RIVERS AND HARBORS. 
 
 SPEECH 
 
 OF 
 
 HON. CLIFTON R. BRECKINRIDGE, 
 
 OF ARKANSAS, 
 
 IN THE 
 
 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
 
 
 Tuesday, February 3, 1885. 
 
 
 WASHINGTON. 
 
 1885 . 
 

 
 
SPEECH 
 
 OF 
 
 HON. CLIFTON R. BRECKINRIDGE. 
 
 The House being in Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, and 
 having under consideration the bill (H. R. 8130) making appropriations for the 
 construction, repair, and preservation of certain public works on rivers and har- 
 bors, and for other purposes — 
 
 Mr. BRECKINRIDGE said: 
 
 Mr. Chairman: When the river and harbor bill was reported to the 
 House I gave notice of my intention to bring in a minority report. I 
 have been unable to write out that report; but in the course of my re- 
 marks I will bring before the House the propositions it would contain. 
 I did not contemplate a dissent from anything in the bill reported by 
 the committee, but an addition to the bill. 
 
 The committee made no appropriations for harbors upon the Missis- 
 sippi River below Cairo. They made a proportionable appropriation 
 for the river below Cairo as a unit; but they left out those additional 
 recommendations of the commission for the respective harbors to which 
 I refer. 
 
 It is of the utmost importance to the people of this country, and 
 especially to those north of Cairo, that the unity of the plan of treating 
 the river should not be interfered with. This is enforced from every 
 source. If the appropriations are broken up into disconnected parts it 
 destroys all continuous and contiguous treatment of the river. This, 
 I say, can not be permitted by the great States north, east, or west of 
 Cairo. The House knows very well that the river below Cairo is not 
 being improved for the benefit of the sparse population upon its banks, 
 but for the benefit of the whole Mississippi Valley, of which the lower 
 part is the least part. There are, however, certain cities of commercial 
 importance situated upon the banks of the lower river, and it can not 
 be expected that the commercial interests centering at these points will 
 be wholly unmindful of their own necessities and rights. 
 
 But the proposition has been brought forward that these ports are not 
 harbors in the usual and commercial sense. This can never be agreed 
 to. Over against it I lay the maintained policy of Congress in cases 
 almost without number. The position of the committee is illogical, 
 unusual, unjust, and unfortunate. 
 
 It was only last year that an appropriation was made for the Mis- 
 souri River as a river. Before that the appropriations were for the im- 
 provement exclusively of the harbors upon that river; and all along the 
 line of Congressional action we have these appropriations for the interior 
 harbors of the country. 
 
 I consider, sir, that a harbor like that at the city of Memphis has a 
 stronger claim upon Congress for attention than even those upon our 
 seaboard. For instance, take the harbof at New York. The improve- 
 
4 
 
 ments there enter in no wise into the general plan of improvement to 
 connect the Atlantic Ocean with Albany, while, on the contrary, an 
 appropriation for the improvement of these harbors upon the Mississippi 
 River, and I cite again the Memphis Harbor, are appropriations for im- 
 provements that will in all human probability, in due time, be links in 
 the general system of the river improvement. There is not a dollar 
 expended nor a lick of work done that is not expended and done where 
 only general river improvement is carried on. It all would be done 
 here in time anyway. The only question is, shall we do it a little 
 quicker than we would in the ordinary course of events ? And yet in 
 the face of a settled question and in the face of this peculiar strength 
 gentlemen hesitate. And why ? 
 
 They say that in due time the general river improvement will cover 
 th!e case. This is true; but this is selfish in our Northern friends to 
 make us wait and suffer until we are relieved only as a tardy incident 
 to their relief. 
 
 They say that such improvements would benefit private property. 
 That is true; but if that is an unavoidable incident in the discharge of 
 our bounden duty, should it grieve us? Why should that confuse our 
 minds ? I know the doctrine of riparian rights and risks. It is sound. 
 But there is another question in this case. This is not a river landing, 
 where a planter hauls cotton from his gin-house a few hours before the 
 steamboat is due. This is the city to which he ships. This is the city 
 to which not only he ships, but also to which hundreds of thousands 
 of other people in the interior and among the uplands and mountains 
 ship their produce, and from which they get their merchandise and 
 manufactured goods of all kinds. 
 
 Here are the railroad centers. Here are the warehouses, the cotton 
 compresses, the paved wharfs, the railroad inclines, and all the other 
 needs and appurtenances of commerce. If these are destroyed the peo- 
 ple who own them^ are losers. There is no doubt about that. But is 
 no one else a loser? Is commerce not affected by the broad funda- 
 mental fact that it can no longer have a port here? It must either 
 stand in its charges the expense of these risks or else it must go by rail 
 to distant ports where stability is found, and of course that makes an 
 equal charge upon the commerce. This may suit the railroads, but it 
 will not pay the farmers and merchants. Who can gainsay this? 
 
 It is questionable whether Congress would sit still and see a city like 
 Memphis, the second city of the South, for Louisville is hardly South- 
 ern, plunge headlong into the Mississippi River and be lost forever. 
 As a case of urgency and distress the American heart would respond to 
 it. Who would say no? We would curb the great river that we only 
 have charge of and save the happy homes of 75,000 people. 
 
 But we do not need to go to this. This is not like a plantation landing. 
 The landing may be swept away and the planter would want only a 
 landing still. The untouched river bank is all he wants. But here 
 are certain great centers, scattered over a thousand miles of river, and 
 commerce must find stability there for its assembled needs, or else the 
 thousands must pay tribute to less fortuitous conditions. The river is 
 but little to these people if they can not do business upon its banks. I 
 appeal to you then, gentlemen from the North, not to see only your own 
 interests, not to disregard these righteous claims, and not to provoke 
 a desperate struggle between yourselves and the commercial interests 
 of the lower States. 
 
 And now there are two other points that I want to speak about as 
 
5 
 
 briefly as I can. In the first place I wish to speak of a few engineering 
 features in connection with the Galveston Harbor improvement. As 
 is known by this House we propose to throw overboard work there that 
 has cost nearly $2,000,000, or at least what little is left of it, and to 
 change the entire management of the work at that place. This is a very 
 grave reflection upon the military engineers who have charge of this 
 work, and there must be very grave reasons for so radical a step. I am 
 one of those who believe that reasons exist not only sufficient to justify 
 the proposed step but sufficient to make it absolutely obligatory upon us. 
 
 The Government work was begun there ten years ago. The survey 
 and plans are given in the report of 1874. At an expenditure of sev- 
 eral hundred thousand dollars a jetty of gabions was extended from 
 what is known as Bolivar Point into the Gulf. General Newton fig- 
 ures it out in his letter to our committee that this gabionnade cost 
 $169,000. Senator Coke, in the very able report he made to the Sen- 
 ate on behalf of the Commerce Committee of that body, figures the cost 
 at $527,000. It is not easy from the Engineer’s report to fix the exact 
 amount; but I have figured it up twice, and it is certain, if the reports 
 be correct, that General Newton is far too low, and I am very much 
 inclined to think that Senator Coke is too low. 
 
 It was expected, as you will see on page 867 of report of 1875 and 
 on page 447 of report of 1877, that this north jetty would secure the 
 desired depth of water there. However, nature has rebuked the dis- 
 regard of her laws and the gabionnade is gone. There is not a vestige 
 of the structure left. This was not due to quicksand or to any such 
 cause. The gabions were no account to begin with, and had they been 
 strong they would have been lost just the same. They exemplified what 
 is known as the submerged jetty, a novel species of structure that we 
 are largely engaged in and with apparently no earthly sign of stability 
 or success. 
 
 I have taken occasion, sir, to read the accounts of all the sea works 
 in the world on the jetty plan that I could find, and I have a long list 
 of them, and never was there any work of that kind undertaken, nor, 
 indeed, was it ever suggested that I have been able to learn except once. 
 The single suggestion that I speak of was in the course of the consul- 
 tations of engineers and others with reference to the improvement of 
 the mouth of the Danube. Sir Charles Hartley, the engineer in charge, 
 stated that the plan of submerged jetties was “actually proposed to the 
 commission by one of its technical advisers.” It permitted the very 
 force you propose to conserve to be dispersed and lost, for your only 
 hope of power is in controlling the surface slope, which controls the 
 currents at all depths, and they would serve no other purpo’se than 
 that of “dangerous submarine reefs.” 
 
