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 Publications of the National Union, No. XLVI. 
 
 THE 
 
 GOVERNMENT POLICY 
 
 WITH RESPECT TO 
 
 AFGHANISTAN, 
 
 BY 
 
 J. D. M. 
 
 PUBLISHED BY THE 
 
 NATIONAL UNION OF CONSERVATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
 
 ASSOCIATIONS. 
 
 8T. STEPHEN'S CHAMBERS, WESTMINSTER. 8.W. 
 
 MARCH 1880.
 
 THE 
 
 GOYEENMENT POLICY 
 
 WITH RESPECT TO 
 
 AFGHANISTAN. 
 
 No part of the Foreign Poll -y of the Government has been mora 
 persistently assailed than its dealings with Afghanistan. We 
 are told that these commenced with a crime and ended with 
 a blunder ; that we made an unj astifiable war upon Shere Ali Khan 
 for the purpose of forcing him to receive an embassy, and of secur- 
 ing to ourselves a scientific frontier ; that our Ambassadoi: has been 
 murdered, and our frontier is insecure ; that we asserted a wish to 
 make Afghanistan friendly and independent, and that we have 
 succeeded in breaking it up into fragments, which are hostile to 
 each other and to ourselves ; tliat our true policy was to preserve 
 the Afghans as a barrier between ourselves and Russia, and that the 
 result of our conduct will be to obliterate Afghanistan, and to 
 bring our own frontier in contact with that of Russia. Finally, 
 we are told that we were warned beforehand of the very dangers 
 and difficulties which have happened, but that we chose wantonly 
 to encounter them by abandoning the old Whig policy which had 
 preserved us in security and peace. 
 
 Now I think it will be found that the whole of this argu- 
 ment rests upon the not uncommon fallacy of criticizing the 
 course which his been taken without enquiriag into the reasons 
 which made it necessary ; of magnifying the undoubted dangers 
 and difficulties which have arisen from adopting that course, 
 and ignormg the still greater dangers and difficulties which
 
 would have arisen from adopting any other course ; of as- 
 suming that peace and security are the same thing, and 
 that the best way of avoiding a contest with a burglar is 
 to remain quietly in bed while he is breaking open -the hall 
 door. My object will be to show that the position of affairs 
 in the end of 1878 left the Government absolutely no alter- 
 native except to make war upon the Amir of Afghanistan ; 
 that if everything which has occurred could have been foreseen, 
 it would still have been necessary to follow exactly the same 
 course ; that if that course has been forced upon us by previous 
 mistakes, those mistakes were committed by Mr. Gladstone's 
 Government ; and that the policy which we are told we ought 
 to have followed is simply the old Whig policy, which 
 consists, first in doing nothing until it is too late, and then 
 in doing nothing because it is too late. 
 
 The whole reasoning on the other side rests upon a per- 
 sistent refusal to recognize the Eussian element in the case. 
 If this is excluded, the argument against the poHcy of the 
 Government would be unanswerable. So long as we had only 
 to do with Afghanistan, no human being would wish to 
 establish an Embassy at Cabul; or would care whether the 
 frontier which separated the British Empire in India from five 
 nations of savages was scientific or unscientific. But it became 
 a very different question when 'we had to consider whether we 
 should allow these millions of savages to be drilled, 
 disciplined, armed and organized by Eussia, and whether 
 we should allow the mountain passes on our own 
 borders to be converted into an impregnable outwork 
 of the Muscovite Empire. To that question only one answer 
 is possible, and that is the answer which it received from the 
 Conservative Government. What I want to show is, that that 
 was the question, and the only question. Further, that the 
 crisis which occurred in 1878 was one to which Russian 
 policy had been steadily advancing] for three-quarters of a 
 century, which must have come ^sooner or later, and which, 
 whenever it did come, must have been met, once for all, 
 either by resistance or surrender. 
 
 o
 
 For upwards of a hundred years, Russian ambition has 
 aimed at two objects — Constantinople and India. The former 
 object was almost attained in the spring of 1878, when 
 Russian troops stood before the gates of Constantinople. They 
 themselves admit that it was the resistance of the English 
 Government alone which prevented their entering those gates. 
 What progress thej have made towards the second object may bo 
 best judged from this simple fact. In the beginning of this 
 century the frontiers of Russia and British India were 
 divided from each other by a distance of 2,000 miles. That 
 distance has now been reduced to 350. The history of this 
 progress is that v/hich is known as the question of Central 
 Asia. No one can offer an intelligent opinion upon Afghan 
 policy who does not understand this history. 
 
 Central Asia may be roughly described as that portion of 
 Asia which lies between Afghanistan and Siberia. In the 
 centre of tbis great tract of country is the Sea of Aral. The 
 larger part of this region is a sandy desert ; but two im- 
 mense rivers which take their rise in the mountains to the 
 north of India, flow into the Sea of Aral, and are bordered 
 by fertile kingdoms. The eastern of these rivers is the Sir 
 Daria or Jaxartes ; the westward is the Amu Daria or Oxus. 
 To the right of this region is the Chinese Empire, while 
 Persia and the Caspian Sea stretch away on the left hand 
 to the borders of Russia. 
 
 Now it is evident that there are two ways by which Russia can 
 approach India ; from the west, in the direction of the Caspian 
 Sea, or from the north, by ascending the rivers which empty them- 
 selves into the Sea of Aral. Accordingly a steady process of 
 conquest has been going on in each direction. 
 
 The first advances were made on the side of Persia. A war 
 which ended in 1813 gave Russia possession of the greater part of 
 the western coast of the Caspian, and by successive gains from 
 Persia, Circassia, and Turkey, an uninterrupted mass of Russian 
 territory now extends from the Black Sea to the Caspian. Russian 
 troops cannot, however, march round the southern coast of the 
 Caspian, as it is still in the hands of Persia. So another war.
 
