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Faculty Working Papers 
 
 College of Commerce and Business Administration 
 University of Illinois at Urbana-Cha mpalgn 
 
FACULTY WORKING PAPERS 
 College of Commerce and Business Administration 
 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
 October 17 . 1978 
 
 ADJUSTMENT FOR INFLATION IN THE BRAZILIAN 
 NATIONAL HOUSING-FINANCE SYSTEM 
 
 Paul Beckerman, Visiting Lecturer, Department 
 of Economics 
 
 #519 
 
 Summary : 
 
 This essay reviews the mechanisms by which the Brazilian national "Housing-Finance 
 System" adjusted the principals of its savings and lending instruments for inflations 
 since the system was founded in 1964. The history of the adoption by the System of 
 different "index-linking plans" is recounted. The contradictions and other difficulties 
 of the various index-linking plans is explained by the inherent difficulty of having 
 index-linked mortgages in a society in which wages, and indeed most other kinds of 
 earnings, are not index-linked.' 
 
 Acknowledgmen t : 
 
 The research on which this essay is based was carried out with the support of a 
 grant from the Social Science Research Council. The writer acknowledges with gratitude 
 the assistance provided him by present and former officials of the Brazilian National 
 Housing Bank, particularly Dr. Jose Eduardo Oliveira Penna, Dr. Rubens Vaz da Costa, Dr. 
 Jose Roberto Rego Monteiro, Sr. Samuel Naschpitz, and Sr. Otaviano Vannini, The writer 
 also acknowledges the useful advice of Dr. Adroaldo Moura da Silva of the Instituto de 
 Pesquisas Economicas of the Universidade de Sao Paulo. The writer alone is responsible 
 for all facts and points of view presented in this work. 
 
 This is a first draft. Please do not cite this work without the permission of the writer. 
 
.'.Mi ..■ .. 
 
 > .■'.:■ 
 
Introduction . 
 
 In any nation with a private financial market, the market for housing 
 finance is singularly vulnerable to sustained inflation. The reasons are 
 clear enough. Mortgages are by nature long-term contracts, but inflation 
 turns the future real value of the monetary unit uncertain — hopelessly 
 uncertain where the future is ten or fifteen years, which is the order of 
 magnitude of a mortgage contract. Consequently, suppliers of finance 
 capital will prefer to avoid the housing-finance market. So much the 
 worse, of course, if the interest rates in the housing-finance market 
 are subjected to unrealistic controls. 
 
 This essay describes how Brazil established a housing-finance market 
 in spite of circumstances of sustained inflation. The principal innova- 
 tion, we shall see, was the introduction of ex post financial index- 
 linking on savings instruments of the housing sector — that is, the intro- 
 duction of savings instruments that guaranteed a certain real , not nominal 
 return. This seems a sm.sible solution at first. :iigh&, and the idea has 
 been considered even in nations that have far less serious inflation 
 problems than Brazil. But in Brazil index-linking created a new problem 
 that proved rather difficult to resolve: If the savings instruments 
 were denominated in real terms, then the assets backing them — i.e., the 
 mortgages — would also have to be denominated in real terms. But under 
 the circumstances of the late 1960s, what Brazilian household would — or 
 could — undertake a liability denominated in real terms? In what follows 
 we recount how the Brazilian authorities found a solution to this prob- 
 lem. The solution, we will argue, was not entirely satisfactory; it 
 violated the index-linking principle in some ways, and came very close 
 in the end to amounting to having nominal mortgages financing index- 
 linked savings with the help of what were, in effect, government subsidies. 
 
 -1- 
 
■2- 
 
 The background of Brazil's housing problem . 
 
 On March 31, 1964 a military-civilian coup d' etat in Brazil 
 toppled the vaguely populist, ineffective government of President JoSo 
 Goulart. The coup was the culmination of a sustained political and 
 economic crisis which seemed, in the opinion of many observers, to be 
 leading inexorably toward social chaos, and perhaps communist or fascist 
 rule. In the view of the military and of a large part of their civi- 
 lian support, the crisis was the manifestation of fundamental deficiencies 
 and dissonances in the Brazilian economy and social structure, and these 
 failings were beyond the capacity of the existing political system to 
 resolve. The new government, under the widely-respected General Humberto 
 Castello Branco, wanted time and power to elaborate the policies it 
 thought were necessary to enable the nation to develop in a secure and 
 steady way. Consequently, for the first time in Brazilian history, the 
 armed forces decided to retain power indefinitely, rather than return 
 the nation to civilian government after a brief transitional period as 
 they had done on certain earlier occasions. Although the army dominated 
 the new government, the ministries and the principal government institu- 
 tions (apart from those concerned with national defense) were placed 
 under the direction of highly competent civilians, who have since come 
 to be described as "technocrats". It was hoped that these civilians 
 could formulate appropriate policies without being subjected to conflict- 
 ing political pressures. 
 
 The principal economic manifestation of the crisis were a severe 
 acceleration of inflation; a prolonged industrial recession; and a 
 growing housing shortage. The recession and the housing shortage were 
 
-3- 
 
 unquestionably due in large measure to the inflation. Brazil had had 
 an inflation problem for many years, because rapid industrialization and 
 
 the construction of a new capital city had made lavish demands on the 
 
 2 
 nation's resources through the 1950s. In the early 1960s the inflation 
 
 accelerated sharply, however: the percentage increases in the general 
 
 price index were 30.5 for 196C, 47.7 for 1961, 51.3 for 1962, 81.2 for 
 
 3 
 1963, and an annual rate of 110.0 for the first three months of 1964. 
 
 (See Table 1.) The Goulart Administration clearly had no viable program 
 
 to control the inflation by 1964: its major stabilization effort, the 
 
 Dantas-Furtado Program, had lasted only through the first six months of 
 
 4 
 1963 and then been abandoned. 
 
 At the time of the coup it was clear to most observers that the main 
 
 cause of the accelerating inflation was the attempt by the federal government 
 
 to seize an increasing rhare of the national income tiirough tin increasing 
 
 budget deficit. Once the inflation had turned serious, the government 
 
 could no longer sell Treasury obligations to finance the deficit. There 
 
 was a usury law in effect, which limited nominal interest rates to twelve 
 
 per cent per year. Strictly speaking this was not really the problem, 
 
 for the bonds could always havs been sold at a heavy discount. The real 
 
 problem was that the rate of inflation finally became so unpredictable 
 
 that it was not possible even to guess what rate of discount would have 
 
 been appropriate for the bonds. The principal causes of the growth of 
 
 the federal deficit were the large wage adjustments granted to government 
 
 employees, particularly one heavy increase granted in late 1963, and 
 
 heavy subsidies to public enterprises, particularly to those engaged in 
 
-4- 
 
 transportation. The deficit was financed by voluminous issues of 
 currency: in spite of the attempt at stabilization during the early 
 part of 1963, 84 percent of the government's deficit for the year was 
 financed by money creation, and the money supply increased by 64 per- 
 cent over the year. 
 
 When the new government assumed power and took stock of the 
 situation that it had inherited, it quickly concluded that it could 
 not bring either the deficit or the inflation under control in the 
 short run. To have done so would have meant either raising taxes 
 drastically, or else dismissing government employees and suspending 
 vital national investment programs. These would have been politi- 
 cally impossible, and at all events the new government did not wish 
 to deepen the industrial recession any further. The new government 
 did introduce a more stringent mechanism f^r pre) arirj;, the government 
 budget, but it accepted the fact that it would have to live with a 
 high deficit for some time to come. At the same time, however, the 
 government's economics team, led by the Ministers of Finance and 
 Planning, Dr. Octavio Gouveia de BulhSes and Dr. Roberto Campos respec- 
 tively, conceived an imaginative plan to mitigate the inflationary 
 impact of the deficit. Under Law 4357 of July 16, 1964 the government 
 was authorized to issue "Re-adjustable National Treasury Obligations" 
 (ORTN) — index-linked bonds. These bonds, of two-, three-, and five- 
 year maturities, were to be re-adjusted every three months according 
 to the wholesale price index compiled by the Fundaclo Getfilio Vargas, 
 an autonomous government institution responsible for a broad range of 
 
-5- 
 
 statistical services including various price and output indices and 
 the national accounts. Interest of six to seven per cent per year was 
 to be paid on the re-adjusted principals. Given the lag in data col- 
 lection and processing, the re-adjustment of the bonds to be made at 
 the beginning of each quarter was to be based on a three-month moving 
 average lagged three months. Thus, an adjustment at the beginning of 
 month t would be made according to the following formula: V represents 
 the value of the bond at the beginning of month t and I represents the 
 wholesale price index for month t, the new value of the bond would be 
 
 V t « y L ^t-4 + ^-5 + ^-6 
 
 This formula was modified a number of times over the years following. 
 The bonds can never have been said to have provided a perfect inflation 
 correction, but at least until the mid-1970s they came as close as was 
 feasible: to all intents and purposes, the bonds provided a positive 
 and near-certain real rate of return. (See Table 2.) The government 
 was therefore able to market these bonds to the public to finance its 
 
 Q 
 
 deficit. (See Table 3.) By the early 1970s the deficit was eliminated, 
 but the ORTN continued to be issued to serve as assets for various insti- 
 tutions that used them to back their own index -linked liabilities. The 
 same law that instituted the ORTN also provided for index-linking of 
 tax debts in arrears, to stimulate prompt payment of taxes (previously 
 the penalty payment had been only one per cent per month on the unpaid 
 balance, so that it was profitable to evade tax payments for as long as 
 possible); and it also introduced index -linking of fixed corporate assets 
 
-6- 
 
 for the purpose of calculating depreciation, so that firms' accounting 
 
 9 
 statements would yield more realistic profit figures. 
 
