Government Documents Bookstacks CENTRAL CIRCULATION AND BOOKSTACKS The person borrowing this material is re- sponsible for its renewal or return before the Latest Date stamped below. You may be charged a minimum fee of $75.00 for each non-returned or lost item. Theft, mutilation, or defacement of library materials can be causes for student disciplinary action. All materials owned by the University of Illinois Library are the property of the State of Illinois and are protected by Article 16B of Illinois Criminal Law and Procedure. TO RENEW, CALL (217) 333-8400. University of Illinois Library at Urbana-Champaign NOV 91999 When renewing by phone, write new due date below previous due date. L162 NASASP-4012 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Volume V NASA Launch Systems, Space Transportation, Human Spaceflight, and Space Science 1979-1988 Judy A. Rumerman The NASA History Series National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA History Office Office of Policy and Plans Washington, D.C. 1999 Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data (Revised for vol. 5) NASA historical data book. (The NASA historical series) (NASA SP ; 4012) Vol. 1 is a republication of: NASA historical data book, 1958-1968./ Jane Van Nimmen and Leonard C. Bruno. Vol. 5 in series: The NASA history series. Includes bibliographical references and indexes. Contents: v. 1 NASA resources, 1958-1968 /Jane Van Nimmen and Leonard C. Bruno — v. 2. Programs and projects, 1958-1968 / Linda Neuman Ezell — v. 3. Programs and pro- jects, 1969—1978 / Linda Neuman Ezell — v. 4. NASA resources, 1969-1978 / Ihor Gawdiak with Helen Fedor — v. 5. NASA launch systems, space transportation, human spaceflight, and space science, 1979-1988 / Judy A. Rumerman. 1 . United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration — History. I. Van Nimmen, Jane. II. Bruno, Leonard C. III. Ezell, Linda Neuman. IV Gawdiak, Ihor. V. Rumerman, Judy A. VI. Series. VII. Series. VIII. Series: NASA SP ; 4012. ^ For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328 ISBN 0-1 6-050030-3 A// CONTENTS List of Figures and Tables v Preface and Acknowledgments xi Chapter One: Introduction 1 Chapter Two: Launch Systems 11 Chapter Three: Space Transportation/Human Spaceflight 105 Chapter Four: Space Science 361 Index 527 About the Compiler 535 The NASA History Series 537 in LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES Chapter One: Introduction Figure 1-1 Program Office Functional Areas Chapter Two: Launch Systems Figure 2- 1 NASA Space Transportation System ( 1 988) 1 4 Figure 2-2 Top-Level Launch Vehicle Organizational Structure 1 6 Figure 2-3 Office of Space Transportation (as of October 1 979) 1 6 Figure 2-4 Code M/Code O Split (as of February 1980) 1 7 Figure 2-5 Code M Merger (as of October 1982) 18 Figure 2-6 Office of Space Flight 1986 Reorganization 20 Figure 2-7 Expendable Launch Vehicle Success Rate 24 Figure 2-8 Atlas-Centaur Launch Vehicle 30 Figure 2-9 Delta 3914 31 Figure 2-10 Delta 3920/PAM-D 31 Figure 2-1 1 Scout-D Launch Vehicle (Used in 1979) 32 Figure 2-12 External Tank 38 Figure 2-13 Solid Rocket Booster 41 Figure 2-14 Solid Rocket Motor Redesign Schedule 44 Figure 2-15 Inertial Upper Stage 48 Figure 2-16 Transfer Orbit Stage 50 Figure 2-17 Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle 55 Table 2-1 Appropriated Budget by Launch Vehicle and Launch-Related Component Table 2-2 Atlas E/F Funding History Table 2-3 Atlas-Centaur Funding History Table 2-4 Delta Funding History Table 2-5 Scout Funding History Table 2-6 Space Shuttle Main Engine Funding History Table 2-7 Solid Rocket Boosters Funding History Table 2-8 External Tank Funding History Table 2-9 Upper Stages Funding History Table 2-10 Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle Funding History Table 2-1 1 Tethered Satellite System Funding History Table 2-12 Advanced Programs/Planning Funding History Table 2-13 ELV Success Rate by Year and Launch Vehicle for NASA Launches Table 2-14 NASA Atlas E/F Vehicle Launches Table 2-15 Atlas E/F Characteristics Table 2- 1 6 NASA Atlas-Centaur Vehicle Launches Table 2-17 Atlas-Centaur Characteristics 59 63 64 65 66 67 69 71 73 75 76 77 78 79 80 82 83 Table 2- -18 Table 2- -19 Table 2- -20 Table 2- -21 Table 2- -22 Table 2- -23 Table 2- -24 Table 2- -25 Table 2- -26 Table 2- -27 Table 2- -28 Table 2- -29 Table 2- -30 Table 2- -31 Table 2- -32 Chronology of Delta Vehicle Launches Delta 2914 Characteristics Delta 3910/3914 Characteristics Delta 3920/3924 Characteristics NASA Scout Launches Scout Characteristics (G-l) STS-Launched Missions Space Shuttle Main Engine Characteristics Main Engine Development and Selected Events Space Shuttle External Tank Characteristics External Tank Development and Selected Events Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Characteristics Chronology of Selected Solid Rocket Booster Development Events Upper Stage Development Transfer Orbit Stage Characteristics Chapter Three: Space Transportation/Human Spaceflight Figure 3-1 NSTS Organization Figure 3-2 Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance Office Organization Figure 3-3 Space Station Program Management Approach Figure 3-A Office of Space Station Organization (December 1986) Figure 3-5 Space Shuttle Orbiter Figure 3-6 Typical STS Flight Profile Figure 3-7 Types of Intact Aborts Figure 3-8 Pallet Structure and Panels Figure 3-9 Spacelab Igloo Structure Figure 3-10 Insulating Materials Figure 3-1 1 STS-1 Entry Flight Profile Figure 3-12 Continuous Flow Electrophoresis System Mid-deck Gallery Location Figure 3-13 STS-5 Payload Configuration Figure 3-14 Payload Flight Test Article Figure 3-15 Manned Maneuvering Unit Figure 3-16 Solar Max On-Orbit Berthed Configuration Figure 3-17 Long Duration Exposure Facility Configuration Figure 3- 1 8 STS 5 1 -A Cargo Configuration Figure 3-19 STS 61-A Cargo Configuration Figure 3-20 EASE/ ACCESS Configuration Figure 3-21 Integrated MSL-2 Payload Figure 3-22 Tracking and Data Relay Satellite On-Orbit Configuration Figure 3-23 STS 5 1 -L Data and Design Analysis Task Force Figure 3-24 Space Shuttle Return to Flight Figure 3-25 Space Shuttle Return to Flight Milestones Figure 3-26 Field Joint Redesign 84 86 87 88 89 90 91 93 94 95 96 97 98 101 103 110 113 116 117 124 132 138 149 149 159 163 170 171 173 175 176 177 179 183 184 185 186 211 213 220 221 VI 3-27 Extendible Rod Escape System 3-28 Availability of Fourth Obiter 3-29 System Integrity Assurance Program 3-30 Major Orbiter Modifications 3-31 Dual Keel Final Assembly Configuration 3-32 Revised Baseline Configuration (1987), Block I 3-33 Enhanced Configuration, Block II 3-34 Habitation Module 3-35 Flight Telerobotic Servicer 3-36 Photovoltaic Module 3-37 Mobile Servicing System and Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator Figure 3-38 Columbus Attached Laboratory Figure 3-39 Columbus Free-Flying Laboratory Figure 3-40 Columbus Polar Platform Figure 3-41 Japanese Experiment Module Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Table 3-1 Table 3-2 Table 3-3 Table 3-4 Table 3-5 Table 3-6 Table 3-7 Table 3-8 Table 3-9 Table 3-10 Table 3-11 Table 3-12 Table 3-13 Table 3-14 Table 3-15 Table 3-16 Table 3-17 Table 3-18 Table 3-19 Table 3-20 Table 3-21 Table 3-22 Table 3-23 Table 3-24 Table 3-25 Table 3-26 Table 3-27 Table 3-28 Table 3-29 Table 3-30 Total Human Spaceflight Funding History Programmed Budget by Budget Category Orbiter Funding History Orbiter Replacement Funding History Launch and Mission Support Funding History Launch and Landing Operations Funding History Spaceflight Operations Program Funding History Flight Operations Funding History Spacelab Funding History Space Station Funding History Orbiter Characteristics Typical Launch Processing/Terminal Count Sequence Space Shuttle Launch Elements Mission Command and Control Positions and Responsibilities Shuttle Extravehicular Activity STS-l-STS-4 Mission Summary STS-1 Mission Characteristics STS-2 Mission Characteristics STS-3 Mission Characteristics STS-4 Mission Characteristics STS-5-STS-27 Mission Summary STS-5 Mission Characteristics STS-6 Mission Characteristics STS-7 Mission Characteristics STS-8 Mission Characteristics STS-9 Mission Characteristics STS 41-B Mission Characteristics STS 41-C Mission Characteristics STS 41-D Mission Characteristics STS 41-G Mission Characteristics 226 228 229 230 244 245 245 247 249 249 250 251 252 253 253 256 259 260 261 262 264 265 266 267 268 269 271 272 273 274 275 277 279 281 283 285 294 296 298 300 302 303 306 307 309 VII Table 3-31 Table 3-32 Table 3-33 Table 3-34 Table 3-35 Table 3-36 Table 3-37 Table 3-38 Table 3-39 Table 3-^0 Table 3-11 Table 3-42 Table 3-43 Table 3-44 Table 3-45 Table 3-16 Table 3-47 Table 3-18 Table 3^9 Table 3-50 Table 3-51 STS 51 -A Mission Characteristics STS 51-C Mission Characteristics STS 51-D Mission Characteristics STS 51-B Mission Characteristics STS 51-G Mission Characteristics STS 51-F Mission Characteristics STS 5 1 -I Mission Characteristics STS 51 -J Mission Characteristics STS 61 -A Mission Characteristics STS 61-B Mission Characteristics STS 61-C Mission Characteristics STS 51-L Mission Characteristics STS-26 Mission Characteristics STS-27 Mission Characteristics Return to Flight Chronology Sequence of Major Events of the Challenger Accident Chronology of Events Prior to Launch of Challenger (STS 51-L) Related to Temperature Concerns Schedule for Implementation of Recommendations (as of July 14, 1986) Revised Shuttle Manifest (as of October 3, 1986) Space Station Work Packages Japanese Space Station Components Chapter Four: Space Science Figure 4-1 Office of Space Science (Through November 1981) Figure 4-2 Office of Space Science and Applications (Established November 1981) Figure 4-3 HEAO High-Spectral Resolution Gamma Ray Spectrometer Figure 4-4 HEAO Isotopic Composition of Primary Cosmic Rays Figure 4-5 HEAO Heavy Nuclei Experiment Figure 4-6 Solar Maximum Instruments Figure 4-7 Solar Mesospheric Explorer Satellite Configuration Figure 4-8 Altitude Regions to Be Measured by Solar Mesospheric Explorer Instruments Figure 4-9 Infrared Astronomy Satellite Configuration Figure 4-10 Exploded View of the European X-Ray Observatory Satellite Figure 4-1 1 Distortion of Earth's Magnetic Field Figure 4-12 Spartan 1 Figure 4-1 3 Plasma Diagnostics Package Experiment Hardware Figure 4-14 Spartan Halley Configuration Figure 4-15 San Marco D/L Spacecraft Figure 4-16 Spacelab 1 Module Experiment Locations (Port Side) 312 313 314 317 318 321 323 324 325 326 328 333 334 337 338 342 345 354 356 359 360 369 370 376 376 377 378 380 381 382 385 387 389 390 391 393 395 vm Figure 4 17 Figure 4-18 Figure 4 l c ) Figure 4-20 Figure 4-2 1 Figure 4-22 Figure 4-23 Figure 4-24 Figure 4-25 Figure 4-26 Figure 4-27 Figure 4-28 Figure 4-29 Figure 4-30 Figure 4-3 1 Figure 4-32 Figure 4-33 Table 4-1 Table 4-2 Table 4-3 Table 4-4 Table 4-5 Table 4-6 Table 4-7 Table 4-8 Table 4-9 Table 4-10 Table 4-11 Table 4-12 Table 4-13 Table 4-14 Table 4-15 Table 4-16 Table 4-17 Spacelab I Modulo Experiment Locations (Starboard Side) 395 Spacelab I Pallet Experiment Locations 397 Spacelab 3 Experiment Module Layout (Looking Down From the Top) 398 Spacelab 2 Configuration 398 OSS-1 Payload Configuration 4()() Hubble Space Telescope 404 Compton Gamma Ray Observatory Configuration 405 Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer Observatory 407 Two Phases of the Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer Mission 408 ROSAT Flight Configuration 409 Cosmic Background Explorer Observatory (Exploded View) 4 \ \ Cosmic Background Explorer Orbital Alignments 4 1 2 Magellan Spacecraft Configuration 417 Magellan Orbit 418 Galileo Mission 419 Galileo Spacecraft 420 Ulysses Spacecraft Configuration 42 1 Total Space Science Funding History 422 Programmed Budget by Budget Category 425 High Energy Astronomy Observatories Development Funding History 426 Solar Maximum Mission Development Funding History 426 Space Telescope Development Funding History 426 Solar Polar Mission Development Funding History 427 Gamma Ray Observatory Development Funding History 427 Shuttle/Spacelab Payload Development Funding History 428 Explorer Development Funding History 429 Physics and Astronomy Mission Operations and Data Analysis Funding History 429 Physics and Astronomy Research and Analysis Funding History 430 Physics and Astronomy Suborbital Programs Funding History 430 Space Station Planning Funding History 431 Jupiter Orbiter/Probe and Galileo Programs Funding History 43 \ Venus Radar Mapper/Magellan Funding History 43 1 Global Geospace Science Funding History 432 International Solar Polar Mission/Ulysses Development Funding History 432 IX Table 4-18 Mars Geoscience/Climatology Orbiter Program Funding History Table 4-19 Lunar and Planetary Mission Operations and Data Analysis Funding History Table 4-20 Lunar and Planetary Research and Analysis Funding History Table 4-21 Life Sciences Flight Experiments Program Funding History Table 4-22 Life Sciences/Vestibular Function Research Funding History Table 4-23 Life Sciences Research and Analysis Funding History Table 4-24 Science Missions (1979-1988) Table 4-25 Spacecraft Charging at High Altitudes Characteristics Table 4-26 UK-6 (Ariel) Characteristics Table 4-27 HEAO-3 Characteristics Table 4-28 Solar Maximum Mission Table 4-29 Dynamics Explorer 1 and 2 Characteristics Table 4-30 Solar Mesospheric Explorer Instrument Characteristics Table 4-3 1 Solar Mesospheric Explorer Characteristics Table 4-32 Infrared Astronomy Satellite Characteristics Table 4-33 European X-Ray Observatory Satellite Characteristics Table 4-34 Shuttle Pallet Satellite-01 Characteristics Table 4-35 Hilat Characteristics Table 4-36 Charge Composition Explorer Characteristics Table 4-37 Ion Release Module Characteristics Table 4-38 United Kingdom Subsatellite Characteristics Table 4-39 Spartan 1 Characteristics Table 4^0 Plasma Diagnostics Package Characteristics Table 4-^1 Spartan 203 Characteristics Table 4-42 Polar BEAR Characteristics Table 4-43 San Marco D/L Characteristics Table 4-44 Chronology of Spacelab Development Table 4^15 Spacelab 1 Experiments Table 4-46 Spacelab 3 Experiments Table 4-47 Spacelab 2 Experiments Table 4-48 Spacelab D-l Experiments Table 4-49 OSS-1 Investigations Table 4-50 Hubble Space Telescope Development Table 4-5 1 Ulysses Historical Summary 432 433 433 434 434 435 436 437 439 441 442 444 446 447 449 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 480 499 505 512 516 518 525 PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS In 1973, NASA published the first volume of the NASA Historical Data Book, a hefty tome containing mostly tabular data on the resources of the space agency between 1958 and 1968. There, broken into detailed tables. were the facts and figures associated with the budget, facilities, procure- ment, installations, and personnel of NASA during that formative decade. In 1 988, NASA reissued that first volume of the data book and added two additional volumes on the agency's programs and projects, one each for 1958-1968 and 1969-1978. NASA published a fourth volume in 1994 that addressed NASA resources for the period between 1969 and 1978. This fifth volume of the NASA Historical Data Book is a continuation of those earlier efforts. This fundamental reference tool presents informa- tion, much of it statistical, documenting the development of four critical areas of NASA responsibility for the period between 1979 and 1988. This volume includes detailed information on the development and operation of launch systems, space transportation, human spaceflight, and space science during this era. As such, it contains in-depth statistical informa- tion about the early Space Shuttle program through the return to flight in 1988, the early efforts to build a space station, the development of new launch systems, and the launching of seventeen space science missions. A companion volume will appear late in 1999, documenting the space applications, support operations, aeronautics, and resources aspects of NASA during the period between 1979 and 1988. There are numerous people at NASA associated with historical study, tech- nical information, and the mechanics of publishing who helped in myriad ways in the preparation of this historical data book. Stephen J. Garber helped in the management of the project and handled final proofing and publication. M. Louise Alstork edited and prepared the index of the work Nadine J. Andreassen of the NASA History Office performed editorial and proofreading work on the project; and the staffs of the NASA Headquarters Library, the Scientific and Technical Information Program, and the NASA Document Services Center provided assistance in locating and preparing for publication the documentary materials in this work. The NASA Headquarters Printing and Design Office developed the layout and handled printing. Specifically, we wish to acknowledge the work of Jane E. Penn, Jonathan L. Friedman, Joel Vendette, Patricia M. Talbert, and Kelly L. Rindfusz for their editorial and design work. In addition, Michael Crnkovic, Stanley Artis, and Jeffrey Thompson saw the book through the publication process. Thanks are due them all. XI CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION NASA began its operations as the nation's civilian space agency in 1958 following the passage of the National Aeronautics and Space Act It succeeded the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) The new organization was charged with preserving the role of the United States "as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology" and in its application, with expanding our knowledge of the Earth's atmos- phere and space, and with exploring flight both within and outside the atmosphere. By the 1980s, NASA had established itself as an agency with consid- erable achievements on record. The decade was marked by the inaugura- tion of the Space Shuttle flights and haunted by the 1986 Challenger accident that temporarily halted the program. The agency also enjoyed the strong support of President Ronald Reagan, who enthusiastically announced the start of both the Space Station program and the National Aerospace Plane program. Overview of the Agency NASA is an independent federal government agency that during the 1980s, consisted of 10 field installations located around the United States, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (a government-owned facility staffed by the California Institute of Technology), and a Headquarters located in Washington, D.C. Headquarters was divided into a number of program and staff offices that provided overall program management and handled administrative functions for the agency. Each program office had respon- sibility for particular program areas (see Figure 1-1). Headquarters also interacted with Congress and the Executive Branch. NASA's structure was quite decentralized. Although Headquarters had overall program responsibility, each installation was responsible for the day-to-day execution and operations of its projects, managed its own facil- ity, hired its own personnel, and awarded its own procurements Each installation also focused on particular types of projects and discipline areas 4 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Program and Project Development NASA called most of its activities programs or projects. The agency defined a program as "a related series of undertakings which are funded for the most part from NASA's R&D appropriation, which continue over a period of time (normally years), and which are designed to pursue a broad scientific or technical goal." A project is "a defined, time-limited activity with clearly established objectives and boundary conditions exe- cuted to gain knowledge, create a capability, or provide a service A project is normally an element of a program." 1 NASA's flight programs and projects followed prescribed phases (with associated letter designators) in their development and execution. This sequence of activities consisted of concept development (Pre-Phase A), mission analysis (Phase A), definition or system design (Phase B), exe- cution (design, development, test, and evaluation) (Phase C/D), launch and deployment operations (Phase E), and mission operations, maintenance, and disposal (Phase F). Although most concepts for missions originated within a field installation, Headquarters retained project responsibility through Phase B. Once a program or project was approved and funded by Congress, the principal responsibility for program or project implementa- tion shifted to the field installation. Internal agency reviews were held dur- ing and between each phase of a project. Before moving to Phase C/D, NASA held a major agency review, and approval and funding by Congress were required. Particular activities never moved beyond Phase B, nor were they meant to. For instance, many aeronautics activities were designed as research efforts and were intended to be turned over to the private sector or to other government agencies once Phase B concluded. NASA's Budget Process NASA's activities relied on getting a reasonable level of funding from Congress. The federal budget process was quite complex, and a brief description as it relates to NASA is presented here. Additional information can be found in Chapter 8, "Finances and Procurement," in Volume VI of the NASA Historical Data Book. NASA operated on a fiscal year (FY) that ran from October 1 through September 30 of the following year. Through FY 1983, the agency bud- get was broken into three accounts or appropriation categories: Research and Development (R&D), Research and Program Management (R&PM), and Construction of Facilities (C of F). An additional appropriation, Space Flight, Control, and Data Communications (SFC&DC) was added in FY 1984 for ongoing Shuttle-related and tracking and data acquisition activities. Although a program office could administer activities from 'NASA Management Instruction 7120.3, "Space Flight Program and Project Management," February 6, 1985. INTRODUCTION more than one appropriation category, such as the Office of Space Right, which managed both R&D and SFC&DC activities, all funds were desig- nated for particular appropriation categories and could not be transferred between accounts without congressional approval. Congress appropriated operating funds each year. These appropria- tions were the culmination of a series of activities that required at least two years of effort by the installations and Headquarters. Two years before a budget year began, Headquarters sent guidelines to each installation that contained programmatic and budget information based on its long-range plans and the budget forecasts from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Each installation then prepared a detailed budget, or Program Operating Plan (POP), for the fiscal year that would begin two years in the future. The installation also refined the bud- get for the remainder of the current fiscal year and the next fiscal year that it had already submitted and had approved, and it provided less detailed budget figures for later years. Upon approval from each installation's comptroller and director, this budget was forwarded to the appropriate Headquarters-level program office, to the NASA comptroller's office, and the NASA administrator. Headquarters reviewed the budget requests from each installation, held discussions with the installations, and negotiated with OMB to arrive at a budget that looked realistic and had a fair chance of passage by Congress. Following these negotiations, NASA formally submitted its budget requests to OMB. This became part of the administration's budget that went to Congress in January of each year. When Congress received the budget, NASA's proposed budget first went to the House and Senate science committees that were charged with authorizing the agency's budget. Each committee held hearings, usually with NASA administrators; reviewed the submission in great detail; debated, revised, and approved the submitted budget; and sent it to the full House or Senate for approval. The authorization committees could limit how much could be appropriated and often set extensive conditions on how the funds were to be spent. Each house approved its own autho- rization bill, which was then submitted to a House-Senate conference committee to resolve any differences. After this took place, the compro- mise bill was passed by the full House and Senate and submitted to the President for his signature. The process to appropriate funds was similar, with the bills going to the proper appropriations committees for discussion, revision, and approval. However, in practice, the appropriations committees usually did not review the proposed budget in as great detail as the authorization committees. Upon committee approval, the appropriations bills went to the full House and Senate, back to a conference committee if necessary, and finally to the President. After approval by the President, OMB estab- lished controls on the release of appropriated funds to the various agen- cies, including NASA. NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Once NASA received control over its appropriated funds, it ear- marked the funds for various programs, projects, and facilities, each of which had an "account" with the agency established for it. Funds were then committed, obligated, costed, and finally disbursed according to the progression of activities, which hopefully coincided with the timing of events spelled out in the budget. NASA monitored all of its financial activities scrupulously, first at the project and installation level and then at the Headquarters level. Its financial transactions were eventually reviewed by the congressional General Accounting Office to ensure that they were legal and followed prescribed procedures. In the budget tables that follow in each chapter, the "request" or "sub- mission" column contains the amount that OMB submitted to Congress. It may not be the initial request that NASA submitted to OMB. The "authorization" is the ceiling set by the authorization committees in their bill. The "appropriation" is the amount provided to the agency. The "pro- grammed" column shows the amount the agency actually spent during the fiscal year for a particular program. INTRODUCTION 2> G Oh 3 J3 Oj cd c cd 00 ex t/3 • 3 5 1 E a. o B a o a. a I/] cd < 5 g B M ~3 7 1 : — u < -a U S3 D u B B D, 00 c cd .1 u c_ o U OS u < 3 'S u B C^ ^> a c b 8&M Cd &h Ph J Ph GO • • • «S 05 C cd .2^ «= o o CO "So cd (X J _ 1 00 • • • OJ Cu O <£ '-C __ eg cd h fto -o< o S . § -• U logy naut nolo eRe nolo 9 - o ox: cj _c B b n « s « C -C ^£ ^c"- 1 > CD y S w s - cd cj " o _ .S oo cu 3 C cu bX) S O o ^ c i- S (U o ^ ac -- Oh O CX c < 2 "2 to :> ££ ex 00 • \S CO I I Pi rr ^ x , § ex ■^ 00 -l M "5 so o O U o c tU E E E U 11 • • 5/5 r3 cu O GO O •C T3 >> c c _c -_» S| o TO * & O 5/3 to U 5/3 "£3 ex < oo ^ TO r5 >. to rs CU TO a pS-l CU £?1 oo < £ CO -oo" £^ c« CU oo I =2*6 to <; °B -a cd §Q 60 ~0 .Sto y 2P TO H ex oo • TO 3 TO tu a < Ti P. C TO TO a to T3 3 u o 6JJ ed C H so E ^2 CU u TO ^ ex >-. 00 00 • "^3 ■S INTRODUCTION 1/5 c - > n c3 — c oducti( al Cap nspora s le Laui OC 5 tS j- C 03 C X) f,A 0> O si Jp « -a h -a -a rr - — ] 03 • t 3 W OS ^ Q. a. t/3 • • • t/5 £ o t/3 >> T3 >■» C & C3 — C 00 3 p -o 2 sd O 03 *j Q r- duct ICa spor -a OC c 03 O 03 C t/i BB tj H P 03 C C -C CU Or 1- O O .2?^-^ -B '43 EsSgS 03 O 8i &I& 03 GO O 00 O 3 00 • • 5 u 3^ >. o *1 00 £ £ 2 s 03 *- 5£ 03 >7 Q P •o C '— ft. SO OC P 3 03 o u Q «3 On >> ^a -1 x> 03 c<3 03 t -1 CJ Gfi 03 ' ■ ^"^s^ X. / 1 T s / ' 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Year Figure 2-7. Expendable Launch Vehicle Success Rate 1979 NASA conducted nine launches during 1979, all successful. These used the Scout, the Atlas E/F, the Atlas-Centaur, and the Delta. Of the nine launch- es, three launched NASA scientific and application payloads, and six sup- ported other U.S. government and nongovernment reimbursing customers. 6 A Scout vehicle launched the NASA Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment (SAGE), a NASA magnetic satellite (Magsat), and a reim- bursable United Kingdom scientific satellite (UK-6/Ariel). An Atlas- Centaur launched a FltSatCom DOD communications satellite and a NASA scientific satellite (HEAO-3). Three launches used the Delta: one domestic communications satellite for Western Union, another for RCA, and an experimental satellite, called SCATHA, for DOD. A weather satel- lite was launched on an Atlas F by the Air Force for NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). ( Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1979 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), 1980), p. 39. LAUNCH SYSTEMS 25 iwo Seven ELV launches took place in L980: three on Deltas, three on Atlas-Centaurs, and one on an Atlas F. Of the seven, one was for NASA; the other six were reimbursable launches for other U.S. government, international, and domestic commercial customers that paid NASA lor the launch and launch support costs. 7 A Delta launched the Solar Maximum Mission, the single NASA mis- sion, with the goal of observing solar flares and other active Sun phe- nomena and measuring total radiative output of the Sun over a six-month period. A Delta also launched GOES 4 (Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite) for NOAA. The third Delta launch, for Satellite Business Systems (SBS), provided integrated, all-digital, interference- free transmission of telephone, computer, electronic mail, and videocon- ferencing to clients. An Atlas-Centaur launched FltSatCom 3 and 4 for the Navy and DOD. An Atlas-Centaur also launched Intelsat V F-2. This was the first in a series of nine satellites launched by NASA for Intelsat and was the first three-axis stabilized Intelsat satellite. An Atlas F launched NOAA-B, the third in a series of Sun-synchronous operational environmental mon- itoring satellites launched by NASA for NOAA. A booster failed to place this satellite in proper orbit, causing mission failure. 1981 During 1981, NASA launched missions on eleven ELVs: one on a Scout, five using Deltas (two with dual payloads), four on Atlas-Centaurs, and one using an Atlas F. All but two were reimbursable launches for other agencies or commercial customers, and all were successful. 8 A Scout vehicle launched the DOD navigation satellite, NOVA 1. In five launches, the Delta, NASA's most-used launch vehicle, deployed seven satellites. Two of these launches placed NASA's scientific Explorer satellites into orbit: Dynamics Explorer 1 and 2 on one Delta and the Solar Mesosphere Explorer (along with Uosat for the University of Surrey, England) on the other. The other three Delta launches had paying customers, including the GOES 5 weather satellite for NOAA and two communications satellites, one for SBS and one for RCA. An Atlas-Centaur, which was the largest ELV being used by NASA, launched four missions: Comstar D-4, a domestic communications satel- lite for Comsat; two Intelsat V communications satellites for Intelsat; and the last in the current series of FltSatCom communications satellites for DOD. An Atlas F launched the NOAA 7 weather satellite for NOAA. "Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1980 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1981). "Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1981 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982). 26 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK In addition, ELVs continued to provide backup support to STS cus- tomers during the early development and transition phase of the STS system. 1982 NASA launched nine missions on nine ELVs in 1982, using seven Deltas and two Atlas-Centaurs. Of the nine, eight were reimbursable launches for other agencies or commercial customers, and one was a NASA applications mission. 9 The Delta supported six commercial and international communications missions for which NASA was fully reimbursed: RCA's Satcom 4 and 5, Western Union's Westar 4 and 5, India's Insat 1A, and Canada's Telesat G (Anik D-l). In addition, a Delta launched Landsat 4 for NASA. The Landsat and Telesat launches used improved, more powerful Deltas. An Aerojet engine and a tank with a larger diameter increased the Delta weight-carry- ing capability into geostationary-transfer orbit by 140 kilograms. An Atlas- Centaur launched two communications satellites for the Intelsat. 1983 During 1983, NASA launched eleven satellites on eleven ELVs, using eight Deltas, one Atlas E, one Atlas-Centaur, and one Scout. A Delta launch vehicle carried the European Space Agency's EXOSAT x-ray observatory to a highly elliptical polar orbit. Other 1983 payloads launched into orbit on NASA ELVs were the NASA-Netherlands Infrared Astronomy Satellite (IRAS), NOAA 8 and GOES 6 for NOAA, Hilat for the Air Force, Intelsat VF-6 for Intelsat, Galaxy 1 and 2 for Hughes Communications, Telstar 3 A for AT&T, and Satcom 1R and 2R for RCA; all except IRAS were reimbursable. 10 The increased commercial use of NASA's launch fleet and launch services conformed to President Reagan's policy statement on May 16, 1983, in which he announced that the U.S. government would facilitate the commercial operation of the ELV program. 1984 During 1984, NASA's ELVs provided launch support to seven satel- lite missions using four Deltas, one Scout, one Atlas-Centaur, and one Atlas E. During this period, the Delta vehicle completed its forty-third consecutive successful launch with the launching of the NATO-HID satel- lite in November 1984. In addition, a Delta successfully launched Landsat 5 for NOAA in March (Landsat program management had trans- 9 Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1982 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1983), p. 19. "Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1983 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), p. 17. ,AUNCH SYSTEMS 27 ferred to NOAA in 1983); AMPTH, a joint American, British, and German space physics mission involving three satellites, in August; and Galaxy-C in September. Other payloads launched during 1984 by NASA ELVs included a Navy navigation satellite by a Seoul, an Intelsat com- munications satellite by an Atlas-Centaur, and a NOAA weather satellite by an v Atlas F vehicle. The launch of the Intelsat satellite experienced an anomaly in the launch vehicle that resulted in mission failure. All mis- sions, except the NASA scientific satellite AMPTE, were reimbursable launches for other U.S. government, international, and domestic com- mercial missions that paid NASA for launch and launch support." In accordance with President Reagan's policy directive to encourage commercialization of the launch vehicle program, Delta, Atlas-Centaur, and Scout ELVs were under active consideration during this time by com- mercial operators for use by private industry. NASA and Transpace Carriers, Inc. (TCI), signed an interim agreement for exclusive rights to market the Delta vehicle, and negotiations took place with General Dynamics on the Atlas-Centaur. A Commerce Business Daily announce- ment, published August 8, 1984, solicited interest for the private use of the Scout launch vehicle. Ten companies expressed interest in assuming a total or partial takeover of this vehicle system. Also in August 1984, President Reagan approved a National Space Strategy intended to implement the 1983 National Space Policy. This strategy called for the United States to encourage and facilitate commer- cial ELV operations and minimize government regulation of these opera- tions. It also mandated that the U.S. national security sector pursue an improved assured launch capability to satisfy the need for a launch sys- tem that complemented the STS as a hedge against "unforeseen technical and operational problems" and to use in case of crisis situations. To accomplish this, the national security sector should "pursue the use of a limited number of ELVs." 12 1985 In 1985, NASA's ELVs continued to provide launch support during the transition of payloads to the Space Shuttle. Five launches took place using ELVs. Two of these were DOD satellites launched on Scouts— one from the Western Space and Missile Center and the other from the Wallops Flight Facility. Atlas-Centaurs launched the remaining three mis- sions for Intelsat on a reimbursable basis. 13 "Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1984 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985), p. 23 ,2 White House Fact Sheet, "National Space Strategy," August 15, 1984. ''Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1985 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986). 28 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK 1986 In 1986. NASA's ELVs launched five space application missions for NOAA and DOD. A Scout launched the Polar Beacon Experiments and Auroral Research satellite (Polar Bear) from Vandenberg Air Force Base; an Atlas-Centaur launched a FltSatCom satellite in December; an Atlas E launched a NOAA satellite; and two Delta vehicles were used — one to launch a NOAA GOES satellite and the other to launch a DOD mission. One of the Delta vehicles failed during launch and was destroyed before boosting the GOES satellite into transfer orbit. An investigation concluded that the failure was caused by an electrical short in the vehicle wiring. Wiring modi- fications were incorporated into all remaining Delta vehicles. In September, the second Delta vehicle successfully launched a DOD mission. 14 Partly as a result of the Challenger accident, NASA initiated studies in 1986 on the need to establish a Mixed Fleet Transportation System, consist- ing of the Space Shuttle and existing or new ELVs. This policy replaced the earlier stated intention to make the Shuttle NASA's sole launch vehicle. 1987 In 1987, NASA launched four spacecraft missions using ELVs. Three of these missions were successful: a Delta launch of GOES 7 for NOAA into geostationary orbit in February; a Delta launch of Palapa B-2, a com- munications satellite for the Indonesian government, in March; and a Scout launch of a Navy Transit satellite in September. In March, an Atlas- Centaur launch attempt of FltSatCom 6, a Navy communications satellite, failed when lightning in the vicinity of the vehicle caused the engines to malfunction. The range safety officer destroyed the vehicle approximate- ly fifty-one seconds after launch. 15 1988 The ELV program had a perfect launch record in 1988 with six success- ful launches. In February, a Delta ELV lifted a classified DOD payload into orbit. This launch marked the final east coast Delta launch by a NASA launch team. A NASA- Air Force agreement, effective July 1, officially transferred custody of Delta Launch Complex 17 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station to the Air Force. Over a twenty-eight-year period, NASA had launched 143 Deltas from the two Complex 17 pads. A similar transaction transferred accountability for Atlas/Centaur Launch Complex 36 to the Air Force. 16 14 Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1986 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1987). ''Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1987 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1988). "Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1988 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1989). LAUNCH SYSTEMS 29 Also in 1988, a Scout launched San Marcos DL from the San Marco launch facility in the Indian Ocean, a NASA-Italian scientific mission, during March. Its goal was to explore the relationship between solar activity and meteorological phenomena by studying the dynamic processes that occur in the troposphere, stratosphere, and thermosphere. In April, another Scout deployed the SOOS-3, a Navy navigation satellite. In June, a third Scout carried the NOVA-II. the third in a series of improved Navy Transit navigation satellites, into space. The final Scout launch of the year deployed a fourth SOOS mis- sion in August. In September, an Atlas E launched NOAA H, a National Weather Service meteorological satellite funded by NOAA, into Sun-synchronous orbit. This satellite payload included on-board search-and-rescue instruments. In addition to arranging for the purchase of launch services from the commercial sector, NASA took steps to divest itself of an adjunct ELV capability and by making NASA-owned ELV property and ser- vices available to the private sector. During 1988, NASA finalized a barter agreement with General Dynamics that gave the company own- ership of NASA's Atlas-Centaur flight and nonflight assets. In exchange, General Dynamics agreed to provide the agency with two Atlas-Centaur launches at no charge. An agreement was signed for the first launch service— supporting the FltSatCom F-8 Navy mission. NASA and General Dynamics also completed a letter contract for a second launch service to support the NASA-DOD Combined Release and Radiation Effects Satellite (CRRES) mission. In addition, NASA transferred its Delta vehicle program to the U.S. Air Force. Finally, enabling agreements were completed to allow ELV companies to nego- tiate directly with the appropriate NASA installation. During 1988, NASA Headquarters signed enabling agreements with McDonnell Douglas, Martin Marietta, and LTV Corporation. The Kennedy Space Center and General Dynamics signed a subagreement in March to allow General Dynamics to take over maintenance and operations for Launch Complex 36. ELV Characteristics The Atlas Family The basic Atlas launch vehicle was a one-and-a-half stage stainless steel design built by the Space Systems Division of General Dynamics. It was designed as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and was considered an Air Force vehicle. However, the Atlas launch vehicle was also used successfully in civilian space missions dating from NASA's early days. The Atlas launched all three of the unmanned lunar explo- ration programs (Ranger, Lunar Orbiter, and Surveyor). Atlas vehicles also launched the Mariner probes to Mars, Venus, and Mercury and the Pioneer probes to Jupiter, Saturn, and Venus. 30 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK A Centaur Stage " 40.8 m NASA used two families of Atlas vehicles during the 1979-1988 period: the Atlas E/F series and the Atlas-Centaur series. The Atlas E/F launched seven satellites during this time, six of them successful (Table 2-14). The Atlas E/F space booster was a refurbished ICBM. It burned kerosene (RP-1) and liquid oxygen in its three main engines, two Rocketdyne MA-3 booster engines, and one sustainer engine. The Atlas E/F also used two small vernier engines located at the base of the RP- 1 tank for added stability during flight (Table 2-15). The Atl as E/F was designed to deliver payloads directly into low-Earth orbit without the use of an upper stage. The Atlas-Centaur (Figure 2-8) was the nation's first high-energy launch vehicle pro- pelled by liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen. Developed and launched under the direction of the Lewis Research Center, it became operational in 1966 with the launch of Surveyor 1, the first U.S. spacecraft to soft- land on the Moon's surface. Beginning in 1979, the Centaur stage was used only in combination with the Atlas booster, but it had been successfully used earlier in combination with the Titan III booster to launch payloads into interplanetary trajectories, sending two Helios spacecraft toward the Sun and two Viking spacecraft toward Mars. 17 From 1979 through 1988, the Atlas-Centaur launched 18 satellites with only two failures (Table 2-16). The Centaur stage for the Atlas booster was upgraded in 1973 and incorporated an integrated electronic system controlled by a digital computer. This flight-proven "astrion- ics" system checked itself and all other sys- tems prior to and during the launch phase; during flight, it controlled all events after the liftoff. This system was located on the equipment module on the forward end of the Centaur stage. The 16,000- word capacity computer replaced the original 4,800-word capacity computer and enabled it to take over many of the functions previously handled by separate mechanical and electrical systems. The new Centaur system handled navigation, guidance tasks, control pressurization, propellant management, telemetry formats and transmission, and initiation of vehicle events (Table 2-17). Stage Figure 2-8. Atlas-Centaur Launch Vehicle l7 For details, see Linda Neuman Ezell, NASA Historical Data Book, Volume III: Programs and Projects, 1969-1978 (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4012, 1988). LAUNCH SYSTI-MS u The Delia Family NASA has used the Delta launch vehicle since the agency's incep- tion. In 1959, NASA's Goddard Space Right Center awarded a contract to Douglas Aircraft Company (later McDonnell Douglas) to produce and integrate twelve launch vehicles. The Delta, using components from the Air Force's Thor intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) program and the Navy's Vanguard launch program, was available eighteen months later. The Delta has evolved since that time to meet the increasing demands of its payloads and has been the most widely used launch vehi- cle in the U.S. space program, with thirty-five launches from 1979 through 1988 and thirty-four of them successful (Table 2-18). The Delta configurations of the late 1970s and early 1980s were des- ignated the 3900 series. Figure 2-9 illustrates the 3914, and Figure 2-10 shows the 3920 with the Payload Assist Module (PAM) upper stage. The 3900 series resembled the earlier 2900 series (Table 2-19), except for the replacement of the Castor II solid strap-on motors with nine larger and more powerful Castor IV solid motors (Tables 2-20 and 2-21). The RS-27 engine, manufactured by the Rocketdyne Division of Rockwell International, powered the first stage of the Delta. It was a single- start power plant, gimbal-mounted and operated on a combination of liquid oxygen and kerosene (RP-1). The thrust chamber was regeneratively Second Stage 35.36 m Overall Length First Stage rr\r 244 cm Dia. Fairing -Oxidizer Tank mgpi 2.44 m dia. /7\ Fairing— PAM-D Second-*- Stage First —J Stage Castor IV, Solids Main Engine mm 35.5 m Figure 2-9. Delta 3914 Figure 2-10. Delta 3920/PAM-D 32 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK cooled, with the fuel circulating through 292 tubes that comprised the inner wall of the chamber. The following four-digit code designated the type of Delta launch vehicle: • 1st digit designated the type of strap-on engines: 2 = Castor II, extended long tank Thor with RS-27 main engine 3 = Castor IV, extended long tank Thor with RS-27 main engine 2nd digit designated the number of strap-on engines 3rd digit designated the type of second stage and manufacturer: 1 = ninety-six-inch manufactured by TRW (TR-201) 2 = ninety-six-inch stretched tank manufactured by Aerojet (AJ10-118K) • 4th digit designated the type of third stage: = no third stage 3 = TE-364-3 4 = TE-364-4 For example, a model desig- nation of 3914 indicated the use of Castor IV strap-on engines, extended long tank with an RS-27 main engine; nine strap-ons; a ninety-six-inch second stage man- ufactured by TRW; and a TE-364- 4 third stage engine. A PAM designation appended to the last digit indicated the use of a McDonnell-Douglas PAM. Scout Launch Vehicle The standard Scout launch vehicle (Scout is an acronym for Solid Controlled Orbital Utility Test) was a solid propellant four- stage booster system. It was the world's first all-solid propellant launch vehicle and was one of NASA's most reliable launch vehicles. The Scout was the small- est of the basic launch vehicles used by NASA and was used for orbit, probe, and reentry Earth missions (Figure 2-11). Fourth Stage and Spacecraft Third Stage u Second Stage First Stage M -Spacecraft - Altair IIIA Antares IIA Castor IIA zU\ Algol IIIA Figure 2-11. Scout-D Launch Vehicle (Used in 1979) LAUNCH SYSTEMS >3 The lii si Seoul launch look place in I960. Since that tunc, forty-six NASA Scout launches have taken place, including fourteen between 1979 and 1988, when every launch was successful (Table 2-22). In addition to NASA payloads. Scout clients included l)()l), the European Space Research Organization, and several European governments. The Scout was used for both orbital and suborbital missions and has participated in research in navigation, astronomy, communications, meteorology, geo- desy, meteoroids, reentry materials, biology, and Earth and atmospheric sensing. It was the only U.S. ELV launched from three launch sites: Wallops on the Atlantic Ocean, Vandenberg on the Pacific Ocean, and the San Marco platform in the Indian Ocean. It could also inject satellites into a wider range of orbital inclinations than any other launch vehicle. Unlike NASA's larger ELVs, the Scout was assembled and the pay- load integrated and checked out in the horizontal position. The vehicle was raised to the vertical orientation prior to launch. The propulsion motors were arranged in tandem with transition sections between the stages to tie the structure together and to provide space for instrumenta- tion. A standard fifth stage was available for highly elliptical and solar orbit missions. Scout's first-stage motor was based on an earlier version of the Navy's Polaris missile motor; the second-stage motor was developed from the Army's Sergeant surface-to-surface missile; and the third- and fourth-stage motors were adapted by NASA's Langley Research Center from the Navy's Vanguard missile. The fourth-stage motor used on the G model could carry almost four times as much payload to low-Earth orbit as the original model in 1960— that is, 225 kilograms versus fifty- nine kilograms (Table 2-23). Vought Corporation, a subsidiary of LTV Corporation, was the prime contractor for the Scout launch vehicle. The Langley Research Center managed the Scout program. Space Shuttle The reusable, multipurpose Space Shuttle was designed to replace the ELVs that NASA used to deliver commercial, scientific, and applications spacecraft into Earth's orbit. Because of its unique design, the Space Shuttle served as a launch vehicle, a platform for scientific laboratories, an orbiting service center for other satellites, and a return carrier for pre- viously orbited spacecraft. Beginning with its inaugural flight in 1981 and through 1988, NASA flew twenty-seven Shuttle missions (Table 2-24). This section focuses on the Shuttle's use as a launch vehicle. Chapter 3 discusses its use as a platform for scientific laboratories and servicing functions. The Space Shuttle system consisted of four primary elements: an orbiter spacecraft, two solid rocket boosters (SRBs), an external tank to house fuel and an oxidizer, and three main engines. Rockwell International built the orbiter and the main engines; Thiokol Corporation 34 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK produced the SRB motors; and the external tank was built by Martin Marietta Corporation. The Johnson Space Center directed the orbiter and integration contracts, while the Marshall Space Flight Center managed the SRB, external tank, and main engine contracts. The Shuttle could transport up to 29,500 kilograms of cargo into near- Earth orbit (185.2 to 1,1 1 1.2 kilometers). This payload was carried in a bay about four and a half meters in diameter and eighteen meters long. Major system requirements were that the orbiter and the two SRBs be reusable and that the orbiter have a maximum 160-hour turnaround time after land- ing from the previous mission. The orbiter vehicle carried personnel and payloads to orbit, provided a space base for performing their assigned tasks, and returned personnel and payloads to Earth. The orbiter provided a hab- itable environment for the crew and passengers, including scientists and engineers. Additional orbiter characteristics are addressed in Chapter 3. The Shuttle was launched in an upright position, with thrust provid- ed by the three main engines and the two SRBs. After about two minutes, at an altitude of about forty-four kilometers, the two boosters were spent and were separated from the orbiter. They fell into the ocean at predeter- mined points and were recovered for reuse. The main engines continued firing for about eight minutes, cutting off at about 109 kilometers altitude just before the spacecraft was inserted into orbit. The external tank was separated, and it followed a ballistic tra- jectory back into a remote area of the ocean but was not recovered. Two smaller liquid rocket engines made up the orbital maneuvering system (OMS). The OMS injected the orbiter into orbit, performed maneuvers while in orbit, and slowed the vehicle for reentry. After reen- try, the unpowered orbiter glided to Earth and landed on a runway. The Shuttle used two launch sites: the Kennedy Space Center in Florida and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Under optimum conditions, the orbiter landed at the site from which it was launched. However, as shown in the tables in Chapter 3 that describe the individual Shuttle missions, weather conditions frequently forced the Shuttle to land at Edwards Air Force Base in California, even though it had been launched from Kennedy. Main Propulsion System The main propulsion system (MPS) consisted of three Space Shuttle main engines (SSMEs), three SSME controllers, the external tank, the orbiter MPS propellant management subsystem and helium subsystem, four ascent thrust vector control units, and six SSME hydraulic servo-actu- ators. The MPS, assisted by the two SRBs during the initial phases of the ascent trajectory, provided the velocity increment from liftoff to a prede- termined velocity increment before orbit insertion. The Shuttle jettisoned the two SRBs after their fuel had been expended, but the MPS continued to thrust until the predetermined velocity was achieved. At that time, main engine cutoff (MECO) was initiated, the external tank was jettisoned, and LAUNCH SYSTEMS \5 the OMS was ignited to provide the final velocity Increment for orbital insertion. The magnitude of the velocity increment supplied by the OMS depended on payload weight, mission trajectory, and system limitations. Along with the start of the OMS thrusting maneuver (which settled the MPS propellants), the remaining liquid oxygen propellant in the orbiter feed system and SSMEs was dumped through the nozzles of the engines. At the same time, the remaining liquid hydrogen propellant in the orbiter teed system and SSMEs was dumped overboard through the hydrogen fill and drain valves for six seconds. Then the hydrogen inboard fill and drain valve closed, and the hydrogen recirculation valve opened, continuing the dump. The hydrogen flowed through the engine hydrogen bleed valves to the orbiter hydrogen MPS line between the inboard and outboard hydro- gen fill and drain valves, and the remaining hydrogen was dumped through the outboard fill and drain valve for approximately 120 seconds. During on-orbit operations, the flight crew vacuum made the MPS inert by opening the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen fill and drain valves, which allowed the remaining propellants to be vented to space. Before entry into the Earth's atmosphere, the flight crew repressurized the MPS propellant lines with helium to prevent contaminants from being drawn into the lines during entry and to maintain internal positive pres- sure. MPS helium also purged the spacecraft's aft fuselage. The last activ- ity involving the MPS occurred at the end of the landing rollout. At that time, the helium remaining in on-board helium storage tanks was released into the MPS to provide an inert atmosphere for safety. Main Engine The SSME represented a major advance in propulsion technology. Each engine had an operating life of seven and a half hours and fifty-five starts and the ability to throttle a thrust level that extended over a wide range (65 percent to 109 percent of rated power level). The SSME was the first large, liquid-fuel rocket engine designed to be reusable. A cluster of three SSMEs housed in the orbiter's aft fuselage provid- ed the main propulsion for the orbiter. Ignited on the ground prior to launch, the cluster of liquid hydrogen-liquid oxygen engines operated in parallel with the SRBs during the initial ascent. After the boosters sepa- rated, the main engines continued to operate. The nominal operating time was approximately eight and a half minutes. The SSMEs developed thrust by using high-energy propellants in a staged combustion cycle. The pro- pellants were partially combusted in dual preburners to produce high- pressure hot gas to drive the turbopumps. Combustion was completed in the main combustion chamber. The cycle ensured maximum performance because it eliminated parasitic losses. The various thrust levels provided for high thrust during liftoff and the initial ascent phase but allowed thrust to be reduced to limit acceleration to three g's during the final ascent phase. The engines were gimbaled to provide pitch, yaw, and roll control during the orbiter boost phase. 36 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Key components of each engine included four turbopumps (two low- and two high-pressure), two preburners, the main injector, the main com- bustion chamber, the nozzle, and the hot-gas manifold. The manifold was the structural backbone of the engine. It supported the two preburners, the high-pressure pumps, the main injector, the pneumatic control assembly, and the main combustion chamber with the nozzle. Table 2-25 summa- rizes SSME characteristics. The SSME was the first rocket engine to use a built-in electronic dig- ital controller. The controller accepted commands from the orbiter for engine start, shutdown, and change in throttle setting and also monitored engine operation. In the event of a failure, the controller automatically corrected the problem or shut down the engine safely. Main Engine Margin Improvement Program. Improvements to the SSMEs for increased margin and durability began with a formal Phase II program in 1983. Phase II focused on turbomachinery to extend the time between high-pressure fuel turbopump (HPFT) overhauls by reducing the operating temperature in the HPFT and by incorporating margin improve- ments to the HPFT rotor dynamics (whirl), turbine blade, and HPFT bear- ings. Phase II certification was completed in 1985, and all the changes were incorporated into the SSMEs for the STS-26 mission. In addition to the Phase II improvements, NASA made additional changes to the SSME to further extend the engine's margin and durability. The main changes were to the high-pressure turbomachinery, main combus- tion chamber, hydraulic actuators, and high-pressure turbine discharge tem- perature sensors. Changes were also made in the controller software to improve engine control. Minor high-pressure turbomachinery design changes resulted in margin improvements to the turbine blades, thereby extending the operating life of the turbopumps. These changes included applying surface texture to important parts of the fuel turbine blades to improve the material properties in the pressure of hydrogen and incorporating a damper into the high-pressure oxidizer turbine blades to reduce vibration. Plating a welded outlet manifold with nickel increased the main com- bustion chamber's life. Margin improvements were also made to five hydraulic actuators to preclude a loss in redundancy on the launch pad. Improvements in quality were incorporated into the servo-component coil design, along with modifications to increase margin. To address a tem- perature sensor in-flight anomaly, the sensor was redesigned and exten- sively tested without problems. To certify the improvements to the SSMEs and demonstrate their reli- ability through margin (or limit) testing, NASA initiated a ground test pro- gram in December 1986. Its primary purposes were to certify the improvements and demonstrate the engine's reliability and operating mar- gin. From December 1986 to December 1987, 151 tests and 52,363 seconds of operation (equivalent to 100 Shuttle missions) were performed. These hot-fire ground tests were performed at the single-engine test stands at the Stennis Space Center in Mississippi and at the Rockwell International Rocketdyne Division's Santa Susana Field Laboratory in California. LAUNCH SYSTEMS 37 NASA also conducted checkout and acceptance tests of the three main engines for the STS-26 mission. Those tests, also at Stcnnis, began in August 1987, and all three STS-26 engines were delivered to the Kennedy Space Center by January 1988. Along with hardware improvements, NASA conducted several major reviews of requirements and procedures. These reviews addressed such topics as possible failure modes and effects, as well as the associated crit- ical items list. Another review involved having a launch/abort reassess- ment team examine all launch-commit criteria, engine redlines, and software logic. NASA also performed a design certification review. Table 2-26 lists these improvements, as well as events that occurred earlier in the development of the SSME. A related effort involved Marshall Space Flight Center engineers who, working with their counterparts at Kennedy, accomplished a com- prehensive launch operations and maintenance review. This ensured that engine processing activities at the launch site were consistent with the lat- est operational requirements. External Tank The external tank contained the propellants (liquid hydrogen and liq- uid oxygen) for the SSMEs and supplied them under pressure to the three main engines in the orbiter during liftoff and ascent. Just prior to orbital insertion, the main engines cut off, and the external tank separated from the orbiter, descended through a ballistic trajectory over a predesignated area, broke up, and impacted in a remote ocean area. The tank was not recovered. The largest and heaviest (when loaded) element of the Space Shuttle, the external tank had three major components: a forward liquid oxygen tank; an unpressurized intertank, which contained most of the electrical components; and an aft liquid hydrogen tank. Beginning with the STS-6 mission, NASA used a lightweight external tank (LWT). For each kilogram of weight reduced from the original external tank, the cargo- carrying capability of the Space Shuttle spacecraft increased one kilo- gram. The weight reduction was accomplished by eliminating portions of stringers (structural stiffeners running the length of the hydrogen tank), using fewer stiff ener rings, and by modifying major frames in the hydro- gen tank. Also, significant portions of the tank were milled differently to reduce thickness, and the weight of the external tank's aft SRB attach- ments was reduced by using a stronger, yet lighter and less expensive, titanium alloy. Earlier, the use of the LWT reduced the total weight by deleting the antigeyser line. The line paralleled the oxygen feed line and provided a circulation path for liquid oxygen to reduce the accumulation of gaseous oxygen in the feed line while the oxygen tank was being filled before launch. After NASA assessed propellant loading data from ground tests and the first four Space Shuttle missions, engineers removed the antigeyser line for STS-5 and subsequent missions. The total length and 38 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Obiter Aft Attachment Propellant Feed, Pressurization Lines and Electrical Umbilicals Orbiter Forward Attachment Intertank T-0 Umbilical Plate Liquid Oxygen Slosh Baffles Integral Stringers SRB Forward Attachment Liquid Oxygen Vent Valve and Fairing Figure 2-12. External Tank diameter of the external tank remained unchanged (Figure 2-12). Table 2-27 summarizes the external tank characteristics, and Table 2-28 pre- sents a chronology of external development. As well as containing and delivering the propellant, the external tank served as the structural backbone of the Space Shuttle during launch oper- ations. The external tank consisted of two primary tanks: a large hydro- gen tank and a smaller oxygen tank, joined by an intertank to form one large propellant-storage container. Superlight ablator (SLA-561) and foam insulation sprayed on the forward part of the oxygen tank, the inter- tank, and the sides of the hydrogen tank protected the outer surfaces. The insulation reduced ice or frost formation during launch preparation, pro- tecting the orbiter from free-falling ice during flight. This insulation also minimized heat leaks into the tank, avoided excessive boiling of the liq- uid propellants, and prevented liquification and solidification of the air next to the tank. The external tank attached to the orbiter at one forward attachment point and two aft points. In the aft attachment area, umbilicals carried flu- ids, gases, electrical signals, and electrical power between the tank and the orbiter. Electrical signals and controls between the orbiter and the two SRBs also were routed through those umbilicals. Liquid Oxygen Tank. The liquid oxygen tank was an aluminum monocoque structure composed of a fusion-welded assembly of pre- formed, chem-milled gores, panels, machined fittings, and ring chords. It operated in a pressure range of 1,035 to 1,138 mmHg. The tank contained antislosh and antivortex provisions to minimize liquid residuals and damp fluid motion. The tank fed into a 0.43-meter-diameter feedline that sent the liquid oxygen through the intertank, then outside the external tank to the aft righthand external tank/orbiter disconnect umbilical. The feedline permitted liquid oxygen to flow at approximately 1,268 kilograms per LAUNCH SYSTI-MS *9 second, with the SSMEs operating at 104 percent of rated thrust, or per- mitted a maximum flow of 71,979 liters per minute. The liquid oxygen tank's double-wedge nose cone reduced drag and healing, contained the vehicle's ascent air data system, and served as a lightning rod. Intertank, The intertank was not a tank in itself but provided a mechanical connection between the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanks. The primary functions of the intertank were to provide structural continuity to the propellant tanks, to serve as a protective compartment to house instruments, and to receive and distribute thrust loads from the SRBs. The intertank was a steel/aluminum semimonocoque cylindrical structure with flanges on each end for joining the liquid oxygen and liq- uid hydrogen tanks. It housed external tank instrumentation components and provided an umbilical plate that interfaced with the ground facility arm for purging the gas supply, hazardous gas detection, and hydrogen gas boiloff during ground operations. It consisted of mechanically joined skin, stringers, and machined panels of aluminum alloy. The intertank was vented during flight. It contained the forward SRB -external tank attach thrust beam and fittings that distributed the SRB loads to the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanks. Liquid Hydrogen Tank. The liquid hydrogen tank was an aluminum semimonocoque structure of fusion-welded barrel sections, five major ring frames, and forward and aft ellipsoidal domes. Its operating pressure was 1,759 mmHg. The tank contained an antivortex baffle and siphon outlet to transmit the liquid hydrogen from the tank through a 0.43-meter line to the left aft umbilical. The liquid hydrogen feedline flow rate was 211.4 kilograms per second, with the SSMEs at 104 percent of rated thrust, or a maximum flow of 184,420 liters per minute. At the forward end of the liquid hydrogen tank was the external tank/orbiter forward attachment pod strut, and at its aft end were the two external tank/orbiter aft attachment ball fittings as well as the aft SRB-external tank stabiliz- ing strut attachments. External Tank Thermal Protection System. The external tank ther- mal protection system consisted of sprayed-on foam insulation and pre- molded ablator materials. The system also included the use of phenolic thermal insulators to preclude air liquefaction. Thermal isolators were required for liquid hydrogen tank attachments to preclude the liquefaction of air-exposed metallic attachments and to reduce heat flow into the liq- uid hydrogen. The thermal protection system weighed 2,192 kilograms. External Tank Hardware. The external hardware, external tank/orbiter attachment fittings, umbilical fittings, and electrical and range safety system weighed 4,136.4 kilograms. Each propellant tank had a vent and relief valve at its forward end. This dual-function valve could be opened by ground support equipment for the vent function during prelaunch and could open during flight when the ullage (empty space) pressure of the liquid hydrogen tank reached 1,966 mmHg or the ullage pressure of the liquid oxygen tank reached 1,293 mmHg. 40 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK The liquid oxygen tank contained a separate, pyrotechnically operat- ed, propulsive tumble vent valve at its forward end. At separation, the liq- uid oxygen tumble vent valve was opened, providing impulse to assist in the separation maneuver and more positive control of the entry aerody- namics of the external tank. There were eight propellant-depletion sensors, four each for fuel and oxidizer. The fuel-depletion sensors were located in the bottom of the fuel tank. The oxidizer sensors were mounted in the orbiter liquid oxygen feedline manifold downstream of the feedline disconnect. During SSME thrusting, the orbiter general purpose computers constantly computed the instantaneous mass of the vehicle because of the usage of the propellants. Normally, MECO was based on a predetermined velocity; however, if any two of the fuel or oxidizer sensors sensed a dry condition, the engines would be shut down. The locations of the liquid oxygen sensors allowed the maximum amount of oxidizer to be consumed in the engines, while allowing suffi- cient time to shut down the engines before the oxidizer pumps ran dry. In addition, 500 kilograms of liquid hydrogen were loaded over and above that required by the six-to-one oxidizer/fuel engine mixture ratio. This assured that MECO from the depletion sensors was fuel rich; oxidizer- rich engine shutdowns could cause burning and severe erosion of engine components. Four pressure transducers located at the top of the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanks monitored the ullage pressures. Each of the two aft external tank umbilical plates mated with a corresponding plate on the orbiter. The plates helped maintain alignment among the umbilicals. Physical strength at the umbilical plates was provided by bolting corre- sponding umbilical plates together. When the orbiter general purpose computers commanded external tank separation, the bolts were severed by pyrotechnic devices. The external tank had five propellant umbilical valves that interfaced with orbiter umbilicals — two for the liquid oxygen tank and three for the liquid hydrogen tank. One of the liquid oxygen tank umbilical valves was for liquid oxygen, the other for gaseous oxygen. The liquid hydrogen tank umbilical had two valves for liquid and one for gas. The intermediate- diameter liquid hydrogen umbilical was a recirculation umbilical used only during the liquid hydrogen chill-down sequence during prelaunch. The external tank also had two electrical umbilicals that carried elec- trical power from the orbiter to the tank and the two SRBs and provided information from the SRBs and external tank to the orbiter. A swing-arm- mounted cap to the fixed service structure covered the oxygen tank vent on top of the external tank during countdown and was retracted about two minutes before liftoff. The cap siphoned off oxygen vapor that threatened to form large ice on the external tank, thus protecting the orbiter's ther- mal protection system during launch. External Tank Range Safety System. A range safety system, moni- tored by the flight crew, provided for dispersing tank propellants if nee- LAUNCH SYS! IMS 41 OSSary. It included a battery power source, a receiver/decoder, antennas, and ordnance. Porf-ChaUenger Modification. Prior to the launch of STS-26, NASA modified the external tank by strengthening the hydrogen pressur- i/ation line. In addition, freezer wrap was added to the hydrogen line. This permitted the visual detection of a hydrogen fire (Fable 2-28). Solid Rocket Boosters The two SRBs provided the main thrust to lift the Space Shuttle off the pad and up to an altitude of about forty-four and a half kilometers. In addition, the two SRBs carried the entire weight of the external tank and orbiter and transmitted the weight load through their structure to the mobile launcher platform. The SRBs were ignited after the three SSMEs' thrust level was verified. The two SRBs provided 71.4 percent of the thrust at liftoff and during first-stage ascent. Seventy-five seconds after SRB separation, SRB apogee occurred at an altitude of approximately sixty-five kilometers. SRB impact occurred in the ocean approximately 226 kilometers downrange, to be recovered and returned for refurbish- ment and reuse. The primary elements of each booster were the motor (including case, propellant, igniter, and nozzle), structure, separation systems, oper- ational flight instrumentation, recovery avionics, pyrotechnics, decelera- tion system, thrust vector control system, and range safety destruct system (Figure 2-13). Each booster attached to the external tank at the SRB's aft frame with two lateral sway braces and a diagonal attachment. The forward end of each SRB joined the external tank at the forward end Nozzle and Thurst Vector Control Systen 4! Motors Aft Skirt and Launch Support SRB-External Tank Attachment Ring, Aft Avionics and Sway Braces Forward Skirt SRB-External Tank Thrust Attachment Rate Gyro Assemblies (2), Separation Avionics, Operational Flight Instrumentation, Recovery Avionics and Range Safety System Figure 2-13. Solid Rocket Booster 42 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK of the SRB's forward skirt. On the launch pad, each booster also con- nected to the mobile launcher platform at the aft skirt with four bolts and nuts that were severed by small explosives at liftoff. The SRBs were used as matched pairs. Each consisted of four solid rocket motor (SRM) segments. The pairs were matched by loading each of the four motor segments in pairs from the same batches of propellant ingredients to minimize any thrust imbalance. The exhaust nozzle in the aft segment of each motor, in conjunction with the orbiter engines, steered the Space Shuttle during the powered phase of launch. The seg- mented-casing design assured maximum flexibility in fabrication and ease of transportation and handling. Each segment was shipped to the launch site on a heavy-duty rail car with a specially built cover. The propellant mixture in each SRB motor consisted of an ammoni- um perchlorate (oxidizer, 69.6 percent by weight), aluminum (fuel, 16 percent), iron oxide (a catalyst, 0.4 percent), a polymer (a binder that held the mixture together, 12.04 percent), and an epoxy curing agent (1.96 percent). The propellant was an eleven-point star-shaped perfora- tion in the forward motor segment and a double-truncated-cone perfora- tion in each of the aft segments and aft closure. This configuration provided high thrust at ignition and then reduced the thrust by approxi- mately one-third fifty seconds after liftoff to prevent overstressing the vehicle during maximum dynamic pressure. The cone-shaped aft skirt supported the four aft separation motors. The aft section contained avionics, a thrust vector control system that con- sisted of two auxiliary power units and hydraulic pumps, hydraulic sys- tems, and a nozzle extension jettison system. The forward section of each booster contained avionics, a sequencer, forward separation motors, a nose cone separation system, drogue and main parachutes, a recovery beacon, a recovery light, a parachute camera on selected flights, and a range safety system. Each SRB incorporated a range safety system that included a bat- tery power source, a receiver-decoder, antennas, and ordnance. Each SRB had two integrated electronic assemblies, one forward and one aft. After burnout, the forward assembly initiated the release of the nose cap and frustum and turned on the recovery aids. The aft assembly, mounted in the external tank-SRB attach ring, connected with the forward assembly and the orbiter avionics systems for SRB ignition commands and nozzle thrust vector control. Each integrated electronic assembly had a multiplexer-demultiplexer, which sent or received more than one mes- sage, signal, or unit of information on a single communications channel. Eight booster separation motors (four in the nose frustum and four in the aft skirt) of each SRB thrust for 1.02 seconds at SRB separation from the external tank. SRB separation from the external tank was electrically initiated. Each solid rocket separation motor was 0.8 meter long and 32.5 centimeters in diameter (Table 2-29). Location aids were provided for each SRB, frustum-drogue chutes, and main parachutes. These included a transmitter, antenna, strobe/con- verter, battery, and saltwater switch electronics. The recovery crew LAUNCH SYSTEMS [3 retrieved the SRBs, nozzles were plugged frustum/drogue chutes, and main parachutes. The the solid rocket motors were de watered, and the crew towed the SRBs back to the launch site. Each booster was removed from the water, and its components disassembled and washed with fresh and de-ionized water to limit saltwater corrosion. The motor segments, igniter, and nozzle were shipped back to Thiokol lor refurbishment. The SRB nose caps and nozzle extensions were not recovered. Testing and production of the SRB were well under way in 1979. The booster performed well until the Challenger accident revealed flaws that had very likely existed for several missions but had resulted in little reme- dial action. The 1986 Challenger accident forced major modifications to the SRB and SRM. /W-Challenger Modifications. On June 13, 1986, President Reagan directed NASA to implement, as soon as possible, the recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. During the downtime following the Challenger accident, NASA analyzed critical structural elements of the SRB, primarily focused in areas where anomalies had been noted during postflight inspection of recovered hardware. Anomalies had been noted in the attach ring where the SRBs joined the external tank. Some of the fasteners showed distress where the ring attached to the SRB motor case. Tests attributed this to the high loads encountered during water impact. To correct the situation and ensure higher strength margins during ascent, the attach ring was redesigned to encircle the motor case completely (360 degrees). Previously, the attach ring formed a "C" and encircled the motor case 270 degrees. In addition, NASA performed special structural tests on the aft skirt. During this test program, an anomaly occurred in a critical weld between the hold-down post and skin of the skirt. A redesign added reinforcement brackets and fittings in the aft ring of the skirt. These modifications added approximately 200 kilograms to the weight of each SRB. Solid Rocket Motor Redesign. The Presidential Commission deter- mined that the cause of the loss of the Challenger was "a failure in the joint between the two lower segments of the right solid rocket motor. The specific failure was the destruction of the seals that are intended to pre- vent hot gases from leaking through the joint during the propellant burn of the rocket motor." 18 Consequently, NASA developed a plan for a redesigned solid rocket motor (RSRM). Safety in flight was the primary objective of the SRM redesign. Minimizing schedule impact by using existing hardware, to the extent practical, without compromising safety was another objective. ^Report at a Glance, report to the President by the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Chapter IV, "The Cause of the Accident," Finding (no pg. number). 44 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK NASA established a joint redesign team with participants from the Marshall Space Flight Center, other NASA centers, Morton Thiokol, and outside NASA. The team developed an "SRM Redesign Project Plan" to formalize the methodology for SRM redesign and requalification. The plan provided an overview of the organizational responsibilities and rela- tionships; the design objectives, criteria, and process; the verification approach and process; and a master schedule. Figure 2-14 shows the SRM Project Schedule as of August 1986. The companion "Development and Verification Plan" defined the test program and analyses required to verify the redesign and unchanged components of the SRM. The SRM was carefully and extensively redesigned. The RSRM received intense scrutiny and was subjected to a thorough certification process to verify that it worked properly and to qualify the motor for human spaceflight. NASA assessed all aspects of the existing SRM and required design changes in the field joint, case-to-nozzle joint, nozzle, factory joint, pro- pellant grain shape, ignition system, and ground support equipment. The propellant, liner, and castable inhibitor formulations did not require changes. Design criteria were established for each component to ensure a safe design with an adequate margin of safety. These criteria focused on loads, environments, performance, redundancy, margins of safety, and verification philosophy. The team converted the criteria into specific design requirements dur- ing the Preliminary Requirements Reviews held in July and August 1986. NASA assessed the design developed from these requirements at the Preliminary Design Review held in September 1986 and baselined in October 1986. NASA approved the final design at the Critical Design Event 1986 1987 1988 A M J j Ia s N D J F M a|m| j j A s|o|n|d J F M A M Major Project Milestones EDR |PRR p DR ( ;d R F/ vc VI DCR y Design Activities Concept Development Requirements Development Detailed Design 1 1 Test Activities Component & Subscale Testing W/ '/// Full-Scale Test Articles (2 1 ! J I I I '////A ////// /// Segments) Structural Test Article Engineering Test Motor - 1 Development Motor - 8 Development Motor - 9 Qualification Motor - 6 1 1 \ 1 ?A £ i — i— y/x I Yi jjj I p rt Flight Hardware Fabrication First Flight Motor 1 | | Design/Fab EZ V est CDR - Critical Design Review DCR - Design Certification Review EDR - Engineering Design Review FACI - First Article Configuration Inspection PDR - Preliminary Design Review PRR - Project Requirements Review Figure 2-14. Solid Rocket Motor Redesign Schedule LAUNCH SYSTEMS I Review held in October l ( )S7. Manufacture of the RSRM test hardware and the first flight hardware began prior to the Preliminary Design Review and continued in parallel with the hardware certification pro- gram. The Design Certification Review considered the analyses and test results versus the program and design requirements to certify that the RSRM was ready to fly. Specific Modifications. The SRM field-joint metal parts, internal ease insulation, and seals were redesigned, and a weather protection sys- tem was added. The major change in the motor case was the new tang capture feature to provide a positive metal-to-metal interference fit around the circumference of the tang and clevis ends of the mating seg- ments. The interference fit limited the deflection between the tang and clevis O-ring sealing surfaces caused by motor pressure and structural loads. The joints were designed so that the seals would not leak under twice the expected structural deflection and rate. The new design, with the tang capture feature, the interference fit, and the use of custom shims between the outer surface of the tang and inner surface of the outer clevis leg, controlled the O-ring sealing gap dimension. The sealing gap and the O-ring seals were designed so that a positive compression (squeeze) was always on the O-rings. The minimum and maximum squeeze requirements included the effects of temperature, O-ring resiliency and compression set, and pressure. The redesign increased the clevis O-ring groove dimension so that the O-ring never filled more than 90 percent of the O-ring groove, and pressure actuation was enhanced. The new field-joint design also included a new O-ring in the capture feature and an additional leak check port to ensure that the primary O-ring was positioned in the proper sealing direction at ignition. This new or third O-ring also served as a thermal barrier in case the sealed insulation was breached. The field-joint internal case insulation was modified to be sealed with a pressure-actuated flap called a j-seal, rather than with putty as in the STS 51-L {Challenger) configuration. The redesign added longer field-joint-case mating pins, with a recon- figured retainer band, to improve the shear strength of the pins and increase the metal parts' joint margin of safety. The joint safety margins, both thermal and structural, were demonstrated over the full ranges of ambient temperature, storage compression, grease effect, assembly stress- es, and other environments. The redesign incorporated external heaters with integral weather seals to maintain the joint and O-ring temperature at a minimum of 23.9 degrees Celsius. The weather seal also prevented water intrusion into the joint. Original Versus Redesigned SRM Case-to-Nozzle Joint. The SRM case-to-nozzle joint, which experienced several instances of O-ring ero- sion in flight, was redesigned to satisfy the same requirements imposed on the case field joint. Similar to the field joint, case-to-nozzle joint mod- ifications were made in the metal parts, internal insulation, and O-rings. The redesign added radial bolts with Stato-O-Seals to minimize the joint 46 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK sealing gap opening. The internal insulation was modified to be sealed adhesively, and a third O-ring was included. The third O-ring served as a dam or wiper in front of the primary O-ring to prevent the polysulfide adhesive from being extruded in the primary O-ring groove. It also served as a thermal barrier in case the polysulfide adhesive was breached. The polysulfide adhesive replaced the putty used in the STS 51-L joint. Also, the redesign added an another leak check port to reduce the amount of trapped air in the joint during the nozzle installation process and to aid in the leak check procedure. Nozzle. Redesigned internal joints of the nozzle metal parts incorpo- rated redundant and verifiable O-rings at each joint. The modified nozzle steel fixed housing part permitted the incorporation of the 100 radial bolts that attached the fixed housing to the case's aft dome. The new nozzle nose inlet, cowl/boot, and aft exit cone assemblies used improved bond- ing techniques. Increasing the thickness of the aluminum nose inlet hous- ing and improving the bonding process eliminated the distortion of the nose inlet assembly's metal-part-to-ablative-parts bond line. The changed tape-wrap angle of the carbon cloth fabric in the areas of the nose inlet and throat assembly parts improved the ablative insulation erosion toler- ance. Some of these ply-angle changes had been in progress prior to STS 51-L. Additional structural support with increased thickness and contour changes to the cowl and outer boot ring increased their margins of safety. In addition, the outer boot ring ply configuration was altered. Factory Joint. The redesign incorporated minor modifications in the case factory joints by increasing the insulation thickness and layup to increase the margin of safety on the internal insulation. Longer pins were also added, along with a reconfigured retainer band and new weather seal to improve factory joint performance and increase the margin of safety. In addition, the redesign changed the O-ring and O-ring groove size to be consistent with the field joint. Propellant. The motor propellant forward transition region was recontoured to reduce the stress fields between the star and cylindrical portions of the propellant grain. Ignition System. The redesign incorporated several minor modifica- tions into the ignition system. The aft end of the igniter steel case, which contained the igniter nozzle insert, was thickened to eliminate a localized weakness. The igniter internal case insulation was tapered to improve the manufacturing process. Finally, although vacuum putty was still used at the joint of the igniter and case forward dome, it eliminated asbestos as one of its constituents. Ground Support Equipment. Redesigned ground support equipment (1) minimized the case distortion during handling at the launch site, (2) improved the segment tang and clevis joint measurement system for more accurate reading of case diameters to facilitate stacking, (3) mini- mized the risk of O-ring damage during joint mating, and (4) improved leak testing of the igniter, case, and nozzle field joints. A ground support equipment assembly aid guided the segment tang into the clevis and LAUNCH SYSTEMS 47 rounded the two pans with each other. Other ground support equipment modifications included transportation monitoring equipment and the lilt- ing beam. Testing. Tests of the redesigned motor were carried out in a horizon- tal attitude, providing a more accurate simulation of actual conditions of the field joint that failed during the STS 51-L mission. In conjunction with the horizontal attitude for the RSRM full-scale testing, NASA incorporat- ed externally applied loads. Morton Thiokol constructed a second hori- zontal test stand for certification of the redesigned SRM. The contractor used this new stand to simulate environmental stresses, loads, and tem- peratures experienced during an actual Space Shuttle launch and ascent. The new test stand also provided redundancy for the original stand. The testing program included five full-scale firings of the RSRM prior to STS-26 to verify the RSRM performance. These included two development motor tests, two qualification motor tests, and a production verification motor test. The production verification motor test in August 1988 intentionally introduced severe artificial flaws into the test motor to make sure that the redundant safety features implemented during the redesign effort worked as planned. Laboratory and component tests were used to determine component properties and characteristics. Subscale motor tests simulated gas dynamics and thermal conditions for compo- nents and subsystem design. Simulator tests, consisting of motors using full-size flight-type segments, verified joint design under full flight loads, pressure, and temperature. Full-scale tests verified analytical models and determined hardware assembly characteristics; joint deflection characteristics; joint perfor- mance under short duration, hot-gas tests, including joint flaws and flight loads; and redesigned hardware structural characteristics. Table 2-30 lists the events involved in the redesign of the SRB and SRM as well as earli- er events in their development. 19 Upper Stages The upper stages boost payloads from the Space Shuttle's parking orbit or low-Earth orbit to geostationary-transfer orbit or geosynchronous orbit. They are also used on ELV missions to boost payloads from an early stage of the orbit maneuver into geostationary-transfer orbit or geo- synchronous orbit. The development of the upper stages used by NASA began prior to 1979 and continued throughout the 1980s (Table 2-31). The upper stages could be grouped into three categories, according to their weight delivery capacity: • Low capacity: 453- to 1,360-kilogram capacity to geosynchronous orbit 19 See Ezell, NASA Historical Data Book, Volume III, for earlier events in SRB development. 