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JAMES BUCHANAN 
 AND HIS CABINET 
 
 ON THE EVE OF SECESSION 
 
 PHILIP GERALD AUCHAMPAUGH, Ph.D. 
 
 Professor of History, State Teacher's College 
 Duluth, Minnesota 
 
 PRIVATELY PRINTED 
 1926 
 
Copyright, 1926 
 
 PHILIP GERALD AUCHAMPAUGH 
 
 UNCASTEH PRESS, INC. 
 LANCASTER. PA. 
 
To 
 MY WIFE AND PARENTS 
 
<r~ 
 
 INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 For nearly a decade I have had an interest in the career of 
 James Buchanan. Phases of his life were the subject of research 
 at Syracuse and Clark Universities while studying for my master's 
 and doctor's degree. Since then my interest has continued. The 
 partial outcome of these pursuits is this small volume containing 
 some of the results of my researches. It is intended to supple- 
 ment the able work of George Ticknor Curtis written some forty 
 years ago. Its purpose is not to please, but to attempt to give a 
 fairer and more sympathetic account of President Buchanan and 
 his Administration than is usually available to the general his- 
 torian. 
 
 A complete list of all who have aided me in my work would be 
 impossible. Among those who have given me of their time and 
 advice, are Dr. George H. Blakeslee of Clark University, where 
 I enjoyed the Fellowship of the American Antiquarian Society ; 
 Dr. Alexander C. Flick, former Head of the History Department 
 of Syracuse University, now State Historian of New York ; Dr. 
 Edwin P. Tanner, Professor of American History, Syracuse Uni- 
 versity; Dr. Lyon G. Tyler, President Emeritus of William and 
 Mary College; and Dr. Findlay C. Crawford, Professor of Politi- 
 cal Science, Syracuse University. 
 
 From the staffs of the Manuscript Division of the Library of 
 Congress, the American Antiquarian Society of Worcester, Mas- 
 sachusetts, Clark University Library, the Manuscript Division 
 of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, and the State Library at 
 Richmond, Virginia, I have received the most kind and courteous 
 co-operation. 
 
 Philip G. Auchampaugh 
 
 Duluth, Minnesota, 
 September i, 1926. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Page 
 Chapter I. James Buchanan, His Works and His Times. . I 
 Scope of the Study — The Difficulties in Understanding the Middle 
 Period — Writers of History — Back to Yesterday Afternoon — Hos- 
 tile Critics of Buchanan — Influences of Buchanan's Childhood — Col- 
 lege Days — Studies — Buchanan as a Lawyer — Defending Judge 
 Franklin — Practice — Thrift and Integrity — The 25th Section of the 
 Judiciary Act Saved — Buchanan and the Supreme Court — Buchanan 
 as a Political Leader — His Motives for Entering that Field — The 
 Issues in Pennsylvania — Reasons for Buchanan's Nomination to the 
 Presidency — Why he Accepted the Nomination — The Matter of the 
 Patronage — Buchanan as a Diplomat — The Russian Mission — Anglo- 
 American Relations — Buchanan's Far Eastern Policy — Judge 
 Moore's Estimate — Buchanan and Franklin — Affairs in Mexico — 
 Buchanan and the Alaskan Purchase — Buchanan as a Public Speaker 
 — The Presidency — The Slavery Issue — Buchanan on Abolition — 
 Slavery in 1850 — Buchanan, State Rights and Southern Rights. 
 
 Chapter II. Some Aspects of the Kansas Problem 21 
 
 The Scope of the Chapter — The Northern Version of the Problem 
 — The Southern View — Buchanan among the Prophets — The 
 Kansas Situation in 1857 — Governor Walker Displeases the South- 
 ern Democracy — Walker's Political Ambitions — Walker's Acts in 
 Kansas — Walker Joins the Opposition — He Fails to Achieve His 
 Ambitions — An Analysis of the LeComption Constitution in Its 
 Relation to Slavery in Kansas — Buchanan and Slavery in Kansas 
 — Buchanan's Political Ideas as Applied to the Situation — His 
 Attitude towards the Changes after 1850 — The Supreme Court 
 and their Decision — The Relation of the Decision towards the 
 Administration Policy in Kansas — Buchanan and Southern Rights 
 — The Parties on the Issue — Reports from the Territory — The Op- 
 position to the Constitution — The Toombs Amendment : The Eng- 
 lish Bill — Douglas Refuses the Peace Pipe — Douglas rather than 
 Kansas the Cause for the Divided Party — The Lull before the 
 Storm. 
 
 Chapter III. Buchanan's Ministers 65 
 
 Buchanan's Ministers as a Factor in his Policy — Sources of In- 
 formation — Relations of each of the Members of the Cabinet 
 with the President on the Eve of Secession — Cobb, Thomas, Dix, 
 Cass, Stanton, Holt, King, Toucey, Floyd, Black, Thompson — 
 
viii CONTENTS 
 
 Buchanan's Valuation of his Cabinet — His Contact with the Lead- 
 ers of the Democracy. 
 
 Chapter IV. Buchanan's Policy, 1 860-1861 130 
 
 Buchanan's Policy from November i860 to January 1, 1861 — 
 Cabinet Ministers and Councils — Preparing the Message — The 
 Message, an Analysis in the Light of the Past, Present, and Future 
 — The Question of Fort Sumter — Floyd and Buchanan — The Posi- 
 tion of the Government Legally Incorrect — The role of Major 
 Anderson and its Effect on the Administration — The Critical Days 
 of December and their Effect on the President's Course. 
 
 Chapter V. The Passing of an Era 173 
 
 Preparation of the Message of January 8th — The Changed Con- 
 ditions and the President's Policy — The Message and Its Effect — 
 Evidences of the Continued Adherence of Buchanan to his Earlier 
 Views — The Peace Conference, its Effect on the President's Policy, 
 its Course, Cause of Failure — Separation of Buchanan from the 
 South, its Cause and Degree — The Inauguration of Lincoln — 
 Buchanan's Return to Wheatland — Policy of the New Adminis- 
 tration — Buchanan's Position During the War. 
 
 Chapter VI. Some Salient Points and Conclusions 190 
 
 Some Salient Points and Conclusions — Buchanan's Policy a Suc- 
 cess — His Characteristics — Economic Interests — Two Vital Factors 
 of Conduct, Political Ideals and Religious Convictions — The 
 Theory of Natural Rights — The Machinery of Union — State Rights 
 in 1867 — The Federal Compact, the True Basis of the Union as 
 Instituted by the Founders — Buchanan's Religious Nature and 
 Its Inevitable Influence on His Policy — The Other Course Psy- 
 chologically Possible — Observations on the Civil War — A Tribute 
 and an Appeal. 
 
 Bibliography : 
 
 A. Unpublished Manuscript Collections 202 
 
 B. Published Personalia 202 
 
 C. Periodicals 203 
 
 D. Pamphlets 204 
 
 E. General Works, Biographies, and Reminiscences. . . . 205 
 
 F. Official and Miscellaneous 209 
 
TABLE OF PRINCIPAL ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 Moore: " Works of James Buchanan," edited by J. B. Moore, 12 
 
 vols., Lippincott, 1908, 1912. 
 Buchanan : " Buchanan's Administration on the Eve of the Re- 
 bellion," James Buchanan, Lippincott, 1866. 
 Curtis : " Life of James Buchanan," George T. Curtis, Harper & 
 
 Brothers, 1883. 
 A. H. A. : American Historical Association Reports. 
 A. H. R. : American Historical Review. 
 Covode: House Reports, 36th Congress, 1st Session, No. 648. 
 
 The report on the Covode Investigation. 
 Horton : " Life of James Buchanan," R. G. Horton, Derby & 
 
 Jackson, 1850. 
 H. S. P. : Manuscripts of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 
 
 at Philadelphia. 
 L. C. : Manuscripts from the Library of Congress, Washington, 
 
 D. C. 
 Irelan : " Our Presidents and Their Administrations," Vol. XV, 
 
 John Robert Irelan, Fairbanks and Palmer, Chicago, 1888. 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
 James Buchanan, His Work and His Times 
 
 Scope of the Study — The Difficulties in Understanding the Middle 
 Period — Writers of History — Back to Yesterday Afternoon — Hos- 
 tile Critics of Buchanan — Influences of Buchanan's Childhood ; Col- 
 lege Days; Studies — Buchanan as a Lawyer — Defending Judge 
 Franklin — Practice — Thrift and Integrity — The 25th Section of the 
 Judiciary Act Saved — Buchanan and the Supreme Court — Buchanan 
 as a Political Leader — His Motives for Entering that Field — The 
 Issues in Pennsylvania — Reasons for Buchanan's Nomination to the 
 Presidency — Why he Accepted the Nomination — The Matter of the 
 Patronage — Buchanan as a Diplomat — The Russian Mission — Anglo- 
 American Relations — Buchanan's Far Eastern Policy — Judge 
 Moore's Estimate — Buchanan and Franklin — Affairs in Mexico — 
 Buchanan and the Alaskan Purchase — Buchanan as a Public Speaker 
 — The Presidency — The Slavery Issue — Buchanan on Abolition — 
 Slavery in 1850 — Buchanan, State Rights and Southern Rights. 
 
 The scope of this study will be to set forth the history of Presi- 
 dent Buchanan and his Cabinet from the election of i860 to the 
 close of the Administration. It has been prefaced by two chap- 
 ters. The first will recapitulate some of the phases of Buchanan's 
 long career in public service. The second will deal with some 
 aspects of the Kansas Question. 
 
 To appreciate the psychology of the elder statesmen of Middle 
 Period, a reader must project himself into an era far different 
 from that of the present time. The task is not easy. In those 
 days, before the ideas of nationalism were dominant, Presidents 
 spoke of the Union as a confederacy. 1 The marks of a frontier 
 
 1 James D. Richardson, Editor, " Messages and Papers of the Presidents," 
 Washington, 1908; for Jackson, Vol. II, p. 437; Harrison, Vol. IV, p. 16; 
 Polk, ibid., p. 635 ; for Tyler, John A. Wise, " Seven Decades of Union," 
 Philadelphia, 1881, p. 251; for Buchanan, Curtis, Vol. II, 175. 
 
 Note: The term "Border State men" is used in this work to designate 
 statesmen coming from the states on Mason-Dixon line who favored com- 
 promise and moderation. Men from the Gulf States on the one hand, and 
 from the New England and New England colonized regions on the other, 
 
 1 
 
2 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 civilization still lingered even in some of the older states, not to 
 mention the " New West." States Rights and Strict Construction 
 were the creed of the leading party. The ideas of State Sover- 
 eignty and, if the need arose, of Secession, were publicly avowed 
 by many of the Senatorial Nestors at Washington. 
 
 For our day the men who fought the War between the States 
 are not the lines of the Blue and the Gray of the 6o's. Instead 
 they are a staff of arm-chair Generals of History Departments, 
 who, for the most part, have taken up their pens for the winning 
 side. The present public under the gentle guidance of these 
 valiant men will finally reach the point where they will marvel 
 that there was another side of the question. The defeated parties 
 in civil conflicts are twice unfortunate, once on the field of arms, 
 and again in the matter of bards, for few minstrels love to sing 
 of defeats. As a result few remember their valor or their ideals. 
 
 Consequently few readers have any interest in an old and honest 
 public servant who served a cause more forgotten than the " Lost 
 Cause " itself. Little wonder that he has been painted in un- 
 seemly colors by Northern writers favoring ideas to which he ac- 
 corded a sincere and unceasing opposition. The South likewise, 
 in its anxiety to place its own cause before the world, had often 
 forgotten the men of the border states, or men who held border 
 state ideas. 
 
 In order to understand the situation, we must get away from 
 present-day industrialized and capitalized nationalism, which 
 seems very much in vogue, and go back to the yesterday at sunset, 
 or, perhaps to the yesterday afternoon of our history in which 
 Buchanan's career was largely spent. We must certainly forget 
 the hosts of ideas of such historians as Hay, la Rhodes, 2 and Hart 3 
 together with their political offspring, the late Henry Cabot 
 
 were often more extreme in the views they held. The terms South and 
 North as now used more accurately apply to these more extreme groups. 
 
 la John George Nicolay and John Hay, " Life of Abraham Lincoln," New 
 York, 1886. 
 
 2 James Ford Rhodes, " History of the United States," New York, 1895. 
 
 3 Albert Bushnell Hart in the New York State Teacher's Association 
 Magazine, March, 191 5, p. 51. 
 
 David Saville Muzzey, " The United States of America," New York, 1921, 
 Vol. I, pp. 525, 526. 
 
HIS WORK AND HIS TIMES 3 
 
 Lodge. 4 The last mentioned individual once delivered a tirade 
 against Buchanan which was far more a tribute to his literary 
 powers than his historical judgment. The speech of another no 
 less loyal Republican, Joseph Cannon, 5 was a most excellent con- 
 trast to the florid and biased partisanship so much in evidence in 
 the utterances of the Massachusetts Senator. 
 
 Let us return to our sketch of the man who has been hailed by 
 some as the Arnold of the sixties, or by others, hardly less criti- 
 cal, as the champion putty-ball of the White House. The myths 
 of the last charge are scarcely less absurd than those of the first. 
 Messrs. Nicolay and Hay insinuated that all Buchanan ever re- 
 ceived was due to political senority, and that he was actually a 
 huge mass of inability. Now the term ability is very vague. No 
 doubt Buchanan had his limitations, but even the Lincoln cult will 
 at times admit some slight flaw in their own idol. Let the cold 
 facts of Buchanan's rise to political power tell their story. 
 
 To those who believe that early childhood determines the man, 
 the following facts will be of interest. Buchanan's father was 
 an able and upright business man of the Pennsylvania frontier. 
 It was he who discovered the fact that the people of Lancaster 
 were rich and prone to go to law. 6 There it was that his son 
 James studied law at a time when the bar of that county had the 
 reputation second to none in the state save Philadelphia, and when 
 Pennsylvania was said to have the smartest lawyers in the land. 7 
 
 The mother of the Buchanan family, Elizabeth Speer Buchanan, 
 had even greater influence in molding the character of the future 
 President. He records that she was always encouraging her sons 
 to match wits with each other to the end that they might make 
 their mark in the world. 8 The parents gave their children the 
 
 4 Congressional Record, Vol. 56, part 8, pp. 7877-7888. A bitter partisan 
 attack of garbled statements made from suppressed evidence. For a better 
 account see Rufus Hardy of Texas, Cong. Rec, Vol. 56, part 12, pp. 430- 
 34- 
 
 5 For this able and excellent speech see Cong. Rec, Vol. 56, part 2, p. 
 2090. 
 
 G John Robert Irelan, " Our Presidents and Their Administrations," Chi- 
 cago, 1888, Vol. XV, p. 20. 
 
 7 William Uhler Hensel, " James Buchanan as a Lawyer," Lancaster, Pa., 
 1911, p. 5- 
 
 8 Curtis, Vol. I, pp. 2, 3. 
 
4 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 best education that the region afforded. Pious instruction of the 
 Presbyterian variety formed part of the parental exhortations 
 with the result that Buchanan developed a strong strain of devo- 
 tion not untinged with fatalism. 9 A younger brother, Edward Y. 
 Buchanan, became the pastor of a large Episcopal church at 
 Philadelphia. Two other brothers were locally prominent but 
 died before middle life. Thus all the family were successful 
 after the current material and moral standards of the time. 
 
 Some might believe from the fact that Buchanan was once ex- 
 pelled from Dickinson College that he was, in youth, wild and 
 irresponsible. 10 Such was not the case. He once wrote that he 
 was not inclined to be wild or dissipated, but that one had to be 
 so considered in order to be a leader. Therefore he attempted to 
 meet the requirements and did. In short, his mother's teaching 
 had had a marked effect although not quite in the desired manner. 
 He had evidently determined to take a leading role wherever he 
 found himself. This ambition, curbed by religious training, led 
 him to seek to be highly respectable rather than notorious. Lan- 
 caster can boast no more model citizen u than the " Sage of 
 Wheatland." 
 
 Ambition is not the sole key to success even as the world meas- 
 ures it. One must also have some good fortune, force of char- 
 acter, or intellectual talent coupled with adaptability. The intel- 
 lectual make-up of Buchanan had become evident at college, and 
 pointed the way to theology, law, or political science had the voca- 
 tional advisers been present to make their contribution. Curtis 
 noted that Buchanan's student notes indicated a fondness for 
 logic and metaphysics. 12 People with shallow minds do not care 
 for such subjects. The practical side of his nature, abetted by 
 his father's interest, turned these talents in the direction of law. 
 He would have graduated with honors had not the spite of the 
 faculty withheld them. 13 Although not of a vindictive nature, 
 
 9 See William Uhler Hensel, " The Religious Character and Convictions 
 of James Buchanan," Lancaster, 191 1, esp. pp. 26-30, 33. 
 
 10 Curtis, Vol. I, pp. 4, 5. 
 
 11 Horton, pp. 282, 283. 
 
 12 Curtis, Vol. I, p. 6. 
 
 13 Curtis, ibid., p. 5. 
 
HIS WORK AND HIS TIMES 5 
 
 Buchanan perhaps remembered their attitude when he refused a 
 request for an endowment after the Civil War. 
 
 Buchanan's career as a lawyer or, more properly, as a legalist 
 was a brilliant one. In that field he gave many proofs of his 
 great intellect, yet it has been quickly passed over by his biog- 
 raphers because it is less dramatic than the period of his political 
 activities. According to a local historian we find, " During the 
 tide of his practise his name occurs oftener in the Reports of the 
 State than that of any lawyer of his time." 14 " His most notable 
 case as a country lawyer was his successful defense of Judge 
 Franklin before the Senate of Pennsylvania when he was only 
 twenty-five years of age. 15 ..." His reputation became state- 
 wide, and business came in like a flood. At the age of forty he 
 was able to retire from practice to choose the more exciting, but 
 less lucrative, field of politics. He was averse to advising per- 
 sons to go into politics before they had enough to live on. While 
 he was thrifty enough to collect every cent of his official salary, 
 he paid many of the bills of the White House from his own 
 purse. 16 Perhaps the most notable item of this kind was the one 
 for the reception for the Prince of Wales, later Edward VII, 
 when he visited this country in i860. Despite the most despicable 
 efforts of the partisan Covode Committee, instigated to ruin his 
 reputation, nothing could be found to question his integrity. 17 
 The same statements could not apply to portions of his party, but 
 the methods of Seward, Weed, and the later Grant Administra- 
 tion offered no inspiring contrast to any actions of the Ante- 
 Bellum Democracy. 
 
 As a member of the House Judiciary Committee, he has left a 
 record which unquestionably places him among the ablest legal 
 minds of the country. His conduct of the famous Peck Impeach- 
 ment Trial brought him into early prominence. The fact that he 
 lost the case by only one vote (22 to 21) did not lessen the im- 
 pression which he made. Judge Black, himself one of America's 
 
 14 Alexander Harris, " Biographical History of Lancaster County," Lan- 
 caster, 1872, pp. 92, 93. 
 
 15 William U. Hensel, " James Buchanan as a Lawyer," p. 8. 
 
 16 Curtis, Vol. II, p. 230 note. 
 
 17 Covode Investigation in House Reports, 36th Congress, 1st Session, No. 
 648. See Minority Report; also Curtis, Vol. II, Chap. XII. 
 
 2 
 
6 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 most famous constitutional lawyers, held his argument, " as the 
 greatest legal argument ever made upon the power of a court to 
 punish for contempt, the point upon which the case turned. 
 . . . " 18 The Senate changed the technicalities in the law that 
 were responsible for the acquittal so that no judge ever com- 
 mitted a similar offense. 19 
 
 The glory of Buchanan's legal career was his Minority Report 
 which saved the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act. This 
 was the section which Marshall had used to invalidate State laws 
 which he held unconstitutional. Charles Warren in his work on 
 the Supreme Court has held it as " one of the great and signal 
 documents in the history of American Constitutional Law. 
 ..." 19a Those who are of the Calhoun Democracy of course do 
 not hold that it was the best course to take. Contrary to the 
 common view, Buchanan was not at all inconsistent in this posi- 
 tion. All through his career the idea of a Court purged of Fed- 
 eralism and filled with States Rights men met with his favor. 20 
 He did not hesitate, however, to find fault with Taney on a de- 
 cision which he considered too centralizing. 21 From another 
 angle one could say that his whole career was spent in trying to 
 settle great questions by arbitration of the Courts to prevent ap- 
 peals to the sword. Of all the lawyer Presidents which the 
 United States have had, none could show a more distinguished 
 record than Buchanan. 
 
 Another field of this distinguished Pennsylvanian is that of 
 political leadership. Historians, for the most part, know too 
 little of the world outside of their studies. An exception, per- 
 haps, was President Wilson, who had he been more of a poli- 
 tician and less of a teacher, might have had better fortune with 
 his Peace Treaty. If historians had more experience with the 
 world, they would see that the business of being a political leader 
 requires intellectual acumen in considerable degree. The knack 
 of being prominent in public life for over forty years, twenty of 
 
 18 Philadelphia Press, March 16, 1882. 
 
 19 Alexander Harris, " Biographical History of Lancaster County," p. 97. 
 19a Charles Warren, " The Supreme Court in United States History," 
 
 Boston, 1922, Vol. II, p. 199. 
 
 20 Moore, Vol. VIII, p. 420. 
 
 21 Warren, ibid., Vol. II, p. 340. 
 
HIS WORK AND HIS TIMES 7 
 
 which were spent as the chief director of the Democratic machine 
 in a state teeming with politicians, including such men as Simon 
 Cameron and Thad. Stevens, was no child's play. True, Bu- 
 chanan never came forward with new ideas in the Halls of Con- 
 gress, but his constructive abilities were put to the directing of 
 his political machine instead. His marked social gifts were a 
 great asset in the political game he loved so well. 
 
 Buchanan had early tasted of the sweets of politics but had 
 decided to withdraw and devote his attention to his profession. 
 The tragic death of his betrothed drove him to find consolation 
 in a renewed participation in public affairs. 22 Beginning as an 
 insurgent against the Duanes and the Dallases, 23 his ability was 
 forced upon the attention of Jackson and his men. Buchanan 
 was never treated fairly by either Jackson or Polk. He gave 
 them honest service but they were at times suspicious of him. 
 In Jackson's case this was spasmodic, and due to the hostile in- 
 trigues of the Blairs. 24 Blaine 25 has well said that Polk was in- 
 capable of judging Buchanan fairly, and Polk's diary, 26 probably 
 written for publication, shows that Secretary Buchanan was by 
 far his intellectual superior. Buchanan, on the other hand, al- 
 ways defended Polk's Administration 27 even when he had dis- 
 agreed with Polk. He greatly respected Mrs. Polk, and it was 
 suggested by Cave Johnson, 28 in 1851, that he marry the widow 
 of the late President. At an earlier time, in writing to Mrs. 
 Catron, a mutual friend, Buchanan had remarked that he might 
 marry someone who would take care of him as he was no longer 
 of romantic mood. That type of love had been cruelly blasted 
 in his youth and lay buried in the grave with the beautiful Miss 
 Coleman. The light and comfort of Buchanan's later years was 
 
 22 Curtis, Vol. I, 18, 19, 22. 
 
 23 E.g., Justin Harvey Smith, " The War with Mexico," Chicago, 1910, p. 
 282. 
 
 24 For indications of feuds with the Blairs, see Moore, Vol. XI, pp. 408, 
 4I3-I5. 
 
 25 James G. Blaine, " Twenty Years of Congress," Norwich, Conn., 1886, 
 Vol. I, pp. 57-59- 
 
 26 E.g., Milo M. Quaife, ed., " Diary of James K. Polk," Chicago, 1910, 
 Vol. Ill, pp. 402-404. 
 
 27 E.g., Curtis, Vol. II, p. 72. 
 
 28 Roy Franklin Nichols, " The Democratic Machine, 1850-54," p. 77. 
 
8 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 his beautiful and accomplished niece, Harriet Lane, whom he had 
 brought up from childhood, and who was his Lady of the Land. 
 
 Buchanan's rise to the Presidency was no dark horse affair. 
 It was a fitting tribute to his political skill as a leader. By 1856 
 he was the man who could best obtain the vote of the Keystone 
 State. With the tide of abolition rising and the possibility of a 
 " Brother's War " increasing, the conservatives looked to him as 
 a possible means of averting the calamity of disunion. 
 
 Pennsylvania, because of its need of a protective tariff, was an 
 unruly member of the Democracy. Buchanan had compromised 
 with the demands of the manufacturers by a middle-of-the road 
 policy for over twenty years. According to Stephens Buchanan 
 saw by i860, that it was impossible and so came out for protec- 
 tion. The question naturally arises as to what would have hap- 
 pened to the party in the state had the Slavery issue not broken 
 the Union at that juncture. Alexander K. McClure, 30 a Republi- 
 can politician of note, frankly said that it was the tariff that 
 carried the state for the Republicans in i860. The victory was 
 aided by the Douglas followers, who left nothing undone to secure 
 the defeat of the Democratic Party in Pennsylvania. 
 
 It is an error to believe that Buchanan's absence from the coun- 
 try during the Kansas-Nebraska agitation was the main factor in 
 nominating him for the Presidency. Neither did Southern men 
 need an Ostend Manifesto to become acquainted with the candi- 
 date from Pennsylvania. Buchanan had protested against the 
 meeting to Pierce. 31 It was more important that Buchanan was 
 the intimate friend of John Slidell, 32 the political leader of the 
 Southwest, and of Henry A. Wise, 33 the able but erratic Governor 
 of Virginia. The latter saw that Buchanan was the only man 
 
 29 Myrta Lockett Avary, " Recollections of Alexander H. Stephens," New 
 York, 1910, pp. 40, 41. 
 
 30 Alexander Kelly McClure, " Lincoln and Men of War Times," Phila- 
 delphia, 1892, pp. 149, 150. 
 
 31 Moore, Vol. IX, pp. 251, 288-9. 
 
 32 Louis M. Sears, "Buchanan and Slidell," A. H. R., Vol. 27 (July, 
 1922). This material may also be found in Professor Sears' "John Sli- 
 dell," Durham, N. C, 1926. 
 
 33 Lyon Gardner Tyler, " Letters and Times of the Tylers," Richmond, 
 Va., 1884, Vol. II, p. 527. 
 
HIS WORK AND HIS TIMES 9 
 
 who, because of his machine, could put Pennsylvania in the Demo- 
 cratic column. This was the main factor that nominated Bu- 
 chanan in 1856. Had Buchanan possessed the little skill usually 
 attributed to him by the average text-book writer, he would never 
 have been mentioned for the nomination. His old rival Dallas 
 was still available, and might have been chosen. Buchanan had 
 by 1856 lost most of his hankering for Presidential honors. He 
 and Slidell scented trouble 34 in the wind, and this together with 
 his increasing years, made him hesitate. 35 
 
 Finally he decided to run for a number of reasons. The role 
 of Henry Clay appealed to him. 36 At heart he was a gentleman 
 and a patriot who desired to bring peace to an agitated country. 
 This was more than could be said of some of his opponents. He 
 felt obligated to his friends who had long supported his candidacy. 
 The idea of abdicating the control of the Pennsylvania Democracy 
 did not appeal to the old leader who had enjoyed forty years of 
 political power. 
 
 The patronage was no small cause of the main difficulties of 
 the Buchanan machine in Pennsylvania. Twelve years of hope 
 had created a greater demand than supply, and there were not 
 enough places in the president's gift to satisfy his followers. 
 Buchanan was too strong to be killed, as Harrison had been, but 
 he found plenty to worry about in the matter of appointments. 37 
 
 34 Louis M. Sears, ibid., A. H. R., Vol. 27, p. 723. 
 
 35 " I can now leave public life with credit. Should I become President 
 the case might become very different, after I shall have worn myself out 
 with the toil and anxiety of the office. Still I do not believe that the next 
 President, should he really be the man for the place, would encounter in- 
 superable difficulties. Unchangeable firmness tempered by prudent discre- 
 tion would, I think, in a great degree put down the slavery agitation. The 
 question has been settled by Congress, and this settlement should be in- 
 flexibly maintained." Buchanan to Harriet Lane, December 28, 1855, Moore, 
 Vol. IX, p. 486. 
 
 36 Horton, p. 426. 
 
 37 " . . . The number of applicants for office in Pennsylvania has been 
 very great and most of these have been worthy and excellent men to whom 
 I am under political obligations. Under these circumstances, the appoint- 
 ment of one is the disappointment of many; and although I have nominated 
 such a number of Pennsylvanians to the Senate as to have produced at last 
 a titter throughout the Body when such nominations were read, yet this 
 
10 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 The South had saved the party, or rather had shown where the 
 party was located on election day, 38 and therefore was left secure 
 in its holdings. Buchanan had a nice way of saying " no," but 
 it was difficult for him to refuse old friends whose abilities en- 
 titled them to consideration. 39 
 
 The Pennsylvania Democracy carried the state in 1856, but 
 with great effort against the Cameron-Fremont coalition. Ma- 
 chine organization told, and so Buchanan was at the pinnacle of 
 his fame when, with a troubled heart, he boarded a train for 
 Washington in the spring of 1857. The man whom Letcher of 
 Virginia had hailed as the cleverest leader of the Democratic 
 party not excepting VanBuren had come into his own. 40 
 
 Another phase of Buchanan's career which merits attention is 
 in the field of foreign relations. Professor Fish, 41 who takes a 
 fling at his Presidential policy, concedes his dialectic skill in 
 diplomatic matters. Sent to St. Petersburg because he was too 
 clever for Jackson, he secured a commercial treaty which had 
 eluded the grasp of American ministers for twenty years. Bu- 
 chanan the bland succeeded where Adams and others had failed. 
 His frank yet affable manner won the favor of the Czar who 
 found in him an agreeable cantrast to the evasive European 
 diplomats. His successor William Wilkins of Pennsylvania de- 
 clared that he had left nothing for him (Wilkins) to do. 42 The 
 final judgment was supplied by the late Andrew D. White, a Re- 
 publican as early as 1856. He studied Buchanan's papers at St. 
 Petersburg ; met Buchanan in London ; and formed a very favor- 
 perhaps only increased the number of disappointed. ..." Buchanan to Wil- 
 liam B. Reed, July, 1858, H. S. P., also Moore, Vol. XI. 
 
 "... The power of patronage is a source of weakness and not of strength. 
 Besides the distribution harrows up ones feelings : because so many worthy 
 applicants must be disappointed. ..." Buchanan to Campbell of Philadel- 
 phia, Nov., 1859, H. S. P. 
 
 38 A. H. A., 1916, Vol. II, p. 200. 
 
 39 See 37. 
 
 40 Ann Mary Butler Crittenden Coleman, " Life of J. J. Crittenden," 
 Philadelphia, 187 1, Vol. I, p. 195. 
 
 41 Carl Russel Fish, " History of American Diplomacy," New York, 1919, 
 p. 282. 
 
 42 From a campaign biography in L. C. 
 
HIS WORK AND HIS TIMES 11 
 
 able opinion of his ability. 43 White noted the excellent conversa- 
 tional powers of Buchanan and declared that he was one of the 
 best conversationalists 44 which he, in the course of a long and 
 eventful life, had met on either side of the Atlantic. An Ohio 
 journalist said, that Buchanan " was the most accomplished diner- 
 out in the state (Pennsylvania) not excepting Morton McMichael 
 of Philadelphia. . . . " 45 His niece realized this gift and encour- 
 aged him in it. 
 
 On the subject of Anglo-American relations, Buchanan was one 
 of the few Americans of his day who realized the influence of 
 the British Empire in world politics. While he held to the ideas 
 of American expansion in season and out, and may therefore be 
 called an imperialist, he also sought to keep on good terms with 
 England. 
 
 While in London, Buchanan enjoyed not a little social prestige, 
 which was in no small degree due to the charm of his niece Har- 
 riet Lane. 46 He made a good bargain with the British in Central 
 America which, although not conceding every point in our favor, 
 was more than the British had been disposed to grant since they 
 had won the fruits of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Dallas, Bu- 
 chanan's successor, consummated the work which he had ad- 
 vanced. Marcy and Pierce were not over pleased with the capital 
 Buchanan's friends made out of his successes. Perhaps they had 
 intended the appointment to have been his last political appear- 
 ance. By the end of Buchanan's Administration, he and Lord 
 Lyons, the British Ambassador, had ironed out most of the old 
 grudges of the two countries. 
 
 Tyler Dennet, 47 a worshipper of William H. Seward, has 
 sought to elevate his Far Eastern policy at the expense of that of 
 Buchanan. Yet in spite of his remarks, his very criticisms are 
 
 43 Andrew Dickson White, " Autobiography," New York, 1914, Vol. I, 
 PP- 72, 73- 
 
 44 Andrew Dickson White, ibid., Vol. I, p. 448. 
 
 45 Cincinnati Commercial. 
 
 46 Curtis, Vol. II, chap. VII. 
 
 47 Tyler Dennet, " Americans in Eastern Asia," New York, 1923, pp. 263, 
 264. Mr. Dennet tries to give the credit of the Townsend Mission to Fill- 
 more, yet Buchanan sustained it. It might also be added that the Japanese 
 Mission here was a success of the Buchanan Administration. 
 
12 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 in a sense compliments to Buchanan's policies there. He finds 
 fault with Buchanan, because without any use of force, he reaped 
 the same privileges in China as the French and English who made 
 two wars for the same ends. Ambassador Reed is not fairly 
 dealt with by Mr. Dennet. He was not only an able lawyer, but 
 a Professor of American History at the University of Pennsyl- 
 vania, and a journalist of note. The use of David Lawrence by 
 President Wilson is another instance of the use of able news- 
 paper men for diplomatic work. Buchanan's policy in the Far 
 East was clever and successful as diplomacy goes. In fact it was 
 too clever for Mr. Dennet's taste. It was one of the few times 
 when American diplomacy received something without a cost. 
 
 In concluding our sketch of this portion of Buchanan's career, 
 no more authoritative citation can be given than that of John 
 Bassett Moore, one of the outstanding American diplomatists 
 of the last and present century. Long familiar with Buchanan's 
 record, he published, in 1904, an account of his advanced position 
 upon the subject of American citizenship in instances where a 
 naturalized citizen returned to his homeland and had occasion to 
 claim our protection. 49 Judge Moore wrote an able article on 
 this phase of Buchanan's career and published it long before he 
 was employed by the executors of the Lane estate to edit the 
 President's papers. In the preface of that able work he has gone 
 on record as saying that diplomacy was Buchanan's special gift. 50 
 Such a statement by a master of the craft is more than enough to 
 put to rout the Republican propaganda to the contrary. 
 
 Temperamentally, Buchanan had many of the traits of the 
 astute Franklin. While the middle period required no such 
 major diplomatic service, yet Buchanan's triumphs were of much 
 the same variety. They were triumphs of personal character in 
 both instances. Professor Marion M. Miller, 51 although not well 
 informed concerning Buchanan's political activities, gives him 
 due credit for his diplomatic capacities and notes the resemblance. 
 It may be also well to add that had Congress accepted Buchanan's 
 
 49 John Bassett Moore, " The Principles of American Diplomacy," New 
 York, 1905, pp. 276, 277; 279-85. 
 
 50 Moore, Vol. I, Preface, p. 2. 
 
 51 Marion Mills Miller, "American Debate," New York, 1916; see sketch 
 on Buchanan. 
 
HIS WORK AND HIS TIMES 13 
 
 ideas 52 on the Mexican problem, there would probably have been 
 no Napoleonic episode in that region. In the question of the pur- 
 chase of Alaska, Buchanan was in advance of Seward. 53 He had 
 attempted to negotiate for the purchase of that region, but Con- 
 gress was sounded and gave forth a hopeless noise. His friend. 
 Senator Gwin of California, was also ardently in favor of the 
 purchase, but, like his chief, saw that the time was not ripe. The 
 House was in the hands of the foes of the Administration and 
 would give no funds for carrying out the purchase. Seward in 
 the popular mind has had too much credit for the idea. Even in 
 his time, and with the aid of the legislative branch, the public had 
 to be educated to the proposition. 
 
 As a public speaker, Buchanan has won more credit than he has 
 usually received. Although many portions of his speeches would 
 weary this hurried age, yet the same could be said of many of the 
 passages of Webster and Clay. If the compilers of source books 
 would select only the fine passages of Buchanan's speeches, just 
 as they have done in the case of Webster, many comparable ex- 
 amples of eloquence of a high order would come to light. Bu- 
 chanan took a leading role in most of the debates of his Con- 
 gressional career. In those speeches, the fire of eloquence is not 
 often present, as he was a man of cautious speech. His more 
 eloquent addresses are of a less political nature, a few of which 
 have come down to us. The same fervor is present in some of 
 his state papers and messages written at the close of his Ad- 
 ministration when his heart was stirred to its depths at the pros- 
 pect of a " Brother's War." For the constitutional historian, 
 Buchanan's productions have a special value, as he had the custom 
 of waiting until both sides had stated their positions in the de- 
 bate. Then he would arise and sum up both sides before stating 
 his own point of view. The high esteem in which he was held by 
 his constituents, who sent him for ten years to the House, and for 
 three terms to the Senate, is a marked proof of his capacity as an 
 able public servant. 
 
 Buchanan's Presidential career has often been held a grand 
 
 52 Curtis, Vol. II, pp. 221, 222. Howard Lafayette Wilson, " Buchanan's 
 Proposed Intervention in Mexico," A. H. R., Vol. V, pp. 187-201. 
 
 53 F. A. Golder, "The Purchase of Alaska," A. H. R., Vol. XXV, pp. 
 411-25, esp. pp. 414, 416, 417. 
 
14 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 failure. This is largely due to the point of view held by most 
 Northern writers who live after, rather than before, the victories 
 of the North of the Civil War. The list would also include cer- 
 tain fire-eating Secessionists as Pollard. 54 When one traces the 
 history of the times in which Buchanan spent his public life, and 
 traces his aims and convictions for which he strove in that period, 
 the conclusions must be greatly altered. 
 
 As a public man Buchanan never hid his attitude on the subject 
 of Southern constitutional rights. Throughout his entire career, 
 he endeavored to obtain their protection inside the Union. As 
 early as 1826, he had taken his stand, publicly, upon the subject 
 of slavery: 
 
 Permit me here, for a moment to speak upon a subject to which 
 I have never before adverted upon this floor, and to which I 
 trust I may never have occasion to advert. I mean the subject of 
 slavery. I believe it to be a great political and moral evil. I 
 thank God that my lot has been cast in a state where it does not 
 exist. But, while I entertain these opinions, I know it is an evil 
 at present without a remedy. It has been a curse entailed upon 
 us by that nation which now makes it a subject of reproach to our 
 institutions. It is, however, one of those moral evils, from which 
 it is impossible for us to escape, without the introduction of evils 
 infinitely greater. There are portions of this Union, in which, if 
 you emancipate your slaves they will become your masters. 
 There can be no middle course. Is there any man in this Union 
 who could for a moment indulge in the horrible idea of abolish- 
 ing slavery by the massacre of the high-minded, and the chivalrous 
 race of men in the South ? I trust there is not one. For my own 
 part I would, without hesitation, buckle on my knapsack, and 
 march with my friend from Massachusetts, (Mr. Everett), in 
 defense of their cause. . . . 55 
 
 Buchanan, then, was not a member of that school who believed 
 " in cutting a white man's throat to set a black man free." At 
 another time he said, 56 " This then is not a question of general 
 morality effecting the consciences of men, but it is a question of 
 constitutional law ; " and at another, " Although in Pennsylvania 
 we are all opposed to slavery in the abstract, yet we will never 
 violate the Constitutional compact which we have made with our 
 
 54 E.g., Edward A. Pollard, "The Lost Cause," New York, 1867, p. 96. 
 
 « 5 Curtis, Vol. II, p. 68. 
 
 56 Horton, p. 426. 
 
HIS WORK AND HIS TIMES 15 
 
 sister states. Their rights will be held sacred by us. Under the 
 Constitution it is their question and there let it remain." 57 
 
 Buchanan's attitude towards the Abolitionists was far more 
 charitable than they or their sons, who have aspired to the writ- 
 ing of history, have been to him. Characterizing them, he said, 
 
 The motives of many of them may have been honest, but their 
 zeal was without knowledge. The history of mankind affords 
 numerous instances of ignorant enthusiasts, the purity of whose 
 motives could not be doubted, who have spread devastation and 
 bloodshed over the face of the earth. . . , 58 
 
 This statement did not apply to that class of persons who en- 
 tered the anti-slavery party for hope of political advancement. 
 For such people the President, and especially his friend, Jeremiah 
 S. Black, had unmitigated contempt. 
 
 Buchanan hoped against expectation for the gradual extinction 
 of Slavery which he held had been indefinitely halted by the tactics 
 of Abolition. 59 He did not sympathize with that school of South- 
 ern thought which held Slavery a blessing for the negro. 
 
 His attitude of which we have been speaking was legal rather 
 than personal. He had no antipathy toward the race as was, and 
 is often in evidence in the North. He asked William Corcoran, 60 
 a famous banker of Washington, to secure a negro who had been 
 the body servant of President Polk to act in like capacity for 
 himself. In Lancaster he employed a colored barber, who paid 
 the following tribute to Buchanan's character at the time of his 
 death, " Why, sir, he didn't know what it was to give a rough 
 answer to man, woman, or child." 61 In a number of instances 
 he purchased slaves in Washington, took them into free Pennsyl- 
 vania, and allowed them to pay him, if they could, from their 
 wages. 62 
 
 During the early part of the struggle of 1850, Buchanan strongly 
 
 57 Buchanan, p. 15. 
 
 58 Moore, Vol. IV, pp. 25, 26. 
 
 59 See letter to Flinn below. Upon Texas and the extinction of slavery 
 in the border states, Sarah Wytton Maury, " The Statesmen of America," 
 London, 1847, p. 29. 
 
 60 Buchanan to William Corcoran, July 14, 1853. Corcoran Mss. L. C. 
 
 61 New York World, June II, 1868. 
 
 62 Curtis, Vol. II, p. 674. 
 
16 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 favored the retention of the Missouri line and its extension 
 through to the Pacific as the best solution of the problem. When 
 the part officially accepted other terms, he withdrew his conten- 
 tion. Writing of the Compromise of 1850 to Cave Johnson, he 
 said, " The Compromise is certainly a hard bargain for the South ; 
 but to acquiesce in it for the sake of union is the duty of every 
 patriot." 
 
 An able summary of Buchanan's ideas upon the crises and its 
 issues is contained in the following letter : 63 
 
 Wheatland 8 August 1849. 
 Dear Sir/ 
 
 I have received your favor of the 6th Instant ; and have no ad- 
 vice to give you except to promote your own interests by every 
 honorable means in your power. If the opportunity offers of be- 
 coming the publisher of a Democratic paper advancing sound 
 Democratic principles, you ought not to be prevented from em- 
 bracing it from the mere circumstance that its editor may not be 
 so friendly to me as to some other members of the party. Be- 
 sides, as publisher you would not be responsible for the Editorials. 
 
 As to my sentiments on the Slavery question, they remain un- 
 changed. I think it ought to have been settled by the adoption 
 of the Missouri Compromise. The time, however, has passed for 
 this : and the general ground of non-intervention is that which the 
 Democratic party ought now to occupy. If they should do this, 
 the question will soon settle itself & peace & harmony will be re- 
 stored to the party & the Union. It is the common ground on 
 which the North & South can unite. Both extremes, Cass on the 
 one hand & Calhoun on the other, hold that Congress have no 
 power to legislate on the question. It is true that Mr. Calhoun 
 & his followers believe that the acquisition of New Territory, 
 even though it should be free as was & is California, enables a 
 slave holder from any of the States to carry slaves into it & to 
 hold them there under the Constitution of the United States. 
 Upon this theory the question must eventually be settled by the 
 Judiciary. But will any slaves be carried there, when all coincide, 
 that the people of the territories, in their sovereign capacity, can 
 regulate this question as they please in their State constitutions 
 preparaory to their admission into the Union? The truth is that 
 so far as the North is concerned the question is a mere humbug. 
 Slavery will never exist in either California or New Mexico. 
 
 63 H. S. P. See also Moore, Vol. VIII, for letters of the period. 
 
HIS WORK AND HIS TIMES 17 
 
 Neither Congress, nor a Territorial Legislature, nor a State Legis- 
 lature will ever re-establish it in either of these Territories. 
 Every well informed man, whether North or South, knows this 
 to be a fact. The North, therefore, by the doctrine of non-inter- 
 vention have obtained all they can desire & with this they ought 
 to be content. To go further & force the Wilmont proviso or 
 any similar measure through Congress can have no other effect 
 than that of causelessly exasperating the South & disturbing the 
 harmony, if not endangering the perpetuity of the Union. It may 
 be sport for Northern Demagogues to urge such a measure ; but 
 it may, also, be death to our brethren of the South. The perpetual 
 agitation of this question excites the slaves by whom they are 
 surrounded, endangers the security of their own persons & that 
 of their families, & may finally drive them to disunion as prefer- 
 able to their present condition. Their feelings will be the more 
 deeply wounded upon the present occasion from the conscious- 
 ness that no real question exists : and that the Wilmont proviso, 
 if it should be forced upon them, will only be to gratify a party 
 or sect at the North who have made its agitation a means of ob- 
 taining political power, at the expense of all their Southern 
 brethren hold most dear. Indeed, I entertain serious fears that 
 this question, although a mere abstraction in its practical effect 
 on slavery in the Territories, may be the first of a series of meas- 
 ures which will eventually destroy the Union. Entertaining these 
 convictions, I think it would be both inexpedient & unjust to 
 establish a Democratic paper at Washington to advocate a union 
 " between the non-interventionists & non-extensionists," or, in 
 other words, between the advocates of the Baltimore platform & 
 the Buffalo platform. The two things seem to be intirely incon- 
 sistent. The one opposes any Legislation whatever on the sub- 
 ject of Slavery; whilst the other insists upon an express pro- 
 vision by law that Slavery shall never be extended. 
 
 The establishment of such a paper at Washington would neces- 
 sarily tend to exasperate the South, — to produce distinct & dan- 
 gerous geographic parties, & to endanger the Union. God forbid ! 
 that when a little forbearance & moderation on the part of the 
 North is all that is necessary, — when by this, they can in fact, 
 accomplish all they desire ; — they should notwithstanding, for the 
 sake of gratifying their feelings, honest though they be, apply a 
 torch to the grandest & most glorious edifice which has ever been 
 erected to human liberty on the face of the earth. Providence in 
 its own good time will abolish Slavery ; & this will be the sooner 
 accomplished by leaving it, without interference, where the Con- 
 stitution of the United States has left it. 
 
18 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 Thus you have my sentiments briefly of the agitiation & thus I 
 have complied with your request. 
 
 From your friend, 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 James Buchanan 
 
 William Flinn 
 Esquire, 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
 As Buchanan is admitted to have been one of the most out- 
 standing members of the State Rights school of political thought 
 even by his enemies, it is not necessary to give extensive citations 
 upon that very important subject. A few of his more note- 
 worthy utterances, of profession of that faith, will, however, be 
 noted. 
 
 The Favorite Son of Pennsylvania began public life as a Fed- 
 eralist chiefly because of the tariff interests of Pennsylvania. 
 Upon entering the political arena at Washington, he became 
 alarmed at the centralizing tendencies of Marshall and joined the 
 States Rights group. The doctrine, which characterized the 
 period, never gained a more devoted follower. Characteristic is 
 a speech in 1837 in which he boldly and manfully proclaimed him- 
 self a champion of the weaker section of the Union, saying, 
 
 I have long since taken my stand, and from it I shall not be 
 driven. I do no desire to maintain myself at home, unless I can 
 do it with regard for the rights of the South. 64 
 
 In 1 85 1 he declared, 
 
 It is the true mission of the Democracy to resist centralism and 
 the absorption of unconstitutional powers by the President and 
 Congress. The sovereignty of the states and a devotion to their 
 reserved rights can alone preserve and perpetuate our happy sys- 
 tem of Government. 65 
 
 In writing to his friend, John Y. Mason of Virginia, of his 
 Presidential prospects in 1851, he summarizes his prospects. 
 
 64 Horton, p. 145. 
 
 65 Curtis, Vol. II, p. 23. 
 
HIS WORK AND HIS TIMES 19 
 
 . . . My own prospects are not as fair as they might be. It is 
 true that the Southern and the Southwestern States would be 
 willing to go for me with as great and probably greater unaminity 
 than for any Northern man. I have been fighting their battles on 
 the Slave Question for the last fifteen years & am considered an 
 ultra in the North on this subject : & for this very reason am not 
 so strong in New York & the Eastern States, as I should other- 
 wise have been. Still they cannot say but that I have always 
 been consistent. . . , 66 
 
 He was not deceived as to his lack of popularity in New England 
 then or later. In a letter to his intimate friend Isaac Toucey, he 
 said, " I was never a favorite in New England & I presume that 
 my opinions on the Slavery Question have rendered me less so 
 than formerly. . . . " 67 
 
 Their historians, for the most part, have continued to make the 
 most of his unpopularity in their books since his death. 
 
 Buchanan's loyalty to these doctrines, State Rights and South- 
 ern Constitutional Rights, practically made him a political martyr. 
 His situation was eloquently stated by John B. Floyd after he 
 had left the Administration in 1861. 
 
 . . . Let me come again to the support in justice of what I be- 
 lieve to be that good old man. (Contemptuous laughter.) Was 
 there since God made this earth a man ever placed in so difficult 
 a position as the President of the United States was placed in? 
 Had he not been true to you? Had his administration not been 
 faithful to the South? Had it not been honest and faithful to the 
 whole Union, because it was distinctly and fearless constitutional? 
 I do not come here to censure, gentlemen, but I will say, because 
 it is due to the truth of history, that in that terrific conflict in 
 which he was engaged, he was not as well sustained by the South 
 as he deserved to be. Perhaps it was intended that this present 
 catastrophe should be precipitated upon the country. If they had 
 taken a different course this doubtless would not have come. 
 But it is not in human nature to be as true to another as to the 
 mother that gave you suck. (Laughter.) Mr. Buchanan could 
 not come to the position of the South as a son of the South 
 would. . . , 68 
 
 66 Written from Wheatland, June 5, 1851, H. S. P. 
 
 67 Buchanan to Isaac Toucey, Wheatland, Nov. 10, 1851. H. S. P. 
 
 68 New York Herald, January 17, 1861. 
 
20 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 To the principles of State Rights Buchanan remained true in 
 days that tried men souls. He did not follow the South out of 
 the Union, but he ever strove for her re-admittance with her 
 rights unimpaired. Unlike some Northern Democrats and Whigs, 
 Buchanan never bowed to the increasing popularity of Abolition- 
 ism. He remained to the end of his days a sturdy and unre- 
 tractant Democrat. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 Some Aspects of the Kansas Problem 
 
 The Scope of the Chapter — The Northern Version of the Problem — 
 The Southern View — Buchanan among the Prophets — The Kansas 
 Situation in 1857 — Governor Walker Displeases the Southern De- 
 mocracy — Walker's Political Ambitions — Walker's Acts in Kansas 
 — Walker Joins the Opposition — He Fails to Achieve His Ambi- 
 tions — An Analysis of the Lecompton Constitution in Its Relation to 
 Slavery in Kansas — Buchanan and Slavery in Kansas — Buchanan's 
 Political Ideas as Applied to the Situation — His Attitude towards 
 the Changes after 1850 — The Supreme Court and their Decision — 
 The Relation of the Decision towards the Administration Policy in 
 Kansas — Buchanan and Southern Rights — The Parties on the Is- 
 sue — Reports from the Territory — The Opposition to the Constitu- 
 tion — The Toombs Amendment — The English Bill — Douglas Re- 
 fuses the Peace Pipe — Douglas, rather than Kansas, the Cause for 
 the Divided Party — The Lull before the Storm. 
 
 The limited scope of this work cannot include a full treatment 
 of the Kansas question. In view of the epithets which have been 
 so often heaped upon the heads of the members of the Buchanan 
 Administration upon the subject, it is rather needful to discuss 
 some of the more important phases of what Greeley termed " a 
 desultory, wasteful, and no very bloody conflict." * 
 
 The story of Kansas as usually told in Northern texts of the 
 last fifty years needs no retelling. It is now canonized by virtue 
 of continued repetition. A majority of idealistic persons, victim- 
 ized by a minority of cruel slaveholders, upheld by a servile Fed- 
 eral authority, which deserted Governor Walker to fawn before 
 the demands of the South — thus the story runs. The Kansas 
 Historical Society reports are an excellent source for anti-slavery 
 ammunition upon this topic. 
 
 The people of the South came to believe that they were being 
 defrauded of their just share of the Kansas-Nebraska Territory 
 
 1 Horace Greeley, " The American Conflict," Hartford and Chicago, 1865, 
 Vol. I, p. 244. 
 
 3 21 
 
22 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 by a Yankee trick known as the Immigrant Aid Society. This 
 Society poured a stream of unnatural immigration into Kansas. 
 Its able managers shrewdly endeavored to make anti-slavery 
 fanaticism pay for itself as it went along. 
 
 The situation which faced Buchanan and the Democratic Party 
 in 1857 was not one of his desire or making. Like Saul of old, he 
 had been among the prophets, and like Cassandra, he was never 
 heeded. As early as 1850 he had expressed a fear that two kinds 
 of immigrants would make their way into the territories as a 
 result of the Compromise of that year. There 2 . . . 
 
 These opposite convictions will necessarily produce dissention & 
 strife between the parties, the one struggling to restrain the 
 Slaves, the other to emancipate them. Is there not therefore the 
 danger that the agitation which now prevails throughout the 
 States may only for a brief season be transferred to the terri- 
 tories to be brought back from thence with increased acrimony? 
 I have no doubt Slaves will be taken there for the purpose of try- 
 ing out the Question if for no other. . . . 
 
 The South had, however, appeared to be satisfied with the 
 doubtful values of the Compromise, and Buchanan had let the 
 matter drop. 
 
 The years that followed showed the repeal of the Missouri line 
 to have been an act of doubtful expediency. What was virtually 
 a small-scale civil war developed in Kansas Territory. Upon as- 
 suming the Presidency, Buchanan found a Territorial Govern- 
 ment established, functioning, and sanctioned by Congress but 
 unpopular with the anti-slavery agitators. In contrast to the first 
 governmental machinery was the so-called Topeka Government, 
 supported by the anti-slavery elements, but having no legal 
 status. 3 Few men cared to undertake the Governorship of so dis- 
 tracted a region. 
 
 At the outset of the Buchanan Administration, Robert J. 
 Walker, a one-time resident of Mississippi, but a native of Penn- 
 sylvania, reluctantly accepted the thorny task. The appointment 
 was unfortunate. For though Walker was a man of parts, hav- 
 ing made a good record as Secretary of Treasury in the days of 
 Polk, he was a man of far-reaching personal ambition, and lack- 
 
 2 Buchanan to Toucey, Wheatland, July 2, 1850. H. S. P. 
 
 3 See the reply to the Silliman letter, Curtis, Vol. II, pp. 199-201. 
 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE KANSAS PROBLEM 23 
 
 ing in patience and tact. He was supposed to keep aloof from 
 both factions in the Territory. Soon, however, Southern leaders 
 read that Walker had made some statements unfavorable to the 
 institution 4 of slavery in Kansas, and seemed to strongly favor 
 a popular vote, or ratification, on the work of the Lecompton 
 Convention. All this, they were convinced, indicated that Walker 
 was the friend of those who were trying to keep them from their 
 share of the territories. Seward 5 was convinced that Walker 
 was trying to make political capital for himself out of the Kansas 
 question. The Cabinet soon came to the same conclusion 6 and 
 voiced it to their chief. 
 
 Walker's ambitions and policies were ill-calculated to insure 
 success. He tried to control Buchanan's choice of appointments 
 in Kansas ; 7 he failed to persuade the Free State men to vote for 
 delegates for the Lecompton Convention with the result that it 
 was in hands of the pro-Slavery men. 
 
 The failure was not unnatural, due to the heated condition of 
 the public mind at the time. He meddled with the affairs of the 
 Territorial Legislature, ousting some of the members whose right 
 to sit was doubtful. The pro-Slavery members of the Conven- 
 tion held that such actions of Walker were plain usurpations of 
 executive power to aid anti-Slavery. He next questioned an in- 
 
 *E.g., Robert Toombs to W. W. Burwell, July 7, 1857, A. H. A., 1916, 
 Vol. II, p. 433. 
 
 5 " There is some room to think that our political affairs at home are to 
 undergo some new complications. Mr. Robert J. Walker and his Secretary, 
 Mr. F. P. Stanton, are uncommon men, independent, self-seeking, and quite 
 ambitious. They don't mean to play parts subordinate and ministering to 
 the ambitions of Cass, Buchanan, March, Douglas, or other aspirants as 
 their predecessors have, but to establish a power of their own. Walker sees 
 his way through the governorship of Kansas to the Senate, and through the 
 Senate to the Presidency. I am to give a private conference today at one. 
 He lets me think, if I will, that he will be content to let Kansas reverse the 
 contest in favor of freedom only stipulating gentleness, prudence and in- 
 demnity. I shall be wiser, and perhaps he, after we meet. But this, too, is 
 for your own private ear." Seward in a letter to his son just before Walker 
 left for Kansas, Frederick W. Seward, " Seward at Washington," New 
 York, 1891, Vol. II, p. 299. This shows that the South had need to watch 
 Walker. 
 
 6 See letters of Cass and Floyd in appendix. 
 
 7 Walker to Buchanan, June 28, 1857, H. S. P. 
 
24 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 junction of a Democratic judge 8 who ordered him to re-seat 
 the same members. His unpopularity with the Convention be- 
 came so marked that he lost every vestige of influence he had with 
 them, and left the Territory. 9 Through such tactless conduct, all 
 the influence of the Administration was lost where it was most 
 needed. Buchanan 10 had hoped that Walker would get the Con- 
 vention to send the entire Constitution back to the voters, but 
 Walker had failed, and instead of retiring gracefully, proceeded 
 to blame the Administration, or its friends, for his lack of suc- 
 cess, and to further his own interests X1 with its opponents. 
 
 8 Judge Cato, see Sen. Ex. Doc., 35 Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. I, no. 8. 
 
 9 Covode, p. 162. 
 
 10 Covode, pp. 116, 117. 
 
 11 Walker realized that his step in throwing out returns of the legislature 
 had been one of very doubtful authority. Nevertheless he was persuaded 
 by George W. Brown (and perhaps others), a Free Soil Democrat from 
 Pennsylvania, and editor of the " Herald of Freedom," that in case he did 
 not throw out those returns a civil war supported by the Republican party 
 in the North would immediately result. Brown later claimed that he did 
 not believe all he told Walker. The Governor evidently believed that there 
 was no way for his ambitions left but to join the conservative wing of the 
 Anti-Slavery party. Furthermore he did not intend to lose anything by 
 this venture. On this occasion he said to Brown : "... And, Mr. Brown, 
 I am frank to say that I have political aspirations of my own, after Kansas 
 is admitted into the Union. My people in the South have gone back on me, 
 and my future hope of position rests with the people of Kansas. Will you 
 aid me in your paper ? " 
 
 " When we are admitted a State under other than the proposed Lecompton 
 Constitution, if there is any place in the government you wish, from the 
 United States Senator down, if I can aid you to it, it is yours." 
 
 Walker dictated an editorial, supposed to have come from a third party, 
 for the Herald, calling him, the Governor, to throw out the bogus returns. 
 Shortly afterwards, accompanied by Stanton, he inspected the districts. 
 Stanton was psychologically a Free-state convert, as he had resolved to 
 settle among them. He seemed to care little for the legalities of the situa- 
 tion. Seward's remarks had proved correct. (George W. Brown, " Remi- 
 niscences of Robert J. Walker," Rockford, Illinois, 1902. See also by the 
 same author, " False Claims of Kansas Historians Truthfully Corrected," 
 Rockford, 1902.) Mr. Brown ably presents the case for the pacific wing of 
 the Anti-slavery group. He was not correctly informed of the state of 
 things at Washington nor does he say much of the Fort Scott troubles in 
 his account of Walker. He shows that certain press agents thrived in 
 making trouble by abetting the radical Anti-slavery element. This would 
 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE KANSAS PROBLEM 25 
 
 Walker was not asked to resign. It was suggested to Buchanan 
 that he be transferred. 12 His resignation was a political docu- 
 ment 13 against the Administration because it had refused to ac- 
 cept his advice, and force a popular ratification on the Lecompton 
 Constitution. Cass, 14 in reply, gave the Governor a well-merited 
 rebuke. Walker's successor, his Secretary Stanton (not Edwin 
 M. Stanton), was of like mind, and, in defiance of instructions 
 from Washington, convened the Territorial Legislature before it 
 was due. For this affrontery he was removed. 
 
 After their break with the Administration, Walker and Stanton 
 gloried in the " martyrdom " ( ?) before appreciative audiences. 15 
 Having reached Washington, Walker accused the Cabinet of plot- 
 ting against him. 16 All such accusations were in error, although 
 he was not popular with that body. 17 Buchanan even took pains 
 to invite him to the White House, 18 but such courtesy did not 
 prevent Walker from trying to injure him in the Covode Investi- 
 gation. 
 
 It was only human for Walker to have political ambitions. He 
 stood for himself first and the Administration afterwards. It is 
 one of the absurdities of history to consider him a victim of the 
 Administration, when he was the victim of his own dreams of a 
 grand role. The Administration's attitude was quite the opposite 
 to the impression he tried to create. Walker's checkered policy 
 was futile. He was not greatly elevated by his new allies. It 
 
 in turn indicate that the files of the Abolition newspapers of the time would 
 not be very accurate history, e.g., ibid., p. 157. 
 
 12 E.g., Frances Pickens to Buchanan, White Sulphur Springs, Va., Au- 
 gust 5, 1857, H. S. P. 
 
 13 > 14 See Sen. Ex. Doc. 35 Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. I, no. 8, p. 132 seq. 
 
 15 For a typical speech by Walker, see Hartford Weekly Courant, March 
 21 and 28, i860. 
 
 16 E.g., Covode, p. 1 14. Douglas asserted that there was a Cabinet plot 
 to ruin him (Douglas), Horace White, "Life of Lyman Trumbul," Boston, 
 1913, p. 74- 
 
 17 E.g., Cobb, A. H. A., 191 1, Vol. II, p. 427; Thompson has shown to 
 have favored complete submission, or if that failed partial submission. On 
 a letter from Wise to Buchanan charging him with a plot, he wrote that 
 it was a lie. See Wise-Buchanan with Thompson's notes, Dec. 17, 1857, 
 H. S. P. See Appendix. 
 
 18 Moore, Vol. X, p. 321 ; Covode, p. 114. 
 
26 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 would perhaps be possible for a biographer to build much of the 
 history of Kansas in 1857 around the fires of his unrealized hopes. 
 In 1876 he died, his greater ambitions still unfulfilled. 
 
 Much ado has been made by foes of the Buchanan Administra- 
 tion over the fact that the Lecompton Constitution was not en- 
 tirely referred to the voters before it was presented to Congress 
 by the President and his party. There has also been the cry of 
 trickery over the material that was submitted to the voters. The 
 voters had been given the privilege of voting for the Constitution 
 with or without slavery. If they voted the latter, the remaining 
 parts of the Constitution protected the existing slave property al- 
 ready in Kansas and amendment of the said portion was pro- 
 hibited for some years. All such language was after all vain 
 talk, and verbiage in view of the actual situation. Still it was 
 enough to keep or to give an excuse for keeping the Free State 
 vote away from the polls, and to send the Constitution with 
 slavery to Washington. It also gave the foes of the Administra- 
 tion the opportunity to raise a campaign cry of trickery in Kansas. 
 