 I respectfully refer those who may not have read the interesting paper 
 I quote from to page 287, volume 21, Proceedings Institution Civil En- 
 gineers, London, to be found in the national library. 
 
 That plan was adopted at Galveston by what is known as the gabi- 
 onnade system. What is a gabion? A gabion is nothing but a huge 
 lunch basket that is cemented on the outside as you cement the inside 
 of a cistern, and that basket is filled with sand, is put in position, and 
 was supposed to be irresistible to storms. These gabions did resist the 
 storms, so far as being broken up is concerned, much better than they 
 resisted some of the other effects of the storms and the effects of tidal 
 currents. Being submerged, and the tides and waves sweeping over 
 them with a dangerous overfall current, they were undermined. Foot- 
 
6 
 
 mats did not save them. The conclusion is well stated in the report of 
 1880, page 1226, where it says : “ In fact, thegabionnadehas essentially 
 gone down below the original bottom.” 
 
 And so they are gone, and that folly has not even its monument left. 
 That would seem to have demonstrated the futility of putting down 
 submerged j etties, for this submerged j etty was not undermined because 
 it had the name of ‘ ‘ gabionnade. ’ ’ No other name would have saved it. 
 
 In 1880 a new method of construction was adopted. Captain Howell 
 was replaced with Major Mansfield, the present officer in charge. What 
 is known as the fascine system, a partial copy of the Dutch works at the 
 mouth of the Maas, was adopted. But the copy is like “Hamlet with 
 Hamlet left out.” The Dutch works are high. These are to be sub- 
 merged. The Maas has silt to protect the fascines. These have no hope 
 of mud to protect them from the teredo, a most destructive sea- worm. 
 And as for gathering sand, our last submerged jetty did not collect 
 sand, as expected. It was left “standing in a trench without sand.” 
 How can this fare better when it is substantially the same shape and 
 height ? They seem to be repeating in principle, though in a little dif- 
 ferent form, the same error that was committed before. 
 
 Over $1,000,000 has been put out on this new work, and the people 
 of Texas continued to pin their hope to the plan. That has gone on, 
 sir, until it has been projected now some four and a quarter miles into 
 the Gulf. All the prophecies with reference to it have failed. 
 
 There were plenty of prophecies of what would be the result of the 
 present j etty at the different stages of its progress — prophecies of depth, 
 of durability, and all that. I will treat of these more particularly later 
 on. The people of Galveston put $100,000 of their own money into the 
 work. But after severe disappointments and about nine years of trial 
 they threw up the case, and last session the entire delegation from Texas, 
 a delegation conspicuous for its ability and high character, told us frankly 
 that further work upon this system was in their opinion a waste of time 
 and money. 
 
 Now the question is, have we enough to satisfy us ? But we must 
 go further in our examination of the work and of the men who have 
 control of it. This will help us to come to a right conclusion as to 
 whether one or both should be put aside. Judging as laymen, we 
 must be largely influenced by our confidence in the men. I will call 
 attention to some of the statements of the engineers. 
 
 You will find, sir, in the printed remarks of my colleague on the com- 
 mittee, General Bayne, of Pennsylvania, a letter from Colonel Mer- 
 rill, an officer of the military Engineer Corps, and who seems now to 
 be a spokesman in this matter. 
 
 Colonel Merrill states that both the Chief of Engineers and the resi- 
 dent engineer deny that the north jetty has yet been located. 
 
 Now, in reference to that, I want to call the attention of the House 
 to page 1225 of the report of the Chief of Engineers for 1880. It reads: 
 
 From its commencement, April 14, 1877, to January 1, 1880, the Bolivar pier — 
 
 Which is the north one — 
 had been extended seaward from the beach 10,220 feet. 
 
 Now that statement is signed by General Newton himself, the pres- 
 ent Chief of Engineers, who is quoted by Colonel Merrill as denying 
 that this jetty has ever been located. 
 
 I can not comprehend, Mr. Chairman, how about two miles of this 
 north jetty could be built, running through nearly three years, without 
 
7 
 
 having been located. Nor can I understand how such a statement as 
 has been presented to us can be thus solemnly certified to Congress for 
 its guidance. Was anybody cashiered or complained of for that im- 
 mense expenditure of the public funds in an unauthorized way ? No, sir; 
 and there was no occasion to do it, for it was on an accepted line. I 
 have quoted from the last report of the board of engineers, and if you 
 will look at their first report, in 1874, you will see that they therein 
 make revised estimates for both the north and south jetty projected to- 
 ward the outer bar, and they raise Captain Howell’s estimate $635,- 
 401.50, making the total $1,759,401.85, instead of $1,124,000.35. The 
 chart is referred to as showing the “ parallel jetties,” and the board 
 takes no exception to that location, nor does it suggest any change. 
 This report also is signed by General Newton himself. It is in the face 
 of these facts and of many more like them, running all through the re- 
 ports, that ‘ ‘ both the Chief of Engineers and the engineer in charge 
 deny that the north jetty has ever been located.” 
 
 I will call attention to one other proof. Here is the chart with the 
 report of 1880. It is the official map of the engineer in charge, Colonel 
 Mansfield, with his signature upon it, and it is under these words: 
 “Showing lines of proposed jetties.” This chart is sent to Congress 
 by the then Chief of Engineers, and it is in Colonel Mansfield’s report 
 dated July 17, 1880, just thirty-seven days after the report of the board, 
 of which General Newton was a member, and which gave advice to the 
 Engineering Department to help it to a final conclusion. After it has 
 been all digested we have this map, which the Chief of Engineers pub- 
 lishes with his report and without comment. Yet the north jetty is 
 not located. I shall have occasion to refer to this map again, as well 
 as to some of the very ample statements in this report about both of 
 the jetties. 
 
 Thus you see both of these gentlemen are frequently and in the most 
 conspicuous manner refuted by point-blank testimony over their own 
 signatures. 
 
 Mr. WHITE, of Kentucky. May I ask the gentleman from Arkansas 
 [Mr. Breckinridge] to give the date of that first statement? 
 
 Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. The date is not given, but Mr. Bayne in- 
 troduced it in his speech here on Saturday, and its general tenor indi- 
 cates that it has been written quite recently. 
 
 Mr. J^AYNE. I think you will find that it bears the date of January 
 21, 1885. 
 
 Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. It is certainly in this year. The date of 
 the first statement from the reports is several years ago, during the 
 progress of the work. 
 
 Mr. SPRINGER. If I do not interrupt the gentleman, I would like 
 to ask him whether, in these comparisons that he is making, he may 
 not be confusing the inner with the outer harbor? 
 
 Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. No, sir. The north jetty has nothing to 
 do with the inner harbor. There is no possibility of that construction. 
 The whole argument is predicated upon this plan, and here are the 
 lines projected into the Gulf and drawings of cross-sections and all that. 
 
 Now, there is another statement made by the engineers, which goes 
 to show how these gentlemen are dealing with this work, and how 
 much confidence we can have that they know what they are about or 
 that they would ever do any good there. 
 
 This statement is in regard to the width between jetties. This officei 
 (Colonel Merrill) says that the statement that the width is to be two 
 
8 
 
 and one- fourth miles between the jetties is positively denied by the 
 Chief of Engineers and by the resident engineer. We can only go upon 
 the data given us by the Chief of Engineers, through the War Depart- 
 ment, and sent here for our guidance. 
 
 Now, sir, here is this chart, indorsed by the final authority and after 
 counsel, and the width is given. It is no “study ” map, and is not so 
 given. You see by it that the outer ends are 12,200 feet apart, consid- 
 erably more than two and one-fourth miles. The inner ends are some- 
 what wider. Here are the dividers [producing them] , and I invite any 
 gentleman to come here and take the measurement for himself and 
 look at this chart. 
 
