteristic 
 
 As regards the Pleasant every one Is content 
 that his judgment, Avhich he bases upon private 
 feeHng, and by which he says of an object that it 
 pleases him, should be limited merely to his own 
 person. Thus he is quite contented that if he 
 says "Canary wine is pleasant," another man may 
 correct his expression and remind him that he ought 
 to say " It is pleasant to me.'' And this is the case 
 not only as regards the taste of the tongue, the 
 palate, and the throat, but for whatever is pleasant to 
 any one's eyes and ears. To one violet colour is soit 
 and lovelv, to another it is washed out and dead. One 
 man likes the tone of wind instruments, another that 
 of strings. To strive here with the desisfn of 
 reproving as incorrect another man's judgment 
 which is different from our own, as if the judgments 
 were logically opposed, would be folly. As regards 
 the pleasant therefore the fundamental proposition 
 is valid, every one has his ozvji taste (the taste of 
 Sense). 
 
 The case is quite different with the Beautiful, 
 It would (on the contrary) be laughable if a man 
 who imagined anything to his own taste, thought to 
 justify himself by saying: "This object (the house 
 we see, the coat that person wears, the concert we , 
 hear, the poem submitted to our judgment) is 
 beautiful y^;;' ;;^^." For he must not call it beazitifur \ 
 if it merely pleases him. Many things may have for 
 him charm and pleasantness ; no one troubles him- 
 self at that ; but if he gives out anything as beautiful, 
 he supposes in others the same satisfaction — he
 
 58 KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT i-art i 
 
 judges not merely for himself, but for every one, and 
 
 speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things. 
 
 Hence he says " the thing is beautiful " ; and he does 
 
 not count on the agreement of others with this his 
 
 judgment of satisfaction, because he has found this 
 
 agreement several times before, but he demands it of 
 
 them. He blames them if they judge otherwise and 
 
 he denies them taste, which he nevertheless requires 
 
 ') from them. Here then we cannot say that eaciLman 
 
 * has his own particular taste. For this would be as 
 
 much as to say that there is no taste whatever ; i.e. 
 
 no sesthetical judgment, which can make a rightful 
 
 claim upon every one's assent. 
 
 At the same time we find as regards the Pleasant 
 that there is an agreement among men in their 
 judgments upon it, in regard to which we deny Taste 
 to some and attribute it to others ; by this not 
 meaning one of our organic senses, but a faculty 
 of judging in respect of the pleasant generally. 
 Thus w^e say of a man who knows how to entertain 
 his guests with pleasures (of enjoyment for all 
 the senses), so that they are all pleased, "he has 
 taste." But here the universality is only taken 
 comparatively ; and there emerge rules which are 
 ov\y genei'al (like all empirical ones), and not iini- 
 versal\ which latter the judgment of Taste upon 
 the beautiful undertiikes or lays claim to. It is a 
 judgment in reference to sociability, so far as this 
 rests on empirical rules. In respect of the Good 
 it is true that judgments make rightful claim to 
 validity for every one ; but the Good is represented 
 only by means of a concept as the Object of a 
 universal satisfaction, which is the case neither with 
 the Pleasant nor with the Beautiful.
 
 Div. iSS THIS UNIVERSALITY ONLY SUBJECTIVE 59 
 
 § 8. The tmiversality of the satisfaction is represented 
 in a judgment of Taste only as subjective 
 
 This particular determination of the universaUty 
 of an sesthetical judgment, which is to be met with in 
 a judgment of taste, is noteworthy, not indeed for 
 the logician, but for the transcendental philosopher. 
 It requires no small trouble to discover its origin,!' 
 but we thus detect a property of our cognitive > 
 faculty w^hich without this analysis w^ould remain 
 unknown. 
 
 First, we must be fully convinced of the fact 
 that in a judgment of taste (about the Beautiful) 
 the satisfaction in the object is imputed to eve^y one, 
 without being based on a concept (for then it would 
 be the Good). Further, this claim to universal 
 validity so essentially belongs to a judgment by 
 which we describe anything as beautiful, that if 
 this were not thought in it, it would never come 
 into our thoughts to use the expression at all, 
 but everything which pleases without a concept 
 would be counted as pleasant. In respect of the 
 latter every one has his own opinion ; and no one 
 assumes in another, agreement with his judgment 
 of taste, which is always the case in a judgment 
 of taste about beauty. I may call the first the taste 
 of Sense, the second the taste of Reflection ; so 
 far as the first lays down mere private judgments, 
 and the second judgments supposed to be generally 
 valid (public), but in both cases sesthetical (not prac- 
 tical) judgments about an object merely in respect 
 of the relation of its representation to the feeling 
 of pleasure and pain. Now here is something 
 strange. As regards the taste of Sense not only
 
 6o A'ANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 does experience show that its judgment (of pleasure 
 or pain connected with anything) is not valid univer- 
 sally, but every one is content not to impute agree- 
 ment with it to others (although actually there 
 is often lound a very extended concurrence in 
 these judgments). On the other hand, the taste 
 of Reflection has its claim to the universal validity 
 of its judgments (about the beautiful) rejected often 
 enough, as experience teaches ; although it may find 
 it possible (as it actually does) to represent judg- 
 ments which can demand this universal agreement 
 In fact it imputes this to every one for each of its 
 judgments of taste, without the persons that judge 
 disputing as to the possibility of such a claim ; 
 although in particular cases they cannot agree as to 
 the correct application of this faculty. 
 
 Here we must, in the first place, remark that a 
 universality which does not rest on concepts of 
 Objects (not even on empirical ones) is not logical 
 but sesthetical, i.e. it involves no objective quantity 
 of the judgment but only that which is subjective. 
 For this I use the expression ^^w^r^;/ validity which 
 signifies the validity of the reference of a representa- 
 tion not to the cognitive faculty, but to the feeling 
 of pleasure and pain for every subject. (We can 
 avail ourselves also of the same expression for the 
 logical quantity of the judgment, if only we prefix 
 objective to "universal validity," to distinguish it 
 from that which is merely subjective and ai^sthetical.) 
 A judgment with objective tmiversal validity 
 is also always valid subjectively ; i.e. if the judg- 
 ment holds for everything contained under a given 
 >^ concept, it holds also for every one who represents 
 an object by means of this concept. Rut from a 
 subjective tmiversal validity, i.e. aesthetical and restino-
 
 Div. I § 8 QUANTITY OF JUDGMENTS OF TASTE 6i 
 
 on no concept, we cannot infer that which is 
 logical ; because that kind of judgment does not 
 extend to the Object. But therefore the aisthetical 
 universality which is ascribed to a judgment must 
 be of a particular kind, because it does not unite 
 the predicate of beauty with the concept of the 
 Object, considered in its whole logical sphere, and 
 yet extends it to the whole sphere of judging 
 persons. 
 
 In respect of logical quantity all judgments of , 
 taste are singular judgments. For because I must 
 refer the object immediately to my feeling of pleasure 
 and pain, and that not by means of concepts, they 
 cannot have the quantity of objective generally 
 valid judgments. Nevertheless if the singular re- 
 presentation of the Object of the judgment of taste 
 in accordance with the conditions determining the 
 latter, were transformed by comparison into a con- 
 cept, a logically universal judgment could result there- 
 from. E.g. I describe by a judgment of taste the 
 rose, that I see, as beautiful. But the judgment / 
 which results from the comparison of several singular / 
 judgments, "Roses in general are beautiful" is no 
 longer described simply as sesthetical, but as a logical 
 judgment based on an sesthetical one. Again the 
 judgment "The rose is pleasant" (to usf) is, 
 although aesthetical and singular, not a judgment \ 
 of Taste but of Sense. It is distinguished from the 
 former by the fact that the judgment of Taste carries ^ 
 with it an cEsthetical qztantity of universality, i.e. of 
 validity for every one ; which cannot be found in 
 a judgment about the Pleasant. It is only judgments 
 about the Good which — although they also determine 
 satisfaction in an object, — have logical and not merely 
 ffisthetical univers.ality ; for they are valid of the
 
 62 KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part l 
 
 Object, as cognitive of it, and thus are valid for every- 
 one. 
 
 If we judge Objects merely according to con- 
 cepts, then all representation of beauty is lost. 
 Thus there can be no rule according to which 
 any one is to be forced to recognise anything as 
 beautiful. We cannot press [upon others] by the 
 aid of any reasons or fundamental propositions 
 our judgment that a coat, a house, or a tiower is 
 beautiful. People wish to submit the Object to 
 their own eyes, as if the satisfaction in it depended 
 on sensation; and yet if we then call the object 
 beautiful, we believe that we speak with a universal 
 voice, and we claim the assent of every one, although 
 on the contrary all private sensation can only decide 
 for the observer himself and his satisfaction. 
 
 We may see now that in the judgment of taste 
 nothing is postulated but such a nnivcrsal voice, 
 in respect of the satisfaction without the intervention 
 of concepts ; and thus \\\^ possibility of an aesthetical 
 judgment that can, at the same time, be regarded 
 as valid for every one. The judgment of taste itself 
 does not postulate the agreement of every one (for 
 that can only be done by a logically universal judg- 
 ment because it can adduce reasons) ; it only /w- 
 putcs this agreement to every one, as a case of the 
 rule in respect of which it expects, not confirma- 
 tion by concepts, but assent from others. The 
 universal voice is, therefore, only an Idea (we do 
 not yet inquire upon what it rests). It may be 
 uncertain whether or not the man, who believes that 
 he is laying down a judgment of taste, is, as a matter 
 of fact, judging in conformity with that Idea ; but 
 that he refers his judgment thereto, and, consequently, 
 that it is intended to be a judgment of taste, he
 
 Div. I § 9 KEY TO THE KRITIK OF TASTE 63 
 
 announces by the expression "beauty.' He can 
 be quite certain of this for himself by the mere 
 consciousness of the separating off everything be- 
 longing to the Pleasant and the Good from the 
 satisfaction which is left ; and this is all for which he 
 promises himself the agreement of every one — a claim 
 w^hich would be justifiable under these conditions, 
 provided only he did not often make mistakes, and 
 thus lay down an erroneous judgment of taste. 
 
 § 9. Investigation of the quest ion whether in the 
 jiLclginent of taste the feeling of pleas^ire precedes 
 or follows the J2tdging of the object 
 
 The solution of this question is the key to the 
 Kritik of Taste, and so is worthy of all attention. 
 
 If the pleasure in the given object precedes, 
 and it is only its universal communicability that is 
 to be acknowledged in the judgment of taste about 
 the representation of the object, there would be a 
 contradiction. For such pleasure would be nothing 
 different from the mere pleasantness in the sensation, 
 and so in accordance with its nature could have only 
 private validity, because it is immediately dependent 
 on the representation through which the object is 
 given. 
 
 Hence, it is the universal capability of com- 
 munication of the mental state in the given re- )/ 
 presentation which, as the subjective condition of / 
 
 the judgment of taste, must be fundamental, and 
 must have the pleasure in the object as its con- 
 sequent. But nothing can be universally com- 
 municated except cognition and representation, so 
 far as it belongs to cognition. For it is only thus 
 that this latter can be objective ; and only through 
 
 \
 
 64 KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 this has it*a universal point of reference, with which 
 the representative power of every one is compelled 
 to harmonise. If the determining ground of our 
 J judgment as to this universal communicability of the 
 representation is to be merely subjective, i.e. is con- 
 ceived independently of any concept of the object, 
 it can be nothing else than the state of mind, which 
 is to be met with in the relation of our representative 
 powers to each other, so far as they refer a given 
 representation to cognition in general. 
 
 The cognitive powers, which are involved by 
 vi this representation, are here in free play, because 
 no definite concept limits them to a definite^ rule 
 of cognition. Hence, the state of mind in this 
 representation must be a feeling of the free play 
 of the representative powers in a given representa- 
 tion with reference to a cognition in general. Now 
 a representation by which an object is given, 
 that is to become a cognition in general, requires 
 Imagination, for the gathering together the manifold 
 of intuition, and Under standinor, for the unitv of 
 the concept uniting the representations. This state 
 of free play of the cognitive faculties in a re- 
 presentation by which an object is given, must be 
 universally communicable ; because cognition, as 
 the determination of the Object with which given 
 representations (in whatever subject) are to agree, 
 is the only kind of representation which is valid 
 for every one. 
 
 The subjective universal communicability of the 
 mode of representation in a judgment of taste, 
 since it is to be possible without presupposing a 
 definite concept, can refer to nothing else than the 
 state of mind in the free play of the Imagination 
 
 1 [First Edition has particular?^
 
 Div. I §9 HARMONY OF THE COGNITIVE POWERS 65 
 
 and the Understanding (so far as they agree with 
 each other, as is requisite for cognition in general). 
 We are conscious that this subjective relation, 
 suitable for cos^nition in oreneral, must be valid for 
 every one, and thus must be universally com- 
 municable, just as if it were a definite cognition, 
 resting always on that relation as its subjective 
 condition. 
 
 This merely subjective (aesthetical) judging of the 
 object, or of the representation by which it is given, 
 precedes the pleasure in the same, and is the ground 
 of this pleasure in the harmony of the cognitive 
 faculties ; but on that universality of the subjective 
 conditions for judging of objects is alone based 
 the universal subjective validity of the satisfaction 
 bound up by us with the representation of the object 
 that we call beautiful. 
 
 That the power of communicating one's state of 
 mind, even though only in respect of the cognitive 
 faculties, carries a pleasure with it ; this we can easily 
 show from the natural propension of man towards 
 sociability (empirical and psychological). But this 
 is not enough for our design. The pleasure that 
 we feel is, in a judgment of taste, necessarily imputed 
 by us to every one else ; as if, when we call a thing 
 beautiful, it is to be regarded as a characteristic of 
 the object which is determined in it according to 
 concepts ; though beauty, without a reference to 
 the feeling of the subject, is nothing by itself But 
 we must reserve the examination of this question 
 until we have answered that other: "If and how 
 aesthetical judgments are possible a priori}'' 
 
 We now occupy ourselves with the easier 
 question, in what way we are conscious of a mutual 
 subjective harmony of the cognitive powers with 
 
 F
 
 66 A-JNT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT i-art i 
 
 one another in the judgment of taste ; is it 
 aesthetically by mere internal sense and sensation ? 
 or is it intellectually by the consciousness of our 
 designed activity, by which we bring them into 
 play ? 
 
 If the given representation, which occasions the 
 judgment of taste, were a concept uniting Under- 
 standing and Imagination in the judging of the 
 object, into a cognition of the Object, the con- 
 sciousness of this relation would be intellectual 
 (as in the objective schematism of the Judgment of 
 which the Kritik^ treats). But then the judgment 
 would not be laid down in reference to pleasure and 
 pain, and consequently would not be a judgment of 
 taste. But the judgment of taste, independently of 
 concepts, determines the Object in respect of 
 satisfaction and of the predicate of beauty. 
 , Therefore that subjective unity of relation can only 
 "^ make itself known by means of sensation. The 
 excitement of both faculties (Imagination and 
 Understanding) to indeterminate, but yet, through 
 the stimulus of the given sensation, harmonious 
 activity, viz., that which belongs to cognition in 
 general, is the sensation whose universal communi- 
 cability is postulated by the judgment of taste. An 
 objective relation can only be thought, but yet, so 
 far as it is subjective according to its conditions, 
 can be felt in its effect on the mind ; and, of a 
 relation based on no concept (like the relation of the 
 representative powers to a cognitive faculty in 
 general), no other consciousness is possible than 
 that through the sensation of the effect, which 
 consists in the more lively play of both mental powers 
 (the Imagination and the Understanding) when 
 
 1 [/.r. The Kritik of /'//;v Reason^ Analytic, bk. ii. c. i.]
 
 Div. I § lo PURPOSIVENESS 67 
 
 animated by mutual agreement. A representation 
 which, as individual and apart from comparison with 
 others, yet has an agreement with the conditions of 
 universality which it is the business of the Under- 
 standing to supply, brings the cognitive faculties 
 into that proportionate accord which we require for 
 all cognition, and so regard as holding for every one 
 who is determined to judge by means of Under- 
 standing and Sense in combination [i.e. for every 
 man). 
 
 EXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL RESULTING FROM 
 THE SECOND MOMENT 
 
 The beautiful is that which pleases universally 
 without [requiring] a concept. 
 
 THIRD MOMENT 
 
 OF JUDGMENTS OF TASTE, ACCORDING TO THE 
 RELATION OF THE PURPOSES WHICH ARE 
 BROUGHT INTO CONSIDERATION IN THEM. 
 
 § I o. Of pztrposiveness in general 
 
 If we wish to explain what a purpose is accord- 
 ing to its transcendental determinations (without 
 presupposing anything empirical like the feeling of 
 pleasure) [we say that] the purpose is the object of 
 a concept, in so far as the concept is regarded as 
 the cause of the object (the real ground of its 
 possibility) ; and the causality of a concept in respect 
 of its Object is its purposiveness [forma finalis). 
 Where then not merely the cognition of an object, 
 but the object itself (its form and existence) is
 
 6S A' A NTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT iart i 
 
 thought as an effect only possible by means of the 
 concept of this latter, there we think a purpose. 
 The representation of the effect is here the deter- 
 mining ground of its cause and precedes it. The 
 consciousness of the causality of a representation, for 
 maintaining the subject in the same state, may here 
 generally denote what we call pleasure ; while on 
 the other hand pain is that representation which 
 contains the ground of the determination of the 
 state of representations into their opposite [of 
 restraining or removing them ^]. 
 
 The faculty of desire, so far as it is determinable 
 to act only through concepts, i.e. in conformity with 
 the representation of a purpose, would be the Will. 
 But an Object, or a state of mind, or even an 
 action, is called purposive, although its possibility 
 does not necessarily presuppose the representa- 
 tion of a purpose, merely because its possibility 
 can be explained and conceived by us only so far 
 as we assume for its ground a causality according 
 to purposes, i.e. in accordance with a will which 
 has regulated it according to the representa- 
 tion of a certain rule. There can be, then, 
 purposiveness without - purpose, so far as we do not 
 place the causes of this form in a Will, but yet can 
 only make the explanation of its possibility 
 intelligible to ourselves by deriving it from a Will. 
 Again, we are not always forced to regard what 
 we observe (in respect of its possibility) from the point 
 
 ^ [Second Edition. Mr. Herbert Spencer expresses much more 
 concisely what Kant has in his mind here. " Pleasure ... is a 
 feeling which wc seek to bring into consciousness and retain there ; 
 pain is ... a feeling which we seek to get out of consciousness and 
 to keep out." Pri?iciplcs of PsycJiplogy, J^ 125.] 
 
 2 [The editions of Hartentstein and Kirchmann omit ohnc before 
 zweck, which makes havoc of the sentence. It is correctly printed 
 by Rosenkranz.]
 
 Div. I S 1 1 PURPOSIVENESS WITHOUT PURPOSE 69 
 
 of view of Reason. Thus we can at least observe a 
 purposiveness according to form, without basing it 
 on a purpose (as the material of the nexus finalis), 
 and remark it in objects, although only by reflection. 
 
 § II. The judgment of taste lias nothing at its 
 basis bnt the form of the purposiveness of an 
 object {or of its mode of reprcsentatioii) 
 
 Every purpose, if it be regarded as a ground of 
 satisfaction, always carries with it an interest — as the 
 determining ground of the judgment — about the 
 object of pleasure. Therefore no subjective pur- 
 pose can lie at the basis of the judgment of taste. 
 But also the judgment of taste can be determined 
 by no representation of an objective purpose, i.e. of 
 the possibility of the object itself in accordance 
 with principles of purposive combination, and 
 consequently by no concept of the good ; because 
 it is an aesthetical and not a cognitive judgment. It 
 therefore has to do with no concept of the character 
 and internal or external possibility of the object by 
 means of this or that cause, but merely with the i/^ 
 relation of the representative powers to one 
 another, so far as they are determined by a 
 representation. 
 
 ' Now this relation in the determination of an 
 object as beautiful is bound up with the feeling of 
 pleasure, which is declared by the judgment of taste 
 to be valid for every one ; hence a pleasantness, 
 [merely] accompanying the representation, can as little 
 contain the determining ground [of the judgment] as 
 the representation of the perfection of the object and 
 the concept of the good can. Therefore it can be 
 nothing else than the subjective purposiveness in the
 
 70 A'JNT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 representation of an object without any purpose 
 (cither objective or subjective) ; and thus it is the 
 mere form of purposiveness in the representation by 
 which an object is given to us, so far as we are 
 conscious of it, which constitutes the satisfaction 
 that we without a concept judge to be universally 
 communicable ; and, consequently, this is the deter- 
 mining ground of the judgment of taste. 
 
 § 12. TJie jiidgment of taste rests on a priori 
 
 grounds 
 
 To establish a priori the connection of the 
 feeling of a pleasure or pain as an effect, with any 
 representation whatever (sensation or concept) as its 
 cause, is absolutely impossible ; for that would be a 
 [particular]^ causal relation which (with objects of 
 experience) can always only be cognised a posteriori, 
 and through the medium of experience itself. We 
 actually have, indeed, in the Kritik of practical 
 Reason, derived from universal moral concepts 
 a priori the feeling of respect (as a special and 
 peculiar modification of feeling which will not 
 stricdy correspond either to the pleasure or the 
 pain that we get from empirical objects). But 
 there we could go beyond the bounds of experience 
 and call in a causality which rested on a super- 
 sensible attribute of the subject, viz., freedom. And 
 even there, properly spe^iking, it was not xhxs feeling 
 which we derived from the Idea of the moral as 
 cause, but merely the determination of the will. 
 But the state of mind which accompanies any 
 determination of the will is in itself a feeling of 
 pleasure and identical with it. and therefore does 
 
 ^ [First Edition.]
 
 niv. I § 12 PRACTICAL PLEASURE 71 
 
 not follow from it as its effect. This last must only 
 be assumed if the concept of the moral as a good 
 precede the determination of the will by the law ; for 
 in that case the pleasure that is bound up with the 
 concept could not be derived from it as from a mere 
 coonition. 
 
 Now the case is similar with the pleasure in 
 aesthetical judgments, only that here it is merely 
 contemplative and does not bring about an interest 
 in the Object, whilst on the other hand in the moral 
 judgment it is practical.^ The consciousness of the 
 mere formal purposiveness in the play of the subject's 
 cognitive powers, in a representation through which 
 an object is given, is the pleasure itself; because it 
 contains a determining ground of the activity of the 
 subject in respect of the excitement of its cognitive 
 powers, and therefore an inner causality (which is 
 purposive) in respect of cognition in general without 
 however being limited to any definite cognition ; and 
 consequently contains a mere form of the subjective 
 purposiveness of a representation in an aesthetical 
 judgment. This pleasure is in no way practical, \J 
 neither like that arising from the pathological 
 ground of pleasantness, nor that from the intellectual 
 ground of the presented good. But yet it involves 
 causality, viz., of maintainiiig without further de- 
 sign the state of the representation itself and the 
 occupation of the cognitive powers. We linger 
 
 1 [Cf. MetapJiysic of Morals, Introd. I. "The pleasure which is 
 necessarily bound up with the desire (of the object whose representa- 
 tion affects feeling) may be called practical pleasure, whether it be 
 cause or effect of the desire. On the contrary, the pleasure which 
 is not necessarily bound up with the desire of the object, and 
 which, therefore, is at bottom not a pleasure in the existence of the 
 Object of the representation, but clings to the representation only, 
 may be called mere contemplative pleasure or passive satisfaction. 
 The feeling of the latter kind of pleasure we call tasteP'\
 
 72 A'ANrS KKITIK OF JUDGMENT I'art i 
 
 over the contemplation of the beautiful, because this 
 contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself, 
 which is analogous to (though not of the same kind 
 as) that lingering which takes place when a [physical] 
 charm in the representation of the object repeatedly 
 arouses the attention, the mind being passive. 
 
 § 13. TJie pure jit dgmejit of taste is independent 
 of e harm and emotion 
 
 Every interest spoils the judgment of taste and 
 takes from its impartiality, especially if the pur- 
 posiveness is not, as with the interest of Reason, 
 placed before the feeling of pleasure but grounded 
 on it. This last always happens in an aesthetical 
 judgment upon anything so far as it gratifies or 
 grieves us. Hence judgments so affected can lay 
 no claim at all to a universally valid satisfaction, or 
 at least so much the less claim, in proportion as 
 there arc sensations of this sort among the de- 
 termining grounds of taste. That taste is always 
 barbaric which needs a mixture of charms and 
 emotions in order that there may be satisfaction, and 
 still more so if it make these the measure of its 
 assent. 
 
 Nevertheless charms are often not only taken 
 account of in the case of beauty (which properly 
 speaking ought merely to be concerned with form) as 
 contributory to the aesthetical universal satisfaction ; 
 but they are passed off as in themselves beauties, 
 j and thus the matter of satisfaction is substituted for 
 the form. This misconception, however, which like 
 so many others, has something true at its basis, may 
 be removed by a careful determination of these 
 concepts. 
 
 A judgment of taste on which charm and emotion
 
 Div. I § 14 PURE JUDGMENTS OF TASTE 73 
 
 have no influence (although they may be bound up 
 with the satisfaction in the beautiful), — which there- 
 fore has as its determining ground merely the pur- 
 posiveness of the form, — is 2l pure judgment of taste. 
 
 § 14. Elucidation by means of examples 
 
 -^sthetical judgments can be divided just like 
 theoretical (logical) judgments into empirical and 
 pure. The first assert pleasantness or unpleasant- 
 ness ; the second assert the beauty of an object or 
 of the manner of representing it. The former are 
 judgments of Sense (material aesthetical judgments) ; 
 the latter [as formal ^] are alone strictly judgments 
 of Taste. 
 
 A judgment of taste is therefore pure, only so 
 far as no merely empirical satisfaction is mingled 
 with its determining ground. But this always 
 happens if charm or emotion have any share in the 
 judgment by which anything is to be described as 
 beautiful. 
 
 Now here many objections present themselves, 
 which fallaciously put forward charm not merely as 
 a necessary ingredient of beauty, but as alone 
 sufficient [to justify] a thing's being called beautiful, 
 A mere colour, e.g. the green of a grass plot, a mere 
 tone (as distinguished from sound and noise) like 
 that of a violin, are by most people described as 
 beautiful in themselves ; although both seem to have 
 at their basis merely the matter of representations, 
 viz., simply sensation, and therefore only deserve to 
 be called pleasant. But we must at the same time 
 remark that the sensations of colours and of tone 
 have a right to be regarded as beautiful only in so 
 
 ^ [Second Edition.]
 
 74 A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 far as they ?LX^piire. This is a determination which 
 concerns their form, and is the only [element] of 
 these representations which admits with certainty of 
 universal communicability ; for we cannot assume 
 that the quality of sensations is the same in all 
 subjects, and we can hardly say that the pleasantness 
 of one colour or the tone of one musical instrument 
 is judged preferable to that of another in the same ^ 
 way by every one. 
 
 If we assume with Eulcr that colours are iso- 
 chronous vibrations {pulsus) of the aether, as sounds 
 are of the air in a state of disturbance, and, — 
 what is the most important, — that the mind 
 not only perceives by sense the effect of these in 
 exciting the organ, but also perceives by reflection 
 the regular play of impressions (and thus the form of 
 the combination of different representations) — which 
 I very much doubt - — then colours and tone cannot 
 be reckoned as mere sensations, but as the formal 
 determination of the unity of a manifold of sensa- 
 tions, and thus as beauties. 
 
 But " pure " in a simple mode of sensation means 
 that its uniformity is troubled and interrupted by no 
 foreign sensation, and it belongs merely to the form ; 
 because here we can abstract from the quality of 
 that mode of sensation (abstract from the colours 
 and tone, if any, which it represents). Hence all 
 simple colours, so far as they are pure, are regarded 
 as beautiful ; composite colours have not this advan- 
 tage, because, as they are not simple, we have no 
 standard for judging whether they should be called 
 pure or not. 
 
 ^ [First Edition \\a.s glcic/ie ; Second Edition has so/c/ic.'\ 
 - [First Edition has Jii'c/it zwcijic for se/ir ziveiflc ; but this was 
 apparently only a misprint.]
 
 Div. I § 14 CHARM AND EMOTION 75 
 
 Biit as regards the beauty attributed to the 
 object on account of its form, to suppose it to be 
 capable of augmentation through the charm of the 
 object is a common error, and one very prejudicial 
 to genuine, uncorrupted, well-founded taste. We 
 can doubtless add these charms to beauty, in order to 
 interest the mind by the representation of the object, 
 apart from the bare satisfaction [received] ; and thus 
 they may serve as a recommendation of taste and its 
 cultivation, especially when it is yet crude and un- 
 exercised. But they actually do injury to the judg- 
 ment of taste if they draw attention to themselves as 
 the grounds for judging of beauty. So far are they 
 from adding to beauty that they must only be admitted 
 by indulgence as aliens ; and provided always that 
 they do not disturb the beautiful form, in cases when 
 taste is yet weak and unexercised. 
 
 In painting, sculpture, and in all the formative arts \ 
 — in architecture, and horticulture, so far as they are ^ 
 beautiful arts^the delineation is the essential thing ; 
 and here it is not what orratifies in sensation but what 
 pleases by means of its form that is fundamental for 
 taste. The colours which light up the sketch belong- 
 to the charm ; they may indeed enliven ^ the 
 object for sensation, but they cannot make it worthy 
 of contemplation and beautiful. In most cases they 
 are rather limited by the requirements of the beauti- 
 ful form ; and even where charm is permissible it is 
 ennobled solely by this. 
 
 Every form of the objects of sense (both of 
 external sense and also mediately of internal) is 
 either yf^?^r£? ox play. In the latter case it is either 
 play of figures (in space, viz., pantomime and 
 dancing), or the mere play of sensations (in time). 
 
 1 \Belebt machen ; First Edition had beliebtl\
 
 76 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 The charm of colours or of the pleasant tones of an 
 instrument may be added ; but the delineation in the 
 first case and the composition in the second consti- 
 tute the proper object of the pure judgment of taste. 
 To say that the purity of colours and of tones, or 
 their variety and contrast, seems to add to beauty, 
 does not mean that they supply a honiogeneous 
 addition to our satisfaction in the form because thev 
 are pleasant in themselves ; but they do so, because 
 they make the form more exactly, definitely, and 
 completely, intuitible, and besides by their charm 
 [excite the representation, whilst they^] awaken and 
 fix our attention on the object itself 
 
 Even what we call onianients [parerga-], i.e. 
 those things which do not belong to the complete 
 representation of the object internally as elements 
 but only externally as complements, and which 
 augment the satisfaction of taste, do so only by their 
 form ; as for example [the frames of pictures,^' or] 
 the draperies of statues or the colonnades of palaces. 
 But if the ornament does not itself consist in beauti- 
 ful form, and if it is used as a golden frame is used, 
 merely to recommend the painting by its charm, it 
 is then calledyf;/^r)' and injures genuine beauty. 
 
 Emotion, that is a sensation in which pleasant- 
 ness is produced by means of a momentary check- 
 ing and a consequent more powerful outflow of the 
 vital force, does not belong at all to beauty. But 
 sublimity [with which the feeling of emotion is 
 bound up'*] requires a different standard of judg- 
 ment from that which is at the foundation of taste ; 
 and thus a pure judgment of taste has for its deter- 
 mining ground neither charm nor emotion, in a word, 
 
 ^ [Second Edition.] - [Second Edition.] 
 
 ■^ [Second Edition.] '^ [Second Edition.]
 
 Div. I § 15 BEAUTY AND PERFECTION 77 
 
 no sensation as the material of the sesthetical judg- 
 ment. 
 
 § 15. The judgment of taste is quite independent 
 of the concept of perfection 
 
 Objective purposiveness can only be cognised by 
 means of the reference of the manifold to a definite 
 purpose, and therefore only through a concept. 
 From this alone it is plain that the Beautiful, the 
 judging of which has at its basis a merely formal 
 purposiveness, i.e. a purposiveness without purpose, 
 is quite independent of the concept of the Good ; 
 because the latter presupposes an objective pur- 
 posiveness, i.e. the reference of the object to a 
 definite purpose. 
 
 Objective purposiveness is either external, i.e. 
 the utility, or internal, i.e. the perfection of the 
 object. That the satisfaction in an object, on 
 account of which we call it beautiful, cannot rest 
 on the representation of its utility, is sufficiently 
 obvious from the two preceding sections ; because 
 in that case it would not be an immediate satis- 
 faction in the object, which is the essential condition 
 of a judgment about beauty. But objective internal 
 purposiveness, i.e. perfection, comes nearer to the 
 predicate of beauty ; and it has been regarded by 
 celebrated philosophers ^ as the same as beauty, 
 with the proviso, if it is thought in a confused ivay. 
 It is of the greatest importance in a Kritik of Taste 
 to decide whether beauty can thus actually be 
 resolved into the concept of perfection. 
 
 1 [Kant probably refers here to Baunigarten (i 714-1762), who was 
 the first writer to give the name of yEsthetics to the Philosophy of 
 Taste. He defined beauty as " perfection apprehended through the 
 senses." Kant is said to have used as a text-book at lectures a work 
 by Meier, a pupil of Baumgarten's, on this subject.]
 
 78 A'ANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 To judge of objective purposiveness we always 
 need not only the concept of a purpose, but (if that 
 purposiveness is not to be external utility but 
 internal) the concept of an internal purpose which 
 shall contain the ground of the internal possibility 
 of the object. Now as a purpose in general is that 
 whose concept can be regarded as the ground of the 
 possibility of the object itself; so, in order to 
 represent objective purposiveness in a thing, the 
 concept of what sort of thing it is to be must come 
 first. The ao^reement of the manifold in it with 
 this concept (which furnishes the rule for combining 
 the manifold) is the qualitative perfection of the 
 1/ thing. Quite different from this is quantitative per- 
 fection, the completeness of a thing after its kind, 
 which is a mere concept of magnitude (of totality).^ 
 In this wJiat the thing ought to he is conceived as 
 already determined, and it is only asked if it has 
 all its requisites. The formal [element] in the repre- 
 sentation of a thing, i.e. the agreement of the manifold 
 with a unity (it being undetermined what this ought 
 to be), gives to cognition no objectiv^e purposiveness 
 ^ whatever. For since abstraction is made of this 
 unity as purpose (what the thing ought to be), 
 nothing remains but the subjective purposiveness 
 of the representations in the mind of the intuiting 
 subject. And this, although it furnishes a certain 
 purposiveness of the representative state of the 
 
 ^ [Cf. Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, v. : "The 
 word perfection is liable to many misconceptions. It is sometimes 
 understood as a concept belonging to Transcendental Philosophy ; 
 viz. the concept of the totality of the manifold, which, taken together, 
 constitutes a Thing ; sometimes, again, it is understood as belonging 
 to Teleology, so that it signifies the agreement of the characteristics 
 of a thing with 2i purpose. Perfection in the former sense might be 
 called quantitative (material), in the latter qualitative (formal) per- 
 fection."']
 
 Div. I § 15 SUBJECTIVE PURPOSIVENESS 79 
 
 subject, and so a facility of apprehending a given 
 form by the Imagination, yet furnishes no perfection 
 of an Object, since the Object is not here conceived 
 by means of the concept of a purpose. For example, 
 if in a forest I come across a plot of sward, round 
 which trees stand in a circle, and do not then represent 
 to myself a purpose, viz. that it is intended to serve 
 for country dances, not the least concept of per- 
 fection is furnished by the mere form. But to 
 represent to oneself a formal objective purposiveness 
 without purpose, i.e. the mere form of a pe7^fection 
 (without any matter and without the concept of that 
 with which it is accordant, even if it were merely 
 the idea of conformity to law in general ^) is a 
 veritable contradiction. 
 
 Now the judgment of taste is an aesthetical judg- 
 ment, i.e. such as rests on subjective grounds, the 
 determining ground of which cannot be a concept, 
 and consequently cannot be the concept of a definite 
 purpose. Therefore by means of beauty, regarded 
 as a formal subjective purposiveness, there is in no 
 way thought a perfection of the object, as a purposive- 
 ness alleged to be formal, but which is yet objective. 
 And thus to distinguish between the concepts of 
 the Beautiful and the Good, as if they were only 
 different in logical form, the first being a con- 
 fused, the second a clear concept of perfection, but 
 identical in content and origin, is quite fallacious. 
 For then there would be no specific difference 
 between them, but a judgment of taste would be 
 as much a cognitive judgment as the judgment by 
 which a thing is described as good ; just as when 
 the ordinary man says that fraud is unjust he bases 
 
 1 [The words even if . . . general were added in the Second 
 Edition.]
 
 8o KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT PART I 
 
 his judgment on confused grounds, whilst the 
 philosopher bases it on clear grounds, but both on 
 identical principles of Reason, I have already, 
 however, said that an eesthetical judgment is unique 
 of its kind, and gives absolutely no cognition (not 
 
 /even a confused cognition) of the Object ; this is only 
 supplied by a logical judgment. On the contrary, 
 i/ it simply refers the representation, by which an 
 Object is given, to the subject ; and brings to our 
 notice no characteristic of the object, but only the 
 purposive form in the determination of the repre- 
 sentative powers which are occupying themselves 
 therewith. The judgment is called sesthetical just 
 because its determining ground is not a concept, 
 but the feeling (of internal sense) of that harmony in 
 the play of the mental powers, so far as it can be felt 
 in sensation. On the other hand, if we wish to call 
 confused concepts and the objective judgment based 
 on them, sesthetical, we will have an Understand- 
 ing judging sensibly or a Sense representing its 
 Objects by means of concepts [both of which are 
 contradictory.^] The faculty of concepts, be they 
 confused or clear, is the Understanding; and al- 
 though Understanding has to do with the judgment 
 of taste, as an a^sthetical judgment (as it has with all 
 judgments), yet it has to do with it not as a faculty 
 by which an object is cognised, but as the faculty 
 which determines the judgment and its representa- 
 tion (without any concept) in accordance with its 
 relation to the subject and the subject's internal 
 feeling, in so far as this judgment may be possible 
 
 ^ in accordance with a universal rule. 
 
 ^ [Second Edition.]
 
 Div. I § i6 FREE AND DEPENDENT BEAUTY' 8i 
 
 § 1 6. The jttdg7}ient of taste, by which an object is 
 
 declared to be beatitifiil under the condition of a 
 
 definite cojicept, is not pnre 
 
 '2 
 There are two kinds of beauty ; free beauty ^^t^ / 
 
 i^pulcJiritudo vaga) or merely dependent beauty 
 {^pulchritudo adhaerens). The first presupposes no 
 concept of what the object ought to be ; the second 
 does presuppose such a concept and the perfection 
 of the object in accordance therewith. The first is 
 called the (self-subsistent) beauty of this or that 
 thing ; the second, as dependent upon a concept 
 (conditioned beauty), is ascribed to objects which 
 come under the concept of a particular purpose. 
 
 Flowers are free natural beauties. Hardly any 
 one but a botanist knows what sort of a thino^ a 
 flower ought to be ; and even he, though recognis- 
 ing in the flower the reproductive organ of the 
 plant, pays no regard to this natural purpose if 
 he is passing judgment on the flower by Taste. 
 There is then at the basis of this judgment no 
 perfection of any kind, no internal purposiveness, 
 to which the collection of the manifold is referred. 
 Many birds (such as the parrot, the humming bird, 
 the bird of paradise), and many sea shells are 
 beauties in themselves, which do not belong to 
 any object determined in respect of its purpose 
 by concepts, but please freely and in themselves. 
 So also delineations a la grecqne, foliage for borders 
 or wall-papers, mean nothing in themselves ; they 
 represent nothing — no Object under a definite 
 concept, — and are free beauties. We can refer 
 to the same class what are called in music phantasies 
 {i.e. pieces without any theme), and in fact all music 
 without words. 
 
 G
 
 82 KANrS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT vart i 
 
 In the judging of a free beauty (according to 
 the mere form) the judgment of taste is pure. 
 There is presupposed no concept of any purpose, 
 which the manifold of the given object is to serve, 
 and which therefore is to be represented in it. By 
 such a concept the freedom of the Imagination which 
 disports itself in the contemplation of the figure 
 would be only limited. 
 
 But human beauty {i.e. of a man, a woman, 
 or a child), the beauty of a horse, or a building 
 (be it church, palace, arsenal, or summer-house) 
 presupposes a concept of the purpose which deter- 
 mines what the thing is to be, and consequently 
 a concept of its perfection ; it is therefore adherent 
 beauty. Now as the combination of the Pleasant 
 (in sensation) with Beauty, which properly is only 
 concerned with form, is a hindrance to the purity of 
 the judgment of taste ; so also is its purity injured by 
 the combination with Beauty of the Good (viz. that 
 manifold which is good for the thing itself in accord- 
 ance with its purpose). 
 
 We could add much to a building which would 
 immediately please the eye, if only it were not 
 to be a church. We could adorn a hgure with all 
 kinds of spirals and light but regular lines, as the 
 New Zealanders do with their tattooing, if only it 
 were not the fio^ure of a human bein^:. And arain 
 this could have much finer features and a more pleas- 
 ing and gentle cast of countenance provided it were 
 not intended to represent a man, much less a warrior. 
 
 Now the satisfaction in the manifold of a thing 
 in reference to the internal purpose which determines 
 its possibility is a satisfaction grounded on a concept ; 
 but the satisfaction in beauty is such as presupposes 
 no concept, but is immediately bound up with the
 
 Div. I § i6 THE SATISFACTION IN BEAUTY 83 
 
 representation through which the object is given 
 (not through which it is thought). If now the judg- 
 ment of Taste in respect of the beauty of a thing is 
 made dependent on the purpose in its manifold, Hke / 
 a judgment of Reason, and thus Hmited, it is no longer 
 a free and pure judgment of Taste. 
 
 It is true that taste gains by this combination of 
 sesthetical with intellectual satisfaction, inasmuch as 
 it becomes fixed ; and though it is not universal, yet 
 in respect to certain purposively determined Objects 
 it becomes possible to prescribe rules for it. These, 
 however, are not rules of taste, but merely rules ^ 
 for the unification of Taste with Reason, i.e. of the 
 Beautiful with the Good, by which the former 
 becomes available as an instrument of design in 
 respect of the latter. Thus the tone of mind which 
 is self-maintaining and of subjective universal validity 
 is subordinated to the way of thinking which can be 
 maintained only by painful resolve, but is of objective 
 universal validity. Properly speaking, however, per- ^ 
 fection gains nothing by beauty or beauty by 
 perfection ; but, when we compare the representa- 
 tion by which an object is given to us with the 
 Object (as regards what it ought to be) by means 
 of a concept, we cannot avoid considering along with 
 it the sensation in the subject. And thus when 
 both states of mind are in harmony our whole factUty 
 of representative power gains. V 
 
 A judgment of taste, then, in respect of an object 
 with a definite internal purpose, can only be pure, 
 if either the person judging has no concept of this 
 purpose, or else abstracts from it in his judgment. 
 Such a person, although forming an accurate judg- 
 ment of taste in judging of the object as free beauty, 
 would yet by another who considers the beauty in
 
 S4 KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT tart i 
 
 it only as a dependent attribute (who looks to the 
 purpose of the object) be blamed, and accused of 
 false taste ; although both are right in their own 
 way, the one in reference to what he has before 
 his eyes, the other in reference to what he has in 
 his thought. By means of this distinction we can 
 settle many disputes about beauty between judges 
 of taste ; by showing that the one is speaking of 
 free, the other of dependent, beauty, — that the 
 first is making a pure, the second an applied, 
 \ judgment of taste. 
 
 S TT 
 
 Of tJic Ideal of beauty 
 
 There can be no objective rule of taste which 
 shall determine by means of concepts what is 
 '^ beautiful. For every judgment from this source 
 is sesthetical ; i.e. the feeling of the subject, and not a 
 concept of the Object, is its determining ground. 
 To seek for a principle of taste which shall furnish, 
 by means of definite concepts, a universal criterion 
 of the beautiful, is fruitless trouble ; because what 
 is sought is impossible and self-contradictory. The 
 universal communicability of sensation (satisfaction 
 or dissatisfaction) without the aid of a concept — 
 the agreement, as far as is possible, of all times 
 and peoples as regards this feeling in the repre- 
 sentation of certain objects — this is the empirical 
 criterion, although weak and hardly sufficing for 
 probability, of the derivation of a taste, thus con- 
 firmed by examples, from the deep -lying general 
 grounds of agreement in judging of the forms under 
 which objects are given. 
 
 Hence, we consider some products of taste as 
 exemplary. Not that taste can be acquired by
 
 Div. i§i7 THE IDEAL OF BEAUTY 85 
 
 imitating others ; for it must be an original faculty. 
 He who imitates a model shows, no doubt, in so 
 far as he attains to it, skill ; but only shows taste 
 in so far as he can judge of this model itself.^ It 
 follows from hence that the highest model, the 
 archetype of taste, is a mere Idea, which every one 
 must produce in himself; and according to which 
 he must judge every Object of taste, every example 
 of judgment by taste, and even the taste of every 
 one. Idea properly means a rational concept, and 
 Ideal the representation of an individual being, 
 regarded as adequate to an Idea.- Hence tha i 
 archetype o f taste, TiyhiVh rprj-ainl y rests on thej 
 mcletermmate Idea that Reason has of a maximum. 
 
 \ 
 
 but whi ch cannot be represented by concepts, but 
 nn1yrn__ar| jridividunl pr^sf nf ^tion. is better called 
 Ihe Ideal of the b eautif ul. Although we are not -v 
 m possession oF this7 we yet strive to produce 
 it in ourselves. But it can only be an Ideal of 
 the Imagination, because it rests on a presentation 
 and not on concepts, and the Imagination is the 
 faculty of presentation. — How do we arrive at such 
 an Ideal of beauty ? A priori, or empirically ? 
 Moreover, what species of the beautiful is suscep- 
 tible of an Ideal ? 
 
 First, it is well to remark that the beauty for 
 
 1 Models of taste as regards the arts of speech must be 
 composed in a dead and learned language. The first, in order 
 
 j^hat they may not suffer that change which inevitably comes over 
 living languages, in which noble expressions become flat, common 
 ones antiquated, and newly created ones have only a short circulation. 
 The second, because learned languages have a grammar which is sub- 
 
 ■ ject to no wanton change of fashion, but the rules of which are 
 preserved unchanged. 
 
 - [This distinction between an Idea and an Ideal, as also the 
 further contrast between Ideals of the Reason and Ideals of the 
 Imagination, had already been given by Kant in the Kritik of Pure 
 Reason., Dialectic, bk. ii. c. iii. §1.]
 
 86 KANrS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT i'ART i 
 
 which an Ideal is to be soucrht canno t be va<ruc 
 — » : ; — __^ __i2 — ^ 
 
 beauty, bu t is /i.vca by a concept o f nl^jr-rtivp 
 ^ purposivene ss ; and thus it cannot appertain to the 
 (Object of a quite pure jud^rmcnl of taste, b ut to 
 that of a judgment of taste which is in p art in- 
 tellectual. That is, in whatever grounds of judg- 
 ment an Ideal is to be found, an Idea of Reason 
 in accordance with definite concepts must lie at 
 its basis ; which determines a priori the purpose 
 on which the internal possibility of the object rests. 
 I An Ideal of beautiful flowers, of a beautiful piece 
 of furniture, of a beautiful view, is inconceivable. 
 But neither can an Ideal be represented of a beauty 
 r^ dependent on definite purposes, e.g. of a beautiful 
 
 ^ ' dwelling-house, 'a beautiful tree, a beautiful garden, 
 etc. ; presumably because their purpose is not 
 sufficiently determined and fixed by the concept, 
 and thus the purposiveness is nearly as free as 
 in the case of vague beauty. The only being w hich 
 ha s the purpose of its existence in its<^h i\ mnv^ whn 
 can determine his purposes by Reason ; or, wh ere 
 he must receive them from external ))erception , yet 
 c an compare them wit h <'^^i-nti:i] -awA — y+iiversal 
 purposes, and can judge this their accordance 
 rT^'^li'-npfilly This vian is, then, alone of all objects 
 
 ] in the world, susceptible of an Ideal of beatUy, as 
 it is only Jiumanity in his person, as an intelligence, 
 that is susceptible of the Ideal oi perfection. 
 
 But there are here two elements. First, there 
 is the a^sthetical noj'mal Idea, which is an individual 
 intuition (of the Imagination), representing the 
 standard of our judgment [upon man] as a thing 
 belonging to a particular animal species. Secondly, 
 there is the rational Idea which makes the purposes 
 of humanity, so far as they cannot be sensibly
 
 Div. I § 17 THE ^STHETICAL NORMAL IDEA 87 
 
 represented, the principle for judging of a figure 
 through which, as their phenomenal effect, those 
 purposes are revealed. The normal Idea of the 
 figure of an animal of a particular race must take its 
 elements from experience. But the greatest 
 purposiveness in the construction of the figure, 
 that would be available for the universal standard 
 of sesthetical judgment upon each individual of this 
 species — the image which is as it were designedly 
 at the basis of nature's Technic, to which only 
 the whole race and not any isolated individual is 
 adequate — this lies merely in the Idea of the 
 judging [subject]. And this, with its proportions, 
 as an sesthetical Idea, can be completely presented 
 in concreto in a model. In order to make intelligible 
 in some measure (for who can extract her whole 
 secret from nature?) how this comes to pass, we 
 shall attempt a psychological explanation. 
 
 We must remark that, in a way quite incompre- 
 hensible by us, the Imagination can not only recall, 
 on occasion, the sjgns for concepts long past, 
 but can also reproduce the image of the figure 
 of the object out of an unspeakable number of 
 objects of different kinds or even of the same kind. 
 Further, if the mind is concerned with comparisons, 
 the Imagination can, in all probability, actually 
 though unconsciously let one image glide into 
 another, and thus by the concurrence of several of 
 the same kind com.e by an average, which serves as J 
 the common measure of all. Every one has seen a 
 thousand full-grown men. Now if you wish to 
 judge of their normal size, estimating it by means of 
 comparison, the Imagination (as I think) allows a 
 great nurciber of images (perhaps the whole 
 thousand)/ to fall on one another. If I am allowed
 
 V 
 
 S8 KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 to cipply here the analogy of optical presentation, 
 it is in the space where most of them are combined 
 and inside the contour, where the place is illumi- 
 nated with the most vivid colours, that the average 
 ^ size is cognisable ; which, both in Iieight and 
 breadth, is equally far removed from the extreme 
 bounds of the greatest and smallest stature. And 
 this is the stature of a beautiful man. (We could 
 arrive at the same thing mechanically, by adding 
 together all thousand magnitudes, heights, breadths, 
 and thicknesses, and dividing the sum by a thou- 
 sand. But the Imagination does this by means 
 of a dynamical effect, which arises from the various 
 impressions of such figures on the organ of internal 
 sense.) If now in a similar way for this average 
 man we seek the average head, for this head 
 the average nose, etc., such figure is at the basis 
 of the normal Idea in the country where the 
 comparison is instituted. Thus necessarily under 
 these empirical conditions a negro must have a 
 different normal Idea of the beauty of the [human 
 figure] from a white man, a Chinaman a different 
 normal Idea from a European, etc. And the same 
 is the case with the model of a beautiful horse or 
 dog (of a certain breed). — This no7'mal Idea is not 
 derived from proportions got from experience [and 
 regarded] as definite rules ; but in accordance with 
 it rules for judging become I'n the first instance 
 possible. It is the image for the whole race, which 
 fioats among all the variously different intuitions of 
 individuals, which nature takes as archetype in her 
 productions of the same species, but w hich appears 
 not to be fully reached in any individual case. It is 
 by no means the whole archetype of bec^iity in the 
 race, but only the form constituting the indis-
 
 Div. I § 17 THE IDEAL OF BEAUTY 89 
 
 pensable condition of all beauty, and thus merely 
 correctness in the [mental] presentation of the race. 
 It is, like the celebrated DorypJiorns of Polycletus^ 
 the rule {^Myrons- Cow might also be used thus for 
 its kind). It can therefore contain nothing 
 specifically characteristic, for otherwise it would not 
 be the normal Idea for the race. Its presentation 
 pleases, not by its beauty, but merely because it 
 contradicts no condition, under which alone a thing 
 of this kind can be beautiful. The presentation is 
 merely correct.^ 
 
 We must yet distinguish the normal Idea of the 
 beautiful from the Ideal, which latter, on grounds 
 already alleged, we can only expect in the human 
 figure. In this the Ideal consists in the expression 
 of the moi'al, without which the object would not 
 please universally and thus positively (not merely 
 negatively in an accurate presentation). The 
 visible expression of moral Ideas that rule men 
 
 ^ [Polycletus of Argos flourished about 430 B.C. His statue of 
 the Spearbearcr {Doryp/ioriis), afterwards became known as the Caiwn ; 
 because in it the artist was supposed to have embodied a perfect 
 representation of the ideal of the human figure.] 
 
 - [This was a celebrated statue executed by ^Myron, a Greek 
 sculptor, contemporary with Polycletus. It is frequently mentioned 
 in the Greek Anthology.] 
 
 3 It will be found that a perfectly regular countenance, such as a 
 painter might wish to haxt for a model, ordinarily tells us nothing ; 
 because it contains nothing characteristic, and therefore rather 
 expresses the Idea of tlie race than the specific [traits] of a person. 
 The exaggeration of a characteristic of this kind, i.e. such as does 
 violence to the normal Idea (the purposiveness of the race) is called 
 caricafiere. Experience also shows that these quite regular 
 countenances commonly indicate internally only a mediocre man ; 
 presumably (if it may be assumed that external nature expresses the 
 proportions of internal) because, if no mental disposition exceeds 
 that proportion which is requisite in order to constitute a man free 
 from faults, nothing can be expected of what is called genius, in 
 which nature seems to depart from the ordinary relations of the 
 mental powers on behalf of some special one.
 
 90 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT i>art i 
 
 inwardly, can indeed only be got from experience ; 
 but to make its connection with all which our 
 Reason unites with the morally good in the Idea of the 
 highest purposiveness, — goodness of heart, purity, 
 strength, peace, etc., — visible as it were in bodily 
 manifestation (as the effect of that which is inter- 
 nal), requires a union of pure Ideas of Reason with 
 great imaginative power, even in him who wishes 
 to judge of it, still more in him who wishes to 
 present it. The correctness of such an Ideal of 
 beauty is shown by its permitting no sensible charm 
 to mingle with the satisfaction in the Object and yet 
 allowincf us to take a cfreat interest therein. This 
 shows that a judgment in accordance with such a 
 ^ standard can never be purely cesthetical, and that a 
 judgment in accordance with an Ideal of beauty is 
 not a mere judgment of taste. 
 
 EXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL 
 DERIVED FROM THIS THIRD MOMENT 
 
 Beauty is the form of the purposiveness of an 
 \ object, so far as this is perceived in it iLntJiout any 
 representation of a ptupose} 
 
 1 It might be objected to this explanation that there are things, in 
 which we see a purposive form without cognising any purpose in 
 them, hke the stone implements often got from old sepulchral tumuli 
 with a hole in them as if for a handle. These, although they plainly 
 indicate by their shape a purposiveness of which we do not know 
 the purpose, are nevertheless not described as beautiful. But if we 
 regard a thing as a work of art, that is enough to make us admit 
 that its shape has reference to some design and definite purpose. 
 And hence there is no immediate satisfaction in the contemplation 
 of it. On the other hand a flower, e.g. a tulip, is regarded as 
 beautiful ; because in perceiving it we find a certain purposiveness 
 which, in our judgment, is referred to no purpose at all.
 
 Div. I § i8 MODALITY OF ^ESTHETICAL JUDGMENTS 91 
 
 FOURTH MOMENT 
 
 OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE, ACCORDING TO THE 
 MODALITY OF THE SATISFACTION IN THE OBJECT 
 
 § 18. What the modality in a judgment of 
 
 taste is 
 
 I can say of every representation that it is at 
 \^2l^\. possible that (as a cognition) it should be bound 
 up with a pleasure. Of a representation that I 
 call pleasant I say that it actually excites pleasure 
 in me. But the beautiful we thin k as having a 
 necessary reference to satisfaction , islow this neces^ 
 sity IS of a peculiar knid. It is not a theoretical' 
 objective necessity ; in which case it would be 
 cognised a priori that every one will feel this satis- 
 faction in the object called beautiful by me. It is 
 not a practical necessity ; in which case, by con- 
 cepts of a pure rational will serving as a rule for 
 freely acting beings, the satisfaction is the necessary 
 result of an objective law and only indicates that we 
 absolutely (without any further design) ought to 
 act in a certain way. But the necess ity which is 
 thought ig ^aiL^ttsthetiral jurlgmpnt ran only b^^Ealled 
 exe mplary \ i.e. a necp'^qi fy of \\ \ e a ^^pnf of all to a 
 judo-ment which i s regarde d a^ the pvnmple of a 
 universal rule that we cannot state. / Since an aestheti- 
 cal judgment is not an objective cognitive judg- 
 ment, this necessity cannot be derived from definite 
 concepts, and is therefore not apodictic. Still less 
 can it be inferred from the universality of experience 
 (of a complete agreement of judgments as to the 
 beauty of a certain object). For not only would 
 
 u-^ 
 
 V
 
 92 KANT'S A'KiriA' OF JUDGMENT parti 
 
 / experience hardly furnish sutticicntly numerous 
 vouchers for this ; but also, on empirical judgments 
 we can base no concept of the necessity of these 
 judgments. 
 
 § 19. T/ie subjective necessity, zuhich we ascribe 
 to the judgment of taste, is conditioned 
 
 The judgment of taste requires the agreement 
 of every one ; and he who describes anything as 
 beautiful claims that every one ougJit to give his 
 approval to the object in question and also describe 
 it as beautiful. The ought in the eesthetical judgment 
 is therefore pronounced in accordance with all the 
 data which are required for judging and yet is only 
 conditioned. We ask for the agreement of every 
 one else, because we have for it a ground that is 
 common to all ; and we could count on this agree- 
 ment, provided we were always sure that the case was 
 correctly subsumed under that ground as rule of 
 assent. 
 
 § 20. TJie condition of necessity luhicJi a judgment 
 of taste asserts is the Idea of a common sense 
 
 If judgments of taste (like cognitive judgments) 
 had a definite objective principle, then the person 
 who lays them down in accordance with this latter 
 would claim an unconditioned necessity for his judg- 
 ment. I f they were devoid of all principle, like those 
 of the mere taste of sense, we would not allow them 
 in thought any necessity whatever. Hence they 
 must have a subjective principle which determines 
 what pleases or displeases only by feeling and not 
 by concepts, but yet with universal validity. But 
 such a principle could only be regarded as a common
 
 Div. I § 21 A COMMON SENSE 93 
 
 sense, which is essentially different from common 
 Understanding which people sometimes call common 
 Sense {sensus coimmmis^ ; for the latter does not 
 judge by feeling but always by concepts, although 
 ordinarily only as by obscurely represented principles. 
 Hence it is only under the presupposition that 
 there is a common sense (by which we do not 
 understand an external sense, but the effect resulting 
 from the free play of our cognitive powers) — it is 
 only under this presupposition, I say, that the judg- 
 ment of taste can be laid down. 
 
 § 21. Have we ground for presupposing a common 
 
 sense ? 
 
 Cognitions and judgments must, along with the 
 conviction that accompanies them, admit of universal 
 communicability ; for otherwise there would be no 
 harmony between them and the Object, and they 
 would be collectively a mere subjective play of the 
 representative powers, exactly as scepticism desires. 
 But if cognitions are to admit of communicability, 
 so must also the state of mind, — i.e. the accordance 
 of the cognitive powers with a cognition generally, 
 and that proportion of them which is suitable for a 
 representation (by which an object is given to us) 
 in order that a cognition may be made out of it — 
 admit of universal cpmmunicability. For without this 
 as the subjective condition of cognition, cognition 
 as an effect could not arise. This actually always 
 takes place when a given object by means of Sense 
 excites the Imagination to collect the manifold, and 
 the Imagfination in its turn excites the Understand- 
 ing to bring about a unity of this collective process 
 in concepts. But this accordance of the cognitive 
 
 L^"
 
 94 7<:aNT'S KRITIK of judgment part I 
 
 powers has a different proportion according to the 
 variety of the Objects which are given. However, it 
 must be such that this internal relation, by which one 
 mental faculty is excited by another, shall be gener- 
 ally the most beneficial for both faculties in respect 
 of cognition (of given objects) ; and this accordance 
 can only be determined by feeling (not according to 
 concepts). Since now this accordance itself must 
 admit of universal communicability, and consequendy 
 also our feeling of it (in a given representation), and 
 I since the universal communicability of 'a feeling 
 '' presupposes a common sense, we have grounds for 
 i assuming this latter. And this common sense is 
 ' assumed without relying on psychological observa- 
 tions, but simply as the necessary condition of the 
 universal communicability of our knowledge, which 
 is presupposed in every Logic and in every prin- 
 ciple of knowledge that is not sceptical. 
 
 § 2 2. The necessity of the universal agreement that 
 is thought in a judgment of taste is a subjective 
 necessity, which is represented as objective tender 
 the presupposition of a common sense 
 
 In all judgments by which we describe anything 
 as beautiful, we allow no one to be of another 
 opinion ; without however grounding our judgment 
 on concepts but only on our feeling, which we there- 
 fore place at its basis not as a private, but as a 
 common, feeling. Now this common sense cannot 
 be grounded on experience ; for it aims at justifying 
 judgments which contain an ozight. It does not say 
 that every one imll agree with my judgment, but 
 that he ought. And so common sense , as an 
 example of whose judgment I here put forward my
 
 Div. I § 22 A COMMON SENSE 95 
 
 judgment of taste and on account of which I attri- 
 bute to the latter an exemplary validity, is_.a_aa^re 
 i deal norm, under the supposition of which I ha ve a 
 right t o make into a rule for every on e a judgment 
 mat accords therewith, as well as the satisfaction i n 
 an ^ubier r pvpre^c^pH in snrh judgment For the 
 principle, which concerns the agreement of different 
 judging persons, although only subjective, is yet 
 assumed as subjectively universal (an Idea necessary 
 for every one) ; and thus can claim universal assent 
 (as if it were objective) provided we are sure that we / 
 have correctly subsumed [the particulars] under jt. ' 
 
 This indeterminate norm of a common sense is 
 actually presupposed by us ; as is shown by our 
 claim to lay down judgments of taste. Whether 
 there is in fact such a common sense, as a consti- 
 tutive principle of the possibility of experience, 
 or whether a yet higher principle of Reason 
 makes it only into a regulative principle for pro- 
 ducing in us a commpn sense for higher purposes : 
 whether therefore Taste is an original and natural 
 faculty, or only the Idea of an artificial one yet to 
 be acquired, so that a judgment of taste with its 
 assumption of a universal assent in fact, is only a 
 requirement of Reason for producing such harmony 
 of sentiment ; whether the ought, i.e. the objective 
 necessity of the confluence of the feeling of any one 
 man with that of every other, only signifies the 
 possibility of arriving at this accord, and the judg- 
 ment of taste only affords an example of the applica- 
 tion of this principle : these questions we have 
 neither the wish nor the power to investigate as 
 yet ; we have now only to resolve the faculty of taste 
 into its elements in order to unite them at last in the 
 Idea of a common sense.
 
 96 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 EXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL RESULTING FROM 
 THE FOURTH MOMENT 
 
 The bcaiiii/itlis that which without any concept 
 is cognised as the object of a necessary satisfaction. 
 
 GENERAL REMARK ON THE FIRST SECTION OF THE 
 
 ANALYTIC 
 
 If we seek the result of the preceding analysis 
 we find that everything runs up into this concept of 
 Taste, that it is a faculty for judging an object in 
 reference to the \vL\?i^\\Ya.l\ox{s free conformity to iaiv. 
 Now if in the judgment of taste the Imagination must 
 be considered in its freedom, it is in the first place 
 not regarded as reproductive, as it is subject to the 
 laws of association, but as productive and spontaneous 
 (as the author of arbitrary forms of possible in- 
 tuition). And although in the apprehension of a 
 given object of sense it is tied to a definite form of 
 this Object, and so far has no free play (such as that 
 of poetry) yet it may readily be conceived that the 
 object can furnish it w^ith such a form containing a 
 collection of the manifold, as the Imagination itself, 
 if it were left free, would project in accordance with 
 the conformity to laiv of the Understanding in 
 general. But that the imaginative power ^q\A<S. be 
 free and yet of itself conformed to /azv, i.e. bringing 
 autonomy with it, is a contradiction. The Under- 
 standing alone gives the law. If, however, the 
 Imagination is compelled to proceed according to a 
 definite law, its product in respect of form is deter- 
 mined by concepts as to what it ought to, be. But 
 then, as is above shown, the satisfaction is not that
 
 Div. I ? 22 UNDERSTANDING AND TASTE 97 
 
 in the Beautiful, but in the Good (in perfection, at 
 any rate in mere formal perfection) ; and the judg- 
 ment is not a judgment of taste. Hence it is a 
 conformity to law without a law ; and a subjective 
 agreement of the Imagination and Understanding, 
 — without such an objective agreement as there is 
 when the representation is referred to a definite 
 concept of an object, — can subsist along with the free 
 conformity to law of the Understanding (which is 
 also called purposiveness without purpose) and with 
 the peculiar feature c^ a judgment of taste. 
 
 Now geometrically regular figures, such as a 
 circle, a square, a cube, etc., are commonly adduced 
 by critics of taste as the simplest and most indis- 
 putable examples of beauty ; and yet they are called 
 regular, because we can only represent them by 
 regarding them as mere presentations of a definite 
 concept which prescribes the rule for the figure 
 (according to which alone it is possible). One of 
 these two must be wrohg, either that judgment of 
 the critic which ascribes beauty to the said figures, 
 or ours, which regards purposiveness apart from a 
 concept as requisite for beauty. 
 
 Hardly any one will say that a man must have taste 
 in order that he should find more satisfaction in a 
 circle than in a scrawled outline, in an equilateral and 
 equiangular quadrilateral than in one which is oblique, 
 irregular, and as it were deformed, for this belongs to 
 the ordinary Understanding and is not Taste at all. 
 Where, e.g., our design is to judge of the size of an 
 area, or to make intelligible the relation of the parts 
 of it, when divided, to one another and to the whole, 
 then regular figures and those of the simplest kind are 
 needed, and the satisfaction does not rest immediately 
 on the aspect of the figure, but on its availability for 
 
 H
 
 98 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 all kinds of possible designs. A room whose walls 
 form oblique angles, or a parterre of this kind, even 
 every violation of symmetry in the figure of animals 
 [e.g. being one-eyed), of buildings, or of flower beds, 
 displeases, because it contradicts the purpose of the 
 thing, not only practically in respect of a definite 
 use of it, but also when we pass judgment on it as 
 regards any possible design. This is not the case 
 in the judgment of taste, which when pure com- 
 bines satisfaction or dissatisfaction, — without any 
 reference to its use or to a purpose, — with the mere 
 consideration of the object. 
 
 The regularity which leads to the concept of an 
 object is indeed the indispensable condition {conditio 
 sine qua non) for grasping the object in a single 
 representation and determining the manifold in its 
 form. This determination is a purpose in respect of 
 cognition, and in reference to this it is always bound 
 up with satisfaction (which accompanies the execu- 
 tion of every, even problematical, design). There is 
 here, however, merely the approval of the solution 
 satisfying a problem, and not a free and indefinite 
 purposive entertainment of the mental powers with 
 what we call beautiful, where the Understanding is 
 at the service of Imagination and not vice versa. 
 
 In a thing that is only possible by means of design, 
 — a building, or even an animal, — the regularity 
 consisting in symmetry must e.xpress the unity 
 of the intuition that accompanies the concept of 
 purpose, and this regularity belongs to cognition. 
 But where only a free play of the representative 
 powers (under the condition, however, that the 
 Understanding is to suffer no shock thereby) is to 
 be kept up. in pleasure gardens, room decorations, 
 all kinds of tasteful furniture, etc., reeularitv that 
 
 \
 
 Div. I § 22 FREE BEAUTY 99 
 
 shows constraint is avoided as much as possible. 
 Thus in the EngHsh taste in gardens, or in bizarre 
 taste in furniture, the freedom of the Imagination is 
 pushed almost near to the grotesque, and in this 
 separation from every constraint of rule we have the 
 case, where taste can display its greatest perfection 
 in the enterprises of the Imagination. 
 
 All stiff regularity (such as approximates to \/ 
 mathematical regularity) has something in it re- ^ 
 pugnant to taste ; for our entertainment in the 
 contemplation of it lasts for no length of time, 
 but it rather, in so far as it has not expressly in 
 view cognition or a definite practical purpose, pro- 
 duces weariness. On the other hand that with 
 which Imagination can play in an unstudied and 
 purposive manner is always new to us, and one 
 does not get tired of looking at it. Marsden in 
 his description of Sumatra makes the remark that 
 the free beauties of natifre surround the spectator 
 everywhere and thus lose their attraction for him.^ 
 On the other hand a pepper-garden, where the stakes 
 on which this plant twines itself form parallel rows, 
 had much attractiveness for him, if he met with it 
 in the middle of a forest. And he hence infers that 
 wild beauty, apparently irregular, only pleases as a 
 variation from the regular beauty of which one has 
 seen enough. But he need only have made the 
 experiment of spending one day in a pepper-garden, 
 to have been convinced that, if the Understanding 
 has put itself in accordance with the order that it 
 always needs by means of regularity, the object will 
 not entertain for long, — nay rather it will impose a 
 burdensome constraint upon the Imagination. On 
 
 1 [See The History of Sumatra, hy^^. Marsden (London, 1783), 
 P- 1 1 3-]
 
 loo HANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT parti 
 
 the Other hand, nature, which there is prodigal in its 
 variety even to luxuriance, that is subjected to no 
 constraint of artificial rules, can supply constant food 
 for taste. — Even the song of birds, which we can 
 brinof under no musical rule, seems to have more 
 freedom, and therefore more for taste, than a song of 
 a human being which is produced in accordance with 
 all the rules of music ; for we very much sooner weary 
 of the latter, if it is repeated often and at length. 
 Here, however, we probably confuse our participa- 
 tion in the mirth of a little creature that we love, 
 with the beauty of its song ; for if this were exactly 
 imitated by man (as sometimes the notes of the 
 nightingale are)^ it would seem to our ear quite 
 devoid of taste. 
 
 Again, beautiful objects are to be distinguished 
 from beautiful views of objects (which often on 
 account of their distance cannot be more clearly 
 cognised). In the latter case taste appears not 
 so much in what the Imagination apprcJicnds in 
 this field, as in the impulse it thus gets to fiction, 
 i.e. in the peculiar fancies with which the mind 
 entertains itself, whilst it is continually being aroused 
 by the variety which strikes the eye. An illustra- 
 tion is afforded, e.g., by the sight of the changing 
 shapes of a fire on the hearth or of a rippling brook ; 
 neither of these has beauty, but they bring with 
 them a charm for the Imagination, because they 
 entertain it in free play. 
 
 1 [Cf. § 42 hifra:\
 
 SECOND BOOK 
 
 ANALYTIC OF ^HE SUBLIME 
 
 § 23. Transition from the faculty which judges of 
 the BeatUifd to that which Judges of the Stiblime 
 
 The Beautiful and the SubHme agree in this, 
 that both please in themselves. Further, neither 
 presupposes a judgment of sense nor a judgment 
 logically determined, but a judgment of reflection. 
 Consequently the satisfactioJi [belonging to them] 
 does not depend on a sensation, as in the case of 
 the Pleasant, nor on a definite concept, as in the 
 case of the Good ; but it is nevertheless referred 
 to concepts although indeterminate ones. And so 
 the satisfaction is connected with the mere presenta- 
 tion [of the object] or with the faculty of presenta- 
 tion ; so that in the case of a given intuition this 
 faculty or the Imagination is considered as in agree- 
 ment with the faculty of concepts of Understanding 
 or Reason, regarded as promoting these latter. 
 Hence both kinds of judgments are singular, and 
 yet announce themselves as universally valid for 
 every subject ; although they lay claim merely to 
 the feeling of pleasure and not to any cognition of 
 the object. 
 
 But there are also remarkable differences between 
 the two. The Beautiful in nature is connected
 
 102 A'AI^T'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 with the form of the object, which consists in having 
 [definite] boundaries. The Subhme, on the other 
 hand, is to be found in a formless object, so far 
 J as in it or by occasion of it boundlessness is repre- 
 sented, and yet its totahty is also present to thought. 
 Thus the Beautiful seems to be regarded as the 
 ^ presentation of an indefinite concept of Understand- 
 )N y ing ; the Sublime as that of a like concept of Reason. 
 Therefore the satisfaction in the one case is bound 
 up with the representation of quality, in the other 
 with that of quantity. And the latter satisfaction 
 is quite different in kind from the former, for this 
 [the Beautiful^] directly brings with it a feeling of 
 the furtherance of life, and thus is compatible with 
 charms and with the play of the Imagination. But 
 the other [the feeling of the Sublime-] is a pleasure 
 that arises only indirectly ; viz. it is produced by 
 the feeling of a momentary checking of the vital 
 powers and a consequent stronger outflow of them, 
 so that it seems to be regarded as emotion, — not 
 N play, but earnest in the exercise of the Imagination. 
 — Hence it is incompatible with [physical] charm ; 
 and as the mind is not merely attracted by the object 
 but is ever being alternately repelled, the satisfaction 
 in the sublime does not so much involve a positive 
 pleasure as admiration or respect, which rather 
 deserves to be called negative pleasure. 
 
 But the inner and most important distinction 
 between the Sublime and Beautiful is, certainly, 
 as follows. (Here, as we are entitled to do, we only 
 bring under consideration in the first instance the 
 sublime in natural Objects ; for the sublime of Art 
 is always limited by the conditions of agreement 
 with Nature). Natural beauty (which is inde- 
 
 ^ [Second Edition.] - [Second Edition.]
 