48 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Medium capacity: 1,360- to 3,175-kilogram capacity to geosynchro- nous orbit High capacity: 3,175- to 5,443-kilogram capacity to geosynchronous orbit Inertial Upper Stages DOD designed and developed the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) medium-capacity system for integration with both the Space Shuttle and Titan launch vehicle. It was used to deliver spacecraft into a wide range of Earth orbits beyond the Space Shuttle's capability. When used with the Shuttle, the solid-propellant IUS and its payload were deployed from the orbiter in low-Earth orbit. The IUS was then ignited to boost its payload to a higher energy orbit. NASA used a two-stage configuration of the IUS primarily to achieve geosynchronous orbit and a three-stage version for planetary orbits. The IUS was 5.18 meters long and 2.8 meters in diameter and weighed approximately 14,772 kilograms. It consisted of an aft skirt, an aft stage SRM with 9,707 kilograms of solid propellant generating 202,828.8 newtons of thrust, an interstage, a forward stage SRM with 2,727.3 kilograms of propellant generating 82,288 newtons of thrust and using an extendible exit cone, and an equipment support section. The equipment support section contained the avionics that provided guidance, navigation, telemetry, command and data management, reaction control, and electrical power. All mission-critical components of the avionics sys- tem and thrust vector actuators, reaction control thrusters, motor igniter, and pyrotechnic stage separation equipment were redundant to ensure better than 98-percent reliability (Figure 2-15). Reaction Control Interstage Avionics Bay jundant lponerrts) (Redundant Comi Extendable Exit Cone Solid-Fuel Rocket Motor Thrust Vector Control Actuator Figure 2-15. Inertial Upper Stage LAUNCH SYSTEMS 49 The spacecraft was attached iodic [US ai a maximum of eight attach mem points. These points provided substantial load-carrying capability while minimizing thermal transfer. Several [US interlace connectors pro video 1 power and data transmission to the spacecraft. Access to these con nectors could be provided on the spacecraft side of the interlace plane or through the access door on the I US equipment bay. The IUS provided a multilayer insulation blanket of alumini/ed Kapton with polyester net spacers and an alumini/ed beta cloth outer layer across the IUS and spacecraft interface. All IUS thermal blankets vented toward and into the IUS cavity. All gases within the IUS cavity vented to the orbiter payload bay. There was no gas flow between the spacecraft and the IUS. The thermal blankets were grounded to the IUS structure to prevent electrostatic charge buildup. Beginning with STS-26, the IUS incorporated a number of advanced features. It had the first completely redundant avionics system developed for an uncrewed space vehicle. This system could correct in-flight fea- tures within milliseconds. Other advanced features included a carbon composite nozzle throat that made possible the high-temperature, long- duration firing of the IUS motor and a redundant computer system in which the second computer could take over functions from the primary computer, if necessary. Payload Assist Module The Payload Assist Module (PAM), which was originally called the Spinning Stage Upper Stage, was developed by McDonnell Douglas at its own expense for launching smaller spacecraft to geostationary-transfer orbit. It was designed as a higher altitude booster of satellites deployed in near-Earth orbit but operationally destined for higher altitudes. The PAM-D could launch satellites weighing up to 1,247 kilograms. It was originally configured for satellites that used the Delta ELV but was used on both ELVs and the Space Shuttle. The PAM-DII (used on STS 61-B and STS 61-C) could launch satellites weighing up to 1,882 kilograms. A third PAM, the PAM-A, had been intended for satellites weighing up to 1,995 kilograms and was configured for missions using the Atlas- Centaur. NASA halted its development in 1982, pending definition of spacecraft needs. Commercial users acquired the PAM-D and PAM-DII directly from the manufacturer. The PAM consisted of a deployable (expendable) stage and reusable airborne support equipment. The deployable stage consisted of a spin- stabilized SRM, a payload attach fitting to mate with the unmanned spacecraft, and the necessary timing, sequencing, power, and control assemblies. The RAM's airborne support equipment consisted of the reusable hard- ware elements required to mount, support, control, monitor, protect, and operate the RAM's expendable hardware and untended spacecraft from liftoff to deployment from the Space Shuttle or ELV. It also provided these 50 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK functions for the safing and return of the stage and spacecraft in case of an aborted mission. The airborne support equipment was designed to be as self-contained as possible. The major airborne support equipment elements included the cradle for structural mounting and support, the spin table and drive system, the avionics system to control and monitor the airborne sup- port equipment and the PAM vehicle, and the thermal control system. The PAM stages were supported through the spin table at the base of the motor and through restraints at the PAR The forward restraints were retracted before deployment. The sunshield of the PAM-D and DII pro- vided thermal protection of the PAM/untended spacecraft when the Space Shuttle orbiter payload bay doors were open on orbit. Transfer Orbit Stage The development of the Transfer Orbit Stage (TOS) began in April 1983 when NASA signed a Space System Development Agreement with Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) to develop a new upper stage. Under the agreement, OSC provided technical direction, systems engineering, mission integration, and program management of the design, production, and testing of the TOS. NASA, with participation by the Johnson and Kennedy Space Centers, provided technical assistance during TOS devel- opment and agreed to provide technical monitoring and advice during TOS development and operations to assure its acceptability for use with major national launch systems, including the STS and Titan vehicles. NASA also established a TOS Program Office at the Marshall Space Flight Center. OSC provided all funding for the development and manu- facturing of TOS (Figure 2-16). In June 1985, Marshall awarded a 16-month contract to OSC for a laser initial navigation system (LINS) developed for the TOS. Marshall would use the LINS for guidance system research, testing, and other pur- poses related to the TOS program. Production of the TOS began in mid- 1986. It was scheduled to be used on the Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS) and the Planetary Observer series of scientific exploration spacecraft, beginning with the Mars Observer mission in the early 1990s. The TOS could place 2,490 to 6,080 kilograms payloads into geosta- tionary-transfer orbit from the STS and up to 5,227 kilograms from the Titan III and IV and could also deliver space- craft to planetary and other high-ener- gy trajectories. The TOS allowed smaller satellites to be placed into geo- ^ 2 _ ]6 stationary-transfer orbit in groups of Transfer Orbit Stage LAUNCH SYSTEMS 51 two or three. Two payloads of the Adas class (1,136 kilograms) or three payloads of the Delta class (636 kilograms) could be launched on a sin- gle TOS mission. Besides delivery of commercial communications satel- lites, its primary market, the TOS would be used for NASA and DOD missions. The TOS system consisted of flight vehicle hardware and software and associated airborne and ground support equipment required lor buildup. Table 3-32 lists its characteristics. Performance capabilities of the TOS included: • Earth escape transfer capability • Geosynchronous transfer orbit capability Orbit inclination change capability • Low-altitude transfer capability • Intermediate transfer orbit capability • De-orbit maneuver • Satellite repair and retrieval Apogee and Maneuvering System The liquid bipropellant Apogee and Maneuvering System (AMS) was designed to be used both with and independently of the TOS. The AMS would boost the spacecraft into a circular orbit and allow on-orbit maneu- vering. Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace worked to develop the AMS with Rockwell International's Rocketdyne Division, providing the AMS RS-51 bipropellant rocket engine, and Honeywell, Inc., supplied the TOS/AMS LINS avionics system. When it became operational, the TOS/AMS combination would deliver up to approximately 2,950 kilograms into geosynchronous orbit from the orbiter's parking orbit into final geosynchronous orbit. The TOS/AMS would have a delivery capability 30 percent greater than the IUS and would reduce stage and STS user costs. The main propulsion, reaction control, avionics, and airborne support equipment systems would be essentially the same as those used on the TOS. In particular, the avion- ics would be based on a redundant, fault-tolerant LINS. Operating alone, the AMS would be able to place communications satellites weighing up to approximately 2,500 kilograms into geostation- ary-transfer orbit after deployment in the standard Space Shuttle parking orbit. Other missions would include low-orbit maneuvering between the Shuttle and the planned space station, delivery of payloads to Sun- synchronous and polar orbits, and military on-demand maneuvering capa- bility. The AMS was planned to be available for launch in early 1989 and would provide an alternative to the PAM-DII. The avionics, reaction control system, and airborne support equip- ment designs of the AMS would use most of the standard TOS compo- nents. Main propulsion would be provided by the 2,650-pound thrust Rocketdyne RS-51 engine. This engine was restartable and operable over extended periods. A low-thrust engine option that provided 400 pounds of thrust would also be available for the AMS. 52 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Centaur Upper Stage NASA studied and began production in the early 1980s of a modified Centaur upper stage for use with the STS for planetary and heavier geo- synchronous mission applications. The proposed modifications would increase the size of the propellant tanks to add about 50 percent more pro- pellant capacity and make the stage compatible with the Space Shuttle. This wide-body version would use the same propulsion system and about 85 percent of the existing Centaur's avionics systems. Contracts were negotiated with General Dynamics, Honeywell, Pratt & Whitney, and Teledyne for the design, development, and procurement of Centaur upper stages for the Galileo and International Solar Polar missions that were scheduled for 1986. However, following the Challenger accident, NASA determined that even with modifications, the Centaur could not comply with necessary safety requirements for use on the Shuttle. The Centaur upper stage ini- tiative was then dropped. Advanced Programs Advanced programs focused on future space transportation activities, including improving space transportation operations through the intro- duction of more advanced technologies and processes, and on servicing and protecting U.S. space assets. The following sections describe NASA's major advanced program initiatives. Several of the efforts progressed from advanced program status to operational status during this decade. Orbital Transfer Vehicle NASA's Advanced Planning/Programs Division of the Office of Space Transportation identified the need for an Orbital Transfer Vehicle (OTV) in the early 1980s, when it became obvious that a way was need- ed to transport payloads from the Space Shuttle's low-Earth orbit to a higher orbit and to retrieve and return payloads to the Shuttle or future space station. The Marshall Space Flight Center was designated as the lead center for the development effort, and the Lewis Research Center led the propulsion system studies. An untended OTV was proposed for a first flight in the early 1990s. NASA believed that the use of aerobraking was necessary to make the OTV affordable. Studies beginning in 1981 conducted at Marshall by definition phase contractors Boeing Aerospace Company and General Electric Reentry Systems determined that aerodynamic braking was an efficient fuel-saving technique for the OTV, perhaps doubling payload capacity. This technique would use the Earth's atmosphere as a braking mechanism for return trips, possibly supplemented by the use of a ballute, an inflatable drag device. When the transfer vehicle passed through the I U'NCM SYSTEMS s< atmosphere, the friction of the air against the vehicle would provide enough drag to slow the vehicle. Otherwise, a rockel engine firing would be required to brake the vehicle. Acroassist braking would save one- bum, and the extra fuel could be used to transport a larger payload to a high orbit. The aeroassisted braking could result in about a twofold Increase in the amount of payload that could be ferried to high altitudes. Boeing's studies emphasized low lifting-body designs — "low lift-to- drag ratio" — designs with a relatively low capability of lift to enable them to fly, but ones that weigh less. General Electric Reentry Systems focused on moderate lift-to-drag ratio designs— relatively moderate lift capability and somewhat heavier weight. In 1981, NASA designated the Lewis Research Center the lead cen- ter for OTV propulsion technology. This program supported technology for three advanced engine concepts that were developed by Aerojet TechSystems, Pratt & Whitney, and Rocketdyne to satisfy a NASA- supplied set of goals. The proposed engines would be used to transfer loads — both personnel and cargo — between low-Earth orbit and geosyn- chronous orbit, and beyond. In addition, because OTVs would face requirements ranging from high-acceleration round-trip transfers for resupply to very low-acceleration one-way transfers of large, flexible structures, NASA investigated variable thrust propulsion systems, which would provide high performance over a broad throttling range. In 1983, NASA chose the same three contractors to begin a program leading to the design, development, test, and engineering of the OTV. These contracts expired in 1986. NASA sponsored another competitive procurement to continue the OTV propulsion program. Funding was reduced, and only Rocketdyne and Aerojet continued the advanced engine technology development. Component testing began in 1988, and further investigations into aerobraking continued into the 1990s. The OTV would be used primarily to place NASA, DOD, and com- mercial satellites and space platforms into geosynchronous orbit. The OTV could also deliver large payloads into other orbits and boost plane- tary exploration spacecraft into high-velocity orbits approaching their mission trajectory. The vehicle was expected to use liquid oxygen-liquid hydrogen propellants. The OTVs reusable design provided for twenty flights before it had to be refurbished or replaced. Because of its reusability, the OTV would significantly reduce payload transportation costs. At the same time, that Lewis was leading propulsion studies, Marshall initiated studies in 1984 to define OTV concepts and chose Boeing Aerospace and Martin Marietta to conduct the conceptual studies. The studies examined the possibilities of both a space-based and an Earth-based OTV. Both would initially be uncrewed upper stages. The ultimate goal, however, was to develop a crewed vehicle capable of fer- rying a crew capsule to geosynchronous orbit. The vehicle would then return the crew and capsule for other missions. The development of a crew capsule for the OTV was planned for the 1990s. 54 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK The Space Shuttle would carry the Earth-based OTV into space. It would be launched from the Shuttle's payload bay or from an aft cargo carrier attached to the aft end of the Shuttle's external tank. The OTV would transfer payloads from a low orbit to a higher one. It would also retrieve payloads in high orbits and return them to the Shuttle. The OTV would then return to Earth in the Shuttle's payload bay. The OTV would separate from the Shuttle's external tank at about the same time that the payload was deployed from the orbiter's cargo bay. The two components would then join together and begin to travel to a higher orbit. This Earth- based OTV offered the advantage of performing vehicle maintenance and refueling on the ground with the help of gravity, ground facilities, and workers who do not have to wear spacesuits. A space-based OTV would be based at the future space station. It would move payloads into higher orbit from the space station and then return to its home there. It would be refueled and maintained at the space station. Studies showed cost savings for space-based OTVs. This type of OTV could be assembled in orbit rather than on the ground so it could be larger than a ground-based unit and capable of carrying more payload. Initial studies of an OTV that would be based at the space station were completed in 1985. A single-stage OTV could boost payloads of up to 7,272 kilograms to high-Earth or geosynchronous orbit. A multistage OTV could provide up to 36,363 kilograms to lunar orbit with 6,818.2 kilograms returned to low-Earth orbit. After completing its delivery or servicing mission, the OTV would use its rocket engines to start a descent. Skimming through the thin upper atmosphere (above sixty kilometers), the OTVs aerobrake would slow the OTV without consuming extra propellant. Then, because of orbital dynamics, the OTV would navigate back to a low-Earth orbit. When the OTV reached the desired orbital altitude, its rocket engines would again fire, circularizing its orbit until it was retrieved by the Space Shuttle or an orbital maneuvering vehicle (OMV) dispatched from the space station. NASA Administrator James M. Beggs stated in June 1985 that the OTV would complement the proposed OMV. The OTV would transport payloads from low-Earth orbit to destinations much higher than the OMV could reach. The majority of the payloads transported by the OTV would be delivered to geostationary orbit. Beggs envisioned that most OTVs would be based at the space station, where they would be maintained, fueled, and joined to payloads. In time, the OTV would also be used to transport people to geostationary orbit. Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle The OMV (Figure 2-17) was designed to aid satellite servicing and retrieval. This uncrewed vehicle could be characterized as a "space tug," which would move satellites and other orbiting objects from place to LAUNCH SYSTEMS 55 place above the Earth. A reusable, remotely operated unmanned propulsive vehicle to increase the range of the Sis, the OMV was designed to be used pri- marily for spacecraft delivery, retrieval, boost, deboost, and close proximity visu- al observation beyond the operating range of the Space Shuttle. The vehicle would extend the reach of the Shuttle up to approximately 2,400 kilometers. Concept definition studies were com- pleted in 1983, and development began toward a flight demonstration of the abil- ity to refuel propellant tanks of an orbit- ing satellite. In 1984, an in-flight demonstration of hydrazine fuel transfer took place successfully on STS 41-G. System definition studies were complet- ed in 1985, and in June 1986, TRW was selected by NASA for negotiations lead- ing to the award of a contract to develop the OMV. The Preliminary Requirements Review took place in 1987, and the Preliminary Design Review was held in 1988, with the Marshall Space Flight Center managing the effort. NASA planned for the OMV to be available for its first mission in 1993, when it would be remotely controlled from Earth. In the early years of use, NASA envisioned that the OMV would be deployed from the Space Shuttle for each short-duration mission and returned to Earth for servicing. Later, the vehicle would be left parked in orbit for extended periods, for use with both the Shuttle and the space station. However, the OMV was the victim of budget cuts, and the contract with TRW was can- celed in June 1990. Figure 2-17. Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle Tethered Satellite System The Tethered Satellite System (TSS) program was a cooperative effort between the government of Italy and NASA to provide the capa- bility to perform science in areas of space outside the reach of the Space Shuttle. The TSS would enable scientists to conduct experiments in the upper atmosphere and ionosphere while tethered to the Space Shuttle as its operating base. The system consisted of a satellite anchored to the Space Shuttle by a tether up to 100 kilometers long. (Tethers are long, superstrong tow lines joining orbiting objects together.) The advanced development stage of the program was completed in 1983, and management for the TSS moved to the Space Transportation 56 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK and Capability Development Division. In 1984, a study and laboratory program was initiated to define and evaluate several applications of teth- ers in space. Possible applications included power generation, orbit rais- ing in the absence of propellants, artificial gravity, and space vehicle constellations. In 1986, the Critical Design and Manufacturing Reviews were conducted on the satellite and the deployer. In 1988, manufacture and qualification of the flight subsystems continued. The twelve-meter deployer boom, reel motor, and on-board computer were all qualified and delivered. Also, manufacture of the deployer structure was initiated, and the tether control mechanisms were functionally tested. A test program was completed for the satellite structural and engineering models. The flight satellite structure was due for delivery in early 1989. The develop- ment of the scientific instruments continued, with delivery of flight satel- lite instruments scheduled for early 1989. The first TSS mission was scheduled for 1991. Advanced Launch System The Advanced Launch System, a joint NASA-DOD effort, was a sys- tems definition and technology advanced development program aimed at defining a new family of launchers for use after 2000, including a new heavy-lift vehicle. President Reagan signed a report to Congress in January 1988 that officially created the program. Within this DOD- funded program, NASA managed the liquid engine system and advanced development efforts. Next Manned Launch Vehicle In 1988, attention was focused on examining various next-generation manned launch vehicle concepts. Three possible directions were consid- ered: Space Shuttle evolution, a personnel launch system, and an advanced manned launch system. The evolution concept referred to the option of improving the current Shuttle design through the incorporation of upgraded technologies and capabilities. The personnel launch system would be a people carrier and have no capability to launch payloads into space. The advanced manned launch system represented an innovative crewed transportation system. Preliminary studies on all three possibili- ties progressed during 1988. Shuttle- C Shuttle-C (cargo) was a concept for a large, uncrewed launch vehicle that would make maximum use of existing Space Shuttle systems with a cargo canister in place of the orbiter. This proposed cargo-carrying launch vehicle would be able to lift 45,454.5 to 68,181.8 kilograms to low-Earth orbit. This payload capacity is two to three times greater than the Space Shuttle payload capability. I Al'NCII SYSTEMS 57 In October l ( )S7, NASA selected three contractors lo perform the first of a two-phase systems definition study for Shultle-C. The efforts focused on vehicle configuration details, including the cargo element's length and diameter, the number of liquid-fueled main engines, and an operations concept evaluation that included ground and flight support systems. A major purpose of the study was to determine whether Shuttle- C would be cost effective in supporting the space station. Using Shuttle- C could free the Space Shuttle for STS-unique missions, such as solar system exploration, astronomy, life sciences, space station crew rotation, and logistics and materials processing experiments. Shuttle-C also would be used to launch planetary missions and serve as a test bed for new Shuttle boosters. The results of the Shuttle-C efforts were to be coordinated with other ongoing advanced launch systems studies to enable a joint steering group, composed of DOD and NASA senior managers. The purpose of the steer- ing group was to formulate a national heavy-lift vehicle strategy that best accommodated both near-term requirements and longer term objectives for reducing space transportation operational costs. Advanced Upper Stages Advanced missions in the future would require even greater capabil- ities to move from low- to high-Earth orbit and beyond. During 1988, activity in the advanced upper stages area focused on the space transfer vehicle (STV) and the possibility of upgrading the existing Centaur upper stage. The STV concept involved a cryogenic hydrogen-oxygen vehicle that could transport payloads weighing from 909.1 to 8,636 kilograms from low-Earth orbit to geosynchronous orbit or the lunar surface, as well as for unmanned planetary missions. The STV concept could potentially lead to a vehicle capable of supporting human exploration missions to the Moon or Mars. Advanced Solid Rocket Motor The Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM) was an STS improve- ment intended to replace the RSRM that was used on STS-26. The ASRM would be based on a better design than the former rocket motor, contain more reliable safety margins, and use automated manufacturing tech- niques. The ASRM would also enhance Space Shuttle performance by offering a potential increase of payload mass to orbit from 5454.5 kilo- grams to 9090.9 kilograms for the Shuttle. In addition, a new study on liq- uid rocket boosters was conducted that examined the feasibility of replacing SRMs with liquid engines. In March 1988, NASA submitted the "Space Shuttle Advanced Solid Rocket Motor Acquisition Plan" to Congress. This plan reviewed pro- curement strategy for the ASRM and discussed implementation plans and schedules. Facilities in Mississippi would be used for production 58 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK and testing of the new rocket motor. In August 1988, NASA issued an request for proposals to design, develop, test, and evaluate the ASRM. Contract award was anticipated for early 1989, and the first flight using the new motor was targeted for 1994. LAUNCH SYSTEMS 59 -9 ^3 K S o a *^3 a ^3 a a I I I I o o o o ^f oo © o o o o o o o o O o o o p o p r->" in r»" »o (N O ^ M l/-> < CO u a o. < d Q. o o o , o o o SO ON ON 2 o o o g o o o ^ m o o ^ - ^ oo 2 =3 -O C < '5b o x> .5 I I -c Oh tt U * O Oh o G ^ a) +-> — O CUO c a •O Qh s ^ S G GO -o u O o c cd 00 Vh 2 CO o^S E bfl O o > < 60 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK 3C 8> 1^ 3s Os o © I s a O o o o o o o o a r-^ o en o> 5J OS \n r^ © m «n m ^ ?s o o o o o o o o ^ «— i o so so H H S S S 3 £ £ © © © © © © © © -H i-H rH (N Cfl 3 3 3 ^ 3 < < < d < w w w O W 000S2 o o o o O CO ©_ p. 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Transfer Orbit Stage Characteristics Length Weight With Lull Propellanl Load Airborne Support Equipment Weight Payload to Geotransfer Orbit Payload to Planetary and High-Energy Orbits Propulsion System Capacity 3.3 m 10,886 kg 1 ,450 kg 6,080 kg from Shuttle 5,227 kg from Titan III and IV Orbis 21 solid rocket motor and attitude control system 1,360 kg to 3,175 kg capacity CHAPTER THREE SPACE TRANSPORTATION/ HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT CHAPTER THREE SPACE TRANSPORTATION/ HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT Introduction In April 1981, after a hiatus of six years, American astronauts returned to space when they left the launch pad aboard the Space Shuttle orbiter Columbia. This chapter describes the major technology used by the Space Shuttle; each Space Shuttle mission through 1988, their pay- loads, and the operations surrounding the missions; the events surround- ing the 1986 Challenger accident and the changes that occurred as a result of the accident; and the development of the Space Station program through 1988, one of NASA's major initiatives of the decade. It also describes the budget for human spaceflight at NASA and the management of human spaceflight activities. The Last Decade Reviewed (1969-1978) The successful culmination of three major spaceflight programs and steady progress in the Space Shuttle program highlighted NASA's second decade. The Apollo program concluded with its lunar landings; Sky lab demonstrated the possibility of a space-based platform that could support human life over an extended period of time; and the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project showed that international cooperation in the space program was possible in the face of political differences. Steady progress in the human spaceflight program encouraged NASA to commit major resources to the Shuttle program. The successful Apollo lunar expeditions caught the imagination of the American public. The first lunar landing took place on July 20, 1969, and was followed by the lunar landings of Apollo 12, 14, 15, 16, and 17. (Apollo 13 experienced a major anomaly, and the mission was aborted before a lunar landing could take place.) However, by the later missions, enthusiasm over the scientific and technological advances gave way to budget concerns, which ended the program with Apollo 17. Skylab was the first American experimental space station to be built and could be considered a predecessor of the space station efforts of the 1980s. Skylab was an orbital workshop constructed from a Saturn IVB 107 108 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK stage. It was launched in May 1973 and visited by three crews over the next nine months, each remaining at the orbiting laboratory for increas- ingly extended periods of time. The mission confirmed that humans could productively function in a space environment. It also provided solar observations, Earth resource studies, and tests of space manufacturing techniques. The 1975 Apollo-Soyuz Test Project involved the docking of an American Apollo vehicle and a Soviet Soyuz vehicle. Joined by a dock- ing module, the two crews conducted joint activities on their docked vehi- cles for two days before separating. Even though many hoped that this program would be the first of ongoing cooperative ventures between the two superpowers, the political situation prevented further efforts during this decade. Although a six-year period interrupted human spaceflights between the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz mission and the first Shuttle flight in 1981, devel- opment of the new Space Shuttle moved slowly but steadily toward its inaugural launch in 1981. The major component of the Space Transportation System (STS), the Shuttle would perform a variety of tasks in orbit, including conducting scientific and technological experi- ments as well as serving as NASA's primary launch vehicle. NASA received presidential approval to proceed with the program in August 1972, and Rockwell International, the prime Shuttle contractor, rolled out Enterprise, the first test orbiter, in September 1976, setting off a series of system and flight tests. The production of Columbia, the first orbiter that would actually circle the Earth, already under way, continued during this time. Even though qualifying Columbia for spaceflight took longer than anticipated, as the decade closed, NASA was eagerly awaiting its first orbital flight test scheduled for the spring of 1981. Overview of Space Transportation/Human Spaceflight (1979-1988) The inauguration of Space Shuttle flights dominated the decade from 1979 through 1988. Twenty-seven Shuttle flights took place, and twenty- six of them were successful. However, from January 28, 1986, the mem- ory of STS 51-L dominated the thoughts of many Americans and effectively overshadowed NASA's considerable achievements. The loss of life and, in particular, the loss of individuals who were not career astro- nauts haunted both the public and the agency. The agency conducted a far-reaching examination of the accident and used the findings of the independent Rogers Commission and the NASA STS 51-L Data and Design Analysis Task Force to implement a series of recommendations that improved the human spaceflight program from both a technical and management perspective. Two successful Shuttle missions followed at the end of the decade, demonstrating that NASA was able to recover from its worst accident ever. The first twenty-four Shuttle missions and the two following the Challenger accident deployed an assortment of government and com- SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT lo ( ; mercial satellites and performed an array of scientific and engineering experiments. The three Spacelab missions highlighted NASA's Investiga tions aboard the Shuttle, studying everything from plant life and monkey nutrition to x-ray emissions from clusters of galaxies. The 1980s also included a push toward the development of a perma- nently occupied space station. Announced by President Ronald Reagan in his 1984 State of the Union address, which directed NASA to have a per- manently manned space station in place within ten years, NASA invested considerable time and money toward bringing it about. The European Space Agency (ESA), Canada, and Japan signed on as major participants in both the financial and technical areas of the Space Station program, and by the end of 1988, Space Station Freedom had completed the Definition and Preliminary Design Phase of the project and had moved into the Design and Development Phase. Management of the Space Transportation/Human Spaceflight Program The organizational elements of the space transportation program have been addressed in Chapter 2, "Launch Systems." Briefly, Code M, at dif- ferent times called the Office of Space Transportation, Office of Space Transportation Systems (Acquisition), and Office of Space Flight, man- aged space transportation activities for the decade from 1979 through 1988. From November 1979 to August 1982, Code M split off the opera- tions function of the spaceflight program into Code O, Office of Space Operations. Also, in 1984, the Office of Space Station, Code S, super- seded the Code M Space Station Task Force, in response to President Reagan's directive to develop and build an occupied space station within the next ten years. Space Station program management is addressed later in this section. The Space Shuttle program was the major segment of NASA's National Space Transportation System (NSTS), managed by the Office of Space Flight at NASA Headquarters. (The Space Shuttle Program Office was renamed the National Space Transportation System Program Office in March 1983.) The office was headed by an associate administrator who reported directly to the NASA administrator and was charged with pro- viding executive leadership, overall direction, and effective accomplish- ment of the Space Shuttle and associated programs, including expendable launch vehicles. The associate administrator for spaceflight exercised institutional man- agement authority over the activities of the NASA field organizations whose primary functions were related to the NSTS program. These were the Johnson Space Center in Houston, the Kennedy Space Center at Cape Canaveral, Florida, the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, and the Stennis Space Center (formerly National Space Technology Laboratories) in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. Organizational elements of the NSTS office were located at NASA Headquarters, Johnson, Kennedy, Marshall, and at the Vandenberg Launch Site in California. 110 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Director NSTS Assistant Director Headquarters (HQ) Operant' Utilizati HQ Program Plannii & Control HQ SHM&QA HQ Deputy Director NSTS Program Johnson Space Center (JSC Manager for SR&QA JSC NSTS Engineering Integration JSC Deputy Director NSTS Operations Kennedy Space Center (KSC) NSTS Resident Office Vandenbere Launch Site (VLS) NSTS Admin Office JSC Operations Integration JSC Operations Integration KSC Operations Integration MSFC NSTS Management Integration j"sc NSTS Progr; Control JSC NSTS Integration & Operations JSC Shuttle Projects Office Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) 6595TH ATG VLS Support Orbiter & GFE Projects JSC External Tank Projeci MSFC Management & Operations KSC SSME Project MSFC Figure 3-1. NSTS Organization The organization of the NSTS was divided into four levels (Figure 3-1). The NSTS director served as the Level I manager and was respon- sible for the overall program requirements, budgets, and schedules. The NSTS deputy directors were Level II managers and were responsible for the management and integration of all program elements, including inte- grated flight and ground system requirements, schedules, and budgets. NSTS project managers located at Johnson, Kennedy, and Marshall were classified as Level III managers and were responsible for managing the design, qualification, and manufacturing of Space Shuttle components, as well as all launch and landing operations. NSTS design authority person- nel and contractors were Level IV managers (not shown in Figure 3-1) and were responsible for the design, development, manufacturing, test, and qualification of Shuttle systems. Initially, the NSTS was based at Johnson Space Center, which was designated as the lead center for the Space Shuttle program. Johnson had management responsibility for program control and overall systems engi- neering and systems integration. Johnson was also responsible for the development, production, and delivery of the Shuttle orbiter and managed the contract of the orbiter manufacturer. Kennedy Space Center was responsible for the design of the launch and recovery facilities. Kennedy served as the launch and landing site for the Shuttle development flights and for most operational missions. Marshall Space Flight Center was responsible for the development, pro- duction, and delivery of the Space Shuttle main engines, solid rocket boosters, and external tank. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 1 1 I Robert F, Thompson served as manager of the Space Shuttle Program Office until 1981, when Glynn S. Lunney assumed the position of NSTS program manager, lie had been with NASA since 1959 and involved in the Shuttle program since 1975. Lunney held the position of manager until his retirement in April 1985. He was replaced by Arnold I). Aldrich in July 1985, a twenty-six-year NASA veteran and head of the Space Shuttle Projects Office at Johnson Space Center. Aldrich's appointment was part of a general streamlining of the NSTS that took effect in August of that year, which reflected the maturation of the Shuttle program. In that realignment, the Level II NSTS organization at Johnson was renamed the NSTS Office and assimilated the Projects Office, consolidating all pro- gram elements under Aldrich's direction. Richard H. Kohrs, who had been acting program manager, and Lt. Col. Thomas W. Redmond, U.S. Air Force, were named deputy managers. Aldrich took charge of the integration of all Space Shuttle program elements, including flight software, orbiter, external tank, solid rocket boosters, main engines, payloads, payload carriers, and Shuttle facilities. His responsibilities also included directing the planning for NSTS opera- tions and managing orbiter and government-furnished equipment projects. Post- Challenger Restructuring The Challenger accident brought about major changes in the man- agement and operation of the NSTS. The Rogers Commission concluded that flaws in the management structure and in communication at all lev- els were elements that needed to be addressed and rectified. Two of the recommendations (Recommendations II and V, respectively) addressed the management structure and program communication. In line with these recommendations, NASA announced in November 1986 a new Space Shuttle management structure for the NSTS. These changes aimed at clar- ifying the focal points of authority and responsibility in the Space Shuttle program and to establish clear lines of communication in the information- transfer and decision-making processes. Associate Administrator for Space Flight Admiral Richard Truly issued a detailed description of the restructured NSTS organization and operation in a memorandum released on November 5, 1986. As part of the restructuring, the position of director, NSTS, was established, with Arnold Aldrich, who had been manager, NSTS, at the Johnson Space Center since July 1985, assuming that position in Washington, D.C. He had full respon- sibility and authority for the operation and conduct of the NSTS program. This included total program control, with full responsibility for budget, schedule, and balancing program content. He was responsible for overall program requirements and performance and had the approval authority for top-level program requirements, critical hardware waivers, and budget authorization adjustments that exceeded a predetermined level. He report- ed directly to the associate administrator for spaceflight and had two deputies, one for the program and one for operations. 112 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK NASA appointed Richard H. Kohrs, who had been deputy manager, NSTS. at the Johnson Space Center, to the position of deputy director, NSTS program. He was responsible for the day-to-day management and execution of the Space Shuttle program, including detailed program plan- ning, direction, scheduling, and STS systems configuration management. Other responsibilities encompassed systems engineering and integration for the STS vehicle, ground facilities, and cargoes. The NSTS Engineering Integration Office, reporting to the deputy director, NSTS program, was established and directly participated with each NSTS pro- ject element (main engine, solid rocket booster, external tank, orbiter, and launch and landing system). Kohrs was located at Johnson, but he report- ed directly to the NSTS director. Five organizational elements under the deputy director, NSTS pro- gram, were charged with accomplishing the management responsibilities of the program. The first four was located at Johnson, and the last was at the Marshall Space Flight Center. NSTS Engineering Integration • NSTS Management Integration • NSTS Program Control • NSTS Integration and Operations Shuttle Projects Office The Shuttle Projects Office had overall management and coordina- tion responsibility for the Marshall elements involved in the Shuttle pro- gram: the solid rocket boosters, external tank, and main engines. NASA named Captain Robert L. Crippen to the position of deputy director, NSTS operations, reporting directly to the NSTS director and responsible for all operational aspects of STS missions. This included such functions as final vehicle preparation, mission execution, and return of the vehicle for processing for its next flight. In addition, the deputy director, NSTS operations, presented the Flight Readiness Review, which was chaired by the associate administrator for spaceflight, managed the final launch decision process, and chaired the Mission Management Team. Three operations integration offices located at Johnson, the Kennedy Space Center, and Marshall carried out the duties of the NSTS deputy director. In addition to the duties of the director and deputy directors described above, Admiral Truly's memorandum addressed the role of the centers and project managers in the programmatic chain and budget pro- cedures and control. In the programmatic chain, the managers of the pro- ject elements located at the various field centers reported to the deputy director, NSTS program. Depending on the individual center organiza- tion, this chain was either direct (such as the Orbiter Project Office at Johnson) or via an intermediate office (such as the Shuttle Projects Office at Marshall). The NSTS program budget continued to be submitted through the center directors to the director, NSTS, who had total funding authority for SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT i n the program. The deputy directors, NSTS program and NS IS operations, each provided an assessment of the budget submittal to the director, NSTS, as an integral part of the decision process. The restructuring also revitalized the Office of Space Flight Management Council. The council consisted of the associate administra- tor for spaceflight and the directors of Marshall, Kennedy, Johnson, and the NSTS. This group met regularly to review Space Shuttle program progress and to provide an independent and objective assessment of the status of the overall program. Management relationships in the centralized NSTS organization were configured into four basic management levels, which were designed to reduce the potential for conflict between the program organizations and the NASA institutional organizations. Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance Although not part of the Office of Space Flight, the Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance (Code Q) resulted from the findings of the Rogers Commission, which recommended that NASA establish such an office with direct authority throughout the agency. NASA established this office in July 1986, with George A. Rodney, formerly of Martin Marietta, named as its first associate administrator (Figure 3-2). The objectives of the office were to ensure that a NASA Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance program monitored equipment status, design val- idation problem analysis, and system acceptability in agency wide plans and programs. Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance Deputy AA Space Flight Safety Panel Support Staff Deputy AA for Systems Assurance Data Syatems/Trend Analysis Division Syatems Assessment Division Reliability, Maintainability & Quality Assurance Division Safety Division Programs Assurance Division Center Safety, Realiability & Quality, Assurance Directories Figure 3-2. Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance Office Organization 114 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK The responsibilities of the associate administrator included the over- sight of safety, reliability, and quality assurance functions related to all NASA activities and programs. In addition, he was responsible for the direction of reporting and documentation of problems, problem resolu- tion, and trends associated with safety. Management of the Space Station Program NASA first officially committed to a space station on May 20, 1982, when it established the Space Station Task Force under the direction of John D. Hodge, assistant for space station planning and analysis, Office of the Associate Deputy Administrator in the Office of Space Flight (Code M). Hodge reported to Philip E. Culbertson, associate deputy administrator, and drew from space station-related activities of each of the NASA program offices and field centers. The task force was responsible for the development of the program- matic aspects of a space station as they evolved, including mission analy- sis, requirements definition, and program management. It initiated industry participation with Phase A (conceptual analysis) studies that focused on user requirements and their implications for design. The task force developed the space station concept that formed the basis for President Reagan's decision to commit to a space station. The task force remained in existence until April 6, 1984, when, in response to Reagan's January 1984 State of the Union address, NASA established an interim Space Station Program Office. Culbertson, in addi- tion to his duties as associate deputy administrator, assumed the role of acting director of the interim office, with Hodge (former director of the Space Station Task Force) as his acting deputy. The interim office was responsible for the direction of the Space Station program and for the planning of the organizational structure of a permanent program office. Also during the first half of 1984, NASA formulated the Space Station program management structure. Associate administrators and center directors agreed to use a "work package" concept and a three-level management structure consisting of a Headquarters office, a program office at the Johnson Space Center, and project offices located at the var- ious NASA centers. The interim office became permanent on August 1, 1984, when NASA established Code S, Office of Space Station. Culbertson became the Associate Administrator for Space Station, and Hodge served as the deputy associate administrator. Culbertson served until December 1985, when he was succeeded by Hodge, who became acting associate administrator. The Office of Space Station was responsible for developing the sta- tion and conducting advanced development and technology activities, advanced planning, and other activities required to carry out Reagan's direction to NASA to develop a permanently manned space station with- in a decade. The program continued using the three-tiered management structure developed earlier in the year. The Headquarters Level A office SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT l is encompassed the Office of the Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Station and provided overall policy and program direction for the Space Station program. The Level U Space Station Program Office at Johnson in Houston reported to the Headquarters office. Space Station Level C project offices at other NASA centers also were responsible to the Office of Space Station through the Johnson program office. Johnson had been named lead center for the Space Station program in February 1984. The associate administrator was supported by a chief scientist, pol- icy and plans and program support offices, and business management, engineering, utilization and performance requirements, and operations divisions. On June 30, 1986, Andrew J. Stofan, who had been director of NASA's Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, was appointed Associate Administrator for Space Station. Along with this appointment, NASA Administrator James C. Fletcher announced several management struc- tural actions that were designed to strengthen technical and management capabilities in preparation for moving into the development phase of the Space Station program. The decision to create the new structure resulted from recommenda- tions made by a committee headed by former Apollo program manager General Samuel C. Phillips. General Phillips had conducted a review of space station management as part of a long-range assessment of NASA's overall capabilities and requirements, including relationships between the various space centers and NASA Headquarters. His report reflected dis- cussions with representatives from all the NASA centers and the contrac- tors involved in the definition and preliminary design of the space station, as well as officials from other offices within NASA. His report recom- mended the formation of a program office, which was implemented in October 1986 when NASA Administrator Fletcher named Thomas L. Moser director of the Space Station Program Office, reporting to Associate Administrator Stofan. Fletcher stated that the new space station management structure was consistent with recommendations of the Rogers Commission, which investigated the Space Shuttle Challenger accident. The commission had recommended that NASA reconsider management structures, lines of communication, and decision-making processes to ensure the flow of important information to proper decision levels. As part of the reconfigu- ration of the management structure, the Johnson Space Center was no longer designated as Level B. Instead, a Level A' was substituted, locat- ed in the Washington metropolitan area, assuming the same functions Johnson previously held (Figure 3-3). Fletcher said the program would use the services of a top-level, non- hardware support contractor. In addition to the systems engineering role, the program office would contain a strong operations function to ensure that the program adequately addressed the intensive needs of a permanent facility in space. 116 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Level A NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC • Policy and overall program direction Level A Support Contractors Washington, DC Management, administrative, office automation, documentation, graphics Level A' .New Level A' originally designated as Level B located at JSC Reston, Virginia Program management and technical content Program Support Contractors Reston, Virginia a Level C Various NASA Centers <^ Project Management: element definition and development Contractors Multiple Locations Detail design, manufacturing, integration and test, plus engineering and technical services Figure 3-3. Space Station Program Management Approach NASA established a systems integration field office in Houston as part of the program office organization. Project managers at the Goddard Space Flight Center, Johnson, Kennedy, Lewis, and Marshall reported functionally to the associate administrator. They coordinated with their respective center directors to keep them informed of significant program matters. NASA assigned John Hodge the job of streamlining and clarifying NASA's procurement and management approach for the Space Station program and issuing instructions related to work package assignments, the procurement of hardware and services, and the selection of contrac- tors for the development phase of the program. In addition, NASA tasked Hodge with developing a program overview document that would define the role automation and robotics would play in the Space Station program and with conducting further studies in the areas of international involve- ment, long-term operations, user accommodations, and servicing. At the same time, Fletcher authorized NASA to procure a Technical and Management Information System (TMIS), a computer-based infor- mation network. It would link NASA and contractor facilities together and provide engineering services, such as computer-aided design, as well as management support on items such as schedules, budgets, labor, and facilities. TMIS was implemented in 1988. The Space Station Program Office was responsible for the overall technical direction and content of the Space Station program, including systems engineering and analysis, configuration management, and the integration of all elements into an operating system that was responsive to customer needs. NASA approved a further reorganization of the Office of Space Station in December 1986. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT I 17 Information Systems Division Safety, Reliability & Quality A'. Mil. in. I Senior Engineer Resources & Administration Division assoi ian Administrator Administrator Uoputy Associate Administrator tor Development Special Assistant Policy Division Chief Scientist Operations Division Utilization Division Strategic Plans & Programs Division Program Director Figure 3-4. Office of Space Station Organization (December 1986) In addition to the associate administrator and two deputies, the approved Space Station program organization included a chief scientist, a senior engineer, and six division directors responsible for resources and administration, policy, utilization, operations, strategic plans and pro- grams, and information systems. There was also a position of special assistant to the associate administrator (Figure 3-4). Andrew Stofan continued in the position of associate administrator. Franklin D. Martin continued as the deputy associate administrator for space station. Previously director of space and Earth sciences at the Goddard Space Flight Center, Martin had been named to the post in September 1986. Thomas L. Moser became the deputy associate administrator for development in October 1986, a new position established by the reorga- nization. In this position, Moser also served as the program director for the Office of Space Station, directing the Washington area office that was responsible for overall technical direction and content of the Space Station program, including systems engineering and analysis, program planning and control, configuration management, and the integration of all the elements into an operating system. The creation of the program director position was the central element of program restructuring in response to recommendations of the committee headed by General Phillips. The Phillips Committee conducted an extensive examination of the Space Station organization. As a result of this restructuring, NASA centers performed a major portion of the systems integration through Space Station field offices that were established at Goddard, Johnson, Kennedy, Lewis, and Marshall. The space station project manager at each of the five centers headed the field office and reported directly to the program manager in Washington. 118 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK A program support contractor assisted the program office and field offices in systems engineering, analysis, and integration activities. Also as part of this reorganization, NASA named Daniel H. Herman senior engineer, a new staff position. The senior engineer advised the associate administrator on the policy, schedule, cost, and user implica- tions of technical decisions. Previously, Herman was director of the engi- neering division, whose functions and responsibilities were absorbed by Moser's organization, and was on the original Space Station Task Force, which defined the basic architecture of the space station system. David C. Black continued to serve as chief scientist for the space sta- tion. Black, chief scientist of the Space Research Directorate at the Ames Research Center, had served as chief scientist for the space station since the post was created in 1984. Paul G. Anderson acted as the director of the Resources and Administration Division, which combined the former business manage- ment and program support organizations. Anderson previously served as comptroller at the Lewis Research Center. Margaret Finarelli, director of the Policy Division, had functional responsibility for the former policy and plans organization. This element of the reorganization reflected the strong policy coordination role required of the Space Station Program Office in working with other ele- ments of NASA, the international partners, and other external organiza- tions. Prior to this assignment, Finarelli was chief of the International Planning and Programs Office in the International Affairs Division at NASA Headquarters. Richard E. Halpern became the director of the Utilization Division, which had responsibility for developing user requirements for the space station, including science and applications, technology development, com- mercial users, and the assurance that those requirements could be effi- ciently and economically accommodated on the space station. Halpern was the director of the Microgravity Science and Applications Division in the Office of Space Science and Applications prior to accepting this position. The Operations Division had the responsibility for developing an overall philosophy and management approach for space station system operations, including user support, prelaunch and postlanding activities, logistics support, and financial management. Granville Paules served as acting director of the Operations Division. Under the new organization, NASA formed two new divisions, Strategic Plans and Programs and Information Systems. The Information Systems Division provided a management focus for the total end-to-end information system complex for Space Station. Alphonso V. Diaz assumed the position of director of strategic plans and programs and had responsibility for ensuring that the evolution of the space station infrastructure was well planned and coordinated with other NASA offices and external elements. As part of its responsibility, this division managed and acted as the single focus for space station automa- SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT \ { ) lion and robotics activities and program-focused technology and advanced development work. The Strategic Plans and Program Division under Mr. Diaz became responsible for determining requirements and managing the Transition Definition program at Level A. The division maintained the Space Station Evolution Technical and Management Plan, which detailed evolution planning for the long-term use of the space station. The Level A' Space Station Program Office in Reston, Virginia, managed the program, including provision for the "hooks and scars," which were design features for the addition or update of computer software (hooks) or hardware (scars). The Langley Evolution Definition Office chaired the agencywide Evolution Working Group, which provided interagency communication and coordination of station evolution, planning, and interfaces with the baseline Work Packages (Level C). (Work Packages are addressed later in this chapter.) William P. Raney, who had served as director of the Utilization and Performance Requirements Division, served as special assistant to the associate administrator. Stofan served as Associate Administrator for Space Station until his retirement from NASA in April 1988, when he was replaced by James B. Odom. Money for Human Spaceflight As with money for launch systems, Congress funded human space- flight entirely from the Research and Development (R&D) appropriation through FY 1983. Beginning with FY 1984, the majority of funds for human spaceflight came from the Space Flight, Control, and Data Communications (SFC&DC) appropriation. Only funds for the Space Station and Spacelab programs remained with R&D. In FY 1985, Space Station became a program office with its own budget. Spacelab remained in the Office of Space Flight. As seen in Table 3-1, appropriated funding levels for human space- flight for most years met NASA's budget requests as submitted to Congress. The last column in the table shows the actual amounts that were programmed for the major budget items. Program funding generally increased during 1979-1988 (Table 3-2). However, the reader must note that these figures are all current year money — that is, the dollar amounts do not take into account the reduced buying power caused by inflation. In addition, the items that are included in a major budget category change from one year to the next, depending on the current goals and resources of the agency and of Congress. Thus, it is difficult to compare dollar amounts because the products or services that those dollars are intended to buy may differ from year to year. Tables 3-3 through 3-10 show funding levels for individual pro- grams within the human spaceflight category. 120 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Space Station NASA's initial estimate of the U.S. investment in the Space Station program was $8 billion in 1984 dollars. By March 1988, this estimate had grown to $14.5 billion, even though, in 1987, the National Research Council had priced the Space Station program at $31.8 billion. 1 President Reagan strongly endorsed the program and persuaded an ambivalent Congress of its importance. Program funding reflected both his persuasive powers and the uncertainty in which members of Congress looked at the space station, who took the view that it had little real scien- tific or technological purpose. The congressional Office of Technology Assessment reported that Congress should not commit to building a space station until space goals were more clear and that the potential uses of the proposed station did not justify the $8 billion price tag. Congress passed the FY 1985 appropriation of $155.5 million for starting the design and development work on the space station based on NASA's initial $8 billion figure. The FY 1986 appropriation reduced the Administration's request from $230 million to $205 million. President Reagan's FY 1987 budget asked for $410 million for the Space Station program, doubling the station funds from the previous year. Congress approved this increase in August 1986, which would move space station into the development phase toward planned operation by the mid-1990s. However, Congress placed limitations on the appropriation; it stipulated that NASA funds could not be spent to reorganize the program without congressional approval. In addition, $150 million was to be held back until NASA met several design and assembly requirements set by the House Appropriations Committee. About $260 million of the $410 million were to be spent for Phase B activities, and the other $150 million was reserved for initial hardware development. NASA must comply with the following conditions: a minimum of thirty-seven and a half kilowatts of power for initial operating capability, rather than the twenty-five kilowatts envisioned by NASA; a fully equipped materials processing laboratory by the sixth Space Shuttle flight and before crew habitat was launched; early launch of scientific payloads; and deployment of U.S. core elements before foreign station elements. 2 During the next month, NASA Administrator James Fletcher stated that the $8 billion estimated for the Space Station program was now seen to be insufficient and that the station must either receive additional funds or be scaled down. The Reagan Administration submitted a request in 'National Research Council, Report of the Committee on the Space Station of the National Research Council (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, September 1987). 2 Report to accompany Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations Budget, 1987, House of Representatives. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPAC III JC ,1 II 121 January L987 for $767 million for the Space Station program. However, alter much debate, which raised the possibility of freezing the entire pro- gram, Congress appropriated only $425 million, hut again, conditions were attached. In the FY 1988 Continuing Resolution that funded the pro- gram, Congress ordered NASA to provide a rescoping plan for the space station. In addition, only $200 million of the $425 million was to be avail- able before June 1, 1988, while the rescoping was under discussion. By the time the rescoping plan had gone to Congress, the cost of the Station was up to $14.5 billion. Further talks in Congress later during the year proposed reducing funding for FY 1989 to an even lower level. The Space Transportation System This section focuses on the structure and operation of the equipment and systems used in the Space Transportation System (STS) and describes the mission and flight operations. The overview provides a brief chronology of the system's development. The next section looks at the orbiter as the prime component of STS. (The launch-related elements — that is, the external tank, solid rocket boosters, main engines, and the propulsion system in general — have been addressed previously in Chapter 2, "Launch Systems.") The last part of this section addresses STS mission operations and support. A vast quantity of data exists on the Space Shuttle, and this document presents only a subset of the available material. It is hoped that the pri- mary subject areas have been treated adequately and that the reader will get a useful overview of this complex system. It is highly recommended that readers who wish to acquire more detailed information consult the NSTS Shuttle Reference Manual (1988). 3 Overview The history of NASA's STS began early in the 1970s when President Richard Nixon proposed the development of a reusable space transporta- tion system. The NASA Historical Data Book, Volume III, 1969-1978, presents an excellent account of events that took place during those early days of the program. 4 By 1979, all major STS elements were proceeding in test and manu- facture, and major ground test programs were approaching completion. NASA completed the design certification review of the overall Space Shuttle configuration in April 1979. Development testing throughout the 'NSTS Shuttle Reference Manual (1988), available both through the NASA History Office and on-line through the NASA Kennedy Space Center Home Page. 4 Linda Neuman Ezell, NASA Historical Data Book, Volume III: Programs and Projects, 1969-1978 (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4012, 1988). 122 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK program was substantially complete, and the program was qualifying flight-configured systems. The orbiter's structural test article was under subcontract for struc- tural testing and would ultimately be converted to become the second orbital vehicle, Challenger. The development of Columbia was proceed- ing more slowly than anticipated, with much work remaining to be com- pleted before the first flight, then scheduled for late 1980. The main engine had accumulated more than 50,000 seconds of test time toward its goal of 80,000 seconds before the first orbital flight, and the first external tank that would be used during flight had been delivered as well as three test tanks. Three flight tanks were also being manufactured for flight in the orbital flight test program. By the end of 1979, Morton Thiokol, the solid rocket booster contractor, had completed four development firings of the solid rocket boosters, and the qualification firing program had start- ed. Two qualification motor firings had been made, and one more was scheduled before the first flight. Most of the rocket segments for the first flight boosters had been delivered to Kennedy Space Center. All launch and landing facilities at Kennedy were complete and in place for the first orbital flight. Ground support equipment and the com- puterized launch-processing installations were almost complete, and soft- ware validation was progressing. All hardware for the launch processing system had been delivered, simulation support was continuing for the development of checkout procedures, and checkout software was being developed and validated. By the end of 1979, nine commercial and foreign users had reserved space on Space Shuttle flights. Together with NASA's own payloads and firm commitments from the Department of Defense (DOD) and other U.S. government agencies, the first few years of STS operations were fully booked. During 1980, testing and manufacture of all major system continued, and by the end of 1980, major ground-test programs neared completion. The first flight-configuration Space Shuttle stood on the launch pad. Additional testing of the vehicle was under way; qualification testing of flight-configured elements continued toward a rescheduled launch in the spring of 1981. In December 1980, Columbia was in final processing at the Kennedy Space Center. The main engines had surpassed their goal of 80,000 sec- onds of engine test time, with more than 90,000 seconds completed. Technicians had mated the orbiter with the solid rocket boosters and external tank in November and rolled it out onto the launch pad in December. Contractors had delivered the final flight hardware, which was in use for vehicle checkout. Hardware and thermal protection system cer- tifications were nearly complete. Further manufacture and testing of the external tanks and solid rocket boosters had also been completed. The Kennedy launch site facilities were completed during 1980 in anticipation of the first launch. The computerized launch processing sys- tem had been used extensively for Space Shuttle testing and facility acti- SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 123 \ation. The high-energy fuel systems had been checked out, and the inte grated test o\' the Shuttle was complete. The mission control center and Shuttle mission simulator facilities at the Johnson Space Center were ready to support the first Shuttle flight. Both the flight crew and ground flight controllers had used these facilities extensively for training and procedure development and verification. Seven full-duration (fifty-four-hour) integrated simulations had been suc- cessfully conducted, with numerous ascent, orbit, entry, and landing runs completed. The mission flight rules and launch-commit criteria had also been completed. Follow-on orbiter production was in progress, leading to the four- orbiter fleet for the STS's future needs. The structural test article was being modified to a flight-configured orbiter, Challenger. Secondary and primary structural installations were under way, and thermal protection installations had begun for vehicle delivery in June 1982. The Space Shuttle program made its orbital debut with its first two flights in 1981. All major mission objectives were met on both flights. Details of these missions and other STS missions through 1988 appear in later sections of this chapter. The following pages describe the orbiter's structure, major systems, and operations, including crew training. Because this volume concen- trates on the period from 1979 through 1988, the wording reflects con- figurations and activities as they existed during that decade. However, most of the Space Shuttle's physical characteristics and operations have continued beyond 1988 and are still valid. Orbiter Structure NASA designed the Space Shuttle orbiter as a space transport vehicle that could be reused for approximately 100 missions. The orbiter was about the same length and weight as a commercial DC-9 airplane. Its structure consisted of the forward fuselage (upper and lower forward fuselage and the crew module, which could accommodate up to seven crew members in normal operations and up to ten during emergency oper- ations), the wings, the mid-fuselage, the payload bay doors, the aft fuse- lage, and the vertical stabilizer. Its appearance, however, differed markedly from a conventional airplane. High-performance double-delta (or triangular) wings and a large cargo bay gave the Shuttle its squat appearance (Figure 3-5 and Table 3-11). A cluster of three Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) in the aft fuse- lage provided the main propulsion for the orbiter vehicle. The external tank carried fuel for the orbiter's main engines. Both the solid rocket boosters and the external tank were jettisoned prior to orbital insertion. In orbit, the orbital maneuvering system (OMS), contained in two pods on the aft fuse- lage, maneuvered the orbiter. The OMS provided the thrust for orbit inser- tion, orbit circularization, orbit transfer, rendezvous, deorbit, abort-to-orbit, and abort-once-around and could provide up to 453.6 kilograms of 124 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Fixed Radiator Panels Rudder/speed Brake Aft Bulkhead Star Tracker Doors Crew Side Hatch Payload Remote gay Door Manipulator System Main Landing Gear Figure 3-5. Space Shuttle Orbiter propellant to the aft reaction control system (RCS). The RCS, contained in the two OMS pods and in a module in the nose section of the forward fuse- lage, provided attitude control in space and during reentry and was used during rendezvous and docking maneuvers. When it completed its orbital activities, the orbiter landed horizontally, as a glider, at a speed of about ninety-five meters per second and at a glide angle of between eighteen and twenty-two degrees. The liquid hydrogen-liquid oxygen engine was a reusable high-per- formance rocket engine capable of various thrust levels. Ignited on the ground prior to launch, the cluster of three main engines operated in par- allel with the solid rocket boosters during the initial ascent. After the boosters separated, the main engines continued to operate for approxi- mately eight and a half minutes. The SSMEs developed thrust by using high-energy propellants in a staged combustion cycle. The propellants were partially combusted in dual preburners to produce high-pressure hot gas to drive the turbopumps. Combustion was completed in the main combustion chamber. The SSME could be throttled over a thrust range of 65 to 109 percent, which provided for a high thrust level during liftoff and the initial ascent phase but allowed thrust to be reduced to limit acceler- ation to three g's during the final ascent phase. The orbiter was constructed primarily of aluminum and was protect- ed from reentry heat by a thermal protection system. Rigid silica tiles or some other heat-resistant material shielded every part of the Space Shuttle's external shell. Tiles covering the upper and forward fuselage sections and the tops of the wings could absorb heat as high as SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 125 650 degrees Centigrade. Tiles on the underside absorbed temperatures up to 1,260 degrees Centigrade. Areas that had to withstand temperatures greater than 1 ,260 degrees Centigrade, sueh as the nose and leading edges of the wings on reentry, were covered with black panels made of rein- forced carbon-carbon. A five-computer network configured in a redundant operating group (four operate at all times and one is a baekup) monitored all Spaee Shuttle subsystems. They simultaneously proeessed data from every area of the Shuttle, each interacting with the others and comparing data. During ascent, acceleration was limited to less than three g's. During reentry, acceleration was less than two and a half g's. By comparison, Apollo crews had to withstand as much as eight g's during reentry into the Earth's atmosphere. The Space Shuttle's relatively comfortable ride allowed crew other than specially trained astronauts to travel on the Shuttle. While in orbit, crew members inhabited a "shirtsleeve" environ- ment — no spacesuits or breathing apparatus were required. The micro- gravity atmosphere remained virtually the only non-Earth-like condition that crew members had to encounter. NASA named the first four orbiter spacecraft after famous explo- ration sailing ships: • Columbia (OV-102), the first operational orbiter, was named after a sailing frigate launched in 1836, one of the first Navy ships to cir- cumnavigate the globe. Columbia also was the name of the Apollo 1 1 command module that carried Neil Armstrong, Michael Collins, and Edwin "Buzz" Aldrin on the first lunar landing mission in July 1969. Columbia was delivered to Rockwell's Palmdale assembly facility for modifications on January 30, 1984, and was returned to the Kennedy Space Center on July 14, 1985, for return to flight. Challenger (OV-099) was also the name of a Navy ship, one that explored the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans from 1872 to 1876. The name also was used in the Apollo program for the Apollo 1 7 lunar module. Challenger was delivered to Kennedy on July 5, 1982. • Discovery (OV-103) was named after two ships. One was the vessel in which Henry Hudson in 1610-11 attempted to search for a north- west passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and instead discovered the Hudson Bay. The other was the ship in which Captain Cook discovered the Hawaiian Islands and explored southern Alaska and western Canada. Discovery was delivered to Kennedy on November 9, 1983. Atlantis (OV-104) was named after a two-masted ketch operated for the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute from 1930 to 1966 that trav- eled more than half a million miles conducting ocean research. Atlantis was delivered to Kennedy on April 3, 1985. 126 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK A fifth orbiter. Endeavour (OV-105), was named by Mississippi school children in a contest held by NASA. It was the ship of Lieutenant James Cook in 1769-71, on a voyage to Tahiti to observe the planet Venus passing between the Earth and the Sun. This orbiter was delivered to NASA by Rockwell International in 1991. Major Systems Avionics Systems The Space Shuttle avionics system controlled, or assisted in control- ling, most of the Shuttle systems. Its functions included automatic deter- mination of the vehicle's status and operational readiness; implementation sequencing and control for the solid rocket boosters and external tank during launch and ascent; performance monitoring; digital data processing; communications and tracking; payload and system man- agement; guidance, navigation, and control; and electrical power distrib- ution for the orbiter, external tank, and solid rocket boosters. Thermal Protection System A passive thermal protection system helped maintain the temperature of the orbiter spacecraft, systems, and components within their temperature limits primarily during the entry phase of the mission. It consisted of vari- ous materials applied externally to the outer structural skin of the orbiter. Orbiter Purge, Vent, and Drain System The purge, vent, and drain system on the orbiter provided unpressur- ized compartments with gas purge for thermal conditioning and prevent- ed the accumulation of hazardous gases, vented the unpressurized compartments during ascent and entry, drained trapped fluids (water and hydraulic fluid), and conditioned window cavities to maintain visibility. Orbiter Communications System The Space Shuttle orbiter communications system transferred ( 1 ) telemetry information about orbiter operating conditions and configu- rations, systems, and payloads; (2) commands to the orbiter systems to make them perform some function or configuration change; (3) docu- mentation from the ground that was printed on the orbiter's teleprinter or text and graphics system; and (4) voice communications among the flight crew members and between the fight crew and ground. This information was transferred through hardline and radio frequency links. Direct communication took place through Air Force Satellite Control Facility remote tracking station sites, also known as the Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network ground stations for NASA missions or space- SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 127 ground link system ground Stations for military missions. Dnvcl signals from the ground to the orbiter were referred to as uplinks, and signals from the orbiter to the ground were called downlinks. Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) communication took place through the White Sands Ground Terminal. These indirect signals from TDRS to the orbiter were called forward links, and the signal from the orbiter to the TDRS was called the return link. Communication with a detached payload from the orbiter was also referred to as a forward link, and the signal from the payload to the orbiter was the return link. Refer to Chapter 4, "Tracking and Data Acquisition Systems," in Volume VI of the NASA Historical Databook for a more detailed description of Shuttle tracking and communications systems. Data Processing System The data processing system, through the use of various hardware components and its self-contained computer programming (software), provided the vehicle with computerized monitoring and control. This sys- tem supported the guidance, navigation, and control of the vehicle, including calculations of trajectories, SSME thrusting data, and vehicle attitude control data; processed vehicle data for the flight crew and for transmission to the ground and allowed ground control of some vehicle systems via transmitted commands; checked data transmission errors and crew control input errors; supported the annunciation of vehicle system failures and out-of- tolerance system conditions; supported pay loads with flight crew/software interface for activation, deployment, deactivation, and retrieval; processed rendezvous, tracking, and data transmissions between payloads and the ground; and monitored and controlled vehicle subsystems. Guidance, Navigation, and Control Guidance, navigation, and control software commanded the guid- ance, navigation, and control system to effect vehicle control and to pro- vide the sensor and controller data needed to compute these commands. The process involved three steps: (1) guidance equipment and software computed the orbiter location required to satisfy mission requirements; (2) navigation tracked the vehicle's actual location; and (3) flight control transported the orbiter to the required location. A redundant set of four orbiter general purpose computers (GPCs) formed the primary avionics software system; a fifth GPC was used as the backup flight system. The guidance, navigation, and control system operated in two modes: auto and manual (control stick steering). In the automatic mode, the pri- mary avionics software system essentially allowed the GPCs to fly the vehicle; the flight crew simply selected the various operational sequences. In the manual mode, the flight crew could control the vehicle using hand controls, such as the rotational hand controller, translational hand con- troller, speed brake/thrust controller, and rudder pedals. In this mode, 12! NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK flight crew commands still passed through and were issued by the GPCs. There were no direct mechanical links between the flight crew and the orbiter's various propulsion systems or aerodynamic surfaces; the orbiter was an entirely digitally controlled, fly-by-wire vehicle. Dedicated Display System The dedicated displays provided the flight crew with information required to fly the vehicle manually or to monitor automatic flight control system performance. The dedicated displays were the attitude director indicators, horizontal situation indicators, alpha Mach indicators, alti- tude/vertical velocity indicators, a surface position indicator, RCS activi- ty lights, a g-meter, and a heads-up display. Main Propulsion System The Space Shuttle's main propulsion system is addressed in Chapter 2, "Launch Systems." Crew Escape System The in-flight crew escape system was provided for use only when the orbiter would be in controlled gliding flight and unable to reach a runway. This condition would normally lead to ditching. The crew escape system provided the flight crew with an alternative to water ditching or to land- ing on terrain other than a landing site. The probability of the flight crew surviving a ditching was very slim. The hardware changes required to the orbiters following the STS 51-L (Challenger) accident enabled the flight crew to equalize the pres- surized crew compartment with the outside pressure via the depressuriza- tion valve opened by pyrotechnics in the crew compartment aft bulkhead that a crew member would manually activate in the mid-deck of the crew compartment. The crew could also pyrotechnically jettison the crew ingress/egress side hatch manually in the mid-deck of the crew compart- ment and bail out from the mid-deck through the ingress/egress side hatch opening after manually deploying the escape pole through, outside, and down from the side hatch opening. Emergency Egress Slide. The emergency egress slide replaced the emergency egress side hatch bar. It provided the orbiter flight crew mem- bers with a rapid and safe emergency egress through the orbiter mid-deck ingress/egress side hatch after a normal opening of the side hatch or after jettisoning of the side hatch at the nominal end-of-mission landing site or at a remote or emergency landing site. The emergency egress slide sup- ported return-to-launch-site, transatlantic-landing, abort-once-around, and normal end-of-mission landings. Secondary Emergency Egress. The lefthand flight deck overhead win- dow provided the flight crew with a secondary emergency egress route. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGH1 129 Side Hatch Jettison. The mid-deck ingress/egress side hatch was modified to provide the capability of pyrotechnicaily jettisoning the side hatch for emergency egress on the ground. In addition, a crew compart- ment pressure equalization valve provided at the crew compartment alt bulkhead was also pyrotechnicaily activated to equalize cabin/outside pressure before the jettisoning of the side hatch. Crew Equipment Food System and Dining. The mid-deck of the orbiter was equipped with facilities for food stowage, preparation, and dining for each crew member. Three one-hour meal periods were scheduled for each day of the mission. This hour included time for eating and cleanup. Breakfast, lunch, and dinner were scheduled as close to the usual hours as possible. Dinner was scheduled at least two to three hours before crew members began preparations for their sleep period. Shuttle Orbiter Medical System. The Shuttle orbiter medical system provided medical care in flight for minor illnesses and injuries. It also provided support for stabilizing severely injured or ill crew members until they were returned to Earth. The medical system consisted of the medications and bandage kit and the emergency medical kit. Operational Bioinstrumentation System. The operational bioinstru- mentation system provided an amplified electrocardiograph analog signal from either of two designated flight crew members to the orbiter avionics system, where it was converted to digital tape and transmitted to the ground in real time or stored on tape for dump at a later time. On-orbit use was limited to contingency situations. Radiation Equipment. The harmful biological effects of radiation must be minimized through mission planning based on calculated predic- tions and monitoring of dosage exposures. Preflight requirements includ- ed a projection of mission radiation dosage, an assessment of the probability of solar flares during the mission, and a radiation exposure history of flight crew members. In-flight requirements included the car- rying of passive dosimeters by the flight crew members and, in the event of solar flares or other radiation contingencies, the readout and reporting of the active dosimeters. Crew Apparel. During launch and entry, crew members wore the crew altitude protection system consisting of a helmet, a communications cap, a pressure garment, an anti-exposure, anti-gravity suit, gloves, and boots. During launch and reentry, the crew wore escape equipment over the crew altitude protection system, consisting of an emergency oxygen system; parachute harness, parachute pack with automatic opener, pilot chute, drogue chute, and main canopy; a life raft; two liters of drinking water; flotation devices; and survival vest pockets containing a radio/bea- con, signal mirror, shroud cutter, pen gun flare kit, sea dye marker, smoke flare, and beacon. 