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 THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. 
 
 A SPEECH 
 
 DELIVERED IN 
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 
 
 ON TUESDAY, 12th OF DECEMBER, 1854, 
 BY 
 
 THE EIGHT HON. SIDNEY HERBERT, M.P, 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 JOHN MUREAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. 
 
 1854.
 
 rONPON- : rRINTKD BY WTLT.TAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET, 
 AND CllAniNG CROSS.
 
 A SPEECH, 
 
 Mr. S. Herbert rose and said, — Sir, the charges which have 
 been brought against the Government to-night are of a character 
 so serious that I hope the House will grant me their attention 
 while I endeavour to give an answer to the statements of the right 
 honourable gentleman the member for Droitwich, and to offer 
 that explanation of the course of the Government which he claimed 
 it as a right — and justly claimed it, as a member of Parliament — 
 to exact from them. That explanation I will endeavour to give 
 by a plain and straightforward narrative of the events in this war 
 as they occurred, so far as they came under the direction of the 
 Government ; and the House of Commons must then judge 
 whether, when they have considered the past conduct of the 
 Government in the prosecution of the war, the Government are 
 entitled to ask for further powers and further assistance for the 
 purpose of carrying it out with vigour. Sir, the charges, as I 
 understand them, which have been made by the right honourable 
 baronet are many in number. He states that the' army was ori- 
 ginally sent out by the Government without any distinct plan or 
 intention ; that when, at last, the Government resolved upon a 
 plan, it was not such a plan as was justifiable, considering the 
 forces at their command, and the information they possessed of the 
 power and strength of the enemy they were about to attack. The 
 right honourable gentleman says further, that the army was too 
 small for its object ; that that army was not a well-appointed, but 
 an ill-appointed army ; and he quoted instances in which it had 
 suffered in its efficiency from the want of due preparation on the 
 part of the Government. He says, also, that that army was sent 
 
 B 2
 
 ( 4 ) 
 
 out too late ; tliat the reinforcements were not sufficient ; that that 
 army, too weak in the first instance, was allowed, by the neglect 
 at home, to dwindle down till it w^as absolutely insignificant. 
 Now, I cannot do better than state — and I will do it in a very 
 few sentences — what was the intention of the Government at the 
 time that this army was first sent into the field ; and I will show 
 next what efforts were made in order to produce that army on the 
 field in the highest state of discipline and efficiency ; and thus you 
 will see how much truth there is in the allegations that the army 
 was too weak for its purpose, and that it was suffered to become 
 still weaker by the want of reinforcements. Now, it was in April 
 that the Government sent instructions to Lord Raglan as to the 
 course he should pursue with the army under his orders. That 
 army was numerically very inferior in strength to that now under 
 his command. 
 
 Let me here say that m every step we took at home or abroad, 
 through our minsters here, through our generals there, we acted 
 in concert with our allies (hear, hear), whose good faith in council 
 has been as signal as their gallantry in the field ; and when I 
 speak of instructions given or intentions entertained, I speak of 
 intentions entertained and instructions given, not by the Enghsh 
 Government alone, but by the allied Governments acting in strict 
 concert together. Well, at the time this army was sent to occupy 
 a portion of the Turkish territory, we had a large fleet in the 
 Black Sea. There was then a very powerful Russian army occu- 
 pying the Danubian Principalities. There had been but few 
 contests then between the Turkish and the Russian forces, and the 
 strength of the Russian army had not been broken by disease and 
 the deficiency of their commissariat. Those who had the best 
 means of forming a military opinion in this matter had not then 
 very great confidence in the power of the Turkish army to resist 
 the attacks which the Russians might direct against it, and 
 thought — and, I believe, justly thought— that in the then aspect 
 of affairs there was danger that a bold stroke might be made 
 against the Turkish capital, and that the Bosphorus might fall 
 into the hands of the Emperor of Russia. I am not now speaking 
 of things that were probable, but in war you must also look to 
 things that are possible, and guard against them. There was also 
 the possibility that if the Turks failed to resist successfully the 
 attacks on their position at Widdin and Kalafat, the Balkan might
 
 ( 5 ) 
 
 be turned, or that the Russians might, without crossing the Balkan 
 range, go to the right of it, and advance down on Constantinople, 
 and that the capital would in that way have been endangered. 
 
 Well, our army was occupied in ascertaining what would be 
 the best line of defence, and strengthening it, in order to keep 
 Constantinople safe from any coup-de-main. But Lord Raglnn, 
 in his instructions, was further told that a p(n'tion of our army 
 should be encamped at Unkiar Skelessi, not only on account of the 
 salubrious and well-watered nature of that portion of the country, 
 but also because it placed him within reach of Varna, should the 
 line of the Balkan be attempted to be forced by the Russians, and 
 likewise because, if any attempt should have to be made on the 
 Russian territory, such as was ultimately contemplated, great 
 advantages would be enjoyed therefor carrying out that object. I 
 mention this to show that the Government had a distinct plan, 
 which was — first, to secure the Dardanelles ; next, to defend Con- 
 stantinople ; next, that capital being safe, to defend the lines of 
 the Balkan ; and; lastly, to be ready to attempt to strike a blow 
 at some vital part of the Russian empire. That which had been 
 foreseen took place : the Russians forced the Danube, Silistria 
 was invested, and Omar Pasha considered that he was in great 
 danger, and that he should be unable to maintain that fortress 
 unless the allies made a combined advance that should threaten 
 and menace the Russian army, and so force them to throw up the 
 siege. We all recollect the events of that siege. We all recollect 
 the gallantry of our own countrymen in a miserable outpost of that 
 fortress (hear) ; but it was not their gallantry alone or their 
 valour, but also a consciousness on the part of the Russians that 
 an advance of the allies from Shumla and Varna rendered it 
 impossible for them to maintain their position, that caused them to 
 raise the siege. 
 
 We are apt after the fact to underrate the value of success 
 achieved (hear, hear), and I have to-night heard a right honour- 
 able gentleman speak of gallant exploits elsewhere in a tone that 
 I did not expect to have heard. Silistria was relieved. An 
 argument may be advanced, as to whether the importance of such 
 relief should have been allowed to interpose before other military 
 operations. No doubt that interposition lost time, but you gained 
 immensely by it ; you gained for the Turkish army a groat moral 
 prestige, and destroyed that prestige which had so long throughout
 
 ( ^ ) 
 
 Europe been attached to the Russian army. It was the first great 
 enterprise of the Russian arras in this war, and it failed. Do not 
 undervalue the importance of that at the outset of a contest. 
 Well, that accomplished, it remained for the Government to 
 decide on the next enterprise which would most tend to strike 
 some effectual blow at the power of Russia in the Black Sea, and 
 so place her neighbours in a state of tranquillity. On the 27th 
 the siege of Silistria was raised, and on the 29th instructions were 
 sent to Lord Raglan — who, from the first, had been desired to 
 ascertain by every means in his power the amount of the Russian 
 forces in the Crimea, and to ascertain how far, with the powers at 
 the disposal of the allies, an attempt on Sebastopol would be 
 successful. The officers who commanded those two armies were 
 men of great military experience, and the Government reposed in 
 them — one of whom is now no more — as it does now in the sur- 
 vivor and the successor of the other, unbounded confidence. 
 (Cheers.) The right honourable baronet asks whether we gave 
 them any positive instructions after we had received any positive 
 information on which we could rely ? If we had shown so little 
 trust and confidence in those men who were selected to hold posts 
 of such responsibility as the command of our armies, we being six 
 weeks distant from the scene of action — if we had had so little 
 confidence in them as to have told them, whether your information 
 be favourable or not, you must wait until we have decided on it 
 and weighed the grounds of your recommendation — then the allied 
 Governments would not only, as the honourable baronet has said, 
 have lost w^eeks, but months, and delayed so long that no expedi- 
 tion could have been attempted. Those officers took every means 
 to ascertain the force of Russia in the Crimea. They held a 
 council of war, and decided, and, as I think, rightly decided, that 
 the attempt ought to be made. (Hear.) They knew the strength 
 of their forces, and, from information, the strength of the forces they 
 would be likely to meet ; and Lord Raglan knew better than any 
 man what accession to his forces he could count upon — for no man 
 knows better what is or is not the military capacity of England. 
 From the moment they had come to a decision, the allied commanders 
 applied every energy of their minds to make preparations for that 
 immense armament which conveyed our armies to the Crimea. 
 