 6 
 
 which Gndsd in 1828, gave Russia the exclusive right of maintain- 
 ing ships of war on the Caspian ; and thereby of turning it into a 
 Russian ferry. In 1838 she established a naval arsenal on the 
 Persian island of Ashurada, on the south east corner of the Caspian, 
 and she has since then crossed over to the eastern coast and set up 
 forts at Tchikislar and Krasnovodsk, which are again the starting 
 points for further aggressions. During the last few years an 
 annual expedition has set out in the direction of India, and moved 
 along the northern frontier of Persia, securing its progress as it 
 went by building new forts. This process, however, is subject to 
 the drawback that the country is bare and difficult, and that the 
 Turkomans who inhabit it are numerous and warlike. Accordingly 
 suggestions have recently been thrown out that Persia should be 
 induced to cede to Kussia a strip of territory bordering upon the 
 desert. If this arrangement was made, the army of the Caucasus 
 could advance to the very border of Afghanistan without leaving 
 Russian soil. 
 
 The advance from' the North is more recent and more rapid. 
 It commenced in 1847, and with some short pauses, caused by 
 the Crimean War and the Polish Eebelhon, it has continued to 
 the present day. The first step was to connect the Sea of Aral 
 with Siberia by a line of forts. Then the Russians steadily 
 advanced up the eastern river, the Jaxartes, annexing the coun- 
 tries which it watered, and then crossed over to the western 
 river, the Oxus, repeating the same process along its banks. In 
 this way the whole of Kliokand and the greater part of Bokhara 
 and Khiva have become absolutely Russian, while the Ehans of 
 Bokhara and Khiva, who are still allowed to exist, are simply 
 Russian vassals, and their territory is for all practical purposes 
 at the disposal of the Czar. In this manner, as I have already 
 said, the nearest point of Muscovite dominion is not more than 
 350 miles from our frontier town of Peshawur, while the inter- 
 vening region belongs to Bokhara, and is really Russian under 
 another name. 
 
 It may be that these proceedings were not commenced with 
 any deliberate view to the conquest of India, but it is quite 
 certain that they will never end till they reach India, or a point
 
 at which further progress is made impossible. Every step in 
 the march has been described by the Foreign Office at St. 
 Petersburg as either temporary or involuntary, but still the 
 march goes on. When Ashurada was occupied, permission was 
 asked to take possession of it for a temporary purpose, but it 
 has never been given up. When the Russians had advanced in 
 1864 up the Jaxartes as far as Khokand, Prince Gortschakoff 
 sat down and wrote a circular, full of the noblest sentiments of 
 Christian moderation, in which he pointed out that Russia had 
 now reached the limits of her conquests, and that for the fature 
 Central Asia was to be at rest. The very next year a fresh 
 attack was made upon Khokand, half of the Khanate was 
 seized at once, and the whole was annexed in 1876. Then 
 came the town of Bokhara, whose capital, Samarcand, was taken 
 in 1868. For two years we were assured by the Russian 
 Emperor himself that his earnest desire was to restore it, 
 but it never has bsen restored. In 1872, the Khivan expedi- 
 tion was determined on and organized, and in the next year 
 it was carried out. Much anxiety was felt in England at 
 this further advance, which would place Bussia in command of 
 the Oxus, which extends up to our very frontier.* Repeated 
 denials of any intention to attack Khiva had been offered until 
 the very year before the attack was made. Then a special 
 envoy. Count Schouvaloff, was sent over for the purpose 
 of comforting our Foreign Minister, and keeping ParUa- 
 ment quiet. He was directed to admit the expedition, but to 
 represent it as something of a perfectly insignificant and 
 ephemeral character. It was to consist of 4^ battalions, and 
 "not only was it far from the intention of the Emperor to take 
 possession of lOiiva, but positive orders had been prepared to 
 prevent it, and directions given that the conditions imposed 
 should bo such as could not in any way lead to a prolonged 
 occupation of Khiva." The expedition of 4j battalions turned 
 out to be five expeditions, numbering about 13,000 men. 
 The actual treaty ceded to Russia all the territory of Khiva on 
 the right bank of the Cxus, with the exclusive right of naviga- 
 ting that river, while an impossible indemnity and other terms
 
 8 
 
 placed the Khan of Kliiva absolutely at the mercy of Russia. 
 No one doubts that both Khiva and Bokhara will follow the fate 
 of Khokand, whenever it becomes convenient to take 
 them. On every occasion the course of events has been 
 exactly the same. Each fresh advance has brought the 
 Russians in contact with a new horde of Turkomans. A 
 Russian subject is killed, or a Russian camel is carried off- 
 and then a fresh expedition is organized which results in fresh 
 decorations to the commanding officer and new accessions of 
 territory to the Czar. It is not necessary to impute any moral 
 blame to the Russians in the matter. The sequence of events 
 may be quite unavoidable. But if it is unavoidable that Eng- 
 land and Russia should meet on the frontiers of India, this is 
 all the better reason why we should take care not to be taken 
 at a disadvantage when the inevitable moment arrives. 
 
 It is now time to show how this slow but steady march of the 
 Muscovite towards our Indian Empire is mixed up with the recent 
 events in Afghanistan. 
 
 About ten years ago the advance of Russia through Central Asia 
 caused much uneasiness in the minds of EngHsh statesmen, and 
 it was suggested that a neutral zone should be established, which 
 should permanently separate the two nations. This scheme was 
 found to be impracticable. On the 24th February, 1869, however 
 Prince Gortschakoff instructed the Russian Ambassador in London, 
 to "repeat to Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of 
 State the positive assurance that His Imperial Majesty looks 
 upon Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere within which 
 Russia may be called on to exercise her influence. No inter- 
 vention or interference whatever, opposed to the independence 
 of that State enters into his intentions." On the 2nd Novem- 
 ber, 1809, Prince Gortschakoff himself said to our Ambassador 
 ** with respect to the inexpediency of either Enghsh or Rus- 
 sian officers going to Afghanistan, that he saw no objection to 
 English officers visiting Cabul, though he agreed with Lord 
 Mayo that Russian agents should not do so." In consequence 
 of this] understanding an examination was made of the northern 
 boundary of Afghanistan, and it was agreed between England
 
 and Russia that it should be considered as extending to a 
 specified point on the Oxus. The whole of these negotia- 
 tions were communicated to the Government of India, and 
 reviewed by them in a despatch dated the 30th June, 1873, 
 which was in turn communicated to the Russian Foreign 
 Office. It stated plainly that '* the complete independence of 
 Afghanistan is so important to the interests of British India 
 that the Government of India could not look upon an attack 
 upon Afghanistan with indifference." It then went on to say, 
 " The assurances given by the Russian Government of their 
 determination not to interfere with Afghanistan have been 
 clear and positive throughout the whole course of these nego- 
 tiations. We unreservedly accept those assurances, and we 
 are satisfied that this frack explanation of the position of the 
 Government of India as regards Afghanistan will not be 
 misinterpreted." 
 
