v *Sfc ESfefc WM ■WW y U\ >j MP, "/ ■ S ■,/ ■ / s MORAL THEOLOGY OF THE CHURCH OF ROME. No. II. CERTAIN POINTS IN S. ALFONSO DE' UGUORI'S MORAL THEOLOGY, CONSIDERED IN NINETEEN LETTERS, BY THE REV. H. E. MANNING, AND THE REV. F. MEYRICK. LONDON: J. AND C. MOZLEY, PATERNOSTER ROW; EDINBURGH : R. GRANT AND SON ; DUBLIN : W. CURRY AND CO. 1855. ADVERTISEMENT. The following Letters arose out of a conversation held in London between the Rev. H. E. Manning, the Rev. F. Meyrick, and others. The Rev. F. Meyrick main- tained that the teaching of S. Alfonso Liguori's Moral Theology was immoral in many respects, specifying in particular his doctrines of Theft and Equivocation. With regard to the first of these, he asserted that it would result from Liguori's teaching that the sin of a conscious thief would still be mortal or venial, according to the amount which he appropriated and the person from whom he stole — in such sense, that a man standing between a nobleman and a commoner, and having the same disposition of mind towards each, would be guilty of a mortal or venial sin, according as he stretched out his right hand, or his left, and stole a certain sum (say As.) from one or the other ; and he further argued that this introduction of the Quantitative Principle made the guilt of an act of Theft, so far, to depend upon something external, instead of upon the frame of 4 ADVERTISEMENT. mind of the agent. With respect to the last, he main- tained that Liguori's theory of Equivocation was incom- patible with Truthfulness. The Rev. H. E. Manning objected to both these positions, and the following morning left a volume of the Homo Apostolicus at the house at which the conversation had taken place, re- questing the Rev. F. Meyrick to read certain chapters, and offering " to explain any difficulties that he might have, if he would write to him on the subject." In con- sequence of this request and proposal, the Rev. F. Meyrick wrote the first letter, which, it will be seen, refers to the points which had been under discussion. The correspondence took place, it is believed, with- out any kind of ill-feeling on either side, and is now published with the assent of both parties, as a contribu- tion towards a subject which is deservedly beginning, more and more, to draw attention towards itself — the Moral Theology of the Church of Rome. July 26, 1855. rs. LETTER I. Eev. F. Meyrick to Rev. H. E. Manning. Blickling, July 15, 1853. My dear Sir, You were kind enough to leave the volume of Liguori, containing the passages of which we had been speaking, and to offer to explain any difficulties that I might have about them. Would you, then, kindly tell me if the following is Liguori's theory of theft, as laid down in Tract x. cap. 2 ? That a cer- tain quantity of matter is required to make theft a mortal sin — that this quantity is greater or smaller according to the state of the owner from whom the theft is made — that in the case of a beggar, a sufficient quantity is one real, of a labourer, two reals, of an artizan, three reals, &c. of a nobleman, one scudo, &c. ? Might not, then, a theft of the same amount be a mortal sin if the owner were a commoner, a venial sin if the owner were a nobleman ? And is not the guilt of the act made to depend upon something external, not upon the frame of mind of the agent ? Again, would you explain the assertion that a wife may sup- port her previous children out of her husband's goods against his will, and spend something under the twentieth of his in- come on alms and gifts. — Tract x. 2. 33. And that a nobleman in extreme distress may steal if he is ashamed to beg. — x. 2. 15. And that a servant may compensate himself for a salary remark- ably too small. — vii. 3. 10. And that a rich man's son may steal from his father three scudi, without grave sin. And that a prince's son commits only a venial sin if he steal from his father anything under fifty scudi. — x. 2. 32. And that a monk is guilty of only a venial sin if he steals any sum less than four scudi from the monastery. In what manner can these cases be reconciled with the principles of morality with which they seem to conflict ? 2 Truthfulness, On the subject of Amphibology and Truthfulness, I should like to have pointed out the difference between falsehood and non-pure mental reservation. — v. 2. 15. Are not the conditions of an oath such as would make it unnecessary to keep almost any oath ? — v. 2. 18. Is not the same true of vows ? — v. 3. Does not the easy bestowal of dispensations take away all security for the observance of pledges ? Can promises be counted important ? — x. 2. 127. or secrets secure? — xi. 3. 9. Does "ex capite meo hoc erui, aequivocando, quia omnia verba e mente, pro qua accipitur caput, procedunt," or " ' mentitus sum/ quia omne peccatum est fallacia et mendacium," mend the moral untruth ? Are any one of the four answers put into the mouth of an unfaith- ful wife truthful? 1. Non fregisse matrimonium. 2. She had not committed adultery, because she had not committed idolatry. 3. Innocens sum ab hoc crimine. 4. Non commisi. Is a seducer on promise of marriage not bound to keep his promise (although the victim did not know of any disparity) because he is longe nobilior?— x. 3. 93. I am, dear Sir, Yours faithfully, F. Meyrick. LETTEE II. Rev. H. E. Manning to Eev. F. Meyrick. 25, Chapel Street, Grosvenor Square, July 20, 1853. My dear Sir, As it is S. Alphonso who is on his trial, it is just that he should be allowed to speak for himself in his own words. I wnll therefore begin by referring to the principles which he pre- supposes in the chapter De Furto. In the Treatise de actibus humanis et peccatis, (Tract iii. c. 2. 4.) he says, " Peccatum mortale estillud quod privat homi- nem divina gratia qua? est anima vitas, et ideo clicitur mortale. Yeniale est quod non privat gratia, sed minuit caritatem, &c." If this distinction be really admitted, I believe most of the supposed difficulties will disappear. According to Catholic Theology, a soul in mortal sin is spiritually dead. Although in the mercy of God it still con- tinues to be the subject of actual grace, it is deprived of habitual, or sanctifying grace ; and is thereby under the power of eter- nal death. Mortal sin deprives the soul of the grace of charity, i. e. of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, by which it is united with God ; and the loss of this grace separates the soul from God. Mortal and Venial Sin. 3 A soul separated from God, if it depart this life without re- conciliation, so far as we know, must be separated from God everlastingly. Therefore mortal sin incurs eternal punishment. Venial sin, though in the order of sin it be less than mortal, yet, in the order of evils, is the greatest of which man is capable, except only mortal. Its effects are, that it — 1. diminishes the grace of charity ; 2. displeases God; and 3. prepares the soul for greater sins, and incurs punishment only less than eternal. May I ask you to tell me before we go further, whether you believe the effects of mortal sin to be such as S. Alphonso states? This seems to me to be the first and necessary step in the mat- ter we have in hand. When I know your mind, I shall be better able to go on. Believe me, my dear Sir, yours faithfully, Henry E. Manning. LETTER III. Eev. F. Meyrick to Eev. H. E. Manning. Blickling, July 22, 1853. My dear Sir, Thank you for yesterday's letter. I am not at all inclined to quarrel with S. Alfonso for saying that there are some sins which would deprive the soul of sanctifying grace, and some which, though displeasing to God, diminishing grace, and preparing for greater sins, yet have not so deadly effects as the first. If the sins which have the first effect are called mor- tal, and those which have the last are called venial, I should not care to dispute the term ; but I cannot think that it follows as a consequence upon this, that all sins may be divided into, as it were, two heaps; and if you commit one belonging to this heap, that it is mortal ; to that, that it is venial. On the contrary, I should conceive that two acts, identically the same in their external features, would be either one or the other, accord- ing to the disposition of mind in which they are done. I was not aware that venial sins were considered " to incur punishment only less than eternal." In that case (if it includes the punishment of Purgatory,) I wonder that they are not con- sidered necessary matter for the " Sacrament of Penance." In using the words, " order of evils," as distinct from sin, I pre- sume you mean material evils. I do not yet quite see how you propose to apply your remarks to the Theory of Theft. I am, dear Sir, yours faithfully, F. Meyrick. 