learning anb fatror. LIBRARY } Universityof Illinois. # cS^Si. B S1 K -^ VOLUME. » • cuss/a, # # ClASSJC? Accession No. Classics Return this book on or before the Latest Date stamped below. University of Illinois Library AUG g 1971 IPS 3 1W MAY 0 P B»l L161— ■H41 HISTORY OF GREECE ABBOTT A HISTORY OF GREECE BY EVELYN ABBOTT, M.A, LL.D. JOWETT LECTURER IN GREEK HISTORY AT BALLIOL COLLEGE PART III. From the Thirty Years Peace to the Fall of the Thirty at Athens, 445-403 B.C. New York: G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS London: LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO. 1900 All rights reserved PREFACE In the first five chapters of this volume I have re- peated some passages from my Pericles (1891) with corrections and other changes. I am sorry for the delay in the appearance of the book, but owing to other work I have been unable to finish it sooner, and even now I am conscious that the labour which I have bestowed on it has been inadequate to the subject. Greek History in the Fifth Century B.C. has an interest which is as inexhaustible as it is imperishable. I am greatly indebted to Mr. W. H. Forbes, Tutor of Balliol College, for numerous suggestions and improve- ments; to Mr. H. W. C. Davis, Fellow of All Souls' College, and Mr. H. Williamson, of Balliol College, for their kindness in reading over my proof-sheets ; and to Mr. F. H. Dale, Fellow of Merton College, for generous help in the Index. E. A. Oxford, December 1899. 58963 Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2015 https ://arch i ve . o rg/detai Is/h isto ryof g reeceb03abbo / CONTENTS CHAPTER I. PAGE The History of Athens prom the Thirty Years' Peace to the Founding of Amphipolis, 445-437, .... 1 A. — Athens and the West : the Foundation of Thurii, . 15 B. — The Samian Revolt : Athens and the East, . . 28 C. — Athens and the North : the Founding of Amphipolis, 37 CHAPTER II. Athens in 445-432, ........ 49 CHAPTER III. The Causes of the Peloponnesian War, . 67 CHAPTER IV. Greece on the Eve of the War, 94 CHAPTER V. The War down to the Death of Pericles, 431-429, . . Ill CHAPTER VI. From the Death of Pericles to the end of 427, . . 155 CHAPTER VII. From the beginning of 426 to the end of 425, . . . 189 CHAPTER VIII. From the beginning of 424 to the Peace of Nicias, 421, . 223 viii CONTENTS. CHAPTER IX. PAGE From the Conclusion of the Peace to the Invasion of Sicily, 421-415, 267 CHAPTER X. Affairs in Sicily, 422-413, 295 CHAPTER XI. From the end of the Sicilian Expedition to the Fall of the Four Hundred, 413-411, 365 CHAPTER XII. From the Fall of the Four Hundred to the Fall of the Thirty, 411-403, 420 CHAPTER XIII. Events in Sicily from the Destruction of the Athenian Armament to the Peace with Carthage, 413-405, . 476 CHAPTER XIV. Literature, Art, Society, etc., 490 APPENDIX I. Expenditure on the War, • 530 APPENDIX II. The Revolution of the Four Hundred, .... 532 INDEX, 541 LIST OF MAPS- PLAN of the Island of Sphagia (Sphacteria) and the Harbour of Navarino, 206 Syracuse during the Athenian Siege, . . . 327 CORRIGENDUM P. 105, 1. 7 from foot : — For " That the cities of the confederacy made some kind of contribution is stated by Thucydides, and the state- ment is confirmed," etc., read "That the Sicilian allies of the confederacy were expected to make a contribution to the expenses of the war is stated by Thucydides, and the statement is con- firmed in regard to other allies," etc. I may add that the Spartans, after the war was ended, demanded from the Eleans their share of the cost, but for this fact we have only the authority of Diodorus (xiv. 17) ; Xenophon does not mention it. CHAPTER I. THE HISTORY OF ATHENS FROM THE THIRTY YEARS PEACE TO THE FOUNDING OF AMPHIPOLIS, 445-437. I. By the terms of the peace of 445 Athens was deprived of all the advantages which she had acquired in the pre- ceding fifteen years. She was no longer the Loss of Athens greatest power in Central Greece, with garri- under the Peace sons at Pegae and Nisaea to secure the isthmus of 445 ' of Corinth ; she no longer held points of vantage in Achaea and at Troezen, from which she could keep in check the most enterprising of the allies of Sparta — Sicyon, Corinth, and Epidaurus; she was confined within the limits of her own territory, between two sections of the enemy. It is true that she retained Naupactus, through which she might still hope to exercise some influence in Western Greece ; it is true that Aegina, the "eyesore of the Peiraeus," though an in- dependent, was nevertheless a tributary ally, and without a fleet of her own; but this was a sorry salvage from the wreck of a land empire, which enabled Athens to employ Boeotian hoplites in the field and place her ships in Megarian harbours, which gave- her the command of the Saronic and Corinthian gulfs. The collapse becomes the more remarkable when we compare the present and the previous conduct of the Athenians. In 456, two months after the defeat of Tanagra, they were again in the field, and by the victory of Oenophyta placed the Wantofvi whole of Boeotia at their feet; but no attempt ous policy at had been made to retrieve the disaster of Athens - Coronea. Thebes gathered the cities of Boeotia round her in a close and hostile confederation; the Phocians and VOL. ill. A 2 CONDUCT OF SPARTA IN 446. Locrians threw off their allegiance, but Athens never called out a single soldier. Since 449 there had been no war — either Hellenic or foreign — to exhaust her resources, and but a small part of her army had been engaged at Coronea. By a vigorous dash at Tanagra, which lay within two days' march of the city, she might have secured captives to hold as hostages for those Athenians who had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and, the balance thus restored, a second contest would have been possible, but she preferred to abandon her position in Central Greece without a struggle. In the peace which Cimon concluded with Sparta in 451 (vol. ii. p. 338), she was allowed to retain her acquisitions in the Peloponnesus and the Megarid ; but now, after five years of undisturbed possession, she is called upon to renounce them all, and she obeys the call without any attempt at resistance. The conduct of the' Spartans is hardly less astonishing. The invasion of Attica by Plistoanax was obviously part of a prearranged scheme, in which Euboea was ? 0 X ndu°t d of th£ deeply concerned. In their revolt the Euboeans Lacedae- must have relied, not only on the Boeotians, monians. * whom they had helped to freedom, but even more on the Lacedaemonians, who invaded Attica in order to divert the Athenians from active operations in the island. For however impregnable the walls of Athens might be, Pericles could not venture to leave the city while the Lacedaemonian army was in Attica. Yet suddenly, at the most critical moment in the fortunes of Euboea, Sparta throws her over, and the invaders return home. It is not difficult to produce instances of Lacedaemonian treachery when the safety of Lacedaemonians was involved (infra, p. 197), but in the present instance the Lacedaemonians were in no danger, and they gained no advantage — at least none to which we can point — by returning home. The Lacedae- monians explained the mystery by the commonplace that Plistoanax had been bribed ; but can we suppose that the ephors of Sparta allowed their policy to be so easily thwarted ? I. 2.] A THEN IAN FOLIC Y A FTER CIMON. Arehidamus was at Sparta, and he at least was above suspicion. Why was the experienced soldier left at home, and a mere youth placed in command of the expedition? Why was no effort made to persist in the policy by which Plistoanax was sent into Attica ? Why was Euboea allowed to fall back into the hands of Athens ? 2. If we had fuller information we should no doubt be able to explain the action of Sparta and Athens in this period ; but in our present ignorance we cannot go beyond conjecture, and of the causes here suggested it is impossible to say which is the true one. (a) The first symptoms of a decline of vigour, or, at any rate, of a change of policy, at Athens are seen immediately after the death of Cimon. The Athenians were victorious at Salamis ; but no attempt poHcyat* was made to gain Cyprus for the Delian Athens after confederacy; the island was abandoned to its Clmon ' s death - fate ; war with Persia was dropped. The death of the great soldier, whose life had been dedicated to foreign wars, seems to have brought with it a cessation of warlike enterprise. In the next four years the two commanders who -stood next to Cimon in reputation — Tolmides and Myronides — also passed away. The extension of Athenian power on land had been largely due to their victories, and Tolmides fell in endeavouring to maintain what he had helped to win. 1 Their places were taken by men of as little capacity as ambition, whom the citizens distrusted and the enemy despised. Pericles himself was by no means a distinguished general; his caution amounted to timidity, and unless in command of an overwhelming force, he shrank from the risk of an engagement. From this period we trace a decline of the Athenian army, of which the last stage was reached on the fatal field of Delium in 424 — a decline for which Pericles 1 The date of the death of Myronides is unknown, but we never hear of him after the expedition to Thessaly in 454, Tolmides, of course, fell at Coronea, 4 ATHENS AND HER ALLIES. was himself largely to blame. But without an efficient army, carefully trained, and led by able generals, Athens could not hope to maintain her position in Central Hellas. (b) In Cimon Athens also lost the citizen who was most influential at Sparta. It was he who concluded the peace of 451 ; and though he had been unable to prevent Change in the , , , , . relations of the breach between Athens and Sparta after Athens and the affair of Ithome, and had shown himself Sparta. , , . .... loyal and patriotic in the conflict which followed, his presence at Athens was at least a guarantee that Lacedae- monian interests were not overlooked. After his death there was no one to take his place in this respect, and we may conjecture that in the interval between 449 and 445 a spirit of distrust and suspicion arose among the Lacedaemonians, who might suppose that Athens abandoned war with Persia merely to renew the war in Greece with greater vigour. Under such circumstances they would in 445 insist on severer terms than those which they accepted in 451. (c) Other and more important causes of the change in the spirit and policy of Athens may be sought in the attitude Attitude of the of tne allies and tne influence of Pericles. The allies towards calamitous reverse which overtook Athens in Athens. Egypt could not fail to have an effect on the cities of the Anatolian coast ; those which were discontented with their position were more inclined to seek aid from Persia ; and the Persian satraps began to renew their hopes of collecting the tribute at which the cities were assessed to the Great King. In 450 there had been troubles at Miletus, Erythrae, and Colophon, which could only be composed by the presence of Athenian garrisons and commissioners. In 446 followed the revolt of Euboea, the largest of all the allied islands, the nearest to Athens, and the most important for the supply of the city. In this period also, so far as we can draw conclusions from the quota-lists, the tribute re- ceived from the allies was constantly diminishing: in 450 the total amount was reduced from 520 talents to 470 or 480 ; and by 440 it amounted to 454 talents only, of which 1.2.] WAR WITH PERSIA DISCONTINUED. 5 not more than 400 were paid. In the years 447-445 twelve cities in the Carian district, two in the Ionian, and two in the Thracian, disappear from the list of those paying tribute to Athens. 1 Such indications of decline were not lost on Pericles, for even if he did not anticipate so serious an out- break as he was soon to experience in the revolt of Samos, he could not fail to perceive that if the Athenian empire was to be maintained, Athens must keep her allies well in hand ; she must concentrate her power on the sea ; she must be invincible in the Aegean, or the cities would rebel and the tribute remain unpaid. With this object in view he allowed the old policy of war with Persia to drop, for experience had shown how fatal was a reverse in the east, and how little could be warwith gained by further conquests. A maritime ^ e Ji^g™ p b p e ed: power could inflict no serious injury on the comes an territory of the king, while the occupation of em P ire - Cyprus, which was, perhaps, possible, would involve unceasing conflict with the Phoenician fleet. The revolt in Egypt, if not wholly suppressed, was so far crushed that no reasonable hope of success remained, and it would be the worst folly to waste the resources of Greece in supporting projects so chimerical as the resuscitation of the Pharaohs. On the other hand, the traditional policy of the Delian League — the object for which it had been founded — could not be abandoned without danger. When war with Persia was discontinued, the allies might claim that their contribu- tions should be discontinued also. Their arguments must be met; their irritation soothed, or, if not soothed, sup- pressed. The change from the Delian confederacy to the Athenian empire was an undertaking which might well absorb the energies of the statesman and the resources of his city. At the time of the defeat of Coronea, Pericles was engaged 1 Busolt in Philologus, 1882, pp. 714, 710, 701, 684. G. G. iii. 1. 556. 6 THE TWO POWERS IN GREECE. [I. 3. in this difficult undertaking, and in his judgment Athens was unequal to the double task of maintaining her ground in Boeotia and the Aegean. Athens was safer without her possessions on land, which were not so much strongholds of her power, as positions inviting attack and provoking resent- ment. It was better to send out Athenian citizens to hold the allies in check as "cleruchs," than to waste their lives in garrison duty. And when, owing to the apparent tameness of his policy, Athens was attacked by a general conspiracy, Pericles showed that he was prepared for still Pericles secures » , , •Ti- the empire of lurther concessions ; he was willing not only Athens by the to withdraw from Central Greece, but to peac " abandon the Athenian possessions in the Peloponnesus also, if, by so doing, he could -secure his principal object and maintain the power of Athens at sea. In this policy he was entirely successful, owing to the selfish stupidity of the Lacedaemonians, who were content that Euboea should be subject to Athens, if only the Peloponnesus were freed from the presence of Athenians; who, regard- less of Corinthian interests, allowed ISTaupactus to remain in the hands of Athens, and regardless of their own, did not even stipulate that the Messenian garrison should be removed, while Aegina, the great Dorian island, famous alike in legend and history, so far from being rescued for the Peloponnesian confederacy, continued to be a helpless ally of Athens, paying tribute which went to increase the Athenian fleet. In the calculations of Pericles such concessions were not too dearly bought by the evacuation of Troezen and the Megarian ports. 3. From this point of view the peace of 445 becomes intelligible. It marks the end of an old policy, and the Greece now beginning of a new one. Greece is now divided divided into into two sections, each of which takes its own two halves. line; the Athenians on sea, the Peloponnesians on land. The division corresponded roughly with the division of Dorians and Ionians, a division which had long been keenly felt in the colonies of the east and west. Such a I. 4.] DANGER OF COLLISION. 7 partition might seem to offer the fairest prospect of lasting peace. The Athenians, by renouncing their acquisitions in the Peloponnesus, withdrew into the circle of the Delian con- federacy, which they had administered for more than thirty years, with the tacit acquiescence, at any rate, of the Pelopon- nesians. The Lacedaemonians by abandoning Euboea, when she was struggling for independence, made it plain that they were not prepared to look beyond the Peloponnesus, or enter on a war with Athens in the cause of the oppressed allies. The prospect was delusive ; on the one _„ r r . . , ' . The partition hand, complete partition was impossible, and imperfect, and on the other, Pericles still cherished ambitions, llkel , 3 f. t ? lead to • •<• t -it • ■ 1 a collision. which, if realised, made a collision with the Peloponnesians inevitable. Athens still retained Naupactus, which was not only the key of the Corinthian gulf, but an outpost in Western Greece, where Corinth traded through her numerous colonies ; and she garrisoned the town with Messenians, who were the deadly enemies of Lacedaemon. Among the cities of the Delian League were some who were bound by a double allegiance to rival sovereigns, such as Potidaea, which was not only a Corinthian colony, governed by officers sent from Corinth, but a subject ally of Athens, engaged to the payment of tribute. Such a situation was delicate, if no more, and nothing but consummate tact could prevent a collision. Worse still, for the hope of lasting peace, was the infatuated passion for Sicily, which haunted the Athenians, and increased in violence when the war with Persia no longer occupied their minds. For con- quest in Sicily meant conquest of the Dorians, of the colonies of Corinth, which were closely connected with their mother-city, and formed the foundation of her pro- sperity. 4. In this new policy Pericles had the support of the poorer classes in the city and Peiraeus, whom he had taught to look on the empire as a convenient source of subsistence (vol. ii. p. 405). And the names of Callias and Andocides, who are mentioned among the plenipotentiaries for conclud- 8 OSTRACISM OF TH U C YD I DES. [1.4- ing the peace, indicate that some of the oldest and richest families in Athens followed his lead. The Cimonian party took another view. They were dissatisfied at Athens. 3 Os- the cessation of war with Persia, with which tracism of the name of their great hero was so inseparably Thucydides. connec ted j and still more dissatisfied at their own position in the city, where Pericles was carrying all before him. The party had been organised by Thucydides as it had never been organised before, but the result was merely a deeper cleft between the aristocrats and the demos. In eloquence Thucydides was no match for Pericles, and among the Athenians eloquence outweighed argument ; but the disasters of the last few years, and the strong feeling which many of the citizens entertained about the use made of the contributions of the allies, inspired the oligarchical party with confidence. Was it not possible to throw the blame of the agitation among the allies, and of the shameful peace, which the agitation had made necessary, on the all- powerful Pericles, and by this means to create a reaction 1 On these grounds, in the winter of 445 ostracism was pro- posed in the city, and the proposal being accepted, the usual arrangements were made for voting in the following spring. But when the day came for decision, the sentence fell, not on Pericles, but on Thucydides. 1 Plato informs us that Thucydides was " of a great family and a man of influence, not at Athens only, but throughout , . . Hellas." He belonged to that class to whom Thucydides : his ° *. character and Athens owed so much, and on whom, m the policy - days of extreme democracy, she looked back as the saviours of the city. To call him an oligarch is unjust, unless we limit the meaning of the word, for he was not an oligarch in the sense in which Antiphon or Pisander were oligarchs. He was an oligarch in the sense in which men 1 Vol. ii. p. 414 ; Pint. Per. 14, 15. Curtius, and Grote (more doubtfully) support the view that the ostracism was the work of the oligarchical party : Curt. Griech. Gesch. ii. 186 ; Grote, iv. 160 (1862). I. 5.] SUPREMACY OF PERICLES. 9 are oligarchs who believe that the masses require leaders and that the leading spirits in any community at any one time are few. He was an oligarch in his opposition to Pericles who used the public revenues to win the favour of the mob for his own purposes, in his friendly feeling towards Sparta, and in his desire to preserve something of a paternal government at Athens. 1 But he was also a sincere friend of the demos, and a patriot, who endeavoured to establish the greatness of Athens on the only basis on which it could endure, by treating the allies with strict and scrupulous justice. 5. With the ostracism of Thucydides the opposition of the oligarchs was silenced. Pericles was now supreme, and could carry out his aims with a free hand. He had cleared the ground on every side. In Hellas he had secured peace and the recognition of Athens as mistress of an empire ; war with Persia was at an end, at any rate de facto; and Athens was united under one party as it had never been united before. Pericles occupied a unique position. He wielded an almost absolute authority in a state where every one was an enthusiast for civil and personal freedom. He ruled, but Position and it was by the will and with the support of the aims of people. In the language of Aristotle we might Pencles - say that he was superior to the people, and therefore their natural king, but in the constitution he was merely a magis- trate who could be deposed from his position at any moment, dependent on the popular will, and on his own power to control it. He administered resources far greater than those of any other city in Greece, and he administered them as he pleased, if he could persuade the people to support his measures. The city of which he was the head was in some respects the most civilised which the world has ever seen. Pericles could avail himself of the services of Phidias in art, and of Sophocles in tragedy ; Anaxagoras and Herodotus were 1 Arist. Athen. Pol. 28, and Sandys' note; Plato, Meno, 94. 10 PERICLES' VIEWS OF EMPIRE. among his friends. He could appreciate all that was excellent in literature ; his ideal of government was among the highest which have ever been proposed. Fortunate indeed should we be, if we had before us a full and accurate record of the years during which he ruled Athens ; we should then under- stand what were his aims at home and abroad, and by what means he sought to realise them. Unhappily we possess nothing more than a record of a few isolated facts, mostly of uncertain date, which rest on indifferent evidence, and stand in doubtful connection with one another. 6. Pericles is often spoken of as a man of wide Panhellenic views, who sought to unite Hellas by welding the various states, Dorian and Ionian, into one nation. This view is only true to a very limited degree. He did indeed attempt, as we shall see, to bring the Hellenes together in various ways, and to break down some of the barriers which divided them, but these attempts, which were a subordinate part of his policy, ended in failure. His chief aims were not Pan- ^ . t . hellenic but Panathenian. He wished to create The Athenian _ , . empire as con- an Athenian empire which should embody as "ericfes 7 * ar £ e a P art °* Bellas as possible. At first he may have dreamed of an empire by land and sea, but, if he did, he was compelled to abandon the idea as beyond the strength of Athens, and from 445 he confined himself to the sea, as we have shown. He had no intention of going back to a confederacy, or of governing the Athenian empire on the old basis of the Delian League. Athens was not to be the leader of a number of equal states, but an imperial city exacting tribute from subjects, and using the tribute for her own purposes. With the exception of Lesbos, Chios, and Samos, all the cities which had once enjoyed the privilege of an equal vote as allies, were now reduced to the condition of subjects, who paid tribute to the common chest, but had no voice in a common council ; their means of defence were taken from them ; their walls pulled down. Some were allowed to manage their own affairs; in others there were Athenian garrisons and commissioners, maintaining DIFFICULTY OF THE TASK. 11 institutions which had been established in the interests of Athens ; and nearly all were compelled to carry their most important cases at law to Athens to be decided by an Athenian jury. Such a political condition was, from a Greek point of view, little better than slavery ; and, from any point of view, it implied a loss of independence. The Athenian empire was an outrage on Greek political feeling ; it was a tyranny, and felt to be a tyranny, though exercised by a city which claimed to be the T he Athenian most advanced of Greek democracies. Im- empire a perialism, in any form, was inconsistent with tyranny ' the Greek love of autonomy, with the march of Greek politics; and Athens was detested by Greece for the same reason that Pisistratus was detested by the Athenians. When she deprived the subject allies of their means of defence, she acted as the tyrant who deprived his citizens of their arms ; when she thrust her institutions upon them, she acted as the tyrant who made his will the law of the state ; in deciding their cases in her courts she acted as the tyrant who constituted himself the judge of his citizens ; and the democratical institutions of Athens only made more galling the contrast between her freedom and the subjection of the allies. The problem which lay before Pericles was un- doubtedly one of great difficulty — so difficult, indeed, that in the world's history it has not been solved more than three or four times. To combine a number of independent communi- ties into one whole, without destroying, on the one hand, the independence of the several cities, or limiting, on the other, the effective force of the combined body, is perhaps the highest achievement of political wisdom. Our own states- men, and our own generation, are deeply conscious of the difficulties which attend such a task, and in the Grecian world the difficulties were greatly increased owing to the intense love of autonomy which prevailed in Greek cities, and the jealousies which divided them. Pericles did not even attempt such a combination, but, on the contrary, by suppressing the Delian synod, he removed the means through 12 THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE. [1.7. which the cities might have been brought together on an equal footing, and by dropping the war with Persia he destroyed the motive which made union possible. 7. Politically, then, and as a step in the development of constitutional history, the empire was a blunder on the part of Athens, and it was a blunder which the Defence of the Q ree ^ 8 never forgot. What can be said on empire : it 0 ensured the the other side ? The empire of Athens is security of the often defended, even by writers of liberal Aegean. ' J opinions, on the ground that it brought to a large part of Greece the blessings of security and civilisation. It is argued, and with truth, that under the rule of Athena the Aegean was cleared of Persians and pirates ; that the cities prospered, and trade developed ; that the mutual quarrels and jealousies of the cities were held in check. All this is true ; but the same may be said with equal truth of the despot's rule over his slaves. They also eat and drink and sleep in security — from every danger but one. A despotism is often the best means of attaining material comforts, but it is nevertheless a despotism involving the destruction of civil growth and freedom. It is no support to this line of defence to show that the contributions which Athens demanded from her allies were, as a rule, very light — that Byzantium and Miletus paid sums to the Athenian treasury which would not have sufficed to maintain a dozen ships at sea for a summer's cruise. Slavery may be cheaper than freedom, but few will come forward to defend it on that ground. The amounts paid to Athens were certainly small, but Athens raised or lowered them much as she pleased, and was strict in exacting arrears. It is true, too, that Pericles, while maintaining the empire for the benefit of Athens, sought to give the allies a share of The em ire a tne S 00 ^ tnm g s w hi°h tne Athenians enjoyed, means of diffus- Athens was to become a centre of light and ing civilisation. leading throughout Hellas ; her subjects were to be attracted to her by splendid festivals ; they were to be instructed and amused by her orators and poets ; they were . r - 8 -l A SOURCE OF SECURITY, ETC. 13 to copy Athenian manners, to talk Attic like Athenians and win the adoration of their countrymen by their metro pol.tan pohsh. Athens was to be the school of G«eS She was to be the home of art, poetry, and though! the glonous city to which every eye in Helli' turned 3 pride acquisition 8 a nofc an empire by arguments which may be^sS in he " lan defence of despotic rule. Shall we take up t^ZT* oner ime, paradoxical perhaps, but Hellenic superiority. and ckim for Athens the right to rule her allies, because she was their superior, just as on the Aristotelian theory he best man ,n the city is the natural ruler of his fellow-cTt^ ior ever bhall we deny to states what we grant to law givers and philosophers t If among a number ofYomm Un here exists one community which is supreme in civihsa t on and .dv.nood beyond the rest in political institutions t ft th e right to rule over them | Not the ^ .^^f peihaps, ,„ cases where the disparity between th rul ng 1 Thjjc. ii. 41 • vii. 63. 14 THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE. [I. 8. city and the subjects is overwhelming, and the blessings which her rule confers are indisputable. But between Athens and the cities which sank to be her subjects, there was no very great disparity except in power. Down to the Ionian revolt the cities of the Asiatic coast, and the islands of the Aegean, were far in advance of Athens, or any other city of the peninsula ; and though they never fully recovered from the disasters of the Persian war, they were still active homes of commerce and thought, and they cherished the memory of a glorious past. Nor was Athens chosen by her subject allies to govern them ; she often forced her rule upon un- willing cities, and sought her own advantage in doing so. There is yet another plea which may be urged in support of the Athenian empire. It may be said that Athens was always ready to support the cause of the op- alupport t™ 6 pressed against the rich and powerful. There democracy. was not a down-trodden "demos" in any allied city, however insignificant and remote, which did not feel that they were at least within reach of help. In any struggle with the oligarchs they could count on the sympathy and support of Athens. At Mytilene the people were no sooner in power than they placed the city in the hands of the Athenians; and the history of Samos is still more striking in this respect. The tyranny of Athens was, at any rate, a refuge from a tyranny more crushing and immediate, and' Athenian ships, even when they came with the tax- gatherer on board, brought to many a message of hope ; To ardent democrats the Athenian empire from this point of view will be more than justified. But democracies are sometimes as selfish as they are inconsistent. The support which Athens gave to democracy perpetuated the intestine strife of cities, a strife which she used for her own purposes, and some of the most cruel scenes in the Peloponnesian war arose out of her ill-timed intervention. So we may argue for and against the Athenian empire without coming to a definite conclusion. The empire was raised on an insecure foundation ; and for this reason it was I. 9.] IT FAILED TO SATISFY GREEK FEELING. 15 foredoomed to perish, not from external attack, but from its own internal want of coherence. "Politics," said Burke, "ought to be adjusted, not to human reasoning, but to human nature," and among the Greeks both reason and nature were opposed to imperialism in any form. Yet the blessings which the empire conferred on Greece were great : security, humanity, sympathy with the oppressed — these were not common qualities in ancient Hellas, but at least they existed at Athens in a larger measure than elsewhere. 1 9. In the ten years which followed the peace, of 445 we can distinguish three important events in the history of Athens— the founding of Thurii, the revolt of Samos, and the colonisation of Amphipolis. Of these I will now give an account, including in the story some details of the relation in which Athens stood at this time to the west, the east, and the north. A.— ATHENS AND THE WEST: THE FOUNDATION OF THURII. In the years when Athens was at the height of her power, that is, in the years from 459 to 451, Pericles had striven to acquire the command of the Corinthian gulf. Att m tg t The Messenians from Ithome had been placed secure the at Naupactus, which commanded the entrance ; Corinthian gulf. Achaea had been received into alliance, Athenians had been placed at Pegae, at the head of the gulf ; repeated attempts had been made to gain possession of Sicyon, and Pericles had himself led a force against Oeniadae in Acarnania. The object of these acquisitions and attempts is not difficult to discern. Through the Corinthian gulf lay the way to those 1 In Thucydides the Athenians defend the acquisition of their empire by their conduct in the Persian wars ; they maintain it from motives of security" and interest : fxaXiara pev vtto deovs, encirci 8e /cat riprjs, varepov Kai a>0eXtas . . . iraai 8e dvenicpdopoD, ra ^vpcpepovra ra>v lAeyiaTcovnepl Kivbvvav ev TiOeaOai — i. 75 ; cp. vi. 82, 83. The extreme point is reached in Cleon's speech, iii. 37 f, and the Melian dialogue v. 85 f. ~ ' , 6 16 A THENS AND THE WEST. [I. 9. western regions in which Greek enterprise had reached a height far surpassing the prosperity of peninsular and even oriental Greece. In the first third of the fifth century the tyrants of Syracuse and Agrigentum were the largest figures in the imagination of the Greeks. In the west, ofthe C west too, the difficulties which stood in the way of for Athens. fae colonisation of the Aegean were not present ; there was no Persian monarch animated by here- ditary hatred, and master of innumerable forces, which seemed ■ to rise superior to every disaster. The ancient enemies of the Grecian race, the Phoenicians and the Tyrrhenians, had been beaten back, for a time, and confined within narrow limits, and the greatest danger which threat- ened the Greek cities in Italy, the advance of tjie native tribes of the interior, was not yet fully perceived. The quarrels of the cities of Magna Graecia had left some of the most fertile sites in that fertile region unoccupied. Croton and Sybaris had united for the destruction of Siris, and not long afterwards Sybaris herself was destroyed by Croton. The land thus laid waste remained unappropriated and uncultivated, and in 480 Themistocles quoted an oracle _ . _ , which commanded the Athenians to colonise Themistocles m ■ and Magna Siris, a command which he threatened to obey Graecia. b y sailing thither with his two hundred ships, if the Greeks refused to fight at Salamis. The same interest in the west is indicated by the names Sybaris and Italia, which he gave to two of his daughters, and perhaps it influenced his verdict in favour of the Corcyraeans in their dispute with Corinth, in which he anticipated the policy of a later day (vol. ii. pp. 181, 268). However this may be, Athenian commerce, even in the days of Themistocles, extended along the Italian coast as far as Campania, and many of the products of the west were doubtless to be seen in the market-place of Athens. 1 In the years which followed, the comparative weakness of the Greek colonies in Italy, l See Busolt, Griech. Gesch. in. 1. 519 f. I. 10.] ATTEMPT TO RE- FOUND SYBARIS. 17 owing to the death of Anaxilaus of Khegium, the expul- sion of the Pythagoreans, and the defeat of the Tarentines in 473, tended yet more to attract ambitious adventurers to the country; and it was about this time that the Athenians were seized with that longing for enterprise in the west, which, in the end, cost them so dear. In 450, envoys from Segesta appeared at Athens asking for assistance in some local quarrel (vol. ii. p. 468), and, four years later, if we may trust the dates of Diodorus, the descendants of the old inhabitants of Sybaris came to Hellas asking the Greeks to take a part in refoundmg their city. 10. After the destruction of Sybaris by the Crotoniates in 510, the remnant of the inhabitants had found a home in Scidrus and Laus, colonies of their city. 1 Here they dwelt for fifty-eight years, during which a new generation took the place of those who had seen the destruction of their city, and new hopes arose in the younger hearts. In 453-452 the Sybarites were collected by Thessalus, and conducted to the site of the old city, between the rivers sybaris re - Sybaris and Orathis. A new town was built, founded and , • ,i i. v x. C again destroyed and, owing to the extreme fertility ot the by croton, site, the inhabitants prospered as of old, but 45 2-446. the hatred of the Crotoniates was not satisfied by sixty years of desolation. Five years after its foundation, they attacked the new city and destroyed it. 2 After this expulsion, the Sybarites abandoned the attempt to found a city for themselves, and sent to Hellas for assistance, offering a share in the colony to all who were willing to join. The Lacedaemonians turned a deaf ear to the appeal, which they may have regarded as dangerous to the interests of their own colony at Tarentum; but at Athens 1 Herod, vi. 21 ; Hist, of Greece, ii. 503. 2 Diod. xi. 90; xii. 10 ; in the first passage he says, GerraXos (Tvvayaycbv tovs v7ro\oi7rovs rSav IvfiapiT&v a>Kt(re rrjv 2vftapiv ; in the second, GerraXoi avvcoKMrav, VOL. III. B 18 FOUNDATION OF THURII, 44$. [I. 10. che project was warmly taken up, especially by Lampon, one of the numerous prophets of the day, who at this time was very influential with the people, and in favour with Pericles. 1 The god of Delphi, when asked for his sanction, defined the site of the new colony in terms as alluring as they were The foundation ambiguous. It was to be planted where men ofThurii. drank water by measure, but ate their meal unmeasured ! Colonists came forward not from Athens only but from various parts of Peloponnesus ; from Elis, Arcadia, and Achaea • from Boeotia and Central Greece, and even from the islands of the Aegean. Ten ships were fitted out at Athens and despatched under the guidance of Lampon and Xenocritus, with whom sailed Dionysius, known as the "Copper" from his desire to introduce copper money at Athens. On arriving in Italy, the emigrants discovered, at a short distance from the site of the ancient town, a spring fitted with a bronze tube which the inhabitants called the bushel. This seemed to indicate the measurement of water, while the well-known fertility of the region promised an inexhaustible supply of grain. The conditions imposed by the oracle being thus fulfilled, a wall was built round the fountain, and a new city arose, called Thurii, from Thuria (gushing), the name of the spring (443). 2 The town which thus arose was not a mere collection of houses, each built as the fancy of the owner might The new city suggest ; it was carefully laid out under the built by Hippo- supervision of the most famous architect of the day. Among those who went from Athens to Thurii was Hippodamus, the son of Euryphon, of Miletus, 1 We first hear of Lampon in the days when Pericles and Thucy- dides were in opposition, i.e. before the ostracism of Thucydides : Plut. Per. 6 ; infra, p. 56. 2 Diod. xii. 10 ; Plut. Nic. 5. For the fertility of the region see . Metagenes, Thuriopersae, in Kock, Com. Att. Frag. i. 706: 6 p.ev TTOTdfios 6 Kpadis Tj/juv Karacpepei fid^as peylcrras avrop-drovs ixep.ayp.ev as, 6 6° erepos thdel Kvp.a vacrrcov na\ Kpecov iv re fiaTiftcov el\vop,evu>v avroae, k.t.A. I. 10.] HIPPODAMUS OF MILETUS. 19 a man • of remarkable powers, speculative and practical : whose eager curiosity no department of knowledge escaped. We may picture him to ourselves as the friend of his countrywoman Aspasia, and brought by her into the Peri- clean circle. In the next century he was remembered as a man, whose abundance of long hair, and warm clothing, worn in summer no less than in winter, had drawn on him the eyes of all ; as a student who posed as an authority in every department of natural philosophy ; as a theorist who wrote about politics without being himself a politician ; and as an architect who set a mode in the laying out of a city. The account which Aristotle gives of his political theories has many points of interest. He wished to establish a supreme court of appeal, and to allow juries to give a modified sentence — but the distinctive feature of his speculations was a certain mathematical precision. Hippodamus wished to have triplets everywhere ; in his ideal - city the land, the citizens, and even the law-suits fell into three classes. A similar spirit governed his architecture; in all the towns which he planned, he introduced straight streets, running at right angles to each other. Before he left Athens, he had "cut up" the Peiraeus in this manner, and he now applied his principles in the building of Thurii. The town formed a square or oblong ; four streets ran from end to end of it — the streets of Heracles, Aphrodite, Olympus, and Dionysus, which were crossed at right angles by the street of Heroes, the Thuria, and the Thurina. The whole was thus composed of twenty blocks of houses, conveniently intersected, and forming a striking contrast to the confusion of the ordinary Greek city. 1 1 For Hippodamus, see Aristot. Pol. ii. c. 8, § 5 f. ; and for the Hippodamean style, ib. iv. (vii.) c. 11 = 1330 b, 21 f., fj de t£>v 18ls Xeyerat, Kai to TrpwTov iv Tle\o7rovvr)cr(p rrjs netpas eXeyxOeiarjs. Duncker, on general grounds, puts the date at 444-443. a I. I 4 .] THE ELE US INI A N MYSTERIES. 25 14. The second scheme was a project for associating the Greeks more closely with the sanctuary at Eleusis. In spite of traditions which spoke of it as an alien, or even a hostile community, Eleusis had long been cherished Eleusis by the Athenians as a sacred place, the home of those holy goddesses whose mysteries were revered throughout Hellas. In the sixth century the Athenians seem to have fallen peculiarly under the influence of mysticism (vol. i. p. 463) ; Musaeus, Orpheus, and other soothsayers became at that time equal authorities with Homer on religious doctrines, or even superior authorities, because they dealt with subjects which do not find a place in the Homeric poems, and they also claimed to be of greater antiquity. The interest in mystical lore, the curiosity about a future life, and the desire for purification from this " muddy vesture of decay," were still further developed by the Pythagorean doctrines, which began to spread in Greece during the first half of the fifth century (vol. ii. p. 488). Legends also glorified the part which the deities of Eleusis had taken in the struggle against Persia • and it was in the precinct of Demeter, both at Plataea and Mycale, that the barbarians were finally defeated. 1 In the years which followed the Persian war, the popularity of the mysteries seems to have greatly increased. In an inscription which is certainly anterior to the popularity of Thirty Years' peace, we find traces of elaborate the m y steries - arrangements for the reception of foreigners at Athens during the mysteries. From the full moon of Metageitnion to the 10th of Pyanepsion (August - October) a sacred truce prevailed, of which any city might avail herself whose citizens wished to share in the holy rites; and while the truce lasted, the benefits extended equally to aliens at Athens and Athenians dwelling in alien cities. To receive the visitors a great temple was planned at Eleusis, which, though unfinished in the lifetime of Pericles, 1 Vol. ii. pp. 192, 233, and Herod, ix. 65, 101. 26 OFFERINGS OF CORN AT ELEUSIS. [I. 14. ranks next to the Parthenon among the buildings with which he adorned Attica. Hence the poet Sophocles in his Antigone could speak of the vale of Eleusinian Deo as a place where all found a welcome. 1 But the mysteries were not the sole attraction of Eleusis; not through them only had blessings been conferred upon Eleusis the Greece by the holy goddesses. It was in the home of adjacent Pharian plain that corn had first agriculture. "been sown ; it was from Eleusis that Demeter sent forth Triptolemus to till the earth, and teach mankind the art of agriculture. This legend was treated by Sophocles in the Triptolemus, one of the three plays with which in 469 he had obtained a victory over the veteran Aeschylus, and it was a subject peculiarly gratifying to Athenian pride. The Greeks with instinctive wisdom saw in agriculture the foundation of law and civilisation ; Demeter, the earth-mother, was to them Demeter Thesmo- phoros, Demeter the founder of ordinances, the protector of house and home, married life and society. All the Hellenes, therefore, owed a debt to Eleusis, and Pericles was not slow to remind them of their obligation. 2 The scheme was supported by the Delphian .god, who commanded the Athenians to bring thankofferings from their harvests to the goddesses at Eleusis — a request which was afterwards extended to all the Greeks. Such oracles could not, of course, be neglected, and a commission was issued to report on the best means of giving effect to them. This report and the proposals which followed the publication of it have been preserved in the following inscription 3 : — 1 Hicks, Inscript. British Mus. i. 2 ; G. I. A. i. 1 ; iv- 1. I J and iv. 3. 1. Kirchhoff puts the inscription before 456. For the temple, see Baumeister, Denkindler, Eleusis; Duncker, G. A. ix. 254 ; Busolt, G. G. iii. 1. 473. Soph. Ant. 1120. 2 Cp. Isocrates, Pauegyr. § 29 f. ; Dionys. Halicarn. i. 12. 3 For the oracles, see Isocr. I.e. ; Aristides, i. 167, Schol. 3. 65- 1. 14.] REPORT ON THE OFFERINGS. 27 " The Athenians are to make offerings of their fruits to the two goddesses as their fathers have done, and as the response from Delphi commands : not less than one-sixth of a bushel from every hundred bushels of barley, and f^ngs^t 6 not less than half a sixth from every hundred Eleusis. bushels of wheat— and this proportion is to be kept throughout, whatever the yearly produce may be, whether less or more. These offerings the demarchs must collect in the demes, and deposit them with the ministers at Eleusis. Three pits must be built at Eleusis in the manner of our fathers, wherever the ministers and the architect think fit, out of the funds belonging to the goddesses ; and in these pits the corn received from the demarchs is to be placed. The allies must also bring offerings in the same manner, and the cities must choose collectors of the corn in whatever manner will, in their opinion, help the collection of it ; and when collected they must send it to Athens, and those who bring it must deposit it with the ministers at Eleusis. . . . The Council must elect heralds and send them to the cities to announce the resolutions. ... At these mysteries the Hierophant and the Torchbearer must call on the Hellenes to make offerings of their fruits as their fathers have done, and as the oracle from Delphi commands. . . . With all the rest of the cities of Greece the Council must communicate as it finds opportunity, telling them how the Athenians and their allies are making offerings of their fruits, and inviting them to bring offerings in the manner of their fathers, and according to the oracle from Delphi — but inviting only and not commanding. The contributions from these cities, if any are brought, are to be collected by the minister in the same manner as the rest." 1 This report was adopted on the motion of Lampon, and written on two stone pillars, of which one was placed in the temple at Eleusis, the other at Athens in the acropolis. 2 To what extent the Greeks who were not allies of Athens responded to this invitation we cannot say. In the next century Isocrates asserts that the majority of the cities of Greece sent yearly to Athens some memorial of the benefits received in ancient days by the gift of agriculture ; those 1 The remainder of the inscription refers to the use which is to be made of the offerings. 2 Dittenberger, ISylloge, 13. The date is after 446 (? 439). 28 SAMOS. [I. IS cities which neglected to do so were often commanded by the oracle at Delphi to send fruits as their fathers had done . in old days. Yet Eleusis seems to have Eleusis never J became a suffered much in the Peloponnesian war, for sacred place for i t j ay on fcne high road of invasion, and the in- all the Greeks. "! ° ' vaders were not debarred by any sense of piety or obligation from laying waste the harvests from which the resources of the temple were drawn. For the eight or nine years during which Agis was encamped at Decelea (413-404) the procession from Athens to Eleusis, which was a conspicuous part of the celebration of the mysteries, was entirely suspended, with the exception of one year, when it was conducted under the protection of an armed force. We may conclude, therefore, that the sacred asso- ciations which the Athenians connected with Eleusis were but slightly felt by the rest of the Greeks, and the attempt to create in Attica a holy place, which might rank with Olympia and Delphi, met with little success. B.—THE SAMIAN REVOLT: ATHENS AND THE EAST. 15. In the midst of his schemes for consolidating the power of Athens, and raising the city to a higher position, Pericles found himself engaged in a conflict which threatened the existence of the Athenian empire. During the years which followed the expulsion of the Persians from Samos, an oligarchical government was in internal fac- power, but their rule was not acceptable to all tions at Samos. tne s am j ans . tnere wag a stron g democratical party in the state, who were only waiting fur a favourable opportunity to overthrow the government with the help of the democracy of Athens. Such an opportunity came in the Quarrel with spring of 440. In the sixth year of the peace, Miletus. Thucydides tells us, the Samians and Milesians went to war about Priene, and the Milesians were de- feated. The cities were not on good terms ; they were rivals in trade, and such near neighbours that each seemed to I. is] QUARREL WITH MILETUS. 29 prosper at the expense of the other. What gave rise to the quarrel about Priene, or what object each city had in view, is not recorded ; we do not even know which of the two was the aggressor in the contest. Priene, though a comparatively unimportant city, was charged with the maintenance of the Panionian festival, which was held on the northern slopes of Mycale, and it is possible that Samos wished to attain this privilege for herself. Or the Samians may have sought to plant a firmer foot on the mainland, and in fact they had already gone to war with Priene for the possession of some towns in the neighbourhood. Whatever the cause, it is surprising to find two cities of the Delian League going to war about a third, without consulting the wishes of the imperial city ; and as Samos still retained her independence, while Miletus was a subject city, we must suppose that Samos was the aggressor. Her action threatened the liberty of Priene, which Miletus strove to protect. 1 The Milesians repaired to Athens, where their complaints were listened to with eagerness. The cities were on excellent terms, and we know of two Milesians at least who were members of the Periclean circle — Aspasia and Hippodamus. And with the Milesian envoys came a number The Milesians of the Samian party, who wished to get rid of apply to the oligarchical government in their city. Such ens ' overtures would be received with the greater readiness because the Athenians were not satisfied with the position of affairs in Samos and the neighbouring continent. Ever since the defeat of the Egyptian expedition Athenian power had been declining in the east, especially in Caria. Between 454 and 441 the Carian tribute, so far as it can be calculated from the lists, fell from about 75 talents to 53 talents; and the 'number of cities w T hich paid it, from 60 or more to 43 — " a certain proof how varying even before the Samian revolt 1 In 450 Miletus was occupied by an Athenian garrison, and Athenian interests were represented by an iiriarKOTTos, This may have been the case in 440 also, 30 REVOLT OF SAMOS, 440. [I. IS was the dominion of the Athenians in a large part of the Carian district." 1 The Athenians at once despatched forty ships to Samos, under the command of Pericles. What steps were taken Pericles at w ^ re S ar d to Priene and the quarrel with Samos: a Miletus we are not told; these were matters of democracy little importance : in sending a fleet across the established. r ' ° Aegean the Athenians had other objects in view than the settlement of a local dispute. The oligarchy at Samos was suppressed, and the obedience of the party was secured by a hundred hostages, fifty men and fifty boys, who were placed in Lemnos ; a democratical form of govern- ment was established and protected by a garrison of Athenian soldiers ; after which the fleet returned to Athens. 2 Samos was not inclined to submit. She could not forget that she had once ruled the eastern Aegean, and that her Reaction at ^ eet W£lS a g reat P ower ] ner Walls Were Samos : the strong, and help might be expected from Persia, overthrow^ Of the deposed oligarchs, some had sought refuge on the continent, others remained in the city. The fugitives communicated with their friends in the island, and with Pissuthnes, the satrap of Sardis. Collecting a body of 700 mercenaries, they crossed over to Samos in the night, and attacked the demos, most of whom fell into their power. They also captured the Athenian garrison and 1 Busolt, Philol. xii. 683, who enumerates twelve cities which paid for the last time in 447-445. Diodorus, xii. 27, goes so far as to say of the Samians : SpaiVTss tovs ' Adrjvaiovs rats evvo'iais 8tav npaypaTcov, a>s evos ovtos tov iravTos €TT€^eLpr](T(P a.7ro8€L^LS evpia-Keiv. Plut., Per. 26 : — MeXtcrcros 6 'Wayevovs, dvi)p (pi\6(roi> koX cvepyerrjs e< ttcivtcov S>v pepvrjpeOa irpoy6va>v. It often occurs in inscriptions. See Dittenb. Syll. 33. I. 19.] THE MACEDONIAN KINGDOM. 39 If he did not aid in the destruction of the Athenians at Drabescus (464) Alexander made no effort to save them, and on their part the Athenians expected Cimon to crown his victory over Thasos by acquiring a portion of Macedonia. 1 From 464 onwards the Athenians and their "benefactor" must have regarded each other with suspicion; on the one hand Alexander might tamper with the allies of Athens ; on the other it was certain that Athens intended to plant a foot on the lower Strymon, and control the passage from Macedonia into Thrace. 19. Alexander died in 454, leaving four sons — Perdiccas, Philip, Menelaus, and Alcetas. Which of the four was the eldest is uncertain, and we do not know what D th f partition of his kingdom Alexander made Alexander: among them, if indeed he made any. When partition of & . ' J his kingdom. we begin to see our way clearly, we find a triple division of the Macedonian dominions. Derdas, the nephew of Alexander, is sovereign of the Elimiotae; the land east of the Axius, adjacent to the Strymon and the Greek cities of Chalcidice, is governed by Philip; and Perdiccas is ruler of Macedonia in the narrower sense, of the territory between the Haliacmon and the Axius. 2 1 Plut. Gim. 14. 2 In a matter so obscure we must expect a difference of opinion. Abel, Makedonien, p. 166, confesses that his account is merely con- jectural, and Duncker, G. A. ix. 225, note, is not convincing. The dates given for the reign of Perdiccas vary from 23 to 41 years ; and Abel considers that this is best explained by supposing that in one calculation the whole period from the death of Alexander to the death of Perdiccas is reckoned ; in the other, the time duriDg which Perdiccas was actually king of the whole country. Perdiccas died in 413 ; but 413 + 41 =454, the date of the death of Alexander ; and 413 + 23 = 436, a probable date for the expulsion of Philip by Per- diccas. Theopompus puts the reign of Perdiccas at 35 years, i.e. it began in 413 + 35 = 448, which may have been the date of a division of the kingdom between Philip and Perdiccas. But what happened in 454-448 ? Abel thinks that in this period Alcetas may have been king of all Macedonia, for in Plato, Gorg. 471 A, Perdiccas is said to have taken the kingdom from Alcetas. By promising him a share in the kingdom, Perdiccas induced Philip to join him in deposing Alcetas, and having obtained his object, set about depriving Philip 10 THE ODRYSIANS. [I. 19. By this division of the Macedonian monarchy the position of affairs was greatly altered. For the moment the Mace- Macedonia and Ionian power was paralysed ; the Greek cities the chaicidic had nothing to fear from their neighbour. If Philip attempted to extend his borders, the aid of Perdiccas could be invoked against him. On the other hand, the Greeks, freed from the fear of attack by Macedon, were less subservient to the Athenians, and their position became more independent. The situation was complicated by the growth of the Odrysian empire in Thrace. The Thracians, no less than the Macedonians, had regained their liberty on ofthe OdrysUn 1 the retreat of the Persians, and in Thrace, as empire. j n Macedonia, the invasion made it easier for an Teres. ambitious prince to extend his power. Teres, the king of the Odrysians, who lay in the valley of the Artiscus, seized the opportunity. He began with subjugating the Thracian tribes as far as the Haemus, from which, by the conquest of the Getae, he pushed his borders to the right bank of the Danube. Beyond the river lay the vast territory of the Scythians, which extended to the Cimmerian Bosphorus, the mouth of the Sea of Azov. Teres secured himself from attack in this direction by marrying his daughter to Aria- pithes, the king of Scythia, and, recrossing the Haemus, advanced his kingdom towards the east, till he almost touched the gates of Byzantium. 1 At the death of Teres in 440 this great empire seems to have been divided between his two sons, Sitalces and Sparadocus, and though Sitalces in a short time united the whole power in his own hands, there was a period during which Thrace, no less than Macedon, was distracted by the claims of rival monarchs. of his share, in which he was at length successful. Duncker thinks that Alexander divided his kingdom between two of his sons, Per- diccas and Philip, but cannot give any reason why the others were passed over. Alcetas and Menelaus are mentioned in O. I. A. i. 42, 43 as sons of Alexander. Abel, however, regards Amyntas as the fourth son, but only on the authority of Syncellus (p. 262). 1 See Thuc. ii. 29, 96, 97 ; Infra, p. 148. I. 20.] THE " THRA CI AN DISTRICT." 41 20. Thus the cities of Chalcidice and Thrace were re- lieved from any danger on the side of the tribes of the interior, at the very time when Athens was Difficulties in engaged in suppressing the revolt of Samos. Strict of the A spirit of rebellion arose among them. By- Athenian zantium, as we know, joined Samos (though em P ire - she does not seem to have taken any active part in assisting her) ; and from an examination of the Quota-lists of 440-436 it appears that a number of cities in the Thracian district refused to pay tribute in those years. 1 Athens endeavoured to meet the resistance by various changes. From the year 437 onwards we find in the lists a number of cities which, with one or two exceptions, appear there for the first time, ranged separately as cities "which tax themselves," and "which private citizens have enrolled to pay tribute"; and of the twenty-four cities in these lists, seventeen are situated in the Thracian district. The inference has been drawn from this, and with probability, that a number of small towns which had hitherto paid as tributaries to larger cities, such as Aenus, Potidaea, and others, were now detached, and not only allowed to pay tribute independently, but to fix their own tribute in the one case, or, in the other, to be enrolled at the wish of some of their citizens in the Athenian empire. 2 What was far more important than these changes and 1 The number of cities which paid tribute in 454-442 is about 45 ; but in 441 we have spaces for 35 only, and in 440 for 37 only. In 438 the cities of Aenus, Argilus, Galepsus, Scapsa, and Stolus do not appear; in 436 eight cities are missing. Between the years 439-436 the tribute was raised at Spartolus, Potidaea, Scabala, Mecyperna, Sane, Mende, Scione, Aegae, Aphytis, cities lying close together on the west coast of Chalcidice, and in Pallene. 2 See Busolt, Philol. xli. 667, etc. ; G. I. A. i. 239-244. The new headings in 437 are : (1) IIoAeis avrai ra^dpevai, (2) irokeis as oi Ibicorai eveypd\jravTo (popov (pepeiv. Busolt's explanation of these headings is conjectural, but it is probable. He also points out that some of the cities which were called upon to pay a higher tribute— Potidaea, Spartolus, Scione, Mende, Stolus — rebelled in 432, or sub- sequently joined Brasidas. Cp. vol. ii. Appendix iii. 9. 42 THE LOWER STRYMON. [I. 20. redistributions of tribute, Athens seized the opportunity of the disaffection among the Greek cities and the division in Macedonia to secure the prize for which she had so long striven. About three miles above its mouth the Strymon widens into a broad lake, the Lacus Cercinitis, which, along its whole length, effectually prevents communi- strymon? cation between the two banks of the river, value of the North-east of the lake stretches the valley of region. the Angites, through which runs a road, skirt- ing Mount Pangaeus on the landward side ; other roads also converge on the river at the point where it issues from the lake ; and the bridge by which the Strymon is there crossed is the key of the communication by land between Thrace and Macedonia. The whole region abounded in timber, always a rare commodity in Greece ; the plains of the Angites and the Strymon were fertile, and through them were brought the products of the interior. But what gave a peculiar value to the district was the abundance of gold and silver which was, procured from Mount Pangaeus and other mines in the neighbourhood. From the produce of these mines the Thasians had derived their ample resources, and as we have seen, Alexander lived to receive a talent a day from his mines near Lake Prasias. 1 Athens had long been in possession of the mouth of the Strymon, and since 464 she had worked the mines of the Thasians on the mainland. 2 But all attempts attempts to to secure the territory between Lake Cercinitis colonise the an d the sea, the valley of the Angites, and the region. inland slopes of Mount Pangaeus, had ended in failure. The story of Athenian hopes and disappointments has been preserved by the Scholiast on Aeschines, 3 who enumerates nine disasters which had befallen the Athenians in this region; and there are few calamities in Athenian 1 When Alexander conquered the Bisaltians he took over their coinage. See Head, Hist. Num. Introd. xlv., and pp. 178, 180. 2 Thuc. i. 101. 8 Aesch. 2. 31. I. 20. J FOUNDING OF AMPHIPOLJS, 437. 43 history more disastrous than the slaughter of 10,000 colonists at Drabescus in 464 (vol. ii. p. 314). 1 In 464 Alexander and Teres were still alive, and their kingdoms were un- divided; by 437 the situation was changed. Athens had also brought her struggle in the east to an end, though at the cost of resigning a number of Carian cities, and the action of the Greeks in Thrace made it clear that a strong centre was needed from which to control them. Philip of Macedon could not offer serious opposition from beyond the Strymon, owing to his relations with his brother Perdiccas, who would readily join the Athenians against him ; and the Odrysians were too much occupied with the contentions of their rival monarchs to render him assistance, even if they wished. In 437 a new colony was sent out under Hagnon, the son of Nicias, who had held command in the war against Samos. 2 Of the constitution of the city nothing is re- Foundingof corded, beyond the statement that the colonists Amphipoiis in were partly Athenian citizens, and partly col- 437 ' lected from the neighbouring towns. 3 The new city was called Amphipoiis, a name apparently derived from the situation. It lay on the slope of a hill, visible from the sea, on the left bank of the river, which is diverted from its course so as to circle round three sides of the hill. Where the river ran no fortifications were needed, but a wall was built from bank to bank across the slope. At some distance from the city lay the bridge over the Strymon. 4 1 The region was known as Phyllis, a name derived in legend from Phyllis, the wife of Demophon, the son of Theseus, with whom, it was believed, the country came as a dower to her husband. Phyllis is said to have visited the Strymon nine times, hence the name "Nine Ways," to meet her lover, who failed to come, and in her anger she pronounced upon the Athenians the curse that they should suffer disaster nine times in that region. 2 Diodorus, xii. 32, who gives the date 435, but cp. Thuc. iv. 102. 3 Thuc. iv. 106 ; Diod. I.e. 4 For Hagnon, whose father was Nicias of Steiria, not to be con- founded with Nicias, the statesman and general, see Thuc. v. 11. The district is described in Leake, Northern Greece, iii. 181 ff. It 44 SCYLES OF SCYTHIA. [I. 21. 21. With a view of securing their position, the Athenians entered into an alliance with Perdiccas, from whom they had Athens and for the time nothing to fear, 1 but in a few years Macedon. Perdiccas succeeded in expelling Philip and uniting Macedonia ; the territory east of the Axius, as far as the Strymon, was added to his own dominions, and he became the neighbour of Athens on the Strymon, at hand to help the Chalcidian cities ! His brother was driven to seek refuge with Derdas the prince of the Elimiotae. In Thrace also the kingdom of the Odrysians was by this time united in the hands of Sitalces. The king of Scythia, Ariapithes, had been treacherously murdered by Sparga- pithes, king of the Agathyrsi, 2 probably in the attempt to annex, by force or by fraud, the territory of his neighbour towards the Danube. He left three sons : Oricus, by his native wife Opaea ; Octamasades, by the daughter of Teres ; and Scyles, by a Greek woman of Istros. Scyles Scytw'af his ° f succeeded his father, and with the throne he love of Greek a } s0 received his father's Scythian wife. He was half a Greek by birth, and this natural bent had been strengthened by education. From his mother he learned the Greek language and letters, thus imbibing a love of Greek manners and life which proved his ruin. When he ascended the throne, he found the barbarous Scythian customs intolerable ; his Scythian wife was odious to him ; and whenever he could, he stole away to indulge his Hellenic inclinations. As often as he visited Olbia, the Milesian colony on the Borysthenes, he left his Scythian retinue in the suburbs, and entered the city, attended by seems to be doubtful whether the bridge lay above or below the wall which Hagnon built ; that it did not lie within it, is clear from Thucydides, iv. 103. Leake, I.e. p. 196, considers that the ancient bridge was probably in the same situation as the modern one, i.e. just below the lake, and above the city, but Grote places it below, vol. iv. p. 547. The present bridge is 300 yards long. For the device by which Hagnon was supposed to have driven away the Edonians, see Polyaen. Strateg. vi. 53. 1 Thuc. i. 57 says of Perdiccas : avfifiaxos rrporepov epciv : cp. Arist. Ach. 504. II. 3 .] OPPOSITION TO PERICLES. 53 who complained that the money of the allies was wasted. Athens could at any moment declare war, not only on a rebellious subject— though this was painfully apparent to the allies but on any power which attempted to injure an ally. The Aegean, under Athenian rule, was free from pirates and Persians. 1 3. Of the internal history of Athens from the fall of Samos to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, few details have come down to us. We can trace Internal a gradual change in the attitude of the people history of 0 _ . , . , 1 • Athens. to Pericles, answering to a change in nis attitude to them. Their thoughts were of present enjoy- ment ; he had ulterior views in all his measures ; and it was inevitable that a point should be reached when the people and their ruler were no longer in harmony. He used his high authority to check their wishes; they submitted, not without resentment. The life which he led, the associ- ates whom he gathered round him, also tended to separate him from the Athenian multitude quite as much as the line which he pursued in politics separated him from the party to which by birth he belonged. In his youth he had married the wife of the wealthy Hipponicus, by whom he had two sons, Xanthippus and Paralus. By what arrangement the marriage p e riciesand was brought about we do not know, but the Aspasia. harmony of the two great families does not seem to have been in any way disturbed. In such matters Athenian feeling was widely different from our own. The connection thus formed did not prove lasting. Whether Pericles failed to engage the affections of his wife as Hipponicus had failed before him, or whether he was overcome by a new passion — 1 If in 435 there was a surplus of 9000 t. in the Acropolis, this amounts to an average annual saving of 450 t. for twenty years. The sums paid by the allies were not enough to account for such a total, even if preserved intact, and Inhere is no doubt that Pericles spent the money of the allies on his public buildings and in paying the Athenians, before 435. Did the savings come from Laurium and the mines opposite Thasos? 54 PERICLES AND ASPASIA. [II- 3 they separated, and the high-born Athenian lady consented to become the wife of a third husband. Pericles was now free to bring to his home the celebrated Aspasia, a Milesian lady, who seems to have come to Athens shortly before the Samian war. She belonged to the class of " companions," but, by general consent, she was the first of her class. All ancient writers agree about her beauty, her genius, and her accom- plishments ; and when she became associated with Pericles, her circle was, in some respects, the leading circle at Athens. Socrates listened eagerly to her conversation ; Anaxagoras, an Ionian like herself, entered into discussion with her on subjects religious and philosophical ; and the friends of Pericles even brought their wives to listen to the wise sayings of the Milesian. 1 It has been suggested that Pericles, in forming this connection with Aspasia, was endeavouring to establish a better position for women in Athenian society. 2 The Woman's life Athenian wife was the mistress of a house, at Athens. the mother of children, treated with the greatest respect, and influential in her own sphere, but she was restrained within narrow limits. She was taught to read and write, and instructed in all manner of household duties, but she seldom ventured beyond the precincts of the house, or was seen in any society but that of her relations. In the country the wives of neighbours visited each other ; in the city it was only on some public occasion, a festival or a funeral, that a woman of position left her home. Mixed society was unknown among women of reputation; they were rigidly excluded from all entertainments, and for a 1 See Plat. Per. c. 24. That she ever became the wife of Pericles is neither proved nor credible. By his own law, Pericles had made marriage between an Athenian and a Milesian impossible; and her son, Pericles the younger, was regarded as illegitimate. 2 Holm, Hist, of Greece, ii. 344, E. T. " Is it likely that a serious- minded and highly educated man like Pericles would not have come to the conclusion that his own example ought to be generally followed in Athens, if the social life of so gifted a people was to be placed on a satisfactory basis ? " II. 4-] RELIGIOUS FEELING OF THE GREEKS, 55 man to enter the house of a friend in his absence was contrary to custom. It is impossible to lay down any general rules in such matters, or to judge of the motives which induced Pericles to take Aspasia into his house. But if Athenian society stood in need of reformation, he did not go the right way to reform it. He was not, indeed, the man to undertake such a task. He was by no means delicate in his relations to women, 1 and though we need not give credit to scandal, we must allow that he laid himself open to attack by this new connection, while he lost the sympathy of what was soundest and best at Athens. Those who lived the life which Xenophon has described in his Oeconomicus, whose sons were trained in the education which Aristophanes has sketched in the Clouds, could not fail to regard with horror Aspasia and her circle. 4. This was not the only point at which Pericles came into conflict with the prevailing sentiment at Athens. We are apt to regard the Greeks as audacious Religion at thinkers, whose minds wandered freely over Athens, every department of human thought, and this is, to a great extent, true of Greek literature, but it is by no means true of Greek life. The Greek was religious to an extraordinary degree ; in every action he felt himself dependent on the gods, whose support he was therefore anxious to obtain in all his plans and purposes. He appealed to the oracles about the most trivial matters : about a purchase, about a strayed sheep, or a stolen ox; nothing monstrous or uncommon occurred but it was regarded as a portent, having an influence on human life. Athens was filled with diviners who inter- preted signs and omens of every kind ; oracles were collected from every source — not only from Delphi or Dodona, but from local prophets in Boeotia or Acarnania, from Bacis, or Glanis, "the elder brother of Bacis." An earthquake caused an adjournment of an important assembly, and a formal cere- mony delayed an execution. l Plat. Per. 10, 13, 28. 56 NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. [II. 4- With such modes of thought the emancipated circle of Pericles had nothing in common. Early in life he seems to have fallen under the influence of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, a philosopher of the Ionian school, from whom he is said to have acquired the stately reserve which was so remarkable a trait in his character. From him he learned to differ from the common opinion of his day, and to substitute natural causes for supernatural. In the teaching of Anaxagoras the world is the work not of chance or necessity, but of an organising intellect which, out of a preceding chaos, brought together similar particles capable of combination, and thus formed the world as we know it. 1 Such a philosophy could not fail to come into collision with the religious beliefs of the Greeks. There was no room in it for that variety of powers with which they had peopled earth and sea and sky. The sun in the eyes of the Greeks was a holy god, a living, personal deity, who traversed the heavens daily from east to west in his bright chariot, but Anaxagoras openly affirmed that the sun and stars were red-hot stones and nothing more. Such views were regarded not merely as impious ; they were dangerous, and would offend the gods, whose vengeance would fall on the city. For of course Pericles and his friends were quite unable to move the convictions of the common people on these matters. Before the ostracism of Thucydides, a ram with one horn was brought to Pericles, and Lampon at once interpreted the portent : it signified that the whole power of the city would pass into the hands of one man. It was in vain that Anaxa- goras had the head opened, and pointed out that the single horn was due to a malformation. Thucydides was ostracised, and Pericles became sole ruler of the state, and Lampon's prophecy was confirmed. Plutarch, who records the incident, though strongly in favour of natural philosophy, is driven to 1 Plut. Per. 4: roty oXois Tvpoiros ov rvyr]v ovd' avayicqv BtaKoaprjaecos dpxrjv, dXka vovv eneaTtjcre nadapbv nai atcparov iv /ae/uy/ueVois navi rots a'XXois dnoKpivovTa ras 6/ioio/iepeiay. Infra, a xiv. n. s] GROWTH OF ENQ UIR Y. 57 confess that the cause and the meaning of a portent may differ. 1 5. In the new movement two elements were combined — the philosophy of Ionia and the rhetoric of Sicily. For more than a century the phenomena of nature had been made a subject of inquiry in the Ionian intellectual cities of Asia Minor, and Anaxagoras was one movement - of the last and greatest representatives of this school of inquiry. The negative results of such philosophy were, of course, more cogent than the positive ; no two thinkers agreed in their explanation of the universe, but they were all of one mind in denying truth and reality to the changing phenomena of the outward world. The same criticism was in time applied to ethics and politics. The various forms of government were discussed, and with them the object and purpose of all government ; a distinction was drawn between nature and ordinance, between universal and particular laws. It was but a short step to pass on to ethics, and ask : What is the measure of right and wrong % What is the value of custom % What weight should be given to authority 1 Is truth the same for all, or does it vary according to circum- stances and temperament? This spirit of inquiry passed from the extreme east to the extreme west of the Grecian world. The speculations current at Miletus and Ephesus were repeated in the cities of Magna Graecia and Sicily, but owing to peculiar circum- stances politics became of more importance than physics in the Sicilian cities, and philosophy tended to pass into rhetoric. Not only were these cities constantly engaged in "setting their house in order," in reconciling the claims of various settlers, and harmonising the customs of various 1 Plut. Per. 6. In Nicias 23 he gives a short account of the progress of natural philosophy in Greece. Of Anaxagoras he says : o yap 7rpwTos cracpfiTTaTov re tto.vt(ov kol OappaXecorarov nepi ae\rp>r]s Karavyao-pwv kcu aKias \6yov (Is ypacprjv nuraOepevos 'Avutjuyopas o#r' avros r]v naXaios ovt' 6 \6yos evbo^os aXX' airopp-qTos ert kui 81 oXiyatv Kai per' ev\a(3eias tivos T) nlaTeeos /3a£i£a)i>. 58 THE "SOPHISTS; [II. 6. tribes, but more especially on the expulsion of the tyrants and the restoration of the old inhabitants to their homes and possessions, numerous questions arose which could only be settled in the law-courts. It was by the art of speech that men hoped to regain their lost position. Often, no doubt, the claims put forward were of a very uncertain kind, and there was a great temptation to "make the worse the better cause." This had not been the attitude of the older inquirers, Philosophers but now philosophy and sophistry parted com- and sophists. pany ; they stood as far asunder as the student of jurisprudence and the successful pleader. While Anaxa- goras was in danger of starvation, had not Pericles come to his help, and Socrates lived on less than the laziest citizen could earn, the new teachers, such as Protagoras of Abdera and Gorgias of Leontini, were well paid for their instruction. The wandering life of these sophists, who went from city to city as lecturers, emancipated them from civic traditions, and thus a prejudice was raised against them in cities where morality came to men through the state and was bound up with state institutions. Among them were men of great ability and knowledge, who played a useful part in stimu- lating the minds of their pupils, and imparting to them knowledge which was new and valuable ; but even the best of them hardly perceived the true effect of his teaching, and the second-rate were mere intellectual gladiators, ready to maintain any thesis for the sake of display and profit. 6. The appearance of the "sophists" and the spread of " sophistical " teaching seems for a time to have revolutionised education at Athens. In more than one play the comic poet Aristophanes contrasts the old and new, the young man as he was when moulded by the best traditions of Athens, and as he became in the hands of sophists. In mind Schi°ng. 1StS an( i body the change was for the worse ; digni- Scenefrom fi e( j obedience and decorous self-control were Aristophanes. , , , . ... ., succeeded by a noisy argumentative conceit, which claimed to be infallible on every subject. "I will tell you how our quarrel began," says Strepsiades in the Clouds, II. 6.] EFFECT OF " SOPHISTRY. 59 speaking of his son ; " we were at dinner, and I asked him to take his lyre and sing me Simonides' song about the combing of the ram. He at once replied that it was not the fashion now to play the lyre and sing over one's wine, ' like an old wife grinding parched barley.' 'Yes ! ' rejoins Phidippides ; ' and did you not deserve to be kicked and beaten for asking your guest to sing, as if you were entertaining grasshoppers % ' Just so," Strepsiades continues, "that is the language he used, and he said that Simonides was a bad poet. With much ado I kept my temper, and asked him to take a branch of myrtle and repeat some lines of Aeschylus. He replied : 'Aeschylus is bombastic, harsh, immature, and rugged.' How my heart went pit-a-pat ; still I curbed myself and said : ' Well ! well ! sing me one of these smart songs which are in fashion.' Forthwith he chanted a lay from Euripides, God help us all ! about the incest of a brother and sister. 1 broke out at this and roundly abused him. He retorted, and word brought up word, till at last he sprang upon me and beat me." 1 This scene is of course intended to be a caricature of the effect of "sophistic" teaching, but of the hold which that teaching obtained on the minds of the younger citizens there is no doubt. We have no reason to suspect exaggeration in the description given in the Protagoras of Plato of the excite- ment caused by the visit of an eminent sophist to Athens. "Last night, or rather very early this morning, Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus and the brother of Phason, gave a tremendous thump with his staff at my door " ; — it is Socrates who is speaking — "some one opened to him, and he came rushing in and bawled out, ' Socrates, are you awake or asleep ? ' "I knew his voice, and said, 'Hippocrates, is that you? and do you bring any news ? ' " ' Good news,' he said ; ' nothing but good.' "'Delightful,' 1 said ; 'but what is the news ? and why have you come Hither at this unearthly hour 1 ' 1 Aristoph. Clouds, 1354 ff. Cp. also the well-known 950 ff. 60 PRO TA GORAS AT A THENS. [II. 7 . " He drew nearer 'o me and said, ' Protagoras is come.' "'Yes,' I replied : 'he came two days ago ; have you only just heard of his arrival ? ' " ' Yes, by the gods,' he said ; 1 but not till yesterday evening.' At the same time, he felt for the truckle-bed, and sat down at my feet, and then he said : ' Yesterday, quite late in the evening, on my return from Oenoe, whither I had gone in pursuit of my runaway slave, Satyrus, as I meant to have told you, if some other matter had not come in the way, when we had done supper and were about to retire to rest, my brother said to me, " Protagoras is come." 1 was going to you at once, and then I thought that the night was far spent. But the moment sleep left me after my fatigue, I got up and came hither direct.' " I, who knew the very courageous madness of the man, said, ' What is the matter ? Has Protagoras robbed you of anything 1 ' " He replied, laughing, ' Yes, indeed, he has, Socrates, of the wisdom which he keeps from me.' " 'But surely,' I said, 'if you give him money, and make friends with him, he will make you as wise as he is himself.' " ' Would to heaven,' he replied, ' that this were the case. He might take all that I have, and all that my friends have, if he pleased. But that is why T have come to you now, in order that you may speak to him on my behalf ; for I am young, and also I have never seen nor heard him (when he visited Athens before I was but a child) ; and all men praise him, Socrates; he is reputed to be the most accomplished of speakers. There is no reason why we should not go to him at once, and then we shall find him at home. He lodges, as I hear, with Callias, the son of Hipponicus ; let us start.' » 1 7. The older men at Athens watched this movement with anxious eyes. More especially were the young orators regarded with suspicion — striplings who came forward with the new equipment of logic and dialectic. They were thought to be entirely without moral principles ; and an Pericles and the orator of the new school was at once assumed new movement, to be a man of bad character. With Pericles and his friends the sophists and their doctrines found a welcome. Aspasia herself was known as a composer of 1 Plato, Protag. p. 310, Jow 7 ett's translation. II. 7 .] PERICLES BECOMES UNPOPULAR. 61 clever speeches ; and Pericles is said to have spent a whole day in arguing with Protagoras the case of a competitor in the Pentathlum, who was accidentally killed by a spear. Who was really to blame — the thrower of the spear, or the spear, or those who arranged the contest? In the new enthusiasm for discussion such absurdities may have oc- curred ; at any rate they were believed, and Pericles brought on himself a part of the dislike which the plain Athenian felt for intellectual hair-splitting. 1 Even in his conduct of the city, he inevitably became the object of a good deal of criticism. By taking the manage- ment of everything into his own hands, he made himself the common mark for discontent. If any interest was harassed, or any scheme went wrong, Pericles was to blame. We have seen that his expenditure on public works brought upon him the severe reproaches of his political opponents, who con- sidered, not without reason, that Athens was thereby placed in a false relation to the allies, and though Pericles knew how to deal with such criticism, his position was slowly shaken. The change was inevitable. Pericles himself no longer showed the same conciliatory temper towards the people. In his conception of democracy there was always the reservation that it must be under control. Attitude of F^ri- He meant to rule, not to be ruled. He refused cles towards to accede to the wishes of the people when the people " their wishes did not coincide with his own. A man of aristocratic birth and temperament, when he attempts to lead a mob, is always in a difficult position. He has broken from his natural supports, and yet he is not wholly in sympathy with his new clientele. At first he can make concessions without endangering those restrictions which he knows to be necessary for the maintenance of the state, but in time the democratic spirit, evoked by him in his own interests, as well 1 Cp. Plut. Per. 36 ; Aristoph. Clovds, 1073 ff. Compare the pro- cedure at the Prytaneum desciibed in DemostLenes, 23. 76. At the Buphonia the Athenians solemnly passed sentence on the axe by which the px wag slain ; Paus. i. 24. 4. 62 CHARGES AGAINST PHIDIAS. [II. 8. as in those of the state, demands more than he can give. So it was with Pericles ; he was willing that the money of the allies should be spent on Athens and on Athenian institu- tions, but, as we have said, he had ulterior aims in view in this expenditure ; he allowed the rich to be heavily fined for public purposes, and took his part in such payments; but he did not wish the finance of Athens to pass into the control of demagogues, who would use the funds, as he had done, to win the people, but without those aims by which he justified his own course. The demagogues could not be expected to make such fine distinctions; they sought to gain for themselves the authority which seemed to be slipping from the hands of Pericles. They wished to lead the people against him if they could, and cared little about the means which they employed in attaining their object. Foremost among them was Cleon, the son of Cleaenetus, a man of low birth and vulgar manners, but of great energy and ability, whose appearance and occupation (he was a tanner) made him the favourite butt of Aristo- phanes. 8. In this manner a combination was formed against Pericles, and parties which usually stood far apart were united, not indeed in a common policy, but in the attempt to put an The attack on enf ^ to tne domination of their rival. The first Phidias. attack seems to have been made through Phidias. He was the chief adviser of Pericles in the adorn- ment of Athens, and he was therefore peculiarly obnoxious to those who were opposed to expenditure on such objects. That Phidias had failed in the charge entrusted to him could not be maintained. Nothing existed in Greece more beauti- ful than the temples which rose under his direction, and the statues executed by him and his school. But it was easy to insinuate that all the sums which had passed into his hands had not been spent honestly. Some years previously he had constructed the great statue of Athena in ivory and gold for the Parthenon, and he was now charged with keep- ing back part of the money. Fortunately he was able to II. 8.] ANAXAGORAS. 63 repel this accusation. On the advice of Pericles, the statue had been so constructed that the gold could be removed without injury to the work. It was now taken off and weighed, and no deficiency was found. The charge of dis- honesty was thus conclusively disproved, but the accusers were not to be shaken off. The public mind was already disquieted on the subject of religion, and a charge of impiety might succeed where a charge of peculation had failed. In the figures which he had depicted on the shield of Athena, it was found that Phidias had introduced portraits of himself and Pericles. This was declared to be an offence against the majesty of the goddess. Phidias was at once thrown into prison, and all the efforts of Pericles to procure his release were in vain. Before the day of trial arrived he was found dead in his cell. 1 The next attack was directed against Anaxagoras. A pro- posal was made by Diopithes, a friend of Nicias, who was the most orthodox and religious of Athenians, that Attack on those who disbelieved in divinities, and passed Anaxa goras. their time in discussing the nature of the heavenly bodies, should be impeached before the Assembly. The proposition was accepted, but whether Diopithes carried the matter farther, and personally attacked Anaxagoras, is not known. A late writer informs us that Oleon brought a charge of impiety against him; others said that Thucydides, who had now returned from ostracism, accused him of treason. Whatever may have been the precise nature of the charge, it seems certain that Anaxagoras was condemned, and was thrown into prison. In a short time he escaped, or was allowed to go free, and a few years later he died at Lampsacus. 2 Protagoras was also banished from the city about this time; and Damon, who was the chief political 1 Plut. Per. 31 : o pev ovv Qabias eis to deo-pcorrjpiov aira^Sui ereXevTrjo-e voo-rjaas, ccs Se (paaiv evtoi, (pappaKois, eVt diaftoXg jov TlepiicXeovs tcov i^6pa>v 7rapao~K€vacrdvT(0v. Ap. Schol. Aristoph. Pax, 588. According to Philochorus, Phidias was exiled, and retired to Elis, where he was subsequently executed. 2 Plut. Per. 32. n: 04 A CCUS A TIONS A GAlttST PERICLES. [II. g. adviser of Pericles, was ostracised, but neither the date nor the cause of his ostracism can be fixed with certainty. For some years the comedians had amused themselves at the expense of Aspasia. She was the "new Omphale," the " concubine of the Olympian Pericles," the "child of Lewdness." And now Hermippus, a comedian whose power lay in the coarseness of his satire, weary, perhaps, of his own abuse, or believing that the ground had been well prepared, ventured to bring a public charge against her. She also was accused of impiety, a subject on which the Athenians were easily roused, but in her case impiety was only the cover for a still more odious imputation. She was brought before the court as an atheist and procuress. As an alien she could not appear at the trial ; her cause was left in the hands of Pericles, and the Athenians looked on with delight, while their great statesman, overcome with emotion, pleaded for his mistress with the entreaties and tears which Athenian custom permitted in a court of law. Aspasia was acquitted. 1 9. The enemies of Pericles were baffled, but his victory did not strengthen his position. The acquittal of Aspasia was merely a concession to his personal influence. It was charges brought clear that he had felt the attack ; and his op- against Pericles, ponents now ventured on a direct accusation. Dracontides proposed in the Assembly that Pericles should give before the fifty Prytaneis an account of his expendi- ture of the public money, and that, in this case, the judges should give their votes before the altar in the Acropolis. The proposal was subsequently altered on the motion of Hagnon, a friend of Pericles, and the case was to be brought before a court of 1500 jurors, voting in the usual way, by dropping pebbles into an urn, as a charge of bribery or maladministration. 2 Nothing came of the proposal ; the case appears never to have been brought into court, unless indeed it was subsequently revived in the year 430. The 1 Pint. Per. 32. „,,',, 2 Pint. Per. 32 : ei're k\ott?i$ kcu hvapGuv, eiV dbtKiov fiov\oiTo nj OVO^xd^LV TTjV bloij-iv. II. 9-J PERICLES PREPARES EOR WAR. 65 attention of the Athenians was drawn away by the impend- ing war with the Peloponnesians, which also created a new division of parties in the city. The iniquities The approach of Phidias, Anaxagoras, and Aspasia were for- of war - gotten in the question whether Athens should go to war, and what were her chances of success. To Pericles war was certainly an advantage ; in war a leader is needed, and he was undoubtedly the leader of Athens. By some, indeed, he was thought to have forced the points at issue between Sparta and Athens to a climax in order to recover his lost position, and we may at least allow that, convinced that war must come, he wished it to come while he was still able to direct the Athenian state. He was well aware that his monopoly of power had been such that he would leave no successor. And for years he had been looking forward to a great struggle, which should place the empire on a still firmer foundation. With war in view he had so organised the empire that all the resources of it lay at the disposal of Athens ; by the law-courts, before whom the cases of the allies were tried, by the sixty ships which year by year he put in commission, by garrisons and wardens established in every city where there were signs of disloyalty, by destroying the walls of the cities, by accumulating an enormous treasure, he had secured Athens against the greatest danger which could overtake her — the revolt of her allies. On land she was not a match for the forces which could be brought against her, but this difficulty Pericles was prepared to meet by allowing the enemy to do their worst ; the loss of the crops and cattle of Attica could easily be replaced so long as Athens was mistress of the sea. So Pericles " watched war coming from the Pelopon nesus." Parties were divided on the question. There were still many who wished that their city should p ar t y opposed be on good terms with Sparta, and were op- towar - posed to any action which rendered this impossible. Such were Nicias and his following, men absolutely loyal to Athens and democracy, but also friendly to Sparta, partly VOL. III. E 66 PA R TIES AT A THENS. [II. 9- as the inheritor of great traditions, partly as a pattern of military organisation. Such, too, were those Athenians who lived in the country — rich men who owned fine houses and large estates ; poor men who cultivated a few ancestral acres, on which they lived in comfort, holding in much contempt the city and the ways of the city. They remembered that in 445 Plistoanax had marched without opposition as far as Eleusis. They knew that war meant invasion. The pleasant houses, the orchards, olive-groves, and highly cultivated farms, the growth of two generations of peaceful possession, would then be destroyed, and they would have to find such shelter as they could within the city walls. In Aristophanes we have pictures — instructive if exaggerated — of these country folks in Dicaeopolis, Strepsiades, and Trygaeus. They are rough yeomen, gross in their tastes and enjoyments, yet not with- out a homely goodness, a love of simplicity, and an inborn appreciation of what is beautiful in art and literature. They are men of sound sense, cherishing a lively hatred of the new culture and its special product, the youthful orator, who always had them at an advantage, and took a peculiar delight in exhibiting his smartness at their expense. On the other hand, the inhabitants of the city, with Cleon to lead them, were eager for war. They were not moved by Party favour- the prospect of the disasters which would fall able to war. on Attica — they would not share in them. They were pleased with the excitement of war, and confi- dently expected a solid result in additions to the empire. There would be more land to occupy as colonists, more tribute to spend on amusements. In any case, there would be a large outlay from the public funds, which would go into the pockets of those who served the city. The risks they disregarded; and indeed there was little risk at sea, and on land Athenian generals were careful not to expose their fellow-citizens, to whom they were responsible, to un- necessary danger. On this question, therefore, the influence of Cleon was thrown on the side of Pericles, who, with this support was able to turn the scale in favour of war. CHAPTER III. THE CAUSES OF THE PELOPONNESI AN WAR. I. Thucydides, who, as a contemporary writer, is most competent to judge of the motives which guided his own generation, informs us that the real cause of Thucydides' the Pelopounesian war was the growing fear of vi ewofthe the Athenian power. "The real reason," he Peioponnesian says, "which led to this great conflict, though war - it was rarely mentioned, was, I believe, that the power of the Athenians alarmed the Peloponnesians, and forced them to go to war; but the causes commonly put forward on either side were two " : the part which the Athenians took in the Corinthian war, and their treatment of Potidaea. The same view is repeated in other passages. "In deciding to go to war, the Lacedaemonians were influenced not so much by the arguments of their allies, as by the fear of the Athenians, and of their increasing power." — "The Athenians were growing too great to be ignored, and though the Lacedae- monians were unwilling by nature to go to war if they could help it, they could remain inactive no longer. Their allies were suffering from the aggression of the Athenians, and therefore they had no other course but to do their best to destroy the Athenian power." 1 The Greek mind was not satisfied with this general pre- disposing cause. Careful as the Greeks always were to assign to the right author the guilt of the first other causes- step in wrongdoing, they naturally asked, not the Megarian what was the general or the remote cause of decree - the war, but what was the immediate and particular cause — J Thuc. i. 23, 88, 118. 68 ATHENS AND MEGA R A. [III. I. what was the precise act which brought about hostilities, and who was guilty of it % To this question various answers were given. A quarrel, of which the exact nature is obscure, had broken out between Athens and Megara. The Athenians charged the Megarians with tilling the sacred land, which, as forming the boundary between the two states, was no man's land, and might not be cultivated. They sent a herald, by name Anthemocritus, to complain, but the Megarians slew him, in defiance of the sacred and universal law of nations. The anger of the Athenians knew no bounds. Charinus proposed in the Assembly that there should be "truceless and unproclaimed " hostility between the two cities ; that any Megarian found on Attic soil should be put to death ; and that the generals, when taking the customary oath on their admission to office, should further pledge themselves to invade the Megarian territory twice a year. 1 Whether these details, which come to us on late authority, are true in every particular, we cannot say, but in some important points they are confirmed by Thucydides. He tells us that the Athenians had passed a decree — supported, certainly, by Pericles, if not proposed by him — by which the Megarians were excluded from the market of Athens and the ports of the Athenian empire ; and when the Pelopon- nesians demanded the cancelling of this decree under a threat of war, the Athenians replied that the Megarians had tilled the border land, and received fugitive slaves. And after the outbreak of the war the Athenians invaded the Megarid every year till the capture of Nisaea. Thus, even on the evidence of Thucydides, the "Megarian decree" was the immediate pretext of the war. The demand that it should be cancelled was put forward in such a manner that if the Athenians had yielded, the outbreak of the war would have been deferred. But what was the real cause of the decree and of the attitude of Pericles towards it % 2 1 Plut. Per. 30. 2 Thuc. i. 139 ; ii. 31. III. I.] OTHER CAUSES OF THE WAR. 69 The contemporary comedians dwell on neither of the two reasons given by Thucydides, though the motive which they ascribe to Pericles may rest on a perversion of The Megar ian the incident of the "fugitive slaves." In their decree : account view, the real grievance was the theft by ofArist °P hanes - the Megarians of two women belonging to Aspasia. This insult Pericles felt himself compelled to punish ; hence his refusal to make any concession. "In his fury the Olympian thundered and lightened, turned Hellas upside down, and passed laws after the style of catches, that the Megarians must not in the land abide, nor on the sea, nor in the markets, nor the continent." 1 In the Pax, a play written four years after the Acharnians, Aristophanes gives another reason for the attitude of Pericles towards the Megarian decree. "The mischief The war due to began with the ruin of Phidias, for Pericles, ^p^^ 10 " 5 fearing to be involved in that disaster, set the Aristophanes, city in a blaze with the tiny spark of the E P horus - Megarian decree; and blew up such a war that the eyes of all the Greeks were filled with tears owing to the smoke." This account of the true cause of the Peloponnesian war is regarded as a revelation from Hermes, and it comes as a surprise to the Chorus and Trygaeus, who had never heard that Phidias was in any way connected with it. In the next century it was regarded as historical. Ephorus tells us that Alcibiades, who was brought up in the house of Pericles, once found his uncle in great distress ; and on inquiring the cause, was informed that he had been asked for an account of the money which he had spent, and was at a loss how to give it. " Would it not be better," observed Alcibiades, "to invent some reason for giving no account 1 Aristoph. Acharn. 504 ff. In the words "in the style of catches," there seems to be an allusion to the "catch" or scolion of Timocreon : — a)(f)e\ev a', 2) rvcj)\e TlXovre, firjr iv yf], ixi)T ev daXdrTfl /xtjr' ev r)7reipa) (^avr^xev, jc.t.A. 70 PERICLES AND THE MEG ART AN DECREE. [III. 2. at all % " Pericles took the hint, and being at the time greatly harassed by the prosecutions of his friends Phidias and Anaxagoras, he decided to give the Athenians something to occupy their minds ; they would be less critical in time of war. For this reason he insisted that the Megarian decree should not be cancelled. 1 That Aristophanes was serious in attributing the Megarian „ decree to the theft of Aspasia's women, or to Pencles object .. 1 . 1 . . ; in supporting the dishonesty of Pericles, is highly impro- ve Megarian To the come( iian all IS ffrist that decree. . ° comes to the mill, and why should he be more just to Pericles than to Socrates ? In the Acharnians he may have merely parodied the cause which was supposed to have brought about the great war of Grecian legend, 2 and in the Pax, as we have seen, he hints that he is giving a new and paradoxical account of the conduct of Pericles. Yet the historians of the next century, though they had Thucydides before them, accept these grotesque stories, and make history out of them. It was to their minds unintelligible that Pericles should havj insisted on such a trifling point as the Megarian decree at the cost of a great war; and we may share in their astonishment while disregarding their explana- tions, We need not suppose that Pericles was guilty of peculation, or the obsequious slave of Aspasia; we know that he was over-logical, and would not listen to a com- promise, when a principle was involved. He believed that the demand for the cancelling of the Megarian decree was merely intended to test the tenacity of the Athenian purpose — that if any concession were made, other demands would follow, and in that belief he resolved to make a firm stand at the very outset. 2. If the immediate cause of hostilities was the refusal 1 Aristoph. Pax, 588 ff. Plut. Ale, 7. Diodorus, xii. 38-40; cp. ibid. 41 : aiTiai pev ovv tov Uekoirovvqa-iaKOV irokcpov Toiavral rives vnrjp^av, a>s"Ecription (Glaucon, Metagenes, and Dracontides). The first expedition was sent out in the first prytany of the year of Apseudes, July-Aug. 433 ; the second later in the same Attic year. See Holzapfel, Beitrdge zur Griech. Gesch. p. 175 ; Forbes, Thuc. i. p. 32 notes and p 125 ; Hicks' Manual of Greek Hist, Ins., No. 41 ; Freeman's Hist, of Sicily, iii, 619 ff. III. 6.] THE POLICY OF THE CORINTHIANS. 79 What induced the Athenians to send out so • small a con- tingent as ten ships was a puzzle to antiquity and is a puzzle to us. Plutarch gives a foolish explanation : that Pericles purposely sent out the son of his old opponent Cimon with an inadequate force, in Xthenfan^send order that he might fail, and fall into contempt. so sma11 a Pericles never sank to such a device as this. force? It is more natural to suppose that the Athenians were at first very doubtful about their policy, and wished' to keep strictly within the limits of a defensive alliance, but when they learnt more of the preparations of Corinth, and the inequality of the fleets, the danger of the situation impressed them. Half-measures were impossible. If the Corcyraean fleet were destroyed the chief advantage of the new alliance would be lost; they would have incurred the enmity of Corinth for nothing. A second and larger contingent was therefore sent in the hope of saving the Corcyraean fleet from destruction. It was unfortunate for Hellas that no Hermocrates arose at this moment to point out the disastrous effects of the policy on which Corinth and Corcyra had em- Mistaken policy barked. If the Corinthians, the most far- of the Corinth- sighted of the Greeks, had not been blinded by ians * passion, they would have perceived that a union with Corcyra was the best means of restraining the aggression of Athens. A conflict was fatal. Every ship which they lost was a ship gained by Athens. But all far-sighted policy was forgotten in the exasperation of the moment. To punish the rebellious city, which had so long defied them, which competed with them in every western port, and con- trolled the route to Sicily, was so dear an object that they forgot their usual wisdom. In old days they had acted the honourable part of peacemakers between Agrigentum and Syracuse, between Athens and Plataea, but now they were prepared to plunge all Hellas in war to satisfy their hatred. 6. When their envoys returned with the intelligence that Athens had decided to support Corcyra, the Corinthians 80 THE BA TTLE OF SYBOTA, 433-2. [111.6. prepared far the renewal of the war. Collecting a fleet of 150 vessels they sailed to Chimerium, a promontory preparations in Thesprotia near the mouth of the Cocytus. for battle. Qn hearing of their approach the Corcyraeans advanced with 110 vessels to one of the islands off the coast of Epirus, known as Sybota; and with them were the ten Athenian vessels. Both fleets were supported by a force of infantry: the Corinthians by an army of the barbarians of the mainland, who were at all times their friends; the Corcyraeans by their own infantry and some Zacynthians, stationed on the promontory of Leucimne, in the south of the island of Corey ra. When their preparations were completed, the Corinthians set sail in the night from Chimerium, and as morning The battle of broke they discovered the Corcyraeans in sybota. ^ Q 0 p en sea bearing down upon them. The battle was the greatest which had yet taken place between two Hellenic fleets. It was not a sailor's battle, but a "conflict of landsmen at sea." The decks of the ships were crowded by soldiers, heavy and light armed, and when ship joined with ship the two crews fought together as if on land. The Athenian vessels, without taking any part in the fight- ing, rowed up wherever they saw the Corcyraeans in diffi- culties, hoping by their presence to scare away the enemy. The Corinthian right wing was defeated by the Corcyraeans, who pursued them to the mainland, and even went ashore Defeat of the to burn and plunder the tents in the camp, corcyraeans. ^ us wa sting precious moments, when their help was needed elsewhere. For on the left the Corinthians put the Corcyraeans to flight, and pressed them so hard that the Athenians, forgetting their orders, joined in the battle and engaged with the Corinthians, who in their fury cared neither to capture men, nor tow away disabled ships, but sailed through the wrecks, cutting down every one upon them. When they had driven the Corcyraeans to land they collected their damaged ships, and the dead, and conveyed them to Sybota — not the island, but a deserted harbour on the mainland ; III. 7] ATHENS AND CORINTH; 438-482. 81 after which they returned to the conflict. The Corey raeans advanced to meet them, and the signal had already been given for a second attack, when the Corinthians suddenly retired. Twenty vessels were seen approaching, which proved to be the second squadron from Athens. These joined the Corcyraean fleet. 1 Though they had destroyed seventy of the enemy's ships, and lost but thirty of their own, the Corinthians did not venture to renew the attack on the following P The Athenians day. Enough, if they could convey their prevent a prisoners home in safety. In order to ascer- ^Tement tain what opposition would be offered, they sent a few men in a boat, without a flag of truce, to the Athenians, upbraiding them with their action and calling upon them, if they were at war with Corinth, to take the crew of the boat, and deal with them as enemies. The Athenians replied that they were merely defending their allies ; if the Corinthians sailed against Corcyra, resistance would be offered, but not otherwise. The Corinthians then sailed home, and on their way Anactorium was betrayed to them. Among their captives, who numbered more than a thousand, were two hundred and fifty of the most influential men at Corcyra. These they treated with the greatest respect, in the hope that by their influence the city might yet be won over ; the remainder, who were slaves, were sold. " Thus the war ended to the advantage of Corcyra, and the Athenian fleet returned home. This was the first among the causes of the Peloponnesian war, the Corinthians alleging that the Athenians had taken part with the Corcyraeans, and had fought against them in defiance of the treaty." 2 7. A second cause of hostilities soon arose, and in this case also it was the Athenians and Corinthians who came 1 The date of the battle is uncertain ; Holzapfel, I.e. p. 75, 86 f. gives May 11-13, 432. In that case ten months or thereabouts were occupied in preparations. See svpia, p. 78 n. The account of Diodorus, xii. 33, differs in some respects from Thucydides. 2 Thuc. i. 46-55. VOL. III. F 82 POTIDAEA REVOLTS FROM ATHENS, 432. [III. 7. into collision. Potidaea, a Corinthian colony on the isthmus of Pallene, was a tributary ally of Athens, but governed by Athens and officers sent annually from Corinth. The Potidaea. Athenians, aware of the hostile spirit now pre- vailing in that city, were afraid that the Potidaeans might be induced to revolt. They had the greater reason for alarm, because Perdiccas, the king of Macedonia, their former ally, had now become their enemy, eager to bring about war be- tween Athens and Sparta, and was entering into negotiations with Corinth and the Chalcidian Greeks (supra, p. 44). Under such circumstances the revolt of Potidaea would be followed by the revolt of Chalcidice. To prevent this disaster, the Athenians demanded that the Potidaeans should send away the Corinthian officers, and refuse to receive them for the future ; raze their city wall towards Pallene ; and also give hostages for their good behaviour. They happened at the time to be sending a fleet to act against Perdiccas, and the generals in command were ordered to put in at Potidaea and see these demands carried out. 1 The Potidaeans in their distress sent envoys to Athens to obtain, if possible, some remission of the sentence, but Revolt of as tne Athenians proved inexorable, other Potidaea, envoys were taken by the Corinthians to July 432. Lacedaemon. Here they received a promise that if the Athenians attacked Potidaea, the Peloponnesians would invade Attica. Upon this the Potidaeans resolved to revolt. They were joined by the Chalcidian Greeks, and their neighbours the Bottiaeans. Perdiccas also supported them, and on his advice, the Chalcidians abandoned their settlements on the coast, and established a common centre at Olynthus. The Athenian fleet, on arriving off the coast, found it 1 Thuc. i. 56, 57. The text has rpiaKovra vavs dnoo-TefcXovTes ml XiXi'ov? SnXiras eVi rfjv yrjv avrov, 'Apv6crrparoi» rov AvKOfirjSovs per aXkoiv 8eKa aTparrjyovuTos. If the numeral is right we have here eleven generals, not to mention the four who were subsequently sent out (c. 61), but see Forbes, ad loc. III. J.I BATTLE OF POTIDAEA. impossible to make a combined attack on Perdiccas and the revolted c.ties in Chalcidice. For the moment they left the cities to themselves, and in concert with their allies Philip the brother of Perdiccas, and his cousins, the brothers of Derdas (see supra, p. 39), they made war on Perdiccas ™\ Cormthians W6re much alarmed h y the movements of the Athenians, and at once took steps to counteract them. -By the exertions of Aristeus, the son of Adim- antus, a warm friend to Potidaea, a volunteer SSX"** force was enrolled, and mercenaries were hired p ° tidaea - from the Peloponnese, amounting in all to a force of 2000 men, who, with Aristeus in command, arrived at Potidaea for y days after the revolt of the city. The Athenians replied by sending out an additional force of 2000 heavy armed. The previous army, which was still engaged in Macedonia, had captured Therma and was besieging Pydna when it was joined by the reinforcements. Terms were arranged with Perdiccas, for it was now impossible to remain longer in Macedonia, and the two armies marched overland to (xigonus, a town not far from Potidaea. Aristeus in expectation of their arrival, had taken up a position on 'the neck of the isthmus between Potidaea and Olynthus He was aided by a detachment of cavalry under Perdiccas', who when he had got the Athenians out of his country, at once broke faith with them, and by allies from the Chalcidian cities. He divided his forces into two parts ; B at,i e „f -Perdiccas and the allies were stationed at p°«v i;viifxaxG>v kcu ei Tis xi ak\o efji6s ovre it'icttis ovG' oppr)v fypLiovre, Kai ov ras vfierepas avToav, el rroXXal ovcrai ^vvc^rjpaprov : viii. 1, ^aXervoi fxev rjaav rols ^vpTvpo6vp,t)6ei(Ti to>v p-qropodv, axrirep ova avrol ^(piaafxevoi : cp. also ii. 64. VOL. III. G SPARTA AND HER ALLIES. [IV. 3. was, in truth, one which could not be undertaken without risk. Even Nicias, who enjoyed the confidence of his citizens as no other general did after the death of Pericles, was unable to act freely in Sicily, for fear of the trial which he knew would await him on his return ; and when the wisest course open to him was to save the remnant of the forces under his command, he could not bring himself to do what he knew to be his duty as a general and a citizen, for fear of the trial which would await him before judges unacquainted with the facts, and influenced by every passing breath of oratory. 