 Again, it is stated by this gentleman that the statement that there 
 were to be outlets or gaps in the jetties is entirely untrue, that noth- 
 ing of the kind is mentioned. He says, “ I can find no authority for 
 the existence of these outlets. ” I will only ask the House to look at 
 the printed statements on that point. Colonel Mansfield states in his 
 last report to Congress, which was under the eye of this engineer, that 
 upon the chart he has shown the line of the north jetty — which of 
 course is another place where the north jetty is located. But I am now 
 discussing the question of outlets. I read from part 2, page 1298, re- 
 port of 1884: 
 
 Upon the chart is shown the line of the north jetty, as I propose. It is to pro- 
 ject from a point abreast the 26-foot depth in Bolivar Channel to 25-foot depth in 
 the Gulf, &c. 
 
 Now, take the 26-foot point in Bolivar Channel and measure from that 
 back to the shore, and you will find that it is over 6,000 feet out from 
 the shore, leaving conclusively a gap of largely over a mile in extent. 
 I furthermore state that while I have not seen the chart since it was 
 sent to the Chief of Engineers, for our present advanced set of the report 
 does not contain it, yet I did see it when I was in Galveston last fall, 
 where I went in compliance with a promise I had made to the Texas 
 delegation that I would go and examine into their wants. When I was 
 in Galveston I saw the proposed chart and it showed a gap of apparently 
 several thousand feet between the shore and the inner end of the north 
 jetty. But the statement I have quoted shows it, and of course the 
 chart referred to is in the office of the Chief of Engineers and was exam- 
 ined by this officer as he states. Then on page 1414 — report of 1882— 
 the board says: “It seems probable that they (the jetties) must be con- 
 nected with the shore.” Do these things indicate gaps or outlets? 
 
 The next question is as to the height of these jetties. It should be 
 remembered that all the successful works of this character in the world 
 (of which there are many instances, and some of them over a hundred 
 years old) are jetties that are high enough to conserve the flow which 
 they seek to direct upon the bar, and they are also high enough to pre- 
 vent sand from being transported over them into the channel, and to 
 prevent their being destroyed by the overfall of waves that would bur- 
 row beneath them. It is a great mistake to suppose that mere sand 
 is a compressible base. The trouble with sand is that it is a movable 
 base. In the report of 1880 the board say there is no more trouble 
 here than on the bars of New England, that nibble would easily stand, 
 and they give a cut of the shape it would take. When the foolish man 
 built his house upon the sand, he had no trouble about the sinking of 
 the sand; it was only when the rain descended and the floods came 
 and the winds blew and beat upon the house, that it fell, and great 
 was the tall thereof — as was the case with the gabions, and as is the 
 
9 
 
 case with much of our sea- work at other places; which, however, I 
 have not time to go into now. They deny that these jetties are to be 
 submerged. If you will look on page 1229, report of 1880, you will 
 find these words: 
 
 It has always been assumed that the Galveston jettiee are to be submerged. 
 
 And it goes on to say that ‘ ‘ an average height of five feet above the 
 sand” may “prove sufficient.” This is signed by General Newton 
 himself. 
 
 Now, as for Major Mansfield upon this point. Turn to page 1211, 
 same report. This language is dated in July, about a month after the 
 board had given its counsel, and is sent to Congress in the following 
 December, as the conclusion of things. It is by Mr. Ripley, an assist- 
 ant to Major Mansfield. And on page 1206 Major Mansfield says he is 
 indebted to him for 1 * so clear and comprehensive an exposition of our 
 plans. 1 ’ The report says : 
 
 The accompanying tracings show the form and position of each jetty. The 
 south jetty * * * commencing at the inner end for 4,080 feet the top is five 
 feet below the water. From this point it “ slopes up to the water surface,” and 
 it never does get substantially above it. 
 
 The north jetty amounts to the same thing. 
 
 Now, if you want an earlier expression upon this point, see page 733, 
 part 1, report of 1874. Captain Howell, the officer in charge, says: 
 
 They maybe called submerged jetties, since they will not, except on a short 
 portion of their lines, be built up to the plane of mean low tide, while for the 
 greater part their tops will be five or six feet below that plane. 
 
 General Newton concurred in the report of that year that took no 
 exception to this, but expressed the opinion that if the “ piers proposed ” 
 were constructed the depth would be increased “in an important de- 
 gree. ” Yet these gentlemen tell us that these jetties are not to be sub- 
 merged. Pray, when and where and by whom have they been changed ? 
 Shall we look to the last report of all ? I mean the last report of the 
 board. Then see page 1454, report of 1882. It says: 
 
 We advise that the jetty be almost if not wholly submerged, as originally 
 intended by Major Howell. 
 
 And they speak of no part showing its head except ‘ 1 the outer ends. ” 
 
 This language also is signed by General Newton, along with the 
 other members of that board. And yet these gentlemen in question, 
 who are our presumed hope, guides, and support — the ones that suffer- 
 ing commerce and a languishing State all look to — they come and cer- 
 tify such things to us, as if we would never look up their past reports, 
 but would go on suffering forever, and forever sustaining them with the 
 people’s millions in wretched experiments that the great marine en- 
 gineers of the world tell us are but child’s play. It is in vain for these 
 gentlemen to talk about this as a mere personal question, when the 
 commerce of the country is suffering, or to denounce honorable mer- 
 chants as “mercenaries,” or an honorable and eminent American as 
 being allied with such despicable characters, when they are failing in 
 argument, failing in works, and even failing in statements of fact. I 
 have been astounded at these proceedings. 
 
 I have been astounded at seeing a high officer of the Government cer- 
 tifying such gross inaccuracies to Congress, and so far forgetting himself 
 as to indulge in billingsgate and slander toward a man and a set of 
 eminent gentlemen who command the respect of all who know them. 
 It has frequently been remarked with%s that this at least seemed to 
 be one project where all the lobbyists were left out, much, apparently, 
 
10 
 
 to their chagrin, and only plain, honest, earnest argument was em- 
 ployed, headed by such eminent gentlemen as our chairman of the Com- 
 merce Committee [Mr. Reagan] and the other able and distinguished 
 members from Texas and the eminent Senators from that State, a dele- 
 gation, as a whole, that is an honor to our country. 
 
 And now, sir, I come to another feature that has lessened my confi- 
 dence in the present administration of this work, and which helped to 
 make me conclude that we need to employ some one else if we do not 
 mean to mock the sufferings of 2, 000, 000 of people. On page 217, part 
 1 of the last report, the Chief of Engineers, General Newton, says the 
 estimate of 1880 “contemplated the obtainment of a channel across 
 the outer bar of at least twenty-jive feet deep. ’ ’ The last words are in 
 italics. Now, sir, there are two reports from the board in 1880, and 
 both of them are signed by General Newton. One is dated New York, 
 June 7, of that year; and on page 1221 of the report of 1880 you find it 
 stated that the project they had been working under, with Major Howell 
 in charge, contemplated ‘ 4 deepening the outer or Gulf bar from twelve 
 to eighteen feet, possibly. ’ ’ No other contemplated depth is mentioned 
 in the report of the board. 
 
 The other reports are the same way. Where then does the Chief of 
 Engineers get his authority for making that statement to Congress ? As 
 a member of the board he has uniformly stated the contrary. There 
 is, however, a place where he gets it, and it carries a moral with it. You 
 will find on page 1214, report of 1880, a statement by Major Mansfield’s 
 assistant, Mr. Ripley, regarding the effect of the jetties he proposes. 
 He says: “We should look with confidence for an extreme depth of not 
 less than twenty-five feet.” This is the only place in all the reports, 
 from the beginning in 1873 down to this time, where any such mention 
 is made. But General Newton says, on page 8, in his letter to our com- 
 mittee, that ‘ ‘ these reports have no other value save the authority of 
 their authors. ’ ’ He further says that they are ‘ ‘ without any sanction 
 from the proper authority.” Is the prophecy of this humble assistant 
 of any “value” to him now? Has it “sanction from the proper au- 
 thority ? ” Go back through all the 4 ‘ proper authority ’ ’ and the maxi- 
 mum purpose stated anywhere is ‘ 1 possibly eighteen feet. ’ ’ How is this 
 to deal with Congress? What hope can we have here? 
 
