CO' ' -t c: ccc< ^^ S5:>^?<0c: r ifcc c MEMORIAL //>^ C/«xf of 1901 . <: ^ cxcc«r^ re otrcc rccotrcfc t<< •^.. <;.K\ X< CC * ^;;'^ 7>r «-<: <--«r c CiCCC In the criminal court of the District of Columbia, No. — John H. Surratt. j And thereupon the defendant saith the said motion is bad in law and in sub- stance. The facts stated do not constitute any ground in law for a challenge of the array. BRADLEY & MERRICK, For Defendant. Mr. PiERREPONT. We join in the demurrer. Mr. Merrick. When the motion was made on yesterday, the high respect that I entertained for the learned counsel upon the other side induced me to ap- prehend that it involved a question of some difficulty, especially in view of the assurance, which I was exceedingly glad to hear given by the United States dis- trict attorney, that the motion was not for the purpose of delay, but upon an exam- ination of the question my apprehension of any difficulty involved in it as a legal proposition was speedily removed, and I beg to suggest to my learned brothers upon the other side, and your honor, that if there is anything in the motion, and it should prevail as a valid objection to a petit jury, the same ob- jection will apply to the grand jury that found the indictment, and on the deci- sion of your honor, should it be to sustain the ground of challenge to the petit jury, we may deem it expedient to change the plea of not guilty and to plead specially to the indictment. It is therefore, in point of substance, as to the re- sult not so very material to the prisoner, for the success of the motion of my learned i'riends on the other side may put him at large. It is somewhat remarkable that the objection now presented to the regularity of the manner in which this jury was drawn should be presented for the first time at this late day. Since the passage of the act of 1862, as Mr. Douglass tells us, the jurors have been uniformly drawn, and the lists iiniformly prepared in the same manner in which the list of this jury was prepared, and in the same manner this jury was drawn ; and if this jury is illegally constituted, and not authorized to return a verdict, your honor has been dealing somewhat inconsiderately with the lives and liberties of the citizens of this country ever since 1863, when your honor came upon the bench. You have hung one man and sentenced scores to the penitentiary, and you are now to be gratified with the intelligence that in all these acts in the taking of human life you were guilty of simply killing, and in all these adjudications inflicting the penalty of incarceration you have pronounced upon ofienders, you are guilty of participation in the act of folse imprisonment. A pleasing reflection to your honor, and a matter for serious consideration for the jurors who participated with you in these crimes. But I apprehend there is no such result following from a just construction of this statute, and I shall very briefly submit to your honor the views that have suggested themselves to me. The first question that avises is upon the construction of the statute. My learned brothers upon the other side contend that the selection of the names that are to be deposited in the jury box is a duty devolving by the law upon the register of Washington city, the clerk of Georgetown, and the clerk of the levy court of the county, and that this duty must be performed by all three conjointly, and that a part of this duty having been performed by one of the three, the duty TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURRATT. 19 •was illegally performed, and the conclusion of that duty are null and void. Your honor will observe that the first section of the act provides : " That it shall be the duty of the register of Washington city, and of the respective clerks of the city of Georgetown and the levy court of Washington county, in the District of Columbia, within one month after the passage of this act, and on or before the first day of February in each year thereafter, to make a list of such of the white male citizens, tax-payers, residing within their respective jurisdictions as they shall judge best qualified to serve as jurors in the courts of said District." This requirement of the law is addressed to these officials respectively. The register of Washington is to make a list of such of the white male citizens, tax- payers, as he thinks best qualified to serve as jurors. So far as the making of the list itself in the first instance is concerned, it cannot be pretended that any part of the duty in regard to it has devolved upon any one else than the register as to the list of Washington, the clerk of Georgetown as to the list for Georgetown, and the clerk of the levy court as to the list for the county, and in the prepara- tion of that list there is a discretionary power left with these several officers to ^ be exercised by each severally, independent of the other within the territory over which the law requires him to perform his duty. The register of Wash- ington has to select from the white male citizens of Washington, tax-payers, such persons as he may think in his judgment best qualified. Your honor will ob- serve that the law does not say that he shall select all that are qualified. It does not say what proportion of those that are qualified he shall select. It does not say how many shall constitute his list, but it provides that he shall make a list of those he deems best qualified ; and in the execution of the duty imposed by this law he is required to leave out some, because he cannot select those who are best qualified, without leaving out those who are more indifferently quali- fied. So with the clerk of Georgetown — so with the clerk of the levy court. In this first section, then, there is no pretence, there is no ground to maintain that the duty imposed upon these officers is to be performed by them conjointly. The second section provides "that the officers aforesaid shall select from the list of theregisterofWashingtonthenamesof four hundred persons ; fi'onithatofthe clerk of Georgetown eighty persons, and from that of the clerk of the levy court forty persons, which proportion after the year 1863 may be varied from year to year," &c. My learned brethren, while they will concede, and must concede the posi- tion advanced in regard to the meaning of the first section, contend that the second section, however, imposed the duty of selecting from the list prepared in obedience to the first section upon the three officers conjointly. They admit, and must admit, that each officer must prepare his own list, but they say that after the list is so prepared by each officer severally, the three are to meet together and conjointly select the number required, from the list so prepared. I submit to your honor that the same construction which applies to the first section must also apply to the second ; that the clear and distinct language of the first, aids in relieving the apparent obscurity of the second, and the several duty designated to be performed by these officers severally in the first section, re- mains a several duty to be performed by them severally under the second section. Each officer has to select from the list he prepares the number of names he is re- quired to have drawn from each list, and I submit to your honor, that the other officers — the clerks of Georgetown and of the levy court — have nothing to do with the selection to be made from the list prepared by the register of Washington. The law has selected three officers of three distinct corporations ; the corporations of Washington, Georgetown, and the county are distinct. The law has selected these three officers, and these three distinct corporations, to perform certain duties within their corporate limits, and relating to the cor- porators. It has imposed the duty upon these officers because they are pre-, sumed to know better than anybody else of the qualifications and character of the corporators among whom they live, and it would be a most remarkable 20 TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURRATT. thing if the law should require an officer of the corporation of Washington to enter into the corporation of Georgetown and perform a duty of this character in regard to the corporators of Georgetown. It would he a remarkable thing if the laAV should require an officer of the corporation of Washington, about whom and about whose official position there is nothing to justify the presumption that he is acquainted with the qualifications and character of the citizens of the county, to go into the county and make from among its citizens a selection of a portion of them who are to perform the high and responsible duties of jurors ; but it would be in perfect accordance with reason, common sense, justice, and law, to require the clerk of the levy court of Washington county, who lives in the county, is familiar with the corporators of the county, to select from among those corporators, the persons who are to perform this delicate office, and it is to be presumed from the relation in which these officers stand, that one can in no way aid or assist the other. The reason why they are brought together is, that in the particular of the jury, the jury is to constitue the jury for the three cor- porations, but in order that it should be wisely and judiciously selected, it is to be selected by the men best competent to make it, most likely to be familiar with the people among whom the selection is required to be made — by the officer of that particular corporation. But, your honor, it is not necessary that in this case I should take this ex- treme position in the construction of the law. My second position is, that the three officers, if the construction of my learned brethren be correct, did con- jointly perform the duty of selecting from these lists. On yesterday, when it became apparent from the statement of Mr. Douglass, made in addition to his affidavit, that that affidavit was not entirely accurate, and*that when the jnror names were deposited in the jury box, all three of these officers were present, I objected to the further inquiry as to what particular judgment was exercised by the one or the other in the selection of the names so deposited. My learned brethren on the other side suggested to me that the argument or view I then ex- pressed was applicable to the main question, and should be expressed as an argument upon the main question, and not upon the question of evidence. What- ever might be the view of this statute when that fact was developed, it struck me instantly that my learned brethren on the other side would see at once there was no ground upon which to rest their motion. 1 supposed, although I had never examined the question at all, that when Mr. Douglass stated these three officers were present at the time, my learned brethren on the other side had been misinformed by the affidavit which they had, and that when the fact was de- veloped that all these officers were present acting together in depositing names in the jury box, it was information that would satisfy them that there was no ground for their motion. My reason for so supposing was this familiar principle, that where three individuals are required by law to perform a qt/asi judicial duty, or a discretionary duty, and the duty is performed, you cannot go back beyond the performance of the duty to inquire how far it was performed by each of the three. Your inquiry is stopped the very instant the fiict is developed that the three were present and participated in the duty imposed upon them. How far it appears of what share he had, how far the judgment of one guided the other, and what passed in consultatiim, are not matters of inquiry by your honor. This board, if board you call it, have rights as well as courts. They are entitled to legal presumption as well as the court, and it is the first time in my professional experience, that I have ever seen the attempt made to inquire how far one of the several parties aided in the perfonnance of the duty that was imposed upon them conjointly when it was shown that all were present. The statement of the question is so plain that argument would only tend to obscure. ' I suggest to your honor, as a third consideration, that we are not now inquiring whether these parties (these officers of the law) performed their duty strictly in accordance with requirements of the law, but we are inquiring how far failure TRIAL OP JOHN H. SURRATT. 21 to comply with these requirements vitiates what was done — two very distinct questions ; and I maintain that even if this officer failed to comply in every par- ticular with the strict requirements of the law, and yet the duty was performed, that while they may be liable for a failure to (jbey and observe the law, the act they have done is a valid and binding act. The statute nowhere declares that the p.anel shall be void. The statute nowhere declares that their action shall be nugatory. It directs certain things to be done, and is Avhat is known to the law as a directory statute. As your honor is aware, the courts have gone to a great extent in construing these directory requirements of the law, with a view to uphold what may have been done under the law. I refer the court to Sedg- wick on Statutory Law, from page 37 i to page 377, for a very full collection of cases bearing upon this point. 1 cannot gather from the case decided any fixed general principle, sufficiently clear and distinct, and state to your honor without reference to special cases, other than this, that whenever the court can construe the law as directory, whenever they can uphold the validity of what is done under the law, although not done in conformity to the law, it will construe the statute to be directory. And it has upheld the validity of what has been done, even while punishing the officer for a failure to comply with the mandates of the law. I read from page 377. " By a paving act, commissioners were empowered to enter into contracts for the work, provided that no contract should be made for any longer term than three years ; and the act then went on to declare that ten days' notice of proposals should be given ; that the contracts should specify the work, the price, and the time of completion, and should be signed by at least three of the commissioners, and that copies should be kept. It was held that the proviso as to the term of the contract was imperative, but that all the other clauses Avere merely direc- tory, (Tindal, C. J., saying: "The act says that the contract shall be signed by the commissioners, &c. ; it does not say that they shall be void unless so signed,") and that a contract was good without them. Here it is obvious that provisions inserted by the legislature for the protection of tax-payers, were nul- lified by a judicial decision. * * * 5|c s|c Jj; " In Massachusetts, where a statute required the assessors to assess a tax within thirty days after the vote of the tax being certified to them, it was held that the naming the time for the assessment was to be considered as directory to the as sessors, and not as a limitation of their authority. So in New York, where a school-tax was voted at a meeting of which no notice was given as required by statute, and afterwards levied, the act was held to be directory merely, and the tax to be well laid. A statute requiring a tax to be assessed, and the tax-list therefore to be made out by the trustees, and a proper warrant attached thereto within thirty days after the district meeting in Avhich the tax shall have been voted, is merely directory as to time. * * * * 5fC # " Indeed, the rule has been carried so far as to hold where a statute directed the vote of the common council of the city of New York to be taken by ayes and nays, that the provision is merely directory. And, again, it has been de- cided that the provision of a statute requiring inspectors of corporate elections to take an oath is only directory. The rule has also been applied to popular elections ; an election has been held valid, though the inspectors were sworn not ou the Bible but on some other book, though the}-^ kept open the polls after the time fixed by law, and committed other minor irregularities." This, then, will show to your honor the disposition of the courts to uphold the validity of what may have been done by an officer even where he has not strictly complied with the requirements of the law. The requirements of every law are mandatory and should be obeyed, and he who disregards them must disregard them at his peril. But where the law itself does not declare that to be void which 22 TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURE ATT. he is required to do, and lias not done, in strict accordance with the requirements of the statute, and the doing of the tiling afifects other parties and the puhlic interests. The law will uphold the act as valid, but may punish the officer as derelict in his duty. The general principle thnt statutory provisions may, in certain cases, he treated as