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 OF 
 
 Hon.WM. WARNER, OF DETROIT, 
 
 IN THE LEGISLATURE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 JANUARY 28, 1864, 
 
 ON SOLDIERS’ SUFFRAGE. 
 
 The Committee of the whole House, haying 
 under consideration the subject of extending 
 the Elective Franchise to Michigan Soldiers, 
 
 - when absent from their places of residence in 
 the Army and Navy of the United States, ei- 
 ther by means of what is called “the field sys- 
 tem,” or “ the proxy system,” Mr. WARNER 
 ' remarked substantially as follows : 
 
 Mr. Chairman : I do not get up, because 
 I am about to attempt to make a speech on 
 this subject, in the technical sense of the term. 
 I have no such purpose. And yet, I feel that 
 I owe it to myself, to the members of this 
 House, and, especially, to those whom I rep- 
 resent on this floor, whether in the Army, 
 or at home, to say, at least, so much as shall 
 be necessary to explain some of the reasons for 
 the vote I expect to cast, when either of the 
 bills now presented for our consideration, 
 shall be put on its final passage. 
 
 How One Is Liable to be Misunder- 
 stood— A Precaution Against It. 
 
 Mr. Chairman : In times of great popular 
 excitement, when the current of general sym- 
 pathy runs high and urgently in one direction, 
 a person, especially one in any public station, 
 is very liable to be so far misapprehended as 
 to be put in a false position, even before those 
 whom he much esteems, and whose opinions 
 are justly entitled to respect, if he cannot, 
 consistently with his convictions of truth and 
 duty, fall in, and go with the current, on all 
 collateral and accidental questions, as well as 
 on all that are truly cardinal. 
 
 To guard against such misapprehension, 
 somewhat, and the injustice attending it, per- 
 mit me, Sir, to say right here, that this war of 
 
 self-preservation on the part of the Union, has 
 my earnest approbation ; and that our brave 
 citizen soldiers engaged in it, have my fervent 
 sympathy, and have had, and shall continue to 
 have, all the practical aid and comfort in my 
 power to render them, till their work shall be 
 fully done, and the rebels shall be coerced to 
 submission, and civil authority and public 
 tranquility fully restored. 
 
 And, if, Mr. Chairman, I shall feel called 
 upon to vote against the passage of either of 
 these bills, or of both, I shall do so, not be- 
 cause my heart is not alive to the interests and 
 wishes of our noble brothers in the field, but 
 because my heart is also alive with love and 
 respect for that same authority of constitu- 
 tional law, to maintain and enfore which, they 
 freely peril all; it will be because I shall feel 
 bound to follow the clear dictates of my un- 
 derstanding and conscience; it will be because 
 I feel bound to do, here, on this floor, what 
 they are giving their blood and lives to secure, 
 namely, obedience to the fundamental law of the 
 land . 
 
 These Measures a Ground of Real 
 Solicitude. 
 
 Mr. Chairman: I frankly confess to you, 
 and to the members of this Committee, 
 that I approach the subject now before 
 us, with feelings of unaccustomed solicitude 
 — a solicitude mingled with sad surprise, and 
 strange, ill-boding fears. It is fair to suppose 
 that these measures indicate the nature of the 
 feeling, and the tendencies of mind, into 
 which a large share of the people have fallen. 
 These measures are, doubtless, both the pro- 
 duct — the natural out-growth— and exponent 
 of the majority. This is a chief reason why 
 I contemplate them with such painful anxie- 
 
2 
 
 ties. I feel as though the majority of this Leg- 
 islature, and perhaps of the people of the State, 
 are, consciously or unconsciously — in some in- 
 stances the lormer, and in others the latter — 
 calling on us through these, and other incon- 
 siderate measures, to launch into lawless 
 chaos. Such seems to be the strong tendency 
 of the majority. I deplore it. I shudder as 1 
 look into the future, and forecast the conse- 
 quences which may spring from these unbid- 
 den experiments, and from the state of public 
 feeling in which they originate. If these pro- 
 clivities and tendencies are to run on, uncheck- 
 ed and uncontrolled, and are to work out their 
 natural and ultimate consequences, what have 
 we that we can look upon as secure? Al- 
 ready, as this family of measures are pressed 
 upon us, under one pretence and another, and 
 as their adoption becomes more and more 
 certain, I seem to feel the very foundations 
 giving way under my feet. 
 
 Adherence to First Principles Essen- 
 tial in These Times. 
 
 Sir, in a day like this, when our country is 
 in a hard life-and-death struggle, in the abyss 
 of civil war; when the whole fabric of our 
 free institutions is shaking from top to bottom 
 under the shock of a vast, and long protract- 
 ed rebellion, aimed at its utter overthrow ; it 
 seems to me that it is no time for us, here, to 
 break away from safe moorings, or voluntarily 
 destroy well-settled landmarks by our course 
 of legislation. We should not suffer ourselves 
 to depart from the well-known and well-tried 
 course of safety, unless actually compelled to 
 do so, by an overruling necessity. We, here, 
 in the loyal States, should, and, if wise, will, 
 hold fast to all fundamentals, so that what 
 ought not to be shaken, shall remain. 
 
 Side Issues Thrown About this Subject 
 by the Message, aud Otherwise. 
 
 But we will draw nearer to the merits of the 
 question in hand. And here I feel compelled 
 to make this further preliminary remark : It 
 not unfrequently happens, Sir, as we all well 
 know, that when a great matter is brought for- 
 ward for consideration and decision, very spe- 
 cious, but, at the same time, really foreign 
 questions work themselves up before the at- 
 tention, get control of it, and divert it from 
 the actual issues in the case, to themselves. 
 In this way it is that these false, irrelevant, 
 but seductive questions, often seem to many 
 minds, to be the very hinges on which the 
 whole case turns : whereas, they are in reality, 
 not in the case at all, but are wholly outside 
 of it, are not related to it, and should have 
 nothing, whatever, to do with it. 
 
 And, now, Sir, I feel fully warranted in say- 
 ing that the case under discussion is one of 
 the most conspicuous of this class of cases. 
 These foreign, false, yet extremely meretri- 
 cious and seductive issues have so crowded 
 themselves into it, about it, and over it, and 
 under it, that the most cautious and discrim- 
 inating among us are in great danger of mis- 
 taking them for the real issue in question. It 
 may, therefore, be quite profitable for us to 
 search out these delusive, side issues, in this 
 case, ‘ and brand and cast them out, so that 
 they will deceive no more. What, then, are 
 they? I answer, that one clearly is this: “If 
 these volunteer citizen soldiers should not 
 
 have a voice in the civil administration of the 
 government for which they fight, then it 
 would be well to inquire, who is worthy of it?” 
 — See Message, page 10. 
 
 Now mark : In the present condition of our 
 election laws, soldiers, when absent from their 
 places of residence, cannot vote at our State 
 or local elections; but it is proposed that this 
 Legislature pass an act enabling them to do 
 so. The essential question arises here in the 
 outset, namely : “ Is it competent for the Leg- 
 islature^ pass such an act? ” This is a Consti- 
 tutional question. It depends, wholly, on the 
 wording of our State Constitution. But this side 
 issue, thus artfully presented to us, as a sort 
 of preamble, would have the question turn, 
 not on the wording and plain sense of the 
 Constitution, but on the worthiness of the 
 soldiers : just as though an admission that our 
 citizen soldiers are worthy of the right to vote, 
 is the same thing as to decide, that the word- 
 ing of the Constitution of Michigan is exactly 
 such as to enable this Legislature to confer on 
 them the right to vote, in our State and local 
 elections, when they are out of the State, or to 
 give this body the undoubted right to send 
 the ballot box to them, out of the State, or 
 out of the town or ward where they reside, or 
 to authorize them to vote by proxy. Why, 
 the worthiness of our volunteers is one thing, 
 and I assure you, sir, that I claim it to be a 
 very great thing ; but, yet, the wording of our 
 Constitution, by which the powers of this Leg- 
 islature are determined, is a verydifferent thing. 
 And while these two things from their very 
 nature, cannot be opposed to each other, they 
 of course have no legal or logical connection. 
 
 Again. It is said: “The volunteer army 
 of the United States is composed of the peo- 
 ple of the United States. They have left their 
 various occupations, not to become profes- 
 sional soldiers, not to renounce civil life and 
 the pursuits of peace, but to establish upon an 
 enduring basis the right to both, for them- 
 selves and their posterity. They are absent 
 from the polls of the elections, in their several 
 towns and wards, beating back the power of a 
 causless and cruel rebellion, in order that 
 these very elections may be held in peace, and 
 that the right to hold them, and to have their 
 results respected and obeyed, shall continue 
 forever. If these volunteer citizen soldiers 
 should not have a voice in the civil administra- 
 tion of the Government,” (that is, if they are 
 not permitted to vote, although ever so far 
 away from their several places of residence) 
 “then, who is worthy of it?”— Message, page 
 9—10. 
 
 Exactly so. This is all just and well, as a 
 tribute to our noble soldiers. But the ques- 
 tion very naturally suggests itself to a fair, 
 logical mind, how does even such a well de- 
 served commendation affect the question as to 
 the constitutional right of Michigan soldiers 
 to vote in our elections, when they are either 
 out of the State, or away from the town or 
 ward in which they reside? We may go still 
 further and claim, and get it universally ad- 
 mitted, that they are very models of patriot- 
 ism. These eloquent representations and 
 awards may deeply move our admiration and 
 sympathy, but it will hardly do for us, as leg- 
 islators, sworn to follow the Constitution, to 
 adopt them, as sufficient reasons for passing 
 either of these bills. The generous, manly, seffi 
 
3 
 
 sacrificing patriotism of our citizen soldiers is 
 one thing; but the powers of this Legislature, 
 under the unmistakable wording of our or- 
 ganic law, is quite another matter. We will 
 honor, reward and rely on the former, in all 
 such ways and degrees as become us to do ; 
 but the latter furnishes the rule for our legis- 
 lative action, and, on no consideration, may 
 we depart from it. 
 
 Again. It is said: “Surely, he who stands 
 faithfully by his country in the shock of bat- 
 tle, may be safely trusted at the ballot box, 
 though it should be carried to him at Vicks- 
 burg or Chattanooga.” — See Message, p. 
 10. Grant it. Nay, affirm it, and re-affirm 
 it, and affirm it again, and let every 
 body admit and assert it at home and 
 abroad, from this day forward. But what 
 then? What has any or all of that to do with 
 the wording and sense of our State Constitu- 
 tion? Does it enlarge any of its provisions, 
 or remove any of its limitations? Does it 
 work any amendments to it, or a meaning into 
 its words, not before there ? Or is any settled 
 rule of interpretation thereby done away with, 
 or others, new and unthought of before, orig- 
 inated and established in their stead? Not at 
 , ail. The safety of sending the ballot box to 
 Chattanooga, the Potomap, to Texas, the Gulf 
 of Mexico, or Islands of the Sea, is one thing; 
 but the special wording of the Constitution by 
 which the action of this Legislature is limited, 
 is another and very different thing, indeed. 
 And, as clear-headed men, desirous of clearing 
 this subject of all extraneous matter, we shall 
 be careful to mark these entire differences, 
 and shut out what is wholly irrelevant. 
 
 I am well aware, that some may undertake 
 to claim, in reply, that what has been cited 
 thus far, as false issues, tending to bias the 
 mind and lead it to commit erroneous acts, 
 are only considerations, offered to show the 
 eminent fitness of an enactment by this Legis- 
 lature, enabling absent soldiers to vote, provi- 
 ded the Constitution will really admit of it. 
 
 In answer to such a plea, it should seem 
 quite sufficient to say, that the remarks re- 
 ferred to, falling from whom they did, to 
 whom they did, when and where they did, and 
 appealing as they did and continue to do, to 
 feelings already formed, and to sympathies al- 
 ready strong, are actually received, taken up 
 and used by the many, here, and throughout 
 the State, as a kind of preamble, expressing the 
 conclusive reasons for the action recommend- 
 ed, and now sought by the friends of these re- 
 spective bills. Such is the effect of them, un- 
 der the circumstances : such is the use made of 
 them. They, therefore, practically raise false, 
 seductive, and dangerous issues. 
 
 But, Mr. Chairman, I have not quite done 
 with this species of reasoning. For it is stated 
 as a good reason why one or the other of these 
 bills should pass, that the soldiers desire to 
 vote ; that they will vote right ; and that a big 
 victory, at the ballot box, would do more to- 
 wards relaxing the rebellion, and saving the 
 Union, than several great victories by our 
 arms. These points were dwelt upon, and em- 
 phasized in this Hall the other evening, and 
 they are taken up, repeated, and urged as de- 
 cisive arguments in favor of these measures. 
 
 Now, in the first place, the comparative ef- 
 fect of these two victories here spoken of, is 
 at least but the prediction of an advocate ; but 
 
 for the sake of the argument, just admit, if 
 you please, that these premises are all valid. 
 What then? What has that to do with the 
 languageof the Constitution, by which this 
 Legislature is to be governed? The desire of 
 the soldiers to vote may be ever so strong, 
 their politics ever so sound, and the effect of 
 their voting ever so gratifying, yet all that 
 does not make the wording of the Constitu- 
 tion, regarding the same, other than what it 
 is, and must continue to be, until changed in 
 a constitutional way. 
 
 Another Side Issue as to Constitu- 
 tional Doubts— The Binding Rule as 
 to Sucli Doubts— Evils of Departing 
 from it. 
 
 It is claimed by the friends of this measure, 
 that if there is “ doubt,” as to its Constitution- 
 ality, the soldier of right and justice, is enti- 
 tled to the benefit of it. (Senate Doc. No. 1, 
 p. 10.) This plea is on the tongue of the 
 many, and we meet it at almost every turn. 
 There is evidently an illusion about the words 
 of this plea to which it owes its plausibility 
 and effect. And it seems to arise in this way : 
 In criminal law, a person is deemed innocent 
 until proved to be guilty ; and when the ac- 
 cused is on trial, he is entitled to the full ben- 
 efits of all real doubts in the matter of proof. 
 And the argument now is, that if this is so, 
 in case of everybody accused of crime, much 
 more should it be so, in case of the soldier, 
 when his right to vote is being settled. If the 
 reputed criminal is entitled to the advantages 
 of all the doubts, it is said, that the soldier is 
 much more entitled to them, in this case. 
 
 Now, Mr. Chairman, in the first place, it so 
 happens, that the soldier is not on trial, here ; 
 but the Constitution of the sovereign State of 
 Michigan, ordained by the people, is on trial , 
 and it is undergoing a hard trial, too, not so 
 much from the want of a perfect case, as from 
 the biases, the moral inability, and foregone 
 conclusions of those sitting upon it. And in the 
 second place, it is not admitted by the friends 
 of the Constitution, that there are any real 
 doubts about this matter. There are sophistries 
 enough thrown about it, it is true, and side 
 issues, illusions and “petty fogs,” but no real 
 doubts, so far as I have been able to see. And, 
 in the third place, if there are doubts about it, * 
 and if the maxim referred to has any applica- 
 tion here at all, certainly the Constitution, 
 established by the sovereign people, as it was 
 understood when it was adopted, and as it has 
 been understood and acted on, from that day 
 down, is emphatically entitled to the benefit of 
 all of them. If doubts exist, surely, in this 
 time of civil and political upheavals, the old, 
 time-hallowed, well-attested course of safety 
 should have the advantage of them. 
 
 And, right here Mr. Chairman, let me ad- 
 vert for a moment to a notion, with which 
 honorable gentlemen seem to be so very well 
 satisfied, namely : “This subject,” they say, 
 
 “ we find to be embarrassed by very formida- 
 ble doubts, in a constitutional respect. We 
 find ourselves unable to solve them. Men of 
 ability and large learning in the law, may be 
 able to do it. Consequently, the shortest and 
 best way for us to dispose of the matter is to 
 pass the bill, let the law go into effect, and 
 
4 
 
 then let the courts settle the question as to its 
 constitutionality.” 
 
 Now, Sir, overlooking, if you please, the ab- 
 sence on the one hand, and presence on the 
 other, of the spirit and qualities, denoted by this 
 somewhat remarkable plea, it is observable 
 1. That the very nature of our office, as mem- 
 bers of this House, makes us not only legisla- 
 tors , but, at the same time judges of the con- 
 stitutionality of our proposed acts. We stand 
 here in this two-iold capacity. The exercise 
 of the legislative powers of the State is com- 
 mitted to our discretion, subject always to the 
 Constitution. It is presumed that we know 
 what the Constitution contains, and that we 
 will pass no law, unless we are first well satis- 
 fied, after faithful examination, that it i6 agree- 
 able to its intent and meaning. Our official 
 oath is based on this idea. By it, we declare, 
 uuder the most solemn sanctions, that we will 
 faithlully discharge the duties of this two-fold 
 office of a State representative, according to 
 the best of our ability, and that, in this two- 
 fold capacity, we will support the Constitution 
 of this State— that we will faithlully give our 
 time and best thoughts to this very business. 
 Now, tell me, how all this can be done, unless 
 we not only legislate, if need shall be, but 
 also adjudge the constitutionality of our legis- 
 lation, and see to it, that it is beneficial on the 
 one hand, and in keeping with the Constitu- 
 tion on the other? Theie can be no other 
 way. We, then, as legislators, are to act as 
 judges, in the first instance, of the constitu- 
 tional validity of our acts. And in discharg- 
 ing this part of our duty, we, of course, are to 
 be guided by the same principles as govern 
 the courts in like cases. This is admitted on 
 all hands, and denied by none. But see now 
 what necessarily coines of it : “It i6 a well-set- 
 tled principle, that the courts cannot interfere 
 and declare a statute void, unless the inva- 
 lidity is placed, in their judgment, beyond 
 reasonable doubt” (Adams vs. Howe, 14 Mass., 
 345. Clark vs. The People, 26 Wend., 599.) 
 
 The points I make here are these : 1. The 
 courts cannot rightfully or lawfully act against 
 their reasonable doubts. (5 Mich. 251.) 2. 
 This rule is just as applicable to the Legisla- 
 ture as to the court. The Legislature must 
 be governed by the same rules of interpreta- 
 tion as the court, and can no more go against 
 its substantial constitutional doubts than the 
 court can against theirs. 
 
 Senate Doc. No. 1 holds out the idea, and 
 many seem to have fallen into the dangerous 
 error, that, if a measure is only so embarrassed 
 with constitutional doubts, that the court will 
 not be fully satisfied of its unconstitutionality , 
 and cn that account will not declare it void, it 
 is then all right, as between us, as legislators, 
 on the one hand, and the Constitution on the 
 other, to pass it. Whereas, the rule is 
 this: We, as legislators, must be first 
 
 satisfied that a statute would be consti- 
 tutional before we can enact it; while the 
 court must be first satisfied, that it is actually 
 ^constitutional before they will declare it 
 void; and if we, as legislators, have a sub- 
 stantial doubt as to whether an act would be 
 constitutional, we are to pause ; while, on the 
 other hand, if the court have a substantial 
 doubt as to the ^constitutionality of an act, 
 they are to likewise pause. 3. It being admit- 
 ted by the plea referred to, and otherwise by 
 
 the members of this body favorable to this 
 measure, that both of these bills are embarras- 
 sed with substantial constitutional doubts, it 
 thence follows, that we are firmly bound, for 
 that very reason, were there no other, to pause 
 in our attempts to pass either of them, and, 
 in due course, dismiss one, and vote down the 
 other. And, 
 
 2. Consider what, surely, must be the con- 
 sequences of the opposite course. If we are 
 to allow ourselves to pass laws of whose con- 
 stitutionality we are not satisfied, or of which 
 we entertain substantial doubts in this regard, 
 on the plea that the courts will properly 
 adjuge and dispose of them, then we may bid 
 “ a last adieu ” to all system and harmony in 
 legislation. Our statute books will soon be- 
 come a great body of questionable and oppos- 
 ing acts, by which the people and all the 
 branches of Government will be thrown into 
 “ confusion worse confounded.” And the 
 courts can afford no relief, because substan- 
 tial constitutional doubts stand in their way, 
 and they are justifiable. We, all the while, 
 keep on in these ways of anarchy, because we 
 are not to be restrained by constitutional 
 doubts, although never so grave and sub- 
 stantial! Thus the indifference to constitu- 
 tional landmarks, already too apparent, will 
 intensify and spread, and so far as it shall pre- 
 vail, just to that extent we shall have nothing 
 to go by, no common ground to stand on, no 
 common rule to act under, no common stand- 
 ard to judge by. In very truth we should then 
 have neither rule nor standard at all. Reason- 
 able doubts no longer detering us, we should 
 launch our legislation out on the tumultuous 
 and harborless 6ea of uncertainty, and this old 
 Ship of State, committed to our management, 
 would roll, and pitch, and strain, and suffer 
 fearful damage, if not a total wreck at our 
 hands. 
 
 Let us then, Mr. Chairman, meet this case 
 as men, as good legislators, investigate and 
 adjudge it with care and candor, respecting 
 and following our well-formed convictions, 
 and pausing, as we are most solemnly bound 
 to do, at our reasonable doubts — being duly 
 forewarned, on the highest of all authority, 
 that “ he that doubteth, and yet eateth, is 
 surely to be condemned.” 
 
 Another Side Issue— Party Policy Re- 
 quires that the Responsibility of This 
 
 Matter be Shifted from the Legisla- 
 ture to the Courts, 
 
 This mischievous side issue, calls for a re- 
 mark. It may be stated thus : The soldiers 
 and the people are clamorous for the passage 
 of this measure ; their feelings are excited and 
 resolute about it; they cannot be made to un- 
 derstand why it should not be passed; if it be 
 not passed, the dominant party will be held 
 responsible for the failure, and will be very 
 likely to suffer great damage as a party by 
 reason of it; and that, consequently, policy 
 requires the passage of this measure, so as to 
 shift the responsibility of its defeat (if defeat- 
 ed it must be) from the party in power to the 
 courts, under the belief that if it is killed by 
 the court, that party will suffer much less in- 
 jury than it will, if it is killed by the Legis- 
 lature. To this plea I reply : 
 
 1. That we, as legislators, as we have al- 
 
5 
 
 ready seen, are bound to act as judges in tbis 
 matter, in the first instance, and that we can- 
 not shirk this duty without committing a 
 breach of trust. 
 
 2. The question for us to consider is, not 
 what would promote the interests of this, 
 that, or the other political party, but is this 
 measure agreeable to the Constitution, and 
 does the best good of the State require its 
 passage? We are to act here for the best 
 good of the entire State, and not exclusively 
 or chiefly for a particular locality, and not at 
 all for Jhe aggrandizement of any political 
 party as such. Our official oath knows no 
 party. It recognizes only the State and 
 National Constitutions, and the best good of 
 the entire people of Michigan. 
 
 3. In the better days of the Republic, it was 
 deemed the dictate of wisdom to place ju- 
 dicial officers above the influences of party 
 politics, or the fluctuations of popular feeling. 
 Consequently they were appointed by the 
 Legislatures for all the courts within their 
 respective States ; but in these latter days a 
 change has taken place in this respect, and now 
 these judicial officers are elective of the 
 people. Thus far, however, the sense of 
 sacredness which attaches to the courts, has 
 to a good degree, shielded them from the 
 debasements, which too often and too strong- 
 ly mark the election of other public officers, 
 and the administration of their trust. But, 
 Sir, it is painful, that we are not able to say, 
 that all of our courts are clear and above re- 
 proach in this direction. We should not forget 
 that judges and magistrates are human, are 
 subject to the same susceptibilities and weak- 
 ness as other men; and that wisdom and safe- 
 ty require that they should not be tempted 
 above what they are able to bear; nor, on the 
 other hand, is it safe to do anything, which 
 shall tend to diminish in the common mind 
 the respect and sense of sacredness felt 
 towards courts of law and justice. But let us 
 pause and ask : what do they propose who seek 
 to escape responsibility in the matter before 
 us, and throw it upon the court? Why, they, 
 in effect, propose, instead of preserving and 
 strengthening the safeguards about our courts, 
 io turn the excited and clamorous feelings of 
 the army and the populace towards the courts 
 to surge and beat against them. What would 
 be the natural consequence? Would it not be 
 in substance this: that if the courts should 
 stand firm, and not shape their action by the 
 popular demand, but by a careful adherence 
 to the letter and spirit of the law, they would 
 either be overthrown, or the upright and un- 
 flinching judges would be discarded, and 
 others elected in their stead, who would 
 accommodate their official acts to the popular 
 feeling? That, sir, would be an evil day for 
 our State. But this is the very condition of 
 things, which this plea, if acted on, would 
 naturally bring about, as every candid man 
 must admit, who will trace out its legitimate 
 consequences. Hence, this plea in behalf of 
 this measure is not to be entertained tor a 
 moment. It is not only utterly false and 
 irrelevant in principle, but it is especially dan- 
 gerous in its tendencies. 
 
 So much, Mr. Chairman, for some of the 
 many seductive side issues, that have been 
 thrown around this subject, which I have 
 thought best to clear away. 
 
 We now come directly to 
 
 Tbe Main Questions at Issue— Wliat 
 They Are— The Controlling Features 
 of these Bills. 
 
 1. The Senate bill No. 3, Sections 1 and 2, 
 provides, that qualified and duly registered 
 voters of this State, shall be permitted to vote 
 by proxy, or by an agent, at every general elec- 
 tion, who shall be absent from the township 
 or ward in which they reside, on the day of 
 election, in the military or naval service of this 
 State or the United States. 
 
 2. The House bill No. 5 provides, that 
 polls shall be opened for each regiment, or 
 detached portion of each regiment or com- 
 pany of Michigan soldiers, when absent from 
 the township or ward in which they reside, in 
 the military service of this State or of the 
 United States ; that such polls shall be opened 
 on the same day that is provided for by Title 
 3, Chap. 6, of the compiled laws; that Com- 
 missioners shall be appointed to take the 
 votes of such absentees ; that the votes shall 
 be canvassed immediately after the polls shall 
 be closed ; that the results shall be certified to 
 by the inspectors unto certain canvassers in 
 the State, and one copy sent by mail to the 
 Secretary of State at Lansing, and another 
 handed to one of the Commissioners; and 
 that each elector, voting by virtue of these 
 provisions, shall be considered as voting in 
 the town or ward in which he had a residence 
 at the time of his entering the military ser- 
 vice. Such are the controlling features of the 
 House bill. 
 
 In a few words, the Senate bill provides, 
 that absent citizen soldiers may vote by proxy. 
 The House bill, on the other hand, provides 
 for sending the ballot box to these soldiers to 
 receive their votes. These are the two central 
 propositions which I propose to consider. 
 If either of these are upheld, details can be 
 readily adjusted to it ; but if each fails, then 
 all falls to the ground. Let me then state 
 these two controlling questions, again, that 
 all may clearly understand just what each 
 one is. 
 
 1. Would an act of the Legislature author- 
 izing citizens of the State, who shall be absent 
 from the township or ward in which they 
 reside, in the military service of this State, or 
 of the United States, to vote by proxy, at our 
 public elections, be constitutional? 
 
 2. Would an act of the Legislature, requir- 
 ing polls ta be opened on the day of our pub- 
 lic elections, among our citizen solders, who 
 shall then be absent from the township or 
 ward in which they reside, in the military ser- 
 vice of this State, or of the United States, be 
 constitutional; and would votes thus given and 
 taken, be valid, and entitled to be counted in 
 the public elections of this State ? 
 
 Mb. Chairman: I am constrained by the 
 convictions of my understanding, and the dic- 
 tates of my conscience, to answer both of 
 these questions in the negative. And now, 
 lease hear me with candor and patience while 
 explain my reasons. 
 
 Provisions of tlie Constitution Appli- 
 cable to This Subject. 
 
 It is admitted on all hands, and denied by 
 nobody, that all there is in the Constitution 
 
relative to this subject is contained in Sec- 
 tions 1, 2 and 5 of Article 7. All there is in 
 Section 5, which applies to this question is 
 this, namely: “No elector shall be deemed to 
 have gained or lost a residence by reason of 
 being employed in the service of the United 
 States or ot this State.” Sec. 2 provides, 
 that “ all votes shall be given by ballot , ex- 
 cept for such township officers as may be 
 authorized by law to be otherwise chosen.” 
 Sec. 1 reads thus : “ In all elections, every 
 white male citizen, every white male inhabit- 
 ant residing in this State on the 24th day of 
 June, 1835; every white male inhabitant, 
 residing in the State on the first day of Janu- 
 ary, 1850, who has declared his intention to 
 become a citizen of the United States, pur- 
 suant to the laws thereof, six months preced- 
 ing an election, or who has resided in this 
 State two years and six months, and declared j 
 his intention as aforesaid, and every civilized 
 male inhabitant of Indian descent, a native of j 
 the United States, and not a member of any 
 tribe, shall be an elector and entitled to vote ; I 
 but no citizen or inhabitant shall be an elector or \ 
 entitled to vote at a7iy election , unless he shall be j 
 above the age of twenty-one years , and has 
 resided in the State three months , and in the town - j 
 ship or ward in which he offers to vote , ten days j 
 next preceding such election .” 
 
 Exposition of These Parts of the Con- 1 
 stitution— Certain Errors in the Mes- 
 sage exposed. 
 