 It was obviously of essential importance that we should strongly 
 attach the ruler of Afghanistan to our interests. The first step 
 towards this object was taken by Lord Mayo in 1869. 
 
 Shore Ali Khan came to the throne in 1863 ; and for five years 
 was engaged in a series of conflicts with his brother, ia which he 
 was alternately victor and vanquished, a Sovereign and a fugitive. 
 During the whole of these contests Sir John Lawrence, the then 
 Viceroy, maintained an attitude of cold neutraHty, recognizing each 
 brother in succession with polite impartiality, as the wheel of 
 fortune revolved. Finally, Shere Ali estabhshed his position 
 beyond dispute ; and in March, 1869, a conference took place 
 between the Ameer and the new Viceroy, Lord Mayo, at Umballah. 
 
 On this occasion Shere Ali appears to have been under no appre- 
 hensions from abroad. His only fear was of a renewal of civil war 
 within his own dominions ; and he strove earnestly to secure an 
 express treaty bindin^r the Indian Government to assist him 
 unconditionally against such an event. This Lord Mayo refused 
 to do ; but he gave him handsome presents of arms and money, 
 with a promise of more ; and he wrote him an official letter, in 
 which he announced that the Government of India would view 
 with severe displeasure any attempt on the part of his rivals to
 
 la 
 
 disturb his position as ruler of Cabul, and to rekindle civil war. 
 This was much less than Shere Ali wanted ; but it was a good 
 deal. The frank and genial manner and manly presence of 
 Lord Mayo had an extraordinary effect upon his mind ; and 
 it is admitted on all hands that he went away contented 
 happy, and loyally attached to British iuterests. 
 
 It is remarkable, however, as bearing upon what afterwards 
 happened, that the Duke of Argyll, the then Secretary of State for 
 India, showed much dissatisfaction with Lord Majofor even the 
 cautious and qualified promises which he had made to the Ameer, 
 and regretted that he had not coupled them with provisoes which 
 would undoubtedly have deprived them of all value in Shere All's 
 eyes. 
 
 Up to this time India and Afghanistan had been left to them- 
 selves, and no cause of difference had sprung up between them. 
 In the very next year, however, the cold shadow of the great 
 northern giant began to fall upon Cabul. From that year the 
 influence of Russia began to make itself felt. In 1870, not 
 withstanding the express promise of Russia to consider Afghanistan 
 as beyond the sphere of her influence, General Kaufl'mann, the 
 Governor- General of Turkestan, began to address a series of 
 letters to Shere Ali. In form they were innocent enough. Qhey 
 contained elaborate accounts of the dealings of Russia with her 
 neighbours in Asia, deaUngs not in themselves very re- 
 assuring, coupled with numerous protestations of love and 
 respect for Afghanistan ; while these again were interspersed with 
 gentle hints that the existing state of harmony depended a good 
 deal upon the sentiments which Shere Ali might evidence towards 
 his patronizing correspondent. In short, they might all be 
 summarised in this way, " I am getting everyone round me com- 
 fortably under my thumb. Be a good quiet Amir, and perhaps 
 your turn won't come." This was the view Sheie Ali took of 
 the correspondence. With Oriental acuteness he read the un- 
 written words between the lines of his great friend's lett rs. 
 He forwarded them to the Government of India, and asked 
 anxiously what they meant. He remarked that in one letter 
 Bokhara was spoken of as intervening between Russia and
 
 11 
 
 Afghanistan, while in another letter Bokhara had mysteriously 
 disappeared, and Eussia was said to be the neighbour of Afghan- 
 istan. He observed that the Governor General took the trouble 
 to inform him that his instructions were to avoid all interfer- 
 ence with or annoyance to his neighbours ; but that somehow or 
 other the Russians had managed to wipe out every neighbour 
 with whom they had come in contact. He pointed out the 
 numerous grounds of difference between himself and the Gover- 
 nor-General which might arise, and sought nervously for advice. 
 The Government of India, most unwisely as I thinjj, told him 
 that he ought to be greatly pleased at getting such nice 
 letters, and supplied him with a sort of model form of reply. 
 
 JMatlers went on in this way till 1873, when a fresh wava of 
 excitement passed through Asia in consequence of the expedition to 
 Khiva. Shere Ali was violently alarmed at this fresh stride of 
 Russia. He predicted that Merv would be the next step. That the 
 Turcomans driven out of the Oasis would take refuge in his 
 dominions, and that the Russians would then follow in pursuit of 
 them. Accordingly, on the 24th July, 1873, Lord Northbrook, the 
 then Viceroy, telegraphed to the Duke of Argyll : — 
 
 *' Amir of Cabul, alarmed at Russian progress, dissatisfied with 
 general assurance, and anxious to know definitely how far he may 
 rely on cur help if invaded. I propose assuring him that if he 
 unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all external relations, 
 we will help him with money, arms, and troops, if necessary, to 
 expel unprovoked invasion. We to be the judge of the necessity. 
 Answer by telegraph quickly." 
 
 This was the turning point of our relations with Afghanistan. 
 The Amir's alarm was genuine and well founded. His anxiety to 
 throw in his lot with us was hearty and sincere. It was evident 
 that the Viceroy shared in his apprehension, and was willing to 
 remove them. A simple unqualified answer, approving of the 
 pr.iposed a. surance, would have saved us the Afghan \tar. But it 
 was not to be. The glamour of Russian diplomacy was still blind- 
 ing the eyes of our statesmen. The Duke of Argyll could not 
 understand how a barbarian hke Shere Ali could have the inpertin- 
 ence to be more clear-sighted than himself. The sooner such
 
 * 12 
 
 self-sufficiency was snubbed the better. So the answer came 
 back : — 
 
 ** Cabinet thinks you should inform Amir that we do not at all 
 share his alarm, and consider there is no cause for it; but you may 
 assure him we shall maintain our settled pohcy in favour of 
 Afghanistan, if he abides by our advice in external affairs." 
 