 Right honourable gentlemen talk of the lateness of the expedi- 
 tion, and think nothing so simple as the embarkation of 50,000
 
 ( 7 ) 
 
 men, and of carrying them across the sea, and landing them, in 
 face of an hostile army, with hoats built and prepared for the 
 landing of horses and siege guns. Right honourable gentlemen 
 talk of this as of landing at a pier in a time of profound peace. 
 (Hear, hear.) These preparations took much labour, and reflect 
 infinite credit on those engaged in them, and I do not know that 
 any expedition ever sailed so perfect and complete in all its de- 
 partments ; and, with the exception of that confusion which must 
 of necessity arise in moving so vast a body of men on so capri- 
 cious an element as the sea, I do not think that there was ever 
 moved so immense a force with so little loss and with so great 
 success. (Cheers.) Was the army landed in the Crimea so in- 
 suflicient for the purpose for which it was intended ? Lord Raglan 
 took 27,000, which, together with our allies, formed a force of 
 more than 50,000 men. What had they to meet ? Nearly the 
 whole of the Russian force in the Crimea, and they met it in an 
 entrenched position, which gave to their numbers an advantage 
 almost equivalent to doubling their force. They held on the 
 heights of Alma a position as strong as that which we held at 
 Inkermann, but they held it with a very different result. (Hear, 
 hear.) 
 
 Let me now ask whether there was nothing else that delayed 
 this expedition? Before it sailed from Varna there broke out a 
 fearful pestilence among our troops ; that pestilence thinned their 
 ranks most grievously, and our troops had to meet an enemy worse 
 than any human enemy and far more dispiriting and terrible to 
 the soldiers. We were, unfortunately, not the only sufferers ; our 
 allies suffered also from this disease, and among them its ravages 
 were more fearful than among our own troops. I do not exactly 
 know the extent of the loss they suffered, but I know the loss from 
 disease in both armies was far greater than any which we sus- 
 tained in action. (Hear.) No sooner had that disease culminated, 
 and commenced to decline among the troops on land, than it broke 
 out in the fleet, which put to sea, as it was thought that the dis- 
 ease could so best be remedied ; but the fleet soon returned, 
 having in a few hours sustained a loss the mortality of which, from 
 its rapidity, was fearful. We left Lord Raglan and Marshal St. 
 Arnaud to recruit their army, and to raise them from that depres- 
 sion consequent on sickness, while making the preparations for the 
 invasion of the Crimea. But is it clear that, had they been able
 
 ( 8 ) 
 
 to land in the Crimea earlier, they would liave been able to have 
 gained much as compared with the enemy ? The difficulty which 
 the Russians had to contend with in receiving reinforcements arose 
 from the difficulty of passing over a soil which became broken up 
 in wet weather. Therefore, the longer the fine weather, the longer 
 could the Russians pour in reinforcements ; that they made good 
 use of their time none could deny, and I suppose that there never 
 was an army moved on land so skilfully and rapidly as was the 
 corps of General Dannenberg which was brought from Odessa. 
 
 The right honourable baronet has said, that we have under- 
 rated the power and skill of our enemy. I recollect that last 
 session I made some observations on that head ; and I said that 
 the public opinion of the country was doing that which the right 
 honourable baronet now accuses us of doing. From the campaign 
 on the Danube, which had this peculiarity, that there was not one 
 pitched battle fought during it, the public chose to assume that 
 the Russian power was waning, if not extinct, and that there was 
 nothing easier than to conquer wherever we chose. I pointed out 
 that the Russian soldier, who is a Russian peasant, is a man of a 
 primitive nature, and, like all primitive people, is strongly and 
 ardently attached to his native country. \ye are apt to think 
 that those of a country which has no free institutions like our own 
 are unable to feel that patriotism which we feel ; but we have had 
 a lesson in this respect, and others will admit, now that they have 
 seen the defence made of Sebastopol, the tenacity with which the 
 Russians defend their country, a tenacity to which when I for- 
 merly alluded I was accused of connivance. (Hear.) But the 
 rin-ht honourable baronet states, that the army was insufficient in 
 number, and has been utterly without reinforcements. The army, 
 when first sent out, was composed of four divisions, the 1st, 2nd, 
 3rd, and Light Division, besides cavalry and artillery. In June, 
 before the orders were given to make a descent on the Crimea, if 
 circumstances were such as to justify such an attack, a fifth divi- 
 sion was formed and placed under the command of the lamented 
 Sir G. Cathcart. Now let me state the reinforcements that were 
 sent out to the army :— in June there were sent 941 men ; in July, 
 4588 men ; in August, 2032 men— yet we are told that from the 
 moment that the expedition was decided on no reinforcements 
 were sent to the army. 
 
 Sir J. Pakixgtox. — I did not sav that.
 
 ( 9 ) 
 
 Then I was so unfortunate as to have misunderstood the right 
 honourable baronet ; but, perhaps he" will admit that, subsequent 
 to the orders, and subsequent to the landing in the Crimea, he 
 said no attempt was made to reinforce the array. Now let us see 
 how that stands. In September there were 1286 men sent out ; 
 in October, 2855 ; in November, 7037. (Hear.) Now these were 
 before other reinforcements, which I admit were called for by 
 subsequent events, and which were requested by Lord Raglan ; 
 but T do not count them, or seek to take any advantage from 
 them, but month by month state to you the troops sent out. But 
 you may argue that these reinforcements were small for a power 
 like England, that can pour out its battalions like water. But, I 
 ask, on whom rests the responsibility that England, at the com- 
 mencement of a war, must make small wars. Why is it ? It is 
 because through every Government and every Parliament, we 
 have always had the same stereotyped system of economy in mili- 
 tary affairs. 
 
 I am speaking the whole plain truth in this matter. (Hear.) 
 I am as much to blame as any one. I have held for some years 
 the responsible situation of Secretary of War, and I know what 
 have been my own short-comings in this respect, but this too I 
 know, that whenever I have brought forward, as I have done, what 
 are called peace estimates, I have constantly been met with 
 motions for large reductions. I say, therefore, that it has been 
 the fault of all parties, all administrations, every Parliament ; I 
 am afraid I cannot give my assent to any exception, however eager 
 I may be to do so ; I have seen administrations formed of various 
 parties — I have seen them taking different courses on almost every 
 conceivable subject, but on one they have agi'eed, and that has 
 been the one to which I have alluded — one of improvident eco- 
 nomy. What lias been the result ? 
 
 At the commencement of the war we had to make means, and 
 to create an army, and to use it at the same time. I recollect at 
 the time when the Militia Bill was brought forward by the honour- 
 able member for Midhurst — and every year that has passed has con- 
 firmed the opinion I entertained of the wisdom of that measure — 
 we had a great many discussions on the military available strength 
 of the country, and honourable gentlemen used arguments to show 
 that after deducting the troops necessary for the occupation of our 
 garrisons, we had not 10,000 available bayonets left in England.
 
 ( y<^ ) 
 
 AVcll, now 1 have shown the number of men originally sent out, 
 and of the reinforcements since sent ; I will now add to them those 
 that have been ordered to embark from the different Mediterra- 
 nean garrisons, and which are sent from home, including also 
 1700 men waiting for ships. I am not now speaking of what have 
 been actually under Lord Raglan's command, but of those which 
 are passing under his command — which, when they have passed 
 there will from first to last have been, in cavalry, infantry, artil- 
 lery, and sapj)ers, 53,044 men. This is the number of non- 
 commissioned officers and privates, exclusive of officers. If you 
 add them, the numbers will be between 54,000 and 55,000 men. 
 (Hear, hear.) I do not believe that the country is aware of the 
 efforts that have been made — they have seen it stereotyped through 
 leading articles that Lord Raglan has been left with 16,000 
 bayonets. But what does 16,000 bayonets mean ? It means all 
 that are left, after deducting all the men on detachment duty, all 
 the cavalry, all the artillery, all the engineers, and all officers and 
 non-commissioned officers, and the 16,000 bayonets are put 
 forward as the whole available army. Why, the Duke of Wel- 
 lington had at the battle of Waterloo only 18,000 British bayonets, ^ 
 and if you will subtract all the officers, non-commissioned officers, 
 cavalry, and artillery, and men not actually engaged, you will 
 attain your object in making a small show upon paper, but you 
 will deceive yourselves and the country as to the efforts she is 
 putting forth. (Hear, hear.) 
 