 Now, keeping distinctly in view the provis- 
 ions of Sections 2 and 5, what is the true intent 
 and meaning of Section 1, just quoted? What ! 
 is the real intendment of it, just as it stands, ! 
 in its connections, whether it be contained in 
 affirmative or negative word6, or by what they : 
 necessarily imply? For it is the real intend- j 
 ment that we should seek, because that must 
 
 f overn: just as the Court of Appeals in New 
 ork, in Newell vs. The .People, 3 Shedd. 97, 
 say: “ Whether we are considering an agree- 
 ment between parties, a statute or a Constitu- I 
 tion, with a view to its interpretation, the I 
 thing we are to 6eek, is the thought which it 
 expresses.” 
 
 Look at the words of this Section. Each 
 one must have some meaning, and no one of 
 them can have but one meaning, where it 
 stands, and it is to be presumed, that that 
 meaning is a sensible one. But what is it? Take : 
 the following, for example: “ Has resided ,” 
 has domiciled, has dwelt, as in a • settled and 
 fixed home. But the word “resided” is 
 modified and limited by the words “ in the 
 township or ward.” Residence is thus restrict- 
 eclto one or the other of these places. And 
 wlat are these places? They are subdivisions 
 of the territory of Michigan, whose boundar- 
 ies are marked out, recorded, and declared by 
 public authority. These divisions, districts, 
 or narrow precincts are known in law by the 
 name and style of “townships or wards,” 
 as the case may be. They not only limit and 
 restrict the word “ resided ” in this sentence, 
 but are themselves also limited and restricted 
 by the words “ in which he offers to vote.” “ In 
 which ” denotes here the identity of “ the town- 
 ship or ward,” with the place of voting. The 
 word “ in” denotes the place at or within which 
 something is said to be or to be done. Here it 
 
 denotes the place, the township or ward within 
 which the citizen may vote. It denotes actual 
 presence, and that the act of voting must be 
 performed within the township or waid, and 
 not out of it. “In” has here exactly this 
 meaning — in, as distinguished from out. 
 
 Residence , then, is restricted to some one 
 township or ward, in the State, and denotes 
 and fixes the location or piace within which the 
 citizens may vote. Thus our Constitution 
 makes the place of voting an essential ingred- 
 ient of the right to vote. It attaches the 
 place of voting to the essential requisites of a 
 voter. 
 
 “ Offers. ” The etymological sense of this 
 word is here, also, the obvious, practical sense 
 of it. As every scholar well knows, it is of 
 Latin origin, and is compounded of ob, signi- 
 fying to or before , and ferro, signifying to bear , 
 to bring , to present. Put together, they make 
 the Latin word offerro , which means to bring 
 to, to present to; and the word, offerro , is ex- 
 pressed in English by the woid “ offer,” the 
 primary sense ot which is to present lor ac- 
 ceptance or rejection; to exhibit something 
 which may be received or rejected. (See Web. 
 Die.) This is both the literal and ordinary, 
 practical meaning. 
 
 “ To vote.” These words are to be con- 
 strued in reference to Sec. 2 of Art. 7, which 
 declares that all votes at public elections shall 
 be given by ballot, except for township officers. 
 “ To offer to vote,” then, at a general elec- 
 tion, means to tender a ballot. Who is to do 
 it? The Constitution says, “he,” (not some 
 one in his stead, but “ he,”) the identical elec- 
 tor in person. 
 
 And right here, perhaps as well as anywhere, 
 I may advert to a certain point made in the 
 Message. Alter quoting the latter member 
 of Sec. 1, the Message says, page 13: “ These 
 are fit words to establish the qualifications of 
 voters, but not to control the Legislature as 
 to places where polls of election shall be es- 
 tablished and votes offered and received.” 
 But what qualifications do these words estab- 
 lish? 1. age; 2, residence in the State three 
 months; 3, a residence for the ten days next 
 preceding the election, in the township or ward 
 in which he , the elector, offers to vote. The 
 thought to be pressed here is, that the town- 
 ship or ward residence, and the place of voting are 
 one and the same, and in this state of identity, 
 they actually constitute one of the qualifica- 
 tions of the voter, “established” by “these 
 fit words ” of the Constitution. These words, 
 in prescribing the requisites of the voter, de- 
 rive a chief element of their potency from the 
 place ol voting; so true is this, that were this 
 element taken away, these words would be 
 emptied of a principal part ot their contents. 
 
 The Message, p. 13, further says that “ these 
 words speak directly as to age and residence, 
 and only to these qualifications.” Grant it, 
 if you please. But, on the other hand, it can- 
 not escape the mind of any one who will be at 
 the pains to analyze the sentence, that the 
 framers of the Constitution were careful to 
 make the place of voting a constituent part of 
 residence. This is all set forth, in due form, in 
 the predicate of the sentence, so that when 
 the Message claims, that qualifications are 
 only stated here, we may safely grant it, be- 
 cause these qualifications include the place of 
 voting. This, then, makes good the 6aying: 
 
7 
 
 “ The wise shall he taken in their own crafti- 
 ness.” 
 
 The Message sees fit to try to avoid the plain 
 import of this Section by holding ont (p. 13) 
 that no greater scope can be given to this part 
 of it than that “ the elector must have resided 
 in some particular township or ward ten days 
 next preceding the election at which he offers to 
 vote.” 
 
 Now, it is hardly necessary to remind fair- 
 minded men, that the Constitution does not 
 read in this way by any means, and that it con- 
 veys no such idea as the one here expressed. 
 It does not say : “ the election at which,” &c., 
 but it says : “in the township or ward in which he 
 offers to vote .” Place of voting, as we shall pres- 
 ently see, is thus made an element of suffrage 
 in our Constitution to better identify the 
 voter, test his qualifications, and thus preserve 
 the purity of elections. 
 
 The natural sense, therefore, to be put on 
 the expression, “ in the township or ward in 
 which he offers to vote,” is, in the township or 
 ward in this State, in which he, the elector in 
 person, is to present his ballot to the proper 
 officer to be received or rejected by him, as 
 the law, and the facts in his case shall require. 
 The Hitherto Universally Received j 
 Exposition Summed Up. 
 
 Wherefore, I submit, that the total effect of ! 
 Sec. 1 is to determine, definitely, 
 
 1. Who, of the inhabitants of the State, 
 shall be entitled to vote, at our public elec- 
 tions. On this point all are agreed. 
 
 2. That the elector must vote in person, if 
 at all. This follows: 1, from the very nature 
 of the process of offering to vote by ballot ; 2, 
 from the principle of common law, requiring i 
 electors to vote, personally, at public elec- | 
 tions, or forego the privilege ; 3, from the fact 
 that the affirmative words of the Sec. confer j 
 on the citizen the right to vote, and from the j 
 further fact, that the Constitution no where be- j 
 stows on him the right of voting by another; I 
 and, 4, from the fact, that the exercise of this 
 right requires the exercise of integrity and 
 discretion, and consequently cannot be deliga- 
 ted without special Constitutional authority. 
 
 3. Another and last effect of this Section is 
 to determine the place in which each elector 
 must appear in person and vote personally, if 
 at all, namely: in the township or ward in 
 which he has his legal residence. The place 
 of voting is thus definitely determined by 
 what the words of the Sec. point to, assume, 
 presuppose, appropriate and necessarily 
 imply ; and for that reason, by what must of 
 necessity enter into their very essence and 
 meaning. 
 
 As this is the material point in this contro- 
 versy, let me dwell on it for a moment, al- 
 though I may but reaffirm what I have already 
 suggested. 
 
 The Constitution, then, requires that the 
 citizen shall have a home, a domicil, a settled 
 abode, a legal residence in some township or 
 ward, in this State, at the time of a public 
 election in order to be entitled to vote thereat; 
 and that, having such residence, he must carry 
 his ballot to the polls, opened in the township 
 or ward where his residence is, and there per- 
 sonally tender his vote, or not vote at all. The 
 controlling idea here is, that the elector must 
 reside in the township or ward, where he 
 
 votes, and that he, in person, must vote, if at 
 all, in the township or ward where he resides. 
 One proposition involves the other. If for 
 any cause the farmer is not permitted to work, 
 except in his own field, then in his own field 
 must he work, if at all. According to our 
 Constitution, the place of residence and the 
 place of voting are one and the same. Conse- 
 quently, an elector having his legal residence 
 in Lansing cannot vote in Corunna, and have 
 his vote certified unto the inspectors of elec- 
 tions in Lansing. No: the Constitution re- 
 quires that the elector, in exercising the right 
 of suffrage, shall observe the territorial subdi- 
 visions of the State, established by public au- 
 thority, and recognized in that insrument, as 
 election districts. His residence determines 
 what district, that is, what township or ward he 
 must be in , personally , when he performs the 
 act of voting. What can be more conclusive? 
 
 Other Principal Reasons for tills Ex- 
 position. 
 
 Now, Mr. Chairman, I submit, with all sin- 
 cerity and confidence, that the exposition I 
 have given, fairly states the intent and mean- 
 ing of the Constitution in relation to the mat- 
 ter now before us. And some of the principal 
 reasons lor this opinion beyond those already 
 suggested in the exposition itself, are briefly 
 these : 
 
 1. This exposition adds no new word to the text , 
 and takes none from it , while it gives to the whole 
 Section , just as it stands , and to every word of it , 
 an obvious , consistent and practicable meaning. 
 And although some of the friends of this 
 measure claim that the effect of this Section 
 is not such, in some respects, as I have stated 
 it to be, yet I am sure, that what I have just 
 said as to what this exposition does, and does 
 not do, is so manifestly true, that all will ad- 
 mit it at once. All will admit, whether they 
 adopt my exposition or not, that it gives to 
 the Section an obvious, consistent and practi- 
 cable meaning-just such an one as the people 
 have received, acted on, and carried out, for a 
 long course of years ; so that particular illus- 
 trations to show that this exposition does ex- 
 actly what I claim for it, under this head, are 
 wholly needless. No one, furthermore, will 
 think of doubting that it is essential to a just 
 exposition of this Section, or any other, that 
 it should do, and not do, just what I claim for 
 this. For all will admit that Chief Justice 
 Tindel, in 2 Scott, N. C., p. 521, well says: 
 “ It is the duty of ail courts to confine them- 
 selves to the words of the Legislature, nothing 
 adding thereto and nothing diminishing;” 
 also, Ernesti, p. 7: “Every word must have 
 some meaning; ” also, the Supreme Court of 
 Massachusetts, 7 Cush., p. 53, 89: “In putting 
 a construction upon any statute, it shall be so 
 expounded, if practicable, as to give some ef- 
 fect to every part of it; ” and, likewise, Chief 
 Justice Parker, 15 Mass., p. 205: “It” (the 
 law) “ is to be construed sensibly, and with a 
 view to the object aimed at by the Legisla- 
 ture.” 
 
 Now the point I make here is this, that the 
 exposition I have given commends itself to us, 
 for the reason, among others, that it adheres 
 to the principles thus expressed by these dif- 
 ferent authorities, and because, also, an adher- 
 ence to them necessitates it. 
 
 2. Another reason in favor of the exposi- 
 
8 
 
 tion stated is this, namely: That it is ar- 
 rived at by giving the words of the Sec- 
 tion their natural import in the order in 
 which they are placed. In other words, it 
 results not only from the best of learning and 
 reasoning applicable to the subject, but also 
 from taking the words of the Section in their 
 ordinary signification and in their actual and 
 proper grammatical arrangement— just as or- 
 diuarj , sensible, and fair-minded men have al- 
 ways received and understood them. Let me 
 illustrate : The Section says, in plain words, 
 that “every white male citizen,” of certain 
 qualifications therein specified, “shall bean 
 elector and entitled to vote,” but the right of 
 substitution is not granted. Now, then, the nat- 
 ural import of these words is, that this is a 
 personal right, a personal privilege or franchise 
 — a right, privilege, or franchise which is per- 
 sonal with the elector, and is to be enjoyed 
 and exercised by him, personally, if at all. He. 
 himself, in person , is to do his own voting, or it 
 is not to be done, at all. This, Sir, is exactly 
 the impression naturally produced on the mind 
 of every body of common sense by an atten- 
 tive reading of this Section. This is the im- 
 pression which has always been produced by 
 it, and always will be. So, too, where the 
 Constitution says the Executive power. of the 
 Government of the State shall be vested in a 
 Governor, the natural import of the language 
 is, that this is a personal trust, which the Gov- 
 ernor is to discharge himself, personally, and 
 not by proxy. What can be plainer? 
 
 Again. Take these words of this Section : 
 “No citizen shall be an elector or entitled to 
 vote at any election, unless he shall be above 
 the age of twenty-one years, and has resided 
 in the State three months, and in the township 
 or ward, in which he offers to vote, ten days 
 next preceding such election.” 
 
 Now is not the natural import of these 
 w ords this : 1. That the elector to be entitled 
 to vote, must have lived in the. State, township 
 or ward, the time named; 2, that he must be, 
 at least twenty-one years old ; 3, that he must 
 reside in the township or ward in which he 
 votes ; and, 4, that he must vote in person, in 
 the township or ward, in which he resides, if 
 he votes at all? Moreover, does not every un- 
 prejudiced man of common 6ense naturally re- 
 ceive the impression on reading these words 
 of this Section, that they peremptorily pre- 
 scribe the place where the elector shall vote, if 
 at all, namely, in the township or ward in 
 which he resides, just as clearly as they do his 
 age and time of residence? Can anything be 
 more certain? Why, you say to George, 
 James and John: “you may go a skating this 
 afternoon, but neither of you shall skate, ex- 
 cept on the mill-pond.” Now then, what is 
 the natural import of your words, as to the 
 place where these lads are to skate, if they 
 skate at all? Can there be any manner of 
 doubt about it? I: your words are taken in 
 their ordinary signification — taken just as sens- 
 ible men think, speak and write, and just in 
 the sense which you intend to express by 
 them, what possible room can there be to a 
 fair mind to doubt that the lads are to skate 
 on the mill-pond, and not elsewhere, it at all? 
 Just so, in relation to the language of this Sec- 
 tion. Taken in its obvious and ordinary sig- 
 nification, the clear, unsophisticated mind, 
 naturally, nay necessarily, receives from it the 
 
 thought that it prescribes the place of voting 
 just as imperatively as it does age, residence, 
 or any other condition of voting. 
 
 But the question naturally arises here, is it 
 proper in ascertaining the meaning of the 
 Constitution, or a statute, to take the words 
 of the law in their natural and ordinary im- 
 port, in the order in which they arc placed? 
 Is this a sound rule of interpretation? We an- 
 swer yes, because 
 
 1. The Constitution is the act of the people. 
 It was ordained by them for the government 
 of all within its jurisdiction. It is in the lan- 
 
 f uage of the people — such as ordinary sensi- 
 le men use and are familiar with in active, 
 practical life. It is not full of subtleties, or 
 embodied in dark words, which mean one 
 thing to an ordinary man of common sense, 
 and a very different thing to a few who have 
 been initiated into the mysteries. It is in 
 plain words, such as ordinary people of com- 
 mon sense can understand. And what a mons- 
 trous absurdity it would be were it otherwise l 
 —absurd in the last degree, to enact laws 
 by which the people are to reerulate their con- 
 duct, which they are to observe, obey and 
 carry out, or expose themselves to the loss of 
 property, to fines and imprisonment, and yet, 
 on the other hand, embody them in such dark 
 and mysterious words, that the people cannot 
 tell what they mean ! Why, were this indeed 
 so, the laws of the land might about as well be 
 in Greek or Chaldee, as far as the people are 
 concerned. But, Sir, this is not so. Far ffom 
 it. And yet it is not to be disguised, that 
 there is a great error in the popular feeling 
 with regard to this very matter. The many 
 seem to have a feeling, that Constitutions and 
 statutes are but little else than a body of enig- 
 mas, whose hidden meaning can be divined 
 only by the initiated few. As a natural result 
 of this, when they take up a law-book, it does 
 not 6eem to occur to them, that it is to be 
 read and understood in the same way, substan- 
 tially, as a history, or as a treatise on morals, 
 science, the useful arts, or any other produc- 
 tion, in human language, that is, by the exer- 
 cise of “good faith and common 6ense,” (by 
 far the most important requisites for a sound 
 interpreter) but they, at once, lay these quali- 
 fications aside, or suspend their action, as be 
 ing now out of place, and with intellects thus 
 neutralized, they begin to stare, vacantly, at 
 the mazes before them, and grope for hidden 
 meanings. Whereas, law is the product of 
 j common sense, it is in language of common 
 sense, and is to be read and understood in a 
 common sense way, according to its natural 
 and ordinary import, except in case of special 
 definitions, which of course are to be regarded. 
 There may be, also, an apparent exception to 
 this rule, in case of technicalities, but there is 
 none in principle, because even technicalities 
 are to be taken in the ordinary sense in which 
 they are used, as such. 
 
 Thus it appears that the rule which requires 
 that the words of the Constitution be taken 
 in their natural and ordinary signification in 
 the order in which they are placed, if we would 
 ascertain their true intent and meaning, is 
 founded on the solid basis of common sense. 
 But this is not all. That this rule of interpre- 
 tation is as good inlaw, as in reason, is shown, 
 2. By the opinions of the courts, and of the 
 most approved elementary law writers. Kent, 
 
9 
 
 Vol. I., p. 521, says: “The words of a stat- 
 ute, if in common U3e, are to be taken in their 
 natural, plain, obvious and ordinary significa- 
 tion and import.” Blackstone lays it down, 
 as his first rale of interpretation, that “ Words 
 are generally to be understood in their usual 
 and most known signification; not so much 
 regarding the propriety of grammar, as their 
 
 G eneral and popular U3e.” (Vol. I., p. 59.) 
 
 'he Supreme Court of New York, by Judge 
 Bronson, 29, Wend. 555, &c., say: “ The cur- 
 rent of authority at the present day is in favor 
 of reading statutes according to the natural 
 and most obvious import of the language, 
 without resorting to subtle and forced con- 
 structions for the purpose of either limiting or 
 extending their operations.” I might quote 
 other authorities in abundance. But these | 
 will suffice to show how they stand. 
 
 Now then, the exposition I have stated, be- 
 ing arrived at by giving the words of the Sec- j 
 tion their natural and ordinary import, in the ! 
 order in which they are placed, as we have 
 fully shown, and this method of interpreta- ; 
 tion being supported by such an array of rea- 
 son and authority, we have, in all this, for the 
 purposes of this argument, a very clincher. 
 
 3. That the makers of the Constitution es- ! 
 
 J eciallv intended by the words of said section ; 
 
 , relative to the place of voting, to deffiaitely 
 establish the place in which each elector shall 
 appear in person and personally cast his vote, 1 
 if he vote at all, namely, in the township or 
 ward in which he resides, is demonsrrated, not | 
 only by the natural and ordinary import of the 
 words themselves, but also by ths particular 
 considerations which led to their being engrafted, 
 as an amendment, into the Constitution of 1835 
 and also to their beinj carried into the Constitution 
 now in force. These considerations show ths evil 
 felt and the specific remedy which the authors of 
 the Constitution mast deliberately intended 
 to create and apply by requiring each elector 
 to vote, if at all, in the place and manner thus 
 fixed ond limited. The facts in this matter 
 are, in substance, these: In the Constitution 
 of 1835, it was provided that no citizen or in- 
 dividual should be entitled to vote except in 
 the district, county or township in wnich ha 
 resided at the time of election. A difference 
 in opinion as to the effect of this provision 
 arose among the inspectors of elections in 
 different parts of the State. Many boards held j 
 that, under this provision, an elector was en- 
 titled to vote for State officers and Congressmen ! 
 anywhere in his election district; for county 
 officers anywhere in his county, but for town j 
 officers he must vote in his township, or, if l 
 polls should not be opened in his township, j 
 he might vote anywhere in his county. From j 
 these difierent rulings, in different localities, 
 much confusion and dissatisfaction resulted, i 
 But the worst thing of all about it was, that I 
 it opened the door to much illegal voting, and | 
 in this way: Unscrupulous electors were ac- 
 customed to go from one town to another in 
 their election district, on the day of election, 
 and vote in each one. By this means great 
 frauds were committed and the elections were 
 not a little corrupted. The evil became se- 
 rious. Good citizens throughout the State 
 felt that it should and mu3t be stopped. But 
 how— “that was the rub.” At length they 
 hit on this expedient, namely: to narrow down 
 the territory or district within which an elec- l 
 
 tor might vote to the smallest practicable 
 limits ; to make it an essential qualification of 
 suffrage that the elector should reside and vete 
 in one and the same district ; to thus bring the 
 polls, as near as conveniently may be, to the 
 settled abode of each citizen so that his rights 
 as a voter would be personally known to the 
 inspectors and to his neighbors about the polls 
 and consequently might be readily and satis- 
 factorily tested They judged that the safe- 
 guards to be thus afforded would be a good 
 remedy for these much felt evils. Conse- 
 quently the Legislature of 1838 proposed “ that 
 so much of the Constitution as prescribes the 
 place in which an elector may vote and which 
 is in these words, to-wit: “ district, county or 
 township,” be abolished, and that the words 
 “township or ward” be substituted in their 
 place,” thus making the sentence, if amended 
 as proposed, read thus: “ No citizen or inhab- 
 itant shall be entitled to vote except in the 
 township or ward in which he shall reside at 
 the time of election.” This proposed amend- 
 ment was agreed to by the Legislature of 1839, 
 and was submitted to and ratified by the peo- 
 ple in the same year. .This provision remained 
 in this form till 1850, when the Constitution 
 was revised and the qualifications of electors 
 and the requirement as to the place of voting 
 were cast in the form in which we find them 
 in Section 1, already quoted. By this change 
 the qualifications of electors were stated more 
 guardidly, but the thought and requirement 
 as to the place of voting remained the same. 
 That is, in either case it was to be performed 
 by the elector, if at all, in the township or 
 ward in which he resided. 
 
 That the people understood the words of the 
 Constitution of 1835, above referred to a3 pre- 
 scribing the place of voting, and that they in- 
 tended to prescribe the place of voting by the 
 amendment of 1839, is shown not only by the 
 general history of the amendment, which dis- 
 closes that such was the object of it, but also 
 by specific words made use of in the very 
 proposition to amend. The proposition says: 
 “ So much of the Constitution as prescribes the 
 place in which electors may vote.” What can be 
 more decisive ? That the people also intended 
 to prescribe the place of voting by the words 
 of said Section 1 of the Constitution of 1850, 
 is clearly proved by this, as well as by many 
 other irrefutable arguments, namely : 1. The 
 thought and requirement of the amendment 
 of 1839, were carried into the Constitution of 
 1850 and that too by the very people, for the 
 most part, who effected the amendment of 
 1839; and 2, The people, and all the authorities, 
 have pursued the same course, exactly, under 
 the Constitution of 1850 as to the place and 
 manner of voting as they did under the 
 amendment of 1839. In this respect there 
 was, and has been, no manner of change. 
 Now, as then, and then, as now, each elector 
 was required to appear in person at the polls 
 in the township or ward in which he resided, 
 and personally cast his vote or not vote at all. 
 
 Such, Sir, was the specific remedy incorpora- 
 ted into the Constitution against illegal voting. 
 And the precise thought which I wish right 
 here to press on the minds of the members of 
 the committee is this, that in this very remedy 
 we clearly see the spirit and object of these 
 particular words of the Constitution pre- 
 , scribing the place of voting— w hat led to their 
 
10 
 
 insertion — what they were designed to effect 
 and what is their true intent and meaning. 
 And in this mode of reasoning I urn sustained 
 by high authority. Blackstone (vol. I p. 01) 
 says : “ The most universal and effectual way 
 
 ol discoverin'; the true meaning of a law, 
 when the words are dubious, is by considering 
 the reason and spirit of it, or the cause which 
 moved the legislator to enact it.” To the 
 same effect, Vattel says, in his essay on the 
 rules of construction, that “the reason of a 
 law or of a treaty — that .is to say, ot the mo- 
 tive which led to the making of it and the ob- 
 ject in contemplation at the time — is the most 
 certain clue to lead us to the discovery of its 
 true meaning.” Kent, vol. 1 p. 521 says: 
 “When the words are not explicit, the inten- 
 tion is to be collected from the context, from 
 the occasion and necessity of the law, from 
 the mischief felt and the object and remedy 
 in view.” Puffendorff says : “ But that which 
 helps us most in the discovery of the true 
 meaning of the law is, the reason of it, or the 
 cause which moved the Legislature to enact 
 it.” The United States Supreme Court, by 
 Marshall, Chief Justice, lay down the same 
 doctrine in 9 Wheat, p 189. And finally the 
 Supreme Court of this State, in Streeter vs. 
 Paton, 7 of Mich. p. 141, lay down the same 
 principle in these explicit terms: “Our ! 
 
 present Constitution was not the formation of 
 a new government, but the continuation of a 
 government formed under a previous Consti- 
 tution, whose supposed or real defects it was 
 intended to correct; and, in construing it, we ; 
 are bound to look to the distribution of ju- j 
 dicial power under the old Constitution, and 
 to discover if we can the evil, if any, arising ! 
 from that distribution and intended to be cor- j 
 rected by the new Constitution.” Thus the 
 principle of construction contended lor here 
 is clearly and authoritatively settled. 
 
 Wherefore, when the words of the Constitu- 
 tion, relative to the place of voting, are view'ed 
 in the light of a remedy, just as the facts show 
 that they should be: when the causes which 
 led to their introduction into the Constitution 
 are inquired into; when the object aimed 
 at by their use is more fully explained by refer- i 
 ence to the well-known facts of history ; then 
 the conviction becomes irresistable, that their j 
 true intent and meaning is, that each elector i 
 6hall vote, personally, if at all, in the town- I 
 ship or ward in which he resides and not by j 
 proxy, or in any other place. Here, then, is j 
 another clincher in favor of the exposition I 
 have offered. 
 
 4. Another consideration of special impor- 
 tance, in favor of the exposition I have given, 
 is, That it is sustained by the uniform practice , 
 custom , or usage of the citizens and authorities oj 
 the State for nearly a quarter of a century — that 
 is , fr om the origin of the State government. 
 
 The well settled doctrine is laid down in 
 Kent, vol. I., p. 524, that “ Where the penning 
 of a statute is dubious, long usage is a just 
 medium to expound it by.” The rule is this, 
 that “long usage” may be resorted to, in or- 
 der to explain a law or written instrument, but 
 not to defeat it. 
 
 What then has been the usage or practice 
 touching this question? When did it begin? i 
 Was the beginning at or about the time the 
 Constitution was adopted? With whom did 
 it originate? Did the men, with whom it 
 
 originated, live at, or about the time that in- 
 strument was made and went into operation? 
 Had they fit opportunities for knowing the cir- 
 cumstances, under which it was framed, sub- 
 mitted, and ratified? And what was the true in- 
 tent and meaning of the members of the Con- 
 vention, who drafted it, and of the people, who 
 adopted it? And has the practice been uni- 
 form, and as extensive as the jurisdiction of 
 the Constitution? Sir, I recognize these as 
 material inquiries in this connection, and they 
 are answerable, affirmatively, ana in a few 
 words. 
 
 As we have already seen, the citizens of this 
 State of all classes, understood that the words 
 of the amendment of 1839, just spoken of, im- 
 peratively required each elector to vote prrson- 
 ally, or not at all, in the township or ward in 
 which he resided, and that they were intro- 
 duced into the Constitution for that very rea- 
 son. And from the time that amendment took 
 effect all voting at State and local elections, pro- 
 ceeded on that idea. The present Constitu- 
 tion was framed and adopted in 1850, by the 
 6am e citizens, substantially, as effected the 
 amendment of 1839. The same idea expressed 
 in the amendment relative to the place of 
 voting, was carried into the new Constitution, 
 but in the words already quoted, namely: 
 “No citizen or inhabitant shall be an elector 
 or entitled to vote, at any election, unless he 
 has resided in the State three mouths and in 
 the township or ward in which he offers his 
 vote ten days next preceding such election.” 
 Now mark this: The members of the Con- 
 vention who drafted this provision and the 
 people who adopted it, understood at the time, 
 and especially intended, that its natural and 
 necessary effect should be to prescribe and 
 fix the place of voting, and require every 
 elector, the same as the amendment of 
 1839, to appear in person at the polls, in the 
 township or ward in which he resides, in order 
 to vote, and there vote personally, or not at 
 all. But how do we know all this? Because, 
 1. Such is the natural and ordinary import of 
 these words, as we have clearly seen. 2. The 
 greater part of them are still living, and they 
 assure us that such was their earnest inten- 
 tion. Some of them, standing high on account 
 of character, intelligence and legal ability, who 
 were also members of the constitutional con- 
 vention, have assured me that such, certainly, 
 was their understanding and intention. 3. The 
 very members of that convention, and the 
 people who adopted the Constitution, of 
 course knew, exactly, what they meant, and 
 they said what they meant and meant what 
 they said; these all, with one accord, and 
 without question, acted on this idea from the 
 start, and from that time down, the same idea 
 has prevailed, and all voting at State and local 
 elections has been done from year to year in 
 exact conformity with it for nearly fifteen 
 years, under this Constitution, and nearly 
 twenty-five since the amendment of the old 
 one. 
 