4 Mortal and Venial Sin. LETTER IV. Rev. H. E. Manning to Rev. F. Meyrick. 25, Chapel St. Feast of S. James, 1853. My dear Sir, I have to thank you for your note, which I received on my return to London to-day. The reason why I wished to ascertain our agreement as to the nature and effects of mortal and venial sin was, because it would remove the possibility of supposing that when S. Alphonso says that a monk who steals four scudi from a monas- tery commits a venial sin, he intends to say that he commits a trifling sin. Such a sin, though venial, offends God, diminishes grace, prepares the soul for greater sin, and incurs temporal punish- ment. It is, therefore, in the eye of the Church very grave, though it fall short of being mortal. I believe if this were borne in mind we should have fewer difficulties as to the Moral Theology of the Catholic Church. Every sin, therefore, how light soever it may appear to be, incurs, according to Catholic doctrine, the consequences above- stated. So that, in my belief, the Catholic Church judges even a venial sin to be more grave than opponents of her Theology judge many a mortal sin. We may now go on to the other principles presupposed by S. Alphonso in his chapter on Theft. In the same Treatise, (iii. ch. 2.) he lays down the following conditions. " Pro certo habendum, ut dictum est num : 2. peccatum, ut sit imputabile, debere esse voluntarium, et ut Voluntarium sit peccatum mortale debet esse pleno consensu patratum. Itaque 1. requiritur plena et perfecta advertentia, ad malitiam objecti, &c." This is the principle which runs throughout his whole The- ology, both in this and in his larger work. Indeed there is not a moral Theologian, so far as I know, who has ever spoken otherwise, except those who, holding a more strict judgment, taught that a virtual " advertentia" is sufficient. — Sect. 25. You will see, therefore, that the criterion by which the diver- sity among sins is determined, is strictly the interior frame of mind in the agent. And this will be the more evident by examining the condi- Gravitas materia. 5 tions under which mortal sins may become venial, or venial sins may become mortal, namely, the absence or presence of a malicious intention, or " advertentia ad malitiam objecti." But this we may examine, if need be, hereafter. — (Treatise iii. c. 2. p. iv. 67. 68.) S. Alphonso goes on to examine the matter more fully in all the sections which relate to invincible ignorance, not one of which is intelligible except on his own principles, namely, that the internal and voluntary state of the agent is the criterion of sinfulness in the act. The sum of all he gives in these words : " Tria requiruntur ad peccatum mortale, gravitas materia;, plena advertentia intellectus, et prefectus consensus voluntatis, &c." — s. 67. It may be asked, then, why he gives a sliding-scale of ducats and scudi for rich and poor, &c. Certainly not to make the quantity of the theft the sole criterion of the sinfulness of the agent. But most plainly because the amount of the theft, in relation to the person wronged, is one chief point in determining the amount of malitia in the thief. Therefore he goes on to say, (Sect. 67.) " Et 1, quoad mate- riam, ejus gravitas consideranda est non solum in se, sed etiam ex circumstantiis, ex toto, et ex fine intento." In his Treatise on Theft, he applies these principles as follows : — In the first Section, (Tract x. c. 2. p. 5.) he defines theft to be, " Occulta et injusta rei aliense ablatio, invito rationalibiter domino." Under all circumstances, and in every form, theft is a sin dif- fering only in this, that it either deprives, or does not deprive, the soul of grace and spiritual life ; either incurs, or does not incur, the death of the soul. In the second Section he goes on to consider the "quantitas furti," and " gravitas materiae." And he at once says two things which are sufficient to render impossible the idea that he mea- sures mortal and venial thefts by an arbitrary external test. First, he says, that to steal a tailor's needle may be a grave matter, because of the wrong done to our neighbour, and, there- fore, because of the u malice" of the agent. I do not transcribe the words as you have them. Punct. xi. sect. 22. Ad judicium, down to " omissionem." The other is, that when he begins to speak of the " diversas dominorum qualitates," he avowedly says that all such judg- ments depend " a sapientum asstimatione," and that " opiniones communiores," are " intrisece probabiliores." It is obvious that in this he is only suggesting the way in 6 Venial Sins. which the amount of wrong done, and the amount, therefore, of malice in the doer, may be estimated. And you are at liberty to adopt, or not, his suggestions as to what is grave, or what is not grave, in the matter of theft. The liberty which he leaves to us we need not deny to him. In his judgment of the state of people among whom he lived, such hints as he gives seemed to him to be an approximation to a just estimate. But I have already made this letter longer than I intended. I should be glad to know any point in it which you may desire to discuss further before we go on. Believe me, my dear Sir, Yours faithfully, Henry E. Manning. LETTER V. Eev. F. Meyrick to Eev. H. E. Manning. Monteviot, Aug. 24, 1853. My dear Sir, I am sorry to have delayed writing so long, but till yesterday I was unable to open my books since my last note. If I do not mistake, your letter contains and enlarges on three propositions. 1. That venial sins are not trifling sins because classed as venial. 2. That gravitas materiae has nothing to do with making a sin mortal, but is only a circumstance from which you can judge whether the frame of mind of the agent was such, that he sinned mortally. 3. That the quantitas furti, in like manner, is not one of the conditions of a theft being mortal, but a sign by which we may judge of the malice of the agent, which malice is the cause of the theft being mortal. 1. I am afraid that I scarcely follow your argument when you say, that it follows that venial sins cannot be confounded with trifling sins, because they diminish grace, &c. All sins, it appears to me, have, according to S. Alphonso's teaching, those effects. No sins, therefore, can be trifling things ; but of sins I presume that some might be trifling relatively to others, though not trifles in themselves. One of the evils of dividing all sins into mortal and venial, appears to me to be the likelihood that men will put all mortal sins on one level, all venial sins on ano- ther level. In case they do this, the latter are pretty sure to be considered lightly of, inasmuch as they include some sins which, relatively, are light. Liguori, too, speaks of venial sins as " quod ob suam levitatem gratiam et amicitiam non tollit, &c." And asserts that they " do not diminish God's love towards us, Advertentia ad malitiam objecti. 