1 3. Thus, owing to the nature of the empire, and the form of her constitution, Athens could not exercise to the full the advantages which she derived from her imperial position. The Spartan The difficulties with which Sparta had to COn- confederacy. ten( } were 0 f anot her kind. The Peloponnesian confederacy was made up of a number of cities, some mari- time and some inland, whose interests and policy could not be the same; and Sparta's authority over them was not easily defined or enforced. Being essentially a land power, she stood in a different relation to Corinth and Megara on the one hand, and to Arcadia and Elis on the other. She could prevent the Mantineans from extending their dominion over the neighbouring Arcadian tribes, but she could not save Potidaea for Corinth. The constant dread of a rising of the helots — the memory of Ithome — sank even deeper into the minds of the Lacedaemonians than the memory of Samos into the minds of the Athenians, and made them unwilling to send out their best troops in large numbers on distant service. When Brasidas marched to Thrace he took with him 1700 heavy-armed, of whom 700 were helots, men of whom the Spartans wished especially 1 Thuc. vii. 48. Nicias says : ev yap ddevai on 'Adrjvaioi acpcov ravra ovk anode £ovrai coarre p.r) avT&v -^rjcpiaapevav aTrekOeiv. v kai ra irpdypara, (locnvep na\ avrol, opoovras /cat ovk aWcov lit ir ipr)o- ei aKovovras yvaaeadai, aXK' i£ hv av Tis cv \eya>v diaftuWy, e/c tovtcov avrovs neiataOai. IV. 3 ] SPARTAN KINGS AND ADMIRALS. 99 to be rid; the remainder were collected from the rest of Peloponnesus, but none were Spartans. 1 — The conduct of war, when once war had been declared by a vote of the Spartan people and the allied cities, rested chiefly with the ephors, who could call out the forces and send them whither they chose, under the command of the Lacedaemonian kings. This was a gain in the direction of rapidity and concentra- tion of movement, but though at Sparta there was no discussion of details in the Assembly, and certainly no public discussion in the Gerousia, there were parties j ealousies and there as well as at Athens ; jealousies and enmities at enmities often fettered the action of success- Sparta - ful generals. The energetic policy of Brasidas was not acceptable to those in authority. " They would not second his efforts because their leading men were jealous of him." 2 The same feeling is shown in the treatment of the admirals. The kings were not allowed to command the fleet, and therefore precautions were taken to prevent an admiral from obtaining too much power. His office was annual, and the same man could not be sent out twice ; and though in the case of Lysander this difficulty was overcome by appointing him second in command to an admiral of no ability, even Lysander was taught that he must not enter into rivalry with the kings. The Spartan commanders, whether admirals or kings, were allowed great freedom of action in the field. The king, at any rate, could lead the army whither he chose, per- spartan haps in secret understanding with the ephors ; commanders, he could make peace without reference to the authorities at home ; and when Agis was stationed at Decelea, he acted almost as an independent power. Unlike the Athenians, the Spartans were very unwilling to condemn their officers for incompetence. Of the admirals in office during the early years of the war, Cnemus failed disgracefully on sea and land in the west of Greece ; and Alcidas not only failed to aid the Mytilenaeans, but behaved with such cowardice and cruelty J Thuc. iv. 78. 80. 2 Thuc. iv. 108. 100 THE ALLIES ON EITHER SIDE. [IV. 4. that there was no further attempt at revolt among the Athenian allies till Brasidas had produced a different im- pression. Yet both were retained in their command, com- missioners being sent out to advise and support them. At Athens such failures would have been punished by death or banishment, but in the mind of the Spartans a soldier was a carefully prepared instrument, which was not to be destroyed or thrown aside. 1 4. The allies on either side at the beginning of the war were as follows : — The Lacedaemonian confederacy included all the nations within the Isthmus except the Argives and Achaeans. These were friendly but neutral ; and from the first the Achaeans of Pellene took part with the Lacedae- monians ; afterwards their example was followed by the rest of the nation. Beyond the limits of the Peloponnese, the Megarians, Phocians, Opuntian Locrians, Boeotians, the Acarnanians of Oeniadae, Leucadians, and Ambraciots were on their side. Of these allies the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicj^on- ians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians provided a navy ; the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians furnished cavalry; the other states infantry only. The allies of Athens were Chios and Lesbos, members of the old Delian League, who still retained their independence, Plataea, the Messenians of Naupactus, the greater part of Acarnania, Corcyra, Zacynthus. Besides these were the subject cities in the following regions : — The seaboard of Caria, the adjacent Dorian peoples, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian coast, and the islands which lay north-east of a line drawn from Peloponnese to Crete, except Melos and Thera. 2 Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra furnished ships, the rest soldiers and money. 3 1 See Thuc. v. 54, 60, 63, for the position of Agis as commander of the army, and for Agis at Decelea, viii. 5. ' ' While he was with his army at Decelea, Agis had the right to send troops whithersoever he pleased, to raise levies, and to exact money." There must have been far abler and more experienced naval officers at Corinth and other maritime cities than could be found at Sparta, but owing to old tradition the command of the fleet was retained by Sparta. 2 Thera paid tribute in 427 or 426. 3 Thuc. ii. 9. IV. 4 .] THE FLEETS. 101 Unfortunately Thucydides has not followed up this list of the allies on either side with a comparative statement of their respective armaments. He tells us what were Forces on the resources of Athens as estimated by Pericles, either side - and what expectations the Peloponnesians, or, at any rate, the Corinthians, formed of success, but he never gives any clear account of the forces which Sparta and her allies could bring into the field. In regard to ships, Athenian fleet< the Athenian fleet is put at 300 vessels, a number which can be reached by the total sum of the ships in service in the first year of the war, and is never exceeded. 1 The Peloponnesians amused themselves with the fancy that they would be able, with the assistance of the Dorian cities in the west, to put on the sea a fleet of 500 ships. 2 But they never reached anything near this amount ; the p e ioponnesian Corinthians in their great struggle with Corcyra fleet - were able to get together 150 ships, of which 90 were their own; but the united fleet of the Peloponnesians amounts to 100 ships only in 430. No more than 42 ships are sent to Lesbos; and 60 is the largest number sent to Corcyra, and also the number surrendered at Pylus in 425, after which the Lacedaemonians built no more ships till 413. Even with the assistance of the Persians they found it difficult to match the numbers of the Athenians. 3 In the army, of course, the preponderance was very largely in favour of Sparta. Athens is credited with 29,000 heavy- armed, of whom, perhaps, 3000 were resident . ' ' 1 1 Athenian army. aliens. Of the number of troops furnished by the allies we have no statement. When he went to Pylus, Cleon took with him no citizens from Athens at all, 1 In Time. ii. 23, 100 ships are sent round Peloponnesus ; in c. 24, 100 are set apart with their trierarchs ; in c. 26, 30 are sent to Loci is, and 70 are at Potidaea (i. 61) = 300. In iii. 17 the distribution is different, and the total only 250. The Lesbians and Chians, who send 50 ships in 430, send none in 431, and Pericles does not mention their contingents. (Xenophon) Rep. Ath. iii. 1 speaks of 400 trier- archs as appointed each year at Athens. 2 Thuc. ii. 7. 3 Thuc. i. 46 ; ii. 66 ; iii. 26 ; iv. 2. 102 THE ARMIES. [IV. 5. but only "the Lemnian and Imbrian forces who were at Athens at the time, the auxiliaries from Aenus, and 400 archers from other places"; and of the total of 5100 hoplites who went to Syracuse in 415 only 2200 were Athenians. 1 Whatever the number was at the beginning of the war, it was greatly diminished towards the close. At the siege of Potidaea there were 7000 Athenians under arms at one time ; but 3400 is the number sent out in both the expeditions to Sicily; and we know from Thucydides that 4400 perished in the plague. 2 The number of the Peloponnesian army which invaded Attica is given by Plutarch 3 at 60,000. But, even if the Peloponnesian light-armed are included, this number is exces- army - sive. At the battle of Tanagra the allies had furnished a force of 10,000 men ; Sparta could furnish about 5000 in round numbers, and Boeotia about 8000. This amounts to 23,000, and if we add 15,000 for the light-armecT Boeotians, and the helot who accompanied every Spartan, we get 38,000 only. This is perhaps too low an estimate, and we may suppose that Sparta could count on the support of about 45,000 troops. 4 5. The Athenians availed themselves of the services of bowmen and cavalry to support their infantry, but they had 1 Thuc. ii. 13, 31 ; iv. 28 ; vi. 43. The Lemnians and Imbrians were however Athenians who had settled as Kkx)povyoi in those islands. 2 Though Alcibiades asserts that "Hellas has been singularly mis- taken about her heavy-armed infantry," we may presume that Thucy- dides could obtain an accurate account of the number of heavy-armed at Athens. Yet his statements are hardly credible. The military age extended from 20 to 60, but the numbers given are 13,000 for those of military age, and 16,000 for those over or below military age (and the resident aliens). If from this sum we deduct 3000 for resident aliens, we have as many men from the two years 19, 20 and the years over 60 as for the years 21-60 ! 3 Per. 33. 4 At the battle of Delium (424) the entire Athenian force of heavy- armed is put at 7000 — a striking contrast to the estimate of Pericles. See Delbrlick, Die Strntegie des Pericles, p. 82. Duncker, Gesch. Alt. ix. 405. Beloch, Griech. Gesch. i. 524, puts the invading army of the Peloponnesians at 20,000-25,000 heavy-armed. This was two-thirds of the whole force. (See also his Bevolkerung, p. 151.) IV. 5-] STRATEGY, MERCENARIES, ETC. 103 no organised light-armed force. The Spartans, on the other hand, had a force of light-armed ready to hand in their helots, but they had no cavalry. For these they trusted to the Boeotians, until the year 425, when they organised a body of 400 horse for the protection of Laconia. 1 In their mode of warfare the two armies differed greatly. The Spartans, trusting to their admirable skill and organisa- tion, sought a fair field in which to fight the Mode of struggle out, and were able at Mantinea to warfare - retrieve even so great a disaster as a breach of their line. The Athenians displayed more versatility. Demosthenes, for instance, won the battle of Olpae by an ambuscade, and the battle of Idomene by a surprise, marching through the night, and attacking the enemy while still asleep. The greatest confusion often prevailed ; at Delium the Athenians slew one another by mistake, and it frequently happened that one part of an army drove the enemy cff the field, only to find on their return that the rest of their forces had been irretriev- ably defeated. The combination of different nationalities in the same army also gave rise to difficulties. In the night attack on Epipolae the Athenians were in terror of their own Dorian allies, whose war-cry, given in Doric, resembled that of the enemy. At Argos we find the nucleus of a standing army in the select thousand "whom the city had long trained at the public expense in military exercises" 2 ; and in the course of the war the use of mercenaries became more common ; even the Athenians, when they found out by experience the value of light-armed troops, did not hesitate to take into their pay the "most bloodthirsty of barbarians." 3 When addressing the allies at Sparta before the beginning of the war, the Corinthians claimed for the Peloponnesians a superiority over the Athenians in courage, but acknow- ledged their inferiority in seamanship. This inferiority, 1 Time. iv. 94, 55. 2 Thuc. v. 67. 3 Thuc. vii. 29. Eor light-armed troops, cp. ii. 79 ; hi. 98 ; iv. 33 f. 104 THE WEALTH OF ATHENS. [IV. 6. they predict, will be removed by practice. 1 If we compare the position of the Athenian navy at the beginning and the Decline of c ^ ose °* tne war ' we tnat tne Corinthians Athenian skill were right. In the sea fights of 429 the skill atsea of Phormio was irresistible, and the arrange- ments which Cnemus made to defeat the dreaded manoeuvres of the Athenian ships were rendered entirely useless. With the progress of the war the balance passes over to the other side. The Corinthians show far greater genius in adapting themselves to the new conditions of naval warfare than the Athenians, who did not perceive when they entered the harbour of Syracuse that they were throwing away all opportunities of displaying their seamanship. Still, even after the destruction of her best ships and her best sailors, Athens held her own ; the victories of Cyzicus and Arginusae were greater than any previously gained in the war, and it was owing to treachery or to the foolish self-confidence of his enemy that Lysander was able to seize the entire Athenian fleet at Aegospotami. 6. In financial resources the Athenians had greatly the advantage of their opponents. We cannot, indeed, say that Finance Athens was the only city in which there was Athenian any systematic finance, for we do not know resources. how the navies of Corinth were supported, but from the time that the management of the Delian League passed into her hands, and still more from the time when the League became the Athenian empire, her position was quite different from that of any other city in Greece. In the year 435, before the outlay on the Propylaea and the siege of Potidaea, a sum of 9700 talents had been accumulated in the Acropolis, and at the beginning of the war 6000 t. were still at the disposal of the city. The income from the allies is" put by Thucydides at 600 t., 2 and if Xenophon is right in 1 Time. i. 121. 2 This perhaps includes more than the mere (f)6pos ; cp. Time. iv. 108, who says that Amphipolis was useful to the Athenians xp r H JL ^ TbiV 7rpoa6d(o, but Amphipolis paid no tribute. IV. 6] FINANCE IN THE PEL OPONNESE. 105 placing the total income of Athens at the beginning of the war at 1000 t., there was a further sum of 400 t. coming in from tolls, dues, mines, and other sources. 1 Considerable sums could also be obtained by borrowing from the temples, which had incomes of their own, distinct from the public revenues. When necessary, a property-tax could be levied, and though the Athenians were averse to taxing themselves directly, this particular burden, as it fell mainly on the rich, was regarded as tolerable by the sovereign Many. 2 A good deal of the cost of war was met by private expenditure. To every ship was attached a trierarch, whose business it was to keep the vessel in repair, and pay a large part of the maintenance when in service. TJie knights also spent money on their horses in addition to the allowance made by the state. There was an honourable and even extravagant spirit of emulation among the richer Athenians in these matters, which was stimulated by the reflection that a wise . expendi- ture was the best means of winning popular favour. The Athenian was taught in a severe school that property has its duties as well as its rights and pleasures. Against these large resources the Spartans and their allies had little to set — at least in public funds. That the cities of the confederacy made some kind of contri- p e io P onnesian bution is stated by Thucydides, and the state- finances - ment is confirmed by an inscription, but no details have been preserved. 3 The amount was probably inconsiderable. Pericles says distinctly that * the Peloponnesians had no money, either in private fortunes or in public treasuries. 1 See Xen. Anab. vii. 1. 27. Aristoph. Wasps, 657 ff. enumerates the sources of Athenian income. He puts the total at 2000 t., but this is probably exaggerated, and in any case the Wasps was written after 425 when the tribute was raised. 2 The rich suffered most in a war ; Thuc. viii. 48. 3 Thuc. ii. 7. Hicks, Historical Inscriptions, 43. Plut. Reg. et Imperial. Apopliih., ' Ap^t'da^oy iv ra> HekoTTOvvrjo-iaKcp noXefxco, ra>v ^v^jxax^v d^iovvTcov Spicrai tovs Cpopovs avrols, elnev, 6 7rokep.os ov reray/jLeva aiTelrai. The same is said of a younger Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, {rjrel being substituted for o-irelrai. J 06 THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. [IV. 7. Even the Corinthians, who as a mercantile nation must have had a clear eye for finance, allow that the confederacy is without public funds ; the deficiency must be met by borrowing from Delphi or Olympia. What amount of treasure was to be found in these temples is unknown, but they were banks to which money was taken for safety, and Elis was certainly a wealthy country, with little or no public expenditure. In Thebes, also, there were rich men, from whom contributions might be received ; but the smallness of the Peloponnesian fleet, which depended on such sources, shows that Pericles was right in saying that the Pelopon- nesians would be more ready to risk their lives than their money. Another source from which funds might be obtained was the King of Persia ; but, apart from the difficulty of send- ing envoys to Susa while the Athenians had command of the sea, it was quite uncertain which side the Great King would take. Till the year 412 nothing was received from his satraps, but from that time forward the Peloponnesian fleet was chiefly maintained at the expense of Persia, and it was by the gold of Pharnabazus and Cyrus that it was enabled to recover from the defeats of Cyzicus and Arginusae. 7. Thus Athens was rich and powerful at sea ; her fleet was beyond comparison superior to any force which could Plan of cam- ^e Drou g nt against it, and she had the means paign— what of supporting it for years. Her army was also was possible ? larger than that of any other Qreek ^ Qn the other hand the Peloponnesian confederacy could bring into the field a greater number of soldiers, the majority of whom were as good or better material, and better trained than the Athenian. That they had very little money to expend on war was not of much importance, so long as operations were restricted within narrow limits, for their army, when in the field, was to a large extent self-supporting. 1 Between belligerents so dissimilar, what plan of campaign 1 Thuc. ii. 23 : xpovov eufxdvavres ev rfj 'Attikt} oaov el)(ov rot iiriTr)ha,a, if this means " so long as they could draw supplies from the country " (cp. iv. 6). IV. 7-] THE PLAN OF PERICLES. 107 was possible ? In previous wars the Athenian army had engaged the Lacedaemonians and their allies, partly in the region of the Isthmus, and partly in Boeotia — and the final result was the disaster of Coronea, and the renunciation of empire in Central Greece. But her fleet had sailed un- challenged round the Peloponnesus ; she had burnt the Lacedaemonian docks at Gytheum, and established herself at Naupactus — a point from which she could exercise great influence in Western Greece. The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, by the mere threat of invading Attica, had compelled Athens to withdraw from the positions which she held in the Peloponnesus, and they had seen the Athenian empire severely shaken by the revolt of Samos. From the experience of the past, plans were formed for pi an of the future. Pericles entirely abandoned the Pericles - attempt to meet the enemy in the field. " They are more in number than we are," he said ; " if we defeat them they will come again in undiminished numbers, and if we are defeated our allies will break into revolt." 1 What was worse still, the loss in every engagement, whatever the event, would fall wholly on Athens and her. subject allies, while in the allied army,, it would be divided among the various states. 2 The Athenians must not enter into the war with any hope of recovering their lost position in Central Greece ; on the contrary, they must be prepared to sacrifice Attica itself and remain within the walls of the city, while their lands were being laid waste and their houses destroyed. "If only we were islanders," Pericles said, "we should be impregnable; and we must feel as much like islanders as we can." By this means the invasion of Attica, the most formidable instrument in the power of the enemy, would be rendered ineffective. The fleet was to be used with vigilance and caution. Athens must be supplied with food ; the allies must be kept well in hand, the coasts of the Peloponnesus harried, but there must 1 This actually happened after the battle of Delium. 2 Cp. Thuc. iv. 73, where the Athenian generals refuse to enter into an engagement on this ground. 108 THE PLAN OF THE PELOPONNESIANS. [IV. 7. be no attempt to enter on distant expeditions — no enter- prise that would distract the city from her immediate object, or waste her strength. He even persuaded the Athenians to set aside 1000 t. and withdraw 100 ships from active service to form a reserve against any great emergency, thus robbing the city of a large part of her resources at the very moment when he was entering on war. He trusted to the deficiencies of the enemy rather than to any active measures on his own part. The Peloponnesians had no money, and without money they could have no ships, and without ships they could not reach the allies of Athens. So long as her empire and revenue were safe, the city was really invulnerable. For war was, above all, a matter of money. If the Athenians clung to this principle, they could look with contempt on the operations of the enemy. If the Peloponnesians invaded Attica, the Athenians would attack the coast of the Pelo- ponnesus; the attempt to establish a city which should control the supplies of Athens could be met by a counter- stroke — a fortress which should control Laconia. "It is a greater calamity to them to have a portion of Laconia ravaged than it is for us to have the whole of Attica laid waste, and no frontier fortress of theirs can prevent us from sailing out where we please, and inflicting damage on them. A naval force can do more in attacks on land than a land force can do in engagements at sea." 1 The Peloponnesians trusted chiefly to their large and well- organised army. With the help of their allies in Boeotia, Plan of the they could invade Attica whenever they chose. Peloponnesians. Archidamus, indeed, though he did not suppose that the Athenians would sacrifice their empire to save Attica, hoped to the last that the threat of invasion would bring them to listen to terms, as had been the case in 445. Others, less familiar with the Athenian spirit, could not believe that they would submit to invasion year after year, and hoped by this means to bring the 1 Thuc. i. 142. I V. 8 ] CRITICISM OF PERICLES. 109 war to a speedy issue. Beyond this the Peloponnesians had no clear plan of campaign. They expected to get ships from the west, and they would build others for themselves, which they would man with sailors tempted from the Athenian service by superior pay. With these they would aid the Athenian allies to revolt and cut off the revenues of the city. They spoke of establishing cities or fortresses which should be a constant source of annoyance to Athens, but these were schemes only, for which the means and the opportunity had yet to come. 1 Happily for them a great soldier and a great traitor came forward at Sparta, who saw where the blow must be struck and how to strike it. 8. We cannot but ask ourselves — Was Pericles right in his view % The conduct of the war down to his death, with the exception of the victories of Phormio, is Criticism on the whole a pitiable record. Would it of Pericles' not have been better to have risked a little strategy - more % Between the seizure of Plataea and the invasion of Attica there was an interval of nearly three months ; in which, had the Athenian army been what it was in the days of Cimon, a blow might have been struck at Boeotia, or measures taken to secure the passes over the isthmus of Corinth. Pericles did not bring the siege of Potidaea to an end before engaging in the great struggle ; and instead of dividing the forces of the enemy, he allowed his own to be divided. Even of his fleet he did not attempt to make the full use : he set aside a large portion of his available force. If with every ship at his command he had destroyed the commerce of Corinth, captured Cythera, and burned the docks at Gytheum, the war would have been finished almost as soon as it was begun. There was no 1 Cp. Time. i. 122, where we see how vague the plans of the Pelopon- nesians were: iirireixio-pbs rfj X^P a ' T€ °o~ a ovk av ris vvv irpoidoi. ■qKLara yap noXepus eVt prjTols ^copei, avros Se dcp' avrov ra 7roAAa rexyaTai rrpbs to naparvyxavov. The Spartans threatened Euboea by colonising Heraclea in 426, but Athens replied effectively by taking Pylusin425. 110 HIS WANT OF ENERGY. [IV. 8. reason whatever why Athens should not have stood at the end of the first year of the war in the position which she occupied at the beginning of 424; but, in the hands of Pericles, the greatest Athenian fleet which ever sailed round Peloponnesus returned after devastating a miserable hamlet. In his infatuated belief that Athens, owing to her wealth, could wear out the enemy, he forgot that ships rapidly decay ; that Athens was carrying on war at enormous cost with little or no result, while the Spartan operations were comparatively inexpensive. The invasion of Attica in the spring, when the Peloponnesians had nothing else to do, was little more than an excursion bringing a pleasant variety into life, at little expense and less risk. 1 In war delays are dangerous — Kaipol ov fievcroi — and with every year that passed it was more probable that some "accident would happen " : a powerful ally might revolt ; the Great King might interfere ; or a Spartan of genius find a weak point in the Athenian panoply. 2 1 In the busy season of the year the Peloponnesians were unwilling to invade Attica : Thuc. iii. 15. 2 On the strategy of Pericles, see Duncker, Gesch. Alt. ix. 417 ff. ; Pfiugk-Hartung, Perikles als Feldherr. Delbruck, op. cit. t defends him. CHAPTER V. THE WAR DOWN TO THE DEATH OF PERICLES 431-429. I. The Thebans had taken no part in the dispute which had arisen between Athens and the Peloponnesus, but they were allies of the Spartans, and for three- Thebes and quarters of a century they had been on bad Plataea. £09? terms with the Athenians. About the time when the Pisis- tratidae were expelled from Athens, the inhabitants of Plataea, the city on the northern slopes of Cithaeron, had applied to Cleomenes, the king of Sparta, for protection against Thebes. Afraid of their neighbour's growing power — Thebes is six or seven miles to the north of Plataea, beyond the Asopus — they wished to break loose from the Boeotian confederation, of which Thebes was the head, and attach themselves to Sparta. Cleomenes pointed out that his city lay at a great distance from Plataea ; before assist- ance could arrive from Peloponnesus the Thebans would have time to lay waste the Plataean territory, and enslave the city. He recommended the Plataeans to apply to Athens, their nearest neighbour, who could render effectual help. On this advice the Plataeans placed themselves under Athenian protection. A quarrel with Thebes followed, and though the Corinthians, who were called in to settle the matter, decided that Plataea should be allowed to choose her own alliance, the Thebans never acquiesced in the arrange- ment. They looked on Plataea as a Boeotian city, and only waited for an opportunity to enforce her allegiance to the Boeotian confederacy. 1 1 Hdt. vi. 108. See vol. i. p. 442; infra, p. 177. Ill 112 THE THEBANS Al PLATAEA, 431. [V. 2. 2. Such an opportunity seemed now to have arrived. At the beginning of spring, in the year 431, a force of . a more than three hundred Thebans, under Plataea seized , , 7 by a party of the command of two of the Boeotarchs, Thebans. entered Plataea by night. No watch had March 431. . *1 ° been set, tor war had not yet been openly proclaimed, and the Plataeans had no reason to apprehend an attack. But the Thebans did not stand cn cere- mony when their interests were at stake, and here, as was only too often the case in Greece, treachery had been at work. There was a party in Plataea which hoped, by detaching the city from Athens, to get the chief power into their own hands. With this view they negotiated with Eurymachus, the son of Leontiades, an eminent Theban, for the despatch of the force, and when it arrived, they opened the gates and received it into the city. Their wish was to cut down their enemies at once, and so clear the ground for their own advancement ; but the Thebans took a more conciliatory course. Grounding their arms in the market-place of the city, they called on those who wished to return to the ancient constitution of Boeotia to join them, and become their allies. It was not in the interest of a party, but in order to consolidate Boeotia, that they wished to recover Plataea. 1 The delay was fatal. At the first entrance of the Thebans, in the darkness of night, the Plataeans were panic-stricken ; they could form no estimate of the number of the enemy, and, Repulse of the believing them to be far more numerous than Thebans. they really were, they listened to their pro- posals. By degrees they discovered that the force was not so overwhelming, and, as the Plataean people were 1 Time. ii. 2-4. For Leontiades see Hdt, vii. 233. The date of the attack is fixed by the words tcXcvtcovtos tov iirjvos — there was a new moon on March 9, and again on April 7 in 431— and the date of the invasion of Attica, which was eighty days after the attack on Plataea, tov depovs Kai tov o~ltov aKfAa^ovTos (c. 19). As the harvest in Greece falls about the beginning of June, the new moon of March must be preferred to that of April. V. 2.] MASSACRE OF THE CAPTIVES, 431. 113 strongly attacked to Athens, they determined to attack the invaders. They reflected that the Thebans were strangers in the city, of which every street, house, and gateway was familiar to themselves. It was easy to surprise them if the attack was made in the dark. The plan was carried out. Just before daybreak a furious onset was made, and though for a short time the Thebans were able to resist, they were soon driven in confusion along the streets, seeking their way out of the city. The only gate open was that by which they had entered, and even this was quickly closed. The Plataeans met them at every turn ; even the women threw down tiles and stones from the roofs of the houses; the largest and most compact body of the whole force rushed blindly into a great room adjacent to the city wall, mistaking the door for one of the city gates, and were thus at the mercy of the Plataeans. When day returned, one hundred and eighty Thebans, including Eurymachus, the chief author of the plot, had been taken captive ; of the rest the majority had been killed. It had been arranged that the main body of the Theban army should march out to support the attack. But in the night a heavy storm of rain had caused the The Plataeans Asopus to rise, and the river could not now put their prison- be crossed without difficulty. Before the ersto eat Thebans reached the Plataean territory, they were met with the report of the disaster which had befallen their country- men. They pressed on, hoping to seize men and property as a compensation for their own citizens, who were in the hands of the Plataeans ; the Plataeans, however, warned them by a herald that, if any damage were done to their property, the Theban captives would be put to death; if they retired, the captives would be given up. On this the Thebans went back into their own country. The Plataeans at once brought in their property from the fields, and when all was secured, they slew the whole of their prisoners. News of the surprise of Plataea had been conveyed to Athens, and a second messenger had reported the capture of VOL. III. H 114 OUTBREAK OF THE WAR, 431- [V. 3. the Thebans. The Athenians at once issued an order for the arrest of every Boeotian who happened to be in Attica, and despatched an envoy to Plataea, requesting that the prisoners should be kept for further instructions. The request, unhappily, came too late. The prisoners had already been put to death when the envoy arrived, and the Plataeans were preparing the city against attack. Such was the first act of the great drama. It forms a striking instance of the insecurity of Greek life, and the furious passions to which this insecurity gave rise. In Plataea there is a party of traitors waiting for an oppor- tunity to destroy their opponents with the help of the Thebans; the Thebans attack a city secured by treaty without waiting for any formal declaration of war; the victorious Plataeans, in spite of the promise by which the Theban army is induced to retire, put all the captives to death. The question was indeed debated whether the promise was or was not confirmed by an oath. Their cruelty and perfidy the Plataeans could not deny, but they resented the accusation of perjury; a refinement which merely proves the superstition and sophistry in which the Greeks of the time were sunk. A hundred years had yet to pass; Plataea had twice to be levelled to the ground, before this neighbourly quarrel was finally settled by the utter destruc- tion of Thebes at the hands of Alexander. 1 3. The thirty years' truce had now been openly broken. Had the Plataeans, instead of acting with more folly if possible than cruelty, preserved their prisoners alive, Preparations the Thebans might have been brought to for war. terms ; Sparta might have disowned the action of her ally in violating the treaty. But the murder of one hundred and eighty Thebans made it impossible to draw back. On both sides preparations were now made for immediate war. There were doubtless many who hailed the outbreak as a relief from intolerable tension ; 1 Thuc. ii. 2-6. Diodorus, xii. 41, differs in some points. V. 3-] ARCHIDAMUS AT THE ISTHMUS, 481. 115 many more who, from mere ignorance and love of change, were weary of peace. All Hellas thrilled with excitement at the impending contest of the greatest of Hellenic cities. Prophecies and oracles passed from mouth to mouth, and the ingenuity of diviners was tasked to the uttermost. Every uncommon phenomenon of nature was noticed and recorded. Quite recently for the first time in the memory of man the island of Delos had been "shaken." Public feeling was strongly on the side of the Spartans; they were looked on as the liberators of Hellas, while Athens was hated and feared as an aggressive and tyrannical city. 1 In their enthusiasm, men allowed their judgment to be swayed by their sym- pathies. "At the beginning of the war, the prevailing opinion in Hellas was that the Athenians would not be able to hold out more than two or three years at the most, if the Lacedaemonians invaded Attica year by year." 2 The Athenians had not taken an active part in the inci- dent of Plataea ; no additional complaint could be brought against them on this ground, except the arrest The Peiopon- of the Boeotians in Attica, which was merely nesian troops , - a assemble at the a measure of precaution. feparta was still isthmus, without any clear and well-defined casus belli, -J une 43L so far as she herself was concerned. But the spirit of war had been aroused, and even those who regretted the out- break of hostilities were compelled to go with the stream. Immediately after the affair of Plataea, the ephors of Sparta sent round to the allies, bidding them furnish troops — two- thirds of their whole force — equipped for a foreign expedi- tion : and at the time appointed, some time before mid- summer, the contingents assembled at the isthmus of Corinth, for the invasion of Attica. Each contingent was commanded by its own generals, but the whole expedition was under the command of Archidamus, king of Lacedaemon. Archidamus had endeavoured to dissuade the con- federacy from immediate war ; and even now he cherished l Thue, ii. 7, 8. 2 Thuc. vii. 28. 116 THE A THENIANS ABANDON ATTICA, 431. [V. 3. the hope that the last and irrevocable step might be avoided. He impressed his army with the necessity of caution in Archidamus attacking so powerful an enemy, who might at negotiation^ 1161 the kst moment be stun g int ° desperate resist- ance ; and even despatched a Spartan envoy to Athens in the hope that some concession might still be made. The Athenians stood firm. The envoy was not even admitted into the city, for Pericles had induced the citizens to refuse to listen to any overtures as long as the Lacedae- monians were in the field. He was denied a hearing, and bidden to cross the frontier before sunset; if the Lacedae- monians wished to negotiate with the Athenians, they must disband their army. When he arrived at the frontier and was about to take leave of the escort which had accompanied him, the envoy, impressed with the greatness of the war which was now inevitable, uttered these words of melancholy prophecy : "This day will be to the Hellenes the beginning of great calamities." On learning that no concessions would be made, Archidamus prepared to enter Attica. 1 Meanwhile, in accordance with the plans of Pericles, the country people of Attica left their pleasant homes and The Athenians cultivated farms, and came to Athens with their leave the wives and children and household goods. They the town?* brought with them even the woodwork of their houses, which in Attica was of far greater value than stone or brick. The removal was not accomplished with- out much discomfort and vexation. Many families had lived in the country for generations ; they were leaving the tombs of their race, and the shrines where they worshipped, for a strange city where they had no home. When they arrived in Athens, there were no houses to receive them. They had to obtain such shelter as they could in vacant spaces, or temples, or in the turrets of the walls. The sudden immi- gration of so large a population was naturally a cause of the greatest disorder, and the sanitary conditions which it 1 Thuc. ii. 10-12. V. 4 ] A R CHI DA MUS AT OENOE, J&l. 117 created must have been revolting. That Pericles should have contemplated the removal of such numbers into the city without making due provision for them was, of course, a gross oversight, of which no practical man would have been guilty. He could discuss physical phenomena with Anaxagoras, and arrange with Phidias and Ictinus for the construction of beautiful buildings, but the prosaic details of life were forgotten. The day of vengeance was not long in coming. 1 4. On leaving the Isthmus, Archidamus led his forces over Mount Geranea into the territory of Megara, where two routes lay before him : he might turn to Archidamus in- the right and pursue the coast road to Eleusis ; vades Attica, or he might continue his march in a north- J une431 - easterly direction till he reached the confines of Boeotia, and then strike into the direct road which connects Thebes and Athens. He chose the second, and when we next hear of him, he is besieging Oenoe, the fortress which severed the communication of Athens and Plataea. In taking this course he may have been influenced by his Boeotian allies, for, if this fortress were in his hands, the Thebans would not only be able to pass in and out of Attica as they pleased, but Athens would be prevented from coming to the aid of Plataea. At the same time he would open a more convenient route between the northern and southern sections of the Peloponnesian alliance than the usual road by Aegosthena and Creusis. The fortresses which guarded the passes into Attica were held by garrisons formed chiefly of young men in the earliest years of their military service. Of the fortifi- He is repulsed cations of Oenoe we know nothing, but, what- at ° enoe - ever they were, they sufficed, with the natural strength of the place, then held by such troops, to bid defiance to the whole strength of the Peloponnesian army. After a delay which brought on him the suspicion of intentional lingering, 1 Time, ii. 14-17 ; Aristoph. Knhjh/s, 789 ff. 118 ARCHIDAMUS AT ACHARNAE, 431. [V. 4. Archidamus was compelled to leave the fortress in his rear. Eighty days had already elapsed since the Thebans entered Plataea. Descending down the valley of the Eleusinian Cephisus, he ravaged Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, from which he advanced over the ridge of hills to Acharnae, the largest of the " demes " of Attica, and barely seven miles from Athens. Here he encamped for some time, devastating the immediate neighbourhood, but not entering the central plain. In thus holding his hand while within sight of the city, he sought to draw the Athenians out of the walls. He had Archidamus at hoped, though in vain, that they would come Achamae. ou t ^ 0 meet him at Eleusis, and when he encamped within sight of Athens, in a town which furnished a large proportion of the heavy-armed soldiers in the Athenian army, he confidently expected to reap one of two advantages. Either he would exasperate the enemy into fighting in the open field, or the Acharnians, knowing that their own property was destroyed, would be less eager to fight for that of others, and Archidamus would be at liberty to ravage Attica as he pleased. His plans were not ill-laid, but they were frustrated by the great personal ascendency of Pericles. So long as the Pelo- ponnesian army lay at Eleusis, the Athenians still cherished the hope that the rest of the country would escape. Those who knew the history of the past were aware that Cleomenes of Sparta had once led an army as far as Eleusis, only to see it disperse. And many would remember that fourteen years before the present invasion, Plistoanax had reached the Thriasian plain and then retired. But when the invaders were actually in sight, and the fairest lands in Attica were at Discontent at their mercy, the situation seemed intolerable. Athens. « The whole people, and especially the younger men, were eager to go out and put a stop to it." The sight was new to them ; they had no experience of the Spartan soldiers' courage and skill. Men gathered in the streets, abusing Pericles and his cowardly policy ; the excitement was increased by oracles, remembered or invented for the v. S-J MEASURES OF PERICLES, 431. 119 occasion. The Acharnians, as was natural, were in the last stage of exasperation. They were a hardy race, the colliers of Attica, who got their living by manufacturing charcoal, "hearts of maple," tough as the logs which they burned. Forgetting all the counsels of Pericles, the whole people called on him to do his duty as a general. The situation was difficult, but Pericles was equal to it. He appears at this time to have exercised an extraordinary Action of degree of authority, by which he was enabled Pericles - to prevent any public meeting at which the popular excite- ment might find expression. He did what he could to soothe the prevailing irritation ; and meanwhile he sent out parties of horse to restrain the invaders from coming too close to the city walls. The Thessalians, true to their old alliance, had sent cavalry to the aid of Athens, and these with the native horse proved themselves at least a match for the Boeotians in the Peloponnesian army. These measures seem to have had some effect upon Archi- damus. It is at any rate remarkable that when he broke up from Acharnae on finding that the Athenians Archidamus would not come out against him, he directed his retlres - course to the north, and contented himself with devastating the country between Mount Parnes and Mount Brilessus. Here his provisions began to fail, and he found it necessary to retire. Passing through the coast land near Oropus to the north-east of Parnes, and wasting the country as he went, he entered Boeotia by this route, 1 5. The Athenians suffered severely by the invasion, but Pericles found means in the course of the year to compensate them in some degree. In spite of opposition he held on his way. His plans for the war were still accepted as the best, 1 Thuc. ii. 18-23. Thucydides says plainly (c. 22) that Pericles eKKKrjalav ovk eVot'ei avrcov ov8e ^vXAoyoi/ oideva. As a general he could summon an extraordinary meeting through the Prytaneis — and therefore he could omit to summon it : but how he could prevent the people from giving expression to their discontent in the ordinary meetings of the Assembly, I do not understand. 120 THE ATHENIAN FLEET, 431. [V. 5. and in the conviction that Athens, and not Attica, was the vulnerable part of the state, a decree was passed that a Plans for the thousand talents should be set apart out of protection of the reserve in the treasury, and a hundred of Athens. ^ ne ^ es ^ triremes selected every year, with trierarchs appointed for each, to be ready for instant use, if an attack was made by sea on the Peiraeus. So earnest were the people in the matter, that it was made a capital offence to propose to use the money or ships for any other purpose. Measures were also taken for securing the safety of the country from unexpected attack by establishing guards on the frontiers. 1 While the Lacedaemonians were still in their country, the Athenians sent out a fleet of a hundred vessels to ravage the , shores of the Peloponnesus. Fifty ships were Movements of in the Athenian also sent by Corcyra, and the combined fleet fleet in the attacked Methone, a fortress on the coast of west of Greece. . J Messenia, a little to the south of Pylus (Navarino), which in the days of Tolmides had been captured and soon afterwards abandoned by the Athenians. Had the attack succeeded, the Athenians would have anticipated the position which they gained six years later by the capture of Pylus. They would have established a place of refuge in Messenia for any helots who could find an opportunity of joining them, and a convenient station for the union of the contingents coming from * east and west. But the attempt failed. In this, their very first landing on the shores of the 1 Thuc. ii. 24 : (pvXaicas Karea-T^aavTo Kara yr\v kcu Kara OdXaaaav, axmep brj efieWov did tvclvtos tov noXepov (pvKd^eiv. In iii. 17 we are told ttjv re yap 'Attiktjv k&\ Evfiotav koi 2a.XafXi.va itcardv (vrjes) ecpvXaaaov. Previotisly the Peiraeus was dcpvXaKros /cat anXyaTos, eiKorcos, did to enLKpareiv ttoXv tpav, /cat irapaKakovvTW rovs IlXaraiets airoarrjvai rwv V. i 3 -] PLATAEA BESIEGED, 1#9. 137 resources of engineering skill were brought to bear upon the city, but in vain ; when a huge mound — the work of seventy days — had been raised against the siege of wall, in order to capture the town by this Piataea - primitive method (x^/xa), 1 the Plataeans rendered it useless, partly by raising the wall, partly by removing the earth through a mine, but most of all by building a second, crescent-shaped wall within that part against which the mound was raised, so that if this were captured, the besiegers would still have another wall to surmount, and at the same time be exposed to a cross fire. Engines of assault were also brought up, among them battering-rams, but the Plataeans broke off the heads of these by dropping heavy beams upon them. 2 The Peloponnesians then attempted to set the town on fire, but the plan failed of success owing to the stillness of the weather and an opportune storm of rain. Finding his efforts useless, Archidamus was driven to invest the city ; a double wall was built round it, and garrisoned partly with Peloponnesian, partly with Boeotian, soldiers. 3 These operations occupied the Peloponnesians .from May to October. During the whole of this time Athens took no steps whatever to deliver those who had shut themselves up in their city and allowed their country to be ravaged in reliance on promises of Athenian help. For these promises Pericles, if it is right to assume that he was not now in office, was not himself responsible, but those who gave them must have been aware that they could not now assist the Plataeans without meeting the Boeotians, at least, in the open 'Adrjvalcov, cos ov Trpoaelxov avrois, enopOrjae ttjp ^copai/. Duncker, G. A. ix. 474 n., thinks it impossible that Archidamus, as the ally of Thebes, can have offered neutrality to the Plataeans, or security for their possessions. This part of the story he regards as an invention of the Spartans, who wished to justify their action as far as possible. 1 See Herod, i. 162 : alpee ras noXias x&>p.a(ri. 2 This is said to be the first occasion on which engines were used ; see supra, p. 33 and note : Droysen, Die Griechischen Kriegsalterthumer, pp. 208, 209, and notes. 3 Thuc. ii. 75-78. For the difficulties connected with the siege, see below. 138 SPARTOLUS: PERICLES RESTORED, 429. [V. 14. field, a policy which had been renounced at the very beginning of the war. The abandonment of Plataea to her fate was the inevitable result of the line taken by Pericles since the peace of 445. Nothing but an effective army could have saved the town, and the Athenian army in the hands of Pericles became eminently ineffective. Some years later, the Athenians tried their strength against Boeotia in the battle of Delium, but only to meet with a most disastrous defeat. 14. About the time of the attack on Plataea, the Athenians sent out an expedition of 2000 heavy-armed and 200 cavalry Defeat of the *° Thrace. They were anxious to follow up Athenians at their successes there, and put an end to the Spartoius. revolt of the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans. From Potidaea, where they disembarked, the troops marched to Spartoius, hopirj that the town would be given up to them. In this they were deceived ; aid arrived at Spartoius from Olynthus, and an engagement took place under the walls, in which, though the Chalcidian heavy-armed were defeated, their cavalry and light-armed gained some advan- tage over those of the Athenians, who had been joined by a small body of targeteers from the neighbourhood. Further reinforcements having arrived, the light-armed troops of Spartoius were encouraged to renew the attack on the Athenians. They drove them back to their baggage, and finally, aided by their cavalry, routed them with severe loss. All three generals perished and a fifth of the force; the rest escaped to Potidaea, and returned home. 1 The news of this defeat seems to have caused a reaction at Athens in favour of Pericles. At the next election of generals, Reaction in May 429, he was replaced in his old position, favour of "and everything was put into his hands." ~ Ci 1 c ' The reaction came too late. At the time when he returned to office (J uly) he was already, perhaps, stricken 1 Thuc. ii. 79. Cp. Diod. xii. 47, who reduces the Athenian forces to 1000. The generals were Xenophon and Phanomachus, who had been in command in the previous year, and Calliades (Diod. I.e. ; Plut. Nic. 6). v. i 5 .] A TTA CK ON A CARNANIA , 429. 139 with the disease which in three or four months brought him to the grave. Under such circumstances, he can hardly have taken any very active part in public affairs, but his last days were cheered by reports of the most brilliant exploits ever achieved by the Athenian fleet. 15. Though the Ambraciots had failed to capture Amphi lochian Argos in the preceding summer, they had not abandoned their designs on the city. They Attack on Acar now came forward with a plan for subjugating nania, which is the whole country of Acarnania, and detaching defeated - it from the Athenian alliance. A combined attack was to be made by land and sea, so that the Acarnanians might be unable to unite their whole forces for resistance. With this view, the Ambraciots requested the Lacedaemonians to send a fleet, with a thousand hoplites on board. On their own part they would bring into the field their army, and also obtain the help of the barbarian tribes of Epirus, with whom they had a large and extensive connection. If the plot succeeded, and Acarnania were conquered, Zacynthus and Cephallenia, and perhaps even Naupactus, would fall into the hands of Sparta, and it would no longer be easy for the Athenians to cruise round the Peloponnesus. This scheme, attractive in itself, and warmly supported by the Corinthians, was readily taken up at Sparta. Cnemus, the admiral who had conducted the attack upon Zacynthus in the previous year, was at once despatched with a thou- sand hoplites in a few vessels, and the fleet was ordered to assemble at Leucas. Cnemus succeeded in crossing to Leucas unobserved by Phormio, the Athenian officer stationed at Naupactus, and was there joined by the ships from Leucas, Ambracia, and Anactorium. With these he sailed to Am- bracia, expecting that the contingents of ships which were coming from Sicyon and Corinth would overtake him there. On his arrival, he found a large force of Chaonians and other Epirotes ready to obey his orders ; even Perdiccas, the king of Macedonia, though ostensibly at peace with Athens, secretly sent a thousand soldiers (who arrived too late to be 140 BA TTLE OF STRA TUS, 4%9. [V. 16. of service), and an equal number came from Antiochus, the king of the Orestae. Feeling himself sufficiently strong to open the game without waiting for the ships from Corinth and Sicyon, Cnemus at once began his march to the south. The route lay along the eastern edge of the Ambracian gulf, through the territory of Argos to Stratus, o» the Achelous, which was the largest city of Acarnania. The Acarnanians, on hearing of the threatened invasion, had at once sent to Phormio for help ; but as he was daily expecting to see the Corinthian ships sail down the gulf, he could not leave Naupactus. Meanwhile the combined forces were approaching Stratus. They advanced in three divisions, of which the barbarians formed the centre. The Hellenic soldiers marched in good order as they had been trained to do, but the barbarians rushed on at full speed, thinking that they had only to be first on the scene to capture the town. The Stratians saw their opportunity ; if they could destroy the barbarians before the Greeks came up, the whole expedition would receive a very sensible check. They placed some of their forces in ambuscades outside the city, and when the assailants were close to the walls, a combined onset was made from the city and from the ambuscades. The Chaonians were at once seized with a panic ; many were slaughtered ; the rest, carrying the other barbarians with them, rushed back to the Greeks, who received their first news of the disaster from the defeated fugitives. Here a stand was made for the remainder of the day, but when night came on Cnemus withdrew to the Anapus, and from thence to Ocniadae, where he disbanded his army. 1 l6. This was not the worst. Almost on the very day of the engagement at Stratus, the fleet from Corinth, which should have co-operated with Cnemus and the land army, was utterly defeated by Phormio at the mouth of the gulf. From his station at Naupactus the Athenian commander saw 1 Thuc. ii. 80-82 ; Diod. xii. 47. V. i6.] PHORMIO' S VICTORY, 429. 141 the ships moving along the Peloponnesian shore. They had no intention of attacking him, and no fear that he would attack their forty-seven vessels with his twenty, when they suddenly saw the Athenian ships p e ioponnesian off the opposite coast of Aetolia, and when in fleet b y the dim light of morning they attempted to cross over from Patrae in Achaea towards Acarnania, they were met by Phormio, who bore down upon them from the mouth of the Evenus. It was impossible to avoid an engagement. The Corinthian commanders knew that their seamen were not a match for the Athenians in point of skill. To be forced into battle was bad enough ; to be attacked outside the strait, where there was room for every manoeuvre, was still worse. They resolved to arrange their fleet in such a manner that the ordinary tactics of sailing through the line of vessels and then charging from the rear would be impossible. With this object they drew up their ships in a circle, turning the prows outward, and keeping them sufficiently close to avoid any inlet. The smaller craft were collected in the central space, where also were placed five of their swiftest triremes, ready to run out at any point where the enemy attacked. On seeing this formation, Phormio at once arranged his plan. Placing his vessels in a single line, he bade them pass round the enemy's fleet in ever narrowing circles. By this means he brought their ships into the smallest possible compass, and kept them in constant expectation of an attack. He continued this movement till the time at which the morn- ing breeze from the Corinthian gulf made it impossible for the Peloponnesian ships to remain steadily in their position. Ship began to dash against ship ; the attention of the sailors was occupied in keeping them clear of each other, the more so as the rough water made it difficult for unpractised rowers to manage their oars. Then Phormio gave the signal for direct attack. The first vessel sunk was one of the admirals', but the havoc soon became universal ; no resistance could be made - f in wM disorder the whole fleet ran for the Achaean 142 CNEMUS AND BRASIDAS, 429. [V. 17. coast, hotly pursued by Phormio, who captured twelve vessels with most of their crews. The rest escaped to Cyllene in Elis, where they were joined by Cnemus and the ships from Leucas. 1 17. At the news of this disaster, the Lacedaemonians were highly indignant. They could not understand how a few commissioners ships could defeat so many, or recognise that sent to Cnemus. their own fleet was so vastly inferior to the Athenian as it had been proved to be. They did not indeed recall their admiral and fine or banish him, as the Athenians would have done under similar circumstances, but, while sending him orders to fight again, they also sent three com- missioners, one of whom was Brasidas, to advise with him. Supported by their help, Cnemus sent round to the Pelopon- nesian allies for more vessels, and refitted those which had been damaged in the engagement. Intelligence of these preparations was brought to Phormio, who at once sent to Athens for reinforcements; a battle Reinforcements might take place any day, and he would have sent to Phormio. to meet the whole Peloponnesian fleet with no more than twenty vessels. From Corcyra, whose fleet was to be of such advantage to Athens in her operations in Western Greece, not a single ship had been sent to aid Acarnania or Phormio, who was thus left entirely to his own resources or help from Athens. The greater is our astonish- ment to find that the reinforcement voted at Athens amounted to twenty vessels only, and that even these, though every day was of the greatest importance, were bidden to sail to Crete before they joined Phormio ! Who was responsible for this extraordinary order we do not know; the Athenians could have gained nothing by the most bril- liant success in Crete — which, so far as we know, they never revisited in the course of the war ; while, on the other hand, the position of Athens in Western Greece was in peril. It 1 Thuc. ii. 83, 84 ; Diod. xii. 48. For details, see Grote, iv. 313, notes. SECOND ENGAGEMENT, 429. 143 was a grave blunder, and nothing but the skill and bravery of Phormio saved Athens from irretrievable disaster. 1 When all was ready, the Peloponnesian fleet left Cyllene for Panormus in Achaea, where the land forces were assem- bled to support it. Phormio, meanwhile, who _ z n Engagement in was resolved not to fight in the narrow channel, the Corinthian sailed from Naupactus to the promontory of gulf * Antirrhium, anchoring outside it. The Peloponnesians, who were as anxious to fight in the gulf as Phormio was to fight outside it, met him by moving to a point exactly opposite, but just inside the gulf, where the distance from shore to shore was not more than a mile. The number of their vessels had been raised to seventy-seven, while Phormio had no more than his original twenty. For six or seven days the two fleets lay opposite each other, until at length Cnemus and Brasidas, finding that Phormio would not enter the strait, determined to draw him into it. Before going into action they thought it necessary to raise the courage of their sailors, — who, in spite of the disparity of The Pelopon numbers, were far from confident of success, nesians encour- — partly by dwelling on the increased chances a g etheirsai,ors of victory, and partly by hinting that any want of courage would be noticed and punished. 2 Phormio also, though he had hitherto trained his sailors to the belief that no superiority of forces on the enemy's side could justify a retreat on theirs, on seeing them dispirited by the odds which they had now to face, gathered them together and encouraged them in a brief address. He pointed out that the enemy had assembled in such force because they were 1 Time. ii. 85. The force was sent to Crete at the request of Nicias, a citizen of Gortys and proxenus of the Athenians, ostensibly to conquer the hostile city of Cydonia, but really to interfere in some neighbourly quarrel between Polichna and Cydonia. It did nothing beyond ravaging the territory of Cydonia, and was delayed by con- trary winds on its return. Nicias was a friend of the Polichnitae, and Arnold, ad loc, suggests that the AtheDians would naturally be ill-disposed towards the Cydonians, who were, in part, colonists from Aegina. 2 Tlluc< {i 87> i4i PIIORMIO AGAIN VICTORIOUS, 4%9- [V. 18. afraid of defeat, and their courage was due, not to experi- ence at sea, but to experience on land. It would fail them when they saw that the Athenians were ready to attack in spite of the disparity of numbers. 1 l8. Forming their vessels four abreast, the Peloponnesians now fronted north-east or east, and sailed along the shore of Achaea into the gulf, twenty of their fastest vessels leading the way. Phormio at once saw the danger ; he had left Naupactus unprotected, for even the Messenians of the town had followed him on shore to support his vessels, and if the Peloponnesian fleet got ahead, they would reach the place before he could save it. He embarked at once, and bidding the Messenians follow, sailed in single file along the coast with all speed for Naupactus. This was exactly what Brasidas wished ; the Athenian ships had now no room for any exhibition of their dreaded skill. Changing front, he suddenly brought his whole line four deep upon the flank of Phormio's vessels. It was an excellent manoeuvre, and well carried mentolTau- oufc '> bufc owin g to the superiority of the pactus : Phor- Athenians in rowing, it was only partially mio's victory. succesB f u i # Eleven of Phormio's vessels escaped the swiftest Peloponnesian ships ; the remaining nine were forced aground ; one ship was taken with its crew, others were being towed away, when the Messenians dashed into the water and saved them. So far the victory was on the side of the Lacedaemonians, who might reasonably have thought that they had redeemed their previous failure. But half the Athenian fleet remained. Of the eleven ships which escaped the attack, ten reached Naupactus, and ranged themselves in a position of defence, should the enemy attempt to force them ashore. One re- mained behind the rest, unable to keep up in the race. In their wake came the twenty Peloponnesian vessels, of which one, a Leucadian, far in advance of the rest, was chasing the Athenian laggard. In the line of pursuit lay a merchantman, i Time. ii. 89. V. 19- ] PHORMWS SECOND VICTOR Y, 429. 145 anchored in the det,p water off Naupactus. The Athenians saw their opportunity. At full speed they rowed round the anchored vessel, and, bearing down on the ship, by which they were themselves pursued, struck her amidships, and so injured her that in a short time she sank. Timocrates, one of the Peloponnesian admirals, who was on board, seeing that his ship was sinking, drew his sword and slew himself. The Peloponnesians were dismayed ; they had come on in loose order, singing the paean of victory, but their temper changed in a moment, and checking their pursuit, they waited for the body of the fleet to come up. The delay was fatal; the Athenians, cheered by the brilliant success of their ship, and seeing the disorder of the enemy, sailed out and fell upon the Peloponnesians, who were without any settled plan of battle. After a short resistance they fled to Panormus, whence they had started, pursued by the Athen- ians, who captured six of the enemy's vessels, and recovered the eight of their own which had been driven on shore. On the following night the Peloponnesians stole away to Corinth. 1 19. The attempt to acquire control of the Corinthian gulf had entirely failed, but before the ships dispersed from Corinth, the Peloponnesian commanders re- Proposed attack solved, at the suggestion of the Megarians, to on the Peiraeus. make an attack in another direction. The harbour of Peiraeus was neither closed nor guarded, and, though forty ships of war lay in the port of Nisaea, the Athenians, secure in the mastery of all the adjacent seas, considered that three ships of war stationed at Budorum on the promontory of Salamis which looks toward Megara, were sufficient to keep them in check. Here was an opportunity for a sudden surprise, an attack on the very centre of the Athenian power. Preparations were at once begun ; the sailors were bidden to take the rowing tackle out of their own ships, and march by 1 Thuc. ii. 90. How the fifty-seven ships of the Peloponnesian fleet which had forced Phormio'snine ships aground were put to flight is not clear. VOL. III. K 146 THE PEL0P0NNES1ANS IN SAL AMIS, 429. [V. 19. night across the isthmus from Corinth to Nisaea. On their arrival, they at once launched the forty vessels, as had been arranged, but at this point their courage failed them; the risk seemed too great, and changing their course, they sailed to Salamis, where they captured the three ships before the Athenians had time to man them, and ravaged the island, of which for nearly a hundred and fifty years the Athenians had been in secure possession. Fire signals at once conveyed information of the attack to Athens. The excitement was intense. The inhabitants of the upper city thought that the enemy had already sailed into the harbour; the inhabitants of Peiraeus feared that Salamis was captured, and an attack on the harbour immi- nent. At daybreak the Athenians rushed to the shore, manned their vessels in all haste, and crossed to Salamis, while others remained on guard in the Peiraeus. The Peloponnesians had no intention of risking an engagement ; the memory of their defeat was too recent, and the ships in which they put out from Nisaea were old and unseaworthy. With their captives and spoil, including the three ships from Budorum, they returned to Megara and dispersed. The Athenians also returned home, but the lesson was not lost on them; from this time onwards the mouth of the harbour was closed and a strict watch kept. 1 In defence of their conduct, the Peloponnesians asserted that they were prevented by adverse winds from entering Peiraeus ; 2 but in the judgment of Thucydides, this was a mere excuse, and there was nothing in the weather to prevent resolute men from entering the harbour. It is, however, doubtful whether an unsupported attack in forty unseaworthy ships on the harbour of Athens, even if success- ful at first, could have ended in anything but disaster ; and as Brasidas was one of the commanders of the Peloponnesian 1 Thuc. ii. 93, 94. 2 " Phalerum, they say, is the right harbour, because it is so hard to tack into Peiraeus." — Clough, Life and Letters, p. 248. V. 20.] LAST DAYS OF PR0RMI0, 429-4^8. 147 fleet, we must suppose that other reasons, and not a want of courage, determined the abandonment of the plan. A few weeks later, Phormio sailed with a considerable force from Naupactus to Astacus, which, in spite of the restora- tion of Evarchus in 431, 1 seems now to have Phormioin been favourable to Athens, and marching into Acamania. i His return to the interior, he expelled from btratus and Athens and Coronta and other towns any citizens who death - were likely to oppose Athenian interests. Oeniadae was unapproachable owing to the floods of the Achelous, and Phormio returned to Naupactus for the winter. In the following spring (428) he sailed to Athens, taking with him his ships and captives ; but such is the vexatious reticence of Grecian historians, that, in spite of his brilliant services to his country, we never hear of this officer again ; we con- clude that he died soon after his return home, or he would certainly have been sent out in the following summer to take the command at Naupactus, a post which was given to his son Asopius. 2 20. Meanwhile the whole of Northern Greece had been terrified by a gathering of the tribes of Thrace. Two years previously, in the summer of 431 (supra, Movements p. 123), Sitalces, the king of the Odrysians, in Thrace: had become an ally of the Athenians, who Sltalces - wished to obtain his assistance in reducing the revolted cities in Chalcidice. About the same time Perdiccas had prevailed upon him to bring about a reconciliation between himself and the Athenians, and to abandon the idea of restoring Philip to his kingdom. In the interval, Perdiccas, having obtained his object, forgot his promises, while Sitalces took no steps towards assisting the Athenians. This neglect was now brought to his notice by some envoys sent from Athens for the purpose, who also would not fail to remind him that Perdiccas had treacherously sent 1000 Macedonians to operate against 1 Time. ii. 33. 2 Thuc. ii. 102, 103. Phormio was one of the heroes of Athenian gtory : cp, Aristoph. Knights, 560 ; Lysistr, 804. 148 THE POWER OF SITALCES, 429. [V. 20. Athens in Acarnania. Sitalces resolved to put forth his whole strength. Perdiccas was to be deposed from the throne of Macedon, and in concert with Hagnon, the Athenian general, whose name was well known in Thrace as the founder of Amphipolis, a combined attack on Chalcidice was planned, in which the Athenians, according to their agreement, were to take part with as large a force as possible. 1 The empire of Sitalces has been described (supra, p. 46). It was the greatest power between the Ionian Sea and the Euxine. The levy of The tribes included in it were numerous and Sitalces. warlike, and only required competent leaders to make them a formidable army. These tribes Sitalces now called out. He first summoned those adjacent to his own territory — the Thracians who dwelt between Mount Haemus and Mount Ehodope, extending to the shores of the Euxine and Hellespont ; then the Getae from beyond the Haemus, and other tribes as far as the Danube — nations which, like their Scythian neighbours, fought in battle as mounted archers. He paid or persuaded a number of Dii from the heights of Rhodope, the most warlike of all the Thracians, and armed with their native dirks, 2 to join his ranks, though they did not acknowledge his supremacy. From the banks of the Strymon he summoned the Agrianes and Laeaei, and other Paeonians ; from the northern slopes of Mount Scombrus the Treres and Tilataei. This mighty host was still increased by many independent tribes who joined it in the hope of plunder, until it reached a total of 150,000 men, of whom one-third were mounted soldiers. 3 In a previous expedition against the Paeonians, Sitalces had cut a road over Mount Cercine, and by this he now Invasion of advanced to Doberus, from which he could Macedonia. descend the valley of the Axius, into Mace- donia. 4 As he carried with him Amyntas, the son of Philip, who was now dead, intending to make him king of Macedonia 1 Thuc. ii. 95, 96. 2 Thuc. vii. 27. 3 Thuc. ii. 96, 98. 4 For the geography, see esp. Abel's Mab donien, p. 60 f. V. 20.] SITALCES IN MACEDONIA, 429. 149 in the room of Perdiccas, he purposely led his forces into the district on the left of the Axius, the part of the kingdom over which Philip had previously ruled. The banks of the river were defended by a number of walled cities, founded by the races which had held the country before the Mace- donian conquest. Of these Eidomene was taken by storm, but others opened their gates to Amyntas, whom they regarded as their legitimate king, and it was not till they reached Europus that the invaders met with a resistance which they could not overcome. Even this did not put an end to their depredations ; they ravaged Mygdonia, Crestonaea, Anthemus, and all Macedonia to the left of Pella and Cyrrhus. 1 The resources of Macedonia were unequal to repelling such a host. The country had not yet been provided with the numerous strongholds and excellent roads by which Archelaus subsequently strengthened his kingdom — doing more for Macedonia in his single reign than all the kings before him. The people made the best of their position, retiring into their castles, and keeping up a series of attacks on the Thracians with their excellent and well-armed cavalry. Their best hope lay in the numbers of the invaders; it was impossible for such a horde to remain long in one place, or risk the dangers of a winter campaign ; and when on reaching Chalcidice, Sitalces found that the Athenians did not appear according to their agreement, he decided to return home. He had already The Athenians entered into negotiations with Perdiccas, who fail to meet had won over Seuthes, the nephew of Sitalces retire^and* 10 and next in power to the king himself, by the makes terms promise of the hand of his sister Stratonice. wlth Perdlccas - The cause of Amyntas was abandoned, and after a raid into Chalcidice and Bottice the Thracian withdrew his army. Nothing important had been achieved. The Chalcidic cities 1 "Left," that is, of the Axius; they did not enter Pieria and Boltiaea. For Bottiaea and Bo'tice, see Forb< s, Thve. i. 51 150 DEA TH OE PERICLES, 429. [V. 21 had not been reduced, and Perdiccas was in a better position than ever. 1 The movement of so great a host filled the neighbouring nations with alarm. The Thessalians, on the south, prepared to meet invasion, and on the north the Thracian tribes who were still independent feared that they would have to fight for their freedom. All the enemies of Athens, aware of the alliance between that city and the Thracian king, expected to see the hosts of the north launched upon their territory. The alarm was not unnatural. Had the Athenians kept their promise, the skill and energy necessary to conduct so great an undertaking might have been supplied; and a larger army would have been brought against the rebellious cities in Thrace than had been seen since the Persian invasion. In their absence the invasion of Macedonia was conducted without any definite aim or fixed purpose, and though the hosts of Sitalces seemed powerful by their numbers, it was their numbers which formed the chief difficulty in the way of success. 2 21. At the time when these events were taking place in the west and north of Greece, Athens was mourning the The death of loss of her great leader. In September 429, Pericles. two y ears an d a half after the outbreak of the war, Pericles died. 3 He sank under a lingering disease, which Plutarch regards as an insidious form of the plague, unaccompanied by the violent symptoms. The mind sym- pathised with the body ; and so low was he brought that to a friend who visited him in his sickness, he showed the 1 Thuc. ii. 100, 101. See also Abel, Makedonien, p. 179. The Macedonian cavalry were redcopaKiapivoi. 2 See Aristoph. Acharn. 148 ff. (425) : 6 6' a>pocre (Sitalces) anevhoav (3or)0r}(reiv, e^ow (rrpaTiav rocravr-qv war ' AOrjvalovs epdv, oa-ov to xprjpa Trapvoncov npoaep^eTai. 3 Thuc. ii. 65 : enel re 6 noXepo? Kareo-TT) . . . erre^iat bvo cttj kci'i e£ prjvas. The date is, however, uncertain, because We do not know whether Thucydides reckons from the affair of Plataea, or the invasion of Attica — in the latter case the death of Pericles must be put in November. V. 21.] INFLUENCE OF PERICLES. 151 amulet which he had allowed the women of his household to hang about his neck. Yet something of the old Pericles remained : a few days before his death, when the friends who gathered round him praised his greatness and his ' victories — the nine trophies which he had erected over the enemies of the city — believing him to be quite unconscious of their presence, Pericles, who had followed their words, found voice to express his wonder why they selected for praise what was partly due to fortune, and had fallen to the lot of many other generals, while they left unrecorded his best and greatest claim to renown. " No action of mine," he said, " has ever caused an Athenian to wear the garb of a mourner." 1 To the sickness and death of Pericles we may, without hesitation, ascribe the unsteadiness of plan and weakness in execution which marks Athenian policy during The death the second half of the year 429. Had he ofPericies: retained his old vigour, the ships sent to aid ^Athenian Phormio would not have been allowed to visit policy. Crete, when their presence was so urgently needed at Naupactus. Nor would the Athenians have failed to perform their part of the compact with Sitalces, and appear on the coast of Ohalcidice, with an adequate fleet, when the Thracians were ravaging the interior. And we cannot but hope, for the honour of Athens and her leader, that in spite of his disin- clination to take the field, Pericles would have made some attempt to relieve Plataea, whose condition, in the summer of the year, was as great a proof of Athenian incompetence and ingratitude as it was of the devotion of her allies. His death was a calamity to Athens. From the first his influence had been personal. He had not built uj> a structure, social and political, which would continue to exist when the creating spirit had passed away ; he had not launched Athens on a new line in which she could move forward without his 1 Plut. Per. 38. The first story is taken from Theophrastus, the scholar of Aristotle, circ. 300 ; for the second no authority is given. 152 POLICY OF PERICLES. [V. 21. guiding care ; he had not even left a party behind him. He ruled alone, and when the reins dropped from his hand, no one else could take them up. A democracy ruled by a great man is an admirable form of government; but a democracy with rulers absorbed in maintaining their own position is incapable of governing itself or others : at home it is distracted by parties ; abroad it is inconsistent or tyrannical. The Athenian empire was an outrage on the autonomous rights of the allies, and the plan of cam- paign with which Pericles entered into the war was not likely, under any circumstances, to lead to a final settle- ment between Athens and Sparta; but, however true this may be, in his views on the position of Athens towards her allies, and in the conduct of the war, Pericles displays the great quality of moderation. He did not oppress the subject cities as they were oppressed after his death ; he did not seek to aggrandise Athens in the war. He dreamed, not of an empire stretching from Crete to Carthage, but of an impregnable Athens, a city so strong that her enemies would desist for very weariness from attacking her. To this policy he would have clung, and neither defeat nor success would have drawn him from it. Those who came after him were of another temper; they used every success as a basis for new demands, and when defeated they were in despair. There were times when the war was carried on better after his death than during his life, but it was carried out without a settled plan. Nicias hoped for one result, Cleon for another; and the policy of Athens varied as one or other was in the ascendant. The mischief which showed itself in the last two years of Pericles' life became fixed and constant. In the internal politics of the city we see a rapid decline. Cleon, if an unworthy successor of Pericles, was at least a man of energy, with a clear eye to the point at issue. When he died, the influence of Nicias became paramount till he met with a rival in Alcibiades, and the management of the state fell into the hands of the two men, who in opposite ways were equally a source of disaster to Athens. V. 21.] IDEALS OF PERICLES. 153 Pericles died, and the glory of Athens died with him; in part, through him. He has no claim to be counted amon^ the statesmen who have put new life into their nation. He was neither a legislator like Solon, nor a constitutional reformer like Clisthenes. Yet we feel that by universal con- sent of friend and enemy, he was the foremost man of his day, to whom all turned in the hour of distress. Persuasion sat on his lips, not merely because he was a great orator, but because he was as wise as he was eloquent, and as honest as he was wise. We must also allow that he cherished nobler ideals than any other Greek before or after him. In the State of Plato the higher life is confined to a few of the citizens ; little or nothing is done for the "working classes" as we should call them. Even in Aristotle's State, this class, though more clearly recognised than in Plato, is shut out from the true life of the citizen. Pericles sought to bring all within the influence of the state ; all were to share in the blessings which it had to bestow; all were to be inspired and ennobled by its influence. If we ask what the state can do for the individual, hardly any other answer can be given but the answer of Pericles. A state cannot equalise property, or efface personal distinction, and the attempt to do so is fatal. It can secure to every one, at least in a large measure, the power to shape a life and character, and the sense of this power is the best possession of a man. The practical result formed a melancholy contrast to this noble ideal. When Pericles died, a large part of the citizens were pauperised by the means which he had taken to provide them with leisure. Their hereditary interest in their fields and farms was broken, and it was not replaced by anything better. Their thoughts were absorbed in a struggle which was anything but ennobling; a struggle which embittered existing hostilities, destroyed the hope of any national union, and fixed the interest of Athens on the maintenance of her empire. The Persian war had been the highest impulse of the fifth century in Greece; it sent a thrill through the nation, and in the years which follow we reap 154 EFFECT OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [V. 21. a harvest of the best which Greece could give. The Peloponnesian war destroyed Hellenism. The delicate bloom faded ; it became more and more clear that Hellenic politics were a failure, and that new forms of union must be devised. With these new arrangements and altered con- ditions of life, the old Hellenic feeling, so intimately bound up with the city-state, could not co-exist. CHAPTER VI. FROM THE DEATH OF PERICLES TO THE END OF 427. I. In the next summer, immediately after the Pelopon- nesians had made their usual invasion of Attica, Athens was startled by the news of the revolt of Lesbos revolts Lesbos (428). The island had been one of the from Athens - first to join the alliance after the battle of Mycale in 479 ; it had remained faithful to Athens when Samos broke into revolt, and amid the general subjugation of the cities of the league, it still retained, like Chios, an independent position. Since the outbreak of the war it had furnished a contingent to the Athenian fleet; and, indeed, at the moment of revolt, ten Mytilenaean ships were lying in the harbour of Athens. But a secret discontent had long been spreading through the island. Before the war, overtures had been made to Lacedae- mon, and though these were rejected, owing no doubt to the inadequacy of the Peloponnesian fleet, the design was not abandoned. The Mytilenaeans, who led the movement, set about filling up the mouths of the harbours of their city, strengthening or restoring the walls, and building ships; vessels were despatched to the Euxine for supplies of corn ; and a force of Scythian bowmen was hired. In the island they attempted to centralise the administration of the island at Mytilene, hoping by this means to put an end to internal dissension. Negotiations were opened with the Boeotians, who, as Aeolians, were akin to the Lesbians, and a second appeal was made to Lacedaemon. The Athenians were at once informed of these movements. The inhabitants of the adjacent island of Tenedos, owing to 155 156 REVOLT OF MYTILENE, 428. [VI. 2. a quarrel with the Lesbians, were only too ready to betray them ; the city of Methymna, which ranked next to Mytilene in Lesbos, was opposed to the policy of consolidation, and retained her loyalty to Athens ; and even in Mytilene itself domestic strife had arisen, which rendered united action impossible. 1 The Athenians were at first incredulous. They were un- willing to believe that a new disaster, calling for prompt The Athenians act i° n m a distant part of the empire, was send an expedi- added to their domestic calamities — to the tion to Lesbos. p] a g Ue anc [ the desolation of Attica. Envoys were sent in the hope of persuading the Mytilenaeans to abandon their plans and preparations, but in vain ; Mytilene would yield to force, and force only. Nothing remained but immediate action. Forty ships, which had been equipped to sail round Peloponnesus, were despatched to Lesbos. It was known that a festival would shortly be held at Mytilene, at the temple of Apollo Maloeis, outside the walls of the city, and this appeared to offer a favourable oppor- tunity for seizing the place in the absence of the citizens. If this plan failed, the Athenian commander was instructed to call on the Mytilenaeans, under a threat of war, to surrender their fleet and dismantle their walls. Meanwhile the ten Mytilenaean ships which were at Athens were detained, and the crews thrown into prison. 2 2. Had the Athenians arrived unexpectedly at Mytilene, they might have succeeded in surprising the town, but in little more than two days their plans were made known to the Lesbians. The festival was, of course, abandoned; the Myti- lenaeans began to barricade and guard the unfinished parts of their harbour-defences and walls, and when the Athenians appeared their demands were refused. But the Mytilenaeans were not in a condition to resist an Athenian fleet ; " a show of fighting" which they made in front of the harbour was 1 Thuc. iii. 2; cp. Arist. Pol. v. 4 = 1304 a 4 ff. 2 Thuc. iii. 3. VI. 2.] THE MYTILENAEANS HARD PRESSED, 428. 157 at once repulsed, and without waiting for a second defeat, they made proposals to the Athenian generals, in the hope of procuring the recall of the fleet for a time. The Athenians The Athenians were conscious that their force at Mytiiene. was too small to reduce the island if driven to extremities, and a cessation of arms was agreed upon, during which the Mytilenaeans were allowed to send one of the informers, who had repented of his action, and other envoys to Athens. They offered to abandon their revolutionary designs if the Athenians would withdraw their ships, but their hopes of success were slight; and while these negotiations were going on, they thought it prudent to send envoys secretly to Lacedaemon for assistance. As the Athenian fleet lay at Malea, to the south of the city, the envoys slipped out to the north, and after a difficult voyage across the open sea, they reached their destination. 1 As was expected, the Mytilenaeans' envoys failed to per- suade the Athenians to withdraw their forces, and on their return hostilities were resumed, Mytiiene being supported by the whole of Lesbos except Methymna, which aided Athens. The Mytilenaeans were still without any real con- fidence in their enterprise ; and after a general attack on the Athenian camp, in which they were certainly not defeated, they retired into the city to wait for the assist- The M ance which they hoped would come from aeans appeal Peloponnesus. In this attitude they were toSpartafor confirmed by Meleas of Lacedaemon and Hermaeondas of Thebes, who had just succeeded in entering the city, and on their advice a second trireme with envoys was sent to Sparta. 2 Such inaction naturally encouraged the Athenians, and many of the allies, who may have been watching the event, when they saw the weakness of the Lesbian resistance, came readily to their help. They now brought up their ships from Malea and anchored round the 1 Thuc. iii. 3, 4. The words npos ftopeav rrjs TToXews are to be taken with dnoo-reWovai. 2 Thuc. iii, 5. 158 THEIR ENVOYS AT OLYMPIA, 428. [VI. 3. south side of the city, establishing two camps, one on either side, and blockading both the harbours. 1 3. Meanwhile the envoys who had left Mytilene in the first ship arrived at Lacedaemon. It was close on the time of the The Olympic games and they were bidden to repair Mytiienaeans to Olympia, in order that they might the more at oiympia. easily make their case known to all the members of the Peloponnesian confederacy. When the games were over, a meeting was arranged, at which they came forward. Like the Corcyraeans at Athens in 432, they had to defend their conduct, and clear it from the stain of unprovoked rebellion. They insisted that in desert- ing Athens they had not forsaken an equal in the hour of danger; they had risen against a tyrant at a favourable moment. The blame rested with the Athenians, who had been false to their principles in the management of the Delian Lea rue. That League was founded to preserve the freedom of Hellas, but it had been perverted to the destruc- tion of it, and no member could continue faithful to the dominant city without betraying the liberty of their allies. It was true that the Lesbians occupied a favoured position in the alliance ; they were still, as they had been at the first, free and independent, supplying ships by agreement, and paying no tribute ; but this position was better in appear- ance than in reality. By allowing one or two allies to re- main independent, the Athenians gave a colour of justice to 1 Thuc. iii. 6. Mytilene was originally built on an island, and, therefore, like Syracuse, the city possessed two harbours* one on the north, the other on the south. The northern harbour, which was probably MaXoet?, was the harbour for ships of war, of which it would contain fifty ; it could be closed if necessary. The southern harbour was larger and deeper, and defended by a mole (Strabo, p. 617). The strait which divided the island and city is called Euripus by Pausanias, iii. 30 (Smith, Diet. Geog. s.v. Mytilene). The promontory of Malea is seventy stades distant from the city to the south, and if by it is meant the Malea at which the Athenians had their "docks and market," we must suppose that they retired there while negotiations were going on, See Jowett, Thucydidks 9 ad loc, VI. 4 -] REASONS FOR THE REVOLT, 428. 159 their conduct, of which it was greatly in need, and they wisely left the strongest allies to the last, when there would be no one to help them. Even this favoured position was retained by a subservience almost slavish to the Athenian people and their leaders. All real equality was gone; the alliance rested on fear, and fear only; the Lesbians were afraid of the Athenian power ; the Athenians were afraid that Lesbos might combine her fleet with another and become a centre of disaffection. On these grounds the city resolved to meet the danger, and secure whatever advantages might be gained by those who made the first move. 1 In revolting from Athens, Mytilene had followed the advice of the Boeotians, and if the revolt was premature, there was the more reason that assistance should be sent. No better opportunity would occur. The Athenians were prostrate with the plague; their ships were occupied; their funds were exhausted. A second invasion of Attica could not fail to create a diversion of their forces. Let no man think that in fighting for Lesbos he was risking his life in another man's quarrel. The interests of Lesbos and the Peloponnesians were the same, and Athens could be injured more deeply in Lesbos than elsewhere. Not Attica, which had been harried over and over again, but the countries from which Attica drew her resources, were the real support of the war. Strip Athens of her allies, and her power was ruined. Pro* vide Peloponnesus with ships, and her efficiency was doubled. "Think," they concluded, "think of the hopes which the Hellenes repose in you ; think of Zeus Olympius, in whose temple we appear, not otherwise than suppliants, and receive us into your alliance. We are risking our lives in a great struggle ; if we win, all will share in the gain ; if we lose, the loss will be felt by all." 2 4, The appeal was not without effect. The Lesbians were received into alliance by the Lacedaemonians, and to divert the Athenian fleet from Mytilene, the Lacedaemonians requested 1 Thuc. iii. 8-12. 2 Thuc. iii. 13, 14. 160 ENERGY OF ATHENS, 428. [VI. 4. their allies to assemble at the Isthmus for a second in- vasion of Attica. They were themselves most energetic, and The Lesbians arrived first at the rendezvous, where they ^Hance^ro ^ e o an preparations for the transport of ships posed invasion from the Corinthian to the Saronic gulf; but of Attica. the allies were less forward, being busy with their ingathering. Meanwhile the Athenians, by a display of their force, made it clear that they could meet the danger at home without recalling a single ship from service. 1 Manning a hundred vessels, with sailors taken from every class of citizens except the two highest, and even from the resident aliens, they stood out to sea along the Isthmus and made descents upon the coast. The Lacedaemonians, finding that the Lesbians were mistaken in their estimate of the . . Athenian strength, and that their own allies The invasion ° ' of Attica did not assemble, returned home, where their abandoned. presence was needed to protect their own territory against the depredations of an Athenian fleet, which had been sent out earlier in the year. Yet they did not wholly forget their pledges to the Lesbians, for they called upon their allies to furnish forty vessels for service at Mytilene, When the Athenians saw that the invasion was abandoned, they also recalled their ships. 2 Meanwhile the Mytilenaeans made an attack upon Me- thymna, the only city in Lesbos which had not joined them. Movements The attack was unsuccessful, but the Myti- in Lesbos. lenaeans were able to strengthen their position in the other cities of Lesbos, and it was clear that the Athenian blockade was ineffective ; a larger force was Paches sent necessary to prevent the rebels from marching to Mytilene. to and fro in the island as they pleased. At the beginning of autumn the Athenians despatched Paches with 1000 Athenian hoplites. He at once surrounded the 1 Thuc. hi 15. The tcaprrov %vyKOfxibr) cannot have been the corn harvest, which had long been over, but refers to the vintage, fruits, etc., or possibly millet, and other grain of that kind ; see Leake, Northern Greece, iv. 158. 2 Thuc. iii. 16. VI. 5-] THE GARRISON AT PL A TAEA, $8. 161 city with a wall, thus cutting off all communication by land as well as sea. 1 5. The revolt of Lesbos carried the centre of operations to eastern Greece. In the west little was done. Early in the summer Asopius, the son of Phormio, was sent out, at the request of the Acarnanians, with a small fleet, Asopius in but the greater part of his ships returned home Western after -ravaging the coast of Laconia. With the Greece - remainder he sailed to Naupactus, and resumed the plans of Phormio by an expedition against Oeniadae. He was sup- ported by the whole force of the Acarnanians, who attacked the city by land and devastated the country round, while he brought his ships up the Acheloiis. But Oeniadae could neither be seduced nor coerced, and Asopius was compelled to retire. A subsequent attack on Leucas cost him his life and the loss of a large part of his force. The remainder seem to have returned to Naupactus. A memorable incident marked the close of the year. Since September 429 the garrison at Plataea had been closely shut up, and nothing had been done by Athens to Plataea . part relieve the distress of her brave allies. When of the garrison supplies began to fail, the besieged resolved to escape - force their way if possible over the wall ; and though about half the number withdrew from the enterprise, 220 men were found willing to risk the danger. The first necessity was to provide scaling ladders of a sufficient length to reach the top of the wall. By counting the layers of bricks in a part which had not been plastered over, a tolerably correct calculation of the height was made (the bricks being, no doubt, of a standard and familiar size). When the prepara- tions were complete, the garrison waited for the advantage of a dark and stormy night ; for it was the custom of the be- siegers to pass the night when fine on the battlements, and when wet, to retire for shelter into the towers, of which there was one at every tenth battlement extending to the inner and outer face of the double wall, but with a passage through it, 1 Thuc. iii. 18. VOL. III. L 162 THE ESCAPE FROM PLA1 A E A, 428. [VI. 5- the intervening spaces being then unprotected. In darkness, wind, and rain the gallant band set out on their forlorn hope. They successfully crossed the ditch round the town, and arrived at the wall. Their armour had been lightened in order to impede their movements as little as possible, while the right foot was left unshod to gain a firmer hold on the slippery mud of the ditches. The ladders were no sooner planted in a space between two towers than they were mounted by soldiers armed with dirks and corslets, who immediately parted right and left to the towers at either end. After these came others armed with javelins only, their shields being carried by their comrades behind. A considerable number had ascended when the noise of a falling tile aroused the enemy. The alarm was at once raised, and the besieging army rushed out on the wall. They did not know what had happened, and their attention was distracted by an attack which the Plataeans in the city made from the opposite side. No one moved from his post lest he should abandon the place where he was most needed ; only the body of Three Hundred, who had been set apart for emergencies, ventured to march along outside the wall to the place where the alarm had been given. Fire signals were at once raised to give information to the Thebans, but they were rendered useless by the beacons which the Plataeans lighted on the wall. 1 Meanwhile the Plataeans had slain the guards of the towers at either end of the space where they had mounted the wall, and not content with occupying the passages through the towers, they planted their ladders against these and sent a body of men to the top. From the towers and from the wall they kept up a constant discharge of missiles, while their comrades planted more ladders against the intervening space, cleared off the battlements, and passed over the wall to the outer ditch. Each man, as he reached the further side, halted and shot arrows or javelins against any of 1 Thuc. iii. 20-22. It has been urged that signals from Plataea could not be visible at Thebes, but they might be very well seen at some place where the Thebans were watching. VI. 5-] THE ESCAPE FROM PLATAEA, 428. 163 the enemy who came in sight. When all had crossed, those in the towers descended and advanced to the ditch. They were at once attacked by the Three Hundred who had pro- vided themselves with torches, a precaution of doubtful advantage, for the Plataeans, standing on the further edge of the ditch, saw the enemy by the lights which they carried, and could discharge their missiles with effect, while they themselves were in darkness. But the crossing of the outer ditch was a difficult task; for owing to the rain it was filled with water, and the frost had spread a film of ice on the surface, thick enough to be an impediment without affording a safe pathway. The difficulties were successfully overcome, and out of the whole number one archer alone was captured by the enemy. After crossing the ditch, the fugitives took the road to Thebes, on which pursuit was least likely to be made — and in fact they could see , the enemy hurrying along the road up Cithaeron to the pass which led to Athens. When they had gone about a mile, they turned sharply round and made for the hills, and so escaped to Athens. Of the 220, 212 had made good their escape, seven had abandoned the attempt, and one was captured. The Plataeans in the city, hearing from those who turned back that their comrades had been cut down to a man, sent a herald in the morning to ask for the bodies of the slain. 1 In the autumn of 428 the war had gone on for three 1 Thuc. iii. 23, 24. Those who doubt the veracity of Thucydides' account of the siege of Plataea point to the fact, among others, that while the historian dwells on the difficulties created by tlie water in the ditch outside the wall, he says nothing of any water in the ditch round the town. If there was water in the one, there would be water in the other. Under certain conditions of soil and situation, the objection would, no doubt, be serious ; but as we know nothing of the situation of the ditches at the point where the wall was crossed, we cannot ascribe much weight to the objection. In any case the area of rainfall inside the wall would be less than the area outside, and it is easy to imagine conditions in which there would be a good deal of water in the outer ditch and little or none in the inner. On the position of Plataea, see Forbes, Thuc. I. xcvii. f.; G. B. Grundy, The Battle of Plataea* 164 A PROPERTY-TAX AT ATHENS, 428. [VI. 6. years and a half, and already the pressure of the expense began to be felt heavily at Athens. For the first time a tax Financial was i m P ose( i on the property of the citizens, difficulties which realised 200 talents (about £40,000), a at Athens. gum e q Ua j one-third of the annual receipts from the Delian confederacy. At the same time twelve ships were sent out under Lysicles, a demagogue who had obtained some transient power after the death of Pericles, to collect money from the cities in Caria and the adjacent region, cities of whose loyalty the Athenians were at no time very secure. The expedition ended in disaster. Lysicles fell in battle against the Carians, aided by the Samians of Anaea, and a large number of his soldiers with him. 1 In the course of the winter a Lacedaemonian envoy, Salaethus by name, who had been despatched, after the meeting at Olympia, with intelligence that Attica was to be invaded and a fleet sent to the relief of Lesbos, succeeded in making his way into Mytilene. He encouraged the Myti- lenaeans to persevere in their plans, and any thoughts which they had entertained of coming to terms with the Athenians were now entirely abandoned. 2 6. With the spring of 427 began a year which was the most terrible of the whole ten years of the war which preceded the peace of Nicias — a year marked on both sides by excesses of savage cruelty, indicating too truly the passions which the war had let loose. After despatching the forty vessels, under the command of Alcidas, to Lesbos, the Peloponnesians made their usual Prolonged invasion of Attica. They were no longer led invasion of by Archidamus, who was either dead or in his Attlca - last illness, but by Cleomenes, who was regent for his nephew, king Pausanias. Expecting to hear of some success gained by their fleet at Mytilene, and with the hope 1 Thuc. iii. 19. For Lysicles see Aristoph. Knights, 132, 762; Plut. Per. 24. After the death of Pericles he married Aspasia, and became a successful orator 2 Thuc. iii. 25. For the Samians, infra, p. 166. VI. 6.] PELOPUNNES/ANS IN THE AEGEAN, 427. 165 of preventing the Athenians from sending any additional force to Lesbos, the Peloponnesians remained in Attica as long as they could, carrying their devastations into the remote districts which had escaped in former invasions, and destroying all that had grown up since the previous spring. But the expected news did not arrive, and when their supplies were exhausted, they returned home. 1 Meanwhile the Peloponnesian ships, instead of sailing directly to Lesbos, wasted time off the coast of Peloponnesus, and then slowly passed across the Aegean to A icidas in the Delos, which they reached before the Athenians Aegean, in the city were aware of their movements. From Delos they put in at the islands of Icarus and Myconus, where, to their astonishment, they were informed that Mytilene had fallen. At first they were incredulous, but on reaching Embatum, in the territory of Erythrae, they found the news confirmed. Mytilene surrendered a week before their arrival on the Asiatic coast. 2 Supplies had run short in the unhappy city, and when all hope of the ships promised from Peloponnesus died away, it became necessary to have recourse to desperate measures. With the intention of making an attack on the Athenian lines, Salaethus gave shields and spears to the populace, who hitherto had served as light-armed soldiers only. 3 They were no sooner in possession of arms than they refused to obey their officers, and gathering together in knots, demanded that all the corn in the city should be brought out and divided equally ; if the demand were refused, they would give surrender of up the city to the enemy. Eeflecting that they M y tilene - were quite unable to prevent the action of the people, and that their own position would be one of great danger if they were excluded from any agreement made with the Athenians, the magistrates of the city joined with the people in coming to 1 Thuc. iii. 26. Tlmcydides here speaks of forty-two ships in the fleet of Aicidas, though previously, c. 16 and 25, he has mentioned forty only, and so in c. 29. 2 Thuc. iii. 29. 3 Thuc. iii. 27. 166 MYTILENE SURRENDERS, 427. [VI. 7. terms with Paches. They placed themselves unconditionally at the mercy of Athens, and agreed to receive the army into the city ; merely stipulating that they should be allowed to send envoys to Athens to plead their cause, and that till they returned Paches should not imprison, nor enslave, nor put to death any of the citizens. Those who had taken a leading part in the negotiations with Lacedaemon sought the pro- tection of the altars, but on receiving an assurance that they should suffer no injury, they also put themselves into the hands of Paches, who placed them in Tenedos. 1 7. When the Peloponnesians found that Lesbos was indeed taken, a council of war was held to decide on their move- Aicidas off the ments. Teutiaplus of Elis urged an immediate coast of Asia. attack on Mytilene ; the enemy were not aware of their presence, and by a sudden descent they might take them off their guard in the careless confidence of their recent victory. Such vigorous action was quite beyond Alcidas. Nor would he listen to the advice of the Ionian exiles and the Lesbians in his fleet, who suggested that he should seize some city of Ionia, or Cyme in Aeolis, as a base of operations from which to excite a revolt in Ionia, an attempt in which he could rely not only on the feeling of the Asiatic Greeks, but on the help of Pissuthnes, the satrap of Sardis. His only wish, now that Mytilene had fallen, was to return whence he came. Sailing from Embatum he put in at Myonnesus, where he slaughtered most of the captives taken on the voyage, a barbarous and foolish act, which could only alienate those whom he was sent to assist, and damage the Spartan cause. As he lay off Ephesus, the Samian oli- garchs, who had established themselves at Anaea, on the mainland, after their expulsion from the island {supra, p. 3 3), 2 protested against his conduct, declaring that he had an ill way of liberating Hellas, if he put to death men who made no resistance and were not even enemies, but allies of Athens 1 Thuc. iii. 28. 2 Thuc. iv. 75. VI. 70 A LCI DAS AND PACHES, #B7. 167 under compulsion. Alcidas then set at liberty ail the sur- viving Ghians in his hands, and some others. 1 Before arriving at Ephesus, he had been sighted by the Salaminia and Paralus, the two state galleys of the Athen- ians. Pursuit was now inevitable, and, indeed, information of his presence had already been conveyed to Paches. Alcidas had no intention of being caught ; from Ephesus he struck across the open sea, " not wishing to touch on any land till he reached Peloponnesus, if he could help it." Paches followed as far as Patmos, without coming in sight of the fleet ; upon which he returned to Notium near Colophon, while Alcidas, fleeing far to the south, was carried by a storm to Crete, whence his vessels straggled home. 2 If Alcidas was cowardly, Paches was treacherous. In the spring of 430 there had been a revolution at Colophon, in which the oligarchical party, aided by Itamenes Paches at and a number of Persians, drove out their Notlum - opponents, and seized the upper city for themselves. The exiles settled in Notium, which was the port of Colophon, where, in a short time, a second faction broke out. A new Persian party was formed, which, of course, had the support of the similar party in Colophon, and a number of Arcadian and barbarian mercenaries were sent to their aid by Pissuthnes. They were now able to drive their opponents out of Notium, and, to secure their position, the mercenaries were placed under the command of one Hippias, in a part of the town which was walled off into a fortress. The Athenian party summoned Paches to their assistance, who induced Hippias to visit him, on the assurance that, if terms were not arranged, he should be sent back uninjured. But no sooner had Paches got him in his power than he made an unexpected attack on the fortress and slew all who were in 1 Thuc. iii. 30-32. His captives were the more numerous because the Ionians, far from attempting to escape, came to his ships under the impression that they were Athenian. No one in the eastern Aegean expected to see Peloponnesian vessels in those waters, so long as the Athenian empire lasted. 2 Thuc. iii. 33, 69. 168 P ACHES AT MYTILENE, 427. [VI. 8. it. He then took Hippias back into the fortress, as he had promised, and caused him to be slain. The Persian party were of course expelled from Notium, and not long after- wards the Athenians sent out a number of commissioners to establish the town as a colony under Athenian laws. Any Colophonian who might be in exile among the neighbouring cities was recalled, if he were of the democratic party, and enrolled in the new settlement. Owing to its situation on the shore, Notium was in the range of Athenian protection ; Colophon, on the other hand, which lay on a hill at some little distance inland, remained in the hands of the Persians. 1 8. From Notium Paches returned to Mytilene. He lost no time in acquiring the two cities of the island, Pyrrha and The Mytiien- Eresus, which were still independent, and then aeans sent to he despatched to Athens the Mytilenaeans Athens. whom he had placed in Tenedos, and any others who seemed specially implicated in the revolt, in- cluding Salaethus. The disturbance was now so utterly crushed that he was able to dismiss the larger part of his forces. 2 When the captives arrived at Athens, Salaethus was at once put to death. 3 The fate of the Mytilenaeans was then cieon's brought before the Athenian Assembly. Cleon, proposal. who by this time had completely won the ear of the people, pressed for an extreme penalty. He proposed to execute, not only the prisoners who had been brought to Athens — who were, in fact, the ringleaders in the revolt — but all the grown-up citizens of Mytilene, and to sell the women and children into slavery. To this atrocious sentence he brought the people to consent by dwelling on the unpro- voked nature of the revolt — for Lesbos was not a subject state, but an equal ally — and pointing out the unexpected and unparalleled circumstance that a Peloponnesian fleet 1 Thuc. iii. 34 ; Xen. Hell. i. 2. 4. 2 Time. iii. 35. 3 He endeavoured to save himself by offering to get the Pelopon- nesians withdrawn from Plataea, but the offer was rejected. VI. 8.] CLEON'S PROPOSAL, 4,27. 169 had crossed the Aegean to support the revolt. Such audacity was thought to imply an extensive plan for the alienation of the Asiatic cities — a plan which must be repressed by the most vigorous measures. At the close of the „ r ° . Cruel decree of meeting a trireme was sent to Paches, an- the Athenians : nouncing the resolution, and bidding him "^J^j™ 66 *" execute it without delay. But when the citizens had retired to their homes, and the excitement of a public meeting had subsided, a change came over their feelings. The decree which had seemed just and politic a few hours before was now regarded as cruel and monstrous. A review of the whole circumstances of the revolt showed that there were different degrees of guilt ; and the populace of Mytilene, who were involved in one sentence with the oli- garchs, had practically been the cause of the surrender of the city to the Athenians. The Mytilenaean envoys present in Athens, and those of the citizens who sympathised with them, were not slow to notice the change of sentiment. They appealed to the magistrates to call a second Assembly, and bring the matter before it once more. It is doubtful whether it was strictly legal to reopen a question which had been decided by a former vote in the Assembly. But, as the Assembly was itself the sovereign power, an act which received its approval could not be called in question by any other body, and there was no standing ordinance which forbade the sovereign power to cancel its own decrees. On the next morning notice was given of a second Assembly, and the people were once more gathered in the Pnyx. 1 Cleon was furious. It was his motion which was being rediscussed ; his policy was being challenged ; his authority shaken. In the speech which Thucydides has put into his mouth on this occasion, we have a sketch of the attitude of the demagogue to the Athenian allies abroad and to his own opponents at home. It was useless, he said, to apply the principles which prevailed in the democracy i Time. iii. 36. 170 C LEON'S SPEECH, 427. [VI. 8- of Athens to the government of her empire. That was a tyranny, and must be maintained as such. As for these changes of purpose— they were odious and ruinous too. Let the law be maintained; innovations were clever, no doubt, but there was something better for a state than cleverness, and that was consistency. " Can any one show that the revolt of the Mytilenaeans is a benefit to the state 1 Of course he can not; the mere attempt to do so means that the speaker has been bribed to persuade you out of your senses. And when can we punish with a truer sense of the injury than when the injury is fresh in our minds 1 The love of fine speeches is the ruin of you Athenians, for when straightforward action on recognised principles is needed, you are always listening to the last argument. Nothing can be worse than the conduct of the Mytilenaeans. They were safe from the enemy ; they had a fleet of their own, and enjoyed a favoured position; yet this did not prevent them from taking sides with our bitterest enemies. The truth is, we have been too lenient with them. We ought to have reduced them to subjection long ago, and treated them like the rest. It is not too late to let them feel the weight of your arm, and the opportunity must not be allowed to pass. And we must make no difference between nobles and people. They were all of one mind about attacking us. If you give way to foolish considerations of mercy, all your allies will revolt. Remember that your empire is involved in the sentence ; for if you spare the Mytilenaeans, you confess that your rule is unjust ; you cannot take up an ideal line about virtue and retain that. Think, too, how they would deal with you, if they had the opportunity, and deal so with them. Eemember the feelings which came over you when first you heard of the revolt, and punish them as they deserve." That his opponents are bribed — that argument is sophistical when opposed to his own views — that the Athenian power is a despotism which can only be supported by despotic measures — that justice is revenge — that mercy and equity VI. 9 .] THE SPEECH OF DIODOTUS, 427. 171 are out of the question in dealing with the allies— that tory stupidity is better than liberal discussion — these are the principles on which Cleon wishes to lead the Athenians of his day. Such ideas were clear and intelligible, and likely to commend themselves to the meanest citizen. 