 Buchanan's reasons for trying to rush Kansas into statehood 
 by means of the Lecompton Constitution were political for the 
 most part, but he had good legal reasons for his course as well. 
 " The Constitution was republican in form, and it had been voted 
 on in a free and open ballot, which the Convention had directed 
 to be taken on the all important question of slavery." 18a Gradual 
 abolition would have resulted had the people voted for the Con- 
 stitution " without Slavery." 19 Such a plan had once satisfied 
 the commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 
 
 The Organic Act did not require the submission of any of the 
 work of the Convention to the voters. 20 True, the North had 
 generally done so for sometime in the case of state constitutions, 
 but the South had frequently held such proceedings unnecessary. 
 Even in Northern states, earlier precedents of the same nature 
 could be found. 21 
 
 18a Curtis, Vol. II, p. 206. 
 
 19 Wilson Leverett Spring, " Kansas," Boston, 1892, p. 223. 
 
 20 Curtis, Vol. II, p. 201. 
 
 21 Edward Mayes, " Life of Lucius Quintus Cassius Lamar," Nashville, 
 Tenn., 1896, p. 68 note. 
 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE KANSAS PROBLEM 27 
 
 It must have been plain to the intelligent enemies of the Ad- 
 ministration that they were making " much ado about nothing," 
 or else casting dust in the eyes of their followers. Most of the 
 Southern leaders in Congress openly said that Kansas would 
 never become a slave state. 22 Once Kansas was invested with the 
 rights of a sovereign statehood, the Federal Government could 
 no more concern itself with its domestic institutions such as the 
 property of its slaveholders. Federal troops and officials would 
 leave the region. The people of Kansas could do whatever they 
 pleased with their own affairs. The Bill of Rights of the Le- 
 compton Constitution declared that the people could alter or 
 abolish their form of government. Whatever distasteful pro- 
 visions on the subject of slavery the Constitution might contain, 
 they were completely at the mercy of their sovereign will. No 
 fetters could be placed upon the powers of the people of Kansas 
 acting in a sovereign capacity. 2241 Buchanan indicated all these 
 things 23 clearly, but the Republicans were determined that their 
 pet issue should not be thus easily laid at rest. Black expressed 
 the sentiments of most Democrats when he wrathfully alluded to 
 the matter as " the knavish trick of the abolitionists in prevent- 
 ing a vote on slavery, by which it would have been expelled from 
 Kansas, and the whole trouble settled in the way they pretended 
 to wish." 24 
 
 To the loyal Democrats of the time, much of the Congressional 
 opposition came not from pious ignorance or bigoted fanaticism, 
 but from the most cynical and sinister hyprocrisy. Better that 
 the Kansas issue be kept alive to bleed, than that the Republican 
 party perish from lack of nourishment. Better still, the Ad- 
 ministration might be badly injured by the continued bleeding. 
 
 Instead of censuring the President for trying to make a state 
 of Kansas, by means of the Lecompton Constitution, for the sake 
 
 22 E.g., see Crump letter in appendix. 
 
 22a The State of New York was then, " governed under a constitution 
 framed and established in direct opposition to the mode prescribed by the 
 previous constitution." J. Buchanan Henry, editor, " The Messages of 
 President Buchanan," New York, 1888, p. 189. 
 
 23 For Buchanan's Messages see Moore, Vol. X, pp. 179-192. 
 
 24 Chauncy F. Black, " Essays and Speeches of Jeremiah S. Black," New 
 York, 1885, p. 273. 
 
28 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 of peace in the Union, it would be more just to blame the Free 
 State voters of Kansas, who, by staying from the election of 
 delegates to the Lecompton Convention, gave the Lecompton 
 Constitution a chance to come into existence. 
 
 It might also be mentioned, that Buchanan had in his posses- 
 sion reports of atrocities by Anti-slavery persons which rivalled 
 those gruesome accounts, so carefully preserved to us in texts, 
 by Anti-slavery historians. 25 Some of the protests were written, 
 not by Southern partisans, but by a Pennsylvania Democrat, 
 whom Buchanan had made a Federal judge in the Territory. 
 To charge Buchanan with desiring to see the institution of 
 Slavery established in Kansas Territory, would be to allow the 
 emotions to usurp the realm of one's historical judgment. It has 
 already been shown that he was, at first, opposed to the repeal of 
 the Missouri line, and that he hoped for the gradual extinction 26 
 of slavery which he had publicly held to be a social misfortune. 27 
 The remarks of Buchanan's friend, Judge Catron, cast further 
 light upon this phase of the subject : 
 
 No, there was no expectation, and, I do not believe, desire, on 
 the part of the present administration, to make it a slave state, 
 but as he (Buchanan) had already been pestered to death with it, 
 he resolved to make it a state as soon as possible, and thus be rid 
 of it, let them fight it out as they liked. In this mood the South- 
 ern members found him when the news came of the Lecompton 
 Constitution being framed, and he committed, thinking no doubt 
 that Douglas would be hot for it, and that there would be no gen- 
 eral opposition in his own party to it. 28 
 
 It is also pertinent that Buchanan gladly supported 29 Governor 
 Denver, Stanton's successor, although Denver was no friend of 
 slavery, and continued many of the policies of Walker. Denver 30 
 had tact, and was not trying to make a political record. He was 
 respected by the people, and left conditions far better than he 
 
 25 See the appendix for a letter of Judge Williams to Attorney General 
 giving a detailed account of some Lane outrages in the Territory. 
 
 26 E.g., see letter to Flinn above. 
 
 27 Buchanan, Introduction, p. I. 
 
 28 Horace White, " Life of Lyman Trumbul," Boston, 1913, pp. 84, 85. 
 
 2f>, 30 Moore, Vol. X, p. 203; for address by Denver see Kas. Hist. Asso- 
 ciation Rpt., 1883-4, PP- 351, 352, 362. 
 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE KANSAS PROBLEM 29 
 
 found them. The next Governor was Samuel Medary, a North- 
 ern Democrat, under whom the political situation continued to 
 improve. In February, 1861, Kansas became a state. At that 
 time Buchanan signed the bill admitting Kansas under a Free- 
 state constitution. This was perfectly consistent with his attitude 
 in the earlier phases of the question, and again indicated, that 
 whatever preference he held for the Lecompton Constitution, was 
 not due to its slavery provisions. 
 
 The motives of Buchanan's policy during this period have been 
 hinted at, but still remain for a more careful analysis. Anyone 
 who had followed Buchanan's political record would have noticed 
 certain out-standing habits of thought which were bound to show 
 themselves in his Kansas policy. There was his long-rooted and 
 ever deepening conviction that the Abolitionists and their politi- 
 cal allies, the Republicans, were bringing the country to its ruin. 
 His publicly proclaimed devotion to securing the South her con- 
 stitutional rights in the Union has already been shown. 31 He 
 loved the Union, his political fortunes were entwined with its 
 perpetuity. He also knew that no Union could peacefully endure 
 where the property rights of a large portion of its inhabitants and 
 perhaps their lives would not be protected. The application of 
 these three ideas : the convictions of the dangers of Abolition to 
 the Union ; the preservation the Union ; the protection of South- 
 ern constitutional rights therein, plus a strong feeling of friend- 
 ship, born of years of acquaintance with Southern statesmen, 
 were bound to come into play in any situation like that of the 
 problem of Kansas. 
 
 It has already been shown that Buchanan was opposed to stir- 
 ring up the Slavery Question. Despite his advice, 32 the party 
 had accepted the Compromise of 1850 and the later Kansas-Ne- 
 braska Bill. In each case he had accepted a decision which he 
 deemed of doubtful advisability. He was a strict party man, 
 and said in i860 that he had never bolted a Democratic ticket. 33 
 
 As early as 1850, Buchanan had been among those who hoped 
 
 31 E.g., Moore, Vol. VIII, p. 372. 
 
 32 E.g., A. H. A., Vol. V, pp. 101-2, Moore, Vol. VIII, p. 372, letter to 
 Flinn above. 
 
 33 Curtis, Vol. II, p. 290. 
 
 / 
 
30 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 that the Supreme Court would settle the question 34 of the status 
 of slaves in the territories. It was no idle expression when he 
 said, in 1856, in his Letter of Acceptance, that he accepted the 
 nomination, not as James Buchanan, but as the candidate of the 
 Democratic Party. 35 He could remember the time when he had 
 been at first opposed to the changes of 1850. 
 
 The Cincinnati platform of 1856 had not answered the ques- 
 tion of whether the Federal Constitution protected slavery in the 
 territories before the people prepared their state constitution for 
 the purpose of entering the Union. The case of Dred Scott was 
 on the docket, and men of States Rights views were on the bench. 
 Many Democrats looked to a decision which, even if not entirely 
 satisfactory, would get acceptance and thus preserve unity of the 
 party. 
 
 Buchanan was among those who sought to be delivered by the 
 Decision. His friend Catron 36 posted him while he was still 
 President-elect because he was very anxious to stear by its com- 
 pass. It was an ill stroke of fate, however, when due to sickness 
 of one of the Judges, the decision was delayed until after his 
 inauguration. That gave his foes the chance to cry conspiracy. 
 There was none, but the majority of the court, goaded by the 
 minority, decided to declare themselves fully on all the points in- 
 volved. It was the minority who first decided to do this. The re- 
 sult was that the decision gave protection to all slave property as 
 well as other property while territories remained in their territorial 
 condition. 
 
 Buchanan had long felt that a crisis was coming. He and 
 Slidell 37 had discussed it before the campaign. To a Pennsyl- 
 vania friend he had said in 1856: 
 
 I had hoped for the nomination in 1844, again in 1848, and 
 even in 1852, but now I would hesitate to take it. Before many 
 years the Abolitionists will bring war upon the land. It may 
 come during the next Presidential term. 38 
 
 34 See Flinn letter above. 
 
 35 Moore, Vol. X, p. 81. 
 
 36 Moore, Vol. X, pp. 106, 107, and Catron letters, H. S. P. 
 
 37 Louis M. Sears, " John Slidell," or A. H. R., July, 1922, p. 723- 
 
 38 Burr on Black, Philadelphia Press, March 16, 1882. 
 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE KANSAS PROBLEM 31 
 
 In 1856 Buchanan had privately and publicly said that his 
 mission would be to destroy sectionalism everywhere, and bring 
 back the good old times. 39 To his mind and many of those of 
 conservative leanings, his election had saved the Union. 
 
 The decision of the Court had now settled the question. 40 The 
 status of slavery in the territories had passed from the realm of 
 politics to the realm of law. Slavery was henceforth a question 
 of property perhaps more than one of politics. People who would 
 still question the matter were, to Buchanan, the enemies of law 
 and order. 41 There are writers who believe that his policy was 
 actuated solely by the desire to avert disunion. If this were the 
 sole reason, it would have been sufficient, and would have been 
 only his plain duty, as the South was only asking for its legal 
 rights. Yet that fact alone does not thoroughly state the Presi- 
 dent's position. It would neglect the fact that he had been the 
 willing advocate of Southern rights for nearly half a century. 
 True, he was wont to use the Union argument, and in all sincerity, 
 on Northern men, who cared more for their own political fences 42 
 
 39 E.g., address to the students of Franklin and Marshall College at Lan- 
 caster, Pa., reported in the New York Herald, Dec. 3, 1856. 
 
 40 E.g., Curtis, Vol. II, p. 206. 
 
 Buchanan in i860: "... The Supreme Court of the United States have 
 decided, — what was known to us all to have been the existing state of affairs 
 for fifty years, — that slaves are property. Admit that fact, and you admit 
 everything. ..." Curtis, Vol. II, p. 293. 
 
 Buchanan, in a draft of his first message on Kansas, denied what Douglas 
 still tried to hold after the Decision, — that the lack of local regulations, or 
 hostile local legislation would keep slavery from the Territories. Buchanan 
 held: 
 
 " It has been suggested that the Legislature of the Territories by hostile 
 enactments. . . . Territorial legislature might interfere . . . might virtually 
 abolish such property in slaves indirectly by. . . . 
 
 Besides it is not to be presumed that the members of such bodies would 
 resort to such an expedient in violation of their solemn oaths to support the 
 constitution, and if they did, such acts would be annulities and have no 
 effect. 
 
 What the constitution recognizes to be property, the Constitution can pro- 
 tect through the agency of the Federal Courts in despite of Territorial legis- 
 lation. ..." (H. S. P.) 
 
 41 Buchanan in Moore, Vol. XII, p. 332. 
 
 42 E.g., Covode, p. 271. 
 
32 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 than for a square deal to the other section of the Union. On the 
 other hand, the excitement in the South has been too often under- 
 estimated by Northern writers. 
 
 The people of Kansas had lost all of the President's confidence 
 as a result of their failure to vote for delegates to the Lecompton 
 Convention. The South was under the spell of the Fire-eaters, 
 who claimed that their section had been tricked out of its share 
 of the Territories. Southern leaders at Washington felt forced 
 to demand the Lecompton Constitution, although they said Kansas 
 could never become a slave state. 43 In the whole struggle, the 
 South showed too much reading of Sir Walter Scott, and his 
 quick-to-draw heroes, while the Republicans mixed the most 
 bigoted fanaticism with the most selfish hypocrisy. 
 
 The Republicans were stubbornly determined to live and defy 
 the Decision of the Court which had been to them almost a politi- 
 cal death sentence. Too many of them used Abolition as a means 
 to political ends. In the minds of many honest Democrats, they 
 were guilty of the most incendiary hypocrisy. 44 The expression 
 of Black has already been noticed. Daniel S. Dickinson, the 
 fearless leader of the Hunker Democracy in New York State, 
 ably expressed the prevailing opinion of the conservative Demo- 
 crats. 
 
 The opposition, just now so fretfully conspicuous, was deter- 
 mined on before you were inaugurated, and the development is 
 made through the Kansas question, because it promised better re- 
 turns than anything else. It was the imperative duty of every 
 good citizen, and especially of every Democrat, to aid you in 
 abating this Kansas nuisance by every energy within his power, 
 and to help throw it out of the doors of Congress, and send it 
 home for adjustment there, at the earliest moment. But instead 
 of this, Senators and Governors unite with, nay out-Herod the 
 Greeleys, Jim Lanes and Topekaites generally, in casting fresh 
 fire-brands into the federal legislature and embroiling the coun- 
 try over abstract and bootless issues. . . . 44a 
 
 43 E.g., Slidell in John Savage's " Living Representative Men," Philadel- 
 phia, i860, p. 446. See also Crump letter in appendix. 
 
 44 See quotation from Black above, also his letter to Judge Woodward, 
 Chapter IV. 
 
 44a Daniel S. Dickinson to Buchanan, Dec. 26, 1857. H. S. P. 
 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE KANSAS PROBLEM 33 
 
 Reports from the Territory coming in to the Administration 
 then, and during the debate, showed the President the need of 
 prompt and the most vigorous action. No Democrat, no true 
 lover of peace, failed to see that Kansas once admitted, the choic- 
 est weapons of the Republican's would be taken away ; 45 the 
 Democratic Party saved ; and the Union preserved. The Re- 
 publicans saw it equally well, and in their zeal for power used 
 every means to prolong the bleeding in Kansas. 46 Many obscure 
 persons who knew little of party politics, and who failed to un- 
 derstand the technicalities of the issue, felt that they were in a 
 holy cause. Such self-deception, however, could hardly have 
 motivated the more practical of their leaders. 
 
 In view of all these considerations, it was but natural that Bu- 
 chanan and his followers should seek to put the matter through 
 Congress as soon as they could. Douglas came out in opposition. 
 This made him so popular with Greeley that, had it not been for 
 Lincoln, he might have become the adopted member of the Re- 
 publican party in his home state. In order to win back the sup- 
 port in the North, the Administration aided by Toombs 47 tried 
 to pass an explanatory amendment, which would give the people 
 additional assurance that they could do as they pleased when 
 they had become a state. Such assurance was superfluous, but 
 there was hope that it might remove opposition to the issue. 
 When this plan did not succeed, the Administration tried the 
 English Bill. 
 
 This bill sent the Lecompton Constitution back to the voters 
 with a land grant. If Kansas was to vote in the negative, she 
 was to remain a territory until her population was sufficient to 
 send a member to the House. Professor Frank Haywood Hod- 
 der 48 has exposed the myth that this bill was a bribe to the people 
 of Kansas because it offered them a land grant along with the 
 Lecompton Constitution. Professor Hodder has shown that Mr. 
 Henry Wilson, who made the charge, in his " Rise and Fall of 
 the Slave Power," rearranged a speech of one of the members of 
 
 45 E.g., Moore, Vol. X, p. 225. 
 
 46 See 44a and Williams letters in appendix. 
 
 47 A. H. A., 191 1, Vol. II, p. 432. Toombs' note is also in H. S. P. 
 
 48 A. H. A., 1906, Vol. I, pp. 201-210. 
 
34 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 Congress to suit his purposes ; that the grant was not unusual in 
 size, being identical to that offered Minnesota in the year previous ; 
 that the final bill of 1861 making Kansas a Free State, which was 
 signed by Buchanan, contained like provisions ; that Congress 
 under the Republicans adopted the policy of delaying would-be 
 States until their population was sufficient to send a member to 
 the House ; that no one claimed that Kansas would ultimately lose 
 the land if she rejected the Constitution. 
 
 The remarks of Buchanan, and of his Cabinet, give ample proof 
 of the real purpose of the Bill. Buchanan wrote Denver, 49 the 
 able and moderate successor of Stanton and Walker, in the initial 
 stages of the struggle that if Lecompton failed, no settlement 
 could be reached before i860, with the results that the material 
 interests of Kansas would be " the sport and capital of the Black 
 Republicans in the Presidential Election of i860." 49 Black said 
 of the English Bill, " Those of them who were willing to give a 
 fair support to the administration, and to regard the English Bill 
 as a settlement, ought to be conciliated, treated kindly, and sup- 
 ported." 50 Post Master General Brown seems to have let it 
 generally be known that any person in rebellion against the party 
 would be welcomed if they stood for the Bill. 51 Yancey's biog- 
 rapher states that it was a concession demanded by Buchanan of 
 the Southern Democracy to save the party in the North. 52 That 
 statement really sums up the whole matter. Quitman's biogra- 
 pher states practically the same thing. 53 
 
 Douglas, according to news forwarded to Buchanan by Senator 
 Gwin of California, 54 was undecided for about a week as to 
 whether to smoke the peace pipe or not. Then, due to pressure 
 brought upon him by Senator Broderick (Gwin's political enemy), 
 and others of his group, he refused it. This was a great mis- 
 fortune to the Northern Democracy. By this time the Free- 
 
 40 Buchanan to Governor Denver, Moore, Vol. X, p. 203. 
 
 50 Covode, pp. 323, 324. 
 
 51 Covode, p. 229. 
 
 52 John Witherspoon Dubose, " Life and Times of William Lowndes 
 Yancey," Birmingham, Ala., 1892, p. 355. 
 
 53 John Francis H. Claiborne, " Life and Correspondence of John A. 
 Quitman," New York, i860, p. 274. 
 
 54 Note of Buchanan from Senator Gwin. H. S. P. 
 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE KANSAS PROBLEM 35 
 
 state men in Kansas were ready to vote and the Lecompton Con- 
 stitution was rejected. Governor Medary, 55 Denver's successor, 
 was able to report, at the close of 1858, that Kansas was behaving 
 herself, and was no longer a subject for Buchanan's enemies to 
 weep over. 
 
 In 1 861 Buchanan signed the bill admitting Kansas as a free- 
 state. 56 His attitude had been consistent from the beginning, for 
 during the entire trouble he had striven for a settlement which 
 would be accepted in all parts of the Union. 
 
 It was the ambition of Douglas, or perhaps his desire to sustain 
 himself in Illinois, far more than the echoes of " Bleeding Kan- 
 sas," which fatally divided the Democracy. 
 
 In spite of the hostile criticism then and since, President Bu- 
 chanan had the satisfaction of having followed the iron path of 
 public duty. The storm had passed, and the sky seemed to clear, 
 but it proved to be a lull before an even greater tempest. 
 
 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II 
 
 Letters Pertaining to Kansas Affairs and Cabinet 
 Relations 
 
 Note: Composition of the Cabinet: Buchanan had carefully 
 selected his Cabinet with attention to political reasons and social 
 traits. The latter he held essential in getting on well with the 
 Congressmen. Cass, although he had a certain amount of Bu- 
 chanan's dislike for his friendly relations with the hostile Cameron 
 group in the Keystone State, was urged by Slidell as the best 
 available man to represent the Northwest. Buchanan was virtu- 
 ally his own Secretary of State, and it was arranged for Bu- 
 chanan to appoint Cass's principal assistant in the department, 
 John Appleton of Maine, a friend of long standing. Cobb was 
 a Georgia " Union Saver " who had been prominent in his state 
 and in Congress. Floyd was popular with the Wise faction in 
 Virginia. Thompson was a friend of the Davis group in Missis- 
 sippi. Aaron V. Brown, Post-Master General, was an amiable and 
 wealthy native of Tennessee. He died in 1859 ar *d was suc- 
 
 56 Medary to Buchanan, Dec. 15, 1858; Jan. 4, 16; Feb. 21, 1859. H. S. P. 
 
 56 Richardson, V, pp. 646, 647. 
 
36 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 ceeded by Thompson's friend, Joseph Holt of the same state. J. 
 Glancey Jones of Pennsylvania had been slated for the cabinet; 
 but, due to the opposition of the Forney faction, he was induced 
 to withdraw, and Jeremiah Sullivan Black, a long acquaintance 
 of Buchanan, was selected. He had been more of a jurist than 
 a politician, and for that reason was the more acceptable. Isaac 
 Toucey, a brilliant Connecticut lawyer and politician, and Nathan 
 Clifford of Maine were considered. Slidell favored Toucey, who 
 had been for a time Attorney-General under Polk. He was finally 
 chosen, and Clifford was, in 1859, put on the Supreme Court 
 bench, where he fully justified Buchanan's opinion of his fitness 
 for the post. The failure to find a Cabinet place for the journal- 
 ist, John W. Forney, because of Southern opposition to him, 
 caused Buchanan considerable trouble in Pennsylvania. Forney 
 became an ardent Republican at a later date, and long continued 
 in politics under their banner. 
 
 When Wise, to Buchanan's sorrow, left him over the Kansas 
 dispute, Floyd remained zealously loyal. So did the Tyler fac- 
 tion in Virginia. Through Toucey's overtures the Hunter fac- 
 tion, the rivals of Wise in Virginia, became closely identified with 
 the Administration until the latter part of i860. Floyd and Black 
 had a disagreement over money due to a contractor named De- 
 Groot. Floyd claimed more money was due DeGroot than Black 
 said he was entitled. After reading over the evidence, it is hard 
 to see that Floyd was not the more correct. A large sum of 
 money, however, was involved, and when Floyd, in spite of an 
 opinion by Black, tried to pay the claim, Buchanan, who knew 
 Floyd was a poor book-keeper, vigorously sustained the Attorney- 
 General's opinion. 
 
 In the main, due to Buchanan's tact in selecting his men, they 
 were most congenial and harmonious until they came to the part- 
 ing of the ways in i860. The rest of the story appears below. 
 The letters here enclosed show the very strong friendly ties ex- 
 isting between the Cabinet and their chief. 
 
 It will be noticed that the Douglas faction did not have any 
 intimate friends in the cabinet. Slidell had warned Buchanan 
 not to put any Douglas man among his ministers. Bright of 
 Indiana had returned to the Senate and thus relieved the Presi- 
 dent of finding a place for him. Cass, as indicated above, was 
 finally chosen as a compromise. 
 
 Breckenridge, who had been nominated Vice-President by the 
 Cincinnati Convention as a compliment to the Douglas supporters, 
 was not over popular with the President until i860. Slidell and 
 Douglas locked horns at the very outset of the term. In reply to 
 a letter of a friend who feared that the cabinet would soon break 
 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE KANSAS PROBLEM 37 
 
 up, Buchanan made it evident that he did not intend to follow 
 the dictates of the Senator from Illinois. Concerning the cabinet 
 and Douglas he said, 
 
 " It was framed with great care and of the four from the South 
 there are three, open, avowed and able states Rights Democrats. 
 I trust in Heaven I may be President myself and think I shall be. 
 I like Douglas very much. He shall have no cause to oppose my 
 administration, but if he should, whilst I shall deeply regret it, I 
 must bear it with a patient and resolute spirit." x 
 
 The Kansas affair served as a casus belli which Douglas was 
 ready to wage for the control of the party. 
 
 The following extracts are indicative of the fact that Bu- 
 chanan's Administration was a very personal one. Few more 
 laborious men have ever occupied the White House. 
 
 " Colonel Phillips has been removed. Dr. Brodheal will go in 
 a few days. It is said that every member of the Cabinet opposes 
 Cutt's (Douglas's father-in-law) appointment; but the President 
 is determined. Governor Floyd told Dr. Blake, in speaking of 
 Cutts, that Mr. Buchanan was different from General Jackson ; 
 that General Jackson could be coaxed from his purposes, but that 
 Mr. Buchanan could neither be coaxed nor driven." (W. C. 
 Dunnington to R. M. T. Hunter, Oct. 6, 1857, A - H - A -> Vol. II, 
 P. 235.) 
 
 " It is said that the Cabinet are all afraid of Mr. Buchanan 
 and that he overhauled the Secretary of War the other day rela- 
 tive to the selling of certain bonds owned by the United States. 
 I do not believe the Cabinet will hold together until the adjourn- 
 ment of Congress." (Ibid., p. 224.) 
 
 " . . . No man ever filled the Presidential office who knew 
 better than he did how to enforce the respect due to his position 
 and I know of no one more tenacious of his opinions when his 
 judgment was fixed. He was absolute master in his own house." 
 (Black on Buchanan, in the Philadelphia Press, Sept. 10, 1883.) 
 
 " Never has there been in the White House a more laborious 
 occupant; he reposes no confidence even in his Cabinet officers, 
 but insists on first reading every paper which they put before 
 him for signature. He seldom leaves the house for exercise or 
 air, but spends twelve or sixteen hours daily in discharging drudg- 
 eries which might be better left to the care of subordinates in the 
 departments. . . . (Clipping from the N. Y. Times, Feb., 1859.) 
 
 " It is evident to the Cabinet that Mr. Buchanan intends to be 
 
 1 Sears, " Buchanan and Slidell," A. H. A., July, 1922. Mr. Sears has 
 incorporated the chapter in his more recent biography " John Slidell," Dur- 
 ham, N. C, 1926. 
 4 
 
38 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 the President in every sense of the word. He is self-determined, 
 not consultive, with the cabinet and, in the deliberation, acts as if 
 the whole government rested its responsibilities alone on him. 
 ..." (New York Herald, March 16, 1857.) 
 
 " His Cabinet called him ' The Squire ' behind his back and 
 they stood in much the same awe of him as boys do of a school- 
 master." (Mary Black Clayton, "Reminiscences of Jeremiah 
 Sullivan Black," St. Louis, 1887, p. 106.) 
 
 The following letters show the conditions in Kansas at the time 
 of the Lecompton agitation. The writer, as has been noticed, 
 was a Northern man, a Pennsylvania Democrat of Somerset 
 County. He had once been a friend of Walker, but when the 
 latter heard he was coming he tried to get another appointed. 
 He was too honest to be used as a tool by the Governor. He was 
 also well known to Black and evidently an intimate friend. His 
 reports are a valuable refutation of traditional histories on the 
 subject. 
 
 Fort Scott, K. T., 
 December 24th, 1857 
 Dear Judge : 
 
 I have just returned from Supreme Court. When at Lecomp- 
 ton, I was called from my bench duties by a note, from acting 
 Governor Stanton, requesting me to go to him, immediately; I 
 did so ; I found him busy preparing a requisition on Gen Harney 
 for troops, to be immediately sent to Fort Scott, to aid the Officers 
 of the law in preserving the peace, and executing legal process, to 
 arrest an armed body (of men) — (Ms. torn) who had assembled 
 to attach that place, and were threatning to burn it; and, who 
 had gone along the Osage river, with Sharps rifles and revolvers, 
 driving men, women and children from their homes ; taking, ap- 
 propriating their property to their own use, and running them 
 out of the Territory. He requested me to meet the troops on the 
 way, and accompany them to Fort Scott, in order that I might 
 take control of the matter, Officially — This, I, of course, did — I 
 rode all night, and met the troops (2 companies of cavalry) at 
 " Little Santa Fee," by forced march, night and day, merely stop- 
 ping to feed etc, we made the distance (140 miles) in two days 
 and one half — when we reached our destination we found that 
 about 100 men, armed and equipped, under command of One 
 Montgomery ( who was a member of the Topeka convention) 
 well fortified on the Osago river, 12 miles from Fort Scott, they 
 having converted the house of a Mr. Southwood, whom they had 
 robbed and drawn from his home. To this fort reenforcements 
 of men, from the central and northern portions of the Territory, 
 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE KANSAS PROBLEM 39 
 
 have been constantly coming — And, we have learned, reliably, 
 that since the adjournment of the legislature, James H. Lane is, 
 now, at Sugar mound near Sugar Creek, in Linn County, some 
 forty miles distant, on his way with 175 men! all armed to assist 
 the men under Montgomery. The U. S. troops are here, to act 
 in the enforcement of the law — Last night, scouts from the as- 
 sailing party were seen passing around the Fort in hailing dis- 
 tance of the Sentinels — Thus, you see we are, literally, besieged 
 by an armed banditti of the Lane party — All of whom are strang- 
 ers to the inhabitants of this Southern section of the Territory, 
 except a very few who are sympathisers with Lane — Now, as the 
 Black Republican papers are filled with absolute falsehoods in 
 relation to this "war" (as they term it), I will give you a true 
 statement of the whole matter, on which, just at this crisis, they 
 have seized and grossly misrepresented, as the excuse for this 
 " warT In September last One Curry, a very boisterour free 
 States man, or rather disciple of Lane & Co, met a Mr. Letterman 
 in the road, as he was riding on his way home. Mr. Curry, in a 
 rude manner, required of Letterman to tell him whether he was 
 a " free state, or a pro-slavery man." This Letterman refused 
 to do, when Curry shot him in the head with a revolver, the ball 
 passing in, below the cheek bone, and out at the back part of his 
 head. As Curry was arrested by due process of law, and the man 
 did not die, Curry was let out on bail, by a justice of the peace. 
 The affair, thus rested until the October term of the Court here ; 
 when Curry was indicted by the Grand Jury. He then fled from 
 these parts, his recognizance having been, in due course of law, 
 forfeited, suit was brought thereon. An attachment was laid 
 upon his property, consisting of oxen, cows etc. as there will be 
 no term of the court until May next, when this suit is triable ; and 
 as, the cattle would cost more for their keeping than their worth, 
 they were sold, in compliance with the provisions of the statutes 
 of our Territory. But before the sale, a body of men of this 
 party, in the Night time, stole the cattle from the place where 
 they were kept. The Marshall, however, went in pursuit of them 
 and recovered them. This is the basis of the story which is 
 blown abroad by the abolition papers, and their allies, turning the 
 matter to account by charging that " those cattle, being the prop- 
 erty of free State men, -were in a lawless manner taken by 300 
 Missourians etc." Not a word of truth is there in these News- 
 paper tales. They are made, by letter writing emissaries for the 
 purpose of Agitation in the East. 
 
 The next item, used falsely, by these agitators to excite sym- 
 pathy in the States, and raise forces in this Territory, is, in truth, 
 as follows : 
 
40 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 A company of some twenty-five men, from the neighbourhood 
 of Lawrence, appeared on the Osage river, near the scene of the 
 above related affair. They were all armed with Sharps rifles and 
 revolvers ; and by force drove the Rev. Mr. Southwood, an old 
 man palsied by the wear of 75 years, and family, from his home 
 and claim, took and used his property, and by threats, compelled 
 him to leave the Territory. They remained boldly, and in de- 
 fiance of law on the Osage at this house ; in the mean time, taking 
 what they needed from the settlers. Soon after their arrival a 
 store, or depot, of ready made clothing and supplies, was estab- 
 lished by an agent of some Eastern Aid Society, and they were 
 furnished by this agent with supplies for the winter. When the 
 court commenced its session, in October, complaint was made in 
 due form, to the Grand Jury of the outrage perpetrated by these 
 men, (upon) the Rev. Mr. Southwood. An indictment was 
 found and presented against twelve of them (whose names were 
 ascertained), process issued, and six of them were arrested and 
 brought into Court. Part of them gave bail, and the others being 
 under guard (there being no prison here) in a short time, made 
 their escape. The leader of the banditti, now in arms against 
 this place, One Bayne, is of the number, who gave bail, as above 
 stated. This man has, from their Fort, demanded boldly, that 
 the records and papers of their prosecution be delivered to him, 
 or the town shall be burnt to ashes. This place being the seat of 
 Justice for the 3d District, is therefore the object of their venge- 
 ance, The(y) repudiate all law. 
 
 In continuance of these outrages, about three weeks since, a 
 party of these men, armed, went to the houses of Mr. Masson, 
 Mr. Gously and Mr. Southwood Jr. (they being witness on part 
 of the Territory against these bandits) and took them by force 
 blindfolded them. Among the captives were two daughters of 
 Mr. Southwood, one 13 years of age, the other 16. All the cap- 
 tives were taken to their fort on Osage, and retained three days 
 and nights ; during which time these young girls were forced to 
 cook for these ruffians. Trial of Mr. Southwood was had, one 
 of these banditti acting as Judge, and the judgment of the court 
 was that Mr. Southwood, should sign a certificate of sale for 
 value received to them, of his horse, 300 bushels of corn and 
 other property, consisting of household affairs, winter's provisions 
 etc. and also a deed of conveyance of his claim, or otherwise be 
 hanged. The result was, that he signed these papers, and was 
 released with threats against his life if he sought redress by law. 
 Gousley and Wasson received similar treatment. 
 
 For these outrages, prosecutions were instituted. Writs were 
 put into the hands of the Marshall for the arrest of some of 
 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE KANSAS PROBLEM 41 
 
 these men who were recognized and could be identified. The 
 Marshall proceeded to the Osage to arrest them. He found them 
 in a well fortified house ; with regular barricades, port holes etc. 
 As he approached the fort forty men in file issued from it under 
 the command of Captain Montgomery and demanded why he was 
 there? Having informed them that he was there as Marshall 
 with writs for the purpose of making arrests of some of their 
 number; he was told to leave, that he could make no arrests 
 there. As he was alone, and they were all armed with Sharps 
 rifles etc. he retired. Next day he returned to the fort and 
 found them still there. As soon as the Marshall with the posse 
 approached near to the fort, a voley was fired at them by these 
 brigands, from it, and repeated some twenty times or more, the 
 balls passing around them thickly. A few of the posse then re- 
 turned their fire, several times. One of the Marshalls posse was 
 shot in the arm, and his horse mortally wounded. The Marshall 
 finding too strongly fortified again returned to Fort Scott. These 
 outlaws boldly informed the Marshall that there was no law in 
 Kansas, and that they were acting under orders from James H. 
 Lane. 
 
 They defiantly remained there, to the terror of the settlers, 
 until last Sunday night, when the Cavalry under command of 
 Captain Sturgis arrived. They then fled from their fort to 
 Sugar Mound, about 12 miles distant. On yesterday, one hun- 
 dred armed men returned to the same fort, and are there, as I 
 am authentically informed a awaiting the advent of the Gen'l 
 James H. Lane, who is advancing with his army of five hundred 
 armed men. 
 
 This last fact I have just learned by a letter handed to me 
 from Mr. Hamilton, and from a messenger who has seen Lane 
 and his encampment. Lane has a wagon load of arms with him 
 to supply those he can enlist on the way. So here we are with a 
 few peacable citizens who have done nothing in violation of law, 
 under the protection of 85 Cavalry, awaiting an attack from these 
 outlaws. Now, I suppose you will say, that this is law and war 
 in a mixed dose. I have held the troops in position to act as a 
 posse comitatus to aid in the execution of the laws in case of re- 
 sistance with formidable force. Our citizens are of course much 
 excited. Now, dear Sir, the object of all this movement by Lane, 
 who represents the Black Republicans in agitation here is to get 
 up an embrio civil war in Kansas to prevent congress from ac- 
 cepting the Lecompton Constitution. But it is pitiable to behold 
 poor settlers, at this inclement season of the year, despoiled of 
 their goods, flying from their homes in terror and destitution. 
 
42 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 And all this, upheld and urged on by persons professing to be 
 Christians who are living in the east in ease and luxury. 
 
 I think Lane has done quite enough in rebellion to justify 
 prompt and energetic proceedings against him. His instructions 
 are sent from the east and he carries them into execution by using 
 a homeless and vagrant rabble who are here, kept fed, and clothed 
 by aid Societies which are busy in this business in the East, whose 
 leading members appeal, falsely, to the sympathy and fanaticism 
 of weak men and women. 
 
 I can assure you that I have, with a determination to be im- 
 partial, viewed matters here,; the result with me is, that not one 
 instance have I found, in which any man of any other party has 
 acted in a manner, regardless of law, but those of the Lane and 
 company black Republican party. I am here to preserve the 
 peace and enforce the law without regard of men or parties. 
 Nearly twenty years of experience as judge, I think, has so trained 
 me in the line of my duty, as to enable me to think, and act im- 
 partially. Besides I have no affection in favor of Slavery, I as- 
 sure you. With all this, I must say that, since I have been here, 
 no pro-slavery man has been guilty of violating the law, that I 
 know of. 
 
 If those who are active in this strife to make Kansas a free 
 State, will send emissaries from the East, to this Territory, to 
 carry out their views, why in the name of Heaven (as they pro- 
 fess to act in that name) do they not send men of honorable and 
 good character, and not the worst of vagrants. But I need not 
 enlarge; the world will in due time wonder that ever such a state 
 of things existed, in this, our day, and land. 
 
 These facts, which I have related, are strictly true, and out of 
 them has been raised all this present, seemingly, deadly strife. 
 
 I shall stand at my post, and do my duty, leaving the conse- 
 quences in the hands of him who holds, in his hand, the destiny 
 of all men. I write this in the midst of alarm and confusion, 
 incident to a virtual siege. I have not time to look over what I 
 have written so as to correct it as to manner and form. The 
 substance is correct. Therefore if you see fit you may let the 
 President see it. 
 
 I send it to Leavenworth to be mailed, as I am informed there 
 is no safe communication by mail here. 
 
 Your old friend truly 
 J Williams 
 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE KANSAS PROBLEM 43 
 
 We certify that the statement set forth in the above communi- 
 cation of Judge Williams may be relied on as substantially true. 
 Epapheo. Rankin George A. Crawford 
 
 Geo. W. Clarke 
 Dan. Al F Greenwood 
 Sam. Al A. Williams elk 
 (Endorsed) 64 US Dst Court 
 
 Dec. 24 1857 
 Judge Williams 
 Kansas Affairs. 
 
 Kansas Fort Scott, March 3rd 1858. 
 To James Buchanan, President of the United States 
 
 Sir: To describe and properly represent to you the distracted 
 condition of this Southern section of our Territory would be im- 
 possible, and done, the representations could, perhaps, be too much 
 for the credulity of any one whose standpoint is within the limits 
 of civilization and law. Washington City on the day of the 
 " Plug Ugly " riot could be a poor similitude of the scene day. 
 and night here. For four months past and particularly since 
 General Lane has assumed military authority as he alleges by vir- 
 tue of appointment of the legislature at the special session there- 
 of, companies of armed men with Sharp rifles, just new from the 
 factories and revolvers, and now with cannon, have established 
 in forts in this region. They are commanded by the most des- 
 perate of men, possessing qualifications, peculiarly adapted to the 
 work assigned them. Their men are not citizens of the territory, 
 with the exception of a very few. The commanding officers of 
 these companies report regularly to Lane, as Commander-in-chief 
 of the Militia of Kansas Territory. They also make requisitions 
 for men and munitions of war on at the same time falsley rep- 
 resenting that " The Missourians " are in the Territory, driving 
 here from all the Free State settlers, when I know and aver that 
 there have not been any Missourians, or any persons whatsoever 
 in all this region of Kansas, since I have been here. (June last), 
 interfering in the least, with anyone except themselves. Thus do 
 they fabricate their excuse, violating truth, for the perpetuating 
 of the most flagrant outrages. 
 
 This has been the Black Republican programme of operation, 
 since I have been here. Whilst I take special care to stand aloof 
 from all agitation by either party, in the meantime I observe most 
 carefully the current of their doings. Every fillibustering foray 
 made on this region of the Territory has been preceeded by pub- 
 lishing in the Black Republican papers of Lawrence, etc. an ac- 
 
44 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 count of attacks, outrages, etc. committed by Missourians and 
 pro-slavery men on Osage Valley, especially free state settlers, 
 when I most positively declare these accounts are entirely untrue. 
 None such have occurred since I have been here, as every citizen 
 knows. As this place is point at which court is holden and from 
 which process has been of course issued, it has become the special 
 object of vengence to attack by these men. For four months the 
 citizens have been obliged to perform military duty, guarding the 
 town day and night. During all this time I have had scarcely 
 one nights sleep. For a week and more, while they were around 
 about the town I was not in bed, or undressed. I kept on the 
 alert so that I might preserve order among our own citizens, as 
 they are of all political parties, as well as to prevent collision and 
 bloodshed between them and the invaders. This so far, thank 
 heaven, aided by a few peaceable and influential citizens, I have 
 several times succeeded in doing. 
 
 Finding from the most authentic sources, about two weeks 
 since, that another bonifide Lane causa belli had been promulgated 
 in the " Prarie City Champion " a Black Republican newspaper, 
 published in that town, laid out by a company in which James H. 
 Lane is president, that in addition to the companies under Bayne 
 and Montgomery, already stationed for months past, 12 miles 
 distant at Fort Bayne, on the Osage river, a strong re-enforce- 
 ment of Lanes men with seven cannon had started from Lawrence 
 with the especial purpose of sacking and burning Fort Scott, and 
 taking possession of the Osage country, I called on acting Gov- 
 ernor General Denver for United States troops, to aid me in 
 keeping the peace and in execution of the laws. The Governor, 
 aware of the prospect of this, promptly responded by making a 
 requisition on the commanding officer at Fort Leavenworth for 
 two companies of cavalry. The troops arrived on Friday last 
 only in the nick of time, as the following facts will show : On 
 Sunday morning before break of day, a body of men under com- 
 mand of Montgomery attacked the house of Mr. James Ferris an 
 aged man and peaceful citizen of Osage 14 miles from this town, 
 seized him, tied him, robbed him of his household goods, his three 
 horses, his and his families' clothing, indeed all he had, except his 
 money. Of this, it was known that he had considerable, but while 
 they were breaking into the house, his son in law escaped by a 
 back way taking the money with him, it being dark when he 
 escaped. His daughters, young women, after some abuse were 
 led off by one of the company with a pretense of getting water to 
 cook them breakfast from the spring which is distant some 100 
 yards from the house, he pitying, them, so soon as the spring was 
 reached made them drop their buckets and escape for their lives 
 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE KANSAS PROBLEM 45 
 
 by running, which they did. After abusing the old man and 
 robbing his house, they left pursuing with their wagons to others 
 who were served in the same way. They have stolen some twelve 
 or fifteen horses besides all the property on which they could lay 
 their hands. They also broke into the house of Mr. Fermaugh 
 in Osage and shot him through the shoulder with a Sharps rifle. 
 When asked why they did such things their reply was that " hav- 
 ing learned that the U. S. Troops were at Fort Scott, and they 
 were prevented from robbing and burning them, they were deter- 
 mined to get something for coming so far, with so much trouble 
 and they would therefore take vengeance on the goods and prop- 
 erty of the pro-slavery " and drive them out of the country. 
 
 Of course the country became aroused, with alarm, at their 
 doings. Soon persons whose property had been taken, appeared 
 in this place, to seek the protection and redress of law. Infor- 
 mations were made on oath in accordance with laws; the deputy 
 Marshal, with his writs finding that he would be restrained by 
 force, one company of cavalry under command of Capt. Anderson 
 accompanied him as a posse to the scene of their outrages. When 
 the Marshall and the cavalry arrived it was found that they had 
 fled, taking the booty in wagons with them. The officers and 
 troops pursued them with all possible speed and energy. After 
 scouring the prairies and groves for two days, they returned to 
 their place last night with some of their principle men as prison- 
 ers. These marauders are in force to about the number of two 
 hundred and fifty or three hundred. Besides small arms they 
 have with them two or three cannons obtained at Lawrence and 
 Ossawattamie. In the country among the farmers, they depre- 
 date by robbing, horsestealing etc. in small squads ; and come on 
 this place in full force. They start from the more northern part 
 of the Territory on foot but by the time they reach their rendez- 
 vous, Fort Bayne on Osage, most of them are mounted. This 
 has been the political rebellion, which has been kept up during 
 the last fall and winter. These are patriotic freemen who refuse 
 to vote, and will not submit to have the Lecompton Constitution 
 forced upon them. 
 
 Just now, as I have been writing this, two settlers, have called 
 on me, informing me that last night, finding that the Marshall 
 and the troops were returned to Fort Scott, these outlaws ap- 
 peared, in number about thirty in the neighborhood, pillaging, 
 stealing horses, and warning others to leave the state in 24 hours, 
 or they would lynch them and their families. Thus do they flee 
 to their hiding places, when pursued by the troops, being warned 
 by their scouts, and gather again as soon as the pursuit is over. 
 The settlers are departing from this region of the Territory daily, 
 
46 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 deeming it the only way of saving their lives and property. It is 
 about the first thing in the morning to be done, on the Osage, for 
 a settler to examine the outer side of his door, particularly if he 
 be a former inhabitant of a slave-holding state ; or, a sound 
 democrat, of the national union stamp whose metal is of the 
 genuine ring, to see whether, during the night pas he has received 
 " notice to quit." If he find such notice on his door " fight or 
 go " is his lot. One of these Osago visiting cards was brought to 
 me, last night, by Captains Anderson as a speciman of Osago 
 fashion." 
 
 I give you a copy of it " literatim et verbatim " — I give the 
 quotation reversed as I consider the Osago fashions reverse the 
 order of things elsewhere. Here it is : 
 
 " Leave this claim in 24 hours." 
 " John Brown Capt." 
 
 The handwriting of this instrument is good betokening an 
 education in any place but squatterdom. The writer uses few 
 words, and knows something of punctuation. I have no idea that 
 •the name, subscribed is his true one. He, no doubt, meant to 
 give a hint that the ejectment would be " done up Brown." They 
 are apt in the use of fire. Of this the following will suffice as an 
 instance which is true, as I am informed by Capt. Anderson. 
 
 Several of these outlaws came out of their hiding places after 
 the Marshall and cavalry had passed through the neighborhood, 
 and finding two boys, sons, one of Mr. Spratt, and the other of 
 Mr. Ferris, they inquired of the boys " where the dragoons had 
 gone " ; the boys replied they did not know, whereupon these 
 ruffans, took bundles of prairie grass and setting fire to it, they 
 burned the children's faces until blistered to force them to tell 
 what the poor things did not know. When I first heard of this 
 I could not believe it ; but the Marshall and Captain Anderson 
 saw one of children and said that it was true. Thus you see the 
 Black Republicans can boast of the fact that the Sepoys are 
 among us. 
 
 Every day furnishes its catalogue of outrages. Extreme ex- 
 citement prevails all over the country. I shall stand by my post, 
 let the consequences be what they may, and do my duty. It re- 
 quires, I assure you, sir, a man's best energies and efforts to en- 
 able him to effect anything officially effective amid such rebellion 
 and anarchy. I assure you the aggression and violence is all on 
 one side, the Black Republicans. 
 
 I feel constrained you of these things as a duty, 
 
 Your obt. servt, etc, 
 His Excellency J. Williams, 
 
 James Buchanan, 
 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE KANSAS PROBLEM 47 
 
 P. S. I merely add that just as I had signed my name to the 
 letter which this accompanies, Mr. Ferris, the father of one of the 
 boys, who were burned by these fiends, came into my room, in 
 much excitement. He informs me that he was driven from his 
 house by a company of men. Being compelled to fly to save his 
 life, his family were left there yesterday evening. He knows not 
 whether they are dead or alive. That Mr. Spratt one of the old- 
 est settlers, and an excellent citizen were barracaded in his house, 
 with a few friends, unable to get away, alive, determined to de- 
 fend themselves to the death. 
 
 He also informs me that his son was held over the fire by these 
 men, until so burnt, about the ankles as well as the face, that the 
 flesh is burnt to the bone. Such are the doings of abolition sway 
 by force of arms, in this part of Kansas. I fear retaliation that 
 heretofore I have succeeded in preventing, will be forced from 
 the friends of the sufferers. This is what the smooth tongued 
 politicians in the East and Congress, too, have desired. They 
 have certainly invited woe, and bid high for rebellion against law 
 and order in Kansas, with a view to the overthrow of constitu- 
 tional and union-loving democracy. If Kansas remains in the 
 Territorial condition, and is not permitted under the constitution 
 now before Congress, we may look for an end, that will be traced 
 in blood from this, the mere beginning. The longer this question 
 is delayed, the more will this unfortunate territory will be over- 
 run by hireling bandits, who seize upon the occasion for employ- 
 ment in their vocation of murder. Every month brings with its 
 lapse crowds of eastern city and country, " short boys," plug 
 uglies, and the like, armed afreash with sharps rifles, ready for 
 the work of rebellion and anarchy. These are the " emmigrated " 
 or missionaries, who are sent by those, who at the altar of the 
 Church and State, and who shout as fiercely the specious cry of 
 " Freedom for Kansas " " oh Tempera Oh Mores ! " 
 But I must conclude 
 
 Yours again, most sincerely, 
 
 " I send this, enroute Missouri as J. W. Williams 
 
 anything in the form and style of 
 government documents is intercepted." 
 
 There is a second letter of April 25th (H. S. P.) stating that 
 the pro-slavery men were being forced to leave Kansas, 2000 men 
 were in sight of the town ; one or more troops had been killed ; 
 the Judge invited to leave the town on pain of death within six 
 days, and his court proceedings broken up by armed men. 
 
 Small wonder Buchanan felt little sympathy with anti-slavery 
 Kansas. 
 
48 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 Letters Pertaining to Walker's Policies in Kansas 
 
 The first letter was one signed by Cass. He was a poor pen- 
 man and the body of his letter was written by another. Floyd 
 had some trouble with his ringers with the result that his letters 
 were usually written by another and only signed by him. Cass 
 said Floyd would write and would send the copy of a letter ad- 
 dressed to Governor Walker. " Of course, no new measures 
 would be taken in your absence, and these letters, therefore, are 
 strictly confined to a renewal of the instructions which had been 
 previously given by your direction. As the letter was followed 
 by a telegraphic message, it was thought necessary that some im- 
 mediate attention should be given to it. We do not like Gov. 
 Walker's letter and I am satisfied that this will be your opinion. 
 I can not believe that he thinks there is a real and pressing neces- 
 sity for the amount of force which he requests unless he means to 
 attempt to disperse the peaceable assemblages of the people at the 
 point of the bayonet. If this was his intention, he will find his 
 error as soon as he receives your last instructions. We all fear 
 that Gov. Walker is endeavoring to make a record for the future, 
 but while we hope otherwise, we are satisfied that in any event 
 your record will be found fully satisfactory. The plan, which 
 you have adopted, is the only true plan. It is to support the con- 
 stitution and the laws, and to take all necessary measures for this 
 purpose. We all desire sincerely that this matter should give you 
 no uneasiness, but that you should remain at Bedford and renew 
 your health and strength for your future labors. I enclose a very 
 satisfactory letter from Judge McLean, by which you will see 
 how necessary your last instructions were." 
 
 On the same day Floyd wrote to his chief inclosing a draft of 
 a letter sent to Walker. Excerpts of the letter are as follows : 
 
 " At Fort Ridgely which can be sent to Fort Leavenworth in 
 three weeks, three companies of Sumner's regiment will be in 
 sixty days upon the borders of the territory, amounting to three 
 hundred men, and for greater precaution, another company of 
 flying artillery can be sent immediately from Fort McHenry. 
 
 " In my Judgement, a thousand men are fully sufficient to 
 overawe those disposed to rebellion, but should a collision with 
 the troop take place, then a general civil war between the oppos- 
 ing parties will be inevitable. In this event, a thousand regular 
 troops under Harney will be much more than enough to turn the 
 scale in favor of law and order. 
 
 " And I am afraid that this movement of the troops, in such 
 imposing numbers, this most formidable preparation for war, is 
 intended rather to cover his Excellency's retreat from his Topeka 
 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE KANSAS PROBLEM 49 
 
 speech, than to prevent the town of Lawrence from adopting a 
 charter for its government. It is very obvious from the tone of 
 his last dispatch that the denunciations of the South have sur- 
 prised, annoyed and alarmed him, and that he intends at all 
 hazard to regain his position or throw the blame of his failure 
 upon someone else, either the administration, or the War Depart- 
 ment. I doubt, now, whether the investment in Gov. Walker is 
 going to turn out very profitable, notwithstanding we all thought, 
 and I in particular, that his mission to Kansas was to prove a 
 perfect political California for the administration. He shall have 
 his forces, you may rely upon that, and then nothing is left for 
 us but prayers for the happy deliverence out of all our troubles ! 
 I trust, with promising union of trusts and faith which so happily 
 blend in your cabinet, your administration may, in this matter, 
 experience the full benefit of the promise given to ' the fervent, 
 effectual prayer of the righteous man.' 
 
 " We meet in Cabinet, and ' discuss ' very much, but I believe 
 we all feel it to be a sort of game of Solitaire, the play of Hamlet 
 with the part of Hamlet left out. But certainly, things are mov- 
 ing on in such a way as to give no grounds of solicitude or un- 
 easiness whatever on your part ; and we all feel that you are serv- 
 ing the State best, for the present, in laying in a stock of robust 
 health for the winter campaigne, which is to be an eventful one. 
 
 M With most respectful regards to Miss Lane, 
 
 " I am very sincerely, your friend 
 John B. Floyd 
 
 War Department 
 Washington, July 31, 1857 
 " His Excellency, 
 " Robert J Walker, 
 " Governor of Kansas, 
 
 " Dear Sir: 
 
 " Your dispatch of the ... of this month was received yester- 
 day at the State Department and very maturely considered in 
 Cabinet. Upon the subject of the troop which you think neces- 
 sary to keep the peace in Kansas I deem it proper to make the 
 following statement : 
 
 " You have with you now eight companies of the Regiment of 
 2d Dragoons and one company of the Sixth Infantry. Sherman's 
 light battery has been ordered to Fort Leavenworth from Fort 
 Snelling, and also the companies of the 10th Infantry. This will 
 constitute a force of about thirteen companies, thoroughly equip- 
 ped and efficient. In addition to this there will be six companies 
 
50 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 under command of Lieut. Col. Johnston, five of which are cav- 
 alry, who will join you as soon as operation upon the boundary 
 survey shall cease, which must happen in sixty or seventy days at 
 farthest. And, moreover, the Cheyenne expedition having been 
 ordered to be broken up, two companies will speedily join the 
 forces at Leavenworth under Col. Sumner, constituting in all a 
 force of twenty-one companies, fourteen of which will be cavalry 
 and one company of light artillery. This, you perceive, is a very 
 powerful force, and I hope will prove sufficient for all purposes, 
 but if the exigencies of the case require a still larger force, you 
 may rest assured all the force necessary for a due enforcement 
 of the law shall be promptly furnished. 
 
 With the highest regard, I am 
 Very truly yours 
 
 Secretary of War 
 
 These letters show conclusively that Walker, and not the Ad- 
 ministration, was the one that wanted troops increased in the 
 region. 
 
 Department of State, 
 Washington, Aug. 6th. 1857 
 Dear Sir : 
 
 Upon receiving your letter yesterday with its enclosures, Gen- 
 eral Cass invited a meeting of the Cabinet for 10 o'clock this 
 morning, when they were all present. At their request I joined 
 them, and took with me the previous instructions to Governor 
 Walker, dated respectively dated July 25 & July 31st. together 
 with your letter to Gov. Floyd and the memoranda which accom- 
 panied it. These papers were carefully read through in order 
 ascertain what is the precise position of the Administration upon 
 the record. I then read a draft of a letter to the Governor, which 
 I wrote hastily this morning, as a sort of a nucleus for discussion, 
 in the event that it was decided to write any letter at all. A copy 
 of this draft is enclosed. The Cabinet seemed to agree that no 
 new instructions were absolutely necessary, but in deference to 
 what seemed to be a slight preference on your part, they inclined 
 to adopt substantially the letter which I had drawn, and to send 
 it on. The last sentence, however, was to be omitted, and there 
 was a suggestion of Gov. Cobb whether a more specific request 
 to Governor to explain what use he intended to make of the 
 required troops, might not be desirable. Pending the discussion 
 on that point, Gov. Floyd read a letter rec'd from Gen'l Harney, 
 & Mr. Henry sent in a letter from Mr. Pleasanton which was also 
 read. Both these letters are to be sent to you today. They 
 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE KANSAS PROBLEM 51 
 
 indicate so clearly a state of things in Kansas which is quite in- 
 consistent with Gov. W's military ideas, that the Cabinet decided 
 to delay any further instructions until you were heard from again. 
 To this conclusion they came, partly from a belief that the ex- 
 isting instructions are deficient, and partly from an idea, that, in 
 the changed aspect of affairs, you might prefer to write the Gov- 
 ernor an unofficial letter. The Cabinet all agreed that there is no 
 probability of a collision in Kansas, and the great difficulty is how 
 Governor Walker will relieve himself from a position which may 
 be intensely awkward. They request me to write to you in their 
 united behalf, that, in their opinion, there is no necessity for you 
 immediate return, and to express their hope, therefore, that you 
 will remain at Bedford as long as you desire to be there, or at 
 least that you will not deprive yourself of the benefit of the 
 Springs, now that you are there, with the idea that there exists 
 any pressing emergency here which cannot wait your return. 
 
 The news from Kentucky today is highly favorable. Indeed 
 notwithstanding the little excitement about Kansas, it does seem 
 to me that the Administration enjoys to a remarkable degree the 
 confidence of the whole community. If no accident occurs, its 
 success can hardly fail to meet your highest expectations. 
 
 The Cabinet determined today to close the Executive Depart- 
 ments tomorrow, in consequence of the death of Mr. Dobbin, the 
 late Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 In haste, 
 
 Very respectfully 
 & truly yours, 
 
 John Appleton. 
 
 Note on John Calhoun of the Lecompton Convention: This 
 man has been so assailed by the anti-slavery group, that it seems 
 a mere act of decency to submit the following concerning his atti- 
 tude. . . . The true attitude of John Calhoun (Covode, p. 163), 
 the President of the Lecompton Convention, has been a subject 
 of much doubt. Walker held him a prevaricator. The Republi- 
 cans in i860 vainly tried to prove that he had received secret 
 orders from the Administration to prevent a referendum. They 
 failed to do so. Calhoun was evidently trying to please all fac- 
 tions to secure himself. He was always the friend of Douglas 
 (Covode, p. in). In attempting to get Walker to accept the 
 work of the Convention, Calhoun was trying to do something ac- 
 ceptable to Douglas. At the same time he seems to have been 
 receiving advice from some pro-Slavery group in Washington. 
 Yet he was shown beyond doubt, to have spoken and worked 
 ardently up to the minute before the final vote was taken, for 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIft 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
52 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 submission of the entire document to the voters, as the plan 
 favored by the Administration (Covode, p. 175). The issue 
 hung on not more than three votes. 
 
 During the struggle the Union published the following note 
 from the St. Louis Ledger: 
 
 " The abolition papers vindictively abuse Mr. Calhoun as ultra- 
 pro-slavery in his principles. The value of all these tirades, the 
 St. Louis Democrat and the New York Tribune, and their co- 
 laborers in the vocation of falsehood will be rightly appreciated 
 when the fact becomes known that Mr. Calhoun was a citizen of 
 Illinois before he was appointed to office in Kansas, that he went 
 into the Territory a Free State man in his opinions ; was elected 
 as such to the convention, acted as such in it, was made president 
 as such, was instructed with a full knowledge of his opinions with 
 the powers which these presses so loudly complain, and will cer- 
 tainly vote to exclude slavery from Kansas. ..." (The re- 
 mainder of the article was a tribute to his character and an appeal 
 to the North not to be deceived by false reports.) 
 
 The following letter from an editor, a son of Governor Wise, 
 was shown to Thompson and received the notations indicated. 
 For what Thompson said to Martin see Covode, p. 315-317. 
 
 Richmond, V a . 
 Dec. 17 th . 1857. 
 Sir: 
 
 My father has received information from a source which he is 
 not at liberty to divulge, that a schedule proposed for adoption 
 by the Lecompton Convention was prepared * under the eye of 
 Mr. Secretary Thompson, and was forwarded to the Convention 
 in Kansas, through his confidential clerk, Mr. Henry L. Martin; 
 — also that this fact fl has been made known to some, ultra men 
 of the Southern delegation in Congress, who have boasted of it, 
 as an instance of concession forced from the Administration. 
 
 The Govr. is somewhat disturbed by these statements, which 
 have reached him under a plausible appearance, and earnestly re- 
 quests that you will furnish him with some reliable information 
 concerning the matter. 
 
 With very high respect 
 Yours truly, 
 * This is utterly false A. Jennings Wise 
 
 His Excy. 
 
 James Buchanan fl This is equally false 
 
 President of the United States J. Thompson 
 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE KANSAS PROBLEM 53 
 
 Note on Jacob Thompson as Secretary of Interior: "... In 
 1856, Mr. Thompson supported James Buchanan in the Presi- 
 dential Convention. After the election, he was invited to take 
 charge of the Department of Interior in Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet. 
 This he accepted and entered on his duties March, 1857. He 
 found the Department a mere aggregation of bureaus, working 
 entirely without concert, and the Secretary a mere figurehead. 
 With his old time energy, he went to work and infused new life 
 into every department, united all the business under one head, 
 himself the director. The department grew in favor and popu- 
 larity with the whole country. The business transacted by it was 
 enormous. The volumes of the decisions of Secretary Thomp- 
 son, in law cases alone, were larger than those of the Attorney 
 General. ..." (J. F. Bivins, " The Life of Jacob Thompson," 
 Historical Papers of the Historical Society of Trinity College, 
 Durham, N. C., 1898, p. 88. For the rest of his career as Secre- 
 tary of Interior, see chapter IV of this study.) 
 
 The writer of the letter below, William Crump, was a Virginia 
 politician and a supporter of the Hunter faction there. The senti- 
 ments are a typical indication of the more moderate sentiment in 
 the South at the time. 
 
 Richmond, February 3rd, 1858 
 My dear Sir : 
 
 Amid the universal applause & congratulations of the wise and 
 just which your last message will evoke, I do not know but that 
 it may seem presumptnous in me to express to you my sense of 
 the grateful admiration which filled my breast as I read its clear 
 and comprehensive statements, to its powerful and persuasive 
 argumentation and its effectionate & manly & patriotic appeals. 
 You will pardon me, I trust, if, in the flow of sentiment it has 
 inspired, I have been made to forget that you are only the Presi- 
 dent, & to feel that a clearer & kindlier tie unites us, as your 
 words of fraternal counsel, and of earnest & spirit stirring en- 
 treaty fell upon my ears. I cannot doubt but that angry elements 
 of faction & of strife, will subside before the presence of one who 
 rebukes them in the laguage of the Republican fathers — in the 
 language of reason, of truth and of patriotism. 
 