 Now sir, what do we see in all this, which 
 touches our present purpose?. See, Sir? 
 Why, we see the men who framed the amend- 
 ment of 1839, and also our present constitu- 
 tion, and the great people of Michigan who 
 adopted both, together with all subsequent 
 accessions to their numbers, who as they, em- 
 brace citizens of all classes, of every political 
 
11 
 
 party, of every description of business, and of 
 every kind and degree of intelligence, all com- 
 ing up, in every part of the State, at a fixed 
 time, from year to year, in unbroken succes- 
 sion, for nearly a quarter of a century, and 
 unanimously illustrate, declare and confirm by 
 what they do, that the true intent and mean- 
 ing of the words of said Section 1, relative to 
 the place of voting, is that each elector, in 
 order to vote at all, shall appear in person at 
 the polls, in the township or ward in which he 
 resides, and there personally tender his vote to 
 the proper officer. 
 
 Sir, in view of a practical exposition such as 
 this, where the precedent is commensurate 
 with the adoption of the Constitution, and ac- 
 quiesced in, and acted upon since that time 
 by an unbroken chain of practice, we may say 
 as the Supreme Court of the United States 
 said, in 1 Cranch 299 : “It has, indeed, fixed 
 
 tne construction. It is a contemporary inter- 
 pretation of the most forcible nature. This 
 practical exposition is too strong and obsti- 
 nate to be shaken or controlled.” Again, by 
 the same Court, 5 Cranch 22, M’Keen v. De- 
 laney’s Lessee, a case arising under the act of 
 Pennsylvania, of 1715, which required deeds 
 to be acknowledged before a Justice of the 
 Peace in the county where the land lay. It 
 had been the contemporaneous and uniform 
 practice from 1715 to the date ot the deed (1775) 
 to acknowledge deeds before a Justice of the Su- 
 preme Court, although the act of 1715 did not 
 authorize such a practice. The Court held, 
 “as that practice had prevailed for so long a 
 period, it must be considered a correct expo- 
 sition of the statute, or good evidence of such 
 construction by the judicial tribunals of Fenn- 
 sylvaniaF In Packard v. Richardson, 17 Mass. 
 121,143. The Supreme Court of Massachu- 
 setts say: “ A contemporaneous is generally 
 the best construction of a statute. It gives 
 the sense of a community of the terms made 
 use bf by a Legislature. If there is ambiguity 
 in the language, the understanding and appli- 
 cation of it, when the statute first comes into 
 operation, sanctioned by long acquiescence on 
 the part of the legislative and judicial tri- 
 bunals, is the strongest evidence that it has 
 been rightly explained in practice. A con- 
 struction under such circumstances becomes 
 established law.” 
 
 And now, Sir, if it be possible, that any 
 doubt can remain in the mind of any member 
 of the committee, it will be effectually re- 
 moved by the words of the Justices of the Su- 
 preme Judicial Court of New Hampshire, ut- 
 tered in reference to a measure like the one 
 now before us. Their words are these : “ The 
 language of the Constitution is to. be understood in 
 the sense in which it was used at the time of its 
 adoption .” Am. Law Reg. for Oct., 1863. 
 
 In what sense the language of Section 1, in 
 question, was used at the time the Constitu- 
 tion of this State was adopted, is a matter of 
 proof; and that proof we have from thousands 
 of living witnesses, and in an unbroken chain 
 of historical facts, as I have before shown, and 
 shall still further show. 
 
 Now, Sir, on the principles established by 
 these decisions it follows, unavoidably, that 
 the living testimony, and the long practice of 
 which I have spoken, relative to the prescribed 
 place of voting, also, as to the personal presence 
 of the elector at the polls, his voting there. 
 
 personally , and, especially, as this practice 
 originated in the sense given to the words of 
 the Constitution before and at the time the in- 
 strument was adopted, and has been univer- 
 sally acquiesced in and partaken of by the 
 people and by the officers of the Government, 
 in all of its departments— I repeat, that ac- 
 cording to these decisions, this practice is now 
 to be accepted by us, and by all concerned, as 
 the correct exposition of said Section 1, and 
 is to be treated as tantamount to such a con- 
 struction by the Supreme Court of this State. 
 
 So, Sir, we have here, in this long and uni- 
 versal usage, thus enforced by thousands of 
 living witnesses, another clincher in favor of 
 the exposition I have given, so strong that no 
 one can break it, or escape from it. 
 
 5. Another consideration in favor of this ex- 
 position is derived from Legislative acts passed 
 at the time , or very soon after the adoption of the 
 Constitution. 
 
 In the case, The People vs. Green, 2 Wen- 
 dell 274, it was held, that in the construction 
 of a statute, great deference is certainly due to 
 a legislative exposition of a constitutional pro- 
 vision, especially when it was made almost 
 contemporaneously with constitutional pro- 
 vision, and may be supposed to result from 
 the same views of policy and mode of reason- 
 ing, which prevailed among the framers of the 
 instrument expounded. 
 
 Now for the application of the rule. Our 
 present Constitution was submitted to the 
 people and approved in November, 1850. The 
 Legislature met shortly thereafter. At its first 
 session, after the adoption of the Constitution, 
 our general election law was passed. It was 
 approved in June, 1851. [So the act was 
 passed almost contemporaneously with the 
 adoption of the Constitution. Now it is but 
 reasonable to suppose, that if the authors of 
 that instrument, or the people who adopted it 
 entertained any such notion, as to the effect of 
 Section 1, Art. 7, in relation to elections, as 
 arc now advanced by the friends of either of 
 the bills before us, the members of that first 
 Legislature would have possessed it, also, and 
 that it would have been embodied by them in 
 the general election law; or, at all events, 
 that they would have given expression to it, 
 in some form or other. Is it conceivable 
 that it could have been otherwise? No, sir. 
 Well did they, in way, directly or indirectly, 
 indicate any such notion? Not by any means. 
 But on the contrary, they did most distinctly 
 indicate the same views, as to the effect of 
 Sec. 1, that are expressed in the exposition I 
 have stated. For, our general election law 
 which they passed, provides that a general 
 election shall be held in the several 
 townships and wards of the State, on 
 Tuesday succeeding the first Monday of No- 
 vember, 1852, and on the same day every 
 second year thereafter. It also provides, that 
 the polls shall be opened at 8 o’clock in the 
 forenoon of that day, and close at 5 o’clock 
 p. m., and that the canvass of the votes shall 
 take place immediately thereafter, and the 
 result declared. These provisions remain to 
 this day unaltered. And you will please ob- 
 serve, that the same idea is expressed here 
 as to th & prescribed place of voting, that is con- 
 tained in the Constitution. You will note 
 this too, that the business of voting, counting 
 the votes, and declaring the result, is all to 
 
12 
 
 be dispatched in a day, if practicable, and in 
 two at most. There is to be no waiting for 
 votes to come in from abroad, no provisions 
 for proxy voting, none for sending the ballot- 
 box away to receive the votes of students, 
 sailors, soldiers, foreign ministers, or other 
 absentees. No, sir, there is nothing of the 
 kind, although Sec. 5, Art 7, of the Constitu- 
 tion, had just been adopted, providing that 
 these classes of citizens shall neither gain or 
 lose a residence by being away. No, sir, there 
 is nothing in the proceedings of that Legis- 
 lature, or any subsequent one, till the present, 
 which has the slightest look towards the pos- 
 sibility oi such a thing. Every thing 6hows 
 that the thought was not then conceived by 
 the wildest dreamer. But on the other hand 
 the exactly opposite idea, viz: that each elec- 
 tor, in order to enjoy the elective franchise 
 must appear in person, in the township or 
 ward in which he resides, and there vote per- 
 sonally — this idea pervades the election laws, 
 and is incorporated into their life and sub- 
 stance. The result then, to which we are 
 thus conducted, is this, 1st, that we have in this 
 particular view of the case, a practical, con- 
 temporaneous, and continuousexposition by the 
 Legislature which agrees exactly, with the one 
 that the opponents of these bills approve oi ; 
 and 2d, that the Supreme Court of the United 
 States, in McCulluck vs the State of Maryland, 
 4 Wheat. 816 by Marshall, Chief Justice, ut- 
 tered good sense as well as good law, when it 
 said: An exposition of the Constitution de- 
 
 liberately established by legislative acts, ought 
 not to be lightly disregarded.” 
 
 I am not unmindful of the fact, 6ir, that the 
 advocates of this soldiers’ voting project, 
 claim that we have in this State legislative 
 
 S recedents for it. It is stated in Senate Doc. 
 
 o. 1, and in the report of the Honorable 
 member lrom Lapeer, Mr. Heminway, that 
 the Legislature ot this State has, in many 
 cases, under the present Constitution, author- 
 ized citizens to hold elections outside of the 
 limits of the township in which they reside. 
 In the report of Mr.Heminway, it is said, that 
 this was done in 1861, in case of Ann Arbor, 
 Pontiac and Coldwater; of Lansing and Sagi- 
 naw in 1859 ; and of Port Huron in 1857— the 
 citizens of each ot these towns, being empow- 
 ered to vote, in a city of the same name, lo- 
 cated within its original limits. 
 
 It seems quite sufficient, in reply to this 
 argument, to say : 
 
 1. That it is admitted, that each of 
 these cities is located in the original boun- 
 daries of the township ot the same 
 name, and that the citizens of the township 
 hold their elections just where they did before 
 the city was established. Now then, how 
 does the case stand? Exactly thus : for cer- 
 tain local purposes, a line is run round a few 
 acres, more or less; but elections are to be 
 held just where they were before the line was 
 run, or the city incorporated. So far as elec- 
 tions are concerned, the city is put into the 
 township, and not the township into the city. 
 
 2. In some of the cases spoken of, and I 
 do not know but in all, the cities were incor- 
 ported, subject to the right of the people of the 
 township to hold elections therein, the same as 
 before. So, for the purposes of elections, the 
 township stands in all respects, just as it would 
 had no city been located within its limits. 
 
 3. Two or three acts of the Legislature of 
 the kind named, of recent date, allowing citi- 
 zens to keep on doing lawful things, just as 
 they had been doing them, cannot De said to 
 form a legislative precedent for a new order 
 of things, affecting constitutional powers, and 
 the purity of elections. A legislative prece- 
 dent to come within the rule is not made quite 
 so quick or quite eo easily. In order to con- 
 stitute acts of the Legislature such a practical 
 exposition of the Constitution, as is entitled 
 to much weight, they must have been passed 
 at or about the time the Constitution was 
 adopted, and acquiesced in, and acted under, 
 by the people and all the departments of the 
 government since that time. Why, Sir, just look 
 at it. If three or four acts of the Legislature 
 of recent date, and without regard to the ac- 
 quiescence of the people and of the other de- 
 partments of government, and their action on 
 them, are to be held as evidence of what the 
 Constitution i6, then the Legislature has only 
 to pass a few successive erroneous acts in or- 
 der to remove all constitutional restrictions 
 on itself whatever, and, in fact, do away with 
 the Constitution entirely. 
 
 4. As we have already intimated, these acts 
 are of recent date. The constitutionality of 
 no one of them has yet been passed upon by 
 the Court. This lact, in connection with 
 preceding considerations, 6hows, that they do 
 not approach anywhere near to a precedent of 
 such attributes, as the rule contemplates, and 
 are, therefore, entitled to no manner of weight, 
 in the settlement of the question in hand. And 
 in this state of utter weakness for such a use, 
 we leave them. 
 
 ! 6. Another consideration of great moment 
 
 in favor of the hitherto universally received 
 exposition of this provision ot the Constitu- 
 tion is, that it agrees with the sense put on it by 
 the members of the legal profession , who lived in 
 the JState at the time the Constitution 
 was adopted and , also , by those who 
 
 came here , or entered the profession soon 
 thereafter — which sense the profession have con- 
 tinued to put upon it , and which they put upon it 
 now , irrespective of party, with perhaps a few 
 seeming exceptions of very recent origin. 
 
 Lord Coke 6ays: “Great regard ought, in 
 construing a statute, to be paid to the con- 
 struction, which the sages of the law, who 
 lived about the time, or soon thereafter, put 
 upon it, because they were test able to judge 
 of the intention ot the makers at the time, 
 when the law was made.” 
 
 Such being the rule , what now are the 
 facts ? The Constitution of this State was 
 adopted but a little over thirteen years ago. 
 The greater part of the lawyers who lived in 
 the State, then, live here now. And what is 
 more, nearly every leading member of the 
 profession in the State, to-day, was in the 
 profession here at that time. I know several 
 lawyers of distinction, who were members of 
 the convention which framed the Constitu- 
 tion. I have conversed with them, on this 
 very matter. They say, emphatically, that 
 the meaning, which they and their contem- 
 porary brethren put on this part of that in- 
 strument, was exactly the same as the one 
 stated in the exposition 1 have offered, I have 
 talked with other lawyers of standing, both 
 Democrats and Republicans, not of that con- 
 vention, but who were here when the Con- 
 
13 
 
 etitution was adopted. These all say that 
 such is the meaning which they and their 
 brethren put upon it. I have talked with good 
 lawyers, who have come to the State, or en- 
 tered the profession, 6ince the adoption of the 
 Constitution, who have given attention to 
 this subject; they say that their view of it i6 
 the same. If I am not mistaken, and I be- 
 lieve I am not, I have conversed with every 
 lawyer of this house, but one, on this point, 
 and I feel confident that all of them actually 
 take the same view that 1 maintain, except 
 one, who says he is not sure, that he 
 has doubts about it. All of the Judiciary 
 Committee take this view, save one, “the 
 doubter.” The chairman of the committee of 
 elections, the Hon. T. G. Smith, submitted a 
 report to us last winter against the constitu- 
 tionality of this very project, by which he did 
 himself credit as a man and as lawyer. And I 
 will venture the remark here, that if any law- 
 yer ot this house, save my friend “the 
 doubter,’ 7 votes lor either of these bills, it will 
 be because his sympathetic impulses carry him 
 beyond the limits of his judgment, or fiom 
 partisan considerations. All of them, save 
 the doubter, evince a conviction, that this pro- 
 ject is unconstitutional. And is it creditable, 
 nay is it possible, nay is it not a libel on human 
 nature to suppose that any of them, with the 
 •anctities of his official oath on his conscience, 
 will hesitate to act on his convictions? — that 
 any one of them will fear, (like the believing 
 parents, whose blind son had been made to 
 see) to take sides on a question of this impor- 
 tance, and vindicate his belief, lest he may, 
 in the happenings of the future, seem to be 
 lacking in party fidelity, and on that account, 
 perhaps, be turned out of the party synagogue? 
 Sir, let me say to such an one, if 6uch an one 
 there be : 1, That the man, who is untrue to 
 his convictions, must lose his own self-re- 
 spect, and he that so acts as to lose his own 
 self-re6pect, is very likely to lose, by the same 
 act, the respect of others; and, 2, that the 
 danger to him in this matter lies on the side of 
 following party ends, or yielding to party 
 lears. For, Sir, let him be assured, betimes, 
 that however much certain political aspirants 
 may strive to make this a party question, they 
 cannot succeed in the attempt. They may 
 get up a little stir here, perhaps, in that direc- 
 tion, and the vote on it, when taken, may be 
 divided by party lines with a few exceptions ; 
 but these lines will not run far or long, out- 
 side of this House. The sober second thought 
 will destroy them. Men of intelligence and 
 weight of all parties, all over the State, will dis- 
 approve of this project, as contrary to the Con- 
 stitution. And instead of being brought in to 
 the support of it as individuals, or as a party, 
 they will scout it in both capacities. So the 
 man is in much greater danger of being mark- 
 ed and eschewed, who goes for it, or tries to 
 induce others to go for it, or to make it a 
 party measure, than the man who stands up 
 square and true to his convictions, and man- 
 fully opposes it. Let him that is in danger 
 take warning. 
 
 But, Mr. Chairman, I have not quite done 
 with the members of the legal profession, who 
 lived here contemporaneously with the adop- 
 tion of the Constitution, and from that time 
 to this. I have said, that they embrace the 
 most conspicuous and influential lawyers of 
 
 the State. And so they do. And, Sir, with- 
 out raising any invidious comparisons, I could 
 not but seem to myself, as lacking in fidelity 
 to the occasion, should I omit to speak of one 
 of the most eminent among them by name. 
 He has been for several years prominently be- 
 fore the people, who have reposed in him 
 great public trusts, and duly appreciated his 
 services in the discharge of them. Hi6 name 
 is a favorite one with the majority of this 
 House, and, in truth, is at present one of the 
 talismanic names of the dominant party in the 
 State. I have, Sir, the honor to refer here to 
 the name of Austin Blair, of Jackson, Mich- 
 igan. And now “ who hath ears to hear let 
 him hear” 
 
 BLAIR vs. BLAIR. 
 
 It seems that a while previous to the 
 meeting of this Legislature last winter, 
 Mr. Blair had occasion to express his 
 views deliberately, as to the constitution- 
 ality and expediency of this same pro- 
 ject with regard to soldiers voting, when 
 away from their place of residence; and in do- 
 ing so, he made use of these words, namely: 
 “ The Legislature cannot authorize a citizen to 
 vote in any place , except in the township or uard 
 where he resides.” He continued: “The lan- 
 guage of Art. 7, Sec. 1, is as follows : ‘ But 
 no citizen or inhabitant shall be an elector or 
 entitled to vote at any election, unless he shall 
 be above the age of twenty-one years, and has 
 resided in this State three months, and in 
 the township or ward in which he offers to vote , 
 ten days next preceding such election,” ’ After 
 making this quotation, he added : “7 think this 
 is decisive .” , 
 
 Such was the deliberate opinion of Mr. Blair, 
 deliberately stated, as to the constitutionality 
 of this measure, but a short time before the 
 meeting of this Legislature last winter. What 
 he then stated as to the expediency of it, we 
 shall take due notice of in its proper place. 
 
 But, Sir, it should 6eem from appearances 
 that Mr. Blair has changed his mind. He then 
 said that “the Legislature cannot authorize a 
 citizen to vote in any place except in the town- 
 ship or ward where he resides;” and he ad- 
 duced the words of the Constitution , Article, Sec- 
 tion, and clause, to support what he said. 
 But he now advances a directly contrary opin- 
 ion, and brings forward certain novel theories^ 
 oj construction to back it — not the plain words* 
 of the Constitution, taken in their natural and 
 ordinary import, but rather certain hitherto 
 v/nknovm theoi'ies of construction. 
 
 Now, Sir, both of these antagonistical opin- 
 ions cannot be correct. If a judge gives two 
 directly opposite opinions on exactly the same 
 set of facts, and under the same law, both 
 cannot be good. In one or the other, he must 
 be either mistaken or dishonest. If a witness 
 testifies to one set of facts, at one hearing of a 
 case, and then to a directly opposite set of 
 facts, at another hearing of the very same case, 
 both of his statements, of course, cannot be 
 true; and not only so, you v^ill of necessity 
 be led to query whether he, at bottom, has 
 any truth in him at all — whether he really has 
 either moral or mental integrity in his head or 
 heart. 
 
 But, Mr. Chairman, let me here make this 
 inquiry : Are we to infer from these surprising 
 disclosures that Mr. Blair is so sadly lacking in 
 
14 
 
 mental integrity as this would indicate, leav- 
 ing moral integrity out oi‘ the question ; that 
 he is not true to his convictions; that his mind 
 is not true to itself; that it is so made up, as 
 not to be able to clearly see and duly appreci- 
 ate the force of fundamental principles, or ad- 
 here to them against temptations from with- 
 out, or the strivings of personal ambition from 
 within? 
 
 Or are we to infer that Mr. Blair has two 
 opinions as to the constitutionality of this 
 measure, one being his opinion as a lawyer, 
 and the other his opinion as a politician, 
 scheming for future promotion, and that he 
 now advances one and now the other, as shall 
 best serve his purpose? 
 
 We daily recognize the tact that a man may 
 and should change his mind, when there is a 
 good reason for it. We recognize the fact, 
 too, that he may differ from himself at differ- 
 ent times. We also, on the other hand, rec- 
 ognize the fact that principles do not change; 
 and that this provision of the Constitution is 
 now just what it was when Mr. Blair pro- 
 nounced it to be decisive against a measure 
 like the one under consideration. We also 
 recognize tkelurther fact, that men sometimes 
 have strong motives for changing their opin- 
 ions, when they have no good reason for it; 
 and in such cases they may assign for reasons 
 what have the form thereof, but not the 
 
 ower. How good Mr. Blair’s reasons are for 
 
 is new opinion, wc have seen a little already, 
 aud shall see more fully a little further on. 
 In the meantime, Mr. Chairman, I must con- 
 fess that I am reminded here of the habits of a 
 certain money and stock broker, a native of 
 France, and a person of note in his way, who 
 resided in Boston. You go into his office and 
 
 say to him : “ Mr. , how is Western ?” He 
 
 would reply : “ Do you wish to buy, or do you 
 wish to sell?” You answer: “Buy.” He 
 
 continues: “Well, the Board closed to-day 
 at $90, with an evident tendency upward. I 
 will sell at $90.50.” But if you say to him: 
 “ 1 wish to sell,” then, he would answer: 
 “ Well, the Board closed to-day at $90, with an 
 evident tendency downward. I will give you 
 $89.50.” But let me again inquire of any who 
 may know, if it be indeed true that Mr. Blair, 
 whom the most of us have hitherto believed 
 to be a man of fair intentions, has at length 
 become so far perfected in the arts of the mod- 
 ern politician as to be capable of saying to any 
 whom it may concern: “If you must and 
 will know the true intent and meaning of the 
 Constitution, relative to this measure, I tell 
 you, as a lawyer , that the Legislature cannot 
 authorize a citizen to vote in any place, except 
 in the township or ward where he resides ; ” 
 but if you are disposed to accommodate, or sell 
 yourself to our side, that is, to my party, within 
 the party, I then tell you, as a politician , be- 
 lieving that “the end justifies the means,” 
 and as one hound to win , Constitution or no 
 Constitution, that the legal validity of this 
 measure “need not be doubted ?” Is this 
 the ultimate object of his recommendation 
 of this measure? If yea, then he and his ad- 
 herents might well pray, in the language of 
 Burns : 
 
 “ O wad some Pow’r the giftie gie us 
 
 To see oursels as others see us! 
 
 It watt frae monie a blunder free us, 
 
 An’ foolish notion,” 
 
 Sir, we should be led to smile at this ex- 
 tremely unsightly spectacle were there not a 
 kind of moral melancholy intermingled which 
 turns ridicule into mourning. But still the 
 position remains in full integrity and force, 
 that the exposition I have offered agrees with, 
 and is supported by, the views of the mem- 
 bers of the the legal profession, who lived in 
 the State at the time the Constitution was 
 adopted, and also of those who came here or 
 entered the profession soon thereafter, which 
 views have universally prevailed until a clique 
 hit upon this measure to preserve party su- 
 premacy and especially personal supremacy in 
 the party. 
 
 7. Another consideration in favor of the 
 exposition I have offered is, that it is agreeable 
 to, and is supported by, principles of the common 
 law in force when the Constitution was adopted, 
 and still remainin force. 
 
 I have, in a manner, anticipated this consid- 
 eration; but it is of too much weight not to 
 be specially stated. 
 
 Kent vol. 1 p. 524 says : “ Statutes are like- 
 wise to be construed in reference to the prin- 
 ciples of the common law.” He adds: “ This 
 has been the language of the courts in every 
 age.” And to guard against mistake or 
 quibbling here it may be well to remark what 
 every common sense man knows to be true, 
 that it is well settled, and questioned by no 
 one, that “ in expounding a constitutional 
 provision the same rules of construction and 
 interpretation should obtain as are adopted 
 and applied in the construction of a statute. 
 (Smith’s Com. :n Stat. and Con. construction 
 p. 418.) And it may be well to note further 
 that our Constitution Art. 20 Sec. 1, recognizes 
 the common law and declares it to be in force. 
 
 What then, was the common law applicable 
 to this subject at the time the Constitution 
 was adopted? Kent Vol. II p. 369 6ays : “In 
 the case of elections in public and municipal 
 corporations, and in all other elections of a 
 public nature, every vote must be personally 
 given.” He cites the cases: The Dean and 
 Chapter of Ferns, Davies’s Kep’t. 129, and At- 
 torney General vs. Scott, 1 Vesey, 413, to sub- 
 stantiate this important doctrine. The words 
 of the Constitution in question, being then 
 construed according to the common law, it 
 follows that the voting there spoken of means 
 voting in person, and that under that instru- 
 ment the elector must vote at public elections 
 personally or not at all. This supports my 
 exposition, while it gives this proxy bill its 
 death blow. 
 
 Again. The provisions of the old Constitu- 
 tion with regard to public elections, as well 
 as the general election law in force before and 
 at the time the present Constitution was adop- 
 ted, harmonized exactly with the principles of 
 the common law effecting the same; and 
 in pursuance of these principles and provisions 
 a practice then prevailed, as we have seen in 
 another aspect of this case, which possessed, 
 1st, all the attributes of a common law princi- 
 ple ; 2, all the authority of constitutional and 
 statutory enactments ; and 3, all the force of a 
 construction by the Supreme Court of this 
 State. This practice, resting on such solid 
 ground, and proceeding under such ultimate 
 legal sanctions, definitely prescribed the place 
 and manner of voting by requiring each elector 
 to be personally present at the pods in the town - 
 
15 
 
 ship or ward in which he resides, and there per- 
 sonally tender his vote , or not vote at all. The facts 
 stated here are admitted by all. Now observe, 
 1. That it was to this practice, then in use and 
 thus established , that the framers of our present' 
 Constitution referred by the words of Sec. 1, 
 to wit : “ No citizen shall be entitled to vote 
 
 at any election unless he has resided in the 
 township or ward in which he offers to vote , ten 
 days next preceding such election.” 2. They 
 took it for granted that this practice must re- 
 main because it was but carrying out an im- 
 poitant principle of the common law, and of 
 the provisions of the positive laws of the 
 State, which, they declare, should remain in 
 force— (Art. 20 Sec. 1;) and because many of 
 them now tell us, and none deny it, that they 
 took it for granted that this practice would 
 continue. 
 
 Now, construing the words of Sec. 1 in 
 question in reference to this practice, it fol- 
 lows that inasmuch as no different provision 
 is made in the Constitution, the right of suf- 
 frage, established by it, is to be exercised by 
 the elector personally at the polls in the township 
 oi' ward in which he resides , and no where else. 
 And this, Sir, puts a complete extinguisher on 
 this field system now sought to be established; 
 so both systems are clearly forbidden by the 
 Constitution when it is construed in reference 
 to the principles of the common law, as the 
 rule requires. 
 
 Now, Sir, no man of common discernment 
 can fail to remark two things here, because 
 they stand out so very prominently : 
 
 1. That by the words they made use of in 
 Sec. 1, the framers of the Constitution so re- 
 ferred to this practice as to recognize its per- 
 manent validity and by necessary implication 
 adopted it and actually made it a part and 
 parcel of that instrument. And, 
 
 2. Having done this, they felt that they had j 
 done, in this regard, all that was necessary to 
 be done ; that the practice being thus brought 
 into the instrument, it was there , and must con- 
 tinue to he there , and that no expressly affirma- 
 tive or expressly negative provisions could do 
 any more. Ana there they left it, without 
 unnecessary words, but in a simple form and 
 there it now stands as an integral part of the 
 Constitution of the State. 
 
 And sir, let me remark another thing here, 
 namely : that the rule requiring statutes and 
 constitutional provisions to be construed in 
 reference to the principles of common law, or 
 established custom or usage, is general in its 
 application. It extends to contracts so as to 
 expound the meaning of their words, or the ! 
 intention of the parties. The application of 
 the rule applied to business affairs is too 
 familiar to require illustration. Parsons, in 
 his work on Laws of Business, p. 35 says: 
 
 “ Any custom will be regarded by the Court 
 which comes within the reason of the rule 
 that makes the custom a part of the contract. 
 It comes within the reason only when it is so 
 far established and so well known to the parties, 
 that it must be supposed that their contract 
 was made with reference to it.” Now, in the 
 case before us, we are not left to supposition. 
 Here is certainty. The framers of the Con- 
 stitution referred to the usage as to voting in 
 such way as to adopt it. This makes the ar- 
 gument perfect. 
 
 Opinions of tlie Conrts. 
 
 8. Another consideration in favor of the re- 
 ceived exposition of the words of the Consti- 
 tution in question, is, that it is sustained by the 
 courts of all the other States , whose Constitutions 
 are similar to ours , where the subject has come be- 
 fore them , unless the court of the State of Iowa is 
 an exception. 
 
 For example: The Constitution of New 
 Hampshire provides for holding meetings of 
 electors, in the several towns of the State for 
 the choice of public officers. It also provides 
 that each elector shall have the right to vote 
 in the presence of the selectmen of the town, 
 in open meeting in the town or parish wherein 
 he dwells. 
 
 Now in what material respect does this pro- 
 vision differ from the provision in question of 
 j our Constitution? Our Constitution requires 
 i that a citizen shall have his legal residence in 
 i the township or ward within the State, where 
 | he votes, and that he shall vote, if at all, in 
 I such township or ward. Again, I ask, wherein 
 j this differs in any material point from the pro- 
 i vision of the Constitution of New Hampshire? 
 
 | If, now, we take into account here, as we cer- 
 | tainly must, what the words of our Constitu- 
 j tion necessarily imply, namely : the recogni- 
 ! tion and adoption of the established exposi- 
 I j tion and practice, which require the elector to 
 ! appear in person at the polls in the township 
 j or ward where he resides, and there, with his 
 1 own hand, tender his vote to the proper officer 
 j in presence of the inspectors; I repeat, that if 
 | this established practice and contemporaneous 
 I exposition are taken into account, the two 
 cases become not only identical in substance, 
 but almost wholly so in details. 
 