7 but only ours towards God." At any rate, sins classed as mor- tal must be far graver than those classed as venial ; and, conse- quently, a servant's theft from his master, or a monk's from his monastery (within the bounds,) must be far less a sin than, say, omitting to hear Mass on Sunday. I should have been inclined, therefore, to think that while no sin is a trifle, yet that the division into mortal and venial sins did naturally and legitimately lead people to consider the latter as relatively trifling, and on the same level with one another as trifling, the more inasmuch as they have not to be confessed. 2. If I have rightly stated your opinion on this point, I agree with it ; but I cannot find it in Liguori. On the contrary, I find there distinctly stated that there are three things necessary for mortal sin : advertentia — consensus — gravitas. I do not find that two things, advertentia and consensus, are necessary and sufficient, and that there is another thing, gravitas, by which a third person may judge whether the two first existed in the agent. When three conditions are given, u quorum si unum desit," the thing does not exist ; it appears to me vain to say that one of these three is not a condition, but only a sign, whereby we may know the existence of the two first. Ob aliquem horum defectum, mortale fieri potest veniale. But I do not understand the meaning which you assign to the words advertentia ad malitiam objecti. You seem to trans- late them by " a malicious intention ;" and I observe that, in one place, you put a comma after the word advertentia. Now malitia objecti can, I presume, have nothing directly to do with the malice of the subject ; but the phrase, perfecta advertentia mali- tia?, or, ad malitiam, must mean a perfect recognition of the badness of the thing. That this may be connected with malice in the agent, I admit ; that it is the same thing, I cannot hold. On the contrary, it appears to me that this doctrine of perfect advertence leads, when pressed, to most fearful consequences, as shown by Pascal in his 4th Provincial Letter. It seems directly to lead to the consequence, that if a man has but destroyed his sense of right and wrong, he cannot do wrong, i. e. by a confusion of ignorance of right with ignorance of fact, to teach that if a man is thoroughly o/co'Aacn-os, he cannot be guilty of mortal sin, — while the second condition, perfectus con- sensus voluntatis, teaches, that if a man is only aKpaTip, he cannot be guilty of mortal sin, — then who can be ? This, however, is by the way. What I want to make out is, that even though advertentia ad malitiam objecti did mean malicious intention, still that two men, in identically the same state of mind, with the same advertence and the same consent, would, according to S. Alphonso's teaching, be guilty, the one 8 Quantitas furti. of a venial sin, the other of a mortal sin, according as the quan- tity of the thing which they had stolen (if it was a matter of theft) were more or less. In this case, " the diversity among sins" cannot be said to be " determined strictly by the interior frame of mind of the agent." You say that the truth of this last statement will become the more evident by examining the conditions under which mortal sins may become venial, or venial sins may become mortal ; namely, the absence or pre- sence of a malicious intention, or, "advertentia ad malitiam objecti." Putting aside the question of the meaning of these words, it is clear that the whole force of the argument here rests in the absence or presence of a malicious intention being the sole condition of mortal sin becoming venial, and venial mortal ; but there are others, and among these is Ex parte materia?, si hose sit parvi momenti. 3. I cannot agree with the definition of Theft. Rationabiliter is a word which appears to me to have no place there. In whose judgment is the possessor to be reasonably unwilling for his goods to be taken away? his own? or the taker's? (I must not say thief s,) or the director's? Nor can I agree with the Communist doctrines laid down in cap. 1. and pushed out so hardily to the justification of stealing or taking. But what we have at present to do with is, the quantitas furti. You say that he has not " given his sliding-scale of ducats and scudi to make the quantity of the theft the sole criterion of the sinfulness of the agent." No ; but that does not seem to me to meet the point. He does teach that a certain frame of mind, advertentia and consensus, the one plena, the other perfectus, are neces- sary for mortal sin. That I perfectly allow ; but he adds, that these are not enough — that the sin is not yet mortal without a certain quantitas. Consequently, the mortality or veniality of the sin does depend upon the Qd. more or less ; plena adverten- tia, perfectus consensus and 2s. Qd. being a mortal sin; plena advertentia, perfectus consensus and 2s. being venial. You give two reasons whereby you say that it is disproved that S. Alphonso makes the quantity the measure of the sin ; or, as I would correct it, in part the measure of the sin. These are, the tailor's needle, and the appeal to the judgment of the wise. I cannot see the connection between these and the inferences you draw from them. Doubtless the first proves that he considered the quantity necessary for a mortal sin legitimately altered according to the condition in life of the sufferer ; but this never was denied. And the second seems to me to mean nothing but that different Doctors differ in their tariffs ; and, therefore, to get at a right tariff, their judgments Quantitas furti. 9 must be compared, which, accordingly, he proceeds to do. I do not see anything about u the malice of the agent ;" " the amount of malice in the doer estimated by the amount of wrong done." The essence of the sin, or, at any rate, one ingredient in the essence of the sin is, as he says, " the quantity of harm done to our neighbour." It seems, then, undeniable that S. Alphonso says, that if a man steal 5s. (say) with full advertence and perfect consent, from a nobleman, he has committed a venial sin ; from a com- moner, he has committed a mortal sin. You say that the amount has shown that he was acting maliciously in one case, and not in the other. This S. Alphonso does not say, so far as I can see, nor can I see how it does prove it. Again S. Alphonso says, that if a man steal 5s. (say) with full advertence and perfect consent, from a nobleman, he has com- mitted a venial sin ; if 5s. Qd. a mortal sin. Yet you say that the amount is no criterion of the sinfulness of the agent. Then what is ? for this is the sole difference in the two cases. I am afraid that we may perhaps not agree on all the points here discussed, but I hope, nevertheless, that you will go on to the other points mentioned in my first letter. I am, my dear Sir, Yours faithfully, F. Meyrick. LETTER VI. Rev. H. E. Manning to Rev. F. Meyrick. Errwood Hall, Buxton, Sept. 8, 1853. My dear Sir, Your letter of August 24th, reached me on Friday last. Since then, until to-day, I have had no time to write. My direction until the 20th of this month, will