 Div. I § 23 BEAUTY AND SUBLIMITY 103 
 
 pendent) brings with it a purposiveness in its 
 form by which the object seems to be, as it were, 
 pre-adapted to our Judgment, and thus constitutes 
 in itself an object of satisfaction. On the other 
 hand, that which excites in us, without any reason- 
 ing about it, but in the mere apprehension of it, 
 the feehng of the subHme, may appear as regards 
 its form to violate purpose \iii respect of the Judg- 
 ment, to be unsuited to our presentative faculty, 
 and, as it were, to do violence to the Imagination ; 
 and yet it is judged to be only the more sublime. 
 
 Now we may see from this that in general we 
 express ourselves incorrectly if we call any object of,^ 
 nature sublime, although we can quite correctly call 
 many objects of nature beautiful. For how can 
 that be marked by an expression of approval, which 
 is apprehended in itself as ^being a violation of 
 purpose ? ' All that we can say is that the object 
 is fit for tTie presentation of a sublimity which can 
 be found in the mind ; for no sensible form can 
 contain the sublime properly so-called. This con- 
 cerns only Ideas of the Reason, which, although no 
 adequate presentation is possible for them, by this 
 inadequateness that admits of sensible presentation, 
 are aroused and summoned into the mind. \ Thus the 
 wide ocean, disturbed by the storm, cannot be called 
 sublime. Its aspect is horrible ; and the mind must 
 be already filled with manifold Ideas if it is to be 
 determined by such an intuition to a feeling itself sub- 
 lime, as it is incited to abandon sensibility and to busy 
 itself with Ideas that involve higher purposiveness. 
 
 Independent natural beauty discovers to us a 
 Technic of nature, which represents it as a system 
 in accordance with laws, the principle of which we 
 do not find in the whole of our faculty of Under-
 
 / 
 
 y 
 
 104 A'AiVrS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 Standing. That principle is the principle of pur- 
 posiveness, in respect of the use of our Judgment 
 in regard to phenomena ; [which requires] that 
 these must not be judged as merely belonging 
 to nature in its purposeless mechanism, but also 
 as belonging to something analogous to art. It, 
 therefore, actually extends, not indeed our cognition 
 of natural Objects, but our concept of nature ; [which 
 is now not regarded] as mere mechanism but as 
 art. This leads to profound inv^estigations as to 
 the possibility of such a form. But in what we 
 are accustomed to call sublime there is nothing 
 at all that leads to particular objective principles 
 and forms of nature corresponding to them ; so far 
 from it that for the most part nature excites the Ideas 
 of the sublime in its chaos or in its wildest and most 
 irregular disorder and desolation, provided size and 
 might are perceived. Hence, we see that the 
 concept of the Sublime is not nearly so important 
 or rich in consequences as the concept of the 
 Beautiful ; and that in general it displays nothing 
 purposive in nature itself, but only in that possible 
 use of our intuitions of it by which there is produced 
 in us a feeling of a purposiveness quite independent 
 of nature. We must seek a ground external to 
 ourselves for the Beautiful of nature ; but seek it 
 for the Sublime merely in ourselves and in our 
 attitude of thought which introduces sublimity into 
 the representation of nature. This is a very need- 
 ful preliminary remark, which quite separates the 
 Ideas of the sublime from that of a purposiveness 
 of natiLve, and makes the theory of the sublime 
 a mere appendix to the a^sthetical judging of that 
 purposiveness ; because by means of it no particular 
 form is represented in nature, but there is only
 
 ^ 
 
 Div. I § 24 DIVISION OF THE SUBLIME 105 
 
 developed a purposive use which the Imagination 
 makes of its representation. 
 
 § 24. Of the divisions of an investigation into the 
 feeling of the siLblime 
 
 As regards the division of the moments of the 
 aesthetical judging of objects^ in reference to the 
 feeling of the sublime, the Analytic can proceed 
 according to the same principle as was adapted in 
 the analysis of judgments of taste. [For as an act 
 of the aesthetical reflective Judgment, the satisfaction 
 in the Sublime must be represented just as in the 
 case of the Beautiful, — according to quantity as 
 universally valid, according to quality as devoid 
 of interest, according to relation as subjective 
 purposiveness, and according to modality as neces- 
 sary. / And so the method here will not diverge 
 from that of the preceding section ; unless, indeed, 
 we count it a difference that in the case where the 
 aesthetical Judgment is concerned with the form of 
 the object we began with the investigation of its 
 quality, but here, in view of the formlessness which 
 may belong to what we call sublime, we will begin 
 with quantity, as the first moment of the aesthetical 
 judgment as to the sublime. The reason for this 
 may be seen from the preceding paragraph. 
 
 But the analysis of the Sublime involves a 
 division not needed in the case of the Beautiful, 
 viz., a division into the mathematically and the 
 dynamically sublime. 
 
 For the feeling of the Sublime brings with it as 
 its characteristic feature a movement of the mind 
 bound up with the judging of the object, while in 
 the case of the Beautiful taste presupposes and
 
 io6 
 
 A'JJVT'S KKITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 PART I 
 
 maintains the miiul in restful contemplation. Now 
 this movement ought to be judged as subjectively 
 purposive {because the sublime pleases us), and 
 thus it is referred through the Imagination either to 
 the faculty of cognition or of desire. In either 
 reference the purposiveness of the given representa- 
 tion ought to be judged only in respect of this 
 faculty (without purpose or interest) ; but in the 
 first case it is ascribed to the Object as a niathc- 
 niatical determination of the Imagination, in the 
 second as dynamical. And hence we have this 
 twofold way of representing the sublime. 
 
 A. — Of the Mathematically Sublime. 
 
 § 25. Explanation of the term '' sublime" 
 
 "^We call that sublime which is absolutely great. 
 But to be great, and to be a great something are 
 quite different concepts [magnitudo and quantitas\ 
 In like manner to say simply (simpliciter) that 
 anything is gj-eat is quite different from saying that 
 it is absolutely great [absolute, iion conparative 
 magnuni). The latter is zvhat is great beyond 
 all comparison. — What now is meant by the 
 expression that anything is great or small or of 
 medium size? It is not a pure concept of Under- 
 standing that is thus signified ; still less is it an 
 intuition of Sense, and just as little is it a concept of 
 Reason, because it brings with it no principle of 
 cognition. It must therefore be a concept ot 
 Judgment or derived from one; and a subjective 
 purposiveness of the representation in reference to 
 the Judgment must lie at its basis. That anything
 
 Div. I § 25 ESTIMATION OF MAGNITUDE 107 
 
 is a magnitude {(jitantuni) may be cognised from the 
 thing itself, without any comparison of it with other 
 things ; viz., if there is a muhipHcity of the 
 homogeneous constituting one thing. But to 
 cognise hoiu great it is always requires some other 
 magnitude as a measure. But because the judging 
 of magnitude depends not merely on multiplicity 
 (number), but also on the magnitude of the unit (the 
 measure), and since, to judge of the magnitude of 
 this latter again requires another as measure with 
 which it may be compared, we see that the 
 determination of the magnitude of phenomena can 
 supply no absolute concept whatever of magnitude, 
 but only a comparative one. 
 
 If now I say simply that anytl;iing is great, it 
 appears that I have no comparison in view, at least 
 none with an objective measure ; because it is thus 
 not determined at all how great the object is. But 
 although the standard of comparison is merely 
 subjective, yet the judgment none the less claims 
 universal assent; "this man is beautiful," and "he 
 is tall," are judgments not limited merely to the 
 judging subject, but, like theoretical judgments, 
 demanding the assent of every one. 
 
 In a judgment by which anything is designated 
 simply as great, it is not merely meant that the 
 object has a magnitude, but that this magnitude is 
 superior to that of many other objects of the same 
 kind, without, however, any exact determination of 
 this superiority. Thus there is always at the basis 
 of our judgment a standard which we assume as the 
 same for every one ; this, however, is not available 
 for any logical (mathematically definite) judging of 
 magnitude, but only for sesthetical judging of the 
 same, because it is a merely subjective standard
 
 io8 A'ANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 lying at the basis of the reflective judgment upon 
 magnitude. It may be empirical, as, e.g., the 
 averaofe size of the men known to us, of animals of 
 a certain kind, trees, houses, mountains, etc. Or it 
 may be a standard given a priori, which through the 
 defects of the judging subject is limited by the 
 subjective conditions of presentation /// concreto ; as, 
 e,.g., in the practical sphere, the greatness of a 
 certain virtue, or of the public liberty and justice in 
 a country ; or, in the theoretical sphere, the 
 greatness of the accuracy or the inaccuracy of an 
 observation or measurement that has been 
 made, etc. 
 
 Here it is remarkable that, although we have no 
 interest whatever in an Object, — i.e. its existence is 
 indifferent to us, — yet its mere size, even if it is 
 considered as formless, may bring a satisfaction with 
 it that is universally communicable, and that con- 
 sequently involves the consciousness of a subjective 
 purposiveness in the use of our cognitive faculty. 
 This is not indeed a satisfaction in the Object 
 (because it may be formless), as in the case of the 
 Beautiful, in which the reflective Judgment finds 
 ^/ itself purposively determined in reference to 
 cognition in general ; but [a satisfaction] in the 
 V'extension of the Imagination by itself. 
 
 If (under the above limitation) we say simply of 
 an object "it is great," this is no mathematically 
 definite judgment but a mere judgment of reflection 
 upon the representation of it, which is subjectively 
 purposive for a certain use of our cognitive powers 
 in the estimation of magnitude ; and we always then 
 bind up with the representation a kind of respect, as 
 also a kind of contempt for what we simply call 
 "small." Further, the judging of things as great or
 
 Div. I ? 25 THE MATHEMATICALLY SUBLIME 109 
 
 small extends to everything, even to all their char- 
 acteristics ; thus we describe beauty as great or 
 small. The reason of this is to be souoht in the 
 fact that whatever we present in intuition according 
 to the precept of the Judgment (and thus represent 
 aesthetically) is always a phenomenon and thus a 
 quantum. 
 
 But if we call anything not only great, but abso- 
 lutely great in every point of view (great beyond all 
 comparison), i.e. sublime, we soon see that it is not 
 permissible to seek for an adequate standard of this 
 outside itself, but merely in itself. It is a magni- 
 tude which is like itself alone. It follows hence 
 that the sublime is not to be sought in the things of 
 nature, but only in our Ideas ; but in which of them 
 it lies must be reserved for the Deduction. 
 
 The foregoing explanation can be thus expressed : 
 the sublime is that i7i comparison zuith which every- 
 thing else is small. Here we easily see that nothing / 
 can be given in nature, however great it is judged 
 by us to be, which could not if considered in another 
 relation be reduced to the infinitely small ; and con- 
 versely there is nothing so small, which does not 
 admit of extension by our Imagination to the great- 
 ness of a world, if compared with still smaller 
 standards. Telescopes have furnished us with 
 abundant material for making the first remark, 
 microscopes for the second. Nothing, therefore, 
 which can be an object of the senses, is, considered 
 on this basis, to be called sublime. But because there 
 is in our Imag^ination a strivinQ- towards infinite 
 progress, and in our Reason a claim for absolute 
 totality, regarded as a real Idea, therefore this very 
 inadequateness for that Idea in our faculty for 
 estimating the magnitude of things of sense, excites
 
 no 
 
 A' A NT'S KKITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 PART I 
 
 / 
 
 in us the feeling of a supersensible faculty. And 
 it is not the object of sense, but the use which the 
 Judgment naturally makes of certain objects on 
 behalf of this latter feeling, that is absolutely great ; 
 and in comparison every other use is small. L^onse- 
 quently it is the state of mind produced by a certain 
 representation with which the reflective Judgment 
 is occupied, and not the Object, that is to be called 
 sublime. 
 
 We can therefore append to the preceding 
 formulas explaining the sublime this other : the sub- 
 lime is that, the mere ability to think which, shows a 
 faculty of the miiid surpassing every standard of Sense. 
 
 § 26. Of that estimation of the magnitude of natural 
 things which is requisite for the Idea of the Sublime 
 
 The estimation of magnitude by means of con- 
 cepts of number (or their signs in Algebra) is mathe- 
 matical ; but that [performed] by mere intuition (by 
 \/ the measurement of the eye) is cesthetical. Now we 
 can come by definite concepts oi hozu great a thing is, 
 [only] ^ by numbers, of which the unit is the measure 
 (at all events by series of numbers progressing to 
 infinity) ; and so far all logical estimation of magni- 
 tude is mathematical. But since the magnitude of 
 the measure must then be assumed known, and this 
 again is only to be estimated mathematically by 
 means of numbers, — the unit of which must be an- 
 other [smaller] measure, — we can never have a first 
 or fundamental measure, and therefore can never 
 have a definite concept of a given magnitude. ^ So 
 th£_estimati on of t he magnitude of the fundamental 
 measure nuist consii 
 
 iisTthat we can immedi- 
 
 1 [Second Edition.]
 
 Div. 1 § 26 APPREHENSION AND COMPREHENSION iii 
 
 a tely appre hend it in intuition and use it by the 
 Im agination for ^-t hc~"p'c s^JtatioDlI!Q r conc epts of 
 '^ nuoib€ju^''-^Fba^4sy.^all-£Sti mation of the magnitude' 
 of the objects_oLjiature is in the enH~SstIieticaT (2:';^ 
 au biectively and no t obje^St^z^j^^^^dEtgnTrnT^dV,,.-^ ^_^_^ 
 
 Now for the matHematical estimation of masfni- 
 tude there is, indeed, no maximum (for the power of 
 numbers extends to infinity) ; but for its aesthetical 
 estimation there is always a maximum, and of 
 this I say that if it is judged as the absolute measure 
 than which no greater is possible subjectively (for 
 the judging subject), it brings with it the Idea of the/.,,.--^ 
 sublime and produces that emotion which no mathe- 
 matical estimation of its magnitude b5^ means of 
 numbers can bring about (except so far as that 
 aesthetical fundamental measure remains vividly in 
 the Imagination). For the former only presents 
 relative magnitude by means of comparison with 
 others of the same kind ; but the latter presents 
 magnitude absolutely, so far as the mind can grasp ^ 
 it in an intuition. 
 
 In receiving a quantum into the Imagination by 
 intuition, in order to be able to use it for a measure 
 or as a unit for the estimation of magnitude by means 
 of numbers, there are two operations of the Imagina- 
 tion involved : apprehension {apprehensid) and com- 
 prehension [coMprehensio cesthehca). As to appre- 
 hension there is no difficulty, for it can go on ad 
 infinitum ; but comprehension becomes harder the 
 further apprehension advances, and soon attains to 
 its maximum, viz., the greatest possible aesthetical 
 fundamental measure for the estimation of magni- 
 tude. For when apprehension has gone so far that 
 the partial representations of sensuous intuition 
 at first apprehended begin to vanish in the Imagina- 
 
 i^
 
 112 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 tion, whilst this ever proceeds to the apprehension 
 of others, then it loses as much on the one side as it 
 gains on the other ; and in comprehension there is a 
 maximum beyond which it cannot go. 
 
 Hence can be explained what Savary'' remarks in 
 his account of Egypt, viz., that we must keep from 
 going very near the Pyramids just as much as we 
 keep from going too far from them, in order to get 
 the full emotional effect from their size. For if we 
 are too far away, the parts to be apprehended 
 (the stones lying one over the other) are only 
 obscurely represented, and the representation of 
 them produces no effect upon the eesthetical judgment 
 of the subject. But if we are very near, the eye 
 requires some time to complete the apprehension of 
 the tiers from the bottom up to the apex ; and then 
 the first tiers are always partly forgotten before the 
 Imagination has taken in the last, and so the com- 
 prehension of them is never complete. — The same 
 thing may. sufficiently explain the bewilderment or, 
 as it were, perplexity which, it is said, seizes the 
 spectator on his first entrance into St. Peter's at 
 Rome. For there is here a feeling of the inadequacy 
 of his Imagination for presenting the Ideas of a 
 whole, wherein the Imagination reaches its maxi- 
 mum, and, in striving to surpass it, sinks back into 
 itself, by which, however, a kind of emotional satis- 
 faction is produced. 
 
 I do not wish to speak as yet of the ground of 
 this satisfaction, which is bound up with a representa- 
 tion from which we should least of all expect it, 
 viz., a representation which makes us remark its 
 inadequacy and consequently its subjective want of 
 purposiveness for the Judgment in the estimation of 
 
 1 \Lcitrcs sur VEgypte, par M. Savary, Amsterdam, 1787.]
 
 Div. I § 26 MONSTROUS AND COLOSSAL 113 
 
 magnitude, I only remark that if the sesthetical judg- 
 ment \spure (i.e. mingled zvithno teleological judgment 
 or judgment of Reason) and is to be given as a com- 
 pletely suitable example of the Kritik of the cesthetical 
 Judgment, we must not exhibit the sublime in pro-v 
 ducts of art {e.g., buildings, pillars, etc.) where human 
 purpose determines the form as well as the size ; \ 
 nor yet in things of nature the concepts of which 
 bring with them a definite purpose {e.g., animals with 
 a known natural destination) ; but in rude nature 
 (and in this only in so far as it does not bring with 
 it any charm or emotion produced by actual danger) 
 merely as containing magnitude. ' For in^ this kind 
 of representation nature contains nothing monstrous 
 (either magnificent or horrible) ; the magnitude 
 that is apprehended may be increased as much as 
 you wish provided it can be comprehended in a 
 whole by the Imagination. An object is monst7'02is 
 if by its size it destroys the purpose which constitutes 
 the concept of it. But the mere presentation of a 
 concept is called colossal, which is almost too great 
 for any presentation (bordering on the relatively 
 monstrous) ; because the purpose of the presentation 
 of a concept is made hard [to carry out] by the in- 
 tuition of the object being almost too great for our 
 faculty of apprehension. — A pure judgment upon 
 the sublime must, however, have no purpose of the 
 Object as its determining ground, if it is to be 
 cesthetical and not mixed up with any judgment of 
 Understanding or Reason. 
 
 Because everything which is to give disin- 
 terested pleasure to the merely reflective Judgment 
 must bring with the representation of it, subjective 
 
 I
 
 114 A'AXrS KRITIK OF JUDGMEXT fart i 
 
 and, as subjective, universally valid purposiveness — 
 although no purposiveness of the /t?r/« of the object 
 lies (as in the case of the Beautiful) at the ground of 
 the judgment — the question arises " what is this 
 subjective purposiveness ? " And how does it come 
 to be prescribed as the norm by which a ground for 
 universally valid satisfaction is supplied in the mere 
 estimation of maofnitude. even in that which is 
 forced up to the point where our facult)* of Imagina- 
 tion is inadequate for the presentation of the concept 
 of maofnitude ? 
 p^ In the process of combination requisite for the 
 estimation of magnitude, the Imagination proceeds 
 of itself to infinity without anything hindering it ; 
 but the Understanding guides it by means of concepts 
 of number, for which it m.ust furnish the schema. 
 And in this procedure, as belonging to the logical 
 estimation of magnitude, there is indeed something 
 
 t objectively purposive, — in accordance with the con- 
 cept of a purpose (as all measurement is), — but nothing 
 purposive arid pleasing for the aesthetical Judgment. 
 There is also in this designed purposiveness nothing 
 which would force us to push the magnitude of the 
 measure, and consequently the coiiiprehetision of the 
 mianifold in an intuition, to the bounds of the faculty 
 of Imagination, or as far as ever this can reach in its 
 presentations. For in the estimation of magnitude 
 by the Understanding (Arithmetic) we only go to a 
 certain point whether we push the comprehension 
 of the units up to the number lo (as in the decimal 
 scale) or only up to 4 (as in the quaternar\- scale) ; 
 the further production of magnitude proceeds by 
 combination or, if the quantum is given in intuition, 
 by apprehension, but merely by way of progression 
 (not of comprehension) in accordance with an as-
 
 Div. I ?26 THE ABSOLUTELY GREAT 115 
 
 sumed principle of progression. In this mathemati- 
 cal estimation of mao^nitude the Understandinsf is 
 equally served and contented whether the Imagination 
 chooses for unit a magnitude that we can take in 
 in a glance, e.g., a foot or rod, or a German mile or 
 even the earth's diameter, — of which the apprehen- 
 sion is indeed possible, but not the comprehension in 
 an intuition of the Imagination (not possible by coiii- 
 prehensio crst/ietica, although quite possible by 
 comprehensio logica in a concept of number). In 
 both cases the logical estimation of magnitude goes 
 on without hindrance to infinitv. 
 
 But now the mind listens to the voice of Reason 
 which, for every given magnitude, — even for those 
 that can never be entirely apprehended, although (in 
 sensible representation) they are judged as entirely 
 given, — requires totality. Reason consequently 
 desires comprehension in one intuition, and so the 
 [joint] presentation of all these members of a pro- 
 gressively increasing series. 1 1 does not even exempt 
 the infinite (space and past time) from this require- 
 ment ; it rather renders it unavoidable to think the 
 infinite (in the judgment of common Reason) as 
 entirely given (according to its totality). 
 
 But the infinite is absolutely (not merely com- 
 paratively) great. Compared with it everything 
 else (of the same kind of magnitudes) is small. And 
 what is most important is that to be able only to 
 think it as a whole indicates a faculty of mind which 
 surpasses every standard of Sense. For [to repre- 
 sent it sensibly] would require a comprehension 
 having for unit a standard bearing a definite relation, 
 expressible in numbers, to the infinite ; which is 
 impossible. Nevertheless, tlie bare capability of 
 thinking this infinite without contradiction requires in
 
 ii6 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT parti 
 
 the human mind a faculty Itself supersensible. For 
 it is only by means of this faculty and its Idea of a 
 noumenon, — which admits of no intuition, but 
 which yet serves as the substrate for the intuition 
 of the world, as a mere phenomenon, — that the 
 infinite of the world of sense, in the pure intellectual 
 estimation of magnitude, can be completely compre- 
 hended under one concept, although in the mathe- 
 matical estimation of magnitude by means of concepts 
 of number it can never be completely thought. The 
 faculty of being able to think the infinite of super- 
 sensible intuition as given (in its intelligible sub- 
 strate), surpasses every standard of sensibility, and 
 is great beyond all comparison even with the 
 faculty of mathematical estimation ; not of course in 
 a theoretical point of view and on behalf of the 
 cognitive faculty, but as an extension of the mind 
 which feels itself able in another (practical) point of 
 view to go beyond the limits of sensibility. 
 
 Nature is therefore sublime in those of its 
 j^ienomena, whose intuition brings with it the Idea 
 v/ of its infinity. This last can only come by the in- 
 adequacy of the greatest effort of our Imagination to 
 estimate the magnitude of an object. But now in 
 mathematical estimation of mafjnitude the Imafjina- 
 tion is equal to providing a sufficient measure for 
 every object ; because the numerical concepts of the 
 Understanding, by means of progression, can make 
 any measure adequate to any given magnitude. 
 //Therefore it must be the cesthetical estimation of 
 magnitude in whicli the effort towards comprehen- 
 sion surpasses the power of the Imagination. Here 
 it is felt that we can comprehend in a whole of 
 intuition the progressive apprehension, and at the 
 same time we perceive the inadequacy of this faculty.
 
 Div. I § 26 SUBLIMITY ONLY IN THE MIND 117 
 
 unbounded in its progress, for grasping and using 
 any fundamental measure available for the estimation 
 of magnitude with the easiest application of the 
 Understanding, Now the proper unchangeable 
 fundamental measure of nature is its absolute whole ; 
 which, regarding nature as a phenomenon, would be 
 infinity comprehended. But since this fundamental 
 measure is a self-contradictory concept (on account 
 of the impossibility of the absolute totality of an 
 endless progress), that magnitude of a natural 
 Object, on which the Imagination fruitlessly spends 
 its whole faculty of comprehension, must Carry our 
 concept of nature to a supersensible substrate 
 (which lies at its basis and also at the basis of our 
 faculty of thought). As this, however, is great^ 
 beyond all standards of sense, it makes us judge as 
 sublime, not so much the object, as our own state oi, 
 mind in the estimation of it. 
 
 Therefore, just as the aesthetical Judgment in\ 
 judging the Beautiful refers the Imagination in its 
 free play to the Understanding, in order to harmonise 
 it with the concepts of the latter in general (without 
 any determination of them) ; so does the same 
 faculty when judging a thing as Sublime refer itself 
 to the Reason in order that it may subjectively be . , •— 
 
 in accordance with its Ideas (no matter what they 
 are) : — i.e. that it may produce a state of mind 
 conformable to them and compatible with that 
 brought about by the influence of definite (practical) 
 Ideas upon feeling. 
 
 We hence see also that true sublimity must be , , 
 
 sought only in the mind of the [subject] judging, > ^ 
 not in the natural Object, the judgment upon which 
 occasions this state. Who would call sublime, e.g., 
 shapeless mountain masses piled in wild disorder
 
 iiS 
 
 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 I'ART I 
 
 upon each other with their pyramids of ice, or the 
 gloomy raging sea ? But the mind feels itself raised 
 in its own judgment if, while contemplating them 
 without any reference to their form, and abandoning 
 itself to the Imagination and to the Reason — which 
 although placed in combination with the Imagination 
 without any definite purpose, merely extends it — it 
 yet finds the whole power of the Imagination in- 
 adequate to its Ideas. 
 
 Examples of the mathematically Sublime of 
 nature in mere intuition are all the cases in 
 which we are given, not so much a larger numerical 
 concept as a large unit for the measure of the 
 Imagination (for shortening the numerical series). 
 A tree, [the height of] which we estimate with 
 reference to the height of a man, at all events gives 
 a standard for a mountain ; and if this were a mile 
 hicyh, it would serve as unit for the number ex- 
 pressive of the earth's diameter, so that the latter 
 mieht be made intuitible. The earth's diameter 
 
 /■ 
 
 vould supply a unit] for the known planetary 
 S)'stem ; this again for the milky way ; and the 
 immeasurable number of milky way systems called 
 nebulai, — which presumably constitute a system of 
 the same kind among themselves — lets us expect 
 no bounds here. Now the Sublime in the az^sthetical 
 judging of an immeasurable whole like this lies 
 not so much in the greatness of the number [of 
 units], as in the fact that in our progress we ever 
 arrive at yet greater units. To this the systematic 
 division of the universe contributes, which represents 
 every magnitude in nature as small in its turn ; and 
 represents our Imagination w^ith its entire freedom 
 from bounds, and with it Nature, as a mere nothing 
 in comparison with the Ideas of Reason, if it is
 
 Div. I § 27 THE FEELING OF THE SUBLIME 119 
 
 sought to furnish a presentation which shall be 
 adequate to them. 
 
 \2"]. Of the quality of the satisfaction in onr 
 judgments ttpon the Sublime 
 
 The feeling of our incapacity to attain to an 
 Idea, which is a law for us, is respect. Now the 
 Idea of the comprehension of every phenomenon 
 that can be given us in the intuition of a whole, is 
 an Idea prescribed to us by a law of Reason, which 
 recognises no other measure, definite, valid for 
 every one, and invariable, than the absolute whole. 
 But our Imagination, even in its greatest efforts, in 
 respect of that comprehension, which we expect 
 from it, of a given object in a whole of intuition 
 (and thus with reference to the presentation of the 
 Idea of Reason), exhibits its own limits and in- 
 adequacy ; although at the same time it shows that 
 its destination is to make itself adequate to this 
 Idea regarded as a law. Therefore the feeling of the 
 Sublime in nature is respect for our own destina- 
 tion, which by a certain subreption we attribute to 
 an Object of nature (conversion of respect for the 
 Idea of humanity in our own subject into respect 
 for the object). This makes intuitively evident the 
 superiority of the rational determination of our 
 cognitive faculties to the greatest faculty of our 
 Sensibility. 
 
 The feeling of the Sublime is therefore a feeling 
 of pain, arising from the want of accordance be- 
 tween the aesthetical estimation of magnitude formed 
 by the Imagination and the estimation of the same 
 formed by Reason. There is at the same time a 
 pleasure thus excited, arising from the corre-
 
 120 KANrS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT takt i 
 
 vX 
 
 spondence with rational Ideas of this very judgment 
 of the inadequacy of our greatest faculty of Sense j/ 
 in so far as it is a law for us to strive after these 
 Ideas. 1 In fact it is for us a law (of Reason), and 
 belono-s to our destination, to estimate as small, in 
 comparison with Ideas of Reason, everything which 
 nature, regarded as an object of Sense, contains 
 that is great for us ; and that which arouses in us 
 the feeling of this supersensible destination agrees 
 with that law. Now the greatest effort of the 
 Imagination in the presentation of the unit for the 
 estimation of magnitude indicates a reference to 
 something absolutely great; and consequently a 
 reference to the law of Reason, which bids us take 
 this alone as our highest measure of magnitude. 
 Therefore the inner perception of the inadequacy 
 of all sensible standards for rational estimation of 
 magnitude indicates a correspondence with rational 
 laws ; it involves a pain, which arouses in us the 
 feeling of our supersensible destination, according 
 to which it is purposive and therefore pleasurable 
 to find every standard of Sensibility inadequate to 
 the Ideas of Understanding. 
 
 The mind feels itself viovcd in the representa- 
 tion of the Sublime in nature ; whilst in a^sthetical 
 judgments about the Beautiful it is in restful 
 \y contemplation. This movement may (especially in 
 its beginnings) be compared to a vibration, i.e. to a 
 quickly alternating attraction towards, and repulsion 
 from, the same Object. The transcendent (towards 
 which the Imagination is impelled in its apprehension 
 of intuition) is for the Imagination like an abyss in 
 which it fears to lose itself; but for the rational 
 Idea of the supersensible it is not transcendent but 
 in conformity with law to bring about such an
 
 Div. I §27 MEASUREMENT OF A SPACE 121 
 
 effort of the Imagination, and consequently here 
 there is the same amount of attraction as there 
 was of repulsion for the mere Sensibility. But 
 the judgment itself always remains in this case only 
 sesthetical, because, without having any determinate 
 concept of the Object at its basis ; it merely 
 represents the subjective play of the mental powers 
 (Imagination and Reason) as harmonious through 
 their very contrast. For just as Imagination and 
 Understanding, in judging of the Beautiful, generate 
 a subjective purposiveness of the mental powers 
 by means of their harmony, so [in this*" case ^] 
 Imagination and Reason do so by means of their 
 conflict. That is, they bring about a feeling that 
 we possess pure self-subsistent Reason, or a faculty 
 for the estimation of magnitude, whose superiority 
 can be made intuitively evident only by the inade- 
 quacy of that faculty [Imagination] which is itself 
 unbounded in the presentation of magnitudes (of 
 sensible objects). 
 
 The measurement of a space (regarded as 
 apprehension) is at the same time a description of it, 
 and thus an objective movement in the act of Imagina- 
 tion and a progress. On the other hand, the compre- 
 hension of the manifold in the unity, — not of thought 
 but of intuition, — and consequently the comprehen- 
 sion of the successively apprehended [elements] in one 
 glance, is a regress, which annihilates the condition of 
 time in this progress of the Imagination and makes 
 coexistence intuitible.- It is therefore (since the 
 time-series is a condition of the internal sense and 
 
 ' [Second Edition.] 
 
 ^ [With this should be compared the similar discussion in the 
 Kritik of Pure Reason, Dialectic, bk. ii. c. ii. § i, On tJic System of 
 Cosniological Ideas. ^ 
 
 ^
 
 122 KANTS K'RITIK OF JUDGMENT parti 
 
 of an intuition) a subjectiv^e movement of the 
 Imagination, by which it does violence to the 
 internal sense ; this must be the more noticeable, 
 the greater the quantum is which the Imagination 
 comprehends in one intuition. The effort, there- 
 fore, to receive in one single intuition a measure for 
 magnitude that requires a considerable time to 
 apprehend, is a kind of representation, which, sub- 
 jectively considered, is contrary to purpose : but ob- 
 jectively, as requisite for the estimation of magnitude, 
 it is purposive. Thus that very violence which is 
 done to the subject through the Imagination is judged 
 as purposive in reference to tJic zvhole determination 
 of the mind. 
 
 The quality of the feeling of the Sublime is that 
 it is a feeling of pain in reference to the faculty by 
 which we judge cesthetically of an object, which pain, 
 however, is represented at the same time as purposive. 
 This is possible through the fact that the very in- 
 capacity in question discovers the consciousness ot 
 an unlimited faculty of the same subject, and that 
 the mind can only judge of the latter aesthetically 
 by means of the former. 
 
 In the logical estimation of magnitude the 
 
 Impn^sihili^ y nf pvp~r""arTiving aT~ahsnh7te totality, 
 
 by means of the progress of the measurement of 
 thjn£sj2 l the^ sensible w o rld iirTTni e and ^pace, was 
 co gnised as objective, i.e. as an impossibility of 
 t/ thinkin g the infTnit e as entirely giS£a^iIand not as 
 merely subjective or that there_was^ only an in- 
 [/ ^apacity^to^^T^^^^ilZEpr there_3i:fi:;:have^ not to 
 do with the d egree of comprehension m _an.Jntuition, 
 fegardecTar^^rmeasure, but everything depends on a 
 concept ot nurhBer! But in oesthetical estimation of 
 rnagnitude the~Concept of number must disappear or
 
 Div. I §28 THE DYNAMICALLY SUBLIME 123 
 
 bechanged,and the comprehension of the Imagination 
 in reference to the unit of measure (thus avoiding the 
 concepts of a law of the successive production of 
 concepts of magnitude) is alone purposive for it. — 
 If now a magnitude almost reaches the limit of our 
 faculty of comprehension in an intuition, and yet 
 the Imagination is invited by means of numerical 
 magnitudes (in respect of which we are conscious 
 that our faculty is unbounded) to sesthetical compre- 
 hension in a greater unit, then we mentally feel our- 
 selves confined aesthetically within bounds^ But 
 nevertheless the pain in regard to the necessary 
 extension of the Imagination for accordance with 
 that which is unbounded in our faculty of Reason, 
 viz. the Idea of the absolute whole, and consequently 
 the very unpurposiveness of the faculty of Ima- 
 gination for rational Ideas and the arousing of them, 
 are represented as purposive. Thus it is that the 
 sesthetical judgment itself is subjectively purposive for 
 the Reason as the source of Ideas, i.e. as the source 
 of an intellectual comprehension for which all sesthe- 
 tical comprehension is small ; and there accompanies 
 the reception of an object as sublime a pleasure, 
 which is only possible through the medium of a pain. 
 
 B. — Of the Dynamically Sublime in Nature 
 
 § 28, Of Nature regarded as Might 
 
 Might is that which is superior to great 
 hindrances. It is called dominion if it is superior 
 to the resistance of that which itself possesses might. 
 Nature considered in an sesthetical judgment as 
 might that has no dominion over us, is dynamically 
 snblime.
 
 124 A'JNT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT tart I 
 
 If nature is to be judged by us as dynamically 
 sublime, it must be represented as exciting fear 
 (although it is not true conversely that every object 
 which excites fear is regarded in our cesthetical judg- 
 ment as sublime). For in :esthetical judgments (with- 
 out the aid of concepts) superiority to hindrances 
 can only be judged according to the greatness of the 
 resistance. Now that which we are driven to resist 
 is an evil, and, if we do not find our faculties a match 
 for it, is an object of fear. Hence nature can be 
 regarded by the aesthetical Judgment as might, and 
 consequently as dynamically sublime, only so far as 
 it is considered an object of fear. 
 
 ■^ But we can regard an object as fearful, without 
 being afraid of it ; viz. if we judge of it in such a 
 way that we merely think a case in which we would 
 wish to resist it, and yet in which all resistance would 
 be altoeether vain. Thus the virtuous man fears 
 God without being afraid of Him ; because to wish 
 to resist Him and His commandments, he thinks is 
 a case that he need not apprehend. But in every 
 such case that he thinks as not impossible, he 
 cocrnises Him as fearful. 
 
 He who fears can form no judgment about the 
 Sublime in nature ; just as he who is seduced by 
 inclination and appetite can form no judgment about 
 the Beautiful. The former flies from the sight of 
 an object which inspires him with awe ; and it is im- 
 possible to find satisfaction in a terror that is seriously 
 felt. Hence the pleasurableness arising from the 
 cessation of an uneasiness is a state of joy. But this, 
 on account of the deliverance from danger [which is 
 involved], is a state of joy when conjoined with the 
 resolve that we shall no more be exposed to the 
 danger ; we cannot willingly look back upon our
 
 Div. I § 28 THE MIGHT OF NATURE 125 
 
 sensations [of danger], much less seek the occasion 
 for them again. 
 
 Bold, overhanging, and as it were threatening, 
 rocks ; clouds piled up in the sky, moving with light- 
 ning flashes and thunder peals ; volcanoes in all their 
 violence of destruction ; hurricanes with their track of 
 devastation ; the boundless ocean in a state of tumult ; 
 the lofty waterfall of a mighty river, and such like ; 
 these exhibit our faculty of resistance as insignificantly 
 small in comparison with their might. But the sight 
 of them is the more attractive, the more fearful it is, 
 provided only that we are in security ; and we \ 
 
 willingly call these objects sublime, because they \r-\^^^ 
 raise the energfies of the soul above their accustomed -^ 
 height, and discover in us a faculty of resistance of ' ^ 
 a quite different kind, which gives us courage to 
 measure ourselves against the apparent almightiness 
 of nature. 
 
 Now, in the immensity of nature, and in the \ 
 insufficiency of our faculties to take in a standard 
 proportionate to the aesthetical estimation of the 
 magnitude of Its realm, we find our own limitation ; 
 although at the same time In our rational faculty we 
 find a different, non-sensuous standard, which has 
 that infinity itself under It as a unity, in comparison 
 with which everything In nature is small, and thus 
 In our mind we find a superiority to nature even in 
 its immensity. And so also the irresistibility of its 
 might, while making us recognise our own [physi- 
 cal ^J impotence, considered as beings of nature, 
 discloses to us a faculty of judging independently of, 
 and a superiority over, nature ; on which is based a 
 kind of self-preservation, entirely different from that 
 which can be attacked and brought into danger by 
 
 1 [Second Edition.]
 
 126 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT parti 
 
 external nature. Thus, humanity in our person 
 remains unhumiliated, though the individual might 
 have to submit to this dominion. In this way nature 
 is not judged to be sublime in our ajsthetical judg- 
 ments, in so far as it excites fear ; but because it calls 
 up that power in us (which is not nature) of regarding 
 as small the things about which we are solicitous 
 (goods, health, and life), and of regarding its might 
 (to which we are no doubt subjected in respect of 
 these things), as nevertheless without any dominion 
 over us and our personality to which we must bow 
 where our highest fundamental propositions, and 
 their assertion or abandonment, are concerned. 
 
 fllierefore nature is here called sublime merely 
 because it elevates the Imagination to a presentation 
 of those cases in which the mind can make felt the 
 proper sublimity of its destination, in comparison 
 
 . with nature itself. 
 
 This estimation of ourselves loses nothinof 
 
 o 
 
 through the fact that we must regard ourselves as 
 safe in order to feel this inspiriting satisfaction ; 
 and that hence, as there is no seriousness in the 
 danger, there might be also (as might seem to be 
 the case) just as little seriousness in the sublimity of 
 our spiritual faculty. For the satisfaction here 
 concerns only the destination of our faculty which 
 discloses itself in such a case, so far as the tendency 
 to this destination lies in our nature, whilst its 
 development and exercise remain incumbent and 
 obligatory. (And in this there is truth [and reality], 
 however conscious the man may be of his present 
 actual powerlessness, when he turns his reflection 
 to it. 
 
 No doubt this principle seems to be too far- 
 fetched and too subtly reasoned, and consequently
 
 Div. I § 28 WAJ? AND PEACE 127 
 
 seems to go beyond [the scope of] an icsthetical 
 judgment ; but observation of men proves the 
 opposite, and shows that it may lie at the root of the 
 most ordinary judgments, although we are not 
 always conscious of it. For what is that which is, 
 even to the savage, an object of the greatest 
 admiration ? It is a man who shrinks from nothing, 
 who fears nothing, and therefore does not yield to 
 danger, but rather goes to face it vigorously with 
 the most complete deliberation. Even in the most 
 highly civilised state this peculiar veneratioii for the 
 soldier remains, though only under the condition 
 that he exhibit all the virtues of peace, gentleness, 
 compassion, and even a becoming care for his own 
 person ; because even by these it is recognised 
 that his mind is unsubdued by danger. Hence 
 whatever disputes there may be about the 
 superiority of the respect which is to be accorded 
 them, in the comparison of a statesman and a 
 general, the sesthetical judgment decides for the 
 latter. War itself, if it is carried on with order and 
 with a sacred respect for the rights of citizens, has 
 something sublime in it, and makes the disposition 
 of the people who carry it on thus, only the more 
 sublime, the more numerous are the clangers to 
 which they are exposed, and in respect of which 
 they behave with courage. On the other hand, a 
 long peace generally brings about a predominant 
 commercial spirit, and along with it, low selfishness, 
 cowardice, and effeminacy, and debases the disposi- 
 tion of the people.^ ^^ 
 It appears to conflict with this solution of the 
 concept of the sublime, so far as sublimity is 
 ascribed to might, that we are accustomed to 
 
 1 [Cf. § 83, infra:\
 
 128 KANrS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 represent God as presenting Himself in His wrath 
 
 and yet in His sublimity, in the tempest, the storm, 
 
 the earthquake, etc. ; and that it would be foolish 
 
 and criminal to imagine a superiority of our minds 
 
 over these works of His, and, as it seems, even 
 
 over the designs of such might. Hence it would 
 
 appear that no feeling of the sublimity of our own 
 
 nature, but rather subjection, abasement, and a 
 
 feeling of complete powerlessness, is a fitting state 
 
 of mind in the presence of such an object, and 
 
 this is generally bound up with the Idea of it 
 
 during natural phenomena of this kind. In religion 
 
 in general, prostration, adoration with bent head, 
 
 with contrite, anxious demeanour and voice, seems 
 
 to be the only fitting behaviour in presence of 
 
 the Godhead ; and hence most peoples have 
 
 adopted and still observe it. But this state of 
 
 mind is far from being necessarily bound up 
 
 with the Idea of the sublimity of a religion and 
 
 its object. The man who is actually afraid, 
 
 because he finds reasons for fear in himself, whilst 
 
 conscious by his culpable disposition of offending 
 
 ao^ainst a Mitjht whose will is irresistible and 
 
 at the same time just, is not in the frame of mind 
 
 for admiring the divine greatness. For this a mood 
 
 of calm contemplation and a quite free judgment 
 
 are needed. Only if he is conscious of an upright 
 
 disposition pleasing to God do those operations of 
 
 mio-ht serve to awaken in him the Idea of the 
 
 sublimity of this Being, for then he recognises in 
 
 himself a sublimity of disposition conformable to 
 
 His will ; and thus he is raised above the fear of 
 
 such operations of nature, which he no longer 
 
 regards as outbursts of His wrath. Even humility, 
 
 in the shape of a stern judgment upon his own
 
 Div. I § 28 RELIGION AND SUPERSTITION 129 
 
 faults, — which otherwise, with a consciousness of good 
 intentions, could be easily palliated from the frailty 
 of human nature, — is a sublime state of mind, 
 consisting in a voluntary subjection of himself to the 
 pain of remorse, in order that the causes of this 
 may be gradually removed. In this way religion is 
 essentially distinguished from superstition. The 
 latter establishes in the mind, not reverence for the 
 Sublime, but fear and apprehension of the all- 
 powerful Being to whose will the terrified man sees 
 himself subject, without according Him any high 
 esteem. From this nothing can arise but a seeking 
 of favour, and flattery, instead of a religion which 
 consists in a sfood life.^ 
 
 Sublimity, therefore, does not reside in anything 
 of nature, but only in our mind, in so far as we can 
 become conscious that we are superior to nature 
 within, and therefore also to nature without us (so 
 far as it influences us). Everything that excites 
 this feeling in us, e.g., the might of nature which 
 calls forth our forces, is called then (although 
 improperly) sublime. Only by supposing this Idea 
 in ourselves, and in reference to it, are we capable of 
 attaining to the Idea of the sublimity of that Being, 
 which produces respect in us, not merely by the 
 might that it displays in nature, but rather by 
 means of the faculty which resides in us of judging 
 it fearlessly and of regarding our destination as 
 sublime in respect of it. 
 
 1 [In the Philosophical Theory of Rcligio/i, pt. i. sub Jin. (Abbott's 
 Translation, p. 360), Kant, as here, divides " all religions into two 
 classes — favour-seeking religion (mere worship) and moral religion, 
 that is, the religion of a good life ; " and he concludes that " amongst 
 all the public religions that have ever existed the Christian alone is 
 moral."] 
 
 K
 
 130 KANT S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT parti 
 
 § 29. Of the modality of the jtidgincnt tcpoji the 
 sublime in natiire 
 
 There are numberless beautiful things in nature 
 about which we can assume and even expect, with- 
 out being widely mistaken, the harmony of every 
 one's judgment with our own. But in respect of 
 our judgment upon the sublime in nature, we cannot 
 promise ourselves so easily the accordance of others. 
 For a far greater culture, as well of the aisthetical 
 Judgment as of the cognitive faculties which lie 
 at its basis, seems requisite in order to be able 
 to pass judgment on this peculiarity of natural 
 objects. 
 
 That the mind be attuned to feel the sublime 
 postulates a susceptibility of the mind for Ideas. 
 For in the very inadequacy of nature to these 
 latter, and thus only by presupposing them and by 
 straining;- the I machination to use nature as a schema 
 for them, is to be found that which is terrible to 
 sensibility and yet is attractive. [It is attractive] 
 because Reason exerts a dominion over sensibility 
 in order to extend it in conformity with its proper 
 realm (the practical) and to make it look out 
 into the Infinite, which is for it an abyss. In 
 fact, without development of moral Ideas, that 
 which we, prepared by culture, call sublime, presents 
 itself to the uneducated man merely as terrible. 
 In the indications of the dominion of nature In 
 destruction, and in the great scale of Its might, 
 in comparison with which his own is a vanishing 
 quantity, he will only see the misery, danger, and 
 distress which surround the man who is exposed to 
 it. So the good, and indeed intelligent, Savoyard
 
 Div. I § 29 TASTE AND FEELING 131 
 
 peasant (as Herr von SaiLss2Lre^ relates) unhesi- 
 tatingly called all lovers of snow-mountains fools. 
 And who knows, whether he would have been so 
 completely wrong, if Saussure had undertaken 
 the danger to which he exposed himself merely, as 
 most travellers do, from amateur curiosity, or that 
 he might be able to give a pathetic account of them ? 
 But his design was the instruction of men ; and 
 this excellent man gave the readers of his Travels, 
 soul-stirring sensations such as he himself had, into 
 the bargain. 
 
 But although the judgment upon the Sublime 
 in nature needs culture (more than the judgment 
 upon the Beautiful), it is not therefore primarily 
 produced by culture and introduced in a merely 
 conventional way into society. Rather has it its root I ^ 
 in human nature, even in that which, alike with 
 common Understanding, we can impute to and 
 expect of every one, viz. in the tendency to the 
 feeling for (practical) Ideas, i.e. to what is moral. | 
 
 Hereon is based the necessity of that agreement 
 of the judgment of others about the sublime with 
 our own which we include in the latter. For 
 just as we charge with want of taste the man who 
 is indifferent when passing judgment upon an object 
 of nature that we regard as beautiful ; so we say 
 of him who remains unmoved in the presence of 
 that which we judge to be sublime, he has no feel- 
 ing. But we claim both from every man, and we 
 presuppose them in him if he has any culture at 
 all ; only with the difference, that we expect the 
 former directly of every one, because in it the Judg- 
 ment refers the Imagination merely to the Under- 
 
 1 [ Voyages dans Ics Alpcs, par H. B. de Saussure ; vol. i. was 
 published at Neuchatel in 1779; vol. ii. at Geneva in 1786.]
 
 132 A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT pari- i 
 
 Standing, the faculty of concepts ; but the latter, 
 because in it the Imagination is related to the 
 Reason, the faculty of Ideas, only under a subjective 
 presupposition (which, however, we believe we are 
 authorised in imputing to every one), viz. the pre- 
 supposition of the moral feeling [in man.^] Thus it 
 V is that we ascribe necessity to this eesthetical judg- 
 ment also. 
 
 In this modality of sesthetical judgments, viz., in 
 the necessity claimed for them, lies an important 
 moment of the Kritik of Judgment. For it enables 
 us to recognise in them an a priori principle, and 
 raises them out of empirical psychology, in which 
 otherwise they would remain buried amongst the 
 feelings of gratification and grief (only with the 
 unmeaning addition of being called finer feelings). 
 Thus it enables us too to place the Judgment 
 among those faculties that have a priori principles 
 at their basis, and so to bring it into Transcendental 
 Philosophy. 
 
 GENERAL REMARK UPON THE EXPOSITION OF THE 
 .ESTHETICAL REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT 
 
 In reference to the feeling of pleasure an object 
 is to be classified as either pleasant, or beautiful, or 
 sublime, or good (absolutely), {jucunduni, pulcJirum. 
 sublime, honestuni). 
 
 The pleasant, as motive of desire, is always of 
 one and the same kind, no matter whence it comes 
 and however specifically different the representa- 
 tion (of sense, and sensation objectively considered) 
 may be. Hence in judging its influence on the 
 mind, account is taken only of the number of its 
 
 1 [Second Edition.]
 
 Div. I § 29 THE ABSOLUTELY GOOD 133 
 
 charms (simultaneous and successive), and so only 
 of the mass, as it were, of the pleasant sensation ; 
 and this can be made intelligible only by qiLantity. 
 It has no reference to culture, but belongs to mere 
 enjoyment. — On the other hand, the beautifid 
 requires the representation of a certain qitality of 
 the Object, that can be made intelligible and 
 reduced to concepts (although it is not so reduced 
 in an eesthetical judgment) ; and it cultivates us, in 
 that it teaches us to attend to the purposivejiess in 
 the feeling of pleasure. — The sublwie consists 
 merely in the relation by which the sensible in the 
 representation of nature is judged available for a 
 possible supersensible use, — The absolutely good, 
 subjectively judged according to the feeling that 
 it inspires (the Object of the moral feeling), as 
 capable of determining the powers of the subject 
 through the representation of an absolutely com- 
 pelling law, is specially distinguished by the mod- 
 ality of a necessity that rests a priori upon concepts. 
 This necessity involves not merely a claim, but 
 a command for the assent of every one, and belongs 
 in itself to the pure intellectual, rather than to 
 the aesthetical Judgment ; and is by a deter- 
 minant and not a mere reflective judgment ascribed 
 not to Nature but to Freedom. But the de- 
 terminability of the subject by means of this Idea, 
 and especially of a subject that can feel hindrances 
 in sensibility, and at the same its superiority to 
 them by their subjugation — involving a modification 
 of its state — i.e. the moral feeling, is yet so far 
 cognate to the aesthetical Judgment and its formal 
 conditions that it can serve to represent the con- 
 formity to law of action from duty as aesthetical, i.e. 
 as sublime or even as beautiful, without losinQf
 
 134 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 purity. This would not be so, if we were to put it in 
 n atural combination with the feeling of the pleasant. 
 
 If we take the result of the foregoing exposition 
 of the two kinds of sesthetical judgments, there 
 arise therefrom the following short explanations : 
 y The Beautiful is what pleases in the mere 
 judgment (and therefore not by the medium of 
 sensation in accordance with a concept of the Un- 
 derstanding). It follows at once from this that it 
 must please apart from all interest, 
 v/ The Sublime is what pleases immediately through 
 its opposition to the interest of sense. 
 
 Both, as explanations of a^sthetical universally 
 valid judging, are referred to subjective grounds ; 
 in the one case to grounds of sensibility, in favour of 
 \/ the contemplative Understanding ; in the other case 
 in opposition to sensibility, but on behalf of the pur- 
 poses of practical Reason, Both, however, united 
 y . in the same subject, are purposive in reference to 
 the moral feeling. The Beautiful prepares us to 
 love disinterestedly something, even nature itself; 
 the Sublime prepares us to este em^ something highly 
 even in opposition to our own (sensible) interest. 
 
 We may describe the Sublime thus : it is an 
 object (of nature) the representation of which deter- 
 mines the mind to think the ttnattainability of nature 
 regarded as a presentation of Ideas. 
 
 Literally taken and logically considered. Ideas 
 cannot be presented. But if we extend our em- 
 pirical representative faculty (mathematically or 
 dynamically) to the intuition of nature, Reason 
 infallibly intervenes, as the faculty expressing the 
 independence of absolute totality,^ and generates the 
 
 ^ \Ah Vcrmogen dcr Independenz dcr absoluten Totaliidt^ a 
 curious phrase.]
 
 DH-. I § 29 IDEA OF THE SUPERSENSIBLE 135 
 
 unsuccessful effort of the mind to make the repre- 
 sentation of the senses adequate to these [Ideas]. 
 This effort, — and the feeling of the unattainability of 
 the Idea by means of the Imagination, — is itself a 
 presentation of the subjective purposiveness of our 
 mind in the employment of the Imagination for its 
 supersensible destination ; and forces us, subject- 
 ively, to think nature itself in its totality as a 
 presentation of something supersensible, without 
 being able objectively to arrive at this presentation. 
 
 For we soon see that nature in space and time 
 entirely lacks the unconditioned, and, consequently, 
 that absolute magnitude, which yet is desired by 
 the most ordinary Reason. It is by this that we 
 are reminded that we only have to do with nature 
 as phenomenon, and that it must be regarded as 
 the mere presentation of a nature in itself (of which 
 Reason has the Idea). But this Idea of the super- 
 sensible, which we can no further determine, — so 
 that we cannot know but only think nature as its 
 presentation, — is awakened in us by means of an 
 object, whose aesthetical appreciation strains the 
 Imagination to its utmost bounds, whether of ex- 
 tension (mathematical) or of its might over the 
 mind (dynamical). And this judgment is based 
 upon a feeling of the mind's destination, which 
 entirely surpasses the realm of the former {i.e. upon 
 the moral feeling), in respect of which the repre- 
 sentation of the object is judged as subjectively 
 purposive. 
 
 In fact, a feeling for the Sublime in nature 
 cannot well be thought without combining therewith 
 a mental disposition which is akin to the Moral. 
 And although the immediate pleasure in the Beauti- 
 ful of nature likewise presupposes and cultivates a
 
 136 A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 certain liberality in our mental attitude, i.e. a satis- 
 faction independent of mere sensible enjoyment, yet 
 Ireedom is thus represented as in play rather than 
 in that law-directed ocnipation which is the genuine 
 characteristic of human morality, in which Reason 
 must exercise dominion over Sensibility. But in 
 oisthetical judgments upon the Sublime this domin- 
 ion is represented as exercised by the Imagination, 
 regarded as an instrument of Reason. 
 
 The satisfaction in the Sublime of nature is 
 \/ then only negative (whilst that in the Beautiful is 
 positive); viz., a feeling that the Imagination is 
 depriving itself of its freedom, while it is purposively 
 determined according to a different law from that 
 of its empirical employment. It thus acquires an 
 extension and a might greater than it sacrifices, — 
 the ground of which, however, is concealed from 
 itself ; whilst yet it feels the sacrifice or the 
 deprivation and, at the same time, the cause to 
 which it is subjected. Astonishnient, that borders 
 upon terror, the dread and the holy awe which 
 seizes the observer at the sight of mountain peaks 
 rearing themselves to heaven, deep chasms and 
 streams raging therein, deep-shadowed solitudes that 
 dispose one to melancholy meditations — this, in the 
 safety in w^hich we know ourselves to be, is not 
 actual fear, but only an attempt to feel fear by 
 the aid of the Imagination ; that we may feel the 
 might of this faculty in combining with the mind's 
 repose the mental movement thereby excited, and 
 being thus superior to internal nature, — and therefore 
 to external, — so far as this can have any influence 
 on our feeling of well-being. For the Imagination 
 by the laws of Association makes our state of con- 
 tentment dependent on physical [causes] ; but it also, 
 
 I
 
 Div. I § 29 SUBJECTIVE PURPOSIVEXESS 137 
 
 by the principles of the Schematism of the Judgment 
 (being so far, therefore, ranked under freedom), is 
 the instrument of Reason and its Ideas, and, as such, 
 has might to maintain our independence of natural 
 influences, to regard as small what in reference to 
 them is great, and so to place the absolutely great 
 only in the proper destination of the subject. The 
 raising of this reflection of the aesthetical Judgment 
 so as to be adequate to Reason (though without a 
 definite concept of Reason) represents the object as 
 subjectively purposive, even by the objective want 
 of accordance between the Imagination in its greatest 
 extension and the Reason (as the faculty of Ideas). 
 
 We must here, generally, attend to what has 
 been already noted, that in the Transcendental 
 Esthetic of Judgment we must speak solely of pure 
 aesthetical judgments ; consequently our examples are 
 not to be taken from such beautiful or sublime 
 objects of Nature as presuppose the concept of a 
 purpose. For, if so, the purposiveness w^ould be 
 either teleological, or would be based on mere sen- 
 sations of an object (gratification or grief) ; and thus 
 would be in the former case not sesthetical, in the 
 latter not merely formal. If then we call the sight 
 of the starry heaven sublime, we must not place at 
 the basis of our judgment concepts of worlds 
 inhabited by rational beings, and regard the bright 
 points, with which we see the space above us filled, 
 as their suns moving in circles purposively fixed 
 with reference to them ; but we must regard it, just 
 as we see it, as a distant, all - embracing, vault. 
 Only under such a representation can we range that 
 sublimity which a pure sesthetical judgment ascribes 
 to this object. And in the same way, if we are to 
 call the sight of the ocean sublime, we must not
 
 I3S KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT tart i 
 
 tJiink of it as we [ordinarily] do, as implying all 
 kinds of knowledge (that are not contained in im- 
 mediate intuition). For example, we sometimes 
 think of the ocean as a vast kingdom of aquatic 
 creatures ; or as the great source of those vapours that 
 fill the air with clouds for the benefit of the land ; or 
 again as an element which, though dividing con- 
 tinents from each other, yet promotes the greatest 
 communication between them : but these furnish 
 merely teleological judgments. To call the ocean 
 sublime we must regard it as poets do, merely by 
 what strikes the eye ; if it is at rest, as a clear 
 mirror of water only bounded by the heaven ; if 
 it is restless, as an abyss threatening to overwhelm 
 everything. The like is to be said of the Sublime 
 and Beautiful in the human figure. We must not 
 regard as the determining grounds of our judgment 
 the concepts of the purposes which all our limbs serve, 
 and we must not allow this coincidence to influence 
 our cesthetical judgment (for then it would no longer 
 be pure) ; although it is certainly a necessary con- 
 dition of cesthetical satisfaction that there should be 
 no conflict between them, ^sthetical purposiveness 
 is the conformity to law of the Judgment in its free - 
 cioin. The satisfaction in the object depends on the 
 relation in which we wish to place the Imagination ; 
 always provided that it by itself entertains the mind 
 in free occupation. If, on the other hand, the judg- 
 ment be determined by anything else, — whether 
 sensation or concept — although it may be conform- 
 able to law, it cannot be the act of 2. free Judgment. 
 If then we speak of intellectual beauty or sublim- 
 ity, these expressions ?lx^, first, not quite accurate, 
 because beauty and sublimity are aesthetical modes 
 of representation, which would not be found in us at
 
 Div. i§29 INTELLECTUAL SATISFACTION 139 
 
 all if we were pure intelligences (or even regarded 
 
 ourselves as such in thought). Secondly, although /f- ^ j ^ 
 
 both, as objects of an intellectual (moral) satisfaction, 
 
 are so far compatible with oesthetical satisfaction ^ — ^ 
 
 that they rest upon no interest, yet they are difficult 
 
 to unite with it, because they are meant \.o produce 
 
 an interest. This, if its presentation is to harmonise 
 
 with the satisfaction in the aesthetical judgment, 
 
 could only arise by means of a sensible interest that 
 
 we combine with it in the presentation ; and thus 
 
 damage would be done to the intellectual purposive- 
 
 ness, and it would lose its purity. 
 
 The object of a pure and unconditioned intel- 
 lectual satisfaction is the Moral Law in that might 
 which it exercises in us over all mental motives that 
 precede it. This might only makes itself aesthetic- 
 ally known to us through sacrifices (which causing a 
 feeling of deprivation, though on behalf of internal 
 freedom, in return discloses in us an unfathomable 
 depth of this supersensible faculty, with consequences 
 extending beyond our ken) ; thus the satisfaction on 
 the sesthetical side (in relation to sensibility) is nega- 
 tive, i.e. against this interest, but regarded from the 
 intellectual side it is positive and combined with an 
 interest. Hence it follows that the intellectual, in 
 itself purposive, (moral) good, aesthetically judged, 
 must be represented as sublime rather than beautiful, 
 so that it rather awakens the feeling of respect 
 (which disdains charm) than that of love and familiar 
 inclination ; for human nature does not attach itself 
 to this good spontaneously, but only by the authority 
 which Reason exercises over Sensibility. Con- 
 versely also, that which we call sublime in nature, 
 whether external or internal {e.g. certain affections), 
 is only represented as a might in the mind to
 
 I40 KANrS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 overcome \certaiii\ ^ hindrances of the Sensibility by 
 means of moral fundamental propositions, and only 
 thus does it interest. 
 
 I will dwell a moment on this latter point. The 
 Idea of the Good conjoined with [strong] affection 
 is called entJmsiasm. This state of mind seems to be 
 sublime, to the extent that we commonly assert that 
 nothing great could be done without it. Now every 
 affection - is blind, either in the choice of its purpose, 
 or, if this be supplied by Reason, in its accomplish- 
 ment ; for it is a mental movement which makes it 
 impossible to exercise a free deliberation about 
 fundamental propositions so as to determine our- 
 selves thereby. It can therefore in no way deserve 
 the approval of the Reason. Nevertheless, aesthetic- 
 ally, enthusiasm is sublime, because it is a tension 
 of forces produced by Ideas, which give an impulse 
 to the mind, that operates far more powerfully and 
 lastingly than the impulse arising from sensible 
 representations. But (which seems strange) the 
 absence of affection {apatheia, pJilegma in signijicatu 
 bond) in a mind that vigorously follows its unalter- 
 able principles is sublime, and in a far preferable 
 way, because it has also on its side the satisfaction 
 
 1 [Second Edition.] 
 
 - Affections are specifically different from passions. The former 
 are related merely to feeling ; the latter belong to the faculty of 
 desire, and are inclinations which render difficult or impossible all 
 determination of the [elective] will by principles. The former are 
 stormy and unpremeditated ; the latter are steady and deliberate ; 
 thus indignation in the form of wrath is an affection, but in the form 
 of hatred (revenge) is a passion. The latter can never and in no 
 reference be called sublime ; because while in an affection the 
 freedom of the mind is hindered, in a passion it is abolished. [Cf. 
 Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, § xvi., where this 
 distinction is more fully drawn out. Affection is described as hasty ; 
 and passion is defined as the sensible appetite grown into a permanent 
 inclination.]
 
 Div. I § 29 AFFECTIONS AND EMOTIONS 141 
 
 of pure Reason.^ A mental state of this kind is 
 alone called noble ; and this expression is subse- 
 quently applied to things, e.g. a building, a garment, 
 literary style, bodily presence, etc., when these do not 
 so much arouse astonishment (the affection produced 
 by the representation of novelty exceeding our 
 expectations), as admiration (astonishment that does 
 not cease when the novelty disappears) ; and this 
 is the case when Ideas agree in their presenta- 
 tion undesignedly and artlessly with the sesthetical 
 satisfaction. "^ 
 
 Every affection of the strenuous kind (viz. that 
 excites the consciousness of our power to overcome 
 every obstacle — animi stremii) is cesthetically sublime, 
 e.g. wrath, even despair {i.e. the despair of indigna- 
 tion, not o{ faintheartedness). But affections of the 
 LANGUID kind (which make the very effort of resist- 
 ance an object of pain — animiim langiiidum) have 
 nothing noble in themselves, but they may be reckoned 
 under the sensuously beautiful. Emotions, which may 
 rise to the strength of affections, are very different. 
 We have both spirited and tender emotions. The 
 latter, if they rise to [strong] affections, are worthless ; 
 the propensity to them is called sentimentality. A 
 sympathetic grief that will not admit of consolation, 
 or one referring to imaginary evils to which we 
 deliberately surrender ourselves — being deceived by 
 fancy — as if they were actual, indicates and produces 
 a tender,"^ though weak, soul — which shows a beauti- 
 ful side and which can be called fanciful, though not 
 enthusiastic. Romances, lacrymose plays, shallow 
 
 1 [In the Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of EtJtics, § xvii., 
 Kant gives the term tnoral apathy to that freedom from the sway of 
 the affections, which is distinguished from indifference to them.] 
 
 ^ [Reading weicJie with Rosenkranz ; Hartenstein and Kirch- 
 mann have iveise, which yields no sense.]
 
 J 
 
 142 KANT'S KRITIK' OF JUDGMENT part I 
 
 moral precepts, which toy with (falsely) so-called 
 moral dispositions, but in fact make the heart lan- 
 guid, insensible to the severe precept of duty, and 
 incapable of all respect for the worth of humanity in 
 our own jDerson, and for the rights of men (a very 
 different thing from their happiness), and in general 
 incapable of all steady principle ; even a religious 
 discourse,^ which recommends a cringing, abject 
 seeking of favour and ingratiation of ourselves, which 
 proposes the abandonment of all confidence in our own 
 faculties in opposition to the evil within us, instead 
 of a sturdy resolution to endeavour to overcome our 
 inclinations by means of those powers which with all 
 our frailty yet remain to us ; that false humility 
 which sets the only way of pleasing the Supreme 
 Being in self-depreciation, in whining hypocritical 
 repentance and in a mere passive state of mind — 
 these are not compatible with any frame of mind 
 that can be counted beautiful, still less with one 
 which is to be counted sublime. 
 
 But even stormy movements of mind which may 
 be connected under the name of edification with 
 Ideas of religion, or — as merely belonging to culture 
 — with Ideas containing a social interest, can in no 
 way, however they strain the Imagination, lay claim 
 to the honour of being sublime presentations, unless 
 they leave after them a mental mood which, al- 
 though only indirectly, has influence upon the mind's 
 consciousness of its strength, and its resolution in 
 reference to that which involves pure intellectual 
 purposiveness (the supersensible). For otherwise 
 all these emotions belong only to motion, which one 
 would fain enjoy for the sake of health. The 
 pleasant exhaustion, consequent upon such dis- 
 
 1 [Cf. p. 129 supra.] 
 
 !
 
 Div. 1 § 29 SUBtlMITY OF THE JEWISH LAW 143 
 
 turbance produced by the play of the affections, is 
 an enjoyment of our wellbeing arising from the 
 restored equilibrium of the various vital forces. 
 This in the/ end amounts to the same thins: as that 
 
 7 
 
 state whiclji Eastern voluptuaries find so delightful, 
 when the)7get their bodies as it were kneaded and 
 all their muscles and joints softly pressed and bent ; 
 only that in this case the motive principle is for the 
 most part external, in the other case it is altogether 
 internal. Many a man believes himself to be edified 
 by a sermon, when indeed there is no edification at 
 all (no system of good maxims) ; or to be improved 
 by a tragedy, when he is only glad at his ennui being 
 happily dispelled. So the Sublime must always have 
 reference to the disposition, i.e. to the maxims which 
 furnish to the intellectual [part] and to the Ideas of 
 Reason a superiority over sensibility. 
 
 We need not fear that the feeling of the sublime 
 will lose by so abstract a mode of presentation, — 
 which is quite negative in respect of what is sensible, 
 — for the Imagination, although it finds nothing be- 
 yond the sensible to which it can attach itself, yet 
 feels itself unbounded by this removal of its limita- 
 tions; and thus that very abstraction is a presentation 
 of the Infinite, which can be nothing but a mere 
 negative presentation, but which yet expands the 
 soul. Perhaps there is no sublimer passage in the 
 Jewish Law than the command, TJioil sJialt not 
 make to thyself any graven image, no7'- the likeness 
 of anything which is in heaven or in the earth or 
 imder the earth, etc. This command alone can 
 explain the enthusiasm that the Jewish people in 
 their moral period felt for their religion, when they 
 compared themselves with other peoples ; or explain 
 the pride which Mahommedanism inspires. The
 
 144 A'ANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 same is true of the moral law and of the tendency to 
 morality in us. It is quite erroneous to fear that if 
 we deprive this [tendency] of all that can recommend 
 it to sense it will only involve a cold lifeless assent 
 and no moving force or emotion. It is quite the other 
 way, for where the senses see nothing more before 
 them, and the unmistakable and indelible Idea of 
 morality remains, it would be rather necessary to 
 moderate the impetus of an unbounded Imagination, 
 to prevent it from rising to enthusiasm, than through 
 fear of the powerlessness of these Ideas to seek aid 
 for them in images and childish ritual. Thus 
 governments have willingly allowed religion to be 
 abundantly provided with the latter accompaniments; 
 and seeking thereby to relieve their subjects of 
 trouble, they have also sought to deprive them of 
 the faculty of extending their spiritual powers beyond 
 the limits that are arbitrarily assigned to them, and 
 by means of which they can be the more easily 
 treated as mere passive ^ beings. 
 
 This pure, elevating, merely negative presenta- 
 tion of morality brings with it, on the other hand, no 
 danger oi fanaticism, which is a belief in our capacity 
 of seeing something beyond all bounds of sensibility, 
 i.e. of dreaming in accordance with fundamental 
 propositions (or of going mad with Reason) ; and 
 this is so just because this presentation is merely 
 negative. For the inso'utableness of the Idea of 
 Freedom ^\\\\X.^ cuts it off from any positive pre- 
 sentation ; but the moral law is in itself sufficiently 
 y and originally determinant in us, so that it does 
 not permit us to cast a glance at any ground of 
 determination external to Itself. If enthusiasm is 
 comparable to madness, fanaticism is comparable to 
 
 1 [Kirchmann has positiv ; but this is probably a mere misprint.]
 
 Div. I § 29 MISANTHROPY 145 
 
 monomania ; of which the latter is least of all com- 
 patible with the sublime, because in its detail it is 
 ridiculous. In enthusiasm, regarded as an affection, 
 the Imagination is without bridle ; in fanaticism, 
 regarded as an inveterate, brooding passion, it is 
 without rule. The first is a transitory accident 
 which sometimes befalls the soundest Understand- 
 ing ; the second is a disease which unsettles it. 
 
 Simplicity (purposiveness without art) is as it 
 were the style of Nature in the sublime, and §o also 
 of Morality which is a second (supersensible) nature ; 
 of which we only know the laws without being able 
 to reach by intuition that supersensible faculty in 
 ourselves which contains the ground of the legisla- 
 tion. 
 
 Now the satisfaction in the Beautiful, like that in 
 the Sublime, is not alone distinguishable from other 
 sesthetical judgments by its universal communica- 
 bility, but also because it acquires an interest through 
 this very property in reference to society (in which 
 this communication is possible). We must, however, 
 remark that separation from all society is regarded 
 as sublime, if it rests upon Ideas that overlook all 
 sensible interest. To be sufficient for oneself, and 
 consequently to have no need of society, without at 
 the same time being unsociable, i.e. without flying 
 from it, is something bordering on the sublime ; 
 as is any dispensing with wants. On the other 
 hand, to fly from men from misanthropy, because we 
 bear ill-will to them, or from anthi'opop/ioby {shyness) , 
 because we fear them as foes, is partly hateful, partly 
 contemptible. There is indeed a misanthropy (very 
 improperly so-called), the tendency to which fre- 
 quently appears with old age in many right-thinking 
 men ; which is philanthropic enough as far ?is good- 
 
 L 
 
 vX
 
 146 KANT'S KRiriK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 will to men is concerned, but which through long and 
 sad experience is far removed from satisfaction with 
 men. Evidence of this is afforded by the propensity 
 to solitude, the fantastic wish for a secluded country 
 seat, or (in the case of young persons) by the dream 
 of the happiness of passing one's life with a little 
 family upon some island unknown to the rest of the 
 world; a dream of which story-tellers or writers 
 of Robinsonades know how to make good use. 
 Falsehood, ingratitude, injustice, the childishness 
 of the purposes regarded by ourselves as im- 
 portant and great, in the pursuit of which men 
 inflict upon each other all imaginable evils, are so 
 contradictorv to the Idea of what men miofht be if 
 they would, and conflict so with our lively wish to 
 see them better, that, in order that we may not hate 
 them (since we cannot love them), the renunciation 
 of all social joys seems but a small sacrifice. This 
 sadness — not the sadness (of which sympathy is the 
 cause) for the evils which fate brings upon others, 
 — but for those things which men do to one another 
 (which depends upon an antipathy in fundamental 
 propositions), is sublime, because it rests upon 
 Ideas, whilst the former can only count as beauti- 
 ful. — The brilliant and thorouo^h Saussiire,^ in his 
 account of his Alpine travels, says of one of the 
 Savoy mountains, called Bonhonime, " There reigns 
 there a certain insipid sadness T He therefore 
 recognised an interesting sadness, that the sight of 
 a solitude might inspire, to which men might wish 
 to transport themselves that they might neither hear 
 nor experience any more of the world ; which, how- 
 ever, would not be quite so inhospitable that it would 
 offer only an extremely painful retreat. — I make 
 
 ^ [L.c. vol. ii. p. I Si.]
 
 Div. i§29 BURKE'S THEORY I47 
 
 this remark solely with the design of indicating 
 again that even depression (not dejected sadness) 
 may be counted among the sturdy affections, if it 
 has its ground in moral Ideas. But if it is grounded 
 on sympathy and, as such, is amiable, it belongs 
 merely to the languid affections. [I make this 
 remark] to call attention to the state of mind which 
 is sublime only in the first case. 
 