 The plain English of this was, " Shere Ali is a nervous fool. 
 Who is he to set himself up for being wiser than we are ? 
 Tell him to be thankful for being as well off as he is." 
 
 The result of these directions was, that when the Ameer's 
 envoy, Syad Nur Mahomed, met the Viceroy at Simla, the 
 latter came prepared to pledge himself to as little that was 
 definite as might be. 
 
 Now, Shere AH's position was this : He was bound by a 
 treaty made by his father with the East India Company, by 
 which Dost Mahomed had pledged himself to be the friend of 
 the friends and the enemy of the enemies of the East India 
 Company, but they had entered into no corresponding pledge 
 to him. This, as he had stated to Lord Mayo in 1869, was 
 a one-sided treaty. He foresaw that the time might come 
 when he would find himself presented with a choice between 
 being the friend or enemy of Russia. He was naturally anxious 
 o secure a formal pledge that if he became tho enemy of Russia 
 he would be certain of finding a friend in England. , But this 
 pledge was exactly what Lord Northbrook was unable or un- 
 willing to give. In the first interview with the Envoy, '' His 
 Excellency the Viceroy observed that if, in the event of any 
 aggression from without, British influence were invoked, and 
 failed to effect a satisfactory settlement, it was probable that 
 the British Government would in that case afford the Ruler 
 of Afghanistan material assistance in repelling an invader. Such 
 assistance would of course be conditional on the Amir following 
 tho advice of the British Government, and having himself ab- 
 stained from aggression." As the Amir wanted certainty and 
 not probability, this declaration was hardly worth going the 
 ^^hole way to Simla to get. At the next meeting the Viceroy 
 seems to have given the same assurance in a more positive
 
 13 
 
 form. The probability was left out ; but the conditions prece- 
 dent were reiterated and enforced. It was also stated that 
 ** the British Government holds itself perfectly free to decide 
 as to the occasion when such assistance should be rendered, 
 and also as to its nature and extent." 
 
 Then the Envoy, who seems to have acted with the greatest 
 fairness, put two questions point blank. 
 
 " He requested in the first place, that in the event of any 
 aggression in the Ameer's territories, the British Government 
 would distinctly state that they would consider such aggressor 
 as an enemy." 
 
 "His Excellency said that in diplomatic correspondence such 
 expressions were always avoided as causing needless irritation. 
 In His Excellency's opinion the assurance above given should 
 be sufficient to satisfy the Amir as to the light in which any 
 aggression would be considered by the British Government." 
 
 " Next, the Envoy pressed that the contingency of aggression 
 by Russia should be specially mentioned in the written assurance 
 to be given to the Amir." 
 
 "To this His Excellency repHed that, setting aside the 
 inexpediency of causing needless irritation to a frigidly Power 
 by such specific mention, the suggestion was one that could not 
 be adopted, inasmuch as it implied an admission of the probability 
 of such a contingency arising, which the British Government are 
 not prepared to admit in the face of the repeated assurances 
 given by Russia." 
 
 In the final letter sent by the Viceroy to Shere Ali this 
 subject was disposed of as follows : — 
 
 " I have had some conversations with your Envoy on the 
 subject of the policy which the British Government would pursue 
 in the event of an attack upon your Highness' tcnilories. A 
 copy of the record of these conversations is attached to this letter. 
 But the question is in my opinion one of such importance that 
 it should be postponed to a more suitable opportunity." 
 
 Did anyone, since the days of Festus, ever hear that the 
 importance of a subject was a reason for putting it aside till 
 a more convenient season ?
 
 14 
 
 So the bewildered Envoy returned to Cabul, there to lay 
 before his master " the record of these conversations." 
 
 Now, this record undoubtedly displays some very pretty and 
 delicate practice in fencing with words. The thrusts of the 
 Envoy were parried with infinite dexterity. The whole thing 
 was admirably calculated to gratify the Duke of Argyll and to 
 read well in a Blue Book. It was probably much applauded in 
 the India Office, and freely chuckled over at St. Petersburgh. 
 But when we ask how it was likely to serve the interests of 
 the British Empire the answer is rather different. 
 
 I think it may bo admitted that Lord Northbrook was really 
 prepared on an emergency to do everything for Shere Ali that 
 the Amir had a right to ask. I think it is even probable 
 that he thought he was conveying to Shere Ali an adequate 
 assurance that he was prepared to do so. But he overlooked 
 two things : first, that Shere Ali. was in a position to give 
 something, and was entitled to ask something in exchange ; 
 secondly, that he would certainly read the words in one sense, 
 while the Viceroy used them in another. 
 
 Shere Ah stood between two possible enemies, to either of 
 whom he might be an absolute invaluable friend. Before decid- 
 ing to which side he should offer his friendship, he was entitled 
 to ascertain which of the two would offer him an ungrudging 
 and absolute friendship in return. Lord Northbrook obviously 
 supposed that the favour was all on his own side, that the Amir 
 was bargaining for future assistance, to which he might affix 
 his own terms. He never contemplated the event which has 
 actually happened, in which the Afghan, by simply placing his 
 territory at the disposal of Russia, might inflict incalculable 
 injury on India. Had he done so, he would probably have 
 hesitated before he dismissed the messenger of peace in the 
 hope of finding him return ''at a more suitable opportunity." 
 
 In the next place Lord Northbrook displayed a woeful ignorance 
 of Oriental nature. A native will give the most implicit confidence 
 to any English gentleman who speaks to him frankly and plainly. 
 He will take our yea and nay as absolute truth. But when, from 
 the purest desire not to overstate our intentions, we begin to qualify
 
 15 
 
 and limit our answers, he looks upon our qualifications as quibbles 
 and our limitations as lies. He judges others by himself. If Shere 
 Ali had used to the Viceroy the Viceroy's language to himself, he 
 would have meant to get out of his promises whenever it suited 
 himself. And there can be no doubt this was the view he took of 
 the cautious language that was nsed to his Envoy. 
 