 It is important to understand both the background of sustained 
 inflation and the government's "gradualist" approach to controlling its 
 deficit and the inflation in order to understand the approach that the 
 government decided upon to resolve the national housing shortage. By 
 1964 the housing shortage had become critical: the filthy, disease- 
 ridden shanty towns that ringed Brazil's cities were growing inexorably, 
 and had even become internationally famous. The rapid industrialization 
 of the country had induced heavy migration into Brazil's cities: in 
 1960 Brazil's urban population was about 32 million, whereas in 1940 
 it had been only about 13 million. This migration entailed a vastly , 
 increased demand for housing, but the inflation, in combination with the/ 
 usury and rent-control lows intended in part to insist the inflation,, 
 served to discourage the finance and construction of new housing. Pri- 
 vate financial institutions could not legally pay savers sufficiently 
 high rates of interest to cover what their accounts lost in purchasing 
 power to monetary depreciation, and the same law prohibited their 
 receiving interest on mortgage loans sufficient to prevent their being 
 de-capitalized. The housing programt of the National Social Insurance 
 Institute (INPS) and the "Popular Hou.e Foundation," which had begun to 
 operate in the 1950s, had collapsed. By the early 1960s only a small 
 number of official and semi-official institutions^ among these the 
 Caixa Econdmicas Federals and Estadu.iis (the federal and state thrift 
 institutions), continued to provide housing credit. Even these institu- 
 
tions had to ration and restrict their lending; hence access to mortgage 
 credit became a matter of privilege. The rent-control legislation, 
 which had a continuing history going back to 1946, aggravated the effect 
 of inflation on housing construction: although rent levels were permitted 
 to rise a number of times, they were never permitted to rise sufficiently, 
 and they made rental of residences a highly unprofitable and uncertain 
 business. 
 
 By early 1964 the Brazilian housing-finance market had virtually 
 ceased to exist. The rent-control law in effect was Law 4240 of June 28, 
 1963; a rent fixed under this law lost more than half its value by the 
 same date a year later. With inflation running at around 100 percent 
 per year, there were no savings available for housing: in March 1964 
 
 the Caixa Econ6mica Federal announced a "temporary suspension" of its 
 
 12 
 mortgage programs; and the statistical bulletin of the Getulio Vargas 
 
 Foundation, Conjuntura EconQmica , reported that in that month the 
 
 Rio de Janeiro real-estate market presented the lowest transaction volume 
 
 13 
 since the bulletin began to record its activity in 1947. The crisis 
 
 at least had the virtue of demonstrating that the housing situation had 
 
 to be reformed entirely, and that the rent-control and usury laws were 
 
 part of the problem, not the solution. 
 
 The Brazilian National-Housing Finance System: the problem of inflation 
 adjustment . 
 
 Having introduced index-linked bonds in the public-finance sphere, 
 
 the government reasoned that the index-linking principle might also be 
 
 applied in the housing-finance sector. A law was drafted by the new 
 
 government and submitted to Congress for rapid debate: it was signed 
 
 as Law 4380 on August 30, 1964. The law instituted a National Housing 
 
-8- 
 
 Plan, the name of which was later changed to the "Housing Finance 
 System" (SFH) . It provided for the chartering of private Real-Estate 
 Credit Societies, Savings-and-Loan Associations, housing cooperatives, 
 and other institutions which ware to serve as "financial agencies" of 
 the new system. A few years later the mortgage programs of the Caixas 
 Econdmicais were also brought into the new system. A new National 
 Housing Bank (BNH) was established as an autonomous federal institution: 
 this was to serve the SFH broadly in the way that a central bank serves 
 a commercial-banking system, acting as a central organ of finance, con- 
 trol, and day-to-day regulation of the system. At first the BNH was 
 financed by a one-per-cent payroll tax on all employees covered by the 
 labor legislation and a forced twenty-year (index-linked) loan of 4 
 percent of residential rents, levied on the landlords. Later on, as 
 we shall relate, the BN11 financing system was completely changed. Most 
 interesting for our present purposes, the law provided that contracts 
 for sale, construction, and mortgage of private houses could — but did 
 not have to — contain provisions to re-adjust amortization payments and 
 outstanding balances according to the national minimum wage — note, not 
 
 according to the government-bond index — sixty days after any date that 
 
 14 
 the minimum wage was changed. The Real-Estate Credit Societies and 
 
 the BNH were authorized to emit "Housing Bills," which could be index- 
 
 linked in the same way as the government's own ORTN. The law also 
 
 authorized the use of index-linked savings accounts. 
 
 The housing and construction markets were made more attractive to 
 
 firms and individuals through reforms in the old rent-control legislation. 
 
-9- 
 
 Law 4494 of November 25, 1964 provided that all new rental leases would 
 be index-linked on an annual basis, while old rental leases would not be 
 index-linked but would be permitted to make an additional upward adjust- 
 ment each year so that eventually their real value would be brought up 
 to an appropriate level. This was part of the new government's policy 
 of permitting "corrective inflation," i.e., bringing certain prices that 
 
 had been regulated at artificially low levels by the previous government 
 
 16 ' " 7 " Jf *' i1 
 
 up into line with the current price level. Later, Decree-Law 322 of 
 
 ' ' '; Sfi " ! ; 
 
 April 4, 1967 limited. the indexation of rents originally contracted before 
 1964, but eliminated all controls on rental leases signed after the date 
 of the Decree- Law. 
 
 Between 1964 and early 1966 the new system remained bound up in 
 planning and organization. A staff of considerable technical capability 
 was assembled at the BM; headquarters in Rio de Jarieiro, A number of 
 issues had to be resolved. For one thing, it appeared that the agencies 
 of the SFH that were being established were not capable of providing 
 housing for the slum-dwellers (though it was recognized that by re- 
 lieving the middle-class housing market the pressure on the lower-class 
 housing market would be relieved). A partial solution to this problem 
 was attempted by authorizing the establishment of "Popular Cooperatives," 
 as special agencies of the. system. Much of the new staff's energies 
 were directed to determining how. adjustment for inflation would operate 
 : in> the BNH. The debate was intense, and politically charged. (The 
 first president of the. BNH, Sandra Cavalcanti, resigned in 1965, claiming 
 that the SFH could not operate equitably with index-linking, although her 
 
-10- 
 
 1 8 
 resignation also had other political motives. A further problem of 
 
 the new system was that it remained under-capitalized for the scope of 
 the problem it was intended to solve. 
 
 The problems of what to do about inflation adjustment and of under- 
 capitalization were resolved during 1966. In January 1966 the BNH, 
 under its attribution of "orienting and controlling" the SFH, issued 
 its "Instruction No. 5." Instruction No. 5 provided that the agencies 
 of the SFH would not only index-link their assets and liabilities, but 
 would do all their accounting in real terms, through the institution 
 of the "Standard Capital Unit" (UPC) as the unit of account of the 
 
 system. The UPC was simply the current par value of government index- 
 
 19 
 
 linked bonds. (Under Decree-Law 70 of November 21, 1966, which also 
 
 authorized the establishment of Savings-and-Loan Associations, the UPC 
 was instituted with a separate legal basis--to Lc calculated in the same 
 way as the ORTN, but to continue as the unit of account of the SFH even 
 in the event that the ORTN were discontinued). 
 
 As we have seen, the legislation that established the SFH originally 
 provided that assets and liabilities would be adjusted according to the 
 minimum wage. There was an important problem with this, however. Begin- 
 ning in mid-1965 the government implemented an incomes policy to control 
 wages: in effect, all major categories of wages henceforth were to be set 
 once a year, each category in a particular month. The new wage level was 
 to be set in such a way that, on the basis of a government projection of 
 inflation for the coming year, the purchasing power of the wage for the 
 coining year would be equal to the average purchasing power of the wage 
 
-11- 
 
 over the previous 24 months. The minimum wage was to be set each year in 
 
 20 
 May according to this policy. Mow clearly this meant that the minimum- 
 wage adjustment would not be sufficient to compensate for the previous 
 year's inflation. Between July 1964 and April 1966, the government-bond 
 index rose by 76 percent while the minimum wage rose by only 33 percent. 
 The government intended to continue this wage policy as part of its struggle 
 against inflation. This created a dilemma for the SFH. On the one hand, 
 if loans and obligations were adjusted according to the minimum wage, the 
 system's creditors would be inadequately protected against inflation and 
 the SFH would be de-capitalized; on the other hand, given that the minimum 
 wage was being repressed, it would have been unfair to ask mortgage-holders 
 of the income groups that the SFH aimed to serve to amortize their loans 
 according to the QRTN index. Instruction No. 5 resolved this problem in 
 the following way: all assets and liabilities oi the L.FH would be linked 
 to the ORTN index, and these included the outstanding balances of all mort- 
 gages. But the monthly payments of amortization and interest on the 
 
 mortgages could, if the mortgage-holder wished, be adjusted according to 
 
 „v • • 21 
 the mxnimum wage. 
 