be Kings- town, Dublin ; after that for a week, Carstairs House, Lanark. Many thanks for your note which came yesterday, and pre- vented my sending this letter to Scotland. Our last two letters lead me to hope that we are nearer to an understanding. Towards the end of your letter you say, St. Alphonsus "does teach, that a certain frame of mind ' advertentia' and ' consen- sus,' the one plena, the other, perfectus, are necessary for mortal sin. That I perfectly allow ; but he adds, that these are not enough ; that the sin is not yet mortal without a certain ' quan- titas,' consequently the mortality, or veniality of the sin does 10 Malitia objecti. depend upon the Gd. more or less ; plena advertentia, perfectus consensus, and 2s. (yd. being a mortal sin ; plena advertentia, perfectus consensus, and 2s. being venial." " Again, St. Alphonso says that if a man steals 5s. (say) with full advertence and perfect consent, from a nobleman, he has committed a venial sin, if 5s. (yd. a mortal sin. Yet you say that the quantity of the theft is not made the criterion of the sin. Then what is % For this is the sole difference of the two cases." From these two pasages I fear you have hardly had time to study the treatises to which I referred you, and I believe that if you will sufficiently examine the meaning of the words which, in your last letter, you translate " the badness of the thing," you will answer your own case ; and perceive the difficulty to be of your own making. In Tract iii. c. i. s. 19. St. Alphonsus says, " Quasritur 1. Unde actus humani desumant suam bonitatem et malitiam ? Re- spondents (quicquid dicant alii) quoad materiale, desumunt ab objectis, et ab eorum circumstantiis. Quoad formale, sive quoad moralem bonitatem et malitiam, a virtutibus quibus conformantur, aut adversantur." Again, Punct. iv. s. 67. " Quoad materiam, ejus gravitas consideranda est non solum in se, sed etiam ex circumstantiis, ex toto, et ex fine intento." You are aware that in this shorter work, St. Alphonsus takes for granted that they who use it have already studied Moral Theology, and are familiar with all that is implied in the terms. He pre-supposes especially a knowledge of his own larger work on Moral Theology. In the full treatise, de actibus humanis, which you will there find (Lib. v. sect. ii. 36.) he says, " Theologi vocant principia moralitalis ea ex quibus fit, ut aliqua actio sit bona, vel mala, vel indifferens. Tria reconsentur hujus modi principia, objectum, finis, circumstantice. ........ " Objectum a quo actus accipit essentialem et primariam mali- tiam est illud circa quod versatur actus moralis ; et primo et per se attingitur ab ipso actu : sic res aliena est objectum furti. .... Deus est objectum omnis actus. Tale objectum non con- sideratur physice. " XXXVIII. Alterum principium moralitatis est finis, non in- trinsecus operis, quod coincidit cum objecto, sed extrinsecus operantis, qui quatenus conveniat vel disconveniat cum regulis morum, dicitur bonus, vel malus moraliter. .... "XXXIX. Tertium moralitalis principium sunt circumstantice qua? dare solent actui aliam bonitatem vel malitiam acciden- talem." Gravitas materice. 11 Among "circumstances" he places Persona?, as one, "qua? saepe addit novam speciem malitiae." From this you will see, 1. That "gravitas" does not mean only " quantitas furti," as you seem throughout to assume : but as St. Alphonsus expressly says, the gravitas of a sin is to be considered and estimated, " non solum in se, sed etiam ex circumstantiis, ex toto, et ex fine intento." — Sect. 67. 2. That the objectum peccati is twofold, material and moral. That in theft, the material object is " res aliena," the moral ob- ject the law of God. 3. That sin being " Dictum, factum, vel concupitum contra legem aeternam," "in hoc consistit tota formalis malitia peccati" namely, in the offence against the Divine law. Sect. xxii. which explains what he says in Sec. xix. already quoted, namely, that the formal or moral malitia of sin arises from its repug- nance to the virtues to which it is opposed. 4. That consequently the " malitia objecti," signifies the whole complex, both material and formal, including the violation of the Divine law. Let us apply this to the cases of theft as you put them. 1. The gravitas materia? signifies not only the quantity of money, but the extent to which the Divine laws of justice and charity have been violated. 2. In order to estimate this, St. Alphonsus says, you cannot consider the matter only, but must include circumstances, the whole of the action, and the end intended. Therefore it is simply in contradiction to his express teaching to say, that he takes quantity alone as the test of mortal and venial sin. You seem to have misled yourself throughout by supposing "gravitas" and "quantitas" to be convertible terms. And by not distinguishing between the " material" and " formal" object. Unless therefore the Qd. more or less, in your supposed case, added " novam speciem malitiae," the two acts, with the same advertentia and consensus would, according to St. Alphonsus, be morally equal. For instance : 1. To steal 2s. from one person, and 2s. 6d. from another, the advertentia, consensus, circumstances, and whole action being the same, or the difference inappreciable, the guilt of the two thefts, according to St. Alphonsus, would be inappreciable. But to steal 2s. from a rich man might be venial, while to steal 2s. 6c?- from a poor man might be mortal, not because of the Qd. more or less, but because of the difference of the out- rage done to the Divine laws of justice and charity ; and of 12 Malitia objecti. the new species of malice, added by the circumstances, the per- son, and the whole complex of the moral act, in quo " consistit tota formalis malitia peccati." And this difference in the moral act and object renders the supposition of the sameness of the state of mind in the agent a case morally impossible. This letter is sufficiently long, and I will send what remains by another post. I would ask you to oblige me by sending any remarks you wish to make on these points separately, as it seems to me that we have been embarrassed by some irrelevant matter. I have already, I believe, twice expressed my willingness to examine all the points you wish ; and I meant what I said. All I ask is, that we may do it as the subject demands ; other- wise it would but waste your time and mine, and do worse than no good. Believe me, my dear Sir, Yours faithfully, H. E. Manning. LETTER VII. Rev. F. Meyrick to Rev. H. E. Manning. Trinity College, Oxford, Sept. 15, 1853. My dear Sir, I have to thank you for two letters which have reached me here, and to which I will reply, as you ask me, separately. The questions in the letter of Sept. 8th, seem to be these : — 1. What is malitia objecti ? 2. What is gravitas materia?? 3. What is quantitas furti ? You say that I have misunderstood them. Before entering on this examination, I would urge that the first should be kept apart from the others. Whatever malitia objecti does mean, whether "malicious intention," as you said in your previous letter, or " badness of the thing," as I translated it, or " the whole complex, both material and formal, including the violation of the Divine Law," as you say in this letter, the question is a totally distinct one from " What is gravitas mate- ria f" I say this because you appear to me to have laid down premises with regard to malitia objecti, and drawn conclusions with regard to gravitas materia? and quantitas furti. Adverten- tia ad malitiam objecti is condition 1, Gravitas materia; is con- Malitia objecti. 