 But if unhappily the demon of discord will not be stilled, and a 
 severed union & hostile sections & civil war shall dishonor our 
 forefathers — desecrate the fabric ( ?) reared by their toil and 
 cemented by their blood, and devastate our teeming fields & red- 
 den our hearth-stones ; however your heart may sadden & may 
 sicken at the spectacle, you cannot reproach yourself, posterity 
 will not reproach you for not admonishing & imploring your 
 5 
 
54 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 country-men to forget their dessentions, to bury their feuds, and 
 to stand firmly and safely by the Constitution & the Union. 
 
 The obligation which we of the South, are under to you, what- 
 ever betides us, can never be forgotten. Your heroic vindication 
 of our constitutional rights is without a parallel in our history, 
 for no statesman whose personal interests & affiliations were 
 north, has ever been subjected to the terrible ordeal through 
 which you have triumphantly passed. While a tongue or a pen 
 remains to us to preserve in tradition, or to embalm in history 
 the memory of your disinterested & exalted conduct, be assured 
 that your name will be a " household word " among us. 
 
 We do not hope — the intelligent among us have never hoped 
 to perpetuate slavery in Kansas. It is plain to us & has long 
 been that an overwhelming majority are against us. But it only 
 makes the outrage more wanton & atrocious ; that they will not 
 exercise their power legitimately ; but perversely & insultingly 
 persist in crushing us, without & against law. This will not be 
 borne I sincerely believe. Our people are pretty incensed & here, 
 as at the North, the aggressive agents are most active & most 
 potential. The conservative — those who calculate the cost & in 
 the end will be most willing to make the sacrifice if it cannot be 
 avoided — look with eager expectation upon your efforts & yet 
 believe they will be successful in preserving the Union and har- 
 mony of these States. But I meant not to discuss the subject, 
 but in writing to you to express my thanks to you for your gen- 
 erous defense of our rights. I fear that I have expressed them 
 perhaps too warmly, but I have followed my instincts in what is 
 written & will not rewrite. I expect & desire no answer, but I 
 could not forbear the expression of the grateful sentiments with 
 which I am sincerely, Your friend, 
 
 Wm. W. Crump, 
 
 In the middle of the summer Floyd became very ill of a car- 
 buncle and was threatened with spinal complications. As a re- 
 sult, he was allowed a leave of absence from Washington until 
 the autumn. Buchanan added to his own duties those of Secre- 
 tary of War during the same period. A number of letters pass- 
 ing between the various members of the Administration at this 
 time give an interesting commentary on the passing and future 
 events in the political arena. 
 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE KANSAS PROBLEM 55 
 
 (L. C.) 
 
 Washington 14 July 1859. 
 My dear Sir/ 
 
 I have on purpose delayed to answer your favor of the 6 th 
 Instant awaiting the return of Governor Floyd. On last evening 
 I learned from his lady that he had abandoned the idea of visit- 
 ing Bedford &, by the advice of his physicians at the Alum 
 Springs, would go to the Hot Springs. For this I am extremely 
 sorry as I do not believe there are any waters on the face of the 
 earth from which he would derive so much benefit as those at 
 Bedford. His health, I am sorry to say, is far from good. 
 
 Whilst it would afford me very great pleasure to accept your 
 kind invitation; yet I need not say how inconvenient it is for 
 ladies to stop half way on a journey. The weather being exces- 
 sively hot we have determined not to leave here until the after- 
 noon of Monday & go through to Cumberland the same night. 
 With many thanks for your kind invitation & many regrets that 
 I cannot accept it & with my best regards to M rs . Faulkner I 
 remain, 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 Your friend, 
 James Buchanan 
 Hon Charles J Faulkner 
 
 Mr. Faulkner was preferred by Wise over Floyd for Secretary 
 of War, but Floyd was more popular, and Wise finally recom- 
 mended his appointment. 
 
 (H. S. P.) 
 
 Attorney General's Office 
 July 23, 1859. 
 My dear Sir : 
 
 Though I do not doubt that you have seen the article in the 
 Pittsburgh Post which proposes you as a candidate for re-elec- 
 tion, I enclose it to you, nevertheless, with the suggestion that 
 perhaps you may regard this as a good occasion for declaring your 
 unalterable determination to retire. 
 
 The enclosed letter from Barr was sent me by Dawson. Barr 
 seems to be afraid of misconstruction, and his conduct is cer- 
 tainly not altogether such as frees him from the imputation he is 
 afraid of. But I am satisfied that he meant nothing but good to 
 you as well as to the party. I think, too, that his editorial article 
 is not calculated to do the slightest injury to either. 
 
 It is extremely probable that your enemies will charge you with 
 acquiesing in the position which the Post places you in, unless you 
 define one for yourself. But on all this subject I do not persume 
 
56 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 to advise. Your better judgment will determine your course 
 without reference to anything which I say. 
 
 About the time you return, I shall be under the necessity of 
 going to Western Pennsylvania where I have much to do, and 
 where I have some friends who continue to 
 
 " Yearn o'er the little good, and pardon my much ill." 
 
 While there, I may be tempted to buy myself a residence suited 
 to my narrow circumstances and simple tastes. But my atten- 
 tion has been somewhat strongly turned to Anandale. I saw 
 Stamburgh a little while after you left, and though I asked him 
 no questions about it, he said that I could easily make an arrange- 
 ment (he did not mention how) by which I could get it. Your 
 name was not mentioned. I take it for granted, therefore, that 
 in purchasing it from you I would not be interfering with any 
 rights or supposed rights of his. That being the case, I should 
 be very much obliged if you will name the price and the terms 
 on which you are willing to part with it. Ceteris paribus I would 
 prefer it greatly to any other place in the world, on account of the 
 neighborhood to Wheatland. Perhaps in retirement, I can per- 
 form the duties of a friendship sincere enough to make you some 
 little atonement for my faults as a public officer. A simple line 
 stating the price and in what payments is all I ask. 
 
 I ought to add that I would not have troubled you about this 
 matter except that I am troubled myself with offers from other 
 quarters which I am unwilling to reject absolutely until I Have 
 at least some idea how Anandale can be got. 
 
 I am very respectfully, 
 To/The President, yours & c. 
 
 Bedford Springs, Pa. J. S. Black 
 
 (L. C.) 
 
 Washington 5 August 1859 
 
 My dear Sir/ 
 
 I regret to learn from M r Drinkard that your health has not 
 improved so much as we all expected & desired. I trust in 
 Heaven, that we may speedily receive information of a more de- 
 cided improvement. In the mean time I beg you not to feel the 
 slightest uneasiness on account of your absence from the Depart- 
 ment. However desirable your presence might be, still this is of 
 no consequence when compared with the restoration of your 
 health. Although we would get along much better with you ; 
 yet M r Drinkard & myself can do the business. Let your mind 
 rest entirely easy on this subject. 
 
 We returned from the Bedford Springs on Tuesday evening 
 last. I have had occasion whilst there, as at all former periods, 
 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE KANSAS PROBLEM 57 
 
 to observe the wonderful effects of these marvellous waters. 
 Their virtue, however, is confined to diseases of the liver, the 
 stomach & the kidneys, & to all bilious complaints. When your 
 brother informed me that you were not suffering- under any of 
 these maladies, I was reconciled to go to Bedford without you, 
 though I had set my heart on enjoying your company. 
 
 I do not know of any news which would be interesting to you 
 that you do not see in the papers. I have done my best to assure 
 the public that I would not be a candidate for renomination or 
 re-election ; though I learn that the Richmond Inquirer still in- 
 sists that I am a candidate. The editor knows better, though the 
 object is plain. It is to create a pretext for charging me with 
 hypocrisy & falsehood. Well let it be so. I have not seen the 
 paper myself. 
 
 Speculations still continue as to who will be the next Candidate 
 for the Presidency. I had not a very good opportunity of ascer- 
 taining the public sentiment of Penn a on this subject whilst at 
 Bedford nor has this been formed ; but there is considerable talk 
 both of Lane & Breckenridge. 
 
 With my kindest regards to M rs . Floyd, I remain always sin- 
 cerely & respectfully your friend, 
 
 James Buchanan 
 Hon : John B. Floyd 
 
 (H. S. P.) 
 
 Healing Springs, Va., 
 8th August 1859. 
 My dear Sir : 
 
 I was in the act of writing to you when I received your very 
 kind letter. I cannot express adequately the grateful obligation 
 I feel under to you, for your thoughtful consideration of me since 
 my unfortunate attack : and for what is still more gratifying to 
 me, your kind sympathy for my wife before she left Washing- 
 ton. It has been the theme of her constant conversation since she 
 joined me & has made an indelible impression upon the gratitude 
 of us both. 
 
 I have not had the heart to write you before, for I desired 
 when I did so, to be able to say with some degree of . . . (not 
 clear) hope that my condition was improved. But this I can- 
 not assert. I do not see that this slight improvement I have made 
 in any thing beyond the effects of the mere quiet & rest which 
 this secluded nook insures. The carbuncle I suffered from, is 
 scarcely improved, although these waters have a marvelous reputa- 
 tion for efficiency in all such cases. I have some reason to fear 
 that the true seat of the disease is spinal which discourages me. 
 
58 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 I pray for vitality enough to make me fully able to perform the 
 duties of my office, and to contribute my humble share towards 
 that triumph of your administration, which as certainly awaits 
 you as the expiration of your time; and which is with me the 
 cheerful & strongest wish of my life. 
 
 I have talked a good deal to gentlemen from all quarters of the 
 country since I came to the mountains and the sentiment of ap- 
 proval of you & your course amongst the Democracy is both 
 universal & hearty. In this State the masses are as sound & as 
 united as they ever were upon any national issue & the course of 
 the Enquirer will effect nothing but its own ruin. I have not as 
 yet met with a single advocate of Mr. Wise for the Presidency in 
 this State, not one. This I think remarkable considering the 
 popularity he did possess, and extraordinary efforts he has been 
 all the time making. But if he had any advocates I think his 
 last, his very last letter to New York would have shaken them 
 loose from him. How this letter is generally supposed to be a 
 forgery for even Wise's folly is scarcely thought to be capable of 
 such a stupendrous blunder. I am more than ever confirmed in 
 the opinion that he is a deranged man. 
 
 Here as you found it in Pa., the chief prominence is given to 
 Breckinridge & Lane in the public conversation for the presidency. 
 If Lane's friends make no mistake, his prospects will be better 
 than those of any other man I know. There is a feeling of great 
 kindness expressed for him by everyone, and those to whom the 
 idea of his candidacy is new are strongly impressed with his 
 availability. 
 
 Mrs. Floyd has been confined to her room ever since she joined 
 me owing partly to rheumatism & somewhat to an injury she re- 
 ceived to one of her knees as she came out. She is recovering 
 however now, and will be well I hope in a short time. She begs 
 you will accept her most respectful regards and with kindest re- 
 membrances of us both to Miss Lane. Believe me my dear Sir 
 to be most 
 
 Sincerely your friend, 
 To his Excy. John B. Floyd 
 
 James Buchanan 
 
 President of the U. States 
 
 Letter of Buchanan to Floyd. L. C. 
 
 (Note by Judge Robt. W. Hughes of Va.) 
 Letter of Mr. Buchanan, showing the relations 
 which subsisted between him and Gov. Floyd 
 throughout his administration until near the 
 end. 
 
 R. W. H. 
 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE KANSAS PROBLEM 59 
 
 Soldiers Home, Sunday 14, August 1859 
 My dear Sir/ 
 
 Our good friend, Mr. Buck, is about to proceed to the Healing 
 Springs tomorrow morning & I embrace the opportunity of writ- 
 ing to you. I have received your kind favor of the 8 th Instant & 
 desire again to assure you that we are getting along quite well in 
 your absence. Any little inconvenience experienced is nothing, 
 less than nothing, compared with the restoration of your health. 
 Compared with this, an additional absence of three months would 
 not be regarded. You ought to relieve your mind altogether from 
 business, cultivate agreeable society, study to obtain Christian 
 tranquillity of spirit, & avoid all depression of mind. We all in 
 this neighbourd feel deep solicitude about M rs . Floyd & yourself 
 
 [sic] 
 & indulge the agreeable anticipation of having you both with us 
 again in the Autumn. 
 
 M r . & M rs . Thompson left for the White Sulphur yesterday. 
 He is not to be absent more than a fortnight. M r . Cobb is now 
 daily expected ; but I suppose the next Cabinet meeting will con- 
 sist of General Cass, Mr. Jones, Mr Holt & myself yet we shall 
 get along very well. General Cass is most remarkable, not only 
 for benevolence & ability at his great age, but for physical quali- 
 ties. He does not seem to regard one of his dangerous attacks a 
 button. He is as sprightly & lively the next morning as though 
 he had enjoyed peaceful & uninterrupted slumbers the night be- 
 fore. I pray Heaven he may last throughout my term at least : 
 & many years after. He & I are now about the last of the " old 
 Fogies," & we must soon surrender the Government to you young 
 fellows. I hope you may not make smashing work. 
 
 Wise doesn't believe that I will not be a candidate ; but says he 
 has knocked my aspirations into a cocked hat. Your military 
 candidate, General Lane, has sustained a sad blow in losing his 
 State. I am sorry for it ; but it may not prostrate him. I mourn 
 over Wise, because I cannot forget his active & efficient friendship 
 in the hour of need. If he should " bag Boston " he will have a 
 chaos of troublesome game in his wallet. 
 
 (The remainder of the President's letter pertained to some 
 minor appointments.) 
 
 (L. C.) Washington 
 
 Aug. 12. 1859 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 We all feel much anxiety, respecting your condition. I was 
 rejoiced to learn from Col. Drinkard yesterday, that you were 
 somewhat better, and that appearances were more encouraging. 
 
60 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 I trust, my good friend, that you will keep up your spirits, for 
 that is an essential element of recovery, and especially when a 
 man is blessed with the genial disposition, which Providence has 
 given to you, and which makes for you such hosts of attached 
 friends. We never meet in Cabinet, without the interchange of 
 regret at your absence and of hope, that we shall soon see you at 
 your post, not less for the sake of the Country, than for our own 
 sake. The President participates in this feeling, as strongly as 
 any of us. 
 
 As to political affairs, I feel little disposition to write you about 
 them. I am impressed with the conviction, that our party is be- 
 coming more consolidated, and the importance realized of united 
 action. Certainly the signs of the times are better. I will not 
 believe, that there is any such judgment against this Country in 
 store, as the defeat of the Democratic party, and above all at this 
 crisis. 
 
 Trusting we shall see you here in good, and with my 
 
 best respects to Mrs Floyd [sic] 
 
 I am my dear Sir, 
 Ever your friend 
 Lew Cass 
 Hon. J. B. Floyd 
 
 (H. S. P.) Sweet Springs Va. 
 
 Aug. 21 st . 1859. 
 To 
 
 His Excellency 
 James Buchanan 
 My dear Sir : 
 
 I have been in the mountains a week today — during the time I 
 had one real shaking ague. This annoyed me no little, and the 
 confinement & medicine necessary to break the chill, were more 
 annoying still. On yesterday I felt entirely restored and left the 
 White Sulphur for these Springs. We reached here last eve- 
 ning. The whole establishment is crowded & our accommodations 
 are inferior to what they were at the White Sulphur. I spent all 
 the evening with Gov. Floyd and Mrs Floyd. They are most 
 comfortably situated and both look better than I was prepared 
 to find. Mrs Floyd is thinner and feebler than when you saw 
 her last but still she walks without limping. Gov. Floyd's skin 
 is clear, his flesh is somewhat reduced, and he only complains of 
 debility. I am now encouraged since I saw him. 
 
 I wish very much you had visited these Springs instead of 
 going to Bedford, or rather I wish you could still visit them. The 
 Mountains are full of people of character & influence. They 
 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE KANSAS PROBLEM 61 
 
 want to see you and a visit would be very highly appreciated by 
 the people. Gov. Floyd thinks it would be a great point if you 
 come, politically. 
 
 In all the speculation there is literally nothing new. 
 
 Your friend, 
 
 J. Thompson 
 I shall certainly return next Saturday or Sunday. 
 
 (H. S. P.) Red Sweet Springs 
 
 5th Sept. 1859. 
 To His Excy. 
 
 James Buchanan 
 President of the U. S. 
 My dear Sir: 
 
 It is just two months today since I left Washington in hopes of 
 finding health in the mountains, which it seemed I would not re- 
 cover at home. I am sorry to say the improvement has not fully 
 answered my expectations. Although not well I am in a meas- 
 ure relieved and, probably if I had allowed the ingredient of ad- 
 vancing years to take its place in the calculations, my improvement 
 is all I should have expected. At any rate I am not the least dis- 
 couraged but on the contrary, fell that I will command the 
 strength for my duties; & that too with a full appreciation of 
 what they will require. Indeed the necessity I feel there will be 
 next winter for health & strength nerves me far beyond all the 
 mineral waters of the mountains. When we get fairly into the 
 conflict, I am sure I shall be fully restored. 
 
 I am of the opinion from all I gather this summer from every 
 source, that, the effort, next winter will be to crush the Demo- 
 cratic party by breaking down your Administration at any cost & 
 by every means which unscrupulous malignity can devise. I 
 think that no previous Congress carried on such a warfare ever, 
 as will characterize the next. But I feel in my inmost man, that 
 I shall bring up & maintain my column in your support, & I would 
 sooner die than to relinquish the trial. 
 
 If we are beaten in the organization of the House, defeat will 
 promote cordiality & bitter discipline amongst our party in Con- 
 gress : which will be our immense gain upon the hermaphrodite 
 organization of the last House under fat Orr, with its spirit of 
 political insubordination. If we are beaten in the House you can 
 control the party easily. You are really very strong with the 
 people ; you have only to dictate your policy & to excommunicate 
 all who fail or refuse to sustain it, to organize the party & secure 
 harmonius action sufficient to carry whatever their united strength 
 can accomplish. You have power in the South because you are 
 
62 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 identified fully with the conservatism of the South: & this was 
 never stronger than it is today. The efforts to form extreme 
 parties here this summer have signally failed. Nothing could be 
 more pitible than the abortive efforts of Gov. Adams, on the Slave 
 trade question. The movement did not rise to the dignity of con- 
 tempt, so too with regard to a project attempted to be gotten up 
 for the " peaceful colonization " of Sonora, a sort of varialoid 
 form of filibustering. 
 
 Amongst others I met here your friend, Mr. Branch of North 
 Carolina. He is far above the generality of Congress in point 
 of talent, & superadded to this, he has the mind of being a true 
 friend of yours & your Administration. 
 
 You would be greatly impressed, I am sure, to witness the pro- 
 found & almost criminal indifference of all men & all papers upon 
 the subject of the next presidential nomination. The only points 
 universally agreed upon are that Douglas & Wise are "... over 
 Tailors." The fiat of the people has gone forth against them. 
 Douglas' last exposition of Squatter Sovereignty will finally ex- 
 tinguish him. Besides being the most objectionable in principle, 
 it is the most sophistical thing that has come from the Little 
 Giant's inscrupulous pen. 
 
 I shall not avail myself of your kind & considerate " leave of 
 absence " to so late as first of the fall ; although the offer of it in 
 the terms you were good enough to use touched me most sensibly. 
 I will return shortly to my post. 
 
 I fear I have scarcely been able to preserve as you suggested 
 " a Christian Cheerfulness," although my mind has been exercised 
 with scriptural associations. I . . . much on " the chosen people 
 of the Lord." The next room is occupied by a remnant of " the 
 children of Isreal," and since their illustrious progenitors threw 
 down the walls of Jerico with the thunder of their ram's horns, 
 I am sure no such Isrealitish drone as my friends keep up con- 
 stantly has ever saluted gentile ears. The next best thing to the 
 New Testament, no doubt, is the Old to engage one's thoughts. 
 
 Mrs. Floyd joins me in the kindest regards to Miss Lane & 
 yourself with which I beg to assure you I am always truly your 
 
 friend, 
 
 John B. Floyd 
 
 (L. C.) 
 
 My dear Sir/ 
 
 In preparing your instructions to the commanding Officer at 
 Harper's Ferry it will be necessary to point out to him in what 
 case he may interfere in the requisition of the Marshal. You 
 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE KANSAS PROBLEM 63 
 
 had better see Judge Black so that your instructions to the Com- 
 manding Officer & his to the marshal may correspond 
 
 Y r . friend 
 
 James Buchanan 
 Governor Floyd 
 
 1859 (Oct.) 
 It refers to the instructions to be given to 
 Col. Robert E. Lee, who was sent to reduce 
 John Brown at Harper's Ferry 
 
 R. W. H. (Note by Judge 
 
 Robt. W. Hughes 
 
 of Norfolk, Va. 
 
 It is not the purpose of this note to review the whole Scott- 
 Buchanan controversy over General Scott's " views." The matter 
 has been thoroughly treated by Buchanan, Black and Curtis. 
 (One of the places most easily available is Curtis, Vol. II, chap. 
 XIV and pp. 365-368; 416; 417.) The following is a good sum- 
 mary of Buchanan views on the subject, adding a bit of new in- 
 formation. It was written to Edwin M. Stanton before he had 
 joined the Republicans. (L. C.) 
 
 Wheatland, April 8, 1861. 
 My dear Sir : — 
 
 Many thanks for your kind favor of April 3rd and that which 
 preceded it. 
 
 From the notes of preparation it may be fairly inferred that 
 the Administration intends to make a hostile demonstration some- 
 where in the Confederate States. If so, Virginia will, I fear, 
 speedily secede. 
 
 Your recollect, perhaps not, for it has attracted but little atten- 
 tion North, the very unfortunate recommendation of Gen. Scott 
 to garrison nine forts including Fortress Monroe in six of the 
 States which afterwards seceded. This document was dated on 
 the 29 October i860, — before the Presidential election & before 
 any disloyal movement on the part of any State. It excited much 
 indignation throughout the South, caused the violent and unspar- 
 ing abuse of its author throughout the Southern States & afforded 
 the pretext, if not the reason, for their rash & unjustifiable con- 
 duct in seizing the forts. When in conversation with Mr. Slidell, 
 I denounced Louisiana for having seized the Forts on the Mis- 
 sissippi, he declared they would never have thought of such a 
 proceeding but for the threatening communication of General 
 Scott. I wish you would get his " View " which he sent to the 
 Secretary of War and myself under his own hand. I know they 
 were communicated immediately to the South but not by whom, 
 
64 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 & I think their substance was at once heralded in the New York 
 Press. I should be very much indebted to you if you would 
 ascertain when they were first announced in the public " Press." 
 It is not very long since they were published in the National In- 
 telligencer with some prefactory remarks no doubt dictated by 
 the General himself. No man but General Scott could ever have 
 written such a paper ; but it was sufficient to set the South on fire. 
 It was under such circumstances, when the Forts in Charleston 
 harbor were in no danger, as the event has proved, before South 
 Carolina had seceded & whilst she was performing all her rela- 
 tive duties to the Union that I was urged to send reinforcements 
 there and commence the conflict. This too at a time as General 
 Scott must have known when I had not more than 500 troops 
 disposable for any purpose. I deemed it wise policy to adopt all 
 means in my power to prevent the other Slave States, who did not 
 favor disunion, from making common cause with South Carolina 
 which was a disunion state per se. Never was a prediction better 
 calculated to its own fulfilment than the " Views " of General 
 Scott. 
 
 I have enjoyed excellent health since my return to this place & 
 have not been sick a single minute notwithstanding what the 
 papers say. I feel ten years younger though time rolls on apace 
 & I shall be 70 years of age on the 23 d of this month should 
 Providence spare my life. 
 
 I should be very happy to see you here ; but should be sorry if 
 you would neglect important business to come without necessity. 
 I do not perceive that such exists to the present moment. You 
 would be still the more welcome should you bring Mrs. Stanton 
 along. — I should be more content in my present situation were it 
 not for my anxiety about the state of the country. 
 
 From your friend, 
 Hon. Edwin M. Stanton. James Buchanan 
 
 P. S. You will observe that General Scott cites Paley's Philoso- 
 phy in favor of coercion, " Last Chapter " & there is not a word 
 in that or any other Chapter of the book to give the slightest 
 countenance to the principle he asserts. Paley instead of the 
 Constitution ! 
 
 (It might be added that at the time Scott presented his 
 " Views " there were not enough troops to garrison the forts in 
 the South. Floyd had had some difficulty getting enough troops 
 to quell some Indian troubles in Oregon, and General Houston 
 waited in vain for more troops to aid in driving marauders who 
 were making raiding parties on Texas from Mexico. Scott had 
 also conceded the legality of secession which the President did 
 not admit. At the time of the above letter Scott had evidently 
 become a coercionist.) 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 Buchanan's Ministers 
 
 Buchanan's Ministers as a Factor in his Policy — Sources of In- 
 formation — Relations of Each of the Members of the Cabinet 
 with the President on the Eve of Secession : Cobb, Thomas, Dix, 
 Cass, Stanton, Holt, King, Toucey, Floyd, Black, Thompson — 
 Buchanan's Valuation of his Cabinet — His Contact with the Lead- 
 ers of the Democracy. 
 
 After the results of the Election of i860, Buchanan had no 
 doubt as to opposition which was to follow. The sun of success 
 had cast dying rays on the ante-bellum Democracy. He ably 
 stated his unenviable situation in his book published some years 
 later, 
 
 The President had less than four months to complete his term 
 of office. The Democratic party, to which he owed his election, 
 had been defeated, and the triumphant party had pursued his 
 administration from the beginning with a virulence uncommon 
 even in our history. Every act of his had been misrepresented 
 and condemned, and he knew that whatever course he might pur- 
 sue, he was destined to encounter their bitter hostility. No public 
 man was ever placed in a more trying position. 1 
 
 The situation was hardly less trying to the several members of 
 the cabinet. The plight of the members from the Southern states 
 was indeed exceedingly unenviable. How were their political 
 ideas and ideals going to react to the events that were to follow? 
 The President's task was the securing and retaining of a group 
 of ministers who would subscribe to his principles and remain 
 with him to the end of his term. The very existence of his gov- 
 ernment was bound up with this delicate undertaking. 
 
 Each of the members presented a different phase of the problem, 
 and will be separately considered. There arises the question as to 
 what Buchanan really thought of his Cabinet and how far they 
 really entered in his schemes and plans for the solution of his 
 difficulties. 
 
 The sources for this portion of the study must be carefully 
 
 1 Buchanan, p. 109. 
 
 65 
 
66 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 weighed by any one who attempts to synthesize them. Black, 
 whose accounts are most voluminous, became rabidly anti-Southern 
 in his later years. He was also, unconsciously, very egotistic. 
 Stanton in private conversations did not hesitate to vilify his 
 former friends, and tried to enlarge the halo around his own head. 
 Holt, Dix, and King became Republicans during the war and 
 tried to increase their " coercive " record in matters applying to 
 the South, once they had repudiated their political faith of former 
 days. Holt tried to straddle, in his attempts to praise both 
 Stanton and Buchanan. Buchanan was annoyed at Holt's ex- 
 travagant remarks on Stanton. Floyd spent most of his time de- 
 fending his own position, — a fact which can well be tolerated 
 owing to the malignity of his enemies. The statements of Thomp- 
 son and Thomas are probably the most reliable. Few statements 
 by Toucey are available. He and Buchanan were the only ones 
 who changed the least all the way through the war period. All 
 of the Cabinet (except Stanton) paid notable tributes to Buchan- 
 an's character and ability, but they never lost a chance to say a 
 good word for themselves when they differed with him. Conse- 
 quently we have many variations of impressions of events in that 
 exciting period. 
 
 One of the main conditions that must be mentioned is that all 
 of the Northern members of the Cabinet were very hostile towards 
 certain United States Senators whom Buchanan naturally held in 
 high favor. Their dislike against these men is so apparent that 
 their scathing remarks must not be too seriously considered. 
 
 Cobb, who had considerable political influence in his own State 
 long before he came into the Cabinet, was the first member to 
 resign. One of Buchanan's main reasons for appointing him 
 was that he had been a strong Unionist in 1850. By 1861 Howell 
 Cobb had come to look upon a Republican Presidential victory as 
 a menace to republican institutions. 
 
 Black said of his character: 
 
 No one who knew him, either as a co-worker or an opponent, 
 could help respecting him. He was honorable, upright, and sin- 
 cere, true to his convictions, perfectly faithful to his duties as he 
 understood them, and a man of great intellectual ability. la 
 
 i a Philadelphia Press, August 21, i88i f 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 67 
 
 Cobb held that the election of Lincoln justified secession and 
 had consequently vigorously dissented from Buchanan's message 
 of December 3d but decided to remain in the cabinet. By De- 
 cember 5th he had made up his mind to follow his state and wrote 
 a public letter to the people of Georgia. (Black had previously 
 suggested they both present their views to Buchanan, let him de- 
 cide, and that the rejected one should quit the Cabinet; but this 
 hurt Cobb's feelings, and Black apologized.) The letter set his 
 course, and his resignation followed. 2 
 
 The parting was a heart-wrench for both President and Min- 
 ister, but it was inevitable. Buchanan passed no judgment upon 
 the political opinions of his ministers regarding Secession, but 
 Cobb had now gone over into the realm of action. 3 Both held 
 each other in high esteem, and after Buchanan's retirement Cobb 
 wrote him an affectionate note in which he said : 
 
 My heart often prompted me to write you ; but whilst you re- 
 mained in Washington, I declined to do so because I knew that my 
 opinions differed so widely from yours that any suggestions from 
 me would be obtrusive and unacceptable. Though silent I sym- 
 pathized with you in every embarrassment which you encountered 
 and rejoiced with all my heart when the fourth of March came 
 and relieved you from troubles which your counsels would have 
 avoided but which were forced upon you by the folly and madness 
 of your enemies and the enemies of your country. 4 
 
 The brief period of service of Philip F. Thomas in Buchanan's 
 Cabinet and the exact reasons for his resignation are well told by 
 himself. An abridged account is here inserted. His views are 
 extremely valuable as he did not become a Republican nor did 
 he belong to the extreme Southern group. 
 
 You will perhaps remember that I had for eighteen months 
 been Commissioner of Patents, a place which I preferred and 
 would again prefer to any under the government were I in active 
 political life. 
 
 My appointment as Secretary of the Treasury was entirely un- 
 expected. . . . 
 
 2 Philadelphia Press, August 21, 1881. 
 
 3 A. H. A., 191 1, Vol. II, p. 505-519. 
 
 4 A. H. A., 191 1, Vol. II, p. 554. 
 
68 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 He then tells how he was informed first by a Colonel Berrett 
 and later by Thompson : 
 
 I explained to him that I was averse to accepting it. I said I 
 did not, in the then chaotic condition of affairs, like to assume such 
 a responsibility especially in view of the fact that the Treasury 
 was empty and the interest on the public debt due within a very 
 few days. Mr. Thompson insisted, and I finally accepted the 
 place. 6 
 
 The Treasury then was indeed in a sorry shape. There wasn't 
 a dollar available and a loan had to be negotiated before the 
 interest on the debt could be paid. 5a Soon after my assumption of 
 the office, Congress passed an act authorizing a $10,000,000. loan, 
 and I at once advertised for $5,000,000 at 12 per cent interest. 
 This large rate of interest was demanded on account of the un- 
 settled condition of the country both financially and politically. I 
 was very much opposed to issuing any more of the loan authorized 
 than was necessary to pay the interest on the public debt. My 
 opinion was that the act of Congress had given ample authority for 
 issuing Treasury notes to meet the necessities of the Government 
 after the interest on the debt was paid. My first desire was to pay 
 the interest and then issue Treasury notes for the balance of the 
 $10,000,000. instead of paying 12 per cent interest on the whole 
 loan. Mr. Buchanan, however, disagreed with me and thought 
 that the full amount of $10,000,000 should be negotiated. I there- 
 fore advertised for the additional $5,000,000. 
 
 This loan was the direct cause of my leaving the Cabinet before 
 the expiration of Mr. Buchanan's term. It was reported to me 
 that some New York capitalists had gone to Mr. Buchanan and 
 said that they would not subscribe for the loan as long as a 
 Southern man remained at the head of the Treasury. I visited 
 Mr. Buchanan and asked him if it were true that he listened to 
 such a reflection upon the honor of one of his Cabinet officers. 
 He replied that such a statement had been made to him. I an- 
 swered, " Very well, then, my connection with the Department 
 must cease." He spoke about my taking the Interior Department 
 from which Mr. Thompson had resigned. I replied in the neg- 
 ative and wrote my letter of resignation. I had, of course, dis- 
 agreed with him somewhat as to his Southern policy, and assigned 
 that as the reason why I left the Cabinet. What was disagreeable 
 to me was that any man should question my fidelity to the trust I 
 held, no matter how much I disagreed as to Mr. Buchanan's politi- 
 cal policy. 
 
 5 Philadelphia Press, August 14, 1881. 
 
 5a This was not due to any maladministration by Cobb. See E. P. Ober- 
 holtzer, " Jay Cook, Financier of the Civil War," Philadelphia, 1907, vol. 
 I, pp. 124-7. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 69 
 
 My service in the Cabinet was anything but an agreeable part 
 of my public life. We were almost constantly in session during 
 the month. I was at the head of the Treasury ready to meet any 
 emergency that might arise, and there were grave responsibilities 
 coming upon us every day. While I held that this Government 
 was a compact between the States and that each was sovereign and, 
 therefore, had the right of secession, I also held that the central 
 Government had the right of coercion if she chose to exercise it. 
 
 A Believer in Nullification 
 I was and still am a believer in the doctrine of nullification as 
 expounded by Mr. Calhoun. I also believed that an officer of the 
 Government had no right to hold his position and do any act 
 calculated to bring discredit upon its authority, and Judge Black's 
 criticism of Jeff Davis' preparation to surrender the forts in 
 Charleston Harbor to South Carolina meets my entire approbation. 
 My position upon the duty of an officer can be found in the record 
 of the Department where an officer of a revenue cutter ran his 
 vessel into Charleston Harbor and turned her over to the South 
 Carolina authorities and then sent me his resignation. I ordered 
 that it be not accepted, and that dishonor be written over his record 
 in the Department and that he be dishonorably dismissed from the 
 service. 
 
 Thomas' successor was John A. Dix of New York. His rela- 
 tions with Buchanan have already received some notice in this 
 study. A vigorous, active man, he possessed a love of sensation- 
 alism. He had been made Postmaster at New York after the 
 default of Isaac Fowler. He had opposed the action of Dean 
 Richmond at the Charleston Convention (Richmond was a pro- 
 Douglas man), and had flayed the Republicans with invectives 
 equal to those of Black. 
 
 As has been stated, the New York bankers were wary about 
 taking up the loan, for fear the money would go South. It has 
 been sometimes stated that Buchanan appointed Dix 6 to please 
 this group. This was not the case. Buchanan was angry at the 
 action of the New York bankers and wrote to Royal Phelps 7 
 (December 22, i860) : 
 
 I hope the Treasury Note Loan may be taken at a reasonable 
 rate of interest. No security can be better, in any event, whether 
 the Cotton States secede or not. . . . 
 
 6 Morgan Dix, " Memoirs of John A. Dix," Vol. I, Chap. VIII. 
 
 7 King, " Turning on the Light," pp. 187-188. Ibid., p. 47. 
 
70 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 I cannot imagine that any adequate cause exists for the extent 
 and violence of the existing panic in New York. Suppose, most 
 unfortunately, that the Cotton States should withdraw from the 
 Union, New York would still be the great city of the continent. 
 We shall still have within the borders of the remaining States all 
 the elements of wealth and prosperity. New York would doubt- 
 less be somewhat retarded in her rapid march; but, possessing the 
 necessary capital, energy and enterprise, she will always command 
 a very large portion of the carrying trade of the very States which 
 may secede. Trade cannot easily be drawn from its accustomed 
 channels. I would sacrifice my own life at any moment to save 
 the Union, if such were the will of God ; but this great and enter- 
 prising nation is not to be destroyed by losing the Cotton States 
 even if this loss were irreparable, which I do not believe unless 
 from some unhappy accident. 8 
 
 Buchanan had sent for Dix to take charge of the War Depart- 
 ment. 
 
 Stanton, however, sent King to the station to ask Dix to accept 
 only the Treasury. Dix carried out the instructions. 9 Buchanan 
 replied that " he thought he could make the arrangements." 10 He 
 may have intended to transfer Thomas to the Interior Department, 
 but Thomas resigned instead. 
 
 As Dix stayed at the White House with Buchanan, their rela- 
 tions were very intimate. Nothing clearer could be desired for 
 proof that Buchanan was running his own government, than the 
 fact that Dix and he were not agreed upon the policy of re-inforc- 
 ing the forts. 11 Dix had no adequate conception of the Southern 
 temperament, so he considered Buchanan slow and timid. 12 But 
 he found Buchanan set on the very wise idea that the North 
 should not start the war, — an idea to which, he states, the President 
 
 8 Some said this letter showed Buchanan was willing to part with the 
 Cotton States, but there is no statement of what Buchanan intended to do so 
 anywhere in the letter, nor did he in any other place say he favored any 
 such idea. 
 
 9 King, " Turning on the Light," p. 189. 
 
 10 Dix, " Memoirs of John A. Dix," Vol. I, p. 371. 
 
 II Ibid., pp. 371, 372. 
 
 12 See 11 : His statement on Buchanan's credulity is amusing. It may be 
 true to the extent that Buchanan was wont to go to the bottom of all 
 rumors no matter of what nature. He was in this sense credulous to 
 some degree. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 71 
 
 clung with uncompromising tenacity. Dix came to respect Bu- 
 chanan for his ability, and above all for his conscientiousness. 13 
 Mr. Buchanan found Dix a very ' agreeable and pleasing com- 
 panion, and their friendship continued until Buchanan's death. 
 
 The " shoot him on the spot " telegram which Dix sent to New 
 Orleans had a great run of popularity in the Northern press and 
 gave Dix considerable fame. In reality it was a farce. The 
 poor meek old gentleman to whom it was sent barely escaped from 
 New Orleans with his life when the message became known. Dix 
 correctly believed that Buchanan would not have allowed him to 
 send the message, so it was sent without Buchanan's knowledge. 
 Buchanan, however, never reproved Dix for having sent it. It 
 is to be admitted, however, that the telegram had a very salutary 
 effect in keeping Northern confidence back of the Administration. 
 
 Later Dix became an intimate with Bennett, who had become 
 one of Buchanan's able vilifiers, yet he had opposed Bennett's ap- 
 pointment to a post at Turin. The failure to appoint was, in 
 Buchanan's opinion, the chief source of the trouble. During the 
 war he became an ardent supporter of the Republicans. In De- 
 cember, i860, he had favored, like many other conservatives, 
 peaceful separation, provided the South aided in attempting com- 
 promise. He regarded Sumter as a cardinal error, and withdrew 
 all his sympathy after that event. 14 Later he exploited his 
 " deeds " to the limit in his latter career. 
 
 One of the most talked of resignations from the cabinet in 1861 
 was that of General Cass. Buchanan's dislike of him has been 
 already mentioned. This psychological fact played an important 
 role at the time of his departure from the Cabinet. Black con- 
 sidered Buchanan's pique as unfair, although he said Cass took 
 it good-naturedly. 15 Consequently the differences of President 
 and Premier were few, as the latter was little more than a cypher 
 as far as Buchanan was concerned. 
 
 In the winter of 1 859-1 860, Cass was already extremely worried 
 
 13 Rhodes omits most of Dix's remarks that are laudatory of Buchanan. 
 
 14 " He went into the war because by the action of the South the chance 
 of peaceful separation had been destroyed." Morgan Dix, " Memoirs of 
 John A. Dix," Vol. I, p. 340. 
 
 15 Moore, Vol. XI, pp. 57, 58. 
 
72 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 over the fate of his country, and came late at night to the house 
 of Roger Pryor, who had made a speech looking towards disunion, 
 and urged him to save the country that had made him (Cass) 
 what he was. 16 
 
 When Buchanan's message of December 3, i860, was before the 
 Cabinet, it was altered to suit Cass, who wished to strengthen the 
 denial of the right to coerce a State. Later, however, the Secre- 
 tary became anxious to reinforce Sumter, and gave that as the 
 reason for his resignation. 17 
 
 McLaughlin had tried to deny that Cass desired to return to the 
 Cabinet by giving statements of Cass' relatives that Cass never 
 said anything to them on that subject. McLaughlin is right and 
 wrong. The cause of Cass' silence to his family was probably 
 due to the fact that his son-in-law had persuaded him to resign. 
 Black thought Cass' son-in-law and others were at the bottom of 
 the matter. Naturally he kept his mind to himself, as he had no 
 desire for further criticism from members of his own household. 18 
 
 When Black told Buchanan that Cass would resign, Buchanan 
 said it was a good riddance, and later recorded that Cass was no 
 man for a crisis such as they then had on their hands. Black, 
 however, desired Cass to return. 19 
 
 Buchanan was angry because the resignation of Cass had put 
 him in a false light with Northern opinion. Some of the papers 
 praised Cass for his action and called Buchanan a traitor. 20 
 Buchanan saw that if Cass returned it would appear as a victory 
 for Cass at his expense. He, therefore, was opposed to the idea 
 of having him return to his official family. The affair taught 
 him that if anyone else left his Cabinet, because of alleged lack 
 of diligence on his own part, it would spell ruin to the Government. 
 Buchanan's Government must in the last resort rest upon con- 
 servative Northern opinion, and he realized that fact. Person- 
 ally, he was pleased that Cass was out of the way. Cass, when 
 
 16 Mrs. Pryor's " Reminiscences of Peace and War," pp. 100, 101. 
 « Ibid. 
 
 18 Andrew Cunningham MacLaughlin, " Life of Lewis Cass," New York, 
 1 891, pp. 340-41. 
 
 19 Moore, Vol. XI, p. 64. An excellent letter on the subject. 
 
 20 B-9-, The Worcester Spy ran a headline : " Buchanan Abets Treason." 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 73 
 
 he saw the abuse which he had caused to be heaped upon his old 
 chief, regretted his resignation. Black believed his main reason 
 for retiring was that he feared the immediate destruction of the 
 Administration, and desired to save his own good name. He said 
 the sentiment in his own section would not sustain him if he re- 
 mained. Black, however, persuaded him to return, and ap- 
 proached Buchanan upon the subject, but Buchanan replied that, 
 as the world had heard all about the trouble in the four days that 
 had ensued, it was too late for him to reconsider Cass* resigna- 
 tion. 21 
 
 It is interesting to note that a friend of Buchanan's, Henry 
 Wycliff, said the same thing as early as 1857. " Although Gen. 
 Cass when in Gen'l Jackson's cabinet was not accustomed to 
 decide questions that arose . . . but left them to the decision of 
 the President who thought unfavorably of him in this regard. . . . 21a 
 
 Mr Buchanan desired in his own defense to tell the truth con- 
 cerning Cass' desire to retract his resignation. Black, from loy- 
 alty to Cass, would not give Buchanan the details unless Buchanan 
 would remain silent about them. Buchanan refused to do this. 
 The President never overcame the idea that Cass had treated him 
 shabbily. When he was requested to contribute something to 
 the Michigan statesman's biography, Buchanan replied, not with- 
 out due courtesy, that he was never associated with the General 
 in his prime, and did not feel qualified to write a sketch of him. 22 
 
 21 Curtis, " Life of James Buchanan," Vol. II, p. 400. 
 
 Rhodes has a different version of this affair. Black's letter to Curtis 
 (See 19) was evidently unknown to him. It is one of those many instances 
 where he refused to give Buchanan the benefit of the doubt. 
 
 21a Henry Wycliff to Buchanan, Dec. 6, 1858, H. S. P. Thompson and 
 Holt also chided Cass with his desertion. See footnote 22. 
 
 22 Moore, Vol. XI, p. 460. 
 
 Thompson's Account (year uncertain), as reported by Burr of the 
 Philadelphia Press, March 14, 1884: 
 " Cass was one of the best old fellows that ever lived, but he loved his 
 ease and hated to differ with any one. I recall an interesting incident when 
 he resigned. The next morning he sent a request that I should call and see 
 him. I went and found the old fellow a good deal disturbed in mind. He 
 said to me : ' Thompson I want you to see the President for me. I want 
 to recall my resignation. I believe I ought to stay with the Administration 
 
74 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 Stanton, who was to fill the vacancy made by Black's transfer, 
 was a peculiar personality. 
 
 He could reach the heights of great love of country, yet blend 
 this virtue with baseness to his friends and contemptible cruelty 
 to his foes. A nervous disorder seems to have existed in his sys- 
 tem which, as in the case of skin disease in Peter the Great, gave 
 rise to wonderful energy. A love of power was his mastering 
 passion, nor was he scrupulous as to means to obtain it. 
 
 Prior to his appointment, Stanton had received many favors at 
 the hand of Black who at this time was much attached to him. 22a 
 and see it through its trouble.' ' I am glad to hear it. I agree with you 
 exactly. You should stand by the President,' I replied. ' Well, you go and 
 see the President in the morning unless you should hear from me in the 
 meantime,' he said. I promised, but before the time arrived for me to see 
 Mr. Buchanan and request a withdrawal of the resignation, Judge Black 
 had been appointed, and General Cass sent me word that he would let it 
 stand." 
 
 Buchanan wrote Toucey that " on December 17, i860, both Mr. Thompson 
 and Judge Black informed that they had held conversation with General 
 Cass on the subject of his resignation." Curtis, Vol. II, p. 600, answered 
 on p. 621. 
 
 See text above. 
 
 Judge Holt to Burr, of the Philadelphia Press, 1881 : 
 
 " I reasoned with him after I knew of his determination, and reasoned 
 with him against his act. He said : ' Holt, you are a Southern man, and 
 represent a very different constituency from mine. You can stay, but I 
 cannot, for the sentiment of my section will not sustain me.' I reasoned that 
 it was the duty of every man who was loyal to the Union to stay and do his 
 best to save the Union." 
 
 A letter written to Black some time in i860 by a Mr. Shunk, perhaps his 
 son-in-law, gave him a good warning which he did not heed. It read as 
 follows : 
 
 " You may depend upon it that Stanton is not a perfectly fair man. Don't 
 start. I have made up my mind upon that point not hastily or rashly but 
 upon sufficient evidence. Mr. Randolph is one of my authorities. He has 
 promised to show me letters from Stanton to him in which Mr. S. tells him 
 that he has no influence upon you whatever — that he is not upon intimate 
 terms with you and that in California matters you don't consult him at all. 
 . . . You may rely on it that he has not done the fair thing with you. He 
 has suffered you to bear all the odium of any disagreeable things you may 
 have done even at his suggestion by representing that he was not on terms 
 of intimacy with you." — Black Papers, L. C. 
 
 22a " Stanton we all know was a tree of his own planting around whose 
 infant roots a good deal of Federal comfort in the way of fees were laid." 
 Baltimore Gazette, July 9, 1878. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 75 
 
 He was also on terms of personal friendship with Buchanan. 
 Before his Cabinet appointment he had been employed under 
 the direction of Black in contesting California land grants upon 
 the behalf of the United States Government. When Aaron V. 
 Brown, Postmaster-General, died, Black had urged Stanton on 
 Buchanan as Postmaster-General, but Thompson was more suc- 
 cessful, and Holt was appointed. 
 
 The reason for his appointment was that Black 23 had had 
 some legal business before the Supreme Court with Stanton, and 
 desired to have a personal friend in the Attorney General's De- 
 partment. 24 Black was very fond of Stanton at this time, but 
 later became his bitter opponent. 
 
 In later life Stanton said that Buchanan had asked his opinion 
 before writing the message of December, i86o. 24a Stanton 
 claimed that he had convinced the President of the right of the 
 Federal Government to coerce a State. 25 Black said that it was 
 all a lie. The best reason he gave was that Stanton approved of 
 Black's memorandum of i860 to the President, which is known 
 to have been an entirely different opinion. 26 It is probably true 
 that Stanton interviewed Buchanan on this subject, but the result 
 upon Buchanan was far from Stanton's view of the matter be- 
 cause Buchanan wrote his niece long before the controversy arose 
 that Stanton knew little constitutional law. 27 Buchanan was in- 
 clined to under-rate rather than over-rate Stanton's ability. 
 
 In 1862 Thurlow Weed published an exaggerated report of this 
 Cabinet scene 28 in which it would seem that the Cabinet had de- 
 liberately insulted Buchanan by peremptorily handing in their 
 resignations because he was inclined to send Anderson back to 
 Moultrie. Stanton seems to have made the most of it among his 
 Republican friends, but he admitted it was exaggerated though 
 " substantially correct." Weed's article was not only exaggerated, 
 
 23 Black, " Black's Works," p. 269. 
 
 24 Moore, Vol. XI, p. 247. 
 
 24a See preparation of the message below. 
 
 26 See Henry Wilson, Atlantic Monthly, Vol. XXV, p. 236; Vol. XXVI, 
 pp. 468, 469. 
 
 26 Black, " Black's Works," pp. 275-276. 
 
 27 Curtis, " Life of James Buchanan," Vol. II, p. 522. 
 
 28 Curtis, "Life of James Buchanan," Vol. II, p. 519. 
 
76 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 but his data was incorrect as he included Dix, 29 who was not in 
 the Cabinet at that time, as among the members. No member of 
 the Northern group ever spoke to the President at this time di- 
 rectly about resigning save Black, and perhaps Toucey (See 
 below). 
 
 Weed was not entirely to blame, for he received the news 
 thirdhand, 30 and only wrote what he heard. On the other hand 
 he was the paid agent of the Government, and used his material 
 without inquiry to injure an old enemy. Upon such matters Bu- 
 chanan was altogether too thin-skinned, and he was much of- 
 fended by the incident. He said he could have ignored it in 
 America, but he was very sensitive about his reputation in Eng- 
 land. 
 
 As there will be occasion to discuss this note later, the sole 
 question that here arises is whether or not Stanton deliberately 
 insulted the President. Black emphatically said that such was 
 not the case. 31 When the President asked the opinion of his 
 Cabinet upon the question of ordering Anderson back to Fort 
 Moultrie, Stanton replied that anyone who participated in such an 
 event would be hanged like Andre, and a President of the United 
 States who would make such an order would be guilty of trea- 
 son. 32 This was strong language, but it was clothed with proper 
 decency, and not spoken directly at Buchanan. 
 
 Black, at an earlier date, had said that no minister of England 
 ever urged his sovereign to relinquish a post capable of being de- 
 fended without being brought to the block. Buchanan had 
 thought Black's expression a harsh one, but did not deny it. 
 Buchanan had never at the time or later believed that Stanton 
 had intended to insult him, although he was rather hurt at the 
 matter as will appear later. Holt says Buchanan answered, " Oh, 
 no ! Not so bad as that, my friend, — not so bad as that ! " and 
 raised his hands depreciatingly at Stanton's remarks. 
 
 29 For the story and Dix' refutation see : Morgan Dix, " Memoirs of 
 John A. Dix," New York, 1883, Vol. I, pp. 37&-380. 
 
 30 Curtis, " Life of James Buchanan," Vol. II, pp. 520-521. 
 si Moore, Vol. XI, p. 266. 
 
 32 Gorham, " Edwin M. Stanton," Vol. I, p. 158. For a slightly different 
 version see : F. A. Flower, " Stanton, the Autocrat of the Rebellion," New 
 York, 1905, p. 95. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 77 
 
 This was Stanton's first " official " appearance in the Cabinet. 
 Had Buchanan believed Stanton intended to be discourteous, he 
 would have discharged him at once; and Black, who loved Bu- 
 chanan as a brother, would have applauded his action. It is to 
 be noted that in his statement of the case, which has been given 
 in Flower's biography 33 and has been set forth above, and which 
 he had prepared, but did not give to the public, Stanton neglected 
 the aftermath of the incident. 
 
 Thomas, who remained a Democrat to the last, and who was 
 personally more or less indifferent to Buchanan, supplies the miss- 
 ing data and dispassionately reviews the incident. In answer to 
 the question, " Were the Cabinet meetings of those days har- 
 monious ? " he replied : 
 
 " Naturally there was more or less feeling displayed in the dis- 
 cussion of the Southern question. Floyd at times got quite 
 boisterous. I shall call to mind one occasion especially when the 
 President chided both Black and Stanton for some remarks cal- 
 culated to provoke heated discussion. Judge Black had said that 
 there never was a time when a Cabinet Officer could propose to 
 give up a Fort capable of being defended without being brought 
 to the block. Floyd got very excited at this, and Buchanan 
 thought the expression a very harsh one and rather took the 
 Judge to task for making such positive expressions, likely to stir 
 up discussions. Then turning to Mr. Stanton he called his atten- 
 tion to some vigorous remark some days before in relation to 
 Southern affairs, and expressed his emphatic disapproval of such 
 harsh expressions. Indeed he spoke very sharply to Stanton, but 
 he took it without reply. Indeed Mr. Stanton had very little to 
 say during those days rather seeming to stand behind Judge Black 
 who was his friend." 34 
 
 The idea of Stanton's great influence is partly due to the fact 
 that Buchanan's policy seemed to change somewhat about the 
 time Stanton entered the cabinet ; and because of eulogies heaped 
 upon Stanton by Henry Wilson, Senator Hoar, Flower, and 
 others. Even Stanton's tempered biographer accepts that theory. 
 There is a statement by Secretary Thompson which would seem 
 
 33 Flower, " Stanton, the Autocrat of the Rebellion," p. 95, for a digested 
 account. Flower is an ardent admirer of Stanton and very anti-Southern 
 in feeling. 
 
 ^Philadelphia Press, August 14, 1881. 
 
78 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 to credit such an idea but the whole theory is based upon the 
 fallacy of false cause. 35 ' 36 
 
 The change in Buchanan's tactics was due to Anderson's inter- 
 ference with his policy; the inflamed condition of the Northern 
 public press ; to an increasing distrust of the South and their ac- 
 cusing him of breaking a pledge, and to the councils of Judge 
 Black, who felt that he would have to withdraw from the cabinet. 
 Thompson did not know of this interview, therefore he thought 
 the change was due to Stanton. 
 
 It was not Stanton, but Black, who presented the objections to 
 his note to the South Carolina Commissioners to Buchanan. 
 
 Stanton, speaking of it, said : 37 
 
 " Judge Black is closer to the President than myself and exer- 
 cises a great deal of influence over him. He will present the 
 written objections which I have prepared 37a and stand by for the 
 purpose of extricating the President from his present peril." 
 
 Stanton's influence with Black no doubt was a considerable 
 factor, but Buchanan considered him too rash and impulsive a 
 councilor and Buchanan detested rash council. 
 
 In 1862 Buchanan said the course of his ministers was without 
 parallel. However, in the heated condition of the public mind at 
 that time, such course was only prudent, as a denial would not 
 have been believed by anybody. 38 
 
 In the main Stanton's attitude was agreeable and as deferential 
 as Buchanan and Black had said. 39 He showed the same trait 
 
 35 Gorham, " Edwin M. Stanton," Boston, 1899, Vol. I, p. 189. 
 
 36 A. H. A., 1911, Vol. II, p. 532; Thompson to Cobb, January 6, i860. 
 
 37 Stanton to Robinson of Pittsburgh, December 30, i860; Flower, " Stan- 
 ton, the Autocrat of the Rebellion," pp. 90, 91. 
 
 This is due to the fact that a short time before, Black, without the knowl- 
 edge of Thompson, had his interview with Buchanan, Stanton became a mem- 
 ber of the cabinet. 
 
 37a Black, not Stanton, wrote the first copy. 
 
 38 Moore, Vol. XI, p. 263. 
 
 39 " Perhaps no calumny that was uttered against him hurt his feelings or 
 injured his character more than that by which he was represented as being 
 bullied and dragooned by Stanton and others. Stanton never but once ven- 
 tured beyond the line of mere obsequiousness and then was driven back to 
 his place cowering under the lash of the President's reprimand." — Philadel- 
 phia Press, August 21, 1881. 
 
 This is practically the same statement as made by Thomas. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 79 
 
 when Schofield 40 came to take over his office at Johnson's order. 
 Stanton was never a brave man when he felt the ground slipping 
 under his feet. It is certain that he tried Lincoln's patience more 
 than Buchanan's because he had greatly swelled out with his suc- 
 cess at running the Union war machine. 41 At times he behaved 
 like a Nero. 
 
 He did not put on high manners in the Cabinet. 42 He loved 
 power but was not yet sure of himself. When Stanton feared 
 dethronement he always resorted to flattery. 43 Long before the 
 Weed letter was known, Buchanan had written to his niece com- 
 menting upon Stanton : 
 
 i 
 
 He never took much part in cabinet councils, because his office 
 did not require it. He was always on my side and flattered me 
 ad nauseam. 44 
 
 Moreover, Buchanan was not particularly favorable towards 
 Stanton at first, but seemed to have liked him better as time went 
 on. Blaine wisely observes that if Stanton had possessed the in- 
 fluence he claimed, Buchanan would have vetoed the Morrill 
 Tariff Bill, which Stanton opposed. 45 
 
 In his letters to Buchanan, Stanton, before he became Secretary 
 of War, displays all due respect for his chief, but some of these 
 letters were so indecent in condemnation of Lincoln that Bu- 
 chanan's relatives courteously kept the worst ones out of print. 46 
 
 Stanton had intrigued with Sumner and Seward officially for 
 the " safety of the Union," but, in the minds of others, his object 
 was to get office under the Republicans. The failure of " Old 
 Abe " to appoint him was doubtless the cause of his bitterness. 
 Upon his appointment to the War Office, Stanton began to turn, 
 and later poured out similar torrents of abuse upon his old Demo- 
 
 40 Poore, " Perley's Reminiscences," Vol. II, p. 230. 
 
 41 A. K. McClure, " Lincoln and Men of War Times," pp. 170-173. 
 
 42 Black, " Black's Works," p. 273. 
 
 43 Poore, " Perley's Reminiscences," Vol. II, p. 230. 
 
 44 Moore, Curtis, Vol. II, p. 523. By this he meant he was for upholding 
 his prerogative. This was probably a private letter and could not have been 
 intended for public use. Buchanan had no idea of what was coming. 
 
 45 Blaine, " Twenty Years of Congress," Vol. I, p. 562. 
 
 48 McClure, " Lincoln and Men of War Times," pp. 157, 158. 
 
80 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 cratic friends. He utterly lacked self-control but never suffered 
 much for it. He was honest, and too able for Lincoln to dis- 
 charge. Lincoln patiently endured his contemptible meanness. 
 Flower glories in the indications of the fact that Stanton aided in 
 getting ready to impeach Buchanan if he disapproved of his 
 policy. 
 
 When Stanton encountered Andrew Johnson, he found a man 
 who had an energetic tongue as himself, and the same disposition 
 to use it. The result was that, despite all his writhing and a great 
 deal of partisan support, he came to a well-merited downfall. 
 
 The conclusion is that Stanton had but little influence with the 
 President, but that he proved of aid to Black's views in cabinet 
 discussions. Public honesty, love of country, and ability are the 
 bright side of the picture, but he also showed extreme and dan- 
 gerous duplicity to those he served. He was the type of man who 
 is to be avoided, or at least not treated with confidence. 
 
 It is one of the paradoxes of history that Holt seems to have 
 received his first major appointment from a man whom he later 
 ceaselessly pursued with a malignant hatred. Aaron V. Brown 
 (Tennessee), Postmaster-General, died in 1857. Buchanan, ac- 
 cording to Thompson, said : 
 
 " I want a man for the Postoffice Department who has no heart. 
 Brown was a man of great ability, but he was altogether too good- 
 natured to withstand the appeals and intrigues of the people who 
 had business with his Department, and things want to be straight- 
 ened out down there. It will take a strong, resolute man, with 
 none of the milk of human kindness in his veins, to do the work." 
 
 " I have got just the man for the place in my Department," said 
 Mr. Thompson. " He will fill the bill exactly." 
 
 " Who is it ? " asked two or three members of the Cabinet in 
 the same breath. 
 
 " Joe Holt," Thompson replied. 47 
 
 There was a laugh all around. Black brought up Stanton's 
 name, and for several days a contest ensued, with the final result 
 that Holt was appointed. 
 
 Holt furiously repudiated the above statement, and claimed his 
 appointment was due to some personal services which, unknown 
 
 47 Philadelphia Press, probably March 4, 1884. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 81 
 
 to Thompson, had brought him to the President's attention. 48 
 Probably both men were partially correct. 
 
 Holt did some vigorous work in the Postoffice Department. 
 Three famous dismissals were Westcott of Philadelphia, Fowler 
 of New York, and Cook of Chicago. From the start he filled the 
 bill. While he disclaimed any disagreement in later years when 
 he had become rabidly anti-Southern, Holt seems to have been 
 more favorable to Buchanan's policy than Black or Stanton. On 
 the other hand, he had become so disliked and feared in Southern 
 circles, that when his nomination was sent to the Senate to succeed 
 Floyd as Secretary of War, Slidell and other Senators left no 
 stone unturned to secure its defeat. Southern papers 49 said that 
 Buchanan was going over to the Coercionists. Holt's brother 
 disapproved of any violent measure, and begged Holt to come 
 away before war started. 50 Holt's agreement with Buchanan's 
 policy was repeatedly and vigorously expressed upon various oc- 
 casions. One is as follows : 
 
 I wish distinctly to say that I believe Mr. Buchanan was in all 
 respects and at all times true to the union. He believed and so 
 did I, that a war during his administration, especially if we began 
 it, would result in the destruction of the Union. It was his policy 
 to preserve the peace if possible and hand over the Government 
 intact to his successor. Mr. Stanton, Judge Black, and myself 
 differed at times with him as to the best way to do this, but we 
 were agreed that it must be done. 
 
 It was Holt who figured in the severing of friendly relations 
 between Buchanan and Slidell. Slidell had secured the appoint- 
 ment of his brother-in-law, Beauregard, to promotion over five or 
 six other officers. Holt annulled the promotion and Slidell wrote 
 a note to Buchanan, desiring to know whether he was responsible 
 for Holt's action. Buchanan upon receiving the letter handed it 
 to Holt and said, " Read this." Holt wrathfully replied, " Mr. 
 President, we have heard this crack of the overseer's whip over 
 our heads long enough. This is an outrage, — it is one that 
 Senator Slidell has no right to address you." " I think so myself 
 
 48 Pamphlet of Holt against Thompson, pp. 8-9, L. C. 
 
 49 E.g., Richmond Enquirer, January 5, 1861. 
 
 50 Holt to Holt, Yazoo City, January 10, 1861, L. C. 
 
82 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 and will write him to that effect," the President answered. " No," 
 said Holt, " I feel that I have a right, Mr. President, to ask that 
 you do more than this ; that you will say to Senator Slidell with- 
 out explanation that this is your act ; for you know that as Secre- 
 tary of War I am simply your representative, and if my acts as 
 such are not your acts, then they are nothing." 
 
 The President agreed, and wrote on the spot a reply in which 
 he informed Slidell that Holt's " acts in the line of his duty are 
 my own acts, for which I am responsible." 
 
 Buchanan and Holt were warm friends at the close of the Ad- 
 ministration. Buchanan said warmly, " Holt, you have been 
 true." " I have tried to be," was the response. 52 ' 53 
 
 He also wrote an excellent testimony in his official letter of 
 resignation, which Buchanan deeply appreciated. Later Buchanan 
 felt somewhat estranged due to a speech in which he thought Holt 
 praised Stanton too highly, and again, when some time after- 
 ward, he accepted a Republican position. No doubt Holt had 
 the Weed story in mind, and the fact that he had been silent in 
 1863, when in 1881 he said: 
 
 I never had a doubt but that at some time justice would be 
 done him and his Administration. It could not be done in the 
 heat of war which followed it. No man's word in its behalf, no 
 matter how prominent his loyalty, would have been accepted or 
 his motives understood. 54 
 
 The quarrel between Holt and Thompson was long and bitter. 
 Holt was exceedingly vindictive. Dix and Black said to each 
 other that Thompson and Holt were both good men, and they 
 hoped it would cease. 
 