130 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Sleeping Provisions. Sleeping provisions consisted of sleeping bags, sleep restraints, or rigid sleep stations. During a mission with one shift, all crew members slept simultaneously and at least one crew member would wear a communication headset to ensure the reception of ground calls and orbiter caution and warning alarms. Personal Hygiene Provisions. Personal hygiene and grooming pro- visions were furnished for both male and female flight crew members. A water dispensing system provided water. Housekeeping. In addition to time scheduled for sleep periods and meals, each crew member had housekeeping tasks that required from five to fifteen minutes at intervals throughout the day. These included clean- ing the waste management compartment, the dining area and equipment, floors and walls (as required), the cabin air filters, trash collection and disposal, and change-out of the crew compartment carbon dioxide (lithi- um hydroxide) absorber canisters. Sighting Aids. Sighting aids included all items used to aid the flight crew within and outside the crew compartment. They included the crew- man optical alignment sight, binoculars, adjustable mirrors, spotlights, and eyeglasses. Microcassette Recorder. The microcassette recorder was used pri- marily for voice recording of data but could also be used to play prere- corded tapes. Photographic Equipment. The flight crew used three camera sys- tems __16mm, 35mm, and 70mm— to document activities inside and out- side the orbiter. Wicket Tabs. Wicket tabs helped the crew members activate controls when vision was degraded. The tabs provided the crew members with tac- tile cues to the location of controls to be activated as well as a memory aid to their function, sequence of activation, and other pertinent informa- tion. Controls that were difficult to see during the ascent and entry flight phases had wicket tabs. Reach Aid. The reach aid, sometimes known as the "'swizzle stick," was a short adjustable bar with a multipurpose end effector that was used to actuate controls that were out of the reach of seated crew members. It could be used during any phase of flight, but was not recommended for use during ascent because of the attenuation and switch-cueing difficul- ties resulting from acceleration forces. Restraints and Mobility Aids. Restraints and mobility aids enabled the flight crew to perform all tasks safely and efficiently during ingress, egress, and orbital flight. Restraints consisted of foot loop restraints, the airlock foot restraint platform, and the work/dining table as well as tem- porary stowage bags, Velcro, tape, snaps, cable restraints, clips, bungees, and tethers. Mobility aids and devices consisted of handholds for ingress and egress to and from crew seats in the launch and landing configura- tion, handholds in the primary interdeck access opening for ingress and egress in the launch and landing configuration, a platform in the mid-deck for ingress and egress to and from the mid-deck when the orbiter is in the SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 131 launch configuration nterdeck access ladder to enter the flight and an deck from the mid-deck in the launch configuration and go from the flight deck to the mid-deck in the launch and landing configuration. Crew Equipment Stowage, Crew equipment aboard the orbiter was stowed in lockers with two sizes of insertable trays. The trays could be adapted to accommodate a wide variety of soft goods, loose equipment, and food. The lockers were interchangeable and attached to the orbiter with crew fittings. The lockers could be removed or installed in flight by the crew members. Exercise Equipment. The only exercise equipment on the Shuttle was a treadmill. Sound Level Meter. The sound level meter determined on-orbit acoustical noise levels in the cabin. Depending on the requirements for each flight, the flight crew took meter readings at specified crew com- partment and equipment locations. The data obtained by the flight crew were logged and/or voice recorded. Air Sampling System. The air sampling system consisted of air bot- tles that were stowed in a modular locker. They were removed for sam- pling and restowed for entry. On-Board Instrumentation. Orbiter operational instrumentation col- lected, routed, and processed information from transducers and sensors on the orbiter and its payloads. This system also interacted with the solid rocket boosters, external tank, and ground support equipment. More than 2,000 data points were monitored, and the data were routed to operational instrumentation multiplexers/demultiplexers. The instrumentation system consisted of transducers, signal conditioners, two pulse code modulation master units, encoding equipment, two operational recorders, one payload recorder, master timing equipment, and on-board checkout equipment. Payload Accommodations The Space Shuttle had three basic payload accommodation cate- gories: dedicated, standard, and mid-deck accommodations: • Dedicated payloads took up the entire cargo-carrying capacity and services of the orbiter, such as the Spacelab and some DOD payloads. Standard payloads — usually geosynchronous communications satellites — were the primary type of cargo carried by the Space Shuttle. Normally, the payload bay could accommodate up to four standard payloads per flight. Power, command, and data services for standard payloads were provided by the avionics system through a standard mixed cargo harness. • Mid-deck payloads — small, usually self-contained packages — were stored in compartments on the mid-deck. These were often manufac- turing-in-space or small life sciences experiments. 32 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Structural attach points for payloads were located at 9.9-centimeter intervals along the tops of the two orbiter mid-fuselage main longerons. Some payloads were not attached directly to the orbiter but to payload carriers that were attached to the orbiter. The inertial upper stage, Spacelab and Spacelab pallet, and any specialized cradle for holding a payload were typical carriers. Small payloads mounted in the payload bay required a smaller range of accommodations. These payloads received a reduced level of electric power, command, and data services, and their thermal conditions were those in the payload bay thermal environment. Small payloads could be mounted in either a side-mounted or an across-the-bay configuration. The Space Shuttle could also accommodate small payloads in the mid-deck of the crew compartment. This location was ideal for payloads that required a pressurized crew cabin environment or needed to be oper- ated directly by the crew. Payloads located in the mid-deck could also be stowed on board shortly before launch and removed quickly after land- ing. Space Shuttle Operations Although each Space Shuttle mission was unique, Space Shuttle mis- sions followed a prescribed sequence of activities that was common to all flights. The following sections describe the typical activities preceding launch, the launch and ascent activities, on-orbit events, and events sur- rounding descent and landing. Figure 3-6 shows the typical sequence of mission events. EXTERNAL TANK SEPARATION v ORBITAL INSERTION ORBITAL OPERATIONS v. DEORBIT \4 -i^SST*- EXTE r N al TANK J&a£^ IMPACT PRELAUNCH Figure 3-6. Typical STS Flight Profile SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT I J3 Prelaunch Activities Space Shuttle components were gathered from various local ions throughout the country and brought to Launch Complex 39 facilities at the Kennedy Space Center. There, technicians assembled the compo- nents — the Ofbiter, solid rocket booster, and external tank — into an inte- grated Space Shuttle vehicle, tested the vehicle, rolled it out to the launch pad, and ultimately launched it into space. Each of the components that comprised the Shuttle system underwent processing prior to launch. NASA used similar processing procedures for new and reused Shuttle flight hardware. In general, new orbiters under- went more checkouts before being installed. In addition, the main engines underwent test firing on the launch pad. Called the Flight Readiness Firing, the test verified that the main propulsion system worked properly. For orbiters that had already flown, turnaround processing procedures included various postflight deservicing and maintenance functions, which were carried out in parallel with payload removal and the installation of equipment needed for the next mission. If changes are made in external tank design, the tank usually required a tanking test in which it was loaded with liquid oxygen and hydrogen just as it was before launch. This confidence check verified the tank's ability to withstand the high pressures and super cold temperatures of the cryogenics. The processing of each major flight component consisted of indepen- dent hardware checks and servicing in an operation called standalone pro- cessing. Actual Shuttle vehicle integration started with the stacking of the solid rocket boosters on a Mobile Launcher Platform in one of the high bays of the Vehicle Assembly Building. Next, the external tank was moved from its Vehicle Assembly Building location to the Mobile Launcher Platform and was mated with the solid rocket boosters. The orbiter, having completed its prelaunch processing and after horizontally integrated payloads had been installed, was towed from the Orbiter Processing Facility to the Vehicle Assembly Building and hoisted into position alongside the solid rocket boosters and the external tank. It was then mated to the external tank/solid rocket booster assembly. After mat- ing was completed, the erection slings and load beams that had been hold- ing the orbiter in place were removed, and the platforms and stands were positioned for orbiter/external tank/solid rocket booster access. After the orbiter had been mated to the external tank/solid rocket booster assembly and all umbilicals were connected, technicians per- formed an electrical and mechanical verification of the mated interfaces to verify all critical vehicle connections. The orbiter underwent a Space Shuttle interface test using the launch processing system to verify Shuttle vehicle interfaces and Shuttle vehicle-to-ground interfaces. After comple- tion of interface testing, ordnance devices were installed, but not electri- cally connected. Final ordnance connection and flight close-out were completed at the pad. 134 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK When the Vehicle Assembly Building prelaunch preparations were completed, the crawler transporter, an enormous tracked vehicle that NASA originally used during the Apollo and Skylab programs, lifted the assembled Space Shuttle and the Mobile Launcher Platform and rolled them slowly down a crawlerway to the launch pad at Launch Complex 39. Loaded, the vehicle moved at a speed of one mile an hour. The move took about six hours. At the pad, vertically integrated payloads were loaded into the payload bay. Then, technicians performed propellant ser- vicing and needed ordnance tasks. After the Space Shuttle had been rolled out to the launch pad on the Mobile Launcher Platform, all prelaunch activities were controlled from the Launch Control Center using the Launch Processing System. On the launch pad, the Rotating Service Structure was placed around the Shuttle and power for the vehicle was activated. The Mobile Launcher Platform and the Shuttle were then electronically and mechanically mated with support launch pad facilities and ground support equipment. An extensive series of validation checks verified that the numerous interfaces were functioning properly. Meanwhile, in parallel with prelaunch pad activi- ties, cargo operations began in the Rotating Service Structure's Payload Changeout Room. Vertically integrated payloads were delivered to the launch pad before the Space Shuttle was rolled out and stored in the Payload Changeout Room until the Shuttle was ready for cargo loading. Once the Rotating Service Structure was in place around the orbiter, the payload bay doors were opened and the cargo installed. Final cargo and payload bay close-outs were completed in the Payload Changeout Room, and the payload bay doors were closed for flight. Propellant Loading. Initial Shuttle propellant loading involved pumping hypergolic propellants into the orbiter 's aft and forward OMS and RCS storage tanks, the orbiter's hydraulic Auxiliary Power Units, and the solid rocket booster hydraulic power units. These were hazardous operations, and while they were under way, work on the launch pad was suspended. Because these propellants were hypergolic — they ignite on contact with one another — oxidizer and fuel loading operations were car- ried out serially, never in parallel. Dewar tanks on the Fixed Service Structure were filled with liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen, which would be loaded into the orbiter's Power Reactant and Storage Distribution tanks during the launch count- down. Before the formal Space Shuttle launch countdown began, the vehicle was powered down while pyrotechnic devices were installed or hooked up. The extravehicular mobility units — spacesuits — were stored on board along with other items of flight crew equipment. Launch Processing System. The Launch Processing System made Space Shuttle processing, checkout, and countdown procedures more automated and streamlined than those of earlier human spaceflight pro- grams. The countdown for the Space Shuttle took only about forty hours, compared with more than eighty hours usually needed for a SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 135 Saturn/Apollo countdown. Moreover, the Launch Processing System called for only about ninety people to work in the firing room during launch operations, compared with about 450 needed for earlier human missions. This system automatically controlled and performed much of the Shuttle processing from the arrival of individual components and their integration to launch pad operations and, ultimately, the launch itself. The system consisted of three basic subsystems: the Central Data Subsystem located on the second floor of the Launch Control Center, the Checkout, Control and Monitor Subsystem located in the firing rooms, and the Record and Playback Subsystem. Complex 39 Ijiunch Pad Facilities. The Kennedy Space Center's Launch Complex 39 had two identical launch pads, which were original- ly designed and built for the Apollo lunar landing program. The pads, built in the 1960s, were used for all of the Apollo/Saturn V missions and the Skylab space station program. Between 1967 and 1975, twelve Apollo/Saturn V vehicles, one Skylab/Saturn V workshop, three Apollo/Saturn IB vehicles for Skylab crews, and one Apollo/Saturn IB for the joint U.S. -Soviet Apollo Soyuz Test Project were launched from these pads. The pads underwent major modifications to accommodate the Space Shuttle vehicle. Initially, Pad A modifications were completed in mid- 1978, while Pad B was finished in 1985 and first used for the ill-fated STS 51-L mission in January 1986. The modifications included the con- struction of new hypergolic fuel and oxidizer support areas at the south- west and southeast corners of the pads, the construction of new Fixed Service Structures, the addition of a Rotating Service Structure, the addi- tion of 1,135,620-liter water towers and associated plumbing, and the replacement of the original flame deflectors with Shuttle-compatible deflectors. Following the flight schedule delays resulting from the STS 51-L accident, NASA made an additional 105 pad modifications. These includ- ed the installation of a sophisticated laser parking system on the Mobile Launcher Platform to facilitate mounting the Shuttle on the pad and emer- gency escape system modifications to provide emergency egress for up to twenty-one people. The emergency shelter bunker also was modified to allow easier access from the slidewire baskets. Systems, facilities, and functions at the complex included: Fixed Service Structure Orbiter Access Arm External Tank Hydrogen Vent Line and Access Arm External Tank Gaseous Oxygen Vent Arm Emergency Exit System Lightning Mast Rotating Service Structure Payload Changeout Room 136 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Orbiter Midbody Umbilical Unit Hypergolic Umbilical System Orbital Maneuvering System Pod Heaters Sound Suppression Water System Solid Rocket Booster Overpressure Suppression System Main Engine Hydrogen Burnoff System Pad Surface Flame Detectors Pad-Propellant Storage and Distribution Launch Sites. NASA used the Kennedy Space Center in Florida for launches that placed the orbiter in equatorial orbits (around the equator). The Vandenberg Air Force Base launch site in California was intended for launches that placed the orbiter in polar orbit missions, but it was never used and has been inactive since 1987. NASA's prime landing site was at Kennedy. Additional landing sites were provided at Edwards Air Force Base in California and White Sands, New Mexico. Contingency landing sites were also provided in the event the orbiter must return to Earth in an emergency. Kennedy Space Center launches had an allowable path no less than thirty-five degrees northeast and no greater than 120 degrees southeast. These were azimuth degree readings based on due east from Kennedy as ninety degrees. These two azimuths — thirty-five and 120 degrees — rep- resented the launch limits from Kennedy. Any azimuth angles farther north or south would launch a spacecraft over a habitable land mass, adversely affect safety provisions for abort or vehicle separation condi- tions, or present the undesirable possibility that the solid rocket booster or external tank could land on foreign land or sea space. Launch and Ascent At launch, the three SSMEs were ignited first. When the proper engine thrust level was verified, a signal was sent to ignite the solid rock- et boosters. At the proper thrust-to-weight ratio, initiators (small explo- sives) at eight hold-down bolts on the solid rocket boosters were fired to release the Space Shuttle for liftoff. All this took only a few seconds. Maximum dynamic pressure was reached early in the ascent, approx- imately sixty seconds after liftoff. Approximately a minute later (two minutes into the ascent phase), the two solid rocket boosters had con- sumed their propellant and were jettisoned from the external tank at an altitude of 48.27 kilometers. This was triggered by a separation signal from the orbiter. The boosters briefly continued to ascend to an altitude of 75.6 kilo- meters, while small motors fired to carry them away from the Space Shuttle. The boosters then turned and descended, and at a predetermined altitude, parachutes were deployed to decelerate them for a safe splash- down in the ocean. Splashdown occurred approximately 261 kilometers from the launch site. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 137 booster descended to an altitude of about cap was jettisoned and the solid rocket booster When a free-falling 4.8 kilometers, its nose pilot parachute popped open. The pilot parachute then pulled out the 16.5-meter diameter, 499-kilogram drogue parachute. The drogue para chute stabilized and slowed the descent to the ocean. At an altitude of 1 ,902 meters, the frustum, a truncated cone at the top of the solid rocket booster where it joined the nose cap, separated from the forward skirt, causing the three main parachutes to pop out. These parachutes were thirty-five meters in diameter and had a dry weight of about 680 kilograms each. When wet with sea water, they weighed about 1,361 kilograms. At six minutes and forty-four seconds after liftoff, the spent solid rock- et boosters, weighing about 7,484 kilograms, had slowed their descent speed to about 100 kilometers per hour, and splashdown took place in the prede- termined area. There, a crew aboard a specially designed recovery vessel recovered the boosters and parachutes and returned them to the Kennedy Space Center for refurbishment. The parachutes remained attached to the boosters until they were detached by recovery personnel. Meanwhile, the orbiter and external tank continued to climb, using the thrust of the three SSMEs. Approximately eight minutes after launch and just short of orbital velocity, the three engines were shut down (main engine cutoff, or MECO), and the external tank was jettisoned on com- mand from the orbiter. The forward and aft RCS engines provided attitude (pitch, yaw, and roll) and the translation of the orbiter away from the external tank at sep- aration and return to attitude hold prior to the OMS thrusting maneuver. The external tank continued on a ballistic trajectory and entered the atmosphere, where it disintegrated. Its projected impact was in the Indian Ocean (except for fifty-seven-degree inclinations) for equatorial orbits. Aborts. An ascent abort might become necessary if a failure that affects vehicle performance, such as the failure of an SSME or an OMS. Other failures requiring early termination of a flight, such as a cabin leak, might also require an abort. Space Shuttle missions had two basic types of ascent abort modes: intact aborts and contingency aborts. Intact aborts were designed to pro- vide a safe return of the orbiter to a planned landing site. Contingency aborts were designed to permit flight crew survival following more severe failures when an intact abort was not possible. A contingency abort would generally result in a ditch operation. Intact Aborts. There were four types of intact aborts: abort-to-orbit, abort-once-around, transatlantic landing, and return-to-launch-site (Figure 3-7): The abort-to-orbit (ATO) mode was designed to allow the vehicle to achieve a temporary orbit that was lower than the nominal orbit. This mode required less performance and allowed time to evaluate prob- lems and then choose either an early deorbit maneuver or an OMS thrusting maneuver to raise the orbit and continue the mission. 138 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Nominal mission or ATO MECO/Separation MECO Staging SRB External tank impact Impact External tank impact To landing Figure 3-7. Types of Intact Aborts • The abort-once-around (AOA) mode was designed to allow the vehicle to fly once around the Earth and make a normal entry and landing. This mode generally involved two OMS thrusting sequences, with the second sequence being a deorbit maneuver. The entry sequence would be similar to a normal entry. This abort mode was used on STS 51-F and was the only abort that took place. • The transatlantic landing mode was designed to permit an intact landing on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. This mode resulted in a ballistic trajectory, which did not require an OMS maneuver. • The return-to-launch-site (RTLS) mode involved flying downrange to dissipate propellant and then turning around under power to return directly to a landing at or near the launch site. A definite order of preference existed for the various abort modes. The type of failure and the time of the failure determined which type of abort is selected. In cases where performance loss was the only factor, the preferred modes would be abort-to-orbit, abort-once-around, transatlantic landing, and return-to-launch-site, in that order. The mode chosen was the highest one that could be completed with the remaining vehicle performance. In the case of some support system failures, such as cabin leaks or vehicle cooling problems, the preferred mode might be the one that would end the mission most quickly. In those cases, transatlantic landing or return-to-launch-site SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT I w might be preferable to abort-once-around or abort-to-orbit. A contingency abort was never chosen If another abort option existed. The Mission Control Center in Houston was "prime" for calling these aborts because it had a more precise knowledge of the orbiter's position than the crew could obtain from on-board systems. Before MECO, Mission Control made periodic calls to the crew to tell them which abort mode was (or was not) available. If ground communications were lost, the flight crew had on-board methods, such as cue cards, dedicated displays, and display information, to determine the current abort region. Contingency Aborts. Contingency aborts would occur when there was a loss of more than one main engine or other systems fail. Loss of one main engine while another was stuck at a low thrust setting might also require a contingency abort. Such an abort would maintain orbiter integrity for in-flight crew escape if a landing could not be achieved at a suitable landing field. Contingency aborts caused by system failures other than those involving the main engines would normally result in an intact recovery of vehicle and crew. Loss of more than one main engine might, depending on engine failure times, result in a safe runway landing. However, in most three-engine-out cases during ascent, the orbiter would have to be ditched. The in-flight crew escape system would be used before ditching the orbiter. Orbit Insertion. An orbit could be accomplished in two ways: the con- ventional OMS insertion method called "standard" (which was last used with STS-35 in December 1990) and the direct insertion method. The stan- dard insertion method involved a brief burn of the OMS engines shortly after MECO, placing the orbiter into an elliptical orbit. A second OMS burn was initiated when the orbiter reached apogee in its elliptical orbit. This brought the orbiter into a near circular orbit. If required during a mission, the orbit could be raised or lowered by additional firings of the OMS thrusters. The direct insertion technique used the main engines to achieve the desired orbital apogee, or high point, thus saving OMS propellant. Only one OMS burn was required to circularize the orbit, and the remaining OMS fuel could then be used for frequent changes in the operational orbit, as called for in the flight plan. The first direct insertion orbit took place during the STS 41-C mission in April 1984, when Challenger was placed in a 463-kilometer-high circular orbit where its flight crew suc- cessfully captured, repaired, and redeployed the Solar Maximum Satellite (Solar Max). The optimal orbital altitude of a Space Shuttle depended on the mis- sion objectives and was determined before launch. The nominal altitude varied between 185 to 402 kilometers. During flight, however, problems, such as main engine and solid rocket booster performance loss and OMS propellant leaks or certain electrical power system failures, might prevent the vehicle from achieving the optimal orbit. In these cases, the OMS burns would be changed to compensate for the failure by selecting a delayed OMS burn, abort-once-around, or abort-to-orbit option. 140 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Tables 3-12 and 3-13 show the events leading up to a typical launch and the events immediately following launch.' On-Orbit Events. Once the orbiter achieved orbit, the major guid- ance, navigation, and control tasks included achieving the proper posi- tion, velocity, and attitude necessary to accomplish the mission objectives. To do this, the guidance, navigation, and control computer maintained an accurate state vector, targeted and initiated maneuvers to specified attitudes and positions, and pointed a specified orbiter body vector at a target. These activities were planned with fuel consumption, vehicle thermal limits, payload requirements, and rendezvous/proximity operations considerations in mind. The Mission Control Center, usually referred to as "Houston," controlled Space Shuttle flights. Maneuvering in Orbit. Once the Shuttle orbiter went into orbit, it operated in the near gravity-free vacuum of space. However, to maintain proper orbital attitude and to perform a variety of maneuvers, the Shuttle used an array of forty-six large and small rocket thrusters — the OMS and RCS that was used to place the Shuttle in orbit. Each of these thrusters burned a mixture of nitrogen tetroxide and monoethylhydrazine, a com- bination of fuels that ignited on contact with each other. Descent and Landing Activities On-Orbit Checkout. The crew usually performed on-orbit checkout of the orbiter systems that were used during reentry the day before deor- bit. System checkout had two parts. The first part used one auxiliary power unit/hydraulic system. It repositioned the left and right main engine nozzles for entry and cycled the aerosurfaces, hydraulic motors, and hydraulic switching valves. After the checkout was completed, the auxiliary power unit was deactivated. The second part checked all the crew-dedicated displays; self-tested the microwave scan beam landing system, tactical air navigation, accelerometer assemblies, radar altimeter, rate gyro assemblies, and air data transducer assemblies; and checked the hand controllers, rudder pedal transducer assemblies, speed brake, panel trim switches, RHC trim switches, speed brake takeover push button, and mode/sequence push button light indicators. Shuttle Landing Operations. When a mission accomplished its planned in-orbit operations, the crew began preparing the vehicle for its return to Earth. Usually, the crew devoted the last full day in orbit to activities, such as stowing equipment, cleaning up the living areas, and The terms "terminal count," "first stage," and "second stage" are common- ly used when describing prelaunch, launch, and ascent events. The terminal phase extends from T minus twenty minutes where "T" refers to liftoff time. First-stage ascent extends from solid rocket booster ignition through solid rock- et booster separation. Second-stage ascent begins at solid rocket booster separa- tion and extends through MECO and external tank separation. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT l II making final systems configurations thai would facilitate postlanding processing. The crew schedule was designed so that crew members were awake and into their "work day" six to eight hours before landing. About four hours before deorbit maneuvers were scheduled, the crew and flight con Hollers finished with the Crew Activity Plan for the mission. They then worked from the mission's Deorbit Prep Handbook, which covered the major deorbit events leading to touchdown. Major events included the "go" from Mission Control Center to close the payload bay doors and final permission to perform the deorbit burn, which would return the orbiter to Earth. Before the deorbit burn took place, the orbiter was turned to a tail- first attitude — that is, the aft end of the orbiter faced the direction of trav- el. At a predesignated time, the OMS engines were fired to slow the orbiter and to permit deorbit. The RCS thrusters were then used to return the orbiter into a nose-first attitude. These thrusters were used during much of the reentry pitch, roll, and yaw maneuvering until the orbiter's aerodynamic, aircraft-like control surfaces encountered enough atmos- pheric drag to control the landing. This was called Entry Interface and usually occurred thirty minutes before touchdown at about 122 kilome- ters altitude. At this time, a communications blackout occurred as the orbiter was enveloped in a sheath of plasma caused by electromagnetic forces generated from the high heat experienced during entry into the atmosphere. Guidance, navigation, and control software guided and controlled the orbiter from this state (in which aerodynamic forces were not yet felt) through the atmosphere to a precise landing on the designated runway. All of this must be accomplished without exceeding the thermal or structural limits of the orbiter. Flight control during the deorbit phase was similar to that used during orbit insertion. Orbiter Ground Turnaround. Approximately 160 Space Shuttle Launch Operations team members supported spacecraft recovery opera- tions at the nominal end-of-mission landing site. Beginning as soon as the spacecraft stopped rolling, the ground team took sensor measurements to ensure that the atmosphere in the vicinity of the spacecraft was not explo- sive. In the event of propellant leaks, a wind machine truck carrying a large fan moved into the area to create a turbulent airflow that broke up gas concentrations and reduced the potential for an explosion. A ground support equipment air-conditioning purge unit was attached to the righthand orbiter T-0 umbilical so cool air could be directed through the orbiter to dissipate the heat of entry. A second ground support equip- ment ground cooling unit was connected to the lefthand orbiter T-0 umbil- ical spacecraft Freon coolant loops to provide cooling for the flight crew and avionics during the postlanding and system checks. The flight crew then left the spacecraft, and a ground crew powered down the spacecraft. Meanwhile, at the Kennedy Space Center, the orbiter and ground sup- port equipment convoy moved from the runway to the Orbiter Processing 142 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Facility. If the spacecraft landed at Edwards Air Force Base, the same procedures and ground support equipment applied as at Kennedy after the orbiter had stopped on the runway. The orbiter and ground support equip- ment convoy moved from the runway to the orbiter mate and demate facility. After detailed inspection, the spacecraft was prepared to be fer- ried atop the Shuttle carrier aircraft from Edwards to Kennedy. Upon its return to the Orbiter Processing Facility at Kennedy, a ground crew safed the orbiter, removed its payload, and reconfigured the orbiter payload bay for the next mission. The orbiter also underwent any required maintenance and inspections while in the Orbiter Processing Facility. The spacecraft was then towed to the Vehicle Assembly Building and mated to the new external tank, beginning the cycle again. Mission Control The Mission Control Center at Johnson Space Center in Houston con- trolled all Shuttle flights. It has controlled more than sixty NASA human spaceflights since becoming operational in June 1965 for the Gemini IV mission. Two flight control rooms contained the equipment needed to monitor and control the missions. The Mission Control Center assumed mission control functions when the Space Shuttle cleared the service tower at Kennedy's Launch Complex 39. Shuttle systems data, voice communications, and television traveled almost instantaneously to the Mission Control Center through the NASA Ground and Space Networks, the latter using the orbiting TDRS. The Mission Control Center retained its mission control function until the end of a mission, when the orbiter landed and rolled to a stop. At that point, Kennedy again assumed control. Normally, sixteen major flight control consoles operated during a Space Shuttle mission. Each console was identified by a title or "call sign," which was used when communicating with other controllers or the astronaut flight crew. Teams of up to thirty flight controllers sat at the consoles directing and monitoring all aspects of each flight twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. A flight director headed each team, which typically worked an eight-hour shift. Table 3-14 lists the mission com- mand and control positions and responsibilities. During Spacelab missions, an additional position, the command and data management systems officer, had primary responsibility for the data processing of the Spacelab's two main computers. To support Spacelab missions, the electrical, environmental, and consumables systems engi- neer and the data processing systems engineer both worked closely with the command and data management systems officer because the missions required monitoring additional displays involving almost 300 items and coordinating their activities with the Marshall Space Flight Center's Payload Operations Control Center (POCC). The Mission Control Center's display/control system was one of the most unusual support facilities. It consisted of a series of projected screen SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT II \ displays that showed the orbiter's real-time location, live television pic lures of crew activities, Earth views, and extravehicular activities. Other displays Included mission elapsed time as well as time remaining before a maneuver or other major mission event. Many decisions or recommen dations made by the flight controllers were based on information shown on the display/control system displays Eventually, it was planned that modern state-of-the-art workstations with more capability to monitor and analyze vast amounts of data would replace the Apollo-era consoles. Moreover, instead of driving the con- soles with a single main computer, each console would eventually have its own smaller computer, which could monitor a specific system and be linked into a network capable of sharing the data. The POCCs operated in conjunction with the Flight Control Rooms. They housed principal investigators and commercial users who monitored and controlled payloads being carried aboard the Space Shuttle. One of the most extensive POCCs was at the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, where Spacelab missions were coordinated with the Mission Control Center. It was the command post, communications hub, and data relay station for the principal investigators, mission managers, and support teams. Here, decisions on payload operations were made, coordinated with the Mission Control Center flight director, and sent to the Spacelab or Shuttle. The POCC at the Goddard Space Flight Center controlled free-flying spacecraft that were deployed, retrieved, or serviced by the Space Shuttle. Planetary mission spacecraft were controlled from the POCC at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California. Finally, private sector pay- load operators and foreign governments maintained their own POCCs at various locations for the control of spacecraft systems under their control. NASA Centers and Responsibilities Several NASA centers had responsibility for particular areas of the Space Shuttle program. NASA's Kennedy Space Center in Florida was responsible for all launch, landing, and turnaround operations for STS mis- sions requiring equatorial orbits. Kennedy had primary responsibility for prelaunch checkout, launch, ground turnaround operations, and support operations for the Shuttle and its payloads. Kennedy's Launch Operations had responsibility for all mating, prelaunch testing, and launch control ground activities until the Shuttle vehicle cleared the launch pad tower. Responsibility was then turned over to NASA's Mission Control Center at the Johnson Space Center in Houston. The Mission Control Center's responsibility included ascent, on-orbit operations, entry, approach, and landing until landing runout completion, at which time the orbiter was handed over to the postlanding operations at the landing site for turnaround and relaunch. At the launch site, the solid rocket boosters and external tank were processed for launch and the solid rocket boosters were recycled for reuse. The Johnson Space Center was responsible for the integration of the complete Shuttle vehicle and was the central control point for Shuttle missions. 144 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, was responsible for the SSMEs, external tanks, and solid rocket boosters. NASA's National Space Technology Laboratories at Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, was responsible for testing the SSMEs. NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, operated a worldwide track- ing station network. Crew Selection, Training, and Related Services Crew Selection NASA selected the first group of astronauts — known as the Mercury seven _i n 1959. Since then, NASA has selected eleven other groups of astronaut candidates. Through the end of 1987, 172 individuals have graduated from the astronaut program. NASA selected the first thirty-five astronaut candidates for the Space Shuttle program in January 1978. They began training at the Johnson Space Center the following June. The group consisted of twenty mission specialists and fifteen pilots and included six women and four members of minority groups. They completed their one-year basic training program in August 1979. NASA accepted applications from qualified individuals — both civil- ian and military— on a continuing basis. Upon completing the course, successful candidates became regular members of the astronaut corps. Usually, they were eligible for a flight assignment about one year after completing the basic training program. Pilot Astronauts. Pilot astronauts served as either commanders or pilots on Shuttle flights. During flights, commanders were responsible for the vehicle, the crew, mission success, and safety. The pilots were second in command; their primary responsibility was to assist the Shuttle com- mander. During flights, commanders and pilots usually assisted in space- craft deployment and retrieval operations using the Remote Manipulator System (RMS) arm or other payload-unique equipment aboard the Shuttle. To be selected as a pilot astronaut candidate, an applicant must have a bachelor's degree in engineering, biological science, physical science, or mathematics. A graduate degree was desired, although not essential. The applicant must have had at least 1,000 hours flying time in jet air- craft. Experience as a test pilot was desirable, but not required. All pilots and missions specialists must be citizens of the United States. Mission Specialist Astronauts. Mission specialist astronauts, work- ing closely with the commander and pilot, were responsible for coordi- nating on-board operations involving crew activity planning, use, and monitoring of the Shuttle's consumables (fuel, water, food, and so on), as well as conducting experiment and payload activities. They must have a detailed knowledge of Shuttle systems and the operational characteristics, mission requirements and objectives, and supporting systems for each of SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT [45 the experiments to be conducted Oil the assigned missions. Mission spe eialists performed on-board experiments, spacewalks, and payload- handling functions involving the RMS arm. Academically, applicants must have a bachelor's degree In engineer- ing, biological science, physical science, or mathematics, pins at least three years of related and progressively responsible professional experi- ence. An advanced degree could substitute for part or all of the experience requirement — one year Tor a master's degree and three years for a doc- toral degree. Payload Specialists. This newest category of Shuttle crew member, the payload specialist, was a professional in the physical or life sciences or a technician skilled in operating Shuttle-unique equipment. The pay- load sponsor or customer selected a payload specialist for a particular mission. For NASA-sponsored spacecraft or experiments requiring a pay- load specialist, the investigator nominated the specialist who was approved by NASA. Payload specialists did not have to be U.S. citizens. However, they must meet strict NASA health and physical fitness standards. In addition to intensive training for a specific mission assignment at a company plant, a university, or government agency, the payload specialist also must take a comprehensive flight training course to become familiar with Shuttle systems, payload support equipment, crew operations, housekeeping techniques, and emergency procedures. This training was conducted at the Johnson Space Center and other locations. Payload specialist training might begin as much as two years before a flight. Astronaut Training Astronaut training was conducted under the auspices of Johnson's Mission Operations Directorate. Initial training for new candidates con- sisted of a series of short courses in aircraft safety, including instruction in ejection, parachute, and survival to prepare them in the event their air- craft is disabled and they have to eject or make an emergency landing. Pilot and mission specialist astronauts were trained to fly T-38 high- performance jet aircraft, which were based at Ellington Field near Johnson. Flying these aircraft, pilot astronauts could maintain their flying skills and mission specialists could become familiar with high- performance jets. They also took formal science and technical courses Candidates obtained basic knowledge of the Shuttle system, includ- ing payloads, through lectures, briefings, textbooks, mockups, and flight operations manuals. They also gained one-on-one experience in the sin- gle systems trainers, which contained computer databases with software allowing students to interact with controls and displays similar to those of a Shuttle crew station. Candidates learned to function in a weightless or environment using the KC-135 four-engine jet transport and in an enor- mous neutral buoyancy water tank called the Weightless Environment Training Facility at Johnson. 146 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Because the orbiter landed on a runway much like a high- performance aircraft, pilot astronauts used conventional and modified T-38 trainers and the KC-135 aircraft to simulate actual landings. They also used a modified Grumman Gulfstream II, known as the Shuttle Training Aircraft, which was configured to simulate the handling charac- teristics of the orbiter for landing practice. Advanced training included sixteen different course curricula cover- ing all Shuttle-related crew training requirements. The courses ranged from guidance, navigation, and control systems to payload deployment and retrieval systems. This advanced training was related to systems and phases. Systems training provided instruction in orbiter systems and was not related to a specific mission or its cargo. It was designed to familiar- ize the trainee with a feel for what it was like to work and live in space. Generally, systems training was completed before an astronaut is assigned to a mission. Phase-related training concentrated on the specific skills an astronaut needed to perform successfully in space. This training was conducted in the Shuttle Mission Simulator. Phase-related training continued after a crew was assigned to a specific mission, normally about seven months to one year before the scheduled launch date. At that time, crew training became more structured and was directed by a training management team that was assigned to a specific Shuttle flight. The training involved carefully developed scripts and scenarios for the mis- sion and was designed to permit the crew to operate as a closely integrated team, performing normal flight operations according to a flight timeline. About 10 weeks before a scheduled launch, the crew began "flight- specific integrated simulations, designed to provide a dynamic testing ground for mission rules and flight procedures." Simulating a real mis- sion, the crew worked at designated stations interacting with the flight control team members, who staffed their positions in the operationally configured Mission Control Center. These final prelaunch segments of training were called integrated and joint integrated simulations and normally included the payload users' operations control centers. Everything from extravehicular activity (EVA) operations to interaction with the tracking networks could be simulated during these training sessions. Shuttle Mission Simulator. The Shuttle Mission Simulator was the primary system for training Space Shuttle crews. It was the only high- fidelity simulator capable of training crews for all phases of a mission beginning at T-minus thirty minutes, including such simulated events as launch, ascent, abort, orbit, rendezvous, docking, payload handling, undocking, deorbit, entry, approach, landing, and rollout. The unique simulator system could duplicate main engine and solid rocket booster performance, external tank and support equipment, and interface with the Mission Control Center. The Shuttle Mission Simulator's construction was completed in 1977 at a cost of about $100 million. Sl'ACirrkANSl'OkTATION/IIUMAN SPACEFLIGH1 147 ( 'rew-Related Services Iii support of payload missions, crew members provided unique ancillary services in three specific areas: EVA, intravehicnlar activity (IVA), and in-flight maintenance. EVAs, also called spacewalks, referred to activities in which crew members put on pressurized spacesuits and life support systems (spacepaks), left the orbiter cabin, and performed various payload-related activities in the vacuum of space, frequently outside the payload bay. (Each mission allowed for at least two crew members to be training for EVA.) EVA was an operational requirement when satellite repair or equipment testing was called for on a mission. However, during any mission, two crew members must be ready to perform a contingency EVA if, for example, the payload bay doors failed to close properly and must be closed manually, or equipment must be jettisoned from the pay- load bay. The first Space Shuttle program contingency EVA occurred in April 1985, during STS 51-D, a Discovery mission, following deployment of the Syncom IV-3 (Leasat 3) communications satellite. The satellite's sequencer lever failed, and initiation of the antenna deployment and spin- up and perigee kick motor start sequences did not take place. The flight was extended two days to give mission specialists Jeffrey Hoffman and David Griggs an opportunity to try to activate the lever during EVA oper- ations, which involved using the RMS. The effort was not successful, but was accomplished on a later mission. Table 3-15 lists all of the opera- tional and contingency EVAs that have taken place through 1988. IVA included all activities during which crew members dressed in spacesuits and using life support systems performed hands-on operations inside a customer-supplied crew module. (IVAs performed in the Spacelab did not require crew members to dress in spacesuits with life support systems.) Finally, in-flight maintenance was any off-normal, on-orbit mainte- nance or repair action conducted to repair a malfunctioning payload. In- flight maintenance procedures for planned payload maintenance or repair were developed before a flight and often involved EVA. Space Shuttle Payloads Space Shuttle payloads were classified as either "attached 1 ' or "free- flying." Attached payloads such as Spacelab remained in the cargo bay or elsewhere on the orbiter throughout the mission. Free-flying payloads were released to fly alone. Some free-flyers were meant to be serviced or retrieved by the Shuttle. Others were boosted into orbits beyond the Shuttle's reach. 148 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Attached Payloads Spacelab Spacelab was an orbiting laboratory built by the ESA for use with the STS. It provided the scientific community with easy, economical access to space and an opportunity for scientists worldwide to conduct experiments in space concerning astronomy, solar physics, space plasma physics, atmos- pheric physics, Earth observations, life sciences, and materials sciences. Spacelab was constructed from self-contained segments or modules. It had two major subsections: cylindrical, pressurized crew modules and U-shaped unpressurized instrument-carrying pallets. The crew modules provided a "shirtsleeve" environment where payload specials worked as they would in a ground-based laboratory. Pallets accommodated experi- ments for direct exposure to space. They could be combined with anoth- er small structure called an igloo. Crew modules and pallets were completely reusable; they were designed for multi-use applications and could be stacked or fitted togeth- er in a variety of configurations to provide for completely enclosed, com- pletely exposed, or a combination of both enclosed-exposed facilities. The Spacelab components got all their electric, cooling, and other service requirements from the orbiter. An instrument pointing system, also part of the Spacelab, provided pointing for the various Spacelab experiment tele- scopes and cameras. The crew module maintained an oxygen-nitrogen atmosphere identi- cal to that in the orbiter crew compartment. Depending on mission require- ments, crew modules consisted of either one segment (short module) or two segments (long module). The short module was four and two- tenths meters long; the long module measured seven meters. All crew modules were four meters in diameter. Most of the equipment housed in the short module controlled the pallet-mounted experiments. Spacelab missions used the long module when more room was needed for laboratory-type investigations. Equipment inside the crew modules was mounted in fifty- centimeter-wide racks. These racks were easily removed between flights so module-mounted experiments could be changed quickly. The U-shaped pallet structure accommodated experiment equipment for direct exposure to the space environment when the payload bay doors were opened. It provided hardpoints for mounting heavy experiments and inserts for supporting light payloads. Individual payload segments were three meters long and four meters wide. The orbiter keel attachment fit- ting provided lateral restraint for the pallet when installed in the orbiter (Figure 3-8). The igloo was a pressurized cylindrical canister 1,120 millimeters in diameter and 2,384 millimeters in height and with a volume of two and two-tenths cubic meters (Figure 3-9). It consisted of a primary structure, a secondary structure, a removable cover, and an igloo mounting structure and housed the following components: SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT I 19 Primary Trunnion Attachment Fitting Outer Skin Panel (Typical) Pallet-to-Pallet Joint Attachment Position Figure 3-8. Pallet Structure and Panels Figure 3-9. Spacelab Igloo Structure 150 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Three computers (subsystem, experiment, and backup) Two input-output units (subsystem and experiment) One mass memory unit Two subsystem remote acquisition units Eleven interconnect stations One emergency box One power control box One subsystem power distribution box One remote amplification and advisory box One high-rate multiplexer An international agreement between the United States and Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom formally established the Spacelab program. Ten European nations, of which nine were members of ESA, participated in the program. NASA and ESA each bore their respective program costs. ESA responsibilities included the design, development, production, and delivery of the first Spacelab and associated ground sup- port equipment to NASA, as well as the capability to produce additional Spacelabs. NASA responsibilities included the development of flight and ground support equipment not provided by ESA, the development of Spacelab operational capability, and the procurement of additional hard- ware needed to support NASA's missions. ESA designed, developed, produced, and delivered the first Spacelab. It consisted of a pressurized module and unpressurized pallet segments, command and data management, environmental control, power distribu- tion systems, an instrument pointing system, and much of the ground sup- port equipment and software for both flight and ground operations. NASA provided the remaining hardware, including the crew transfer tunnel, verification flight instrumentation, certain ground support equip- ment, and a training simulator. Support software and procedures devel- opment, testing, and training activities not provided by ESA, which were needed to demonstrate the operational capability of Spacelab, were also NASA's responsibility. NASA also developed two principal versions of the Spacelab pallet system. One supported missions requiring the igloo and pallet in a mixed cargo configuration; the other version supported missions that did not require the igloo. Scientific Experiments In addition to the dedicated Spacelab missions, nearly all STS mis- sions had some scientific experiments on board. They used the unique microgravity environment found on the Space Shuttle or the environment surrounding the Shuttle. These experiments were in diverse disciplines and required varying degrees of crew involvement. Details of the scien- tific experiments performed on the various Shuttle missions are found in the "mission characteristics" tables for each mission. SPACI TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT LSI Get-Away Specials The Get-Away Specials were small self-contained payloads. Fifty- three Get-Away Special payloads had flown on Space Shuttle missions through 1988. The idea for the program arose in the mid-1970s when NASA began assigning major payloads to various Shuttle missions. It soon became apparent that most missions would have a small amount of space available after installing the major payloads. NASA's discussion of how best to use this space led to the Small Self-Contained Payloads pro- gram, later known as the Get-Away Special program. This program gave anyone, including domestic and international organizations, an opportunity to perform a small space experiment. NASA hoped that by opening Get-Away Specials to the broadest com- munity possible, it could further the goals of encouraging the use of space by all, enhancing education with hands-on space research opportunities, inexpensively testing ideas that could later grow into major space exper- iments, and generating new activities unique to space. In October 1976, NASA's Associate Administrator for Space Flight, John Yardley, announced the beginning of the Get-Away Special program. Immediately, R. Gilbert Moore purchased the first Get-Away Special pay- load reservation. Over the next few months, NASA defined the program's boundaries. Only payloads of a scientific research and development nature that met NASA's safety regulations were acceptable. Payloads were to be self-contained, supplying their own power, means of data collection, and event sequencing. Keeping safety in mind and the varying technical exper- tise of Get-Away Special customers, NASA designed a container that could contain potential hazards. Three payload options evolved: • A 0.07-cubic-meter container for payloads up to twenty-seven kilo- grams costing $3,000 • A 0.07-cubic-meter container for payloads weighing twenty-eight to forty-five kilograms for $5,000 • A 0.14-cubic-meter container for payloads up to ninety kilograms costing $10,000 Early in 1977, NASA assigned the Get-Away Special program to the Sounding Rocket Division, later renamed the Special Payloads Division, at the Goddard Space Flight Center. Meanwhile, news of the Get-Away Special program had passed informally throughout the aerospace com- munity. With no publicity since Yardley's initial announcement the previ- ous year, NASA had already issued more than 100 payload reservation numbers. The Get-Away Special team did not anticipate flying a Get-Away Special payload before STS-5. However, the weight of a Get-Away Special container and its adapter beam was needed as ballast for STS-3's aft cargo bay. Thus, the Get-Away Special program and the Flight Verification Payload received an early go-ahead for the STS-3 flight in 52 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK March 1982. The first official Get- Away Special, a group of experiments developed by Utah State University students, flew on STS-4. Details of this Get-Away Special and the other Get-Away Special experiments can be found in the detailed STS mission tables that follow. Shuttle Student Involvement Program The Shuttle Student Involvement Program (SSIP) was a joint venture of NASA and the National Science Teachers Association (NSTA). It was designed to stimulate the study of science and technology in the nation's secondary schools. To broaden participation in the program, NASA solicited industrial firms and other groups to sponsor the development of the student experiments. Sponsors were asked to assign a company sci- entist to work with the student; fund the development of the experiment, including the necessary hardware; provide travel funds to take the student to appropriate NASA installations during experiment development; and provide assistance in analyzing postflight data and preparing a final report. Students proposed and designed the payloads associated with the program. NASA and the NSTA held contests to determine which student exper- iments would fly on Space Shuttle missions. Following the mission, NASA returned experiment data to the student for analysis. Most Shuttle missions had at least one SSIP experiment; some missions had several experiments on board. Hardware developed to support the student experiments was located in the mid-deck of the orbiter. As a general rule, no more than one hour of crew time was to be devoted to the student experiment. The first SSIP project took place during the 1981-82 school year as a joint venture of NASA's Academic Affairs Division and the NSTA. The NSTA announced the program, which resulted in the submission of 1,500 proposals and the selection of 191 winners from ten regions. Ten national winners were selected in May 1991. NASA then matched the finalists with industrial or other non-NASA sponsors who would support the development and postflight analysis of their experiments. Winners who were not matched with a sponsor had their experiments supported by NASA. Details of individual SSIP experiments can be found in the detailed STS mission tables that follow. Free- Flying Payloads Free-flying payloads are released from the Space Shuttle. Most have been satellites that were boosted into a particular orbit with the help of a inertial upper stage or payload assist module. Most free-flying payloads had lifetimes of several years, with many performing long past their anticipated life span. Some free-flying payloads sent and received com- munications data. These communications satellites usually belonged to companies that were involved in the communications industry. Other free-flying payloads contained sensors or other instruments to read SPACin RANSIH )K I A I ION/HUMAN SPACId LKJI II 153 atmospheric conditions. The data gathered by the sensors was transmitted to Earth either directly to a ground station or by way of a TORS. Scientists on Earth interpreted the data gathered by the instruments. Kxamplcs of this kind of satellite were meteorological satellites and planetary probes. These satel- lites frequently were owned and operated by NASA or another government agency, although private industry could participate in this type of venture. Other free-flying payloads were meant to fly for only a short time period. They were then retrieved by a robot arm and returned to the Shuttle's cargo bay. Individual free-flying payload missions are discussed in Chapter 4, "Space Science," in this volume and Chapter 2, "Space Applications," in Volume VI of the NASA Historical Data Book. Payload Integration Process The payload integration process began with the submission of a Request for Flight Assignment form by the user organization — a private or governmental organization — to NASA Headquarters. If NASA approved the request, a series of actions began that ultimately led to spaceflight. These actions included signing a launch services agreement, developing a payload integration plan, and preparing engineering designs and analyses, safety analysis, and a flight readiness plan. An important consideration was the weight of the payload. For orbiters Discovery (OV-103), Atlantis (OV-104), and Endeavour (OV-105), the abort landing weight constraints could not exceed 22,906 kilograms of allowable cargo on the so-called simple satellite deployment missions. For longer duration flights with attached payloads, the allowable cargo weight for end-of-mission or abort situations was limited to 11,340 kilograms. For Columbia (OV-102), however, these allowable cargo weights were reduced by 3,810.2 kilograms. In November 1987, NASA announced that the allowable end-of-mis- sion total landing weight for Space Shuttle orbiters had been increased from the earlier limit of 95,709.6 kilograms to 104,328 kilograms. The higher limit was attributed to an ongoing structural analysis and addition- al review of forces encountered by the orbiter during maneuvers just before touchdown. This new capability increased the performance capa- bility between lift capacity to orbit and the allowable return weight during reentry and landing. Thus, the Shuttle would be able to carry a cumulative weight in excess of 45,360 kilograms of additional cargo through 1993. This additional capability was expected to be an important factor in deliv- ering materials for construction of the space station. Moreover, the new allowable landing weights were expected to aid in relieving the payload backlog that resulted from the STS 51-L Challenger accident. Space Shuttle Missions The following sections describe each STS mission beginning with the first four test missions. Information on Space Shuttle missions is 154 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK extremely well documented. The pre- and postflight Mission Operations Reports (MORs) that NASA was required to submit for each mission provided the majority of data. At a minimum, these reports listed the mission objectives, described mission events and the payload in varying degrees of detail, listed program/project management, and profiled the crew. NASA usually issued the preflight MOR a few weeks prior to the scheduled launch date. The postflight MOR was issued following the flight. It assessed the mission's success in reaching its objectives and discussed anomalies and unexpected events. It was signed by the individuals who had responsibil- ity for meeting the mission objectives. NASA also issued press kits prior to launch. These documents includ- ed information of special interest to the media, the information from the prelaunch MORs, and significant background of the mission. Other sources included NASA Daily Activity Reports, NASA News, NASA Fact Sheets, and other STS mission summaries issued by NASA. Information was also available on-line through NASA Headquarters and various NASA center home pages. Mission Objectives Mission objectives may seem to the reader to be rather general and broad. These objectives usually focused on what the vehicle and its com- ponents were to accomplish rather than on what the payload was to accomplish. Because one main use of the Space Shuttle was as a launch vehicle, deployment of any satellites on board was usually a primary mis- sion objective. A description of the satellite's objectives (beyond a top level) and a detailed treatment of its configuration would be found in the MOR for that satellite's mission. For instance, the mission objectives for the Earth Radiation Budget Satellite would be found in the MOR for that mission rather than in the MOR for STS 41-G, the launch vehicle for the satellite. In addition, missions with special attached payloads, such as Spacelab or OSTA-1, issued individual MORs. These described the sci- entific and other objectives of these payloads and on-board experiments or "firsts" to be accomplished in considerable detail. The Test Missions: STS-1 Through STS-4 Overview Until the launch of STS-1 in April 1981, NASA had no proof of the Space Shuttle as an integrated Space Transportation System that could reach Earth orbit, perform useful work there, and return safely to the ground. Thus, the purpose of the Orbital Flight Test (OFT) program was to verify the Shuttle's performance under real spaceflight conditions and to establish its readiness for operational duty. The test program would expand the Shuttle's operational range toward the limits of its design in SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SI'ACNLKill I 155 careful increments. During four flights of Columbia, conducted from April 1981 to July 1^82, NASA tested the Shuttle in its eapaeities as a launch vehicle, habitat lor crew members, freight handler, instrument platform, and aircraft. NASA also evaluated ground operations before, during, and after each launch. Each flight increased the various structural and thermal stresses on the vehicle, both in space and in the atmosphere, by a planned amount. The OFT phase of the STS program demonstrated the flight sys- tem's ability to safely perform launch orbital operations, payload/scientif- ic operations, entry, approach, landing, and turnaround operations. Table 3-16 provides a summary of STS-1 through STS-4. Following the landing of STS-4 on July 4, 1982, NASA declared the OFT program a success, even though further testing and expansion of the Shuttle's capabilities were planned on operational flights. The OFT pro- gram consisted of more than 1,100 tests and data collections. NASA test- ed many components by having them function as planned — if an engine valve or an insulating tile worked normally, then its design was verified. Other components, such as the RMS arm, went through validation runs to check out their different capabilities. Final documentation of Shuttle per- formance during OFT considered the reports from astronaut crews, ground observations and measurements, and data from orbiter instru- ments and special developmental flight instrumentation that collected and recorded temperatures and accelerations at various points around the vehicle and motion from points around the Shuttle. The first OFT flights were designed to maximize crew and vehicle safety by reducing ascent and entry aerodynamic loads on the vehicle as much as possible. The missions used two-person crews, and the orbiter was equipped with two ejection seats until satisfactory performance, reli- ability, and safety of the Space Shuttle had been demonstrated. Launch operations were controlled from the Kennedy Space Center and flight operations from the Johnson Space Center. At the end of OFT, Columbia s main engines had been demonstrated successfully up to 100 percent of their rated power level (upgraded engines throttled to 109 percent of this level on later flights) and down to 65 percent. Designed to provide 1.67 million newtons of thrust each at sea level for an estimated fifty-five missions, the engines were on target to meeting these guidelines at the end of the test program. They met all requirements for start and cutoff timing, thrust direction control, and the flow of propellants. Launch Phase NASA tested the Space Shuttle in its launch phase by planning increasingly more demanding ascent conditions for each test flight, and then by comparing predicted flight characteristics with data returned from Aerodynamic Coefficient Identification Package and developmental flight instrumentation instruments and ground tracking. Columbia lifted slightly heavier payloads into space on each mission. The altitudes and speeds at 156 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK which the solid rocket boosters and external tank separated were varied, as was the steepness of the vehicle's climb and main engine throttling times. All of these changes corresponded to a gradual increasing during the test program in the maximum dynamic pressure, or peak aerodynamic stress, inflicted on the vehicle. At no time did Columbia experience any signifi- cant problems with the aerodynamic or heat stresses of ascent. A major milestone in the test program was the shift (after STS-2) from using wind tunnel data for computing Columbia 's ascent path to using aerodynamic data derived from the first two flights. On STS-1 and STS-2, the Shuttle showed a slight lofting — about 3,000 meters at main engine cutoff — above its planned trajectory. This was caused by the inability of wind tunnel models to simulate the afterburning of hot exhaust gasses in the real atmosphere. Beginning with the third flight, the thrust of the booster rockets was reoriented slightly to reduce this lofting. On STS-3 and STS-4, however, the trajectory was considered too shallow, in part because of a slower than predicted burn rate for the solid rocket boosters that had also been observed on the first two flights. Engineers continued to use OFT data after STS-4 to refine their predic- tions of this solid propellant burn rate so that ascent trajectories could be planned as accurately as possible on future missions. In all cases, the combined propulsion of main engines, solid boosters, and OMS engines delivered the Shuttle to its desired orbit. STS-4 was the first mission to orbit at a twenty-eight-and-a-half- degree inclination to the equator. The first flights flew more steeply inclined orbits (thirty-eight to forty degrees) that took them over more ground tracking stations. The more equatorial STS-4 inclination was favored because it gave the vehicle a greater boost from the rotating Earth at launch. The first two flights also verified that the vehicle had enough energy for an emergency landing in Spain or Senegal, as abort options, should two main engines fail during ascent. After STS-5, the crew ejec- tion seats were removed from Columbia, eliminating the option to eject and ending the need for astronauts to wear pressure suits during launch. Solid Rocket Boosters. On each test flight, the twin solid rocket boosters provided evenly matched thrust, shut off at the same times, and separated as planned from the external tank, then parachuted down to their designated recovery area in the Atlantic Ocean for towing back to the mainland and reloading with solid propellant. Each booster had three main parachutes that inflated fully about twenty seconds before water impact. Prior to the test flights, these parachutes were designed to sepa- rate automatically from the boosters by means of explosive bolts when the rockets hit the water, because it was thought that recovery would be easier if the chutes were not still attached. On the first and third flights, however, some parachutes sank before recovery. Then, on STS-4, the separation bolts fired prematurely because of strong vibrations, the parachutes detached from the rockets before water impact, and the rockets hit the water at too great a speed and sank. They were not recovered. As a result of these problems, NASA changed SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 157 the recovery hardware and procedures beginning with STS-5. Instead of separating automatically with explosives, the parachutes remained attached to the boosters through water impact, and were detached by the recovery team. Sections of the boosters were also strengthened as a result of water impact damage seen on the test flights. External Tank. The Space Shuttle's external fuel tank met all perfor- mance standards for OFT. Heat sensors showed ascent temperatures to be moderate enough to allow for planned reductions in the thickness and weight of the tank's insulation. Beginning with STS-3, white paint on the outside of the tank was left off to save another 243 kilograms of weight, leaving the tank the brown color of its spray-on foam insulation. Onboard cameras showed flawless separation of the tank from the orbiter after the main engines cut off on each flight, and Shuttle crews reported that this separation was so smooth that they could not feel it hap- pening. To assist its breakup in the atmosphere, the tank had a pyrotech- nic device that set it tumbling after separation rather than skipping along the atmosphere like a stone. This tumble device failed on STS-1, but it worked perfectly on all subsequent missions. On all the test flights, radar tracking of the tank debris showed that the pieces fell well within the planned impact area in the Indian Ocean. Orbital Maneuvering System. Shortly after it separated from the fuel tank, the orbiter fired its two aft-mounted OMS engines for additional boosts to higher and more circularized orbits. At the end of orbital oper- ations, these engines decelerated the vehicle, beginning the orbiter's fall to Earth. The engines performed these basic functions during OFT with normal levels of fuel consumption and engine wear. Further testing included startups after long periods of idleness in vacuum and low grav- ity (STS-1 and STS-2), exposure to cold (STS-3), and exposure to the Sun (STS-4). Different methods of distributing the system's propellants were also demonstrated. Fuel from the left tank was fed to the right tank, and vice versa, and from the OMS tanks to the smaller RCS thrusters. On STS-2, the engine cross-feed was performed in the middle of an engine burn to simulate engine failure. Orbital Operations Once in space, opening the two large payload bay doors with their attached heat radiators was an early priority. If the doors did not open in orbit, the Shuttle could not deploy payloads or shed its waste heat. If they failed to close at mission's end, reentry through the atmosphere would be impossible. The STS-1 crew tested the payload bay doors during Columbia's first few hours in space. The crew members first unlatched the doors from the bulkheads and from each other. One at a time, they were opened in the manual drive mode. The movement of the doors was slightly more jerky and hesitant in space than in Earth-gravity simulations, but this was expected and did not affect their successful opening and closing. The 158 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK crew members closed and reopened the doors again one day into the STS-1 mission as a further test, then closed them for good before reentry. The crew verified normal alignment and latching of the doors, as did the STS-2 crew during their door cycling tests, including one series in the automatic mode. The crew also tested door cycling after prolonged exposure to heat and cold. The doors were made of a graphite-epoxy composite material, while the orbiter itself was made of aluminum. It was therefore important to understand how they would fit together after the aluminum expanded or contracted in the temperature extremes of space. At the beginning of STS-3 orbital operations, the doors opened as usual. The payload bay was then exposed to cold shadow for a period of twenty-three hours. When the crew closed the port-side door at the end of this "coldsoak," the door failed to latch properly, as it did after a similar cold exposure on the STS-4 mission. Apparently, the orbiter warped very slightly with nose and tail bent upward toward each other, accounting in part for the doors' inability to clear the aft bulkhead. The crew solved the problem by holding the orbiter in a top-to-Sun position for fifteen minutes to warm the cargo bay, then undergoing a short "barbecue roll" to even out vehicle temperatures, allowing the doors to close and latch normally. In addition, hardware changes to the doors and to the aft bulkhead improved their clearance. Thermal Tests. Thermal tests accounted for hundreds of hours of OFT mission time. The temperatures of spacecraft structures changed dramatically in space, depending on their exposure to the Sun. Temperatures on the surface of payload bay insulation on STS-3, for example, went from a low of -96° C to a peak of 127° C. The Space Shuttle kept its components within their designed temperature limits through its active thermal control system, which included two coolant loops that transported waste heat from the orbiter and payload electronics to the door-mounted radiator panels for dumping into space, and through the use of insulation and heaters. Figure 3-10 shows the insulating mate- rials used on the orbiter. The OFT program tested the orbiter' s ability to keep cool and keep warm under conditions much more extreme than that of the average mis- sion. STS-3 and STS-4 featured extended thermal "soaks," where parts of the orbiter were deliberately heated up or cooled down by holding certain attitudes relative to the Sun for extended time periods. These long ther- mal soaks were separated by shorter periods of "barbecue roll" for even heating. On STS-4, the thermal soak tests continued with long tail-to-Sun and bottom-to-Sun exposures. Overall, these hot and cold soak tests showed that the Shuttle had a better than predicted thermal stability. STS-3 readings showed that the orbiter's skin kept considerably warmer during coldsoaks than had been expected and that many critical systems, such as the orbital maneuvering engines, were also warmer. Most vehicle structures also tended to heat up or cool down more slowly than expected. The active thermal control sys- SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 159 Figure 3-10. Insulating Materials tern, with its coolant loops and space radiators, proved capable of han- dling Shuttle heat loads in orbit, even under extreme conditions. The crew tested the space radiators with all eight panels deployed, and they proved capable of shedding most heat loads with only four pan- els deployed. During ascent, another part of the thermal control system, the Shuttle's flash evaporators, transferred heat from circulating coolant to water, beginning about two minutes into the ascent when the vehicle first required active cooling. These flash evaporators normally worked until the space radiators were opened in orbit. Then, during reentry, the flash evaporators were reactivated and used down to an altitude of approximately 36,000 meters. From that altitude down to the ground, the Shuttle shed heat by boiling ammonia rather than water. During OFT, the crew members successfully tested these methods of cooling as backups to each other. Subsystems. All crews for the flight test program tested and retested the Space Shuttle's main subsystems under varying conditions. On the four OFT flights, virtually every system — hydraulic, electrical, naviga- tion and guidance, communications, and environmental control — performed up to design standards or better. The hydraulic subsystem that controlled the movement of the Shuttle's engine nozzles, its airplane-like control flaps, and its landing 160 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK gear functioned well during OFT launches and reentries. The crew tested the hydraulic system successfully on STS-2 by cycling the eleven control surfaces while in orbit. On STS-4, the hydraulics were evaluated after a long coldsoak, and the crew found that the circulation pumps needed to operate at only minimal levels to keep the hydraulic fluids above critical temperatures, thus saving on electric power usage. Although an oil filter clog in the hydraulic system's auxiliary power units delayed the launch of STS-2 by more than a week, the problem did not recur. Tighter seals were used to prevent the oil from being contami- nated by the units' hydrazine fuel. The STS-2 mission was also cut short because of the failure of one of the three Shuttle fuel cells that converted cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen to electricity. A clog in the cell's water flow lines caused the failure, and this problem was remedied during OFT by adding filters to the pipes. This failure allowed an unscheduled test of the vehicle using only two fuel cells instead of three, which were enough to handle all electrical needs. Partly as a result of the Shuttle's thermal stability, electricity consumption by the orbiter proved to be lower than expected, ranging from fourteen to seventeen kilowatts per hour in orbit as opposed to the predicted fifteen to twenty kilowatts. The Shuttle's computers successfully demonstrated their ability to control virtually every phase of each mission, from final countdown sequencing to reentry, with only minor programming changes needed during the test program. The crew checked out the on-orbit navigation and guidance aids thoroughly. The orbiter "sensed" its position in space by means of three inertial measurement units, whose accuracy was checked and periodically updated by a star tracker located on the same navigation base in the flight deck. The crew tested this star tracker/iner- tial measurement unit alignment on the first Shuttle mission, including once when the vehicle was rolling. The star tracker could find its guide stars in both darkness and daylight. Its accuracy was better than expect- ed, and the entire navigation instrument base showed stability under extreme thermal conditions. Radio and television communication was successful on all four flights, with only minimal hardware and signal acquisition problems at ground stations. Specific tests checked different transmission modes, radio voice through the Shuttle's rocket exhaust during ascent, and UHF transmission as a backup to the primary radio link during launch and operations in space. All were successful. Tests on STS-4 also evaluated how different orbiter attitudes affected radio reception in space. The closed-circuit television system inside the orbiter and out in the cargo bay gave high-quality video images of operations in orbit. In sun- light and in artificial floodlighting of the payload bay, they showed the necessary sensitivity, range of vision, remote control, and video-record- ing capabilities. Attitude Control. When in orbit, the Shuttle used its RCS to control its attitude and to make small-scale movements in space. The thrusting SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT If) I power and propellant usage oi' both types of RCS jets were as expected, with the smaller verniers more fuel-efficient than expeetecl. Two of the lour vernier jets in Columbia's tail area had a problem with the downward direc- tion of their thrust. The exhaust hit the aft body flap and eroded some of its protective tiles, whieh also reduced the power of the jets. One possible solu- tion eonsidered was to reorient these jets slightly on future orbiters. The orbiter demonstrated its ability to come to rest after a maneuver. At faster rates, it proved nearly impossible to stop the vehicle's motion without overshooting, then coming back to the required "stop" position, particularly with the large primary engines. Both types of thrusters were used to keep the orbiter steady in "attitude hold" postures. The small thrusters were particularly successful and fuel-efficient, holding the vehi- cle steady down to one-third of a degree of drift at normal rates of fuel use, which was three times their required sensitivity. Further tests of the RCS assessed how well Columbia could hold steady without firing its jets when differential forces of gravity tended to tug the vehicle out of position. The results of these tests looked promising for the use of "passive gravity gradient" attitudes for future missions where steadiness for short periods of time was required without jet firings. Remote Manipulator System. Ground simulators could not practice three-dimensional maneuvers because the remote manipulator system (RMS) arm was too fragile to support its own weight in Earth gravity. Therefore, one of the most important as well as most time-consuming of all OFT test series involved the fifteen-meter mechanical arm. This Canadian-built device, jointed as a human arm at the shoulder, elbow, and wrist, attached to the orbiter at various cradle points running the length of the inside of the cargo bay. In place of a hand, the arm had a cylindrical end effector that grappled a pay load and held it rigid with wire snares. A crew member controlled the arm from inside the orbiter. The arm could be moved freely around the vehicle in a number of modes, with or with- out help from the Shuttle's computers. The crew tested all manual and automatic drive modes during OFT. They also tested the arm's ability to grab a pay load firmly, remove it from a stowed position, then reberth it precisely and securely. Lighting and television cameras also were verified — the crew relied on sensitive elbow and wrist cameras as well as cameras mounted in the payload bay to mon- itor operations. For the test program, special data acquisition cameras in the cargo bay documented arm motion. STS-2 was the first mission to carry the arm. Although the crew did not pick up a payload with the arm, the astronauts performed manual approaches to a grapple fixture in the cargo bay, and they found the arm to control smoothly. The crew also began tests to see how the arm's movement interacted with orbiter motions. The crew reported that firings of the small vernier thrusters did not influence arm position, nor did arm motions necessitate attitude adjustment firings by the orbiter. STS-3 tests evaluated the arm with a payload. The end effector grap- pled the 186-kilogram Plasma Diagnostics Package (PDP), removed it 162 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK manually from its berth in the cargo bay, and maneuvered it automatical- ly around the orbiter in support of OFT space environment studies. Pilot Gordon Fullerton deployed and reberthed the package. Before one such deployment, the arm automatically found its way to within 3.8 centime- ters of the grapple point in accordance with preflight predictions. The crew also verified the computer's ability to automatically stop an arm joint from rotating past the limit of its mobility. The third crew complet- ed forty-eight hours of arm tests, including one unplanned demonstration of the elbow camera's ability to photograph Columbia's nose area during an on-orbit search for missing tiles. Television cameras provided excellent views of arm operations in both sunshine and darkness, and the STS-4 crew reported that nighttime operations, although marginal, were still possible after three of the six payload bay cameras failed. The third and fourth crews continued evalu- ating vehicle interactions with arm motion by performing roll maneuvers as the arm held payloads straight up from the cargo bay. This was done with the PDP on STS-3 and with the Induced Environment Contamination Monitor on STS-4, which weighed twice as much. In both cases, the crew noted a slight swaying of the arm when the vehicle stopped, which was expected. The RMS was designed to move a payload of 29,250 kilograms, but it was tested only with masses under 450 kilograms during OFT. Future arm tests would graduate to heavier payloads, some with grapple points fixed to simulate the inertias of even more massive objects. The Shuttle Environment. In addition to these hardware checkouts, the test program also assessed the Space Shuttle environment. This was important for planning future missions that would carry instruments sen- sitive to noise, vibration, radiation, or contamination. During OFT, Columbia carried two sensor packages for examining the cargo bay envi- ronment. The Dynamic, Acoustic and Thermal Environment experi- ment — a group of accelerometers, microphones, and heat and strain gauges — established that noise and stress levels inside the bay were gen- erally lower than predicted. The Induced Environment Contamination Monitor, normally secured in the cargo bay, was also moved around by the manipulator arm to perform an environmental survey outside the orbiter on STS-4. The Contamination Monitor and the Shuttle-Spacelab Induced Atmosphere Experiment and postlanding inspections of the cargo bay backed up the Induced Environment Contamination Monitor's survey of polluting particles and gasses. These inspections revealed minor deposits and some discoloration of films and painted surfaces in the bay, which were still being studied after OFT. A new payload bay lining was added after STS-4. The PDP measured energy fields around the orbiter on STS-3. The PDP, used in conjunction with the Vehicle Charging and Potential Experiment, mapped the distribution of charged particles around the spacecraft. These readings showed a vehicle that was relatively "quiet" SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 163 electrically— it moved through the Earth's energy fields wiih interference Levels much lower than the acceptable limits. The crew also discovered a soft glow around some of the Shuttle's surfaces that appeared in several nighttime photographs. An experiment added to STS-4 to identify the glow's spectrum supported a tentative explanation that the phenomenon resulted from the interaction with atomic oxygen in the thin upper atmosphere. Inside the Shuttle, the cabin and mid-deck areas proved to be livable and practical working environments for the crew members. The test flight crews monitored cabin air quality, pressure, temperature, radiation, and noise levels and filmed their chores and activities in space to document the Shuttle's "habitability." The crews reported that their mobility inside Columbia was excellent, and they found that anchoring themselves in low gravity was easier than expected. There was almost no need for special foot restraints, and the crew members could improvise with ordinary duct tape attached to their shoes to hold themselves in place. Descent and Landing At the end of its time in orbit, the Space Shuttle's payload bay doors were closed, and the vehicle assumed a tail-first, upside-down posture and retrofired its OMS engines to drop out of orbit. It then flipped to a nose-up attitude and began its descent through the atmosphere back to Earth. Figure 3-11 shows the STS-1 entry flight profile. The Shuttle's insulation needed to survive intact the burning friction of reentry to fly on the next mission. Columbia's aluminum surface was covered with several different types of insulation during the test program, with their distribution based on predicted heating patterns. These included Figure 3-11. STS-1 Entry Flight Profile 164 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK more than 30,000 rigid silica tiles of two types (black for high tempera- tures, white for lower) that accounted for over 70 percent of the orbiter's surface area. Television cameras viewing the outside of the Shuttle clearly revealed that several tiles had shaken loose during the vehicle's ascent and were missing from the aft engine pods. These tiles had not been den- sified — a process that strengthened the bond between tile and orbiter — as had all the tiles in critical areas and every tile installed after October 1979. No densified tiles were lost during the test flights. On each flight, there was some damage to tile surfaces during launch and reentry. Vehicle inspection revealed hundreds of pits and gouges after STS-1 and STS-2. While the damage was not critical, many tiles needed to be replaced. Crew reports, launch pad cameras, and cockpit films recorded chunks of ice and/or insulation falling from the external tank; during ascent and launch, pad debris flew up and hit the orbiter, and these impacts were blamed for most of the tile damage. During the test pro- gram, NASA instituted a general cleanup of the pad before launch, and the removal of a particular insulation that had come loose from the boost- er rockets reduced debris significantly. On the external tank, certain pieces of ice-forming hardware were removed. As a result, impact dam- age to the tiles was greatly reduced. While some 300 tiles needed to be replaced after STS-1, fewer than forty were replaced after STS-4. Weather also damaged some tiles during the test program. Factory waterproofing of new tiles did not survive the heat of reentry, and Columbia had to be sprayed with a commercial waterproofing agent after each mission so as not to absorb rainwater on the pad. The waterproofing agent was found to loosen tile bonds where it formed puddles, though, and STS-3 lost some tiles as a result. Then, while STS-4 sat on the pad awaiting launch, a heavy hail and rainstorm allowed an estimated 540 kilograms of rainwater to be absorbed into the porous tiles through pits made by hailstones. This water added unwanted weight during ascent and later caused motion distur- bances to the vehicle when the water evaporated into space. Shuttle engi- neers planned to use an injection procedure to waterproof the interior of the tiles for future missions. As a whole, the thermal protection system kept the orbiter's skin within required limits during the OFT flights, even during the hottest periods of reentry. For the test program's last three flights, the crews performed short- duration maneuver changes in the vehicle's pitch angle that tested the effects of different attitudes on heating. Heating on the control surfaces was increased over the four flights, and on STS-3 and STS-4, the angle of entry into the atmosphere was flown more steeply to collect data under even more demanding conditions. Sensors on the orbiter reported temperatures consis- tent with preflight predictions. Notable exceptions were the aft engine pods, where some low-temperature flexible insulation was replaced with high-tem- perature black tiles after STS-1 showed high temperatures and scorching. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT k>5 Aerodynamic Tests The major objective of aerodynamic testing was to verily controlled flight over a wide range of altitudes (beginning at 120,000 meters where the air is very thin) and velocities, from hypersonic to subsonic. In both manual and automatic control modes, the vehicle Hew very reliably and agreed with wind tunnel predictions. Each flight crew also conducted a number of maneuvers either as pro- grammed inputs by the guidance computer or as control stick commands by the crew in which the vehicles flaps and rudder were positioned to bring about more demanding flight conditions or to fill data gaps where wind tunnel testing was not adequate. These corrections were executed perfectly. In the thin upper atmosphere, the Space Shuttle used its reac- tion control thrusters to help maintain its attitude. Over the four test flights, these thrusters showed a greater-than-expected influence on the vehicle's motion. The orbiter's navigation and guidance equipment also performed well during reentry. Probes that monitored air speeds were successfully deployed at speeds below approximately Mach 3, and navi- gational aids by which the orbiter checks its position relative to the ground worked well with only minor adjustments. Unlike returning Apollo capsules, the Space Shuttle had some cross- range capability — it could deviate from a purely ballistic path by gliding right or left of its aim point and so, even though it had no powered thrust during final approach, it did have a degree of control over where it land- ed. The largest cross-range demonstrated during the test program was 930 kilometers on STS-4. The Space Shuttle could return to Earth under full computer control from atmospheric entry to the runway. During the test program, however, Columbia's approach and landing were partly manual. The STS-1 approach and landing was fully manual. On STS-2, the auto-land control was engaged at 1,500 meters altitude, and the crew took over at ninety meters. Similarly, STS-3 flew on auto-land from 3,000 meters down to thirty-nine meters before the commander took stick control. It was decid- ed after an error in nose attitude during the STS-3 landing that the crew should not take control of the vehicle so short a time before touchdown. The STS-4 crew therefore took control from the auto-land as Columbia moved into its final shallow glide slope at 600 meters. Full auto-land capability remained to be demonstrated after STS-5, as did a landing with a runway cross-wind. Stress gauges on the landing gear and crew reports indicated that a Shuttle landing was smoother than most commercial airplanes. Rollout on the runway after touchdown fell well within the 4,500-meter design limit on each landing, but the actual touchdown points were all considerably beyond the planned touchdown points. This was because the Shuttle had a higher ratio of lift to drag near the ground than was expected, and it "floated" farther down the runway. 166 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Ground Work The OFT program verified thousands of ground procedures, from mating the vehicle before launch to refurbishing the solid rocket boosters and ferrying the orbiter from landing site to launch pad. As the test pro- gram progressed, many ground operations were changed or streamlined. Certain tasks that had been necessary for an untried vehicle before STS-1 could be eliminated altogether. As a result of this learning, the "turnaround" time between missions was shortened dramatically — from 188 days for STS-2 to seventy-five days between STS-4 and STS-5. Major time-saving steps included: • Leaving cryogenic fuels in their on-board storage tanks between flights rather than removing them after landing • Alternating the use of primary and backup systems on each flight rather than checking out both sets of redundant hardware on the ground before each launch • Reducing the number of tests of critical systems as they proved flightworthy from mission to mission The OFT program verified the soundness of the STS and its readiness for future scientific, commercial, and defense applications. Orbiter Experiments Program Many of the experiments that flew on the first four Shuttle missions were sponsored by the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (Code R) through its Orbiter Experiments Program. NASA used the data gathered from these experiments to verify the accuracy of wind tunnel and other ground-based simulations made prior to flight, ground-to-flight extrapolation methods, and theoretical computational methods. The prime objective of these experiments was to increase the tech- nology reservoir for the development of future (twenty-first century) space transportation systems, such as single-stage-to-orbit, heavy-lift launch vehicles and orbital transfer vehicles that could deploy and service large, automated, person-tended, multifunctional satellite platforms and a staffed, permanent facility in Earth orbit. The Orbiter Experiments Program experiments included: Aerodynamic Coefficient Identification Package Shuttle Entry Air Data System Shuttle Upper Atmospheric Mass Spectrometer Data Flight Instrumentation Package Dynamic, Acoustic and Thermal Environment Experiment Infrared Imagery of Shuttle Shuttle Infrared Leeside Temperature Sensing Tile Gap Heating Effects Experiment Catalytic Surface Effects SPACli TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 167 Each of these experiments, plus the others listed in Table 3 16, is dis cussed as part of the Individual "mission characteristics" tables (Tables 3-17 through 3-20). Mission Characteristics of the Test Missions (STS-1 Through STS-4) STS-I Objective. The mission objective was to demonstrate a safe ascent and return of the orbiter and crew. Overview. Columbia reported on spacecraft performance and the stresses encountered during launch, flight, and landing. The flight suc- cessfully demonstrated two systems: the payload bay doors with their attached heat radiators and the RCS thrusters used for attitude control in orbit. John W. Young and Robert L. Crippen tested all systems and con- ducted many engineering tests, including opening and closing the cargo bay doors. Opening these doors is critical to deploy the radiators that release the heat that builds up in the crew compartment. Closing them is necessary for the return to Earth. Young and Crippen also documented their flight in still and motion pictures. One view of the cargo bay that they telecast to Earth indicated that all or part of sixteen heat shielding tiles were lost. The loss was not considered critical as these pods were not subjected to intense heat, which could reach 1,650° C while entering the atmosphere. More than 30,000 tiles did adhere. A detailed inspection of the tiles, carried out later, however, revealed minor damage to approximately 400 tiles. About 200 would require replacement, 100 as a result of flight damage and 100 identified prior to STS-1 as suitable for only one flight. Observations revealed that the water deluge system designed to sup- press the powerful acoustic pressures of liftoff needed to be revised, after the shock from the booster rockets was seen to be much larger than antic- ipated. In the seconds before and after liftoff, a "rainbird" deluge system had poured tens of thousands of gallons of water onto the launch platform and into flame trenches beneath the rockets to absorb sound energy that might otherwise damage the orbiter or its cargo. Strain gauges and micro- phones measured the acoustic shock, and they showed up to four times the predicted values in parts of the vehicle closest to the launch pad. Although Columbia suffered no critical damage, the sound suppres- sion system was modified before the launch of STS-2. Rather than dump- ing into the bottom of the flame trenches, water was injected directly into the exhaust plumes of the booster rockets at a point just below the exhaust nozzles at the time of ignition. In addition, energy-absorbing water troughs were placed over the exhaust openings. The changes were enough to reduce acoustic pressures to 20 to 30 percent of STS-1 levels for the second launch. 168 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK STS-2 Objectives. NASA's mission objectives for STS-2 were to: • Demonstrate the reusability of the orbiter vehicle • Demonstrate launch, on-orbit, and entry performance under condi- tions more demanding than STS-1 • Demonstrate orbiter capability to support scientific and applications research with an attached payload • Conduct RMS tests Overview. Originally scheduled for five days, the mission was cut short because one of Columbia's three fuel cells that converted supercold (cryogenic) hydrogen and oxygen to electricity failed shortly after the vehicle reached orbit. Milestones were the first tests of the RMS's fifteen- meter arm and the successful operation of Earth- viewing instruments in the cargo bay. The mission also proved the Space Shuttle's reusability. In spite of the shortened mission, approximately 90 percent of the major test objectives were successfully accomplished, and 60 percent of the tests requiring on-orbit crew involvement were completed. The per- formance of lower priority tests were consistent with the shortened mis- sion, and 36 percent of these tasks were achieved. The mission's medical objectives were to provide routine and contin- gency medical support and to assure the health and well-being of flight personnel during all phases of the STS missions. This objective was achieved through the careful planning, development, training, and imple- mentation of biomedical tests and procedures compatible with STS oper- ations and the application of principles of general preventive medicine. It was also discovered that shortened sleep periods, heavy work loads, inad- equate time allocation for food preparation and consumption, and esti- mated lower water intake were just sufficient for a fifty-four-hour mission. A plan was therefore developed to restructure in-flight timelines and institute corrective health maintenance procedures for longer periods of flight. OSTA-1 was the major on-board mission payload. Sponsored by the Office of Space and Terrestrial Applications, it is addressed in Chapter 2, "Space Applications," in Volume VI of the NASA Historical Data Book. STS-3 Objectives. The NASA mission objectives for STS-3 were to: Demonstrate ascent, on-orbit, and entry performance under condi- tions more demanding than STS-2 conditions Extend orbital flight duration Conduct long-duration thermal soak tests Conduct scientific and applications research with an attached payload SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 169 Overview. NASA designated OSS- 1 as the attached payload on STS-3. The Office of Space Science sponsored the mission. This mission is discussed in Chapter 4, "Space Science." The crew performed tests of the robot arm and extensive thermal test- ing of Columbia itself dining this flight. Thermal testing involved expos- ing the tail, nose, and tip to the Sun for varying periods of time, rolling it ("barbecue roll") in between tests to stabilize temperatures over the entire body. The robot arm tested satisfactorily, moving the PDP experiment around the orbiter. STS-4 Objectives. The NASA mission objectives for STS-4 were to: • Demonstrate ascent, on-orbit, and entry performance under condi- tions more demanding than STS-3 conditions • Conduct long-duration thermal soak tests Conduct scientific and applications research with attached payloads Overview. This was the first Space Shuttle launch that took place on time and with no schedule delays. The mission tested the flying, handling, and operating characteristics of the orbiter, performed more exercises with the robot arm, conducted several scientific experiments in orbit, and landed at Edwards Air Force Base for the first time on a concrete runway of the same length as the Shuttle Landing Facility at the Kennedy Space Center. Columbia also planned to conduct more thermal tests by expos- ing itself to the Sun in selected altitudes, but these plans were changed because of damage caused by hail, which fell while Columbia was on the pad. The hail cut through the protective coating on the tiles and let rain- water inside. In space, the affected area on the underside of the orbiter was turned to the Sun. The heat of the Sun vaporized the water and pre- vented further possible tile damage from freezing. The only major problem on this mission was the loss of the two solid rocket booster casings. The main parachutes failed to function properly, and the two casings hit the water at too high a velocity and sank. They were later found and examined by remote camera, but not recovered. During the mission, the crew members repeated an STS-2 experiment that required the robot arm to move an instrument called the Induced Environmental Contamination Monitor around the orbiter to gather data on any gases or particles being released by the orbiter. They also con- ducted the Continuous Flow Electrophoresis System experiment, which marked the first use of the Shuttle by a commercial concern, McDonnell Douglas (Figure 3-12). In addition to a classified Air Force payload in the cargo bay, STS-4 carried the first Get-Away Special — a series of nine experiments prepared by students from Utah State University. The payload bay was exposed to cold shadow for several hours after opening of the doors. When the port- side door was closed at the end of 170 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Fluid Systems Module CFES Experiment Support Module (Standard Storage Locker) Experiment Control and Monitoring Module Sample Storage Module Fluids Control & Conditioning System Sample Pump Figure 3-12. Continuous Flow Electrophoresis System Mid-deck Gallery Location the "coldsoak," it failed to latch properly, as it did during the STS-3 mis- sion. The solution on both flights was the same and was adopted as the standard procedure for closing the doors following a long cold exposure: the orbiter would hold a top-to-Sun position for fifteen minutes to warm the cargo bay, then undergo a short "barbecue roll" to even out vehicle temperatures, allowing the doors to close normally. Mission Characteristics of the Operational Missions (STS-5 Through STS-27) The Space Transportation System became operational in 1982, after completing the last of four orbital flight tests. These flights had demon- strated that the Space Shuttle could provide flexible, efficient transporta- tion into space and back for crew members, equipment, scientific experiments, and payloads. From this point, payload requirements would take precedence over spacecraft testing. Table 3-21 summarizes Shuttle mission characteristics. The narrative and tables that follow (Tables 3-22 through 3-44) provide more detailed information on each Shuttle mission. STS-5 STS-5 was the first operational Space Shuttle mission. The crew adopted the theme "We Deliver" as it deployed two commercial commu- nications satellites: Telesat-E (Anik C-3) for Telesat Canada and SBS-C for Satellite Business Systems. Each was equipped with the Payload Assist Module-D (PAM-D) solid rocket motor, which fired about forty-five min- utes after deployment, placing each satellite into highly elliptical orbits. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGH1 171 The mission carried the first crew of lour, double the number on the previous four missions. It also carried the first mission specialists individuals qualified in satellite deployment payload support, EVAs, and the operation of the RMS. This mission featured the first Shuttle landing on the 15,000-foot-long concrete runway at Edwards Air Force Base in California. NASA canceled the first scheduled EVA, or spacewalk, in the Shuttle program because of a malfunction in the spacesuits. Experiments on this mission were part of the Orbiter Experiments Program, managed by NASA's Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST). The primary objective of this program was to increase the technology reservoir for the development of future space transportation systems to be used by the Office of Space Flight for further certification of the Shuttle and to expand its operational capabilities. Figure 3-13 shows the STS-5 payload configuration, and Table 3-22 lists the mission's characteristics. STS-6 STS-6, carrying a crew of four, was the first flight of Challenger, NASA's second operational orbiter. The primary objective of this mission was the deployment of the first Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS-1) to provide improved tracking and data acquisition services to spacecraft in low-Earth orbit. It was to be injected into a geosynchronous transfer orbit by a two-stage inertial upper stage. The first stage fired as planned, but the second stage cut off after only seventy seconds of a Development Flight ANIKC-3 instrumentation Open Sunshield Figure 3-13. STS-5 Payload Configuration (The payload was covered by a sunshield to protect against thermal extremes when the orbiter bay doors were open. The sunshield, resembling a two-piece baby buggy canopy, was constructed of tubular aluminum and mylar sheeting.) 172 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK planned 103-second burn. TDRS entered an unsatisfactory elliptical orbit. Excess propellant was used over the next several months to gradually cir- cularize the orbit, using the spacecraft's own attitude control thrusters. The maneuver was successful, and TDRS-1 reached geosynchronous orbit and entered normal service. This mission featured the first successful spacewalk of the Space Shuttle program, which was performed by astronauts Donald H. Peterson and F. Story Musgrave. It lasted about four hours, seventeen minutes. The astronauts worked in the cargo bay during three orbits, testing new tools and equipment-handling techniques. This mission used the first lightweight external tank and lightweight solid rocket booster casings. The lightweight external tank was almost 4,536 kilograms lighter than the external tank on STS-1, with each weigh- ing approximately 30,391 kilograms. The lightweight solid rocket boost- er casings increased the Shuttle's weight-carrying capability by about 363 kilograms. Each booster's motor case used on STS-6 and future flights weighed about 44,453 kilograms, approximately 1,814 kilograms less than those flown on previous missions. Table 3-23 identifies the characteristics of STS-6. STS-7 STS-7 deployed two communications satellites, Telesat-F (Anik C-2) and Palapa-Bl into geosynchronous orbit. Also, the Ku-band antenna used with the TDRS was successfully tested. The OSTA-2 mission was also conducted on STS-7. This mission involved the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (the former West Germany) in a cooperative materials processing research project in space. Further details of the OSTA-2 mission are in Chapter 2, "Space Applications," in Volume VI of the NASA Historical Data Book. This mission used the RMS to release the Shuttle Pallet Satellite (SPAS-01), which was mounted in the cargo bay. SPAS was the first Space Shuttle cargo commercially financed by a European company, the West German firm Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm. Operating under its own power, SPAS-01 flew alongside Challenger for several hours and took the first full photographs of a Shuttle in orbit against a background of Earth. The RMS grappled the SPAS-01 twice and then returned and locked the satellite into position in the cargo bay. STS-7 was the first Shuttle mission with a crew of five astronauts and the first flight of an American woman, Sally Ride, into space. This mis- sion also had the first repeat crew member— Robert Crippen. Details of the mission are in Table 3-24. STS-8 STS-8's primary mission objectives were to deploy Insat IB, complete RMS loaded arm testing using the payload flight test article (PFTA), SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 173 Note: Numbers In circles refer to grapple fixture locations 4.77 m width Figure 3-14. Payload Flight Test Article accomplish TDRS/Ku-band communications testing, and achieve assigned experiments and test objectives. The RMS carried its heaviest loads to date, and the PFTA had several grapple points to simulate the inertias of even heavier cargoes. Figure 3-14 illustrates the PFTA configuration. STS-8 was the first Space Shuttle mission launched at night. The tracking requirements for the Indian Insat IB satellite, the primary pay- load, dictated the time of launch. STS-8 also had the first night landing. The crew performed the first tests of Shuttle-to-ground communica- tions using TDRS. Launched into geosynchronous orbit on STS-6, TDRS was designed to improve communications between the spacecraft and the ground by relaying signals between the spacecraft and the ground, thus pre- venting the loss of signal that occurred when using only ground stations. This mission carried the first African- American astronaut, Guion S. Bluford, to fly in space. Details of STS-8 are listed in Table 3-25. STS-9 STS-9 carried the first Spacelab mission (Spacelab 1), which was developed by ESA, and the first astronaut to represent ESA, Ulf Merbold of Germany. It successfully implemented the largest combined NASA and ESA partnership to date, with more than 100 investigators from eleven European nations, Canada, Japan, and the United States. It was the longest Space Shuttle mission up to that time in the program and was the first time six crew members were carried into space on a single vehicle. The crew included payload specialists selected by the science community. The primary mission objectives were to verify the Spacelab system and subsystem performance capability, to determine the Spacelab/orbiter 174 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK interface capability, and to measure the induced environment. Secondary mission objectives were to obtain valuable scientific, applications, and technology data from a U.S. -European multidisciplinary pay load and to demonstrate to the user community the broad capability of Spacelab for scientific research. ESA and NASA jointly sponsored Spacelab 1 and conducted investi- gations on a twenty-four-hour basis, demonstrating the capability for advanced research in space. Spacelab was an orbital laboratory with an observations platform composed of cylindrical pressurized modules and U-shaped unpressurized pallets, which remained in the orbiter's cargo bay during flight. It was the first use of a large-scale space airlock for sci- entific experiments. Altogether, seventy-three separate investigations were carried out in astronomy and physics, atmospheric physics, Earth observations, life sci- ences, materials sciences, space plasma physics, and technology — the largest number of disciplines represented on a single mission. These experiments are described in Chapter 4, "Space Science," in Table 4-45. Spacelab 1 had unprecedented large-scale direct interaction of the flight crew with ground-based science investigators. All of the mission objectives for verifying Spacelab's modules were met, and Earth-based scientists communicated directly with the orbiting space crew who performed their experiments, collected data immediate- ly, and offered directions for the experiments. Table 3-26 list the charac- teristics of this mission. STS41-B The primary goal of STS 41-B was to deploy into orbit two commer- cial communications satellites— Western Union's Westar VI and the Indonesian Palapa-B2. (Failure of the PAM-D rocket motors left both satellites in radical low-Earth orbits.) The crew devoted the remainder of STS 41-B to a series of rendezvous maneuvers using an inflatable balloon as the target, the test flights of two Manned Maneuvering Units (Figure 3-15), and the checkout of equipment and procedures in preparation for Challenger's flight (41-C) in April, which would be the Solar Maximum satellite repair mission. Commander Vance D. Brand led the five-person crew for this mis- sion. He had previously commanded the first operational flight of the Space Shuttle, STS-5. The other crew members, pilot Robert L. "Hoot" Gibson and three mission specialists (Bruce McCandless II, Ronald E. McNair, and Robert L. Stewart), flew in space for the first time. This mission featured the first untethered spacewalks. Gas-powered backpacks were used to demonstrate spacewalk techniques important for the successful retrieval and repair of the disabled Solar Maximum space- craft. The crew members also tested several pieces of specialized equip- ment during the two five-hour EVAs. The Manipulator Foot Restraint, a portable workstation, was attached to the end of and maneuvered by the SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 175 Figure 3-15. Manned Maneuvering Unit RMS arm. Attached to the foot restraint, an astronaut could use the robot arm as a space-age "cherry picker" to reach and work on various areas of a satellite. The RMS, just over fifteen meters long and built for the Space Shuttle by the National Research Council of Canada, was to be used to deploy the SPAS as a target for Manned Maneuvering Unit-equipped astronauts to perform docking maneuvers. However, the SPAS remained in the payload bay because of an electrical problem with the RMS. SPAS was to be used as a simulated Solar Maximum satellite. The astronauts were to replace electrical connectors attached to the SPAS during one of the spacewalks to verify procedures that astronauts would perform on the actual repair mission. The Manned Maneuvering Unit-equipped astronauts were also to attempt to dock with the pallet satellite, thereby simulating maneuvers needed to rendezvous, dock, and stabilize the Solar Maximum satellite. The crew members conducted two days of rendezvous activities using a target balloon (Integrated Rendezvous Target) to evaluate the naviga- tional ability of Challenger's on-board systems, as well as the interaction among the spacecraft, flight crew, and ground control. The activities obtained data from Challenger's various sensors (the rendezvous radar, star tracker, and crew optical alignment sight) required for rendezvous and exercised the navigation and maneuvering capabilities of the on-board software. The rendezvous occurred by maneuvering the orbiter to within 244 meters of its target from a starting distance of approximately 193.1 kilometers. In the process, sensors gathered additional performance data. 176 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK This mission initiated the new Shuttle numbering system in which the first numeral stood for the year, the second for the launch site (1 for Kennedy, 2 for Vandenberg Air Force Base), and the letter for the origi- nal order of the assignment. The mission characteristics are listed in Table 3-27. STS41-C STS 41-C launched Challenger into its highest orbit yet so it could rendezvous with the wobbling, solar flare- studying Solar Maximum satellite, which had been launched in February 1980. Its liftoff from Launch Complex 39's Pad A was the first to use a "direct insertion" ascent technique that put the Space Shuttle into an elliptical orbit with a high point of about 461.8 kilometers and an inclination to the equator of twenty-eight and a half degrees. On the eleventh Shuttle flight, Challenger's five-person crew suc- cessfully performed the first on-orbit repair of a crippled satellite. After failed rescue attempts early in the mission, the robot arm hauled the Solar Max into the cargo bay on the fifth day of the mission (Figure 3-16). Challenger then served as an orbiting service station for the astronauts, using the Manned Maneuvering Unit, to repair the satellite's fine-point- ing system and to replace the attitude control system and coronagraph/polarimeter electronics box during two six-hour spacewalks. MEB Changeout Figure 3-16. Solar Max On-Orbit Berthed Configuration SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 177 The robot arm then returned the Solar Max to orbit to continue its study of the violent nature of the Sun's solar activity and its effects on Earth. The successful in-orbit repair demonstrated the SIS capability of w ni- space" payload processing, which would be exploited on future missions. Challenger's RMS released the Long Duration Exposure Facility into orbit on this mission (Figure 3-17). Carrying fifty-seven diverse, passive experiments on this mission, it was to be left in space for approximately one year but was left in space for almost six years before being retrieved by STS-32 in January 1990. Cinema 360 made its second flight, mounted in the cargo bay. The 35mm movie camera recorded the Solar Max rescue mission. A second film camera, IMAX, flew on the Shuttle to record the event on 70mm film designed for projection on very large screens. Table 3-28 contains the details of this mission. STS41-D Discovery made its inaugural flight on this mission, the twelfth flight in the Space Shuttle program. The mission included a combination cargo from some of the pay loads originally manifested to fly on STS 41-D and STS 41-F. The decision to remanifest followed the aborted launch of Discovery on June 26 and provided for a minimum disruption to the launch schedule. Failures of the PAM on earlier missions prompted an exhaustive examination of production practices by the NASA-industry team. This team established new test criteria for qualifying the rocket motors. The new testing procedures proved satisfactory when the Shuttle successfully deployed two communications satellites equipped with PAMs, SBS-4 and Telstar 3-C, into precise geosynchronous transfer orbits. A third satellite, Syncom IV-2 (also called Leasat-2), was equipped with a unique upper Primary grapple fixture EARTH END End support beam SPACE END -7^ Secondary grapple fixture containing Experiment Initiate System Figure 3-1 7. Long Duration Exposure Facility Configurati 178 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK stage. This satellite was the first built especially for launch from the Shuttle. NASA's Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST) spon- sored this mission, designated OAST-1. Details of this mission are located in Chapter 3, "Aeronautics and Space Research and Technology," in Volume VI of the NASA Historical Data Book. Payload specialist Charles Walker, a McDonnell Douglas employee, was the first commercial payload specialist assigned by NASA to a Shuttle crew. At 21,319.2 kilograms, this mission had the heaviest payload to date. Details of STS 41-D are in Table 3-29. STS41-G This mission was the first with seven crew members and featured the first flight of a Canadian payload specialist, the first to include two women, the first spacewalk by an American woman (Sally Ride), the first crew mem- ber to fly a fourth Space Shuttle mission, the first demonstration of a satellite refueling technique in space, and the first flight with a reentry profile cross- ing the eastern United States. OSTA-3 was the primary payload and was the second in a series of Shuttle payloads that carried experiments to take mea- surements of Earth. Details of the payload can be found in Chapter 2, "Space Applications," in Volume VI of the NASA Historical Data Book. This mission deployed the Earth Radiation Budget Satellite less than nine hours into flight. This satellite was the first of three planned sets of orbiting instruments in the Earth Radiation Budget Experiment. Overall, the program aimed to measure the amount of energy received from the Sun and reradiated into space and the seasonal movement of energy from the tropics to the poles. The Orbital Refueling System experiment demonstrated the possibil- ity of refueling satellites in orbit. This experiment required spacesuited astronauts working in the cargo bay to attach a hydrazine servicing tool, already connected to a portable fuel tank, to a simulated satellite panel. After leak checks, the astronauts returned to the orbiter cabin, and the actual movement of hydrazine from tank to tank was controlled from the flight deck. Details of this mission are in Table 3-30. STS 51 -A This mission deployed two satellites— the Canadian communications satellite Telesat H (Anik-D2) and the Hughes Syncom IV- 1 (Leasat-1) communications satellite— both destined for geosynchronous orbit. The crew also retrieved two satellites, Palapa B-2 and Westar 6, deployed dur- ing STS 41-B in February 1984. Astronauts Joseph P. Allen and Dale A. Gardner retrieved the two malfunctioning satellites during a spacewalk. Discovery carried the 3-M Company's Diffusive Mixing of Organic Solutions experiment in the mid-deck. This was the first attempt to grow organic crystals in a microgravity environment. Figure 3-18 shows the STS 5 1 -A cargo configuration, and Table 3-3 1 lists the mission's characteristics. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 179 Manipulator Foot Restraint Westar-VI Retrieval Pallet Diffusive Mixing of Organic Solutions Manned Maneuvering Unit/Fixed Service Structure Radiation Monitoring Experiment Figure 3-18. STS 51 -A Cargo Configuration STS51-C STS 51-C was the first mission dedicated to DOD. A U.S. Air Force inertial upper stage booster was deployed and met the mission objectives. The Aggregation of Red Cells mid-deck payload tested the capabili- ty of NASA's Ames Research Center apparatus to study some character- istics of blood and their disease dependencies under microgravity conditions. NASA's Microgravity Science and Applications Division of the Office of Space Science and Applications sponsored this experiment, which was a cooperative effort between NASA and the Department of Science and Technology of the government of Australia. For details of this mission, see Table 3-32. STS 51 -D STS 51-D deployed the Telesat-1 (Anik C-l) communications satel- lite attached to PAM-D motor. The Syncom IV-3 (also called Leasat-3) was also deployed, but the spacecraft sequencer failed to initiate antenna deployment, spinup, and ignition of the perigee kick motor. The mission was extended two days to ensure that the sequencer start levers were in the proper position. Astronauts S. David Griggs and Jeffrey A. Hoffman performed a space walk to attach "fly swatter" devices to the RMS. Astronaut M. Rhea Seddon engaged the Leasat lever using the RMS, but 180 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK the postdeployment sequence failed to begin, and the satellite continued to drift in a low-Earth orbit. This mission also involved the first public official, Senator Jake Garn from Utah, flying on a Space Shuttle mission; Garn carried out a number of medical experiments. The crew members conducted three mid-deck experiments as part of NASA's microgravity science and applications and space science programs: American Flight Echocardiograph, Phase Partitioning Experiment, and Protein Crystal Growth. Another payload was "Toys in Space," an examination of simple toys in a weightless envi- ronment, with the results to be made available to students. The mission's characteristics are in Table 3-33. STS51-B The first operational flight of the Spacelab took place on STS 51-B. Spacelab 3 provided a high-quality microgravity environment for delicate materials processing and fluid experiments. (Table 4^6 describes the individual Spacelab 3 experiments.) The primary mission objective was to conduct science, application, and technology investigations (and acquire intrinsic data) that required the low-gravity environment of Earth orbit and an extended-duration, stable vehicle attitude with emphasis on materials processing. The secondary mission objective was to obtain data on research in materials sciences, life sciences, fluid mechanics, atmos- pheric science, and astronomy. This mission was the first in which a prin- cipal investigator flew with his experiment in space. The NUSAT Get- Away Special satellite was successfully deployed. The Global Low Orbiting Message Relay satellite failed to deploy from its Get- Away Special canister and was returned to Earth. Details of this mission are in Table 3-34. STS 51 -G During this mission, NASA flew the first French and Arabian payload specialists. The mission's cargo included domestic communications satel- lites from the United States, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia— all successfully deployed. STS 51-G also deployed and retrieved the Spartan- 1, using the RMS. The Spartan, a free-flyer carrier developed by NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center, could accommodate scientific instruments originally devel- oped for the sounding rocket program. The Spartan "family" of short- duration satellites were designed to minimize operational interfaces with the orbiter and crew. All pointing sequences and satellite control commands were stored aboard the Spartan in a microcomputer controller. All data were recorded on a tape recorder. No command or telemetry link was pro- vided. Once the Spartan satellite completed its observing sequence, it "safed" all systems and placed itself in a stable attitude to permit its retrieval and return to Earth. NASA's Astrophysics Division within the SIVUT: TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT I X I Office of Space Science and Applications sponsored the Spartan with a sci- entific instrument on this mission provided by the Naval Research Laboratory. The mission mapped the x-ray emissions from the Perseus Cluster, the nuclear region of the Milky Way galaxy, and the Scorpius X-2. In addition, the mission conducted a Strategic Defense Initiative experiment called the High Precision Tracking Experiment. SIS 51-CJ included two French biomedical experiments and housed a materials pro- cessing furnace named the Automated Directional Solidification Furnace. Further details are in Table 3-35. STS51-F STS 51-F was the third Space Shuttle flight devoted to Spacelab. Spacelab 2 was the second of two design verification test flights required by the Spacelab Verification Flight Test program. (Spacelab 1 flew on STS-9 in 1983.) Its primary mission objectives were to verify the Spacelab system and subsystem performance capabilities and to deter- mine the Spacelab-orbiter and Spacelab-payload interface capabilities. Secondary mission objectives were to obtain scientific and applications data from a multidisciplinary payload and to demonstrate to the user com- munity the broad capability of Spacelab for scientific research. The mon- itoring of mission activities and a quick-look analysis of data confirmed that the majority of Verification Flight Test functional objectives were properly performed in accordance with the timeline and flight procedures. NASA developed the Spacelab 2 payload. Its configuration included an igloo attached to a lead pallet, with the instrument point subsystem mounted on it, a two-pallet train, and an experiment special support struc- ture. The instrument point subsystem — a gimbaled platform attached to a pallet that provides precision pointing for experiments requiring greater pointing accuracy and stability than is provided by the orbiter — flew for the first time on Spacelab 2. The Spacelab system supported and accom- plished the experiment phase of the mission. The Spacelab 2 experiments are listed in Table 4-47, and the overall mission characteristics are in Table 3-36. STS 51-1 STS 51-1 deployed three communications satellites, ASC-1, Aussat-1, and Syncom IV-4 (Leasat-4) . It also retrieved, repaired, and redeployed Syncom IV-3 (Leasat-3) so that it could be activated from the ground. Astronauts William F. Fisher and James D.A. van Hoften per- formed two EVAs totaling eleven hours, fifty-one minutes. Part of the time was spent retrieving, repairing, and redeploying the Syncom IV-3, which was originally deployed on STS 51-D. Physical Vapor Transport of Organic Solids was the second micro- gravity-based scientific experiment to fly aboard the Space Shuttle. (The first was the Diffusive Mixing of Organic Solutions, which flew on 182 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK STS 51 -A in November 1984.) Physical Vapor Transport of Organic Solids consisted of nine independent experimental cells housed in an experimental apparatus container mounted on the aft bulkhead in the mid- deck area. The crew interface was through a handheld keyboard and dis- play terminal. Using this terminal, the crew selected and activated the experiment cells, monitored cell temperatures and power levels, and per- formed diagnostic tests. Table 3-37 includes the details of STS .51 -I. STS 51 -J STS 51 -J was the second Space Shuttle mission dedicated to DOD. Atlantis flew for the first time on this mission. Details are in Table 3-38. STS 61 -A The "Deutschland Spacelab Mission D-l" was the first of a series of dedicated West German missions on the Space Shuttle. The Federal German Aerospace Research Establishment (DFVLR) managed Spacelab D-l for the German Federal Ministry of Research and Technology. DFVLR provided the payload and was responsible for payload analytical and phys- ical integration and verification, as well as payload operation on orbit. The Spacelab payload was assembled by MBB/ERNO over a five-year period at a cost of about $175 million. The D-l was used by German and other European universities, research institutes, and industrial enterprises, and it was dedicated to experimental scientific and technological research. This mission included 75 experiments, most performed more than once (see Chapter 4). These included basic and applied microgravity research in the fields of materials science, life sciences and technology, and communications and navigation. Weightlessness was the common denominator of the experiments carried out aboard Spacelab D-l. Scientific operations were controlled from the German Space Operations Center at Oberpfaffenhofen near Munich. The mission was conducted in the long module configuration, which featured the Vestibular Sled designed to provide scientists with data on the functional organization of human vestibular and orientation systems. The Global Low Orbiting Message Relay satellite was also deployed from a Get- Away Special canister. Figure 3-19 shows the STS 61 -A cargo configuration, and Table 3-39 lists the mission's characteristics. STS61-B Three communications satellites were deployed on this mission: Morelos-B, AUSSAT-2 and Satcom KU-2. The crew members conducted two experiments to test the assembling of erectable structures in space: Experimental Assembly of Structures in Extravehicular Activity and Assembly Concept for Construction of Erectable Space Structure (EASE/ACCESS), shown in Figure 3-20. These experiments required two SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 183 Materials Experiment Assembly Scientific Airlock Spacelab long module Global Low Orbiting Message Relay Satellite Figure 3-19. STS 61 -A Cargo Configuration spacewalks by Astronauts Sherwood C. Spring and Jerry L. Ross lasting five hours, thirty-two minutes and six hours, thirty-eight minutes, respectively. This flight featured the first Mexican payload specialist, the first flight of the PAM-D2, the heaviest PAM payload yet (on the Satcom), and the first assembly of a structure in space. Table 3-40 contains STS 61-B's characteristics. STS 61-C This mission used the Hitchhiker, a new payload carrier system in the Space Shuttle's payload bay, for the first time. This Hitchhiker flight car- rier contained three experiments in the Small Payload Accommodation program: particle analysis cameras to study particle distribution within the Shuttle bay environment, coated mirrors to test the effect of the Shuttle's environment, and a capillary pumped loop heat acquisition and transport system. Columbia successfully deployed the Satcom KU-1 satellite/PAM-D. However, the Comet Halley Active Monitoring Program experiment, a 35mm camera that was to photograph Comet Halley, did not function properly because of battery problems. This mission also carried Materials Science Laboratory-2 (MSL-2), whose configuration is shown in Figure 3-21. Franklin R. Chang-Diaz was the first Hispanic American to journey into space. He produced a videotape in Spanish for live distribution to 184 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK EASE Starboard ACCESS Figure 3-20. EASE/ACCESS Configuration audiences in the United States and Latin America via the NASA Select television circuit. Details of this mission are in Table 3-41. STS51-L The planned objectives of STS 51-L were the deployment of TDRS-2 and the flying of Shuttle-Pointed Tool for Astronomy (SPARTAN-203)/Halley's Comet Experiment Deployable, a free-flying module designed to observe the tail and coma of Halley's comet with two ultraviolet spectrometers and two cameras. Other cargo included the Fluid Dynamics Experiment, the Comet Halley Active Monitoring Program experiment, the Phase Partitioning Experiment, three SSIP experiments, and a set of lessons for the Teacher in Space Project. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT IK5 Automated Dlroctlonal — — Solidification Furnace (AOSF) Furnace Container Automated Directional Solidification Furnaco(ADSF) Control Electronlca Container J Axla Acouallc tovltalor (JAAl) Experiment Tape Recorder (ETR) Power Control Box(PCB) System Control Unlt(SCU) Linear Trlaxlal Acceierometer (LTA) Junction Box Signal Conditioners (6) Pressure Transducers (2) OFT Pump Package and Instrumentation Kit Note: MLI Blanket3 Not Shown Figure 3-21 . Integrated MSL-2 Payload See the following major section on the Challenger accident for detailed information about this mission. STS 51-L's characteristics are listed in Table 3-42. STS-26 This mission marked the resumption of Space Shuttle flights after the 1986 STS 51-L accident. The primary objective was to deliver TDRS-3 to orbit (Figure 3-22). Meeting this objective, the satellite was boosted to geosynchronous orbit by its inertial upper stage. TDRS-3 was the third TDRS advanced communications spacecraft to be launched from the Shuttle. (TDRS-1 was launched during Challenger's first flight in April 1983. The second, TDRS-2, was lost during the 1986 Challenger accident.) Secondary payloads on Discovery included the Physical Vapor Transport of Organic Solids, the Protein Crystal Growth Experiment, the Infrared Communications Flight Experiment, the Aggregation of Red Blood Cells Experiment, the Isoelectric Focusing Experiment, the Mesoscale Lightning Experiment, the Phase Partitioning Experiment, the Earth-Limb Radiance Experiment, the Automated Directional Solidification Furnace, and two SSIP experiments. Special instrumenta- tion was also mounted in the payload bay to record the environment expe- rienced by Discovery during the mission. The Orbiter Experiments Autonomous Supporting Instrumentation System- 1 (OASIS- 1) collected and recorded a variety of environmental measurements during the orbiter' s in-flight phases. The data were used to study the effects on the 186 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK TDRS Single Access #2 S-Band Omni Antenna C-Band Antenna TDRS Single Access #1 S-Band Multiple Access TDRS Signal Figure 3-22. Tracking and Data Relay Satellite On-Orbit Configuration orbiter of temperature, pressure, vibration, sound, acceleration, stress, and strain. See the section below on the Challenger accident and subsequent return to space for information on changes to the Space Shuttle imple- mented for this mission. STS-26's characteristics are listed in Table 3-43. STS-27 This was the third STS mission dedicated to DOD. Details of STS-27 are listed in Table 3-44. The Challenger Accident and Return to Flight Until the explosion that ended the STS 51-L mission on January 28, 1986, few had been aware of the flaws in the various systems and opera- tions connected with the Space Shuttle. The investigations that followed the accident, which interrupted the program for more than two years, dis- closed that long-standing conditions and practices had caused the acci- dent. The following section focuses on the activities of the commission that investigated the explosion, the findings of the various investigations that revealed problems with the Shuttle system in general and with Challenger in particular, and the changes that took place in the Shuttle program as a result of the investigations. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 1X7 The following documents have provided most of the data for this see tion, and they provide a fascinating look at the events sm rounding the accident. The reader might consult them lor additional insight about this part oi' NASA history. • STS 5I-L Data and Design Analysis Task Force — Historical Summary, June 1986 • Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Vol. I-IV, June 6, 1986 • Report to the President — Actions to Implement the Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, July 14, 1986 • "Statement by Dr. James Fletcher," NASA administrator, regarding revised Shuttle manifest, October 3, 1986 • Report to the President — Implementation of the Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, June 30, 1987 Immediately after the Challenger explosion, a series of events began that occupied NASA for the next two years, culminating with the launch of Discovery on the STS-26 mission. Table 3-45 summarizes the activi- ties that took place from January 28, 1986, through September 29, 1988, the Shuttle's return to flight. Presidential Commission Formation and Activities of the Rogers Commission On February 3, 1986, President Ronald Reagan appointed an inde- pendent commission chaired by William R Rogers, former secretary of state and attorney general, and composed of persons not connected with the mission to investigate the accident. The commission's mandate was to: 1. Review the circumstances surrounding the accident to establish the probable cause or causes of the accident 2. Develop recommendations for corrective or other action based upon the commission's findings and determinations 6 Immediately after its establishment, the commission began its inves- tigation and, with the full support of the White House, held public hear- ings on the facts leading up to the accident. 6 Report at a Glance, Report to the President by the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), Preface (no page number). 188 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK The commission construed its mandate to include recommendations on safety matters that were not necessarily involved in this accident but required attention to make future flights safer. Careful attention was given to concerns expressed by astronauts. However, the commission felt that its mandate did not require a detailed investigation of all aspects of the Space Shuttle program nor a review of budgetary matters. Nor did the commission wish to interfere with or displace Congress in the perfor- mance of its duties. Rather, the commission focused its attention on the safety aspects of future flights based on the lessons learned from the investigation, with the objective of returning to safe flight. Congress rec- ognized the desirability of having a single investigation of this accident and agreed to await the commission's findings before deciding what fur- ther action it might find necessary. For the first several days after the accident — possibly because of the trauma resulting from the accident — NASA seemed to be withholding information about the accident from the public. After the commission began its work, and at its suggestion, NASA began releasing much infor- mation that helped to reassure the public that all aspects of the accident were being investigated and that the full story was being told in an order- ly and thorough manner. Following the suggestion of the commission, NASA also established several teams of persons not involved with the 51-L launch process to supported the commission and its panels. These NASA teams cooperated with the commission and contributed to what was a comprehensive and complete investigation. Following their swearing in on February 6, 1986, commission members immediately began a series of hearings during which NASA officials out- lined agency procedures covering the Space Shuttle program and the status of NASA's investigation of the accident. On February 10, Dr. Alton G. Keel, Jr., associate director of the Office of Management and Budget, was appointed executive director. Dr. Keel gathered a staff of fifteen experi- enced investigators from various government agencies and the military ser- vices, as well as administrative personnel to support commission activities. Testimony began on February 10 in a closed session, when the com- mission began to learn of the troubled history of the solid rocket motor joint and seals. Commission members discovered the first indication that the con- tractor, Morton Thiokol, initially recommended against the launch on January 27, 1986, the night before the launch of STS 51-L, because of con- cerns regarding the effects of low temperature on the joint and seal. Additional evidence supplied to the commission on February 13 and 14 pro- vided the first evidence that the solid rocket motor joint and seal might have malfunctioned, initiating the accident. The session on February 14 included NASA and contractor participants who had been involved in the discussion on January 27 about whether to launch Challenger. Following that session, Chairman Rogers issued a statement noting that "the process [leading to the launch of Challenger] may have been flawed" and that NASA's Acting SPACE TRANSIT )RTATI( )N/I II IM AN SPA( III ,I< il II W) Administrator Dr. William Graham had been asked **not to include on the investigating teams at NASA, persons involved in that process." 1 The commission itself thus assumed the role of investigators and divided itself into lour investigative panels: 2. 3. Development and Production, responsible for investigating the acqui- sition and test and evaluation processes for Space Shuttle elements Pre-Launch Activities, responsible for assessing the Shuttle system processing, launch readiness process, and prelaunch security Mission Planning and Operations, responsible for investigating mis- sion planning and operations, schedule pressures, and crew safety areas 4. Accident Analysis, charged with analyzing the accident data and developing both an anomaly tree and accident scenarios After the panels were finalized and the new approach described before Congress, the working groups went to the Marshall Space Flight Center, the Kennedy Space Center, and Morton Thiokol to begin analyz- ing data relating to the accident. A series of public hearings on February 25, 26, and 27 presented additional information about the launch decision obtained from testimo- ny by Thiokol, Rockwell, and NASA officials. At that time, details about the history of problems with the then-suspect solid rocket motor joints and seals also began emerging and focused the commission's attention on the need to document fully the extent of knowledge and awareness about the problems within both Thiokol and NASA. Following these hearings, separate panels conducted much of the com- mission's investigative efforts in parallel with full commission hearings. Panel members made numerous trips to Kennedy, Marshall, the Johnson Space Center, and Thiokol facilities in Utah to hold interviews and gather and analyze data relating to their panels' respective responsibilities. At the same time, a general investigative staff held a series of indi- vidual interviews to document fully the teleconference between NASA and Thiokol officials the night before the launch; the history of joint design and O-ring problems; NASA safety, reliability, and quality assur- ance functions; and the assembly of the right solid rocket booster for STS 51-L. Subsequent investigations by this group were directed toward the effectiveness of NASA's organizational structure, particularly the Shuttle program structure, and allegations that there had been external pressure on NASA to launch on January 28. Members of the commission and its staff interviewed more than 160 individuals and held more than thirty-five formal panel investiga- tions, which generated almost 12,000 pages of transcript. Almost 6,300 documents, totaling more than 122,000 pages, and hundreds of 7 Ibid., Appendix A, Commission Activities, p. 206. 190 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK photographs were examined and became part of the commission's per- manent data base and archives. These sessions and all the data gathered added to the 2,800 pages of hearing transcripts generated by the commis- sion in both closed and open sessions. In addition to the work of the commission and its staff, more than 1,300 employees from all NASA facilities were involved in the investi- gation and were supported by more than 1,600 people from other gov- ernment agencies and more than 3,100 from NASA's contractor organizations. Particularly significant were the activities of the military, the Coast Guard, and the National Transportation Safety Board in the sal- vage and analysis of the Shuttle wreckage. Description of the Accident The flight of Challenger on STS 51-L began at 11:38 a.m., Eastern Standard Time, on January 28, 1986. It ended 73 seconds later with the explosion and breakup of the vehicle. All seven members of the crew were killed. They were Francis R. Scobee, commander; Michael J. Smith, pilot; mission specialists Judith A. Resnik, Ellison Onizuka, and Ronald E. McNair; and pay load specialists Gregory Jarvis of Hughes Aircraft and S. Christa McAuliffe, a New Hampshire teacher — the first Space Shuttle passenger/observer participating in the NASA Teacher in Space Program. She had planned to teach lessons during live television transmissions. The primary cargo was the second TDRS. Also on board was a SPARTAN free-flying module that was to observe Halley's comet. The commission determined the sequence of flight events during the 73 seconds before the explosion and 37 seconds following the explosion based on visual examination and image enhancement of film from NASA-operated cameras and telemetry data transmitted by the Shuttle to ground stations. Table 3^6 lists this sequence of events. The launch had been the first from Pad B at Kennedy's Launch Complex 39. The flight had been scheduled six times earlier but had been delayed because of technical problems and bad weather. Investigation and Findings of the Cause of the Accident Throughout the investigation, the commission focused on three criti- cal questions: 1. 2. What circumstances surrounding mission 51-L contributed to the cat- astrophic termination of that flight in contrast to twenty-four suc- cessful flights preceding it? What evidence pointed to the right solid rocket booster as the source of the accident as opposed to other elements of the Space Shuttle? Finally, what was the mechanism of failure? SPACT! TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT m Using mission data, subsequently completed tests and analyses, and recovered wreckage, the commission identified all possible faults thai could originate in the respective flight elements of the Space Shuttle thai might have led to loss of Challenger. The commission examined the launch pad, the external tank, the Space Shuttle main engines, the orbitcr and related equipment, payload/orbiter interfaces, the payload, the solid rocket boosters, and the solid rocket motors. They also examined the pos- sibility of and ruled out sabotage. The commission eliminated all elements except the right solid rocket motor as a cause of the accident. Four areas related to the functioning of that motor received detailed analysis to determine their part in the accident: 1. 2. Structural loads were evaluated, and the commission determined that these loads were well below the design limit loads and were not con- sidered the cause of the accident. Failure of the case wall (case membrane) was considered, with the conclusion that the assessments did not support a failure that started in the membrane and progressed slowly to the joint or one that start- ed in the membrane and grew rapidly the length of the solid rocket motor segment. Propellant anomalies were considered, with the conclusion that it was improbable that propellant anomalies contributed to the STS 51-L accident. The remaining area relating to the functioning of the right solid rock- et motor, the loss of the pressure seal at the case joint, was determined to be the cause of the accident. The commission released its report and findings on the cause of the accident on June 9, 1986. The consensus of the commission and partici- pating investigative agencies was that the loss of Challenger was caused by a failure in the joint between the two lower segments of the right solid rocket motor. The specific failure was the destruction of the seals that were intended to prevent hot gases from leaking through the joint during the propellant burn of the rocket motor. The evidence assembled by the commission indicated that no other element of the Space Shuttle system contributed to this failure. In arriving at this conclusion, the commission reviewed in detail all available data, reports, and records, directed and supervised numerous tests, analyses, and experiments by NASA, civilian contractors, and var- ious government agencies, and then developed specific scenarios and the range of most probable causative factors. The commission released the following sixteen findings: L A combustion gas leak through the right solid rocket motor aft field joint initiated at or shortly after ignition eventually weakened and/or penetrated the external tank initiating vehicle structural breakup and loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger during STS mission 51-L. 192 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK 2. 3. The evidence shows that no other STS 51-L Shuttle element or the payload contributed to the causes of the right solid rocket motor aft field joint combustion gas leak. Sabotage was not a factor. Evidence examined in the review of Space Shuttle material, manufac- turing, assembly, quality control, and processing on non- conformance reports found no flight hardware shipped to the launch site that fell outside the limits of Shuttle design specifications. Launch site activities, including assembly and preparation, from receipt of the flight hardware to launch were generally in accord with estab- lished procedures and were not considered a factor in the accident. Launch site records show that the right solid rocket motor segments were assembled using approved procedures. However, significant out-of-round conditions existed between the two segments joined at the right solid rocket motor aft field joint (the joint that failed). a. While the assembly conditions had the potential of generating debris or damage that could cause O-ring seal failure, these were not considered factors in this accident. b. The diameters of the two solid rocket motor segments had grown as a result of prior use. c. The growth resulted in a condition at time of launch wherein the maximum gap between the tang and clevis in the region of the joint's O-rings was no more than 0.008 inch (0.2032 millimeter) and the average gap would have been 0.004 inch (0.1016 mil- limeter). With a tang-to-clevis gap of 0.004 inch (0.1016 millimeter), the O-ring in the joint would be compressed to the extent that it pressed against all three walls of the O-ring retaining channel. The lack of roundness of the segments was such that the smallest tang-to-clevis clearance occurred at the initiation of the assem- bly operation at positions of 120 degrees and 300 degrees around the circumference of the aft field joint. It is uncertain if this tight condition and the resultant greater compression of the O-rings at these points persisted to the time of launch. 6. The ambient temperature at time of launch was 36 degrees F, or 15 degrees lower than the next coldest previous launch. a. The temperature at the 300-degree position on the right aft field joint circumference was estimated to be 28 degrees plus or minus 5 degrees F. This was the coldest point on the joint. b. Temperature on the opposite side of the right solid rocket boost- er facing the sun was estimated to be about 50 degrees F. 7. Other joints on the left and right solid rocket boosters experienced similar combinations of tang-to-clevis gap clearance and tempera- ture. It is not known whether these joints experienced distress during the flight of 51-L. d. e. SPACT: TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 193 9. Experimental evidence indicates that due to several effects associat- ed With the solid rocket booster's ignition and combustion pressures and associated vehicle motions, the gap between the tang and the cle- vis will open as much as 0.0/7 and 0.029 inches (0.4318 and 0.7366 millimeters) at the secondary and primary O-ringS, respectively. a. This opening begins upon ignition, reaches its maximum rate of opening at about 200-300 milliseconds, and is essentially com- plete at 600 milliseconds when the solid rocket booster reaches its operating pressure. b. The external tank and right solid rocket booster are connected by several struts, including one at 310 degrees near the aft field joint that failed. This strut's effect on the joint dynamics is to enhance the opening of the gap between the tang and clevis by about 10-20 percent in the region of 300-320 degrees. O-ring resiliency is directly related to its temperature. a. A warm O-ring that has been compressed will return to its origi- nal shape much quicker than will a cold O-ring when compres- sion is relieved. Thus, a warm O-ring will follow the opening of the tang-to-clevis gap. A cold O-ring may not. b. A compressed O-ring at 75 degrees F is five times more respon- sive in returning to its uncompressed shape than a cold O-ring at 30 degrees F. c. As a result it is probable that the O -rings in the right solid boost- er aft field joint were not following the opening of the gap between the tang and clevis at time of ignition. 10. Experiments indicate that the primary mechanism that actuates O-ring sealing is the application of gas pressure to the upstream (high-pressure) side of the O-ring as it sits in its groove or channel. a. For this pressure actuation to work most effectively, a space between the O-ring and its upstream channel wall should exist during pressurization. b. A tang-to-clevis gap of 0.004 inch (0.1016 millimeter), as proba- bly existed in the failed joint, would have initially compressed the O-ring to the degree that no clearance existed between the O-ring and its upstream channel wall and the other two surfaces of the channel. c. At the cold launch temperature experienced, the O-ring would be very slow in returning to its normal rounded shape. It would not follow the opening of the tang-to-clevis gap. It would remain in its compressed position in the O-ring channel and not provide a space between itself and the upstream channel wall. Thus, it is probable the O-ring would not be pressure actuated to seal the gap in time to preclude joint failure due to blow-by and erosion from hot combustion gases. 194 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK 11. The sealing characteristics of the solid rocket booster O-rings are enhanced by timely application of motor pressure. a. Ideally, motor pressure should be applied to actuate the O-ring and seal the joint prior to significant opening of the tang-to- clevis gap (100 to 200 milliseconds after motor ignition). b. Experimental evidence indicates that temperature, humidity and other variables in the putty compound used to seal the joint can delay pressure application to the joint by 500 milliseconds or more. c. This delay in pressure could be a factor in initial joint failure. 12. Of 21 launches with ambient temperatures of 61 degrees F or greater, only four showed signs of O-ring thermal distress; i.e., erosion or blow-by and soot. Each of the launches below 61 degrees F resulted in one or more O-rings showing signs of thermal distress. a. Of these improper joint sealing actions, one-half occurred in the aft field joints, 20 percent in the center field joints, and 30 per- cent in the upper field joints. The division between left and right solid rocket boosters was roughly equal. b. Each instance of thermal O-ring distress was accompanied by a leak path in the insulating putty. The leak path connects the rock- et's combustion chamber with the O-ring region of the tang and clevis. Joints that actuated without incident may also have had these leak paths. 13. There is a possibility that there was water in the clevis of the STS 51 -L joints since water was found in the STS-9 joints during a destack operation after exposure to less rainfall than STS 51-L. At time of launch, it was cold enough that water present in the joint would freeze. Tests show that ice in the joint can inhibit proper secondary seal performance. 14. A series of puffs of smoke were observed emanating from the 51-L aft field joint area of the right solid rocket booster between 0.678 and 2.500 seconds after ignition of the Shuttle solid rocket motors. a. The puffs appeared at a frequency of about three puffs per sec- ond. This roughly matches the natural structural frequency of the solids at lift off and is reflected in slight cyclic changes of the tang-to-clevis gap opening. b. The puffs were seen to be moving upward along the surface of the booster above the aft field joint. c. The smoke was estimated to originate at a circumferential posi- tion of between 270 degrees and 315 degrees on the booster aft field joint, emerging from the top of the joint. 15. This smoke from the aft field joint at Shuttle lift off was the first sign of the failure of the solid rocket booster O-ring seals on STS 51-L. 16. The leak was again clearly evident as a flame at approximately 58 seconds into the flight. It is possible that the leak was continuous but unobservable or non-existent in portions of the intervening peri- od. It is possible in either case that thrust vectoring and normal vehi- cle response to wind shear as well as planned maneuvers reinitiated SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 1^5 or magnified the leakage from a degraded seal in the period preced ing the observed flames. The estimated position of the flame, centered at a point 307 degrees around the circumference of the aft field joint, was confirmed by the recovery of two fragments of the right solid rocket booster a. A small leak could have been present that max have grown to breach the joint in flame at a time on the order of 58 to 60 sec- onds after lift off. b. Alternatively, the O-ring gap could have been resettled by depo- sition of a fragile buildup of aluminum oxide and other combus- tion debris. This resealed section of the joint could have been disturbed by thrust vectoring, Space Shuttle motion and flight loads inducted by changing winds aloft. c. The winds aloft caused control actions in the time interval of 32 seconds to 62 seconds into the flight that were typical of the largest values experienced on previous missions. Conclusion. In view of the findings, the commission concluded that the cause of the Challenger accident was the failure of the pressure seal in the aft field joint of the right solid rocket booster. The failure was due to a faulty design unacceptably sensitive to a number of factors. These factors were the effects of temperature, physical dimensions, the charac- ter of materials, the effects of reusability, processing and the reaction of the joint to dynamic loading* Contributing Causes of the Accident In addition to the failure of the pressure seal as the primary cause of the accident, the commission identified a contributing cause of the acci- dent having to do with the decision to launch. The commission conclud- ed that the decision-making process was flawed in several ways. The testimony revealed failures in communication, which resulted in a deci- sion to launch based on incomplete and sometimes misleading informa- tion, a conflict between engineering data and management judgments, and a NASA management structure that permitted internal flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers. The decision to launch concerned two problem areas. One was the low temperature and its effect on the O-ring. The second was the ice that formed on the launch pad. The commission concluded that concerns regarding these issues had either not been communicated adequately to senior management or had not been given sufficient weight by those who made the decision to launch. O-Ring Concerns. Formal preparations for launch, consisting of the Level I Flight Readiness Review and Certification of Flight Readiness to 'Ibid., Findings, pp. 70-72. 196 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK the Level II program manager at the Johnson Space Center, were fol- lowed in a procedural sense for STS 51-L. However, the commission concluded that relevant concerns of Level III NASA personnel and ele- ment contractors had not been, in critical areas, adequately communicat- ed to the NASA Levels I and II management responsible for the launch. In particular, objections to the launch voiced by Morton Thiokol engi- neers about the detrimental effect of cold temperatures on the perfor- mance of the solid rocket motor joint seal and the degree of concern of Thiokol and the Marshall Space Flight Center about the erosion of the joint seals in prior Shuttle flights, notably STS 51-C and 51-B, were not communicated sufficiently. Since December 1982, the O-rings had been designated a "Criticality 1" feature of the solid rocket booster design, meaning that component failure without backup could cause a loss of life or vehicle. In July 1985, after a nozzle joint on STS 51-B showed secondary O-ring erosion, indi- cating that the primary seal failed, a launch constraint was placed on flight STS 51-F and subsequent launches. These constraints had been imposed and regularly waived by the solid rocket booster project manag- er at Marshall, Lawrence B. Mulloy. Neither the launch constraint, the reason for it, nor the six consecutive waivers prior to STS 51-L were known to Associate Administrator for Space Flight Jesse W. Moore (Level I), Aldrich Arnold, the manager of space transportation programs at the Johnson Space Center (Level II), or James Thomas, the deputy director of launch and landing operations at the Kennedy Space Center at the time of the Flight Readiness Review process for STS 51-L. In addition, no mention of the O-ring problems appeared in the Certification of Flight Readiness for the solid rocket booster set desig- nated BI026 signed for Thiokol on January 9, 1986, by Joseph Kilminster. Similarly, no mention appeared in the certification endorsement, signed on January 15, 1986, by Kilminster and Mulloy. No mention appeared in the entire chain of readiness reviews for STS 51-L, contrary to testimony by Mulloy, who claimed that concern about the O-ring was "in the Flight Readiness Review record that went all the way to the L-I review." 9 On January 27 and through the night to January 28, NASA and con- tractor personnel debated the wisdom of launching on January 28, in light of the O-ring performance under low temperatures. Table 3-47 presents the chronology of discussions relating to temperature and the decision to launch. Information is based on testimony and documents provided to the commission through February 24, 1986. Except for the time of launch, all times are approximate. According to the commission, the decision to launch Challenger was flawed. Those who made that decision were unaware of the recent histo- ry of problems concerning the O-rings and the joints and were unaware "Ibid., pp. 2610-1 p. 85, from Commission Hearing Transcript, May 2, 1986, SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT \ { n of the initial written recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch at temperatures below 53 degrees F and the continuing oppo sition of the engineers at Thiokol after management reversed its position. If the decision makers had known all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have decided to launch STS 51-L on January 28, 1986. The commission revealed the following four findings: 1. The commission concluded that there was a serious Haw in the deci- sion-making process leading up to the launch of flight 51-L. A well- structured and managed system emphasizing safety would have flagged the rising doubts about the solid rocket booster joint seal. Had these matters been clearly stated and emphasized in the flight readi- ness process in terms reflecting the views of most of the Thiokol engineers and at least some of the Marshall engineers, it seems like- ly that the launch of 51-L might not have occurred when it did. 2. The waiving of launch constraints seems to have been at the expense of flight safety. There was no system that mandated that launch con- straints and waivers of launch constraints be considered by all levels of management. 3. The commission noted what seemed to be a propensity of manage- ment at Marshall to contain potentially serious problems and to attempt to resolve them internally rather than communicate them for- ward. This tendency, the commission stated, was contrary to the need for Marshall to function as part of a system working toward success- ful flight missions, interfacing and communicating with the other parts of the system that worked to the same end. 4. The commission concluded that Thiokol management reversed its position and recommended the launch of 51-L at the urging of Marshall and contrary to the views of its engineers in order to accom- modate a major customer. Ice on the Launch Pad. The commission also found that decision makers did not clearly understand Rockwell's concern that launching was unsafe because of ice on the launch pad and whether Rockwell had indeed recommended the launch. They expressed concern about three aspects of this issue: 1. An analysis of all of the testimony and interviews established that Rockwell's recommendation on launch was ambiguous. The com- mission found it difficult, as did Aldrich, to conclude that there was a no-launch recommendation. Moreover, all parties were asked specif- ically to contact Aldrich or other NASA officials after the 9:00 a.m. Mission Management Team meeting and subsequent to the resump- tion of the countdown. 2. The commission was also concerned about NASA's response to Rockwell's position at the 9:00 a.m. meeting. The commission was not convinced Levels I and II appropriately considered Rockwell's 198 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK concern about the ice. However ambiguous as Rockwell's position was, it was clear that Rockwell did tell NASA that the ice was an unknown condition. Given the extent of the ice on the pad, the admit- ted unknown effect of the solid rocket motor and Space Shuttle main engines' ignition on the ice, as well as the fact that debris striking the orbiter was a potential flight safety hazard, the commission found the decision to launch questionable. In this situation, NASA seemed to be requiring a contractor to prove that it was not safe to launch, rather than proving it was safe. Nevertheless, the commission determined that the ice was not a cause of the 5 1-L accident and did not conclude that NASA's decision to launch specifically overrode a no-launch rec- ommendation by an element contractor. 3. The commission concluded that the freeze protection plan for Launch Pad 39-B was inadequate. The commission believed that the severe cold and presence of so much ice on the fixed service structure made it inadvisable to launch and that margins of safety were whittled down too far. Additionally, access to the crew emergency slide wire baskets was hazardous due to icy conditions. Had the crew been required to evacuate the orbiter on the launch pad, they would have been running on an icy surface. The commission believed that the crew should have been told of the condition and that greater consid- eration should have been given to delaying the launch. Precursor to the Accident Earlier events helped set the stage for the conditions that caused the STS 5 1-L accident. The commission stated that the Space Shuttle's solid rocket booster problem began with the faulty design of its joint and increased as both NASA and contractor management first failed to rec- ognize the problem, then failed to fix it, and finally treated it as an accept- able flight risk. Morton Thiokol did not accept the implication of tests early in the program that the design had a serious and unanticipated flaw. NASA did not accept the judgment of its engineers that the design was unacceptable, and as the joint problems grew in number and severity, NASA minimized them in management briefings and reports. Thiokol's stated position was that "the condition is not desirable but is acceptable." 10 Neither Thiokol nor NASA expected the rubber O-rings sealing the joints to be touched by hot gases of motor ignition, much less to be par- tially burned. However, as tests and then flights confirmed damage to the sealing rings, the reaction by both NASA and Thiokol was to increase the amount of damage considered "acceptable." At no time, the commission found, did management either recommend a redesign of the joint or call for the Shuttle's grounding until the problem was solved. l0 Ibid., p. 120, from Report, "STS-3 Through STS-25 Flight Readiness Reviews to Level III Center Board," NASA. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT IW The commission stated that the genesis of the Challenger accident the failure of the joint of the right solid roeket motor began with deci- sions made in the design of the joint and in the failure by both Thiokol and NASA's solid roeket booster project office to understand and respond to facts obtained during testing. The commission concluded that neither Thiokol nor NASA responded adequately to internal warnings about the faulty seal design. Furthermore, Thiokol and NASA did not make a time- ly attempt to develop and verify a new seal after the initial design was shown to be deficient. Neither organization developed a solution to the unexpected occurrences of O-ring erosion and blow-by, even though this problem was experienced frequently during the Shuttle's flight history. Instead, Thiokol and NASA management came to accept erosion and blow-by as unavoidable and an acceptable flight risk. Specifically, the commission found that: 1 . The joint test and certification program was inadequate. There was no requirement to configure the qualifications test motor as it would be in flight, and the motors were static-tested in a horizontal position, not in the vertical flight position. 2. Prior to the accident, neither NASA nor Thiokol fully understood the mechanism by which the joint sealing action took place. 3. NASA and Thiokol accepted escalating risk apparently because they "got away with it last time." As Commissioner Richard Feynman observed, the decision making was "a kind of Russian roulette. . . . [The Shuttle] flies [with O-ring erosion] and nothing happens. Then it is suggested, therefore, that the risk is no longer so high for the next flights. We can lower our standards a little bit because we got away with it last time. . . . You got away with it, but it shouldn't be done over and over again like that." 11 4. NASA's system for tracking anomalies for Flight Readiness Reviews failed in that, despite a history of persistent O-ring erosion and blow- by, flight was still permitted. It failed again in the sequence of six consecutive launch constraint waivers prior to 51-L, permitting it to fly without any record of a waiver, or even of an explicit constraint. Tracking and continuing only anomalies that are "outside the data base" of prior flight allowed major problems to be removed from and lost by the reporting system. 5. The O-ring erosion history presented to Level I at NASA Headquarters in August 1985 was sufficiently detailed to require cor- rective action prior to the next flight. 6. A careful analysis of the flight history of O-ring performance would have revealed the correlation of O-ring damage and low temperature. Neither NASA nor Thiokol carried out such an analysis; consequent- ly, they were unprepared to properly evaluate the risks of launching n IbicL, p. 148, from Commission Hearing Testimony, April 3, 1986, p. 2469. 200 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK the 51-L mission in conditions more extreme than they had encoun- tered before. NASA 5 Safety Program The commission found surprising and disturbing the lack of reference to NASA's safety staff. Individuals who testified before the commission did not mention the quality assurance staff, and no reliability and quality assurance engineer had been asked to participate in the discussions that took place prior to launch. The commission concluded that "the extensive and redundant safety assurance functions" that had existed "during and after the lunar program to discover any safety problems" had become ineffective between that period and 1986. This loss of effectiveness seriously degraded the checks and balances essential for maintaining flight safety. 12 Although NASA had a safety program in place, communications failures relating to safety pro- cedures did not operate properly during STS 51-L. On April 3, 1986, Arnold Aldrich, the Space Shuttle program manag- er, appeared before the commission at a public hearing in Washington, D.C. He described five different communications or organizational fail- ures that affected the launch decision on January 28, 1986. Four of those failures related directly to faults within the safety program: lack of prob- lem reporting requirements, inadequate trend analysis, misrepresentation of criticality, and lack of involvement in critical discussions. A properly staffed, supported, and robust safety organization, he stated, might well have avoided these faults and thus eliminated the communications fail- ures. The commission found that: 1 . Reductions in the safety, reliability and quality assurance work force at the Marshall and NASA Headquarters seriously limited capability in those vital functions. 2. Organizational structures at Kennedy and Marshall placed safety, reliability, and quality assurance offices under the supervision of the very organizations and activities whose efforts they are to check. 3. Problem reporting requirements were not concise and failed to get critical information to the proper levels of management. 4. Little or no trend analysis was performed on O-ring erosion and blow-by problems. 5. As the flight rate increased, the Marshall safety, reliability, and qual- ity assurance work force was decreasing, which adversely affected mission safety. 6. Five weeks after the 51-L accident, the criticality of the solid rocket motor field joint had still not been properly documented in the prob- lem reporting system at Marshall. n lbid., p. 152. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SI'ACII I. Kill I 201 Pressures on (lie System From the Space Shuttle's inception, NASA had advertised that the Shuttle would make space operations "routine and economical. " The impli- cation was that the greater annual number of flights, the more routine Shuttle flights would become. Thus, NASA placed heavy emphasis on the schedule. However, one effect of the agency's determination to meet an accelerated flight rate was the dilution of resources available for any one mission. In addition, NASA had difficulty evolving from its single-flight focus to a sys- tem that could support an ongoing schedule of flights. Managers forgot in their insistence on proving it operational, the commission stated, that the Shuttle system was still in its early phase. There might not have been enough preparation for what "operational" entailed. For instance, routine and regu- lar postflight maintenance and inspections, spare parts production or acqui- sition, and software tools and training facilities developed during a test program were not suitable for the high volume of work required in an oper- ational environment. The challenge was to streamline the processes to pro- vide the needed support without compromising quality. Mission planning requires establishing the manifest, defining the objectives, constraints, and capabilities of the mission, and translating those into hardware, software, and flight procedures. Within each of these major goals is a series of milestones in which managers decide whether to proceed to the next step. Once a decision has been made to go ahead and the activity begun, if a substantial change occurs, it may be necessary to go back and repeat the preceding process. In addition, if one group fails to meet its due date, the delay cascades throughout the system. The ambitious flight rate meant that less and less time was available for completing each of the steps in the mission planning and preparation process. In addition, a lack of efficient production processing and mani- fest changes disrupted the production system. In particular, the commis- sion found that manifest changes, which forced repeating certain steps in the production cycle, sometimes severely affected the entire cycle and placed impossible demands on the system. The commission found that pressures on the STS to launch at an overambitious rate contributed to severe strains on the system. The flight rate did not seem to be based on an assessment of available resources and capabilities and was not modified to accommodate the capacity of the work force. The commission stated that NASA had not provided adequate resources to support its launch schedule and that the system had been strained by the modest nine missions that had launched in 1985. After the accident, rumors appeared that persons who made the decision to launch might have been subjected to outside pressures to launch. The com- mission examined these rumors and concluded that the decision to launch was made solely by the appropriate NASA officials without any outside inter- vention or pressure. 13 The commission listed the following findings: l3 Ibid., p. 176. 202 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK 1 . The capabilities of the system were stretched to the limit to support the flight rate in the winter of 1985-86. Projections into the spring and summer of 1986 showed that the system, as it existed, would have been unable to deliver crew training software for scheduled flights by the designated dates. The result would have been an unac- ceptable compression of the time available for the crews to accom- plish their required training. 2. Spare parts were in critically short supply. The Space Shuttle program made a conscious decision to postpone spare parts procurements in favor of budget items of perceived higher priority. The lack of spare parts would likely have limited flight operations in 1986. 