 This meant, in practice, that Instruction No. 5 allowed the mortgage- 
 
 22 
 holder to elect one of two payments plans. ' Under both, the outstanding 
 
 balance of the mortgage was corrected every three months according to the 
 
 ORTN index. Under what was called "Plan A," however, the monthly payments 
 
 of amortization plus interest, calculated when the mortgage was drawn up 
 
 in current cruzeiros , were adjusted annually according to the minimum wage, 
 
 sixty days after the adjustment of the minimum wage. After 300 months, 
 
-12- 
 
 if the mortgage were still not completely amortized, the monthly payments 
 would be corrected thereafter according to the ORTN index. Under what 
 was called "Plan B," the monthly payments of amortization and interest 
 were corrected from the start like the outstanding balance, every three 
 months according to the ORTN index. Under both plans, the monthly pay- 
 ments were determined initially in current cruzeiros according to the 
 "French" Amortization Plan, or Tabela " Price" as it is known in Brazil. 
 The French Amortization Plan determines the monthly payments of amortiza- 
 tion and interest for a given mortgage, interest, and term in such a way 
 that all the payments are equal. The Appendix describes the calculation 
 of the French Amortization Plan and Plan A in algebraic terms. 
 
 Since Instruction No. 5 altered the dispositions of Law 4380 
 regarding adjustment within the SFH for inflation, special legislation 
 had to be submitted to Congress to modify Law 4380. This legislation had 
 been drawn up and debated in Congress during 1965 and the early part of 
 1966. In the congressional debates important opposition to the index- 
 linking concept emerged, and the legislation was amended to authorize 
 the SFH to grant certain mortgages without fully index-linking their 
 outstanding balance. On the advice of his economic ministers, who were 
 keenly aware that the SFH could not operate fairly and rationally with 
 both nominal and index-linked finance, the President vetoed those por- 
 tions of the legislation permitting nominal mortgages. The legislation 
 authorizing Instruction No. 5 was signed as Law 5049 of June 29, 1966. 
 Congress actually over-rode the veto in August; again, on the advice 
 of his economic ministers, the President responded immediately with 
 
-IV 
 
 23 
 Decree-Law 19 of August 30, 1966. " This Decree-Law annulled all 
 
 the legislation that permitted any form of nominal finance within the 
 SFH, and legally established the provisions of Instruction No. 5 as 
 obligatory. 
 
 At about the same time, a radical change was made in the financing 
 system of the BNH. The BNK was considered under -capitalized for its 
 task, as we have noted; at the same time, the social-security and un- 
 employment-insurance schemes of the existing labor legislation were 
 regarded as unsatisfactory on various grounds. A single solution was 
 found for both problems: Law 5107 of September 13, 1966 created the 
 "Job-Tenure Guarantee Fund" (FGTS). The FGTS was to be financed by a 
 compulsory deposit made each month by all firms, in the amount of 8 
 percent of the total remuneration paid during the previous month to all 
 employees covered by the FGTS. The deposit was Lo be made to special 
 accounts associated with the name of each employee (and not with the 
 firm, as was the case under the previous labor laws). These accounts 
 were to be index— linked according to the ORTN and were to pay annual 
 interest 3 to 6 percent (this was later reduced to 3 percent for all 
 FGTS accounts). The employee, or his beneficiary, was to have access 
 to the account when he was dismissed without due cause for any reason 
 from his employment, or in the event of retirement, disability, or 
 death. In addition, even where an employee left his employment volun- 
 tarily, he was to have access to his account for a number of purposes-r- 
 for example, to capitalize his own enterprise, or, in the cas-e of a 
 woman, to get married. The FGTS was instituted without repealing the 
 
-14- 
 
 old labor laws regarding indemnization of workers dismissed without just 
 cause. Under the old laws, the worker received indemnization only when 
 he was dismissed without just cause after at least one year in a given 
 employment. To this day workers may choose to remain under the old laws 
 or to enter the FGTS. A majority chose the FGTS at its inception, and 
 workers entering the labor force since 1966 have almost unanimously pre- 
 ferred the FGTS. Under Law 5107, the resources of the FGTS were to be 
 applied entirely in the BNB, thus making an enormous volume of savings 
 available to the SFH. The FGTS rapidly became the BNH's principal source 
 of funds, comprising more than three quarters of the BNH's total lia- 
 bill ties. 
 
 During 1966 the first Real-Estate Credit Societies began to operate 
 in Brazil's larger cities, and in 1967 the first Savings-and-Loan Associa- 
 tions were set up. During 1967 the SFH agencies beg;, n an expanded program 
 of mortgage credit. It is clear that the character of the real-estate 
 market changed radically during the first few months of the year. The 
 construction industry revived, with powerful direct and multiplier benefits 
 for national income and employment. In June 1967 a leader of the construc- 
 tion industry gave his opinion that "index-linking constitutes the greatest 
 conquest of the [1964] Revolution, (on account of its] permitting the 
 
 turn-over of resources dedicated to housing, through the maintenance of 
 
 25 
 their real value." Not everyone, however, was quite as pleased as this 
 
 with the operation of index-linking in the SFH. Indeed as large numbers of 
 
 people took on mortgages and saw how the mortgage-payments system operated, 
 
 criticisms and protests began to mount. It was particularly disconcerting 
 
-15- 
 
 for mortgage-holders to discover that, after having made a monthly 
 payment or two, the nominal balance outstanding was higher than the 
 original nominal value of the mortgage. Many mortgage-holders could 
 understand neither the mechanism nor the rationale of the system, and 
 many had taken on mortgages beyond their means on the supposition that 
 inflation would erode the real outstanding balance as it always used 
 to. There were protests from labor unions, and also from sectors of 
 
 the military, who had had privileged access to what little mortgage 
 
 26 
 credit had been available in the early 1960s. 
 
 Part of the problem was that the BNK had done an exceedingly poor 
 
 27 
 job of explaining the new system and its rationale to the public. 
 
 Public relations was a general failing of the technocratic policies that 
 had been instituted since 196A: precisely because the technocrats' 
 policies did not depend /or their institution on a political constituency, 
 they did not feel a strong compulsion to explain what they were doing to 
 the general public. But the payments plans of the mortgages, with their 
 outstanding balances index-linked and their amortizations adjusted ac- 
 cording to the minimum wage, did have a number of troubling properties. 
 Some of these were corrected early on, some only later. The first problem 
 was that the amortization of a mortgage might last much longer than ori- 
 ginally planned. The minimum wage was lagging well behind the ORTN index, 
 and thus the outstanding balance was corrected at a faster rate than the 
 monthly payments. It was widely feared that this meant that the out- 
 standing balance could grow indefinitely and the mortgage turn eternal 
 if the minimum wage continued to lag. These fears were certainly justified 
 
-16- 
 
 in theory: as the Appendix shows, the outstanding balance could increase 
 in real terms , after a monthly payment was made, if the monthly payment 
 were insufficient to cover all of the real interest on the outstanding 
 balance for the month. The view of the BNH staff was that this was highly 
 unlikely to occur very often--over the long run, it was felt, the minimum 
 wage simply could not be allowed by the government to continue to lag r 
 behind the price level. The public did not maintain such confidence, 
 however. 
 
 The BNH made a first attempt to solve the problem through a 
 Resolution of its Council, RC 30 of August 23, 1967. This provided 
 that if any mortgage lasted fifty percent longer than its originally 
 contracted term the BNH would pay the balance to the financing entity. 
 A special fund was set up for this purpose in the BNH, called the Fund 
 for the Compensation of t'nge Variations (FCVS). It was financed by 
 
 collecting from each SFH mortgage holder an amount equal to his first 
 
 28 
 monthly payment at the time that that payment was made. 
 
 A further problem with the payments scheme was that the annual 
 
 increase in the monthly payments took place on July 1 of each year, 
 
 sixty days after the annual increase in the minimum wage, but many 
 
 mortgage-holders received the annual increase in their earnings at a 
 
 different time of the year. The BNH solved this problem in late 1967 
 
 by introducing a "Plan C." Plan C was the same as Plan A, except that 
 
 under a Plan C the mortgage-holder could decide at what month of the 
 
 29 
 year his monthly payments would be adjusted. 
 
 The introduction of the FCVS and of Plan C did not entirely 
 
 resolve the problems of the mortgage-payments schemes. In the first 
 
-17- 
 
 place much of the public still resented the escalation of outstanding 
 balances and monthly payments. True, it was no longer possible for a 
 mortgage to become eternal. Now, however, the fear was expressed that 
 the FCVS could go bankrupt: if the minimum wage continued to lag behind 
 the price index, the FCVS might accumulate more debt than it could pay 
 off. It seemed at least possible that a given mortgage could end up, 
 6ven after one-and-a-half times the originally specified term, wi, th an 
 outstanding balance greater in real terms than the original payment on 
 the mortgage to the FCVS. In this case the particular mortgage wouLd, 
 take more from the FCVS than it had put in.. This was perhaps not likely- 
 the technical staff of the BNH maintained a sanguine faith that the 
 minimum wage could not be allowed to decline very much longer in real 
 terms. After all there were national labor productivity gains, and con- 
 sumer demand could not lung withstand a declining real wage. But the 
 eventual bankruptcy of the FCVS was a theoretical possibility, and pro- 
 posals to change the system continued to be made. The introduction., of 
 Plan C created a problem of its own. Under Plan C, a mortgage-holder . : , 
 could put off the increase in his monthly payment for as much as eleven 
 months after the time that it would have gone into effect under Plan A., 
 By then inflation would have made this mortgage-holder's monthly payment 
 smaller in real terms than it would be if he had chosen an earlier month. 
 