 We can now compare the above Transcendental 
 Exposition of aesthetical judgments with the Physio- 
 logical worked out by Burke and by many clear- 
 headed men among us, in order to see whither a 
 merely empirical exposition of the Sublime and 
 Beautiful leads. Burke, who deserves to be re- 
 garded as the most important author who adopts 
 this mode of treatment, infers by this method "that 
 the feeling of the Sublime rests on the impulse to- 
 wards self-preservation and on fear, i.e. on a pain, 
 which not going as far as actually to derange the parts 
 of the body, produces movements which, since they 
 purify the finer or grosser vessels of dangerous or 
 troublesome stoppages, are capable of exciting plea- 
 sant sensations ; not indeed pleasure, but a kind of 
 satisfying horror, a certain tranquillity tinged with 
 terror."^ The Beautiful, which he founded on love 
 
 1 [See Burke, O71 the Sublime and Beautiful, Part IV., Sect, 
 vii, " If the pain and terror are so modified as not to be actually 
 noxious ; if the pain is not carried to violence, and the terror is not 
 conversant about the present destruction of the person, as these 
 emotions clear the parts, whether fine or gross, of a dangerous and 
 troublesome incumbrance, they are capable of producing delight ; 
 ' not pleasure, but a sort of delightful horror, a sort of tranquillity 
 tinged with terror ; which, as it belongs to self-preservation, is one 
 of the strongest of all the passions." Kant quotes from the German 
 version published at Riga in 1773. This was a free translation made 
 from Burke's fifth edition.]
 
 148 KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 (which he wishes to keep quite separate from 
 desire), he reduces to " the relaxing, slackening, and 
 enervatinof of the fibres of the bodv, and a conse- 
 quent weakening, languor, and exhaustion, a faint- 
 ing, dissolving, and melting away for enjoyment." ^ 
 And he confirms this explanation not only by cases 
 in which the I machination in combination with the 
 Understanding can excite in us the feeling of the 
 Beautiful or of the Sublime, but by cases in which 
 it is combined with sensation. — As psychological 
 observations, these analyses of the phenomena of 
 our mind are exceedino^lv beautiful, and afford rich 
 material for the favourite investigations of empirical 
 anthropology. It is also not to be denied that all 
 representations in us, whether, objectively viewed, 
 they are merely sensible or are quite intellectual, 
 may yet subjectively be united to gratification or 
 grief, however imperceptible either may be ; because 
 they all affect the feeling of life, and none of them, 
 so far as it is a modification of the subject, can be 
 indifferent. And so, as Epicurus maintained, all 
 gratification or grief may ultimately be corporeal, 
 whether it arises from the representations of the 
 Imagination or the Understanding ; because life 
 without a feeling of bodily organs would be merely 
 a consciousness of existence, without any feeling of 
 vv'ell-being or the reverse, i.e. of the furthering or 
 the checking of the vital powers. For the mind 
 is by itself alone life (the principle of life), and 
 
 1 [See Burke, I.e., Part IV., Sect. xix. " Beauty acts by re- 
 laxing the solids of the whole system. There are all the appear- 
 ances of such a relaxation ; and a relaxation somewhat below the 
 natural tone seems to me to be the cause of all positive pleasure. 
 Who is a stranger to that manner of expression so common in all 
 times and in all countries, of being softened, relaxed, enenated, 
 dissolved, melted away by pleasure ? "]
 
 Div. I § 29 A PRIORI PRINCIPLES OF TASTE 149 
 
 hindrances or furtherances must be sought outside 
 it and yet in the man, consequently in union with 
 his body. 
 
 If, however, we place the satisfaction in the 
 object altogether in the fact that it gratifies us by 
 charm or emotion, we must not assume that any 
 other man agrees w^ith the sesthetical judgment which 
 we pass ; for as to these each one rightly consults 
 his own individual sensibility. But in that case all 
 censorship of taste would disappear, except, indeed 
 the example afforded by the accidental agreement 
 of others in their judgments were regarded as 
 commanding our assent ; and this principle we should 
 probably resist, and should appeal to the natural 
 right of subjecting the judgment, which rests on the 
 immediate feeling of our own well-being, to our own 
 sense and not to that of any other man. 
 
 If then the judgment of taste is not to be valid 
 merely egoisticaUy, but according to its inner nature, — 
 i.e. on account of itself and not on account of the 
 examples that others give of their taste, — to be 
 necessarily valid pluTalistically, if we regard it as a 
 judgment which may exact the adhesion of every 
 one ; then there must lie at its basis some a priori 
 principle (whether objective or subjective) to which 
 we can never attain by seeking out the empirical 
 laws of mental changes. For these only enable us 
 to know how we judge, but do not prescribe to us 
 how we ought to judge. They do not supply an 
 tcnconditioned command,^ such as judgments of taste 
 presuppose, inasmuch as they require that the 
 satisfaction be immediately connected with the 
 representation. Thus the empirical exposition of 
 
 ^ [Reading Gebot mth Hartenstein and Rosenkranz ; Kirchmann 
 has Gesetz.'\
 
 ISO KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 aesthetical judi^mcius may be a beginning of a 
 collection of materials for a higher investigation ; 
 but a transcendental discussion of this faculty is also 
 possible, and is an essential part of the Kritik of 
 Taste. For if it had not a priori principles, it could 
 . / not possibly pass sentence on the judgments of 
 others, and it could not approve or blame them 
 with any appearance of right. 
 
 The remaining part of the Analytic of the 
 ^sthetical Judgment contains first the 
 
 DEDUCTION OF [PURE^] yESTIIETICAL JUDGMENTS 
 
 § 30. TJic Deduction of crsthctical judgments on the 
 objects of nature must not be directed to what 
 luc call Sublime in nature, but only to the 
 Beautiful. 
 
 The claim of an cesthetical judgment to universal 
 validity for every subject requires, as a judgment 
 resting on some a priori principle, a Deduction (or 
 legitimatising of its pretensions) in addition to its 
 Exposition ; if it is concerned with satisfaction or 
 dissatisfaction in the form of the' Object. Of this 
 kind are judgments of taste about the Beautiful in 
 Nature. For in that case the purposiveness has its 
 ground in the Object and in its figure, although '^ 
 does not indicate its reference to other objects in 
 accordance with concepts (for a cognitive judgment), 
 but merely has to do in general with the appre- 
 hension of this form, so far as it shows itself con- 
 formable to the faculty of concepts and of the pre- 
 sentation (which is identical with the apprehension) 
 
 ^ [Second Edition.]
 
 Div. I ? 30 EXPOSITION AND DEDUCTION 151 
 
 of them in the mind. We can thus, in respect 
 of the Beautiful in nature, suggest many questions 
 touching the cause of this purposiveness of their 
 forms, e.g., to explain why nature has scattered 
 abroad beauty with such profusion, even in the 
 depth of the ocean, where the human eye (for 
 which alone that purposiveness exists) but seldom 
 penetrates. 
 
 But the Sublime in nature — if we are passiiig" 
 upon it a pure cesthetical judgment, not mixed up with 
 any concepts of perfection or objective purposive- 
 ness, in which case it would be a teleological 
 judgment — may be regarded as quite formless or 
 devoid of figure, and yet as the object of a pure 
 satisfaction ; and it may display a subjective 
 purposiveness in the given representation. And we 
 ask if, for an sesthetical judgment of this kind, — over^ 
 and above the Exposition of what is thought in it,- — 
 a Deduction also of its claim to any (subjective) 
 a priori principle may be demanded. 
 
 To which we may answer that the Sublime in 
 nature is improperly so called, and that properly 
 speaking the word should only be applied to a 
 state of mind, or rather to its foundation in 
 human nature. The apprehension of an otherwise 
 formless and unpurposive object gives merely the 
 occasion, through which we become conscious of 
 such a state ; the object is thus employed as 
 subjectively purposive, but is not judged as such 
 in itself and on account of its form (it is, as it were, 
 a species finalis accept a, non data). Hence our 
 Exposition of judgments concerning the Sublime in 
 nature was at the same time their Deduction. For 
 when we analysed the reflection of the Judgment in 
 such acts, we found in them a purposive relation of 
 
 /
 
 152 A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 the cognitive faculties, which must be ascribed 
 uhimately to the faculty of purposes (the will), and 
 hence is itself purposive a priori. This then 
 immediately involves the Deduction, i.e. the 
 justification of the claim of such a judgment to 
 universal and necessary validity. 
 
 We shall therefore only have to seek for the 
 deduction of judgments of Taste, i.e. of judgments 
 about the Beauty of natural things ; we shall thus 
 treat satisfactorily the problem with which the whole 
 faculty of aesthetical Judgment is concerned. 
 
 §31. Of the metJiod of deduction of jitdgments 
 
 of Taste 
 
 A Deduction, i.e. the guarantee of the legitimacy 
 of a class of judgments, is only obligatory if the 
 judgment lays claim to necessity. This it does, if 
 it demands even subjective universality or the agree- 
 ment of every one, although it is not a judgment 
 of cognition but only one of pleasure or pain in a 
 given object ; i.e. it assumes a subjective purpos- 
 iveness thoroughly valid for every one, which must 
 not be based on any concept of the thing, because 
 the judgment is one of taste. 
 
 We have before us in the latter case no cosfnitive 
 judgment — neither a theoretical one based on the 
 concept of a Nature in general formed by the Under- 
 standing, nor a (pure) practical one based on the 
 Idea of Freedom, as given a priori by Reason. 
 Therefore we have to justify a priori the validity 
 neither of a judgment which represents what a 
 thing is, nor of one which prescribes that I ought 
 to do something in order to produce it^ We have 
 merely to prove for the Judgment generally the
 
 Div. I § 31 METHOD OF DEDUCTION 153 
 
 universal validity of a singular judgment that ex- 
 presses the subjective purposiveness of an empirical 
 representation of the form of an object ; in order 
 to explain how it is possible that a thing can please 
 in the mere act of judging it (without sensation or 
 concept), and how the satisfaction of one man can 
 be proclaimed as a rule for every other ; just as the 
 act of judging of an object for the sake of a cognition 
 in general has universal rules, 
 
 If now this universal validity is not to be^ based 
 on any collecting of the suffrages of others, or on 
 any questioning of them as to the kind of sensations 
 they have, but is to rest, as it were, on an autonomy 
 of the judging subject in respect of the feeling of 
 pleasure (in the given representation), i.e. on his 
 own taste, and yet is not to be derived from con- 
 cepts ; then a judgment like this — such as the 
 judgment of taste is, in fact — has a twofold logical 
 peculiarity. First, there is its a priori universal ^ 
 validity, which is not a logical universality in ac- 
 cordance with concepts, but the universality of a 
 singular judgment. Secondly, it has a necessity ^ 
 (which must always rest on a priori grounds), 
 which however does not depend on any a priori 
 grounds of proof, through the representation of 
 which the assent that every one concedes to the 
 judgment of taste could be exacted. 
 
 The explanation of these logical peculiarities, \ 
 wherein a judgment of taste is different from all 
 cognitive judgments — if we at the outset abstract 
 from all content, viz., from the feeling of pleasure, 
 and merely compare the a^sthetical form with the 
 form of objective judgments as logic prescribes it 
 — is sufficient by itself for the deduction of this 
 singular faculty. We shall then represent and elu-
 
 154 A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 cidate by examples these characteristic properties of 
 taste. 
 
 § 32. First peculiarity of the judgtnent of Taste 
 
 The judgment of taste determines its object in 
 respect of satisfaction (in its beauty) with an ac- 
 companying claim for the assent of every one, just 
 as if it were objective. 
 
 ^ To sav that "this flower is beautiful" is the 
 same as to assert its proper claim to satisfy every 
 one. By the pleasantness of its smell it has no 
 such claim. A smell which one man enjoys gives 
 another a headache. Now what are we to presume 
 from this except that beauty is to be regarded as 
 a property of the flower itself, which does not ac- 
 commodate itself to any diversity of persons or of 
 their sensitive organs, but to which these must 
 accommodate themselves if they are to pass any 
 judgment upon it ? And yet this is not so. For 
 a judgment of taste consists in calling a thing 
 beautiful just because of that characteristic in respect 
 of which it accommodates itself to our mode of 
 apprehension. 
 
 Moreover, it is required of every judgment which 
 is to prove the taste of the subject, that the subject 
 shall judge by himself, without needing to grope 
 about empirically among the judgments of others, 
 and acquaint himself previously as to their satisfac- 
 tion or dissatisfaction with the same object ; thus 
 his judgment should be pronounced a priori, and 
 not be a mere imitation because the thing actually 
 gives universal pleasure. However, we ought to 
 think that an a pi'iori judgment must contain a 
 concept of the Object, for the cognition of which
 
 .'^€ 
 
 Div. i§32 SUBJECTIVE UNIVERSALITY 155 
 
 it contains the principle ; but the judgment of taste 
 is not based upon concepts at all, and is in general 
 not a cognitive but an sesthetical judgment. 
 
 Thus a young poet does not permit himself to 
 be dissuaded out of his conviction that his poem is 
 beautiful, by the judgment of the public or of his 
 friends ; and if he gives ear to them he does so, 
 not because he now judges differently, but because, 
 although (in regard to him) the whole public has 
 false taste, in his desire for applause he finds reason 
 for accommodatino- himself to the common error 
 (even against his judgment). It is only at a later 
 time, when his Judgment has been sharpened by 
 exercise, that he voluntarily departs from his former 
 judgments ; just as he proceeds with those of his 
 judgments which rest upon Reason. Taste [merely] ^ 
 claims autonomy. To make the judgments of others 
 the determining grounds of his own would be heter- 
 onomy. 
 
 That we, and rightly, recommend the works of 
 the ancients as models and call their authors classical, 
 thus forming among writers a kind of noble class 
 who give laws to the people by their example, seems 
 to indicate a posteriori sources of taste, and to con- 
 tradict the autonomy of taste in every subject. But 
 we might just as well say that the old mathematicians, 
 — who are regarded up to the present day as supply- 
 ing models not easily to be dispensed with for the 
 supreme profundity and elegance of their synthetical 
 methods, — prove that our Reason is only imitative, 
 and that we have not the faculty of producing from 
 it in combination with intuition rigid proofs by 
 means of the construction of concepts." There is 
 
 ^ [Second Edition.] 
 
 2 [Cf. Kritik of Pure Rcaso??, Methodology, c. i, § i. "The 
 
 .L> 
 
 ^^
 
 156 KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT i-art i 
 
 no use of our powers, however free, no use of 
 Reason itself (which must create all its judgments 
 a priori from common sources) which would not 
 giv^e rise to faulty attempts, if every subject had 
 always to begin anew from the rude basis of his 
 natural state, and if others had not preceded him 
 with their attempts. Not that these make mere 
 imitators of those who come after them, but rather 
 by their procedure they put others on the track 
 of seeking in themselves principles and so of pursu- 
 ing their own course, often a better one. Even in 
 religion — where certainly every one has to derive 
 the rule of his conduct from himself, because he 
 remains responsible for it and cannot shift the 
 blame of his transgressions upon others, whether 
 his teachers or his predecessors — there is never 
 as much accomplished by means of universal pre- 
 cepts, either obtained from priests or philosophers 
 or got from oneself, as by means of an example 
 of virtue or holiness which, exhibited in history, 
 does not dispense with the autonomy of virtue 
 based on the proper and original Idea of morality 
 {a priori), or change it into a mechanical imitation. 
 Folloimng, involving something precedent, not 
 / "imitation," is the right expression for all influence 
 that the products of an exemplary author may 
 have upon others. And this only means that we 
 draw from the same sources as our predecessor 
 did, and learn from him onlv the wav to avail 
 ourselves of them. But of all faculties and talents 
 Taste, because its judgment is not determinable by 
 concepts and precepts, is just that one which most 
 needs examples of what has in the progress of culture 
 
 construction of a concept is the a priori presentation of the corre- 
 sponding intuition."]
 
 Div. I §33 SECOND PECULIARITY 157 
 
 received the longest approval ; that it may not 
 become asfain uncivilised and return to the crudeness 
 of its first essays. 
 
 \ ZZ- Second peculiarity of the judgment of Taste 
 
 The judgment of taste is not determinable by 
 grounds of proof, just as if it were merely subjective. 
 /_If a man, /;/. the first place, does not find a buildX 
 ing, a prospect, or a poem beautiful, a hundred voices ' 
 all highly praising it will not force his inmost agree-/ 
 ment^ He may indeed feign that it pleases him in 
 order that he may not be regarded as devoid of 
 taste ; he may even begin to doubt whether he has 
 formed his taste on a knowledge of a sufficient 
 number of objects of a certain kind (just as one, 
 who believes that he recognises in the distance as a 
 forest, something w^hich all others regard as a town, 
 doubts the judgment of his own sight). But he 
 clearly sees that the agreement of others gives no 
 valid proof of the judgment about beauty. Others 
 might perhaps see and observe for him ; and w^hat 
 many have seen in one way, although he believes 
 that he has seen it differently, might serve him as 
 an adequate ground of proof of a theoretical and 
 consequently logical judgment. uBut that a thing 
 has pleased others could never serve as the basis 
 of an sesthetical judgment. A judgment of others 
 which is unfavourable to ours may indeed rightly 
 make us scrutinise our own carefully, but it can 
 never convince us of its incorrectness. There is"^ 
 therefore no empirical grotmd of proof w^hich would ; 
 force a judgment of taste upon any one. 
 
 Still less, in the second place, can an a priori 
 proof determine according to definite rules a judg-
 
 IS8 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part I 
 
 ment about beauty. If a man reads me a poem of 
 his or brings me to a play, which does not on the 
 whole suit my taste, he may bring forward in proof 
 of the beauty of his poem Battcux^ or Lessing or 
 still more ancient and famous critics of taste, and 
 all the rules laid down by them ; certain passages 
 which displease me may agree very well with rules 
 of beauty (as they have been put forth by these 
 writers and are universally recognised) : but I stop 
 my ears, I will listen to no arguments and no 
 reasoning ; and I will rather assume that these rules 
 of the critics are false, or at least that they do not 
 apply to the case in question, than admit that my 
 judgment should be determined by grounds of proof 
 a priori. For it is to be a judgment of Taste and 
 not of Understanding or Reason. 
 
 It seems that this is one of the chief reasons 
 why this aesthetical faculty of judgment has been 
 given the name of Taste. For though a man 
 enumerate to me all the ingredients of a dish, and 
 remark that each is separately pleasant to me and 
 further extol with justice the wholesomeness of this 
 particular food — yet am I deaf to all these reasons ; 
 I .try the dish with my tongue and my palate, and 
 thereafter (and not according to universal principles) 
 do I pass my judgment. 
 
 In fact the judgment of Taste always takes the 
 form of a singular judgment about an Object. The 
 Understanding can form a universal judgment by 
 comparing the Object in point of the satisfaction it 
 affords with the judgment of others upon it : e.g. 
 "all tulips are beautiful." But then this is not a 
 judgment of taste but a logical judgment, which 
 
 1 [Charles Batteux (1713-17S0), author of Les Beaux Arts 
 reduits a icn mcme principe.'\
 
 uiv. I § 34 ^ NO OBJECTIVE PRINCIPLE 159 
 
 takes the relation of an Object to taste as the 
 predicate of things of a certain species. That 
 judgment, however, in which I find an individual 
 given tulip beautiful, i.e. in which I find my satis- 
 faction in the object to be universally valid, is alone 
 a judgment of taste. Its peculiarity consists in the 
 fact that, although it has merely subjective validity, 
 it claims the assent of all subjects, exactly as it 
 would do if it were an objective judgmient resting 
 on grounds of knowledge, that could be established 
 by a proof. 
 
 § 34. There is no objective principle of Taste 
 
 possible 
 
 By a principle of taste I mean a principle under\ 
 the condition of which we could subsume the con- 
 cept of an object and thus infer by means of a 
 syllogism that the object is beautiful. But that is 
 absolutely impossible. For I must immediately 
 feel pleasure in the representation of the Object, 
 and of that I can be persuaded by no grounds of, 
 proof whatever.) Although, as Hznne says,^ all critics 
 can reason more plausibly than cooks, yet the same 
 fate awaits them. They cannot expect the deter- 
 mining ground of their judgment [to be derived] 
 from the force of the proofs, but only from the 
 reflection of the subject upon its own proper state 
 
 1 [Essay XVIII, The Sceptic. "Critics can reason and dispute 
 more plausibly than cooks or perfumers. We may observ^e, however, 
 that this uniformity among human kind, hinders not, but that there 
 is a considerable diversity in the sentiments of beauty and worth, and 
 that education, custom, prejudice, caprice, and humour, frequently 
 vary our taste of this kind. . . . Beauty and worth are merely of a 
 relative nature, and consist in an agreeable sentiment, produced by 
 an object in a particular mind, according to the peculiar structure and 
 constitution of that mind."]
 
 i6o 
 
 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 PART I 
 
 ^ 
 
 </ 
 
 (of pleasure or pain), all precepts and rules being 
 rejected. 
 
 But although critics can and ought to pursue 
 their reasonings so that our judgments of taste may 
 be corrected and extended, it is not with a view to 
 set forth the determining^ oround of this kind of 
 ojsthetical judgments in a universally applicable 
 formula, which is impossible ; but rather to investi- 
 gate the cognitive faculties and their exercise in 
 these judgments, and to explain by examples the 
 reciprocal subjective purposiveness, the form of 
 which, as has been shown above, in a given repre- 
 sentation, constitutes the beauty of the object. 
 Therefore the Kritik of Taste is only subjective 
 as regards the representation through which an 
 object is given to us ; viz. it is the art or 
 science of reducing to rules the reciprocal rela- 
 tion between the Understandins: and the Imac^ina- 
 tion in the given representation (without reference 
 to any preceding sensation or concept). That 
 is, it is the art or science of reducing to rules 
 their accordance or discordance, and of determining 
 the conditions of this. It is an art, if it only shows 
 y this by examples ; it is a science if it derives the 
 possibility of such judgments from the nature of 
 these faculties, as cognitive faculties in general. 
 We have here, in Transcendental Kritik, only to do 
 with the latter. It should develop and justify the 
 subjective principle of taste, as an a priori principle 
 of the Judgment. This Kritik, as an art, merely 
 seeks to apply, in the judging of objects, the physio- 
 logical (here psychological), and therefore empirical 
 rules, according to which taste actually proceeds 
 (without taking any account of their possibility) ; 
 and it criticises the products of beautiful art just as,
 
 Div. I § 35 THE SUBJECTIVE PRINCIPLE i6l 
 
 regarded as a science, it criticises the faculty by 
 which they are judged. 
 
 § 35, The principle of Taste is the sttbjective 
 principle of Judgment in general 
 
 The judgment of taste is distinguished from a 
 logical judgment in this, that the latter subsumes a 
 representation under the concept of the Object, 
 while the former does not subsume it under any 
 concept ; because otherwise the necessary universal 
 agreement [in these judgments] would be capable 
 of being compelled by proofs. Nevertheless it is 
 like the latter in this, that it claims universality and 
 necessity, though not according to concepts of the 
 Object, and consequently a merely subjective neces- 
 sity. Now, because the concepts in a judgment 
 constitute its content (what belongs to the cognition 
 of the Object), but the judgment of taste is not 
 determinable by concepts, it is based only on the 
 subjective formal condition of a judgment in general. 
 The subjective condition of all judgments is the 
 faculty of Judgment itself. This when used with 
 reference to a representation by which an object is 
 given, requires the accordance of two representative 
 powers : viz. Imagination (for the intuition and 
 comprehension of the manifold) and Understanding 
 (for the concept as a representation of the unity of 
 this comprehension). Now because no concept 
 of the Object lies here at the basis of the judgment, 
 it can only consist in the subsumption of the 
 Imagination itself (in the case of a representation 
 by which an object is given) under the conditions 
 that the Understanding requires to pass from intui- 
 tion to concepts. That is, because the freedom of the 
 
 ^
 
 1 62 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 Imagination consists in the fact that it schematises 
 without any concept, [the judgment of taste must 
 
 /rest on a mere sensation of the reciprocal activity of 
 the Imagination in \\.s freedoin and the Understand- 
 ing with its conformity to law. It must therefore 
 rest on a feehng, which makes us judge the object 
 : by the purposiveness of the representation (by 
 which an object is given) in respect of the 
 furtherance of the cognitive faculty in its free playy 
 Taste, then, as subjective Judgment, contains a 
 principle of subsumption, not of intuitions under 
 concepts, but of the faculty of intuitions or pre- 
 sentations {i.e. the Imagination) under the faculty 
 ^ of the concepts {i.e. the Understanding) ; so far as 
 
 the former in its freedom harmonises with the latter 
 in its conformity to law. 
 
 / In order to discover this ground of legitimacy 
 by a deduction of the judgments of taste we can 
 only take as a clue the formal peculiarities of this 
 kind of judgments, and consequently can only con- 
 sider their loc^ical form. 
 
 \ 2,^. Of the problem of a Deduction of jztdgments 
 
 of Taste 
 
 The concept of an Object in general can im- 
 mediately be combined with the perception of an 
 object, containing its empirical predicates, so as 
 to form a cognitive judgment ; and it is thus that a 
 judgment of experience is produced/ At the basis 
 of this lie a priori concepts of the synthetical 
 unity of the manifold of intuition, by which the 
 
 1 [For the distinction, an important one in Kant, between judg- 
 ments of experience and judgments of perception, see his Prolegomena^ 
 § 1 8. Cf. Kanfs Critical Philosophy for English Readers, vol. i. 
 p. I 1 6.]
 
 Div. I S36 JUDGMENTS OF TASTE SYNTHETICAL 163 
 
 manifold is thought as the determination of an 
 Object. These concepts (the Categories) require 
 a Deduction, which is given in the Kritik of pure 
 Reason ; and by it we can get the solution of the 
 problem, how are synthetical a priori cognitive 
 judgments possible ? This problem concerns then 
 the a priori principles of the pure Understanding 
 and its theoretical judgments. 
 
 But with a perception there can also be com- 
 bined a feeling of pleasure (or pain) and a satis- 
 faction, that accompanies the representation of the 
 Object and serves instead of its predicate ; thus 
 there can result an sesthetical non-cognitive judgment. 
 At the basis of such a judgment — if it is not a mere 
 judgment of sensation but a formal judgment of 
 reflection, which imputes the same satisfaction 
 necessarily to every one, — must lie some a priori 
 principle ; which may be merely subjective (if an ob- 
 jective one should prove impossible for judgments of 
 this kind), but also as such may need a Deduction, 
 that we may thereby comprehend how an sesthetical 
 judgment can lay claim to necessity. On this is 
 founded the problem with which we are now 
 occupied, how are judgments of taste possible } 
 This problem then has to do with the a priori 
 principles of the pure faculty of Judgment in 
 CBsthetical ]\idi^rs\^ViX.s ; i.e. judgments in which it has 
 not (as in theoretical ones) merely to subsume under 
 objective concepts of Understanding, and in which 
 it is subject to a law, but in which it is, itself, 
 subjectively, both object and law. 
 
 This problem then may be thus represented^ 
 how is a judgment possible, in which merely from | 
 ■our oii'JL feeling of pleasure in an object, inde- 
 pendently of its concept, we judge that this pleasure]
 
 i64 A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 attaches to the representation of the same Object 
 in every other subject, and that a priori without 
 waiting for the accordance of others ? 
 
 It is easy to see that judgments of taste are 
 synthetical, because they go beyond the concept 
 and even beyond the intuition of the Object, and 
 add to that intuition as predicate something that is 
 not a cognition, viz. a feehng of pleasure (or pain). 
 Although the predicate (of the personal pleasure 
 bound up with the representation) is empirical, never- 
 theless, as concerns the required assent of every one 
 the judgments are aprio7'i, or desire to be regarded as 
 such ; and this is already involved in the expressions 
 of this claim. Thus this problem of the Kritik of 
 Judgment belongs to the general problem of trans- 
 cendental philosophy, how are synthetical a priori 
 judgments possible ? 
 
 § o7- What is properly asserted a priori of an 
 object in a judgment of Taste 
 
 That the representation of an object is immedi- 
 ately bound up with pleasure can only be internally 
 perceived, and if we did not wish to indicate 
 anything more than this it would give a merely 
 empirical judgment. For I cannot combine a 
 definite feeling (of pleasure or pain) with any 
 representation except where there is at bottom an 
 a priori principle in the Reason determining the 
 Will. In that case the pleasure (in the moral 
 feeling) is the consequence of the principle, but 
 cannot be compared with the pleasure in taste, 
 because it requires a definite concept of a law ; and 
 the latter pleasure, on the contrary, must be 
 bound up with the mere act of judging, prior to all 
 
 1
 
 / 
 
 y 
 
 Div. I § 38 DEDUCTION 165 
 
 concepts. (_Hence also all judgments of taste are 
 singular judgments, because they do not combine \ \^ 
 their predicate of satisfaction with a concept, but 
 with a given individual empirical representation. 
 
 And so it is not the pleasure, but the tiniversal 
 validity of this pleasure, perceived as mentally 
 bound up with the mere judgment upon an object, 
 which is represented a priori in a judgment of 
 taste as a universal rule for the Judgment and valid 
 for every one. It is an empirical judgment [to say] 
 that I perceive and judge an object with pleasure. 
 But it is an a priori judgment [to say] that I find it 
 beautiful, i.e. I attribute this satisfaction necessarily 
 to every one. 
 
 § -^^Z. Deduction of judgments of Taste 
 
 If it be admitted that in a pure judgment of 
 taste the satisfaction in the object is combined with 
 the mere act of judging its form, it is nothing else 
 than its subjective purposiveness for the Judgment 
 which we feel to be mentally combined with the 
 representation of the object. The Judgment, as 
 regards the formal rules of its action, apart from all 
 matter (whether sensation or concept), can only be 
 directed to the subjective conditions of its employ- 
 ment in general (it is applied ^ neither to a particular 
 mode of sense nor to a particular concept of the 
 Understanding) ; and consequently to that subjective ^ 
 [element] which we can pre-suppose in all men (as 
 requisite for possible cognition in general). Thus 
 the agreement of a representation with these con- 
 ditions of the Judgment must be capable of being |/ 
 assumed as valid a priori for every one. I.e. we 
 
 ^ [First Edition has " limited."]
 
 1 66 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 may rightly impute to every one the pleasure or the 
 subjective purposiveness of the representation for 
 the relation between the cognitive faculties in the 
 act of judging a sensible object in general.^ 
 
 Remark 
 
 This deduction is thus easy, because it has no 
 need to justify the objective reality of any concept, 
 for Beauty is not a concept of the Object and the 
 judgment of taste is not cognitive. It only maintains 
 that we are justified in pre-supposing universally in 
 every man those subjective conditions of the Judg- 
 ment which we find in ourselves ;|and further, that 
 we have rightly subsumed the given Object under 
 these conditions. The latter has indeed unavoidable 
 difficulties which do not beset the logical Judgment, 
 Inhere we subsume under concepts, but in the 
 aisthetical Judgment under a merely sensible rela- 
 tion between the Imagination and Understanding 
 mutually harmonising in the representation of the 
 form of the Object, — in which case the subsumption 
 may easily be deceptive. Yet the legitimacy of 
 the claim of the Judgment in counting upon uni- 
 versal assent is not thus annulled ; it reduces itself 
 
 f 1 In order to be justified in claiming universal assent for an 
 / ccsthetical judgment that rests merely on subjective grounds, it is 
 , sufficient to assume, (i) that the subjective conditions of the 
 \j Judgment, as regards the relation of the cogniti\e powers thus put 
 
 into activity to a cognition in general, are the same in all men. 
 This must be true, because otherwise men would not be able to 
 1^ communicate their representations or even their knowledge.^ (2) 
 The judgment must merely have reference to this relation (con- 
 sequently to thQfonnal condition of the Judgment) and be pure, i.e. 
 not mingled either with concepts of the Object or with sensations, as 
 determining grounds. If there has been any mistake as regards 
 this latter condition, then there is only an inaccurate application of 
 the privilege, which a law gives us, to a particular case ; but that 
 does not destroy the privilege itself in general.
 
 Div. I ? 39 COMMUNICABILITY OF SENS A TIONS 167 
 
 merely to judging as valid for every one the cor- 
 rectness of the principle from subjective grounds. 
 For as to the difficulty or doubt concerning the 
 correctness of the subsumption under that principle, 
 it makes the legitimacy of the claim of an sesthetical 
 judgment in general to such validity and the prin- 
 ciple of the "l^ame, as little doubtful, as the alike 
 (though neither so commonly nor readily) faulty 
 subsumption of the logical Judgment under its 
 principle can make the latter, an objective principle, 
 doubtful. But if the question were to be, how is 
 it possible to assume nature a priori to be a com- 
 plex of objects of taste ? this problem has reference 
 to Teleology, because it must be regarded as a 
 purpose of nature essentially belonging to its con- 
 cept to exhibit forms that are purposive for our 
 Judgment. But the correctness of this latter as- 
 sumption is very doubtful, whereas the efficacy of 
 natural beauties is patent to experience. 
 
 § 39- Of the comm^micability of a Sensation 
 
 If sensation, as the real in perception, is related 
 to knowledge, it is called sensation of the senses ; 
 and its specific quality may be represented as gener- 
 ally communicable in a uniform way, if we assume 
 that every one has senses like our own. But this 
 cannot at all be presupposed of any single sensation. 
 To a man who is deficient in the sense of smell, 
 this kind of sensation cannot be communicated ; 
 and even if it is not wholly deficient, we cannot 
 be certain that he gets exactly the same sensation 
 from a flower that we have. But even more must 
 we represent men as differing in respect of the 
 pleasantness or unpleasantness involved in the sen- 
 
 A
 
 1 68 KANT'S KRTTIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 sation from the same object of sense ; and it is 
 absolutely not to be required that every man should 
 take pleasure in the same objects. Pleasure of this 
 kind, because it comes into the mind through the 
 /senses, in respect of which therefore we are passive, 
 we may call the pleasure of enjoyment. 
 
 Satisfaction in an action because* of its moral 
 character is on the other hand not the pleasure of 
 enjoyment, but of spontaneity and its accordance 
 with the Idea of its destination. But this feeling, 
 called moral, requires concepts, and presents not free 
 / purposiveness, but purposiveness that is conformable 
 to law ; it therefore admits of being universally 
 communicated only by means of Reason, and, if the 
 pleasure is to be homogeneous for every one, by 
 very definite practical concepts of Reason, 
 
 Pleasure in the Sublime in nature, regarded as 
 a pleasure of rational contemplation, also makes 
 claim to universal participation ; but it presupposes, 
 besides, a different feeling, viz. that of our super- 
 ^ sensible destination, which, however obscurely, has a 
 ■^ moral foundation. But that other men will take 
 account of it, and will find a satisfaction in the con- 
 sideration of the wild greatness of nature (that 
 certainly cannot be ascribed to its aspect, which is 
 rather terrifying), I am not absolutely justified in 
 supposing. Nevertheless, in consideration of the 
 fact that on every suitable occasion regard should be 
 had to these moral dispositions, I can impute such 
 satisfaction to every man, but only by means of the 
 moral law which on its side again is based on 
 concepts of Reason. 
 
 On the contrary, pleasure in the Beautiful is 
 neither a pleasure of enjoyment nor of a law-abid- 
 ing activity, nor even of rational contemplation in
 
 DIV. I § 40 
 
 TASTE A SENSUS COMMUNIS 
 
 169 
 
 accordance with Ideas, but ofjiiere refiectLoa. With-'^ 
 out having as rule any purpose or fundamental 
 proposition, this pleasure accompanies the ordinary 
 apprehension of an object by the Imagination, as 
 faculty of intuition, in relation with the Understand- 
 ing, as faculty of concepts, by means of a procedure 
 of the Judgment which it must also exercise on 
 behalf of the commonest experience ; only that in 
 the latter case it is in order to perceive an empirical 
 objective concept, in the former case (in sesthetical 
 judgments) merely to perceive the accordance of the 
 representation with the harmonious (subjectively 
 purposive) activity of both cognitive faculties in their 
 freedom, i.e. to feel with pleasure the mental state 
 produced by the representation. This pleasure 
 must necessarily depend for every one on the same 
 conditions, for they are subjective conditions of the 
 possibility of a cognition in general ; and the pro- 
 portion between these cognitive faculties requisite 
 for Taste is also requisite for that ordinary sound 
 Understanding w^hich we have to presuppose in 
 every one. Therefore he who judges with taste (if 
 only he does not go astray in this act of conscious- 
 ness and mistake matter for form or charm for 
 beauty) may impute to every one subjective purpose- 
 iveness, i.e. his satisfaction in the Object, and may 
 assume his feeling to be universally communicable ' 
 and that without the mediation of concepts. 
 
 < 
 
 \ 40. Of Taste as a kiiid of sensws communis 
 
 We often give to the Judgment, if we are con- 
 sidering the result rather than the act of its reflection, 
 the name of a sense, and we speak of a sense of 
 truth, or of a sense of decorum, of justice, etc. And
 
 I70 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part I 
 
 yet we know, or at least we ought to know, that 
 these concepts cannot have their place in Sense, and 
 further, that Sense has not the least capacity for 
 expressing universal rules ; but that no representa- 
 tion of truth, fitness, beauty, or justice, and so forth, 
 could come into our thoughts if we could not rise 
 beyond Sense to higher faculties of cognition. The 
 common Understanding of 7?ien, which, as the mere 
 healthy (not yet cultivated) Understanding, we regard 
 as the least to be expected from any one claiming the 
 name of man, has therefore the doubtful honour of 
 being given the name of common sense {sensns com- 
 munis) ; and in such a way that by the name 
 coinmon (not merely in our language, where the word 
 actually has a double signification, but in many 
 others) we understand vulgar, that which is every- 
 where met with, the possession of which indicates 
 absolutely no merit or superiority. 
 
 But under the sensus communis we must include 
 the Idea of a sense common to all, i.e. of a faculty of 
 judgment, which in its reflection takes account 
 [a priori) of the mode of representation of all other 
 men in thought ; in order as it were to compare its 
 judgment with the collective Reason of humanity, 
 and thus to escape the illusion arising from the 
 private conditions that could be so easily taken for 
 objective, which would injuriously affect the judg- 
 ment. This is done by comparing our judgment 
 with the possible rather than the actual judgments 
 of others, and by putting ourselves in the place of 
 any other man, by abstracting from the limitations 
 which contingently attach to our own judgment. 
 This, again, is brought about by leaving aside as 
 much as possible the matter of our representative 
 state, i.e. sensation, and simply having respect to
 
 Div. I §40 MAXIMS OF UNDERSTANDING 171 
 
 the formal peculiarities of our representation or 
 representative state. Now this operation of reflec- 
 tion seems perhaps too artificial to be attributed 
 to the faculty called common sense ; but it only 
 appears so, when expressed in abstract formulae. 
 In itself there is nothing more natural than to 
 abstract from charm or emotion if we are seeking a 
 judgment that is to serve as a universal rule. 
 
 The following Maxims of common human Under- 
 standing do not properly come in here, as parts of 
 the Kritik of Taste ; but yet they may serve to 
 elucidate its fundamental propositions. They are : 
 1° to think for oneself; 2° to put ourselves in thought 
 in the place of ever)' one else ; 3° always to think 
 consistently. The first is the maxim of ztnprejitdiced 
 thought ; the second of enlarged thought ; the third 
 of consecutive thought.^ The first is the maxim of 
 a never passive Reason. The tendency to such 
 passivity, and therefore to heteronomy of the 
 Reason, is called prejudice ; and the greatest pre- 
 judice of all is to represent nature as not subject 
 to the rules that the Understanding places at its 
 basis by means of its own essential law, i.e. is 
 superstition. Deliverance from superstition is called 
 cnligJitenment \- because although this name be- 
 longs to deliverance from prejudices in general, 
 
 ^ [Kant lays down these three maxims in his hitroduction to Logic, 
 § vii, as "general rules and conditions of the avoidance of error."] 
 
 - We soon see that although enlightenment is easy /;/ thesi, yet /;; 
 hypothesi it is difficult and slow of accomplishment. For not to be 
 passive as regards Reason, but to be always self-legislative, is indeed 
 quite easy for the man who wishes only to be in accordance with his 
 essential purpose, and does not desire to know what is beyond his 
 Understanding. But since we can hardly avoid seeking this, and 
 there are never wanting others who promise with much confidence 
 that they are able to satisfy our curiosity, it must be very hard to 
 maintain in or restore to the mind (especially the mind of the public) 
 that bare negative which properly constitutes enlightenment. 
 
 /
 
 172 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT tart i 
 
 yet superstition specially {in sensii eminenti) de- 
 serves to be called a prejudice. For the blindness 
 in which superstition places us, which it even im- 
 poses on us as an obligation, makes the need of 
 being guided by others, and the consequent passive 
 state of our Reason, peculiarly noticeable. As 
 regards the second maxim of the mind, we are 
 otherwise wont to call him limited {bornd, the 
 opposite of enlarged) whose talents attain to no 
 great use (especially as regards intensity.) But 
 here we are not speaking of the faculty of cognition, 
 but of the mode of thoiigJit which makes a purposive 
 use thereof. However small may be the area or the 
 degree to which a man's natural gifts reach, yet it 
 indicates a man of enlarged thought if he disregards 
 the subjective private conditions of his own judg- 
 ment, by which so many others are confined, and 
 reflects upon it from a universal standpoint (which 
 he can only determine by placing himself at the 
 standpoint of others). The third maxim, viz. that 
 of consecutive thought, is the most difficult to attain, 
 and can only be attained by the combination of both 
 the former, and after the constant observance of 
 them has grown into a habit. We may say that 
 the first of these maxims is the maxim of Under- 
 standing, the second of Judgment, and the third of 
 Reason. 
 
 I take up again the threads interrupted by this 
 digression, and I say that Taste can be called sensns 
 commnnis with more justice than sound Under- 
 standing can ; and that the ffisthetical Judgment 
 rather than the intellectual may bear the name 
 of a sense common to all,^ if we are w^illing to use 
 
 ^ We may designate Taste as sens us communis astheticus^ common 
 Understanding as sensus communis logicus.
 
 Div. I § 41 DEFINITION OF TASTE 173 
 
 the word "sense" of an effect of mere reflection 
 upon the mind : for then we understand by sense 
 the feehng of pleasure. We could even define 
 Taste as the faculty of judging of that which makes 
 universally communicable, without the mediation of 
 a concept, our feeling in a given representation. 
 
 The skill that men have in communicatinor their 
 
 o 
 
 thoughts requires also a relation between the Ima- 
 gination and the Understanding in order to associate 
 intuitions with concepts, and concepts again with 
 those concepts, which then combine in a cognition. 
 But in that case the agreement of the two mental 
 powers is accoj^ding to law, under the constraint of 
 definite concepts. Only where the Imagination in 
 its freedom awakens the Understanding, and is put 
 by it into regular play without the aid of concepts, 
 does the representation communicate itself not as a 
 thought but as an internal feeling of a purposive 
 state of the mind. 
 
 Taste is then the faculty of judging a priori of 
 the communicability of feelings that are bound up 
 with a given representation (without the mediation 
 of a concept). 
 
 If we could assume that the mere universal 
 communicability of a feeling must carry in itself an 
 interest for us with it (which, however, we are not 
 justified in concluding from the character of a 
 merely reflective Judgment), we should be able 
 to explain why the feeling in the judgment of taste 
 comes to be imputed to every one, so to speak, as 
 a duty. 
 
 §41. Of the empirical interest in the Beautiful 
 That the judgment of taste by which something 
 
 /
 
 174 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT parti 
 
 is declared beautiful must have no interest as its 
 determining ground has been sufficiently established 
 above. But it does not follow that after it has been 
 given as a pure sesthetical judgment, no interest can 
 be combined with it. This combination, however, 
 can only be indirect, i.e. taste must first of all be 
 represented as combined with something else, in 
 order that we may unite with the satisfaction of 
 mere reflection upon an object a pleasure in its 
 existence (as that wherein all interest consists). For 
 here also in sesthetical judgments what we say in 
 cognitive judgments (of things in general) is valid ; 
 a posse ad esse non valet conseqnentia. This 
 something else may be empirical, viz. an inclination 
 proper to human nature, or intellectual, as the 
 property of the Will of being capable of a p^Hori 
 determination by Reason. Both these involve a 
 satisfaction in the presence of an Object, and so can 
 lay the foundation for an interest in what has by 
 itself pleased without reference to any interest 
 whatever. 
 
 Empirically the Beautiful interests only in 
 society. If we admit the impulse to society as natural 
 to man, and his fitness for it, and his propension 
 towards it, i.e. sociability, as a requisite for man as 
 a being destined for society, and so as a property 
 belonging to humanity, we cannot escape from 
 regarding taste as a faculty for judging everything 
 in respect of which we can communicate our feeling 
 to all other men, and so as a means of furthering 
 that which every one's natural inclination desires. 
 
 A man abandoned by himself on a desert island 
 would adorn neither his hut nor his person ; nor 
 would he seek for flowers, still less would he grow 
 plants, in order to adorn himself therewith. It is
 
 Div. I §41 FJiOCESS OF CIVILISATION 175 
 
 only in society that it occurs to him to be not merely 
 a man, but a refined man after his kind (the be- 
 ginning of civilisation). For such do we judge him 
 to be who is both inclined and apt to communicate 
 his pleasure to others, and who is not contented 
 with an Object if he cannot feel satisfaction in it in 
 common with others. Again, every one expects and 
 requires from every one else this reference to uni- 
 versal communication [of pleasure], as it were from an 
 original compact dictated by humanity itself. ^Thus, 
 doubtless, in the beginning only those things which 
 attracted the senses, e.g., colours for painting 
 oneself (roucou among the Carabs and cinnabar 
 among the Iroquois), flowers, mussel shells, 
 beautiful feathers, etc., — but in time beautiful forms 
 also (e.g. in their canoes, and clothes, etc.), which 
 bring with them no gratification, or satisfaction of 
 enjoyment — were important in society, and were 
 combined with great interest. Until at last 
 (civilisation, having reached its highest point, makes\ 
 out of this almost the main business of refined in- 
 clination ; and sensations are only regarded as of 
 worth in so far as they can be universally communi- 
 cated. Here, although the pleasure which every 
 one has in such an object is inconsiderable and in 
 itself without any marked interest, yet the Idea of 
 its universal communicability increases its worth in 
 an almost infinite degree. 
 
 But this interest that indirectlv attaches to the 
 Beautiful through our inclination to society, and 
 consequently is empirical, is of no importance for us 
 now ; because we have only to look to what may 
 have a reference, although only indirectly, to the 
 judgment of taste a priori. For if an interest 
 should also be detected as bound up with this form.
 
 176 KANT'S KRITIh' OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 taste would detect for our faculty of judging a 
 means of passing from sense-enjoyment to moral 
 feeling ; and so not only would we be the better 
 guided in employing taste purposively, but there 
 would be thus presented a link in the chain of the 
 human faculties a priori, on which all legislation 
 must depend. |_We can only say thus much about 
 the empirical interest in objects of taste and in 
 taste itself. Since it is subservient to inclination, 
 however refined the latter may be, it may easily be 
 confounded with all the inclinations and passions, 
 which attain their greatest variety and highest 
 degree in society ; and the interest in the Beautiful, 
 if it is grounded thereon, can only furnish a very 
 ambiguous transition from the Pleasant to the Good. 
 
 o 
 
 But whether this can or cannot be furthered by 
 taste, taken in its purity, is what we now have to 
 investigate. 
 
 § 42. Of the iiitcllectiLal interest in the Beaut if nl 
 
 With the best intentions those persons who 
 refer all activities, to which their inner natural 
 dispositions impel men, to the final purpose of 
 humanity, viz., the morally good, have regarded the 
 taking an interest in the Beautiful in general as a 
 mark of good moral character. But it is not with- 
 out reason that they have been contradicted by 
 others who rely on experience ; for this shows that 
 connoisseurs in taste not only often, but generally, 
 are given up to idle, capricious, and mischievous 
 passions, and that they could perhaps make less 
 claim than others to any superiority of attachment 
 to moral principles. Thus it would seem that the 
 feeling for the Beautiful is not only (as actually is
 
 Div. I § 42 TASTE AND MORALITY 177 
 
 the case) specifically different from the Moral feeling ; 
 but that the interest which can be bound up with it 
 is hardly compatible with moral interest, and cer- 
 tainly has no inner affinity therewith. 
 
 Now I admit at once that the interest in the 
 Beatitifitl of Art (under which I include the 
 artificial use of natural beauties for adornment and 
 so for vanity) furnishes no proof whatever of a 
 disposition attached to the morally good or even 
 inclined thereto. But on the other hand, I maintain 
 that to take an vninediate interest in the Beauty of 
 Nature (not merely to have taste in judging it) is 
 always a mark of a good soul ; and that when this 
 interest is habitual it at least indicates a frame of 
 mind favourable to the moral feeling, if it is 
 voluntarily bound up with the conteinplatio)i of 
 nature. It is to be remembered, however, that I 
 here speak strictly of the beautiful yb7';;^i' of Nature, 
 and I set aside the charms, that she is wont to 
 combine so abundantly with them ; because, though 
 the interest in the latter is indeed immediate, it is 
 only empirical. 
 
 He who by himself (and without any design of 
 communicating his observations to others) regards 
 the beautiful figure of a wild flower, a bird, an 
 insect, etc., with admiration and love — who would 
 not willingly miss it in Nature, although it may 
 bring him some damage, who still less wants any 
 advantacre from it — he takes an immediate and also 
 an intellectual interest In the beauty of Nature. ^ 
 I.e. it is not merely the form of the product of 
 nature which pleases him, but its very presence 
 pleases him, the charms of sense having no share in 
 this pleasure and no purpose whatever being 
 comibined with it. 
 
 N
 
 178 KANrS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 But it is noteworthy that if we secretly deceived 
 this lover of the beautiful by planting in the ground 
 artificial flowers (which can be manufactured exactly 
 like natural ones), or by placing artificially carved 
 birds on the boughs of trees, and he discovered the 
 deceit, the immediate interest that he previously took 
 in them would disappear at once ; though, perhaps, 
 a different interest, viz. the interest of vanity in 
 adorning his chamber with them for the eyes of 
 others, would take its place. This thought then must 
 accompany our intuition and reflection on beauty, 
 
 / viz. that nature has produced it ; and on this alone 
 is based the immediate interest that we take in 
 it. Otherwise, there remains a mere judgment of 
 taste, either devoid of all interest, or bound up 
 with a mediate interest, viz. in that it has refer- 
 ence to society ; which latter [interest] furnishes 
 no certain indications of a morally good disposi- 
 tion. 
 
 , This superiority of natural to artificial beauty 
 
 in that it alone arouses an immediate interest, 
 although as regards form the former may be sur- 
 passed by the latter, harmonises with the refined 
 and thorough mental attitude of all men who have 
 cultivated their moral feelinof. If a man who has 
 taste enough to judge of the products of beautiful 
 Art with the greatest accuracy and refinement 
 willingly leaves a chamber where are to be found 
 those beauties that minister to vanity or to any 
 social joys, and turns to the beautiful in Nature 
 in order to find, as it were, delight for his spirit 
 in a train of thought that he can never completely 
 evolve, we will regard this choice of his with 
 veneration, and attribute to him a beautiful soul, 
 to which no connoisseur or lover [of Art] can lay 
 
 k
 
 Div. I § 42 INTELLECTUAL INTEREST IN BEAUTY 179 
 
 claim on account of the interest he takes in his 
 [artistic] objects. — What now is the difference in 
 our estimation of these two different kinds of Objects, 
 which in the judgment of mere taste it is hard to 
 compare in point of superiority ? 
 
 We have a faculty of mere sesthetical Judgment 
 by which we judge forms without the aid of concepts, 
 and find a satisfaction in this mere act of judgment ; 
 this we make into a rule for every one, without this 
 judgment either being based on or producing any 
 interest. — On the other hand, we have also a 
 faculty of intellectual Judgment which determines an 
 a priori satisfaction for the mere forms of practical 
 maxims (so far as they are in themselves qualified 
 for universal legislation) ; this we make into a 
 law for every one, without our judgment being 
 based on any interest whatever, thotigh in this case 
 it produces such an interest. The pleasure or pain 
 in the former judgment is called that of taste, in 
 the latter, that of moral feeling. 
 
 But it also interests Reason that the Ideas (for 
 which in moral feeling it arouses an immediate 
 interest) should have objective reality ; i.e. that 
 nature should at least show a trace or eive an 
 
 o 
 
 indication that it contains in itself a ground for 
 assuming a regular agreement of its products with 
 our entirely disinterested satisfaction (which we 
 recognise a prioid as a law for every one, without 
 being able to base it upon proofs). Hence Reason 
 must take an interest in every expression on the 
 part of nature of an agreement of this kind. 
 Consequently, the mind cannot ponder upon the 
 beauty of Nature without finding itself at the same 
 time interested therein. But this interest is akin 
 to moral, and he who takes such an interest in the 
 
 L^^
 
 l8o A'ANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 beauties of nature can do so only in so far as he 
 previously has firmly established his interest in the 
 morally good. If, therefore, the beauty of Nature 
 interests a man immediately we have reason for 
 attributing to him, at least, a basis for a good moral 
 disposition. 
 
 It will be said that this account of aesthetical 
 judgments, as akin to the moral feeling, seems far 
 too studied to be regarded as the true interpretation 
 of that cipher through which Nature speaks to us 
 figuratively in her beautiful forms. However, in the 
 first place, this immediate interest in .the beautiful 
 is actually not common ; but is peculiar to those 
 whose mental disposition either has already been 
 cultivated in the direction of the good or is emi- 
 nently susceptible of such cultivation. In that case 
 the analogy between the pure judgment of taste 
 which, independently of any interest, causes us to 
 feel a satisfaction, and also represents it a prio7'i 
 as suitable to humanity in general, and the moral 
 judgment that does the same thing from concepts 
 without any clear, subtle, and premeditated reflec- 
 tion — this analog}^ leads to a similar immediate 
 interest in the objects of the former as in those of 
 the latter ; only that in the one case the interest 
 is free, in the other it is based on objective laws. 
 To this is to be added our admiration for Nature, 
 which displays itself in its beautiful products as Art, 
 not m.erely by chance, but as it were designedly, 
 in accordance with a regular arrangement, and as 
 purposiveness without purpose. This latter, as we 
 never meet with it outside ourselves, we naturally 
 seek in ourselves ; and, in fact, in that which 
 constitutes the ultimate purpose of our being, viz, 
 our moral destination. (Of this question as to the
 
 Div. I ? 42 THE CHARMS OF NATURE iSi 
 
 ground of the possibility of such natural purposive- 
 ness we shall first speak in the Teleology.) 
 
 It is easy to explain why the satisfaction in the 
 pure sesthetical judgment in the case of beautiful Art 
 is not combined with an immediate interest as it is 
 in the case of beautiful Nature. For the former is 
 either such an imitation of the latter that it reaches 
 the point of deception and then produces the same 
 effect as natural beauty (for which it is taken) ; or 
 it is an art obviously directed designedly -to our 
 satisfaction. In the latter case the satisfaction in the 
 product would, it is true, be brought about immedi- 
 ately by taste, but it would be only a mediate interest 
 in the cause lying at its root, viz. an art that can 
 only interest by means of its purpose and never in 
 itself. It will, perhaps, be said that this is also 
 the case, if an Object of nature interests us by its 
 beauty only so far as it is associated with a moral 
 Idea. But it is not the Object itself which im- 
 mediatelv interests us, but its character in virtue 
 of which it is qualified for such association, which 
 therefore essentially belongs to it. 
 
 The charms in beautiful Nature, which are so 
 often found, as it were, fused with beautiful forms, 
 may be referred to modifications either of light 
 (colours) or of sound (tones). For these are the only 
 sensations that imply not merely a sensible feeling 
 but also reflection upon the form of these modifications 
 of Sense ; and thus they involve in themselves as 
 it were a language by which nature speaks to us. 
 which thus seems to have a higher sense. Thus the 
 white colour of lilies seems to determine the mind 
 to Ideas of innocence ; and the seven colours in 
 order from the red to the violet seem to suggest the 
 Ideas of (i) Sublimity, (2) Intrepidity, (3) Candour,
 
 l82 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 (4) Friendliness, (5) Modesty, (6) Constancy, (7) 
 Tenderness. The song of birds proclaims glad- 
 someness and contentment with existence. At least 
 so we interpret nature, whether it have this design 
 or not. But the interest which we here take in 
 beauty has only to do with the beauty of Nature ; 
 it vanishes altogether as soon as we notice that we 
 are deceived and that it is only Art — vanishes so 
 completely that taste can no longer find the thing 
 beautiful or sigfht find it charminfr. What is 
 more highly praised by poets than the bewitching and 
 beautiful note of the nightingale in a lonely copse 
 on a still summer evening by the soft light of the 
 moon ? And yet we have instances of a merry host, 
 where no such songster was to be found, deceiving 
 to their great contentment the guests who were 
 staying with him to enjoy the country air, by hiding 
 in a bush a mischievous boy who knew how to 
 produce this sound exactly like nature (by means of 
 a reed or a tube in his mouth). But as soon as we 
 are aware that it is a cheat, no one will remain 
 long listening to the song which before was counted 
 so charming. And it is just the same with the 
 songs of all other birds. It must be Nature or be 
 regarded as Nature, if we are to take an immediate 
 intc7'cst in the Beautiful as such ; and still more is 
 this the case if we can require that others should 
 take an interest in it too. This happens as a matter 
 of fact when we regard as coarse and ignoble the 
 mental attitude of those persons who have no feeling 
 for beautiful Nature (for thus we describe a suscep- 
 tibility to interest in its contemplation), and who 
 confine themselves to eating and drinking — to the 
 mere enjoyments of sense.
 
 Div. I § 43 ART AND NATURE 183 
 
 § 43. Of Art 171 general 
 
 (i). Art'i?, distinguished from Nature, as doing- 
 [facere) is distinguished from acting or working 
 generally {age)^e), and as the product or result of the 
 former is distinguished as laork {opus) from the 
 working {effectus) of the latter. 
 
 By right we ought only to describe as Art, 
 production through freedom, i.e. through a will 
 that places Reason at the basis of its actions. 
 For although we like to call the product of bees 
 (regularly built cells of wax) a work of art, this is 
 only by way of analogy : as soon as we feel that this 
 work of theirs is based on no proper rational 
 deliberation, we say that it is a product of Nature 
 (of instinct), and as Art only ascribe it to their 
 Creator, 
 
 If, as sometimes happens, in searching through 
 a bog we come upon a bit of shaped wood, we do not 
 say : this is a product of Nature, but, of Art. Its 
 producing cause has conceived a purpose to which 
 the plank owes its form. Elsewhere too we should see 
 art in everything which is made so that a representa- 
 tion of it in its cause must have preceded its actual 
 existence (as even in the case of the bees), .though 
 without the effect of it even being capable of being 
 ihoitght. But if we call anything absolutely a work 
 of art in order to distinguish it from a natural effect, 
 we always understand by that a work of man. 
 
 (2). A7't regarded as human skill differs from 
 science (as can from hiow) as a practical faculty does 
 from a theoretical, as Technic does from Theory (as 
 mensuration from geometry). And so what we can 
 do, as soon as we merely know what ought to be
 
 iS4 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 done and therefore are sufficiently coQ;nisant of the 
 desired effect, is not called Art. Only that which 
 a man, eyen if he knows it completely, may not 
 therefore have the skill to accomplish, belongs 
 to Art. Camper^ describes yery exactly how the 
 best shoes must be made, but he certainly could 
 
 — = not make one." 
 
 (3). Art also differs from Jiandicraft ; the first is 
 called y)r£', the other may be called mercenary. We 
 regard the first as if it could only prove purposive 
 as play, i.e. as occupation that is pleasant in itself. 
 But the second is regarded as if it could only be com- 
 pulsorily imposed upon one as work, i.e. as occupa- 
 tion which is unpleasant (a trouble) in itself, and 
 which is only attractive on account of its effect {e.g., 
 the wage). Whether or not in the grade of the 
 professions we ought to count watchmakers as 
 artists, but smiths only as handicraftsmen, would 
 require another point of view from which to judge 
 than that which we are here taking up ; viz. [we 
 should have to consider] the proportion of talents 
 which must be assumed requisite in these several 
 occupations. Whether or not, again, under the so- 
 called seven free arts some may be included which 
 ous^ht to be classed as sciences, and many that are 
 akin rather to handicraft, I shall not here discuss. 
 But it is not inexpedient to recall that in all free 
 arts there is yet requisite something compulsory, 
 
 ^ or, as it is called, uiechanisni, without which the 
 
 ^ [Peter Camper (1722-1789), a celebrated naturalist and com- 
 parative anatomist ; for some years professor at Groningen.] 
 
 - In my country a common man, if you propose to him such a 
 problem as that of Columbus with his e^^g, says, that is not art, it is 
 only science. I.e. if we know how, we can do it ; and he says the 
 same of all the pretended arts of jugglers. On the other hand, he 
 will not refuse to apply the term art to the performance of a rope- 
 dancer.
 
 Div. I §44 FINE ART 1S5 
 
 Spirit, which must be free in art and which alone 
 inspires the work, would have no body and would 
 evaporate altogether; e.g., in poetry there must be 
 an accuracy and wealth of language, and also 
 prosody and measure. [It is not inexpedient, I say, 
 to recall this], for many modern educators believe 
 that the best way to produce a free art is to remove 
 it from all constraint, and thus to chancre it from 
 work into mere play. 
 
 §44. Of beatUiful Art 
 
 There is no Science of the Beautiful, but only a 
 Kritik of it ; and there is no such thing as beautiful 
 Science, but only beautiful Art. For as regards the 
 first point, if it could be decided scientifically, i.e. by 
 proofs, whether a thing was to be regarded as beauti- 
 ful or not, the judgment upon beauty would belong 
 to science and would not be a judgment of taste. 
 And as far as the second point is concerned, a 
 science which should be beautiful as such is a 
 nonentity. For if in such a science we were to ask 
 for grounds and proofs, we would be put off with 
 tasteful phrases (bon-mots). — The source of the 
 common expression, beautiful science, is without 
 doubt nothing else than this, as it has been rightly 
 remarked, that for beautiful art in its entire complete- 
 ness much science is requisite ; e.g. a knowledge of 
 ancient languages, a learned familiarity with classical 
 authors, history, a knowledge of antiquities, 
 etc. And hence these historical sciences, because 
 they form the necessary preparation and basis for 
 beautiful art, and also partly because under 
 them is included the knowledge of the products of 
 beautiful art (rhetoric and poetry), have come to
 
 1 86 R'ANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 be called beautiful sciences by a transposition of 
 words. 
 
 If art which is adequate to the cognition of a 
 possible object performs the actions requisite there- 
 for merely in order to make it actual, it is mechanical 
 art ; but if it has for its immediate design the feeling 
 of pleasure, it is called cEstJietical art. This is again 
 either pleasant or beautiful. It is the first, if its 
 purpose is that the pleasure should accompany the 
 representations [of the object] regarded as mere 
 sensations ; it is the second if they are regarded as 
 modes of cognition. 
 
 Pleasant arts are those that are directed merely 
 to enjoyment. Of this class are all those charming 
 arts that can gratify a company at table ; e.g. the 
 art of telling stories in an entertaining way, of start- 
 ing the company in frank and lively conversation, of 
 raising them by jest and laugh to a certain pitch of 
 merriment ; ^ when, as people say, there may be a 
 great deal of gossip at the feast, but no one will be 
 answerable for what he says, because they are only 
 concerned with momentary entertainment, and not 
 with any permanent material for reflection or subse- 
 quent discussion. (Among these are also to be 
 reckoned the way of arranging the table for enjoy- 
 ment, and, at great feasts, the management of the 
 music. This latter is a wonderful thing. It is meant 
 to dispose to gaiety the minds of the guests, regarded 
 solely as a pleasant noise, without any one paying 
 the least attention to its composition ; and it favours 
 the free conversation of each with his neighbour.) 
 
 ^ [Kant was accustomed to say that the talk at a dinner table 
 should always pass through these three stages — narrative, discussion, 
 and jest ; and punctilious in this, as in all else, he is said to have 
 directed the conversation at his own table accordingly (Wallace's 
 Kant, p. 39).]
 
 Piv. i§45 ARTIFICIAL BEAUTY 187 
 
 Again, to this class belong all games which bring 
 with them no further interest than that of making 
 the time pass imperceptibly. 
 
 On the other hand, beautiful art is a mode of 
 representation which is purposive for itself, and 
 which, although devoid of [definite] purpose, yet 
 furthers the culture of the mental powers in refer- 
 ence to social communication. 
 
 The universal communicability of a pleasure 
 carries with it in its very concept that the plq_asure ^■"""^ 
 is not one of enjoyment, from mere sensation, but 't) 
 
 must be derived from reflection ; and thus sesthetical 
 art, as the art of beauty, has for standard the 
 reflective Judgment and not sensation. 
 
 § 45. Beatitifttl Art is an art, in so far as it seems 
 
 like nature 
 
 In a product of beautiful art we must become 
 conscious that it is Art and not Nature ; but yet the 
 purposiveness in its form must seem to be as free 
 from all constraint of arbitrary rules as if it were a 
 product of mere nature. On this feeling of freedom 
 in the play of our cognitive faculties, which must at 
 the same time be purposive, rests that pleasure 
 which alone is universally communicable, without 
 being based on concepts. Nature is beautiful 
 because it looks like Art ; and Art can only be called 
 beautiful if we are conscious of it as Art while yet it 
 looks like Nature. 
 
 For whether we are dealing with natural or with 
 artificial beauty we can say generally : That is beauti- 
 ful which pleases in the mere act of jzidging it (not 
 in the sensation of it, or by means of a concept). 
 Now art has always a definite design of producing
 
 I.^ ^^ 
 
 1 88 KANTS K KIT IK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 something. But if this something were bare sensa- 
 tion (something merely subjective), which is to be 
 accompanied with pleasure, the product would please 
 in the act of judgment only by mediation of sensible 
 feeling. And again, if the design were directed 
 towards the production of a definite Object, then, 
 if this were attained by art, the Object would only 
 please by means of concepts. But in both cases the 
 art would not please in the mere act of judging ; i.e. 
 it would not please as beautiful, but as mechanical. 
 
 Hence the purposiveness in the product of beauti- 
 ful art, although it is designed, must not seem to be 
 designed ; i.e. beautiful art must look like nature, 
 
 \/ althouorh we are conscious of it as art. But 
 
 *& 
 
 a 
 
 product of art appears like nature when, although its 
 agreement with the rules, according to which alone 
 the product can become what it ought to be, isptmc- 
 tilio2isIy observed, yet this is not /^zV/y?///)' apparent; 
 [the form of the schools does not obtrude itself]^ — it 
 shows no trace of the rule having been before the eyes 
 of the artist and having fettered his mental powers. 
 
 \ 46. BemUiful Art is the art of genins 
 
 ^ Genius is the talent (or natural gift) which gives 
 the rule to Art. Since talent, as the innate productive 
 faculty of the artist, belongs itself to Nature, we may 
 express the matter thus : Genius is the innate mental 
 disposition {ingeniuni) thro7igh which Nature gives 
 the rule to Art. 
 
 Whatever may be thought of this definition, 
 whether it is merely arbitrary or whether it is 
 adequate to the concept that we are accustomed to 
 combine with the word genius (which is to be 
 
 ^ [Second Edition.] 
 
 X
 
 Div. I § 46 GENIUS 189 
 
 examined in the following paragraphs), we can 
 prove already beforehand that according to the 
 signification of the word here adopted, beautiful arts 
 must necessarily be considered as arts oi genius. 
 
 For every art presupposes rules by means of 
 which in the first instance a product, if it is to be 
 called artistic, is represented as possible. But the 
 concept of beautiful art does not permit the 
 judgment upon the beauty of a product to be 
 derived from any rule, which has a concept as its 
 determining ground, and therefore has at its basis a 
 concept of the way in which the product is possible. 
 Therefore, beautiful art cannot itself devise the rule ^^^ 
 according to which it can bring about its product. 
 But since at the same time a product can never be 
 called Art without some precedent rule, Nature in t--" 
 the subject must (by the harmony of its faculties) 
 give the rule to Art; i.e. beautiful Art is only possible 
 as a product of Genius. 
 
 We thus see (i) that genius is a talent for\ 
 producing that for which no definite rule can be ^ 
 given ; it is not a mere aptitude for what can be j 
 learnt by a rule. Hence originality must be its 
 first property. (2) But since it also can produce 
 original nonsense, its products must be models, i.e. ■ ^ 
 exemplary ; and they consequently ought not to 
 spring from imitation, but must serve as a standard 
 or rule of judgment for others. (3) It cannot ! 
 describe or indicate scientifically how it brings about; ^ 
 its products, but it gives the rule just as nature 
 does. /Hence the author of a product for which he 
 is indebted to his genius does not know himself 
 how he has come by his Ideas ; and he has not the 
 power to devise the like at pleasure or in accordance 
 with a plan, and to communicate it to others in
 
 190 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 precepts that will enable them to produce similar 
 products. (Hence it is probable that the word 
 genius is derived from genius, that peculiar guiding 
 and guardian spirit giv^en to a man at his birth, from 
 whose suggestion these original Ideas proceed.) 
 (4) Nature by the medium of genius does not 
 prescribe rules to Science, but to Art ; and to it 
 only in so far as it is to be beautiful Art. 
 
 § 47. EhLcidation and conji^'ination of the above 
 explanation of Genitis 
 
 Every one is agreed that genius is entirely 
 opposed to the spirit of imitation. Now since 
 learninof is nothinor but imitation, it follows that 
 the greatest ability and teachableness (capacity) 
 regarded qiid teachableness, cannot avail for genius. 
 Even if a man thinks or composes for himself, and 
 does not merely take in what others have taught, 
 even if he discovers many things in art and science, 
 this is not the rio;-ht oround for callino- such a 
 (perhaps great) head, a genius (as opposed to him 
 who because he can only learn and imitate is called 
 a shallozv-pate). For even these things could be 
 learned, they lie in the natural path of him who 
 investigates and reflects according to rules ; and 
 they do not differ specifically from what can be 
 acquired by industry through imitation. Thus we 
 can readily learn all that Neiuton has set forth in his 
 immortal work on the Principles of Natural 
 Philosophy, however great a head was required to 
 discover it ; but we cannot learn to write spirited 
 poetry, however express may be the precepts of the 
 art and however excellent its models. The reason 
 is that Newton could make all his steps, from the
 
 Div. I § 47 ART AND SCIENCE 191 
 
 first elements of geometry to his own great and 
 profound discoveries, intuitively plain and definite 
 as regards consequence, not only to himself but to 
 every one else. But a HomeT" or a IVieland cannot 
 show how his Ideas, so rich in fancy and yet so full q ^ 
 of thought, come together in his head, simply 
 because he does not know and therefore cannot 
 teach others. In Science then the greatest 
 discoverer only differs in degree from his laborious 
 imitator and pupil ; but he differs specifically from 
 him whom Nature has gifted for beautiful Art. 
 And in this there is no depreciation of those great 
 men to whom the human race owes so much 
 gratitude, as compared with nature's favourites in 
 respect of the talent for beautiful art. For in the 
 fact that the former talent is directed to the ever- 
 advancing greater perfection of knowledge and 
 every advantage depending on it, and at the same 
 time to the imparting this same knowledge to 
 others — in this it has a great superiority over [the 
 talent of] those who deserve the honour of being 
 called oreniuses. For art stands still at a certain 
 point ; a boundary is set to it beyond which it 
 cannot go, which presumably has been reached long 
 ] ao-o and cannot be extended further. Ao-ain, 
 1 artistic skill cannot be communicated ; it is imparted 
 to every artist immediately by the hand of nature ; 
 and so it dies with him, until nature endows another "^^ 
 in the same way, so that he only needs an example 
 ; in order to put in operation in a similar fashion the 
 talent of which he is conscious. 
 
 If now it is a natural gift which must prescribe 
 its rule to art (as beautiful art), of what kind is this 
 rule ? It cannot be reduced to a formula and serve 
 as a precept, for then the judgment upon the
 
 ^ 
 
 \<iZ KANTS KKITIK OF JUDGMENT parti 
 
 beautiful would be determinable accordinof to 
 concepts ; but the rule must be abstracted from the 
 fact, i.e. from the product, on which others may try 
 their own talent by using it as a model, not to be 
 copied but to be imitated. How this Is possible is 
 hard to explain. The Ideas of the artist excite like 
 Ideas in his pupils if nature has endowed them with 
 a like proportion of their mental powers. Hence 
 models of beautiful art are the only means of 
 handing down these Ideas to posterity. This 
 cannot be done by mere descriptions, especially not 
 in the case of the arts of speech, and in this latter 
 classical models are only to be had in the old dead 
 languages, now preserved only as "the learned 
 languages." 
 
 ^ Although mechanical and beautiful art are very 
 different, the first being a mere art of industry and 
 learning and the second of genius, yet there is no 
 beautiful art in which there is not a mechanical 
 element that can be comprehended by rules and 
 followed accordingly, and in which therefore there 
 must be something scholastic as an essential 
 condition. For [in every art] some purpose must 
 be conceived ; otherwise we could not ascribe the 
 product to art at all, it would be a mere product of 
 chance. But in order to accomplish a purpose, 
 definite rules from which we cannot dispense 
 ourselves are requisite. Now since the originality 
 of the talent constitutes an essential (though not the 
 only) element in the character of genius, shallow 
 heads believe that they cannot better show them- 
 selves to be full-blown geniuses than by throwing 
 off the constraint of all rules ; they believe, in effect, 
 that one could make a braver show on the back of 
 a wild horse than on the back of a trained animal.
 