 Now let us see how the Judges of the Su- 
 preme Court of New Hampshire regard a 
 measure like the one now before us, in its re- 
 lations to their Constitution, which we see is 
 essentially the same as ours as far as this meas- 
 | ure is concerned. The Judges of that court, 
 in an opinion given under date of June 23d, 
 j 1863, say: “By the common law, in elections 
 
 of public and municipal corporations, and in 
 all other public elections, every vote must be 
 personally given. (Citing 2 Kent Com. 291 
 [369 — 10th Ed.] The Dean., &c., of Ferns, 
 Davies 129, Ang. and A. Corp., 3d Ed., 95-97, 
 Taylor vs. Griswold, 2 Green, (N. Y.) 226,234,- 
 235; Phillips vs. Wickham 1, Page 578; State 
 vs. Tudor, 5 Day, 333; See Attorney-General 
 ! vs. Scott, 1 Yesey, 413.) They continue: 
 “ The history of the origin of the powers 
 of towns in New England, and of the na- 
 ture and usages of their meetings (almost 
 identical, in detail even, with ours in Mich- 
 ; igan), shows that in this respect the prac- 
 \ tice here, before and at the date of the adop- 
 tion of the Constitution, was in accordance 
 with the general rule of the common law. 
 As the language of the Constitution is to be 
 understood in the sense in which it was used 
 at the time of its adoption (opinion of the 
 Justices, 41 N. H., 551,) and as at that time, 
 both by the common law and by the settled 
 usage here, the right ot voting for public offi- 
 cers was a right that must be exercised per- 
 sonally by the voter at the meeting held for 
 the purpose, it follows that if no different pro- 
 vision is made in the Constitution, the right of 
 suffrage established by it is to be exercised by 
 the voter in person, at the meetings duly held 
 
for that parpose.” They farther say : “We [ 
 have thus far coa3idered the provisioas of this 
 bill as if they were in fact what they purport 
 to be, provisions to allow the elector to vote 
 by another in the meeting of the town, &c., i 
 in which he is entitled to vote. But the bill, ; 
 in effect, permits the elector to vote at places 
 other than those dxed by the Constitution ; 
 
 * * * * anl this, we think, is in conflict ; 
 with its provisions ! ” (Am. Law Reg. for 
 Oct., 740.) This opinion nts our case now in 
 hand exactly. It seems to deal a decisive blow 
 at every material point in and about this 
 measure now sought to be passed. 
 
 Again. The Constitution of Pennsylvania, 
 Article 3, Section 1, provides that “In elec- 
 tions by the citizens, every white freeman of 
 the age of twenty-one years, having resided in 1 
 this State one year, and in the election district 
 wher * he offers to vote , ten days immediately 
 preceding such election, and within two years 
 aid a State or county tax, which shall have ; 
 een assessed at least ten days before the elec- j 
 tion, shall enjoy the rights of an elector.” 
 
 You will observe here that exactly the same 
 form of words is used in -the Pennsylvania Con- 
 stitution, with regard to the place of voting, 
 that is used in ours. The former says: “In 
 
 the election district, where he offers to vote; ” 
 ours says: “ in the township or ward in which 
 he offers to vote.” The Constitution of Penn- 
 sylvania does not describe election districts; 
 it makes no boundaries; it does not say what 
 they are, or what they shall be; in short, it 
 does not create them; neither does ours. 
 Both are exactly alike in these respects. That 
 Constitution recognizes them, as existing and 
 to exist; our does the same, in relation to 
 townships and wards. That takes them up 
 and makes them an integral part of itself ; 
 ours does the same in relation to townships 
 and wards, making them “election districts.” 
 The similarity of the two instruments, as to 
 the provisions compared here, is complete. 
 So far all is plain. 
 
 A law was passed by the Legislature of 
 Pennsylvania, providing for soldiers, engaged 
 in the service of the United States, to vote in 
 their public elections when absent from their 
 election districts, whether within or outside 
 of the boundaries of the State. In the case, 
 Chase vs. Miller, the question as to the consti- 
 tutionality of this law came before the Su- 
 preme Court of that State in the winter of 
 1862, to be adjudged and settled. The opin- 
 ion of the Court was delivered May 23d, 1862, 
 in which they say : “The Constitution does 
 not define an election district. Election dis- 
 tricts acquired their first constitutional recogni- 
 tion in 1838. They had, however, long been 
 familiar to our ordinary legislation. Always, 
 from 1799 down to the present hour, election 
 districts, within the meaning of our statute, 
 have denoted subdivisions of Pennsylvania 
 territory, marked out by know boundaries 
 pre-arranged and declared by public authority.” 
 (The same as the townships and wards* in 
 Michigan when our Constitution was adopted.) 
 The court continues : “Now, whilst the Con- 
 stitution did not stop to define election dis- 
 tricts, it took up and incorporated them, as 
 the Legislature had theretofore or should there- 
 after define and regulate them. And, there- 
 fore election districts mean in the Constitu- 
 tion just what they mean in the statutes.” j 
 
 .1 
 
 This describes our case here in Michigan pre- 
 cisely. Our townships and wards, for the pur- 
 poses of voting are our election districts. 
 New townships and wards may be established 
 by the Legislature, old ones divided, or their 
 boundaries modified; but no matter what 
 changes take place in this respect, they still 
 mean, in the Constitution, subdivisions of 
 Michigan territory, the same as in the statute. 
 And as the court of Pennsylvania says: “ We 
 must understand the Constitution, then, as 
 prescribing to the qualified voter that his bal- 
 lot must be cast in such election district;” 
 that is, in such township or ward. 
 
 That court further says, in this same case: 
 “ To offer to vote by ballot, is to present one’s 
 self, with proper qualifications, at the time 
 and place appointed, and to make manual 
 delivery of the ballot to the officers appointed 
 by law to receive it. The ballot cannot be sent 
 by mail or express, nor can it be ca3t outside 
 of all Pennsylvania election districts, and cer- 
 tified into the county where the voter has his 
 domicil. We cannot be persuided, that the 
 Constitution ever contemplated any such 
 mode of voting, and we have abundant reason 
 for thinking, tnat to permit it would break 
 down all the safe-guards of honest suffrage. 
 The Constitution meant, rather, that the vater 
 in propria personae should offer his vote in an 
 appropriate election district, (township or 
 ward in Michigan) in order that his neighbors 
 might be at hand to establish his right to vote 
 if it were challenged, or to challenge it if it 
 were doubtful.” 
 
 “ The amendment [requiring residence in the 
 election district where the freeman offers to 
 vote] so understood introduced not only a new 
 test of the right of suffrage, to wit, a district 
 residence, (township or ward in Michigan) 
 but a rule of voting also. Place became an 
 element of suffrage for a two-fold purpose. 
 Without the district residence no man shall 
 vote, but having had the district residence, 
 the right it confers is to vote in that district .” 
 [In that township or ward in Michigan.] 
 “ Such,” the court says, “is the voice or the 
 Constitution ” And such, then, is the voice 
 of the Constitution of Michigan, for the two 
 cases are exactly the same. 
 
 Again. The provisions of the Constitution 
 of Connecticut in relation to this subject are 
 very similar to those in the Constitution of New 
 Hampshire. And the General Assembly of 
 Connecticut, passed an Act in 1832, “provid- 
 ing a mode of taking the votes in the election 
 of State and other officers of persons absent 
 from the State as volunteers in the military 
 service of the United States.” But the Judges 
 of the Supreme Court of that State pronounced 
 the act repugnant to the Constitution and 
 void, because, as a principal reason, it author- 
 ized votes to be taken at places other than 
 those prescribed in that instrument. (Am. L. 
 Reg. for June, 1833, p. 430.) And, Sir, these 
 decisions indicate the course, in which the de- 
 cisions of the courts of all the States run 
 with regard to this subject where it h&3 come 
 before them under constitutional provisions 
 similar to our own, unless the court of Iowa 
 forms an exception, to which we will now give 
 a moment’s attention. 
 
 Article 3, Section 1 of the Constitution of 
 that State reads as follows: “Every white 
 male citizen of the United States, of the age 
 
17 
 
 of twenty-one years, who shall have been a 
 resident of the State six months next preced- 
 ing the election, and of the county in which he 
 claims his vote , sixty days, shall be entitled to 
 vote at all elections, which are now, or may 
 be authorized by law.” 
 
 By an act, approved September 11th 1862, 
 the Legislature of Iowa provided that the 
 qualified electors of the State in the military 
 service of the United States, be permitted to 
 vote at certain elections at polls opened and 
 conducted beyond the limits of the county 
 and the State of which they claim to be resi- 
 dents. 
 
 The Supreme Court of Iowa, in Morrison vs. 
 Spininger, already referred to, say on grounds 
 which we shall soon point out : “ We feel 
 constrained to say, that this law can be, and 
 should be, upheld.” 
 
 The first question which naturally arises 
 here is : Are the Constitutions of Iowa and 
 Michigan alike as to the subject-matter before 
 us? We will let the Supreme Court of Iowa 
 answer this question. In the case just re- 
 ferred to, that court having, in a preceding 
 sentence, spoken of the express provisions of 
 the Constitutions of Kentucky and Illinois 
 regarding this question says: “The Con- 
 
 stitution of Michigan, on the- other hand 
 contains no such express provisions or 
 or restrictions, and is not so entirely unlike 
 our own” — suggesting, most emphatically, 
 that in their opinion there is a substantial dif- 
 ference in the two instruments as to this 
 question. Senate Doc. No. 1 in quoting from 
 this same sentence, is careful to omit that part 
 of it suggesting this diiference. That court 
 is at the pains to point out in part, what this 
 difference is as it stands in their mind3. It 
 consists in the difference of meaning between 
 the words, “ claims''’ and “ offers .” The Iowa 
 Constitution says: “in which he claims his 
 vote,” while ours says: “ in which he offers to 
 vote.” In illustration of this difference that 
 court says: “Etymologically it (claims) by 
 no means implies that place or presence are 
 essential to its potency or completeness. On 
 the other hand, to “ offer ” to do a thing is, to 
 bring to, or before — to present for acceptance 
 or rejection — to exhibit something that may 
 be taken or received, or not. And hence the 
 argument drawn from the case in Pennsyl- 
 vania, is not by any means conclusive (against 
 the constitutionality of the Iowa act, on ac- 
 count of this difference in the Constitutions 
 of the two States). For (continues the 
 court) while, in the language of Woodward, 
 J, it may be true, that to offer to vote by bal- 
 lot, is to present one’s self, with proper qual- 
 ifications, at the time and place appointed and 
 make manual delivery of the ballot to the offi- 
 cers appointed by law to receive it — it by no 
 means necessarily follows that the same would 
 be the meaning of the word “ claims ” as used 
 in our Constitution. The one does not imply 
 so conclusively as the other, the idea of a per- 
 sonal presence in order to assert the right.” 
 
 Such, Sir, is the difference as adjudged by the 
 Supreme Court of Iowa between the Constitu- 
 tions of Pennsylvania and Michigan on the 
 one hand and of Iowa on the other, with re- 
 gard to this question. 
 
 The next question is : Why did the court of 
 Iowa suffer the act of its Legislature permit- 
 ting absent soldiers to vote, to pass as consti- 
 
 tutional? We will let the court answer this 
 question for itself, the same as we did the 
 other. Having cited several cases, in which 
 the books abound, showing “ that if it be 
 doubtful or questionable whether the Legislature 
 has exceeded its limits, the judiciary cannot 
 interfere, though it may not be satisfied that 
 the act is constitutional,” the court then say : 
 “In view of this well-settled rule, recognized 
 in the foregoing cases, we feel entirely satis- 
 fied as to our duty in the present case. There 
 is certainly a substantial doubt — and although 
 we might not be satisfied of its constitutional- 
 ity. — yet if not satisfied of its ^constitution- 
 ality it is our duty to uphold the law.” 
 
 Without stopping to discuss the propriety 
 of the application of this rule in this particu- 
 lar instance, there is no doubt as to the valid- 
 ity of the rule itself and that it applies to 
 legislators as between them and the Constitu- 
 tion, requiring them to pause at substantial 
 doubts the same as the court, as we have 
 already seen. 
 
 It is also observable in this connection, that 
 the court of Iowa in giving its opinion in this 
 case, speak approvingly of the Connecticut 
 and New Hampshire decisions, which I have 
 adduced to support my position against this 
 measure, and that while they admit by impli- 
 cation that the Pennsylvania decision is good 
 law, under the Constitution of that State, they 
 claim that the provisions of the two Constitu- 
 tions affecting this question are not the same! 
 You see too what the difference is between our 
 Constitution and that of Iowa, as adjudged by 
 the court of the latter; that in the opinion of 
 that court the meaning of the expression “ in 
 which he offers to vote,” is exactly what I have 
 stated it to be; that the court of Iowa was in 
 doubt as to the constitutionality of their sol- 
 diers’ voting act, after all the advantages it 
 gained from the word, “claim,” but that it 
 finally upheld it, because, notwithstanding 
 its “ substantial doubt,” it wa3 not satisfied of 
 its ^^constitutionality. ’ ’ 
 
 Now, Sir, this decision stands by itself and 
 alone. But it is not to be despised on that ac- 
 count. Let all the respect be given to it to 
 which it is justly entitled, where it belongs and 
 applies ; yet it should not be expected to weigh 
 very much with this body in support of the 
 measure now before us, and especially as it 
 weighs quite as much, at least, against as for 
 it, and when, too, the united voices of all these 
 other courts are against it, as well as the great 
 body of truth and argument which we perceive 
 to be arrayed against it, and know the same to 
 be unanswerable. 
 
 We should be loth to believe, on ordinary 
 proof, that a man claiming to have clear views 
 and patriotic motives would affect to entrench 
 himself behind this decision, on this occasion, 
 against such formidable odds. And yet, Sir, 
 strange to say, we hear Honorable gentlemen, 
 even of the legal profession, connected with 
 this Legislature, say that they can go for this 
 measure under shelter of the Iowa decis- 
 ion, although, in the very same sentence, they 
 tell us that they by no means accept it as good 
 law even under the Constitution of that State. 
 Their conduct in this respect, is well suited to 
 remind us of the habits of the ostrich. It is said 
 of that animal that if it is hotly pursued, it will 
 thrust its head into the sand, and, although its 
 whole body is exposed, it fancies itself secure, 
 
18 
 
 because, haring thus closed its eyes and ears 
 to the danger, it docs not hear or see it. It is, 
 therefore, called the silliest of birds. 
 
 Mr. Chairman, the decision of the court of 
 Connecticut referred to, is spoken of in the 
 Message, and also in reports, and especially in 
 Senate Doc. No. 1, as sustaining the principle 
 of tins House bill, or of the field system, 
 where the Constitution is worded like ours. 
 Is this so in fact? Let the court speak ior 
 itself. We have seen, Sir, that the form of 
 words in the Constitution of Pennsylvania 
 relative to this subject, is just like ours. The 
 court of Connecticut use these words with 
 reference to that, namely : “In Pennsylvania the 
 place only was prescribed by the Constitution; 
 but that teas sufficient to render an act of the Leg- 
 islature authorizing the reception of soldiers ’ votes 
 out of the State invalid .” The case of Pennsyl- 
 vania is our case exactly; and the court of 
 Connecticut in pronouncing thus against the 
 constitutionality of the Pennsylvania act pro- 
 nounces with equal force against the constitu- 
 tionality of this measure. Consequently, if 
 you pass this measure, you will do so in defi- 
 ance of a judicial opinion as controlling in 
 authority as a judicial decision can be not pro- 
 nounced by the Supreme Court of our own 
 State, or of the United States. 
 
 To prevent misapprehension, it may be well 
 to observe here that the Constitutions of some 
 of the States do not fix the place of voting; 
 they prescribe the qualifications of the voter 
 without making the place of voting within the 
 State, an essential element of suffrage; but 
 they commit the power to the Legislature to 
 regulate the place where votes may be offered 
 and received. The Constitutions of Ohio and 
 Wisconsin come under this category; and it is 
 thought by some good lawyers that the recep- 
 tion of votes outside of the limits of these 
 States may be constitutionally authorized by 
 their respective Legislatures, but not so where 
 the Constitution of a State directly or by 
 implication fixes the place of voting. 
 
 Before closing this part of the argument, I 
 desire to call the attention of the Committee 
 to the language of Section 3 of the House Bill 
 now before us. This Section reads as follows: 
 “Each elector voting by virtue of the provisions 
 of this act, shall be considered as voting in the 
 town or ward in which he had a residence at 
 the time of his entering the military service— 
 that is, he shall have the right, so far as au- 
 thorized by this act, to vote for the same offi- 
 cers and no others that he might lawfully have 
 voted for in the township or ward in which he 
 resided at the time of entering the military 
 service.” 
 
 The doctrine involved in this Section seems 
 to be this, namely : Acts otherwise repugnant 
 to the Constitution, become constitutional and 
 valid, simplv by an act of the Legislature de- 
 claring that they shall be considered consti- 
 tutional. This doctrine being admitted, it 
 follows that if it be indeed true, as the matter 
 now stands, that it would be unconstitutional 
 to vote by proxy at public elections, or to send 
 the ballot box out of the State to receive the 
 votes of our citizen soldiers, an act of the 
 Legislature declaring that the same shall be 
 “ considered'" constitutional, or as voting in 
 the town or ward in which the persons thus 
 voting had a residence at the time of entering 
 the military service, would make it all actual- 
 
 ly so, or so in effect. Such seems to be the 
 doctrine involved in this Section. 
 
 Now, Mr. Chairman, I confess that the ab- 
 surdity of this doctrine is so glaring, that one 
 can hardly be justified in taking up time in 
 pointing it out ; and I certainly should not feel 
 warranted in doing so on this occasion, 
 did I not happen to know that many being de- 
 ceived, accept this doctrine as tenable. 
 Many suppose that it is competent for the 
 Legislature to declare that any provision of the 
 Constitution shall be deemed to mean whatev- 
 er it shall see fit, and that such declaration 
 must govern. 
 
 Many too argue in this way : That the ballot- 
 box of any township or ward is the symbol of 
 of such township or ward for all the purposes 
 of public elections ; that to whatever point in 
 the United States the ballot-box shall be trans- 
 ported by the authority of the Legislature, and 
 opened for the reception of votes, there the 
 township or ward to which it belongs is sym- 
 bolically present; and that in this way any 
 township or ward in the State may be carried 
 in elfect to any citizen-soldier of this State, 
 whether within or without its geographical 
 lines, so as to enable him to vote to all intents 
 and purposes, in the township or ward where 
 he resides, agreeably to the spirit of the Con- 
 stitution. 
 
 Now, Sir, I will let the Judges of the Supreme 
 Court of Connecticut reply to the doctrine and 
 reasoning here referred to. They remark, in 
 the case already cited, as follows : “ Doubt- 
 less the General Assembly may say in any lan- 
 guage they choose, that a statute (mark that — 
 ‘•a statute ”) shall be considered, held and 
 taken to embrace some subject-matter or 
 thing, or construed to be in accordance with, 
 or a compliance with some other statute, <fec., 
 and if the place of voting could have been fixed 
 by statute , the provision in question would be 
 valid. But applied to the Constitution that 
 provision of the law is an anomaly , and in ef- 
 fect, an eflort by an inferior to change, extend 
 and indirectly control a clear, full and exhaus- 
 tive mandate of its superior, in a material par- 
 ticular, even in respect to its own organization, 
 and inconsistent with the fundamental princi- 
 ples of constitutional law. 
 
 “If the General Assembly (the Legislature) 
 can thus add to, alter and control one consti- 
 tutional provision respecting elections, there 
 are no others beyond their reach. They may 
 direct votes to be taken at any time, and say 
 that they shall be considered, held and taken 
 to have been cast on the first Monday of April. 
 They may authorize minors to vote and say 
 that their votes shall be considered, taken and 
 held to be the votes of electors of full age ; 
 or colored men, and say that their votes shall 
 be considered, taken and held to be the votes 
 of white men and electors ; and so may au- 
 thorize the taking and counting of the votes 
 of women and aliens. Nor would there re- 
 main any other matter of constitutional pro- 
 vision or purpose, which might not be reached 
 at any time by a temporary and fluctuating 
 legislative majority, and by the same legisla- 
 tive alchemy of changing things constructively, 
 into what they are not in fact, be practically 
 controlled or annulled. Indeed, the same pro- 
 cess which could turn votes taken in a camp 
 to votes taken in an electors’ meeting (in a 
 I township or ward) might turn those taken in 
 
19 
 
 fact in the electors’ meeting (or in a township 
 or ward) into the votes of women, or aliens, 
 or minors, or colored men, and exclude them 
 for that reason from the canvass, and so on, 
 till the Constitution and constitutional law be- 
 came a mockery.” 
 
 Dogmas Put Forth in Support of this 
 Pleasure by its Advocates. 
 
 Having given an exposition of the words of 
 the Constitution relative to this question, 
 which I am morally certain contains the truth, 
 the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
 and having substantiated it by facts, argu- 
 ments, authority and law not to be impeached, 
 
 I have thus made out my case, and might 
 with propriety here rest ; and it may be that 
 a due regard to your patience requires me to 
 do so. But, Sir, certain theories have been 
 framed with great care and have been pressed 
 on our attention with extreme assiduity, in ; 
 order, if possible, to evade this hitherto uni- 
 versally received exposition, and thus facili- 
 tate the passage of this measure. They seem 
 to be of a mixed nature. That is, they seem 
 to be somewhat of the nature of outside ques- 
 tions, and somewhat in a line with these meas- 
 ures. But they are made up of errors for the 
 most part ; yet they have just enough of truth 
 about them, or the semblance of truth, to give 
 the error currency and effect with many 
 minds. I therefore now propose to take them 
 up and consider them separately. 
 
 I. In support of this proxy bill it is said : 
 
 1. That it is a well-settled principle of law 
 that whatever any person has oi-iginal author- 
 ity to do himself he may do by another. 
 
 2. That the Bill providing for the soldiers’ 
 voting by proxy is based on this well-estab- 
 lished principle of law. 
 
 The first of these propositions is correct 
 beyond all question, but the second is clearly 
 erroneous. And the error lies in this, that 
 this principle of law with regard to agency ap- 
 plies only to what men have an original right 
 or authority to do in their private affairs, and 
 to certain mechanical or ministerial acts, 6uch 
 as are performed by a Deputy Sheriff and a 
 poster of notices. It does not apply to their 
 political acts and relations. Walker, in his 
 treatise on American Law, p. 246, says : “One 
 person cannot depute another to vote for 
 him ” — meaning in civil and political elections. 
 And Kent says, Vol. 2, p. 369, as we have be- 
 fore seen, that “in the case of elections in 
 public and municipal corporations, and in all 
 other elections of a public nature, eveiy vote 
 must be personally given.” This is a principle 
 of common law every where recognized. 
 
 Besides. Here is another consideration 
 which should seem to be decisive, namely: 
 The right to vote is a delegated right. It is not 
 an original, natural on necessary right, such, 
 for instance, as is the right to live. In our 
 American system this right is created by the 
 several State Constitutions. They determine 
 by careful definitions the classes of persons 
 on whom this right shall be conferred, and by 
 implication that it shall not be conferred on 
 any others. In respect to the right of voting 
 the Constitution is of the nature of an enabling 
 act. It gives the inhabitant all the right to 
 vote he possesses. It enables those coining 
 within its descriptions to exercise this right 
 in the form which it points out. Others, 
 
 both persons and forms, are excluded. This 
 right, then, dees not extend to all — far from 
 it. In this State, for illustration, the people, 
 in framing the Constitution, withheld it from 
 aliens, negroes, Indians of any tribe ; from wo- 
 men and minors — in short, from everybody 
 except such as answer to a certain specific de- 
 scription. Such as come under this descrip- 
 tion are called citizens, and to them the Con- 
 stitution delegates the power to vote at State 
 and local elections, in person, but not by proxy. 
 It no where confers on the elector the right of 
 substitution. It thence follows, that with us 
 the right to vote is strictly personal, and can- 
 not be delegated or performed by proxy. 
 [Lyon vs. Jerome, 26 Wend., p. 485.] 
 
 Furthermore. The right to vote being dele- 
 gated by the Constitution to a carefully speci- 
 fied class, without the right of substitution,, 
 it is in the nature of a personal privilege, a 
 personal franchise, or an office in the enjoy- 
 ment and discharge of which the whole com- 
 monwealth is much interested, and great 
 parity , care and discretion are required. For 
 this reason, it is personal and cannot be dele- 
 gated to, or exercised by, an agent. In the 
 case, Powell vs. Tuttle, 3 Comstock, p. 396, the 
 Court says: “ An authority to do acts merely 
 mechanical may be delegated, but not so where 
 the act involves the exercise of judgment and 
 discretion.” 
 
 Thus, Mr. Chairman, the question seems to 
 be settled beyond the possibility of being dis- 
 turbed, that the office of an elector in this 
 State is strictly personal, and that its duties 
 cannot be performed, or meddled with by an 
 agent, or by proxy, any more than those of an 
 assessor, a judge, or legislator. 
 
 But Honorable gentlemen profess to find 
 support for this proxy bill in an argument of 
 this sort. They say: “Here is an elector 
 
 without hands. He comes to the polls and 
 some one, at his request and in his presence, 
 deposits his vote for him.” Now they ask: 
 “ Is not this vote lawfully cast? ” Grant it. 
 What then? Why, they ask: “Is not this 
 
 voting by another, by an agent, by proxy, and 
 does not this in reality admit the principle of 
 this proxy bill?” By no manner of means. 
 For, as the Justices of the Supreme Court of 
 New Hampshire well say, in the opinion be- 
 fore cited: “ If it were allowable, that the votes 
 of infirm or disabled electors be deposited for 
 them in their presence, it would by no means 
 follow that this could be done for them in 
 their absence ; for,” they continue, “an act 
 done by me, in the presence, and under the con- 
 trol of another, for that other, is regarded, not 
 as the exercise of a delegated authority, but as 
 the personal act of the party in whose behalf 
 it was performed; “but,” they add, “it is 
 otherwise, where the act is doneby a person’s 
 direction in his absence and beyond his control .” 
 They cite Kidder vs. Prescott, 4 Foster 263 ; 
 and Hanson vs. Rowe, 6 Foster 327. Thus it 
 appears, Sir, that this fancied argument is 
 far more halt, and blind, and maimed, and pit- 
 iable than the poor cripples from whose case 
 it is derived. 
 
 But, Mr. Chairman, the practice of voting by 
 proxy, in joint stock companies or monied 
 corporations, is adduced in support of this 
 proxy bill. Some seem to be much influenced 
 by it. But it seems to me that if gentlemen 
 will think a moment, they will clearly discover. 
 
20 
 
 that there Is no real analogy between the two 
 things. Why look: The principle on which 
 voting is based, in joint stock companies, 
 stands alone. It i6 peculiar. There the right 
 to vote attaches to the shares, in the capital | 
 stock. It goes with them as they are trans- 
 ferred from one to another. Very generally 
 each share, by the act of incorporation, is en- 
 titled to one vote. Hence the greater the 
 number of shares one holds, the greater 
 the number of votes he is entitled to cast; and 
 vice versa. And here mark this, that even in ! 
 any of these companies, a shareholder cannot , 
 vote by proxy, unless it is specially provided i 
 for in the act of incorporation. A clause is ' 
 almost always inserted in a charter, or general 
 act, that members may vote “ in person or by 
 proxy.” But if, for any cause, the words “by 
 proxy,” are left out, as they are in State Con- 
 stitutions and election laws, each shareholder 
 must be present and vote iu person, or not at 
 all. In Taylor vs. Griswold, 2 Green’s N. J. 
 Rep. 223, the Supreme Court, after full and 
 learned discussion, held it to be a principle of | 
 the common law, that where an election de- | 
 pends upon the exercise of judgement the i 
 right can not be deputed; and that it requires 1 
 legislative sanction before any corporate body j 
 can make a valid by-law authorizing mem- 
 bers to vote by proxy. 
 
 The conclusion, therefore, Mr. Chairman, is 
 plain, and not to be eluded, that this proxy 
 Dill has no support from law, the decisions of 
 the courts, analogy or usage, but that all these 
 are directly against it. It must, therefore, 
 fall dead to* the ground. 
 
 II. Another of these mixed theories is this : 1 
 * All political power,” say they, “ is vested j 
 In the people ” — grant it — “the people make j 
 and unmake Constitutions” — grant that, also 
 — “that we, the members of the Leg- 
 islature, are the representatives of the peo- ; 
 pie, duly commissioned to exercise their I 
 powers of government” — true, within con- 
 stitutional limits — “and that we, by virtue I 
 of our relations to the people as their j 
 civil and political representatives, may prop- 
 erly do whatever it is competent for the I 
 people to do or authorize to be done as 
 regards the exercise of governmental powers.” j 
 Not so, by any means. A more startling 
 nonsequiter could hardly be stated. 
 