 To respond to the growing criticism of the amortization plans, the 
 BNH announced a reform: through Resolution 36/69 of, the BNH Administra- 
 tive Council (November 1969), Plans A and C were replaced by a single 
 "Wage Equivalence Plan" (PFS), while Plan B was retained under the name 
 
-18- 
 
 of "Index-linking Plan." Under the Wage-Equivalence Plan, the term of 
 each mortgage would be fixed definitively at the signing of the mortgage. 
 The initial contribution of one monthly payment to finance the FCVS was 
 eliminated, but the FCVS was retained: if the accumulated increase in 
 the minimum wage over the term of a particular mortgage were to turn out 
 less than the accumulated increase in the ORTN index, the FCVS would pay 
 what was still owed to the financing entity. On the other hand, however, 
 if the accumulated increase in the minimum wage were to turn out more 
 than the accumulated increase in the government-bond index, the mortgage- 
 holder would nevertheless continue to make adjusted monthly payments 
 until the end of the term originally specified. In this case, the mort- 
 gage-holder would pay more, in real terms, than he had borrowed; the 
 original loan would be completely amortized before the end of the term, 
 and after the point at which this happened the hid rtg aye-holder 's re- 
 maining payments would be paid into the FCVS. The PES also incorporated 
 a mechanism to solve the problem created by permitting monthly payments 
 to be adjusted at different times of the year. Henceforth, under the 
 PES the mortgage-holder could decide at what quarter (not month) his 
 monthly payments would be adjusted each year. A "Wage-Equalizing Co- 
 efficient" would be applied to the adjustment of the monthly payments: 
 this was a kind of fine-tuned correction determined by the BNH through 
 a complex formula — the longer the adjustment was put off after the 
 
 increase in the minimum wage, the higher would be the correction co- 
 
 30 
 efficient applied. 
 
 The PES was a peculiar reform. To many people it had the air of 
 
 a political confidence trick based on the fact that the public still 
 
■19- 
 
 uncerstood so little of the technical intricacy of index-linking. 
 Inceed, it is clear that the reform was designed for the maximum 
 psychological effect, to avoid having to make a more drastic reform. 
 One of the most important changes made under the PES was that mortgage- 
 holders were simply no longer told what their outstanding balance was 
 after they made their monthly payments. They did not need to know any- 
 more, the BNH argued: the monthly payments were simply made as before, 
 until the term was up. Only if a mortgage-holder wished to pay off his 
 mortgage before its term was up would he be told its current outstanding 
 balance. It is clear that the average Brazilian mortgage-holder tended 
 to evaluate his situation by comparing his mortgage payments to what he 
 would pay if he were renting a home, bearing in mind that mortgage 
 parents would eventually come to an end and he would own his home; con- 
 sequently the PES confo.ne'd father sensitively u. the psychology of the 
 Brazilian mortgage-holder. A few months after the reform was announced, 
 Co ijuntura Economica offered the view that "it would surely be an 
 exaggeration to claim that the essence of the Wage-Equivalence Plan was 
 
 a ihange of name, but one must not under-estimate the importance of the 
 
 31 
 psychological escape valve..." ' By establishing that the term of all 
 
 SFH mortgages would henceforth be specified at the time they were signed, 
 
 the BNH removed at a stroke the uncertainty attaching to the term of the 
 
 mortgages, and the resentment that this entailed. But — curiously for a 
 
 reform designed by proponents of index-linking — it accomplished this by 
 
 turning the real amount to be paid by an SFH mortgage-holder uncertain, 
 
 and quite likely to turn out greater or smaller than the original loan. 
 
-20- 
 
 Only if the mortgage-holder selected the "Index -linking Plan" would he 
 be certain that he would pay back in real terms exactly the same amount 
 that he had borrowed. But this plan was simply too risky for many mort- 
 gage-holders. A Gallup poll in 1969 confirmed that most Brazilians still 
 believed that the growth of the minimum wage would continue to lag behind 
 that of the price level. It had lagged behind since 1962. The BNH 
 reasoned that eventually the growth of labor productivity must pull it 
 
 up — hence, as Conjuntura Economica put it, "there is no reason whatever 
 
 32 
 for a priori fears for the fate of the [FCVS]." The public pessimism 
 
 revealed by the Gallup poll was probably based not only on the previous 
 eight years' experience, but also on the view that the government was 
 generally regarded as pro-business; that there was considerable leeway 
 within which the government could set the minimum wage; and that it would 
 probably continue Lo be . ct with a view tu conLiulliug inflationary cost 
 pressures. The Brazilian economy was growing rapidly, but so was the 
 number of new entrants into the labor force; hence new entrants could be 
 compelled to accept a low wage, while older members of the labor force 
 could move on to nigher-paying jobs. 
 
 By the end of the 1960s, then, the SFH was operating with a peculiar 
 mortgage-payments system that did not quite work according to the index- 
 linking principle. Given die government's wage policy, the PES was argu- 
 ably the best compromise possible. It conformed to the Brazilian mortgage- 
 holder's psychology remarkably well, and it seems to have reduced the 
 public complaints quite dramatically. It placed the SFH as a whole in a 
 somewhat precarious position, at least theoretically, because the BNH's 
 
-21- 
 
 obligations — particularly the FGTS — were index -linked according to the 
 ORTN index. It is possible that this meant that the SFH could not provide 
 as much subsidized, low-income housing as it should have, because the 
 real interest rates for low-income programs were lower than those for 
 programs serving the middle classes. During the 1970s the decline in 
 the real value of the minimum wage was arrested, and the real minimum 
 wage appears to have been roughly stabilized. This relieved the mortgage- 
 payments problem considerably, and as we shall relate the SFH found it 
 possible to reduce the cost of mortgage finance. 
 
 In the late 1960s the SFH began an active program of index-linked 
 passbook savings. This has proven to be the most successful application 
 of the index-linking principle in Brazil; indeed, there are grounds for 
 believing that after 1974 the passbook-savings program proved too successful 
 
 3'! 
 
 from the point of view Oj. the Brazilian economy uei a V/hole. Index-linked 
 passbook savings accounts were made available at the private agencies of 
 the SFH, particularly), the Real-Estate Credit Societies, the Savings-and-Loan 
 Associations, and the federal and state Caixas Econdmicas , and they carry 
 a government guarantee up to a limit which is itself index-linked. Their 
 growth to date has been extraordinary, and they have apparently had some 
 success in attracting savings from relatively poorer people. The larger 
 financial institutions outside the SFH have also incorporated passbook- 
 savings programs into their operations, although only the agencies of the 
 SFH work exclusively with index-linked liabilities. The passbook savings 
 accounts generally pay about 6 percent interest per year, with quarterly 
 index-linking calculated on the smallest of three balances on the first 
 
-22- 
 day of each of the three months of the previous quarter. There is 
 generally a period of six months after a new account is opened before 
 interest and index-linking is credited to the account. Until 1974 
 deposits made up to the fifteenth of each month were considered to 
 have been made on the first of the month, and deposits made after the 
 fifteenth were considered to have been made on the first day of the 
 next month, for purposes of calculating interest and index-linking. 
 After November 1974 the grace period was reduced from fifteen to five 
 days. The SFH agencies continued to issue index-linked housing bonds, 
 
 though during the 1970s the public has come to prefer the liquidity 
 
 34 
 of the passbook savings. By the start of the present decade, the 
 
 mechanisms of inflation adjustment within the SFH were pretty much 
 settled. The liabilities of the SFH — the FGTS, the housing bonds is- 
 sued by the privale agencies of the SFH, and the passouok savings 
 accounts — were all index-linked according to the ORTN index. The 
 mortgage-payments of the system were all adjusted according to the 
 PES, save for the small proportion of mortgages that were completely 
 index-linked. The accounting of the SFH was done in terms of the 
 UPC, a unit that was linked to the ORTN index. Tne passbook-savings 
 accounts were extremely popular, and they grew through the 1970s; in 
 addition the FGTS accounts were index-linked. Broadly speaking, then, 
 the index-linked liabilities of the SFH, which were essentially public 
 assets, were accepted and popular. The mortgages were far less popular, 
 although the institution of the PES had clearly improved their public 
 acceptance. Nevertheless complaints about the mortgages continued. 
 
-23- 
 
 In an interview with this writer, Dr. Rubens Vaz da Costa, who served 
 
 as president of the BNH from 1971 to 1974, reported that the mortgage- 
 
 35 
 payments scheme was his most persistent public-relations problem. 
 