 Div. I § 48 TASTE AND GENIUS 193 
 
 Genius can only furnish rich material for products? 
 of beautiful art ; its execution and its form require 
 talent cultivated in the schools, in order to make 
 such a use of this material as will stand examination , 
 by the Judgment. But it is quite ridiculous for a 
 man to speak and decide like a genius in things 
 which require the most careful investigation by 
 Reason. One does not know whether to lauofh 
 more at the impostor who spreads such a mist round 
 him that we cannot clearly use our Judgment and 
 so use our Imagination the more, or at the 'public 
 which naively imagines that his inability to cognise 
 clearly and to comprehend the masterpiece before 
 him arises from new truths crowding in on him in 
 such abundance that details (duly weighed definitions 
 and accurate examination of fundamental proposi- 
 tions) seem but clumsy work. 
 
 § 48. Of the relation of Genius to Taste 
 
 For judging of beautiful objects as such taste 
 is requisite ; but for beautiful art, i.e. for th.& produc- 
 tion of such objects, genius is requisite. 
 
 If we consider grenius as the talent for beautiful 
 art (which the special meaning of the word implies) 
 and in this point of view analyse it into the faculties 
 which must concur to constitute such a talent, it is 
 necessary in the first instance to determine exactly 
 the difference between natural beauty, the judging 
 of which requires only Taste, and artificial beauty, 
 the possibility of which (to which reference must be 
 made in judging such an object) requires Genius. ^ 
 
 A natural beauty is a beautiful thing ; artificial \ .^l^ 
 beauty is a beautifcl representation of a thing. _^ -1 
 
 In order to judge of a natural beauty as such ''^^^ f^ 
 
 ° 2- 

 
 \y 
 
 ^ 
 
 194 KANT'S KKITIK OF JUDGMENT parti 
 
 I need not have beforehand a concept of what sort 
 of thing the object is to be ; i.e. I need not know 
 its material purposiveness (the purpose), but its 
 mere form pleases by itself in the act of judging 
 it without any knowledge of the purpose. n3ut if 
 the object is given as a product of art, and as such 
 is to be declared beautiful, then, because art always 
 supposes a purpose in the cause (and its causality), 
 there must be at bottom in the first instance a 
 concept of what the thing is to bej And as the 
 agreement of the manifold in a thing with its inner 
 destination, its purpose, constitutes the perfection 
 of the thing, it follows that in judging of artificial 
 beauty the perfection of the thing must be taken 
 into account ; but in judging of natural beauty 
 (as S2icJi) there is no question at all about this. — 
 It is true that in judging of objects of nature, especi- 
 ally objects endowed with life, e.g. a man or a horse, 
 their objective purposiveness also is commonly taken 
 into consideration in judging of their beauty ; but 
 then the judgment is no longer purely aesthetical, 
 i.e. a mere judgment of taste. Nature is no longer 
 judged inasmuch as it appears like art, but in so 
 l^far as it is actual (although superhuman) art ; and 
 / the teleological judgment serves as the basis and 
 condition of the aesthetical, as a condition to which 
 the latter must have respect. In such a case, e.g. if 
 it is said "that is a beautiful woman," we think 
 nothing else than this : nature represents in her 
 figure the purposes in view in the shape of a woman's 
 figure. For we must look beyond the mere form to 
 a concept, if the object is to be thought in such a 
 way by means of a logically conditioned aesthetical 
 judgment. 
 
 Beautiful art shows its superiority in this, that
 
 Div. I §48 THE UGLY IN ART 195 
 
 it describes as beautiful things which may be in 
 nature ugly or displeasing,-^ / The Furies, diseases, 
 the devastations of war, etc., may [even regarded 
 as calamitous],^ be described as very beautiful, as 
 they are represented in a picture. There is only\ 
 one kind of ugliness which cannot be represented '| 
 in accordance with nature, without destroying all / 
 sesthetical satisfaction and consequently artificial 
 beauty ; viz. that which excites disgu st..^ For in 
 this singular sensation, which rests on mere imagina- 
 tion, the object is represented as it were obtruding 
 itself for our enjoyment while we strive against it 
 with all our might. And the artistic representation 
 of the object is no longer distinguished from the 
 nature of the object itself in our sensation, and thus 
 it is impossible that it can be regarded as beautiful. 
 The art of sculpture again, because in its products 
 art is almost interchangeable with nature, excludes 
 from its creations the immediate representation of 
 ugly objects ; e.g. it represents death by a beautiful 
 genius, the warlike spirit by Mars, and permits 
 [all such things] to be represented only by an 
 allegory or attribute^ that has a pleasing effect, 
 and thus only indirectly by the aid of the interpret- 
 ation of Reason, and not for the mere aesthetical 
 Judgment. 
 
 1 [Cf. Aristotle's Poetics, c. iv. p. 1448 b: a yap ai'To. Ai'-j;pws 
 opw/iev, toi'twv ras ei/covas toLs /AaAtcTTa •j^Kpt^co/xevas \o.ipoiJi.^v de(j}~ 
 povvres olov Oqp'iwv re /^lopt^as rwv drt/xoTarwv /cat veKpwv. Cf. also 
 Rhetoric^ I. 11, p- 1371 b; and Burke on the Sublime and Beautiful., 
 Part I. § 16. Boileau {L'art poetique, chant 3), makes a similar ob- 
 servation : 
 
 " II nest point de serpent ni de monstre odieux 
 Qui, par Tart imit(f, ne puisse plaire aux yeux. 
 D'un pinceau delicat Tartifice agreable 
 Du plus affreux objet fait un objet aimable."] 
 
 2 [Second Edition.] ^ [Cf. p. 199 infra.'\
 
 196 A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT tart i 
 
 ^ 
 
 p 
 
 So much for the beautiful representation of an 
 object, which is properly only the form of the pre- 
 sentation of a concept, by means of which this latter 
 is communicated universally. — But to give this 
 form to the product of beautiful art, mere taste is 
 requisite. By taste the artist estimates his work 
 after he has exercised and corrected it by manifold 
 examples from art or nature ; and after many, often 
 toilsome, attempts to content himself he finds that 
 form which satisfies him. Hence this form is not, 
 as it were, a thing of inspiration or the result of a 
 free swing of the mental powers, but of a slow and 
 even painful process of improvement, by which he 
 seeks to render it adequate to his thought, without 
 detriment to the freedom of the play of his powers. 
 /. But taste is merely a judging and not a produc- 
 ; tive faculty ; and what is appropriate to it is therefore 
 not a work of beautiful art. j It can only be a product 
 belonging to useful and mechanical art or even to 
 science, produced according to definite rules that 
 can be learned and must be exactly followed. But 
 the pleasing form that is given to it is only the 
 vehicle of communication, and a mode, as it were, 
 of presenting it, in respect of which we remain free 
 to a certain extent, although it is combined with 
 a definite purpose. Thus we desire that table 
 appointments, a moral treatise, even a sermon, 
 should have in themselves this form of beautiful 
 art, without it seeming to be sought : but we do 
 not therefore call these things works of beautiful art. 
 Under the latter class are reckoned a poem, a piece 
 of music, a picture gallery, etc. ; and in some works 
 of this kind asserted to be works of beautiful art we 
 find genius without taste, while in others we find 
 
 taste without genius.
 
 Div. I 1 49 SPIRIT 197 
 
 § 49. Of the faculties of the mind that constittUe 
 
 Genius 
 
 We say of certain products of which we expect 
 that they should at least in part appear as beautiful 
 art, they are without spirit^; although we find nothing 
 to blame in them on the score of taste. A poem 
 may be very neat and elegant, but without spirit. 
 A history may be exact and well arranged, but 
 without spirit. A festal discourse may be solid and 
 at the same time elaborate, but without spirit. 
 Conversation is often not devoid of entertainment, 
 but it is without spirit : even of a woman we say 
 that she is pretty, an agreeable talker, and courteous, 
 but without spirit. What then do we mean by 
 spirit ? 
 
 Spirit, in an aesthetical sense, is the name given 
 to the animating principle of the mind. But that 
 by means of which this principle animates the soul, 
 the material which it applies to that [purpose], is what 
 puts the mental powers purposively into swing, i.e. 
 into such a play as maintains itself and strengthens 
 the mental powers in their exercise. 
 
 Now I maintain that this principle is no other t--^ 
 than the faculty of presenting cssthetical Ideas. And 
 by an aesthetical Idea I understand that representation 
 of the Imaofination which occasions much thought, 
 without, however, any definite thought, i.e. any concept, ^ rj 
 
 being capable of being adequate to it ; it conse- 
 quently cannot be completely compassed and made 
 intelligible by language. — We easily see that it is 
 the counterpart (pendant) of a rational Idea ; which 
 
 1 [In English we would rather say "without soul" ; but I prefer 
 to translate Geist consistently by spirit, to avoid the confusion of it 
 with Seele^ 
 
 ^
 
 iqS KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part I 
 
 conversely is a concept to which no intuition (or 
 representation of the Imagination) can be adequate. 
 The Imagination (as a productive faculty of 
 cognition) is very powerful in creating another 
 nature, as it were, out of the material that actual 
 nature gives it. We entertain ourselves with it 
 when experience becomes too commonplace, and 
 by it we remould experience, always indeed in 
 ^ accordance with analogical laws, but yet also in 
 accordance with principles which occupy a higher 
 place in Reason (laws too which are just as natural 
 to us as those by which Understanding comprehends 
 empirical nature). Thus we feel our freedom from 
 the law of association (which attaches to the em- 
 pirical employment of Imagination), so that the 
 material supplied to us by nature in accordance with 
 this law can be worked up into something different 
 which surpasses nature. 
 
 Such representations of the Imagination we may 
 call Ideas, partly because they at least strive after 
 something which lies beyond the bounds of experi- 
 ence, and so seek to approximate to a presentation of 
 concepts of Reason (intellectual Ideas), thus giving 
 to the latter the appearance of objective reality, — 
 but especially because no concept can be fully ade- 
 quate to them as internal intuitions. The poet ven- 
 tures to realise to sense, rational Ideas of invisible 
 beings, the kingdom of the blessed, hell, eternity, 
 creation, etc. ; or even if he deals with things of 
 which there are examples in experience, — e.g. death, 
 envy and all vices, also love, fame, and the like, — 
 he tries, by means of Imagination, which emulates 
 the play of Reason in its quest after a maximum, 
 to go beyond the limits of experience and to present 
 them to Sense with a completeness of which there
 
 Div. i§49 ^STHETICAL ATTRIBUTES 199 
 
 is no example in nature. This is properly speaking 
 the art of the poet, in which the faculty of sesthetical ' 
 Ideas can manifest itself in its entire strength. But 
 this faculty, considered in itself, is properly only a 
 talent (of the Imagination). 
 
 If now we place under a concept a representa- \ 
 tion of the Imagination belonging to its presentation, \ 
 but which occasions in itself more thought than can j 
 ever be comprehended in a definite concept, and / 
 which consequently aesthetically enlarges the con- / 
 cept itself in an unbounded fashion, the Imagination 
 is here creative, and it brings the faculty of intel- 
 lectual Ideas (the Reason) into movement ; i.e. by 
 a representation more thought (which indeed belongs 
 to the concept of the object) is occasioned than can , 
 in it be grasped or made clear. ' 
 
 Those forms which do not constitute the presenta- 
 tion of a given concept itself but only, as approxi- 
 mate representations of the Imagination, express the 
 consequences bound up with it and its relationship 
 to other concepts, are called (sesthetical) attribiUes of 
 an object, whose concept as a rational Idea cannot 
 be adequately presented. Thus Jupiter's eagle with 
 the lightning in its claws is an attribute of the 
 mighty king of heaven, as the peacock is of his 
 magnificent queen. They do not, like logical attri- ^ 
 
 biites, represent what lies in our concepts of the 
 sublimity and majesty of creation, but something 
 different, which gives occasion to the Imagination to 
 spread itself over a number of kindred representa- 
 tions, that arouse more thought than can be expressed 
 in a concept determined by words. They furnish ^^ 
 an (^st helical Idea, which for that rational Idea takes 
 the place of logical presentation ; and thus as their 
 proper office they enliven the mind by opening out
 
 200 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT parti 
 
 to it the prospect into an illimitable field of kindred 
 representations. But beautiful art does this not only 
 in the case of painting or sculpture (in which the 
 term "attribute" is commonly employed): poetry 
 and rhetoric also get the spirit that animates their 
 works simply from the sesthetical attributes of the 
 object, which accompany the logical and stimulate 
 the Imagination, so that it thinks more by their aid, 
 although in an undeveloped way, than could be com- 
 prehended in a concept and therefore in a definite 
 form of words. — For the sake of brevity I must 
 limit myself to a few examples only. 
 
 When the great King ^ in one of his poems 
 expresses himself as follows : 
 
 " Oui, finissons sans trouble et mourons sans regrets, 
 En laissant I'univers comble de nos bienfaits. 
 Ainsi I'astre du jour au bout de sa carriere, 
 Repand sur I'horizon une douce lumiere ; 
 Et les derniers rayons qu'il darde dans les airs, 
 Sont les derniers soupirs qu'il donne a I'univers ; " 
 
 he quickens his rational Idea of a cosmopolitan 
 disposition at the end of life by an attribute which 
 the Imagination (in remembering all the pleasures of 
 a beautiful summer day that are recalled at its close 
 by a serene evening) associates with that representa- 
 tion, and which excites a number of sensations and 
 secondary representations for which no expression 
 is found. On the other hand, an intellectual concept 
 may serve conversely as an attribute for a represent- 
 ation of sense and so can quicken this latter by 
 means of the Idea of the supersensible ; but only by 
 
 ^ [Bami quotes these lines as occurring in one of Frederick the 
 Great's French poems : " Epitre au mar^chal Keith, sur les vaines 
 terreurs de la mort et les frayeurs d'une autre vie;" but I have not 
 been able to verify his reference. Kant here translates them into 
 German.]
 
 Div. I § 49 JESTHETICAL IDEAS 201 
 
 the sestheticai [element], that subjectively attaches 
 to the concept of the latter, being here employed. 
 Thus, for example, a certain poet^ says, in his 
 description of a beautiful morning : 
 
 " The sun arose 
 As calm from virtue springs." 
 
 The consciousness of virtue, if we substitute it in 
 our thoughts for a virtuous man, diffuses in the mind 
 a multitude of sublime and restful feelino-s and a 
 boundless prospect of a joyful future, to which no 
 expression that is measured by a definite concept 
 completely attains.- I 
 
 In a word the sestheticai Idea is a representation"^ 
 of the Imagination associated with a given concept, 
 which is bound up with such a multiplicity of partial 
 representations in its free employment, that for it no 
 expression marking a definite concept can be found ; ) ^ 
 and such a representation, therefore, adds to a 
 concept much ineffable thought, the feeling of which / 
 quickens the cognitive faculties, and with language, 1 
 which is the mere letter, binds up spirit also. / 
 
 The mental powers, therefore, whose union (in a 
 certain relation) constitutes genius are Imagination 
 and Understanding. In the employment of the 
 Imagination for cognition it submits to the constraint 
 of the Understanding and is subject to the limitation 
 
 1 [I have not been able to identify this poet.] 
 
 2 Perhaps nothing more sublime was ever said and no sublimer 
 thought ever expressed than the famous inscription on the Temple of 
 his (Mother Nature) : " I am all that is and that was and that shall 
 be, and no mortal hath lifted my veil." Segner availed himself of 
 this Idea in a suggestive vignette prefixed to his Natural Philosophy, 
 in order to inspire beforehand the pupil whom he was about to lead 
 into that temple with a holy awe, which should dispose his mind to 
 serious attention. [J. A. de Segner (i 704-1 777) was Professor of 
 Natural Philosophy at Gottingen, and the author of several scientific 
 works of repute.]
 
 202 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT parti 
 
 of being conformable to the concept of the latter. 
 On the contrary, in an aesthetical point of view it is 
 free to furnish unsought, over and above that agree- 
 ment with a concept, abundance of undeveloped 
 material for the Understanding ; to which the 
 Understanding paid no regard in its concept, but 
 which it applies, though not objectively for cogni- 
 tion, yet subjectively to quicken the cognitive powers 
 and therefore also indirectly to cognitions. Thus 
 genius properly consists in the happy relation 
 [between these faculties], which no science can teach 
 and no industry can learn, by which Ideas are found 
 for a given concept ; and on the other hand, we thus 
 find for these Ideas the expression, by means of 
 which the subjective state of mind brought about by 
 them, as an accompaniment of the concept, can be 
 communicated to others. The latter talent is pro- 
 perly speaking what is called spirit ; for to express 
 the ineffable element in the state of mind implied by 
 a certain representation and to make it universally 
 communicable — whether the expression be in speech 
 or painting or statuary — this requires a faculty of 
 seizing the quickly passing play of Imagination and 
 of unifying it in a concept (which is even on that 
 account original and discloses a new rule that could 
 not have been inferred from any preceding principles 
 or examples), that can be communicated without any 
 constraint [of rules].^ 
 
 If after this analysis we look back to the explana- 
 tion given above of what is called genius, we find : 
 first, that it is a talent for Art ; not for Science, in 
 which clearly known rules must go beforehand and 
 determine the procedure. Secondly, as an artistic 
 
 1 [Second Edition.]
 
 Div. I §49 CHARACTERISTICS OF GENIUS 203 
 
 talent it presupposes a definite concept of the product, 
 as the purpose, and therefore Understanding; but 
 it also presupposes a representation (although an 
 indeterminate one) of the material, i.e. of the in- 
 tuition, for the presentment of this concept ; and, 
 therefore, a relation between the Imagination and 
 the Understanding. Third/y, it shows itself not so 
 much in the accomplishment of the proposed pur- 
 pose in a presentment of a definite concept, as in the 
 enunciation or expression of csstketical Idea§, which 
 contain abundant material for that very design ; and 
 consequently it represents the Imagination as free 
 from all guidance of rules and yet as purposive in 
 reference to the presentment of the given concept. 
 Finally, in \\\^ fourth place, the unsought undesigned 
 subjective purposiveness in the free accordance of 
 the Imagination with the legality of the Understand- 
 ing presupposes such a proportion and disposition 
 of these faculties as no following of rules, whether 
 of science or of mechanical imitation, can bring 
 about, but which only the nature of the subject can 
 produce. 
 
 In accordance with these suppositions genius is 
 the exemplary originality of the natural gifts of a 
 subject in the free employment of his cognitive 
 faculties. In this way the product of a genius (as 
 regards what is to be ascribed to genius and not to 
 possible learning or schooling) is an example, not 
 to be imitated (for then that which in it is genius 
 and constitutes the spirit of the work would be lost), 
 but to be followed, by another genius ; whom it 
 awakens to a feeling of his own originality and 
 whom it stirs so to exercise his art in freedom from 
 the constraint of rules, that thereby a new rule is 
 gained for art, and thus his talent shows itself to be
 
 204 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 exemplary. But because a genius is a favourite of 
 nature and must be regarded by us as a rare pheno- 
 menon, his example produces for other good heads 
 a school, i.e. a methodical system of teaching accord- 
 ing to rules, so far as these can be derived from the 
 peculiarities of the products of his spirit. For such 
 persons beautiful art is so far imitation, to which 
 nature through the medium of a genius supplied 
 the rule. 
 
 But this imitation becomes a mere aping, if the 
 scholar copies everything down to the deformities, 
 which the genius must have let pass only because 
 he could not well remove them without weakening 
 his Idea. This mental characteristic is meritorious 
 only in the case of a genius. A certain aiidacity in 
 expression — and in general many a departure from 
 common rules — becomes him well, but it is in no way 
 worthy of imitation ; it always remains a fault in 
 itself which we must seek to remove, though the 
 genius is as it were privileged to commit it, because 
 the inimitable rush of his spirit would suffer from 
 over-anxious carefulness. JMannerism is another 
 kind of aping, viz. of xw^x^ peculiarity (originality) in 
 general ; by which a man separates himself as far as 
 possible from imitators, without however possessing 
 the talent to be at the same time exemplary. — 
 There are indeed in general two ways [modi) in 
 which such a man may put together his notions of 
 /expressing himself ; the one is called a manner {inodus 
 cBsthetictis), the other a method {jnodics logicus). They 
 differ in this, that the former has no other standard 
 than xh^ feeling of unity in the presentment, but the 
 latter follows definite principles ; hence the former 
 alone avails for beautiful art. But an artistic pro- 
 duct is said to show mannerism only when the
 
 Div. I § 50 TASTE AND GENIUS 205 
 
 exposition of the artist's Idea is founded on its very 
 singularity, and is not made appropriate to the Idea 
 itself. The ostentatious [prdcieux), contorted, and 
 affected [manner, adopted] to differentiate oneself 
 from ordinary persons (though devoid of spirit) is 
 like the behaviour of a man of whom we say, that 
 he hears himself talk, or who stands and moves 
 about as if he were on a stage in order to be stared 
 at ; this always betrays a bungler. 
 
 § 50. Of the combination of Taste with Genins in 
 the prodzicts of beantifid Art 
 
 To ask whether it is more important for the \ 
 things of beautiful art that Genius or Taste should 
 be displayed, is the same as to ask whether in it 
 more depends on Imagination or on Judgment. 
 Now, since in respect of the first an art is rather i 
 said to be full of spirit, but only deserves to be 
 called a bcantifnl art on account of the second ; 
 this latter is at least, as its indispensable condition 
 {conditio sine qua non), the most important thing 
 to which one has to look in the judging of art as 
 beautiful art. Abundance and originality of Ideas ^ 
 are less necessary to beauty than the accordance 
 of the Imagination in its freedom with the conformity 
 to law of the Understanding. For all the abundance 
 of the former produces in lawless freedom nothing 
 but nonsense ; on the other hand, the Judgment 
 is the faculty by which it is adjusted to the 
 Understanding. 
 
 Taste, like the Judgment in general, is the / 
 discipline (or training) of Genius ; it clips its wings, 
 it makes it cultured and polished ; but, at the same 
 time, it sfives gruidance as to where and how far
 
 2o6 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT parti 
 
 ^ 
 
 it may extend itself, if it is to remain purposive. 
 And while it brings clearness and order into the 
 multitude of the thoughts [of genius], it makes the 
 Ideas susceptible of being permanently and, at the 
 same time, universally assented to, and capable of 
 being followed by others, and of an ever-progressive 
 culture. Vif, then, in the conflict of these two properties 
 in a product something must be sacrificed, it should 
 be rather on the side of genius^,^ and the Judgment, 
 which in the things of beautiful art gives its decision 
 from its own proper principles, will rather sacrifice 
 the freedom and wealth of the ImaQ-ination than 
 permit anything prejudicial to the Understanding. 
 
 For beautiful art, therefore. Imagination, Under- 
 standing, Spirit, and Taste are requisite.^ 
 
 §51. Of the division of the beaiUiful arts 
 
 We may describe beauty in general (whether 
 natural or artificial) as_jh£_^^r^i^^£_ofjesthetical_ 
 Ideas ; only that in beautiful Art this Idea must 
 be occasioned by a concept of the Object ; whilst 
 in beautiful Nature the mere reflection upon a 
 , given intuition, without any concept of what the 
 
 / object is to be, is sufficient for the awakening and 
 
 communicating of the Idea of which that Object 
 is regarded as the expression. 
 
 If, then, we wish to make a division of the 
 
 ^ The three former faculties are united in the first instance by 
 means of the fourth. Hume gives us to understand in his History 
 of England ihdi\. although the English are inferior in their productions 
 to no people in the world as regards the evidences they display of 
 the three former properties, separately considered, yet they must be 
 put after their neighbours the French as regards that which unites 
 these properties'. [In his Observations on the Beautiful and Sublime, 
 § iv. sub init., Kant remarks that the English have the keener sense 
 of the sublime, the French of the beautiful.']
 
 Div. I § 51 THE ARTS OF SPEECH 207 
 
 beautiful arts, we cannot choose a more convenient 
 principle, at least tentatively, than the analogy of 
 art with the mode of expression of which men 
 avail themselves in speech, in order to communicate 
 to one another as perfectly as possible not merely 
 their concepts but also their sensations.^ — This is 
 done by word, deportment, and tone (articulation, 
 gesticulation, and modulation). It is only by the 
 combination of these three kinds of expression that 
 communication between the speaker [and his hearers] 
 can be complete. For thus thought, intuitfon, and 
 sensation are transmitted to others simultaneously 
 and conjointly. 
 
 There are, therefore, only three kinds of beautiful \ 
 arts ; the arts of speech, the formative arts, and the ^ / 
 art of the play of sensations (as external sensible 
 impressions). ) We may also arrange a division by 
 dichotomy ; thus beautiful art may be divided 
 into the art of expression of thoughts and of in- 
 tuitions ; and these further subdivided in accordance 
 with their form or their matter (sensation). But 
 this would appear to be too abstract, and not so 
 accordant with ordinary concepts. 
 
 ( I ) The arts of speech are rhetoric and poetry's 
 Rhetoric is the art of carrying on a serious business . 
 of the Understanding as if it were a free play of ( i/ ^^ ^ 
 the Imagination ; poetry, the art of conducting a 
 free play of the Imagination as if it were a serious 
 business of the Understanding. 
 
 The orator, then, promises a serious business, 
 and in order to entertain his audience conducts it 
 as if it were a mere play with Ideas. The poet 
 
 1 The reader is not to judge this scheme for a possible division 
 of the beautiful arts as a deliberate theory. It is only one of various 
 attempts which we may and ought to devise.
 
 2o8 A- J NT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part I 
 
 merely promises an entertaining play with Ideas, 
 and yet it has the same effect upon the Under- 
 standing as if he had only intended to carry on 
 its business. The combination and harmony of 
 both cognitive faculties, Sensibility and Under-" 
 standing, which cannot dispense with one another, 
 but which yet cannot well be united without con- 
 straint and mutual prejudice, must appear to be un- 
 designed and so to be brought about by themselves : 
 otherwise it is not beautiful art. Hence, all that 
 is studied and anxious must be avoided in it, for 
 beautiful art must be free art in a double sense. 
 It is not a work like a mercenary employment the 
 greatness of which can be judged according to a 
 definite standard, which can be attained or paid 
 for ; and again, though the mind is here occupied, 
 it feels itself thus contented and aroused, without 
 looking to any other purpose (independently of 
 reward). 
 
 The orator therefore gives something which he 
 does not promise, viz. an entertaining play of the 
 Imagination ; but he also fails to supply what he 
 did promise, which is indeed his announced busi- 
 ness, viz. the purposive occupation of the Under- 
 standing. On the other hand, the poet promises 
 little and announces a mere play with Ideas ; but 
 he supplies something which is worth occupying 
 ourselves with, because he provides in this play 
 food for the Understanding, and by the aid of 
 Imagination gives life to his concepts. [Thus the 
 orator on the whole gives less, the poet more, than 
 he promises.]^ 
 
 (2) The FORMATIVE arts, or those by which ex- 
 pression is found for Ideas in sensible intuition (not 
 
 ^ [Second Edition.] 
 
 ij
 
 Div. I § 51 THE FORMATIVE ARTS 209 
 
 by representations of mere Imagination that are 
 aroused by words), are either arts of sensible tritth or 
 of sensible illusion. The former is called Plastic, the 
 latter Painting. Both express Ideas by figures in 
 space ; the former makes figures cognisable by two 
 senses, sight and touch (although not by the latter 
 as far as beauty is concerned) ; the latter only by 
 one, the first of these. The aesthetical Idea (the 
 archetype or original image) is fundamental for both 
 in the Imagination, but the figure which expresses 
 this (the ectype or copy) is either given ""in its 
 bodily extension (as the object itself exists), or as it 
 paints itself on the eye (according to its appearance 
 when projected on a flat surface). In the first case 
 the condition given to reflection may be either the 
 reference to an actual purpose or only the semblance 
 of it. 
 
 To Plastic, the first kind of beautiful formative. 
 Art, belong Sciilptnrc and Architecture. Theyfrj-/ 
 presents corporeally concepts of things, as they 
 might have existed in natztre (though as beautiful art 
 it has regard to aesthetical purposiveness). The 
 second is the art of presenting concepts of things 
 that are possible only through Art, and whose form 
 has for its determining ground not nature but an 
 arbitrary purpose, with the view of presenting them 
 with aesthetical purposiveness. In the latter the 
 chief point is a certain uscjpf the artistic object, by 
 which condition the aesthetical Ideas are limited. 
 In the former the main design is the mere e^pressioii_ 
 of aesthetical Ideas. Thus statues of men, gods, 
 animals, etc., are of the first kind ; but temples, 
 splendid buildings for public assemblies, even 
 dwelling - houses, triumphal arches, columns, mau- 
 soleums, and the like, erected in honourable remem- 
 
 p
 
 210 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT parti 
 
 brance, belong to Architecture. Indeed all house 
 furniture (upholsterer's work and such like things 
 which are for use) may be reckoned under this art ; 
 because the suitability of a product for a certain use is 
 the essential thino; in an architectural u'ork. On the 
 other hand, a n\e.Te. piece of sculpture, which is simply 
 made for show and which is to please in itself, is as 
 ^ a corporeal presentation a mere imitation of nature, 
 though with a reference to sesthetical Ideas ; in it 
 sensible truth is not to be carried so far that the 
 product ceases to look like art and looks like a pro- 
 duct of the elective will, 
 
 ' Paintitig, as the second kind of formative art, 
 which presents 2i sensible illusion artificially combined 
 with Ideas, I would divide into the art of the 
 ^ beautiful depicting of nature and that of the beautiful 
 arrangeynent of its l>roducts. The first is paintifig 
 proper, the second is the art of landscape gardening. 
 The first gives only the illusor\' appearance of 
 corporeal extension ; the second gives this in 
 accordance with truth, but only the appearance of 
 utility and availableness for other purposes than the 
 mere play of the Imagination in the contemplation 
 of its forms.^ This latter is nothinsf else than the 
 
 o 
 
 1 That landscape gardening may be regarded as a species of 
 the art of painting, although it presents its forms corporeally, seems 
 strange. But since it actually takes its forms from nature (trees, 
 shrubs, grasses, and flowers from forest and field — at least in the first 
 instance), and so far is not an art like Plastic ; and since it also has 
 no concept of the object and its purpose (as in Architecture) con- 
 ditioning its arrangements, but involves merely the free play of the 
 Imagination in contemplation, — it so far agrees with mere sesthetical 
 painting which has no definite theme (which arranges sk>', land, and 
 water, so as to entertain us by means of light and shade only). — In 
 general the reader is only to judge of this as an attempt to combine 
 the beautiful arts under one principle, \\z. that of the expression of 
 aesthetical Ideas (according to the analogy of speech), and not to 
 regard it as a definitive analysis of them.
 
 Div. I f 51 PAINTING 211 
 
 ornamentation of the soil with a variety of those 
 things (grasses, flowers, shrubs, trees, even ponds, 
 hillocks, and dells) which nature presents to an 
 observer, only arranged differently and in conformity 
 with certain Ideas. But, again, the beautiful arrange- 
 ment of corporeal things is only apparent to the eye, 
 like painting ; the sense of touch cannot supply any 
 intuitive presentation of such a form. Under paint- 
 ing in the wide sense I would reckon the decoration 
 of rooms by the aid of tapestr}^ bric-a-brac, and all 
 beautiful furniture which is merely available to be 
 looked at ; and the same may be said of the art of 
 tasteful dressing (with rings, snuff-boxes, etc.). For 
 a bed of various flowers, a room filled with various 
 ornaments (including under this head even ladies' 
 finen,^), make at a fete a kind of picture ; which, like 
 pictures properly so called (that are not intended to 
 teach either history or natural science), has in \aew 
 merelv the entertainment of the Imaofination in free 
 play with Ideas, and the occupation of the aesthetical 
 Judgment without any definite purpose. The 
 detailed work in all this decoration may be quite 
 distinct in the different cases and may require 
 very different artists ; but the judgment of taste 
 upon whatever is beautiful in these various arts is 
 always determined in the same wa\^ : viz. it only 
 judges the forms (without any reference to a 
 purpose) as they present themselves to the eye 
 either singly or in combination, according to the 
 effect they produce upon the Imagination. — But 
 that formative art may be compared (by analog}-) 
 with deportment in speech is justified by the fact 
 that the spirit of the artist supplies by these figures 
 a bodily expression to his thought and its mode, and 
 makes the thing itself as it were speak in mimic
 
 212 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT parti 
 
 language. This is a very common play of our 
 fancy, which attributes to lifeless things a spirit 
 suitable to their form by which they speak to us. 
 
 (3) The art of the beautiful play of sensa- 
 tions (externally produced), which admits at the 
 same time of universal communication, can be con- 
 cerned with nothing else than the proportion of the 
 different degrees of the disposition (tension) of the 
 sense, to which the sensation belongs, i.e. with its tone. 
 In this far-reaching signification of the word it may 
 be divided into the artistic play of the sensations of 
 . hearing and sight, i.e. into Music and the Art of 
 ^ colour. — It is noteworthy that these two senses, 
 besides their susceptibility for impressions so far as 
 these are needed to gain concepts of external objects, 
 are also capable of a peculiar sensation bound up 
 therewith, of which we cannot strictly decide whether 
 it is based on sense or reflection. This susceptibility 
 may sometimes be wanting, although in other respects 
 the sense, as regards its use for the cognition of 
 objects, is not at all deficient but is peculiarly fine. 
 That is, we cannot say with certainty whether 
 colours or tones (sounds) are merely pleasant sensa- 
 tions or whether they form in themselves a beauti- 
 ful play of sensations, and as such bring with them 
 in aesthetical judgment a satisfaction in the form [of 
 the object]. If we think of the velocity of the 
 vibrations of light, or in the second case of the air. 
 which probably far surpasses all our faculty of 
 judging immediately in perception the time interval 
 between them, we must believe that it is only the 
 effect of these vibrations upon the elastic parts of 
 our body that is felt, but that the tivie interval 
 between them is not remarked or brought into judg- 
 y ment ; and thus that only pleasantness and not
 
 Div. I § 52 MUSIC 213 
 
 beauty of composition is bound up with colours and 
 tones. But on the other hand, first, we think of 
 the mathematical [element] which enables us to 
 pronounce on the proportion between these oscilla- 
 tions in music and thus to judge of them ; and by 
 analogy with which we easily may judge of the 
 distinctions between colours. Secondly, we recall 
 instances (although they are rare) of men who with 
 the best sight in the world cannot distinguish 
 colours, and with the sharpest hearing carwiot dis- 
 tinguish tones ; whilst for those who can do this 
 the perception of an altered quality (not merely of 
 the degree of sensation) in the different intensities 
 in the scale of colours and tones is definite ; and 
 further, the very number of these is fixed by in- 
 telligible differences. Thus we may be compelled 
 to see that both kinds of sensations are to be 
 regarded not as mere sensible impressions, but as 
 the effects of a judgment passed upon the form in 
 the play of divers sensations. ^The difference in our 
 definition, according as we adopt the one or the 
 other opinion in judging of the grounds of Music, 
 would be just this : either, as we have done, we 
 must explain it as the beautiful play of sensations 
 (of hearing), or else as a play oi pleasant sensations. 
 According to the former mode of explanation music 
 is represented altogether as a beautiful art ; accord- 
 ing to the latter, as 2. pleasant art (at least in part). 
 
 § 52. Of the combination of beantifU arts in one 
 and the same product 
 
 Rhetoric may be combined with a pictorial pre- 
 sentation of its subjects and objects in a theatrical 
 piece ; poetry may be combined with music in a
 
 214 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 song, and this again with pictorial (theatrical) pre- 
 sentation in an opera ; the play of sensations in 
 music may be combined with the play of figures in 
 the dance, and so on. Even the presentation of the 
 sublime, so far as it belongs to beautiful art, mav 
 combine with beauty in a tragedy in verse, in a 
 didactic poe7n, in an oratorio ; and in these combina- 
 tions beautiful art is yet more artistic. Whether it 
 is also more beautiful mav in some of these cases be 
 doubted (since so many different kinds of satisfac- 
 tion cross one another). Yet in all beautiful art the 
 essential thing is the form, which is purposive as 
 regards our observation and judgment, where the 
 pleasure is at the same time cultivation and disposes 
 ^ the spirit to Ideas, and consequently makes it sus- 
 ceptible of still more of such pleasure and enter- 
 tainment. The essential element is not the matter 
 of sensation (charm or emotion), which has only to 
 do with enjoyment ; this leaves behind nothing in 
 the Idea, and it makes the spirit dull, the object 
 gradually distasteful, and the mind, on account of 
 its consciousness of a disposition that conflicts with 
 purpose in the judgment of Reason, discontented 
 with itself and peevish. 
 
 If the beautiful arts are not brought into more or 
 less close combination with moral Ideas, which alone 
 bring with them a self-sufficing satisfaction, this latter 
 fate must ultimately be theirs. They then serve only 
 as a distraction, of which we are the more in need the 
 more we avail ourselves of them to disperse the dis- 
 content of the mind with itself; so that we thus render 
 ourselves ever more useless and ever more discon- 
 tented. The beauties of nature are generally of most 
 benefit in this point of view ; if we are early accus- 
 tomed to observe, appreciate, and admire them.
 
 Div. I f 53 SUPERIORITY OF POETRY' 2V- 
 
 % 53. Comparison of the respective cEsthetical woi'th 
 of the beautiful arts 
 
 Of all the arts poetry (which owes its origin 
 almost entirely to genius and will least be guided by 
 precept or example) maintains the first rank. It 
 expands the mind by letting the Imagination at 
 liberty ; and by offering within the limits of a given 
 concept amid the unbounded variety of possible 
 forms accordant therewith, that which unites the 
 presentment of this concept with a wealth of thought, 
 to which no verbal expression is completely 
 adequate ; and so rising aesthetically to Ideas. It 
 strengthens the mind by making it feel its faculty — 
 free, spontaneous and independent of natural deter- 
 mination — of considering and judging nature as a 
 phenomenon in accordance with aspects which it 
 does not present in experience either for Sense or 
 Understanding, and therefore of using it on behalf 
 of, and as a sort of schema for, the supersensible. 
 It plays with illusion, which it produces at pleasure, 
 but without deceiving by it ; for it declares its 
 exercise to be mere play, which however can be 
 purposively used by the Understanding. — Rhetoric, 
 in so far as this means the art of persuasion, i.e. 
 of deceiving by a beautiful show {ars oratoi'ia), 
 and not mere elegance of speech (eloquence and 
 style), is a Dialectic, which borrows from poetry 
 only so much as is needful to win minds to the side 
 of the orator before they have formed a judgment, 
 and to deprive them of their freedom ; it cannot 
 therefore be recommended either for the law courts 
 or for the pulpit. For if we are dealing with civil 
 law, with the rights of individual persons, or with
 
 2i6 A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 lasting instruction and determination of people's 
 minds to an accurate knowledge and a conscientious 
 observance of their duty, it is unworthy of so 
 important a business to allow a trace of any luxuri- 
 ance of wit and imagination to appear, and still less 
 any trace of the art of talking people over and of 
 captivating them for the advantage of any chance 
 person. For although this art may sometimes be 
 directed to legitimate and praiseworthy designs, it 
 becomes objectionable, when in this way maxims and 
 dispositions are spoiled in a subjective point of view, 
 though the action may objectively be lawful. It is 
 not enough to do what is right ; we should practise 
 it solely on the ground that it is right. Again, the 
 mere concept of this species of matters of human 
 concern, when clear and combined with a lively 
 presentation of it in examples, without any offence 
 against the rules of euphony of speech or propriety 
 of expression, has by itself for Ideas of Reason (which 
 collectively constitute eloquence), sufficient influence 
 upon human minds ; so that it is not needful to add 
 the machinery of persuasion, which, since it can be 
 used equally well to beautify or to hide vice and 
 error, cannot quite lull the secret suspicion that one 
 is being artfully overreached. In poetry every- 
 thing proceeds with honesty and candour. It 
 declares itself to be a mere entertaining play of the 
 Imagination, which wishes to proceed as regards 
 form in harmony with the laws of the Understand- 
 ing ; and it does not desire to steal upon and 
 ensnare the Understanding by the aid of sensible 
 presentation.^ 
 
 ^ I must admit that a beautiful poem lias always given me a pure 
 gratification ; whilst the reading of the best discourse, whether of 
 a Roman orator or of a modern parliamentary speaker or of a
 
 Div. I § 53 THE ART OF TONE 217 
 
 After poetry, if we are to deal with chamn and 
 mental movement, I would place that art which comes 
 nearest to the art of speech and can very naturally 
 be united with it, viz. the art of tone. For although 
 it speaks by means of mere sensations without con- 
 cepts, and so does not, like poetry, leave anything 
 over for reflection, it yet moves the mind in a greater . 
 variety of ways and more intensely, although only '. / 
 
 transitorily. It is, however, rather enjoyment than ^i/^ 
 cultivation (the further play of thought that i§ excited 
 by its means is merely the effect of an, as it were, 
 mechanical association) ; and in the judgment of 
 Reason it has less worth than any other of the beauti- 
 ful arts. Hence, like all enjoyment, it desires constant' i^ 
 change, and does not bear frequent repetition with- 
 out producing wearinessj Its charm, which admits 
 of universal communication, appears to rest on this, 
 that every expression of speech has in its context a 
 tone appropriate to the sense. This tone indicates 
 more or less an affection of the speaker, and pro- 
 duces it also in the hearer ; which affection excites 
 in its turn in the hearer the Idea that is expressed 
 
 preacher, has always been mingled with an unpleasant feeling of 
 disapprobation of a treacherous art, which means to move men in 
 important matters like machines to a judgment that must lose all 
 weight for them on quiet reflection. Readiness and accuracy in 
 speaking (which taken together constitute Rhetoric) belong to 
 beautiful art ; but the art of the orator {ars oratoria), the art of 
 availing oneself of the weaknesses of men for one's own designs 
 (whether these be well meant or even actually good does not matter) 
 is worthy of no respect. Again, this art only reached its highest 
 point, both at Athens and at Rome, at a time when the state was 
 hastening to its ruin and true patriotic sentiment had disappeared. 
 The man who along with a clear insight into things has in his power 
 a wealth of pure speech, and who with a fruitful Imagination capable 
 of presenting his Ideas unites a lively sympathy with what is truly 
 good, is the vir bonus dicendi peritus, the orator without art but of 
 great impressiveness, as Cicej-o has it ; though he may not always 
 remain true to this ideal.
 
 2i8 K-JNT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part I 
 
 in Speech by the tone in question. Thus as modula- 
 tion is as it were a universal lanQruaQ^e of sensations 
 intelligible to every man, the art of tone employs 
 it bv itself alone in its full force, viz. as a laneuaee 
 of the affections, and thus communicates universally 
 according to the laws of association the aesthetical 
 Ideas naturally combined therewith. Now these 
 sesthetical Ideas are not concepts or determinate 
 thoughts. Hence the form of the composition of 
 these sensations (harmony and melody) only serves 
 instead of the form of language, by means of their 
 proportionate accordance, to express the a^sthetical 
 Idea of a connected whole of an unspeakable wealth 
 of thought, corresponding to a certain theme which 
 produces the dominating affection in the piece. This 
 can be brought mathematically under certain rules, 
 because it rests in the case of tones on the relation 
 between the number of vibrations of the air in the 
 same time, so far as these tones are combined simul- 
 taneously or successively. To this mathematical 
 form, although not represented by determinate con- 
 cepts, alone attaches the satisfaction that unites the 
 mere reflection upon such a number of concomitant 
 or consecutive sensations with this their play, as a 
 condition of its beauty valid for every man. It is 
 this alone which permits Taste to claim in advance 
 a rightful authority over ever}' one's judgment. 
 
 But in the charm and mental movement produced 
 by Music, Mathematic has certainly not the slightest 
 share. It is only the indispensable condition {con- 
 ditio sine qua non) of that proportion of the impres- 
 sions in their combination and in their alternation by 
 which it becomes possible to gather them together 
 and prevent them from destroying one another, and 
 to harmonise them so as to produce a continual
 
 Div. I § 53 INFERIORITY OF MUSIC 219 
 
 movement and animation of the mind, by means of 
 affections consonant therewith, and thus a dehghtful 
 personal enjoyment. 
 
 If, on the other hand, we estimate the worth of 
 the Beautiful Arts by the culture they supply to the 
 mind, and take as a standard the expansion of the 
 faculties which must concur in the Judgment for 
 cognition, Music will hav^e the lowest place among 
 them (as it has perhaps the highest among those arts 
 which are valued for their pleasantness), because it 
 merely plays with sensations. The formative arts 
 are far before it in this point of view ; for in putting 
 the Imagination in a free play, which is also accord- 
 ant with the Understanding, they at the same time 
 carry on a serious business. This they do by pro- 
 ducing a product that serves for concepts as a 
 permanent self-commendatory vehicle for promoting 
 their union with sensibility and thus, as it were, 
 the urbanity of the higher cognitive powers. These 
 two species of art take quite different courses ; the 
 first proceeds from sensations to indeterminate Ideas, 
 the second from determinate Ideas to sensations. 
 The latter produce peTuianent, the former only 
 transitory impressions. The Imagination can recall 
 the one and entertain itself pleasantly therewith ; 
 but the other either vanish entirelv, or if thev are 
 recalled involuntarily by the Imagination they are 
 rather wearisome than pleasant.^ Besides, there 
 attaches to music a certain want of urbanity from the 
 fact that, chiefly from the character of its instru- 
 ments, it extends its influence further than is desired 
 (in the neighbourhood), and so as it were obtrudes 
 itself, and does violence to the freedom of others 
 
 ^ [From this to the end of the paragraph, and the next note, 
 were added in the Second Edition.]
 
 220 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 who are not of the musical company. The Arts 
 which appeal to the eyes do not do this ; for we need 
 only turn our eyes away, if we wish to avoid being 
 impressed. The case of music is almost like that of 
 the delight derived from a smell that diffuses itself 
 widely. The man who pulls his perfumed handker- 
 chief out of his pocket attracts the attention of all 
 round him, even against their will, and he forces 
 them, if they are to breathe at all, to enjoy the 
 scent ; hence this habit has gone out of fashion.^ 
 
 Among the formative arts I would give the palm 
 to painting ; partly because as the art of delineation 
 it lies at the root of all the other formative arts, and 
 partly because it can penetrate much further into 
 the region of Ideas, and can extend the field of 
 intuition in conformity with them further than the 
 others can. 
 
 § 54. Remark 
 
 As w^e have often shown, there is an essential 
 difference between what satisfies simply in the act 
 of J2idging it, and that which gratifies (pleases in 
 sensation). We cannot ascribe the latter [kind of 
 satisfaction] to every one, as we can the former. 
 Gratification (the causes of which may even be 
 
 ^ Those who recommend the singing of spiritual songs at family 
 prayers do not consider that they inflict a great hardship upon the 
 public by such noisy (and therefore in general pharisaical) devo- 
 tions ; for they force the neighbours either to sing with them or to 
 abandon their meditations. [Kant suffered himself from such annoy- 
 ances, which may account for the asperity of this note. At one 
 period he was disturbed by the devotional exercises of the prisoners 
 in the adjoining jail. In a letter to the burgomaster "he suggested 
 the advantage of closing the windows during these hynm-singings, 
 and added that the warders of the prison might probably be directed 
 to accept less sonorous and neighbour-annoying chants as evidence 
 of the penitent spirit of their captives" (Wallace's Kant, p. 42).]
 
 Div. I §54 GRATIFICATION AKD SATISFACTION 221 
 
 situate in Ideas) appears always to consist in a feeling 
 of the furtherance of the whole life of the man, and 
 consequently, also of his bodily well-being, i.e. his 
 health ; so that Epiairiis, who gave out that all 
 gratification was at bottom bodily sensation, may, 
 perhaps, not have been wrong, but only misunder- 
 stood himself when he reckoned intellectual and 
 even practical satisfaction under gratification. If 
 we have this distinction in view we can explain 
 how a gratification may dissatisfy the man who 
 sensibly feels it {e.g. the joy of a needy but well- 
 meaning man at becoming the heir of an affec- 
 tionate but penurious father) ; or how a deep grief 
 may satisfy the person experiencing it (the sorrow 
 of a widow at the death of her excellent husband) ; 
 or how a gratification can in addition satisfy (as in 
 the sciences that we pursue) ; or how a grief [e.g. 
 hatred, envy, revenge) can moreover dissatisfy. 
 The satisfaction or dissatisfaction here depends on 
 Reason, and is the same as approbation or disap- 
 probation ; but gratification and grief can only rest 
 on the feeling or prospect of a possible (on whatever 
 grounds) zuell-being or its opposite. 
 
 All changing free play of sensations (that have 
 no design at their basis) gratifies, because it furthers ^ 
 the feeling of health. In the judgment of Reason 
 we may or may not have any satisfaction in its 
 object or even in this gratification ; and this latter 
 may rise to the height of an affection, although 
 we take no interest in the object, at least none 
 that is proportionate to the degree of the gratifica- 
 tion. We may subdivide this free play of sensations 
 into the//^j' of fortune [games of chance], the//c?jK ^ 
 of tone [music], and the play of tJiought [wit]. The 
 first requires an interest, whether of vanity or of
 
 222 KANT'S KRiriK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 selfishness ; which, however, is not nearly so great 
 as the interest that attaches to the way in which 
 we are striving to procure it. The second requires 
 merely the change of sensations, all of which have 
 a relation to affection, though they have not the 
 degree of affection, and excite aesthetical Ideas. 
 The third springs merely from the change of re- 
 presentations in the Judgment ; by it, indeed, no 
 thought that brings an interest with it is produced, 
 but yet the mind is animated thereby. 
 
 How much gratification games must afford, 
 without any necessity of placing at their basis an 
 interested design, all our evening parties show ; 
 for hardly any of them can be carried on without 
 a game. But the affections of hope, fear, joy, 
 wrath, scorn, are put in play by them, alternating 
 every moment ; and they are so vivid that by them, 
 as by a kind of internal motion, all the vital processes 
 of the body seem to be promoted, as is shown by 
 the mental vivacity excited by them, although 
 nothing is gained or learnt thereby. But as the 
 beautiful does not enter into games of chance, we 
 will here set it aside. On the other hand, music 
 and that which excites laughter are two different 
 kinds of play with sesthetical Ideas, or of representa- 
 tions of the Understanding through which ultimately 
 nothing is thought, which can give lively gratification 
 merely by their changes. Thus we recognise pretty 
 clearly that the animation in both cases is merely 
 bodily, although it is excited by Ideas of the mind ; 
 and that the feeling of health produced by a motion of 
 the intestines corresponding to the play in question 
 makes up that whole gratification of a gay party, 
 which is regarded as so refined and so spiritual. 
 It is not the judging the harmony in tones or
 
 Div. I § 54 ANAL YSIS OF LA UGHTER 223 
 
 sallies of wit, — which serves only in combination 
 with their beauty as a necessary vehicle, — but the 
 furtherance of the vital bodily processes, the affection 
 that moves the intestines and the diaphragm, in 
 a word, the feeling of health (which without such 
 inducements one does not feel) that makes up the 
 gratification felt by us ; so that we can thus reach 
 the body through the soul and use the latter as the 
 physician of the former. 
 
 In music this play proceeds from bodily sensa- 
 tions to eesthetical Ideas (the Objects *of our 
 affections), and then from these back again to the 
 body with redoubled force. In the case of jokes 
 (the art of which, just like music, should rather be 
 reckoned as pleasant than beautiful) the play begins 
 w^th the thoughts which together occupy the body, 
 so far as they admit of sensible expression ; and 
 as the Understanding stops suddenly short at this 
 presentment, in which it does not find what it ex- 
 pected, we feel the effect of this slackening in the 
 body by the oscillation of the organs, which promotes 
 the restoration of equilibrium and has a favourable 
 influence upon health. 
 
 In everything that is to excite a lively convulsive 
 laueh there must be somethino- absurd (in which the 
 Understanding, therefore, can mTono satisfaction). 
 Laughter is an affection arising from the sudden / 
 transformation of a strained expectation into nothing. 
 This transformation, which is certainly not enjoyable 
 to the Understanding, yet indirectly gives it very 
 active enjoyment for a moment. Therefore its 
 cause must consist in the influence of the repre- 
 sentation upon the body, and the reflex effect of 
 this upon the mind ; not, indeed, through the 
 representation being objectively an object of grati-
 
 & 
 
 iiioa- (for how cc___ _ _c ^ ^ :: :' - 
 gradiy?), but simpiT dirougfa h -^ _ 
 
 reoresentatiofts brii^pi^ about an ec .._;:: 
 
 L::e vital powers in d»e.bodT. 
 
 ^ S-- — -^-^ this stxxx to be tcJd : An Indian ai the 
 
 - '^ . Englishman in Surat, when he saw a 
 
 " ^-=d and all the beer turned into 
 
 - ^ Testified his great astonishment 
 
 " :~ — --- ex L_ When the Englishman 
 
 '^^~^-~ '? : ---c ^this coastCHii^ vou so 
 
 ■ T am not at all astonished 
 
 : - : I do wr- ir' " vvou ever 
 
 ^^ :;- : rives us 
 
 V -ir-ves 
 
 Lr . _-:__;; :_: . .;_:iuion was 
 
 ?— - :_ - :~- iT-i iht- ~^ suddenhr 
 
 - '^" " — r.::r..\^ '. A^i ' The heir of a 
 
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 - - r t y 
 
 to loc^ sag. 
 
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 : -Live oppoate 
 
 — ould stiD be 
 ^ A grief — 
 For if 2L 
 r.- - . _~ . Ilea leiling a 
 ^e its falsehood inunedi- 
 i.j, :: : - -S : €^. the ^xmt)' of the pec^Ie 
 
 - fXiie Tzrsz Z : - ii3 - as in -±& rase of a loaB wbo ^ts tise 
 
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 LTT. I i 5i|. 7 HZ ILLUSIOX IJf A JEST 225 
 
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 It is r -I in all socii ci^rs liife lest 
 
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 - : - : :z:r ~. zz zz zz z z- n^w to
 
 226 A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part I 
 
 another standpoint in order to contemplate its 
 object, may correspond an alternating tension and 
 relaxation of the elastic portions of our intestines, 
 which communicates itself to the diaphragm (like 
 that which ticklish people feel). In connection with 
 this the lungs expel the air at rapidly succeeding 
 intervals, and thus bring about a movement 
 beneficial to health ; which alone, and not what 
 precedes it in the mind, is the proper cause of the 
 gratification in a thought that at bottom represents 
 nothing. — Voltaire said that heaven had given us 
 two things to counterbalance the many miseries of 
 life, hope and sleep} He could have added latighter, 
 if the means of exciting it in reasonable men were 
 only as easily attainable, and the requisite wit or 
 originality of humour were not so rare, as the talent 
 is common of imagining things which break ones 
 head, as mystic dreamers do, or which break ones 
 neck, as your genius does, or which break one s heart, 
 as sentimental romance-writers (and even moralists 
 of the same kidney) do. 
 
 We may therefore, as it seems to me, readily 
 concede to EpiciLrus that all gratification, even that 
 which is occasioned through concepts, excited by 
 aesthetical Ideas, is animal, i.e. bodily sensation ; 
 without the least prejudice to the spiritual feeling 
 of respect for moral Ideas, which is not gratification 
 at all but an esteem for self (for humanity in us), 
 that raises us above the need of gratification, and 
 
 '- [ Henriade, Chant 7, sub init. 
 
 "Du Dieu qui nous crea la cldmence infinie, 
 Pour adoucir les maux de cette courte vie, 
 A place parmi nous deux etres bienfaisants, 
 De la terre k jamais aimables habitants, 
 Soutiens dans les travaux, trdsors dans I'indigence : 
 L'un est le doux sommeil, et I'autre est I'esperance.'"]
 
 Div. 1 § 54 NAIVETE 227 
 
 even without the sHghtest prejudice to the less noble 
 [satisfactions] of /^^/^. -f-.-Jx-^JUAJtuJ 
 
 We find a combination of these two last in 
 naivetd, which is the breaking out of the sincerity 
 originally natural to humanity in opposition to that 
 art of dissimulation which has become a second 
 nature. We laugh at the simplicity that does not 
 understand how to dissemble ; and yet we are 
 delighted with the simplicity of the nature which 
 thwarts that art. We look for the commonplace 
 manner of artificial utterance devised with foresight 
 to make a fair show ; and behold ! it is the 
 unspoiled innocent nature which we do not expect 
 to find, and which he who displays it did not think 
 of disclosing. That the fair but false show which 
 generally has so much influence upon our judgment 
 is here suddenly transformed into nothing, so that, 
 as it were, the rogue in us is laid bare, produces a 
 movement of the mind in two opposite directions, 
 which gives a wholesome shock to the body. But 
 the fact that something infinitely better than all 
 assumed manner, viz. puri ty of dispo sition (or at 
 least the tendency thereto), is not^uit^ extinguished 
 yet in human nature, blends seriousness and high 
 esteem with this~play o f the Judgment, But be- 
 cause it is only a transitory phenomenon, and the -7>^ -^^ '^^ ■^'^ "'^ "- 
 vp )] nf rjlf^^'Tni'l^tin n js soon drawn over it a g-am. \^ ^^^ — 
 there is mingled therewith a compassion which is 
 an emotion of tenderness ; this, as play, readily 
 admits of combination with a good-hearted laugh, 
 and ordinarily is actually so combined, and withal is 
 wont to compensate him who supplies the material 
 therefor for the embarrassment which results from 
 not yet being wise after the manner of men. — An 
 art that is to be naive is thus a contradiction ; but
 
 228 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 the representation of naivete in a fictitious per- 
 sonage is quite possible, and is a beautiful though 
 a rare art. Naivete must not be confounded with 
 open-hearted simplicity, which does not artificially 
 spoil nature solely because it does not understand 
 the art of social intercourse. 
 
 The hunwroiLS manner again may be classified 
 as that which, as exhilarating us, is near akin to 
 the gratification that proceeds from laughter ; and 
 belongs to the originality of spirit, but not to 
 the talent of beautiful art. Hzujioilv in the good 
 sense means the talent of being able voluntarily 
 to put oneself into a certain mental disposition, 
 in which everything is judged quite differently 
 from the ordinary method (reversed, in fact), and 
 yet in accordance with certain rational principles 
 in such a frame of mind. He who is involuntarily 
 subject to such mutations is called a man of Jmuiours 
 [launisch] ; but he who can assume them voluntarily 
 and purposively (on behalf of a lively presentment 
 brought about by the aid of a contrast that e.xcites 
 a laugh) — he and his exposition are called humorous 
 [launigt]. This manner, however, belongs rather 
 to pleasant than to beautiful art, because the object 
 of the latter must always show proper worth in 
 itself, and hence requires a certain seriousness 
 in the presentation, as taste does in the act of 
 judging.
 
 SECOND DIVISION 
 
 DIALECTIC OF THE .ESTHETICAL JUDGMENT 
 
 §55 
 
 A faculty of Judgment that is to be dialectical 
 must in the first place be rationalising, i.e. its judg- 
 ments must claim universality ^ and that a priori ; 
 for it is in the opposition of such judgments that 
 Dialectic consists. Hence the incompatibility of 
 aesthetical judgments of Sense (about the pleasant 
 and the unpleasant) is not dialectical. And again, 
 the conflict between judgments of Taste, so far 
 as each man depends merely on his own taste, 
 forms no Dialectic of taste ; because no one proposes 
 to make his own judgment a universal rule. There 
 remains therefore no other concept of a Dialectic 
 which has to do with taste than that of a Dialectic 
 of the Kritik of taste (not of taste itself) in respect 
 of its principles ; for here concepts that contradict 
 one another (as to the ground of the possibility of 
 judgments of taste in general) naturally and unavoid- 
 ably present themselves. The transcendental Kritik 
 
 1 We may describe as a rationalising judgment (Judicium 
 ratiocina/ts) one which proclaims itself as universal, for as such it 
 can serve as the major premise of a syllogism. On the other hand, 
 we can only speak of a judgment as rational {Ji/diciii/n ratiociiiatuni) 
 which is thought as the conclusion of a syllogism, and consequently as 
 grounded a priori.
 
 230 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 of taste will therefore contain a part which can bear 
 the name of a Dialectic of the eesthetical Judgment, 
 only if and so far as there is found an antinomy of 
 the principles of this faculty which renders its con- 
 formity to law, and consequently also its internal 
 possibility, doubtful. 
 
 § 56. Representation of the antinomy of Taste 
 
 The first commonplace of taste is contained in 
 the proposition, with which every tasteless person 
 proposes to avoid blame : every one has his own taste. 
 That is as much as to say that the determining 
 ground of this judgment is merely subjective (grati- 
 fication or grief), and that the judgment has no right 
 to the necessary assent of others. 
 
 The second commonplace invoked even by those 
 who admit for judgments of taste the right to speak 
 with validity for every one is : there is no disputing 
 about taste. That is as much as to say that the deter- 
 mining ground of a judgment of taste may indeed be 
 objective, but that it cannot be reduced to definite 
 concepts ; and that consequently about the judgment 
 itself nothing can be decided by proofs, although 
 much may rightly be contested. For contesting [quar- 
 relling] and disputing [controversy] are doubtless the 
 same in this, that by means of the mutual opposition 
 of judgments they seek to produce their accordance ; 
 but different in that the latter hopes to bring this 
 about according to definite concepts as determining 
 grounds, and consequently assumes objective concepts 
 as grounds of the judgment. But where this is 
 regarded as impracticable, controversy is regarded 
 as alike impracticable. 
 
 We easily see that between these two common-
 
 Div, II § 57 ANTINOMY OF TASTE 231 
 
 places there is a proposition wanting, which, though 
 it has not passed into a proverb, is yet famiHar 
 to every one, viz. there may be a quarrel about 
 taste (although there can be no controversy). But 
 this proposition involves the contradictory of the 
 former one. For wherever quarrelling is permissible, 
 there must be a hope of mutual reconciliation ; 
 and consequently we can count on grounds of our 
 judgment that have not merely private validity, and 
 therefore are not merely subjective. And- to this 
 the proposition, every one has his own taste, is 
 directly opposed. 
 
 There emerges therefore in respect of the prin- 
 ciple of taste the following Antinomy : — 
 
 (i) Thesis. The judgment of taste is not based 
 upon concepts ; for otherwise it would admit of 
 controversy (would be determinable by proofs). 
 
 (2) Antithesis. The judgment of taste is based 
 on concepts ; for otherwise, despite its diversity, we 
 could not quarrel about it (we could not claim for 
 our judgment the necessary assent of others). 
 
 § 57. Solution of the antinomy of Taste 
 
 There is no possibility of removing the conflict 
 between these principles that underlie every judg- 
 ment of taste (which are nothing else than the two 
 peculiarities of the judgment of taste exhibited 
 above in the Analytic), except by showing that the 
 concept to which we refer the Object in this kind 
 of judgment is not taken in the same sense in both 
 maxims of the aesthetical Judgment. This twofold 
 sense or twofold point of view is necessary to our 
 transcendental Judgment ; but also the illusion
 
 232 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 which arises from the confusion of one with the 
 other is natural and unavoidable. 
 ^>^^' The judgment of taste must riLfer^to-some con- 
 cept ; otherwise it could make absolutely no claim 
 to be necessarily valid for every one. But it is not 
 ^^^--' therefore capable of being proved _/i:w«-a concept ; 
 because a concept may be either determinable or in 
 itself undetermined and undeterminable. The con- 
 cepts of the Understanding are of the former kind ; 
 l^ they are determinable through predicates of sensible 
 intuition which can correspond to them. But the 
 /i\ \ transcendental rational concept of the supersensible, 
 W } which lies at the basis of all sensible intuition, is of 
 the latter kind, and therefore cannot be theoretically 
 determined further. 
 
 Now the judgment of taste is applied to objects 
 of Sense, but not with a view of determining a con- 
 cept of them for the Understanding; for it is not a 
 cognitive judgment. It is thus only a private 
 judgment, in which a singular representation intui- 
 tively perceived is referred to the feeling of pleasure ; 
 and so far would be limited as regards its validity 
 to the individual judging. The object is for me an 
 object of satisfaction ; by others it may be regarded 
 quite differently — every one has his own taste. 
 
 Nevertheless there is undoubtedly contained in 
 the judgment of taste a wider reference of the 
 representation of the Object (as well as of the 
 subject), whereon we base an extension of judg- 
 ments of this kind as necessary for every one. At 
 the basis of this there must necessarily be a concept 
 somewhere ; though a concept which cannot be 
 determined through intuition. But through a con- 
 cept of this sort we know nothing, and consequently 
 it can supply no proof for the judgment of taste.
 
 Div. II § 57 SOLUTION OF THE ANTINOMY 233 
 
 S uch a co ncept is thejiierejmre ratuDnal^qncept of' 
 t he sup ersensibls-w hich underlie s the Object ( and 
 also the subject judg in g;' it), reg arded as an objec t 
 of sense and thus as phenomenal/ For if we do 
 notadmit such a reference, the claim of the judg- 
 ment of taste to universal validity would not hold 
 good. If the concept on w^hich it is based were 
 only a mere confused concept of the Understanding, 
 like that of perfection, with which we could bring 
 the sensible intuition of the Beautiful into corre- 
 spondence, it would be at least possible in itself to 
 base the judgment of taste on proofs ; which con- 
 tradicts the thesis. 
 
 But all contradiction disappears if I say : the 
 judgment of taste is based on a concept (viz. the 
 ^oncept of the general ground of the subjective 
 )urposiveness of nature for the Judgment) ; from 
 "hich, however, nothing can be known and proved 
 in respect of the Object, because it is in itself 
 undeterminable and useless for knowledge. Yet at 
 the same time and on that very account the judg- 
 ment has validity for every one (though of course 
 for each only as a singular judgment immediately 
 accompanying his intuition); because its determining 
 ground lies perhaps in the concept of that which 
 may be regarded as the supersensible substrate of/ 
 humanity. 
 
 The solution of an antinomy only depends on 
 the possibility of showing that two apparently con- 
 tradictory propositions do not contradict one another 
 in fact, but that thev mav be consistent ; although the 
 explanation of the possibility of their concept may 
 transcend our coo-nitive faculties. That this illusion 
 is natural and unavoidable bv human Reason, and 
 
 1 [Cf. p. 241 infraJ]
 
 y 
 
 234 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 also why it is so, and remains so. although it ceases 
 to deceive after the analysis of the apparent con- 
 tradiction, may be thus explained. 
 / In the two contradictory judgments we take the 
 ^.concept, on which the universal validity of a judg- 
 ment must be based, in the same sense ; and yet we 
 apply to it two opposite predicates. In the Thesis 
 we mean that the judgment of taste is not based 
 upon determinate concepts ; and in the Antithesis 
 that the judgment of taste is based upon a concept, 
 but an indeterminate one (viz. of the supersensible 
 substrate of phenomena). Between these two there 
 IS no contradiction. 
 
 We can do nothing more than remove this 
 conflict between the claims and counter-claims of 
 taste. It is absolutely impossible to give a definite 
 objective principle of taste, in accordance with 
 which its judgments could be derived, examined, 
 and established ; for then the judgment would not 
 be one of taste at all. The subjective principle, 
 viz. the indefinite Idea of the supersensible in us, 
 can only be put forward as the sole key to the 
 puzzle of this faculty whose sources are hidden 
 from us : it can be made no further intellisjible. 
 
 The proper concept of taste, that is of a merely 
 reflective sesthetical Judgment, lies at the basis of 
 the antinomy here exhibited and adjusted. Thus 
 the two apparently contradictory principles are 
 reconciled — both can he true ; which is sufficient. 
 If, on the other hand, w^e assume, as some do, 
 pleasantness as the determining ground of taste (on 
 account of the singularity of the representation 
 which lies at the basis of the judgment of taste), or, 
 as others will have it, the principle of perfection (on 
 account of the universality of the same), and settle
 
 Div. II § 57 ^STHETICAL IDEAS 235 
 
 the definition of taste accordingly ; then there arises 
 an antinomy which it is absolutely impossible to 
 adjust except by showing that both the contrary 
 (not merely contradictory) propositions are false. 
 And this would prove that the concept on which 
 they are based is self-contradictory. Hence we see 
 that the removal of the antinomy of the sesthetical 
 Judgment takes a course similar to that pursued by 
 the Kritik in the solution of the antinomies of pure 
 theoretical Reason. And thus here, as also in the 
 Kritik of practical Reason, the antinomies force us 
 against our will to look beyond the sensible and to 
 seek in the supersensible the point of union for all 
 our a priori faculties ; because no other expedient is 
 left to make our Reason harmonious with itself. 
 
 Remark I. 
 
 As we so often find occasion in Transcendental 
 Philosophy for distinguishing Ideas from concepts of 
 the Understanding, it may be of use to introduce 
 technical terms to correspond to this distinction. I 
 believe that no one will object if I propose some. — 
 In the most universal signification of the word, 
 Ideas are representations referred to an object, 
 according to a certain (subjective or objective) 
 principle, but so that they can never become a 
 cognition of it. They are either referred to an 
 ijituition, according to a merely sjjjbjective principle 
 of the mutual harmony of the cognitive powers 
 (the Imagination and the Understanding), and they, 
 are then called cesthetical \ or they are referred to 
 a concept according to an objective principle, 
 although they can never furnish a cognition of the 
 object, and are called rational Ideas. In the latter
 
 /: 
 
 236 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT parti 
 
 case the concept is a transcendent one, which is 
 different from a concept of the Understanding, to 
 which an adequately corresponding experience can 
 always be supplied, and which therefore is called 
 nunanent. 
 
 An (Esthctical Idea cannot become a cognition, 
 because it is an intuition (of the Imagination) for 
 which an adequate concept can never be found. 
 A rational Idea can never become a cognition, 
 because it involves a concept (of the supersensible), 
 corresponding to which an intuition can never be 
 
 given. 
 
 Now I believe we might call the aesthetical Idea 
 u^ an inexponible representation of the Imagination, 
 "■^ and a rational Idea an indemonstrable concept of 
 Reason. It is assumed of both that they are not 
 generated without grounds, but (according to the 
 above explanation of an Idea in general) in 
 conformity with certain principles of the cognitive 
 faculties to which they belong (subjective principles 
 in the one case, objective in the other). 
 
 Concepts of the Understanding must, as such, 
 always be d^enionstxable [if by demonstration we 
 understand, as in anatomy, merely presentation^ ; ^ 
 i.e. the object corresponding to them must always- 
 be capable of being given in intuition (pure Xix:- 
 empirical).; for thus alone could they become 
 cognitions. The concept of magnitude can be given 
 a priori in the intuition of space, e.g. of a right line, 
 etc. ; the concept of canse in impenetrability, in the 
 collision of bodies, etc. Consequently both can be 
 authenticated by means of an empirical intuition, 2.e. 
 the thought of them can be proved (demonstrated, 
 verified) by an example ; and this must be possible, 
 
 \ '.'[Second Edition.] 
 
 C6
 
 Div. ii§57 DEMONSTRATION 237 
 
 for Otherwise we should not be certain that the con- 
 cept was not empty, i.e. devoid of any Object. 
 
 In Logic we ordinarily use the expressions 
 demonstrable or indemonstrable only in respect of 
 propositions, but these might be better designated by 
 the titles respectively of mediately and immediately 
 certain propositions ; for pure Philosophy has also 
 propositions of both kinds, i.e. true propositions, 
 some of which are susceptible of proof and others 
 not. It can, as philosophy, prove them on a priori 
 grounds, but it cannot demonstrate them \ unless 
 we wish to depart entirely from the proper mean- 
 ing of this word, according to which to demonstrate 
 [ostendere, exkibere) is equivalent to presenting a 
 concept in intuition (whether in proof or merely in 
 definition). If the intuition is a priori this is called 
 construction ; but if it is empirical, then the Object 
 is displayed by means of which objective reality is 
 assured to the concept. Thus we say of an ana- 
 tomist that he demonstrates the human eye, if by 
 a dissection of this organ he makes intuitively 
 evident the concept which he has previously treated 
 discursively. 
 
 It hence follows that the rational concept of the 
 supersensible substrate of all phenomena in general, 
 or even of that which must be placed at the basis of 
 our arbitrary will in respect of the moral law, viz. 
 of transcendental freedom, is already, in kind, an 
 indemonstrable concept and a rational Idea ; while 
 virtue is so, in degree. For there can be given in 
 experience, as regards its quality, absolutely nothing 
 corresponding to the former ; whereas in the latter 
 case no empirical product attains to the degree of 
 that causality, which the rational Idea prescribes as 
 the rule.
 
 238 k'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 As in a rational Idea the Imagination with its 
 intuitions does not attain to the given concept, so in 
 an sesthetical Idea the Understandijighyxls concepts 
 never attains completely to that internal intuition 
 which the Imagination binds up with a given 
 representation. Since, now, to reduce a representa- 
 tion of the Imagination to concepts is the same 
 thing as to expound it, the eesthetical Idea may be 
 called an inexponible representation of the Imagina- 
 tion (in its free play). I shall have occasion in the 
 sequel to say something more of Ideas of this kind ; 
 now I only note that both kinds of Ideas, rational 
 and sesthetical, must have their principles ; and must 
 v^" have them in Reason — the one in the objective, 
 ^ the other in the subjective principles of its 
 employment. 
 
 We can consequently explain genius as the 
 faculty of (Esthetical Ideas ; by wdiich at the same " 
 time is shown the reason why in the products of 
 genius it is the nature (of the subject) and not a 
 premeditated purpose that gives the rule to the art 
 (of the production of the beautiful). For since the 
 beautiful must not be judged by concepts, but by 
 the purposive attuning of the Imagination to 
 agreement with the faculty of concepts in general, it 
 cannot be rule and precept which can serve as the 
 subjective standard of that aesthetical but uncon- 
 ditioned purposiveness in beautiful art, that can 
 rightly claim to please every one. It can only be 
 that in the subject which is nature and cannot be 
 brought under rules or concepts, i.e. the super- 
 sensible substrate of all his faculties (to which no 
 concept of the Understanding extends), and 
 consequently that with respect to which it is the 
 final purpose given by the intelligible [part] of our
 
 Div. II § 57 THREE KINDS OF ANTINOMIES 239 
 
 nature to harmonise all our cognitive faculties. 
 Thus alone is it possible that there should be 
 a priori at the basis of this purposiveness, for which 
 we can prescribe no objective principle, a principle 
 subjective and yet of universal validity. 
 