9, The leader of the opposite party was Diodotus, of whom, unfortunately, we know nothing. He began with some allusions to Cleon. The two greatest The speech of impediments to wise counsel were haste and Dlodotus - passion, of which the first was a sign of folly, and the second implied a vulgar and narrow mind. A man who wished to prevent discussion was either one who had not the sense to see that in no other way could light be thrown on the future, or he had a discreditable proposal to make, and knowing that it would not bear examination, he endeavoured to silence opposition by the virulence of his abuse, or by hints of cor- ruption. But discussion was quite a different thing from slander, or invective, and those who demanded it ought not to be suspected of dishonesty and corruption ; there was no better citizen than the man who tried to convince his fellows of what was right by fair argument. If a speaker could not venture to come forward openly with his opinion, he was compelled to deceive his audience ; and thus the patriot and the traitor were on the same level. This was a great evil and a great mistake too, for those who came forward to advise the people were men who had taken unusual pains to form a sound opinion, and moreover they were respon- sible for what they said. "The present question is merely one of policy. Is the severe sentence likely to do us harm or good 1 Cleon's proposal may be just in the abstract sense of justice — but is it politic 1 I say it is not. The fear of death does not deter men from crime ; men have gone on increasing the severity of sentences — for in earlier times they would naturally be milder — but crimes are still committed. The present outweighs the future; and hope suggests escape. It is impossible, and simply absurd to suppose, that human i 172 THE SPEECH OF DIODOTUS, 427. [VI. 9- nature when bent upon some favourite project can be restrained either by the power of law or by any other terror. Such a sentence as that which we are met to discuss will only drive our enemies to despair. They will resist to the last man, for there is no hope if they yield. Our wars will be fought to the bitter end, and when we are victorious there will be nothing left for us to gain. Let us be as cautious and vigilant as you will; but avoid extremity in punishment. In the present case we must make a distinction. The popular party are our friends everywhere ; the people of Mytilene took no part in the revolt. If you destroy them equally with the guilty, you will alienate your friends; besides, if guilty and innocent share the same fate, no one will care to be innocent. Cleon may insist that his proposal is just, but justice and expediency cannot always be com- bined. I do not speak to you of lenity or mercy, words which are out of place in a discussion of this kind. I only advise what is most politic. You have the guilty men in your hands : pass sentence on them as you will ; but leave the rest of the inhabitants untouched." 1 In this remarkable speech we observe that hardly a word is said in condemnation of the cruelty of the decree, though many of the audience were painfully conscious of this. Diodotus accepts the sentiment of his audience, and endeavours to show how far it can be rightly indulged. The proposal of Cleon is even allowed to be just, i.e. it corresponds fairly to the degree of resentment which the Athenians might be expected to feel towards the Lesbians. The only point in question is the expediency of such a wholesale execution. And here it is interesting to notice that Diodotus uses argu- ments of which the world has been very slow to recognise the value. That severity of punishment, far from preventing, tends to aggravate crime is now a commonplace ; but it has only become so after a long series of judicial atrocities. Another feature of these speeches, less striking, but 1 Thuc. iii. 42-48. See Jowett's translation. VI. io.] PUBLTC SPEAKING AT ATHENS. 173 perhaps even more significant as an indication of Athenian feeling, is the view taken of the political adviser or speaker. We see an audience delighting in displays of rhetoric, who can be influenced and carried away by a clever speech ; and as a natural consequence we find a class of orators growing up who make it their sole business to lead or mislead the Assembly. They were masters of argument and disputation ; men with whom subtlety was far above sincerity. They drew upon themselves the hatred of both the sections of conservative feeling at Athens ; we find them denounced as bitterly by Aristophanes as they are by Cleon. Both alike warned the people against unprincipled leaders, who were either bribed to play their part, or spoke as "sophists" from a mere love of discussion. There was, no doubt, some truth in this point of view, but the means taken to destroy the influence of these " orators " were not without evils. It was unfair to charge every speaker who happened to oppose the popular feeling with corruption and dishonesty. As Diodotus points out, the suspicion thus created stood in the way of those who honestly wished to give good advice to their citizens. At the best, the politician had enough responsibility, for often he alone was made to suffer, when the people had eagerly supported him, or even when the failure of his plan was due to others. 1 10. The excitement in the Assembly was great, and no one knew on which side the decision would fall. The show of hands appeared to be nearly equal in favour Mytiiene of either proposal, but the amendment of issav ed. Diodotus was carried by a small majority. A trireme was immediately despatched to overtake the ship which had been sent out twenty-four hours previously. The envoys 1 It is remarkable that Aristophanes, though opposed to the war, and to any severe treatment of the allies, never directly alludes to the atrocities which made the Athenian name odious in Greece, but cp. Knights, 1025, Kepfiepov dvdpcnrodiaTrjv ; and indeed the massacre of the Mytilenaeans "is alluded to among the crimes of the Athenian people but two or three times in the whole of ancient literature." — Forbes, Thuc. I. ci. 174 C LEON'S DECREE RESCINDED, 427. [VI. 10. from Mytilene provided the crew with wine and meal, and promised a large reward if they arrived at Lesbos in time to prevent the execution of the decree. The sailors rowed without stopping, eating meal kneaded with wine and oil as they sat at the oar, and giving up their places to a fresh relay of men when they required sleep. As there was happily no opposing wind, and the first trireme did not hasten on its dismal errand, the race was won, and Mytilene was saved. Paches had already read the decree of the Athenians, and was preparing to carry it into execution, when the second vessel arrived to countermand the orders. 1 Even now the sentence was severe enough. All the Mytilenaeans who had been sent to Athens, more than a Massacres and thousand in number, were put to death; the confiscations. walls of the city were pulled down ; the ships carried away. The whole of the island, with the exception of the territory of Methymna, was then divided into three thousand lots, of which three hundred were set aside for the temples, and the rest assigned to Athenian citizens. The new owners, though sent out to the island, did not permanently reside on their property, but leased it at an annual rent of two minae a lot to Lesbian tenants. Such an income would be welcome to many who had lost all their property in the repeated invasions of Attica, and enabled many more to qualify for the hoplite class who had hitherto fallen below it. The total sum brought each year into Athens was 5400 minae, or about £18,000. On his return to Athens, Paches was brought to trial by Cleon, and so shameful was his conduct proved to be that he slew himself in open court. 2 1 Time. iii. 49. There could not, of course, be two sets of rowers in one ship, for the space would not admit of this. But we may suppose that the room ordinarily occupied by the officers of the sbip, or assigned to hoplites, was on this occasion given up to men who rowed. 2 For the death of Paches see Plutarch, Nic. 6, who says that it occurred when he was being tried for his conduct in office. Another account attributes it to his treatment of two Lesbian women ; see the VI. ii.] PLATAEA SURRENDERS, 427. 175 II. From the punishment of Mytilene at the hands of the Athenians we pass to the punishment of Plataea at the hands of the Peloponnesians, a punishment The surrender more severe, more indefensible, and more dis- of Plataea - graceful to those who inflicted it. Soon after the recovery of Lesbos the supplies of the besieged Plataeans were utterly exhausted, and they had to choose between starvation and submission. The city was, indeed, reduced to such weakness that resistance to a vigorous attack from the besiegers would have been impossible, but such an attack was strictly for- bidden by the Lacedaemonians, who, looking forward to peace with Athens, did not wish Plataea to come under the category of towns taken by force — which it might be neces- sary to restore — but under that of towns yielded by agree- ment, which either side would claim to keep. For this reason the general in command of the siege was instructed to send a herald to Plataea, which was now in the last stage of exhaustion, and inquire whether the garrison would sub- mit themselves to the judgment of the Lacedaemonians; " the guilty would be punished, but no injustice would be done." In the belief that they would receive a fair trial, and would be, at any rate, in the hands of the Lacedae- monians, not of their bitter enemies the Thebans, the garri- son gave up their city. Food was immediately supplied to them until the commissioners who were to decide their fate should arrive from Sparta. On the arrival of the judges the hopes of the Plataeans were dashed to the ground. No accusation was brought against them ; they were merely asked, one after the other, epigram of Agathias (a d. 570, Anthol. v'\i. 614). Paches slew their husbands, but the women escaped him and made their way to Athens, where they denounced his conduct. Cleon probably had a grudge against Paches for his want of promptness in executing the first decree. See Beloch, Die Attische Politik, pp. 30, 33. Cp. Plut. Aristid. 26. For some difficulties connected with the revolt, see Forbes, Time. i. ci., f. When Thucydides says that the somewhat more than 1000 who were put to death were alriaTaroi rijs dnoardo-eais, one is inclined to doubt the numeral. 176 THE TRIAL OF THE PLATAEANS, 427. [VI. It. the short and simple question, whether they had rendered any assistance to the Lacedaemonians or their allies in the Trial of the present war. Of course, as they were allies of piataeans. Athenians, there was but one answer ; an answer which implied* immediate condemnation. In the hope -that they might move their judges to take a more favourable view, they requested leave to address them through two of their number, Astymachus, and Lacon, who was the proxenus of the Lacedaemonians at Plataea. The head and front of the offence of the Piataeans was their alliance with Athens. Originally a member of the Boeotian Speech of the League, the city had broken away from the con- piataeans. federacy, to which, both by race and territory, she naturally belonged, and associated with the Athenians (supra, p. 111). But the Piataeans were able to prove that they had taken this step on the advice of the Spartan king, Cleomenes, and therefore — whether they were right or wrong in abandoning their Boeotian friends — the Spartans could not justly condemn them. And though they had joined in the gene- ral alliance formed in 481 to resist the Persians, this did not cancel the alliance with Athens already existing. In taking the Athenian side they were only fulfilling obligations which every city was bound to fulfil. In the present war their city had been attacked by Thebes without notice or provoca- tion, even at a holy season, a proof that without the support of the Athenians they would have lost their independence. Instead of reproaching them for their fidelity to allies who had aided them in a time of trouble, the Spartans should remember their services to the cause of Hellas. In the great invasion they alone among the cities of Boeotia had fought for liberty. They had even gone on board ship as seamen, leaving their city to destruction. How different was the conduct of the Thebans, who had done their best to enslave Hellas to the barbarians. At Plataea the decisive battle had been fought; in their country were the memorials of victory, the tombs of the slain, and the temples in which the conquerors offered prayer and thanksgiving ; it was they VI. 12.] THE APPEAL OF THE PLATA EANS, Jffl. 177 who, year by year, made offerings to the dead who had fallen in the glorious struggle ; their land was sacred, pledged by the oath of Pausanias to be inviolate and in- dependent. And were they then to be rooted out from the soil of Greece to satisfy the revenge of their most bitter enemies % That would be a stain on the honour of Lacedae- mon, which now stood first in Greece ; a denial of the protec- tion due to them as to all suppliants. But if the Spartans were indeed obdurate, let them at least put the garrison back in the city and leave them, if perish they must, to perish of hunger. Terrible as such a fate would be, they would rather die so than fall into the hands of the Thebans. 1 The language in which Thucydides has clothed these thoughts is touching and pathetic. We cannot read it without realising what terrible dangers beset a small city in Greece at the hands of powerful neighbours ; what sacrifices were made in the passionate desire for "independence." We are also deeply impressed with the honourable attachment of Plataea to Athens — an attachment ill repaid by the selfish policy which, while urging resistance, abandoned the city to the enemy. On the other hand, we cannot but lament the presence in this brave and faithful people of that spirit of division which caused it to break away from a union in which alone it would have found protection. Odious as was the conduct of Thebes, we cannot say that her efforts to create a united Boeotia were unjust or impolitic, and to these efforts Plataea was the greatest obstacle. There was also the danger that Plataea might become, as happened in other cities of Boeotia, a centre for democratic intrigues in the interest of Athens. 12. The Thebans thought it necessary to make a reply to this appeal. There were points in their own past which required excuse, and they wished to put Reply of the their case against Plataea as strongly as they Thebans - could. It was true that in the Persian invasion they had 1 Time. iii. F 3 f. vol. nv M 178 MASSACRE OF THE PL A TAEANS, $1. [VI. 12. joined the invader, but Thebes was not her own mistress at the time; she was in the hands of a few leading families, who managed everything in their own interests, and when she got back her constitution, she acted very differently. By the victory of Coronea Hellas was freed from the dominion of Athens. It was true, too, that they had seized Plataea at a time of peace and in a holy season ; but they were not the first to move in the matter ; they merely accepted an invitation sent by the leading citizens in the town. The Plataeans, on the other hand, had acted with the greatest perfidy in attacking the Thebans who came with peaceful intentions, and slaying their captives, though pledged to spare their lives. As for their fidelity, it was merely another name for perfidy. They had forsaken the alliance which they made with the Peloponnesians, and joined Athens in enslaving cities which they were bound to aid, such as Aegina. Their boasted patriotism in the Persian war was due to their alliance with Athens ; it did not arise from any regard for Hellas, as their subsequent conduct showed. And their present isolation was entirely due to their own obstinacy. Had they accepted the offer of Archidamus, no harm would have happened to them. Were they to go unpunished for such conduct, and claim to be free from the operation of the common laws of Hellenic warfare? 1 The Spartans took the view that Plataea, by refusing the neutrality which Archidamus offered, had fallen back into Massacre of her original position as an ally of Sparta, the Plataeans. rpj^ i uc ki ess Plataeans were brought forward once more, one by one, and the same question was put to each : " Had he done any service to the Lacedaemonians or their allies in the war 1 " and each one, as he answered "No," was taken away and put to death. The total number thus murdered amounted to two hundred Plataeans and twenty- five Athenians. The women who had remained in the city were sold into slavery. For about a year the Thebans 1 Thuc. iii. 60 VI. 13- ] THE CORCYRAEANS, 481-427. 179 allowed the deserted town to be the home of some Megarian exiles ; but afterwards they razed it to the foundations. The territory was converted into public land and leased to citizens of Thebes. For many years the site of the city remained desolate, and the survivors of the citizens con- tinued to live at Athens, whence a number of them were subsequently sent as colonists to occupy Scione. 1 13. At Plataea and Mytilene we have examples of the principles upon which the war was conducted by the leading cities on either side. The course of our narrative now leads us to Corcyra, to be present at scenes which illustrate the nature of domestic strife in Greek cities. We cannot affirm that this ferocious spirit was engendered by the war, but, as we shall see, the opposition of Athenian and Peloponnesian interests afforded opportunities to the conflicting parties, oligarchical and democratic, of which they were not slow to avail themselves. When the Corcyraean envoys appeared at Athens in 433, they pointed out the advantage which Athens would derive in a war with Sparta from the union of the „ „, Corcyra sends Corcyraean and Athenian fleets. The greater little aid to is our surprise to find that, when the war Athens - broke out, Corcyra furnished little or no assistance. In the summer of 431, notwithstanding the crushing defeat of 433, fifty Corcyraean vessels joined the fleet which sailed round Peloponnesus, but after this no ships were sent till 426, when fifteen came to the help of Demosthenes. When the Corinthians restored Evarchus to Astacus, when Phormio was engaged at such fearful odds with the Peloponnesian fleet, and in urgent need of reinforcements, the Corcyraean triremes lay inactive in the harbour of the city. The explanation is to be sought in the changes which took place at Corcyra in the interval between 431 and 427. In the 1 Thuc. iii. 68 ; v. 32 ; Diod. xii. 76. The restoration came forty years later, after the peace of Antalcidas in 387, but the town was again destroyed (Diod. xv. 46 ; Pans. ix. 1) For the Plataeans at Athens, see Gilbert, Handbuch, i. p. 178 ( = 187 E.T.). 180 FA C TIONS AT CORC YA'A . [VI. 13. naval engagement of 432 a number of Corcyraeans, belonging to the foremost families in the island, had been captured and carried to Corinth. They were treated with the greatest consideration while detained in the city, and at some time, which we cannot fix, were allowed to return at a nominal ransom of eight hundred talents, for which their proxeni at Corinth became security. It was not intended that such an enormous sum should ever be exacted ; on the contrary, the captives were really sent back in the Corinthian interest, to detach Corcyra from Athens ; and on their return the city was thrown into great confusion. 1 The condition of parties at Corcyra at this time is un- certain. As many of the oligarchs in the city had either The Corcyraean been slain or taken captive, the democrats oligarchs. must have gained in power, and perhaps it was owing to their ascendency that the Athenians received a contingent of fifty ships in 431. However this may be, the captives, on their return, endeavoured to estrange Athens and Corcyra, and so great was their influence, that the Athenians and Corinthians each sent envoys to the island, the first to maintain their position, the second to take advantage of the new movement. A public assembly was held, in which it was resolved that the Corcyraeans, while continuing allies of the Athenians as before, should renew their former friendship with the Peloponnesians. The oligarchs were not content with this success; they aimed at nothing less than the suppression of the Athenian or democratic party in the city, and with Peithias. this view they summoned Peithias, the leader of the people and proxenus of the Athenians, to take his trial on a charge of attempting to enslave Corcyra to Athens. The people refused to condemn their leader ; and in revenge Peithias charged five of the richest citizens with cutting stakes for their vineyards in the sacred wood of Zeus and Alcinous, a practice forbidden by law, under, a fine of a 1 Thuc. iii. 70 ; cp. i. 55, supra, p. 81 VI. I4-] THE OLIGARCHS VICTORIOUS, 427. 181 stater (3s.) for each stake. The accused were condemned, and found themselves burdened with a ruinous fine. In vain they took refuge at the altars of Zeus and Alcinous, entreating to be allowed to pay their debt by instalments ; at the instigation of Peithias, the council insisted on im- mediate payment. The oligarchs were desperate ; they knew that the democratic leader was in favour of a strict alliance, offensive and defensive, with Athens, and, as he was all- powerful in the council, their own ruin was imminent. Eushing with daggers into the council-chamber, they struck him down, and others to the number of sixty, some of whom were not even councillors. 1 The oligarchs summoned the people, and told them that what they had done was done to free Corcyra from the dominion of Athens. The city would now go back to her old neutrality, and stand aside from the quarrel which divided Greece. Athenians and Pelopon- nesians would be received without distinction, if they came in one ship only, and with peaceable intentions. The people had no alternative but to sanction this arrangement ; the oligarchy then sent envoys to Athens to put their conduct in the best light, and to dissuade the democrats, who had set sail in the Athenian trireme, from organising any opposition. But their envoys no sooner arrived than they were arrested and carried over to Aegina. 2 These events took place while the Athenians were engaged in the blockade of Mytilene, and it is possible that the oli- garchs of Corcyra ventured to strike so boldly in the belief that no assistance would come to the Corcyraean demos from Athens. In other respects the moment was favourable ; the death of Phormio, and the defeat and death of his son Asopius, must have weakened Athenian influence in the west, and their only available force in that quarter was a squadron of twelve ships which lay at Naupactus under the command of Nicostratus. 14. Soon after the despatch of their envoys the oligarchs 1 Time. iii. 70. 2 Time. iii. 71-72. ♦ 182 DEMOCRATIC REACTION, J$7. [VI. 14. were reinforced by a Corinthian trireme with ambassadors from Lacedaemon. They now attacked the people, driving Sedition at them to seek refuge at night in the acropolis Corcyra. an( j other high parts of the town. They also held the southern or Hyllaic harbour, while their opponents occupied .the market-place and the harbour opposite the continent. The next day both parties endeavoured to increase their numbers by inviting the slaves in the island to join them. A large number came to the help of the democrats, while the oligarchs were aided by a band of 800 auxiliaries from the mainland, for here, as at Epidamnus, the oligarchs and barbarians acted together. A day was allowed to pass in quietness, but on the next the contest was vigorously renewed, even the women joining in the fray — at least on the popular side — and hurling missiles from trie housetops on their enemies. The contest went on till evening, and was turning in favour of the demos, who had the larger numbers and the better position, when the oligarchs, fearing that the people would seize the docks, set fire to a number of houses near the market-place and other large blocks of building. The fire was effectual in checking the advance of their opponents, and both parties remained in their respective positions for the night. The Corinthian trireme, seeing the turn that events had taken, stole away, and the greater part of the auxiliaries returned to the continent. 1 On the next day Nicostratus came up from Naupactus with his ships, and 500 heavy T armed Messenians. He Nicostratus endeavoured to reconcile the hostile factions by attempts a proposing that ten of the most guilty oligarchs reconciliation, should De brought to trial, while the rest made a truce and laid aside their enmity, but the ten selected for trial immediately fled, and when Nicostratus was about to quit the island, the popular leaders requested him to leave behind five of his ships for their protection, their place in 1 Thuc. iii. 74. VI. IS-] NICOSTRATUS AT CORCYRA, 427. 183 the fleet being taken by five Corcyraean vessels. Nicostratus agreed, and the people began to man the ships with crews selected from the oligarchs. The oligarchs took alarm. Why were they selected to serve under Athenians 1 Were they not being sent to Athens for punishment 1 In their terror they took refuge in the temple of the Dioscuri, where they remained in spite of the assurances of Nicostratus. In the eyes of the people, this dread of serving in the Athenian fleet was a proof of treasonable designs. They Distress of disarmed them by removing their weapons the oligarchs, from their houses, and would even have killed those whom they met — for in the meanwhile most of the refugees had left their sanctuary — had not Nicostratus interfered. In their distress the unfortunate oligarchs, to the number of 400, took refuge in the temple of Hera; but the people, believing themselves to be insecure so long as their enemies remained in the city, persuaded them to leave the temple, and they were conveyed to the island opposite, to which provisions were regularly sent. 1 15. For three or four days affairs continued in this posi- tion, Nicostratus still remaining at Corcyra. A new scene in the drama opened with the arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet. After the failure at Lesbos, the Lacedaemonians had deter- mined to increase their navy ; and hearing of the troubles in Corcyra, they instructed Alcidas, who was still in command, to sail to the island. Accompanied by Brasidas, who had been chosen as his adviser, he set sail from Cyllene in Elis, with a fleet of fifty-three ships, and anchored for the night at Sybota, a harbour on the mainland. The next morning he sailed upon the city. 2 His arrival created the greatest confusion. The popular party were now between two enemies — those in the city and those in the fleet. They hastily manned sixty vessels which lay in the harbour and sent them out in detachments, without waiting till the whole force was ready. Two of the 1 Thuc. iii. 75. 2 Thuc. iii. 76. 184 ALCIDAS AT COKCYRA, [VI. 15. Corcyraean ships, on reaching the enemy, at once deserted to them ; in others the crews began to fight with each other. A Arrival of the battle followed, which, owing to the skill and Peioponnesian coolness of the Athenians, was protracted till fleet - sunset, when the Peloponnesians returned to their station at Sybota with thirteen Corcyraean vessels. No attempt was made, either on that or the succeeding day, to capture the town, for in spite of the remonstrances of Brasidas, Alcidas refused to take the opportunity offered by the panic which prevailed. So great was the alarm in the city that the Corcyraeans removed the refugees from the island, and even persuaded some to go on board the thirty triremes, which they were able to man in expectation of a second battle. Alcidas, however, contented himself with ravaging the south of the island for half the day, and when at nightfall signals from Leucas announced the arrival of sixty Athenian ships, he at once sailed homewards, creeping along the shore, and transporting his ships over the low isthmus which united Leucas with the mainland, to escape detection by the Athenians. The popular party were now absolute masters of the city. The fleet which arrived from Athens, under the command of Eurymedon, joined that of Nicostratus, making a total of seventy-two vessels, besides the thirty Corcyraean ships, which, though partly manned by oligarchs, were commanded Massacre of by captains of the other party. Thus supported, the oligarchs. the Corcyraean demos went to work with a will. The five hundred Messenians, who had hitherto remained out- side the city, were brought within the walls, and all the ships were united in the Hyllaic harbour. The massacre then began. Every oligarch found in the city was at once cut down ; and when the Corcyraean ships approached the shore, those refugees who had been placed on board were taken out and slaughtered. Of the suppliants who still remained in the temple of Hera, about fifty were persuaded to come out and stand their trial. These were at once condemned. A much larger number refused to leave the temple, preferring VI. 16.] MASSACRE OF THE OLIGARCHS, $7. 185 to be their own executioners ; many put an end to their lives in the shrine ; others went into the precincts and hanged themselves on the trees, or destroyed themselves in any manner they could. The massacre went on for the seven days during which the Athenian fleet remained at Corey ra. It was ostensibly a political execution, an extermination of the oligarchs, but in reality many other motives were at work ; personal enmity, and even the desire to get rid of a creditor, were as active here as in the proscriptions of Rome. Whatever crimes a man committed there was no risk of con- demnation, for all were alike implicated in the slaughter. "Every form of death was seen, and everything, and more than everything, that commonly happens in revolutions happened then. The father slew the son, and the suppliants were torn from the temples and slain near them; some of them were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus and there perished." 1 Even a week of butchery did not suffice for the demos to exterminate their opponents. About 500 of the oli- garchs survived the massacre, and passed over Escapeofthe — we do not know how — to the mainland, survivors to whence they issued forth in plundering raids the mainland - to the island, raids so successful, that Corcyra was reduced to famine. But in spite of their successes they were unable to bear the separation from their city. They sent envoys to Lacedaemon and Corinth asking to be restored, and when this hope failed, they returned to Corcyra in boats, which they burnt, that they might have no resource except in the conquest of the island. They established themselves in a fort on Mount Istone, from which they plundered the country and the city. 2 l6. We may anticipate the progress of events and tell out this wretched story to the end. For a year and a half the exiles continued their depredations, but in the spring of 425 the Athenians, when despatching a fleet of forty vessels to 1 Time. iii. 81 (Jowett). 2 Thuc. iii. 85. 186 THE OLIGARCHS AT CORCVRA, 425. [VI. 16. Sicily under the command of Eurymedon and Sophocles, gave them orders to call at Corcyra on their way and put End of the an en( ^ to the disorder. During the last year Corcyraean the inhabitants of the city had been greatly dis- sedition. tressed, and they were now suffering severely from famine, while their enemies were supported by the presence of a Peloponnesian fleet of sixty vessels. On its way, as we shall see, the Athenian fleet occupied Pylus, an event which, though it delayed the Athenians, compelled the Peloponnesians to withdraw their fleet from the island. On their arrival, Eurymedon and Sophocles joined the citizens in an attack upon the fortress of Istone. The attack was successful ; the exiles were driven out, and after fleeing for refuge to an elevated part of the mountain, surrendered at discretion to the Athenians. The generals carried their captives to the island of Ptychia, till they could be sent to Athens, guaranteeing their safety on condition that no attempt at escape should be made. But the leaders of the Corcyraean demos, fearing that the Athenians would not put their captives to death, persuaded a few to run the risk, and promised to find a boat for the purpose. The fugitives were of course captured, and the whole number were now given up to the Corcyraeans. For this treachery the Athenian generals themselves were partly to blame ; at any rate, they were not unwilling to insist with the utmost precision on the terms of the capitulation, without any regard to the means by which the fugitives had been brought to break them ; and as they were themselves engaged to sail to Sicily, they had no wish that captives whom they had taken should be carried to Athens by others, who would reap the honour of their success. 1 The Corcyraeans placed the prisoners in a large chamber, from which, having arranged a number of hoplites in two The final rows, they led them out, twenty at a time, massacre. chained to one another. As they passed along the rows they were beaten and stabbed by the hoplites on i Thuc. iv. 46, 47. VI. 17.] THE FINAL MASSACRE, 48$. 187 either side, each of whom seized the opportunity to avenge himself on an enemy, while others with scourges lashed those who lingered on their way. In this manner about sixty were taken out and destroyed before their fate was discovered. When this was known, those who remained in the chamber called on the Athenians to put them to death with their own hands if they pleased, but they refused to go out or to allow any one to enter. The Corcyraeans made no attempt to force a passage through the doors; they climbed on the roof, and, breaking through it, pelted the prisoners with the tiles, or shot arrows upon them. The wretched men de- fended themselves for a time, but at length most of them in despair put an end to their lives in any way that they could. The massacre went on through the day and the greater part of the following night, till all were destroyed. The women who had been captured in the fortress were sold as slaves. " This," says Thucydides, "was the end of the great Corcyraean sedi- tion, at any rate for the period of the Peloponnesian war, for, in fact, little or nothing was left of the oligarchical party." 1 17. We now return to the year 427. The Athenians did not forget the threatened attack on the Peiraeus in 429. Soon after the recovery of Lesbos Nicias seized Nicias captures the island of Minoa, lying in front of Megara, Minoa - which the Megarians had fortified and used as a military station. It was nearer Megara than Budorum or Salamis, and if the Athenians held it they would have complete control of Nisaea. Nicias directed his attack to the side nearest the mainland, and after destroying two towers which commanded the connection with the shore, gained the whole island, in which he built a fort and left a garrison. 2 At the close of the summer Athens took a step which was attended with momentous results — a step more opposed than 1 Thuc. iv. 47, 48. For a criticism on Thucydides' account of the Corcyraean sedition, see Muller-Strubing in N~. Jahrbiich. fur Phil. vol. 133, p. 585 ff. ; and for a criticism on this, Holm, Greek Hist. ii. p. 392. See also Macan, Transactions of the Oxford Phil. Soc. 1886- 1887, pp. 30-31. 2 Thuc. iii. 51. 188 THE ATHENIANS IN SICILY, 427. [VI. 17. any which she had hitherto taken to the policy of Pericles. Envoys arrived from the Chalcidians of Sicily, among whom was Gorgias, the sophist, of Leontini, asking for assistance against Syracuse and the Dorians. Since the final suppres- sion of the rising of the Sicels, Syracuse had greatly extended her power (vol. ii. p. 472). She was now at war with the Leontines, who, finding themselves shut up by land and sea, and relying on the alliance which had been made in 433, came to Athens for assistance. With them were envoys from Ehegium, a city which, like their own, was in alliance with Athens. The envoys were well received. At the beginning of the war the Dorians of Sicily had been ranged among the allies of Sparta, in the confident hope that they would send to the Peloponnese a fleet far more numerous than that of Athens, and though no ships had ever crossed the sea, the alarm had not passed away. There were other reasons also which weighed with the Athenians; in the petition of the Leontines they saw an opportunity of realis- ing the long-cherished hope of extending their dominion The Athenians over most prosperous of Greek settlements, send ships to A pretext for war was not far to seek. As Sicily. Ionians, as allies, they were bound to succour their allies and kinsmen. A small fleet was despatched to Sicily under Laches, who seems, however, to have done nothing till the winter, when an abortive attack was made on the inhabitants of the Liparaean Islands. 1 Meanwhile Athens was once more a city of the dead and dying. The plague, which since the summer of 428 had greatly The plague diminished in severity, though it had never reappears at entirely ceased, returned in all its terrors, and Athens. continued to rage for a whole year (427-426). In this dreadful scourge no fewer than 4400 of the heavy- armed citizens perished, and 300 of the knights; the mortality among the common people could not even be estimated. 2 1 Thuc. iii. 86, 88. 2 Thuc. iii. 87. The plague raged from early summer 430 to early summer 428, and again from winter 427 to winter 426. CHAPTER VII. FROM THE BEGINNING OF 426 TO THE END OF 425. I. There was no invasion of Attica by the Lacedaemonians in the spring of 426. The allies had collected at the Isthmus as usual, but their advance was prevented by no invasion of a series of earthquakes, and they returned Attica - home. The season was indeed remarkable for physical disturbances, which could not fail to impress the super- stitious minds of the Greeks. The elements seemed to be taking a part in the terrible conflict which was spreading desolation and bloodshed throughout Hellas. But though the Lacedaemonians allowed the year to pass without an invasion of Attica, they fell upon another project, which promised far greater results, and is a Colonisation of proof that their plans of warfare were being Heraclea by the conceived on a larger and more effective scale. s P artans - The Trachinians, a Melian tribe, dwelling near the pass of Thermopylae, had suffered greatly at the hands of their neighbours the Oetaeans. Their first intention was to put themselves in the hands of the Athenians, but on second thoughts they sent an envoy to the Lacedaemonians, as the more trustworthy allies (infra, p. 1 99). Their envoy was joined by others from the Dorians, the mountain state which claimed to be the metropolis of Lacedaemon, for they, like Trachis, had been ravaged by the Oetaeans, and were in urgent need of help. The Lacedaemonians resolved to send out a colony, not merely to assist the suppliants, but because a city of their own in that region would be of service in the war. Could a fleet be maintained at Thermopylae, it might cross to Euboea, or control the passage to Thrace. They consulted 190 THE FO UN DA TION OF HERA CLE A, 426. [VI I. 2. the oracle of Delphi, and on receiving a favourable answer sent out colonists from Sparta and the Perioecic cities, in- viting any of the Greeks who chose to join, except the Ionians and Achaeans and some other nations. The leaders of the colony were three in number, and all from Lacedae- mon: Leon, Alcidas, and Dam agon. The name Heraclea was given to the new city. The Athenians were at first greatly alarmed for the safety of Euboea, but their fears proved to be groundless. The Thessalians, who ruled the neighbouring districts, and all whose territory was threatened, were bitterly hostile to the new city, and carried on ceaseless war against it ; and when the governors who were sent out from Sparta, by their harsh and tyrannical conduct, frightened away the greater part of the settlers, it was easy for the neighbouring nations to complete their conquest. 1 The foundation of Heraclea was an attempt to carry out the plan of e^iTcix" 7 "/^, which the Corinthians mentioned in 432 as one of the means by which Athens might be attacked. To whom the attempt was due we do not know, but in the winter of 427-426 the aged king Archidamus was succeeded by his son Agis, who, as a younger man and more warlike in his views, would be likely to venture on new methods. About this time also Plistoanax was brought back to Sparta after nineteen years of exile. This for a time may have encouraged the Spartans to new plans, though Plisto- anax was subsequently desirous of peace. 2 2. The Athenians also ventured on new projects. They began the operations of the year by sending out fleets to the Nicias at Melos east and west. Nicias was despatched with a and Tanagra. large f orce to the island of Melos, a colony of the Lacedaemonians, which had hitherto refused to become 1 Thuc. iii. 92, 23. Strabo, p. 428. Leake, Northern Greece, ii. 26 f. 2 Thuc. v. 16. Can we accept Aristoph. Ach. 652 f., hia tov& i/fias AaKedaifxovioi rrjv elprjvqv npoKakovvTai kcli ttjv K'iyivav anaiTovcrw, as evidence that the Spartans were willing to make peace in 426 ? V 1 1 . 3. ] D EMOS THENES AT LE UCAS, 426. 191 a member of the Delian confederacy. The recent events in Lesbos may have warned the Athenians that it was necessary to make their power felt in the Aegean, and above all to deprive the Lacedaemonians of any stations where a Dorian fleet might find shelter. Whatever the cause, they now determined to force the island into the confederacy. 1 The attempt failed, and after devastating the island, Nicias returned to Oropus, on the northern border of Attica. Here the hoplites disembarked under cover of night, and marched along the Asopus to Tanagra. At the same time, on a pre- concerted signal, the whole force of Athens advanced over the border to join the invading army. They devastated the country round Tanagra, and defeated the Tanagraeans in battle, after which, without attempting to make use of the victory, they retired, some to the city, and others to the ships. Nicias continued his voyage to eastern Locris, where he ravaged the sea-coast ; and then returned home. 2 3, The second fleet sailed westwards under the command of Demosthenes, the son of Alcisthenes, of whom we now hear for the first time. Nothing is said of ~ P Demosthenes any attempt to land on the Peloponnesus ; in western Demosthenes opened the campaign by destroy- Greece - ing the garrison at Ellomenus in Leucadia, and followed up his success by devastating the territory of Leucas. He laid waste the territory on both sides of the isthmus on which the town lay, and reduced the enemy to inaction, but when the Acarnanians in his army urged him to cut the city off with a wall and help them to rid themselves of an old enemy, they found that he had other plans in view. 3 The Messenians at Naupactus were on bad terms with their neighbours the Aetolians, and they wished to avail 1 About this time, or a little earlier, Thera must have been com- pelled to join the Athenian alliance, and pay a tribute of three talents {supra, p. 100). 2 Thuc. iii. 91. The attack on Melos was renewed ten years later with terrible success : the battle of Tanagra was an anticipation of the battle of Delium two years later. 3 Thuc. iii. 91, 94. 192 INVASION OF AETOIIA, 426. [VII. 3. themselves of the large army collected under the com- mand of Demosthenes, to subdue their opponents. They pointed out that the Aetolians, though numerous and warlike, dwelt in villages distant from each other, and unprotected by walls. Their warriors were only light-armed soldiers, who, if they were attacked before they had time to assemble, could be reduced without difficulty. Of the three tribes which composed the nation, the Apodoti were to be taken first, then the Ophioneis, and after these the Eurytanes, the largest and most barbarous portion of the whole. 1 If these were conquered, the rest could be brought over without difficulty. Demosthenes was inclined to gratify the Messenians, but his plans went far beyond their proposals. He hoped, by winning over the nations of Aetolia and the neighbouring Demosthenes in districts, to march through western Locris, Aetoha. unassisted by any power from Athens, to Cytinium in Doris, and so make his way round Parnassus into Phocis. The Phocians, though nominally allies of the Spartans, were friendly to the Athenians, and would probably join the Athenian leader, or could be compelled to do so. When in Phocis, Demosthenes would be on the borders of Boeotia, the ultimate object of his expedition. 2 He led his forces away from Leucas, much against the will of the Acarnanians, to Sollium, a town on the opposite coast, where he laid his new plans before the army. The Acarnanians, finding that Leucas was not to be besieged, at once with- drew, and with them fifteen ships which had come from Corcyra, but with th,e rest of his army, to which he now added 300 Epibatae (marines) from the Athenian ships, Demosthenes marched against the Aetolians. The western 1 Time. iii. 94. Of the Eurytanes, Thucydides tells us that their dialect was unintelligible, and that they ate their meat uncooked. 2 It is interesting to observe that both Demosthenes and Nicias have in view an attack on Boeotia in this year ; the one from the south, the other from the north. It is obvious that the plan of 424 was already in the air. VII. 3-] DEMOSTHENES DEFEATED, 426. 193 Locrians, unlike their kinsmen on the east, were allies of the Athenians, and being neighbours of the Aetolians, armed like them, and acquainted with their mode of fighting, their co-operation was eagerly sought by the general, who per- suaded them to join him at some point in the interior and serve as his guides through the country. The territory which Demosthenes was about to invade forms roughly the apex of an angle, of which the two sides are the river Hylaethus and the Corinthian gulf. It is a mountainous region, difficult of access. The Apodoti appear to have occupied the left bank of the river and the hills which border it; the Ophioneis lay beyond them on the right bank ; the Eurytanes further to the north and north- east. 1 Marching from Oeneon, whither he sailed from Sollium, Demosthenes halted his troops for the night in the temple of Nemean Zeus, a place well known as the scene of the death of the poet Hesiod. In the next three days he captured three Aetolian villages, the last of which was Teichium on the confines of the Ophioneis. He did not intend to push his conquests beyond the Apodoti till he had reduced the whole of their territory. "When this was accomplished he would return to Naupactus, and thence, begin a new expedition against the Ophioneis. But the Messenians, impatient of the caution of their leader, urged him to press on at once, and unfortunately Demosthenes adopted their advice. Without waiting for the Locrians, of whose light-armed javelin men he was greatly in need, he marched upon Aegitium, a town lying among Defeat of high hills, about ten miles from the coast. Demosthenes at The inhabitants, who had already been joined Ae & ltlum - by the combined forces of the Aetolians, even from the distant tribes bordering on the Meliac gulf, abandoned the town and encamped upon the surrounding heights, from which they threw their missiles at the Athenians, running 1 See Woodhouse, Aetolia, p. 16 ff. The dividing lines of the tribes cannot be drawn very precisely. The Apodoti may have been settled on both banks of the river Hvlaethus. VOL. III. N 194 A TTA CK ON NA UP A CTUS, 426. [VI 1 . 3. down from the summits in all directions, retiring whenever the Athenians advanced, and attacking when they retired. This desultory mode of battle continued for a long time, greatly to the disadvantage of the Athenians. So long as their archers had a supply of arrows and could use them, they held their ground, the Aetolian light-armed being com- pelled to retire before the shots of the bowmen; but when the archers lost their commander, and were themselves exhausted by the long conflict, they turned and fled. Ignorant of the locality, for their guide was slain, they found themselves entangled in impassable ravines, in which their light-armed and active enemies caught them at every step. A large number fled into a wood, to which the Aetolians at once set fire ; others wandered about till death overtook them, and but a small remnant escaped to Oeneon. Of the three hundred Athenians, one hundred and twenty had been slain, men in the very flower of their youth, whom Thucy- dides describes as the finest soldiers who fell in the war. When the dead had been recovered from the Aetolians, the ships returned to Naupactus and thence to Athens; Demosthenes, however, fearing to return home after his failure, remained in the neighbourhood of Naupactus. 1 After this success the Aetolians were eager to revenge themselves on Naupactus for the invasion of their country. In the late summer the Lacedaemonians, at pactus, which their request, sent a large force over the gulf, is saved by When he reached Delphi, the Spartan general, Demosthenes. . T .hiUrylocnus, sent envoys to the Locrians, through whose territory the route to Naupactus lay, to detach them from the Athenians ; and the Locrian towns, far from making any resistance, not only gave hostages for a safe conduct, but even joined in the expedition, with one or two exceptions. The army entered the territory of Naupactus, where they were joined by the Aetolians, and laid 1 Thuc. iii. 95-98. For the locality, see Leake, Northern Greece, ii. 612 ff., and especially Woodhouse, Aetolia, p. 57 ff., 340 ff. VII. 4 .] A MB R AC I A AND ARGOS, 426. 195 waste the country as far as the suburbs of the city ; but here their successes came to an end. Demosthenes, when he heard of the intended expedition, knowing the defenceless state of Naupactus, which was both weakly garrisoned and weakly fortified, persuaded the Acarnanians to send 1000 hoplites, with whom he sailed to the city, just in time to save it. Eurylochus felt that it was now impossible to take the place by storm, and withdrew into the neighbouring territory of Calydon and Pleuron. He had already entered into negotiations with the Ambraciots for a combined attack upon Argos Amphilochicum and Acarnania, by which, if successful, the inhabitants of those regions could be brought over to the Lacedaemonian alliance. 1 4. In the autumn the Ambraciots, as they had promised, sent a large force against Argos. Traversing the pass between the mountains and the sea, which commands invasion of the northern entrance into the Argive territory, Ar £° s - they seized Olpae, a strong fortress on a hill by the sea, about three miles distant from the city. The Argives were aided by the Acarnanians, who, with part of their forces, marched to the city, and with others occupied Crenae (wells), a place in the adjacent plain, to prevent the Peloponnesians under Eurylochus from joining the Ambraciots at Olpae. They also sent a messenger to Demosthenes begging him to take command of their army, and to twenty Athenian vessels which happened at the time to be cruising off the coast of the Peloponnese. The Ambraciots at Olpae, fearing that Eurylochus might be unable to make his way through Acarnania, when they would have to fignt without his assistance or return home as best they could, sent to Ambracia and requested the citizens to join them in full force. When he heard that the Ambraciots were at Olpae, Eurylochus set out out in haste from Proschium (west of Pleuron), and crossing the Achelous, advanced through Acarnania, where, owing to the absence of the inhabitants 1 Time, iii. 100-102. 196 DEMOSTHENES AT OLPAE, 426. [VII. 4. at Argos, he met with no resistance. Leaving Stratus on his right, and taking to the range of Mount Thyamus, a wild uncultivated district, he descended into the Argive plain by night, and passed between Argos and Crenae to Olpae. At daybreak the united forces pitched their camp at a place called the "metropolis," in the immediate neighbourhood. Not long afterwards the Athenians sailed into the Ambracian gulf, and with them Demosthenes at the head of 200 Messenian heavy-armed and sixty Athenian bowmen. The battle of The ships lay at anchor off the hill of Olpae, oipae. while the Acarnanians and Amphilochians, who had already assembled at Argos, prepared for battle. Demosthenes, who was commander-in-chief, at once led out his army to Olpae, and encamped in a position separated from the enemy by a deep ravine. For five days the two armies remained inactive, but on the sixth they drew out for battle. Finding that the Peloponnesian forces were numerous enough to overlap his own, Demosthenes placed a force of hoplites and light-armed soldiers in a deep lane overgrown with brushwood, in order that they might attack in the rear the extreme wing of the enemy should it attempt to encircle him. The armies then joined battle. The stratagem of Demosthenes was entirely successful. The Peloponnesians had begun to encircle his right, when the Acarnanians appeared from their ambush and drove them back in such haste that they carried with them the greater part of the army. On the other wing the Ambraciots succeeded in defeating their opponents and driving them to the city, but on their return they were attacked by the victorious Acarnanians, and forced to seek refuge in Olpae, with much difficulty and loss. The Mantineans alone among the invad- ing forces preserved an orderly retreat. On the next day Menedaeus, who was now general of the Peloponnesians, as both Eurylochus and Macarius, the second in command, had fallen, proposed a truce to cover the retreat of his soldiers. Demosthenes was unwilling to enter into open negotiations for the retreat of the whole army, and proposed a separate VII. 5-] PELOPONNESIAN TREACHERY, 426. 197 treaty with the Mantineans and the Peloponnesians, hoping thereby not only to isolate the Ambraciots and their mer- cenaries, but also to bring the Lacedaemonians and Pelopon- nesians into ill repute for their selfish treachery in saving their own lives at the cost of their allies. The Retreat of the terms were no sooner fixed than the Pelopon- Peloponnesians. nesians buried their dead and prepared for their own escape. Under pretence of gathering wood and fodder, the Mantineans and others included in the truce began to steal away in small companies, till they were at some distance from Olpae, when they abandoned all disguise and ran off at full speed. The Ambraciots and others who had gone out with them, seeing their movements, quickened their pace in order to overtake them, while the Acarnanians, who thought that all alike were retiring without permission, started in pursuit. When their generals announced that the Peloponnesians were retreating under a truce, there was for a moment an alarm that the whole army had been treacherously allowed to escape, and one of the soldiers in his rage and disappointment threw a javelin at his commanders. Afterwards they let the Mantineans and Peloponnesians go, but the Ambraciots were cut down on every hand. The survivors escaped into the territory of the Agraeans, whose king, Salynthius, afforded them a friendly shelter. 1 5. Immediately after the battle of Olpae, news had been brought to Demosthenes that the Ambraciots were advancing in full force from the city to join their allies, of whose defeat they knew nothing. He at once sent a portion of his army to occupy the roads and take up a strong position on the 1 Thuc. iii. 105-111. For the topography, see Leake, Northern Greece, iv. p. 242 ff. ; Oberhummer, Alcarnanien, p. 107 f . ; Heuzey, Le Mont Olympe et VAcarnanie, p. 293 f. The possible changes of the coast render it difficult to be precise, but on the whole I am inclined to agree with Heuzey about the situation of Olpae, which he places at Hellenokuli, and not as Leake and Oberhummer at Agrilo- vuni. The ravine which separated the two armies will then be the stream flowing from Lutro to Arapi. The position of Argos and Crenae is certain. 198 BATTLE OF IDOMENE, me. [VII. S enemy's route, intending to follow with the remainder as soon as possible. On their way into the Argive plain the Ambraciots had to pass through a narrow and difficult defile, which forms the only entrance in this direction, and it was of the utmost importance to Demosthenes that he should secure this pass. His advanced force succeeded during the night in seizing, unknown to the enemy, the larger of two hills, which Thucydides calls Idomene ; the smaller had already been occupied by the Ambraciots. After the evening meal, Demosthenes advanced with half his force to the pass, while the other half was sent further to the east, through the Amphilochian hills. Marching all night, he came upon Battle of the Ambraciots at daybreak, while they were idomene. y e t j n their beds and quite ignorant of his approach. Their confusion was the greater because he had purposely placed his Messenians in the van, that the Am- braciots, hearing their Doric dialect, might receive them as friends. The army thus surprised was immediately put to flight with prodigious slaughter ■ they fled down the hill, but only to find the roads secured, 1 and driven back on every side they wandered in unknown ravines or fell into the ambuscades prepared for them. In despair some rushed to the sea-shore and swam to the Attic ships, thinking, in the extremity of their terror, that if die they must, it was better that they should be slain by the sailors than fall into the hands of the detested and barbarian Amphilochians. The few survivors found their way back to Ambracia. Thucydides illustrates the severity of this defeat by the following incident. When the herald came from the Am- Numberofthe braciots at Olpae to ask for the corpses of slain ; the Am- the slain, knowing nothing of the battle of braciot herald? T j j • j.i p . i -i i Idomene, and seeing the arms of the dead, he expressed his astonishment at their number. A by- stander, who believed him to be the herald from Idomene, asked how many he thought had fallen. "About two 1 Were they secured, in part, by the forces sent through the hills ? VII. 6.] SLAUGHTER OF THE AMBRA CIOTS, 426. 199 hundred," was the reply. " Then these are not their arms, for here are those of more than a thousand." The herald answered, "They cannot then be the arms of those who fought with us." " Indeed they are," said the other, "if you were fighting yesterday at Idomene." "Yesterday we fought with no one ; it was the day before, in the retreat." The other replied, " All I know is that these are the arms of those with whom we fought yesterday, the men who marched from the city of Ambracia." When the herald heard this, he understood that the army from the city had perished, and overcome by the disaster, he broke into a loud cry and departed as he came, without even asking for the dead. For this, adds the historian, was the greatest calamity that overtook any one city in an equal number of days throughout the whole war, and so great was the number of the slain, compared with the population of the city, that he does not venture to state it. Had the Amphilochians and the Acarnanians been willing to take the advice of Demosthenes and march upon Ambracia, they would easily have captured the city, but this they refused to do lest they should find the Athenians, if settled there, more troublesome neighbours than their old enemies. 1 Ambracia was subsequently reinforced by a garrison from Corinth. 6. In Sicily (supra, p. 187) nothing of importance was achieved beyond the capture of Messene' by which the Athenians became masters of both sides of the strait and , ~. .,. l mi Affairs in Sicily; planted a firm toot on bicilian ground. Ine desultory war- fleet seems to have been distracted between the fare : . new P re - claims of Italy and Sicily; too weak to take an independent line, it made desultory attacks as the Rhegians, the Sicilian allies, or the Sicels called for its 1 Thuc. iii. 112-113; Oberhummer, I.e., p. 110; Heuzey, I.e. 293 ff. He places the greater Idomene at Liapochori, the smaller at Paleokoulia (p. 304), but the locality cannot be determined with precision. It is, however, certain that the smaller Idomene was near the sea, and apparently it was not far from the iar^oXrj or pass leading from Ambracia into the plain of Argos. 200 THE A THENIANS IN SICIL Y, 426. [VII. 7. assistance. In one of these, Laches captured a fortress on the river Halex, the boundary separating the territory of Locri from that of Rhegium. In another, he made an un- successful attempt on Inessa, a Sicel town, but held by the Syracusans. In a third, the Athenians landed in the territory of Himera, while their Sicel allies ravaged the interior border. 1 At the close of the year, when Laches returned to Ehegium, he found himself superseded by Pythodorus. The alli.es of Athens in Sicily had become weary of the useless war. On land they had lost ground, and though an insig- nificant fleet was as yet sufficient to keep the Syracusans off the sea, the enemy were preparing a larger force. They called on the Athenians to increase the number of their ships, and the Athenians, "partly because they wished to bring the war in Sicily to an end, and partly to keep their sailors in practice," equipped a fleet of forty vessels. As it was now too late for naval operations, they sent Pythodorus, with a few ships only, intending to despatch a larger number in the following spring. The change brought no better fortune. On his arrival Pythodorus sailed to the Locrian fortress, which Laches had captured, but he was defeated and forced to retire. 2 7. Towards the close of the year the Athenians, warned by an oracle, as was said, resolved to purify the sacred p island of Delos, and restore the old festival ofDeios; and which once made it the centre of the Ionic restoration of race (vol. i. 519). A similar purification had _ e . been made, more than a century before, by Pisistratus, but to a limited extent, so much only of the island being cleansed as could be seen from the temple. On the present occasion the purification was thorough and complete : all the dead who had been buried in Delos were 1 Thuc. iii. 90, 99, 103. Perhaps it was at this time that Laches renewed the fatal alliance with Segesta, which is recorded as his work. Thuc. vi. 6. For the previous alliance see vol. ii. 468. 2 Thuc. iii. 115; Freeman, Sicily, iii. 31 ff. Laches was put on his trial on his return : see Aristoph. Wasps, 240, 836 ff. VII. 8.] PURIFICATION OF DELOS, 426. 201 removed, and for the future neither death nor birth was allowed to take place in the island. The Athenians then restored the Delia as a " five-yearly " festival. Though the old games had fallen into disuse, the islanders had kept up their choral dances, and the Athenians had sent choruses and sacrificed. The gymnastic exercises were now renewed, and horse-races were added— a contest unknown in the old festival. We can hardly doubt that tke Athenians, in thus renewing the sanctity and importance of Delos, wished to bind together the Ionic race as closely as possible. The events of the previous year had shown how necessary it was to preserve by every means the allegiance of their allies in the east, and they had recently launched on a new career as the champion of Ionic influence in the west. It was important to show that the championship was something more than imperial domination. The head of Ionic cities must treat the colonies of her race, not merely as allies or subjects, but as fellow-worshippers of the great Ionic deity, and linked together by the enjoyment of a common festival. 1 8. In the following spring (425) the Peloponnesians invaded Attica, but they had barely been in the country a fortnight before they returned home. The invasion had short invasion been made so early in the year that they could of Attica, not support their forces on the harvest, and the weather was unusually severe, but what chiefly hastened their return was the alarming news from Sparta. 2 The fleet destined for Sicily set out from Athens about the same time that the Peloponnesians invaded Attica. The generals in command were Eurymedon and Sophocles, but Demosthenes, who had returned home from Acarnania, 1 Thuc. iii. 1 04. The celebration of the festival took place in the spring. The final disappearance of the plague in this year may also, as Cur tiiis thinks, have influenced the Athenians in this matter. 2 Thuc. iv. 2 : rot) rjpos Tvp\v tov oltov iv tt} aK/xfj elvai, ib. 6, irpcp epoTOvr)6r}vai rpls iv rr]K rei^icr/xan Trapdanovbov koL aXXa ovk d£i6\oyo boKovvra elvai ovk. dnedldoaav, laxvpiCdfi€Voi on drj e'lp-qro, eav no.) otiovv irapajSadrj, \e\vo-0ai rds airovbds. VII. II.] THE DELA Y AT PYLUS, $5. 211 afterwards the liberal offers of the Lacadaemonians tempted mariners to set out from every part of the coast, under cover of bad weather, and land on the outward shore of the island. The Helots more especially were ready to encounter any danger in the hope of freedom. Divers were also found who passed from the army on the mainland to the island, drawing leather bottles attached to a string, and filled with poppy- seed, mixed with honey and bruised linseed. Meanwhile the position of the Athenians was becoming critical. The island must be blockaded, the fortress garri- soned night and day, but there was no secure Difficult posi . anchorage for the ships; the forces on land tionofthe were without sufficient supplies of food and Athenians - water or a proper camp. If the siege lasted into the winter, neither ships nor army could maintain iheir position. An attack on the island would seem to have been an obvious expedient, but so great was the terror inspired by the Spartan name, that the attempt was not even proposed. The generals contented themselves with sending messages to Athens, and waiting for further orders. 1 The disappointment led to a change of feeling, and for the moment Cleon was the best-abused man in the city. It was he who had repulsed the Lacedaemonians, and put an end to the overtures of peace ; ii cieon, who the prisoners escaped, as was only too probable, retorts on the Athens would have thrown away her great generals * opportunity. Cleon, who was still firm against peace, replied to these charges by asserting that the accounts from Pylus were untrue, and proposing that a commission be appointed to visit the place and report precisely on the state of affairs. The commission was at once appointed, Cleon himself with one Theagenes being placed upon it. Upon this he changed his ground, declaring that a commission was a waste of time. If the generals were men, they would sail to Pylus and finish the business out of hand : were he a general he would do so 1 Thuc. iv. 26. 212 CLEON SENT TO PYLUS, 425. [VII. 12. without delay. In these hints Cleon was aiming at Nicias, who, though he had taken no part in the action at Pylus, was the most influential of the staff, and supported the Lacedaemonians in their proposals for peace. The scene which follows is probably without a parallel in any civilised cieon and political community. Nicias came forward and Nicias. offered to forego his command in favour of Cleon ; let him be chosen general and try his fortune. Cleon retorted that it was for Nicias, not for him, to lead the army of Athens ; but it was now too late, and the audience would not let him withdraw. He made the best of his position, and declared that without taking a single Pylus as"** 0 Athenian resident with him, assisted only by general : his the colonists from Lemnos and Imbros who were promises. Athens, by the targeteers recently arrived from Aenus, and a body of archers, he would bring the Spartans alive to Athens, or slay them on the spot, within twenty days. The Athenians laughed at the extravagant promise, but they readily gave their consent to his appointment as general. If he succeeded, the success would be a public gain; if he failed, the city would be well rid of him. 1 12. When the Assembly had finally confirmed him in his office, Cleon at once sent news of his coming to Demosthenes, whom of all the generals at Pylus he chose as his colleague. 2 Demosthenes was already preparing to make an attack on Sphacteria, and had collected some additional forces with this object. An accidental fire had burned down the wood 1 Time. iv. 27, 28. 2 Thuc. iv. 29. Demosthenes is here spoken of as one of the generals, but when the fleet sailed in the spring, he was merely a private citizen (iv. 2). In the inscription, C. I. A. i. 273 (01. 88, 4, 425-424), we read among the payments in the "fourth prytany," i.e. about Nov. 425 : crTpaTTjyols irepi UeXonovvrjaov ArjiioaOevei 'A^Kiadevovs 'A 233 which have invited their assistance, that they carry on war against us. Deprived of these, they will go back whence they came ; and we shall be at peace. "Let me remind you also that the end of war is uncertain. It is not determined by the justice or injustice of a cause. Fortune is capricious, and fortune is supreme. The best lesson which she teaches is distrust. Let us take this lesson to heart, and in our distrust of the future and alarm at the presence of the Athenians, make up our quarrels, at least till we have got rid of the common enemy. In this way we shall preserve our independence ; we shall go to war how and when we please, and not at the bidding of another. "I will end as I began. I am not speaking solely in the interest of Syracuse, but in the interests of all. Do not, I entreat you, in your eagerness to damage your opponents, inflict far worse damage on yourselves ; or think that you can govern fortune according to your own moods. Be willing to make mutual concessions ; cast aside all jealousies of tribe or city ; be good neighbours and good Siceliots, resolute in the determination to manage your own affairs, and resist the interference of foreigners whether they come as allies or as mediators." 1 The speech of Hermocrates was decisive. The cities agreed to unite ; and no change was made in their mutual relations, with the exception of Camarina, which agreed to purchase Morgantina from Syracuse for a fixed sum. Those who were allies of the Athenians sent for the officers in command of the fleet and requested them to join in the pacification. They accepted the proposal without any remonstrance, and after a brief interval withdrew their forces from the island. Thus the Athenians saw themselves shut out from any hope of planting a foot in Sicily, or taking advantage of local quarrels to further their own interests. They were at 1 Thuc. iv. 58-64. Notice that Hermocrates, in this speech, while appealing to the common feeling of the Greeks in Sicily, and urging them to act as inhabitants of one island home, entirely ignores the natives of the island. 234 THE A THENIANS LEA VE SIC1L Y, [VIII. 4- liberty to visit the western waters in a single ship of war- that was allowed by the common custom of Greece — but The Athenians tneir P resence witn an y g reater number would retire from be the signal for hostilities. So far as we can sicily ' see, Eurymedon and his fellow-generals were quite unable to make or mar in the pacification ; they could neither prevent the meeting of the congress nor influence its decision, nor refuse to accept the result. On their return to Athens they were at once put on their trial. Pythodorus and Sophocles were driven into exile, and we do not hear of them again. Eurymedon was merely fined ; he was des- tined to return and fall in Sicily. From the language of Thucydides we infer that the accusations were frivolous. "In the enthusiasm of their success the Athenians were im- patient of every check ; they looked on all things as possible, and any armament as sufficient, so extravagant were the hopes aroused in them by their unexpected prosperity." 1 4. The Lesbians who had escaped from the island in 428-427 had settled on the mainland opposite. With the help of some Peloponnesian mercenaries they captured Rhoeteum, but afterwards they restored the town to the rightful owners for a large sum of money— and acquired Antandrus, which they intended to make their headquarters. Timber was abundant there, and with the help of a fleet they could harass Lesbos. But two Athenian generals, who were col- lecting tribute in the neighbourhood, seeing their designs, gathered together a force and recovered the town. They feared that it would become to Lesbos what Anaea was to Samos, a constant source of danger and alarm. 2 The successes of Athens had kindled new hopes in the heart of every democrat throughout Greece. Hippocrates and Demosthenes had no sooner returned to Athens from Nisaea than negotiations were opened with them by a number of Boeotians, who desired to see a popular form of government established in their cities. A plot was formed 1 Thuc. iv. 65. 2 Thuc. iv. 52, 75. VIII. 4 .] MOVEMENT IN BOEOTIA, 4H- 235 by which the conspirators undertook to raise a revolt at different points in Boeotia : at Siphae, a seaport on the Corinthian gulf in the territory of Thespiae, and at Chaeronea, a dependency of Orchomenus, movement in in the extreme north, while the Athenians were Boeotia : plan to seize the temple of Apollo at Delium, near for an invaslon - Tanagra, in the south. To prevent the Boeotians from bringing their whole force to bear on any single point, these movements were to take place simultaneously, on a fixed day. If successful, the conspirators would have at least three places of vantage, and by maintaining these and devastating the country, they hoped in time to effect a general revolution. Demosthenes was at once sent to Naupactus to collect an army of Acarnanians and other allies for the attack on Siphae, while Hippocrates remained in the city, ready to march on Delium at the time appointed. Some Orchomenian exiles had already engaged a body of mercenaries from Peloponnesus, and a number of the neighbouring Phocians were associated in the project. 1 On his arrival at Naupactus Demosthenes found that the Acarnanians had already brought Oeniadae into the Athenian alliance. He immediately began to collect Demosthenes forces for the attack on Siphae, and while at Naupactus. waiting for the time appointed, employed them in subduing the Agraeans. But the plan of invasion miscarried. By some mistake Demosthenes sailed for Siphae before Hippo- crates had reached Delium, and the Boeotians, who had been forewarned of the danger, occupied Siphae and Chaeronea in force. The revolt was suppressed before it had broken out ; the conspirators, seeing their mistake, made no sign, and Demosthenes returned to Naupactus. 2 Hippocrates was not deterred from executing his part of the plot. Marching to Delium with the entire force of Athens, both light and heavy-armed, including all the available metic and allied troops, he set about fortifying the 1 Time. iv. 76, 77. 2 Thuc. iv. 89. 236 THE ATHENIANS IN BOEO 77 A, 4U- [VIII. 4. temple. In three days and a half the work was nearly finished, and the array set out on its return. When they Hippocrates had marched about a mile, the hoplites halted, at Deiium. awaiting their general, who had re-mained at the temple to superintend the completion of the defensive works, but the light-armed went their way homewards. Meanwhile the Boeotians had gathered together from forces assemble every part of the country, under the command and attack the 0 f the Boeotarchs. When they saw that the Athenian army. Athenians were returning home, most of the generals were unwilling to attack them, on the ground that the enemy were no longer in Boeotian territory ; they had, in fact, halted on the borders of Oropia ; but Pagondas, one of the two Boeotarchs from Thebes, was eager for battle, and summoning the soldiers in detachments, lest they should all leave their arms at once, urged them to engage, without caring where the battle was fought, whether on Athenian soil or on Boeotian. The Athenian was an invader whom they must repel; and it was folly to talk of boundaries when dealing with a neighbour who sought to advance his frontier to the utmost limit of Boeotia. Let them remember Coronea, and show themselves worthy of that glorious day. 1 The soldiers responded to this appeal, and as it was now late in the day, Pagondas at once led them forward to a position where they were separated from the enemy by a hill. When he had drawn up his forces, he ascended to the summit, ready to sweep down on the foe. He had under his command 7000 heavy-armed, 500 targeteers, and 1000 horse, besides an organised force of 10,000 light-armed. On the right he placed the Thebans and the Boeotians from the neighbouring districts ; on the left the Thespians, Tana- graeans, and Orchomenians ; in the centre the troops from Haliartus, Coronea, and Copae, and the region round Lake Copais. The cavalry and light-armed troops were placed, as usual, on the wings. The formation of the ranks varied in 1 Thuc. iv. 90-92. VIII. 4-] THE BATTLE OF DELIUM, 424. 237 the different contingents, but the Thebans were drawn up twenty-five deep. While at Delium Hippocrates had been informed of the approach of the Boeotians. He at once sent orders to the army to form for battle, and soon afterwards joined them in person, leaving three hundred horse at Delium, partly to protect the temple, and also in the hope that they might have an opportunity of attacking the Boeotians during the battle, a danger which the Boeotians provided against by detaching a separate body of troops to meet them. In heavy-armed and cavalry the Athenians were about equal to the Boeotians, but they were almost entirely without light- armed troops. No organised force of the kind existed in the Athenian service, and of the irregular multitude which had followed the expedition from Athens, the greater part were by this time far on their way to the city. The army was drawn up at a uniform depth of eight shields; the cavalry took their place on the wings. Before advancing Hippocrates made a short address to the troops, in which he reminded his soldiers that a victory over the Boeotian cavalry would not only give them possession of Boeotia, but relieve Attica from invasion, for without the protection of this force the Peloponnesians would never venture into their land. "Meet your enemy," he cried, "as those ought to meet him who call Athens their home— as sons of the men whom Myronides led to victory at Oenophyta ! " 1 He had only gone over half the line when the Boeotians rushed down the hill with a shout, and the Athenian heavy- armed met them at the double. Those on the extreme right and left of either army could ofDeiSST- not engage, owing to the watercourses which defeat of the prevented their advance, but the rest at once Athenians - joined in close conflict, shield upon shield. On their own right the Athenians were victorious ; part of the enemy were put to flight, and the Thespians, who stood their ground, 1 Thuc. iv. 93-95. 238 DEFEAT OF THE ATHENIANS, [VIII. 4. though attacked on all sides, were at length driven to seek the protection of the centre. So furious was the fighting, so confused the ranks, that some of the Athenians fell by the hands of their own countrymen, who mistook them for the enemy. On the left the extraordinary weight of the Theban column, aided by the ground, was found irresistible ; slowly, and step by step, the Athenians were driven back, though as yet the line was unbroken. But now Pagondas, seeing that he had nothing to fear in this part of the battle, secretly detached two companies of horse to assist his broken left, and when they appeared over the ridge, the victorious Athenians, believing themselves attacked by a new army, were panic-stricken and fled ; after this the wavering left could no longer keep their ground, and the whole army was put to flight, every man seeking safety where he could find it. The Boeotian cavalry, who were now joined by a troop of Locrians, followed in pursuit, but the approach of night aided the fugitives. Some reached Mount Parnes, on the direct route to Athens, others Oropus and Delium, whence, on the next day, they were conveyed home by sea. 1 The battle of Delium presents many features of interest. It is the first battle in Greek history of which the details are clear enough to enable us to form an idea Remarks on 0 the battle of the engagement. We know the numbers of Delium. on s -jd eSj an( j their disposition ; the mode of attack, and the cause of defeat. The absence of light- armed troops was a defect in the Athenian army, which their defeat at Spartolus should have taught them to remedy; which Demosthenes, had he been in command, would probably have remedied. The enormous depth of the Theban line was an anticipation of the tactics which proved successful fifty years later on the field of Leuctra, and on this occasion it seems to have taken the Athenians by surprise, or they were unable to perceive its importance. While the Boeotians 1 The Boeotians lost about 500 in the battle, the Athenians 1000, including the general Hippocrates, besides light-armed and baggage bearers. See Thuc. iv. 96 : cf. ib. 101. VIII. 4-] CAPTURE OF THE TEMPLE, 404. 239 have the advantage in the composition of their army, their strategy is also superior to that of the Athenians. Not only do they secure a position, which added immensely to the force of their charge, but when his left is broken Pagondas at once sees that his cavalry can be employed to restore it, though unable to advance on the troops ranged opposite ; on the other hand, the Athenian cavalry is useless Decline of the from first to last, failing even to cover with effect Athenian arm y- the retreat of the army. If it be said that the Athenians were now departing from the policy of Pericles, and that their defeat is a proof of his wisdom in forbidding them to meet the enemy in the field, the observation is true, but it seems to be not less true that the policy which Pericles pursued in regard to the Athenian army had been fatal to strategic skill. 1 The Athenian garrison was still in possession of the temple at Delium. The Boeotians attempted to dislodge them by refusing to give up the bodies of those who capture of had fallen in the battle, but after some time Delium - had been wasted in fruitless negotiations, they resolved to carry the place by assault. They had already been joined by large reinforcements, and the number of the heavy-armed infantry must have amounted to nearly 10,000— an over- whelming force to bring upon a temple surrounded by an earthwork thrown up in three days, and held by a few hundred men. But so helpless was a Greek army before a fortress of any kind, that the besiegers found it necessary to send for slingers and javelin-men from the Melian gulf to clear the walls, and even then the fort was not captured till an ingenious engine had been devised by which they set fire to the woodwork of the palisade and material from the neighbouring vineyard, with which the ramparts had been hastily constructed. The greater part of the garrison escaped to the sea, but about two hundred were captured 1 Cp. Aristoph. Frogs, 1021 fF.: AIO. Qrjfialovs yap TveTrolrjKas dvbpeiorepovs els rov noXepov . . . AI. dXX vpiv avr' egrjv aaKeiv, dXX' ovk eVi tovt eTpdrreaQf. 240 BRAS ID AS MARCHES TO THRACE, J&4. \_V\U. 5. and a few were slain. The Athenians now sent a second herald to recover their dead, who were at once given up to them. They had remained unburied seventeen days. 1 5. The defeat of Delium was a heavy blow to Athens, but a heavier still was now to fall upon her. Brasidas had returned Brasidas ivom Megara to his task of collecting forces marches to for the expedition to Chalcidice. In addition chaicidice. tQ the 70Q Helotg provided by the Spartan government, he got together by persuasion and promises a force of a thousand heavy-armed, and with these he set out to the north. He had, of course, no difficulty in reaching the Lacedaemonian colony at Heraclea ; but to pass through Thessaly was not an easy task, for the Thessalian people were friendly to Athens, and Greek custom did not allow an armed force to cross a neighbour's territory without formal consent. But the governing class in Thessaly was oligarchical, and Brasidas had friends, who, at his request, acted as his guides. With their help and his own tact and energy, he succeeded in making his way to Pharsalus, whence he passed through Perrhaebia to Dium, a city in the territory of Perdiccas. The Macedonian king lost no time in uniting the Greek force with his own army, for the purpose of attacking Brasidas and Arrhibaeus, the king of the Lyncestians, but Perdiccas. when they were on the point of entering Lyncestis, Brasidas expressed a wish for a personal inter- view with Arrhibaeus, whom he hoped to make an ally of the Peloponnesians. Perdiccas was greatly enraged, and reminded him that he was paid to obey Macedonian orders, not to "act as a peacemaker." Brasidas, nevertheless, opened negotiations with Arrhibaeus, and at his persuasion withdrew his army, upon which Perdiccas, who had hitherto paid half the expenses of the Peloponnesian forces, now refused to pay more than a third. His position was even worse than it had been before the arrival of the Pelopon- nesians ; he had less hope of subduing Arrhibaeus ; and the 1 Time. iv. 97-101. VIII. 5-] BKASIDAS RECEIVED AT ACANTHUS, 241 Athenians, suspecting that he had brought Brasidas into Macedonia, declared him an enemy. Brasidas was now free to pursue his own plans in regard to the Chalcidic cities. On the eastern shore of Chalcidice, where the isthmus connects the promontory of Acte Brasidas at and Mount Athos with the mainland, a few Acanthus - miles from the mouth of the canal of Xerxes, lay Acanthus, a colony of Andros, and a subject city of the Athenians. Hither he marched in response to an invitation from the oligarchical party in the town. He found the inhabitants by no means agreed on the question of admitting him with his forces, for here, as almost everywhere, the people were attached to the Athenians. But as it was now the vintage time, and the crop, still un gathered, was at the mercy of the army, they consented to receive him alone, and hear what he had to say. Brasidas, who was "not a bad orator for a Lacedaemonian," made the most of the permission. He declared that he had come to liberate Hellas, and to make good the promises with which Sparta had begun the war. He had come at great risk, and it was a bitter disappointment to find opposition in the first city to which he appealed. What was it that they feared % Was his power inadequate % At Nisaea the Athenians, though superior in numbers, refused to fight with his unassisted forces, and would they be able to send as large an army across the sea to Acanthus % 1 Or was his honesty questionable % He brought the most solemn pledges from the Spartans, that every city which joined them at his invitation should be an independent ally. Or did they suspect that he had come to help one party in the city against the other % Nothing was further from his intention ; neither the many nor the few had reason to fear him ; he had no thought of substituting a domestic for a foreign tyranny. The Spartans were known to be men 1 This statement of Brasidas is not true, see Thuc. iv. 108. His army at Nisaea included a lar^e number of Corinthians, who were not with him at Acanthus, and was superior in number to the enemy (iv. 73). VOL. III. Q 242 ARG1LUS AND AMPHIPOLIS, m> [VIII. 5- of their word ; they would not damage their reputation by- actions which would be disgraceful even in an Athenian. But the Acanthians must not suppose that they could remain neutral and continue friends while refusing to admit him into the city. If they would not listen to persuasion, he would try force, for he could not allow them to help the Athenians by their contributions, or to stand in the way of the liberation of Hellas. They had it in their power to save their property, and win a name for their city ; but he would maintain his cause against all opposition. Let them choose the better part. 1 The Acanthians were in favour of admitting Brasidas, as might be expected when an army was at the city gates awaiting the signal to devastate the fruit-laden Acanthus g and vineyards— and, as they gave their votes marches on secretly, every one could follow his own Amphipohs. judgment. Their example was followed by the neighbouring city of Stagirus. It was now October, but Brasidas had no intention of throwing away the advantages which he might gain before the Athenian fleet could arrest his progress. He was already in communication with Argilus, and had hopes of winning no less a prize than Amphipolis itself. The foundation of that city appears to have caused the greatest discontent at Argilus, and, as we find Argilians settled in Amphipolis, it is probable that the territory and population of the new town had been increased at the expense of the older settlement. Whatever the cause, the Argilians and Athenians were on bad terms, and Amphipolis was the bone of contention. The Argilians wished for nothing better than to expel the Athenians, who were but a small minority in the mixed population of the city, and their efforts were aided by a party which had the support of Perdiccas and the Chalcidic cities. Of these dis- contents Brasidas was fully informed, and he resolved to make use of them. Starting from Arnae, a town a few miles distant from Acanthus, on the evening of a stormy day, he 1 Thuc. iv. 84-88. VIII. 5 ] BRASIDAS A T AMPHIPOLIS, 4%. 243 advanced rapidly to Argilus, where his arrival was the signal for revolt, but he would not allow himself to be detained; he rushed on through the storm and darkness, and by early morning reached the bridge which crossed the Strymon, at a little distance from Amphipolis. A small body of soldiers were in charge ; these he quickly dispersed, and crossing the river, entered the territory of Amphipolis, which he allowed his army to ravage. The citizens, who woke in the gloom of a wintry morning to find themselves the prey of an unex- pected enemy, were filled with alarm; of those who dwelt outside the walls, some fled to the city, others were taken captive. They felt that they were betrayed, but the extent of the conspiracy was unknown, and every man suspected his neighbour. So great was the panic that Brasidas might have secured the city ; but he preferred to wait for the action of his confederates, and, when they failed to carry out their part of the plot, he remained in his position. The Athenians, on hearing of the arrival of Brasidas in Chalcidice, had kept a close watch on the district ; 1 and of the two generals who had been appointed to this service, Eucles and Thucydides the historian, the first was now in Amphi- polis, the second at Thasos, half a day's voyage distant. In concert with Eucles, the Athenian party kept the gates of the city closed, and sent to Thucydides for help, who immedi- ately set sail with seven vessels, in the hope of saving Amphipolis, or at least occupying Eion, at the mouth of the Strymon. As owning a right over the working of gold- mines in Thrace, he was a man of much influence in the district ; and could he reach Amphipolis, he would be able to bring in reinforcements by land and sea. Brasidas no sooner heard of his approach than he issued a pro- clamation offering the most moderate terms. Any citizen of Amphipolis, even if an Athenian, might either remain in the city undisturbed, or, if he chose, leave it in five days, taking his property with him. The proclamation had the * Thuc, iv, 82, 244 EXILE OF THUCYDIDES, 424. [VIII. 6. desired effect ; the Amphipolitans were relieved for them- selves and their relatives who had fallen into the hands of Brasidas; the Athenians, who were but a small propor- tion of the inhabitants, were glad to escape from danger. Capture of Brasidas took possession of Amphipolis, and Amphipoiis. on the evening of the same day, Thucydides occupied Eion. With the help of the fugitives from Amphipolis, he put the place into a state of defence, and when Brasidas suddenly attacked it by land and water, his attempt was defeated. The Athenians were still able to watch the lower course of the Strymon with their triremes. 1 6. But Amphipolis had fallen, and with it the bridge over the river had passed out of Athenian control. The prize so Condemnation long coveted, so hardly won, was lost ; and the of Thucydides. wav to their allies was open to the enemy. In their vexation the Athenians turned upon Thucydides, whom they chose to consider responsible for the disaster. He was brought to trial and banished, or perhaps, after his failure, went into voluntary exile. If we may trust his own narrative, he was certainly not remiss in reply to the appeal for help, and but for his rapidity of movement Eion would have been lost no less than Amphipolis. It is not so clear that proper measures had been taken to secure the safety of the Strymon. The importance of the bridge over the river was well known to the Athenians, and above all to Thucy- dides, as his own words prove to us. 2 Indeed, it is reasonable to suppose that this position was allotted to him among the generals, owing to his intimate acquaintance with the region and his great influence in it. Yet the bridge over the Strymon, though at some distance from Amphipolis, and apparently within easy reach of Argilus, a city long suspected by Athens Negligence °^ disloyalty, i s ne ^ D y a small guard only ; at of the Amphipolis the general is unsupported by any Athenians. garrison, and is therefore compelled to accept the decision of the people, while Eion is the prize of the 1 Thuc. \v. 102-107. 2 Thuc, iv. 108. VIII. 6.] BRASIDAS IN THRACE, 424. 245 first comer. Even at Thasos no regular force seems to have been maintained, for the ships which Thucydides brought to Eion are said to "have been accidentally at hand." Such negligence was certainly culpable, but we hardly know enough of the facts to decide who was to blame. The Athenians may have sent out the generals with orders to go to Amphipolis and Thasos ; they may have supplied them with insufficient forces, trusting to "moral influence," and believing that the period of the year had begun in which active operations were impossible. We are told that when they heard of the arrival of Brasidas in Chalcidice they declared Perdiccas an enemy, and kept a watch on their colonies in that district, but we do not hear of any forces being sent out, and it was not till Amphipolis had fallen that they placed garrisons in the towns. One point is very clear. The Athenians were quite incapable of dealing with so great a soldier, so acute a diplomatist as Brasidas. While they slept, he marched, regardless of the weather and the season. While they collected revenues, he offered emanci- pation. The power of Sparta, which hitherto had been a mere name to the subjects of Athens in northern Greece, he brought in visible presence to the gates of their cities : the hopes of years were at last realised ; the liberator was come. And he came, not in the interests of party, to give oligarch the advantage over democrat, or democrat over oligarch, but offering freedom to all, without respect to their political creed. The Sparta which he represented was not the narrow and selfish community by the Eurotas, but a large and liberal state, which, far from seeking to establish oligarchy in every allied city, was bound, not in honour only, but by solemn oaths, to respect the independence of all who joined her. He encouraged the timid, reassured the suspicious, and convinced the wavering ■ in his description Sparta was the ideal deliverer of whom the oppressed had dreamed so long, and the impression thus created continued for years to increase the reputation of the city. When persuasion failed, he struck, and struck hard. He saw 246 TORONE CAPTURED, 424. [VIII. 7. that the real weakness of the Athenian empire was its great extent. If an active spirit of revolt were excited through the various districts, even Athenian resources were inadequate to keep her power from crumbling to decay. Athens never recovered from the blow dealt her by Brasidas in Chalcidice, and when the same policy was repeated by Alcibiades in Ionia, the empire was doomed. Fortunately for Athens, the plans of Brasidas received little support from the Spartans, who were quite unable to sympathise with them. The liberation of Greece was in Spartan eyes a small matter compared with the recovery of the prisoners captured at Sphacteria ; and, blinded by the miserable jealousy which is so painful a feature in the Greek character, their leading men were more anxious to check the success of their great general than to promote it. 7. After the capture of Amphipolis, Perdiccas forgot his resentment and came to support the conqueror in settling Brasidas cities. Eager to extend his operations, acquires Brasidas sent to Sparta for reinforcements, and Acte, etc. began building ships of war on the Strymon. With his allies he marched into Acte, the most eastern of the three promontories of Chalcidice, and brought over the cities there, with one or two exceptions. 1 From Acte he crossed to Torone, which he captured with the aid of a party in the city. Marching through the night Brasidas as ^ e ^ ore 5 ne encamped before daylight at a captures temple less than half a mile from the city — his 1 0 ro n e approach being unperceived by all but those who were in the plot. Of these a few met him at the temple, and by them seven of his light-armed soldiers — for out of twenty selected for the purpose only seven had the courage to go — were introduced into the city and obtained possession of the gates. When the signal was given, Brasidas rushed forward and secured the town without difficulty. Most of the in- habitants were entirely ignorant of the plot by which they 1 Time. iv. 107, 108, 109. VIII. 8.] WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENCE, m. 247 had been betrayed to the enemy. The Athenian garrison, who though apparently charged with the care of the great gates had been asleep in the market-place at the time of the attack, escaped with some slight loss— partly on foot, partly with the assistance of two vessels which lay off the shore — to Lecythus, a fortified promontory separated from Torone by a narrow isthmus, where they were joined by their adherents in the town. After an interval of two days, during which he had granted a truce to the Athenians for the burial of their dead, Brasidas attacked and carried Lecythus. His success was greatly due to the fall of a tower, which spread consternation among the besieged. Eegarding this accident as a proof of divine aid, he piously devoted a sum of thirty minae, which he had pro- mised as a reward to the soldier who should first climb the walls, to the temple of Athena, and consecrated the whole of Lecythus as a precinct to the goddess. The capture of Torone was the last event of the campaign. For the rest of the winter Brasidas occupied himself with securing his conquests and forming future plans. So far he had been entirely successful, and his last enterprise taught him that he had little to fear from an Athenian garrison. Nothing could be more inefficient than the defence of Torone ; the walls are out of repair, and in parts without a guard ; a conspiracy is formed in the city, without any suspicion either on the part of the Athenians or their supporters ; the garrison are asleep ; the gates are insufficiently watched. If this were all the opposition which Athens had to offer, another campaign would decide the fate of the Athenian possessions in Thrace. 1 8. Such was the war in Chalcidice, where, by his energy and enthusiasm, one man was carrying all before him. At home matters wore a very different aspect. Each of the combatants had suffered severely in the last year, and each was apprehensive of new calamities. The fall of Torone roused the Athenians to their danger, and the insufficiency 1 For Torone, Thuc. iv, 110-116, 248 A TRUCE CONCLUDED, 423. [VIII. 8. of their own measures. If their empire was to be kept together a larger force must be sent out to Chalcidice, and a truce in the meantime Brasidas must be restrained concluded. f rom f ur ther aggression. The Lacedaemonians, though regarding the successes of Brasidas as a poor com- pensation for their losses at home, were aware of the impression which they made at Athens, and sought to take advantage of it. Both parties hoped to gain by a cessation of hostilities, and at the very beginning of the spring of 423 a truce was concluded for a year. In this instance, as so often, the Spartan policy was short- sighted and selfish to a degree almost incredible. We can understand why the Athenians should desire a truce which would prevent Brasidas from making new conquests, and enable them to send out reinforcements; but why should Sparta consent to it 1 Why should she wish Brasidas to be stopped in his career, when, as she very well knew, he was inflicting the severest blows upon the enemy 1 Thucydides explains the situation, but in language so obscure that it is almost unintelligible. The dominant feeling of the Spartans was a wish to recover the prisoners now lying at Athens, and this they might hope to do by offering in exchange their conquests in Thrace, conquests which they could surrender without injury to their allies in Peloponnesus. If, however, the war continued, Brasidas might be defeated, and they would then no longer have these conquests to offer, and if he were victorious, he might indeed restore the balance of the war, but even so they would not have gained their point. Their prisoners would be prisoners still ; their recovery would be subject to the chances of war. It was better to sacrifice Chalcidice at once, in spite of all that Brasidas had said about liberation, and make use of his success for the object which they had most at heart. 1 1 Thuc. iv. 117. The words v fxev arepeadai, rols &' e< rov 'Lcrov dfivvofievoi tavSvveveiv koX Kparrjaeiv, are very obscure. See Barton and Chavasse, ad loc. VIII. 9-] TERMS OF THE TRUCE, 1^23. 249 We observe with some surprise that the first two clauses of the truce refer to the temple at Delphi. All Greeks are to be allowed to consult the oracle according Terms of the to hereditary custom, and steps are to be taken truce - for the detection of those who misappropriate the funds of the temple — provisions which imply that there had been some difficulty in obtaining access to the sacred shrine and some improper use of the sacred treasure. 1 With regard to their conquests each side was to keep what it possessed on the day when the truce was signed. The Lacedaemonians might sail along their own coasts and the coasts of the confederacy in rowing vessels of not more than 500 talents burden, but not in ships of war. A safe-conduct was assured during the truce to envoys from both cities, in the hope that a lasting peace might be arranged ; deserters were not to be received ; and any disputes which might arise were to be settled by arbitration. The terms having been agreed upon by Sparta and her allies, were carried by envoys, with plenary powers, to Athens for acceptance, and if any change was desired, the Athenians were requested to send plenipotentiaries to Sparta. On the motion of Laches the Athenians accepted the terms, and on the 14th of Elaphebolion, i.e. about the end of March 423, hostilities were suspended. 9. The truce had hardly been signed before new diffi- culties arose. While Athens and Sparta were negotiating peace, the city of Scione, on the promontory of Pallene, went over to Brasidas. He at once crossed from scione revolts Torone, and publicly commended the Scionaeans from Athens - for their courage and good sense. Though almost as defence- less as islanders, owing to the Athenian occupation of 1 The oracle cannot be said to have been quite impartial in the war. Apollo promised his assistance to the Peloponnesians. He also authorised the foundation of Heraclea. Whether the Peloponnesians carried out their intention of borrowing money from Delphi we do not know ; but the funds seem to have been open to them and not to thr Athenians. 250 SCIONE REVOLTS, 423. [VIII. 9. Potidaea, they had by their own act joined the side of liberty : such bravery was a good omen of their future conduct, and the Lacedaemonians would honour it as it deserved. The Scionaeans were filled with delight ; even those who had opposed the revolt now supported it, and were prepared to go to war with Athens. One spirit animated all. Brasidas received the greatest honours which the city could bestow ; as the deliverer of Greece he was crowned with a crown of gold ; while the citizens crowded round him with salutations and placed garlands on his head as though he had been a victorious athlete returning from the games. Brasidas left a small garrison in the city and returned to Torone, but soon afterwards he appeared again with a larger force ; he was already in negotiation with Mende and Potidaea, and hoped to acquire those cities, with the help of Scione, before the Athenians could arrive. 1 At this moment came the envoys from home announc- ing the truce. The allies of Lacedaemon in Ghalcidice all agreed to the terms, but the Athenian envoy refused to admit the Scionaeans when it was found that they had Difficulties revolted after the truce had been signed, about Scione. while Brasidas, though he sent back his army to Torone, would not surrender the town. The Athenians, when they heard the report of the envojr, prepared to sail to Scione, but the Lacedaemonians announced that they should regard the expedition' as a breach of the truce, and asked to have the matter settled by arbitration. To this the Athenians would not agree : they were exasperated at the thought that even islanders were revolting in reliance upon the power of Lacedaemon — a power useless at sea — and instantly passed a resolution, on the proposal of Cleon, that Scione should be destroyed and all the inhabitants put to death. In the main question they were right, for the revolt of Scione took place two days after the signing of . the truce, l Time. iv. 120, 121, VIII. 9-] INVASION OF L YNCESTIS, 423. 251 and confining their operations to this one point, they avoided any further hostilities. 1 Meanwhile Mende went over, and Brasidas, though the truce had been proclaimed, did not hesitate to receive the city, excusing his conduct on the ground that Revolt of the Athenians had themselves violated the Mende - terms. His action at Scione inspired the Mendaeans with confidence, but the movement was due to a small party who, fearing for their own safety, compelled the populace to go with them. The Athenians were now more enraged than ever, and directed their expedition against Mende as well as Scione. Brasidas made arrangements for the defence of both, but he was unable to be present in person. At this crisis in the fortunes of two Greek cities, which trusted in him to save them from destruction, he was called away to . . £T Brasidas joins support Perdiccas in a new invasion oi Lyncestis. Perdiccas in an At the cause of this sudden change in his plans invasion of . -i Lyncestis ; we can only guess • m the previous summer he reasons for this, had offended Perdiccas by coming to terms with Arrhibaeus, and his subsequent career had been one of unbroken success; he was not now seeking admission into the Chalcidic cities ; he was the hero, the deliverer, to whom all turned with longing eyes. After the con- quest of Amphipolis he was visited by Perdiccas, who may have induced him to reconsider his position towards Arrhibaeus; or he may have been driven by the need of larger forces for protecting his conquests to secure the help of the Macedonian army at any price. He knew that the Athenians would come, and come quickly ; that he must meet them unaided by any troops from Lacedaemon ; that Perdiccas would not render him assistance till he had helped to carry out the object for which he and his forces had been invited to Macedonia. On some such grounds he may have been brought to join Perdiccas, as he now did, with the 1 Thuc. iv. 122. /ecu raXXa f)avxaC OVT€S * s tovto 7rap€aKevd£ovTO. 252 RE TREA T OF PERDICCA S, 423. [ V 1 1 1 . 10. bulk of his Peloponnesian forces, and as mmy Chalcidian troops as could be supplied by Acanthus and other towns. That he did so with a heavy heart and divided purpose is clear from his conduct — and indeed the step was fatal; no fewer than 3000 heavy-armed Hellenic troops and a large force of cavalry were withdrawn from Chalcidice at a time when the presence of the Athenians was daily expected. 10. The combined armies entered the Lyncestian territory and defeated the troops of Arrhibaeus, after which they Defeat of the remained inactive, awaiting the arrival of some Lyncestians. Ulyrian auxiliaries. When the Illyrians did not appear, Perdiccas wished to push on and destroy the villages round, while Brasidas was anxious to return to Mende, and refused to go further without the Illyrians. The dispute was ended by the news that the Illyrians had thrown Perdiccas over and joined Arrhibaeus. Perdiccas and Brasidas now resolved to retreat. The two armies lay at some distance from each other, and in the night the Mace- Retreat of donians, seized with a sudden panic, rushed Perdiccas. homewards, carrying Perdiccas with them before he had time to acquaint Brasidas with his move- ments. When the morning broke, Brasidas found himself face to face with the Illyrians, and without the support of his allies. Nothing remained but retreat, and was retreat possible ? Could his army be kept together in the pre- Difficuit osi sence °f a multitude of dancing and yelling tionof Brasidas; Savages, who threatened an immediate attack. retreat 6rly ^ G ^ ree ^ s rare ly marched far beyond their own borders, and expected to find in the enemy armour, tactics, and organisation resembling their own ; conflict with savages was new to them. Brasidas saw the danger and met it. He arranged his army in a hollow square, within which he collected the light-armed forces ; the most active of the soldiers were placed in readiness for a sally, should the enemy attack ; while the general himself, with 300 picked men, took up his position in the rear, to receive VIII. 10.] BR AS IDAS AND THE ILL YRIANS, 253 the first onset. He briefly addressed his men. What if they had been abandoned by their allies % It was their duty to conquer by their own valour without the assistance of others. What if they were attacked by greater numbers % They came from cities where the few held the many in subjection. The sight of a barbarian foe was new to them, and what was unknown was feared ; but the terror was for the eye only. Barbarians were not trained to fight in ranks ; they felt no shame in deserting their post ; they were under no control- ling authority. " Your safety lies in despising these attempts to frighten you, which are but a proof that the enemy shrinks from a battle. By resisting their onset, and retiring in perfect order, you will soon reach a place of security ; and you will find that hordes such as these, if you receive their first attack, are careful for the future to display their valour at a distance. But if you yield to them they will dog your steps, being men of infinite courage where there is nothing to fear." The orders of Brasidas were obeyed ; the barbarians were successfully resisted. After a time they ceased to attack him, and hastened forward, partly to overtake the retreating Macedonians, some of whom they slew, partly to occupy the heights commanding the gorge through which Brasidas must pass on his way to Macedonia. When he was about to enter the defile he perceived their intention, and bade his three hundred run at full speed, without thought of line or order, to the summit of the hill, which he thought that they would occupy, and dislodge the enemy. This was done, and the rest of the army ascended without difficulty, for the barbarians, being greatly discouraged, desisted from further pursuit. The soldiers of Brasidas were greatly enraged at the conduct of their allies, and on entering Macedonia they revenged themselves by slaughtering the oxen Breach between of the waggons, and appropriating the baggage Brasidas and thrown away in the retreat. Perdiccas now Perdlccas - regarded Brasidas as an enemy, and, forgetting the old hatred 254 MENDE AND SCI ONE, 1^23. [VIII. n. in the new, forgetting too his own natural interests, he sought an opportunity of joining the Athenians. 1 II. When Brasidas returned to Torone his worst fears were realised. Mende had been captured by the Athenians, and the position of Scione was desperate. On their arrival in Chalcidice, under the command of Nicias and Nicostratus, the Athenian fleet found the Mendaeans and their garrison, a body of 700 Peloponnesian hoplites, encamped under the command of Polydamidas, a Lacedaemonian, on a steep hill outside the town. An attempt was made to dislodge them, but without success ; Nicias was driven back wounded, and the whole army narrowly escaped a severe defeat. Next day the Athenians sailed round to the other side of the city, where, without even a brush with the enemy, they took the suburb and ravaged the country round. Nicostratus encamped near the Potidaean gate of the town, where Nicias joined him after completing the devastation of the country as far as the borders of Scione. Within the city all was confusion. Faction had broken out, three hundred Scionaeans, who had come to the help of the city, had gone home, and when Polydamidas began to draw up his soldiers in the market- place for an attack on the enemy, one of the popular party declared that he had no wish to fight, and would not go out. Polydamidas answered him sharply, and from words proceeded to blows, upon which the populace at once seized their arms and rushed upon the Peloponnesians. They fled in terror at this unexpected attack, and their alarm was increased when they saw the gates opened to receive the Athenians ; they believed themselves to be the victims of a preconcerted plot, and sought refuge in the Acropolis, with some loss. Meanwhile the Athenian army poured into the town, pillaging and destroying, and it was only by the personal intervention of the generals that the lives of the inhabitants were spared. The Mendaeans were bidden to return to their old form of constitution, and it was left to them to put on their trial any * Time. iv. 124-128. VIII. 12.] PERDICCAS jOlNS THE ATHENIANS, 42S. 255 citizen whom they thought guilty, a concession which could safely be made after the recent outburst of popular fury. The Athenians then cut off the fugitives in the Acropolis by a wall, extending at either end to the sea, and, leaving a detachment to guard it, went on to Scione. 1 Here the same tactics were pursued. To save the city from being surrounded, the inhabitants, with their Pelopon- nesian auxiliaries, encamped on a hill outside Blockade the walls ; the Athenians by a vigorous effort °f Scione. dislodged them, and at once set about building a siege-wall. Before the work was finished, the Peloponnesians who had taken refuge in the Acropolis of Mende broke out by the shore, and joined their friends in Scione. 2 In the meantime Percliccas came to terms with the Athen- ian generals, and in order to prove the sincerity of his con- version, which Nicias thought was much in need Perdiccas joins of proof, he prevailed on his friends in Thessaly * e d **pf t *" s ; to stop the passage of some reinforcements Lacedaemonian which were marching to the aid of Brasidas. 3 reinforcements. The three commissioners who had been sent to Chalcidice to report on the state of affairs were, however, able to make their way through, and brought with them a number of the younger citizens, whom, contrary to the custom of their state, the Spartans intended to make governors of their cities in Thrace. Of these, Clearidas was established in Amphipolis, and Pasitelidas in Torone. 4 12. In Greece the truce was strictly maintained, so far as operations between the belligerents were concerned ; but for those who had old scores to pay off, the opportunity was too good to be lost. Taking advantage of the heavy losses which i Thiic. iv. 129, 130. 2 Time. iv. 131. 3 This agreement was confirmed by a formal alliance : cp. C. I .A. i. 42 ; Thuc. v. 6, 83 ; Forbes, Time. I. xcv. 4 Thuc iv. 132. On the inscription which, as Boeckh and Hicks suppose, contains the names of Athenians who fell in Chalcidice in 423, see Jowett, Thuc. t. xcviii. The blockade of Scione is alluded to in Aristoph. Wasps, 209 (Feb. 422) : vrj At' rjplp Kpelrrov rjv Trjpelv ^Kiiivqv dvTi tovtov rov narpos* 256 EXPULSION OF THE DELIA NS, 422. [VIII. 13. the Thespians had suffered in the battle of Delium, the Thebans marched to the town and destroyed the walls. They Thespiae charged the Thespians with "Atticism," an absurd accusation against men who had fought by their side in defence of Boeotia at Delium, and, under the circumstances, as hypocritical as it was absurd. Later in Tegea and the year the Mantineans and Tegeans renewed Mantinea. their long-standing feud, but, after a hotly con- tested battle, the victory was undecided ; both sides set up trophies, both sent spoils to Delphi, but the Tegeans could claim the slight advantage of encamping on the field of battle. 