3. The stated manifesting policies were not enforced. Numerous late manifest changes (after the cargo integration review) were made to both major pay loads and minor pay loads throughout the Shuttle pro- gram. These changes required additional resources and used existing resources more rapidly. They also adversely affected crew training and the development of procedures for subsequent missions. 4. The scheduled flight rate did not accurately reflect the capabilities and resources. • The flight rate was not reduced to accommodate periods of adjustment in the capacity of the work force. No margin existed in the system to accommodate unforeseen hardware problems. • Resources were primarily directed toward supporting the flights and thus were inadequate to improve and expand facilities need- ed to support a higher flight rate. 5. Training simulators may be the limiting factor on the flight rate; the two current simulators cannot train crews for more than twelve to fif- teen flights per year. 6. When flights come in rapid succession, current requirements do not ensure that critical anomalies occurring during one flight are identi- fied and addressed appropriately before the next flight. Other Safety Considerations During its investigation, the commission examined other safety- related issues that had played no part in the STS 51-L accident but nonethe- less might lead to safety problems in the future. These safety-related areas were ascent (including abort capabilities and crew escape options), landing (including weather considerations, orbiter tires and brakes, and choice of a landing site), Shuttle elements other than the solid rocket booster, process- ing and assembly (including record keeping and inspections), capabilities of Launch Pad 39-B, and involvement of the development contractors. Ascent. The events of flight 51-L illustrated the dangers of the first stage of a Space Shuttle ascent. The accident also focused attention on orbiter abort capabilities and crew escape. The current abort capabilities, options to improve those capabilities, options for crew escape, and the performance of the range safety system were of particular concern to the commission. spact: TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 203 The Shuttle's design capabilities allowed lor successful intact mis sion abort (a survivable landing) on a runway alter a single main engine failure. The Shuttles design specifications did not require that the orbiter be able to manage an intact abort if a second main engine should fail. II two or three main engines failed, the Shuttle would land in water in a con- tingency abort or ditching. This maneuver was not believed to be surviv- able because of damage incurred at water impact. In addition, the Shuttle system was not designed to survive a failure of the solid rocket boosters. Furthermore, although technically the orbiter had the capability to sepa- rate from the external tank during the first stage, analysis had shown that if it were attempted while the solid rocket boosters were still thrusting, the orbiter would "hang up" on its aft attach points and pitch violently, with probable loss of the orbiter and crew. This "fast separation" would provide a useful means of escape during first stage only if solid rocket booster thrust could be terminated first. 14 Studies identified no viable means of crew escape during first-stage ascent. The commission supported the further study of escape options. However, it concluded that no corrective actions could have been taken that would have saved the Challenger's flight crew. Landing. The Space Shuttle's entry and landing formed another risky and complicated part of a mission. Because the crew could not divert to an alternate landing site after entry, the landing decision must be both timely and accurate. In addition, the landing gear, including the wheels, tires, and brakes, must function properly. Although the orbiter tires were designed to support a landing up to 108,864 kilograms at 416.7 kilometers per hour with thirty-seven kilome- ters per hour of crosswind and have successfully passed testing programs, they had shown excessive wear during landings at Kennedy, especially when crosswinds were involved. The tires were rated as Criticality 1 because the loss of a single tire could cause a loss of control and a subse- quent loss of the vehicle and crew. Because actual wear on a runway did not correspond to test results, NASA directed testing to examine actual tire, wheel, and strut failure to better understand this failure case. The commission found that the brakes used on the orbiter were known to have little or no margin, because they were designed based on the orbiter' s design weight. As the actual orbiter 's weight grew, the brakes were not redesigned; rather, the runway length was extended. Actual flight experience had shown brake damage on most flights, which required that special crew procedures be developed to ensure successful braking. The original Shuttle plan called for routine landings at Kennedy to minimize turnaround time and cost per flight and to provide efficient operations for both the Shuttle system and the cargo elements. While those considerations remained important, concerns such as the perfor- mance of the orbiter tires and brakes and the difficulty of accurate weath- er prediction in Florida had called the plan into question. "Ibid., p. 180. 204 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK When the Shuttle landed at Edwards Air Force Base, approximately six days are added to the turnaround time. The commission stated that although there were valid programmatic reasons for landing the Shuttle routinely at Kennedy, the demanding nature of landing and the impact of weather conditions might dictate the prudence of using Edwards on a reg- ular basis for landing. The cost associated with regular scheduled landing and turnaround operations at Edwards was thus a necessary program cost. Decisions governing Shuttle operations, the commission stated, must coin- cide with the philosophy that unnecessary risks have to be eliminated. Shuttle Elements. The Space Shuttle main engine teams at Marshall and Rocketdyne had developed engines that achieved their performance goals and performed extremely well. Nevertheless, according to the com- mission, the main engines continued to be highly complex and critical components of the Shuttle, with an element of risk principally because important components of the engines degraded more rapidly with flight use than anticipated. Both NASA and Rocketdyne took steps to contain that risk. An important aspect of the main engine program was the exten- sive "hot fire" ground tests. Unfortunately, the vitality of the test program, the commission found, was reduced because of budgetary constraints. The number of engine test firings per month had decreased over the two years prior to STS 51-L. Yet this test program had not demonstrated the limits of engine operation parameters or included tests over the full operating envelope to show full engine capability. In addition, tests had not yet been deliberately conducted to the point of failure to determine actual engine operating margins. The commission also identified one serious potential failure mode related to the disconnect valves between the orbiter and the external tank. Processing and Assembly. During the processing and assembly of the elements of flight 51-L, the commission found various problems that could bear on the safety of future flights. These involved structural inspections in which waivers were granted on sixty of the 146 required orbiter structural inspections, errors in the recordkeeping for the Space Shuttle main engine/main propulsion system and the orbiter, areas in which items called for by the Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document were not met and were not formally waived or excepted, the Shuttle processing contractor's policy of using "designated verifiers" to supplement quality assurance personnel, and the lack of acci- dental damage reporting because technicians were concerned about los- ing their jobs. Launch Pad 39-B. The damage to the launch pad from the explosion was considered to be normal or minor, with three exceptions: the loss of the springs and plungers of the booster hold-down posts, the failure of the gaseous hydrogen vent arm to latch, and the loss of bricks from the flame trench. Involvement of Development Contractors. The commission deter- mined that, although NASA considered the Shuttle program to be opera- tional, it was "clearly a developmental program and must be treated as SPACI-: TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 205 such by NASA."" Using procedures accepted by the transportation indus- try was only partly valid because each mission expanded system and per- formance requirements. The Shuttle's developmental status demanded that both NASA and all its contractors maintain a high level of ill-house experience and technical ability. The demands of the developmental aspects o[' the program required: 1 . Maintaining a significant engineering design and development capa- bility among the Shuttle contractors and an ongoing engineering capability within NASA 2. Maintaining an active analytical capability so that the evolving capa- bilities of the Shuttle can be matched to the demands on the Shuttle Recommendations of the Presidential Commission The commission unanimously adopted nine recommendations, which they submitted to President Reagan. They also urged NASA's adminis- trator to submit a report to the president on the progress NASA made in implementing the recommendations. These recommendations are restat- ed below. Design. The faulty solid rocket motor joint and seal must be changed. This could be a new design eliminating the joint or a redesign of the cur- rent joint and seal. No design options should be prematurely precluded because of schedule, cost or reliance on existing hardware. All solid rock- et motor joints should satisfy the following requirements: • The joints should be fully understood, tested and verified. • The integrity of the structure and of the seals of all joints should be not less than that of the case walls throughout the design envelope. • The integrity of the joints should be insensitive to: - Dimensional tolerances. - Transportation and handling. - Assembly procedures. - Inspection and test procedures. - Environmental effects. - Internal case operating pressure. - Recovery and reuse effects. - Flight and water impact loads. • The certification of the new design should include: - Tests which duplicate the actual launch configuration as closely as possible. "Ibid., p. 194. 206 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK - Tests over the full range of operating conditions, including tem- perature. • Full consideration should be given to conducting static firings of the exact flight configuration in a vertical attitude. Independent Oversight The administrator of NASA should request the National Research Council to form an independent solid rocket motor design oversight committee to implement the commission 's design recom- mendations and oversee the design effort. This committee should: • Review and evaluate certification requirements. • Provide technical oversight of the design, test program and certification. • Report to the administrator of NASA on the adequacy of the design and make appropriate recommendations. II Shuttle Management Structure. The Shuttle Program Structure should be reviewed. The project managers for the various elements of the Shuttle program felt more accountable to their center management than to the Shuttle program organization. Shuttle element funding, work pack- age definition, and vital program information frequently bypass the National STS (Shuttle) Program Manager. A redefinition of the Program Manager 's responsibility is essential. This redefinition should give the Program Manager the requisite author- ity for all ongoing STS operations. Program funding and all Shuttle Program work at the centers should be placed clearly under the Program Manager 's authority. Astronauts in Management. The commission observes that there appears to be a departure from the philosophy of the 1960s and 1970s relating to the use of astronauts in management positions. These individ- uals brought to their positions flight experience and a keen appreciation of operations and flight safety. • NASA should encourage the transition of qualified astronauts into agency management positions. The function of the Flight Crew Operations director should be ele- vated in the NASA organization structure. Shuttle Safety Panel. NASA should establish an STS Safety Advisory Panel reporting to the STS Program Manager. The Charter of this panel should include Shuttle operational issues, launch commit criteria, flight rules, flight readiness and risk management. The panel should include representation from the safety organization, mission operations, and the astronaut office. SlttCli TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 207 /// Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis. NASA and the primary Shuttle contractors should review all Criticality I, IR, 2, and 2I< items and hazard analyses. This review should identify those items that must he improved prior to flight to ensure mission safety. An Audit Panel, appoint- ed by the National Research Council, should verify the adequacy oj the effort and report directly to the administrator of NASA. IV Safety Organization. NASA should establish an Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance to be headed by an associate adminis- trator, reporting directly to the NASA administrator. It would have direct authority for safety, reliability, and quality assurance throughout the agency. The office should be assigned the workforce to ensure adequate oversight of its functions and should be independent of other NASA func- tional and program responsibilities. The responsibilities of this office should include: • The safety, reliability and quality assurance functions as they relate to all NASA activities and programs. • Direction of reporting and documentation of problems, problem res- olution and trends associated with flight safety. Improved Communications. The commission found that Marshall Space Flight Center project managers, because of a tendency at Marshall to management isolation, failed to provide full and timely information bearing on the safety of flight 51-L to other vital elements of Shuttle pro- gram management. • NASA should take energetic steps to eliminate this tendency at Marshall Space Flight Center, whether by changes of personnel, organization, indoctrination or all three. • A policy should be developed which governs the imposition and removal of Shuttle launch constraints. • Flight Readiness Reviews and Mission Management Team meetings should be recorded. • The flight crew commander, or a designated representative, should attend the Flight Readiness Review, participate in acceptance of the vehicle for flight, and certify that the crew is properly prepared for flight. 208 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK VI Landing Safety. NASA must take actions to improve landing safety: • The tire, brake and nose wheel steering systems must be improved. These systems do not have sufficient safety margin, particularly at abort landing sites. • The specific conditions under which planned landings at Kennedy would be acceptable should be determined. Criteria must be estab- lished for tires, brakes and nose wheel steering. Until the systems meet those criteria in high fidelity testing that is verified at Edwards, landing at Kennedy should not be planned. Committing to a specific landing site requires that landing area weather be forecast more than an hour in advance. During unpre- dictable weather periods at Kennedy, program officials should plan on Edwards landings. Increased landings at Edwards may necessitate a dual ferry capability. VII Launch Abort and Crew Escape. The Shuttle program management considered first-stage abort options and crew escape options several times during the history of the program, but because of limited utility, technical unfeasibility, or program cost and schedule, no systems were implemented. The commission recommends that NASA: • Make all efforts to provide a crew escape system for use during con- trolled gliding flight. • Make every effort to increase the range of flight conditions under which an emergency runway landing can be successfully conducted in the event that two or three main engines fail early in ascent. VIII Flight Rate. The nations reliance on the Shuttle as its principal space launch capability created a relentless pressure on NASA to increase the flight rate. Such reliance on a single launch capability should be avoided in the future. NASA must establish a flight rate that is consistent with its resources. A firm payload assignment policy should be established. The policy should include rigorous controls on cargo manifest changes to limit the pressures such changes exert on schedules and crew training. IX Maintenance Safeguards. Installation, test, and maintenance proce- dures must be especially rigorous for Space Shuttle items designated SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 2() { ) Critical itx /. NASA .should establish (i system of analyzing and reporting performance trends of such items. Maintenance procedures for such items should he specified in the Critical Items List, especially for those such as the liquid-fueled main engines, which require unstinting maintenance and overhaul. With regard to the arbiters, NASA should: • Develop and execute a comprehensive maintenance inspection plan. • Perform periodic structural inspections when scheduled and not per- mit them to be waived. • Restore and support the maintenance and spare parts programs, and stop the practice of removing parts from one orbiter to supply another. 16 Concluding Thought The commission urged that NASA continue to receive the support of the administration and the nation. The agency constitutes a national resource that plays a critical role in space exploration and development. It also provides a symbol of national pride and technological leadership. The commission applauded NASA's spectacular achievements of the past and anticipated impressive achievements in the future. The findings and recommendations presented in this report were intended to contribute to future NASA successes that the nation both expects and requires as the 21st century approaches. STS 51-L Investigations and Actions by NASA Safely Returning the Shuttle to Flight Status While the Presidential Commission investigated the accident, NASA also conducted an investigation to determine strategies and major actions for safely returning to flight status. In a March 24, 1986, memorandum, Associate Administrator for Space Flight Richard H. Truly defined NASA's comprehensive strategy and major actions that would allow for resuming the Space Shuttle's schedule. He stated that NASA Headquarters (particularly the Office of Space Flight), the Office of Space Flight centers, the NSTS program organization, and its various contractors would use the guidance supplied in the memo to proceed with "the realistic, practical actions necessary to return to the NSTS flight schedule with emphasis on flight safety." 17 In his memo, Truly focused on three areas: actions required prior to the next flight, first flight/first year operations, and development of sustainable safe flight rate. l6 Ibid., p. 196. 17 Richard H. Truly, NASA Memorandum, "Strategy for Safely Returning the Space Shuttle to Flight Status," March 24, 1986. 210 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Actions Required Prior to the Next Flight. Truly directed NASA to take the following steps before the return to flight: • Reassess the entire program management structure and operation Redesign the solid rocket motor joint (A dedicated solid rocket motor joint design group would be established at Marshall to recommend a program plan to quantify the solid rocket motor joints problem and to accomplish the solid rocket motor joints redesign.) • Reverify design requirements Complete Critical Item List (CIL)/Operations and Maintenance Instructions reviews (NASA would review all Category 1 and 1R crit- ical items and implement a complete reapproval process. Any items not revalidated by this review would be redesigned, certified, and qualified for flight.) Complete Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document review • Reassess launch and abort rules and philosophy First Flight/First Year Operations. The first flight mission design would incorporate: Daylight Kennedy launch Conservative flight design to minimize transatlantic-abort-launch exposure Repeat payload (not a new payload class) No waiver on landing weight Conservative launch/launch abort/landing weather NASA-only flight crew Engine thrust within the experience base No active ascent/entry Developmental Test Objectives Conservative mission rules Early, stable flight plan with supporting flight software and training load • Daylight Edwards Air Force Base landing The planning for the flight schedule for the first year of operation would reflect a conservative launch rate. The first year of operation would be maintained within the current flight experience base, and any expansion of the base, including new classes of payloads, would be approved only after a very thorough safety review. Development of Sustainable Safe Flight Rate. This flight rate would be developed using a "bottoms-up" approach in which all required work was identified and that work was optimized, keeping in mind the avail- able work force. Factors with the potential for disrupting schedules as well as the availability of resources would be considered when develop- ing the flight rate. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 21 I Design and Development Task Force Also while the Presidential Commission was meeting, NASA formed the 51-L Data and Design Analysis Task Foree. This group supported the Presidential Commission and was responsible for: 1. Determining, reviewing, and analyzing the facts and circumstances surrounding the STS 51-L launch 2. Reviewing all factors relating to the accident determined to be rele- vant, including studies, findings, recommendations, and other actions that were or might be undertaken by the program offices, field cen- ters, and contractors involved 3. Examining all other factors that could relate to the accident, includ- ing design issues, procedures, organization, and management factors 4. Using the full required technical and scientific expertise and resources available within NASA and those available to NASA 5. Documenting task force findings and determinations and conclusions derived from the findings. 6. Providing information and documentation to the commission regard- ing task force activities. The task force, which was chaired by Truly, established teams to examine development and production; prelaunch activities; accident analysis; mission planning and operations; and search, recovery, and reconstruction; and a photo and TV support team. Figure 3-23 shows the task force organization. Each task force team submitted multivolume reports to the Presidential Commission, which included descriptions of the accident as Production Team Jack Lee (MSFC) - Lead Clay McCullough (JSC) - Deputy STS 51-L Data and Design Anaylsis Task Force Robert Crippen (JSC) Nathan Lindsay USAF) Joseph Kerwin (JSC) Walt Williams (HOs) Analysis Team Leaders and Deputies Tom Utsman (KSC) - Lead Robert Bourne (USAF) - Deputy Staff (HQs) Jay Honeycutt Staff (KSC) Legal Counsel - Ed Perry Secretariat - Bert Jackson Admin - Jack Martin Public Affairs - Chuck Hollinshead Resources - Jack Umstead Report - Jay Wortman Accident Analysis Team Alton Jones (GSFC) - Lead John Thomas (MSFC) - Deputy Mission Plannin & Operations Team Tommy Holloway (JSC) - Lead Harold Draughton (JSC) ■ Deputy Ed O'Connor (USAF) - Lead Ed Weber (KSC) - Deputy Photo & TV Support Team Daniel Germany (JSC) - Lead Thomas Redmond (JSC) - Deputy Charles Stevenson - KSC Rep George McDonough - MSFC Rep John Erickson - JSC Rep Figure 3-23. STS 51-L Data and Design Analysis Task Force 212 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK well as numerous corrective measures needed to be taken. Called "Lessons Learned and Collateral Findings," this report contained eight lessons learned and twenty-nine collateral findings, all addressing virtu- ally every aspect of Shuttle planning, processing, launch, and recovery. 18 The task force also briefed members of Congress on its findings. Actions to Implement Recommendations After the report of the Presidential Commission was published (on June 9, 1986), President Reagan directed NASA Administrator James Fletcher on June 13 to report to him within 30 days on how and when the commission's recommendations would be implemented. The president said that "this report should include milestones by which progress in the implementation process can be measured." 19 NASA's Report to the President: Actions to Implement the Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, submitted to the president on July 14, 1986, responded to each of the commission's rec- ommendations and included a key milestone schedule that illustrated the planned implementation (Figure 3-24). The proposed actions and the steps that NASA had already taken when the report was issued follow in the narrative below. Table 3-48 pre- sents an implementation timetable. 20 Recommendation I Solid Rocket Motor Design. At NASA's direction, the Marshall Space Flight Center formed a solid rocket motor joint redesign team to include participants from Marshall and other NASA centers and individuals from outside NASA. The Marshall team evaluated several design alternatives and began analysis and testing to determine the preferred approaches that minimized hardware redesign. To ensure adequate program contingency, the redesign team would also develop, at least through concept definition, a totally new design that did not use existing hardware. The design verifi- cation and certification program would be emphasized and would include tests that duplicated the actual launch loads as closely as feasible and pro- vided for tests over the full range of operating conditions. The verifica- tion effort included a trade study to determine the preferred test orientation (vertical or horizontal) of the full-scale motor firings. The lH STS 51-L Data and Design Analysis Task Force, Historical Summary (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1986), p. 3-90. l9 Ronald Reagan, Letter to James C. Fletcher, NASA Administrator, June 13, 1986. ^Report to the President: Actions to Implement the Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 14, 1986), Executive Summary. SPAC'li TRANSIT )K'l'A'ri()N/l It IM AN SPA( I IIJ( il II 213 214 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK solid rocket motor redesign and certification schedule was under review to fully understand and plan for the implementation of the design solu- tions. The schedule would be reassessed after the solid rocket motor Preliminary Design Review in September 1986. Independent Oversight. In accordance with the commission's recom- mendation, the National Research Council (NRC) established an Independent Oversight Group chaired by Dr. H. Guyford Stever and reporting to the NASA administrator. The NRC Independent Oversight Group was briefed on Shuttle system requirements, implementation, and control; solid rocket motor background; and candidate modifications. The group established a near-term plan, which included briefings and visits to review inflight loads, assembly processing, redesign status, and other solid rocket motor designs, including participation in the solid rocket motor Preliminary Design Review in September 1986. Recommendation II Shuttle Management Structure. The NASA administrator appointed General Samuel C. Phillips to study how NASA managed its programs, including relationships between various field centers and NASA Headquarters and emphasizing the Space Shuttle management structure. On June 25, 1986, the administrator directed Astronaut Robert L. Crippen to form a fact-finding group to assess the Space Shuttle manage- ment structure. The group would report recommendations to the associ- ate administrator for spaceflight by August 15, 1986. Specifically, this group will address the roles and responsibilities of the Space Shuttle pro- gram manager to assure that the position had the authority commensurate with its responsibilities. General Phillips and the administrator would review the results of this study with a decision on implementation of the recommendations by October 1, 1986. Astronauts in Management. The Crippen group would also address ways to stimulate the transition of astronauts into management positions. It would also determine the appropriate position for the flight crew oper- ations directorate within the NASA. Shuttle Safety Panel. The associate administrator for spaceflight would establish a Shuttle Safety Panel by September 1, 1986, with direct access to the Space Shuttle program manager. Recommendation III Critical Item Review and Hazard Analysis. On March 13, 1986, NASA initiated a complete review of all Space Shuttle program failure modes and effects analyses and associated Critical Item Lists. Each Space Shuttle project element and associated prime contractor was conducting separate comprehensive reviews which would culminate in a program- wide review with the Space Shuttle program manager at Johnson Space Center later in 1986. Technical specialists outside the Space Shuttle pro- gram were assigned as formal members of each of these review teams. All Criticality 1 and 1R critical item waivers were canceled. The teams SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 215 reassessed and resubmitted waivers iii categories recommended for con- tinued program applicability. Items which could not he revalidated would he redesigned, qualified, and certified for flight. All Critieality 2 and 3 Critical Item Lists were being reviewed for reacceptance and proper cat- egorization. This aetivity would culminate in a comprehensive final review with NASA Headquarters beginning in March 1987. As recommended by the commission, the National Research Council agreed to form an Independent Audit Panel, reporting to the NASA administrator, to verify the adequacy of this effort. Recommendation IV Safety Organization. The NASA administrator announced the appointment of George A. Rodney to the position of associate adminis- trator for safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance (SRM&QA) on July 8, 1986. This office would oversee the safety, relia- bility, and quality assurance functions related to all NASA activities and programs and the implementation system for anomaly documentation and resolution, including a trend analysis program. One of Rodney's first actions would be to assess the available resources, including the work force required to ensure adequate execution of the safety organization functions. In addition, he would assure appropriate interfaces between the functions of the new safety organization and the Shuttle Safety Panel, which would be established in response to the commission Recommendation II. Recommendation V Improved Communications. Astronaut Robert Crippen's team (formed as part of Recommendation II) developed plans and recom- mended policies for the following: • Implementation of effective management communications at all levels Standardization of the imposition and removal of STS launch con- straints and other operational constraints • Conduct of Flight Readiness Review and Mission Management Team meetings, including requirements for documentation and flight crew participation This review of effective communications would consider the activi- ties and information flow at NASA Headquarters and the field centers that supported the Shuttle program. The study team would present findings and recommendations to the associate administrator for spaceflight by August 15, 1986. Recommendation VI Landing Safety. A Landing Safety Team was established to review and implement the commission's findings and recommendations on land- ing safety. All Shuttle hardware and systems were undergoing design 216 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK reviews to ensure compliance with the specifications and safety concerns. The tires, brakes, and nose wheel steering system were included in this activity, and funding for a new carbon brakes system was approved. Ongoing runway surface tests and landing aid requirement reviews were continuing. Landing aid implementation would be complete by July 1987. The interim brake system would be delivered by August 1987. Improved methods of local weather forecasting and weather-related support were being developed. Until the Shuttle program demonstrated satisfactory safety margins through high fidelity testing and during actu- al landings at Edwards Air Force Base, the Kennedy Space Center land- ing site would not be used for nominal end-of-mission landings. Recommendation VII Launch Abort and Crew Escape. On April 7, 1986, NASA initiated a Shuttle Crew Egress and Escape review. The analysis focused on egress and escape capabilities from launch through landing and would analyze con- cepts, feasibility assessments, cost, and schedules for pad abort, bailout, ejection systems, water landings, and powered flight separation. This review would specifically assess options for crew escape during controlled gliding flight and options for extending the intact abort flight envelope to include failure of two or three main engines during the early ascent phase. In conjunction with this activity, NASA established a Launch Abort Reassessment Team to review all launch and launch abort rules to ensure that launch commit criteria, flight rules, range safety systems and proce- dures, landing aids, runway configurations and lengths, performance ver- sus abort exposure, abort and end-of-mission landing weights, runway surfaces, and other landing-related capabilities provided the proper mar- gin of safety to the vehicle and crew. Crew escape and launch abort stud- ies would be complete on October 1, 1986, with an implementation decision in December 1986. Recommendation VIII Flight Rate. In March 1986, NASA established a Flight Rate Capability Working Group that studied: 1 . The capabilities and constraints that governed the Shuttle processing flows at the Kennedy Space Center 2. The impact of flight specific crew training and software delivery/cer- tification on flight rates The working group would present flight rate recommendations to the Office of Space Flight by August 15, 1986. Other collateral studies in progress addressed commission recommendations related to spares pro- visioning, maintenance, and structural inspection. This effort would also consider the NRC independent review of flight rate, which a congres- sional subcommittee had requested. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 217 The report emphasized NASA's strong support for a mixed fleet to satisfy Launch requirements and actions to revitalize the United States expendable Launch vehicle capabilities. Additionally, NASA Headquarters was formulating a new cargo manifest policy, which would establish manifest ground rules and impose constraints to late changes. Manifest control policy recommendations would be completed in November 1986. Recommendation IX Maintenance Safeguards. A Maintenance Safeguards Team was established to develop a comprehensive plan for defining and imple- menting actions to comply with the commission recommendations con- cerning maintenance activities. The team was preparing a Maintenance Plan to ensure that uniform maintenance requirements were imposed on all elements of the Space Shuttle program. The plan would also define organizational responsibilities, reporting, and control requirements for Space Shuttle maintenance activities. The Maintenance Plan would be completed by September 30, 1986. In addition to the actions described above, a Space Shuttle Design Requirements Review Team headed by the Space Shuttle Systems Integration Office at the Johnson Space Center was reviewing all Shuttle design requirements and associated technical verification. The team focused on each Shuttle project element and on total Space Shuttle sys- tem design requirements. This activity was to culminate in a Space Shuttle Incremental Design Certification Review approximately three months before the next Space Shuttle launch. Because of the number, complexity, and interrelationships among the many activities leading to the next flight, the Space Shuttle program man- ager at the Johnson Space Center initiated a series of formal Program Management Reviews for the Space Shuttle program. These reviews were to be regular face-to-face discussions among the managers of all major Space Shuttle program activities. Each meeting would focus on progress, schedules, and actions associated with each of the major program review activities and would be tailored directly to current program activity for the time period involved. The first of these meetings was held at the Marshall Space Flight Center on May 5-6, 1986, with the second at the Kennedy Space Center on June 25, 1986. Follow-on reviews will occur approxi- mately every six weeks. Results of these reviews will be reported to the associate administrator for spaceflight and to the NASA administrator. On June 19, 1986, the NASA administrator announced the termina- tion of the development of the Centaur upper stage for use aboard the Space Shuttle. NASA had planned to use the Centaur upper stage for NASA planetary spacecraft launches as well as for certain national secu- rity satellite launches. Major safety reviews of the Centaur system were under way at the time of the Challenger accident, and these reviews were intensified to determine whether the program should be continued. NASA decided to terminate because, even with certain modifications identified 218 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK by the ongoing reviews, the resultant stage would not meet safety criteria being applied to other cargo or elements of the Space Shuttle system. Revised Manifest On October 3, 1986, NASA Administrator James C. Fletcher announced NASA's plan to resume Space Shuttle flights on February 18, 1988. He also announced a revised manifest for the thirty-nine months following the resumption of Shuttle flights (Table 3^19). (The manifest was revised several times prior to the resumption of Shuttle flights. Most flights did not launch on the dates listed here.) Fletcher stated that the manifest was based on a reduced flight rate goal that was "acceptable and prudent" and that complied with presiden- tial policy that limited use of the Shuttle for commercial and foreign pay- loads to those that were Shuttle-unique or those with national security or foreign policy implications. Prior to the Challenger accident, roughly one- third of the Shuttle manifest was devoted to DOD missions, another third to scientific missions, and the remainder to commercial satellites and for- eign government missions. Fletcher said that for the seven-year period fol- lowing resumption of Shuttle flights (through 1994), NASA would use 40 percent of the Shuttle's capability for DOD needs, 47 percent for NASA needs, and 12 percent to accommodate commercial, foreign government, and U.S. government civil space requirements. This reflected the priorities for payload assignments with national security at the top, STS operational capability (TDRS) and dedicated science payloads next, and other science and foreign and commercial needs last. He stated that at the beginning of this seven-year period, DOD would use considerable Shuttle capability to reduce its payload backlog, but for the remaining years, DOD's use would even out at approximately one-third of Shuttle capability. Fletcher stated that the revised manifest placed a high priority on major NASA science payloads. The Hubble Space Telescope, Ulysses, and Galileo, which had been scheduled for a 1986 launch, would be launched "as expeditiously as possible." 21 Implementing the Commission 's Recommendations Approximately one year after NASA addressed how it would imple- ment the recommendations of the Presidential Commission, NASA issued a report to the president that described the actions taken by NASA in response to the commission's recommendations on how to return to safe, reliable spaceflight. 22 This report and the accompanying milestone 21 Statement by Dr. James C. Fletcher, Press Briefing, NASA Headquarters, October 3, 1986. 22 Report to the President: Implementation of the Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1987). sivut: transit )RTATI( >n/i ium an spac i ;i i u ;i it 2I ( ) chart (Figure 3 -25) showed the significant progress NASA made in meet ing its implementation milestones. The recovery activity, as described in the report, focused on three key aspects: the technical engineering changes being selected and implemented; the new procedures, sale guards, and internal communication processes that had been or were being put in place; and the changes in personnel, organizations, and atti- tudes that occurred. Responding to the commission's findings as to the cause of the acci- dent, NASA changed the design of the solid rocket motor. The new design eliminated the weakness that had led to the accident and incorporated of a number of improvements. The new rocket motors were to be tested in a series of full-scale firings before the next Shuttle flight. In addition, NASA reviewed every element of the Shuttle system and added improved hardware and software to enhance safety. Improved or modified items or systems included the landing system, the main liquid-fueled engines, and the flight and ground systems. NASA implemented new procedures to provide independent SRM&QA functions. A completely new organization, the SRM&QA office, which reported directly to the NASA administrator, now provided independent oversight of all critical flight safety matters. The new office worked directly with the responsible program organization to solve tech- nical problems while still retaining its separate identity as final arbiter of safety and related matters. NASA completed personnel and organizational changes that had begun immediately after the accident. A new, streamlined management team was put in place at NASA Headquarters, with new people well down within the field centers. Special attention was given to the critical issues of management isolation and the tendency toward technical complacency, which, combined with schedule pressure, led to an erosion in flight safety. This awareness of the risk of spaceflight operations, along with NASA's responsibility to control and contain that risk without claiming its elimi- nation, became the controlling philosophy the Space Shuttle program. The report addressed the nine recommendations made by the Presidential Commission and other related concerns. Recommendation I The commission recommended that the design of the solid rocket motor be changed, that the testing of the new design reflect the opera- tional environment, and that the National Research Council (NRC) form a committee to provide technical oversight of the redesign effort. NASA thoroughly evaluated the solid rocket motor design. As well as the solid rocket motor field joint, this evaluation resulted in design changes to many components of the motor. The field joint was redesigned to provide high confidence in its ability to seal under all operating condi- tions (Figure 3-26). In addition, the redesign included a new tang capture latch that controlled movement between the tang and clevis in the joint, a third O-ring seal, insulation design improvements, and an external heater 220 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK 01 & 1! IE H 5 e So in Us a II it» a E E if in « < SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 221 O ring material size and groove changed Filled insulation gap Zinc chromate putty Third O-ring added Interference fit capture latch added Original design New design Figure 3-26. Field Joint Redesign with integral weather seals. The nozzle-to-case joint, the case parts, insu- lation, and seals were redesigned to preclude seal leakage observed in prior flights. The nozzle metal parts, ablative components, and seals were redesigned to improve redundancy and to provide pressure verification of seals. Other nozzle modifications included improvements to the inlet, cowl/boot, and aft exit assemblies. Modifications were incorporated into the igniter case chamber and into the factory joints to improve their margins of safety. The igniter case chamber wall thickness was being increased. Additional internal insula- tion and an external weather seal were added to the factory joint. Ground support equipment was redesigned to minimize case distortion during storage and handling, to improve case measurement and rounding tech- niques for assembly, and to improve leak testing capabilities. Component laboratory tests, combined with subscale simulation tests and full-scale tests, were being conducted to meet verification require- ments. Several small-scale and full-scale joint tests were successfully completed, confirming insulation designs and joint deflection analyses. One engineering test, two developmental tests, and three qualification full-scale motor test firings were to be completed before STS-26. The engineering test motor was fired on May 27, 1987, and early analysis of the data indicated that the test met its objectives. NASA selected the horizontal attitude as the optimum position for static firing, and a second test stand, which could introduce dynamic loads at the external tank/solid rocket motor aft attach struts, was con- structed. Improved nondestructive evaluation techniques were being developed, in conjunction with the Air Force, to perform ultrasonic inspection and mechanical testing of propellant and insulation bonding 222 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK surfaces. Complete x-ray testing of all segments were reinstated for near- term flights. Contingency planning included development of alternate designs, which did not utilize existing hardware, for the field and nozzle-to-case joints and for the rocket motor nozzle. An NRC Solid Rocket Motor Independent Oversight Panel, chaired by Dr. H. Guyford Stever, was actively reviewing the solid rocket motor design, verification analyses, and test planning and was participating in the major program reviews, including the preliminary requirements and the preliminary design reviews. A separate technical advisory group, consisting of twelve senior engineers from NASA and the aerospace industry and a separate group of representatives from four major solid motor manufacturers, worked directly with the solid rocket motor design team to review the redesign status and provide suggestions and recommendations to NASA and Morton Thiokol. The solid rocket motor manufacturers — Aerojet Strategic Propulsion Company, Atlantic Research Corporation, Hercules Inc., and United Technologies Corporation (Chemical Systems Division) — were review- ing and commenting on the present design approach and proposing alter- nate approaches that they felt would enhance the design. As a result of these and other studies, NASA initiated a definition study for a new advanced solid rocket motor. Additional details of the redesigned solid rocket motor can be found in Chapter 2 as part of the discussion of the Shuttle's propulsion system. Recommendations II and V The commission recommended [II] that the Space Shuttle Program management structure be reviewed, that astronauts be encouraged to make the transition into management positions, and that a flight safety panel be established. The commission recommended [V] that the tenden- cy for management isolation be eliminated, that a policy on launch con- straints be developed, and that critical launch readiness reviews be recorded. In March 1986, Associate Administrator for Space Flight Rear Admiral Richard Truly initiated a review of the Shuttle program manage- ment structure and communications. After the commission report was issued, he assigned Captain Robert L. Crippen responsibility for devel- oping the response to commission recommendations II and V. This effort resulted in the establishment of a director, NSTS, reporting directly to the associate administrator for spaceflight, and other changes necessary to strengthen the Shuttle program management structure and improve lines of authority and communication (see Figure 3-1) at the beginning of this chapter. The NSTS funding process was revised, and the director, NSTS, now was given control over program funding at the centers. Additionally, the flight readiness review and mission management team processes were strengthened. The director of flight crew operations would participate in both of these activities, and the flight crew comman- SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 223 dcr, or a representative, would attend the Plight readiness review. These meetings would be recorded and formal minutes published. Since the accident, several current and former astronauts were assigned to top management positions. These included: the associate administrator for spaceflight; the associate administrator for external affairs; the acting assistant administrator, office of exploration; chief, Headquarters operational safety branch; the deputy director, NSTS oper- ations; the Johnson Space Center deputy center director; the chairman of the Space Flight Safety Panel; and the former chief of the astronaut office as special assistant to the Johnson director for engineering, operations, and safety. A Space Flight Safety Panel, chaired by astronaut Bryan O'Connor, was established. The panel reported to the associate administrator for SRM&QA. The panel's charter was to promote flight safety for all NASA spaceflight programs involving flight crews, including the Space Shuttle and Space Station programs. Recommendation III The Commission recommended that the critical items and hazard analyses be reviewed to identify items requiring improvement prior to flight to ensure safety and that the NRC verify the adequacy of this effort. The NSTS uses failure modes and effects analyses, critical item lists, and hazard analyses as techniques to identify the potential for failure of critical flight hardware, to determine the effect of the failure on the crew, vehicle, or mission, and to ensure that the criticality of the item is reflect- ed in the program documentation. Several reviews were initiated by pro- gram management in March 1986 to reevaluate failure analyses of critical hardware items and hazards. These reviews provided improved analyses and identified hardware designs requiring improvement prior to flight to ensure mission success and enhance flight safety. A review of critical items, failure modes and effects analyses, and haz- ard analyses for all Space Shuttle systems was under way. NASA devel- oped detailed instructions for the preparation of these items to ensure that common ground rules were applied to each project element analysis. Each NASA element project office and its prime contractor, as well as the astro- naut office and mission operations directorate, were reviewing their sys- tems to identify any areas in which the design did not meet program requirements, to verify the assigned criticality of items, to identify new items, and to update the documentation. An independent contractor was conducting a parallel review for each element. Upon completion of this effort, each element would submit those items with failure modes that could not meet full design objectives to the Program Requirements Control Board, chaired by the director, NSTS. The board would review the documentation, concur with the proposed rationale for safely accepting the item, and issue a waiver to the design requirement, if appropriate. The NRC Committee on Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit, chaired by retired U.S. Air Force General Alton Slay, was 224 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK responsible for verifying the adequacy of the proposed actions for return- ing the Space Shuttle to flight status. In its interim report of January 13, 1987, the committee expressed concern that critical items were not ade- quately prioritized to highlight items that may be most significant. NASA was implementing a critical items prioritization system for the Shuttle program to alleviate the committee's concerns. Recommendation IV The commission recommended that NASA establish an Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance, reporting to the NASA admin- istrator, with responsibility for related functions in all NASA activities and programs. The NASA administrator established a new NASA Headquarters orga- nization, the Office of Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA), and appointed George Rodney as associate administrator. The Operational Safety Branch of that office was headed by astronaut Frederick Gregory. The new organization centralized agency policy in its areas of responsibility, provided for NASA-wide standards and procedures, and established an independent reporting line to top man- agement for critical problem identification and analysis. The new office exercised functional management responsibility and authority over the related organizations at all NASA field centers and major contractors. The new organization was participating in specific NSTS activities, such as the hardware redesign, failure modes and effects analysis, critical item identification, hazard analysis, risk assessment, and spaceflight sys- tem assurance. This approach allowed the NSTS program line manage- ment at Headquarters and in the field to benefit from the professional safety contributions of an independent office without interrupting the two different reporting lines to top management. Additional safeguards were added by both the line project management and the SRM&QA organiza- tion to ensure free, open, rapid communication upward and downward within all agency activities responsible for flight safety. Such robust mul- tiple communications pathways were expected to eliminate the possibili- ty of serious issues not rising to the attention of senior management. Recommendation VI The commission recommended that NASA take action to improve landing system safety margin and to determine the criteria under which planned landings at Kennedy would be acceptable. Several orbiter landing system modifications to improve landing sys- tem safety margins would be incorporated for the first flight. These included a tire pressure monitoring system, a thick-stator beryllium brake to increase brake energy margin, a change to the flow rates in the brake hydraulic system, a stiffer main gear axle, and a balanced brake pressure application feature that would decrease brake wear upon landing and pro- vide additional safety margin. SPACirikANSl'Okl/VIION/IIUMAN SPACN I. Kill I 225 Several other changes were being evaluated to support longer term upgrading of the landing system. A new structural carbon brake, with increased energy eapaeity, was approved and would he available in 1989. A fail-Operational/fail-safe nose wheel steering design, including redun- dant nose wheel hydraulics capability, was being reviewed by the orbiter project office for later implementation. The initial Shuttle flights were scheduled to land at the Edwards Air Force Base complex. A total understanding of landing performance data, the successful resolution of significant landing system anomalies, and increased confidence in weather prediction capabilities were preconditions to resuming planned end-of-mission landings at the Kennedy Space Center. Recommendation VII The commission recommended that NASA make every effort to increase the capability for an emergency runway landing following the loss of two or three engines during early ascent and to provide a crew escape system for use during controlled gliding flight. Launch and launch abort mode definition, flight and ground proce- dures, range safety, weather, flight and ground software, flight rules, and launch commit criteria were reviewed. Changes resulting from this review were being incorporated into the appropriate documentation, including ground operating procedures, and the on-board flight data file. NASA reviewed abort trajectories, vehicle performance, weather require- ments, abort site locations, support software, ground and on-board proce- dures, and abort decision criteria to ensure that the requirements provided for maximum crew safety in the event an abort was required. The review resulted in three actions: the landing field at Ben Guerir, Morocco, was selected as an additional transatlantic abort landing site; ground rules for managing nominal and abort performance were established and the ascent data base was validated and documented; and a permanent Launch Abort Panel was established to coordinate all operational and engineering aspects of ascent-phase contingencies. Representatives from NASA and the Air Force were reviewing the external tank range safety system. This review readdressed the issue of whether the range safety system is required to ensure propellant dispersal capability in the event of an abort during the critical first minutes of flight. The results of this analysis would be available in early 1988. Flight rules (which define the response to specific vehicle anomalies that might occur during flight) were being reviewed and updated. The Flight Rules Document was being reformatted to include both the techni- cal and operational rationales for each rule. Launch commit criteria (which define responses to specific vehicle and ground support system anomalies that might occur during launch countdown) were being reviewed and updated. These criteria were being modified to include the technical and operational rationale and to document any procedural workarounds that would allow the countdown to proceed in the event one of the criteria was violated. 226 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Although a final decision to implement a Space Shuttle crew escape capability was not made, the requirements for a system to provide crew egress during controlled gliding flight were established. The requirements for safe egress of up to eight crew members were determined through a review of escape routes, time lines, escape scenarios, and proposed orbiter modifications. The options for crew egress involved manual and powered extraction techniques. Design activities and wind tunnel assess- ments for each were initiated. The manual egress design would ensure that the crew member did not contact the vehicle immediately after exit- ing the crew module. Several approaches being assessed for reducing potential contact included a deployable side hatch tunnel that provided sufficient initial velocity to prevent crew/vehicle contact and an extend- able rod and/or rope that placed the crew release point in a region of safe exit (Figure 3-27). Both approaches provided for crew egress through the orbiter side hatch. The director, NSTS, authorized the development of a rocket-powered extraction capability for use in a crew egress/escape system. Crew escape would be initiated during controlled gliding flight at an altitude of 6,096 meters and a velocity of 321.8 kilometers per hour. The system con- sisted of a jettisonable crew hatch (which has been approved for installa- tion and also applied to the manual bail-out mode) and individual rockets to extract the crew from the vehicle before it reached an altitude of 3,048 meters. Ground egress procedures and support systems were being reviewed to determine their capability to ensure safe emergency evacuation from the orbiter at the pad or following a non-nominal landing. An egress slide, Figure 3-27. Extendible Rod Escape System (In this system, the crew module hatch would be jettisoned and the rod would be extended through the hatch opening. The crew member would attach a lanyard to the rod, exit the vehicle in a tucked position, release at the end of the rod, and para- chute to a ground or water landing.) SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 227 similar to that used oil commercial aircraft, was being designed for use should an emergency escape be required alter a runway landing. A study was initiated to evaluate future eseape systems that would potentially expand the crew survival potential to include first-stage (solid rocket boosters thrusting) flight. Recommendation VIII The commission recommended that the nation not rely on a single launch vehicle capability for the future and that NASA establish a flight rate that is consistent with its resources. Several major actions reduced the overall requirements for NSTS launches and provided for a mixed fleet of expendable launch vehicles and the Space Shuttle to ensure that the nation did not rely on a single launch vehicle for access to space. NASA and DOD worked together to identify DOD payloads for launch on expendable launch vehicles and to replan the overall launch strategy to reflect their launches on expendable launch vehicles. The presidential decision to limit the use of the NSTS for the launch of communications satellites to those with national security or foreign policy implications resulted in many commercial communica- tions satellites, previously scheduled for launch on the NSTS, being reas- signed to commercial expendable launch vehicles. In March 1986, Admiral Truly directed that a "bottoms-up" Shuttle flight rate capability assessment be conducted. NASA established a flight rate capability working group with representatives from each Shuttle pro- gram element that affects flight rate. The working group developed ground rules to ensure that projected flight rates were realistic. These ground rules addressed such items as overall staffing of the work force, work shifts, overtime, crew training, and maintenance requirements for the orbiter, main engine, solid rocket motor, and other critical systems. The group identified enhancements required in the Shuttle mission simu- lator, the Orbiter Processing Facility, the Mission Control Center, and other areas, such as training aircraft and provisioning of spares. With these enhancements and the replacement orbiter, NASA projected a max- imum flight rate capability of fourteen per year with four orbiters. This capacity, considering lead time constraints, "learning curves," and budget limitations, could be achieved no earlier than 1994 (Figure 3-28). Controls were implemented to ensure that the Shuttle program ele- ments were protected from pressures resulting from late manifest changes. While the manifest projects the payload assignments several years into the future, missions within eighteen months of launch were placed under the control of a formal change process controlled by the director, NSTS. Any manifest change not consistent with the defined capabilities of the Shuttle system would result in the rescheduling of the payload to another mission. 228 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Fourth Orbiter 16- Flight Availability (5 o > Q- £5 o» 8- LL 1988 1992 1996 Figure 3-28. Availability of Fourth Orbiter (With a fourth orbiter available, fourteen flights per year would be possible in 1994.) Recommendation IX The commission recommended that NASA develop and execute a maintenance inspection plan, perform structural inspections when sched- uled, and restore the maintenance and spare parts program. NASA updated the overall maintenance and flight readiness philoso- phy of the NSTS program to ensure that it was a rigorous and prominent part of the safety-of-flight process. A System Integrity Assurance Program was developed that encompassed the overall maintenance strat- egy, procedures, and test requirements for each element of flight hard- ware and software to ensure that each item was properly maintained and tested and was ready for launch. Figure 3-29 reflects the major capabili- ties of the System Integrity Assurance Program. NASA alleviated the requirement for the routine removal of parts from one vehicle to supply another by expanding and accelerating vari- ous aspects of the NSTS logistics program. Procedures were being insti- tuted to ensure that a sufficient rationale supported any future requirement for such removal of parts and that a decision to remove them underwent a formal review and approval process. A vehicle checkout philosophy was defined that ensured that systems remain within performance limits and that their design redundancy fea- tures functioned properly before each launch. Requirements were estab- lished for identifying critical hardware items in the Operational Maintenance Requirements Specification Document (defines the work to be performed on the vehicle during each turnaround flow) and the Operations and Maintenance Instruction (lists procedures used in per- forming the work). SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACII LKilll 229 Configuration and Maintenance Requirements Flight Operations Closed- Loop Accounting Design Life Validation Requirements Configuration and Maintenance Implementation LogiatlcB Requirements SRM & QA Roquiroments Spares and Provisions Flight Operations h Data Collection and Analysis Hardware/Software Problem Resolution Training and Certification Roqulrcmonu Program Compliance Assurance and Status System Requirements Accounting Status 1 Risk Decision Status • Hazard Analysis ■ Integrated Problem Assessment Trend Analysis Critical Item Status and History FMEA/CIL Data zcr Management Reports Figure 3-29. System Integrity Assurance Program (This program established the functional responsibilities and program requirements necessary to provide the proper configuration, operations, inspection, maintenance, logistics, and certified personnel to ensure that the NSTS was ready for flight.) Related Return-to -Flight Actions At the time of the Rogers Commission report, NASA was engaged in several tasks in support of the return-to-flight activities that were not directly related to commission recommendations: A new launch target date and flight crew for the first flight were iden- tified. The program requirements for flight and ground system hardware and software were being updated to provide a clear definition of the cri- teria that the project element designs must satisfy. The NSTS system designs were reviewed, and items requiring modi- fication prior to flight were identified. Existing and modified hardware and software designs were being verified to ensure that they complied with the design requirements. The program and project documents, which implemented the rede- fined program requirements, were being reviewed and updated. 230 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK • Major testing, training, and launch preparation activities were contin- uing or were planned. Orbiter Operational Improvements and Modifications. The NSTS program initiated the System Design Review process to ensure the review of all hardware and software systems and to identify items requiring redesign, analysis, or test prior to flight. The review included a complete description of the system issue, its potential consequences, recommend- ed correction action, and alternatives. The orbiter System Design Review identified approximately sixty Category 1 system or component changes out of a total of 226 identified changes. 23 (Category 1 changes are those required prior to the next flight because the current design may not con- tain a sufficient safety margin.) Figure 3-30 illustrates the major improvements or modifications made to the orbiter. Space Shuttle Main Engine. Improvements made to the Shuttle's main engines are addressed in Chapter 2 as part of the discussion of the Shuttle's propulsion system. Orbital Maneuvering System/Reaction Control System AC-Motor- Operated Valves. 24 The sixty-four valves operated by AC motors in the OMS and RCS were modified to incorporate a "sniff line for each valve to permit the monitoring of nitrogen tetroxide or monomethyl hydrazine in the electrical portion of the valves during ground operations. This new line reduced the probability of floating particles in the electrical micros witch portion of each valve, which could affect the operation of the Orbital Maneuvering System • AC Motor Valve Bellows Modified - Thermal Protection System • Reinforced — Mid Fuselage • Thermal Modified Rudder/Speed Brake ■ Power Drive Unit Improved Body Flap • Power Drive Unit Improved Auxiliar Power Units • Electrical Interlocks • Isolation Valve Instrumentation Added Main Propulsion System • 17-Inch Disconnect Latch Modified Figure 3-30. Major Orbiter Modifications * Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1988 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989) p. 24. 24 The information regarding additional changes presented from this point onward came from the NSTS Shuttle Reference Manual (1988), on-line from the Kennedy Space Center Home Page. NI'ACh; TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 231 microswitch position indicators for on-board displays and telemetry. It also reduces the probability of nitrogen tetroxicle or monomethyl hydrazine leakage into the bellows of each AC-motor-operated valve. Primary RCS Modifications. The wiring of the fuel and oxidizer injector solenoid valves was wrapped around eaeh of the thirty-eight pri- mary RCS thrust chambers to remove electrical power from these valves in the event of a primary RCS thruster instability. Fuel Cell Modifications. Modifieations to the fuel eell ineluded the deletion of end-cell heaters on each fuel cell power plant because of poten- tial electrical failures and replacement with Freon coolant loop passages to maintain uniform temperature throughout the power plants; the improve- ment of the hydrogen pump and water separator of each fuel cell power plant to minimize excessive hydrogen gas entrained in the power plant product water; the addition of a current measurement detector to monitor the hydrogen pump of each fuel cell power plant and provide an early indi- cation of hydrogen pump overload; the modification of the starting and sustaining heater system for each fuel cell power plant to prevent over- heating and the loss of heater elements; and the addition of a stack inlet temperature measurement to each fuel cell power plant for full visibility of thermal conditions. Other improvements included the modification of the product water lines from all three fuel cell power plants to incorporate a parallel (redundant) path of product water to the Environmental Control and Life Support System's potable water tank B in the event of a freeze- up in the single water relief panel and the addition of a water purity sen- sor (pH) at the common product water outlet of the water relief panel to provide a redundant measurement of water purity. Auxiliary Power Unit Modifications. The auxiliary power units that were used to date had a limited life. Each unit was refurbished after twen- ty-five hours of operation because of cracks in the turbine housing, degra- dation of the gas generator catalyst (which varied up to approximately thirty hours of operation), and operation of the gas generator valve mod- ule (which also varied up to approximately thirty hours of operation). The remaining parts of the auxiliary power unit were qualified for forty hours of operation. Improved auxiliary power units were scheduled for delivery in late 1988. A new turbine housing would increase the life of the housing to seventy-five hours of operation (fifty missions); a new gas generator increased its life to seventy-five hours; a new standoff design of the gas generator valve module and fuel pump deleted the requirement for a water spray system that was required previously for each auxiliary power unit upon shutdown after the first OMS thrusting period or orbital check- out; and the addition of a third seal in the middle of the two existing seals for the shaft of the fuel pump/lube oil system (previously only two seals were located on the shaft, one on the fuel pump side and one on the gear- box lube oil side) reduced the probability of hydrazine leaking into the lube oil system. The deletion of the water spray system for the gas gen- erator valve module and fuel pump for each auxiliary power unit resulted 232 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK in a weight reduction of approximately sixty-eight kilograms for each orbiter. Upon the delivery of the improved units, the life-limited auxiliary power units would be refurbished to the upgraded design. Main Landing Gear. The following modifications were made to improve the performance of the main landing gear elements: 1 . An increase in the thickness of the main landing gear axle to provide a stiffer configuration that reduces brake-to-axle deflections, pre- cludes brake damage experienced in previous landings, and mini- mizes tire wear 2. The addition of orifices to hydraulic passages in the brake's piston housing to prevent pressure surges and brake damage caused by a wobble/pump effect 3. The modification of the electronic brake control boxes to balance hydraulic pressure between adjacent brakes and equalize energy applications, with the removal of the anti-skid circuitry previously used to reduce brake pressure to the opposite wheel if a flat tire was detected 4. The replacement of the carbon-lined beryllium stator discs in each main landing gear brake with thicker discs to increase braking ener- gy significantly 5. A long-term structural carbon brake program to replace the carbon- lined beryllium stator discs with a carbon configuration that provides higher braking capacity by increasing maximum energy absorption 6. The addition of strain gauges to each nose and main landing gear wheel to monitor tire pressure before launch, deorbit, and landing 7. Other studies involving arresting barriers at the end of landing site runways (except lake bed runways), the installation of a skid on the landing gear that could preclude the potential for a second blown tire on the same gear after the first tire has blown, the provision of "roll on rim" for a predictable roll if both tires are lost on a single or mul- tiple gear, and the addition of a drag chute Studies of landing gear tire improvements were conducted to deter- mine how best to decrease tire wear observed after previous Kennedy Space Center landings and how to improve crosswind landing capability. Modifications were made to the Kennedy Space Center's Shuttle landing facility runway. The primary purpose of the modifications was to enhance safety by reducing tire wear during landing. Nose Wheel Steering Modifications. The nose wheel steering system was modified on Columbia (OV-102) for the 61-C mission, and Discovery (OV-103) and Atlantis (OV-104) were being similarly modi- fied before their return to flight. The modification allowed for a safe high- speed engagement of the nose wheel steering system and provided positive lateral directional control of the orbiter during rollout in the pres- ence of high crosswinds and blown tires. SPACP TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACPI U( ill I Thermal Protection System Modifications. The area all ol the rem forced carbon-carbon nose cap to the nose landing gear doors were dam aged (tile slumping) during flight operations from impact during aseent and overheating during reentry. This area, which previously was eovered with high-temperature reusable surface insulation tiles, would now be covered with reinforced carbon-carbon. The low-temperature thermal protection system tiles on Columbia's mid-body, payload bay doors, and vertical tail were replaced with advanced flexible reusable surface insu- lation blankets. Because of evidence of plasma flow on the lower wing trailing edge and elevon landing edge tiles (wing/elevon cove) at the out- board elevon tip and inboard elevon, the low-temperature tiles were being replaced with fibrous refractory composite insulation and high-tempera- ture tiles along with gap fillers on Discovery and Atlantis. On Columbia, only gap fillers were installed in this area. Wing Modification. Before the wings for Discovery and Atlantis were manufactured, NASA instituted a weight reduction program that resulted in a redesign of certain areas of the wing structure. An assess- ment of wing air loads from actual flight data indicated greater loads on the wing structure than predicted. To maintain positive margins of safety during ascent, structural modifications were made. Mid-Fuselage Modifications. Because of additional detailed analysis of actual flight data concerning descent-stress thermal-gradient loads, tor- sional straps were added to tie all the lower mid-fuselage stringers in bays 1 through 1 1 together in a manner similar to a box section. This eliminat- ed rotational (torsional) capabilities to provide positive margins of safety. Also, because of the detailed analysis of actual descent flight data, room- temperature vulcanizing silicone rubber material was bonded to the lower mid-fuselage from bays 4 through 11 to act as a heat sink, distributing temperatures evenly across the bottom of the mid-fuselage, reducing ther- mal gradients, and ensuring positive margins of safety. General Purpose Computers. NASA was to replace the existing gen- eral purpose computers aboard the Space Shuttle orbiters with new upgraded general purpose computers in late 1988 or early 1989. The upgraded computers allowed NASA to incorporate more capabilities into the orbiters and apply advanced computer technologies that were not available when the orbiter was first designed. The upgraded general pur- pose computers would provide two and a half times the existing memory capacity and up to three times the existing processor speed, with mini- mum impact on flight software. They would be half the size, weigh approximately half as much, and require less power to operate. Inertial Measurement Unit Modifications. The new high-accuracy inertial navigation system were to be phased in to augment the KT-70 inertial measurement units in 1988-89. These new inertial measurement units would result in lower program costs over the next decade, ongoing production support, improved performance, lower failure rates, and reduced size and weight. The HAINS inertial measurement units also would contain an internal dedicated microprocessor with memory for 234 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK processing and storing compensation and scale factor data from the ven- dor's calibration, thereby reducing the need for extensive initial load data for the orbiter's computers. Crew Escape System. Hardware changes were made to the orbiter and to the software system to accommodate the crew escape system addressed in Recommendation VII. Seventeen-Inch Orbiter /External Tank Disconnects. Each mated pair of seventeen-inch disconnects contained two flapper valves: one on the orbiter side and one on the external tank side. Both valves in each dis- connect pair were opened to permit propellant flow between the orbiter and the external tank. Prior to separation from the external tank, both valves in each mated pair of disconnects were commanded closed by pneumatic (helium) pressure from the main propulsion system. The clo- sure of both valves in each disconnect pair prevented propellant discharge from the external tank or orbiter at external tank separation. Valve closure on the orbiter side of each disconnect also prevented contamination of the orbiter main propulsion system during landing and ground operations. Inadvertent closure of either valve in a seventeen-inch disconnect during main engine thrusting would stop propellant flow from the exter- nal tank to all three main engines. Catastrophic failure of the main engines and external tank feed lines would result. To prevent the inad- vertent closure of the seventeen-inch disconnect valves during the Space Shuttle main engine thrusting period, a latch mechanism was added in each orbiter half of the disconnect. The latch mechanism provided a mechanical backup to the normal fluid-induced-open forces. The latch was mounted on a shaft in the flow stream so that it overlapped both flap- pers and obstructed closure for any reason. In preparation for external tank separation, both valves in each seven- teen-inch disconnect were commanded closed. Pneumatic pressure from the main propulsion system caused the latch actuator to rotate the shaft in each orbiter seventeen-inch disconnect ninety degrees, thus freeing the flapper valves to close as required for external tank separation. A backup mechanical separation capability was provided in case a latch pneumatic actuator malfunctioned. When the orbiter umbilical initially moved away from the external tank umbilical, the mechanical latch disengaged from the external tank flapper valve and permitted the orbiter disconnect flap- per to toggle the latch. This action permitted both flappers to close. Changes made to the Space Shuttle main engines as part of the Margin Improvement Program and solid rocket motor redesign were addressed in Chapter 2 as part of the discussion of launch systems. Return to Flight Preparation for STS-26 NASA selected Discovery as the Space Shuttle for the STS-26 mis- sion in 1986. At the time of the STS 51-L accident, Discovery was in tern- SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 235 in the Kennedy Space Center' porary Storage in cne Kennedy space I enter S Vehicle Assembly Building, awaiting transfer to the Orbiter Processing Facility for prcpara lion for the first Shuttle flight from Vandcnberg Air Force Base, California, scheduled for later that year. Discovery last flew in August L985 on STS 51-1, the orbiter's sixth flight since it joined the fleet in November 1983. In January 1986, Atlantis was in the Orbiter Processing Facility, pre- pared for the Galileo mission and ready to be mated to the boosters and tank in the Vehicle Assembly Building. Columbia had just completed the STS 61-C mission a few weeks prior to the Challenger accident and was also in the Orbiter Processing Facility undergoing postflight deconfiguration. NASA was considering various Shuttle manifest options, and it was determined that Atlantis would be rolled out to Launch Pad 39-B for fit checks of new weather protection modifications and for an emergency egress exercise and a countdown demonstration test. During that year, NASA also decided that Columbia would be flown to Vandenberg for fit checks. Discovery was then selected for the STS-26 mission. Discovery was moved from the Vehicle Assembly Building High Bay 2, where it was in temporary storage, into the Orbiter Processing Facility the last week of June 1986. Power-up modifications were active on the orbiter's systems until mid-September 1986, when Discovery was transferred to the Vehicle Assembly Building while technicians per- formed facility modifications in Bay 1 of Orbiter Processing Facility. Discovery was moved back into the Orbiter Processing Facility's Bay 1 on October 30, 1987, a milestone that initiated an extensive modi- fication and processing flow to ready the vehicle for flight. The hiatus in launching offered an opportunity to "tune up" and fully check out all of the orbiter's systems and treat the orbiter as if it was a new vehicle. Technicians removed most of the orbiter's major systems and components and sent them to the respective vendors for modifications or rebuilding. After an extensive powered-down period of six months, which began in February 1987, Discovery's systems were awakened when power surged through its electrical systems on August 3, 1987. Discovery remained in the Orbiter Processing Facility while workers implemented more than 200 modifications and outfitted the payload bay for the TDRS. Flight processing began in mid-September with the reinstallation and checkout of the major components of the vehicle, including the main engines, the right- and lefthand OMS pods, and the forward RCS. In January 1988, Discovery's three main engines arrived at the Kennedy Space Center and were installed. Engine 2019 arrived on January 6, 1988, and was installed in the number one position on January 10. Engine 2022 arrived on January 15 and was installed in the number two position on January 24. Engine 2028 arrived on January 21 and was installed in the number three position also on January 24. The redesigned solid rocket motor segments began arriving at Kennedy on March 1, and the first segment, the left aft booster, was stacked on Mobile Launcher 2 in the Vehicle Assembly Building's High 236 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Bay 3 on March 29. Technicians started with the left aft booster and con- tinued stacking the four lefthand segments before beginning the righthand segments on May 5. They attached the forward assemblies/nose cones on May 27 and 28. The solid rocket boosters' field joints were closed out prior to mating the external tank to the boosters on June 10. An interface test between the boosters and tank was conducted a few days later to ver- ify the connections. The OASIS payload was installed in Discovery's payload bay on April 19. TDRS arrived at the Orbiter Processing Facility on May 16, and its inertial upper stage arrived on May 24. The TDRS/inertial upper stage mechanical mating took place on May 3 1 . Discovery was moved from the Orbiter Processing Facility to the Vehicle Assembly Building on June 21, where it was mated to the external tank and solid rocket boosters. A Shuttle interface test conducted shortly after the mate checked out the mechanical and electrical connections among the various elements of the Shuttle vehicle and the function of the on-board flight systems. The assembled Space Shuttle vehicle aboard its mobile launcher plat- form was rolled out of the Vehicle Assembly Building on July 4. It trav- eled just over four miles to Launch Pad 39-B for a few major tests and final launch preparations. A few days after Discovery's OMS system pods were loaded with hypergolic propellants, a tiny leak was detected in the left pod (June 14). Through the use of a small, snake-like, fiber optics television camera, called a Cobra borescope, workers pinpointed the leak to a dynatube fit- ting in the vent line for the RCS nitrogen tetroxide storage tank, located in the top of the OMS pod. The tiny leak was stabilized and controlled by "pulse-purging" the tank with helium — an inert gas. Pulse-purge is an automated method of maintaining a certain amount of helium in the tank. In addition, console operators in the Launch Control Center firing room monitored the tank for any change that may have required immediate attention. It was determined that the leak would not affect the scheduled Wet Countdown Demonstration Test and the Flight Readiness Firing, and repair was delayed until after these tests. The Wet Countdown Demonstration Test, in which the external tank was loaded with liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen, was conducted on August 1. A few problems with ground support equipment resulted in unplanned holds during the course of the countdown. A leak in the hydro- gen umbilical connection at the Shuttle tail service mast developed while liquid hydrogen was being loaded into the external tank. Engineers traced the leak to a pressure monitoring connector. During the Wet Countdown Demonstration Test, the leak developed again. The test was completed with the liquid hydrogen tank partially full, and the special tanking tests were deleted. Seals in the eight-inch fill line in the tail service mast were replaced and leak-checked prior to the Flight Readiness Firing. In addi- tion, the loading pumps in the liquid oxygen storage farm were not func- tioning properly. The pumps and their associated motors were repaired. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 237 After an aborted first attempt, the twenty-two-second Flight Readiness Firing of Discovery' 's main engines took place on August 10. The first Flight Readiness hiring attempt was halted inside the T-ten second mark because oi' a sluggish fuel bleed valve on the number two main engine. Technicians replaced this valve prior to the Might Readiness Firing. This firing verified that the entire Shuttle system, including launch equipment, flight hardware, and the launch team, were ready for flight. With more than 700 pieces of instrumentation installed on the vehicle ele- ments and launch pad, the test provided engineers with valuable data, including characteristics of the redesigned solid rocker boosters. After the test, a team of Rockwell technicians began repairs to the OMS pod leak. They cut four holes into two bulkheads with an air- powered router on August 17 and bolted a metal "clamshell" device around the leaking dynatube fitting. The clamshell was filled with Furmanite — a dark thick material consisting of graphite, silicon, heavy grease, and glass fiber. After performing a successful initial leak check, covers were bolted over the holes on August 19, and the tank was pres- surized to monitor any decay. No leakage or decay in pressure was noted, and the fix was deemed a success. TDRS-C and its inertial upper stage were transferred from the Orbiter Processing Facility to Launch Pad 39-B on August 15. The pay load was installed into Discovery's payload bay on August 29. Then a Countdown Demonstration Test was conducted on September 8. Other launch prepa- rations held prior to launch countdown included final vehicle ordinance activities, such as power-on stray-voltage checks and resistance checks of firing circuits, the loading of the fuel cell storage tanks, the pressurization of the hypergolic propellant tanks aboard the vehicle, final payload close- outs, and a final functional check of the range safety and solid rocket booster ignition, safe, and arm devices. STS-26 Mission Overview The Space Shuttle program returned to flight with the successful launch of Discovery on September 29, 1988. The Shuttle successfully deployed the TDRS, a 2,225-kilogram communications satellite attached to a 14,943 -kilogram rocket. In addition, eleven scheduled scientific and technological experiments were carried out during the flight. The STS-26 crew consisted of only experienced astronauts. Twenty months of preflight training emphasized crew safety. The crew members prepared for every conceivable mishap or malfunction. Among the changes made in the Shuttle orbiter was a crew escape system for use if an engine should malfunction during ascent to orbit or if a controlled landing was risky or impossible. As part of this escape sys- tem, the crew wore newly designed partially pressurized flight suits dur- ing ascent, reentry, and landing. Each suit contained oxygen supplies, a parachute, a raft, and other survival equipment. The new escape system 238 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK would permit astronauts to bail out of the spacecraft in an emergency during certain segments of their ascent toward orbit. To escape, the astro- nauts would blow off a hatch in the spacecraft cabin wall, extend a tele- scoping pole 3.65 meters beyond the spacecraft, and slide along the pole. From the pole, they would parachute to Earth. The improved main engines were test-fired for a total of 100,000 sec- onds, which is equal to their use time in sixty-five Shuttle launches. The solid rocket boosters were tested with fourteen different flaws deliberate- ly etched into critical components. The launch was delayed for one hour and thirty-eight minutes because of unsuitable weather conditions in the upper atmosphere. Winds at altitudes between 9,144 and 12,192 meters were lighter than usual for that time of the year, and launch was prohibited because this condition had not been programmed into the spacecraft's computer. However, after specialists analyzed the situation, they judged that Discovery could with- stand these upper-air conditions. Shuttle managers approved a waiver of the established flight rule and allowed the launch to proceed under the existing light wind conditions. Upon the conclusion of the mission, Discovery began its return to Earth at 11:35 a.m., Eastern Daylight Time, on October 3. Discovery was travel- ing at about twenty-five times the speed of sound over the Indian Ocean when the astronauts fired the deorbit engines and started the hour-long descent. Touchdown was on a dry lake bed at Edwards Air Force Base. Space Station Overview and Background The notion of a space station was not new or revolutionary when, in his State of the Union message of January 25, 1984, President Ronald Reagan directed NASA to develop a permanently occupied space station within the next ten years. Even before the idea of a Space Shuttle had been conceived in the late 1960s, NASA had envisioned a space station as a way to support high-priority science missions. Once the Shuttle's development was under way, a space station was considered as its natur- al complement — a destination for the orbiter and a base for its trip back to Earth. By 1984, NASA had already conducted preliminary planning efforts that sought the best space station concept to satisfy the require- ments of potential users. Reagan's space station directive underscored a national commitment to maintaining U.S. leadership in space. A space station would, NASA claimed, stimulate technology resulting in "spinoffs" that would improve the quality of life, create jobs, and maintain the U.S. skilled industrial base. It would improve the nation's competitive stance at a time when more and more high-technology products were being purchased in other countries. It offered the opportunity to add significantly to knowledge of SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 239 Earth and the universe. The president followed up his directive with a request for $150 million for space station efforts in FY 1985. Congress approved this request and added $5.5 million in earlier year appropua tions to total $155.5 million lor the spaee station in FY 1985. ' From its start, international participation was a major objeetive of the Spaee Station program. Other governments would conduct their own def- inition and preliminary design programs in parallel with NASA and would provide funding. NASA antieipated international station partners who defined missions and used station capabilities, participated in the definition and development activities and who contributed to the station capabilities, and supported the operational activities of the station. Events moved ahead, and on September 14, 1984, NASA issued a request for proposal (RFP) to U.S. industry for the station's preliminary design and definition. The RFP solicited proposals for four separate "work packages" that covered the definition and preliminary design of station elements: 1. Pressurized "common" modules with appropriate systems for use as laboratories, living areas, and logistics transport; environmental con- trol and propulsive systems; plans for equipping one module as a lab- oratory and others as logistics modules; and plans for accommodations for orbital maneuvering and orbital transfer systems 2. The structural framework to which the various elements of the station would be attached; interface between the station and the Space Shuttle; mechanisms such as the RMS and attitude control, thermal control, communications, and data management systems; plans for equipping a module with sleeping quarters, wardroom, and galley; and plans for EVA 3. Automated free-flying platforms and provisions to service and repair the platforms and other free-flying spacecraft; provisions for instru- ments and payloads to be attached externally to the station; and plans for equipping a module for a laboratory 4. Electrical power generation, conducting, and storage systems. 