 Remark II. 
 
 The following important remark occurs here : 
 There are three kinds of Antinomies of pure 
 Reason, which, however, all agree in this, th at they 
 compel us_to give up the otherwise very natural 
 hypotkesis — diat_2objectS2^^of2[s^n^^ in 
 
 theniserv^s^__ajTdJbrce_jiS--to-4:^^ --_^ 
 
 pheno mena, and to sup ply to them an intelligible 
 siibBti:atg_j£ometIimg~supersensible of which the 
 
 c oncept i s CsvXyf^^rv^^^rf^^^ anrt-^^t-ippHpc; no__£]22r^'' 
 
 -JiaoidedgeJ Without such grrtt nomics — 4^eason \ 
 could never decide upon accepting a principle > 
 narrowing so much the field of its speculation, and 
 could never bring itself to sacrifices by which so 
 many otherwise brilliant hopes must disappear. 
 For even now when, by w^ay of compensation for 
 these losses, a greater field in a practical aspect 
 opens out before it, it appears not to be able without 
 grief to part from those hopes, and disengage itself 
 from its old attachment. 
 
 That there are three kinds of antinomies has its 
 ground in this, that there are three cognitive 
 faculties, — Understanding, Judgment, and Reason \^ 
 of which each (as a superior cognitive faculty) must 
 have its a pi'iori principles. For Reason, in so far 
 as it judges of these principles and their use, 
 inexorably requires, in respect of them all, the un- 
 conditioned for the given conditioned ; and this
 
 240 A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 can never be found if we con sider the sensible as 
 belongino ^ to things in the mselv es, and do not 
 rather su]3^ 1y_to it. a s mere phen omenon, something 
 su persensible (the intelligible substrate of nature 
 )QtHZ£xte rnal and internal) as]~ rtRrTealitv in itself 
 [Sache an sich selbst]. There are then: (ij For 
 tlic cognitnuT' faciilty^Vi antinomy of Reason in 
 respect of the theoretical employment of the Under- 
 standing extended to the unconditioned ; (2) for 
 the feeling of pleasiLre and pain an antinomy of 
 Reason in respect of the sesthetical employment of 
 the Judgment; and {'^ for the faculty of desire an 
 antinomy in respect of the practical employment of 
 the self- legislative Reason; so far as all these 
 faculties have their superior principles a priori, and, 
 in conformity with an inevitable requirement of 
 Reason, must judge and be able to determine their 
 Object, unconditionally according to those principles. 
 As for the two antinomies of the theoretical 
 and practical employment of the superior cognitive 
 faculties, we have already shown their unavoidablc- 
 ness, if judgments of this kind are not referred to a 
 supersensible substrate of the given Objects, as 
 phenomena ; and also the possibility of their solu- 
 tion, as soon as this is done. And as for the 
 antinomies in the employment of the Judgment, in 
 conformity with the requirements of Reason, and 
 their solution which is here given, there are only 
 two ways of avoiding them. Either : we must deny 
 that any a priori principle lies at the basis of the 
 sesthetical judgment of taste ; we must maintain that 
 all claim to necessary universal agreement is a ground- 
 less and vain fancy, and that a judgment of taste 
 only deserves to be regarded as correct because it 
 happens that many people agree about it ; and this, 
 
 i
 
 Div. II §58 IDEA OF THE SUPERSENSIBLE 241 
 
 not because we assinne an a priori principle behind 
 this agreement, but because (as in the taste of the 
 palate) of the contingent similar organisation of the 
 different subjects. Or : we must assume that the 
 judgment of taste is really a disguised judgment of 
 Reason upon the perfection discovered in a thing 
 and the reference of the manifold in it to a purpose, 
 and is consequently only called sesthetical on 
 account of the confusion here attaching to our 
 reflection, although it is at bottom teleological. In 
 the latter case we could declare the solution of the 
 antinomies by means of transcendental Ideas to 
 be needless and without point, and thus could 
 harmonise these laws of taste with Objects of sense, 
 not as mere phenomena but as things in themselves. 
 But we have shown in several places in the ex- 
 position of judgments of taste how little either of 
 these expedients will satisfy. 
 
 However, if it be granted that our deduction at 
 least proceeds by the right method, although it be 
 not yet plain enough in all its parts, three Ideas 
 manifest themselves. First, there is the Idea of 
 the supersensible in general, without any further 
 determination of it, as the substrate of nature. 
 Secondly, there is the Idea of the same as the 
 principle of the subjective purposiveness of nature 
 for our cognitive faculty. And thirdly, there is the 
 Idea of the same as the principle of the purposes 
 of freedom, and of the agreement of freedom with 
 its purposes in the moral sphere. ^^i*' 
 
 § 58, Of the Idealism of the pttrposiveness of both 
 Nat2ire and Art as the imiqtie principle of 
 the cssthetical Judgment. 
 
 To begin with, we can either place the principle
 
 242 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 of taste in the fact that it always judges in accord- 
 ance with grounds which are empirical and therefore ' 
 are only given a posteriori by sense, or concede 
 that it judges on a priori grounds. The former 
 would be the empiricism of the Kritik of Taste ; 
 the latter its rationalism. According to the former 
 the Object of our satisfaction would not differ from 
 i\\Q pleasant ; according to the latter, if the judgment 
 rests on definite concepts, it would not differ from 
 the good. Thus all beatdy would be banished from 
 the world, and only a particular name, expressing 
 perhaps a certain mingling of the two above-named 
 kinds of satisfaction, would remain in its place. But 
 we have shown that there are also a priori grounds 
 of satisfaction which can subsist along with the 
 principle of rationalism, although they cannot be 
 comprehended in definite concepts. 
 
 On the other hand, the rationalism of the prin- 
 ciple of taste is either that of the realism of the 
 purposiveness, or of its idealism. ■ Because a judg- 
 ment of taste is not a cognitive judgment, and 
 beauty is not a characteristic of the Object, con- 
 sidered in itself, the rationalism of the principle of 
 taste can never be placed in the fact that the pur- 
 / posiveness in this judgment is thought as objective, 
 i.e. that the judgment theoretically, and therefore 
 also logically (although only in a confused way), 
 refers to the perfection of the Object. It only refers 
 cesthetically to the agreement of the representation 
 of the Object in the Imagination with the essential 
 principles of Judgment in general in the subject. 
 - Consequently, even according to the principle of 
 rationalism, the judgment of taste and the distinc- 
 tion between its realism and idealism can only be 
 settled thus. Either in the first case, this subjective
 
 Div. II § 58 REALISM OF PURPOSIVENESS 243 
 
 purposiveness is assumed as an actual (designed) 
 pttrpose of nature (or art) harmonising with our Judg- 
 ment ; or, in the second case, as a purposive har- 
 mony with the needs of Judgment, in respect of 
 nature and its forms produced according to particular 
 laws, which shows itself, without purpose, sponta- 
 neously, and contingently. 
 
 The beautiful formations in the kingdom of 
 organised nature speak loudly for the Realism of the 
 aesthetical purposiveness of nature ; since we might 
 assume that behind the production of the beautiful 
 there is an Idea of the beautiful in the producing 
 cause, viz. a purpose in respect of our Imagination. 
 Flowers, blossoms, even the shapes of entire plants ; 
 the elegance of animal formations of all kinds, 
 unneeded for their proper use, but, as it were, 
 selected for our taste ; especially the charming variety 
 so satisfying to the eye and the harmonious arrange- 
 ment of colours (in the pheasant, in shell-fish, in 
 insects, even in the commonest flowers), which, as 
 it only concerns the surface and not the figure of 
 these creations (though perhaps requisite in regard 
 of their internal purposes), seems to be entirely 
 designed for external inspection ; these things give 
 great weight to that mode of explanation which 
 assumes actual purposes of nature for our sesthetical 
 Judgment. 
 
 On the other hand, not only is Reason opposed 
 to this assumption in its maxims, which bid us always 
 avoid as far as possible unnecessary multiplication 
 of principles ; but nature everywhere shows in its 
 free formations much mechanical tendency to the 
 ^productions of forms which seem, as it were, to be 
 made for the aesthetical exercise of our Judgment, 
 without affording the least ground for the supposition
 
 244 A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 that there is need of anything more than its mechan- 
 ism, merely as nature, according to which, without 
 any Idea lying at their root, they can be purposive 
 for our judgment. But I understand hy free forma- 
 tions of nature those whereby from a fluid at 7'est, 
 through the volatihsation or separation of a portion 
 of its constituents (sometimes merely of caloric), the 
 remainder in becoming; solid assumes a definite 
 shape or tissue (figure or texture), which is different 
 according to the specific difference of the material, 
 but in the same material is constant. Here it is 
 always presupposed that we are speaking of a per- 
 fect fluid, i.e. that the material in it is completely 
 dissolved, and that it is not a mere medley of solid 
 particles in a state of suspension. 
 
 Formation, then, takes place by a shooting together, 
 i.e. by a sudden solidification, not by a gradual 
 transition from the fluid to the solid state, but all at 
 once by a saltus ; which transition is also called 
 crystallisation. The commonest example of this 
 kind of formation is the freezing of water, where 
 first icicles are produced, which combine at angles 
 of 60°, while others attach themselves to each vertex, 
 until it all becomes ice ; and so that, while this is 
 going on, the water does not gradually become 
 viscous, but is as perfectly fluid as if its temperature 
 were far higher, although it is absolutely ice-cold. 
 The matter that disengages itself, which is dissipated 
 suddenly at the moment of solidification, is a con- 
 siderable quantum of caloric, the disappearance of 
 which, as it was only required for preserving 
 fluidity, leaves the new ice not in the least colder 
 than the water which shortly before was fluid. 
 
 Many salts, and also rocks, of a crystalline 
 figure, are produced thus froni a species of earth
 
 Div. II § 58 CRYSTALLISATION 245 
 
 dissolved in water, we do not exactly know how. 
 Thus are formed the crystalline configurations of 
 many minerals, the cubical sulphide of lead, the ruby 
 silver ore, etc., in all probability in water and bv 
 the shooting together of particles, as they become 
 forced by some cause to dispense with this vehicle 
 and to unite in definite external shapes. 
 
 But also all kinds of matter, which have been 
 kept in a fluid state by heat, and have become solid 
 by cooling, show internally, when fractured, a 
 definite texture. This makes us judge that if their 
 own weight or the disturbance of the air had not 
 prevented it, they would also have exhibited on the 
 outer surface their specifically peculiar shapes. This 
 has been observed in some metals on their inner 
 surface, which have been hardened externally by 
 fusion but are fluid in the interior, bv the drawing 
 oft' the internal fluid and the consequent undisturbed 
 crystallisation of the remainder. Many of these 
 mineral crystallisations, such as spars, hematite, 
 arragonite, etc., often present beautiful shapes, the 
 like of which art can only conceive ; and the halo 
 in the cavern of Antiparos ^ is merely produced by 
 \vater trickling down strata of gypsum. 
 
 The fluid state is, to all appearance, older than 
 the solid state, and plants as well as animal bodies 
 are fashioned out of fluid nutritive matter, so far 
 as this forms itself in a state of rest. This last of 
 course primarily combines and forms itself in freedom 
 according to a certain original disposition directed 
 towards purposes (which, as will be shown in Part 
 II., must not be judged sesthetically but teleo- 
 logically according to the principle of realism), 
 
 1 [Antiparos is a small island in the Cyclades, remarkable for a 
 splendid stalactite cavern near the south coast.]
 
 246 A'ANT'S KRITIk' OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 but also perhaps in conformity with the universal 
 law of the affinity of materials. Again, the watery 
 fluids dissolved in an atmosphere that is a mixture 
 of different gases, if they separate from the latter 
 on account of cooling, produce snow figures, which 
 in correspondence with the character of the special 
 mixture of gases, often seem very artistic and are 
 extremely beautiful. So, without detracting from 
 the teleological principle by which we judge of 
 organisation, we may well think that the beauty of 
 flowers, of the plumage of birds, or of shell-fish, 
 both in shape and colour, may be ascribed to nature 
 and its faculty of producing forms in an aesthetically 
 purposive way, in its freedom, without particular 
 purposes adapted thereto, according to chemical 
 laws by the arrangement of the material requisite 
 for the organisation in question. 
 
 But what shows the principle of the Ideality of 
 the purposiveness in the beauty of nature, as that 
 which we always place at the basis of an cesthetical 
 judgment, and which allows us to employ, as a 
 ground of explanation for our representative faculty, 
 no realism of purpose, is the fact that in judging 
 beauty we invariably seek its gauge in ourselves 
 a priori, and that our aesthetical Judgment is itself 
 legislative in respect of the judgment whether 
 anything is beautiful or not. This could not be, on 
 the assumption of the Realism of the purposiveness 
 of nature ; because in that case we must have 
 learned from nature what we ouofht to find beautiful, 
 and the aesthetical judgment would be subjected to 
 empirical principles. For in such an act of judging 
 the important point is not, what nature is, or even, 
 as a purpose, is in relation to us, but how we take 
 it. There would be an objective purposiveness in
 
 Div. II § 5S IDEALISM OF PURPOSIVENESS 247 
 
 nature if it had fashioned its forms for our satis- 
 faction ; and not a subjective purposiveness which 
 depended upon the play of the Imagination in its 
 freedom, where it is we who receive nature with 
 favour, not nature which shows us favour. The 
 property of nature that gives us occasion to per- 
 ceive the inner purposiveness in the relation of our 
 mental faculties in judging certain of its products' 
 — a purposiveness which is to be explained on 
 supersensible grounds as necessary and universal — 
 cannot be a natural purpose or be judged by us as< 
 such ; for otherwise the judgment hereby determined 
 would not be free, and would have at its basis 
 heteronomy, and not, as beseems a judgment of 
 taste, autonomy. 
 
 In beautiful Art the principle of the Idealism of 
 purposiveness is still clearer. As in the case of 
 the beautiful in Nature an sesthetical Realism of this 
 purposiveness cannot be perceived by sensations 
 (for then the art would be only pleasant, not beauti- 
 ful). But that the satisfaction produced by aesthetical 
 Ideas must not depend on the attainment of definite 
 purposes (as in mechanically designed art), and that 
 consequently, in the very rationalism of the principle, 
 the ideality of the purposes and not their reality \ 
 must be fundamental, appears from the fact that ( 
 beautiful Art, as such, must not be considered as a ' 
 product of Understanding and Science, but of Genius, 
 and therefore must get its rule through cEstJietical 
 Ideas, which are essentially different from rational 
 Ideas of definite purposes, 
 
 j just as the ideality of the objects of sense as 
 phenomena is the onty^^R^y^ of explaining the possi- 
 bility of their forms being susceptible of a priori 
 determination, so the idealism of purposiveness, in
 
 248 A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 judging the beautiful in nature and art, is the only 
 hypothesis under which Kritik can explain the 
 possibility of a judgment of taste which demands 
 a pj'iori validity for every one (without grounding 
 on concepts the purposiveness that is represented in 
 the Object). 
 
 § 59- Of Beauty as the symbol of Morality 
 
 Intuitions are always required to establish the 
 reality of our concepts. If the concepts are empiri- 
 cal, the intuitions are called examples. If they are 
 pure concepts of Understanding, the intuitions are 
 called schemata. If we desire to establish the 
 objective reality of rational concepts, i.e. of Ideas, 
 on behalf of theoretical cognition, then we are asking 
 for something impossible, because absolutely no 
 intuition can be given which shall be adequate to 
 them. 
 
 All Jiypotyposis (presentation, siibjectio sub ad- 
 spectuiii), or sensible illustration, is twofold. It is 
 either schematieal, when to a concept comprehended 
 by the Understanding the corresponding intuition is 
 given ; or it is symbolical. In the latter case to a 
 concept only thinkable by the Reason, to which no 
 sensible intuition can be adequate, an intuition is 
 supplied with which accords a procedure of the Judg- 
 ment analogous to what it observes in schematism, 
 i.e. merely analogous to the rule of this procedure, 
 not to the intuition itself, consequently to the form 
 of reflection merely and not to its content. 
 
 There is a use of the word symbolical that has 
 been adopted by modern logicians, which is mis- 
 leading and incorrect, i.e. to speak of the symbolical 
 mode of representation as if it were opposed to the
 
 Div. 11 § 59 SCHEMA AND SYMBOL 249 
 
 intuitive', for the symbolical is only a mode of the 
 
 Jntuitive. The latter (the intuitive), that is, may 
 
 I be divided into the schematical and the synnbolicati 
 
 \ modes of representation. Both are hypotyposes, i.e. \ 
 
 I presentations {exhibitiones) ; not mere characterisa- I 
 
 tions, or designations of concepts by accompanying 
 \ sensible signs which contain nothing belonging to 
 ' the intuition of the Object, and only serve as a 
 means for reproducing the concepts, according to 
 the law of association of the Imagination, and con- 
 sequently in a subjective point of view. These are 
 \ either words, or visible (algebraical, even mimetical) 
 signs, as mere expressions for concepts.^ 
 " _Allu ntujliQftSy--vv4H€4^-W€— supply, to concepts a 
 prion, are therefore. &\xh^^.scJic}uat£L-&^~syj2iboIs, of 
 wETcFThe former_Qontain direct, the latter indirect, 
 prese ntations of t he concept. ^The former do this 
 emonstrativeIy~; the latter _by_mea ri^ c^'^ an anal ogy / 
 iox which we~avail ourselves even of empirical 
 intuitions) in which the Judgment exercises a double 
 function ; first applying the concept to the object 
 of a sensible intuition, and then applying the mere 
 rule of the reflection made upon that intuition to a 
 quite different object of which the first is only the 
 symbol. Thus a monarchical state is represented 
 by a living body, if it is governed by national 
 laws, and by a mere machine (like a hand-mill) if 
 governed by an individual absolute will ; but in both 
 cases only symbolically. For between a despotic 
 state and a hand-mill there is, to be sure, no similar- 
 ity ; but there is a similarity in the rules according 
 
 1 The intuitive in cognition must be opposed to the discursive 
 (not to the symbohcal). The former is either schciiiatical, by demon- 
 stration ; or symbolical, as a representation in accordance with a 
 mere analogy.
 
 250 A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 to which we reflect upon these two things and their 
 causality. This matter has not been sufficiently ana- 
 lysed hitherto, for it deserves a deeper investigation ; 
 but this is not the place to linger over it. Our 
 language \i.e. German] is full of indirect presenta- 
 tions of this sort, in which the expression does not 
 contain the proper schema for the concept, but 
 merely a symbol for reflection. Thus the words 
 ground (support, basis), to depend (to be held up from 
 above), lo flow from something (instead of, to follow), 
 substance (as Locke expresses it, the support of 
 accidents), and countless others, are not schematical 
 but symbolical hypotyposes and expressions for con- 
 cepts, not by means of a direct intuition, but only 
 by analog)' with it, i.e. by the transference of reflec- 
 tion upon an object of intuition to a quite different 
 concept to which perhaps an intuition can never 
 directly correspond. If we are to give the name of 
 cognition to a mere mode of representation (which 
 is quite permissible if the latter is not a principle of 
 the theoretical determination of what an object is in 
 itself, but of the practical determination of what the 
 Idea of it should be for us and for its purposive use), 
 then all our knowledge of God is merely symbolical ; 
 and he who regards it as schematical, along with the 
 properties of Understanding, Will, etc., which only 
 establish their objective reality in beings of this 
 world, falls into Anthropomorphism, just as he who 
 gives up every intuitive element falls into Deism, by 
 which nothing at all is cognised, not even in a 
 practical point of view. 
 
 Now I say the Beautiful is the symbol of the 
 
 yj morally Good, and that it is only in this respect (a 
 
 reference w^hich is natural to every man and which 
 
 every man postulates in others as a duty) that it
 
 Div. 11 ? 59 BEAUTY AND GOODNESS 251 
 
 gives pleasure with a claim for the agreement of 
 every one else. |f By this the mind is made conscious 
 of a certain errnoblement and elevation above the 
 mere sensibility to pleasure received through sense, 
 and the worth of others is estimated in accordance 
 with a like maxim of their Judgment. That is the 
 intelligible, to which, as pointed out in the preceding 
 paragraph, Taste looks ; with which our higher 
 cognitive faculties are in accord ; and without which 
 a downriorht contradiction would arise between their 
 nature and the claims made bv taste. In this 
 faculty the Judgment does not see itself, as in empiri- 
 cal judging, subjected to a heteronomy of empirical 
 laws ; it gives the law to itself in respect ot the 
 objects of so pure a satisfaction, just as the Reason 
 does in respect of the faculty of desire. Hence, 
 both on account of this inner possibility in the 
 subject and of the external possibility of a nature 
 that agrees with it, it finds itself to be referred to 
 something within the subject as well as without him, 
 something which is neither nature nor freedom, but 
 which yet is connected with the supersensible ground 
 of the latter. In this supersensible ground, there- 
 fore, the theoretical faculty is bound together in 
 unity with the practical, in a way which though 
 common is yet unknown. We shall indicate some 
 points of this analogy, while at the same time we 
 shall note the differences. 
 
 (i) The beautiful pleases immediately (but only 
 in reflective intuition, not, like morality, in its 
 concept). (2) It pleases apart from any interest 
 (the morally good is indeed necessarily bound up 
 with an interest, though not with one which precedes 
 the judgment upon the satisfaction, but with one 
 which is first of all produced by it). (3) The
 
 252 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 freedotn of the Imagination (and therefore of the 
 sensibiHty of our faculty) is represented in judging 
 the beautiful as harmonious with the conformity to 
 law of the Understanding (in the moral judgment 
 the freedom of the will is thought as the harmony of 
 the latter with itself accordino- to universal laws of 
 Reason). (4) The subjective principle in judging 
 the beautiful is represented as tiniversal, i.e. as valid 
 for every man, though not cognisable through any 
 universal concept. (The objective principle of moral- 
 ity is also expounded as universal, i.e. for every 
 subject and for every action of the same subject, and 
 thus as cognisable by means of a universal concept). 
 Hence the moral judgment is not only susceptible of 
 definite constitutive principles, but is possible only by 
 grounding its maxims on these in their universality. 
 A reference to this analoQfv is usual even with 
 the common Understanding [of men], and we often 
 describe beautiful objects of nature or art by names 
 that seem to put a moral appreciation at their basis. 
 We call buildings or trees majestic and magnificent, 
 landscapes laughing and gay ; even colours are 
 called innocent, modest, tender, because they excite 
 sensations which have somethinof analoQfous to the 
 consciousness of the state of mind brought about 
 by moral judgments. Taste makes possible the 
 transition, without any violent leap, from the charm 
 of Sense to habitual moral interest ; as it represents 
 the Imagination in its freedom as capable of pur- 
 posive determination for the Understanding, and so 
 teaches us to find even in objects of sense a free 
 satisfaction apart from any charm of sense. 
 
 \
 
 APPENDIX §6o ART TEACHING 253 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 ^ 60. Of the inetJiod of Taste 
 
 The division of a Kritik into Elementology 
 and Methodology, as preparatory to science, is 
 not appHcable to the Kritik of taste, because there 
 neither is nor can be a science of the Beautiful, 
 and the judgment of taste is not determinable by 
 means of principles. As for the scientific element 
 in every art, which regards trutJi^ in the presentation 
 of its Object, this is indeed the indispensable 
 condition [conditio sine qua non) of beautiful art, 
 but not beautiful art itself. There is therefore for 
 beautiful art only a manner {inodiis), not a method 
 of teaching {jnethodus\ The master must show 
 what the pupil is to do and how he is to do it ; and 
 the universal rules, under which at last he brings 
 his procedure, serve rather for bringing the main 
 points back to his remembrance when occasion 
 requires, than for prescribing them to him. Never- 
 theless regard must be had here to a certain ideal, 
 which art must have before its eyes, although it 
 cannot be completely attained in practice. It is 
 only through exciting the Imagination of the pupil 
 to accordance with a given concept, by making him 
 note the inadequacy of the expression for the Idea, 
 to which the concept itself does not attain because 
 it is an aesthetical Idea, and by severe Kritik, that 
 he can be prevented from taking the examples set 
 before him as types and models for imitation, to 
 be subjected to no higher standard or independent 
 judgment. It is thus that genius, and with it the 
 freedom of the Imagination, is stifled by its very
 
 254 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part i 
 
 conformity to law ; and without these no beautiful 
 art, and not even an accurately judging individual 
 taste, is possible. 
 
 The propaedeutic to all beautiful art, regarded in 
 the highest degree of its perfection, seems to lie, 
 not in precepts, but in the culture of the mental 
 powers by means of those elements of knowledge 
 called Jiuumnio)'a, probably because humanity on the 
 one side indicates the universal feeling of sympathy, 
 and on the other the faculty of being able to com- 
 vmnicate universally our inmost [feelings]. For 
 these properties taken together constitute the charac- 
 teristic social spirit ^ of humanity by which it is 
 distinofuished from the limitations of animal life. 
 The age and peoples, in which the impulse towards 
 a law-abiding social life, by which a people becomes 
 a permanent community, contended with the great 
 difficulties presented by the difficult problem of 
 uniting freedom (and equality) with compulsion 
 (rather of respect and submission from a sense of 
 duty than of fear) — such an age and such a people 
 naturally first found out the art of reciprocal com- 
 munication of Ideas between the cultivated and 
 uncultivated classes and thus discovered how to 
 harmonise the large-mindedness and refinement of 
 the former with the natural simplicity and origin- 
 ality of the latter. In this way they first found that 
 mean between the higher culture and simple nature 
 which furnishes that true standard for taste as a 
 sense universal to all men which no general rules 
 can supply. 
 
 With difficulty will a later age dispense with 
 those models, because it will be always farther 
 
 r 
 ^ [I read Geselligkeit with Rosenkranz ; Hartenstein and Kirch- 
 
 mann have Cliickseligkeit.']
 
 APPENDIX 1 60 PROPAEDEUTIC TO TASTE 255 
 
 from nature ; and in fine, without having permanent 
 examples before it, a concept will hardly be possible, 
 in one and the same people, of the happy union of 
 the law-abiding^ constraint of the hio-hest culture with 
 the force and truth of free nature which feels its own 
 proper worth. 
 
 Now taste is at bottom a faculty for judging of 
 the sensible illustration of moral Ideas (by means 
 of a certain analogy involved in our reflection upon 
 both these) ; and it is from this faculty also and 
 from the greater susceptibility grounded thereon 
 for the feeling arising from the latter (called moral 
 feeling), that that pleasure is derived which taste 
 reo^ards as valid for mankind in general and not 
 merely for the private feeling of each. Hence 
 it appears plain that the true propaedeutic for the 
 foundation of taste is the development of moral 
 Ideas and the culture of the moral feeling ; because 
 it is onlv when sensibilitv is brought into aQ^reement 
 with this that genuine taste can assume a definite 
 invariable form. 
 
 r
 
 THE KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 PART II 
 
 KRITIK OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT
 
 § 6i. Of the objective pin^posiveiiess of Nature 
 
 We have on transcendental principles good 
 ground to assume a_subjective purposiveness in 
 nature, in its particular laws, in reference to its 
 comprehensibility by human Judgment and to the 
 possibility of the connection of particular experiences 
 in a system.> This may be expected as possible in 
 many products of nature, which, as if they were 
 established quite specially for our Judgment, contain 
 a specific form conformable thereto, which through 
 their manifoldness and unity serve at once to 
 strengthen and to sustain the mental powers (that 
 come into play in the employment of this faculty), 
 and to these we therefore give the name of beaiUiful 
 forms. 
 
 But that the things of nature serve one another 
 as means to purposes, and that their possibility is 
 only completely intelligible through this kind of 
 causality — for this we have absolutely no ground in 
 the universal Idea of nature, as the complex of the 
 objects of sense. In the above-mentioned case, the 
 representation of things, because it is something in 
 ourselves, can be quite well thought a priori as 
 suitable and useful for the internally purposive 
 determination of our cognitive faculties ; but that 
 purposes, which neither are our own nor belong to 
 nature (for we do not regard nature as an intelligent
 
 26o KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 being), could or should constitute a particular kind of 
 causality, at least a quite special conformity to law, 
 — this we have absolutely no a priori reason for 
 presuming. Yet more, experience itself cannot prove 
 to us the actuality of this ; there must then have 
 preceded a rationalising subtlety which only sport- 
 ively introduces the concept of purpose into the 
 nature of things, but which does not derive it from 
 Objects or from their empirical cognition. To this 
 latter it is of more service to make nature compre- 
 hensible according to analogy with the subjective 
 ground of the connection of our representations, 
 than to cognise it from objective grounds. 
 
 Further, objective purposiveness, as a principle 
 of the possibility of things of nature, is so far re- 
 moved from necessary connection with the concept 
 of nature, that it is much oftener precisely that upon 
 which one relies to prove the contingency of nature 
 and of its form. When, e.g., we adduce the struc- 
 ture of a bird, the hollowness of its bones, the 
 disposition of its wings for motion and of its tail for 
 steering, etc., we say that all this is contingent in the 
 highest degree according to the mere nexus effectivus 
 of nature, without calling in the aid of a particular 
 kind of causality, namely that of purpose {iiexus 
 Jinalis). In other words, nature, considered as mere 
 mechanism, can produce its forms in a thousand 
 different ways without stumbling upon unity in ac- 
 cordance with such a principle. It is not in the 
 concept of n^iture but quite apart from it that we 
 can hope to find the least ground a priori for this. 
 
 Nevertheless the teleological act of judgment is 
 rightly brought to bear, at least problematically, 
 upon the investigation of nature ; but only in order 
 to bring it under principles of observation and
 
 § 6i OBJECTIVE PURPOSIVENESS 261 
 
 inquiry according to the analogy with the causahty 
 of purpose, without any pretence to explain it there- 
 by. It belongs therefore to the reflective and not 
 to the determinant judgment. The concept of com- 
 binations and forms of nature in accordance with 
 purposes is then at least one principle more for 
 bringing its phenomena under rules where the laws 
 of simply mechanical causality do not suffice. For 
 we bring in a teleological ground, where we attribute 
 causality in respect of an Object to the con^cept of 
 an Object, as if it were to be found in nature (not 
 in ourselves) ; or rather when we represent to our- 
 selves the possibility of the Object after the analogy 
 of that causality which we experience in ourselves, 
 and consequently think nature technically as through 
 a special faculty. If, on the other hand, we did not 
 ascribe to it such a method of action, its causality 
 would have to be represented as blind mechanism. 
 If, on the contrary, we supply to nature causes acting 
 designedly, and consequently place at its basis teleo- 
 logy, not merely as a regulative principle for the 
 m^ro. jzidging of phenomena, to which nature can be 
 thought as subject in its particular laws, but as a 
 constihttive principle of the derivation of its products 
 from their causes ; then would the concept of a 
 natural purpose no longer belong to the reflective 
 but to the determinant Judgment. Then, in fact, it 
 would not belong specially to the Judgment (like 
 the concept of beauty regarded as formal subjective 
 purposiveness), but as a rational concept it would 
 introduce into a natural science a new causality, 
 which we only borrow from ourselves and ascribe 
 to other beings, without meaning to assume them 
 to be of the same kind with ourselves.
 
 FIRST DIVISION 
 
 ANALYTIC OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT 
 
 § 62. Of the objective purposizxiicss wJiich is merely 
 foj'inal as distinguished from that which is material 
 
 All geometrical figures drawn on a principle 
 display a manifold, oft admired, objective purposive- 
 ness : i.e. in reference to their usefulness for the 
 solution of several problems by a single principle, 
 or of the same problem in an infinite variety of 
 ways. The purposiveness is here obviously ob- 
 jective and intellectual, not merely subjective and 
 sesthetical. For it expresses the suitability of the 
 figure for the production of many intended figures, 
 and is cognised through Reason. But this pur- 
 posiveness does not make the concept of the object 
 itself possible, i.e. it is not regarded as possible 
 merely with reference to this use. 
 
 In so simple a figure as the circle lies the key 
 to the solution of a multitude of problems, each of 
 which would demand various appliances ; whereas 
 their solution results of itself, as it were, as one of 
 the infinite number of excellent properties of this 
 figure. Are we, for example, asked to construct a 
 triangle, being given the base and vertical angle ? 
 The problem is indeterminate, i.e. it can be solved 
 in an infinite number of wavs. But the circle 
 embraces them all together as the geometrical locus
 
 Div. I § 62 GEOMETRICAL FIGURES 263 
 
 of the vertices of triangles satisfying the given 
 conditions. Again, suppose that two Hnes are to 
 cut one another so that the rectangle under the 
 segments of the one should be equal to the rect- 
 angle under the segments of the other ; the solution 
 of the problem from this point of view presents 
 much difficulty. But all chords intersecting inside 
 a circle divide one another in this pi'oportion. Other 
 curved lines suggest other purposive solutions of 
 which nothing was thought in the rule that furnished 
 their construction. All conic sections in themselves 
 and when compared with one another are fruitful 
 in principles for the solution of a number of possible 
 problems, however simple is the definition which 
 determines their concept. — It is a true joy to see 
 the zeal with which the old geometers investigated 
 the properties of lines of this class, without allowing 
 themselves to be led astray by the questions of nar- 
 row-minded persons, as to what use this knowledge 
 would be. Thus they worked out the properties of 
 the parabola without knowing the law of gravitation, 
 which would have suggested to them its application 
 to the trajectory of heavy bodies (for the motion of 
 a heavy body can be seen to be parallel to the curve 
 of a parabola). Again, they found out the properties 
 of an ellipse without surmising that any of the 
 heavenly bodies had weight, and without knowing 
 the law of force at different distances from the point 
 of attraction, which causes it to describe this curve 
 in free motion. While they thus unconsciously 
 worked for the science of the future, they delighted 
 themselves with a purposiveness in the [essential] 
 being of things which yet they were able to present 
 completely a priori in its necessity. Plato, himself 
 master of this science, hinted at such an original
 
 264 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 constitution of things in the discovery of which we 
 can dispense with all experience, and at the power 
 of the mind to produce from its supersensible prin- 
 ciple the harmony of beings (where the properties 
 of number come in, with which the mind plays in 
 music). This [he touches upon] in the inspiration 
 that raised him above the concepts of experience to 
 Ideas, which seem to him to be explicable only 
 through an intellectual affinity with the origin of all 
 beings. No wonder that he banished from his 
 school the man who was ignorant of geometry, since 
 he thought he could derive from pure intuition, 
 which has its home in the human spirit, that which 
 Anaxagoras drew from empirical objects and their 
 purposive combination. For in the very necessity 
 of that which is purposive, and is constituted just as 
 if it were desiofnedlv intended for our use, — but at 
 the same time seems to belong originally to the 
 being of things without any reference to our use — 
 lies the ground of our great admiration of nature, 
 and that not so much external as in our own Reason. 
 It is surely excusable that this admiration should 
 through misunderstanding gradually rise to the 
 height of fanaticism. 
 
 But this intellectual purposiveness, although no 
 doubt objective (not subjective like sesthetical 
 purposiveness), is in reference to its possibility 
 merely formal (not real). It can only be conceived 
 as purposiveness in general without any [definite] 
 purpose being assumed as its basis, and consequently 
 without teleoloofv beine needed for it. The fioure of 
 a circle is an intuition which is determined bv means 
 of__^^]ije---tfTTdCTstahtnTin' accord mg to a principle. 
 The joaky— uf tHis principle which T arbitrarily 
 assume a^nd^ljse as fundamental con^eptTapplied to
 
 Div. I § 62 REAL PURPOSIVENESS 265 
 
 a^orm ofintuition_Jspace) which is met with in 
 mysel£-as_a^_r£prgsejTtalion^^ renHers 
 
 i ntelliffibl^-^e unity of m 3ivy^-ttd:es--^'esiiking;^-j^Qfli 
 the constructio n of that con cept, whi£h--ajJ&-^^ttffiQsive 
 for many possible designs. But this purposiveness 
 does not~inTpiy--ar-^^u«^^ii2i:^-OF-any other ground what- 
 ever. It is quite different if I meet with order and 
 regularity in complexes of things, external to my- 
 self, enclosed within certain boundaries ; as, e.g., in 
 a garden, the order and regularity of th^ trees, 
 flower-beds, and walks. These I cannot expect to 
 derive a prioid from my bounding of space made 
 after a rule of my own ; for this order and regularity 
 are existing things which must be given empirically 
 in order to be known, and not a mere representation 
 in myself determined a priori according to a prin- 
 ciple. So then the latter (empirical) purposiveness, 
 as real, is dependent on the concept of a purpose. 
 
 But the ground of admiration for a perceived 
 purposiveness, although it be in the being of things 
 (so far as their concepts can be constructed), may 
 be very well involved and apprehended as rightful. 
 The manifold rules whose unity (derived from a 
 principle) excites admiration, are all synthetical and 
 do not follow from the concept of the Object as in 
 the case of the circle ; but require this Object to 
 be given in intuition. Hence this unity gets the 
 appearance of having empirically an external basis 
 of rules distinct from our representative faculty ; as 
 if therefore the correspondence of the Object to that 
 need of rules which is proper to the Understanding 
 were contingent in itself, and therefore only possible 
 by means of a purpose expressly directed thereto. 
 Now because this harmony, notwithstanding all this 
 purposiveness, is not cognised empirically but a
 
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 268 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 because through it the Understanding as the faculty 
 of concepts, and the Imagination as the faculty of 
 presenting them, feel themselves strengthened a 
 priori. (This, when viewed in connection with the 
 precision introduced by Reason, is spoken of as 
 elegant.) Here, however, the satisfaction, although 
 it is based on concepts, is subjective ; while per- 
 fection brings with itself an objective satisfaction. 
 
 \(i2)' Of the relative as distinguished froin the 
 imier piLrposiveness of nature 
 
 Experience leads our Judgment to the concept of 
 an objective and material purposiveness, i.e. to the 
 concept of a purpose of nature, only when ^ we have 
 to judge of a relation of cause to effect which we 
 find ourselves able to apprehend as legitimate only 
 by presupposing the Idea of the effect of the 
 causality of the cause as the fundamental condi- 
 tion, in the cause, of the possibility of the effect. 
 This can take place in two ways. We may regard 
 the effect directly as an art product, or only as 
 material for the art of other possible natural beings ; 
 in other words, either as a purpose or as a means 
 towards the purposive employment of other causes. 
 This latter purposiveness is called utility (for man) 
 or mere advantage (for other creatures), and is 
 merely relative ; while the former is an inner pur- 
 posiveness of the natural being. 
 
 For example, rivers bring down with them all 
 kinds of earth serviceable for the growth of plants 
 
 ^ As in pure mathematic we can never talk of the existence, but 
 only of the possibility of things, viz. of an intuition corresponding to 
 a concept, and so never of cause and effect, it follows that all 
 purposiveness observed there must be considered merely as formal 
 and never as a natural purpose.
 
 Div. I § 63 RELA TIVE PURPOSIVENESS 269 
 
 which sometimes is deposited inland, often also at 
 their mouths. The tide brings this mud to many 
 coasts over the land or deposits it on the shore ; 
 and so, more especially if men give their aid so 
 that the ebb shall not carry it back again, the fruit- 
 bearing land increases in area, and the vegetable 
 kingdom gains the place which formerly was the 
 habitation of fish and shells. In this way has nature 
 itself brought about most of the extensions of the 
 land, and still continues to do so, although very 
 slowly. — Now the question is whether this is to 
 be judged a purpose of nature, because it contains 
 profit for men. We cannot put it down to the account 
 of the vegetable kingdom, because just as much is 
 subtracted from sea-life as is added to land-life. 
 
 Or, to give an example of the advantageousness 
 of certain natural thinsfs as means for other creatures 
 (if we suppose them to be means), no soil is more 
 suitable to pine trees than a sandy soil. Now the 
 deep sea, before it withdrew from the land, left 
 behind laro^e tracts of sand in our northern regions, 
 so that on this soil, so unfavourable for all cultiva- 
 tion, widely extended pine forests were enabled to 
 grow, for the unreasoning destruction of which 
 we frequently blame our ancestors. We may ask if 
 this original deposit of tracts of sand w^as a purpose 
 of nature for the benefit of the possible pine forests ? 
 So much is clear, that if we regard this as a pur- 
 pose of nature, we must also regard the sand as a 
 relative purpose, in reference to which the ocean 
 strand and its withdrawal were means : for in the 
 series of the mutually subordinated members of a 
 purposive combination, every member must be 
 regarded as a purpose (though not as a final 
 purpose), to which its proximate cause is the means.
 
 270 A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part li 
 
 So too if cattle, sheep, horses, etc., are to exist, 
 there must be grass on the earth, but there must 
 also be saline plants in the desert if camels are to 
 thrive ; and again these and other herbivorous 
 animals must be met with in numbers if there are 
 to be wolves, tigers, and lions. Consequently the 
 objective purposiveness, which is based upon ad- 
 vantage, is not an objective purposiveness of 
 things in themselves ; as if the sand could not be 
 conceived for itself as an effect of a cause, viz. the 
 sea, without attributing to the latter a purpose, and 
 regarding the effect, namely the sand, as a work of 
 art. It is a merely relative purposiveness contin- 
 gent upon the thing to which it is ascribed ; and 
 although in the examples we have cited, the dif- 
 ferent kinds of grass are to be judged as in 
 themselves organised products of nature, and con- 
 sequently as artificial, yet are they to be regarded, 
 in reference to the beasts which feed upon them, as 
 mere raw material. 
 
 But above all, though man, through the freedom 
 of his causality, finds certain natural things of 
 advantaofe for his desip-ns — desis^ns often foolish, 
 such as using the variegated plumage of birds to 
 adorn his clothes, or coloured earths and the juices 
 of plants for painting his face ; often again reason- 
 able as when the horse is used for riding, the ox or 
 (as in Minorca) the ass or pig for ploughing — yet 
 we cannot even here assume a relative natural pur- 
 pose. For his Reason knows how to give things 
 a conformity with his own arbitrary fancies for which 
 he was not at all predestined by nature. Only, if 
 we assume that men are to live upon the earth, then 
 the means must be there without which they could 
 not exist as animals, and even as rational animals
 
 Div. I § 63 RELATIVE PURPOSIVENESS 271 
 
 (in however low a degree of rationality) ; and there- 
 upon those natural things, which are indispensable in 
 this regard, must be considered as natural purposes. 
 
 We can hence easily see that external purpos- 
 iveness (advantage of one thing in respect of others) 
 can be regarded as an external natural purpose only 
 under the condition, that the existence of that 
 [being], to which it is immediately or distantly 
 advantageous, is in itself a purpose of nature. 
 Since that can never be completely determined by 
 mere contemplation of nature, it follows that rela- 
 tive purposiveness, although it hypothetically gives 
 indications of natural purposes, yet justifies no ab- 
 solute teleological judgment. 
 
 Snow in cold countries protects the crops from 
 the frost ; it makes human intercourse easier (by 
 means of sleighs). The Laplander finds in his 
 country animals by whose aid this intercourse is 
 brought about, i.e. reindeer, who find sufficient 
 sustenance in a dry moss which they have to 
 scratch out for themselves from under the snow, 
 and who are easily tamed and readily permit them- 
 selves to be deprived of that freedom in which they 
 could have remained if they chose. For other 
 people in the same frozen regions marine animals 
 afford rich stores ; in addition to the food and 
 clothing which are thus supplied, and the wood 
 w^hich is floated in by the sea to their dwellings, 
 these marine animals provide material for fuel by 
 which their huts are warmed. Here is a wonderful 
 concurrence of many references of nature to one 
 purpose ; and all this applies to the cases of the 
 Greenlander, the Lapp, the Samoyede, the inhabit- 
 ant of Yakutsk, etc. But then we do not see why, 
 generally, men must live there at all. Therefore to say
 
 272 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 that vapour falls out of the atmosphere in the form of 
 snow, that the sea has its currents which float down 
 wood that has grown in warmer lands, and that 
 there are in it great sea monsters filled with oil, 
 because the idea of advantage for certain poor 
 creatures is fundamental for the cause which collects 
 all these natural products, would be a very ven- 
 turesome and arbitrary judgment. For even if there 
 were none of this natural utility, we should miss 
 nothing as regards the adequateness of natural 
 causes to [man's] constitution ; much more even to 
 desire such a tendency in, and to attribute such a 
 purpose to, nature would be the part of a presump- 
 tuous and inconsiderate fancy. For indeed it might 
 be observed that it could only have been the greatest 
 want of harmony among men which thus scattered 
 them into such inhospitable regions. 
 
 § 64. Of the peculiar character of things as 
 natiiral purposes 
 
 In order to see that a thing is only possible as a 
 purpose, that is to be forced to seek the causality of 
 its origin not in the mechanism of nature but in a 
 cause whose faculty of action is determined through 
 concepts, it is requisite that its form be not possible 
 according to mere natural laws, i.e. laws which can 
 be cognised by us through the Understanding alone 
 when applied to objects of Sense ; but that even the 
 empirical knowledge of it as regards its cause and 
 effect presupposes concepts of Reason. This con- 
 tingency of its form in all empirical natural laws in 
 reference to Reason affords a ground for regarding 
 its causality as possible only through Reason. For 
 Reason, which must cognise the necessity of every 
 
 I
 
 Div. I § 64 NATURAL PURPOSES 273 
 
 form of a natural product in order to comprehend 
 even the conditions of its genesis, cannot assume 
 such [natural] necessity in that particular given form. 
 The causality of its origin is then referred to the 
 faculty of acting in accordance with purposes (a 
 will) ; and the Object which can only thus be re- 
 presented as possible is represented as a purpose. 
 
 If in a seemingly uninhabited country a man 
 perceived a geometrical figure, say a regular hexagon, 
 inscribed on the sand, his reflection busied with such 
 a concept would attribute, although obscurely, the 
 unity in the principle of its genesis to Reason, and 
 consequently would not regard as a ground of the 
 possibility of such a shape the sand, or the neigh- 
 bouring sea, or the winds, or beasts with familiar 
 footprints, or any other irrational cause. For the 
 chance against meeting with such a concept, which is 
 only possible through Reason, would seem so 
 infinitely great, that it would be just as if there were 
 no natural law, no cause in the mere mechanical 
 working of nature capable of producing it ; but as 
 if only the concept of such an Object, as a concept 
 which Reason alone can supply and with which it 
 can compare the thing, could contain the causality 
 for such an effect. This then would be regarded as 
 a purpose, but as a product of art, not as a natural 
 purpose {vestigiiuu hoininis video)} 
 
 But in order to regard a thing cognised as a 
 natural product as a purpose also — consequently as a 
 natural purpose, if this is not a contradiction — some- 
 thing more is required. I would say provisionally : 
 
 [1 The allusion is to Vitruvius dc Architectura, Bk. vi. Praef. 
 " Aristippus philosophus Socraticus, naufragio cum ejectus ad Rhodi- 
 ensium litus animadvertisset geometrica schemata descripta, exclam- 
 avisse ad comites ita dicitur, Bene speremus, hominum enim vestigia 
 video."] 
 
 T
 
 274 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part li 
 
 a thing exists as a natural purpose, if it is [although 
 in a double sense] ^ both cause and cjfcct of itself. 
 For herein lies a causality the like of which cannot 
 be combined with the mere concept of a nature with- 
 out attributing to it a purpose ; it can certainly be 
 thought without contradiction, but cannot be com- 
 prehended. We shall elucidate the determination 
 of this Idea of a natural purpose by an example, 
 before we analyse it completely. 
 
 In the first place, a tree generates another tree 
 according to a known natural law. But the tree 
 produced is of the same genus ; and so it produces 
 itself generically. On the one hand, as effect it is 
 continually self-produced ; on the other hand, as 
 cause it continually produces itself, and so perpetuates 
 itself generically. 
 
 Secondly, a tree produces itself as an individtial. 
 This kind of effect no doubt we call c^rowth ; but 
 it is quite different from any increase according to 
 mechanical laws, and is to be reckoned as generation, 
 though under another name. The matter that the 
 tree incorporates it previously works up into a speci- 
 fically peculiar quality, which natural mechanism ex- 
 ternal to it cannot supply ; and thus it develops itself 
 by aid of a material which, as compounded, is its own 
 product. No doubt, as regards the constituents got 
 from nature without, it must only be regarded as an 
 educt ; but yet in the separation and recombination 
 of this raw material we see such an oriorinalitv in 
 the separating and formative faculty of this kind of 
 natural being, as is infinitely beyond the reach of art, 
 if the attempt is made to reconstruct such vegetable 
 products out of elements obtained by their dissection 
 or material supplied by nature for their sustenance. 
 
 1 [Second Edition.]
 
 Div. I § 65 EXAMPLE 275 
 
 Thirdly, each part of a tree generates itself in 
 such a way that the maintenance of any one part 
 depends reciprocally on the maintenance of the rest. 
 A bud of one tree engrafted on the twig of another 
 produces in the alien stock a plant of its own kind, 
 and so also a scion engrafted on a foreign stem. 
 Hence we may regard each twig or leaf of the same 
 tree as merely engrafted or inoculated into it, and 
 so as an independent tree attached to another and 
 parasitically nourished by it. At the same time, 
 while the leaves are products of the tree they also in 
 turn give support to it ; for the repeated defoliation 
 of a tree kills it, and its growth thus depends on 
 the action of the leaves upon the stem. The self- 
 help of nature in case of injury in the vegetable 
 creation, when the want of a part that is necessary 
 for the maintenance of its neighbours is supplied 
 by the remaining parts ; and the abortions or mal- 
 formations in growth, in which certain parts, on 
 account of casual defects or hindrances, form them- 
 selves in a new way to maintain what exists, and so 
 produce an anomalous creature, I shall only mention 
 •in passing, though they are among the most won- 
 derful properties of organised creatures. 
 
 § 65. Things regarded as natural purposes are 
 organised beings 
 
 According to the character alleged in the pre- 
 ceding section, a thing, which, though a natural pro- 
 duct, is to be cognised as only possible as a natural 
 purpose, must bear itself alternately as cause and as 
 effect. This, however, is a somewhat inexact and 
 indeterminate expression which needs derivation 
 from a determinate concept.
 
 276 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part 1 1 
 
 Causal combination as thought merely by the 
 Understanding is a connection constituting an ever- 
 progressive series (of causes and effects) ; and things 
 which as effects presuppose others as causes cannot be 
 reciprocally at the same time causes of these. This 
 sort of causal combination we call that of effective 
 causes {iiextts effectivus). But on the other hand, a 
 causal combination according to a concept of Reason 
 (of purposes) can also be thought, which regarded 
 as a series would lead either forwards or backwards ; 
 in this the thing that has been called the effect 
 may with equal propriety be termed the cause of 
 that of which it is the effect. In the practical 
 department of human art we easily find connections 
 such as this ; e.g. a house, no doubt, is the cause of 
 the money received for rent, but also conversely 
 the representation of this possible income was the 
 cause of buildincj the house. Such a causal connec- 
 tion we call that of final causes {iiexus finalis). We 
 may perhaps suitably name the first the connection 
 of real causes, the second of those which are ideal ; 
 because from this nomenclature it is at once compre- 
 hended that there can be no more than these two 
 kinds of causality. 
 
 For a thing to be a natural purpose in \\\^ first 
 place it is requisite that its parts (as regards their 
 presence and their form) are only possible through 
 their reference to the whole. For the thing itself is 
 a purpose and so is comprehended under a concept 
 or an Idea which must determine a prioid all that 
 is to be contained in it. But so far as a thing is 
 only thought as possible in this way, it is a mere 
 work of art ; i.e. a product of one rational cause 
 distinct from the matter (of the parts), whose 
 causality (in the collection and combination of the
 
 Div. I § 65 ORGANISED BEINGS 277 
 
 parts) is determined through its Idea of a whole 
 possible by their means (and consequently not 
 through external nature). 
 
 But if a thing as a natural product is to involve 
 in itself and in its internal possibility a reference to 
 purposes, — i.e. to be possible only as a natural pur- 
 pose, and without the causality of the concepts of 
 rational beings external to itself, — then it is requisite 
 secondly that its parts should so combine in the unity 
 of a whole that they are reciprocally cause and effect 
 of each other's form. Only in this way can the Idea 
 of the whole conversely (reciprocally) determine the 
 form and combination of all the parts ; not indeed as 
 cause — for then it would be an artificial product — 
 but as the ground of cognition, for him who is 
 judging it, of the systematic unity and combination 
 of all the manifold contained in the given material. 
 
 For a body then which is to be judged in itself 
 and its internal possibility as a natural purpose, it 
 is requisite that its parts mutually depend upon each 
 other both as to their form and their combination, 
 and so produce a whole by their own causality ; 
 while conversely the concept of the whole may be 
 regarded as its cause according to a principle (in a 
 being possessing a causality according to concepts 
 adequate to such a product). In this case then the 
 connection of effective causes may be judged as an 
 effect through filial causes. 
 
 In such a product of nature every part not only 
 exists by means of the other parts, but is thought as 
 existing for the sake of the others and the whole, 
 that is as an (organic) instrument. Thus, however, 
 it might be an artificial instrument, and so might be 
 represented only as a purpose that is possible in 
 general ; but also its parts are all organs reciprocally
 
 278 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 p7'od2uing each other. This can never be the case 
 with artificial instruments, but only with nature which 
 supplies all the material for instruments (even for 
 those of art). Only a product of such a kind can 
 be called a uatui-al purpose, and this because it is 
 an organised and self -organising being. 
 
 In a watch one part is the instrument for moving 
 the other parts, but the wheel is not the effective 
 cause of the production of the others ; no doubt one 
 part is for the sake of the others, but it does not 
 exist by their means. In this case the producing 
 cause of the parts and of their form is not contained 
 in the nature (of the material), but is external to it in 
 a being which can produce effects according to Ideas 
 of a whole possible by means of its causality. Hence 
 a watch wheel does not produce other wheels, still 
 less does one watch produce other watches, utilising 
 (organising) foreign material for that purpose; hence 
 it does not replace of itself parts of which it has been 
 deprived, nor does it make good what is lacking in 
 a first formation by the addition of the missing parts, 
 nor if it has gone out of order does it repair itself — 
 all of which, on the contrary, we may expect from 
 organised nature.-^/An organised being is then not 
 a mere machine, for that has merely moving power, 
 but it possesses in itself formative power of a self- 
 propagating kind which it communicates to its 
 materials though they have it not of themselves ; 
 it organises them, in fact, and this cannot be ex- 
 plained by the mere mechanical faculty of motion. 
 
 We say of nature and its faculty in organised 
 products far too little if we describe it as an analogon 
 of art ; for this suggests an artificer (a rational being) 
 external to it. Much rather does it organise itself 
 and its organised products in every species, no doubt
 
 Div. i§65 ORGANISATION OF NATURE 279 
 
 after one general pattern but yet with suitable devia- 
 tions, which self-preservation demands according to 
 circumstances. We perhaps approach nearer to this 
 inscrutable property, if we describe it as an analogon 
 of life ; but then we must either endow matter, as 
 mere matter, with a property which contradicts 
 Its very being (hylozoism), or associate therewith an 
 alien principle standing in communion with it (a 
 soul). But in the latter case we must, if such a 
 product is to be a natural product, either presuppose 
 organised matter as the instrument of that soul, 
 which does not make the soul a whit more compre- 
 hensible ; or regard the soul as artificer of this 
 structure and so remove the product from (corporeal) 
 nature. Tospeak strictly, then, the organisation of 
 nature has in it nothing analogous to any causality 
 we know.^ Beauty in nature can be rightly described 
 as an analogon of art, because it is ascribed to objects 
 only in reference to reflection upon their external 
 aspect, and consequently only on account of the 
 form of their external surface. But internal natural 
 perfectim, as it belongs to those things which are 
 only possible as natural purposes, and are therefore 
 called organised beings, is not analogous to any 
 physical, i.e. natural, faculty known to us ; nay even, 
 regarding ourselves as, in the widest sense, belong- 
 
 1 We can conversely throw light upon a certain combination, 
 much more often met with in Idea than in actuality, by means of an 
 analogy to the so-called immediate natural purposes. In a recent 
 complete transformation, of a great people into a state the word 
 organisation for the regulation of magistracies, etc., and even of the 
 whole body politic, has often been fitly used. For in such a whole 
 every member should surely be purpose as well as means, and, whilst 
 all work together towards the possibility of the whole, each should 
 be determined as regards place and function by means of the Idea 
 of the whole. [Kant probably alludes here to the organisation of 
 the United States of America.]
 
 / 2So 
 
 K' A NT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT 
 
 PART II 
 
 ingto nature, it is not even thinkable or explicable by 
 means of any exactly fitting analogy to human art. 
 
 The concept of a thing as in itsel/ja^ naitural 
 
 purpose is therefore no constitutive concept^oL 
 
 Understanding or of Reason, but it can serve as a 
 regulative concept for the reflective Judgment, to 
 guide our investigation about objects of this kind 
 by a d istant analogy wi th o ur own causajity accord- 
 ing to purposes generally, and in our meditations 
 upon their ultimate ground. This latter use, however, 
 ^ is not in reference to the knowledge of nature or of 
 ,its original ground, but rather to our own practical 
 faculty of Reason, in analogy with which we con- 
 sidered the cause of that purposiveness. 
 
 Organised beings are then the only beings in 
 nature which, considered in themselves and apart 
 from any relation to other things, can be thought as 
 possible only as purposes Df_ nature. Hence they 
 first afford objective reality to the concept of a 
 purpose of Jiatu7'e, as* distinguished from a practical 
 purpose ; and so they give to the science of nature the 
 basis for a teleology, i.e. a mode of judgment about 
 natural Objects according to a special principle 
 which otherwise we should in no way be justified 
 in introducing (because we cannot see a prion the 
 s^possibility of this kind of causality). 
 
 § 66. Of the principle of judging of intertial 
 purposiveness in organised beings 
 
 This principle, which is at the same time a 
 definition, is as follows : An organised product of 
 nature is one in which every part is reciprocally 
 pinpose [end^ and means. In it nothing is vain, with-
 
 Div. I § 66 INTERNAL PURPOSIVENESS 2S1 
 
 out purpose, or to be ascribed to a blind mechanism 
 of nature. 
 
 The principle is no doubt, as regards its occasion, 
 derived from experience, viz. from that methodised 
 experience called observation ; but on account of 
 the universality and necessity which it ascribes to 
 such purposiveness it cannot rest solely on empirical 
 grounds, but must have at its basis an a priori 
 principle, although it be merely regulative and 
 these purposes lie only in the idea of the judging 
 [subject] and not in an effective cause. We may 
 therefore describe the aforesaid principle as a maxim 
 forjudging of the internal purposiveness of organised 
 beings. 
 
 It is an acknowledged fact that the dissectors 
 of plants and animals, in order to investigate their 
 structure and to find out the reasons, why and for 
 what end such parts, such a disposition and com- 
 bination of parts, and just such an internal form 
 have been given them, assume as indisputably neces- 
 sary the maxim that nothing in such a creature is 
 vain ; just as they lay down as the fundamental 
 proposition of the universal science of nature, that 
 72^//^zV/^' happens by chance. In fact, they can as little 
 free themselves from this teleological proposition 
 as from the universal physical proposition ; for as 
 without the latter we should have no experience 
 at all, so without the former we should have no 
 guiding thread for the observation of a species 
 of natural things which we have conceived teleologi- 
 cally under the concept of natural purposes. 
 
 Now this concept brings the Reason into a 
 quite different order of things from that of a mere 
 mechanism of nature, which is no longer satisfying 
 here. An Idea is to be the ground of the possibility
 
 2S2 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part II 
 
 of the natural product. But because this is an 
 absolute unity of representation, instead of the 
 material being a plurality of things that can supply 
 by itself no definite unity of composition, — if that unity 
 of the Idea is to serve at all as the a priori ground 
 of determination of a natural law of the causality of 
 such a form of composition, — the purpose of nature 
 must be extended to everything included in its 
 product. For if we once refer action of this sort 
 on the whole to any supersensible ground of deter- 
 mination beyond the blind mechanism of nature, 
 we must judge of it altogether according to this 
 principle ; and we have then no reason to regard 
 the form of such a thing as partly dependent on 
 mechanism — for by such mixing up of disparate 
 principles no certain rule of judging would be left. 
 
 For example, it may be that in an animal body 
 many parts can be conceived as concretions accord- 
 ing to mere mechanical laws (as the hide, the bones, 
 the hair). And yet the cause which brings together 
 the required matter, modifies it, forms it, and puts 
 it in its appropriate place, must always be judged of 
 teleologically ; so that here everything must be con- 
 sidered as organised, and everything again in a 
 certain relation to the thing itself is an organ. 
 
 § 67. Of the principle of the teleological judging 
 of natiLre in geney^al as a system of purposes 
 
 We have already said above that the external 
 purposiveness of natural things affords no sufficient 
 warrant for using them as purposes of nature in 
 order to explain their presence, and for regarding 
 their contingently purposive effects as the grounds 
 of their presence according to the principle of final
 
 Div. I § 67 THE PURPOSE OF NA TURE 2S3 
 
 causes. Thus we cannot take for natural purposes, 
 rivers because they promote intercourse among 
 inland peoples, inountains because they contain the 
 sources of the rivers and for their maintenance in 
 rainless seasons have a store of snow, or the slope 
 of the land which carries away the water and leaves 
 the country dry ; because although this shape of the 
 earth's surface be very necessary for the origin and 
 maintenance of the vegetable and animal kingdoms, 
 it has nothing in itself for the possibility of which 
 we are forced to assume a causality according to 
 purposes. The same is true of plants which man 
 uses for his needs or his pleasures ; of beasts, the 
 camel, the ox, the horse, dog, etc., which are indis- 
 pensable for him as well for food as because they 
 are used in his service in many different ways. In 
 the case of things which we have no reason for 
 regarding in themselves as purposes, such external 
 relation can only be hypothetically judged as pur- 
 posive. 
 
 To judge of a thing as a natural purpose on 
 account of its internal form is something very 
 different from taking the existence of that thing to 
 be a purpose of nature. For the latter assertion 
 we require not merely the concept of a possible 
 purpose, but the knowledge of the final purpose 
 \scopus) of nature. But this requires a reference 
 of such knowledge to something supersensible far 
 transcending all our teleological knowledge of nature, 
 for the purpose of [the existence of]^ nature must 
 itself be sought beyond nature. The internal form 
 of a mere blade of grass is sufficient to show that 
 for our human faculty of judgment its origin is 
 
 1 [These words are inserted by Rosenkranz, but omitted by 
 Hartenstein and Kirchmann.]
 
 284 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT tart ii 
 
 possible only according to the rule of purposes. 
 But if we change our point of view and look to the 
 use which other natural beings make of it, abandon 
 the consideration of its internal orofanisation and 
 only look to its externally purposive references, we 
 shall arrive at no categorical purpose ; all this pur- 
 posive reference rests on an ever more distant con- 
 dition, which, as unconditioned (the presence of a 
 thing as final purpose), lies quite outside the physico- 
 teleological view of the world. For example, grass 
 is needful for the ox, which again is needful for man 
 as a means of existence, but then we do not see why 
 it is necessary that men should exist (a question 
 this, which we shall not find so easy to answer if we 
 sometimes cast our thouQfhts on the New Hollanders 
 or the inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego). So con- 
 ceived, the thing is not even a natural purpose, for 
 neither it (nor its whole genus) is to be regarded as 
 a natural product. 
 
 Hence it is only so far as matter is organised 
 that it necessarily carries with it the concept of a 
 natural purpose, because this its specific form is at 
 the same time a product of nature. But this con- 
 cept leads necessarily to the Idea of collective 
 nature as a system in accordance with the rule of 
 purposes, to which Idea all the mechanism of nature 
 must be subordinated according to principles of 
 Reason (at least in order to investigate natural 
 phenomena in it). The principle of Reason belongs 
 to it only as a subjective principle or a maxim : viz. 
 everything in the world is some way good for some- 
 thing ; nothing is vain in it. By the example that 
 nature gives us in its organic products we are justi- 
 fied, nay called upon, to expect of it and of its laws 
 nothing that is not purposive on the whole.
 
 Div. I § 67 DESIGN IN NA TURE 285 
 
 It is plain that this is not a principle for the 
 determinant but only for the reflective judgment ; 
 that it is regulative and not constitutive ; and that 
 we derive from it a clue by which we consider 
 natural things in reference to an already given ground 
 of determination according to a new law-abiding 
 order ; and extend our natural science according to 
 a different principle, viz. that of final causes, but yet 
 without prejudice to the principle of mechanical 
 causality. Furthermore, it is in no wise thus 
 decided, whether anything of which we judge by this 
 principle, is a designed purpose of nature ; whether 
 the grass is for the ox or the sheep, or whether 
 these and the other things of nature are here for 
 men. It is well also from this side to consider the 
 things which are unpleasant to us and are contrary 
 to purpose in particular references. Thus, for 
 example, we can say : The vermin that torment men 
 in their clothes, their hair, or their beds, may be, 
 according to a wise appointment of nature, a motive 
 to cleanliness which is in itself an important means 
 for the preservation of health. Or again the mos- 
 quitoes and other stinging insects that make the 
 wildernesses of America so oppressive to the savages, 
 may be so many goads to activity for these primitive 
 men, [inducing them] to drain the marshes and 
 bring light into the forests which intercept every 
 breath of air, and in this way, as well as by cultivat- 
 ing the soil, to make their habitations more healthy. 
 The same thing, which appears to men contradictory 
 to nature in its inner organisation, if viewed in this 
 lio-ht sfives an entertaininsf, sometimes an instructive, 
 outlook into a teleological order of things, to which, 
 without such a principle, mere physical observation 
 would not lead us by itself. Thus some persons
 
 286 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 regard the tapeworm as given to the men or 
 animals in whom it resides, as a kind of set-off for 
 some defect in their vital organs ; now I would ask 
 if dreams (without which we never sleep, though we 
 seldom remember them) may not be a purposive 
 ordinance of nature ? For during the relaxation of 
 all the moving powers of the body, they serve 
 to inwardly excite the vital organs by the medium 
 of the Imagination and its great activity (which in 
 this state generally rises to the height of affection). 
 During sleep the Imagination commonly is more 
 actively at play when the stomach is overloaded, in 
 which case this excitement is the more necessary. 
 Consequently, then, without this internal power of 
 motion and this fatiguing unrest, on account of which 
 we complain about our dreams (though in fact they 
 are rather remedies), sleep even in a sound state of 
 health would be a complete extinction of life. 
 
 Also the beauty of nature, i.e. its connection 
 with the free play of our cognitive faculties in 
 apprehending and judging of its appearance, can be 
 regarded as a kind of objective purposiveness of 
 nature in its whole [content] as a system of which 
 man is a member ; if once the teleoloQ-ical iudeine 
 of the same by means of the natural purposes with 
 which organised beings furnish us, has justified for 
 us the Idea of a great system of purposes of nature. 
 We can regard it as a favour ^ which nature has felt 
 
 ^ In the aesthetical part [.^^ 58, p. 247] it was said : We view beauti- 
 ful nature with favour, whilst we have a quite free (disinterested) satis- 
 faction in its form. For in this mere judgment of taste no considera- 
 tion is given to the purpose for which these natural beauties exist ; 
 whether to excite pleasure in us, or as purposes without any reference 
 to us at all. But in a teleological judgment we pay attention to 
 this reference, and here we can 7'egard it as a fai'our of 7iature that 
 it has been willing to minister to our culture by the exhibition of so 
 many beautiful figures.
 
 Div. I § 68 THE BE A UTY OF NA TURK 287 
 
 for US, that in addition to what is useful it has so 
 profusely dispensed beauty and charm ; and we can 
 therefore love it, as well as regard it with respect on 
 account of its immensity, and feel ennobled ourselves 
 by such regard ; just as if nature had established 
 and adorned its splendid theatre precisely with this 
 view. 
 
 We shall say only one thing more in this para- 
 graph. If we have once discovered in nature a 
 faculty of bringing forth products that can only be 
 thought by us in accordance with the concept of 
 final causes, we go further still. We venture to 
 judge that things belong to a system of purposes, 
 w^hich yet do not (either in themselves or in their 
 purposive relations) necessitate our seeking for any 
 principle of their possibility beyond the mechanism 
 of causes working blindly. For the first Idea, as 
 concerns its ground, already brings us beyond the 
 world of sense ; since the unity of the supersensible 
 principle must be regarded as valid in this way not 
 merely for certain species of natural beings, but for 
 the whole of nature as a system. 
 
 § 68. Of the principle of Teleology as internal 
 principle of natural science 
 
 The principles of a science are either internal to 
 it and are then called domestic {principia doniestica), 
 or are based on concepts that can only find their 
 place outside it and so tu:^ foreign principles {pere- 
 grina). Sciences that contain the latter, place at 
 the basis of their doctrines auxiliary propositions 
 {lemmata), i.e. they borrow some concept, and with 
 it a ground of arrangement, from another science. 
 
 Every science is in itself a system, and it is not
 
 288 A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 enough in it to build in accordance with principles 
 and thus to employ a technical procedure, but we 
 must go to work with it architectonically, as a 
 building subsisting for itself; we must not treat it as 
 an additional wing or part of another building, but as 
 a whole in itself, although we may subsequently 
 make a passage from it into that other or conversely. 
 
 If then we introduce into the context of natural 
 science the concept of God in order to explain the 
 purposiveness in nature, and subsequently use this 
 purposiveness to prove that there is a God, there is 
 no internal consistency in either science \i.e. either 
 in natural science or theology] ; and a delusive 
 circle brings them both into uncertainty, because 
 they have allowed their boundaries to overlap. 
 
 The expression, a purpose of nature, already 
 sufficiently prevents the confusion of mixing up 
 natural science and the occasion that it gives for 
 judging telcologically of its objects, with the con- 
 sideration of God, and so of a theological derivation 
 of them. We must not regard it as insignificant, 
 if one interchanges this expression with that of a 
 divine purpose in the ordering of nature, or gives 
 out the latter as more suitable and proper for a 
 pious soul, because it must come in the end to 
 deriving these purposive forms in nature from a 
 wise author of the world. On the contrary, we 
 must carefully and modestly limit ourselves to the 
 expression, a purpose of nature, which asserts exactly 
 as much as we know. Before we ask after the cause 
 of nature itself, we find in nature, and in the course 
 of its development, products of the same kind which 
 are developed in it according to known empirical 
 laws, in accordance with which natural science must 
 judge of its objects, and, consequently, must seek
 
 Div. I § 68 THE BOUNDS OF PHYSIC 289 
 
 in nature their causality according to the rule of 
 purposes. So then it must not transgress its bounds 
 in order to introduce into itself as a domestic principle 
 that, to whose concept no experience can be com- 
 mensurate, upon which we are only entitled to 
 venture after the completion of natural science. 
 
 Natural characteristics which demonstrate them- 
 selves a priori, and consequently admit of insight 
 into their possibility from universal principles with- 
 out any admixture of experience, although they 
 carry with them a technical purposivenes^, yet can- 
 not, because they are absolutely necessary, be referred 
 to the Teleology of nature, as to a method belonging 
 to Physic for solving its problems. Arithmetical 
 or geometrical analogies, as well as universal 
 mechanical laws, — however strange and admirable 
 may seem to us the union of different rules, quite 
 independent of one another according to all appear- 
 ance, in a single principle, — possess on that account 
 no claim to be teleological grounds of explanation 
 in Physic. Even if they deserve to be brought into 
 consideration in the universal theory of the purposive- 
 ness of things of nature, yet they belong to another 
 [science], i.e. Metaphysic, and constitute no internal 
 principle of natural science ; as with the empirical 
 laws of natural purposes in organised beings, it is not 
 only permissible but unavoidable to use the teleo- 
 logical mode of jtidging as a principle of the doctrine 
 of nature in regard to a particular class of its objects. 
 
 So to the end that Physic may keep within its 
 own bounds, it abstracts itself entirely from the 
 question, whether natural purposes are designed or 
 undesigned; for that would be to meddle in an 
 extraneous business, in Metaphysic. It is enough 
 that there are objects, alone explicable according 
 
 u
 
 290 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT i-art ii 
 
 to natural laws which we can only think by means 
 of the Idea of purposes as principle, and also alone 
 internally cognisable as concerns their internal form, 
 in this way. In order, therefore, to remove the 
 suspicion of the slightest assumption, — as if we 
 wished to mix with our cfrounds of coq^nition 
 something not belonging to Physic at all, viz. a 
 supernatural cause, — we speak, indeed, in Teleology 
 of nature as if the purposiveness in it were designed, 
 but in such a way that this design is ascribed to 
 nature, i.e. to matter. Now in this way there can 
 be no misunderstanding, because no design in the 
 proper meaning of the word can possibly be ascribed 
 to inanimate matter ; we thus give notice that this 
 word here only expresses a principle of the reflective 
 not of the determinant Judgment, and so is to 
 introduce no particular ground of causality ; but 
 only adds for the use of the Reason a different 
 kind of investigation from that according to 
 mechanical laws, in order to supplement the in- 
 adequacy of the latter even for empirical research 
 into all particular laws of nature. Hence we speak 
 quite correctly in Teleology, so far as it is referred 
 to Physic, of the wisdom, the economy, the fore- 
 thought, the beneficence of Nature, without either 
 making an intelligent being of it, for that would be 
 preposterous ; or even without presuming to place 
 another intelligent Being above it as its Architect, 
 for that would be presumptuous.^ But there should 
 
 1 The (jerman word vci'vicsscn is a good word and full of 
 meaning. A judgment in which we forget to consider the extent of 
 our powers (our Understanding) may sometimes sound very humble, 
 and yet make great pretensions, and' so be very presumptuous. Of 
 this kind are most of those by which we pretend to extol the divine 
 wisdom by ascribing to it designs in the works of creation and 
 preservation which are really meant to do honour to the private 
 wisdom of the reasoner.
 