purely directory has been recognized in all the States." In regard to capital trials for murder in Michigan, a statute, requiring a circuit judge to assign a day for the trial, has been held clearly directory so far as time is concerned." In this case the statute imperatively required that a day should be assigned for the trial of the capital cases ; the statute was made in favor of the prisoner, in favor of life, and yet the courts uphold the action of one of its officers acting thus in a manifest disregard of this charitable and mandatory requirement of the law. But I do not deem it necessary, as I stated in regard to the first position, to maintain the third to the extent to which I have carried it. The second, as I have indicated to the court, is conclusive upon this subject. These men were present doing the act, and you cannot inquire into what part was done by one and Avhat part by another. It is their act. The list of jurors Avas placed in the box by them, and the certfiicate is signed by thi'ee men. They have therefore ratified by their OAvn signature what was done; they have, by their subsequent act, declared that this box was made up according to law. Now I ask my learned brethren upon the other side to answer me this question : Suppose thi'ee men were to meet together in conclave — suppose the clerk of Georgetown and of the levy coiirt had said to Mr. Douglass, take your list and make out from your list these men from Washington that ought to go in this box, and he had done it, and conjointly Avith the others deposited the names in the box, would your honor come into court and say these men had not performed the duties charged upon them as quasi oi&cial duties? Unquestionably not. But, say my brethren upon the other side, he made out no list. He did make a list, call it by Avhat name you please. He made out four hundred names of those he regarded as best qualified in the city of Washington ; he was not required to make any more. The number of individuals who should be upon that list or who should compose it Avere matters exclusively within his oavu discretion, and when he made out four hundred names it was an exercise of his discretion in the selection of men best qualified to serve as jurors. But I am consuming time unnecessarily, for the case is definitely settled by the judges of England in their unanimous opinion in the famous case of Daniel O'Connell. I refer to 11 Clark and Finnelly, page 167. Daniel O'Connell being indicted of high crimes and misdemeanors, applied his challenge to the array of jurors, and your honor will perceive that the refusal to grant him the ben- efit of the challenge to this array was a A'ery hard and possibly a very harsh one. The challenge of the defendant, Daniel O'Connell, was as follows . " And the said Daniel O'Connell thereupon, in his own proper person, challenges the array of the said panel, because, he says, that at the special sessions heretofore holden in and for the county of the city of Dublin on the 14th of November, 1S43, before the right honorable Frederick ShaAV, recorder of the said city, for the purpose of examining the list of jurors for the said city for the now current year 1844, pursuant to the statutable enactments in such case made and pro- A-ided, the clerks of the peace in and for the said city duly laid before the re- corder divers, to wit : Twenty lists theretofore duly furnished to the clerks of the peace by the scA-eral collectors of grand jury cess within the city, in that be- half duly authorized to make such lists, containing or purporting to contain a true list of every man residing Avithin their respectiA-e districts." Now, your honor, the law under Avhich this challenge was interposed, and ac- cording to the requirements by which it was expected to be made aA'ailable, pro- vided the clerks of the peace for the city of Dublin should lay before the re- TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURRATT. 23 corder certain lists whicli were to be furuislied to the clerks of tlie peace by the several collectors of the grand jury cess. The lists were to be made by the col- lectors of persons qualified to act as jurors. The collectors having made out the list were to furnish them to the clerks of the peace, the clerks of the peace were to furnish them to the recoi'der, the recorder was to certify to the qualification, and from these lists the jury book was to be made out, and from the juiy book the sheriff was to collect the panel. This was the law. Now the challenge set forth what I have read to your honor, and goes on to say : "And that the said several lists respectively were at the special sessions duly corrected, allowed, and signed by the said recorder, pursuant, &c. ; and that the several persons whose names are hereinafter mentioned were then and there adjudged by the recorder to have the qualifications hereinafter named, and that the names of the several persons were then and there contained in the said seve- ral lists so corrected, allowed, and signed as aforesaid." Your honor will observe you have now got your list from the collectors of the grand jury cess to the clerks of the peace, from the clerks of the peace to the recorder, and your lists are certified and approved by the recorder. He goes on : "But that the recorder did not, as by the said statutable enactments is directed, cause to be made out from the said several last-mentioned lists one general list containing the names of all persons whose qualifications had been so allowed, arranged according to rank and property ; nor did the recorder thereupon, or at all, deliver such general list containing such names to the clei'ks of the peace, to be fairly copied by the said clerks of the peace in the same order as by the said statutable enactments is directed, but on the contrary thereof omitted so to do ; and that a certain paper writing, purporting to be a general list, purporting to be made out from such several lists so corrected, allowed, and signed as afore- said, was illegally and fraudulently made out by some person or persons un- known ; and that the said paper writing, purporting to be such general list as aforesaid, did not contain the names of all the persons whose qualifications had been allowed upon the correcting, allowing, and signing of said lists as aforesaid by the recorder, but omitted the names of divers, to wit, fifty-nine persons." Following your list then from the collector of the grand jury cess and clerks of the peace to the recorder, and the recorder having, as your honor ob- serves, approved and ratified these lists, it then appears that the recorder failed to make out a general list and make a copy of the list which he had approved, but that some unknown party made out a list omitting fifty-nine names that were upon the lists approved by the recorder, and that this had been done fraudulently and illegally. "And the said Daniel O'Connell further says that the several persons whose names were so omitted from the fraudulent paper writing, purporting to be the general list, were, at the time of the return of the collectors' lists, and at the time of the special sessions, and still are severally residents within the said city, and were at the several times, aud now are, duly qualified to be, and should and ought to have bc-en placed upon the general list ; and that from the fraudu- lent paper writing purporting to be such general list as aforesaid, a certain book, purporting to be the jurors' book of the said city for the current calendar year, 1844, was made up and framed." Your honor will see that the jury book was formed from this fraudulent list, and that on that ground the challenge was interposed. The demui'rer was filed conceding all the facts — conceding that the lists made out had not been made up by the recorder, that it had been made up by some person unknown, that it h:ul been fraudulently made up for this case, and that from the very list thus fraudulently made up the jurors' list had been taken, and the jury had been summoned by the sheriff. The court below sustained the demurrer. The case went up to the House of Lords, aud the lords called upon the judges of England for their counsel. The 24 TRIAL OF JOHN H. SUREA.TT. judges of England were unanimous in favor of the demurrer, and the lords co-operated with them. The opinion held by Chief Justice D. Tindal. giving the unanimous judgment on the part of the judges will afford to your honor an easy and clear solution of the difficulty presented to you here, while the lord chancellor in giving his opinion coincides with Chief Justice Tindal, and eluci- dates the subject, as I think your honor will say, to your entire satisfaction. I beg leave to read from a portion of Chief Justice Tindal's opinion. On page S32 your honor will find the question propounded by the lords and the judges. The question is this : "Is there any sufficient ground for reversing the judgment on account of the judgments of the court overruling and disallowing the challenges to the array, or any or either of them, or of the matters stated in such challenges?" On page 247 Chief Justice Tindal in his opinion says : " The answer to the sixth question (ante, p. 232) Avill depend upon the princi- ple upon which the law allows a challenge to the array of a jury. The only ground upon which the clialleuge to the array is allowed by the English law, is the unindifferency or defeult of the sheriff. But no want of indifferency in the sheriff, nor any defoult in him or his officers was assigned for the cause of chal- lenge upon this occasion. "The array of the panel is challenged in this case upon the ground that the general list from which the jurors' book is made up, had not been completed in every respect in conformity with the requisites of the statutes, but that, on the contrary, the names of fifty-nine persons duly qualified to serve on the jury for the county of the city of Dublin, were omitted from the general list, and from the special jurors' book of the said county, but the challenge contains no accusation against the sheriff, or any of his subordinate officers. The challenge by each of the defendants alleges in deed, " that a list, purporting to be a gen- eral list, was illegally and fraudulently made out, by some person or per- sons unknown ;" and the challenge by Mr. Steele states further, " that the names were left out for the purpose and with the intent of prejudicing the said Thomas Steele in this cause, by some person or persons unknown;" but neither in the one case nor in the other is the most distant suggestion that the sheriff is in fault. The sheriff therefore being neither unindifferent nor in default, the principle upon which the challenge to the array is given by law, does not apply to the present case. The statute has, in fact, taken from the sheriff that duty of selecting jurymen which the ancient law imposed upon him, and has substi- tuted instead a new machinery in the hands of certain officers, by whom the list is to be prepared for the sheriff's use." I beg here in this connection to call your honor's attention to one particular feature of this opinion of the learned judge, reasoning upon the doctrine that the only cause of challenge is unindifferency or default on the part of the sheriff. My learned brother on the other side will see that the sheriff has nothing to do with the selection of the jurymen. The statute having taken from the sheriff that duty anciently imposed upon him, and placed it in the hands of other offi- cers by whom the list is to be prepared for the sheriff's use; and yet, although it appeared that the list prepared by these officers was substituted for another improperly and fraudulently ; still the challenge was not allowed, because the only ground of challenge must be unindifferency or default on the part of the sheriff. Here we have a similar substitute of machinery, the statute having taken from the marshal the selection of the jury and placed it in the custody of other officers in a manner very much analogous to the law of England. There the assessors were to furnish the list to the clerks of the peace, the clerks of the peace to the recorder, the recorder to make out a clear list the jury book, and a copy of that list to be placed in the hands of the sheriff. Here the clerk of Georgetown, of the levy court, and the register of Wash- ington are to prepare certain names and put them in a box, which box is to be TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURRATT. 25 placed in charge of the clerk of the supreme court to be sealed up. From that box the jurors are to be drawn, and return is to be certified by the clerk of the crim- inal court. The sheriff has nothing to do with all this. There tlie challenge is made because the jury book was not prepared in conformity to law ; here be- cause the jury box was not prepared as alleged in strict conformity to the law. The two stand precisely alike so far as the preparation of the juiy book there and the jury box here is concerned. The chief justice goes on : " If the sheriff, when the jurors' book was furnished to him, had acted im- properly in selecting the names of the jury from the book, such misconduct would have been a good cause of challenge to the array ; but that which is really complained of is, that the material of the book out of which the jury is selected by the sheriff", and for which the sheriff" is not responsible, has been im- properly composed. It is not, therefore, a ground of challenge to the array ; and further, it is manifest that no object or advantage could have been gained if the challenge had been allowed, for if the challenge had been allowed, the jury process would have been directed to some other officer, who would have been obliged to choose bis jury out of the very same special jurors' book as that which the sheriff had acted on, for no other was in existence. The same objection might again be made to the jury panel secondly returned, and so totics quoties, so that the granting of this challenge would, in effect, amount to the preventing the case from being brought to trial at all. The very same difficulty might occur in England, if, throiigh accident, carelessness, or design, a single juiy list, directed to be returned by the overseers of any parish within the county, were not handed over to the clerk of the peace, or if a single name should have been omitted in any list actually delivered to the clerk of the peace. The jury book must necessarily in either case be deficiently made up. But if deficiency were allowed to be a ground of challenge to the array, the business of every assize in the kingdom might effectually be stopped. That there must be some mode of relief for an injury occasioned by such non-observance of the directions of an act of Pai'liament, is undeniable ; but the only question before us is, Avhether it is the ground of challenge to the array ? and we all agree in thinking it is not, and therefore we answer this question in the negative." I will not detain the court by reading from the opinion of the learned lord chancellor, for he pursues the same course of reasoning as that pursued by Chief Justice Tindal, and coincides in the opinion I have read. He says : " If the sheriff is unindiflferent, to use the legal expression, if he is not equal between the parties, that is a ground of challenge to the array. If he is guilty of any default in returning the jury, that also is a ground for this species of challenge. Those are the only grounds of challenge to the array. They are of a personal nature, and are confined to the sheriff" or other officer, whoever he may be, by whom the jury is returned." I do not mean to say there is anything peculiar in the character of the sher- iff that makes him specially liable in the particular mentioned in this opinion, but it is the officer who makes return that must be guilty of unindifferency or default ; but the opinion goes to the extent that a challenge of the array is only proper where there is a default of the officer Avho makes the return of the par- ticular jury, and not of the officer who selects the particular jury. There ought to be, and there is a remedy where the jury book or the jury box lias not been properly prepared, but it is not a remedy by challenging the array. That remedy applies only where the officer making the return of the particular petit jury has been guilty in selecting that particular jury. I respectfully submit, therefore, that if this case in England is law, there is no difficult question before this court. And if it is not, there is no difficult question, because, as I have said, those men were present in the discharge of their duty. And I further state, that if cognizant of the fact that there is a defect in thi^ 26 TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURRATT. jury (if there be a defect) and we go to trial, we thereby waive any advantage that we might otherwise be entitled to in consequence of that defect. The learned counsel on the other side, yesterday seemed