27 Proposals from industry were received in November 1984. Also in 1984, NASA designated the Johnson Space Center as the lead center for the Space Station program. In addition, NASA established seven inter- 25 "Space Station," NASA Information Summaries, December 1986, p. 2. 26 U.S. Congress, Conference Report, June 16, 1984, Chronological History, Fiscal Year 1985 Budget Submission authorized the initial $150 million. The Conference Committee authorized the additional $5 million from fiscal year 1984 appropriations as part of a supplemental appropriations bill, approved August 15, 1985. "Space Station Definition and Preliminary Design, Request for Proposal, September 15, 1984. 240 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK center teams to conduct advanced development activities for high- potential technologies to be used in station design and development, and the agency assigned definition and preliminary design responsibilities to four field centers: the Marshall Space Flight Center, Johnson, the Goddard Space Flight Center, and the Lewis Research Center. The agency also established a Headquarters-based Space Station Program Office to provide overall policy and program direction. Response to proposals for a space station was not uniformly favorable. In particular, the New York Times criticized the usefulness of the project. It called the proposed space station "an expensive yawn in space" (January 29, 1984) and "the ultimate junket" (November 9, 1984). 28 The Times claimed that unoccupied space platforms could accomplish anything that an occupied space platform could. Nevertheless, Reagan remained an enthusiastic proponent of the project, and NASA moved ahead. NASA defined three categories of missions as the basis for space sta- tion design. Science and applications missions included astrophysics, Earth science and applications, solar system exploration, life sciences, materials science, and communications. Commercial missions included materials processing in space, Earth and ocean observations, communi- cations, and industrial services. Technology development missions included materials and structures, energy conversion, computer science and electronics, propulsion, controls and human factors, station sys- tems/operations, fluid and thermal physics, and automation and robotics. NASA's 1984 plans called for the station to be operational in the early 1990s, with an original estimated U.S. investment of $8.0 billion (1984 dollars). 29 The station would be capable of growth both in size and capa- bility and was intended to operate for several decades. It would be assem- bled at an altitude of about 500 kilometers at an inclination to the equator of twenty-eight and a half degrees. All elements of the station would be launched and tended by the Space Shuttle. 30 On April 19, 1985, NASA's Space Station Program Office Manager Neil Hutchinson authorized the start of the definition phase contracts. Marshall, Johnson, Goddard, and Lewis each awarded competitive con- tracts on one of four work packages to eight industry teams (Table 3-50). These contracts extended for twenty-one months and defined the system requirements, developed supporting technologies and technology develop- ment plans, performed supporting systems and trade studies, developed preliminary designs and defined system interfaces, and developed plans, cost estimates, and schedules for the Phase C/D (design and development) 2 «New York Times, January 29, 1984; New York Times, November 9, 1984. 29 Philip E. Culbertson, "Space Station: A Cooperative Endeavor," paper to 25th International Meeting on Space, Rome, Italy, March 26-28, 1985, p. 4, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC. 30 Leonard David, Space Station Freedom— A Foothold on the Future, NASA pamphlet, Office of Space Science, 1986. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 241 activities. In addition to the lead centers lor each work package, the Kennedy Space Center was responsible lor pre! light and launch operations and would participate in logistics support activities. Other NASA centers would also support the definition and preliminary design activities. Also during 1985, NASA signed memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with Canada, ESA, and Japan. The agreements provided a framework for cooperation during the definition and preliminary design phase (Phase B) of the program. Under the MOUs, the United States and its international partners would conduct and coordinate simultaneous Phase B studies. NASA also signed an MOU with Space Industries, Inc., of Houston, a privately funded venture to exchange information during Phase B. Space Industries planned to develop a pressurized laboratory that would be launched by the Space Shuttle and could be serviced from the station. Progress on the station continued through 1986." NASA issued a Technical and Management Information System (TMIS) RFP in July. The TMIS would be a computer-based system that would support the techni- cal and management functions of the overall Space Station program. NASA also issued a Software Support Environment RFP for the "envi- ronment" that would be used for all computer software developed for the program. A draft RFP for the station's development phase (Phase C/D) was also issued in November 1986, with the definitive RFP released on April 24, 1987. 32 In 1987, in accordance with a requirement in the Authorization Act for FY 1988, NASA began preparing a total cost plan spanning three years. Called the Capital Development Plan, it included the estimated cost of all direct research and development, spaceflight, control and data communications, construction of facilities, and resource and program management. This plan complemented the Space Station Development Plan submitted to Congress in November 1987. Also during 1987, NASA awarded several station development con- tracts: 1 . Boeing Computer Services Company was selected in May to develop the TMIS. 2. Lockheed Missiles and Space Company was chosen in June to devel- op the Software Support Environment contract. 31 It is interesting to note that by 1986, the Soviet Union had already operat- ed several versions of a space station. In February 1986, it placed into orbit a new space station called Mir, the Russian word for peace. The Soviets indicated they intended to occupy Mir permanently and make it the core of a busy complex of space-based factories, construction and repair facilities, and laboratories. 32 "NASA Issues Requests for Proposals for Space Station Development," NASA News, Release 87-65, April 24, 1987. 242 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Grumman Aerospace Corporation was picked in July to provide the Space Station Program Office with systems engineering and integra- tion, in addition to a broad base of management support. In addition, Grumman and Martin Marietta Astronautics Company were selected in November for definition and preliminary design of the Flight Telerobotic System, a space robot that would perform station assembly and spacecraft servicing tasks. In December 1987, NASA selected the four work package contrac- tors. These four aerospace firms were to design and build the orbital research base. Boeing Aerospace was selected to build the pressurized modules where the crews would work and live (Work Package 1). NASA chose McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company to develop the struc- tural framework for the station, as well as most of the major subsystems required to operate the facility (Work Package 2). GE Astro-Space Division was picked to develop the scientific platform that would operate above Earth's poles and the mounting points for instruments placed on the occupied base (Work Package 3). NASA selected the Rocketdyne Division of Rockwell International to develop the system that would fur- nish and distribute electricity throughout the station (Work Package 4). The contracts included two program phases. Phase I covered the approximately ten-year period from contract start through one year after completion of station assembly. Phase II was a priced option that, if exer- cised, would enhance the capabilities of the station by adding an upper and lower truss structure, additional external payload attachment points, a solar dynamic power system, a free-flying co-orbiting platform, and a servicing facility. Contract negotiations with Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, GE Astro-Space, and Rocketdyne to design and build Freedom's occupied base and polar platform were completed in September 1988. With these contracts in place, the definition and prelim- inary design (Phase B) ended and detailed design and development (Phase C/D) began. The award of these contracts followed approval by Congress and President Reagan of the overall federal funding bill that made available more than $500 million in FY 1988 for station develop- ment activities. This amount included funds remaining from the FY 1987 station appropriation as well as the new funding provided under the FY 1988 bill. 33 In February 1988, the associate administrator for space station signed the Program Requirements Document. This top-level document contained requirements for station design, assembly, utilization, schedule, safety, evolution, management, and cost. In May, the Program Requirements Review began at the NASA Headquarters program office and was com- pleted at the four work package centers by the end of the year. The Program Requirements Review provided a foundation to begin the ""NASA Awards Contracts to Space Station Contractors," NASA News, Release 87-187, December 23, 1987. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 243 detailed design and development process by verifying program require inents and ensuring that those requirements could be traced across all lev- els of the program and he met within the available technical and fiscal resources. In July 1988, President Reagan named the international station Freedom. The U.S. international partners signed agreements to cooperate with the United States in developing, using, and operating the station. Government-level agreements between the United States and nine European nations, Japan, and Canada, and MOUs between NASA and ESA and between NASA and Canada were signed in September. The NASA-industry team proceeded to develop detailed requirements to guide design work beginning early in 1989. Proposed Configurations For the purpose of the 1984 RFP, NASA selected the "power tower" as the reference configuration for the station. NASA anticipated that this configuration could evolve over time. The power tower would consist of a girder 136 meters in length that would circle Earth in a gravity-gradient attitude. Pressurized laboratory modules, service sheds, and docking ports would be placed on the end always pointing downward; instruments for celestial observation would be mounted skyward; and the solar power arrays would be mounted on a perpendicular boom halfway up the tower. After intensive reviews, NASA replaced the power tower configura- tion in 1985 with the "dual keel" configuration (Figure 3-31). This con- figuration featured two parallel 22.6-meter vertical keels, crossed by a single horizontal beam, which supported the solar-powered energy sys- tem by a double truss, rectangular- shaped arrangement that shortened the height of the station to ninety-one meters. This configuration made a stronger frame, thus better dampening the oscillations expected during operations. The design also moved the laboratory modules to the station's center of gravity to allow scientists and materials processing researchers to work near the quality microgravity zone within the station. Finally, the dual keel offered a far larger area for positioning facilities, attaching pay- loads, and storing supplies and parts. NASA formally adopted this design at its May 1986 Systems Requirements Review. Its Critical Evaluation Task Force modified the design in the fall of 1986 to increase the size of the nodes to accommodate avionics packages slated for attachment to the truss, thereby increasing pressurized volume available as well as decreas- ing the requirement for EVA. In 1987, NASA and the administration, responding to significant increases in program costs, decided to take a phased approach to station development. In April 1987, the Space Station program was divided into Block I and Block II. Block I, the Revised Baseline Configuration, included the U.S. laboratory and habitat modules, the accommodation of attached payloads, polar platform(s), seventy-five kilowatts of photo- voltaic power, European and Japanese modules, the Canadian Mobile 244 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK \ TDRSSAnt ^ Upper Boom \ anna Photovoltaic Array YoKA Vertical Keels K$k\ ^^ utt^L Servicing r* Fa^V- Facility V ^JBf Remote ' ^§Q Manipulator * «^B Radiator Solar Dynamic M Power Unit J^P^r Lower Boom Figure 3-31. Dual Keel Final Assembly Configuration (adopted at May 1986 Systems Requirements Review) Servicing System, and provisions for evolution (Figure 3-32). The mod- ules would be attached to a 110-meter boom. Block II, an Enhanced Configuration, would have an additional fifty kilowatts of power via a solar dynamic system, additional accommodation of attached payloads on dual keels and upper and lower booms, a servicing bay, and co-orbiting platforms (Figure 3-33). Operations and Utilization Planning NASA first formulated an operations concept for the space station in 1985 that considered preliminary launch, orbit, and logistics operational requirements, objectives such as reduced life-cycle costs, and interna- tional operations. It was determined that the station elements fulfill user requirements affordably and that NASA be able to afford the overall sys- tem infrastructure and logistics. In 1985, the Space Station Utilization Data Base (later called the Mission Requirements Data Base) included more than 300 potential pay- loads from the commercial sector and from technology development, sci- ence, and applications communities. The information in this data base was used to evaluate potential designs of the station and associated plat- forms. Besides NASA, user sponsors included ESA, Canada, Japan, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. In addition, a large number of private-sector users had requested accommodations on the station. Considerable interest was also expressed in using polar SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT Figure 3-32. Revised Baseline Configuration (1987), Block I (This configuration would include the U.S. laboratory and habitat modules, accom- modation of attached pay loads, polar platform(s), seventy -five kilowatts of photo- voltaic power, European and Japanese modules, the Canadian Mobile Servicing System, and provisions for evolution.) Figure 3-33. Enhanced Configuration, Block II (This would have an additional fifty kilowatts of power via a solar dynamic system, additional accommodation of attached pay loads on dual keels and upper and lower booms, a servicing bay, and co-orbiting platforms. ) 246 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK platforms for solar-terrestrial physics, life sciences, astronomy, and Earth observation investigations. Polar platforms could support many related instruments, provide operational flexibility because of their modular design, and have indefinitely long lifetimes because they could be ser- viced while in orbit. In 1986, NASA formulated an Operations Management Concept that outlined the philosophy and management approaches to station operations. Using the concept as a point of departure, an Operations Task Force was established to perform a functional analysis of future station operations. In 1987, the Operations Task Force developed an operations concept and concluded its formal report in April. NASA also implemented an opera- tions plan, carried out further study of cost management, and conducted a study on science operations management that was completed in August. NASA issued a preliminary draft of a Space Station User's Handbook that would be a guide to the station for commercial and government users. Pricing policy studies were also initiated, and NASA also revised the Mission Requirements Data Base. Part of the utilization effort was aimed at defining the user environment. The "Space Station Microgravity Environment" report submitted to Congress in July 1988 described the microgravity characteristics expected to be achieved in the U.S. Laboratory and compared these characteristics to baseline program oper- ations and utilization requirements. Evolution Planning The station was designed to evolve as new requirements emerged and new capabilities became available. The design featured "hooks" and "scars," which were electronic and mechanical interfaces that would allow station designers to expand its capability. In this way, new and upgraded components, such as computer hardware, data management software, and power systems, could be installed easily. The Enhanced Configuration was an example of evolution planning. In this version, two 103 -meter-long vertical spines connected to the hor- izontal cross boom. With a near-rectangle shape comparable in size to a football field, the frame would be much stiffer and allow ample room for additional pay loads. In 1987, NASA established an Evolution Management Council. The Langley Research Center was designated as responsible for station evo- lution to meet future requirements. This responsibility included conduct- ing mission, systems, and operations analyses, providing systems-level planning of options/configurations, coordinating and integrating study results by others, chairing the evolution working group, and supporting advanced development program planning. A presidential directive of February 11, 1988, on "National Space Policy" stated that the "Space Station would allow evolution in keeping SPACF TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGH1 247 with the needs of station users and the long-term goals of the U.S." 34 This directive reaffirmed NASA's objective to design and build a station that could expand capabilities and incorporate improved technologies. Planning for evolution would occur in parallel with the design and devel- opment of the baseline station. To support initiatives such as the Humans to Mars and Lunar Base projects, the station would serve as a facility for life science research and technology development and eventually as a transportation node for vehi- cle assembly and servicing. Another evolutionary path involved growth of the station as a multipurpose research and development facility. For these options, Langley conducted mission and systems analyses to deter- mine primary resource requirements such as power, crew, and volume. NASA Center Involvement Marshall Space Flight Center The Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, was des- ignated as the Work Package 1 Center. Work Package 1 included the design and manufacture of the astronauts' living quarters, known as the habitation module (Figure 3-34); the U.S. Laboratory module; logistics elements, used for resupply and storage; node structures connecting the modules; the Environmental Control and Life Support System; and the thermal control and audio/video systems located within the pressurized modules. Figure 3-34. Habitation Module 34 Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: Presidential Directive on National Space Policy," February 11, 1988. 248 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Marshall established the Space Station Freedom Projects Office to manage and direct the various design, development, and operational activities needed to successfully complete the Work Package 1 assign- ment, as well as several facilities to support its work package activities. These included the Payload Operations Integration Center, the Engineering Support Center, and the Payload Training Facility. Johnson Space Center The Johnson Space Center near Houston was responsible for the design, development, verification, assembly, and delivery of Work Package 2 flight elements and systems. This included the integrated truss assembly, propulsion assembly, mobile transporter, resource node design and outfitting, external thermal control, data management, operations management, communications and tracking, extravehicular systems, guidance, navigation, and control systems, and airlocks. Johnson was also responsible for the attachment systems, the STS for its periodic visits, the flight crews, crew training and crew emergency return definition, and operational capability development associated with operations planning. Johnson provided technical direction to the Work Package 1 contractor for the design and development of all station subsystems. Johnson set up the Space Station Freedom Projects Office with the responsibility of managing and directing the various design, development, assembly, and training activities. This office reported to the Space Station Program Office in Reston, Virginia. The projects office at Johnson was to develop the capability to conduct all career flight crew training. The inte- grated training architecture would include the Space Station Control Center and ultimately the Payload Operations Integration Center when the station became permanently occupied. Johnson established several facili- ties in support of its various responsibilities: the Space Station Control Center, the Space Systems Automated Integration and Assembly Facility, the Space Station Training Facility, and the Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory. Goddard Space Flight Center The Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, had responsibility for the Work Package 3 portion of the Space Station pro- gram. It was responsible for developing the free-flying platforms and attached payload accommodations, as well as for planning NASA's role in servicing accommodations in support of the user payloads and satel- lites. Goddard was also responsible for developing the Flight Telerobotic Servicer (Figure 3-35), which had been mandated by Congress in the conference report accompanying NASA's FY 1986 appropriations bill. The Flight Telerobotic Servicer was an outgrowth of the automation and robotics initiative of the station's definition and preliminary design phase. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SI'ACIII.Kill I 249 Figure 3-35. Flight Telerobotic Servicer Lewis Research Center The Lewis Research Center was responsible for the Work Package 4 portion of the Space Station program. Its station systems directorate was responsible for designing and developing the electric power system. This included responsibility for systems engineering and analysis for the over- all electrical power system; all activities associated with the design, development, test, and implementation of the photovoltaic systems (Figure 3-36); hooks and scars activities in solar dynamics and in support of Work Package 2 in resistojet propulsion technology; power manage- ment and distribution system development; and activities associated with Truss Beta Gimbals Solar Array Wing #2 Integrated Equipment Assembly Alpha Gimbal Radiator Figure 3-36. Photovoltaic Module 250 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK the Lewis station power system facilities and in planning electric power system mission operations. International Cooperation Canada In March 1986, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and President Reagan agreed to Canadian participation in the Space Station program. Canada intended to commit $1.2 billion to the program through the year 2000. Canada planned to provide the Mobile Servicing Center for Space Station Freedom. Together with a U.S. -provided, rail-mounted, mobile transporter, which would move along the truss, the Mobile Servicing Center and the transporter would comprise the Mobile Servicing System. The Mobile Servicing System was to play the main role in the accomplishing the station's assembly and maintenance, mov- ing equipment and supplies around the station, releasing and capturing satellites, supporting EVAs, and servicing instruments and other payloads attached to the station. It would also be used for docking the Space Shuttle orbiter to the station and then loading and unloading materials from its cargo bay. NASA considered the Mobile Servicing Center as part of the station's critical path: an indispensable component in the assembly, performance, and operation of the station. In space, Canada would supply the RMS, the Mobile Servicing Center and Maintenance Depot, the special purpose dex- terous manipulator, Mobile Servicing System work and control stations, a power management and distribution system, and a data management sys- tem (Figure 3-37). On the ground, Canada would build a manipulator development and simulation facility and a mission operations facility. The Canadian Space Agency would provide project management. Figure 3-37. Mobile Servicing System and Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator SPACT! TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 251 European Space Agency ESA gave the name "Columbus" to its program to develop the three elements that Europe was to contribute to the station: the Columbus Attached Laboratory, the Columbus Free-Flying Laboratory, and the Columbus Polar Platform. Columbus would provide an in-orbit and ground infrastructure compatible with European and international user needs from the mid-1990s onward. The program would also provide Europe with expertise in human, human-assisted, and fully automatic space operations as a basis for future autonomous missions. The program aimed to ensure that Europe establish the key technologies required for these various types of spaceflight. The concept of Columbus was studied in the early 1980s as a follow- up to the Spacelab. The design, definition, and technology preparation phase was completed at the end of 1987. The development phase was planned to cover 1988-98 and would be completed by the initial launch of Columbus's three elements Columbus Attached Laboratory. This laboratory would be perma- nently attached to the station's base. It would have a diameter of approx- imately four meters and would be used primarily for materials sciences, fluid physics, and compatible life sciences missions (Figure 3-38). The attached laboratory would be launched from the Kennedy Space Center on a dedicated Space Shuttle flight, removed from the Shuttle's payload bay, and berthed at the station's base. Figure 3-38. Columbus Attached Laboratory 252 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Figure 3-39. Columbus Free-Flying Laboratory Columbus Free-Flying Laboratory. This free-flying laboratory (the "Free Flyer") would operate in a microgravity optimized orbit with a twenty-eight-and-a-half-degree inclination, centered on the altitude of the station (Figure 3-39). It would accommodate automatic and remotely controlled payloads, primarily from the materials sciences and technolo- gy disciplines, together with its initial payload, and would be launched by an Ariane 5 from the Centre Spatial Guyanais in Kourou, French Guiana. The laboratory would be routinely serviced in orbit by a Hermes at approximately six-month intervals. Initially, this servicing would be per- formed at Space Station Freedom, which the Free Flyer would also visit every three to four years for major external maintenance events. Columbus Polar Platform. This platform would be stationed in a highly inclined Sun-synchronous polar orbit with a morning descending node (Figure 3-40). It would be used primarily for Earth observation mis- sions. The platform was planned to operate in conjunction with one or more additional platforms provided by NASA and/or other international partners and would accommodate European and internationally provided payloads. The platform would not be serviceable and would be designed to operate for a minimum of four years. The platform would accommo- date between 1,700 and 2,300 kilograms of ESA and internationally pro- vided payloads. Japan Japan initiated its space program in 1985 in response to the U.S. invi- tation to join the Space Station program. The Space Activities Commission's Ad Hoc Committee on the Space Station concluded that Japan should participate in the Phase B (definition) study of the program with its own experimental module. On the basis of the committee's con- clusion, the Science and Technology Agency concluded a Phase B MOU with NASA. Under the supervision of the Science and Technology Agency, the National Space Development Agency of Japan, a quasi- SPACT! TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 253 Figure 3^0. Columbus Polar Platform governmental organization responsible for developing and implementing Japanese space activities, began the detailed definition and the prelimi- nary design of the Japanese Experiment Module (JEM), which is shown in Figure 3-41 and would be attached to the Space Station. The JEM would be a multipurpose laboratory consisting of a pressurized module, an exposed facility, and an experiment logistics module (Table 3-51). The JEM would be launched on two Space Shuttle flights. The first flight Figure 3^41. Japanese Experiment Module 254 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK would transport the pressurized module and the first exposed facility. The second flight would transport the second exposed facility and the experi- ment logistics module Commercial Participation From its inception, one of the prime goals of the Space Station pro- gram was to encourage private- sector, space-based commercial activity. President Reagan's 1984 State of the Union message stated the objective of promoting private-sector investment in space through enhanced U.S. space-based operational capabilities. The station was planned to be highly conducive to commercial space activities by providing extended time in orbit, facilities for research and testing, and the presence of a trained crew for the periodic tending, repair, and handling of unexpected occurrences. NASA's 1985 "Commercial Space Policy" set forth guidelines for the use of space for commercial enterprises relating to the station and other NASA activities. The guidelines stated that NASA welcomed and encour- aged participation in station development and operations by companies that sought to develop station systems and services with private funds. NASA would provide incentives and technical assistance, including access to NASA data and facilities, where appropriate. NASA would pro- tect proprietary rights and would request privately owned data only when necessary to carry outs its responsibilities. 35 NASA expected the private sector to be a principal user of station capabilities. It also expected the private sector to participate in the pro- gram by providing services, both on the ground and in orbit. The private sector would participate in the program through procurements to design and build elements of the station and its related systems. In 1986, NASA's Commercial Advocacy Group conducted workshops to identify and encourage potential commercial use of the station, particularly in the areas of materials processing, Earth and ocean remote sensing, commu- nications satellite delivery, and industrial services. In August 1986, NASA established "Guidelines for United States Commercial Enterprises for Space Station Development and Operations." These guidelines were to encourage U.S. private- sector investment and involvement in develop- ing and operating station systems and services. In November 1987, NASA issued a series of new program initiatives designed to expand the opportunities for pioneering commercial ventures in space. The initiatives built on earlier commercial development policies and provided for the continued encouragement of private space activities. The 1988 National Space Policy mandated the provision for commercial participation in the Space Station program. Commercial participation would be possible through commercial utilization and commercial 35 "NASA Guidelines for United States Commercial Enterprises for Space Station Development and Operations," Office of Space Station, NASA, 1985, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Washington, DC. SPACI* TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGH1 255 infrastructure activities. Commercial utilization activities would involve commercial users of the station who would conduct space-based research and development activities. Commercial infrastructure activities would involve provisions for selected station-related systems and services on a commercial basis to NASA and station users. In October 1988, NASA published revised policy guidelines for pro- posals from commercial entities to provide the infrastructure for the sta- tion. These guidelines, revised in response to President Reagan's Commercial Space Initiatives, issued in February 1988, were intended to provide a framework to encourage U.S. commercial investment and involvement in the development and operation of Space Station Freedom. NASA would use these guidelines to evaluate proposals from industry for participating in the Space Station program. 36 36 "NASA Issues Draft Guidelines on Station Commercial Infrastructure, NASA News, Release 88-144, October 25, 1988. 256 SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT "3 a> Q q o o o o o o O O in eo on oo n 00 < Q ^ o o o o m o o o On O SO CO CO 00 OS © so, so q cn oo" so" r-; CO so^ VO rf on — " r^" en ON r- Tf on r- co no Tf - a © ^3 *- a ^ Q. ^3 < >J >3 ^3 R ^5 c 3 £ •JC ts . 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E E E E E X o 3 42 X O ed E CJ CJ E E CJ E — E E E g E OJ E CJ E CJ E z '5 z < < < Ij < 3 < < < < < "<3 ^ v^ esc -s: 268 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK ^ =: Q CO ^o in D On D O in rf o" on lO 00 (N oo — — ^i- n- O O O *o o o o Q m O O g o o in 1/0 to o — CN r. x) m 2 <_, '3 X) C E c u •rj — ,W Cij o bfi EC c 3 c O © o OX) C c © © B q q o q © in ©' o" u o in o — ^c 3 a. * t/3 a. o u 60 ■3 i— "O "O c ^ 3 3 3 C £ X % 2 — ■a u o a > n c <" ^ 4J u T-l U 00 ^ E E < < .S oi IT) >C r^ X oc Z/S X 00 ^v ^ ON ON SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 269 Table 3 II. Orbiter Characteristics Component ( lharacteristics Length 37.24 Height 17.25 Vertical Stabilizer 8.01 Wingspan 23.79 Bod) Rap \rca (sc| in) 12.6 Width 6.1 Aft Fuselage Length 5.5 Width 6.7 Height 6.1 Mid-Fuselage Length 18.3 Width 5.2 Height 4.0 Airlock (cm) Inside Diameter 160 Length 211 Minimum Clearance 91.4 Opening Capacity 46x46x 127 Forward Fuselage Crew Cabin (cu m) 71.5 Payload Bay Doors Length 18.3 Diameter 4.6 Surface Area (sq m) 148.6 Weight (kg) 1,480 Wing Length 18.3 Maximum Thickness 1.5 Elevons 4.2 and 3.8 Tread Width 6.91 Structure Type Semimonocoque Structure Material Aluminum Gross Takeoff Weight Variable Gross Landing Weight Variable Inert Weight (kg) (approx.) 74,844 Main Engines Number 3 Average Thrust 1 .67M newtons at sea level 2.10M newtons in vacuum Nominal Burn Time 522 seconds 270 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-11 continued Component Characteristics OMS Engines Number Average Thrust Dry Weight (kg) Propellant RCS Engines Number Average Thrust Propellant Major Systems 26,688 newtons 117.9 Monomethyl hydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide 38 primary (4 forward, 12 per aft pod) 6 vernier (2 forward, 4 aft) 3,870 newtons in each primary engine 111.2 newtons in each vernier engine Monomethyl hydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide Propulsion; Power Generation; Environmental Control and Life Support; Thermal Protection; Communications; Avionics; Data Processing; Purge, Vent, and Drain; Guidance, Navigation, and Control; Dedicated Display; Crew Escape All measurements are in meters unless otherwise noted. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 271 Table 3-12. Typical Launch Processing/Terminal Count Sequence Time Even] T- 1 1 In T-5 hr 30 mm T-5 hi T-4 hr 30 min T-2 hr 50 min T-2 hr 4 min T-l hr 5 min T-30 min T-25 min T-20 min T-9 min T-9 min T-7 min T-5 min T-4 min 30 sec T-3 min T-2 min 55 sec T-l min 57 sec T-31 sec T-30 sec T-27 sec T-25 sec T-l 8 sec T-3. 6 sec T-3. 46 sec to 3.22 sec T-0 T+2.64 sec T+3 sec Start retraction oi rotating service structure (completed by I 7 In 30 min) Enter 6-hr built-in hold, followed by clearing of pad Start countdown, begin chill down of liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen transfer system Begin liquid oxygen fill ol external tank Begin liquid hydrogen fill of external lank 1-hr built-in hold, followed by crew entry operations Crew entry complete; cabin hatch closed; start cabin leak check (completed by T-25 min) Secure white room; ground crew retires to fallback area by T-10 min; range safety activation/Mission Control Center guidance update Mission Control Center/crew communications checks; crew given landing weather information for contingencies of return-to-abort or abort once around Load flight program; beginning of terminal count 10-min built-in hold (also a 5-min hold capability between T-9 and T-2 min and a 2-min hold capability between T-2 min and T-27 sec) Go for launch/start launch processing system ground launch sequencer (automatic sequence) Start crew access arm retraction Activate orbiter hydraulic auxiliary power units (APUs) Orbiter goes to internal power Gimbal main engines to start position External tank oxygen to flight pressure External tank hydrogen to flight pressure Onboard computers' automatic launch sequence software enabled by launch processing system command Last opportunity for crew to exit by slidewire Latest hold point if needed (following any hold below the T-2 min mark, the countdown will be automatically recycled to T-9 min) Activate solid rocket booster hydraulic power units; initiative for management of countdown sequence assumed by onboard comput- ers; ground launch sequencer remains on line Solid rocket booster nozzle profile conducted Main propulsion system start commands issued by the onboard GPCs Main engines start Main engines at 90 percent thrust Solid rocket booster fire command/holddown bolts triggered LIFTOFF 272 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK £> (J ^t — ; ooovdodinr--— 'Ci — vo ro co CN (N on co i the sis induced atmospheric luminosities that had relevance i<>i scientific and engineering aspects of payload operations. Oxygen Atom Interaction With Materials Test. This was con ducted to obtain quantitative reaction rates of low-Earth orbit oxygen atoms with various materials used on payloads. Data obtained on STS-2 through 4 indicated that some payloads might be severely limited in life because of oxygen effect. The STS-5 test provided data for assessment of oxygen effects and possible fixes. Development Flight Instrumentation. This was a data collection and recording package, located in the aft areas of the payload bay, consisting of three magnetic tape recorders, wideband fre- quency division multiplexers, a pulse code modulation master unit, and signal conditioners. Aerodynamic Coefficient Identification Package (ACIP). This package, which has flown on STS-1 through 4, continued to collect aerodynamic data during the launch, entry, and landing phases of the Shuttle; establish an extensive aerodynamic data- base for verification of the Shuttle's aerodynamic performance and the verification and correlation with ground-based data, including assessments of the uncertainties of such data; and provide flight dynamics data in support of other technology areas, such as aerothermal and structural dynamics. Mission Success Shuttle Student Involvement Program: 1 . Growth of Porifera in Zero-Gravity studied the effect of zero gravity on sponge, Porifera, in relation to its regeneration of structure, shape, and spicule formation following separation of the sponge. 2. Convection in Zero-Gravity studied surface tension convec- tion in zero gravity and the effects of boundary layer condi- tions and geometries on the onset and character of the convection. 3. Formation of Crystals in Weightlessness compared crystal growth in zero gravity to that in one-g to determine whether weightlessness eliminates the causes of malformation of crystals. Successful a Weight includes all cargo but does not include consumables. 296 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-23. STS-6 Mission Characteristics Vehicle Crew Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Landed Revolution No. 81 Challenger (OV-099) Cmdr: Paul J. Weitz Pilot: Karol J. Bobko MS: Donald H. Peterson, F. Story Musgrave April 4, 1983, 1:30:00 p.m., EST, Kennedy Space Center The launch set for January 20, 1983, was postponed because of a hydrogen leak into the number one main engine aft compart- ment, which was discovered during the 20-second Flight Readiness Firing (FRF) on December 18. Cracks in the number one main engine were confirmed to be the cause of the leak during the second FRF performed January 25, 1983. All three main engines were removed while the Shuttle was on the pad, and fuel line cracks were repaired. Main engines two and three were reinstalled following extensive failure analysis and test- ing. The number one main engine was replaced. An additional delay was caused by contamination to the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS-1) during a severe storm. The launch on April 4 proceeded as scheduled. 284.5 km/28.45 degrees 116,459 kg April 9, 1983, 10:53:42 a.m., PST, Runway 22, Edwards AFB Orbiter was returned to Kennedy April 16, 1983. 2,208 m 49 seconds 5 days, hours, 23 minutes, 42 seconds Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN) Tracking and Data Relay Satellite- 1/IUS G-005 Customer: The Asahi Shimbun This experiment was proposed by two Japanese high school students to make artificial snowflakes in the weightlessness of space. The experiment was to contribute to crystallography, especially the crystal growth of semiconductors or other mate- rials from a vapor source. SPACL TRANSPORTATION/HUM AN SPACEFLIGH1 297 Table 3 23 continued G 049 Customer: Air Force Academ) Academy cadets conducted six experiments: 1. Metal Beam Joiner demonstrated that soldering oi beams can be accomplished in space. 2. Metal Alloy determined whether tin and lead will combine more uniformly in a zero-gravity environment. 3. loam Metal generated loam metal in zero-gravity forming a metallic sponge. 4. Metal Purification tested the effectiveness of the zone-refin- ing methods of purification in a zero-gravity environment. 5. Electroplating determined how evenly a copper rod can be plated in a zero-gravity environment. 6. Microbiology tested the effects of weightlessness and space radiation on microorganism development. Experiments G-381 Customer: George W. Park Seed Company, Inc. This payload consisted of 46 varieties of flower, herb, and veg- etable seeds. It studied the impact of temperature fluctuations, vacuum, gravity forces, and radiation on germination rate, seed vigor, induced dormancy, and varietal purity. An objective was to determine how seeds should be packaged to withstand spaceflight. Continuous Flow Electrophoresis System (CFES). A sample of biological material was continuously injected into a flowing medium, which carried the sample through a separating column where it was under the influences of an electric field. The force exerted by the field separated the sample into its constituent types at the point of exit from the column where samples were collected. Mission Success Monodisperse Latex Reactor. This materials processing experi- ment continued the development of uniformly sized (monodis- perse) latex beads in a low-gravity environment, where the effects of buoyancy and sedimentation were minimized. The particles may have major medical and industrial research appli- cations. Night/Day Optical Survey of Lightning. This studied lightning and thunderstorms from orbit for a better understanding of the evolution of lightning in severe storms. Aerodynamic Coefficient Identification Package (ACIP) (see STS-5) Successful 298 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-24. STS-7 Mission Characteristics Vehicle Crew Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Landed Revolution No. Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials Challenger (OV-099) Cmdr: Robert L. Crippen Pilot: Frederick H. Hauck MS: John M. Fabian, Sally K. Ride, Norman E. Thagard June 18, 1983, 7:33:00 a.m., EDT, Kennedy Space Center The launch proceeded as scheduled. 296.3 km/28.45 degrees 113.027.1 kg June 24, 1983, 6:56:59 a.m., PDT, Runway 15, Edwards AFB The planned landing at Kennedy was scrubbed because of poor weather conditions, and the mission was extended two revolu- tions to facilitate landing at Edwards. Orbiter was returned to Kennedy June 29, 1983. 3,185 m 75 seconds 6 days, 2 hours, 23 minutes, 59 seconds 98 Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN) Telesat-F/PAM-D (Anik C-2), Palapa-Bl/PAM-D G-002 Customer: Kayser-Threde GMBH German high school students provided the experiments for this GAS. Their five experiments studied crystal growth, nickel cat- alysts, plant contamination by heavy metals, microprocessor controlled sequencers, and a biostack studying the influence of cosmic radiation on plant seeds. G-305 Customer: Department of Defense Space Test Program The Space Ultraviolet Radiation Environment (SURE) instru- ment, developed by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) Space Science Division, marked the debut of the GAS motor- ized door assembly (MDA). The MDA allowed the payload's spectrometer to measure the natural radiation in the upper atmosphere at extreme ultraviolet wavelengths. SURE was the first in a series of experiments planned by the NRL that ulti- mately would provide global pictures of "ionospheric weather." G-033 Customer: Steven Speilberg Movie director Steven Speilberg donated this GAS to the California Institute of Technology after receiving the payload as a gift. Caltech students designed and built one experiment, which examined oil and water separation in microgravity, and a second, which grew radish seeds, testing the theory that roots grow downward because gravity forces dense structures (amy- loplasts) to settle to the bottom of root cells. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 299 Table 3 24 continued G-009 ( lustomer: Purdue I fniversity Purdue University students conducted three experiments: 1. Seeds were germinated in microgravity on a spinning disk. 2. Nuclear Particle Detection Experiment traced and recorded the paths of nuclear particles encountered in the near-Earth space environment. 3. Fluid Dynamics Experiment measured the bulk oscillations of a drop of mercury immersed in a clear liquid. G-088 Customer: Edsyn, Inc. Edsyn ran more than 60 experiments on soldering and de- soldering equipment. Passive experiments determined how sol- dering gear would function in space. Powered experiments investigated the physics of soldering in microgravity and a vacuum. G-345 Customer: Goddard Space Flight Center The Ultraviolet Photographic Test Package exposed film sam- ples to the space environment. Detachable Payload Experiments G-012 Customer: RCA High school students from Camden, New Jersey, with the back- ing of RCA Corporation and Temple University, investigated whether weightlessness would affect the social structure of an ant colony. Shuttle Pallet Satellite (SPAS)-Ol. Ten experiments mounted on SPAS-01 performed research in forming metal alloys in micro- gravity and using a remote-sensing scanner. The orbiter's small control rockets fired while SPAS-01 was held by the RMS to test movement on the extended arm. OSTA-2 Payload (see Chapter 5, "Space Applications") Mission Success Continuous Flow Electrophoresis System (CFES) (see STS-6) Monodisperse Latex Reaction (see STS-6) Successful 300 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-25. STS-8 Mission Characteristics Vehicle Crew Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Landed Revolution No. 98 Challenger (OV-99) Cmdr: Richard H. Truly Pilot: Daniel C. Brandenstein MS: Dale A. Gardner, Guion S. Bluford, Jr., William E. Thornton August 30, 1983, 2:32:00 a.m., EDT, Kennedy Space Center Launch was delayed 17 minutes because of weather. 296.3 km/28.45 degrees 110,107.8 kg September 5, 1983, 12:40:43 a.m. PDT, Runway 22, Edwards AFB Orbiter was returned to Kennedy September 9, 1983. 2,856.3 m 50 seconds 6 days, 1 hour, 8 minutes, 43 seconds Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials Experiments Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN) Insat 1B/PAM-D G-346 Customer: Goddard Space Flight Center The Cosmic Ray Upset Experiment attempted to resolve many of the questions concerning upsets caused by single particles. An upset, or change in logic state, of a memory cell can result from a single, highly energetic particle passing through a sensi- tive volume in a memory cell. G-347 Customer: Goddard Space Flight Center The Ultraviolet-Sensitive Photographic Emulsion Experiment evaluated the effect of the orbiter's gaseous environment on ultraviolet-sensitive photographic emulsions. G-475 Customer: The Asahi Shimbun The Japanese Snow Crystal Experiment attempted to create the first snowflakes in space, which had been attempted unsuccess- fully on STS-6. G-348 Customer: Goddard Space Flight Center The Contamination Monitor Package measured the changes in outer coatings and thermal blanket coverings on the Shuttle that were caused by atomic oxygen erosion. Development Flight Instrumentation Pallet (DFI Pallet): • High Capacity Heat Pipe Demonstration (DSO 0101) pro- vided an in-orbit demonstration of the thermal performance of a high-capacity heat pipe designed for future spacecraft heat rejection systems. • Evaluation of Oxygen Interaction with Materials (DSO 0301) obtained quantitative rates of oxygen interaction with materials used on the orbiter and advanced payloads. SPA( :e TRANSP( )k I A I K )N/I ii im AN SIV\( III K il II Wl Table 3 25 continual Biofeedback Experiments. Six rats were Mown in the Animal Enclosure Module to observe animal reactions in space ami i<> demonstrate that the module was capable of supporting six healthy rats in orbit without compromising the health and com- fort of either the astronaut crew or the rats. Continuous How Electrophoresis System (CFES) (see STS-6) Aerodynamic Coefficient Identification Package (ACIP) (see STS-5) Radiation Monitoring Experiment. This consisted of hand-held and pocket-sized monitors, which measured the level of back- ground radiation present at various times in orbit. The two devices were self-contained and powered by 9-volt batteries. At appointed times, the crew took and recorded measurements of any radiation that penetrated the cabin. Investigation of STS Atmospheric Luminosities (see STS-5) Mission Success Shuttle Student Involvement Program: Biofeedback Mediated Behavioral Training in Physiological Self Regulator: Application in Near Zero Gravity Environment. This aimed to determine whether biofeedback training learned in a one-g environment can be successfully implemented at zero-g. Successful 302 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-26. STS-9 Mission Characteristics Vehicle Crew Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Landed Revolution No. 167 Columbia (OV-102) Cmdr: John W. Young Pilot: Brewster H. Shaw MS: Owen K. Garriott, Robert A.R. Parker PS: Byron K. Lichtenberg, Ulf Merbold (ESA) November 28, 1983, 11:00:00 a.m., EST, Kennedy Space Center Launch set for September 30, 1983, was delayed 28 days because of a suspect exhaust nozzle on the right solid rocket booster. The problem was discovered while the Shuttle was on the launch pad. The Shuttle was returned to the Vehicle Assembly Building and demated. The suspect nozzle was replaced, and the vehicle was restacked. The countdown on November 28 proceeded as scheduled. During launch and ascent, verification flight instrumentation (VFI) operated the Spacelab and the Spacelab interfaces with the orbiter. This instrumentation monitored Spacelab subsystem performance and Spacelab-to-orbiter interfaces. Data were recorded during launch and ascent on the VFI tape recorder and played back to receiving stations on Earth during acquisition of signal periods using the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS). 287.1 km/57.0 degrees 112,320 kg December 8, 1983, 3:47:24 p.m., PST, Runway 17, Edwards AFB Landing was delayed approximately 8 hours to analyze problems when general purpose computers one and two failed and inertial measurement unit one failed. During landing, two of the three auxiliary power units caught fire. During descent and landing, the VFI continued to monitor and record selected Spacelab para- meters within the payload bay. One hour after touchdown, power to the induced environment contamination monitor was removed. Orbiter was returned to Kennedy December 15, 1983. 2,577.4 m 53 seconds 10 days, 7 hours, 47 minutes, 24 seconds Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials Experiments Mission Success Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN)/Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) INSAT-1B/PAM-D None See Table 4-45, Spacelab 1 Experiments Successful SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGH1 $03 Table 3-27. STS 41-H Mission CharacteristU A Vehicle Crew Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Landed Revolution No Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials Challenger (OV-099) c inch : Vance I). Brand Pilot: Robert L. Gibson MS: Bruce McCandless II, Ronald E. McNair, Robert I. Stewart February 3, 1984, 8:00:00 a.m., EST, Kennedy Space (enter The launch, set for January 29, was postponed for 5 days while the orbiter was still in the Orbiter Processing Facility to allow changeout of all three auxiliary power units (APUs), a precaution- ary measure in response to APU failures on the STS-9 mission. 350 km/28.5 degrees 113,605 kg February 11, 1984, 7:15:55 a.m., EST, Runway 15, Kennedy This was the first end-of-mission landing at Kennedy. 3,294 m 67 seconds 7 days, 23 hours, 15 minutes, 55 seconds 128 Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN) Westar-VI/PAM-D, Palapa-B2/PAM-D G-004 Customer: Utah State University Students at the University of Aberdeen in Scotland used one of Utah State's spacepaks on this payload. Aberdeen students flew experiments on spore growth, three-dimensional Brownian motion, and dimensional stability. Two other spacepaks con- tained experiments on capillary action in the absence of gravity. G-008 Customer: Utah State University This payload was purchased by the Utah Section of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and donat- ed to Utah State University: 1 . In the experiment conducted by students from Brighton High School, Salt Lake City, radish seeds sprouted in a zero- g environment. About one-half of the germinated seeds had flown earlier in an STS-6 experiment. 2. Students from Utah State University attempted to crystallize proteins in a controlled-temperature environment under zero-g conditions. The crystallization of proteins was neces- sary for studies in x-ray crystallography. 3. Two Utah State students devised this payload. The first experiment reran a soldering experiment flown on GAS G-001. The second tested an experimental concept for creat- ing a flow system for electophoresis experiments. 304 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-27 continued G-349 Customer: Goddard Space Flight Center Contamination Monitor Package (flown on STS-8) measured the flow of atomic oxygen by determining the mass loss of car- bon and osmium, known to readily oxidize. The mass loss indi- cated the atomic oxygen flux as a function of time, which was correlated to altitude, attitude, and direction. This experiment exposed the Shuttle's outer coatings and thermal blanket cover- ings to normal orbit conditions. G-051 Customer: GTE Laboratories, Inc. Arc Lamp Research studied the configuration of an arc lamp in gravity-free surroundings. Scientists hoped the experiment would pave the way for the development of a more energy- efficient commercial lamp. Experiments G-309 Customer: U.S. Air Force Cosmic Ray Upset Experiment (CRUX) was a repeat of G-346 initially flown by Goddard on STS-8. This experiment investi- gated upsets or changes in the logic state of a memory cell caused by highly active energetic particles passing through a sensitive volume in the memory cell. Acoustic Containerless Experiment (ACES). This materials processing furnace experiment was enclosed in two airtight canisters in the orbiter middeck. Activated at 23 hours mission elapsed time, ACES ran a preprogrammed sequence of opera- tions and shut itself off after 2 hours. Monodisperse Latex Reaction (see STS-6) Radiation Monitoring Experiment (see STS-8) Isoelectric Focusing Experiment. This self-contained experi- ment package in the middeck lockers was activated by the crew at the same time as ACES. It evaluated the effect of electro- osmosis on an array of eight columns of electrolyte solutions as DC power was applied and pH levels between anodes and cath- odes increased. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGH1 305 Table 3-27 continued ( linema 360 Camera. Two Cinema 360 cameras were carried on board to provide a lest for motion picture photography in a unique formal designed especially for planetarium viewing, One camera was located in the crew cabin area and the other in a GAS canister in the payload bay. The primary objective was to test the equipment and concept. Film footage taken by the two systems was also of considerable value. Arriflex 35mm Type 3 motion picture cameras with an 8mm/f2.8 "fisheye" lens were used. The Cinema 360 camera, including an accesso- ry handle and lens guard/support, weighed about 5 kilograms. A system power supply weighed an additional 7.7 kilograms. Filming inside the orbiter focused on activities on the flight deck. The camera system located in the GAS canister in the payload bay provided film on exterior activities, including EVA/MMU operations, satellite deployment, and RMS opera- tions. Lens focus, diaphragm setting, and frame speed were preset, thus requiring no light level readings or exposure calcu- lations by the crew. Each camera carried a 122-meter film mag- azine. Filming done on this flight and subsequent missions was used in the production of a motion picture about the Space Shuttle program. Mission Success Shuttle Student Involvement Program: This experiment tested the hypothesis that arthritis may be affected by gravity. Successful 306 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-28. STS 41 -C Mission Characteristics Vehicle Crew Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Challenger (OV-099) Cmdr: Robert L. Crippen Pilot: Francis R. Scobee MS: George D. Nelson, James D. A. van Hoften, Terry J. Hart April 6, 1984 8:58:00 a.m., EST, Kennedy Space Center The launch proceeded as scheduled with no delays. 579.7 km/28.5 degrees 115,329.6 kg April 13, 1984, 5:38:07 a.m., PST, Runway 17, Edwards AFB The mission was extended 1 day when astronauts were initially unable to grapple the Solar Maximum Mission spacecraft. The planned landing at Kennedy was scrubbed and the mission extended one revolution to facilitate landing at Edwards. Orbiter was returned to Kennedy April 18, 1984. 2,656.6 m 49 seconds 6 days, 23 hours, 40 minutes, 7 seconds Landed Revolution No. 108 Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials Experiments Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN) Long Duration Exposure Facility- 1 (LDEF- 1 ) None The experiments carried aboard the reusable LDEF fell into four major groups: material structures, power and propulsion, electronics and optics, and science. The 57 separate experi- ments involved more that 200 investigators from the United States and eight other countries and were furnished by govern- ment laboratories, private companies, and universities. They are described in Chapter 4, "Space Science." Radiation Monitoring Experiment (see STS-8) Cinema 360 (see STS 4 1-B) IMAX. The IMAX camera made the first of three scheduled trips into space on this mission. Footage from the flight was assembled into a film called The Dream Is Alive. The IMAX camera was part of a joint project among NASA, the National Air and Space Museum, IMAX Systems Corporation of Toronto, Canada, and the Lockheed Corporation. Mission Success Shuttle Student Involvement Program: This experiment studied the honeycomb structure built by bees in zero gravity, compared to the structure built by bees on Earth. Successful SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 307 Table 3 29. SIS 41-1) Mission Characteristics Vehicle Crei* Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Landed Revolution No Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials Experiments Discovery (OV-103) Cmdr: Henry w. Hartsfield, Jr. Pilot: Michael L. Coals MS: Judith A. Resnik, Richard M. Mullane, Steven A. Hawley PS: Charles I). Walker August 30, 1984, 8:41:50 a.m., EDT, Kennedy Space Center The launch attempt on June 25 was scrubbed during a T-9 minute hold because of failure of the orbiter's back-up general purpose computer (GPC). The launch attempt on June 26 abort- ed at T-4 seconds when the GPC detected an anomaly in the orbiter's number three main engine. Discovery was returned to the Orbiter Processing Facility and the number three main engine replaced. (To preserve the launch schedule of future missions, the 41-D cargo was remanifested to include pay load elements from both the 41-D and 41-F flights, and the 41 -F mission was canceled.) After replacement of the engine, the Shuttle was restacked and returned to the pad. The third launch attempt on August 29 was delayed when a discrepancy was noted in flight software of Discovery's master events controller relating to solid rocket booster fire commands. A software patch was verified and implemented to assure all three booster fire commands were issued in the proper time interval. The launch on August 30 was delayed 6 minutes, 50 seconds when a private aircraft intruded into the warning area off the coast of Cape Canaveral. 340.8 km/28.5 degrees 119,513.2 kg September 5, 1984, 6:37:54 a.m. PDT, Runway 17, Edwards AFB Orbiter was returned to Kennedy September 10, 1984. 3,131.8 m 60 seconds 6 days, hours, 56 minutes, 4 seconds 97 Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN) SBS-4/PAM-D, Syncom IV-2/UUS (Leasat-2), and Telstar 3-C/PAM-D None Cloud Logic to Optimize Use of Defense Systems (CLOUDS). Sponsored by the Air Force, this payload consisted of two 250-exposure camera assemblies with battery-powered motor drives, which were used at the aft flight deck station for cloud photography data collection. 308 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-29 continued Vehicle Glow Experiment. This experiment characterized sur- face-originated vehicle glow on strips of material that were attached to the robot arm. Observations made during previous Shuttle flights indicated that optical emissions originated on spacecraft surfaces facing the direction of orbital motion. These emissions showed differing spectral distribution and intensity of the glow for different materials and spacecraft altitude. These results had significance for observations made from the space telescope and space station. CFES-III (see STS-6) Radiation Monitoring Experiment (see STS-8) IMAX(seeSTS41-C) Mission Success Shuttle Student Involvement Program: Purification and Growth of Single Crystal Gallium by the Float Zone Technique in a Zero Gravity Environment, Shawn Murphy/Rockwell International. This experiment compared a crystal grown by the "Flat Zone" technique in a low-gravity environment with one grown in an identical manner on Earth. Successful SPAC I : TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGH1 \W) Table 3 30. STS41-G Mission Characteristics Vehicle Crew Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Challenger (OV-099) Cmdr: Robert L. Crippen Pilot: Jon A. McBride MS: David C. Leestma, Sally K. Ride, Kalhryn I). Sullivan PS: Paul D. Scully-Power, Marc (iaincau (Canadian Space Agency) October 5, 1984 7:03:00 a.m.. EDT, Kennedy Space Center Launch proceeded as scheduled with no delays. 403.7 km/57.0 degrees 110,125 kg October 13, 1984, 12:26:38 p.m., EDT, Runway 33, Kennedy 3,220 m 54 seconds 8 days, 5 hours, 23 minutes, 38 seconds Landed Revolution No. 133 Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN)/Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) Earth Radiation Budget Satellite (ERBS) G-013 Customer: Kayser-Threde GMBH The Halogen Lamp Experiment (HALEX) tested the perfor- mance of halogen lamps during periods of microgravity. The flight was financed by ESA. G-007 Customer: Alabama Space and Rocket Center Project Explorer Payload: 1 . This experiment attempted to transmit radio-frequency mea- surements to ground-based radio hams around the world. This experiment was built by the Marshall Space Flight Center Amateur Radio Club. 2. Alabama university students investigated the growth of a complex inorganic compound with exceptional conductive properties, the solidification of an alloy with superplastic properties, and the germination and growth of radish seeds in space. The payload did not operate, and a reflight was scheduled for STS 61-C. G-032 Customer: International Space Corp. This experiment studied the strength of surface tension in the absence of gravity by firing BBs at free-standing spheres of water in microgravity. A second experiment on this GAS used five small electrical furnaces to produce new materials. 310 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-30 continued G-306 Customer: Department of Defense Space Test Program The Trapped Ions in Space experiment recorded the tiny radia- tion damage tracks left by heavy ions as they passed through a stack of track-detecting plastic sheets during flight. Upon return to Earth, the tracks were etched chemically, revealing cone- shaped pits where particles had passed. Investigators then stud- ied the pits to deduce the energies and arrival direction of the different types of ions that were collected. G-038 Customer: Marshall — McShane The investigator used vacuum deposition techniques to coat glass spheres with gold, platinum, and other metals to create lustrous space sculptures. The process was similar to that used on Earth to coat lenses, glass, and mirrors, but the vacuum and weightlessness of space allowed a highly uniform coating only a few microns thick. A control sphere was evacuated to the nat- ural vacuum level of space and sealed. Back on Earth, the investigator took measurements of it to determine the vacuum level at which the depositions had occurred. G-518 Customer: Utah State University Four experiments flown on STS 41-B were reflown. The exper- iments explored basic physical processes in a microgravity environment: capillary waves caused when water is excited, separation of flux and solder, thermocapillary convection, and a fluid flow system in a heat pipe. G-074 Customer: McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co. This experiment demonstrated two methods of delivering par- tially full tanks of liquid fuel, free of gas bubbles, to engines that control and direct orbiting spacecraft. G-469 Customer: Goddard Space Flight Center The Cosmic Ray Upset Experiment (CRUX) III evolved from experiments flown on STS-8 and STS 41-B. It tested fur types of advanced, state-of-the-art microcircuits, totaling more than 12 megabytes. This environment for this experiment was harsh- er by orders of magnitude than for previous CRUX payloads carried at lower latitudes. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT Ml Table 3 30 continued Experiments Aurora Photography Expenment. I his was conducted foi the U.S. An Force. Orbital Refueling System. This developed and demonstrated the equipment and techniques for refueling existing satellites in orbit. Four fuel transfers, controlled by the crew from within the crew cabin, were performed during the mission, in addition to a spacewalk designed to connect a servicing tool to valves thai simulated existing satellites not originally designed lor on- orbit refueling. Radiation Monitoring Experiment (see STS-8) IMAX(seeSTS41-C) Canadian Experiment (CANEX). Mark Garneau, the Canadian payload specialist, conducted ten experiments for the National Research Council of Canada. They fell into the categories of space technology, space science, and life sciences. Mission Success Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD). The Central Research Institute for Physics in Budapest, Hungary, developed a small portable dosimetry system that was carried in a cabin locker. It received doses of cosmic radiation during spaceflight for com- parison with the currently used dosimetry systems. Successful, with the exception of the Shuttle Imaging Radar (SIR)-B. Challenger 's Ku-band antenna problems severely affected the SIR-B. A reflight of SIR-B was requested and manifested on STS 72-A, at that time scheduled for launch in February 1987. 312 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-31. STS 51 -A Mission Characteristics Vehicle Crew Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Landed Revolution No. 127 Discovery (OV-103) Cmdr: Frederick H. Hauck Pilot: David M. Walker MS: Anna L. Fisher, Dale A. Gardner, Joseph P. Allen November 8, 1984, 7:15:00 a.m., EST, Kennedy Space Center Launch attempt on November 7 was scrubbed during a built-in hold at T-20 minutes because of wind shears in the upper atmosphere. The countdown on November 8 proceeded as scheduled. 342.6 km/28.5 degrees 119,443.7 kg November 16, 1984, 6:59:56 a.m., EST, Runway 15, Kennedy 2,881.6 m 58 seconds 7 days, 23 hours, 44 minutes, 56 seconds Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials Experiments Mission Success Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN)/ Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) Telesat-H/PAM-D (Anik D2), Syncom IV-1/PAM-D (Leasat-1) None The Diffusive Mixing of Organic Solutions (DMOS) experi- ment, a collaboration between 3M and NASA, was the first attempt to grow organic crystals in the microgravity environ- ment of the orbiter. The program's ultimate goal was to pro- duce commercially valuable products in the fields of organic and polymer chemistry. The experiment studied the physical processes that govern the crystal growth and evaluated the dif- fusive mixing method of crystal growth. It also evaluated the type of apparatus used for its suitability for crystal growth in the weightless environment of low-Earth orbit. Radiation Monitoring Experiment (see STS-8) Successful SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SI'ACIH.KiHI H J Table 3 32. STS51 ('Mission Characteristics Vehicle Crew Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Landed Revolution No Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials Experiments Mission Success Discovery (OV-103) Cmdr: Thomas K. Mnttingly II Pilot: Loren J. Shriver MS: James F. Buchli, Ellison S. Onizuka PS: Gary E. Pay ton January 24, L985, 2:50:00 p.m., EST, Kennedy Space Centei The January 23 launch was scrubbed because of freezing weather conditions. (Challenger was scheduled for STS 51-C, but thermal tile problems forced the substitution of Discovery.) 407.4 km/28.5 degrees 113,804.2 kg January 27, 1985, 4:23:23 p.m., EST, Runway 15, Kennedy 2,240.9 m 50 seconds 3 days, 1 hour, 33 minutes, 23 seconds 49 Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN)/ Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) DOD85-1/IUS None Aggregation of Red Blood Cells. This tested the capability of the apparatus to study in weightlessness some of the various characteristics of blood, such as viscosity, and their disease dependencies. Preliminary results indicated that: • It was possible to obtain perfect microphotographs of blood cells in space under conditions of heavy vibration. • Cells form aggregates that grow with time, analogous to pat- terns on Earth. • The internal organization and structure of aggregates seem to be different under zero gravity. • Individual red cells do not show abnormal shapes under zero gravity; notwithstanding the origin of the blood samples, they looked normal. • Because there was no sludging under weightlessness, studies on interactions between cells should be much easier. • Changes in shape of red cells in astronauts (as reported by Johnson Space Center) must be caused by a change of calci- um metabolism. Successful 314 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-33. STS 51-D Mission Characteristics Vehicle Crew Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Landed Revolution No. 1 10 Discovery (OV- 103) Cmdr: Karol J. Bobko Pilot: Donald E. Williams MS: M. Rhea Seddon, S. David Griggs, Jeffrey A. Hoffman PS: Charles D. Walker, Sen. E.J. Garn April 12, 1985, 8:59:05 a.m., EST, Kennedy Space Center The launch set for March 19 was rescheduled to March 28 because of remanifesting of payloads from canceled mission 51-E. The launch was delayed further because of damage to the orbiter's pay load bay door when the facility access platform dropped. The April 12 launch was delayed 55 minutes when a ship entered the restricted solid rocket booster recovery area. 527.8 km/28.5 degrees 113,804.2 kg April 19, 1985, 8:54:28 a.m. EST, Runway 33, Kennedy Extensive brake damage and a blown tire during landing prompted the landing of future flights at Edwards AFB until the implementation of nose wheel steering. 3,138.8 m 63 seconds 6 days, 23 hours, 55 minutes, 23 seconds Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN)/Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) Telesat-I/PAM-D (Anik C-l), Syncom IV-3/UUS (Leasat-3) G-035 Customer: The Asahi Shimbun Physics of Solids and Liquids in Zero Gravity was designed to determine what happened when a metal or plastic (solid) was allowed to collide with a water ball (liquid) in weightlessness. The behavior of the metal or plastic ball and the water ball after collision was observed on video systems. G-471 Customer: Goddard Space Flight Center Capillary Pump Loop Experiment investigated whether a capil- lary pump system could transfer waste heat from a spacecraft out into space. The experiment consisted of two capillary pump evaporators with heaters and was designed to demonstrate that such a system can be used under zero-gravity conditions of spaceflight to provide thermal control of scientific instruments, advanced orbiting spacecraft, and space station components. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGH1 U5 Table 3 33 continued Experiments Phase Partitioning Experiment Phase partitioning is a selective, yel gentle and inexpensive technique used to separate biomed leal materials, SUCh as cells and proteins. It establishes a two phase system by adding various polymers to a water solution containing the materials to be separated. Theoretically, phase partitioning should separate cells with significantly higher reso lution than was presently obtained in the laboratory. Investigators believed that when the phases are emulsified on Earth, the rapid, gravity-driven fluid movements occurring as the phases coalesce tended to randomize the separation process. They expected that the theoretical capabilities of phase parti- tioning systems could be more closely approached in the weightlessness of orbital spaceflight, where gravitational effects of buoyancy and sedimentation were minimized. American Flight Echocardiograph. This experiment studied the effects of weightlessness on the cardiovascular system of astro- nauts, which was important for both personal and operational safety reasons. The newly available instrument gathered in- flight data on these effects during space adaptation to develop optimal countermeasures to crew cardiovascular changes (par- ticularly during reentry) and to ensure long-term safety to peo- ple living in weightlessness. Protein Crystal Growth (PCG). This experiment studied the composition and structure of proteins, extremely important to the understanding of their nature and chemistry and the ability to manufacture them for medical purposes. However, for most complex proteins, it had not been possible to grow, on Earth, crystals large enough to permit x-ray or neutron diffraction analyses to obtain this information. A key objective of the over- all PCG program was to enable drug design without the present empirical approach to enzyme engineering and the manufacture of chemotherapeutic agents. Toys in Space. The crew demonstrated the behavior of simple toys in a weightless environment. The results, recorded and videotaped, became part of a curriculum package for elemen- tary and junior high students through the Houston Museum of Natural Science. Studies showed that students could learn physics concepts by watching mechanical systems in action. In an Earth-based classroom, the gravitational field has a constant value of 1-g. Although the gravity force varied greatly through- out the universe and in noninertial reference frames, students could only experiment in a constant 1-g environment. The film- ing of simple generic-motion toys in the zero-g environment enabled students to discover how the different toy mechanical systems work without gravity. 316 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-33 continued Image Intensifier Investigation. This tested low-light-level pho- tographic equipment, in preparation for the visit by Halley's Comet. Astronaut Hoffman examined an image intensifier cou- pled with a Nikon camera, a combination that intensified usable light by a factor of about 10,000. It was believed that the equipment could be used to observe objects of astronomical interest through the Shuttle's window, including Halley's Comet. Hoffman photographed objects at various distances from the Sun when it was below the horizon, similar to lighting conditions when the comet appeared. Continuous Flow Electrophoresis System (CFES) III (see STS- Medical Experiments Mission Success Shuttle Student Involvement Program: 1. Statoliths in Corn Root Caps examined the effect of weight- lessness on the formation of statoliths (gravity-sensing organs) in plants and was tested by exposing plants with capped and uncapped roots to spaceflight. The root caps of the flight and control plants were examined postflight by an electron microscope for statolith changes. 2. Effect of Weightlessness on the Aging of Brain Cells used houseflies and was expected to show accelerated aging in their brain cells based on an increased accumulation of age pigment in, and deterioration of, the neurons. Utah Senator E.J. "Jake" Garn was the first public official to fly aboard the Space Shuttle. Garn was a payload specialist and congressional observer. As payload specialist, he conducted medical physiological tests and measurements. Tests on Garn detected and recorded changes the body underwent in weight- lessness, an ongoing program that began with astronauts on the fourth Shuttle flight. Garn accomplished the following: • During launch, Garn wore a waist belt with two stethoscope microphones fastened to an elastic bandage. At main engine cutoff, about 8.5 minutes into the flight, the belt was plugged into a portable tape recorder stored in the seat flight bag and began recording bowel sounds to evaluate early in- flight changes in gastric mobility. • An electrocardiogram recorded electrical heart rhythm in the event of space motion sickness in orbit. • Garn was wore a leg plethysmography stocking to measure leg volume. It recorded the shifting of fluids during adapta- tion to weightlessness. • Blood pressure and heart rate were recorded in orbit and during reentry. • Another test measured Garn's height and girth in space to determine the amount of growth and change in body shape associated with weightlessness. Space travelers may grow up to 2 inches while weightless. • Tests determined whether a medication dosage on Earth was adequate in space with acetaminophen. Garn's saliva was collected for analysis after each dose. Successful _ SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 317 Table 3 34. STS 51-B Mission Characteristics Vehicle Crew Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Landed Revolution No Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials Challenger {OS 099) Cmdr: Robert F. Overmyei Pilot: Frederick I). Gregory MS: Don L. Lind, Norman E. Thagard, William E. Thornton PS: Lodewijk van den Berg, Taylor (i. Wang April 29, 1985, I 2:02: IS p.m., EDT, Kennedy Space Center This flight was first manifested as 51-E. It was rolled back from the pad because of a timing problem with the TDRS-B payload. Mission 51-E was canceled, and the orbiter was remanifested with 51-B payloads. The launch on April 29 was delayed 2 minutes, 18 seconds because of a launch processing system failure. 411.1 km/57.0 degrees 111,984.8 kg May 6, 1985, 9: 1 1 :04 a.m. PDT, Runway 17, Edwards AFB Orbiter was returned to Kennedy May 11, 1985. 2,535 m 59 seconds 7 days, hours, 8 minutes, 46 seconds .111 Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN)/ Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) NUSAT (Get-Away Special); GLOMR was scheduled for deployment but was rescheduled on STS 61 -A G-010 Customer: R. Gilbert Moore Northern Utah Satellite (NUSAT) was a cooperative effort among the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Weber State College, Utah State University, New Mexico State University, Goddard, the U.S. Air Force, and more than 26 private corpora- tions. It was deployed into a 20-month orbit. It was an air traf- fic control radar calibration system that measured antenna patterns for ground-based radar operated in the United States and in member countries of the International Civil Aviation Organization. Experiments Mission Success G-308 Customer: Department of Defense Space Test Program The Global Low Orbiting Message Relay (GLOMR) satellite was planned to pick up digital data streams from ground users, store the data, and deliver the messages in these data streams to customers' computer terminals upon command. It was designed to remain in orbit for 1 year. However, because of a malfunc- tion in the Motorized Door Assembly, GLOMR was not deployed on this mission. See Table 4-46, Spacelab 3 Experiments Successful 318 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-35. STS 51-G Mission Characteristics Vehicle Crew Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Discovery (OV-103) Cmdr: Daniel C. Brandenstein Pilot: John O. Creighton MS: Shannon W. Lucid, Steven R. Nagel, John M. Fabian PS: Patrick Baudry (CNES), Sultan Salman Al-Saud June 17. 1985, 7:33:00 a.m., EDT, Kennedy Space Center The launch proceeded as scheduled with no delays. 405.6 km/28.5 degrees 116,363.8 kg June 24, 1985, 6:11:52 a.m., PDT, Runway 23, Edwards AFB Orbiter was returned to Kennedy June 28, 1985. 2,265.6 m 42 seconds 7 days, 1 hour, 38 minutes, 52 seconds Landed Revolution No. 112 Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN)/Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) Morelos-A/PAM-D, Telstar-3D/PAM-D, Arabsat-A/PAM-D, Spartan- 1 (deployed and retrieved) G-025 Customer: ERNO-Raumfahrttechnik GMBH Liquid Sloshing Behavior in Microgravity examined the behav- ior of liquid in a tank in microgravity. It was representative of phenomena occurring in satellite tanks with liquid propellants. The results were expected to validate and refine mathematical models describing the dynamic characteristics of tank-fluid sys- tems. This in turn would support the development of future spacecraft tanks, in particular the design of propellant manage- ment devices for surface-tension tanks. Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials G-027 Customer: DFVLR Slipcasting Under Microgravity Conditions was performed by Germany's material research project, MAUS. Its goal was to demonstrate with model materials the possibility of slipcasting in microgravity, even with unstabilized suspensions using mix- tures of powders with different density, grain size, and concentration. G-028 Customer: DFVLR Fundamental Studies in Manganese-Bismuth produced man- ganese-bismuth specimens with possibly better magnetic prop- erties than currently was possible under Earth gravity. SIVU'I- TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT U9 Table 3 35 continued G-034 Customer: Dickshire ( loors Texas Student Experiments featured twelve differenl biologii al and physical science experiments designed by high school stu dents from El Paso and Ysleta, Texas. The microgravity experi ments studied the growth of lettuce seeds, barley seed germination, the growth of brine shrimp, germination of turnip seeds, the regeneration of the flat work planeria. the wicking of fuels, the effectiveness of antibiotics on bacteria, the growth of soil mold, crystallization in zero gravity, the symbiotic growth of the unicellular algae chlorella and the milk product kefir, the operation of liquid lasers, and the effectiveness of dynamic ran- dom access memory computer chips without ozone protection. G-314 Customer: DOD Space Test Program Space Ultraviolet Radiation Environment (SURE) measured the natural radiation field in the upper atmosphere at extreme ultra- violet wavelengths, between 50 and 100 nanometers. These measurements provided a way of remotely sensing the ionos- phere and upper atmosphere. Experiments G-471 Customer: Goddard Space Flight Center Capillary Pumped Loop investigated the thermal control capa- bility of a capillary-pumped system under zero-gravity condi- tions for ultimate use in large scientific instruments, advanced orbiting spacecraft, and space station components. Spartan 1 . This was the first in a series of Shuttle-launched, short-duration free-flyers designed to extend the capabilities of sounding rocket class experiments. Its primary mission was to perform medium-resolution mapping of the x-ray emission from extended sources and regions, specifically the hot (10,000 degrees Celsius) gas pervading a large cluster of galax- ies in the constellation Perseus and in the galactic center and Scorpius-X-2. In addition, it mapped the x-ray emissions from the nuclear region of the Milky Way galaxy. French Echocardiograph Experiment. This measured and stud- ied the evolution of the fundamental parameters that character- ized cardiac function, blood vessel circulation, and cardiovascular adaptation. After reviewing the data, the princi- pal investigator observed a decrease of cardiac volume, stroke volume, and left ventricular diastolic volume, a decrease in cerebral circulatory resistance, and noted variations in peripher- al resistance and vascular stiffness of the lower limbs. 320 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-35 continued French Posture Experiment. This had five general objectives: a study of the adaptive mechanisms of postural control, the influ- ence of vision in adaptations, the role of the otoliths in the ocu- lomotor stabilization reflexes, their role in the coordination of eye and head movements, and mental representation of space. After reviewing the data, the principal investigator observed a change in vertical optokinetic nystagmus, which included an asymmetry reversal and a downward shift in beating field of the nystagmus, as well as a decrease in the gain of the vestibu- lar ocular reflex. Automated Directional Solidification Furnace. Experiments carried out in the furnace demonstrated the capability of the furnace equipment and provided preliminary scientific results on magnetic composites. Future missions would demonstrate the feasibility of producing improved magnetic composite materials for commercial use. These materials could eventually lead to smaller, lighter, stronger and longer lasting magnets for electrical motors used in aircraft and guidance systems, surgical instruments, and transponders. Mission Success High-Precision Tracking Experiment. Flown by the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, this tested the ability of a ground laser beam director to accurately track an object in low- Earth orbit. Successful SPACT: TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 321 Table 3 36. STS 51 -F Mission Characteristics Vehicle Crew Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Landed Revolution No Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get- Away Specials Challenger (OV-099) Cmdr: C. Gordon Fullerton Pilot: Roy I). Bridges, Jr. MS: F. Story Musgrave, Karl (i. Ileni/e, Anthony W. England PS: Loren W. Acton, John- David F. Bartoe July 29, 1985, 5:00:00 p.m., EDT, Kennedy Space (enter The launch countdown on July 12 was halted at T-3 seconds when a malfunction of the number two main engine coolant valve caused a shutdown of all three main engines. Launch countdown was initiated on July 27 and continued to about T-9 minutes on July 29. At that time, launch was delayed 1 hour, 37 minutes because of a problem with the table maintenance block update uplink. In addition, ascent was hampered when at 5 minutes, 45 seconds into ascent, the number one main engine shut down prematurely, resulting in an abort-to-orbit trajectory. The abort-to-orbit trajectory resulted in the orbiter's insertion orbit altitude being approximately 108 x 143 nautical miles. A final orbit if 314.84 x 316.69 kilometers was achieved to meet science payload requirements. During launch and ascent, verifi- cation flight instrumentation (VFI) operated. The VFI was strategically located throughout Spacelab and at the Spacelab interfaces with the orbiter. The VFI monitored Spacelab sub- system performance and Spacelab/orbiter interfaces. Data were recorded during launch and ascent on the VFI tape recorder and played back to ground receiving stations during acquisition of signal periods utilizing the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS). 