 Three year's later, when Lord Lytton was attempting to 
 enter into direct communications with the Amir, our agent 
 stated his opinion to him, that Shere Ali *' would be glad to 
 come to our terms if he were once convinced of our meaning 
 real business ; but that we must be clear and open in our com- 
 munications, as the Afghans have come to suspect a second 
 meaning in all we utter." This could only have had reference 
 to the impression produced on the Amir's mind by the Simla 
 negotiations. 
 
 The effect of the interview upon the Amir is beyond doubt. 
 He returned an an answer which, for cool insolence, probably 
 surpassed anything that had ever reached the Foreign Depart- 
 ment at Calcutta. He thanked God " that such security has 
 been established in all countries that no aggressions will 
 take place, nor will any power raise discussions or disputes 
 within the dominions of that power ; and that the use of inimical 
 expressions has been discontinued in diplomatic correspondence, 
 and that peace and tranquillity have been secured to the whole 
 world." He then remarked, in substance, that under the cir- 
 cumstances Syad Nur Mahomed had taken a great deal of 
 unnecessary trouble in going to Simla. 
 
 Evidently the "suitable opportunity" was not likely to 
 recm*. It never did. Upon this point Yakub Khan's evidence 
 is conclusive. He said to General Roberts last year : *' In 
 1869 my father was fully prepared to throw in his lot with 
 you. He had suffered many reverses before making himself 
 secure on the throne of Afghanistan ; and he had come to 
 the conclusion that his best chance of holding what he had 
 won lay in an alliance with the British Government. He did 
 not receive from Lord Mayo as large a supply of arms and 
 ammunition as he had hoped, but nevertheless he returned to
 
 16 
 
 Cabul fairly satisfied, and so he remained until the visit of 
 Nur Mahomel to India in 1873. This visit brought matters 
 to a head. The diaries received from Nur Mahomed during 
 his stay in India, and the report which he brought back on 
 his return, convinced my father that he coald no longer hope 
 to obtain from the British Government all the aid that he 
 wanted ; and from that time he began to turn his attention 
 to the thoughts of a Russian alliance. You know how this 
 ended." 
 
 I think we shall not be far wrong in dating the Afghan 
 War back to the Duke of Argyll's telegram. 
 
 The interchange of letters between Shere Ali and the 
 authorities at Tashkend now continued and became more 
 frequent, and the Amir gradually ceased to forward such 
 letters to the Indian Government or to consult them upon 
 his repHes. In 1875 Envoys began to arrive from General 
 Kaufmann, and in 1876 they became so numerous that the 
 Government of India requested the Foreign Office to com- 
 plain of the proceding as a direct violation of the understanding 
 arrived at in 1869. The manner in which the complaint was 
 met was characteristic of Russian diplomacy, whose great 
 principle appears to be, not to let its right hand know what 
 its left hand is doing. Prince Gortschakoff telegraphed to 
 Count Schouvaloff desiring him to give a flat contradiction to 
 the statement that General Kaufmann had been interfering at 
 Cabul either by an agent or in any other mauner. General 
 Kaufmann put his hand to his heart, and appealed 
 indignantly to his general character as shielding him from 
 such an accusation. He asserted that his relations with Shere 
 Ali had been limited to changes of civihty, and that he had 
 never sent to Cabul either agents or even a single messenger. 
 His letters had only been matters of pure courtesy, and had 
 been forwarded through the Amir of Bokhara, once or twice 
 a year. This explanation was met by the Indian Government 
 with a simple contradiction. The letters, many of which 
 were forthcoming, spoke for themselves. They said of their 
 number, *♦ During the past year they have been incessant.
 
 17 
 
 The bearers of them are regarded by the Amu- as agents of 
 the Russian Government, and on one pretext or another 
 some person recognized by the Afghan Government as 
 a Russian agent is now almost constantly at Cabul." It 
 certainly confirms this view that Shere Ah, in acknowledging 
 one of these letters from General Kaufmann, speaks of it 
 as having been received "by hand of your Envoy Aishan 
 Khwaja Bazurg." It is now well known that a mass of 
 correspondence has been found in Cabul shewing dealings 
 between the Amir and the Russians of a much more intimate 
 character than had previously been suspected. All that is 
 pubHcly known of these papers as yet is that the Govern' 
 ment considers that they cannot safely be pubhshed. 
 
 It is now time to take up that series of events which culminated 
 in the final refusal of Shere Ali to receive a British Embassy, and 
 in the consequent declaration of war. 
 
 In January, 1875, Lord Salisbury wrote to the Government of 
 India pointing out the comparative uselessness of the Native 
 Agent at Cabul, and instructing them to take measures for pro- 
 curing the assent of the Amir to the establishment of a 
 British Agency at Herat, to be subsequently followed by a 
 similar agency at Kandahar. No agency was suggested at Cabul. 
 This despatch was answered on the 7th June, by an elaborate 
 reply, in which the Government of India stated their objections 
 to the course proposed. Their principal argument was that the 
 Amu* would either refuse the proffered agency, or accept it with 
 great reluctance. Lord Salisbury pressed his views again upon 
 the Government of India in November, 1875, and Lord North- 
 brook again renewed his objections in Januar}', 1870. In the 
 latter despatch he says : " We fully appreciate the force of the 
 considerations referred to in your lordship's despatch, which 
 render it conceivable that circumstances may occur, as they 
 have occurred before, to draw the Russian Government into a 
 line of action contrary to their real intentiocs and wishes. At 
 present, however, we are in possession of no information which 
 leads us to look upon Russian interference in Afghanistan as a 
 probable or near contingency, or to anticipate that the Russian
 
 18 
 
 Government will deviate from the policy of non-extension so 
 recently declared.'' 
 