 Those few people who had access to mortgage credit before 1964 naturally 
 found the SFH payments system dis-advantageous when compared with the 
 earlier nominal mortgage scheme; that was only understandable. But 
 there were other people who still found the escalating monthly payments 
 perplexing and expensive. It was clear that too many people were taking 
 on mortgage obligations beyond their means, and the BNH struggled against 
 this problem with great difficulty. On certain occasions mortgage- 
 holders who were having problems meeting their payments were permitted 
 to change their mortgages. 
 
 Around 1970 the SFH found that, with funds coming in from the FGTS 
 and the passbook saving, accounts, (.he liabilities of the system were 
 growing faster than the assets. The BNH concluded that it was in a 
 position to make mortgage terms more attractive, and throughout the 1970s 
 it took various steps to reduce the cost of mortgages. At the same time, 
 as the,. real. minimum wage stabilized and it came to seem possible that 
 it would even, rise, the problems associated with the PES took on a dif- 
 ferent character. If the real minimum wage really did begin to rise, 
 mortgages would be amortized unnecessarily rapidly. 
 
 A number of measures were taken to meet these problems. Law 5705 
 of September 21, 1971 provided for reduced mortgage rates and lengthened 
 terms. Decree-Law 1188 of the same date provided a fiscal incentive: 20 
 percent of the monthly payments made during a given year could henceforth 
 
-24- 
 
 be deducted from personal income taxes. This measure affected a 
 relatively small part of the Brazilian public, since only a small per- 
 centage of Brazil's population falls into income brackets sufficiently 
 high to incur income tax. Following these changes, the BNH decided to 
 make a change that ran somewhat in the opposite direction: it replaced 
 the Tabela " Price " with a "System of Constant Amortizations" (SAC) as 
 the means of calculating the monthly payments to be made on mortgages. 
 Henceforth, the monthly amortizations made in each month were to be equal, 
 and the monthly payments would consist of the amortization and the 
 interest on the (index-linked) outstanding balance. The monthly payments 
 would be calculated at the signing of the mortgage, and then adjusted 
 according to the PES. Under the SAC, the first monthly payments (in real 
 terms) would be higher, and then decline over the term of the mortgage, 
 rather than remain cons nt. This would seem a ..:£rt.;,ive change, since 
 the real monthly payments under the SAC would fall while an average 
 family's real income would rise. It was justified on two grounds. The 
 first was that the real-estate market would respond to the relaxation 
 of mortgage rates and terms made the previous month by raising the 
 price of real estate; increasing the initial mortgage payments, it was 
 hoped, would tend to offset this. The second was that Brazilians had 
 
 always been accustomed to falling real monthly payments on their raort- 
 
 37 
 gages, and the SAC was more in keeping with this. 
 
 Further reductions in the SFH rates were effected during 1972. 
 
 This was part of a general government effort to reduce interest rates 
 
 in all of Brazil's financial sector. Resolution 235 of the National 
 
Monetary Council (the nation's monetary authority, under the chairman- 
 ship of the Finance Minister) of September 14, 1972 provided for a 
 general reduction of the rates of interest on liabilities and assets of 
 the SFH. In addition, the same Resolution provided that no scheme of 
 inflation adjustment could exceed the adjustment of the ORTN. In the 
 SFH this effectively meant that if the minimum wage rose by more than 
 the accumulated adjustment of the ORTN over the preceding year, the 
 ORTN adjustment would be used to adjust the monthly payments. Conse- 
 quently, monthly payments could not rise by more than the ORTN index. 
 Finally, the same Resolution provided that interest rates must all be 
 expressed in annual terms, not quarterly terms. This in itself effec- 
 tively lowered interest rates that had previously been expressed in 
 quarterly terms and had been compounded quarterly. After December 
 1972, index-linking on lVi'S accounts was to be applied annually, not 
 quarterly as previously. 
 
 In 1974 the government extended the benefits of the fiscal incentive 
 provided in 1971 to all mortgage-holders, not merely those who paid income 
 tax. Decree-Law 1358 of November 12, 1974 eliminated the 1971 fiscal 
 benefit, and replaced it with credit certificates to be given to all mort- 
 gage-holders in the value of 10 percent of the monthly payments that had 
 been paid during the previous year. Decree-Law 1431 of December 5, 1975 
 
 increased the percentage to 12 percent, and also raised the minimum and 
 
 39 
 
 maximum amounts that could be so credited under the previous law. 
 
 A number of other changes were made in the operations of the SFH 
 throughout the 1970s, but these are outside the scope of the present 
 essay, which is the method of adjusting for inflation employed by the 
 
-26- 
 
 SFH. We should note, however, chat in 1975 and 1976 substantial changes 
 were made in the way the the ORTN adjustments are made, as part of a 
 
 broader government objective to reduce the attractiveness of index-linked 
 
 40 
 assets vis-a-vis nominal assets. In August 1975 the government announced 
 
 that henceforth the adjustment could be reduced, if the increase in the 
 price index was due, in the view of the government, to "accidental" fac- 
 tors, such as the agricultural disasters that plagued Brazil during 1975. 
 In May 1976 a more drastic change was made: henceforth the ORTN adjustment 
 would be made according to the formula 
 
 .8 • p + .2 • 15% 
 
 (in annual terms), where p is the adjustment that would have been made 
 
 under the previous formula. It was hoped that in this way the "inflation- 
 
 41 
 feedback." effect of inde;..-linking on the economy woula De weakened. 
 
 Conclusions . 
 
 What lessons can be drawn from the institution of adjustment for 
 inflation in the Brazilian Housing-Finance System? Some of our conclusions 
 seem rather obvious a priori . One hardly needs to refer to the Brazilian 
 experience to be convinced that in an inflationary context people are 
 pleased enough to hold index-linked assets but would rather not undertake 
 index-linked obligations. Thus it is not surprising that the Brazilian 
 public accepted the index-linked social insurance fund quite happily, and 
 demonstrated considerable enthusiasm for Index-linked housing bonds and 
 passbook savings; nor la it surprising that the mortgage-payments schemes 
 generated controversy and protest. 
 
-2 7- 
 
 What is perhaps most interesting about the experience of the SFH is 
 the dilemma that the BNH staff faced in 1966 when it drew up Instruction 
 No. 5. The BNH staff reasoned, correctly, that it would be impossible to 
 finance a nation-wide mortgage program unless the SFH guaranteed its 
 liabilities against the (unpredictable) erosion of their value through 
 inflation. In other words, long-term liabilities would not be subscribed 
 in terms of a depreciating monetary unit. Thus the BNH staff proposed 
 that the SFH employ a unit of account that maintained its purchasing- 
 power value, the UPC. The problem — and this is the heart of the index- 
 linking dilemma — was that liabilities in terms of the UPC must be backed 
 by assets denominated in the same unit of account. These assets, however, 
 would be liabilities of the public. Given that the national monetary 
 unit was still the cruzeiro , it was impossible for the public to back 
 its UPC liabilities with UPC assets, for the assets oi the public must, 
 perforce, be largely in terms of the monetary unit. In particular, wage 
 contracts under the Brazilian incomes policy were still denominated in 
 terms of the cruzeiro . Thus the BNH staff had to struggle to make the 
 mortgage-payments scheme compatible, on the one hand, with the UPC lia- 
 bilities of the SFH and, on the other hand, with the cruzeiro assets of 
 the public. 
 
 The solutions that the BNH staff reached, in Instruction No. 5 and 
 in the PES, must be regarded as ingenious, even if imperfect, considering 
 the nature of the problem that they were up against. It has manifestly 
 proved successful, at least to the extent that the SFH has grown and 
 expanded its programs. It is clear that the SFH has not been able to 
 
-28- 
 
 provide as much low-cost housing for persons of lower-income classes as 
 it ought to have on grounds of social criteria: Brazil's larger cities 
 still have too much sub-standard housing. But the SFH has financed a 
 large amount of new housing construction; and even if it is true that 
 the direct beneficiaries of this were middle class, the housing market 
 as a whole was considerably eased. Moreover, since 1968 the BNH has 
 provided credit to municipalities for construction of urban infrastruc- 
 ture. The value that this has had for Brazil's urban development cannot 
 be over-estimated. 
 
 All the same, to return to our theme, the Brazilian public has 
 clearly not liked index- linking, and it is likely that if it had been 
 able to choose it would have preferred to do without it altogether. 
 But given the inflationary circumstances, it was probably the only 
 viable solution for the national housing shortage, anu it wai> probably 
 the only means by which savings could be accumulated. It was precisely 
 for situations like this that the military felt that they had to retain 
 power: there were too many Brazilian problems of this kind that re- 
 quired unpopular, long-term solutions, solutions that a more democratic 
 regime could not provide. 
 