 When Holt was made Secretary of War, Horatio King, who 
 had survived the Silliman letter episode, was elevated from the 
 place of First Assistant to Postmaster-General. 54a During the 
 
 51 Crawford, S. W., " Genesis of the Civil War," p. 276. Crawford says 
 it was a place at West Point. Holt in the Philadelphia Press in 1881 says 
 promotion. King, " Turning on the Light," p. 57, gives the letter. West 
 Point is mentioned. 
 
 52 Philadelphia Press, August, 1881, H. S. P. 
 
 53 Also Holt Pamphlet, 1861, L. C. 
 
 54 Philadelphia Press, 1881, H. S. P. 
 
 54a King was appointed acting Postmaster-General, January 1, 1861 ; he 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS S3 
 
 early part of December he had busied himself in getting people of 
 Northern sentiments to bombard the Administration with letters, 55 
 and had devoted himself to trying to persuade the President to 
 still the voice of the Constitution, which was going over to Seces- 
 sion, although it was still supposed to be the organ of the Ad- 
 ministration. 
 
 Buchanan probably did not desire to be accused of suppressing 
 a publication solely because of its political views. The paper 
 increased in volume of its tone, and he finally wrote the editor a 
 private letter requesting him to state that its opinions were not 
 his own. The editor immediately complied with the request with 
 a statement in his paper (December 27, i860). In January the 
 President finally felt justified in rescinding the Government ad- 
 vertising in the Constitution's columns, and this fact, and its fall- 
 ing off in circulation soon caused its death. 
 
 King was one of the few members of a department to be pro- 
 moted to its head. He fulfilled his duties very acceptably, but 
 does not seem to have enjoyed much of Buchanan's confidence 
 until after his term was over, when he helped the ex-President 
 gather some of the material for his book. 56 During the Civil 
 War some of the old Cabinet received favors under the new 
 regime. King accepted a position in the Bureau fixing the value 
 of freed slaves. This political apostasy mortified Buchanan some- 
 what, but he was too kind-hearted to pass any censure on King. 
 
 King had journalistic talent, and even took a hand at writing 
 poetry. He collected some of his articles in a book " Turning on 
 the Light," published in 1895. Many of the articles contain 
 valuable primary material, and testify to the fine traits of Bu- 
 chanan's character. 
 
 His anti-Southern views, which increased as years went on, 
 spoiled much of his work. His later article calling Toucey a 
 Secessionist is incorrect in its charge, to say the least. He also 
 gave some wrong impressions on the state of Buchanan's health, 
 
 was nominated by the President on the 1st of February; and confirmed by 
 the Senate in the appointment on the 12th of February. King, " Turning 
 on the Light," p. 14. 
 
 55 King, " Turning on the Light," Chapter I. 
 
 06 See letters in Curtis, Vol. II, from King to Buchanan. 
 
84 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 and the reasons for Floyd's and Cobb's resignations. 57 His book, 
 however, served a real need, and, notwithstanding some errors, is 
 a valuable one of the period. 
 
 Few persons have suffered more from historical injustice than 
 Isaac Toucey, Buchanan's Secretary of Navy. An attempt will 
 be made to recount his relations with Buchanan at the close of the 
 Administration and to dispel some popular delusions that have 
 been propagated to his detriment. 
 
 There are three erroneous impressions concerning Toucey's 
 policy at this period : the first, that he was a Secessionist ; the sec- 
 ond, that he deliberately scattered the fleet at this juncture ; and the 
 third, that he was a colorless, negative sort of individual. 
 
 57 Pamphlet by King privately published, New York, 1894. 
 
 Holt's Changes of Mind : 
 
 The following excerpt shows Holt's attitude on the date mentioned: 
 
 " I am still for the Union because I have yet a faint hesitating hope that 
 the North will do justice to the South and save the Republic before the 
 wreck is complete. But action to be available must be prompt." From 
 Robert Gourdin, quoting a letter of Holt, November 30, i860, letter of 
 Gourdin, January 27, 1861, L. C. 
 
 On the 14th of March he wrote Buchanan that the new administration 
 seemed to be pacific and was pleased with the idea. See Moore, Vol. XI, 
 pp. 167, 168. 
 
 On May 24th he declared that Buchanan made a mistake in not sending 
 troops to Sumter. He was much opposed to the South at this time. See 
 Moore, Vol. XI, pp. 196, 197. 
 
 But in 1881 he said : " I am convinced that the feeling that they first fired 
 upon the flag aroused our people to a point of enthusiasm which carried 
 us through the war." See King, " Turning on the Light," p. 121. 
 
 " But when you take into consideration the conspicuous party divisions, 
 the peaceful inclination of our people, and the attitude of Congress, it is 
 easy to see that those acts of conciliation on the part of the Government 
 and its officers at the time were wisest and best." Philadelphia Press, Au- 
 gust, 1881. 
 
 The following statement was made over the removal of Post-master 
 Cook in Chicago : 
 
 "I shall moreover never for a moment place my judgment or wishes in 
 conflict with yours, to which it is my pleasure to defer." Holt to Bu- 
 chanan, December 6, 1859. 
 
 Buchanan believed Cook had been framed, and was inclined to sustain him. 
 Later, however, he was allowed to resign as his conduct seemed to have 
 been irregular. It shows who was the President in fact as well as name. 
 Holt was one of the strongest men in the cabinet. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 85 
 
 Toucey was one of the ablest constitutional lawyers of his day. 
 He had been Attorney-General for a time under Polk. His repu- 
 tation as a legalist was among the first in his State. Unlike the 
 rest of the Cabinet, save Cass, he was a man of somewhere near 
 Buchanan's age, and like him held views characteristic of the 
 period that was drawing to a close. 
 
 Toucey was not a Secessionist. When Buchanan's first mes- 
 sage (December 3, i860) came up before the Cabinet, Floyd's 
 diary 58 states that Toucey approved it while the Southern mem- 
 bers opposed it on the Secession issue. He alone endorsed Bu- 
 chanan's first draft to the South Carolina Commissioners, 59 and 
 did not hesitate to oppose Stanton in the matter, a fact that Stan- 
 ton took pains to remember by vilifying his name at a later date. 60 
 When Buchanan declined to move Anderson back to Moultrie 
 upon Hunter's request, Toucey again endorsed Buchanan's stand 
 as the only thing possible under the circumstances. 61 The very 
 fact that Toucey supported the President, who all the while op- 
 posed the constitutional right of Secession, is evidence enough. 
 
 Black did not like it because Toucey seemed disinclined to " go 
 crosswise" of the President, 62 but Toucey had no reason for 
 doing so. Black also was angry because he thought Toucey told 
 Buchanan the Brooklyn could not clear the bar at Charleston. 
 Hence the idea he gave that Toucey was indifferent. 63 
 
 The error regarding Toucey's scattering of the fleet was prob- 
 ably based on a very partisan congressional report, which was 
 characteristic of the Republicans at that period, before he left 
 office. Later Toucey himself was called to testify before another 
 committee, where he handed some very hot shots to Congress. 
 He showed that the home squadron was unusually large at the 
 time as compared with some previous periods. He had desired 
 converting some of the ships into steam frigates. As to the ships 
 out of repair, he had notified Congress of the fact; Congress, 
 
 58 Pollard, " Lee and His Lieutenants," p. 794. 
 69 Crawford, " Fort Sumter," p. 149. 
 
 60 Gideon Wells, Diary, Vol. II, pp. 272, 273. 
 
 61 Crawford, "Fort Sumter," p. 159; Trescott to Cobb, January 14, 1861 ; 
 A. H. A., 1916, pp. 529, 530. 
 
 62 Philadelphia Press, 1881. 
 
 63 Black to Buchanan, January 19, 1861 ; Black Papers, 1861-1862. L. C. 
 
86 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 however, had not only paid no heed, but had seen fit to cut the 
 appropriations of the Department. 64 
 
 Although a rather taciturn man, Toucey had plenty of spirit. 
 The following letter is a vigorous statement of his political faith 
 and indicates a vigorous character. The matter of Fort Pickens 
 is thoroughly discussed. 
 
 Ex-Gov. Toucey to Buchanan, June 5, 1861 : 
 
 My dear Sir : 
 
 I find myself obliged at last to reply to your very welcome letter 
 without being able to give a copy of the joint Order which Mr. 
 Holt & myself sent to the military & naval forces near Pensacola. 
 It was prepared as I understood by Mr. Holt upon consultation 
 with General Scott & with his full concurrence, & sent to the 
 Navy Dept., where I certainly concurred in it & affixed to it my 
 official signature. I have written to the present Sec. of the Navy 
 for a copy but get no answer. I recollect very well the object & 
 purport of it. It was issued during the session of the Peace 
 Convention at Washington to prevent a collision & to hold things 
 for the time being in statu quo. The troops on board the Brooklyn 
 were not for the present to be landed nor any aggressive move- 
 ment to be made, if the troops on the other side abstained from 
 any attack & from any further preparation for attack. The 
 Order was a very stringent one against any hostile movement or 
 preparation by the Secessionists and required in that event the 
 most prompt & vigorous action by the U. S. forces. Mr. Holt 
 undoubtedly has a copy of it. I shall hereafter send you one if 
 I can obtain it. 
 
 The naval force assembled at Pensacola under y r . Adm n . con- 
 sisted of the Steam Ship Brooklyn, the frigate Sabine, the sloop 
 of War Macedonia, the Steamer Wyandotte, & for a time the 
 
 64 Senate Reports, 37th Congress, 2d session, No. 37, pp. 58, 59, 234. 
 
 For the account of the Toucey- Ward expedition prepared to relieve Sum- 
 ter, see Curtis, Vol. II, p. 621. 
 
 The committee had to satisfy itself by criticising Toucey for allowing 
 certain officers to resign who later joined the confederates. The same thing 
 happened in England during the Ulster troubles when British officers re- 
 signed rather than fight their own people and who no doubt would have de- 
 fended Ulster had she been attacked, yet no serious criticism was made 
 against them. England is still the home of much honest common sense. 
 The Minority Report said no evidence proved that Toucey knew of the 
 future intent of those officers. 
 
 Senate Reports, 37th Congress, 2d session, No. 87, p. 13, et seq. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 87 
 
 sloop of War St. Louis. Without including the troops on board 
 the Brooklyn, this Squadron c d . have thrown a re-inf orcement of 
 six or seven hundred men into Fort Pickens at any time. I have 
 not been able to discover that any additional force has been sent 
 there. The only list I have seen, one recently published, compre- 
 hended no more. There was never any difficulty in re-inforcing 
 Fort Pickens. This was perfectly well understood. However 
 all that makes no difference. The re-inforcement under this 
 Adm n . is trumpeted as a great feat, although they have only done 
 what we were prepared to do, & enabled them to do, at any 
 moment. 
 
 I am surprised that young Seward sh d . say anything that might 
 be considered an attack on the peace policy of y r . Adm r . for I 
 called on Gov. Seward at the State Dept. soon after he assumed 
 its duties & the tenor of his language was altogether for peace & 
 conciliation, & I was as strongly impressed by it as Judge Camp- 
 bell appears to have been on another occasion. However we 
 ought not to be surprised at anything. The present Federal Ex- 
 ecutive has cut loose from the restraints of the Constitution & 
 laws, & is now carrying on without authority the most disastrous 
 war this country was ever engaged in — more disastrous than w d . 
 be a combined attack upon us by all the nations of Europe. What 
 right has a Pres*. of the U. S. to enlist for three years an army 
 of ioo or 150,000 men without the authority of Congress? 
 What right has he to blockade half our ports & to suspend our 
 commercial treaties with England, France & the other countries? 
 What right has he to disperse the militia of Missouri organized 
 and assembled under the laws of the U. S. & of Missouri with 
 the flag of the Union floating over them? What right has he to 
 seize the City of Alexandria & occupy it by force which he had 
 no authority to enlist, to arrest citizens for alleged offences 
 against the laws & shut them up in camp, proclaim martial law & 
 suspend the Habeas Corpus? What right has he by an order of 
 the Atty. Genl. to invade the sanctity of private correspondence & 
 seize summarily and simultaneously the private papers of all the 
 Northern Telegraph Offices? What right has he without con- 
 sulting Congress to plunge the country in a hundred millions of 
 debt to be followed inevitably by an immensely larger one? The 
 public mind may be paralyzed momentarily by atrocious usurpa- 
 tions, but they cannot pass unnoticed. A day of terrible reckon- 
 ing will certainly come. It w d . be a libel on the whole history of 
 this country to suppose that it can settle down under a military 
 depotism. 
 
 I left Washington on the 26th of March & went directly 
 home. I found my friends ready to receive me. They gave me 
 
88 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 an enthusiastic welcome. The Mayor of the City addressed me 
 & I responded. At the General Election which occurred on the 
 following Monday, it happened after a severe contest that the 
 Republicans in the City & town of Hartford were defeated by 
 more than 500 majority — a very gratifying result. But since that 
 time Fort Sumter has been cannonaded, the pacific policy which 
 you inaugurated which kept the border states in the Union, & 
 w d . have given the Union men of the Cotton States the ascendency 
 & brot them back to us, has been abandoned, the war policy 
 adopted, & the country precipitated into an abyss which no hu- 
 man eye can penetrate. 
 
 The morning I left for home, Judge Black called & spent an 
 hour with me. I understood it was his intention to continue in 
 Washington. He was still residing with Lt. Harrison where he 
 has been from the time he gave up his house on Franklin Square. 
 Mrs. Toucey wishes to be presented most kindly to yourself & 
 Miss Lane. Will you please present to her my warmest regards 
 & attachment 
 
 I am 
 
 With the highest respect & esteem 
 most faithfully 
 Your friend 
 
 I. Toucey. 65 
 
 During the war he suffered much petty persecution. At one 
 time during the Civil War his picture was taken from among the 
 portraits of the Governors in the State House at Hartford, but 
 with the subsiding of popular wrath it was restored. Buchanan 
 remarked that the Republicans were trying to make a scapegoat 
 of Toucey. 66 
 
 In the years that followed his Presidency, Buchanan wrote: 
 
 Our constant agreement in all important measures is a solace 
 and comfort and endears you to me in a peculiar manner. 67 
 
 The following are extracts from Mrs. Toucey to Buchanan's 
 niece, Harriet Lane. 68 
 
 65 From Buchanan Papers, H. S. P. 
 
 66 Moore, Vol. XI, p. 243. 
 
 67 Curtis, Vol. II, p. 587. 
 
 68 Buchanan-Lane Papers, L. C. October 9, 1862; June 19, 1863. 
 Toucey placed the following remarks in his official resignation: 
 
 " I have witnessed the indefatigable industry, the disinterested patriotism 
 the self sacrificing devotion, the anxious endeavor to be right in all your 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 89 
 
 You speak feelingly of our country's trouble. There is not on 
 the page of History a record of madness and folly as we have at 
 present. At this age of the world to resort to arms for the settle- 
 ment of any difficulty is an evidence that we have not so far 
 emerged from barbarism as we had supposed, and in spite of our 
 boasted progress the moral advance has been very slow. Surely 
 President Buchanan's policy was wise and Christian, and will be 
 thought so by all the world. One of the painful consequences of 
 this cruel war is the separation from Southern friends. We have 
 a lovely niece, the daughter-in-law of Gen. Polk, who is enscounced 
 on a plantation somewhere in Louisiana for whom we feel great 
 sympathy for so obnoxious is the family name, we are unable to 
 address letters to her nor she, nor any member of Gen. Polk's 
 family dare place their signature to letters to us sent by mail. . . . 
 
 Would that his [Buchanan's] mantle had fallen upon his suc- 
 cessor & that peace might have been preserved to our . . . har- 
 rassed country. 
 
 The writer once styled John B. Floyd the Black Sheep of the 
 Cabinet. Further search into the sources have led him to the 
 conclusion that it would be more just to call him the scapegoat of 
 Northern public opinion. 
 
 Floyd was a man of real personality and ability, save perhaps 
 in dealing with contractors. He was active, alert, always attend- 
 ing to his duties except when utterly unable to be about. The 
 administration of his office force seems to have been able. The 
 army was kept in as good state of fitness as the funds would 
 allow. He was generous, — too much influenced by selfish per- 
 sons for his own good. If he was careless in the giving of con- 
 tracts or funds of the Government, he was the same in his own 
 business. He was at least an able administrator, except on items 
 of finance. 
 
 Letters have been given in this material which show that Bu- 
 chanan never had a more loyal or devoted member of his Cabinet 
 than the Secretary of War. He has never been given due credit 
 for strongly disapproving of a plot to kidnap Buchanan suggested 
 to him by Wigfal. 69 
 
 decisions, and the consummate prudence and ability which have marked your 
 entire course through greater difficulties than ever before beset the path of 
 the chief magistrate of the country." Toucey to Buchanan. 
 69 North American Review, February, 1887, p. 179. 
 
90 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 There are three charges once believed about Floyd, all of which 
 have been disapproved. The charge that he used his position to 
 supply the South with arms ; that he plundered the Interior De- 
 partment bonds; and that he was a Secessionist at heart. Even 
 a Congressional Committee of his opponents was forced to admit 
 that he had not so prostituted his office. Even Mr. Rhodes has 
 deigned to admit this fact. He did, in i860, act as an agent of 
 some of the Southern States to buy some condemned muskets 
 which were purchasable by any bidder. If any one of the South- 
 ern States feared attack from any quarter, they certainly had a 
 right to buy arms from any place as a commercial transaction. 
 Such an act did not in itself indicate a wish to break the Union. 70 
 Most of the guns sold in 1859 were so poor that the State of 
 Louisiana, which bought some, refused to keep the contract. A 
 few small arms were distributed in advance, as had often hap- 
 pened before, in 1861, but were sent to Northern as well as to 
 Southern States. Others of the Southern States, for fear of 
 negro revolts, did not ask for their quotas in 1861 or several years 
 before that time. In any case, the amount was relatively of little 
 account. 71 Considering the things Floyd could have done and did 
 not do, points to much in his favor. 72 He sent nothing to Vir- 
 ginia; he knew the efficiency of the Southern cavalry, but sent 
 not a sabre ; he knew the Southern need of artillery, but sent not 
 a gun before December, i860. He sent no ammunition. By law 
 such guns as were shipped were shipped on application to the 
 Ordnance Bureau without any special order from the head of the 
 Department. 73 
 
 On the question of shipping from Pittsburgh to the South, 
 Floyd has again been charged with breach of trust. The oral 
 order was given to Captain Maynadier on October 20, i860, be- 
 cause Floyd was sick in bed. No great storm-clouds had yet 
 
 70 For the "Stolen Arms" see: Curtis, Vol. II, pp. 409-417; King, 
 " Turning on the Light," Chapter XVII ; Black, " Black's Essays," p. 266 
 et seq. 
 
 Black says the South did not get their quota (probably larger guns) in 
 i860. 
 
 71 King, ibid., pp. 198-199. 
 
 72 Tyler's Quarterly, January, 1921, p. 155. 
 
 73 Tyler s Quarterly, January, 1921, p. 155. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 91 
 
 arisen. There was no special reason for selecting Pittsburgh 
 save for convenience. The forts were not yet completed, but 
 precedents could be found where guns had been sent and mounted 
 on platforms in such cases. (Floyd's political attitude in this 
 period will be shown below.) On December 20th, Floyd gave a 
 final order for shipping these cannon. This was at a time when 
 things were relatively quiet. Only South Carolina had seceded. 
 It would be interesting to note whether Floyd gave this order 
 before he heard this news. Even then Floyd no doubt only 
 thought of being prepared against unconstitutional Northern acts. 
 There was also no reason to believe that other States would fol- 
 low, if something were done to compromise the difficulties. The 
 cannon were not sent to a firebrand State. 74 
 
 When the news reached Pittsburgh, there was a furore. A 
 mass meeting was held at which a friend of Buchanan's, William 
 Wilkins, and a brother-in-law of Stanton, James A. Hutchinson, 
 took a prominent part. 75 These men got into touch with Stan- 
 ton, who went to Buchanan about it. Buchanan saw nothing to 
 worry about, but he asked Black about the orders, and referred 
 a telegraph from Pittsburgh to Floyd immediately upon receiving 
 it. 76 Black said the orders were correct, 77 but privately advised 
 Buchanan to rescind the order in view of the excited condition 
 of affairs. 78 
 
 A committee was sent up to Washington from Pittsburgh in- 
 cluding Hutchinson. Stanton and the delegation saw the Presi- 
 dent. He consulted with Holt and as a result gave orders to 
 revoke the shipment. 79 Hutchinson telegraphed the order to 
 Pittsburgh and the matter ended. 80 There was no such extreme 
 excitement either in Washington or the South such as was to take 
 
 74 Ibid., October, 1923, p. 90. 
 
 75 Clipping, H. S. P. " Who Stopped the Cannon ? " 
 
 76 Tyler's Quarterly, October, 1923, p. 88. 
 
 77 Curtis, Vol. II, p. 309. 
 
 78 Black to Buchanan, " Xmas Night," i860, H. S. P. 
 
 70 There is considerable reason to believe that at this time Buchanan did 
 not expect any State to follow South Carolina out of the Union. E.g., 
 Trescot's opinion, A. H. R., April, 1908. Trescot's opinions in some cases 
 are not true to fact but I see no reason to doubt this one. 
 
 80 H. S. P. clipping: "Who Stopped the Cannon?" 
 
92 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 place at the end of the month. The secession of South Carolina 
 was not unexpected. It has yet to be proved that Floyd sent the 
 second order for any special reason. This was also sent before 
 the bond theft was discovered, which tends to discount the idea 
 that it was a peace offering of Floyd to the radicals of his sec- 
 tion as Buchanan and Black believed. 
 
 For some time before December, i860, Floyd's carelessness in 
 business matters had pained the President and some of his col- 
 leagues, 81 but had been endured because of compensating ability 
 in other lines. 
 
 Captain Meigs (consulting engineer, in charge of the building 
 of the Washington aqueduct) and Floyd had quarreled bitterly 
 over some contracts upon the building of the Capitol, and Floyd 
 had been on the point of resigning in September, i860. Floyd 
 wanted Meigs stationed elsewhere. Buchanan left the matter 
 with Black 82 as Attorney-General, who seems to have sustained 
 Floyd, as he remained. 
 
 In 1858 Floyd began to issue acceptances. In i860 he was 
 warned by Senator Benjamin that he might get into trouble in 
 case any accidents happened to the supplies. 
 
 The initial part of the story of the abstracted bonds has been 
 ably summed up by a Floyd defendant (Judge Robert M. 
 Hughes) : 
 
 During Buchanan's administration the Mormons had been giv- 
 ing trouble, and an expedition had been sent to Utah under Col. 
 A. S. Johnston to control them. It was called the " Utah War." 
 The troops had to be supplied by wagons across the Great Ameri- 
 can Desert, some of which were intercepted by the Mormons. 
 
 81 Black, " Black's Essays." 
 
 This was due to Floyd's insistence on the payment of a huge claim known 
 as the de Groot claim which Black, as Attorney-General, held illegal. 
 Buchanan became much vexed at Floyd's lack of financial finesse, and he 
 lost influence in such matters with the President. " Mr Buchanan's wrath 
 was thoroughly aroused when he heard of the Secretary's assent to the pay- 
 ment of a large claim in the face of the Attorney-General's opinion that it 
 was unjust and illegal. By his stern command the money was stopped be- 
 fore it reached the hands of the claimant." — " Black's Essays," p. 13. 
 
 (This is a statement of fact garbed in somewhat rhetorical language.) 
 
 82 Buchanan to Black, September 8, i860, H. S. P. See Meigs letter-book 
 (L. C.) for his hatred of Floyd. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 93 
 
 The slowness of communication caused great delay in the ac- 
 counts, and the panic of 1857 impaired the ability of Russel, 
 Majors & Waddell, the contractors, to handle their contract. 
 Floyd therefore, at their request, accepted their drafts or orders 
 upon him, to be charged against their earnings. If he had not 
 done so, the troops might have starved ; there was a clerk in the 
 Interior Department named Godard Bailey. His wife was a 
 cousin of Floyd, and he owed his job to Floyd. On December 
 19th it was discovered that he had abstracted from the invested 
 Indian funds of the Interior Department $879,000 of the state 
 bonds and turned them over to Russel, receiving as collateral an 
 equivalent amount of the Floyd acceptances. He claimed to 
 have done it to protect Floyd's reputation, on the theory that 
 Floyd would have to resign if the acceptances were protested. 
 (A. I. B. 259:270.) He gave Drinkard, Floyd's chief clerk, as 
 his authority for this supposed result ; but Drinkard denied that 
 he had ever said anything of the sort (A. I. B. 120). His specu- 
 lations had been going on since the previous July, and some of 
 the acceptances had in fact been protested as far back as Septem- 
 ber without any such result. There was never a syllable of evi- 
 dence to show that Floyd knew anything about it till the exposure. 
 . . . He left Washington so poor that he had to borrow money 
 to pay his expenses home. (Black 13; Rhodes, Vol. II, pp. in, 
 238.) The worst that had been said of him even by the com- 
 mittee ostensibly investigating the Interior Department, but really 
 investigating him, was that he was careless in keeping an account 
 of these acceptances. 83 
 
 The act was politically justifiable and legally much could be 
 said for it. In 1862 Black upheld the bonds, and accepted a re- 
 tainer from one of the holders. Caleb Cushing sustained them, 
 and three of the eight judges of the Supreme Court voted for 
 their legality. If Floyd was wrong, he was in good legal com- 
 pany. 84 
 
 The Government was in an embarrassing situation. Some 
 friends of Nahum Capen, Postmaster of Boston, and an intimate 
 friend of Buchanan, had inquired of Black and Buchanan about 
 the acceptances, and had been told that if Floyd did it it must be 
 all right. 85 Benjamin had spoken to the President about it quite 
 a while before. Buchanan replied that if Floyd had done it there 
 
 83 Tyler's Quarterly, October, 1923, pp. 90, 91. A. I. B. is 36th Congress, 
 2d Session, House Reports No. 78. 
 
 84 Tyler's Quarterly, October, 1923, pp. 92, 93. 
 
 85 According to Capen in a letter to Buchanan, December 9, 1861, H. S. P. 
 
94 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 must be a law for it, and referred him to Floyd. Benjamin then 
 asked about the authority. Floyd said it was an old custom. 
 Benjamin advised him to issue no more, due to risk to the sup- 
 plies from Indian attacks or other causes. Floyd consented, but 
 later did issue more. Benjamin advised him in the fall of i860. 
 The first issue had been in 1858. Buchanan said a Senator other 
 than Benjamin told him that drafts on the War Department were 
 on the New York Exchange. Buchanan questioned Floyd, who 
 said there were only three or four of them. Having ascertained 
 that no positive law provided for such an act, Buchanan told him 
 not to issue any more. Later Floyd did deem an issue necessary, 
 and did it without any further advice on the subject. 86 
 
 The Committee that investigated the matter found no criminal 
 intent. 87 An indictment was issued against Floyd for " conspiracy 
 to defraud " the Government. He came back from his home in 
 Virginia to Washington (March, 1861), gave bail, and asked for 
 trial. His counsel, Carlisle, told him his testimony on the com- 
 mittee was sufficient, and to save money had the indictment 
 squashed by an agreed statement of facts. Carlisle invoked an 
 act of Congress, which provided that a witness before Congress 
 should not be held in any court for such acts concerning which 
 he had testified. 88 
 
 This disclosure came at a very unfortunate time. The Cabinet 
 was struck with consternation. A session was called and lasted 
 until the small hours of the morning. 89 Thompson returned from 
 
 86 Moore, Vol. XI, p. 355. Buchanan to Capen, January 24, 1864. 
 Buchanan here also said he did not tell any agent from Boston that 
 
 Floyd's practice was valid. 
 
 Buchanan had stated this fact in a letter to Black, answering the question 
 as to whether he wanted to make a public statement regarding some of 
 Floyd's statements pertaining to his issuing the notes. 
 
 " In regards to Mr. Floyd's statements, I do not intend to say anything 
 for the present. Soon after I first heard of his acceptances of drafts pay- 
 able on a certain day, I had a conversation with him on the subject from 
 which I felt confident he would never accept any more and I rested satis- 
 fied. About his conditional acceptances I never knew anything. My im- 
 pression is that he is still a poor man but on this I may be mistaken." — 
 March 18, 1861, Black Papers, L. C. 
 
 87 36th Congress, 2d session, House Reports No. 78. 
 
 88 Tyler's Quarterly, October, 1923, p. 94. 
 
 89 36th Congress, 2d Session, House Reports, p. 68. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 95 
 
 North Carolina and went into action. There was no indication 
 that any one thought Floyd guilty of willful embezzlement. 
 
 " The suspicion in the minds of the members of the cabinet was, 
 that the man who communicated these facts was one of a band of 
 conspirators who were concerned in a scheme for the plunder of 
 the fund." 90 
 
 Of these, Floyd was held to be the victim. It was viewed as a 
 bad example of mismanagement. 
 
 The press went wild over the news. Cries for impeachment 
 came from such papers as the Times and even the Herald hesi- 
 tated. Popular ideas were afloat that the government was being 
 looted by potential rebels. Black seems to have thought Floyd 
 the worst bungler the government had ever encountered. 91 Floyd 
 had disobeyed his instructions, but that probably was not the 
 main point in this case. Buchanan had to have Secretaries who 
 could be depended upon to give no cause of public complaint of 
 such a nature. Political necessity demanded that he find a new 
 man. Immediate action was urged by Black, and the President 
 was not completely convinced of Floyd's good motives, although 
 inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt. Black, who was 
 at this time Secretary of State, later held the issue legal. 
 
 Convinced that he must avoid future embarrassments, Buchanan 
 determined to have Floyd leave the cabinet and put in some one 
 who would be more accurate, and also satisfactory to Northern 
 public opinion. The situation was becoming more and more un- 
 comfortable for Southern men in the Cabinet. They could have 
 seen that in a last resort Buchanan's support must come from 
 the conservative part of the Northern people. Besides a volun- 
 tary resignation lessened chances of impeachment. No doubt 
 Buchanan thought he did Floyd a favor when he desired him to 
 leave voluntarily. 
 
 The President asked Black to notify Floyd that he wished him 
 to resign, but Black refused. Buchanan then said he would find 
 some one. The one finally found was Breckenridge, a kinsman. 
 Breckenridge notified Floyd, and afterwards told the President 
 
 90 Ibid., p. 70. 
 
 91 Black to Buckalew, partly printed in Tyler's Quarterly, April, 1923, 
 dated January 28, 1861, in " Black Papers," L. C. 
 
96 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 that Floyd was surprised, but said he would resign. 92 Floyd evi- 
 dently did not mention this fact to his family, however. 93 
 
 Buchanan had given an explanation of his policy to the South 
 Carolina Delegation, December 10. It so happened that shortly 
 after some Commissioners from South Carolina came to Wash- 
 ington that Anderson moved. Thus the two events were brought 
 together. 94 
 
 Unforeseen events were now at hand which were destined to 
 provide Floyd a more dignified reason for leaving Federal Serv- 
 ice. Anderson suddenly left Moultrie for Sumter. Buchanan 
 had determined not to disturb the status quo but to act if attacked. 
 Floyd's instructions of December I, i860 95 show that he was not 
 plotting to surrender without a fight. He had also made it known 
 to Trescot and others that he would resign before he would con- 
 sent to reenforcements as he was opposed to a bullying policy. 
 
 On December 10th Anderson received oral orders 96 through 
 General Buell to fortify one fort or the other if attacked, and to 
 defend himself to the last extremity. He was authorized to shut 
 himself in one or the other of the forts if he had tangible evi- 
 dence of a commg assault. At the same time he was warned 
 that no collision was desired, and only to use the above orders if 
 attacked by the populace in case they obtained the upper hand 
 over State authority. Buchanan, when he asked for and read 
 
 92 Crawford, " Fort Sumter," p. 215. 
 
 93 Tyler's Quarterly, October, 1923, p. 87. 
 
 Some of Floyd's connections claim Buchanan did not request Floyd's 
 resignation. 
 
 It is certain, in my opinion. Crawford shows that Black told him of 
 Buchanan's request. Buchanan made this statement that he had requested 
 Floyd's resignation before Floyd's death in a letter in reply to General Scott. 
 National Intelligencer, November 1, 1862. 
 
 94 Buchanan, p. 187. 
 
 95 " It is believed from information thought to be reliable that an attack 
 will not be made on your command and the Secretary has only to refer to 
 his conversation with you and to caution you that should his convictions un- 
 happily prove untrue, your action must be such as to be free from the charge 
 of initiating a collision. If attacked, you are of course expected to defend 
 the trust committed to you to the best of your ability." War Department to 
 Anderson, " Anderson Papers," L. C, Washington, December 1, i860. 
 
 96 See whole note, Crawford, " Fort Sumter," p. 73. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 97 
 
 Buell's letter on the 21st, decided it would be folly to expect 
 Anderson to lose all his men for a mere point of military glory. 
 To avoid such useless slaughter, he ordered Anderson, if attacked 
 by a greatly overwhelming force, to get the best terms he could. 97 
 An attack would have set the North aflame for war without the 
 need of killing all his men. When the fort was attacked, only one 
 man was killed and that by accident. The battle was more like a 
 test case. 
 
 Although Anderson had acted without any further orders on 
 the part of the President, and without compliance with orders as 
 Floyd understood them, the Administration did not decide to re- 
 store Anderson. Floyd, whose resignation had been pending six 
 days, now had what he considered a good and valid reason to 
 resign in any event, and did so. Had there never been any ac- 
 ceptances, Floyd would have resigned at this point due to his 
 views against coercion. 
 
 At a meeting of the President and some Senators, 98 he issued a 
 statement to the President telling him he was pledged to maintain 
 the status quo. Later he came unasked (on the 27th) to the 
 Cabinet, and read a protest in an excited mannen. The President 
 desired to make a sharp written reply, but some of the Cabinet 
 persuaded him not to take up the issue. Floyd heard of it, and in / 
 
 his resignation written the 27th and sent the 29th, politely dis- 
 claimed any discourteous intent. 99 Buchanan had on the 25th 
 written him a friendly note, inclosing the Pittsburgh dispatch. 
 Buchanan accepted the resignation at the time, but he did not 
 write his official acceptance until December 31st. 100 This termi- 
 nated the career of Floyd as Secretary of War — a career which 
 had brought much misfortune on himself and the Administration. 
 It is my opinion that Floyd, while always defending himself, at the 
 same time saw it was impossible for the President to retain him, 
 and appreciated the fact that the President delayed until the 
 
 97 Crawford, " Fort Sumter," pp. 73-75 ; also in " Anderson Papers," L. 
 C. Floyd to Anderson, December 21, i860. 
 
 98 A. H. R., April, 1908, p. 544; Tyler's Quarterly. Black's Works, p. 13. 
 
 99 Curtis, Vol. II, p. 410. 
 
 100 Tyler's Quarterly, October, 1923, p. 88. 
 
98 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 Sumter crisis gave him his opportunity. In such a case Floyd was 
 bound to resign, as he was openly opposed' to, and held himself 
 pledged against, any change in the harbor. 
 
 The question now remains as to what Floyd in all these esca- 
 pades was really aiming at. Gorham, in his " Life of Stanton," 
 tries to show Floyd guilty of great duplicity merely because he 
 was willing to get some muskets for the South. That act as has 
 been shown was not unusual. Anybody could buy them. Floyd's 
 action throughout was merely defensive. Pollard's extracts from 
 a diary discovered after Floyd's death show a significant sen- 
 tence some days after Gorham says Floyd joined the Secession- 
 ists : 
 
 My own conservatism seems in these discussions to be unusual 
 and almost misplaced. 101 
 
 Alexander, in his " Military Memoirs of a Confederate," states 
 that one of the things which annoyed the South (probably in the 
 fall of i860) was that Floyd, who was known to be against Seces- 
 sion, was on a tour of fort inspection. 102 
 
 101 Pollard, " Lee and His Lieutenants," p. 794. 
 
 Pollard, because of his intense hatred of both Buchanan and Jefferson 
 Davis, is not to be trusted in respect to his opinion of them. He knew and 
 admired Floyd. The portion of the diary is no doubt genuine as it corre- 
 sponds to other remarks of Floyd's at that time and with other Cabinet 
 accounts. 
 
 102 Pollard, unlike Floyd, was a warm Secessionist. 
 
 The following was from Buchanan's manuscript of his book but was 
 omitted upon the advice of his friend Mr. Kennedy of the Interior Depart- 
 ment : 
 
 The first paragraph declared that Floyd's instructions denied the existence 
 of a pledge and that the Fort Sumter incident gave him a chance to be wel- 
 comed by the Secessionists. 
 
 " It cannot be denied that Secretary Floyd was naturally a man of noble 
 impulses and a generous heart. As a man of business he was both careless 
 and reckless and would go much too far to oblige his friends' favorites. 
 The President often had occasion to correct his decisions. Still it is ex- 
 tremely doubtful whether he ever profited by the Russell frauds. It is cer- 
 tain that he retired from office a poor man. [Still these had involved him 
 in what he supposed to be a fatal necessity of acting a part in opposition to 
 his better nature.] " 
 
 Part of Buchanan's criticism was due to the fact that some of his friends 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 99 
 
 But even better proof exists. Floyd wrote a public letter pub- 
 lished in the Richmond Enquirer on December 6th, in which he 
 advised against Secession and dwelt at length on its inexpediency. 
 His position was very much like that of Alexander H. Stephens 
 at the time. He warned the South against trusting English aid, 
 and asked that Virginia initiate a convention of the States to heal 
 the trouble. The policy was practically the same as that of the 
 Administration and Northern Democrats. There was no need of 
 Floyd's writing a letter. It cost him the support of many South- 
 ern radicals. It was a firm and manly declaration. 
 
 As to his opposition to coercion, Floyd never made any secret. 
 But it did not follow at all that he favored the States withdraw- 
 ing from the Union. Upon returning home, he remained rela- 
 tively in retirement until the war broke out. He felt that a war, 
 if it once broke out, would be long and bitter. His mind was bent 
 on defending his State from coercion. He was one of the many 
 men whom Republicans drove out of the Union when they tried to 
 force border State men to invade the Southern States. 
 
 The relations of Judge Black and the President were very 
 intimate and always interesting. In many ways he was the direct 
 opposite of Buchanan. He was always hating or loving 103 some 
 friend or idea. Ever an earnest advocate, a shield and sword 
 for his friends, he was the terror of his foes. While he mingled 
 caution with a vehement spirit, he was never philosophical. He 
 preferred direct assault to intrigue, had considerable ability, but 
 little savior faire. Honest, devoted, and fearless, he was never 
 backward in championing a cause or a friend. 
 
 Buchanan had known him for many years, but not as intimately 
 before 1857 as some few other Pennsylvanians. He valued him 
 highly for his ability, honesty, and frankness, and owing to the 
 fact that he was not always looking for office. Black had little 
 experience with Southern politics before 1857. At first Buchanan 
 had not desired to have him in his Cabinet because, in giving 
 
 told him that Floyd had insulted him in his Richmond Speech of 1861. This 
 was not at all the case, as Floyd had praised his character very highly in 
 that address. 
 
 103 Buchanan, who was more philosophical, according to Black " often 
 thought I was unreasonable, even severe toward both the Abolitionists and 
 Secessionists." 
 
100 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 an instance, he told William Porter that Black was so careless in 
 keeping appointments that it would lead to diplomatic embarrass- 
 ments. The reasons for his final decision have been noted. Bu- 
 chanan never had occasion to regret it. 
 
 Nevertheless, some Northern historians have greatly overesti- 
 mated Black's influence in the Cabinet. This matter is enhanced 
 by the fact that many of Black's utterances on the subject were 
 written by Col. Frank Burr of the Philadelphia Press, who so ar- 
 ranged his articles as to give Black the chief place in the picture. 
 He practically admits this tendency in an eulogy on Black in 
 1883. 104 Some of the old conservative Democrats were displeased 
 with this, and Black repeatedly denied any such intention. It 
 must be noticed, however, that he was not deficient in self-evalua- 
 tion, although he was in manner unaffected. The American Bar 
 has seldom had a greater member than Buchanan's Attorney-Gen- 
 eral. Had political spite not debarred him from the Supreme 
 Court, his name would no doubt have been linked with the great- 
 est of that body. 
 
 The general impression one gets is that Buchanan considered 
 himself by far the superior in statesmanship. 105 Experience 
 counted much with the President, and in his eye Black was still 
 a " political baby " in i860. 106 Of his business and administra- 
 tive ability, he must have been convinced. He held his literary 
 talent in high regard as he was always trying to persuade him to 
 write the history of his Administration. Above all, both men 
 loved each other as David and Jonathan. The history of their 
 relationship during the close of the Administration is a history of 
 differences of two friends, a fact which proves without a doubt 
 that Buchanan was the ruling spirit of his Administration. 
 
 Thomas, perhaps the most unbiased recorder of the events in 
 which he participated, speaks of Black as follows : 107a 
 
 Judge Black could come nearer managing him [Buchanan] 
 than any man I know but he could not always do it, by any 
 means, neither did he take his advice at all times. 
 
 104 Philadelphia Press, August 20, September 10, 1883. 
 
 105 « M r Buchanan and I were trying to reach the same ends by different 
 methods." Philadelphia Press, September 10, 1883. 
 
 106 Old clipping from the Philadelphia Press, i860. Meigs' note-book, 
 L. C. ; gossip on Democratic candidates for the Presidency. 
 
 107a Philadelphia Press, August 14, 1881 ; by Burr. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 101 
 
 Of all the men in the cabinet in those days, Judge Black was the 
 one who never lost his head. He was the one positive and con- 
 servative force in that cabinet. He expressed his convictions 
 clearly and forcibly, and never seemed to lose his self-possession. 
 Thompson also states the situation : 107b 
 
 I was much perplexed those days, as almost every member of 
 the Cabinet was. Black had a good deal of trouble. His rela- 
 tions with the President were peculiar. They were from the 
 same State, and until the differences came between them on the 
 eve of the war, they had probably never earnestly differed. After 
 it did come they were often seriously at variance, and frequently 
 Black would be on the verge of resignation. 1070 
 
 Thompson did not know that Black actually offered his resigna- 
 tion to Buchanan. Speaking of Black he said : 
 
 Although he was very strongly opposed to the position taken 
 by the southern members of the cabinet, we all admired him very 
 much. 
 
 In answering a charge made by a close friend of Buchanan 
 that he (Black) had put himself unduly in the foreground, Black 
 said (to Colonel Burr) : 
 
 " I never said or thought that I was the central figure of Mr. 
 Buchanan's Administration. Mr. Buchanan was not only the 
 central but the only figure. It is true that Mr. Buchanan was 
 constitutionally fearless and firm even to stubbornness. He lis- 
 tened sometimes very patiently while he was making up his mind 
 but when once made up he was as immoveable as a rock." 
 
 Then follows an expression of Black's surprise that he con- 
 sented to change his decision on the first draft to the South 
 Carolina Commissioners : 
 
 " He had never before to my knowledge given up an opinion 
 once formed. He was in the habit of acting upon his own con- 
 victions unmoved by the influence of anybody whomsoever they 
 might be." 108 
 
 i07b ibM^ March 14, 1883. 
 
 107c Ibid., September 17, 1883, Tennessee Advocate. 
 
 ^Philadelphia Press, August 21-22, 1881. 
 
 " Of course I recollect but little besides the general tenor of the con- 
 versation. I held that what the Southern men at that time called ' allegiance * 
 to the State was an absurdity; that the word was a feudal one and ex- 
 pressed the duty of a vassal to his lord. It had no proper place in our 
 8 
 
102 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 In treating of the Secession movement, the two, as will be 
 shown later, had their differences from the start. Black tried 
 to erase the term " allegiance " from the political science vocabu- 
 lary in America, merely retaining the term " obedience " to laws 
 both State and Federal. This was a rather novel way of stating 
 the divided sovereignty idea. Buchanan did not personally hold 
 to the idea of paramount State allegiance, 109 but did believe in 
 State Sovereignty and strict construction. He also realized that 
 the doctrine was considered a logical deduction from State Sover- 
 eignty by many of the most distinguished men of the different sec- 
 tions of the Union. 
 
 Black's opinions in November, i860, as well as those of a con- 
 servative and able Pennsylvania Democrat, are clearly and ad- 
 mirably set forth in the two letters following, which not only set 
 forth the difficulties of the Administration, but sketch the rise of 
 the anti-slavery agitation since its inception : 
 
 My Dear Judge : 
 
 I received, a week ago or more, under your frank the address 
 of Your Son & read it with great satisfaction. It is only too 
 highly polished. Still it lacks not pith and strength, and gives 
 political vocabulary. 4 Obedience to the laws is the duty of an American 
 citizen.' ' Federal and State laws are of equal obligation, assuming them 
 to be not expressly or impliedly forbidden by the Constitution. ... To 
 all this Davis had an answer. What I said did not seem to make much 
 impression on him. . . ." Philadelphia Press, August 21 (or 22), 1881. 
 
 109 Moore, Vol. XI, p. 187. 
 
 One reason for Black's insistence on reenforcements to the Fort was per- 
 haps the fact that after he became Secretary of State, he was beset by the 
 consuls of the foreign powers at Charleston concerning the attitude of the 
 Government towards the secession movement. The policy of ignoring the 
 movement as a legal nullity involved some delicate points on the matters of 
 giving clearance papers, etc. The Federal government had no officer in the 
 port and none was confirmed by the Senate ; and at the same time the Presi- 
 dent held that Congress, rather than he, had power to recognize the acts of 
 the State officials. All through this matter the President kept strictly 
 within the limits of his granted authority so as to give his Congressional 
 opponents no offense. 
 
 Some undated letters in the Crawford Papers, (L. C.,) from Black state 
 that in his private opinion he held that an individual cannot be punished 
 when compelled to do an act by local authorities but that he could not ac- 
 knowledge papers of clearance (issued by " South Carolina") officially. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 103 
 
 promise of the paternal capacity for saying fine things in the right 
 way. I wish that son all success. I was very much pleased with 
 my acquaintance with him at Harrisburg and should value an op- 
 portunity to extend and cultivate it. 
 
 Thus I acknowledge your politeness in sending me the address 
 & have given you my opinion of it as I have of every document & 
 production you have ever sent me. / never have been able to get 
 even an acknowledgment from you of any opinion, speech or other 
 thing that I have sent you. There's the difference. 
 
 I have had no heart to write you or anybody else on politics 
 since the election. But now as I have pen in hand let me say a 
 few things I want to say to somebody & I don't care how faith- 
 fully you preserve what I write — nor when or how it may come 
 up in judgment against me. 
 
 Lincoln & Seward are right. The conflict is irrepressible. 
 
 Lloyd Garrison, offended with some trifle in the Colonization 
 Society about 1835, & instigated not only by the D-l but by some 
 English infidels, started the scheme of abolishing the Slavery of 
 the U. S. He drew to himself all those Boston infidels whom 
 unitarianism had thrown up to the surface & they commenced the 
 war on Slavery. Their weapons were sometimes gross blas- 
 phemies — sometimes literary platitudes — sometimes humanitarian 
 philosophies — but whichever they were, they were directed against 
 Slavery, not because they cared for blacks or whites, but because 
 Slavery was an Institution of civilized and Christianized Society. 
 They saw the plain evidence that the principle of human bondage 
 had received Divine sanction. This intensified their hate of it. 
 They knew that we as a people were not responsible for the in- 
 stitution, but that we had dealt wisely with it and had turned it to 
 good account — making it the instrument of blessing to both our- 
 selves & the Slaves. This maddened their rage. Here was a 
 chance to war against God, Native Country, political & social In- 
 stitutions — and the vultures whetted their beaks for an unusual 
 feast. 
 
 The first body of men they captivated was the Methodist 
 Church & then the conspiracy began to attract attention. Then 
 the Presbyterian, Congregational, & Baptist Churches began to 
 preach & pray & resolve about Slavery. The politicians of New 
 England seized hold & mounted the hobby. All New England 
 became abolitionist. New York fell the next victim, then one 
 after another of the Western States and last of all our own good 
 old Pennsylvania. 
 
 O what a fall was there my Countrymen, 
 When You & I and all of us fell down 
 Whilst bloody treason flourished over us. 
 
104 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 Thus this foul plague has over-spread all the North & has got 
 possession of the patronage & power of the government. Do you 
 suppose it is going to stop now ? I tell you Nay. It is irrepres- 
 sible. It means to invade the South & sweep Slavery into the 
 sea. 
 
 Consider how it has mixed itself up with Northern ideas. We 
 are a thrifty, industrious, money getting people, and all our thrift 
 is attributed to the abolition of slavery in these northern states. 
 
 We are a Church-going people, and anti-Slavery has become 
 the cherished dogma of northern theology. Not only so, but per- 
 sonal religion has come to be measured by the zeal of slavery 
 agitation. In almost all the Churches above mentioned abolition- 
 ism has become, practically, a test of good standing, if not of 
 Church membership. The Episcopal & the Romish Churches 
 alone hold on to the conditions of communion prescribed by the 
 Saviour, and increasing hate of these Churches has marked the 
 progress of abolitionism. Its march has been attended also with 
 other results — such as conjugal infidelities & prostitution — 
 breaches of trust of all sorts, legislative corruptions, fraudulent 
 insolvencies, stuffing ballot boxes, gambling, lying, slandering, 
 drunkenness &c &c. 
 
 We are an educating people, — and abolitionism born in hell & 
 nursed by the new Episcopal Churches has entered into our 
 schools, school books & school literature. 
 
 Now is it to be supposed that abolitionism so incorporated with 
 our thrift, our religion, our education, is going to die out just as 
 it is about to clothe itself with the patronage & power of the gov- 
 ernment? I look for no such improbable event. On the contrary 
 I expect it to wax more fat, more aggressive, more destructive. 
 
 The democratic party has become powerless before the march 
 of this Monster. The party is fast becoming abolitionized. At 
 this moment, not only political leaders in the party here in Penn a . 
 but men high in office by virture of Democratic votes, are the 
 most gratified of Lincoln's admirers. Their sympathies were with 
 him in the contest & if their votes were cast for Douglas it was 
 not until they were assured that they would not hinder Lincoln's 
 success. I don't mean that all Douglas men were for Lincoln — 
 the honest among them were deluded — but the excessively consci- 
 entious sticklers for regular nominations, those Simon pures that 
 have always helped Simon Cameron to represent the democracy — 
 these immaculate patriots and all wise philosophers who insisted 
 that the democratic party should have a candidate for whom no 
 democratic state would vote — these are the men I mean who were 
 careful not to vote for Foster or Douglas until they had assured 
 themselves of the success of Curtin & Lincoln. And they, these 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 105 
 
 very men, set up for future leaders of the party & what do you 
 suppose the party will do to resist abolitionism under their lead? 
 
 The results of the election are not to be looked for in any 
 legislation that shall exclude slavery from the territories or other- 
 wise interfere with it. Legislation won't be attempted until the 
 debauch of the public mind shall have become so general as to 
 abolitionize both houses of Congress & the Sup. Court, for until 
 then all attempts at legislation would be abortive. But neverthe- 
 less the conflict is to be waged with renewed vigor. An abolition 
 party is to be built up in the South through patronage. The 
 press, the pulpit, & the lecturer's rostrum in the North are to keep 
 up the agitation. A raid here and there and a local insurrection 
 now & then are to be achieved. Wells & Springs & Food are to 
 be poisoned. An occasional duelling will be fixed & a husband & 
 father be occasionally found with his throat cut & thus the ir- 
 repressible conflict is to go on — until one after another concludes 
 — ' well slavery is a bad thing — slavery is a sin against God & 
 man — slavery ought to be restricted, tormented, extirpated — let's 
 vote for the anti-slavery candidates.' 
 
 Now, my dear Sir, all this I believe & in view of it what ought 
 a Northern man of common sense, of common honesty and who 
 believes that slavery was intended as a special blessing to the 
 people of the United States — what ought such a man, what ought 
 I to think of the proposition of the Southern States to secede 
 from the Union ? 
 
 As a Northern man I would beg them to wait — to hear and to 
 forbear a little longer. Though I consider them greatly outraged, 
 not merely by Lincoln's election, but by the northern legislation 
 that has already abolished the constitution & by the agitation which 
 has destroyed the ' public tranquility ' the Constitution was de- 
 signed to promote, yet it is possible the fears which are too prob- 
 able may not be realized. It is possible that the Good Being who 
 has shielded us in times of danger may save us from our own 
 folly & wickedness. It is possible that some miracle may exercise 
 the northern mind and restore it to sanity. I would point them 
 to the sound minority of the north — the more than 7000 who have 
 not bowed the knee to Baal & who, though persecuted & cast 
 down, will never yield an inch willingly to trenchant abolitionism 
 but will fight it as they have fought anti-masonry, Bankism, 
 Knownothingism and every other fanticism. 
 
 If such appeals will not stay secession, then let it come. There 
 is cause. Much as I deplore it I cant deny it. We have broke 
 the bond long since, repeatedly, ruthlessly and ' a bargain broken 
 on one side is broken on all sides.' As a Northern man I cannot 
 in justice condemn the South for withdrawing from the Union. 
 
106 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 I believe they have been loyal to the Union formed by the Consti- 
 tution — secession is not disloyalty to that, for that no longer 
 exists. The North has extinguished it. 
 
 And if they do go out, don't let a blow be struck against them 
 by the present administration. Dissuade them if you can, but if 
 you can't let them go in peace. I wish Pennsylvania could go with 
 them. They are our brethren. They have not annoyed us. 
 They have benefitted & blessed us in a thousand ways. They 
 have been good & peaceable neighbors. We are the wrong 
 doers. We have driven them off & if we raise an arm to strike 
 the 4 stones of Rome will move to mutiny.' 
 
 Mr.. Buchanan has got the most delicate duty to perform that 
 any human being was ever called to. I hear that he insists on 
 execution of the laws in all states that remain in Union, but that 
 he will not resist secession. That is exactly right. Though I 
 would have him dissuade from secession as long as moral suasion 
 can avail, but if it can't avail, coercion is not to be thought of as a 
 preventive. 
 
 As to Lincoln's administration, it will follow that of Buchanan, 
 Pearce & Fillmore in this slavery question. He will never put it 
 on that tissue of lies which is called the Chicago platform, for I 
 hear he is not a born idiot. He knows the Government can't last 
 an hour on that basis and for the present the irrepressible is not to 
 be waged in that form. Public opinion rather is to be debauched 
 more & more as Seward told you. 
 
 But I stop. Why I have written you I scarcely know except 
 that I wanted to pour out my heart into some ear & thought pos- 
 sibly I might suggest something worthy of your consideration in 
 this hour of peril. 
 
 I am half inclined to think however that I should unsay what I 
 began by saying & should ask you not to preserve this letter but 
 to burn it after reading it twice. 
 
 Of course I should be greatly gratified to hear from you and 
 am 
 
 Yours truly, 
 
 Geo. W. Woodward 110 
 
 Attorney General's Office 
 My dear Sir : 
 
 When I received your admirable letter, I intended to take the 
 first moment that I could steal either from rest or my labor, to 
 give it an answer — not such an answer as it deserved, for that 
 was beyond my capacity, but an answer which at least would be 
 
 no Black Papers, L. C, Vol. XXXIII, Woodward to Black, November 
 18, i860. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 107 
 
 full and frank on all the subjects to which it refers. The moment 
 of leisure has not come even yet. But if it had, I suppose my 
 purpose would hardly hold, for events, so many of them and some 
 so unexpected, have occurred in the meantime, that to discuss 
 their bearing upon the general subject would require very con- 
 siderable reflection. 
 
 We are probably in the midst of a revolution, bloodless as yet. 
 The cotton states have sedately, calmly and deliberately deter- 
 mined that no power which they can resist shall retain them in 
 the Union beyond the 4th of March; they will not have Abe 
 Lincoln to rule over them. It is not worth while to talk about 
 theories, for whether secession be revolution or the exercise of a 
 constitutional right, it comes to the same thing in the end. This 
 great country is to be dismembered. The Constitution that 
 Washington gave his approbation to is to be broken up and de- 
 stroyed. I see the beginning but not the end.'' The probabilities 
 are strongly in favor of the opinion that all the southern States 
 will secede sooner or later. If Congress authorizes and the Presi- 
 dent attempts to carry out a system of coertion or subjugation 
 they will all be in a blaze instantly. On the contrary if no force 
 is used, and the cotton-states can show the others the road to 
 independence and freedom from abolition rule without fighting 
 their way, every slave state will regard the question as one of free 
 choice to be governed by their sympathies. In that event, the 
 choice, of course, will be made before long, and then where are 
 we? Can we in Pennsylvania live at peace with those intolerable 
 mischief-makers in New England who do mischief like monkeys 
 for the mere sake of mischief? We have no slaves to interfere 
 with, it is true ; but they have organized a war against the institu- 
 tion of marriage which at this moment is as strong as the aboli- 
 tion societies were twenty years ago, and they have just as good 
 a right to force free-love upon Pennsylvania as free-labor upon 
 Virginia. I am inclined to think also that you and I would take 
 any interference with our matrimonial relations about as hard as 
 the southern people take northern intervention between them and 
 their servants. 
 
 I think, however, that you overstate somewhat the power and 
 the depth of the mere bigotry, superstition and fanaticism at the 
 bottom of the late northern movements. I do not believe that the 
 real anti-slavery feeling, the actual desire & determination to 
 abolish slavery, is as extensive as your view makes it seem. The 
 corruptions which you speak of, the total disregard of moral 
 principle by politicians, are to a greater extent the cause of the 
 anti-slavery vote, and that vote to a greater extent the effect of 
 them than you suppose. You may remember that in one of my 
 
108 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 imprudent letters written to you about two years ago, I told you 
 in substance, that I regarded a certain infamous transaction in 
 Pennsylvania as likely to bring about this very state of things. 
 How could we expect a set of politicians thus prostituted to hear 
 or to understand what was necessary to be done to save the coun- 
 try? How can it be possible that they care whether the country 
 is saved or not? Prostrate and fallen as they were, how could 
 they rise to the height of that great argument, which was before 
 them on the 7. of November. No, sir, those who conscientiously 
 and really put the abolition of slavery before the peace of the 
 country and the harmony of the states are restricted to a few 
 hardened, wicked ribald infidels combined with a few others, 
 religious, to be sure, but blinded and brutalized by bigotry. The 
 worst trouble is that we now seem to have a majority in the 
 northern states, of men who are perfectly willing to take advan- 
 tage of any prejudice whether they approve it or not, which will 
 give them votes enough to carry them into power. It must be 
 perfectly well known to you that in 1856 there was a serious 
 debate among them, (it was scarcely settled indeed at the time of 
 the election) whether their rallying principle should be opposition 
 to the Catholic religion or opposition to the slave-holders. It is 
 as sure as death that in i860 they would have gone to burning 
 churches & convents, and smelling about female schools with just 
 as much zest as they attack slavery in the southern states, if 
 thereby they could have been equally certain of success. If the 
 abuses of marital power and the wrongs of women should in 
 1864 become the basis of a party organization strong enough to 
 hold the balance of power in the Union, how many of our anti- 
 slavery patriots do you suppose would have virtue enough to re- 
 sist the temptation of joining them, especially if a few married 
 men would suffer their indignation to boil over and say or do 
 some violent things such as southern men have occasionally done 
 under the influence of excitement produced by the abolitionists? 
 But enough of this. The fact is, and we cannot change it, that 
 though fanaticism alone or corruption alone would have been 
 impotent, they are now united and present to us a front more 
 terrible than an army with banners. 
 
 If the southern states could be induced to hold back, to make 
 a fair effort, & the Democracy of the Northern states could be 
 reorganized & expurgated, and the conscience of the masses fairly 
 appealed to, I am satisfied that all would be well. But I fear 
 there is no chance for either. The news from the southern states, 
 Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi & Florida grows worse and worse. 
 Virginia is preparing to perform the duties of an arbitrator, but 
 it does not seem probable that she will be listened to. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 109 
 
 Mr. Buchanan has, as you truly say, the most delicate and diffi- 
 cult duty to perform that ever was assigned to a human being, and 
 when it shall be performed, no portion of this people will say, 
 " God bless you." A few scattered and bold hearts here and 
 there will dare to do him justice. But in the North, his life's life 
 has been already lied away, and the South will adhere to him only 
 so long as he expresses no opinion against the constitutional right 
 of secession, and no determination to abandon his sworn duty of 
 seeing the laws faithfully executed. There is but one thing left 
 for him, and that is the approbation of his own conscience. For 
 myself I value as highly as anybody the recollection that I once 
 seemed to have some portion of the public confidence at home. 
 But it will give me far more pride for the balance of my life to 
 remember that I risked and lost it in a faithful support of princi- 
 ples which sooner or later will be acknowledged as necessary for 
 the preservation of the noblest political system that the world 
 ever saw. 
 
 I said your letter was admirable. That is not merely my own 
 opinion. I took the liberty of reading it confidentially to several 
 of my friends. Cobb said he would give a hundred dollars for a 
 copy of it. Gen. Cass said that it made him feel gladder than 
 ever for his vote in the Senate on your nomination. To these 
 two I read it separately, and afterwards to the President and all 
 the members of the Cabinet together. It excited universal ad- 
 miration and approbation for its eloquence & its truth. The 
 slight criticism that I have made upon it in this reply was not ex- 
 pressed by anybody else. They wanted to publish it very much. 
 I am not sure that I would advise its publication in its present 
 form. But can you not embody the same ideas in a shape which 
 will enable me to lay it before the world? Think of this and 
 write me again as soon as convenient. 
 
 I am, very respectfully & 
 Truly yours &c 
 
 J. S. Black. 111 
 Judge Geo. W. Woodward 
 Philad a . Pa. 
 
 From the beginning, upon the question of re-enforcing Fort 
 Sumter, the President and Black differed on the solution of the 
 problem. To the other members of the Cabinet he appeared to 
 be meddlesome. The President told him in a polite way that 
 such matters were primarily the concern of the War Depart- 
 
 111 Black Papers, Vol. XXXIII, Black to Woodward, November 24, i860. 
 
110 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 ment. 112 Congress was inactive and troops were few. 113 These 
 arguments were enough even had the President not put his faith 
 in a different method of procedure. While Black's ideas have 
 been applauded by certain Northern historians, it would seem 
 that there was much to be said against them. 
 
 As time went on his impatience grew to a great degree and was 
 fanned by the arrival of Stanton in the Cabinet, in the last of 
 December. The arrival of the South Carolina Commissioners, 
 and their demand that Anderson be restored to Moultrie, aroused 
 his impatience still more. When the President did not even ask 
 his opinion on his reply to the South Carolina Commissioners, 
 Black spoke out vigorously (see Stanton), but to no effect. He 
 was now ready to resign, but could hardly bring himself to break 
 with Buchanan in his hour of peril. A passage from one of the 
 numerous accounts read as follows: 
 
 On Sunday morning the 30th, Judge Black drove to Mr. Toucey 
 and informed that gentleman that if the President's decision was 
 not changed he would be compelled to resign. A half an hour 
 afterwards he repeated his determination to Mr. Stanton who 
 said they would go or stay together. Then Mr. Toucey carried 
 the news to the White House, and the consultation of Messrs. 
 Black and Stanton was interrupted by a message earnestly sum- 
 moning the former to meet the President. " I know," continued 
 Judge Black, " the sort of appeal he will make to me, in the name 
 of our sacred and long standing friendship. To resist will be 
 the most painful duty of my life." But Mr. Stanton thought it 
 was no time for magnanimity and he exhorted him to be firm 
 against all persuasions. 114 
 
 Judge Black was not mistaken. Mr. Toucey, the President 
 said, had brought the worst news he had heard yet, and bad news 
 was sadly frequent. 
 