 I showed before that the report of Major Mansfield was what was 
 sent to us for our guidance. He says on page 1206, once quoted, that 
 this report of Mr. Ripley’s is “ a clear and comprehensive exposition of 
 our plans.” Now the Chief of Engineers adopts it, and let us see how 
 he proposes to give us 4 4 at least twenty-five feet” of water. 
 
 Look at the chart, which is a part of the report, and is signed by 
 Major Mansfield in official form, and look at the text on page 1211 and 
 following: 
 
 The south jetty has a total length of 15,330 feet, and extends from the 6-foot 
 contour at its inner end to the 13?-foot contour at its outer end. Commencing 
 at the inner end, the top for 4,080 feet is 5 feet below the water surface. 
 
 * * * * • * * ^ * 
 
 The north jetty has a total length of 8,090 feet, and extends from the outer 
 end of the Bolivar gabionnade to the 12-foot contour across the bar. 
 
 We all know the history of those submerged gabions. Now, sir, here 
 are these submerged jetties 12,200 feet apart — over two and a quarter 
 miles, going scarcely to twelve feet depth, and they, according to this 
 last complexion, are to give us 4 %t least twenty-five feet” of water. 
 Sir, comment is unnecessary. 
 
11 
 
 But the humble assistant and the officer in charge, even when their 
 reports are sent to us professing to be the plan, and that not dissented 
 from by the Chief of Engineers in his accompanying report, are not 
 “the proper authority .’ ’ Are they “proper authority” now? Pray 
 who is managing this business? The board says on page 1229, report 
 of 1880, in speaking of these jetties : 
 
 Neither, however, should be carried more than two miles seaward until the 
 other has progressed nearly an equal ratio. 
 
 On page 1214, same report, the local engineer says: 
 
 There can be no doubt, therefore, that the south jetty is the important one, 
 and should be constructed first. 
 
 Now which has been done? There has been constructed nearly four 
 and one-half miles of the south jetty and not a foot of the north jetty, 
 unless it be a trial section. Was this according to the plan ? Was it by 
 authority? 
 
 The map of 1880, says General Newton, page 8 of letter, was a 
 “crude idea.” They had been at that work for seven years. Was it 
 still “crude?” In 1881 and in 1882 they leave out the north jetty. 
 In 1883 they locate it, he says, in a different position. Now, in 1884 
 we seem to have another position, suspended out in the sea. Is it still 
 crude? I believe it is more crude to-day than it ever was. It is in an 
 inextricable tangle, and neither plan nor men offer the slightest basis 
 for hope. 
 
 Colonel Merrill also quotes from Major Mansfield and says the south 
 jetty has not been completed. This point is important only as addi- 
 tional evidence of the kind of testimony we are getting and of the faith 
 we can have in the way matters are going on. I will dispose of it briefly. 
 (See report of 1883, page 1063.) Here is a letter from Major Mansfield 
 to the mayor-elect of Galveston in regard to what it would take to com- 
 plete this jetty. Congress had failed to pass a river and harbor bill the 
 previous session. Galveston was willing to borrow money and give it 
 to the work, though of course it concerns the whole State of Texas. 
 Major Mansfield says: 
 
 One hundred thousand dollars will keep the work on through the summer, 
 and will effect the entire completion of the south jetty. 
 
 He got the money and spent it without trouble or delay to the “en- 
 tire completion” of this jetty, and yet we have this unqualified state- 
 ment made to us. All of the j etty had been raised to “ its full height, ’ 1 
 except a 6,000-foot gap. They had concluded to bring the jetty higher 
 than any plan had contemplated, and “the $100,000 is necessary to 
 close this gap. ’ ’ Then the jetty will be ‘ ‘ built up throughout to level 
 of mean low water, ’ ’ which, as stated, was ‘ ‘ entire completion. ’ ’ That 
 is enough of this. 
 
 Here also Major Mansfield states that he expected this to obtain an 
 18-foot channel by the following fall, but the only effect of any note 
 was the deepening of a trench on the wrong side of the jetty. 
 
 This brings me to the claim now made of the effect of this work upon 
 the channel. 
 
 The Chief of Engineers says in his last report that there is “ a very 
 apparent improvement in depth over the outer bar.” 
 
 Major Mansfield says, as quoted here by Colonel Merrill: 
 
 The depth of water over the outer bar has been improved so that naviga tion has 
 been benefited to the extent of about two feet, and this has been accomplished 
 by the Government works, which consist of an incomplete jetty running from 
 Fort Point out to the crest of the bar, a distance of four and one-quarter miles. 
 
12 
 
 Now, the only way to tell what the effect of that jetty has been is to 
 take the depth on the bar at the time it was begun and compare it with 
 the depth on the bar after it is finished. On page 147 of the report for 
 1880, the Chief of Engineers says: 
 
 The appropriation of $500,000 asked for is to be applied to building jetties of 
 brush and stone directed toward obtaining an improved depth of water over 
 the outer bar, where there is now but twelve and three-quarter feet. 
 
 Now turn to page 1301 of the last report, and we see that the pres- 
 ent depth is stated at “thirteen feet,” and as for any movements that 
 have taken place the past year, they are summed up on page 1298 in 
 the expression: 
 
 No benefit to navigation has resulted yet. 
 
 And on the same page Major Mansfield himself says: 
 
 The depth of thirteen feet at mean low tide in the jetty channel of one year 
 ago has been maintained. 
 
 Mr. REAGAN. What is the date? 
 
 Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. August 28 of last year. It is the last re- 
 port we have before Congress. Now, what was the original depth ? The 
 original depth was twelve and three- fourths feet, and they have got, as 
 they certify in print here, thirteen feet, which is an increase of just 
 three inches. As shown by their own printed statements it is only three 
 inches, yaet these gentlemen report to Congress, and one of them sol- 
 emnly says, ‘ ‘ there is a very apparent improvement in depth over the 
 outer bar, ’ ’ and the other one says it is two feet. 
 
 Mr. SPRINGER. What is the difference between depth at low tide 
 there and high tide? 
 
 Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. All measurements are calculated at mean 
 low tide unless expressly stated to the contrary. The rise of the tide 
 there is a trifle over a foot. 
 
 A Member. Perhaps they made a mistake. 
 
 Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think they did. The whole thing is a 
 mistake. If they have made a single ordinary mistake they do not ex- 
 plain it. I will say that we have time and again tried to get the Chief 
 of Engineers before the committee to inform us on the subject, but we 
 have never been able to get him there. When we urged him to come 
 
 Mr. WILLIS. I hardly think my friend ought to go that far. Gen- 
 eral Newton was invited before the committee but replied he was on a 
 court-martial. 
 
 Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I am going to state that. Last year we in- 
 vited the Chief of Engineers before our committee to give us informa- 
 tion, and we were put off by some question of etiquette. I want to state 
 here, as I understand it, and the chairman can correct me if lam wrong, 
 that while we had discussed this question with Captain Eads, the en- 
 gineer who represented one view, we invited the Chief of Engineers 
 again, and he declined to come, upon the statement that he was on a 
 court-martial that was sitting in the city. Here is a great national 
 work practically in his charge, and a committee of the Federal Congress 
 is considering the matter in a short session; we invite him to meet us, 
 and we are put off in this manner. 
 
 Mr. ROSECRANS. He was obliged by order of the Secretary of 
 War to sit on the court-martial, of which the hours are fixed. 
 
 Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. If it is not a matter of discretion with him 
 then it is all right. None of us seem to have thought of that. There 
 was no court-martial before. It is doubtless as much our fault as his 
 
13 
 
 that the Secretary of War was not asked to let the court-martial wait 
 a few hours on the wants of Congress. We have tried this two ways 
 and during two sessions, and we must content ourselves with the printed 
 testimony, which I have mainly gone over. I wish to condemn most 
 strongly this whole way of dealing with the public interests. 
 