 Div. I § 6S PLACE OF TELEOLOGY 291 
 
 be only signified thereby a kind of causality of 
 nature after the analogy of our own in the technical 
 use of Reason, in order to have before us the rule 
 according to which certain products of nature must 
 be investigated. 
 
 But now why is it that Teleology usually forms 
 no proper part of theoretical natural science, but 
 is regarded as a propaedeutic or transition to /m^ - 
 Theology? This is done in order to restrict the (l^iiuLuly^" -^f' 
 study of nature mechanically considered to that 
 which we can so subject to observation or experi- 
 ment that we are able to produce it ourselves as 
 nature does, or at least by similar laws. For we 
 see into a thing completely only so far as we can 
 make it in accordance with our concepts and bring 
 it to completion. But organisation, as an inner 
 purpose of nature, infinitely surpasses all our faculty 
 of presenting the like by means of art. And as 
 concerns the external contrivances of nature regarded 
 as purposive (wind, rain, etc.). Physic, indeed, con- 
 siders their mechanism, but it cannot at all present 
 their reference to purposes, so far as this is a condi- 
 tion necessarily belonging to cause ;/for this nece ssity 
 of connection has to do altogether with the com- 
 bination of our concepts and not with the constitu- 
 tion of things. Jf
 
 SECOND DIVISION 
 
 DIALECTIC OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT 
 
 § 69. JV/iai is an antinoiny of the Judgment f 
 
 The determinant Judgment has for itself no 
 principles which are the foundation of concepts of 
 Objects. It has no autonomy, for it S2ibs2imes only 
 under given laws or concepts as principles. Hence 
 it is exposed to no danger of an antinomy of its own 
 or to a conflict of its principles. So [we saw that] 
 the transcendental Judgment which contains the 
 conditions of subsuming under categories was for 
 itself not nomothetic, but that it only indicated the 
 conditions of sensuous intuition, under which reality 
 (application) can be supplied to a given concept, as 
 law of the Understanding, whereby the Judgment 
 could never fall into discord with itself (at least as 
 far as its principles are concerned). * 
 
 But the reflective Judgment must subsume under 
 a law, which is not yet given, and is therefore in fact 
 only a principle of reflection upon objects, for which 
 we are objectively quite in want of a law or of a 
 concept of an Object that would be adequate as a 
 principle for the cases that occur. Since now no use 
 of the cognitive faculties can be permitted without 
 principles, the reflective Judgment must in such 
 cases serve as a principle for itself This, because
 
 Div. II §70 NATURAL DIALECTIC 293 
 
 it is not objective and can supply no ground of 
 cognition of the Object adequate for design, must 
 serve as a mere subjective principle, for the pur- 
 posive employment of our cognitive faculties, i.e. 
 for reflecting upon a class of objects. Therefore in 
 reference to such cases the reflective Judgment has 
 its maxims — necessary maxims — on behalf of the 
 cognition of natural laws in experience, in order to 
 attain by their means to concepts, even concepts 
 of Reason ; since it has absolute need of such in 
 order to learn merely to cognise nature according to 
 its empirical laws.- — Between these necessary 
 maxims of the reflective Judgment there may be a 
 conflict and consequently an antinomy, upon which 
 a Dialectic bases itself. If each of two conflicting 
 maxims has its ground in the nature of the cognitive 
 faculties, this may be called a natural Dialectic, and 
 an unavoidable illusion which we must expose and 
 resolve in our Kritik, to the end that it may not 
 deceive us. 
 
 § 'JO. Representation of this antinomy 
 
 So far as Reason has to do with nature, as the 
 complex of objects of external sense, it can base itself 
 partly upon laws which the Understanding itself 
 prescribes a priori to nature, partly upon laws which 
 it can extend indefinitely by means of the empirical 
 determinations occurring in experience. To apply 
 the former kind of laws, i.e. the universal laws of 
 material nature in general, the Judgment needs no 
 special principle of reflection, since it is there 
 determinant because an objective principle is given 
 to it through Understanding. But as regards the 
 particular laws that can only be made known to us
 
 294 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part il 
 
 through experience, there can be under them such 
 great manifoldness and diversity, that the Judgment 
 must serve as its own principle in order to in- 
 vestigate and search into the phenomena of nature 
 in accordance with a law. Such a guiding thread is 
 needed, if we are only to hope for a connected 
 empirical cognition according to a thoroughgoing 
 conformity of nature to law, even its unity according 
 to empirical laws. In this contingent unity of 
 particular laws it may very well happen that the 
 Judgment in its reflection proceeds from two maxims. 
 One of these is suggested to it a priori by the mere 
 Understanding ; but the other is prompted by par- 
 ticular experiences, which bring the Reason into 
 play in order to form a judgment upon corporeal 
 nature and its laws in accordance with a particular 
 principle. Hence it comes about that these two 
 kinds of maxims seem not to be capable of existing 
 together, and consequently a Dialectic arises which 
 leads the Judgment into error in the principle of its 
 reflection. 
 
 ^\\^ first inaxi^n of Judgment is \\\^ proposition : 
 all production of material things and their forms 
 must be judged to be possible according to merely 
 mechanical law^s. 
 
 The second maxim is the cotmter -proposition : 
 some products of material nature cannot be judged 
 to be possible according to merely mechanical laws. 
 (To judge them requires quite a different law of 
 causality, namely, that of final causes.) 
 
 If these regulative principles of investigation be 
 converted into constitutive principles of the possi- 
 bility of Objects, they will run thus : 
 
 Proposition : All production of material things is 
 possible according to merely mechanical laws.
 
 Div. II ? 70 ANTINOMY OF THE JUDGMENT 295 
 
 Counter-proposition : Some production of material 
 things is not possible according to merely mechanical 
 laws. 
 
 In this latter aspect, as objective principles for 
 the determinant judgment, they would contradict 
 each other ; and consequently one of the two pro- 
 positions must necessarily be false. We shall then, 
 it is true, have an antinomy, but not of Judgment ; 
 there will be a conflict in the legislation of Reason. 
 Reason, however, can prove neither the one nor the 
 other of these fundamental propositions, because we 
 can have a priori no determinant principle of the 
 possibility of things according to mere empirical 
 laws of nature. 
 
 On the other hand, as regards the first-mentioned 
 maxims of a reflective Judgment, they involve no 
 contradiction in fact. For if I say, I must judge, 
 according to merely mechanical laws, of the possi- 
 bility of all events in material nature, and conse- 
 quently of all forms regarded as its products, I„dp ir 
 naMtiiereforn-say : They are possible in this ivay alone 
 (apart from any other kind of causality). All that is 
 implied is <<J must always reflect upon them according 
 to the principle of the rnerejn echanism o f_naturp, and 
 consegpaendyjn\'es.tigate^ this,asJaiiRs T ran ; bernuse 
 unless. this jjes^at^eJ^a sLs of investigation, the re can 
 
 ^£J}P pXQH^^J SI'Q'^'^'^^'^g"^ "^ nature at all . But this 
 does not prevent us, if opportunity offers, from follow- 
 inof out the second maxim in the case of certain natural 
 forms (and even by instigation of these in the whole 
 of nature), in order to reflect upon them according 
 to the principle of final causes, which is quite a 
 different thing from explaining them according to 
 the mechanism of natu re. Reflection in accordance 
 w^ith the first maxim is thus not removed ; on the
 
 296 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part il 
 
 contrary, we are told to follow it as far as we can. 
 Nor is it said that these forms would not be possible 
 in accordance with the mechanism of nature. It is 
 only asserted that human Reason in following up this 
 maxim and in this way could never find the least 
 ground for that which constitutes the specific 
 [character] of a natural purpose, although it would 
 increase its knowledg-e of natural laws. Thus it is 
 left undecided whether or not in the unknown inner 
 ground of nature, physico-mechanical and purposive 
 combination may be united in the same things in one 
 principle. We only say that our Reason is not in a 
 position so to unite them ; and that therefore the 
 Judgment (as 7'eficctive — from subjective grounds, 
 not as determinant, in consequence of an objective 
 principle of the possibility of things in themselves) 
 is compelled to think a different principle from that 
 of natural ' mechanism as the ground of the possi- 
 bility of certain forms in nature. 
 
 § 71. Preliminary to the solntion of the above 
 
 antinomy 
 
 We can in no way prove the iinpossibility_of the 
 production of organised natural products by the mere 
 mechanism of nature, because we cannot see into 
 the first inner ground of the infinite multiplicity of 
 the particular laws of nature, which are contingent 
 for us since they are only empirically known ; and so 
 we cannot arrive at the inner all-sufficient principle 
 of the possibility of a nature (a principle which lies 
 in the supersensible). Whether therefore the pro- 
 ductive faculty of nature is sufficient for that which 
 we judge to be formed or combined in accordance 
 with the Idea of purposes, as well as for that which
 
 Div. II §71 SOLUTION OF THE ANTINOMY 297 
 
 we believe to require merely a mechanical system 
 [Maschinenwesen] of nature ; or whether there lies 
 at the basis of thino^s which we must necessarily 
 judge as properly natural purposes, a quite different 
 kind of original causality, which cannot be contained 
 in material nature or in its intelligible substrate, viz. 
 an archi '-^^'-'^ni"^ TTp,^,:^fc|onr];r)nr^^l-,;c jg a question 
 to which our Reason, very narrowly limited in respect 
 of the concept of causality if it is to be specified a 
 priori, can give no answer whatever.—- But it is just 
 as certain and beyond doubt that, in rega rd ,tc\ r>nr 
 cognitive faculties, th e mere mechanism of na ture 
 can furnish no grou nd of explan ation o f the produ c- 
 tion of organised beijigs. For the rejiective Judg- 
 ment it is therefore a quite correct fundamental 
 proposition, t hat for that connection of things accord-. 
 in g to final causes which is so plain, there must , be 
 thought a caus ality distinct from that of mechanism, 
 viz. that of an (intelligent) Cause of the world acting 
 in accordance with purposes ; but for the deteruii- 
 nant Jttdginent this would be a hasty and unprovable 
 proposition. In the first case it is a mere maxim of 
 the Judgment, wherein the concept of that causality 
 is a mere Idea, to which we by no means undertake 
 to concede reality, but which we use as a guide to 
 reflection, which remains thereby always open to all 
 mechanical grounds of explanation and does not 
 withdraw out of the world of Sense. In the second 
 case the proposition would be an objective principle 
 prescribed by Reason, to which the determinant 
 Judgment must subject itself, whereby however it 
 withdraws beyond the world of Sense into the tran- 
 scendent and perhaps is led into error. 
 
 All appearance of an antinomy between the 
 maxims of the proper physical (mechanical) and the 
 
 4
 
 298 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 teleological (technical) methods of explanation rests 
 therefore on this :Cthat we confuse a fuadamental 
 propo sition of the retlectiv^e with one of the deter- 
 minant Judo^Tient, alT d~the ^?//^;/^;;/v of __die first 
 (which has mere subjective validity for our use of 
 Reason in respect of particular empirical laws) with 
 t he heteronomy of the _s econd^ w hich must re pfulate 
 itsel£_acc^rding^ tq_laws (universal or particular) 
 given to it by the Understanding. 
 
 § 72. Of the different systems lu/iick deal with the 
 purposiveness of nature 
 
 No one has ever doubted the correctness of the 
 proposition that judgment must be passed upon 
 certain things of nature (organised beings) and their 
 possibility in accordance with the concept of final 
 causes, even if we only desire a guiding thread to 
 learn how to cognise their constitution through 
 observation, without aspiring to an investigation into 
 their first origin. The question therefore can only 
 be : whether this fundamental proposition is merely 
 subjectively valid, i.e. is a mere maxim ot our 
 Judgment ; or whether it is an objective principle of 
 nature, in accordance with which, apart from its 
 mechanism (according to the mere laws of motion), 
 quite a different kind of causality attaches to it, viz. 
 that of final causes, under which these laws (of 
 moving forces) stand only as intermediate causes. 
 
 We could leave this question or problem quite 
 undecided and unsolved speculatively ; because if we 
 content ourselves with speculation within the bounds 
 of mere natural knowledge, we have enough in these 
 maxims for the study of nature and for the tracking 
 out of its hidden secrets, as far as human powers
 
 Div. II § 72 THE TECHNIC OF NATURE 299 
 
 reach. There is then indeed a certain presentiment 
 of our Reason or a hint as it were given us by- 
 nature, that, by means of this concept of final causes, 
 we go beyond nature, and could unite it to the 
 highest point in the series of causes, if we were to 
 abandon or at least to lay aside for a time the 
 investigation of nature (although we may not have 
 advanced far in it), and seek thenceforth to find out 
 whither this stranger in natural science, viz. the 
 concept of natural purposes, would lead us. 
 
 But here these undisputed maxims pass over 
 into problems opening out a wide field for difficulties. 
 Does purposive connection in nature prove a p^ar- 
 ticular kind of causality .^ Or is it not rather, 
 considered in itself and in accordance with objective 
 principles, similar to the mechanism of nature, rest- 
 ing on one and the same ground ? Only, as this 
 ground in many natural products is often hidden too 
 deep for our investigation, we make trial of a 
 subjective principle, that of art, i.e. of causality 
 according to Ideas, and we ascribe it to nature by 
 analogy. This expedient succeeds in many cases, 
 but seems in some to mislead, and in no case does 
 it justify us in introducing into natural science a 
 particular kind of operation quite distinct from the 
 causality according to the mere mechanical laws of 
 nature. We give the name of Technic to the pro- 
 cedure (the causality) of nature, on account of the 
 appearance of purpose that we find in its products ; 
 and we shall divide this into designed {technica 
 mtentionalis) and undesigned [technica naturalis\ 
 The first is meant to signify that the productive 
 faculty of nature according to final causes must be 
 taken for a particular kind of causality ; the second 
 that it is at bottom the same as the mechanism of
 
 300 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 nature, and that its contingent agreement with our 
 artistic concepts and their rules should be explained 
 as a mere subjective condition of judging it, and not, 
 falsely, as a particular kind of natural production. 
 
 If we now speak of systems explanatory of 
 nature in regard of final causes, it must be remarked 
 that they all controvert each other dogmatically, 
 i.e. as to objective principles of the possibility of 
 things, whether there are causes which act designedly 
 or w'hether they are quite without design. They 
 do not dispute as to the subjective maxims, by 
 which we merely judge of the causes of such 
 purposive products. In this latter case disparate 
 principles could very well be unified ; but in the 
 former, contradictorily opposed laws annul each other 
 and cannot subsist together. 
 
 There are two sorts of systems as to the Technic 
 of nature, i.e. its productive power in accordance 
 with the rule of purposes ; viz. Idealism or Realism 
 of natural purposes. The first maintains that all 
 purposiveness of nature is undesigned; the second 
 that some (in organised beings) is designed. From 
 this latter the hypothetical consequence can be 
 deduced that the Technic of Nature, as concerns 
 all its other products in reference to the w^hole of 
 nature, is also designed, i.e. is a purpose. 
 
 (i) The Idealism of purposiveness (I always 
 understand by this, objective purposiveness) is either 
 that of the casuality or th.Q fatality of the determina- 
 tion of nature in the purposive form of its products. 
 The former principle treats of the reference of matter 
 to the physical basis of its form, viz. the laws of 
 motion ; the second, its reference to the hypei'physical 
 basis of itself and of the whole of nature. The 
 system of casuality that is ascribed to EpictLviis or
 
 Div. II § 72 REALISM OF PURPOSIVEKESS 301 
 
 Democritus is. taken literally, so plainly absurd that 
 it need not detain us. Opposed to this is the 
 system of fatality, of which Spinoza is taken as the 
 author, although it is much older according to 
 all appearance. This, as it appeals to something 
 supersensible to which our insight does not extend, 
 is not so easy to controvert ; but that is because its 
 concept of the original Being is not possible to 
 understand. But so much is clear, that on this 
 theory the purposive combination in the world must 
 be taken as undesigned ; for although derived from 
 an original Being, it is not derived from His Under- 
 standing or from any design of His. but rather from 
 the necessity of His nature and of the world-unity 
 which emanates from Him. Consequently the 
 Fatalism of purposiveness is at the same time an 
 Idealism. 
 
 (2) The Realism of the purposiveness of 
 nature is also either physical or hyperphysical. 
 The formei' bases the purposes in nature, by the 
 analosfv of a facultv actinor ^vith desiorn, on the life 
 of matter (either its own or the life of an inner 
 principle in it, a world-soul) and is called Hylozoism. 
 The latter derives them from the original ground 
 of the universe, as from an intelligent Being 
 (originally living), who produces them with design, 
 and is Theism} 
 
 1 We thus see that in most speculative things of pure Reason, 
 as regards dogmatic assertions, the philosophical schools have 
 commonly tried all possible solutions of a given question. To 
 explain the purposiveness of nature men have tried either lifeless 
 matter or a lifeless God, or again, living matter or a living God. 
 It only remains for us, if the need should arise, to abandon all 
 these objective assertions and to examine critically our judgment 
 merely in reference to our cognitive faculties, in order to supply to 
 their principle a value which, if not dogmatic, shall at least be that 
 of a maxim sufficient for the sure employment of Reason.
 
 302 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 \ ']'%,. None of tJic above systems give iv/iat they 
 
 pretend 
 
 What do all these systems desire ? They desire 
 to explain our teleological judgments about nature, 
 and they go so to work therewith that some deny 
 their truth and, consequently, explain them as an 
 Idealism of Nature (represented as Art) ; others 
 recognise them as true, and promise to establish 
 the possibility of a nature in accordance with the 
 Idea of final causes. 
 
 (i) The systems which defend the Idealism of 
 final causes in nature grant, it is true, on the one 
 hand to their principle a causality in accordance with 
 the laws of motion (through which [causality] natural 
 things exist purposively) ; but they deny to it inten- 
 tioiiality, i.e. that it eiesignedly determines itself to 
 this its purposive production ; in other words, they 
 deny that the cause is a purpose. This is Epicurzts s 
 method of explanation, according to which the dis- 
 tinction between a Technic of nature and mere 
 mechanism is altogether denied. Blind chance is 
 taken as the explanatory ground not only of the 
 agreement of the developed products with our con- 
 cepts of the purpose, and consequently of [nature's] 
 Technic ; but also of the determination of the causes 
 of this production in accordance with the laws of 
 motion, and consequently of their mechanism. Thus 
 nothing is explained, not even the illusion in our 
 teleological judgments, and consequently, the pre- 
 tended Idealism of these in no way established. 
 
 On the other hand, Spinoza wishes to dispense 
 with all inquiries into the ground of the possibility 
 of purposes of nature, and to take away all reality
 
 Div. II § 73 SPINOZISM 303 
 
 from this Idea. He allows their validity in general 
 not as products but as accidents inhering in an 
 original Being ; and to this Being, as substrate of 
 those natural things, he ascribes in regard to them not 
 causality but mere subsistence. On account of its 
 unconditioned necessity, and also that of all natural 
 things as accidents inhering in it, he secures, it is 
 true, to the forms of nature that unity of ground 
 which is requisite for all purposiveness ; but at the 
 same time he tears away their contingence, without 
 which no unity of purpose can be thought, and with 
 it all design, inasmuch as he takes away all 
 intelligence from the original ground of natural 
 things. 
 
 But Spinozism does not furnish what it wishes. 
 It wishes to afford an explanatory ground of the 
 purposive connection (which it does not deny) of 
 the things of nature, and it merely speaks of the 
 unity of the subject in which they all inhere. But 
 even if we concede to it that the beings of the 
 world exist in this way, that ontological unity is not 
 therefore a unity of p^npose, and does not make this 
 in any way comprehensible. For this latter is a 
 quite particular kind of unity which does not follow 
 from the connection of things (the beings of the 
 world) in a subject (the original Being), but implies in 
 itself reference to a cause which has Understanding ; 
 and even if we unite all these things in a simple 
 subject, this never exhibits a purposive reference. 
 For we do not think of them, first, as the inner 
 effects of the substance, as if it were a cmise ; nor, 
 secondly, of this cause as a cause producing effects 
 by means of its Understanding. Without these 
 formal conditions all unity is mere natural necessity ; 
 and, if it is ascribed as well to things which we
 
 304 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 represent as external to one another, blind necessity. 
 But if we wish to give the name of purposlveness of 
 nature to that which the schoolmen call the tran- 
 scendental perfection of things (in reference to their 
 proper being), according to which everything has in 
 itself that which is requisite to make it one thing 
 and not another, then we are only like children 
 playing with words instead of concepts. For if all 
 things must be thought as purposes, then to be a 
 thing is the same as to be a purpose, and there is 
 at bottom nothing which specially deserves to be 
 represented as a purpose. 
 
 We hence see at once that Spinoza by his redu- 
 cing our concepts of the purposive in nature to our 
 own consciousness of existing in an all-embracing 
 (though simple) Being, and by his seeking that form 
 merely in the unity of this being, must have intended 
 to maintain not the realism, but the idealism of its 
 purposlveness. Even this he was not able to accom- 
 plish, because the mere representation of the unity 
 of the substrate cannot bring about the Idea of a 
 purposlveness, even that which is only undesigned. 
 
 (2) Those who not only maintain the Realism of 
 natural purposes, but also set about explaining it, 
 believe that they can comprehend, at least as 
 regards its possibility, a practical kind of causality, 
 viz. that of causes working designedly ; otherwise 
 they could not undertake to supply this explanation. 
 For to authorise even the most daring of hypotheses, 
 at least the possibility of what we assume as basis 
 must be certain, and we must be able to assure 
 objective reality to its concept. 
 
 But the possibility of living matter cannot even 
 be thought ; its concept involves a contradiction 
 because lifelessness, inertia, constitutes the essential
 
 Div. 11 § 73 THEISM 305 
 
 character of matter. The possibility of matter 
 endowed with Hfe, and of collective nature regarded 
 as an animal, can only be used in an inadequate 
 way (in regard to the hypothesis of purposiveness in 
 the whole of nature), so far as it is manifested by 
 experience in the organisation of nature on a small 
 scale ; but in no way can its possibility be compre- 
 hended a priori. There must then be a circle in 
 the explanation, if we wish to derive the purposive- 
 ness of nature in organised beings from the life of 
 matter, and yet only know this life in organised 
 beings, and can form no concept of its possibility 
 without experience of this kind. Hylozoism, there- 
 fore, does not perform what it promises. 
 
 Finally, Theism can just as little establish 
 dogmatically the possibility of natural purposes as a 
 key to Teleology ; although it certainly is superior to 
 all other grounds of explanation in that, through the 
 Understandino- which it ascribes to the original 
 Being, it rescues in the best way the purposiveness 
 of nature from Idealism, and introduces a causality 
 acting with design for its production. 
 
 But we must first prove satisfactorily to the 
 determinant Judgment the impossibility of the 
 unity of purpose in matter resulting from its mere 
 mechanism, before we are justified in placing the 
 ground of this beyond nature in a determinate way. 
 We can, however, advance no further than this. 
 In accordance with the constitution and limits of 
 our cognitive faculties (whilst we do not comprehend 
 even the first inner ground of this mechanism) we 
 must in no wise seek in matter a principle of 
 determinate purposive references ; but no other 
 way of judging of the origination of its products 
 as natural purposes remains to us than that 
 
 X
 
 3o6 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 by means of a supreme Understanding as cause of 
 the world. But this is only a ground for the 
 reflective, not for the determinant Judgment, and 
 can justify absolutely no objective assertion. 
 
 § 74. The reason that we cannot treat the concept of 
 a Technic of nature dogmatically is tJie fact that 
 a natural purpose is inexplicable 
 
 We deal with a concept dogmatically (even 
 though it should be empirically conditioned) if we 
 consider it as contained under another concept of 
 the Object which constitutes a principle ^ of Reason, 
 and determine it in conformity with this. But we 
 deal with it merely critically, if we consider it only 
 in reference to our cognitive faculties and con- 
 sequently to the subjective conditions of thinking it, 
 without undertaking to decide anything about its 
 Object. Dogmatic procedure with a concept is 
 then that which is conformable to law for the 
 determinant Judgment, critical procedure for the 
 reflective Judgment. 
 
 Now the concept of a thing as a natural purpose 
 is a concept which subsumes nature under a 
 causality only thinkable through Reason, in order to 
 judge in accordance with this principle about that 
 which is given of the Object in experience. But in 
 order to use it dogmatically for the determinant 
 Judgment, we must be assured first of the objective 
 reality of this concept, because otherwise we could 
 subsume no natural thing under it. Again, the 
 
 ^ [That is, the wider concept serves as a universal, under which 
 the particular may be brought ; cognition from principles, in Kant's 
 phrase, is the process of knowing the particular in the universal by 
 means of concepts.] 
 
 s
 
 Div. ii§74 NATURAL PURPOSES 307 
 
 concept of a thing as a natural purpose is, no doubt, 
 empirically conditioned, i.e. only possible under 
 certain conditions given in experience, though not 
 to be abstracted therefrom ; but it is a concept only 
 possible in accordance with a rational principle in 
 the judgment about the object. Its objective 
 reality, therefore {i.e. that an object in conformity 
 with it is possible), cannot be comprehended and 
 dogmatically established as such a principle ; and we 
 do not know whether it is merely a sophistical and 
 objectively empty concept {conceptus ratiocinans), or 
 a rational concept, establishing a cognition and 
 confirmed by Reason {conceptus ratiocinatus)} 
 Therefore it cannot be dogmatically treated for the 
 determinant Judgment, i.e. it is not only impossible 
 to decide whether or not things of nature considered 
 as natural purposes require for their production a 
 causality of a quite peculiar kind (that acting on 
 design) ; but the question cannot even be put, 
 because the concept of a natural purpose is simply 
 not susceptible of proof through Reason as regards 
 its objective reality. That is, it is not constitutive 
 for the determinant Judgment, but merely regulative 
 for the reflective. 
 
 That it is not susceptible of proof is clear from 
 the fact that as concept of a natural product it' 
 embraces in itself necessity and at the same time a 
 contingency of the form of the Object (in reference 
 to the mere laws of nature) in the selfsame thing 
 regarded as purpose. Hence, if there is to be no 
 contradiction here it must contain a ground for the 
 possibility of the thing in nature, and also a ground 
 of the possibility of this nature itself and of its 
 
 1 [This distinction will be familiar to the student of the Kritik of 
 Pure Reason. See Dialectic, bk. i., Of t/ie Concepts of Pure Rcason.'\
 
 3o8 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 reference to something which, not being empirically 
 cognisable nature (supersensible), is therefore for 
 us not cognisable at all. [This is requisite] if it 
 is to be judged according to a different kind of 
 causality from that of natural mechanism when we 
 wish to establish its possibility. The concept of a 
 thing, then, as a natural purpose, is transcendent 
 for the dctcmiiinant Judgment, if we consider the 
 Object through Reason (although for the reflective 
 Judgment it certainly may be immanent in respect 
 of the objects of experience). Hence for determi- 
 nant judgments objectiv'e reality cannot be supplied 
 to it ; and so it is intelligible how all systems that 
 one may project for the dogmatic treatment of the 
 concept of natural purposes and of nature itself 
 [considered] as a whole connected together by 
 means of final causes, can decide nothing either by 
 objective affirmation or by objective denial. For if 
 things be subsumed under a concept that is merely 
 problematical, its synthetical predicates {e.g. in the 
 question whether the purpose of nature which we 
 conceive for the production of things is designed or 
 undesigned) can furnish only problematical judgments 
 pf the Object, whether affirmative or negative ; and 
 we do not know whether we are judging about 
 something or about nothing. The concept of a 
 causality through purposes (of art) has at all events 
 objective reality, and also the concept of a causality 
 according to the mechanism of nature. But the 
 concept of a causality of nature according to the 
 rule of purposes, still more of a Being such as 
 cannot be given us in experience, a Being who is 
 the orio^inal cause of nature, thouQ^h it can be 
 thought without contradiction, yet is of no avail for 
 dogmatic determinations. For, since it cannot be
 
 Div. II § 75 OBJECTIVE PURPOSIVENESS 309 
 
 derived from experience, and also is not requisite 
 for the possibility thereof, its objective reality' can 
 in no way be assured. But even if this could be 
 done, how can I number among the products of 
 nature things which are definitely accounted products 
 of divine art, when it is just the incapacity of nature 
 to produce such things according to its own laws 
 that made it necessary to invoke a cause different 
 from it ? 
 
 ^ 75, The concept of an objective piLrposiveness of 
 nature is a C7'itical principle of Reason for 
 the reflective JiLcigment 
 
 If is then one thing to say, "the production of 
 certain things of nature or that of collective nature 
 is only possible through a cause which determines 
 itself to action according to design"; and quite 
 another to say, " I can according to the peczdiar 
 constitjition of my cognitive faculties judge concern- 
 ing the possibility of these things and their produc- 
 tion, in no other fashion than by conceiving for this 
 a cause working according to design, i.e. a Being 
 which is productive in a way analogous to the 
 causality of an intelligence." In the former case I 
 wish to establish something concerning the Object, 
 and am bound to establish the objective reality of 
 an assumed concept ; in the latter, Reason only 
 determines the use of my cognitive faculties, con- 
 formably to their peculiarities and to the essential 
 conditions of their ranee and their limits. Thus 
 the former principle is an objective proposition for 
 the determinant Judgment, the latter merely a 
 subjective proposition for the reflective Judgment, 
 i.e. a maxim which Reason prescribes to it.
 
 310 KANrS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part li 
 
 We are in fact indispensably obliged to ascribe 
 the concept of design to nature if we wish to 
 investigate it, though only in its organised products, 
 by continuous observation; and this concept is 
 therefore an absolutely necessary maxim for the 
 empirical use of our Reason. It is plain that once 
 such a guiding thread for the study of nature is 
 admitted and verified, we must at least try the said 
 maxim of Judgment in nature as a whole ; because 
 according to it many of nature's laws might discover 
 themselves, which otherwise, on account of the 
 limitation of our insight into its inner mechanism, 
 would remain hidden. But though in regard to 
 this latter employment that maxim of Judgment is 
 certainly useful, it is not indispensable, for fiature 
 as a whole is not given as orga nised (in the narrow 
 sense of the word above indicated). On the other 
 hand, in regard to those natural products, which 
 must be judged of as designed and not formed 
 otherwise (if we are to have empirical knowledge of 
 their inner constitution), this maxim of the reflective 
 Judgment is essentially necessary ; because the very 
 thought of them as organised beings is impossible 
 without combining therewith the thought of their 
 designed production. 
 
 Now the concept of a thing whose existence or 
 form we represent to ourselves as possible under 
 the condition of a purpose is inseparably bound up 
 with the concept of its contingency (according to 
 natural laws). Hence the natural things that we 
 find possible only as purposes supply the best proof 
 of the contingency of the world -whole ; to the 
 common Understanding and to the philosopher 
 alike they are the only valid ground of proof for its 
 dependence on and origin from a Being existing out-
 
 Div. ii§75 VALUE OF TELEOLOGY 311 
 
 side the world — a Being who must also be intelligent 
 on account of its purposive form. Teleology then 
 finds the consummation of its investigations only in 
 Theology. 
 
 But what now in the end does the most complete 
 Teleology prove ? Does it prove that there is such 
 an intelligent Being ? No. It only proves that 
 according to the constitution of our cognitive faculties 
 and in the consequent combination of experience 
 with the highest principles of Reason, we can form 
 absolutely no concept of the possibility of such a 
 world [as this] save by thinking a designedly -working 
 supreme cause thereof. Objectively we cannot there- 
 fore lay down the proposition, there is an intelligent 
 original Being ; but only subjectively, for the use of 
 our Judgment in its reflection upon the purposes in 
 nature, which can be thought according to no other 
 principle than that of a designing causality of a 
 highest Cause. 
 
 If we wished to establish on teleolopfical orounds 
 the above proposition dogmatically we should be 
 beset with difficulties from which we could not 
 extricate ourselves. For then the proposition must 
 at bottom be reduced to the conclusion, that the 
 organised beinafs in the world are no otherwise 
 possible than by a designedly-working cause. And 
 we should unavoidably have to assert that, because 
 we can follow up these things in their causal com- 
 bination only under the Idea of purposes, and cognise 
 them only according to their conformity to law, we 
 are thereby justified in assuming this as a condition 
 necessary for every thinking and cognising being — 
 a condition consequently attaching to the Object and 
 not merely to our subject. But such an assertion 
 we do not succeed in sustaining. For, since we do
 
 312 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part il 
 
 not, properly speaking, observe the purposes in 
 nature as designed, but only in our reflection upon 
 its products think this concept as a guiding thread 
 for our Judgment, they are not given to us through 
 the Object. It is quite impossible for us a priori to 
 vindicate, as capable of assumption, sucJi a concept 
 according to its objective reality. It remains there- 
 fore a proposition absolutely resting upon subjective 
 conditions alone, viz. of the Judgment reflecting in 
 conformity with our cognitive faculties. If we ex- 
 pressed this proposition dogmatically as objectively 
 valid, it would be : " There is a God." But for us 
 men there is only permissible the limited formula : 
 " We cannot otherwise think and make compre- 
 hensible the purposiveness which must lie at the 
 bottom of our cognition of the internal possibility of 
 many natural things, than by representing it and the 
 world in general as a product of an intelligent cause, 
 [aGod]."^ 
 
 ( Now if this proposition, based on an inevitably 
 '^necessary maxim of our Judgment, is completely 
 (satisfactory from every Jmman point of view for both 
 Ythe speculative and practical use of our Reason, I 
 should like to know what we lose by not being able 
 to prove it as also valid for higher beings, from 
 objective grounds (which unfortunately are beyond 
 our faculties). It is indeed quite certain that we 
 cannot adequately cognise, much less explain, organ- 
 ised beings and their internal possibility, according 
 to mere mechanical principles of nature ; and we can 
 say boldly it is alike certain that it is absurd for men 
 to make any such attempt or to hope that another 
 Newton will arise in the future, who shall make 
 comprehensible by us the production of a blade of 
 
 1 [Second Edition.]
 
 Div. II § 76 ORGANISMS 
 
 grass according to natural laws which no design has 
 ordered.^ We must absolutely deny this insight to 
 men. <But th^njiow dD we know that in nature, if 
 we could penetrate to the principle by which it 
 specifies the universal laws known to us, there 
 ccmnoiMeJxidilQn (in its mere mechanism) a sufficient 
 ground of the possibility of organised beings, without 
 supposing any design in their production ? would 
 it not be judged by us presumptuous to say this ? 
 Probabilities here are of no account when we have 
 to do with judgments of pure Reason. — \Ve_cannot 
 therefore judge objectively, either affirmatively or 
 negatively, concerning the proposition : " Does^ a 
 Being acting according to design lie at the basis of 
 what we rightly call natural purposes, as the cause 
 of the world (and consequently as its author) ? " So 
 much only is sure, that if we are to judge according 
 to what is permitted us to see by our own proper 
 nature (the conditions and limitations of our Reason), 
 we can place at the basis of the possibility of these 
 natural purposes nothing else than an intelligent 
 Being. This alone is in conformity with the maxim 
 of our reflective Judgment and therefore with a 
 ground which, though subjective, is inseparably 
 attached to the human race. 
 
 § 76. Remark 
 This consideration, which very well deserves to 
 
 1 [This principle, that for our intellect, the conception of an 
 organised body is impossible except by the aid of the Idea of design, 
 is frequently insisted on by Kant. Professor Wallace points out 
 {Kant, p. no) that as far back as 1755, in his General PJiysiogony 
 and Theory of the Heavens, Kant classed the origin of animals and 
 plants with the secrets of Providence and the mystical number 666 
 " as one of the topics on which ingenuity and thought are occasion- 
 ally wasted."]
 
 314 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 be worked out in detail in Transcendental Philosophy, 
 can come in here only in passing, by way of elucida- 
 tion (not as a proof of what is here proposed). 
 
 Reason is a faculty of principles and proceeds in 
 its furthest demand to the unconditioned ; on the 
 other hand, the Understanding stands at its service 
 always only under a certain condition which must be 
 given. But without concepts of Understanding, to 
 which objective reality must be given, the Reason 
 cannot form any objective (synthetical) judgment ; 
 and contains in itself, as theoretical Reason, 
 absolutely no constitutive but merely regulative 
 principles. We soon see that where the Under- 
 standing cannot follow, the Reason is transcendent, 
 and shows itself in Ideas formerly established (as 
 regulative principles), but not in objectively valid 
 concepts. But the Understanding which cannot 
 keep pace with Reason but yet is requisite for the 
 validity of Objects, limits the validity of these Ideas 
 to the subject, although [extending it] generally to all 
 [subjects] of this kind. That is, the Understanding 
 limits their validity to the condition, that according 
 to the nature of our (human) cognitive faculti.es, or, 
 generally, according to the concept which we our- 
 selves can make of the faculty of a finite intelligent 
 being, nothing else can or must be thought ; though 
 this is not to assert that the ground of such a judg- 
 ment lies in the Object. We shall adduce some 
 examples which, though they are too important and 
 difficult to impose them on the reader as proved 
 propositions, yet will give him material for thought 
 and may serve to elucidate what we are here 
 specially concerned with. 
 
 It is indispensably necessary for the human 
 Understanding to distinguish between the possibility
 
 Div. II § 76 POSSIBILITY AND ACTUALITY 315 
 
 an d the act uality of things. The ground for this 
 lies in the subject and in the nature of our cognitive 
 faculties. Such a distinction (between the possible 
 and the actual) would not be given were there not 
 requisite for knowledge two quite different elements, 
 Understanding for concepts and sensible intuition 
 for Objects corresponding to therii. If our Under- 
 standing were intuitive it would have no objects but 
 those which are actual. Concepts (which merely ex- 
 tend to the possibility of an object) and sensible intui- 
 tions (which give us something without allowing us 
 /\to cognise it thus as an object) would both disappear. 
 But now the whole of our distinction between the 
 merely possible and the actual rests on this, that the 
 former only signifies the positing of the representa- 
 / tion of a thing in respect of our concept, and, in 
 / general, in respect of the faculty of thought ; while 
 \ the latter signifies the positing of the thing in itself 
 ^outside this concept].^ The distinction, then, of 
 possible things from actual is one which has merely 
 s^jective validity for the human Understanding, 
 because we can always have a thing in our thoughts 
 although it is [really] nothing, or we can represent a 
 thing as given although we have no concept of it. 
 The propositions therefore — that things can be 
 possible without being actual, and that consequently 
 no. conclusion can be drawn as to actuality from 
 mere possibility — are quite valid for human Reason, 
 without thereby proving that this distinction lies in 
 
 things themselves. That this does not follow, 
 
 and that consequently these propositions, though 
 valid of Objects (in so far as our cognitive faculty, as 
 sensuously conditioned, busies itself with Objects of 
 sense), do not hold for things in general, appears 
 
 ^ [Second Edition,]
 
 3i6 ICANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 from the irrepressible demand of Reason to assume 
 something (the original ground) necessarily existing 
 as unconditioned, in which possibility and actuality 
 should no longer be distinguished, and for which 
 Idea our Understanding has absolutely no concept ; 
 i.e. it can find no way of representing such a thing 
 and its manner of existence. For if the Understand- 
 ing thinks such a thing (which it may do at pleasure), 
 the thing is merely represented as possible. If it is 
 conscious of it as given in intuition, then is it actual ; 
 but nothing as to its possibility is thus thought. 
 Hence the concept of an absolutely necessary Being 
 is no doubt an indispensable Idea of Reason, but yet 
 it is a problematical concept unattainable by the 
 human UnderstandinQf. It is indeed valid for the 
 employment of our cognitive faculties in accordance 
 with their peculiar constitution, but not valid of the 
 Object. Nor is it valid for every knowing being, 
 because I cannot presuppose in every such being 
 thought and intuition as two distinct conditions of 
 the exercise of its cognitive faculties, and conse- 
 quently as conditions of the possibility and actuality 
 of things. An Understanding into which this dis- 
 tinction did not enter, might say : All Objects that I 
 know are, i.e. exist ; and the possibility of some, 
 which yet do not exist {i.e. the contingency or the 
 contrasted necessity of those which do exist), might 
 never come into the representation of such a being 
 at all. But what makes it difficult for our Under- 
 standing to treat its concepts here as Reason does, 
 is merely that for it. as human Understanding, that 
 is transcendent (/.r. impossible for the subjective 
 conditions of its cognition) which Reason makes 
 into a principle appertaining to the Object. — Here 
 the maxim always holds, that all Objects whose
 
 Div. ii§76 REGULATIVE PRINCIPLES 317 
 
 cognition surpasses the faculty of the Understanding 
 are thought by us according to the subjective condi- 
 tions of the exercise of that faculty which necessarily 
 attach to our (human) nature. If judgments laid 
 down in this way (and there is no other alternative 
 in regard to transcendent concepts) cannot be con- 
 stitutive principles determining the Object as it is, 
 they will remain regulative principles adapted to the 
 human point of view, immanent in their exercise 
 and sure. 
 
 Just as Reason in the theoretical consideration 
 of nature must assume the Idea of an unconditioned 
 necessity of its original ground, so also it presupposes 
 in the practical [sphere] its own (in respect of nature) 
 unconditioned causality, or freedom, in that it is con- 
 scious of its own moral command. Here the objective 
 necessity of the act, as a duty, is opposed to that 
 necessity which it would have as an event, if its 
 ground lay in nature and not in freedom {i.e. in the 
 causality of Reason). The morally absolutely neces- 
 sary act is regarded as physically quite contingent, 
 since that which ought necessarily to happen often 
 does not happen. It is clear then that it is owing 
 to the subjective constitution of our practical faculty 
 that the moral laws must be represented as commands, 
 and the actions conforming to them as duties ; and 
 tiiat Reason expresses this necessity not by an " ?> " 
 (happens), but by an "ought to be." This would 
 not be the case were Reason considered as in its 
 causality independent of sensibility (as the subjective 
 condition of its application to objects of nature), and 
 so as cause in an intelligible world entirely in agree- 
 ment with the moral law. For in such a world there 
 would be no distinction between "ought to do" and 
 "does," between a practical law of that which is
 
 3i8 KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 possible through us, and the theoretical law of that 
 which is actual through us. Though, therefore, an 
 intelligible world in which everything would be 
 actual merely because (as something good) it is 
 possible, together with freedom as its formal condi- 
 tion, is for us a transcendent concept, not available 
 as a constitutive principle to determine an Object 
 and its objective reality ; yet, because of the consti- 
 tution of our (in part sensuous) nature and faculty it 
 is, so far as we can represent it in accordance with the 
 constitution of our Reason, for us and for all rational 
 beines that have a connection with the world of 
 sense, a universal regulative principle. This principle 
 does not objectively determine the constitution of 
 freedom, as a form of causality, but it makes the 
 rule of actions according to that Idea a command 
 for every one, with no less validity than if it did 
 so determine it. 
 
 In the same way we may concede thus much as 
 regards the case in hand. Between natural mechan- 
 ism and the Technic of nature, i.e. its purposive 
 connection, we should find no distinction, were it not 
 that our Understanding is of the kind that must 
 proceed from the universal to the particular. The 
 Judgment then in respect of the particular can cog- 
 nise no purposiveness and, consequently, can form no 
 determinant judgments, without having a universal 
 law under which to subsume that particular. Now 
 the particular, as such, contains something contingent 
 in respect of the universal, while yet Reason requires 
 unity and conformity to law in the combination of 
 particular laws of nature. This conformity of the 
 contingent to law is called purposiveness ; and the 
 derivation of particular laws from the universal, as 
 regards their contingent element, is impossible a
 
 Div. 11 §77 A NATURAL PURPOSE 319 
 
 priori through a determination of the concept of 
 the Object, . Hence, the concept of the purposive- 
 ness of nature in its products is necessary Ibr human 
 Judgment in respect of nature, but has not to do 
 with the determination of objects. It is, therefore, 
 a subjective principle of Reason for the Judgment, 
 which as regulative (not constitutive) is just as 
 necessarily valid for our huma^i Judgment as if it 
 were an objective pr inciple. 
 
 § 11- Of the peculiarity of the human Understand- 
 ings by means of which the concept of a natural 
 purpose is possible. ^ 
 
 We have brought forward in the Remark 
 peculiarities of our cognitive faculties (even the 
 higher ones) which we are easily led to transfer 
 as objective predicates to the things themselves. But 
 they concern Ideas, no object adequate to which 
 can be given in experience, and they could only 
 serve as regulative principles in the prosecution 
 of the latter. This is the case with the concept 
 of a natural purpose, which concerns the cause 
 of the possibility of such a predicate, which cause 
 can only lie in the Idea. But the result correspond- 
 ing to it {i.e. the product) is given in nature ; and 
 the concept of a causality of nature as of a being 
 acting according to purposes seems to make the 
 Idea of a natural purpose into a constitutive principle, 
 which Idea has thus something different from all 
 other Ideas. 
 
 This difference consists, however, in the fact 
 that the Idea in question is not a rational principle 
 for the Understanding but for the Judgment. It 
 is, therefore, merely the application of an Under-
 
 320 A'AA'T'S KKITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 Standing in general to possible objects of experience, 
 in cases where the judoment can only be reflective, 
 not determinant, and where, consequently, the object, 
 although given in experience, cannot be deterviinately 
 Judged m conformity with the Idea (not to say with 
 complete adequacy), but can only be reflected on. 
 
 There emerges, therefore, a peculiarity of our 
 (human) Understanding in respect of the Judgment in 
 its reflection upon things of nature. But if this be 
 so, the Idea of a possible Understanding different 
 from the human must be fundamental here. (Just 
 so in the Kritik of Pure Reason we must have in 
 our thoughts another possible [kind of] intuition, if 
 ours is to be regarded as a particular species for which 
 objects are only valid as phenomena). And so we 
 are able to say : Certain natural products, from the 
 special constitution of our Understanding, uiiis^ be 
 considered by us, in regard to their possibility, as if 
 produced designedly and as purposes. But we do 
 not, therefore, demand that there should be actually 
 given a particular cause which has the representa- 
 tion of a purpose as its determining ground ; and 
 we do not deny that an Understanding, different 
 from {i.e. higher than) the human, might find the 
 ground of the possibility of such products of nature 
 in the mechanism of nature, i.e. in a causal combina- 
 tion for which an Understanding is not explicitly 
 assumed as cause. 
 
 We have now to do with the relation of our 
 Understanding to the Judgment: viz. we seek for 
 a certain contingency in the constitution of our 
 Understanding, to which we may point as a peculi- 
 arity distinguishing it from other possible Under- 
 standinsfs. 
 
 This contingency is found, naturally enough.
 
 Div. ii§77 A DISCURSIVE UNDERSTANDING 321 
 
 in the particular, which the Judgment is to bring 
 under the tmiversal oi the concepts of Understand- 
 ing. For the universal of c//r (human) Understanding 
 does not determine the particular, and it is contingent 
 in how many ways different things which agree in 
 a common characteristic may come before our 
 perception. Our Understanding is a faculty of 
 concepts, i.e. a discursive Understanding, for which 
 it obviouslv must be continofent of what kind and 
 how very different the particulars may be that 
 can be given to it in nature and brought under its 
 concepts. But now intuition also belongs to know- 
 ledge, and a faculty of a complete spontaneity gf 
 intuition would be a cognitive faculty distinct from 
 sensibility, and quite independent of it, in other 
 words, an Understanding in the most general sense, 
 hus we can think an intuitive Understanding 
 [negatively, merely as not discursive ^], -which does 
 not proceed from the universal to the particular, 
 and so to the individual (through concepts)./ For 
 it that contingency of the accordance of nature in 
 its products according to partic^ilar laws with the 
 Understanding would not be met with ; and it is 
 this contingency that makes it so hard for our 
 Understanding to reduce the manifold of nature 
 to the unity of knowledge. This reduction our 
 Understanding can only accomplish by bringing 
 natural characteristics into correspondence which is 
 very contingent, with our faculty of concepts, and 
 of which an intuitive Understandinor would have 
 no need. 
 
 Our Understanding has then this peculiarity as 
 concerns the Judgment, that in cognition by it the 
 particular is not determined by the universal and 
 
 ^ [Second Edition.] 
 Y 
 
 <T
 
 322 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part li 
 
 cannot therefore be derived from it ; but at the same 
 time this particular in the manifold of nature must 
 accord with the universal (by means of concepts and 
 laws) that it may be capable of being subsumed 
 under it. This accordance under such circumstances 
 must be very contingent and without definite principle 
 as concerns the Judgment. 
 
 In order now to be able at least to think the possi- 
 bility of such an accordance of things of nature with 
 our Judgment (which accordance we represent as 
 contingent and consequently as only possible by means 
 of a purpose directed thereto), we must at the same 
 time think of another Understanding, by reference to 
 which and apart from any purpose ascribed to it, we 
 may represent as necessary that accordance of natural 
 laws with our Judgment, which for our Understand- 
 ing is only thinkable through the medium of purposes. 
 
 In fact our Understanding has the property of 
 proceeding in its cognition, e.g. of the cause of a 
 product, from the analytical-iLniversal (concepts) to 
 the particular (the given empirical intuition). Thus 
 as regards the manifold of the latter it determines 
 nothing, but must await this determination by the 
 Judgment of the subsumption of the empirical 
 intuition (if the object is a natural product) under 
 the concept. We can however think an Under- 
 standing which, being, not like ours, discursive, but 
 intuitive, proceeds from the synthetical-universal 
 (the intuition of a whole as such) to the particular, 
 i.e. from the whole to the parts. The contingency of 
 the combination of the parts, in order that a definite 
 form of the whole shall be possible, is not implied 
 by such an Understanding and its representation of 
 the whole. Our Understanding requires this because 
 it must proceed from the parts as universally con-
 
 Div. II § 77 AN INTUITIVE UNDERSTANDING 323 
 
 ceived grounds to different forms possible to be 
 subsumed under them, as consequences. According 
 to the constitution of our Understanding a real 
 whole of nature is regarded only as the effect of the 
 concurrent motive powers of the parts. Suppose 
 then that we wish not to represent the possibility of- 
 the whole as dependent on that of the parts (after 
 the manner of our discursive Understanding), but 
 according to the standard of the intuitive (original) 
 Understanding to represent the possibility of the 
 parts (according to their constitution and combina- 
 tion) as dependent on that of the whole. In accord- 
 ance with the above peculiarity of our Understanding 
 it cannot happen that the whole shall contain the 
 ground of the possibility of the connection of the 
 parts (which would be a contradiction in discursive 
 cognition), but only that the representation of a 
 whole may contain the ground of the possibility of 
 its form and the connection of the parts belonging 
 to it. Now such a whole would be an effect [prodzict) 
 the representation of which is regarded as the cause 
 of its possibility, but the product of a cause whose 
 determining ground is merely the representation of 
 its effect is called a purpose. Hence it is merely a 
 consequence of the particular constitution of our 
 Understanding, that it represents products of nature 
 as possible, according to a different kind of causality 
 from that of the natural laws of matter, namely, that 
 of purposes and final causes. Hence also this 
 principle has not to do with the possibility of such 
 things themselves (even when considered as pheno- 
 mena) according to the manner of their production, 
 but merely with the judgment upon them which is 
 possible to our Understanding. Here we see at 
 once why it is that in natural science we are not
 
 324 KANT'S KRITJK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 long contented with an explanation of the products 
 of nature by a causality according to purposes. For 
 there we desire to judge of natural production merely 
 in a manner conformable to our faculty of judging, 
 i.e. to the reflective Judgment, and not in reference 
 to thinofs themselves on behalf of the determinant 
 Judgment. It is here not at all requisite to prove 
 that such an intcllectzis archetypiis is possible, but 
 only that we are led to the Idea of it, — which too 
 contains no contradiction, — in contrast to our dis- 
 cursive Understanding which has need of images 
 {iiitellechis ectypus) and to the contingency of its 
 constitution. 
 
 If we consider a material whole, according to its 
 form, as a product of the parts with their powers 
 and faculties of combining with one another (as well 
 as of bringing in foreign materials), we represent to 
 ourselves a mechanical mode of production of it. 
 But in this way no concept emerges of a whole 
 as purpose, whose internal possibility presupposes 
 throughout the Idea of a whole on which depend 
 the constitution and mode of action of the parts, as 
 we must represent to ourselves an organised body. 
 It does not follow indeed, as has been shown, that the 
 mechanical production of such a body is impossible ; 
 for to say so would be to say that it would be 
 impossible (contradictory) for any Understanding to 
 represent to itself such a unity in the connection of 
 the manifold, without the Idea of the unity being at 
 the same time its producing cause, i.e. without 
 designed production. This, however, would follow 
 in fact if we were justified in regarding material 
 beings as things in themselves. For then the unity 
 that constitutes the ground of the possibility of 
 natural formations would be simply the unity of
 
 Div, ii§77 A SUPERSENSIBLE SUBSTRATE 325 
 
 space. But space is no real ground of the products, 
 but only their formal condition, although it has this 
 similarity to the real ground which we seek that in 
 it no part can be determined except in relation to the 
 whole (the representation of which therefore lies at 
 the ground of the possibility of the parts). But now 
 it is at least possible to consider the material world 
 as mere phenomenon, and to think as its substrate 
 something like a thing in itself (which is not pheno- 
 menon), and to attach to this a corresponding 
 intellectual intuition (even though it is not ours). 
 Thus there would be, although incognisable by us, 
 a supersensible real ground for nature, to which we 
 ourselves belong. In this we consider according to 
 mechanical laws what is necessary in nature regarded 
 as an object of Sense ; but we consider according to 
 teleological laws the agreement and unity of its 
 particular laws and its forms — which in regard to 
 mechanism we must judge contingent — regarded as 
 objects of Reason (in fact the whole of nature as a 
 system). Thus we should judge nature according 
 to two different kinds of principles without the 
 mechanical way of explanation being shut out by 
 the teleological, as if they contradicted one another. 
 From this we are permitted to see what otherwise, 
 though we could easily surmise it, could w^ith difficulty 
 be maintained with certainty and proved, viz. that 
 the principle of a mechanical derivation of purposive 
 natural products is consistent with the teleological, 
 but in no way enables us to dispense with it. In a 
 thing that we must judge as- a natural purpose (an 
 organised being) we can no doubt try all the known 
 and yet to be discovered laws of mechanical produc- 
 tion, and even hope to make good progress there- 
 with ; but we can never get rid of the call for a
 
 326 A'AAT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 quite different ground of production for the possi- 
 bility of such a product, viz. causaHty by means of 
 /purposes. <[Absolutely no human Reason (in fact 
 Cno finite Reason Hke ours in quahty, however much 
 ^it may surpass it in degree) can hope to understand 
 I the production of even a blade of grass by mere 
 >mechanical causes. As regards the possibility of 
 such an object, the teleological connection of causes 
 and effects is quite indispensable for the Judgment, 
 even for studying it by the clue of experience. For 
 external objects as phenomena an adequate ground 
 related to purposes cannot be met with ; this, although 
 it lies in nature, must only be sought in the super- 
 sensible substrate of nature, from all possible insight 
 into which we are cut off Hence it is absolutely 
 impossible for us to produce from nature itself 
 grounds of explanation for purposive combinations ; 
 and it is necessary by the constitution of the human 
 cognitive faculties to seek the supreme ground of 
 these purposive combinations in an original Under- 
 standing as the cause of the world. 
 
 \ ']^. Of the 7inion of the principle of the iiniversal 
 mechanism of matter zvith the teleological prin- 
 ciple in the Technic of nature. 
 
 It is infinitely important for Reason not to let 
 slip the mechanism of nature in its products, and in 
 their explanation not to pass it by, because without 
 it no insig-ht into the nature of things can be attained. 
 Suppose it admitted- that a supreme Architect 
 immediately created the forms of nature as they 
 have been from the beginning, or that He predeter- 
 mined those which in the course of nature continu- 
 ally form themselves on the same model. Our
 
 Div. II ? 78 A HEURISTIC PRINCIPLE 327 
 
 knowledge of nature is not thus in the least furthered, 
 because we cannot know the mode of action of that 
 Being and the Ideas which are to contain the 
 principles of the possibility of natural beings, and 
 we cannot by them explain nature as from above 
 downwards (a priori). And if, starting from the 
 forms of the objects of experience, from below 
 upwards {a posteriori), we wish to explain the 
 purposiveness, which we believe is met with in ex- 
 perience, by appealing to a cause working in accord- 
 ance with purposes, then is our explanation quite 
 tautological and we are only mocking Reason with 
 \vords. Indeed when we lose ourselves with this 
 way of explanation in the transcendent, whither 
 natural knowledo-e cannot follow, Reason is seduced 
 into poetical extravagance, which it is its peculiar 
 destination to avoid. 
 
 On the other hand, it is just as necessar}' a 
 maxim of Reason not to pass by the principle of 
 purposes in the products of nature. For. although 
 it does not make their mode of origination any more 
 comprehensible, yet it is a heuristic principle for 
 investigating the particular laws of nature ; suppos- 
 inof even that we wish to make no use of it for 
 explaining nature itself, in which we still always 
 speak only of natural purposes, although it appa- 
 rently exhibits a designed unity of purpose, — i.e. 
 without seeking the ground of their possibility beyond 
 nature. But since we must come in the end to this 
 latter question, it is just as necessary to think for 
 nature a particular kind of causality which does not 
 present itself in it, as the mechanism of natural causes 
 which does. To the receptivity of several forms, 
 different from those of which matter is susceptible by 
 mechanism, must be added a spontaneity of a cause
 
 328 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT partii 
 
 (which therefore cannot be matter), without which no 
 ground can be assigned for those forms. No doubt 
 Reason, before it takes this step, must proceed with 
 caution, and not try to explain teleologically every 
 Technic of nature, i.e. every productive faculty of 
 nature which displays in itself (as in regular bodies) 
 purposiveness of figure to our mere apprehension ; 
 but must always regard such as so far mechanically 
 possible. But on that account to wish entirely to 
 exclude the teleological principle, and to follow 
 simple mechanism only — in cases where, in the 
 rational investigation of the possibility of natural 
 forms through their causes, purposiveness shows 
 itself quite undeniably as the reference to a different 
 kind of causality — to do this must make Reason 
 fantastic, and send it wandering among chimeras of 
 unthinkable natural faculties ; just as a mere teleo- 
 logical mode of explanation which takes no account 
 of natural mechanism makes it visionary. 
 
 In the same natural thing both principles cannot 
 be connected as fundamental propositions of explana- 
 tion (deduction) of one by the other, i.e. they do not 
 unite for the determinant Judgment as dogmatical 
 and constitutive principles of insight into nature. If 
 I choose, e.g., to regard a maggot as the product of 
 the mere mechanism of nature (of the new formation 
 that it produces of itself, when its elements are set 
 free by corruption), I cannot derive the same product 
 from the same matter as from a causality that acts 
 according to purposes. Conversely, if I regard the 
 same product as a natural purpose, I cannot count 
 on any mechanical mode of its production and regard 
 this as the constitutive principle of my judgment 
 upon its possibility, and so unite both principles. 
 One method of explanation excludes the other ;
 
 Div. II § 78 EXPLANATION AND EXPOSITION 329 
 
 even supposing that objectively both grounds of 
 the possibiHty of such a product rested on a single 
 ground, to which we did not pay attention. The 
 principle which should render possible the compati- 
 bility of both in judging of nature must be placed 
 in that which lies outside both (and consequently 
 outside the possible empirical representation of 
 nature), but yet contains their ground, i.e. in the 
 supersensible ; an'd each of the two methods of 
 explanation must be referred thereto. Now of this 
 we can have no concept but the indeterminate con- 
 cept of a ground, which makes the judging of nature 
 by empirical laws possible, but which we cannpt 
 determine more nearly by any predicate. Hence the 
 union of both principles cannot rest upon a ground 
 of explanation of the possibility of a product accord- 
 ing to given laws, for the determinant Judgment, but 
 only upon a ground of its exposition for the rejlective 
 Judgment. — To explain is to derive from a principle, 
 which therefore we must clearly know and of which 
 we can give an account. C^No doubt the principle of 
 the mechanism of nature and that of its causality 
 in one and the same natural product must coalesce 
 in a single higher principle, which is their common 
 source, because otherwise they could not subsist 
 side by side in the observation of nature. But if 
 this principle, objectively common to the two, which 
 therefore warrants the association of the maxims of 
 natural investigation depending on both, be such 
 that, though it can be pointed to, it cannot be 
 determinately known nor clearly put forward for use 
 in cases which arise, then can we from such a 
 principle draw no explanation, i.e. no clear and 
 determinate derivation of the possibility of a natural 
 product in accordance with those two heterogene-
 
 330 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part II 
 
 OLis principles. But now the principle common to 
 the mechanical and teleological derivations is the 
 supersensible, which we must place at the basis of 
 nature, regarded as phenomenon. And of this, in a 
 theoretical point of view, we cannot form the smallest 
 positive determinate concept. It cannot, therefore, 
 in any way be explained how, according to it as 
 principle, nature (in its particular laws) constitutes 
 for us one system, which can be cognised as possible 
 either by the principle of physical development or 
 by that of final causes. If it happens that objects 
 of nature present themselves which cannot be 
 thought by us, as regards their possibility, according 
 to the principle of mechanism (which always has 
 a claim on a natural being), without relying on 
 teleological propositions, we can only make an hypo- 
 thesis. Namely, we suppose that we may hopefully 
 investigate natural laws with reference to both 
 (according as the possibility of its product is cognis- 
 able by our Understanding by one or the other 
 principle), without stumbling at the apparent con- 
 tradiction which comes into view between the prin- 
 ciples by which they are judged. For at least the 
 possibility is assured that both may be united 
 objectively in one principle, since they concern pheno- 
 mena that presuppose a supersensible ground. 
 
 Mechanism, then, and the teleological (designed) 
 
 Technic of nature, in respect of the same product 
 
 and its possibility, may stand under a common 
 
 j supreme principle of nature in particular laws. But 
 
 \ since this principle is transcendent we cannot, because 
 
 (of the limitation of our Understanding, unite both 
 
 , principles /// the explanation of the same production 
 
 of nature even if the inner possibility of this product 
 
 /is only intelligible [verstandlich] through a causality
 
 ij/rriiMM (^<^(M^ 
 
 Div. II ? 78 PRINCIPLE OF TELEOLOGY 331 
 
 according to purposes (as is the case with organised 
 matter). We revert then to the above fundamental 
 proposition of Teleology. ^According to the con- ' 
 stitution of the human Understanding, no other ^ 
 t han des ignedly working causes can be assumed 
 for the possibility of organised beings in nature ; 
 and the mere mechanism of nature cannot be 
 adequate to the explanation of these its products. 
 But we do not attempt to decide anything by this 
 fundamental proposition as to the possibility of such 
 things themselves^" 
 
 This is only a maxim of the reflective, not of 
 the determinant Judgment ; consequently only sub- 
 jectively valid for us, not objectively for the possi- 
 bility of things themselves of this kind (in which 
 both kinds of production may well cohere in one 
 and the same ground). Further, without any con- 
 cept, — besides the teleologically conceived method 
 of production, — of a simultaneously presented 
 mechanism of nature, no judgment can be passed 
 on this kind of production as a natural product. 
 Hence the above maxim leads to the necessity of 
 an unification of both principles in judging of things 
 as natural purposes in themselves, but does not lead 
 us to substitute one for the other either altogfether 
 or in certain parts. ^For in the pjace of what is 
 thought (at least by us) as possible only by design 
 we ca nnoj set mechanism, and in the place of what 
 is cognised as mechanically necessary we cannot set ^/traUu.- 
 contingency, which would need a purpose as its ni^^JL,^ ^ 
 determining ground; but we can only subordinate j^^ 'j^^^ 
 the one (Mechanism) to the other (designed Tech- 
 nlc), which may quite well be the case according to 
 the transcendental principle of the purposiveness of 
 nature.
 
 332 A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 For where purposes are thought as grounds of 
 the possibihty of certain things, we must assume a 
 means [thereto] whose law of working requires for 
 itself nothing presupposing a purpose, which law 
 consequently can be mechanical and yet a cause 
 subordinated to designed effects. Thus — in the 
 organic products of nature, and also when prompted 
 by their infinite number, we assume (at least as a 
 permissible hypothesis) design in the combination of 
 natural causes by particular laws as a tmiversal 
 principle of the reflective Judgment for the whole of 
 nature (the world), — we can think a great and 
 indeed universal combination of mechanical with 
 teleological laws in the productions of nature, 
 without interchanging the principles by which they 
 are judged or putting one in the place of the other. 
 For, in a teleological judgment, the matter, even if 
 the form that it assumes be judged possible only 
 by design, can also, conformably to the mechanical 
 laws of its nature, be subordinated as a means to 
 the represented purpose. But, since the ground of 
 this compatibility lies in that which is neither one 
 nor the other (neither mechanism nor purposive 
 combination), but is the supersensible substrate of 
 nature of which we know nothing, the two ways of 
 representing the possibility of such Objects are not 
 to be blended together by our (human) Reason. 
 However, we cannot judge of their possibility 
 otherwise than by judging them as ultimately 
 resting on a supreme Understanding by the 
 connection of final causes ; and thus the teleo- 
 logical method of explanation is not eliminated. 
 
 Now it is quite indeterminate, and for our 
 Understanding always indeterminable, how much 
 the mechanism of nature does as a means towards
 
 Div. ii§78 MECHANICAL EXPLANATIONS 333 
 
 each final design in nature. However, on account 
 of the above-mentioned intelhgible principle of 
 the possibility of a nature in general, it may be 
 assumed that it is possible throughout according to 
 the two kinds of universally accordant laws (the 
 physical and those of final causes), although we 
 cannot see into the way how this takes place. 
 Hence we do not know how far the mechanical 
 method of explanation which is possible for us may 
 extend. So much only is certain that, so far as we 
 can go in this direction, it must always be inadequate 
 for thino;s that we once recop^nise as natural 
 purposes ; and therefore we must, by the consti- 
 tution of our Understanding, subordinate these 
 grounds collectively to a teleological principle. 
 
 Hereon is based a privilege, and on account of 
 the importance which the study of nature by the 
 principle of mechanism has for the theoretical use of 
 our Reason, also an appeal. <AVe should explain all 
 products__and_^ccurrences in nature, even the most 
 purposive, by mechanism as far as is in our power 
 (the limits of which we cannot give an account of in 
 this kind of investigation). But at the same time 
 we are not to lose sight of the fact that those things 
 which we cannot even state for investigation except 
 under the concept of a purpose of Reason, must, in 
 conformity with the essential constitution of our 
 Reason, and notwithstanding those mechanical 
 causes, be subordinated by us finally to causality in 
 accordance with purposes.
 
 METHODOLOGY OF 
 THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT.^ 
 
 ^ 79. Whether teleology vmst be treated as if it 
 belonged to the doctrine of nature 
 
 Every science must have its definite position in 
 the encyclopaedia of all the sciences. If it is a 
 philosophical science its position must be either in 
 the theoretical or practical part. If again it has 
 its place in the former of these, it must be either in 
 the doctrine of nature, so far as it concerns that 
 which can be an object of experience (in the 
 doctrine of bodies, the doctrine of the soul, or the 
 universal science of the world), or in the doctrine of 
 God (the original ground of the world as the 
 complex of all objects of experience). 
 
 Now the question is, what place is due to 
 Teleology ? Does it belong to Natural Science 
 (properly so called) or to Theology ? One of the 
 two it must be ; for no science belongs to the 
 transition from one to the other, because this 
 transition only marks the articulation or organ- 
 isation of the system, and not a place in it. 
 
 That it does not belong to Theology as a part 
 of it, although it may be made of the most 
 important use therein, is self-evident. For it has as 
 
 ^ [This is marked as an Appemiix in the Second Edition.]
 
 APPENDIX §79 PLACE OF TELEOLOGY 335 
 
 its objects, natural productions, and their cause, and 
 althouoh it refers at the same time to the latter as 
 to a ground lying outside of and beyond nature (a 
 Divine Author), yet it does not do this for the 
 determinant but only for the reflective Judgment in 
 the consideration of nature (in order to guide our 
 judgment on things in the world by means of such 
 an Idea as a regulative principle, in conformity with 
 the human Understanding), 
 
 But it appears to belong just as little to Natural 
 Science, which needs determinant and not merely 
 reflective principles in order to supply objective 
 grounds for natural effects. In fact, nothing is 
 gained for the theory of nature or the mechanical 
 explanation of its phenomena by means of its 
 effective causes, by considering them as connected 
 according to the relation of purposes. The 
 exhibition of the purposes of nature in its products, 
 so far as they constitute a system according to 
 teleological concepts, properly belongs only to a 
 description of nature which is drawn up in accord- 
 ance with a particular guiding thread. Here 
 Reason, no doubt, accomplishes a noble work, 
 instructive and practically purposive in many points 
 of view ; but it gives no information as to the 
 origin and the inner possibility of these forms, 
 which is the special business of theoretical Natural 
 Science. Teleology, therefore, as science, belongs 
 to no Doctrine, but only to Kritik ; and to the 
 Kritik of a special cognitive faculty, viz. Judgment. 
 But so far as it contains principles a priori, it can 
 and must furnish the method by which nature must 
 be judged according to the principle of final causes. 
 Hence its Methodology has at least negative 
 influence upon the procedure in theoretical Natural
 
 336 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 Science, and also upon the relation which this can 
 have in Metaphysic to Theology as its propae- 
 deutic. 
 
 s^ So. Of the necessary subordination of the mechani- 
 cal to the teleological principle in the explanation 
 of a thing as a natural pnjpose. 
 
 Th.^ privilcoe of aiming at a merely mechanical 
 method of explanation of all natural products is in 
 itself quite unlimited ; but the faculty of attaining 
 thereto is by the constitution of our Understanding, 
 so far as it has to do with things as natural purposes, 
 not only very much limited but also clearly bounded. 
 For, according to a principle of the Judgment, by 
 this process alone nothing can be accomplished 
 towards an explanation of these things ; and con- 
 sequently the judgment upon such products must 
 always be at the same time subordinated by us to a 
 teleological principle. 
 
 It is therefore rational, even meritorious, to 
 pursue natural mechanism, in respect of the ex- 
 planation of natural products, so far as can be done 
 with probability ; and if we give up the attempt it is 
 not because it is impossible in itself to meet in this 
 path with the purposiveness of nature, but only 
 because it is impossible for ns as men. For there 
 would be required for that an intuition other than 
 sensuous, and a determinate knowledge of the 
 intellitrible substrate of nature from which a Q:round 
 could be assigned for the mechanism of phenomena 
 according to particular laws, which quite surpasses 
 our faculties. 
 
 Hence if the naturalist would not waste his 
 labour he must in judging of things, the concept of
 
 APPENDIX §8o ANALOGY OF FORMS 337 
 
 any of which is indubitably established as a natural 
 purpose (organised beings), always lay down as basis 
 an original organisation, which uses that very 
 mechanism in order to produce fresh organised 
 forms or to develop the existing ones into new 
 shapes (which, however, always result from that 
 purpose and conformably to it). 
 
 It is praiseworthy by the aid of comparative 
 anatomy to go through the great creation of organ- 
 ised natures, in order to see whether there may not 
 be in it somethino- similar to a svstem and also in 
 accordance with the principle of production. For 
 otherwise we should have to be content with the 
 mere principle of judgment (which gives no insight 
 into their production) and, discouraged, to give up 
 all claim to natural insight in this field. The ao-ree- 
 ment of so many genera of animals in a certain 
 common schema, which appears to be fundamental 
 not onlv in the structure of their bones but also in 
 the disposition of their remaining parts, — so that 
 with an admirable simplicity of original outline, a 
 great variety of species has been produced by the 
 shortening of one member and the lengthening of 
 another, the involution of this part and the evolution 
 of that, — allows a ray of hope, however faint, to 
 penetrate into our minds, that here something may 
 be accomplished by the aid of the principle of the 
 mechanism of nature (without which there can be no 
 natural science in general). This analogy of forms, 
 which with all their differences seem to have been 
 produced according to a common original type, 
 strengthens our suspicions of an actual relationship 
 between them in their production from a common 
 parent, through the gradual approximation of one 
 animal-genus to another — from those in which the 
 
 z
 
 338 A'AJVT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 principle of purposes seems to be best authenticated, 
 i.e. from man, down to the polype, and again from 
 this down to mosses and lichens, and finally to the 
 lowest stage of nature noticeable by us, viz. to crude 
 matter. And so the whole Technic of nature, which 
 is so incomprehensible to us in organised beings 
 that we believe ourselves compelled to think a 
 different principle for it, seems to be derived from 
 matter and its powers according to mechanical laws 
 (like those by which it works in the formation of 
 crystals). 
 
 Here it is permissible for the Arc/icrologist of 
 nature to derive from the surviving traces of its 
 oldest revolutions, according to all its mechanism 
 known or supposed by him, that great family of 
 creatures (for so we must represent them if the said 
 thoroughgoing relationship is to have any ground). 
 He can suppose the bosom of mother earth, as she 
 passed out of her chaotic state (like a great animal), 
 to have given birth in the beginning to creatures of 
 less purposive form, that these again gave birth to 
 others which formed themselves with greater adapta- 
 tion to their place of birth and their relations to each 
 other ; until this womb becoming torpid and ossified, 
 limited its births to definite species not further 
 modifiable, and the manifoldness remained as it 
 was at the end of the operation of that fruitful 
 formative power. — Only he must still in the end 
 ascribe to this universal mother an organisation 
 purposive in respect of all these creatures ; otherwise 
 it would not be possible to think the possibility of 
 the purposive form of the products of the animal and 
 vegetable kingdoms.^ He has then only pushed 
 
 ^ We may call a hypothesis of this kind a daring venture of 
 reason, and there may be few even of the most acute naturalists
 
 APPENDIX § So VARIATIONS FROM TYPE 339 
 
 further back the ground of explanation and cannot 
 pretend to have made the development of those two 
 kingdoms independent of the condition of final 
 causes. 
 