 It will be remembered that this was the third great calamity 
 which had befallen Buchanan in about ten days, namely ; the 
 rumors of Floyd's default ; the unexpected move of Anderson ; 
 and now the resignation of his premier, not to count that of Cass. 
 
 112 Philadelphia Press, August 7, 1881. This article gives some excellent 
 facts, but shows an attempt of the writer to put Black in the spot-light. 
 "3 Moore, Vol. X, pp. 282, 283. 
 n* Black Papers, L. C. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 111 
 
 He had thought that Judge Black at least would not desert him 
 in this bitter hour. If he had left him in the day of his power 
 and prosperity it might have been different but at this, the dark- 
 est moment of trial and adversity, his friends were -few, and sorely 
 needed. Almost, but not quite overcome, Judge Black responded 
 that he longed to stand by the President and defend him to the 
 end. 
 
 " There is," said he, " no storm of popular indignation I would 
 not breast by your side, no depth of misfortune into which I 
 would not descend provided you had a course to defend. But 
 answer to the Commissioners leaves you no cause, it sweeps the 
 ground from under our feet, it places you where no man can 
 stand with you, and where you cannot stand alone." 
 
 Mr. Buchanan was deeply moved, but not more so than Judge 
 Black. 114a 
 
 He responded by placing the answer in the hands of the Secre- 
 tary with permission to make it what he pleased, but with the in- 
 juction to return it by six o'clock that evening. There was no 
 time to be lost. Judge Black hastened to the Attorney-General's 
 office, where he wrote the following paper, and Mr. Stanton copied 
 it as rapidly as the sheets were thrown to him. 
 
 Curtis, who relied upon information from the Black articles 
 and addresses, termed this matter a " Cabinet Crisis." It was 
 more properly speaking " Black's Crisis." Like most of the 
 others, his nerves were on edge, and the incident appeared larger 
 to him than to Buchanan or some of the other members of the 
 Cabinet. Only Stanton, Toucey, and himself seemed to have 
 known anything of it at the time. Holt, writing of the matter in 
 1884, said: 115a 
 
 His highly impulsive temperament and the extreme solicitude 
 under which we were acting may have led him to say as much, 
 but if so, it was unknown to me at the time. Certainly no such 
 avowel was made to myself, nor did I make any such to him or 
 
 114a In a later notice of this event Buchanan's position will be set forth 
 more fully. 
 " 5 Moore, Vol. XI, p. 86. 
 ilea Cf. with Thomas' remark above. 
 The conclusion is that one may be impulsive and still know what he wants. 
 
112 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 other, and of this he has left record evidence. In a letter from 
 him to Mr. Schell under date of 6th of August 1863 he said 
 " neither Stanton nor Mr. Holt ever spoke to the President about 
 resigning upon any contingency whatever, before the incoming 
 of the new Administration." 
 
 The result of this burst of " highly impulsive " temperament 
 has been the relative distortion of an historical incident. (Bu- 
 chanan's reasons for the first note will be given later.) 
 
 The incidents of the Sumter and Commissioners question had 
 a marked effect on Black's psychology. He speedily became as 
 bitter to the South as he was to the Republicans. 
 
 On January the 28th he wrote a long letter to Buckalew, United 
 States Minister to Ecuador (a native of Pennsylvania and a per- 
 sonal friend), finding fault with the South, Buchanan's policy, 
 the Republicans, and everything in general. 116 On the 17th he 
 wrote a letter of similar nature to A. V. Parsons. 117 He was 
 evidently much put out about Anderson's truce, although he did 
 not say so. On the 226. of January he addressed a letter to Bu- 
 chanan as he could not attend the Cabinet because he was laid 
 up with rheumatism. In this communication he made some 
 caustic remarks on some of Toucey's acts, but paid tribute to his 
 character. Toucey had authorities who told him the Brooklyn 
 could not clear the bar at Charleston while some persons told 
 Black they thought it could. Speaking of Buchanan's policy, he 
 remarked : 118 
 
 Your credulity seemed then to be founded upon certain assur- 
 ances of certain outside persons in whom you confided that noth- 
 ing of the kind was in contemplation. 
 
 He added that he thought the Administration had been deceived 
 by the South. Continuing, he said : 
 
 The short official race which yet remains to us must be run 
 before a cloud of witnesses, and to win we must cast aside every 
 weight and the sin of statecraft which doth so easily beset us, and 
 
 116 Black to Buchalew, January 28, 1861, Black Papers, L. C. Parts have 
 been quoted in this study. 
 i 17 Black Papers, L. C. 
 118 Black to Buchanan, January 22, 1861 ; Black Papers. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 113 
 
 look simply upon our duty and the performance of it as the only 
 prize of high calling. 
 
 Thus combining vigorous exhortation with courtesy and clever- 
 ness, he betrayed the fact that others have tried to deny, namely 
 that the President had to be handled with care. Remembering 
 the fact that Buchanan had been in national politics some thirty 
 years longer than his Secretary, the conclusion was not out of 
 place. 
 
 I am free to admit that in this hasty note I may have been mis- 
 taken. I do not claim to be more zealous in the public service 
 nor more patriotic than my neighbors ; certainly not wiser than my 
 colleagues. To your better judgment I defer implicitly. But 
 my absence from the council today annoyed me supposing as I 
 did that some of the matters here referred to might be discussed 
 in it. . . , 119 
 
 119 Black to Buchanan, January 22, 1861, Black Papers, L. C. 
 
 Health Matters : Certain persons, including King, have tried to convey 
 the impression that Buchanan was much enfeebled by the cares of his office. 
 Before commenting upon this further see the following passages written by 
 a daughter of Judge Black, who was with him at the time in Washington. 
 Black was a man in the prime of life, brave, vigorous, aggressive. Buchanan 
 was 70 years old in April, 1861. 
 
 " The anxieties of the time told on Judge Black. His picture taken just 
 after he left the Cabinet shows a care-worn sad and thin face, not recogniz- 
 able by those who knew him in his later years of prosperity and happiness. 
 He left Washington full of mourning for the state of the country and very 
 poor in pocket." — Mary Black Clayton, " Reminiscences of Jeremiah Sullivan 
 Black," p. 115. 
 
 In another place (p. 112) she again alludes to the subject: 
 
 " Those who were beside Judge Black at that time, and suffered with him, 
 can never forget those anxious days and sleepless nights," 
 
 and adds that in 1859 he was " worn out from work and tobacco." He was 
 laid in with rheumatism in the latter part of January for a short time. Holt 
 lost his wife in i860. He was also reported as recovering from an attack of 
 pneumonia in the winter of the same year. 
 
 One of the humorous attempts to give the idea that Buchanan was feeble 
 is the mention of his wearing a dressing gown (or wrapper). Mr. Pierce, 
 however, had a very beautiful one which he wore while President (Maunsell 
 B. Field, "Memories of Many Men"). Better still, the Lancaster Corre- 
 spondent of the Herald in 1856, (June 28), describes an occasion where Bu- 
 chanan wore such a gown. A Douglas paper in a caricature of the Presi- 
 dent in i860 before the election describes him : 
 
114 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 Black's influence on writing Buchanan history has been fortu- 
 nate and unfortunate. In summing up the matter, he told Bu- 
 chanan he thought he was at first too lenient to the South and 
 later too much so to the Republicans. Buchanan promptly de- 
 fended his policy, and on one occasion in a vigorous style : 
 
 I am not at all astonished to learn that your views and mine are 
 so far out of accord, & that in my administration I first conceded 
 too much to the South & afterwards too much to the present ad- 
 ministration. My policy was well matured . . . (in his Decem- 
 ber and January messages). . . . From there I never consciously 
 swerved. . . . Our opinions may be at variance but I should be 
 truly sorry to present ourselves in opposition to each other in 
 regard to matters of fact. 
 
 Black long outlived Buchanan, reaping riches and legal vic- 
 tories. He was one of the most prominent men of his times. 
 
 " Up to his elbows in papers and up to his neck in political mischief — sits 
 the Old Public Functionary ! He is arrayed in a long dressing-gown and 
 slippers, holds an unlighted cigar in his mouth and has a peculiar nervous 
 twitching always to the left as if some unseen spirits were plucking him on 
 that side by the sleeve and whispering distasteful counsel. . . ." 
 
 No one thought he ever needed any rest in that dismal winter. From 
 morn to night he was interviewed and harried. Small wonder the President 
 looked worn and haggard (Mrs. Pryor, " Reminiscences of Peace and War," 
 p. no) ; yet he kept everlastingly at work. Even when he was not well 
 enough to go to his office he held Cabinet conferences in his library. (King, 
 "Turning on the Light," p. 30.) During all this time he did clerical work 
 that would have exhausted a younger man. He read an almost unlimited 
 number of letters, and filed them when answered. Midst the cares of gov- 
 ernment, the President even managed to attend at a wedding (on December 
 20th, Curtis, "Life of James Buchanan," Vol. II, pp. 488, 489). Upon the 
 slightest remission of business, his constitution always began recuperating. 
 At first he enjoyed good health after his return home (Moore, " Buchanan's 
 Works," Vol. XI, p. 181), but in May, 1861, he suffered from a severe 
 attack of rheumatism (Moore, "Buchanan's Works," Vol. XI, pp. 190, 191). 
 His excellent health enabled Buchanan to live eight years after his term, 
 when he died at the advanced age of seventy-seven. 
 
 When one takes all things into account, Buchanan stood the test wonder- 
 fully well. His vitality was marvelous. Polk died soon after his term, — 
 worn out. Harrison died in office. Pierce had to go abroad for a rest, 
 Buchanan courteously putting a government vessel at his disposal for part 
 of the trip. Wilson suffered a stroke, and Harding died of overwork. 
 Many of these men had far less to endure than Buchanan. The wonder is 
 that he stood the strain with no lightening of his official duties. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 115 
 
 Scorning Republican offers to favor, he remained a Democrat to 
 the last, and from time to time bore eloquent and accurate testi- 
 mony as to the character and ability of his chief. 
 
 On the other hand, his repetition of his variance with Buchanan 
 is not to be too well taken. The solution will always be a matter 
 of doubt, and Buchanan had plenty of support from Democrats 
 both North and South in his policy of delay. Republican writers 
 of the Reconstruction period flattered Black's ideas in order to 
 shift responsibility from themselves. As their writers now tend 
 to assume cheerfully the credit for making the Civil War, that 
 tendency is passing. At any rate, the shades of Buchanan and 
 Black can delight themselves in the never-ending satisfaction of 
 an eternal friendship. 
 
 The most attractive member of Buchanan's Cabinet was Jacob 
 Thompson. 
 
 A review of his relations with the President is of interest as a 
 character study, and also because it throws much light on the 
 period. His unpopularity in the North was due to the fact that 
 it fell to his lot to be the agent of the Confederate Government in 
 Canada during the war. In that capacity 119a it was his duty to 
 try and co-operate with those in the North opposed to the con- 
 tinuation of the war. 
 
 Thompson was a man who has never received due notice. A 
 most pleasing personality, he had a very cool head, and could play 
 a difficult role with little friction. Winning, able, persuasive in 
 argument, affectionate, and warm hearted, he melted opposition 
 rather than destroyed it. The deep mutual regard between 
 Secretary and President is very apparent in the correspondence 
 which forms a vivid and very full narrative of their relations in 
 the critical days of the period. 
 
 The information given by him, with some allowance for claim- 
 ing a somewhat larger sphere than he may have occupied, is lucid 
 and valuable. A general summary of his attitude is given in a 
 
 119a F or a brief account of Thompson's activities in Canada, and a refuta- 
 tion of the base charges made against him by Holt and others that he had 
 something to do with the assassination of Lincoln, his personal friend, see 
 J. F. Bivins, " Life of Jacob Thompson," in Historical Papers of Trinity 
 College, Durham, N. C, 1898, pp. 88-91. 
 
116 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 letter to Samuel Crawford, and serves as a correction in some 
 parts of Trescot's Narrative. 
 
 Memphis, Tenn., 
 Feb. 29th, 1884. 
 Gen. S. W. Crawford. 
 
 Dear Sir : 
 
 I have been delayed in making my reply to your very courteous 
 questions by the company which has been at my house ever since 
 the receipt of your letter. 
 
 In the first paragraph where you state my position to the Presi- 
 dent, you state it correctly, and although I have added a few ad- 
 ditional words, I leave it with you to adopt these words or leave 
 them out as you may prefer. 
 
 When you come to the orders to Gen. Anderson, I took little or 
 no part in them. When the S. C. Commissioners came to Wash- 
 ington I did not go to see them. I did not allow myself to be 
 complicated with the matter or question at all. I felt that if we 
 could manage to keep the peace, Congress could have ample op- 
 portunity to compose our difficulties, and if Congress failed, the 
 Peace Congress could come to some agreement and save the coun- 
 try. This was the hope of the President, and I determined to 
 stand by him as long as I could and therefore it was impossible 
 for me to have said to Gov. Floyd that if he left the Cabinet I 
 would follow him on any contingency whatever. I am sure I 
 never threatened to leave the Cabinet except upon the occurrence 
 of a conflict of Arms or the secession of my State. I hope there- 
 fore you will correct this statement. 
 
 I know Judge Black took the liveliest interest in the question of 
 reinforcing the Charleston Forts — as the question did not in any 
 way come up in my Department I paid but little attention to it 
 except to express apprehensions that an effort to strengthen them 
 the first would lead to conflict and I considered that would be 
 disastrous. Until the removal of Gen. Anderson from Fort 
 Moultrie to Fort Sumpter, my attention was never called to the 
 orders. Then I heard the history of those orders first from 
 Judge Black and afterwards in the Cabinet I am satisfied however 
 that Judge Black suggested and caused to be adopted the phrase 
 that Gen. Anderson was to have the authority to judge of the evi- 
 dence of an intention to attack him and then to strengthen him- 
 self as he thought best. 
 
 I have answered you with all frankness and as my duties as 
 Secretary of Interior called my attention to the other matter I 
 took but little interest in the order issued to the Army. I did 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 117 
 
 not believe the constitution conferred any power on Congress to 
 wage war upon a state or to use force upon a state. And there- 
 fore I acted throughout to avoid if possible any conflict of arms. 
 This was the principle on which I acted from beginning to the 
 end. 
 
 With sincere Respect 
 
 Yours truly 
 
 J. Thompson. 
 
 At another time he further described his attitude : 12 ° 
 
 My own position was made plain to the President very early in 
 the action. I told him if it were possible I would like to remain 
 with him until the close of his administration, but if Mississippi 
 seceded I must go out too. I went to Mississippi when a young 
 man, and anything I am she made me. There I had a handsome 
 property. My family, my relatives, and my friends were in Mis- 
 sissippi. If I remained with the Union I would be denounced as 
 a traitor to my state. If I resigned when my state seceded I 
 would be called a traitor to my country. All this I laid before the 
 President and asked which horn of the dilemna I should take. 
 His reply was : " When your state secedes, I will not insist upon 
 your remaining." 
 
 Buchanan accepted the situation as unevitable although later 
 he thought Thompson made a mistake. 121 Thompson's position 
 was not unlike that of Lee. A second account of the approach to 
 the President upon Cass' resignation shows the President as de- 
 termined to keep him out of the Cabinet as Curtis has stated. 
 
 I can tell you something, however, about the resignation of 
 Cass which may be of interest. The day after sending in his 
 resignation, he came to me and said he had a request to make. 
 He wanted me to go to the President and ask for the return of 
 his letter. It was a delicate task, but I accepted it. The very 
 moment I broached the subject to the President I knew I had 
 undertaken a bootless errand. He heard my request in silence 
 and seemed perfectly indifferent. After a while I arose to go 
 and hinted at the object of my visit, but the President was not in- 
 clined to understand and I left without the letter. I told Cass 
 frankly how matters stood, and he said he supposed he would let 
 it go and say no more. 
 
 120 Philadelphia Press, September 17, 1883. 
 
 121 Moore, Vol. XI, p. 221. 
 
118 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 Because of an inference made by Clingman that Buchanan 
 secretly approved that Thompson should attend a convention in 
 North Carolina in December, i860, Thompson gave a detailed ac- 
 count of the whole subject, which is here reproduced. 
 
 When asked : " What was the President's action in relation to 
 South Carolina when it seceded ? " 122 
 
 Thompson replied : 
 
 I claimed that Mr. Buchanan planted himself upon the Consti- 
 tution in his treatment of the whole Southern question. He held 
 that a State had no right to secede, and that the Government had 
 no right to use force against it — a sort of astride the fence that 
 would bring the dissatisfied state into that sort of relation to the 
 general government that an adjustment of the differences between 
 the two must of necessity be peacefully made. This was his idea 
 in the arrangement with South Carolina. She was not to com- 
 mit any hostile acts, and he was not to menace its people by re- 
 inforcing the Southern forts. In other words they both agreed 
 that everything should stand in status quo so long as his Presi- 
 dential term remained continued. 
 
 Some time in the month of December, i860 while I was Secre- 
 tary of the Interior, the government of Mississippi sent me a letter 
 requesting me to act as commissioner of that state to the State of 
 North Carolina, and urge it to co-operate with Mississippi in 
 measures for the protection and maintenance of Southern rights. 
 This appointment was unexpected and took me by surprise. I 
 was known as a co-operationist, and was opposed to separate 
 State action. I believed all the Southern States should have a 
 perfect understanding with each other, and when the time came 
 for movement — if movement must be made — they should act to- 
 gether and act simultaneously. At that time Mr. Buchanan had 
 sent to Congress his very able message in which he had denounced 
 secession as heresey, unconstitutional and unauthorized. I dif- 
 fered from this message in this : That while I admitted the con- 
 stitution did not provide the remedy for the States, yet each had 
 retained this right, from which they had never parted, to with- 
 draw for cause the powers they had conferred upon the general 
 government and resume the full exercise of them. But as I held, 
 no man could justify secession which was not sufficient to justify 
 revolution, and as there was not and could not be during the ad- 
 ministration of Mr. Buchanan any justifying cause of secession, 
 and as our difference was a mere abstract one I could with pro- 
 
 i" Philadelphia Press, March 4, 1884. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 119 
 
 priety hold my place in the cabinet. When the governor's letter 
 was received and I had determined it was my duty to accept the 
 appointment, I sought and obtained an interview with the Presi- 
 dent and told him I wished a leave of absence to visit the Legis- 
 lature of North Carolina. At first he endeavored to dissuade me 
 from going, but as I persisted he insisted upon knowing what I 
 proposed to do. I unbosomed myself to him with the utmost 
 frankness. I told him that an exciting canvas was going on in 
 Mississippi in the subject of secession — that I was opposed to any 
 hasty and hurried action on the part of the state, but that he knew 
 that my conviction was that I owed my primary allegiance to my 
 state ; and whatever destiny she chose must necessarily be my 
 destiny; as, yet there was no existing cause that would justify 
 secession ; there would be none during his administration, and if 
 the states of the South could and would co-operate and appoint a 
 future day for a united convention, and this was known to the 
 whole country, and we could avoid a conflict of arms and blood- 
 shed, Congress which was then in session, could and probably 
 would in the meantime provide some compromise which would 
 remove from the Southern mind any apprehension of an invasion 
 of their rights from the North. I could hurry up North Caro- 
 lina, she thereby would acquire an influence to hold back Missis- 
 sippi and the gulf states. To this end I would visit the state. 
 All the influence possible should be exerted to induce the states to 
 have a full and candid understanding of the rights of the South- 
 ern men in their slave property. Unless that was reached I fore- 
 saw that the disruption of the Union was inevitable. If the 
 President preferred I would at once resign, or hold my place, 
 just as he desired. To this he frankly replied that while he feared 
 I would be the subject of misconstruction yet he could not say 
 he wished me to resign. And with that leave I went to North 
 Carolina and I am confident I had but one interview with the 
 President on the subject of leave of absence and therefore I could 
 not have delivered to the President the weighty opinions and " all 
 he said " of Mr. Clingman. And without this second conversa- 
 tion, all the evidence of Mr. Clingman is mere sounding brass. 123 
 I cannot close this letter without bearing testimony to the great- 
 ness, goodness, and worth of our departed chieftain. It was his 
 fortune to live amid dissolving empires. But a purer man, a 
 more sincere friend, a more devoted patriot, an honester citizen, 
 and truer guardian of the public interests never lived or wielded 
 power. 
 
 123 Both accounts were published with a letter of Harriet Lane dated 
 September 29, 1877, in the Lancaster Daily Intelligencer. Clipping in Bu- 
 chanan's Papers, H. S. P. 
 
120 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 A statement 124 by Thompson's chief clerk made in the House 
 during the war confirms the above testimony. He stated that 
 Thompson was much opposed to war, and earnestly desired to 
 see tranquillity restored. He felt that perhaps some one desired 
 to embarrass him by appointing him to the North Carolina con- 
 vocation. 
 
 The excitement over the abstraction of the Indian Bonds led 
 some persons to suspect Thompson, who, like Floyd, had nothing 
 to do with the matter. Black alluded to the accusation as fol- 
 lows : 125 
 
 Having mentioned the name of Mr. Thompson, I ought to say 
 that the most infamous slander ever uttered against any public 
 man in this country was the charge against him of abstracting 
 bonds belonging to the Indian Trust Fund. He was and is a man 
 of unspotted integrity ; a committee of his enemies declared that 
 in this transaction he was entirely faultless, and yet the accusa- 
 tion is continually repeated for the gratification of mere political 
 malice. 
 
 Thompson's part in advising Buchanan in the preparation of 
 his message of December i860 and January 1861 will be given 
 later. Upon reading Black's account of his reluctant intention 
 to leave the Cabinet in December, Thompson said : 126 
 
 I had no idea he would make it at the time he did, although he 
 made a remark to me a day or two before that I remembered at 
 once when I heard of his action. We were walking along a 
 corridor of the White House together, and as we reached the 
 President's door Black said to me : " Thompson, I can't see how 
 we are to hold together. I think there must soon be a general 
 breaking up." He said no more, and we separated — he to visit 
 the President, I to go home. 
 
 His ignorance of this event later led him, as has been men- 
 tioned, to attribute Buchanan's attitude to the arrival of Stan- 
 ton. 127 
 
 124 House Reports, 37th Congress, 3d Session No. 19. Kennedy also re- 
 futed Clingman in a letter dated October 10, 1877, to the Baltimore Sun. 
 Clipping in Buchanan Papers, H. S. P. 
 
 125 Philadelphia Press, August 21, 1881, by Burr. 
 
 126 Philadelphia Press, September 17, 1884. 
 i 27 A. H. R, 191 1, Vol. II, p. 532. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 121 
 
 The sending of the Star of the West brought about Thompson's 
 resignation. He wrote Cobb that Buchanan and Holt had played 
 the " meanest trick " 128 on him by sending a secret expedition to 
 relieve Sumter and keeping him in the dark so that the news 
 might not reach Charleston. Nevertheless, his affection for Bu- 
 chanan did not cease, nor his regard for him abate as is shown 
 in his letter of resignation, and a farewell letter that does credit 
 to both of them. 129 
 
 A feud, which seems to have been smoldering, burst forth at 
 this time between Thompson and Holt over a telegram that 
 Thompson wrote his friend Longstreet in South Carolina, who 
 was trying to restrain the radicals. This feud lasted for over 
 twenty years. It was later intensified over the claim of Thomp- 
 son that Holt had paid witnesses to testify that he had had some- 
 thing to do with the assassination of Lincoln in order that Thomp- 
 son could be executed. 130 This accusation was a base falsehood 
 on the part of Holt. Thompson liked Lincoln personally, and 
 would never have thought of such a thing. 130a 
 
 Thompson's account of the reason why Holt remained with 
 the Union, although probably somewhat exaggerated, is an inter- 
 esting contribution to the economic interpretation of History. 
 
 Holt's reason for being a Union man I can easily give you . . . 
 
 (Then follows the story of his appointment already given) 
 
 ... So he was appointed. After this Holt voted with me, and 
 we got along very well together, until one day when he asked me 
 what I thought would be the result of interstate war. I was in 
 the act of stepping out of the door, and, remembering the fact 
 that Holt's money was all invested in Missouri bonds, jocularity 
 remarked that of one of the results I felt quite certain — state 
 bonds would be a drug on the market. From that moment Holt 
 became my bitterest foe. . . . 131 
 
 128 A. H. A. Report, 191 1, Vol. II, p. 532. 
 
 129 Curtis, Vol. II, pp. 401-404. 
 
 130 Among Holt's articles which show the intense hatred of which he was 
 capable, are found those in the National Intelligencer, March 28, 1861 ; a 
 pamphlet, " Treason and Its Punishment," 1865 ; and in the Philadelphia 
 Press, October 12, 1883. 
 
 130a See reference for 119a. 
 
 131 Philadelphia Press, September 17, 1884. Holt denied this in a subse- 
 quent article. 
 
122 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 Black wrote to Dix in regard to the unfortunate and acri- 
 monious quarrel : 132 
 
 It pains me therefore to see the difficulty between Holt and 
 Thompson. Of course you know Holt well enough to make you 
 sure that he is not only an incorruptible but a very able man. 
 
 Thompson is in my estimation, as upright, true and honest a 
 man as ever lived ; one of the most efficient executive officers this 
 Government ever had and always true to his duty as he appre- 
 hended it. They are quarreling on a point where they are both 
 right and both wrong. The order in question was given. Holt 
 heard it and Thompson did not. What is there in this to make 
 an issue about? I think the construction upon Thompson's de- 
 spatch that it was a violation of official confidence was a very 
 harsh one. On the whole this business ought to be dropped just 
 where it now is, and if you meet Holt, I think you ought to say 
 so. I have no influence that I know of with either of the parties. 
 
 A confidential account of what actually took place, and who did 
 and who did not hear the orders concerning the Star of the West, 
 is contained in the two following letters. It is noticeable that the 
 cautious Black did not reply until after the Administration was 
 over. The reason was that Thompson intended to put the letter 
 in a paper to answer Holt. 
 
 Washington, D. C. 
 To Hon. J. S. Black Jany 14th, 1861. 
 
 Dear Sir : 
 
 The uniform frankness which has ever been maintained between 
 us, makes it proper for me to address you certain enquiries and 
 to ask a candid reply. I am doing this simply to vindicate myself 
 against the attacks of enemies which I anticipate will be made on 
 my return home. 
 
 When the question was up before the Cabinet on Wednesday 
 Jany 2nd whether re-enforcements should be sent to Major An- 
 derson; Did we or did we not agree to send a messenger to Fort 
 Sumter to ascertain his true condition and also his wish as to 
 re-enforcements? 
 
 Did you not then say to the President, does the sending of a 
 messenger imply that no additional troops are to be sent till the 
 return of the Messenger — & did or did not the President reply 
 then rather impatiently raising both hands, " Judge Black, it 
 implies nothing," or something to that effect? 
 
 i 82 Philadelphia Press (by Burr), September 10, 1883. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 123 
 
 As the letter of the S. C. Commissioners was brought in while 
 Mr. Holt was taking down the interrogatories to be propounded to 
 Major Anderson; that subject being about finished; I read the 
 letter, discussion arose as to the proper disposition of it, it was 
 determined to return it. The endorsement was made by the 
 President. Mr. Glosbrenner was called in and directed to deliver 
 to the Commissioners. Did or did not the question of sending 
 re-enforcements ever become a substantive subject of considera- 
 tion in the Cabinet after the reading of the letter? As I aver 
 before high Heaven I never heard the remark of the President, 
 re-enforcements must be now sent — did you hear that evening 
 such a. remark from the President? 
 
 On Thursday as we left the Cabinet meeting you asked me in 
 a spirit of kindness and friendship — If troops have to be sent to 
 Charleston, will you feel bound to resign your place in the Cabinet ; 
 I replied, I would feel myself bound to do so. You then asked 
 me to see & talk with you before I acted. I promised you, I would 
 do so but added I had no thought you could change my purpose. 
 
 At the time of that conversation did or did you not know that 
 troops had been ordered by the President or with the President's 
 knowledge to re-enforce Major Anderson. 
 
 I hope you will do me the justice to give me your recollection of 
 the facts in response to these questions and I will not permit 
 myself to doubt your willingness to do so. 
 With high regard 
 
 Your friend 
 
 J. Thompson. 133 
 
 Washington, 
 March 18, 1861. 
 My dear Sir : 
 
 My reply to your note is somewhat late. 133a in the day may seem 
 late; but your communication in the " Intelligencer " of this morn- 
 ing reminds me that I can not put it off any longer withhold with- 
 out seeming to do you injustice. 
 
 That an order to reinforce Fort Sumter was given the " Star of 
 the West " was sent by the War Department to Fort Sumter 
 with men and provisions for Fort Sumter in pursuance of the 
 President's order made in Cabinet council I think is a fact well 
 established by the testimony of Messrs. Holt, Toucey and Stanton. 
 But it can not be proved by me for though I was present at the 
 meeting I have no recollection of hearing such an order given. 
 As it escapes me I can readily believe that you and Gov. Thomas 
 
 133 Black Papers, Vol. XXXV, L. C. 
 
 i;!3a Italics indicate portions of the draft crossed out. 
 
124 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 did not observe notice it; for we were all equally interested and 
 excited by the affair we were dealing with. 
 
 I was present when you wrote your answer to Judge Longstreet's 
 despatch. I wished you not to send it and used what argument 
 and persuasion I could to make you withhold it. But I did not 
 suggest that it would be was a breach of official confidence / did 
 not see then and do not now regard it so. Knew the precise 
 situation in which you were placed, as I certainly would have done 
 if justice had permitted me to put such a construction could have 
 been put upon the act. with any show of justice, I know the 
 precise situation in which you were placed and I believed then as 
 I do now that you were not bound by any consideration had the 
 same right to speak of your obligations of secrecy with regard to 
 the * Star of the West ' were no greater than those of any other 
 individual in the nation you were bound in silence concerning the 
 ' Star of the West * by no obligation which was not equally bind- 
 ing upon the hundreds of other persons who had learned of her 
 movements just as you had learned them. 
 
 all your 
 
 I am bound to say that your whole char duties as 
 
 The records of the government will show how ably and up- 
 rightly you performed your duties as the Head of the Interior 
 Department. In the unhappy troubles which were brought upon 
 the country and upon one. In all the discussions and controver- 
 sies controversies which marked the closing months divided the 
 Cabinet during the closing months of the last administration your 
 bearing was always frank and free and generous to your col- 
 leagues who differed from you but marked at the same time by 
 unyielding fidelity to your own strong convictions, of You and 
 I agreed in general and on a few occasions / am with great respect 
 we differed I am bound to say Bound &c that I never met a fairer 
 opponent or /. S. Black stood beside a truer friend. 
 
 With profound respect I am Your svt. J. S. B. 
 
 It might be well to remark that there is a lack of complete 
 agreement upon influences, and upon facts in a few instances of 
 testimony upon Cabinet matters. But the writer has also noticed 
 that the same results often occur in the testimony of witnesses in 
 trials where the witnesses have seen certain acts take place from 
 their respective angles. No attempt has been made to secure a 
 perfect consistency. History is not mathematics and cannot be 
 limited by the same exact laws. 
 
 I 3 * Black Papers, Vol. XXXVI, Black to Thompson. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 125 
 
 The attitude of Buchanan towards his Cabinet has been wilfully 
 misrepresented by some writers. The myth of the Cabinet Re- 
 gency was concocted by Nicolay and Hay to injure Buchanan, and 
 possibly in the hope of bolstering up the work of Stanton, and 
 perhaps Black. The history of how Buchanan held his Cabinet 
 together, when part of it was in disagreement on means of policy, 
 marks one of the ablest pieces of work of the President's whole 
 career. One main factor must be understood from the start. The 
 overwhelming majority was agreed on the main aim of the policy, 
 which was to avoid a great civil outbreak, and do all that could be 
 done to promote a compromise so as to bridge the gulf and save 
 the Union. 
 
 First, then, Black admitted in a letter to Curtis on September 
 26, 1 881, that Buchanan was but little influenced by his Cabinet. 135 
 
 I think the worst trouble he got into, or at least the one which 
 in his subsequent life he remembered with more regret than any 
 other, was caused by his resolution not to trust his constitutional 
 advisers with his plans and modes of management. He over- 
 estimated his own power when he thought he could get along 
 without their assistance. He took a great deal of unshared re- 
 sponsibilities. His consultations with outsiders were frequent and 
 confidential but they did not control him. His object was to get 
 information and he got a great deal which he did not communicate 
 to his cabinet. . . . 
 
 Black believed that after his so-called " crisis " Buchanan put 
 himself in a different attitude, but while there is no doubt that 
 Buchanan did humor his Cabinet somewhat for political reasons 
 after that time, there is some evidence that he still kept his own 
 council, and went his own way. One incident illustrating this 
 fact is that neither Stanton nor Black knew where the Brooklyn 
 was going as late as the 25th of February when questioned by 
 Tyler. 136 
 
 The mental attitude of Buchanan was stated by a long-standing 
 and very intimate friend who was highly (and it would appear 
 justly) incensed at the editing of Burr's first interview (August 
 7, 1881) with Black. Joseph E. Baker was Buchanan's Collector 
 
 135 Moore, Vol. XI, p. 62. 
 
 1 36 " Life and Times of the Tylers," Vol. II, p. 589. 
 
126 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 of the Port at Philadelphia, a most trustworthy political lieutenant 
 and friend. Buchanan's papers contain many of Baker's letters, 
 chiefly concerned with the politics of Philadelphia, where he was 
 the chief of one of the factions of the Democracy. Baker was a 
 native of Lancaster and had known Buchanan since " I was about 
 two feet high." In the interview in which he criticized some of 
 Black's remarks, he touched on Buchanan's attitude toward his 
 Cabinet, with reasons for his course. 
 
 In the inharmonious relations of the Cabinet the President was 
 accustomed to ask many questions " for advice " which masked 
 his designs. He may have employed duplicity or as it is some- 
 times called diplomacy in calling out the real intentions of his 
 advisers. . . . The fact is that he made particular confidants of 
 none of his Cabinet officers. As Cobb once said : " We were like 
 a lot of boys." He heard them and acted on their advice if it 
 accorded with his views and contrarily if it did not suit him. 137 
 
 Baker also vigorously denied that Buchanan was timid, and 
 claimed Black said so. This accusation Black vigorously denied 
 in another interview 138 (about August 21, 1881), which has been 
 quoted above. Speaking further on Baker's remarks Black said : 
 
 Mr. Baker however dishonors him when he charges him with 
 duplicity in dealing with his Cabinet officers. He was never 
 guilty of falsehood that I know of. I think Mr. Baker had his 
 unreserved confidence, and it may be that I did not. . . . [He said 
 that Mr. Baker was ignorant of the South Carolina Commissioner 
 matter.] 
 
 The fact seems to be that the President did not try to deceive 
 his councilors in any sinister sense, but that he was resolved to 
 keep as much freedom as possible on the one hand, and keep his 
 cabinet from breaking in pieces on the other. He asked advice 
 of many persons, partly for information, and partly to avoid 
 
 137 Philadelphia Press, August 20, 1881, article by Burr. 
 
 138 Philadelphia Press, August 21, 1881, article by Burr. 
 
 The President made the initial drafts of most of the documents sent by 
 his secretaries. For example, the first draft of Holt's reply to Senators 
 Hunter, Slidell, and Mallory over conditions at Fort Pickens is really 
 Buchanan's work, and remains among his papers as an excellent testimony 
 of his personal supervision. It will be given later. 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 127 
 
 committing himself, or answering questions. Some outsiders took 
 this as an indication that he did not know what he wanted to do, 
 and this delusion has persisted until now, whereas quite the con- 
 trary was really the case. 
 
 The members of the Cabinet have left a very bitter record of 
 Buchanan's intercourse with the Senators. This attitude on the 
 part of the President was perfectly natural. Here were the men 
 that counted, as far as he was concerned. Some of them, like 
 Slidell, were men of long years of friendly association. They 
 were men of mature age and long political experience ; they repre- 
 sented the States of the Union, they had been his pillars in the 
 legislative branch. They had greatly contributed in making him 
 President. He looked on them as barriers between him and his 
 foes. It was to be expected that he should regard these men as 
 more important than his ministers, whom he considered more as 
 advisers and officers to do his bidding. 
 
 Thompson, who had much respect for both Davis and the 
 President, gives his opinion of their logical political relations : 139 
 
 There is not the least doubt that the warmest personal relations 
 existed between Mr. Davis and the President. He consulted him 
 on all matters of importance and gave considerable weight to his 
 opinions. Really Davis was looked upon in the Senate as the 
 champion of the Administration. He represented interests upon 
 which the President leaned for support, and it followed that he 
 should be consulted when an important step was to be taken. 
 This relationship grew rather than diminished up to the very last. 
 To such an extent was it carried that some members of the Cabinet 
 were actually jealous, and thought it a slight upon them that the 
 President should prefer to consult with one outside of the Cabinet. 
 
 . . . There were reasons for his moderation. You must know 
 that Buchanan was the President of the South. He depended 
 upon Southern politicians for support, and, therefore, must look 
 to them for advice and counsel. 
 
 After his message of December, there was a rapid cooling of 
 his relations with men of the Gulf State group. They urged 
 him for a while and, it must be admitted, paid little attention to 
 his convenience. It is difficult for admirers of Buchanan to 
 pardon this incessant importuning to recognize the legality of 
 
 139 Philadelphia Press, September 17, 1883. 
 
128 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 Secession or to evacuate Charleston harbor. Still, it must be 
 also remembered that these men were likewise in hot water, being 
 constantly flooded with letters desiring information upon matters 
 of governmental policy. It was a difficult time in all quarters. 
 After the message of January 8th, personal intercourse practically 
 ceased between the President and the Gulf State group. Still, 
 Buchanan had information from that section through men em- 
 ployed in minor civil positions, and through a great mass of cor- 
 respondence. 140 
 
 After Buchanan refused to send Anderson back, some Southern 
 Senators made insulting remarks tending to break down respect 
 for him. Buchanan would have been indeed very obtuse had he 
 not been worried over the state of the country, but when one goes 
 through the annals and sees the vast amount of work he person- 
 ally dispatched, the number of people he received, and the long 
 hours of Cabinet counsel, such remarks are seen to be due to the 
 fact that Buchanan was firmly holding to his correct legal position 
 that he had no power to change the relationships of the State to 
 the Union without Congressional assent. 141 
 
 140 Moore, Vol. XI, pp. 221, 222. 
 
 14 i Curtis, Vol. II, p. 488. 
 
 Toombs, Benjamin, and the more courteous Davis soon split with the 
 President on the issue of the day. Mallory, Hunter, and Slidell were 
 among the others. On the other hand, the President seems to have re- 
 tained pleasant relations with Bayard, Cushing, Bigler, Judge Campbell, 
 and a host of border-State and conservative Southern State men to the 
 close of his administration and after. 
 
 As an example of disagreement of a milder type, the following statement 
 by Davis is submitted after the South Carolina episode. It was written 
 at a time when he felt very bitter towards the Administration : 
 
 " President Buchanan has forfeited any claim which he may have had 
 on our forbearance and support. I regard his treatment of South Carolina 
 as perfidious, and place no reliance upon him for the protection of our 
 lights or abstinence from hostility to us. In this do not understand me 
 as alleging a wicked purpose — his evil deeds rather spring from irresolution 
 and an increasing dread of northern excitement. He is said to fear that 
 his house at Wheatland may be burned & it is reported that he apprehends 
 impeachment when the withdrawal of Southern Senators shall give the 
 requisite majority in the Senate to convict him." — Davis to J. J. Pettus, 
 " Works of Jefferson Davis," Vol. IV, p. 565. 
 
 The following was written years later, after more reflection. The 
 
BUCHANAN'S MINISTERS 129 
 
 Enough has been said to substantiate the statement of Buchan- 
 an's niece, found in her very able paper contributed to Curtis' 
 biography : 142 
 
 I knew quite intimately nearly all the members of his Cabinet, 
 and heard a good deal of their conversation, and I know with what 
 respect they spoke of him, and that the whole tone of their con- 
 versation was that he was the master. 
 
 Sufficient extracts have been presented to show that it was the 
 desire to seek the path of public duty, as he understood it, which 
 led his Cabinet to give him their respect. Cobb, Holt, Black, King, 
 Thompson, and also Floyd are prolific in such testimony. 
 
 first half has been often quoted, but the last part which is very fair and 
 candid has been generally omitted by Northern writers : 
 
 " Mr. Davis remarked that Mr. Buchanan more than fulfilled the Euro- 
 pean idea of a Chief-of-State in his social relations than any American 
 since Washington. He was dignified, polished, reticent, and suave; fond 
 of lady-gossip and atmosphere of intrigue, a stickler for the ceremony 
 of power. His misfortune was as regarded his reputation North, that 
 he could not forget in a month, and at the dictation of a party only 
 representing the majority of one section, all those principles which had 
 been imbibed in his youth, and formed the guiding stars of his career 
 through over fifty years of public service." — John J. Craven, " Prison Life 
 of Jefferson Davis." London, p. 302. 
 
 142 Curtis, Vol. II, p. 676. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 Buchanan's Policy, 1860-1861 
 
 Buchanan's Policy from November i860 to January 1, 1861 — 
 Cabinet Ministers and Councils — Preparing the Message — The 
 Message, an Analysis in the Light of the Past, Present, and Fu- 
 ture — The Question of Fort Sumter — Floyd and Buchanan — The 
 Legal Aspects of the Position of the Government — The Role of 
 Major Anderson and its Effect on the Administration — The Criti- 
 cal Days of December and their Effect on the President's Course. 
 
 Buchanan, as most other public men, realized that the prospect 
 of a Republican President would be received with considerable 
 apprehension by many Southern people. In the month that in- 
 tervened before the convening of Congress, Buchanan was ab- 
 sorbed in preparing his message. The actual drafting was mostly 
 done in the State Department, where he usually spent the morn- 
 ing in a room set apart for himself. It is not possible to sketch 
 the daily chain of events entirely, but the general trend is dis- 
 cernible. On November 7th, the following entry occurs in 
 Floyd's diary : 1 
 
 The President wrote me a note this evening, alluding to a 
 rumor which reached the city, to the effect that an armed force 
 had attacked and carried the forts in Charleston harbour. He 
 desired me to visit him, which I did, and assured him that the 
 rumor was altogether without foundation, and gave it as my 
 opinion that there was no danger of such an attempt being made. 
 We entered upon a general conversation upon the subject of dis^ 
 union, and discussed the probabilities of it pretty fully. We con- 
 curred in the opinion that all the indications from the South 
 looked as if disunion was inevitable. He said that whilst his rea- 
 son told him there was great danger, yet his feelings repelled the 
 convictions of his mind. 
 
 The next day Floyd noted that Buchanan was busy in the State 
 Department, drafting his message. 
 
 1 Pollard, "Robert E. Lee and His Lieutenants," p. 791. 
 
 As has been said before, Pollard had a hatred for both Buchanan and 
 Davis. His own comments are not to be regarded, but the diary seems to 
 be genuine. « 
 
 130 
 
BUCHANAN'S POLICY, 1 860-1861 131 
 
 On November the 9th the President took up the administra- 
 tion policy with the Cabinet in formal council : 
 Floyd continues : 2 
 
 A Cabinet meeting was held as usual at one o'clock ; all the 
 members were present, and the President said the business of the 
 meeting was the most important ever before the Cabinet since his 
 induction into office. The question he said which was to be con- 
 sidered and discussed, was the course to pursue in relation to the 
 threatening aspect of affairs in the South especially in South Caro- 
 lina. After considerable amount of desultory conversation, he 
 asked the opinions of each member of the Cabinet as to what 
 should be done or said relative to a suggestion which he threw 
 out. His suggestion was that a proposition should be made for 
 a general convention of the States as provided for under the con- 
 stitution, and to propose some plan of compromising the angry 
 disputes between the North and South. He said that if this were 
 done, and the North or non-slaveholding States should refuse it, 
 the South would be justified before the whole world for refusing 
 longer to remain in a Confederacy where her rights were so 
 shamefully violated. He said that he was compelled to notice at 
 length the alarming condition of the country, and that he would 
 not shrink from his duty. 
 
 Floyd states that Cass deplored Southern injuries, favored a 
 convention and coercion ; Secession he held illegal. Black was 
 for a convention, coercion, and re-enforcements to Charleston. 
 Cobb was hopeless upon the future of the Union. Holt did not 
 advise a convention, because in case it failed he thought it would 
 accelerate Secession. Thompson was for a convention. He was 
 opposed to coercion, which would drive his State to direct action. 
 Toucey was for a convention, and believed that retaliatory State 
 measures would bring the Northern fanatics to their senses. 
 Floyd described himself both as opposed to Secession and rash- 
 ness. He believed the Republicans would be powerless to do 
 anything. His statements of his position are practically the same 
 as given by Trescot's Narrative. 
 
 The idea of a convention was neither new nor novel. Many 
 of the conservative Democrats and border-State men were for 
 this means of adjustment. Two of the ablest judges of Bu- 
 chanan's own State were strongly in favor of the plan, Judges 
 
 2 Pollard, " Robert E. Lee and His Lieutenants," pp. 791-793. 
 
132 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 Woodward 3 and Lewis. 4 Buchanan's idea of Southern moral 
 justification was a long standing conviction as will be shown in 
 taking up his message. It was perfectly consistent with his de- 
 nial of the legality of Secession. 
 
 Buchanan was ready about this time to issue a proclamation of 
 his policy. He asked Black about such a plan, but Black advised 
 him to wait until Congress convened. This Black later regretted, 
 because as time went on, the President felt confident that he could 
 kill the idea by an exposition of the subject. Buchanan also at an 
 early date asked Black about his opinion of the nature of the 
 Union as a compact, and whether the South had a legal right to 
 secede. He cited Rawle as an eminent authority for the legality 
 of such an (see below) act, but he was inclined to disagree, and 
 was glad to find Black did not hold the idea either. 5 
 
 When Black saw his chief set on the idea of going over the 
 whole subject in detail, he prepared at his request a sort of a draft 
 such as he said might have been used for a proclamation. Bu- 
 chanan was not satisfied with it. He said it was provocative, and 
 asked Black to write another confining himself to a legal state- 
 ment of the case. He had marked out a noble and impartial 
 course for himself, saying to Black at this time : 
 
 " I desire to stand between the factions like a day's man with 
 my hand on the head of each counselling peace." 6 If writers 
 would print a few more of these noble and patriotic utterances 
 instead of finding fault with the President's policy, the reading 
 world might approach a fairer judgment of Buchanan's character. 
 
 Before Black drew up the final opinion, Buchanan was evi- 
 dently drafting and redrafting opinions on the subject. It was 
 his custom to draft and redraft many times in the case of im- 
 portant documents. His nephew states he went through the 
 same procedure on his inaugural. 7 There is also the possibility 
 that he brought some of Black's first draft before the Cabinet. 
 Stanton's friends say he was consulted also around the tenth. 
 
 3 Woodward to Black, letter ; see topic Black and Buchanan above. 
 
 4 Konkle, " Life of Chief Justice Ellis Lewis," Philadelphia, 1907, p. 247. 
 
 5 Philadelphia Press, August 21, 1881 ; article by Burr. 
 
 6 Philadelphia Press, September 10, 1883 ; by Burr. 
 
 7 See Curtis, Vol. II, p. 187. 
 
BUCHANAN'S POLICY, 1 860-1861 133 
 
 His opinion had little weight with Buchanan, who considered him 
 not very profound on constitutional law. 8 All through this period 
 the President was sounding public opinion. Floyd speaks of the 
 meeting of November 10th, as follows : 9 
 
 Nov. 10. We had a cabinet meeting to-day at which the Presi- 
 dent read a very elaborate paper, prepared either as part of his 
 message or as a proclamation. It was well written in the main 
 and met extravagant commendation from Gen. Cass, Gov. Toucey, 
 Judge Black and Mr. Holt. Cobb, Thompson and myself found 
 much to differ with it. Cobb because it inculcated submission to 
 Lincoln's election, and intimated the use of force to coerce a sub- 
 mission to his rule ; and because it reprehended the policy of the 
 Kansas-Nebraska Bill. Thompson because of the doctrine of 
 acquiescence 9a and the hostility to the secession doctrine. I ob- 
 jected to it because I think it misses entirely the temper of the 
 Southern people and attacks States Rights doctrine on the sub- 
 ject of secession. I do not see what good can come of the paper, 
 as prepared, and I do see how much mischief may flow from it. 
 
 On November 13th the general situation was again overhauled 
 in a formal session. Floyd noted : 10 
 
 We had a long session of the cabinet today. The President 
 read a good paper suggesting a convention of the States for an 
 amicable adjustment of pending difficulties. He is uncertain 
 whether he shall make it a proclamation or part of his message. 
 
 He also noted financial stringency in New York. 
 
 On the 17th of November Buchanan propounded a set of ques- 
 tions to Black as the latter had requested him. These were to be 
 the basis of his attitude toward the Southern question. Whether 
 the first opinion was alone an answer to the questions of this date 
 is not known, but from what Black says it would seem that they 
 were not, and were of a less legal nature. 
 
 8 See article on Stanton. He was appointed Attorney-General at Black's 
 request because they were friends ; because Black wanted a man he thought 
 he could rely on ; and because they were trying some cases in the Supreme 
 Court. 
 
 9 Pollard, " Robert E. Lee and His Lieutenants," p. 794. 
 9a To the election of Lincoln. 
 
 10 Pollard, " Robert E. Lee and His Lieutenants," p. 795. 
 
 10 
 
134 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 This opinion 11 was delivered on November 20th. He con- 
 cluded that the government could act only on the defensive, that 
 it could take care of its property, and enforce the decrees of its 
 courts on individuals; but it showed that there was no common 
 law for the federal government to use in absence of specific legis- 
 lative commands, and that to enforce the law against united op- 
 position in any state " would be simply making war upon them " ; 
 that a declaration of war would ipso facto expel a State from a 
 Union. Buchanan's subsequent ideas on the subject were incisive. 
 
 11 Moore, Vol. XI, pp. 21, 22; Curtis, Vol. II, pp. 319-324. 
 
 According to a well-known writer, Mr. Corwin, who is an extreme na- 
 tionalist, Black erred in the matter in refusing to send troops against the 
 people of a State. — Corwin, " National Supremacy," pp. 242, 243. 
 It is one of the many attempts to read into the words domestic violence 
 meanings not intended by the ratifiers of the Constitution. The instrument 
 but not the interpretation of some of the framers was accepted by the 
 ratification conventions. — Fowler, " Sectional Controversy," pp. 248, 249. 
 The incidents which Mr. Corwin uses are not identical. They are cases 
 where Federal laws were opposed by individuals in a State and not sup- 
 ported with the will of the people en bloc as a State expressing itself through 
 its proper representatives in a convention. Jackson's act has been discussed 
 by Curtis, a more nationalistic thinker than Buchanan himself. — Moore, Vol. 
 XI, pp. 46-48. 
 
 Mr. Corwin has avoided use of references that counteract his theory. — 
 Scott, J. B., " The United States of America, A Study in International Or- 
 ganization," p. 201 et seq. Fowler, " Sectional Controversy," p. 220. 
 Some of the States even reserved the right to draw their granted adherence 
 to themselves. — Fowler, ibid., p. 26. 
 
 Jackson did not behave like a nationalist in the matter of the Georgia 
 Indians; nor in his farewell address. — Statesman's Manual, p. 391. 
 Works of Stephens, Davis, Tyler, and Tucker have ably and successfully 
 upheld contrary doctrines. Had the ratifiers of the constitution ever dreamed 
 of Mr. Corwin's theories, the instrument would have never been ratified. 
 Even granting the privilege of a peaceful revolution it narrowly escaped 
 defeat in New York and Virginia. The fetish of which he speaks had 
 found plenty of adherents before the Civil War. 
 
 A nationalist like Hamilton saw the impracticability of State coercion. — 
 Fowler, " Sectional Controversy," p. 26. 
 
 If this phrase did not mean anything, as Mr. Corwin would have us believe, 
 then the Fathers were a group of deliberate frauds who spoke to deceive. 
 And if this were true, their idea was killed by the interpretation of the 
 ratifiers of the document. To say the least, there were always two schools 
 of thought on the subject. 
 
BUCHANAN'S POLICY, 1 860-1861 135 
 
 Those writers, however, who extol Black, and adversely criticize 
 Buchanan for their stand on the matter of the Union, will find no 
 stronger statement against coercing by force the people of a State 
 into admitting the supremacy of the Federal Government than is 
 found in the last paragraph of this paper of Judge Black in any 
 official document of the President. 
 
 While 12 these formal consultations were in progress there were 
 also many other meetings between the President and one or more 
 of his Cabinet, and between the members themselves. Some 
 time between the 19th and the 26th of November Floyd tele- 
 graphed Davis, and notified Mason and Hunter to come to Wash- 
 ington. Davis says that he was sent for by two members of the 
 Cabinet. The other one was probably Cobb. Floyd's idea was 
 not to get Davis to see about the President's message, so much 
 as to quiet his apprehensions in regard to Fort Sumter being at- 
 tacked, in the possibility of which event he desired to send rein- 
 forcements. 
 
 The oft-quoted and over-estimated rumor, that Buchanan 
 altered his message to a considerable extent, is dispelled by 
 Thompson, who was questioned on the subject at the time when 
 Davis stated it in his book. 13 
 
 " I . . . think the President told me that he had written him 
 privately to come up and talk over the message with him." 14 
 
 Davis says nothing of any such letter in his book, so perhaps 
 Thompson was mistaken. 
 
 " Did his visit have any effect upon the tenor of the message? " 
 
 " If so, it was imperceptible to me. I heard it read at a Cabinet 
 
 meeting, and afterward read it over carefully myself before it 
 
 was seen by Davis. I heard it read again after Mr. Davis had 
 
 spoken with the President and could detect no change whatever." 
 
 12 November 13. President gave $100 for the famine relief in Kansas. 
 November 23. " The President repeatedly expressed himself against the 
 secession movement believing that before revolutionary measures are adopted 
 every constitutional and legal means ought to be exhausted." — Richmond 
 Enquirer. 
 
 Also announced the President had finished his message. 
 
 13 Jefferson Davis, " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," New 
 York, 1881, Vol. I, pp. 38-39. 
 
 14 Philadelphia Press, 
 
136 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 The fact that he took down Davis* remarks shows nothing, ex- 
 cept that he was courteous and desired them as a matter of record. 
 Davis admits that the message was so unlike what he wished that, 
 when it was read, he publicly opposed it. Buchanan frequently 
 kept memoranda of interviews. Davis and Buchanan were at 
 odds from the start on the legality of Secession. Of his many 
 friends one whose views were somewhat, but not wholly like his 
 own (Buchanan's), was Senator Bayard 14a of Delaware. 
 
 What Floyd accomplished was to bring Davis and the other 
 two Senators to town a few days in advance of their normal 
 arrival to be present at the opening of Congress. Buchanan would 
 have without doubt gone over his message with them in any 
 event. As has been mentioned, it was his custom to discuss public 
 matters with a great number of prominent persons in order to 
 get different light upon the public opinion in different parts of 
 the country. He depended upon these very Senators to aid him 
 in a peaceful solution of the crisis, and to protect him from any 
 violent attacks which the radical Republicans might launch upon 
 his Administration. Davis had stood by him nobly in 1850, when 
 an attack had been made by John P. Hale upon some of his 
 remarks during Buchanan's absence from the Senate. Hunter 
 was a moderate man by temperament, and both he and Mason 
 represented one of the leading border States in the Union. Bu- 
 chanan was also strongly hopeful that inasmuch as he and his 
 Administration had always supported the South in their constitu- 
 tional rights in the Union, they owed it to him to make no attempt 
 
 14a " It is the President's duty under his oath of office to see that the laws 
 are faithfully executed. But could the Government of this country ever 
 have been founded for times like this among the persons [not clear] that 
 gave it existence? 
 
 "If when the reason leaves the law itself ceases, be true at any time is it 
 not the time now? The framers of the Constitution made force impossible 
 against the citizen of any State acting under State orders. The reason of 
 Federal power was State consent and when that is denied what but the 
 ultimio ratio regnum can be given when the reason for the law ceased. 
 
 " But I am clear that the details of war against the consent of a State 
 against the whole or a part of her citizens will be without warrant [under 
 anything — not clear — of the name of construction] of any provisions of the 
 Constitution."— Bayard to Black, January 7, 1861 ; L. C 
 
BUCHANAN'S POLICY, 1 860-1861 137 
 
 to go out during his term of office. Then, he believed that the Re- 
 publicans would come to terms, and the whole trouble would be 
 over. These men were his friends, and comrades for many years. 
 He was naturally bound to them by the inevitable ties of sympathy 
 that such associations had brought. To have assumed that he 
 would not hear the advice of the leaders 15 of the Democracy at 
 so grave a crisis, when much of the destiny of the country de- 
 pended on the conciliation of all factions, would be absurd. 
 
 An important phase in the final drafting of the message has 
 been told as follows by Thompson : 16 
 
 The draft of Mr. Buchanan's last message to Congress was up 
 for consideration in the Cabinet. The spirit with which it should 
 deal with the Southern question was an all important one to the 
 public men of that section, and there was a great division in the 
 Cabinet upon it. The members from the South were anxious to 
 get all the concessions possible, and especially desired the message 
 to deny the right of the General Government to use force against 
 a State. 
 
 We had an earnest discussion upon that phase of the message 
 said Mr. Thompson, to-day when reviewing the events of those 
 days, and the President seemed exceedingly anxious to get all 
 the light he could as to his powers under the Constitution. Judge 
 Black was advising him that he had a right to use the whole mili- 
 
 15 Horatio King, who had an interview with Buchanan, relates it as 
 follows : 
 
 " Our chief clerk, Mr. Clements, and myself had an hour with the 
 President last evening, and our interview was most satisfactory. Mr. C. 
 has just returned from Tennessee, and brings good news from that State 
 to the effect that nearly everybody there is opposed to the hasty action of 
 South Carolina, and is in favor of one more effort to preserve their rights 
 in the Union. The President appeared to be much gratified to be assured 
 of this. He is, as I supposed a firm Union man ... I have no doubt he 
 will take strong ground in his message against secession as well as the 
 right of secession ; but were I allowed to guess, I would say that he will 
 not be in favor of using force unless the property of the United States is 
 interfered with, such as the taking of the forts etc. when he would be 
 obliged to act. . . ." — King to Dix, November 27, i860. King, " Turning 
 on the Light," p. 28. 
 
 For the next thirty days King was very much excited, and did his best 
 to have pressure brought to bear on the President to sustain and ward off 
 all Southern suggestions. 
 
 16 Philadelphia Press, March 4, 1883 ; by Burr. 
 
138 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 tary force of the Government to protect the public property and 
 enforce the laws in any State in the Union ; and that a state has 
 no right under any circumstances to dissolve its relations with the 
 Federal Government. To this doctrine the Southern members 
 strongly objected. Some of them expressed their opinions upon 
 the subject quite freely. I went to the President quietly and 
 asked him if he would go with me over the Constitution and the 
 Convention that framed it. I said to him that there was certainly 
 no expressed power in the instrument itself that gave him the 
 right to use force against a State, and I though that I could con- 
 vince him from the debates that it was the intention of the Con- 
 vention that framed the fundamental law of the land to deny either 
 to the President or Congress any such power. He asked me to 
 bring the authorities. I went to my department, got the report, 
 marked the pages where this question was under, and then went 
 to him with them. We looked over the subject carefully together, 
 and then I left him. When I called again for a Cabinet meeting 
 he said : " Thompson, you are right on one important point ; it is 
 clear to my mind that there is no reserved or expressed power 
 granted by the Constitution to use force against a State for any 
 purpose. It is also apparent that the framers of the instrument 
 intended to deny both to the President and to Congress any such 
 power. I am also convinced that a State has no right to secede 
 from the Union." I was, of course, pleased that the President 
 had reached the conclusion I had urged upon him. 
 
 When the Cabinet met I saw he had the Constitution and the 
 report of the Convention before him on the table. The subject 
 was soon under discussion, and Judge Black most earnestly urged 
 his views upon the President. Much of the final discussion was 
 provoked by this phrase in the message : 
 
 " Coercing a State by force of arms to remain in the Con- 
 federacy, a power which I do not believe the Constitution has 
 conferred on Congress." 
 
 This was the phrase Judge Black especially objected to. Gen- 
 eral Cass thought it could do no harm, and the rest of us were in 
 favor of it. When it was decided that it should remain the 
 President said to Judge Black : 
 
 " I cannot agree with you that the Constitution gives the General 
 Government the right to use force against a State, and I think, if 
 you will read these authorities, you will change your mind " — re- 
 ferring to the debates I had given him. 
 
 Judge Black did not accept his defeat with very good grace, and 
 said to me that he did not see how he could submit to such a 
 conclusion. I said to him that he of all men should stand by the 
 
BUCHANAN'S POLICY, 1 860-1861 139 
 
 Administration. He and the President had long been friends and 
 were from the same State. He and I were very intimate and 
 talked a great deal about the situation, and he was often restless 
 over the President's decisions over a great many matters. 
 
 This narrative of Thompson's, able as it is, overstates the case 
 in some respects. In the first place ; the attitude of Black is over- 
 done, probably due to Burr's editing, as a reference to the paper 
 (August, 1881) will show. Secondly: there was nothing new in 
 this stand of Buchanan's. He had officially declared the same 
 thing on coercion in a letter of 1859, after the John Brown Raid, 
 and, as has already been shown, the whole trend of the public 
 utterances of his long career had been in the same direction. 
 
 There were few public men in the country who were better read 
 in the legal history of the country than he. What he concluded 
 from reading the debates, was what any person might clearly 
 conclude. In our own time constitutional lawyers and teachers 
 have read into, and taught into, our Constitutional history strained 
 interpretations of the work of the Constitutional and the ratifying 
 Conventions. Had the idea of State coercion been noised around 
 in the days of the beginning, after the manner of the post Civil 
 War period, there would have been no United States. Had the 
 rulers of that day desired the type of government that was forced 
 on their posterity in 1861, they would have sat down and drawn 
 a frank declaration of a unitary government and been done with 
 it. What Buchanan saw was plain to any person who desired a 
 Union by the consent of the governed. 
 
 Some of the States acted on the above idea by declaring them- 
 selves seceded, but provided for their officers to carry on Federal 
 laws and duties, or provided that Federal officers should not be 
 disturbed. Georgia did this, but South Carolina did not, though 
 Rhett 17 was strongly in favor of it. 
 
 17 New York Herald, December 21, i860. 
 
 Part of Trescot's Narrative of December 2, i860: 
 
 " He had come to the conclusion that the State would secede. ' But,' 
 said he, ' you know I cannot recognize them ; all I can do is to refer them 
 to Congress.' 
 
 " On Sunday night, when I saw him, he went over the ground again, 
 said that he thought his message ought to be acceptable to the South, 
 that he had spoken boldly and clearly and that all he had declared was 
 
140 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 The message 18 which Buchanan presented to Congress on De- 
 cember 3d thoroughly discussed the whole Secession question. 
 It has been admitted able by some of Buchanan's hostile critics. 
 Curtis, whose legal abilities on constitutional subjects are well 
 known, held a high opinion of it, 19 although he seems to have 
 strained the meaning of certain portions to correspond to some of 
 his own (Whig) ideas. Two paragraphs or more were said to 
 have been omitted, but are now lost with the earlier drafts. 20 
 
 He first showed the cast of his mind by going to what he 
 considered the cause of the whole trouble. This was certainly 
 not a bid for Republican popularity. As in 1859, he went back 
 to his remarks of the thirties, and again stated that when the 
 South feared for their domestic self-preservation the Union could 
 not hold. 21 This feeling was brought about by the " long con- 
 that with regard to the laws of the United States and the property, he 
 would discharge all the obligations of his official oath." — A. H. R., Vol. 
 XIII, pp. 537-538. 
 18 Moore, Vol. XI, pp. 7-55. 
 i» Curtis, Vol. II, Chapter XVI. 
 