 It is difficult to imagine a franker confession of ignorance 
 than this, or one which more fully shows the necessity for such 
 an agency as Lord SaHsbury had desired. As to the objection 
 founded on Shere All's unwillingness to receive a British 
 Agent, it is very probable that in his existing state of feeling 
 he would have objected. But in 1875, the Eastern Ques- 
 tion had not been opened up. The advances of Bussia 
 to Shere Ali were being cautiously made in preparation for 
 a crisis which had not arrived ; and it is probable that if the 
 matter had been strongly pressed upon him, the Bussians would 
 not have counselled an open resistance. Had he yielded 
 at that time, the result might have been to check the 
 intrigue which finally lured him to his ruin. Difficulties there 
 were, no doubt. But the result showed that to postpone a 
 difficulty is not to overcome it. He who shrinks from en- 
 countering the cub may have to fight the Hon. 
 
 The next steps in the matter were taken by Lord Lytton 
 who succeeded Lord Northbrook, as Viceroy, early in 1876. 
 They extended over several months, and may be stated 
 briefly as possible. 
 
 A messenger was sent to Shere Ah asking him to receive a special 
 British Mission at Cabul. The ostensible object of the Mission was 
 to make a formal communication of the arrival of the New Viceroy, 
 and of Her Majesty's assumption of the title of Empress of India. 
 The substantial object, however, was to bring about a renewal of 
 the discussions of 1869 and 1873. Shere AH refused to receive the 
 Mission, but offered to depute the British Agent at Cabul, or a 
 special agent of his own, to learn the proposals of the Government. 
 The British Agent accordingly arrived, and was sent back with the 
 offer of an alliance substantially the same as that which the Amir 
 had sought for in 1873. It was made conditional, however, on his 
 declining all communications with Russia, receiving British Agents 
 at Herat and on the frontier, though not at Cabul, receivmg special 
 missions when desired, and deputing an Envoy to the Viceroy's 
 head-quarters. A considerable delay followed before the Amir
 
 19 
 
 would receive or discuss this communication. At length he sent an 
 Envoy of his own who reached Pe-hawur in the end of January, 
 1877, and was there met on behalf of the Government of India 
 by Sir Lewis Pelly. It appeared at once that he had no 
 authority to negotiate on the basis that was offered. He 
 remained, however, a considerable time at Peshawur, stating 
 at great length the grievances of his master, and at last 
 died. A fresh envoy was on his way from Cabal, who it was 
 reported had authority eventually to accede to the British 
 demands. But in the meantime the Viceroy had received in- 
 telHgence of the growing hostility of Sheer Ali, of his massing 
 his troops in the British frontier, preaching a religious war, 
 tampering with the border tribes, and seeking to make alliances 
 with the neighbouring chiefs. An alliance which involved large 
 gifts of money and arms to one who was already almost our 
 foe, was a thing not to be pressed forward, and Lord Lytton put 
 an end to the negotiations. 
 
 It would be unnecessary to say anything more about a trans- 
 action which came to nothing, but that a vigorous attempt has 
 been made to represent the hostility of Shore Ali as dating from 
 Lord Lytton's Viceroyalty, and as arising, first from our estab- 
 lishing a British force at Queltah, and secondly from the attempt 
 to thrust a British Embassy upon him in violation of an express 
 pledge, supposed to have been given by Lord Mayo in 1869, 
 that no such Embassy should be sent. 
 
 As to the first assertion, the facts are these : — 
 Quettah is at the head of the Bolan Pass, v.'hich is the 
 principal arproach to Afghanistan from Bombay. It is not 
 in Afghan territory at all, but belongs to the Klian of Khelat. 
 By a treaty of 1854 between the British Government and the 
 Khan of Khelat we were authorized to occupy it whenever 
 we liked. In 1876 it was occupied pending arrangements for 
 the settlement of dissensions in Khelat iiself, and the occu- 
 pation was made permanent in 1877, partly on account of the 
 benefic.'al effect it had had upon Khelat, and partly with a 
 view to eventuaUties in Afghanistan. Even if Shere Ali had 
 been dissatisfied with the measure, this was no reason why
 
 20 
 
 we should not have taken a step of the first importance to 
 ourselves, which we were entitled to take by treaty. But there 
 is iu fact no evidence that it was considered a real grievance 
 by the Amir. Our agent stated indeed that he had taken 
 umbrage at these proceedings, because he regarded Khelat as 
 forming a part of the Afghan State since the days of Ahmed 
 Shah, but he admitted that this was a sentimental grievance, 
 and not seriously urged. 
 
 As to the second point, the only foundation for the idea 
 that any such pledge was given, is a statement to that effect 
 contained in a private letter from Lord Mayo to the Duke of 
 Argyll. The public and official records of the Umballah 
 Conference, and the discussions connected with it, show that 
 no such pledge was given. Before Sliere Ali left his own 
 dominions he held a sort of CabiDet Council at Cabul, in 
 which the propriety of admitting British Agents was discussed. 
 He stated his own opinion to be that European Agents should 
 not be received at Cabul, but that there would be no objection 
 to their being located at Candahar, Balkh, or Herat. This 
 view was assented to by all present. The same view was put 
 forward in conversation at Umballah by his Minister. No 
 formal proposal to send any such agents was made by Lord 
 Mayo in 1869, and the matter was evidently considered one 
 which did not press for a decision. In the discussion which 
 took place during Lord Lytton's Viceroyalt}', Shore Ali never 
 put forward any pledge by Lord Mayo as a reason for not 
 receiving an Embassy. He stated several grounds of objection, 
 one of which was that if he received an Enghsh Envoy he 
 would also have to receive a Russian Envoy. The plea which is 
 set up for him by his English defenders appears never to 
 have entered his mind. 
 
 We now come to the third and final stage of the matter in 1878. 
 In the beginning of that year the war between Russia and Turkey 
 came to an end, and then followed a period of several months during 
 which it seemed probable that it would be followed by a war 
 between Russia and England. 
 