 The right honourable baronet has said, and with perfect fairness 
 and truth, that the Government has no right to complain of the 
 House of Commons, and they have behaved with fairness and 
 liberality, and have not made objections to any call or demand 
 which the Government has made ; but the right honourable gen- 
 tleman says, that the question is, whether these powers or further 
 powers should be intrusted to the hands of those who have shown 
 so little wisdom, prudence, and foresight? The right honourable 
 baronet drew a picture of a Member of Parliament's duty : it 
 was his duty to give his support to a war which he felt to be just, 
 and to give his support also to a Government he thought capable 
 of conducting it efficiently. He says, however, that he gave 
 extraordinary powers to the preseiit Government, whom he thought 
 incapable of using them with wisdom, prudence, or foresight. If 
 that be his rule, it is not mine. If we are to derive any advantage
 
 ( 11 ) 
 
 from this strange proceeding on his part, I reject it ; if he thinks 
 the Government incapable of carrying on affairs, it is not his duty 
 to intrust them with power, but to transfer it to some other men 
 more honest and capable of conducting affairs, so as to satisfy 
 himself and the country. 
 
 The right honourable baronet has also asserted that they had 
 neglected to supply the army with proper appointments ; he founds 
 his charge on a proceeding which, in a military point of view, was 
 necessary, and on which the government could not have dictated, 
 and neither did they pretend to dictate, to military men. The 
 right honourable baronet says they landed without tents, and he 
 conceives that the executive were in fault for having sent out 
 a great army without a sufficiency of tents ; but every regiment 
 that went out with its arms and munition took also tents, and I 
 do not believe that any army ever before went out so perfectly 
 appointed in these respects. There is no doubt about their having 
 the tents, but it is said Lord Raglan landed on the 16th of Sep- 
 tember without tents. The night was wet, and the men were 
 exposed to a great deal of suffering, and they did for a few days 
 that which the Duke of Wellington and the Spanish army did for 
 four years. No doubt much sickness was caused by this — it is 
 very easy to judge of this after the fact — and Lord Raglan is 
 blamed for having landed without tents, and having brought them 
 so unprovided to Balaklava. 
 
 But let me put another question, and let any one judge whether 
 Lord Raglan is to be blamed. He knew that they had to meet a 
 very powerful arn)y, which had intrenched itself, and it was very 
 obvious that within a short time of landing, and probably at the 
 time of landing, they would have to meet an energetic, deter- 
 mined, and skilful enemy. Lord Raglan might have brought all 
 his tents, but then he would have left behind him all those batta- 
 lions the space for which would have been taken up by the tents. 
 A powerful force is stationed at the Alma, and nothing can be 
 done until their position is forced or turned. Now, if the result 
 of the battle of the Alma, instead of being a glorious victory, had 
 been an undecided success in consequence of the want of two or 
 three battalions, the expedition would have been lost, and what 
 would then have been said of Lord Raglan ? (Hear, hear.) It 
 would have been said, " Why did you fill your 6hi])S with ambu- 
 lances and tents when you had men, and such men, lying idle at
 
 ( 12 ) 
 
 Varna ? You v\ ere going upon an expedition in which you knew 
 that the first blow was everything, and to take men with you, and 
 plenty of them, should have been the one and the only considera- 
 tion." But now tlie battle of the Alma has boen won it is easy for 
 the right honom-able gentleman to say that it might have been 
 won with fewer men. Just so. The right honourable gentleman 
 thinks nothing of the expedition to Bomarsund. There was, cer- 
 tainly, he says, a blockade, but you sent your great thips into the 
 Baltic upon an expedition ending in nothing. One right honour- 
 able baronet thinks nothing of the capture of islands almost inac- 
 cessible, held by a very powerful enemy, in which buildings had 
 been marked out for erection which would have made them into 
 another Cronstadt, or another Helsingfors, so that there might be 
 in the Gulf of Finland another perpetual menace to another capital. 
 This is the result which the right honourable gentleman treats 
 with such supreme contempt ; but the Emperor of the French 
 differs from him in opinion, for he gave a marshal's baton to the 
 general who commanded the French troo})s engaged in the expe- 
 dition. (Hear, hear.) 
 
 I now come back to the Alma, and the right honourable gentle- 
 man's charge, that tents were not provided for the troops. I hope 
 the explanation I have given will be obvious to everyone and satis- 
 factory to the country. I do not believe that one iota of blame 
 attaches to Lord Raglan for that proceeding. (Cheers from the 
 Opposition.) I believe he did what every man in his place ought 
 to do — he judged of the circumstances as they then stood, he did 
 not pretend to prophesy the success of the army, but he took 
 every means to insure it. It is now easy to say that his success 
 was certain, and that he should have left men behind and taken 
 tents with him instead. 
 
 I must here diverge for a moment to meet a charge which the 
 right honourable gentleman has not made, but which has been 
 frequently made elsewhere, and I shall make a very frank state- 
 ment on that subject to the House ; nor shall I, in defending what 
 appears to me to be defensible, condescend for one moment to 
 conceal what I think with respect to details which have been, in 
 my opinion, unsatisfactory. Last session we had a great deal of 
 discussion as to the merits of the commissariat, and the commis- 
 sariat was then subjected to much popular criticism. I believe 
 that the o])inions then formed with regard to the commissariat
 
 ( 13 ) ■ 
 
 were exaggerated, and not founded on ftict, but I am not prepared 
 to say that at the end of a long peace the commissariat, or any 
 other department of the array, was necessarily, or could be, in as 
 perfect a state as experience and practice could make it. I have 
 no doubt, therefore, that there was ground for a certain portion 
 of criticism upon the part of those who were determined to find 
 fault ; but the com^missariat has outlived those criticisms, and I 
 believe it is now universally admitted that there never was an army 
 better fed than the army of Lord Raglan, Their rations have 
 been increased, and they are now 50 per cent, larger in meat than 
 the rations of British troops have been at any previous time. 
 When fears arose as to their health from the non-use of vege- 
 tables, immediate steps were taken to supply them from Trieste, 
 Venice, and Smyrna, with fresh vegetables ; and when I heard that 
 they were being sold to the men, I wrote to Lord Raglan, that, in 
 my opinion, whatever was necessary to make the soldiers efficient 
 in the peculiar position in which they were placed, with a view to 
 the public service, ought to be supplied at the expense of the 
 public, (Hear, hear.) 
 
 But it has been stated that there has been great mismanage- 
 ment with respect to the medical department of the army during 
 the campaign, and I am very anxious that the House should know 
 the exact truth upon this subject, because, I think, nothing can 
 be so detrimental to the public service as for the public to imagine 
 that when our bravest men were laid prostrate by suffering, be it 
 from wounds or be it from sickness, they met with heartless 
 neglect at a time when they had earned for themselves a right to 
 the utmost care and solicitude. Let me first state what was the 
 amount of the staff which we sent out. For a long period no army 
 iiad left the shores of England so large and so well appointed ; 
 and certainly none had ever left it to conduct operations so im- 
 portant, but so hazardous, as the army of Lord Raglan. It was 
 felt that going to a climate so doubtful, the efficiency of the 
 medical staff was a matter of paramount importance. When, 
 therefore, the army was first organized, the Government took the 
 opinion of a gentleman upon a matter of detail, which I instance 
 in order to show the care and attention with which these matters 
 were looked to : they took the opinion of a very eminent man, 
 namely, Mr, Guthrie, a surgeon of great experience as well as 
 talent, who had stated that there was an error in the organization of
 
 ( 14 ) 
 
 tlie medical department. lie said, " You have but three medical 
 officers to a regiment ; you have a large staff"; the staff-surgeon 
 has none of that local interest in a regiment which the regimental 
 surgeon has. In the field the regimental surgeon has the strongest 
 interest in bringing his men to a state of health as rapidly as pos- 
 sible, and getting them back to their battalions, while the staff"- 
 surgeon has no interest, one way or the other, in clearing the 
 hospitals ; and therefore do not give so many men to your staff*, 
 but give a fourth surgeon to every regiment, and your medical 
 department will be more efficient." 
 