13 dition 3 of the mortality of sins. Unless the third can be resolved into the first, as you attempted in your previous letter, the question of the meaning of condition 1 is, as I said, a bye- question with regard to the matter in hand, which is an objec- tion, not to condition 1, but to condition 3. 1. What is objectum ? S. Alfonso answers : " That about which the act is." He gives instances : " The property of others" is the object of " theft." " God" is the object of " love." You have written here, "Deus est objectum omnis actus." This is to me wholly unintelligible. If " God" is the object of " theft," then truly object is used in a sense to me perfectly novel ; but on looking both in the Theologia Moralis and the Homo Apostoli- cus, I find, not " omnis actus," but " actus am oris." You have no doubt, therefore, made an error in transcribing the passage. This is a thing, of course, most easily and naturally done ; but, at the same time, with the passage itself the argument founded upon it must fall — which appears to be that God's Law is the moral object of all acts ; and hence its violation the formal object — not cause, but object — of all bad acts. I have read the Treatise on Human Actions carefully, and find it laid down that human actions are moral so far as they are in accordance with right reason in their object, in their end, and in their circumstances ; that the most important of these is the object — that this object is that about which the moral act is • — that as the object is good or bad, so the act is essentially good or bad — that the object may be good, bad, or indifferent — that it is good if in accordance with right reason, bad if the contrary, indifferent if neither in accordance nor in disagree- ment. That this is unphilosophically expressed, is acknowledged in the next paragraph, but it is clear what it means — viz. that a malum objectum is a " thing" about which an act is, which " thing," being in itself not in accordance with right reason, gives the character of malitia also to the act. How, then, was my translation of malitia objecti — " the bad- ness of the thing" — wrong ? It does not differ materially from that which I have now worked out from S. Alfonso — viz. " the non-accordance with right reason (malitia) of the thing about which the act is (objecti)." It is certainly nearer to it than either " the malice of the agent," or " the whole complex, both material and formal, including the violation of the Divine command." On this point, then, I would conclude that what- ever argument you rested in your previous letter on " adverten- tia ad malitiam objecti," meaning " the malice of the agent," must fall to the ground. In this letter of Sept. 8th, on com- paring your quotation from Tr. iii. 1. 19. Unde actus, &c. with the assertion that the objectum peccati is twofold, material and 14 Malitia objecti. moral, and " in hoc consistit tola formalis malitia peccati" it appears to me that you make " malitia objecti" " malitia humani actus" and " malitia peccati" all the same thing. Now, inas- much as the malitia objecti is the main cause of malitia humani actus, which actus thereby becomes peccatum, it would not be worth noticing this, were it not that I think the division into material and moral, material and formal belongs more right- fully, in the sense in which you use it, to the goodness and bad- ness of the act, than to the mere object. " Form" always mean- ing " that which makes a thing to be what it is," the formal badness of an act, or of sin, would doubtless consist in " its offence against the Divine Laws," or " its repugnance to the virtues to which it is opposed ;" but a formal object can only be that which makes an object to be the object of the act of which it is the object. And so S. Alfonso uses the word — e. g. " The material object of Faith, i. e. that thing which we are bound to believe, is God : the formal object of Faith, i. e. the motive, on account of which we are bound to believe what is revealed, is God's veracity." — hi. 4. Again, in the case of Hope, " The material object, i. e. that thing which we ought to hope for, is eternal happiness . . . the formal object, i. e. the motive on account of which we are bound to hope, is either God's mercy, omnipotence, promise, or goodness." — iii. 21. And Charity, " The material object of Charity is primarily God . . . the formal object, God, so far as He is infinite Goodness, as He is the aggregation of all perfections, or infinite perfection." — > iii. 24. The formal object, then, is that which makes the material object to be the object of the act. It has nothing what- ever to do with goodness, or with badness — with the Law of God, or with the violation of His Law. I cannot, therefore, think that I have " misled myself by not distinguishing between the material and formal object," as though the latter had to do with an observance or violation of God's Law, which we see that it has not. On the contrary, you must excuse me for thinking that you have confounded formale objectum with for- malis malitia peccati. 2. You say that I have confused gravitas materia? with quan- titas furti. What, then, is gravitas materia? f Perhaps the best way of discovering will be, to examine the other passages in which S. Alfonso uses the phrase, or its correlative, parvitas materia?. The very fact of parvitas being the word contrary to gravitas, points to what it means. " Is parvitas materia? allowed in the transgression of a promis- sory oath, so that a man who promises to give some little thing, if he really has the intention of giving when he swears, and afterwards does not give, only commits a light sin ? A very Gravitas and partitas materia;. 15 probable opinion says No. ... A no less probable, nay, perhaps a more probable one, says Yes. ... It is certain that if you only do not keep some little of that which you have sworn, it is not grave ; e. g. if you have sworn not to drink wine, you do not commit a mortal sin by drinking a little, because then parvitas materia' is an excuse. . . . You may say the same of a man who only takes away a little from the sum which he has sworn to give to another." — iv. 174. Here, then, the materia is grave or small, according as the quantity is greater or less. In the matter of labouring on Sunday, " it is asked, what is gravity material ? Some say the third part of a day, . . . others, one hour, . . . others, two hours, . . . others, two hours and a little over, . . . Croix concludes two hours and a half." — iv. 305. Here, then, the materia is grave or small, according as the quan- tity of time is greater or less. On fasting. " You must confess whether you have taken a notable quantity once or often, for it is perfectly probable that, in this, materia? parvitas excuses from mortal sin, as if a sick man's servant or a cook tasted a little meat. Pasqualigo says that half an ounce is materia parva, but this is deservedly rejected by the Salamanca Doctors, who say that materia parva is only the eighth part of an ounce." — iv. 1029. Here, then, the materia is grave or small, according as the quantity eaten is greater or less. " What is materia parva in omitting to say office ? Azorius, &c. hold that a man commits a mortal sin who omits half, or, as others say, a third of 'a small hour,' because such part is notable materia with respect to that hour ; but, with greater probability, this is denied by Lessius, &c. because, though that part is notable in respect to the small hour, yet it is light in itself, and in respect to the whole office, whence, on