 20 These drafts are lacking in Buchanan's papers, which went through a 
 fire before being housed at the Historical Society. 
 
 21 J. M. Mason's daughter (" Life of J. Mason," p. 163) says that the 
 Southern people never feared revolt. That is an overdrawn statement, 
 but more true in Virginia than in other parts of the South. Riots in 
 Charleston occurred in the thirties ; recent race riots have taken place in 
 Washington and Chicago. Burgess tells of the fright in Tennessee in 
 1859; and the following extract shows the situation in Georgia as early as 
 1844. 
 
 " What will it avail us at the South for the incendiaries to cease their 
 work after our throats are cut and our houses burned? Sir, the negroes 
 in Georgia are already saying to each other that great men are trying to 
 get them free and will succeed, and many other expressions of similar 
 nature. And if the agitation of the subject is continued for three months 
 longer we will be compelled to arm our militia and shoot down our own 
 property in the field. . . ." Hon. J. W. H. Underwood of Georgia to 
 Howell Cobb, February 2, 1844, A. H. R., 191 1, Vol. II, pp. 54, 55. 
 
 Probably the danger was not feared in certain sections of the border 
 States, but in the cotton States it was considered by many a real menace. 
 Buchanan expressed this conviction in letters as well as public addresses 
 before i860 and after. He touched on a great fact in concluding the 
 paragraph — that when any people find that a government cannot and will 
 
BUCHANAN'S POLICY, 1 860-1861 141 
 
 tinued and intemperate interference of the Northern people and 
 had produced its natural effects. " 
 
 The President then briefly cited the circulation of inflammatory 
 circulars among negroes since Jackson's time, and resolutions in- 
 troduced at Washington and sent over the country. It will be re- 
 membered that, as Senator, he wisely voted to receive, but table, 
 such resolutions so as to prevent the linking of anti-slavery with 
 the restraint of our speech or right of petition on the slavery 
 issue. He then said that the moral responsibility rested on the 
 States as sovereign bodies, and that the North " are no more 
 responsible and have no more right to interfere with them than 
 with the similar institutions in Russia or in Brazil." 
 
 Without forbearance no President could save the Union. 
 
 The question which Buchanan propounded to himself was: 
 
 " Does the election of i860 constitute a valid cause for 
 secession ? " 
 
 When he answered that question in the negative it put him on 
 the record as opposed to any violent action because of that election. 
 
 The new President, he believed, once feeling the burdens of 
 office, would be conservative. He described the many limitations 
 of the office of the executive, which showed his own strict con- 
 struction views of the office. Then, in a philosophic vein, with 
 one of his favorite phrases : " Sufficient unto the day is the 
 evil thereof, the day of evil may never come unless we shall 
 rashly bring it upon ourselves." The idea of waiting for the 
 overt act was in direct conflict with Cobb's opinions (November 
 13th), and had accelerated his resignation. 
 
 The doctrine of legal secession was declared to be of recent 
 origin ; it would lead to petty jarring republics ; Jackson and 
 Madison were quoted as opposed to it. The powers of the Fed- 
 eral Government were enumerated, and the supreme law clause 
 was mentioned as a means to " secure the uninterrupted exercise 
 of these high powers." 22 Davis agreed to that also. 
 
 not perform the sacred duty of protecting life and property, no feeling of 
 loyalty can long endure. The Gulf States in 1860-1861 could not find many 
 benefits which they could not better enjoy as independent States. 
 22 Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederacy," Vol. I, pp. 150, 151. 
 
142 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 The statement that the laws of the Federal Government in their 
 legitimate sphere were as binding on the individuals of the States 
 as if textually inserted therein was probably intended to be a 
 very strong statement. It sounds like Black's theory of obedience 
 to laws and elimination of sovereignty. As a fact there was 
 nothing in it to disturb even a follower of Calhoun, because Cal- 
 houn cheerfully admitted that individuals owed obedience to 
 Federal law but supreme allegiance to the State. The question of 
 allegiance Buchanan did not touch. He considered state allegiance 
 as "principles of false 23 honor" in i86i, 23a but did not take it 
 up at this time. He could hardly do so as the matter was never 
 fully settled until the Civil War was closed. 
 
 Then followed a number of paragraphs devoted to the perpetu- 
 ity of the Union. 24 He correctly noticed that the Articles of 
 Confederation were perpetual. He might have continued to ob- 
 serve that in that case a peaceful revolution brought about desired 
 
 23 " false " — mistaken. 
 
 2 3a Moore, Vol. XI, p. 187. 
 
 24 In speaking of the Virginia resolutions, Buchanan denied that Madi- 
 son ever intended a resort to violent measures to change the Constitution. 
 There was an implied denial that these measures gave the right to any- 
 irregular proceeding like secession. He generally referred to Madison's 
 report to sustain this point. The South, however, and Calhoun had claimed 
 that his doctrine of secession grew from these resolutions. Madison had 
 denied it when he became alarmed at the proceedings of South Carolina 
 in 1832, but he had found himself much embarrassed at that time. Upon 
 the Kentucky resolution, Buchanan was silent. Both parties in the papers 
 in i860 raked the files for letters of the fathers supporting their causes. 
 One thing is certain, that the great Democrat, Thomas Jefferson, favored 
 peaceful rather than violent separation at the time of the Missouri Com- 
 promise, although he deeply deplored any such event. He was also against 
 military coercion of the West in case that part of the country seceded in 
 1803. 
 
 (R. G. Horton, "Youth's History of the Civil War," p. 68. At an 
 earlier date see Jefferson's Works, edited by T. J. Randolph, Vol. IV, p. 14. 
 Jefferson's Works, Ford Edition, Vol. IV, p. 191 ; Vol. VI, p. 66.) 
 Edward Everett tried to show that Jefferson had spoken of naval co- 
 ercion, but he neglected to indicate that this was an occasion in which 
 secession from the Union was not contemplated. Jefferson would never 
 have consented to keep over one-third of the states in the Union at the 
 point of the bayonet. 
 
BUCHANAN'S POLICY, 1 860-1861 143 
 
 changes through the agency of the Congress. The precedent was 
 plain to any thinking person as to what could be done to avert 
 disaster. 
 
 Buchanan delivered an able attack on the personal liberty laws, 
 declaring the historical necessity of the Fugitive Slave Act as a 
 means of Union; the nullity of personal liberty laws, and that 
 unless the States repealed those acts " it is impossible for any 
 power to save the Union." In passing, it may be observed that, 
 whether right or wrong by individual creeds, the laws were a 
 violation of the Constitution. The States passing them refused 
 to secure the property of other persons in the Union. This was 
 revolutionary, and a breach of the essence of government. It was 
 a violation of the articles of government and all principles of 
 political science. To live in a Union which could not secure the 
 protection of the property of its citizens would be ruin in the long 
 run. The North in such a case would be violating the Union. 
 The Federal compact had been violated. Buchanan's attitude was 
 not Calhounism, but an argument based on the general principle 
 for which governments were supposed to exist. It is also well to 
 remember that in some States, fines were laid on persons who 
 might comply with the Federal acts. A man who " rescued," in 
 Buchanan's term, a proven fugitive by violence from the posses- 
 sion of a marshal for his punishment was liberated on a writ of 
 habeas corpus by the supreme court of Wisconsin. Still, Northern 
 writers decry Southern nullification ! These personal liberty acts 
 were the creation of State legislatures and not sovereign con- 
 ventions, — a state of things more easily suited to Federal coercion. 
 What would the North have said had the Administration forced 
 the carrying out of the Fugitive Slave Law by large bodies of 
 troops ? 
 
 The President declared that unless the repeal of these acts 
 took place, the Constitution would have been wilfully violated, 
 and the injured States, " after having first used all peaceful and 
 constitutional measures to obtain redress, would be justified in 
 revolutionary resistence to the government of the Union." Fur- 
 ther on he declared: "It (Secession) may or it may not be a 
 justifiable revolution but still it is revolution." 
 
 Buchanan was practically compelled to make these statements 
 
144 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 to avoid inconsistencies. His memory could carry him back to 
 1856 when he declared the election of Fremont would cause the 
 disruption of the Union, an event which caused him to say : " God 
 save the Union ! I do not wish to survive it." 2C His later sup- 
 port of the war displeased one of his old friends who wrote : 26 
 
 In one of your letters now before me you indicate and defend 
 in the strongest terms the very position the South has assumed. 
 Your countenance of the Government is less strange than the rest 
 for you are peculiarly situated and in your heart cannot bless 
 this war upon us. 
 
 While it is entirely possible that Buchanan may have remarked 
 as stated, I have only thus far found citations where he stated 
 such a possibility as an inevitable and deplorable result rather than 
 with approbation. 
 
 Again, in 1857, after the Dred Scott case and during the time 
 his foes were harrying him over Kansas, a Virginian politician, 
 Colonel Parker, quotes him as saying : 27 
 
 "If the Personal Liberty laws are not repealed in the North, 
 the South will have a right to secede and ought to secede." 
 
 It will be noticed that in neither of these cases is a legal right 
 discussed. Also, it has been noted that in the middle of No- 
 vember, Buchanan already made practically the same statement 
 that he made in his message. Whether or not Buchanan did 
 admit a legal right to secede before he became President is very 
 doubtful, but not absolutely impossible. In either case the fact 
 remains that he did not consider Lincoln's election a valid cause 
 and that fact left no doubt of his stand in 1860-1861. 
 
 The President also reviewed the nature of his functions in the 
 crisis. Like everything else, he construed the Militia Acts of 
 1795 and 1807 strictly. Lincoln, at a later date, pulled them into 
 ludicrious shape to give his own acts the color of legality. For 
 some weeks Mr. Lincoln, like Buchanan, did not try to execute 
 the law where " the entire population would constitute one solid 
 
 25 Moore, Vol. XI, pp. 91-92. 
 
 26 Bowen, of Baltimore, to Buchanan, April 17, 1861, H. S. P. 
 
 27 Virginia Magazine of History, Vol. XIII, p. 85. 
 
BUCHANAN'S POLICY, 1 860-1861 145 
 
 combination to resist him [a Federal officer]." Such a matter has 
 been covered in speaking of Black's opinion. According to the 
 ideas of the time, it would have been unconstitutional. But Bu- 
 chanan gave Congress plenty of opportunity to pass new laws to 
 give ample force to such portions of the Constitution. He an- 
 nounced his policy concerning the forts, etc., which he maintained 
 to the end. The declaration that he had no power to recognize 
 any change in State status in its relation to the general government, 
 saying that such power belonged to Congress alone, convinced 
 many that he intended to take no steps toward secession. It was 
 also bound to discourage those who hoped he would advise 
 recognition. 
 
 Upon the subject of coercion of a State to remain in the Union, 
 Buchanan displayed thorough knowledge and marked ability. He 
 declared it was not in the delegated powers, and had been refused 
 by the convention. Madison was cited as the chief support, but 
 a host of others could have been found in the ratifying conventions 
 to the same effect. In such a war, he said, the Union was bound 
 to be destroyed because the seceding States, if defeated, would 
 afterward be held as provinces. This was a foreshadowing of 
 Stevens' theory of reconstruction. It will be remembered that 
 certain Republicans spoke of the Constitution being destroyed by 
 Civil War. The truth is that the old Union died. The new 
 political philosophy plus the use of text-books after the war 
 altered the nature of the Union. 
 
 Even on the ground of expediency, war would be undesirable. 
 The President pointed out that in such a case peaceable recon- 
 struction would be impossible. He then stated the creed of his 
 heart, which was truly a statement of the condition of things since 
 the beginning of the Constitution: 
 
 Our Union rests upon public opinion, and can never be cemented 
 by the blood of its citizens shed in civil war. If it cannot live on 
 the affections of the people, it must one day perish. Congress 
 possesses many means of preserving it by conciliation; but the 
 sword was not placed in their hand to preserve it by force. 28 
 
 28 The following interesting note is from the pen of an authoritative 
 writer of the present day : 
 "... The difficulty of controlling by force the will of the people of a 
 
146 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 While this might be a confession of his faith, as head of the Fed- 
 eral Government, he had to curtail his ideas, and make a consist- 
 ency with the other portions of his message. Besides, he never 
 held the idea of permanent separation or independence of the 
 Southern States. Some new form of agreement ought to be 
 reached. To this end he suggested Congressional amendments as 
 the means to save the Union. These would, at this point, have 
 been along the line of the Dred Scott case. In his message of 
 January the 8th he went back to his favorite idea of a compromise 
 line. 
 
 A digest of the policy which the Administration had decided 
 upon appears to be as follows: 
 
 Secession is a nullity, but it is one of those State acts for 
 which the Constitution does not provide a punishment. It is an 
 act outside the sphere of Federal authority. When, however, any 
 delusioned individual does an act which violates a Federal law, he 
 may be resisted or punished, provided Congress supplies the means. 
 
 The founders never intended to coerce a State or the people of a 
 State organized as such. Such acts by them are nullities, to be ig- 
 nored. The legal relationship of the States to the Federal Gov- 
 ernment was intended to be perpetual. A State cannot authorize 
 an individual to commit an act against Federal law which she has 
 once promised to uphold. As long, then, as the two spheres did 
 not conflict, a clash could be avoided. t 
 
 The criticism of the theory would be this : 
 
 Admitting that the Union was intended to be perpetual, yet so 
 were the Articles of Confederation. By refusing to coerce the 
 people of a State by force, the Fathers really prepared the way for 
 a peaceful revolution. The revolution of 1789 was peaceful, the 
 new government was an experiment based on consent of the 
 people of thirteen units acting as thirteen units. While one of 
 these units could not legally withdraw her consent, she could not 
 have force brought to bear against her for the act. Nor could 
 individuals be punished for acting by express authority of the 
 
 State so as to compel them to elect Senators and Representatives and 
 perform various other obligations to the Union remains unsolved by any 
 constitutional provision." — John Bassett Moore, "Four Phases of Ameri- 
 can Development," pp. 114-115, Baltimore, 1912. 
 
BUCHANAN'S POLICY, 1860-1861 147 
 
 agents (e.g. State Government) carrying out the will of the 
 organized people of a State. Black practically admitted this 
 principle when he said it was his private opinion they could not 
 punish a man for granting clearance papers at State orders. 28a 
 
 The Supreme law clause was not endowed with the right to 
 force the people of a State. It could not transcend the Constitu- 
 tion. It was no more than a treaty clause and only applied to 
 delegated or specific powers. This was the Southern and Demo- 
 cratic idea of the time. 29 
 
 The Administration had decided on the theory of its policy, and 
 prepared to carry it out. 
 
 The effects of the message were diverse. The radical Re- 
 publicans, who were hot for blood-letting, were hostile to it. 
 Some ridiculed it. It marked the parting of the ways with some 
 of the Southern Senators, because it did not admit the legal right 
 of secession, and showed them any interference with Federal 
 property was liable to cause trouble. If Buchanan had to hear 
 the disapproval of the enemy press and Southern Senators, he had 
 the consolation of seeing his policy endorsed by many in the 
 border States and by conservatives and moderates everywhere. 
 
 Any reader may find in Miss Scrugham's " Peaceable Ameri- 
 cans," 30 or Coleman's " Life of Crittenden " 31 plenty of evidence 
 
 28a Since the Civil War the States have been prostrated and this doctrine 
 tamely surrendered. The States are now as powerless as a collection of 
 jelly fish. 
 
 29 The remainder of the message found foreign affairs in the main 
 satisfactory. Mexico was still insulting in her manners. Cuba was a 
 desirable purchase ; Kansas had at last been settled except that it was now 
 in need of aid, due to famine; peace reigned in Utah, and the President 
 argued for specific duties in the tariff. 
 
 30 " Peaceable Americans," New York, 1922. 
 
 31 Coleman's " Life of Crittenden," Vol. II, Philadelphia, 1871. Watson, 
 " Life in the Confederate Army," pp. 81-89. 
 
 Buchanan and Jackson: To the cry copied in our day in text books, " Oh, 
 for an hour of Jackson ! " uttered by a class of people whose love of power 
 desires to brush aside all constitutional guarantees, Mr. Buchanan gave a 
 vigorous and pointed answer in his reply to the libels of General Scott in 
 1862. 
 
 " The General's supplementary note of the same day, presenting to me 
 General Jackson's conduct in 1833, during the period of nullification, as an 
 
148 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 of the compromise feeling of the time. In the Gulf States some 
 of the Union minority wanted action, but Tennessee, Kentucky, 
 and Virginia, while almost solid against coercion, were yet favor- 
 able for compromise. Lincoln drove North Carolina, Virginia, 
 Arkansas, out of the Union. Maryland sent many of her sons 
 South. Missouri was held by the Germans; and Kentucky de- 
 sired to be neutral. The resources of those States who finally 
 left the Union were a great aid to the Southern cause. Such were 
 the results of what was regarded as coercion. Seward and Bu- 
 chanan were both of the same mind in opposing coercion, and I 
 believe Seward could have solved it far more satisfactorily than 
 the more radical Republicans. 
 
 example, requires no notice. Even if the cases were not entirely different I 
 had previously determined on a policy of my own, as will appear from my 
 annual message." — Moore, Vol. XI, p. 284. 
 
 Curtis has thoroughly and ably treated the legal aspects of the topic. — 
 See Moore, Vol. XI, pp. 47-48. 
 
 A few words may be added of psychological difference. While I have 
 seen statements of Buchanan's, admiring Jackson's will power and sagacity 
 in feeling the public pulse, I have never seen any tribute of his to Jackson's 
 legal ability or intellectual powers. Anybody who cares to admit it knows 
 that Jackson's attitude toward South Carolina was largely due to what he 
 thought was a conspiracy against him by Calhoun. Backed by a cabinet of 
 ex-Federalists, his actions were those of a South American dictator rather 
 than a constitutional official. It is also well known that many of his party 
 disapproved of this procedure. Jackson's farewell message, used by Bu- 
 chanan in his book, breathes a very different spirit. His first work was 
 largely that of Livingston and his second that of Taney who had embraced 
 State Rights. In fighting South Carolina Jackson thought he was killing 
 a rebellious enemy. In 1861 Buchanan at the start had looked to most of 
 the Northern group to aid him in keeping the peace and keep off attacks on 
 his Administration from the ultra-Republicans. The personal political situa- 
 tion in the two cases as well as the public state of mind was very different. 
 
 It might also be added that in the oft-quoted letter of Jackson to Bu- 
 chanan on Nullification he spoke of the Union as a confederacy. Buchanan 
 was not a disciple of the Nullification theory which was not identical with 
 Secession. The chief remark of approval of Jackson was a statement in 
 his farewell address in which he stated it was futile to think that the Union 
 could be held together by force alone. — Statesmen's Manual, p. 151. The 
 Jackson proclamation of 1833 was composed by the anti-States Right man, 
 Livingston. The one here quoted was largely the work of Taney, who had 
 been converted to it. 
 
BUCHANAN'S POLICY, 1 860-1861 149 
 
 It has already been indicated that the problem of preparing the 
 message was involved with that of Fort Sumter. Floyd was 
 firmly against the idea of coercion, and also believed if a gloved 
 hand were used, things would turn out to the satisfaction of the 
 Administration and the State. He had been a student of the 
 University of South Carolina, and knew conditions in that region. 
 Cass and Black, on the other hand, were always urging reinforce- 
 ments. We have already mentioned the fact that Buchanan was 
 going over the matter with Floyd since early November (see diary 
 above). 
 
 Towards the last of November the President became uneasy 
 lest some effort would be made to seize the forts, and, according 
 to Trescot, Floyd had moments of unrest himself. The follow- 
 ing interview, reported by Floyd, leaves no room for doubt as to 
 the President's determination not to hand over the forts. 32 
 
 32 Trescot's Narrative, A. H. R., Vol. XIII. 
 
 Value of Trescot's Narrative: Some of this work is very valuable ; some 
 is misleading. Trescot favored Secession at an early date and therefore 
 lost such confidence of Buchanan which he may have had. The actual events 
 in which he participated are valuable account. On the other hand it was his 
 interest to make the most of the pledge idea although he understood the 
 President's difficulties. His inferences on the details on the " cabinet crisis " 
 are incorrect because he was not told just what did happen. He utterly 
 lacked the ability to see the humane side of Buchanan's character, and his 
 work suffers as a result. Some other criticisms of Chauncey Black and 
 Holt on Crawford's " Fort Sumter " are inserted here as they are really on 
 his narrative which Crawford used. In short, some of Trescot's inferences 
 are erroneous while his account of participation, with due allowance for his 
 secession feelings, may be regarded as valuable contributions to the period. 
 
 u Of course Mr. Trescot's account of my father's position in the Cabinet 
 discussions is perfectly conscientious. But I think it is all wrong. The 
 President complained that his views were too political and not sufficiently 
 legal and technical. But I prefer that Father should state it for himself." — 
 From Chauncey Black to Samuel W. Crawford, Crawford Papers, L. C. 
 
 Two letters from Holt (July 25 and December 28, 1885) contain the fol- 
 lowing remarks : 
 
 Speaking of the reason for his appointment, Holt said : 
 
 " While I have never doubted but that the preparation of the paper re- 
 ferred to led to my appointment as Post Master General, I do not know 
 it as a fact." 
 
 (This, of course, was not Thompson's version of the matter.) He thought 
 that Crawford was too severe on Buchanan. 
 
 11 
 
150 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 Some time, probably in the latter part of November, the follow- 
 ing discussion took place between Floyd and the President : 33 
 
 " Mr. Floyd, are you going to send recruits to Charleston to 
 strengthen the forts? What about sending reinforcements to 
 Charleston ? " 
 
 I was taken very much by surprise to find the President making 
 this inquiry, indicating to my mind a change of policy on his part. 
 
 I said : " Mr. President, nothing about sending recruits to 
 Charleston." 
 
 " Don't you " said he, " intend to strengthen the forts at 
 Charleston ? " 
 
 " I do not intend to strengthen the forts at Charleston." 
 
 Says he : " Mr. Floyd, I would rather be in the bottom of the 
 Potomac tomorrow than that these forts in Charleston should fall 
 into the hands of those who intend to take them. It will destroy 
 me, sir." 
 
 And said he: "Mr. Floyd, if that thing occurs it will cover 
 your name — and it is an honorable name, sir — with an infamy 
 that all time can never efface, because it is in vain that you will 
 attempt to show that you have not some complicity in handing 
 over those forts to those who take them." 
 
 Floyd said he would risk his life and his honor on the declara- 
 tions of the South Carolinians that they would not be touched. 
 
 He said to me : " That is all very well but pardon me for ask- 
 ing you, does that secure the forts ? " I said, " No, sir ; but it is 
 a guarantee that I am in earnest in the belief that I expressed to 
 you that the forts are secure." 
 
 Said he : "I am not satisfied." 
 
 Floyd said he was sorry for it. He offered to make out orders, 
 but said it would mean conflict. He said the forts would be 
 safe; the State would send her Commissioners to Congress, and 
 
 " I suppose that by this time your book is in preparation, & that of course 
 the questions of which we conversed last summer have been settled, I refer 
 particularity to the atrocious calumny reported to you by Trescot, which 
 represented certain members of his Cabinet as having attempted to bull 
 doze President Buchanan in a most insulting manner. . . ." 
 
 33 Abridged from Floyd's somewhat florid speech at Richmond, 1861. New 
 York Herald, January 17, 1861. Part also in the Times. 
 
 This speech has been much libelled by Northern writers. 
 
BUCHANAN'S POLICY, 1 860-1861 151 
 
 that body could decide what to do. Floyd said that he would 
 resign if Congress decided on coercion. 
 
 Buchanan finally agreed to see what General Scott would ad- 
 vise, and that ancient authority on the art of war was telegraphed 
 to come from the West to the Capital at once. 34 
 
 This conversation so excited Floyd that he sent for Davis, 
 Mason, and Hunter to come up earlier than usual to Washington 
 to assure Buchanan there was no danger to the forts. 35 Davis, 
 while rinding Buchanan concurring with some of his views, was 
 not at all successful in persuading him to take the troops out of 
 the harbor. 
 
 Most people have probably forgotten that the sites of the Fed- 
 eral forts at Charleston, and in some other places as well, were 
 held on the basis of contract or conditional cession from the 
 State to the Federal Government. 36 Up to a certain point the 
 Administration and the State were agreed of the status. Davis 
 says : 37 
 
 Mr. Buchanan, the last President of the old school, would as 
 soon have thought of aiding in the establishment of a monarchy 
 among us as of accepting the doctrine of coercing a State into 
 submission to the will of a majority, in mass, of the people of the 
 United States. When discussing the question of withdrawing 
 the troops from Charleston, he yielded ready assent to the propo- 
 sition that the cession of a site for a fort, for purposes, lapses, 
 whenever that fort should be employed by the grantee against 
 the State by which the cession was made, on the familiar principle 
 that any grant for a specific purpose expires when it ceases to be 
 used for that purpose. 
 
 Upon another statement of the case, the Federal government 
 was entirely incorrect. This was due to Black. Buchanan ac- 
 cepted it, and the Southerners were quick to point out the error in 
 the matter. Black said that the Federal government had pur- 
 chased the Federal property and owned it outright. As has been 
 shown above, such were not the facts in the case. The only 
 
 34 Crawford, " Fort Sumter," p. 28. 
 
 35 Floyd's speech at Richmond, New York Herald, January 17, 1861. 
 
 36 For a brief account see Davis, " Rise and Fall of Confederacy," Vol. I, 
 pp. 209-212. 
 
 37 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 216-217. 
 
152 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 things the Federal Government owned were the improvements 
 they had made on the sites. 
 
 On the other hand, as Buchanan considered Secession a nullity, 
 there was no reason for his giving up the forts as far as he was 
 concerned. 
 
 The Southerners then said that if he was only keeping them 
 as property, then, why garrison them, when a garrison only 
 frightened the people? To this argument there was reason, for 
 while the States could not claim the right to have the forts re- 
 turned, it was very evident that the forts were intended to be 
 used against foreign aggression alone, and not under any circum- 
 stances by the Federal government against themselves. 
 
 Buchanan would have been the last man in the world to have 
 voluntarily given up the forts without the authority of Congress. 
 No Democratic President from the North could have dreamed 
 of such a thing in the face of the powerful political consequences. 
 From the beginning it was evident to Black and Buchanan that 
 the forts were a sort of a test case in which the whole future 
 trend of events and the fate of the Administration were involved. 
 
 The President determined to present the matter of the status 
 of the property to Congress. 38 He was firmly convinced that 
 peaceful measures alone would localize the conflict, and felt it his 
 duty to give them a peaceful direction. With the slender re- 
 sources at his command, limited by the legal perogatives of his 
 office, he felt unable to conduct a war without a united North and 
 a Congress willing to co-operate without limit. 
 
 To adjust this matter, four of the members of Congress of 
 South Carolina sought an interview before the State actually 
 seceded. They interviewed the President on December 8th and 
 the ioth. On these occasions he only received them as private 
 gentlemen. His regard of his Constitutional powers and proper 
 limitations were always carefully observed. At a later date the 
 South Carolinians found it to their advantage to take the posi- 
 tion that Buchanan had given a pledge not to disturb the status 
 quo. Such a thing he never intended in the sense of later ac- 
 cusation. Practically everyone has now come to the conclusion 
 that no legal or formal pledging was undertaken. Even the South 
 
 38 For full account of Buchanan's attitude in February, see below. 
 
BUCHANAN'S POLICY, 1860-1 86 1 153 
 
 Carolinians seem to have admitted it at the time. The statement 
 of the gentlemen is merely an expression of strong conviction and, 
 as they were not received in a legal capacity, it need not have been 
 considered as in any sense binding on them. 39 
 
 What Buchanan probably intended was to lay his policy before 
 them and carry it out, provided he knew in advance what they 
 intended to do. His aim was in every way laudable. It was to 
 localize the disturbance and give time for Congress to act, or have 
 public opinion in the other States bring moral pressure to bear on 
 South Carolina until some reconciliation should be reached. He 
 never had any intention of so binding himself that he would not 
 be free to act in any unforseen circumstance. He was under 
 oath to preserve the Constitution as he understood it, and his 
 annual message showed that he did not intend to surrender the 
 forts. He considered himself morally bound all the way through 
 to do all he could to avert a crash that would wreck the Union. 
 It was directly in line with his efforts in sending Cushing upon the 
 18th to South Carolina to try to keep things as they were until 
 some overt act should be committed by the Federal Government. 40 
 But he did not change his mind. 41 
 
 Anderson's move was wholly unexpected, and brought a bale- 
 ful chain of circumstances. Had Buchanan restored the status 
 he would have broken up his own government. Even Trescot, 42 
 who was a Secessionist, saw the President's position in this light. 
 His duty to keep his government afloat was certainly paramount 
 to his policy on the status of the forts in Charleston Harbour. 
 
 Pickens, elected Governor of South Carolina just before the 
 State seceded, in order to put a halo on his head before his people, 
 sent Colonel Hayne with a letter to the President. Trescot 
 found out what the letter was in advance, and told Buchanan. 
 The President asked for more time than overnight to answer 
 (the indecent haste of Pickens is manifest) it, and Hayne con- 
 
 39 Curtis, Vol. II, p. 377. 
 
 40 Crawford, " Fort Sumter," pp. 87--88. This mission failed. Upon 
 Cushing's return, the Cabinet met, but I have no account of it. Buchanan 
 and Cushing were agreed on the main lines of policy. 
 
 41 Crawford, ibid., p. 39. 
 
 « A. H. R., Vol. XIII, p. 553- 
 
154 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 sented to wait until the next evening. Trescot, with the concur- 
 rence of Slidell and Mason, telegraphed to Pickens, and the letter 
 was withdrawn, much to the President's satisfaction. 43 
 
 The President had, however, drafted a reply 44 in which he 
 firmly stated that Congress alone could act on his requests ; that 
 he had no power to hand over Fort Sumter, and warned the Gov- 
 ernor that an attack on the forts would mark the beginning of a 
 conflict. The act of one independent government seizing the 
 property of another would be, he declared, always considered a 
 just cause for hostilities. It will be noted that both the State 
 and Federal governments were regarded as practically independ- 
 ent of each other, so that statement conveys no idea of recogni- 
 tion. 
 
 A new twist was now about to take place, as South Carolina 
 had determined on secession. 
 
 The resignation of Cass, who differed with the President on 
 his Sumter policy, has been reviewed above. Sufficient to say 
 here, that the opportunity it gave to the President's enemies to 
 increase their propaganda against him in the North, was not lost 
 on the President. He gave it as one of the reasons for not tak- 
 ing Cass back, saying all the world knew of his resignation. The 
 whole incident made him wary. Perhaps it increased his tend- 
 ency not to confide in his Cabinet too much, so as to prevent their 
 resigning for political reasons. It is not difficult to see how the 
 Cass incident may have reacted on the " Black crisis," and have 
 aided in securing Black's retention. Still, the friendship of the 
 two men was probably the strongest link. 
 
 When Buchanan first received the news of the secession of 
 South Carolina, he was at the residence of Mr. Parker, to attend 
 the wedding of his daughter to Mr. Bouligny of Louisiana. It 
 was a very Southern affair. On the same day he had written a 
 
 « A. H. A., Vol. XIII, pp. 541, 542. 
 
 4 * Curtis, Vol. II, pp. 384, 385- 
 
 The content of this reply shows that whatever he said on the tenth was 
 not intended to hamper his carrying out necessary means to secure the fort. 
 
 Holt regarded Anderson as under an implied pledge to act on the defensive 
 as outlined in Buchanan's letter to Hayne (January). But he was sup- 
 posed to use his own judgment in repelling attack. — Holt letter, February 
 23, 1861; also in the Anderson Papers; Crawford, "Fort Sumter," p. 294. 
 
BUCHANAN'S POLICY, 1 860-1861 155 
 
 letter to Bennett for the Herald, stating he was in the best of 
 health, because the Tribune had featured a headliner on the 17th 
 declaring him to be insane. Inquiring about a commotion that 
 occurred in the hall after the marriage ceremony, Buchanan was 
 informed by Mrs. Roger Pryor (Virginia) that South Carolina 
 had seceded. Stunned for a moment, he sat down in his chair, 
 but his prudence stood him in good stead. He asked for his 
 carriage, and went home before committing himself, or stopping 
 to be questioned. There he awaited the official information, 
 which came some hours later. 45 
 
 On the same day he drew up his reply to Governor Pickens* 
 letter asking the surrender of the fort, — a letter that had been 
 written on the 17th. Buchanan vigorously and ably set forth his 
 prerogatives, stating he had no authority to make any such ar- 
 rangement, and warning the Governor that an attack on the forts 
 would mark the beginning of a civil war. The letter of Pickens, 
 owing to the advice from Davis and Slidell, was withheld. 46 
 
 The 22d and 23d set the Cabinet and the country in a whirl by 
 the Stolen Bonds episode. 47 This was the second of the intense 
 problems for the Administration. 
 
 Hardly had the news of Cass' resignation been noised through 
 the country, when all eyes were again turned to Fort Sumter and 
 Major Anderson. He had been especially selected by Floyd, be- 
 cause of his coolness and judgment, to replace Gardiner at Sum- 
 ter when clouds appeared on the horizon. A man of high honor, 
 bravery, and ability, he saw the difficulties in his situation, and 
 strongly felt the responsibilities upon him. He seems to have 
 understood his position better than Black, who seems only to 
 have comprehended the fact that Northern public opinion desired 
 the forts to be held, and discounted Southern feeling. About 
 November, Anderson wrote to the Department : 48 
 
 I will thank the Department to give me special instructions as 
 my position here is rather a political than a military one. 
 
 45 Mrs. R. A. Pryor, "Reminiscences of Peace and War," pp. 110-114. 
 « Curtis, Vol. II, pp. 384-385. 
 
 On the 24th-25th Pittsburgh became excited over the shipment of the 
 cannon. 
 
 47 See above on Floyd. 
 
 48 Answer to a letter of the 23d of November from Washington. 
 
156 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 In the main he was like Buchanan and, like him, believed it was 
 his duty to forbear. 49 As he wrote to Pickens : 
 
 You know, Governor. My heart was never in this war. 50 
 
 A letter after his removal to Sumter reveals similar statements. 
 The following is taken from the copy sent to Buchanan : 
 
 W. A. Gorden, Esq., Jan. ii, 1861. 
 
 Washington, D. C. Fort Sumter, 
 
 My dear Sir : 
 
 Indeed you are right — a cheering word from an old friend is 
 most acceptable and goes direct to the heart. Like yourself, my 
 sympathies are in the matter of the sectional controversy all with 
 the South, but I must confess that I have lost all sympathy with 
 the people who govern this State. They are resolved to com- 
 mence their secession with blood. I shall do all that I can with 
 honor to prevent the occurrence of so sad an event — but fear that 
 all will be of no avail. 
 
 This morning they sank three vessels in the main entrance to 
 this harbor. Their folly has closed their ports to the commerce 
 of the world — and they now hope to keep the Government from 
 sending reinforcements to me. Little do they know of the power 
 of the General Government if it be compelled to resort to it. 
 Until they fired on the U. S. flag day before yesterday, I had 
 hoped that the Government would settle the matter without a 
 resort to arms — but now, unless some mediation takes place, I do 
 not see how a conflict can be avoided. 
 
 I have had a great deal of work to do since I came into the 
 Fort to put it in condition for defence. I am today mounting 
 some of my best guns, and if I have a few days more, hope, by 
 God's blessings to be prepared for any force they may bring 
 against me. My force is only about Yz of what it ought to be, 
 and I am therefore compelled to arrange everything so as to 
 make the best use for it. 
 
 Trusting that God will guide me in my duty to him and to my 
 beloved country, I am sincerely, your friend, 
 
 Robert Anderson. 
 
 49 E.g., " Trusting in God that nothing will occur to array a greater num- 
 ber of states than have already taken ground against the general govern- 
 ment." — January 6, 1861, Anderson Papers, L. C. 
 
 r '° Abner Doubleday, " Forts Sumter and Moultrie," New York, 1876. 
 
 Mrs. Anderson, although a Southerner, was much opposed to South Caro- 
 lina. She continually harassed Buchanan to aid Anderson. — E.g., Letter, 
 December 3, i860, Mrs. Anderson to Buchanan, H. S. P. 
 
BUCHANANS POLICY, 1 860-1861 157 
 
 It is very difficult to see where Anderson received any definite 
 evidence 50a that any attack was to be made prior to his removal 
 to Sumter. However, it was a perfectly natural act for a man 
 who had been for some days in a harrassing situation of responsi- 
 bility, not only for the property, but for the men in his command. 
 Even those who disagree with his course cannot condemn him 
 for taking it. Having what he regarded general orders, and see- 
 ing indications that he construed as a menace, he took the only 
 course possible from his point of view. On the other hand, this 
 course probably tended to discredit the policy of the commis- 
 sioners in the eyes of their friends, and they naturally blamed 
 Buchanan, who had acted without guile in the whole matter. 
 The chain of events seemed to make for misunderstanding. 51 The 
 only real encouragement for his course seemed to be the approval 
 of the local militia officers who marched into Moultrie. 52 This 
 proves nothing, as they were probably looking for a rupture, and 
 their approval may have been based on the fact that they hoped to 
 bottle Anderson in. The conservatives who had been trying to 
 keep the peace were naturally most cast down, and affairs in 
 Washington became very critical. 53 Anderson received many 
 congratulatory notes, 54 some in response to his own anxious in- 
 quiry 55 as to whether he had made a mistake in his move. 
 
 Floyd was greatly surprised to hear that Anderson had gone 
 
 50a Even Floyd was uneasy over a possible outbreak and mentioned it to 
 Trescot. See A. H. R., April, 1908, pp. 534-5. 
 
 51 He knew of no intention to settle the matter by diplomacy, and declared 
 even if a pledge had existed between Floyd and the Governor, the latter had 
 violated it in making use of armed steamers in the harbor. — See Letter Book, 
 December 31, i860: to War Department, L. C. 
 
 52 Anderson's Letter Book, December 28, i860: Letter to War Depart- 
 ment, quoting a remark of Lieutenant Hall of the South Carolina militia. 
 
 53 E.g., Robert N. Gourdin, December 27, i860: Anderson in no danger; 
 the State was pledged. 
 
 54 Dix to Anderson, January 21, 1861. Winter Davis to Anderson, De- 
 cember 31, i860. 
 
 55 Crittenden to Anderson, February 18, 1861. Strong hopes for return 
 of the States. — Anderson Papers, L. C. 
 
 The letters of his brother, Larz Anderson, who visited both Charleston 
 and Washington, indicate a strong hope for peace if reinforcements would 
 be dispensed with. — Anderson Papers, L. C. 
 
158 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 to Sumter. He telegraphed Anderson directly, asking him for an 
 explanation. The President first heard of the news from Davis, 
 Hunter, and Trescot. In this oft-quoted interview he declared the 
 move was against his policy. The President sent for Floyd, who 
 said he had no official news. General Lane, and Senators Bigler, 
 Yulee, and Mallory next appeared and remonstrated with the 
 President. Slidell late in the day was authorized to telegraph 
 that Anderson had acted against his orders, but he refused to go 
 a step further, having said he would hear Anderson's side and 
 consult with his Cabinet. 56 Again his firmness and caution saved 
 the day for himself, for if he had promised to restore Anderson, 
 he might have had a split in his ministry on his hands. 
 
 Buchanan called his Cabinet. Buell had also been summoned, 
 and disagreed with Floyd upon the merits of Anderson's move 
 while they were in the hall of the White House. Black reviews 
 this Cabinet meeting as follows : 
 
 From the evening of the 27th to the morning of the 31st, three 
 days and four nights, the removal of Anderson and the answer to 
 the Commissioners were under discussion. The Commissioners 
 had arrived on the 26th and news of Anderson's removal was re- 
 ceived on the morning of the 27th. 
 
 That morning as the Cabinet were assembling and the members 
 were dropping in one by one, Mr. Stanton communicated to Judge 
 Black the startling intelligence from Anderson. 
 
 " Good," said the latter, " I am glad of it. It is in precise ac- 
 cordance with his orders." " It is not," said Mr. Floyd, who 
 besides the President was the only person present. " But it is," 
 retorted Judge Black. " I recollect the orders distinctly word for 
 word." The President feared that Mr. Floyd was correct, and 
 Mr. Stanton's memory was not clear. Judge Black suggested that 
 the orders had better be sent for, and the dispute settled at once. 
 
 Upon inspection they fully confirmed his statement, and left the 
 President no alternative but to support Anderson. Mr. Floyd 
 alone persisted in the opposite. . . . 
 
 As soon as the Cabinet was formally opened, Floyd read his 
 note 57 in a discourteous and excited tone (which has been con- 
 sidered above). The Cabinet divided on what to do with An- 
 derson. 
 
 56 Trescot's Narrative, A. H. R., Vol. XIII, pp. 544, 545- 
 
 57 Floyd resigned on the 29th. 
 
BUCHANAN'S POLICY, 1 860-1861 159 
 
 Joseph Baker, 08 who had come to Washington on the 26th, 
 remarks : 
 
 ... it [Anderson's move] called forth the latent differences in the 
 cabinet which had for months been scattering thorns in the Presi- 
 dent's path. The President told me at the time that his Cabinet 
 troubles gave him more annoyance than the political situation did. 
 It is well to remember that whatever act originated with the 
 President was contemptuously discussed by both extremists, and 
 even the dismissal of a cabinet officer would have been unfavor- 
 ably construed . . . 
 
 Commissioners to treat with the Federal Government had been 
 appointed on December 22d. They had arrived in Washington 
 on the 26th, but had postponed their interview until the 28th, 
 when they were courteously received. Finding the cabinet divided 
 upon the grave problems that concerned them, they were in a 
 tense mood. They presented their official note the next day, 
 attempting to claim that the President was violating a pledge, 
 which he had no power to make, and which had not been at first 
 thus intended. They also stated their powers, and asked for the 
 evacuation of Charleston Harbor. They harassed the President 
 for two hours on the 28th, but he stood by his position, bidding 
 them look to Congress for relief. 159 
 
 The Commissioners repeatedly pressed the President for the 
 restoration of Anderson. Buchanan refused to commit himself 
 to no avail. Finally he said : 
 
 " Mr. Barnwell, you are pressing me too importunately ; you 
 don't give me time to consider ; you don't give me time to say my 
 prayers. I always say my prayers when required to act upon any 
 great State affair." 
 
 Why any text book writer should have the callous effrontary to 
 belittle such a remark is nearly beyond comprehension. There 
 have been a number of Presidents who felt the need of religion 
 in giving consolation to their responsibilities. At another point 
 the very devout nature of Buchanan will be noted. Suffice to 
 
 58 Collector of the Port of Philadelphia, often referred to as one of Bu- 
 chanan's few confidants. — Part of article in Philadelphia Press, August 20, 
 1881. 
 
 59 Crawford, " Fort Sumter," pp. 146-160. 
 
160 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 say here that he believed in a " family altar " ; that he had been 
 in the habit of reading the Bible and Jay's Exercises daily for 
 twelve years before i86i. e0 He used the expression frequently 
 when he was hard pressed or crowded with work. Mrs. Pryor 
 mentions it ; 61 it appeared in a book published in 1859, and written 
 in 1859 in which the President had used it before 1857, referring 
 to the rush of candidates for offices and the cry for place ; and it 
 was written by Buchanan himself in a letter to Clarendon on 
 March 27, 1858. 62 The idea that the President was starting out 
 on a new road at this point, due to special conditions, is a miser- 
 able falsity born of mean motives. 
 
 Between the 27th and the 30th, the President sounded public 
 opinion in Washington on the Sumter issue. 63 He told a num- 
 ber that he was inclined to send Anderson back, and watched the 
 reactions. In nearly all cases Northern people were vigorously 
 against this policy. 
 
 Unknown to him, Stanton, Sickles, and others had created an 
 inflated enthusiasm by telegraphing politicians in the different 
 Northern towns to fire salutes, have parades, and send congratu- 
 latory telegrams to the President for upholding Anderson's 
 course. 64 As a result the President received many such missives 
 sustaining his course, or rather pointing the way of " public opin- 
 ion." Among the more belligerent there was real joy, and in 
 some localities Anderson became the hero of the hour. 
 
 Buchanan was beset on all sides. No President in American 
 history ever spent so terrible a ten days. All things seemed to 
 vanish into chaos. Because he was unwilling and too perplexed 
 to heed Judge Campbell, the latter wrote to Pierce that he was 
 unmanned; and scored the incapacity of Congress as well. 65 
 
 60 Curtis, Vol. II, pp. 371-375. 
 
 61 Pryor, " Reminiscences of Peace and War," p. 56. Mary J. Windle, 
 " Life in Washington," p. 143. 
 
 62 Moore, Vol. X, p. 199. 
 
 63 Crawford, " Fort Sumter," pp. 146-150. Curtis, Vol. II, pp. 371-375- 
 
 64 E. P. Alexander, " Military Memoirs of a Confederate," p. 11. An ex- 
 cellent viewpoint. Also Lossing, " A Pictorial History of the Civil War," 
 Philadelphia, 1866, Vol. I, p. 285 note. 
 
 65 To Pierce, December 29, i860. — Pierce Papers. 
 
BUCHANAN'S POLICY, 1 860-1861 161 
 
 Others said worse things, but through it all the President kept 
 the keynote of his policy, — the prevention of civil war, — believing 
 and hoping that the darkest hour was but before the dawn and, 
 if there was to be no dawn, to keep his hands free of the blood 
 of his countrymen. Worried, harassed, he performed wonders 
 of labor, and in the words of the historian Lyon G. Tyler : 66 
 " Take him all in all, Mr. Buchanan was decidedly the most 
 gentlemanly, competent, and collected officer that had anything to 
 do with the government from the secession of South Carolina to 
 the firing on Fort Sumter." 
 
 On the evening of the 29th, Buchanan read his draft to the 
 Cabinet after a somewhat spirited session, which does not, how- 
 ever, seem to have made much impression on him personally. 
 Black now became excited, and relates the following bit of his- 
 tory. 67 
 
 None of us said a great deal about it [the reply] because all 
 of us knew by experience that when Mr. Buchanan made up his 
 mind he was immovable. No man ever filled the Presidential 
 office who knew better than he did how to enforce the respect 
 due to his station and I know of no one more tenacious of his 
 opinion when his judgment was once fixed. He was absolute 
 master in his own house. Therefore when that cabinet adjourned, 
 I did not believe it possible that our official relations could con- 
 tinue. 
 
 I spent the most miserable and restive night of my life. My 
 mind was in wild tumult and I arose the next morning determined 
 
 to resign before night 
 
 . . Mr. Buchanan at once requested my presence but I hesitated 
 to go for I knew the temper of the appeal he would make to me. 
 I felt that he would place his demand that I remain by his side 
 upon such grounds of personal friendship that it would make it 
 impossible for me to leave him without laying myself open to the 
 charge of having deserted a friend who had greatly honored and 
 trusted me at a time when he was under the shadow of the great- 
 est trouble of his life. He sent a second time and I went. I 
 found him greatly disturbed and his first words were : 
 
 " Is it true that you are going to desert me ? " 
 
 " It is true that I am going to resign," was my reply. 
 
 " I am overwhelmed to know," said he, " that you of all other 
 
 66 L. G. Tyler, "Letters and Times of the Tylers," Vol. II, p. 615. 
 
 67 Philadelphia Press, September 10, 1883, by Burr. 
 
162 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 men are going to leave me in this crisis. You are from my own 
 State, my closest political and personal friend, I have leaned upon 
 you in these troubles as upon none other, and I insist that you 
 shall stand by me to the end." 
 
 He then reviewed our association and made such appeal to me 
 as I knew he would when I responded to his summons. After 
 he was through I replied : 
 
 " Mr. President, from the start I had determined to stand by 
 you to death and destruction if need be. I promised that as long 
 as there was a button to the coat I would cling to it. But your 
 action has taken every button off and driven me away from you." 
 
 " What do you refer to ? " said he. 
 
 " Your reply to the South Carolina Commissioners. 68 That 
 document is the powder that has blown your Cabinet to the four 
 winds. The Southern members will leave because you do not 
 concede what they ask, and your conclusions make it impossible 
 for them to stay. The paper is even harder upon the Northern 
 members of your political household. It forces the Southern men 
 out, and you cannot ask that we stay. I would not leave you for 
 any earthly consideration so long as I could stay by you with self- 
 respect, but I cannot do it, if the paper you have prepared is sent 
 to the gentlemen from South Carolina." 
 
 The President seemed surprised that I took this document so 
 much to heart and I confess that it took all the determination I 
 had to announce to him my decision with relation to it, for his 
 manner toward me was kind and his appeal to me earnestness 
 itself. To my surprise he did not even argue the points of my 
 objection as I expected he would. He heard me without a word 
 and when I had finished said : 
 
 " Judge, you speak the words of my heart. I recognize the 
 force and justice of what you say. The letter to the South Caro- 
 lina Commissioners my tongue dictated, but not my reason. But 
 
 68 Buchanan had known of plenty of cases to justify his attitude on aid 
 from a hostile Congress. 
 
 " Congress so long delays troops we can't get them into the field until 
 the commencement of the Vomito season at Vera Cruz." — Buchanan to 
 Donelson (written while he was Secretary of State), January 29, 1845, 
 Donelson Papers, L. C. 
 
 His letter to Marcy, August 29, 1856, shows the despair of the Democrats 
 over the failure of the Republicans to pass Pierce Army Bill for needed 
 troops. See Moore, Vol. X, p. 89. 
 
 His own administration did not get enough troops to keep the Indians 
 quiet and run the Utah war properly. Seward alone of the Republicans 
 favored military support in Utah. 
 
BUCHANAN'S POLICY, 1 860-1861 163 
 
 I feel that we must not have an open rupture. We are not pre- 
 pared for war, and if war is provoked, Congress cannot be relied 
 upon to strengthen my arm, and the Union must utterly perish. 
 " But, Mr. President, you must stand by your position, and 
 boldly, with your judgment." 69 
 
 He did not hesitate a moment but turned to me and said : 
 " Your resignation is the one thing that shall not be. I will 
 not — I cannot part with you. If you go, Holt and Stanton will 
 leave, and I will be in a sorry attitude before the country. This 
 is the greatest trouble I have had yet to bear. Here, take this 
 paper and modify it to suit yourself ; but do it before the sun 
 goes down. Before I sleep this night I must know that this 
 matter is arranged to your satisfaction." 
 
 In answer to the question as to whether the first note conceded 
 the right of secession, Black replied : 
 
 No ! no ! a thousand times no ! It is a gross libel upon the 
 truth to assume that Mr. Buchanan's letter acknowledged the 
 right of Secession. This was a question upon which his judg- 
 ment was fixed at the beginning of the troubles and never modi- 
 fied. The paper was so unsatisfactory to the Southern members 
 that they were bound to go. This certainly would not have been 
 their conclusion if the President had acknowledged the kernel of 
 the principle they were contending for. My objections to the 
 paper were that it dallied with the enemies of the Government, 
 implied certain diplomatic rights of South Carolina that could not 
 exist, and yielded points that were unfair to the President's posi- 
 tion. 
 
 The President accepted the paper and framed his answer to 
 the so-called South Carolina Commissioners to avoid the points 
 I had raised. 
 
 The objections, which he immediately set to work to prepare, 
 were copied by Stanton. Their contents have long been known 
 to the public. A. K. McClure, 70 who talked with Black on the 
 subject, states that Buchanan had said in his first paper: 
 
 I have declined for the present to reinforce these forts [in 
 Charleston Harbor] relying upon the honor of South Carolinians 
 that they will not be assaulted while they remain in their present 
 
 69 Had the President refused to sustain Anderson, the loan which the 
 Government had attempted to float might have utterly failed. This would 
 have virtually paralyzed the machinery of the Government. 
 
 70 See Crawford, " Fort Sumter," for printed copy, pp. 153, 154. E. A. 
 K. McClure, " Lincoln and Men of War Times," p. 277. 
 
164 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 conditions but that Commissioners will be sent by the convention 
 to treat with Congress on the subject. 
 
 From one of the objections on Black's paper, the inference 
 seems to be that the President intended to recommend to Con- 
 gress that it do something about the property in Charleston. 
 This Black seems to have felt might be used later as a handle by 
 the State authorities to claim de facto recognition. As all re- 
 lations between the Federal Government and the States are offi- 
 cially conducted through the State Department, Black had very 
 personal reasons for being interested, as he might be held jointly 
 responsible for future issues arising out of the question. There 
 is no reason to believe that Buchanan had any idea of committing 
 himself in any way on the status of South Carolina. Black 
 feared a misconstruction. 
 
 Black objected to " the deep regret of the President that the 
 Commissioners are not inclined to proceed with the business they 
 came for." 71 This merely showed that Buchanan desired to en- 
 courage the delegation to try Congress and thus gain time for 
 compromise. Black, however, desired the President to refrain 
 from mentioning any such disappointment. 
 
 He objected to the phrase against State coercion, and advised 
 the President that he could not legally pledge himself not to keep 
 a free hand in regard to the forts. 
 
 The President on this point completely vindicated himself in 
 the reply, but did not deny that there had been a mutual state- 
 ment of policy at the time. Black also commended Anderson. 
 On this point he later changed his mind. He also urged the 
 President to make it clear that the move of Anderson could not 
 in any way be construed as an aggressive act. All the way 
 through he made the most of the right of the Federal Govern- 
 ment to its property. An exhortation to reinforce Anderson fol- 
 lowed the memorandum. 
 
 Speaking of the modified draft, Thompson said, in 1882 : 72 
 
 How or by whom it was done I cannot say. I noticed that it 
 had been radically changed when I heard it read the last time. 
 
 71 Crossed out on the original ; much like paragraph 2 of Black's objec- 
 tions. 
 
 72 Philadelphia Press, September 17, 1883. 
 
BUCHANAN'S POLICY, 1 860-1861 165 
 
 and said so to the President, " Yes," he answered, " I have modi- 
 fied it somewhat." But I and my Southern colleagues never 
 knew anything of the way in which the changes were made until 
 I read Judge Black's statement today. 
 
 The Commissioners were not at all satisfied with the answer, 
 and wrote a long note to the President in which they accused him 
 of bad faith. The reception and rejection are described by 
 Thomas : 73 
 
 I remember distinctly that when their answer was received to 
 the paper prepared from the memorandum for the President 
 which Judge Black gave you, Mr. Thompson opened it and read 
 it aloud to the Cabinet. Every man present immediately said 
 that it was of such a character that the President could not re- 
 ceive it. The President, I think, was the last to speak. He said, 
 Let it be returned," and that settled it. ... I did not hear him 
 say " Reinforcements shall now be sent," as I see it stated that 
 he did. 
 
 On the same day of Black's interview (Sunday, December 30) 
 Trescot 74 again tried to persuade the President to restore the 
 status. Toucey was also at the White House. Indeed, he 
 seemed to be the only faithful friend of the President who did 
 not flinch in the crisis. They both told Trescot that it would be 
 impossible to haul down the flag in Charleston with Northern 
 opinion at its present heat. Trescot took the idea that it might 
 be possible to march the militia out of Moultrie and march An- 
 derson in again. He then went to Hunter with the idea, and 
 Hunter proposed it to the President. 75 It was in vain. Hunter 
 came out saying: 
 
 "It is useless to repeat what passed. The case is hopeless. 
 The President has changed his ground and will maintain it to the 
 last extremity. Telegraph your people to sink vessels in the en- 
 trance of the harbor immediately. They have no time to lose." 
 
 The everlasting importuning of these men had forced the Presi- 
 dent into a more and more unconciliatory policy. 76 
 
 73 Philadelphia Press, August 4, 1881, by Burr. 
 
 74 Crawford, " Fort Sumter," p. 159. Part of Crawford's inferences were 
 incorrect. See account above. 
 
 ™ A. H. A, 1916, Vol. II, p. 530. 
 
 76 The Commissioners now addressed their angry note to the President. — 
 Crawford, ibid., p. 159. 
 12 
 
166 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 The departure of the Commissioners seemed to indicate to Bu- 
 chanan the increased probability of the beginning of war which, 
 
 Mr. Burgess has lugged in the idea of Buchanan fearing assassination. 
 ("Civil War and the Constitution," Vol. I, p. 86, New York, 1895.) This 
 was a species of propaganda of the Republicans in i860. As threats from 
 the South were balanced by threats from the North, it could not have 
 swayed Buchanan to the Southern side alone. Buchanan, like Jefferson and 
 Seward, was not a combative man, but he had plenty of Christian fortitude 
 and will power in doing what he thought was right. A plot to kidnap him 
 has already received mention. It is probably true that he considered the 
 possibilities of being murdered in office or more likely of being killed by 
 hectoring and over-work, but it is equally true that, when he had time, he 
 walked about at sunset, alone and unattended, on Pennsylvania Avenue dur- 
 ing the last three months, where his large figure would have been an easy 
 target to a ruffian " patriot." It will be shown that he rode up the street 
 with Lincoln in his carriage a few days after the latter had yielded to the 
 advice of friends to go in disguise through Baltimore. Furthermore, just 
 after he refused to restore Anderson, he held his reception on New Year's 
 as usual where he could have been shot as easily as McKinley at Buffalo. 
 Speaking of this subject the correspondent of the Herald said (January 2) : 
 
 " Notwithstanding the menaces of assassination and insult with which the 
 President has been threatened by the valient General Webb and other swash- 
 bucklers, he will as usual be accessible to his fellow citizens of all parties, 
 have no guard but the consciousness of discharging his duty with singleness 
 of heart and respect of the American people for the constituted authority 
 of the land." 
 
 Speaking during the War of the threatened invasion of Lancaster by the 
 Confederate army, when some were urging him to leave, he wrote to Black : 
 
 " For my own part I felt no alarm at the approach of the rebels and with 
 the help of God should not have removed from Wheatland had I been sur- 
 rounded by a hundred thousand of them. I have schooled my mind to meet 
 the inevitable evils of life with Christian philosophy." — July 17, 1863, Black 
 Papers, L. C. 
 
 It was this consolation and a striving to keep right with God that solaced 
 him in the dark periods of his career. 
 
 To a man fond of public life and not free from vanity, the sacrifice of 
 popular praise was most laudatory. For a man who disliked contention to 
 refuse to justify the radicals of either side, and to undergo years of ostra- 
 cism by part of his own community, for conscience sake and the desire to 
 save his fellows from the madness of their own folly, was moral fortitude 
 of the highest order. 
 
 In the period of trial he wrote : 
 
 " I would sacrifice my own life at any moment to save the Union, if such 
 were the will of God. . . ." Moore, Vol. XI, p. 74. 
 
BUCHANAN'S POLICY, i 860-1861 167 
 
 with his slender resources and a discordant Congress, he felt very 
 unable to conduct. The order for the sailing of the Star of the 
 West and his statement to Holt, " It is now over, and reinforce- 
 ments 77 must now be sent," indicate that no further evidence is 
 needed to show that had the President been once convinced that 
 war was the only way out, he would have conducted it as best he 
 could. But other forces were shortly to appear which were in 
 direct harmony with his hopes and faith in peaceful adjustment. 
 The expedition of the Star of the West, then, marks the low- 
 water mark of the President's hope to save the existing Union. 
 
 The move of Anderson had brought down Buchanan's plans 
 like a house of cards. He knew the character of the Commis- 
 sioners, and he also knew that it was not to the advantage of the 
 South to begin hostilities. Having sounded sentiment, he felt 
 sure that all had gone as well as could be expected 78 and hopes 
 for compromise were reasonably bright. His chief concern was 
 over the possible break-up of his Cabinet, which he hoped to keep 
 a unit to the end of his term. 79 
 
 But Anderson's move had changed all this ; had put him in a 
 place where his intentions had been misconstrued, and had brought 
 the country to the verge of war. Small wonder that he is reported 
 to have said to the suggestion of promoting Anderson : " I will 
 leave that for my successor to do." 80 
 
 For him, the change was one of the greatest blunders that could 
 have happened. He now had to make considerable realignment of 
 policy, but not of purpose. 
 
 77 Reenforcements were decided upon December 30. The boat sailed 
 January 5th. 
 
 78 Speaking of his policy in 1861, he said : 
 
 " In my message therefore of the 3d December I stated ' It is not believed 
 that any attempt will be made to expel the United States from this property 
 by force.' In this belief I was justified by the event — as there was no 
 trouble until after Major Anderson retired from Moultrie to Fort Sumter 
 as he had a right to do having first spiked his cannon and burned the gun 
 carriages." — January 29, 1861. — Curtis, Vol. II, p. 532. 
 
 79 Buchanan, p. in. 
 
 80 Lossing, " Pictorial History of the Civil War," Vol. I, p. 281. 
 Lossing took part of his material from hostile newspapers, and the 
 
 above remark may or may not be true. Lossing was hostile to Buchanan 
 because of Cass of whom he made a hero in his book. Cass stayed at his 
 house after the resignation. 
 
168 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 APPENDIX 
 
 EXCERPTS FROM A FEW LETTERS RECEIVED BY BUCHANAN AT THE 
 CLOSE OF HIS ADMINISTRATION x 
 
 I will do everything in my power to modify them [events in the 
 South] as much as possible to arrest any hostile action during 
 your administration. ... I deeply regret the embarrassment which 
 will surround you. — Slidell to Buchanan, November n, i860. 
 
 Slidell's attitude was not to be severely criticized. He had 
 written a newspaper article saying that Lincoln would be more 
 moderate than Seward, during the campaign of i860. His break 
 with Buchanan over Beauregard has been noted. Up to January 
 29th he was often in consultation with the President. 
 
 I think the South ought not to make this trouble during your 
 term of office for you have always been their friend and they 
 should stand by your administration to the last. — Cornelia Roose- 
 velt to Buchanan, New York, November 5, i860, H. S. P. 
 
 I cannot close this letter without bearing my testimony to the 
 zealous and earnest devotion to the best interest of the country 
 with which during a term of unexampled trial and trouble you 
 have sought to discharge the duties of your high state. — DePhillips 
 to Buchanan, Philadelphia, December 12, i860, H. S. P. 
 
 Every Southern heart owes you a debt of gratitude. — A. P. 
 Hayne to Buchanan, New York, December 22, i860, H. S. P. 
 
 Toombs wants to know if Buchanan ordered Anderson to 
 Sumter; says it is bad policy. — Washington, December 28, i860, 
 H. S. P. 
 
 Republicans desire Buchanan to begin war and thus escape 
 blame : present Union cannot be preserved for it should have to 
 be held by main force : hopes for two peaceful countries to unite 
 in the future in case of foreign aggression. — V. C. Bradford to 
 Buchanan, Philadelphia, January 3, 1861, H. S. P. 
 
 Governor Moore of Alabama : 
 
 Letter telling of the taking of the forts due to fear of action on 
 the part of the Federal Government. — January 4, 1861, H. S. P. 
 
 1 The Baker letters are from Joseph Baker, a lifelong intimate friend of 
 Buchanan. He was at this time Collector of the Port at Philadelphia. 
 Bradford and Phillips were both Philadelphia Democrats. Levi P. Bowen 
 was a former Whig who had voted for Buchanan in 1856. He was on 
 very good and frank terms with the President. 
 
BUCHANAN'S POLICY, 1 860-1861 169 
 
 Letter from Isaac Sturgeon states : 
 
 That he fears danger to the arsenal in St. Louis. — January 6, 
 1861, H. S. P. 
 
 Mr. President, if you had been among us in the South and 
 your kindred and destiny were here, you could not do less than 
 we are doing. Let the voice of common justice save us from 
 your condemnation. — Part of a Long Letter from William F. 
 Sanford (Ala.), January 6, 1861, H. S. P. 
 