 Dr. Andrew Smith, the head of the medical department of the 
 army, differed from Dr. Guthrie in this respect. He said, in no 
 battle is every regiment engaged ; and, if you give a fourth surgeon 
 to every regiment, those regiments which have suffered most will 
 not have enough, while those who have not suff'ered at all will 
 have too many. Those who have suffered must depend on the 
 staflf; but the staff" will be weakened, and the colonels of the 
 regiments which have not been engaged will not let a surgeon of 
 their own go, for they will say that their own regiments may be 
 engaged on the next day. I consulted Lord Raglan as to which 
 system he preferred, and he said he thought Dr. Guthrie was right. 
 But there was great authority on either side ; and we therefore 
 said to the one, " Take your large regimental establishment ;" and 
 to the other, " Take your large statf establishment." (Hear, hear.) 
 Dr. Andrew Smith had devoted himself to the work night and day ; 
 he collected all the purveyors of hospitals who had had experience 
 in previous wars. They met at his house, and drew up a report as 
 to the proper amount of stores to be sent out. In this report they 
 drew upon their recollections of the Peninsula, and made their 
 calculations at so much per head. Well, we trebled it. The 
 Government felt that since the period of the Peninsular war great 
 improvements had been made, the comforts of the soldiers were 
 now more attended to, and more must be done than had been done 
 in the campaigns of Wellington. I mention this to show that it 
 was our object to make these preparations for the army as good 
 and as ample as possible. I am not saying that all has been done 
 successfully, or could not have been done better, but that w^e 
 spared no exertion to make it as efficient as we could. Now, how 
 many gentlemen were appointed to the army ? Of staff" medical 
 officers there were 280, of regimental medical officers 192, and of
 
 ( 15 ) 
 
 ordnance medical officers 14 ; making a total of 486, or, with the 
 nine medical officers of the 5th division, of 495. But upwards of 
 100 of these have been added since the battle of the Alma; but 
 at that time, also, it must be recollected that the force was much 
 smaller. At that battle the medical establishment, as it was at 
 first fixed for the army, amounted to 275. On looking at the 
 ' Moniteur de I'Armee,' I find that the medical establishment for 
 the French army amounted to exactly the same number, 270 odd, 
 although their army was numerically larger than ours. If we had 
 chosen to limit our medical staff to the number engaged in the 
 Peninsula, we should have sent out one surgeon to every 145 men, 
 while the number we have sent is one to every 77 men. 
 
 Much complaint has been made upon this subject ; and a great 
 deal of the blame which has been cast upon it is just in this sense, 
 that when sickness makes its ravages upon an army which is at 
 the same time engaged in constant operations against an enemy, 
 the strain upon the medical officers becomes so great that no num- 
 ber you can send will be sufficient. But was there no difficulty in 
 getting together this large staff ? It was necessary to send all the 
 most experienced men we could find, and we drew from the depots 
 all the regimental surgeons of military experience to send out ; 
 but it was also necessary to keep some at home, because we had 
 the cholera in England as well as in Turkey, and we could not 
 trust entirely to civilians for attendance upon the troops, because, 
 when such a case as the cholera arises, a civilian, who has a large 
 practice in the country, and whose clients are very important to him, 
 says. It will not be honest in me to receive your pay, as I can no 
 longer attend to your regiment. We had great difficulty in getting 
 these men together, for they were scattered about in emigrant 
 ships, in merchant ships, and in various other vocations in different 
 parts of the world. We also employed numbers of civilians, giving 
 them a temporary rank in the army ; and they did not wish for 
 more, as they were only desirous of the opportunity of getting 
 practice and experience. 
 
 I think the House will do me the justice to admit that, as far 
 as the medical staff is concerned, the Government cannot be 
 charged with looking at it in a niggard spirit, or with not antici- 
 pating great drains upon that establishment, which was just double 
 in number that wdiich had ever before been sent with an English 
 army. I must not read to the House the long lists which have
 
 ( 16 ) 
 
 been published of the materiel whlcli was sent out. I am not 
 speaking to that which is the weak point in the department — viz., 
 its distribution, but to the fact of its having been prepared and 
 sent out — to the fact that Dr. A. Smith was indefatigable in his 
 endeavours to supply the army with every possible comfort, nay, 
 with every possible luxury that could be of use in a hospital. The 
 list contains the items of blankets and bedding, of cotton sheets 
 19,000, and everything upon that sort of scale. I will not take 
 up time by reading it, but I wish to impress upon the House and 
 upon the right honourable gentleman that it has not arisen from 
 heartless indifference to the sufferings of the troops that they have 
 been exposed to privations, (Hear, hear.) 
 
 I have alluded to a statement that after the battle of the Alma 
 a great deal of unnecessary suffering was inflicted on our troops in 
 consequence of the bad arrangements of the medical staff. I can 
 refer upon this subject to documentary evidence, but I think I can 
 put the case to the House in a manner which will convince them 
 that there has been great misapprehension and great exaggeration 
 of the evils which have existed, and which at the commencement 
 of a war must exist. It was stated that the wounded of the 
 British army at Alma lay upon the field of battle untended for two 
 or three days — that they were brought down to the ships with 
 their wounds undressed, and put on board one of them in such 
 numbers that it was rendered unsafe. I believe that a great 
 deal of this misapprehension arose from ignorance of what hap- 
 pened in places beyond the observation of those who made the 
 allegations. 
 
 The French army took fewer men than we did, and carried 
 their ambulances with them ; they had, I rejoice to say, fewer 
 wounded than we had, and, being nearer to the sea, all their 
 wounded were carried immediately to the ships. Our troops were 
 some of them four or five miles from the sea, and a field hospital 
 was established at some farm-buildings at or near the spot where 
 they had fallen. All the men whose cases permitted them to be 
 moved were moved into it, and those who could not be moved 
 were treated on the field, their wounds were dressed, and as much 
 comfort afforded them as possible — little enough that is. All such 
 plans after a great battle, and upon the battlefield, are necessarily 
 rough and inefficient for the comfort of the men ; but this is one of 
 the stern necessities of war. The men were brought down the next
 
 ( 17 ) 
 
 day, or the day following, from the field-hospital, or from the 
 field, and placed on board ship. It was supposed that those who 
 were thus carried down were being brought for the first time from 
 the spot at which they were wounded, and that no treatment had 
 yet been afforded them ; but I have evidence which satisfies me 
 that in not one single instance was a man allowed to leave this 
 field-hospital without his hurts being dressed. But I will take a 
 previous case, namely that of the Kangaroo, after the landing at 
 Old Foi't ; but it is quite true that a number of men, far beyond 
 what she could possibly carry, were in the first instance placed on 
 board the Kangaroo. The statement, however, that 1500 persons 
 were placed on board is an exaggeration, for I believe that the 
 number did not much, if at all, exceed 700. It was stated that 
 the officer in command made a signal that he was overloaded, and 
 that the medical officer remonstrated against so large a number 
 being placed on board, and 450 only were sent in her. The 
 medical department was free from blame ; but persons command- 
 ing transj)orts. and those who are without the same responsibility 
 as medical men, are often very unwilling to put themselves out of 
 the way for a department which is not their own. Some of the 
 wounded were removed from the Kangaroo to another vessel. 
 It was stated that hundreds died of the cholera during the pas- 
 sage ; the number, I believe, was really 22, and that is a small 
 proportion, when it is recollected there were many cholera cases, 
 and that at that very period the proportion of deaths to sickness 
 w^as greater than that here in the London hospitals. There was 
 great confusion, great discomfort ; but I maintain that these 
 things cannot always be avoided in war. (Hear, hear.) In the 
 position in which we were placed after the battle of the Alma the 
 men could not be left on the field ; Lord Raglan was obliged to 
 remain two or three days on the spot because he was aware that if 
 he left them they would be massacred by the Cossacks, and, of 
 course, their sufferings on board ship were great before they 
 reached the general hospital of Constantinople. But it is said that 
 their wounds were not dressed during the whole time that they 
 were on board ship. I am informed by surgeons accustomed 
 to the treatment of gunshot wounds, that no surgeon would think 
 of re-dressing a wound of this description within three or four days 
 after it had been made ; the great object being not to disturb the 
 wound, and to keep the dressings wet. It may, therefore, be true, 
 
 c
 
 ( 18 ) 
 
 that the wounds were not dressed on board, and yet that the suf- 
 ferers did not experience any unnecessary neglect. 
 