 Why, Mr. Chairman, have the authors of ! 
 this theory forgotten what country they are 
 in, and the genius of the government under I 
 which they live, and about which they thus j 
 speculate? In monarchical and despotic gov- j 
 ernments, a similar doctrine has been held. | 
 Sir William Blackstone remarks: “We 
 
 may venture to affirm that the power of Par- 
 liament is absolute and without control.’' 
 And Coke himself says: “ That the power and 
 jurisdiction of Parliament is so transcendent 
 and absolute that it cannot be considered 
 either for causes orpersons within any bounds.” 
 But, Sir, this country is not England, nor is this 
 government the English government. This is 
 the United States, and we live under a system 
 of government peculiar to America. And I 
 submit that this system in respect to the point 
 here raised, is in substance this: 
 
 The people, in their calm and clear moments 
 and in their original and aggregate capacity, 
 ordain articles to regulate the exercise of their 
 sovereignty, or powers of government. They 
 
 divide their “powers of government into 
 three departments : the legislative, executive 
 and judicial.” This is so with the general, 
 as well as with each of the State governments. 
 In this State the people, by their organic arti- 
 cles, have divested themselves of the powers 
 of legislation, and lodged them in a “ Senate 
 and House of Representatives.” to be exer- 
 cised, however, subject to the true intent and 
 meaning of these articles. For the people took 
 good care to set metes and bounds in these arti- 
 cles beyond which their officers and representa- 
 tives, in any department of government, shall 
 not pass. In general terms, these articles pre- 
 scribe the organization, powers, and duties of 
 the Legislature, as well as the other depart- 
 ments of government. And these articles are 
 the Constitution. It must remain just as it is 
 in each “jot and tittle,” until changed by the 
 people in the manner therein specified. And 
 by this instrument, just as it stands, must this 
 Legislature be strictly governed, and to it its 
 action must be conformed, otherwise it will 
 be of no effect. So the Courts hold. For 
 example: The Supreme Court of New York, 
 
 when composed of those master jurists, Nel- 
 son, Bronson, and Cowen, unanimously held on 
 this point, as follows : “Under our form of 
 
 f ovemment, the Legislature is not supreme, 
 t is only one of the organs of that absolute 
 sovereignty which resides in the whole body of 
 the people. Like other departments of the 
 government, it can only exercise such powers 
 as have been delegated to it; and when it 
 steps beyond that boundary, its acts, like 
 those of the most humble magistrate in the 
 State, who transcends his jurisdiction, are ut- 
 terly void” (Tyler V6. Porter, 4 Hill 140.) 
 
 Thus endeth this theory of Legislative om- 
 nipotence. 
 
 III. But, Sir, here is another of these mixed 
 theories. It lays down a new rule of construc- 
 tion — a rule which has been invented, it 
 should seem, for the special purpose of se- 
 curing, if possible, the passage of this 
 measure in some form or other. This theory 
 is somewhat complex, but may be clearly sta- 
 ted as follows : 
 
 1. The Constitution of the United States is 
 a grant of powers, while the State Constitutions 
 grant no powers, but only impose limitations 
 of power. 
 
 2. It thence follows that in ascertaining the 
 powers of the Legislature, under the State 
 Constitution, we are to look not at what is au- 
 thorized to be done, but what is prohibited. 
 
 3. All such prohibitions must be 11 express” 
 — “ direct” in distinction from implied or from 
 affirmative provisions; otherwise they are not 
 biading on the Legislature. 
 
 4. There is in the Constitution of Michigan 
 no '•'■express prohibition” against the proposed 
 law to authorize absent soldiers to vote; there- 
 fore, such a law would be free from constitu- 
 tional objection. 
 
 Such, Sir, is one of the theories of the cham- 
 pions of this measure, as to a rule of 
 constitutional construction. Is it correct? 
 It certainly has the merit of novelty. But the 
 question is not whether it is new or old, 
 whether it is an acknowledged principle, or a 
 dogma invented for the occasion, but is it cor- 
 rect or erroneous? This is the question. 
 
 Now, Sir, as to points 1 and 2 of this 
 theory : They have, it must be confessed, the 
 
21 
 
 show of depth and philosophy abont them, 
 not a little imposing. And it is not pretended 
 that they do not involve important distinctions 
 and doctrines. But, nevertheless, I respect- 
 fully submit : 
 
 1. That they are erroneous, so far as they 
 are at variance, if they are at variance at all, 
 with the well-settled doctrine, namely : That 
 both the Federal and State Constitutions are 
 acts of the people speaking in their original 
 capacity — the former being the act of the peo- 
 ple of all the States, the latter of the people 
 of each seperate State, by and for themselves ; 
 that by these Constitutions, the people have 
 divided the powers of sovereignty between the 
 government of the Union and* those of the 
 States ; that they are each sovereign and inde- 
 pendent with respect to the objects committed 
 to it, and neither of them sovereign and inde- 
 pendent with respect to the objects committed 
 to the other— the authority of the Federal 
 Constitution, and the laws of Congress and 
 the public treaties made in pursuance of it 
 being supreme, in case of conflict; and that 
 (what is more especially applicable to this dis- 
 cussion) each of these Constitutions, in its 
 distinctive sphere, prescribes, both by afflrma- 
 ive and negative provisions how the public au- 
 thority shall be executed, and what shall be the 
 organization, powers, and duties, of their res- 
 pective Legislatures, as well as the other de- 
 partments ofgovernment, State, no less than 
 national. (4 Wheaton 316 ; Kent’s com. vol. 1, 
 p. 504; Webster in reply to Calhoun, Feb. 16th, 
 33.) I repeat, that so far as points 1 and 2 of 
 this theory conflict, if they conflict at all, with 
 the views just stated, then just to that extent, 
 these points must be held to be erroneous. 
 But I submit : 
 
 2. That although it is suggested in Senate 
 Doc. No. 1, p. 2, and in the minority report of 
 the Committee on the Judiciary of this'.House of 
 the 25th inst., that the question hinges on the' 
 doctrines set forth in points 1 and 2 of this 
 theory yet, as a matter of fact and of l»gic, it 
 is clearly otherwise, and that the real impor- 
 tance of the theory for the purposes of this 
 case is contained in points 3 and 4, including 
 the inference. We may, therefore, dismiss the 
 former and turn our attention to the latter. 
 
 Well, then, as to point 3. It is indeed true, 
 that in order to prohibit the State Legislature 
 by the Constitution from doing an act, the 
 prohibiting clause must be “ express ” — di- 
 rect''' in distinction from bein ^implied or from 
 being an affirmative provision? Is this a 
 sound rule of construction? May not an 
 affirmative provision work prohibitions? May 
 not a prohibition be implied if the implication 
 be a necessary one? Or must it be in “ direct ,” 
 or “ express ” terms, as thou shadt not? The 
 authors of this theory of construction aver 
 that it must be. They produce no authority 
 to support it except their own dicta. But let 
 us hear what they say. On pages 9 and 10 of 
 Senate Doc. No. 1 of this Session, are these 
 word s : “It seems clearly established that our 
 Constitution contains no “ express ” ptohibition 
 to prevent the Legislature from passing such 
 a law (a law authorizing absent soldiers to 
 vote). Can the members hesitate to pass it in 
 the absence of such prohibition ?’ ’ Here the ar- 
 gument in favor of such a law is, that there Is 
 no “ express prohibition ” in the Constitution 
 against it. That instrument, it is alleged, does 
 
 not say to the Legislature, in the “ express ” 
 language of prohibition, you shall not pass it, 
 and on the ground of the “ absence ” of such 
 an “ express prohibition,” the argument for 
 the law is based by the authors of this theory. 
 Members of this House stoutly maintain the 
 same position. 
 
 On the other hand, the friends of the Con- 
 stitution hold that there is nothing better set- 
 tled in the whole range of legislation, or juris- 
 prudence than this, namely: That the Con- 
 stitution limits and restrains the action of the 
 Legislature : 
 
 1. By express prohibition. This is admitted, 
 and may be passed. 
 
 2. By affirmative provisions. That is to say, 
 if the Constitution says, affirmatively , that a 
 thing shall be done, or a right exercised in a 
 particular way, every other way is thereby 
 excluded and prohibited as fully and as firmly 
 as it could have been done by “ express prohi- 
 bitions.” What is the difference in the effect 
 of your words, whether you say, affirmatively , 
 to your boy, John: “You shall stay in your 
 room to-day,” or, negatively: “ You shall not 
 leave your room, to-day ! ” Do not the affir- 
 mative words, “ you shall stay in," limit Jonn’s 
 action just as much and as effectually as the 
 negative words, “you shall not leave?” And 
 is not this an inherent principle of language? 
 Are not these forms of expression used, inter- 
 changeably, by all classes, and in every spe- 
 cies of composition? Why, look at the com- 
 mon sense of the thing. You tell John, affirm- 
 atively, “to stay in his room to-day.” Do 
 you not say to him by this affirmative require- 
 ment that he shall not do otherwise? Do not 
 these affirmative words contain a negative as 
 strong as can be stated that John shall not leave 
 
 ‘ his room to-day ?” And is he at liberty to 
 leave, when you have expressly told him to stay 
 in, simply because you did not expressly pro- 
 hibit him from going out? Or must you, in 
 order to make it obligatory on John to stay 
 in, “ expressly prohibit ” him from going out? 
 Or must you go even farther, and think of 
 each thing that it is possible for him to do, in- 
 consistent with his staying in, and re-utter 
 your “ exvress prohibition'''' against every sepa- 
 rate particular? Why, Sir, every one well 
 knows who can speak or understand the Eng- 
 lish language, that your affirmative require- 
 ment, that John shall stay in, obliges him to do 
 that very thing, and forbids him from 
 doing every thing else, whatever, in any 
 way inconsistent with it. And now, Sir, 
 does not this same principle hold good, 
 in determining what limits the words of 
 the Constitution impose on the power of 
 the Legislature? This theory of construc- 
 tion now under review flatly denies it. 
 Consequently, we may appeal to the de- 
 cisions of the courts to settle the matter. 
 What, then, say the courts about it ? In the 
 case of The District Township of the city o- 
 Dubuque vs. The City of Dubuque, 7 Clarkf 
 (Iowa,) the court says : “ If by a law or Con- 
 stitution, a thing is to be done in a particu- 
 lar manner or form, this includes a negative 
 that it shall not be done otherwise.” Also, in 
 the 5 of Texas, 418, the court says: “Affirm- 
 ative words in a statute, may be construed as 
 a negative of what is not affirmed.” Again. 
 In 3 Brevard, p. 396 the court hold: “ Where 
 an act requires a thing to be done in a particu- 
 
22 
 
 lar way, that way alone must be pursued.” 
 The same principle is laid down with great 
 clearness, in Head and Amory vs. The Provi- 
 dence Insurance Co., 3 Cranch, p. 127. Other 
 cases might be cited, but these are quite suffi- 
 cient to show us that the courts hold, that 
 affirmative words, as thou shalt do thus and so, 
 firmly bind those on whom they operate to the 
 modes specified, and prohibit all other modes, 
 or courses, or forms inconsistent with them, 
 quite as effectually as any negative forms ot 
 expression, conceivable. 
 
 And right here, Mr. Chairman, another con- 
 sideration is worthy of notice : Smith, in his 
 Commentaries on Statutory and Constitutional 
 Construction, p. 663, says: “ Every construc- 
 tion, which leads to an absurdity, ought to be 
 rejected.” And Vattel, among his rules of 
 construction, has this: “We should not give 
 
 to any piece a meaning from which any absurd 
 consequences would follow, but must interpret 
 it in such a manner as to avoid absurdity.” 
 
 Now, just see to what absurdities the rule 
 of construction, contended for by this novel 
 theory, would lead to, if adopted It holds, 
 that in order to prohibit the Legislature from 
 doing an act, there must be an “ Express pro- 
 hibition,” in the Constitution to that effect — 
 that it must say, “ you shall not .” Just apply 
 this rule practically, and see bow it works: 
 The Constitution says, affirmatively, that “ the 
 Governor shall hold his office for two years.” 
 It does not say, that he shall not hold it any 
 longer. Now tell me, does, or does not, 
 this affirmative provision of the Constitution 
 prohibit the Legislature from passing an act, 
 that he shall hold his office for four, five or 
 any greater number of years than two ? Ac- 
 cording to this new theory of construction, it 
 is competent for the Legislature to do so, be- 
 cause there is no “ express prohibition” against 
 it in the Constitution. Again : The Constitu- 
 tion says affirmatively : “ The judicial power 
 is vested in one Supreme Court, in Circuit 
 Courts, in Probate Courts, and in Justices of 
 the Peace.” Now, is the Legislature at liberty 
 to take away this power from these tribunals 
 and re-invest it, tor example, in the Board of 
 State Auditors because there is no “ express ” 
 constitutional prohibition against it ? If not, 
 what becomes of this rule of construction laid 
 down in said Doc. No. 1? Again: the Con- 
 stitution provides affirmatively , that every 
 white male citizen and inhabitant and every 
 civilized male inhabitant of Indian descent, 
 answering to certain specific descriptions, 
 shall be entitled to vote. It does not say that 
 other inhabitants shall not vote. Now if this 
 Legislature should pass an act allowing aliens, 
 women, minors, negroes and Indians of regu- 
 lar tribes to vote in our State and local elec- 
 tions, would the law be constitutional because 
 there is no “ express prohibition” in the Con- 
 stitution against it ? If not, what then be- 
 comes of this rule of construction, that 
 the Legislature may lawfully do anything in 
 the nine of legislation not “ expressly prohi- 
 bited 1 ' by the Constitution; and what too 
 becomes of the appeal in behalf of this House 
 Bill, founded on the “ absence of such prohi- 
 bition ? ” Sir, what ought to become of them ? 
 We have seen that this kind of construction 
 has no foundation in the nature of human 
 language; that it has no support lrom the 
 decisions ©f the courts, but that it is roundly 
 
 denied by the courts as well as by the nature 
 and use of language, and that, finally, it is 
 contradictory to common sense and leads to 
 extreme absurdities wherever it is applied. 
 What, then, ought to become of it— this very 
 sum and substance of the aforenamed Docu- 
 ment No. 1 ? You say, Sir. let it fall, although 
 great may be the fall of it, “because it is 
 founded on the sand.” And thus endeth that 
 Document and its “ lone idea.” 
 
 We might add, that the powers ot the Leg- 
 islature arc limited, 
 
 3. By what the words qf the Constitution neces- 
 sarily imply. But as I shall have occasion to 
 6peak of this important source ot limitation a 
 little further on, it would not be a good use of 
 time to dwell on it here. 
 
 IV. We next come to still another of these 
 mixed theories. This, like the one last con- 
 sidered, relates to a rule of construction. It 
 teaches that the Legislature may be restrained 
 by express requirements or by express prohibi- 
 tions in the Constitution, but not by implica- 
 tion — not restrained by any thing which the 
 words of the Constitution presuppose or imply. 
 Such is the theory. 
 
 Sir, let no one fancy from the extraordinary 
 character of this theory, that I am setting up 
 “ a man of straw” here. This theory is in 
 print. In the Message, p. 11, are these words : 
 “ That the Legislature has the power to fix 
 the time, place and manner of holding elec- 
 tions and to establish the qualifications of 
 voters, unless prohibited by the Constitution 
 from doing so, need not be doubted.” Here 
 is the word “ prohibited, but neither “ direct- 
 ly ” or “ expressly,” is prefixed to it. All is 
 not yet fully ready for that. Again : ib. p. 12, 
 are these words, “ That instrument (the Con- 
 stitution) has nowhere required that the elec- 
 tion shall be held in any particular place.” That 
 is, according to this particular theory, it is not 
 required to be in the townships and wards, and 
 why ? Because it is not done in “ direct or 
 express” terms, but only by implication. How- 
 ever, we have not, as yet, come to the word 
 “ direct,” in this State paper. But we are be- 
 ing eautiously led to it. It is near at hand. 
 For on page 13 we read, that “ they (words 
 of Sec. 1 Art. 7 of the Constitution in relation 
 to qualifications of voters and the place of 
 voting) speak directly as to age and residence, 
 and only f“ directly”] to those qualifications. 
 All else is incidental and explanatory .” Here 
 we have it. And the obvious suggestion here 
 is, that there is and can be no such thing in 
 the Constitution as an implied direction to the 
 Legislature of the nature either of a restraint 
 or a rule of duty. But let us look still further. 
 On page 13 we read: “H it was intended to 
 forbid the Legislature from authorizing the 
 reception of a vote in any other place than in 
 the town or ward where the elector resided, it 
 is not conceivable, that it should be left by the 
 Convention to a merely casual expression, 
 which does not directly either command or 
 forbid any thing.” Here the theory comes 
 plainly to the surface, that a provision of the 
 Constitution must be either “ directly” affirm- 
 ative or “ directly” negative, in order to act 
 on the Legislature as a command or prohibi- 
 tion. Implications , however clear and necessary, 
 are , according to this theory , qf no avail. Noth- 
 ing but directly, affirmative, or negative terms, 
 “as you shall, or shall not,” are to be regarded. 
 
23 
 
 But once more. On page 13 of this same 
 Message, is this language : “These words (of 
 Sec. 1 Art. 7, before referred to,) no doubt 
 presuppose , that the offer to vote will be made 
 In the township or ward in which the elector 
 resides. But they neither require it to be so, 
 nor forbid it to be otherwise.” That is to say, 
 according to this theory, it is plain beyond the 
 possibility of doubt, on the very face of Sec. 
 
 1 Art. 7 of the Constitution, that the makers 
 of that instrument took it for granted, and 
 that this Section assumes it, and is based upon 
 it as an existing and permanent fact, that the 
 elector would appear in person in the township 
 or ward where he resides, and there personally 
 offer to vote; and yet it alleges on the other 
 hand that all this is of no manner of import- 
 ance as a restraint on the action of the Legis- 
 lature, and why ? Because, forsooth, it does 
 not happen to be stated in the exact form of 
 an express requirement or prohibition ! Such is 
 the theory of construction set forth in the 
 Message ! No authority is adduced to support 
 it. No reason is given for it, founded in law, 
 language, usage, fact, or common sense. And 
 none can be given for it, springing from any 
 of these sources. It rests upon the solitary 
 ipse dixit of the author; and the degree of im- 
 portance to be attached to it from this cir- 
 cumstance, each one will judge for himself. 
 
 Before going further with this theory, it 
 may not be amiss to call attention to what ev- 
 idently suggested it, which is this : The place 
 of voting, and the personal presence of the 
 voter there, and his voting personally, are 
 fixed, not by expressly affirmative or expressly I 
 negative provisions of the Constitution, but 
 by what the words of that instrument in said j 
 Sec. 1 necessarily imply, which is, in fact, but ' 
 a continuance of the practice relative to vo- ! 
 ting, then long in use, and agreeable to com- 
 mon law and the old Constitution as amended 
 in 1839. The framers of that instrument very 
 well knew that this practice was fully provided 
 for, and would be perpetuated by such an im- ! 
 plication as the one contained in the words 
 they usa. Consequently, they there left the ■ 
 matter to go on as aforetime. 
 
 The author of this theory of construction, 
 which we are here speaking of, evidently 
 clearly saw just how this matter actually 
 stands in the Constitution, and that this neces- 
 sary implication as a source ot restraint on 
 the Legislature, must be, somehow, disposed 
 of, or this measure could not be passed. Hence 
 this theory. 
 
 Now Sir, the friends of constitutional law 
 do not admit* in any manner, the validity of 
 this pretended principle of construction, and 
 claim, on the contrary, that the Legislature is 
 not only limited and restrained by the express- 
 ly affirmative and negative provisions of the 
 Constitution, but that it is also limited and 
 restrained, 
 
 , 3. By what the words of the Constitution neces- 
 sarily imply. 
 
 1. The courts so hold. In the case, 
 Sears vs. Cottrell, 5 Michigan, p. 260, the 
 Supreme Court of this State says: “ An act 
 of a State Legislature, not prohibited by the 
 express words of the Constitution, or by 
 necssessary implication , cannot be declared 
 as a violation of that instrument.” 
 
 Mr. Chairman, please note carefully, the 
 terms of this pertinent decision. It places 
 
 “ the necessary implications ” of the Consti- 
 tution on an equal footing with its “express 
 words ” as sources of restraint on the action 
 of the Legislature. The court declares that 
 they possess equal force and are entitled to 
 equal respect. And thus it appears that this 
 is the well established law of the land, any 
 new-born theory in the Message or elsewhere 
 “to the contrary notwithstanding.” 
 
 And even in the Iowa case, so much relied 
 on by the friends of this measure, (O’Neal vs. 
 Watson) the Court distinctly recognizes the 
 same doctrine. It says: “The Legislature 
 clearly has the power to legislate on all right- 
 ful subjects of legislation, unless expressly 
 prohibited from so doing, or where the prohi- 
 bition is implied from some express provision.” 
 This hits the case in hand exactly. Our Con- 
 stitution says: “No citizen or inhabitant shall 
 be an elector or entitled to vote at any elec- 
 tion, unless he shall be above the age of twen- 
 ty-one years, and has resided in the State three 
 months, and in the township or ward in which 
 he offers to vote, ten days next preceding such 
 election.” This is an ‘ ‘ express ’ ’ negative 
 “ provision;” and the prohibition implied in it, 
 is, that no elector shall be permitted to vote 
 who does not personally appear at the polls in 
 the town or ward in which he resides, and 
 there personally offer to vote, as will presently 
 more fully appear. So the Iowa case confirms 
 the position, that the Legislature is limited 
 and restrained in its action by what the words 
 of the Constitution necessarily imply. 
 
 In McCullock vs. the State of Maryland (4 
 Wheat 316), Chief J ustice Marshall, speaking 
 for the entire Court, pronounced an act of the 
 Legislature of Maryland void, not on the ground 
 that it was prohibited bv any express words of 
 the Federal Constitution, (and indeed the 
 Court said, that there were none of that char- 
 acter against the act,) but because it was in 
 conflict with what the wording of that instru- 
 ment necessarily implies. And in remarking on 
 the case, that great prince of American juris- 
 prudence dwells with characteristic vigor and 
 point on what he very suggestively terms “ that 
 vast mass of incidental powers which must be 
 involved in the Constitution, if that instrument 
 he not a splendid baublef 
 
 Again: In Streeter vs. Paton, 7 Mich. 341, 
 the question arose whether the merely affirma- 
 tive provision of Art. 6 Sec. 1 of the Constitu- 
 tion, vested exclusive judicial jurisdiction in 
 the courts therein named, or whether it is 
 competent for the Legislature to give concur- 
 rent jurisdiction with any of these tribunals 
 to a Circuit Court Commissioner, or to any one 
 else, because not prohibited from doing so by 
 any expressly negative words. 
 
 To this our Supreme Court said: “There 
 are no negative or other terms used, clearly 
 and beyond all doubt, confining the power to 
 the Courts mentioned. It is by implication 
 only, it is so confined ; and not by any express 
 language that the power to vest any part of it 
 elsewhere is taken from the Legislature, if the 
 Legislature is in fact destitute of this power. 
 This implication , standing by itself would he 
 conclusive ”— how apposite to this theory be- 
 fore us and how decisive against it ! 
 
 Thus, we see, Mr. Chairman, that the law 
 on this subject is clear and strong in support 
 of our proposition, that the action of the Leg- 
 islature is limited and restrained by what 
 
24 
 
 the words of the Constitution necessarily imply , 
 us well us by expressly affirmative and negative 
 provisions; and that, consequently, the con- 
 trary doctrine, set forth and advocated in the 
 Message, has no manner of legal foundation. 
 But, 
 
 2. Usage and common sense both teach 
 the same thing. They teach, as clearly and 
 as positively, as do the courts, that the 
 aower and action of the Legislature, are 
 imited and restrained by what the words 
 of the Constitution necessarily imply. Our 
 Constitution, our laws, our jurisprudence, 
 our literature, our every day transactions 
 abound in illustrations of the truth of this 
 position. For example : The Constitution of 
 this State sa)s, “ The property of no person 
 shall be taken for public use without just 
 compensation therefor.” In Sec. 2 of the 
 same Art. is prescribed the manner in which 
 6uch compensation shall be determined, when 
 private property is so taken. But the Consti- 
 tution no where says, in express terms, that 
 private property may be taken for the use and 
 benefit of the public. But yet these words 
 “ pre-suppose” the existence of the right; they 
 clearly imply it ; they distinctly recognize it, 
 and go on the ground of it ; consequently, the 
 right is contained in them by necessary implica- 
 tion. 
 
 Again. The Federal Constitution confers on 
 Congress the power “ to establish poet offices 
 and post roads.” But whence the authority 
 and duty of Congress, under and by virtue of 
 that instrument, to errry the mail, and to pun- 
 ish those who rob it, or steal letters from a 
 post office ? Why, Sir, all the authority or 
 duty there is for all that, is implied in the au- 
 thority to “establish post offices and post 
 roads.” And our whole immense post office 
 system, and all the laws and regulations con- 
 cerning it, are based on that implication. Our 
 State and National Constitutions and laws are 
 full of similar illustrations But let us take 
 for a moment, more familiar cases— such as 
 we meet with in every day life. For instance : 
 If you, with my consent, go to work for me 
 without any express agreement as to compen- 
 sation, it is “ presupposed' ’ that I will pay you 
 what your services are fairly worth, and I am 
 obliged to do so, by necessary implication. If 
 you have sold goods to me, of any description, 
 and I have consented to receive them, with- 
 out any agreement as to price, it is “ presuppos- 
 ed ,” that! will pay you what they are reason- 
 ably worth, and I am firmly bound to do so, 
 by what that pre-supposition necessarily im- 
 plies. If I ask you for a hundred dollars and 
 you let me have it, and I go away with it, a 
 word not being said by either of us as to re- 
 funding it, is \& pre-sitpposed that I will account 
 to you for it, and, by necessary implication, 
 resulting from such pre-supposition, I am 
 obliged to do so. And thus it is that this prin- 
 ciple of pre-supposition and necessary impli- 
 cation operates in matter-of-fact life. 
 
 Take one case more. The Federal and State 
 Constitutions both say with entire clearness, 
 
 “ that the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus 
 shall not be suspended except in case of re- 
 bellion or invasion the public safety require 
 it.” But you will please note, that neither of 
 these instruments say in express words, that 
 the privileges of this writ may be suspended at 
 all ; and yet the words of each Constitution j 
 
 pre-suppose that it may be suspended in the 
 contingency contemplated; they go on that 
 basis ; and, consequently, this pre-supposition 
 enters into the very essence of the provision. 
 
 Now, Sir, since this is so, and it is impossi- 
 ble to be otherwise, it thence plainly follows 
 that if the words of the Constitution, Art. 7, 
 Sec. 1, “ pre-suppose that the offer to vote will 
 be made in the township or ward in which the 
 elector resides,” as the Message expressly af- 
 firms the fact to be, then, that must be the 
 fundamental law by necessary implication, and 
 for the reason already illustrated, namely : 
 That where the words of the Constitution 
 “ pre-suppose ” a right, privilege or duty to ex- 
 ist, and recognize it as permanent, and proceed 
 on the ground of it, the same thereby becomes 
 a vital part of the instrument itself by neces- 
 sary implication ; and the case becomes still 
 stronger, if such a thing be possible, where 
 what is thus pre-supposed or implied, is agree- 
 able to the principles of common law, as is 
 the fact, in this particular instance, as we have 
 before fully shown. 
 
 And in the pregnant words of Chief Justice 
 Marshall, this proposition is “sustained on a 
 principle, which so entirely pervades the Con- 
 stitution, is so intermixed with the materials 
 which compose it, so interwoven with its web, 
 so blended with its texture, as to be incapable 
 of being separated from it, without rending 
 it into shreds.” 
 
 Thus, Sir, the theory of the Message, that 
 the power and action of the Legislature are 
 not limited and restrained by what the words 
 of the Constitution pre-suppose and imply, 
 
 “ Melts into air, into thin air; 
 
 And, like the baseless fabric of a vision 
 
 Leaves not a rack behind.” 
 
 V. Another of these evasive theories is this ; 
 “ These words of the Constitution , to wit: ‘ In the 
 township or ward in which he offers to vote, 1 prop- 
 erly mean the township or ward, in which the elec- 
 tors vote is to take effect .” 
 
 This construction, if I rightly understand 
 its history, originated with a gentleman of ac- 
 knowledged ability, and who stands high and 
 strong in the domain of party politics, not only 
 of this State but of the nation. It seems to be 
 quite satisfactory to very many. I may, there- 
 fore, be allowed to dwell on it for a few mo- 
 ments. And I confess to a feeling of embar- 
 rassment in attempting it, because I am not 
 sure that I know exactly what it means. The 
 distinguished author of it did not happen to 
 tell us, nor as far as I know, has any of those 
 accepting it. We must then, get- at it as best 
 we can. 
 