to suppose it was not competent for us to waive that advantage. I find the rule to be that wherever a jury or juror is liable to challenge and a verdict is found, even in a capital case, the party cannot take advantage of any defect in the jury unless he was ignorant of th-. defect before he went to trial, and unless it so appears upon record. It is necessary that he should make affidavit to the fact that a knowledge of the incapacity of the juror came to him after the trial. If he had that knowledge before the trial, he will not be permitted to allege it in support of a motion for a new trial. I may be allowed to suggest also to your honor, that this motion is not founded upon any alleged incapacity of the jurors themselves ; it is simply upon the warrant on which they were selected. It is possible — it is unquestionably true, that if it were founded upon any incapacity of the individual jurors — if it were founded upon the absence of any of the legal qualifications prescribed for jurors, the motion might be entertained by the court. But it is not because of any legal disqualification of any of the jurors composing the panel, but simply because they have not been brought here in the way the gentlemen think they ought to have been brought. I hope the. United States is looking for the attainment of justice in this case ; I trust nothing may be developed in this case looking towards anything else. I trust the government will tread the high and honorable path which leads to the attainment of simple, and I may add, speedy justice. And entertaining this hope, I suggest to your honor, whether it is probable a jury against whose qualification nothing is alleged, who were summoned without regard to this case, and before it was anticipated it might be tried, are not better fitted to do justice than another summoned in anticipation of the case — a case not of an ordinary private nature, but one of great public interest, in which, while the United States as a government, I trust will tread in the highways I have spoken of, there are individuals occupying offices in that government who may be disposed to tread lower paths, through which we will have to follow. May it please your honor, I shall say no more upon this motion than to add that after the most careful examination I have been able to give to it, the honest conelusiou to Avhich I have come is, that the ground, probably, upon which the motion rests, is to be found in the act of 1853, page 160, 10 Statutes at Large, which act provides that where a criminal case is on trial in this court, and a jury has been impanelled, and another term begins during the progress of the trial, the cause shall continue ; but leaves it exceedingly questionable whether, unless the jury is fully impanelled before the end of the term, the cause can be tried. That other term begins on IMonday next, and unless a jury in this case is impanelled before Saturday night it is questionable whether this case will be tried for many days or many years. Mr. PiERREPONT. May it please your honor ; when learned and eminent counsel arise in a solemn manner to address the court, I always suppose them to be sincere. 1 have no doubt that the learned and eminent gentleman who has just taken his seat is not only sincere, but earnest in the extreme, in his desire to prevent the success of this motion. The logic of that sincerity will be apparent when I quote the beginning of his s'peech. He says : " If this motion prevail, then the grand jury which found this indictment was illegal, and it puts my client at large." Now, I suppose, my learned friend came here to put his client at large. Mr. Merrick. By the verdict of a jury. Mr. PiERREPONT. If not, Avhy is he here? I conceive that he is not here for any other purose than to put his client at large. If the motion that we have made, he says, prevail, his client is at large ; and yet he talks an earnest hour to your hon- or in order to have you deny this motion, and thus prevent his client being at large. TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURRATT. 27 Let us see what all tins means. It is a very cxtraordino.iy spectacle, truly, to have a lawyer, earnest in the defence of his client, rising and telling your honor, that if the very thing we ask is done his client is free ; and yet exerting himself with an earnestness and an ingenuity which is commendable, to prevent his client from gaining his liberty. It is something new in the administration of justice. I fimcy, your honor, that I have a right to infer either that he is not sincere in believing that the success of this motion would set his client at large, or else he will have to meet this extraordinary result, that he does not wish to have his client at large. Mr. Merrick. Will the learned counsel allow me a moment ? I merely wish to say in reply to the first suggestion, M-liich he is now eliminating, that I desire my client to be set at large by the verdict of a jury. IMy judgment is that if this motion prevail, this indictment ftxUs ; but the blood-hounds of the law may still track him for another indictment. I desire him to go forth from this court- room free from accusation and protected for the future. Mr. PlEKRBPONT. Well, then, your honor, the reason is that he wants him tried by a jury, and that is exactly what we want. I called your honor's at- tention yesterday to die section of the statute now before me, that whenever there is a failure from any cause with regard to a jury, the marshal shall summon good and lawful men under this law to exercise that high function ; and we yesterday proposed, in order that no delay might be had, that the marshal should proceed to summon a jury, and if they choose to say so, we will without another word say, let the marshal proceed, under your honor's direction, to subpoena a jury and biing them into this court to try this case. They will discover before we progress much further, that the United States are as zealous, as earn- est, and as eager, to try this cause as the other side; and they will discover before it is through that the public mind will be set right with regard to a great many subjects about which there have been such active, numerous, and un- founded reports. Since I have been here in this city for these past few days, has it been circulated in nearly all the journals of this country, that the United States dared not bring forward the diary found upon the murderer of the Presi- dent, because that diary would prove things they did not want to have known. All these things will be proved to be false, and all the papers, about the sup- pression of which so much has been said, will be exhibited here on the trial of this case. We are anxious that it should be proceeded with at once. It has likewise been circulated through all the public jom-ujils, that after the former convictions, when an effort was made to go to the President for pardon, men active here at the seat of government prevented any attempt being made, or the President being even reached for the purpose of seeing whether he would not exercise clemency; whereas, the truth, and the truth of record which will be presented in this court, is that all this matter was brought before the Presi- dent and presented to a full Cabinet meeting where it was thoroughly discussed ; and after such discussion, condemnation and execution received not only the sanction of the President but that of every member of his Cabinet. This and a thousand .)tlier of these ffilse stories will be all set at rest forever in the pro- gress of this trial ; and the gentlemen may feel assured that not only are we ready but that we are desirous of proceeding at once with the case. If your honor please, it is inconceivable to the human mind that mortal man can be placed in a more solemn position than in coming before a court and a jury where a fellow mm is to be tried for his life for tlie murder of another. More than ordinarily solemn is this great occasion. On the 14th of April, 1865, a crime was committed that shocked the whole civilized world ; a crime against human b'fe ; a crime against the laws ; and a crime against our beloved govern- ment. Men have suffered death for that crime, and one, who is now the prisoner at the bar, by the grand jury of your District, has been found to have been en- gaged in that great crime. He is here to be tried. We hope he will be tried 28 TRIAL OF JOHN H SURRATT. and in a way that is decent and becoming, with all the solemnities and with all the forms of law; that he will be tried justly and ftiirly ; and we desire that the jury who shall sit to try him shall be a jury brought here, accorling to all the forms of law, so that when they shall render their verdict, whether that verdict be acquittal or condemnation, this whole country and the entire civilized world, who will read that verdict will know and feel that the man has b(!en tried fairly, that he has been tried justly, that he has been tried by a judge of high moral character and great legal learning, that he has been defended by able counsel, and that the verdict, for him or against him, has been pronounced by honest jurors who are brought here in all respects according to the law. This motion is made for the purpose that when this trial shall take place, it shall be in such a way that all men everywhere shall see it has been such a trial as the occasion requires, that it shall not be a mockery and a sham, and that the prisoner shall not be tried by jurors who are not legal triers, but by jurors that are brought here under the laws of the United States, fit and proper men to try this case as the law directs. My learned friend while making the assertion to your honor that the preva- lence of our motion would set his client at large, at the same time urges your honor to deny this motion, and says that we cannot look into the acts of this jury, nor into the statutes which direct how a jury shall be empanelled or how they shall be selected, and cites a case from England, which I shall presently call to your attention, in relation to the sheriff of England. Permit me to say that in looking at your laws, I discover that the sheriff has no more to do with this jury than the clerk of the Senate of the United States. Neither the sheriff, nor the marshal occupying the place of sheriff, has any responsible duty in re- lation to the empanelling of this jury. Now I call your attention to the law, and I submit to your honor that when a man is to be tried for his life, if the verdict is to be of any validity, he must be tried according to the law. In this country and in England from which we derive our notions of liberty, ever has the law been jealous of human life, and so jealous that I believe it to be a well- settled principle of law that no stipulation of counsel and no stipulation of the prisoner ever could allow him to be tried by twelve men and convicted and ex- ecuted upon such a verdict. The law of public policy is that the man who is to be tried for his life shall be tried in all respects according to law ; that the judge who tries him shall sit according to the law ; and that the Avitnesses shall be sworn and testify according to the rules of law ; and the jurors who are to bring in their judgment upon such a man are to be selected in the way that the law directs ; and if selected otherwise the verdict is good for nothing. Let us see what the statute says about it — the statute under which these jurors have any power whatever to try this prisoner. Save for this statute these jurors have no more right to sit in judgment than jurors from the city of New York or from the city of London. What does the statute say ? Let me read it : " Be it enacted hy the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in (hngress assembled, That it shall be the duty of the regis- ter of Washington city and of the respective clerks of the city of Georgetown and the levy court of Washington county, in the District of Columbia, within one month after the passage of this act, and on or before the first day of February in each year thereafter, to make a list of such of the white male citizens, tax- payers, residing within their respective jurisdictions, as they shall judge best qualified to serve as jurors in the courts of the said District." Now what is required by this law in the very first section ? That the jurors shall be white male citizens, tax- payers, of this District, otherwise they cannot be jurors. Now let me ask my learned friend if he had come into this court and discovered that every juryman sitting in these seats was a negro, and he had made the motion we have now made, and I had risen and said to him, " You cannot set aside this panel because you have heard the evi- TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURE ATT. 29 dence bore of these men who selected it, and you cannot go behind wliat the}'- say about it." What would my learned friend say to the argument ? Suppose I took his own ingenious and excellent argument and turned it against himself, what would he say to it? Would he think it a good argument if every man who sat there was a negro? Would he not turn me to this statute and say " of the white male citizens," and then turn to your honor and say, "Arc these white male citizens, every man of whom is a woolly-headed African ? [Laughter.] He cannot meet that suggestion ; and the case is precisely parallel to the one at bar. Mr. jMerrick. If my learned friend will allow me to ask him a question Mr. PiERREPONT. Any. Mr. Mkrrick. Does the learned gentleman include in his motion challenging this array any objection to the personal qualification of these jurors 1 Mr. Pierrepont. I most assuredly do. Mr. jMerrick. I was not aware of it. Mr. PlERREPOiNT. They are just as much disqualified as though they were negroes. The statute says they shall be "white;" and the statute says they shjill be "tax-payers;" and the statute says they shall reside within this Dis- trict. We find they are not a jury of tax-payers, and they are not a jury of negroes; but they might just as well have been tax-payers and negroes, for on inquiry of my learned friend, the district attorney, I am informed that you have in your District negroes who are tax-payers. If these, then, had been tax-paying negroes, they would have been just as well qualified as white non-tax-payers, and there is no getting rid of it. Let us see what further the statute says on this subject. I am only in the beginning of it. Those are the men that the law says are to be selected as jurors. I repeat, let us see what further it says. And they may put in " the names of such qualified persons as were on the list the previous year, but who did not serve as jurors ; and the lists thus made of the register and clerks afore- said shall be kept by them respectively and be delivered to their successors in office." These three men shall make their lists of tax-payers who are white in these three districts. What shall they do Avhen they get together ? The officers aforesaid shall select from the list of the register of Washington city the names of four hundred pci-sons. That is what these three men are to do. This board, as my learned adversary calls it, and very justly, are to select first from the list of the n gister of the city of Washington four hundred names. Let us start there. Did they select from the register's list of the city of W^ashington four hundred names ? He tells you that they never selected one name, and that he never had there a list, first or last. When I asked him on the cross-exam- ination here yesterday, after they had brought him here, " Did the others even see the rolls of the names that you put into the box?" He said "No." " Did you see any that they put in?" He said "No." And you will find it so appears on the record. What was the object of this law ? The register of the city of Washington was to bi-ing the list of tax-payers whom he deemed qualified. The clerk of the levy court was to bring his list of tax-payers M'hom he judged to be quali- fied. The clerk of Georgetown was to bring his list of tax-jmyers Avhom he thought to be qualified. And this board, thus together, was to select first from the register's list of the city of Washington the names of four hundred persons, from that of the clerk of Georgetown eighty, and from that of the clerk of the levy court forty. Did these three men select from the list of the register of Washington four hundred ? They never selected a man, and that evidence is perfect and complete. Did the three select from the list of the clerk of George- town eighty persons ? Not a man. Did this board select from the list of the clerk of the levy court forty ? Not one. Now, there was some reason for this law, was there n(;t ? The object of it was to have a fair jury. This statute was passed by the Congress of the United States for the govern- 30 TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURRATT. ment of this District, in Avhicli it was known when the statute was passed that there were persons of