 Major Mansfield is quoted by Colonel Merrill as saying: 
 
 This structure is a most substantial one, and is not likely to deteriorate much. 
 
 I presume this means that the jetty is in a good state of preservation. 
 I dislike very much to have to contradict that statement. It is very 
 painful to me, as this whole business is, but I have no right to regard 
 my personal reluctance. I hold in my hand the soundings I made on 
 that jetty last autumn, being in company with Major Mansfield him- 
 self, and I estimate that not less than 50 per cent. , as shown by the 
 soundings on the crest of the jetty after you get a little out from the 
 shore end, is gone. I have the soundings here in my note -book. Major 
 Mansfield accompanied me in an open boat; I did a part of the sound- 
 ings, and I had one of his employes do the other part of it, I taking 
 down the notes as we went and making a summary statement of the 
 first part. Major Mansfield may be erroneously quoted; but here are 
 the facts, and they are my guide. 
 
 Mr. ROSECRANS. Will the gentleman permit a further question ? 
 
 Mr. BLANCHARD. Let me ask the gentleman first when was that ? 
 
 Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. It was last fall ; in November of last year. 
 
 Mr. ROSECRANS. I desire to ask the gentleinan (as it is necessary 
 to know in connection with such measurements) from what surface he 
 started ? 
 
 Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I took it from the usual surface of meas- 
 urement adopted by the engineers. The point is that this j etty is stated 
 in this report to have been brought up by them to mean low tide. That 
 you find established on page 1063, report of 1882, and the oral state- 
 ments also were made to me. Now, I took my soundings at an un- 
 usually low state of the tide, and consequently the statement I attack 
 has all the benefits of the elements on its side. I find in my notes this 
 remark: “ The pilot says the water was lower than he had seen it in a 
 long time.” 
 
 Mr. ROSECRANS. Will my friend permit another question ? Did 
 you have any means of knowing how that measurement or point from 
 which you measured compared with the bench-mark usually taken as 
 the low-tide mark ? 
 
 Mr. BRECKINRIDGE The engineer who accompanied me, and also 
 the marine men acquainted with the facts, informed me that at that 
 time it was unusually low tide. The work had previously been a little 
 out of higher water than that, and I am giving its present depth below 
 a lower surface of water. 
 
 Mr. ROSECRANS. But the gentleman knows that there is a bench- 
 mark from which such comparisons are made. 
 
 Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Of course I do not question that. We all 
 know that. 
 
 Mr. ROSECRANS. This bench-mark is the datum plane or line. I 
 have had much experience in water measurement, and there may be in 
 such cases a mistake in beginning the measurement from the wrong 
 point, instead of taking a surface point or datum-plane which has been 
 established. 
 
 Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Nothing can effect the practical fact that at 
 
14 
 
 what I was informed was an unusual low condition of the tide I made 
 this sounding on that jetty, which, as we know, had been brought 
 visibly up to the surface of the water and a little above it, and now, at 
 unusually low tide, I found points— there were plenty of places, even 
 then — where a steamboat could run over the jetty, and I have the meas- 
 urements here to show the facts. ' 
 
 Here they are, running ten, nine, and seven feet under water on the 
 crest, though the average of course is less. When there happened to 
 be a spit of sand we would find it as shoal as three feet, or even eighteen 
 inches; but the outer half of the jetty shows an average depth on the 
 crest of, say, six and one-half feet, with an occasional high point. Near 
 shore it is well preserved, owing to sand there, and to being much higher 
 originally, as shown in the last report, than the other parts. 
 
 It is hardly necessary for me to carry this analysis further. I do not 
 believe that there is a single essential statement in General Newton’s 
 letter, or in the joint paper from Colonel Merrill and Major Mansfield, 
 that is not as erroneous as these propositions of which I have just treated. 
 This work is but a sample of much that is going on all around the coast. 
 We have made appropriations for other harbors under a species of pro- 
 test, for we provide a temporary harbor board, to be composed mainly 
 of men not associated with these wretched schemes, most of which as- 
 suredly should never have been begun, and that board is to report fully 
 to the next Congress. 
 
 I am a plain, business man, and I try to look at things in a plain, 
 common-sense way, and I think that surely there can be no bureau of 
 the Government more sadly in need of reform than this one is. The 
 officers are free from corruption ; but there is a thorough unfitness for 
 this work. There is an easy-going, indifferent, unreliable way of doing 
 things that needs to be stirred up and reorganized from the very bot- 
 tom. The time has come for a change. The people won’t stand this. 
 They ought not to stand it. And we need to start a reform here in 
 Congress. We should select proven ability for these works, settle upon 
 works with greater care, and then make adequate appropriations for 
 them. Unless we are going to complete a work in the right way it is 
 a public duty that we should not undertake it at all. 
 
 Mr. ROSECRANS. That is right. 
 
 Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. And let me say here that this should not 
 be a political bill or a log-rolling measure, or a bill to distribute the 
 public revenues, or anything of that kind. With due regard to the 
 equities it should be a business measure for the improvement of the 
 commerce of our country, with neither Democracy nor Republicanism 
 in it. 
 
 Now we propose to employ an engineer second to none in the world, 
 to supply the Secretary of War with money, and to tell him to improve 
 this harbor according to the plans of a man in whom we have confidence. 
 We are not here to do anything for him, but we want to hire him to 
 do something for us. He can make nothing but his $5,000 a year and 
 his $3,000 a foot. He has not the spending of a dollar. He tells us the 
 work must be almost entirely of stone or concrete, and he tells us the 
 approximate cost. We find it far less than the estimates of our engi- 
 neers of cost for an equal extent of inferior work upon the basis of their 
 South Pass estimates, allowing the usual percentage for contingencies. 
 This eminent engineer tells us that there is not a particle of doubt about 
 making the work a success. But he will do it as all the great jetty 
 works in the world are done. 
 
15 
 
 How idle are estimates for the present plan ! The work is located 
 wrong to start with. Had this sort of work been located right we have 
 no assurance that we have confidence in that any amount of money 
 thus applied would ever get and maintain a good channel. The sea has 
 destroyed all of the north jetty. The tide and teredo have destroyed 
 nearly, if not quite, one-half of the south jetty. The bar would move 
 seaward if the feeble things were finished, and leave you worse off than 
 before. What is your condition now, after vast expenditures? What 
 would it be in this line if you wasted millions in this way? Colonel 
 Merrill says: “It is quite possible,’ ’ in speaking of such work, “that 
 one or the other [jetty] might require removal.” 
 
 The doctrine laid down by Eads is to be sure you have mastered your 
 subject before you begin work, and then push it with all possible speed. 
 General Newton says Hartley’s works at the Sulina mouth of the Dan- 
 ube “were eminently tentative in their character. ” I find the reverse 
 to be the case. The first work was provisional, but the tracings were 
 exactly the same, and when Hartley began his work he pushed out 
 upon his lines with th$ utmost dispatch. The Dutch works of the 
 Scheur branch of the River Maas, says General Newton, “is a case 
 where heroic treatment has been applied, with the result of an imme- 
 diate failure. ” The reverse is true. The treatment was feeble. The 
 jetties were much wider apart than was the cut that supplied water for 
 them; consequently a vast amount of dredging had to be done; and 
 instead of the bar being dispersed by a vigorous current, it was simply 
 turned over by slow degrees to be as bad an obstruction as it was be- 
 fore. They have since imparted energy to the current by adequate 
 contraction. 
 