 France must have cotton : France cannot allow any power to 
 disturb its production and transit. If necessary France must 
 intervene. — Davis or Dawes to Buchanan, January 7, 1861, H. 
 S. P. 
 
 I have just returned from a tour of preaching 
 
 . . Secession was carrying all before it 
 
 . . But as soon as your message made its appearance, the change in 
 public sentiment was so manifest that the heart of the lovers of 
 our blessed Union was made to rejoice. — Rev. P. A. Samson, 
 Griffin, Ga., January 7, 1861, H. S. P. 
 
 There are few unconditional secessionists in Maryland, although 
 there is no doubt of deep and universal sympathy for the South. — 
 L. K. Bowen to Buchanan, Washington (Bowen was a native of 
 Maryland), January 7, 1861, H. S. P. 
 
 . . . for we of the South elevated you to your present post by 
 almost unanimous choice. . . . Washington would have had peace. 
 — Taylor to Buchanan, Middleton, Miss., January 11, 1861, H. 
 S. P. 
 
 Hopes no reinforcements : leave the matter to Congress " To 
 withdraw the troops would overwhelm you and your administra- 
 tion:" choose another port of entry than South Carolina: Scott 
 and Seward are together : " The general has not forgotten that 
 you were a member of the Administration during which he ' par- 
 took of a hearty plate of soup ' or your Greenburg speech." 
 Scott would be a military dictator: Harvey of the New York 
 Tribune is a bad man: Holt is with him. — Baker to Buchanan, 
 January 11, 1861, H. S. P. 
 
 . . . your excellency is aware that the President of the United 
 States without the express authority of Congress possesses no 
 power to accept men and money for — Crossed out on the back of 
 a letter [in Buchanan's writing] from Governor of New York 
 tendering State aid against South, January 11, 1861, H. S. P. 
 
170 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 Pickens a traitor ; not expedient to protect property : civil author- 
 ity ended: let Congress act. — Baker to Buchanan, January 12, 
 1861, H. S. P. 
 
 . . . whole people hereabout speak of your manly and patriotic 
 course. — N. E. Paine to Buchanan, Rochester, January 13, 1861, 
 H. S. P. 
 
 Wants the Star of the West to return: foresees doom of the ad- 
 ministration if he doesn't send it back. — W. V. Bartlett to Bu- 
 chanan, New York, January 15, 1861, H. S. P. 
 
 Coercion will destroy all hope and liberty. " We must have our 
 rights, and if we are met by force in asserting them, why we must 
 resist. That's the whole of it. . . . Let the South alone. We 
 will take care of ourselves, and if best for us, we will come back 
 to a just government, or if not we will leave it. One thing is 
 certain ; South Carolina is out of the good old thirteen." — J. G. W. 
 Ramsey to Buchanan, Mecklenburg near Knoxville, Tenn., Janu- 
 ary 15, 1861, H. S. P. 
 
 . . . advise against the shedding of blood : constitution has been 
 violated : if Congress had done its duty as on the tariff the States 
 would have been retained. — H. A. Raines to Buchanan, Rush, 
 Texas, January 20, 1861, H. S. P. 
 
 If you coerce, the Democratic party is gone. The Republicans 
 will not be so anxious for war if they have to take the responsibil- 
 ity. — E. W. Willberger to Buchanan, Chicago, January 21, 1861, 
 H. S. P. 
 
 Florida secession announced January 21, 1861. 
 Received Yulee in person January 23, 1861. 
 H. S. P. 
 
 V. S. Bradford of Philadelphia desires Buchanan to evacuate 
 the forts. — January 25, 1861, H. S. P. 
 
 Digest: No hope for Union: whole system would be destroyed 
 sooner or later if the South submits : 
 
 Shall they go in peace or war?: reconstruction may follow peace- 
 ful separation : maintenance of the Constitution greater than 
 Union: greater is the duty of keeping Republican institutions: if 
 the North wants Union let it repeal hostile State laws ... to 
 save the South. 
 
 Writer says he is no politician. — Salem, Miss., January 28, 1861, 
 H. S. P. Sent from Salem, Mass., to Buchanan. 
 
BUCHANAN'S POLICY, 1 860-1861 171 
 
 Note from Senator Bigler, Slidell, and Hunter, anxious to 
 avoid collision. 
 
 Let the Brooklyn succor the Fort if attacked.— January 29, 
 1861, H. S. P. 
 
 Louisiana not for secession : yet will not be driven. Approves 
 Buchanan's course : first wrongs committed by the North. — Henry 
 Baldwin, of Syracuse, N. Y., to Buchanan, writing from New 
 Orleans, La., January 30, 1861, H. S. P. 
 
 Thomas J. Judge is commissioner from Alabama to negotiate 
 for the transfer of Federal Property in that State : 
 Buchanan will only receive him as a private citizen, and has no 
 power to act on the matter. C. C. Clay desires Buchanan to 
 recognize the State before Lincoln makes war. 
 A religious letter : 
 
 " We are two peoples but may be friendly & 
 useful to each other yet." — February 1, 1861. . . . 
 Another letter from Clay on February 5th: 
 
 Judge will not see Buchanan on the terms mentioned. Clay 
 says the property belongs to Alabama: urges no reinforcements: 
 recites long list of grievances against the North, crossed out 
 portion says the letter of Judge was courteous : criticizes Scott 
 and Black: advises Buchanan to trust his judgment and feelings, 
 H. S. P. 
 
 Bowen is angry at Hicks and Davis (of Maryland) ; people say 
 that they are for the Republicans : no need of fearing that Mary- 
 land will leave before the fourth of March: watch Virginia; 
 (there are some indications that Buchanan was trying to use his 
 influence in Maryland to stop the calling of a Constitutional Con- 
 vention before Lincoln could come in) ; hopes the State will 
 stand for Southern rights but also for Union. — February 1, 1861, 
 H. S. P. 
 
 Maryland politics in chaos; the coming Convention will repre- 
 sent only a small body of the people : 
 
 " They will not move a step towards Secession unless Virginia 
 encourages them." 
 
 Tells Buchanan not to worry over the Convention. — William 
 Morris (Baltimore) to Buchanan, February 6, 1861, H. S. P. 
 
 Letter from a Federal officer in Pensacola says the seceders get 
 the best out of the armistice : bad equipment in the fort : seceders 
 lack discipline. — February 7, 1861, H. S. P. 
 
 Letter of February 28, 1861, says: now the batteries are much 
 stronger at Pickens. — H. S. P, 
 
172 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 A. B. Greenwood would have accepted the place of Secretary 
 of Interior, but his State, to his disgust, seized the Little Rock 
 Arsenal. — Greenwood to Buchanan, Washington, February 8, 
 1861, H. S. P. 
 
 Charles B. Pickens of Boston says that Buchanan's course saved 
 the country. — February 11, 1861, H. S. P. 
 
 Money is abundant, but there is such want of confidence in the 
 future that business is paralyzed. . . . — C. M. Macalaster, New 
 York, February 13, 1861, H. S. P. 
 
 The passage of the Morrill Tariff Bill at this time a disastrous 
 event. — H. M. Phillips (Philadelphia) to Buchanan, February 17, 
 1861, H. S. P. 
 
 Wikyoff threatens to use the Herald against Buchanan if he 
 does not give Bennett an appointment. — Written about February 
 25, 1861. 2 
 
 2 Bennett did later receive an appointment from Lincoln and joined his 
 cause. He refused the appointment but felt very grateful for the offer. 
 Shortly after this he attacked Buchanan, thus laying the basis for future 
 historians. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 The Passing of an Era 
 
 The Passing of an Era— Preparation of the Message of January 
 8th — The Changed Conditions and the President's Policy — The 
 Message and its Effect — Evidences of the Continued Adherence 
 of Buchanan to His Earlier Views — The Peace Conference, its 
 Effect on the President's Policy, its Course, Cause of Failure — 
 Separation of Buchanan from the South, its Cause and Degree — 
 The Inauguration of Lincoln — Buchanan's Return to Wheatlands 
 — Policy of the New Administration — Buchanan's Position During 
 the War. 
 
 The New Year did not dawn brightly. The reply to the South 
 Carolina Commissioners and Buchanan's refusal to receive their 
 note, brought the country nearer than before to the civil conflict. 
 Hope, however, though temporarily shadowed, had not vanished 
 in the heart of the older generation, who hoped to the last that a 
 rent in the Union could be averted. On January 2d reinforce- 
 ments were ordered to Fort Sumter, and as a result Thompson 
 resigned a few days later. 1 
 
 Trescot believes that Toombs' statement to Buchanan that 
 Georgia would secede upon his failure to send Anderson back to 
 Moultrie had considerable effect. It would seem, however, that 
 it was one of many events that changed the political horizon. The 
 hostility of South Carolina over the move of Anderson, the in- 
 creased excitement on the Gulf States, made Buchanan more 
 anxious for Congressional support. He still hoped, and correctly 
 so, for the adherence of large border States to the Union on the 
 basis of non-coercion. They did not disappoint him, but it now 
 
 1 The Tribune began to turn for coercion about January 3d. See part 
 on Thompson for details. 
 
 Although Buchanan offered the vacancy to different persons only one, 
 Mr. A. B. Greenwood, would take it. His State, Arkansas, seceded, to his 
 disgust, and thus made it impossible for him to accept. For the remainder 
 of the term Moses Kelly, the chief clerk of the Department ably per- 
 formed the duties of the office. It was perfectly plain to Buchanan that 
 he had to use much tact in keeping his Cabinet together until the end 
 of his term. 
 
 173 
 
174 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 appeared evident that the Gulf States were becoming disaffected. 
 (It will be shown, however, that no mental change had taken place 
 on his main hope for solution of the difficulties.) With the 
 horizon black with clouds, Buchanan began to prepare his message. 
 The President and Cabinet went to work with a will. Thomas 
 remarked : 2 
 
 The Cabinet was then almost constantly in session, and the bulk 
 of the message was written paragraph by paragraph in the pres- 
 ence of the Cabinet, and discussed as it was prepared. I remem- 
 ber on the 7th ... we were closing it up. . . . 
 
 On January 4th Thompson put his advice in writing. It is a 
 very able and important historical document. It is also one of 
 the most interesting side lights on the President's attitude and his 
 points of variance with his Secretary. 
 
 Washington, D. C, 
 To His Excellency James Buchanan January 4, 1861. 
 
 President of the U. S. 
 Sir: 
 
 On yesterday you read a proposed message to the Senate and 
 House of Representatives, in which you transmitted correspond- 
 ence with the Commissioners of South Carolina. As one of your 
 constitutional advisers, I am called upon to say, what ought to be 
 contained in that message, and although you have not asked my 
 opinion in writing, I hope you will pardon the suggestion on that 
 subject, which I feel it my duty to you, and to the country, now 
 to make. 
 
 The time has come when the great issue of this Age should be 
 met squarely and firmly. A temporizing policy is tantamount to 
 destruction. You have been officially notified that South Carolina 
 has, in fact, withdrawn from this Confederacy and this day claims 
 to be an independent, foreign State. It is also well known that 
 four other States are ready to declare their separation. It is also 
 well known that a pervading sense of insecurity disquiets the 
 public mind in ten other States, and they are contemplating the 
 question of uniting their destiny with these States. You may 
 shut your eyes and close your ears, and say, " I cannot and do 
 not know these facts officially, or knowing them, I have no power 
 to recognize them as facts. That either South Carolina nor any 
 other State has the constitutional right to secede is a mere nullity." 
 Be it so. Still without authority she declares herself an inde- 
 
 2 Philadelphia Press, August 14, 1881, by Burr. 
 
THE PASSING OF AN ERA 175 
 
 pendent Sovereignty, even admit the absurdity that her Govern- 
 ment is in open rebellion against this Government. That then is 
 your duty as the Chief Magistrate of this Union, you are bound, 
 from time to time to furnish Congress with all the information in 
 your possession touching the States of the Union, — and therefore 
 in laying your correspondence with the South Carolina before 
 Congress. 
 
 I would seize the occasion to bring the whole subject to their 
 attention. I would inform them, that the idea of enforcing the 
 laws in those seceding States is wholly inconsistent with the 
 obligation of ensuring the domestic tranquility, of providing for 
 the general welfare, and of securing the blessings of liberty to 
 ourselves and our posterity. That although the State may have 
 no constitutional power to withdraw from the Union, yet she has 
 undertaken to do that very thing, and Congress possesses no power 
 to coerce her to return into the Union. That this General Gov- 
 ernment and all Government in America, is based on the consent 
 of the people, and it can only be held together by the chains of 
 reciprocal good will and affection. According to existing laws, 
 all duties can be collected only in the Port of Charleston. The 
 Port of Charleston extends only to the waterfront within the 
 corporate limits of that city. It is in vain for you to send your 
 Collector to a people who consider themselves no longer within 
 your jurisdiction. Your sending him only incurs insult and 
 derision. If he goes, you must clothe him with power to coerce 
 not the resistence of a lawless mob, but the authorities of an or- 
 ganized government. It is in vain to think you are only enforcing 
 the laws upon individuals, because you would meet no resistence 
 which was not organized and directed by the Government. It 
 would be a palpable evasion of the Constitution of the United 
 States, which rests in Congress the sole power of declaring or 
 making war. This act, which would be considered war by all the 
 Nations of the World, I would not perform it. If a brother's 
 blood is to be shed, let those who have the wickedness as well as 
 the power and the will, take the responsibility. I would wash my 
 hands of such a sacrilegious deed. 
 
 As Congress has no power to coerce a State to submission to 
 this Government — has no power by the military arm to force her 
 to undo her unlawful acts, and as the collection of the revenue by 
 a superior force would be nothing short of subjugation, what then 
 is left to be done? 
 
 Having brought the whole subject to the attention of Congress, 
 I, as President of the whole Union, would appeal to them by all the 
 considerations of patriotism of a common inheritance, a common 
 
176 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 glory in the past, a common pride in the present greatness of this 
 Country, and the incalculable blessings in acts of civilization and 
 religion in store for the generations yet to come, to secure the 
 discontented States in all their rights of property. The Southern 
 States have been insulted and wronged, and a majority section 
 has elected rulers on principles hostile to their domestic peace and 
 safety. 
 
 Having ascertained the Source and extent of the distrust and 
 insecurity, I would call upon Congress to forget party, to merge 
 their prejudices in their love of country, its liberties, and its 
 glorious institutions by giving the amplest guarantees for pro- 
 tection of the rights of all. 
 
 But if we are already two peoples, if sectional hate is so 
 strongly and deep rooted that the two great sections of this 
 Country cannot longer live together in peace, by securing to each 
 a full measure of justice, then, before I would pursue a line of 
 policy which would inevitably inaugurate a civil war, and thus 
 force you to imbrue your hands in the blood of your fellow citi- 
 zens, I would recommend to Congress the adoption of measures 
 for the peaceable separation of these States and a free election 
 should be secured to each State to determine for herself in what 
 division of States she would cast her lot. Thus prosperity would 
 be secured, individual prosperity and happiness would be unin- 
 terrupted, peace, religion, civilization and the great onward moral 
 spectacle would be presented of a mighty revolution effected by 
 public opinion without shedding a drop of blood. Such a revolu- 
 tion would be the grandest triumph of the nineteenth century. I 
 think you might even draw Hope from despair. When the sister- 
 hood of States come together to draw up the articles of separation, 
 their natural love and affection might still prevail and save the 
 rights of all, and thereby save the Union of these States. 
 
 I have made these suggestions with a scrupulous regard to 
 your previous position taken in your message. I have not said 
 one word having reference to my own peculiar views with regard 
 to the right of secession, and I have consulted no one in regards 
 to this but a single member of your cabinet who I think approves 
 them as worthy of the crisis. 
 
 With highest consideration, 
 Your friend, 
 
 J. Thompson. 
 
 The message, 3 however, followed a somewhat different direction. 
 On December 3d Buchanan had declared secession to be revolu- 
 3 Moore, Vol. XI, pp. 94-98. 
 
THE PASSING OF AN ERA 177 
 
 tion ; he now informed Congress that the country was in the midst 
 of a revolution, and extraordinary measures were needed at once. 
 Buchanan exhibited broken-heartedness over the thought of the 
 Union going to destruction. The idea of Americans killing each 
 other in mortal strife filled his eyes with tears as he entreated 
 Congress to forget party, and do something to help save the 
 country. He declared himself ready to act as vigorously on the 
 defensive as his means permitted. He again uttered one of the 
 chief features of his policy : Time is a great conservative power : 
 and urged Congress to direct its attention to some sort of prompt 
 action while peace still lasted. He set forth his defensive policv 
 regarding the ports in the South, and justified it. No one can 
 read these two messages and doubt Buchanan's honest devotion 
 to the Union he had served so long. 
 
 The drift of the more radical portions of the South away from 
 the Administration, having begun in December, now continued. 
 The reply to the South Carolina Commissioners had given it 
 impetus. The appointment of Holt had evoked wrath. 4 On the 
 2d of January, Seward suggested a call on the President. Old 
 faces vanished, and new ones appeared at the White House. 
 Wise wrathf ully declared : 
 
 Mr. Buchanan's new allies, the Black Republicans and coercion 
 Democrats, his latter day friends, who now applaud his policy and 
 who but lately denounced his efforts to preserve peace, urge that 
 South Carolina is the wrong-doer that she is the party that has 
 begun the war. 5 
 
 The President's military policy has been ably summarized in 
 his very able reply to General Scott in 1862. 6 A brief summary 
 of his policy follows here, in a letter to Holt written in 1861 : 7 
 
 Wheatland, 16 March, 1861. 
 My dear Sir : 
 
 I have received yours of the 14th instant & it has afforded me 
 much gratification. The rumors to which I referred were that 
 you had said Fort Sumter could & would have been reinforced 
 
 *E. g., A. H. A., 191 1, Vol. II, p. 528. 
 
 5 Richmond Enquirer, January 5, 1861. 
 
 6 See Moore, Vol. XI, p. 279. 
 
 ' Holt Papers, L. C; also Moore, Vol. XI, p. 171. 
 
/ 
 
 178 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 thirty days before the end of my administration but I had pre- 
 vented &c. &c. &c. Both Judge Black & Mr. Stanton have writ- 
 ten me that Mr. Seward had shown them written comments on 
 your note to Mr. Lincoln accompanying Major Anderson's Dis- 
 patches. If that memory be correct, the General has placed him- 
 self in an awkward position as papers in my possession will prove 
 as well as your letter concerning Thompson. I wish you could 
 occasionally see the members of the old Cabinet & converse with 
 them. 
 
 I have never swerved to the right or to the left from the policy 
 enunciated in my last annual message. Soon after I learned 
 that the collector at Charleston had resigned, I nominated a suc- 
 cessor; but no action was taken upon the nomination. Intensely 
 anxious that no collision should occur at Charleston which might 
 precipitate the Country into Civil War, I was yet ever ready & 
 willing to send reinforcements to Major Anderson had he re- 
 quested them. Indeed I did this without his request on the sug- 
 gestion of General Scott at what was deemed a critical moment. 
 The Star of the West was only happy in one respect & that is 
 that she was not sunk & no blood was shed. 
 
 Then came the Peace Convention & the earnest appeal of the 
 Legislature of Virginia to me & to the authorities of the Seceding 
 States " to agree to abstain pending the proceedings contemplated 
 by the action of this General Assembly, from any & all acts 
 calculated to produce a collision of arms between the States & the 
 Government of the United States." This agreement I refused 
 peremptorily to enter into; notwithstanding Mr. Tyler said in his 
 report to the Governor of Virginia ; " that her efforts to recon- 
 struct & to preserve depended for their success on her being per- 
 mitted to conduct them undisturbed by outside collision." " He 
 [I] replied that he [I] had in no manner changed his views as 
 presented in his annual Message & that he could give no pledges ; 
 that it was his duty to enforce the laws & the whole power rested 
 with Congress." 
 
 In truth at all times & under all circumstances & to all persons 
 I kept myself entirely free to reinforce Major Anderson when- 
 ever the exigency might require. In your letters to Col. Hayne of 
 the 26 January & 6 February you tell him explicitly that " At the 
 present moment, it is not deemed necessary to reinforce Major 
 Anderson because he makes no such request & feels quite secure 
 in his position. Should his safety hozvever require reinforcements, 
 every effort will be made to supply them." In your letter of the 
 6 Feb. you are still more explicit on this subject. 
 
 General Scott, to my knowledge, never submitted any plan on 
 paper for the reinforcement of Fort Sumter. Indeed, he told me at 
 
THE PASSING OF AN ERA 179 
 
 a late period that he had never read Major Anderson's Dispatches ; 
 & I advised him by all means to do so. His note to me on Sunday 
 the 30th December to send the 250 recruits from New York 
 which resulted in the expedition of the Star of the West is a curi- 
 osity, which I shall preserve both for defence & as a memento. 
 The expedition prepared at New York under his auspices to be 
 ready in case of emergency, I know little of in detail. Of course 
 it was blown up by Major Anderson's Dispatches received on the 
 4th March. 
 
 I would thank you to send me a copy of your communication to 
 President Lincoln of the 5th March. 
 
 We are living here in peace & quiet where we should be most 
 happy to see you. I have no trouble except that I may be called 
 upon to defend myself against an assault from General Scott & 
 Mr. Lincoln's administration. 
 
 I am glad with all my heart that its policy seems to be pacific; 
 because I believe that no other policy can preserve & restore the 
 Union. Mr. Lincoln may now make an enviable name for himself 
 & perhaps restore the Union. 
 
 Miss Lane desires to be kindly remembered to you. 
 From your friend 
 
 very respectfully 
 Hon. Joseph Holt. James Buchanan. 
 
 P.S. I find among my papers the enclosed copy of a letter from 
 Gov. Pickens to Major Anderson of the nth Jan. together with 
 the Major's answer of the same date, & also Major Anderson's 
 letter of the 12th Jan. They belong to the War Department & 
 ought to be returned there. They have been long since published. 
 I do not know how they came into my possession. 
 
 Anyone reading Buchanan's reply to Scott will note that 
 it was Scott and Holt who considered it expedient to substitute 
 the Star of the West for the Brooklyn. Major Anderson agreed 
 upon a truce with Governor Pickens in order to send a messenger 
 to Washington to see what the move really meant. Buchanan was 
 not pleased with this idea, but decided to allow it to stand. 8 Hayne 
 was restrained from handing in his letter by the intervention of 
 Slidell, Fitzpatrick and Mallory. In the meanwhile a very hope- 
 ful event took place. Virginia set forth her plan of having a 
 
 8 Curtis, Vol. II, p. 452 et seq. 
 
180 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 peace convention and the venerable John Tyler came to Washing- 
 ton to tender the noble offer of mediation at this critical period. 9 
 
 Hayne's mission (to the President from South Carolina) found 
 the President standing firmly on his previous policy. It is perti- 
 nent to insert at this place some of the portions of a first draft of 
 Holt's reply to Senators Slidell, Fitzpatrick, and Mallory who 
 had requested that the President consider Hayne's letter from 
 Pickens. It shows conclusively that the President was still actively 
 formulating the policy of the Administration. Holt's abridged 
 draft may be found in Moore, Vol. XI, pp. 1 26-141. Some of 
 the omitted portions in the other draft are quoted below. 10 
 
 Crossed out portion between the phrase " on the defensive " 
 and " and to authorize " etc. 
 
 in protecting and preserving the public property of the United 
 States and to make no aggression on the people of any State. 
 This duty however he must perform because he has no right to 
 make a voluntary surrender of the public property to any power, 
 to any human power without the authority of Congress 
 
 In the next paragraph, after the words " United States " phrase 
 crossed out is 
 
 wholly independent of any question of State coercion. 
 
 Then follows a whole crossed out paragraph as follows : 
 
 Should South Carolina attack Fort Sumter this to employ your 
 own language [will be to employ in your own language is crossed 
 out] " initiating hostilities " between her and the United States. 
 South Carolina may if she should deem it ever, in the present 
 condition of the country to make war upon the United States Fort 
 Sumter, but should she do this it will be a war of aggression on 
 her part against the United States and not a war of coercion on 
 the part of Congress the United States to compel her to remain in 
 or return to the Union. 11 The two cases are entirely distinct. 
 
 On the margin of the same sheet also crossed out is the follow- 
 ing: 
 
 9 L. G. Tyler, " Letters and Times of the Tylers," Vol. II, p. 587 et seq. 
 The best account of the Peace Conference. 
 
 10 Moore, Vol. XI, p. 130, H. S. P. 
 
 11 Notice Black's opinion, Nov. 20th. 
 
THE PASSING OF AN ERA 181 
 
 This will be on his part making war against the United States for 
 an independent cause & does not involve in the slightest degree 
 the question of State Coercion. 
 
 " At the present moment " (then crossed out) " I am pleased " 
 changed to: " it is not deemed necessary." 
 After the word " reinforcements " 
 
 they shall be sent although the harbor of Charleston has been 
 obstructed in such a manner as to render access to Fort Sumter 
 very difficult 
 every effort will be made to supply them 
 
 After " South Carolina " 
 
 unless I possessed the power of Congress I could furnish no 
 such assurance 
 
 After the words " war " and " it would be a vain pledge wholly 
 unconstitutional " " an act of usurpation " " on my part," for the 
 Executive " to pledge himself that they would or they " to give an 
 assurance etc. 
 After the word " exist " 
 
 suffice it to say that they have hitherto exercised a wise and dis- 
 creet forbearance on this subject although several of the States, 
 some of them even before secession have initiated hostilities by 
 seizing forts and other public property within their limits. lla 
 
 Major Anderson is not " threatening " menacing Charleston 
 and it is the desire of my heart that the authorities of Charleston, 
 South Carolina, may not precipitate hostilities, by perpetrating 
 hostilities and cause the shedding of human blood in the necessary 
 self defence of his position . . . and I am convinced. . . . 
 
 The document was signed " Holt," but the entire paper is in 
 Buchanan's writing, and at times the word " I " is used. 
 
 Among other things the ideas which appear are : that Buchanan 
 would not sympathize with the South in a war for independence ; 
 that he was against aggressive acts against the " seceded " States 
 at that stage of the events ; that he did not expect Major Anderson 
 
 lla This appears nearly the same in " Buchanan," p. 156. 
 13 
 
182 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 to hand over the Fort without firing a shot ; llb and that he still 
 had strong hopes that peaceful settlement was on the way. 
 
 Had a movement for peace by Virginia not appeared, there is 
 little doubt that another expedition would have gone for Sumter. 
 Toucey had one prepared under the direction of a man named 
 Ward. 12 Warships were stationed off Fort Pickens to aid in case 
 of attack. This was the idea of Buchanan and Holt. Some of 
 the rest of the Cabinet were for no delay, but Buchanan did not 
 know it at the time. 13 The policy was highly successful. It pre- 
 vented hostilities during the Peace Conference, and at the same 
 time the Fort was never lost by the Federal authorities. The 
 State, to its credit, also ceased preparations during the Peace 
 Conference. There was no specific agreement given by either 
 side, but both recognized a humane obligation. 
 
 The Old Dominion now made a glorious effort to prevent a 
 " Brothers' War." This effort was begun in the middle of Janu- 
 ary. The venerable John Tyler arrived in Washington to inter- 
 view Buchanan, and to request him to place the idea before Con- 
 gress and in the meanwhile suspend hostile operations. While 
 
 llb The above statement is further proved by the following extract 
 which King took from his diary and put in his book " Turning on the 
 Light," p. 45 : 
 
 11 February 19. In Cabinet today the principal matter presented was an 
 inquiry from Major Anderson, in charge of Fort Sumter, at Charleston, 
 what he should do in the event of the floating battery understood to have 
 been constructed at Charleston being towed toward the fort with the 
 evident purpose of attack. The President wished time to consider. Mr. 
 Holt asked what he would do, or rather what Major Anderson ought to 
 do, in case he were in charge of a fort and the enemy should commence 
 undermining it. The President answered that he should ' crack away at 
 them.' The President, however, is very reluctant to fire the first gun. The 
 Peace Convention, he said, was now in session in this city, and its 
 president, ex-President Tyler, had this morning assured him that no attack 
 would be made on the fort. The President expressed the opinion that 
 the fort would eventually be taken." 
 
 12 Curtis, Vol. II, pp. 620-622. 
 
 13 Moore, Vol. XI, p. 212. 
 
 The fleet could not have gotten near during high sea, but a shot by the 
 State would have made the fort another Sumter, and the fleet then would 
 have shelled the fort at the first opportunity. 
 
THE PASSING OF AN ERA 183 
 
 Buchanan refused to make any promises which might tie his hands 
 in regard to Fort Sumter, 14 he welcomed the move at such a 
 critical period with unaffected gratitude. President and ex- 
 President worked and hoped for a peaceful outcome. 
 Mrs. Tyler wrote: 
 
 Mr. Buchanan (the President) spent the evening in our parlor 
 evening before last. . . . He first wrote the President a letter full 
 of gratitude for the relief he had afforded him in probably pre- 
 venting, through his influence at Charleston, the attack on Fort 
 Sumter. . . . 15 
 
 Buchanan sent an able and hopeful message, accompanying the 
 Resolutions, to Congress urging them to forward the cause of 
 compromise, and to abstain from acts of violence while such 
 efforts were in progress. 16 An interesting letter on the situation 
 is here inserted written by the brother of Major Anderson, who 
 had been both at Charleston and Washington, and thus saw both 
 sides of the situation at first hand. 17 
 
 My dear Brother 
 
 I am still here. I wish to go home, but cannot make up my 
 mind to do so — so long as I see any chance of doing good. I do 
 not know how far my efforts to ameliorate your condition, & keep 
 the peace for awhile, in hopes of a pacific settlement, may have 
 been successful. I fear that you may not enjoy the full benefits 
 intended — that the relaxations are not real reliefs & that there is 
 more promise than performance in your market facilities. I trust 
 that I am deceived in this apprehension. The principal relief, I 
 suppose, that could be afforded you, would be the suspension of 
 hostile proceedings in your neighborhood. Whether this can be 
 accomplished or not, I do not know. It may be I believe, but I 
 am not yet aware of the proper agency. What the steps now 
 taken by Virginia will result in, is a matter of conjecture, but 
 there is hope in them of general good. I do not like it that you 
 should be left without reinforcements, but, under the present 
 circumstances I do not see how it can be done without producing 
 an immediate break-out of war, which something, that may evolve 
 
 14 Moore, Vol. XI, p. 113. 
 
 15 L. G. Tyler, " Letters and Times of the Tylers," Vol. II, p. 613. 
 
 16 Moore, Vol. XI, pp. 113-119. Kentucky Resolutions, Moore, Vol. XI, 
 pp. 124-125. 
 
 17 Marked, " Received Jan. 24, 1861." 
 
184 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 itself within the next Forty days, might prevent. It is clear to me 
 that the ultra-Republicans wish a collision, while the lovers of 
 Union desire more time for conciliation — not from Congress but 
 from the people. In the meanwhile you are left in the most dif- 
 ficult & delicate of positions — God grant you wisdom still to do 
 the part of a soldier, a patriot, & a Christian. 
 
 Mr. Crittenden is said to have made a glorious speech in secret 
 Session yesterday, in which he vindicated you, from some criticism, 
 in the handsomest and most eloquent manner. It was on the 
 subject of the confirmation of Mr. Holt's nomination as Secy of 
 War. He paid high compliments to Mr. H. also. The nomina- 
 tion was confirmed by a large majority. If the need of aid, for 
 your security, is greater than the need of time, for the keeping off 
 of war, I doubt not what would be the result. Your wife writes 
 me in better spirits. 
 
 I commend you to our Father in Heaven, — may he bless & 
 keep you. 
 
 The Genl was too unwell — with Influenza — to see me today. 
 He always speaks of you as if you were his son. Ever your Bro. 
 
 L. A. 
 
 Just before the calling of the convention the guns of Fort 
 Monroe 18 were turned in the direction of Virginia. Tyler natu- 
 rally protested this act at a time when he was doing all in his 
 power to preserve the peace. 19 At this time Buchanan wrote Holt 
 the following letter : 20 
 
 Washington, 30 January, 1861. 
 My dear Sir : 
 
 It is time we should have decided whether it is practicable, with 
 the means in our power, considering the obstacles enterposed in 
 the harbor of Charleston to reinforce Major Anderson at Fort 
 Sumter, should the action of the authorities of South Carolina or 
 his request render this necessary. The high military attentment 
 and just reputation of Lieutenant General Scott render his advice 
 on this subject of the greatest importance. Should reinforcement 
 be deemed practible, then in consultation with him a plan ought to 
 be devised in advance to accomplish the object. I should be 
 grateful to see General Scott, the Secretary of the Navy and your- 
 self at 12 o'clock today or any other hour most convenient to 
 
 18 See King, " Turning on the Light," pp. 58, 59. 
 
 19 Tyler, " Letters and Times of Tylers," Vol. II, p. 591. 
 
 20 Holt Papers, L. C The draft in Moore does not say anything about 
 Fort Monroe. Moore, Vol. XI, pp. 123, 124. 
 
THE PASSING OF AN ERA 185 
 
 yourself to talk over this and other matters. On the evening of 
 Mr. Tyler's departure (the 28th inst.) I received a note from him 
 from which the following is an extract : " Will you pardon me for 
 calling your attention to the rumors contained in the newspapers 
 of the morning which state that active proceedings are in course 
 of execution at Fortress Monroe, in planting cannon upon the 
 Land side of the Fort with their muzzles turned landward and 
 overlooking the country. If this be so, Mr. President, is such 
 proceeding either appropriate or well timed? I shall do no more 
 than call your attention to the circumstance and leave it with out 
 comment with this single remark that when Virginia is making 
 every possible effort to redeem and save the Union it is seemingly 
 ungracious to have cannon levelled at her bosom." In my answer 
 of the same evening I stated : " I shall make it a point to inquire 
 tomorrow evening into the rumors in the newspapers to which you 
 refer in relation to Fortress Monroe." I have made enquiries 
 but without any specified result. 
 Hon. J. Holt. Your friend very respectfully 
 
 James Buchanan. 
 
 The Peace Congress continued until nearly the end of Bu- 
 chanan's term. Attempts were made to continue a plan something 
 like the Missouri line, which had failed in Congress, although 
 sponsored by earnest patriots like Crittenden. It appears in spite 
 of varying accounts 21 that it failed because the conciliatory group 
 
 21 Tyler, "Letters and Times of the Tylers," Vol. II, pp. 605-617; 
 Buchanan, pp. 145-170. 
 
 Davis states that Buchanan through Hunter had consented to receive a 
 commissioner from the Confederates to refer to Congress. Curtis denies 
 this (Vol. II, pp. 487-489). Buchanan may have said something which 
 led Hunter to hope for it while the Peace Convention was in session. 
 Crawford arrived when prospects had fallen. Buchanan did not receive 
 him. The whole matter rests with Senator Hunter. Crawford was very 
 displeased at his lack of success, and wrote a characteristic attack on 
 Buchanan. 
 
 In order to stifle any complaint for neglect, and because Black and 
 Holt urged him, Buchanan and Scott scoured around and found a few 
 troops mostly from West Point to act as a posse comitatus during Lincoln's 
 Inauguration. Part of these arrived by February 22d when they prepared 
 to parade. Tyler ("Letters and Times of the Tylers," p. 615), who felt 
 handicapped in his peace efforts at such a display in Washington while 
 he was directing the Peace Congress, protested and Buchanan ordered the 
 parade to be cancelled. Sickles, however, protested to Buchanan and 
 
186 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 of the Republicans could not get the radical wing into line. Tyler 
 made a last plea for the President to remove the troops from Sum- 
 ter which he, as in the case of previous requests, declined. Lin- 
 coln had by this time arrived. One of Buchanan's last acts was 
 to sign the Morrill Tariff, although he was not entirely pleased 
 with it. Stephens says that he found Buchanan had decided upon 
 more protection in i860. It was this problem that pushed Penn- 
 sylvania out of the Democratic column. A split might have 
 occurred between the Northern and Southern portions of the 
 party, had not slavery arisen, on the tariff question. 
 
 While neither Buchanan's philosophy nor his policy had changed 
 since December, he and leaders of the South had drifted apart. 
 While he cherished an earnest wish to avert the horrors of civil 
 war, he seems to have felt that some of the Southern leaders had 
 deserted him. For the sake of peace, and to give them a fair 
 adjustment, he had breasted the radical portion of Northern opin- 
 ion, and had told Davis he would not be surprised to find his home 
 in ashes when he reached it. 22 Like Webster, he had sacrificed 
 much, and he felt he had not been fairly dealt with. Speaking to 
 Tyler in February, 23 
 
 He complained that the South had not treated him properly; 
 that they had made unnecessary demonstrations by seizing unpro- 
 tected arsenals and forts, and thus perpetrating acts of useless 
 bravado which had been quite as well let alone. 
 
 The following draft of a letter to Joshua Bates in England, 
 written just after Sumter, reveals the same feelings : 
 
 ... I was seventy years of age on the 23d April last and should 
 be perfectly happy in my retirement were it not for the troubles of 
 our country. As an American citizen I know you feel them deeply. 
 
 Holt that there was nothing unusual in it and the order to cancel the 
 parade was rescinded. (King, "Turning on the Light," Chap. V). 
 
 There was opposition to having troops brought into the city made by 
 some persons in Congress, just as others would have complained had none 
 been brought. At Holt's suggestion Buchanan wrote a message of ex- 
 planation (Moore, Vol. XI, pp. 152, 153). Talk of conspiracy was rife, 
 but a committee found no conclusive evidence. 
 
 22 Davis, " Rise and Fall of Confederate Government," p. 265, note. 
 The papers reported similar remarks. The idea that Buchanan always 
 
 catered to public opinion is here refuted. 
 
 23 Tyler, " Letters and Times of the Tylers," Vol. II, p. 588. 
 
THE PASSING OF AN ERA 187 
 
 The South had many grievances of which to complain, not from 
 any action of the Federal Government, which had never done them 
 the slightest actual injury, but from the intemperate zeal of the 
 State Legislatures and abolitionists of the North, and their inter- 
 ference with the execution of the Fugitive Slave Law and with 
 Southern Slavery generally. The time had arrived, however, 
 when all this was passing away, and although Mr. Lincoln had 
 been elected President, there was a majority in both Houses of 
 Congress to sustain their Constitutional rights. Besides, the de- 
 cision of the Supreme Court of the United States was in their 
 favor. In the face of these facts, they determined to secede, and 
 became intensely hostile to myself for having presented them in 
 my annual message of December last. They repudiated my argu- 
 ments against the claimed right of Secession, and rushed headlong 
 to their own ruin whatever may be the final event. There still 
 might have been hopes of reconstruction for the Union without 
 employing force for this purpose, had they not causelessly com- 
 menced the war themselves by firing on Fort Sumter which was 
 doing them no harm and was not intended to do them harm. This 
 act has thoroughly aroused the North & united them almost as one 
 man. Indeed it is estimated that three-fourths who have rushed 
 to the defence of our time honored & glorious flag are Democrats 
 who had always maintained constitutional rights of the South on 
 the question of Domestic Slavery. I have observed with pain & 
 regret the course of the British Government against us & in favor 
 of the revolutionists & of the dismemberment of the Republic. 
 It would seem that Louis Napoleon inclines to the opposite course. 
 
 To his nephew he also wrote often, saying that while all were 
 for peace, they could not recognize independence. 
 
 They have behaved so badly as to have forfeited the regard of 
 the masses of the Northern Democracy & I confess I sympathize 
 with them in this respect. 24 
 
 With equal zeal, however, he always believed in giving the 
 South all her old rights if she would return to the Union. 
 
 At last the day of Lincoln's Inauguration arrived. 
 
 Buchanan spent most of the morning signing bills, then hurried 
 to ride with Lincoln to the Inauguration. Apprehensions of vi- 
 olence had filled the minds of many. Speaking of the incident, a 
 contemporary has said : 
 
 24 Draft of letter, Buchanan to Henry, Buchanan, July n, 1861, H. S. P. 
 
188 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 The most timid of peace-loving Quakers, the presence of the out- 
 going side by side in the open barouche with the in-coming Presi- 
 dent, dispelled all fears of a day of war. Under the circumstances 
 this ride of Buchanan with Lincoln was a courageous act of 
 official courtesy. It was the exception to what the custom had 
 been in such cases, and being unexpected it attracted the special 
 notice and admiration of friends and foe. 25 
 
 At last he was to be relieved of the burden of holding the gov- 
 ernment for a party whose policy was looked forward to with 
 fear and dread by over a third of the country. Another con- 
 temporary speaking of him on this day remarked : 
 
 Buchanan appeared pale and wearied; yet his face beamed with 
 radiance, for he felt relieved from the crushing care and anxiety 
 which he had borne for four years during seasons of great peril. 26 
 
 At the different towns through Maryland and southern Penn- 
 sylvania on Buchanan's homeward journey he received ovations. 
 Before he left Washington he remarked, in regard to Southern 
 opposition to Lincoln, that 
 
 he saw no occasion for it, as Mr. Lincoln really intended them well 
 and he had reason to believe that the present administration would 
 be a peaceful administration. 27 
 
 Even at Lancaster, a town belonging to his political opponents, 
 he was greeted with deep regard as one of the most distinguished 
 men of his time. 28 
 
 For a time his policy was continued, but at last Lincoln changed 
 his ground. 
 
 Any person who cares to go into the subject, or even by glancing 
 
 2,5 Outlook, Vol. 127, p. 218. " Honest Abe and the Little Giant," G. B. 
 Wallis. 
 
 26 The Atnerican National, Cleveland, Vol. II, pp. 824-825, edited by J. 
 H. Kennedy; authors, B. J. Lossing, J. K. Upton, H. G. Riddle, J. V. 
 Cooley. 
 
 The above article was probably by Lossing who was in Washington at 
 the time. 
 
 27 A very complete account is given in a paper published at Towsontown, 
 Maryland, found among Buchanan's papers. H. S. P. 
 
 28 See Curtis, Vol. II, pp. 506-512, for his homecoming at Lancaster. 
 
THE PASSING OF AN ERA 189 
 
 at the works of Tyler 28a or Connor, 28b can easily trace the steps by 
 which Lincoln gradually came to favor the radical element in his 
 party and decided on a policy liable to invoke hostilities. 280 A 
 radical Republican committee organized to criticize the govern- 
 ment, after spending a page or so abusing Buchanan's policy, add- 
 ing the following significant paragraph on its own administra- 
 tion: 
 
 Mr. Lincoln assumed the government on the fourth of March 
 1 86 1 ; although the affairs were very threatening at the South and 
 the insurrection was rapidly gaining ground, yet no measure seems 
 to have been adopted and no movement made for the security of 
 the yard until the ioth day of April. 29 
 
 This is evidence that at first Lincoln and Seward considered it 
 wise to follow Buchanan's policy. The change later was due to 
 radical pressure in their own party. 
 
 During the war which followed, Buchanan as a citizen in the 
 North, gave the government loyal support. His attitude was well 
 summarized by John Sherman, who was a personal rather than a 
 political friend : 
 
 He said he had done all he could to prevent the war but now that 
 it was upon us, it was the duty of all patriotic people to make it 
 a success, that he approved all that had been done by Mr. Lincoln 
 of whom he spoke in high terms of praise. 30 
 
 He gave subscriptions for the Soldiers' Relief, sustained the 
 Draft Law, wrote the history of his Administration, and took an 
 active interest in politics up to the week of his death. Indeed, the 
 last part of his life was not uninteresting but it does not fall 
 within the scope of this study. 
 
 28a L. G. Tyler, " Letters and Times of the Tylers," Richmond, 1885. 
 
 28b Henry G. Connor. John Archibald Campbell, New York, 1921. 
 
 Mary Scrugham, " Peaceable Americans," 1860-61, New York, 1922. 
 
 28c E.g., see quotations in Grierson's " Lincoln the Practical Mystic." 
 
 In critical moments Lincoln had an excellent supply of intuition. 
 Lincoln's motives were not in the main economic, but born of religious 
 ideas. At times he seemed to leap into the dark, but his career shows that 
 these acts were of the nature of an inspiration. 
 
 29 37th Congress, 2d session, Senate Report No. 37, p. 5. 
 
 80 John Sherman, "Recollections of Forty Years," New York, 1895. 
 
 This did not mean that he favored all of his political policies by any 
 means. Buchanan remained a Democrat to the last. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 Some Salient Points and Conclusions 
 
 Some Salient Points and Conclusions — Buchanan's Policy a Suc- 
 cess — His Characteristics — Economic Interests — Two Vital Fac- 
 tors of Conduct, Political Ideals and Religious Convictions — 
 The Theory of Natural Rights — The Machinery of Union — State 
 Rights in 1867— The Federal Compact, the True Basis of the 
 Union as Instituted by the Founders — Buchanan's Religious Na- 
 ture and Its Inevitable Influence on His Policy — No Other Course 
 Psychologically Possible — Observations on the Civil War — A 
 Tribute and an Appeal. 
 
 Buchanan had every reason to congratulate himself on the suc- 
 cess of his policy. 1 His main aim, to give things a peaceful di- 
 rection, and prevent the opening of a terrible " Brothers' War," 
 had been accomplished midst terrific difficulties. At the same 
 time, he had held the Northern members of his Cabinet in his 
 cabinet save one, thus preventing the disintegration of his Ad- 
 ministration. No official recognition had been given the seceded 
 States, so that his successor was under no commitment in that 
 regard. Some Federal property had been taken, but other points 
 had been reinforced. No stone had been left unturned to promote 
 measures of compromise that would be fair to all concerned. The 
 
 1 A conservative Northern writer, who took Buchanan to task for his 
 too favorable attitude toward coercion, sums up his position in i860 as 
 follows : 
 
 ". . . His condition as President at that time was a very trying and 
 perplexing one. Elected as a Democrat upon principles that always gave 
 satisfaction to the people of the Southern States, it is not to be supposed 
 that he would desire to fight with the South the battle of the Republican 
 party. The genuine Democratic party and the South had no quarrel ; and 
 James Buchanan, belonging to that school had none either. Should he 
 provoke a war with the South during the remnant of his term of office? 
 Surely not. He and his party had done all in their power to avert the 
 calamity then coming upon the country, and were able to settle the troubles 
 if they had the power. But that had passed from their hands, and it was 
 the new power that the South designed to resist. Not the nation did 
 they mean to resist, but simply the power of the Republican party." — Harris, 
 " Biog. Hist, of Lancaster County," p. 112. 
 190 
 
SOME SALIENT POINTS AND CONCLUSIONS 191 
 
 public was rapidly becoming quieted and reconciled to the idea 
 that the Union could be saved without a " Brothers' War." The 
 President had also escaped the pitfalls of the Republicans, by 
 standing firmly on his constitutional prerogatives, both in dealing 
 with Congress and the Southern States. Few men beset by so 
 many chances of pitfall have ever managed to extricate themselves 
 so skillfully. 
 
 In the social realm of public affairs Buchanan's Administration 
 has had few rivals. Miss Harriet Lane ranks as one of the most 
 famous of the " First Ladies of the Land." 2 At Lancaster, Bu- 
 chanan kept open house with democratic simplicity ; at Washing- 
 ton his levees were like those of a European Monarch. 3 
 
 Buchanan was a born courtier. In spite of the fact that he 
 carried his head on one side, due to oblique eyesight, he was a 
 distinguished-looking man. 4 Being a master of the art of con- 
 versation, 5 he was a social favorite. Even one of his worst 
 critics, Von Hoist, admits that he was a perfect gentleman. 
 
 The chief characteristics that Buchanan manifested in his 
 public and private career seem to me to have been : a strong 
 sense of duty, manifesting itself in a desire to promote the gen- 
 eral welfare of America as he understood it ; strong religious 
 feeling and sense of accountability to the Diety for his acts ; 
 humaneness, gentleness, a tendency to forgive rather than to 
 blame, thrift without meanness, suavity combined with quiet per- 
 sistence, and the knack of getting his way without seeming to do 
 so ; quiet but invincible obstinacy in holding to his lines of policy ; 
 great circumspection and prudence, combined with a genius for 
 intrigue and organizing ability, which made him a political leader ; 
 a strong memory, combined with a natural gift for dialectic rea- 
 soning, which made him an able lawyer and diplomat. By tem- 
 perament he was well balanced, sometimes swayed by sentiment, 
 but never by passion. All of these characteristics served to make 
 him an ideal public servant. 
 
 Another reason for his policy was his concern over the eco- 
 
 2 Laura Holloway, " Ladies of the White House," pp. 498-525. 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 515. 
 
 4 Curtis, Vol. II, p. 672. 
 
 5 A. D. White's Autobiography, Vol. I, pp. 72-73. 
 
192 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 nomic ruin that war would bring upon the country. James Bu- 
 chanan, thrifty and reasonably well off in worldly goods, was 
 bound to notice this phase of the question in more detail than 
 Abraham Lincoln, who was never a business success. Buchanan 
 had, in 1856-1857, a private income of about six thousand dollars 
 a year. His wealth, the result of inheritance, and judicious in- 
 vestments (he did not speculate), made from the large returns 
 of his legal practice, which had enabled him to retire before forty. 
 Thrifty and exact in his personal expenditures, he was extremely 
 honest, taking great care in reporting all his items of personal tax, 
 and in keeping his accounts to the last cent. On the other hand, 
 he was a very humane creditor, and ready to give to worthy 
 causes of charity. 
 
 To those persons who hold that economic motives are the de- 
 termining factor in human conduct, there could be no doubt of 
 Buchanan's devotion to the Union. He held bonds on the seced- 
 ing States which, of course, became valueless after their secession. 
 He also owned property in southern Pennsylvania, which was 
 overrun by the enemy during the war. 
 
 Most of his wealth at the time of his death was in railroad 
 bonds and mortgages. His total estate was valued at three hun- 
 dred thousand dollars which was rather a good income in those 
 days. 6 Not even his worst foes could find a flaw in his integrity. 
 He spent more when in the White House than he received from 
 his salary. 
 
 On the back of a paper he noted sentiments similar to those in 
 his book, which bear out the remarks above. 7 
 
 The result of civil war to preserve it doubtful and the blood- 
 shed and burdens on the people 
 
 . . . doubtful whether the union could be preserved by civil war 
 and if it could the bloodshed, taxes, and disaster etc. it would 
 ensue. 
 
 Some impromptu speeches he made on a visit in North Caro- 
 lina in 1859 showed the same attitude on the waste of war. 
 
 Throughout this study the attempt has been made to show that 
 Buchanan's policy during his Administration was, in view of his 
 
 6 Tables appeared in the local papers. Clippings, H. S. P. 
 
 7 H. S. P. 
 
SOME SALIENT POINTS AND CONCLUSIONS 193 
 
 past and professed opinions, not only natural but inevitable. By 
 way of summary, a brief review of two phases of bis thought 
 will be presented to bring this assertion into strong relief. These 
 elements were of the utmost importance in his life. They were : 
 first, his political philosophy or creed, and, more important still, 
 his religious nature. 
 
 An interesting manuscript, not dated, but which by its contents 
 indicates that it was a draft of an address delivered some time 
 before Buchanan became President, 8 gives an able and clear- 
 cut commentary to Buchanan's political philosophy. It is the 
 more important as it was not delivered on a political occasion, 
 but at a commencement of Dickinson College. The main theme 
 was the utility and necessity of education in a Democracy, and 
 was a plea for State maintained secondary schools, — a topic dis- 
 cussed at that time in Pennsylvania. It is not labored like some 
 of Buchanan's speeches, written to avoid attack, and is therefore 
 a clear-cut expression of his views. 
 
 In the following passage will be found his idea of the u Natu- 
 ral Rights " philosophy, which had been popular as an historical 
 as well as political truth in the days of '76. 
 
 To be kept in regular motion, the relative rights of the Union 
 & of the States can only be preserved inviolate by an enlight- 
 ened & intelligent people. 
 
 . . . Besides vice is the natural companion of ignorance. Al- 
 though poets have presented to us the most glorious pictures of 
 man in a state of nature, although they have described that state 
 as the golden age of the human race; yet history & experience 
 have taught us that these are but dreams of fancy & that man in 
 his savage state is selfish & that his heart burns with fierce & un- 
 governable passions. Education is as necessary to correct his 
 heart as to inform his understanding. Virtue & knowledge must 
 unite & exert their joint influence over the American people, or 
 our Republic must fall the prey to some factious demagogue or 
 some military ursurper. 
 
 Democracy, therefore, was to be won by long evolution and 
 training. The Abolitionists were preaching that it was the birth- 
 right of all, regardless of race or creed. The difference is ap- 
 
 8 Probably in the forties or early fifties. 
 
194 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 parent. In another portion of the speech Buchanan explained 
 the whole system of Union as he understood it. 
 
 We became independent; and we have established the most 
 perfect ; but at the same time, the most complicated form of Gov- 
 ernment which the world ever witnessed. We have reduced into 
 successful practice, that which had been considered impracticable, 
 an imperium in imperio. We have constituted a General Gov- 
 ernment, to manage the common interest of the whole American 
 people; whilst we have established twenty-four State sovereign- 
 ties, to take care of the individual or separate interests of the 
 people within their respective territorial jurisdiction. The at- 
 traction of the General Government ought to be no greater than is 
 sufficient to preserve the States within their proper orbits. Should 
 the day ever arrive when its influence shall become so powerful 
 as to draw the States within its vortex, and to consolidate them 
 with itself, the glory of our Republic will then be at an end. . . . 
 On the other hand, disunion is equally to be dreaded with con- 
 solidation. The freedom and happiness of the American people 
 are equally at war with both. Should the tendency towards dis- 
 union become too powerful to be controlled by the Federal Gov- 
 ernment, then the States 
 
 will run lawless through the void, 
 Destroying others, by themselves destroyed. 
 
 This complex Government, in all its various branches, springs 
 from the people, and must be sustained by the people. Each 
 elector in this country is a sovereign, in the strictest sense of the 
 word. He is answerable to no tribunal, but that of God and his 
 own conscience, for his exercise of the right of suffrage. This 
 nicely balanced machine, therefore, can only . . . (not clear) 
 . . . State. Shall we patiently behold other States contesting for 
 that moral power in the Union which must ever spring from 
 knowledge, without making a single effort in the glorious cause 
 of education. I trust not. I hope for better things. 
 
 The American System was a new political wonder. It was to be 
 venerated and cherished. It was very evident to Buchanan, how- 
 ever, that it could not stand violent convulsions without giving up 
 the spirit that made it. His prophetic prediction of the devasta- 
 tion which would be incurred in case of a civil war, wherein 
 Pennsylvania would be another Flanders, was strikingly fulfilled. 
 
 The following statement was made in 1867, Therein Buchanan 
 
SOME SALIENT POINTS AND CONCLUSIONS 195 
 
 shows the effect of the war period, together with the same abid- 
 ing trust that the Democratic Party was still destined to play an 
 important role in the history of the new Nation. 
 
 An attempt has been made to cast odium on the doctrine of 
 State rights by falsely attributing to it the dangerous heresy of 
 Secession. This never was a State right because entirely incon- 
 sistent with the very nature of the obligations into which all the 
 States entered with each other by the Formation of the Federal 
 Constitution. If admitted, it would make the Union a mere rope 
 of Sand instead of a great and powerful Government. Happily 
 the claim has now been forever extinguished. The Democratic 
 party springs naturally out of the very essence of the Federal 
 Constitution and must exist as long as it shall endure. Let any 
 man take up the Bill of Rights which our ancestors deemed neces- 
 sary to limit and restrict federal power and read it line by line 
 and there he will see [not clear] embodied most of the principles 
 of the Democratic party. I shall not go into the detail, having 
 already proceeded much further than I had intended. 9 
 
 Upon the nature of the Federal Compact, Black related the fol- 
 lowing in 1881. 10 
 
 But after the election (i860) he asked me whether the argu- 
 ments which had been used to favor the right of secession long 
 ago in New England and South Carolina had made any impres- 
 sion on my mind. I replied, " None whatever." He said that 
 he was extremely glad that I did not believe the Federal compact 
 to be like an article of partnership between private persons which 
 could be dissolved by anyone who was dissatisfied, and wished to 
 retire from the business. I asked him how he could suppose that 
 such an absurdity could get into my head. He said it had got 
 into the heads of other men who were very sound on other sub- 
 jects and instanced Rawle of Philadelphia. " But," he said, " no 
 matter for that, we are in accord and that is enough. It is easy 
 to demonstrate that this secession theory is without any logical or 
 legal foundation." He said he was not without confidence that 
 he could make the truth too clear to be resisted by the Southern 
 men themselves. 
 
 On the other hand, in his message Buchanan held that if the 
 North kept on violating the compact, it plainly constituted moral 
 
 9 On the back of a dinner invitation, 1867. 
 
 10 Philadelphia Press, August 21, 1881, by Burr. 
 
196 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 justification for the South to secede. Rawle wrote, long before 
 Calhoun. He was a Federalist, and a resident of Philadelphia. 
 
 Buchanan criticized the officers of West Point for joining the 
 Confederacy : 1X 
 
 Whilst I can imagine why an officer might resign rather than 
 shed the blood of citizens of his native state in war, yet it is diffi- 
 cult to excuse or palliate the next step which is to go over to the 
 enemy and make war upon the time honored flag of the country. 
 
 This was unjust because Rawle's book 12 was used as a text-book 
 at West Point, and taught the priority of state over Federal al- 
 legiance. 
 
 An incisive answer to the oft-repeated query as to what the 
 " Fathers " thought, is contained in the following very valuable 
 statement of Thompson. It throws into strong relief the attitude 
 of Buchanan, Davis, and Black upon the problem that confronted 
 them. 
 
 Davis was a Secessionist and never sought to disguise it. He 
 was outspoken on all occasions. Black on the contrary, was 
 bitterly opposed to it and was equally frank. Their arguments 
 were long, frequent and exhaustive. His (Buchanan's) views 
 too were well known to me. I have heard him express himself 
 a hundred times and can define his position exactly. In reply to 
 those who would urge the right of the States to secede he would 
 say, " I find no such right declared in the Constitution." 
 
 When it was argued that no constitutional right was claimed, 
 and that it was simply the right of a sovereign to withdraw from 
 a compact, to secede from a confederation to whom certain rights 
 had been granted, the reply would always be the same, " I find 
 no such right laid down in the Constitution." 
 
 Our forefathers remembered that all governments since the 
 world began were built up by force. They desired to build one 
 founded on the affections of the people. They wanted a govern- 
 ment that the people would love to serve, and as long as they 
 loved it, it was easy to see that it would hold together. But be- 
 yond this they saw nothing. 
 
 " Therefore, gentlemen," the President would say, " you have 
 no right to secede. But if you do secede, I do not know that we 
 
 11 National Intelligencer, May 6, 1861. 
 
 12 Wm. Polk, " Life of Leonidas Polk," Vol. i, p. 266. 
 
 Rawle was used as a text in 1825-7 and was no doubt available as a sup- 
 plementary book until 1861. 
 
SOME SALIENT POINTS AND CONCLUSIONS 197 
 
 can force you back in again. The Constitution gives us the power 
 to enforce the laws, but that it also confers the broader power of 
 forcing states which have voluntarily entered the Union to re- 
 main, I cannot say." 12a 
 
 Anyone who follows the hopes and fears of the men of 1789 
 cannot but see the correctness of this opinion. On the other 
 hand, Buchanan saw the possibility that the North would not be 
 minded to let the South go, and might try to hold the South by 
 force, with a resulting war that would destroy the whole fabric 
 and theory of Union. Hence, his zealous desire to settle the 
 crisis without resort to war. 13 Only by peace and by mutual 
 compromise and guarantees could the wonderful political struc- 
 ture based upon consent of the governed be preserved. 1321 The 
 United States was a great experiment in the history of modern 
 States, a great league based upon the voluntary consent of its 
 members. It was an earnest devotion to this great and noble 
 attempt in the field of political science that led Buchanan to strive 
 to uphold it midst the tidal wave of sectional hatreds. No wonder 
 then he was firmly convinced that the Union could not sustain 
 the shock of internal strife among its component parts. Such a 
 strife would in itself denote that its life-giving spirit had expired. 
 In this sense Buchanan was the last President of that Union of 
 the ante-bellum era. The Union was not restored until the Ad- 
 ministration of Hayes, and then it was not the same, since the 
 theory of the old system had passed away. The experiment of 
 1789 had been crushed. 
 
 12a Philadelphia Press, after Burr's article in Black in 1883, abridged 
 from an article in the Appeal published at Memphis, Tenn. 
 
 13 Just after resigning, Thompson wrote Cobb (A. H. A., 191 1, Vol. II, 
 P- 533) : 
 
 ..." The President still adheres to his position that he has no power of 
 coercion but he has a most curious idea that enforcing the laws at the point 
 of the bayonet is not coercion. . . ." 
 
 This attitude was not inconsistent with his idea that Secession was a 
 nullity, and was in harmony with his policy of defense and not aggression. 
 Personally I have in another place expressed my disagreement with this 
 idea as being the more desirable one for the time. 
 
 13a Neither was the theory inconsistent with his attitude after the fall of 
 Sumter. In that case he held that war was begun by an attack against 
 property belonging to the Federal Government. He had warned the South 
 Carolinians of the effects of such an act while he was still President. 
 14 
 
198 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 The other and more vital trait of Buchanan's psychology was 
 his religious nature. No President of the United States was 
 ever more religious than he. Rejoicing in tolerance, — he was 
 even willing to send his niece to a Catholic school, — he subjected 
 himself to the most severe religious introspection. As early as 
 1844 he wrote to his clerical brother: 
 
 I am a believer but not with that degree of firmness of faith 
 calculated to exercise a controlling influence over my conduct. 
 I ought constantly to pray " help thou my unbelief " / think 
 often and I think seriously of my latter end; 13b but when I pray 
 (and I have preserved, and with the blessing of God shall preserve, 
 this good habit from my parents) I can rarely keep my mind 
 from wandering. I trust that the Almighty Father through the 
 merits and atonement of His Son will yet vouchsafe me a clear 
 and stronger faith than I possess. In the meantime I shall en- 
 deavor to do my duty in all the relations of life. 
 
 All his life 14 he was a church going, prayerful, Bible-reading 
 man. He believed that religion should manifest itself in good 
 works, and quietly gave aid to the unfortunate. While to a con- 
 siderable extent a fatalist, he yet did not believe in all the Presby- 
 terian tenets of predestination, and would have joined the Re- 
 formed Church because of the less severe Heidelberg catechism 
 had not the elders told him his complete adherence would not be 
 required. 145 * 
 
 In this study repeated citations have indicated the fact that Bu- 
 chanan was aware that he was nearing life's inevitable close. 
 His vitality was great, and he survived his term of office some 
 eight years, but this was probably longer than he had anticipated. 
 He was never a cruel man and very seldom a vindicative one. 
 This religious-humane nature developed the natural idea that a 
 " Brothers' War " was a crime, — a public murder. And Bu- 
 chanan consequently made up his mind he would rather die than 
 be guilty of the blood of his countrymen shed in civil strife. If 
 
 13b Italics mine. 
 
 14 Curtis, Vol. II, pp. 678-679; also Maury, "Statesmen of America in 
 1846," published 1847, pp. 15-16. 
 
 14a \\r. Rush Gillan, " James Buchanan," Paper read before the Kittoch- 
 tiney Historical Society of Franklin County, Chambersburg, Pa., 1900, pp. 
 21, 22. 
 
SOME SALIENT POINTS AND CONCLUSIONS 199 
 
 they started it, he was free to defend, but the shedding of blood, 
 he foresaw, meant a terrible war fatal to Union, — an act which 
 he, above all others, was determined not to commit. This fact 
 comes out publicly and clearly in his proclamation for a day of 
 Prayer, which is like a text for his policy : 
 
 Let us implore him . . . and above all to save us from the 
 horrors of civil war and blood guiltiness. 
 