a variety of views in relation to the great public questions. It was known that in this city there were a great many men who did not sympathize with the government. There were others who were its bitter enemies. There were others who were zealously in its favor. There were the strongest abolitionists on the one hand, and on the other those who believed in and favored slavery. Every grade and class of political opinion and of moral view and religious notion existed in this city when this statute was passed, as it does today, and Congress was anxious that jurors should be so selected that Avhen men came to be tried in this District they should feel that they were to have a jury without prejudice, and a jury in the selection of which more than one man had been engaged. That they could have a jury, after the list had been prepared, of the kind of men that the statute required, the strict provisions of which I have just read. Now, I appeal to your honor if, under the evidence before the court on the demurrer which admits it, one single requisite has been complied with. I ask your honor, suppose that these men had selected any sort of men they had pleased, men who were not residents, and, as I before said, men who were negroes, Avould that have been a good jury ? Suppose the clerk of the Senate and the chairman of the Judiciary Committee had met together to select jurors and put their names in the box, and then afterwards the clerk had drawn them out, would that have been a good selection of the jury ? It would have been just as good as this. It would have been just as strict a com- pliance with the law as this is. "Why have any law about it ? Why not say, " Let the register and these men go and do as they please about it." The law was made surely for something. Let us see what further provisions they made to guard against any fraud or any partiality in relation to the selection of a jury. " The names selected from said lists shall be written on separate and similar pieces of paper, which shall be so folded or rolled up that the names cannot be seen, and placed in a box." Were the names written on these pieces of paper taken from those lists ? Not a name selected by this board was taken from these lists ; but these three dif- ferent persons selected, and neither ever let the other know, as the evidence shows, what he had selected. Not a man knew any except such as were his own ; and the register of this city did not even know his own, for his own clerk, as he says himself, rolled up the names and put them in. "And they shall be placed in the box to be provided by the register and the clerks aforesaid, which box shall be sealed, and after being thoroughly shaken shall be delivered to the clerk of the circuit court of Washington county for safe keeping." Let us see whether that part of the law, under this evidence, was complied with. The box was not sealed, as the evidence shows. It was not sealed or delivered to the clerk. That is a very important provision. If the box was delivered to the clerk unsealed, why, your honor knows, there might be a clerk dishonest — I do not wish to be understood as making any such suggestion here, on the contrary, very far from it — but there might be a clerk or a deputy clerk, or some one connected with the office, who might see fit to stuflP that box with other names for other motives ; and, therefore, to provide against this, it is enacted that this box, by these men who compose this board, shall be sealed and thoroughly shaken, and after it is thus sealed and thoroughly shaken it shall be delivered to the clerk of the circuit court. The evidence is that when this box was de- livered to the clerk of the circuit court it was unsealed. Can it be said and urged to your honor that these men, intrusted with the performance of this high duty, can properly disregard every one of these requirements ? I submit to your honor, and will prove by this evidence before I am through, that from the first step they took to the last they did so disregard them. Not one single act did they do that was not in violation of the statute. Nexti " that the said register and clerks and the clerk of the circuit court TRIAL OF JOHX H. SURRATT. 31 shall, at least ten days before the commencement of each term of the circuit or of the criminal court, meet at the City Hall of Washington city, and then and there the clerk of the circuit court shall publicly break the seal of said box, and proceed to draw therefrom the names of so many persons as are required." There is another requisition: That these men, that this board of three, should thus select the jurors and put their names in a box, seal it up and deliver it to the clerk, shaken and sealed; and a very important jirovision it is, as your honor will see. ISuppose, for any bad motive — no such motive do I attribute in this case, but make the supposition simply as an illustration of the point of law that I wish to bring- to the attention of the court — suppose, from any motive of par- tiality or interest, one of these gentlemen forming the board saw ht, in drawing from the box, to draw names which were in his hand instead of the names in the box. The law provides that he shall not have that opportunity ; that he shall not draw them, but that the clerk of this court shall draw the names. Now, what is the evidence ? It is that one of this board, the clerk of Georgetown, drew the names, and not the clerk of this court. The clerk of Georgetown had no more right to draw these names than my learned friend, the district attorney; and drawing them, he was doing that which made it an illegal draft of this jury, directly contrary to the law. Law is not supposed to be made in folly, or in nonsense. Congress makes this solemn provision that these names shall be drawn by the clerk, who is not one of the board, but a totally different man, after the box containing the names shall have been delivered to him, shaken and sealed ; yet one of this board draws the jury. That is the evidence before us, and uncontradicted. Let us Bee what further provisions are made in relation to this matter. It was evidently anticipated by the Congress which passed this law that a contingency might arise in which it might become necessary to set aside the array and order a new panel, and, in order to meet that contingency, they have made provision for it in the section which I will now read; and I will just say that my learned friend, in reading from this case in England, read what the learned judge there said in relation to their law ; that their law did not allow them to go behind the sheriff in relation to the matter, and he gave as one good reason why the sheriff's selection should not be set aside, that there was no other earthly mode prepared in England by which they could proceed to the trial of any case. My learned friend read it from the report, some portions of which I shall have occasion, in a moment or two, to cite to your honor. Mr. Bradley. Will you be kind enough to repeat the remark just made ? I was otherwise engaged at the moment, and did not hear it. Mr. PiKRRRPONT. I say that one of the reasons that the Lord Chief Justice Tindal gave as a good reason for setting aside the selection of jurors in England was, that if that motion were granted, there would be no mode by which they could get a jury to proceed with the trial of causes, Mr. Bradley. Oh, yes; I now understand you. Mr. PiRRREPONT. Now, in our case no such reason can be assigned. The statute does contemplate just such an emergency, and has made a provision for it. It provides, in section five, that " if a jury be required for the circuit court, the twenty-six persons whose names shall first be drawn shall constitute the jury for that term ; and the names of the persons drawn as aforesaid shall not be again placed in such box for a period of two years. If any person whose name is so drawn shrJl have died, or has removed from the District, or has becDmo otherwise disabled from serving as a juror, the said register and clerks shall draw from the box the name of another person who shall serve instead ; and after the requisite number of jurors shall have been so drawn, the said box shall be again sealed and delivered to the clerk of the circuit court, as aforesaid." Immediately following that provision is section 7th, Avhich says that "in case either of the ofiicers whose duty it is to make out the lists aforesaid shall ne- 32 TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURRATT. gleet or refuse to act, or in case either of them shall be interested in any action or proceeding pending in the said circuit or criminal court, the chief judge of the circuit court shall appoint a fit and proper person to discharge the jury instead; and if the persons selected as jurors do not attend, the court may order the marshal to summon other respectable tax payers, possessing the other legal qualifications, to swpply the deficiency ; but if at any time there should not be, by reason of challenge or otherwise, a sufficient number of jurors to make up the panel, the court shall order the marshal to summon as many talesmen as are necessaiy for that purpose." Now, if the persons selected as jurors do not attend, the court may order the marshal to summon other respectable — what? "Other respectable tax-payers, possessing the other legal qualifications, to supply the deficiency." In the first section it states what the legal qualifications are — " to be tax-payers, and to pos- sess the other qualifications." The seventh section provides that, in case of failure from any cause, the court shall direct the marshal to summon as tales- men other respectable tax-payers, possessing the other legal requisites ; and the marshal, under the direction of the court, shall thus prepaie the list of other re- spectable tax-payers, &c. Congress seemed, therefore, determined that in no event should justice fail, and that no such reason could be given by your honor as was given by Chief Justice Tindal, that there could be no other mode of pro- ceeding. The thing is complete ; there is no difficulty whatever in the matter. Con- gress has provided, first, that it shall be done in a particular way; that a par- ticular kind of persons, and those only, shall be the jurors, and that they shall be Selected in a certain manner and drawn in a certain manner ; and then, to avoid the possibility of a failure of justice, they say that, if from challenging or from a7iy other cause, a sufficient number may not be had, the court shall order the marshal to make the selections from the proper persons having the legal qualifications, so that all these questions will lie quite outside of this case, and power in the court is complete. There is no cause or reason for delay ; it may ])e done now and forthwith, and the sooner it is done the better. I take it for granted that my learned friends want it to be done soon. They want to go ou "with the case. We are as anxious as they to go on with it. There is one argument which was made by the gentleman in the early part of his remarks to which I desire to call to the attention of the court, and that is this, that if this jury is an illegal jury, why, then, other men have been convicted here illegally. He urged it with much earnestness, that that was a reason, if you had been going on in an illegal way, why you should continue to do so. I think that, on reflection, my learned friend will not consider that argument sound. If you have been doing illegal or immoral or any other Avrong acts, the time to stop is when you first make the discovery, and not to say, " We wall continue it, because w^e have always done it." Your honor knows when we made some attempt to civilize the Indians, and an Indian chief was reproved for murdering his enemies, and was told that it was unchristian and wrong, he said he had always killed his enemies, and insisted that, therefore, he should still kill them. An immoral woman of the Sandwich islands, too, whom our missionaries attempted to convert to virtue after marriage, urged as a reason for continuing her mode of life, that she had always been so doing as she was then. My learned friend read from page 247, of Clark & Finnelly's Reports. Let us see what that case was. The question came up for this judge to answer; and the answer he gave to the sixth question was — in England they have a statute upon the subject it seems ■ Mr Bkauley. I beg your pardon. * Mr. Pi ERR H PONT. They have a statute in England to which he alludes. I am coming to that in a moment. TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURE ATT. 33 Mr. Mf.uuick. I thouglit you stated that there was a statute iu regard to the grounds uijon which a challenge would he allowed. Mr. I'lHRUKPONT. Oh, no, sir; the statute upon wliich this was based. The answer of the learned juflge was: "the only ground upon which the array is allowed by the Knglish law is the vnintUjf'creiiruf or dtjauit of the s/icrijf. But no want of indifference in the sheriff, nor any default iu iiiin or his officers, was assigned for the cause of the challenge upon this occasion." That was the end of the case. It ought to have been the end of the case. This word " unindifFerency," which I see the learned judge uses here, is cer- tainly a new word to ine — I never saw it before. I suppose, however, it is a good one. 3[r. Mi.hruk It is habitually used in that connection throughout the law. Mr. PlKRRKPttNT. 1 say I suppose it is a good word; but it is not one that I am accustomed to. Uf course, we understand w hat it means. Now, the only ground to the challenge of the array that is allowed by the English law is the "unindifferency or default of the sheriff." That being so, it does not need much comment. Ihconlygroundupon which the law allowed a challenge was not pretended to exist, as the learned judge said. Iht-refore there was no necessity for spending a great deal of time upon a case like that. Of course, that would end the case. It did not need so much learning or argument as the learned judge and the lord chancellor seem lo have given to it ; but from the notoriety of the case, and from the magnitude of the subject involved, which was then made a political affair, they saw fit to give it a great deal of consideration, and gave as reasons why they should not undertake to set aside this panel the ftict that they had no possible way of having justice administered, no other mode of getting a jury. It was not pretended in the challenge, as the judge said, that the legal ground and the only legal ground upon which there could be any complaint pre- dicated existed. Therefore, of course, the motion was denied. And in this case, if there is no ground for it, of course the motion will be denied. If there is ground for it, 1 take it the motion will be granted. In this case, we act under the laws of the United States directly — under a statute. It is a principle of the common law, well known and understood by all lawyers and all men, per- liaps, that it lies in the discretion of the judge to construe the law ; it is not only in his discretion but his duty to see that the law over which he is called to preside is properly administered. Your honor is placed iu your high posi- tion in this court for the purpose of giving construction to this statute ; for the purpose of seeing that the laws of Congress relating to this District and this court over which you preside are executed. This is not an mnneaning statute. The reasons of it are apparent upon its face, and when Congress passed it it was understood that this statute was to be obeyed, and that when a man was to be tried for his life, or when he was to be tried for any felony, or any lesser crime or misdemeanoi-, or for anything else, the jurors who were to try him were to be selected hy law, and that no irregularity, informality, or defect in that se- lection should be passed lightly over by the judge who {)resides. But it is his duty to see that the law is atbninistcred, if it be called to his notice; and if the statute has never before been called to your notice, of course your honor has not passed upon it. As I learn from my associate, the district attorney, and as 1 infer from what the learned counsid on the other side have said, this question has never here arisen before. Of course, therefore, it is no man's fault; it has not been thought of. These men proceeded in their own way. They thought they would take their way to get a jury, instead of the way of the law. They chose to tread in their own path ; to be a law unto themselves ; to say," We will fix up a jury as we please," reckless of the law. It is your honor's duty to see that a jury is selected iu the way that the law directs, and that is all we ask. We are ready now to proceed to trial ; we are desirous that the trial shall be 3 34 TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURRATT. proceeded with, and we ask and urge that this other provision of the statute by which your honor is empowered to dii'ect the marshal to summon a jury for