 Now shall we stop this trifling and give these people a harbor ? Here 
 are nine hundred miles of coast and not a harbor. Here is the first 
 cotton-growing State in the Union, here is the first wool-producing 
 State in the Union, here is the first cattle-raising State in the Union, 
 here are over 2,000,000 of people, $120,000,000 annually of farm prod- 
 ucts, $1,000,000,000 of the people’s wealth, 6,000 miles of railroads 
 carrying their commerce, not to speak of adjacent States, and all are 
 suffering from the lack of a harbor. The entire territory dependent is 
 equal to all of the New England States and New York, New Jersey, 
 Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, 
 Michigan, Wisconsin, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Iowa, 
 Minnesota, and Nebraska. Shall we give this region a harbor? I say 
 yes, and I call the attention of Congress to the striking fact that from 
 Hampton Roads, almost at the base of the Capitol, to the Mexican line, 
 nearly 3,000 miles, there is only one harbor entrance where a first-class 
 merchantman or a well-appointed man-of-war can float. That is the 
 south pass of the Mississippi River. Pensacola is questionable and un- 
 certain. 
 
 Mr. DIBBLE. Will the gentleman from Arkansas permit me to in- 
 terrupt him long enough to say that Port Royal, on the South Carolina 
 coast, has twenty-six feet of water? 
 
 Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. The commerce of that point is so small that 
 I did not remember it. I accept the statement of the gentleman. 
 There seems to be that remote point which has twenty-six feet of 
 water. But take a city like Wilmington or Savannah or Charleston or 
 Mobile. They are all second or even third-class harbors; and our com- 
 merce must not be compelled to make the long and expensive hauls to 
 New Orleans and Hampton Roads. 
 
Mr. KING. Twenty-six feet of water does not admit a first-class 
 man-of-war or modern merchantman. 
 
 Mr. DIBBLE. The Great Eastern only draws twenty- eight feet. 
 
 Mr. KING. In New Orleans a ship drawing twenty-nine or thirty 
 feet can enter. 
 
 Mr. Nicholls rose. 
 
 Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Do not talk across me. I have no time to 
 yield for further interruption. 
 
 Now, Mr. Chairman, there is one other point I desire to discuss — 
 and these remarks are much less complete and much less compact than 
 I would like to make them. 
 
 I want to call attention to our action about the Mississippi River 
 Commission. The bill shows that we provide for an advisory engineer 
 for the commission, and we recommend that James B. Eads be ap- 
 pointed to the place, and we require the Secretary of War to carry on 
 the improvement of that river according to the plans, &c., of the com- 
 mission as the same may be approved or amended by the advisory en- 
 gineer. 
 
 This, too, has been rightly called a radical step. Nothing of an ordi- 
 nary character could justify us for a moment in taking such a step as 
 this, and it is proper and unavoidable that the House and the country 
 be given the reasons for our course. I will say that it is the result of the 
 most mature consideration and counsel ; and at a very full sitting of the 
 committee, after long and protracted discussion, all present agreed to 
 this step except my friend from Pennsylvania [Mr. Bayne]. I do not 
 consider it necessary to reply to the dissenting argument my friend has 
 made. It needs no reply. It is proper to say that my friend from West 
 Virginia [Mr. Gibson], who also dissents, was not present at that meet- 
 ing. His speech needs no reply. I can not but hope that had he been 
 present and participated in our lengthy and earnest proceedings he would 
 have concurred in our general purpose. But of course this is conjec- 
 tural. 
 
 I will try to explain the reasons for our decision. 
 
 This commission was organized under an act approved June 28, 1879. 
 It was composed of seven members: Col. Q. A. Gilmore, president of 
 the commission; Maj. Charles R. Suter, Maj. C. B. Comstock, all of the 
 Engineer Corps of the Army; James B. Eads, and B. M. Harrod, civil 
 engineers, and Hon. Benjamin Harrison, now a Senator from Indiana. 
 The personnel has somewhat changed — Mr. Eads has gone out, Mr. Har- 
 rison has gone out; but I need not dwell upon that. In plain terms, 
 they were to take charge of the whole question of the improvement of 
 the Mississippi River from Cairo to the Galf. Their jurisdiction is now 
 somewhat enlarged. The idea of a board or commission for this vast 
 and vital business was and still is a wise one. 
 
 After long and mature consideration the commission agreed upon a 
 plan for the improvement of the river. That plan is set forth in their 
 first report (Senate Executive Document No. 58, second session, Forty- 
 sixth Congress, and dated March 6, 1880). The report treats with great 
 clearness of the philosophy of the case, and it lays down a plan of work 
 in conformity thereto, reciting successful practice. It is not necessary 
 for me to recite the accompanying dissenting reportof Major Comstock 
 and Mr. Harrison, for they concur in the general features and only dis- 
 sent in “some less important points.” This plan has received the ap- 
 proval of Congress and the country. This is evinced by several appro- 
 priations by Congress, aggregating over $8,000,000, which, with the 
 
17 
 
 appropriation in this bill, will amount to over $11,000,000. I do not 
 include anything above Cairo. The people have applauded this; execu- 
 tives have recommended it, and both political parties in national con- 
 vention have pledged themselves to the continuation of the work. 
 
 Now, sir, wheat is the plan to which we have pinned our faith, and 
 of which we have no reason to doubt? I can best state it by reading 
 extracts from the first report of the commission. On page 16 it says: 
 
 It has been observed in the Mississippi River, and is indeed true of all silt- 
 bearing streams flowing through alluvial deposits, that the more nearly the 
 high river width, or width between the banks, approaches to uniformity, the 
 more nearly uniform will be the channel depth, the less will be the variationsof 
 velocity, and the less the rate of caving to be expected in concave bends. * * * 
 Uniformity of width secured by contraction will produce increased velocity, and 
 therefore increased erosion of bed at the shoal places, accompanied by a corre- 
 sponding deposit of silt and deep places, and consequently greater uniformity 
 of depth. 
 
 Uniform depth joined to uniform width — that is to say, uniformity of effective 
 cross-section — implies uniform velocity, and this means that there will be no 
 violent eddies or cross-currents, and no great and sudden fluctuations in the 
 silt-transporting power of the current. There will, therefore, be less erosion 
 from oblique currents and eddies, and no formation of shoals and bars pro- 
 duced by silt taken up from one part of the channel and dropped in another. 
 
 f * * ¥ * ¥ ¥ 
 
 The work to be done, therefore, is to scour out and maintain a channel through 
 the shoals and bars * * * and to build up new banks and develop new 
 shore lines, so as to establish, so far as practicable, the requisite conditions of 
 uniform velocity for all stages of the river. 
 
 ****** * 
 
 This improvement can be accomplished below Cairo by contracting the low- 
 water channel way to an approximately uniform width of about 3,000 feet, 
 * * * by causing, through the action of appropriate works constructed at suit- 
 able localities, the deposition of sand and other earthy materials transported 
 by the water upon the dry bars and other portions of the present bed not em- 
 braced within the limits of the proposed low-water channel. The ultimate 
 effect sought to be produced by such deposits is a comparative uniformity in 
 the width of the high-water channel of the river. 
 
 • * * * * * * 
 
 These constructions will commonly be open or permeable to such a degree 
 that * * * they will sufficiently check the current to induce a deposit of silt 
 in selected localities. 
 
 I could cite more, but this is enough. I will add, however, that an- 
 other important feature was the closure of outlets of which the Atclia- 
 falaya was perhaps the most important. It was agreed to at once stop 
 the enlargement of that outlet, but not to take further action until the 
 report of Major Benyaurd, who was then making a survey of it, should 
 be received. The estimated cost of the first step was $10,000. 
 
 I will now turn to the second report of the commission (there was 
 another report the meanwhile, which, however, relates principally to 
 other matters), which is dated November 25 , 1881, and begins on page 
 2745 of the report of the Chief of Engineers of that year. In this report 
 the commission shows that it has not silled the Atchafalaya, and it 
 continues to promise that the initial step shall be taken. Running 
 through the whole report there is a confusion of thought, and therefore 
 I turn to the report of Mr. Eads, which accompanies the report of the 
 commission, for a plain and clear restatement of the original plan of 
 improvement. Mr. Eads, I believe, was also the author of the first re- 
 port. 
 
 Mr. ROSECRANS. Did I understand the gentleman to say that the 
 author of the first report was Captain Eads ? 
 
 Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. It is so stated. 
 
 Mr. ROSECRANS. I wish to say that I have known that all along 
 since I have known anything about engineering, and it is good sense. 
 
 Be 2 
 
18 
 
 Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I will not go over Mr. Eads’s reasoning 
 about the Atchafalaya, in the course of which he urges most strenu- 
 ously that immediate action be taken toward the closure of that peril- 
 ous outlet, and says that the closure should be completed in “six 
 years, ” so as to restrain ‘ ‘ about one-sixth of its volume per annum. ’ ’ 
 This general subject is also treated with the greatest clearness and abil- 
 ity in the report signed by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Thomas] 
 and the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Ellis] — in their report accom- 
 panying the Burrows report. These two papers are masterly and com- 
 plete, and no thoughtful man can read them without concluding that 
 advocates of the “outlet ” theory are among the most mistaken of men. 
 There is no proposition more opposed to numberless facts, more incon- 
 sistent with reason, or more universally condemned by all classes of 
 engineers. But Mr. Eads, in summing up the adopted plan on page 
 2775, says: 
 
 The plan of improvement recommended by the commission differs from any 
 other previously proposed for the correction of the channel in the fact that it 
 looks to a rectification of the high-water channel by the ultimate narrowing of 
 these wide places as the only method by which a deep and uniform low-water 
 channel can be permanently secured. 
 
 The wide places in the high-water channel create alternations of current ve- 
 locity and steeper slopes to overcome the excessive frictional resistance. These 
 cause the water to be highly charged with sediment at one part of its journey to 
 the sea, and much less highly charged at others. This creates scouring and de- 
 positing in the bed, and radical changes in the channel by the caving away of 
 its banks. 
 
 By reducing these wide places to a width approximately the same as that of 
 the narrow parts of the river the friction is reduced, a lower slope and. uniform 
 depth will be obtained, and the velocity of current will not be subject to its 
 present changes. A uniform charge of current will result from uniform current 
 velocity, and the caving of the banks will then be practically arrested for the 
 reason that when the water has the full charge of sediment due to its velocity it 
 can carry no more, and can not, therefore, scour the channel more deeply, by 
 which the undermining of the banks is effected. 
 
 Permanence of channel will not, therefore, be secured until these excessive 
 widths are reduced. A less depth at low water than twenty feet will not insure 
 stability of channel, for the reason that a less depth will result from only a par- 
 tial reduction of the wide places. Permanence of channel will be attained only 
 in proportion as uniformity of width of the high-water channel is attained, and 
 when this is secured the depth at low water may be considerably more than 
 twenty feet, but it will certainly not be less. The sooner these wide places are 
 corrected the less will the improvement of the river cost. 
 
 * * & * * # * 
 
 There can be no doubt of the entire feasibility of so correcting the Mississippi 
 River from Cairo to the Gulf that a channel depth of twenty feet during the 
 low-water seasons can be permanently secured throughout its entire course. 
 
 Upon the basis of this plan the commission estimated, on page 2752 
 of report of 1881, that the entire cost of improving the six reaches from 
 Cairo to Red River, one hundred and eighty- four miles, would be 
 $8,226,000, and for the entire river to that point $33,000,000. There 
 was no material dissent from this. 
 
 After this the breach between Captain Eads and the majority of the 
 commission further widened. Captain Eads contended for a "faithful 
 adherence to the plan and doctrine laid down, while the majority of 
 the commission seemed unable to realize the fixed laws of nature; they 
 never seemed to clearly grasp the problem in hand, and they varied and 
 dallied as men often do in controversy and when they immediately 
 confront a question too great for them the principles of which in calm 
 moments they clearly admit. 
 
 The very simplicity of the great question seems to baffle them. They 
 failed to grasp the central facts and ideas. The result of this was that 
 Captain Eads afterward resigned from the commission, it being an open 
 
19 
 
 secret that he did so in order to escape the responsibility of errors which 
 he had clearly pointed out but could not avert. He did not participate 
 in the proceedings of the commission after the report I have quoted from. 
 The country did not appreciate the force of the weak tendency that had 
 set in, and 1 know that it was only near the close of the last session of 
 Congress that, for my own part, I became fully aware and seriously 
 alarmed at the course the commission was taking. 
 
 It then began to appear plain to me that the commission was radi- 
 cally and fatally departing from the plan of work we thought they were 
 pursuing, and I have since studied the reports with greater care than 
 before, and I have renewed my examination of most of their work. 
 This departure has been a growth. It has been like increasing weak- 
 ness, until now the present report comes to us and it contains plans 
 and statements that must be squarely met by all who have real con- 
 victions or any high purpose in connection with the river. 
 
 I will trace this matter. In the next report after the one I last read 
 from, that is, in the report for 1882, after Eads had ceased to take a part 
 in the proceedings, you find in a paper from Professor Mitchel, a mem- 
 ber of the commission, a gentleman looked upon as simply a technical 
 adviser, the following language on page 263: 
 
 Indeed, under the general rule that the bars form at the reversion points of 
 curves it is evident that their position must vary as these curves vary, and that 
 the holding of the curves by revetment or otherwise is an essential early step 
 in the control of the river. It antedates logically the retrenchment which is to 
 deepen the water at the bars. 
 
 This is a new doctrine. It is true it is put in an obscure place, and 
 in very small print; but it comes, as by request, from one of the com- 
 mission, and it seems as if they are seeking a new conclusion. 
 
 We had previously been told that to narrow these wide and shoal places by 
 silt-arresting works was the only method by which a deep and uniform low- 
 water channel can be permanently secured. 
 
 Of course this was to be in connection with high-water treatment. 
 
 We were also told that — 
 
 The wide places in the high-water channel create alternations of current ve- 
 locity, &c. 
 
 And then that — 
 
 This creates * * * radical changes in the channel by the caving away of 
 its banks. 
 
 We were told that — 
 
 Permanence of channel will not, therefore, be secured until these excessive 
 widths are reduced. 
 
 And that when we properly reduce these excessive widths where the 
 bars are then — 
 
 Uniform depth will be obtained and the velocity of current will not be sub- 
 ject to its present changes. 
 
 When that is done — 
 
 A uniform charge of current will result. 
 
 And that — 
 
 The caving of the banks will then be practically arrested. 
 
 This stands to reason, and it has never failed in all its numerous prac- 
 tice. The professor loses sight of the cross-over bars in the channel, 
 where you find from five to fifteen feet of water, while in the caving 
 bends the water is, say, one hundred feet deep and often deeper. These 
 submerged bars always join the lower and the upper ends of the dry 
 bars, and they are not “at the reversion points of curves;” but they 
 
20 
 
 form just where the river passes the sustaining wall or bank that has 
 been caving and spreads out and unloads at this wide and sluggish point 
 in floods preparatory to running with increased and destructive velocity 
 into the next bend below. This is the bar that causes the mischief. 
 This is the bar that was to be “ scoured out ’ ’ by contracting the dry 
 bars just here and at their other parts as additional aid as the “only ” 
 method by which the river could possibly be improved. Now, this 
 contraction upon these wide bars is to be preceded by something else. 
 
 If the Mississippi River were dry and you started in a buggy to drive 
 down its bed from Cairo to the Gulf you would have a very up and down 
 hill road to travel. In plaees you would be in a deep and narrow gorge, 
 and again you would be upon a hill-top, nearly up to the brink of the 
 bank, and a broad expanse of sand would stretch out perhaps for miles 
 on either side of you. You would then be up on a sand-bar, while 
 your previous position was where there had been a caving bend. Now, 
 suppose this bed be filled again with a great flood. You readily see 
 that when the water gets to the broad and shallow bar it spreads out 
 and loses a part of its velocity. 
 