 On the 26th May, 1878, an official order appeared in the
 
 21 
 
 Turkestan Gazette for the formation of three expeditionary detach- 
 ments whose hncs of march were given. They all formed a con- 
 centrated movement in Afghanistan. And while the Congress at 
 Berlin was sitting, Russian troops were steadily advancing to the 
 frontiers of India. At the same time the news letters from 
 Afghanistan teemed with accounts of the arrival, actual or expected, 
 of Russian envoys of high miUtary rank. On the 18th June, the 
 Peshawar agent informed our Government that the Russian Envoy 
 at Cabul had laid before the Amir certain proposals, which he sent 
 in full. They contained amongst other things, requests that the 
 Amir should allow Russian troops to be stationed in four places in 
 the boundaries of i\fghanistan, and give them passage and 
 supplies en their way to India. 
 
 Leave was to be given to Russia to construct telegraphs and 
 roads through Afghanistan. An alliance offensive and defen- 
 sive was to be made between the two States. In short, the 
 resources of Afghanistan were to be placed for all purposes 
 of attack against England at the service of Russia. 
 
 In the end of July the Russian General Stoletoff, with his 
 retinue, arrived in Cabul, and they were received by the Amir 
 with every mark of honour and confidence. 
 
 These proceedings were discussed triumphantly by the Rus- 
 sian journals, and six days after the signature of the Treaty of 
 Berlin, the Moscow Gazette referred to them in these words: — 
 "The time has arrived for Russia to establish her influence over 
 the whole of Central Asia, and this is all the more easy as 
 the Ruler of Afghanistan is not on good terms with England — 
 our foe in Central Asia. The concentration of our influence 
 on the frontiers of the territory of the Empress of India would 
 be only a natural answer to the EngHsh seizure of Cyprus 
 and all the approaches to Asia. Such may be the unobtrusive, 
 though peaceable object of the military operations undertaken by 
 the troops of the Turkestan mihtary circuit, as our correspondent 
 at Berlin truly remarked the other day : — ' In Asia there arc two 
 pohtical powers confronting each other, and they must 
 inevitably come into collision.' England wishes to bo Russia's 
 nearest neighbour in Asia Minor ; and it is only natural, therefore,
 
 22 
 
 that Russia, in her turn, should desire to approach somewhat nearer 
 to the English frontiers in India." 
 
 It has never bsea clearly known how far the Eussian forces 
 proceeded, but it is stated that they were r.-called after the signature 
 of the Treaty of BerHn. The Russian Embassy, however, rema'ned 
 in Cabul long after the conclusion of the treaty was known, and 
 did not finally leave until Shore All's departure from Afghanistan. 
 
 It was clearly impossible for the British Government to 
 allow Shore Ali to receive a Eussian Embassy, and refuse 
 one from England. Accordingly on the 14th August, 1878, 
 the Government wrote informing the Amir of their intention 
 to send Sir Neville Chamberlain to him, upon a special mis- 
 sion. The letter was sent by a Native Envoy, and reached 
 Cabul in the middle of September. The answers he re- 
 ceived from the Amir and his Ministers were evasive and 
 procrastinating, and he wrote that he suspected that the 
 coming of the EngHsh Mission was impossible, so long as 
 the Russians were there. The real facts of the case, how- 
 ever, as to the rejection of the English Mission are now 
 known from two independent sources. A letter from Cabul, 
 dated the 13th October, and addressed to the Eussian paper. 
 The Golcs, says, '* The Amir had asked General Stolietoff 
 for advice regarding the reception of the British Mission. 
 General Stolietoff raplied in an evasive manner, but gave 
 the Amir to understand tlat the simultaneous presence of 
 Embassies of two countries which were ivlmost in hostile re- 
 lations, would be inconvenient. The Amir then decided to 
 refuse admission to the EngUsh Mission." 
 
 The account Yakoob Khan gave to General Eoberts is to 
 the same effect. He said, " When my father receivi d from 
 the Government of India the letter informing him that a 
 British Mii-sion was about to proceed to Cabul, he read it 
 out in Durbar. The members of the Russian Embassy were 
 present. After the reading was finished, Colonel Stolietoff 
 rose, saluted the Amir, and asked permission to leave Cabul. 
 If permi ted, he would, he said, travel to Tashkend without 
 delay and report the state of affairs to General Kaufmaun,
 
 23 
 
 who would inform the Czar, and thus bring pressure to bear 
 upon England. He promh-cd to return in six weeks or two 
 months, and urged the Amir meanwhile to do everything in 
 his power to prevent the British Mission from reaching 
 Cabul." This gets rid of fill the argumentation which was 
 used in the end of 1878, to the effect that the Amir would have 
 been willing to receive the mission, if we had not flurried 
 him by our indecent haste to force ourselves into his presence. 
 
 On the 21st September the mission reached the Afghan outpost, 
 and Major Cavagnari rode on to know what reception it would 
 meet. The officer in command informed him that he was prepared 
 to resist the passage of the Envoy by force. An ultimatum, 
 demanding an apology and fall satisfaction was then sent, but also 
 without effect. And then the British Government had to decide 
 the question, what was to be dene ? 
 
 There could be do doubt that technically this insolent refusal to 
 receive an Embassy was in itself a ground of war. If when 
 relations wtre strained between Germany and Eussia, we were 
 to fete the German Ambassador, and send word to St. Petersburg 
 that the Russian Ambassador would not be received at court, and 
 would be shot if he tried to land at Dover pier, 'there can 
 be very Uttle doubt that a declaration of war would follow 
 as fast as a messenger could bring it. But Shere Ali 
 did more than thi^\ He reversed to our detriment the 
 whole policy of an Indian Empire. Both Liberals and Conser- 
 vatives had laid down as the cardinal point of our poHcy that 
 Afghanistan should be friendly and independent, and that for that 
 purpose it should be kept free from all Russian interference, direct 
 or indirect. This policy had been communicated to Shere Ali, and 
 assented to by him. To further it he had asked for and received 
 money and arms, and, what was of far more value, he had had the 
 displeasure of the British Government threatened to his rivals. 
 Yet without provocation, and to suit his own caprice, at a time when 
 we were threatened with war by Russia, he had introduced oar 
 rivals, ^ho might at any moment become our enemies, to the 
 weakest part of our Empire, and given them not merely 
 the key of the door, but the door itself. The strictest
 