the purpose of trying the cause shall be enforced, and that a jiuy shall be empan- elled, in order that we may be permitted to proceed to trial at the earliest day that such jury can be selected. And we see no reason why it may not be to-morrow as well as any distant day, so that any so-called reason of delay is not a reason; so that any alleged reason of the failure of justice is a false reason. The statute has provided for all these things, and it lies in your honor to enforce it ; and when the facts have been presented before the court; when it is shown that the statute is not complied with, and when it appears that the law has provided that a jury may be selected by your honor's direction in case of previous failure, I, for one, cannot for a moment imagine that your honor will not direct that the law be complied with, or that you will allow subordinates to exercise their own whims or notions, to set aside the solemn statute of the law. This is a case such as your honor has never tried, such as your honor never will again try ; such as has never been before tried in this country, and such, we hope, as never will be tried again. It is the first civil trial for the murder of a President of the United States ; the first civil trial for the great crime of an attempt to destroy the government of the United States; one of that class of crimes which shock the whole world. Many people Avho despaired of the republic have doubts whether you can, before a civil tribunal, obtain a just and honest trial, a fair and impartial verdict in a great case like this. Therefore this case possesses a weight and magnitude such as purely no other case in this country ever had. It is in fact not simply the trial of a man for his life ; it is in a measure a trial whether we can get a jury legally empanelled to try assassins and murderers of the President of the United States, who attempted to throw our country into confusion and anarchy, and who designed all the hor- rors to follow their act which the human mind can conceive. It is to be seen whether such trial can be fair, whether justice can be done. All of us who have read anything of history or who have reflected upon human nature, know that civil society will protect itself. They know, if the civil courts and the verdicts of juries cannot administer justice, that society, as in France and in other coun- tries where the necessity has arisen, will be driven to take refuge in the gloomy despotism of military power. God deliver us from that ! we want to show before our countrymen and before the world, that an honest jury of this District will give an honest verdict ; that we can have a fair trial before an impartial court; and we believe that when the jury thus selected are brought together to try the cause, they will give a verdict with which our countrymen will be satis- fied — and that is all we want. Mr. Bradley. If your honor please, I know no case in which it has been my fortune to be engaged heretofore in which I rose to discuss a question of law with deeper interest than I feel now. The temptation is very great to be led away from the true question submitted to your honor for your decision, and it is ex- ceedingly difiicult to resist following the course which has been pursued upon the other side by discussing, not questions of law, but by presenting considera- tions to the court which should have no influence upon any judicial mind. We are told that a jury is to be empanelled to try the assassm of the Presi- dent. It would have been better to have said him who has been charged with being concerned in that monstrous crime. Mr. PiBRREPONT. Excuse me; I think my learned friend could not have heard all the language I used. I said, as found by the grand jury. Mr. Bradley. That observation escaped my attention. There are, if the court please, other inducements which are hard to resist, that lead me to make some commentaries upon the course pursued by gentlemen on the other side ; but time is too precious, for I desire to have this discussion closed in time to receive the decision of your honor to-day, that if this motion is overruled and the demurrer TRIAL OF JOHN 11. SURRATT. 35 sustained we may at once proceed to impanel a jury, and if it is not and thoi-e is any other movement of delay on the part of the prosecution, that wo may be pre- pared to meet every dilatory process as soon as it arises. We are in earnest, we desire to have this party ti'ied now, we desire to have him tried by a jury omni exceptione. mnjores, against whom not a breath has been uttered by any counsel who has addressed the court since the commencement of these proceed- ings, by a jury empanelled according to the form of law which has prevailed since the passage of the act under which it is empanelled — a jury above challenge for qualification — a jury conceded to have been selected by honest men with honest ])urposes, without reference to this trial — a jury standing, if a jury can stand, impartial in view of such an event as has been referred to — a jury standing impartial between the govcrinneut and the accused. We desii-e that th(! inten- tion of the act of Congress shall be carried out, which Avas to take from the marshal of this District the power to select jurors ; we desire, if possible, to avoid the selection which may be made of talesmen, for Ave know too well the conilition of society here ; we desire to have such a jury as has been impanelled under the circumstances in which this jury has been summoned, admitted to be free from all exception. Rut again I take issue with my learned friend on the other side. We desire to have a jury that can try the case now ; for if we do not try it now, no jury under that statute can be summoned or returned until next February. The condition in which the marshal is to be called in to summon talesmen cannot arise, because there has been no panel returned, and therefore no panel can be exhausted, and until a panel has been returned and has been exhausted by some process of law, the authority of the marshal to summon tales- men is out of the question. The predicate is that a panel shall have been ex- hausted. If there is no panel, there is no predicate, and if that is no predicate, the marshal cannot summon. We are sincere, if your honor please, in endea- voring to bring this question to an issue now. Our brethren claim and we accord to them the same sincerity. We may have done them injustice in sup- posing this was interposed for delay; we may have done them injustice in sup- posing that at this late stage of the term and after so many years of experience this process of selecting a jury was first discovered to be wrong. I hope we did. But there is a graver view uf this question which has not been touched by the counsel on the other side, nor by my learned brother who preceded me. We have been told that it is an obligation of common law that the courts shall en- force statutory provisions ; but there is a higher and a holier duty, that courts shall not make law. The counsel on the other side seek b}' this motion to prevail upon your honor to make a law. We have no statute upon the subject of challenging the ai'ray. We stand upon the common law of England, the common law of the State of Maryland, the common law engrafted upon the laws of the District of Columbia, the common law which must stand unless repealed or modified by the statute, common law which is as binding upon the judgment and conscience of this court as though it were statute law. Now, sir, what is that common law ? Can any man, lawyer or not, doubt what that common law is when be reads or has heard read the case of O'Oonnell and the Queen ? Can any man doubt that by the common law of England, the only challenge to the array was for default in the man charged with the summoning ofthe jury ? The prepara- tion of the list of jurors was not cause of challenge. If any case can bring this case directly to judicial decision, that case of O'Connell does. There was fraud and illegality charged directly upon the party making out the jury book, which was admitted on the record as being fraudulent and illegal, and the courts say in such a case as that there is no such remedy as a challenge of the array. They say admit that it sounds harsh and tyrannical : what of that ? It is the law of the land, and they go back to the year books of Edward II and Edward III where it was laid down by Lord Cook that the challenge to the 36 TRIAL OF JOHN H. SUERATT. array cannot be allowed, exce])t for partiali'y in the person snramoning the jury. Whether there are other remedies or not is not for me to say. Whether there are other remedies which in this instance the United States might have pursued is not for me to say. 1 say it is laid down by that highest and greatest court of the present time, a court composed of the fitteen judges of England, that by the common law a challenge to the array can only go to tlie disqualification of the officer making the summons and return. Ko human ingenuity can escape the conclusion of that case. Argument is vain. It is like buffeting the light waves against a great rock, ii falls back in spray. There is the solid basis, the deci- sion of the fifteen judges of England, the most solid basis upon which we can rest the principles of our lih<'rty, the commou law of England. It comes to us under that rule thus strict, thus limited, thus defined, hoary with age, baptized in our own revolution, the common law of England. Now, for the purposes of this case your honor is asked to make a new commou law. I appeal to your honor to vindicate the common law of England, and to enforce it. Now, sir, I pass from that to another consideration. When this question was proposed yesterday I conceded that the defendant in this case, according to the current of decisions, could not waive a defect in the empanelling of the jury. I stated, however, that I had seen two well-reasoned decisions the other way. I have since then seen four, and, unless the defect appear upon the record of the case, or unless it shall clearly appear that the party did not know of the dis- qualification or defect, he is as completely concluded as though it were a civil case, and he had, in form, waived tliat right the waiver is conclusive, and I refer my learned brothers upon this point to a case in seventh Wendell — with which one of them at least, Mr. Pierrepont, is perfectly familiar — in which a man in a capital case moved for a new trial on the ground of irregularity in empanelling the jury. The case is found on page 421. 1 read from the opinion of the court : ■ " The revised statutes provide that a jury for the trial of an indictment shall be drawn in the same manner as is prescribed by law for the trial of issues of fact in civil cases, (2 Rev. Stats., 734, 735;) and in civil cases where there is not a jury empanelled in another cause the statute directs that the ballots containing all the names of the jurors returned and appearing at such court, shall be placed together in the same box before any jury shall be drawn there- from, (2 Rev. Stats., 421, §64.) Here, the ballot containing the name of Smith not having been placed in the box before the drawing of the jury commenced, it is said the statute was violated, and the prisoner is entitled to a new trial." The language is so distinct that no one can fail to understand it, yet the requiiemsut was departed from in this case, and this a capital case. I read further from the opinion : " We have several times had occasion to consider the effect of an ommission on the part of the officer whose duty it is to draw and empanel jurors to conform to the precise regulations prescribed by law in that respect, and we have uni- formly held that this statute, like many others of a similar character, is to be considered as directory to the officers merely, and that a neglect to conform to its provisions will not j^er se be a sufficient ground for setting aside the verdict of such jury where the court sees that the party cannot have been prejudiced by it, (5 Cowan, 289. 7 Id., 232.") Now, I would like to know how a party would be prejudiced by trying his case before this jury, but, if your honor please, I can see how he can be preju- diced by summoning talesmen to supply their places. I read further : " Th« 59th section of the same act (2d Rev. Stats., 420,) provides that the clerk ot the court shall cause the names of the several persons r( ferred as jurors by the bheriff, with their respective additions and places of residence, to be written on several and distinct pieces of paper, each in the same manner, as near as may be, and so as to resemble each other as much as possible, and so that TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURRATT. 37 the names written tlieveon shall not be visible. In Cole and Pony, (6 Cowan, 584,) a motion was made to set aside a verdict on the ground that the ballots coQtaining the names of the jurors were not folded at all, but were put open into the box, in such manner that, the names might easily have been seen by the person drawing them. On the other hand the atfidavit of the clerk who drew the jury was produced, stating distinctly that he did not see the names of the jury until after they were drawn. The motion was denied on the ground that the statute was directory merely to the otiicer drawing the ballots, and that the mistake of the officer in the discharge of his duty, was not a ground for setting aside the proceedings where no injury to the party complaining was shown or pretended. The principle of this case is believed to be fully sanctioned by a great variety of decisions in our own and the English courts." Again, on page 424, he uses this language : " The conclusion from these cases appears to me to be this : that any mere informality or mist tke of any officer in drawing a jnry, or any irregularity or misconduct in the jurors themselves, will not be a sufficient ground for setting aside a verdict, either in a criminal or civil case, where the court are satisfied that the party complaining has not or could not have sustained any injury from it." Again, on pagp* 426 : " The case of King vs. Hunt, (4 Barn and Aid., 430,) bears a strong analogy to the case at bar. That was the case of an information for a libel, before a special jury. Ten of the special jury attended, and two talesmen were sworn, and the defendant was convicted. He moved for a new trial on the ground that the officer had omitted to summon the two special jurymen who had not attended, and it was contended that it was absolutely necessary that all should be summoned ; that the act of parlaiment was imperative, for it required all to be summoned, and if two were omitted, so might any other number. But the court unanimously refused the motion, saying that it would be an alarming principle to establish that a verdict could be set aside because the sheriff had omitted to summon one juryman out of the whole panel; that applications of this sort were addressed to the discretion of the court ; that if the officer had not done his duty he might be punished for it, and if his omission has actually produced prejudice to the party, then the court might, in its discretion, prevent injustice from being done by granting a new trial. In that case, the omission had not been shown to have bren prejudicial to the defendant and therefore the motion was refused. This, I apprehend, is the true rule to be collected from all the cases " He then reviews the case of The People ?'