1 When the winter of 423 was drawing to a close, Brasidas endeavoured to retrieve his fortunes in Chalcidice by an Brasidas attack on Potidaea. Arriving in the night, he attempts succeeded in planting a ladder against the wall, Potidaea, but at ^ moment wnen the watchman had passed in vain. Jr by ; but before he could ascend it, the attack was discovered, and he withdrew his army in haste to Torone. 2 The year had seen a disastrous change in his position ; of the cities which had come over to him in the spring, when his star was in the ascendant, Mende was lost, and Scione was closely besieged. No assistance could be expected from Macedonia, and the way was blocked against reinforcements from home. As yet the Athenians were present with but a small number of ships ; in the coming summer he might be called upon to meet their whole force unaided. 13. The truce expired in March, but hostilities were not resumed till the summer, after the Pythian games. During Expulsion of the interval the Athenians, thinking that the theDeiians. purification of Delos was still incomplete, ex- pelled the entire population from the island, on the ground that they were defiled by some ancient stain, and unfit to 1 Thuc. iv. 133, 134. The battle took place iv AaodiKia rys 'Opeo-Bidos, "in the valley of the Alpheus, near the spot where Megalopolis was afterwards built" (Arnold). 2 Thuc. iv. 135 : rov yap KG)$a>vos napevc^devToe ovtg>9 is to hiaitevov, np\v inaveXdelv tov irapabihovTa avTov, r) npoadeo-LS iyevero. VIII. 13.] CLEON AT TO RONE, 422. 257 dwell in the holy land. The exiles found a home at Adra- myttium, under the protection of Pharnaces, the Persian satrap 1 {infra, p. 270). When the Pythian games were over, Cleon persuaded his citizens to send him out with an army to Chalcidice. The success of the previous year had fallen to his cleon sails opponent Nicias, whose reputation as a general to chalcidice. had steadily advanced since the miserable scene of 425. In the interval Cleon had been busy squeezing the allies 2 and filling the law-courts, to the great satisfaction of his followers and the increase of his own power. His military ambition had been kindled by his achievement at Pylus, and when in 422 he was once more chosen general he wished for an opportunity of displaying his genius. He nattered himself that he had only to appear in Chalcidice and all that had been lost would be recovered. He set sail with thirty ships, having on board twelve hundred Athenian hoplites and three hundred horsemen, besides a number of allies. At Seione, which was still blockaded, he added to his forces any soldiers who could be spared from the siege. Landing near Torone, and finding that Brasidas had left the city in charge of Pasitelidas with a diminished garrison, he at once des- patched ten of his ships into the harbour, and marched his infantry on the town. In order to increase the size of Torone and protect the inhabitants, Brasidas had enclosed and fortified a suburb, which he incorporated with the city by breaking down the old wall. On this new fortification Cleon directed his attack. Pasitelidas was preparing to repel him when the Athenian ships sailed into the harbour. His forces being inadequate to hold both the He captures suburb and the town, he rushed back to the Torone. city, leaving the way clear for Cleon. But he was too late. The ships had taken the city before he could reach it, 1 Time. v. 1. What led the Athenians to this step we do not know ; but it indicates an unusual degree of religious excitement in the city.' 2 For the ra£is (popov of 425 (C /. A. i. 37) and the raising of the tribute, supra, p. 222. VOL. III. r 258 CLE ON AT EION, 422. [VIII. 14. and meanwhile the army entered from the suburb. Some of his men were cut down at once, the rest were captured, himself among them. Brasidas, who hastened to the rescue, was within five miles of the city when he heard of its fall. Cleon had reason to be proud of his success. At his first attempt, without even a serious conflict, he had recovered the headquarters of the enemy, and could send seven hundred prisoners to Athens. He had stolen a march on Brasidas, and proved himself more energetic than the greatest of Spartan generals. It cannot be said on this occasion that he reaped the glory which was another's due ; he sailed out, so far as we know, in sole command, taking the whole responsi- bility upon himself. His success was owing to the rapidity of his movements, his skill in dividing his force, and attacking the town simultaneously at two points. On the other hand, the conduct of Brasidas is inexplicable. What induced him to leave Torone with an insufficient garrison at the moment when a large Athenian force was expected? "Was he misled by false intelligence, or was he still collecting reinforcements at the time when Cleon arrived ? Whatever the cause, the result was disastrous, and the Spartan power in which he had persuaded the Chalcidic cities to put their trust was shown to be unequal to the task which it had undertaken. 14. From Torone Cleon sailed to Eion at the mouth of the Strymon. The recovery of Amphipolis was the chief object cieon arrives of his expedition, but, before entering on so at Eion. difficult a task, he wished to collect reinforce- ments from Macedonia and Thrace. While waiting for their arrival, he attacked and took the neighbouring town of Galepsus. Brasidas was informed of his movements, and at once marched up from Argilus to Cerdylium, a hill on the right Brasidas ^ank °* tne Strymon, commanding a view of marches to Amphipolis and the country round. From this Cerdylium. point he could keep a watch on Cleon, should he attempt the town without waiting for his reinforcements. VIII. 14- ] HE ADVANCES TO AMPHIPOLIS, 422. 259 He divided his army into two portions, one of which he kept near him on the hill ; the other was placed in Amphipolis, under the command of Clearidas. 1 Cleon was unable to carry out his plans. His soldiers grew weary of inaction; their spirits drooped; they mur- mured loudly against the strategy which kept cleon ad _ them idle in the sight of their enemy; and vanceson_ contrasted in no flattering terms the conduct Am P hl P° lls - and abilities of their own general with those of Brasidas. It was with the utmost unwillingness that they had taken service under such a leader. 2 Cleon gave way to the dis- content so far as to advance upon Amphipolis, not with the intention of risking a battle, but merely to reconnoitre. He posted his army on the hill above the city, which commanded a view of the lake on the Strymon, and the country towards Thrace, as well as the interior of Amphipolis. He did not anticipate an engagement, and felt confident that he could without difficulty retire to Eion whenever he pleased. The opportunity which Brasidas desired had come ; Cleon, unsupported by his Thracian and Macedonian auxiliaries, was within striking distance. As soon as he Brasidas saw the Athenians on the opposite hill, he prepares to hastened from Cerdylium, and entering Amphi- attack the , , . , , r ™ • i Athenians. pons, joined his forces to those oi Clearidas. He did not venture to offer battle in the open, for though his army was about as numerous as that of the enemy, it was far inferior in quality. He selected 150 of his best hoplites with whom to make a sudden attack on the Athenian centre, while the rest were stationed under the command of Clearidas at the Thracian gate of the city, with orders to rush out and 1 Thuc. v. 6. 2 Thucydides says that their reluctance was more than justified, and such was the feeling of the knights or cavalry who served under Cleon ; cp. Aristoph. Clouds, 572 f . ; but so far as Cleon's conduct went, they had no reason to be dissatisfied. When rapidity was required, he moved rapidly, and it was in the confidence arising from success that his soldiers became so impatient. Cleon knew when to wait, and they did not. 260 DEFEAT AND DEATH OF CLE ON, 422. [VIII. 14. support him. In a short address to the soldiers he explained his plans : they were not to be dismayed by the disparity of numbers ; the enemy would be taken unawares and thrown into disorder by his attack, and the reinforcement under Clearidas would come upon them as a new army and fill them with alarm. The advance of Brasidas into the town was observed by the Athenians, and Cleon was informed that the enemy's forces were collected near the gate, under which the feet of men and horses could be seen. He went himself to look, and finding that an attack was intended, he gave orders to his army to retire by the left wing, which, as he lay along the ridge facing the town, was the part of his army nearest Eion. He hoped to get away before the enemy sallied out, and when the troops seemed to delay, he ordered his right to wheel round and march forward to the coast, thus presenting the unshielded side of his soldiers to Amphipolis. Brasidas detected the mistake. He rushed out of the city with his followers at the first gate in the Long Wall, and hastening up the steepest part of the hill, fell upon the Athenian centre as it was preparing to retire to Eion. The Athenians were terrified at the Battle of 1 1 1 ... Amphipolis : sudden attack, and thrown into disorder. Death of cieon Clearidas then sallied out and attacked the and Brasidas. . , . . right wing ; upon which the army was panic- stricken and fell to pieces. The left, which was completely severed from the rest, hastened to Eion, the right retired up the hill. At this moment both the commanders fell : Brasidas, while advancing to attack the Athenian right, was wounded and carried off the field ; Cleon was overtaken in his flight by a Myrcinian targeteer and cut down on the spot. On the top of the hill the Athenian right continued for some time to repulse the attacks of Clearidas, but at length, hemmed in by cavalry and targeteers, with whom they could not come to close quarters, they were put to flight. The whole army was now routed, and the survivors fled as they could to Eion, whence they sailed back to Athens. VIII. 15] DEA TH OF BRASIDAS, 1$2. 261 About six hundred Athenians were slain, of their enemies seven only, but of these seven one was Brasidas. He lived long enough to be assured of his victory. He was buried with public honours in the city, followed to his grave by all the army. And as his devotion Honours paid in saving the city seemed more than human, to Brasldas - the grateful citizens made his tomb a shrine, and sacrificed to him with yearly games and offerings as a Hero. Regard- ing him as their deliverer, they also made him the Founder of Amphipolis, transferring to him the honours hitherto assigned to Hagnon, whose shrine they destroyed, as well as any other building which commemorated their connection with Athens. They were an Athenian colony no longer. 1 15. By saving Amphipolis, Brasidas rendered a great service to Sparta, who had now an important post to offer in return for the captives at Athens. And we Brasidas cannot praise too highly the skill and devotion by which the city was saved. The attack on the Athenian line was admirably planned and executed. Every detail of the action was carefully arranged : every arrangement effi- ciently carried out. Brasidas anticipated every movement of Cleon, and fell upon him at the very moment when re- sistance was almost impossible. His own onset at the head of 150 men upon the centre of the Athenian army — a force of picked men— over most unfavourable ground, was a feat without parallel in the war, and impossible for any general but Brasidas, who alone possessed the genius to plan such a charge, and the power to inspire his men and keep them together. Confidence in their leader's judgment, devotion to his person, and admiration of his courage, these were the feelings which animated every soldier in his army, and by these the audacious enterprise, which in other hands might have proved a disastrous failure, if it could have been executed 1 Time. v. 6-12. For the topography of Amphipolis, see Leake, Northern Greece, iii. 190 f. ; Grote, Hist, of Greece, iv. 546. Diodorus, xii. 14, gives a different account of the battle ; Cleon falls fighting bravely in the ranks. 262 CLEON AND BR AS ID AS, 422. [VIII. 15. at all, proved a brilliant victory. When we turn from this rapid, definite, and energetic movement, this devoted con- fidence and admiration, to consider the action of the Conduct of Athenians, the contrast is great indeed. Cleon cieon at is compelled by the clamours of his army to Amphipohs. marcn upon Amphipolis without waiting for his reinforcements ; the leader allows his wishes to be forced by his soldiers, and the soldiers claim to direct their general. Such insubordination is fatal to the discipline which alone makes an army efficient, and such weakness marks a general as unfit for his post. Yet we must in this point make large allowance for Cleon. He appears to have had some difficulty in persuading the Athenians to send an expedition against Amphipolis at all ; they did not see the imperative necessity of recovering the town by arms, when they still had the Spartan prisoners in their hands, and they were disinclined to renew the war after the year of truce. Thus the expedi- tion was unpopular from the first, and only sent out under His command the pressure of Cleon's personal influence. It unpopular. became more unpopular still when it was known that Cleon was to have the command. The soldiers, who were knights and hoplites of the best class, took service with the greatest unwillingness : they had, or professed to have, no confidence in their leader. With such relations existing between general and soldiers, there was little hope of success- ful action, but the conduct of Cleon on reaching Amphipolis goes far to cancel any excuse which we can make for his He is entirely marcn thither. He at once fell into the trap outwitted by which Brasidas had prepared for him ; and Brasidas. when he saw the gates closed, and no evidence of an intended sally, he assumed that the enemy was over- awed at his mere approach. In his extravagant self-confidence he thought that he could come and go as he pleased, and allowed his soldiers to wander from their ranks. " Had he brought up his siege-engines," he said, "he could have assaulted the city at once." When he became aware of his danger, he at once lost all courage, threw his army into confusion by VIII. i6.] DESIRE FOR PEACE, 263 giving orders for retreat, and fled for his life. The Athenians, abandoned and demoralised, were cut down almost without resistance, till six hundred of the best soldiers in the city were left upon the field, at a loss to the enemy of seven men only. 16. The battle of Amphipolis was the last event of the Archidamian war, 1 for in Greece neither side had moved since the expiration of the truce. The scene in Chalcidice was indeed little more than a personal duel, in which both principals were but moderately supported by the government at home. Influence now passed Desire for peace; into the hands of those who heartily desired Niciasand ,„.. . . , , / , Phstoanax. peace — Nicias at Athens and Phstoanax at Sparta. The fall of Gleon after a career of such unexpected prosperity must have made a deep impression on the sensitive and even superstitious mind of Nicias. He was afraid that a similar reverse might overtake himself. He desired to pre- serve the good fortune which had attended him hitherto; "he would have liked to rest from toil and to give the people rest ; and he hoped to leave behind him to other ages the name of a man who in all his life had never brought disaster on the city." 2 Plistoanax had other reasons, and they were even more personal. Banished from Sparta after the events of 446-445, in which he was suspected of receiving bribes to induce him to quit Attica, he had retired to Mount Lycaeus, where he dwelt in a house, half of which lay within the sacred precinct of Zeus— so great was his fear of the Lacedaemonians. He remained in exile nineteen years, when, owing to the repeated commands of the Oracle of Delphi, he was brought back and restored to the throne with all the ceremonies customary at a coronation. Nevertheless he was suspected of influencing the Delphic priestess in some dishonest manner, and the calamities which the Spartans sufl'ered after 426 were by some attributed to his return. For this reason he was anxious to put an end 1 The name given to the war from 431 to 421. 2 Thuc. v. 16. 264 FEELING AT SPARTA, 422-421. [VIII. 16. to the war, and preclude any further chance of disaster from this source ; above all by recovering the Spartan captives from Athens to rescue the city from her helpless position. Nor were the cities less inclined to peace than their leaders. Since their success at Pylus, the Athenians had suffered Feeling at severely at Delium and Amphipolis, and they Athens and now perceived that war was not the one-sided Sparta. game which in the flush of their success they had imagined it to be ; the Lacedaemonians, so far from reducing the Athenians by a few invasions of Attica, found themselves at the end of a ten years' struggle with their own territory ravaged from Pylus and Cythera, and a number of their best citizens in chains at Athens. The Helots were constantly deserting, and the ever-present fear of a revolt was more keenly felt than ever. Another reason of great weight with them was the approaching close of the Thirty Years' Peace which had been concluded between Argos and Sparta in 451. If Argos were free from her obligations, she might join Athens, or she might form a second centre in Peloponnese, to which any dissatisfied city could repair. She was demanding the restoration of Cynuria as a condition of renewing the peace, and if pressed by the war to secure her help Sparta would be compelled to give way. On these grounds negotiations for peace were opened in the winter of 422-421, and towards the spring the Spartans, in order to force the hand of the Athenians, Negotiations m , 7 for peace— announced to their allies that they would be 422-421, winter. re q U j re( j to assist in invading Attica and building a fort to command the country. The announce- ment had the desired effect; and after a good deal of negotiation and many journeys to and fro, a peace was finally arranged. The Lacedaemonians then summoned their allies to a conference at Sparta, and in spite of the opposition of the Boeotians, Corinthians, Megarians, and Eleans, the majority accepted the terms. 17, These were as follows : Both parties were to give up VIII. 170 PEACE CONCLUDED, 421. 265 what they had acquired by force of arms. The Athenians were to restore Pylus, Cy thera, Methana, Pteleum, and Atalanta ; the Lacedaemonians Amphipolis and Panactum The terms (a fortress on the frontier of Attica which had of peace - been betrayed to the Boeotians just after the renewal of the war). The Boeotians refused to surrender Plataea, on the ground that it had been won not by force but by agree- ment, and Athens replied by retaining Nisaea for the same reasons. With regard to the Chalcidic cities, Scione, Torone, and Sermyle were left, without any conditions, to the mercy of the Athenians. Others were to be independent on condition that they paid the tribute as assessed by Aristides; they were to be allies of neither party unless they joined the Athenians of their own free will — these were Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. If the inhabitants were dissatisfied, they were free to change their abode and take their property with them. All prisoners on either side were to be restored. Free access to the " common temples " was guaranteed to all Hellenes. The temple at Delphi was declared inde- pendent, and the Delphians were to be an independent state, enjoying their own revenues, laws, and customs. Neither party was to take up arms to the injury of the other in any way or manner ; and controversies were to be decided by arbitration. The peace was to continue for fifty years. 1 In these terms the Spartans paid but little attention to the interests of their allies. No mention is made of Potidaea, the relief of which was one of the chief causes of the war. The Megarian decree was so far from being rescinded, that the port of the city was now given up to Athens ; the desola- tion of Aegina and the slaughter of the inhabitants were condoned; and from her action in Chalcidice it was plain that Sparta was wholly careless what befel the towns if she could save her own citizens : — the tribute was guaranteed to 1 Thuc. v. 18. 266 TERMS OF THE PEACE, 421. [VIII. 17- Athens from cities from which she had not now the power to collect it without an armed force. There was no doubt a party at Athens which had looked for more than this. Those who had hoped, with Cleon, to break up the Pelopon- nesian confederacy, and recover the full extent of empire which Athens had possessed in 447 or gain more, were bitterly disappointed. In the Peloponnesus Sparta had lost nothing ; she was still the head of the confederacy, if the confederacy would follow her. The treasury of Athens had been emptied ; the utmost pressure had been put upon the allies to provide money and men, yet both by sea and land Athens had since 424 failed to achieve any success. Even those who acquiesced in the plan of "wearing Sparta out " must have felt that the war had been useless. And the peace was useless too. All the causes which led to hostilities in 431 were still at work : was it likely that an agreement for fifty years, which settled nothing, would prevent them from taking effect 1 CHAPTER IX. FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THE PEACE TO THE INVASION OF SICILY, 421-415. I. The peace had barely been concluded before it became clear what peace meant. The question who should begin the work of restitution was decided by lot, Thetermsof and the lot fell on Sparta. She found herself the peace not unable to carry out her undertaking. All the carrie out * prisoners in her hands were at once set at liberty ; but when Clearidas, who commanded in Thrace after the death of Brasidas, received orders to give up Amphipolis, he declared himself unable to do so against the wishes of the Chalcidians, and he was eventually recalled home with all the Pelopon- nesian forces under his command ; 1 Athens continued to be deprived of her most coveted possession. She retaliated by refusing to give up Pylus and Cythera, or the prisoners taken at Sphacteria : and thus the Spartans also failed to secure the objects for which they had sacrificed all their gains in the war. Still greater were the difficulties which arose out of the attitude of the allies. The Corinthians, exasperated at the neglect of their claims, refused to accept the peace ; and the Boeotians contented themselves with securing their own interests by a truce with Athens terminable at ten days' notice. 2 Sparta was in difficulties. In spite of her recent successes her reputation in the Peloponnese had fallen so low, that the Argives ventured to reject the terms which she had offered for a renewal of the truce. On the other hand, there 1 Thiic. v. 21. 2 Thuc. v. 32. 268 ALLIANCE OF SPARTA AND ATHENS, J&l. [IX. 2. was nothing under the terms of the existing peace to prevent the members of the confederacy from joining Athens if they chose to do so. To obviate these dangers, Sparta proposed Alliance be- ^° enter i nto a separate alliance with Athens ; tween Sparta and after some negotiations the offer was accepted. The alliance was primarily defen- sive : each city was to assist the other in case of invasion, and Athens was to help Lacedaemon against any revolt of the Helots. But the invader, in each case, was regarded as an enemy of both cities, to be punished by them conjointly, and neither city was to cease from war before the other. 1 Immediately after the conclusion of the alliance, the Athenians restored the captives taken at Sphacteria, but as Sparta was unable to give back Amphipolis, they refused to withdraw their troops from Pylus or Cythera. By this alliance the Spartans were greatly the gainers. They could count on the help of Athens in case of an invasion by Argos ; Pylus could not be used as a centre from which to spread revolt among the Helots ; and above all, they had attained the object which they had most at heart — the recovery of their countrymen. 2. The Argives were confirmed in their contempt of their ancient enemy. For ten years past the Grecian cities Argos had been oppressed by military service and contributions ; they had seen their cities pillaged, their fields wasted, their commerce destroyed, while Argos had enjoyed the blessings of peace and prosperity. The city has indeed no history during the thirty years since she concluded peace with Sparta, but Thucydides significantly remarks that she had made " a harvest of both sides " ; she had also become a centre of democracy in the Peloponnese ; and so far as we can form an opinion, she had been improving her army by the creation of what may be called a " standing force " of a thousand picked soldiers, supported and trained at the expense of the city, a body with which no doubt she intended to meet the trained soldiers of Sparta. Once more 1 Thuc. v. 22-24, and the note in Poppo-Stahl on 22. 2. IX. 3.] ARGOS COMES TO THE FRONT, J$l> 269 she might hope to resume the position which her rival could no longer retain, and become, as in heroic days, the leader of Greece. The allies of Sparta were more exasperated than ever by the alliance between Sparta and Athens, and per- sisted in their refusal to accept the terms of the peace. As at the beginning of the war, the Corinthians Corinthians were the most energetic in expressing their at Argos. displeasure. On leaving the conference at Sparta, after the conclusion of the peace and alliance, their envoys turned aside to Argos, and urged the authorities there not to lose the opportunity which now offered of drawing over the con- federacy, and protecting the Peloponnese from the Spartans and Athenians, who were conspiring against the liberties of Greece. If it were known that Argos would receive any city into a defensive alliance, many would flock to her, through hatred of the Lacedaemonians. To prevent any public repulse, they advised that negotiations should be carried on by a select body of men, and not through the general Assembly. The Argives took the matter up, and appointed twelve men with whom the cities could treat. Only in the case of Athens or Sparta wishing to join were the proposals to be laid before the people. 1 3. The Mantineans were the first to join. For some time past they had acted in a manner of which they could hardly expect that Sparta would approve. During the The Argive truce of 423 they had been at war with Tegea, confederacy, and though they failed in this direction, they had succeeded in reducing a considerable part of Arcadia. These conquests they knew that the Lacedaemonians, now that their hands were free from the war, would not allow them to retain. Moreover they were a democracy like Argos, and had always been in sympathy with that city. 2 Their defection was the signal for a general agitation among the cities of the confederacy, which the Lacedaemonians vainly endeavoured 1 Thuc. v. 27, 28. See Aristoph. Pax, 468, 9, the Argives nare- yiXav roiv TaXanrcopovfievcoP Kai ravra 8i;^o#ei> fiicrBo(popovvT€s a\(piTa. ? ^huc f iv, 134, and v. 28, 29, 33, 81. f 270 ALLIES OF ARGOS, 421. [IX. 3. to check by sending envoys to Corinth to remonstrate. The Corinthians, who had summoned the recalcitrant cities, replied in their presence that they were justified in breaking away from the confederacy. Of the real but private grounds of offence — that neither Sollium nor Anactorium had been restored to them — they said nothing, but pretended that they were bound by their oaths to their allies in Thrace, for in the ordinances of the confederacy such separate oaths were allowed to be a valid reason for refusing to accept Mantinea the decision of the majority. The Eleans andEiis. were the next to conclude an alliance with Argos. They also had their quarrel with Sparta, who had decided against them in a contention with Lepreum, and restored this city to its former independence (infra, 275). They were followed by the Corinthians, who, however, would only consent to a defensive alliance, and the Chalci- dians. The Megarians and Boeotians agreed to stand aloof. They were well aware that the Lacedaemonian constitution was more congenial to their own oligarchical form of govern- ment than the Argive democracy. 1 While these negotiations were taking place in the Pelopon- nesus, Athens was asserting her imperial power. The blockade of Scione was brought to an end, and the un- fortunate city treated with the utmost severity. All the grown up men were put to the sword, and the women and children sold into slavery. The Athenians also brought back the Delians from Adramyttium to Delos, "moved partly by the defeats which they had sustained, partly by an oracle of the Delphic God." 2 When the Argives and Corinthians appeared at Tegea with proposals that the city should join them, they met Tegea and with a repulse. In Boeotia they fared little Boeotia. better. The Boeotians still hesitated about joining the Argives. They had concluded a truce, termin- able at ten days' notice, with Athens soon after the peace 1 Time. v. 29-34. 2 Time, v. 32. IX. 4 .] ACTION OF SPARTA, 421- 271 was settled, and the Corinthians were anxious that they also should be on a similar footing. They persuaded the Boeotians to go with them to Athens and support their request, but the Athenians merely answered that if the Corinthians Were allies of Sparta they were included in the terms of the general truce. 1 4. Meanwhile Sparta endeavoured to recover her position. King Plistoanax marched with the whole force of the city into Arcadia, rescued the Parrhasians from their subjection to the Mantineans, and destroyed a fort which had been built by the Mantineans in the Par- rhasian town of Cypsela, to command the Sciritis. The Helots who had served with Brasidas, on their return to Laconia, had received their freedom and permission to dwell where they pleased, but now they were settled with the Neodamodes 2 at Lepreum to defend it against Elis. The prisoners from Sphacteria, who hitherto had enjoyed the privileges of citizens, and in some cases had been elected to public office, were disfranchised : they could neither hold office, nor buy nor sell — a severe sentence considering that the government had thrown upon them the responsibility of their surrender (supra, p. 215), but one which after a time was cancelled. Negotiations went on with Athens about the terms of the peace which were still unfulfilled, and though no result -was attained, the Athenians agreed to withdraw the Messenians and Helots from Pylus, 3 and settled them in Cephallenia. Such a state of affairs satisfied no one. When the ephors of the year came into office at Sparta in the autumn of 421, a new line of policy was taken up. After an abortive dis- cussion at Sparta, in which the Athenians, Boeotians, Corin- 1 Time. v. 32. 2 The Neodamodes were emancipated Helots (Thuc. vii. 58), but there was some difference between them and the soldiers of Brasidas which we cannot explain. 3 Thuc. v. 34, 35. The reasons of the Spartans for the disfranchise- ment are noticeable : beiaavres pr\ n Sia rrjv £vp drjpcp rr]p.(pov vpiv ; rt be o~oi ravr ; rj 6° 6y av avrjp, ov criyr)o-€i ; Kayco Vt'ycov. A passage which shows with what interest these negotiations and changes were watched in Athenian homes. 2 Thuc. v. 56. IX. 9 .] AGIS IN ARGOLIS, 418. 279 armed, 500 cavalry and an equal number of "runners" 1 ) collected at Phlius. Before the forces could combine, the Argives met the Lacedaemonians at Methydrium, supported by the Mantineans and 3000 Eleans. They were eager to attack, but in the night Agis broke up his camp and joined the allies at Phlius. The Argives followed, and took up a position on the road from Nemea to Argos, expecting by this means to prevent Agis from reaching the city. Agis outmanoeuvred them by dividing his forces. With his Arcadian and Epidaurian allies, he descended by a difficult path into the plain ; the Corinthians and Phliasians entered it at another point by an equally difficult route ; the Boeotians, who were well supplied with cavalry, the Megarians, and Sicyonians descended by the Nemean road, on which the Argives lay. On hearing that Agis was in the plain, lay- ing waste their territory, the Argives returned from their position near Nemea, and after a slight brush with the Corinthians and Phliasians, drew up for battle. They were surrounded on all sides. Agis cut them off from the city ; the Corinthians and their allies held the higher ground to the west; and on the Nemean road lay the Boeotians. Their Athenian allies had not yet come up, and they were without cavalry. When the armies were on the point of engaging, two Argives, Thrasyllus, one of the five generals, and Alciphron, the proxenus of the Lacedaemonians, came to terms with Agis, undertaking that Argos Agiscomesto should satisfy any complaints which the terms with Lacedaemonians had to bring against her, and Argos - enter into a lasting peace. Agis, after conferring with one of the Lacedaemonian magistrates who were in the camp, agreed to a truce for four months, to allow time for the Argives to fulfil their promises. In these transactions neither party was supported by public authority ; four persons only — two on each side — acting entirely upon their own responsibility, 1 Thuc. v. 57. For the afiLTmoi who are mentioned in this passage only in Thucydides, see Arnold's note, ad. loc. Xenophon mentions them among the Boeotian forces at Mantinea (362). 280 THE ALLIES IN ARCADIA, 418. [IX. 10. decided the issue of the campaign. When drawing off his forces, Agis did not even inform his allies what had taken place, but such was the discipline of the Peloponnesian army that, though indignant at his action, they obeyed his com- mands. Never before had so fine an army been collected ; all the allies were present except the Mantineans and Eleans, who were fighting for Argos, and the soldiers were picked men. " In numbers and quality they were a match for the force opposed to them and for another as large," and they had caught the Argives in a trap. More undaunted still were the Argives, who had not at all realised how perilous was their position. They blamed their generals for allowing the Lacedaemonians to escape them. It was their custom to decide any disputes which arose in a campaign at the Charadrus, a ravine outside the city walls, and when the army reached this place on the march home, the soldiers began to stone Thrasyllus. He saved his life by fleeing to an altar for protection, but his property was confiscated. 1 10. After the truce had been concluded, the Athenian contingent arrived at Argos, 1000 foot and 300 horse, under The Argives Laches and Nicostratus. The Argives were renew the f or senc li n pr them back, as the war was at an war on the 0 i n /r • instigation of end, but the Eleans and Mantineans compelled Aicibiades. them to listen to Alcibiades, who, though not one of the generals for the year, was present as an envoy. He urged that the truce which had been concluded in the absence of some of the allies had no validity. They must disregard it, and make the best of the present opportunity, Alcibiades prevailed. The allies at once marched upon Orchomenus in Arcadia, where, after some delay, they were joined by the Argives, in open violation of their engagement with Sparta. Orchomenus, unable to resist the united forces, agreed to join them. These were now uncertain what step to take : the Eleans called on them to march upon Lepreum; the Mantineans proposed an attack upon Tegea; and when 1 Thuc. v. 57-60. IX. 10.] THE LACEDAEMONIANS AT MANTINEA, 4I8. 281 the proposal of the Mantineans was preferred, the Eleans withdrew their forces, thus depriving the army which they had insisted on calling into the field of the support of three thousand men. 1 The conduct of Agis had- been severely condemned at Lacedaemon, and when it was known that Argos had promptly broken the truce, and that Orchomenus had surrendered, it was proposed to punish him, contrary to all tradition, by razing his house to the ground and imposing a heavy fine. Agis prevailed on the authorities to remit these severe penalties, but the Lacedaemonians passed a new law, by which the king was forbidden to lead out an army from the city without the leave of ten commissioners, who were chosen to be his advisers. They were now informed by their friends in Tegea that the city was all but lost; nothing could save it but immediate help. They were roused to action as they had never been roused before : without a moment's delay they marched with their Helots to Orestheum, and called on their Arcadian TheLacedae allies to follow them to Tegea. The allies in monians again Corinth and Boeotia were summoned, and the take the field - war-cry was sent even to Phocis and Locris ; but it was difficult for the contingents to assemble at such short notice, and unless united they could not make their way through territory which was occupied by the enemy. With the Arcadians to support them, the Lacedaemonians, who had put five-sixths of their force in the field, took up a position near the temple of Heracles, in the territory of the Man- tineans. The allies then ranged themselves in a strong position over against them. The light-armed were already throwing their stones and javelins, when one of the elders called to Agis that he was curing one mistake by committing another, for the enemy were in too strong a position to be attacked with success. Upon this Agis withdrew his troops to a position on the low watershed between Tegea and Mantinea, 1 Thuc. v, 61, 62. 282 SPARTAN DISCIPLINE, 418. [IX. 11. and directed the water, which, as it did much damage, was a constant source of contention between the two cities, upon the fields of the Mantineans. By this means he succeeded in drawing the allies into the plain. The generals were The armies at unwilling to leave their strong position, but Mantinea. soldiers, who were already dissatisfied with the campaign in Argolis, declared that they were again be- trayed. The enemy was escaping once more, without attack or pursuit. They descended into the plain ; and the Lacedae- monians, on returning to their old camp by the Heracleum, suddenly found themselves face to face with an army drawn up for battle. It was a moment in which Spartan discipline was invaluable; never before had they been so taken by surprise. Under the commands of Agis, passed down through a succession of officers to the smallest divisions of the army, the troops fell into order. On the left were the Sciritae, next to whom were the Helots who had served under Brasidas, and the Neodamodes ; beside these were ranged the Lacedae- monians in their companies ; then came the Arcadian allies, and on the right the Tegeatae and a few Lacedaemonians : the cavalry were placed on both wings. The right wing of the allies was held by the Mantineans, in whose territory the engagement took place ; next to them were the allies from Arcadia; beside these were the "Thousand" of the Argives, a select body of troops trained at the public expense ; then the rest of the Argives, who were arranged in five battalions, and their allies the Cleonaeans and Orneatae. On the left were the Athenians, flanked by their cavalry. 1 II. Before joining battle, the commanders spoke a few words of encouragement to their soldiers. The Mantineans 1 In numbers the Lacedaemonians appeared to have the advantage ; but beyond a computation which gives 3584 as the number of the Lacedaemonians, Thucydides will not venture on any precise state- ment. It is worth attention that Thucydides describes the Cleon- aeans and Orneatae as allies of the Argives : this would lead us to suppose that they stood in the same relation to Argos as, e.g., the Tegeatae to Sparta. The words fxel^ov ecpavrj of the Lacedaemonian army may imply that he was present at the battle. — Thuc. v. 67-68. IX. ii.] THE BATTLE OF MA NT1NEA , 418- 283 were reminded that if defeated they would again be slaves of the Lacedaemonians, but if victorious they could maintain the dominant position which they had recently gained in Arcadia; the Argives that they had at last an opportunity of revenging themselves on their ancient The battle of enemies, and recovering their supremacy in the Mantinea - Peloponnese. The Athenians were told that a defeat of the Lacedaemonians in Peloponnese would be a blow to their supremacy from which they would not recover ; they would never again interfere with the expansion of Athenian power or invade Attica. "But the Lacedaemonians, both in their war-songs and in the words which a man spoke to his com- rade, did but remind one another of what their brave spirits knew already. For they had learned that true safety was to be found in long previous training, and not in eloquent exhortations uttered when they were going into action." 1 When the signal was given for battle, the Argives and their allies rushed eagerly forward, while the Lacedaemonians advanced slowly to the music of flute-players, who were placed in their ranks, not from motives of religion, as Thucydides remarks, but that by their music the steps of the soldiers might be steadied, and their time preserved unbroken. The weak point in a Greek army was the right or unshielded flank, and for this reason every army tended, even unconsciously, to overlap the opposing line by moving to the right, each soldier seeking to cover his spear arm by the shield of his comrade. Owing to this movement, the two armies, even before joining battle, began to overlap each other on the right — the Lacedaemonians passing beyond the Athenians, and the Mantineans beyond the Sciritae. Agis had sufficient forces at command to extend his line beyond both wings of the enemy without unduly diminish- ing its depth ; and seeing the danger to which the Sciritae and Brasideans were exposed, he gave instructions for them to move to the left and cover the Mantineans, and at 1 Thuc. v. 69, Jowett. 284 DEFEAT OF THE ALLIES, 418. [IX. 11. the same time ordered two of the Lacedaemonian polemarchs to march their divisions from the right into the vacant space which the movement of the Sciritae necessarily caused in the centre of his line. The polemarchs refused to obey orders : the Sciritae were unable to close up, and the Lacedaemonian army was broken into two divisions. To any other forces such a failure in tactics would have been ruinous, but the Spartans were either too stupid to under- stand the full extent of their danger, or too courageous to be discouraged by it. Their left wing was defeated and driven back to the waggons by the Mantineans and the select Ar- gives, who outflanked them on the one hand, and on the other dashed through the broken line upon the unshielded arm of their opponents ; but in the centre, where Agis was posted with the three hundred Spartan "knights," the allies fled at the first approach of the enemy without striking a blow. The allied line was now in a worse plight than that of the Peloponnesians. The right had rushed forward in pur- suit of the enemy ; the centre, including some of the Athenians, was driven back by the Spartan charge. Only the Athenians on the extreme left remained in their position. They were in great danger of being surrounded on one side and defeated on the other, but they were saved from destruc- tion partly by the excellent service of their own cavalry, and partly by a change in the plans of Agis, who ordered the whole army to go to the support of his defeated left. The Athenians and Argives of the centre seized the opportunity to leave the field, and this was the end of the conflict. For when the Mantineans and select Argives saw the rest of their army defeated, and the whole Spartan force advancing on themselves, they abandoned any further pursuit of the Sciritae, and fled. Of the allies, about eleven hundred fell, including both the Athenian generals ; and of the Lacedae- monians about three hundred. The loss of the allies on their side was inconsiderable. 1 1 Time. v. 70-74. IX. 12.] EFFECT OF THE BATTLE, '418. 285 Thucydides describes the battle of Mantinea as " by far the greatest of Hellenic battles which had taken place for a long time, and fought by the most famous cities." It is also so described that we can form a clear conception of it. We can follow the progress of the conflict step by step. One point only is not easily explained — the insubordination of the Spartan polemarchs. No doubt the movement which Agis ordered was one involving difficulty and danger ; but danger and difficulty are not reasons for disobeying orders in the battlefield ; and such a movement, difficult as it was, could not have been beyond the capacity of the Spartan army — the most perfect instrument of war in the Grecian world. The polemarchs were afterwards sent into exile " for their cowardice," a light punishment for their offence. They had imperilled the safety of the Spartan army on a day when Sparta's power and position were at stake. After the battle, the Spartans collected the arms of the enemies slain, and erected a trophy; the dead they gave back, according to custom, and, retiring to Tegea with their own dead, buried them there. They then dismissed their allies, and returned to Sparta to celebrate the Carnea. The second king, Plistoanax, who had marched out just before the battle with reinforcements, had reached Tegea, but re- turned on hearing of the victory. The contingents from the more distant allies were countermanded. 1 12. The battle of Mantinea 1 placed Sparta in a higher position than she had occupied since the outbreak of war in 431. The reputation of her army, which had suffered from the disaster at Pylus, was fully restored ; her soldiers "were thought to have been hardly used by fortune, but in character to be the same as ever." 2 Her policy was now clear, and she began to carry it out in an effective manner. When the festival of the Carnea was over, an army was led out to Tegea, and with these warlike movements to support them, proposals of peace were sent to Argos. In that city there 1 Thuc. v. 73-75. * Thuc, v, 75, Jowett, 286 SPARTA AND ARGOS, 418. [IX. 12. had always been a party which sympathised with Sparta, and were willing to overlook the jealousies and enmities of the past, if they might have her assistance in establishing Alliance their own power on the ruins of the democracy, between Sparta The proxenus of the Argives at Sparta, Lichas and Argos. by name, appeared at Argos offering war or peace, as they were pleased to accept it. It happened that Alcibiades was in the city at the time, supporting the democratic interest, but, in spite of his influence, after a heated discussion, the Spartan party carried the day ; terms were agreed upon between Argos and Sparta. The army then retired from Tegea, and not long afterwards Argos, renouncing her alliance with Mantinea, Athens, and Eiis, entered into an alliance with Sparta. 1 The alliance between Argos and the discontented members of the Peloponnesian League is now finally at an end, and the Peloponnesus is again united round Sparta, with Argos as her ally. The alliance between Sparta and Athens is still in force ; but Athens and Argos are allies no more. 2 In the strength of this new combination, the two cities dis- played an energy hitherto unknown in the Peloponnesus. 1 By the terms of the first treaty, the Argives were to evacuate Epidauria and destroy iheir fortifications. And if the Athenians refused to do the same, they were to be regarded as enemies. No pretext was to be left for their interference in the affairs of the Peloponnese. The cities in the Peloponnesus, both small and great, were to be independent ; a provision which put an end to any ambitious schemes of dominion cherished by the Mantineans. One clause seems directly aimed at the Athenians : " If any one from without Peloponnesus comes against Peloponnesus with evil intent, the Peloponnesians shall take counsel together, and shall repel the enemy." The terms of the treaty might be shown by either party to their allies, who, however, were allowed to accept or refuse them as they pleased. In the second treaty, the alliance between Argos and Sparta is extended to the rest of the Peloponnesus, and even to the allies outside the Peloponnesus. All were to be independent, and in undisturbed possession of their own territory ; all were to submit to arbitration on fair terms ; and if a quarrel broke out between any two of them, it was to be settled by some impartial state. 2 Thuc. v. 77, 79. IX. 13- ] EXTENSION OF OLIGARCHY, 418. 287 Envoys were sent to Perdiccas, whom they persuaded to join them, when it suited his convenience to do so, and to the Chalcidian cities, with which "they renewed their former oaths and swore new ones." No communications were to be entered into with Athens unless she withdrew entirely from the Peloponnesus, and no alliance was to be made, no war declared, by the cities, except in concert. 1 The action of Argos made it impossible for the Mantineans to hold out. The claim to supremacy over neighbouring cities of Arcadia, which they had endeavoured Action of to set up in the general confusion of the war, 2 Sparta towards was abandoned, and they came to terms with her alhes * Lacedaemon, concluding a peace for thirty years. 3 At Sicyon, also, where the government was unsatisfactory, the Lacedaemonians appeared in force, and established a more oligarchical constitution. Similar changes were soon after- wards carried out through the whole of Achaea, in which hitherto Pellene alone had been an active ally of Sparta. In their own city, the oligarchs of Argos put down the democracy, with the help of the Lacedaemonians, and Argos was now entirely governed in the interests of Lace- daemon; even Elis, finding she had as little to hope from the Athenians as from the Lacedaemonians, in a short time ceased to take any part on either side. 4 13. The hopes of Alcibiades appeared to be ruined. After the battle — too late to be of any service at the critical moment — reinforcements had arrived at Mantinea from Athens and Elis ; and while the Lacedaemonians were occupied with the Carnea, these allied forces marched upon Epidaurus to punish an invasion which the Epidaurians had made into the Argive territory. They began siege of to surround the city with a wall, and when the E P ld aurus. Athenians had completed their portion, a garrison was left in it composed of contingents from the various cities, and the allies returned home. Little was gained by their labour ; by 1 Time. v. 79, SO. 2 Thuc. v. 29. 3 Thuc. v. 81 ; Xen. Hell. v. 2. 2. 4 Thuc. v. 82. 288 PARTIES AT ATHENS, 4I8. [IX. 14. the terms agreed upon, since the commencement of the work, between Argos and Lacedaemon, Argos was compelled to evacuate Epidauria and call on Athens to do the same. 1 Not long afterwards, the Athenians sent Demosthenes to bring their troops away : he succeeded in getting the fortifi- cations into his own hands, but it was impossible to remain ; the Athenians renewed their treaty with Epidaurus, and gave up the position. 2 For these disasters Alcibiades and Nicias were chiefly to blame. The restless spirit of Alcibiades had involved Athens „ . in the complications which had turned out so Parties at „, _ A Athens; "1 ', -Nicias had been dilatory in sending out ostracism of the necessary forces. The popular leaders at Hyperbolus. . - 1 f 1 . Athens believed that their opportunity had come. What the failure of Nicias at Pylus had been to Cleon, the failure of Alcibiades at Mantinea might be to Hyperbolus. Ostracism was demanded in the hope of getting rid of Nicias or Alcibiades, one the opponent, the other the rival, of the lamp- seller. It was thought that the supporters of Nicias would vote against Alcibiades, and the supporters of Alcibiades against Nicias. Alcibiades saw the danger, and met it by joining Nicias. Contrary to all expectation, the sentence fell on Hyperbolus, who left Athens, never to return. So absurd did the result appear, that ostracism was henceforth discontinued. It was not to protect Athens against such men as Hyperbolus that the institution had been invented ; for him to aspire to the position of a tyrant was ridiculous. 3 14. In the following summer (417) the Spartans discovered how slight was the hold which they had on Argos. The alliance, Athens and which was to last for fifty years, did not last Argos. twelve months. The popular party took ad- vantage of the G-ymnopaediae at Lacedaemon to attack the 1 Time. v. 75. 2 Thuc. v. 80 ; O. I. A. i. 180 ; Dittenberger, Sylloge, p. 69. 3 Thuc. viii. 73 ; Plut. Ale. 13 ; Arist. 7. The year of the ostra- cism is, however, uncertain : 417 is the most probable on general grounds ; see Beloch, Attisch. Pol. p. 339 f., Griech. Oesch. i. 567. IX. i 4 ,] ARGOS AND A THENS, 417-416. 289 oligarchs, of whom they slew some and expelled the rest. The Spartans, who were informed, unwillingly put off the festival and advanced to Tegea ; but it was too late ; they could only return home and resume the celebration of the festival. Even when both the Argive parties appeared before a congress of the allies at Sparta, the Lacedaemonians contented themselves with denunciations of the democrats, and idle promises of help to their opponents. Meanwhile the democratic party at Argos drew nearer to Athens. In order to secure their communications with the sea, should the Spartans invade Argolis, they began to build Long Walls from Argos to the coast. All the citizens, with their wives and slaves, were engaged in the work, assisted by masons and carpenters from Athens. Sparta was now thoroughly roused, and before the walls could be finished, Agis appeared with an army and destroyed them. Yet the constitution of the city was unchanged; the oligarchical faction was too feeble to help the Lacedaemonians or to be helped by them. 1 In these movements at Argos we may trace the hand of Alcibiades. Meanwhile Nicias was engaged in the northern Aegean, where he blockaded the ports of Perdiccas, whom the Athenians now regarded as an enemy. 2 In the summer (416), Alcibiades sailed to Argos, and, seizing three hundred of the citizens who were suspected of favouring the Lacedaemonians, he placed them in the adjacent islands. In spite of this severe purging, the democrats were still sus- picious; and when the Lacedaemonians threatened an in- vasion towards the end of the year, they apprehended more of the citizens. The Spartans, however, finding the omens against them, returned home without entering the Argive territory. 3 Athens and Sparta were still at peace ; and the situation remained the same even when the Athenians at Pylus plun- dered the Lacedaemonians, and the Corinthians, on private 1 Thiic. v. 82, 83. 2 Thuc. v. 83 ; see Dittenb. Syll. p. 70. 3 Time. v. 115, 116. VOL. III. T 290 THE PEACE OF NICIAS AND AFTER. [IX. 14. grounds, went to war with the Athenians. The Spartans contented themselves with proclaiming that any one who chose to make reprisals by plundering the Athenians was at liberty to do so. 1 In the Archidamian war it was the Corinthians who took the lead in forcing the Lacedaemonians to take up arms; and in their forecasts they pointed out more clearly than others what was needed in order to ensure success. When peace was concluded they found that their exertions had been in vain ; so far from gaining anything by ten years of war, their towns of Sollium and Anactorium had been lost to them, and Potidaea was now an Athenian colony. The same was the case with the Megarians, who saw their port in Athenian hands. The Boeotians had indeed gained some- thing by the destruction of Plataea and Panactum, and their victory at Delium had given them a high position in Greece, yet they also must have felt that a peace which formally left Athens where she was at the beginning of the war was not the object for which they had taken up arms. In the negotiations which follow the peace of Nicias, the Corinthians again take the lead, but while refusing to accept the terms, they are conscious that they cannot themselves form a centre to which the discontented members of the confederacy will flock. Neither in legend nor in history was the city so famous that she could lead the Peloponnesus ; she had never held the "Hegemonia" by acquisition or inheritance. Hence she betook herself to Argos, the city of Agamemnon, and for a time there was a probability that a second Peloponnesian confederacy would be formed with Argos at the head, while Sparta sought to protect herself by separate alliances with Athens and Boeotia, thus revealing the weakness of her position, and the selfishness of her aims. The project is wrecked on political difficulties. Argos was a democracy — which, though a recommendation in the eyes of Mantineans and Eleans, could not fail to excite jealousy in the minds of 1 Thuc. v. 115. IX. IS.] ATHENS AND ME LOS, 416. 291 Corinthians and Boeotians. For if democracy formed the basis of union, Athens must come in. Alcibiades seizes a favour- able moment, and endeavours to unite the democratic cities of Peloponnese with Athens. Hence the alliance of Argos, Elis, Mantinea, and Athens. Democracy is now ranged against oligarchy. This gives Sparta, to whom, as an oligarchy, her old allies return, the opportunity which she wishes for. The two opposing forces meet at Mantinea, and Sparta is victorious. The superiority of her army is re-established. Once more she becomes the leading state of the Peloponnesus and the acknowledged head of the confederacy. She avails herself of her position to establish oligarchy on a firmer basis where necessary, as at Sicyon and in Achaea. Argos is isolated and compelled to make terms — for a time ; Mantinea comes in ; Elis stands sullenly aloof, and we hear but little more of her in the Peloponnesian war. It must however be borne in mind that the Peloponnesians were still without a fleet. On the water Athens was supreme, and she could retaliate on the spread of Laconian oligarchy on land by the extension of Athenian imperialism at sea. Her second expulsion from any share in the affairs of the Peloponnese made her more determined to be absolute in her own dominions. Hence the attack on Melos, and the savage temper in which hostilities were carried on ; hence, perhaps, among other motives, a desire to revenge on the Dorians in Sicily her failure against the Dorians at home. 15. For us who read our Greek history in Thucydides, all other events of the year 416 are overshadowed by the expedition which the Athenians now sent against Melos. In the year 426 Nicias had made an attack on the island, and though the attempt was unsuccessful, we find the Melians assessed at 15 talents in the tribute list of 425. Steps were taken to enforce this payment, or, at any rate, to coerce the Melians into becoming subject allies of the Athenians, and at length they were driven into open hostilities. The Athenians resolved to make an example of them, and teach the Greeks that if Sparta had won her cause in the 292 THE ATHENIANS AT ME LOS, 416. [IX. 15. Peloponnese, she was powerless to help her allies in the islands. Athens was mistress of the sea, and if islands such as Melos and Thera were allowed to be independent, or to range themselves on the side of Sparta, they held their position on sufferance. Athens had long held her hand, but now she allowed it to fall with fearful severity. 1 A large force was despatched against the island, but before taking further steps, envoys were sent to treat with , . the Melians. These were not brought before Athenian 0 . expedition the people, as was common m democratic states, to Meios. were requested to explain their views to the magistrates and chief men of the city. 2 The Athenians agreed to this with some reluctance — they would gladly have displayed their eloquence — and suggested that the conference should take the form of a dialogue, in which each side should state their opinions. This dialogue is reproduced in the history of Thucydides. What opportunity he had of making himself acquainted with the actual substance of the discussion we do not know ; he is not likely to have been at Melos at the time ; and it was impossible to get information from the Melians who took part in it — for they were put to death. His information can only have come from the Athenian side, 3 and if the dialogue has any claim to authenticity, if it is not merely a record of the arguments which Thucydides puts into the mouth of Athenians and Melians, as suitable to the situation of each, we must suppose that there were Athenians who thought that the arguments used by the envoys could be repeated without discredit to the Athenian people. Or shall we 1 Thuc. v. 84. Tkuc. says : " The Melians are colonists of the Lacedaemonians who would not submit like the other islanders. At first they were neutral and took no part; but when the Athenians tried to coerce them by ravaging their lands, they were driven into open hostilities."] The generals in command were Cleomedes and Tisias. Thuc. I.e. ; cp. Dittenberger, Syll. p. 70. 2 Thuc. v. 85 j cf. iv. 22 and v. 27. 3 Unless the partisans of the Athenians in the city were spared in the general massacre, IX. 15- ] THE CLAIMS OF THE ATHENIANS, 416. 293 suppose that the historian, before narrating a deed which left even in antiquity an indelible stain on the name of Athens, endeavours to explain — not to palliate — their action by showing that such deeds were the natural result of the ideas which, under the tuition of Cleon and Hyperbolus, and perhaps of Alcibiades, had now begun to take possession of the Athenian mind 1 We have not come here, the Athenians say, with any pretence of justice, which is a question to be discussed between equals. We fall back on an older principle — that those who have the power will take what they can, and the weaker must submit. It is to our interest that you should be our subjects, for every independent island is at once a danger to our empire and evidence of its weakness ; if you will submit without resistance no harm will befall you, but if from any foolish love of freedom or loyalty to Lacedaemon you resist an overwhelming power, you will be the authors of your own destruction. If you trust to the chances of war, in which the result is sometimes contrary to all expectation, we remind you of the delusive nature of hope — a spendthrift who ruins every one who stakes his all at her bidding. If again you believe that the justice of your cause will win you the favour of heaven, we reply that we are no less confident. In acting as we act, we are but doing as men have always done, and as we believe that the gods also do : we rule where we have the power. This always has been and always will be the guiding principle of action. And if you trust in the honour of the Lacedaemonians, we reply that their virtue begins at home and ends at home. In their dealings with foreign nations they are well known to regard what is pleasant as honourable, and what is convenient as just. It was in vain that the Melians pleaded the claims which bound them to- their kinsmen at Lacedaemon. The point at issue was not honour but existence. Honour is a foolish word which has brought many men to ruin, and to shame too, because their disasters were the result of their own 294 MASSACRE OF THE MEL1ANS, 416. [IX. 15. folly. "Remember this," the Athenians said in conclusion, "and be on your guard against a seductive name. The safety of your city rests on your decision ! ' n In spite of this plain speaking, the Melians resolved to hold out. They would not surrender without a struggle the freedom which they had enjoyed for 700 years ; and they still hoped that assistance would come from Lacedaemon. They were willing to remain neutral, but to this proposal the Athenians would not listen. The envoys returned to the army, and the city was at once surrounded by a wall; a garrison was left, and the troops dispersed. The siege lasted through the summer ; twice did the Melians break through the wall and bring in supplies, but as the winter approached a larger force was sent out. Within the walls there was treachery, and at length no other course was left but to surrender at discretion. The men of military age were massacred, the women and children sold into slavery. 1 Thuc. v. 112. It is probable, though not certain, that in the years 424-415 was written the singular treatise on the Athenian Republic, which is commonly included among the works of Xenophon. It is the work of some Athenian oligarch, who, though quite out of sympathy with the Athenian constitution, criticises it as an instru- ment adapted for a certain object. The expansion of the democracy, and the maintenance of Athens at the expense of the allies, are the main thesis of the book, ideas which were naturally popular at a time when Athens was absolute mistress of the sea, and which resulted in the Sicilian expedition. See Forbes, Thuc. 1. lix. f. ; and Newman, Politics of Aristotle^ i. 538 f. CHAPTER X. AFFAIRS IN SICILY, 422-413. I. So far as ridding Sicily of the Athenians went, the pacification of Gela was a masterstroke. From the departure of Eurymedon and his colleagues in 424 down to the great expedition nine years later, no Athenian ships of war visited the island. Less was achieved in putting an end to domestic strife; in this respect Hermocrates had hardly hoped for success ; he was aware that factions would break out in the cities, and if they confined their quarrels within the limits of Sicily, he was willing to let things take their course. It was at Leontini that disturbances arose, and Syracuse herself, the city of Hermocrates, had a share in them. After the withdrawal of the Athenians, the Leontinians had enrolled a number of additional citizens, and in order to find land for them, it was proposed to redivide the Faction at territory of the state. This popular measure Leontim - alarmed the notables, who at once sought the aid of Syracuse, and drove the demos out of the town to seek refuge where they could, after which they abandoned their old home and went to live at Syracuse as citizens of that city. Not long afterwards a number of them, discontented with their new position, returned, and established themselves partly at a fortress in the Leontine territory, partly in Leontini itself, from which, supported by the majority of the exiled demos, they carried on war with Syracuse. Their efforts availed little ; the Leontine territory still remained a part of Syra- cuse \ Leontini ceased to exist as a community, and all that now remained of the once flourishing city state was a band of exiles encamped in two fortresses ; democrats who had 295 298 PHAEAX IN SICIL Y, 422. [X. 2. been driven from Leontini, and oligarchs who had exiled themselves from Syracuse. 1 At Messene also domestic faction broke out soon after the congress ; the aid of the Locrians was invited by one of the Faction at parties, and so numerous were the settlers who Messene. ^ 00 ]^ U p their abode there, that for a time Messene became "a possession of the Locrians." But the absence of so large a body weakened Locri, and when a revolt broke out among some of the Locrian colonies, she could no longer maintain her position at Messene. 2 2. On hearing of these domestic quarrels, the Athenians resolved to renew communication with their friends in mu A . Sicily. In the summer of 422 a commission The Athenians J . . send Phaeax was sent out, consisting of Phaeax and two to Sicily. others, in the hope of forming a combination against Syracuse. Such a combination was necessary if Leontini was to be restored, and Phaeax could now answer Hermocrates by pointing out that the enemy whom all had to fear was not the foreigner against whom he had warned them, but the city which he represented. In choosing Phaeax as an envoy, the Athenians appear to have carefully selected a man who was known as a diplomatist rather than a general. He was smooth of tongue and conciliatory in manner, a man of persuasive conversation rather than an orator, yet subtle in argument and forcible in expression — a favourite among the fledgling disputants of Athens. 3 On his way Phaeax was able to make terms with the Locrians, who alone of the allies had refused to make peace with the Athenians at the time of the pacification of Gela. From Locri he went on to Camarina, the city which had most to fear from Syracuse, as her immediate neighbour. Here, and at the more powerful city of Agrigentum, he was successful, but at Gela he failed; the city adhered to her policy, choosing Syracuse before Athens. Phaeax was dis- heartened; and, thinking it useless to visit the rest of the 1 Thuc. v. 4. 2 Thuc. v. 5. 3 Eupolis, Frag. 95 K. Aristoph. Knights, 1374 f. X. 3-] PROSPERITY OF ATHENS, 421-415. 297 cities, he returned through the country of the Sicels to Catana, where his ships met him. On the way he visited Bricinniae, one of the fortresses in which the Leontines were encamped, and gave them what encouragement he could. 1 In his voyage home he endeavoured to establish amicable relations with those maritime cities of Sicily and Italy at which he touched, but his embassy had little or no result. The time had not yet come when Athens could interfere with effect in the affairs of Sicily, and indeed it never came. And at this moment the spirit of enterprise at Athens was crushed. The tide of success had turned in favour of Sparta : the defeat of Delium and the loss of Amphipolis, with other successes of Brasidas in Chalcidice, weighed heavily against the gains at Pylus and Cythera. Danger threatened the city in a very vital part of her empire ; and till the career of Brasidas could be checked, a distant expedition to the west was out of the question. 3. In the years which followed the peace of Nicias, Athens rapidly recovered from the disasters of the Archidamian war. Her revenues were unimpaired, and we are informed that seven thousand talents of surplus were Athens during deposited in the Acropolis in the time of the peace of Nicias. 2 The population increased till the Nlcias * ravages of the plague were forgotten. There were many who longed for the stirring times of war, and with the genuine spirit of Athenians thought the years wasted which passed in inaction. They longed for novelty ; they dreamed of empire ; and why not, when the men and money were at hand % Others turned their thoughts to the revenues which 1 Thuc. v. 5. 2 Andocides, De Pace, § 8 ; Aeschines, Fals. Leg. p. 337. But I agree with. Grote, v. 144, note 3, that we cannot place confidence in either of these authorities. For the inscription to which Grote refers as proving that 3000 t. had been stored in the Acropolis during the peace of Nicias {C. I. A. i. 32 ; Hicks, Hist. Inscrip. 37) see Jowett's Essay on Inscriptions, Thuc. I. lxii. ff. Though written down after 420, it is supposed by some authorities to refer to a period before the war. Money was accumulated, Thuc. vi. 26. 298 THE SEG ESTAEANS AT ATHENS, 416. [X. 3. were lying useless in the treasury of Athena. The soldier's calling was rapidly becoming a profession, by which he expected to live, and for him war was a time of plenty. There could be no better use of the public funds than the acquisition of new territory, from which new revenues would flow to the city, and new pay to the citizens. In the autumn of 416 a quarrel broke out between two neighbouring cities in the west of Sicily — Segesta and Selinus. Segesta and Segesta was a town of the Elymi, with which, Selinus. as we have seen, the Athenians had entered into alliance about the middle of the century — an alliance apparently renewed by Laches. 1 Selinus was a colony of the Sicilian Megara, a Dorian city which could rely on Dorian Syracuse. The quarrel related to those trivial matters which were always disturbing the peace of neighbouring towns: rights of intermarriage, and the use or limits of neutral ground. Selinus sought the aid of Syracuse, and thus suc- ceeded in reducing her enemy to great straits by sea and land. In her distress, Segesta called to mind her ancient ally, the city beyond the sea, whose eyes had long been fixed with an eager gaze on Sicily. Her envoys appeared at Athens, reminding the Athenians of the old connection, and begging for assistance. 2 They had many complaints to make, but throughout they dwelt chiefly on the aggression of Syra- cuse. Was the desolation of Leontini to go unpunished ? Was Syracuse to destroy the allies who still remained to Athens in Sicily 1 In that case Dorian would join Dorian, and colonist would join mother-city, and the west would come with an overwhelming host to overthrow the empire of Athens. It was prudent for the Athenians to meet the danger before it was too late by sending help to their oppressed allies ; ample means would be supplied for the support of any assistance which might come. 3 1 Supra, p. 188. In Thuc. vi. 6 Classen omits Aeovrivoiv. 2 Diodorus, xii. 82, asserts that Segesta applied in vain to Acragas and Syracuse, — and to Carthage. The first statement is so im- probable that we cannot ascribe any weight to the second. 3 Thuc. vi. 6. X. 3-] THE ATHENIANS AND SICILY, 41$. 299 The appeal of the Segestaeans led to much discussion. Some supported it ; others pointed out that Segesta was a distant barbarian city of which little was Envoyssent known. After many meetings, it was resolved from Athens to send envoys to Segesta to report on the to Segesta - resources of the city, and the state of the war with Selinus. Here for the moment the matter rested, but the thoughts of the Athenians were once more turned to Sicily. We may imagine how the subject grew in the minds of men during the winter months (416-415) before the return of the envoys. The distance of the island, the extent and resources of it, the number and size of the cities, their population, their sym- pathies and antipathies, their past history— all these were subjects of discussion in the colonnades and shops of Athens. Any one who had more information than the rest became the hero of the hour ; men gathered round him and hung on his lips, forming in their minds bright pictures of the gain and glory that was coming. Foremost in the movement was Alcibiades, whose restless spirit foiled at Mantinea, was eager to seek distinction in some new field of action. Athens at peace and limited by treaties, Athens unable to put forth her strength, was no city for him. He saw himself sailing to Sicily at the head of a larger force than any which had ever visited the waters of the west, winning the cities by force or persuasion, and so passing onwards, " roaming with a hungry heart," till he reached Carthage, the metropolis of the west. The greatest of Phoenician cities would fall before his attack ; her fleets would be added to his own, and he would then turn upon his course, and bring an irresistible armament against the Peloponnesus. Meanwhile the envoys arrived at Segesta. They were more than satisfied by what they saw of the wealth of the town ; they were entertained most hospitably, and at every house they saw an abundance of gold and silver plate ; they also heard of large reserves in the treasuries and temples; and what they heard they believed, without further examina- tion. On their return they were accompanied by Segestaean 300 ATHENS WILL HELP SEGESTA, 415. envoys, who brought with them sixty talents, a month's pay for the sixty ships which they asked the Athenians to supply. The Athenians hesitated no longer. On hearing the report of the envoys, they decreed to send sixty ships to Segesta, The Athenians nn ^ er tne command of Nicias, Alcibiades, and decree aid to Lamachus. The immediate object of the ex- Segesca - pedition was to aid Segesta against Selinus, but if time and means permitted, the generals, who were granted full powers, were to promote the restoration of Leontini, and advance in any way that they could the interests of Athens in Sicily (415). 4. Four days after this decree was passed, the Assembly was again summoned to discuss the details of the expedition. Opposition Nicias seized the opportunity to give expres- of Nicias. g - on to v i ews< l n hi s opinion the decree was a mistake ; and it was against his wish that he had been chosen one of the generals to conduct the expedition. " We are met to discuss the details of our force," he said ; "but in my judgment it would be better to discuss the original ques- tion." It was useless to advise Athenians to be content with what they had, or to warn them against risking present advantage in the hope of future gain. But was it wise to seek new enemies in Sicily, when they were leaving so many enemies behind them in Greece 1 They must not rely on the peace ; those who maintained it had many complaints to make, and others did not maintain it at all. The Chalcidic cities were still in revolt ; the Corinthians had never accepted the terms of agreement; the Boeotians were only held in check by a truce terminable at ten days' notice. Was this a time to divide the Athenian power and send the greater half across the sea 1 "If we are successful," he continued, "we cannot maintain our conquests ; and what can be more foolish than to enter into a war in which we gain nothing if we succeed, and lose much if we fail % We are warned that if we do not interfere, all Sicily will fall into the hands of Syracuse — but what have X. 4 .] NICIAS OPPOSES, 415. 301 we to fear ? The Syracusans will not risk their empire by joining the Lacedaemonians against us — that would prepare the way for their own destruction. Leave Sicily to the Siceliots, and be on your guard against the old enemy, who is plotting to overthrow your democracy first, and then your empire. 1 "The best way of terrifying the Siceliots is to keep at a distance from them, or, if we visit the island at all, to display our power and return at once. Men are always afraid of what is strange and distant. And we must not despise the Lacedaemonians because we have defeated them. They are still planning to retrieve the past. We ourselves have only recently recovered from great disasters ; we cannot afford to waste our resources on those who will make no adequate return if successful, and if they fail will involve us in their own destruction. He who urges you to undertake this war is a young man without experience, pleased with the novelty of office, and eager to gratify his own ambition, or find means to support his extravagance. He has gathered his friends round him, but you must not be afraid of them ; remember the risk, and do not be shamed into voting against your convictions. Leave the Siceliots to manage their own affairs, and tell the Segestaeans that as they began the quarrel with- out consulting you, they must bring it to an end without your help." Nicias then turned to the presiding officer, and begged him not to shrink from putting to the vote a question which had been decided already. Such an act might be informal, but no formalities should be allowed to stand in the way of the safety of the state. 2 1 Thuc. vi. 11 : oira>s ttoKlv 8i dXcyapxtas enifiovXevovo-av ogecos (hvXa£6peda ; a passage which shows that Nicias at any rate was fully alive to the action of Sparta after Mantinea. ^ 2 Thuc. vi. 14 : iuu pa>SeZ^ to dvaylrMo-ai, to p.kv Xvetv tovs vop.ovs p.i] /xera Toa&vb" av p.apTvp(ov ahiav - oW, k.tX In what did the illegality consist? In the case of the Mytilenaean decree, iii. 36, a subject already decided was 302 ALCIBIADES AND NIC/AS, 415. 5. Though Nicias had not mentioned Alcibiades by name, the audience were well aware who the young man was whom The answer he accused of urging Athens to her destruction, of Alcibiades. All eyes were turned upon him, and he was not slow to respond. The public policy at once became a personal question, as was invariably the case with Alcibiades. His own wishes, his own interests, his own influence and position were of paramount importance to him. In genius, both political and military, he was far the first man of his day, and he did not underrate hi, abilities. Nor did the Athenians underrate them, but they looked with suspicion on one whose personal extravagance and contempt of all social custom marked him out as a man who had objects in view which he could never satisfy as a citizen among citizens. The ever- present dread of "a tyranny" gave a legitimate sanction to the envy with which many Athenians regarded every eminent citizen. "Nicias has attacked me," Alcibiades said, " for my wish to take command in this expedition. My answer is that I have as good a right to command as any other man, or better ; and I am equal to the post. The extravagance which he charges against me has been of the greatest service to the city. At a time when our resources were thought to be exhausted, I made a display at Olympia which was the astonishment of all Greece, entering seven chariots for the race, and obtaining the first, second, and fourth places. 1 Such success is rewarded with public distinctions, and it is also evidence of power. That I should be envied is natural ; but those who are disliked in their lifetime often become, in a later age, the pride of their cities. At any rate, I had influence enough to combine the Peloponnesus against Sparta. I proposed for reconsideration, and not a word is said about any illegality. In this case, it may be urged, the reconsideration of the decree was not the object for which the meeting had been summoned • it was brought up in the course of the debate ; and to this extent the Mytilenaean decree is not strictly parallel. 1 Probably in 01. 90 (b.c. 420). 2t 5.] ALC1BIADES SUPPORTS THE EXPEDITION, 4-16. 303 appeal to you, then, to make use of my impetuosity while it lasts ; combine my rashness and the good fortune of Nicias to secure success in this great expedition. Do not change your minds under the impression that Sicily is a great power : the Sicilian cities are not like ours; they are inhabited by a mixed population, without common sympathies, or fixed sentiments. No one thinks of his city as his home, nor is he prepared to fight for it— to him it is a place to make a fortune in, which he may carry elsewhere when he pleases. Among such cities there can be no consistent policy : they will not follow one leader, nor are their armies so large as we think ; and indeed throughout Hellas, the fighting force has been found far less than the estimate. " But Nicias says : * Remember what an enemy you are leaving behind you.' This consideration will weigh with us but little, if we look at the matter fairly. When our fathers acquired this empire, they were at war with the Pelopon- nesians and the Persians too, but, owing to the superiority of their fleet, they overcame both. And we also shall leave behind a fleet more than sufficient to keep the Peloponnesians in check. On these grounds, then, we have no reason to hesitate, nor have we any excuse for throwing over our allies. We must keep our engagements with them, regardless of loss and gain. We did not attach them to us with the intention that they should come to our assistance, but in the hope that they would prevent our enemies from crossing the sea. It was by helping others— Greeks or barbarians— when they called upon us, that we acquired our empire, and if we abandon this policy to stay at home and make nice dis- tinctions in sending assistance, we may lose what we have got. We cannot fix a limit to our empire, and say that we will go thus far and no farther: we must rule or be ruled; and before we can change our politics, we must change our nature. If we sail to Sicily, we shall humble the pride of the Peloponnesians ; we shall add Western Hellas to our empire, or at least injure the power of Syracuse to our own advantage. 304 EXTENSIVE PREPARATIONS, bl5. [X. 6. " Do not follow Nicias in his want of energy and mistrust of youth. Youth and age must go together ; each supplying the defects of the other, as they have done in the past. The state, if at rest, like everything else will wear herself out by internal friction. Every pursuit which requires skill will bear the impress of decay, whereas by conflict fresh experience is always being gained, and the city learns to defend herself, not in theory, but in practice. My opinion in short is, that a state used to activity will quickly be ruined by a change to inaction ; and that they of all men enjoy the greatest security who are truest to themselves and their institutions even when they are not the best." 1 6. Such a speech could not fail to be convincing, for it appealed to the strongest impulses of the Athenians ; and when the envoys from Segesta and Leontini came forward, reminding them of the pledges which they had given, they were more eager than ever for the expedition. Nicias saw that it was useless to press his arguments further ; the stream was too strong for any direct opposition ; he hoped that a change might come when the Athenians realised the vast preparations which would be required. It was not now a question of thirty or forty ships. To meet the forces of Sicily with any hope of success, a large army must be sent out, including slingers and bowmen who would act against the Sicilian cavalry ; the fleet must be on a great scale to ensure a constant supply of food, besides that which would have to be conveyed from Attica. An ample supply of money would also be necessary, for the promises of the Segestaeans might be found delusive. The words of Nicias, so far from diverting the Athenians from their purpose, merely confirmed them in it. They thought that with a general so cautious, and an equipment so complete, they could not fail. The Sicilian fever ran higher than ever. All alike were seized with a passionate desire to sail, the elder among them convinced that they 1 Time. vi. 16-18. See Jowett's translation. X. 7-] OMENS AT ATHENS, 415. 305 would achieve the conquest of the island, the younger long- ing to see with their own eyes the marvels of a distant country, while the main body of the troops expected to receive present pay and to conquer territory which would be an inexhaustible mine of pay for the future. 1 At last one of the audience, weary of the objections and delays of Nicias, came forward and asked him to state plainly what forces he considered necessary. 2 Nicias replied that so far as he could form an opinion, without further consideration, a fleet of not less than 100 triremes, and a force of 5000 heavy-armed, with a proportionate number of light-armed, would be required. On this the Assembly at once decreed that the generals should receive full powers to decide about the number of the fleet, and arrange for the despatch of the expedition. The day on which this decree was passed was a day of evil omen at Athens. It was the sacred day of Adonis, and if Aristophanes may be believed, the cries of the women who came out upon the roofs of the houses to lament Adonis were heard even in the Assembly. 3 Other tokens of impending evil were not wanting, and even Socrates is said to have been warned by his familiar sign against the expedition. 7. At this moment, when every one was more than usually disposed to pay attention to signs and omens, an outrage was committed at Athens which spread a panic through the city. 1 Thuc. vi. 24. 2 Thuc. vi. 25. Thucydides does not give the name, hut there is little doubt that the man w as Demostratus. See Plut. Nic. 12 : dvaaras yap 6 pa\i(TT(i tcov drjpaycoycov eVi tov -rrokepov napo^vvcov tovs 'AOrjvaiovs Arjpoo-TpaTOs ecprj tov Ni/aai> irpocpdcreLs \eyovTa navo-eiv Kai yjrrjcpio-pa ypdtyas oncos aiiTOKpaTopes coaiv oi aTpaTrjyol ndvTavda Kanel (BovXevo- pevoi Kcii 7rpaTTOVT€S, eneio-e tov brjpov -^/rjCplaaadaL. This account agrees with Aristoph. Lysistr. 391 ff. 3 Aristoph. Lysistr. 339 f. : o t 'Adcoviacrpos ovtos ovirl tcov Teycbv, ov 'yo!> tvot cov fjicovov iv Tr)KKkr]o-iq. eXeyev S' 6 prj copacri pev ArjpocrTpaTOS 7rAfii> ds ^LKeXlav 17 yvvfj 8' opxovpevrj "at, at, "AcWtV," cprjaiv, k.t.X. Cp. Plut. Ale. 18 ; Nic. 13. VOL. III. U 306 SA CRILE GIO US 0 UTRA GES, 415. It was the custom of the Athenians to set up in the porti- coes of their houses and temples square pedestals of stone, The mutilation carved into a rude resemblance of the human of the Hermae. head and trunk. These statues were known as Hermae-, they were relics of some primeval cult, associ- ated with good luck and productive power. In a single night, about six weeks after the vote had been given for the expedition, every statue in the city but one was found mutilated to a greater or less degree. Who committed the outrage, and what was their object in committing it, was never known. It may have been an attempt to put a stop to the expedition to Sicily by adding one more to the unfavourable omens which attended it ; and it was even asserted to be the work, directly or indirectly, of the Corinthians, who thus sought to save Syracuse from attack. If this was really the case, the attempt entirely failed ; amid all the excitement which the outrage created, no one, not even those most opposed to the expedition, took advantage of it to persuade the people to change their plans. It is also possible that the outrage was merely the frolic of a wine-party, but this explanation, though afterwards given, did not satisfy public opinion in the present state of excitement. The crime was commonly regarded as the act of conspirators, who aimed at nothing less than the overthrow, of the constitution, a view which we should be better able t© explain if we were more thoroughly acquainted with the state of feeling at Athens at this time. It is also possible to take another view. The party spirit aroused by the ostracism of Hyperbolus was still bitter ; there may have been a feeling that the people had feeen deprived of the leader whom they trusted, and deceived into accepting Alcibiades. Every one felt that a man was growing into power whose habits and aims were inconsistent with the safety of the existing con- stitution. It was largely due to him that the Sicilian ex- pedition was sent out; he was one of the generals; if he returned victorious, his power would be unbounded ; he might aim at the consummation which every eminent Greek X. 7 .] ATTACK ON ALCIBTADES, 4-15. 307 was supposed to desire, and make himself tyrant. But if the mutilation of the Hermae was in any way connected with an attempt to destroy Alcibiades, we must regard it as a preliminary step, intended to excite public fanaticism, and fill the mind of the people with alarm for the safety of the city, for no evidence was ever produced which implicated Alcibiades in this crime. Large rewards were at once offered for the discovery of the perpetrators ; and every one who knew of any sacrilegious act committed against the gods was requested to , f , . . & , Z 1 Profanation of come forward and give information, lo carry the mysteries : out the investigation more successfully, the attack on Council received full powers, and a Commis- sion was appointed, of which Pisander, Charicles, and Diog- netus were members. 1 Information was given by a number of metics and slaves, who, though they could tell nothing about the Hermae, spoke of other mutilations committed by young men in their intoxication. It was also stated that the mysteries wefre profaned by being celebrated in private houses ; and in connection with this the name of Alcibiades was mentioned. Thereupon his enemies, especially Androcles, the leading democrat of the day, at once attacked him, declaring that he was really to blame for all the acts of impiety which had been committed. His life and conduct showed that he was no friend to democracy, and these out- rages were steps towards its overthrow. 2 1 Thuc. vi. 27 ; Andoc. De Myst. 14, 36. 2 Thuc. vi. 28, aWeov dyaXp-drcov irepLKOiral rives vtto vcoarepav /xera 7raiSia? Kai o'lvov yeycvrjpevai ; viii. 65. The details are by no means clear. In Andoc De Myst. 11 ff., we are told that in the Assembly which was held just before the departure of the expedition, Pythoni- cus came forward with a declaration that Alcibiades was in the habit of celebrating the mysteries in a private house, and offered to prove the charge on the evidence of a slave, by name Andromachus. The slave, when produced, asserted that Alcibiades, Niciades, and Meletus celebrated the mysteries in the house of Pulytion. But in Plut. Alcib. 19, Androcles is mentioned as bringing forward slaves and metics with information of the same kind; and apparently before 308 THE FLEET SAILS FOR SICILY, 415. [X. 8. Alcibiades demanded to be put on his trial at once. It was unjust, he said, that he should be exposed in his absence Alcibiades to tne att acks °f n i s enemies. This was exactly allowed to go what his enemies did not wish. If the case were to Sicily. brought up for settlement before the expedition sailed, Alcibiades would have the support of all those who were serving in the army ; if he were detained in Athens, it Was doubtful whether the Argives and Mantineans who had joined at his solicitation would not return home. And his own personal influence would go far towards securing his acquittal. Availing themselves of the help of other speakers in the Assembly who were not known as opponents of Alci- biades, they carried through a proposal that he should sail at once, and be recalled to stand his trial within a fixed time. 1 8. The time was now come for the departure of the ex- pedition. Most of the allies, the merchantmen, and the Departure of lesser craft had been ordered to sail to Corcyra, the expedition. anc [ there await the arrival of the Athenians. On the day fixed, the soldiers and sailors went down to the Peiraeus at daybreak, accompanied by almost the whole popu- lation of the city, whether native or foreign. It was an impressive scene. At this final moment of their departure, the dangers of the enterprise seemed more real ; there were many misgivings and fears for the future, and the partings were not without tears. But the preparations were on so great a scale, the equipments so complete, that failure seemed impossible, and as the day wore on, confidence was restored. No armament so magnificent had ever left the harbour of Athens. Empty ships had been provided at the public expense, and pay for the sailors at the rate of a drachma a day ; the trierarchs had not only selected the best crews, paying additional wages to the superior sailors and the officers, but, in a spirit of honourable rivalry, had spent large sums on the adornment of their vessels. The same the Council. There were also other informers ; and the reward was. claimed by all. Andoc. I. c. § 27. 1 Thuc. vi. 29 ; Plut. Alcib. 19. X. 8.] THE FLEET OFF ITALY, 415. 309 spirit prevailed in the infantry. For, though the Athenian soldier had what might be called a " regulation " shield and spear, the body-armour was determined in some degree by the means or caprice of each citizen, who could vary his panoply as he pleased. A Greek campaign was never with- out its commercial accompaniments ; besides the soldiers and sailors, merchants joined the expedition with a view to trade ; and even among the soldiers themselves, many took with them goods for traffic as well as maintenance. When all were on board, silence was proclaimed by sound of trumpet ; the customary prayers were offered, not singly from each ship, but in unison from all, in which the thousands gathered on the shore took part. Libations were then poured from vessels of gold and silver ; the paean rose, and when these rites were ended, the ships sailed out of the harbour in single line. They raced as far as Aegina, after which they passed quickly on to Corcyra. 1 Here the generals arranged the vast host, making three divisions, which were assigned by lot, one to each general. 2 They also sent on three ships to make inquiries The fleet at what cities in Italy or Sicily would receive Corc y ra ~ them. On reaching Italy they first touched at Tarentum, where, as was natural from a Dorian city, they met with a very cold reception. They were not allowed to cast anchor or obtain a supply of water. The same was the case at Locri ; the rest of the cities were content with ^ u . } . at Rhegium. closing their gates and markets against them. Even at Ehegium, which, as a Chalcidian city, was expected 1 Thuc. vi. 30-32. 2 The numbers which crossed to Sicily at this time were as follows : —Heavy-armed Athenians, 1500 + 700 armed Thetes = 2200 ; allies, 2900 ; total 5100. Bowmen, 480, slingers, 700 ; light-armed Megar- ians, 120 ; horsemen, 30 ; making a total of 6430 in all. Of ships there were sixty triremes and forty transports from Athens ; thirty- four Chian ships and two Rhodian penteconters. The crews of the last cannot be accurately calculated, but altogether the sailors amounted to more than twenty thousand men. There were also thirty merchantmen, with corn, bakers, etc.; a hundred boats, be- sides boats of merchantmen which followed to trade. Thuc. vi. 43. 310 PARTIES IN SYRACUSE, 415. [X. 9- to be friendly, they were not received within the walls, though allowed to encamp outside and obtain provisions. The Rhegians would only act in concert with the other Italiots. Here for a time the fleet remained, awaiting the return of the ships which had been sent on to Segesta to inquire what money might be expected from that city. 9. Meanwhile intelligence of the expedition was con- veyed to Syracuse. At first it was received with disbelief. Discussion Athenagoras, who was at the time leader of at Syracuse. ^he p 0 p U l a r party, declared that the Athenians would never be guilty of such folly as to attack Sicily in the present state of affairs in Greece. Men who were so familiar with military preparations as the Athenians, knew too well what was necessary for such a great and distant enterprise, to enter upon it ; and the reports which were current had been set about with a purpose. In war the city must be led by a few men, and this was what the oligarchical party most desired. Athenagoras spoke in answer to Hermocrates, who had received accurate information, and knowing that the Athen- ians would certainly come, and were or soon would be at Corcyra, had suggested that the Syracusans with all the Siceliots who would join should sail to Tarentum to meet them on their arrival off the coast of Italy. Such a bold stroke would give them pause, and perhaps prevent them from cross- ing the Ionian Sea. This daring suggestion received no sup- port. Finally, a general who was present reminded his countrymen that this was not the time for political strife ; and, availing himself of the powers which his position con- ferred upon him, he dismissed the Assembly with an assur- ance that the proper precautions would be taken for the public safety. 1 1 Thuc. vi. 32-41. The proposal of Hermocrates was perhaps in- tended to unite Sicily and Italy in resistance to the invader. His plan would not have turned the Athenians from their purpose. All would have been risked on a single battle, and the probability is that the Athenians would have won. X. 10.] PLANS OF THE GENERALS ; N/CI AS, 415. 311 All doubt was soon removed. Word came from Rhegium that the enemy were encamped there. Upon this the Syra- cusans reviewed the available military force of the city, and despatched garrisons to various border fortresses in the in- terior, for it was of the first importance that the Sicels should be prevented from joining the Athenians. 10. The ships which had been sent forward to Segesta returned to the Athenians with the intelligence that their envoys had been grossly deceived. There were The fraud of the only thirty talents in the Segestaean treasury. Se s estaeans - The profusion of gold and silver plate, which had been re- garded as evidence of wealth, was a mere sham ; the same cups and vessels had been used over and over again at the various entertainments to which the Athenians had been invited during their stay in the city, and a portion of these had been borrowed ; the vessels in the temple of Eryx were of silver only. By Nicias the news was not unexpected, but the spirits of the other generals sank at the disappointment of their hopes. Not a man from Ehegium ; not a talent from Segesta ! 1 Before advancing further, the generals discussed the plan of campaign. The opinions given were characteristic of their authors. Nicias wished to make as great a piansofthe show and do as little as possible. He proposed & enerals - that they should sail at once against Selinus, and if the Segestaeans would find pay for the whole army, they would act accordingly ; if not, they must demand pay for the sixty ships which had been asked for, and the fleet should remain and bring the quarrel to an end by force or persuasion. They would then sail along the coast of Sicily, displaying to the cities the power of Athens, and her loyalty to her allies — and so return home without wasting the resources of the city, unless some favourable opportunity occurred of rendering aid to Leontini. The most splendid armament which had ever left Athens was to aim at nothing more than composing a petty squabble between two cities of the second rank, and 1 Time vi. 46. 312 ALCIBIADES AND LAMACHUS, 415. [X. 10. this on condition of receiving an adequate contribution to the expense ! Alcibiades was all for diplomacy. He had not forgotten his successes in the Peloponnese ; how he had combined the cities against Sparta, and forced her to stake her position on the issue of a single battle. He wished to send envoys to all the Grecian cities, except Selinus and Syracuse, beginning with Messene, which, being placed on the strait, was a most excellent base of operations. The Sicels, also, must be visited; those who were subject to Syracuse must be per- suaded to revolt; those who were independent must be brought into alliance. When allies had been secured, they could attack Selinus and Syracuse, if these cities refused to accede to their requests. Alcibiades was unwilling that so great a force should return home without any adequate achievement, but he failed to see how greatly the Athenians would suffer in prestige, if, tacitly confessing that their force was insufficient, they delayed action till they had secured allies in Sicily. To Lamachus neither of these plans commended itself; he was a soldier, and nothing but a soldier — a plain man without the support of birth or wealth. He had a soldier's instinct for striking while the iron is hot. He proposed to attack Syracuse at once, using the deserted port of Megara as a base of operations. If Syracuse was gained, Sicily was gained, and it would be far easier to gain Syracuse if they attacked at once, while their power was most impressive, and the fear of them at its height. They would win far more allies by immediate action than by delay; and their armament would never be so efficient as at the moment of its arrival in Sicily. 1 That this advice was far the best from a military point of view there can be no doubt. It was, however, open to one 1 Thuc. vi. 47-49. For Lamachus see Plut. Mc. 15 ; and the Acharnians of Aristophanes, where he is mockingly called rjpcos (549, etc.) ; Pax, 465. In the Frogs, after his death, the title is given him in earnest (1307). X. 10.] THE ATHENIANS AT CA TANA, 4,15. 313 serious diplomatic objection : it tore away the flimsy disguises by which the Athenians had endeavoured to conceal their plans, and made it perfectly clear that the conquest of Sicily was the object of the expedition. Besides, such hard hitting was not likely to find favour with Nicias, and it also destroyed the play of diplomacy in which Alcibiades hoped to shine. Lamachus received no support, and gave his vote in favour of the plan of Alcibiades, which would at least prevent the expedition from returning to Athens without achieving any result whatever. 1 Alcibiades at once visited Messene, but he failed to obtain any active support from the city ; if the fleet came they would grant supplies and no more. Two of the generals then sailed with sixty ships to TheAthenians Naxos, where they were well received, and m0 vefrom Catana, which hesitated. From Catana they ^™™ to sailed on to the Terias, and the next day to Syracuse, sending ten triremes into the Great Harbour to see what ships were there, and also to announce to the city that they had come to restore the Leontines. On their return to Catana, some Athenian soldiers entered the city through a neglected postern gate, and appeared in the market-place at a time when the citizens were gathered in assembly to hear an address from Alcibiades— for, though the army was ex- cluded, the generals were allowed to enter the city and say their say. Upon this the Syracusan party became alarmed and left the city; the rest decided to receive the Athenians, who now sailed thither with their whole fleet from Ehegium. At Catana intelligence was brought from Camarina which induced them to hope that the city might be won if they appeared there. They sailed at once, but nothing came of the visit. The Camarinaeans declared 1 It is strange that Alcibiades should not have seen how excellent the advice of Lamachus was. A decisive victory on the first arrival of the fleet at Sicily would have placed him beyond the reach of his enemies. He may have feared failure, but more probably he was blinded by his passion for diplomacy. Nor would such an aristocrat willingly listen to the suggestion of the plebeian Lamachus. 314 THE HER MAE AND AND0C1DES, 415. [X. ii. that they were under an oath to receive a single vessel and no more. 1 The Athenians returned to Catana. II. Meanwhile the opponents of Alcibiades were pursuing their course at Athens. In the eagerness to obtain informa- The affair of tion about the Hermae, any evidence was ac- the Hermae. cepted, no matter from what source it came. 2 Numbers of citizens were thrown into prison by the Council. Among the informers Teucer and Dioclides were the most prominent. Dioclides declared that he had seen the muti- lators at their work by the light of the full moon, but on investigation it turned out that the outrage took place on the night of the new moon ! 3 With hardly less shameless- ness he asserted that he gave information because the guilty persons would not pay him to withhold it. Yet he was regarded as a patriot, and, adorned with a crown, he was con- ducted in a mule car to dine in the Prytaneum. 4 What followed is told differently by Thucydides and Andocides, the orator, who was implicated in the affair. From Thucydides, who mentions no names, we learn that one of those who had been arrested and imprisoned "was induced by a fellow-prisoner to make a confession — whether true or false I cannot say • opinions are divided, and no one knew at the time, or to this day knows, who the offenders were. His companion argued that even if he were not guilty he ought to confess and claim a pardon ; he would thus save his own life, and at the same time deliver Athens from the prevailing state of suspicion. His chance of escaping would be better if he confessed his guilt in the hope of a pardon, than if he denied and stood his trial. So he gave evidence both against himself and others in the matter of the Hermae. 5 The Athenians were delighted to think that they had at last 1 Time. vi. 50-52. 2 Thuc. vi. 53. 3 Plut. Alcib. 20 ; Diod. xiii. 2. Grote disbelieved this. (Vol. v. p. 174, n.) 4 Andoc. De Myst. §§ 41, 45. In examining the persons thus ruthlessly attacked, the Council went so far as to suspend the decree of Scainandrius, which forbade the putting of any Athenian to torture, but the men escaped. Andoc. I.e. § 43. 6 Thuc. vi, 60, Jowett. X. II.] ATTACK ON A L CIBIADES, Itl5. 315 discovered the authors of the conspiracy. The informer was liberated, and all against whom he brought no charges : the accused, as many of them as could be found, were executed." In his Oration on the Mysteries, delivered in 399, Andocides, who is, no doubt, the prisoner to whom Thucydides refers, endeavours to clear his character. He could point to the fact that the Hermes before his own house was the only one uninjured in the city, as evidence that he had nothing to do with the outrage. That he had informed against his fellow-prisoners he could not deny, but he could explain the motives which led him to do so. It was not from any desire to save himself that he repeated what he had heard from those who were implicated in the outrage ; he wished to save his friends and relations, and put an end to the painful state of suspicion in which the city was plunged. He also main- tains, in direct contradiction to the statement of Thucydides, that no one was put to death in consequence of his infor- mation. Among those mentioned in his list some had already been condemned on the evidence of Teucer; others had escaped sentence by going into exile; and the remaining four, whom he was the first to mention, men previously sus- pected and certainly guilty, had saved their lives by flight. 1 True or false, the information given by Andocides cleared the air. The Athenians were delivered from their fear of revolution. But the enemies of Alcibiades had Renewed attack all the wider scope for their schemes ; they on Alcibiades. could now fix the attention of the people cm the danger to be apprehended from his ambition. About this time the Spartans happened to send a small body of troops to the Isthmus in connection with the Boeotians, and this was re- presented as a movement against Athens, prompted by Alcibiades and supported by a party of conspirators in the i Andoc. De Myst. §§ 49, 52 f. See also De Reditu, § 7, and Mr. Merchant's Appendix, "On the connection of Andocides with the mutilation of the Hermae," p. 178 of his edition, Bivingtons, 1889 ; Plutarch, Alcib. 21. 316 HE IS RECALLED BUT ESCAPES, 415. [X. 12. city. The greatest excitement prevailed, and for one night the people lay in arms in the temple of Theseus. At Argos also there was some disturbance, and his friends there were suspected of a leaning towards tyranny. This was enough to revive the impression made by the violation of the mysteries, and it was resolved to bring him to trial without further delay. 1 An impeachment for impiety was brought forward by Thessalus, the son of Cimon, and the Sala- minian galley was despatched to Catana to bring him home to trial. 2 On their return to Catana, the Athenians found the Salaminia waiting for Alcibiades. Orders had been given A1 ' ■ to those on board not to arrest him, a step Alcibiades re- , . , . . . ' * called from wincn might have alienated the Argives and Sicily: his Mantineans in the army; he was merely re- ' quested to go back to Athens and defend him- self. He made no resistance, and, together with others who were accused, at once accompanied the state galley on the homeward voyage. By the time that they reached Thurii he seems to have ascertained more clearly the state of feeling at Athens ; to return was to fall a victim to the prejudice which his enemies had created against him. He disappeared from his ship with his companions, and after searching for him in vain, the Salaminia returned alone to Athens. 3 12. After the departure of Alcibiades, Mcias and Lamachus divided their forces into two portions, for which they cast Movements of lots ' as bef o r e. Whether they formally revised the Athenians their plans is not stated; in the operations m Sicily. which immediately follow, we seem to have a combination of the three schemes. The whole fleet sailed from Catana to Segesta to ascertain what money would be 1 Thuc. vi. 61. 2 According to Plutarch, Alcib. 22, Alcibiades was charged with celebrating the mysteries in his own house, where he took the part of hierophant himself, Pulytion that of torchbearer, and Theodoras that of herald, etc. This is a different version from that given in Andocides, I.e. § 12, where it is stated that the celebration took place in the house of Pulytion. 3 Thuc. vi. 61. X. 12.] THE ATHENIANS AT SYRACUSE, 415. 317 supplied, and also to investigate the nature of the dispute with Selinus. On the way they touched at Himera, where they were not received, and succeeded in capturing and en- slaving Hyccara, a town of the Sicanians. From Hyccara the army returned by land to Catana, through the territory of the Sicels. Nicias, with the fleet, went on to Segesta, where he received the 30 talents still remaining in the treasury. A far larger sum was received from the slaves taken at Hyccara, who were sold at Catana for 120 talents. The summer was now almost over ; what remained was spent in a fruitless attempt on Hybla Geleatis. 1 So far the campaign had been conducted on the programme of Nicias and Alcibiades. The result cannot be called successful. Besides Naxos, no Greek city had joined the Athenians but Catana, and Catana had been gained by an accident; no town had been captured but the barbarian Hyccara. The delay had produced the natural result at Syracuse. The alarm created by the arrival of the Athenians had worn off : the Syracusans, so far from dreading attack, clamoured to be led out to Catana ; their horse rode up to the Athenian lines, asking whether they had come to restore the Leontines, or themselves to settle in Syracusan territory. Such insolence could not be permitted. The generals at once resolved to remove from Catana to Syracuse, but the change was not easily accomplished. If they went openly by sea, there would be difficulties about disembarka- tion; if by land, they would be harassed by the Syracusan horse. It was necessary to resort to stratagem, in which Nicias was helped by citizens of Syracuse, acting in concert with their party at Catana. The Syracusans Theyadvance were led to believe that the Athenian camp fromcatana might be surprised at night and their fleet toS y racuse - burnt. A day was fixed upon ; the Syracusans marched out and encamped for the night on the Symaethus, from which, next day, they pressed on to Catana, to find the Athenians i Thuc. vi, 62, 318 BATTLE BY THE GREAT HARBOUR, 415. [X. 12. gone, they, meanwhile, learning that the Syracusans had left the city, embarked with all haste, entered the Great Harbour, and encamped on a convenient site which had been pointed out to them near the Olympieum. Lying between trees and houses on the one hand, and the cliffs of the shore on the other, they were well protected from the Syracusan cavalry, which could not take them on either flank. They strengthened their position still further by repairing a fortress on the promontory of Dascon and breaking down the bridge over the Anapus ; their ships they protected by a stockade. No attempt was made from the city to disturb them till the Syracusans, on their return from Catana, rode up to the lines and offered battle, an offer which Nicias did not then accept. 1 The next day a sharp engagement took place. The Athenian army was divided into two sections ; one half was Battle of in advance, drawn up in line, eight shields Syracuse. deep ; the other remained near the encampment, arranged in a square with the baggage in the centre. These also were eight shields deep, and were under orders to support any part of the line which might be in difficulties. The Syracusans were drawn up sixteen shields deep, and on the right were posted their cavalry, 1200 in number, with the javelin men. After a short speech, Nicias led his men forward, too rapidly for the enemy, who never supposed that the Athenians, after their refusal of the previous day, would begin the attack. The engagement opened with skirmishes of the light-armed — the " stone-throwers," bowmen, and slingers on either side, each in turn defeating the other, but without any decisive result. Sacrifices were then offered; the trumpets sounded; the heavy-armed met. For a long time the Syracusans held their ground, though somewhat dismayed by a violent thunderstorm which broke upon the battle — for though not deficient in courage, they were with- out experience of war. At length the Argives defeated the Syracusan left, and the Athenians those on the right: 1 Thuc. vi. 63-66. For the places mentioned see the plan, p. 327. X. 12.] THE ARMY RETURNS TO CA TANA, 415. 319 the whole line then broke up and turned to flight. The victorious army had to remain content with the possession of the field, for pursuit was rendered impossible by the Syra- cusan horse, which by repeated charges compelled the Athenians to keep together. Without even seizing the Olympieum, where the Syracusans had placed a large amount of treasure, 1 they returned to their position and set up the usual trophy of victory. They then gathered up the corpses of their slain, and burnt them on a funeral pyre. On the next day, after giving back to the Syracusans Thg Athenians their dead, they collected the spoils on the return to battlefield and at once sailed back to Catana, Catana - carrying with them the bones of their dead. They thought, or Nicias thought, that in spite of their victory they could not maintain their position without a force of cavalry ; and they were in need of supplies. They resolved to defer further operations till the spring. Meanwhile they would send to Athens for money and horsemen; and gain what support they could from the cities of Sicily. 