 One final observation. We have considered the SFH and its problem 
 of adjusting to an inflationary context from a rather limited perspective, 
 and this has kept certain other issues off the stage. We have observed 
 that the particularly remarkable achievement of the BNH staff was that 
 it managed to solve the problem instituting a constant-purchasing-power 
 unit of account in an economy that has continued to use a depreciating 
 
-29- 
 
 monetary unit as its unit of account. The rest of Brazil's financial 
 system, apart from the federal Treasury (which is a special case, since 
 obviously a government that can compel the creation of new money need 
 not worry in the same way as private firms about the backing of its own 
 obligations), has not been able to resolve this dilemma. Brazil's 
 industrial and commercial finance continues to be denominated in the 
 monetary unit. Now this has placed the SFH in a peculiar position. 
 Since its liabilities are index-linked, its competitive position in the 
 market for investable funds is exceedingly strong. Indeed, ironically, 
 its position is the stronger, the higher and the more uncertain is the 
 rate of inflation. This writer has argued in separate works that the 
 competitive pressure of the availability of index-linked assets has 
 had severe effects on other financial institutions — particularly Brazil's 
 investment banks, t>toek markets, non-bank financial uu<_ermediaries f 
 and commercial banks. In situations of rising inflation, such as have 
 occurred in recent years in Brazil, this pressure has caused severe 
 problems for Brazil's financial system. In evaluating the success 
 of the modes of inflation-adjustment employed by Brazil's SFH, these 
 problems should not be ignored, even though they are beyond the limited 
 scope of the present essay. 
 
-30- 
 
 Appendix 
 
 1. Without index-linking, the French Amortization Plan operates 
 as follows. Given a mortgage of S n , a monthly rate of interest 
 r, and the number n of monthly payments to be made, the size of 
 each monthly payment 1' is given by 
 
 P = rU±ElL. s (1) 
 
 (l+r) n -l ° 
 
 This formula is derived as follows. Let I be the interest payment 
 to be made at time t, A the amortization to be made at time t, and 
 S the outstanding balance after the payment at time t. The point 
 of the plan is that for all t 
 
 P = A +1 = constant. (2) 
 
 By definition, 
 
 s t = s t-i - V (3) 
 
 the interest payment is calculated as 
 
 h - rS t-r < 4 > 
 
 Substituting (3) and (4) into (2) gives 
 
 S t-1 " b t + rS t-l " P ' 
 
 or Y = (l+r)S t _ 1 - S f 
 
-31- 
 
 Hence S x = (l+r)S Q - P, 
 
 S 2 « (l+r)S 1 - P 
 
 = (l+r) 2 S Q - (l+r)P - P, 
 
 t-1 
 S„ = (l+r)X - P 3E (1+r) c . (5) 
 
 
 C T 
 
 Since 
 
 s n = o, 
 
 
 n-1 
 
 
 = (l+r) n S - P X 
 t=0 
 
 and 
 
 
 
 P . W* s . 
 n-1 
 
 
 I d+rr 
 
 t=0 
 
 n-1 . n-1 1 
 
 Now Z (l+r) C = (l+r) " 1 E [ T ^-] t 
 t=0 t=0 
 
 l-(— ) n 
 - (l+r)- 1 [—i^-] 
 
 (l+r) n -l 
 
 Therefore 
 
 p= _ril±r^ Q<E#D< 
 <l+r)-l U 
 
-32- 
 
 2. Plan A may be described as follows. Let p represent the ORTN price 
 index at time t; w the minimum wage at time t; P the nominal monthly 
 payment at time t; P the monthly payment calculated at the signing of the 
 mortgage, through the French Amortization Plan; S the nominal balance 
 after the monthly payment has been made; A the nominal amortization pay- 
 ment . Then 
 
 W t 
 
 t v 
 
 p w 
 
 and S = — S^ . (1+r) - P — . 
 t P t-1 w 
 
 3. The operation of Plan A may be described simply as follows. Let P 
 represent the nominal monthly payment of amortization and interest calcu- 
 lated according to the French Amortization Plan at t ■ 0, the time when 
 the mortgage is signed. Let P represent the nominal monthly payment 
 that will actually be pi d at time t, S the noi. :i rial outstanding 
 
 wage at time t, p the ORTN index at time t, and r the monthly interest 
 rate. Then 
 
 W t 
 P = P " — , (6) 
 
 t w Q 
 
 and then the new outstanding balance is given by 
 
 P t 
 
 s t " < 1+r > T Q s c-i " p t 
 
 - d + r) ^ S - P - i . (7) 
 
 p 
 
 i.e., the new nominal outstanding balance is given by the old balance, 
 
 escalated by the ORTN index, multiplied by one plus the interest rate, 
 
-33- 
 
 minus the monthly payment. It is clear that S may exceed S , ; it 
 will if 
 
 P t « 
 
 p 
 
 4. Not only might the nominal value of S exceed that of S ,J the 
 
 real outstanding balance may increase after a monthly payment has been 
 
 V 
 
 made. The real values of S and S„ , at time t are given by S^ — and 
 
 : t-1 ° t p. 
 
 p C 
 
 S ," (using the ORTN ind.jx as the deflator) . 
 
 P t 
 
 >;-:'■:> 
 
 P P P 
 
 S r «** - (1+r) S„ | — - P- — 
 
 t P t t-1 p t t p t 
 
 p w t' p 
 = (1+r) S^ , — - P — — 
 
 - t " Lp t w p t 
 
 p o p o P W t p o 
 
 S„ — - S„ . — = [(1+r) - L] S^ . — - P -£■ — . 
 tp t-lp -,„ : t-1 p w p 
 
 Consequently the real outstanding balance will increase if 
 
 w t p p 
 P--FrS f . -- , (9) 
 
 w P t t-1 Pj . 
 
 i.e., if the real monthly payment is insufficient to cover the real 
 interest on the previous real outstanding balance. 
 
-34- 
 
 NOTES 
 
 See Skidmore (1967) pp. 253-330, for a history of the events 
 leading up to the overthrow of the Goulart government and the assumption 
 of power by the Castello Branco government. 
 
 2 
 On the reasons for the Brazilian inflation of the early 1960s, 
 
 see Baer (1965). 
 
 3 
 
 Calculated from the table "Indice geral de precos", in the 
 
 periodical Conjuntura Econ6mica , April 1977, p. 92. 
 
 See Skidmore (1967), pp. 234-259 for a discussion of the Dantas- 
 Furtado Program and its historical context. 
 
 See Conjuntura Econ6mica , May 1964, pp. 15-17; also Baer, 
 Kerstenetzky, and Siraonsen (1965). 
 
 See Kafka (1967), and Simonsen (1970), esp. pp. 23-40. 
 
 For the history of the ORTN adjustment formulas, see Conjuntura 
 Economica , "Correc,3o moneta'ria e realimentacSo inflacioniria," June 1976, 
 pp. 88-94. 
 
 8 
 
 See Chacel, Simonsen, and Wald (1970), pp. 111-113, and Baer and 
 
 Beckerman (1974). 
 
 9 
 
 See Baer and Simonsen (1965), Chacel, Simonsen, and Wald (1970), 
 
 pp. 99-107, and Baer and Beckerman (1974). 
 
 Kampel and Miranda do Valle (1974), p. 9. 
 
 See Chacel, Simonsen, and Wald (1970), pp. 39-42. The very weak- 
 ness of the housing-finance market may have prevented an inflationary 
 demand for loans to build inflation-res istent luxury housing. 
 
 12 
 
 Conjuntura Econ3mica , July 1964, pp. 49-52. 
 
 13 
 
 Conjuntura Econ6mica , July 1964, p. 49. The political crisis 
 
 of March 1964 was probably also an important factor. 
 
 14 
 
 The provisions of Law 4380 are summarized in Chacel, Simonsen, 
 
 and Wald (1970), pp. 123-124. See also Kampel and Miranda do Valle (1974). 
 See Kampel and Miranda, pp. 147-148. 
 16 See Ellis (1969). 
 17 See Simonsen (1975), 66-67. 
 
-35- 
 
 18 
 
 In 1969, Sandra Cavalcanti discussed her views on the use of index- 
 linking in the SFH in a newspaper interview. She felt that the SFH could 
 not sustain its system of inflation adjustment, and she believed that the 
 public complaints that arose against index-linking during the late 1960s 
 provedr her point. "What the Ministry of Planning failed to remember when 
 it decided to institute the index-linking system within the BNH is that 
 economics is not mathematics. Economics is people, unemployment, disaster, 
 something human that a computer cannot resolve," she said. During 1965, 
 she noted, in the limited operations that the BNH was then carrying out, 
 a system of "inflation compensation" was employed: "the re-adjustment of 
 the value of the amortization was in relation to current money and the 
 amortization was calculated as 25 percent of the [mortgage-holder's] 
 salary. And the purchasers [of homes] had, in this form, conditions to 
 continue paying." She recommended that the SFH interest rates and the 
 index-linking be modified, and perhaps subsidized through some economic 
 activity of the state. Jornal do Brasil of Rio de Janeiro, "BNH d'ef ende 
 a correcao monetfiria e culpa a semantics, " November 3, 1969, pp. 28—29. 
 
 ■19 ' " ' " ' ; ' 
 
 The provisions of Instruction No. 5 were explained to this writer 
 
 by Dr. Jos6 Eduardo Oliveira Penna, the director of the BNH from December 
 
 1965 to March 1974, in several interviews granted in November 1976 and 
 
 May 1977. 
 
 "'20 
 
 See Fishow (1974), pp. 267-268. The wage policy is discussed 
 
 .throughout Simonsen (1970); the rationale of the policy is discussed on 
 
 pp. 26-28. 
 
 21 
 
 As explained to this writer by Dr. Jose 1 Eduardo Oliveira Penna. 
 