.?. McKay, which was a capital case, and in which the defendant was convicted of murder. " He was then brought into this court by habeas corpus, and the indictment and proceedings against him in the court of oyer and terminer, were also re- turned in obedience to a certiorari, directed for that purpose. Upon the papers thus before the court, the counsel for the prisoner moved an arrest of judgment on the ground that no venire had been issued to surarnou the petit jnry, and it appeared that the venire issued was not under the seal of the court, and that no official return had been made to it by the sheriff. It was admitted by the counsel for the people that the case stood precisely as though no venire had been issued, it having no seal and was, therefore, absolutely void, but they con- tended that no venire was necessary. The only judgment then was whether the judgment could be sustained when the record showed that no venire had been issued." Judge Spencer says : " Inasmuch, then, as the venire was necessary at the com- mon law, and as the statute yet requires it to be issued, the omi-ssion to issue it we must consider an error apparent on the record, and in such a case, affecting life, we do not feel ourselves authorized to dispense with a jjrocess required by the 38 TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURRATT. commou law, and also l»y tlie statute, altbougli we may not be able to perceive much use iu continuing it." The decision proceeded on the ground that the error was apparent on the record, and the court conld not disregard it. I might refer your honor to other cases equally in point, but these are suffi- cient for my purposes. I therefore say, if the court please, that there is no error apparent on the record of the court in this case. There is no error show- ing any irregularity in making out these list?, in preparing the jury-box, in opening tbe jury-box, in drawing tlie jurors, there is no error of record, and if the case should go to trial advertised as the defendant has been by the pro- ceedings now under consideration, he would be bound by that verdict as effect- ually as if every form of law had been complied with. There is no reason, then, of public justice; there is no reason of public sentiment, lor that has been invoked ; there is no reasv)n affecting the public at large which could make a change in this case from the ordinary course of proceedings since the passage of the act of 1862 necessary or proper, but there is eveiy inducement which can operate upon the mind or conscience of the judge to continue this trial now with this free, unembarrassed, impartial jury, and of not submitting the defendant to all the disadvantages which the act of Congress was intended to remove and subject the defendant to trial by a jury which is denounced by the act of Congress itself. Now, if your honor please, a word only as to the construction of this statute. Mr. PiKKREPOiXT. I understood you to argue that in England there was no statvite having any effect upon the empanelling of the jury. Mr. Bradley. I did not say that. Mr. PlERREPONT. I so understood you. Mr. Bradley. What I stated was, that there is no statute iu England touching the question of a challenge to an array. Mr. PlERREPONT. I so Understood you. That is the very point to which I wish to call your attention. I do so because I supposed you would desii'e to answer it. If you will turn to Chitty's Criminal Law, page 537, you will find challenges are of two kinds : " Challenges for cause are of two kinds : 1st. To the whole array. 2d. To individual jurymen. To challenge the array is to except at once to all the jurors in the panel on account of some original defect in making the return to tbe venire." Mr. Bradley. Now, if the court please, I am very much obliged to the gen- tleman for furnishing me with that. Now, if the gentleman will find me a statute authorizing it, I will be obliged. Mr. PlERREPONT. If you will turn over a page or so you will find it. Mr. Bradley. I will turn to that directly. That is the commou law. If your honor will turn back to the time of second and third Edwards, to the " Year books," you will find that it was common law then. Now I proceed, sir : " It is either a principal challenge or for favor, the former of which is founded on some manifest partiality, and is therefore decisive, while the grounds of the latter are less certain, and left to the determination of triers iu the manner we shall state hereafter. The legitimate causes of a principal challenge are not very numei'ous. Thus, if the sheriff be actually prosecutor, or the party aggrieved, the array may be challenged, though no objection can be taken in arrest of judgment. So, if the sheriff be of actual atfiuity to either of the parties, and the relationship be existing at the time of the return — if he return any individual at the request of the prosecutor or the defendant, or any person he believes to be more favorable to one side than to the other — if an action of battery be depending between the sheriff and the defendant, or if the latter have an action of debt against the former — the array may be quashed on the presumption of partiality iu the officer. So, also, if the sheriff, or his bailiff TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURRATT. 39 who makes the return, is undin- the distress of the party indicted, or indicted, or has any pecuniary interest in tlie event, or his counsel, attorney, servant, or arhi- trator, in the same cause, a principal challenge will be admitted. And, in general, the same reasons which we have already seen would cause it to he directed to the coroners or elisors, will also be sufficient to quash the array when partiality may reasonably be suspected. For all these causes of sus- picion the king may challenge as well as the defendant." Every one of these are cases personally afPecting the sheriff — every one of them. Now, we go a step further : " But besides these, the default of the sheriff will be sometimes a ground of principal challenge to the array. Thus, if the array be returned by the bailiff of a franchise, and the sheriff return it as from himself, the return will be bad, because the party will lose his challenge, though if the sheriff return one from the liberty, it will suffice, and the lord of the franchise will be compelled to resort to his action against him." Was not that the default of the sheriff? Was it not charged against him that he had failed to discharge his duty, and summoned the commoners, when he was bound to summon the knights i It was the default of the sheriff — his per- sonal misconduct — all of them looking to the default or misconduct of the re- turning officer. The Court. Mr. Bradley, does the default direct itself to the summoning power of the sheriff, or to the selecting power of that officer ? Mr. Bradley. To the summoning power. It refers to both, your honor, but it must be the act of the sheriff. There is a middle stage, sir, and there is where we are to go. The sheriff is the only party who is responsible at the common law, and the statute has failed to provide a remedy under the new act of Con- gress. In England, in the case of O'Connell and the Queen, the statute pro- vided the mode of selecting and making up the jury book, and the whole duty of the sheriff was to select jurors out of that book. There was no charge of mis- conduct against the sheriff, and while all the anterior proceedings were declared to be illegal, yet the court says, "You charge nothing against the sheriff in making his return," and unless you do, this form of redress cannot avail you. The court say they may have a remedy, but the question is as to the form of the remedy. I need not say to this honorable court that the forms of the law are as much of the substance of the law as the law itself. The forms of the remedies to which men resort are just as binding upon them as the highest statu- tory obligations. Courts are bound by the forms which men adopt and deter- mine according to the law respecting those forms. My attention is called to the passage from the opinion ot the Chief Justice in that case: "The sheriff, therefore, being neither unindifferent nor in default, the prin- ciple upon which the challenge to the array is given by law does not apply to the present case." The statute has, in fact, taken from the shei'iff that duty of selecting jurymen which the ancient law imposed upon him, and has substituted instead a new ma- chinery, in the hands of certain officers, by whom the list is to be prepared for the sheriff's use. If the sheriff, when the jurors' book was furnished to him, had acted improp erly in selecting the names of the jury from the book, such misconduct would have been a good cause of challenge to the array. "But that which is really coin})lained of is, that the material of the book out of which the jury is selected by the sheriff, and for which the sheriff is not re- sponsible,- has been improperly composed. It is not, therefore, a ground of challenge to the array. And further, it is manifest that no object or advantage could have been gained if the challenge had been allowed ; for if the challenge had been allowed the jury process would have been directed to some other 40 TRIAL OF JOHN 11. SURRATT. officer, Avbo would have been obliged to choose his jury out. of the very same special jurors' book as that which the sherifF had acted on, for no other was in existence. The same objection might again be made to the jury panel secondly returned, and so tofies quoties ; so that the granting of this challenge wouhi, in effect, amount to the preventing the case from being brought to trial at all. The very same difficulty might occur in England, if, through accident, careless- ness, or design, a single jury list, directed to be returned by the overseers of any parish within the county, were not handed over to the clerk of the peace, or if a single name should have been omitted in any list actually delivered to the clerk of the peace. The jury book must necessarily, in either case, be de- ficiently made up. But if such deficiency were allowed to be a ground of chal- lenge to the array, the business of every assize in the kingdom might effectually be stopped. That there must be some mode of relief for an injury cocasioned by such non-observance of the directions of an act of Parliament, is uncdeniable but the only question before us-is, whether it is the ground of challenge to the array ; and we all agree in thinking it is not, and therefore we answer this question in the negative." That is what we complain of. Mr. PiERREPOXT. We make no complaint of the sheriff. His duty is simply ministerial. Mr. Bradley. It is not, therefore, a ground of challenge to the array that they do complain of. The fifteen judges in England say that is no ground of complaint. The learned gentlemen here say it is ground of complaint. They say it is true thi?t they make no complaint of the sheriff or marshal, because he is only performing a ministerial duty, but they go back to the material out of which the list is made, and the court — the fifteen judges — say that it is not ground of complaint. I admit that my learned friend on the other side has argued this case with great ability, but I take the opinion of these fifteen judges in preference to his argu- ment. These judges, I repeat, say that it is not ground of complaint, while my learned friend says it is ground of complaint. Then, if your honor please, if I am right in my reading of these books — that where the cause of complaint does not exist upon the record, and a man is tried for his life, he cannot take advantage of that defect after his trial, except upon clear proof that he was ignorant of the defect at the time of the trial. If I am right in that, then I say they may proceed to trial at once. The defendant, as he has the right to do, waives the objection, notwithstanding the great value put upon the life of an "assassin." Now, if the court please. I will proceed one step further, and I have already occupied much more time than I allowed myself. In illustrating this law, my learned brother says : " Suppose this board — we will call them a board, though they seem to be a very soft kind of board from what I can understand from the other side, that they did not discharge their duty any better — suppose this board had selected a panel of black men, and the panel had come in, all woolly- headed Africans — well, it would not be agreeable to me I admit — but is there no remedy ? The remedy is not by challenging the array. That is all I have to say on that point. Mr. PiERREPONT. It would not be the sheriffs fault? Mr. Bradley. It would not be the sheriffs fault, and, therefore, it is not to challenge the array. But there would soon be found an entire remedy — very Boon. Suppose they are not tax payers, and they challenge the array, and bring in their evidence to prove the fact that they are not tax-payers. There is no fault on the part of the marshal, and, therefore, they cannot challenge the array by any process known to the English and. the American common law. They may have one, and another remedy, but it does not follow that they have TRIAL OF JOHN IT. SURRATT. 41 the remedy of the challenge of the array; and there is the mi8take, the fatal mistake on the other side. Bat suppose, if your honor pleaso, that tlii.s motion prevail, what then? Tlic learned gentleman, taking up this statute, reads as follows : "SECTroN 5 * * * But in a capital case, where the said panel shall have been exhausted by reason of challenge or otherwise, the court before whom such capital case is pending may, in its discretion, order additional names to be drawn ; and if all the names in tiie box shall have been drawn out and no jury found, the court may order the marshal to summon talesmen until a jury shall be found." And, again : "Section 7. * * * And if at any time there should not be, by reason of challenge or otherwise, a sufficient number of jurors to make up the panel, the court shall order the marshal to summon as many talesmen as are necessary for that purpose." Persons selected as jurors having the same qualifications Mr. PiERREPONT. Tax-payers, and having the other qualifications. Mr. Bradley. Yes, sir; but that is not all. I will read the language of the statute: "And if the persons selected as jurors do not attend, the court may order the marshal to summon other respectable tax-payers, possessing the other legal qualifications, to supply the deficiency." After reading these sections, the gentleman turns back to the first, and says "tax-payers" is used there; "white male citizens" is also used there. He did not, however, read to your honor the eighth section, which prescribes the qualifi- cations of jurors. What are they ? " That no person shall be competent to act as a Juror unless he be a citizen of the United States, a resident of the District of Columbia, over twenty-one and under sixty-five years of age, a good and lawful man who has never been con- victed of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude." Now, the previous sections require that he should be a tax-payer also, and I ask my learned friend to show me where it says he shall be a "white man." Have I not a right then to resist this motion? Is there not every inducement which a white man can have to resist it 1 Mr. PiERREPONT. You will find the term "white male citizen" in the sev- enth line of the first section. Mr. Bradley. Oh ! I know, but that is when the jury is to be listed. When the register of the city of Washington, the clerks of Georgetown, and the county, are to make out their lists they are limited to white men. The District Attorney. Does not that define the description of persons? Mr. Bradley. Yes ; but when the marshal goes to summon talesmen, how is it ? The statute simply says " must be tax-payers, and possess the other legal qualifications." Mr. Pierrepo.nt. The first section speaks of certain qualifications. Mr. Bradley. No, sir; those are exactions, req^uired when the lists are be- ing made out, not qualifications. I think I can see where this thing is drifting. It is not delay that is sought, but they have another motive more powerful than delay. It is to get another jury in the place of an honest jury already summoned. Why, sir, the gentle- man talks about the misgivings in the public prints. I do not know that he has seen what I hold in my hand, an article from this place denouncing this jury because sixteen of them are Catholics, as they say, but there it is — such an article has been written and published in the New York Herald. I know, too, that the same article, published yesterday morning, foreshadows the fact that these gentlemen were to come into court on the day they did, and make the identical motion that they have submitted here. 42 TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURRATT. Mr. Merrick. Aud the writer states the ground of the motion. Mr. Bradley. Yes, sir ; states the ground of the motion. It looks to me as if it came from very near home. Mr. PiRRREPONT. What does it state as the ground of the motion ? Mr. Bradley. There it is, (handing a copy of the New York Herald to Mr. Pierrepont,) just the same ground precisely as was stated here, that it was not a lawful panel. Mr. Pierrepoxt. Oh! (laughingly.) Mr. Bradley. But I do not mean to be led off in this way; and I beg the pardon of your honor for being led away from what is really a very important and grave question, to which we should confine ourselves. I repeat that I do not mean, if I can help it, to be led into the discussion of any outside matters, but will endeavor to confine myself to the pure proposition of law. Now, sir, let us look at this statute. The act of 1862 says : " It shall be the duty of the register of Washington city, and of the respective clerks of the city of Georgetown, and the levy court of Washington county, in the District of Colum- bia, within one month after the passage of this act, aud on or before the first day of February, in each year thereafter, to make a list of such of the white male citizens, tax-payers, residing within their respective jurisdictions, as they shall judge best qualified to serve as jurors in the courts of said District, in which lists may be included, in the discretion of the officer making the same, the names of such qualified persons as were on the list of the previous year, but did not serve as jurors, and the lists thus made out by the register and clerks aforesaid shall be kept by them, respectively, and be delivered over to their successoi's in office." That is the duty of these parties. But when the polls ai'e exhausted, when the jury box, or the panel is exhausted, drawn from the jury box, then the marshal shall go out and summon " other respectable tax-payers, possessing the other legal qualifications, to supply the deficiency." And then the very next clause is : " And if at any time there should not be, by reason of challenge, or otherwise, a sufficient number of jurors to make up the panel, the court shall order the marshal to summon as many talesmen as are necessary for that pur- pose." Then in the next section it is provided : " That no person shall be competent to act as a juror unless he be a citizen of the United States, a resident of the District of Columbia, over twent3''-one and under sixty-five years of age, a good and lawful man, who has never been convicted of a felony," and so on. Now, sir, I agree that these officers in selecting their jurors are to confine them- selves to " white male citizens," but I say when that panel is exhausted, aud the marshal goes out from this court to summon talesmen, he has to summon citizens of the United States, between twenty-one and sixty-five years of age, tax-payers, resident in the city of Washington. Mr. Pierrepont. He is confined to white men. Mr. Bradley, No, sir. Mr. Pierrepont. That is what we hold. That is one of the first qualifica- tions mentioned. He could not summon any other. Mr. Bradley. No, sir. Nowhere in the statute will you find the term " white male citizen" repeated. The Court. Perhaps the counsel might reverse his position if the marshal should happen to summon such on the next panel. [Laughter.] Mr. Bradley. Then, sir, I might argue the other way. The question is not settled yet, and I am only stating my present convictions. Argument by coun- sel on the other side might disturb those convictions a good deal, and cause me to go over to the other side. [Laughter.] If the court please, that is the " chance" if the motion be granted. And I would here ask the counsel, if the marshal should go out with the order of this court to summon talesmen, " citi- TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURRATT. 