 The velocity is also diminished by the friction opposed to the water 
 by this vast exposure of bottom surface. A part of the sediment that 
 the river was able to carry before it was thus retarded by dispersion 
 and by friction is of course at once dropped to the bottom. Thus the 
 bar goes on building down-stream, adding below what may be picked 
 up at its head. But the water has a certain distance to tall before it 
 reaches the Gulf, and it will make up for this almost no surface slope 
 upon the bar by plunging headlong into the bend below, and in its 
 new course it will pick up a new load of sediment from the bottom. 
 This destroys the repose of the bank, and as soon as the sustaining 
 pressure of the water is taken from the side of the bank by the falling 
 of the water the bank will begin to cave in. They are land slides. 
 
 This new load of sediment will not be dropped until another wide 
 place is reached, at which the river will again spread out and the same 
 operation will be repeated, this new bar causing the same trouble be- 
 low it that the previous bar has caused just above. Wide places and 
 sand-bars are exchangeable terms. I repeat that the cure laid down 
 for this trouble is to remove the cause. That is to say, you will erect 
 contraction- works at the wide places so as to bring the river at that 
 point to its normal and proper width. Then the river may want to 
 spread, but you will not let it. If you do not let it disperse then it can 
 not drop its load of sediment. If it is kept loaded, then it can not take 
 up any more load when it gets into the next bend. As I said before, the 
 slope of the surface of the water is nearly level on a bar. As soon as it 
 gets over the bar the slope of the water is steep compared to what it 
 was on the bar, and of course the current is correspondingly swift. 
 
 But you will soon make the water cut out the bar, and you then not 
 only send the current loaded into the bend, but you also, by the re- 
 moval of the bar, have deprived the current of the cause of its excessive 
 velocity. You have then brought about a general state of uniformity. 
 Then it is that “the caving of the banks will be practically arrested.” 
 What revetting you then must do will be only an incident, and easy to 
 do. A good deal of this sort would be needed; £ut it will be easy to 
 do, and comparatively inexpensive. 
 
 If it be said that the works are imperiled, I reply that you are put- 
 ting them where the river is constructive and not destructive. You 
 treat the river at its lazy parts and help it to follow its natural bent. 
 
21 
 
 This then was to be done by proper contraction at the excessively 
 wide places. The constructions for this purpose were to be ‘ 4 commonly 
 open or permeable’ ’ so that they will sufficiently check the current to 
 induce a deposit of silt in selected localities. They were to effect “ the 
 deposition of sand and other earthy materials transported by the water 
 upon the dry bars and other portions of the present bed not embraced 
 within the limits of the proposed low- water channel.” 
 
 This is what was to be done, so that the water would be made to re- 
 move the bars, the cause of the caving, for surely we can do nothing 
 unless we can hold the banks. The qnestion is how are they to be held 
 and how can they be held? These works would promptly “ scour out 
 and maintain a channel through the shoals and bars. ’ ’ 
 
 Now, however, they are not going to effect a cure by removing the 
 cause, but by treating the effect. Indeed they have changed their 
 views as to what is the cause. We shall see later on how futile it is to 
 go into the teeth of the river in this way, and then we can better judge 
 whether or not we ought to permit the commission to commit us to 
 this change of plan. 
 
 What I have read from Professor Mitchell’s paper prepares us to ex- 
 pect the expression in the main report, page 11, “the main item of 
 cost will of course be the bank protection. ’ ’ This was the only prom- 
 inent intimation then of these growing errors. It is very forcible in 
 the light of later events. 
 
 And so matters go until near the close of last session we had the com- 
 mission before the River and Harbor Committee. It is sufficient to say 
 that their influence with the committee was much greater before we 
 heard them than it was afterward. Soon after that we were startled 
 with the information that the extensive revetment work at Memphis and 
 in Hopefield Bend was a total loss, and that great city was in imminent 
 peril, with the vital interests of the vast commerce that seeks its facil- 
 ities in equal danger. We found that the entire work there had been 
 upon this new plan. Last session Congress gave $200,000 for the emer- 
 gency, and we find that it too is being spent in the same way. Not a 
 dollar has been or is being spent to remove the cause of all this trouble: 
 that is, the bars above. They revet where the water is one hundred 
 and one hundred and five feet deep, while just above lie the fatal bars, 
 with some eight and twelve feet of depth. 
 
 The current continues to come upon them with unabated fury, stripped 
 of its load and ready for the fray, and poor obstinate man stands there 
 fighting the laws of God. 
 
 Why not conform to nature and seek her potent aid ? Is it because 
 their great rival told them what to do and they are unwilling to learn ? 
 Are the public interests to suffer for this ? Eads told them the truth. 
 He understood the case. It is not Eads we are fighting for or the com- 
 mission we are fighting against. It is the engineering truth we want, 
 and he happened to understand it and these gentlemen do not. We are 
 pressing forward for the public interests. Men must stand the con- 
 sequences of their errors, and pique and pride can no more control the 
 Mississippi River than could Canute, by waving his feeble scepter, 
 cause the tide to recede. The plain Dutch have done with their sea- 
 works what his majesty could not achieve. 
 
 Look further into their last report. You find estimates for various 
 harbors on the river, aggregating $2,014,000, and every dollar is for 
 revetment. You find on page 4 that they propose a systematic course 
 of revetment for the bends from Cairo down. This they propose to do 
 
22 
 
 and to let the river scour out its bars, &c. , by natural agency, aided 
 only by revetment instead of proceeding in the line of nature’s work. 
 This work, as is clearly deducible from their estimates, will cost at the 
 least over $130,000 a mile, including plant, while from what they are 
 now trying at Memphis I think the estimate maybe more safely put at 
 $30 a foot than at $20, if it is to be carried to the maximum depth, and 
 we have scarcely a hope of stability short of that. The same policy is 
 largely practiced in the reaches under treatment. They estimated in 
 1880 that, say, $1,250,000 would complete Providence reach, and they 
 have now spent, say, $2,000,000 on it, and the report says as much more 
 is required. 
 
 For Plum Point reach they estimated less than $1,500,000, and they 
 have spent over $2,000,000 on it, with the intimation of spending in all 
 $4,000,000, with no limit then fixed. For one of the commission says, 
 on page 32, that they will spend three times the original estimates on 
 these reaches, and then the final sum is undetermined. The Atchafa- 
 laya is not even silled yet, and to-day the whole North is in grave dan- 
 ger of being cut off from the Gulf, and New Orleans is in grave danger 
 of being cut off from the North. All this is the result of deviations 
 from the adopted plan. There is a grave duty for us to discharge here. 
 Can we permit this? Is there a gentleman here who ever dreamed of 
 permitting these deviations from the adopted plan for treating the 
 river? Can we countenance them for a moment by look, or word, or 
 vote? How are we to act as custodians of the public funds and of this 
 grand river? I expect accidents. I can pardon errors; but I can not 
 condone this radical, fundamental, foolish, and ruinous change of policy. 
 
 Gentlemen, it must be done openly. It can not be hid in a corner. 
 The plain v^ay, the honest way, and the manly way is the only way. 
 We must rebuke those who deserve it. We must in every way merit 
 the confidence of the country. The country has given and will give 
 freely of its money. They ask only frankness and candor of us. Can 
 you fail to stop these departures? Can you ask money for these 
 wretched experiments ? Have you a particle of doubt of your true 
 plan ? The former offers untold expense and no results. The latter is 
 reasonable in amount and has never failed. Where contraction has 
 been only partially completed the results are perfect to that extent. 
 Of course, enemies to the West, the special pleaders of Eastern railroad 
 corporations, will pervert the truth and seek to take advantage of our 
 candor and of our dilemma; but we can not help this, and they can 
 not fool the House or the people. 
 
 This is the condition in reports and from observation. We must 
 make them go back to what we have confidence in. They must stop 
 this ceaseless revetting and first remove the bars which are the chief 
 cause of the trouble. You never find a caving bend but what there is 
 a bar above it. You never find a caving reach but what there is a bar 
 in the middle and a surplus channel to be closed. 
 
 Mr. ROSECRANS. Will the gentleman permit an interruption? 
 
 Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Pardon me; I have only a moment left. 
 
 The statements I make are plain in the proof. 
 
 [Here the hammer fell.] 
 
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