314.84 km/49.5 degrees 114,695 kg August 6, 1985, 12:45:26 p.m., PDT, Runway 23, Edwards AFB The VFI continued to monitor and record selected Spacelab parameters on the VFI tape recorder and the orbiter payload recorder during descent and landing. Approximately 25 minutes after landing, orbiter power was removed from Spacelab. The mission was extended 17 revolutions for additional payload activities because of the abort-to-orbit. Orbiter was returned to Kennedy August 11, 1985. 2,611.8 m 55 seconds 7 days, 22 hours, 45 minutes, 26 seconds 127 Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN)/ Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) Plasma Diagnostics Package (PDP) (see experiments below) None 322 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-36 continued Experiments Spacelab 2 (see Table 4—47, Spacelab 2 Experiments) Plasma Diagnostics Package. The instrument package was extended and released by the RMS to take measurements after the orbiter maneuvered to selected attitudes. After taking mea- surements, the manipulator arm recaptured the PDP and returned it to the vicinity of the payload bay. Before landing, it was locked back in place on the aft pallet. Instruments mounted within the PDP included a quadrispherical low-energy proton and electron differential analyzer, a plasma wave analyzer and electric dipole and magnetic search coil sensors, a direct cur- rent electric field meter, a triaxial flux-gate magnetometer, a Langmuir probe, a retarding potential analyzer and differential flux analyzer, an ion mass spectrometer, and a cold cathode vacuum gauge. (See Chapter 4 for further data on the PDP.) Protein Crystal Growth in a Microgravity Environment. The pur- pose was to develop hardware and procedures for growing pro- teins and other organic crystals by two methods in the orbiter during the low-gravity portion of the mission. Generally, hard- ware for both methods worked as planned. Postflight analysis showed that minor modification in the flight hardware was need- ed and a means of holding the hardware during activation, crys- tal growth, deactivation, and photography was desirable. The dialysis method produced three large tetragonal lysozyme crys- tals with average dimensions of 1.3 mm x 0.65 mm x 0.65 mm. The solution growth methods produced small crystals of lysozyme, alpha-2 interferon, and bacterial purine nucleoside phosphorylase. (See also STS 51-D.) Gravity-Influenced Lignification in Higher Plants/Plant Growth Unit. Mung beans and pine seedlings, planted in the Plant Growth Unit before flight, were flown to monitor the produc- tion of lignin, a structural rigidity tissue found in plants. Mission Success Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment (SAREX). Astronauts England and Bartoe conversed from Challenger with amateur radio operators through a handheld radio. Successful SPACL TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGH1 J23 Table 3-37. STS 51-1 Mission Characteristu V Vehicle Crew Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Landed Revolution No Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials Experiments Mission Success Discovery (OV- 103) Cmdr: Joseph H. Engle Pilot: Richard (). Covey MS: James I). A. van Molten, John M. Lounge, William F. Fisher August 27, 19X5, 6:58:01 a.m., EDT, Kennedy Space Center The August 24 launch was scrubbed at T-5 minutes because of thunderstorms in the vicinity. The launch on August 25 was delayed when the orbiter's number five on-board general pur- pose computer failed. The launch on August 27 was delayed 3 minutes, 1 second because of a combination of weather and an unauthorized ship entering the restricted solid rocket booster recovery area. 514.9 km/28.5 degrees 118,983.4 kg September 3, 1985, 6:15:43 a.m., PDT, Runway 23, Edwards AFB The mission was shortened 1 day when the Aussat sunshield hung up on the Remote Manipulator System camera and Aussat had to be deployed before scheduled. Orbiter was returned to Kennedy September 8, 1985. 1,859.3 m 47 seconds 7 days, 2 hours, 17 minutes, 42 seconds .112 Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN)/Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) ASC-1/PAM-D; Aussat- 1/PAM-D, Syncom IV-4/UUS (Leasat-4); Syncom IV-4 failed to function after reaching cor- rect geosynchronous orbit None Physical Vapor Transport Organic Solid Experiment (PVTOS). In this second of some 70 experiments the 3M Corporation planned to conduct by 1995, solid materials were vaporized into a gaseous state to form thick crystalline films on selected sub- strates of sublimable organics. 3M researchers studied the crys- tals produced by PVTOS for their optical properties and other characteristics that might ultimately have important applications to 3M's businesses in the areas of electronics, imaging, and health care. Successful 324 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-38. STS 51 -J Mission Characteristics Vehicle Crew Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Landed Revolution No. 64 Atlantis (OV- 104) Cmdr: Karol J. Bobko Pilot: Ronald J. Grabe MS: Robert L. Stewart, David C. Hilmers PS: William A. Pailes October 3, 1985, 11:15:30 a.m., EDT, Kennedy Space Center The launch was delayed 22 minutes, 30 seconds because of the main engine liquid hydrogen prevalve close remote power con- troller showing a faulty "on" indication. 590.8 km/28.5 degrees classified October 7, 1985, 10:00:08 a.m., PDT, Runway 23, Edwards AFB Orbiter returned to Kennedy October 11, 1985. 2,455.5 m 65 seconds 4 days, 1 hour, 44 minutes, 38 seconds Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials Experiments Mission Success Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN) Not available None Not available Successful SPACLTRANSI'Okl AIION/HUMAN SPAC I IIJCiFII 325 /able J 39. STS61-A Mission Characteristics Vehicle Crew Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Challenger (OV-099) Cmdr: Henry W. Hartsfield, Jr. Pilot: Steven R. Nagel MS: James F. Buchli, Guion S. Bluford, Jr., Bonnie J. Dunbar PS: Reinhard Furrer, Ernst Messerschmid, Wubbo J. Ockels (ESA) October 30, 1985, 12:00:00 noon, EST, Kennedy Space (enter Launch proceeded as scheduled with no delays. 383.4 km/57.0 degrees Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials 110,570.4 kg November 6, 1985, 9:44:53 a.m., PST, Runway 17, Edwards AFB Orbiter was returned to Kennedy November 1 1, 1985. 2,531.1 m 45 seconds 7 days, hours, 44 minutes, 53 seconds Landed Revolution No. 112 Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN)/Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) Global Low Orbiting Message Relay (GLOMR) deployed from G-308 G-308 Customer: Department of Defense Space Test Program GLOMR, originally planned for deployment on STS 51-B, was successfully deployed and remained in orbit for 14 months. The GLOMR satellite, a 68-kilogram, 62-side polyhedron, was a data-relay, communications spacecraft. Its purpose was to demonstrate the ability to read signals and command oceano- graphic sensors, locate oceanographic and other ground sen- sors, and relay data from them to customers. The satellite could pick up digital data streams from ground users, store the data, and deliver the streams to customers' computer terminals upon command. Spacelab D-l (see Table 4-48, Spacelab D-l Experiments) Successful Experiments Mission Success 326 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-40. STS 61 -B Mission Characteristics Vehicle Crew Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Landed Revolution No. 109 Atlantis (OV-104) Cmdr: Brewster H. Shaw, Jr. Pilot: Bryan D. O'Connor MS: Mary L. Cleave, Sherwood C. Spring, Jerry L. Ross PS: Rodolfo Neri Vela, Charles D. Walker November 26, 1985, 7:29:00 p.m., EST, Kennedy Space Center The launch proceeded as scheduled with no delays. 416.7 km/28.5 degrees 118,596 kg December 3, 1985, 1:33:49 p.m., PST, Runway 22, Edwards AFB The mission was shortened one revolution because of lightning conditions at Edwards. Atlantis landed on a concrete runway because the lakebed was wet. Orbiter was returned to Kennedy December 7, 1985. 3,279.3 m 78 seconds 6 days, 21 hours, 4 minutes, 49 seconds Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials Experiments Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN)/ Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) Morelos-B/PAM-D, AUSSAT-2/PAM-D, Satcom Ku-2/PAM-DII G-479 Customer: Telesat Canada Telesat, Canada's domestic satellite carrier, sponsored a nation- al competition soliciting science experiments from Canadian high school students. The selected experiment, called Towards a Better Mirror, proposed to fabricate mirrors in space that would provide higher performance than similar mirrors made on Earth. Orbiter Experiments (OEX). An onboard experimental digital autopilot software package was tested. The autopilot software could be used with the orbiter, another space vehicle, such as the Orbital Transfer Vehicle, which was under development, or the space station. OEX was designed to provide precise stationkeep- ing capabilities between various vehicles operating in space. Protein Crystal Growth Experiment (PCG). This experiment studied the possibility of crystallizing biological materials, such as hormones, enzymes, and other proteins. Successful crystal- lization of these materials, which were very difficult to crystal- lize on Earth, would allow their three-dimensional atomic structure to be determined by x-ray crystallography. IMAX Cargo Bay Camera. The IMAX camera was used to document payload bay activities associated with the EASE/ACCESS assembly during the two spacewalks. Experimental Assembly of Structures in Extravehicular Activity (EASE). This experiment studied EVA dynamics and human factors in the construction of structures in space. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 327 Table J 40 continued Assembly Concepl for Construction of Erectable Space Structures (ACCESS). This experiment validated ground based timelines based on the neutral buoyaney water simulator at the Marshall Space Right Center, lluntsville, Alabama. (Yew members manually assembled and disassembled a 45-foot truss to evaluate concepts lor assembling larger structures in space. Morelos Payload Specialist Experiments. Rodolfo Neri Vela performed a series of mid-deck cabin experiments and took photographs of Mexico: 1. Effects of Spatial Environment on the Reproduction and Growing of Bacteria. Cultures of Escherichia coli B-strain were mixed in orbit with different bacteriophages that attack the E. coli and were observed for possible changes and pho- tographed as required. 2. Transportation of Nutrients in a Weightless Environment. Ten plant specimens were planted in containers that allowed a radioactive tracer to be released in orbit for absorption by the plants. At selected intervals, each plant was sectioned and the segments retained for postflight analysis to deter- mine the rate and extent of absorption. 3. Electropuncture and Biocybernetics in Space. This experi- ment validated electropuncture theories, which stated that disequilibrium in the behavior of human organs could be monitored and stimulated using electric direct current in specified zones. The experiment was performed by measur- ing the conductance of electricity in a predetermined zone. If a disequilibrium was detected, exercises or stimulus would be applied for a certain period until the value of the conductance fell into the normal range. 4. Effects of Weightlessness and Light on Seed Germination. Seed specimens of amaranth, lentil, and wheat were planted in orbit in two identical containers. One container was exposed to illumination and the other to constant darkness. Photographs of the resulting sprouts were taken every 24 hours. One day prior to landing, the sprouts were submitted to a metabolical detection process for subsequent histologi- cal examination on Earth to determine the presence and localization of starch granules. 5. Photography of Mexico. Postearthquake photos were taken of Mexico and Mexico City. Diffusive Mixing of Organic Solutions. This experiment grew organic crystals in near- zero gravity. 3M scientists hoped to pro- duce single crystals that are more pure and larger than those available on Earth to study their optical and electrical properties. Mission Success Continuous Flow Electrophoresis System (CFES) (see STS-6) Successful 328 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-41. STS 61 -C Mission Characteristics — „ Vehicle Crew Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Landed Revolution No.98 Columbia (OV-102) Cmdr: Robert L. Gibson Pilot: Charles F. Bolden, Jr. MS: Franklin R. Chang-Diaz, Steven A. Hawley, George D. Nelson PS: Robert J. Cenker, Congressman Bill Nelson January 12, 1986, 6:55:00 a.m., EST, Kennedy Space Center The launch set for December 18, 1985, was delayed 1 day when additional time was needed to close out the orbiter aft compartment. The December 19 launch attempt was scrubbed at T-14 seconds because of an indication that the right solid rocket booster hydraulic power unit was exceeding RPM red- line speed limits. (This was later determined to be a false read- ing.) After an 18-day delay, a launch attempt on January 6, 1986, was halted at T-31 seconds because of the accidental draining of liquid oxygen from the external tank. The January 7 launch attempt was scrubbed at T-9 minutes because of bad weather at both transoceanic landing sites (Moron, Spain, and Dakar, Senegal). After a 2-day delay, the launch set for January 9 was delayed because of a launch pad liquid oxygen sensor breaking off and lodging in the number two main engine prevalve. The launch set for January 10 was delayed for 2 days because of heavy rains. The launch countdown on January 12 proceeded with no delays. 392.6 km/28.5 degrees 116,123 kg January 18, 1986, 5:58:51 a.m. PST, Runway 22, Edwards AFB The planned landing at Kennedy, originally scheduled for January 17, was moved to January 16 to save orbiter turn- around time. The landing attempts on January 16 and 17 were abandoned because of unacceptable weather at Kennedy. A landing was set for January 18 at Kennedy, but persisting bad weather forced a one-revolution extension of mission and land- ing at Edwards AFB. Orbiter was returned to Kennedy January 23, 1986. 3,110 m 59 seconds 6 days, 2 hours, 3 minutes, 51 seconds Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN)/ Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) SatcomKU-1/PAM-DII The Environmental Monitoring Package was contributed by Goddard to measure the effects of launch and landing forces on the bridge and, hence, on the internal environment of the GAS containers. Sound levels, vibrations, and temperature were measured by attaching acoustical pickups, accelerometers, strain gauges, and thermocouples to the bridge. These instru- ments were connected to a GAS container with equipment that controlled the instruments and recorded their data. SPACIi TRANSIT )k I A I l( )N/I II IM AN SPA( I'll K il II 129 Table 3 41 continued The GAS Bridge Assembly was Mown for the first time on this mission. It contained the 12 (iAS canisters G-310 The objective of this Air Force Academy-sponsored payload was to measure the dynamics of a vibrating beam in a xero-g environment. G-463, G-464, G-462 Customer: NASA Office of Space Science and Applications Ultraviolet Experiment was a group of get-away specials designed to measure diffuse ultraviolet background radiation. The two ultraviolet spectrometers were to look into distant space to observe the high-energy spectrum thought to be asso- ciated with the origin of the universe. Other observational tar- gets included galaxies, dust areas, Halley's Comet, and selected stars. It was the only set of GAS experiments to fly as a group of three electrically interconnected containers. G-062 Customer: General Electric Company Space Division Four student experiments from Pennsylvania State University and sponsored by the General Electric Co. made up this pay- load. The liquid droplet heat radiator experiment tested an alternative method of heat transfer, which investigated how moving droplets can radiate heat into space. The second experi- ment studied the effect of microgravity on the surface tension of a fluid. The third experiment studied the effect of convection on heat flow in a liquid by submersing a heat source in a con- tainer of liquid. G-332 Customer: Booker T. Washington High School This canister contained two contributions from Houston, Texas. The Brine Shrimp Artemia experiment from Booker T. Washington High School determined the behavioral and physi- ological effects of microgravity on eggs hatched in space. The High School for Engineering provided the Fluid Physics Experiment, which examined the behavior of fluid when heated in microgravity. G-446 Customer: Alltech Associates, Inc. This experiment investigated the effect of gravity on particle dis- persion of packing material in high-performance liquid chro- matography analytical columns. The investigators expected that by reducing gravity, a more efficient column would be produced. 330 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-41 continued G-470 Customer: Goddard Space Flight Center A joint investigation by Goddard and the U.S. Department of Agriculture examined the effects of weightlessness on gypsy moth eggs and engorged female American dog ticks. It was hoped that the data obtained would lead to new means of con- trolling these insect pests. G-007 Customer: Alabama Space and Rocket Center This canister housed four specific payloads that were originally scheduled to fly on STS 41-G. However, it was not turned on during that mission. Postflight investigation determined that the experiments were not at fault, and they were rescheduled for STS 61-C. The experiment included: 1 . A study of the solidification of lead-antimony and alu- minum-copper alloys 2. A comparative morphological and anatomical study of the primary root system of radish seeds 3. Examination of the growth of metallic-appearing needle crys- tals in an aqueous solution of potassium tetracyanoplatinate 4. A half-wave dipole antenna installed on the canister's top cover plate that was sponsored by the Marshall Amateur Radio Club G-449 Customer: St. Mary's Hospital, Milwaukee The Laser Laboratory at St. Mary's Hospital in Milwaukee sponsored this four-part experiment: 1 . The BMJ experiment studied the biological effects of neodymium and helium-neon laser light upon desiccated human tissue undergoing cosmic ray bombardment. Medica- tions also were exposed to laser light and cosmic radiation. 2. LEDAJO was to determine cosmic radiation effects on med- ications and medical/surgical materials using Lexan detectors. 3. BLOTY analyzed contingencies that develop because of zero-gravity in blood typing. In Earth-bound blood typing, gravity was essential to produce clumping. 4. CROLO evaluated laser optical protective eyewear materials following exposure to cosmic radiation. G-481 Customer: Vertical Horizons This payload transported samples of painted linen canvases and other artistic materials into space. The investigators evaluated how unprimed canvas, prepared linen canvas, and portions of oil painted canvas reacted to space travel. SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT J31 Table 3 41 continued Experiments G-494 Customer: National Research Council of Canada This payload was co-sponsored by the Canada ( !entre for Space Science and the National Research Council of Canada. The experiment consisted of seven filtered photometers thai mea sureel oxygen, oxide, and continuum emissions in the terrestrial night glow and in the Shuttle night glow. Materials Science Laboratory-2 (MSL-2). Primary mission objectives were the engineering verification of the MSL pay- load carrier and of the three materials processing facilities. Secondary objectives were the acquisition of flight specimens and experimental data for scientific evaluation. The MSL-2 held the following experiments: 1. Electromagnetic Levitator. This experiment studied the effects of material flow during solidification of a melted material in the microgravity environment. 2. Automated Directional Solidification Furnace. This experi- ment investigated the melting and solidification process of four materials. 3. Three- Axis Acoustic Levitator. Twelve liquid samples were suspended in sound pressure waves, and rotated and oscillat- ed in a low-gravity, nitrogen atmosphere. Investigators studied the degree of sphericity attainable and small bubble migration similar to that found in the refining of glass. Comet Halley Active Monitoring Program. This was supposed to investigate the dynamical/morphological behavior as well as the chemical structure of Comet Halley. The 35mm camera that was to photograph Comet Halley did not function properly because of battery problems. Infrared Imaging Experiment. This acquired radiometric pic- tures/information of selected terrestrial and celestial targets. Initial Blood Storage Experiment. This experiment investigated the factors that limit the storage of human blood. The experiment attempted to isolate factors such as sedimentation that occurred under standard blood bank conditions. A comparison was made of changes in whole blood and blood components that had expe- rienced weightless conditions in orbit with similar samples stored in otherwise comparable conditions on the ground. 332 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-A1 continued Hitchhiker G- 1 .This was the first of a generic class of small payloads under the Small Payload Accommodation program. These payloads were located in the orbiter bay on the starboard side and used specially designed carriers, which attached to the existing GAS attach fittings. This supported three instruments: 1 . Particle Analysis Cameras for the Shuttle provided film images of particle contamination around the Shuttle in sup- port of future DOD infrared telescope operations. 2. Capillary Pump Loop provided a zero-g test of a new heat transport system. 3. Shuttle Environment Effects on Coated Mirrors was a pas- sive witness mirror-type experiment that determined the effects of contamination and atomic oxygen on ultraviolet optics material. Mission Success Shuttle Student Involvement Program: 1. Argon Injection as an Alternative to Honeycombing was a material processing experiment that examined the ability to produce a lightweight, honeycomb structure superior to the Earth-produced structures. 2. Formation of Paper in Microgravity studied the formation of cellulose fibers in a fiber mat under weightless conditions. 3. Measurement of Auxin Levels and Starch Grains in Plant Roots investigated the geotropism of a corn root growth in microgravity and determined whether starch grains in the root cap were actually involved with auxin production and transport. Successful SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 333 Table 3-42. SIS 51-L Mission Characteristics Vehicle Crew Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Landed Revolution No Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials Experiments Mission Success Challenger (OV-099) Cmdr: Francis R. Scobee Pilot: Michael J. Smith MS: Judith A. Resnik, Ellison S. Oni/uka, Ronald E. McNair PS: Gregory B. Jarvis Teacher in Space Project: Sharon Christa McAuliHe January 28, 1986, 1 1:38:00, EST, Kennedy Space Center The first Shuttle liftoff scheduled for January 22 was slipped to January 23, then January 24, because of delays in STS 61-C. The launch was reset for January 25 because of bad weather at the transoceanic abort landing site in Dakar, Senegal. To use Casablanca (not equipped for night landings) as an alternate transoceanic abort landing site, T-zero was moved to a morning liftoff time. The launch was postponed 1 day when launch pro- cessing was unable to meet the new morning liftoff time. A pre- diction of unacceptable weather at Kennedy led to the launch being rescheduled for 9:37 a.m., EST, January 27. The launch was delayed 24 hours when the ground-servicing equipment hatch-closing fixture could not be removed from the orbiter hatch. The fixture was sawed off and the attaching bolt drilled out before closeout was completed. During the delay, cross winds exceeded return-to-launch-site limits at Kennedy's Shuttle Landing Facility. The January 28 launch was delayed 2 hours when the hardware interface module in the launch processing system, which monitors the fire detection system, failed during liquid hydrogen tanking procedures. An explosion 73 seconds after liftoff claimed the crew and vehicle. 2,778.8 km (planned)/28.5 degrees (planned) 121,778.4 kg No landing N/A N/A 73 seconds N/A Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN)/ Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) None None None Unsuccessful 334 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-43. STS-26 Mission Characteristics Vehicle Crew Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Landed Revolution No Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials Experiments Discovery (OV-103) Cmdr: Frederick H. Hauck Pilot: Richard O. Covey MS: John M. Lounge, David C. Hilmers, George D. Nelson September 29, 1988, 11:37:00 a.m., EDT, Kennedy Space Center The launch was delayed 1 hour, 38 minutes to replace the fuses in the cooling systems of two of the crew's flight pressure suits and because of lighter than expected upper atmospheric winds. Suit repairs were successful, and the countdown continued after a waiver of a wind condition constraint. 376 km/28.5 degrees 115,489.3 kg October 3, 1988, 9:37:11 a.m., PDT, Runway 17, Edwards AFB Orbiter was returned to Kennedy October 8, 1988. 2,271.1 m 46 seconds 4 days, 1 hour, minutes, 1 1 seconds 64 Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN)/ Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) TDRS-3/IUS None Physical Vapor Transport of Organic Solids. This experiment by 3M scientists produced organic thin films with ordered crys- talline structures to study their optical, electrical, and chemical properties. The results could eventually be applied to the pro- duction of specialized thin films on Earth or in space. Protein Crystal Growth (PCG) experiments. A team of industry, university, and government research investigators explored the potential advantages of using protein crystals grown in space to determine the complex, three-dimensional structure of specific protein molecules. Knowing the precise structure of these com- plex molecules would aid in understanding their biological function and could lead to methods of altering or controlling the function in ways that may result in new drugs. - » Infrared Communications Flight Experiment. Using the same kind of invisible light that remotely controls home TV sets and VCRs, mission specialist Nelson conducted experimental voice communications with his crewmates via infrared, rather than standard radio-frequency, waves. One major objective of the experiment was to demonstrate the feasibility of the secure transmission of information via infrared light. Unlike radio- frequency signals, infrared waves will not pass through the orbiter's windows; thus, a secure voice environment would be created if infrared waves were used as the sole means of com- munications within the orbiter. Infrared waves can also carry data as well as voice (such as biomedical information). SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT J35 Table 3—43 continued Automated Directional Solidification Furnace. This special space fumace developed and managed by Mai shall Space Plight Center demonstrated the possibility of producing lighter, stronger, and better performing magnetic composite materials in a microgravity environment. Aggregation of Red Blood Cells. Blood samples from donors with such medial conditions as heart disease, hypertension, dia- betes, and cancer Hew in this experiment developed by Australia and managed by Marshall. The experiment provided information on the formation rate, structure, and organization of red cell clumps and on the thickness of whole blood cell aggregates at high and low flow rates. It helped determine whether microgravity could play a beneficial role in new and existing clinical research and medical diagnostic tests. Results obtained in the Shuttle microgravity environment were com- pared with results from a ground-based experiment to deter- mine what effects gravity had on the kinetics and morphology of the sampled blood. Isoelectric Focusing. This was a type of electrophoresis experi- ment that separated proteins in an electric field according to their surface electrical charge. Mesoscale Lightning Experiment. This obtained nighttime images of lightning to better understand the effects of lightning discharges on each other, on nearby storm systems, and on storm microbursts and wind patterns and to determine interrela- tionships over an extremely large area. Phase Partitioning Experiment. This investigated the role gravi- ty and other physical forces played in separating — that is, parti- tioning — biological substances between two unmixable liquid phases. OASIS Instrumentation. This collected and recorded a variety of environmental measurements during various in-flight phases of the orbiter. The information was used to study the effects on the orbiter of temperature, pressure, vibration, sound, accelera- tion, stress, and strain. It also was used to assist in the design of future pay loads and upper stages. Earth-Limb Radiance Experiment. Developed by the Barnes Engineering Co., this photographed Earth's "horizon twilight glow" near sunrise and sunset. The experiment provided pho- tographs of Earth's horizon that allowed scientists to measure the radiance of the twilight sky as a function of the Sun's posi- tion below the horizon. This information allowed designers to develop better, more accurate horizon sensors for geosynchro- nous communications satellites. 336 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3^3 continued Shuttle Student Involvement Program: 1 . Utilizing a Semi-Permeable Membrane to Direct Crystal Growth attempted to control crystal growth through the use of a semi-permeable membrane. Lead iodide crystals were formed as a result of a double replacement reaction. Lead acetate and potassium iodide reacted to form insoluble lead iodide crystals, potassium ions, and acetate ions. As the ions traveled across a semi-permeable membrane, the lead and iodide ions collided, forming the lead iodide crystal. 2. Effects of Weightlessness on Grain Formation and Strengthening Metals heated a titanium alloy metal filament to near the melting point to observe the effect of weightless- ness on crystal reorganization within the metal. It was expected that heating in microgravity would produce larger crystal grains and thereby increase the inherent strength of the metal filament. Successful Mission Success SPACT! TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT >37 Table 3-44. STS-27 Mission Characteristics Vehicle Crew Launch Orbital Altitude & Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Post- landing Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Landed Revolution No Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials Experiments Mission Success Atlantis (OV-104) ( "null: Robert L. Gibson Pilot: Guy s. Gardner MS: Richard M. Mullane, Jerry L. Ross, William M. Shepherd December 2, 1988, 9:30:34 a.m., EST, Kennedy Space Center The launch, set for December 1, 1988, during a classified win- dow lying within a launch period between 6:32 a.m. and 9:32 a.m., was postponed because of unacceptable cloud cover and wind conditions and reset for the same launch period on December 2. Altitude classified/57.0 degrees Classified December 6, 1988, 3:36:11 p.m., PST, Runway 17, Edwards AFB Orbiter was returned to Kennedy December 13, 1988 2,171.1 m 43 seconds 4 days, 9 hours, 5 minutes, 37 seconds Not available Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN)/ Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) Not available None Not available Successful 338 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3^5. Return to Flight Chronology Date Event January 28. 1986 Moments after the Challenger (STS 51-L) explosion, all mission data, flight records, and launch facilities are impounded. Within an hour, Associate Administrator for Space Flight Jesse Moore names an expert panel to investigate. January 29 Interim Mishap Investigation Board is named and approved by NASA Acting Administrator William R. Graham. February 3 President Ronald Reagan announces the formation of a presidential commission to investigate the Challenger accident. Commission is to be headed by former Secretary of State William Rogers. February 5 Acting Administrator Graham establishes the 51-L Data and Design Analysis Task Force to assist the Rogers Commission, designating the Associate Administrator for Space Flight as chairperson. February 18 U.S. Senate holds first of a series of hearings on the Challenger accident. February 20 Rear Admiral Richard H. Truly is appointed Associate Administrator for Space Flight. February 25 Administrator James M. Beggs, on leave since December 4, 1985, pending disposition of indictment, resigns. Indictment is later dis- missed, and Beggs receives apology from Attorney General Edwin Meese. March 5 First Program Management Review for Space Shuttle program is held at Marshall. Reviews are planned for every 6 weeks. March 13 NASA begins review of Failure Modes Effects Analysis and Critical Items Lists. March 24 Admiral Truly, in NASA Headquarters Office of Space Flight mem- orandum "Strategy for Safely Returning Space Shuttle to Flight Status," outlines actions required prior to next flight, first flight/first year operations, and development of sustainable flight rate. Truly directs Marshall to form solid rocket motor joint redesign team with National Research Council (NRC) oversight. Truly initiates review of National Space Transportation System (NSTS) management structure. First system design review is conducted to identify changes to improve flight safety. March 28 Arnold D. Aldrich, manager of NSTS, initiates review of all items on Critical Items List. March NASA Flight Rate Capability Working Group is established. April 7 NASA initiates Shuttle crew egress and escape review. May 12 James C. Fletcher is sworn in as NASA Administrator. June 6 Report to the President by the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (Rogers Commission) is released. It recommends: • Redesign faulty joint seal (either eliminate joint or redesign seal to more stringent standards) • Provide independent redesign oversight by NRC • Review Shuttle management to redefine the program manager's responsibility, place astronauts in management positions, and establish an STS Safety Advisory Panel • Improve criticality review and hazard analysis (An audit panel from NRC should verify the adequacy of the effort.) SPACIi TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT J39 Table 3- 45 continued Date Kvent June () com. June 11 June 13 June 19 June 25 June 30 July 8 July 11 July 24 August 15 September 10 September 29 October 1 • Establish a safely office headed by a NASA associate administra- tor to oversee safely, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance functions with viable problem reporting, documenta- tion, and resolution • Improve communication, especially from Marshall, develop launch constraints policy, and record Flight Readiness Review (FRR) and Mission Management Team meetings (Flight crew commander should attend FRR.) • Improve landing safety, including tire brake and nosewheel steer- ing, and conditions for Kennedy landing, with landing area weather forecasts more than an hour in advance, and create crew escape system for controlled gliding flight and launch abort pos- sibilities in case of main engine failures early in ascent • Establish flight rate to be consistent with NASA resources, and create firm payload assignment policy • Implement maintenance safeguards, especially for Criticality I items Admiral Truly testifies before the House Committee on Science and Technology on status of work in response to Rogers Commission recommendations and announces small group to examine overall Space Shuttle program management, to be headed by astronaut Robert L. Crippen. President Reagan writes to NASA requesting the implementation of Rogers Commission recommendations. Centaur upper stage is terminated because of safety concerns. Astronaut Robert L. Crippen is directed to form a fact-finding group to assess Shuttle management structure and implement effective management and communications. Andrew J. Stofan is appointed Associate Administrator of the Office of Space Station at NASA Headquarters. NASA establishes an Office of Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance and appoints George A. Rodney Associate Administrator. NASA Report to the President, Actions to Implement Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger, announces return to flight for first quarter of 1988. Fletcher states NASA has responded favorably to the Rogers Commission recommendations in every area and promises another report in 1 year. NASA announces abandonment of lead center concept for space station. President Reagan issues statement announcing intent to build a fourth Shuttle orbiter as a replacement and that NASA will no longer launch private satellites. Astronaut Brian D. O'Connor is appointed chair of the Space Flight Safety Panel. James R. Thompson is appointed Director of Marshall Space Flight Center. Lt. Gen. Forrest S. McCartney is appointed Director of Kennedy Space Center. 340 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-^45 continued Date Event October 3 October 6 October 12 October 14 October 29 November 11 December 30 January 7, 1987 January 9 January 25 February 25 February March 9 Revised NASA manifest is published incorporating president's new policy on commercialization of space and changes in priorities for flying on the Shuttle. Dale D. Myers is appointed Deputy Administrator of NASA. Aaron Cohen is appointed Director of Johnson Space Center. Astronaut Frederick D. Gregory is appointed Chief, Operational Safety Branch, Safety Division, Office of Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance at NASA Headquarters. U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology releases its report: Investigation of the Challenger Accident. Shuttle management is reorganized. NSTS manager Aldrich is appointed Director of NSTS in the Office of Space Flight at NASA Headquarters. Two NSTS deputy director positions are established: Richard H. Kohrs as Deputy Director for NSTS program and Robert L. Crippen as Deputy Director of NSTS operations. Shuttle project office manager at Marshall is to report directly to the deputy director for NSTS program. Former Apollo program manager Brig. Gen. Samuel C. Phillip's study of NASA management is presented to the NASA administrator. Administrator Fletcher issues "State of NASA" memorandum and reestablishes Project Approval Document as a management tool. Flight crew is selected for first Space Shuttle mission (STS-26, Discovery) after accident: commander — Frederick H. Hauck; pilot — Richard O. Covey; and mission specialists — John M. Lounge, George D. Nelson, and David C. Himmers. Public Opinion Laboratory publishes The Impact of the Challenger Accident on Public Attitudes Toward the Space Program: A Report to the National Science Foundation. Findings include: • Accident increased an already strong national pride in the Shuttle program. Public responded to the deaths of the Challenger astro- nauts with a sense of personal loss. • Public viewed accident as a minor setback, with universal expec- tation of a return to flight. • Cost-benefit assessment increased significantly as a result of the accident. • There was a willingness to support increased federal funds for space. • Rogers Commission discussion and criticism did not erode posi- tive views of NASA held by public. • Net effect of accident was a more positive attitude toward the space program. NASA publishes Responses to the Recommendations of the House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology Report of the Investigation of the Challenger Accident, which includes a summary of activities undertaken in response to the Rogers Commission investigation. Crew begins training for STS-26 mission. Former NASA Deputy Associate Administrator (1965-1975) Willis H. Shapley is appointed Associate Deputy Administrator (Policy). SPACI! TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT Ml Table 3-45 continual Date Event May 29 June 22 June 22 June 30 July 22 July 31 August 4 August 17 August 30 August October 22 October 29 November 19 February 11, 1988 September 29 John ML Klineberg is appointed Director of Lewis Research Center. Noel W. Hinners is appointed Associate Deputy Aclminislralm (Institution). John W. Townsend is appointed Director of Goddard Space Might Center. Administrator Fletcher submits report to the president on status of NASA's work to implement Rogers Commission recommendations. Report details changes to solid rocket motor design, management structure and communications, criticality review and hazards analy- sis, safety organization, landing safety, launch abort and crew escape, flight rate maintenance safeguards, and related return to flight safeguards. Second interim progress report of NRC's Committee on Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit is issued. Replacement orbiter contract is awarded to Rockwell International, and production of OV-105 is initiated. STS-26 begins power-up. Leadership and America s Future in Space (Ride Report) is released. First major test occurs on redesigned solid rocket motor. Advanced solid rocket motor design and definition study contracts are awarded to five aerospace firms by Marshall. NASA issues first mixed fleet manifest for Space Shuttle missions and expendable launch vehicles. Vice President Bush, in speech at Marshall, pledges to reestablish the National Space Council if elected president. Testing begins on escape system that could be activated during con- trolled gliding flight. White House issues the President's Space Policy Directive and Commercial Space Initiative, declaring it is the president's policy to establish long-range goals to expand the human presence and activi- ty beyond Earth orbit into the solar system, to create opportunities for U.S. commerce in space, and to continue the national commit- ment to a permanently manned space station. Successful launch of STS-26, Discovery, signals NASA's "return to flight." Mission launches TDRS-C, lasts 4 days, 1 hour, 57 seconds, and orbits Earth 64 times. 342 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3-46. Sequence of Major Events of the Challenger Accident Mission Time (GMT, in Elapsed Time hr:min:sec) Event (sec.) Source 16:37:53.444 ME 3 Ignition Command 37:53.564 ME 2 Ignition Command 37:53.684 ME 1 Ignition Command 38:00.010 SRM Ignition Command (T=0) 38:00.018 Holddown Post 2 PIC firing 38:00.260 First continuous vertical motion 38:00.688 Confirmed smoke above field joint on RH solid rocket motor 38:00.846 Eight puffs of smoke (from 0.836 through 2.500 sec MET) 38:02.743 Last positive evidence of smoke above right aft solid rocket booster/ external tank attach ring 38:03.385 Last positive visual indication of smoke 38:04.349 SSME 104% Command 38:05.684 RH solid rocket motor pressure 11.8 psi above nominal 38:07.734 Roll maneuver initiated 38: 19.869 SSME 94% Command 38:2 1 . 1 34 Roll maneuver completed 38:35.389 SSME 65% Command 38:37.000 Roll and yaw attitude response to wind (36.990 to 62.990 sec) 38:51.870 SSME 104% Command 38:58.798 First evidence of flame on RH solid rocket motor 38:59.010 Reconstructed Max Q (720 psf) 38:59.272 Continuous well-defined plume on RH solid rocket motor 38:59.763 Flame from RH solid rocket motor in +Z direction (seen from south side of vehicle) 39:00.014 SRM pressure divergence (RH vs. LH) 39:00.248 First evidence of plume deflection, intermittent 39:00.258 First evidence of solid rocket booster plume attaching to external tank ring frame 39:00.998 First evidence of plume deflection, continuous 39:01 .734 Peak roll rate response to wind 39:02.094 Peak TVC response to wind 39:02.414 Peak yaw response to wind 39:02.494 RH outboard elevon actuator hinge moment spike 39:03.934 RH outboard elevon actuator delta pressure change 39:03.974 Start of planned pitch rate maneuver 6.566 GPC 6.446 GPC 6.326 GPC 0.000 GPC 0.008 E8 Camera 0.250 E9 Camera 0.678 E60 Camera 0.836 E63 Camera 2.733 CZR-1 Camera 3.375 E60 Camera 4.339 E41M2076D 5.674 B47P2302C 7.724 V90R5301C 19.859 E41M2076D 21.124 VP0R5301C 35.379 E41M2076D 36.990 V95H352nC 51.860 E41M2076D 58.788 E207 Camera 59.000 BET 59.262 E207 Camera 59.753 E204 Camera 60.004 B47P2302 60.238 E207 Camera 60.248 E203 Camera 60.988 E207 Camera 61.724 V90R5301C 62.084 B58H1150C 62.404 V90R5341C 62.484 V58P0966C 63.924 V58P0966C 63.964 V90R5321C SPAnrrRANSPOKTATION/IIUMAN SPACI-I LKJI 1 1 >43 Table 3 46 continued Mission rime (GMT, in Elapsed Time hi: m in: sec) Event (see.) Source 39:04.670 Change in anomalous plume shape (LH : tank leak near 2058 ring frame) 39:04.715 Bright sustained glow on sides of external tank 39:04.947 Start of SSME gimbal angle large pitch variations 39:05. 174 Beginning of transient motion from changes in aero forces due to plume 39:06.774 Start of external tank LH 2 ullage pressure deviations 39:12.214 Start of divergent yaw rates (RH vs. LH solid rocket booster) 39: 1 2.294 Start of divergent pitch rates (RH vs. LH solid rocket booster) 39:12.488 SRB major high rate actuator command 39: 12.507 SSME roll gimbal rate 5 deg/sec 39: 12.535 Vehicle max +Y lateral acceleration (+.227 g) 39: 12.574 SRB major high rate actuator motion 39: 12.574 Start of H 2 tank pressure decrease with two flow control valves open 39: 12.634 Last state vector downlinked 39: 12.974 Start of sharp MPS LOX inlet pressure drop 39: 1 3.020 Last full computer frame of TDRS data 39: 13.054 Start of sharp MPS LH 2 inlet pressure drop 39: 13.055 Vehicle max; Y lateral acceleration (.254 g) 39:13.134 Circumferential white pattern on external tank aft dome (LH 2 tank failure) 39:13.134 RH solid rocket motor pressure 19 psi lower than LH solid rocket motor 39: 13. 147 First hint of vapor at intertank 39:13.153 All engine systems start responding to loss of fuel and LOX inlet pressure 39:13.172 Sudden cloud along external tank between intertank and aft dome 39:13.201 Flash between orbiter and LH 2 tank 39:13.221 SSME telemetry data interference from 73.211 to 73.303 39: 13.223 Flash near solid rocket booster forward attach and brightening of flash between orbiter and external tank 39: 13.292 First indication of intense white flash at solid rocket booster forward attach point 64.660 64.705 64.937 65.164 66.764 72.204 72.284 72.478 72.497 72.525 E204 Camera E204 Camera V58H1100A V90R5321C T41P1700C V90R2528C V90R2525C V79H2111A V58H1100A V98A1581C 72.564 B58H1151C 72.564 T41P1700C 72.624 Data reduction 72.964 V41P1330C 73.010 Data reduction 73.044 V41P1100C 73.045 V98A1581C 73.124 E204 Camera 73.124 B47P2302C 73.137 E207 Camera 73.143 SSME team 73.162 E207 Camera 73.191 E204 Camera 73.211 73.213 E204 Camera 73.282 E204 Camera 344 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3^46 continued Mission Time (GMT, in Elapsed Time hr:min:sec) Event (sec.) Source 39:13.337 Greatly increased intensity of white flash 39: 1 3.387 Start of RCS jet chamber pressure fluctuations 39: 13.393 All engines approaching HPFT discharge temp redline limits 39: 1 3.492 ME 2 HPFT discharge temp Chan. I A vote for shutdown; two strikes on Chan. 39: 13.492 ME 2 controller last time word update 39: 13.513 ME 3 in shutdown from HPFT discharge temperature redline exceedance 39:13.513 ME 3 controller last time word update 39:13.533 ME 1 in shutdown from HPFT discharge temperature redline exceedance 39:13.553 ME 1 last telemetered data point 39: 13.628 Last validated orbiter telemetry measurement 39: 13.641 End of last reconstructed data frame with valid synchronization and frame count 39: 14. 140 Last radio-frequency signal from orbiter 39: 14.597 Bright flash in vicinity of orbiter nose 39: 16.447 RH solid rocket booster nose cap separation/chute deployment 39:50.260 RH solid rocket booster RSS destruct 39:50.262 LH solid rocket booster RSS destruct 73.327 E204 Camera 73.377 V42P1552A 73.383 E41Tn010D 173.482 MEC data 73.482 MEC data 73.503 MEC data 73.503 MEC data 73.523 Calculation 73.543 Calculation 73.618 V46P0120A 73.631 Data reduction 74.130 Data reduction 74.587 E204 Camera 76.437 E207 Camera 110.250 E202 Camera 110.252 E230 Camera SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT *45 Table 3-47, Chronology of Events Prior to Launch of Challenger (STS 51-L) Related to Temperature Concerns Date and Time (EST) key Participants Event Jan. 27, 1986 NASA project managers and 12:36 p.m. contractor support personnel (including Morton Thiokol) Launch Scrub. Decision made to scrub because of high crosswinds at launch site. Jan. 27 1:00 p.m. Same as above Postscrub Discussion. All appropriate personnel are polled as to feasibility to launch again with 24-hour cycle. Result in no solid rocket booster constraints for launch at 9:38 a.m., January 28: • Request is made for all par- ticipants to report any con- straints. Jan. 27 At Kennedy Space Center: 1:00 p.m. Boyd C. Brinton, manager, space booster project, Thiokol; Lawrence O. Wear, manager, solid rocket motor project office, Marshall Space Flight Center At Morton Thiokol, Utah: Arnold R. Thompson, supervisor, rocket motor cases; Robert Ebeling, manager, ignition system and final assembly, solid rocket motor project Conversation. Wear asks Brinton if Thiokol had any concerns about predicted low temperatures and above what Thiokol had said about cold temperature effects following January 1985 flight 51-C: • Brinton telephones Thompson and other Thiokol personnel to ask them to determine whether there were concerns based on predicted weather conditions. Ebeling and other engineers are notified and asked for evaluation. Jan. 27 NASA Level I and Level II 2:00 p.m. management. At Kennedy: Jesse W. Moore, associate administrator for space flight, NASA Headquarters; Arnold D. Aldrich, manager, space transpor- tation programs, Johnson Space Center; Larry Mulloy, manager, solid rocket booster projects office, Marshall; William Lucas, director, Marshall Mission Management Team Meeting. Discussion includes temperature at the launch facility and weather conditions predicted for launch at 9:38 a.m. on Jan. 28, 1986. 346 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3^4-7 continued Date and Time (EST) Key Participants Event Jan. 27 2:30 p.m. Jan. 27 4:00 p.m. Jan. 27 5:15 p.m. At Thiokol, Utah: R. Boisjoly, seal task force, Morton Thiokol, Utah; Robert Ebeling, manager, ignition system and final assembly, solid rocket motor project At Kennedy: A.J. McDonald, manager, solid rocket motor project, Morton Thiokol; Carver Kennedy, vice president, space services, at Kennedy for Morton Thiokol At Thiokol, Utah: Robert Ebeling, manager solid rocket motor project office, igniter and final assembly, Thiokol, Utah At Kennedy: Al McDonald, manager, solid rocket motor project, Morton Thiokol; Cecil Houston, manager, Marshall resident office at Kennedy Boisjoly learns of cold temperatures at Cape at meeting convened by Ebeling. Telephone Conversation. McDonald receives call from Ebeling expressing concern about performance of solid rocket booster field joints at low temperature: • McDonald indicates he will call back latest temperature predictions up to launch time. • Carver Kennedy calls Launch Operations Center and receives latest tempera- ture information. • McDonald transmits data to Utah and indicates he will set up telecon and asks engineering to prepare. Telephone Conversion. McDonald calls Houston informing him that Morton Thiokol engineering had concerns regarding O-ring temperatures: • Houston indicates he will set up teleconference with Marshall and Morton Thiokol. SPACL TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 347 Table 3 47 ion tinned Date and (EST ime Key Participants Event Jan. 21 5:25 p.m. Jan. 27 5:30 p.m. Jan. 27 5:45 p.m. At Kennedy: Cecil Houston, manager, Marshall resident office at Kennedy At Marshall: Judson A. Lovingood, deputy manager, Shuttle projects office, at Marshall At Kennedy: Stanley R. Reinartz, manager, Shuttle projects office, Marshall At Marshall: Jud Lovingood, deputy manager, Shuttle projects office, Marshall At Kennedy: Stan Reinartz, manager, Shuttle projects, Marshall At Marshall: Jud Lovingood, deputy manager, Shuttle projects office, Marshall Plus Thiokol and other personnel Telephone ( '<>nver\(itt<>n: I louston calls Lovingood informing him of the concerns about temperature effects on the O-rings and asks him to establish a telecon with: Stanley R. Reinartz, manager, Shuttle projects office, Marshall at Kennedy; Lawrence B. Mulloy, manager, solid rocket booster project, Marshall at Kennedy; George Hardy, deputy director, science and engineering, at Marshall; and Thiokol personnel. Telephone Conversation. Lovingood calls Reinartz to inform him of planned 5:45 p.m. teleconference. Lovingood proposes that Kingsbury (director of science and engineering, Marshall) participate in teleconference. Teleconference. The discussion addresses Thiokol concerns regarding the temperature effects on the O-ring seals: • Thiokol is of the opinion launch should be delayed until noon or afternoon. • A decision was made to transmit the relevant data to all of the parties and set up another teleconference for 8:15 p.m. • Lovingood recommends to Reinartz to include Lucas, director, Marshall, and Kingsbury in 8:45 p.m. conference and to plan to go to Level II if Thiokol recommends not launching. 348 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3^7 continued Date and Time Key Participants Event (EST) Jan. 27 At Marshall: Jud Lovingood, Telephone Conversation. 6:30 p.m. deputy manager, Shuttle Lovingood calls Reinartz and projects office, Marshall tells him that if Thiokol per- sists, they should not launch: At Kennedy: Stan Reinartz, • Lovingood also suggests manager, Shuttle projects office, advising Aldrich, manager, Marshall NSTS (Level II), of tele- conference to prepare him for Level I meeting to inform of possible recom- mendation to delay. Jan. 27 At Kennedy: Larry Mulloy, 7:00 p.m. manager, solid rocket booster projects office, Marshall; Stan Reinartz, manager, Shuttle projects office, Marshall; William Lucas, director, Marshall; Vim Kingsbury, director of engineering, Marshall Conversion. Reinartz and Mulloy visit Lucas and Kingsbury in their motel rooms to inform them of Thiokol concern and planned teleconference. Jan. 27 8:45 p.m. Teleconference Participants: At Kennedy: Stan Reinartz, manager, Shuttle projects office, Marshall; Larry Mulloy, manager, solid rocket booster projects office, Marshall; Al McDonald, manager, solid rocket motor project, Morton Thiokol At Marshall: Jud Lovingood, deputy manager, Shuttle project office, Marshall; George Hardy, deputy director, science and engineering, Marshall At Thiokol, Utah: Jerry Mason, senior vice president, Thiokol, Wasatch; Joe Kilminster, vice president/manager, Shuttle projects, Thiokol, Wasatch; Robert Lund, vice president, engineering, Thiokol; Roger Boisjoly, seal task force — structures, Thiokol; Arnie Thompson, supervisor, structures, Thiokol Teleconference. Telefaxes of charts presenting history of O-ring erosion and blow-by for the primary seal in the solid rocket booster field joints from previous flights, as well as results of subscale tests and static tests of solid rocket motors: • The data show that the tim- ing function of the O-rings would be slower from lower temperatures and that the worst blow-by occurred on solid rocket motor 15 (STS51-C) in January 1985 with O-ring tempera- tures of 53 degrees F. • Recommendation by Thiokol was not to launch Challenger (STS 51-L) until the temperature of the O-ring reached 53 degrees F, which was the lowest O-ring temperature of any previous flight. Plus other personnel SPAC'l TRANSIT )KTA'I'I()N/MUM AN SPACEFLIGHT 34/\C III IC JI II 357 Table 3 4 { ) continued Date Mission Purpose Vehicle Jan. 15. 1990 Feb. I, 1990 April 1, 1990 April 15, 1990 May 30, 1990 July 1, 1990 July 15, 1990 Aug. 15, 1990 Sept. 30, 1990 Oct. 15, 1990 STS-41/CiRO STS-42/DOD STS-43/IML STS-44/GPS-5, EOS- 1, SHARE STS-45/DOD STS-46/DOD STS-47/GPS-6, Skynet-4, MSL-5 STS-48/DOD STS-49/Planetary STS-50/GPS-7, INSAT-1D,TSS-1 Atlantis Discovery Columbia NASA mission to inves- Columbia tigate extraterrestrial gamma- ray sources; free-flyer mounts to Shuttle fittings and provides own propulsion; an ELV candidate Classified Commercial maritime communications services; uses PAM-D EOS — Commercial mission to produce pharmaceuticals for large-scale tests leading to FDA approval and commercial production; special crossbay structure; weighs approximately 2,722 kilograms SHARE— NASA mission to evaluate on-orbit thermal per- formance of a heat pipe radiator element designed for Space Station heat rejection system application; 50-foot elements mounts on longeron Classified Classified Skynet — United Kingdom military communications satellite; uses PAM-D2 upper stage Classified Assignments for Galileo and Ulysses to be determined; uses IUS INSAT — Indian communi- cations and meteorological satellite; uses PAM-D TSS— NASA/Italy cooperative mission to demonstrate system capabilities by deploying and retrieving tethered satellite and measuring engineering data from pay load on satellite; pallet Atlantis Discovery Columbia Atlantis Discovery Columbia 358 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 3^9 continued Date Mission Purpose Vehicle Nov. 15. 1990 STS-51/ LDEF RETR. Syncom Jan. 15, 1991 STS-52, ATLAS- 1. COFS-1 Feb. 1, 1991 March 1, 1991 March 30, 1991 STS-53/GPS-8, GPS-9, MSL-6, SSBUV-1 STS-54/DOD STS-55/ EURECA, Skynet-4, GPS-10 LDEF RETR— NASA Atlantis mission to retrieve and return the LDEF to Earth so results may be analyzed; purpose to avoid uncontrolled reentry; will occupy about half of pay load bay; weighs approximately 9,980 kilograms Syncom — Commercial mission to provide communi- cations services under lease to the U.S. Navy (Leasat); weighs 7,711 kilograms with own perigee stage ATLAS — NASA mission Discovery to measure long-term variability in the total energy radiated by the Sun and determine the variability in the solar spectrum; igloo plus two pallets COFS— NASA mission to demonstrate structural integrity through deployment, retraction, and restowage and develop techniques for distributed control and adaptive control methods; pallet SSBUV— NASA mission Columbia to measure ozone character- istics of the atmosphere; mounts on longeron; weighs approximately 453.6 kilograms Classified OV-105 EURECA— ESA platform Atlantis placed in orbit for 6 months offering conventional services to experiments; releasable, retrievable cross-bay structure; weighs approximately 3,856 kilograms SPACi; TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACI.I IK ,11 1 J59 TT 0> OX) CO -£ C/3 CO 'i Ph 1) u © £ m 0) OX) CO 'd X W CO CO T3 a- T3 O >3 O C*0 1 a. £ © 1-5 CO ,© Ci £ ■? ^n *> *-* *cs £ 0) OX) CO gg -^ CO u -= CO t» ffu CO s o £ cy G u CO -a >> E in 00 5 Q cd U u c 5-H fO ,- V c , - h cj U \o >* | — ; X5 c oo 3 CJ CJ o ON CJ £ Pu o < — 1 p^ -^ £ ^"^ J"3 o O >' 'j-i o o c* Qh (^ a; h Q < c cj a c/f d O U "3 O u •— "C [J U jj p< s s OS cd *ob •: s ° S3 . ^ 3 J> a ^ in O s < * CJ CJ cO a. o o U CJ O < CO £ Qh in o gj u 'C CJ c3 5 CO oo ^M CJ 4-J 3 in CJ V3 CJ 4-H 1 ° CO T3 CJ ^ 3 ■4-J cO lo 3 >, -o 3 3 jQ 3 3 o 3 u CJ <^ CO o -o ^ GO a — "C s s CO CJ V3 c 2 o c Qh CO s X) -5 T3 'oo > o 3 t: ^ 3 O o C u CO CJ c# J ffi Z hJ W u c« V «>— i +* £ *K S3 O a c« cu & 360 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK ■8 & s a ^ £ 5fl o G o J o. w 35 £ y. cy — - c ^ c •— N o i CO c o o 0) S-H S2 co cd > — CO -O o 3 a o o c 'o CO 3 cd a 0) S a x ^ o 20 = 1 "C p to O -g a U E 00 M o cd £ £ ^H O CM C o < Id o Oh o wo o o Oh CO C cd r 73 in wo c CO o. CD =5 CO O 60 ed *— O !Z3 o Oh Oh CO .^ •— o cd — T3 to 13 c cd GO 0) T3 C £ cd a o CJ wo c | "C ^ -3 ^^ cd cd to CO (D U E ^O cd s to CD O 2 Oh X Oh c _o OJ "to to •— C3 -4—* a £ '> v Assembly >v Figure 4-3. HEAO High-Spectral Resolution Gamma Ray Spectrometer Neon Flash Tube Array (Typical) Glass Radiator Counter Box Photomultiplier Tubes Aerogel/Silca Power Radiator Counter Glass Radiator Figure 4-4. HEAO Isotopic Composition of Primary Cosmic Rays NPACisciiNn: 377 Ion Chamber /^ Detector Module (ICDM)^ Cerenkov Detector Ion Chamber Detector Module (ICDM) • Photomultiplier Assembly (PMA) S/C Interface Fitting Hodoscope Assembly Honeycomb Window Charge Detector Assembly Modoscope Assembly Figure 4-5. HEAO Heavy Nuclei Experiment Solar Maximum Mission The Solar Maximum Mission (also known as Solar Max) observato- ry was an Earth-orbiting satellite that continued NASA's solar observato- ry research program, which had begun in 1962. The satellite was a three-axis inertially stabilized platform that provided precise stable point- ing to any region on the Sun to within five seconds of arc. The mission studied a specific set of solar phenomena: the impulsive, energetic events known as solar flares and the active regions that were the sites of flares, sunspots, and other manifestations of solar activity. Solar Max allowed detailed observation of active regions of the Sun simultaneously by instruments that covered gamma ray, hard and soft x-ray, ultraviolet, and visible spectral ranges. Table 4-28 lists the mission's characteristics, and Figure 4-6 contains a diagram of Solar Max's instruments. Solar Max was part of an international program involving a world- wide network of observatories. More than 400 scientists from approxi- mately sixty institutions in seventeen foreign nations and the United States participated in collaborative observational and theoretical studies of solar flares. In the solar science community, 1980 was designated the "Solar Maximum Year" because it marked the peak of sunspot activity in the Sun's eleven-year cycle of activity. The first months of the mission were extremely successful. Careful 378 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK ( Bent Crystal V Spectrometer X-Ray / Polychromator I Flat Crystal ( Spectrometer White-Light Coronograph Polarimeter Hard X-Ray Burst Spectrometer* Solar Gamma Ray Scintillator* Hard X-Ray Imaging Spectrometer High-Resolution Ultraviolet Spectrometer and Polarimeter These instruments have no aperture hold in the forward closeout. They view through an opaque closeout plate. Figure 4-6. Solar Maximum Instruments orchestration of the instruments resulted in the most detailed look at solar flares ever achieved. The instruments recorded hundreds of flares, and the cumulative new data base was unsurpassed. Solar Max instruments set new standards of accuracy and precision and led scientists to a number of firsts and new answers to old questions. However, nine months into the mission, fuses in the attitude control system failed, and the satellite lost its ability to point with fine precision at the Sun. Although a few instru- ments continued to send valuable data despite the loss of fine pointing, most of the instruments were useless, and those still operating lost the benefits of operating in a coordinated program. The mission was declared a success, however, because its operation, although abbreviated, fulfilled the success criteria established before launch. Nevertheless, its reduction from the expected two years to nine months meant a significant loss to solar science. NASA designed Solar Max to be serviced in space by a Space Shuttle crew. Thus, in April 1984, the crew of STS 41-C successfully repaired Solar Max. Following its repair, Solar Max operated successfully until November 1989. A description of the STS 41-C repair mission is in Chapter 3. Dynamics Explorer 1 and 2 The Dynamics Explorer 1 and 2 satellites provided data about the coupling of energy, electric currents, electric fields, and plasmas (ionized SPACH SCIKNCH W) atomic particles) among the magnetosphere, the ionosphere, ami the atmosphere. The two spacecraft worked together to examine the process- es by which energy from the Sun flows through interplanetary space and entered the region around Earth, controlled by the magnetic forces from Earth's magnetic field, to produce the auroras (northern lights) that affect radio transmissions and possibly influence basic weather patterns. The two satellites were stacked on a Delta launch vehicle and placed into coplanar (in the same plane but at different altitudes) orbits. Dynamics Explorer 1 was placed in a higher elliptical orbit than Dynamics Explorer 2. The higher orbit allowed for global auroral imag- ing, wave measurements in the center of the magnetosphere, and crossing of auroral field lines at several Earth radii. Dynamics Explorer 2's lower orbit allowed for neutral composition and temperature and wind mea- surements, as well as an initial apogee to allow measurements above the interaction regions for suprathermal ions and plasma flow measurements at the base of the magnetosphere field lines. The two satellites carried a total of fifteen instruments, which took measurements in five general categories: Electric field-induced convection Magnetosphere-ionosphere electric currents Direct energy coupling between the magnetosphere and the ionosphere Mass coupling between the ionosphere and the magnetosphere Wave, particle, and plasma interactions The Dynamics Explorer mission complemented the work of two pre- vious sets of satellites, the Atmosphere Explorers and the International Sun-Earth Explorers. The three Atmosphere Explorer satellites studied the effects of the absorption of ultraviolet light waves by the upper atmos- phere at altitudes as low as a satellite can orbit (about 130 kilometers). The three International Sun-Earth Explorer satellites studied how the solar wind interacted with Earth's magnetic field to transfer energy and ionized charged particles into the magnetosphere. The Dynamics Explorer mission also was to set the stage for a fourth program planned for later in the 1980s that would provide a comprehensive assessment of the energy balance in near-Earth space. The mission's characteristics are in Table 4-29. Solar Mesospheric Explorer The Solar Mesospheric Explorer, launched in 1981, was part of the NASA Upper Atmospheric Research program. NASA developed this program under the congressional mandates in the FY 1976 NASA Authorization Act and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. It focused on developing a solid body of knowledge of the physics, chemistry, and dynamics of the upper atmosphere. From an initial emphasis on assess- ments of the impacts of chlorofluoromethane releases, Shuttle exhausts, 380 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK and aircraft effluents on stratospheric ozone, the program evolved into extensive field measurements, laboratory studies, theoretical develop- ments, data analysis, and flight missions. The Solar Mesospheric Explorer was designed to supply data on the nature and magnitude of changes in the mesospheric ozone densities that resulted from changes in the solar ultraviolet flux. It examined the inter- relationship between ozone and water vapor and its photo dissociation products in the mesosphere and among ozone, water vapor, and nitrogen dioxide in the upper stratosphere. The University of Colorado's Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics provided the science instruments for this mission. The laborato- ry, under contract to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, was also responsible for the observatory module, mission operations, the Project Operations Control Center, and science data evaluation and dissemination. Ball Aerospace's Systems Division provided the spacecraft bus and satellite integration and testing. The science team was composed of seventeen members from four institutions. A science data processing system, locat- ed at the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics, featured an on- line central processing and analysis system to perform the majority of data reduction and analysis for the science investigations. The spacecraft consisted of two sections (Figure 4-7). The spacecraft bus carried communication, electrical, and command equipment. A notable feature was the 1.25-meter diameter disc used for mounting the 2,156 solar cells directed toward the Sun to feed power into the two nick- el cadmium batteries. A passive system that used insulating material and a network of stripes on the outer surface kept internal temperatures with- in limits. The satellite body was spin-stabilized. Spin Axis Omni Antenna (1of 2) Nitrogen Dioxide Spectrometer Infrared Radiometer Radiator Photon Alarm Solar Ultraviolet Spectrometer Ozone Spectrometer Infrared Radiometer Telescope (Cover Closed) 1 .27 Micron Spectrometer Note: High gain antenna and second omni antenna mounted in center of solar cell array ring on Sun side Figure 4-7. Solar Mesospheric Explorer Satellite Configuration SPACE SCIENCE $81 90 90 80 80 70 Mesosphere 70 60 — 60 50 — 50 40 Upper Stratosphere — 40 30 — — — — 1 1 — 1 — _ 30 20 20 - ~ *h (0 CO £1 • o CO o N o O)«o SI ' o 0) c o N o Ozone Controlled by Transport Pressure & Temperature Measured < C O si s Si N N02 Measured Water Measured Figure 4-8. Altitude Regions to Be Measured by Solar Mesospheric Explorer Instruments The observatory module carried the instruments. Four limb scanning instruments measured ozone, water vapor, nitrogen dioxide, temperature, and pressure in the upper stratosphere and mesosphere at particular alti- tudes (Figure 4-8). Two additional instruments monitored the Sun. The Solar Mesospheric Explorer spun about its long axis at ninety degrees to its orbital plane so that on every turn, the instruments scanned the atmos- phere on the horizon between twenty and eighty kilometers. Data from the rotating science instruments are gated (cycled "on") once each revo- lution. Table 4-30 lists the characteristics of each instrument, and Table 4-31 lists the mission's characteristics. Infrared Astronomy Satellite The Infrared Astronomy Satellite (IRAS) was the second Netherlands-United States cooperative satellite project, the first being the Astronomical Netherlands Satellite launched in 1974. A memorandum of understanding between the Netherlands Agency for Aerospace Programs 382 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK and NASA established the project on October 4, 1977. The United Kingdom also participated in the program under a separate memorandum of understanding between the United Kingdom's Science and Engineering Research Council and the Netherlands Agency for Aerospace Programs. Under the terms of the memorandum of understanding, the United States provided the infrared telescope system, the tape recorders, the Delta launch vehicle, the scientific data processing, and the U.S. co-chair and members of the Joint IRAS Science Working Group. The Netherlands Agency for Aerospace Programs provided the other co-chair and European members of the Joint IRAS Science Working Group, the space- craft, the Dutch additional experiment (DAX), and the integration, test- ing, and launch preparations for the flight satellite. The Netherlands Agency for Aerospace Programs and the Science and Engineering Research Council provided spacecraft command and control and primary data acquisition with a ground station and control center located at Chilton, England. The United States provided limited tracking, com- mand, and data acquisition by stations in the NASA Ground Spacecraft Tracking and Data Network. IRAS was the first infrared satellite mission. It produced an all-sky survey of discrete sources in the form of sky and source catalogues using four broad photometry channels between eight and 120 micrometers. The mission performed the all-sky survey, provided additional observations on the more interesting known and discovered sources, and analyzed the data. The satellite system consisted of two major systems: the infrared tele- scope and the spacecraft (Figure 4-9). The infrared telescope system con- sisted of the telescope, cryogenics equipment, electronics, and a focal-plane detector array. The detector array consisted of a primary set Coarse Sun Sensors Spacecraft Interface Skirt Figure 4-9. Infrared Astronomy Satellite Configuration SPACE SCIENCE J83 of infrared detectors, a set of photodiodes for use as aspect sensors, and a DAX. The DAX comprised a low-resolution spectrometer, a chopped photometric channel, and a short wavelength channel. The spacecraft pro- vided the support functions of electrical power, attitude control, comput- ing, and telecommunications. During its all-sky survey, IRAS observed several important phenom- ena. It detected a new comet, named Comet IRAS-Araki-Alcock (1983d), which was distinguished by its very close approach to Earth, 5 million kilometers on May 1 1, 1983, the closest approach to Earth of a comet in 200 years. IRAS discovered a second, extremely faint comet (19830 on May 12. This comet was a million times fainter than the first and was leaving the solar system. IRAS also discovered very young stars (proto- stars) no more than a million years old. It also observed two closely inter- acting galaxies that were being disrupted by each other's gravitational forces. IRAS made approximately 200,000 observations and transmitted more than 200 billion bits of data, which scientists have continued to examine and analyze. IRAS revolutionized our understanding of star formation, with obser- vations of protostars and of interstellar gas in star- forming regions. It dis- covered the "interstellar cirrus" of wispy cool far-infrared emitting dust throughout our galaxy. It discovered infrared emissions in spiral galaxies, including a previously unknown class of "ultraluminous infrared galaxies" in which new stars were forming at a very great rate. IRAS also showed that quasars emit large amounts of far-infrared radiation, suggesting the presence of interstellar dust in the host galaxies of those objects. IRAS operated successfully until November 21, 1983, when it used the last of the super- fluid helium refrigerant that cooled the telescope. IRAS represented as great an improvement over ground-based telescopes as the Palomar 200-inch telescope was over Galileo's telescope. The unprecedented sensitivity of IRAS provided a survey of a large, unex- plored gap in the electromagnetic spectrum. The international IRAS sci- ence team compiled a catalogue of nearly 250,000 sources measured at four infrared wavelengths — including approximately 20,000 new galax- ies and 16,000 small extended sources — and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's Infrared Processing and Analysis Center produced IRAS Sky Maps. IRAS successfully surveyed more than 96 percent of the sky. Its mission characteristics are in Table 4-32. The Plasma Interaction Experiment (PIX-II) also rode on the Delta launch vehicle that deployed IRAS. A Lewis Research Center investiga- tion, PIX-II evaluated the effects of solar panel area on the interactions between the space charged-particle environment and surfaces at high potentials (+/-one keV). PIX-II was the second experiment to investigate the effects of space plasma on solar arrays, power system conductors, insulators, and other exposed spacecraft components. The experiment remained with the second stage of the Delta launch vehicle in orbit at an altitude of 640 kilometers. Data from PIX-II were transmitted to two tracking stations. 384 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK European X-Ray Observatory Satellite NASA launched the European X-Ray Observatory Satellite (EXOSAT) for the European Space Agency (ESA), which reimbursed NASA for the cost of providing standard launch support in accordance with the terms of a launch services agreement signed March 25, 1983. A Delta 3914 placed the satellite in a highly elliptical orbit that required approximately four days to complete. This orbit provided maximum observation periods, up to eighty hours at a time, while keeping the space- craft in full sunlight for most of the year, thereby keeping thermal condi- tions relatively stable and simplifying alignment procedures. The orbit also allowed practically continuous coverage by a single ground station. EXOSAT supplied detailed data on cosmic x-ray sources in the soft x-ray band four one-hundredths keV to eighty keV. The principal scien- tific objectives involved locating x-ray sources and studying their spec- troscopic and temporal characteristics. The location of x-ray sources was determined by the use of x-ray imaging telescopes. The observatory also mapped diffuse extended sources such as supernova remnants and resolve sources within nearby galaxies and galaxies within clusters. The space- craft performed broad-band spectroscopy, or "color" cataloguing of x-ray sources, and studied the time variability of sources over time scales rang- ing from milliseconds to days. The EXOSAT observatory was a three-axis stabilized platform with an inherent orbit correction capability. It consisted of a central body cov- ered with super-insulating thermal blankets and a one-degree-of-freedom rotatable solar array. The platform held the four experiments, which were co-aligned with the optical axis defined by two star trackers, each mount- ed on an imaging telescope (Figure 4-10). Table 4-33 contains the mis- sion's characteristics. Shuttle Pallet Satellite The Shuttle Pallet Satellite (SPAS)-Ol was a reusable platform built by the German aerospace firm Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB) and carried on STS-7 as part of an agreement with MBB. The agreement provided that, in return for MBB's equipping SPAS-01 for use in testing the deployment and retrieval capabilities of the remote manipulator arm, NASA would substantially reduce the launching charge for SPAS-01. The platform contained six scientific experiments from the West German Federal Ministry of Research and Technology, two from ESA, and three from NASA along with several cameras. The first satellite designed to be recaptured by the Shuttle's robot arm, SPAS-01 operated both inside and outside the orbiter's cargo bay. In the cargo bay, the satellite demonstrated its system performance and served as a mounted platform for operating scientific experiments. Seven scientific experiments were turned on during the third day of the flight and ran continuously for about twenty-four hours. spaci;scii;ncI' J85 (Solar Array and Drive) Experiment Electronics Boxes Marked • Gas Scintillation Proportional Counter | Medium Energy Proportional Counter Array (Hydrazine Tank) (Propane Tanks) (S-Bank Antenna(e)) Figure 4-10. Exploded View of the European X-Ray Observatory Satellite In the free-flyer mode, SPAS -01 was used as a test article to demon- strate the orbiter's capability to deploy and retrieve satellites in low-Earth orbit. During this phase of the mission, crew members operated two German and three NASA experiments. MBB built the platform to demon- strate how spaceflights could be used for private enterprise purposes. The West German Federal Ministry of Research and Technology supported the SPAS-01 pilot project and contributed to mission funding. Mission characteristics are in Table 4-34. Hilat The Air Force developed Hilat to gather data on ionospheric irregu- larities and auroras (northern lights) in an effort to improve the effective- ness of Department of Defense communications systems. The interaction of charged particles, ionized atmospheric gases, and magnetic fields can degrade radio communications and radar system performance at high 386 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK latitudes. Four of the five experiments on board were sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agencies. They measured turbulence caused by ionos- pheric irregularities and observed electron, ion, proton, and magnetic activity. The fifth experiment, sponsored by the Air Force Geophysics Laboratory at Hanscom Air Force Base, used an auroral ionospheric map- per to gather imagery of the auroras. NASA was reimbursed for launch services. Table 4-35 contains the mission's characteristics. Active Magnetospheric Particle Tracer Explorers The Active Magnetospheric Particle Tracer Explorers (AMPTE) pro- ject investigated the transfer of mass from the solar wind to the magne- tosphere and its further transport and energization within the magnetosphere. It attempted to establish how much of this immense flow from the Sun, which sometimes affected the performance of electronic systems aboard satellites, entered the magnetosphere and where it went. AMPTE mission objectives were to: • Investigate the entry of solar wind ions to the magnetosphere • Study the transport of magnetotail plasma from the distant tail to the inner regions of the magnetosphere Study the interaction between an artificially injected plasma and the solar wind • Establish the elemental and charge composition of energetic charge particles in the equatorial magnetosphere The scientific experiments carried aboard the three AMPTE satellites (described below) helped determine the number and energy spectrum of solar wind ions and, ultimately, how they gained their high energies. Figure 4-11 illustrates the distortion of Earth's magnetic field into the magnetosphere. AMPTE also investigated the interaction of two different flowing plasmas in space, another common astronomical phenomenon. AMPTE studied in detail the local disturbances that resulted when a cold dense plasma was injected and interacted with the hot, rapidly flowing natural plasmas of the solar wind and magnetosphere. The AMPTE spacecraft injected tracer elements into near-Earth space and then observed the motion and acceleration of those ions. One expected result was the for- mation of artificial comets, which were observed from aircraft and from the ground. In this respect, AMPTE's active interaction with the environ- ment made it different from previous space probes, which had passively measured their surrounding environment. This international cooperative mission consisted of three spacecraft: (1) a German-provided Ion Release Module (IRM), which injected artifi- cial tracer ions (lithium and barium) inside and outside Earth's magne- tosphere; (2) a U.S.-provided Charge Composition Explorer (CCE), which detected and monitored these ions as they convected and diffused SPAChSCIINCi: 3X7 Figure 4-11. Distortion of Earth's Magnetic Field (The solar wind distorts Earth's magnetic field, in some cases pushing field lines from the day side of Earth back to the night side.) through the inner magnetosphere; and (3) a United Kingdom-provided subsatellite (UKS), which detected and monitored these ions within a few hundred kilometers of the release point. Each of the spacecraft con- tributed to the achievement of the mission objectives. The IRM released tracer ions in the solar wind and attempted to detect them with the CCE inside the magnetosphere. This was done four times under different solar wind conditions and with different tracer ions. The IRM also released barium and lithium ions into the plasma sheet and observed their energy spectrum at the CCE. Four such releases took place. In addition to the spacecraft observations, ground stations and air- craft in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres observed the artificial comet and tail releases. No tracer ions were detected in the CCE data, a surprising result, because, according to accepted theories, significant fluxes of tracer ions should have been observed at the CCE. However, in the case of the last two tail releases, the loss of the Hot Plasma Composition Experiment instrument on April 4, 1985, severely restricted the capability of the CCE to detect low-energy ions. The spacecraft also formed two barium artificial comets. In both instances, a variety of ground observation sites in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres obtained good images of these comets. Observations relating to the composition, charge, and energy spec- tra of energetic particles in the near equatorial orbit plane of the CCE 388 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK were to occur for a period of at least six months. With the exception of the Hot Plasma Composition Experiment, the instruments on board the CCE acquired the most comprehensive and unique data set on magne- tospheric ions ever collected. For the first time, the ions that made up the bulk of Earth's ring current were identified, their spectrum deter- mined, and dynamics studied. Several major magnetic storms that occurred during the first year of operation allowed measurements to be taken over a wide range of magnetic activity indices and solar wind conditions. The three AMPTE spacecraft were launched into two different orbits. A Delta launch vehicle released the three satellites in a stacked fashion. The CCE separated first from the group of three, and the IRM and UKS remained joined. The CCE on-board thrusters fired to position the satel- lite in Earth's equatorial plane. About eight hours later, the IRM fired an on-board rocket to raise the IRM/UKS orbit apogee to twice its initial value. The two satellites then separated, and for the remainder of the mis- sion, small thrusters on the UKS allowed it to fly in close formation with the IRM satellite. Tables 4-36, 4-37, and 4-38 list the specific orbit char- acteristics of the three satellites. Spartan 1 Spartan 1 was the first of a continuing series of low-cost free-flyers designed to extend the observing time of sounding-rocket-class experi- ments from a few minutes to several hours. The Astrophysics Division of NASA's OSSA sponsored the satellite. The Naval Research Laboratory provided the scientific instrument through a NASA grant. The instrument, a medium-energy x-ray scanner, had been successfully flown several times on NASA sounding rockets. It scanned the Perseus Cluster, Galactic Center, and Scorpius X-2 to provide x-ray data over the energy range of a half keV to fifteen keV (Figure 4-12). The June 1985 launch was NASA's second attempt to launch Spartan 1. It had previously been manifested on STS 41-F for an August 1984 flight, but was demanifested because of problems with the launch of Discovery. Researchers could use the Spartan family of reusable satellites for a large variety of astrophysics experiments. The satellites were designed to be deployed and retrieved by the Shuttle orbiter using the remote manip- ulator system. Once deployed, the Spartan satellite could perform scien- tific observations for up to forty hours. All pointing sequences and satellite control commands were stored aboard the Spartan in a micro- computer controller. A 10 10 -bit tape recorder recorded all data, and no command or telemetry link was provided. Once the Spartan satellite com- pleted its observations, it "safed" all systems and placed itself in a stable attitude to allow for retrieval by the orbiter and a return to Earth for data analysis and preparation for a new mission. Table 4-39 lists Spartan l's mission characteristics. spach sciknct: 389 Grapple Fixture Sun Sensor Mounts Solar Optical Bench Sunshade Bright Object Sensor Sunshade Door Radar Enhancement Devices Figure 4-12. Spartan 1 Plasma Diagnostic Package The Plasma Diagnostics Package (PDP) flew on two Shuttle mis- sions— STS-3 as part of the OSS-1 payload and STS 51-F as part of the Spacelab 2 mission. On its first flight, it made measurements while mounted in the Shuttle payload bay and while suspended from the remote manipulator arm. It successfully measured electromagnetic noise created by the Shuttle and detected other electrical reactions taking place between the Shuttle and the ionospheric plasma. On STS 51-F, the PDP made additional measurements near the Shuttle and was also released as a free-flyer on the third day of the mis- sion to measure electric and magnetic fields at various distances from the orbiter. During the maneuvers away from the Shuttle, called a "fly- around," a momentum wheel spun the satellite to fix it in a stable enough position for accurate measurements. As the orbiter moved away to a dis- tance of approximately a half kilometer, an assembly of instruments mounted on the PDP measured various plasma characteristics, such as low-energy electron and proton distribution, plasma waves, electric field strength, electron density and temperature, ion energy and direction, and pressure of unchanged atoms. This was the first time that ambient plasma was sampled so far from the Shuttle. The survey helped investigators determine how far the orbiter's effects extended. Figure 4-13 illustrates PDP experiment hardware, and Table 4^0 describes characteristics of the PDP on STS 51-F. PDP characteristics on STS-3 were very similar. 390 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK RMS Grapple Fixture Plasma Diagnostics Package Figure 4-13. Plasma Diagnostics Package Experiment Hardware Spartan 203 (Spartan Halley) 'I Spartan 203 was one of the STS 51-Lpayloads aboard Challenger that was destroyed in January 1986. Spartan Halley, the second in NASA's continuing series of low-cost free-flyers, was to photograph Halley's comet and measure its ultraviolet spectrum during its forty hours of flight in formation with the Shuttle. The spacecraft was to be deployed during the second day of the flight and retrieved on the fifth day. Both operations would use the remote manipulator system. The instruments being used had flown on sounding rockets as well as on the Mariner spacecraft. The mis- sion was to take advantage of Comet Halley's location of less than 107.8 million kilometers from the Sun during the later part of January 1986. This period was scientifically important because of the increased rate of subli- mation as the comet neared perihelion, which would occur on February 9. As Halley neared the Sun, temperatures would rise, releasing ices and clathrates, compounds trapped in ice crystals. NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center and the University of Colorado's Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics recycled sev- eral instruments and designs to produce a low-cost, high-yield spacecraft. Two spectrometers, derived from backups for a Mariner 9 instrument that studied the Martian atmosphere in 1971, were rebuilt to survey the comet in ultraviolet light from 128- to 340-nanometer wavelength. The spec- trometers were not to produce images but would reveal the comet's chem- istry through the ultraviolet spectral lines they recorded. From these data, scientists would have gained a better understanding of how (1) chemical structure of the comet evolved from the coma and proceeded down the tail, (2) species changed with relation to sunlight and dynamic processes with- in the comet, and (3) dominant atmospheric activities at perihelion related to the comet's long-term evolution. Figure 4-14 shows the Spartan Halley configuration, and Table 4-41 lists the mission's characteristics. spact: scii«:nct: J91 Grapple q Fixture — — . ^. \\ Star Tracker -^ / Aspect Cameras —^ <£^(\ ^S^~^~-^_/ ^~~i, ^ y \^<^ : ^ BBttle "7 \^f\^^^^ ,^^^^^^^^7 ACS Jets Science Payload U ^^k^sJjJs^ I II AC?tf Jh^Jmma hM^l- m ff /^s. //{CCjflFrt sC&^ -- ^^Lx if I / ]llo^^ J | ^ ^x. Sw^™8 wNL lit / ^""v^ / frt> ...