2 We cannot of course tell to what extent the Athenians suffered from the Syracusan horse, but as their loss in the battle did not amount to one-fifth of the enemy's, the damage cannot have been great. Yet Nicias at once con- demns his equipment as insufficient, abandons all thought of further hostilities, and resolves to spend the whole of the coming winter in renewed preparations. He was known as one of the safest of Athenian generals — a commander under whom any one might serve with the least possible risk, — but his caution was now become timidity. A resolute attack on Syracuse at this time, such as Lamachus doubtless advised, would probably have carried the city ; but such an attack would have cost lives ; and Nicias knew the temper of the Athenians towards those who led their fellow-citizens — their 1 This omission Plutarch ascribes to the piety of Nicias; Nic. 16. 2 Thuc. vi. 67-71. The historian seems to dwell with peculiar interest on this first conflict, describing in considerable detail what was after all an unimportant matter. 320 EFFORTS OF THE SYRACUSANS, 415-4U. [X. 13. sons or brothers — to destruction. He fell back on the plan of Alcibiades, when Alcibiades was no longer present to carry it out. 13. The Syracusans made the best of the respite. On the advice of Hermocrates, who encouraged his countrymen by pointing out that their defeat was due to want at r symcuse. S °f skill rather than want of courage — they Envoys sent had been like apprentices in war matched to Greece. with skilled craftsmen — they reformed their military system, training their army, and reducing the num- ber of generals from fifteen to three, of whom Hermocrates was himself to be one. To these they gave full powers, binding themselves by an oath to obey the orders given. They also sent envoys to Corinth and Lacedaemon. They wished if possible to get help from these cities, or at least to induce the Lacedaemonians, by making open and vigorous war on Athens, to prevent the sending of additional forces to Sicily. 1 When they arrived at Corinth, the envoys, who had endeavoured on their way to rouse the Greek cities in Italy to a sense of the impending danger, were received with great enthusiasm; a vote was at once passed for sending aid to Syracuse, and Corinthian envoys were chosen to accompany them to Sparta and support their petition. To Sparta they went, and there found Alcibiades and his companions, who, on their non-appearance at Athens, had been condemned to death. They had crossed from Thurii to Cyllene in Elis, whence Alcibiades had been brought to Alcibiades Sparta under a safe-conduct. He now appeared at Sparta. j n ^he Assembly, and every eye was turned upon him when he came forward to support the Syracusans. For the Spartan authorities were already intending to send envoys to prevent the Syracusans from coming to terms with the Athenians, but they declined to take any more active steps in their behalf. They were in fact considering the 1 Thuc. vi. 72, 73. X. i 3 .] ALCIBIADES AT SPARTA, 415-4U- 321 renewal of the war at home, and wished to concentrate their forces on that. 1 After a few opening words, in which he convinced his audience that he was a traitor to Athens, and not to them, Alcibiades pointed out the importance of sending assistance to Syracuse. He declared that the object of the expedition was not the conquest of Sicily only, but of Italy, and even Carthage. Mistress of these regions, and using their resources to increase her fleets and her armies, Athens would then bring an irresistible force against the Peloponnesus, and reduce her to the condition of a subject. This, which was a dream of his own and other excited minds at Athens, he declared to be a settled plan, which the generals in Sicily would endeavour to carry out. Hence it was of vital im- portance to Sparta to save Syracuse. He urged them to send ships so manned that the rowers could at once serve as heavy-armed, and above all to send a Spartan to take the chief command in the city. At the same time they must not neglect the war in Greece. They must occupy Decelea, which commanded the frontier towards Boeotia and Euboea ; by this means they would not only damage the Athenian territory, but cut off the revenues derived from the silver- mines at Laurium and other sources. When the allies saw the Lacedaemonians in earnest, they would no longer stand in awe of Athens, and would refuse to pay their tribute. With this the Athenian empire would come to an end, and Sparta would become the acknowledged leader of a willing Hellas. 2 The Spartans were persuaded; they believed, and were right in believing, that Alcibiades spoke in their interests, and that he knew the points at which Athens could be attacked with the greatest success. Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, who was well known in the west (supra, p. 21), was appointed to take the command in Sicily, and ordered to arrange at once with the Corinthians and Syracusans as to the best and speediest means of sending help. i Time. vi. 88, 93. VOL. III. 2 Thuc. vi. 89-92. X 322 HERM OCR A TES AT CAMAR/JVA, 41&414. [X. 14. 14. The Syracusans were not less active than the Spartans. During the winter they enlarged the fortifications of the city, Preparation of inclosing the district known as the Temenites, the syracusans. and extending the new wall along the whole front towards Epipolae. 1 They also planted a garrison at Megara, and at the Olympieum, and protected with stockades any point in the shore which offered opportunities for landing. The Athenians, after leaving the Great Harbour, had sailed to Messene, in the hope that the city would be betrayed to them, but failing in this, owing to the treachery of Alcibiades, they returned to Naxos for the winter, aban- doning their camp at Catana. This the Syracusans now destroyed; and hearing that the Athenians were in hopes of persuading Camarina to disregard the convention of Gela and go back to the alliance which had been made in the time of Laches, they sent Hermocrates and other envoys to counteract them. The situation was discussed in a public assembly of the Camarinaeans, and Thucy- dides has availed himself of the opportunity to bring before us the opposite views of the patriotic defenders of the island, and of the invaders. Hermocrates spoke Camarina, *■ Hermocrates, first. He endeavoured to throw discredit on Athenians ^ e Athenian professions by pointing to their past conduct, which showed what they really had in view when proposing an alliance. They had gathered allies round them under pretence of liberating them from the yoke of Persia, but the liberation had been no more than a change of slavery; and their object now, in their pretended support of Leontini, was the enslavement of Sicily. Besides Camarina was a Dorian city, and between Dorians and Ionians there could be no lasting friendship. Sicily must combine to repel the invader; by offering a united front they might hope for success, but if there was a division among them, the Athenians would carry the day. 1 See Freeman, Hist, of Sicily, vol. iii. Appendix xii. The details cannot be fixed with any degree of certainty. X. 14- ] THE ATHENIANS AT CAMARINA, 415-414- 323 Syracuse would do her part ; if Camarina did not choose to join her — and in the recent battle her assistance had been of the most half-hearted kind— she would be treated as a traitor, should the Syracusan cause gain the day. The Athenian envoy, Euphemus, took up the assertion that the Ionians and Dorians were always at enmity. It was for that reason that Athens had established her independence in Hellas after the Persian war— for why should she follow the lead of Sparta ?— and that independence she would main- tain. On her empire depended her safety. It was the same fear of falling into the power of Dorian Peloponnesus that had brought them into Sicily, but they came as allies and not to establish an empire. This might appear to be an inconsistent policy, but it was not so ; the Athenians were guided by the same motives in each case. It was to their advantage to have subject allies in Greece, and inde- pendent allies in Sicily ; and therefore the Camarinaeans need not be afraid of them. But of Syracuse they had every reason to be afraid ; she was an aggressive city, which sought by subjugating Sicily to become a great power, and for that reason Athens was attacking her. It was through fear of Syracuse that Camarina had already entered into alliance with Athens ; let her follow the same policy with greater vigour now, when it was in her power to render efficient help. The hearts of the Camarinaeans were with the Athenians though they were not without some suspicions of their designs on Sicily; with Syracuse, as a neighbouring city, they were always at variance. At the same time they were afraid of the Syracusans, who, if victorious, would certainly punish their defection. They answered the envoys that as both cities were allies, they could join neither; but they never- theless sent some slight assistance to the Syracusans, as they had already done in the battle by the Great Harbour. 1 The Athenians spent the rest of the winter in negotiating 1 Thuc. vi. 75-88. 324 THE ATHENIANS ON EPIPOLAE, 414. [X. 15. with the Sicels. Those who had maintained their inde- pendence — inhabitants of the midland regions of the island The Athenians — were mostly on the Athenian side, and and the Sicels. f urn i s h e d supplies. Others, who dwelt in the plain and were subject to the Syracusans, stood aloof for a time, but were compelled to come over, except those who were rescued by timely aid from Syracuse. The Athenian camp was also removed from Naxos to the old position at Catana. At the beginning of the winter a trireme had been sent to Athens for cavalry and supplies ; another was des- patched to Carthage to open friendly negotiations and obtain help if possible, and yet another to Etruria, where some of the cities promised help, which subsequently came. Horses were demanded from the Sicels and Segestaeans, and siege-materials were prepared. 1 15. As soon as the weather permitted (414), the Athenians opened the campaign by devastating parts of the Syracusan territory which lay between the city and Catana, and acquired a Sicel town named Centoripa. On their return to Catana they found that 250 horsemen had arrived from Athens with their harness, but no horses, and large supplies of money. Nicias now resolved to begin the siege of Syracuse. In order to cut off the city on the landward side, it was neces- The Athenians sar y * or tlie Athenians to occupy Epipolae — a succeed in seiz- long triangle of table-land, with sides more or mg Epipolae. j egg p rec jpit 0 us, which slopes gently from an elevated point on the west to the city wall — as a base ; if this occupation could be prevented, a siege was impossible. On hearing that the Athenians had received reinforcements, the Syracusan generals held a review in the low land by the Anapus, and chose a select band of six hundred heavy-armed to act as a garrison on Epipolae, which seems to have been hitherto left unprotected. But it was too late. While they were thus engaged, the Athenians advanced from Catana to a 1 Thuc. vi. 74, 88. X. 16.] THEY BEGIN THE SIEGE OF SYRACUSE, 4U- 325 point on the shore near Leon, less than a mile from Epipolae. Here they landed their infantry, while the fleet returned to Thapsus. The infantry at once rushed to Epipolae, which they ascended, unperceived, by a narrow path near the Eury- elus, at the western end of the slope. When the Syracusans caught sight of them from their position near the Anapus, they hastened to the defence; the six hundred and other troops came up at full speed, but as they had to traverse about three miles before they reached the enemy, their attack was ineffectual and irregular. About half of the select troops were slain, including the commander, and the rest retreated into the city. The Athenians then built a fort at Labdalum, on the edge of Epipolae, looking towards Megara, as a storehouse for their supplies. They were now joined by a body of horsemen from Segesta, and having also obtained horses for the cavalry who had come from Athens, they could put in the field a troop of six hundred and fifty mounted soldiers. From Labdalum they advanced to Syke, in the direction of Syracuse, and began to build a circle or central fortress, from which to carry on the wall of circum- vallation. 1 16. The Athenians were now firmly established on Epi- polae ; for the Syracusans did not venture on a general battle, and even their dreaded cavalry were defeated in a slight 1 Thuc. vi. 97 : tvanep KaOe^o^voi Irelxicrav tov kvkXov Sia rdxovs. There is much doubt about the meaning of tov kvkXov. Is it (1) the wall by which they intended to surround Syracuse, or (2) a circular fort at Syke ? That there was such a fort is certain, cp. c. 102 ; yet in vii. 2 t<3 aXXto tov kvkXov trpbs rbv TpayiKov seems to mean the part of the besiegers' wall towards Trogilus. For though in vi. 98 we can join itpbs Bopeav tov kvkXov, we cannot joinTrpo? rbv TpayiXov rov kvkXov. In some other points also the language of Thucydides is obscure. Why does he use the extraordinary expression at the beginning of c. 97 : TavTrjs ty)S vvktos Trj eniyiyvopevr) rjpepa"} There is nothing to which Tavrrjs rrjs v. can conveniently refer. What we expect to be told is that the Athenians came to Leon during the night, and on the next day ascended Epipolae. But he also speaks of a review— i£r}Ta£ovTo, c. 97 ; and where does this come in ? It is difficult to suppose that it was held at Leon, for time was everything in seizing Epipolae. See Freeman, Hist, of Sicily, iii. 211, Appendix xiii. 326 : WALL AND COUNTER-WALL, 414. [X. 16. engagement. They at once began to build a wall which should extend from the edge of the Great Harbour to the open sea towards Trogilus, using the "circle" wan and the as a Dase of operations. They first took in hand first Syracusan the section towards the north of the circle ; and the Syracusans, seeing them engaged in that direction, resolved, on the advice of Hermocrates, to run a counter-wall, protected by a stockade, south of the circle from the city wall, so as to cross the line on which the Athenian wall would be built. Even if they did not succeed in carrying their counter-wall past the Athenian line, they would at least divide them, and prevent them from carrying on their work with their whole force. And as the Athenian ships had not yet sailed into the Great Harbour, the Syracusans could still make free use of the shores of it. Without any opposition from the Athenians, who refused to be drawn from their building on the north, they completed the wall, and placed a garrison on it. The Athenians replied by severing the conduits which conveyed water into the city, and afterwards, taking advantage of the carelessness of the garrison at noonday, they drove the Syracusans from the counter-wall and destroyed it. 1 On the next day the Athenians began to carry their wall southwards from the circle, to secure the cliffs which over- The second hung the marshy ground between Epipolae and syracusan wall. tne Q reat Harbour ; and the Syracusans, on seeing this, resolved at any rate to prevent them from advanc- ing from the cliffs to the shore of the harbour. Abandoning the higher ground, and even the lower level on the southern slope of Epipolae, they now cut a trench " through the middle of the marsh," and planted a stockade alongside. The Athenians in reply ordered their fleet to sail from Thapsus into the Great Harbour, and when they had brought their 1 Thuc. vi. 99, 100. The nature of the counter- wall is clear from C. 100 : ocra re earavpadr] Kai (OKohoiir)6r) rov V7rorei^i'cr/xaro?. It was also furnished with wooden towers. There is no doubt that it ran south of the circle, though iu Poppo-Stahl — on vi. 99 — it is put north. X. 16.] THE SECOND COUNTER-WALL, 4U- 327 wall to the edge of the cliffs, they at once attacked and destroyed the newly erected stockade. In the battle which followed they defeated the Syracusans, but the Death of victory was dearly purchased by the death of Lamachus ' Lamachus, who, while reinforcing the Athenian right, was SYRACUSE DURING THE ATHENIAN SIEGE. This plan has been copied, with the permission of the Delegates of the Clarendon Press, from that in Professor Freeman's History of Sicily, vol. iii. p. 167. The forti- fications of Tycha and Temenites are quite uncertain ; perhaps the dotted line 1 should be extended south-east to the point where the dotted line 7 leaves the wall of Achradina, and the solid lines enclosing Temenites (on all sides but the east) removed. This is the view taken in the map given in Lupus, Syrakus. cut off from the main body, and slain, with five or six others. Nicias had taken no part in the attack. He had 328 THE SYRACUSANS IN DESFA1K, 414. [X. 17. remained behind in the " circle " on Epipolae owing to illness. He too found himself in danger of being cut off, for while the engagement in the marsh was still going on, a party of Syracusans, who had fled into the city, formed again, attacked the circle,, and even carried an outwork connected wkh it. Nicias, who was almost alone, could only save himself by setting on fire the engines and timber which lay scattered round. By this means he not only kept off the enemy, but gave a signal to the Athenians on the lower ground, who at once sent assistance. At the same time the sight of the Athenian ships sailing into the Great Harbour re- called the Syracusans to the defence of the city. From all quarters they retired within the walls, and abandoned the attempt to prevent the Athenians from completing their siege wall. 1 17. The death of Lamachus was a severe blow to the Athenians — the more severe because the sole command of the fleet and army was now in the hands of Nicias, who, owing to illness, was more than ever unequal to his position. Fortunately, no further action was required for a time. The Athenians went on with their work, unmolested by the Syra- cusans, carrying a double wall from the cliffs of Epipolae to the edge of the harbour. 2 The tide of feeling now changed in their favour ; supplies were brought in from all parts of Sicily; from Etruria came three ships of fifty oars; and many of the Sicels, who had hitherto wavered, sent con- Despondency ot tingents. The Syracusans, on the other hand, the Syracusans. De g an to despair ; no help came to them from the Peloponnesus, and the complete blockade of the city seemed inevitable. In their vexation they deposed the generals, including Hermocrates, whom they blamed for their misfortunes, and chose three others in their place. 1 Time, vi. 101, 102 ; Freeman, I.e. p. 669. The words airb rov kvkKov irel^i^ov rov Kprj/xvov are explained by eVetS?) to npos rov Kprjpvov i^eipyaaro just below. 2 Thuc. vi. 103 : airo rav 'EnnroXcov koX tov Kpr]p.vd>dovs , . . (**XP l rrjs 0a\do-(TT)s. X. i 7 .] GYL1PPUS AT HIM ERA, 4U> 329 The surrender of the city was publicly discussed, and negotiations were opened with Nicias. Unknown to them the Deliverer was on his way. On receiving his instructions (supra, p. 321), Gylippus had arranged with the Corinthians to despatch two Approach of ships without delay to Asine in Messenia, and G y H PP us - prepare for starting, when the season arrived, as many more as they meant to send. 1 With these ships he had reached Leucas on his way to the west, when he was in- formed that Syracuse was completely invested by the Athenians and beyond relief. Gylippus at once showed of what metal he was made. If Sicily were lost, he might still save Italy, and he determined to press on. Accom- panied by Pythen, the Corinthian commander, he sailed with two Laconian and two Corinthian ships to Tarentum, leaving the rest to follow. From Tarentum, after an un- successful effort to win over Thurii, of which city his father had once been a citizen, he passed along the coast, intending to visit the adjacent cities, but he was caught in a violent storm, and only with difficulty made his way back to Taren- tum. 2 Nicias was informed of his arrival, but treated it as a matter of no importance. What harm could a privateering expedition, with four ships, inflict on the Athenian army 1 And this had been the opinion at Thurii. But Gylippus thought differently. After refitting his ships at Tarentum, he advanced to Locri. Here he received more precise infor- mation about the situation of affairs at Syracuse, He lands at and formed his plans accordingly. He deter- Himera - mined to sail to Himera, and after collecting what forces he could, to come back to Syracuse by land. He succeeded 1 Time. vi. 93. 2 Thuc. vi. 104. dpTraardeis vn' > dvepov Kara rov Tepivaiov KoXnov, os innvel ravrr) jxeyas Kara Bopeav £o~tt)kg)s, dirocpeperai is to ireXayos. The Terinaean gulf is on the other side of the " foot 55 of Italy, and Gylippus could not have reaohed it without passing through the straits of Messina. Why Thucydides chooses so distant a point in determining the position of Gylippus it is difficult to say. Was he misled by imperfect information 1 330 GONG YL US RE A CHES S YRA C USE, 4H> [X. i3. in passing the straits unseen by the ships which Nicias, on hearing of his advance to Locri, had sent to intercept him, and reached Him era. The Sicels of the district were favour- able, and as their king, Archonides, who was a friend of the Athenians, had recently died, they could render efficient assistance; Himera, Selinus, and Gela also furnished con- tingents. Gylippus quickly found himself at the head of a force of about three thousand men, including the rowers on his own vessels, whom he armed. With these he at once marched on Syracuse. l8. The great news had already reached the city. After the departure of Gylippus, the Corinthian ships had crossed . . , . with all speed from Leucas, and Gongylus, one Arrival of r . . Gongylus at of the commanders, though latest in starting, Syracuse. was the first to arrive at Syracuse, which he seems to have had no difficulty in entering. He found the citizens on the point of meeting in the Assembly to discuss the terms of peace with the Athenians. Hopeless of success, they wished to bring the war to an end. This mood was quickly changed when they heard from Gongylus that his was the first of a number of ships, and that a Lacedae- monian, Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, was on his way to Syracuse. They at once abandoned all thought of peace, and resolved to march out with their whole force to meet Gylippus. Of the double wall which they were building from the southern edge of Epipolae to the harbour, the Athenians had now completed about a mile ; only a small portion at the harbour's edge remained to be finished. From the cliff to the "circle," the wall, a single one, was finished; from the "circle" to Trogilus on the north, part of the wall was finished, part was being built, and for the remainder the stones were placed in readiness. It was still possible to enter Syracuse at this point. 1 Gylippus seems to have been 1 We do not know what interval of time separated the seizure of Epipolae by the Athenians from the coming of Gylippus, but a more active general than Nicias could now be would certainly have X. 18.] GY LIP PUS ENTERS SYRACUSE, 414. 331 accurately informed of the state of affairs. Seeing that the Athenians were engaged upon their wall on the edge of the harbour, he rushed on Epipolae, ascending Gyii PP us on by the Euryelus, as the Athenians had done ^vo\^. before him, and united with the Syracusans, who had come out from the city to meet him. With their support he advanced on the Athenian fortification. 1 The Athenians were taken at a disadvantage, and thrown into some con- fusion, but they drew out for battle. Their astonishment was great when G-ylippus, before giving the order for attack, sent a herald to say that he was willing to grant an armis- tice for five days, if in that interval the Athenians would leave Sicily. To this proposal no reply was made; and, when we remember that the Athenian force was many times as great as that commanded by Gylippus, and that they held, or ought to have held, complete control of the sea, we cannot wonder that they treated the offer with contempt. The engagement which followed was not fought out; Gylippus, seeing that the Syracusans had a difficulty in forming, withdrew to a more open position, and He enters when Nicias declined to follow, led his army Syracuse, within the walls to encamp in the Temenites. The next day, to divert the attention of the Athenians, he drew out the greater part of his army in front of the Athenian lines ; while, with a smaller force, he captured Labdalum, which was out of sight of the Athenian lines. The Syracusans^also obtained their first success at sea by seizing an Athenian completed his wall of circumvallation without delay. A single wall, cutting off the city from sea to sea, might have been built in the time required to build a double one for a much smaller distance, but such a wall did not satisfy Nicias, who never recognised that rapidity is one of the first conditions of success in war. He had of course failed m his duty in taking insufficient measures for intercepting Gylippus and the Corinthians, and in allowing Gongylus to eDter Syracuse. 1 Thuc. vii. 2: eVi r6 TeL X t(Tfxa rS>v 'AO^vaicov. Poppo-Stahl regards this reixio-fxa as the double wall of the Athenians on the level ground near the harbour. The omission to secure Euryelus was another gross blunder on the part of the Athenians. 332 THE THIRD COUNTER-WALL, 4U. [X. 19. trireme, which was keeping watch near the mouth of the harbour. 1 Encouraged by their success, the Syracusans now The third Syra- reverted to their old plans. Once more they cusanwaii. began to build a wall which should cut the Athenian line, and render it impossible for them to complete their work. This new wall was, of course, built on Epipolae to the north of the circle, where the Athenian line was still incomplete. 19. Finding that all was going against him on land, Nicias began to pay more attention to the sea than he had done hitherto. When they finally entered the Great Harbour, the Athenian ships appear to have been stationed in the north- west corner, not far from the point where the Athenian wall subsequently abutted on the harbour's edge. It was important that they should be near the army, but in other respects the position was unsatisfactory. It was at a distance from the smaller harbour of the Syracusans, which it was the duty of the Athenians to blockade, and from the mouth of the Great Harbour, through which their Nicias seizes supplies were now chiefly brought. To obviate piemmyrium. these evils, Mcias seized Plemmyrium, the pro- montory on the southern side of the entrance to the harbour, and built on it three forts, one large and two smaller, to serve as storehouses. The ships of war and larger boats were now brought up and moored off Plemmyrium. Yet even this new position, though excellent so far as the control of the harbour was concerned, was not without its disadvan- tages. Water and wood could only be obtained at a distance, and the sailors who went in search of them were often c^t off by the Syracusan horse, of which a third part was told off for this service. Nicias also sent out twenty ships to intercept the Corinthian contingent, which was now expected from Leucas. 2 In building their wall, the Syracusans actually availed themselves of the stones which the Athenians had placed l Thuc. vii. 3. 2 Thuc. vii. 4. X. 19.] CARRIED PAST THE ATHENIAN WALL, 4U- 333 for use in their own fortification. To protect the work, Gylippus constantly led out his forces in front of it ; and the Athenians faced him with theirs. In the first _ . The third Syra- engagement which took place between tnem, cusanwaiiis they fought in the narrow space between the carried past the * i • n i \i a . n Athenian wall. Athenian wall and the byracusan counter-wall, where the Syracusan horse could not operate. The Syra- cusans were defeated and driven back, but Gylippus, with a frankness remarkable in a Spartan general addressing strangers under his command, took the blame upon himself, and encouraged his men to try their fortune again, under more favourable conditions. Peloponnesians and Dorians were not to be defeated by Ionian s and islanders, a motley horde gathered from the ends of the earth. Nicias, on the other hand, was anxious to fight under any circumstances, for the counter-wall was now brought up within a short dis- tance of the Athenian wall, and, unless the Syracusans could be checked, there was an end to all hope of cutting off the city. In the second engagement, Gylippus, taught by his previous experience, drew out his men further away from the walls, and placed the cavalry on his right wing, which we may suppose lay towards Epipolae and the open ground. His dispositions were successful. The Athenians were de- feated and beaten into their own lines, and in the following night the Syracusans carried their wall past the Athenian line. The game was won. 1 On sea also the Athenians were unfortunate. The squad- ron sent out to intercept the Corinthian ships failed to catch them. They entered the harbour unobserved, and their crews at once joined the Syracusans in completing their work on the fortifications. 2 1 Thuc. vii. 6, 7. 2 Thuc. vii. 7 : i-vvereixi-o-av to Xoiitov toIs 2vpaKoaiois ^XP L T °v iyicapo-iov Tei'^ovs. The meaning of these last words is very doubtful. Grote, whom Freeman and others follow, supposed that Thucydides is referring to a wall along Epipolae, which was carried down from Euryelus to meet (/ue^pO the counter-wall of the Syracusans. But why with a fort at Euryelus, another at Labdalum, and three 7rpor€t^tV/xara 334 NIC IAS 1 IE TIER TO THE ATHENIANS, 4H- [X. 20. 20. Gylippus had obtained the first and greatest object of his coming; he had delivered Syracuse from any im- mediate danger. He was on the full tide of success, and Gylippus collects felt that he was able to leave the city for a reinforcements, time, to collect new reinforcements in Sicily. He was now able to persuade those who had hitherto been waverers to join him. Preparations were also made for attacking the Athenians on sea, and more envoys were sent to Lacedaemon and Corinth, asking for further help to meet the reinforcements which would certainly come from Athens in the spring. Nicias had already sent numerous messengers home to report the change in his prospects, and now feeling that his Letter of Nicias position was critical, he resolved to write a totheAthen- letter to the Athenians, in order that they reinforcements might know from himself the difficulties in required. which he was placed. Sad was the story which he had to tell, and envoys might be unable or un- willing to repeat the whole truth. In this he acted like the honest and courageous man that he was; he also acted wisely, for it was now necessary that the truth should be known. He had to confess that since the coming of Gylip- pus he had been entirely outgeneralled on land. Unless the Syracusan counter-wall was captured, and this could not be done without a large force, Syracuse could no longer be besieged. Encouraged by their success on land, the enemy were contemplating an attack on the Athenian fleet. They who but a little while ago were hardly known to possess a navy, were about to assail the greatest sea-power in the world ! During their stay in Sicily, the Athenian ships had greatly deteriorated in condition; the demands on the service had been so incessant, that there was no opportunity of properly drying the vessels. To obtain supplies it was necessary to be constantly on the watch ; and, as the Syra- on Epipolae, should this long wall be necessary ? Yet no other solu- tion has been found which suits the description in vii. 43 so well. See Freeman, Hist, of Sicily, vol, in. Appendix xv. X. 21.] THE ATHENIANS DECREE SUPPLIES, tf4- 335 cusan ships were more numerous than their own, there was always a danger of attack. Their crews were also destroyed and demoralised ; many had been slain by the Syracusan horse, many more deserted, and their places had to be filled by slaves. These evils Nicias was unable to remedy. He had now no resources left but such as he had brought with him ; the cities in Sicily, Naxos and Catana, were unable to help, and if the Italian cities from which he purchased supplies went over to the enemy, the war would be brought to a close by the starvation of his army. He concluded with declar- ing that the force at his disposal was no longer equal to the task before it. They had to face a united Sicily, which would soon receive help from Peloponnesus. Another arma- ment, not less than the first, and amply provided with money, must be sent out, or the forces must at once be recalled from Sicily. And what was done must be done quickly. For himself, he begged to be relieved from his command, to which in his present state of health he was quite unequal. 1 21. Thucydides ascribes the failure of the Sicilian expedi- tion to a want of support from home ; the Athenians were absorbed in intrigues and factions, and paid Reinforce . too little attention to affairs in Sicily. 2 In this ments decreed he may be referring to the recall of Alcibiades, to Slclly# which was a grave error — though its consequences could hardly be foreseen at the time — or to other party feuds, un- known to us, which prevented the Athenians from listening to the messages of Nicias. For otherwise it is difficult to understand the statement. When by the letter of Nicias the true condition of affairs in Sicily became known, there was no 1 Time. vii. 7-15. 2 Thuc. ii. 65. After the death of Pericles, the leaders of the people irpdirovTO ko.6' rjbovds rep drjpco /cat ra Trpdypara ivdibovat. e£ &v SXXa re 7roXXa, cos iv p^ydXrj ndkei kol dpxrjv exovcrj], fjpapTrjSr) kol 6 is 2iKe\iav irkovs' os ov rocrovrov yvcopr]s dpdprrjpa rjv irpbs ovs iTrrjeo-av, oaov oi iKnep^avres ov ra 7rpoo~(popa rols olxopevois imyiyvaaKOVTes, dXKa Kara rets Idias 8ia(3o\ds nep\ rrjs rov br)p,ov irpocrrcKTiaS) rd re iv r<3 o-TparoTviba dpfikvTepa eVotow, kol to. 7rep\ Ttjv irokiv np&rov iv dXkr]\ois irapdxOrjarav. 336 VIOLATION OF THE TRUCE, M- [X. 21. hesitation about sending out reinforcements on the most liberal scale. And though the Athenians refused to relieve Nicias from his command, they chose two officers from the troops in Sicily — Menander and Euthydemus by name — to support him till new generals should arrive from home. 1 Preparations were made for a second expedition, of which Demosthenes, now the best officer in Athens, and Eurymedon, who was already known in Sicily, were placed in command. Eurymedon was despatched at once (midwinter 414) with ten ships and 120 talents. He did not, however, remain at Syracuse, but sailed back to return with Demosthenes in the following year. At the same time twenty ships were sent to cruise round the Peloponnesus, and keep watch at Naupactus, to prevent any reinforcements reaching Syracuse. 2 This momentous resolution was taken at a time when the situation of affairs at home was becoming more serious from day to day. To the end of the summer of 414 the peace between Athens and Sparta had been maintained, at least to the extent that neither state had invaded the territory of the other. Such restraint satisfied the letter of the treaty, and that was enough. But in the autumn of 414, when an Athenian fleet had gone to the help of Argos in resisting an invasion from Lacedaemon, the generals in command — ■ Pythodori^ and others — were persuaded to 3ioiatethe mnS make a descent on Laconian territory at truce in the Epidaurus Limera and Prasiae. 3 This was the Peloponnesus. 0 pp 0rtun fty f or w hich the Lacedaemonian s had long been waiting ; the marauding excursions from Pylus, and damage done to other parts of the Peloponnesus beyond the limits of Laconia, did not amount to actual violation of the terms of peace, and if they had acted upon them, they would again have been haunted by the feeling that they were the aggressors in the quarrel, as they had been during the 1 Cp. Grote, Hist, of Greece, iv. 196. * Thuc. vii. 17 : itv 'ETwroAeoi/ rpia — to which the fugitives fled ; (3) to aVo rrjs TrpvTrjs naparei- ^itr/xa tooi> 'Svpa.Koalcou — which the Athenians captured and began to strip of its battlements. The expression dno rrjs 7rpamj? is very obscure — it seems to mean the nearest part of the Traparelxtarpa, but this would be more correctly expressed by to and Tijs TrpcoTtjs rod naparei^o'paTos : (4) ra rrpoTeixto-para, from which Gylippus brought his forces to the assistance of the Syracusans. These are the same as the o-rpaToneha (hence the reading £v TrporeixLO-pao-iv, vii. 43). The position of the camps is not given with accuracy. The impression left by Thucydides is that to dno tt]s Trpar-qs 7raparei'xio-/ia reached a point not very far from Euryelus — that the camps lay between this point and the city. And as the Athenians were apparently on the northern side of the wall, the camps of the Syracusans, etc., were on this side also 1 X. 28.] NIC IAS DECIDES TO REMAIN, 413. 347 to distinguish accurately who was a friend and who was an enemy. The Athenian front was driven back, but others were still climbing up Epipolae, and pressing forward, ignorant of what had occurred. No one knew whither to turn first, or whom to attack, and owing to the constant use of it in their uncertainty, the Athenian watchword became known to the enemy. Still more misleading was the Dorian war-cry, which, being used on both sides, made their Dorian allies as terrible to the Athenians as the enemy. At length the Syracusans succeeded in driving the Athenians to the edge of the cliff. Some found their way to the level ground down the narrow path; others threw themselves from the cliffs and perished. Of the survivors those who were acquainted with the locality returned to the camp, but many lost themselves and were cut off when day appeared by the Syracusan horse. 1 28. After this disaster, Demosthenes wished at once to return to Athens. The soldiers were encamped in a marshy and unwholesome region; and their spirit Demosthenes was broken by constant defeat. The sea was wishes to still open, and there was work for them nearer £52!i to™** home than at Syracuse. But Nicias feared the remain. shame of an open confession of defeat, and bad as his own position was, he was led to suppose from the information supplied by his friends that affairs in Syracuse were still worse. In spite of the successes of Gylippus — who after his victory went for a second time into the interior to collect troops— there was an Athenian party at Syracuse who wished Nisias to remain, and misled him into the belief that the resources of Syracuse were all but exhausted. Of this, or of his own doubts and fears, he said nothing, but strongly urged that if they returned to Athens without a vote of the Athenian people, they would be brought to trial before juries who knew nothing of the situation, and the very soldiers who now clamoured to be led home would be 1 Time, vii. 42-45. 348 ECLIPSE OF THE MOON, 41S. [X. 28. the first to come forward against them. It was better, if die they must, to fall in the field of battle, than to be condemned on a false charge in a court of law. Demosthenes then insisted that if they remained they should at least move their quarters to Thapsus and Catana, where they would be able to support the army by raiding the interior, and at the same time have free use of the open sea. In this he was supported by Eurymedon ; but Nicias opposed the change, and nothing was done. Gylippus now returned with large reinforcements. Agri- gentum, it is true, was still unfriendly, and as the anti- Gyiippus Syracusan party had just succeeded in expelling collects their opponents, the hope of bringing that reinforcements. eifcy Qver feU ^ the groun( J. But the rest of Sicily was on the side of Syracuse. With these reinforce- ments also came the hoplites who had been despatched from Peloponnesus in the spring. They had been carried away to Libya, whence they had coasted, in triremes furnished by Cyrene, to Neapolis, a Carthaginian factory. From this point — the nearest to Sicily — they crossed to Selinus, where Gylippus found them. 1 On the arrival of Gylippus, the Syracusans resolved to make another attack by land and sea. And Nicias, seeing the great increase in the forces of the enemy and the daily deterioration of his own, came over to the view of Demos- thenes, and gave orders for all to be ready to break up Nicias now camp, and sail out of the harbour at a given willing to signal. The necessary preparations were made, deterred by an( ^ tne y were on the point of sailing, when the an eclipse. moon was eclipsed. Such a phenomenon was Aug. 27, 413, g-fcill regarded by the Greeks as a direct mani- festation of the divine will. 2 The soldiers, who had been 1 Thuc. vii. 50 ; supra, p. 337. 2 See the remarkable passage in Plut. Nic. 23 : tov fiev yap rjXiov rrjv nepl ras rpiaKadas enLaKOTrjaiv dpcos ye ttcos rjhrj avvecppovovv na\ oi ttoXXoI yevofxevrjv vno rrjs (reXrjvrjs' avrrjv be rrjv ae\qvr)v, wtivi avyrvy- %avovo-a ml ttcos als dnoWvai Kai ^poay X. 29.] THIRD SEA-FIGHT AT SYRACUSE, 413. 341 eager to go, were now as eager to remain, and Nicias, the most superstitious of men, declared that he would not even allow the question to be raised, till thrice nine days had elapsed, that being the period within which the soothsayers forbade any movement. 1 By this infatuated folly the doom of the Athenians was sealed. General and army must share the blame, for in this matter Nicias and his men were in accord. The contempt for Anaxagoras and his teaching at Athens was bearing bitter fruit. 29. After some days' practice with their ships, the Syra- cusans advanced once more upon the Athenian fleet. The Athenians had still the advantage of numbers on their side, but they were fighting under conditions which made numbers and skill of little avail. Their centre was the first to give way ; after which Eurymedon, who commanded the right wing, and was endeavouring to sail round the enemv, was driven to shore, in the "recess of the harbour." His ships were destroyed and himself slain. The defeat of the rest of the fleet was an easy task. Gylippus, when he saw that the Athenians were being engagement: driven to shore beyond the protection of defeat of the their own camp and stockade, sent down a Athemans - portion of the infantry who had been led against the Athenian wall, to destroy the sailors as they came to land ; but first the Tyrrhenians {supra, p. 328), who were on guard at this part of the shore, and then the whole body of Athenian hoplites came up, and the Syracusans were defeated with some loss. An attempt which the Syracusans made to set the remainder of the ships on fire was also unsuccessful. 2 The help sent to the Athenians had been sent in vain. Contrary to their experience and expectation, they had irj(TL 7ravToba7ras, ov padiov r\v KaTaka$eiv, nXX' oXKokotov fjyovvTo /cat 7rp6 avp,(popa>v tivcov p,eyciKa>v e'fc deov yivop.evov ar]p,elov. 1 Thuc. vii 50 ; cp. Plut. Nic. 23, who tells us that Nicias had no skilled seer at hand at the time : 6 yap avvrjdrjs avrov nai to noXv Ttjs deiaidaifxovlas dcpaipcov 2ri\l3i8r)s iredvrjKci jxiKpbv €p,7rpoa6ev. Stilbides would have told him that the omen was favourable. 2 Thuc. vii. 51-54. See Diodorus, xiii. 13 ; Freeman, l,c. pp. 693 ff, 350 THE HARBOUR CLOSED, 413. [X.30. suffered a serious defeat at sea, and their despondency was great. They had no hope of gaining any advantage by diplomacy, for Syracuse was a democracy like Athens, and a change of constitution could not be held out as an inducement to the Syracusan people to join them. On land and sea they were outmatched. This was the first time that they had been engaged with a power resembling their own in energy and resources, and to this, more than any other cause, their failure was due. 1 30. The Syracusans now sailed about the harbour as they pleased. They were no longer anxious about the safety of their city; they thought no more of their own deliverance, but were eager to destroy the Athenian fleet and army, and win for themselves imperishable renown. With this object The Syracusans tne y resolved to close the mouth of the harbour, close the mouth thus preventing any escape by sea. The spirit the^thenians °^ the Athenians was so greatly broken that prepare for a they made no effort to keep the harbour open, final struggle. ^ when ^ ^ d()ne ^ effect Q f ft was more clearly realised. Food was already scarce ; the supplies from Catana had been stopped when it was resolved to transfer the camp thither, and unless the bar at the harbour mouth were broken, nothing could be brought in by sea. The generals determined to concentrate what re- mained of the forces for a final effort'. The walls on Epipolae were entirely abandoned, and the army brought within the smallest possible space. Every ship that was in any degree seaworthy was to be launched ; and every available man was to go on board. If they succeeded in breaking their way out, they could establish themselves at Catana ; if they failed, they would burn their ships and march by land to some friendly city. A hundred and ten ships were put upon the water ; on the decks were archers and javelin-men — for the contest was not to be one of skill, but of sheer force — a 1 Thuc. vii. 55; cp. viii. 96. Aristotle, Politics, v. 4-9 = 1304 a 27, observes : koi iv 2,vpaKovo~ais 6 drjpos a'lrios yevopevos rrjs vlktjs tov nuhepov tov npos 'AOrjvalovs i< nokiTelas ds drjpoKpaTiav peTtfiakev. X. 30.] PREPARATIONS FOR A LAST BATTLE, fylS. 351 " land -fight on sea." In order to counteract the effect of the heavy prows of the enemy's ships, the Athenian vessels were furnished with " iron hands," or grapnels, which would hold the attacking ship at close quarters, and prevent it from retir- ing to make a second charge. When all the preparations were complete, Nicias endeavoured to rouse the Address of soldiers from their despondency. They were Nicias - veterans in warfare, he said, who knew the changes and chances of battle. They might still hope for victory, for every precaution had been taken, and with their infantry they still had the superiority. He called on the sailors who were not Athenians, to save the empire, in whose advantages they shared, reminding them that by identifying themselves with Athens, speaking the Athenian dialect, and imitating Athenian manners, they had been admired throughout Greece as citizens of the great city. 1 Let them show that, in spite of disease and calamity, they were still the first sailors in the world. To the Athenians in the army he pointed out how great was the issue at stake. The fleet and the army could not be replaced. If they failed in the impending contest, they would fall into the hands of the Syracusans, " and you know," Nicias said significantly, "with what intentions you attacked them," while the Athenians at home would be unable to save themselves from subjection to the Lacedae- monians. " Stand firm, therefore, now if ever, and remember, one and all of you who are embarking, - that you are both the fleet and army of your country, and that on you hangs the whole state and the great name of Athens : for her sake, if any man exceed another in skill or courage, let him display them now ; he will never have a better opportunity of doing good to himself and saving his country." 2 Gylippus also addressed his soldiers. He reminded them that the Athenians had come to Sicily with the intention of 1 Thuc. vii. 63 : oi Teas 3 A6r]vaioL voni£6jievoi nai /jltj ovres vfxwv rrjs re cfxov^s rrj Ittkttx]^ Kai twv TpoiroiV rfj /n/x^o-ei eOanfid^eade Karri rrjv 'EXXaSct. 2 Thuc. vii. 64, Jowett. 352 THE GREAT STRUGGLE, 413. [X. 31. enslaving the island, and using it as an instrument for en- slaving Hellas. These hopes had been dashed to the ground. Address of The irresistible navy had been defeated, and Gyiippus. it would soon be defeated again. The pre- parations of the enemy, the crowding of their decks with heavy-armed and javelin-men, and the great number of ships, would be a hindrance rather than a help. The attack which they were about to deliver was the last effort of despair, for it was impossible for them to remain where they were. Their good fortune had left them and deserted to the Syracusans. "I need not tell you that they are our enemies, and our worst enemies. They came against our land that they might enslave us, and if they had succeeded, they would have inflicted the greatest sufferings on our men, and the worst indignities upon our wives and children, and would have stamped a name of dishonour on our whole city. Wherefore, let no one's heart be softened to them. Seldom are men exposed to hazards in which they lose little if they fail, and win all if they succeed." 1 31. What followed can only be told in the words of Thucydides. "While Nicias, overwhelmed by the situation, and seeing how great and how near the peril was (for the ships were on the very D f t f th point of rowing out), feeling too, as men do on the Athenians. eve °f a g reat struggle, that all which he had done was nothing, and that he had not said half enough, again addressed the trierarchs, and calling each of them by his father's name, and his own name, and the name of his tribe, he entreated those who had made any reputation for themselves not to be false to it, and those wkose ancestors were eminent rot to tarnish their hereditary fame. He reminded them that they were the inhabi- tants of the freest country in the world^ and how in Athens there was no interference with the daily life of any man. He spoke to them of their wives and children and their fathers' gods, as men will at such a time ; for then they do not care whether their common-place phrases see in to be out of date or not, but loudly reiterate the old appeals, 1 Thuc. vii. 68, Jowett. X. 3L] NATURE OF THE FIGHTING, 413. 353 believing that they may be of some service at the awful moment. When he thought that he had exhorted them, not enough, but as much as the scanty time allowed, he retired, and led the land-forces to the shore, extending the line as far as he could, so that they might be of the greatest use in encouraging the combatants on board ship. Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, who had gone on board the Athenian fleet to take the command, now quitted their own station, and proceeded straight to the closed mouth of the harbour, intending to force their way to the open sea where a passage was still left. " The Syracusans and their allies had already put out with nearly the same number of ships as before. A detachment of them guarded the entrance of the harbour ; the remainder were disposed all round it in such a manner that they might fall on the Athenians from every side at once, and that their land-forces might at the same time be able to co-operate wherever the ships retreated to the shore. Sicanus and Agatharchus commanded the Syracusan fleet, each of them a wing ; Pythen and the Corinthians occupied the centre. When the Athenians approached the closed mouth of the harbour, the violence of their onset overpowered the ships which were stationed there ; they then attempted to loosen the fastenings. Whereupon from all sides the Syracusans and their allies came bearing down upon them, and the conflict was no longer confined to the entrance, but extended throughout the harbour. No previous engagement had been so fierce and obstinate. Great was the eagerness with which the rowers on both sides rushed upon their enemies whenever the word of command was given ; and keen was the contest between the pilots as they manoeuvred one against another. The marines too were full of anxiety that, when ship struck ship, the service on deck should not fall short of the rest ; every one in the place assigned to him was eager to be foremost among his fellows. Many vessels meeting — and never did so many fight in so small a space, for the two fleets together amounted to nearly two hundred — they were seldom able to strike in the regular manner, because they had no opportunity of first retiring or breaking the line ; they generally fouled one another as ship dashed against ship in the hurry of flight or pursuit. All the time that another vessel was bearing down, the men on deck poured showers of javelins and arrows and stones upon the enemy ; and when the two closed, the marines fought hand to hand, and en- deavoured to board. In many places, owing to the want of room, they who had struck another found that they were struck themselves ; VOL. III. Z 354 THE ATHENIANS DEFEATED, 413. [X. 31. often* two or even more vessels were unavoidably entangled about one, and the pilots had to make plans of attack and defence, not against one adversary only, but against several coming from different sides. The crash of so many ships dashing against one another took away the wits of the sailors, and made it impossible to hear the boat- swains, whose voices in both fleets rose high, as they gave directions to the rowers, or cheered them on in the excitement of the struggle. On the Athenian side they were shouting to their men that they must force a passage and seize the opportunity now or never of returning in safety to their native land. To the Syracusans and their allies was represented the glory of preventing the escape of their enemies, and of a victory by which every man would exalt the honour of his own city. The commanders, too, when they saw any ship backing without necessity, would call the captain by his name, and ask, of the Athenians, whether they were retreating because they expected to be more at home upon the land of their bitterest foes than upon that sea which had been their own so long ; on the Syracusan side, whether, when they knew perfectly well that the Athenians were only eager to find some means of flight, they would themselves fly from the fugitives. " While the naval engagement hung in the balance, the two armies on shore had great trial and conflict of soul. The Sicilian soldier was animated by the hope of increasing the glory which he had already won, while the invader was tormented by the fear that his fortunes might sink lower still. The last chance of the Athenians lay in their ships, and their anxiety- was dreadful. The fortune of the battle varied ; and it was not possible that the spectators on the shore should all receive the same impression of it. Being quite close, and having different points of view, they would some of them see their own ships victorious ; their courage would then revive, and they would earnestly call upon the gods not to take from them their hope of deliverance. But others, who saw their ships worsted, cried and shrieked aloud, and were by the sight alone more utterly unnerved than the defeated combatants themselves. Others again, who had fixed their gaze on some part of the struggle which was undecided, were in a state of excitement still more terrible ; they kept swaying their bodies to and fro in an agony of hope and fear as the stubborn conflict went on and on ; for at every instant they were all but saved or all but lost. And while the strife hung in the balance, you might hear in the Athenian army at once lamentation, shouting, cries of victory or defeat, and all the various sounds which are wrung from a great host in extremity of danger. Not less agonising were the X. 32.] DEMOSTHENES WOULD FIGHT AGAIN, US. 355 feelings of those on board. At length the Syracusans and their allies, after a protracted struggle, put the Athenians to flight, and triumphantly bearing down upon them, and encouraging one another with loud cries and exhortations, drove them to land. Then that part of the navy which had not been taken in the deep water fell back in confusion to the shore, and the crews rushed out of the ships into the camp. And the land-forces, no longer now divided in feeling, but uttering one universal groan of intolerable anguish, ran, some of them to save the ships, others to defend what remained of the wall; but the greater number began to look to themselves and to their own safety." 1 32. Even in this dreadful hour there was one soldier in the Athenian army whose spirit was not broken, whose genius at once divined the best plan of saving the wreck : \ 0 .,, Demosthenes of the army. The Athenians had still more w i S h es to ships available for service than the enemy ; let * he them go on board again and endeavour to force their way out at daybreak : such was the advice of Demos- thenes. Nicias agreed, but when the order was given to the sailors, they refused to obey it. They would not again face the enemy on sea ; and nothing remained for the generals but to arrange for retreat by land. Hermocrates suspected their intention, and resolved to prevent it by securing the roads and passes. Euined though it was, the Athenian army was still numerous, and, if settled in Sicily, might become a source of danger. The Syracusan authorities agreed with Hermocrates; but would their soldiers be willing to carry out the plan 1 They had just won a great victory, and were also celebrating a festival — to be called out for service at such a time would be too great a hardship. If Action of Hermocrates could not rouse the Syracusan Hermocrates. soldier to a sense of his duty, he could at least count on the folly of the Athenian commander. When night came on he sent out friends of his own to play the part of envoys from the 1 Thuc. vii. 69-71, Jowett. For the account of Diodorus, see Freeman, I.e. p. 348 ff. 356 THE ATHENIANS RETREAT, 413. Athenian party in Syracuse, and warn Nicias that the passes were guarded. Let him wait for daylight before moving his army. The Athenian generals swallowed the bait, counter- manded the orders given, and even delayed till the following day, that the soldiers might set out as well equipped as the circumstances permitted. In this interval the Syracusans had ample time to secure the fords and passes into the interior, and to dispose their forces in the best positions for attack. They also towed the Athenian ships from the shore of the harbour to the city, except a few which the Athenians had burnt. 1 33. At last the retreat began. " The Athenians were in a dreadful condition ; not only was there the great fact that they had lost their whole fleet, and instead of their Retreat of the ex P ecte( i triumph had brought the utmost peril upon Athenians. Athens as well as upon themselves, but also the sights which presented themselves as they quitted the camp were painful to every eye and mind. The dead were unburied, and when any one saw the body of a friend lying on the ground he was smitten with sorrow and dread, while the sick or wounded who still survived but had to be left were even a greater trial to the living, and more to be pitied than those who were gone. Their prayers and lamentations drove their companions to distraction; they would beg that they might be taken with them, and call by name any friend or relation whom they saw passing ; they would hang upon their departing comrades and follow as far as they could, and when their limbs and strength failed them and they dropped behind many were the impre- cations and cries which they uttered. So that the whole army was in tears, and such was their despair that they could hardly make up their minds to stir, although they were leaving an enemy's country, having suffered calamities too great for tears already, and dreading miseries yet greater in the unknown future. There was also a general feeling of shame and self-reproach,— indeed they seemed, not like an army, but like the fugitive population of a city captured after a siege ; and of a great city too. For the whole multitude who were marching together numbered not less than forty thousand. Each of them took with him anything he could carry which was likely to be of use. l Thuc. vii. 74, X. 33-] NICIAS ENCOURAGES THEM, US. 357 Even the heavy-armed and cavalry, contrary to their practice when under arms, conveyed about their persons their own food, some because they had no attendants, others because they could not trust them ; for they had long been deserting, and most of them had gone off all at once. Nor was the food which they carried sufficient ; for the supplies of the camp had failed. Their disgrace and the universality of the misery, although there might be some consolation in the very community of suffering, was nevertheless at that moment hard to bear, especially when they remembered from what pride and splendour they had fallen into their present low estate. Never had an Hellenic army experienced such a reverse. They had come intending to enslave others, and they were going away in fear that they would be themselves enslaved. Instead of the prayers and hymns with which they had put to sea, they were now departing amid appeals to heaven of another sort. They were no longer sailors but landsmen, depend- ing, not upon their fleet, but upon their infantry. Yet in face of the great danger which still threatened them all these things appeared endurable." 1 Nicias was not wanting at this crisis. Though suffering so severely from a painful disease that his condition was apparent to every one, he endeavoured to Heroism of inspire his soldiers with such hope as their Nlcias - circumstances admitted. He entreated them not to be cast down by their misfortunes. He himself, though his life had been passed in the performance of every duty, was now deserted by the good fortune which had hitherto attended him, and involved in the common calamity. Yet looking on the past he still cherished hope for the future. If they had been under the displeasure of any god when they set forth to attack Syracuse, their sufferings were an ample ex- piation ; they were now an object of divine compassion rather % than divine envy. They were still a great army, such as no Sicilian city could easily resist ; and wherever they encamped they would at once form a city. The march must be made in good order, and in haste, for supplies were short ; but as soon as they reached the territory of the Sicels they would be safe. They had no place of retreat near, to which a 1 Thuc. vii. 75, Jowett. 358 THEIR ROUTE BARRED, 413. [X. 33. coward could fly, and on their success it depended whether the power of Athens, overthrown for the time, should be re- stored. "It is men, not walls or ships, which make a city." The heavy-armed were arranged in two hollow squares, within which were placed the baggage and the light-armed, The line of and two divisions were made of the army : the march. g rgt marcn i n g un( j er the command of Nicias, the second under Demosthenes. At the ford of the Anapus they found a body of Syracusans waiting for them; these they defeated, and passed onwards, for about five miles, harassed all the way by the Syracusan horse and javelin men. The next day, after marching about two miles and a half, they encamped in a plain to obtain food and water; meanwhile the Syracusans built a wall across a steep hill path, between two ravines, up which their route lay. When the Athenians resumed their march on the third day they were again attacked by the horse, as before, and after a fruitless resistance returned to their camp. The next day (the 4th) they marched up to the hill, but only to find the pass held by the Syracusan army in great force. Their efforts to break through were in vain, and to add to their discouragement a storm of thunder and lightning burst over the army. The very elements seemed to be fighting against them. They succeeded, nevertheless, in preventing an attempt which G-ylippus made to cut them off in the rear by a wall across the ravine through which they had passed. They then retired towards the level ground and encamped for the night. With the next day (the 5th) they again advanced, but the Syracusans set upon them from every side, retiring when the Athenians advanced, and attacking when they retired. After a long struggle the Athenians once more encamped in the plain about three quarters of a mile in advance of their former position. 1 1 Thuc. vii. 77-79. Thucydides gives the name 'Anpaiov \enas to the hill between two ravines where the Athenians were checked : it is the modern Monasterello, and the pass leading to it is the Cava Spampi- nato. See Freeman, Jlist. of Sicily, iii. p. 375 ; p. 701 ff. ; infra, p. 364. X. 34-1 DEMOSTHENES SURRENDERS, 413. 359 The Athenian generals now changed their plans. They abandoned the attempt to penetrate into the interior, and resolved to retire to the coast under cover of ^ i t oc Change of route. night. In this way they hoped to shake on the Syracusans, by whom such a change of route would be quite unexpected. They got away unobserved, but their ill luck still pursued them ; a panic fell on the army ; the division of Demosthenes was thrown into disorder, and greatly delayed on its march. At daybreak (6th day) Nicias reached the sea, and struck into the Helorine road, intending, when they arrived at the Cacyparis, to march up the river into the interior, where the Sicels, to whom they had sent envoys, would receive them. When he reached the river, he found the Syracusans engaged in cutting off their progress through the ford by walls and palisades. He succeeded in driving them off, but on the advice of his guides he aban- doned the plan of marching up the Cacyparis, and went on to the Erineus, where, as he hoped, he would be less hindered by the Syracusans. 1 34. The Syracusans, when they found the Athenians gone from their encampment, were for a moment dismayed and indignant. They even suspected Gylippus of Surrender of allowing them to escape. But though the Demosthenes, fugitives had changed their route, it was easy to trace them, and in a short time the Syracusans came up with the division of Demosthenes (6th day), which had not yet In their attempt to win this pass, the Athenians were, in Professor Freeman's opinion, endeavouring to make their way to Catana — and this is the view of Diodorus, xiii. 18, 7rporjeaav eVt Kardvrjs — which, however, must be a mistake. In c. 80. I, Thucydides says rjv fj ^vjXTraa-a 686s avrr) ovk eVi Karats to) arparevpaTL, and if rj £vp.. 686s means "the whole retreat " this is decisive. The only change in their plans was that whereas they originally intended to march inland at once, now they marched by the shore till they could find a favourable opportunity of striking into the country. Cp. 80. 2. 1 For the topography, see Freeman, Hist, of Sicily, iii. 706. The Cacyparis is apparently the Cassibile; about the Erineus there is more doubt : it may be the Cavallata, a small stream to the south of Avola. 360 NIC I AS CONTINUES HIS RETREAT, 413. [X. 34. recovered from the panic of the night, and was about six miles in the rear of Nicias. When they attacked him he abandoned all thought of retreat, and prepared to resist, but the enemy would not give him the opportunity of a battle. He was driven into an olive-garden, an enclosure sur- rounded by a wall, with roads running on each side of it. Here, the whole day through, his soldiers were exposed to the missiles of the enemy from every side, until at length Gylippus, seeing their distress, proclaimed that any islanders in the army, who came over to him, would retain their freedom. A few cities, and only a few, availed themselves of the permission; the majority, whether from distrust of the Syracusans or from loyalty to Athens, preferred the nobler part of sharing to the end in the disasters of the day. After some further delay the whole force, amounting to 6000 men, agreed to give up their arms on condition that their lives should be spared, a stipulation in which Demos- thenes himself refused to be included. What money they had was collected — and enough was found to fill four shields — and the men were immediately led away to the city. 1 Nicias meanwhile had crossed the Erineus and encamped his division on rising ground. The next day, the seventh of Nicias at the the retreat, when the Syracusans came up, they Assinarus. announced the surrender of Demosthenes, and called on Nicias to do the same. On finding that the state- 1 Thuc. vii. 81, 82. The narrative of Thucydides is not clear; he speaks as if both divisions entered the Helorine road and advanced to the Cacyparis. Bat this is not probable, for by the middle of the day Nicias is fifty stadia ahead of Demosthenes, though at some distance from the Erineus, yet the whole distance between the Cacyparis and Erineus is not more than forty stadia. Plutarch identifies the olive- garden as that of Polyzelus (the brother of Hiero), Nic. c. 27 ; and informs us that Demosthenes attempted to kill him- self, but was prevented by his captors. Pausanias also mentions the attempt, on the authority of Philistus, the Sicilian historian (see below, p. 364, n.), i. 29. 12 : ypd(pa) 5e ovdev didcpopa 77 &[\c6r)v eiy KaTcivriv, eXrj'i^OjxrjP 6pp,mp,evos ivTevOev Kai tovs Tro\ep,iovs /cantos in o low. X. 35-1 THE STONE-QUARRIES, 413. 363 fought between Greeks ; no conqueror had ever won a victory so complete. 1 35. An assembly was now held of the Syracusans and their allies to decide on the fate of the prisoners. The two generals — Nicias and Demosthenes — were at Fateofthe once condemned to death, in spite of the prisoners, opposition of Gylippus. Demosthenes, perhaps, could hardly have expected any other doom. From the Lacedaemonians he had nothing to hope ; the seizure of Pylus was not to be forgotten ; nor were the Corinthians likely to spare the man who had dealt so severe a blow at their colony of Ambracia. 2 Nicias was sacrificed, partly to the Athenian party in Syra- cuse, who were afraid of inconvenient disclosures, and partly to the Corinthians, who, knowing his wealth, thought that he might purchase his escape to Greece. 3 " For these reasons or the like he was put to death/' a man who, in the opinion of Thucydides, was less deserving than any of the Hellenes of his time of such a miserable end. The rest of the prisoners were placed in the stone-quarries on the southern slope of Achradina. A scanty measure of food and water, barely enough to sustain life, was allowed them day by day. There they remained, suffering the extremes of temperature — glowing heat in the day, and piercing chill at night— in the midst of intolerable smells, and "every kind of misery which could befall man in such a place." At the end of ten weeks the Syracusans took out all except the Athenians and their allies from Sicily or Italy, and sold them for slaves. The rest remained for nearly six months longer, when the survivors were removed to the public prison of Syracuse. 4 Sicily " was now full of slaves " —not uncivilised slaves purchased from barbarous regions, 1 Plut. Nic. 27, 28. He fixes the day on the 27th Metageitnion (Sep. 21?). * Supra, p. 199. 3 Thuc. vii. 86. According to Diodorus, xiii. 19, it was at first proposed by Diocles to put them to death with torture. He gives the discussion at great length. 4 Thuc. vii. 87 ; Diod. xiii. 33. 364 ENSLAVED ATHENIANS, 413. [X. 35, but cultivated Athenians, superior in every way to many of their captors. It is to the honour of the Sicilians that their merits were recognised by their masters. Plutarch informs us that those who could repeat passages from Euripides were allowed their freedom ; and even the wretched straggler who could sing a song out of the famous tragedies was supplied with food and water. 1 Such was the end of the Sicilian expedition. " Of all the Hellenic actions which took place in this war, or indeed of any Hellenic actions which are on record, this was the greatest, the most glorious to the victors, the most ruinous to the vanquished, for they were utterly and at all points defeated, and their sufferings were prodigious. Fleet and army perished from the earth — nothing was saved ; and of the many who went forth, few returned home." 2 1 Plut. Nic. 29. Later writers, as usual, supplement or correct the narrative of Thucydides. Justin (iv. 5) says that Demosthenes put an end to himself (thus improving on Philistus, supra), Plutarch, that he and Nicias were not put to death by the order of the Syracusans, but died by their own hands, Hermocrates giving them the oppor- tunity of doing this while the Assembly was still in session. Diodorus tells us that they were put to death at the instigation of Gylippus, whose speech he gives (inter alia) — a correction of Thucydides due perhaps to some Sicilian historian who wished to remove the stigma from his nation. What value is to be attributed to the picturesque details given in the text from Plutarch it is impossible to say ; had we the history of Philistus before us we should be able to explain much. He was an eye-witness of the siege (Plut. Nic. 19), and wrote a history of Syracuse down to the capture of Agrigentum in 406. 2 Thuc. vii. 87. Approach to 'AKpaiov Xenas. A very narrow defile with steep sides at least one and a half mile long : then a very small space of open country. I climbed the hill to the left. The "AKpaiov Xerras in front, rising gently at first, more steeply afterwards ; a little road running up it : a comparatively open valley, with perhaps a ravine at the bottom, on the right (of the Xenas, from the spectator's point of view) : a very deep ravine running far up into the hills on the right, and forking after about a quarter of a mile. W. H. FORBES, Note of a Visit to Syracuse, 1881. CHAPTER XL FROM THE END OF THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION TO -THE FALL OF THE FOUR HUNDRED (413-411). I, No formal report was sent to Athens of the destruction of her forces in Sicily, and the unauthorised rumours which reached the city were at first received with Feeling at incredulity, for the Athenians could not be- Athens on the lieve that so great a calamity had overtaken sSnan 6 so splendid an army and so safe a general ; disaster, and even when they heard the story from the lips of the survivors, soldiers of known reputation who had escaped from the general destruction, it was long before they could bring themselves to accept the whole truth. 1 When doubt was no longer possible, their minds were filled with rage, grief, and alarm. They turned fiercely upon the " orators " who had persuaded them into the expedition, forgetting that those who had opposed their wishes had been cried down as rogues and traitors. Not less bitter was their resentment against the prophets who had spoken smooth things, and the diviners who had foretold from the omens the conquest of Sicily. Their hearts were saddened, not merely by the failure of their hopes, but by the loss of friends and relatives. " The citizens mourned, and the city mourned." And when they thought of the war in 1 Thuc. viii. 1. Plutarch, Nicias 30, tells us that the news was first brought to Athens by a stranger, who on landing in the Peiraeus entered a barber's shop and spoke of the disaster as commonly known. The barber at once informed the magistrate, who summoned him before the Assembly, and called on him for his authority ; but as he could give no account of the stranger, he was put on the rack and tortured until his story was confirmed. sag 366 ATHENS AFTER SICILIAN DISASTER, 4I8. [XI. I. which they were again involved, what a prospect was before them ! The flower of the infantry and cavalry lay in the quarries of Syracuse, and their places could only be filled, if at all, by the old, or the young, or the incompetent. Crews could not be collected for the ships, and if they could, there was no money to pay them ; the number of triremes in the docks was quite inadequate to the demands of the crisis. They foresaw that in this hour of her weakness not only would the old enemies of Athens redouble their efforts for her destruction ; not only would the allies hasten to throw off the yoke under which they had groaned so long, but the forces of the West were now free to take part in the conflict. Since the capture of the Peloponnesian fleet in the harbour of Pylus in 425, Athens had had nothing to fear at sea, but the days of security were ended. The ships of Sicily, which even in 431 were expected to form the bulk of the Pelo- ponnesian fleet, would now appear off the Peiraeus to complete the ruin of the tyrant of the seas. Yet even in this crisis of their fortunes, the Athenians did not lose heart, but with the marvellous buoyancy which they always displayed in misfortune, they made Courageofthe " . \ / J Athenians : preparations to meet the gathering storm. It they prepare was fortunate for them that the winter season was at hand, during which the Syracusan ships would not venture across the water; and that Brasidas, whose restless energy regarded all seasons of the year as equally fit for martial operations, was no longer alive to lead or inspire the Peloponnesians. In six months of comparative inaction on the part of the enemy much might be done; ships could be built ; money saved or collected ; and above all a strict watch set over the subject and allied cities. „ More especially the Athenians directed their Fortification of . j; Sunium : estab- attention to Jiuboea, which, since Agis had Prober ° f occupied Decelea, was doubly necessary to them as a source of supplies ; and in order to secure the safety of their merchantmen — as it was now impossible to import corn overland — they fortified the headland of XI. 2.] THE ENEMIES OF ATHENS, 413. 367 Sunium. The strictest attention was given to economy, expenses were retrenched where possible ; even the fortress in Laconia, which had been built by the fleet on the voyage to Sicily, was now abandoned. These measures were carried out under the superintendence of a board of ten Probuli or Commissioners of Public Safety, " who were chosen to advise together and lay before the people such measures as might be required from time to time." 1 The establishment of such a board was felt to be a step towards oligarchy. Democracy was in fact on its trial, and many were ready to take advantage of the shock which it had received by the failure of the great popular enterprise, though, as yet, no one knew how deep was the distrust of existing institutions. 2 * 2. By the enemies of Athens the news of the great disaster was received with a thrill of delight. At last the tyrant city was down; and but a few months would ~ .. r eeling of the pass before her destruction was complete, enemies of Every one hastened to be in at the death. Athens - Those who had hitherto stood apart from the war were eager to join in it. They wished to share in the glory of the final victory which could not be long delayed; they longed to repay the evils which they had suffered in antici- pation, knowing that if Athens had been successful in Sicily they would have been added to the list of her victims. The 1 Of the duties of these officers we can only form a vague opinion on evidence which is not very trustworthy. In the Lysistrata of Aristophanes, which was brought out in 411, a Probulus is intro- duced, and the duties assigned to him are partly financial and partly political. With his colleagues he seems to have had control over the public funds, and to have received deputations from foreign states, duties which usually devolved on the Prytanes. But they did not take the place of the Council, which still retained its administrative power and brought proposals before the Assembly. See Lysist 11 421 f., 433 ff., 980 ff. ; Gilbert, Beitrdge, p. 289. The number of the Probuli is fixed by Aih. Pol. c. 29. Two only are known to us by name: Hagnon and Sophocles. The first is the adoptive father of Theramenes ; the second may be the poet. 2 Thuc. viii. 1, 4. 368 THE ALLIES PREPARE TO REVOLT, 41S. [XI. 2. subjects of Athens, allowing their temper to get the better of their judgment, were convinced that the tyrant city could not hold out for a year. The Lacedaemonians and their allies expected a large force from Sicily in the spring, with whose help they would bring the war to a close, and free themselves for ever from the apprehensions which had for two generations agitated the Grecian world. The Athenian empire and Athenian dreams of conquest would be things of the past. Greece would fall back into the old grooves, and Sparta would be once more acknowledged as the leading state. 1 But low as she was brought, Athens was still " mistress of the sea," and without ships Sparta could accomplish nothing. 2 Preparations for In the winter of 413 Agis marched from aPeioponnesian Decelea upon the Oetaeans and neighbouring neet tribes, and in spite of the protests of the Thes- salians, whose subjects they were, insisted that they should not only join the alliance, but contribute money and give pledges of fidelity. On their part, the Lacedaemonians called upon the cities of the alliance to build a fleet of one hundred vessels (of which fifty were to be provided by them- selves and the Boeotians in equal proportions) ; these were to be ready by the following spring. And now the evil which Athens had most to fear began to show itself. From all sides envoys from her allies flocked The allies pre- to the Lacedaemonians, requesting their help pare to revolt : i n throwing off the yoke. First in the field Lesbos apply were the Euboeans, who visited Agis at Decelea. to Agis. Agis eagerly listened to their proposals, and at once sent home for additional troops and officers, of whom one was Alcamenes, the son of Sthenelaidas (supra, p. 89), but when he was about to transport them across the Euripus, a deputation from Lesbos arrived proposing to bring their 1 Thuc. viii. 2. 2 The Athenians had command of the sea during the winter of 413 ; for the Spartans were without ships, and were as always slow to take advantage of the situation. XI. 2.] EUBOEA, LESBOS, CHIOS, ETC., 413. 369 island over. As the Lesbians had the powerful support of the Boeotians, their ancient kinsmen, Agis abandoned Euboea and promised to send a small fleet to act with the Lesbians, under the command of Alcamenes, who was to be " harmost" of Lesbos, a title now mentioned for the first time. In making these arrangements he acted without reference to the home authorities. 1 His position at Decelea allowed him to take up an independent line, and by his zeal and policy he had won the confidence of the allies. Like Brasidas, but in a less degree, he exhibited Spartan energy and ability without the severe formalism of the Spartan officer, and for this reason the cities applied to him for help , ., n , . . r The Chians more readily than to the impracticable govern- a p P iyto Sparta: ment on the Eurotas. To Sparta, meanwhile, Tissaphernes came the Chians and Erythraeans accompanied by an envoy from Tissaphernes, the King's general on the Asiatic coast and satrap of Sardis. Tissaphernes had lately succeeded Pissuthnes, with orders to crush the revolt which that satrap had excited. By purchasing Lycon, a Greek soldier in command of the revolted troops, he had forced Pissuthnes to capitulate ; but the rebels still held their ground in Caria, under Amorges, the son of Pissuthnes ; and the King now commanded Tissaphernes, not only to produce Amorges alive or dead, but to collect the arrears of tribute from the Greek cities of the coast, which though unpaid since 479 were duly entered as a debt against the satrap (cp. vol. ii. 73, 286). For these reasons Tissaphernes readily undertook to support any force which the Lacedaemonians would send into Ionia. Finally, two exiled Envoysfrom Greeks, Calligitus of Megara and Timagoras of Pharnabazus Cyzicus, came from Pharnabazus, the satrap of at Sparta - Phrygia, who, being also pressed for arrears of tribute, was eager to bring over the Athenian allies in the Hellespont to Persia and negotiate an alliance between Lacedaemon and the Great King. But though the envoys of Pharnabazus 1 This is the more remarkable after the events of 418 and the arrangements mentioned supra, p. 281. VOL. III. 2 A 370 THE REVOLT SUPPORTED, 412. [XI. 3. had brought twenty-five talents with them, a tempting bait to Spartan cupidity, Tissaphernes and the Chians found a powerful advocate in Alcibiades, who was the hereditary and personal friend of Endius, one of the ephors of the year. Before a final decision was pronounced, the Spartans sent an envoy to Chios to ascertain whether the island was able to make good her promises. On receiving a favourable report, they at once admitted the Chians and monians decide Erythraeans into alliance, and passed a vote to support the to send forty ships to their help (the Chians chians ° had sixty), of which Lacedaemon herself under- took to furnish ten. Melancridas, the admiral, was placed in command, but an earthquake occurring before the ships put to sea, Chalcideus was elected in the room of Melancridas, and the number of the ships was reduced to five. 1 3. Meanwhile the allied vessels and those which Agis had collected to sail to Lesbos, thirty -nine in all, were assembled The Lacedae- i n the Corinthian gulf. A meeting of the allies monian fleet to was held at Corinth, and it was agreed that the Lesbos, and the A eet should sail first to Chios, then to Lesbos, Hellespont. an d finally to the Hellespont. To each district a separate commander was assigned : Chalcideus to Chios, Alcamenes to Lesbos, and Clearchus to the Hellespont. In order to distract the attention of the Athenians, the ships were to sail in two detachments, and with this precaution it was thought safe, in the present state of the Athenian navy, to sail through the open sea without any attempt at con- cealment. When the season was sufficiently advanced for operations, the Chian envoys were most urgent that the Peloponnesian The fleet de- ships should sail at once, before their designs layedbythe became known to the Athenians (412). Three Spartans were despatched to Corinth with orders to carry the ships over the Isthmus and set out for 1 Thuc. viii. 5 : vtto ftacri\ea>s yap vecoarl irvy^ave treir pay pevos tovs €< rrjs eavrov apx*}* ov bvvdpevos Trpdao-eaOai enaXpeiXrjae : ibid. c. 6. Ctes. Pers. 52. XI. 3.] THE DEFEAT OFF PEIRA E UM> 412. 371 Chios. But an unexpected difficulty arose. The Corinthians would not sail till they had celebrated the Isthmia, nor even agree to the suggestion of Agis that he should send forward his detachment while they remained behind. Meanwhile the Athenians, who had received information of what was going on, sent to Chios to complain, and the Chians, though deny- ing the accusation, complied with the Athenian demand for a contingent of seven ships. The time had not yet come for open rebellion; the oligarchs, who alone were in the plot, were not in a position to brave the enmity of the people, who had no wish to break with Athens. 1 At the Isthmian games, which they visited under the protection of the sacred truce, the Athenians discovered the truth about Chios, and, on returning home, TheLacedae . they took measures to prevent the Lacedae- monian fleet monian ships from leaving Cenchreae, the Corin- Athenians^ thian port on the Saronic gulf. When the Peiraeumin Spartan Alcamenes set sail after the festival Cormthla - with twenty-one ships, he found his movements watched by an equal number of Athenian vessels, by which he was at length driven on shore at Peiraeum, a desolate harbour on the extreme edge of the Corinthian territory towards Epidauria. Leaving a sufficient number of ships to blockade the defeated foe, the Athenians retired to a small island close at hand, where they encamped and sent to Athens for reinforcements. In the engagement the greater part of the Peloponnesian ships had been disabled and Alcamenes slain. News of the disaster was at once conveyed to the Corin- thians, who came to the rescue on the next day, and were quickly followed by the rest of the inhabitants of the district. At first they despaired of protecting the ships in a situation so desolate, but finally they drew them ashore, and left a force of infantry in charge, till some opportunity of escape should arise. It had been arranged between Alcamenes and the ephors 1 Time. viii. 7-9. For the date of the Isthmia see Goodhart's note on c. 9 ; he puts them in May, in this year. 372 ALCIBIA DES AT SPARTA, 412. [XI. 4. that a horseman should be despatched to Sparta when his ships left the Isthmus. On receiving this information, they Dismay at prepared to send off their own five vessels, Sparta : under Chalcideus and Alcibiades, but when they Af-bSde^ near d of the defeat at Peiraeum, they changed their plans, and resolved not only to send no ships of their own to Asia, but to recall those which had already put to sea. If Alcibiades had not been at Sparta, no further steps would have been taken; the "Ionic war" would have been abandoned before it had well begun ; the Chians would have been left to their fate, and the offer of Persian aid neglected. He pointed out to the ephors that if Chalcideus set sail at once, he would reach Chios before the news of the disaster of Peiraeum; and for himself he had only to land in Ionia, and so persuasive would be his proofs of the inability of Athens either to protect or to punish her subjects, that the cities would at once come over. In private he appealed to the ambition of his friend Endius, urging him not to allow the honour of exciting rebellion in Ionia, and winning for Sparta the alliance of the Great King, to pass into the hands of Agis. The ephors withdrew their opposition, and allowed Chalcideus to set sail. 1 About the same time, the prospects of the confederacy were a little brightened by the return of the ships which had sailed to Sicily with Gylippus. These, sixteen in number, had been roughly handled off Leucadia by the Athenian squadron which lay in wait for them, but had escaped with the loss of one trireme, and now sailed into the harbour of Lechaeum. 2 4. As they crossed the Aegean, Chalcideus and Alcibiades seized every ship which came in their way, to prevent news chalcideus and of their a PP roacn reaching Chios. They did Alcibiades sail not make directly for the island, but put in to ioma. a £ Q 0I y CUS on the mainland opposite, where they were met by some of their Chian confederates. It was arranged that the Chians should return home and summon a 1 Thuc. viii. 11, 12. 2 Thuc, viii. 13, XI. 4.J CHIOS RE VOLTS ; ALARM AT A THENS, 412. 373 meeting of the Council, without announcing publicly the arrival of the Peloponnesians, who suddenly appeared in the harbour, to the astonishment of the populace. Alcibiades and Chalcideus were admitted to the Council; Revolt of chios , and, on hearing that a fleet was coming to Erythrae, their assistance, the Chians revolted from clazomenae - Athens. Their example was followed by the Erythraeans on the opposite coast, and afterwards by Clazomenae. And, as Clazomenae lay on a small island, and was therefore quite at the mercy of any hostile fleet, the citizens fortified Polichna on the mainland as a place of retreat in danger. The revolted cities at once began to rebuild the walls which the Athenians had compelled them, in old days, to pull down, and prepared for war. 1 The news was quickly carried to Athens, where it created the greatest excitement. Chios was the only " independent " ally remaining, except Methymna. Since the for- Alarmat mation of the Delian League, she had continued Athens : the a faithful friend, rendering assistance when ^"J 6 funds required, and in return retaining unimpaired her old institutions, though, like the rest, she had been com- pelled to destroy her walls. 2 She was the largest and perhaps the wealthiest of all the allied cities, and, amid the various storms of warfare, she had enjoyed profound peace. No island was so well and thoroughly cultivated : in none was there such an abundance of slaves. In their extremity, the Athenians considered that the time had come for rescinding the decree by which a thousand talents had been set apart at the beginning of the Archidamian war ; and the money was partly spent in manning ships to sail to Chios, ships sent Eight were at once despatched under the com- t0 Asia " mand of Strombichides, and twelve more were to follow under Thrasycles. Both these squadrons were withdrawn from the blockading force at Peiraeum, their place being taken, at least in part, by fresh ships. Other thirty vessels 1 Thuc. viii. H. 2 Thuc. iv. 51. 374 A L CIBIA DES AT MILETUS, 412. [XI. 5. were also to be manned, for, in the excitement of the moment, no sacrifice was thought too great. Strombichides sailed to Samos, and thence to Teos, in the hope of preventing a revolt there, but Chalcideus also sailed to the town with twenty-three ships, supported by the land forces of Erythrae , Fm and Clazomenae, and the Athenians were com- Revolt of Teos. rN m pelled to return to Samos. Teos went over to the Peloponnesians, and the wall which the Athenians had built to protect it towards the interior was pulled down. Having thus secured the most important of the Ionian islands for Sparta, Alcibiades resolved to bring over the most important of the cities on the mainland. He was on friendly terms with the leading citizens of Miletus, and flattered himself with the figure which he would make with the Chians and with Endius, if he could win the capital of Ionia before the arrival of any reinforcements from Peloponnesus. He persuaded Chalcideus, on his return from Teos, to leave behind the crews of the Peloponnesian vessels to form a force of heavy-armed infantry in Chios, and fill their places in the ships with Chians. With the five vessels thus manned, and other twenty obtained from Chios, he sailed in all secrecy to Miletus. The ships had barely reached the harbour before Strombichides and Thrasycles appeared with the united Alcibiades wins Athenian fleet. But it was too late. Miletus over Miletus. had a i ready reY0 lted, and the Athenians could do no more than lie at anchor off the island of Lade and watch the progress of events. 1 5. Alcibiades had made good his promise with regard to the revolt of Ionia, but he had still to arrange an alliance First alliance between Lacedaemon and the Great King, between Sparta This was a matter of little difficulty, after and the King. successes which had been gained, and on the revolt of Miletus Tissaphernes and Chalcideus agreed upon the following terms : that all the territory and all the cities which were now in the King's possession, or had 1 Thuc. viii. 17. XI. 5-] SPARTA AND THE GREAT KING, 418. 375 ever been in the possession of his forefathers, should be his ; that the Lacedaemonians and their allies should help the King to prevent the Athenians from collecting tribute, or deriving any other advantage from these cities ; that both parties should carry on war against the Athenians in common, and bring it to an end by common consent only ; that cities which rebelled from the King should be treated as rebels from the Lacedaemonians and their allies, and vice versa. 1 The words of this shameful bargain can hardly have been sufficiently weighed by Chalcideus, or he would have shrunk, as Lichas afterwards shrank, from surrendering to the King all the territory which his forefathers had ever Remarks on possessed. In the days of Xerxes, before 480, the the treat y- Persian dominions not only included all the Greek cities in Asia, all the islands off the coast, and the Cyclades, but ex- tended into Europe as far as Mount Olympus. Even Thessaly and Boeotia might be considered as part of the kingdom of Xerxes, for they had been occupied by his troops with the consent of the inhabitants. And these concessions were more than a mere renunciation of claims ; for the Spartans were bound to assist the King in reducing to submission any of the new subjects who might rebel. On the other hand, the King was pledged to nothing. No stipulations were made for the payment of the fleet, the bait by which Tissaphernes had gained the assistance of Sparta. The truth was that Chalcideus was merely a tool in the hands of Alcibiades and Tissaphernes. In order to gain his immediate purpose, Alcibiades was willing to accept any conditions, regardless of the fate of his countrymen and the liberty of Greece, and it was a matter of no moment to him that the Spartans, who claimed to liberate Hellas, were pledging half of it into slavery. Tissaphernes gained all and more than all that he expected. The cities, which he could not reduce, were placed in his hands without the loss of a ship or a man • the tribute for which he was pressed would flow into his 1 Thuc. viii. 18. 376 ACTIVITY OF THE CHIANS, 412. [XI. 6. coffers, and the satrap of Sardis would once more occupy the position which he had lost at Mycale. The Chians were not content with sending out ships under a Spartan officer ; they wished to play their own part in the Action of great work of liberation. After the departure the chians. 0 f Chalcideus, they despatched ten ships which landed at Anaea, 1 opposite Samos, wishing to gather news of the attempt on Miletus. But Chalcideus sent messengers to warn them away, asserting that Amorges was in the neigh- bourhood with his army ; and at the same time, an Athenian squadron of sixteen triremes was sighted, which had been sent under the command of Diomedon, to join the other two generals. The Chians immediately fled, losing four ships to the Athenians, who went on to Samos. From Teos, where they had taken refuge, the Chians brought over Lebedos and Lebedos and Erae, after which their forces, both naval and Teos partly 1 military, returned home. Not long afterwards recovered by Tissaphernes appeared at Teos, and completed Athens. destruction of the wall, but he, in his turn, had no sooner gone than Diomedon arrived and persuaded the Teians to receive the Athenians as well as their opponents. Erae, however, which he also attempted, held out against him. While these events were taking place in Ionia, the Spartans were encouraged by success at home. The twenty ships w , „ , which had been blockaded since the Isthmia at The Pelopon- . nesian ships .reiraeum, succeeded in breaking out. They pTiraeum fr ° m returne( ^ to Cenchreae, where they were joined by Astyochus, who had been appointed high admiral of the Peloponnesian fleet, and prepared to sail to Chios. 2 6. So far the balance was against the Athenians. There was hardly a place on the mainland of Ionia which they 1 See Thiic. iv. 75; supra, pp. 33, 164. 2 Thuc. viii. 19, 20. The appointment of Astyochus would lead us to suppose that the annual change of magistrates had taken place at Sparta ; if so, new ephors were now in office, and Alcibiades lost the support of Endius, which would give Agis the opportunity he ought. XI. 7.1 RE VOL UTION A T SAMOS, 412. 377 could call their own ; Chios was in active hostility ; the Great King was in alliance with the enemy. All their hopes centred in Samos ; if this island remained loyal, they samos all had still a strong base of operations ; if it im P°rtant joined in the revolt, Ionia was gone. It was state of the a subject city, without walls, crushed for a island - long time by a heavy indemnity, 1 and subsequently called upon to pay tribute and furnish soldiers. The nature of the government after 440 is uncertain, but as the oligarchs took the lead in the rebellion, and Pericles, on his first voyage, established a democracy, we should naturally sup- pose that a democracy was left in power when the city was finally reduced. However this may be, the oligarchs certainly gained in influence, and if the government was not entirely in their hands, they were now a strong party in the island. Whether they entered into negotiations with the Chians is unknown, but it is probable enough that the success of the Chian oligarchs and the revolt of Miletus aroused in the minds of the Samian oligarchs the hope of Popular recovering their power. They were, in any revolution case, suspected, and the suspicion gave rise atSamos - to an outbreak of popular fury. With the help of three Athenian ships which were at hand, the demos attacked the notables, slew two hundred of them, banished four hundred more, and divided among themselves their houses and lands as spoils of victory. The Athenians, partly to reward such ardour in a good cause, and partly because they were now sure of their fidelity, allowed the democrats the privileges of independence. Henceforth they governed the city for themselves, excluding the old landowners or Geomori from every privilege, refusing even to marry or give in marriage among them. 2 7- On their return from Teos, the Chians did not relax their energies. They despatched thirteen ships to Lesbos— the second point in the Lacedaemonian programme. On 1 Time. vii. 57 j i. 117. Thuc. viii. 21 ; C.I. A. i. 56. 378 ATHENIANS AT LESBOS AND CHIOS, 412. [XI. 7. arriving at the island, the ships put in at Methymna, which immediately revolted; and leaving four vessels to protect the city, they passed on to Mytilene, which revo^of 5 also joined them. Meanwhile Astyochus had Lesbos. arrived at Chios from Cenchreae, and after a stay of two days followed to Lesbos ; but before he could reach the island, the Athenian fleet, twenty-five vessels strong, under the command of Diomedon and Leon (who had come from Athens with ten additional ships) had appeared at Mytilene and recovered the city. When Astyochus heard of this disaster on his arrival at Eresus (in the south of the island) he abandoned Mytilene, and contented himself with bringing over Eresus. Arming the citizens, while he sent the hoplites of his own ships, under the command of Eteonicus, to Antissa and Methymna, he himself sailed thither to support them. Soon afterwards he returned to Chios, taking his soldiers with him. The attempt on Lesbos proved a failure at every point ; the island fell back into the hands of the Athenians, who settled affairs to their liking, and afterwards crossed over to the mainland, where they destroyed the fort which the Clazomenians were building at Polichna. The authors of the revolt fled to Daphnus, a neighbouring town ; the rest of the inhabitants returned to their island, and Clazomenae also was once more Athenian. 1 Encouraged by these successes, Diomedon and Leon carried the war into Chios. Using Lesbos, the Oenussae, and some forts in the territory of Erythrae as a basis, they landed at various points in the island. Their ships had been manned by hoplites "from the roll," who had been compelled to serve The Athenians as marines, and with these excellent troops they in Chios, defeated the Chians with great slaughter, and laid waste their country. Such a disaster had not been known at Chios since the days of the Persian war, and it was the more deeply felt owing to the high cultivation of the 1 Time, viii. 22, 23 § 4 ; supra, p. 373 ; see Jowett's Thuc. i., Essay on Inscriptions, xciii. XI. 8.] BATTLE OF MILETUS, 412. 379 island. Hardly any other people in Greece had enjoyed so long a respite from the miseries of war, and in the judgment of Thucydides none had made a better use of their prosperity. Their present sufferings were indeed of their own making, but their opinion of the desperate state of Athens was one shared by almost all the Greeks, and therefore a pardonable mistake. What they had not accurately estimated was the indolence, timidity, and incapacity of the Spartan rulers, and the almost superhuman energy which Athens displayed in the hour of need. When they found themselves driven off the sea and their country ravaged, a reaction set in, and overtures were made with a view to putting the city into the hands of the Athenians. But the plot was checked by the appearance of Astyochus, who was brought over from Erythrae for the purpose. 1 8. Meanwhile the Athenian squadron of twenty ships still lay at Lade watching Miletus. A descent was made on the Milesian territory, and in the conflict which The Athenians followed, Chalcideus, the Lacedaemonian com- at Miletus - mander, was slain ; but this success led to no change in the situation, and it was not till the close of the summer that affairs took a decisive turn. By this time Athens had once more gathered her strength ; a fleet of forty-eight ships sailed to Samos, having on board 1000 Athenian hoplites, 1500 Argives — 500 of whom were armed by the Athenians — and 1000 of the allied forces, under the command of Phrynichus and two others. From Samos they moved to Miletus, where they were met by 800 Milesians, the Peloponnesian forces of Chalcideus, and the auxiliaries of Tissaphernes, who also furnished a force of cavalry. In the battle which followed, the Argives, despising their enemies as Ionians, Battle of and meeting them in disorder, were defeated Mlletus - by the Milesians with heavy loss ; but the Athenians, after repulsing the Peloponnesians and their auxiliaries, marched 1 Time. viii. 24. The historian is very anxious that we should estimate at its proper value the acoeppoavvr] of a city which was not spoiled by prosperity. 380 HERMOCRATES ARRIVES IN IONIA, 412. [XI. 8. up to the gates of Miletus, and there piled arms, for the Milesians, on seeing the defeat of their friends, offered no further resistance. After the battle, which was remarkable for the victory of Ionians on both sides, the Athenians proceeded to cut off Miletus by building a wall across the isthmus, which connected the city with the mainland. 1 But ere the day closed, the news came that the combined fleet of the Peloponnesians and Sicilians was at hand, fifty-five triremes strong, under the command of Theramenes. What the Athenians dreaded had come to pass; their Syracusan enemy, Hermocrates, anxious to complete the ruin which he had so well begun, persuaded his city to send him over with twenty ships, to which Selinus, grateful for her deliver- ance, had added two : and, uniting: with these, Hermocrates i -n i i arrives with the reloponnesian squadron, which was at last £cUy fr0m ready, had sailed over to join Astyochus. The appearance of the great Syracusan gives in- terest and elevation to the war. He was capable and honest, and sincerely in earnest in liberating Greece. His ability raised him above his Spartan colleagues ; his honesty above Alcibiades and Tissaphernes. He takes no decisive part in the contest, but from time to time he will reappear, leaving always the impression of a noble and patriotic soldier. The fleet sailed to Leros, 2 but on learning that the Athenians were at Miletus, they passed on to Teichiussa, in the Iasian gulf, to await further information. Here they were visited by Alcibiades, who not only acquainted them with the defeat of the Milesians, with whom he had fought, but urged them, as they wished to save Ionia, to lose no time in relieving Miletus. Upon this the Peloponnesians made preparations for sail- 1 Thuc. viii. 25. The Peloponnesians here mentioned are thought to be the e7Tt/3arat who served on board the ships of Chalcideus. Chalcideus had left his crews behind in Chios (cp. c. 17, 32). 2 Thuc. viii. 26. Leros is an island about forty miles from Miletus, but a convenient position from which to watch the city. See Herod, v. 125. XI. 8.] ATHENIAN HEADQUARTERS AT SAMOS, 412. 381 ing on the next morning to Miletus. But Phrynichus, the Athenian commander, who had heard of their approach, had no intention of risking an engagement, and though his colleagues were at first indignant ^tittf™™*™* that an Athenian fleet should retire before Miletus to the enemy, he convinced them of the wisdom Samos * of a cautious policy. The fleet broke up from Miletus and returned to Samos, whence the Argives, annoyed at their defeat and at the turn which events had taken, returned home. Next morning the Peloponnesians sailed out from Teichiussa, leaving their heavy tackle behind them, in ex- pectation of an engagement, but after waiting a day, they returned, and on the instigation of Tissaphernes The Pelopon went on to Iasus, where Amorges still held nesiansat out. The Iasians, who never expected to see Iasus - any but Athenian ships in their bay, were taken unawares, and the town captured. Amorges was given up to Tissa- phernes ; his mercenaries, who were chiefly Peloponnesians, were pressed into the victorious ranks; while Tissaphernes was allowed to have the town, and all the captives, slave or free, on a payment of a daric (16s.) for each. The spoil, which was very great, the accumulation of many years of prosperity, was divided among the soldiers. The fleet then returned to Miletus. 1 After the services rendered to him at Iasus, Tissaphernes could no longer refuse to make good the promise of support by which he had drawn the Spartans to Ionia. He now appeared at Miletus with a month's pay for the whole of the fleet, at the rate of an Attic drachma (8d.) a man; but with ill-timed parsimony he declared that he could not for the future provide more than half a drachma without special per- mission from the King. This proposal provoked a strong remonstrance from Hermocrates, which was so far effectual that Tissaphernes slightly increased the amount. 2 The total 1 Time. viii. 28. 2 Time. viii. 29. He appears to have counted 55 ships as 60. See Goodhart's note. 382 ASTYOCHUS AND THE CHIANS, 412. [XI. 9. number of ships in the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus now amounted to eighty, of which twenty were Chian. About the same time the Athenians received a reinforcement of thirty-five ships from Athens, and as their numbers now amounted to a hundred and four triremes, they resolved to divide the force and send thirty under the command of Strombichides to Chios, while Phrynichus, Charminus, and others with the remainder kept watch over Miletus. 1 9. Astyochus, the admiral of Sparta, was still engaged at Chios in suppressing the plot (p. 379), but when he heard of the arrival of Theramenes he took courage, and sailed out to make attacks on the mainland at Pteleum and Clazomenae. At neither place did he meet with success ; and when leaving Clazomenae he was caught in a great storm and carried to Cyme, while the rest of the ships sought refuge in the adjacent islands. There they lay for eight days, consuming the property which the Clazomenians had conveyed to the islands for safety, after which, the storm abating, they also went on to Cyme. Astyochus was now solicited to take part Astyochus in another attempt to bring over Lesbos, but at Chios. as the allies refused to join, he returned to Chios; and about the same time Pedaritus arrived from Lacedaemon as governor of the island. He brought with him the auxiliaries which had been obtained at Iasus, and found in Chios the crews of the ships which Chalcideus had left behind, 500 strong. Nevertheless he turned a deaf ear to the suggestions of Astyochus, and would neither sail to Lesbos nor allow the Chians to do so. Upon this Astyochus went away in a rage to Miletus, taking with him the few ships which he had in his own command, and declaring that a day would come when the Chians would need his help and fail to obtain it. On his voyage he narrowly escaped being caught by the Athenian squadron which was sailing to Chios. The fleets anchored on opposite sides of Corycus, 1 Thuc. viii. 30. Strombichides is mentioned as one of the generals who brought up these reinforcements. Had he gone back to Athens ? XI. 9.] SPARTA AND THE GREAT KING, ^12, 383 hidden from each other by a spur of the mountain ; and it was merely because Astyochus was called out of his course to investigate a supposed plot at Erythrae that he did not fall into the Athenians' hands. 1 From Erythrae He returns to he made his way to Miletus. On their part Miletus - the Athenian ships were caught in a storm when leaving Corycus, by which three of their number were carried to the city of Chios, the crews being slain or captured as they were driven ashore. The rest sought shelter under the lee of Mimas, and sailed thence to Lesbos. So far Iasus had been the furthest point to the south touched by the Peloponnesians, and this town had. been attacked to please Tissaphernes. But the Peloponnesians now bethought themselves of their own kinsmen in Asia. A fleet under the command of Hippocrates, a Spartan, but chiefly composed of Thurian vessels, led by Dorieus of Rhodes, put in at Cnidus, a Dorian colony, which had been already won over by Tissaphernes. 2 They were quickly followed by the Athenians from Samos, who captured six of the vessels, and were within an ace of recovering Cnidus. When Astyochus arrived at Miletus he found the Pelopon- nesian fleet in a high state of efficiency ; pay being regular and good, and the spoil of Iasus yet unexhausted, while the Milesians were most eager in the cause. The spirits of the Peloponnesians rose with their prosperity, and the former treaty with Tissaphernes, which had been drawn up in the timidity of their first arrival, was no longer satisfactory. A second was arranged between Theramenes — who had not yet given up his command — and the satrap, in which Second tre aty the King was pledged to maintain any army with the which he should invite to his aid, while it was Persians - in his country. In other respects also some modifications were introduced ; the war was to be carried on in common as before, and neither party was to come to terms without the 1 Thuc. viii. 30-33. 2 Thuc. viii. 35, reading vno TiacrcKfiepvovs. See Goodhart. 384 PELOPONNESIANS SAIL TO HELLESPONT, 412. [XI. 10. consent of the other, but if one party required the aid of the other he was to be satisfied with the assistance which he could persuade him to give : the King undertook not to attack the Lacedaemonians or their allies, and the Lacedae- monians on their part recognised the King's claim to all the country and cities which had belonged to him or his father, or his forefathers, and undertook not to exact tribute from these. 1 After concluding this treaty, which was perhaps intended for the home authorities, Theramenes set out for Sparta in a boat, but on the voyage he was lost at sea. Affairs at Chios were going from bad to worse. The Athenians crossed over from Lesbos (p. 378), and after defeating the Chians in numerous engagements, established themselves at Delphinium, a strong fortress convenient for the sea, and close to the town of Chios. Factions also broke _ out among the citizens. The revolt had been Desperate ° condition of brought about by the oligarchs, without the Chios - knowledge of the people, and even among the oligarchs there had been a reaction, owing to the ill success of the rising. Some citizens had been put to death by Pedaritus, the new governor, on a charge of Atticism, and a spirit of suspicion was abroad, which required most careful watching. Messengers were sent to Astyochus, begging him to send assistance, but in vain, and at length Pedaritus despatched an envoy to Sparta to make complaint of the conduct of the admiral. 2 10. The Peloponnesians now carried out the last part of the programme which they had sketched in the autumn of the preceding year. The envoys of Pharnabazus had remained at Lacedaemon, in the hope of inducing the nefian fleet is authorities to send out a fleet to the Helles- despatchedto pont. At length — it was now December — the Hellespont. , i £ n ■> , , , . they were successful, and twenty-seven ships were despatched under the command of Antisthenes. On 1 Thuc. viii. 37. 2 Thuc. viii. 38. XI. io. ] £)ISTR£SS OF THE CHIANS, 41$. 385 its way the fleet was ordered to carry eleven commissioners, of whom Lichas was one, to Miletus, where they were to investigate the charges against Astyochus, and supersede him if necessary. The ships were then to sail to the Hellespont under the command of Clearchus. When crossing the Aegean, the fleet put in at Melos, where they came upon ten Athenian vessels ; three of these were destroyed, but the rest escaped, and fearing that they would convey intelligence to Samos, the Lacedaemonians shaped their course to Crete, and so to Caunus, whence they sent to Miletus, begging for aid in conveying the ships past Samos. For since their return from Iasus, some three months previously, the Pelo- ponnesians had remained at Miletus, and over against them, on the island of Samos, were the Athenians, ever ready to make a descent when opportunity offered. 1 Pedaritus still urged Astyochus to come to Chios, which was reduced to the greatest distress. The sea was closed to the Chians, their land laid waste, and since the ^. 