 I have dilated rather at length upon this subject because I do 
 feel that, if it were true that anything like systematic or heartless 
 indifference had been manifested by any department, but above 
 all by the medical department, it would produce a terrible re- 
 action in the spirit of the people of this country, and destroy that 
 confidence in the administration and management of the army, 
 which has of late years njade it so much more easy to recruit its 
 ranks. 
 
 As I am upon this point I may say a few words with regard to 
 the general hospital at Scutari, and this is a subject which, I 
 admit, has caused me much anxiety. The distance at which we 
 are placed from the scene of action is such that we are helpless to 
 assist in any great emergency ; we can send out stores and men, 
 but we cannot direct their immediate application. I will not con- 
 ceal what I consider to be the real truth with regard to this 
 hospital, although 1 have seen evidence upon both sides so con- 
 tradictory that I would defy any man who was willing to give 
 credit to either party to know what conclusion to come to. We 
 have been told that it was not possible to procure lint in the 
 hospital, and the greatest indignation has been expressed against 
 the persons charged with these matters for leaving the hospital so 
 unprovided. I have accounts from medical men, which I will not 
 read. They are the persons who have been impugned, and unjustly 
 impugned, by public opinion, and their statement is that there 
 never was for a moment a deficiency in the stores, but there had 
 been the greatest mismanagement as to their distribution — whether 
 of lint, of linen, or of anything else. At the time the army left Varna 
 the general hospital was there, and orders were then given that 
 the stores should be sent down to Scutari, but that order, in the 
 hurry and bustle of the departure, was never executed. The 
 principal portion of the stores remained at Varna, while the whole 
 mass of the wounded were sent to Scutari ; fortunately there was 
 with the assistance of the Turkish Government a sufficiency to 
 meet the difficulty of the moment. A deficiency being ap- 
 prehended, the medical officers accepted a loan of tliera from the 
 Turkish Government for the use of the hospital. Therefore there 
 was at one time an apprehended deficiency ; there never was a 
 positive deficiency : but I will tell you what there has been — there
 
 ( 19 ) 
 
 has been a system engendered during the peace which has greatly 
 encumbered the hospitals ; of check and counter-check for the 
 purpose of economy. There have been all manner of forms to be 
 gone through before stores could be issued to the medical officers. 
 Every account I get says this ; the medical men in their vocation 
 are beyond all praise, especially those at the head of the establish- 
 ment ; they work night and day — their tenderness to the sick, their 
 humanity, their zeal, their energy are mentioned by every one, 
 friend and foe. But the deficiency is this : that, with plenty of 
 stores, no one seemed to know where to lay their hands upon 
 them ; with plenty of materials at their disposal, the forms were so 
 cumbrous that they never could be produced with that rapidity 
 which was necessary for the purposes of a military hospital. The 
 moment we heard complaints of this kind we sent out a commission 
 with authority to inquire into the causes of these evils and set 
 them right. We thought there might be timidity on the part of 
 some of the officials in asking for what they might require, and we 
 telegraphed to Lord Stratford, telling him the supplies were to be 
 unlimited, and that the hospital was to be provided with every- 
 thing. Private benevolence came in aid. We did everything we 
 could, and I am glad to see, by the accounts I get from persons 
 on whose judgment I can depend, that things have been in some 
 degree set right. One gentleman, whose letter is private, but 
 whose name alone would be a guarantee that he was not disposed 
 to criticise too favourably upon this subject, says, " I see there 
 much to blame and much to praise. But day by day I see 
 manifest improvement. To manage more than 3000 casualties of 
 the worst nature is indeed a task to be met in an entirely satis- 
 factory way by nothing short of a miraculous energy.'' He says, 
 " With regard to the past, I could pick many a hole, and show where 
 head has been wanted and duty neglected ; but I see so much 
 exertion being made that I will throw a veil over that; if the 
 wheel is in the rut, at any rate I can say every one is puttmg'his 
 shoulder to the wheel to get it out again." I do believe that those 
 who have been so free to blame have not really considered and 
 made allowance for the difficulties of the case. When 1000 or 
 1100 wounded men are simultaneously brought into a hospital, if 
 you had all the order and all the appliances you could wish, you 
 never could prevent a scene of confusion arising from the sudden 
 influx of so many wounded men. (Cheers.) 
 
 c 2
 
 ( 20 ) 
 
 I hope the House will do me the justice to acknowledge that 
 in speaking on this question I have not concealed my honest 
 opinion. (Hear, hear.) I migiit have read to you flat contra- 
 dictions of everything that has been advanced, written by men 
 who made their statements in perfect good faith, who could 
 give the dates of the particular cases with the greatest accuracy ; 
 and I have no doubt they would give to the House the exact 
 facts as to particular accusations, but they would not give to the 
 House what I should like it to have — a fair general view of the 
 real circumstances of the case. If I might be allowed to say one 
 word on this subject before I leave it, it is this : — One thing which 
 the Government did to insure the comfort of the sick and wounded 
 has been eminently successful. The House will recollect that, 
 some time ago, a lady undertook to carry out a number of nurses 
 for the purpose of alleviating the sufferings of the sick and 
 wounded. I have received not only from medical men, but from 
 many others who have had an opportunity of making observations, 
 letters couched in the highest possible terms of praise. I will not 
 repeat the words, but no higher words of praise could be applied 
 to women for the wonderful energy, the wonderful tact, the wonder- 
 ful tenderness, combined with the extraordinary courage and self- 
 devotion which have been displayed' by that lady (loud cheers) ; 
 and I am glad to say that the characteristics which have been 
 shown by that lady, the force and influence of her character, seem 
 to have penetrated all those working with her, and I believe not 
 only the patients themselves, but every person connected with the 
 hospital, will be benefited by the admixture of this new element 
 in the management of a military hospital. (Cheers.) 
 
 I have been led away from my subject in this digression, but I 
 hope the House will pardon me, and I will now come back to what I 
 was saying in answ-er to the observations of the right honourable 
 baronet. I have stated what was the force of our armament — I 
 have shown the amount of the army which was originally sent, 
 and which is now about to be sent to Lord Raglan, taking the 
 reinforcements due to him, and adding them to those already in 
 his possession ; and a letter has been put into my hand from Sir 
 H. Ward, stating — and I was delighted to hear it — that he had 
 letters from Admiral Boxer, in which he mentioned that 24,000 
 English and French troops had passed through the Bosphorus 
 since the 5th of last month. I have shown you the number of the
 
 ( 21 ) 
 
 reinforcements, I liave shown you that they amounted tirst, in 
 .hme, to 941 ; July, to 4580 ; August, 2032 ; September, 1286 ; 
 October, 2855 ; and November, 7037, making altogether 18,739, 
 exclusive of the reinforcements since sent ; and I have shown you, 
 including the original army and the other reinforcements, we have 
 sent out over 54,000 men ; and I ask you whether, consulting our 
 history, England, in the first year of any war in which she was 
 engaged, ever sent forth such an army as this. (Cheers.) 
 
 You say, and say with truth — and I believe you — " You have 
 absorbed our reserve," We have done so. The right honourable 
 baronet says, the questions he put to-night were not all, and that 
 on another day he might call us to account, and ask us why we 
 sent an expedition against Sebastopol at all. I will not wait for 
 that time, but I will tell him why. Because we knew that Sebas- 
 topol is the stronghold of the power of liussia in the south (cheers) ; 
 we knew that the blockade of Russia, however effectual, will not 
 strike home in a manner that will be sensibly felt ; and we knew 
 that the destruction of her fortresses along the Circassian coast, 
 although it shakes her power to the centre in those provinces of Asia 
 which she has of late years appropriated, is not still such a blow as 
 w'ould be inflicted if by any means at our disposal we could destroy 
 her fleet and arsenal at Sebastopol. It was a great undertaking ; 
 I admit it was a great hazard, but 1 tell you next year it would 
 have been impossible. Round that mighty fortress, day by day, 
 and night by night, have been rising chains of forts ; and, if we 
 give them time, they will continue to rise until it is absolutely 
 impregnable. If Sebastopol is not taken or destroyed in this 
 campaign, it will never be taken or destroyed. There was a 
 great risk in the undertaking, it is said. I say there was. But I 
 recollect a friend of mine, last session, saying he had seen a 
 gentleman of influence in the City, who liad told him there was 
 but one feeling there of unanimity as to the way in which the war 
 should be carried on. He said, "We all hope that the war will 
 be carried on with the utmost vigour and determination, but no 
 risks must be run, and no danger of disaster incurn-d." (Laughter.) 
 Now, if we can conduct a war with that happy mixture of energy 
 and determination, combined with no risk to ourselves — that happy 
 mixture of prudence and boldness which would inflict all the lo:s 
 upon the enemy and none upon ourselves — truly we might say the 
 golden age of war has come. (Hear, hear.) But in carrying on war 
 you nuitt run great risks if you acquire great advantages. (Cheers.)
 