 “To take effect” means to be efficacious. 
 A vote, therefore, to take effect in a township 
 or ward, must mean, if indeed it has any 
 meaning at all, one of two things: either to 
 operate in the choice of township or ward of- 
 ficers only, or to be counted in the township or 
 ward. To confine the votes of electors to the 
 choice of township or ward officers, would, of 
 necessity, put an end to all County or State 
 elections. Taken in this sense, this construc- 
 tion would defeat the object, not only of Sec. 
 1, referred to, but of the whole Constitution, 
 and thus paralize, and even destroy the govern- 
 ment itself. Consequently, in this sense, it is 
 to be rejected. If by this construction is 
 meant, that the votes of electors are to be 
 
25 
 
 counted in the township or ward, where they 
 reside, then there are many fatal objections to 
 it: 
 
 1. It does not take the words of the Con- 
 stitution in their natural or ordinary import, 
 which, as we have seen, is essential. What 
 honest, straight-forward man of common sense, 
 would ever imagine, that the phrase, “in 
 which he offers to vote,” means “in which 
 his vote is to take effect,” that is, to he counted ! 
 Why, just look at the two sets of words. Com- 
 pare them. How entirely dissimilar in mean- i 
 ing! For example: “He” does not mean 
 “his;” nor can the words “ offers to vote,” j 
 be so twisted as to mean “ to take effect,” or 
 to count votes, or to be counted. The words 
 of the Constitution referred to, only seek to 
 provide for getting votes into the ballott box ; 
 they leave it to the Legislature to determine 
 how and by whom they shall be counted, after 
 being cast into it. Why, Sir, this is all pretence, 
 the absurdity of which is really too glaring to 
 be talked about. But the announcement and 
 advocacy of this theory can be accounted for, 
 perhaps on the hypothesis, that the friends of 
 this measure deem it important to become all 
 things to all men, if by any means, they may de- 
 ceive some, and thus carry it. But, 
 
 2. This theory of construction takes plain 
 words out of the Constitution and puts dubious 
 ones into it. It is wholly unallowable to do 
 either. Indeed, any theory of construction, 
 which adds to or takes from the text of that 
 instrument, is not to be tolerated for a mo- 
 ment. We may expound when necessary, but 
 not alter or amend. In King vs. Burrell, 12 
 A. & E. 468, Judge Patterson says: I see the 
 necessity of not importing into statutes words 
 which are not to be found there. Such a mode 
 of interpretation, (he adds) only occasions 
 endless difficulty.” And in a case before cited, 
 Chief Justice Tindal says: “It is the duty of 
 all courts to confine themselves to the words 
 of the statute, nothing adding thereto, and 
 nothing diminishing.” Otherwise, the courts 
 would take on themselves the business of mak- 
 ing laws, as well as interpreting and applying 
 them. In like manner, legislators are to take 
 the words of the Constitution just as they na- 
 turally or fairly read. If we take out words 
 from it or put them in, we take on ourselves 
 the responsibility of altering and amending 
 the Constitution instead of obeying and carry- 1 
 ing it out. If the Constitution is imperfect, it 
 is the business of the people, in their original 
 capacity to amend it, in the mode prescribed, 
 and not ours ; and until the people shall do 
 that, its words, just as they stand, must gov- 
 ern us. 
 
 3. This proposed reading for this part of the 
 Constitution, is mere conjecture, or construe- I 
 tion, which means drawing conclusions respect- ] 
 ing a point or idea, which lies outside of, or 
 beyond the text. The rule is, that where the 
 sense of the words of the text is plain and 
 reasonable, as in this instance, a resort to con- 
 struction is not admissible. In his work on j 
 Statutory and Constitutional Law, p. 227, Seg- j 
 wick says : “ When we see what is the sense, * I 
 that agrees with the intention of the instru- 
 ment, it is not allowable to wrest the words to 
 
 a contrary meaning.” Vattel says : “ It is not 
 allowable to interpret what has no need of in- 
 terpretation.” He continues: “When a deed 
 (an instrument) is worded in clear and pricise 
 
 terms, when its meaning is evident and leads 
 to no absurd consclusion, there can be no rea- 
 son for refusing to admit the meaning, which 
 such deed (instrument) naturally presents. To 
 go elsewhere in search of conjecture, in order 
 to restrict or extend it, is but an attempt to elude 
 it.” Exactly so. And how completely these 
 apposite words of this great authority bring to 
 naught this evasive theory of our distinguish- 
 ed partisan politician. 
 
 4. By looking back to what we have estab- 
 lished in the course of this argument, we see, 
 that this theory, or the proposed reading of the 
 Constitution, is contrary to the universal, uni- 
 form, and unquestioned usage from the time 
 the Constitution was adopted — contrary to 
 cotemporaneous legislation, to the opinion of 
 the legal profession, universally, at and from 
 the time the Constitution was proposed, and 
 to the opinions of all the courts of such of the 
 States as have spoken on this subject, whose 
 organic law, on this point, is similar to ours. 
 
 For these reasons we may regard the pro- 
 posed reading, or the substitution of the words 
 “ in which his vote is to take effect,” for the 
 words, “ in which he offers to vote,” as a gross 
 violation of the text — as a shere conjecture, 
 lying outside of the expression of the text, 
 having the effect, if not the deliberate design 
 to evade the plain meaning of the Constitution, 
 and thus secure for an ulterior end, a law not 
 agreeable to its letter or intent. 
 
 VI. Another of these evasive theories is. That 
 a law like the one noio proposed is necessary 
 to give effect to Sec. 5, Art. 7, of the Constitu- 
 tion, which declares, that “no elector shall 
 be deemed to have gained or lost a residence 
 by reason of his being employed in the service 
 of the United States or of this State; nor 
 while engaged in the navigation of the waters 
 of this State or of the United States, or of the 
 high seas ; nor while a student of any seminary 
 of learning; nor while kept at aDy alms-house, 
 or other asylum at public expense; nor while 
 confined in any public prison.” 
 
 Now, it is maintained, that for the want of 
 a statute, corresponding with this provision of 
 the Constitution, this right ol absentees to 
 vote is not available; that it is wholly inert; 
 and that “ it is not to be supposed, that it was 
 the purpose of the Constitution to preserve a 
 naked right to vote, but with restrictions pre- 
 venting its exercise.” 
 
 This view of the case, taken all alone, seems 
 plausible. It is an artful way to beg the ques- 
 tion. But the first inquiry here is, what is the 
 true intent and meaning of this provision? 
 When we know that, it must govern us. In 
 ascertaining what the intention of an instru- 
 ment is, all elementary writers on law, and all 
 the courts, as well as our own common sense, 
 tell us, that “ the intention of the law-giver is 
 to be deduced from a view of the whole and 
 every part of a statute, taken and compared 
 together.” Kent vol. 1, p. 520, 12 Wheat. 332. 
 Now, we have already shown by facts, argu- 
 ments, authority, and law, not to be shaken, 
 that the true intent and meaning of Sec. 1, Art. 
 
 7, is that each elector in order to vote, must 
 appear in person at the polls in the township 
 or ward in which he resides, and there person- 
 ally tender his vote. 
 
 Now, the same facts, arguments, authorities, 
 and settled decisions of the courts, or nearly 
 the same, by which the sense of Sec. 1 is 
 
26 
 
 established, determine the meaning of Sec. 
 
 5 to be exactly this: No elector, if absent 
 from the township or ward in which he 
 resides, on any of the grounds therein named, 
 shall either lose or gain a residence on that 
 account, but as to the matter of voting, as 
 well as to other purposes of residence, he shall 
 stand, precisely, where he would have stood, 
 had he not been absent at all. His residence 
 is continued, lii3 right to vote where he resides 
 is preserved, so that when lie comes back to 
 the place of bis residence, he can exercise this 
 right at once, without being obliged to earn a 
 residence a second time. Such, I submit, is 
 the true meaning ot the words of See. 5, taken 
 in their natural, ordinary, and necessary import, 
 in the order in which they are placed. It makes 
 the two Sections entirely harmonious, and both 
 taken together, sustain the exposition I have 
 stated. 
 
 This particular theory, then being met and 
 disposed of by the same considerations, in the j 
 main, as the last, I refer to them without fur- j 
 ther comment upon it. 
 
 VII. Another theory designed to elude the I 
 received exposition, and secure the passage of 
 this measure is this: “ The present contingency 
 
 is one not contemplated by the Convention which 
 framed the Constitution, or by the people who 
 adopted it ; ” that public policy requires , that the 
 Constitution be construed liberally , so as to avoid 
 as far as possible , the hardships and inconveni- 
 cncies connected with these dark and bloody times ; 
 and that the received exposition practically dis- 
 franchises a large share of our most patriotic and 
 worthy fellow citizens— a hardship which the pas- 
 sage of this measure would remove. 
 
 Now, Mr. Chairman, I call you to witness, 
 and I call the members of this Committee to 
 witness, that I am not arguing against the pro- 
 priety of soldiers' voting, in itself considered — 
 not at all; but that out Constitution, as it now 
 reads, prohibits the passage of either of these 
 Bills. This is just where I stand. Keeping 
 this in view, let us examine the position taken 
 by the friends of this project, as here stated. 
 Let us do it candidly, being only desirous to 
 know and obey the truth. 
 
 In the first place, we all know, or should 
 know, that it is not true, that the Constitu- 
 tion does not contemplate a contingency 
 in public affairs, in kind, like the present. 
 
 It is not pretended, that the framers of 
 that instrument* or the people adopting it, 
 foresaw that any particular rebellion or inva- 
 sion would take place ; but it is plain enough, 
 on the lace of that instrument, that they foie- 
 saw, that rebellion or invasion of some kind, 
 in some form and to some degree, less or more, 
 might occur, and foreseeing it, they provided 
 for it. For example ; They provided, that 
 
 “ the privileges of the writ of habeas coipus 
 shall not be suspended, except in case of rebel- 
 lion and invasion the public safety requires it.” 
 These words clearly show, that they foresaw, 
 that times such as these, might occur. They 
 also provided for enrolling and equipping the 
 militia, determined who shall be Cominander- 
 in-Chief of the military and naval forces of 
 the State, and authorized him to call them out 
 “ to suppress insurrection and repel invasion .” 
 These, then, are some of the main points to 
 which these proofs conduct us : 1. That the 
 Convention, framing the Constitution, and the 
 people adopting it, had these terrible contin- I 
 
 gencies in mind, and in view of them fixed the 
 place of voting, and required the elector to ap- 
 pear in person and vote personally, as already 
 pointed out. 2. The received exposition does 
 not have the effect to disfranchise soldiers any 
 more than it does students, sailors, or foreign 
 ministers. It disfranchises no one. In fact, 
 it has just the contrary effect. It faithfully 
 continues the elective franchise for these vari- 
 ous classes of absentees, in full force, to be 
 enjoyed by them at once on their return. Is 
 this a mere empty right — a right of no value — 
 a barefaced mockery ? While away, these per- 
 sons are not at home to vote, it is true ; nor 
 arc they at home to enjoy its comforts, to take 
 care of their families and business. These are 
 great evils, they are great hardships, but they 
 are incident to certain vocations, and, espec- 
 ially, to a state of war. They illustrate the 
 enormous crime of this rebellion, the ill desert 
 of 6uch as aid and abet it, and the sympathy 
 and gratitude due to those who endure these 
 hardships, in order to quell it, and save the 
 Union. 
 
 But, Mr. Chairman, our official duty as legis- 
 lators, is plain. The people have placed a 
 Constitution over us, and made us 6unject to 
 it. We must take its words, just as they stand, 
 and naturally mean. By this must we be 
 strictly governed, and not by any notions of our 
 own a6 to what is policy, what is convenient, 
 or inconvenient, what is a privilege or hard- 
 ship. And so the courts decide. The Inhabi- 
 tants of St. George, Dwarrisp. 597, Mr. Justice 
 Taunton says: “ Policy is a very questionable 
 and unsatisfactory ground; because men’s 
 minds differ much on the nature and extent of 
 public policy.” He continues; “The ground 
 ot public policy is a very unsafe one. It is 
 best to adhere to the words used in the act of 
 Parliament.” Also Judge Story in Conflict of 
 Laws, says: “Arguments from policy or incon- 
 venience ought to have little weight. The only 
 sound principle is to declare ita lex scripta est , 
 (thus the law is written,) to follow and to 
 obey; nor could there be well found a more 
 unsafe guide or practice than mere policy and 
 convenience.” In the Queen vs. Justices of 
 Lancastershire 11 A. & E. 157, Mr. Justice 
 Patterson says: “I cannot tell what conse- 
 quences may result from the construction 
 which we must put upon the Statute ; but if 
 mischievous, they must be remedied by the 
 Legislature.” In Rhodes vs. Smithurst, 4 
 Mess, and W. 63, Lord Abenger says ; “A court 
 of law ought not to be influenced, or govern- 
 ed by any notions of hardship ; cases may re- 
 quire legislative interference, but judges can- 
 not modify the rules of law.” 
 
 Now exactly the 6ame principle applies as 
 between the Legislature and the Constitution. 
 The Legislature cannot be justified in disre- 
 garding or evading the plain meaning of any 
 provision of that instrument, because it con- 
 flicts with the opinions of policy, expediency, 
 convenience, hardship, or justice entertained 
 by its different members. The remedy for an 
 imperfect, unwise, or oppressive provision of 
 the Constitution, if such exists, is by an ap- 
 peal to the justice and patriotism of the peo- 
 ple. In their original and aggregate capacity, 
 they can correct the evil by amendment, or a 
 new instrument ; but the Legislature cannot 
 assume their rights any more than the court. 
 The Legislature, itself, is the creature of 
 
27 
 
 the Constitution, the same as the court, 
 and must follow its provisions with equal 
 strictness, and by the same rules of interpre- 
 tation. 
 
 This theory, therefore, with regard to the 
 unanticipated state of the country, public 
 policy, inconvenience, and the like, being er- 
 roneous throughout, either in fact or in law, 
 is entitled to nb manner ot weight against the 
 plain sense of the Constitution. 
 
 VIII. One thing more. Were this measure 
 passed , would the law he valid for the election of 
 Congressmen and Presidential Electors, although 
 incompatible with the Constitution of Michigan ?” 
 
 This question, so far as I know, has not been 
 raised by anybody here or elsewhere. I don't 
 know as any one, on either side, will think it 
 worthy ot consideration. But, being aware of 
 the ingenuity and boldness of the champions ot 
 this measure on this floor, I expect that they 
 will claim, in due time, that, should it become a 
 law, it will be valid as to the election of mem- 
 bers of Congress and Presidential Electors, 
 however repugnant it may be to our State Con- 
 stitution. 
 
 Now, as I do not wish to take the floor 
 again on this subject, permit me to anticipate 
 this point to be hereafter raised by the other 
 side, in all probability, and also the argument 
 by which they will attempt to sustain it. With j 
 a view to this, it is to be noted here that Sec. 
 IV. 1, Art. 1. of the Constitution of the United 
 States, reads as follows: “The times, places, 
 
 and manner of holding elections for Senators 
 and Representatives (in Congress) shall 
 be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
 thereof; but the Congress may, at any time, 
 by law, make or alter such regulations, except 
 as to the places of choosing Senators.” And 
 Sec. I. 1, Art. II, of the same instrument, 
 reads thus: “Each State shall appoint, in 
 such a manner as the Legislature thereof may 
 direct, a number of electors (of President 
 and Vice-President) equal to the whole num- 
 ber of Senators and Representatives to which 
 the State may be entitled in Congress.” 
 
 We may well expect, Sir, that the friends of 
 this measure will make the most they possibly 
 can out of these provisions, in order to pro- 
 mote its passage. And what positions will 
 they take, and what course of argument will 
 they be likely to institute in view of them? 
 
 I opine, that all their efforts in this respect, 
 will amount, in substance, to this, namely : 
 
 1. “ The Constitution of the United States 
 is the supreme law of the land, anything in the 
 Constitution or laws of any State to the com 
 trary notwithstanding.” 
 
 2. By these provisions of the Federal Com 
 stitution, the times, places and manner of 
 holding elections for the officers in question, 
 are to be prescribed, not by the people of the 
 several States acting in their original char- 
 acter, not by the Constitutions of the different 
 States ; but, on the contrary, the power to so 
 prescribe and determine, is taken away from 
 the people of the several States, in their pri- 
 mary capacity— taken away from State Con- 
 stitutions— and committed to the Legislatures 
 of the respective States, subject only to the 
 revision of Congress ; so that State Constitu- 
 tions have no jurisdiction or control in the 
 case whatever, while the Legislature of each 
 State has full jurisdiction, independent of the 
 Constitution thereof, having derived it direct- 
 
 ly from the paramount authority, to-wit, the 
 Federal Constitution. 
 
 3. It necessarily follows from these premises 
 that should either of these bills be passed by 
 this Legislature, the law will be valid, how- 
 ever much it may conflict with the Constitu- 
 tion of the State, because it will be in pursu- 
 ance of the express provisions of the Federal 
 Constitution, whose authority is supreme. 
 
 Such, Sir, I prophesy, is the substance of the 
 argument which the champions ot this meas- 
 ure will try to set up in its behalf, on these 
 provisions of the Constitution of the United 
 States. In reply, it should seem quite suffi- 
 cient to say : 
 
 That Sec. II. 1, Art. 1. of the Federal Con- 
 stitution, reads in this way: “The House of 
 Representatives (in Congress) shall be com- 
 posed of members chosen every second year 
 by the people of the several States ; and the 
 electors in each State shall have the qualifications 
 requisite for electors of the most numerous branch 
 of the State Legislature .” 
 
 By this provision of the United States Con- 
 stitution, it is left to each State to determine 
 the qualifications of electors of Federal Rep- 
 resentatives, subject, however, to this one lim- 
 itation, namely : That the qualifications must 
 be the same, as for electors of State Represen- 
 tatives,” in order that the States may not be 
 tempted to pervert this- power.” 
 
 As before suggested, these qualifications of 
 electors, or requisites, or conditions of suf- 
 frage, differ in different States ; in some there 
 is a property qualification, in others, not; in 
 some color is made a qualification, in others, 
 not; in some “place" is an essential requisite, 
 in others, not. But whatever these qualifica- 
 tions, requisites or conditions, are, in any State, 
 they must be the same for electors of 
 Congressmen as for electors of State Repre- 
 sentatives. You will please note here, that 
 the qualifications or requisites of electors of 
 State Representatives are made the standard — 
 made so bv the Federal Constitution. 
 
 The Constitution of this State, as we have 
 already fully seen, makes “ place ” an element, 
 or condition of voting. That is, it makes it an 
 essential requisite of electors of all public 
 offipers, elective of the people, (“the most 
 numerous branch of the State Legislature " 
 included,) that they vote “in the township or 
 ward” where they reside. Now, right here, 
 be it observed : 
 
 1. That by the provision of the Federal Con- 
 stitution, last quoted, that instrument, in ef- 
 fect, takes up, adopts, appropriates, and im- 
 poses this same requisite for electors of 
 Federal Representatives from Michigan as com- 
 pletely as it would have done had it been 
 incorporated into its very text. 
 
 2. That this Legislature cannot, by any pos- 
 sibility, avoid this cardinal requisite for electors 
 of Representatives in Congress by any act of 
 legislation, because it is firmly tied to it both 
 by the Constitution of the State and of the 
 United States. 
 
 3. That Congress cannot avoid this essential 
 requisite for electors of Congressmen, here in 
 Michigan, (to-wit, that the elector shall vote 
 “in the township or ward” where he resides) 
 by taking the matter into its own hands, 
 because that body is, also, firmly bound to it 
 by an express provision of the Federal Con- 
 stitution— Ait. 1, Sec. II. 1, 
 
28 
 
 Thus, Sir, this anticipated argument in favor 
 of the validity of this measure for the election 
 of Congressmen wholly iails, when examined 
 and put to the te«t. 
 
 I might oiler other considerations showing 
 that this anticipated argument is utterly in- 
 defensible, as far as the electiou of Federal 
 Representatives is eoncerned; but it is not 
 necessary, as it is already ovei thrown and dis- 
 posed of; nevertheless, without attempting to 
 discuss the question, whether or not, an act of 
 the Legislature would be valid, which should 
 be authorized by the Constitution of the Uni- 
 ted States, but unauthorized by the Constitu- 
 tion of the State, we shall do well not to for- 
 get, 
 
 1. That in case the Constitution of the State, 
 and of the United States, contain provisions 
 with regard to the same subject, affecting the 
 powers of the Legislature of the State, they 
 are to be construed with reference to each 
 other; that the words of each are to be taken 
 in their natural and ordinary import; and 
 holding to this rule, that interpretation of the 
 afore-mentioned provisions of these respective 
 instruments, is to prevail, which shall be con- 
 sistent and harmonious, one with the other. 
 
 2. The universally received exposition, on 
 which I have dwelt, ot Sec. 1, Art. 7, of the 
 Constitution of this State with regard to elec- 
 tions, and of Sec. II. 1, and of Sec. IV. 1. of Art . 
 
 I. of the Constitution of the UnitedStatcs rela- 
 tive to the election of Federal Representatives — 
 I repeat that this exposition, as denoted by 
 our general election law, gives lull effect to 
 every word of these several provisions, and 
 makes them aud the Statute all consistent and 
 harmonious with each other, as to the qualifi- 
 cations of electors, the time, place, and man- 
 ner of holding elections, as well as to every 
 other particular to which they relate. 
 
 3. The argument in favor of the validity of 
 the law now sought, as to the election of Con- 
 gressmen, (which I have anticipated,) would 
 array the Constitution of the United States 
 against both itself, and the Constitution of this 
 State; it would also array the action of the Leg- 
 islature against both the' State and Federal Con- 
 stitutions, and make the subordinate superior 
 to the principal — the creature superior to the 
 creator. Such an innovation, resulting in such 
 antagonisms and absurdities, is wholly unal- 
 lowable, as against an exposition and practice, 
 co-eval and co-extensive, with the adoption and 
 jurisdiction of the Constitution of the State, 
 which gives every word involved a full, natural 
 and reasonable meaning, and makes them all 
 blend in one consistent and harmonious whole. 
 This latter is a practical exposition, which 
 possess attributes “too firm to be shaken or 
 controlled.” 
 
 One word as to the ejection of Presidential Elec- 
 tors. As we have seen, the Constitution of the 
 United States provides that they shall be ap- 
 pointed by each State in such manner as the 
 Legislature thereof may direct. This provision 
 has been taken in its most comprehensive 
 meaning. A large discretion has been exer- 
 cised under it by the Legislatures of the differ- 
 ent States. They have determined- who shall 
 appoint, as well as the mode of appointing. 
 For this reason, there is some diversity among 
 the several States as to the mode of choosing 
 these Electors. In some of the States they are 
 chosen by the Legislature, in others by district s, 
 
 and in others by general ticket. In this State 
 they are elective of the people by general 
 ticket. The bills before us contemplate this 
 same mode of electing them. 
 
 Now, Sir, I submit with deference, that, 
 granting that the Legislature may repeal that 
 part of the election law which relates to the 
 mode of choosing these Electors, and direct 
 that they shall be appointed in some other 
 mode; yet, when and so long , as it makes them 
 elective of the people at our general election, 
 and by the qualified electors of the State, 
 the Constitution of the State comes in to 
 prescribe and determine their qualifications 
 or requisites, or the conditions under which 
 they shall vote, if at all; and because that 
 Constitution requires each and all electors of 
 of public officers to vote at our general elec- 
 tions, in the township or ward where they re- 
 side. it thence follows, that the proposed law, 
 allowing them to vote elsewhere, and even 
 outside of the State lines at such elections, 
 would be invalid as to the choice of Presiden- 
 tial Electors the same as for other public offi- 
 cers. 
 
 Consequently, the doctrine, that the pro- 
 posed law, would be valid for the election of 
 Federal Representatives and Presidential Elec- 
 tors, even if unconstitutional and void as to 
 the election of other public officers, cannot be 
 lawfully upheld here in Michigan, whatever 
 may be the case in some of the other States. 
 
 Now, Sir, to recapitulate somewhat, at this 
 point in this discussion: It has been my aim 
 thus far, 
 
 1. To clear the subject in hand, of seductive 
 side issues, and to put it in its just light. 
 
 2. To state the true intent and meaning of 
 the Constitution with regard to it. 
 
 3. To illustrate and sustain that intent and 
 meaning, as thus stated, by facts, arguments, 
 authority, and law as settled by the courts. 
 
 4. To meet and overthrow by the same 
 means, the many false theories, gotten up and 
 brought forward by the special champions of 
 this measure to elude the plain sense of the 
 Constitution, turn the minds of members 
 away from the real merits of the case, and, 
 thus, to secure the enactment of the proposed 
 law. And this finishes what I have to say, at 
 this time, on the constitutionality of this measure. 
 I regret, that the effort is so far short of 
 the work of a master; but, Sir, I have 
 uttered as best I could, under the circum- 
 stances, what occurred to me. The subject 
 unfolded, as I proceded, and as a result, I have 
 detained you far beyond my expectation; but 
 without offering any apology for holding the 
 floor so long, except such as the importance 
 of the subject, the circumstances of the occa- 
 sion, the relations of one portion of this body 
 to the other, and my freedom from party ob- 
 ligations and party trammels naturally suggest, 
 I now propose to add a few words with re- 
 gard to 
 
 Tlie Expediency of this Project. 
 
 Many think it unwise to pass a law of the 
 kind proposed because, 
 
 1. It is so nearly impracticable to carry it out. 
 The Committee of Elections took this view 
 last winter, in their able Report before spoken 
 of, to which I refer, as presenting a lucid 
 statement of this particular point. And Mr. 
 Blaik, himself, on the occasion referred to, in 
 
:29 
 
 speaking of this point, used these words: 
 “It is well nigh impossible to have the sol- 
 diers vote because of the great number of 
 districts in which votes are to be polled, and 
 returns made, and because the soldiers will be 
 subject to the contiol of their commanding 
 officers, and may be in line of battle, or on a 
 march upon election day.” This is one of the 
 grounds which Mr. Blair then assigned for his 
 conviction, that such a law as is now sought, 
 would be inexpedient. He states the point 
 fairly. Is it less important, and forcible now, 
 than then? If you say yes, please adduce the 
 proof. 
 
 2. Many regard it inexpedient to pass this 
 measure , on account of the opportunity the ex- 
 periment would afford for illegal voting , it being 
 alike impossible to enforce any efficient system of 
 challenging , or to punish offenders. 
 
 Suppose somebody in New Orleans knows 
 the name and place of residence of some 
 Michigan soldier, who, for some reason, is un- 
 able to be on hand to vote. The ballot box 
 from Michigan comes there for votes. This 
 man at New Orleans, steps forward, and, as- 
 suming the name of the absent soldier from 
 Michigan, offers to vote. There is no one 
 there to challenge him. He votes. This is 
 but one case in many thousands, perhaps. In 
 this way the ballot box would quite likely be 
 stuffed "with illegal votes. Now, how can any 
 law, which we may pass here, prevent such a 
 result if the ballot box is sent there as pro- 
 posed; and how can punishment be inflicted 
 on the offender under any law of Michigan, so 
 long as the laws of Michigan have no effect 
 outside of the State lines? In short, what law 
 is there against stuffing a Michigan ballot box 
 in New Orleans, or anywhere else outside of 
 the lines of the State? Under what law could 
 the offender be complained of ? What court 
 would have jurisdiction of such a case? Indeed, 
 could any case be gotten up on account of such 
 an act? Would it be an offence against law? 
 Would it not be a kind of mischief which 
 would work great evils, but yet could not be 
 got at? Thisjis what is claimed as quite sure 
 to follow from the passage of this measure. 
 