7 , Disastrous occupation of Delphinium by the Athenians, the state of affairs slaves had deserted in large numbers, putting at Chlos - their knowledge of the country at the service of the enemy. If help were sent at once, it would be possible to prevent the Athenians from completing Delphinium and the still larger fortifications which they were planning for their army and fleet. Astyochus was preparing to despatch some ships, notwithstanding his threat (p. 382), when the news came of the arrival of the Peloponnesian ships at Caunus. Upon this he abandoned Chios, and sailed to join the new comers. It was of the first importance to bring the commissioners safe to Miletus, and by uniting the fleets, he might gain command of the sea. On his way he attacked Movements of and overran Cos, which had been recently As tyochus: desolated by a terrible earthquake, but on with the reaching Cnidus, he was compelled to sail, Athenian s. without disembarking his men, against an Athenian squadron, 1 Thuc. viii. 39. VOL. III. 2 B 386 LICHAS AND TISSAPHERNES, 412. [XI. 10. which had been sent from Samos under Charminus to keep watch over the Peloponnesian ships. Charminus was reported to be off Syme, and thither Astyochus followed him. A storm of rain, followed by a thick fog, scattered his ships, and when morning broke, his left wing came in sight of the Athenians, the rest being hidden by the island. Charminus at once attacked with a few vessels, and defeated his opponents, but when the rest of the fleet came up he found himself outnumbered, and took to flight. The contingents of the Peloponnesians then united and returned to Cnidus, whither they were soon followed by the entire Athenian fleet, but neither side would risk an engagement, 1 and the Athenians returned to Samos. The whole Peloponnesian fleet was now collected at Cnidus, and the eleven commissioners reviewed the situation. The Peiopon- Tissaphernes also was present. Some criticisms nesian fleet at were made on his past conduct, and arrange- cmdus ' ments for the future discussed. Lichas was bold enough to express his dissatisfaction at both the treaties which had been concluded, pointing out that if the King was Quarrel of to be master of the territory which had been Lichas and governed by his forefathers, his country would Tissaphernes. ex t en d to Boeotia, and so far from liberating Hellas, the Lacedaemonians would be agents in establishing a Median empire. He must have better terms than these, which indeed he refused to observe, nor would he accept Persian support on such conditions. On this Tissaphernes went away in a rage, and for the time Persia and Sparta were estranged. 2 The alliance now received an important acquisition. As they lay at Cnidus, the most influential inhabitants of Rhodes joins Ehodes made overtures to them, inviting them the alliance. to ^ the igland> Rhodes wag & power f ul state, with a large force of infantry and numerous soldiers, 1 Thuc. viii. 41. For Charminus at Syme see also Aristoph. Thesmoph. 801 ff. 2 Thuc. viii. 43 ; cf. 52. XI. II.] THE PELOPONNESIANS AT RHODES, 411. 387 wealthy enough to supply the funds so necessary at the present moment, when the allies were looking for supplies to take the place of the pay of Tissaphernes. The invitation was eagerly accepted, and the fleet, ninety-four vessels strong, put in at Camirus. The populace, as usual, had not been informed of the plans of the oligarchs, and as the place was unfortified, they fled in terror. The Lacedaemonians re- assured them, and a congress was held of the three cities of the island, Camirus, Ialysus, and Lindus, after which Ehodes formally seceded to the Peloponnesians. On hearing of the revolt, the Athenians sailed to the island in the hope of saving it, but in vain ; all that they could do was to make attacks on Ehodes from neighbouring stations at Cos and Chalce. The Rhodians contributed to the allies no less than thirty-two talents, and Astyochus, Thg PeIopon- finding himself in comfortable quarters, drew nesian fleet his vessels on shore and remained inactive for ^f 1 * 1118 at Rhodes. nearly three months (January to March 411), equally regardless of the danger in Chios, and of the im- portant events which, as he knew, were taking place in Samos. II. After the death of Chalcideus and the accession to office of new ephors, the feeling at Lacedaemon had turned against Alcibiades. Agis was his personal ^g Spartans enemy, and others were doubtless jealous of his turn against success, while Endius was no longer in office to Alciblades - protect him. Before leaving Miletus, Astyochus had received instructions to put him to death, but Alcibiades, who had his suspicions, escaped by withdrawing to Tissaphernes. He was naturally indignant at the conduct of the Spartans ; and perhaps he reflected that it was by his own act that the Greeks of Asia were passing into the empire of He escapes to the Persians, from which they had been so long Tissaphernes, and so successfully preserved. His thoughts h?m to reduce once more returned to Athens, and with his thepayofthe usual energy he exerted himself to the utmost to Pel °P° nneslans - damage the Pelopoimesian cause. Knowing that Tissaphernes 388 ALCIBIADES AND TISSA PHERNES, 411. [XI. ix. could not or would not furnish supplies, he supported him in reducing the pay from a drachma to three obols— and even this was not supplied regularly-urging that the Athenians paid no more, not so much from economy as because they found that sailors if overpaid became dissolute and incapable. Arrears of pay were also an inducement to sailors to re- main on their ships. The objections of the trierarchs and generals could be silenced by timely presents of money, and, in fact, Hermocrates alone refused the bait. When the cities applied for funds, Alcibiades had answers ready, telling the Chians with his own lips that the richest of the Greeks ought to be ashamed of asking for funds; would they not even pay the auxiliaries who had come to their assistance? Did they expect to be rescued without cost of money or life 1 The subject cities which had paid tribute to Athens were reminded that they were only spend- ing on themselves what they had formerly spent on the Athenians. And to one and all he pointed out that Tissa- phernes must needs be careful while he was spending his own resources, but if the King should send supplies, the pay of the sailors would be increased, and the wants of the cities considered. In private he advised Tissaphernes not to be in any haste to finish the war, either by bringing up the Phoenician fleet— a plan which he had in view— or by in- creasing the forces of the Peloponnesians. It was not to his advantage that the same state should be supreme by land and sea; a divided control was better, for in this case the King could use one power against the other. It was much The true policy safer, and much cheaper, too, to allow the fJZ7oT Greeks to wear out their power on each other, batants wear than to raise the Spartans into a position from each other out. which ^ ^ ^ ^ great expense and danger. And after all the Athenians would prove the more serviceable allies of the two; thev had no desire to make conquests on land ; they wished to enslave the seas, and could assist the King in enslaving the Greeks in his territory; whereas the Lacedaemonians posed as the XI. n.] ALCIBIADES AND ATHENS, 411. 389 liberators of Greece, and were not likely to free the cities from the Athenians in order to make them the slaves of the King. Let it be his object to reduce both, getting as much as he could from the Athenians, and then driving the Peloponnesians out of the country. This advice agreed with the wishes as well as the interests of Tissaphernes. He took Alcibiades into his confidence, and at once began to reduce his payments to the fleet. At the same time he refused to allow them to engage with the enemy till joined by the Phoenician fleet, which would give them an irresistible superiority. By this means he destroyed the efficiency of the fleet, and Astyochus, the admiral, being already in Persian pay, though he sought to conceal his own treachery by faint remonstrances, could offer no real opposition. 1 In giving this advice to Tissaphernes, sound though it was, Alcibiades had other aims in view than the interests of the Persians. He must be a power somewhere, and a power in Greece; and he had no sooner ceased to be influential at Sparta than he wished to be again influential at Athens. Yet how could he hope to be restored to the The real aims city which he had so deeply injured 1 or what of Alcibiades. influence could he gain so long as the people were governed by the leaders who had expelled him ? The position might well seem desperate, but he knew the divided state of feeling at Athens, and how to turn it to his own advantage. Since the Sicilian disaster democracy had lost in credit, and many citizens were inclined— even with the most patriotic views— to doubt whether a change might not be introduced with advantage. As the old sources of supply fell off, and the burden pressed more and more heavily upon them, the richer citizens sought to be rid of the war and the government which persisted in it at their expense. The old opposition between oligarchy and democracy which had divided Cimon and Pericles took a sharper edge; and if many wished to reform the democracy, there were others, and those perhaps Thuc. viii. 45, 46. 390 OLIGARCHICAL MOVEMENT AT SAMOS, jJl. [XL 12. the ablest men in the city, who wished to get rid of it altogether. If Alcibiades could hold out a hope of new supplies, he would certainly attract those who were being ruined by the war ; and if this help were conditional on the overthrow of democracy, he would get rid of the popular leaders who stood in the way of his return. What his own position under an oligarchy would be he does not seem to have considered, but if he were the instrument in establish- ing such a government, he could hardly fail to profit by it. 12. Such were his hopes, and he no sooner found himself in favour with Tissaphernes than he began to feel his way Ai d in the fleet at Samos, intimating that if an proposes an oligarchy took the place of the "villainous oligarchical democracy " which had banished him, he would revolution. «■»,,. , - A , , be willing to return, and secure tor Athens the support of Tissaphernes. These overtures were met more than half way by the trierarchs and others at Samos, who were dissatisfied with the existing form of government. Of these a few visited Alcibiades, who explained his views clearly, promising to bring over Tissaphernes and the King if the democracy were abolished in which the King could place no confidence. They returned filled with hopes that they would get the government into their own hands, and bring the war to an end, and with this object in view, a plot for a revolution was formed. The proposals of Alcibiades were announced openly, and the people, though at first alarmed, were soon quieted by the prospect of receiving pay from the treasures of the Great King ; but when the conspirators began to discuss matters more carefully among themselves, they found a formidable opponent among their own numbers. Of all the generals in the camp at Samos the ablest was Phrynichus, the son of Stratonides. We have already seen Opposition of that he prevented the Athenians from rashly Phrymchus. encountering the enemy at a time when defeat would have been fatal ; and Thucydides, when recording his conduct, remarks that on this as on every other occasion "then XI. 12.] PHRYNICHUS OPPOSES, #11. 391 and afterwards " he showed himself a man of most capable judgment. He appears to have been of humble origin ; he began life as a shepherd in the country, an occupation which he afterwards changed for the more promising but less honest career of a "sycophant" in the city. 1 What his political convictions were it is difficult to say ; for on the one hand he saw very clearly the advantage which Athens derived from her democratical constitution, and on the other he became one of the chief agents in overthrowing it. Whether democrat or oligarch, he was probably guided by personal motives only, and above all by a hatred and distrust of Alcibiades, whose return to Athens he wished to prevent by every means. This hatred now brought him into opposition to the proposed revolution, and his keen insight at once detected the diffi- culties which attended it. The King was not likely to throw over the Lacedaemonians when their fleet had become power- ful, and join the Athenians in destroying what views of he had helped to create; they had done him P^rynichus. no harm, while the Athenians were justly the objects of his suspicion. The change from democracy to oligarchy would gain Athens no advantage in the subject cities; on the contrary, her empire mainly rested on the support of the demos, and those who had gone over to the Lacedaemonians had not revolted to establish an oligarchy, but to obtain independence. The desire of freedom would not be satisfied by a change of constitution, and the oligarchs, "the gentlemanly party," would cause the Athenians quite as much trouble in the allied cities as the democrats ; they were selfish and unscrupulous, and would not shrink from bloodshed without form of trial, while the people were the refuge of the oppressed. 2 On general grounds, there- 1 Lysias 20, §§ 11, 12. / , - , 2 Thuc. viii. 48 : tovs re icakovs Kayadovs ovop.a{op.<-vovs ovk e\ao~o-a> vvtovs vofitCeiv o-iplo-L rrpdyp-aTa rrapi&iv tov bfaov, vopiaras ovras KaX io-rjyrjTas twv kolkvv ro5 br)Li(0, e£ hv to. TrAei'co avrovy cofpeXeio-Oai- K a\ to p,ev eV eneivoLs dvai kgu afcpiroi av ^ koi fiiawTepov aTrodvrjaKeit tov Se brjuov acpuv re KaTafpvyrjv dvai Kai iitelvav a-o)(ppoviaTJ}V. 392 HE ATTEMPTS TO DESTROY ALCIBIADES, 411. [XI. 13 fore, there was no reason why Athens should exchange democracy for oligarchy; and with regard to Alcibiades, Phrynichus was aware that he cared neither for the one nor for the other form of government. His only object was to return to his " clique " at Athens, by whose help he would be able to carry out his designs, whatever they might be. Above all, Phrynichus entreated his colleagues not to c jate divisions among the people at a moment when it waa nost important that all should act in harmony. 13. These were wise counsels, but they were not followed. The conspirators resolved to go on with their work, and despatched Pisander, with some others, to Athens, to pre- pare the way for the changes which were to win Persian help for the city — the return of Alcibiades, and the removal of the democracy. 1 Phrynichus now found attempts to himself in a dangerous position, for if the destroy proposal to recall Alcibiades were carried at Athens, as he foresaw that it would be, his action in opposing it would probably cost him his life. He re- solved, if possible, to get rid of Alcibiades ; and with this object secretly informed Astyochus, who had not yet left Miletus for Rhodes, that Alcibiades was ruining the Lacedaemonian interests with Tissaphernes, and bringing him over to the Athenians. His own treachery he excused by the plea that a man might be pardoned for damaging his enemy even at the expense of his state — such was the morality which faction and misapplied acuteness had taught the Greeks. But Astyochus had no mind to punish Alcibiades, who was great danger, indeed out of his power. He saw that he was from which i n favour with Tissaphernes, and that his own he extricates ., ,-, ,. .,. i , • himself with interests lay, not m punishing, but in serving much dim- him. He immediately went to Magnesia, a! ' where Alcibiades and Tissaphernes were, and laid before him the communications of Phrynichus. His services did not go unrewarded, and from this time he was 1 Thuc. viii. 49, 50. XI. I3-] HIS MESSAGE TO ASTYOCHUS, 411. 393 in the pay of Persia, an accomplice in the designs of Tissa- phernes, to whose injurious treatment of the Peloponnesian fleet he could only oppose a faint remonstrance (p. 389). Alcibiades at once sent a letter to the authorities at Samos, attacking Phrynichus, and demanding his execution as a traitor. Phrynichus was in greater danger than before, but he extricated himself with admirable skill. He addressed another communication to Astyochus, complaining of his conduct in revealing the former message, but nevertheless offering him an opportunity of destroying the entire Athenian fleet at Samos, and giving minute details for the execution of the plan; and as before, he excused his conduct on the ground that he must either destroy his enemies or perish miserably at their hands. He then announced to the army that the enemy intended to take advantage of the unpro- tected state of Samos to make an attack on the fleet, and being himself general, he pushed on the fortification of the city and kept the strictest watch at every point. Meanwhile Astyochus had communicated the intelligence to Alcibiades, as before ; and Alcibiades, in his turn, sent a second letter to his friends in Samos exposing the treachery of Phrynichus. But the letter failed to have any effect, for, owing to the conduct of Phrynichus, Alcibiades was not believed, and his communication was thought to be merely a malicious attempt to destroy his enemy. Alcibiades now addressed himself with yet greater zeal to the task of winning over Tissaphernes to the Athenian cause. The satrap was not unwilling to be persuaded, for the conduct of Lichas at Cnidus had con- JoTunt^mng vinced him of the truth of Alcibiades' warning, to abandon and he now regarded the Lacedaemonians as the spartans * bent on the liberation of Greece — a policy not at all in his interests. But the numbers of the Peloponnesian fleet were so great that he did not venture openly to break with Sparta. 1 Meanwhile the envoys from Samos, with Pisander at their 1 Thuc. viii. 52. 394 PISANDER AT A THENS, 411. [XI. 13. head, arrived at Athens. An assembly was held, in which they stated the chief points in the new policy, insisting that Pisander ^ Alcibiades were recalled and the constitu- arrives at tion changed, they would have the assistance AtheiJa< of the King in overcoming the Peioponnesians. The proposal met with much opposition. The people could not bear the thought of exchanging democracy for oligarchy, while the enemies of Alcibiades protested against the return of an outlaw, and the protest was supported in the strongest Excitement language by the Eumolpidae and Kerykes, the at Athens. guardians of the sacred rites which he had out- raged. Pisander was not to be turned from his purpose : regardless of the abuse poured upon him, he called up each of his opponents, and asked him the simple question, whether he had any hope of the city. The Peioponnesians had more ships at sea, more allied cities to support them ; the re- sources of the King and of Tissaphernes were open to them, while Athens was without funds, and without prospect of funds, unless the King supplied them. To this question there could be but one answer. Pisander then plainly told the excited multitude that they would never succeed in gaining the King, unless the constitution were "sobered" and office confined to fewer hands. If this were done, the King would have confidence in them, and why should they discuss the constitution when their existence was at stake % At a future time they could restore what they had removed. Alcibiades also must be recalled, for he, and no one else, could carry the negotiations through. Upon Th Ath ni ns ^ s tne P eo pl e g ave wa y 5 though unwillingly ; agree to the the change seemed absolutely necessary at the change of moment, and they hoped that it would be for constitution. . 1 . \ . a time only, as Pisander suggested. A decree was passed empowering Pisander to return to Samos with ten envoys, and make the best arrangements that he could for securing Alcibiades and Tissaphernes. 1 1 Thuc. viii. 53, 54. XI. 14- ] POLITICAL CLUBS AT ATHENS, 411. 395 At the same time Phrynichus was removed from his command— at the suggestion of Pisander, who knowing that he was opposed to the return of Alcibiades, charged him with treacherously betraying Ionia to Amorges— and with him his colleague, Scironides. Their places were filled by Leon and Diomedon, 1 who were at once despatched to Samos. 14. In his public advocacy of the revolution, Pisander acted a part as legitimate as it was courageous ; but before leaving Athens he took other steps to secure his ends, pisander and which have left a dark stain upon the move- the clubs - ment. Among the characteristic features of Athenian life were the small associations, which tended to flourish and abound in a society where family influence was imperfectly felt, and where the church was not yet distinguished from the state. They were formed for all kinds of purposes — religious, social, and political — and known by very different names. The members were united by the closest obligations, which, being honourable rather than legal, they could not break without in- curring the deepest infamy. So far as they were religious and social, these combinations were tolerated though not supported by the state; no one was thought a worse citizen because he sought enjoyment or protection by joining an Ipavos, whose members were pledged to some common entertainment, or to save any one of their body who fell into the hands of pirates. "With political associations the case was different : these might be open or they might be secret, in support of the constitution, or against it. It had long been the custom of the leading politicians to gather round them Political a knot of friends on whom they could rely in associations carrying their measures. More especially was at Athens - this the case with the oligarchical party, who. being fewer in number, naturally sought the strength of union. In the stormy times which followed the expulsion of the tyrants, Isagoras had been supported by an association of this kind in his 1 Leon and Diomedon must therefore have returned to Athens from Chios, where we last heard of them, but Thucydides has not recorded this. 396 PISANDER SETS THE CLUBS TO WORK, [XI. I* attempt to establish an oligarchical government, and in the last struggle against Pericles, Thucydides had carefully organised and drilled his party. In these instances there had been no attempt at concealment, and though the result was a sharper opposition of parties, the practice was no more to be condemned than are the means by which we carry on our party government. It was otherwise in the Peloponnesian war, when personal aims took the place of public. The associations became more secret, their aims less legitimate. Thucydides speaks of conspiracies which had for their object suits at law and public offices, that is, secret societies formed with the purpose of securing for their members success in trials and elections. Such objects were not necessarily criminal ; the richer men at Athens had reason enough to protect themselves from the attacks of sycophants, and found it difficult to maintain their position in the government of the city, but the societies might easily become criminal, and being secret they were suspected. Even if they were no more than clubs formed for common amusement, the prevailing distrust and discontent ascribed to them a more sinister motive, especially after the affair of the Hermae in 415. To these "conspiracies" Pisander now addressed himself, bidding them unite and form some common plan for the overthrow of the constitution. They must set to work at once and prepare the ground against his return from Samos. 1 But the game was far from being won, as Pisander quickly discovered on reaching the court of Tissaphernes. In so far as he advised him to allow the combatants to fhTcourt S wear out their strength on each other, Alcibi- Tissaphemes. a( j eg a rea i influence with the satrap, but beyond this point he could not carry him. Tissaphernes 1 Thuc viii. 54 : fivwfxoaias, a'lnep irdyxavov nporepov iv rfj TroXei oScnu, Ari StW Ka\ d PX ais, Hi 82. See Thirlwall, Hist. Greece, vol. iv. (8vo), Appendix i. Cp. Aristoph. Lysistr. 577 : kol tovs ye (rvvcarafjihovs tovtovs, AuKe8aip.ovlcov Kal rcov £vp.p,dxa)v npos Tiacra(pepvr]v Kal 'lepap-ev-qv Kal tovs Qapvanov 7rai8as irepl rcov (Saai\ea>s irpayixarayv Kal AaKedaifiovicov Kal tcov ^vp.p.dxo)v. The sons of Phar- naces are Pharnabazus and his brother. Hieramenes is a doubtful XI. 15- ] PELOPONNESIANS RETURN TO MILETUS, 411. 399 In this treaty we see that the remonstrances of Lichas had not been without effect; some limits are assigned to the " country of the King " which the Greeks were Nature of the not to molest. On the other hand, the question treat y- of the European possessions of the Persians is left open ; and much more definite conditions are laid down about supplies. We observe also that the King now speaks of his own navy, implying that the Peloponnesian fleet is rather a useful ally than a vital force in the conduct of the war. By promising to bring up this navy — which never appeared— Tissaphernes had prevented the Lacedaemonians from engaging with the Athenians ; and he now formally uses the same promise to put a limit to the supplies which they were to receive. On the conclusion of the treaty, Tissaphernes pretended to make arrangements for the arrival of the Phoenician fleet, while the Peloponnesians at last broke up from their long inaction at Ehodes and returned to nesL^ieave Miletus. In this they were not only consulting Rhodes for the wishes of Tissaphernes ; they were putting themselves in a better position for the relief of Chios. Envoys had also arrived from Eretria, asking assistance in bringing over Euboea, a step which was again in serious contemplation, and the more so because a combined party of Boeotians and Eretrians had been successful in persuading the garrison of Oropus, on the borders of Attica and Boeotia, opposite Eretria, to surrender the place. The request was refused, or perhaps referred to the authorities at home, who soon after took the matter up. On the way to Miletus, the fleet came in sight of the Athenian squadron, which, under the command of Leon and Diomedon, had been watching them from Chalce, but neither side would engage. 1 The Athenians now returned to Samos to keep watch over their enemy at Miletus. The relief which the Chians expected from the Pelopon- person. In Xen. Hell. ii. 1. 9, a Hieramenes is mentioned, who married a sister of Darius. 1 Time. viii. 59, 60, 55. 400 THE HELLESPONT, 411. [XI. 15. nesians never came, for Astyochus was unable to pass the Athenians without an engagement, which he was probably for- , bidden to risk till the arrival of the Phoenician The Pelopon- nesiansin fleet. Their position was almost desperate, Chios. when they succeeded in bringing up from Miletus a Spartan named Leon, to take the place of Pedaritus, and a small squadron of twelve vessels. Upon this the Chian fleet attacked the Athenians, and though the engagement was not decided, they certainly were not defeated. A few days afterwards the Athenian commander Strombichides found it necessary to leave Chios for the Hellespont, where Abydus and Lampsacus had been induced to revolt by Dercyllidas, the Spartan, of whom we now hear for the first time. Strombichides succeeded in recovering Lamp- sacus, from which he carried off the slaves and materials of war, but Abydus could neither be persuaded nor forced to return to alliance. Strombichides had to content him- self with establishing a garrison at Sestos, to keep watch over the Hellespont. 1 The news of these successes so en- couraged Astyochus that he at length ventured to sail with two ships to Chios, and finding that the island was no longer in any danger, he brought back all the Chian ships to join his own fleet at Miletus. With these reinforcements he sailed out to attack the Athenians, but in vain ; they refused to leave the harbour. They were indeed in a miserable plight. On their return from Tissaphernes, Pisander and the envoys, far from aban- Attempted doning their plans, pursued them with still revolution greater eagerness, and even persuaded some of piansoTthe tne leading Samians to join them in establish- oiigarchs. { n g a n oligarchy, though these had recently helped to destroy the Samian oligarchs. They resolved to go on with the war, and contribute the necessary funds from their own resources ; the burden would not press so heavily if borne in their own interests. And with regard to Alcibiades, 1 Thuc. viii. 62. XI. I5-] PI SANDER A GAIN AT A THENS, 411. 401 they now discovered that he was not a man suited to an oligarchy, and left him to go his own way. Being firm for revolution at all costs, they sent Pisander and half the envoys back to Athens to complete the P i sande rsent revolution there, bidding them establish oli- to Athens to garchies in every city at which they touched on ration* 16 the way j the other half they sent to various ther e- subject towns. Diotrephes, who had been chosen to command in the Thracian district, was despatched to his province, where he had no sooner arrived than he put Diotrephes down the democracy at Thasos ; but the result at Th asos. was by no means answerable to the expectations of the oligarchs. Two months after his departure, the Thasians began to build walls, and in conjunction with some exiles who had taken refuge with the Peloponnesians, they summoned ships to their aid and went over to Lacedaemon, thus re- forming the state and getting rid of the demos without any risk to themselves. And the same thing, Thucydides says, happened in many other cities. When the power of the demos had been checked and the oligarchs could act in safety, they threw aside the sham independence proffered by their fellow-oligarchs at Athens and secured complete freedom. 1 On their way to Athens, Pisander and his colleagues not only put down democracies in any city at which they touched, but collected forces to aid them in their under- Pi sander a t taking. When they reached the city, they Athens, found that their partisans in the various clubs had been most active in preparing the ground. The first three or four months of the year 411 had been little better than a reign of terror in the city. Androcles, a leading demo- Reign of terror crat, who had taken the foremost part in ex- at Athens, polling Alcibiades, was secretly assassinated by some of the younger oligarchs, and the same fate overtook others who stood in the way of the conspirators. A programme of the 1 Thuc. viii. 64. For Diotrephes we ought perhaps to read Diitrephes {supra, p. 338). See Goodhart's note. VOL. III. 2 0 402 THE RE VOL UTWN AT A THENS, 411. [XI . 16. Reformed Constitution had also been issued, in which it was declared that henceforth no one should receive money for service to the state other than military : that the franchise should be confined. to those men who were most able to assist the city in purse and person, and that their numbers should not exceed five thousand. This was meant for the public, for of course the conspirators intended to keep the power . . , in their own hands. The Assembly and the Oligarchical > . J plans at Council still continued to meet as before ; but Athens. a t their meetings such subjects only were dis- cussed as pleased the conspirators; no one spoke who was not of their party, or said anything which they had not previously considered. Opposition was indeed out of the question, for if any one was rash enough to support the democracy, he at once disappeared, and no attempt was made to discover his murderers, or to punish them if they fell under suspicion. The people were terror-struck and dumb ; every one thought himself fortunate if silence secured im- munity. The extent of the conspiracy was unknown, and therefore exaggerated ; to claim sympathy was dangerous, to repel attack impossible : many were found among the con- spirators, whose lives and opinions seemed to make such a position impossible, and the popular party, terrified by these instances of treachery, lost all confidence in themselves. 1 16. Pisander and his colleagues now appeared at Athens, and lost no time in carrying out the remaining part of their _ „ , . programme. The Athenians were summoned The Revolution : r » _ _ meeting at to an Assembly, at which ten 2 commissioners Coionus. with full powers were chosen to frame a con- stitution, and they were to report by a given day to the people. When the day came, the Assembly was again summoned, not in the Pnyx, nor in Athens at all, but in the precinct of Poseidon at Coionus, rather more than a mile 1 Thuc. viii. 66. 2 In Ath. Pol. c. 29 we have thirty, including the ten Probuli ; see Sandys' note. XI. 1 6.] THE ASSEMBLY AT COLON US, 411. 403 distant from the city. 1 The Commissioners then brought forward their report, if report it can be called, for they had made no attempt to frame a constitution; and contented themselves with recommending the suspension of the law against illegal proposals, by which, more directly than by any other provision, the stability of the constitution was in ordinary times maintained. Every citizen was now at liberty to make what proposals he pleased, however unconstitutional they might be, and any one who attacked him on the score of illegality was threatened with severe penalties. In other . words, the Athenian constitution was now thrown into the melting-pot, and those whose business it was to provide a new model left matters to take their own course, which was exactly what the conspirators wished. Pisander at once came forward with a scheme for a new form of government. He proposed to sweep away all Government the existing arrangements for public offices ; of the Four and for the future to abolish the payment of Hundred - officers ; to restrict the franchise, as before, to five thousand citizens; and to place the management of the state in the hands of a new Council of four hundred members, who were to be irresponsible, and empowered to summon the five thousand at their pleasure, and at their pleasure only. The election of the four hundred was arranged as follows : five proedri were chosen by the Assembly; of these five, each selected nineteen others ; and each of the hundred thus chosen selected three. 2 Not a word was said against these proposals. So well had 1 Thuc. Upbv IIo(rei8 tt}v ftovXelav ; ovd' avros tovto ye (prjacis. XI. i6.] THE OLIGARCHICAL GOVERNMENT, 411. . 405 Council, who, after offering the prayers and sacrifices cus- tomary upon entering on office, chose by lot 1 some of their number to act as a standing committee, and set about chang- ing the details of the constitution. There was now no general Assembly, and the choice of officers, civil and military, lay entirely with the Council : any one not of their party was no doubt removed from his post to make way for an oli- garch, but we cannot follow their action into particulars. All we know is that they ruled the city by force ; some citizens whom it was thought convenient to get rid of were put to death, others were imprisoned, others were sent out of the country. 2 At one point they stopped short — they did not propose to recall the exiles. On his previous visit to Athens, Pisander had used the name of Alcibiades and his in- The exiles not fluence with the Persian satrap to win the recalled - consent of the Athenian people to a change of the constitu- tion, but after the interview with Tissaphernes these hopes came to an end. Phrynichus, who, since his recall to Athens had worked heartily in the oligarchical cause, was well aware that the return ot his enemy would involve his own destruc- tion. Even in regard to the war, the policy of the oligarchs was no longer in harmony with that of Alcibiades. He was the declared enemy of Sparta, and offered'the help of Persia in continuing the war ; they had no wish to continue the war, and had therefore no .need of Persian help. Their objects were personal : they wished to secure their position and to free the city from the rule of the multitude at any cost ; in the pursuit of these aims Alcibiades would have been in their way, and they could not recall the exiles without recalling him. 3 1 Thuc. viii. 70 : dneKXrjp^aav. 2 Thuc. I.e. : Kara updros eve/xov rrjv ttoXlv. For the election of generals, see Pol. Ath. c. 31, where a distinction is drawn between the election of the generals before and aftei the establishment of the Council. For the remainder of the Attic year, generals were to be chosen from the five thousand (by whom?); afterwards the Council was to elect them. 3 Thuc. viii. 91. Infra, p. 412. See, however, Ath. Pol. 32 end, 406 THE FOUR HUNDRED AND AG IS, 411. [XI. 17. They were no sooner in power than they sent envoys to Agis at Decelea, thinking that he would listen to overtures, Q t t which came, not from a " faithless multitude," Agis ; his fruit- but f rom oligarchs who sympathised with Lace- less advance on daemon. Agis, however, was by no means Athens. . . & ' ' , / convinced that the people would acquiesce in the new government ; if all were quiet for the moment, new factions would certainly arise, should a large army appear before the gates of the city. So far from entering into negotiations, he at once summoned forces from the Pelopon- nese, and with these and his own garrison he marched upon Athens, expecting by his approach to throw the citizens into such confusion that they would accept what terms he pleased, or at least to find the Long Walls deserted in the general tumult, and an easy prey to his attack. These plans were foiled by the excellent discipline of the Athenians. Within the city the strictest order was kept, and not a man was moved from his post ; when the Peloponnesians came up to the walls, troops were sent out against them with such effect that Agis suffered some loss. Upon this he retired to Decelea, and sent the reinforcements home. He was now more inclined to listen to the overtures which still came to him from the Four Hundred, and they, in their turn, were encouraged to send an embassy to Lacedaemon. 1 17. The success of the conspiracy had been due in a great measure to the absence of large numbers of the citizens. Had the £< seafaring rabble " who manned the fleet at Samos been present at the Assembly at Golonus, democracy would Difficulty with not have died so easily at Athens. And, in the fleet. truth, it was not dead. The fleet now consti- tuted the real power of the city. If the sailors refused to obey orders from home, any treaties which the oligarchs might make where it is stated that the Athenians abandoned negotiations with Lacedaemon because the Lacedaemonians insisted on the surrender of the empire. 1 Thuc. viii. 81 ; see also c. 86, 90 ; Antiphon and Pisander were the chief movers. The envoys were Laespodias, Aristophon, and Melesias. They never reached Lacedaemon. Infra, p. 412. XI. I7-] OLIGARCHY SUPPRESSED AT SAMOS, 411. 407 with Sparta were idle forms. So long as the action of the fleet was undecided, Agis was not likely to retire from Decelea. It was, therefore, essential to the success of the oligarchical movement that it should be supported in the fleet. The situation was the more difficult as the sailors were strongly democratical ; and the Samians had recently The revolution risen against their oligarchical government. at Samos - Yet, before leaving for Athens, Pisander and the Athenians of his party had persuaded a number of the Samians to abandon their new principles, and a body of three hundred had been formed with a view to carrying out a counter- revolution. The conspirators began their work , r . , . , June 411. m the usual manner, with assassination ; they struck down Hyperbolus, the Athenian demagogue, who, after his ostracism {supra, p. 288), had lived at Samos — an act in which they were abetted by Gharminus, one of the Athenian generals, and they were about to make an attack on the popular party, when they met with opposition where they perhaps least expected it. The generals Leon and Diomedon, who had been sent out by the oligarchs at Athens to take the place of Phrynichus and Scironides (supra, o/Cr-x i • n i .,i 1 Action of Leon p. 395), were by no means satisfied with the turn an d Diomedon ; which affairs were taking; ; their sympathies the revolution . 1 1 v • 1 m i crushed. were with the people, m whose commence and esteem their influence lay. Thrasybulus also, one of the trierarchs, and Thrasyllus, one of the heavy-armed rank and file, with some others, were known to be warm friends of democracy. When the conspiracy was discovered, the Athenians at once went among the soldiers and sailors, beseeching each one separately to oppose it: more especi- ally they sought out the crew of the Paralus, the state ship, who were all Athenian citizens, and ready to attack oligarchy, real or imaginary. The generals were also careful to leave behind a number of ships when they were called away from Samos, and when at last the three hundred made their attack, it was successfully resisted, and democracy was maintained. About thirty of the conspirators were slain; 408 UNION OF SAMIANS AND ATHENIANS, 411. [XI. 18. three who were most deeply implicated were sent into exile : the remainder were allowed to live in peace under the democracy. 1 18. The Paralus was at once despatched with the news to Athens. By this time the Four Hundred were in power, and when the crew, who were ignorant of the sent ^Athens : course of events, landed at Peiraeus, two or chaereasre- three were immediately thrown into prison, with S news a of° S while the rest were transferred to a transport t ie Four vessel and sent to keep watch off Euboea. Hundred ' gut Chaereas, a staunch democrat, who had come out in the ship from Samos, found means to escape and return to the island, where he set about most exaggerated reports of the conduct of the oligarchs. He declared that no one was allowed to say a word against the usurpers ; that freeborn Athenians were punished with the lash; that women and children were outraged ; and that the oligarchs intended to seize the relations of all the soldiers in Samos who were not of their party with the intention of putting them to death if resistance were made. By these reports intense excite- the Athenians in the fleet were roused to such ment at^Samos : f UI y were on the point of attacking Samiansand the oligarchs, when the moderates prevented Athenians. an outbreak by pointing out the danger of a quarrel while the enemy lay at hand to take advantage of it. Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, who were now the acknow- ledged leaders of the democratic party, seized the spirit of the hour to come forward publicly and pledge the soldiers, especially those of the oligarchic faction, by the strongest oaths, not only to forget their differences and maintain the democracy, but to carry on the war with Sparta to the last ; and above all, to be uncompromising enemies of the Four Hundred. The same pledges were taken by all the Samians of military age. From this time forward Athenians and Samians made common cause, participating equally in 1 Thuc. viii. 73. XI. i8.] SAMOS IS ATHENS, 411. 409 dangers and successes, and regarding their interests as in- separable. They had no hope but in themselves and in each other ; Samian and Athenian would alike perish if the enemy at Miletus or the oligarchs at Athens gained the day. 1 In this common danger the past was forgotten. Thirty years before, Samos had nearly destroyed the Athenian power in the Aegean, but now she was the sole means of preserving it. For if the Samians had joined the oligarchs at this moment, or had merely taken up an independent position, the war would have speedily been brought to an end in the interest of the oligarchs, and democracy would have ceased to be a power in Eastern Greece. Secure of the support of the Samians, the Athenians took steps to strengthen their position. New generals, among whom were Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, were Newgenerals chosen in the room of the old ; and any trier- chosen at archs who were suspected of oligarchical sym- Samos - pathies were replaced by men of sounder principles. They called on each other not to lose heart ; Athens was indeed lost to them, but in numbers and resources they had the advantage. They had a base of operations at Samos, a great and famous city, from which they could send out to collect supplies from the allies. It was owing to the fleet that Athens had enjoyed security ; they were the protecting force which kept off the Persians and supplied the city. They had it in their power to reduce Athens if the oligarchs refused to restore the ancient constitution, but Athens could neither help nor injure them. She could not send them money, for she had none; nor direct their movements, for they could not trust the destroyer of their liberties. There was also a hope that Alcibiades would yet join them, and bring the King to their side : he and they were both enemies of the Peloponnesians. And at the worst, with such a fleet at command, they could win for themselves a new city and a new country on some distant shore. 2 1 Thuc. viii. 75. * Thuc. viii. 76. 410 ALCIBIADES AT SAMOS, 411. [XI. 19. 19. The next step was to approach Alcibiades, without whose assistance there was no hope of obtaining help from Overtures to Tissaphernes. Hitherto he had declared him- Aiobiades. ge ]f an enem y to democracy, and it was there- fore uncertain what attitude he would take up towards the Athenians at Samos, or whether they would receive him. The second difficulty was removed by the persuasive argu- ments of Thrasybulus and his friends, who at length obtained a formal safe-conduct for the exile. A general assembly of the soldiers was then summoned, at which Alcibiades came forward. For the first time since the Sicilian expedition had left Athens, he stood face to face with an audience of his countrymen. It was soon clear that he had not lost the old power of fascination. After lamenting his exile, not without reproach of those who had been the cause of it, he entered on the political situation. He exaggerated his influence with Tissaphernes, with a view of securing his own position at Samos and shaking that of the oligarchs at Athens, whom he knew to be opposed to his return ; and he raised the hopes of his hearers to the highest pitch by declaring that Tissaphernes had pledged himself to keep the Athenians supplied — if only he could put confidence in them— so long as he had any resources left, even if he had to coin the silver fittings of his litter; and that the Phoenician fleet, which was lying at Aspendus, would be brought up to their assist- ance, and not to the assistance of the Peloponnesians. But on one condition only would his confidence be given to the Athenians — Alcibiades must be received back and placed in a responsible position. 1 On hearing these promises, the Athenians were greatly elated. So far from feeling any anxiety about their own future, „ . - they looked forward with confidence to the day Alcibiades r , ^ elected general when they would bring the Four Hundred at Samos. to account. Alcibiades was at once elected one of the staff of generals, and entrusted with the control of 1 Thuc. viii. 81 : et crcos avros Karikdutv avrio avabef-aiTo. XI . 20. ] THE FLEE T AND THE F0 UR HUNDRED, 411. 411 affairs. So great was their enthusiasm that many were eager to sail at once to the Peiraeus, regardless of the enemy who lay at Miletus watching their movements, but this Alcibiades would not permit. The help of Tissaphernes must be first secured, and with this object he departed, immediately the Assembly was over, to the satrap's court. 1 It was now as necessary for him to exaggerate his success with the Athenians to Tissaphernes as it had previously been to overstate his influence with the satrap at Samos. 20. The commissioners of the Four Hundred had reached Delos when they became aware of the state of affairs in Samos. As it was useless to go back, and perhaps worse than useless to go forward, they stayed in the island awaiting the course of events. When they heard that Alcibiades had been received, they ventured to continue their ^ commis journey, and on their arrival at Samos they S i on ersfrom were brought before a meeting at which he Athens arrive r™ ? • . at Samos. was present. The excitement was intense ; for a time the soldiers demanded their instant execution as the destroyers of the democracy, but when at length they obtained a hearing, they entered on an apology for the Four Hundred, contradicting the reports of Chaereas about the treatment of the citizens, and maintaining that the change in the constitution had been made honestly in the interests of the city. Little attention was paid to their words, and the angry temper of the Assembly was shown in a number of conflicting proposals, of which the most popular was a renewal of the resolution to sail at once to the Peiraeus. Alcibiades, who had by this time returned to Samos, again interposed his veto, and repressing the excitement against the ambassadors, he sent them away with the reply that he was willing to accept the Five Thousand as counsels of the governing body at Athens, but the Four Alcibiades. Hundred must be removed, and the old council of Five Hundred restored. He also expressed his warm approval of 1 Time. viii. 82. 412 DIVISIONS IN THE FOUR HUNDRED, 411. [XI. 21. any measures which had been taken with a view to economy, and bade the Athenians continue the war to the uttermost, for so long as the two parties remained, there was a hope of reconciliation : but a mistake on either side would lead to the ruin of both. 1 In the same Assembly the Athenians were cheered by the presence of some envoys from Argos, who had come over with the crew of the Paralus to offer their sympathy and assistance to " the Athenian people at Samos." The Paralians had been recalled from their cruise off Euboea to convey the envoys of the Four Hundred to Lacedaemon, but when sailing off Argos they arrested the ambassadors and deposited them with the Argives, whose envoys they now brought to Samos. 2 21. The commissioners at once returned to Athens, and re- ported the message of Alcibiades. The result was a division Return of the in the oligarchical party. Pisander and Phry- commissioners nichus, who had broken with Alcibiades, and to Athens. were 0 pp 0se d to n j s return, resolved to follow the path upon which they had entered : the advice of Alcibiades could have no weight with them while his position at Samos menaced their position at Athens. They were more eager than ever to make terms with Lacedaemon ; and for this object were willing to sacrifice not only the Athenian empire, but even the independence of the city, if required. It was better, they thought, to save themselves by admitting the Lacedaemonians into the city than to perish at the hands of the hated democrats, as they certainly would perish, if the constitution were restored. The moderates, on the other . . hand, among whom were Theramenes, the son Divisions ' i . • p i among the of Hagnon, and Anstocrates, two 01 the gene- Four Hundred. ra j s 0 f t ^ e Four Hundred, were alarmed at the turn which events had taken. They recognised the power of Alcibiades and the armament at Samos, and without openly opposing the oligarchs, they urged the policy of making the Five Thousand a real and not a merely nominal part of the 1 Thuc. viii. 86. 2 Thuc. viii. 86. See above, p. 406. XI . 21 . ] THE FOR TIFICA T10N OF EE TIONEA , 411. 413 constitution. If the government were kept in too few hands, they would be without the strength necessary for carrying out their measures. These were their public sentiments : in their hearts they were animated partly by personal jealousy — for many of them had been left behind in the race for power by their more able but less scrupulous partisans — partly by real alarm and the desire to save themselves in the coming restoration by posing as democratic leaders. The extremists saw that their position was threatened. Another embassy was sent to Sparta — Antiphon and Phry- nichus being among the envoys — with instruc- j 1 iii Proposals for tions to conclude peace on any tolerable terms, peace to Sparta; And meanwhile a fortress which was in course fortification of . T-i • . r Eetionea. 01 erection on JLetionea, a projecting spur of land commanding the entrance to the Peiraeus, was rapidly pushed on to completion. 1 Within the fortification was included a large portico or store-house, and orders were issued that all the corn in the city should be conveyed into it, and all that was imported should be deposited there — and from thence retailed to the city — orders which made the holders of the fort absolute masters of the supplies of Athens. The building of this fortress had been regarded with sus- picion from the first by the more moderate members of the oligarchy, and Theramenes had repeatedly expressed his opinion that it was not so much intended to keep out the Athenian ships from Samos as to admit those of the Peloponnesians. 2 When the envoys returned from Sparta without obtaining any terms of peace, and at the same time the news was brought that the Peloponnesian fleet, raised by Excitement at contingents from Italy and Sicily to forty-two Athens - vessels, lay off Las in Laconia in preparation for a descent on Euboea, the worst suspicions were confirmed. Theramenes asserted that the fortress would prove the ruin of the city : 1 Thuc. viii. 90. The details are somewhat obscure, but see Goodhart's plan. 2 Thuc. viii. 89, 90, 91. 414 PHRYN1CHUS IS ASSASSINATED, 411. [XI. 21. the fleet was intended not for Euboea but for Athens, and unless immediate steps were taken all would be lost. These suspicions were at first whispered about in small knots of the citizens, but the excitement increased every hour. At length Phrynichus, who had recently returned from Sparta, and was perhaps regarded with suspicion more than any Assassination other of the extremists, owing to his previous of Phrynichus. conduct at Samos, was struck down by an assassin in the crowded market-place, near the Council- Chamber. The assassin, who was one of the frontier guard, escaped, and his accomplice, an Argive, who was caught and put to the torture, refused to give the name of any person who had incited him to the act : all that he would confess was that many conspirators were in the habit of meeting at the house of the captain of the Peripoli and elsewhere. The matter was allowed to pass without any further investigation, or at any rate without any severe measures being taken to crush the conspiracy. 1 1 Thuc. viii. 92 says that the assassin (who escaped) was one of the Peripoli, and that his accomplice (who was captured) was an Argive. Plutarch {Ale. 25), who can always be precise where older authorities are vague, gives the name of the Peripolus : Hermon (whom Thuc. mentions, c. 92, as captain of the Peripoli, at Munychia), and adds, ol 'ABrjvaioi 8lkt]s yevopevrjs tov yJkv Qpvvlyov irpoboo-lav KaTeyjfrjCpLO-avTo redvrjKoros, top 5' "Ep/uova Kai rovs /ier' avrov (tvo-tclvtcis eo~Te(pdvu>o-av. On the other hand, Lysias asserts (13, § 71) that Thrasybulus the Calydonian and Apollodorus of Megara were the assassins, the actual blow being struck by Thrasybulus — and that both of them escaped. For this service they were subsequently made Athenian citizens by public decree. (The object of Lysias is to prove that Agoratus had nothing to do with the death of Phry- nichus.) Lycurgus, while retaining the names Thrasybulus and Apollodorus, gives a different account of the circumstances of the murder: pim'yov yap arrocrcpayevTO? vvurcop napa ttjp Kprp>r]v ttjv ev rots olavois vtto ' KnoWodcopov Kai Qpaav(3ov\ov Kai tovto,; \r)(p8 evToov Kai is ro ^eapcoTr/piov dnoTedevTaiv vtt6 tcov tov <&pvvi)(Ov (pikcov, k.t.X. A:nd in an inscription belonging to the spring of 409, Thrasybulus and Apollodorus receive rewards from the Athenian people by public decree : C.I. A. i. 59 ; Dittenb. 43 ; Hicks, 56. See Arnold's note on Thuc. I.e., which, however, was written before the discovery of the inscription. Bergk was the first to connect the inscription with the murder of Phrynichus. Whether he was right XI. 22.] THERAMENES, 411. 415 22. The death of Phrynichus was the signal for more energetic action on the part of the moderates. The pre- vailing suspicion was increased by the movements of the Peloponnesian fleet, which first advanced to Aegina and then returned to Epidaurus. Theramenes insisted that there was no longer any room for doubt or delay, the army must act or they would be lost. Thus encouraged, the hoplites engaged on the works at Eetionea, among whom was Aristo- Destruction Q f crates, in command of his tribe, and Hermon, the fort at the captain of the Peripoli, seized one of the Eetionea - oligarchical generals, named Alexicles, "a man of influence among the clubs," and detained him amid the cheers of the rank and file. The Four Hundred were assembled in the Council- Chamber, Theramenes being with them, when they received intelligence of the outbreak. They wished to suppress it at once by force, but Theramenes checked them, and offered to go and release Alexicles. He took with him one of the generals whom he knew to be of his own party, and went to the Peiraeus, which was now a scene of the wildest excite- ment. For Aristarchus, a general of the oligarchical party, had come up with a number of the younger knights, and while some thought that Alexicles had been killed, others in so doing may be doubted. For (1) there is not a word about the assassination in the inscription, nor is Apollodorus mentioned as the accomplice of Thrasybulus ; (2) Lysias says that it is clear from the inscription that Agoratus had nothing to do with the matter, but his name is mentioned in this inscription ; (3) Thucydides gives no names, but " one of the Peripoli " would naturally be an Athenian citizen, and his accomplice was an Argive. That Thrasybulus and Apollodorus were rewarded for some act which benefited the Athenian people is clear, and in the time of Lysias they were thought to be the murderers of Phrynichus, but his account of the facts is inaccurate. The older contemporary author states that the accomplice was put to the torture : Lysias says that both assassins escaped : in the next generation both were captured ! Such is our evidence for an act committed in open day (according to our best authority) in the market-place of Athens. See Gilbert, Beitragr, 320 tf., on the whole story ; he attempts to explain how Thucydides made his mistakes ! But surely Thucydides could have learned the facts from the inscription. 416 DESTRUCTION OF EETIONEA, 411. [XI. 22. feared an attack on the Peiraeus from the city. The older men endeavoured to calm the citizens, and Thucydides, a Thessalian of Pharsalus, the proxenus of the Athenians in that city, was especially active in pointing out the danger of domestic strife when the enemy was at hand to take advantage of the confusion. Theramenes then came forward, and in a loud and angry voice upbraided the soldiers for their action. This was known to be a feint, and produced no effect. The soldiers asked him, in reply, what he thought about the fort : " Should it be destroyed or not ? "— and as he now saw which way the feeling ran, he replied : "Yes, if they thought so." 1 The work of destruction was at once begun, but Theramenes, though he had broken with the Four Hundred, was not prepared for the restoration of democracy. He proclaimed the Five Thousand, and called on every one who wished them to govern to help in destroying the fort. The fort was destroyed ; Alexicles was released. On the * next day the Four Hundred met in the Council-Chamber; the army in the Peiraeus assembled in the theatre of Dionysus near Munychia, and resolved without delay to march to the city, where they piled arms in the temple of the Dioscuri. Deputies came to them from the Four Hundred, who now offered to publish the names of the Five Thousand, and to choose the Four Hundred from them in any way which the Assembly might approve. After long discussions, the soldiers became calmer, and a day was fixed for an Assembly to be held in the theatre of Dionysus, at which the constitution should be settled. The day came, and at the very moment when the people were gathering in the theatre, the Peloponnesian fleet was Fear of attack seen sailing from Megara along the coast of from Sparta. Salamis. The excitement was intense; the warning of Theramenes was remembered ; every one thought 1 Thuc viii. 92. The historian puts the conduct of Theramenes in a very suspicious light. XI. 23.] DEPOSITION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED, 411. 417 that Athens was betrayed. The whole city rushed down to the harbour and prepared to defend it. 1 The squadron passed round Sunium to Oropus on its way to Euboea, but though their worst fears were over, the Athenians found themselves compelled in their distracted state to despatch a fleet for the protection of that island. A battle was fought off Eretria under very disadvantageous conditions and with an in- adequate force. For a time the Athenians resisted, but in vain. They were overpowered and driven to the shore. Some escaped to Ohalcis, and to a fortress near Eretria, but those who sought refuge in the city were cut down ; twenty- two ships and their crews fell into the hands of the Pelopon- nesians. The whole of Euboea, except Oreus (Hestiaea), now revolted — a very severe blow to Athens, which since the occupation of Decelea had largely depended on the island for supplies. 2 23. Athens was well-nigh lost. Ships there were none, nor sailors ; the main source of supplies was cut off; the fleet at Samos was alienated ; the city was torn with sedi- tion. The enemy were at hand with a victorious fleet : they had but to lie off the Peiraeus, and sedition would develop into civil war , or to blockade the city, and so compel the fleet to abandon Ionia. Either of these plans they could easily have carried out, but as Thucydides remarks, " on this as on so many other occasions, the Lacedaemonians proved themselves to be the most convenient enemies whom the Athenians could possibly have had." 3 The danger passed away, but the panic completed the ruin of the Four Hundred. An Assembly was held in the Pnyx, the "first ?Xl?our of many," at which the Four Hundred were Hundred: formally deposed, and the government placed theconsthu^ in the hands of the Five Thousand, in which tion which number were to be included all the citizens followed - who could provide themselves with body-armour. No one 1 Thuc. viii. 94. 2 Thuc. viii. 95, who gives more details of the battle. 3 Thuc. viii. 96. VOL. III. 2 D 418 FATE OF THE LEADERS, 411. [XI. 23. was to be paid for the discharge of official duties. The details of the constitution were fixed in a series of meetings, and Nomo- thetae were appointed to revise the laws (see infra, p. 420). The government thus appointed was the best which ever existed at Athens in the memory of Thucydides— at least in its early days — a mixture of oligarchy and democracy, under which the city was again able to raise her head. The Athenians at Samos and those at Athens now felt themselves in accord, and though some years still elapsed before they became one city, there was no longer any fear of a serious collision. 1 Of the leaders of the Four Hundred, Pisander, Alexicles, and others retired to Decelea ; Aristarchus, who was one The leaders °^ g enera l s > collected a few archers, " of the of the Four most barbarous sort," and led them to Oenoe, Hundred. the Athenian fortress on the borders of Boeotia (supra, p. 117), which was now being besieged by the Corin- thians. Availing himself of his position, he treacherously in- duced the garrison to capitulate, and Oenoe fell into the hands of the Boeotians. Antiphon and Archeptolemus were arrested and put to death, and their property was confiscated. The same sentence was recorded against the leaders who escaped. 2 Of the speech made by Antiphon in his defence, Thucydides observes that it was undoubtedly the best ever made by any man tried on a capital charge down to his day. He goes on to describe Antiphon as inferior in aperf to none of his con- temporaries — a judgment which has been a stone of stumbling. 1 Thuc. viii. 97; Ath. Pol. 33; Beloch, Griech. Geschich. ii. 71, speaks of this as the constitution of Theramenes, and undoubtedly Theramenes and Aristocrates were the leaders of the moderate party. When Beloch goes further and asserts that the constitutions described in Ath. Pol. 30, 31 refer to the constitution of Theramenes, and not to the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, it is difficult to follow him. There was doubtless great confusion between the two constitutions, and between the proposals of the Four Hundred which were and those which were not carried out. See Thuc. viii. 96, and infra. Appendix ii. 2 Thuc. viii. 68 ; Lysias, 7, § 4. The accuser of Antiphon was Andron, himself one of the Four Hundred. Harpocration, sub voc. *Av8pa>v. XI. 23-] AN TIP HON AND THERA MENES, 411. 419 But dpeWj does not always mean moral virtue. The historian would not for a moment have compared Antiphon and Nicias. Antiphon was as able and effective a man as lived in Athens in his day, and succeeded where success seemed almost impossible. That his aims were treacherous, and that the means he employed to compass them were such as are in use among traitors and conspirators, Thucydides has made per- fectly clear. By a judgment somewhat similar Theramenes is said by the historian to be a "good speaker and a sagacious man." This he undoubtedly was, as we shall see, but whether he was honest in his sagacity is one of the puzzles of Greek history. 1 1 Thuc. viii. 68 ; Beloch, I.e. ii. 72, takes a favourable view, after Aih. Pol. c. 28. For Antiphon, see also Plutarch, Vitae Dec. Orat. CHAPTER XII. FROM THE FALL OF THE FOUR HUNDRED TO THE FALL OF THE THIRTY. I. The constitutional history of Athens, from the fall of the Four Hundred to the end of the war, is very obscure. The Nomo- Who were the Nomothetae mentioned by thetae. Thucydides, (supra, p. 418) and what were the changes to which he alludes, when he observes that the government established on the deposition of the Four Hundred was " in its early days " the best that he had known 1 How long did these early days last ? When and how was the democracy restored 1 To these questions, which it is easy to ask, no clear answer can be given. In the Athenian constitution, the decrees of the Assembly were, strictly speaking, administrative acts only, not laws, and how laws were passed in the fifth century at Athens is unknown. It is usually assumed that the process of legisla- tion which existed in the fourth century, and is described by Demosthenes, was in use in the preceding century. Under this arrangement the Nomothetae were little more than a special jury, selected from the ordinary Heliaea, before whom laws were put on their trial — the new against the old, where two came into conflict, or the new on its own merits. It is not likely that such Nomothetae are meant in the present case. More probably a commission is meant, who were to examine the statutes of Athens, and endeavour to bring them into better order. We find traces of such a commission in the appointment of Nicomachus to issue a corrected code of the laws of Solon, 1 and the publication of i Lysias, OraU 30, with Frphberger's Introduction. The task was 420 XII. 2.] THE REFORMED CONSTITUTION, 411. 421 the Draconian laws in 409. But the work was not carried out with any completeness — an indication that the government of the Five Thousand did not long continue in power. 1 2. Immediately after assuming office, the new government passed a decree for the recall of Alcibiades and other exiles, and sent envoys to Samos to explain the posi- Athens divided . tion of affairs, 2 and urge the army to vigorous the city and . action. Alcibiades did not return : Athens and Samos - Samos remained for the present divided : the government at Samos was not the government at Athens, and the generals of the fleet were not the generals in command in the city. This division could not fail to be a source of weakness to the government. The demos quickly recovered its position and took the power from them. 3 The real demos was not at Athens, but at Samos, where about eighteen thousand men were now serving in the fleet. Even if half of these were aliens, the remaining nine thousand were a larger portion of the city than the Five Thousand, and after their victory at Cyzicus {infra, p. 427), the Athenian sailors would not be in a mood to allow themselves to be excluded from the franchise. 4 In a very few months, Theramenes and his friends found themselves compelled to relax something from the severe standard of their earliest regulations. In an inscription of 410, 5 payments are made for the " diobelia " out of the state funds. Whatever the " diobelia " may have been, to be finished in four months, but Nicomachus remained in office six years, furnishing laws on demand to those who paid for them — so at least his enemies said — or cancelling those in existence. 1 For this view of the Nomothetae, see Frohberger, I.e., Gilbert, Beitrage, p. 326 ff., who draws a parallel between this legislation and the decree of Tisamenus in 403. 2 In Plut. Alcib. 32, Critias proposes this decree ; in Diodorus, xiii. 38, Theramenes. 3 Ath. Pol. c. 34. If the decree of Demophantus (Andoc. De Myst. § 96) really belongs to Hecatombaeon 410, there is no doubt that the democracy was restored by that time. 4 For the absence of men from Athens in 411, cp. Aristoph. Lysistr. 524. Those vvho were in the city were constantly in armour, cp. ibid. 555 ff., and Thuc. viii. 69. 5 Dittenberger, SyU. 44 ; C. I. A. i. 188. 422 DEMOCRACY RESTORED, 4H-410. [XII. 3. whether payment to the poorer people to enjoy the festivals, or payment to the jurors, such payment was not contem- plated in the first ardour of financial reform. And in the Constitution of Athens we are told that this payment was proposed by Cleophon, who was the leader of the extreme ch th democratic party. Cleophon may have been a government member of the Five Thousand, but he is not towards likely to have occupied a leading position democracy. .1 i \ c 1 a i among them unless the temper 01 the Athen- ians had undergone a considerable change. But the brilliant success of Cyzicus, and the financial relief which followed it, may have made it impossible to repress an outburst of democratic fervour, or to adhere to the strict rule of expendi- ture laid down in 411. 1 3. While Athens had been well-nigh reduced to despair by the revolt of Euboea, the war in the East had taken a inactivity of more favourable turn. For some time the the Peiopon- Peloponnesian sailors had been much dis- nesians. satisfied with the conduct of their admiral Astyochus, and Tissaphernes. No advantage had been taken of the anarchy prevailing among the Athenians, though Astyochus had a far superior fleet. Tissaphernes neither brought up the promised Phoenician ships, nor provided regular pay. Astyochus attempted to satisfy his men by offering battle; but the Athenians refused. They had summoned Strombichides from the Hellespont, whither he had been sent with twenty-four ships, and till he arrived they felt their numbers to be insufficient. The Pelopon- nesians, on the next day, were about to attack Samos, but, 1 Ath. Pol. c. 28. That the sum of two obols constituted some well-known payment at Athens at the time when the Frogs was acted (405) is clear from 1. 141 of that play : cos fieya bvvaaBov navraxov ro> dv dj3o\a>. The scholiast, ad loc, explains it by the juror's fee, and it is possible that the juror's fee, which was abolished under the Four Hundred, was reintroduced at i lower rate — two obols instead of three. But Aeschines, Fals. Leg. § 76, asserts that Cleophon cor- rupted the Athenians by the distribution of money, which is the view taken in the Ath. Pol. of the " diobelia." XII. 3 .] ASTYOCHUS, 411. 423 on learning that Strombichides had returned, they retired to Miletus, and when the Athenians offered battle, they too refused in turn. The large fleet (a hundred and twelve ships) could not be maintained without Persian help, and, as Tissaphernes was remiss in payment, Astyochus accepted the offer of Pharna- bazus, and despatched forty ships to the Hellespont. A storm drove them back, and ten only reached the strait. These brought over Byzantium, where Glearchus, their com- mander, joined them. 1 The ill-feeling against Astyochus and Tissaphernes con- tinued to increase, and when it was known that Alcibiades had returned to Samos, the sailors were more Mutiny at exasperated than ever. More especially the Mil etus. Syracusan and Thurian sailors, who were free men, were outspoken in their demands for pay, and when Astyochus answered them roughly and even threatened Dorieus of Thurii with his staff, they broke into open violence. Astyochus only saved his life by taking refuge at an altar. The Milesians, not less indignant, drove out the garrison from a fort which Tissaphernes had built in their city, in spite of the remonstrances of Lichas, the Spartan general, who counselled submission. 2 About midsummer, Astyochus was succeeded in his office by Mindarus. He returned to Sparta, and with him an envoy from Tissaphernes, to complain of the Mindarus conduct of the Milesians, and defend himself succeeds against attacks. The Milesians also sent Ast y° chu s. envoys, together with Hermocrates the Syracusan, who had been especially vehement in condemning the inactivity and treachery of the Spartan management of the fleet. Mean- while Tissaphernes went to Aspendus, under pretence of bringing up the Phoenician fleet, which was there, in number 147 ships, and appointed Tamos his agent in his absence. At Aspendus he was joined by Alcibiades. 3 1 Time, viii. 78-80. 3 Thuc. viii. 87, 88. * Thuc. viii. 83, 84. 424 MIND AR US IN THE HELLESPONT, 411. [XII. 4. Upon this Mindarus delayed no longer. Convinced of the dishonesty of Tissaphernes, he left Miletus for the Helles- He moves to pont, but a storm compelled him to take the Hellespont. re f U g e a t Icarus, whence he sailed to Chios. Thrasyllus started in pursuit with the Athenian fleet, and observing that the enemy was at Chios, he made Lesbos his headquarters, intending to attack him there. He also wished to recover Eresus, which had revolted. Thrasybulus had already reached the place, having sailed direct from Samos. While they were thus engaged, Mindarus was able to slip away from Chios to Rhoeteum in safety. The small Athenian squadron, which had previously been sent into the straits to watch Clearchus (supra, p. 423), escaped with some loss to Lesbos, and joined the fleet, which they found quietly be- sieging Eresus, never supposing that the Peloponnesians would escape them. The Athenians at once followed the enemy to the Hellespont, and prepared for action. 1 4. The battle took place off Cynossema, a promontory in the Chersonese, near Madytus. The Athenian ships, seventy- Battle of six in number, lay along the Chersonese, from Cynossema. Idacus to Arrhiani. The Peloponnesian, which numbered eighty-eight, extended from Abydus to Dardanus on the opposite shore. Mindarus, on the left wing, was opposed to Thrasybulus ; the Syracusans, on the right, to Thrasyllus. As the Peloponnesian left extended beyond the Athenian, Mindarus wished to shut them into the strait, and, at the same time, to force their centre back upon the land. Thrasybulus was, however, able to over-lap Mindarus, and secure the passage into the open ; but, at the same time, the Athenian left passed beyond Cynossema, and the centre being thus weakened by the extension of the wings, the Peloponnesians were able to drive it on shore. Neither right nor left wing could render assistance, and, indeed, the projecting promontory prevented Thrasyllus from seeing what was taking place. But the Pelo- ponnesians, in their eager pursuit of the defeated enemy, 1 Thuc. viii. 99-101. XII. 4 ] DEFEATED AT CYNOSSEMA, 411. 425 allowed their line to fall into disorder. Thrasybulus at once left off extending his wing, turned upon the ships opposed to him, and put them to flight. He then attacked the victori- ous centre, which, owing to the confusion, fell into a panic, and hardly offered any resistance. Thrasyllus meanwhile had defeated the Syracusans ; the Athenians were victorious along the whole line. 1 In material advantage the Athenians did not gain much by the victory, for though they destroyed twenty-one of the allied ships, they lost fifteen of their own. But the moral effect was great ; they had once more proved their superiority at sea. They ceased to depreciate them- selves or to think much of their enemies' seamanship. In the city the news of the victory was received with delight ; the Athenians could hardly believe their good fortune. Their spirits rose ; once more they began to have hopes of victory, and their immediate anxiety was greatly lessened on finding that the Peloponnesian ships were summoned by Mindarus from Euboea to the Hellespont. After repairing their ships, the fleet captured eight more of the enemy's fleet, and recovered Cyzicus. 2 Alcibiades now returned from Aspendus, declaring that he had made Tissaphernes a firmer friend of the Athenians than ever. Tissaphernes, however, finding that the -r, -, . , . 0 , . Tissaphernes. reloponnesians were resenting his conduct m every way, thought it prudent to follow them to the Helles- pont and explain ; it was not to his advantage that Pharna- bazus should succeed where he had failed. His first step was to visit Ephesus and offer sacrifice to Artemis. 3 The fleet from Euboea did not reach Mindarus without very serious loss, owing to a storm. 4 It was followed by a 1 Time. viii. 104, 105. See the plan in Goodhart's Time. viii. p. 164. 2 Thuc. viii. 107. 3 The history of Thucydides breaks off with the arrival of Tissa- phernes at Ephesus. 4 Diod. xiii. 41 states that Epicles and Hippocrates, whom Min- darus sent to bring away Hegesandridas and his fleet, sailed back with fifty ships, which were entirely lost, except twelve men, of whom Hippocrates must have been one, for we hear of him again. 426 ALCIBIADES IN THE HELLESPONT. [XII. 5. small detachment of Athenian vessels, which were no longer required at home, and a slight engagement took place. Soon afterwards Dorieus brought up his ships from Rhodes. The Action in the Athenians attacked him as he entered the Hellespont. Hellespont, and a general engagement followed. The event was still undecided when Alcibiades arrived with eighteen ships from Samos, upon which the Peloponnesians broke and fled to Abydus. When they reached the shore, they were vigorously supported by Pharnabazus, who rode his horse into the sea, calling on his soldiers, horse and foot, to follow him and beat off the enemy. The Athenians sailed back to Sestos, taking with them thirty of the enemy's ships, and those which they had lost in the previous engagement. The greater part of the fleet then dispersed to collect money. Thrasyllus was sent to Athens to report and ask for reinforce- ments. 1 5. Tissaphernes, on arriving in the Hellespont, was at once visited by Alcibiades, who brought presents and tokens of friendship. The Persian replied by arrest- Aiubiadeb, declaring that he had orders from the King to make war on the Athenians. Alcibiades was taken to Sardis, and there remained for thirty days, when he escaped to Clazomenae. He subsequently rejoined the Athenians at Cardia, whither they had retired to avoid an attack from Mindarus, and on hearing that the Pelopon- nesians had gone to Cyzicus, he resolved to attack them there. Crossing over to Sestos, where the fleet was instructed to meet him, he was on the point of setting out, when he was joined by two detachments of ships, one under Theramenes from Macedonia, the other under Thrasybuius from Thasos. 2 1 Xen. Hell. i. 1 ; Diod. xiii. 45, 46 ; Plut. Alcib. 27. 2 After helping to arrange the new constitution at Athens, Thera- menes had been sent to the Euripus, where he vainly endeavoured to prevent the completion of a mole, joining Euboea and Boeotia. He then visited the islands, levying contributions, and restoring democracy at Paros ; subsequently he aided Archelaus of Macedonia in besieging Pydna, whence he sailed to the Hellespont (Diod. xiii. 47, 49). The Four Hundred were deposed in August or September XII. 5-1 BATTLE OF CYZICUS, 410. 427 Alcibiades was anxious to come upon the enemy before this addition to his force was known. When, on the next day, he arrived at Proconnesus, he found that Mindarus, supported by Pharnabazus, had captured Cyzicus. He remained in the island for the rest of the day, keeping under strict control all the craft, down to the smallest boat, and forbidding any one to cross to the mainland under pain of death. Next morning he assembled his men and addressed them, pointing out that they had no supplies, while the enemy was supported in abundance by the Persians ; whatever the conditions, they must fight — on sea, on land, and if necessary against walls and fortifications. In the midst of a storm of The battle rain and a heavy fog he set sail for Cyzicus, of Cyzicus. but as he approached the town the sky cleared, and he saw the Peloponnesian fleet exercising at a distance from the harbour, to which his ships prevented their return. The Peloponnesians, when they saw themselves cut off from the town by a superior force, hastened to land, and forming their ships into a compact line, defended themselves against the Athenian attack. Alcibiades now withdrew twenty ships from his line, and passing behind it, put the crews on shore in order to take the Peloponnesians in the rear. He was met by Mindarus, who also disembarked a number of his men, but Mindarus was slain, and his soldiers put to flight. The whole fleet fell into the hands of the Athenians, except the ships of the Syracusans, which were set on fire. Alcibiades returned with his prizes to Proconnesus. 1 From Proconnesus he again advanced to Cyzicus, intend- ing to attack the town, but the inhabitants, finding themselves abandoned by Pharnabazus and the Peloponnesians, admitted him without resistance. Once more master of the sea, he used his power to recruit the finances of Athens. From 411, and the battle of Cyzicus was fought in March 410 — so that little time can have been devoted by Theramenes to the new constitution. 1 Xen. Hell. i. 1. 13 ff. Diodorus, xiii. 49-51, gives a different account, and Plutarch also in some points, Alcib. 28. 428 PHARNABAZUS AND THE PELOPONNESIANS. [XII. 6. Cyzicus, where he remained twenty days, he exacted lar^e sums ; then he sailed to the Bosphorus, collecting money on A1 ... . the way from Perinthus and Selymbria. At Alcibiades J \ J collects Chrysopolis, opposite Byzantium, he built a supplies. fortress and custom house, after which he returned to the Hellespont, leaving Theramenes with thirty ships to collect the dues and keep the strait open. 1 6. The Peloponnesians were for a time paralysed by their defeat. Hippocrates, the second in command, sent home a message of despair, which never reached Sparta, but was intercepted and carried to Athens : " Our ships are gone : Mindarus is dead : the crews are starving : we know not what to do." From this helpless plight they were roused by the energy and faithfulness of Pharnabazus. To every soldier he gave a cloak and money sufficient for two months. The sailors he equipped in heavy arms, and bidding them take no heed of the loss of timber while their lives were safe, he dispersed them to guard the coast of his satrapy. He then assembled the generals of the various contingents in the Peloponnesian fleet, and bade them build triremes at Antandrus as many as they had lost. 2 Wood they could get from Ida, and money he would supply. But though the Syracusans seem to have replaced their twenty ships in a short time, it was many months before the Peloponnesians were again in possession of an adequate fleet. ' 6 The success of the Peloponnesians since the renewal of the war had not been such as to make a warlike policy popular at Sparta. It was true that Agis was master of Attica, and that the Asiatic cities of the Athenian empire were in revolt ; but Athens could still keep a fleet on the sea, and she had triumphed over domestic faction, her greatest danger. 1 Xen. Hell. i. 1. 20 f. ; Diod. xiii. 52, 64. 2 The Antandrians had obtained a garrison from the Peloponnesians on their arrival in the Hellespont to protect them against the oppres- sion of Tissaphernes and the treachery of his lieutenant Arsaces ; Time. viii. 108. For the previous fortunes of the town see supra, p. 234. 3 Xen. Hell. i. 1. 23-26. XII. 7-] THE SPARTANS PROPOSE PEACE, 410. 429 Tissaphernes had proved a faithless friend ; Alcibiades was again an Athenian general ; Astyochus had shown himself incompetent and dishonest. The reports brought home from the fleet, the conflicting statements of Tissaphernes, Astyochus, Hermocrates, and the envoys from the sailors, had opened the eyes of the Spartans : they now understood why their fleet had remained inactive for months at Ehodes ; and why Astyochus had taken no advantage of the distracted state of the Athenians at Samos. Since the fleet had gone to the Hellespont, in spite of the active aid of Pharnabazus, one disaster had followed on another, and now came the tidings of its utter destruction. If peace could be had on tolerable terms, peace was desirable. So Endius (supra, p. 37 0) appeared at Athens, proposing a uti possidetis so far as the ^ gpartans cities ranged on either side were concerned ; a propose peace ; withdrawal of troops from the garrisons, and ^ thens re J ects an exchange of prisoners, man for man. The Spartans, no doubt, greatly exaggerated the distress to which they had reduced Athens by the desolation of Attica, the liberation of Euboea, and the cutting off of supplies from the cities of the empire ; and Endius is said to have pointed out that peace was needed quite as much in the interests of Athens as of Sparta. They were quickly undeceived. So far from being cast down by misfortune, the Athenians were elated by their victory ; their constitution was being restored to them ; their revenues were much improved, and they had hopes of recovering their empire. On Cleophon's motion the proposals for peace were rejected. 1 7. The misfortunes of the Peloponnesian fleet were increased 1 Xenophon does not mention this proposal ; Diodorus, xiii. 52, 53. The terms are : ras pev TtoKeis e^eii/, as eKarepot Kpa.Tovp.ev, to. 8e dppoxipia to. 7rap' oXXtjXoi? KaraXvaai, tchv de di^aXcorGw \vrpovvres avd' euos 'Atiqvaiov Xafieiv eva AaKwra. In the archonship of Theopompus (411-410), Philochorus, frag. 117. Diod. gives us the speech of Endius, and his account is supported by Nepos and Justin. For Cleophon, who from now till his death in 404 was among the leaders of the democracy see supra, p. 422, and infra, p. 450. fie was a lyre-maker by trade. 430 HERMOCRATES BANISHED, / : 10. [XII. 7. by the loss of Hermocrates and his colleagues. Though not less unsuccessful than the rest in the recent conflicts, they had displayed more capacity and resolution; but they had lost their ships, and to this they probably owed the loss of their position. During the absence of Hermocrates from Syracuse the extreme democrats, with Diocles at their head, had risen to power, and as Hermocrates was not in Banishment of favour with the party or their leader, they did Hermocrates. n0 ^ j et £ ne opportunity slip. He was banished with his colleagues, and new generals were sent out to take his place. 1 Hermocrates communicated the decision of his government to his soldiers, and at their request he remained in office till his successors arrived. In the interval the new vessels were finished, and they were sent to join the new generals at Miletus. Hermocrates himself repaired to Pharnabazus, with whom he visited the court of Susa. We shall hear of him again in Sicily, but he takes no further part in the Peloponnesian war. 2 Meanwhile Thrasyllus was raising a force at Athens. He nad returned to the city shortly before the battle of Cyzicus. The success of the fleet was greatly in his favour, and he was able to convince the Athenians of his personal capacity by obtaining a slight advantage over Agis, who, venturing Thrasyllus too near the walls of the city, was repulsed at Athens. w i t h i oss jj e t 00 k out a fleet of fifty ships, with a thousand heavy-armed and a hundred horse. Soldiers were needed now no less than sailors, for the victories of the fleet had enabled the Athenians to attack the revolted cities on land. That the Athenians should have been able to furnish such a force is truly wonderful; the fleet was still in the Hellespont, it was still necessary to keep watch on the walls of Athens day and night, and no supplies could be drawn from Attica and Euboea. With reason might Agis 1 Infra, p. 481. 2 Xen. Hell. i. 1. 27-30. For the journey to Susa, cp. Thuc. viii. 85, infra, p. 434. In a short time the Syracusans found it necessary to withdraw their ships from the Aegean for use at home. XII. 8.] THRASYLUS IN IONIA, 410. 431 exclaim, as he saw the corn ships sailing past from Pontus to the Peiraeus, that it was of little use for him to remain at Decelea, if Athens could be fed from the north. At his re- quest Clearchus, who must have been recalled (supra, p. 424), was sent back with a few ships, collected from Megara and other allies, to the Hellespont. He succeeded in escaping from the Athenians with some loss, and once more established himself at Byzantium. 1 8. In the summer of 410 Thrasyllus set sail from Athens. He had come to the city to collect forces for the support of Alcibiades in the Hellespont, but the subsequent victory of Cyzicus made this unnecessary, and he directed his course to Ionia. After defeating the Milesians at Pygela, and obtaining possession of Colophon, he made an incursion into Lydia, where the corn was now ripe, and collected a large amount of spoil, burning the villages and devastating the country. He then attempted an attack on Ephesus. Dividing his forces into two detachments, he landed his He is defeated heavy-armed at the foot of Mount Coressus, atE P h esus. to the south of the city, the light troops and cavalry on the marsh to the north. In both divisions he was severely defeated; the Ephesians being greatly assisted in their defence by the Syracusans, whose twenty ships had by this time been completed and placed under the command of the new generals, together with five additional vessels, and by troops brought up by Tissaphernes, who had received warning of the intended attack. Thrasyllus retired to Lesbos. While lying at anchor at Methymna, he caught sight of the Sicilian vessels sailing back to the Hellespont, and at once put to sea in pursuit. Five of the ships he Thrasyllus in captured with their crews; the remainder he the Helle spont. pursued to Ephesus. 2 He now joined Alcibiades at Sestos, 1 Xen. Hell. i. 1. 35, 36. According to Diodorus, Clearchus was present at the battle of Cyzicus, I.e. c. 51. 2 The captives were placed in the stone quarries of Peiraeus, but in the following winter they dug their way out, and escaped, some to Decelea, others to Megara. 432 ATHENS LOSES PYLUS AND NISAEA. [XII. 8. and the whole fleet crossed to Lampsacus, to winter quarters. But when Alcibiades wished to combine the squadron of Thrasyllus with his own, his soldiers refused to unite with men who had been recently defeated, and it was not till they had joined in a successful engagement with Pharnabazus that the two sections became one army. The winter was spent at Lampsacus, in fortifying the town and in making incursions into the King's country. 1 During this winter (i.e. October 410- April 409) the Lacedae- monians at length succeeded in driving the Athenians out of 1 recovered Py nis - Xenophon merely informs us that " the by theLacI- 6 ^ Helots who had deserted from Malea to Cory- daemonians. phasium " were allowed by the Lacedaemonians to go out on terms. From Diodorus we learn that the Athenians, on hearing that Pylus was closely invested, sent Anytus with thirty triremes to relieve it, but he was pre- vented by contrary winds from passing Malea, and returned home. Eager to bring the siege to an end, the Lacedaemonians seem to have offered favourable terms, which were accepted. Whether Anytus was to blame, or not, he was put on his trial on his return, and only escaped conviction by bribing his judges. 2 Another misfortune which befell Athens about this The Megarians time was the loss of Nisaea. With the help of recover Nisaea. ^he Sy ra cusan prisoners who had escaped from Peiraeus, and perhaps at their instigation, the Megarians, by a sudden attack, recovered their port. The Athenians at once came up with a considerable force, and succeeded in 1 Xen. Hell. i. 2. 1-17 ; Diod. xiii. 64 ; Plut. Ale. 29. I hare put the expedition of Thrasyllus in 410 in spite of the difficulty about the rebuilding of the twenty Syracusan ships, which were fiuished between the battle of Cyzicus (spring) and some little time before the battle of Ephesus (summer). If we put the expedition in 409, we have to account for (1) the long delay of Thrasyllus at Athens (from the beginning of 410 to May 409), and (2) for the inaction of Alcibiades during these months. But see Beloch, Griech. Gesch. ii. 79, note, and his paper in Philoo. 43, p. 293 f. 2 Xen. I.e. 2. 18 ; Diod. xiii. 64 ; Aih. Pol. 27. Anytus is said to have been the first who succeeded in bribing a jury. Afterwards he became notorious as one of the accusers of Socrates. XII. 9.] ALCIBIADES AT CHALCEDON, 409. 433 defeating the Megarians, but their success was in vain. Nisaea passed out of their hands. 1 The Spartans also had their losses. From the first their colony at Heraclea had been a source of disaster to them, and now, owing to the treachery of the Achaeans, their harmost Labotas was slain with 700 men in a conflict with the neighbouring Oetaeans. 2 9. In the spring of the following year (409) the Athenians advanced to Proconnesus, with the intention of carrying on the war in the Bosphorus. Their first operations were at Chalcedon. The Chalcedonians, who had been informed of their approach, had collected their movable property, and placed it for safety with their friends and neighbours the Thracians of Bithynia. Alcibiades at once marched to the Bithynian frontier with a small force of horse and foot, supported by the fleet, and demanded the property. The Thracians were unable to refuse the request, and Alcibiades returned to Chalcedon laden with spoil. He Alcibiades at invested the city by drawing a trench and chalcedon. palisade round it from the Bosphorus to the Propontis, and where the work was intersected by the river Chalcedon (?) he fortified the banks on either side as securely as the nature of the ground permitted. The Lacedaemonian governor of the town, Hippocrates, offered battle within the lines, while Pharnabazus appeared with a large force outside the city. The issue was doubtful for a time, but when Alcibiades brought up reinforcements, the Chalcedonians fled into the city, with the loss of their commander, and Pharnabazus retired to his camp. Alcibiades then left for the Chersonese to collect money, placing the army in the command of Thra- syllus and Thrasybulus. In his absence these Agreement generals came to terms with Pharnabazus, who with agreed to pay the Athenians twenty talents, Pharnabaz "s. and to conduct their ambassadors to the King. The Chalce- donians on their part pledged themselves to pay the ordinary 1 Diod. xiii. 65. Xenophon does not mention this incident. 2 Xen. Hell. i. 2. 18. For Heraclea, see supra, p. 275. The Lacedaemonians seem to have recovered the place from the Boeotians. VOL. III. 2 E 434 A THENS A CQ UIRES B YZA N7IUM, 409. [X 1 1 . 9. tribute 1 to Athens, with all arrears; and the Athenians under- took not to make war on Chalcedon till the return of the embassy. The convention was subsequently ratified by Alci- biades on behalf of Chalcedon, after which Pharnabazus retired to Cyzicus, bidding the envoys meet him there. The embassy, which consisted of five Athenians and two Argives, was joined by envoys of the Lacedaemonians, including Pasippidas, the admiral chosen to succeed Mindarus, together with Hermo- crates and his brother Proxenus. When the winter came on, they had advanced no further than Gordieum, in Phrygia, where for the present they remained. 2 Alcibiades, who had not only collected large supplies in the Chersonese on his previous visit, but had captured and Selymbria, and even made an attempt on surrender of Byzantium, had taken the oaths to Pharnabazus Byzantium. ^ proxy at Chrysopolis in the Bosphorus. He now led the fleet to the European coast to attack Byzantium, which was held by Ciearchus with some Laconian, Megarian, and Boeotian troops (supra, p. 431). The assault soon passed into a siege, and Ciearchus did not hesitate to reserve what food there was for the use of the garrison. He then left the city in the care of the Megarian and Boeotian commanders, and repaired to Pharnabazus to collect money and ships — for the Lacedaemonian fleet was now being restored : a few ships had been left in the Hellespont by Pasippidas ; others had been built at Antandrus ; others were off the coast of Thrace in command of Agesandridas, 3 all which Ciearchus hoped, with the help of Pharnabazus, to collect, organise, and make efficient. In his absence a party in Byzantium betrayed the city to the Athenians to save the inhabitants from starvation. The garrison were surprised, and compelled to surrender, 4 1 This implies that the duty on exports {supra, p. 338) had been removed and the old system revived — in certain places, at any rate. 2 Xen. I.e. i. 3. 1-14. For Pasippidas, who had fallen under a suspicion of treacherous dealings with Tissaphernes while collecting ships at Thasos, see Xen. I.e. i. 1. 32. 3 Xen. Hell. i. 3. 17. 4 Xen. Hell. i. 3. 1 8-22. XII. 10.] CYRUS SENT TO THE COAST, 408. 435 and the Athenians thus acquired possession of both sides of the Bosphorus. 10. In the next spring (408) Pharnabazus and the envoys went forward from Gordieum on their way to Susa. They were met by a former embassy of Lacedaemonians, Boeotius and others, 1 returning from Susa, who informed Cyrug . g gent them ' that their mission was useless ; the down to the Lacedaemonians had carried every point with coast ' the King. With them was Cyrus, the King's younger son, who had been sent to take the command on the coast, and aid the Lacedaemonians in the war. 2 He carried with him a royal letter addressed to all the cities of the coast, and bearing the King's seal, by which he was appointed "'Caranus,' or chief, of all the forces which muster at Castolus." The Athenian envoys on hearing this wished to go on at once to Susa, or to return home ; but at the request of Cyrus, Pharnabazus detained them, and it was three years before they were set at liberty. The Lacedaemonians, Argives, and Syracusans in the embassy were not, of corns' 1 , subject to any restraint. With the exception of Abydus, the whole of the Hellespont was once more a part of the Athenian empire. The city was in possession of an all-powerful fleet, and her Alcibiades resources had been largely increased. This had prepares to mainly been the work of Alcibiades, and the return home * time seemed to have come when he might return to Athens with safety. The fleet bad been divided into three portions. Thirty ships had been sent to Thrace under Thrasybulus to collect money ; twenty Alcibiades took to Samos and Caria, where he collected no less than a hundred talents imme- diately after the conquest of Byzantium; the remainder returned to Athens in the care of Thrasyllus. From Caria, Alcibiades sailed to Samos, and from thence to Paros, with a 1 This embassy has not been mentioned before by Xenophon, and nothing more is known about it. 2 Xen. Hell. i. 4. 3 : Kapavov to>v els KaaTo>\6v d0poi£ofiepa>v. Both Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus were now subject to Cyrus. 436 ALCIBIADES AT ATHENS, W8. [XII. II. small part of his force, and hearing that the Lacedaemonians were preparing a new fleet of thirty vessels in their dock at Gytheum, he at once sailed thither to satisfy himself of the fact. He was also anxious to receive news from his friends at Athens, being still uncertain of the feeling towards him in the city. He now learned that he had been elected one of the generals for the year, and without further delay he sailed to the Peiraeus. Seven years had elapsed since he had left the city, in the pomp of the great Sicilian expedition — years in which he had done great good and great evil to his state. He had become the foremost man in Hellas. At Sparta and at Sardis, no less than The return of at Athens, he had carried all before him. At Aicibiades. his approach the Athenians crowded to the port, eager to catch a glimpse of their great citizen. Some were his ardent partisans, who declared that his banishment had been unjust, the work of enemies who wished to bring about his destruction for their own purposes. Others still looked on him as the chief source of evil in the past, and of danger in the future. So apprehensive was Aicibiades that some attack would be made upon him that he refused to go ashore, till he caught sight of his cousin Euryptolemus and other friends, to whose protection he could trust. Meet- ings were held of the Council and Assembly, at which he declared that he was the victim of injustice, and guiltless of the sacrilege laid to his charge. He carried the people with him, and without a protest from his enemies he was elected general with full powers, as the one man who could save Athens and restore her empire. 1 II. Aicibiades arrived at Athens on the day of the Plyn- teria, on which the statue of Athena was disrobed and 1 Xen. HelL i. 4. io, Diodorus, xiii. 68, and Athenaeus, xii. 49 give a highly coloured account of the return of Aicibiades, which becomes more highly coloured still in the hands of Duris ; but the historians of the fourth century are more restrained. Aicibiades no doubt brought with him the hundred talents from Caria, but the spoils and captured vessels bad already been conveyed to Athens by Thrasyllus, and helped to turn the tide in favour of Aicibiades. XII. ii.] LYSANDER BECOMES ADMIRAL, 408. 437 cleansed. It was a solemn day in the Athenian calendar, on which business was suspended ; and this was afterwards remembered as ominous of the later fortunes Returnof of Alcibiades. He remained in the city three Aicibiades months or more, and made amends to the to Ioma * Eleusinian deities, whose rites he had profaned, by conduct- ing the procession to Eleusis at the time of the mysteries by land, which the Athenians had not ventured to do since Agis had occupied Decelea. In October he set sail with a large armament, 1500 heavy-armed, 150 horse, and 100 ships. After an attack on Andros, which had revolted, he returned to Samos, and found that in his absence changes were taking place of the first importance. Cyrus, as we have seen, had been sent down in the spring of the year to take command of the forces on the coast. He spent the summer, we do not know how Lysander or where, for it was not till late in the year sent out as that he arrived at Sardis. Here he was visited navarch - by Lysander, who, shortly before the return of Alcibiades, had come out as admiral of the Lacedaemonian fleet, in the place of Cratesippidas, who had succeeded Pasippidas. Lysander had employed the interval in collecting ships, and before approaching Cyrus, he was master of a fleet of seventy vessels. The meeting of the two men was the turning-point in the war. Sparta had at last found the right man for her work, and her action was no longer to be crippled by the vacillating and treacherous policy of Tissaphernes. 1 Cyrus had brought a large sum of money with him, and was also prepared to spend his own resources, even to melt- ing down the throne on which he sat. But Lysander and when Lysander asked for a drachma a day for Cyrus, his sailors, he replied that his instructions from the King would not allow such a rate of pay. Half a drachma (3 obols) and no more would be paid to each man, but the Lacedae- 1 That Cyrus came to the coast early in the year is clear from Xenophon, Hell. i. 4. 3, for the envoys actually saw him. 438 LYSANDER AND CYRUS, 408. [XII. 12. monians might maintain as many ships as they pleased. Lysander was not to be foiled. After the banquet, when Cyrus drank to him, and asked how he could gratify him, he replied, "By adding an obol to the sailors' pay." This was done, and the timely liberality roused the greatest enthusiasm among the Spartan fleet. The Athenians were proportionately discouraged. They endeavoured, with the help of Tissaphernes, to bring Cyrus back to the old plan of wearing out each combatant upon the other, but Cyrus would not listen to the suggestion. A new policy was on foot, and Alcibiades must have been bitterly conscious of the change. He was no longer a power with the Persians. 12. Lysander returned to Ephesus, where he remained for the winter (408-407), quietly refitting and repairing his Defeat of the fleet. Alcibiades, who had hitherto remained Athenians inactive at Samos, now sailed to the help of atNotium. Thrasybulus, who was fortifying Phocaea, leaving his pilot Antiochus in command, with instructions not to attack Lysander. Moved by curiosity or contempt, Antiochus sailed with his own ship and one other into the harbour of Ephesus, and passed under the prows of Lysander's vessels. This led to an engagement, in which Lysander bring- ing his whole fleet to bear upon the Athenians, who hastened up in detachments, defeated them, and destroyed fifteen of their ships. Alcibiades at once returned to Samos and offered battle, but Lysander refused, as his fleet was by no means equal in numbers to that of the Athenians 1 (407). When this reverse became known at Athens, the popular feeling turned against Alcibiades. He had done nothing to ...... . realise the great hopes entertained at his elec- Alcibiades is or deposed from tion ; he had failed in the negotiations through his command. Tissaphernes ; and he was now accused of negligence in his command, and deposed. In his room ten generals were elected, whose names are connected with one of the most melancholy passages in Greek history — Conon, 1 Xen. Hell. i. 5. 1-15. XII. 12.] ALCIBIADES DEPOSED, 407. 439 Diomedon, Leon, Pericles, Erasinides, Aristocrates, Arches- tratus, Protomachus, Thrasyllus, Aristogenes. 1 Alcibiades retired to a fortress which he had built in the Chersonese, near Bisanthe. His place at Samos was taken by Conon, who was despatched from Andros where he had been left by Alcibiades, with the twenty ships under his command. He at once reorganised the fleet, selecting seventy of the best ships, and manning them with the most efficient sailors. With this force, though less by forty ships or more than the fleet of Alcibiades, he was able to make descents on the territory of the enemy. 2 Conon's place at Andros was taken by Phanosthenes, with a small squadron of four triremes. On his way thither he overtook two Thurian ships, which he captured with their crews. Among the prisoners was Dorieus of Rhodes, a famous athlete, who having been banished from Rhodes by the sentence of the Athenians— in the period when Rhodes was still a subject ally of the Athenian empire— had settled at Thurii, and taken command of Thurian ships against Athens. 3 When he was brought to Athens, the citizens decided by public decree to treat him with the respect due to an i Xen. i. 5. 16-17 ; Plut. Alcib. 36 ; Diod. xiii. 73. That he was deposed is clear from Lysias, 21. 7. Xenophon mentions Aristocrates and Adimautus as generals chosen with Alcibiades to act on land when he left Athens, Hell. i. 4. 21. Thrasybulus and Conon were also generals for this year, ib. i. 4. 10, and probably Thrasyllus. If so, Conon, Androcles, and Thrasyllus were continued in office ; Thrasy- bulus, Alcibiades, and Adimantus deposed. It is doubtful whether the elections of generals were always held at the ordinary time in these later years of the war, or whether the ten were always elected at one time. Before Alcibiades returned to Athens, he, Conon, and Thra- syllus were chosen ; this may have been at the ordinary time. Then Alcibiades seems to have received full power by a later election or confirmation ; and the election of Aristocrates and Adimantus is not mentioned till Alcibiades is leaving Athens. The date of the battle of Notium is uncertain, but it would seem to have taken place late in the summer of 407, for the generals elected after it are in office in autumn 406, when the battle of Arginusae was fought. 2 Hell. i. 5. 18-21.' 3 Thuc. iii. 8 ; viii. 35, 84, supra p. 426. 440 PERICLES THE YOUNGER. [XII. 12. Olympian victor ; the rest of the captives were sold, but he was set at liberty. 1 Before entering on the final crisis of the war, we may turn aside for a moment to listen to a conversation which, as . Xenophon tells us, Socrates held with Pericles Conversation of x Socrates with the younger, the son of the statesman (supra, Pencies the p 132), about the time when he was looking for- younger. A / , . ° ward to becoming one of the generals of Athens. We cannot of course be precise about the year, but we may fix it at no long time before the battle of Arginusae. After dwelling on the glorious actions of Athens in old days, Pericles continues : — The wonder to me, Socrates, is how our city ever came to decline. Soc. I think we are the victims of our own success. Like some athlete, whose facile preponderance in the arena has betrayed him into laxity until he eventually succumbs to punier antagonists, so we Athenians, in the plenitude of our superiority, have neglected ourselves and are become degenerate. Per. What then ought we to do now to recover our former virtue ? Soc. There need be no mystery about that, I think. We can rediscover the institutions of our forefathers — applying them to the regulation of our lives with something of their precision, and not improbably with like success ; or we can imitate those who stand at the front of affairs to-day, adopting to ourselves their rule of life, in which case, if we live up to the standard of our models, we may hope at least to rival their excellence, or by a more conscientious adherence to what they aim at, rise superior. You would seem to suggest (he answered) that the spirit of beautiful and brave manhood has taken wings and left our city; as, for instance, when will Athenians, like the Lacedaemonians, rever- The decline of ence Q ^ — ^ Athenian who hates his own father the Athenian .° character. as a startmg-pomt for the contempt he pours upon grey hairs 1 When will he pay as strict an attention to the body, who is not content with neglecting a good habit, but laughs to scorn those who are careful in the matter ? When shall we Athenians so obey our magistrates — we who take a pride, as it were, in despising authority % When, once more, shall we be united as a 1 Xen. Hell. i. 5. 19. XII. I3-] THE ATHENIAN SOLDIER. 441 people, we who, instead of combining to promote common interests, delight in blackening each other's characters, envying one another more than we envy all the world besides ; and— which is our worst failing— who, in private and public intercourse alike, are torn by dissension, and are caught in a maze of litigation, and prefer to make capital out of our neighbours' difficulties rather than to render mutual assistance ? To make our conduct consistent, indeed, we treat our national interests no better than if they were the concerns of some foreign state ; or make them bones of contention to wrangle over, and rejoice in nothing so much as in possessing means and ability to indulge these tastes. From this hot-bed is engendered in the state a spirit of blind folly and cowardice, and in the hearts of the citizens spreads a tangle of hatred and mutual hostility which, as I often shudder to think, will some day cause some disaster to befall the state greater than it can bear. Do not (replied Socrates), do not, I pray you, permit yourself to believe that the Athenians are smitten with so incurable a depravity. Do you not observe their discipline in all naval matters ? Look at their prompt and orderly obedience to the superintendence at the gymnastic contests, their quite unrivalled subservience to their teachers in the training of our choruses. Yes (he answered), there 's the wonder of it ; to think that all these good people should so obey their leaders, but that our hoplites and our cavalry, who may be supposed to rank before the rest of the citizens in excellence of manhood, should be so entirely unamenable to discipline. 1 13. In the following spring (406), Lysander, who seems to have remained inactive at Ephesus during the winter, was succeeded as admiral by Callicratidas. 2 When Callicratidas handing over his ships, Lysander reminded his succeeds successor of the victory which he had won, and L y sander - claimed for his fleet the supremacy at sea. Callicratidas bade him take the fleet to Miletus, passing between Samos and the mainland, and give it into his charge there; he would 1 Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 13 ff. Dakyns' translation. 2 The time is fixed by Xenophon's mention of an eclipse of the moon, which is, no doubt, that of April 15, 406— unless, indeed, this notice of time is spurious ; see Wilkins, Mus. Phil. Cant. i. 555, and Beloch, I.e. Callicratidas had probably been appointed admiral in the preceding autumn. 442 CALLICRA TIDAS SUCCEEDS L YSANDER, 406. [XI I. 13 then allow that the Peloponnesians were masters of the waters. This Lysander refused to do, as he was no longer admiral of the fleet. Callicratidas immediately increased his fleet to 140 ships with the intention of attacking Conon; but he found that he was the object of a conspiracy on the part of Ly sander's adherents, who loudly complained of the folly of the Lacedaemonians in changing their admirals, and sending out inexperienced men to replace those who had acquired a thorough knowledge of their ships and crews. Callicratidas met them with the plain statement that he was not the maker of the laws of his city ; it was his business to obey them. This he intended to do, and while he held his office he would make the best of it, but it was for them to say whether they wished him to stay or return home and explain the position of affairs. Other difficulties were in store for him. Lysander had paid back to Cyrus all the money remaining in his hands, and when Callicratidas repaired to Sardis to ask for supplies, he was kept waiting at the doors of Cyrus with designed humiliation. Exasperated at the indignities put upon him, he returned to Miletus, resolved, if ever he reached Lacedaemon again, to bring about a reconciliation between Athens and Sparta, and put an end to the discreditable relations now existing between Greeks and barbarians. From Miletus he sent to Lacedaemon for supplies, and summoning an assembly of the Milesians, asked for contributions to enable him to make use of his force. The Milesians, in spite of their partiality to Lysander, could not refuse to contribute, and, having also procured a sum of money from Chios, Callicratidas was able to sail to Methymna, which was protected by an Athenian garrison. He Callicratidas took the town by storm, but of the captives he at Lesbos. on jy ^ e Athenian garrison and the slaves ; the rest he set at liberty, declaring that no Greek should be sold into slavery while he was in command. To Conon, who had sailed up from Samos to the aid of Methymna, he sent word that he would put an end to his adultery with the sea, and when he saw him putting out on his return, he XII. I4-] CONON A T MYTILE NE, 4O6. 443 in^e^ed his ships and pursued him to Mytilene, with his whole fleet consisting of one hundred and seventy vessels. Conon with whom were Leon and Erasinides, was compelled to fight at the harbour's mouth, and lost thirty out of his seventy ships before reaching the town. Here he was blockaded by Callicratidas, who summoned forces from Methymna and Chios, and was now supplied with money by Cyrus. The position of the Athenians was indeed alarming; Mytilene was without provisions, shut in on every side, and unless intelligence could be conveyed to Athens, conon blockaded Conon had no hope of relief. Selecting two of at M ^ lene ' the swiftest vessels, he prepared them for four days, and on the fifth, at mid-day, when the enemy's vigilance was relaxed, he sent them out of the harbour, one towards the Hellespont the other across the open sea. Pursuit was immediate, and before sunset the second vessel was brought back. The other escaped and carried the news of the siege to Athens 14. If Conon and what remained of his fleet were to be saved, immediate action was necessary, and that on no small scale In thirty days the Athenians prepared and launched a fleet of one hundred and ten vessels. All who were of age to serve, whether slave or free, and even a large number of the class of the knights, were compelled to go on board. On reaching Samoa,. the fleet added ten Samian vessels to the number, and more than thirty others were collected from the allies The generals were now in command of a force of more' than one hundred and fifty ships, with which they sailed to the islands of Arginusae, opposite Lesbos, and there took their evening meal. Callicratidas, who had advanced to meet them with one hundred and twenty ships, leaving Eteonicus to blockade Conon with fifty, when he saw their fires, attempted to surprise them by a night attack, but was prevented by a storm. Towards morning the weather cleared, and he sailed at daybreak to Arginusae. The battle which followed was the greatest fought m the whole course of the war. For Athens it was a decisive battle; if she was defeated, the war was at an end ; she had ventured 444 BATTLE OF ARGINUSAE, 406. [XII. 14. her last stake. The Athenians had the advantage in numbers, but their fleet had been hastily prepared, and was manned by inexperienced sailors ; they were conscious that it was incapable of the skilful manoeuvres for which they had long been famous. It was drawn up in two massive wings, each of sixty vessels; the centre, which apparently lay on the islands of Arginusae, was formed by a single line. On the left wing, which put out towards the open sea, Aristocrates and Diomedon were in command in the first line, Pericles and Erasinides in the second, each with fifteen ships ; the centre was occupied by the Samians and other allies ; on the right, between the islands and the shore, were Protomachus and Thrasyllus, supported by Lysias and Aristogenes, each with fifteen ships as on the left. The Peloponnesians were drawn up in a single line : they were old sailors, and wished to take whatever advantage of their skill they could. 