 ( -^2 ) 
 
 It is said it was a great hazard. Unquestionably it was; and I 
 know that many niihtary men thought it too great a hazard to be 
 attempted ; but others equal in authority said, and said truly, 
 " You must do it now, or you never will do it at all." I admit 
 that there was very great hazard, but, at the same time, the prize 
 was of such enormous importance that we should have been un- 
 worthy of our places if we had not attempted, while we could 
 with any chance of success, to strike a blow at the only vulnerable 
 place, which is the very centre and heart of the power of Russia in 
 the Black Sea. (Cheers.) 
 
 Well, I hope that the right honourable baronet will be satisfied 
 with this answer, which is the only one I can give him. We 
 know the hazards of war ; but it is easy to judge of events after 
 they have taken place. (]\Iinisterial cheers.) But let the right 
 honourable baronet reflect on the course which was taken by 
 certain parties with reference to this subject during the last 
 session. I confess that all last summer, when I heard the lan- 
 guage in which the Government was urged to make an attempt 
 upon Sebastopol — they thought the subject had escaped the 
 attention of the Government, I suppose — but the language in 
 which it was urged was in itself so arrogant, so ignorant, and so 
 presumptuous, that I used to feel, when I heard it, a sort of super- 
 stitious fear that such arrogance and such presumption would 
 bring down a judgment from Heaven upon us. They talked of 
 Russian power — judging from the weakened, dispirited, and de- 
 moralized army that could make no progress in the campaign 
 upon the Danube — they talked of the power of Russia as if it 
 were nothing. We did not enter into this war in that spirit. W^e 
 knew the great resources she possessed, and we did everything in 
 owe power to ensure success.' It is true that I have heard a criti- 
 cism made by some military men upon the whole proceeding. 
 They say, — you have sent out more men than you can well main- 
 tain, you have sent out what you will find it difficult to feed : it 
 is much more than you can manage. That was the difficulty I 
 spoke of before — of making a great start in the first year of 
 the war. It is a difficulty which you have to encounter when you 
 have to make an army at the same time that you are to use it. 
 Recollect this — we have few well-seasoned soldiers in this country. 
 See the difficulties we have had to encounter. We have no 
 conscription in England ; we have no compulsory service whatever
 
 ( 23 ) 
 
 in England, except for internal defence ; we have to trust entirely 
 to the voluntary system. You cannot make an army as other 
 nations may. You cannot make an army by a stroke of the pen, 
 or by an ukase raise 100,000 soldiers. We must get men willing 
 to come ; but on the other hand, when they do come, you have got 
 the materials which no conscription in the world can furnish 
 (cheers) — you have got for your materials men not dragged from 
 their reluctant homes against their wills, and from their peaceful 
 pursuits, to be forced into scenes of blood and scenes of horror to 
 which they were averse. You have got free men — men animated 
 by high spirit, full of adventure, full of life, full of ambition — men 
 whom no suffering can break, who can never complain that one 
 hardship or suffering to which they have been exposed has been 
 forced upon them by a tyrannical Government. You have had 
 that difficulty, but you have had another — at least when we are 
 talking of augmentation, we have had a difficulty which has })ressed 
 very uuich upon us; for some time emigration to a great extent 
 has been going on from this country, and more especially from the 
 sister country, Ireland, where it has dried up the sources of our 
 military supply. You have had great prosperity in trade and 
 agriculture, and consequent demand for labour, and all that would 
 not be in favour of the recruiting serjeant. But when I look back 
 to the records of history, and see what were the means by which 
 in former wars we attempted to get men — how we ])ersuaded men 
 into the militia by a bounty of ten guineas, and drafted them out 
 of it by a bounty of eleven guineas, and, after all, we coidd only 
 raise 24,000 men in one year — and when 1 look at what has been 
 done during this the first year of the war, I must confess the con- 
 t!"ast is not unfavourable. (Cheers.) Taking into account the 
 enlistments, both in the regulars and the Ea!^t India Company's 
 service, and the Marines, we should have added by free enlistment 
 something like 40,000 men, such as I have described, to our forces. 
 I do say, then, I reply with confidence to the inquiry as to the 
 augmentation of the army. We are getting men not faster than 
 they are required, but faster than we can form them into regiments, 
 drill them, and make them skilful and useful soldiers of their 
 Queen and country. (Cheers.) 
 
 And here on that point I will- stop to say that Lord Hardinge, 
 the Commander-in-Chief, at the very commencement issued a 
 regulation in regard to the troops for the East, that he would not
 
 ( 24 ) 
 
 allow a single man to go out unless he was previously practised in 
 the use of the Minie rifle. It has been the fashion for some to 
 depreciate the value of the services of Lord Hardinge. I have 
 served with Lord Hardinge as Commander-in-Chief, and with 
 others as Commander-in-Chief, and 1 have been able to see what 
 Lord Hardinge has been able to accomplish under circumstances 
 of great difficulty. If you look at the nature of the successes 
 which our arms have achieved in the Crimea, I think it will strike 
 you that the next thing to be noticed, after the indomitable courage 
 and fortitude of the men, is the skill with which they have used 
 their weapons, and the superiority of the weapons which have been 
 placed in their hands. If it had not been for Lord Hardinge, I 
 do not believe you would have had a division armed with Minie' 
 rifles. 1 do not mean that Lord Hardinge introduced them ; but 
 if he had not during the short time he was at the head of the 
 Ordnance Department imparted a great impulse to their intro- 
 duction, they would not liave been in the use they are now. 
 Many officers of high military rank were notoriously prejudiced 
 in favour of the (jld regulation musket, and could not be got out 
 of the routine ; and even such men as Sir C. Napier, enlightened 
 and intelligent as he vi'as, clung to the last to Brown Bess, and 
 said, " For God's sake don't take away Brown Bess." But Lord 
 Hardinge had made a regulation that not a recruit should leave 
 this country unless he was propei-ly instructed in the skilful use of 
 this formidable arm. And what is the opinion of the men as to 
 the use of the rifle ? and what was the opinion of those not armed 
 with it, from witnessing its effect ? That opinion was manifested 
 on the dreadful day of Inkermann, where, whenever a man, not 
 having the rifle, saw a man fall who had, he ran, seized his Minie, 
 and used it for the rest of the day. It is not only the superiority 
 of the weapon, but the consciousness which it gives the man who 
 has it that he is dependent upon his skill, and must devote his 
 mind to exercise that skill. The result is that, in^tead of firing 
 at random, and only one ball in 600 or 700 taking effbct, they 
 saw the soldier using his weapon with the facility with which a 
 gamekeeper would his fowlingpieee, and taking the proper pre- 
 caution to make every shot tell. 
 
 Well, we have had this army to create, to drill, and to send out. 
 Men are coming in rapidly ; we shall be able to augment the re- 
 giments largely, and thus istablish a reserve, so that another year it
 
 ( 2o ) 
 
 sliall not be said, as it has been this year, " You have put our all 
 upon one great effort." It has been said, we thould have sent out 
 earlier two, three, four, live, or six regiments ; but could we have 
 done so ? What will the right honourable baronet say when he is 
 told how long it takes to make a soldier ? What were the regiments 
 that have been sent out ? Three months ago regiments that have 
 been sent out were in our colonies, or returning from a tropical 
 climate, mere skeletons of regiments. They were to be engaged in 
 Crimean duty, and had to be totally reformed. Some of these regi- 
 ments were not in England at this time ; some were in Canada ; 
 others in the West Indies. How, then, can it be said to us, rein- 
 forcements should have been sent out three months ago ? We 
 could not get a man of those regiments which the riglit honourable 
 baronet says ought to have been sent out ; and he must recollect 
 that we cannot create an army by a stroke of a pen ; we must get 
 the men first, then make them into soldiers by drilling them, and 
 instructing them in the skilful use of their weapon ; for nothing 
 will be so injurious to the reputation of our army as sending men 
 into the field inefficient for their duty. (Cheers.) 
 