 3. Many argue against the expediency of this 
 
 measure, because: 1 . No discussions can be 
 had in the camps on political topics , or the merits 
 of candidates. 2. The soldiers are not in circum- 
 stances to vote independently , but rather as their 
 Commanders shall desire. 3. This measure would 
 thus put a very dangerous power into the hands 
 of these Commanders , which they could easily use, 
 especially by confederating with a few ambi- 
 tious men at home, to get a kind of voting 
 monopoly, hold the balance of power, control 
 elections, and thus, the State and national 
 governments. In such event, the sword, the 
 purse, and the law would fall into the same 
 hands, and misrule, or a terrible despotism, 
 would probably be the result. Such is the way 
 which many reason, irrespective of party. 
 Their views are strengthened by reference to 
 examples, occurring in the past, and in France 
 and Mexico in our own day. It should seem 
 that Mr. Blair has shared in these general 
 views. For in speaking of this measure, not 
 long ago, he said: 11 1 confess to having no 
 
 great confidence in the votes of soldiers far away 
 from home , and subject to all the influences of camps 
 and where no discussion can be had.” Mr. 
 Blair had already spoken of the soldiers being 
 
 subject, on election days as well as on others, to 
 the control of their commanding officers. But 
 Mr. Blair, for some cause, now holds very 
 different language. He now says: “ If these 
 volunteer citizen soldiers should not have a 
 voice in the civil administration of the gov- 
 ernment, then it would be well to inquire, 
 who is worthy of it.” He now tells us, in 
 effect, that the ballot box may be safely sent 
 among these soldiers, although subject to the 
 control of their Commanders, and right into 
 the very camps, whose influences he seems to 
 have been so suspicious of, but a short time 
 ago! Then he declared, that he had no great 
 confidence in votes taken of the soldiers, under 
 such circumstances; but, now, forsooth, his 
 confidence seems to repose on them especially. 
 Whence this conversion ? Whence this casting 
 discredit on the votes of soldiers, yesterday, 
 and panegyrics on them to-day? Can there be 
 any good reason for it? There may be a strong 
 motive for it ; but is there any good reason ? Are 
 not the soldiers as far away from home now as 
 then? Are they not as fully subjected to all the 
 influences of camps, and are not these influ- 
 ences quite as bad, now, as then? Or has a 
 continuance in army life, made the soldiers 
 more intelligent, and virtuous, and less and less 
 under the control of their Commanders, so that 
 they can vote more under standingly, and with a 
 greater degree of independence now than they 
 could have done at the last general election? 
 And is this why Mr. Blair has turned, “ right 
 about face,” on this question? Or is there less 
 opportunity, now, than then, for an ambitious 
 office-seeker, at home, to conspire with Com- 
 manders in the camps, so as to control elec- 
 tions to his liking — so as to secure, for exam- 
 ple, the choice of such, and 60 many 
 Representatives and Senators tor the next 
 Legislature, as shall accomplish his wishes, 
 and thus effect his advancement? Is it indeed 
 true, that such an improvement has really taken 
 place? And is that the actual, producing cause 
 of Mr. Blair’s radical change of mind? The 
 point of my inquiry is, not whether Mr. Blair 
 had a motive for this change, for that is ad- 
 mitted ; but whether he has a justifying reason 
 for it. He submitted, in his Message, certain 
 theories in support of his new views; but 
 having handled and examined them, we find 
 that they are just about as innocent of truth 
 as a pretty bauble is of solid matter. Now, 
 we inquire, again, does any justifying reason 
 anywhere exist for this “ change of base,” on 
 the part of Mr. Blair? The truth is, Sir, 
 man follows the promptings of his dominant 
 motive-, and the character of the motive de- 
 pends on the real character of the man. If he 
 is a man of truth and “right reason” — if 
 these compose the substance of his moral and 
 intellectual being — then his dominant motive 
 will spring from truth and reason, and he will 
 follow their light whithersoever it shall lead 
 him. But, on the other hand, if he is greedy 
 of gain, or of political preferment, — if either 
 of these passions is dominant in him, his 
 ruling motive will spring from it, and he will 
 follow its promptings, change fronts, and shift 
 about for good reasons, or without them, or 
 against them as the case may be, so long 
 as he remains a man of this type. I 
 remember a case in point. I was once 
 present at a meeting of a set of Rail- 
 road directors. They had a confidential adviser 
 
30 
 
 the very contents of whose being 1 was a desire 
 for gain. He was also present. They submit- 
 ted a certain financial project to him for his 
 opinion. The case was a plain one, and be at 
 once decided against the scheme, and gave his 
 reasons, which were good: just as Mr. Blair 
 did, a short time ago, against this project. 
 But this money-loving adviser, of a sudden, 
 saw how he could make ten thousand dollars, 
 in half an hour, out of the railroad, if the 
 plan of the directors were adopted. Controlled 
 by his ruling motive , he changed his mind os- 
 tensibly, and in ten minutes after he gave his 
 first opinion, he gave another diametrically 
 opposite. The plan was adopted, because the 
 directors had a bias that way, and in less than 
 two hours their adviser had made $10,000 out 
 of the concern and got his money, which went 
 so far to ruin it, and that is all the good his 
 new opinion did them. Now this old sharper 
 had a motive lor changing his opinion, and it 
 controlled him, but he had no justifying reason 
 for it; and he knew that in that process he 
 received a lie into the inmost sanctuary of his 
 nature, and gave utterance to it in his second 
 opinion. 
 
 Hoes this illustrate any part of Mr. Blair’s 
 course in this matter? Mr. Blair, as well as 
 the sharper, changes “ his base.” Mr. Blair 
 gives no more justifying reasons for it, than 
 the sharper. We see the motive ($10,000), 
 which determined -the sharper to contradict 
 himself on all material points. What is Mr. 
 Blair’s motive? Is it to provide lor himself 
 votes against the time of need? Has he daring 
 enough to try to navigate the uneven political 
 sea, in two contrary opinions on such a ques- 
 tion as this, when the motive in which the last 
 originated, stands out so plainly and the means 
 for carrying it out are 60 very revolutionary? 
 Why, one would naturally suppose, that he 
 would have been admonished, betimes, by the 
 fate of the adventurer, who undertook to get 
 across a rough river in two tubs, having one 
 foot in each. The poor fellow see-sawed, and 
 pitched in opposite directions, first one side 
 being up, and then the other, as the waves 
 happened to rise or fall, till at length he reach- 
 ed a point, where the waters divided, and his 
 tubs, taking opposite courses, split him right 
 up, and thus finished him. 
 
 And is it not more than possible, Sir, that 
 when these two entirely contradictory posi- 
 tions of Mr. Blair, on a constitutional question, 
 involving the integrity of the Constitution it- 
 self, the purity of elections, and the stability of 
 the government, become generally known and 
 compared ; when the nature, tendency, and ob- 
 ject of the last position shall be well under- 
 stood, as the same will soon oe; then, in that 
 day, shall not the voice of an indignant people 
 be heard coming up from all parts of the State, 
 louder than the voice of many waters, saying: 
 “ The double-minded man,” the man of no 
 settled principles, the man, who now advances 
 one opinion, and now another directly con- 
 trary, the man, who now goes for one course 
 of action, and now for an entirely opposite 
 course — such a man is “unstable in all his 
 ways?” He hath no sure foundations. He is 
 not to be built on more than a quicksand. 
 Avoid him. These extremely exigent times 
 call for men for high places, of clear heads and 
 pure hearts, of vigorous wills and solid bottom, 
 who are founded on the rock of unchanging 
 
 truth and right reason, and who can “ stand 
 fast in one mind,” having fit qualifications lor 
 conducting the country, successfully, through 
 this season of special exigency and trial. And 
 this leads me to consider, 
 
 4. The dangerous precedent , which the passage 
 of the proposed law and the practice under \ t } 
 would afford as to the management of elections. 
 
 Mr. Chairman, I was bom and brought up in 
 a State, the most thoroughly and nobly Whig, 
 of any State in the Union — the State of Ver- 
 mont. I was taught, from the first, to regard 
 the British, the Democrats, and the Devil, as 
 being pretty much on a par. And I confess, 
 that I remain very much of the same mind 
 still, although I am free to admit, that I have 
 learned, that there are many honorable excep- 
 tions to this general proposition among the 
 Democrats, and that the Whigs were not, and 
 that the Republicans are not all as pure and 
 wise, as I once supposed them to be. But I 
 never had any affinity for the distinctive spirit 
 or dogmas of the democratic party. And I 
 never cast a democratic political party vote in 
 my life, and it is not likely I ever shall. I al- 
 ways had a kind of feeling, more or less dis- 
 ; tinctand influential, that pretty much all that 
 i is peculiar to that party, whether in spirit or 
 theory, is the result of the fall of man ; and 
 yet, in spite of this, I rejoice to be able to re- 
 cognize many excellent men among the Demo- 
 crats; nay, some of God’s noblest offspring. 
 
 Now, Sir, it wa6 a standing charge, on the 
 part of the Whig party against the Democrats, 
 that the latter would do anything — change 
 their tenets, 6hift grounds, deny, to-day, what 
 they swore to, yesterday, trample the Consti- 
 tution, and, especially, stuff the ballot box, and 
 I corrupt the elections, in short, that they would 
 ! do any thing, no matter what, in order either 
 to preserve or gain party ascendancy; and 
 lurthermore, (and as a natural consequence) 
 i that the irreverence for age and experience, 
 tor learning, -wisdom and religion, the disposi- 
 tion to break through all law and all principle, 
 
 I and all constitutional restrictions, so prevalent 
 in the land, is attributable to the spirit and 
 : conduct of the democratic party, and its mem- 
 j bers. Nor did the matter stop here. The 
 Whigs, at length, being joined by a few of the 
 more considerate and conscientious of the 
 | Democrats, organized the Republican party. 
 
 Of course, the Whigs carried over into the new 
 i party, all their old accusations and prejudices 
 against the Democrats, and have increased the 
 stock by such additions, as they have been able 
 from time to time to accumulate. And the 
 | opportunities have not been either few nor 
 small; so that, now, accusations and charges 
 against the Democrats, and. especially, for ir- 
 regular and corrupt proceedings at elections, 
 really constitute an important department of 
 the literature of the Republican party ; and I 
 have no thought of attempting to deny, that 
 it is all substantially true. And, now, let it 
 be granted, that it is indeed so ; that the Dem- 
 ocrats are just as bad as the Republicans 
 charge them to be. Let us suppose too, that 
 this measure is passed by Republican votes 
 against Democratic, and that the law has gone 
 into effect, and the ballot box has been sent 
 out of the State, and all over the United States, 
 lor votes. Now, see what a precedent is thus 
 afforded by Republicans to these lawless Dem- 
 ocrats. Aud suppose, too, one thing more, 
 
31 
 
 namely, that in the ups and downs of party, 
 these reckless Democrats, full of all subtilty 
 and mischief, again come into power. Now, 
 with such a precedent as this before them, 
 originated and established too, by the circum- 
 spect, law -loving and law-abiding Republicans, 
 what would these Democrats not do with the 
 ballot box, and in the conduct of elections, in 
 order to choose their candidates and carry 
 their points ! They will not restrict the ballot 
 box, when sent out of the township or ward to 
 the soldier, and the camp. They will not be 
 guilty of such narrow and odious partiality as 
 that. Not they. For they will, at once, so 
 amend the law, as to authorize the ballot box 
 to be sent to all citizens out of the town or 
 ward in which they reside, wherever they are, 
 in this or in foreign lands, and polls to be opened 
 in other States, in the chief places of concourse, 
 in the streets, in the opening of the gates, in 
 the cities, at all points, at home and abroad, 
 where a democratic ballot box can be filled up 
 for the benefit of that party in Michigan. And 
 from that time on, they would overrun us, rive 
 us from head to foot, cut us up root and 
 branch, and trample us down. And should 
 you remonstrate against it, and ask why 
 do ye so, they will point you to this law, this 
 very precedent, which you establish, and say : 
 “Here. is our justification;” and you will be 
 speechless, smitten “ with shame anjl confu- 
 sion of face.” Will you, then, by the passage 
 of this measure, deliberately establish such a 
 precedent as that for these audacious Phils- 
 tines, who may soon become your political 
 masters? Will you thus deliberately arm your 
 deadly foes, who persistently seek your fair 
 places, your dominion, your political life? 
 You, Sir, may have rashness enough to venture 
 it. The majority of this body may be rash 
 enough to venture it. But, thank Heaven, I, 
 for one, am not; and believing “discretion to 
 be the better part of valor,” I shall not con- 
 sent to it. 
 
 And this leads me to speak of another con- 
 sideration, which appeals especially to Repub- 
 licans, namely: 
 
 5. This measure will , if passed and carried out , 
 he a source of annoyance and grief to a large por- 
 tion of the people of the State, and will serve to 
 give increased aggravation to other extreme Re- 
 publican measures , and thus , tend strongly to 
 weaken the Republican party, and displace it from 
 power. 
 
 Sir, we are now under a Republican State 
 and National Administration. I am glad that 
 it is 6Q, if we must have party domination. 
 This is a Republican Legislature. I am glad 
 of it, and for the same reason. The Republi- 
 can party is held responsible for the acts of 
 this body, and for the acts of the State and 
 National governments, in all ot their depart- 
 ments. I fully recognize and deeply realize 
 the force of this pregnant fact. That party is 
 one. If one portion of it suffers, the whole 
 suffers. And the history of political parties 
 teaches this lesson With special distinctness, 
 namely: That generally speaking, extreme or 
 abnormal acts of any department of govern- 
 ment, about which the feelings of the people 
 at large are much exercised, naturally give rise 
 to more or less of doubt and censure in the 
 public mind. If one extreme act after another 
 is committed, and especially, it a course of ex- 
 treme acts and measures are set on foot and 
 
 persisted in, which are of general application, 
 the tears of the honest, impartial many, are 
 thus awakened; their patience becomes tried 
 and their confidence gradually withdrawn from 
 the party in power. In this way a majority is 
 very sure to be prepared, sooner or later, to 
 take sides against the ruling party, chargeable 
 with such acts, and to show its opposition, on 
 the first opportunity, by ousting it from con- 
 trol. Consequently, the party in power, if it 
 wishes to retain its ascendancy, should, and if 
 wise, certainly will, ever keep this principle 
 clearly in view, and will be careful to restrain 
 its acts and measures within the bounds of wise 
 moderation, and not suffer itself to go to ex- 
 tremes, in any instance, unless compelled to 
 do so by unavoidable necessity. 
 
 Now, Sir, what is the position of the Repub- 
 lican party in this regard, at this juncture? 
 This is certainly true of it, namely : That, 
 owing principally, if not wholly, to these 
 strangely anomalous times, the Republicans, 
 in the control of both State and National af- 
 fairs, have instituted and pursued many extra- 
 ordinary measures, not a tew of which, have 
 been extreme. Such, for example, as the sus- 
 pension of the writ of habeas corpus, in States 
 far distant from the field of military opera- 
 tions, where the courts were in full operation — 
 military arrests of citizens, not connected with 
 the army, on account of speaking their opin- 
 ions— the Proclamation of Emancipation— the 
 Drafts — making paper money a legal tender — 
 Federal taxation, &c. Understand me, Sir. I 
 do not speak here of these national measures 
 to condemn them — not at all; but to remind 
 gentlemen of the tendencv, which such ex- 
 treme measures have to strain public confi- 
 fidence, and that, on this account, good judg- 
 ment forbids, that they be needlessly multipled. 
 And to impress these two points on the minds 
 of the members of the Committee, let me here 
 refer to another extreme measure of the times, 
 namely: the exemption of the Government 
 Bonds from National, State and local taxes, 
 when held by institutions or individuals, as an 
 investment — an exemption, which has this 
 startling effect : to take the burden of taxa- 
 tion, growing out of, and to grow out of, 
 these mountains of State and National debts, 
 from the shoulders of the rich and monied 
 men and institutions of the country, and put 
 it on the backs of farmers and mechanics, and 
 especially on the latter. The result is, that 
 the farmer and mechanic are forced to pay 
 National, State and local taxes for the benefit 
 of the rich and forehanded, while these same 
 rich and forehanded institutions and persons 
 are permitted to go free from all these taxes to 
 the full extent of the enormous funded debt 
 of the General Government! We can better 
 perceive the practical working of this system 
 by taking a single case. The General Govern- 
 ment owes Dives, for example, $50,000, and he 
 holds the bonds of the government as evidence 
 of the debt. The government pays him inter- 
 est in gold, which is equal to about ten per 
 cent., and to get the money, it levies a tax on 
 everything, which the mechanics in the vicini- 
 ty make and produce; so that every hoop, 
 which the cooper shaves, every horse-nail, 
 which the blacksmith makes, every peg, which 
 the shoemaker drives, every stitch, which the 
 tailor or dressmaker takes, every mortise, 
 which the carpenter beats, every straw which 
 
32 
 
 the girl braids, is taxed for the benefit of Dives, f ' 
 while Dives, himself, is exempted. These 
 haid- working and struggling laborers are I 
 watched and hound bv the inevitable tax- 
 gatherer, are forced to keep an exact account | 
 of everything they do, little and great, make a i 
 sworn statement of it, monthly, and pay a 
 heavy per centage on it, for the benefit of rich 
 and well-to-do exempts, from whom they never, 
 personally, received a single penny. Now this 
 Is one of the Republican measures of the day; 
 and I recognize in it, and in its practical work- 
 ings, elements of dissatistaction and difficulty, 
 sufficient to try the strength of the hold which 
 the Republican party has on the confidence of 
 the people. I am not now finding fault with 
 the system. That is not my object. I refer 
 to it and to its workings as facts to show, that 
 we, Republicans, have already quite as many 
 extreme measures on our hands, as we can 
 take care of, and retain our party supremacy. 
 
 Again. When we come home to our own 
 State, we have this bounty system, State, 
 county, city and town — these relief funds— all 
 of which involve the necessity ol heavy taxes. 
 
 In addition to these unusual measures, we have 
 these extraordinary acts tor building railroads, 
 by which a numerical majority in a town, 
 county or city, as the case may be, can compel 
 the minority against their judgement and will, 
 to put from a fifth to a tenth of all they are 
 worth, or are supposed to be worth, iuto a 
 joint stock company. If these railroad acts 
 arc not unconstitutional, they, certainly, are 
 such an extreme exercise of Legislative power, 
 as are suited to strain public confidence in the ! 
 party having control. And now last, but not 
 least, comes this extraordinary measure lor 
 voting by proxy, or sending the ballot box all 
 over the country to gather up votes. 
 
 The thought I wish to enforce here is, that 
 it is impolitic for the party in power to pass 
 this measure, because, on the one hand, it is 
 not needed , in order to retain Republican as- 
 cendency in the State, and on the other, the 
 Republicans will lose by it a great deal more 
 than they can gain — because it will produce 
 such a strain on the public confidence. It is 
 an old saying, that “ it is the last feather which 
 breaks the camel’s back.” Now, I do not go 
 so far as as to say, that this measure, if it shall 
 be passed and go into effect, will break down 
 the Republican party in the State, or displace 
 it from power; but I do sincerely believe that 1 
 coming in at this crisis, on top of others re- 
 ferred to, it will give them, in the common 
 mind, new significance and aggravation, and 
 will, thus, operate greatly to the injury of the 
 Republican party. It will be a source of much 
 annoyance and irritation to a powerful minor- 
 ity, and, also, to the more intelligent and con- 
 siderate of the Republicans. This minority, 
 fruitful in expedients and Argus-eyed, will, of 
 course, make out of it, all the party capital of i 
 which it is capable. And it is, exactly, the 
 thing for them in this respect, at this particu- j 
 lar time. For mark, here, their chief charge j 
 against the Republicans, namely, that they are | 
 not worthy of political power, and that in their 
 hands it is not safe, either for the people, or 
 for the government, as a system of polity ; and 
 that facts show it to be so. Now, should this 
 measure be passed, it will be to them a mine, 
 rich in proof of the truth of this charge. It 
 will be exposed on all sides, and will pay well i 
 
 for every fair attack on it. It is not at a dis- 
 tance, either in respect of space or interest. 
 It is here and every well-directed blow will 
 tell against it, and consequently against the 
 party responsible for it. Its grossly uncon- 
 stitutional features, its tendency to cast aside 
 the safe-guards, which the experience and wis- 
 dom of ages have found necessary, as a pro- 
 tection to the ballot box and the purity of 
 elections, will be pointed out and brought 
 home to the people, and enforced upon them, 
 as an index of the dominant spirit and practi- 
 cal tendencies of the Republican party of the 
 present day. These vigilant foes, whose lead- 
 ers have, each, an hundred eyes, and are well 
 tutored in the arts of political warfare, will 
 show by this measure, if passed, that the Re- 
 publican party contemns the common law, and 
 the people, or the greater part of them, will 
 ( admit the validity of the proof and feel its 
 force. They will show by it, that the Republi- 
 can party has, at length, become so emptied of 
 I moral sense and common honesty, as to set 
 I aside the obvious sense of the words of the 
 Constitution, taken in their natural and or- 
 I dinary signification, and to get up and 
 | follow groundless subtleties in their stead ; 
 
 ! so far emptied of moral sense and common 
 ! honesty, as to break through long estab- 
 lished, universal and unbroken legal usage, 
 
 | commensurate with the adoption and juris- 
 diction o’f the Constitution, and acquiesced in, 
 
 | and partaken of, by all the departments of the 
 j government; so far emptied of these essential 
 I qualities, as to attempt to annul, or elude by 
 legislation the constitutional remedy, specially 
 i prescribed by the people against illegal voting; 
 
 | so far emptied, as aforesaid, as not to heed 
 the opinions of the legal profession, as held 
 and expressed on this subject from the time 
 the Constitution was proposed, including the 
 carefully considered opinions of Mr Blue 
 himself, given but a short time ago ; so far 
 emptied and demoralized, as aforesaid, as to 
 ignore and brave every principle of interpre- 
 tation established by the experience and com- 
 mon sense of mankind; and, finally, to tram- 
 ple the decisions of all the courts of all the 
 States which have spoken on this subject, un- 
 der Constitutions similar to our own. 
 
 And having shown all this, which they can 
 easily do (especially, as it is all so true and 
 palpable, that very few intelligent Republicans 
 will think of doubting it), they will not let it 
 rest, but will dwell on it. They will tell of it, 
 and repeat it, and use it in all manner of con- 
 nections to your disadvantage. They will take 
 good care to spread before the people all the 
 various items of proof connected with this 
 measure, tending to substantiate their propo- 
 sition, that the Republicans of this day are 
 not fit to have and exercise control, and that it 
 is not safe for the people to let it remain in 
 their hands. And be assured, Sir, they will 
 make this proof tell on the minds of the peo- 
 ple of this State. For be it remembered, that 
 the larger part of the adult population of the 
 State have been personally concerned, more 
 or less, in the matters out of which nearly all 
 this proof grows. For example: They en- 
 grafted the amendment of 1889 into the old 
 Constitution, as a special remedy against ille- 
 I gal voting; they know what the doctrine of 
 j common law was in relation to personal ap- 
 I pearance and personal voting, at the time the 
 
33 
 
 last Constitution was made; they helped make 
 the present Constitution. They well know 
 what they meant by the expression “in the 
 township or ward in which he offers to vote;” 
 and that they said honestly in a common sense 
 way, just what they meant ; they well know 
 how it was understood at the time; how all 
 the lawyers understood it; what the universal 
 practice has been under it; and what conclu- 
 sive force all this has in ascertaining the true 
 sense of the Constitution. Consequently the 
 people will know of their own personal knowl- 
 edge, that the afore-mentioned proof con- 
 nected with this measure, going to substan- 
 tiate the charge of the Democrats against the 
 Republicans, is unimpeachable. 
 
 Having satisfied the people of the gross un- 
 constitutionality of this Republican measure, 
 and its dangerous tendencies, especially as to 
 the purity ot elections, the Democrats will 
 next inquire, what all this shuffling; all these 
 studied evasion; all these idle pretences; 
 all these disorganizing processes are really 
 for — to what end are they directed? And 
 they will charge, that it is all simply to keep 
 yourselves in power, and office, if it be a pos- 
 sible thing, and your fellow citizens of another 
 political name, out ; nay more, that it is, also, 
 to enable a clique in the Republican party in 
 the State, to control and use that party for 
 their own personal advancement. 
 
 Such, Sir, in plain English, the Democratic 
 party will charge, is the real object aimed at 
 by this extraordinary measure. And they will 
 prove it to be so, because it is true, and the 
 proof is abundant. And what is more, a ma- 
 jority of the people will believe it; for they 
 cannot account for these things in any other 
 way. Having reached this vantage ground, 
 and standing firmly on it, the Democrats will, 
 thereupon, put this question to the people, 
 namely : Is that party fit to have and exercise 
 political control, that will deliberately use 
 such fiieans to accomplish such ends ; and is 
 it safe for you, the people of Michigan, to suf- 
 fer the control to remain in its hands — in the 
 hands of a party, whose managing clique, 
 rather than be superseded by a vote of the 
 people, given according to the reasonable re- 
 quirements of the Constitution, would tear 
 the very frame-work of the government in 
 ieces for the sake of bossing its ruins? And, 
 ir, being well satisfied of the facts on which 
 this pungent appeal will be made, many a 
 hitherto good Republican will yield to its ap- 
 palling force. 
 
 And, Sir, there is this further consideration 
 to be taken into account in this connection. 
 The public mind in this State will not cofine its 
 inquiries to this one measure ; nor will the 
 Democrats suffer it to be thus confined. The 
 people having seen that the Republicans, in 
 order to pass this measure and secure by it, if 
 ossible, a continuance in power, wilfully 
 roke through a most formidable body of 
 restrictions, imposed by the Constitution, by 
 long and universal usage and common sense ; 
 it will naturally put them on the inquiry as to 
 other Republican measures, and especially 
 such as may be called extreme. They will say 
 to themselves : “We see how bad it is in this 
 instance, and is it not reasonable to suppose 
 that it has been and w ill continue to be as bad 
 or worse in others?” Moreover they will* 
 continue : “If Republicans here will conduct 
 
 in this manner, is it not reasonable to sup- 
 pose, that they have, and will, conduct 
 in a similar manner elsewhere? We see, that 
 they passed this measure against fundamental 
 law and common sense, and judging from 
 what we thus see and know, is it not fair to in- 
 fer that a large part of what they do, and es- 
 ecially their extreme measures, whether of 
 tate or national policy, proceed on no better 
 grounds?” In this matter, the people will 
 say : “ We see that the Republican leaders were 
 governed by motives of personal aggrandize- 
 ment, with little or no regard to the rest, or 
 the public good. “ Is it not probable,” they 
 will then ask, “that this same motive has and 
 will continue to control them in other things?” 
 And, finally, the decisive question will be 
 reached by them, to-wit: “Now, since these 
 things are so, is it safe to trust these Republi- 
 cans with power any longer?” 
 
 On these grounds, and in these ways, Mr. 
 Chairman, will this measure, if passed, be 
 the occasion of casting suspicions in the pub- 
 lic mind against Republican rule, both State 
 and national, of a very injurious character to 
 the Republican party. Public confidence in 
 it, will be impaired. One member after an- 
 t other will withdraw from it, till at length it 
 will lose its strength and empire. 
 
 Mr. Chairman, there is another thing con- 
 nected with this measure, which, if it passes, 
 will operate very injuriously to the Republi- 
 can party. It is implied, perhaps, in what I 
 have already said ; but I feel called upon to 
 bring it out more distinctly, and warn Repub- 
 licans of its damaging consequences. It may 
 be distasteful to some of you, but that will 
 not be my fault. What I refer to, is this: 
 The difficulty you will have in making the 
 people believe that you are really honest and 
 sincere in this business, and especially your 
 leaders. The good people will not readily, 
 believe that you, leaders, are 60 deficient in 
 legal knowledge, or common sense, as to really 
 adjudge this measure constitutional, in the 
 face of all the arguments and light standing 
 forth against it, so plain, that “ a way-faring 
 man,” although of the common class, “need 
 not err therein.” And, surely, you ought not 
 to expect an intelligent people to believe in 
 the constitutionality of this measure, when 
 you do not believe in it yourselves. And you, 
 in effect, will confess, publicly, in this hall, 
 and before our respective constituents, that, 
 you do not believe in its constitutionality, and 
 that all your words, in that direction, are a 
 miserable sham. You will do it, now and here. 
 For let me put this to you : If you foresaw, 
 that the practical effect of this measure would 
 be such as to give the Democrats the victory, 
 in the next election, so as to throw the Re- 
 publicans out of power, and put the Demo- 
 crats in, and if the Democrats were seeking 
 its passage, on that account, how do you 
 think its constitutionality would then look to 
 you? How would the Constitution then read? 
 Do you not think it would read, under such 
 circumstances, in the natural, common sense 
 way, ju 3 t as it has always been read? Would 
 you not then be clear and positive as to the 
 sense? Would you have any doubts to be 
 cleared up by the court after election? Now 
 if any friend of this measure is otherwise 
 minded; if he verily thinks that he should, in 
 such case, go for it and defend it, the same as 
 
34 
 
 ho does now, “ let him speak, for him have I 
 offended.” I pause for a reply. No one 
 speaks. This silence is significant. It is 
 regnant with admissions. The people will 
 ear of it, and note it. They will detect in it 
 the very plague-spot at the bottom of this bus- 
 iness — the lack of true honesty of mind, on 
 the one hand, and the presence of unholy per- 
 sonal and party ambition on the other. The 
 reaction on the Republican party will be un- 
 fortunate. A shade will be thus thrown over 
 it. But the instigators and leaders in this 
 thing, will be marked. The detested blotch 
 of insincerity will be on them. And if their 
 names shall again come up fora place 01 trust, 
 is it not likely that you will hear those 
 prophetic words of the Message, passing and 
 re-passing among the people: “They would 
 not be fit to make laws, who will not obey 
 the fundamental law.” And thus, Sir, is it 
 not quite likely, that the political career of 
 the head ones in this scheme, will be wisely 
 and righteously cub off by the sober judgement 
 of the people? It may be, however, that be- 
 cause “ a lie will sometimes run a mile while 
 Truth is getting on her boots,” some of this 
 clique may secure an election, after all, by the 
 help of this measure, especially, as the court 
 cannot get at the law, till after election ; 
 but if any of this clique do thus secure an 
 election, it will be at the expense of the Re- 
 publican party — an expense, which will be al- 
 most suicidal. But very little will that disquiet 
 them provided they, themselves, win. Why, 
 Sir, we can, in that kind of imagination, which 
 •is true to nature, even now hear them solo- 
 quize in the words of the expressive dog- 
 gerel: 
 
 “ Of all my father’s family 
 I love myself the best; 
 
 If Providence provides for me, 
 
 What care I for the rest.” 
 
 Sir, I am very ready to kill off the Demo- 
 crats in a political sense. But please excuse 
 me from attempting it by the use of 6uch 
 means as will kill myself twice, while I kill 
 them but once. I do not propose to dig a pit 
 for them, where I shall first fall into it myself. 
 I do not propose to take steps against them 
 that shall cost me bitter repentence ; that shall 
 compromise my sense of manly uprightness, 
 my idea of a high minded statesman, or that 
 shall take aught from my own self-respect, or 
 awaken in my conscience a sentiment of self- 
 impeachment and self-condemnation. God 
 save me from such apostacy — from such trea- 
 son to truth and honor l 
 
 Sir, I have seen enough of men and things 
 to satisfy me, that the wisest way, the strong- 
 est way, the most efficacious way, is the hon- 
 est way; and that honesty in politics, as well 
 as in other things, “is the best policy.” The 
 doctrine that one may do eyil/that good may 
 come, is quite as weak, foolish, and wicked in 
 politics as in morals and religion. Besides, 
 we have fallen on so serious times, the God of 
 nations is dealing with us so earnestly, that 
 “pious frauds,” even in party politics, are 
 shockingly incongruous, and should seem to 
 expose us to still more terrible chastisements. 
 