 Even as concerns the variation to which certain 
 individuals of organised genera are accidentally 
 subjected, if we find that the character so changed 
 is hereditary and is taken up into the generative 
 power, then we cannot pertinently judge the varia- 
 tion to be anything else than an occasional develop- 
 ment of purposive capacities originally present in 
 the species with a view to the preservation of the 
 race. For in the complete inner purposiveness of 
 an organised being, the generation of its like is 
 closely bound up with the condition of taking 
 nothing up into the generative power which does 
 not belong, in such a system of purposes, to one of 
 its undeveloped original capacities. Indeed, if we 
 depart from this principle, we cannot know with 
 certainty whether several parts of the form which is 
 now apparent in a species have not a contingent and 
 unpurposive origin ; and the principle of Teleology, 
 to judge nothing in an organised being as unpur- 
 
 through whose head it has not sometimes passed. For it is not 
 absurd, hke that getieratio aquivoca by which is understood the 
 production of an organised being through the mechanics of crude 
 unorganised matter. It would ahvays x&iw.'sivcs. generatio iinivoca in the 
 most uni\-ersal sense of the word, for it only considers one organic 
 being as derived from another organic being, although from one 
 which is specifically different ; e.g. certain water-animals transform 
 themselves gradually into marsh -animals and from these, after 
 some generations, into land- animals. A priori., in the judgment 
 of Reason alone, there is no contradiction here. Only experience 
 gives no example of it ; according to experience all generation 
 that we know is gcneratio hoinoityina. This is not merely 
 Iinivoca in contrast to the generation out of unorganised material, 
 but in the organisation the product is of like kind to that which 
 produced it ; and generatio hetcronyina, so far as our empirical 
 knowledge of nature extends, is nowhere found.
 
 340 A'A/VT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part li 
 
 posive which maintains it in its propagation, would 
 be very unreliable in its application and would be 
 valid solely for the original stock (of which we have 
 no further knowledge). 
 
 Humc^ takes exception to those who find it 
 requisite to assume for all such natural purposes a 
 teleological principle of judgment, i.e. an architectonic 
 Understanding. He says that it may fairly be asked : 
 how is such an Understanding possible ? How can 
 the manifold faculties and properties that constitute 
 the possibility of an Understanding, which has at the 
 same time executive might, be found so purposively 
 together in one Being ? But this objection is with- 
 out weight. For the whole difficultv which surrounds 
 the question concerning the first production of a 
 thing containing in itself purposes and only compre- 
 hensible by means of them, rests on the further 
 question as to the unity of the ground of the com- 
 bination in this product of the various elements [des 
 jNIannichfaltigen] which are external to one another. 
 For if this ground be placed in the Understanding of 
 a producing cause as simple substance, the question, 
 so far as it is teleoloQfical, is sufficientlv answered ; 
 but if the cause be sought merely in matter as an 
 
 ^ [It is probable that Kant alludes here to Hume's Essay On a 
 Providence and a Fittiax State, § xi of the Inquiry. Hume argues 
 that though the inference from an effect to an intelligent cause may 
 be valid in the case of human contrivance, it is not legitimate to rise 
 by a like argument to Supreme Intelligence. " In human nature 
 there is a certain experienced coherence of designs and inclinations ; 
 so that when from any fact \ve have discovered one intention of any 
 man, it may often be reasonable from experience to infer another, 
 and draw a long chain of conclusions concerning his past or future 
 conduct. But this method of reasoning can never have place with 
 regard to a being so remote and incomprehensible, who bears much 
 less analogy to any other being in the universe than the sun to 
 a waxen taper, and who discovers himself only by some faint traces 
 or outlines, beyond which we have no authority to ascribe to him 
 any attribute or perfection."]
 
 APPENDIX § 80 PANTHEISM AND SPINOZISM 341 
 
 aggregate of many substances external to one another, 
 the unity of the principle is quite wanting for the 
 internally purposive form of its formation, and the 
 a2Ltocracy of matter in productions which can only 
 be conceived by our Understanding as purposes is 
 a word without meaning. 
 
 Hence it comes to pass that those who seek a 
 supreme ground of possibility for the objectively- 
 purposive forms of matter, without attributing to it 
 Understanding, either make the world-whole into a 
 single all-embracing substance (Pantheism), or 
 (which is only a more determinate explanation of 
 the former) into a complex of many determinations 
 inhering in a single simple substance (Spinozism) ; 
 merely in order to satisfy that condition of all 
 purposiveness — the Jinity of ground. Thus they do 
 justice indeed to one condition of the problem, viz. 
 the unity in the purposive combination, by means of 
 the mere ontological concept of a simple substance ; 
 but they adduce nothing for the other condition, 
 viz. the relation of this substance to its result as 
 purpose, through which relation that ontological 
 ground is to be more closely determined in respect 
 of the question at issue. Hence they answer the 
 whole question in no way. It remains absolutely 
 unanswerable (for our Reason) if we do not repre- 
 sent that original ground of things, as simple 
 substance ; its property which has reference to the 
 specific constitution of the forms of nature grounded 
 thereon, viz. its purposive unity, as the property of 
 an intelligent substance ; and the relation of these 
 forms to this intelligence (on account of the contin- 
 gency which we ascribe to everything that we think 
 possible only as a purpose) as that of causality.
 
 342 KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT tart ii 
 
 si 8 1 . Of the association of mechanism with the teleo- 
 logical principle in the explanation of a natural 
 purpose as a natural product 
 
 According to the preceding paragraphs the 
 mechanism of nature alone does not enable us to 
 think the possibility of an organised being ; bjt (at 
 least according to the constitution of our cognitive 
 faculty) it must be originally subordinated to a 
 cause working designedly. But, just as little is the 
 mere teleological ground of such a being sufficient 
 for considering it and judging it as a product of 
 nature, if the mechanism of the latter be not associ- 
 ated with the former, like the instrument of a cause 
 working designedly, to whose purposes nature is 
 subordinated in its mechanical laws. The possi- 
 bility of such a unification of two quite different 
 kinds of causality, — of nature in its universal con- 
 formity to law with an Idea which limits it to a 
 particular form, for which it contains no ground in 
 itself — is not comprehended by our Reason. It lies 
 in the supersensible substrate of nature, of which we 
 can determine nothing positively, except that it is 
 the being in itself of which we merely know the 
 phenomenon. But the principle, "all that we as- 
 sume as belonging to. this nature [phenomenon^ and 
 as its product, must be thought as connected with 
 it according to mechanical laws," has none the 
 less force, because without this kind of causality 
 organised beings (as purposes of nature) would not 
 be natural products. 
 
 Now if the teleological principle of the produc- 
 tion of these beings be assumed (as is inevitable), 
 we can place at the basis of the cause of their
 
 APPENDIX § 8i PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY 343 
 
 internally purposive form either Occasionalism or 
 Pre-established Harmony. According to the former 
 the Supreme Cause of the world would, conform- 
 ably to its Idea, furnish immediately the organic 
 formation on the occasion of every union of inter- 
 mingling materials. According to the latter it 
 would, in the original products of its wisdom, only 
 have supplied the capacity by means of which an 
 organic being produces another of like kind, and 
 the species perpetually maintains itself; whilst the 
 loss of individuals is continually replaced by that 
 nature which at the same time works towards their 
 destruction. If we assume the Occasionalism of the 
 production of organised beings, all nature is quite 
 lost, and with it all employment of Reason in judging 
 of the possibility of such products ; hence we may 
 suppose that no one will adopt this system, who has 
 anything to do with philosophy. 
 
 [The theory of] Pre-established Harmony may 
 proceed in two different ways. It regards every 
 organised being as generated by one of like kind, 
 either as an ediict or ?l product. The system which 
 regards generations as mere educts is called the 
 theory of individual prefoi'mation or the theory of 
 evolution : that which regards them as products is 
 entitled the system of epigenesis. This latter may 
 also be entitled the system of generic preformation, 
 because the productive faculty of the generator and 
 consequently the specific form would be virtually 
 preformed according to the inner purposive capacities 
 which are part of its stock. In correspondence with 
 this the opposite theory of individual preformations 
 would be better entitled the theory of invokUion. 
 
 The advocates of the theory of evolution, who 
 remove every individual from the formative power
 
 344 A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part II 
 
 of nature, in order to make it come immediately 
 from the hand of the Creator, would, however, not 
 venture to regard this as happening according to 
 the hypothesis of Occasionalism. For according 
 to this the union is a mere formality, a propos of 
 which a supreme intelligent Cause of the world has 
 concluded to immediately form a fruit, and only to 
 leave to its parent its development and nourishment. 
 They declare themselves for preformation ; as if it 
 were not all the same, whether a supernatural origin 
 is assigned to these forms in the beginning or in the 
 course of the world. On the contrary, a great 
 number of supernatural arrangements would be 
 spared by occasional creation, which would be 
 requisite, in order that the embryo formed in the 
 beginning of the world might not be injured up to 
 [the moment of] its development by the destructive 
 powers of nature, and might keep itself unharmed ; 
 and there would also be requisite an incalculably 
 greater number of such preformed beings than would 
 ever be developed, and with them many creations 
 would be made without need and without purpose. 
 They would, however, be willing to leave at least 
 something to nature, so as not to fall into a com- 
 plete Hyperphysic which can dispense with all 
 natural explanations. It is true, they hold so fast 
 by their Hyperphysic that they find even in abortions 
 (which it is quite impossible to take for purposes of 
 nature) an admirable purposiveness ; though it be 
 only directed to the fact that an anatomist would 
 take exception to it as a purposeless purposiveness, 
 and would feel a disheartened wonder thereat. But 
 the production of hybrids could absolutely not be 
 accommodated with the system of preformation ; 
 and to the seeds of the male creature, to which they 
 
 I
 
 APPENDIX S Si theory OF EPIGENESIS 345 
 
 had attributed nothing but the mechanical property 
 of serving as the first means of nourishment for the 
 embryo, they must attribute in addition a purposive 
 formative power, which in the case of the product of 
 two creatures of the same genus they would concede 
 to neither parent. 
 
 On the other hand, even if we do not recognise 
 the great superiority which the theory of Epigenesis 
 has over the former as regards the empirical grounds 
 of its proof, still prior to proof Reason views this 
 way of explanation with peculiar favour. For in 
 respect of the things which we can only represent as 
 possible originally according to the causality of 
 purposes, at least as concerns their propagation, this 
 theory regards nature as self-producing, not merely 
 as self-evolving : and so with the least expenditure 
 of the supernatural leaves to nature all that follows 
 after the first beginning (though without determining 
 anything about this first beginning by which Physic 
 generally is thwarted, however it may essay its 
 explanation by a chain of causes). 
 
 As regards this theory of Epigenesis, no one has 
 contributed more either to its proof or to the establish- 
 ment of the legitimate principles of its application, — 
 partly by the limitation of a too presumptuous em- 
 ployment of it, — than Herr Hofr. Bhunenbach} In 
 all physical explanations of these formations he 
 starts from organised matter. That crude matter 
 should have originally formed itself according to 
 mechanical laws, that life should have sprung from 
 the nature of what is lifeless, that matter should 
 have been able to dispose itself into the form 
 
 1 [J. F. Blumenbach (i 752-1840), a German naturalist and 
 professor at Gottingen ; the author oi Insiitntiones PhysiologiccB (1787) 
 and other works.]
 
 346 A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 of a selt-maintaining purposiveness — this he rightly 
 declares to be contradictory to Reason. But at the 
 same time he leaves to natural mechanism under 
 this to us indispensable principle of an original 
 organisation, an undeterminable but yet unmistake- 
 able element, in reference to which the faculty of 
 matter in an organised body is called by him a 
 formative inpnlsc (in contrast to, and yet standing 
 under the higher guidance and direction of, that 
 merely \\i^Q\\2i\\\Q.-A formative poiver universally resi- 
 dent in matter). 
 
 § 82. Of the teleological system in the external 
 relations of organised beings 
 
 By external purposiveness I mean that by which 
 one thing of nature serves another as means to a 
 purpose. Now things which have no internal pur- 
 posiveness and which presuppose none for their 
 possibility, eg. earth, air, water, etc., may at the same 
 time be very purposive externally, i.e. in relation to 
 other beings. But these latter must be organised 
 beings, i.e. natural purposes, for otherwise the former 
 could not be judged as means to them. Thus water, 
 air, and earth cannot be regarded as means to the 
 raising of mountains, because mountains contain 
 nothing in themselves that requires a ground of 
 their possibility according to purposes, in reference to 
 which therefore their cause can never be represented 
 under the predicate of a means (as useful therefor). 
 
 External purposiveness is a quite different con- 
 cept from that of internal purposiveness, which 
 is bound up with the possibility of an object irre- 
 spective of its actuality being itself a purpose. We 
 can ask about an organised being the question :
 
 APPENDIX § 82 ORGANISA TION OF SEX 347 
 
 What js, it for ? But we cannot easily ask th is 
 a bout j hjno^s in which we .recognise merely the 
 working of nature's mechanism. For in the 
 former, as regards their internal possibility, w^e repre- 
 sent a causality according to purposes, a creative 
 Understanding, and w^e_j;efer_this^cjlve^.fac]^^ d^C^kp^ 
 its determining gTound, viz. design. There is only 
 one external purposiveness which is connected with 
 the internal purposiveness of organisation, and yet 
 serves in the external relation of a means to a 
 purpose, without the question necessarily arising, as 
 to what end this being so organised must have 
 existed for. This is the organisation of both sexgs 
 in their mutual relation for the propagation of their 
 kind ; since here we can always ask, as in the case 
 of an individual, why must such a pair exist ? The 
 answer is : This pair first constitutes an organising 
 whole, though not an organised w^hole in a single 
 body. 
 
 If we now ask, wherefore anything is, the answer 
 is either: Its presence and its production have no 
 reference at all to a cause working according to 
 design, and so we always refer its origin to the 
 mechanism of nature, or : There is somewhere a de- 
 signed ground of its presence (as a contingent natural 
 being). This thought we can hardly separate from 
 the concept of an organised thing ; for, since we 
 must place at the basis of its internal possibility a 
 causality of final causes and an Idea lying at the 
 ground of this, we cannot think the existence of this 
 product except as a purpose, ^^or the represented / 
 efiect, the representation of which is at the same 
 time the determining ground of the intelligent cause 
 working towards its production, is called a purpose. 
 In this case therefore we can either say: The^
 
 348 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 purpose of the existence of such a natural being 
 is in itself; i.e. it is not merely a purpose but a 
 final purpose, or : This is external to it in another 
 natural being, i.e. it exists purposively not as a 
 final purpose, but necessarily as a means.' 
 
 But if we Qfo throuofh the whole of nature 
 we find in it, as nature, no being which could 
 make claim to the eminence of being the final 
 purpose of creation ; and we can even prove a prion 
 that what might be for nature an tiltimate purpose, 
 according to all the thinkable determinations and 
 properties wherewith one could endow it, could yet 
 as a natural thing never be ■3i final purpose. 
 
 If we consider the vegetable kingdom we might 
 at first sight, on account of the immeasurable 
 fertility with which it spreads itself almost on every 
 soil, be led to take it for a mere product of that 
 mechanism which nature displays in the formations 
 of the mineral kingdom. But a more intimate 
 knowledge of its indescribably wise organisation 
 does not permit us to hold to this thought, but 
 prompts the question : What are these things 
 created for ? If it is answered : For the animal 
 kingdom, which is thereby nourished and has thus 
 been able to spread over the earth in genera so 
 various, then the further question comes : What 
 are these plant-devouring animals for ? The answer 
 would be something like this : For beasts of prey, 
 which can only be nourished by that which has life. 
 Finally we have the question : What are these last, 
 as well as the first -mentioned natural kingdoms, 
 good for ? For man, in reference to the manifold 
 use which his Understanding teaches him to make 
 of all these creatures. He is the ultimate purpose 
 of creation here on earth, because he is the only
 
 APPENDIX §82 AN ULTIMATE PURPOSE 349 
 
 being upon it who can form a concept of purposes, 
 and who can by his Reason make out of an 
 aggregate of purposively formed things a system of 
 purposes. 
 
 We might also with the chevaHer Linncetts go 
 the apparently opposite way and say : The herbivo- 
 rous animals are there to moderate the luxurious 
 growth of the vegetable kingdom, by which many 
 of its species are choked. The carnivora are to set 
 bounds to the voracity of the herbivora. Finally 
 man, by his pursuit of these and his diminution 
 of their numbers, preserves a certain equilibrium 
 between the producing and the destructive powers 
 of nature. And so man, although in a certam 
 reference he might be esteemed a purpose, yet in 
 another has only the rank of a means. 
 
 If an objective purposiveness in the variety of 
 the genera of creatures and their external relations 
 to one another, as purposively constructed beings, 
 be made a principle, then it is conformable to Reason 
 to conceive in these relations a certain organisation 
 and a system of all natural kingdoms according 
 to final causes. Only here experience seems flatly 
 to contradict the maxims of Reason, especially as 
 concerns an ultimate purpose of nature, which is 
 indispensable for the possibility of such a system 
 and which we can put nowhere else but in man. 
 For regarding him as one of the many animal 
 genera, nature has not in the least excepted him 
 from its destructive or its productive powers, but 
 has subjected everything to a mechanism of its own 
 without any purpose. 
 
 The first thing that must be designedly pre- 
 pared in an arrangement for a purposive complex 
 of natural beings on the earth would be their place
 
 350 A'JXrS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 of habitation, the soil and the element on and in 
 which they are to thrive. vBut a more exact know- 
 ledsfe of the constitution of this basis of all organic 
 production indicates no other causes than those 
 working quite undesignedly, causes which rather 
 d estro y thajT_ja\-our production, order, and piurposes. 
 \ Land and sea not only contain in themselves 
 , memorials of ancient misjhtv desolations which have 
 confounded them and all creatures that are in them ; 
 ' but their whole structure, the strata of the one 
 ( and the boundaries of the other have quite the 
 appearance of being the product of the wild and 
 violent forces of a nature working in a state of chaos. 
 Although the figure, the structure, and the slope of 
 the land might seem to be purposively ordered 
 for the reception of water from the air, for the 
 welling up of streams between strata of different 
 kinds (for many kinds of products), and for the 
 course of rivers — vet a closer investigation shows 
 that they are_j]ierp.l )^the^ effects of volcanie-ewi^ons 
 or of inundations of the ocean, as regards not only 
 the first production of this figure, but, above all, its 
 subsequent transformation, as well as the disappear- 
 ance of its first organic productions.^ Now if the 
 place of habitation of all these creatures, the soil 
 (of the land) or the bosom (of the sea), indicates 
 
 1 If the once adopted name Xaiural history is to continue for the 
 description of nature, we may in contrast with art, give the title of 
 Arcliaology of tiatiire to that which the former literally indicates, viz. 
 a representation of the old condition of the earth, about which, 
 although we cannot hope for certainty, we have good ground for 
 conjecture. As sculptured stones, etc., belong to the province of art, 
 so petrefactions belong to the archaeolog)- of nature. And since work 
 is actually being done in this [science] (under the name of the Theory 
 of the Earth), constantly, although of course slowly, this name is 
 not given to a merely imaginary- investigation of nature, but to one to 
 which nature itself leads and invites us.
 
 APPENDIX? 82 AN ULTIMATE PURPOSE 351 
 
 nothing but a quite undesigned mechanism of its 
 production, how and with what right can we demand 
 and maintain a different origin for these latter 
 products ? The closest examination, indeed (in 
 C^;;^/^;'"i- judgment), of the remains of the aforesaid 
 devastations of nature seems to show that man was 
 not comprehended in these revolutions ; but yet he 
 is so dependent on the remaining creatures that, if 
 a universally directing mechanism of nature be 
 admitted in the case of the others, he must also 
 be regarded as comprehended under it ; even though 
 his Understanding (for the most part at least) has 
 been able to deliver him from these devastations. 
 
 But this argument seems to prove more than 
 was intended by it. It seems to prove not merely 
 that man cannot be the ultimate purpose of nature, 
 and that on the same grounds the aggregate of 
 t he org^an ised things _of nature on the earth cannot 
 be a s ystem of purposes ; but also that the natural 
 products formerly held to be natural purposes have 
 no other origin than the mechanism of nature. 
 
 But in the solution given above of the Antinomy 
 of the principles of the mechanical and teleological 
 methods of production of organic beings of nature, 
 we have seen that they are merely principles of 
 the reflective Judgment in respect of nature as it 
 produces forms in accordance with particular laws 
 (for the systematic connection of which we have 
 no key). They do not determine the origin of 
 these beinors in themselves ; but onlv sav that we, 
 bv the constitution of our Understandinof and our 
 Reason, cannot conceive it in this kind of being; ex- 
 cept according to final causes. The greatest possible 
 effort, even intrepidity, in the attempt to explain 
 them mechanically is not only permitted, but we
 
 
 352 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part U 
 
 are invited to it by Reason ; notwithstanding that 
 we know from the subjective grounds of the particular 
 species and hmitations of our Understanding (not 
 e.g. because the mechanism of production would 
 contradict in itself an origin according to purposes) 
 that we can never attain thereto. Finally, the 
 compatibility of both ways of representing the 
 possibility of nature may lie in the supersensible 
 principle of nature (external to us, as well as in 
 us) ; 4vhilst the method of representation according 
 to final causes may be only a subjective conditio,n 
 of the use of our Reason, when it not merelv wishes 
 to form a judgment upon objects as phenomena, 
 but desires to refer these phenomena together with 
 their principles to their supersensible substrate, in 
 order to find certain laws of their unity possible, 
 which it cannot represent to itself except through 
 purposes (of which the Reason also has such as 
 are supersensible). 
 
 \'^'-i. Of the tdtimate purpose of nature as a 
 teleological system 
 
 We have shown in the preceding that, though 
 not for the determinant but for the reflective 
 Judgment, we have sufficient cause for judging 
 man to be, not merely like all organised beings 
 a natural purpose, but also the ulti77iate purpose of 
 nature here on earth ; in reference to whom all 
 other natural things constitute a system of purposes 
 according to fundamental propositions of Reason. 
 If now that must be found in man himself, which 
 is to be furthered as a purpose by means of his 
 connection with nature, this purpose must either 
 be of a kind that can be satisfied bv nature in 
 
 1
 
 APPENDIX § 83 HAPPINESS 353 
 
 its beneficence ; or it is the aptitude and skill for 
 all kinds of purposes for which nature (external 
 and internal) can be used by him. The first 
 purpose of nature would be man's happiness, the 
 second his culture. 
 
 The concept of happiness is not one that 
 man derives by abstraction from his instincts and 
 so deduces from his animal nature ; but it is a 
 mere Idea of a state, that he wishes to make 
 adequate to the Idea under merely empirical 
 conditions (which is impossible). This Idea he 
 projects in such different ways on account of the 
 complication of his Understanding with Imagination 
 and Sense, and changes so often, that nature, even 
 if it were entirely subjected to his elective will, 
 could receive absolutely no determinate, universal 
 and fixed law, so as to harmonise with this vacillat- 
 ing concept and thus with the purpose which each 
 man arbitrarily sets before himself And even if 
 we reduce this to the true natural wants as to 
 which our race is thoroughly agreed, or on the 
 other hand, raise ever so high man's skill to 
 accomplish his imagined purposes ; yet, even thus, 
 what man understands by happiness, and what is 
 in fact his proper, ultimate, natural purpose (not 
 purpose of freedom), would never be attained by 
 him. For it is not his nature to rest and be 
 contented with the possession and enjoyment of 
 anything whatever. On the other side, too, there 
 is something wanting. Nature has not taken him 
 for her special darling and favoured him with 
 benefit above all animals. Rather, in her destructive 
 operations, — plague, hunger, perils of waters, frost, 
 assaults of other animals great and small, etc., — in 
 these things has she spared him as little as any 
 
 2 A
 
 354 A' A NT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 Other animal. Further, the inconsistency of his 
 own natural dispositions drives him into self-devised 
 torments, and also reduces others of his own race 
 to misery, by the oppression of lordship, the barbarism 
 of war, and so forth ; he, himself, as far as in him 
 lies, works for the destruction of his own race ; so 
 that even with the most beneficent external nature, 
 its purpose, if it were directed to the happiness 
 of our species, would not be attained in an earthly 
 system, because our nature is not susceptible of it. 
 Man is then always only a link in the chain of 
 natural purposes ; a principle certainly in respect 
 of many purposes, for which nature seems to have 
 destined him in her disposition, and to which he 
 sets himself, but also a means for the maintenance 
 of purposiveness in the mechanism of the remaining 
 links. As the only being on earth which has an 
 Understanding and, consequently, a faculty of setting 
 arbitrary purposes before itself, he is certainly en- 
 titled to be the lord of nature ; and if it be regarded 
 as a teleological system he is, by his destination, the 
 ultimate purpose of nature. But this is subject to 
 the condition of his having an Understanding and 
 the Will to give to it and to himself such a reference 
 to purposes, as can be self-sufficient independently 
 of nature, and, consequently, can be a final purpose ; 
 which, however, must not be sought in nature itself. 
 But in order to find out where in man we have 
 to place that idtiinate purpose of nature, we must 
 seek out what nature can supply to prepare him 
 for what he must do himself in order to be a final 
 purpose, and we must separate it from all those 
 purposes whose possibility depends upon things 
 that one can expect only from nature. Of the 
 latter kind is earthly happiness, by which is under-
 
 APPENDIX §83 CULTURE 355 
 
 Stood the complex of all man's purposes possible 
 through nature, whether external nature or man's 
 nature ; i.e. the matter of all his earthly purposes, 
 which, if he makes it his whole purpose, renders 
 him incapable of positing his own existence as a 
 final purpose, and being in harmony therewith. 
 There remains therefore of all his purposes in 
 nature only the formal subjective condition ; viz. 
 the aptitude of setting purposes in general before 
 himself, and (independent of nature in his purposive 
 determination) of using nature, conformably to the 
 maxims of his free purposes in general, as a means. 
 This nature can do in regard to the final purpose 
 that lies outside it, and it therefore may be regarded 
 as its ultimate purpose. The production of the 
 aptitude of a rational being for arbitrary purposes 
 in general (consequently in his freedom) is atlture. 
 Therefore, culture alone can be the ultimate purpose 
 which we have cause for ascribing- to nature in 
 respect to the human race (not man's earthly hap- 
 piness or the fact that he is the chief instrument 
 of instituting order and harmony in irrational nature 
 external to himself). 
 
 But all culture is not adequate to this ultimate 
 purpose of nature. The culture of skill is indeed the 
 chief subjective condition of aptitude for furthering 
 one's purposes in general ; but it is not adequate to 
 furthering the will'" in the determination and choice 
 of purposes, which yet essentially belongs to the 
 whole extent of an aptitude for purposes. The 
 latter condition of aptitude, which we might call the 
 culture of training (discipline), is negative, and 
 consists in the freeing of the will from the despotism 
 of desires. By these, tied as we are to certain 
 
 ^ [First Edition \iz.% freedom.'\
 
 356 KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 natural things, we are rendered incapable even of 
 choosing, while we allow those impulses to serve as 
 fetters, which Nature has given us as guiding 
 threads that we should not neglect or injure the 
 destination of our animal nature — we being all the 
 time free enough to strain or relax, to extend 
 or diminish them, according as the purposes oi 
 Reason require. 
 
 Skill cannot be developed in the human race 
 except by means of inequality among men ; for the 
 great majority provide the necessities of life, as it 
 were, mechanically, without requiring any art in 
 particular, for the convenience and leisure of others 
 who work at the less necessary elements of culture, 
 science and art. In an oppressed condition they 
 have hard work and little enjoyment, although 
 much of the culture of the higher classes gradually 
 spreads to them. Yet with the progress of this 
 culture (the height of which is called luxury, reached 
 when the propensity to what can be done without 
 begins to be injurious to what is indispensable), 
 their calamities increase equally in two directions, 
 on the one hand through violence from without, on 
 the other hand throufjh internal discontent ; but 
 still this splendid misery is bound up with the 
 development of the natural capacities of the human 
 race, and the purpose of nature itself, although not 
 our purpose, is thus attained. The formal condition 
 under which nature can alone attain this its final 
 design, is that arrans^ement of men's relations to one 
 another, by which lawful authority in a whole, which 
 we call a civil comnumity, is opposed to the abuse 
 of their conflicting freedoms ; only in this can the 
 greatest development of natural capacities take 
 place. For this also there would be requisite, — if
 
 APPENDIX § 83 THE EFFECTS OF WAR 357 
 
 men were clever enough to find it out and wise 
 enough to submit themselves voluntarily to its 
 constraint, — a cosmopolitan whole, i.e. a system of 
 all states that are in danger of acting injuriously 
 upon each other,^ Failing this, and with the 
 obstacles which ambition, lust of dominion, and 
 avarice, especially in those who have the authority 
 in their hands, oppose even to the possibility of 
 such a scheme, there is, inevitably, lija^" (by 
 which sometimes states subdivide and resolve 
 themselves into smaller states, sometimes a state 
 annexes other smaller states and strives to form a 
 greater whole). Though war is an undesigned 
 enterprise of men (stirred up by their unbridled 
 passions), yet is it [perhaps] - a deep-hidden and 
 designed enterprise of supreme Wisdom for 
 preparing, if not for establishing, conformity to law 
 amid the freedom of states, and with this a unity of 
 a morally grounded system of those states. In 
 spite of the dreadful afflictions with which it visits 
 the human race, and the perhaps greater afflictions 
 with which the constant preparation for it in time 
 of peace oppresses them, yet is it (although the 
 hope for a restful state of popular happiness is ever 
 further off) a motive for developing all talents ser- 
 viceable for culture, to the highest possible pitch. ^ 
 
 As concerns the discipline of the inclinations, — 
 for which our natural capacity in regard of our 
 
 1 [These views are set forth by Kant more fully in the essay 
 Zuni ciuigcn Fricden (1795).] 
 
 - [Second Edition.] 
 
 3 [Cf. The PJiilosophical Theory of Religion^ Part i., On tJie bad 
 principle in Human Naiuir, III., where Kant remarks that although 
 war " is not so incurably bad as the deadness of a universal mon- 
 archy . . . yet, as an ancient observed, it makes more bad men than 
 it takes away."]
 
 JLf-VT"5 KRITIK OFJUDGJlRyr PAStr n 
 
 .5 3.11 rtnifPirti FcLCc ^^ ~ : T ' 51Vc, OUt 
 
 - "7 deveic — - -frv 
 
 = ? -erepdveof 
 : y- We 
 
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 „ L5 cc-ire: r i^cm us by : t r ent of 
 
 tastr - ;- : T -":ion. and ev-- z\ Lie ^.axuiy 
 ok sc^ci- - - r "^ - ^ icx)d for " '\ '^ :'- - ; - the 
 insadahie z.^^ " itkms -seki. But 
 
 vet - : . : ■ - ; . : - ^ : ; -r — ever 
 
 'A 
 
 T'ecukiTa:' 
 
 1'^ ■: ~ - \ - . ' : : : '". :ir r^'ranzy •:: ^-r. 5:-' ' : ns, 
 
 ' i :" ' lOT a "ip, in 
 
 Kci lave authoiit}' ; whilst the evus 
 
 - ^rt visited, partly by nature, partly 
 
 oy Lit i: ir== of men, ; 
 
 . i-^v-ers of the £ i . 
 
 lo submis: : ie us leei aa 
 
 apdnit f:r i : '■ s i i 
 in us.' 
 
 - 7*- 1 V--. - 1 r" h is esdn^^ei by that 
 
 er Tre rarrral - -he =cm of all nuBnAt iiui i % £^. 
 
 '-1 ; easj : t. Iz =~Vt b^tnr aeco; Ibr who wotdd 
 
 "■; ' . .. si"r~ -_^- .- - ^ .- — ^ cCTwIilioiis ' wfeo 
 
 wj± tbe cncr^e ct -?rrr-e>- a n —err r / . reczed zo ecjojrneEt ?
 
 APPE?ri)is f S4 TEE VAL UE OF LIFE ^9 
 
 I S4- Of the fimd purpose of the existence of a 
 worlds i.e. of creation itself 
 
 A final purpose is that purpose which needs do 
 other as comdkmsi o£ its possibility. 
 V If themere mf f^p^'^^rn nf naijii^^ te assumed as 
 the aroamd o{ exa^aaiatio n of its piirposivesess, we 
 cannot ask : what are things ^ there for ? For 
 aaxKrdimg lo such an ideah'stic system it is only the 
 physical possibilit}- of things (to think which as 
 purposes would be mere subdety without any Object) 
 that is imder discussion : whether we refer this fornp 
 of things to chance or to blind necessitr, in either 
 case the qoestiofl wooM be vain. If however, we 
 assume the purposive combination in the world to 
 be real and to be [brought about_ by a particular kind 
 of causaHty, tjz. that of a designedly worhing cause, 
 we cannot stop at the question : why have things 
 of the world (organised beings) this or that form ? 
 why are they placed by nature in this or that rela- 
 tion to one another ? But once an Understanding 
 is thought that must be regarded as the cause of 
 the possibility of such forms as they are actually 
 tbamd in things, it must be also asked on objective 
 grounds : WTio could have determined this pro- 
 ductive Understanding to an operation of this kind ? 
 
 We have sho^sm aLove iriiat raloe Efe lias in Tirtoe of iidaai it 
 ccmtains in itself^ irben Irred in accordance Ttith the purpose that 
 niarnre Jbas aJnmg -witii ns, and -irhich consists in -wiiai we do (not 
 inerelT -wiiai we ---•-" in -wiijctu howerer, we sre always but means 
 towards an nr_.:- ..ned final purpose. Tbere remains then 
 no tTi ing but the Talne which we ourselves give oirr Efe, thrcnagii wiiat 
 we can not oioly do, but do pnrposTreh- in such rodependence of 
 naxnre that the esistence of nature itself ra n only be a purpose 
 tmder this conditioin. 
 
 ■^ p^irst Editicm has tUngs in the ^r/>rM.J
 
 36o KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 This being is then the final purpose in reference to 
 which such things are there, 
 
 I have said above that the final purpose is not a 
 purpose which nature would be competent to bring 
 about and to produce in conformity with its Idea, 
 because it is unconditioned. For there is nothing 
 in nature (regarded as a sensible being) for which 
 the determining ground present in itself would not 
 be always conditioned ; and this holds not merely of 
 external (material) nature, but also of internal 
 (thinking) nature — it being of course understood 
 that I only am considering that in myself which is 
 nature. But a thing that is to exist necessarily, on 
 account of its objective constitution, as the final 
 purpose of an intelligent cause, must be of the kind 
 that in the order of purposes it is dependent on no 
 further condition than merely its Idea. 
 
 Now we have in the world only one kind of 
 beings whose causality is teleological, i.e. is directed 
 to purposes and is at the same time so constituted 
 that the law according to which they have to de- 
 termine purposes for themselves is represented as 
 unconditioned and independent of natural conditions, 
 and yet as in itself necessary. The being of this 
 kind is man, but man considered as noumenon ; the 
 only natural being in which we can recognise, on the 
 side of its peculiar constitution, a supersensible 
 faculty [freedom) and also the law of causality, 
 together with the Object, which this faculty may 
 propose to itself as highest purpose (the highest 
 good in the world). 
 
 Now of man (and so of every rational creature 
 in the world) as a moral being it can no longer 
 be asked : why [queui in fiiieiii) he exists ? His 
 existence involves the highest purpose to which,
 
 APPENDIX §84 FINAL AND ULTIMATE PURPOSE 361 
 
 as far as is in his power, he can subject the 
 whole of nature ; contrary to which at least he 
 cannot regard himself as subject to any influence 
 of nature. — If now things of the world, as beings 
 dependent in their existence, need a supreme cause 
 acting according to purposes, man is the final pur- 
 pose of creation ; since without him the chain of 
 mutually subordinated purposes would not be com- 
 plete as regards its ground. Only in man, and 
 only in him as subject of morality, do we meet 
 with unconditioned legislation in respect of purposes, 
 which therefore alone renders him capable of being 
 a final purpose, to which the whole of nature is 
 teleologically subordinated.^ 
 
 1 It would be possible that the happiness of rational beings in 
 the world should be a purpose of nature, and then also this would be 
 its ultimate purpose. At least we cannot see a priori why nature 
 should not be so ordered, because by means of its mechanism this 
 effect would be certainly possible, at least so far as we see. But 
 morality, with a causality according to purposes subordinated thereto, 
 is absolutely impossible by means of natural causes ; for the principle 
 by which it detemiines to action is supersensible, and is therefore 
 the only possible principle in the order of purposes that in respect of 
 nature is 9,bsolutely unconditioned. Its subject consequently alone 
 is qualified to be the. Jiiial purpose of creation to which the whole of 
 nature is subordinated. — Happiness^ on the contrary, as has been 
 shown in the preceding paragraphs by the testimony of experience, 
 is not even a purpose of nature in respect of man in preference to 
 other creatures ; much less a final pu7pose of creation. Men may 
 of course make it their ultimate subjective purpose. But if I ask, 
 in reference to the final purpose of creation, why must men exist ? 
 then we are speaking of an objective supreme purpose, such as the 
 highest Reason would require for creation. If we answer : These 
 beings exist to afford objects for the benevolence of that Supreme 
 Cause ; then we contradict the condition to which the Reason of man 
 subjects even his inmost wish for happiness (viz. the harmony with 
 his own internal moral legislation). This proves that happiness can 
 only be a conditioned purpose, and that it is only as a moral being 
 that man can be the final purpose of creation ; but that as concerns 
 his state happiness is only connected with it as a consequence, 
 according to the measure of his harmony with that purpose regarded 
 as the purpose of his being.
 
 362 KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 § 85. Of Physico-theology 
 
 Physico-theology is the endeavour of Reason to 
 infer the Supreme Cause of nature and its properties 
 from the purposes of nature (which can only be 
 empirically known). Moral theology (ethico-theology) 
 would be the endeavour to infer that Cause and its 
 properties from the moral purpose of rational beings 
 in nature (which can be known a prio7H). 
 
 The former naturally precedes the latter. For if 
 we wish to infer a World Cause teleologically from 
 the things in the world, purposes of nature must 
 first be given, for which we afterwards have to seek 
 a final purpose, and for this the principle of the 
 causality of this Supreme Cause. 
 <::;^Many investigations of nature can and must be 
 conducted according to the teleological principle, 
 without our having cause to inquire into the ground 
 of the possibility of purposive working which we 
 meet with in various products of nature. But if we 
 wish to have a concept of this we have absolutely 
 no further insisfht into it than the maxim of the 
 reflective Judgment affords: viz. if only a single 
 organic product of nature were given to us, by the 
 constitution of our cognitive faculty we could think 
 no other ground for it than that of a cause of nature 
 I itself (whether the whole of nature or only this part) 
 which contains the causality for it through Under- 
 standing. This principle of judging, though it does 
 not bring us any further in the explanation of 
 natural things and their origin, yet discloses to us an 
 outlook over nature, by which perhaps we may be 
 able to determine more closely the otherwise so 
 unfruitful concept of an Original Being.
 
 h 'MA /k^ Cf. , '^ a^UVttui^ A^lulr^y 0.4 Cu 
 
 APPENDIX §85 PHYSICO-THEOLOGY 363 
 
 k^'c^''^-- (n^^r Qauip^^u^ j,.i 
 
 7? 
 
 Now I say that Physico-theology, however far it 
 may be pursued, can disclose to us nothing of 2.jinal^ 
 pit7'pose of creation ; for it does not even extend to 
 the question as to this. It can, it is true, justify the' 
 concept of an intelHgent World Cause, as a subject- / 
 ive concept (only available for the constitution of 
 our cognitive faculty) of the possibility of things \ 
 that we can make intelligible to ourselves accord-' 
 ing to purposes ; but it cannot determine this concept \ 
 further, either in a theoretical or a practical point of 
 view. Its endeavour does not come up to its design 
 of being the basis of a Theology, but it always ■ jj 
 remains only a_physical Teleology; because -the y^'^i- 
 purposive reference therein is and must be always 1 /^^jJ' 
 considered only as conditioned in nature, and it / ^ 
 
 consequently cannot inquire into the purpose for 
 which nature itself exists (for which the ground must 
 be sought outside nature), — notwithstanding that it 
 is upon the determinate Idea of this that the deter- 
 minate concept of that Supreme Intelligent World 
 Cause, and the consequent possibility of a Theology, 
 depend. 
 
 <C.What^ the things in the world are mutually 
 ujeful for ; what good the manifold in a thing does 
 for the thing ; how we have ground to assume that 
 nothing in the world is in vain, but that everything 
 in nahire is good for something, — the condition being 
 granted that certain things are to exist (as purposes), 
 whence our Reason has in its power for the Judg- 
 ment no other principle of the possibility of the 
 Object, which it inevitably judges teleologically, 
 than that of subordinating the mechanism of nature 
 to the Architectonic of an intelligent Author of the 
 world — all this the teleolo^ical consideration of the 
 world supplies us with excellently and to our extreme
 
 364 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 admiration. But because the data, and so the 
 principles, for detennining that concept of an intelH- 
 gent World Cause (as highest Artist) are merely 
 empirical, they do not enable us to infer any 
 of its properties beyond those which experience 
 reveals in its effects. No w experi ence, since it 
 can never embrace collective nature as a^^ystem, 
 must often (apparently) happen upon this concept 
 (and by mutually conflicting grounds of proof) ; but 
 it can never, even if we had the power of surveying 
 empirically the whole system as far as it concerns 
 mere nature, raise us above nature to th_e purpose of 
 its existence, and so to the determinate concejDt of 
 that supreme Intelligence. 
 
 If we lessen the problem with the solution of 
 which Physico-theology has to do, its solution appears 
 easy. I f we reduce the concept of a Deity to that 
 of an intelligent being thought by us, of which there 
 may be one or more, which possesses many and very 
 great properties, but not all the properties which are 
 requisite for the foundation of a nature in harmony 
 with the greatest possible purpose ; or if we do not 
 scruple in a theory to supply by arbitrary additions 
 what is deficient in the grounds of proof, and so, 
 where we have only ground for assuming much 
 perfection (and what is "much" for us?), consider 
 ourselves entitled to presuppose all possible perfec- 
 tion ; thus indeed physical Teleology may make 
 weighty claims to the distinction of being the basis 
 of a Theology. But if we are desired to point out 
 what impels and moreover authorises us to add these 
 supplements, then we shall seek in vain for a ground 
 of justification in the principles of the theoretical 
 use of Reason, which is ever desirous in the ex- 
 planation of an Object of experience to ascribe to
 
 APPENDIX § 85 ANCIENT THEISM 365 
 
 it no more properties than those for which empirical 
 data of possibihty are to be found. On closer exami- 
 nation we should see that properly speaking an Idea 
 of a Supreme Being, which rests on a quite different 
 use of Reason (the practical use), lies in us funda- 
 mentally a priori, impelling us to supplement the 
 defective representation, supplied by a physical 
 Teleology, of the original ground of the purposes 
 in nature by the concept of a Deity ; and we should 
 not falsely imagine that we had worked out this 
 Idea, and with it a Theology by means of the 
 theoretical use of Reason in the physical cognition 
 of the world — much less that we had proved its 
 reality. 
 
 Onecannot blamethe ancients much, if they thought 
 of their gods as differing much from each other 
 both as regards their faculties and as regards their 
 designs and volitions, but yet thought of all of them, 
 the Supreme One not excepted, as always limited 
 after human fashion. For if they considered the 
 arrangement and the course of things in nature, they 
 certainly found ground enough for assuming some- 
 thing more than mechanism as its cause, and for 
 conjecturing behind the machinery of this world 
 designs of certain higher causes, which they could 
 not think otherwise than superhuman. But because 
 they met with good and evil, the purposive and 
 the unpurposive, mingled together (at least as far 
 as our insight goes), and could not permit them- 
 selves to assume nevertheless that wise and benevo- 
 lent purposes of which they saw no proof lay hidden 
 at bottom, on behalf of the arbitrary Idea of a 
 supremely perfect original Author, their judgment 
 upon the supreme World Cause could hardly have 
 been other than it was, so long as they proceeded
 
 366 KANrS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 consistently according to maxims of the mere 
 theoretical use of Reason, Others, who wished 
 to be theologians as well as physicists, thought to 
 find contentment for the Reason by providing for 
 the absolute unity of the principle of natural things 
 which Reason demands, the Idea of a Being of 
 which as sole Substance the things would be 
 all only inherent determinations. This Substance 
 would not be Cause of the World by means of 
 intelligence, but in it all the intelligences of the 
 beings in the world would be comprised. This 
 Being consequently w^ould produce nothing accord- 
 ing to purposes ; but in it all things, on account 
 of the unity of the subject of which they are mere 
 determinations, must necessarily relate themselves 
 purposively to one another, though without purpose 
 and design. Thus they introduced the Idealism of 
 final causes, by changing the unity (so difficult to 
 explain) of a number of purposively combined 
 substances, from being the unity of causal depend- 
 ence on one Substance to be the unity of inherence 
 in one. This system — which in the sequel, con- 
 sidered on the side of the inherent world beings, 
 becomes Pantheism, and (later) on the side of the 
 Subject subsisting by itself as Original Being, 
 becomes Spinozisin, — does not so much resolve as 
 explain aw^ly into nothing the question of the first 
 ground of the purposiveness of nature ; because this 
 latter concept, bereft of all reality, must be taken 
 for a mere misinterpretation of a universal onto- 
 logical concept of a thing in general. 
 
 Hence the concept of a Deity, w^hich would 
 be adequate for our teleological judging of nature, 
 can never be derived according to mere theoretical 
 principles of the use of Reason (on which Physico-
 
 APPENDIX §85 PHYSICAL TELEOLOGY 367 
 
 theology alone is based). For as one alternative 
 we may explain all Teleology as a mere deception 
 of the Judgment in its judging of the causal com- 
 bination of things, and fly to the sole principle of a 
 mere mechanism of nature, which merely seems to 
 us, on account of the unity of the Substance of 
 whose determinations nature is but the manifold, 
 to contain a universal reference to purposes. Or 
 if, instead of this Idealism of final causes, we 
 wish to remain attached to the principle of the 
 Realism of this particular kind of causality, we 
 may set beneath natural purposes many intelligent 
 original beings or only a single one. But so far 
 as we have for the basis of this concept [of Realism] 
 only empirical principles derived from the actual 
 purposive combination in the world, we cannot on 
 the one hand find any remedy for the discordance 
 that nature presents in many examples in respect 
 of unity of purpose ; and on the other hand, as to 
 the concept of a single intelligent Cause, so far as 
 we are authorised by mere experience, we can 
 never draw it therefrom in a manner sufficiently 
 determined for any serviceable Theology whatever 
 (whether theoretical or practical). 
 
 Physical Teleology impels us, it is true, to seek 
 a Theology ; but it cannot produce one, however 
 far we may investigate nature by means of experi- 
 ence and, in reference to the purposive combination 
 apparent in it, call in Ideas of Reason (which must 
 be theoretical for physical problems). —--What is the 
 use, one might well complain, of placing at the basis 
 of^all these arrangements a great Understanding 
 incommensurable by us, and supposing it to govern 
 the world according to design, if nature does not and 
 cannot tell us anything of the final design ? For
 
 368 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 without this we cannot refer all these natural pur- 
 poses to any common point, nor can we form any 
 teleological principle, sufficient either for cognisincr 
 the purposes collected in a system, or for forming 
 a concept of the Supreme Understanding, as Cause 
 of such a nature, that could serve as a standard 
 for our Judgment reflecting teleologically thereon. 
 I should thus have an artistic Understandings for 
 scattered purposes, but no Wisdom for a final pur- 
 pose, in which final purpose nevertheless must be 
 contained the determining ground of the said Under- 
 standing. But in the absence of a final purpose 
 which pure Reason alone can supply (because all 
 /purposes in the world are empirically conditioned, 
 .and can contain nothing absolutely good but only 
 /what is good for this or that regarded as a contin- 
 gent design), and which alone would teach me 
 what properties, what degree, and what relation of 
 the Supreme Cause to nature I have to think in 
 order to judge of nature as a teleological system ; 
 how and with what right do I dare to extend at 
 pleasure my very limited concept of that original 
 Understanding (which I can base on my limited 
 knowledge of the world), of the Might of that 
 original Being in actualising its Ideas, and of its 
 Will to do so, and complete this into the Idea of 
 an Allwise, Infinite Being? If this is to be done 
 theoretically, it would presuppose omniscience in 
 me, in order to see into the purposes of nature in 
 their whole connection, and in addition the power 
 of conceiving all possible plans, in comparison with 
 which the present plan would be with justice re- 
 garded as the best. For without this complete 
 knowledge of the effect I can arrive at no deter- 
 minate concept of the Supreme Cause, which can
 
 appendix! 8s VALUE OF THYSICO-THEOLOGY 369 
 
 only be found in the concept of an Intelligence 
 infinite in every respect, i.e. the concept of a Deity, 
 and so I can supply no foundation for Theology. 
 
 Hence, with every possible extension of physical 
 Teleology, according to the propositions above laid 
 down we may say : By the constitution and the 
 principles of our cognitive faculty we can think of 
 nature, in its purposive arrangements which have 
 become known to us, in no other way than as the 
 product of an Understanding to which it is subject. 
 But the theoreticaLinvestigation of nature can never 
 reveal to us whether this Understanding may not 
 also, with the whole of nature and its productio/i, 
 have had a final design (which would not lie in the 
 nature of the sensible world). On the contrary, 
 with all our knowledge of nature it remains unde- 
 cided whether that Supreme Cause is its original 
 ground according to a final purpose or not rather 
 by means of an Understanding determined by the 
 mere necessity of its nature to produce certain forms 
 (according to the analogy of what we call the Art- 
 instinct in animals) ; without it being necessary to 
 ascribe to it even wisdom, much less the highest 
 wisdom, combined with all other properties requisite 
 for the perfection of its product. 
 
 Hence Physico- theology is a misunderstood 
 physical Teleology, only serviceable as a prepara- 
 tion (propaedeutic) for Theology ; and it is only 
 adequate to this design by the aid of a foreign 
 principle on which it can rely, and not in itself, 
 as its name seems to indicate. 
 
 2 B
 
 370 KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT varp ii 
 
 § 86. Of Ethico-theology 
 
 The commonest Understanding, if it thinks over 
 the presence of things in the world, and the existence 
 of the world itself, cannot forbear from the judgment 
 that all the various creatures, no matter how great 
 the art displayed in their arrangement, and how 
 various their purposive mutual connection, — even 
 the complex of their numerous systems (which we 
 incorrectly call worlds), — would be for nothing, if 
 there w^ere not also men (rational beings in general). 
 W^ithout men the whole creation would be a mere 
 waste, in vain, and without final purpose. But 
 it is not in reference to man's cognitive faculty 
 (theoretical Reason) that the being of everything 
 else in the world gets its worth ; he is not there 
 merely that there may be some one to contemplate 
 the world. For if the contemplation of the world 
 only afforded a representation of things without 
 any final purpose, no worth could- accrue to its 
 beinof from the mere fact that it is known ; we 
 must presuppose for it a final purpose, in reference 
 to which its contemplation itself has worth. Again 
 it is not in reference to the feeling of pleasure, or 
 to the sum of pleasures, that we think a final purpose 
 of creation as given ; i.e. we do not estimate that 
 absolute worth by well-being or by enjoyment 
 (whether bodily or mental), or in a word, by happi- 
 ness. For the fact that man, if he exists, takes 
 this for his final design, gives us no concept as to 
 why in general he should exist, and as to what 
 worth he has in himself to make his existence 
 pleasant. He must, therefore, be supposed to be 
 the final purpose of creation, in order to have a
 
 APPENDIX S 86 A GOOD WILL 371 
 
 rational Qrround for holdinof that nature must 
 harmonise with his happiness, if it is considered 
 as an absolute whole according to principles of 
 purposes. — Hence [that which we seek] is only 
 the faculty of desire ; not, however, that which 
 makes man dependent (through sensuous impulses) 
 upon nature, nor that in respect of which the worth 
 of his being depends upon what he receives and 
 enjoys. But it is that worth which he alone can 
 give to himself, and which consists in what he 
 does, how and according to what principles he 
 acts, and that not as a link in nature's chain but 
 in the freedom of his faculty of desire. That ' is, 
 a good will is that whereby alone his being can 
 have an absolute worth, and in reference to w^hich 
 the being of the world can have 2. final purpose. 
 
 The commonest judgment of healthy human 
 Reason completely accords with this, that it is 
 only as a moral being that man can be a final 
 purpose of creation ; if we but direct men's attention 
 to the question and incite them to investigate it. 
 What does it avail, one will say, that this man 
 has so much talent, that he is so active therewith, 
 and that he exerts thereby a useful influence over 
 the community, thus having a great worth both 
 in relation to his own happy condition and to the 
 advantage of others, if he does not possess a good 
 will } He is a contemptible Object considered in 
 respect of his inner self ; and if the creation is 
 not to be without any final purpose at all, he, who 
 as man belongs to it, but as a bad man is in a 
 world under moral laws, must conformably to these 
 forfeit his subjective purpose (happiness), as the 
 sole condition under which his existence can accord 
 with the final purpose.
 
 372 A'ANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 If now we meet with purposive arrangements 
 in the world and, as Reason inevitably requires, 
 subordinate the purposes that are only conditioned 
 to an unconditioned, supreme, i.e. final, purpose ; 
 then we easily see in the first place that we are 
 thus concerned not with a purpose of nature 
 (internal to itself), so far as it exists, but with 
 the purpose of its existence along with all its 
 ordinances, and, consequently, with the ultimate 
 purpose of creation, and specially with the supreme 
 condition under which a final purpose {i.e. the 
 determinining ground of a supreme Understanding 
 for the production of beings of the world) can be 
 allowed. 
 
 Since now it is only as a moral being that 
 we recognise man as the purpose of creation, we 
 have in the first place a ground (at least, the 
 chief condition) for regarding the world as a 
 whole connected according to purposes, and as 
 a system of final causes. And, more especially, as 
 regards the reference (necessary for us by the 
 constitution of our Reason) of natural purposes to 
 an intelligent World Cause, we have one principle 
 enabling us to think the nature and properties of 
 this First Cause as supreme ground in the kingdom 
 of purposes, and to determine its concept. This 
 physical Teleology could not do ; it could only 
 lead to indeterminate concepts of it, unserviceable 
 alike in theoretical and in practical use. 
 
 From this so definite principle of the causality 
 of the Original Being we must not think Him 
 merely as Intelligence and as legislative for nature, 
 but also as legislating supremely in a moral kingdom 
 of purposes. In reference to the highest good, 
 alone possible under His sovereignty, viz. the
 
 APPENDIX §S6 ATTRIBUTES OF DEITY 373 
 
 existence of rational beings under moral laws, we 
 shall think this Orio^inal Being: as all-knowino; : thus 
 our inmost dispositions (which constitute the proper 
 moral worth of the actions of rational heinous of the 
 world) will not be hid from Him, We shall think 
 Him as all-mighty : thus He will be able to make 
 the whole of nature accord with this hiofhest 
 purpose. We shall think Him as all-good, and at 
 the same time as j'usl : because these two properties 
 (which when united constitute Wisdo7}i) are the 
 conditions of the causality of a supreme Cause of 
 the world, as highest good, under moral laws. So 
 also all the other transcendental properties, such 
 as Eternity, Omnipresence, etc. [for goodness and 
 justice are moral properties^], which are presupposed 
 in reference to such a final purpose, must be thought 
 in Him. — In this way moral Teleology swy^^\\&^ the 
 deficiency in physical Teleology, and first establishes 
 a Theology ; because the latter, if it did not borrow 
 from the former without being observed, but were 
 to proceed consistently, could only found a Demon- 
 ology, which is incapable of any definite concept. 
 
 But the principle of the reference of the world 
 to a supreme Cause, as Deity, on account of the 
 moral purposive determination of certain beings in 
 it, does not accomplish this by completing the 
 physico-teleological ground of proof and so taking 
 this necessarily as its basis. It is sufficient in itself 
 and directs attention to the purposes of nature and 
 the investigation of that incomprehensible great art 
 lying hidden behind its forms, in order to confirm 
 incidentally by means of natural purposes the Ideas 
 that pure practical Reason furnishes. For the 
 concept of beings of the world under moral laws 
 
 1 [Second Edition.]
 
 374 KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT i-art ii 
 
 is a principle {a priori) according to which man must 
 of necessity judge himself. Further, if there is 
 in general a World Cause acting designedly and 
 directed towards a purpose, this moral relation must 
 be just as necessarily the condition of the possibility 
 of a creation, as that in accordance with physical 
 laws (if, that is, that intelligent Cause has also a 
 final purpose). This is regarded a priori by 
 Reason as a necessary fundamental proposition for 
 it in its teleological judging of the existence of 
 things. It now only comes to this whether we 
 have sufficient ground for Reason (either specula- 
 tive or practical) to ascribe to the supreme Cause 
 that acts in accordance with purposes a final pur- 
 pose. For it may a prio7'i be taken by us as 
 certain that this, by the subjective constitution of 
 our Reason and even of the Reason of other beings 
 as far as we can think it, can be nothing else than 
 man under moral laws : since otherwise the pur- 
 poses of nature in the physical order could not be 
 known a priori, especially as it can in no way be 
 seen that nature could not exist without such pur- 
 poses. 
 
 Remark 
 
 Suppose the case of a man at the moment when 
 his mind is disposed to a moral sensation. If sur- 
 rounded by a beautiful nature, he is in a state of 
 restful, serene enjoyment of his being, he feels a 
 want, viz. to be grateful for this to some being or 
 other. Or if another time he finds himself in the 
 same state of mind when pressed by duties that 
 he can and will only competently perform by a 
 voluntary sacrifice, he again feels in himself a want, 
 viz. to have thus executed a command and obeyed
 
 APPENDIX ? 86 THE WITNESS OF CONSCIENCE 375 
 
 a Supreme Lord. Or, again ; if he has in some 
 heedless way transgressed his duty, but without 
 becoming answerable to men, his severe self- 
 reproach will speak to him with the voice of a judge 
 to whom he has to give account. In a word, he 
 needs a moral Intellio^ence, in order to have a Beino- 
 for the purpose of his existence, which may be, 
 conformably to this purpose, the cause of himself 
 and of the w^orld. It is vain to assign motives 
 behind these feelings, for they are immediately 
 connected with the purest moral sentiment, because 
 gratitude, obedience, and Immiliation (submission to 
 deserved chastisement) are mental dispositions that 
 make for duty ; and the mind which is inclined 
 towards a widening of its moral sentiment here only 
 voluntarily conceives an object that is not in the 
 world in order where possible to evince its duty 
 before such an One. It is therefore at least possible 
 and grounded too in our moral disposition to repre- 
 sent a pure moral need of the existence of a Being, 
 by which our morality gains strength or even (at 
 least according to our representation) more scope, 
 viz. a new object for its exercise. That is, [there is 
 a need] to assume a morally-legislating Being out- 
 side the world, without any reference to theoretical 
 proofs, still less to self-interest, from pure moral 
 grounds free from all foreign influence (and conse- 
 quently only subjective), on the mere recommenda- 
 tion of a pure practical Reason legislating by itself 
 alone. And although such a mental disposition 
 might seldom occur or might not last long, but be 
 transient and without permanent effect, or might 
 even pass away without any meditation on the object 
 represented in such shadowy outline, or without care 
 to bring it under clear concepts — there is yet here
 
 376 A'JNT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part h 
 
 unmistakably the ground why our moral capacity, 
 as a subjective principle, should not be contented in 
 its contemplation of the world with its purposiveness 
 by means of natural causes, but should ascribe to 
 it a supreme Cause governing nature according to 
 moral principles. — In addition, we feel ourselves 
 constrained by the moral law to strive for a uni- 
 versal highest purpose which yet wc, in common 
 with the rest of nature, are incapable of attaining ; 
 and it is only so far as we strive for it that we can 
 judge ourselves to be in harmony with the final 
 purpose of an intelligent World Cause (if such there 
 be). Thus is found a pure moral ground of practical 
 Reason for assuming this Cause (since it can be 
 done without contradiction), in order that we may 
 no more regard that effort of Reason as quite idle, 
 and so run the risk of abandonino- it from weariness. 
 With all this, so much only is to be said, that 
 though fear first produces gods (demons), it is 
 Reason by means of its moral principles that can 
 first produce the concept of God (even when, as 
 commonly is the case, one is very ignorant in the 
 Teleology of nature, or is very doubtful on account of 
 the difficulty of adjusting by a sufficiently established 
 principle its mutually contradictory phenomena). 
 Also, the inner moral purposive destination of man's 
 being supplies that in which natural knowledge is 
 deficient, by directing us to think, for the final 
 purpose of the being of all things (for which no 
 other principle than an ethical one is satisfactory to 
 Reason), the supreme Cause [as endowed] with 
 properties, whereby it is able to subject the whole 
 of nature to that single design (for which nature is 
 merely the instrument), — i.e. to think it as a Deity.
 
 APPENDIX § 87 MORAL TELEOLOGY 377 
 
 %^']. Of the moral proof of the Being of God 
 
 There is a physical Teleology, which gives 
 sufficient ground of proof to our theoretical re- 
 flective Judgment to assume the being of an 
 intelHgent World-Cause. But we find also in our- 
 selves and still more in the concept of a rational 
 being in general endow^ed with freedom (of his 
 causality) a moral Teleology. However, as the 
 purposive reference, together with its law, is deter- 
 mined a priori in ourselves and therefore can be 
 cognised as necessary, this internal conformity to 
 law requires no intelligent cause external to us ; 
 any more than we need look to a highest Under- 
 standing as the source of the purposiveness (for 
 every possible exercise of art) that we find in the 
 geometrical properties of figures. But this moral 
 Teleology concerns us as beings of the world, and 
 therefore as beings bound up with other things in 
 the w^orld ; upon which latter, whether as purposes 
 or as objects in respect of which we ourselves are 
 final purpose, the same moral laws require us to 
 pass judgment. This moral Teleology, then, has 
 to do with the reference of our own causality to 
 purposes and even to a final purpose that we must 
 aim at in the world, as well as with the reciprocal 
 reference of the world to that moral purpose, and 
 the external possibility of its accomplishment (to 
 which no physical Teleology can lead us). Hence 
 the question necessarily arises, whether it compels 
 our rational judgment to go beyond the world and 
 seek an intelligent supreme principle for that refer- 
 ence of nature to the moral in us ; in order to 
 represent nature as purposive even in reference to
 
 378 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 our inner nioral legislation and its possible accom- 
 plishment. There is therefore certainly a moral 
 Teleology, which is connected on the one hand with 
 the nomothetic of freedom and on the other with that 
 of nature ; just as necessarily as civil legislation is 
 connected with the question where the executive 
 authority is to be sought, and in general in every 
 case [with the question] wherein Reason is to 
 furnish a principle of the actuality of a certain 
 regular order of things only possible according to 
 Ideas. — We shall first set forth the progress of 
 Reason from that moral Teleolos^v and its reference 
 to physical, to Theology ; and then make some 
 observations upon the possibility and the validity 
 of this way of reasoning. 
 
 If we assume the being of certain things (or 
 even only certain forms of things) to be contingent 
 and so to be possible only through something else 
 which is their cause, we may seek for the uncon- 
 ditioned ground of this causality of the supreme 
 (and so of the conditioned) either in the physical or 
 the teleological order (either according to the nexus 
 effectivits or the nex2is finalis). That is, we may 
 either ask, what is the supreme productive cause of 
 these things ; or what is their supreme (absolutely 
 unconditioned) purpose, i.e. the final purpose of that 
 cause in its production of this or all its products 
 generally? In the second case it is plainly pre- 
 supposed that this cause is capable of representing 
 purposes to itself, and consequently is an intelligent 
 Being ; at least it must be thought as acting in 
 accordance with the laws of such a being. 
 
 If we follow the latter order, it is a Funda- 
 mental Proposition, to which even the commonest 
 human Reason is compelled to give immediate
 
 APPENDIX §8; FINAL PURPOSE OF NATURE 379 
 
 assent, that if there is to be in general 2. final pur- 
 pose furnished a priori by Reason, this can be no 
 other than man (every rational being of the world) 
 itnder moral lazvs} | For (and so every one judges) 
 if the world consisted of mere lifeless, or even in 
 part of living but irrational, beings, its existence 
 would have no worth because in it there would be 
 no being who would have the least concept of 
 what worth is. Again, if there were intelligent 
 beings, whose Reason were only able to place the 
 worth of the existence of things in the relation of 
 
 1 I say deliberately under moral laws. It is not man in 
 accorda7ice with moral laws, i.e. a being who behaves himself in 
 conformity with them, who is the final purpose of creation. P'or by 
 using the latter expression we should be asserting more than we 
 know ; viz. that it is in the power of an Author of the world to 
 cause man always to behave himself in accordance with moral 
 laws. But this presupposes a concept of freedom and of nature (of 
 which latter we can only think an external author), which would 
 imply an insight into the supersensible substrate of nature and its 
 identity with that which causality through freedom makes possible 
 in the world. And this far surpasses the insight of our Reason. 
 Only of man inider moral /aws can we say, without transgressing 
 the limits of our insight : his being constitutes the final purpose of 
 the world. This harmonises completely with the judgment of 
 human Reason reflecting morally upon the course of the world. 
 We believe that we perceive in the case of the wicked the traces of a 
 wise purposive reference, if we only see that the wanton criminal does 
 not die before he has undergone the deserved punishment of his 
 misdeeds. According to our concepts of free causality, our good 
 or bad behaviour depends on ourselves ; we regard it the highest 
 wisdom in the government of the world to ordain for the first, 
 opportunity, and for both, their consequence, in accordance with moral 
 laws. In the latter properly consists the glory of God, which is 
 hence not unsuitably described by theologians as the ultimate 
 purpose of creation. — It is further to be remarked that when we 
 use the word creation, we understand nothing more than we have 
 said here, viz. the cause of the fieino- of the world or of the things 
 in it (substances). This is what the concept properly belonging to 
 this word involves {actiiatio substauticc est creatio) ; and con- 
 sequently there is not implied in it the supposition of a freely 
 working, and therefore intelligent, cause (whose being we first 
 of all desire to prove).
 
 38o KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 nature to themselves (their well-being), but not to 
 furnish of itself an original worth (in freedom), then 
 there would certainly be (relative) purposes in the 
 world, but no (absolute) final purpose, because the 
 existence of such rational beings would be always 
 
 purposeless. But the moral laws have this peculiar 
 
 characteristic that they prescribe to Reason some- 
 thing as a purpose without any condition, and 
 consequently exactly as the concept of a final pur- 
 pose requires. The existence of a Reason that can 
 be for itself the supreme law in the purposive refer- 
 ence, in other words the existence of rational beings 
 under moral laws, can therefore alone be thought as 
 the final purpose of the being of a world. If on the 
 contrary this be not so, there would be either no 
 purpose at all in the cause of its being, or there 
 would be purposes, but no final purpose. 
 
 The moral law as the formal rational condition 
 of the use of our freedom obliges us by itself alone, 
 without depending on any purpose as material 
 condition ; but it nevertheless determines for us, 
 and indeed a priori, a final purpose towards which 
 it obliges us to strive ; and this purpose is the 
 liighest good in the zat?;'/^^' possible through freedom. 
 
 The subjective condition under which man (and, 
 according to all our concepts, every rational finite 
 being) can set a final purpose before himself under 
 the above law is happiness. Consequently, the 
 highest physical good possible in the world, to be 
 furthered as a final purpose as far as in us lies, is 
 happiness, under the objective condition of the 
 harmony of man with the law of vioralitv as worthi- 
 ness to be happy. 
 
 But it is impossible for us in accordance with all 
 our rational faculties to represent these two
 
 APPENDIX § 87 THE MORAL PROOF 381 
 
 requirements of the final purpose proposed to us by 
 the moral law, as connected by merely natural 
 causes, and vet as conformable to the Idea of that 
 final purpose. Hence the concept of the practical 
 necessity of such a purpose through the application 
 of our powers does not harmonise with the 
 theoretical concept of the physical possibility of its 
 performance, if we connect with our freedom no 
 other causality (as a means) than that of nature. 
 
 Consequently, we must assume a moral World- 
 Cause (an Author of the world), in order to set 
 before ourselves a final purpose consistently with 
 the moral law ; and in so far as the latter is 
 necessary, so far {i.e. in the same degree and on the 
 same ground) the former also must be necessarily 
 assumefl ; i.e. we must admit that there is a God.^ 
 
 This proof, to which we can easily give the form 
 of logical precision, does not say : it is as necessary 
 to assume the Beino- of God as to recoo^nise the 
 validity of the moral law ; and consequently he who 
 cannot convince himself of the first, can judge 
 himself free from the obli orations of the second. 
 No ! there must in such case only be given up the 
 aiming at the final purpose in the world, to be 
 brought about by the pursuit of the second (viz. a 
 happiness of rational beings in harmony with the 
 pursuit of moral laws, regarded as the highest 
 
 1 [Note added in Second Edition.] This moral argument does 
 not supply any objectively-valid proof of the Being of God ; it does 
 not prove to the sceptic that there is a God, but proves that if he 
 wishes to think in a way consonant with morality, he must admit the 
 assumption of this proposition under the maxims of his practical 
 Reason. — We should therefore not say : it is necessary y^r morals 
 [Sittlichkeit], to assume the happiness of all rational beings of the 
 world in proportion to their nioraUty [Moralitat] ; but rather, this is 
 necessitated by morality. Accordingly, this is a subjective argument 
 sufficient for moral beings.
 
 382 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part 11 
 
 good). Every rational being would yet have to 
 cognise himself as straitly bound by the precepts 
 of morality, for its laws are formal and command 
 unconditionally without respect to purposes (as the 
 matter of volition). But the one requisite of the 
 final purpose, as practical Reason prescribes it to 
 beings of the world, is an irresistible purpose 
 imposed on them by their nature (as finite beings), 
 which Reason wishes to know as subject only to the 
 moral law as inviolable condition, or even as 
 universally set up in accordance with it. Thus 
 Reason takes for final purpose the furthering of 
 happiness in harmony with morality. To further 
 this so far as is in our power {i.e. in respect of 
 happiness) is commanded us by the moral law ; be 
 the issue of this endeavour what it may. The 
 fulfilling of duty consists in the form of the earnest 
 will, not in the intermediate causes of success. 
 
 Suppose then that partly through the weakness 
 of all the speculative arguments so highly extolled, 
 and partly through many irregularities in nature and 
 the world of sense which come before him, a man 
 is persuaded of the proposition. There is no God ; 
 he would nevertheless be contemptible in his own 
 eyes if on that account he were to imagine the 
 laws of duty as empty, invalid and inobligatory, 
 and wished to resolve to transgress them boldly. 
 Such an one, even if he could be convinced in the 
 sequel of that which he had doubted at the first, 
 would always be contemptible while having such a 
 disposition, although he should fulfil his duty as 
 regards its [external] effect as punctiliously as could 
 be desired, for [he would be acting] from fear or 
 from the aim at recompense, without the sentiment 
 of reverence for duty. If, conversely, as a believer
 
 APPENDIX § 87 THE CASE OF A SCEPTIC 383 
 
 [in God] he performs his duty according to his con- 
 science, uprightly and disinterestedly, and neverthe- 
 less believes that he is free from all moral obligation 
 so soon as he is convinced that there is no God, this 
 could accord but badly with an inner moral dispo- 
 sition. 
 
 We may then suppose the case of a righteous 
 man \e.g. Spinoza],^ who holds himself firmly 
 persuaded that there is no God, and also (because 
 in respect of the Object of morality a similar 
 consequence results) no future life ; how is he to 
 judge of his own inner purposive destination, by 
 means of the moral law, which he reveres in 
 practice ? He desires no advantage to himself 
 from following it, either in this or another world ; 
 he wishes, rather, disinterestedly to establish the 
 good to which that holy law directs all his powers. 
 But his effort is bounded ; and from nature, although 
 he may expect here and there a contingent accord- 
 ance, he can never expect a regular harmony 
 agreeing according to constant rules (such as his 
 maxims are and must be, internally), with the purpose 
 that he yet feels himself obliged and impelled to 
 accomplish. Deceit, violence, and envy will always 
 surround him, although he himself be honest, 
 peaceable, and kindly ; and the righteous men with 
 whom he meets will, notwithstanding all their 
 worthiness of happiness, be yet subjected by nature 
 which regards not this, to all the evils of want, 
 disease, and untimely death, just like the beasts of 
 the earth. So it will be until one wide grave 
 engulfs them together (honest or not, it makes no 
 difference), and throws them back — who were able 
 to believe themselves the final ■ purpose of creation 
 
 ^ [Second Edition.]
 
 384 A'AA^T'S KRITIK OF JUDGAIENT part ii 
 
 — into the abyss of the purposeless chaos of matter 
 from which they were drawn. ^ — - The purpose, then, 
 which this well-intentioned person had and ought to 
 have before him in his pursuit of moral laws, he 
 must certainly give up as impossible. Or else, if he 
 wishes to remain dependent upon the call of his 
 moral internal destination, and not to weaken the 
 respect with which the moral law immediately 
 inspires him, by assuming the nothingness of the 
 single, ideal, final purpose adequate to its high 
 demand (which cannot be brought about without 
 a violation of moral sentiment), he must, as he 
 well can — since there is at least no contradiction 
 from a practical point of view in forming a concept 
 of the possibility of a morally prescribed final pur- 
 pose — assume the being of a moral author of the 
 world, that is, a God. 
 