 See also Cortjuntura EconQmica , "0 Piano de Equivalgncia Salarial e a 
 
 correqSo monetaria," March 1970, pp. 65-67. 
 
 22 
 
 As long as the mortgage was below a certain ceiling; above that 
 
 ceiling Plan B had to be used. Also, in practice, SFH agencies "strongly 
 suggested" one plan or the other for particular mortgages. 
 
 i ■ 23 
 
 The "Decree-Law" is a legislative device used in Brazil and a 
 
 number of other Latin-American nations. A presidential decree is issued, 
 
 establishing immediately as law a disposition that would otherwise require 
 
 congressional approval. The congress may then approve or disapprove the 
 
 disposition: If it disapproves, the disposition ceases to be effective. 
 
 In Brazii, the "Institutional Act No. 2" of 1965 (one of a series of 
 
 extra-constitutional changes promulgated by the post-1964 governments) 
 
 re-organized Brazil's political parties into a "government" party and 
 
 an "opposition" party. The government party, as part of its "party 
 
 discipline," is required to vote in Congress in favor of any Decree-Law. 
 
 Since the government party has had a congressional majority since 1965, 
 
 the Brazilian president has effectively held legislative powers since 
 
 then. 
 
-36- 
 
 24 
 
 See Kampel and Miranda do Valle, pp. 41-47; also Conjuntura 
 
 EconOmica , '"Editorial, * Fundo de Garantia de Tempo de Serviqo," 
 
 October 1966, pp. 9-11. 
 
 25 
 
 From a speech by Moacir Gomes de Almeida, an important construc- 
 tion entrepreneur and a member of the Sindicato de ConstruqSo Civil, a 
 trade association of construction firms. Quoted by the Folha de S5o Paulo, 
 June 1967. 
 
 The debate is briefly mentioned in Kampel and Miranda do Valle, 
 pp. 66-67, and in Conjuntura Econo'mica , "Mercado imobili^rio — em discusslo 
 a correqao monet£ria," September 1968. Dr. Jose" Eduardo Oliveira Penna 
 told this writer that he spent a large amount of his time between 1967 and 
 1969 responding to the public protests about the mortgage-payments systems. 
 Dr. Oliveira Penna believed that the protests came principally from func- 
 tionaries of the federal and state Caixas Econo'micas who were used to 
 working with nominal mortgages; from public servants and members of the 
 armed forces who had had privileged access to mortgage credit before 1964; 
 and from persons who had taken on excessive mortgage burdens. At one point, 
 in 1968, Dr. Oliveira Penna offered to permit persons who wished to change 
 the terms of their mortgage to do so. Dr. Oliveira Penna kindly showed 
 this writer a file of documents that he maintained from the period. These 
 include a memorandum by General Gerson de Pina, who was particularly active 
 in the opposition to the mortgage-payments system; General Gerson de Pina 
 made it clear that he did not oppose the index-linking principle, only 
 that he was contrary to the precise way that the SFH had applied it, par- 
 ticularly where "those wuo live solely on wages and pensions" are concerned. 
 He also suggested that the monthly payment never be permitted to exceed 
 30 percent of the mortgage-holder's income. "Some means must be found," 
 he added, "to humanize the evolution of the outstanding balance, to stimu- 
 late the borrower to amortize the loan in the shortest possible term." 
 Another document was a memorandum from an adviser to the national railway 
 system's "Department of Assistance to the Railway Worker." This memorandum 
 complained that the existing housing program of this department could not 
 be modified to conform with the SFH system. The file also included a 
 mathematical analysis by an actuary, showing that mortgages under Plan A 
 could turn eternal (on grounds similar to those given in the Appendix to 
 the present essay). Finally, the file includes various statements pre- 
 pared by BNH officials in support of the index-linking principle and the 
 mortgage-payments scheme. In an inflationary context, these argue, there 
 is no other means to ensure the continued availability of funds for mort- 
 gage finance. 
 
 The public dissatisfaction with index-linking — in spite of the 
 degree to which the public received Index-linking through the FGTS and 
 the passbook-savings accounts introduced in 1968 — was considerable. The 
 daily Jornal do Brasil of Rio de Janeiro published an opinion poll on 
 September 9, 1969, p. 48. The public's response to the question, "In 
 your opinion, index-linking ought to be ?" was as follows: 
 
-37- 
 
 reduced, 36 per cent; increased 4 per cent; left unchanged, 10 per cent, 
 abolished, 36 per cent. The remaining 14 per cent had no opinion or did 
 not know. 
 
 The Jornal do Brasil described the situations of three mortgage- 
 holders in a feature article later that year. One was an engineer who 
 had undertaken a mortgage with full index-linking (Plan B). His salary 
 did not keep. pace with the ORTN index, and he was now paying half his 
 salary to cover his mortgage. Another was finding it so difficult to 
 meet. his payments that he was thinking of selling back his home to get 
 out from under index-linking. A third, a poorer man, seems not to have 
 understood that his mortgage was index-linked in any sense — apparently 
 he had never heard of index-linking — but seemed to feel that his mort- 
 gage was a good enough deal. Jornal do Brasil , "BNH defende a correcSo 
 monetaria e culpa a semantica," November 3, 1969, p. 28. 
 
 27 
 
 This was recognized by the BNH staff. Dr. Jose" Eduardo 
 
 Oliveira Penna wrote a brief monograph in August 1968 entitled "Seven 
 Errors and One Truth," in which he listed seven common mis-conceptions 
 maintained by the public regarding the SFH mortgage-payments schemes 
 and refuted them. These mis-conceptions were that the mortgage could 
 become eternal; that the adjustments of the monthly payments would lag 
 forever behind the adjustment of the ORTN; that the outstanding balance 
 rose in real terms; that the rates were impossible to understand and 
 arbitrary; that the monthly payment rose faster than the mortgage- 
 holder's wage packet; that the mortgage-holder did not know what his 
 mortgage would finally cost him; and that the government was profiting 
 illicitly from index-linking. The monograph then noted as the one 
 truth that the plans had indeed been poorly explained to the public. 
 Characteristically, the monograph received limited circulation. 
 
 In an interview in 1969 with a reporter from the daily Jornal do 
 Brasil of Rio de Janeiro, officials of the BNH suggested that the 
 essence of the public-relations problem was psychological or semantic. 
 "Perhaps we ought to call ... the index-linking of debts and monthly 
 payments determination of their current value ( "atualizacao de valor" ) . 
 "The long-term tendencies of wages is to grow in real terms. Only 
 those who do not believe in the country and do not believe in the pos- 
 sibilities and capacity of the Brazilian believes otherwise." Jornal 
 do Brasil , "BNH defende a correcao monetaria e culpa semantica," 
 November 3, 1969. 
 
 28 
 
 See the Conjuntura EconSmica article cited in Note 21. Dr. 
 
 Oliveira Penna explained this to the writer. 
 
 29 
 Ibid. 
 
 Ibid. 
 
-38- 
 
 31 
 
 Conjuntura Economica , article cited in Note 20, p. 67. The 
 
 reform was also discussed at the time by the newsweekly magazine Veja , 
 which is a Brazilian equivalent of the united States' Time or Newsweek . 
 Veja 's article included the following observations. "The expression 
 'index-linking' has become damned [in the mind of the public]; the people 
 are afraid to purchase houses and are afraid that they will not be able 
 to meet their monthly payments." Hence, the article continues, a "psy- 
 chological solution" has been presented through the adaption of the PES. 
 But [the PES] is not all illusion, since through the new plans, the 
 purchaser [of a home] receives a large gift: he will be able to conclude 
 the payment of his home." "Behind the decision lies the conviction that 
 the country will manage to overcome inflation in the short run and thus 
 that index-linking will end at once." The Brazilian press, as these 
 excerpts from Veja ' s contemporary coverage illustrate, was generally 
 hostile to the index-linking concept, and was not really very helpful 
 in explaining the idea to the public. Quotations from "HabitacHo: 
 Uma correcao psicol6gica," Veja , September 26, 1969, p. 32. 
 
 32 
 
 Conjuntura Economica, article cited in Note 21, p. 66. 
 
 33 See Beckerman, "The Trouble . . ." (1978). 
 
 34 
 
 On the resources of the SFH, see Conjuntura Econ6mica , "0 
 
 Sistema Brasileiro de Poupanca e Eraprestimo," March 1974, pp. 65-70. 
 
 This article is part of an "Estudo Especial" of Conjuntura Econdmica 
 
 on the SFH, March 1974, pp. 45-117. 
 
 35 
 
 Interview with Dr. Rubens Vaz da Costa on September 28, 1976. 
 
 See Conjuntura Econdmica , "Sistema Financeiro Habitacional- 
 Recursos superam aplicacoes," September 1972, pp. 86-89, p. 86. 
 
 37 
 
 See Conjuntura Economica , "Tabela Price e o sistema financeiro 
 
 habitacional," January 1972, pp. 55-58. The writer learned the principal 
 
 justifications for the adoption of the SAC in an interview with Dr. Jose 1 
 
 Roberto Rego Monteiro, the BNH staff-member who was the principal advocate 
 
 of the change, December 3, 1976. 
 
 38 
 
 See Conjuntura Economica , "Sistema Financeiro Habitacional- 
 
 crescimento tranqliilo," February 1973, pp. 94-100, p. 95. 
 