 Viewed, then, in the light of policy, this 
 measure is a bad matter for the Republican 
 party, which will be held responsible for it. 
 And the more you revolve it, the worse it will 
 look ; the more you befriend it, the more in- 
 
 jury it will do you. Before you go far with it, 
 you will be as glad to get quit of it, as Gen. 
 Ethan Allen was to get rid of his quid of pep- 
 per! 
 
 As yon remember, that old hero was 
 taken prisoner in the war of the Revolution, 
 by the British. He was permitted to quarter 
 with officers in the British army of his own 
 rank, according to military etiquette. He 
 was an outspoken man— blunt, and fearing 
 nobody, He was withal, a sharp joker, ana 
 quick and apt at repartee. In all tnese things, 
 he generally got the better of bis British mess- 
 mates, who were always trying “to come up 
 with him.” One day they sat down to dinner. 
 Allen 6aw a tea-cup full of cayenne pepper, 
 but did not know what it was. It looked 
 rather attractively to him, and be fancied that 
 it must be as agreeable to the palate as to the 
 eye. So he dipped his broad table knife into 
 it, and took a large quid of it into his mouth. 
 A wink and suppressed smile went round the 
 table. John Bull felt sure that he had got 
 Brother Jonathan at last. Allen saw, that he 
 had caught himself in a bad trap. The pepper 
 began to bite. But having great self-po66ession 
 and an iron will, he determined to brave it out. 
 He worked the pepper with his tongue about 
 his month as fast as he could, hoping that it» 
 fury would thus soon be spent ; but the more 
 he worked it, the more it burnt. The tears 
 began to run. His burning month gasped for 
 cool air. He could hold out no longer. So, 
 quackling and strangling, he cried out; 
 “ Gentlemen, with your permission, I will take 
 this Hell Fire out of my mouth, and pocket it 
 to light my pipe with!” 
 
 This measure, Sir, may, now, seem to you 
 rich in promises, “ but, at last, it will sting 
 like a serpent, and bite like an adder.” It 
 may seem all right to you, as a party expe- 
 dient, but, if passed, “ the end thereof will bo 
 the ways of death” to the Republican party in 
 Michigan. Yon may rush into these abnormal 
 acts, and, in in your infatuation, fancy that the 
 people will not know, that they will not con- 
 sider, and that all will be secure ; but know 
 ye, that for all these things, the sovereign peo- 
 ple will bring you into judgment. And when 
 your fear cometh as desolation, and your de- 
 struction cometh as a whirlwind, remember 
 the warnings this day received, and that I, for 
 one, am clear of the responsibility of your 
 overthrow. 
 
 6. Another consideration showing the inexpe- 
 diency of passing this measure is to be found in 
 
 The Tendency It would Have to Tn* 
 centre and demoralize the Public 
 Mind. 
 
 1. In relation to constitvliondL law : — For th© 
 Constitution, as we have seen, prescribes th© 
 boundaries of legislative and judicial authori- 
 ty, in short, the organization, the powers, and 
 duties of all the various departments, and or- 
 gans, which, in the aggregate, form the com- 
 plex machine of government. It also carefully 
 asserts and defines those individual rights, 
 which not even the law-making power, not 
 even the people themselves, shall be permitted 
 to infringe. Consequently, our lives, our liber- 
 ties,. our property, our institutions, our social 
 order, our security, our peace, our welfare, as 
 individuals and as a people, all vest on const!- 
 
35 
 
 tutional law. And just so far as this is broken 
 down, or set at naught, or eluded, just to that 
 extent all is lost. Fidelity, therefore, to con- 
 stitutional law, is the first duty of every indi- 
 vidual in his capacity as a citizen ; and if this 
 be so with the private citizen, how emphati- 
 cally true is it, in case of legislators, and, in 
 fact, all public officers. For our perpetuity 
 and stability as free States depend much more 
 on the spirit of obedience to law among the 
 leading and influential classes, than on jails, 
 forts and armies. And how is it, that “the 
 British Constitution and the English nation 
 have outlived its feudalism, its despotism and 
 its barbarism, of a thousand years, and now 
 promise a thousand years more of constitu- 
 tional freedom?” It is chiefly owing to the 
 spirit of obedience to law, manifested in its 
 courts, and by its ruling and influential 
 classes. 
 
 And that man is a very imperfect student of 
 history and of human nature, who has failed 
 to learn this important lesson, namely : That 
 no state of mind can be more pregnant with 
 evil than that, which can knowingly violate or 
 elude the Constitution, and, at the same time, 
 seek to excuse or justify it by artifices, by 
 ingenious theories, by cunning speculations, 
 by specious arguments, derived from notions 
 of mere policy. Wherever this state of mind 
 exists, and has sway, it will never be wanting 
 in objects of paramount importance, in ex- 
 tremely exigent occasions, such as seem to it 
 to be strongly characterized by that kind of 
 necessity, which now calls for the exercise of 
 doubtful powers, and now knows no law what- 
 ever. In this way, one part after another of 
 the Constitution is set at naught, till at length 
 it is stripped of its force, and is either over- 
 thrown, or treated as inoperative and void: 
 Just as the Supreme Court of New York, by 
 Judge Bronson in Oakley vs. Aspinwall, 3 
 corns. 547, 568, says: “If the Legislature or 
 the courts may take that office upon them- 
 selves, (of supplying the defects or amending 
 the Constitution) or if, under color of con- 
 struction, or upon any other specious ground, 
 they may depart from that which is" plainly 
 declared, the people may well despair of ever 
 being able to set a boundary to the powers of 
 the government. Written Constitutions will 
 be worse than useless.” 
 
 The judge continues: “ Believing, as I do, 
 that the success of free institutions depends 
 on a rigid adherence to the fundamental law, 
 
 I have never yielded to considerations of ex- 
 pediency in expounding it. There is always 
 some plausible reason for the latitudinarian 
 constructions which are resorted to for the 
 purpose of acquiring power — some evil to be 
 avoided, or some good to be attained, by 
 pushing the powers of the government beyond 
 their legitimate boundary. It is by yielding 
 to such influences that Constitutions are grad- 
 ually undermined, and finally overthrown. 
 My rule has ever been to follow the funda- 
 mental law, as it is written, regardless of con- 
 sequences. If the law does not work well, the 
 people can amend it; and inconveniences can 
 be borne long enough to await that process. 
 But if the Legislature or the courts undertake 
 to cure defects by forced and unnatural con- 
 structions, they inflict a wound upon the Con- 
 stitution which nothing can heal. One step 
 taken by the Legislature or the judiciary in 
 
 enlarging the powers of the government, opens 
 the door for another, which will be sure to 
 follow; and so the process goes on, until all 
 respect for the fundamental law is lost, and the 
 powers of the government are just what those in 
 authority please to call themf 
 
 But let us now consider, 
 
 2. The tendency, which this kind of legisla- 
 tion here sought, must have to uncentre and 
 demoralize the public mind, not only with re- 
 gard to fundamental law, and the management 
 of public affairs, but 
 
 In Relation to Morals, Generally. 
 
 This general tendency appears from this: 
 The fundamental law, as we have seen, is 
 founded in right and justice. It does not 
 not create them, but denotes or expresses 
 them; and its one great object is to establish 
 such fixed regulations, as shall naturally lead 
 the people, and all public officers, to intend 
 right in all their purposes, and compel them 
 to do right, and act justly in their character as 
 citizens, and in all their private and official re- 
 lations. Now then, if by your theories, by 
 your acts, and by your examples, you teach 
 the people, that the fundamental law is not to 
 be held sacred and inviolate ; that there is no 
 intrinsic principle in or about it, that should 
 necessarily restrain those under its jurisdic- 
 tion from trifling with it, from eluding it, and 
 setting it at naught, provided there is an ur- 
 gent motive for it ; if such is the effect of what 
 you say and do, in this regard, the tendency of 
 it is to break up, in their minds, the very foun- 
 dations of all morality. The habits and ten- 
 dencies of mind and feeling, thus formed, will 
 naturally extend themselves to the first prin- 
 ciples of right and justice, honor and truth, 
 in all their applications to human character 
 and human relations. If you, in these high 
 places, cease to abide by the fundamental law, 
 or to properly maintain and respect it, you 
 must not be surprised at seeing many of the 
 people advance a step further, and others fur- 
 ther still, and so on, until license and anarchy 
 shall fill the land. And if you will sow the 
 seed, you should not complain of the abun- 
 dance of the crop. 
 
 In a conversation the other day with an 
 Honorable member of this House on this sub- 
 ject, he frankly admitted, that the principles 
 in the case, the law and the argument were 
 with me; but he was also bold enough to add, 
 that “he was of the notion, that it would do 
 to stretch the Constitution, somewhat, in this 
 particular case.” But my Honorable friend evi- 
 dently had not traced such kind of legislation 
 out to its natural consequences. It did not 
 seem to occur to him, nor does it seem to 
 occur to others, agreeing with him, that they 
 are proposing an extremely dangerous exper- 
 iment-one which, if carried out, will strong- 
 ly tend to conjure a spirit of misrule, 
 which will not “ down” at their bidding. Why, 
 it may seem a very small thing to many to 
 unbar the cage and let the grim lion out; but 
 when fairly loose and abroad, who shall lay 
 his hand on his mane and put him in again? 
 Once out, he will rioit and destroy us. 
 
 There was a large pond, on one of the hills 
 of New England, covering a great number of 
 acres. There was a small out-let at one end 
 of it. The ground from this end broke off a 
 few rods from the pond, forming a slope of 
 arable land to a rich, valley below. A man had 
 
36 
 
 a little Baw mill on this rivulet. He became 
 short of water. He needed but a little more. 
 If lie could not get it, his business and means 
 of living would be cut off. In a case so urgent 
 as his, he thought it would do to cut away the 
 fixed boundary of that great pond, “ some- 
 what,” — only a little, however. He tried it. 
 The water pressed down. The earth gave 
 way. The channel deepened and widened 
 with frightful rapidity. The waters rushed 
 out of their ancient boundaries, raging as they 
 went, and sweeping away crop6, fences, cattle, 
 houses, barns, and mills, and deluging and 
 laying waste the beautiful region beneath. 
 These, Sir, are but feeble illustrations of the 
 evils which will sooner or later come upon us, 
 if we, as rulers and a people, once begin to 
 break through the ultimate boundaries of law. 
 
 If you, Sir, or others, fancy that these are 
 but the words of an alarmist, when no real 
 danger is to be apprehended from these un- 
 constitutional measures, then just turn to the 
 present condition ot the people ot the insurg- 
 ent States. Carefully trace its history, in its 
 origin, progress, and results, so far as devel- 
 oped. By such an examination you will find, 
 that they were first taught by their leaders, 
 in one way and another, to disrespect funda- 
 mental law, and that this fearlul habit was 
 thus, by degrees, formed in the popular mind. 
 The evil seed, it is true, was sown in a genial 
 eoil, where it took quick and deep root, and 
 brought forth fruit an hundred fold, in a short 
 time. But yet, it was all natural. And when 
 the habit was once formed, and had taken 
 possession of them, the distinction between 
 right and wrong, as a natural result, was easi- 
 ly lost sight or, “ the boundaries of vice and 
 virtue were confounded, and the whole sub- 
 stance of morals” with them fell a prey to 
 blind and irrational passions. The traces of 
 honor, virtue, humanity, and patriotism disap- 
 peared, more and more, from their conversa- 
 tion, from their manners, from their legisla- 
 tion, from their executive and judicial admin- 
 istrations, from their public speeches, frbm 
 their popular publications and current litera- 
 ture. “ Hence, that intrepidity in guilt, which 
 has cased the hearts” of that people, and es- 
 pecially of their leaders and influential classes, 
 “ as with tripple brass.” Tbe consequences are 
 now felt. The fabric of society there totters to 
 its base, if it be not already forever overthrown ; 
 “ the very earth rocks and trembles under 
 their feet, and the whole heavens are enveloped 
 in darkness, No imagination can portray, no 
 mind can grasp the horrors,” which that spirit 
 of lawlessness, thus let lose and propagated, 
 has already produced; “nor when the angel 
 in the Apochalyps, to whom the keys are en- 
 trusted, shall be commissioned to open the 
 bottomless pit,” will he disclose a much more 
 appaling spectacle of depiavity and wretched- 
 ness than is at present exhibited throughout 
 the greater part of the rebel States. 
 
 Sir, this is history. It is not the moanings 
 of a croaker, having no corresponding reality. 
 No, Sir! The widowed and fatherless multi- 
 tudes among us; the desol olate homes all over 
 the tree States ; the hard marches, the watch- 
 ings, the hunger, and the shed blood of thou- 
 sands of our brethren, testify that this is all 
 matter-of-fact history. 
 
 And, now, Sir, with such a living contem- 
 poraneous example confronting them, one 
 
 whose attendant consequences shake the foun- 
 dations of the adhering States, and even en- 
 danger their very existence, what can the ac- 
 tuaries of this lawless measure, with their no 
 less lawless advocacy of it, really have in heart ! 
 What can they be thinking of! Are they am- 
 bitious to repeat this Southern experiment 
 here in the North? If nay, why then do they 
 thus strive to put in operation, 7/ere, the causes, 
 which produced 6uch a terrible condition of 
 things there? If you would avoid such a dread- 
 ful end, why enter on the way, which leads to 
 it? If you will sow the wind, you must, in 
 turn, reap the whirlwind. This follows from 
 the necessary law of cause and effect. 
 
 And, permit me, Sir, in closing to direct 
 attention to 
 
 Another Aspect of this General Sub- 
 ject. 
 
 We claim to be a Christian people — to re- 
 cognize the constant superintendence and su- 
 premacy of God, and our entire dependence on 
 Him, both as individuals and as a Nation. And 
 yet, Sir, so it is, that here in this Christian 
 country, nothing is thought so vulgar, 60 much 
 out of taste, in a body like this, as a serious 
 appeal to the principles which regulate tho 
 divine administration with regard to human 
 affairs. 
 
 But, Sir, that man is a shallow statesman, 
 and as dangerous as he is shallow, who fails to 
 recognize these principles of the divine gov- 
 ernment, and act with a careful reference to 
 them. For be it remembered, Sir, that the 
 God of Heaven is certainly quite as much the 
 God of Nations, as He is the God of nature ; 
 and that the laws ordained by Him for the 
 regulation of communities and Nations, are 
 quite as fixed and operative as those establish- 
 ed by Him in nature. The latter we learn by 
 experiments and observation. The former are 
 taught us in the Scriptures, sometimes by 
 direct precept, and, sometimes, by real cases, 
 where the principle of the particular law or 
 laws are applied and the operations and results 
 recorded. Among these established laws or 
 principles of the divine administration, rela- 
 tive to Nations, is this, namely : Whenever 
 rulers and persons of authority and influence 
 lead the people away in mind, heart, or action 
 from the straight paths of sincerity and good 
 faith, of uprightness and obedience to the 
 dictates of truth and justice, then both rulers 
 and the ruled, the leaders and the lead are to 
 be chastised, in some form or other by the 
 divine hand, but with all long-suffering and 
 patience, with a view to bring them to their 
 senses and effect their reformation. If the 
 corrections be heeded, and reformation ensues, 
 they are, thereupon, restored to divine favor 
 and protection ; otherwise, they are left to go 
 on from bad to worse, and, thus, work out their 
 utter destruction. Accordingly we read, I. K. 
 14:16, “And He shall give Israel up because 
 of the sins of Jeroboam, who did sin, and who 
 made Israel to sin.” Also, II. Ch. 83:9—11, 
 “SoMannaseh made Judah and the inhabi- 
 tants of Jerusalem to err, and to do worse 
 than the heathen, whom the Lord had destroy- 
 ed before the Children of Israel” — (Just as the 
 selfish, partisan politicians not in rebeldom 
 exclusively, but even in the free States, nay in 
 Michigan," are, to-day, leading the people to 
 
37 
 
 imitate the rebels in their disrespect for law, 
 and for men, who love truth and their country 
 more than they do party and its black arts.) 
 “ And the Lord spoke to Manasseh and to the 
 people; but they would not hearken” — (any 
 more than the desperate partisans and their 
 blind adherents of these times.) “Wherefore, 
 the Lord brought upon them the captains of 
 the host of the King of Assyria, which took 
 Manasseh among the thorns, and bound him 
 with fetters and carried him to Babylon”— that 
 ancient Richmond, whither a large portion of 
 the Jewish captives were led by their haughty 
 conquerors, and where they suffered such 
 brutal outrages, that the name of Babylon be- 
 came to them the symbol of cruelty, calamity, 
 and wretchedness— just as the modem Baby- 
 lon, Richmond, Va., will hereafter be to the 
 people of this Union. Again. We read in 
 Jer. 18: “If that Nation against whom I have 
 pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent 
 of the evil, that I thought to do unto them.” 
 This passage expresses one of the cardinal 
 principles of the divine government with re- 
 
 S ard to the Nations of which I have spoken. 
 
 ut, again, note this: “Because my people 
 have forgotten me, they have burned incense to 
 vanity, and they have caused them to stumble 
 in their ways from the ancient paths, to walk 
 in paths, in a way not cast up ; to make their 
 land desolate and a perpetual hissing ; every 
 one that passeth thereby 6hall be astonished, 
 and wag his head, I wiU scatter them as with 
 an east wind before the enemy ; I will show 
 them the back, and not the face, in the day of 
 their calamity.” Now, Sir, please note the 
 points in this ominous statement, and their 
 natural connection : 1. The offence — forgetful- 
 ness of God, on the part of the Nation. 2. The 
 mischievous consequences— departure from 
 the good, old, safe, constitutional way — a 
 stumbling out of the right ways into forbid- 
 den ways, that lead to ruin. The people falling 
 into this course, will make their land desolate, 
 and themselves miserable, just as the rebels 
 have done, and just as we shall do, if we for- 
 sake the right paths. The rebels are hissed, 
 and deserve to be hissed. Every one that 
 passes through their land, makes his remark 
 on it, “ is astonished and wags his head.” If 
 we forget God, here in the free States — our de- 
 pendence on Him, His principles of govern- 
 ment, the morality and spirit of beneficence 
 He requires — we shall likewise depart, and 
 plunge into a similar destruction; the two 
 things are tied together. 3. God will sooner 
 or later turn his back on the Nation, that for- 
 gets Him, and His teachings and methods, and 
 continues in it. He will withhold His favor 
 and protection from it, and finally give it up 
 to its enemies to be scattered and swept away. 
 
 This is a fixed principle in His administra- 
 tion. 
 
 Here we have, Sir, some of the principles 
 which enter into the divine economy with re- 
 gard to Nations. And whoever will carefully 
 study the history of by-gone and contempo- 
 raneous Nations, will be deeply impressed 
 with the all-mastering grasp of these princi- 
 ples, and also, with the infinite steadiness and 
 inflexibility with which they have been ap- 
 plied and enforced, in the ongoings of Provi- 
 dence. 
 
 It is extremely proper, Sir, that we be re- 
 minded, in this connection, of 
 
 Certain Very Alarming Symptoms in 
 Our Case. 
 
 We have national fasts. We come together 
 and acknowledge and lament the corruptions 
 of the age. We discant on its luxury and 
 venality, the irreligion ot the rich, the immor- 
 alities of the poor, and the forgetfulness of 
 God, which pervades all classes, and especially 
 the intolerable crimes of the South, and of 
 their coadjutors, infesting the adhering States. 
 All this is well, so far as it springs from sin- 
 cerity, and should not be omitted. 
 
 Again. As public officers, and as a people, 
 we solemnly avow our allegiance to the gov- 
 ernment, to constitutional law, and the duty of 
 fidelity to it. As public officers, we sware be- 
 fore our final Judge, that we will support the 
 Constitution, and will faithfully discharge the 
 duties of our office. In this act we invoke the 
 divine vengeance, if we fail to fulfill this awful 
 pledge. 
 
 But, having uttered these confessions, ac- 
 knowled the divine supremacy, sued for divine 
 succor, and taken these solemn oaths ; one set 
 of us straightway enters into the business of 
 stealing from the government directly ; another 
 confederates together to defraud the govern- 
 ment under the specious guise of contracts, 
 land grants, and money appropriations ; anoth- 
 er set seek to profit pecuniarily, by bringing 
 about certain legislation, or procuring certain 
 judicial decisions, no matter how corrupt and 
 dangerous they may be ; another set, (and their 
 name is legion) make use of their influence 
 or official position for objects of personal am- 
 bition; to pervert the government, and make 
 it a vast engine of party aggrandizement and 
 party sway ; to render the Constitution in a 
 great degree void, or full of mischief or the 
 grounds of it, by the constructions, which they 
 put upon it— by deliberately striving to make 
 it mean anything, no matter what, if so be, it 
 will suit their partisan purposes for the time 
 being. Among this multitudinous 6et are 
 they, who make a mock of the Constitution ; 
 who delight in ridiculing such as would un- 
 derstand, respect, and hold fast to the principles 
 of constitutional law, whether State or na- 
 tional ; who point at such, and call them de- 
 risive names. It matters not how much learn- 
 ing one has, how deeply he may be read in the 
 science of interpretation, how profound, and 
 just his views are, how large and ripe his ex- 
 perience, how able he may be as a publicist, 
 how pure his life, how exalted his patriotism, 
 how eminent his services ; yet, if he ventures 
 to offer his views on a constitutional question, 
 and if they are, in any way, unfavorable to 
 their personal or party schemes, then, if he is 
 not renowned as a lawyer, they jeer him as 
 being a bundle of self-conceit, and as an in- 
 stance of the superlatively ridiculous ; but, on 
 the other hand, if he happens to be a lawyer, 
 then they deride him as forgetting the spirit 
 and sticking in the mere letter, as being a 
 heartless abstractionist, as obsolete, and be- 
 longing to a cast-off age. Nor is this all. If 
 as a citizen, a patriot, and a statesman, he re- 
 cognizes his allegiance to his country as para- 
 mount to his allegiance to party, and if con- 
 sequently, he shall say to his fellow-citizens : 
 
 “ Come, let us, in this hour of our country’s 
 extreme peril, forget our partisanship and 
 save our country ; let us hold our individual 
 
38 
 
 party preferences in due subordination, and as 
 a band of brothers, give our ungrudging sup- 
 port to the government and to each other, 
 until treason is coerced to submission and 
 civil authority restored;” if he but says and 
 does this, why, according to this set, he is 
 strangely out of joint; the screws are loose 
 all about him, and he, indeed, “hath a devil,” 
 and is to be scouted and driven out as the bane 
 and plague of the elect and precious party, 
 whether Republican or Democratic. And still 
 another set among us, greatly embarass the 
 government and abridge its efficiency by sow- 
 ing the seeds of groundless discontent, and, 
 thus, “render aid and comfort to the ene- 
 my.” This class stigmatize an enlightened 
 zeal for the energy and efficiency of the Govern- 
 ment, (even in this hardest of all struggles for 
 self-preservation,) as the offspring of a temper 
 fond of despotic power, and hostile to the I 
 principles of constitutional liberty. They | 
 seem to forget, that extreme crises in public j 
 affairs, call for extraordinary remedies — not j 
 unlawful remedies, but such as the nature and 
 shifting necessities of the case require. They 
 seem to forget, that the vigor of the Govern- 
 ment is essential to the security of liberty, 
 nay, to its own existence; that, in the contem- 
 plation of a sound, and well-informed judge- 
 ment, the true interests of liberty, the people, j 
 and the Government can never be separated; J 
 and that a dangerous ambition more often 
 lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the 
 rights of the people, than under the forbidding 
 appearance of zeal for the firmness, vigor and 
 efficiency of the Government. This class of 
 men seem to forget, too, that history teaches 
 us that the former has been a much more cer- 
 tain road to the introduction of despotism, 
 than the latter; that of those men, who have 
 overturned the liberties of republics, the 
 greatest number have begun their career by 1 
 paying an obsequious court to the people— to ; 
 the sacred and imperiled rights of “the dear, | 
 the dear people;” commencing Demagogues 
 and ending Tyrants.* “These are of their 
 father the Devil, and the works of their father 
 they will do.” 
 
 How to be Ruined as a Nation— Who 
 Most to be Feared— How to be Saved. 
 
 Now, Sir, let us be admonished betimes, as 
 public men and as a people, that we are not to 
 be delivered from these great public troubles, ' 
 the Nation saved, and the smiles of Heaven re- 
 gained, so long as this order of things shall ! 
 prevail. No, Sir, not by any means ; lor we ! 
 know that all these things are from beneath, 
 and tend, necessarily, under the divine economy 
 respecting States and Nations, to bring down 1 
 the penal retributions of Heaven, and reduce 
 the Nation to disintegration and final ruin — 
 yes, Sir, to disintegration and final ruin. And 
 I here submit with a sad heart, that we, as a 
 Nation, have quite as much to fear, in the ag- 
 gregate, from the numerous classes or sets of 
 men in the adhering States, to which I have 
 just referred, as we have from the rebels. For 
 the rebels are without , and act openly; but 
 these are within, and under the guise of zeal, 
 par excellence, for the loyal cause, they gnaw 
 at the roots of the tree of civil and social life, 
 
 * Vide Federalist. 
 
 and, thus, sap the very foundation of things. 
 We may bring the rebels to lay down their 
 arms, and to become dutiful citizens again ; or 
 if they remain incorrigible, we may extermi- 
 nate them. But how shall we protect our- 
 selves, our country, and posterity against these 
 increasing multitudes among us in “ sheep’s 
 array” of all parties, who make merchandize 
 of the calamaties of their country, and seek 
 to fatten on the blood of their neighbors ; or 
 whose lust of place and of power, is as insa- 
 tiable as the grave, whose implacable selfish- 
 ness never tires, and whose personal and party 
 intrigues know no limit, right, law, or end, but 
 success! These political partisans fasten on 
 the government and the people like a host of 
 vampires. They environ and love us, “as the 
 wolves the trembling lambs” to devour us. 
 They are the Jeroboams, who cause the people 
 to err. They are the Achans, who prevent the 
 success of our arms, and cause the God of bat- 
 tles to turn His back upon us and not His face, 
 in the day of our calamity. 
 
 “As we wax hot in faction 
 
 In battle we wax cold ; 
 
 Wherefore men fight not as they fought 
 
 In the brave days of old.”f 
 
 Let us, therefore, as a people no longer fol- 
 low such as seek to divide and distract us — 
 who seek not us, but ours. Let them no 
 longer have dominion over us. Let us rather 
 come to our senses, now, before the day of 
 deliverence shall have passed by, and learn, 
 that there is no other way given under Heaven 
 whereby the Nation can be saved, except by our 
 renouncing all these hidden things of dishon- 
 esty, all these by-ends, and all this political 
 party shuffling, and accepting and following, in 
 all good conscience, in our relations as individ- 
 uals, as public servants, and as members of the 
 State, those solid principles of morals, pru- 
 dence and patriotism, sanctioned by the divine 
 administration, and “ which have stood the 
 test and sustained the virtue of 6ix thousand 
 years.” 
 
 Last Appeal. 
 
 Now, Sir, since all these things are so, and 
 cannot be otherwise, a voice proceeds out of 
 them louder than thunder, and as solemn and 
 impressive as the roar of Eternity, calling on 
 all undutiful ones to whefin I have referred, to 
 desist. Thus far they have withstood this 
 more than human appeal. “ Unmoved by the 
 uproar of elements, and undismayed by that 
 voice, which astonishes Nature and appals the 
 guilty, they continue absorbed in their specu 
 lations,” in their partisan schemes, and per- 
 sonal promotion — continue in their political 
 shuffling, nay, in gambling with the very blood 
 and life of the Nation on private account, mak 
 ing, it should seem, “ all the more haste, lest 
 the shades of a premature night may fall upon 
 them,” and cut them off from the consumma- 
 tion of their designs. But, Sir, let us even 
 
39 
 
 now, one and all, in this last great straggle o 
 our fatherland for constitutional existence, 
 honorably lay aside these evil ways, and espec- 
 ially the sins of personal and party ambition, 
 which so easily beset us, and returning to the 
 old path, which is the good way of our fathers, 
 
 pull, an honest pull, and a pull all-together, to 
 rescue our common country, with its free in- 
 stitutions, from impending overthrow, and to 
 yet make it the model Nation, the light and 
 pride of every people in the whole earth, lead- 
 ing the way to their liberties, their happiness, 
 their perfection, and their glory. 
 
 fit should be remembered that this speech was made in the darkest hour of this great national 
 struggle, when reverses were frequently occurring; when attention seemed to he much turned, in the 
 Army as well as out of it, from the one great purpose of saving the Union, to the matter of Presi- 
 dent-making, and to party politics connected therewith; and before the present order of things was 
 inaugurated under the auspices of the single-eyed and earnest-hearted Grant, from which success 
 naturally results; and for which let God he devoutly praised; and let the Administration, Grant, and 
 our noble brothers in the field, receive, each according to his measure, the abundant honor, and 
 gratitude due them from the present, and all coming generations. 
 

 
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