 § 88. Liinitation of the validity of the moral proof 
 
 Pure Reason, as a practical faculty, i.e. as 
 the faculty of determining the free use of our 
 causality by Ideas (pure rational concepts), not only 
 comprises in the moral law a regulative principle of 
 our actions, but supplies us at the same time with a 
 subjective constitutive principle in the concept of 
 an Object which Reason alone can think, and which 
 is to be actualised by our actions in the world 
 according to that law. The Idea of a final purpose 
 in the employment of freedom according to moral 
 laws has therefore s\ih]QC\\v& practical reality. We 
 are a priori determined by Reason to promote 
 with all our powers the sumumm bontim [Weltbeste] 
 which consists in the combination of the greatest 
 welfare of rational beings with the highest condition
 
 APPENDIX § 88 THE SUMMUM BONUM 385 
 
 of the good in itself, i.e. in universal happiness 
 conjoined with morality most accordant to law. 
 In this final purpose the possibility of one part, 
 happiness, is empirically conditioned, i.e. dependent 
 on the constitution of nature (which may or may 
 not agree with this purpose) and is in a theoretical 
 aspect problematical ; whilst the other part, morality, 
 in respect of which we are free from the effects of 
 nature, stands fast a priori as to its possibility, and 
 is dogmatically certain. It is then requisite for the 
 objective theoretical reality of the concept of the 
 final purpose of rational beings, that we should not 
 only have a priori presupposed to ourselves a final 
 purpose, but also that the creation, i.e. the world 
 itself, should have as regards its existence a final 
 purpose, which if it could be proved a priori would 
 add objectivity to the subjective reality of the final 
 purpose [of rational beings]. For if the creation has 
 on the whole a final purpose, we cannot think it 
 otherwise than as harmonising with the moral pur- 
 pose (which alone makes the concept of a purpose 
 possible). Now we find without doubt purposes in 
 the world, and physical Teleology exhibits them in 
 such abundance, that if w^e judge in accordance with 
 Reason, we have ground for assuming as a principle 
 in the investigation of nature that nothing in nature 
 is without a purpose ; but the final purpose of nature 
 we seek there in vain. This can and must therefore, 
 as its Idea only lies in Reason, be sought as regards 
 its objective possibility only in rational beings. And 
 the practical Reason of these latter not only supplies 
 this final purpose ; it also determines this concept in 
 respect of the conditions under which alone a final 
 purpose of creation can be thought by us. 
 
 The question is now, whether the objective 
 
 2 c
 
 386 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT vart ii 
 
 reality of the concept of a final purpose of creation 
 cannot be exhibited adequately to the theoretical 
 requirements of pure Reason — if not apodictically 
 for the determinant Judgment yet adequately for the 
 maxims of the theoretical reflective Judgment ? 
 This is the least one could expect from theoretical 
 philosophy, which undertakes to combine the moral 
 purpose with natural purposes by means of the Idea 
 of one single purpose ; but yet this little is far more 
 than it can accomplish. 
 
 According to the principle of the theoretical re- 
 flective Judgment we should say : if we have ground 
 for assuming for the purposive products of nature a 
 supreme Cause of nature — whose causality in respect 
 of the actuality of creation is of a different kind from 
 that required for the mechanism of nature, i.e. must 
 be thought as the causality of an Understanding — 
 we have also sufficient ground for thinking in this 
 original Being not merely the purposes everywhere 
 in nature but also a final purpose. This is not 
 indeed a final purpose by which we can explain the 
 presence of such a Being, but one of which we 
 may at least convince ourselves {as was the case in 
 physical Teleology) that we can make the possibility 
 of such a world conceivable, not merely according to 
 purposes, but only through the fact that we ascribe 
 to its existence a final purpose. 
 
 But a final purpose is merely a concept of our 
 practical Reason, and can be inferred from no data 
 of experience for the theoretical judging of nature, 
 nor can it be applied to the cognition of nature. No 
 use of this concept is possible except its use for 
 practical Reason according to moral laws ; and the 
 final purpose of creation is that constitution of the 
 world which harmonises with that which alone we
 
 APPENDIX § SS THE MORAL PROOF 387 
 
 can put forward definitely according to laws, viz, the 
 final purpose of our pure practical Reason, in so far 
 as it is to be practical. — Now we have in the moral 
 law which enjoins on us in a practical point of view 
 the application of our powers to the accomplishment 
 of this final purpose, a ground for assuming its 
 possibility and practicability, and consequently too 
 (because without the concurrence of nature with a 
 condition not in our power, its accomplishment 
 would be impossible) a nature of things harmonious 
 with it. Hence we have a moral ground for think- 
 ing in a world also a final purpose of creation. 
 
 We have not yet advanced from moral Teleology 
 to a Theology, i.e. to the being of a moral Author 
 of the world, but only to a final purpose of creation 
 which is determined in this way. But in order to 
 account for this creation, i.e. the existence of things, 
 in accordance with ^ final purpose, we must assume 
 not only first an intelligent Being (for the possibility 
 of things of nature which we are compelled to judge 
 oi 2lS purposes), but also a moral Being, as author of 
 the world, i.e. a God. This second conclusion is of 
 such a character that we see it holds merely for 
 the Judgment according to concepts of practical 
 Reason, and as such for the reflective and not the 
 determinant Judgment. It is true that in us morally 
 practical Reason is essentially different in its prin- 
 ciples from technically practical Reason. But we 
 cannot assume that it must be so likewise in the 
 supreme World -Cause, regarded as Intelligence, 
 and that a peculiar mode of its causality is requisite 
 for the final purpose, different from that which is 
 requisite merely for purposes of nature. We cannot 
 therefore assume that in our final purpose we have 
 not merely a moral ground for admitting a final
 
 3S8 A'AJVT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 purpose of creation (as an effect), but also for admit- 
 ting a moral Being 2iS the original ground of creation. 
 But we may well say, that, according to the constitu- 
 tion of our rational faculty, we cannot comprehend 
 the possibility of such a purposiveness in respect of 
 the moral laiv, and its Object, as there is in this final 
 purpose, apart from an Author and Governor of the 
 world, who is at the same time its moral Lawgiver. 
 
 The actuality of a highest morally-legislating 
 Author is therefore sufficiently established merely 
 for the practical use of our Reason, without deter- 
 mining anything theoretically as regards its being. 
 For Reason requires, in respect of the possibility of 
 its purpose, which is given to us independently by 
 its own legislation, an Idea through which the 
 inability to follow up this purpose, according to the 
 mere natural concepts of the world, is removed 
 (sufficiently for the reflective Judgment). Thus this 
 Idea gains practical reality, although all means of 
 creating such for it in a theoretical point of view, for 
 the explanation of nature and determination of the 
 supreme Cause, are entirely wanting for speculative 
 cognition. For the theoretical reflective Judgment 
 physical Teleology sufficiently proves from the pur- 
 poses of nature an intelligent World-Cause ; for the 
 practical Judgment moral Teleology establishes it 
 by the concept of a final purpose, which it is forced 
 to ascribe to creation in a practical point of view. 
 The objective reality of the Idea of God, as moral 
 Author of the world, cannot, it is true, be established 
 by physical purposes alone. But nevertheless, if the 
 cognition of these purposes is combined with that 
 of the moral purpose, they are, by virtue of the 
 maxim of pure Reason which bids us seek unity 
 of principles so far as is possible, of great importance
 
 APPENDIX § 88 ANTHROPOMORPHISM 389 
 
 for the practical reality of that Idea, by bringing in 
 the reality which it has for the Judgment in a theo- 
 retical point of view. 
 
 To prevent a misunderstanding which may easily 
 arise, it is in the highest degree needful to remark 
 that, in the first place, we can think these properties 
 of the highest Being only according to analogy. 
 How indeed could we investigate [directly] the 
 nature of that, to which experience can show us 
 nothing similar ? Secondly, in this way we only 
 think the supreme Being ; we cannot thereby cognise 
 Him and ascribe anything theoretically to Him. It 
 would be needful for the determinant Judgment in 
 the speculative aspect of our Reason, to consider 
 what the supreme World -Cause is in Himself. 
 But here we are only concerned with the question 
 what concept we can form of Him, according to the 
 constitution of our cognitive faculties ; and whether 
 we have to assume His existence in order merely 
 to furnish practical reality to a purpose, which pure 
 Reason without any such presupposition enjoins 
 upon us a priori to bring about with all our powders, 
 i.e. in order to be able to think as possible a designed 
 effect. Although that concept may be transcendent 
 for the speculative Reason, and the properties 
 which we ascribe to the Being thereby thought may, 
 objectively used, conceal an anthropomorphism in 
 themselves ; yet the design of its use is not to 
 determine the nature of that BeinQ: which is unattain- 
 able by us, but to determine ourselves and our 
 will accordingly. We may call a cause after the 
 concept which we have of its effect (though only in 
 reference to this relation), without thereby meaning^ 
 to determine internally its inner constitution, by 
 means of the properties w^hich can be made known
 
 390 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 to US solely by similar causes and must be given in 
 experience. For example, amongst other properties 
 we ascribe to the soul a vis locomotiva because 
 bodily movements actually arise whose cause lies in 
 the representation of them ; without therefore mean- 
 ing to ascribe to it the only mode [of action] that we 
 know in moving forces (viz. by attraction, pressure, 
 impulse, and consequently motion, which always 
 presuppose an extended being). Just so we must 
 assume something, which contains the ground of the 
 possibility and practical reality, i.e. the practicability, 
 of a necessary moral final purpose ; but we can think 
 of this, in accordance with the character of the effect 
 expected of it, as a wise Being governing the world 
 according to moral laws, and, conformably to the 
 constitution of our cognitive faculties, as a cause of 
 things distinct from nature, only in order to express 
 the relation of this Beino- which transcends all our 
 
 o 
 
 cognitive faculties to the Objects of our practical 
 Reason. We do not pretend thus to ascribe to it 
 theoretically the only causality of this kind known to 
 us, viz, an Understanding and a Will : we do not 
 even pretend to distinguish objectively the causality 
 thought in this Being, as regards what is for ns 
 final purpose, from the causality thought in it as 
 regards nature (and its purposive determinations in 
 general). We can only assume this distinction as 
 subjectively necessary by the constitution of our 
 cognitive faculties, and as valid for the reflective, not 
 for the objectively determinant Judgment. But if we 
 come to practice, then such a regulative principle (for 
 prudence or wisdom) [commanding us] to act con- 
 formably to that as purpose, which by the constitu- 
 tion of our cognitive faculties can only be thought as 
 possible in a certain way, is at the same constitutive,
 
 APPENDIX § 88 THE WITNESS OF CONSCIENCE 391 
 
 i.e. practically determinant. Nevertheless, as a 
 principle for judging of the objective possibility of 
 things, it is no way theoretically determinant (i.e. it 
 does not say that the only kind of possibility which 
 belongs to the Object is that which belongs to our 
 thinking faculty), but is a mere regulative principle 
 for the reflective Judgment. 
 
 Remark 
 
 This moral proof is not one newly discovered, 
 although perhaps its basis is newly set forth ; since 
 it has lain in man's rational faculty from its earliest 
 germ, and is only continually developed with its 
 advancing cultivation. So soon as men begin to 
 reflect upon right and wrong — at a time when, quite 
 indifferent as to the purposiveness of nature, they 
 avail themselves of it without thinking anvthine 
 more of it than that it is the accustomed course of 
 nature — this judgment is inevitable, viz. that the 
 issue cannot be the same, whether a man has 
 behaved fairly or falsely, with equity or with 
 violence, even though up to his life's end, as far as 
 can be seen, he has met with no happiness for his 
 virtues, no punishment for his vices. It is as if 
 they perceived a voice within [saying] that the issue 
 must be different. And so there must lie hidden in 
 them a representation, however obscure, of some- 
 thing after which they feel themselves bound to 
 strive ; with which such a result would not agree, — 
 with which, if they looked upon the course of the 
 world as the only order of things, they could not 
 harmonise that inner purposive determination of 
 their minds. Now they might represent in various 
 rude fashions the way in which such an irregularity
 
 392 KANTS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 could be adjusted (an irregularity which must be 
 far more revolting to the human mind than the 
 blind chance that we sometimes wish to use as a 
 principle for judging of nature). But they could 
 never think any other principle of the possibility of 
 the unification of nature with its inner ethical laws, 
 than a supreme Cause governing the world accord- 
 ing to moral laws ; because a final purpose in them 
 proposed as duty, and a nature without any final 
 purpose beyond them in which that purpose might 
 be actualised, would involve a contradiction. As to 
 the [inner] ^ constitution of that World -Cause they 
 could contrive much nonsense. But that moral 
 relation in the government of the world would 
 remain always the same, which by the uncultivated 
 Reason, considered as practical, is universally 
 comprehensible, but with which the speculative 
 Reason can make far from the like advance. — 
 And in all probability attention would be directed 
 first by this moral interest to the beauty and the 
 purposes in nature, which would serve excellently 
 to strengthen this Idea though they could not be 
 the foundation of it. Still less could that moral 
 interest be dispensed with, because it is only in 
 reference to the final purpose that the investiga- 
 tion of the purposes of nature acquires that im- 
 mediate interest which displays itself in such a 
 great degree in the admiration of them without any 
 reference to the advantage to be derived from them. 
 
 & 
 
 § 89. Of the use of the moral argument 
 
 The limitation of Reason in respect of all our 
 Ideas of the supersensible to the conditions of its 
 
 ^ [Second Edition.]
 
 APPENDIX § 89 THEOSOPHY AND DEMONOLOGY 393 
 
 practical employment has, as far as the Idea of God 
 is concerned, undeniable uses. For it prevents 
 Theology from rising into Theosophy (into tran- 
 scendent concepts which confound Reason), or from 
 sinking into Demonology (an anthropomorphic way 
 of representing the highest Being). And it also 
 prevents Religion from turning into Theurgy (a 
 fanatical belief that we can have a feelino- of other 
 supersensible beings, and can reciprocally influence 
 them), or Into Idolatry (a superstitious belief that we 
 can please the Supreme Being by other means than 
 by a moral sentiment).^ 
 
 For if we permit the vanity or the presumptjon 
 of sophistry to determine the least thing theoretically 
 (in a way that extends our knowledge) in respect 
 of what lies beyond the world of sense, or if we 
 allow any pretence to be made of insight into the 
 beinof and constitution of the nature of God, of 
 His Understanding and Will, of the laws of both 
 and of His properties which thus affect the world, 
 I should like to know where and at what point 
 we will bound these assumptions of Reason. For 
 wherever such insio^ht can be derived, there mav 
 yet more be expected (if we only strain our reflection. 
 as we have a mind to do). Bounds must then be 
 put to such claims according to a certain principle, 
 and not merely because we find that all attempts 
 of the sort have hitherto failed, for that proves 
 nothing against the possibility of a better result. 
 
 1 In a practical sense that religion is always idolatrj^ which 
 conceives the Supreme Being with properties, according to which 
 something else besides morality can be a fit condition for that which 
 man can do being in accordance with His Will. For however pure 
 and free from sensible images the concept that we have formed 
 may be in a theoretical point of view, yet it will be in a practical 
 point of view still represented as an idol^ i.e. in regard to the char- 
 acter of His \Vill, anthropomorphically.
 
 394 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT tart ii 
 
 But here no principle is possible, except either to 
 assume that in respect of the supersensible absolutely 
 nothing can be theoretically determined (except 
 mere negations) ; or else that our Reason contains 
 in itself a yet unused mine of cognitions, reaching 
 no one knows how far, stored up for ourselves and 
 our posterity. — But as concerns Religion, i.e. 
 morals in reference to God as legislator, if the 
 theoretical cognition of Him is to come first, morals 
 must be adjusted in accordance with Theology ; 
 and not only is an external arbitrary legislation 
 of a Supreme Being introduced in place of an 
 internal necessary legislation of Reason, but also 
 whatever is defective in our insight into the nature 
 of this Being must extend to ethical precepts, and 
 thus make Religion immoral and perverted. 
 
 As regards the hope of a future life, if instead of 
 the final purpose we have to accomplish in con- 
 formity with the precept of the moral law, we ask 
 of our theoretical faculty of cognition a clue for the 
 judgment of Reason upon our destination (which 
 clue is only considered as necessary or worthy of 
 acceptance in a practical reference), then in this 
 aspect Psychology, like Theology, gives no more 
 than a negative concept of our thinking being. 
 That is, none of its actions or of the phenomena 
 of the internal sense can be explained materialistic- 
 ally ; and hence of its separate nature and of the 
 continuance or non- continuance of its personality 
 after death absolutely no ampliative determinant 
 judgment is possible on speculative grounds by 
 means of our whole theoretical coQ^nitive facultv. 
 Here then everything is handed over to the 
 teleological judging of our existence in a practically 
 necessary aspect, and to the assumption of our
 
 APPENDIX § 90 CONVICTION AND PERSUASION 395 
 
 continuance as a condition requisite for the final 
 purpose absolutely furnished by Reason. And so 
 this advantage (which indeed at first glance seems 
 to be a loss) is apparent ; that, as Theology for 
 us can never be Theosophy, or rational Psychology 
 become Pneuniatology — an ampliative science — so 
 on the other hand this latter is assured of never 
 falling into Materialism. Psychology, rather, is a 
 mere anthropology of the internal sense, i.e. is the 
 knowledge of our thinking self in life ; and, as 
 theoretical cognition, remains merely empirical. 
 On the other hand, rational Psychology, as far as 
 it is concerned with questions as to our eternal 
 existence, is not a theoretical science at all, but 
 rests on a single conclusion of moral Teleology ; 
 as also its whole use is necessary merely on account 
 of the latter, i.e. on account of our practical 
 destination. 
 
 § 90. Of the kind of belief in a teleological proof 
 of the Being of God 
 
 The first requisite for every proof, whether it 
 be derived from the immediate empirical presenta- 
 tion (as in the proof from observation of the object 
 or from experiment) of that which is to be proved, 
 or by Reason a priori from principles, is this. It 
 should noi persuade, but convince} or at least should 
 tend to conviction. I.e. the ground of proof or 
 the conclusion should not be merely a subjective 
 (sesthetical) determining ground of assent (mere 
 illusion), but objectively valid and a logical ground 
 
 1 [Cf. Introd. to Logic, ix. p. 63, "Conviction is opposed to Persua- 
 sion, which is a behef from inadequate reasons, of which we do not 
 know whether they are only subjective or are also objective."]
 
 396 A'ANTS K'RITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 of cognition ; for otherwise the Understanding is 
 ensnared, but not convinced. Such an illusory 
 proof is that which, perhaps with good intent but 
 yet with wilful concealment of its \veaknesses, is 
 adduced in Natural Theology. In this we bring 
 in the great number of indications of the origin 
 of natural things according to the principle of 
 purposes, and take advantage of the merely 
 subjective basis of human Reason, viz. its special 
 propensity to think only one principle instead of 
 several, whenever this can be done without con- 
 tradiction ; and, when in this principle only one or 
 more requisites for determining a concept are 
 furnished, to add in our thought these additional 
 [features] so as to complete the concept of the 
 thing by arbitrarily supplementing it. For, in truth, 
 when we meet with so many products in nature 
 which are to us marks of an intelligent cause, why 
 should we not think One cause rather than many; 
 and in this One, not merely great intelligence, 
 power, etc., but rather Omniscience, and Omni- 
 potence — in a word, think it as a Cause that con- 
 tains the sufficient ground of such properties in all 
 possible things } Further, why should we not 
 ascribe to this unique, all-powerful, origijfial Being 
 not only intelligence for natural laws and products, 
 but also, as to a moral Cause of the world, supreme, 
 ethical, practical Reason ? For by this completion 
 of the concept a sufficient principle is furnished 
 both for insight into nature and for moral wisdom ; 
 and no objection grounded in any way can be made 
 against the possibility of such an Idea. If now 
 at the same time the moral motives of the mind are 
 aroused, and a lively interest in the latter is added 
 by the force of eloquence (of which they are indeed
 
 APPENDIX § 90 CAUTION 397 
 
 very worthy), then there arises therefroni a per- 
 suasion of the objective adequacy of the proof; and 
 also (in most cases of its use) a wholesome illusion 
 which quite dispenses with all examination of its 
 logical strictness, and even on the contrary regards 
 this with abhorrence and dislike as if an impious 
 doubt lay at its basis. — Now against this there 
 is indeed nothing to say, so long as we only 
 have regard to its popular usefulness. But then 
 the division of the proof into the two dissimilar 
 parts involved in the argument — belonging to 
 physical and moral Teleology respectively — cannot 
 and must not be prevented. For the blending 
 of these makes it impossible to discern where the 
 proper force of the proof lies, and in what part 
 and how it must be elaborated in order that its 
 validity may be able to stand the strictest ex- 
 amination (even if we should be compelled to 
 admit in one part the weakness of our rational 
 insight). Thus it is the duty of the philosopher 
 (supposing even that he counts as nothing the claims 
 of sincerity) to expose the above illusion, however 
 wholesome it is, which such a confusion can produce; 
 and to distinguish what merely belongs to persuasion 
 from that which leads to conviction (for these are 
 determinations of assent which differ not merely 
 in degree but in kind), in order to present plainly 
 the state of the mind in this proof in its whole 
 clearness, and to be able to subject it frankly to 
 the closest examination. 
 
 But a proof which is intended to convince, can 
 asain be of two kinds ; either decidinor what the 
 object is in itself, or what it is for 2ls (for men in 
 general) according to our necessary rational principles 
 of judgment (proof Kar dX/jOeiav or Kar avBpcoTTov,
 
 398 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 the last word being taken in its universal significa- 
 tion of man in general). In the first case it is based 
 on adequate principles for the determinant Judgment, 
 in the second for the reflective Judgment. In the 
 latter case it can never, when resting on merely 
 theoretical principles, tend to conviction ; but if 
 a practical principle of Reason (which is therefore 
 universally and necessarily valid) lies at its basis, 
 it niay certainly lay claim to conviction adequate 
 in a pure practical point of view, i.e. to moral 
 conviction. But a proof tends to conviction, though 
 without convincing, if it is [merely] ^ brought on the 
 way thereto ; i.e. if it contains in itself only objective 
 Qfrounds, which althouQ:h not attaininof to certaintv 
 are yet of such a kind that they do not serve merely 
 for persuasion as subjective grounds of the judgment." 
 All theoretical grounds of proof resolve them- 
 selves either into: (i) Proofs by logically strict 
 Syllogisms of Reason ; or where this is not the case, 
 (2) Conclusions according to analogy; or where this 
 also has no place, (3) Probable opinion ; or finally, 
 which has the least weight, (4) Assumption of a 
 merely possible ground of explanation, i.e. Hy- 
 pothesis. — Now I say that all grounds of proof in 
 general, which tend to theoretical conviction, can 
 bring about no belief of this kind from the highest to 
 the lowest degree, if there is to be proved the 
 proposition of the existence of an original Being, as 
 a God, in the signification adequate to the whole 
 content of this concept ; viz. a moral Author of the 
 world, by whom the final purpose of creation is at 
 the same time supplied. 
 
 ^ [Second Edition.] 
 
 - \I.c. Urtheils. First Edition had Urtheiletis, the judging 
 subject.]
 
 APPENDIX § 9° ANALOGY 399 
 
 (i.) As to the logical/y accurate ^Yooi \)roc&&dmg 
 from universal to particular, we have sufficiently estab- 
 lished in the Kritik the following : Since no intui- 
 tion possible for us corresponds to the concept of 
 a Being that is to be sought bevond nature — whose 
 concept therefore, so far as it is to be theoretically 
 determined by synthetical predicates, remains always 
 problematical for us — there is absolutely no cognition 
 of it to be had (by which the extent of our theoretical 
 knowledge is in the least enlarged). The particular 
 concept of a supersensible Being cannot be subsumed 
 under the universal principles of the nature of things, 
 in order to conclude from them to it, because those 
 principles are valid simply for nature, as an object 
 of sense. 
 
 (2.) We can indeed think one of two dissimilar 
 things, even in the very point of their dissimilarity, 
 in accordance with the analogy ^ of the other ; but 
 
 1 Analogy (in a qualitative signification) is the identity of the 
 relation between reasons and consequences (causes and effects), so 
 far as it is to be found, notwithstanding the specific difference of the 
 things or those properties in them which contain the reason for like 
 consequences (i.e. considered apart from this relation). Thus we 
 conceive of the artificial constructions of beasts by comparing them 
 with those of men ; by comparing the ground of those effects brought 
 about by the former, which we do not know, with the ground of 
 similar effects brought about by men (reason), which we do know ; 
 i.e. we regard the ground of the former as an analogon of reason. 
 We then try at the same time to show that the ground of the artisan 
 faculty of beasts, which we call instinct, specifically difiterent as it 
 is in fact from reason, has yet a similar relation to its effect (the 
 buildings of the beaver as compared with those of men). — But then 
 I cannot therefore conclude that because man uses reason for 
 his building, the beaver must have the like, and call this a 
 conclusion according to analogy^ But from the similarity of the 
 mode of operation of beasts (of which we cannot immediately 
 perceive the ground) to that of men (of which we are immediately 
 conscious), we can quite rightly conclude according to analogy, that 
 Ijeasts too act in accordance with representations (not as Descartes 
 has it, that they are machines), and that despite their specific 
 distinction they are yet (as living beings) of the same genus as
 
 400 A'JiVrS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 we cannot, from that wherein they are dissimilar, 
 conclude from the one to the other by analogy, i.e. 
 transfer from the one to the other this sio-n of 
 specific distinction. Thus I can, according to the 
 analogy of the law of the equality of action and 
 reaction in the mutual attraction and repulsion of 
 bodies, also conceive of the association of the 
 members of a commonwealth according to rules of 
 right ; but I cannot transfer to it those specific 
 determinations (material attraction or repulsion), and 
 ascribe them to the citizens in order to constitute a 
 system called a state. — Just so we can indeed 
 conceive of the causality of the original Being in 
 respect of the things of the world, as natural 
 purposes, according to the analogy of an Under- 
 standing, as ground of the forms of certain products 
 which we call works of art (for this only takes place 
 on behalf of the theoretical or practical use that 
 we have to make by our cognitive faculty of this 
 concept in respect of the natural things in the world 
 according to a certain principle). But we can in 
 no way conclude according to analogy, because in 
 the case of beincrs of the world Understandino- must 
 
 man. The principle of our right so to conclude consists in the 
 sameness of the ground for reckoning beasts in respect of the said 
 determination in the same genus with men, regarded as men, so far 
 as we can externally compare them with one another in accordance 
 with their actions. There is par ratio. Just so I can conceive, 
 according to the analogy of an Understanding, the causality of the 
 supreme World-Cause, by comparing its purposive products in the 
 world with the artificial works of men ; but I cannot conclude 
 according to analogy to those properties in it [which are in man], 
 because here the principle of the possibility of such a method of 
 reasoning entirely fails, \iz. the paritas rationis for counting the 
 Supreme Being in one and the same genus with man (in respect of 
 the causality of both). The causality of the beings of the world, 
 which is always sensibly conditioned (as is causality through Under- 
 standing) cannot be transferred to a Being which has in common with 
 them no generic concept save that of Thing in general.
 
 APPENDIX § 90 ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY 401 
 
 be ascribed to the cause of an effect which is judged 
 artificial, that in respect of nature the same causaHty 
 which we perceive in men attaches also to the Being 
 which is quite distinct from nature. For this concerns 
 the very point of dissimilarity which is thought 
 between a cause sensibly conditioned in respect of 
 its effects and the supersensible original Being Itself 
 in our concept of it, and which therefore cannot be 
 transferred from one to the other. — In the verv 
 fact that I must conceive the divine causality only 
 according to the analogy of an Understanding (which 
 faculty we know in no other being than in sensibly- 
 conditioned man) lies the prohibition to ascribe to 
 it this Understanding in its proper signification.^ 
 
 (3.) Opinion finds in a p7Hori judgments no place 
 whatever, for by them we either cognise something 
 as quite certain or else cognise nothing at all. But 
 if the given grounds of proof from which we start (as 
 here from the purposes in the world) are empirical, 
 then we cannot even with their aid form any opinion 
 as to anything beyond the world of sense, nor can 
 we concede to such venturesome judgments the 
 smallest claim to probability. For probability is 
 part of a certainty possible in a certain series of 
 grounds (its grounds compare with the sufficient 
 ground as parts with a whole), the insufficient ground 
 of which must be susceptible of completion. But 
 since, as determining grounds of one and the same 
 judgment, they must be of the same kind, for other- 
 wise they would not together constitute a whole (such 
 as certainty is), one part of them cannot lie within 
 
 1 We thus miss nothing in the representation of the relations of 
 this Being to the world, as far as the consequences, theoretical or 
 practical, of this concept are concerned. To wish to investigate what 
 it is in itself, is a curiosity as purposeless as it is vain. 
 
 2 D
 
 402 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 the bounds of possible experience and another outside 
 all possible experience. Consequently, since merely 
 empirical grounds of proof lead to nothing super- 
 sensible, and since what is lacking in the series of 
 them cannot in any way be completed, we do not 
 approach in the least nearer in our attempt to attain 
 by their means to the supersensible and to a cognition 
 thereof. Thus in any judgment about the latter by 
 means of arguments derived from experience, prob- 
 ability has no place. 
 
 (4.) If an hypothesis is to serve for the explanation 
 of the possibility of a given phenomenon, at least its 
 possibility must be completely certain.^ 1 1 is sufficient 
 that in an hypothesis I disclaim any cognition of 
 actuality (which is claimed in an opinion given out 
 as probable) ; more than this I cannot give up. The 
 possibility of that which I place at the basis of my 
 explanation, must at least be exposed to no doubt ; 
 otherwise there would be no end of empty chimeras. 
 But to assume the possibility of a supersensible 
 Being determined according to certain concepts 
 would be a completely groundless supposition. For 
 here none of the conditions requisite for cognition, 
 as regards that in it which rests upon intuition, is 
 given, and so the sole criterion of possibility re- 
 maining is the mere principle of Contradiction 
 (which can only prove the possibility of the thought, 
 not of the object thought). 
 
 The result then is this. For the existence 
 [Dasein] of the original Being, as a Godhead, or of 
 the soul as an immortal spirit, absolutely no proof 
 in a theoretical point of view is possible for the 
 
 1 [Cf. Iiitrod. fo Logic, p. 76, where the conditions of a legitimate 
 hypothesis are laid down. See also Kritik of Pure Reason, Methodo- 
 logy, c. i. § 3.]
 
 APPENDIX § 91 COGNISABLE THINGS 403 
 
 human Reason, which can bring about even the 
 least degree of belief. The ground of this is quite 
 easy to comprehend. For determining our Ideas 
 of the supersensible we have no material whatever, 
 and we must derive this latter from things in the 
 world of sense, which is absolutely inadequate for 
 such an Object. Thus, in the absence of all deter- 
 mination of it, nothing remains but the concept of a 
 non-sensible something which contains the ultimate 
 ground of the world of sense, but which does not 
 furnish any knowledge (any amplification of the 
 concept) of its inner constitution. 
 
 §91. Of the kind of belief prodiued by a practical 
 
 faith 
 
 If we look merely to the way in which anything 
 can be for 21s (according to the subjective constitu- 
 tion of our representative powers) an Object of 
 knowledge {irs cognoscibilis), then our concepts will 
 not be confronted with Objects, but merely with our 
 cognitive faculties and the use which they can make 
 of a given representation (in a theoretical or practical 
 point of view). Thus the question whether any- 
 thing is or is not a cognisable being is not a question 
 concerning the possibility of things but of our 
 knowledo^e of them. 
 
 Cognisable things are of three kinds : things of 
 opinion {opinabile) ; things of fact [scibile) ; and things 
 of faith {jnere credibile). 
 
 (i.) Objects of mere rational Ideas, which for 
 theoretical knowledge cannot be presented in any 
 possible experience, are so far not cognisable things, 
 and consequently in respect of them we can form no 
 opinion ; for to form an opinion a priori is absurd in
 
 404 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 itself and the straight road to mere chimeras. Either 
 then our proposition is certain a priori or it contains 
 nothing for behef. Therefore things of opinion are 
 always Objects of an empirical cognition at least 
 possible in itself (objects of the world of sense) ; but 
 which, on account merely of the [low] degree of this 
 faculty that we possess, is for ns impossible. 
 Thus the ether of the new physicists,^ an elastic 
 fluid pervading all other material (mingled in- 
 timately with it) is a mere thing of opinion, yet is 
 such that, if our external senses were sharpened to 
 the highest degree, it could be perceived ; though it 
 can never be presented in any observation or ex- 
 periment. To assume [the existence of] rational 
 inhabitants of other planets is a thing of opinion ; for 
 if we could come closer to them, which is in itself 
 possible, we should decide by experience whether 
 they did or did not exist ; but as we shall never come 
 so near, it remains in the region of opinion. But to 
 hold the opinion that there are in the material 
 universe pure thinking spirits without bodies (viz. if 
 we dismiss as unworthy of our notice certain pheno- 
 mena which have been published as actual ") is to be 
 called poetic fiction. This is no thing of opinion, 
 but a mere Idea which remains over, when we 
 
 ^ [This illustration is also given in the Logic (p. 57) ; where the 
 three modi oi belief, Opinion, Faith, and Knowledge, are distinguished 
 from each other. Cf. Kritik oi Pure Reason, Methodology, c. ii. § 3.] 
 
 - [The speculations of Swcdenborg seem to have always had a 
 strange fascination for Kant. In an early essay, Dreams of a Visionary 
 explained by Dreams of Metaphysics, he avows his scepticism as to 
 the value of the information which " psychical research " can supply 
 about the spirit-world, though he is careful not to commit himself to 
 any dogmatic statement on the subject of ghosts. In the Kritik of 
 Pure Reason (when discussing the Postulates of Empirical Thought) 
 he gives, as an instance of a concept inconsistent with the canons of 
 possibility, " a power of being in a community of thought with other 
 men, however distant from us."]
 
 APPENDIX § 91 THINGS OF FACT 405 
 
 remove from a thinking being everything material, 
 and only leave thought to it. Whether then the 
 latter (which we know only in man, that is, in 
 combination with a body) does survive, we cannot 
 decide. Such a thing is a sophistical being {ens 
 rationis ratiocinantis), not a rational being {ens 
 rationis ratiocinatce) \ ; of which latter it is pos- 
 sible to show conclusively, the objective reality 
 of its concept ; at least for the practical use of 
 Reason, because this which has its peculiar and 
 apodictically certain principles a priori, demands 
 (postulates) it. 
 
 (2.) Objects for concepts, whose objective reality 
 can be proved (whether through pure Reason or 
 through experience, and, in the first case, from its 
 theoretical or practical data, in all cases by means of 
 a corresponding intuition) are things of fact {res 
 facti)r Of this kind are the mathematical properties 
 of magnitudes (in geometry), because they are sus- 
 ceptible of -Sl presentation a priori for the theoretical 
 use of Reason. Further, things or their charac- 
 teristics, which can be exhibited in experience 
 (either our own or that of others through the 
 medium of testimony) are likewise things of fact. 
 — And, what is very remarkable, there is one 
 rational Idea (which is susceptible in itself of no 
 presentation in intuition, and consequently, of no 
 theoretical proof of its possibility) which also comes 
 under things of fact. This is the Idea oi freedom, 
 
 1 [Cf. supra, p. 229.] 
 
 2 I here extend, correctly as it seems to me, the concept of a 
 thing of fact beyond the usual signification of this word. For it is 
 not needful, not even feasible, to limit this expression merely to 
 actual experience, if we are talking of the relation of things to our 
 cognitive faculties ; for an experience merely possible is quite sufficient 
 in order that we may speak of them merely as objects of a definite 
 kind of cognition.
 
 4o6 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 whose reality, regarded as that of a particular kind 
 of causality (of which the concept, theoretically 
 considered, would be transcendent), may be exhibited 
 by means of practical laws of pure Reason, and 
 conformably to this, in actual actions, and, con- 
 sequently, in experience. — This is the only one 
 of all the Ideas of pure Reason, whose object is a 
 thino; of fact, and to be reckoned under the scibilia. 
 
 (3.) Objects, which in reference to the use of 
 pure practical Reason that is in conformity with 
 duty must be thought a priori (whether as conse- 
 quences or as grounds), but which are transcendent 
 for its theoretical use, are mere things of faith. Of 
 this kind is the highest good in the world, to be 
 brought about by freedom/ The concept of this 
 cannot be established as regards its objective reality 
 in any experience possible for us and thus adequately 
 for the theoretical use of Reason ; but its use is 
 commanded by practical pure Reason [in reference 
 to the best possible working out of that purpose]," 
 and it consequently must be assumed possible. This 
 commanded effect, together zvith the only conditions 
 of its possibility thinkable by ns, viz. the Being of 
 God and the immortality of the soul, are things of 
 faith {res fidei), and of all objects are the only ones 
 which can be so called.'- For though what we learn 
 by testimony from the experience of others must be 
 believed by us, yet it is not therefore a thing of 
 
 1 [Cf. Introduction to Logic, p. 59 note.] 
 
 - [Second Edition.] 
 
 3 Things of faith are not therefore articles of faith ; if we 
 understand by the latter things of {a\i\\ to the cojifcssion of which 
 (internal or external) we can be bound. Natural theology con- 
 tains nothing like this. For since they, as things of faith (like 
 things of fact) cannot be based on theoretical proofs, [they are 
 accepted by] a belief which is free and which only as such is compatible 
 with the morality of the subject.
 
 APPENDIX § 91 THINGS OF FAITH ■ 407 
 
 faith ; for it was the proper experience of some one 
 witness and so a thing of fact, or is presupposed as 
 such. Again it must be possible by this path (that 
 of historical faith) to arrive at knowledge ; and the 
 Objects of history and geography, like everything 
 in general which it is at least possible to know by 
 the constitution of our cognitive faculties, belong 
 not to things of faith but to things of fact. It is 
 only objects of pure Reason which can be things of 
 faith at all, though not as objects of the mere pure 
 speculative Reason : for then they could not be 
 reckoned with certainty among things, i.e. Objects 
 of that cognition which is possible for us. They are 
 Ideas, i.e. concepts of the objective reality of which 
 we cannot theoretically be certain. On the other 
 hand, the highest final purpose to be worked out by 
 us, by which alone we can become worthy of being 
 ourselves the final purpose of creation, is an Idea 
 which has in a practical reference objective reality 
 for us, and is also a thing. But because we cannot 
 furnish such reality to this concept in a theoretical 
 point of view, it is a mere thing of faith of the pure 
 Reason, along with God and Immortality, as the 
 conditions under which alone we, in accordance with 
 the constitution of our (human) Reason, can conceive 
 the possibility of that effect of the use of our freedom 
 in conformity with law. But belief in things of faith 
 is a belief in a pure practical point of view, i.e. a 
 moral faith, which proves nothing for theoretical pure 
 rational cognition, but only for that which is practical 
 and directed to the fulfilment of its duties ; it in no 
 way extends speculation or the practical rules of 
 prudence in accordance with the principle of self- 
 love. If the supreme principle of all moral laws is 
 a postulate, so is also the possibility of its highest
 
 4o8 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 Object ; and consequently, too, the condition under 
 which we can think this possibility is postulated 
 along with it and by it. Thus the cognition of 
 the latter is neither knowledge nor opinion of the 
 being and character of these conditions, regarded as 
 theoretical cognition ; but is a mere assumption in 
 a reference which is practical and commanded for 
 the moral use of our Reason. 
 
 If we were able also with some plausibility to 
 base upon the purposes of nature, which physical 
 Teleology presents to us in such rich abundance, a 
 determinate concept of an intelligent World-Cause, 
 then the existence [Dasein] of this Being would not 
 be a thing of faith. For since this would not be 
 assumed on behalf of the performance of my duty, 
 but only in reference to the explanation of nature, 
 it would be merely the opinion and hypothesis most 
 conformable to our Reason. Now such Teleology 
 leads in no way to a determinate concept of God ; 
 on the contrary, this can only be found in the con- 
 cept of a moral Author of the World, because this 
 alone furnishes the final purpose to which we can only 
 reckon ourselves [as attached] if we behave conform- 
 ably to what the moral law prescribes as final purpose 
 and consequently obliges us [to do]. Hence it is 
 only by its reference- to the Object of our duty, as 
 the condition of the possibility of attaining the final 
 purpose of the same, that the concept of God attains 
 the advantage of being [reckoned as] valid jn our 
 belief as a thing of faith ; but on the other hand, this 
 same concept cannot make its Object valid as a thing 
 of fact. For, although the necessity of duty is very 
 plain for practical Reason, yet the attainment of its 
 final purpose, so far as it is not altogether in our 
 own power, is only assumed on behalf of the practical
 
 APPENDIX § 91 FAITH 409 
 
 use of Reason, and therefore is not so practically 
 necessary as duty itself^ 
 
 Faith (as habitus, not as actus) is the moral 
 attitude of Reason as to belief in that which is un- 
 attainable by theoretical cognition. It is therefore 
 the permanent principle of the mind, to assume as 
 true, on account of the obligation in reference to it, 
 that which it is necessary to presuppose as condition 
 of the possibility of the highest moral final purpose " ; 
 
 ^ The final purpose which the moral law enjoins upon us to 
 further, is not the ground of duty ; since this lies in the moral law, 
 which, as formal practical principle, leads categorically, independently 
 of the Objects of the faculty of desire (the material of the will) and 
 consequently of any purpose whatever. This formal characteristic of 
 my actions (their subordination under the principle of universal 
 validity), wherein alone consists their inner moral worth, is quite in 
 our power ; and I can quite well abstract from the possibility or the 
 unattainableness of purposes which I am obliged to promote in con- 
 formity with that law (because in them consists only the external 
 worth of my actions) as something wliich is never completely in my 
 power, in order only to look to that which is of my doing. But then 
 the design of promoting the final purpose of all rational beings 
 (happiness so far as it is possible for it to be accordant with duty) 
 is even yet prescribed by the law of duty. The speculative Reason, 
 however, does not see at all the attainableness of this (neither on the 
 side of our own physical faculty nor on that of the co-operation of 
 nature). It must rather, so far as we can judge in a rational way, 
 hold the derivation, by the aid of such causes, of such a consequence 
 of our good conduct from mere nature (internal and external) without 
 God and immortality, to be an ungrounded and vain, though well- 
 meant, expectation ; and if it could have complete certainty of this 
 judgment, it would regard the moral law itself as the mere deception of 
 our Reason in a practical aspect. But since the speculative Reason 
 fully convinces itself that the latter can never take place, but that on 
 the other hand those Ideas whose object lies outside nature can be 
 thought without contradiction, it must for its own practical law and 
 the problem prescribed thereby, and therefore in a moral aspect, 
 recognise those Ideas as real in order not to come into contradiction 
 with itself. 
 
 - It is a trust in the promise of the moral law ; [not however 
 such as is contained in it, but such as I put into it and that on 
 morally adequate grounds. ^J For a final purpose cannot be com- 
 manded by any law of Reason without this latter at the same time 
 
 " [Second Edition.]
 
 4IO KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 althouq-h its possibility or impossibility be alike 
 impossible for us to see into. Faith (absolutely so 
 called) is trust in the attainment of a design, the 
 promotion of which is a duty, but the possibility of 
 the fulfilment of which (and consequently also that 
 of the only conditions of it thinkable by us) is not to 
 be comprehended by us. Faith, then, that refers to 
 particular objects, which are not objects of possible 
 knowledge or opinion (in which latter case it ought 
 to be called, especially in historical matters, credulity 
 and not faith), is quite moral. It is a free belief, not 
 in that for which dogmatical proofs for the theore- 
 tically determinant Judgment are to be found, or in 
 that to which we hold ourselves bound, but in that 
 which we assume on behalf of a desic^n in accord- 
 ance with laws of freedom. This, however, is not, 
 like opinion, without any adequate ground ; but, is 
 grounded as in Reason (although only in respect of 
 its practical employment), and adeqiiately for its 
 design. For without this, the moral attitude of 
 thought in its repudiation of the claim of the theore- 
 tical Reason for proofs (of the possibility of the 
 Objects of morality) has no permanence ; but 
 wavers between practical commands and theoretical 
 doubts. To be incredulotts means to cling to 
 
 promising, however uncertainly, its attainableness ; and thus justify- 
 ing our belief in the special conditions under which alone our Reason 
 can think it as attainable. The \\'Oxdi.Jidcs expresses this ; and it can 
 only appear doubtful, how this expression and this particular Idea 
 came into moral philosophy, since it first was introduced with 
 Christianity, and the adoption of it perhaps might seem to be only a 
 flattering imitation of Christian terminology. But this is not the only 
 case in which this wonderful religion with its great simplicity of state- 
 ment has enriched philosophy with far more definite and purer con- 
 cepts of morality, than it had been able to furnish before ; but which, 
 once they are there, dixo. freely assented to by Reason and are assumed 
 as concepts to which it could well have come of itself and which it 
 could and should have introduced.
 
 APPENDIX § 91 MORAL UNBELIEF » 411 
 
 maxims, and not to believe testimony in general ; 
 but he is 2mbelieving, who denies all validity to 
 rational Ideas, because there is wanting a theoretical 
 ground of their reality.^ He judges therefore dog- 
 matically. A dogmatical unbelief cannot subsist 
 together with a moral maxim dominant in the 
 mental attitude (for Reason cannot command one to 
 follow a purpose, which is cognised as nothing more 
 than a chimera) ; but a doubtful faith can. To this 
 the absence of conviction by grounds of speculative 
 Reason is only a hindrance ; and for this a critical 
 insight into the limits of this faculty can remove its 
 influence upon conduct, while it substitutes by way 
 of compensation a paramount practical belief. 
 
 If, in place of certain mistaken attempts, we 
 wish to introduce a different principle into philo- 
 sophy and to procure influence for it, it produces 
 great contentment if we can see how and why those 
 attempts must have disappointed us. 
 
 God, freedom, and immortality, are the problems 
 at the solution of which all the preparations of 
 Metaphysic aim, as their ultimate and unique purpose. 
 Now it was believed that the doctrine of freedom is 
 needed for practical philosophy only as its negative 
 condition ; but that on the other hand the doctrine 
 of God and of the constitution of the soul, as belong- 
 ing to theoretical philosophy, must be established for 
 themselves and separately, in order afterwards to 
 unite both with that which the moral law (possible 
 only under the condition of freedom) commands, 
 and so to constitute a religion. But we can easily 
 
 ^ [Cf. Introd. to Logic, ix. p. 60, "That man is morally unbelieving 
 who does not accept that which though impossible to know is inorally 
 necessary to suppose."]
 
 412 A'AA/rS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT i-art ii 
 
 see that these attempts must fail. For from mere 
 ontological concepts of things in general, or of the 
 existence of a necessary Being, it is possible to 
 form absolutely no determinate concept of an 
 original Being by means of predicates which can 
 be given in experience and can therefore serve for 
 cognition. Again a concept based on experience 
 of the physical purposiveness of nature could furnish 
 no adequate proof for morality, or consequently for 
 cognition of a Deity. Just as little could the cogni- 
 tion of the soul by means of experience (which we 
 only apply in this life) supply us with a concept of 
 its spiritual immortal nature, a concept which would 
 thus be adequate for morality. Theology and 
 Pneuinatology, regarded as problems of the sciences 
 of a speculative Reason, can be established by no 
 empirical data and predicates, because the concept 
 of them is transcendent for our whole cognitive 
 faculty. — The determination of both predicates, 
 God and the soul (in respect of its immortality) 
 alike, can only take place by means of predicates, 
 which, although they are only possible from a super- 
 sensible ground, must yet prove their reality in 
 experience ; for thus alone can they make possible 
 a cognition of a quite supersensible Being. — The 
 only concept T)f this kind to be met with in human 
 Reason is that of the freedom of men under moral 
 laws, along with the final purpose which Reason 
 prescribes by these laws. Of these two [the moral 
 laws and the final purpose] the first are useful for 
 ascribing to the Author of Nature, the second for 
 ascribing to man, those properties which contain 
 the necessary condition of the possibility of both 
 [God and the soul]; so that from this Idea we can 
 conclude as to the existence and constitution of
 
 APPENDIX § 91 FAILURE OF THEORETICAL PROOFS 413 
 
 these beings which are otherwise quite hidden 
 from us. 
 
 Thus the ground of the failure of the attempt 
 to prove God and immortahty by the merely 
 theoretical path lies in this, that no cognition 
 whatever is possible of the supersensible in this 
 way (of natural concepts). The ground of its 
 success by the moral way (of the concept of free- 
 dom) is as follows. Here the supersensible (free- 
 dom), which in this case is fundamental, by a 
 determinate law of causality that springs from it, 
 not only supplies material for cognition of other 
 supersensibles (the moral final purpose and the 
 conditions of its attainability), but also establishes 
 its reality in actions as a fact ; though at the same 
 time it can furnish a valid ground of proof in no 
 other than a practical point of view (the only one, 
 however, of which Religion has need). 
 
 It is thus very remarkable that of the three pure 
 rational Ideas, God, freedom, and wimortality, that 
 of freedom is the only concept of the supersensible 
 which (by means of the causality that is thought in 
 it) proves its objective reality in nature by means of 
 the effects it can produce there ; and thus renders 
 possible the connection of both the others with 
 nature, and of all three together with Religion. 
 We have therefore in us a principle capable of 
 determining the Idea of the supersensible within 
 us, and thus also that of the supersensible without 
 us, for knowledge, although only in a practical 
 point of view ; a principle this of which mere 
 speculative philosophy (which could give a merely 
 negative concept of freedom) must despair. Conse- 
 quently the concept of freedom (as fundamental 
 concept of all unconditioned practical laws) can
 
 414 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 extend Reason beyond those bounds, within which 
 every natural (theoretical) concept must remain 
 hopelessly limited. 
 
 General reiitark on Teleology 
 
 If the question is, what rank the moral argument, 
 which proves the Being of God only as a thing of 
 faith for the practical pure Reason, maintains among 
 the other arguments in philosophy, it is easy to 
 count up the whole possessions of this last ; by 
 which it appears that there is here no choice, 
 but that our theoretical faculty must give up all its 
 pretensions before an impartial Kritik. 
 
 All belief must in the first place be grounded 
 upon facts, if it is not to be completely groundless ; 
 and therefore the only distinction in proofs that 
 there can be is that belief in the consequence derived 
 therefrom can either be grounded on this fact as 
 knozvledge for theoretical cognition, or merely as 
 faiili for practical. All facts belong either to the 
 natural concept which proves its reality in the 
 objects of sense, given (or w^hich may possibly be 
 given) before all natural concepts ; or to the concept 
 of freedom, which sufficiently establishes its reality 
 through the .causality of Reason in regard of certain 
 effects in the world of sense, possible through it, 
 which it incontrovertibly postulates in the moral law. 
 The natural concept (merely belonging to theoretical 
 cognition) is now either metaphysical and thinkable 
 completely a priori, or physical, i.e. thinkable a 
 posteriori and only necessary through determinate 
 experience. The metaphysical natural concept 
 (which presupposes no determinate experience) is 
 therefore ontological.
 
 APPENDIX § 91 THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF 415 
 
 The ontological proof of the being of God from 
 the concept of an original Being is either that 
 which from ontological predicates, by which alone it 
 can be thought as completely determined, infers 
 absolutely necessary being ; or that which, from the 
 absolute necessity of the being somewhere of some 
 thing, whatever it be, infers the predicates of the 
 original Being. For there belongs to the concept 
 of an original Being, inasmuch as it is not derived 
 from anything, the unconditioned necessity of its 
 presence, and (in order to represent this) its com- 
 plete determination by its [mere]^ concept. It was 
 believed that both requirements were found in the 
 concept of the ontological Idea of a Being the nwst 
 real of all; and thus two metaphysical proofs 
 originated. 
 
 The proof (properly called ontological) resting 
 upon a merely metaphysical natural concept con- 
 cludes from the concept of the Being the most real 
 of all, its absolutely necessary existence ; for (it is 
 said), if it did not exist, a reality would be wanting 
 to it, viz. existence. — The other (which is also 
 called the \x\Q.i2.Yihys\co-cosjnologual proof) concludes 
 from the necessity of the existence somewhere of a 
 thing (which must be conceded, for a being is 
 given to us in self- consciousness), its complete 
 determination as that of a Being the most real of 
 all ; for everything existing must be completely 
 determined, but the absolutely necessary (i.e. that 
 which ive ought to cognise as such and conse- 
 quently a priori) must be completely determined by 
 means of its ow7i concept. But this is only the case 
 with the concept of a thing the most real of all. 
 It is not needful to expose here the sophistry in 
 
 1 [First Edition.]
 
 4i6 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 both arguments, which has been already clone else- 
 where ; ^ it is only needful to remark that neither 
 proof, even if they could be defended by all 
 manner of dialectical subtlety, could ever pass from 
 the schools into the world, or have the slightest 
 influence on the mere sound Understanding. 
 
 The proof, which rests on a natural concept 
 that can only be empirical and yet is to lead us 
 beyond the bounds of nature regarded as the 
 complex of the objects of sense, can be no other 
 than that derived from X^t. ptii'poses of nature. The 
 concept of these cannot, it is true, be given a priori 
 but only through experience ; but yet it promises 
 such a concept of the original ground of nature as 
 alone, among all those which we can conceive, is 
 suited to the supersensible, viz. that of a highest 
 Understanding as Cause of the world. This, in fact, 
 it completely performs in accordance with principles 
 of the reflective Judgment, i.e. in accordance with 
 the constitution of our (human) faculty of cogni- 
 tion. — But whether or not it is in a position to 
 supply from the same data this concept of a supreme, 
 i.e. independent intelligent Being, in short of a God 
 or Author of a world under moral laws, and conse- 
 quently as sufficiently determined for the Idea of a 
 final purpose of the being of the world — this is the 
 question upon which everything depends, whether 
 we desire a theoretically adequate concept of the 
 Oricfinal BeinQ- on behalf of our whole knowledee of 
 nature, or a practical concept for religion. 
 
 This argument derived from physical Teleology 
 is worthy of respect. It produces a similar effect 
 in the way of conviction upon the common Under- 
 standing as upon the subtlest thinker ; and a 
 
 ^ [In the Kritik oi Pure Reason, Dialectic, bk. II. c. iii. §§ 4, 5.]
 
 APPENDIX § 91 THE DESIGN ARGUMENT 417 
 
 Reiviariis^ has acquired immortal honour in his 
 work (not yet superseded), in which he abundantly 
 develops this ground of proof with his peculiar 
 thoroughness and lucidity. — But how does this 
 proof acquire such mighty influence upon the mind, 
 especially in a judgment by cold reason (for we 
 might refer to persuasion the emotion and elevation 
 of reason produced by the wonders of nature) upon 
 a calm and resigned assent ? It is not the physical 
 purposes, which all indicate in the World Cause 
 an unfathomable intelligence; these are inadequate 
 thereto, because they do not content the want of the 
 inquiring Reason. For, wherefore (it asks) are ^ all 
 those natural things that exhibit art ? Wherefore 
 is man himself, whom we must regard as the ulti- 
 mate purpose of nature thinkable by us ? Wherefore 
 is this collective Nature here, and what is the final 
 purpose of such great and manifold art ? Reason 
 cannot be contented with enjoyment or with con- 
 templation, observation, and admiration (which, if 
 it stops there, is only enjoyment of a particular kind) 
 as the ultimate final purpose for the creation of the 
 world and of man himself; for this presupposes a 
 personal worth, which man alone can give himself, 
 as the condition under which alone he and his being 
 can be the final purpose. Failing this (which alone 
 is susceptible of a definite concept), the purposes of 
 nature do not satisfactorily answer our questions ; 
 especially because they cannot furnish any detej'- 
 ininate concept of the highest Being as an all- 
 sufficient (and therefore unique and so properly 
 
 ^ [H. S. Reimarus (1694- 1768), the author of the famous 
 Wolfenbuttcl Fragnic7its^ published after the death of Reimarus by 
 Lessing. The book alluded to by Kant is probably the Abhand- 
 liingen von den vornehnisten Wahrheiten der itatiirlichen Religion 
 (1754), which had great popularity in its day.] 
 
 2 E
 
 4i8 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 called highest) being-, and of the laws according to 
 which an Understanding is Cause of the world. 
 
 Hence that the physico-teleological proof con- 
 vinces, just as if it were a theological proof, does 
 not arise from our availing ourselves of the Ideas of 
 purposes of nature as so many empirical grounds of 
 proof of a highest Understanding. But it mingles 
 itself unnoticed with that moral ground of proof, 
 which dwells in every man and influences him 
 secretly, in the conclusion by which we ascribe to 
 the Being, which manifests itself with such incom- 
 prehensible art in the purposes of nature, a final 
 purpose and consequently wisdom (without however 
 being justified in doing so by the perception of the 
 former) ; and by which therefore we arbitrarily fill 
 up the lacunas of the [design] argument. In fact 
 it is only the moral ground of proof which produces 
 conviction, and that only in a moral reference with 
 which every man feels inwardly his agreement. 
 But the physico-teleological proof has only the 
 merit of leading the mind in its consideration of the 
 world by the way of purposes and through them to 
 an intelligent Author of the world ; for the moral 
 reference to purposes and the Idea of a moral legis- 
 lator and Author of the world, as a theological 
 concept, seem to be developed of themselves out of 
 that ground of proof, although they are in truth pure 
 additions. 
 
 From this on we may allow the customary 
 statement to stand. For it is generally difficult (if 
 the distinction requires much reflection) for ordinary 
 sound Understanding to distinguish from one 
 another as heterogeneous the different principles 
 which it confuses, and from one of which alone it 
 actuallv draws conclusions with correctness. The
 
 APPENDIX § 91 THE MORAL ARGUMENT 419 
 
 moral ground of proof of the Being of God, properly- 
 speaking, does not merely complete and render 
 perfect the physico-teleological proof; but it is a 
 special proof that supplies the conviction which is 
 wanting in the latter. This latter in fact can do 
 nothing more than guide Reason, in its judgments 
 upon the ground of nature and that contingent but 
 admirable order of nature only known to us by 
 experience, to the causality of a Cause containing 
 the ground of the same in accordance with purposes 
 (which we by the constitution of our cognitive 
 faculties must think as an intelligent cause) ; and 
 thus by arresting the attention of Reason it makes 
 it more susceptible of the moral proof. For what 
 is requisite to the latter concept is so essentially 
 different from everything which natural concepts 
 contain and can teach, that there is need of a parti- 
 cular ground of proof quite independent of the 
 former, in order to supply the concept of the 
 original Being adequately for Theology and to 
 infer its existence. — The moral proof (which it 
 is true only proves the Being of God in a practical 
 though indispensable aspect of Reason) would pre- 
 serve all its force, if we found in the world no 
 material, or only that which is doubtful, for physical 
 Teleology. It is possible to conceive rational beings 
 surrounded by a nature which displayed no clear 
 trace of organisation but only the effects of a mere 
 mechanism of crude matter ; on behalf of which and 
 amid the changeability of some merely contingent 
 purposive forms and relations there would appear 
 to be no ground for inferring an intelligent Author. 
 In such case there would be no occasion for a 
 physical Teleology ; and yet Reason, which here 
 gets no guidance from natural concepts, would
 
 420 KAA^T'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part II 
 
 find in the concept of freedom and in the moral 
 Ideas founded thereon a practically sufficient ground 
 for postulating the concept of the original Being 
 in conformity with these, i.e. as a Deity, and for 
 postulating nature (even the nature of our own 
 being) as a final purpose in accordance with freedom 
 and its laws — and all this in reference to the indis- 
 pensable command of practical Reason, — How- 
 ever the fact that there is in the actual world for 
 the rational beings in it abundant material for 
 physical Teleology (even though this is not neces- 
 sary) serves as a desirable confirmation of the 
 moral argument, as far as nature can exhibit any- 
 thing analogous to the (moral) rational Ideas. For 
 the concept of a supreme Cause possessing intelli- 
 gence (though not reaching far enough for a 
 Theology) thus acquires sufficient reality for the 
 reflective Judgment, but it is not required as the 
 basis of the moral proof; nor does this latter serve 
 to complete as a proof the former, which does not 
 by itself point to morality at all, by means of an 
 argument developed according to a single principle. 
 Two such heterogeneous principles as nature and 
 freedom, can only furnish two different kinds of 
 proof; and the attempt to derive one from the 
 other is found unavailing: as regfards that which is 
 to be proved. 
 
 If the physico-teleological ground of proof 
 sufficed for the proof which is sought, it would 
 be very satisfactory for the speculative Reason ; 
 for it would furnish the hope of founding a Theo- 
 sophy (for so we must call the theoretical cognition 
 of the divine nature and its existence which would 
 suffice at once for the explanation of the constitution 
 of the world and for the determination of moral laws).
 
 APPENDIX § 91 LACUNA IN TELEOLOGICAL PROOF 421 
 
 In the same way If Psychology enabled us to arrive 
 at a cognition of the Immortality of the soul It would 
 make Pneumatology possible, which would be just 
 as welcome to the speculative Reason. But neither, 
 agreeable as they would be to the arrogance of our 
 curiosity, would satisfy the wish of Reason in respect 
 of a theory which must be based on a cognition of 
 the nature of things. Whether the first, as Theology, 
 and the second, as Anthropology, when founded on 
 the moral principle, i.e. the principle of freedom, and 
 consequently in accordance with the practical use [of 
 Reason] do not better fulfil their objective final design, 
 is another question which we need not here pursue. 
 The physico-teleological ground of proof does 
 not reach to Theology, because it does not and 
 cannot give any determinate concept, sufficient 
 for this design, of the original Being ; but we must 
 derive this from quite another quarter, or must 
 supply Its lacuna by an arbitrary addition. You 
 Infer, from the great purposiveness of natural forms 
 and their relations, an intelligent Cause of the 
 world ; but what is the degree of this intelligence 
 [Verstand] ? Without doubt you cannot assume that 
 it is the highest possible Intelligence ; because for 
 that it would be requisite that you should see that 
 a greater intelligence than that of which you per- 
 ceive proofs in the world, is not thinkable ; and this 
 would be to ascribe Omniscience to yourself.^ In 
 the same way, if you Infer from the magnitude of 
 the world the very great might of Its Author, 
 you must be content with this having only a com- 
 parative significance for your faculty of comprehen- 
 
 1 [These arguments are advanced by Hume, Inquiry, § vii. Cf. 
 also Kritik of Pure Reason, Dialectic, bk. II. c. iii. § 6, and Kritik 
 of Practical Reason, Dialectic, c. ii. g vii.]
 
 422 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part li 
 
 sion ; for since you do not know all that is possible, 
 so as to compare it with the magnitude of the world 
 as far as you know it, you cannot infer the Almighti- 
 ness of its Author from so small a standard, and so on. 
 Now you arrive in this way at no definite concept 
 of an original Being available for a Theology ; for 
 this can only be found in the concept of the totality 
 of perfections compatible with intelligence, and you 
 cannot help yourself to this by merely empirical data. 
 But without such a definite concept you cannot infer 
 a ttniipie intelligent original Being ; you can only 
 assume it (with whatever motive). — Now it may 
 certainly be conceded that you should arbitrarily 
 add (for Reason has nothing fundamental to say 
 to the contrary) : Where so much perfection is 
 found, we may well assume that all perfection is 
 united in a unique Cause of the world, because 
 Reason succeeds better both theoretically and prac- 
 tically with a principle thus definite. But then 
 you cannot regard this concept of the original Being 
 as proved by you, for you have only assumed it on 
 behalf of a better employment of Reason. Hence 
 all lamentation or impotent anger on account of 
 the alleged mischief of rendering doubtful the 
 coherency of your chain of reasoning, is vain pre- 
 tentiousness, which would fain have us believe that 
 the doubt here freely expressed as to your argument 
 is a doubting of sacred truth, in order that under 
 this cover the shallowness of your argument may 
 pass unnoticed. 
 
 Moral Teleology, on the other hand, which is 
 not less firmly based than physical, — which, indeed, 
 rather deserves the preference because it rests 
 a priori Q)X\ principles inseparable from our Reason 
 — leads to that which is requisite for the possibility
 
 APPENDIX § 91 RELIGION 423 
 
 of a Theology, viz. to a determinate concept of the 
 supreme Cause, as Cause of the world according 
 to moral laws, and, consequently, to the concept 
 of such a cause as satisfies our moral final purpose. 
 For this are required, as natural properties belong- 
 ing to it, nothing less than Omniscience, Omni- 
 potence, Omnipresence, and the like, which must be 
 thought as bound up with the moral final purpose 
 which is infinite and thus as adequate to it. Hence 
 moral Teleology alone can furnish the concept of 
 a unique Author of the world, which is available 
 for a Theology. 
 
 In this way Theology leads immediately to 
 Religion, i.e. the recognition of ottr duties as divine 
 commands'", because it is only the recognition of 
 our duty and of the final purpose enjoined upon 
 us by Reason which brings out with definiteness 
 the concept of God. This concept, therefore, is 
 inseparable in its origin from obligation to that 
 Being. On the other hand, even if the concept 
 of the original Being could be also found deter- 
 minately by the merely theoretical path (viz. the 
 concept of it as mere Cause of nature), it would 
 afterwards be very difficult — perhaps impossible 
 without arbitrary interpolation [of elements] — to 
 ascribe to this Being by well-grounded proofs 
 a causality in accordance with moral laws ; and 
 yet without this that quasi - theological concept 
 could furnish no foundation for religion. Even if 
 a religion could be established by this theoretical 
 path, it would actually, as regards sentiment 
 (wherein its essence lies) be different from that in 
 which the concept of God and the (practical) 
 conviction of His Being originate from the funda- 
 
 1 [Cf. Kritik of Practical Reason, Dialectic, c. ii. § v.]
 
 424 KANT'S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 mental Ideas of morality. For if we must suppose 
 the Omnipotence, Omniscience, etc., of an Author 
 of the world as concepts given to us from another 
 quarter, in order afterwards only to apply our 
 concepts of duties to our relation to Him, then 
 these latter concepts must bear very markedly the 
 appearance of compulsion and forced submission. 
 If, instead of this, the respect for the moral law, 
 quite freely, in virtue of the precept of our own 
 Reason, represents to us the final purpose of our 
 destination, we admit among our moral views a 
 Cause harmonising with this and with its accomplish- 
 ment, with the sincerest reverence, which is quite 
 distinct from pathological fear ; and we willingly 
 submit ourselves thereto.^ 
 
 If it be asked why it is incumbent upon us to 
 have any Theology at all, it appears clear that 
 it is not needed for the extension or correction of 
 our cognition of nature or in general for any theory, 
 but simply in a subjective point of view for Religion, 
 i.e. the practical or moral use of our Reason. If 
 it is found that the only argument which leads to 
 a definite concept of the object of Theology is itself 
 moral, ' it is not only not strange, but we miss 
 nothing in respect of its final purpose as regards 
 the sufficiency of belief from this ground of proof, 
 provided that it be admitted that such an argument 
 
 1 The admiration for beauty, and also the emotion aroused by 
 the manifold purposes of nature, which a reflective mind is able 
 to feel even prior to a clear representation of a rational Author of the 
 world, have something in themselves like religious feeling. They 
 seem in the first place by a method of judging analogous to moral 
 to produce an effect upon the moral feeling (gratitude to, and 
 veneration for, the unknown Cause) ; and thus by exciting moral 
 Ideas to produce an effect upon the mind, when they inspire that 
 admiration which is bound up with far more interest than mere 
 theoretical observation can bring about.
 
 APPENDIX § 91 ELUCIDATION 425 
 
 only establishes the Being of God sufficiently for 
 our moral destination, i.e. in a practical point of 
 view, and that here speculation neither shows its 
 strength in any way, nor extends by means of it 
 the sphere of its domain. Our surprise and the 
 alleeed contradiction between the here asserted 
 possibility of a Theology and that which the Kritik 
 of speculative Reason said of the Categories — viz. 
 that they can only produce knowledge when applied 
 to objects of sense, but in no way when applied 
 to the supersensible — vanish, if we see that they 
 are here used for a cognition of God not in a 
 theoretical point of view (in accordance with what 
 His own nature, which is inscrutable by us, may 
 be) but simply in a practical. — In order then 
 at this opportunity to make an end of the mis- 
 interpretation of that very necessary doctrine of 
 the Kritik, which, to the chagrin of the blind 
 dogmatist, refers Reason to its bounds, I add here 
 the following elucidation. 
 
 If I ascribe to a body motive force and thus 
 think it by means of the category of causality, 
 then I at the same time cognise it by that [category]; 
 i.e. I determine the concept of it, as of an Object in 
 general, by means of what belongs to it by itself 
 {as the condition of the possibility of that relation) 
 as an object of sense. If the motive force ascribed 
 to it is repulsive, then there belongs to it (although 
 I do not place near it any other body upon which 
 it may exert force) a place in space, and moreover 
 extension, i.e. space in itself, besides the filling 
 up of this by means of the repulsive forces of 
 its parts. In addition there is the law of this 
 filling up (that the ground of the repulsion of the 
 parts must decrease in the same proportion as the
 
 426 KANTS KRiriK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 extension of the body increases, and as the space, 
 which it fills with the same parts by means of this 
 force, is augmented). — On the contrary, if I think 
 a supersensible Being as the first mover, and thus 
 by the category of causality as regards its deter- 
 mination of the world (motion of matter), I must 
 not think it as existing in any place in space nor 
 as extended ; I must not even think it as existing 
 in time or simultaneously with other beings. Hence 
 I have no determinations whatever, which could 
 make intelligible to me the condition of the possi- 
 bility of motion by means of this Being as its 
 ground. Consequently, I do not in the very least 
 cognise it by means of the predicate of Cause (as 
 first mover), for itself; but I have only the re- 
 presentation of a something containing the ground 
 of the motions in the world ; and the relation of 
 the latter to it as their cause, since it does not 
 besides furnish me with anything belonging to the 
 constitution of the thing which is cause, leaves its 
 concept quite empty. The reason of this is, that 
 by predicates which only find their Object in the 
 world of sense I can indeed proceed to the being 
 of soihething which must contain their ground, but not 
 to the determination of its concept as a supersensible 
 being, which excludes all those predicates. By 
 the category of causality, then, if I determine it 
 by the concept of a first mover, I do not in the 
 very least cognise what God is. Perhaps, however, 
 I shall have better success if I start from the 
 order of the world, not merely to think its causality 
 as that of a supreme Understanding, but to cognise 
 it by means of this determination of the said con- 
 cept ; because here the troublesome condition of 
 space and of extension disappears.^ — - At all events
 
 APPENDIX § 91 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 427 
 
 the great purposlveness in the world compels us 
 to think a supreme cause of it, and to think its 
 causality as that of an Understanding ; but we are 
 not therefore entitled to ascribe this to it. {E.g. 
 we think of the eternity of God as presence in 
 all time, because we can form no other concept 
 of mere being as a quantum, i.e. as duration ; 
 or we think of the divine Omnipresence as presence 
 in all places in order to make comprehensible to 
 ourselves His immediate presence in things which 
 are external to one another ; without daring to 
 ascribe to God any of these determinations, as some- 
 thing cognised in Him.) If I determine the causal- 
 ity of a man, in respect of certain products which are 
 only explicable by designed purposlveness, by think- 
 ing it as that of Understanding, I need not stop 
 here, but I can ascribe to him this predicate as a 
 well-known property and cognise him accordingly. 
 For I know that intuitions are given to the senses 
 of men and are brought by the Understanding 
 under a concept and thus under a rule ; that this 
 c oncept onl y contains the c o mmon characteristi c 
 (with omiss ion of the particular o nes) and is thus 
 dis cursive ; and that the rules for bringing given 
 representations under a consciousness in general 
 are given by Understanding before those intuitions, 
 etc. I therefore ascribe this property to man as a 
 property by means of which I cognise him. How- 
 ever, if I wish to think a supersensible Being (God) 
 as an intelligence, this is not only permissible in a 
 certain aspect of my employment of Reason — it is 
 unavoidable ; but to ascribe to Him Understanding 
 and to flatter ourselves that we can cognise Him by 
 means of it as a property of His, is in no way per- 
 missible. For I must omit all those conditions
 
 428 KANrS KRITIK OF JUDGMENT part ii 
 
 under which alone I know an Understanding, and 
 thus the predicate which only serves for determining 
 man cannot be applied at all to a supersensible 
 Object ; and therefore by a causality thus determined, 
 I cannot cognise what God is. And so it is 
 with all Categories, which can have no significance 
 for cognition in a theoretical aspect, if they are not 
 applied to objects of possible experience. — How- 
 ever, according- to the analogy of an Understanding 
 I can in a certain other aspect think a supersensible 
 being, without at the same time meaning thereby to 
 cognise it theoretically ; viz. if this determination of 
 its causality concerns an effect in the world, which 
 contains a design morally necessary but unattainable 
 by a sensible being. For then a cognition of God 
 and of His Being (Theology) is possible by means 
 of properties and determinations of His causality 
 merely thought in Him according to analogy, which 
 has all requisite reality in a practical reference 
 though only in respect of this (as moral). — An 
 Ethical Theology is therefore possible ; for though 
 morality can subsist without theology as regards its 
 rule, ut cannot do so as regards the final design 
 which this proposes, unless Reason in respect of 
 it is to be renounced. But a Theological Ethic 
 (of pure Reason) is impossible ; for laws which 
 Reason itself does not give and whose observance it 
 does not bring about as a pure practical faculty, 
 cannot be moral. In the same way a Theological 
 Physic would be a nonentity, for it would propose no 
 laws of nature but ordinances of a Highest Will ; 
 while on the other hand a physical (properly speak- 
 ing a physico-teleological) Theology can serve at 
 least as a propsedeutic to Theology proper, by giving 
 occasion for the Idea of a final purpose which
 
 APPENDIX § 91 CONCLUSION 429 
 
 nature cannot present by the observation of natural 
 purposes of which it offers abundant material. It 
 thus makes felt the need of a Theology which shall 
 determine the concept of God adequately for the 
 highest practical use of Reason, but it cannot develop 
 this and base it satisfactorily on its proofs. 
 
 THE END 
 
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