 I hope. Sir, that this House will believe that the Government 
 have not been neglectful of these considerations, and have made 
 every exertion to raise and strengthen our army. Look back at 
 the history of all previous expeditions, at the commencement of 
 our wars, and show me one which has been equal in strength to 
 that which has now been sent out. Show me one in which at 
 the end of the first campaign they had come out with a higher 
 reputation. Can it be said now, as Sir Henry Bunbury says of 
 our army before the expedition to Egypt, that the public had lost 
 all confidence in the skill, and even the courage, of our officers 
 and men ; and that one of the greatest benefits of the successful 
 campaign of Sir R. Abercrombie was to restore the reputation 
 of the armies after the disastrous disgraces which England liad 
 undergone. 
 
 But 1 want to know what is our position at present. I want to 
 know whether, at any period in the history of England, our mili- 
 tary character stands higher than it does at this moment. I want 
 to know what is the effect ui)on the ])ublic opinion of Europe of 
 the manner in which our battalions have conducted themselves. 
 I want to know what is the eff'ect upon Russia, and upon its 
 armies, of the manner in which our battalions have repulsed every
 
 ( 20 ) 
 
 attack they have made upon them. Sir, I must say I think that 
 those persons who take upon themselves to criticise our operations, 
 and to sity that Ahua ouglit to have been turned instead of 
 stormed, could not have studied the map of the country (m which 
 their opinions are offered, or they would see that the ground on 
 the right of the Russians on that occasion was so steep and so 
 inaccessible that its commander did not even think it necessary to 
 strengthen it : and if Lord Raglan, whose conduct has been 
 attacked, and whose reputation has been assailed, for not turning 
 that position, had adopted the course which has been so suggested, 
 he could have done nothing which the commander of the Russian 
 troops could have more desired. He would have desired nothing 
 better than to have separated the English and French armies, and 
 to have placed his own army between the English forces and the 
 ships, which formed the basis of our operations. 
 
 So, likewise, it has been alleged against Lord Raglan that he 
 ought to have assaulted Sebastopol immediately after the march 
 to Balaklava. But, Sir, I don't think that we, sitting here, are very 
 good judges of such operations. (Cheers.) I know that many 
 eminent military men on the spot, and knowing the circumstances, 
 thought otherwise, and were highly averse to such an undertaking. 
 Talk of leading flesh and blood against batteries, and that that 
 ought not to be risked, and that positions should be turned ! What 
 would such men have said if he had led the troops against a 
 town of which we knew nothing of the interior, where it was im- 
 possible to say how much of Prince Menschikott"s army might 
 have been, of the defence of which we knew nothing, and where 
 our soldiers might have been exposed to massacre in detail in a 
 town every house of which was a fortification ? I confess I do defer 
 to the opinions of the eminent men who commanded the French 
 and English armies on that occasion, (Cheers.) 
 
 But the right honourable baronet says the troops have been ex- 
 posed to unnecessary privations. Now, is it true, as has been 
 asserted by the right honourable baronet, that we took no pre- 
 cautions with regard to warm clothing ? Warm clothing was sent 
 out ; and that brings me to another point. It has been, as we all 
 know, a matter of great regret that the ship conveying those stores 
 was unfortunately lost. But I uuist say that that loss has been 
 greatly exaggerated. The value of the cargo of that ship was 
 estimated at no less a sum than 500,000/. ; but I understand that
 
 ( ii7 ) 
 
 it was not more than 180,000/. This was, no doubt, a great loss. 
 But immediate steps were taken to remedy that loss; supplies 
 were obtained from Constantinople, and there is reason to hope that 
 that loss has not been felt. With regard to the clothing of the 
 army, it so happened that when Lord Raglan applied for clothing 
 the answer was, " It has been already ordered, and a great part 
 has been already embarked." So that the letters of Lord Raglan 
 in asking for supplies had been already anticipated. 
 
 Then the Government have been charged with being ignorant of 
 the severity of the climate of the Crimea, and with not adopting 
 those means which are best calculated to protect the troops from 
 its injurious influence. Now, what is the position in which we 
 have been placed ? I have a letter from a gentleman, a member of 
 this House, but whom I do not now see in his place, but a gentle- 
 man whose opinion is always worth having, who says — " Experto 
 crede, I know the climate of the Crimea well ; don't believe the 
 accounts that are published about the temperature ; but whatever 
 you do, follow the custom of the country ; they must know best, 
 and they clothe themselves in skins and not in woollen." I then 
 requested the opinion of a person of great experience in Arctic 
 researches, and he came to me and said, " Don't dress the men in 
 skins, stick to wool, that is the only thing to keep them warm." 
 (Laughter.) I ask the House how was 1 to decide between these 
 two authorities? Without attempting to do so, I thought the 
 safest tiling was to take the advice of both, and to send out both 
 skins and woollen (cheers) ; and my hope is, that before long every 
 man in the army will have a change, both of woollen and of skins, 
 from top to toe. ^^ c have sent out seal-skin caps, vvhich are so 
 made as to cover the face and ears ; waterproof leggings also are 
 supplied ; likewise an outer coat of waterproof, under which can 
 be worn a long vest made of tweed lined with hare-skin, rabbit- 
 skin, cat-skin, and every other kind of skin. (Hear, and laugh- 
 ter.) Besides this, we have sent out a peculiar description of coat 
 — not lined in the usual style, but according to what is called the 
 Canada fashion; and lastly, there will be a sheep-skin coat, I 
 hope, for each man. Thus, I think it will be seen that the men 
 will be supplied with ample means to clothe themselves both with 
 skins and woollens that must keep them warm. (Hear, hear.) 
 
 Then with regard to providing huts for the troops, what have 
 the Government done? They felt that, in this particular, time
 
 ( 28 ) 
 
 was everything. To have tliem built here at home and tlien send 
 them out to the Crimea was felt to be a process that would occupy 
 much too long a space of time ; but the moment the requisition 
 for huts arose, we telegraphed to Lord Westmoreland at Vienna 
 and to Lord Stratford at Constantinople, desiring them to send 
 out instantly such huts as they could have constructed in those 
 countries. Lord Westmoreland immediately forwarded all the 
 huts he could procure by way of Trieste ; and huts, and materials 
 for constructing them, were also forwarded from Malta, and I 
 hope we shall hear from Constantinople. If, therefore, any huts 
 or buildings should be sent out by us from this country, as has 
 been done, whenever they may arrive at the Crimea, they will, I 
 hope, be rather accessories and additions to what have already 
 been supplied than the furnishing an article not yet possessed by 
 the army. (Cheers.) It is thus, then, that I answer the charge 
 brought against us of having shown a heartless neglect and a 
 gross indifference to the comfort and safety of what I believe to 
 be the noblest army in the world. (Cheers.) 
 
 I have alluded to the manner in which our army is raised, and 
 which I consider to be the best mode that any nation can adopt. 
 What is the proof of tliat ? Witness their conduct at the battle of 
 the Alma. You have seen them both in attack and defence. I 
 do not believe that any action was ever more difficult in point of 
 attack than the carrying of the heights of Alma. Nor do 1 be- 
 lieve that you ever before heard an instance of such self-reliance, ■ 
 of such self-confidence, as was displayed at Balaklava, especially in 
 sustaining the charge of the Russian cavalry by the 93rd High- 
 landers, under that tried soldier Sir Colin Campbell, (Cheers) 
 Every man remained in his place as they stood, two deep ; as it 
 has been well described, "as the Russians came within GOO yards, 
 down went that line of steel, and before that fire and those im- 
 movable ranks the Russian horsemen turned and fled." 
 
 Well, what have you at Inkerraann? The battle of Inkermann 
 had been in preparation weeks before. It is said that so far back 
 as the 24th of October a council of war was held by the Russians, 
 and the whole of the battle was well arranged. The country, for 
 upwards of a hundred miles round, was swept of everything. 
 Every cart, every bullock, every horse, every cari-iage, was appro- 
 priated to bring troops to this action. I believe the course taken 
 by the enemy was imexampled in the history of military warfare.
 