the point of gratntas materia?, the quantity of the whole office is to be regarded, and not that of each hour. So Palao, &c. say that it is light matter to omit less than the whole of a small hour. And so Elbel, &c. say that, owing to parvitas materice, a man would not commit a grave sin who should omit the whole of Vespers on Easter-eve. . . . Sanchez, &c. well conclude that that is universally con- sidered parva materia that does not mount up to the quantity of one whole hour." — v. 147. Here, then, materia parva is a small quantity, materia gravis a large quantity, gravitas and parvitas materia? depending upon quantity. In saying Mass. " In this, Doctors admit parvitas mate- ria? to excuse from mortal sin, and, where there is reason, from venial sin, as if the Mass be terminated a little before day- break, or begun a little after midday ; but in assigning such materia, they differ mightily. Azorinus fixes for gravis mate- 1 6 Gravitas materice and gravitas peccati. ria twenty minutes, Layman, half an hour," &c. — vi. 346. Here, then, materia gravis is a large quantity of time ; materia parva, a small quantity. " In talking with nuns is parvitas materice allowed ? De Alessandro thinks not, but the common opinion is on the other side. Writers, however, differ in fixing what is parva materia in such talking. Ciera thinks a few words. Merolla, ten words. Diana, the length of a miserere and a little more. Quarti, a quarter of an hour; nor is Quarti' s opinion condemned by Clement IXth's Decree, for the only opinion there condemned was, that a quarter of an hour and half a quarter was materia parva" &c. vii. 236. Here, then, materia gravis is a greater quantity of time, materia parva a smaller quantity. It is useless to quote more ; the principle is as plain as day- light. According as the quantity is more or less, the materia is grave or small, and accordingly the sin mortal or venial. Why should it be otherwise in the case of theft % It is not. In theft, too, the materia is grave or small, according to the quantity stolen ; but there is this difference from other cases, that here the quantity is not, as elsewhere, absolute, but relative, and so S. Alfonso teaches : " What is materia gravis in theft is worth here elucidating more clearly. Whatever some say," (viz. Navarrus, who fixed five farthings, (half a real) and others who fixed £2. (ten gold pieces) for all alike,) "Doctors are agreed, and it cannot be denied, that to determine the hujus materice quantitatem, the same quantity cannot be assigned absolutely for all, but it must be measured relatively to the circumstances of the person, thing, place, and times." Whether the quantity is relative or absolute is a wholly subordinate question, it is still quantity which makes the materia grave or light ; quantity of what is stolen in a case of theft ; quantity of time in the case of talking to nuns, and so on, but always quantity. Having thus re-asserted the position which you have denied, I am bound to show that your arguments are not such as to prove the contrary. I do not think this difficult, for, a. You start with a false assumption, viz. that gravitas materia? and gravitas peccati are the same thing. Thus, " you will see," you say, " that gravitas (materice is not expressed but must be understood) does not mean only quantitas furti, as you seem throughout to assume, but as S. Alphonso expressly says, the gravitas of a sin is to be considered and estimated," &c. He does not say gravitas of a sin, but gravitas materice. Again, in your letter of September 9th, you say, " he lays down the rule, that in estimating the gravitas peccati one element is the quantitas furti." He lays down no special rule about gravitas peccati, but about gravitas materia' ; and it is observable, that what he calls Gravitas materia; relative. 17 gravitas materia* in his larger work, in the corresponding passage in the Homo Apostolicus he calls quantitas furti. These are his words ; " To estimate when quantitas furti amounts to mortal sin, the quantity must be considered not only in itself, but relatively to circumstances," &c. Is quantitas only one element of quanti- tas ? The same thing runs through your letters ; but the dis- tinction between materia and peccatum is a very important one, for it is gravitas peccati which includes " the extent to which the Divine Laws of Justice and Charity have been violated," not the gravitas materia?. b. You argue that gravitas materia? is not the same (in the specific case) as quantitas furti, because S. Alfonso says that materia? gravitas is to be estimated " non solum in se sed etiam ex circumstantiis, ex toto, et ex fine intento," which you after- wards thus explain. " The gravitas materia? signifies not only the quantity of money, but the extent to which the Divine Laws of Justice and Chanty have been violated. In order to estimate this, S. Alphonso says you cannot consider the matter only, but must include circumstances, the whole of the action, and the end intended." That gravitas materia? does mean the extent to which the Divine Law has been violated — apart from the notion that mere quantity does violate more (a thing which, of course, implies that quantity is the test of the mortality of actions, which you started with denying,) is, if what I have argued above holds, an error arising from the confusion of objectum formale with formalis malitia peccati, and of gravitas materia? with gravitas peccati. That which is to be estimated, then, is not the violation of God's Law, but the gravity or amount of the matter in hand, whether that matter be time, other people's property, or any- thing else. This matter, he says, must not be estimated solely in se, that is, as he expresses it in his Theologia Moralis, abso- lutely by itself, but (a) ex circumstantiis, that is, as he again says, relatively to such circumstances as persons which may make mat- ter absolutely and by itself light, to become grave, as Qd. is ab- solutely by itself light, but relatively to a very poor man, grave — (fl) ex toto— -not, I conceive, as you translate it, "the whole of the action," but the whole of the amount concerned, whether money, time, or anything else, as illustrated by the example, that if a man has vowed to give 4000 scudi, it is venial not to give three of them " etsi talis pars, absolute in se spectata sit notabilis, comparatione tamen totius, morali judicio non valde videtur aestimanda (7) ex fine intento, i. e. relatively to the purpose in hand, "ad quern si parum facit, levis est, gravis autem si multum," ii. 56. The meaning, then, of this sentence would be, that the amount necessary for mortal sin was relative, not absolute. This does c 18 Quantitas furti. not the least interfere with my argument. You have to prove the propriety, 1, of such a condition at all as gravitas materia ; 2, of such gravitas materia? being relative, not absolute ; (a point which, granted the first, I should not dispute ;) 3, of a scale being drawn out of such relative gravity ; 4, of the special scale adopted by S. Alfonso. Bournemouth, Sept. 20th. Having been travelling in North- amptonshire and elsewhere for some days, I have been unable to finish this letter till to-day. I have now to thank you for your note of the 13th, making the correction which you will see that I have anticipated. Of course you are prepared to give up the superstructure built upon the error. 1 I have two more remarks to make still, in comment, on your letter. 