■•■'' Arrival Late 1995 Jupiter Figure 4-31. Galileo Mission would descend into the Jovian atmosphere; a nonspinning section of the orbiter carrying cameras and other aimed sensors would image the plan- et and its satellites; and the spinning main orbiter spacecraft that carried fixed instruments would sense and measure the environment directly as the spacecraft flew through it (Figure 4-32). Unfortunately, after launch, the high-gain antenna on the probe would fail, reducing the amount of data that could be transmitted. Even so, the Galileo orbiter continued to transmit data from the probe throughout 1996. Ulysses The International Solar Polar Mission (renamed Ulysses in 1984) was a joint mission of NASA and ESA, which provided the spacecraft and some scientific instrumentation. NASA provided the remaining scientific instrumentation, the launch vehicle and support, tracking support, and the radioisotope thermoelectric generator. The mission was designed to obtain the first view of the Sun above and below the plane in which the planets orbit the Sun. The mission would study the relationship between the Sun and its magnetic field and particle emissions (solar wind and cos- mic rays) as a function of solar latitude to provide a better understanding of solar activity on Earth's weather and climate. Figure 4-33 shows the spacecraft configuration. The basis for the Ulysses project was conceived in the late 1950s by J.A. Simpson, a professor at the University of Chicago. Initially planned as a two- spacecraft mission between NASA and ESA, this mission, called "Out of Ecliptic," would allow scientists to study regions of the Sun and the surrounding space environment above the plane of the ecliptic that had never before been studied. Later, the project name was changed to the 420 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Low-Gain Antenna Sun Shields Magnetometer Sensors Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators Jupiter Atmosphere Probe Scan Platform Containing: • Photopolarlmeter Radiometer • Near-Infrared Mapping Spectrometer • Solid-State Imaging Camera • Ultraviolet Spectrometer Figure 4-32. Galileo Spacecraft International Solar Polar Mission. Delays in Shuttle development and concerns over the effectiveness of the inertial upper stage led to a House Appropriations Committee recommendation in the 1980 Supplemental Appropriations Bill that the International Solar Polar Mission be termi- nated. Later, in 1981, budget cuts led NASA to cancel the U.S. spacecraft contribution to the joint mission, which was restructured to a single ESA spacecraft mission. This was the first time that NASA had reneged on an international commitment. The ESA spacecraft completed its flight acceptance tests in early 1983 and was placed in storage. In 1984, the International Solar Polar Mission was renamed Ulysses. It was originally scheduled to launch in 1986 but was another victim of the Challenger accident and the elimination of the Centaur upper stage. The launch took place in October 1990 using the Shuttle and both an iner- tial upper stage and payload assist module upper stage. The launch ser- vices were contributed by NASA. Table 4-5 1 presents an overview of the history of the Ulysses project. Mars Geochemical-Climatology Orbiter/Mars Observer The Mars Observer mission was the first in a series of planetary observer missions that used a lower cost approach to inner solar system exploration. This approach starts with a well-defined and focused set of science objectives and uses modified production-line Earth-orbital space- craft and instruments with previous spaceflight heritage. The objectives of the Mars Observer mission were to extend and complement the data SPACE SCIENCE 421 1. Solar-Wind Plasma 2. Solar-Wind Ion-Composition Spectrometer 3 Magnetic Fields 4. Energetic-Particle Composition 5. Spectral, Composition and Anisotropy at Low Energies (HI-SCALE) j- High-Gain Antenna 6 Cosmic-Ray and Solar Particle 7 Unified Radio and Plasma Wave 8 Solar X-Hays and Cosmic Gamma Rays 9 Cosmic Dust 10 Coronal Sounding Gravitational Waves 1A9 ' (Hidden In this view) r> Radial Boom i^J^^.A.^ Equipment Platlorm "~— S/C Radiator RTG - Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator \ Ulysses Axes Figure 4-33. Ulysses Spacecraft Configuration acquired by the Mariner and Viking missions by mapping the global sur- face composition, atmospheric structure and circulation, topography, fig- ure, gravity, and magnetic fields of Mars to determine the location of volatile reservoirs and observe their interaction with the Martian envi- ronment over all four seasons of the Martian year. The Mars Observer was launched on September 25, 1992. It lost con- tact with Earth on April 21, 1993, three days before it was to enter orbit around Mars. Small Planetary Bodies In 1985, NASA made the first close-up studies of the solar system's comets and asteroids. These objects may represent unaltered original solar system material preserved from the geological and chemical changes that took place in even smaller planetary bodies. By sampling and studying comets and asteroids, scientists could begin to inquire into the origin of the solar system itself. These efforts began with the encounter of Comet Giacobini-Zinner by the International Cometary Explorer spacecraft in September 1985 and continued with the 1986 encounters of Comet Halley by U.S. and foreign spacecraft and by inten- sive studies of the comet from ground-based observatories coordinated through the International Halley Watch. 422 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK I! 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C*3 C « ° 2^ 'iUC?™^>De5"^DRI™>N(U £ 11 £ £ £ XI s- -o M T3 In 13 istri istri istri istri istri istri V3 «j "q ^ ^ oo -s: — -^ -^ 424 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK ^3 1 -a X ♦s j o d F 1 '1 1 B o 3 X X X 3 _3 O 3 3 3 oa oi C/5 c/5 'a. 03 0/j 93 bfl 1 ^ 15 T3 -3 •3 13 U 3 3 3 c O c X X X o "«e T3 "3 -3 "S 03 55 OJ OJ oa o g "3 T3 ■3 U '5 oh 3 3 C 5b c o CO i i E U < < < U — 6 =: Cl. 0 .— • r-- oo in r- ^t — i moo en en o o "1 "*, °» "1 CC > o =2 < 3. § z «2 —< On NO o o o © o o o o O no Tf o en r^ r--' oo Tt \o -h >n OO >0 (N an 426 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 4-3. High Energy Astronomy Observatories Development Funding History (in thousands of dollars) Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Appropriation Programmed (Actual) 1979 1980 11,400 4,800 11,400 4,800 10,647 2,100 a Undistributed. House and Senate appropriations committees allocated $11,400,000. b Undistributed. Table 4-4. Solar Maximum Mission Development Funding History (in thousands of dollars) Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Appropriation Programmed (Actual) 1979 1980 16,200 600 16,200 600 16,700 3,100 a Undistributed. House and Senate appropriations committees allocated $16,200,000. b Undistributed. Table 4-5. Space Telescope Development Funding History (in thousands of dollars) a Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Appropriation Programmed (Actual) 1979 79,200 79,200 b 79,200 1980 112,700 112,700 c 112,700 1981 119,300 119,300 119,300 119,300 1982 119,500 119,500 119,500 121,500 1983 137,500 137,500 137,500 182,500 1984 120,600 165,600 d 165,600 195,600 1985 195,000 195,000 195,000 195,000 1986 127,800 127,800 127,800 125,800 1987 95,900 e 95,900 95,900 96,000 1988 98,400 98,400 93,400 93,100 Renamed Hubble Space Telescope Development in FY 1986 submission. Undistributed. House Appropriations Committee allocated $64,200,000. Senate Appropriations Committee allocated $79,200,000. Undistributed. House Authorization Committee increased amount for development of space telescope by $47 million; Senate Authorization Committee increased amount for space telescope by $50 million to pay for cost overruns. Conference Committee reduced Senate authorization by $5 million. Amended budget submission. Original submission = $27,900,000. SPACE SCIENCE 427 Table 4 6. Solar Polar Mission Development Funding History (in thousands of dollars) a Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Appropriation Programmed (Actual) 1 979 13,000 13,000 b 12,500 1980 50.000 50,000 c 47,900 1981 39,600 d 39,600 28,000 e 28,000 1982 5,000/ 5,000 8 5.000 // 1983 21,000 21,000 6,000 6,000 1984/ See Table 4- -17 a Renamed International Solar Polar Mission in FY 1980. b Undistributed. House Appropriations Committee allocated $8,000,000. Senate Appropriations Committee allocated $13,000,000. c Undistributed. d Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission = $82,600,000. Decrease reflects pro- gram descoping that took place in mid- 1980 to contain the amount of cost growth because of change in launch date from 1983 to 1985. The change resulted from the FY 1981 budget amendment (NASA FY 1982 Budget Estimate, International Solar Polar Mission Development, Objectives and Status, pp. RD 4-12). e Reflects recission. / Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission = $58,000,000. Decrease reflects NASA's decision to terminate the development of the U.S. spacecraft for the mission. g Undistributed. Total FY 1982 R&D appropriation = $4,973,100,000 (basic appropriation). h Programmed amount placed under Planetary Exploration funding beginning in FY 1982. i Became part of Planetary Exploration program. See Table 4-7. Table 4-7. Gamma Ray Observatory Development Funding History (in thousands of dollars) Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Appropriation Programmed (Actual) 1981 19,100 19,100 8,200 a 8,200 1982 8,000 b 8,000 8,000 8,000 1983 34,500 34,500 34,500 34,500 1984 89,800 89,800 89,800 85,950 1985 120,200 120,200 120,200 117,200 1986 87,300 87,300 87,300 85,300 1987 51,500 51,500 51,500 50,500 1988 49,100 49,100 49,100 53,400 a Reflects recission. b Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission = $52,000,000. 428 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 4-8. Shuttle/Spacelab Payload Development Funding History (in thousands of dollars) a, b Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Appropriation Programmed (Actual) 1979 38,300 38,300 c 34,900 1980 41,300 41,300 d 40,600 1981 29,100 29,100 27,400 e 27,400 1982 35,000/ 43,000 8 47,556 1983 81,400 81,400 81,400 81,000 1984 92,900 88,400 h, i 92,900 80,900 1985 105,400 113,400 105,400 105,400 1986 135,500 125,500 110,500 89,400 1987 84,600; 84,100 84,600 72,800 k 1988 75,400 75,400 80,400 47,800 / Included mission management beginning FY 1981. Incorporated Space Station Payload Development and mission management beginning in FY 1986. Undistributed. Both House and Senate appropriations committees allocated $38,300,000. Undistributed. Reflects recission. Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission = $51,800,000. Undistributed. FY 1982 R&D basic appropriation = $4,973,100. R&D appropriation reflect- ing effects of General Provision Section 501 = $5,740,900. House Appropriations Committee allocation for Shuttle/Spacelab Payload Development = $35,000,000. Senate Appropriations Committee allocation for Shuttle/Spacelab Payload Development = $40,000,000. Supplemental appropriations bill Conference Committee report indicates allocation of $40,000,000 for Shuttle/Spacelab Payload Development. Senate Authorization Committee reduced amount authorized for solar optical telescope by $1.6 million to offset space telescope increases and added $5 million for space plasma labora- tory. Conference Committee added $2.5 million for space plasma laboratory and decreased by $7 million amount authorized for solar optical telescope. Amended budget submission. Original budget submission = $95,400,000. Amended budget submission. Original budget submission = $115,100,000. Included $5 million for astrophysics payloads and $4.6 million for space physics payloads. Additional $8.1 million for astrophysics payloads and $9.9 million for space physics payloads were added to programmed amount. spaci: SC IIN( I 420 Table 4 9. Explorer Development Funding History (in thousands of dollars) Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Appropriation Programmed (Actual) 1979 29,800 29,800 a 3 1 ,288 1980 30,400 30,400 b 32,300 1981 33,000 33,000 33,000 33,300 1982 36,600 36,600 36,600 33,300 1983 34,300 34,300 34,300 34,300 1984 48,700 48,700 48,700 48,700 1985 51,900 51,900 51,900 51,900 1986 55,200 55,200 55,200 48,200 1987 56,700 56,700 56,700 55,700 1988 60,300 70,300 70,300 67,900 a Undistributed. Both House and Senate appropriations committees allocated $29,800,000 for Explorer Development. b Undistributed. Table 4-10. Physics and Astronomy Mission Operations and Data Analysis Funding History (in thousands of dollars) Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Appropriation Programmed (Actual) 1979 32,400 32,400 a 25,453 1980 36,500 36,500 b 37,100 1981 38,900 38,900 38,900 38,900 1982 47,000 c 47,000 47,000 45,300 1983 85,600 86,600 d 85,600 61,400 1984 79,500 80,500 e 79,500 68,100 1985 109,100 109,100 109,100 109,100 1986 119,900 119,900 119,900 111,700 1987 125,700/ 125,700 125,700 131,000 1988 128,100 128,100 128,100 140,500 a Undistributed. Both House and Senate appropriations committees allocated $32,400,000. b Undistributed. d Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission = $53,500,000. d House Authorization Committee reduced amount to be allocated for Space Shuttle/Solar Maximum Mission Spacecraft Retrieval by $9.2 million to $77,400,000 and increased amount by $ 1 million for data analysis for HEAO and OAO. Senate Authorization Committee increased the amount to $93,600,000 to counter "slow progress in future programs and basic technology areas." (Footnote "d" accompanying Chronological History of the FY 1983 Budget Submission, prepared by NASA Comptroller, Budget Operations Division.) Authorization Conference Committee reduced increase to $1 million over submission. e House Authorization Committee increased amount for HEAO by $1 million. / Amended budget submission. Original budget submission = $172,700,000. 430 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 4-11. Physics and Astronomy Research and Analysis Funding History (in thousands of dollars) Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Appropriation Programmed (Actual) 1979 35,900 35,900 a 44,005 1980 34,300 34,300 b 33,774 1981 36,700 c 42,800 basic: 42,800 reflects Sec. 412: 38,000 37,700 1982 38,000 d 38,000 38,000 22,935 1983 39,200 39,200 e 39,200 28,500 1984 29,800 35,800/ 49,800 g 35,873 1985 36,900 47,900 39,900 111,700 1986 42,300 42,300 42,300 49,000 1987 51,100 51,100 49,700 53,400 1988 60,100 60,100 60,100 82,900 h Undistributed. Both House and Senate appropriations committees allocated $35,900,000 for Research and Analysis. b Undistributed. c Amended budget submission. Original budget submission = $42,800,000. d Amended budget submission. Original budget submission = $42,500,000. e See footnote "c" in Table 4-10. / House Authorization Committee increased authorization for Universities Basic Research pro- gram by $4 million and Universities Research Instrumentation by $2 million. Senate Authorization Committee increased Universities Basic Research by $4 million. g House and Senate appropriation committees increased appropriation by $20 million for Physics and Astronomy and Planetary Exploration at NASA's discretion. h Additional $10.3 million for Shuttle Test of Relativity Experiment added to programmed Table 4-12. Physics and Astronomy Suborbital Programs Funding History (in thousands of dollars) Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Appropriation Programmed (Actual) 1979 29,300 29,300 a 28,207 1980 26,900 26,900 b 27,226 1981 30,900 30,900 30,900 39,900 1982 35,500c 35,500 35,500 43,842 1983 38,200 39,200*2 38,200 48,100 1984 53,300 53,300 52,300 52,477 1985 58,700 58,700 58,700 58,700 1986 62,400 62,400 62,400 59,900 1987 64,400 64,400 64,400 79,100 1988 75,700 80,400 75,700 44,700 a Undistributed. Both House and Senate appropriations i committees allocated $29,300,000 for Suborbital Programs. b Undistributed. c Amended budget submission. Original budget submission : = $37,500,000. d See footnote " e" in Table 4-10. SPAC I S( II nci; 431 Table 4 13. Space Station Planning Funding History (in I lion sands of dollars) Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Appropriation Programmed (Actual) 20,000 IX, 900 1.5,500 1987 a 1988 20,000 h 20,000 a Space Station Planning not included in budget estimates or appropriation Tor FY 19X7 i arate budget item. Incorporated in Spacelab/Space Station Payload Development and M Management Budget category. b Increased budget submission from $0 to $2(),()()(),()()(). as sep- ission Table 4-14. Jupiter Orbiter/Probe and Galileo Programs Funding History (in thousands of dollars) a Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Appropriation Programmed (Actual) 1979 78,700 78,700 b 78,700 1980 116,100 116,100 c 116,100 1981 63,100 63,100 63,100 63,100 1982 108,800 108,000 108,000 115,700 1983 92,600 92,600 91,600 91,600 1984 79,500 79,500 79,500 79,500 1985 56,100 56,100 56,100 58,800 1986 39,700 39,700 39,700 64,200 1987 77,000 d 77,000 77,000 71,200 1988 55,300 55,300 55,300 51,900 Renamed Galileo Development in FY 1981. Undistributed. House Appropriations Committee allocated $68,700,000. Senate Appropriations Committee allocated $78,700,000. Undistributed. Reflects budget amendment that increased budget submission from $0 to $77,000,000 Table 4-15. Venus Radar Mapper/Magellan Funding History (in thousands of dollars) Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Appropriation Programmed (Actual) 1984 29,000 29,000 29,000 29,000 1985 92,500 92,500 92,500 92,500 1986 112,000 112,000 112,000 120,300 1987 69,700 a 69,700 69,700 97,300 1988 59,600 59,600 59,600 73,000 a Amended budget submission. Original budget submission = $66,700,000. 432 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 4-16. Global Geospace Science Funding History (in thousands of dollars) a Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Appropriation Programmed (Actual) 1988 18,600 Global Geospace Science was previously budgeted under Environmental Observations (Applications). There was no specific budget amount for Global Geospace Science in the FY 1988 budget submission. However, the Senate report, which accompanied the FY 1988 appropri- ations bill (H.R. 2783, September 25, 1987), indicated that NASA had requested $25,000,000 for the program for FY 1988. NASA's FY 1988 budget submission for Environmental Observations = $393,800,000, the authorization = $393,800,000, and the appropriation = $378,800,00. These figures were compiled prior to the OSS A reorganization. For the FY 1988 budget year that coin- cided with the OSSA reorganization, Global Geospace Science was moved to Physics and Astronomy. Table 4-1 7. International Solar Polar Mission/Ulysses Development Funding History (in thousands of dollars) a, b Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Appropriation Programmed (Actual) 1984 c 8,000 8,000 8,000 6,000 1985 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000 1986 5,600 5,600 5,600 8,800 1987 24,000 d 24,000 24,000 10,300 1988 10,800 10,800 10,800 7,800 a Renamed International Solar Polar Mission in FY 1980. b Renamed Ulysses in FY 1986 submission. c Moved from Physics and Astronomy Management (see Table 4-6). d Reflects budget amendment that increased budget submission from $0 to 24,000,000. Table 4-18. Mars Geoscience/Climatology Orbiter Program Funding History (in thousands of dollars) a Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Appropriation Programmed (Actual) 1985 16,000 16,000 16,000 13,000 1986 43,800 38,800 38,800 33,800 1987 62,900 62,900 62,900 35,800 1988 29,300 42,300 54,300 53,900 Renamed Mars Observer in FY 1986 submission. si>aci:scii:nci-: 433 I'ablc 4 19. Lunar and Planetary Mission Opera I ions and Data Analysis Funding History (in thousands of dollars) Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Appropriation Programmed (Actual) 1979 84,400 84,400 a 59,300 1980 59,000 59,000 b 58,800 1981 60,500 c 64,800 basic : 64,800 61,800 reflects Sec. 412 : 61,800 1982 45,800 d 45,800 45,800 42,600 1983 26,500 38,500 26,500 38,500 1984 43,400 43,400 43,400 43,400 1985 58,800 58,800 58,800 56,100 1986 95,000 95,000 95,000 67,000 1987 77,200 e 77,200 77,200 75,100 1988 77,000 77,000 77,000 73,792 a Undistributed. House Appropriations Committee allocated $84,400,000. Senate Appropriations Committee allocated $78,700,000. b Undistributed. c Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission = $64,800,000. d Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission = $50,900,000. e Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission = $130,200,000. Table 4-20. Lunar and Planetary Research and Analysis Funding History (in thousands of dollars) Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Appropriation Programmed (Actual) 1979 24,000 24,000 a 44,400 1980 45,100 45,100 b 45,000 1981 51,700 51,700 basic : 51,700 50,700 reflects Sec. 412 : 50,700 1982 51,500 c 51,500 d 46,700 1983 35,500 46,500 37,300 50,300 1984 45,500 60,500 45,500 59,500 1985 54,500 64,500 61,500 61,500 1986 62,900 62,900 62,900 59,500 1987 63,500 63,500 63,500 69,500 1988 75,300 75,300 75,300 67,308 a Undistributed. Both House and Senate appropriations committees allocated $24,000,000. b Undistributed. c Amended budget submission. Original budget submission = $57,200,000. d Undistributed. Total R&D (basic appropriation) = $4,973,100,000. R&D appropriation reflecting Sec. 501 = $4,740,900,000. 434 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 4-21. Life Sciences Flight Experiments Program Funding History (in thousands of dollars) Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Appropriation Programmed (Actual) 1979 12,400 14,400 a 15,700 1980 12,900 12,900 b 16,600 1981 12,700 c 14,700 12,700 12,700 1982 14,000 d 14,000 14,000 14,000 1983 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 1984 23,000 23,000 23,000 23,000 1985 27,100 27,100 27,100 27,100 1986 33,400 33,400 33,400 32,100 1987 31,700 c 36,700 31,700 30,000 1988 32,900 32,900 32,900 33,800 a Undistributed. Both House and Senate appropriations committees allocated $12,400,000. b Undistributed. c Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission = $19,200,000. d Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission = $16,500,000. e Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission = $36,700,000. Table 4-22. Life Sciences/Vestibular Function Research Funding History (in thousands of dollars) Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Appropriation Programmed (Actual) a 1979 1980 3,800 3,700 3,800 3,700 No amount programmed specifically for Vestibular Function Research. Included in Space Biology Research to be conducted on the orbital flight test or Spacelab 1 mission. Undistributed. Both House and Senate appropriations committees allocated $3,800,000. Undistributed. SPACE SCIENCE 135 Table 4 2 J. Life Sciences Research and Analysis Funding History (in thousands of dollars) Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Appropriation Programmed (Actual) 1979 24,400 24,400 a 24,400 1980 27,300 27,300 b 27,200 1981 26,400 c 30,500 basic : 30,500 29,488 reflects Sect. 412: 29,488 1982 29,500 d 29,500 29,500 25,500 1983 31,700 31,700 31,700 31,700 1984 36,000 36,000 36,000 35,000 1985 36,200 36,200 36,200 35,200 1986 38,600 38,600 38,600 34,000 1987 63,500 63,500 63,500 41,800 1988 41,700 41,700 41,700 38,400 a Undistributed. Both House and Senate appropriations committees allocated $24,400,000. b Undistributed. c Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission = $30,500,000. d Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission = $32,700,000. 436 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 4-24. Science Missions (1979-1988) Date Mission Discipline/Program Sponsor Jan. 30, 1979 Spacecraft Charging at High Altitudes June 2, 1979 UK-6 (Ariel)* Aug. 10, 1979 High Energy Astronomy Observatory-3 (HEAO) Feb. 14, 1980 Solar Maximum Mission Aug. 3, 1981 Dynamics Explorer 1 and 2 Oct. 6, 1981 Solar Mesosphere Explorer March 22, 1982 OSS-1 (STS-3) Jan. 25, 1983 Infrared Astronomy Satellite (IRAS) May 26, 1983 European X-Ray Observatory Satellite (EXOSAT)* June 22, 1983 Shuttle Pallet Satellite (SPAS)-Ol June 27, 1983 Hilat* Nov. 28, 1983 Spacelab 1 (STS-9) Aug. 16, 1984 Active Magnetospheric Particle Tracer Explorers (AMPTE) April 29, 1985 Spacelab 3 (STS 51-B) June 17, 1985 Spartan- 1 July 29, 1985 Spacelab 2 (STS 51-F) July 29, 1985 Plasma Diagnostic Package (PDP) Oct. 30, 1985 Spacelab D-l (STS 61 -A) Jan. 23, 1986 Spartan 203 (Spartan-Halley) (failed to reach orbit) Nov. 13, 1986 Polar Bear* March 25, 1988 San Marco D/L Solar Terrestrial/U.S. Air Force Astrophysics/U.K. Science Research Council Astrophysics Solar Terrestrial Solar Terrestrial and Astrophysics Solar Terrestrial and Astrophysics Spacelab Astrophysics Astrophysics/European Space Agency Platform for science experiments/Germany Astrophysics/U.S. Air Force Spacelab (multidiscipline) Astrophysics Spacelab (multidiscipline) Astrophysics Spacelab (multidiscipline) Earth Sciences and Applications German Spacelab (multidiscipline) Astrophysics Astrophysics/U.S. Air Force Astrophysics NASA provided launch service or other nonscience role. si>A( i sciinci: 437 Table 4-25. Spacecraft Charf>in}> at High Altitudes Characteristics Launch Date/Range January 30, 1979/Eastern lest Range Date of Reentry Turned off May 28, L991 Launch Vehicle Delta 2914 NASA Role Launch services tor U.S. Air Force and three experiments Responsible (Lead) Center Goddard Space Flight Center Mission Objectives Instruments and Experiments (NASA experiments were the Light Ion Mass Spectrometer, the Electric Field Detector, and the Magnetic Field Monitor) Place the Air Force satellite into a highly elliptical orbit of sufficient accuracy to allow the spacecraft to achieve its final elliptical orbit while retaining sufficient stationkecp- ing propulsion to meet the mission lifetime requirements 1 . Satellite Surface Potential Monitor measured the potential of a sample surface of various compositions and aspects relative to vehicle ground or to the reference surface by command. 2. Charging Electrical Effect Analyzer measured the electromagnetic background induced in the spacecraft as a result of the charging phenomena. 3. Spacecraft Sheath Electric Fields measured the asymmetric sheath-electric field of the spacecraft, the effects of this electric field on particle trajectories near the spacecraft, and the current to the spherical probe surfaces mounted on booms at distances of 3 meters from the spacecraft surface. 4. Energetic Proton Detector measured the energetic proton environment of the trapped particles at space- craft altitudes with energies of 20 to 1,000 keV, in six or more differential channels, plus an integral flux in the range from 1 to 2 MeV. 5. High Energy Particle Spectrometer measured the flux, spectra, and pitch angle distribution of the ener- getic electron plasma in the energy range of 100 keV to >3000 keV, the proton environment at energies between 1 MeV and 100 MeV, and the alpha particle environment between 6 MeV and 60 MeV during the solar particle events. 6. Satellite Electron Beam System consisted of an indi- rectly heated, oxide-coated cathode and a control grid. It controlled the ejection of electrons from the spacecraft. 7. Satellite Positive Ion Beam System consisted of a Penning discharge chamber ion source and a control grid. It controlled the ejection of ions from the spacecraft. 8. Rapid Scan Particle Detector measured the proton and electron temporal flux variations from 50eV to 60 keV for protons and 50 eV to 10 MeV for electrons, with an ultimate time resolution of milliseconds. 438 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 4-25 continued 9. Orbit Characteristics: Apogee (km) Perigee (km) Inclination (deg.) Period (min.) Weight (kg) Dimensions Shape Power Source Prime Contractor 10. 11 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. Thermal Plasma Analyzer measured, by retarding potential analysis, the environmental photo and sec- ondary electron densities and temperatures, in the range of 10 ' to 10 4 electrons per cubic centimeter, for electrons of energies in the range eV to 100 eV. Light Ion Mass Spectrometer used magnetic mass analysis and retarding potential analysis for tempera- ture determination. It measured the ion density and temperature in the energy range of 0.01 to 100 eV and in the density range of 0.01 to 1,000 ions/cm 3 . Energetic Ion Composition Experiment determined momentum and energy per charge and measured ions in the mass range of 1 to 150 AMU per charge with energies of 100 eV to 20,000 eV. San Diego Particles Detectors measured protons and electrons in the energy range 1 eV to 80,000 eV in 64 discrete steps. This experiment measured the parti- cle flux to the spacecraft, overall charge of the space- craft, differential charge on parts of the spacecraft, and charge accumulated on selected material samples. It also measured the ambient plasma and detected oscillations, enabling better predictions of magnetos- phere dynamics. Electric Field Detector measured AC and DC electric fields in the tenuous plasma region of the outer mag- netosphere. Magnetic Field Monitor measured the magnetic flux density in the range ±5 milligauss with a resolution of 0.004 milligauss. Thermal Coatings monitored temperatures of insulat- ed material samples to determine the changes that took place in their solar absorptive and emissive characteristics with time exposure in space. Quartz Crystal Microbalance measured the deposition rate of contaminants (mass) as a function of energy in the axial and radial directions, respectively. 43,251 27,543 7.81 1,416.2 655 Diameter of 172.7 cm; length of 174.5 cm Cylindrical Solar arrays SAMSO, Martin Marietta Aerospace Corp. SPACH SCIIiNCIi 439 Table 4 26. UK-6 (Arid) Characteristics Launch Date/Range Date <>1* Reentry Launch Vehicle NASA Role Responsible (Lead) Center Mission Objectives Instruments and Experiments June 2, 1979/Wallops Flighl Center Switched off March 19X2; reentered September 23, 1990 Scout Launch services for United Kingdom Science Research Council Langley Research Center Place the UK-6 satellite in an orbit that will enable the successful achievement of the payload scientific objectives: • Measure the charge and energy spectra of galactic cosmic rays, especially the ultraheavy component • Extend the x-ray astronomy to lower levels by exam- ining the spectra, structure, and position of intrinsi- cally low energy sources, extend the spectra of known sources down to low energies, and study the low-energy diffuse component • Study the fast periodic and aperiodic fluctuations in x-ray emissions from a number of low galactic lati- tude sources and improve the knowledge of the con- tinuum spectra of the sources being observed. 1 . Cosmic Ray Experiment measured the charge and energy spectra of the ultraheavy component of cosmic radiation with particular emphasis on the charge region of atomic weights above 30 (Bristol University). 2. Leicester X-Ray Experiment investigated the periodic and aperiodic fluctuations in emissions from a wide range of x-ray sources, down to submillisecond time scales (Leicester University). 3. MSSL/B X-Ray Experiment studied discrete sources and extended features of the low-energy x-ray sky in the range of 0.1 to 2 keV. It also studied long- and short-term variability of individual x-ray sources (Mullar Space Laboratory of University College, London and Birmingham University). 4. Solar Cell Experiment investigated the performance in orbit of new types of solar cells mounted on a flex- ible, lightweight support (Royal Aircraft Establishment). 5. CMOS Experiment was a complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) electronics experiment that investigated the susceptibility of these devices to radiation in a space environment (Royal Aircraft Establishment). 440 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 4-26 continued Orbit Characteristics: Apogee (km) Perigee (km) Inclination (deg.) Period (min.) Weight (kg) Dimensions Shape Power Source Prime Contractor Results 656 607 55.04 97 154.5 n/a Cylindrical Solar array and battery power Marconi Space and Defense Systems, Ltd. The satellite lasted beyond its 2-year design life. However, it lost at least half its data. It suffered from radio interfer- ence from Earth, which caused the high-voltage supplies and its tape recorder to switch on and off sporadically and to lose information that should have been stored. The problem was alleviated by using more NASA ground sta- tions, an Italian receiving station in Kenya, and a portable station set up by University College in Australia. SPACK SCIKNCI: 441 Table 4-27. HEAO-3 Characteristics Launch Date/Range Date of Reentry Launch Vehicle NASA Role Responsible (Lead) Center Mission Objectives Instruments and Experiments Orbit Characteristics: Apogee (km) Perigee (km) Inclination (deg.) Period (min.) Weight (kg) Dimensions Shape Power Source Prime Contractor Results September 20, 1979/Eastern Test Range December 7, 1981 Atlas-Centaur Project management Marshall Space Right Center Study gamma ray emission with high sensitivity and resolution over the energy range of about 0.06 MeV to 10 MeV and measure the isotopie composition of cosmic- rays from lithium through iron and the composition of cosmic rays heavier than iron 1. High-Spectral Resolution Gamma Ray Spectrometer (Jet Propulsion Laboratory) explored sources of x-ray and gamma ray line emissions from approximately 0.06 to 10 million electron volts. It also searched for new discrete sources of x-rays and gamma rays and measured the spectrum and intensity of Earth's x-ray and gamma ray albedo (Figure 4-3). 2. Isotopie Composition of Primary Cosmic Rays (Center for Nuclear Studies, France, and Danish Space Research Institute) measured the isotopie com- position of primary cosmic rays with atomic charge Z between Z=4 (beryllium) to Z=26 (iron) and in the momentum range from 2 to 20 giga electron volts per nucleon (Figure 4-4). 3. Heavy Nuclei Experiment (Washington University, California Institute of Technology, and University of Minnesota) observed rare, high-atomic-number (Z>30), relativistic nuclei in the cosmic rays. It also measured the elemental composition and energy spectra of these nuclei with sufficient resolution to determine the abundance of individual elements from chlorine (Z=17) through at least uranium (Z=92). These data provided information on nucleosynthesis models and on the relative importance of different types of stellar objects as cosmic ray sources (Figure 4-5). 504.9 486.4 43.6 94.5 2,904 Diameter of 2.35 m; length of 5.49 m Cylindrical with solar panels (two modules: experiment and equipment) Solar arrays and nickel cadmium batteries TRW Systems, Inc. Mission was highly successful; the satellite returned data for 20 months. 442 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 4-28. Solar Maximum Mission Launch Date/Range Date of Reentry Launch Vehicle NASA Role Responsible (Lead) Center Mission Objectives Instruments and Experiments (Figure 4-6) Orbit Characteristics: Apogee (km) Perigee (km) Inclination (deg.) Period (min.) Weight (kg) Dimensions Power Source Prime Contractor February 14, 1980/Eastern Test Range December 2, 1989 Delta 3910 Project management Goddard Space Flight Center Observe a sizable number of solar flares or other active- Sun phenomena simultaneously by five or six of the Solar Maximum Mission experiments, with coalignment of the narrow field-of-view instruments, and measure the total radiative output of the Sun over a period of at least 6 months with an absolute accuracy of 0.5 percent and short-term precision of 0.2 percent 1 . Gamma Ray Spectrometer measured the intensity, energy and Doppler shift of narrow gamma ray radiation lines and the intensity of extremely broad- ened lines. 2. Hard X-Ray Spectrometer helped determine the role that energetic electrons played in the solar flare phenomenon. 3. Hard X-Ray Imaging Spectrometer imaged the Sun in hard x-rays and provided information about the posi- tion, extension, and spectrum of the hard x-ray bursts in flares. 4. Soft X-Ray Polychromator investigated solar activity that produced solar plasma temperatures in the 1.5 million to 50 million degree range. It also studied solar plasma density and temperature. 5. Ultraviolet Spectrometer and Polarimeter studied the ultraviolet radiation from the solar atmosphere, par- ticularly from active regions, flares, prominences, and active corona, and studied the quiet Sun. 6. High Altitude Observatory Coronagraph/Polarimeter returned imagery of the Sun's corona in parts of the visible spectrum as part of an investigation of coronal disturbances created by solar flares. 7. Solar Constant Monitoring Package monitored the output of the Sun over most of the spectrum and over the entire solar surface. 573.5 571.5 28.5 96.16 2,315.1 Diameter of 2. 1 m; length of 4 m Solar arrays Goddard in-house SPACE SCIENCE 143 Table 4 28 continued Results/Remarks This mission was judged successful based on the results of the mission with respect to the approved prclaunch objec- tives, For the first 9 months of operation, the mission eon tiiuionsly gathered data from seven experiments on hoard. These data represented the most comprehensive informa tion ever collected about solar Hares. Project scientists gained valuable insight into the mechanisms that trigger solar Hares and significant information about the total energy output from the Sun. The payload of instruments gathered data collectively on nearly 25 flares. After 9 months of normal operation, the satellite's attitude control system lost its capability to point precisely at the Sun. At that point, the spacecraft was placed in a slow spin using a magnetic control mode, which permitted continued opera- tion of three instruments while coarsely pointing at the Sun. This was the first NASA satellite designed to be retrieved and serviced by the Space Shuttle. The Solar Max Repair Mission (STS 41-C) was successful and was completed after 7 hours, 7 minutes of extravehicular activ- ity. Following its repair, Solar Max discovered several comets as well as continuing with its planned solar observations. 444 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 4-29. Dynamics Explorer 1 and 2 Characteristics Launch Date/Range Date of Reentry Launch Vehicle NASA Role Responsible (Lead) Center Mission Objectives Instruments and Experiments August 3, 1981/Western Test Range Dynamics Explorer 1 retired February 28, 1991, Dynamics Explorer 2 reentered February 19, 1983 Delta 3913 Project management Goddard Space Flight Center Investigate the strong interactive processes coupling the hot, tenuous, convecting plasmas of the magnetosphere and the cooler, denser plasmas and gases co-rotating in Earth's ionosphere, upper atmosphere, and plasmasphere Dynamics Explorer 1 : 1 . High Altitude Plasma Instrument (five electrostatic analyzers) measured phase-space distributions of electrons and positive ions from 5 eV to 25 eV as a function of pitch angle. 2. Retarding Ion Mass Spectrometer (magnetic ion mass spectrometer) measured density, temperature, and bulk flow of H+, He+, and 0+ in high-altitude mode, and composition in the 1-64 AMU range in low- altitude mode. 3. Spin-Scan Auroral Imager (spin-scan imaging pho- tometers) imaged aurora at visible and ultraviolet and made photometric measurements of the hydrogen corona. 4. Plasma Waves (long dipole antennae and a magnetic loop antenna) measured electric fields from 1 hertz (Hz) to 2 MHz, magnetic fields from 1 Hz to 400 kHz, and the DC potential difference between the electric dipole elements. 5. Hot Plasma Composition (energetic ion mass spec- trometer) measured the energy range from keV to 17 keV per unit charge and the mass range from 1 AMU to 138 AMU per unit charge. 6. Magnetic Field Observations (fluxgate magnetome- ter) measured field-aligned currents in the auroral oval and over the polar cap at two altitudes. Dynamics Explorer 2: 1 . Langmuir Probe (cylindrical electrostatic probe) mea- sured electron temperature and electron or ion concentration. 2. Neutral Atmosphere Composition Spectrometer (mass spectrometer) measured the composition of the neu- tral atmosphere. 3. Retarding Potential Analyzer measured ion tempera- ture, ion composition, ion concentration, and ion bulk velocity. 4. Fabray-Periot Interferometer measured drift and tem- perature of neutral ionic atomic oxygen. 5. Ion Drift measured bulk motions of ionospheric plasma. SPACE SCIENCE 445 Table 4-29 continual 6. Vector Electric Field Instrument (tnaxial antennas) measured electric fields at ionospheric altitudes and extra-low -frequency and low-frequency ionosphere irregularities. 7. Wind and Temperature Spectrometer (mass spectrom- eter) measured in-situ, neutral winds, neutral particle temperatures, and the concentration of selected gases. 8. Magnetic Field Observations (see Dynamics Explorer 1 above) 9. Low Altitude Plasma Instrument (plasma instrument) measured positive ions and electrons from 5 eV to 30 keV. Dynamics Explorer 1 Dynamics Explorer 2 23,173 1,012.5 569.5 309 89.91 89.99 409 97.5 424 Width of 134.6 cm; length of 114.3 cm 16-sided polygon Solar cell arrays RCA The spacecraft achieved a final orbit somewhat lower than planned because of short burn of the second stage in the Delta launch vehicle, but could still carry out the full sci- entific mission. Orbit Characteristics: Apogee (km) Perigee (km) Inclination (deg.) Period (min.) Weight (kg) Dimensions Shape Power Source Prime Contractor Results 446 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK M 5 e c« w 55 fc fa « y: £ xs ^ a pd a. a ^ S "X X •< 5 "* >< rf* CN DC m 3 r] < o< in m (N E E < o DO C/5 •— b o o o o ri (N 3 o O o in i i c i o o o> m ^ H (N b Ph o O — i CN m m < CO o o 'fj Cti e u v- c D. 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"3 03 03 •— ^3 43 ft E 03 43 3 XJ 3 Xj »5 03 3 E T3 * * 3 s CQ LU 03 OJ 03 E3 a C U CJ 'y -O "3 13 43 03 03 s ^. s CA > 2 2 C a> 03 -3 XJ 3 H H 03 3 3 a 03 03 be bd 73 03 03 E E 3 ■j — i 3 2 2 S PL E 13 C 3 S 2 I ■a 03 o 03 3 T3 ^3 03 43 43 _3 o '*Z *{h PL LL o Q Q 3C < < 'oT o £ o CO H Cu c o o a c o o o 03 CO cs 03 Q 2 < 04 CO o o -J o c ri >, _o 2 > 03 ed < 3 -J be 1 c i_ 03 Ih 03 U r3 U "S ft g Q CO' ^— ^ _-3 3 bo 3 3 O X5 U 3 03 c^ ■J7^ 03 03 ft ft E "C co B3 — '53 03 3 N 3 Q 03 "o3 2 _o *j^ -2 03 y. od ft u 03 co a & -c g 5 ^^ g J? CO si 43 i ^ xl X .£ 516 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 4-49. OSS-1 Investigations Investigation Principal Investigator Institution Contamination Monitor Package measured the buildup of molecular and gas contaminants in the orbiter environment to determine how molecular contamination affects instrument performance. J. Triolo Goddard Space Flight Center/U.S. Air Force Microabrasion Foil Experiment measured the numbers, chemistry, and density of micrometeorites encountered by spacecraft in near- Earth orbit. J. A.M. McDonnell University of Kent, England Vehicle Charging and Potential Experiment measured the electrical characteristics of the orbiter, including its interactions with the natural plasma environment of the ionosphere and the distur- bances that result from the active emission of electrons. P. Banks Utah State University Shuttle-Spacelab Induced Atmosphere provided data on the extent that dust particles and volatile materials evaporating from the orbiter produced a local "cloud" or "plume" in the "sky" through which astronomical observations could be made. J. Weinberg University of Florida Solar Flare X-Ray Polarimeter measured x-rays emitted during solar flare activities on the Sun. R. Novick Columbia University Solar Ultraviolet Spectral Irradiance Monitor was designed to establish a new and more accurate base of solar ultraviolet irradiance measurements over a wide wavelength region. G. Brueckner Naval Research Laboratory Plant Growth Unit demonstrated the effect of near weightlessness on the quantity and rate of lignin formation in different plant species during early stages of development and tested the hypothesis that, under microgravity, lignin might be reduced, causing the plants to lose strength and droop rather than stand erect. J.R. Cowles University of Houston SPACE SCIENCE 517 Table 4 49 continued Investigation Principal Investigator Institution Thermal Canister Experiment determined the ability of a device using controllable heat pipes to maintain simulated instruments at several temperature levels in thermal loads. S. Ollendorl ( ioddard Space Right Center Plasma Diagnostics Package studied the interaction of the orbiter with its surrounding environment, tested the capabilities of the Shuttle's Remote Manipulator System, and carried out experiments in conjunction with the Fast Pulse Electron Generator of the Vehicle Charging and Potential Experiment, also on the OSS-1 payload pallet. The package was deployed for more than 20 hours and was maneuvered at the end of the 15.2-meter RMS. (See also Table 4-40.) S. Shawhan University of Iowa 518 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 4-50. Hubble Space Telescope Development Date Event 1940 Astronomer R.S. Richardson speculates on the possibility of a 300-inch telescope placed on the Moon's surface. 1960/1961 The requests for proposal (RFP) for the Orbiting Astronomical Observatory spacecraft and the astronomical instruments to be flown aboard them are issued. 1962 The National Academy of Sciences recommends the construc- tion of a large space telescope. 1965 The National Academy of Sciences establishes a committee to define the scientific objectives for a proposed large space tele- scope. 1968 The first astronomical observatory, the Orbiting Astronomical Observatory- 1 , is launched. 1972 The National Academy of Sciences again recommends a large orbiting optical telescope as a realistic and desirable goal. 1973 NASA establishes a small scientific and engineering steering committee headed by Dr. C. Robert O'Dell of the University of Chicago to determine which scientific objectives would be fea- sible for a proposed space telescope. 1975 The European Space Agency becomes involved in the project. 1977 NASA selects a group of 60 scientists from 38 institutions to participate in the design and development of the proposed space telescope. June 17, 1977 NASA issues the Project Approval Document for the space telescope. The primary project objective is to "develop and operate a large, high-quality optical telescope system in space which is unique in its usefulness to the international science community. The overall scientific objectives... are to gain a sig- nificant increase in our understanding of the university — past, present, and future — through observations of celestial objects and events...." NASA awards the contract for the primary mirror to Perkin- Elmer of Danbury, Connecticut. 1978 Congress appropriates funds for the development of the space telescope. Oct. 19, 1977 April 25, 1978 Dec. 1978 Marshall Space Flight Center is designated as the lead center for the design, development, and construction of the telescope. Goddard Space Flight Center is chosen to lead the development of the scientific instruments and ground control center. Rough grinding operation begins at Perkin-Elmer in Wilton, Connecticut. 1979 Jan. 20, 1979 Money requests for space science program increase 20 percent ($100 million), which includes money for the space telescope. Feb. 1979 Debate over which institute NASA should choose to develop the space telescope takes place. (John Hopkins University is chosen.) SPACI S( IINCL siy Table 4-50 continued Date Event May 29. 1979 The decision is made to have Fairchild Space & Electronics Company modify the communications and data handling mod- ule it developed for NASA's Multimission Modular Spacecraft for use on the space telescope. June 1979 Marshall Space Flight Center decides that the alternative sensor was receiving little management attention at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the space telescope was unlikely to be ready lor a 1983 launch. July 1979 Marshall Space Flight Center compiles its Program Operating Plan for fiscal year 1980; Lockheed and Perkin-Elmer overshot the cost for the space telescope by millions of dollars of the original budgeted adjusted program's reserves. Nov. 18, 1979 Dec. 14, 1979 1980 Five states compete for the space telescope: Maryland, New Jersey, Illinois, Colorado, and California. Competing groups include University Research Association, Associated Universities, Inc. (AUI), and Association of Universities for Research and Astronomy (AURA). AUI wants the project at Princeton; AURA wants it at Johns Hopkins University. Goddard Space Flight Center releases the Space Telescope Science Institute RFP. Proposals are due March 3,1980. Feb. 13, 1980 Feb. 21, 1980 May 29, 1980 Sept. 18, 1980 1981 Dr. F.A. Speer, manager of the High Energy Astronomy Observatory program at Marshall Space Flight Center, is named manager of the space telescope project for Marshall. NASA Associate Administrator Dr. Thomas A. Mutch informs Congress that the space telescope can be completed within its "originally estimated costs." NASA estimates space telescope development costs at $530 million, with another $600 million allotted for operation of the system over a 17-year period. Mutch says progress toward launch in December 1983 "contin- ues to be excellent." NASA announces the selection of Ford Aerospace to negotiate a contract for overall system design engineering on preliminary operations requirements and the test support system for the space telescope. NASA officials admit to space telescope cost and schedule problems in hearing before the House Science and Technology subcommittee. Jan. 6, 1981 A.M. Lovelace, NASA associate administrator/general manag- er, submits a revised space telescope cost and schedule esti- mate. The launch period is revised to the first half of 1985, and the estimated development cost at launch is $700 million to $750 million (in 1982 dollars). 520 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 4-50 continued Date Event Jan. 16. 1981 April 29, 1981 April 30, 1981 Oct. 23, 1981 Dec. 10, 1981 1982 NASA selects AURA for final negotiation of a contract to establish, operate, and maintain the Space Telescope Science Institute. It will be located at Johns Hopkins University. The contractor's estimate of the cost of the 5-year contract is $24 million, plus additional funds to support a guest observer and archival research program. Perkin-Elmer completes polishing of the 2.4-meter primary mirror (see events dated November 1990). Goddard Space Flight Center awards the contract for the man- agement of the Space Telescope Science Institute to AURA. The period of performance for the $40.4 million contract extends through 1986. The institute will be located at Johns Hopkins University. Space telescope's "main ring" is delivered to Perkin-Elmer Corp. from Exelco Corp., which fabricated the ring over a peri- od of 18 months. Perkin-Elmer finishes putting an aluminum coating 3 millionths of an inch thick on the primary mirror. Jan. 26, 1982 Congress increases space telescope funding by $2 million to $121.5 million. March 1982 The Critical Design Review of the space telescope's support systems module is completed, and the design is declared ready for manufacturing. March 28, 1982 A report from the House Appropriations Committee states that the space telescope would cost $200 million more and reach orbit a year later than expected because of difficulties in devel- opment. The report blames delays and cost overruns on NASA for understaffing the program by 50 percent in its early devel- opment and on Perkin-Elmer for failing to properly plan for a project of the technical and manufacturing difficulty of the space telescope. Also, unremovable dust on the primary mirror after 15 months in a Perkin-Elmer "clean room" had lowered its reflecting power by 20 to 30 percent. 1983 Feb. 4, 1 983 NASA Administrator Beggs tells the House Science and Technology Committee that technical problems in developing the electronics and guidance and pointing system of the optical telescope assembly of the space telescope will delay the launch of the telescope and increase costs. March 24, 1983 NASA Administrator Beggs tells House subcommittee that the space telescope has problems in a number of areas — the latch- ing mechanism, the fine guidance sensor system, and the pri- mary mirror — that are likely to result in cost overruns of $200 million or more and at least a 12- to 18-month delay. Beggs says that the primary mirror is coated with dust after sit- ting in a clean room for a year and may not be able to be cleaned without harming its surface. Its capability could be lim- ited to 70 or 80 percent. SPAC! N( unci-: 521 Table 4-50 continued Date Even! March 25, 1983 April 13, 1983 April 26, 1983 June 15, 1983 June 15, 1983 Oct. 5, 1983 Nov. 17, 1983 Dec. 22, 1983 1984 The preliminary report by the Investigations and Survey Stall of the House Appropriations subcommittee stales that the spaee telescope will overrun its costs by $200 million, boosting its overall cost to $1 billion. NASA names James B. Odom as manager of Marshall Space Flight Center's space telescope project. James Welch, NASA's director of space telescope development, states that NASA may accept the dirty primary mirror because a current study indicates that the mirror would be within the acceptable range and would meet the original specifications in the contract. Also, NASA has decided to coat the sticking latch- ing mechanism with tungsten carbide rather than redesign it. Dr. William Lucas, Marshall Space Flight Center director, tells the House Space subcommittee that NASA estimates that tele- scope project costs will increase $300 million to $400 million to approximately $1.1 billion to $1.2 billion, and it expects to be able to launch in June 1986. He states that technical prob- lems "are now understood and resolution is in hand." Administrator Beggs acknowledges that, in retrospect, NASA made some errors in planning and running the space telescope program, but that the instrument has not been compromised. The space telescope is officially renamed the Edwin P. Hubble Space Telescope. NASA submits a report to Congress on proposed action that would augment efforts planned for the space telescope develop- ment by $30.0 million above the authorized and appropriated amount, for a revised FY 1984 level of $195.6 million. Space telescope officials are cautiously optimistic that the seri- ous problems that surfaced on the space telescope over the last year have been solved and that the instrument can be launched on schedule in 1986. April 2, 1984 The estimated cost of the space telescope has risen to $1,175 million. NASA Administrator Beggs states that Lockheed will lose some of its award fees because of poor workmanship prob- lems. April 30, 1984 NASA reports that tests of the fine guidance sensors have demonstrated that the telescope will meet stringent pointing and tracking requirements. May 14, 1984 The idea surfaces of refurbishing the space telescope in space. May 31, 1984 The five science instruments to fly on the space telescope com- plete acceptance testing at Goddard Space Flight Center: high- resolution spectrograph, faint-object spectrograph, wide-field/ planetary camera, faint-object camera, high-speed photometer. July 12, 1984 Technicians at Perkin-Elmer clean the primary mirror. NASA states that cleaning of the primary mirror has confirmed that the observatory will have the very best optical system possible. 522 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 4-50 continued Date Event Dec. 6, 1984 1985 Goddard Space Flight Center's Telescope Operations Control Center satisfactorily conducts command and telemetry tests with the Hubble Space Telescope at Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation. This is the first of seven assembly and veri- fication tests. Jan. 17-18, 1985 Feb. 1, 1985 July 8, 1985 July 19, 1985 Dec. 5, 1985 1986 Jan. 26, 1986 Feb. 27, 1986 May 2- June 30, 1986 May 21, 1986 May 27, 1986 Aug. 7, 1986 Aug. 8, 1986 1987 A workshop by the Space Telescope Science Institute is held to give scientists an opportunity to present their recommendations for key projects for the space telescope. The National Society of Professional Engineers presents an award to Perkin-Elmer Corp. for its development of the Hubble Space Telescope's optical telescope assembly. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. reports that it has completed assembly of the primary structure for the Hubble Space Telescope. Goddard Space Flight Center releases the RFP for design and fabrication of an Imaging Spectrograph for the space telescope. Proposals are due September 17. NASA selects three scientific investigations for the space tele- scope to lead to the development of one or two advanced scien- tific instruments for Hubble. The destruction of Challenger delays the launch of Hubble and other missions. Hubble completes acoustic and dynamic and vibrational response tests. The tests indicate that it can endure the launch environment. Thermal-vacuum testing is conducted. The last elements of Hubble — the solar arrays — are delivered to Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. (Sunnyvale, California) for integration into the main telescope structure. Hubble successfully completes the thermal-vacuum testing in the Lockheed thermal-vacuum chamber. NASA and the Space Telescope Science Institute in Baltimore announce that 19 U.S. amateur astronomers will be allowed to make observations with Hubble. This decision is to show grati- tude to the amateur astronomers for their help with telescopes for the last 400 years. Hubble successfully completes 2 months of rigorous testing. March 17, 1987 Hubble starts a 3-day ground system test involving the five instruments that will be carried on board: wide field and plane- tary camera, high-resolution spectrograph, faint object spectro- graph, high-speed photometer, and faint object camera. Aug. 31- Goddard Space Flight Center's Space Telescope Operations Sept. 4, 1987 Control Center, Marshall Space Flight Center, and the Space Flight Telescope Science Institute conduct a joint orbital verifica- tion test. si>aci:scii{nci; 523 Table 4-50 continued Dale Lveni Sept. l ). 19X7 19S8 Hubble completes the reevaluation of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMHA). This reevaluation of the FMEA/Critical Items List/hazard analysis is directed by the Space Telescope Development Division as part of NASA's strategy to return the Space Shuttle to flight status. Feb. 10, 1988 March 31, 1988 June 20, 1988 July 24, 1988 August 31, 1988 1989 Fred S. Wojtalik is appointed manager of the Hubble project at Marshall Space Flight Center. The draft Program Approval Document for Hubble is complet- ed. The draft contains the objectives of Hubble, the technical plan, including the experiments and descriptions, and the sys- tems performance requirements. NASA begins the fourth ground system test (GST-4) of Hubble. This will be the longest ground test to date, lasting 5 1/2 days, and also the most sophisticated because all of the six instru- ments will be used in their various operational modes; the new instrument is the fine-guidance astrometer. Hubble completes the GST-4 tests successfully, except for a tim- ing incompatibility between the science instruments and the com- puter. The problem is to be corrected by adjusting the software. NASA delays launch of Hubble from June 1989 to February 1990. July 19, 1989 The Space Telescope Science Institute completes its selection of the first science observation proposals to be carried out using Hubble. Among the 162 accepted proposals (out of 556 submitted) are plans to search for black holes in neighboring galaxies, to survey the dense cores of globular star clusters, to better see the most distant galaxies in the universe, to probe the core of the Milky Way, and to search for neutron stars that may trigger bizarre gamma-ray bursts. Oct. 1989 A modified Air Force C-5A Galaxy transports the Hubble Space Telescope from Lockheed in California to its launch site at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida. 1990 Jan. 19, 1990 NASA delays the Hubble launch to replace O-rings. Feb. 5-7, 1990 Confidence testing is held. Feb. 10, 1990 Feb. 13, 1990 End-to-end communications test run using Tracking and Data Relay Satellite-East is concluded to interconnect the payload interfaces of Discovery in its hangar, Hubble in the Vertical Processing Facility, and the Space Telescope Operations Control Center at Goddard Space Flight Center. The final confidence test is held. Feb. 15, 1990 Closeout operations begin. Feb. 17, 1990 Functional testing of Hubble's science instruments is completed. March 29, 1990 Hubble is installed in the Space Shuttle orbiter Discovery's payload bay. April 24, 1990 Hubble is launched on STS-31. 524 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 4-50 continued Date Event June 21, 1990 Hubble's project manager announces the telescope's inability to focus properly. July 2, 1990 The Hubble Space Telescope Optical Systems Board of Investigation is formed under the chairmanship of Dr. Lew Allen of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Oct. 16, 1990 Responsibility for the Hubble project (except for the optical system failure questions) is transferred from Marshall to Goddard. Nov. 1990 The Board of Investigation releases findings, which conclude that a spherical aberration was caused by a flawed measuring device that was used to test the primary mirror at the manufac- turer's facility. Dec. 2, 1993 The Hubble Repair Mission on STS-61 installs corrective lens- es and replaces solar panels. SPACK SCIIiNCT: 525 Table 4-51. Ulysses Historical Summary Spacecraft Launch Vehicle/ Upper Stage Launch Date October L978 Project Start 1 NASA spacecraft 1 ESA spacecraft Single STS/IUS (3-stage launch) 1983 launch April 1980 Split launches: 1 NASA, 1 ESA Launch deferred to 1985 February 1981 NASA spacecraft "slowdown" Launch vehicle changed to STS/Centaur Launch deferred to 1986 September 1981 U.S. spacecraft canceled January 1982 Launch vehicle changed to STS/IUS (2-stage) July 1982 Launch vehicle changed to STS/Centaur January 1986 Challenger accident Launch deferred indefinitely June 1986 STS/Centaur program canceled November 1986 IUS/PAM-S upper stage procurement decision Launch date selected: October 1990 Nnl INDEX Aaron. John, 373 Abrahamson. James A., 17, 18 Active Magnetospheric Particle Tracer Explorer, AMPTE, 373, 386, 388 Advanced Communications Technology Satellite, ACTS, 50 Advanced Launch System, 56 Advanced Solid Rocket Motor, ASRM, 57, 58 Aerojet Strategic Propulsion Company, 222 Aerojet TechSy stems, 53 Air Force, U.S., 17, 24, 28, 29, 169, 179, 221, 225, 375, 385, 386 Aldrich, Arnold J., 19, 111, 196, 197, 200 Aldrin, Edwin "Buzz," 125 Allen, Joseph P., 178 Ames Research Center, 118, 179 Anderson, Paul G., 118 Apogee and Maneuvering System, AMS, 51 Apollo, 107, 108, 115, 125, 134, 135, 165 Arizona, University of, 366 Armstrong, Neil, 125 Atlantic Ocean, 33, 138, 156 Atlantic Research Corporation, 222 Atlantis, 125, 153, 182, 232, 233, 235, 405 Atlas, 13, 16, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 47, 51,375 Aurora, satellite, 28 Australia, 179 Austria, 150 B Ball Aerospace, 380 Beggs, James M., 54, 370 Belgian, 150 Big Bang, 404, 410 Black, David C, 118 Bluford, Guion S., 173 Boeing Aerospace Corporation, 52, 53, 24 1, 242, 402 Brand, Vance D., 174 Briggs, Geoffrey, 371 British Science and Engineering Research Council, 399, 400, 408 Bundeministerium fur Forschungs und Technologie, BMFT, 408, 409 California Institute of Technology, 402 California, University of, 402, 406 Canada, 170, 173, 241, 243, 244, 250 Canadian Space Agency, 250 Capital Development Plan, 241 Captain Cook, 125 Carnegie Institute, 367 Castor, II, IV, 31 Centaur, 16, 17, 22, 24, 26, 29, 51, 57, 217, 375,417,418,420 Centre Spatial Guyanais, 252 Centro Ricerche Aerospaziali, 392 Challenger, 3, 14, 19, 28, 41, 43, 45, 52, 107, 108, 111, 115, 122, 123, 125, 128, 139, 153, 171, 172, 174, 175, 176, 177, 185, 186, 187, 188, 190, 191, 195, 196, 199, 203, 212, 217, 218, 235, 364, 368, 390, 403, 409, 410, 417, 418,420 Chang-Diaz, Franklin R., 183 Charge Composition Explorer, CCE, 386, 387, 388 Chicago, University of, 402, 419 Clean Air Act of 1977, 379 Coast Guard, U.S., 190 Collins, Michael, 125 Colorado, University of, 380, 390 Columbia, 107, 108, 122, 125, 153, 155, 156, 157, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 183, 232, 233, 235 Columbus, 251,252 Combined Release and Radiation Effects Satellite, CRRES, 29 Comet Giacobini-Zinner, 368, 402, 421 Comet IRAS-Araki-Alcock, 383 Commerce Business Daily, 27 Compton, Arthur Holly, 405 Compton Gamma Ray Observatory, CGRO, 401,404,405,406 Compton Telescope, COMPTEL, 405 Congress, U.S., 3, 4, 14, 20, 21, 22, 56, 57, 119, 120, 121, 188, 189, 212, 239, 241, 242, 246, 248, 363, 373, 374, 417 Copernicus, Orbiting Astronomical Observatory, 402 Cosmic Background Explorer, COBE, 409, 410 Crew Activity Plan, 141 527 528 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Crippen. Robert L.. 112. 167, 172, 214, 215, 222 Critical Design Review, 44-45, 56 Critical Item List, CIL, 210, 214, 215 Culbertson. Philip E., 18, 114 Extravehicular activity, EVA, 146, 147, 171 174, 181,239,250 Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer, EUVE, 368, 401,406,407 Data and Design Analysis Task Force, 51-L, 211 Delta. 13, 16, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31. 49, 51, 368, 379, 382, 383, 384, 399, 406.407,409,410 Denmark, 150 Department of Defense, DOD, 19, 27, 28, 33, 48, 53, 56, 57, 122, 131, 179, 182, 186, 218,227,385,391 Design Certification Review, 45 Deutsche Forschungs Versuchsanstat fur Luft und Raumfahrt, DFVLR, 393 (see German Aerospace Research Establishment) Diaz, Alphonso V., 118, 119 Discovery, 125, 147, 153, 177, 178, 185, 187, 232, 233, 235, 236, 237, 238, 388 Douglas Aircraft Company, 3 1 Drop Dynamics Module, 395 Dutch additional experiment, DAX, 382, 383 Dynamics Explorer 1, 378, 379 Earth, 33, 34, 48, 52, 53, 55, 56, 107, 108, 125, 126, 129, 141, 143, 148, 152, 157, 161, 163, 165, 167, 168, 171, 174, 177, 178, 180, 238, 239, 243, 246, 252, 254, 363, 364, 366, 369, 370, 372, 373, 374, 375, 379, 383, 385, 388, 395, 396, 399, 401, 402, 404, 406, 410, 411, 413, 414, 416,418,419,420,421 Eaton, Peter, 19 Edelson, Burton I., 371 Edwards Air Force Base, California, 34, 136, 142, 169, 171, 204, 208, 210, 216, 225, 238 Ellington Field, 145 Endeavour, 126, 153 Enterprise, 108 European Space Agency, ESA, 26, 109, 148, 150, 173, 174, 241, 243, 244, 252, 368, 384, 394, 399, 400, 401, 402, 405, 408, 419,420 European X-Ray Observatory Satellite, EXOSAT, 26, 384 Evolution Management Council, 246 Expendable Launch Vehicles, ELV, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 33, 47, 49,217,368 Feynman, Richard, 199 Finarelli, Margaret, 118 Fisher, William F, 181 Fisk, Lennard A., 371 Fitts, Jerry, 17 Fletcher, James C, 115, 116, 120, 212, 218 Flight Readiness Firing, 133, 236, 237 Flight Readiness Review, 112, 195, 196, 199, 207, 215, 223 France, 150 Freedom, Space Station, 242, 243, 250 Fullerton, Gordon, 162 Galaxy satellite, 27 Galileo, 52, 218, 368, 369, 383, 417, 418, 419 Gardner, Dale A., 178 Garn, Senator Jake, 180 German Aerospace Research Establishment, DFVLR, 182 (see Deutsche Forschungs Versuchsanstat fur Luft und Raumfahrt) German Federal Ministry of Research and Technology, 182 Germany, Federal Republic of, 150, 172, 173, 405, 407, 418 Gemini, 142 General Accounting Office, 6 General Dynamics, 29, 52 General Electric, GE, 52, 53, 242 General purpose computers, GPC, 127, 128, 233 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite, GOES, 25, 26, 28 Get- Away Special, 151, 152, 169, 180, 182 Gibson, Robert L. "Hoot," 174 Glaser, Harold, 371 Goddard Space Flight Center, 31, 116, 117, 143, 144, 151, 180, 240, 248, 368, 369, 371, 390, 392, 399, 402, 403, 406, 409 Graham, William, 189 Greenbelt, Maryland, 248 Gregory, Frederick, 224 Griggs, David, 147, 179 Grumman Corporation, 242 Grumman Gulfstream II, 146 Guastaferro, Angelo, 371 Gunn, Charles R., 15 INDliX 529 II Halley's Comet, 183. 184. I 90, 390, 40 1, 416. 421 Halpern. Richard E., 118 Hercules Inc.. 222 Herman, Daniel H., 118,371 High Energy Astronomy Observatories. HEAO. 365, 366, 375, 376, 409 High-pressure fuel tiirbopnmp, HPFT, 36 Hilat. 385, 391 Hinners, Noel W., 369. 372 Hitchhiker, 183 Hodge, John D., 18, 114, 116 Hoffman, Jeffrey, 147, 179 Honeywell, Inc., 51, 52 Hubble, Edwin P., 367 Hubble Space Telescope, 218, 367, 368, 401, 402, 403, 404 Hudson, Henry, 125 Hughes Aircraft, 26, 178, 416 Huntsville, Alabama, 247 Hutchinson, Neil, 240 Jel Propulsion Laboratory, JPL, 143, 171, J80, 383,406, 416 Johns Hopkins University, 403 Johnson Space Center, JSC, 34, 50, 109, 1 10, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 123, 143, 144, 145, 155, 189, 196, 217, 223, 239. 240, 248 Jupiter, 365, 366, 396, 411,413,417 K Keel, Alton G., Jr., 188 Kennedy Space Center, KSC, 29, 34, 37, 50, 109, 110, 112, 113, 116, 117, 122, 125, 133, 135, 136, 137, 141, 142, 143, 155, 169, 176, 189, 190, 196, 200, 203, 204, 208, 210, 216, 217, 224, 225, 232, 235, 241, 251,369 Kenya, 392 Kilminster, Joseph, 196 Kodak, 402 Kohrs, Richard H., Ill, 112 Kourou, French Guiana, 252 Indian Ocean, 33, 137,238 Inertial Upper Stage, IUS, 17, 48, 49 Infrared Astronomy Satellite, IRAS, 26, 381, 382, 383 Insat, 26, 172, 173 Intelsat, 26 Intercontinental ballistic missile, ICBM, 29, 30 Intermediate range ballistic missile, 3 1 International Cometary Explorer, ICE, 402, 421 International Halley Watch, 421 International Solar Polar Mission, 52, 419, 420 International Sun-Earth Explorer, ISEE, 401, 402,415 International Ultraviolet Explorer, IUE, 399, 400, 401 Intravehicular activity, IVA, 147 Ion Release Module, IRM, 386, 387, 388 Italian Commissione per le Ricerche Spaziali, 391 Italy, 150, 391 Itek, 402 Japan, 241,243, 244, 252,401 Japanese Experiment Module, JEM, 253 Jarvis, Gregory, 190 Landsat, 26 Langley Research Center, 33, 246, 247 Laser initial navigation system, LINS, 50, 51 Launch Abort Panel, 225 Launch Control Center, 134, 135, 236 Launch Processing System, 134, 135 Leasat, 147, 177, 179, 181 Leicester University, United Kingdom, 408 Lewis Research Center, 30, 52, 53, 115, 116, 117, 118,240,249,250,383 Lightweight external tank, LWT, 37 Lockheed, 241,402 Long Duration Exposure Facility, 177 LTV Corporation, 29, 33 Lunney, Glynn S., Ill M Magellan, 369, 416, 417 Magnetic satellite, Magsat, 24 Mahon, Joseph B., 16, 18, 19 Main engine cutoff, MECO, 34, 40, 137, 139 Main propulsion system, MPS, 34, 35 Manipulator Foot Restraint, 174 Manned Maneuvering Unit, 174, 175, 176 Manufacturing Review, 56 Mariner, 365, 390, 421 Mars, 29, 30, 247, 365, 366, 368, 372, 413, 414, 420 530 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Mars Observer, 50, 420, 421 Marshall Space Flight Center, MSFC, 34, 37, 44.50.52.55, 109. 110. 112. 113, 116, 117, 142. 143. 144. 189, 196, 197, 200, 204, 207. 210. 212, 217, 240, 247, 248, 402 Martin. Franklin D., 117, 371, 373 Martin Marietta Corporation, 29, 33, 34, 51, 53. 113.242,402,416 Max Planck Institut fuer Extraterrestrische Physik, MPE, 408 McAuliffe, S. Christa, 190 McCandless, Bruce, II, 174 McDonald, Franklin B., 372 McDonnell Douglas, 29, 49, 169, 178, 242 McNair, Ronald E., 174, 190 Memorandum of Understanding, MOU, 241, 243,252,391,392,393,408 Merbold, Ulf, 173, 394 Mercury, 29, 144, 365 Mexico, 180 Milky Way, 401 Mission Control Center, 139, 141, 142, 143, 146, 227 Mission Operations Reports, MOR, 154 Mobile Launcher Platform, 134, 135 Moon, 29, 30, 372, 402 Moore, Jesse W., 18, 196,371 Moore, R. Gilbert, 151 Morocco, Ben Guerir, 225 Moser, Thomas L., 115, 117, 118 Mulloy, Lawrence B., 196 Mulroney, Brian, 250 Musgrave, F Story, 172 Mutch, Thomas A., 369 N NASA Advisory Council, 20 NASA Authorization Act, 379 National Academy of Sciences, 402, 418 National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, NACA, 3 National Aeronautics and Space Act, 3 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA, 3, 4, 5, 6, 19-33, 36, 37, 41, 43, 44, 47, 48, 50-55, 58, 107-123, 134, 135, 136, 143, 144, 145, J50-156, 164, 166, 171, 174, 177-191, 195, 197-201, 205, 208-228, 233, 235, 238, 239, 240-247, 252, 254, 255, 363-379, 388, 391, 393, 406, 408 National Aerospace Plane, 3 National Air and Space Museum, 367 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NOAA, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 244 National Research Council, NRC, 120, 206, 207,214,215,216,219,222,223 National Research Council of Canada, 175 National Science Teachers Association, NSTA, 152 National Space Development Agency, 252 National Space Policy, 27, 246 National Space Technology Laboratories, 109, 144 National Space Transportation System, NSTS, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 121, 222, 223, 225, 228, 230 National Transportation Safety Board, 190 National Weather Service, 29 Naugle, John E., 372 Naval Research Laboratory, 180, 388, 399 Navy, U.S., 33, 125 Neptune, 367, 368, 411, 414, 415 Netherlands, 150, 367, 381, 405 Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory, 248 New York Times, 240 Nicogossian, Arnauld, 371 Nixon, Richard, 121 Nobel Prize, 405 Norris, Theodrick B., 371 NOVA-II satellite, 29 O O'Connor, Bryan, 223 O'Dell, C. Robert, 402 Odom, James B., 119 Office of Management and Budget, OMB, 4, 6, 21, 363 Office of Technology Assessment, 120 Onizuka, Ellison, 190 Orbital Flight Test, OFT, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 166 Orbital maneuvering system, OMS, 34, 35, 123, 124, 134, 137, 138, 139, 141, 156, 157, 163,230,231,235,236,237 Orbital maneuvering vehicle, OMV, 54, 55, Orbital Sciences Corporation, OSC, 50 Orbital Transfer Vehicle, OTV, 52, 53, 54 Orbiter Processing Facility, 141, 142, 227, 235, 236, 237 Orbiting Solar Observatory, 365 Oscar, satellite, 391 Pacific Ocean, 33 Palapa, 172, 174, 178 Paules, Granville, 118 Payload Assist Module, PAM, 49, 50, 51, 170, 174, 177, 179, 183 I\l)l \ 531 Pay load Flighl Test Article. PFTA, 172, 173 Payload Operations Control Center, POCC, 142. 143 Pel lerin. Charles . I.. 371 Perldn-Ebner, 402 Peterson, Donald H., 172 Phillips. Samuel C, 115, 117, 214 Pioneer. 365. 366, 367,414,415,416 Plasma Diagnostics Package, PDP. 161 , 162, 389 Pluto, 365, 367, 404 Polar Beacon Experiments and Auroral Research satellite. Polar BEAR, 391 Pratt & Whitney. 52, 53 Preliminary Design Review, 44, 45, 55, 214 Preliminary Requirements Review, 55 Program Requirements Review, 242 R Raney, William P., 119 RCA, 24, 25, 26 Reaction control system, RCS, 124, 128, 134, 137, 140, 141, 160, 161, 167, 230, 231, 235, 236 Reagan, Ronald, 13, 26, 43, 56, 109, 114, 120, 187, 205, 212, 238, 240, 250, 254, 255 Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor, RSRM, 43, 44, 45, 47, 57, 199 Redmond, Thomas W., 1 1 1 Remote Manipulator System, RMS, 144, 145, 147, 161, 168, 171, 172, 175, 177, 179, 239, 250 Request for Proposal, RFP, 239, 241, 243 Research Animal Holding Facility, 396 Resnik, Juditli A., 190 Reston, Virginia, 248 Return-to-launch-site, RTLS, 137, 138 Ride, Sally, 172, 178 Ritchey Chretien Telescope, 400, 403 Rocketdyne, 30, 51, 53, 204, 242 Rockwell International, 31, 33, 36, 51, 125, 126, 189, 197, 198, 242 Rodney, George A., 113, 215, 224 Roentgen Satellite, ROSAT, 401, 407, 408, 409 Rogers Commission, 108, 111, 113, 115, 187 Rogers, William P., 187, 188 Rome, University of, 393 Ross, Jerry L., 183 Sander, Michael, 371 Satcom, 182, 183 Satellite Business Systems, SBS, 25 Saturn, 107, 135, 365, 366, 367, 411, 415 Saudi Arabia, 1X0 SCATHA satellite, 24 Scobee, Francis R., L90 Scout, 13. 16, 22. 26, 27, 28, 33. 391, 303 Seddon, M. Rhea. 179 Senegal, 156 Shuttle Mission Simulator. 146, Shuttle Pallet Satellite. SPAS, 384 Shuttle Student Involvement Program, SSIP, 152, 184 Simpson, J. A., 419 Skylab, 107, 134,135 Slay, Alton, 223 Smith, Bradford, 366 Smith, Michael J., 190 Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, 409 Smithsonian Institute, 367 Soffen, Gerald, 371 Solar Maximum Satellite, Solar Max, 139, 174, 175, 176, 177, 366, 377, 378, 406 Solar Mesospheric Explorer, 379, 380 Solid Rocket Booster, SRB, 17, 22, 23, 33, 34, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 110, 112, 123, 126, 134, 156, 166, 172, 192, 193, 194, 203, 227, 236, 237 Solid Rocket Motor, SRM, 42, 44, 45, 48, 49, 57, 170, 192, 205, 206, 212, 214, 219, 221, 222 Solid Spinning Upper Stage, SSUS, 17 SOOS-3 satellite, 29 Soviet Union, 401 Soyuz, 108, 135 Space Industries, Inc., 241 Space Shuttle, 13, 14,15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 28, 33, 34, 37, 38, 43, 48, 49, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 131, 132, 134, 135, 139, 140, 141, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 157, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 169, 170, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 195, 198, 199, 200, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 211, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 222, 223, 224, 225, 227, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 250, 251, 253, 364, 367, 368, 371, 373, 374, 375, 378, 384, 389, 390, 394, 395, 399, 401, 404, 406, 408,409,410,420 Space Shuttle Main Engine, SSME, 22, 23, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 123, 124, 127, 136, 137, 144,191,204,230,234 Space Station, 107, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 246, 247, 248, 252, 253, 254, 255 532 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Space Station Control Center, 248 Space Station Development Plan, 241 Space Station Training Facility, 249 Space Station User's Handbook, 246 Space Systems Automated Integration and Assembly Facility, 248 Space Telescope Advisory Committee, 403 Space Telescope Science Institute, 402 Space transfer vehicle, STV. 57 Space Transportation System, STS, 13, 14, 26, 50. 51, 52, 56, 108, 112, 121, 122, 123, 148, 152, 153, 154, 155, 166, 168, 170, 177. 186, 201, 206, 218, 222, 23, 24, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 248, 367 Spacelab, 109, 147, 148, 150, 154, 162, 173, 174, 180, 181, 182, 251, 364, 366, 368, 371,389,394,395,397,399 Spain, 150, 156 Spartan, 180, 190, 388 Spring, Sherwood C, 183 Stennis Space Center, 36, 37, 109 Stever, H. Guyford, 214, 222 Stewart, Robert L., 174 Stofan, Andrew J., 115, 116, 119, 369, 371 Strategic Defense Initiative, 181 Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment, SAGE, 24 STS-1, 157, 158, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168,172,393 STS-2, 156, 157, 158, 160, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 367 STS-3, 151, 153, 156, 157, 158, 162, 164, 165, 168, 169, 170, 389 STS-4, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 162, 163, 165, 166, 169 STS-5, 37, 151, 156, 157, 165, 166, 170, 171, 174 STS-6, 37, 171, 172, 173 STS-7, 172, 398 STS-8, 172, 173 STS-9, 173, 181, 194,394 STS-26, 36, 37, 41, 47, 49, 185, 186, 187, 221,235 STS-27, 186,235 STS-30,417 STS-32, 177 STS-34,418 STS41-B, 174, 178 STS 41 -C, 139, 174, 176,378 STS 41 -D, 177, 178 STS41-F, 177,388 STS41-G, 55, 154,178 STS 51 -A, 178,182 STS51-B, 180, 196, 394, 395 STS51-C, 179, 196 STS51-D, 147, 179,181 STS51-F, 181,389,396 STS51-G, 180, 181,394 STS 51-1, 181,182, 235 STS 51 -J, 182 STS 51-L,46,47, 108, 128, 135, 184, 185, 187, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 196, 197, 198,199,200,202,204,211 STS 61 -A, 182,394,398,403 STS61-B,49, 182, 183 STS61-C49, 183, 232, 235 Sun, 126, 169, 177, 365, 366, 367, 374, 377, 378, 379, 381, 386, 390, 402, 410, 419 Switzerland, 150 Syncom, 147, 177, 179, 181 System Design Review, 230 Teacher in Space Project, 184, 190 Technical and Management Information System, TMIS, 116,241 Teledyne, 52 Telesat,26, 170, 172, 178, 179 Telstar, 177 Tethered Satellite System, TSS, 55, 56 Thiokol Corporation, 33, 43, 44, 47, 122, 188, 189, 196,197, 198, 199,222 Thomas, James, 196 Thompson, Robert F, 111 Titan, 30, 48, 50 Tracking and Data Relay Satellite, TDRS, 127, 142, 152, 171, 172, 173, 184, 185, 190, 218,235,236,403 Transfer Orbit Stage, TOS, 50, 51 Transpace Carriers, Inc., 27 Truly, Richard H., 19, 111, 112, 209, 210, 211, 227 TRW, Inc., 55 U Uhuru, 365 UK-6/ Ariel, 24 Ulysses, 218, 368,419,420 United Kingdom, UK, 150, 367, 375, 382, 387, 388, 405, 407, 408 United States, U.S., 14, 25, 26, 27, 122, 135, 150, 173, 174, 178, 241, 243, 252, 375, 382, 405, 407, 408, 418, 420, 421 United Technologies Corporation, 222 Uranus, 368, 411, 413, 414, 415 Utah State University, 152, 169 INDEX 533 Vandenbcrg Air Force Base. California, 28, ! 1, 34. 109, 136, 176, 235 Vanguard. 31.33 Van Hoften, James D.A., IS I Van Renssalaer, Frank, 17 Vehicle Assembly Building, 133, 134, 142, 23?. 230 Venus, 29, 126. 365. 367, 369. 413, 416, 418 Viking, 30, 365. 366, 367, 414, 421 Vought Corporation, 33 Voyager, 365, 366, 367, 368, 401, 41 1, 413, 414 Weiss, Stanley I.. 16 Welch, James C, 371 Westar satellite, 26, 174, 178 Western Union, 24, 26, 174 White House, 187 White Sands, New Mexico. 136 Wisconsin, University of, 402 Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 125 X X-ray Timing Explorer, XTE, 407 Y W Walker, Charles, 178 Wallops Flight Facility, 27, 33 Wallops Island, Virginia, 392 Weeks, L. Michael, 16 Yardley, John F., 15, 16, 151 Young, John W., 167 Zeiss, Carl, Company, 408 ABOUT THE COMPILER Judy A. Rumerman is a professional technical writer who has written or contributed to numerous documents for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. She has been the author of documents covering various spaceflight missions, the internal workings of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center, and other material used for training. She was also the compiler of U.S. Human Spaceflight: A Record of Achievement, 1961-1998, a monograph for the NASA History Office detailing NASA's human spaceflight missions. Ms. Rumerman has degrees from the University of Michigan and George Washington University. She grew up in Detroit and presently resides in Silver Spring, Maryland. 535 THE NASA HISTORY SERIES Reference Works, NASA SP-4000 Chronology of Science, Chronology of Science, Chronology of Science, Chronology of Science, Chronology of Science, Technology, and Technology, and Technology, and Technology, and Technology, and Grimwood, James M. Project Mercury: A Chronology (NASA SP-4001, 1963). Grimwood, James M., and Hacker, Barton C., with Vorzimmer, Peter J. Project Gemini Technology and Operations: A Chronology (NASA SP-4002, 1969). Link, Mae Mills. Space Medicine in Project Mercury (NASA SP-4003, 1965). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1963: Policy (NASA SP-4004, 1964). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1 964: Policy (NASA SP-4005, 1965). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965: Policy (NASA SP-4006, 1966). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1966: Policy (NASA SP-4007, 1967). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967: Policy (NASA SP-4008, 1968). Ertel, Ivan D., and Morse, Mary Louise. The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, Volume I, Through November 7, 1962 (NASA SP-4009, 1969). Morse, Mary Louise, and Bays, Jean Kernahan. The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, Volume II, November 8, 1962-September 30, 1964 (NASA SP-4009, 1973). Brooks, Courtney G., and Ertel, Ivan D. The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, Volume III, October 1, 1964-January 20, 1966 (NASA SP-4009, 1973). Ertel, Ivan D., and Newkirk, Roland W., with Brooks, Courtney G. The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, Volume IV, January 21, 1966-July 13, 1974 (NASA SP-4009, 1978). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1968: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy (NASA SP-4010, 1969). Newkirk, Roland W., and Ertel, Ivan D., with Brooks, Courtney G. Skylab: A Chronology (NA$K$P-40\l, 1977). Van Nimmen, Jane, and Bruno, Leonard C, with Rosholt, Robert L. NASA Historical Data Book, Volume I: NASA Resources, 1958-1968 (NASA SP-4012, 1976; rep. ed. 1988). Ezell, Linda Neuman. NASA Historical Data Book, Volume II: Programs and Projects, 1958-1968 (NASA SP-4012, 1988). Ezell, Linda Neuman. NASA Historical Data Book, Volume III: Programs and Projects, 1969-1978 (N AS A SP-4012, 1988). Gawdiak, Ihor Y., with Fedor, Helen, compilers. NASA Historical Data Book, Volume IV: NASA Resources, 1969-1978 (NASA SP-4012, 1994). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1969: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy (NASA SP-4014, 1970). 537 538 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Chronology of Science, Technology, and Chronology of Science, Technology, and Chronology of Science, Technology, and and and Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1970: /V>//cy (NASA SP-4015, 1972). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1971: Policy (NASASP-4016, 1972). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1972: Policy (NASA SP-4017, 1974). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1973: Chronology of Science, Technology, Policy (NASA SP-4018, 1975). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1974: Chronology of Science, Technology, Po//cy (NASA SP-40 19, 1977). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1975: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy (NASA SP-4020, 1979). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1976: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy (NASA SP-4021, 1984). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1977: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy (NASA SP-4022, 1986). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1978: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy (NASA SP-4023, 1986). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1979-1984: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy (NASA SP-4024, 1988). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1985: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy (NASA SP-4025, 1990). Noordung, Hermann. The Problem of Space Travel: The Rocket Motor. Stuhlinger, Ernst, and Hunley, J.D., with Garland, Jennifer, editors (NASA SP-4026, 1995). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1986-1990: A Chronology (NASA SP-4027, 1997). Management Histories, NASA SP-4100 Rosholt, Robert L. An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963 (NASA SP-4101, 1966). Levine, Arnold S. Managing NASA in the Apollo Era (NASA SP-4102, 1982). Roland, Alex. Model Research: The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1915-1958 (NASA SP-4103, 1985). Fries, Sylvia D. NASA Engineers and the Age of Apollo (NASA SP-4104, 1992). Glennan, T. Keith. The Birth of NASA: The Diary ofT Keith Glennan. Hunley, J.D., editor (NASA SP-4105, 1993). Seamans, Robert C, Jr. Aiming at Targets: The Autobiography of Robert C. Seamans, Jr. (NASA SP-4106, 1996) Project Histories, NASA SP-4200 Swenson, Loyd S., Jr., Grimwood, James M., and Alexander, Charles C. This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury (NASA SP-4201, 1966). Green, Constance McL., and Lomask, Milton. Vanguard: A History (NASA SP-4202, 1970; rep. ed. Smithsonian Institution Press, 1971). Till' NASA HISTORY SERIES 539 Hacker, Barton C, and Grimwood, James M. On Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gemini (NASA SP-4203, 1977). Benson, Charles D. and Faheity, William Barnaby. Moonport: A History of Apollo Launch Facilities and Operations (NASA SP-4204, 1978). Brooks, Courtney G., Grimwood, James M., and Swenson, Loyd S., Jr. Chariots for Apollo: A History of Manned Lunar Spacecraft (NASA SP-4205, 1979). Bilstein, Roger E. Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles (NASA SP-4206, 1980). SP-4207 not published. Compton, W. David, and Benson, Charles D. Living and Working in Space: A History ofSkylab (NASA SP-4208, 1983). Ezell, Edward Clinton, and Ezell, Linda Neuman. The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (NASA SP-4209, 1978). Hall, R. Cargill. Lunar Impact: A History of Project Ranger (NASA SP-4210, 1977). Newell, Homer E. Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science (NASA SP-4211, 1980)/ Ezell, Edward Clinton, and Ezell, Linda Neuman. On Mars: Exploration of the Red Planet, 1958-1978 (NASA SP-42 12, 1984). Pitts, John A. The Human Factor: Biomedicine in the Manned Space Program to 1980 (NASA SP-4213, 1985). Compton, W. David. Where No Man Has Gone Before: A History of Apollo Lunar Exploration Missions (NASA SP-4214, 1989). Naugle, John E. First Among Equals: The Selection of NASA Space Science Experiments (NASA SP-4215, 1991). Wallace, Lane E. Airborne Trailblazer: Two Decades with NASA Langley's Boeing 737 Flying Laboratory (NASA SP-4216, 1994). Butrica, Andrew J., editor. Beyond the Ionosphere: Fifty Years of Satellite Communication (NASA SP-4217, 1997). Butrica, Andrews J. To See the Unseen: A History of Planetary Radar Astronomy (NASASP-4218, 1996). Mack, Pamela E. Editor. From Engineering Science to Big Science: The NACA and NASA Collier Trophy Research Project Winners (NASA SP-4219, 1998). Reed, R. Dale, with Lister, Darlene. Wingless Flight: The Lifting Body Story (NASA SP-4220, 1997). Heppenheimer, T.A. The Space Shuttle Decision: NASA's Quest for a Reusable Space Vehicle (NASA SP-4221, 1999). Center Histories, NASA SP-4300 Rosenthal, Alfred. Venture into Space: Early Years of Goddard Space Flight Center (NASA SP-4301, 1985). Hartman, Edwin, P. Adventures in Research: A History of Ames Research Center, 1940-1965 (NASA SP-4302, 1970). Hallion, Richard P. On the Frontier: Flight Research at Dry den, 1946-1981 (NASA SP- 4303, 1984). 540 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Muenger, Elizabeth A. Searching the Horizon: A History of Ames Research Center 1940-1976 (NASA SP-4304, 1985). Hansen, James R. Engineer in Charge: A History of the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 1917-1958 (NASA SP-4305, 1987). Dawson, Virginia P. Engines and Innovation: Lewis Laboratory and American Propulsion Technology (NASA SP-4306, 1991). Dethloff, Henry C. "Suddenly Tomorrow Came . . . ": History of the Johnson Space Center (NASA SP-4307, 1993). Hansen, James R. Spaceflight Revolution: NASA Langley Research Center from Sputnik to Apollo (NASA SP-4308, 1995). Wallace, Lane E. Flights of Discovery: 50 Years at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center (NASA SP-4309, 1996). Herring, Mack R. Way Station to Space: A History of the John C. Stennis Space Center (NASA SP-43 10, 1997). Wallace, Harold D., Jr. Wallops Station and the Creation of the American Space Program (NASA SP-43 11, 1997). Wallace, Lane E. Dreams, Hopes, Realities: NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center's First Forty Years (NASA SP-4312, 1999). General Histories, NASA SP-4400 Corliss, William R. NASA Sounding Rockets, 1958-1968: A Historical Summary (NASASP-4401, 1971). Wells, Helen T., Whiteley, Susan H., and Karegeannes, Carrie. Origins of NASA Names (NASA SP-4402, 1976). Anderson, Frank W., Jr. Orders of Magnitude: A History of N AC A and NASA, 1915-1980 (NASA SP-4403, 1981). Sloop, John L. Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion Fuel, 1945-1959 (NASA SP-4404, 1978). Roland, Alex. A Spacefaring People: Perspectives on Early Spaceflight (NASA SP-4405, 1985). Bilstein, Roger E. Orders of Magnitude: A History of the NACA and NASA, 1915-1990 (NASA SP-4406, 1989). Logsdon, John M., editor, with Lear, Linda J., Warren-Findley, Jannelle, Williamson, Ray A., and Day, Dwayne A. Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume I: Organizing for Exploration (NASA SP-4407, 1995). Logsdon, John M., editor, with Day, Dwayne A., and Launius, Roger D. Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume II: External Relationships (NASA SP-4407, 1996). Logsdon, John M., editor, with Launius, Roger D., Onkst, David H., and Garber, Stephen J. Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume III: Using Space (NASA SP-4407, 1998).