1 The pilot of Callicratidas, observing the disparity of numbers, advised him to decline battle, to which he replied that he was by no means a necessary man at Sparta, and it would be disgraceful to retreat. The battle was hotly con- tested, but when Callicratidas, who commanded the right, was hurled into the sea by the force of his impact on an enemy's ship and drowned, 2 and the left wing was defeated by Protomachus, the whole fleet turned to flight, some to Chios, but most to Phocaea. The Athenians returned to Arginusae. They had lost twenty-five vessels and their crews, but in the Peloponnesian fleet at least seventy ships had been destroyed, including nine ships out of ten in the Lacedaemonian contingent. The victory was complete, and at once restored to Athens the control of the Aegean. 3 Immediately after the battle, the Athenian generals issued orders to Theramenes and Thrasybulus to collect the crews 1 Hell. i. 6. 29 ff. See Zeune's note. 2 For Callicratidas, see Grote, Hist, of Greece, v. 496 f., 503 f. 3 Hell. i. 6. 34. The battle was fought in the archonship of Callias (406-405), Ath. Pol. c. 34 ; and not long before the Apaturia (November). XII. IS] LOSS OF THE SAILORS, 4O6. 445 from the floating wrecks, and were about to sail with the rest of the fleet to relieve Conon when the storm of the previous night again broke over them and Escape of rendered any movement impossible. Eteonicus, Eteonicus. however, was able to take advantage of the delay to escape from Mytilene. A despatch-boat brought him the news of the defeat, but he at once bade the sailors leave the harbour without a word, and return with crowns proclaiming the victory of Callicratidas and the destruction of the Athenian fleet. On their arrival, Eteonicus offered sacrifice openly for the good news. He then despatched his triremes with all haste to Chios, for which the wind was favourable, and him- self led his army into camp at Methymna. When the wind moderated, Conon sailed to meet the Athenians, who were advancing from Arginusae, and informed them of the escape of Eteonicus. After an ineffectual movement to Mytilene and Chios, the fleet returned to Samos. 1 15. The victory of Athens had not been gained without loss, and in this case the loss fell not only on hired crews and slaves, but on Athenian citizens who had been compelled to serve as sailors. The Athenian general who risked or lost the lives of his citizens could not rely on the generosity of the people to save him from the attacks of rivals and enemies ; his success was too often forgotten, and his failure punished with unjust severity. When it became, known that the survivors had not been saved from the wrecks after the battle, the city was filled with indignation. All the generals, except Conon, were deposed and ordered home. Two of them, Protomachus and Aristogenes, did not return, but Pericles, Diomedon, Lysias, Aristocrates, Thrasyllus, and Erasinides appeared at Athens to answer the charges against them. 2 1 Xen. Hell i. 6 ; Diod. xiii. 98. 2 The tenth general, Archestratus, seems to have died at Mytilene before the battle ; Diod. xiii. 101 ; Lysias, 21. 8. Why we should have Lysias in this list and among those who commanded in the battle, while Leon is mentioned among the generals of the year, is not clear. In Xen. i. 6. 16, Leon is said to have accompanied Conon to Mytilene, and his name is not mentioned again. 446 THE RA MENES AND THE GENERALS, 4O6. [XII. 15. At this time the leader of the people at Athens was Arche- demus, "a man with a clever tongue in his head." 1 Having The attack on brought Erasinides into court on a charge of the generals. peculation, he seized the opportunity to attack him for his conduct as general. The Council took the matter up, and when the generals made their report, it was proposed that they should be arrested and the case referred to the people. In the Assembly which followed, the chief accuser was Theramenes. Together with Thrasybulus he had been directed to save the men on the wrecked ships, and the guilt of abandoning them, if it could not be brought home to the generals, would rest on these two. In the despatch written by the generals immediately after the battle, they had been exempted from any blame; the violence of the storm had rendered it impossible to save the survivors. The generosity of the generals availed them little. Theramenes had felt the public pulse, and saw that some victim would be demanded in the present state of excitement. That victim he was resolved not to be. He declared that the generals must explain why they had abandoned the sailors to their fate. In a brief reply — for the legal privilege of making a speech was denied to them — each general stated the facts : that they had intended to sail against Eteonicus, and left the recovery of the sailors to Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who were competent and experienced commanders, but the storm was so severe that nothing could be done. 2 The Assembly was convinced of the 1 Xen. Hell. i. 7. 2 ; cp. Mem. ii. 9. 4, where he says that he was poor because he would not make money by dishonest means. He was employed by Crito to keep the sycophants at bay. Aristophanes, if he is speaking of the same man, takes a different view (Frogs, 417) : os €iTT€Tr)s &>v ovk. e 25.^ Cp Plato Apol. 32 C: rrapavo^, Z> s i v T £ W ' Xpovco waaiv vptv edo£ev. It was also illegal to prevent Euryptolemus from following up his indictment of Callixenus for illegality. Frankel Die Geschworn. Gericht. p. 79 ft, endeavours to clear the Athenians from the charge of illegality in this matter. It is true that the trial did not take place m a law-court, but in the Assembly, and the forms of law which prevailed in a court cannot be applied to it The fact that ^ e P^ UCd wereasked t0 Prepare a form of procedure seems to imnlv that there was no fixed rule in these trials. 1 As a boat was able to reach Eteonicus immediately after the battle, and Eteonicus himself escaped from Mytilene, the generals may have allowed some precious time to elapse before giving their orders to Theramenes and Thrasybulus. But nothing is said of this in the accusation ; and the boat may have left before the worst of the VOL. III. 2 450 ETEONICUS AT CHIOS, 4O6. [XII. 16. 16 While thus executing their ablest commanders, the Athenians haughtily rejected the overtures for peace which once more came to them from Lacedaemon. The terms offered were a status quo, and the withdrawal of the Lacedae- monian troops from Decelea. Some of the more moderate citizens were inclined to accept them, but Cleophon, by his violence, carried the people with him. He came into the Assembly intoxicated, and wearing his cuirass, and declared that he would not allow any peace to be made unless the Lacedaemonians restored the cities of the Athenian empire which were in their possession. 1 The fleet remained at Samos for the winter, making descents on the enemy's country, but without any attempt to follow up their victory by a further attack on the remains of the Peloponnesian fleet. 2 Chios was again the rendezvous of the Peloponnesians There may have been some sixty vessels in all, the crews of which with the soldiers, would amount to a total of twelve thousand men. To feed such a multitude was no easy task ; to pay them was impossible. So long as the summer lasted, the men could earn money by working in the fields, and the pro- duce of the country sufficed for their maintenance; but with the approach of winter they found themselves as ill-fed as they were ill-clad and ill-paid. In their distress fuppSses they formed a conspiracy to seize the city of I conspiracy Chios, and that they might be known to each at Chios. othei>} the conspirat ors agreed to distinguish themselves by carrying a reed. . Before any definite step was taken, information of the plan was brought to Eteomcus. His position was difficult. The conspirators were so numerous storm. It must be remembered that the generals bad bo motive whatever for neglecting to rescue the survivors, and that they consistently maintained that rescue was impossible 1 Ath Pol. c. 34. Cleophon had already opposed peace after the battle of Cyzicus (supra, p. 429), and was to oppose it again just 2a/xou. Diod. xiii. 100. XII. I7-] INACTION OF THE ATHENIANS, 4O6. 451 that an attack upon them was by no means certain to succeed. If it failed, the city would fall into their hands, and the pro- spects of the Peloponnesians, already sufficiently low, would be ruined. If, on the other hand, it succeeded, the conspiracy could not be crushed without slaughter of the allies who were serving in the Peloponnesian army. Eteonicus extricated him- self with the same resourcefulness which he had shown at Myti- lene. Collecting a band of fifteen men, armed with daggers, he passed through the streets of Chios, and on meeting a conspirator cut him down on the spot. A crowd gathered round, inquiring why the man was slain. " Because he was wearing a reed" was the answer, and no sooner was this known than every one who was wearing a reed made haste to throw it away. The conspiracy thus broken up, Eteonicus called the Chians together, and urged them to supply him with funds to pay his sailors, who would otherwise mutiny. The Chians agreed, upon which Eteonicus, ordering the sailors to go on board, visited each trireme in turn, and carefully concealing his knowledge of the recent conspiracy from the crews, presented them with a month's pay. 1 17. The Athenians still remained inactive. Two additional commanders were sent out to join Conon — Adimantus, a former colleague at Andros, and Philocles ; Adimantus was an oligarch, subsequently suspected of traitorous communications with the enemy, Philocles a democrat, who was prepared to outstrip Cleon in his cruel punishment of conquered enemies (see infra, p. 458). Such officers, even if com- j vi i 11. -i Thelonians petent, were not likely to work harmoniously ask for Ly _ together, and the opportunity of reviving the sander to be fortunes of Athens in Ionia was allowed to slip. Eteonicus remained unmolested at Chios, while the cities of the coast annoyed, rather than alarmed, by the petty inroads of the Athenians, gathered fresh courage. It was resolved to despatch envoys to Sparta with a request that Lysander should be sent out to take command of the fleet. His name 1 Xen. Hell. ii. 1. I f. 452 LY SANDER AGAIN IN COMMAND, 405. [XII. 17. was all-powerful in the cities of Ionia, and he was also the personal friend of Cyrus, who indeed sent ambassadors of his own to support the request of the Greeks. 1 The laws of the Spartans did not permit the same man to serve as admiral twice, but this difficulty was overcome by electing Abacus as admiral, and Lysander as his epistoleus or lieutenant. Aracus was nobody, and intended to be nobody ; indeed it is doubtful whether he left Sparta at all. The command of the fleet was given to Lysander, who arrived at Ephesus in the spring of 405. 2 In this instance, as so often, we see the vast importance of personal influence in Greek history. Lysander had no sooner Lysander arrived in Asia than the war took a new turn, and Cyrus. jj e summoned Eteonicus from Chios to Ephesus, collected and repaired any vessels which had taken refuge elsewhere, and arranged to build new ships at Antandrus. Then he applied to Cyrus for the money, without which operations were impossible, and Cyrus — though nothing was now left of the money given to him by the King — supplied him from his own resources so liberally that Lysander was able to pay all arrears due to his sailors, and fit his ships for action. The Athenians advanced to Chios and Ephesus in the hope of engaging with Lysander, but failing to prevent the union of the enemy's fleet, they contented themselves with putting their ships in order and awaiting the event. 3 The Athenians, meanwhile, were listening to the Frogs of Aristophanes, and laughing over the adventures of Dionysus The "Frogs" of when journeying to Hades in search of a tragic Aristophanes. poet to take the place of Sophocles, who had recently died. The play is, to a large extent, a condemna- tion of Euripides, but the poet has seized the opportunity to tell the Athenians some home truths about the political 1 Xen. Hell, ii. 1. 6, 7 ; Diod. xiii. 100. For Cyrus and Lysander, see Isocrates, Panath. 39. 2 Xen. Hell. I.e., where see Underbill's note on the admiral; Plut. Lys. 7. See also Beloeh, Rhein. Mus. 34. 117 ff. 3 Xen. Hell. ii. 1. 10-12 ; Diod. xiii. 104. XII. 17.] ' THE "FROGS" OF ARISTOPHANES, 405. 453 situation at the moment. The dissensions of the Four Hun- dred, in spite of the excellent constitution which followed, had left bitter memories behind them. Many citizens had been deprived of their franchise ; others had been driven into exile. Aristophanes counsels reconciliation and unity. "We ought to put all the citizens on an equality," he says, " an d remove their apprehensions. If any one was thrown by the tricks of Phrynichus, those who slipped then ought to be allowed to purge their offence, and put away their mis- deeds. No one in the city ought to be deprived of his franchise; it is disgraceful that those who have fought in one battle, and one only, should forthwith be ' Plataeans ' and masters after being slaves, 1 though I am far from saying that this arrangement is not a good one— in fact, it is the only sensible thing that you have done ; but surely those who, like their fathers before them, have often fought at our side, and are, moreover, our kinsmen, ought to be forgiven this one offence. Eelax your wrath, you who are naturally the wisest of men, and let us gladly make every one who will fight on our side a kinsman and a citizen with full rights. If we behave ourselves in this proud and froward spirit when our city is in the trough of the seas, we shall be found some day to have made a great mistake." 2 From other passages in the play we see that the conduct of Theramenes at the trial of the generals had made a deep impression on the city. "Always to take the easier place is the mark of a man of ability, a born Theramenes." " A clever man is Theramenes, and quick at all points. If a comrade gets into a scrape, and he is standing by, he quickly falls clear of the mischief— no Chian but a Cean." 3 Cleophon also, who took a foremost part in rejecting the terms of 1 The slaves who fought at Arginusae were allowed to become "Plataeans," i.e. Athenian citizens with a limited franchise, like the survivors of the Plataeans after the destruction of their city in 427 2 Aristoph. Frogs, 687 ff. 3 Aristoph. Frogs, 541, 965. Hnos was the name given to the worst throw at dice ; Ceos was the birthplace of Theramenes. 454 LYSANDER AND CYRUS, 405. [XII. 18. peace with Sparta, comes in for a share of abuse, as he always does in the comedies of Aristophanes. " On his chattering lips the Thracian swallow mourns and raves, perched on foliage of alien growth, and twitters a melancholy nightingale strain, that he will be lost even, even if the votes are equal." 1 In 407 a new and debased coinage, of gold, had been introduced into the city, in the foolish hope of lightening the financial strain. Aristophanes speaks of this new coinage with great contempt in comparison with the old pure silver coinage ; urging the Athenians to cling to the old coins and throw what is new and worthless aside. So also must they cling to men of the old true stamp. " The only hope of Athens lies in the employment of those good and worthy citizens, who are now as it were out in the cold, and the one hero of them all, round whom the scattered forces of the city may still rally, is a man whom they half love, half hate, yet with whose services they cannot dispense — the exile Alcibiades." 2 l8. Cyrus was now called away to visit his father, Darius II., who had fallen sick and felt his death to be at hand. Before leaving Sardis, he sent for Lysander and created him his vicegerent in his absence. Placing in his hands his surplus funds, and assigning to him the revenue of his cities, he charged him strictly to spare no expense in building ships, and not to engage with the Athenians, unless his forces were far superior in number. 3 Lysander's plans went beyond the reconstruction of the Peloponnesian fleet. He was resolved that a Lacedaemonian empire should take the place of the Athenian empire, and as a necessary step to this end, democratical government must 1 Aristoph. Frogs, 679 ff. The language is intentionally grotesque. Cleophon was not a native Athenian. Lysias speaks of Cleophon in a different tone, 30. IO ff. It was the rule to acquit a criminal if the votes were equal, but the misdeeds of Cleophon were too patent. 2 Merry's Frogs, Introd. p. 6; ib. 1. 720 ff. ; 1418 ff. 3 Plutarch, Lys. 9, adds that Cyrus promised to bring up additional ships from Phoenicia and Cilicla, which may be true, but these " Phoenician ships " were always coming, and never came. XII. i8.] LYSANDER IN THE AEGEAN, 405. 455 be rooted out. Wherever it was possible, he removed his opponents and established a strictly oligarchical government under the control of decarchies and harmosts. As soon as he could leave Ephesus, he repaired to Miletus, where his oligarchical friends had already endeavoured to Lysander at force a revolution on the people, but without Miletus, success. Both parties were by this time prepared to forget the quarrel, and Lysander, who pretended to agree in this reconciliation, publicly threatened the authors of the revolu- tion with punishment. When he had thus induced the democrats to remain in the city, he attacked them at the festival of the Dionysia, and cut down more than three hundred of them • the rest of the party, to the number of a thousand, found refuge with Pharnabazus. 1 Lysander was now in a position to treat the Athenian fleet with the contempt which it deserved. Regardless of its presence, he sailed down the coast to Caria, and then struck across the Aegean to Aegina i n Attica : and Attica. The cities of the archipelago he sails to saw with astonishment a Peloponnesian fleet Abydus ' cruising at will in the waters which Athens had so long claimed as her own domain. In Attica he had an interview with Agis, in which the course may have been fixed upon which he finally took for the destruction of Athens. Agis had already called the attention of the Lacedaemonian authorities to the supplies which reached Athens through the Bosphorus, and rendered useless his own efforts to reduce the city. If the corn-ships which sailed out of the Pontus in large numbers just before the autumn equinox were allowed to reach the Peiraeus, the city would easily bear a protracted siege. The cities of Ionia were indeed secured, but Byzantium and Chalcedon, Sestos and Lampsacus were still in the hands of Athens : it was there that the blow must be struck, if the efforts of so many long years were at last to be brought to a successful conclusion. From Attica, Lysander 1 Diod. xiii. 104; Plut. Lys. 9. 456 LYSANDER IN THE HELLESPONT, 405. [XII. 19. seems to have carried his fleet back to Rhodes, whence as the summer went on he sailed northwards as far as Abydus. 1 19. On hearing that Lysander had sailed to the Hellespont, the Athenians chose three additional generals — Menander, Tydeus, and Cephisodotus 2 — and followed him from Chios with their whole fleet of one hundred and eighty vessels, keeping well out to sea as the coast was now hostile to them. Before they arrived, he had already passed from Abydus to Lysander at Lampsacus, which he took by storm and gave Lampsacus. ove r to his soldiers to plunder, for, in spite of the previous capture by the Athenians, Lampsacus was still a wealthy city, and filled with supplies of all kinds. The news of this disaster was brought to the Athenians immediately after their arrival at Elaeus ; they at once re-embarked for Sestos, and after obtaining supplies there, advanced to the harbour of Aegospotami, opposite Lampsacus, 3 where Lysander was still stationed with his ships. The hostile fleets were now in full view of each other, for the Hellespont is at this point The Athenians not ( l u ^ e two miles broad. As it was too at Aegospo- late for an engagement, the Athenians went on 1,1 shore for the night, according to the custom of Greek sailors, and took their evening meal. Early on the following morning, Lysander put his men on board, and made complete and minute arrangements for a battle, giving orders at the same time that no one should stir from his post, or put his ship out to sea. The Athenians also embarked at sunrise, and drew up their ships at the mouth of the harbour of Lampsacus, but after waiting the whole day without any forward movement on Lysander's part, they returned to Aegospotami. When they retired, Lysander sent his swiftest vessels to watch their movements ; and till these returned he 1 Xen. Hell. ii. 1. 15, 16 ; Plut. Lys. 9 ; Diod. xiii. 104. Diodorus speaks of a pursuit of Lysander by the Athenian fleet. Of the visit to Attica, Xenophon says nothing. 2 Xenophon's language would lead us to believe that the fleet chose these generals, and so Gilbert takes it, Beitrdge, p. 390. 3 Xen. Hell. ii. 1. 15-21; Plut. Lys. 9; Diod. xiii, 104, XII. 19- ] THE ATHENIANS FOLLOW HIM, 405. 457 kept his men on board. For four days in succession these manoeuvres were repeated, for Lysander would not put to sea, and the Athenians dared not attack him under cover of the land. The delay which was of no importance to one fleet was fatal to the other. Lysander, lying close to Lampsacus, had ample stores of all kinds at hand ; his crews were kept together, and could go on board at a moment's notice, but the Athenians were stationed in a desert harbour, where the sailors had to fetch their provisions from Sestos, nearly two miles distant. Each day that Lysander refused to meet them, they grew more contemptuous of the enemy, and wandered farther from their ships. The danger of the situation did not escape Alcibiades, who watched the movements from one of his fortresses (supra, p. 429). Biding up to the Athenian camp, he begged the generals to remove their ships to Sestos, offering at the same time to obtain for them the assistance of the Thracian princes — Medocus and Seuthes — who were his friends. The advice was wise, and it was given by one who knew by bitter experience the tactics of Lysander ; the value of it is not lessened if we suppose that Alcibiades wished to secure his own return home, or believe Diodorus, who asserts that he asked for a share in the command. But it was rejected ; the generals, with Tydeus and Menander at their head, bade him depart : the fleet was in their charge, not in his. 1 On the fifth day the Athenians advanced as before, pre- pared to attack, and Lysander, as usual, refused to meet them. But he gave orders to the ships which followed them to the shore to sail back as soon as they saw them disem- barked and scattered along the Chersonese, and raise a shield when in midchannel. On seeing the signal he ordered his fleet to advance with the utmost speed upon the enemy, while the land forces, under the command of Thorax, marched along the coast to be in readiness, if needed. Of the Athenian 1 Xen. Hell. ii. 1. 22-26 ; Plut. Lys. 10 : Ale. 36, 37 ; Djod. xiii. 105 f 458 THE BATTLE OF AEG OSPO TAMI, 405. [XII. 20. generals Conon alone appears to have been on the watch, and he at once gave the signal for action. But the crews were scattered; in some vessels there were rowers captures the enough for two banks of oars, in others for one ; Athenian others were entirely empty ; only Conon's own ship with seven others and the Paralus were fully manned. These escaped ; the rest of the fleet Lysander captured before they had time to put to sea, all the crews being taken except those who escaped to the fortresses in the neigh- bourhood. Conon with his eight ships fled to join Evagoras in Cyprus ; the Paralus returned to Athens with the news of the destruction of her last fleet. 1 20. Lysander returned with his prizes to Lampsacus. Before the day closed he despatched Theopompus, a Milesian freebooter, to Sparta with the news of his victory, and so great was the speed of the pirate's vessel, that it reached the city on the third day. Lysander then assembled the allies to deliberate on the fate of the captives, and the opportunity was not lost. Many and bitter were the accusations against the Athenians ; old and new iniquities were charged against them, and among the most recent a resolution which they had passed, on the proposal of Philocles, to strike off the hand of every prisoner, 2 and the action of Philocles himself in dashing from the rocks the entire crews of two triremes which Massacre of had fallen into his hands. It was resolved to the Athenians. p U t to death all the Athenian prisoners, except Adimantus, who had opposed the decree to mutilate the 1 Xen. I.e. 27-29; Plut. Lys. 11; Alcib. 37. Diodorus, xiii. 106, gives a somewhat different account. According to him, Philocles, who was in command for the day, ordered the trierarchs to man their vessels and follow him. He put out speedily with thirty vessels, before the rest were ready, and Lysander on hearing of this at once attacked. Philocles was defeated ; the rest were unprepared ; and at the same time the Lacedaemonian infantry under the command of Eteonicus were put on shore and captured part of the Athenian camp. Lysander then completed the destruction of the fleet. Lysias, 21. 11, speaks of twelve ships which escaped, in which the eight ships under Conon are not included. 2 Plut. Lys. 9. XIL 20.] THE ATHENIAN FLEET CAPTURED, 405. 459 captives ; or, as some said, had betrayed the fleet to Lysander. The remainder, to the number of three thousand, were slain on the spot, beginning with Philocles, who, though blood- thirsty and incompetent, was a man of high spirit. When asked by Lysander what penalty a man ought justly to suffer, who had urged his citizens to exercise such cruelty upon Greeks, he bade him make no accusations where there were no judges to hear them ; now that he was victorious, let him do as he would have been done by had he been conquered. Then after taking a bath and putting on his best attire, he led the way to the place of slaughter. 1 The bodies of the slain were cast out unburied, in defiance of the deepest sentiments of Greek religion and the universal practice of Greek warfare. 2 Thus without the loss of a single ship Lysander captured the enemy's fleet, and put an end at once to the Athenian empire and the Peloponnesian war. The contest, so long and stoutly maintained, was decided almost without a blow ; the city, whose courage had overcome the disaster of Syracuse, fell a victim to the incompetence of her own generals, and in less than a year from the battle of Arginusae, in which she seemed to have swept her enemy from the sea, Athens was left with hardly a trireme to call her own. Plutarch, moralis- ing on the success of Lysander, remarks that in many minds the achievement was regarded as superhuman, and tells us of omens and portents which preceded the event. But the defeat of Aegospotami was brought about by causes which are as common as they are human. Lysander conquered in the Hellespont by the same tactics by which he had conquered at Notium ; he refused to fight till he had beguiled the enemy into security and could take him at an advantage. He may have been assisted by the treachery of his opponents, though 1 Theophrastus, in Plut. Lys. 13. 2 Xen. Hell. I.e. ; Plut. Lys. 11. For the treachery of Adim'antus, besides Xenophon see Lysias, 14. 38. Gilbert denies it, Beitrdge, p. 340. For the disregard of burial, Pausanias, ix. 32. 9. Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus mentions this. The date of the battle is about September 405 ; cp. Ath. Pol. 34. 2, where it is placed in the archonship of Alexias. 460 POLICY OF LYSANDER, 405. [XII. 21. the only ground for this accusation is the clemency shown to Adimantus, for which a sufficient reason was given at the time ; but if their treachery is uncertain, the gross incom- petence of the generals is plain to every eye. It is shown not only at Aegospotami by their rejection of the warning of Alcibiades, but even more by the carelessness with which they had allowed precious time to slip past while stationed at Samos. At the last, it is true, they seem to have wished to engage with Lysander, who, in spite of their efforts, sailed to and fro as he pleased ; but they made no attempt to destroy his fleet before it had become formidable. The crews of the Peloponnesian fleet repaired their vessels, Lysander with thirty-five ships sailed into Ephesus, and collected help from far and near till his ships equalled the Athenians' in numbers, while the Athenians occupied their fleet with inroads upon the Asiatic cities, which may have provided some necessary supplies, but certainly exasperated the in- habitants into more active opposition. Lysander, as they well knew, had unlimited means at his disposal ; he could afford to wait for the favourable moment, without diminishing the efficiency of his ships and crews ; but the cost of the Athenian fleet was a terrible strain on a city exhausted in money and men. Every month, every week, was of importance, yet the summer passed away and nothing was done, till Lysander struck a blow at the Hellespont, the last source from which Athens could draw supplies. 21. Lysander had no thought of making an immediate attack on Athens, but as in winning his victory, so in his use , . of it he followed a definite and preconceived Lysander in | the Bosphorus plan. Knowing well that the walls of Athens and Hellespont. were i m p re gnable, and that if the people re- sisted, by starvation alone could they be brought to surrender, he resolved to drive back to Athens every Athenian whom he found in the cities of her empire, in order that the number of her inhabitants might be increased, and the effects of famine be more quickly felt. He was also aware that his work was but half done, so long as Sestos, Byzantium, and Chalcedon XII. 21.] ATHENS BLOCKADED, 405. 46J remained Athenian, especially as Alcibiacles was at hand to take advantage of the situation. To these cities, after arrang- ing the affairs of Lampsacus, he directed his course. Sestos was taken after a slight resistance ; at Byzantium and Chalcedon he was received without opposition. The Athenian garrisons were dismissed on condition of returning to Athens ; if found elsewhere, any Athenian would be put to death. Sthenelaus, a Lacedaemonian, was then placed in charge of the cities as harmost, and Lysander returned to Lampsacus to refit his ships. When he had got together a fleet of two hundred vessels, he sailed to Lesbos, where he established harmosts and decarchies in all the cities of the island. 1 Eteonicus was despatched to the Thracian coast to bring over the cities there, a task which he of Lysander: easily accomplished. For the whole of the sle & eof Athens, remaining allies of Athens now revolted from the city, with the single exception of Samos, where the demos, repeating the events of 412, massacred any notables who had remained in the city or returned to it, and kept the power in their own hands. From Lesbos, Lysander announced to Agis at Decelea and the authorities at Sparta, that he was advancing upon Athens. The second king, Pausanias, at once called out all the Peloponnesians, except the Argives, and marched to the city, where, uniting with the forces from Decelea, they encamped in the " Academy," the gymnasium beyond the Ceramicus. Lysander on his voyage collected as inany of the Aeginetans, Scion aeans, Melians and other exiles as he could, and restored them to their respective cities. Then he appeared at the Peiraeus with one hundred and fifty ships, blockading the harbours, and entirely preventing the importa- tion of food. 2 It w 7 as night when the Paralus reached Athens with the news of the destruction of the fleet. The dreadful words passed from lip to lip, till the wail of lamentation spread from 1 Xeu. Hell. ii. 2. I, 2, 5 Diod. xiii. 106, 2 Plut. Lys. 13, 14. Diod. xiv. 3 gives a hundred ships. Xen. I.e.', Jspcr. adv. Call. § 61. 462 THE SIEGE OF ATHENS, 405. [XII. 21. the Peiraeus to the city, and "for that night no one slept." Sorrow for the dead was mingled with fear for the future, for the day of vengeance was at last come, and full measure would now be exacted for the wrongs inflicted on the helpless allies — on Aegina, Scione, Melos, and others. Yet even in _ A , . this dire crisis, the courage of the Athenians did The Athenians ' ° prepare for not fail. If there was no prospect of a success- a siege. f u i res i s tance, there was at least a hope of obtaining better terms, should the enemy feel that they had still something to conquer. On the next day an Assembly was held, at which it was resolved to prepare for a siege by filling up the mouths of all the harbours but one, repairing the walls where necessary, and manning them. They had expected to see Lysander enter the Peiraeus every hour, and when his coming was delayed, they recovered a little from their consternation. It was not long before they discovered the meaning of the delay. Fugitives poured in from one city after another, swelling the multitude which had to be fed. Meanwhile Agis had marched up from Decelea and Pausanias from the Peloponnesus, and at last Lysander appeared. By land and sea the hostile forces closed round the doomed city. But the walls of Themistocles could neither be stormed nor destroyed ; the vast array of force was helpless against them, and as Lysander had foreseen, it was necessary to await the effect of famine. Pausanias returned to Sparta, Agis to Decelea, Lysander's fleet remained off the Peiraeus to cut off supplies. Athens was left to starve. 1 22. The feeling that all were involved in a common calamity, that the city needed the help of all who could help Proposals her, promoted harmony for the moment among for peace. the various sections of the citizens. Old en- mities were forgotten ; and many who had been deprived of the franchise were now restored to their rights. 2 Ere long 1 Diod. xiii. 107 ; Plut. Lys. 14. 2 This was done on the motion of Patroclides, see Andoc. Myst. 73 ff. ; Lys. 25, 27. Perhaps it was little more than a movement to give power to the oligarchical section in the city. XII. 22.] PROPOSALS FOR PEACE, 405-404. 463 the inevitable evil appeared : food began to run short. Envoys were sent to Agis, intimating that Athens would join the alliance of Sparta, if she might retain the Long Walls and Peiraeus. Agis bade them apply to Lacedaemon, but when they reached Sellasia, on the borders of Laconia, they were stopped by the ephors, who informed them that they must come with more reasonable proposals. 1 These tidings caused the greatest despair in the city. Slavery was the doom to which all looked forward ; and even while a second embassy was being arranged, many would die of famine. Yet when Archestratus suggested that ten stadia of the Long Walls should be destroyed, as the Lacedaemonians demanded, he was at once thrown into prison, and on a motion, probably due to Cleophon, who declared that he would cut the throat of any citizen who so much as mentioned peace, it was forbidden by public decree to support any pro- posal of the kind. Theramenes now came forward and suggested that he should go to Lysander and discover what the Lacedaemonians really meant by their demand. To Lysander accordingly he went, and remained with him three months, by which time Athens was reduced to such a plight that any terms must be accepted. 2 Even when he returned, he merely reported that Lysander had referred him to the home govern- ment for terms. Ten envoys, of whom he was one, were at once despatched with full powers to Sparta, where an Assembly of the allies was summoned by the ephors to discuss the terms of peace. The envoys of Thebes and Corinth were against making any terms at all ; they wished to see Athens utterly destroyed, but Sparta nobly refused to enslave a _ 1 Xen. Hell. ii. 2. 11 f., who says that, though many died of starva- tion, no mention was made of reconciliation, and it was only when the supply of food was exhausted that the proposals were made. This is inconsistent with the fact that the city held out for more than three months longer. 2 Where Lysander was at this time it is not easy to make out • it appears that he did not go to Samos till after the capitulation ; and yet he cannot have remained all the time with his fleet off the Peiraeus 464 ATHENS CAPITULATES, 404. [XII. 22. Greek city, " which had rendered great service to Greece in her hour of danger." If Athens would destroy the Long Walls and the fortifications of the Peiraeus, receive back the exiles, surrender all her ships of war except twelve, withdraw from all the cities of her empire, and join the Lacedaemonian confederacy, Sparta would grant peace, and allow the city to retain her independence. At Athens the ground had been cleared in the meantime by the removal of Cleophon, who was brought to trial on a charge of desertion and executed. When Theramenes returned, a multitude gathered round him, eager to learn their fate. Had he failed in his mission, and was the famine still to rage in the city 1 Or what were the terms on which Athens was to purchase her existence 1 The next day an Assembly was summoned at which the envoys made their report, and Theramenes advised that the terms should be accepted. Even at this last moment there were some who The urged resistance, but this was mere insanity; capitulation. ^ e people, by a large majority, were in favour of peace. Lysander at once sailed into the Peiraeus, and, amid great rejoicing, "to the sound of flutes," the work of destruc- tion was begun. That day was thought to be the dawn of freedom for Greece (Munychion 16= April 404). 1 23. After the capitulation, Lysander sailed to Samos, which was still independent. Successful resistance to such a force Lysander at as he had at command was hopeless, yet the Samos. Samians held out for a time, and at length were allowed to leave the island uninjured. The oligarchs were restored to their homes and their property, but the 1 Xen. Hell. ii. 2. 15-23 ; Plut. Lys. 14, who gives the text of the resolution of the ephors ; Diod. xiii. 107 ; Ath. Pol. 34. In her first proposals, Sparta was willing to allow Athens to retain Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, but afterwards this concession was withdrawn ; similarly, the destruction of ten stadia of the Long Walls is increased to the destruction of the Long Walls and fortifications of Peiraeus. For the opposition of Cleophon, see Lysias, 13. 8 f., who also puts the conduct of Theramenes in a very unfavourable light. Among those who resisted to the last were the generals Strombichides and Dio- nysodorus. According to Plutarch, Lysander went to Samos during the siege, but Xenophon does not mention this. XII. 23.] PARTIES AT A THENS, 465 government was placed in the hands of a decarchy of Spartans, with Thorax as harmost. 1 As his work— the destruction of the Athenian empire and of democracy—seemed now to be com- plete, Lysander dismissed the various contingents of the allied fleet to their respective cities, while with the Lacedaemonian squadron he returned to Laconia, taking with him the prows of the captured vessels and the navy of Athens. He also brought the crowns which he had received from grateful cities as gifts to himself, and a sum of 470 talents in silver, the surplus of the tribute-money assigned to him by Cyrus for the conduct of the war, and other property gained in his successes, all which he delivered to the Lacedaemonians "at the end of the summer." 2 Athens was at peace with Sparta, but she was not at peace with herself. We have seen that in 411 there were three distinct parties in the city: oligarchs who Factions at would have nothing but oligarchy, even if they Athens, were kept in power by Sparta; moderates, who would make the franchise co-extensive with civic duties ; and the extreme democrats, who maintained that Athens was the Athenian people. From the Constitution of Athens we learn that the same parties reappeared on the present occasion. No sooner had Lysander departed than Athens was disturbed by civic contention. The constitution under which the Athenians were to live had not been precisely fixed when peace was made. The democracy wished to preserve the constitu- tion unaltered; 3 the notables, who could rely on associations or clubs, were eager for oligarchy, while others, who, though without the support of clubs, claimed to be among the leading men of the state, w i shed for y ^drptos TroWa, a modified 1 Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 6; Diod. xiv. 3 ; Plut. Lyc. 14. Thorax had A^:;~ nd ° f ^ LaCedaemo ™» -™ 7 ^ Lampsacus and * Xen Hell.il 3. 7 ff. Plutarch (Lys. 16) differs from this ; in his account Lysander sails from Samos to Thrace, and Gylippus takes the money home, appropriating some on the way-in whichsoever he is detected. Cp. Diorl. xiii. 106. however, ne 3 Aih. Pol. 34 : diaaoi^eiv rbv 8r}fj.ov. VOL. III. 2(} 466 OLIGARCHS, MODERATES, DEMOCRATS, 404. [XII. democracy, like that of Clisthenes, with a restriction of the franchise. 1 The numbers of the oligarchical party were increased by the exiles, who, on the proposal of Theramenes, were allowed Critias. t0 return immediately after the conclusion of peace. 2 Foremost among these was Critias, the son of Callaeschrus, who, since his banishment in 406, had lived in Thessaly, the chosen land of those who found the existence of a law-abiding citizen intolerable. 3 While there, he had occupied himself with organising a rebellion of the Penestae against their masters, from a restless spirit of faction rather than a love of freedom or democratical government, 4 for he was himself a warm admirer of the Spartan system, and had even written a treatise on it. Other members of the extreme party were Satyrus, by whom Cleophon was brought to execution, Charmides, Theognis, and Eratosthenes. Alci- biades either could not or would not return. He was too deeply implicated in hostility to Sparta to come back at a moment when Spartan influences were all-powerful. After the conclusion of peace he left the Chersonese for the court of Pharnabazus, who soon afterwards caused him to be assassinated, perhaps at the request of Critias. 5 The head of the moderate party was Theramenes, with whom were associated Anytus, Clitophon, Archinus, Phormisius, and others ; in the ranks of the popular party were the generals 1 Diodorus repeats, but with less precision, the account given in the Ath. Pol. In both it is assumed that it was one of the conditions of peace that the Athenians should retain rj ndrpios rroXirela, but Diodorus says that the phrase was differently interpreted— by the oli- garchs as f) 7ra\aia KardaTaais {i.e. the constitution before Solon), and by the moderates as fj tg>v Trarepcov noXirela {i.e. the constitution of Clisthenes). Xenophon fails us at this point ; he says not a word of events between the capitulation and the establishment of the Thirty, 01 tovs Trarpiovs vopovs (Tvyypdyj/ovai. 2 Lysias, 12. 77 ; Xen. ii. 3. 42. 3 Plato, Orito 53. 4 Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24. 6 See Pint. Ale. 38 ff. ; Beloch, G.G. ii. 118 f.; Critias probably took the same view of Alcibiades now as Phrynichus had done in 411. XI I. 24. ] L YSANDER AGAIN AT A THENS, 404. 467 Strombichides and Eucrates, and Thrasybulus of Steiria, and they were afterwards joined by many of the moderates 'such as Archinus and Anytus. m Immediately after the conclusion of the peace the associa- tions on which the oligarchs chiefly relied began to show activity. Five ephors were elected by them to promote the interests of their party in any way that seemed expedient. These are not to be regarded as public magistrates like the Probuli, who preceded the former change of the constitution; they were the servants of their party, not the servants of the state. The public election of such officers— whose number and name are so significant— would imply a greater change in the constitution than we have a right to assume at a time when the democracy was still in existence. 1 Perhaps it was by the secret influence of these officers that the oligarchs were able to get rid of the leaders of the democratic party. Strombichides, Eucrates, and others were accused of con- spiracy, and put in prison, though their execution was not carried out till the Thirty came into power. 2 24. The disputes were brought to an end by the appear- ance of Lysander, who was summoned to decide the question. In the Constitution of Athens we are briefly informed that the oligarchs carried the day ^ns^the with the support of Lysander, and, on the Thh-ty^'re 6 proposal of Dracontides, it was resolved to established - elect thirty commissioners to draw up a constitution. Dio- dorus, who seems to follow the same authority, gives more details. As the leader of the moderate party, Theramenes opposed the proposals of the oligarchs and Lysander, and remonstrated against the attempt to rob the city of her freedom, calling his attention to the clause in the treaty which allowed the Athenians to enjoy their hereditary con- *iA^? 8ia8 ' 12 ' 43 ' Wh ° alone menti °ns these officers, says expresslv that they were elected 8 W o K paria S er t oVv rpia- kovtcl elcrrjkdov Kpidr]a6p.evoi, arravTcov Oavaros KaTeyiyvacnteTO. See further, Ath. Pol. 36. 2 Ath. Pol. 35 ; Xen. Hell. ii. 3. ii. 12. 3 A very few months sufficed to show the Thebans that they would gain nothing by Sparta's victory. Hence a complete change in their feelings towards the Athenians. XII. 25.] CRITICS AND THERA ME2VES, 404. 471 of men whose only fault was their eminence or wealth. If men like Leon of Salamis, and Niceratus, the son of Nicias (who had never shown any sympathy with democracy), were put to death, their friends, who were now inclined to support the oligarchical party, would become hostile to it. 1 Critias retorted that a tyranny needs equal watchfulness, whether the tyrants be thirty or one. Theramenes then pointed out that the basis of power was too small; they must associate with their rule a sufficient number of men to give them a real superiority in power. The Thirty, to prevent Theramenes from becoming the centre of a party, prepared a list of three thousand . persons to whom they were willing to give a share in the constitution, and when he declared that the number was insufficient, they deprived all the citizens, outside their list, of their weapons. They were now above all fear; they robbed and murdered as they pleased, and bade Theramenes do the same, but he refused, saying that such conduct was worse than that of the sycophants whom they had put to death. It was now clear to the more violent members of the party that they must rid themselves of Theramenes. In a meeting of the Council, Critias attacked him for his criticism of their conduct, and demanded his execution. At Sparta, the best governed of all cities, no one was allowed to criticise the government under the severest penalties. If Theramenes were spared, he would inspire their opponents with a spirit of rebellion; if he were put to death, his execution would destroy the hopes of all the malcontents within the city or without. Theramenes defended himself in a manner which won the audience, and there was little doubt that he would be acquitted if the decision were left to the Council. For this Critias was prepared. He had gathered together a number of men armed with daggers to support him in any 1 For Leon see Plato's Apol. 32. Socrates with four others was bidden by the Thirty to bring him from Salamis to Athens for execution : Ota kcu aXkbis eKetvoi 7toAAois 7roXAa TrpoaeraTTov (iovKo/xevoi oas 7r\eio-Tovs avaiiKiiaai alTia>v. Socrates refused to go, though the other four went. 472 DEATH OF THERAMENES, 404. [XII. 25. act of violence, and these he now summoned to the entrance of the Council room. He then came forward and addressed the Council: "Among our recent laws is one which, while Execution of forbidding the execution of any member of the Theramenes. Three Thousand w j fc hout your vote, permits the Thirty to put to death by their own sentence any one outside that list. I, therefore, with the consent of my colleagues strike off Theramenes from the list of the Three Thousand ; and we shall order his execution." Theramenes sprang to the altar of Hestia, and called on those present for help. "Any one of your names," he cried, "can be struck out of the list as easily as mine." The appeal was in vain. The precincts of the Council room were filled with men who were known to be armed, and no one dared lift a hand to help. The Eleven were summoned. They came, led by "the shameless and insolent " Satyrus, and Critias bade them arrest Theramenes, "who had been sentenced according to the law," and deal with him as was fit. Satyrus and his attendants tore Theramenes from the altar in spite of his resistance and cries, and carried him through the market-place, loudly pro- testing against the iniquity of his condemnation. " Be quiet," said Satyrus, "or you will suffer for it." "If I am quiet," retorted Theramenes, " shall I not suffer % " When drinking the hemlock he threw a portion of the draught away as in a game of cottabus, saying : "This to Critias, the fair." 1 26. By the death of Theramenes the Thirty seemed to have removed all opposition, and to make themselves yet more secure they allowed no one but those who were on their 1 Xen. Hell. ii. 3. In the Ath. Pol. c. 37, Theramenes is con- demned not only under the law quoted by Xenophon, but also under another which forbade any of those who had taken part in the de- struction of Eetionea {supra, p. 416) to share in the constitution of the Thirty. The order of events is also different : the citizens are not deprived of their arms till after the death of Theramenes, whose execution takes place after the arrival of Thrasybulus at Phyle. There is a similar difference with regard to Callibius and the garri- son from Lacedaemon. Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 14 ; Plut. Lys. 15 ; Ath. Pol. 37. XII. 26.] RETURN OF THRASYBULUS, 403. 473 list to enter the city. But a reaction had begun. With a body of seventy exiles, Thrasybulus (supra, p. 407) advanced from Thebes and seized Phyle, a border fortress Thrasybulus on Mount Parnes. The Thirty sent a force atPh y le - of cavalry to dislodge him, but in vain. A blockade was rendered impossible by the weather (it was now winter, 404- 403), and when the Lacedaemonian garrison marched out from Athens to check the predatory excursions of the exiles, they were surprised and put to flight with considerable loss. The Thirty became alarmed. They resolved to secure for themselves a refuge at Eleusis, in the event of their being unable to maintain the city. The population of the town was arrested and handed over to the Eleven; on the next day, by a forced vote of the Three Thousand, they were condemned to death to the number of three hundred. 1 Thrasybulus was now in command of one thousand men. With these, by a rapid march through the night, he entered the Peiraeus, and established himself at Munychia. „ A ; J He advances lhe Thirty at once attacked him, but they to Peiraeus. were defeated, Critias being slain in the con- DeathofCritias - flict. 2 ' When giving back the bodies of the slain, the opposing parties were brought into contact, and Cleocritus, the herald of the mysteries, a man of large stature and commanding voice, addressed the citizens from the city, begging them to renounce allegiance to the Thirty, who for the sake of their own gain had slain more Athenians in eight months than the Peloponnesians had done in ten years. Let all unite and put an end to this shameful war, detestable alike to gods and men, in which the very conquerors wept over the slain. The words were not without effect. The Three Thousand were no longer of. one mind, and after some discussion, they deposed the Thirty, and elected a body of Ten, 3 one from each tribe. The Thirty retired to Eleusis. 1 Xen. I.e. ii. 4. 8 f. ; Lys. 12. 52; 13. 44; cp. Diod. xiv. 32. Some citizens from Salamis were included in the condemnation. 2 Xen. I.e. 10-19. 3 Xen. I.e. 20-24. In Ath. Pol. two bodies of Ten are mentioned. 474 PA US AN IAS AT A THENS, 403. [XII. 26. Skirmishes went on between the city and the Peiraeus without any important result, but as their numbers increased, the exiles became more confident and formidable. From the city and from Eleusis the oligarchs sent to Lacedaemon for assistance. At Ly Sander's suggestion a hundred talents were supplied. He also persuaded the city to send him to Lysander and Athens as harmost, and his brother Libys, who Pausanias was admiral, in command of a fleet of forty ships. On his arrival he joined his party at Eleusis, while the fleet cut off all supplies from the Peiraeus. The patriots were now in a situation almost hopeless, but fortunately for Athens, Lysander's successes had provoked a reaction against him at Sparta. King Pausanias was by no means inclined to allow Lysander to take the lead, and with him was a majority of the ephors. They called out the allies, of whom, however, the Boeotians and Corinthians, already offended at the conduct of the Spartans, refused to furnish contingents, and sent Pausanias at the head of a considerable force to Athens. He had no intention of acting with vigour ; he wished to put an end to the faction, and deprive Lysander of the opportunity of interfering, and in this policy he was supported by the ephor Nauclidas, who was present according to custom in his army. After some skirmishing, negotiations were opened with him by both The recon- parties, from the Peiraeus and from the city, ciiiation. an( j through him with Sparta. Fifteen com- missioners were sent to Athens, and terms were arranged which both the oligarchs and democrats were willing to accept ; on the disputed question of the constitution nothing was said. The citizens were allowed to return unmolested to their occupations ; but any one who was afraid to remain The first were chosen on the deposition of the Thirty to bring the war to a close, but they continued the tyranny until they were deposed in turn, and a second Ten, ol ^eXnaroi, were chosen. Yet in this second Ten was Rhinon, whom Isocrates adv. Call. § 7 mentions as one of the Ten elected on the deposition of the Thirty. Cp. also Heracl. Pont. i. 9. XII. 26.] THE ATHENIANS RECONCILED, 403. 475 in the city was at liberty to migrate to Eleusis, which was established as an independent community, and so remained for two years (403-401). A general law of amnesty was carried, under which the past was to be forgotten; the only persons excepted being the Thirty Tyrants, the Eleven, and the Ten ; and even these might claim the benefit of the law, if they would submit to the legal scrutiny of their office. 1 Pausanias returned with his army to Sparta. Lysander and Libys were completely foiled ; Athens was delivered from the Tyrants, and democracy was still alive in Greece. 1 Xen. I.e. 24-29, who specifies the Ten in the Peiraeus (supra, p. 470) ; Ath. Pol. c. 38-39, in which the Ten who first succeeded the Thirty {supra, p. 473) are meant. Andoc. De Myst. § 81 ff. The recon- ciliation took place in the archonship of Euclides, 403-402; Ath. Pol c. 39. CHAPTER XIII. EVENTS IN SICILY FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT TO THE PEACE WITH CARTHAGE, 4I3-405- I. After the departure of Gylippus and the allied forces from Syracuse, Hermocrates {supra, p. 232) was by far the most prominent man in the city. It was due to him that Syracuse had enlarged and improved her navy, and won those great victories which had cut off the retreat of the Athenians by sea; he had also taken a large share in the e ' final destruction of the Athenian army. Eager to carry out to the end the work which he had so success- fully begun, he persuaded his countrymen to send him out with a fleet in 412 to join the Peloponnesians in completing the ruin of the Athenian empire, which he with the rest of the Grecian world believed could not be long delayed. 1 In spite of his noble patriotism, and the eminent services which he had rendered to his nation, Hermocrates had won neither the confidence nor the affection of the Syracusans. He was an oligarch, when the tide of feeling was setting strongly to democracy, and as at Athens after Salamis, so now at Syracuse, the triumph of the fleet threw increased power into the hands of the people. It was only by his success as a general that he maintained his ground. In his absence the people asserted their power, and the constitution of Syracuse was rearranged on more purely democratic lines. The change was mainly due to Diocles — the popular leader of 1 Thuc. viii. 26, towards the end of the summer. Thucydides mentions twenty-two ships. Diodorus, xiii. 63, speaks of thirty-five. 476 XIII. 2.] SEGESTA AND CARTHAGE, 410. 477 the day ; whether or not he was Diodes the legislator is doubtful— who persuaded the city to introduce the lot in the election of officers, and to appoint a commission to draw up a new constitution. 1 When the Syracusan fleet was destroyed at Cyzicus, the enemies of Hermocrabes had no difficulty in depriving him and his colleagues of their office, and driving them Hermocrates into exile. He received the intelligence at isban ished. Antandrus, and though assured of the sympathy and support of his officers, he did not attempt to resist the decree of his city. After giving up the fleet to his successors, he retired to the court of Pharnabazus, and soon afterwards joined the Spartan embassy to Susa (supra, p. 430), intending, when an opportunity offered, to win his way back to Syracuse. 2. Sicily now became the scene of a conflict even more terrible than that from which she had just emerged, and, as before, the mischief began with the quarrels of Segesta and Selinus. The success of Syracuse, which seiinusand supported Selinus, the annihilation of the Se g es * a - Athenians, who were the allies of Segesta, could not fail to affect the mutual relations of the cities. Selinus was able to carry everything with a high hand ; Segesta feared that by resistance she might bring upon herself the vengeance of Syracuse. She voluntarily retired from the territory which had been in dispute, but when the Selinuntians pushed their encroachments still further, she sent envoys Segesta appeals to Carthage, begging for assistance, and offer- to Car tha ge . ing to place herself in the hands of Carthage. After some discussion the Carthaginians decided to send help, and appointed Hannibal, the grandson of Hamilcar who perished at Himera, general of the forces. 2 Hannibal sent envoys with 1 Diod. xiii, 35, who ascribes to this Diocles what was true or thought to be so of the older statesman. Freeman, Hist of Sicily iii. 442, 722. 2 Cp. vol. ii. p. 446 ; Diodorus says that his father, Gisco, ended his life at Selinus, having been banished from Carthage owing to Hamilcar's defeat. 478 THE CARTHAGINIANS IN SICIIY, 409. [XIII. 3. the Segestaeans to Syracuse to complain of the conduct of Selinus, and the Syracusans, who after the exhaustion of the previous war were in no mood to enter on a new one, voted to remain at peace with Carthage, though they would not renounce their alliance with Selinus. 1 The Carthaginians upon this despatched a small force to the aid of Segesta, and the Selinuntians, who in the confidence of superior power had spread through the country, looting and destroying, were at length taken off their guard, and severely defeated, with the loss of all their spoil. Both sides now applied for help, the Selinuntians to Syracuse, the Segestaeans to Carthage. War between Sicily and Carthage was inevit- able, and Hannibal, who was eager to wipe out from his race the blot of Himera, spent the winter in collecting forces. 2 3. In the spring of 409 Hannibal landed on the promontory of Lilybaeum, at the head of a large force well equipped Hannibal lands with arms and siege-engines. 3 He drew his in Sicily. ships ashore in the bay of Motye to show the Syracusans that he had no intention of sailing against their city, and marched with his forces to Selinus. The city was ill prepared for an attack. Though she had joined in the previous war, taking the part of the Carthaginians against Gelo, in two generations of peace her walls had been allowed to fall out of repair. Her energies had been absorbed in building the vast temples whose ruins attest the prosperity of Selinus, — temples still unfinished when the invader fell upon the city. Yet in the hope that succour would come from Syracuse she determined to resist. Hannibal brought Destruction up his engines, but nine days elapsed before of selinus. a breach was made in the walls sufficient to admit of a successful assault. Even then the town was 1 Diod. xiii. 43. 2 Diod. xiii. 44. He informs us that in the force which came to the aid of Segesta were a number of Campanians who had been hired by the Chalcidian cities to support Athens. 3 About the numbers ancient authors were in dispute. Ephoru3 mentioned 200,000 foot and 4000 horse ; Timaeus not much more than 100,000. XIII. 3-] DESTRUCTION OF SELINUS, 409. 479 not captured without a good deal of hard fighting in the streets. It was given over to the soldiers, who slew without distinction of age or sex, and carried off everything of value from the houses and temples. Only those women were spared who had fled with their children to the temples, and they were spared not for mercy's sake, but lest in despair they should set fire to the sacred places and destroy the treasures in them— spared, too, for outrage and slavery. Six thousand persons are said to have perished; five thousand were carried captive into Africa ; about half that number escaped to Agrigentum. The very corpses of the dead were mutilated ; the savage conquerors went about with strings of hands round their bodies, and heads spitted on their spears. The walls of the city were levelled to the ground. 1 When the envoys from Selinus applied for assistance, the Syracusans were at war with Naxos and Catana. They at once came to terms with these cities ; and on hearing of the siege of Selinus they sent out a force of 3000 heavy-armed under Diocles to relieve it. The army had only reached Agrigentum when they heard that Selinus was taken. Thereupon they sent envoys to Hannibal, begging him to allow the captives to be ransomed, and to spare the shrines of the gods. Hannibal replied that the Selinuntians had failed to preserve their freedom, and must therefore submit to slavery ; the gods, he added, had already left the city in resentment at the conduct of the inhabitants. Yet he received with kindness the aged Empedion, who came to him as an envoy from the fugitives, and not only restored to him his own lands, but set at liberty any of his kinsmen who were among the captives. Empedion had not changed with his city ; he had maintained the Carthaginian cause, and urged Selinus to open her gates to Hannibal. The citizens who had escaped were subsequently allowed to return and cultivate the soil on condition of paying a rent to Carthage. 2 4. Hannibal now advanced to Himera, the city which was 1 Diod. xiii. 54-57. 2 Diod. xiii. 59. 480 DESTRUCTION OF HIMERA, 409. [XIII. 4. the scene of his grandfather's defeat and death, and which, therefore, above all others, was marked out by him for Attack on vengeance. Part of his army he placed on some Himera, and hills at a little distance from the city ; with the of thTcity! 1 resfc he encam P ed round He battered the walls with engines, and drove mines under them, supporting the roof of his mines with beams, which he set on fire when the work was finished. The Himeraeans, aided by the army of Diodes, now amounting to about 5000 men, defended themselves with courage and energy; they repaired their shattered walls, and even drove the Cartha- ginians back to their camp on the hills, but only to be defeated with great slaughter by Hannibal. Diocles, alarmed for the safety of Syracuse by a report that Hannibal was about to march on that city, resolved to take his forces back at once; and though the Sicilian ships, which had been recalled from Ionia at the approach of war with Carthage, appeared off Himera, the town was unable to hold out longer. A considerable number of the women and children were carried away by these ships to a place of security, but before the whole population could be thus saved, a new breach was made in the walls, through which the irresistible Iberians in Hannibal's army fought their way. The same indiscriminate slaughter began as at Selinus, but Hannibal put an end to it : he wished to take as many captives as he could. The houses he gave up to the soldiers as spoil ; the temples he plundered and burnt, the city he razed to the ground, the women and children he placed in the camps; but the men, to the number of three thousand, he "led to the place where Hamilcar had been executed by Gelo," and there put them to death with torture and mutilation. 1 He then returned in triumph to Carthage (409). 5. Since his exile, Hermocrates had been preparing for his 1 aiKKrdfxfvos icare triage, Diod. xiii. 62. According to the Cartha- ginian story (and Herodotus) Hamilcar was not executed by Geio, but Diodorus follows some other version of his death (Hdt. vii. 165) I XI 1 1 . 5- ] DEA TH OF HERMO CRA TES, 407. 481 return to Syracuse, and he had received liberal support from Pharnabazus towards his object. He was now (408) at Messene, where he built himself five triremes, and took into his pay a force of a thousand hoplites. With j „ Return of these, and as many more of the fugitive Hermocrates Himeraeans, he endeavoured to make his way to Sicil y- into Syracuse. The moment seemed favourable. It was clear that the military administration had not been improved by the recent changes in the city. Diocles had accomplished nothing, and was quite incapable of meeting Hannibal in the field ; Hermocrates was known to be an able commander. But the attempt was made in vain ; the opposition was still too strong. Hermocrates then marched through the island to Selinus, rebuilt a portion of the walls, summoned back the inhabitants who could be collected, and made the town a base of operations against the Phoenicians. He laid waste the country of Motye and Panormus, carrying off abundant spoils, and defeating the enemy with great loss. When his success became known at Syracuse, the demos were more inclined to receive him, but Diocles was still able to prevent his return. To gain their good will yet more, he repaired to Himera (407), and, encamping in the suburbs of the ruined city, collected the bones of the Syracusans who had fallen there. These he placed on wagons richly adorned, and sent them on their way to Syracuse. As an exile he could not enter the city, but the arrival of the wagons caused the outburst of faction which he expected. Diocles, who was responsible for abandoning the bodies unburied and now opposed the reception of the relics, was driven into exile, and the remains of the dead were honoured by a public funeral. Even after this service Hermocrates was not admitted to the city, so deeply rooted was the fear that he would make himself tyrant. He retired to Selinus; but not long afterwards, on the invitation of friends, he came again to Syracuse, and forced his way with a few Death of adherents into the town. He had reached Hermocrates. the market-place, when he was overpowered and cut down. VOL. III. 2 H 482 SIEGE OF A GR1GENTUM, 4O6. [XIII. 6. Of his supporters, a few owed their escape to the belief that they were slain, and among these was Dionysius, 1 6. The Carthaginians, encouraged by their success, and perhaps irritated by the action of Hermocrates, resolved to attempt the conquest of the whole of Sicily. Hannibal was Hannibal again chosen general, and when, owing to his prepares for a age, he begged to decline the office, Himilco, of new campaign, the same family, was appointed to support him. Troops were collected from every quarter, allies from the Mauretanians and Nomads as far as the borders of Cyrene, mercenaries from Iberia and Campania, until a total force of at least 120,000 was reached. 2 Forty triremes, which were sent on in advance, were defeated with a loss of fifteen vessels off the coast of Sicily ; but, in spite of this disaster, Hannibal succeeded in carrying over his army. He had no sooner arrived in Sicily than he marched upon Agrigentum 3 (406). Agrigentum was the second city of Sicily. It was strongly placed, and the advantages of natural position had been in- Siege and creased by art. The country round was fertile, capture of and in expectation of the war, large quantities Agrigentum. of produce had been conveyed into the town. On his arrival, Hannibal made two divisions of his army, as he had done at Himera. One division was encamped on the adjacent hills, the other close to the town. He then sent envoys to the city asking the Agrigentines to become his allies, or at least to remain neutral — requests which were rejected at once. The siege began. In his description of it, Diodorus, our only authority, gives us but little help in regard to the topography. One camp of the Carthaginians, as we have seen, was pitched close to the city, and we may place it to the south-west, on the right bank of the Hypsas. On this side of the city walls the generals, after a careful 1 Diod. xiii. 63, 75. The chronology is uncertain. 2 Diod. xiii. 80. So Timaeus, but here again Ephorus gives & larger number— 300,000. 3 Diod. xiii. 80-85, who here digresses into a long account of Agrigentum. XIII. 6.] SYRACUSE SENDS HELP, 4O6. 483 examination, directed their attack. Two wooden towers were constructed, from which for a whole day the Cartha- ginians carried on the assault, till they were recalled at nightfall by the sound of a trumpet. Before morning the towers had been burned by the besieged. Hannibal now resolved to attack the wall at several points, and in order to obtain material for raising mounds against it from Avhich the besiegers could carry on operations (x^/mra, supra, p. 137), he gave orders for the destruction of the tombs which lay outside the city. His orders were being rapidly carried out when the work received a sudden check. A thunderbolt struck the monument of Thero at the moment when it was being pulled down, and the soothsayers forbade any further disturbance of the sepulchre. A plague also broke out in the camp, causing intense suffering. Hannibal himself was one of the victims, and Himilco, seeing his army distressed with superstitious terrors, not only countermanded any further destruction of the tombs, but even sacrificed a child to Cronos (Moloch) after the Carthaginian manner, and plunged victims into the sea to propitiate Poseidon. He did not, however, relax his efforts in the siege, but completed the mounds with the help of other materials, and placed his engines upon them. The Agrigentines were aided by Dexippus, a Lacedaemonian, at the head of 1500 mercenaries, and by 800 Campanians, who in the previous campaign had been in Hannibal's pay, but had left him in disgust at the close. The Syracusans, who now fully recognised the danger which threatened Sicily, sent large reinforcements, 1 which were joined on the way by contingents from Camarina, Gela, and elsewhere, till the whole force is said to have amounted to 30,000 foot and 5000 horse, and they were supported by a fleet of thirty ships. The army had crossed the Himeras, when it was met by a detachment of the Carthaginians. These it severely defeated 1 Agrigentum had refused to aid Syracuse against Athens (supra, p. 341). 484 FALL OF AGRLGENTUM, 4O6. [XIII. 6. and pursued towards Agrigentum, capturing the camp on the hills, in which Daphnaeus, the Syracusan general, took up his quarters. The Agrigentines were eager to sally out and complete the destruction of the enemy, but their generals refused, and the fugitives found safety in the camp by the city. When the Syracusan soldiers joined those in the city, there were loud complaints of the conduct of the generals. A meeting was called, which ended in a tumult ; four of the Agrigentine generals were stoned to death, the fifth being spared on account of his youth. Even Dexippus was suspected of treachery. Daphnaeus now contemplated an attack on the camp of the Carthaginians, and for a time succeeded in reducing them to such distress that the soldiers were on the eve of a mutiny, when Himilco, bringing up ships from Motye and Panormus, fortunately captured a Greek fleet laden with stores for the city. The situation was now entirely changed : the Agrigen- tines had consumed their stores so lavishly that there was little or nothing left ; and it became clear to the auxiliaries that there was no hope of saving the city. The Campanians went over at once to Himilco; Dexippus was suspected of bribery, and at any rate refused to remain. Agrigentum was abandoned to its fate. After the departure of these troops, the Agrigentines, leaving the infirm and aged behind, slipped away to Gela under cover of night, in terror of the enemy, in sorrow for their friends and lost homes, in utter misery and despair. Himilco seems to have made no attempt to attack them; he was satisfied to gain the city without the risk and loss of a battle. The fugitives were allowed by the Syracusans to settle at Leontini. 1 When Himilco entered Agrigentum there was the same ruthless slaughter of the helpless, the same desecration and destruction of temples as at Selinus. The amount of spoil was enormous : Agrigentum was one of the richest of Greek cities; from the day of its foundation it had never 1 Diod. xiii. 89. XIII. 7-] DIONYSIUS A GENERAL AT SYRACUSE, 406. 485 been captured, and the inhabitants took a pride in acquiring the costliest furniture and the finest works of art. The choicest pictures and statues were sent to Carthage, among them the famous bull of Phalaris. The siege had lasted eight months, and came to an end in December 406. Himilco remained in the city for the rest of the winter. 1 7. The fall of Agrigentum created the greatest consterna- tion throughout Sicily. The inhabitants of the country sought shelter in Syracuse, and sent their The rise of families and their goods to Italy. The Syra- Dionysius. cusan generals were severely blamed for abandoning the city, but no measures were taken and merely formal accusations were brought against them by the Agrigentines till Dionysius, who had greatly distinguished himself at Agrigentum, came forward in the Assembly and attacked them as traitors ; in punishing such men, he said, they ought not to wait for the legal sentence of condemnation, but to take the matter into their own hands at once. For this speech Dionysius was fined, as an incendiary, but the fine was at once paid by Philistus, the famous historian of his country, who urged Dionysius to go on as he had begun, and he would pay his fines the whole day long, if necessary. Dionysius then charged the generals with receiving bribes. He advised the people no longer to choose their generals from the rich, who were always ready to increase their own wealth at the expense of their country, but from the poorer citizens, who could be trusted. He had already resolved to make himself tyrant of Syracuse ; and after the feeble and disastrous cam- paign which had just closed, it was not difficult to persuade the people that a strong hand was needed, if the war with Carthage was to be carried on with success. Daphnaeus and his colleagues were deposed, and other generals chosen, among whom was Dionysius himself. But he refused to act in concert 1 Diod. xiii. 90. The bull with other treasures was restored to Agrigentum by Scipio 260 years after the siege, and was to be seen there in the time of Diodorus. Timaeus, who lived in the interval doubted its existence. 486 DION YS I US AS TYRANT, 406. [XI 1 1. 7. with his colleagues, and secretly spread reports that they were in communication with the enemy. To strengthen his position, he persuaded the Syracusans to recall the exiles — men of the party of Hermocrates, who were opposed to the democracy, and had no hope of regaining their position while it remained in power. Among these he would find friends as long as he could satisfy their demands. His schemes were aided by an appeal for help from Gela, which was in immediate danger of attack by Himilco. Dionysius The city was under the command of Dexippus, at Geia. to whose support Dionysius was sent with a moderate force. He found the city distracted by faction, and at once joining the party of the poor, he brought the rich to trial, got them condemned and their property con- fiscated. The money thus obtained he spent in paying the soldiers, and returned to Syracuse the idol of the army. There also he excited the poor against the rich, who, he declared, were neglecting the protection of the city at a time of the greatest danger. One plan, and one only, could save them ; as in the days of Gelo their army must be led by a general with full powers. The people assented, and he was elected to the office. He had still much to fear. His opponents were many, and the city began to be suspicious. He knew the democratic instincts of the Syracusan people, among whom it was not safe openly to take a step towards tyranny. As general he ordered the military population, under forty years of age, to march out to Leontini, with provisions for thirty days. Leontini at this time was full of fugitives from Agrigentum, of exiles and strangers. There he encamped, and in the night he seized the Acropolis of the city, pretending that the step was necessary to protect himself against assassination. Next day an Assembly was called, consisting for the most part of soldiers and fugitives, and by their vote he was allowed to have the security of a bodyguard of six hundred men of his own selection. With this support he was able to throw off the mask and appear as tyrant. He got his rivals XIII. 8.] THE FALL OF GELA, 405. 487 Daphnaeus and Damarchus executed ; Dexippus he dis- missed to Hellas, as he found him unwilling to fall in with his schemes. He also strengthened his connection with the oligarchical party by marrying the daughter of Hermocrates, and giving his sister in marriage to Polyxenus, the brother of Hermocrates. By this means Dionysius, " who began life as a scribe and a common citizen, became tyrant of the greatest city in Greece, a position which he retained till his death thirty-eight years afterwards." 1 8. In the spring (405), Himilco, after destroying what remained of the carved work of the temples at Agrigentum, and levelling the city with the ground, ad- Himilco vanced into the territory of Gela and Camarina. attacks Gela - After devastating the territory, he sat down -before Gela in an entrenched camp, and began his attack on the city. The Geloans defended themselves bravely, and Dionysius came to their aid with a large force from Syracuse. 2 At first he pitched his camp near the sea, and attempted to cut off the enemy's supplies ; afterwards he divided his army into three sections, and delivered an attack. Some slight success was gained, but the day ended in disaster, and Dionysius was driven back into the city with great loss. A council was held, at which it was decided that Gela was not the place where a decisive battle could be fought. Dionysius asked for a truce on the following / Dionysius day in order to bury the dead, but, under cover fails to of night, he sent the people out of the city relieveGela - early in the night to Camarina, and afterwards withdrew himself, leaving two thousand light-armed to kindle fires, and so deceive the enemy into the belief that the city was occupied. These troops also were to leave at dawn. Gela was abandoned to the Carthaginians. At Camarina he com- pelled the women and children and the helpless part of the population to retire with the Geloans at once to Syracuse. 1 Diod. xiii. 96. 2 Diod. xiii. 109. As before, the numbers are differently given by different historians. » 488 DIONYSIUS SECURES HIMSELF, 405. [XIII. 8. It was a mournful exodus. The fear of the Carthaginians overpowered every other feeling; the highborn was mingled with the meanest ; the maiden was forced to renounce her retirement and travel wearily on foot, in the eyes of all men. Some left all they had, satisfied if they could save their lives ; some, under the burden of age and sickness, were unable to go at all. Dionysius was now as thoroughly hated as the men whom he had deposed and executed. If they had been bribed, Exasperation he had allowed the enemy to conquer in order at Dionysms. ^ na (. he might establish his power over the terrified cities. The contingents from Italy returned home. The cavalry, on finding that they could not slay Dionysius on his way back to Syracuse, owing to the presence of his bodyguard, not one of whom, it was observed, had perished in the battle, rode back to the city, and revenged themselves by burning his house and ill-treating his wife till she died. Dionysius, who suspected what was taking place, got to- gether a few troops, on whom he could rely, and hastened home. He arrived at Achradina in the night and found the gates closed against him. These he burned, and rushed to the market-place, where his mercenaries shot down the knights who attempted to check him. He lost no time in executing or banishing all his opponents, and thus became master of the city. The Geloans and Camarinaeans, who suspected his action towards them, joined the Agrigentines at Leontini. 1 Though victorious, Himilco was unable to continue the campaign. He had lost more than half his army by the Peace with plague, and could no longer remain in his camp. Carthage. jj e offered, terms to Dionysius, which were readily accepted. The Carthaginians were to retain all their old colonies ; the Sicanians, Selinus, Himera, and Agrigen- tum were to be given up to them ; Gela and Camarina were to pull down their walls and pay tribute. Leontini, Messene, 1 Diod. xiii. 112 ff. XIII. 8.] PEACE WITH CARTHAGE, 405. 489 and the Sicels were to be independent, Syracuse was to be subject to Dionysius ; the captives and any ships which had been taken on either side were to be restored. Thus the war ended. The Carthaginians returned to Carthage, carrying the plague with them, which raged for some time in the city and among the allies, till the state was brought to the brink of destruction. 1 Sicily, though at a heavy cost, had got rid of the invading host, but Syracuse was once more in the hands of a tyrant. In the West, as in the East, democracy had been found unequal to the task imposed upon her. . 1 Diod. xiii. 114. See Freeman, Hist, of Sicily, vol. iii. c. 9, for a minute account of the invasion. Our authority is Diodorus, who perhaps drew from Philistus — at first or second hand. CHAPTER XIV. LITERATURE, ART, SOCIETY, ETC. I. At the beginning of the Fifth Century, lyric poetry was not only the prevailing mode of poetical composition, but, in the hands of two great masters, it was attain- Simonides ing a higher development than at any previous and Pindar. period. The odes of Simonides of Ceos (558- 468) and Pindar of Thebes (520-440) were the acknowledged masterpieces of lyric art. Of Simonides we have unfor- tunately nothing but a few lyric fragments, and short elegiac poems, commemorative of some person or event, but even in what we have we find a depth of feeling and a felicity of expression unsurpassed in Greek poetry. Simonides before all things knew when he had said enough. It is this which makes his famous couplet on the Spartans who fell at Ther- mopylae so unapproachable. 1 With Pindar we have been more fortunate, at least in regard to his Epinician odes. Of these a considerable number has come down to us, many of which rank among the most splendid compositions of the kind. It is indeed difficult to realise the full effect of the performance of one of these wonderful poems, owing to the difficulty of the language and our ignorance of Greek metres and music. As the Olympic victor was raised for the moment above all mortal men, so was his victory celebrated by a unique combination of music and verse, elaborated with the greatest skill, that each art might give her full support to the other. 2 1 a> dyyeWeiv AaKeSai/zoinoiS 1 on 177 Se Kei/xeda, rois neivatv prjpacri TreiOo/jLevoi. 2 Pindar's poems are dva£trota S oras we owe tne -wise saying that punishment is inflicted for the reformation of the offender, not for the satisfaction of revenge or the adjust- 1 See Grote, I.e. vol. i. 67 ff. ; Zeller, Pre-Socratic Philosophy, vol. ii. ; Windelband, I.e. 205 ff. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy. Leucippus is in other accounts a native of Elea or of Miletus ; but in any case he must be considered the master of Democritus. 2 (See Grote, I.e. i. p. 9 f . ; Pater, l.c, c, iii, \ XIV. 13. ] ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY: DEMOCRITUS. 511 ment of the balance of fault and retribution. In other respects, we must allow, the views of Protagoras were less advanced : he maintained that might was right, which was inconsistent even with his own condemnation of slavery. His most famous doctrine was expressed in the words, " Man is the measure of all things " — which, if it meant that there was no knowledge outside the human mind, was true enough, but far from true if it implied that every man was entitled to have his own rule of right and wrong. He refused to enter into any arguments about the existence or nature of the gods on the ground that the human faculties were inadequate, and human life too short for such discussions, views which naturally brought him into disrepute as an atheist. In his metaphysical speculations he seems to have been a follower of Heraclitus {supra, p. 507), and, in fact, his teaching on the nature of knowledge implies a theory in which all things are in constant change. 1 Of the ethical teaching of Democritus, the greatest representa- Democntus - tive of the school of Abdera, we have many interesting frag- ments. Sometimes he speaks as a utilitarian : " Pleasure and disgust are the criteria of good and evil " ; which is, however, but another way of saying that a properly trained nature will hate evil and love good. The highest virtue is to fulfil all duty to the state — it is in the state that a man's nature becomes realised, and he shows his qualities, good or bad. Duty must be done for its own sake, without thought of the gods or of a future existence, for which indeed there is no room in the system of Democritus. From the conscious- ness of duty fulfilled arises that peace of mind which is the true human felicity. This peace is neither the rapture of the mystic nor the dream of the idealist ; it is the calm satis- faction of the man who does not seek his pleasures in what is mortal, or undertake tasks which are too high for him, for the old sayings fxr)8ev ayav, yv(o6i creavrov are still among the best guides in life. The greatest help towards attaining 1 See Protagoras in Pauly's Real- Encyclopaedic 512 POLITICAL SCIENCE: HIPPODAMUS. [XIV. 14. this peace is education, of which Democritus nobly says, that it is an ornament to the prosperous and a refuge to the unfortunate. There is also no greater pleasure for a man than the contemplation of great actions and the investiga- tion of truth ; and for his own part, Democritus would rather be the discoverer of a single new truth than sit on the throne of the Great King. The soul is the home of the genius which shapes our lives, and chance is but a phantom invented by mankind to excuse their own folly. 1 14. The beginnings of political science also go back to the Sixth Century. The Pythagorean societies had drawn upon Political themselves the hatred of the cities in which science. they were formed because their principles seemed hostile to civic life. In other cases, we find philo- sophers taking a leading part in the political movements of their cities. Empedocles and Parmenides were remembered with honour at Agrigentum and Elea. As time went on, the various constitutions were classified, and their merits discussed ; in the time of Herodotus there were already three types — monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy — though he strangely places the discussion of them in the mouths of the Persian conspirators. 2 A further step was taken when men who were in no way connected with practical politics drew up ideal constitutions. The first to do this was Hippodamus of Miletus (supra, p. 19), who wished to introduce something like mathematical precision into his state, and, led perhaps by some knowledge of Athenian juries, wished that the sentences of the popular juries should be revised by a supreme court. The sophists, of course, gave much attention to such subjects. Protagoras was inclined to maintain the authority of the state ; he regarded justice as the uniting principle in politics, and a knowledge of justice, he said, comes insensibly to any one who has been bred in a civilised state — a common-sense doctrine which does credit to the " sophist." Other teachers 1 See Beloch, Griech. Gesch. i. 626 f., and the quotations there given from Democritus. 2 Herod, iii. 80 f. XIV. T5-] THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE CITIZEN. 513 held more dangerous doctrines. Much was made of the difference between convention and nature. Thrasymachus in the Republic of Plato regards justice as the outcome of a social compact which limits the natural rights of man. Hippias considered those laws only as divine which were uni- versal. But what is to become of the state if "nature" is only another name for "force" — especially as it became more and more clear, in the transformation of Greek politics, " that the government of a state must have force at its back " % During the later period of the Peloponnesian war, the opposi- tion of oligarchy and democracy became an all-absorbing interest, and as Sparta gained in the contest, her institutions attracted more attention, and greatly influenced the political speculation of the time. 1 15. The views of the philosophers, if they had become popular, would have destroyed the orthodox religion. In the system of Democritus the gods were allowed philosophy to exist, but only as spirits who took no part and reli s ion - in the ordering of the world ; Anaxagoras put intellect in the place of divine power, and Protagoras was an " agnostic." It was only in the teaching of the Pythagoreans that re- ligion maintained a place, and their religion was not that of the common people. There was also an opposition between the philosopher and the citizen ; the man who, as a rule, was without family ties, who wandered from his native city, or did not hesitate to criticise her institutions, was regarded with suspicion by the citizen whose life was passed within his native walls, and who thought it the highest virtue to have the same friends and the same enemies as his state. But the Greeks were not readers, though it is probable that almost every Athenian could read, and for a long time the speculations of philosophy were either written down in books, or discussed in narrow circles. In Athens, at any rate, philosophy and religion did not diverge so widely as among the bolder thinkers of Ionia and Thrace. This was due, in a 1 See Newman, Politics of Aristotle, vol. i. In trod. p. 380 ff. VOL. III. 2 K 514 SOCRATES. [XIV. 15. great measure, to the influence of Socrates, the son of So- phroniscus (469-399), who, discarding physical inquiries alto- gether, devoted himself to moral and mental speculation and criticism. He was an Athenian of the Athenians, so great a lover of his city that he never left it except to serve in the battlefield, and when condemned to death, refused to save his life by disobedience to the laws under which he suffered ; a man of so religious a nature that he claimed to be guided in all his actions by a divine voice. He took up the questions opened by the wandering sophists, so far as they related to ethics or politics, and endeavoured to find answers to them based on deeper inves- tigation. A sculptor by trade, he was satisfied with the barest pittance of wages, and spent his time in talking to any one whom he could find ready to enter into discussion with him. Asking no fee for his instruction^— if instruction it could be called when he always insisted that he was the most ignorant of the company — he associated with rich and poor, till he gathered round him a band of disciples, who shaped the philosophy of the next century. He wrote nothing, nor did he attempt to frame any system of ethics, or to teach in any regular course. His power lay in conversation ; by a series of subtly contrived questions, he led the discussion this way and that, till his opponent had become involved in inextricable difficulties, or downright contradictions. Pro- fessing to know nothing himself, he was always convincing others of their ignorance, and at the same time stimulated them to a sure foundation of knowledge and virtue. Among those who listened to him was Xenophon, who, in the simple memorials which he has written down of his master's conver- sation, has given us an accurate picture of Socrates as he might be seen in the market-place of Athens, or at a barber's shop, or in the house of a friend, day by day, asking ques- tions and tearing to pieces the answers which he received, till he exposed their superficiality, if he did not attain to the truth beyond them. Plato, also a disciple, made the conver- sations of Socrates the basis of his dialogues. Through his \ XIV. i6.] PHYSICAL SCIENCE. 515 genius, Socrates has become the best-known figure among the philosophers of the world, and the account which he has given of his master's closing days is little less than a canonisation. For Socrates, whose whole life was passed in the performance of duty, fell a victim to the religious and political susceptibilities of the Athenians ; he was accused of atheism, and of perverting the young men with whom he associated, and, when more than seventy years of age, he was condemned to death (399). l6. Through Socrates, Athens became a centre of philo- sophy, so far as it concerned ethics and politics. In the department of science she had, as we have said, but little share. Hippocrates, the great e lcme " physician of the century, was a native of Cos, and what may be called the medical schools of the time were to be found in that island and at Epidaurus, Cnidus, and Croton. To Croton also belonged Democedes (vol. ii. 38), and in the next generation Alcmaeon, who was the founder of anatomy. From Cnidus came Euryphon, and Ctesias, who was physi- cian to Artaxerxes Mnemon at the close of the century. The writings of Hippocrates were the " classics " of the art. Disease was no longer regarded as due to supernatural influence, and to be cured by charms and incantations, or by dreams in the temple of Asclepius. Hippocrates maintained that all diseases have a natural cause, and natural means must be taken for their cure. Nature must be aided where possible, and when she cannot be aided, she must be left to herself. "What drugs cannot cure, the knife must heal; where the knife fails, fire must be tried; and if fire fails, there is no cure." 1 In the kindred sciences of botany and biology little was done, though Democritus laid a foundation for future studies in his treatises on the causes of seeds, plants, and fruits, and on the structure of animals. More attention was paid to 1 See Beloch, Gr. Gesch. i. 605; Pauly, Real-Encycl. Hippocrates. The treatise, Be acre et aquis, is still valuable for the acute observa- tions recorded in it of the influence of climate on health. 516 MATHEMATICS: GEOGRAPHY. [XIV. 16. mathematics ; in the Platonic system they occupied the fore- most place among studies preparatory to philosophy — a Mathematics P 03 i tion due not so much to the teaching of Socrates as to Plato's sympathy with exactness of thought. Yet no Athenian seems to have attained great eminence as a mathematician, except perhaps Meton, who arranged the calendar on a new and more accurate system (432), based on a cycle of nineteen years, by which the solar and lunar years were brought into closer connection with each other. Other mathematicians and astronomers of the Periclean age were Oenopides of Chios, Hippocrates also of Chios, Anaxagoras, Hippodamus of Miletus, and Theodoras of Cyrene. 1 In geography, both scientific and descriptive, the Greeks took the liveliest interest. In his Prometheus Vinctus the Geography P oet Aeschylus makes an opportunity to give his audience a sketch of the wanderings of Io ; and, as we have seen, geographical works were among the first efforts in prose. The Pythagoreans advanced so far as to conceive of the earth as a cone, and Parmenides, following this up, invented a theory of zones ; but the current view in the Fifth Century was still that of the Ionians, who regarded the earth as a flat plate floating on air in the middle of the universe. This view seems also to have been held by Herodotus, though he discards the notion of an ocean stream and of a circular earth. The general form of the Mediter- ranean was pretty well known, but measurements were inaccurate, and therefore conflicting. Whether Libya was surrounded by the sea, or the Caspian closed at the northern end were still open questions. Little or nothing was known of the west or north of Europe — for what the Phoenician traders had discovered they kept as a trade secret — or of India, in spite of the voyage of Scylax. 2 1 For Meton's cycle see Pauly, I.e. iii. 141 f. Anaxagoras is said to have occupied himself when in prison with the quadrature of the circle. Windelband, I.e. 130; Burnet, I.e. 281. 2 Herod, iv. 44. \ XIV. i7- ] FINE ARTS: PAINTING. 517 17. In all the departments of fine art, though not equally in all, a new impulse seems to have stimulated Greece in the Fifth Century. The art of painting had long been employed in a subordinate manner for the Paintin& decoration of houses and of marble tombs, and on a smaller scale for the decoration of vases. Of pictures in the modern sense— pictures on wood — we hear of one executed at the command of Mandrocles, of the bridge built by him over the Bosphorus, and placed in the Heraeum at Samos. There is also the legend of the picture of the battle with the Magnetes painted by Bularchus for Candaules of Lydia, who paid for it with its weight in gold. 1 At the end of the Sixth and begin- ning of the Fifth Century there was a remarkable develop- ment in vase painting, the black figures which had long been in use being discarded for red. But the creator of painting as a fine art was Polygnotus of Thasos, who, in Cirnon's time, decorated the walls of the Painted Polygnotus - Porch at Athens. The most famous of his works were the paintings in the porch of the Cnidians at Delphi, in which he depicted the underworld and the destruction of Troy, of which, fortunately, Pausanias has given us a minute descrip- tion. 2 The skill of Polygnotus was shown, not so much in his colouring, as in the expression which he gave to the face and figure, and in the composition of his pictures. "He knew how to breathe into the old forms and rules a higher intellectual life, and develop from them a higher artistic beauty." 3 A painter who did much to improve the decoration of the stage was Agatharchus of Samos, the younger contemporary of Polygnotus, and as a good scene could hardly be painted without some knowledge of perspective, we may suppose that Agatharchus made this his study. 4 But the greatest of 1 Herod, iv. 88 ; Plin. N. II. vii. 126 ; xxxv. 55. 2 Paus. x. 25-31. 3 Brunn. See the article "Malerei" in Baumeister, Denhmdler vol. ii., by Von Rohden. 4 It was Agatharchus whom Alcibiades compelled to paint his 513 FINE ARTS: SCULPTURE. [XIV. 18. Greek painters were Zeuxis of Heraclea and Parrhasius of Ephesus, who belong to the end of the century. Of the works Zeuxis and of Zeuxis we have no details, with the excep- Parrhasius. tion of his Centaur Family, which is described by Lucian. In the Acharnians of Aristophanes there is an allusion to the Eros which he painted in the temple of Aphrodite at Athens — "a beautiful boy crowned with roses." Aristotle says of him that his art was such that he could make even the impossible credible, but his paintings were deficient in the expression of character, being in this respect the reverse of those of Polygnotus. 1 Parrhasius was the con- temporary and rival of Zeuxis. About twenty of his paintings are mentioned : among them the Healing of Telejphus, the Madness of Odysseus, Philodetes on Lemnos, and Prometheus, which show an inclination towards subjects in which strong emotion was expressed without loss of dignity. The story of the contest between Zeuxis and Parrhasius is well known. Zeuxis painted grapes with such fidelity that the birds came to pluck them. Confident of success, he went to the studio of Parrhasius, and seeing his picture, bade him draw the curtain which concealed it. But the curtain was the picture, and Zeuxis acknowledged that Parrhasius had won. 18. In sculpture, the artists of the Fifth Century attained an eminence which has never been surpassed. By what inspiration of genius and sleight of hand they Sculpture. were able to pass at once from the heavy, insipid forms of the previous century, so rigid in their attitude, so vacant in expression, so coarse in the colouring, to the grace- ful and animated perfection of the age of Pericles, cannot be explained. As it was in the drama, so it was in sculpture ; great masters appeared who carried the art forward with astonishing rapidity. The progress was not confined to house by shutting him up in it, and bidding him either finish the work and come out with a handsome payment, or break out as best he could. 1 Luc. Zeuxis. Arist. Ach. 955 ; Arist. Poet. 6. See the article on Zeuxis in Pauly's Real- Ency clop. \ XIV. i8.] SCULPTORS OF THE FIFTH CENTURY. 519 Athens, but spread through the cities round the Saronic gulf, with the exception of Corinth. Canachus of Sicyon, and Hageladas of Argos were widely known quite early in the century ; the first was pre-eminent in working in bronze, and his success in this material greatly influenced the work in stone. He also made a statue of Aphrodite in ivory and gold for her temple in Sicyon. At Aegina the sculptures of the temple of Athena belong to this period ; the chief master here was Onatas, whose works were thought equal to those of the greatest sculptors of the Attic school. 1 In Athens, soon after the Persian war, Critius and Nesiotes executed statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton, to replace those which Xerxes had carried off to Susa. 2 These artists were followed by Calamis and Myron, whose bronze figures of animals were among the finest efforts of Greek plastic art. Greater still was Phidias, in whose hands the human form was rendered with a dignity and perfection which Phldias " is still the wonder and despair of the sculptor. His material was generally marble; the figures in the pediments of the Parthenon, by which his style is best known, were necessarily of this material, but he also wrought in bronze, and, in his finest efforts, in gold and ivory. The statue of Zeus at Olympia, which was regarded in antiquity as something almost superhuman, and the statue of Athena in the Parthenon, were executed in these materials. In estimating the effect of such statues, we must remember that they were placed in the dimly lighted cellae of temples, where the brilliance of the colouring would be much subdued. 3 After the death of Phidias the primacy in art passes from Athens to Argos, where Polyclitus executed work only Polyclltus ' second, and not in all respects second, to the Athenian 1 See Pauly, .Real-Encycl. Onatas, and Paus. viii. 42. 7 ; v. 25 ad fin. 2 Lucian, Philosoph. c. 18; Paus. i. 8. 5, who ascribes the statues to Critius only. 3 See Beloch, G. G. i. 586, who compares the use of gold mosaics in basilicae. Myron was a native of Boeotia, but naturalised at Athens j both he and Phidias were pupils of the Argive Hageladas. 520 STYLES OF ARCHITECTURE. [XIV. 19. master. The Argive Hera was thought worthy to rank with the Olympian Zeus, and in his Amazon Polyclitus carried off the prize from his rival. Other very famous statues were the Diadumenus — a youth binding the chaplet of victory on his brow, of which a copy still exists in the Villa Farnese — the Doryphorus, and the Apoxyomenus. 19. In architecture the advance was not so great as in sculp- ture, though here also the finest efforts of the art belong to this century and were to be found at Athens. To the two styles already in use — the Doric and the Ionic, of which the Doric was employed in Old Greece, the Ionic in Asia, — a third, the Corinthian, was added with its richly carved capital, but the innovation was not re- ceived with much favour. It was even a departure from the severer styles which had hitherto prevailed, when the Erech- theum was rebuilt on the Acropolis, towards the end of the century, with Ionic pillars and Caryatids. The great temples were all Doric : the Parthenon, the Theseum, so-called, the best-preserved piece of Athenian architecture, the temple at t Bassae, the temples of Aegina and Olympia, of cmp Ca Agrigentum and Selinus, though varying in detail, are all of this style. The great architect of the age was Ictinus, the builder of the Parthenon (completed in 438), and of the temple of Apollo Epicurius at Bassae (see supra, p. 127), but he was ably supported by others — by Callicrates, who was joined with him in building the Parthenon, and Mnesicles, the architect of the Propylaea (437-432). Athens now be- came incomparably the most beautiful city of Greece, a city which every one wished to see, and which those who had seen wished to see again. In other parts of Attica also, temples arose at the bidding of Pericles — at Eleusis, where the temple of the Holy Goddesses was rebuilt on a much larger scale; at Sunium, which is still crowned by the columns of the ruined temple of Athena ; and at Rhamnus, where the temple to Nemesis was rebuilt. In Sicily, also, Hiero of Syracuse and Thero of Agrigentum vied with each other in building great temples to celebrate the deliverance XIV. i 9 .] BUILDINGS OF PERICLES. 521 of Sicily from the attack of the barbarians. Agrigentum now became, owing to its wealth and prosperity (see supra, p. 484), the "fairest of the cities of men"; and among the many temples which adorned the town, the temple of Olympian Zeus rose conspicuous, " surpassed in magnitude by no Grecian building of the kind, except that of Diana at Ephesus." 1 At Selinus, also, temples, hardly less splendid, were erected, and in both cases the work seems to have been interrupted by the Carthaginian invasion (c. xiii.). At Segesta, too, are the remains of a temple — " one of the most perfect and striking ruins in Sicily " — which appears to have been left unfinished. At Athens, Pericles did not occupy himself with temples only. To the south of the Acropolis, a little eastward of the theatre of Dionysus, he built an Odeum or other music-hall, for the performance of musical con- buildings, tests, a detached circular building with a dome-shaped roof, supported by numerous pillars in the interior, a copy it was said of the tent of Xerxes. 2 With the help of Hippodamus, he laid out the Peiraeus in the approved mode of straight streets crossing each other at right angles, and the work of Hippodamus was commemorated by the market-place which bore his name. 3 More important by far was the addition of the second of the Long Walls which connected Athens and Peiraeus. It ran parallel to the wall already built (vol. ii. p. 327), to the south of it, and was apparently erected soon after the ostracism of Thucydides, when Pericles ruled without a rival. When this wall was completed, that joining Athens and Phalerum became of little use, and was allowed to fall into decay. 4 20. Yet in spite of this great expenditure in temples and 1 See Bunbury in Smith's Diet, of Geog. sub voc. Agrigentum. 2 Plut. Per. 13. The building seems to have attracted attention: the comedians compared it to the peculiarly shaped head of Pericles, Paus. i. 20. 4 : In Theophrastus, Charact., the dooXeV^s asks : iroaoi elori Kiopes tov 'iiSei'ou ; 3 See Baumeister, Denkrnaler, Peiraeus, 1198 a. 4 Plut. Per. 13 ; Plato, Gorg. 455 E. 522 THE CITY OF A THENS. [XIV. 20. public buildings, little was done for the comfort and con- venience of the residents in the city. We can hardly be Condition of wrong in supposing that Athens was better cared Athens. f or than most Greek towns ; yet what a picture do we get of the streets from the comedians and the orators ! The old men who visit their fellow-juror in the early morning, in the Wasps of Aristophanes, grope their way through the gloom by the light of a few lanterns carried by boys. " Hold the lantern lower," cries one, " that we may not do ourselves a mischief on a stone." "Take care," replies the boy, "and step clear of the mud." Conscious of their own danger, they imagine that their friend is unable to join them because he is suffering from some accident of this kind. Water used in the house was thrown into the street at evening without ceremony, a cry of warning being thought enough for the protection of the passers-by. From a scene in the Ecclesia- zusae it is clear that no rules of decency were observed in the streets at night. 1 To these natural dangers and disgusts were added others arising from a love of practical jokes, or the wildness of Athenian youth. The mutilation of the Hermae is a notorious instance of the outrages which could be perpetrated in the public streets with little fear of detec- tion ; and Lysias gives us a graphic description of a disreput- able street row, which only came to an end when every one engaged had got a broken head. 2 Bands of young men roamed the street — Triballi or Autolekythi, or whatever the name of the society might be — and any one who fell into their hands had reason to remember his misfortune. Or at the breaking up of an entertainment, the more excited of the party would burst open the doors of a mistress or a companion and bring the night to a close there. The less frequented parts of the town were the resorts of the worst characters, and no one could be found there without some risk to his reputation. The astynomi, who were in charge of the city, do not seem to have taken any measures for the preservation Wasps, 246 ff. ; Acharn. 590 f. ; Eccl. 321 f. 2 In Simon. \ XIV. 21.] GREEK RELIGION. 523 of order, at least we never hear of any organised ni^ht police or watchmen. The only remedy for outrage was the law- courts, in which a victory might be worse than Cadmean if obtained by the poor man against the rich. 21. We have already seen {supra, p. 55) how sensitive the Greeks were to any innovations in religious teaching, and this was peculiarly the case at Athens. There Qreek religion were, no doubt, some who had their doubts and their heresies, but as a whole the people wished to worship the gods as their fathers had done, and regarded them from the traditional point of view. The Greek deities were originally personifications of natural forces and pheno- mena, and, to the last, traces of their origin clung about them. Zeus was lord of the sky, and Poseidon ruled the sea. But impulses and emotions also gained a place among divine powers, and the gods themselves were swayed by them. There were also numerous local deities, and spirits without any special name, who influenced men for good and evil. From the first, too, there was an ethical element in Greek religion, as may be seen, for instance, from the fact that oaths were placed under divine sanction, and Ethical however great the resistance which faith offered P r °s r ess. to philosophy, it was inevitable that the higher minds should from time to time find something to criticise in the beliefs of older generations. We have seen how Xenophanes attacked the current ideas of the deities, and insisted on a higher conception of their moral nature (vol. ii. p. 514). How difficult it was to take such a step is clear from the example of Pindar and Aeschylus, who, great poets though they were, and filled with noble conceptions of the divine nature, yet accepted the ordinary mythology so far as to ascribe the worst vices to the srpreme Deity. The old ideas and the new continued to exist side by side; and, indeed, such inconsistencies seem inseparable from the history of religion. Still, much was gained, and this was not the only point in which progress was made. By slow degrees the idea of one 524 THE OLD AND THE NEW. [XIV. 21. deity began to prevail over Polytheism. Not only did Zeus rise above the rest of the deities — that conception is as old The mono. as Homer — but he becomes almost the only theistic idea. object of veneration — at least to the noblest minds, such as Aeschylus. 1 And besides the Oeot of popular belief, the divine power, regarded as the operation of divine beings apart from the intervention of a personal deity, is denoted by the abstract and impersonal expression, to ddov. That this tendency did not, however, shake the public faith in polytheism, is shown, on the one hand, by the numerous temples which were erected in the Fifth Century, and on the other, by the last acts of Socrates, who was careful before he left the world to compose poetry in obedience to the oracle, and pay his offering to Asclepius ; and by the last play of Euripides, who atoned for the rationalism of earlier years by writing the Bacchael Nor was the grossness of the old conceptions purged away. The attitude of the comedians towards the deity shows that in their opinion at any rate the "gods love a joke," without much caring whether it was indecent and made at their own expense or not. 2 It is significant, also, that Aristotle in the next century speaks of the temples as places where pictures may still be seen which it is not good for the young to see. 3 There was a sacredness about such primitive representations which sank deep into the popular mind. We need only remember the intense excite- ment caused at Athens by the mutilation of the Hermae. Two other movements characteristic of Greek religion may be noticed in the Fifth Century : the growing popularity of mystic rites, and especially of the mysteries of Eleusis, and the introduction of foreign rites into Greece. (1.) In mysticism religion cleared itself to some degree of the polytheism of the poets and cosmographers. 4 Not only was 1 Agam. 74 f., Zrjva de tis rrpocppovcos imviKia Kkafav rcvf-erai (ppevwv to nav. Cp. Suppl. 90 f., 524 ff. 2 Plato, Grat. 406 0. : (pikonaiauoves yap ml oi BeoL 3 Arist. Pol. vii. 17. Io=1336 b. * See Windelbatid, l.C. p. 134. XIV. 21.] MYSTERIES AND FOREIGN RITES. 525 the circle of the mystic deities very limited, but it was the individual soul and its fortunes in the future life with which the rites were concerned. The ethical element might at least become predominant ; for what- e mystenes - ever the nature of the ritual, there was at least some idea of guilt and retribution accompanying it. In some way or other it was well with those who had been initiated, and so widely was this belief diffused that the ordinary Greek would not willingly die without the rite. 1 The attempt of Pericles to make the mysteries a centre of Greek religious life, and the necessity of rebuilding the temple of Eleusis on a larger scale, are evidence of the increasing numbers which nocked to the annual commemoration. 2 (2.) The Greeks who settled on foreign shores were always hospitable to the deities whom they found in their new abodes ; and in their own country they allowed the slaves who were imported in great numbers Foreign ntes * from the north and east to practise the ceremonies and ritual which they brought with them. By degrees the more important of these, which naturally appealed to the curiosity of the Greeks, were recognised by the state. Soon after the Persian war, a shrine was built in the market-place at Athens for the Magna Mater of Phrygia. 