 24 
 
 stickler for international law can hardly deny that such treachery 
 might justly be punished by war. But I go further, and say 
 that war was not only just but necessary. Suppose we had 
 done nothing, and allowed the Russians to obtain the treaty 
 they demanded, what would have been the result ? The Amir's 
 army would have been drilled and disciplined by skilful in- 
 structors. Military roads and telegraphs would have been con- 
 structed, the passes would have been fortified, an impregnable 
 barrier would have been raised to bar our advance, while be- 
 hind it intrigues could have been prosecuted, and invasion 
 prepared with secresy and safety. We are often told that a 
 Russian invasion of India is an impossibility. I think it is, 
 until Russia is in possession of Afghanistan or some similar 
 point of departure. At present, owing to distance and want of 
 transport, her forces would have to arriva in driblets, and 
 ijould be cut off in detail. But the gardens of Herat and 
 the plains of Candahar would suffice for the gathering 
 of an army, and every fragment would be in perfect safety till the 
 whole was ready to swoop down from their heights. With such a 
 vantage ground, however, invasion would be unnecessary. Russia 
 would be the master of our destiny, and could afford to allow us to 
 bleed slowly to death. Stationed in Afghanistan her influence 
 would be supreme in Persia, and she could annex as much of it as 
 she required as marching ground for her army of the Caucasus. 
 Our position in India would be revolutionised. Our Empire is 
 girdled round by independent states, such as Bcloochislan, Cash- 
 mere, Nepaul, and Burmah, who now willingly recognize 
 our superiority. Within our frontiers are numerous feuda- 
 tories ; the unconquered Rajputs, who trace their ancestry 
 from the sun ; the great Mahratta States of Baroda, Gwalior, 
 and Indore, who still pine over the memory of their 
 former independence ; the territory of the Nizam, whose 
 wild Arab mercenaries are with difficulty kept in order by Sir Salar 
 Jung. All of these are now at peace, because we are stronger than 
 they, and because they know none as strong as ourselves. But 
 when Afghanistan was once mediatised by Russia, Beloochistan, 
 Cashmere, Nepaul, and perhaps even Burmah, would soon have
 
 25 
 
 Knssian Ambassadors to direct their Courts, and Russian Generals 
 to drill their armies. We should be surrounded by a ring of fire. 
 Every feudal Court would be a centre for intrigue, and the Foreign 
 Oflfice on the Neva would be a Court of Appeal from the India 
 Office on the Thames. The whole tone of our Government 
 . would have to change. Distrust and coercion would take 
 the place of confidence and liberty. The Native States 
 which at present are wholesome centres of National life, 
 would have to be sternly disarmed and perhaps absorbed. 
 The perpetual peace which now reigns from the Himalayas to 
 Ceylon would be replaced by suspicion and strife. By the 
 time rebelHon had been suppressed, and a dead level of 
 depression and discontent had been attained, the debt of India 
 would have been doubled ; taxation would have been increased, 
 and the railways and works of irrigation would have been 
 checked. The dark Northern cloud alone would still remain. 
 We should be compelled to maintain along the Indus alone a 
 European Army larger than is now sufficient for the whole of 
 India. Even without war y>o should find a creeping paralysis 
 spreading over us in the East. Our influence in Europe 
 would disappear, for we should have become heljriess in the 
 presence of Russia, or any nation with whom Russia was 
 allied. At the slightest rumour of war we should have to 
 draft all our available forces to the Punjaub. 
 
 The present war has, no doubt, brought us dangers and diffi- 
 culties, but they are nothiog to the dangers and difficulties 
 which would have followed from doing nothing. I have never 
 yet met anyone who could say what they would have done except 
 go to war. The only other suggestion I havo ever heard is, 
 that our real cause of offence was with Russia, and that it was 
 unmanly to attack a weak power, when we were afraid to attack 
 a strong one. This is the sort of argument that raises a roar 
 among a mob, but is hardly adapted to rational beings. If war 
 is an evil, the smaller the war the smaller the evil. Do those 
 who declaim against the war in Afghanistan really think that 
 we ought to have commenced a war with Russia, which would 
 have wrapped the whole of Europe in flames ? or that when
 
 26 
 
 we wanted to strengthen our position in the Khyber Pass the 
 wisest way was to commence operations in the Baltic and the 
 Black Sea ? If they mean anything, they must mean that we 
 should have applied diplomatic pressure to Russia to withdraw its 
 Embassy. This is exactly what we did, and the pressure was 
 successfal, because we had previously made the position of the 
 Embassy untenable. But if we had resorted to diplomacy at 
 St. Petersburg alone, we must have admitted that as against Shere 
 Ali we had no ground of complaint. He, therefore, would have 
 maintained his position, that he had a right to exclude us and to 
 receive Russia. But if he had a right to receive Russia, it is 
 difficult to see why Russia had not a right to be received. At all 
 events at a crisis of European regotiations, when our weight was 
 essential in the interests of peace, we should .have been involved 
 in a fresh litigation with Russia, and forced to stand ready at any 
 moment for a great war. In the end Russia would probably 
 have withdrawn her Embassy to return again when wanted, but 
 she would have left behind her consuls, her engineers, and her 
 officers. She would have established the point that she could 
 break treaties when and how she liked, and that she could protect 
 others ia doing the same. A war might have been avoided, but our 
 position in the East would have perished. The Queen of England 
 might still call herself Empress of India, but the real Emperor 
 would be the Czar of Russia. 
 
 With all its losses and outlay I beheve the Afghan war has been 
 a great success. It has maintained our influence in Europe, and 
 exalted it in Asia. It has shown the nations who surround our 
 Indian Empire that we are not afraid to btrike, even though the 
 great Colossus of the North standi behind our foe. Russia has 
 been publicly seen to tempt a friend to his ruin, and then 
 to leave him to his fate. The voices which accused us 
 of decrepitude are silenced. The loyalty of our feudatories 
 has been quickened and refreshed, for they are proud to 
 serve a master whom they can respect as well as fear. 
 Perhaps before long even the Afghans may learn that sab- 
 mission to law is the first step to liberty. 
 
 J. D. M.
 
 J^;