 ( 29 ) 
 
 It was preconcerted that this attack should take place. Every- 
 thing was to depend upon it ; and the Emperor of Russia was 
 assured that the result was certain. Our men keeping their 
 lonely watch — after the battle came those after-memories which 
 great events evoke — remembered that they heard the bells 
 tolling in the churches of Sebastopol, and the murmur of great 
 masses of men surging within the city. No doubt the religious 
 ceremonies of the church were used to invest the occasion with 
 a -still more sacred character; no doubt appeals were made to 
 the patriotism and religious feelings of those large masses of men. 
 In the night heavy artillery was moved up to heights commanding 
 our camp. As at Talavera, it was a surprise : men in the guise 
 of deserters drew our sentinels from their posts, so that no alarm 
 was given. At last came that terrible onslaught of 40,000 men 
 on 8000. Yes. Well, the morning came, clouded by a heavy 
 mist. There were 8000 men — as one. right honourable gentle- 
 man has said, who brings a charge against the Government for 
 that fcict, as if the whole army consisted only of 8000 men. 
 Those 8000 soldiers stood for hours beating back, with a fortitude 
 and a courage more like gods than men, the attacking force that 
 had come against them, and whose numbers were so great, that, 
 as one body was repulsed, another and another came up and 
 took its place. (Cheers.) I don't believe that, even going back 
 to those battles which have acquired almost gigantic propor- 
 tions from the length of time which has elapsed since they oc- 
 curred, any instance can be adduced of such courage and unshaken 
 bravery as those 8000 men dis})layed under circumstances so 
 adverse and for so long a period against such immense odds. 
 (Cheers.) That was a soldiers' battle. (Cheers.) There was, 
 there could be, no manoeuvring. There you saw the character of 
 the English soldier — led, no doubt, by regimental officers, but it 
 was the battle of the soldier standing in the ranks, and dying or 
 conquering where he stood. (Cheers.) Well, who are these 
 men who displayed such signal courage ? I rejoice at the number 
 of the letters that have been published in the newspapers written 
 by soldiers. I rejoice that the people of England should know of 
 what materials their armies are composed. The people of Eng- 
 land are apt to look at a soldier as only fit for parade, and at the 
 officer as exclusively possessing the moral and intellectual quali- 
 ties of a soldier ; but, after seeing the courage, the good conduct,
 
 ( 30 ) 
 
 and the patience displayed by these men under unheard-of diffi- 
 culties and sufferings, that opinion can no longer be entertained, 
 
 I, ask the House to look at that army which is without a crime, 
 in which the office of judge-advocate is a sinecure, and mark the 
 simple piety shown by the men writing to their w-ives, saying to 
 them that they are sure their children's prayers are heard, for that 
 God has mercifully protected them in the hour of battle. See the 
 touching words with which another speaks of the terrible loss of 
 the Colditreams, and says " eight officers buried in one grave ; 
 there was not a dry eye." How honourable are those words to the 
 officers who had inspired and to the men who felt such affection for 
 those gallant gentlemen who had died leading them to victory I 
 These were the men who showed mercy to the vanquished even 
 under a horrible provocation ! But then comes the picture, too 
 truly drawn, I admit, by the right honourable baronet the member 
 for Droitwich, of the melancholy losses which our army have sus- 
 tained. Among them is one, Sir G. Cathcart, who, to the 
 qualities of an accomplished soldier, added the enlightened views 
 of an able administrator. He had a combination of qualities of 
 the highest character, and his loss is a public loss, which will not 
 soon be repaired. (Cheers.) 
 
 It is impossible not to be struck, in reading the names of those 
 who have fallen, with the numbers of those who have gone to the 
 war from a sense of duty, and who have shown how little even 
 high position and those luxuries which wealth commands can 
 enervate the spirit of the English gentleman. (Cheers.) This 
 spirit has animated the army from the lowest to the highest 
 ranks. (Hear, hear.) I lament as much as the right honourable 
 gentleman can do the losses which we know that many even in 
 this House have sustained. (Hear.) 1 cannot look around me 
 without knowing that there are the parents and brothers and 
 other relatives of many of those gallant men who have so cheer- 
 fully laid down their young lives for the service of their country. 
 (Hear, hear.) But I turn from this painful subject, and say that 
 at any rate it is satisfactory to me to know that, great as this loss 
 has been — great especially in the high character of the men in 
 whatever rank who have fallen — yet in mere numbers that loss has 
 not been so large as on former occasions. England has undergone 
 greater losses at Talavera and Albuera, than it has sustained in 
 the Crimea. At Albuera, out of six or seven thousand men. onlv
 
 ( 31 ) 
 
 eighteen hundred escaped iinwounded, whereas in all the engage- 
 ments in the Crimea, from the beginning to the end, there has not 
 been a greater loss by the sword in battle than 1350. More have 
 died — om- whole loss amounts to no less than 4456 ; but this number 
 includes 2782 who have died of disease and of wounds, as well as 
 1350 who have been killed. Now, bad as that is, still it is much 
 less than what the exaggerated statements I have seen make our 
 losses to be. I have therefore thought it my duty to make that 
 statement in order to remove any more painful feeling than the 
 truth really warrants. 
 
 Let me say here, that we hope that the most public recognition 
 will be made which we can give, of the assistance we have re- 
 ceived, and of the gallantry with which that assistance has been 
 given by our allies. It is a pleasure to read those private letters, 
 better evidence than any public despatches, of Lord Raglan, which 
 show the brotherhood that exists between the two commanders, 
 founded on the estimation which each has formed of the other 
 under trying circumstances. Our army cheered enthusiastically 
 the advance of General Bosquet's division when they came up at 
 that opportune moment and relieved the shattered battalions that 
 had been so long resisting the desperate attacks of the enemy ; and 
 they were right. Sir, I believe that this mixing together of the 
 armies of the two countries will effect a greater change in the 
 mutual relations between the two nations than can ever be achieved 
 by diplomatic notes and paper treaties. A French officer has 
 said that each army is acquiring the qualities of the other, — that 
 while we are acquiring the dash of the French, the French are 
 acquii'ing the firmness of the English. I believe in that union of 
 the two armies, which is the type of the union of the two nations, 
 we see the best prospect of attaining the great end we have in 
 view. 
 
 I ask those who, two months ago, were looking despondingly at 
 the state of things, to look at the position of England now ; and 
 to look at what has been the effect of the war already upon our 
 enemy. Li previous wars we had alliances with countries who 
 took our money, but did not always fight, and the Governments 
 of which sometimes intrigued against us. We are now in alliance 
 with the most military and chivalrous nation in Europe, and we 
 see the opinion of Europe dciy by day coming nearer and nearer 
 to us, while Russia is placed in a state of isolation. A hostile
 
 ( 32 ) 
 
 army is entrenched above her own chief arsenal, her fleet has been 
 sunk by her own act, her forts ak)ng the coast of Circassia have 
 been destroyed by her own hand. These are the effects of the first 
 cani])aign. I ask, where can you find, in the history of England, 
 a first campaign of not more than a few montlis' duration attended 
 with such results? (Hear.) But still I hope to see more done, 
 and for that purpose our army considerably increased ; and if 
 you, the House of Commons, think it ought to be, tell us so. 
 (Hear, hear.) I tell you that the country is determined, at all 
 hazard and at all cost, that the army of Lord Raglan shall be 
 supported. (Loud cheers.) If the House of Commons does not 
 answer to that feeling of the country, then the House of Commons 
 must take the consequence (hear, hear), for, depend upon it, there 
 is but one feeling upon this subject. We are engaged in a war 
 which was entered upon with reluctance ; we must carry it on 
 vigorously to obtain that which is the object of all war — namely, 
 peace; for peace to be obtained must be conquered. (Cheers.) 
 Let no exertions be spared which will enable us by vigorous 
 operations to gain that end. (Cheers.) I say further, if you 
 think the Government worthy to be intrusted with those powers, 
 then intrust them (hear) ; but I would sooner a thousand times turn 
 out one government, or ten governments, than that any other policy 
 should be adopted. (Hear, hear.) I care not in whose hands the 
 conduct of the war is placed, provided it be carried on with vigour 
 and determination ; and provided the representatives of the people 
 lionestly and truly carry out the will of the nation, that the noblest 
 of armies shall be assured of the means — so far as human means 
 can avail — to obtain a perfect triumph. (Loud and long continued 
 cheering.) 
 
 lONDON : PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET, 
 AND CHARINO CROSS.
 
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