 39 
 
 See Conjuntura Economica , "Sistema Financeiro Habitacional- 
 
 ferte expansao no ano,' February 1976, pp. 165-174, p. 174. 
 
 40 
 
 See Conjuntura Econdtuica , Inflacao, correcao monetSria, 
 
 e indices de precos," September i975, pp. 91-94, esp. pp. 93-94. 
 
 41 
 
 See Banco Central do Brasil, Relat6rio 1976 , p. 137. 
 
 42 
 
 See Beckerman, "The Trouble ..." (1978), and Beckerman, "Index- 
 linked Financial Assets ..." (1978). 
 
 M/D/105 
 
-39- 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Banco Central do Brasil: Boletim (issued monthly). 
 
 Banco Central do Brasil: Relatorio (issued annually). 
 
 Beckerman, Paul, "The Trouble with Index-linking: Notes on the Recent 
 Brazilian Experience," unpublished paper, University of Illinois, 
 1978. 
 
 Beckerman, Paul, "Index-linked Government Bonds and the Efficiency of 
 
 Monetary Policy," unpublished paper, University of Illinois, 1978. 
 
 Beckerman, Paul, "Index-linked Financial Assets and the Brazilian 'In- 
 flationary-Feedback' Mechanism," unpublished paper, University of 
 Illinois, 1978. 
 
 Campos, Robert, "Brazil: Monetary Correction — Its Applications and Effects," 
 Bank of London and South American Review , 3, 1969, 347-360. 
 
 Carpenter, Robert, "Origens dos recursos principals do Sistema Financeiro 
 da Habitacao," mimeo, 1975. 
 
 Baer, Werner, Industrialization and Economic Development in Brazil (Home- 
 ■- wood, Illinois, 1965). 
 
 Baer,, Werner and Beckerr.um, Paul, "Indexing in Brazil," World Development , 
 October-December 1974, pp. 35-47. 
 
 Chacel, Julian; Simonsen, Mario H. ; Wald, Arnoldo, Correcao monetaria 
 (Rio de Janeiro, 1970). 
 
 Conjuntura Econ6mica : "Transacoes de empresas imabiliarias, October 
 1964, pp. 77-83. 
 
 Conjuntura Economica , "'Editorial,' Fundo de Garantia de Tempo de Servico," 
 October 1966, pp. 9-11. 
 
 Conjuntura Econdmica , "Mercado imobiliario — em discussao a correcao 
 monetaria," September 1968. 
 
 Conjuntura Econ6mica : "0 Piano de equivalencia salarial e a correcao 
 monetaria," March 1970, pp. 65-68. 
 
 Conjuntura Econ6mica : "Correcao monetaria — de novo em destaque," 
 July 1971, pp. 49-54. 
 
 Conjuntura Economica : "0 Sistema Brasileira de Poupanca e Emprestimo," 
 March 1974, pp. 65-70. (Part of an "Estudo Especial" on the Sistema 
 Financeiro da Habitacao, pp. 45-117.) 
 
-40- 
 
 Conjuntura Econflraica : "Correcao monet£ria — tema de interesse 
 Internacional," May 1974, pp. 110-114. 
 
 Conjuntura EconSmica : "Correcao monet^ria das ORTN — formas de calculo," 
 December 1974, pp. 92-95. 
 
 Conjuntura Economica : "Correcao iconetSria — funcao e custos," May 1975, 
 pp. 107-109. 
 
 Conjuntura Economica : "Inflacao, correcao raonetciria, e indices de 
 precos," September 1975, pp. 91-94. 
 
 Conjuntura Economica : "Correcao monetario — aspectcs institucionais," 
 September 1975, pp. 97-102. 
 
 Conjuntura EconSmica : Correcao monet£ria e cr£dito no Brasil," 
 November 1975, pp. 96-101. 
 
 Conjuntura Econ6mica : "Os novos rumos da correcao monetaria, November 
 1975, pp. 102-104. 
 
 Conjuntura Economica : "Correcao monetaria e realimentacao inf lacionSria," 
 June 1976, pp. 88-94. 
 
 The Economist : "How Brazil showed the way," April 27, 1974, pp. 82-83. 
 
 The Economist : "Change in Direction: A Survey of Brazil," July 31, 1976. 
 
 Ellis, Howard, "Corrective Inflation in Brazil, 1964-1966," in The Economy 
 of Brazil , ed. H. Ellis (Berkeley, 1969). 
 
 Fishlow, Albert, "Indexing Brazilian-Style: Inflation Without Tears?", 
 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity , No. 1, 1974, pp. 261-282. 
 
 Idrio, Oswaldo, "A Correcao monetdria nos f inanciamentos habitacionais 
 brasileiros," (BNH publication, Rio de Janeiro 1974). 
 
 Kafka, Alexandre, "Indexing for Inflation in Brazil," in Essays on Inflation 
 and Indexation (Washington, 1974), ed. H. Giersch, pp. 87-98. 
 
 Kafka, Alexandre, "The Brazilian Stabilization Program, 1964-1966," 
 Journal of Political Economy , August 1967, pp. 596-634. 
 
 Kampel, Luiz Cezar, and Miranda do Valle, Maria Thereza, Sistema Financeiro 
 da Habitacao (Rio de Janeiro, 1974). 
 
 Kleiman, Ephraim, "Monetary Correction and Indexation: The Brazilian 
 
 and Israeli Experience," in Explorations in Economic Research (NBER) , 
 Vol. 4, No. 1, Winter 1977. 
 
-41- 
 
 Lemgruber, AntSnio, "Inflation in Brazil," in L. B. Krause and W. S. 
 Salant, ed., Worldwide Inflation (Washington, D.C., 1977), pp. 
 395-448. 
 
 Ness, Walter, "Financial Markets Innovation as a Development Strategy: 
 Initial Results from the Brazilian Experience," Economic Develop- 
 ment and Cultural Change , April 1974, pp. 453-472. 
 
 Ness, Walter, A Influencia da correcao monetaria no sistema financeiro 
 (Rio de Janeiro, 1977). 
 
 Reynolds, Clark and Carpenter, Robert, "Financiamento e habitacao e 
 distribuicSo de riqueza no Brasil," mimeo, 1975. 
 
 Simonsen, M£rio Henrique, "Inflation and the Money and Capital Markets 
 In Brazil," in The Economy of Brazil , ed. H. S. Ellis (Berkeley, 
 1969). 
 
 Simonsen, MSrio Henrique, Inflacao; Gradualismo x tratamento de choque 
 (Rio de Janeior, 1970). 
 
 Simonsen, M5rio Henrique, "Correcao monetiria — a experiencia brasileira,' 
 Conjuntura Econ6mica , July 1975, pp. 65-69. 
 
 Skidmore, Thomas, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964 (New York, 1967). 
 
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The Interpretation of Table 2b: The value of the index-linked bonds has 
 been determined each month by adjusting the previous month's value according 
 to the wholesale price index lagged several months, using the following 
 formula: 
 
 * ^ \-5 + h-6 + h-7 ' 
 where V is the value of the bond at time t and I is the wholesale 
 price Index. (Originally the index-linked bonds were adjusted every three 
 months, according to the formula: 
 
 v = V -^ ^ ^ ) 
 
 t t-1 I + I + I 
 
 Z L V7 X t-8 L t-9 " 
 
 The prir.cipal changes made in the calculation of the bond values were these: 
 
 in 1969 a new wholesale price index was used, removing the wholesale prices 
 
 of goodiJ for export. In 1972 and 1973 a complicated formula was employed, 
 
 weighting the above formula by 60 percent and making the remaining 40 percent 
 
 of the formula depend on the government's target for inflation over the 
 
 coming period. During 1974 the previous formula was adopted again. In 
 
 August 1975 the wholesale price Index was "purged" of price increases deemed 
 
 to have been the consequence of the agricultural failures that occurred 
 
 around that time, for purposes of calculating the bond readjustment. After 
 
 April 1976 the adjustment formula became (approximately): 
 
 I + I + I — 
 
 V = 0.8 V '- 2 ^ ^ + 0.2V (1.15) 12 . 
 
 If the bonds were perfect hedges against inflation, the correction formula 
 would 3e : 
 
I 
 
 v = v . - ■ . (§) 
 t t-1 I K ' 
 
 The first ::igure given for each month in Table 2Lb is the value: 
 
 -- „ X June 1964 
 v = V . . 
 
 t-1 
 
 If the formula (§) had actually been used to adjust the bonds beginning 
 
 in August :L964, this first figure would be 10.00. To the extent that our 
 
 calculated figure falls short from 10.00, therefore, the bonds have failed 
 
 to incorporate the full inflation (measured by the v;holesale price index) 
 
 that occurred since July 1964. To determine the real rate of return (net 
 
 of interes :) on a bond held between times t and t, . calculate 
 ...-•' o I s 
 
 V - V 
 
 . H ^ . 
 
 \ 
 
 o 
 
 At least between 1965 and 1974, our table shows that index-linked bonds 
 have pretty much retained their value. Between any given dates, however, 
 the bonds do clearly have real gains or losses. The second figure given 
 for each month shows the value 
 
 « „ T June 196 4 
 
 ** -v -^r - .-' 
 
 where G i:> the general price index. 
 
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