3 From Phrygia also came the wine-god Sabazius, who is mentioned in the Wasps of Aristophanes, and in a few years became a popular deity, as might be expected from his nature. 4 The Thracian god- dess Bendis had a temple in the Peiraeus at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Ammon was by that time wor- shipped in Laconia; and Lysander, when checked by Pausanias at Athens, went to consult his oracle in Libya. Among the women of Athens the worship of Adonis, an importation 1 Aristoph. Pax, 370. I. 2 Supra, p. 25. The mysteries of Samothrace were also becoming more popular, but initiation in them was the exception rather than the rule : cp. Aristoph. Pax, 277 f. : dXX* et ris vpcbv iv SafioBpaKy rvyxavei pep.vrjp.evos, k.t.A. 3 See Beloch, G. G. ii. 5, n. 3. 4 Aristoph, Wasps, 9, 10 ; Lysistr. 388 : ol nvKvol 2aj3d£ioi. 5?G TRADE AND COMMERCE. [XIV. 22. from Cyprus, was much in vogue; at the time when the expedition to Sicily was being discussed, the ominous cry of the lament for Adonis was heard in the Assembly. 1 Other rites, introduced from Phrygia or Thrace, were of a kind which appealed to the dregs of the people. Noisy processions rushed along the streets to the sound of fife and drum ; while at night the faithful gathered together for the initiation of some neophyte, and availed themselves of the opportunity to indulge in excesses of every kind. 2 Thus at the time when in one direction religious feeling in Greece was struggling upwards to a higher conception of the deity, it was sinking in another into the utter degradation which for centuries to come left its mark on the nation. 3 22. Down to the time of their disastrous revolt, the Ionian cities of Asia were the centres of Greek trade. The ships of Miletus were known from the Cim- Effectsofthe r . . , Ionian revolt merian Bosphorus to Naucratis m Egypt ; the on trade. c j fc y wag on f r j en £Qy terms with Eretria in Euboea, and with Sybaris in Italy. The Phocaeans opened the trade to the far west; the Samians were known at Cyrene ; the Dorian city of Cnidus was in close relations with Croton. Through these Ionian cities the products and wares of the interior of Asia were shipped to Greece. After the suppression of the revolt and the outbreak of hostilities between Persia and Old Greece all this was at an end. For twenty years (500-480) Grecian ships were excluded from the eastern Aegean, and " all beyond Delos seemed as far off as the pillars of Hercules." The altered relations with Persia would doubtless check the trade with the interior, at least for a time, and, their power and prosperity lost, the cities fell into the second rank. Much of the trade which they lost passed into the hands of Athens. At the time when Xerxes crossed the Helles- 1 Aristoph. Lysistr. 389 f. Supra, p. 305. 2 See the lively description in Beloch, G. G. ii. 7. 3 On Greek religion as represented in literature, see Professor Campbell's Religion in Greek Literature. XIV. 22.] AGRICULTURE. 527 pont she was importing corn from the Euxine; and after the liberation of Ionia and the Hellespont, trade would be free to follow the natural channels, and Trade ox gather round the city which now became the Athens - centre of the Greek world. Under the shadow of the Delian League, the trade of Athens became firmly rooted. She not only entered into treaties with numerous emporia In the Aegean- even in the far east— but she felt herself suffi- ciently strong to impose " navigation laws " on many cities which traded with her. In the importation of corn, more especially, the most stringent precautions were taken to secure an ample supply at a moderate price. By the con- quest and final destruction of Aegina. she got rid of a powerful rival ; and though the trade with the west still remained chiefly in the hands of Corinth, the commerce of Athens was so firmly established that even the capture of the city by Lysander failed to destroy it. It was otherwise with agriculture. From the days of Pisistratus till the outbreak of the war, with the exception of the invasion of Xerxes, Attica had enjoyed AgriculturCt unbroken security. The land was not only tilled wherever tillage was possible— and used as pasture in the wilder parts— but the owners of the soil lived on their farms, built themselves handsome houses, and enjoyed to the full the quiet and independence of a country life. All this was changed by the Peloponnesian war. Those who had lived in comfort and abundance were driven into Athens to find shelter where they could, and, by the end of the war, most of them were ruined. Of the straits to which they were reduced we have melancholy proof in the Memorabilia of Xenophon. In the Plutus of Aristophanes also, which belongs to the period after the war, we get a picture of dire poverty. In the earlier plays the poor man complains of the aggres- sion of the rich, and of their monopoly of the good things of the state, but it is not wealth which he covets so much as power. He is happy enough on three obols a day if only he can show his contempt for the rich. To have the great man 528 SOCIETY: SLAVERY, [XIV. 23. at an advantage, to make him cringe and cog — this is marrow to the juryman who se*6 highly paid offices going into the hands of the " son of Coesyra." 1 23. When we attempt to form any general conception of the social life and character of the Greeks, we are met at the outset by some facts of the first importance. The institution of slavery divided every city and every household into two sections, of which one was supposed to exist for the comfort and convenience of the other. It may be true that slaves were kindly treated in daily life by the Greeks, but their legal position was intolerable : in his own bouse every man was a tyrant, with more than a tyrant's power over those around him. The moral dangers of such relations are obvious, and they must also have been fatal to a great extent to elevation of character. The slave-owner alternated between a self-sufficient pride when he compared himself with the " living tool " which he employed, and an ever-present apprehension that his tools might combine Society. against him. Society was on an insecure basis, and though the difficulties which attend the opposi- tion of labour and capital were avoided, even trade and industry were greatly injured by the system. Again, there were no professions in Greece, and even if their place may- have been taken to some slight extent by the various societies so popular among the Greeks, the profound influ- ence which professions now exercise on character was not brought to bear in shaping the life of the Greek. 2 Once more, as we have seen, women were not admitted into society at Athens, and though in some other cities, as at Sparta, they were not so strictly secluded, social life in the modern sense did not exist. 1 Aristoph. Pint. 535 ff. ; cp. Wasps, 546 ff., whpre the juror ends the description of his office with the words : up' ov fxeyaKrj tovt 1 ear apxh K( *i T °v ttXovtov Karaxh vi l' 2 Perhaps an exception ought to be made in favour of medicine, but even this art was largely practised by slaves. The army at Sparta, and the navy at Athens, were also useful in bringing men together, and diffusing an esprit de corps among them. XIV. 23.] TYPES OF CHARACTER. 529 The Greeks were proudly conscious of certain broad dis- tinctions which separated them from the "barbarians" (vol. ii. p. 25), but they were not less conscious of the endless variety of types to be found in their different cities. Not only did Ionian differ from Dorian, but each city, and almost each village, had its characteristics. The Argives were sots and thieves; the Tirynthians were given to incontrollable laughter ; the Boeotians, as a nation, were dull, but while Thebes was the home of "insolence," Tanagra was a very pleasant place for a stranger to visit. The bearded Carystian was regarded as dangerous to the peace of families. Even in Attica a distinction was drawn between the Attici and the Athenians ; the first were meddlesome, prying syco- phants ; the second of a noble, generous nature. 1 If we confine ourselves to Athens, we find in the plays of Aristophanes " all sorts and conditions of men " : the coarse countryman who hates the sophist-taught citizen, the carefully nurtured and educated boy, the dissolute youth who has discarded the old teaching for the new (supra, p. 59). We conclude that there was much that was good, and much that was bad ; and, in the fearlessly outspoken language of comedy, the bad seems to predominate. Yet there is some- thing of an ideal beauty about the fine conception of youth which Aristophanes has sketched in the Clouds, and even in his Trygaeus and Dicaeopolis there is a soundness which re- deems the coarser elements. Of Athenian women it would be monstrous to take our opinions from the comedians, though rn Aristophanes, even in the Lysistrata and Thesmophoriazusae, there are some pleasant glimpses of domestic life. And if in the Fifth Century Greece declined somewhat from that wonderful age in which Arete and Nausicaa, Penelope and Andromache had their birth, Athens was at least still capable of admiring an Alcestis and an Antigone. 1 See Pseudo-Dicaearchus in Mliller, F. H. G, ii. 255 (Frazer, Paus. i. xliii.) ; Theophrastus, ap. A then. vi. 261, d. VOL. III. 2L APPENDIX I. EXPENDITURE ON THE WAR. It is impossible, with the evidence at our command, to give any accurate account of the cost of the Peloponnesian war, though the attempt has been made more than once. The statements about the income of Athens are vague and inconsistent, the accouut of ex- penditure incomplete. 1. Xenophon asserts that the total income of Athens at the begin- ning of the war amounted to 1000 talents ; Aristophanes, in 422, puts it at 2000 1 ; Thucydides gives no annual total, but informs us that the Athenians had a reserve of 6000 talents at the beginning of the war, and that the annual income from the allies was 600 talents. From inscriptions we learn that the Athenians borrowed 4730 talents in the seven years between 433-427 from the sacred treasury of Athena 2 ; but whether this sum is wholly included in the 6000 talents of reserve, is not clear. 2. Confining ourselves to Thucydides, we find that the Athenians set apart 1000 talents at the beginning of the war, leaving a sum of 5000 available for expenditure. From this we may perhaps deduct another thousand for the expense of Potidaea, after the beginning of the war. To the 4000 thus remaining we have to add, in the autumn of 428, the income for three and a half years, which, at 600 talents a year, would amount to 2100 talents. Yet these resources were so far diminished that an extra tax was then found necessary. We need not of course assume that the treasury was bankrupt in 428, but if a year's income (600 t.) was in hand, the expenditure had amounted to no less than 5500 talents in three and a half years, supposing that the ordinary income of Athens covered her ordinary expenditure. At this rate the average expense of the war was about 1600 talents a year. It is clear from Thucydides that the Athenians began by paying their soldiers at an extravagant rate, which they were unable to maintain, and even in 425 the war was regarded as a fruitful 1 Arist. Wasps, 660 ; Xen. Anab. vii. 1. 27. * C.L A.L 193. 630 App. I.] EXPENDITURE ON THE WAR, 531 source of income to those who took service in it. Envoys and generals are particularly mentioned for the high pay which they drew. And we are perhaps justified in regarding the extravagant expenditure as a cause of the popularity of the war. 1 But the immediate reason for the imposition of the war-tax at the time of the revolt at Mytilene was probably the prospect of a siege which experience had proved so costly, and the danger of further revolt. And Cleon, who was now a power in the state, might take advantage of this to throw an extra burden on the rich. 3. Once more, if we ask how Athens, if her reserve was so nearly exhausted in 428, was able to continue the war, the reply seems to be : (1) that the war-tax was continued, and this, with the income of the allies, would produce about 800 talents per annum in addition to the ordinary income ; (2) that in 427 and 426 operations were not carried on on any great scale ; (3) and that in and after 425 the tribute was raised, 2 till the yearly amount reached 1200 talents. 1 This is clearly the view of Aristophanes in the Acharnians. 2 On this subject, see Jowett, Thuc. i. p. lxviii. ff. ; Kirchhoff, Zur Gesch. des Athen. Staatsschatzes, Abh. der Berl. Akad. 1876, p. 54 f. ; also Beloch, Rhein. Mus., Bd. 38 ; Boeckh, Staatsh. p. 360, ed. 3, and Frankel, note 471. I have left out of the calculation the ordinary receipts of the city, say 400 talents, and the ordinary expenditure ; and anything which might be borrowed from the revenues of the temples, an amount which cannot be calculated with any accuracy. The average yearly sum of 1600 talents for expenditure is, I think, as low as can be reckoned at the beginning of the war. But we must admit that our ignorance of the relation in which the sums borrowed from the treasurers of Athena (C. /. A. i. 193) stand to the 5000 talents of reserve, introduces an element of uncertainty into the whole calculation. The question of the raising of the tribute is discussed by Jowett, I.e. p. xliv. ff. There is no reason to doubt that the amount of tribute received after 425 was much larger than before, and it may by degrees have reached 1200 talents, the sum mentioned by Andocides (De Pac. 9), and Aeschines {F. L. 186). The rise was probably due to Cleon ; it certainly was not due to Alcibiades, as Andocides {in Alcib. 11) says, if made in 425, for Alcibiades had not then come forward in public affairs. Cp. also Forbes, Thuc. I. lxxxvii. lxxxviii. APPENDIX II. THE REVOLUTION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED. 1. We learn from Thucydides that the movement which ended in the establishment of the Four Hundred began in the Athenian camp at Samos, and had its origin partly in the feeling of the trierarchs and leading men in the fleet, who were dissatisfied with the existing form of government — under which the heaviest burdens fell on them, as wealthy men — and partly in the overtures of Alcibiades, who let it be known that he would be glad to return and make Tissaphernes the friend of Athens, but this was possible on one condition only : " they must establish an oligarchy and abolish the villainous democracy which had driven him out " (viii. 47, 48). From the camp at Samos the matter was introduced at Athens by Pisander and his fellow-envoys, who were sent by the conspirators to the city to get Alcibiades recalled and the democracy suppressed, and finally to make Tissaphernes a friend of the Athenians (supra, p. 394). Of all this there is not a word in the Athenaion Politeia. The author never mentions Samos or Alcibiades. He merely says, c. 29, "when the Lacedaemonians had gained the upper hand through their alliance with the King of Persia, the Athenians were compelled to abolish the democracy, and establish in its place the constitution of the Four Hundred" — and at once goes on to give an account of the meeting at which the change was proposed. He adds: "The real argument which persuaded the majority was the belief thnt*the King of Persia was more likely to form an alliance with them, if they should establish an oligarchy " — (Kenyon's translation). 2. In the account of Thucydides the change in the constitution was first proposed at Athens by Pisander and the envoys on their arrival from Samos. See the graphic description in viii. cc. 53, 54 (supra, I.e.), in which we notice the following points : — 1. The opening speech of Pisander. 2. The furious opposition. 532 App. II.] THUCYDIDES AND ARISTOTLE. 53S 3. The pertinent question of Pisander put to individual citizens. 4. His final declaration, "after which, partly in fear and. partly in hope that it might be hereafter changed," the people gave way. 5. The passing of the decree that Pisander should go to Samos with ten others and negotiate with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. 6. The deposition of Phrynichus and Scironides from their office as generals, and the sending out of Leon and Diomedon to take their places. 7. The visit of Pisander to the clubs, "one after the other," which he exhorts to unite and put down the democracy. The author of the Politeia ignores these details. He begins his account of the change with a description of a meeting held at Athens, which is quite distinct from the meeting convened to hear Pisander and the envoys. "The speech recommending the change before the vote was made by Melobius, and the motion was drawn up by Pythodorus (but the majority were persuaded by the belief that the King would be more likely to enter into an alliance with an oligarchy). The motion was to the following effect : 4 The popular Assembly was to elect twenty persons over forty years of age, who, in con- junction with the existing ten members of the Committee of Public Safety, should take an oath that they would frame such proposals as they thought best for the state, and should then draw up proposals for the public safety. In addition, any other person was to be free to make any proposition he liked, so that the people might be able to choose the best of all the courses suggested to them.' Clitophon concurred with the motion of Pythodorus ; but proposed that the committee should also investigate the ancient laws drawn up by Olisthenes when he created the democracy, in order that they might have these too before them in deciding on what was the best ; his suggestion being that the constitution of Clisthenes was not really democratical, but closely akin to that of Solon," c. 29, K. 1 Not one of these three names is mentioned by Thucydides in con- nection with the Four Hundred, and, as we shall see, by the time 1 Melobius is mentioned as one of the Thirty in Lysias 12. 12, and this is no doubt the same person. Pythodorus is mentioned as one of the Four Hundred by Diogenes Laertius, ix. 8. 54. He may be the same Pythodorus who in 414 landed on the coast of Laconia. For Clitophon see Aristoph. Frogs, 967, where Euripides claims him as a pupil along with Theramenes. 534 REVOLUTION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED. [App. II. that the commissioners were appointed to report on the constitution, it was impossible to hope for alliance with Persia. 3. Thucydides informs us that Pisander and his colleagues were compelled to break with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes on their return to the East. But though they lost the hope of help from Persia, they determined to go on with the revolution. (Thuc. viii. 63 ; supra, p. 400.) So Pisander and half the envoys were sent back to Athens to carry out the scheme (which was also extended to the subject cities). On their arrival they found the revolution more than half accomplished by the oligarchical clubs, who had created a Keign of Terror. And meanwhile a public programme had been put forward : 1. That no one ought to receive pay who was not on military service. 2. That not more than five thousand should have a share in the government — those namely who were best able to serve the state in person and with their money (supra, p. 402). In the Politeia the two points mentioned in the "programme" are included in the recommendations of the commissioners appointed under the proposal of Pythodorus. Beyond this not a word is said of the means by which the oligarchs went to work to secure their object. 4. From Thucydides we learn that when Pisander and his col- leagues arrived at Athens (this was, of course, his second visit), they " at once set to work and prepared to strike the final blow." They began by calling an Assembly and proposing the election of ten com- missioners, who should have full powers to frame for the city the best constitution they could, and were to report to the people by a given day (viii. 67, supra, p. 402). As we have seen, the nomination of commissioners is said in the Politeia to have taken place at the first meeting convened to dis- cuss the subject — at any rate no previous meeting is mentioned or suggested. 1 5. When the day arrived which had been fixed for the report, so Thucydides continues, Pisander and his party convened an Assembly at Colonus, but the commissioners merely moved that any Athenian 1 The number of commissioners in the Politeia is thirty j in Thucy- dides ten. The Politeia is supported by Androtion and Philochorus, cp. Harpocration, s.v. avyypafa'Ls, who notices the contradiction and identities the ten commissioners mentioned by Thucydides with the ten Probuli. Thucydides may be right ; it was easy for later authors to confuse these commissioners with the Thirty tyrants. \ App. II.] THUCYDIDES AND ARISTOTLE. 535 should be allowed to make any proposal that he pleased, and threatened with severe penalties any one who indicted the proposer for unconstitutional action (supra, p. 403). In the Politeia we are told that the commissioners made two pre- liminary proposals : 1. The Prytanes were to be compelled to put to the vote any motion offered on behalf of the public safety. 2. All indictments for illegal proposals were abolished, all im- peachments and public prosecutions, in order that every Athenian should be free to give his counsel on the situation, if he chose ; and they decreed that if any person imposed a fine on any other for his acts in this respect, or prosecuted him, or summoned him before the courts, he should, on an information being laid against him, be summarily arrested and brought before the generals, who should deliver him to the Eleven to be put to death. They then drew up the constitution in the following manner : 1. The revenues of the state were not to be spent on any purpose but the war. 2. All magistrates should serve without remuneration as long as the war should last, except the Nine Archons and the Prytanes for the time being, who should each receive three obols a day. 3. The general franchise was to be restricted, so long as the war should last, to all Athenians who were most capable of serving the state personally or pecuniarily, to the number of not less than Five Thousand. 4. The Five Thousand to have full powers, even of making treaties with whomsoever they willed. 5. Ten men, over forty years of age, were to be elected out of each tribe to draw up the list (KaraXegovo-i) of the Five Thousand (c. 29, E.). In this account Thucydides and the Politeia agree so far as the "preliminary" measures are concerned, but while in the Politeia the rest of the measures proposed are all said to be the work of the com- missioners ("these were the proposals put forward by the Com- mittee," c. 30), Thucydides draws a distinction between the proposals of the Commissioners and the decrees of the Assembly. After de- scribing the proposals of the commissioners as given above he goes on : " The whole scheme now came to light. A motion was made by Pisander (Thuc. viii. 68). 536 REVOLUTION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED. [App. II. " 1. To abolish all the existing magistracies and the payment of magistrates. "2. To choose a presiding board of five; these five to choose one hundred ; and each of the hundred to co-opt three others. "3. The Four Hundred thus chosen to meet in the Council chamber; to have absolute authority to govern as they thought best. "4. The Five Thousand to be summoned by them whenever they chose (viii. 6V)." 6. In the Politeia we are informed that after the proposals of the Committee had been ratified, the Five Thousand (who must ther efore have been enrolled 1 ) elected a hundred commissioners from their own numbers to draw up the constitution. These framed two con- stitutions, one for the future, in which there is not a word about a Council of Four Hundred, and another for the present. In this last there was to be a Council of Four Hundred, as in the ancient constitution, forty from each tribe, chosen out of candidates of more than thirty years of age, selected by the members of the tribes. This Council was to appoint the magistrates, and draw up the form of oath which they were to take ; and in all that concerned the laws, in the examination of official accounts, and in other matters generally, it might act according to its discretion. It must, however, observe the laws that might be enacted with reference to the constitution of the state, and had no power to alter them or to pass others. The generals were to be provisionally elected from the whole body of the Five Thousand, but so soon as the Council came into existence it was to hold an examination of military equipments, and thereon elect ten persons, together with a secretary, and the persons thus elected should hold office during the coming year with full powers, and should have the right, whenever they desired it, of joining in the deliberations of the Council. The Five Thousand were also to elect a single Hipparch and ten Phylarchs ; but for the future the Council was to elect these officers according to the regulations above laid down (c. 31, K.). 1 Cp. Lysias, Orat. 20, which is in defence of Polystratus, one of the KarakoyeU. Polystratus claims to have put nine thousand citizens on the list in eight days, after which he left for Eretria to take part in the battle. This implies that the selection of the Five Thousand was one of the last, not one of the first, acts of the Four Hundred. \ App. II.] THUCYDIDES AND ARISTOTLE. 537 No office might be held more than once, except that of councillor and general. Comparing this account with Thucydides we see that there is a discrepancy (a) in the account of the Five Thousand, who in Thucydides are only to be summoned when the Four Hundred shall think fit, and in the Politeia are definitely chosen, and in turn choose the commissioners under whose arrangements the Four Hundred come into power ; (b) in the account of the election of the Four Hundred. In the Politeia it is not stated by whom the Four Hundred are chosen, but they are chosen equally from the ten tribes, out of candidates previously selected by the tribes. In Thucy- dides they are chosen by co-optation — and practically five men are responsible for the whole Four Hundred. 7. From Thucydides we learn that after the assembly at Colon us, the Four Hundred were installed in the Council-Chamber. Of this he gives a full and graphic account (supra, p. 404). In the Politeia we are told that when the constitution as just stated had been drawn up by the Commissioners, and had been ratified by the general voice, the existing Council was dissolved before it had completed its term of office. It was dissolved on the fourteenth day of the month Thargelion, in the archonship of Callias (May 411), and the Four Hundred entered into office on the twenty-first (c. 32, EL). 8. Finally, we are told in the Politeia that when the constitution had been established, the Five Thousand were only nominally selected, and the Four Hundred, together with the ten officers on whom full powers had been conferred, occupied the Council-Chamber, and really administered the government. They began by sending ambassadors to the Lacedaemonians, proposing a cessation of the war on the terms of the status quo, but as the Lacedaemonians refused to listen to them unless they would also abandon their maritime empire, they dropped the negotiations (c. 32 K.j. Thucydides informs us that when the Four Hundred had installed themselves in the Council-Chamber, they elected Prytanes by lot of their own number, and did all that was customary in the way of prayers and sacrifices to the gods at their entrance into office, but in a short time they wholly changed the democratic system, and governed the city with a high hand. They also sent heralds to Agis at Decelea, wishing to conclude peace with him— and finally, on his advice, to Lacedaemon, but without effect. Thus, at the cost of contradicting himself about the Five Thousand, who he now says 538 REVOLUTION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED. [App. II. were only nominally selected, whereas they have hitherto been a working part of the constitution, the author of the Politeia comes into agreement with Thucydides. Both authors also agree that the leading spirits in the oligarchical revolution were Antiphon, Pisander, and Theramenes, but Phrynichus is not mentioned in the Politeia. Of the reaction by which the government of the Four Hundred was suppressed, we have a full and graphic account in Thucydides. Here also the movement begins in Samos, and the democratic party go back to the point where the oligarchs had begun, the recall of Alcibiades and alliance with the Great King (Thuc. viii. 73 and 74). Thucydides traces the return to democracy step by step, and shows us how the counter-revolution was rendered possible and accom- plished. His chief points are : 1. The Four Hundred send ten commissioners to Samos, who, however, on hearing of the reaction there, advance no further than Delos (viii. 72). 2. The oligarchy at Samos is overthrown, mainly owing to the exertions of Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, Leon, and Diomedon. The Samians and Athenians unite, after hearing the exaggerated reports of Chaereas, and resolve to oppose oligarchy and carry on the war (viii. 74, 75). 3. Alcibiades is recalled, and elected general (viii. 82). 4. The envoys from Athens now go on to Samos. They declare that all the citizens are in turn to be members of the Five Thousand, and make other explanations (viii. 86). 5. Message of Alcibiades to the Four Hundred (ibid.). 6. Return of the Commissioners to Athens. The message of Alcibiades stimulates the moderate oligarchs, led by Thera- menes and Aristocrates. They maintain that the Five Thousand should be established in reality and not in name, and the constitution made more equal. They are afraid (a) of Alcibiades, (6) of their extreme colleagues, who were sending envoys to Lacedaemon. These were Antiphon, Phrynichus, Aristarchus, and Pisander (viii. 89, 90). 7. The extremists fortify Eetionea, and negotiate with Lacedae- mon (viii. 90). 8. The moderate party alarmed. Theramenes takes the lead. Assassination of Phrynichus, and demolition of Eetionea. " Let the Five Thousand rule." (The popular party feared that the Five Thousand might actually exist. The Four App. II.] THUCYDIDES AND ARISTOTLE. 539 Hundred did not wish the Five Thousand to exist, or to be known not to exist, viii. 92.) 9. Negotiations between the popular party and the Four Hundred, who promise that they will publish the names of the Five Thousand, and that the Four Hundred shall be elected out of those in turn in such a manner as the Five Thousand may think fit (viii. 93). 1 10. The approach of the Lacedaemonians puts an end to nego- tiations. Battle of Eretria (viii. 94, 95). 11. On the news of the loss of Euboea the Four Hundred are deposed, and the constitution placed in the hands of the Five Thousand. "This number was to include all who could furnish themselves with arms. No one was to re- ceive pay for holding any office, on pain of falling under a curse. This government, during its early days, was the best which the Athenians ever enjoyed within my memory," viii. 97 (cp. supra, p. 418). To compare with this vivid account we have in the Politeia no more than the following meagre statement :— " After the loss of the naval battle of Eretria (when the Four Hundred had been in office about four months), and the revolt of the whole of Euboea except Oreus, the indignation of the people was greater than at any of the earlier disasters, since they drew far more supplies at this time from Euboea than from Attica itself. Accordingly they deposed the Four Hundred, and committed the management of affairs to the Five Thousand, who consisted of persons possessing a military equipment. At the same time they voted that pay should not be given for any public office. The persons chiefly responsible for the revolution were Aristocrates and Theramenes, who disapproved of the action of the Four Hundred in retaining the direction of affairs entirely in their own hands, and referring nothing to the Five Thousand. The constitution of the state seems to have been admir- able during this period, since it was a time of war, and the franchise was in the hands of those who possessed a military equipment " (c. 33, K.). When we compare these two authorities, we cannot doubt that in the history of Thucydides we have the account of a contemporary who had studied the movement thoroughly in its rise and fall, and 1 Is this the basis of the constitution "for the future" friven in Ath. Pol. c. 30? 8 540 THUCYDIDES AND ARISTOTLE. [App. II. accounted for every step. In the Politeia we have details which are partly confused, and partly, so far as we can tell, mere proposi- tions which were never carried out. The meeting at which Melobius spoke may have taken place in the interval between the first and second visits of Pisander, but it is confused in part with the meeting held after his second arrival. The Five Thousand are spoken of as the Four Hundred may have spoken of them "when they wished them neither to exist nor to be known not to exist." In two points there is a direct conflict of testimony : in Thucyd des we have ten Commissioners, in the Politeia thirty ; and the election of the Four Hundred is quite different in the two accounts. In both points I am inclined to think Thucydides the safer guide. The differences between the account of the Thirty Tyrants in the Politeia and in Xenophon are noticed in the notes to the text. We cannot, of course, give the same weight to Xenophon as we do to Thucydides. \ INDEX. (The references are to Chapter and Section of the event i A Acanthus, receives Brasidas (424), viii. 5. Acarnania, alliance of Athens with, i. 22; organised attack on, by the Ambraciots and Lacedaemonians (429), v 15. Acarnanians, their quarrel with Demosthenes, vii. 8 ; aid the Argives against the Am- braciots (426), vii 4. Acbaea, brought into alliance with Sparta and made more oligarchical (418), ix. 12. Actium, battle of (435), iii. 3. Adimantus, appointed Athenian general (406), xii. 17 ; and Lysander (405), xii. 20. Adonis, festival of, at Athens on the day when the expedition to Sicily was finally decreed (415), x. 6. Adramyttium, the Delians settled at (422), viii. 13. Aegina, inhabitants expelled from (431), v. 6 ; fame of the island, Herodotus' feeling to- wards the Aeginetans, Pindar's praises of them, viii. 1. Aeginetans, massacre of the (424), viii. 1. Aegitiuni, Demosthenes defeated at (426), vii. 3. Aegospotami, battle of (405), xii. 19. Aeschylus, xiv. 2. Aetolia, invasion of, by Demosthenes (426), vii. 3; the Aetolian tribes described, ibid. ; their territory, ibid. Agatharchus, a Syracusan general (413), x. 81. Agatharchus of Samos, xiv. 17. Agathon, the tragedian, xiv. 4. Agis, succeeds Archidamus as King of Sparta (427), vii. 1 ; leads out the Peloponnesian troops, "no one knows whither" (419), ix. 8 ; invades Argolis (418), ix. 9 ; concludes ; the numbers in parentheses give the date mentioned.) peace with the Argives, ibid. ; censured for his conduct in the Argive campaign, ix. 10; ten commissioners sent out with, ibid. ; at Argos, destroys the unfinished Long Walls (417), ix. 14; invades Attica (413), x. 22; fortifies Decelea, ibid. ; at Decelea, marches ag inst the Oetaeans and neighbouring tribes, xi. 2; negotiates with Euboea and Lesbos, ibid. ; advances on Athens (411), xi. 16; (405), xii. 21. Agriculture, i. 14; xiv. 22. Agrigentum, refuses aid to Syracuse (413), x. 24; Diocles at (409), xiii. 3 ; escape of the Selinuntians to, ibid. ; siege of (406), xiii. 6 ; abandoned to the Syracusans, ibid. ; destruc- tion of the city, ibid. ; given up to Carthage at che peace in 405, xiii. 8 ; temples at, xiv. 19. 'Aiepaiov Aen-a?, the, in Sicily, x. 33, note. Alcamenes, appointed "harmost" of Lesbos (413), xi. 2 ; slain, xi. 3. Alcetas, son of Alexander, i. 19. Alcibiades, and Pericles, iii. 1 ; comes to the front at Athens, ix. 5 ; his hereditary friend- ship with Sparta, ibid. ; negotiates with Argos, ibid.; outwits Nicias, ix. 3; general in 419, ix. 8 ; in Achaea, ibid. ; in Epidauria, ibid. ; p rsuades the Argives to renew the war with Sparta, ix. 10 ; after Man tinea, ix. 13; at Argos (416), ix. 14; eagerly sup- ports the expedition to Sicily, x 3 ; ap- pointed one of the generals to Sicily (415), ibid. ; his speech on the Sicilian expedition, x. 5 ; his extravagance and success at Olympia, ibid. ; no evidence to prove that he was connected with the affair of the Hermae, x. 7 ; guilty of profanation of the mysteries, ibid., see note ; demands to be put 541 542 INDEX. on his trial before leaving for Sicily (415), ibid.; he is allowed to go. ibid.; endeavours to gain Messene, x. 10 ; his plan of campaign in 415, ibid.; plot of his enemies at Athens, x. 11 ; the Salaminia sent to Sicily to bring him home, ibid. ; he escapes at Thurii. ibid. ; at Sparta (414). x. 13 ; his advice to the Spartans, ibid. ; his influence at Sparta, and with Endius (412). xi. 3 ; sails to Ionia (412), xi. 4 ; revolt of Chios, Erythrae,. Clazo- menae, ibid. ; at Chios, ibid. ; sails to Mil- etus, and causes the city to revolt (412), ibid. ; estranged from Spartans, xi. 11 ; escapes to Tissaphernes(411),i&MZ. ; intrigues for his return to Athens, xi. 12; proposes an oligarchical revolution in Athens, ibid. ; approached by Athenians at Samos (411), xi. 19; elected general, ibid. ; reply to the Commissioners of the Pour Hundred, xi. 20; decree passed for his recall, xii. 2; dealings with Tissaphernes, xii. 3, 5 ; at the battle of Cyzicus (410), xii. 5 ; collects sup- plies for the Athenians, ibid. ; invests Chalcedon (409), xii. 9 ; ratifies convention with Pharnabazus, ibid. ; besieges Byzan- tium, ibid.; returns to Athens (408), xii. 10; sails to Samos with a large force (408), xii. 11 ; deposed from his command by Athenians (407), xii. 12; returns to the Chersonese, ibid. ; his advice to the Athen- ians at Aegospotami, xii. 19; leaves the Chersonese for the court of Pharnabazus (404), xii. 23 ; assassinated, ibid. Alcidas, a Spartan admiral (428-427), iv. 3 ; in the Aegean, vi. 6, 7 ; his cowardice and cruelty, vi. 7; his return from the Aegean, ibid. ; at Corcyra (427), vi. 15. Alcinous, sacred wood of. at Corcyra, vi. 13. Alciphron, an Argive, proxenus of the Lace- daemonians, ix. 9. Alexander of Macedon, i. 18 ; his sons, i. 19. Allies, Athenian, compelled to destroy their walls, i. 17; "who tax themselves," or have been "enrolled by private citizens," i. 20 ; of Sparta, in the Peloponnesian war, iv. 4 ; of Athens, in the Peloponnesian war, H id. ; Athenian, revolt of, after the Sicilian expe- dition (413), xi. 2 f. Ambraciots, the, seize Amphilochian Argos, driven out by Phormio, i. 22 ; organise an attack on Amimilochian Argos (430), v. 11 ; invade Amphilochian Argos (426), vii. 4; great slaughter of the, at Idomene, vii. 5. Ammon, xiv. 21. Amorges, son of Pissuthnes, xi. 2. Amphipolis foundation of (437), i. 20 ; and Argilus, taken by Brasidas (424), viii. 5 ; is not surrendered by Clearidas after 421, ix. 1. Amyntas, son of Philip of Macedonia, v. 20. Anactorium, betrayed to Corinth, iii. 6 ; Acquired by the Athenians (425), vii. 14. Anaea, Samian oligarchs at (439), i. 16 ; attack Lysicles (428), vi. 5; remonstrate with Alcidas, vi. 7. Anaxagoras, and Aspasia, ii. 3; and Pericles, ii. 4 ; and Lampon, ibid. ; attack on, he is imprisoned, but escapes, ii. 8 ; his philo- sophy, xiv. 12. Anaximander of Miletus, xiv. 11. Andocides, sent to Corcyra (433), iii. 5 ; his oration on the mysteries, x. 11. Androcles, the leading democrat in 415, op- posed to Alcibiades, x. 7. Angites, valley of the, i. 20. Antandrus, Lesbian exiles at, viii. 3. Anticles, general at Samos, i. 16. Antimachus of Colophon, an epic poet, xiv. 6. Antiphon, arrested and put to death (411), xi. 23 ; his oratory and character, ibid. Apaturia, the festival of, xii. 15. Apodoti, the, an Aetolian tribe, vii. 3. Apollo Maloeis, temple of, at My tilene, vi. 1 ; Pythaeus, temple of, at Argos, ix. 8. Arbitration, the Athenians ask for, before going to war, iii. 12 ; cf. iii. 10. Arcadia, Plistoanax in, ix. 4. Archidamus, king of Sparta, his speech on the war, iii. 10 ; attempts further negotia- tions before invading Attica, v. 3 ; invades Attica in June 431, v. 4; at Oenoe, ibid.; repulsed, ibid. ; at Acharnae, ibid. ; at Plataea (429), v. 13 ; his^ death, vii. 1. Architecture, xiv. 19. Argilus, discontent at, owing to the founda- tion of Amphipolis, viii. 5. Arginusae, battle of (406), xii. 14 ; loss of Athenian crews at, ibid. Argives, invade Epidauria (419), ix. 8 ; maintain the same clay in the calendar, ibid. ; take the field against Agis (418), ix. 9 ; come to terms with Agis, ibid. ; persuaded by Alcibiades to renew the war with Sparta (418), ix. 10; the Select Thousand in their army at Man- tinea, ibid. ; the, at Miletus as auxiliaries of Athens (412), xi. 8 ; they return home, ibid. Argolis, coast of, attacked by the Athenians (430), v. 8. \ INDEX. 543 Argos, Select Thousand in the army, iv. 5, iX. 2; her attitude to Sparta in 422, viii. 16 ; flourishing condition of in 421, ix. 2; urged by the Corinthians to take the lead in the Peloponnese, ibid. ; a demo- cracy, ibid. ; forms alliance with Mantinea, Elis, Corinth, and Chalcidice in 421, ix. 3; and Boeotia, unsuccessful negotiations between (421), ix. 4; and Sparta in nego- tiation (420), ix. 5; Alcibiades negotiates with, ibid.; and Athens (420), ix. 6 ; alliance between Argos, Elis, Mantinea, and Athens, ibid. ; and Epidaurus, quarrel between (419), ix. 8 ; and Sparta in 418, ix. 9, 10 ; and Sparta, alliance between (after Man- tinea), ix. 12; renounces her alliance with Athens, Mantinea, and Elis, ibid. ; the oligarchs put down the democracy (418), ibid. ; evacuates Epidauria, ix. 13 ; the democratic party aided by Athens renounces the Spartan alliance (417), ix. 14 ; Alci- biades at (416); he seizes a number of the oligarchical party, ibid. ; supplies troops to Athens (413), x. 22. Argos, Amphilochian, i. 22 ; at war with Ambracia, ibid. ; attack on (430), v. 11 ; invasion of (426), vii. 4. Ariapithes, king of Scythia, i. 19; murdered by Spargapithes, i. 21 ; his sons, ibid. Aristarchus, an Athenian general (411), xi. 23. Aristeus, of Corinth, takes help to the Poti- daeans, iii. 7 ; escapes from the city, ibid. ; seized by Sitalces and given up to the Athenians (430), v. 12. Aristophanes, his caricature of the sophistic teaching, ii. 6 ; his view of the causes of the war, iii. 1 ; his view of the orators at Athens, vi. 9 ; his advice to the Athenians after Arginusae, xii. 17 ; views upon Thera- menes, Cleophon, and Alcibiades, ibid. ; remarks upon the new coinage, ibid. ; his plays, xiv. 5. Army, decline of the Athenian, i. 2, viii. 4 ; of Athens, iv. 4 ; of the Peloponnesian con- federacy, ibid. ; the Argive, a standing force of a thousand men, ix. 2. Arnae, a town in Chalcidice, viii. 5. Arrhibaeus, Brasidas comes to terms with, contrary to the wishes of Perdiccas, viii. 5. Artaphernes, a Persian envoy, arrested (425), vii. 14. Artas, chief of the Messapians (413), x. 26. Artaxerxes, death of (425), vii. 14. Artemon of Clazomenae, i. 16, note. Asopius, in Western Greece (428), vi. 5 ; his death, ibid. Aspasia, ii. 3; and the Sophists, ii. 7; attacked by Hermippus, the comedian, ii. 8; her fugitive slaves received by the Megarians, iii. 1. Assembly, Athenian, a source of difficulty in the management of the Empire, iv. 2 ; and generals, ibid. ; reopening of a subject already discussed, vi. 8, x. 4 ; cf. Mytilene. Assinaria, the, a festival at Syracuse, x. 34. Assinarus, Nicias reaches the river, x. 34. Astacus, v. 5. Astyochus, the Spartan admiral, at Lesbos, xi. 7; arrives at Chios, ibid.; attacks Pteleum and Clazomenae (412), xi. 9 ; sug- gests an expedition to Lesbos, ibid.; quarrels with Pedaritus, and returns to Miletus, ibid. ; engagement with Athenians, xi. 10 ; sails to Chios (411), xi. 15; and Pharna- bazus, xii. 3 ; returns to Sparta, ibid. Atalanta fortified by the Athenians (431) v. 5. Athena, of the Brazen House, the ourse of, iii. 12. Athenagoras, leader of the democrats at Syracuse, in 415, denies that the Athenians will come, x. 9. Athenian, empire, destruction of the walls of the allied cities, i. 17; the Carian and Ionian district divided in 442, reunited in 436, ibid. ; changes in the "Thracian district," i. 20; fleet, movements of, in 431, v. 5 ; in the Euripus, ibid. ; sent round the Peloponnesus (430), v. 8; empire, a tyranny (Pericles), v. 9 ; Mytilenaean view of, vi. 3 ; fleet, at Pylus (425), vii. 10; attacks the Peloponnesian, at Pylus, ibid. ; part of their forces too late for Mantinea, ix. 13 ; besiege Epidaurus, ibid. ; envoys visit Segesta (416), x. 3; deception practised upon, ibid. ; fleet, in Sicily, at Naxos, Catana, and Syracuse, x. 10 ; sails into the Great Harbour of Syracuse (414), x. 16 ; opposes the Four Hundred (411), xi. 18; unites with Samians (411), ibid.; generals, trial of (406), xii. 15 ; condemned, ibid. ; demo- cracy, liable to sudden passion, ibid. ; fleet, leaves Chios (405), xii. 19; captured at Aegospotami, ibid. ; generals, gross incom- petency of, xii. 20. See Empire. Athenians, the, superstitious, ii. 4 ; at war with Perdiccas, iii. 7 ; their reply to the charges of Corinth at Sparta, iii. 9 ; defence of their empire, ibid. ; character of the, 544 INDEX. iv. 1 ; leave the country for the town (431), V. 3; their exasperation at the invasion, v. 4; occupy Aegina, v. 6; their dissatis- faction with Pericles (430), v. 9; arrange with Sitalces to make an attack on the Chalcidic cities, but fail to keep their appointment (429), v. 20 ; action on hearing of the revolt of Lesbos, vi. 1 ; at Mytilene, vi. 2 ; their energy in 428, vi. 4 ; their finances, vi. 5, see Appendix 1 ; their cruelty, vi. 8; sail to Sicily (427), vi. 17 ; inconvenient neighbours, vii. 5, see Heraclea ; the, resolve to send a large fleet to Sicily, in 426, vii. 6; their du- plicity in regard to the Spartan fleet, vii. 10 f. ; the, in Sicily (425), vii. 15 ; the, capture Nisaea (424), viii. 2; attempt on Megara foiled by Brasidas, ibid. ; the, leave Sicily (424), viii. 3; the, defeated at Delium (424), viii. 4; their anger at Scione, viii. 9 ; viewof their empire expressed in the Melean dialogue, ix. 15 ; in Sicily, advance from Catana to the shore of the Great Harbour of Syracuse, x. 12; the, encamp on the shore of the Great Harbour of Syracuse (415), ibid. ; their first engage- ment with the enemy, ibid. ; their fear of the Syracusan cavalry, ibid. ; retire from Syracuse to Catana, for the winter of 415, ibid. ; send to Athens for horsemen and money, ibid. ; the, in Sicily, visit Messene, x. 14; leave Catana for Naxos, ibid. ; the, at Camarina, ibid. ; negotiates with Sicily (415-414), ibid. ; the, send envoys to Carthage and Etruria, ibid. ; at Syracuse, first year, ibid. ; arrival of rein- forcements from Athens (414), x. 15 ; obtain cavalry from Athens and Segesta, ibid. ; the, destroy the first Syracusan counter-wall (414), x. 16; the, destroy the second counter- wall of the Syracusans, ibid. ; at Syracuse, their prosperous condi- tion (414), x. 17 ; their fortunes at Syracuse begin to sink, x. 18 ; a trireme captured by the Syracusans, ibid. ; their miserable con- dition at Syracuse (414), x. 20; the, resolvj to send a second expedition to Syracuse (414), x. 21 ; the second expedition to Syracuse delayed, x. 22 ; suffer greatly by the occupation of Decelea, ibid. ; their first battle in the Great Harbour of Syra- cuse (413), x. 24 ; lose Plemmyrium, ibid ; their transports captured, ibid. ; second engagement in the Great Harbour of Syracuse ; they are defeated (413), x. 25 ; engage with the Corinthians off Brineum (413), x. 26; their reinforcements arrive under Demosthenes, ibid. , their third engagement with the Syracusans in the Great Harbour (413), x. 29 ; their defeat, ibid. ; last engagement in the Great Harbour (413), x. 30, 31 ; the, refuse to go on board their ships after their last defeat, x. 32 ; their retreat from Syracuse (413), x. 33 f. ; number of those who retreated, ibid. ; number of the prisoners taken at Syracuse (413), x. 34 ; their fate, x. 35 ; the, incredulous of the result of the Sicilian expedition, xi. 1 ; the measures then taken, ibid. ; the, discover the plans for revolt among their allies (412), xi. 3 ; the, send ships to Asia, xi. 4 ; the, at Miletus, xi. 8 ; their fleet assembled at Samos, ibid. ; moves to Miletus, and then returns to Samos, ibid. ; agree to an oligarchical constitution (411), xi. 13 ; sub- mit to the Government of the Four Hundred (411), xi. 16 ; their courage after Aegospotami (405), xii. 21 ; the, religion, xiv. 15 ; disregarded physical science, xiv. 12, 15, 16. Athens, change of policy at, i. 2 ; and her allies, ibid. ; parties at, after 445, i. 4 ; ruled by right of superiority, i. 8; and the West, i. 9 ; and the Messapians, i. 12 ; and Neapolis, ibid. ; and the North, i. 18 ff. ; and Macedon, ibid. ; her policy towards Perdiccas and Sitalces, i. 21 : supports Philip, endeavours to gain the friendship of Sitalces, ibid. ; forms an alliance with Perdiccas, ibid. ; and Western Greece, AmpMlochian Argos, i. 22; makes an alliance with Acarnania, ibid. ; and Corinth, ibid. ; parties in, after 445, ii. 1; religion at, ii. 4; sophists and sophistic teaching at, ii. 6 ; at variance with Meg.ira, iii. 1 ; and Corinth, iii. 2 ; envoys from Corcyra and Corinth, at, iii. 4; her policy towards Corcyra, iii. 4, 5 ; enters into a defensive alliance with, iii. 5; sends ten and afterwards twenty ships to protect her, ibid. ; her ships at the battle of Sybota, iii. 6 ; they prevent a second engagement, ibid. ; insists that Potidaea shall raze her wall, iii. 7 ; and Sparta con- trasted, iv. 1 f. ; her fleet in 431, iv. 4 ; her army, ibid. ; financial position of, at the beginning of the war, iv. 6 ; and Plataea, vi. 11 ; concludes a truce with Sparta for a year (423), viii. 8 ; and Sparta, INDEX. 545 alliance between, in 421, ix. 1 ; and Argos (420), ix. 6; in alliance with Mantinea and Elis, ibid. ; sends forces to aid the Argives in Epidauria (419), ix. 8 : politics at, after Mantinea, ix. 13; aids the demo- cratic party in Argos, ix. 14 ; her attempt to gain a footing in Sicily, in 422, a failure, x. 2; prosperity of, after the peace of Nicias, x. 3; an ally of Segesta, ibid.; visited by envoys from, ibid. ; fear of con- spiracy at, in 415, x. 11 ; alarm at, on the revolt of Chios (412), xi. 4; the reserve fund now employed, ibid. ; in danger from the Peloponnesian fleet, xi. 23 ; siege of, by Lysander (405-404), xii. 21 ; surrender of, to Sparta (404), xii. 22 ; state of the city, xiv. 20 ; trade of, xiv. 22 ; Pericles' ideal of, see Funeral speech. Atomists, the, xiv. 12. Attica, Pericles' measures for the security of, v. 5 ; invaded (431), v. 4 ; (430), v. 8 ; (428), vi. 1 ; proposed second invasion in the same year, vi. 4; invaded (427), vi. 6; (425), i.8. B Bacchylides, xiv. 1. Bacis, ii. 4. Bassae, temple of Apollo at, xiv. 19. Bendis, a Thracian deity, xiv. 21. ! Biology, xiv. 16. Bisaltia annexed by Macedon, i. 18. Boeotia, popular movement, and organisation of a rising (424), viii. 4 ; and Corinth, in 421, ix. 4 ; forms an alliance with Sparta, ibid. Boeotians, have a truce terminable at ten days' notice with Athens in 421, ix. 1 ; un- willing to join Argos in 421, ix. 3. Bosphorus, importance of corn-supplies from, xii. 18. Botany, xiv. 16. Bottiaeans, the, aid the Potidaeans, iii. 7. Brasidas, opposition to his policy, iv. 3 ; at Methone, v. 5; with Cnemus in the Corin- thian gulf, v. 17; adviser of Alcidas, vi. 15 ; at Pylus, vii. 9; appointed to Thrace, viii. 2 ; in the Megarid (424), ibid. ; inarches to Chalcidice, viii. 5 ; and Perdiccas, ibid. ; at Acanthus, ibid.; at Amphipolis, ibid. ; his policy in Thrace, viii. 6 ; sends to Sparta for reinforcements, and begins building ships on the Strymon (424), viii. 7; at Torone, ibid. ; at Scione, viii. 9 ; he refuses to give up the VOL. III. city, ibid. ; receives Msnde (423), ibid. ; his mistake on leaving Chalcidice to invade Lyncestis, ibid. ; joins Perdiccas in the in- vasion of Lyncestis, his retreat, and breach with Perdiccas, viii. 10 ; commissioners sent to (423), viii. 11 ; unsuccessfully attempts Potidaea (423), viii. 12; why absent from Torone when Cleon arrived ? viii. 13 ; defeats Cleon at Amphipolis (422), viii. 14; his death and the honours paid to him, ibid. ; his strategy, viii. 15 ; the helots who served in his army, settled at Lepreum (421), ix. 4 ; present at the battle of Mantinea, ix. 10. Bricinniae, a fortress in the Leontine territory visited by Phaeax (422), x. 2. Budorum, a fort on Salamis, v. 19. Byzantium, revolts from Athens (440), i. 15 ; returns to her allegiance, i. 17 ; joins the Peloponnesians (411), xii. 3 ; besieged by the Athenians (409), xii. 9 ; captured by them, ibid. ; taken by Lysander (405), xii. 21. 0 Cacyparis, Nicias reaches the river, x. 33. Calamis, an Athenian sculptor, xiv. 8. Calendar, Greek, ix. 8. Callias, an Athenian general at Potidaea, iii. 7. Callicrates, xiv. 19. Callicratidas, appointed Spartan admiral (406), xii. 13; his relations with Lysander and Cyrus, ibid. ; his humane treatment of Greek captives, ibid.; drowned at Arginusae (406), xii. 14. Callistratus, an Athenian hipparch at Syra- cuse, x. 34. , Callixenus, xii. 15. Carnarina, plot to betray the city to Syracuse (425), vii. 15 ; and Gela (424), viii. 3 ; visited by the Athenian fleet (415), x. 10 ; Hermo- erates at (415), x. 14; the Athenians at, ibid. ; sends aid to Syracuse (413), x. 24 ; abandoned to the Carthaginians (405), xiii. 8. Canachus of Sicyon, xiv. 18. Cannonus, decree of, xii. 15. Carian district, i. 2 ; defection of allies in, i. 15 ; defections in 441-436, i. 17. Carthage, Athenians contemplate an attack on (?), x. 13 ; the Athenians send envoys to (415-414;, x. 14; and Segesta, xiii. 2; con- cludes peace with Dionysius (405), xiii. 8; terms of the peace, ibid. ; plague at, ibid. 2 M 546 INDEX. Carthaginians in Sicily (409), xiii. 3 ; their | brutality at Selinus, ibid. ; Carthaginian j invasion of Sicily (406), xiii. 6. Catana, the Athenian fleet sails to, x. 10 ; the Athenian army returns to, in 415, x. 12 ; the Athenians return to, from Naxos, x. 14 ; the Athenian army leaves for Epipolae, x. 15. Centoripa, acquired by the Athenians, x. 15. Cephallenia, becomes an ally of Athens, v. 5. Ceramicus, Athenians buried in the, v. 7. Cercinitis, Lacus, i. 20. Chaeronea, a rising contemplated at (420), viii. 4. Chalce, Athenian fleet at (411), xi. 14. Chalcedon, siege of (409), xii. 9 ; convention at, ibid.; occupied by Lysander (405), xii. 21. Chalcideus, a Spartan commander (-113), xi. 2 ; appointed to command at Chios, xi. 3 ; at Teos, xi. 4 ; at Chios, ibid. ; sails to Iouia, | ibid.; his alliance with Tissaphernes, xi. 5. ] Chalcidians, the, become allies of Argos in j 421, ix. 3 ; terms respecting, in the peace , of 421, viii. 17. Chalcidice, threatened by Sitalces (429), v. 20; application to Sparta for help (424), viii. 2 ; Brasidas marches to (424), viii. 5 ; success of Brasidas in, and weak defence of the Athenians, ibid, and ff. ; Cleon in (423-422), viii. 13 f. Chaonians, aid in attacking Amphilochian Argos (430), v. 11 ; aid Cnemus in attacking Acarnania, v. 15; their defeat at Stratus, ibid. Charicles, a member of the commission to investigate sacrilege (415), x. 7 ; general with Demosthenes (413), x. 22; collects troops at Argos, ibid. Chians, the, compelled to pull down their walls (425), vii. 14 ; send to Sparta wishing to revolt (413). xi. 2 ; supply seven ships to Athens, ix. 13 f. ; their revolt delayed, ibid. ; activity of, xi. 5 ; they bring over Lebedos and Brae, ibid. ; attempt to bring over Lesbos to Sparta (412), xi. 7. Chios sends ships against Samos, i. 16; and Lesbos, send fifty ships to the Athenian fleet (430), v. 8 ; Chalcideus appointed to the command in, xi. 3 ; revolts from Athens (412), xi. 4 ; devastation of, by the Athenians (412), xi. 7 ; great prosperity of the island down to this time, ibid. ; their mistake as to the power of Athens, ibid. ; under Pedaritus, xi. 9 ; desperate condition of, during Athenian occupation, xi. 10; com- pletely invested by the Athenians (411), xi. 14; conspiracy among Peloponnesian fleet at (406), xii. 16. Chrjsopolis, xii. 5. Cimon, change in Athenian policy after his death, i. 2; his liberality, ii. 1. " Circle," the, on Epipolae, x. 15; attacked by the Syracusans, and barely saved by Nicias, x. 16. Clazomenae, revolts from Athens (412), xi. 4 ; returns to its allegiance, xi. 7. Cleandridas at Thurii, i. 12. Clearchus, appointed to the command of the Hellespont (413), xi. 3 ; at Byzantium (410), xii. 7. Clearidas, established in Amphipolis (423), viii. 11 ; refuses to give up Amphipolis, in 421, ix. 1 ; he is recalled home, ibid. Cleomenes, regent for Pausanias, leads the invasion into Attica (427), vi. 6. Cleon, chief of the demagogues at Athens, ii. 7 ; supports Pericles in his war policy, ibid. ; said to have attacked Anaxagoras, ii. 8 ; sup- ports the war party, ii. 9 ; his proposal about the Mytilenaeans (427), vi. 8 ; his speech, ibid. ; his view of the Athenian empire, ibid. ; his view of the " orators " at Athens, vi. 9 ; attacks Paches, vi. 10 ; his extravagant de- mands after the seizure of Pylus, vii. 10; his attack on the generals about Pylus, vii. 11 ; he is sent there, ibid. ; and Demosthenes (425), vii. 12 ; his conduct at Pylus, vii. 13 ; sails to Chalcidice (423), viii. 13 ; he takes Torone, ibid. ; his ability as a general shown at the capture of Torone, ibid. ; at Eion, viii. 14 ; captures Galepsus, ibid. ; marches on Amphipolis (422), ibid. ; discontent of his army at, viii. 14, 15 ; his defeat and death, viii. 14 ; his conduct at Amphipolis examined, viii. 15. Cleophon, leader of the extreme democratic party at Athens, xii. 2 ; opposes ppace with Sparta (410), xii. 6 ; opp 'ses peace with Sparta alter Arginusae (406), xii. 16 ; views of Aristophanes on his character, xii. 17 ; again resists proposals for peace with Sparta, xii. 22 ; brought to trial and ex- ecuted, ibid. " Cleruchs" at Lesbos, vi. 10. Clouds (of Aristophanes), scene from, ii. 6. Clubs at Athens, their nature and aims, xi. 14. Cnemus, a Spartan admiral (430), iv. 3; in Acar- nania (429), v. 15; defeated by Phormio (429), v. 17, 18 ; his proposed attack on the Peiraeus, v. 19. \ INDEX. 547 Cnidus, expedition to, by Hippocrates (412), xi. 9 ; a school of medicine at, xiv. 16. Coinage, new, at Athens (407), xii. 17. Colonus, meeting of Athenian assembly at (411), xi. 16. Colophon, revolution at (430), v. 12 ; in the hands of the Persians, vi. 7. Comedy, xiv. 5. Congress (proposed) of the Greeks, i. 13. Conon, stationed at Naupactus (413), x. 26; one of the ten generals (406), xii. 12 ; block- aded at Mytilene, xii. 13. Corcyra, and Corinth, iii. 2 ; navy of the Cor- cyraeans, ibid. ; her action in the Persian war, ibid. ; her colony at Epidamnus, iii. 3 ; defeats Corinth at sea (435), ibid. ; the oli- garchs of Epidamnus appeal to and are received, ibid. ; the Corcyraeans besiege Epidamnus, ibid. ; sends envoys to Athens, ibid. ; defeated at Sybota, iii. 6 ; but saved from further disaster by the Athenians, ibid. ; sends fifty ships to Athens (431), v. 5 ; change in hei attitude to Athens, vi. 13 ; envoys sent to Athens, ibid. ; sedition at, vi. 13, 14 ; after 433, ibid. ; help sent to Athens, ibid. ; end of the sedition (425), vi. 16 ; the rendezvous of the Sicilian expedition in 415, x, 8. Corinth, her relations with Athens, iii. 2 ; with Corcyra, ibid. ; adopts Epidamnus as her colony and sends aid, iii. 3 ; prepara- tions for war with Corcyra, ibid. ; battle off' the Ambracian gulf, and defeat of the Cor- inthians, ibid. ; sends envoys to Athens, iii. 4 ; her war with Corcyra a mistake, iii. 5 ; prepares for a second conflict, iii, 6 ; the battle of Sybota, ibid. ; defeats Corcyra at Sybota, and takes many captives, ibid. ; excitement at, owing to the affairs of Poti- daea, iii. 8; complains of the conduct of Athens at Sparta, ibid. ; and Boeotia in 421, ix. 4 ; unable to take a leading part in the Peloponnesus, ix. 14 ; Syracusan en- voys at (415), x. 13 ; proposes destruction of Athens to Sparta (404), xii. 22. Corinthia, Nicias makes a descent on (Solygea) (425), vii. 14. Corinthian war, the, iii. 3 f. ; fleet, movement of, in 431, v. 5 ; ships, arrive at Syracuse (414), x. 18. Corinthians, their action at the time of the Samian revolt, i. 16; their view of the Athenians, iii. 8 ; threaten to seek a new alliance if Sparta will not help them, ibid.; speech before the allies at Sparta on the war, iii. 11 ; their skill in adapting their navy to new conditions, iv. 5 ; refuse to accept the peace of 421, viii. 16; urge Argos to take the lead in the Peloponnesus, ix. 2 f. ; become allies of Argos, in 421, ix. 3 ; wish to be on a truce with Athens ter- minable at ten days' notice, Athens refuses, ibid. ; refuse to join in the alliance with the Athenians (420), ix. 6; their naval engage- ment with the Athenians off Erineum (413), x. 26; wait for the Isthmian games before sailing (413), xi. 3. Covonta, Phormio at (429), v. 19. Cos, a school of medicine, xiv. 16, Cratinus, xiv. 5. Crestonice, annexed by Macedon, i. 18. Critias, his life in exile, xii. 23 ; returns to Athens (404), ibid. ; his work as member of the Thirty, xii. 25 ; brings about the execu- tion of Theramenes, ibid. ; death of (403), xii. 26. Critius, an Athenian sculptor, xiv. 18. Crotona, unfriendly to Athens (413), x. 26. Cuneiform alphabet, the, Persian despatches written in, vii. 14. Cynossema, battle of (411), xii. 4. Cyrus, sent to take command on the coast and to aid the Lacedaemonians (408), xii. 10 ; and Lysander, xii. 11 ; supplies Ly- sander with resources (405), xii. 17 ; leaves Sardis (405), xii. 18 ; makes Lysander his vice-regent, ibid. Cythera, capture of, by Nicias (424), viii. 1 ; restored by the Athenians in 421, ix. 1. Cyzicus, recovered by the Athenian fleet, xii. 4 ; battle of (410), xii. 5. D Damarchus, a Syracusan general, executed (406), xiii. 7. Damon, his advice to Pericles, ii. 2; ostra- cised, ii. 8. Daphnaeus, a Syracusan general at Agri- gentum (406), xiii. 6 ; deposed, xiii. 7 ; executed, ibid. Daphnus, the Athenians from Clazomenae take refuge in, xi. 7. Dascon, a promontory on the shore of the Great Harbour of Syracuse, x. 12. Decelea, Alcibiades advises the occupation of, x. 13 ; eff ect of the occupation on Athens, x. 22, 548 INDEX. Delians, the, expelled from their island and settled by Pharnaces at Adramyttium (422), viii. 13; restored to their island in 421, ix. 3. Delium, the Athenians fortify the temple (424), viii. 4 ; the battle of, ibid. ; the temple cap- tured, ibid. Delos, earthquakes at, v. 3 ; purification of the island and restoration of the games (426), vii. 7. Delphi, the oracle and Thurii, i. 10, 12; attitude of the oracle towards Sparta about the war, iii. 11 ; funds at, iv. 6 ; stipula- tions about, in the truce of 423, viii. 8 ; the temple not impartial, ibid., note ; terms re- specting, in the peace of 421, viii. 17. Delphinium, fortress in Chios seized by Athenians (412), xi. 9. Demeter Thesmophoros, i. 14. Democracy, supported by Athens, i. 8 ; estab- lished at Samos (439 ?), i. 16, note ; at Argos, ix. 2 ; and Mantinea, ix. 3 ; on its trial at Athens (413), xi. 1 ; established at Samos in 412, xi. 6 ; destroyed in Greece (404), xii. 24; at Syracuse, xiii. 1; and the drama, xiv. 5, 6. Democritus, his physical philosophy, xiv. 12 ; his ethical philosophy, xiv. 13. Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, in Leu- cadia, vii. 3 ; in Aetolia, ibid. ; he is defeated, ibid. ; contemplates an invasion of Boeotia (426), ibid. ; unwilling to re- turn to Athens after his defeat, ibid. ; at Olpae (426), vii. 4 ; his strategy, ibid. ; at Idomene, vii. 5 ; returns to Athens, and accompanies the fleet (425), vii. 8 ; and Cleon (425), vii. 12 ; employs light- armed troops on Sphacteria, ibid. ; his con- duct atPylus, vii. 13 ; in the Megarid (424), viii. 2 ; sent to Naupactus to arrange for an attack on Siphae, viii. 4 ; sent to Epidaurus to bring the Athenian troops away (418), ix. 13 ; appointed to command in Sicily, x. 21 ; and Charicles erect a fort in Laconia (413), x. 22 ; his voyage to Syracuse (413), x. 26 ; his arrival at Syracuse, x. 27 ; he at- tempts the counter-wall of the Syracusans, ibid. ; his attack by night on Epipolae, ibid. ; wishes to carry the Athenian forces back to Athens, x. 28 ; or to move to Thapsus and Catana, ibid. ; his proposal after the last defeat of the Athenians (413), x. 32 ; surrender of his army, x. 34 ; attempts his own life, ibid., note; cp. note to x. 35 ; put to death at Syracuse, x. 35. Demostratus, urges Nicias to fix the amount of troops needed for Sicily, x. 6, and note. Derc\llidas, a Spartan, xi. 15. Derdas, nephew of Alexander, king of the Elimiotae, i. 19. Dexippus, a Lacedaemonian at Agrigentum (406), xiii. 6 ; dismissed from Sicily, xiii. 7. Diitrephes, conducts Thracian mercenaries from Athens (413), x. 23. Diobelia, paid out of state funds, xii. 2. Diocles, the democratic leader at Syracuse, xiii. 1, and note ; sent to relieve Selinus (409), xiii. 3; aids the Himeraeans, xiii. 4. Dioclides, gives information about the pro- fanation of the mysteries, x. 11. Diodotus, opposed to Cleon, vi. 9. Diognetus, a member of the commission to investigate sacrilege (411), x. 7. Diomedou, recovers Teos in part for Athen3, xi. 5. Dionysius,i;he " copper" at Thurii, i. 10. of Syracuse, attacks the Syracusan generals for their conduct at Agrigentum (406) , xiii. 7 ; at Gela, ibid. ; elected general with full powers, ibid. ; at Leontini, ibid. ; allowed to have a bodyguard, ibid. ; marries the daughter of Hermocrates, and becomes tyrant of Syracuse, ibid. ; recognised as tyrant of Carthage (405), xiii. 8 ; attempts to relieve Gela, but fads, ibid. ; . hatred of, owing to his failure at Gela, ibid. ; ill- treatment of his wife, ibid. ; his return to Syracuse, ibid. ; he concludes peace with Carthage (405), ibid. Diopithes, attacks Anaxagoras, ii. 8. Diotimus, at Neapolis, i. 12. Dorians, at Thurii, i. 12 ; and Ionians, iv. 1. Dorieus of Rhodes, leads Thurian vessels to Cnidus (412), xi. 9; captured by Athenians (407) , xii. 12 ; liberated by them, ibid. Dracontides, attacks Pericles, ii. 9 ;(?) proposes election of the Thirty at Athens, xii. 24. Drama, development of the, xiv. 2 ; the, its connection with democracy, xiv. 5, 6. E Earthquakes in 426, vii. 1. Eclipse of the moon, the Athenians deterred by, from leaving Syracuse (413), x. 28. Eetionea, fortification of, xi. 21 ; destruction of the fortification (411), xi. 22. Eion, saved from Brasidas by Thucydides (424), viii. 5. INDEX. 549 Eleans, the, refuse to accept the terms of the peace of 421, viii. 16 ; withdraw from the allied army (418), ix. 10. Eleatics, the, xiv. 11. Eleusis, i. 14; the Greeks invited to bring offerings to, ibid. ; seized by the Thirty (403), xii. 26; established as independent (403-401), ibid. Elis, joins the alliance with Argos, ix. 3 ; quarrels with Sparta, ibid. ; and Athens in alliance (420), ix. 6 ; and Lepreum, ix. 7 ; sends troops to Mantinea which arrive too late and take part in the siege of Epidaurus (418), ix. 13. Ellomenus in Leucadia, vii. 3. Elpinice, and Pericles, i. 17. Empedocles, xiv. 12. Empire, the Athenian, i. 6 ; it ensured the safety of the Aegean, i. 7; and diffused civilisation, ibid. ; a tyranny which failed to satisfy Greek feeling, i. 6-8 ; the rule of the superior, i. 8 ; supported democracy, ibid. ; defence of, iii. 9 ; its extent, a source of difficulty, iv. 2 ; managed through the Assembly, ibid. ; want of consistent policy, ibid. ; a tyranny, vi. 8 ; view of, ix. 15 ; defence of,atCamarina, x. 14. See Athenian. Endius, eplior at Sparta (413), xi. 2 ; and Alei- biades, xi. 3 ; envoy from Sparta to Athens (410), xii. 6. Ephors, the Spartan, visit Pylus (425), vii. 10 ; at Athens (404), xii. 23. Ephorus, his account of the origin of the Peloponnesian war, iii. 1. Epic poetry in the fifth century, xiv. 6. Epicharmus of Cos, xiv. 5. Epidamnus, applies for help to Corcyra, iii. 3; asks advice at Delphi, ibid. ; applies to Corinth, ibid. ; a colony of Corcyra, ibid. ; government of, ibid. ; factions at, ibid; be- sieged by the Corcyraeans, ibid. ; capitulates, ibid. Epidaurus, and Argos, quarrel between (419), ix. 8 ; siege of (418), ix. 13 ; a school of medicine, xiv. 16. Epidaurus Limera, ravaged by the Athenians (414), x. 21, 22. Epipolae, seized by the Athenians (414), x. 15 ; attack of the Athenians on (413), x. 27. Epitadas, commander -of the Spartans in Sphacteria, vii. 9, and vii. 12. e7n.Te1x10-ju.65. See Heraclea, Decelea, Pylus, Minoa. Erae, revolts from Athens (412), xi. 5. Eretria, battle of (411), xi. 22. Erineum, battle off (413), x. 26. Erineus, Nicias reaches the river, x. 34. Erj thrae, revolts from Athens (412), xi. 4. Eteonicus, escapes from Mytilene (406), xii. 14 ; suppresses a conspiracy at Chios (406), xii. 16. Etruria, the Athenians send envoys to (415- 414), x. 14: three ships from, come to Syracuse (414), x. 17. Euboea, sends to Agis wishing to revolt (4 13), xi. 2 ; revolts from the Athenians (411), xi. 22. Eucles, an Athenian general at Amphipolis (424) , viii. 5. Euphemus, his speech at Camarina (415), x. 14. Eupolis, the comedian, his remark on Pericles, ii. 2 ; xiv. 5. Euripides, popularity of, in Sicily, x. 35, xiv. 4 ; condemns slavery, xiv. 13. Euryelus, on Epipolae, x. 15. Eurylochus, a Spartan general (426), vii. 3; in Acarnania and Amphilochian Argos, vii. 4. Euryinedon, an Athenian general at Corcyra (425) , vi. 16 ; at Pylus, vii. 8 ; in Sicily, vii. 15, viii. 3 ; fined, ibid. ; appointed to com- mand in Sicily, x. 21 ; sent to Sicily (414), ibid. Eurytanes, the, an Aetolian tribe, vii. 3. Euthydemus, chosen to support Nicias, x. 21. Evarchus, tyrant of Astacus, v. 5. F " Festival-money," the, ii. 2. Finance, at Athens, iv. 6, vi. 5, see App. 1 ; drain of the Athenian finances (414-413), x. 22, 23 ; measures for economy at Athens after the Sicilian expedition, xi. 1. Fire-signals, at Salamis, v. 19; at Plataea, vi. 5. Five Thousand* the, establishment of (411), xi. 23. Fleet, Athenian, at Samos, amounts to more than two hundred ships, i. 16 ; of Athens, iv. 4 ; of Sparta, ibid. ; of Sparta, acquired by the Athenians, vii. 10. Four Hundred, the, establishment of (411), xi. 16 ; nature of their rule, ibid. ; intrigues with Agis, xi. 16; send commissioners to Samos, xi. 20 ; divisions among them, xi. 21 ; send embassy to Sparta, ibid. ; are deposed, xi. 23. Funeral speech of Pericles, v. 7. \ 550 INDEX. G Galepsus, captured by Cleon (422), viii. 14. Gela, and Camarina (424), viii. 3 ; the congress of, ibid. ; sends aid to Syracuse (413), x. 24 ; abandoned to the Carthaginians, xiii. 8; besieged by Himilco (405), ibid. General, relation of, to the Assembly, iv. 2. Generals, afraid of sacrificing the lives of the citizens, iv. 2 ; at Syracuse the number reduced to three, x. 13. Geography, scientific and descriptive, xiv. 16. Glanis, " the elder brother of Bacis," ii. 4. Glaucon, sent to Corcyra, iii. 5. Gongylus, a Corinthian commander, brings the news of the coming of Gylippus to Syracuse, x. 18. Gorgias, comes to Athens as an envoy, vi. 17. Grapnels in the Athenian ships at Syracuse, x. 30. Great King, envoys to, from Lacedaemon, vii. 14 ; from Athens, ibid. ; from Persia to Sparta, ibid. See Persia. Greece, divided by the peace of 445, i. 3 ; in 421-415, ix. 14 ; feeling in, after the Sicilian expedition, xi. 2. Greek character, varieties of, xiv. 23. Grundy, G. B., his view of the geography of Pylus, vii. 10, note. Gylippus, appointed to take the command in Sicily (415), x. 13; at Leucas, x. 17; his voyage to the west, ibid. ; collects forces at Himera, and marches on Syracuse (414), ibid. ; ascends Epipolae, his ultimatum to the Athenians, x. 18 ; captures Labdalum, ibid. ; sets out to collect reinforcements, x. 20; captures Plemmyriuin, x. 24; brings reinforcements to Syracuse (413), ibid. ; brings reinforcements to Syracuse, x. 28; his address to his men before the final battle in the Harbour, x. 30. H Hageladas of Argos, xiv. 18. Hagnon, general at Samos, i. 16; founds Amphipolis, i. 20; his proposal about Pericles, ii. 9 ; and Sitalces, v. 20. Halieis, Athenian attack on (430), v. 8. Hannibal, grandson of Hamilcar, appointed Carthaginian general, xiii. 2 ; sends envoys co Syracuse, ibid. J lands in Sicily (409), xiii. 3; destroys Selinus, ibid. ; destroys Himera, xiii. 4 ; returns to Carthage, ibid. ; invades Sicily for the second time (406), xiii. 6 ; be- sieges Agrigentum, ibid. ; dies of the plague, ibid. "Harmost," the title first mentioned in 413, xi. 2. Hecataeus of Miletus, xiv. 7. Hellanicus, xiv. 9. Hellas, feeling in favour of Sparta in the war, v. 3 ; opinion that it would be ended in two or three years, ibid. Hellenism, destroyed by the Peloponnesian war, v. 21. Hellespont, the, Clearchus appointed com- mander to, xi. 3 ; recovered by the Athen- ians (408), xii. 10. Helots, Lacedaemonian dread of, vii. 13 ; the Spartan fear of, viii. 2 ; iniquitous massacre of the, ibid. Heraclea, founded by Sparta (426), vii. 1; seized by the Boeotians (420), ix. 7. Heraclitus of Ephesus, xiv. 11. Hermae, the mutilation of the, at Athens (415), x. 7 ; possible explanations of, ibid. Hermaeondas of Thebes, at Mytilene, vi. 2. Hermione, Athenian attack on (430), v. 8. Hermippus, attacks Aspasia, ii. 8. Hermocrates of Syracuse, his speech at Gela (424), viii. 3; has information of the coining of the Athenian fleet, x. 9 ; he proposes to go to meet them, ibid. ; chosen general at Syracuse, x. 13 ; deposed by the Syracusans (414), x. 17 ; deceives Nicias, and secures the roads and passes near Syracuse (413), x. 32; and Tissaphernes, xi. 8; arrives at Miletus from Sicily, ibid. ; goes as envoy to Sparta (411), xii. 3; banished by the Syracusans (410), xii. 7 ; repairs to Pharna- bazus, ibid. ; returns to Sicily (408), xiii. 5 ; at Himera (407), ibid. ; attempts to return to Syracuse and is slain, ibid. Herodotus, xiv. 8. Hesiod, his death, vii. 3. Himera, Athenians not received at (415), x. 12 ; Gylippus at (414), x. 17 ; Hannibal at, xiii. 4 ; destruction of, ibid. Himilco, general with Hannibal (406), xiii. 6 ; at Agrigentum, ibid. ; attacks Gela (405), xiii. 8. Hippias, (1) of Notium, vi. 7; (2) the sophist, xiv. 14. Hippocrates, an Athenian general in the Megarid (421), viii. 2; in Boeotia, viii. 4; defeated at Delium, ibid. INDEX. 551 Hippocrates, the physician, xiv. 16. Hippodamus, architect of Thurii, i. 10 ; and of the Peiraeus, ibid., xiv. 14. Hipponicus, his wife married to Pericles, ii. 3. Hybla Galeatis, attacked unsuccessfully by the Athenians (415), x. 12. Hyccara, captured by the Athenians (415), x. 12 ; sale of the slaves taken at, ibid. Hyperbolus, ostracised, ix. 13; assassinated at Samos (411), xi. 17. I Ialysus, refuses tribute in 440 (?), i. 17. Iasus, captured by the Peloponnesians (412), xi. 8. Iberians, in Hannibal's army, xiii. 4. Ictinus, xiv. 19. Idomene, battle of (426), vii. 5. Ulyrians, their attack on Brasidas (423), viii. 10. Imbrian, the, "cleruchs" serve in the Athenian army, vii. 11. Impiety, charges of, against Phidias, Anax- agoras, and Aspasia, ii. 8. Independence, Greek desire of, vi. 11. "Ionia unfortified," i. 17. Ionian, district, i. 2; philosophy, ii. 5. Ionians, and Dorians, iv. 1 ; Athenians and Asiatic Ionians, ibid. Italy, attitude of the cities in, to the Sicilian expedition (415), x. 8. K Kings, Spartan, did not command the fleet, iv. 3 ; both the, leave Sparta at the same time, ix. 10, 11. Knights, the Athenian, unwilling to serve under Cleon in Chalcidice (422), viii. 15. L Labdalum, a fort built by the Athenians on Epipolae (414), x. 15 ; captured byGylippus, x 18. Lacedaemonians, arrange to send forty ships to Lesbos, vi. 4; determine to increase their navy (427), vi. 15 ; colonise Heraclea (426), vii. 1 ; treachery of, after the defeat of Olpae, vii. 4 ; their retreat, ibid. ; at Pylus (425), vii. 9; refuse to aid the Aeginelans (424), viii. 1 ; send forces to aid the Epi- daurians (419), ix. 8 ; also send forces by sea, which is regarded as a breach of the treaty, ibid. ; the Athenian view of their policy, ix. 15 ; resolve to build a fleet (413), xi. 2. See Sparta and Spartans. Lacedaemonius, son of Cimon, sent to Corcyra with ten ships (433), iii. 5. Laches, an Athenian general, sent to Sicily (427), vi. 17 ; recalled from Sicily, and put on his trial, vii. 6 ; proposes that the terms of the truce be accepted in 423, viii. 8 ; slain at Mantinea (418), ix. 11. Laconia, the Athenians land on, contrary to the terms of the peace (414), x. 21 ; the Athenians erect a fortress in (413), x. 22. Lamachus, appointed one of the generals to Sicily (415), x. 3 ; his plan of campaign in 415, x. 10 ; slain in battle at Syracuse, x. 16. Lampon, takes part in the founding of Thurii, i. 10; his report on Eleusis, i. 14; and Anaxagoras, ii. 4. Lampsacus, taken by Lysander (405), xii. 19. Lebedos, revolts from Athens (412), xi. 5. Lecythus, at Torone, viii. 7; taken by Brasidas, ibid. Lemnian, the, cleruchs serve in the Athenian army, vii. 11. Leon, an Athenian general (412), xi. 7. Leontini, at war with Syracuse (427), vi. 17 ; factions at, x. 1 ; the oligarchs seek the aid of Syracuse, ibid.; the city broken up, ibid. ; two fortresses occupied on the territory of, ibid. ; recognised as independent at the peace in 405, xiii. 8. Lepreum, Neodamodes settled at, ix. 4 ; quarrel between Elis and Sparta about, ix. 7. Lesbian, the, exiles settle at Antandrus, viii. 3. Lesbos, sends ships against Samos, i. 16 ; and Chios send fifty ships to the Athenian fleet (430), v. 8 ; revolt of (428), vi. 1 ; received into the Peloponnesian alliance, vi. 4; divided into lots and occupied by Athenian cleruchs, vi. 10 ; sends to Agis wishing to revolt (413), xi. 2; the Chians attempt to bring the island over to Athens, xi. 7 ; remains Athenian, ibid. ; treatment of, by Lysander, xii. 21. Leucadia, Demosthenes in (426), vii. S. Leucas, attack on (428), vi. 5 Leucippus, xiv. 12. 552 INDEX. Liohas, sent as commissioner to investigate conduct of Astyochus (412), xi. 10 ; quarrels with Tissaphernes, ibid. Light-armed troops, their value recognised in the course of the war, iv. 5 ; at Spartolus, v. 14; their mode of fighting, vii. 3; em- ployed on Sphacteria, vii. 12. Lindus, refuses tribute in 440 (?), i. 17. Liparaean islands, Athenian attack on (427), vi. 17. Locri, opposed to the Athenians in 415, x. 8 ; Gylippus at, x. 17. Locrians, the, at Messene, x. 1 ; revolt among the colonies of Locri, ibid. Logographers, the, xiv. 7. Long Walls at Athens, destroyed by Lysander (404) , xii. 22. Lucanians, the, destroy the Sybarites, i. 12. Lyncestis, invaded by Perdiccas and Brasidas (423), viii. 9, 10. Lyric poetry, did not flourish at Athens, xiv. 1. Lysander, appointed admiral by Sparta (408), xii. 11 ; his relations with Cyrus, ibid. ; succeeded as admiral by Callicratidas (406), xii. 13 ; sent out as lieutenant of the fleet (405) , xii. 17 ; at Ephesus, ibid. ; made vice- regent by Cyrus (405), xii. 18 ; his attitude to democracy aud Athenian empire, ibid. ; destroys democrats at Miletus, ibid. ; sails to Aegina and Attica, ibid. ; returns to Abydus, ibid. ; takes Lampsacus (405), xii. 19 ; captures Atheiran fleet at Aegospotami, ibid.; massacres all Athenian prisoners after Aegospotami, xii. 20; takes cities in the Bos- phorus and Hellespont, xii. 21 ; at Lesbos ibid. ; advances upon Athens and blockades the Peiraeus, ibid. ; destroys the Long Walls (404), xii. 22 ; sails to Samos and restores the oligarchy, xii. 23 ; returns to Laconia, ibid. ; assists in the establishment of the Thirty (403), xii. 24 ; goes to Athens as har- most, xii. 26; decline of his influence at Sparta, ibid. Lysicles, sent to collect money in Caria (428), Vi. 5 ; his death, ibid. M Macedonia, history of, after the Persian wars, i. 18 ; partition of the kingdom, i. 19 ; invaded by Sitalces (429), v. 20 Magna Graecia, Themistouleo' views on, i. 9. Malea, a promontory on Lesbos, vi. 2. Mantinea, at war with Tegea (423), viii, 12 ; alliance with Athens (420), ix. 6 ; battle of (418), ix. 10, 11 ; rejoins the Spartan con- federacy, and concludes a peace for thirty years, abandoning her claim to supremacy in Arcadia, ix. 12. Mautineans, the, at Olpae, vii. 4 ; join Argos in 421, ix. 3 ; their aggression in Arcadia checked by the Spartans (421). ix. 4. Massacres at Corcyra (427), vi. 14, 15. Mathematics, xiv. 16. Medicine, xiv. 16. Megara, invaded by the Athenians (431), v. 6 J Megarian oligarchs at Pegae, viii. 2 ; popular party negotiates with Athens (424), ibid. Megarian, exiles allowed to live at Plataea, vi. 12 ; decree, the, a cause of the war, iii. 1 ; to what was it due ? ibid. Megarians, their complaints at Sparta of the conduct of Athens, iii. 8 ; their exclusion from the trade of Athens, iii. 12; have forty ships at Nisaea, v. 19 ; refuse to accept the peace of 421, viii. 16. Megarid, the, invaded by the Athenians, iii. 1. Melancridas, a Spartan admiral (413), xi. 2. Meleas of Lacedaemon, at Mytilene, vi. 2. Melesander, sent to collect tribute in Lycia (430), v. 11 ; his death, ibid. Melissus, commander of the Samians, i. 17. Melos, attacked by the Athenians (426), vii. 2; assessed by Athens in 425, ix. 15; conference between the Melians and the Athenians, ibid. ; attack of the Athenians on (416), ibid. ; massacre of the inhabitants, ibid. Menander, chosen to support Nicias, x. 21. Mende, revolts to Brasidas (423), viii. 9; recovered by the Athenians, viii. 11. Menedaeus, a Spartan general, vii. 4. Menelaus, son of Alexander, i. 19. Mercenaries, from Peloponnesus, viii. 3, 4; Thracian, at Athens, x. 23. Messapians, and Athenians, i. 12 ; friendly to the Athenians, x. 26. Messene, taken by the Athenians, vii. 6; lost to Athens (425), vii. 15; factions at, x. 1 ; Alcibiades visits (415), x. 10 ; unsuc- cessful attempt to win, by the Athenians, x. 14. Messenian troops, the, at Sphacteria, vii. 12 ; established at Pylus (425), vii. 13. Messenians of Naupaci us, propose an invasion of Aetolia (426), vii. 3. INDEX. 553 Methana, Nicias at (425), vii. 14. Methone, attack on, by Athenian fleet (431), v. 5 ; repulsed by Brasidas, ibid. Methymna, remains loyal to Athens, at the revolt of Lesbos (428), vi. 1 ; attacked by Mytilene, vi. 4; taken by the Pelopon- nesians (406), xii. 13. Meton, the Athenian mathematician, xiv. 16 ; his cycle, ibid. Miletus, quarrels with Samos (440), i. 15 ; applies to Athens, ibid. ; revolts from Athens, xi. 4; battle o*(412), xi. 8 ; oligarchy at (411), xi. 15 ; joins the Lacedaemonians, ibid. ; the Milesian school of philosophers, xiv. 11.' Mindarus, succeeds Astyochus as Spartan admiral (411), xii. 3 ; takes the fleet to the Hellespont, ibid. Minoa, occupied by Nicias (427), vi. 17. Mnesicles, xiv. 19. Mycalessiis, attack on, by Thracians, x. 23. Myron, xiv. 18. Mysteries, popularity of, i. 14; profanation of, by Alcibiadesand others, x. 7 ; informa- tion about the profanation of, x. 11. Mysticism at Athens, xiv. 21. Mytilenaeans, revolt from Athens and organise Lesbos, vi. 1; defeated by the Athenians, and conclude an armistice to send envoys to Athens, vi. 2 ; also send to Lacedaemon, ibid. ; at Olympia, vi. 3 ; re- ceived into the Peloponnesian alliance,vi. 4; attack Methymna, ibid. ; Paches sent to Mytilene, ibid. ; discussion of their fate at Athens, vi. 8 ; the Athenians cancel their severe decree, vi. 10; massacre of ibid. N Naupactus, Phormio sent to (429), v. 11; Phormio defeats the Peloponnesians off, v. 18 ; the A.etolians wish to attack (426), vii. 3 ; saved by Demosthenes, ibid. ; twenty ships sent to (414), x. 21. Naxos (in Sicily), attack on (425), vii. 15 ; the Athenian fleet sails to (415), x. 10; the Athenians encamp at, x. 14. Neapolis and Athens, i. 12. Neodamodes, the, settled at Lepreum (421), ix. 4 ; at the battle of Mantinea (418), ix. 10. Nesiotes, an Athenian sculptor, xiv. 18. Nicias, opposed to war, ii. 9; of Gortys, v. 17, note; occupies Menoa (427), vi. 17; at Melos, vii. 2 ; at Tanagra (42b), ibid. and Cleon. in 425, vii. 11; criticism of his conduct in the matter of Pylus, vii. 13 ; at Solygea (425), vii. 14 ; at Methana, ibid. ; captures Cythera (424), viii. 1 ; at Mende and Scione, viii. 11; eager for peace in 422, viii. 16 ; his caution, and desire to be a safe general, ibid. ; outwitted by Alci- biades, ix. 6; after Mantinea, ix. 13; blockades the ports of Perdiccas (416), ix. 14; appointed one of the generals to Sicily (415), x. 3 ; his speech about the ex- pedition to Sicily, x. 4 ; his plan of cam- paign in 415, x. 10 ; divides the forces with Lamachus, after the departure of Alci- biades, x. 12 ; his excessive caution, ibid. ; breaks up from Catana, and wins Epipolae (414), x. 15 ; his dangerous position in the "circle," x. 16; vainly attempts to inter- cept Gylippus, x. 17 ; his want of energy in the conduct of the siege, x. 18, note ; begins to make use of the Athenian fleet (414), x. 19 ; seizes Plemmyrinm, ibid. ; endeavours to intercept the Corinthian contingent, ibid. ; sends a letter to Athens (414), x. 20 ; refuses to return to Athens after the failure of the attack on Epipolae, x. 28 ; or to go to Thapsus, ibid. ; deterred by an eclipse from leaving Syra- cuse (413), ibid. ; his address to his m«n before the final battle in the Harbour, x. 3') ; deceived by Hermocrates into wasting time at Syracuse (413), x. 32; his heroism in encouraging the Athenians in their retreat, x. 33 ; reaches the Cacyparis, ibid. ; the Erineus, x. 34 ; the Assinarus, ibid. ; surrenders, ibid. ; put to J death at Syracuse, x. 35. Nicostratus, an Athenian commander, at Naupactus, vi. 13 ; at Corcyra, vi. 14 ; at Mende and Scione, viii. 11 *, slain at Man- tinea, ix. 11. Nine Ways, the, i. 20, note. ~is isaea, capture of, by the Athenians (424), viii. 2 ; retained by the Athenians in 421, vii. 17 ; recovered bythe Megarians (410-409), xii. 8. Nomothetae, appointed to revise the laws, after deposition of the Four Hundred (411) ' at Athens, xi. 23, xii. 1. Notfum, factions at, vi. 7; Paches visits, ibid. ; defeat of Athenian fleet at (407), xii. 12. Nymphodorus of Abdera, brother-in-law of Sitalces, i. 21; invited to Athens (431), v. 6. 554 INDEX. o Octamasades, son of Ariapithes, i. 21. Odeum, the, at Athens, xiv. 19. Odrysian empire, growth of the, i. 19 ; under Sitalces, i. 21; its extent and revenues, ibid. Oeniadae, saved by floods from attack, v. 19 ; Asopius attacks, vi. 5. Oeneon, Demosthenes at, vii. 3. Oenoe, Archidamus repulsed at (431), v. 4; captured by the Boeotians (411), xi. 23. Oetaeans, ravage the Trachinian territory, vii. 1. Oligarchies, establishment of, by Pisander, xi. 16. Oligarchs at Corcyra (431-427), vi. 13; escape to the mainland, vi. 15 ; final massacre (425), vi. 16. Oligarchy, at Samos, i. 15 ; suppressed by Athens, ibid. ; restored, ibid. ; spread of, after the battle of Mantinea, ix. 12; Nicias apprehends dangers from, x. 4 ; established by Ly sander (405), xii. 18. Olpae, seized by the Ambraciots (426), vii. 4 ; battle of, ibid. Olympia, funds at, iv. 6; the Mytilenaeans at (428), vi. 3. Olympian festival (420), Spartans excluded from, ix. 7. Olympieum, a temple near the shore of the Great Harbour of Syracuse, x. 12 ; the Athenians encamped near, but leave it un- • touched, ibid. Olynthus, becomes a common centre for the Chalcidian Greeks, iii. 7. Onatas of Aegina, xiv. 18. Ophioneis, the, an Aetolian tribe, vii. 3. Oracles, constant appeal to, even about trifles, ii. 4. Orator aud general, iv. 2; orators at Athens, vi. 9. Oratory, growth of, xiv. 10. Orchoinenus, surrenders to Argos (418), ix. 10. Ostracism of Hyperbolus (417 ?), ix. 13. P Paches, sent to Mytilene (428), vi. 4; at Mytilene, vi. 6, 7 ; his treachery at Notium, vi. 7 ; brought to trial, slays him- self in the court, vi. 10. Pagondas, a Boeotian general (Boeotarch), viii. 4. Painting, the art of, xiv. 17. Panactum destroyed, ix. 4. Pangaeus, Mount, i. 20. Panhellenic schemes of Pericles, i. 13. Panoptae, the, a play of Cratinus, xiv. 5. Panyasis of Halicarnassus, an epic poet, xiv. 6. Paralus, son of Pericles, ii. 3 ; carried off by the plague (430), v. 10. Paralus, the, escapes from Aegospotami (405), xii. 19. Parmenides, xiv. 11. Parrhasians, the, rescued from the Man- tineans by PHsloanax, ix. 4. Parrhasius, xiv. 17. Parthenon, the, ii. 2, xiv. 18, 19. Paities, in Athens after 445, ii. 1 ; later, ii. 9. Pasitelidas, established in Torone (423), viii. 11 ; unable to maintain Torone for Brasidas, viii. 13. Patrae, Alcibiades causes the building of long Avails at (419), ix. 8. Pausanias, king of Sparta, marches upon Athens (405), xii. 21 ; leads a force to Athens (403), xii. 26; dealings with Ly- sander, ibid. Payment of officers at Athens, abolition of (411), xi. 16. Peace, of 445, i. 1 ; envoys sent from Athens to Sparta about, but without result (430), v. 9 ; proposals for, by the Spartans in 425, vii. 10 ; feeling at Athens in favour of (424), viii. 8 ; desire for, in 422, viii. 16 ; negotia- tions for (422-421), ibid. ; the majority of the Spartan allies accept it, ibid. ; of 421, terms of, viii. 17 ; of 421, unsatisfactory to both sides, and could not be lasting, ibid., ix. 1 ; of 421, infringement of, by the Lacedae- monians (419), ix. 8 ; the terms of, infringed by Athens (414), x. 21 ; terms of surrender in 404, xii. 22. See Cyzicus, Arginusae. Pedaritus, governor of Chios (412), xi. 9; quarrels with the admiral Astyochus, ibid. ; killed at Chios (411), xi. 14. Pegae, party of Megarian oligarchs at, viii. 2. Peiraeum, the Peloponnesian ships driven on shore at (412), xi. 3 ; the Peloponnesian ships break out from, xi. 5. Peiraeus, proposed attack on the (429), v. 19 ; architecture of, xiv. 19. Peithias of Corcyra, vi. 13. Pellene, a city of Achaea, on the side of Sparta, iv. 4, ix. 12. INDEX, 555 PelopoDnesian, confederacy, the allies invited to Sparta, iii. 8 ; confederacy, the allies formally summoned to discuss the question of war, iii. 11 ; speech of the Corinthians, ibid. ; confederacy, in favour of war, ibid. ; slowness and inactivity of, ibid. ; war, plans of campaign, iv. 7 ; criticism of the plan of Pericles, iv. 8 ; war, excitement at the outbreak of, v. 3 ; signs and wonders, ibid.; war, the first year (431), v. 4-7 ; second year (430), v. 8-12 ; fleet, sent against Zacynthus (430), v. 11 ; war, third year -(429), v. 13 to end ; fleet, in 429, v. 16-18; war (428), vi. 1-5 ; war (427), vi. 6-17 ; war (426), vii. 1-7 ; war (426-425), vii. 8-15 ; fleet, acquired by the Athenians (425), vii. 10 ; fleet, given up to Athens, ibid. ; ships return from Sicily (412), xi. 3; war (413-412), xi. 1-10 ; fleet to sail to Chios, Lesbos, and the Hellespont, xi. 3 ; at Peiraeum, ibid. and 5 ; in Ionia, xi. 3 f., see Chalcideus ; first treaty with Persia, xi. 5 ; fleet, at Lesbos, xi. 7, see Astyochus ; at Miletus, xi. 9 ; becond treaty with Persia, ibid. ; fleet, at Cuidus, xi. 10; at Rhodes, ibid. ; war (411), xi. 11-23, xii. 4; fleet returns to Miletus, xi. 15 ; third treaty with Persia, ibid. ; fleet off Euboea, xi. 22 ; mutiny at Miletus, xii. 3 ; fleet in the Hellespont, | seeMindarus, xii. 3 ; defeated at Cynossema * (411), xii. 4 ; and at Cyzicus (410), xii. 5 ; recover Pylus, xii. 8 ; fleet, victorious at Notiura, xii. 2, see Lysander, defeated at Arginusae (406), xii. 14 ; victorious at Aegos- potami (405), xii. 18, 19 ; war (410), xii. 5-8 ; (409), xii. 9; (408), xii. 12; (407), ibid.; (406), xii. 13-17 ; (405), xii. 17-21 ; (404), xii. 21-25. Perdiccas, son of Alexander, i. 19 ; becomes an ally of Athens, i. 21 ; expels his brother Philip, ibid. ; supports the Potidaeans in their revolt, iii. 7; at war with Athens, ibid. ; becomes an ally of the Athenians (431), v. 6 ; sends troops to aid Cnemus in Acarnania, v. 15 ; and Sitalces (429), v. 20 ; applies to Sparta for help (424), viii. 2 ; and Brasidas, viii. 5 ; visits Brasidas after the capture of Amphipolis (424). viii. 7 ; invades Lyncestis, with the support of Brasidas (423), viii. 9, 10 ; his retreat, ibid. ; comes to terms with the Athenians (423), viii. 11; prevents reinforcements from reaching Brasidas, ibid. ; friendly with Thessaly, ibid.; declared an enemy (416), ix. 14. Pericles, secures empire by the peace of 445, i. 2 ; supreme at Athens, i. 5 ; his imperifl policy, i. 6 ; his Panhellenic schemes, i. 13, 14 ; at Samos, i. 15, 16 ; his conduct of the war at Samos, i. 17 ; his funeral speech after the Samian war, ibid. ; his retort to Elpinice, ibid, note ; his use of the money of the allies, ii. 2 ; introduces payment for service, ibid. ; saves largely from the revenues, ibid. ; his aim in paying the law-courts, ibid. ; result of the payment, ibid.; ruler of Athens, ibid.; elected general year after year, ibid. ; change of the people towards, ii. 3 ; his wife and children, ibid.; his connection with Aspasia, ibid. ; and the new philosophy, ii. 4; and the sophists, ii. 7 ; his argument with Protagoras, ibid. ; becomes unpopular, ibid. ; his attitude towards the demagogues, ibid. ; attacked through his friends, ii. 8 ; defends Aspasia, ibid. : charges brought against him, ii. 9 ; prepares for war, ibid. ; his pecuniary difficulties a cause of the Peloponnesian war, iii. 1 ; could only govern Athens through the Assembly, iv. 2 ; his plan of campaign in the Peloponnesian war, iv. 7 ; was his plan the best? iv. 8; rejects over- tures from the Lacaedemonians when they are in the field, v. 3 ; neglects to make proper arrangements for the countrymen in the city, ibid. ; prevents the people from meet- ing, v. 4 ; maintains his policy, v. 5 ; takes measures for the security of Attica, ibid. ; bis funeral speech (431), v. 7 ; the Athenians exasperated against (430), v. 9 ; his speech to them, ibid. ; he is deposed, and fined, v. 10 ; his sons, Xanthippus and Paralus, carried off by the plague, ibid. ; his son by Aspasia made legitimate (430), ibid. ; re- elected general (429), v. 14 ; the death of (429), v. 21 ; effect of this at Athens, ibid. ; ideals of, ibid. ; he left no successor, ibid. Pericles, the younger, son of Pericles, il. 3, note ; made an Athenian citizen (430), v. 10. Persians, war with, discontinued, i. 2; treaty with Sparta, xi. 15 ; second treaty with Peloponnesians (412), xi. 9 ; estrangement from Spartans, xi. 10 ; third treaty with the Peloponnesians (411), xi. 15. Phaeax, sent to Sicily (422), x. 2 ; at Locrl, Camarina, Agrigentum, and Gela, his mission a failure, ibid. Phalaris, the bull of, sent to Carthage, xiii. 6. Pharnabazus, sends envoys to Sparta (413), 556 INDEX. xi. 2 ; induces the Peloponnesians to sail to the Hellespont (411), xii. 3 ; supports the Peloponnesians after Cyzicus, xii. 6 ; makes an agreement with Athenians at Chalcedon, I (409), xii. 9. Pharnaces, the Persian satrap of Phrygia, (422), viii. 13. Phaselis in Lycia, a centre of trade, v. XI. I Phea, the Athenian fleet at, v. 5. Phidias, attack on, he is thrown into prison, where he dies, ii. 8 ; his peculations a ] cause of the Pelopounesian war, iii. 1, xiv. 18. Phigalea, the plague at, v. 8 ; the temple at, ibid. Philip, son of Alexander, i. 19 ; expelled by Perdiccas, takes refuge with Derdas, i. 21 ; supported by Athens, ibid.; brother of Per- diccas, an ally of the Athenians, iii. 7. Philistus, the historian of Syracuse, x. 34, 35, notes ; supports Dionysius, xiii. 7. Philocles, appointed Athenian general (406), xii. 17; his dealings with captives (405), xii. 20 ; executed by Lysander, ibid. Philosophers and sophists, ii. 5. Philosophy, physical, disliked at Athens, ii. 4; of Ionia, ii. 5; development of, xiv. 11 f. ; and religion, xiv. 15. Phoenician fleet, expected at Samos, i. 16. Phormio, general at Samos, i. 16; at Amph^- lochian Argos, i. 22 ; helps to blockade Potidaea, iii. 7 ; sent against the Chal- cidians, v. 6 ; sent to Naupactus (430), v. 11 ; reinforcements sent to, but ordered to go to Crete, v. 17 ; his victories in the Corinthian gulf (429), v. 16-18 ; at Astacus, Stratus, and Coronta, v. 19; returns to Athens (428), ibid.; his death (?), ibid. Phrynichus, his opposition to Alcibiudes, and intrigues with Astyochus, xi. 12, 13 ; re- moved from his command (411), xi. 13 ; envoy to Sparta (411), xi. 21 ; assassinated, ibid. the tragedian, xiv. 2. Phyllis, i. 20, note. Pictures, famous, xiv. 17. Pindar, xiv. 1. Piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean (430), v. 11. Pisander, a member of the commission to investigate impiety, x. 7 ; advocates olig- archical revolution in Athens, and return of Alcibiades (411), xi. 13; iutrigues with political clubs, xi. 14 ; negotiations with i Tissaphernes and Alcibiaies (411), ibid. ; \ returns from Samos to Athens (411), xi. 16 ; proposes the government of the Four Hun- dred, ibid. Pissuthnes, satrap of Sardis, aids Samos in revolt, i. 16; aids the Persian party in Notium (427), vi. 7 ; his rebellion sup- pressed by Tissaphernes, xi. 2. Plague, the, at Athens (430), v. 8 ; reappears at Athens (427), vi. 17 ; in the Carthaginian camp at Agrigentum, xiii. 6. Plataea, and Thebes, v. 1 ; seized by a party of Thebans (431), v. 2 ; the attack repulsed, ibid. ; the Theban prisoners put to death, ibid. ; perfidy of the Plataeans, ibid. ; the Peloponnesians at (429), v. 13 ; the territory inviolable (?), ibid. ; wall built round at, ibid. ; escape of part of the gar- rison (428), vi. 5 ;. surrender of (427), vi. 11 ; trial of the Plataeans by the Spartans, ibid. ; position of, to Thebes and Sparta, ibid. ; their appeal to Sparta, ibid. ; retained by Thebes in 421, viii. 17. Plataeans, massacre of the, vi. 12 ; the sur- vivors live at Athens and Scione, ibid. Plays, how represented at Athens, xiv. 6. Plemmyrium, captured by Nicias (414), x. 19 ; captured by Gylippus (413), x. 24. Plistoanax, his return from exile, vii. 1 ; king of Sparta, in favour of peace (422), viii. 16 ; in Arcadia, rescues the Parrhasians, anil puts an end to the aggression of the Man- tineans (421), ix. 4 ; marches out to Tegea, at the time of the battle of Mantinea (418), ix 11. Polemarchs, insubordination of, at the battle of Mantinea, ix. 11. Political, parties at Athens after the war, xii. 23 ; parties at Athens, their reconciliation I after the Thirty, xii. 26 ; science, in Greece, xiv. 14. Polyclitus, xiv. 18. Polydamidas, a Lacedaemonian, commander of the garrison at Mende, viii. 11. Polygnotus of Thasos, xiv. 17. Portents, how interpreted (the one-horned ram), ii. 4. Potidaea, the revolt of, a cause of the Pelo- ponnesian war, iii. 7 ; a Corinthian colony, and governed by officers from Corinth, but a subject ally of Athens, ibid. ; applies to Lacedaemon for help, ibid.; Aristeus at, ibid. ; battle of, ibid. ; blockaded, ibid. ; siege of (431), v. 6 ; surrender of (430), v. 12 ; j Brasidas makes an unsuccessful attack on I (423), viii. 12. INDEX. 557 Prasiae, Athenian attack on (430), v. 8 ; ravaged by the Athenians (414), x. 21. Priene, cause of a quarrel between Samos and Miletus, i. 15. Probuli, a board of ten, established at Athens (413), xi. 1. Professions, absence of, in Greece, xiv. 23. Property -tax, iv. 6; at Athens imposed for the first time in 428, vi. 5. Propylaea, the, ii. 2. Prose writing in Greece, xiv. 7. Protagoras, at Athens, ii. 6; his argument with Pericles, ii. 7 ; banished from Athens, ii. 8, xiv. 13. Protagoras of Plato, scene from, ii. 6. Ptychia, an island near Corcyra, vi. 16. Pydna, acquired by Macedon, i. 18. Pylus, seized and fortified by the Athenian fleet (425), vii. 8 ; the Lacedaemonians are unable to dislodge the Athenians, vii. 9; the Athenians at, ibid. ; the Spartan ephors visit, vii. 10 ; armistice agreed upon, ibid. ; long delay in the operations* vii. 11 ; criti- cism of the account of, vii. 13; Athens refuses to give up, in 421, ix. 1 ; the Athen- ians agree to withdraw the Messenians and Helots from (421), ix. 4; recovered by Lacedaemonians (410-409), xii. 8. Pyrrha, in Lesbos, acquired by Athens, vi. 8. Pythagoreans, the, xiv. 12. Pythen, the Corinthian commander, sails with Gylippus, x. 17 ; at Syracuse (413), x. 31. Pythodorus, sent to Sicily (426), vii. 6 : in Sicily, ibid., viii. 3 ; is exiled on his return to Athens, viii. 3 ; lands in Laconia (414), x. 21. R Religion, at Athens, ii. 4 ; and philosophy, xiv. 15; ethical progress in, xiv. 21 ; mono- theism, Hid. ; mysticism, ibid. ; foreign rites, ibid. Reserve fund of a thousand talents at Athens (431), v. 5 ; used after the revolt of Chios (412), xi. 4. Responsibility at Athens, iv. 2, vi. 9. Revenues of Athens, large savings from, ii. 2 ; after the peace of Nicias, x. 3. Rhegium, gives little support to the Athen- ians in 415, x. 8; the Athenian generals discuss their plans of campaign at, x. 10 ; the Athenian fleet at, ibid. ; the ships sent to make inquiries at Segesta, return to, ibid. Rhetoric in Sicily, ii. 5. Rhodes, joins the Peloponnesian alliance (412), xi. 10; harbours Peloponnesian fleet (411), ibid. Rhoeteum, viii. 3. s Sabazius, a Phrygian deity, xiv. 21. Sacrilege at Athens, commission to investi- gate, x. 7. Sadocus, son of Sitalces, becomes an Athen- ian citizen (431), v. 6. Salaethus, a Lacedaemonian envoy at Myti- lene, vi. 5; gives arms to the populace of Mytilene, vi. 6; put to death, vi. 8. Salaminia, the, sent to Sicily to bring home Alcibiades, x. 11. Salamis overrun by the Peloponnesians, v. 19. Samos, internal factions at, i. 15; quarrel with Miletus (440), ibid. ; Pericles at, ibid. ; democracy established, ibid. ; reaction and revolt, ibid. ; the Samians defeated by Pericles, i. 16 ; capitulates, ibid. ; terms of capitulation, ibid. ; was a democracy estab- lished? ibid. ; cost of the siege, ibid. ; importance of the island to Athens (412),' xi. 6 ; popular revolt at, ibid. ; the island allowed to be independent, ibid* ■ becomes the Athenian headquarters in Ionia (412), xi. 8 ; attempted oligarchical revolution at(411), xi. 15 ; overthrow of attempted oligarchical government (411), xi. 17; attitude to the Four Hundred, xi. 18 ; alone remains faith- ful to Athens after Aegospotami (405) xii. 21. Satyrus, xii. 25. Scione, revolts to Brasidas after the truce is signed (423), viii. 9; blockaded by the Athenians (423), viii. 11 ; capture of, and massacre of the inhabitants (421), ix. 3. Sciritae, the, in the army at Man tinea, ix. 10. Scu'pture, xiv. 18. Scyles, son of Ariapithes, i. 21 ; his love of Greek customs, ibid. ; he is initiated in the Dionysiac rites, ibid. ; deposed, ibid. ; put to death by Octamasades, ibid. Sea, the, regarded as the territory of the Athenians, ix. 8. Segesta, envoys from, at Athens, i. 9; her quarrel with Selinus in 416, x. 3 ; her alii- ance with Athens, ibid. ; seeks the aid of Athens, ibid. ; Athenian envoys visit, and report upon, ibid. ; deception practised 558 INDEX. upon them, ibid. ; discovery of the fraud practised on the Athenian envoys at, x. 10 ; the Athenian fleet sails to (415), x. 12 ; a body of horse from, joins the Athenians, x. 15 ; and Selinus, xiii. 2 ; and Carthage, ibid. Selinuntians, the, defeat of, xiii. 2. Selinus her quarrel with Segesta in 416, x. 3 ; seeks the aid of Syracuse, ibid. ; and Segesta, xiii. 2 ; destruction of (409), xiii. 3. Sestos, taken by Lysander (405), xii. 21. Seuthes, the nephew of Sitalces, marries Stratonice, sister of Perdiccas, v. 20. Sicanus, a Syracusan general (413), x. 81. Sicels, the Athenians negotiate with (415-414), x. 14 ; destroy a body of reinforcements on their way to Syracuse (413), x. 24. Sicilian, fleet, vii. 15 ; expedition, causes of the failure of, x. 21. Sicily Athenian passion for, i. 3 ; growth of rhetoric in, ii. 5 ; the Athenians send ships to (427), vi. 17 ; affairs in, in 426, vn. 6 ; ships sent to, in 425, detained at Pylus, vii 8-10 ; affairs in, in 425, vii. 15 ; affairs in 424, the congress of Gela, viii. 3 ; after the congress of Gela, x. 1 ; attempt of the Athenians to gain a footing in, in 422, x 2 ; Athenian interest in the island, x. 3 ; the Athenians resolve to send an expedition to Sicily (415), ibid. ; Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus appointed generals, ibid. ; first armament sent to (415), x. 6 ; depart ure of the great expedition, x. 8 ; reinforcements sent to from Peloponnesus and Boeotia, x. 22 ; from Athens, x. 26 ; effect of the disaster in, at Athens (413), si. 1 ; return of thePelopon- nesian ships from Sicily (412), xi. 3. Sicyon, the constitution rearranged on a more oligarchical basis (418), ix. 12. Siege, of Plataea (430), v. 13 ; engines used at Samos (?), i. 16, note; at Plataea, v. 13. Simonides, xiv. 1. Siphae, a rising contemplated at (424), rm. 4. Sitalces, son of Teres, i. 19 ; the kingdom of the Odrysians united in his hands, i. 21 ; receives Scyles, and exchanges him for Sparadocus, ibid. ; Athens wishes to form an alliance with, ibid. ; alliance with (431), v. 6; arrests the Peloponnesian envoys on their way to the Great King, and gives them up to Athens (430), v. 12 ; invades Mace- donia (429), v. 20 ; his levy, ibid. Slavery, condemned by the sophists, xiv. 23 ; iu Greece, ityd. Slaves, the, at Athens, desert to Decelea, x. 22 ; number of, in Sicily after the defeat of the Athenians, x. 35. Society, at Athens, ii. 3 ; in Greece, xiv. 23. Socrates, and Aspasia, ii. 3 ; his views on the decline of the Athenian character, xn. 12 ; his conduct as one of the prytanes, xii. 15, xiv. 15 ; his death, ibid. Sollium, capture of, by Athens, v. 5. Solygea, Nicias at (425), vii. 14. Sophists, and philosophers, ii. 5; their wandering life, ibid. ; their teaching at Athens, ii. 6 ; disliked at Athens, ii. 7 ; the, xiv. 13. Sophocles, an Athenian general, at Corcyra (425), vi. 16; at Pylus, vii. 8; m Sicily (425), vii. 15, viii. 3 ; exiled on his return to Athens, ibid., xiv. 3. Sparadocus, son of Teres, expelled by Sitalces, takes refuge in Scythia, given up to Sitalces, i. 21. . . * Spargapithes, king of the Agathyrsi, i. 21. Sparta, her conduct in 446, i. 1 ; decision of the Assembly about the war, iii. 10 ; negotia- tions with Athens in the hope of avoiding war iii. 12; her demands, ibid.; and Athens contrasted, iv. 1 f. ; her fleet in 431 iv. 4 ; her army, ibid. ; without any well-defined casusbdli in 431, v. 3 ; assembles her troops at the Isthmus, ibid. ; and Lesbos, vi. 2 ; bids the Mytilenaean envoys appear at Olympia, vi. 3 ; proposes peace after the seizure of Pylus, vii. 10; concludes a truce with Athens for a year (423), viii. 8 ; short- sighted policy of, in 423, ibid. ; her attitude to Argos in 422, viii. 16 ; her indifference to the interests of her allies in the peace of 421, viii 17; and Athens, alliance between (421), ix. 1 her position as head of the Peloponnesian league severely shaken by the peace of 421, ix. 2 ff . ; forms an alliance with Boeotia (421), ix. 4; and Argos (420), ix. 5 ; her citizens excluded from the Olympian festival (420), ix. 7 ; and Argos, in 418, ix. 9, 10; and Argos, alliance between (after Mantinea), ix. 12 ; short duration of her alliance with Argos, ix 14; Syracusan envoys at (415), x. 13; the Chians and Erythraeans send to, pro- posing to revolt, xi. 2; the Spartans in- clined to abandon the Athenian allies (412>, xi. 3 ; overtures to, by the Four Hundred (411), xi. 21 ; magnanimity towards Athens, xii. 22. Spartan, confederacy, difficulties m the way of action, iv. 8 ; jealousies and enmities, INDEX, 55& ibid. ; confederacy, financial position of, iv. 6 ; pay a contribution but have no public funds, ibid. Spartans, characteristics of, slowness and deliberation, iii. 10; the common Greek opinion of, iv. 1, note ; retained even incom- petent officers in command, iv. 3 ; send commissioners to Cnemus, v. 17, see Bra- sidas ; cut off in Sphacteria, vii. 9 ; send envoys to Athens to treat for peace (425), vii. 10 ; on Sphacteria, surrender, vii. 12 ; astonishment of Greece at this, vii. 13 ; carried captive to Athens from Pylus, ibid.- their fear of the Helots, viii. 2 ; iniquitous massacre of the Helots, ibid. ; their de- spondency in consequence of defeat (424), establish a force of cavalry, and send out garrisons into various parts of the country, ibid. ; obtain a clear casus belli against the Athenians (414), x. 21 ; invade Attica (413), x. 22 ; propose" peace after the battle of Cyzicus (410), xii. 6 ; after Arginusae (406), xii. 16. Spartolus, defeat of the Athenians at (429), v. 14. Sphacteria, the island of, vii. 9 ; geographical i difficulties connected with, vii. 10 ; blockade of, vii. 10, 11 ; attack on the island, vii. 12 ; the captives taken at, restored by Athens in 421, ix. 1. Spindle, the=arrow, vii. 13. Sthenelaidas, ephor of Sparta, his speech on the war, iii. 10. Stone quarries, the, at Syracuse, the Athenians placed in, x. 35. Stratus, defeat of the Chaonians at (429), v. 15. Strombichides, an Athenian general (412), xi. 4. Strymon, geography of the lower, i. 20. Styplion, commander of the troops on Sphacteria, vii. 12. Superstition, of the Athenians, ii. 4 ; fear of eclipses, x. 28. Sybaris, refounded and destroyed by Croton, i. 20. Sybarites, the remnant destroyed by the Lucanians, i. 12. Sybota, battle of, iii. 6. Syke, the, on Epipolae, x. 15. Syracusans, outwitted by the Athenians, who • are able to transfer their fleet from Catana to the Great Harbour, x. 12; exhibit con- tempt for the Athenians, ibid. ; their first engagement with the Athenians on the shore of the Great Harbour (415), ibid. ; ex- cellence of their cavalry, ibid. ; their pre- parations in the winter of 415, x. 13 ; send envoys to Corinth and Lacedaemon, ibid. ; enclose the Temenites (415), x. 14; place garrisons in the Olympieum and Megara, ibid. ; their first counter-wall (414), x. 16 ; destroyed by the Athenians, ibid. ; their second counter-wall, ibid. ; destroyed by the Athenians, ibid. ; despondency of, x. 17; depose Hermocrates, ibid. ; contemplate surrendering (414), x. 18 ; prevented by the arrival of Gongylus, ibid. ; their third wall, ibid. ; under Gylippus, defeated, but after- wards victorious and carry their third wall past the Athenian line, x. 19; resolve to attack the Athenians at sea, x. 24 ; the first engagement (413), ibid. ; capture Athenian transports, ibid. ; their second engagement in the Great Harbour, they are victorious (413), x. 25 ; their third naval engagement with the Athenians (413), x. 29; their victory, ibid. ; dangerous enemies to the Athenians because like them, x. 29 ; close the mouth of the Great Harbour (413), x. i 30 ; last engagement in the Harbour, x. 30, 31 ; their triumphant return from the Assinarus to the city (413), x. 34; their treatment of the Athenian prisoners, x. 35. Syracuse, at war with Leontini (427), vi. 17; aid of, sought by Leontini, x. 1 ; news of the Athenian expedition carried to, x. 9 ; a general dismisses the Assembly, ibid. ; the Athenians send ten slaps into (*15), x. 10 ; ten Ath enian ships enter the Great Harbour, ibid. ; the whole Athenian fleet enters, x. 12 ; the army encamps on the shore, ibid. ; Alcibiades advises help to be sent to, x. 13 ; the Athenian fleet sails into the Great Har- bour (414), x. 16; arrival of the Corinthian ships at, x. 19 ; retreat of the Athenians from, X. 33 f. T Taenarus, the curse of, iii. 12. Tanagra, attacked by Nicias (426), vii. 2. Tegea, at war with Mantinea (423), viii. 12; refuses to join Argos, ix. 3 ; the allied armies propose to attack (418), ix. 10; Agis marches to the relief of, ibid. ; and Mantinea, quarrel about the water, ix. 10. Temples, built in the fifth century, xiv. 19. Teuedos, hostile to Mytilene, vi. 1. 560 INDEX. Teos, revolts from Athens (412), xi. 4; Diomedon partially recovers, for Athens, xi. 5. Terentum, opposed to the Athenians in 415, x. 8. Teres, king of the Odrysians, i. 19 ; death of, ibid. ; his sons, ibid. Teucer, gives information about the profana- tion of the mysteries, x. 11. Teutiaplus of Elis, his advice to Alcidas, vi. 7. Thales of Miletus, xiv. 11. Theban tactics, a line twenty-five deep, at Delium, viii. 4. Thebans, their conduct in the Persian war, vi. 11, 12 ; their relations to Plataea, v. 1 ff, vi. 12 ; insist on the destruction of the walls of Thespiae (423), viii. 12 ; see Plataea. Thebes, wealth of, iv. 6 ; and Plataea, v. 1 ; proposes destruction of Athens to Sparta, xii. 22. Themistocles, and Magna Graecia, i. 9. Theodoras of Cyrene, a mathematician, xiv. 16. Thera, pays tribute, iv. 4, note. Theramenes, the Spartan, makes second treaty with Persians (412), xi. 9; lost at sea, ibid. son of Hagnon, his position in the Four Hundred, xi. 21 ; breaks with the Four Hundred (411), xi. 22; at Arginusae, xii. 14; accuses the generals at Arginusae (406), xii. 15 ; views of Aristophanes upon him, xii. 17 ; visits Lysander (404), xii. 22 ; sent as envoy to Sparta, ibid. ; proposes return of the exiles, xii. 23 ; his part in the election of the Thirty, xii. 24 ; his policy, ibid. ; opposes the conduct of the Thirty, xii. 25 ; attacked by Critias and executed (404), ibid. Therma, acquired by Macedon, i. 18 ; restored to Perdiccas (431), v. 6. Thero, monument of, at Agrigentum, xiii. 6. Thespiae, the walls pulled down by theThebans (423V viii. 12. Thespians, the, arrive at Syracuse (413), x. 24; on Epipolae, x. 27. Thessalians, allies of the Athenians, v. 4. Thessalus, refouuds Sybaris(?), i. 10; son of Cimon, impeaches Alcibiades for profaning the mysteries, x. 11. Thessaly, political feeling in the country, viii. 5 ; on friendly terms with Perdiccas, viii. 11. Thirty, the, election of, at Athens (404), xii. 24; character of their government, xii. 25; apply for Spartan garrison (404), ibid. ; seize Eleusis (403), xii. 26; defeated by Thrasybulus, ibid. ; deposed, ibid. Thrace, growth of the Odrysian empire, i. 19. Thracian, "district," i. 2; changes in, i. 18; from 437, i. 20; mercenaries, at Athens (413), x. 23. Thrasybulus, general of Athenian fleet, xi. 18; at Arginusae, xii. 14; makes terms with oligarchs (403), xii. 26 ; attacks the Thirty from Phyle, ibid. ; marches to Peiraeus, ibid. Thrasyllus, an Argive general (418), ix. 9 ; at the battle of Cynossema (411), xii. 4; sent to Athens, ibid. ; raises a force at Athens (410), xii. 7 ; defeated at Ephesus (410), xii. 8 ; in the Hellespont, ibid. Thrasymachus, the sophist, xiv. 14. Thronium, captured by the Athenians (431), v. 5. Thucydides, the son of Melesias, ostracism of, i. 4; general at Samos, i. 16; said to have accused Anaxagoras of treason, ii. 8. the historian, a general (424), at Thasos, viii. 5 ; fails to relieve Ainphipolis, ibid,. ; an exile from Athens, viii. 6 ; his remarks on the Sicilian expedition, x. 21 ; his opinion as to the best Athenian govern- ment, xi. 23 ; his judgment on Antiphon ibid., xiv. 9. Thurii, foundation of, i. 10 ; construction of the town, ibid. ; dissensions at, i. 11 ; fresh colonists invited, ibid. ; date of the founda- tion, ibid., note; Cleandridas at, i. 12; becomes Dorian and secedes from Athens, ibid. ; refuses to join Gylippus, x. 17 ; the Thurians become allies of the Athenians (413), x. 26. Thyreatis, Ageinetans settled in the, v. 6, viii. 1. Timocreon of Rhodes, xiv. 1. Tissaphernes, sends an envoy to Sparta (413), xi. 2; his alliance with Chalcideus, xi. 5; obtains possession of Amorges, xi. 8 ; pro- vides pay for the Peloponnesian fleet, ibid. ; makes second treaty with the Pelopon- nesians (412), xi. 9; quarrels with Lichas, xi. 10; receives Alcibiades (411), xi. 11; reduces pay of Peloponnesian fleet, ibid. ; concludes a third treaty with the Pelopon- nesians (411), xi. 15 ; follows Peloponnesians to the Hellespont, xii. 4 ; arrests Alcibiades (410), xii. 5. Tlupoleinus, general at Samos, i. 16. INDEX. 561 Torone, captured by Brasidas (424), viii. 7; recovered for Athens by Cleon (422), viii. 13. Trachinians, their country ravaged by the Oetaeans, vii. 1. Trade, effect of the Ionian revolt on, xiv. 22 ; of Athens, ibid. Tragia, battle of, i. 16. Tribute, diminution of, in 450-440, i. 2 ; of the allies in Caria, i. 15; collected in Lycia (430), v. 11 ; raising of the, by Athens in 425, vii. 16 ; see App. 1 ; of the Asiatic cities, reckoned as due to the Great King, xi. 2. Triremes, a hundred set apart at the begin- ning of the war, v. 5. Troezen, Athenians attack, in 430, v. 8. Tyrrhenians, in the Athenian army at Syra- cuse (413), x. 29. V Vase-painting, xiv. 17. w War, parties for and against, at Athens, ii. 9 ; causes of the Peloponnesian, Thucydides' views, iii 1 ; the Megarian decree, ibid. ; the peculations of Phidias, ibid. ; the Peloponnesian, due to the peculations of Pericles, ibid. ; the cost of, iv. 6 ; largely met by private expenditure, ibid. ; savage nature of the Peloponnesian, even in 430, v. 12. Warfare, mode of, among the Athenians and Spartans, contrasted, iv. 5 ; difficulties of, ibid. West, the, and Athens, i. 9; Athenian view of conquest in, x. 13. Women, their life at Athens, ii. 3 ; at Athens, xiv. 23. X Xanthippus, son of Pericles, ii. 3 ; carried off by the plague (430), v. 10. Xenocritus, takes part in the founding of Thurii, i. 10. Xcnophanes of Blea, xiv. 11. z Zacynthus, attack on (430), V. 11. Zeno, xiv. 11. Zeuxis, xiv. It.