1. You write, " Unless the Qd. more or less in your supposed case added ' novam speciem malitiae,' the two acts with the same advertence and consent, would, according to S. Alphonso, be morally equal." Now, as he distinctly says that they are not equal, and you only leave one condition under which they can be unequal, you, of course, intend that condition to be taken, viz. that the Qd. additional adds "novam speciem malitias." You hold, therefore, that there is some new circumstantia which has added another accidental malitia to the act. This circum- stantia can only be the difference in persona, or the mere dif- ference in quantity. You cannot mean the difference in persona, because that would not cover the first case of 2s. and 2s. Qd., or the third case of 5s. and 5s. Qd. where the persona is the same, but only the second, which you have not quoted. You must, therefore, mean the additional quantity. Now the very thing which you began with denying, is, that the quantity of the thing stolen is made (granted advertence and consent) to constitute the difference of mortality and veniality between the two acts of theft; and now you argue that the additional Qd., not only " auget malitiam intra eandem speciem," but also " addit novam speciem malitiae." In this you go beyond S. Alfonso, for he classes quantitas furti under the head of circumstances, " speciem tantum aggravantes" — ii. 34 ; and excludes it from the class of circumstances, " speciem mutantes." — vi. 468. 1 The following is the note referred to : — Sept. 13, 1853. My dear Sir, In the quotation from St. Alphonsus's larger work in my last letter but one, I trusted my MS. notes, not having the book with me, and wrote " omnis actus" instead of actus amoris." I have not been able to refer to the original till to-day. Believe me, my dear Sir, Yours faithfully, H. E. Manning. Quantitas furti. 19 2. You say, " To steal 2s. from a rich man might be venial, while to steal 2s. 6d. from a poor man might be mortal morally impossible." You have unnecessarily aggravated the invidiousness of the case ; it should rather have been 2s. from a richer man, and 2s. from a poorer man, or 2s. and 2s. 6c7. from the same man ; but passing that by, that the case might be venial, and might be mortal, I should not dream of denying ; but then, on the other side, to steal the 2s. 6d. might be venial, and to steal the 2s. might be mortal, according to the frame of mind of the agent. It is not a question of might be, but of is, nor can you fairly start with a might be, i. e. a contingency in your premiss, and arrive at a morally impossible, i. e. a necessity in your conclusion. That conclusion is remarkable. That it is morally impossible that a man could, with the same state of mind, steal 2s. and 2s. bd. either from different persons, or from the same person, when that person is in such a position as that, with respect to him, 2s. is materia parva, 2s. Qd. materia gravis. However you account for this necessary difference of state of mind, whether because in the latter case " greater outrage is done to the Divine Laws of Justice and Charity," or because " a new species of malitia is added," or because " the whole complex of the moral act" is altered, it is only throwing back the difficulty a step further. Why and how is greater outrage done to the Divine Laws by the theft of the additional sixpence ? Why and how does the additional sixpence add a new species of malitia 1 ? Why and how does it alter the complex of the moral act ? One answer, it appears to me, can alone be given, because quantity is made the criterion between greater and less sins, even to the extent of making it (advertence and consent presupposed,) the distinctive feature between a mortal and a venial sin. 1 remain, my dear Sir, Yours faithfully, F. Metrick. LETTER VIII. Rev. H. E. Maying to Rev. F. Meyeick. Errwood, September 9, 1853. My dear Sir, I understood you in London to say, that St. Alphon- sus lays down a scale of supposed mortal and venial sins in the matter of theft from Commoners and Noblemen. The last illustration given was, the stealing half-a-crown from Lord L. or from myself. 20 Scale of Thefts. Twice in your letters you put the same case of theft from a " Commoner," or a " Nobleman :" in one place underlining the words. You do not suppose that St. Alphonsus goes by a sort of Red Book, or by a list of the Lords and Commons, as if title were the rule of his estimate. Have you not been misleading yourself by this illustration ? St. Alphonsus says nothing of Commoners and Noblemen in the sense of the cases you proposed. He takes, as you correctly stated in your letter of July 15, the classes of poor who beg, poor who labour, persons who have means of their own, artizans, traders, upper classes, noblemen included, royal persons, &c. It is manifest that his scale is formed on the diversities of lot, as to substance, from want to wealth, in the widest and fullest sense, and takes it as the measure of susceptibility of injury. His scale rests upon the same moral truth as the Parable which Nathan spoke by inspiration ; and in another aspect, of the com- mendation of our Divine Lord bestowed upon the Widow's mite. To put cases of Noblemen and Commoners, unless they in- volve this diversity of condition, and the consequent degrees of susceptibility of injury, is irrelevant. If they do involve this difference, I do not know how any Christian can deny the conclusion. For instance : To steal 5s. from a Nobleman, may be a very light injury. To steal 5s. from a Commoner, who earns his bread by hard labour, may be a very grave injury. And the formalis malitia of the act, according to St. Alphon- sus, would vary accordingly. In the scale given he lays down the following general rules : 1. That the poor who live on alms, as the old, sick, desti- tute, &c, are more susceptible of injury by theft, than poor who can earn their living : that poor who can earn their living are more susceptible of injury than those who have means of their own, and so on. 2. That in proportion as the injury inflicted is greater, (adver- tentia and consensus always pre-supposed,) the violation of the opposite virtues of justice and charity is greater, and the formalis malitia of the act is greater likewise. 3. That in estimating the gravitas peccati, one element is the quantitas furti, which, he says, is to be considered, " non solum in se ipsa, sed etiam respectu personarum, temporis, et loci," (sec. 22) by which he brings into the estimate the whole moral or formal malitia of the act. And after giving the instance of the tailor's needle, he says, "Et ita etiam potest esse grave Advertentia — Consensus — Gravitas. 21 (saltern contra caritatem) furari rem tenuis pretii, si dominus magnam paenam subiturus esset ob illius omissionem." If you will consider these words, you will hardly ask, " If quantity is not made the criterion of the theft, then what is ?" I suppose no one will say that all thefts, from the greatest to the least, deprive the soul of sanctifying grace, nor that no theft whatsoever does so. Some, therefore, do, and some do not. And it is necessary for souls to discover for themselves, or by the help of their pastors, what is their state before God. To ascertain this is as difficult as it is vital, and all that we can do, is to use the best criteria we can. St. Alphonsus, therefore, says, 1. That in trying to ascertain the guilt of thefts, the points to be estimated are — 1. The advertentia. 2. The consensus. 3. The Gravitas Furti. 2. That the gravitas furti consists formally and morally in the violation of the divine laws of justice and charity. 