43 zens of the United States, between twenty-one and sixty-five years of age, tax- payers, resident in the city of "Washington," and should return here a panel of colored men, we could challenge the array. Mr. PiBRREPONT, We would. Mr. Bradlky. Gentlemen, I don't want to give you the chance; I don't want to put your virtue to so severe a test. [Laughter.] One word, sir, as to the construction of this statute and I leave this question. Is it directory or is it not ? In the cases referred to in 7th Wendell, we find that where certain proceedings are required, not essential to the substance, and they be not observed, non-compliance will not vitiate the list of the jury; they will not vitiate the panel of the jury. Where a man is tried for a capital offence by a jury, all of whose names were not put into the box before they began to draw the panel, and the statute in terms required that they should be put into the box, the court said that the statute was directory. Now let us look at this statute. It provides that the register of the city of Washington shall make out a list of persons whom he deems best qualified as jurors ; the clerks of Georgetown and the county the same. It says, " the officers aforesaid shall select." The gentlemen say it was a power conferred upon these three men jointly ; each man must carry to that meeting a greater number than the amount to be selected. The register of Washington must carry more than four liundred, because out of his list is to be selected four hundred, and so as to the others If he carries only four hundred there cannot be much of a selection. He has then to carry, according to their construction, more than four hundred, in order that the other two may select. The statute says he shall make out a list of those whom he deems best qualified for jurors, and each of the others do the same; and the officers aforesaid shall select from the list made out by the register of Washington, four hundred names, and from the others so many. They say that that is wholly illegal and void, unless they all three unite in making this selection. Is it so, or is this provision merely direc- tory 1 Does the failure of the three to act jointly vitiate the panel or not 1 Is it a power granted to three to be excercised by the three together, or can it be exercised by each one for himself? Suppose only two of them met — suppose there is no clerk alive in Georgetown, or in the county, and the time comes round when they are to make the selection, what are we to do then ? We cannot have any jury in that part of the District ; you cannot have any jury. If it is a power given to the three, each and all three must unite in exercising it. Two cannot exercise it. Nay, more : suppose they are all three together, and two of them agree upon a man while a third differs, what is to be done ? There is no power given in that case. The inference is that the majority shall govern. That, I suppose, is an ordinary rule. There is no provision for it. What then was the intention of the legislature 1 It was to get a list of jurors prepared by men not concerned in trials in court, criminal or civil, not partisans, but men bound by their official position to do justice, and to make out a list equally as they could between all the contending parties. Each man makes out his list; he has exercised his best judgment. Is he prepared to submit that judgment to the other parties or not ? I mean, is the law mandatory or is it directory ? Does anybody complain 1 No. Does anybody say there is any irregularity except this misapplication of the law 1 No. What does Judge Savage say in the case I read from 7th Wendell : " That where it was by the mistake of the parties, it does not usually vitiate." There must be corru])tion, and the corruption must be alleged and proved ; but this is not the mode by which that charge of corruption can be investigated and established. There is a mode, undoubtedly, by which the United States might have reached any irregularity, but it cannot be by this process of challenging the array. The statute, then, means to get an honest and unbiased jury, and although there were, and are now, and always will be, persons residing in the same town, 44 TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURRATT. differing in their political sentiments — some for, and some against, the govern- ment; some sympathizing and some not sympathizing — yet Congress has invested these men with discretion ; has given them a directory authority, and if these officers had made a mistake in the exeixise of that authority thus given to them, and the law is directory, then that mistake does not vitiate the panel. May it please your honor, the argument of ab iwoni-eniente is a very appro- priate one here. If it be true that this whole list of jurors is illegal, and cannot be passed upon, I ask your honor Avhere are you going to get a jury until next February. Mr. PiKRREPONT. The statute provides the mode. Mr. Bradley. I am answered that the statute provides the mode. Why, if your honor please, does not this law afiect the civil as well as the criminal court? Does the statute provide for that ? Did Congress mean when they said, that if the panel is exhausted the court should order the marshal to empannel a jury, that the court should order a jury to be summoned when there has been no jury returned or empan'^elled or listed? Can it be pretended here, if the court pleases, that if these officers, the register of the city of Washington, the clerk of Georgetown, and the clerk of the county, had never met to perform the duty under that law, that the court could have ordered a jury to be summoned or the marshal to go out and summon talesmen ? It is made to depend entirely upon the exhaustion of a "panel," anda "panel" means a "legal panel." This list of names i§ no panel unless it is legally here. There is no return of the jurors, because the list of jurors put into the clerk's hands, according to their theory, is no list, and there being no list and no return, there is no panel, and there being no panel it cannot be exhausted, and if it is not exhausted then the marshal cainiot summon talesmen. Mr. PiERREPONT. Our argument is, that the panel is illegally summoned. Mr. Bradley. Why, may it please your honor, an illegal panel is no panel at all. The very ground upon which they proceed is, that there is no jury here. If there is a jury here let them go on and try the case. It is because there is no jury here that they seek now to summon a jury here, and there is no jury here they say because these officers failed to discharge their duty according to law, to make their returns according to law. Therefore there being no return, no panel, I ask how the panel can be exhausted. That is the question. Let me read that pas- sage again. I believe my learned friend has confounded words here. * * " In a capital case, where the said panel shall have been exhausted by reason of challenge or otherwise, the court, before whom such capital case is pending, may, in its discretion, order additional names to be drawn ; and if all the names in the box shall have been drawn ou tand no jury found; the court may order the jury to summon talesmen until a jury shall be found, and if a jury be re- quired for the circuit court, the twenty-six persons whose names shall first be drawn shall constitute the jury for that term, and the names of the persons drawn as afore- said shall not be again placed in such box for the period of two years. If any person, whose name is so drawn, shall have died or removed from the district, or has become otherwise disabled from serving as a juror, the said register and clerks shall draw from the box another name who shall serve instead, and after the requisite number of jurors shall have been so drawn, the said box shall be again sealed and delivered to the clerk of the circuit court as aforesaid." Now, sir, if thei-e are no such persons legally selected, drawn, or summoned, how can there be a panel. How can the marshal proceed to summon a panel in the place of that exhausted by challenge or otherwise, when there is no panel to be so exhausted. He cannot do it, in my humble view. 1 think the intention of Congress in this matter is perfectly clear, and, therefore, I shall not further discuss that question. I contend, therefore, that there is no ground upon which this challenge of array can stand. TRIAL OP JOHN H. SURRATT. 45 'I'he District Attor.xev. I do not rise for tlie.piirpo.se of ar^-uiiig the mo- tion before the court, but, with the permission of your honor, and my learned friend, simply to say a word or two regarding a certain statement in one of the newspapers of the day to wliich my attention has just b(;en called. It is an item in the New York Herald, purporting to be telegraphed from this city. The article is not very complimentary to myself, but as my friend is spoken of in very high terms, I am not disposed to quarrel with the writer, for, as a generous- hearted man, 1 am more anxious for the reputation of my friend than I am for my own. What is intimated in it, I would not think of sutHcient im- portance to bo called to the attention of the ccmrt, were it not that allusion has been made to it here by the learned counsel who last addressed your honor He stated that there was some reason not made known for the motion which we have submitted. I deem it due to myself to say ]\Ir. Bradley. I beg your pardon if I have said anything wrong. I thought it was a fair retort upon what was said by Judge Pierrepont. The District Attormjy. Notwithstanding the disclaimer of the gentleman to impute any wrong motive to us in subniittirg the motion now before your honor, 1 think, inasmuch as public reference has been made to it here, it is due to my position before the country to say a word. I will here say, then, that there is no one Avho would more earnestly and sincerely deprecate any appeal to religious prejudices than myself. Politicians may speak, think, and act as they please, but for my part I would drive from the halls of justice the demon of party spirit and religious fanaticism. I trust in God the day will never come when a judge, or a jury, will be influenced in the discharge of the highest and most solenni duty that could possibly be devolved upon human beings by political or religious considerations. In regard to the construction which has been given by the learned gentleman to that part of the act which invests the court with power to order the marshal, when the jtauel has been exhausted by challenge or otherwise, to summon jurors, I deem it also proper to say that the marshal would be entrusted with power, with a right, to summon no other than white persons. All I desire Mr. Bradley. I beg your honor's pardon, but this subject has been very fully discussed by counsel on both sides, and I hope no fuither discusion will take place. The District Attor.\ev\ Very well, sir, I am satisfied. I only intended to say a word or two. The Court. I do not see how it would be possible for me to render my opin- ion on this question to day. We have a great deal of business before the su- preme court, sitting in hranc, and we have a session to-morrow for the purpose of concluding that business for the term. The court is to meet at 2 o'clock on that day, and, as it is expected several very important decisions will then be rendered, it is proper and necessary that o{)portuiiity should be afforded for consultation with regard to them. 1 will endeavor, however, to be ready to give an opinion upon this question to-morrow morning, and in order to hasten the progress of the cause, and that no time may be lost by adjourning now — an hour before our usual time — if it will be agreeable to counsel on either side, we will meet to-raon*ow morning at 9 o'clock. Counsel on either side expressing their assent, the court thereupon adjourned until to-morrow morning at 9 o'clock. Ju\E 12, 1S67. The court was opened at 10 o'clock. The Court then said : In regard to the motion of the district attorney to quash the array, or to challenge the array granted upon the affidavit of Samuel Doug- 46 TRIAL OF JOHN H. SUERATT lass, register of Wasliington city, I have considered the argument advanced by learned counsel on both sides, and I will now proceed to pronounce my opinion in regard to the motion : The act of Congress, approved June 16, 1862, entitled " an act for the selec- tion of jurors to serve in the several courts of the District of Columbia," provides for the selection of jurors in the following manner: First. It makes it the duty of the register of the city of "Washington, on or before the first day of February, to prepare a list of such of the white male citi- zens, taxpayers residing within this city, whom he may deem best qualified to serve as jurors, in which he may include the names of such qualified peiossn as were on his list for the previous year, but who did not serve as jurors ; the clerk of the levy court is also required to make a list, by the same time and in like manner, from such persons qualified to serve as jurors who reside in that portion of the District not included in either of the cities of Washington or Georgetown, and the clerk of the city of Georgetown is required to make, at the same time and manner, a list of persons qualified to serve as jurors, from citizens of similar qualifications residing in Georgetown. And each of these officers is required to preserve such list, so made, in the archives of his office, and to trans- mit the same to his successor. The making of these several lists is to be the work of each officer in his separate official capacity. The lists for the three principal divisions of the District being thus prepared, it is made the duty of these three officers to act together, and select, in their joint capacity, from the lists so prepared as aforesaid by the register of Wash- ington city, the names of four hundred persons, and from the Georgetown lists the" names of eighty persons, and from the lists prepared by the levy court the names of forty persons. The first section, which imposes the duty of preparing the lists of qualified jurors, treats of that duty as the duty of these officers respectively. Each one is, in the express language of the act, " to make a list," and each is permitted, by the law, to place upon his list the names of such qualified persons as were on the list of the previous year, as, "in the discretion of the officer making the same," may seem proper. The lists are to be made by them, and kept by them respectively, each one preparing and having the charge and safe keeping of his own list of the persons for his respective district. About this there can be no doubt, and, indeed, there is no controversy in this case. When we come to the second section of the act, which provides for the number of names to be selected from these several lists of persons qualified to serve as jurors, persons of whose qualifications each of these officers is to judge severally within his own jurisdiction or precinct, we find that the legislature no longer uses the word respective or respectively, but proceeds to declare, in ij)sissifnis verbis, " that the officers aforesaid " (all of them, not one or two, but all three of them) " shall select from the list of the register of Washington city the names of four hundred person, from that of the clerk of Georgetown eighty persons, and from that of the clerk of the levy court forty persons." While the work of preparing the three lists is the several labor of the officers, independent of one another, the work of selecting the five hundred and twenty names is devolved upon " the officers aforesaid," the whole three conjunctly. It may not, perhaps, be necessary that they should all meet together, and at the same time and place agree upon the fotn- hundred names to be taken from the Washington list, or eighty from the Georgetown list, or the forty from the county li.st, but certain it is, that all " the officers aforesaid" shall select the number of names prescribed by the statute. If one of the clerks only shall make the selection from the list prepared by himself, or even if two of them shall make the selec- tion, this will not meet the requirement of the law. The principle has been too well established by a long current of decisions to TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURRATT. 47 be now questioned, that when the law, enjoining upon three or more the duty of performing an act, without giving to a majority the power to act in the premises, all must act, or the action of those who do act is a nullity, and there is not in the statute a fjuestion, one single word or syllable, that looks in the least towards a selection to be made from the three lists, or any of them, except by the united judgment of three officers upon whom the duty is imposed. It is just as certain, therefore, that the entire three must act in making the selection of five hundred and twenty names for jurors, as that eacli of the clerks and the register is to prepare his own lists severally. After these five hundred and twenty names shall have been selected by " the officers aforesaid," then the fourth section of the act of Congress further pro- vides, that " the names selected from said lists shall be written on separate and similar pieces of paper, which shall be so folded or rolled up that the names cannot be seen, and placed in a box to be provided by the register and clerks aforesaid, which box shall be sealed, and after being thoroughly shaken, shall be delivered to the clerk " of this court. The fifth section provides, that when juries are needed for any of the courts during the year, the register and city clerks, and the clerk of this court, shall meet at the city hall, and such juries shall be drawai by the clerk of this court, who is to publicly break the seal of the box and proceed to draw the requisite number of names. Such are, briefly stated, the provisions of the act of Congress upon Avhich the motion in this case to quash the array is rested, as I understand them, and as I apprehend they must be utiderstood by everybody possessed of ordinary cajjacity, and free from the bias of interest or prejudice. There can be no other construction put upon these provisions, which will not do violence to, and, indeed, utterly pervert the language used by the legislature to convey their intention. lu enacting these provisions it was doubtless the intention of Congress no longer to leave in the hands of one man — the marshal, or any other single man — the power of selecting juries, in whole or in part, except in the exigencies of certain cases, for which they provided in the same act, and which cases are of rare occurrence. This power, vested oftentimes in marshals and sheriffs, nobody doubts, had heretofore been often grossly abused, and in many instances made the instrument of injustice, and wrong, and Congress thought it would better serve the purposes of justice if it should institute the combined selective power to three or four officers, the register of Washington city, the clerk of George- town, the clerk of the levy court, and the clerk of the supreme court, in the place of the much abused and arbitrary solitary power of the marshal. This language, in my judgement, expresses the intention as clearly as any idea can be pictured by the English language. Each of these officers was, doubtless, intended to act as a safeguard against any abuse which the partiality, bias, or corrupt disposition of the other might possibly allnre him to commit. The affidavit of Samuel E. Douglass, the register of Washington city at the time of the selection, made in January or February last, of the names from which the present panel of jurors is taken, shows, first, that neither the clerk of George- town, nor of the levy court, saw one single name on his list, much less aided or CO operated with him in selecting the four hundred which the law requires that these three "officers aforesaid" should select, and that he did not see a single name upon the list of either of the others, or co-operate in selecting from their lists. On the contrary, it shows that each of these three officers put into the ■ box the number of names specified in the act for their respective jurisdictions, each independently of the other, and without the slightest regard to the judg- ment or consent of either of the other two. The affidavit further shows, that after the selection of the names to be put in the box had been thus made, in utter disregard of the requirements of the act of Congress in that behalf, instead of sealing up the box and thoroughly shaking it, and then depositing it with the clerk of the supreme court, as required by the 48 TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURRA'IT. fourtli section, and then meeting afterwards in the office of the clerk of the court to witnees him break the seal and draw the names of the jury required for the present term of this court, as provided for in the fifth section of the act, the clerk of Georgetown city at the same time, though in the pi-esence of the clerk of the court and the other officers, proceeded to draw from the box the names of this present panel, to which challenge is now made. Tliis was also a most re- prehensible disregard of the plain provisions of the act. These are the facts upon which tlie application to quash the array is grounded. The question presented by the law, and the facts, (which are all admitted by the demurrer,) for the decision of the court, is twof )ld in its character : First. Does the law of Congress require that the judgment of all three of the officers named therein should, either united or several)}', pass upon the entire five hundred and twenty names required to go into the box in making this selection from the three lists, or does it only require that the clerk of George- town only should pass judgment in selecting the eighty names from that city, the clerk of the levy court upon the forty to be chosen from the rural portion of the District, and the register of Washington to select the four hundred to be taken from this city ? Secondly. Whether, if the act of Congress does require the judgment of all three of these officers to be exercised in the selection of the entire iive hundred and twenty names to be placed in the box, the placing them there in the manner described by Mr. Douglass in his affidavit, is cause of principal challenge to the array. [ am clear in my conviction that the law requires the united judgment of the three officers named in the act in the selection of the entire number of names to be placed in the box, for the reasons that I have ah-eady mentioned. Is, then, the several action of each of these officers in selecting exclusively from his own list, and not even looking at the lists of either of the others, or even knowing any of the names taken from these lists to be placed in the box, as sworn to by Mr. Douglass, and admitted by the counsel for the prisoner, a ground in law upon which to set aside the array. It is argued by the counsel for the prisoner that it is not ; that nothing ex- cept a defect in the summoning of a jury by the sheriff is principal cause of challenge to the array in England by the common law, which we have inherited from our Biitish ancestors, and winch is the law in this District, by which we are to be governed in the decision of this question ; and the case of the Queen against O'Coiniell and others, has been cited by the counsel for the prisoner at the bar as conclusive of the question in tliis case. I confess that my veneration f )r tlie common law of England may sometimes even run into a weakness, but the day is long passed with me, and should be with everybody, when decisions of courts and mere arbitrary utterances of test-writers, however hoary with age, or exalted in position, are to be accepted as Procustian beds, on which otlier courts and other people are bound to fit themselves, with or without reason. Witli me no decision is of weight that lacks of reason for its solid foundation, unless it be the decision of a superior court that holds a mastery over me, whose mandates, right or wrong, reasonable or unreasonable, I am compelled by law to obey. The grand object of jury trials in this country or in England is, or ouglit to be, and is supposed to be, a fair and impartial investigation of the subject in controversy by honest and upright meu, who are entirely inditf.rent between the parties to the suit. It was to subserve .this view that cliallenges were per- mitted to be made either to tlie array or to the poll, and either by principle or by favor. Some persons entertain the idea that challenges, and many other advantages, are given by the commmi law to the prisoner exclu-ively, and nothing to tiie State. Tliis is as if we should say, that all the provisions and formularies of the common law were invented simply for the purpose of pre- TRIAL OF JOHN H. SUREATT. 49 venting the public from obtaining its just demands upon the guilty offender against society. It is as though such formularies were a mere means and cere- mony by which the accused is to derive every advantage and have every means to assist in setting him at large, without respect to the rights of an offended com- munity. I enteitain a different opinion. I concur Avith Chief Justice Gibson, of Pennsylvania, in the case of the Commonwealth vs. Joliffe, 7th Watt, 585, in which he says : "Total impunity was not the end proposed by the legis- lature, nor ought it, perhaps, to be desired by the philanti'opist. It is not easy to discover a conclusive reason why the punishment of the felon ought to move our tenderest sympathies, or why the laws ought to be defectively construed in purpose that he might elude them. To rob the executioner of his victim when the laws are sanguinary, it might be an achievement to boast of, but we are told at the mitigation of our penal code that the certainty of conviction to be ex- pected from mildness of punishment would more than compensate in its effects the want of that severity which was thought to deter by its terrors. * * If it be further indulged, a shorter and certainly a cheaper mode of obtaining its end would be to have no prosecution at all. But it is one which would scarce be found to answer in the state of the times. Why, then, should the prisoner have more than serves" (speaking of challenges) " to give him a fair trial? and his twenty peremptory challenges certainly gives him that, and having secured to him all he had a right to require, it must have occurred to the legislature that the commonwealth must have a fair trial too." Let us now see whether the case of O'Connell and the Queen, tried in 1844, is one which we ought, according to the counsel of the prisoner at the bar, to accept as conclusive upon the question now before us. In that case, by 3d and 4th William IV, chapter 19, and by 4th and 5th William IV, chapter Sth, cer- tain provisions were made regulating the mode in which certain books should be prepared, from which the sheriff was required to make certain a selection of juries. In the preparation of one or more of the lists from which these jury books were made a number of names of persons qualified as jurors was omitted. A challenge; to the array was made in this case on the ground of the omission, and it Avas held that such omission in one of the preliminary lists was not a suffi- cient cause of challenge to the array. But that is by no means the present case. To make the case at bar similar to that of O'Connell, and bring it within the ruling in tliat case, it would be necessary that Congress should, in the law for summoning jurox's, have incorporated a provision requiring that the three officers, who stand in the place of the sheriff, should have prepared their res])ect- ive lists from the lists of the assessors, or some other officers, and that in mak- ing the lists of said other officers some negligent or fraudulent omission should have occurred. It may be admitted, without any prejudice to the motion in this case, that the omission by such assessors or other officers to make a com- plete list from the list or jury book, if we may so term it, used by the register and clerks, in order to inform them as to who all the persons legally qualified as jurors in their respective jurisdictions were, would not have been of sufficient ground of itself to set up this motion. And yet I am free to say that, in my opinion, it ought to be sufficient. But admitting it were not, it is a very differ- ent case from the one before us. Here Congress requires that we combine the judgment of three officers in selecting the persons of whom the juries are to be composed. Each of these officers is to be a guard over the other two, to pre- vent him from perpetrating a wrong against individuals or the community by putting in the box, from which jurors for a Avhole year are to l)e taken in all the courts, the names of persons who are disqualified, either from want of mental capacity, moral rectitude, purity of blood, Avant of proper age, or tax paying qualifications. 4 50 TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURRATT. If one of these officers, as Mr. Douglass did on the occasion of filling the jury-box on February last, should exercise an exclusive judgment in the selec- tion of 400 out of the 520 names put into the box, the safeguard which Con- gress sought, by the act, to throw around tlie selection of jurors, is not worth a fig, and the law was not worth the time consumed in its passage. Mr. Douglass may be, and doubtless is, an honest, fair-minded and honorable man ; but the law cannot be relaxed on that account, for we cannot tell how long the office may continue to be filled b} such men. It was enacted to prevent dishonest or prejudiced or partial men from carrying out their dishonesty, prejudices or par- tiality, and we have no right to relax the law because of our belief in the fair- ness of any man. The public, as well as individuals, have a right to exact a rigid compliance with the requirements of the law, and the only way to secure a fair and impar- tial verdict, both to the public and the prisoner, in this, as in all other cases, is to see that the law be fully, fairly, and impartially executed in all its require- ments. The three officers speciiied in the act of Congress stand in the place of the marshal or sheriff. Juries who are summoned to try cases in this court must not only be summoned properly, but must be selected in obedience to the requirements of the laws. The case of O'Conuell can scarcely be said to be regarded as law in this country, where mere forms at this day are considered as of mere secondary im})ortance when compared with the substance of the law. If any partiality or default in the sheriff or deputy in arraying the panel gives either party the right to challenge the array, as is undoubtedly the law, vide 3d Blackstone, 350 ; then such partiality or default on the part of those who are substituted for the sheriff must likewise be good cause of challenge to the array. In the State of New York it has been held, in the case of Gardner vs. Turner, .9th Johnson, page 260, that the drawing of seventy-two names by the clerk from the jury-box, instead of thirty-six, the number required by law, and the selecting of thirty-six by him out of the seventy-two, and his direction to the sheriff to summon the thirty-six thus selected by him, was such default as would sustain a challenge to the array. In the case of James Maguire, plain- tiff in error, vs. The People, defendents in error, (2d Parker's Criminal ilepoi'ts, page 148,) it was held that, inasmuch as the district attorney was required by statute to issue his precept for summoning the petit jury, a jury summoned by the sheriff, without such precept was wrongfully summoned, an