3. That to estimate this violation, we must consider not only the quantity stolen, but the circumstances of the case, the per- son, the time, the place, &c. 4. That this estimate can only be made by the judgment of the prudent and experienced, who are familiar with the condi- tion of their own countries and people. It is not that doctors differ in their tariff from self-sufficiency, but that men of sense, judging in different countries, and for different classes of people, in different conditions of society, necessarily give various deci- sions. St. Alphonsus says, the " opinions which are more commonly received " are " intrinsically more probable," showing that the whole subject matter is one on which rules can be given only in general. To treat it, therefore, as an appraisement of sins by shillings and sixpences, is not to object to St. Alphonsus, but to mis- understand him. Believe me, my dear Sir, Yours faithfully, H. E. Manning. 22 Quantitas furti — Gravitas materia. LETTER IX. Rev. F. Meyrick to Rev. H. E. Manning. Bournemouth, Poole, Sept. 24, 1853. My dear Sir, In your letter of July 25th, the scope of your argu- ment was, I believe, that quantitas furti was not one of the con- ditions of a theft being mortal, but a sign by which we could tell " the interior frame of mind of the agent ;" " the conditions under which mortal sin may become venial, or venial sin may become mortal, being the absence or presence of a malicious intention, or advertentia ad malitiam objecti." Advertentia ad malitiam objecti, therefore, combined, doubtless, with consensus, was, according to this theory, the cause of the mortality of a sin, and gravitas materice was only a sign by which its existence might be known. In my reply of Aug. 24, I pointed out that advertentia ad malitiam objecti could not mean malicious inten- tion — that gravitas materia? was distinctly stated by Liguori to be a condition, without which a sin was not mortal ; and that the reason why it would be natural in him to make a certain quantitas a necessary condition for theft, was, that he taught that the essence of the sin, or, at any rate, one ingredient in the essence of the sin, was, "the quantity of harm done to our neighbour." In your letter of Sept. 9, the whole scope of the argument is, that in proportion as the injury inflicted upon our neighbour is greater or less, the sin is greater or less ; and, therefore, that quantitas, both absolute and relative, is a necessary condition of a theft being mortal. I may consider, therefore, that you have abandoned the ground which you first took up as untenable, and adopted a position which, I allow, is more in accordance with Liguori's teaching. It remains to examine whether this theory, which adopts and justifies the principle of quantitas furti, will do better than the previous one, which, made as though it were not there at all, or, if there, could be resolved into some- thing else. As to the supposed difficulty of " nobleman" and " com- moner," on which you seem to imagine that I have a miscon- ception, I have understood the term " nobleman" just as you do. The reason why I chose it more than others, was, that it was a more comprehensible class than some of the others, and because we had begun originally with the mention of that class. His scale in the Theologia Moralis is apparently Scale of Thefts. 23 s. d. With respect to those who beg, 5 With respect to those who work, 10 With respect to mechanics, 1 With respect to the moderately rich, 1 8 With respect to the absolutely rich, or very opulent merchants, 2 6 With respect to very rich noblemen, 1 5 With respect to a very rich community, 7 6 With respect to kings 10 It would not be difficult to find fault with the relative pro- portions here laid down, but as my objection is to scales being laid down at all, and to any kind of amount being defini- tively fixed as a necessary condition of mortality, I do not choose to take such low ground as that of objecting to any spe- cial scale. It will be seen, however, that this scale bears out my original assertion, that, according to S. Alfonso, the theft of 2s. &d. from Lord L. would have been venial, and from yourself, mortal, if committed at the same time and place, and with identically the same degree of malicious intention towards each. I am aware that you have denied the possibility of the existence of an equal degree of malice in cases where the sufferers have not about the same amount of wealth, but I believe that I have disproved that position in my last letter. Indeed, it appears to me that it only requires to be stated nakedly, in order to dis- prove itself. To come to the main question now at issue. Is the harm done to our neighbour the formal cause of the sinfulness of theft in such sense as, that, with the increase of harm done, the sinfulness of the act of theft increases in like ratio ? This is plainly the foundation on which you rest your arguments in your letter of Sept. 9, as shown by your saying that, accord- ing as 5s. was a very light or very grave injury, "the formalis malitia would vary accordingly." And again, " that in pro- portion as the injury inflicted is greater . . . the formalis malitia of the act is greater likewise." Now it is obvious to remark on this, 1. That it is not very high morality. There is teaching of a more exalted character to be found among heathens, e. g. Horace : " Nam de mille fabae modiis si surripis unum Damnum est, non f acinus, mihi pacto lenius isto." 2. That it is a lawyer-like fashion of measuring crime 1 The epithet is omitted in the Homo Apostolicus, but is doubtless meant. 24 The essential Sinfulness of Theft. more adapted to a criminal code of a state, than a method of computing sinfulness on the principles of religion and pure morality. 3. That if the principle were carried out, it would be very- difficult for a clerk in the Rothschilds' firm, or a servant in Lord Westminster's household, to be guilty of a mortal theft, for their masters are not easily "susceptible of injury" by mode- rate losses. 4. That a man finding a purse containing 5s. and wilfully appropriating it, would be ignorant whether he had committed a mortal or venial sin — whether, that is, God's grace was withdrawn from him, and his soul spiritually dead, or whether he had but sinned in a way sufficient not to diminish God's grace towards him, but only his own affection towards God. But I maintain that the amount of harm done to our neigh- bour is not the formal cause of the sinfulness of theft. " Sin," says S. Alfonso, " is defined by S. Augustin and S. Thomas. ' A thing said, a thing done, or a thing coveted, against the Eternal Law.' The words, ' against the Eternal Law,' are used, because in this consists the whole formal badness of the sin." Now God has written the moral law in our hearts, and the positive law in His Word : " Thou shalt not take that which is not thine to take." This is the law of Justice in one of its forms. As soon, therefore, as anyone has knowingly and wilfully taken that which was not his to take, he has broken the Divine Law of Justice. The act of the sin of Theft is complete. Whether the thing was worth more or less, whether more or less harm has been done to the owner, are, I acknowledge, points of importance ; but they are further points ; they do not once come into consideration as elements constituting the essential sinfulness of the act of theft, but only as adding, it may be, an additional malitia to it. " Circumstances," says S. Alfonso, " either add a new kind of badness to an act, or aggravate its badness." Such a circum- stance is the more or less injury inflicted by the theft. A man sees 6