 A more detailed statement of his determined policy appears in 
 his message of January 8th : 15 
 
 At the beginning of these unhappy troubles I determined that 
 no act of mine should increase the excitement in either section of 
 the country. If the political conflict were to end in civil war, it 
 was my determined purpose not to commence it or even to furnish 
 an excuse for it by any act of this government. My opinions re- 
 main unchanged, that justice as well as sound policy requires us 
 to seek a peaceful solution of the questions at issue between the 
 North and the South. 
 
 In later years, it was his great solace, that he had done all he 
 could to preserve the peace. Certainly no man could have felt 
 more earnestly the solicitude for the welfare of his country, nor 
 striven more earnestly to save it from destruction. 
 
 With certain fundamental political ideas which had been the 
 result of years of reflection and matured conviction, with a cer- 
 tain concept of public duty growing out of religious ideas held 
 since childhood, it was psychologically impossible for Buchanan 
 to tread any other path. 
 
 Since the Civil War, nationalists have by diverse ways tried to 
 undermine the theories of the ante-bellum period. Except to 
 partisans, such attempts have but little value. There were repre- 
 sentations of both parties in the convention that planned, and 
 those later that ratified the Constitution. While some States ac- 
 cepted the instrument, they rejected the philosophy of national- 
 ism by the manner of their ratification. Secession was always 
 able to hold its own from the beginning as a Constitution dogma. 
 It is plainer still that the Fathers had no intention of coercing a 
 State in the mass. Had they read into the right to coerce indi- 
 viduals the broad construction applied in 1861, the Constitution 
 
 15 Curtis, Vol. II, p. 435. 
 
200 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 would never have been ratified. In defiance of Mr. Madison, the 
 State of New York practically gave conditional ratification to the 
 new scheme. The dread of the Fathers of civil war, their dread 
 of despotism, their wish to found a Union on the consent of the 
 governed, and the great force of State jealousy made a nation- 
 alistic idea, except to the very few, impossible. 
 
 The fanaticism, the commercial greed, which wanted to use 
 the wealth of the South by holding her in the Union, together 
 with the foolish exaltation of slavery by Southern radicals, coupled 
 with the pride and the hot temper of the South, brought about a 
 wild insanity which, through the course of peculiar events, led to 
 the overthrow of sane advice, and plunged the Union into de- 
 struction. 
 
 The fact that the North finally decided to support Lincoln's 
 government does not state the whole case. Many Democrats and 
 border-State men, who would have refused to have abetted ag- 
 gressive measures looking to a military invasion of a State, and 
 who were working night and day to keep the peace, felt that all 
 was in vain after the South Carolinians fired on Fort Sumter. 
 The South has always held that Lincoln's act of sending rein- 
 forcements was the first act of war, and that they had a right to 
 repel it. History, however, shows that while people sometimes 
 have undoubted rights, it is sometimes advantageous to forego 
 their exercise to secure more lasting benefits in the longer course 
 of events. The Republicans were in no condition to push matters 
 to conclusions, and the hope for suitable compromise and pre- 
 servation had by no means perished. The psychological reac- 
 tion drove the North towards War, just as Buchanan had told the 
 South it would, and thus hope of peace and conciliation vanished. 
 
 The Civil War was a great misfortune to the country. The 
 finely balanced machine set up in 1789 was wrecked. The new 
 creation was only the same by courtesy of legal dicta, because it 
 gave ear to new political theories and sought after the glitter of 
 the new economic prosperity. The marked legal gains to the 
 negro race were in sharp contrast to the new chaining of both 
 races to a new economic order that was still more destructive of 
 Jeffersonian political liberty, and from which the pretended relief 
 is the still more binding chain of a despotic prolitariat. 
 
SOME SALIENT POINTS AND CONCLUSIONS 201 
 
 The trouble lies in the belief that material comfort is the only 
 element of happiness. Commercialism is the despot of present- 
 day America. This has led to centralization of everything, in- 
 cluding the Government. America must learn the ideals of local 
 self-determination all over, and also learn that the satisfactions of 
 philosophy, art, political science, and religion are as interesting 
 and worth while as those of commerce and increased production. 
 The " Deserted Village," and " The Old Homestead " must be 
 restored. 
 
 The fall of States Rights is as much due to the States them- 
 selves as to the grasping of the central government. Brought up 
 to hold the States in terms of political contempt, modern legislators 
 have sought to avoid their responsibilities, and secure quiet tenure 
 of office by passing duties and problems to the central Govern- 
 ment that they should have solved themselves. Let us hope that 
 a new day is not far distant. In the meantime there is the op- 
 portunity to deal more gently with the statesmen of yesterday. 
 
 The inevitable animosities of Civil War have, and will yet for 
 a generation, prevent the Northern Democrats from receiving 
 their place in history. Eminent among this group stands James 
 Buchanan. His intellect was of that profound type, equal to the 
 best of his day, yet so clothed by a conservative temperament that 
 he has received less pages in text books than some of his more 
 spectacular contemporaries. Yet that same canny intellect made 
 him rank among our ablest diplomats of his age, and made him 
 one of the most astute political leaders our democracy has yet 
 produced. His thoroughness and tireless industry made him one 
 of the best of public functionaries ; as a citizen he was a model 
 of virtue; as a statesman he made duty his guiding star. His 
 was a self-sacrificing devotion to the Constitution as he under- 
 stood it. His attitude toward the people of the South was but 
 the natural result of thirty years of friendly association. Peace- 
 ful by nature as Jefferson, and with a devotion to the Union like 
 that of Webster, he sacrificed his political reputation, and at 
 times risked personal danger to avert a needless and heartless 
 " Brothers' War " followed by a cruel reconstruction. For this 
 policy of self-abnegation, dictated by a sense of religious obliga- 
 tion to his fellowmen, James Buchanan is entitled to a generous 
 judgment at the hands of a generous people. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 A. Unpublished Manuscript Collections 
 
 Robert Anderson MSS., L. of C. 
 
 Jeremiah S. Black MSS., L. of C. 
 
 Buchanan MSS., Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 
 
 Buchanan MSS., L. of C. 
 
 Buchanan-Johnston MSS., L. of C. 
 
 William W. Corcoran MSS., L. of C. 
 
 Lewis S. Coryell MSS., Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 
 
 Cralle MSS., L. of C. 
 
 Samuel W. Crawford MSS., L. of C. 
 
 Crittenden MSS., L. of C. 
 
 Andrew J. Donaldson, L. of C. 
 
 Dreer Collection MSS., Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 
 
 Joseph Holt MSS., L of C. 
 
 Horatio King MSS., L. of C. 
 
 Franklin Pierce MSS., L. of C. 
 
 Edwin M. Stanton MSS., L. of C. 
 
 Martin Van Buren MSS., L. of C. 
 
 Henry A. Wise MSS., State Library, Richmond, Virginia. 
 
 B. Published Personalia 
 
 Essays and Speeches of Jeremiah Sullivan Black, Chauncy F. Black, ed., 
 
 New York, 1885. 
 The Works of James Buchanan, John Bassett Moore, ed., Philadelphia, 
 
 1908-10. 
 Works of John Calhoun, 1854. 
 
 Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, Rowland Dunbar, ed., New York, 1923. 
 Correspondence of Robert M. T. Hunter, Charles H. Ambler, ed., Annual 
 
 Report of the American Historical Association, 1916, Vol. II. 
 Diary of James K. Polk, M. M. Quaife, ed., Chicago, 1910. 
 Papers of Thomas Ruffin, J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton, ed., Raleigh, 1918. 
 Carl Schurz Correspondence, Political Papers, New York, 1913. 
 Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens and Howell 
 
 Cobb, U. B. Phillips, ed., Annual Report of the American Historical 
 
 Association, 191 1, Vol. II. 
 Diary of Martin Van Buren, John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., Annual Report of 
 
 the American Historical Association, 1918, Vol. II. 
 Diary of Gideon Wells, Boston, 191 1. 
 202 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 203 
 
 C. Periodicals 
 
 i. Newspapers: 
 
 Alabama: The Confederation (Montgomery), Buchanan's Clippings, 
 
 Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 
 District of Columbia : Washington Chronicle, American Antiquarian 
 Society. 
 Washington National Intelligencer, (daily), American Anti- 
 quarian Society, L. of C, State Library, Richmond, Virginia. 
 Washington Star, American Antiquarian Society, L. of C. 
 Washington Union, American Antiquarian Society, L. of C. 
 Connecticut : Columbia Weekly Register, American Antiquarian So- 
 ciety. 
 Courant (Hartford), American Antiquarian Society. 
 Louisiana: The Daily True Delta (New Orleans), Buchanan's Clip- 
 pings, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 
 New Orleans Weekly Times, Buchanan Scrap Book, Historical 
 Society of Pennsylvania. 
 Maryland: The Leader (Baltimore), Buchanan Scrap Book, Histori- 
 cal Society of Pennsylvania. 
 Massachusetts : Boston Post, American Antiquarian Society. 
 New York : New York Commercial Advertiser, American Antiqua- 
 rian Society. 
 New York Herald, American Antiquarian Society. 
 New York Times, American Antiquarian Society. 
 New York Tribune, American Antiquarian Society. 
 New York World, American Antiquarian Society, Buchanan's 
 Scrap Book. 
 Ohio : Cincinnati Commercial, American Antiquarian Society, Bu- 
 chanan Scrap Book, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 
 Pennsylvania: Lancaster Daily Intelligencer, Buchanan Clippings, 
 Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 
 Lancaster Monthly Intelligencer, American Antiquarian Society. 
 Philadelphia Press, American Antiquarian Society, Historical 
 
 Society of Pennsylvania. 
 Philadelphia Public Ledger, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 
 The Press (York), Buchanan Scrap Book, Historical Society 
 of Pennsylvania. 
 Virginia : Alexandria Gazette, American Antiquarian Society. 
 
 Richmond Enquirer, American Antiquarian Society, L. of C, 
 State Library, Richmond, Virginia. 
 2. Newspaper Clippings: 
 
 Scrap Books on the Civil War, chiefly New York World and New 
 
 England Papers, American Antiquarian Society. 
 File of Biographical Clippings, American Antiquarian Society. 
 
204 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 Clippings collected by Buchanan and relatives, Historical Society of 
 
 Pennsylvania. 
 Scrap Book, Buchanan MSS., Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 
 Clippings in Meigs' Diary, L. of C. 
 3. Magazines: 
 
 Americana. 
 
 American Historical Review. 
 
 Atlantic Monthly (Vol. XIV). 
 
 Connecticut Magazine of History (Vol. VIII). 
 
 Kansas Historical Society Reports. 
 
 Missouri Historical Review (Vol. XVII-XVIII). 
 
 New York State Teachers' Association Magazine. 
 
 North American Review (1887). 
 
 Ohio Archaeological and Historical Society. 
 
 Outlook (Vol. CXXVII). 
 
 Phrenological Journal. 
 
 Tyler's Quarterly. 
 
 Virginia Magazine of History. 
 
 William and Mary Quarterly. 
 
 D. Pamphlets 
 
 1. A large collection of miscellaneous pamphlets of speeches, political 
 
 literature, etc., among the Buchanan Collection in the His- 
 torical Society of Pennsylvania. 
 
 2. J. S. Black and J. O. Broadhead. Letter to the Secretary of War upon 
 
 the legal liability of the government to meet certain acceptances 
 of the late Secretary Floyd. Washington, 1862. 
 
 W. Rush Gillan, James Buchanan, Paper read before the Kittochtiney 
 Historical Society, March 30, 1900 (Pamphlet at Cornell Uni- 
 versity Library). Chambersburg, Pa., 1900. 
 
 W. A. Harris, The Record of Fort Sumter, Columbia, S. C, 1862. 
 
 William Uhler Hensel, Attitude of James Buchanan on the Subject of 
 Slavery, Lancaster, 1912. 
 Mr. Buchanan's Administration upon the Eve of the Rebellion, 
 
 Lancaster, 1912. 
 James Buchanan as a Lawyer, (Reprinted from the Pennsylvania 
 
 Law Review), Lancaster, 191 1. 
 Religious Character of James Buchanan, Lancaster, 1913. 
 
 Joseph Holt, Treason and its Treatment, New York, 1865. Reply to 
 Thompson, Speech at Irving Hall, New York, 1861. 
 
 King, Memorial pamphlet on Horatio King, (printed by his son), New 
 York, 1899. 
 
 C. Stuart Patterson, Remarks of C. Stuart Patterson in reply to Blaine 
 concerning Buchanan, 1883. Short Answers to Reckless Fabri- 
 cations, 1856. (Buchanan Campaign Pamphlet). 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 205 
 
 William Henry Trescot, Trescot's Narrative (Reprinted from the 
 American Historical Review, Vol. XIII), Lancaster, 1908. 
 
 E. General Works, Biographies and Reminiscences 
 
 (References here given principally the works from which citations 
 are made) 
 
 Alexander, De Alva, Political History of the State of New York, 1906. 
 Alexander, Edward Porter, Military Memoirs of a Confederate, New 
 
 York, 1907. 
 Alfred, Frank H., Life of Jefferson Davis, Cincinnati and Chicago, 1868. 
 Avery, Isaac Wheeler, History of Georgia, New York, 1881. 
 Avery, Myrta Lockett, Recollections of Alexander H. Stephens, New 
 
 York, 1910. 
 
 Bancroft, George, Life and Letters of George Bancroft, New York, 1908. 
 
 Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, R. Underwood Johnson and Clarence 
 Buel, ed., New York, 1908. 
 
 Bigelow, John, Retrospections of a Busy Life, New York, 1909. 
 
 Blaine, James Gillespie, Twenty Years of Congress, Norwich, Connecticut, 
 1886. 
 
 Bledsoe, Albert Taylor, Is Davis a Traitor? Richmond, 1907. 
 
 Botts, John Minor, History of the Great Rebellion, New York, 1866. 
 
 Boutwell, George Sewall, Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, 
 New York, 1902. 
 
 Boykin, Samuel, Life of Howell Cobb, New York, 1870. 
 
 Boyle, Joseph B., In Memory of Edwin McMasters Stanton, Steubenville, 
 Ohio, 1910. 
 
 (Probably by William B. Reed), Life and Services of James Buchanan, 
 New York, 1856. 
 
 Buchanan, James, Buchanan's Administration, New York, 1866. 
 
 Burgess, John William, The Middle Period, The Civil War and the Con- 
 stitution, New York, 1895. 
 
 Butler, Benjamin Franklin, Butler's Book, Boston, 1892. 
 
 Carpenter, Francis Bicknell, The Inner Life of Abraham Lincoln, Six 
 
 Months in the White House, Boston, 1879. 
 Chadwick, French Ensor, Causes of the Civil War, New York, 1907. 
 Chancellor, William Estabrook, Our Presidents and their Office, New 
 
 York, 1912. 
 Claiborne, John Francis H., Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman, 
 
 New York, i860. 
 Clay-Clopton, Mrs. Virginia, A Belle of the Fifties, New York, 1905. 
 Clayton, Mary Black, Reminiscences of Jeremiah Sullivan Black, St. Louis, 
 
 1887. 
 Clifford, Philip Greeley, Nathan Clifford, Democrat, New York, 1922. 
 
206 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
 Coleman, Mrs. Mary Butler, Crittenden, Life of J. J. Crittenden, Phila- 
 delphia, 1871. 
 
 Conway, Monane Daniel, Autobiography of Memories and Experiences, 
 Boston, 1904. 
 
 Corwin, Edward Samuel, National Supremacy, New York, 1913. 
 
 Cox, Samuel Sullivan, Three Decades of Federal Legislation, Providence, 
 Rhode Island, 1888. 
 
 Craven, John J., Prison Life of Jefferson Davis, London. 
 
 Crawford, Samuel Wylie, Genesis of the Civil War, New York, 1887. 
 
 Cullom, Shelby Moore, Fifty Years of Public Service, Chicago, 191 1. 
 
 Curtis, George Ticknor, Life of James Buchanan, New York, 1883. 
 
 Curtis, George Ticknor, Constitutional History of the United States, New 
 York, 1879. 
 
 Cutts, James Madison, Constitutional and Party Questions as Received 
 Orally from the late Stephen A. Douglas, New York, 1866. 
 
 Davis, Jefferson, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, New 
 
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 1889. 
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208 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
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 1902. 
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 1912. 
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210 JAMES BUCHANAN AND HIS CABINET 
 
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INDEX 
 
 Abolitionists, 15, 187 
 
 Abolition, rise of, 103, 104 
 
 Administration Buchanan's, theory 
 of, on state and federal relations, 
 146 
 
 Alabama, arsenal seized, 168; asks 
 for adjustment of federal claims, 
 171 
 
 Alaska, Buchanan and, 13 
 
 Allegiance, 142; Thompson on, 117 
 
 Amendments, constitutional, sug- 
 gested by Buchanan in i860, 146 
 
 Anderson, Lars, brother of Major 
 Anderson, letter of, 183, 184 
 
 Anderson, Major, appointment to 
 Charleston, 155; character, 155; 
 his role, 153; and South Carolina, 
 156, 181, 182; instructions, 96, 97, 
 182 note; on "pledge," 157 note; 
 moves to Sumter, 157; effects of 
 move, 78, 153, 167; Floyd tele- 
 graphs, 158; upheld by Crittenden 
 and Scott, 184; Black on, 164; 
 Thompson on, 116; return to 
 Moultrie requested, 158; Buchan- 
 an's attitude, 165, 178, 179; re- 
 enforcements for, 123, 185; hailed 
 a hero, 160. See Charleston, South 
 Carolina and Sumter 
 
 Anglo-American relations, Buchanan 
 and, 11 
 
 Anti-slavery agitation, 105; charac- 
 terized by Black, 107, 108 
 
 Arkansas, arsenal seized, 172 
 
 Army, appropriations, 162 note 
 
 Appleton, John, of Maine, Asst. 
 Secretary of State, 35; on Walker 
 in Kansas, 50, 51 
 
 Baker, Joseph B., Collector of the 
 Port at Philadelphia, on Bu- 
 
 chanan's cabinet, 125, 126; on 
 Anderson, 159, 169; on Gov. 
 Pickens, 170 
 
 Bates, Joshua, of London, England, 
 Buchanan to, 186, 187 
 
 Bayard, James A., U. S. Senator 
 (Delaware), 128 note; on coercion, 
 136 note 
 
 Benjamin, Judah P., U. S. Senator 
 (Louisiana), cautions Floyd con- 
 cerning acceptances, 93 
 
 Bennett, James Gordon, editor of the 
 New York Herald, fails to obtain 
 an appointment, 71, 155; threatens 
 trouble, 172 and note 
 
 Bigler, William, U. S. Senator (Penn- 
 sylvania), 128 note; and Sumter 
 question, 158, 171 
 
 Black, Chauncy, son of Jeremiah S. 
 Black, on "Trescot's Narrative," 
 149 note 
 
 Black, Jeremiah Sullivan, U. S. At- 
 torney General 1857-60, Secretary 
 of State 1860-61, long acquainted 
 with Buchanan, 100, 101 ; friendship 
 for Buchanan, 115; character, 99, 
 111,113; legal ability and talents, 
 100; on Buchanan, 5, 195; on Cass 
 and Buchanan, 71, 73; on Cobb, 
 66; on Holt-Thompson feud, 82, 
 122; upholds Thompson, 116; in 
 regard to bond myth, 120, 124; 
 Thompson on Black and Buchanan, 
 101, on Black, 116; unfair to 
 Toucey, 85; relations with Floyd, 
 36; in the Meigs incident, 92; and 
 the DeGroot claim, 92 note; up- 
 holds Floyd's acceptances in 1862, 
 93; urges Buchanan against Floyd, 
 95; declines to ask Floyd to resign, 
 95; urges the appointment of 
 
 211 
 
212 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Stanton, 74; warned concerning 
 Stanton, 74; on campaign for i860, 
 55; opinions on allegiance, 161, 
 1 64 ; the so-called ' ' crisis, "111,112; 
 differences with Buchanan, 114, 
 115; drafts opinion of November 
 i860, 132, 134; opposes proclama- 
 tion, 132; ideas on coercion, 131, 
 135, 137, 138, 145; on granting 
 clearance papers, 147; on title to 
 forts at Charleston, 151 ; considers 
 resignation, 120, 154, 161 ; inter- 
 views Buchanan, 162, 163; re- 
 mains in cabinet, 138; desires to 
 buy a farm, 56; leaves Washington 
 a poor man, 113; a Democrat 
 during the war, 115; attacked by 
 Baker, replies, 126 
 
 Blake, Dr. John B., of Washington, 
 D. C, 37 
 
 Bonds, Indian, incident of, 155 
 
 Border States, Buchanan and, 173 
 
 Bowen, Levi K., Maryland politican, 
 to Buchanan, 169, 171 
 
 Bradford, Vincent C, of Philadelphia, 
 168; wishes forts evacuated, 170 
 
 Breckinridge, John C, Vice-President 
 of the United States, and nomina- 
 tion for the Presidency in i860, 36; 
 asks Floyd to resign, 95; men- 
 tioned, 57, 78 
 
 "The Brooklyn," 112, 125; to 
 succor Sumter, 171; Holt and 
 Scott substitute the "Star of the 
 West," 179 
 
 Brown, Aaron V., Postmaster Gen- 
 eral 1857-59, death, 80; and Kan- 
 sas question, 84 
 
 Brown, George W., editor, "Herald 
 of Freedom," on Walker, 24 note 
 
 Brown, John, in Kansas, 46 
 
 Buchanan, Miss Annie, niece of the 
 President, on cabinet relations, 129 
 
 Buchanan, James, President of the 
 United States 1857-61, parents of 
 3; education, 4; at Dickinson 
 
 College, 4; characteristics, 4; hon- 
 esty, 5; diplomatic talent, 10, 11, 
 191 ; conversational powers, 11; 
 speaker, 13; determination, 37, 38; 
 tenacious of opinions, 37 ; industry, 
 37, 114; carefulness, 132; courte- 
 ous, 144; a courtier, 191 ; tact, 36; 
 religious nature, 62, 160, 198; im- 
 partiality, 132; consistency, 114; 
 conservative, 101, 102; craft, 126; 
 philanthropic, 135; defies popular 
 opinion, 186; a gentleman, 191; 
 lover of peace, 186, 201; fatalistic, 
 198; abnegates self, 201; humane, 
 198; wealthy, 192; physical char- 
 acteristics : vision, 191; health, 
 113, 114, 161; attire, 113, 114; 
 mind, 4; studies, 4; studies law, 5; 
 defends the 25th section of the 
 Judiciary Act, 6; a political leader, 
 6, 7; Secretary of State, 7; causes 
 for nomination of, in 1856, 8, 9; 
 attitude towards nomination, 8, 9; 
 troubles with patronage, 9 note; 
 diplomatic career, 10; aids Anglo- 
 American amity, 1 1 ; Far Eastern 
 policy, 11, 12; Mexican policy, 13; 
 would buy Alaska, 13; as a speaker, 
 13; as legislator, 13; defends 
 Southern Constitutional rights, 14, 
 18, 19; attitude on slavery, 14, 15, 
 17, 19, 28; towards the negro, 15; 
 on the crisis of 1850, 16-18; career 
 as a Federalist, 18; a Democrat 
 during the war, 20; foresees trouble 
 in the territories, 22; appoints 
 Robert J. Walker, Governor of 
 Kansas, 22 ; difficulties with Walk- 
 er, 24, 25; legal aspects of his 
 Kansas policy, 26; no desire for 
 slavery in Kansas, 28; motives for 
 his Kansas policy, 29, 30; attitude 
 towards the Dred Scott case, 31; 
 disgusted with voters of Kansas, 32 ; 
 relation with the English Bill, 34; 
 admits Kansas as a free state, 35; 
 
INDEX 
 
 213 
 
 selects members of his cabinet, 36; 
 appoints State Rights men, 37; 
 cause of break with Douglas, 37; 
 relations with cabinet, 37, 38; 
 letters from Judge Williams con- 
 cerning Kansas conditions, 38-47; 
 letters from Cass, Floyd and 
 Appleton pertaining to Walker, 48- 
 51; questions Thompson concern- 
 ing "plot," 52; praised by William 
 Crump for Kansas policy, 53, 54; 
 letters to Floyd, 55, 59; letter from 
 Black, 56; letters from Floyd, 57, 
 58, 61; instructions regarding 
 Harpers Ferry, 62, 63; relations 
 with General Scott, 63-65; ac- 
 cepts Cobb's resignation, 66, 67 
 differs with Thomas over loan, 68 
 accepts Thomas' resignation, 68 
 displeased with New York bankers, 
 69, 70; appoints Dix to Treasury 
 Department, 69; relations with 
 Dix, 69-71; alters message of i860 
 to please Cass, 72; attitude to- 
 wards Cass' resignation, 72, 73; 
 seeks facts of the incident, 74; re- 
 lations with Stanton, 75-79; crit- 
 icises his ministers, 79; impeach- 
 ment planned by Stanton, 80; re- 
 lations with Holt, 80-83; loses 
 support of Slidell, 82; opinion of 
 Holt, 82; relations with Horatio 
 King, 82-84; attitude towards 
 the Washington "Constitution," 
 83; relations with Toucey, 84-89; 
 letter of Toucey to Buchanan, 
 86-88 ; relations with Floyd, 89-99 ; 
 attitude towards Floyd's accept- 
 ances, 94; requests Floyd's resig- 
 nation, 95; displeased with Floyd, 
 98; final estimate of Floyd in 1868, 
 98; relations with Judge Black, 
 100-114; reason for appointing 
 Black, 100; alarms Black in the 
 matter of the South Carolina Com- 
 missioners, 101, 102; interviews 
 15 
 
 Black concerning the note and his 
 intended resignation, no; urges 
 him to remain in the cabinet, no; 
 requests Black to alter the note, 
 in; has three successive calami- 
 ties, no; advised by Black, 112; 
 differs with Black, 114, 115; friend- 
 ship with Black, 114; with Thomp- 
 son, 115; on resignation of Cass 
 according to Thompson, 118; pol- 
 icy of, reviewed by Thompson, 118; 
 criticised by Thompson for sending 
 the "Star of the West," 121; re- 
 enforcements to Sumter, 123, 124; 
 holds Northern members in cabinet 
 after December i860, 125; attitude 
 towards cabinet, 125-127, 129; 
 writes his own drafts, 126 note; at- 
 titude towards leaders of the Sen- 
 ate, 127; relations with Davis, 127; 
 severs relations with Southern Sen- 
 ators, 128; importuned by them, 
 128; criticised by Davis, 128 note; 
 consults Floyd on situation Novem- 
 ber i860, 130, 133, 135; consults 
 with cabinet, 131; suggests con- 
 vention of states, 131; consults 
 Black on the matter of a proclama- 
 tion, 132, 133; cites Rawle, 132; 
 not satisfied with Black's opinion; 
 would be a daysman; requests 
 Black to redraft opinion, 133; con- 
 sults Davis, 135, 136; looks to a 
 peaceful solution of difficulties, 136, 
 137; talks with King, 137 note; 
 reviews constitutional debates with 
 Thompson, 138, 139; refutes 
 Black's argument for coercion, 
 138; discusses the situation with 
 Trescot, 139 note, 140 note; 
 message of i860, 140-146; holds 
 war inexpedient, 145; theory of the 
 administration analyzed, 146, 147; 
 effects of the message, 147; com- 
 pared with Jackson, 147 note, 148 
 note; apprehensive over situation 
 
214 
 
 INDEX 
 
 at Charleston, 149; discusses the 
 matter with Floyd, 150; threats of 
 ministers denied by Holt, 150 note; 
 discusses status of forts, 151; ac- 
 cepts Black's views on title, 151, 
 152; reasons for his policy, 152; 
 sends Cushing to Charleston, 153; 
 question of a pledge, 152, 153; pre- 
 pares answer to Senators concern- 
 ing Mission of Hayne, 154; effect 
 of Cass' resignation and Black's 
 attitude on his policy regarding 
 the forts, 154; is notified of the 
 secession of S. C, 154; denies he 
 is insane, 155; replies to Gov. 
 Pickens, 155; ignorant of instruc- 
 tions to Anderson, 157; attitude 
 towards Anderson's move, 158; 
 convenes cabinet, 158; annoyed by 
 them, 1 59 ; urged by the S. C. Com- 
 missioners, 159; weighs opinion on 
 Sumter question, 160; is the object 
 of friendly propaganda, 160; crit- 
 icised, 161; reads draft to Com- 
 missioners, 161 ; interview with 
 Black, 161, 163; reason for policy, 
 163; not for secession, 163; final 
 reply to Commisioners, 164, 165; 
 refuses to reconsider policy, 165; 
 rumors of assassination, 166; plot 
 to abduct, 166 note; devotion to 
 the Union, 166 note; "Star of the 
 West" sent to Sumter, 167; effects 
 of Anderson's move reviewed, 167; 
 remarks on letter of the Governor 
 of New York on the matter of 
 military aid, 169; letters of ap- 
 proval to, 170, 172; extracts of 
 letters to, 164-172; offers A. B. 
 Greenwood, Head of Interior De- 
 partment, 172; prospects in Janu- 
 ary 1861, 173, 174; takes defensive 
 attitude, 177; coldness of Southern 
 leaders, 177; reviews and defends 
 his policy to Holt, 177-179; first 
 draft of an answer to requests of 
 
 Hayne, 180; expects Anderson to 
 protect himself, 182; favors Peace 
 Convention, 184-186; questions 
 Holt concerning orders to forts, 184, 
 185; refuses to see a Confederate 
 Commissioner, 185 note; orders 
 troops to Washington, 185; dis- 
 pleased with the South, 186; with- 
 stands Northern radical opinion, 
 186; complains of treatment at the 
 hands of the South, 186; reviews 
 his policy to Bates, 186, 187; de- 
 fends Northern Democrats, 187; 
 would give South her constitutional 
 rights in the Union, 187; at the 
 Inauguration of Lincoln, 188; re- 
 turn to Wheatland, 188; attitude 
 during the war, 190; retrospect of 
 his policy, 190, 191; characteris- 
 tics reviewed, 191; economic ideas 
 and the war, 192; idea of a "state 
 of nature," 193; on the spheres of 
 government, 194; on the mission 
 of the Democracy, 195; on the 
 Federal compact, 195; on coercive 
 power of the Constitution, 197; 
 faith and creed of, 198; considers 
 the war a crime, 198, 199; seeks 
 peaceful solution of country's 
 troubles, 199; services of, reviewed, 
 201 
 
 Buckalew, Mr., United States Minis- 
 ter to Ecuador, Black to, 112 
 
 Buell, General, receives oral orders to 
 Anderson, 96, 97; disagrees with 
 Floyd concerning content of the 
 orders, 158 
 
 Burr, Col. Frank, correspondent of 
 the Philadelphia Press, admirer of 
 Black, 100, 139 
 
 Cabinet, appointments discussed, 35- 
 37; Buchanan's attitude towards, 
 37 ; comments on Walker in Kansas, 
 48-52; accounts of their services, 
 66; attitude of, towards Floyd, 95; 
 
INDEX 
 
 215 
 
 approves Judge Woodward's letter, 
 109; "cabinet crisis" really 
 "Black's crisis," III, 112; con- 
 flicting accounts of, 124; myth of 
 cabinet regency, 125; myth of a 
 crisis, 125; meeting of, Nov. 9, 
 i860, 131; Nov. 10, i860, Nov. 13, 
 i860, 133; other meetings, 137, 
 138; and draft to S. C. Commission- 
 ers, 161; votes to return note of 
 S. C. Commissioners, 165; vacan- 
 cies difficult to fill, 173 note; and 
 message of January 8, 174. See 
 names of each minister of the 
 cabinet 
 
 Calhoun, John, President of the Le- 
 Compton Convention, 51, 52 
 
 Calhoun, John, U. S. Senator (South 
 Carolina), on allegiance, 142; men- 
 tioned, 69, 143, 196 
 
 Cameron, Simon, U. S. Senator 
 (Pennsylvania), 104 
 
 Campbell, Judge, U. S. Supreme 
 Court, 87, 128; criticises Buchanan, 
 160 
 
 Campaign of 1856, Buchanan sees a 
 crisis in, 30 
 
 Capen, Nahum, Postmasterat Boston, 
 93 
 
 Cass, Lewis, Secretary of State, 1857- 
 60, appointment of, 35; attitude 
 of Buchanan towards, 71; on 
 Walker, 48; rebukes Walker, 48; 
 health of, 59; to Floyd, 59, 60; 
 alarmed over prospects of Seces- 
 sion, 71, 72; and message of 
 December 1 860, 72 ; resignation of, 
 73, 74, 117; effect of, 154; wishes 
 to rescind resignation, 72, 73, 117; 
 approves Woodward's letter, 109 
 
 Catron, John, Judge U. S. Supreme 
 Court, 28; and Dred Scott Case, 
 30 
 
 Charleston, South Carolina, 69, 85; 
 Black on, 76; Thompson on, 116, 
 175; Buchanan on, 178; Tyler's in- 
 
 fluence at, 183; title of forts at, 
 151, 152. See Anderson, Sumter 
 and South Carolina 
 
 Cincinnati platform, 30 
 
 Civil War, closes an issue, 142; An- 
 derson on danger of, 156; urges 
 against war, 170; Buchanan would 
 avert, 175; attack on Sumter 
 means, 180, 190; Buchanan on 
 economic aspects of, 192, holds it a 
 crime, 198; causes of, 200; effects 
 of, 200 
 
 Claiborne, J. F. H., Secretary of 
 John A. Quitman, on English Bill, 
 34 
 
 Clay, Clement C, U. S. Senator 
 (Alabama), asks recognition of 
 Alabama, 171 
 
 Clay, Henry, U. S. Senator (Ken- 
 tucky), 13 
 
 Clayton, Mary Black, daughter of 
 Judge Black, on health of Black, 
 113 
 
 Clifford, Nathan, of Maine, Judge U. 
 S. Supreme Court, 36 
 
 Clingman, Thomas L., U. S. Senator 
 (North Carolina), statements of, 
 corrected by Thompson, 118, 119 
 
 Cobb, Howell, Secretary of Treasury 
 1 857-1 860, appointment of, 35; 
 character of, 66; attitude towards 
 Buchanan, 67; and finances, 68 
 note; approves Judge Woodward's 
 letter, 109; concerning the cabinet, 
 126; attitude on message of De- 
 cember i860, 67,133, 141; resigns, 67 
 
 Coercion, Thompson on, 117; Cass 
 on, 131; cabinet on, 131; Black 
 and, 145; Congress and, 143; dis- 
 cussed, 145-147; vain if attempted, 
 170; Buchanan opposed to, 196; 
 changes, 197 note; discussed by 
 Black, 134, 135, 137; Bayard and, 
 136; South and, 138; repudiated 
 by Buchanan, 138; discussed, 139; 
 Buchanan opposed to, 180 
 
216 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Commissioners, South Carolina, a 
 factor in Floyd's resignation, 96; 
 reply to, 161, 173; Black and reply, 
 no, 162; Stanton and reply, 162; 
 Thompson on, 116; arrive in Wash- 
 ington, 158; present note, 159; 
 protest to Buchanan, 165; letter 
 returned, 165; departure of, 166. 
 See Anderson, Sumter, Charleston 
 and Pickens 
 
 Compromise of 1850, 29 
 
 Compact, Federal, violated by the 
 North, 195 
 
 Confederacy, The United States, 1, 
 131 
 
 Confederacy, Southern, 196 
 
 Confederation, Articles of, cited by 
 Buchanan, 142; perpetual, 146 
 
 Congress, 61 ; Buchanan's message of 
 December i860 and, 118, 130, 140- 
 146; refuses army bill, 162 note; 
 distrusted by Buchanan, 163; alone 
 has power to change status of 
 forts at Charleston, 181 ; Buchanan 
 urges Peace Convention on, 183 
 
 Constitution, federal, 54; and co- 
 ercion, 137, 138, 139, 199 
 
 Convention of States, suggested by 
 Buchanan, 131; cabinet and, 131; 
 Judges Woodward and Lewis on, 
 132 
 
 Corwin, Edward Samuel, professor, 
 criticises Democratic doctrines, 134 
 note 
 
 Crawford, Samuel Wylie, author, on 
 Black and Floyd, 96; on Commis- 
 sioners and Buchanan, 185 note 
 
 Curtis, George T., lawyer and author, 
 on message of December, i860 140 
 
 Cushing, Caleb, statesman, Buchanan 
 sends, to South Carolina, 153 and 
 note, 128 note 
 
 Davis, Jefferson, U. S. Senator (Mis- 
 sissippi), replies to arguments of 
 Black, 102; criticises Buchanan, 
 
 128 note, 129 note; requested to 
 come to Washington, 135; opposes 
 Buchanan's message of December, 
 136; on the supreme law clause, 
 141 ; fails to persuade Buchanan to 
 remove troops from Sumter, 151; 
 interviews Buchanan over Sumter, 
 158; a secessionist, 196 
 
 DeGroot, claim, and Floyd, 36, 92 
 note 
 
 Democrats, and Kansas, 27 ; and Le- 
 Compton constitution, 33; in de- 
 cline, 104, 105; coercion fatal to, 
 170; lose Pennsylvania, i860; 
 alienated by the South, 187; 
 Buchanan on mission of, after the 
 Civil War, 195; led into the war, 200 
 
 Democracy, 193 
 
 Denver, Governor of Kansas Terri- 
 tory, policy of, 28, 35, 44 
 
 DePhillips, Mr., of Philadelphia, to 
 Buchanan, 168 
 
 Dickinson College, attended by Bu- 
 chanan, 193 
 
 Dickinson Daniel S., Leader of the 
 Hunker Democracy of New York, 
 discusses Kansas situation, 32 
 
 Dix, John A., Secretary of Treasury 
 1861, reasons for appointment, 69; 
 accepts Treasury appointment, 70; 
 opinions of Buchanan, 70, 71; 
 his famous telegram, 71; relations 
 with editor Bennett, 71; becomes 
 anti-Southern, 71 ; on the Holt- 
 Thompson feud, 82; letter to 
 Black, 122; letter of King to, 137 
 note 
 
 Douglas, Stephen A., U. S. Senator 
 (Illinois), and Kansas, 33; and the 
 English Bill, 34; effects of his 
 policy, 34, 35; signs of break with 
 Buchanan before Kansas trouble, 
 37; friends opposed by Slidell for 
 Buchanan's cabinet, 36; Floyd on, 
 62; supporters in Pennsylvania in 
 i860, 104 
 
INDEX 
 
 217 
 
 Dred Scott decision, 30; effect on 
 slavery, 31; on Republicans, 32 
 
 Drinkard, Col., of the War Depart- 
 ment, 59, 93 
 
 Election of i860, 130; Buchanan dis- 
 cusses, 141; holds no cause for se- 
 cession, 144; effects of, 65 
 England, attitude towards U. S., 187 
 English Bill, nature of, 33, 34; 
 Yancey on, 34; Claiborne on, 34 
 
 Faulkner, Charles J., U. S. Minister 
 to France, 55 
 
 Financial stringency in New York, 
 133; troubles and Anderson, 163; 
 conditions in New York, 1861 
 
 Fitzpatrick, Wm. Benjamin, U. S. 
 Senator (Alabama), 179, 180 
 
 Flinn, William, journalist, letter to 
 Buchanan, 16-18 
 
 Florida, secedes, 170 
 
 Floyd, John B., Secretary of War 
 1857-60, appointment of, 35; loyal 
 to Buchanan, 36; quarrels with 
 Black, 36; on Buchanan's attitude 
 towards the South, 19; on Walker 
 in Kansas, 48-50; illness, 54, 90; 
 on leave, 54, 55; letters of Bu- 
 chanan to, 56-57, 59; characterized, 
 89; as Secretary of War, 89; 
 spurns plot to abduct Buchanan, 
 89; charges against, refuted, 90; 
 the matter of "stolen arms," 90; 
 the Pittsburgh cannon episode, 90, 
 91; dislikes Meigs, 92; acceptances 
 issued by, 92, 93; and the DeGroot 
 claim, 92 note; leaves Washington 
 a poor man, 93; acts upheld by 
 Black in 1862, 93; cautioned by 
 Benjamin against the issuance of 
 acceptances, 93, 94; attitude of 
 Buchanan concerning acceptances, 
 93i 94; discusses issues of Novem- 
 ber with Buchanan, 130, 131; 
 diary of, 130, 131; appoints 
 
 Anderson to Moultrie, 155; in- 
 structions to Anderson, 96; uneasy 
 over the safety of the forts, 157 
 note; sends for Southern Senators, 
 151; favors convention of states, 
 131; opposed to coercion, 151 ; for 
 forbearance, 156; on Anderson's 
 move to Sumter, 97; resigns, 97; 
 held no secessionist, 98; opposes 
 secession publicly, 99; on coercion, 
 99 
 
 Forney, John W., journalist and Clerk 
 of the House, fails to receive 
 cabinet post, 36 
 
 Franklin, Benjamin, and Buchanan 
 compared, 12, 13 
 
 Franklin, Judge, of Pennsylvania, de- 
 fended by Buchanan, 5 
 
 Free-state men in Kansas, 28; decide 
 to vote, 35 
 
 France, and the South, 169 
 
 Fund, Indian Trust, 120 
 
 Gardiner, Col., replaced by Major 
 Anderson at Charleston, 155 
 
 Garrison, William Lloyd, abolitionist, 
 103 
 
 Georgia, and the federal government, 
 
 139 
 
 Glossbrenner, A. J., Secretary to the 
 President, 123 
 
 Government, of the United States, 
 one of consent, 145, 196; centraliza- 
 tion in, 201 ; a unique creation, 194 
 
 Greenwood, A. B., of Arkansas, 
 offered place in Buchanan's cabinet, 
 172, 173 note 
 
 Gwin, W. M., U. S. Senator (Cali- 
 fornia), on Douglas and the 
 English Bill, 34 
 
 Hale, John P., U. S. Senator (New 
 Hampshire), criticises Buchanan, 
 136 
 
 Hamilton, Alexander, statesman, on 
 State coercion, 134 
 
218 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Harding, Warren G., President of the 
 United States, death of, 114 note 
 Harney, General, in Kansas, 38 
 Harpers Ferry episode, 62, 63 
 Hayne, Col., Commissioner of Gover- 
 nor Pickens (S. C), arrives in 
 Washington, 153, 154, 180; Bu- 
 chanan's reply to, 180 
 Herald, New York, 155, 172 
 Historians, opinions of Buchanan, 2 
 Hodder, Frank H., professor, dis- 
 cusses the English Bill, 33, 34 
 Holt, Joseph, Postmaster General 
 1 8 59- 1 86 1, Secretary of War 1861, 
 first appointment, 35, 80, 81; 
 career of, 81 ; feud with Thompson, 
 121 ; charges against Thompson re- 
 futed, 115 note; hates Thompson, 
 82 ; on the draft of the message of 
 December i860, 133; opposes con- 
 vention of states, 131; on Cass' 
 resignation, 74 note; on "Black's 
 crisis," in, 112; on Stanton in the 
 cabinet, 76; did not offer resigna- 
 tion, 150 note; attitude towards 
 the Union, 121 and note; changes 
 ideas concerning events of 1 860-1, 
 84 notes; mentioned, 86; on Bu- 
 chanan's policy, 81, 82; becomes 
 anti-secessionist, 81; as Secretary 
 of War, instructs Anderson, 154; 
 requested to confer with Buchanan, 
 185; relations of, with Slidell, 81, 
 82; addressed by Buchanan, 167; 
 effect of his appointment as Secre- 
 tary of War upon the South, 177; 
 Buchanan writes to, on Sumter 
 and Scott, 177-179; Buchanan 
 drafts Holt's reply to Hayne, 180; 
 Buchanan questions Holt on in- 
 structions to Fort Monroe, 185; 
 wife dies, 113 
 Houston, General Samuel, desires 
 
 troops for Texas, 64 
 Hunker, faction of New York De- 
 mocracy, 32 
 
 Hunter, Robert M. T., U. S. Senator 
 (Virginia), 85; requested to come to 
 Washington, 135; and Buchanan, 
 136; and Sumter, 158, 165; warns 
 Trescot to notify Charleston to 
 defend itself, 165; wishes to avoid 
 collision, 171; and the S. C. Com- 
 missioners, 185 
 
 Immigrant Aid Society, 22 
 Interior Department, vacancy not 
 filled, 173 
 
 Jackson, Andrew, President of the 
 United States, compared with 
 Buchanan, 147 note, 148 note; and 
 Taney, 148 note; leader, 7 
 
 Jefferson, Thomas, President of the 
 United States, 142 note 
 
 Johnson, Albert S., General, 92 
 
 Johnson, Andrew, President of the 
 United States, and Stanton, 80 
 
 Judge, Thomas J., Confederate em- 
 issary, and federal property, 171 
 
 Judiciary Act, 25th section, defended 
 by Buchanan, 6 
 
 Judiciary Committee, Buchanan a 
 member of, 5 
 
 Kansas, anti-slavery historians on, 
 21; Southern attitude towards, 
 21, 22; Walker's policy in, 24, 25, 
 47-51; Stanton's policy in, 25; 
 party struggles, 23-25; organic act 
 of, 26; Democratic attitude to- 
 wards, 27; Free-state voters in, 
 28; atrocities in, 28, 38-47; ad- 
 ministration of Governor Denver, 
 28, 29; of Medary, 29; enters the 
 Union as a free state, 29; English 
 Bill concerning, 33, 34; rejected 
 by the voters, 35; conditions at 
 Fort Scott, 38-47; plot on the 
 question of the LeCompton con- 
 stitution denied, 52; South and, on 
 the matter of slavery, 54; famine 
 in, 135 note. See LeCompton 
 
INDEX 
 
 219 
 
 Kelley, Moses, acts as Secretary of 
 Interior, 173 note 
 
 King, Horatio, Postmaster General 
 1 861, opposes the course of the 
 "Constitution," 83; holds an office 
 under Lincoln, 83; becomes anti- 
 Southern, 83; writes of Buchanan, 
 83, 84; on Buchanan's attitude on 
 secession, 137 note 
 
 Lancaster, Pennsylvania, welcomes 
 the return of Buchanan, 188 
 
 Lane, Harriet, niece of Buchanan, 
 First Lady of the Land during his 
 administration, 7, 8; presides at 
 the White House, 191 
 
 Lane, Joseph, candidate for Vice- 
 President, i860, 58, 59 
 
 Lane, Jim, anti-slavery leader in 
 Kansas, 32, 39, 41-44 
 
 LeCompton convention, 23; quarrels 
 with Walker, 24; Calhoun presid- 
 ing officer of, 51, 52 
 
 LeCompton constitution, struggle for 
 acceptance, 26, 28, fails, 34, 35; 
 charge of a plot concerning, denied, 
 52 
 
 Lee, Robert E., Colonel (later Con- 
 federate General), instructions to, 
 63; in same position as Thompson 
 on allegiance, 117 
 
 Lincoln, Abraham, President of the 
 United States, 103, 104; policy of, 
 106; Thompson friend of, 121; 
 Buchanan and Lincoln's election, 
 141 ; election of, and secession, 144; 
 construes the Militia Acts, 144, 145; 
 inauguration of, 187; Buchanan 
 rides with, 188, 189 and note; a 
 mystic, 189 note; orders troops 
 South, 200 
 
 Longstreet, Judge Augustus, of South 
 Carolina, notified of expedition to 
 Charleston, 121 
 
 "The Lost Cause," 2 
 
 Louisiana, situation in, 171 
 
 Lyons, Lord, British Minister to the 
 United States, 1 1 
 
 Macalaster, C. M., financier, to 
 Buchanan on New York conditions, 
 172 
 
 McClure, Alexander Kelley, politician 
 and editor, on the content of 
 Buchanan's first draft of his note 
 to the S. C. Commissioners, 163, 164 
 
 Madison, James, statesman, and 
 President of the United States, 
 ideas of, defied, 200 
 
 Martin, Henry L., clerk in the 
 Department of Interior, 52 
 
 Maryland, conditions in, 169; politics 
 in, 171 
 
 Mallory, U. S. Senator (Florida), 
 158, 179, 188 
 
 Mason, James M., U. S. Senator 
 (Virginia), approves withdrawal of 
 Hayne's note, 154; summoned to 
 Washington, 135; and Buchanan, 
 136 
 
 Mason, John Y., American Minister 
 to Paris, 18, 19 
 
 Meigs, Captain, dislikes Floyd, 92 
 
 Message of December i860 (Buchan- 
 an's), 130, 131; discussed in cab- 
 inet, 133, 137; review of, 140; 
 Curtis on, 140 
 
 Message of January 8, 1861 (Bu- 
 chanan's), cabinet and, 174 
 
 Mexico, in i860, 147 
 
 Militia Acts, Buchanan construes, 
 strictly, 144, 145 
 
 Missouri Compromise, 16, 22 
 
 Moore, John Bassett, Judge and 
 diplomat, 12 
 
 Moore, Governor, of Alabama, to 
 Buchanan, 168 
 
 Mormons, expedition against, 92 
 
 Morrill tariff, 186; Stanton and 
 Buchanan differ concerning, 79 
 
 Moultrie, Fort, 1 16; Anderson leaves, 
 157. See Anderson and Sumter 
 
220 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Napoleon, Louis, Emperor of France, 
 
 187 
 Natural Rights philosophy, discussed 
 
 by Buchanan, 193 
 Navy. See Toucey 
 New England, Buchanan unpopular 
 
 in, 19 
 New York, Governor of, tenders aid, 
 
 169; and ratification of the federal 
 
 constitution, 200 
 Non-coercion, Buchanan holds doc- 
 trine of, 196; and the border 
 
 states, 173 
 North, aroused by the firing on Fort 
 
 Sumter, 187; driven to war, 200 
 North Carolina, visit of Thompson to, 
 
 December i860, 119, 120 
 
 "Old Fogies," 59 
 
 Opinion, Northern radical, resisted 
 
 by Buchanan, 186 
 Oregon, troubles in, 64 
 Orr, James L. , Speaker of the House, 61 
 
 Parker, Col., Virginia politician, 144 
 
 Patronage, in 1856, 9 
 
 Peace and war sentiment, December 
 i860, 147, 148 
 
 Peace Conference, initiated by Vir- 
 ginia, 182, 185 and note 
 
 Peck, Judge, impeachment of, 5 
 
 Pennsylvania, Democrats in 1856, 10; 
 election of i860 in, 57; politics and 
 issues in, 8, 9 
 
 Pensacola, conditions at, 171 
 
 "Personal Liberty Laws," Buchanan's 
 opinion of, 143, 144; repeal of, 
 asked, 170 
 
 Pickens, Francis, Governor of South 
 Carolina, and Col. Hayne's mission 
 to Washington, 153, 180; and 
 Anderson, 156, 182 and note; 
 Buchanan replies to, 155 
 
 Pierce, Franklin, President of the 
 United States, 11 ; army bill, 162 
 note. 
 
 Pittsburgh, cannon incident, 155 
 
 Polk, James K., President of the 
 United States, 7; death of, 114 
 
 Pollard, E. A., author and editor, dis- 
 likes Davis and Buchanan, 130 note 
 
 President, powers of, Thompson on. 
 175 
 
 Pro-slavery group in Kansas, 23 
 
 Pryor, Roger A., Congressman and 
 editor, visited by Cass, 72 
 
 Pryor, Mrs. Roger A., notifies Bu- 
 chanan of the secession of South 
 Carolina, 155; quotes Buchanan, 
 160 
 
 Quakers, 188 
 
 Ramsey, J. G. W., letter to Buchanan, 
 
 170 
 Ratification of constitutions in the 
 
 South, 25 
 Rawle, Mr., lawyer and writer, cited 
 
 by Buchanan, 132; on secession, 
 
 195, 196 
 Reconstruction, hope for, expressed, 
 
 170 
 Reed, William, author, lawyer, dip- 
 lomat, 11, 12 
 Republicans, and the Dred Scott case, 
 
 32; Buchanan on Kansas and, 34; 
 
 press of, makes trouble in Kansas, 
 
 39, 43, 44; policy criticised, 41, 43; 
 
 solicit sympathy in the East, 42; 
 
 lack power, 200; said to desire 
 
 war, 168; blamed by Buchanan for 
 
 troubles of the country, 140, 148; 
 
 said to be allies of Buchanan, 177; 
 
 divisions of, 185, 186 
 Resolutions, Virginia and Kentucky, 
 
 142 note 
 Revolution, Buchanan holds country 
 
 in a state of, 177 
 Revolution of 1789, 146 
 Rhett, Barnwell, editor and politician, 
 
 on relation of federal government 
 
 and South Carolina, 139 
 
INDEX 
 
 221 
 
 Richmond Enquirer, Floyd article in, 
 99 
 
 Rights, Southern constitutional, sus- 
 tained by Buchanan, 14, 15, 18, 19, 
 29, 31; William Crump on, 53; 
 Buchanan willing to restore, 186 
 
 Roosevelt, Mrs. Cornelia, to Bu- 
 chanan, 168 
 
 Russel, Majors & Waddell, con- 
 tractors, 93 
 
 Saint Louis, arsenal at, 169 
 
 Schell, Augustus, Collector of the 
 Port of New York, 112 
 
 Schofield, General, and Stanton, 79 
 
 Scott, Sir Walter, author, influence 
 on the South, 32 
 
 Scrugham, Miss Mary, historian, 
 "Peaceable Americans," cited, 147 
 
 Seceded states and the federal govern- 
 ment, 139 
 
 Secession, Black on, 102; Judge 
 Woodward on, 105, 106; discussed 
 in the cabinet, 155; and the title 
 to the forts at Charleston, 152; Se- 
 cession of S. C. announced to Bu- 
 chanan, 155; disagrees with Davis 
 on, 136; talks with King concern - 
 in S> l 37 note; relation of, to 
 Lincoln's election, 141; Anderson 
 on, 154, 155, 156; Buchanan cites 
 Jackson and Madison on, 141 ; holds 
 it revolution, 143; concerned 
 over, in 1856, 144; the Virginia 
 Resolution and, 142 note; Bu- 
 chanan on, 135 note; opposed to, 
 163 ; Buchanan advised by Thomp- 
 son concerning, 174-176; argued 
 by Davis, 196; Buchanan replies 
 to Davis, 196, 197; Buchanan 
 questions Black concerning, 195 
 
 Senators, United States, cabinet 
 jealous of, 127; Buchanan parts 
 company with Southern, 127; im- 
 portune Buchanan, 128; and An- 
 derson, 158; effects of policy, 165 
 
 Separation, peaceful, urged by 
 Thompson, 176 
 
 Sectionalism, Buchanan would de- 
 stroy, 31 
 
 Seward, William H., U. S. Senator 
 (New York), 13, 103; on Walker's 
 intentions in Kansas, 23; and 
 Judge Campbell, 87; cooperates 
 with Stanton, 79; opposes coercion, 
 148; policy of, 189; suggests call 
 on Buchanan, 177 
 
 Sherman, John, Congressman, visits 
 Buchanan, 189 
 
 Sickles, Daniel, Congressman, makes 
 propaganda on Sumter issue, 160; 
 opposes cancellation of Washing- 
 ton's Birthday parade, 185 
 
 Slave revolts, 140 note 
 
 Slavery, in the territories, 16-18; 
 Buchanan on, in 1826, 14; Bu- 
 chanan does not seek slavery in 
 Kansas, 28; Buchanan on, in i860, 
 141; Buchanan hopes for gradual 
 abolition of, 17 
 
 Slidell, John, U. S. Senator (Louisi- 
 ana), 8; opposed to Douglas, 36; 
 aids in selection of Buchanan's 
 cabinet, 35; urges the selection of 
 Toucey, 36; relations with Holt, 
 81, 82; mentioned, 126; and 
 Col. Hayne, 154; to Buchanan, 
 168, 171 
 
 South, and the election of 1856, 10; 
 excitement in, over Kansas, 32; 
 Buchanan defends, 140; Buchanan 
 does not look to Southern independ- 
 ence, 146; owes Buchanan grati- 
 tude, 168; asks for justice, 196; 
 claims on Buchanan, 169; de- 
 ceived Buchanan, 112; relations 
 cool with Buchanan, 177, 186; 
 criticised by Buchanan, 186; Bu- 
 chanan would restore rights of, 187; 
 blames Lincoln for the war, 200; 
 cause of Buchanan's attitude to- 
 wards, 201 
 
222 
 
 INDEX 
 
 South Carolina, 91 note; problem of 
 clearing vessels at Charleston, 102; 
 Buchanan on the situation at 
 Charleston, 118; Jackson and, 148; 
 announces secession, 155; situa- 
 tion in i860, 156; federal property 
 in, 180; warned by Buchanan, 197 
 note 
 
 Sovereignty, State, Black on, 102; 
 mentioned, 2, 18 
 
 Spheres of government, Buchanan on, 
 194 
 
 Stanton, Mr., Secretary, and acting 
 Governor of Kansas, policy of, 25 
 
 Stanton, Edwin McMasters, Attorney 
 General of the United States, 1860- 
 61, Buchanan to, 63, 64, 66; in- 
 trigues of, 70, 79; and Lincoln, 79, 
 80; suggested for the place of 
 Postmaster General, 80; character- 
 ized, 74 and note, 80; career prior 
 to appointment of Attorney Gen- 
 eral, 75; reasons for appointment 
 °f 1 75> J 33 note; and Buchanan's 
 message of i860; 75, 133; Weed's 
 account of, 75, 77; Black on, 78 
 note; Thomas on, 77; little in- 
 fluence with Buchanan, 78; and 
 Black, 78; biographers on, 77; and 
 Anderson, 178; and Anderson's 
 instructions, 158; creates propa- 
 ganda on Sumter issue, 160; aids 
 Black in reply to S. C. Commis- 
 sioners, no, in, 163 
 
 "Star of the West," The, sent, 167; 
 Buchanan not responsible for its 
 selection, 179; causes Thompson's 
 resignation, 121, 124; return of, re- 
 quested, 170. See Sumter 
 
 State of Nature, discussed by Bu- 
 chanan, 193 
 
 States Rights, attacked, 133; creed 
 of the Democracy, 195; cause of 
 decline of, 201 ; dominant creed of 
 the middle period, 2; men in 
 Buchanan's cabinet, 37 
 
 States, place of, in federal system, 194 
 
 Sumner, Charles, U. S. Senator (Mas- 
 sachusetts), intrigues with Stanton, 
 79 
 
 Sumter, Fort, Buchanan and Floyd 
 discuss, 149, 150; reinforcements 
 for, 122, 123, 173; Black on re- 
 enforcements, 102 note; expedition 
 to, 182; title to, 151, 180; and 
 Cass' resignation, 154 and note; 
 question of a pledge concerning, 
 I5 2 , 153, 157 note, 164, 165, 178, 
 181; situation at Charleston, 149, 
 150; Buchanan's policy, 182, 183; 
 refuses to surrender forts, 155; 
 orders reinforcements, 173; denies 
 pledge, 178; warns S. C. that an 
 attack means war, 180; would send 
 aid if needed, 181 ; Anderson moves 
 into Sumter, 156, 157; effect of, on 
 Black, 112; effect on Georgia, 173; 
 on Washington, 158; Southern 
 congressmen and, 152; Buchanan 
 urged to evacuate the fort, 170; 
 relation of the problem to the 
 Peace Convention, 183-185; re- 
 view of Buchanan's policy on, 178, 
 179; effect of attacks on, on the 
 North, 187; on Buchanan, 197; on 
 the Northern Democrats, 200 
 
 Supreme Court, and slavery in the 
 territories, 30; and Southern rights, 
 187 
 
 Supreme law clause of the Constitu- 
 tion, interpretations of, 141, 142, 
 147 
 
 Taney, Roger B., Chief Justice of the 
 
 United States Supreme Court, aids 
 
 Jackson, 48 note 
 Tariff, 170, 172, 186 
 Tennessee, conditions in i860, 137 
 
 note 
 Territories, Buchanan foresees trouble 
 
 in, 22 
 Thomas, Philip F., Secretary of 
 
INDEX 
 
 223 
 
 Treasury, 1 860-61, appointment of, 
 67; real cause of resignation, 68; 
 constitutional doctrines of, 69; 
 on Stanton and Buchanan, 77; on 
 Black and Stanton, 100; on the 
 return of the note of the S. C. Com- 
 missioners, 165; on the preparation 
 of the message of January 8th, 174 
 
 Thompson, Jacob, Secretary of In- 
 terior, appointment of, 35; on Cass' 
 resignation, 73, 74; denies part in 
 a plot concerning LeCompton con- 
 stitution, 52; career as Secretary 
 of Interior, 53; on appointment of 
 Holt, 80; on Black,. 101; defended 
 by Black, 120; ignorant of Black's 
 intention of resignation, 78 note, 
 120; characteristics, 115; letter to 
 S. W. Crawford concerning his 
 part in the cabinet, 116, 117; un- 
 popular in the North, 115; on 
 the cabinet and Fort Sumter, 116; 
 error in regard to Stanton, 120; a 
 cooperationist, 118, 119; visits 
 North Carolina, 118; discusses al- 
 legiance, 117; resignation of, 116, 
 I2 3» !73; replies concerning Davis' 
 influence on Buchanan's message of 
 i860, 133; notices change in the 
 note to the S. C. Commissioners, 
 164; discusses non-coercion, in- 
 fluence of, 115; favors a convention 
 of states, 131; advises Buchanan, 
 174-176 
 
 Toombs, Robert, U. S. Senator 
 (Georgia), 168; requests informa- 
 tion on Anderson, 173 
 
 Topeka, government, 22, 32 
 
 Toucey, Isaac, Secretary of Navy, 
 letter of Buchanan to, 22; appoint- 
 ment of, 36; mentioned, 66; and 
 resignation of Cass, 74 note; Black 
 on, 112; career of, 84, 85 ; not a se- 
 cessionist, 84, 85; favors a con- 
 vention of states, 131; supports 
 Buchanan's policy regarding Sum- 
 
 ter, 85, 165; naval policy of, 85; 
 criticised by Congress, 86 note; 
 planned relief for Sumter, 86, 87; 
 discusses same, 123; on draft of 
 Buchanan's message, 133; warns 
 Buchanan of Black's intention to 
 resign, no; called to conference on 
 naval matters, 184; a spirited 
 Democrat, 86, 88; persecuted dur- 
 ing the war, 88 
 
 Toucey, Mrs. Isaac, letter to Miss 
 Lane concerning Buchanan, 89 
 
 Trescot, Wm. H., Assistant Secretary 
 of State, 91, 96 note; his "Narra- 
 tive " evaluated, 149 note; on 
 Buchanan and secession, 139 note; 
 on Toombs and the secession of 
 Georgia, 173; concerning pledge re- 
 garding Sumter, 153; remonstrates 
 with Buchanan on the move of 
 Anderson, 158, 165; and Hayne's 
 note, 153; telegraphs Governor 
 Pickens, 154 
 
 Tribune, New York, says Buchanan 
 is insane, 155; shifts policy to 
 coercion, 173 note 
 
 Tyler, faction in Virginia, 36 
 
 Tyler, Lyon G., historian, on Bu- 
 chanan and Sumter, 161 
 
 Tyler, John, President of the United 
 States, heads Virginia peace delega- 
 tion, 182; protests parade, 185 
 
 Tyler, Mrs. John, quoted, 182 
 
 Union, Federal, 17; Buchanan would 
 save, 31; the Civil War fatal to, 
 199; destroyed in 1861, 197; one 
 of consent, 145; devotion of Bu- 
 chanan to, 166 
 
 Utah, war in, 42, 43 
 
 Virginia, in 1856, 9; and Kansas 
 issue, 53, 54; would mediate in 
 1861, 108 
 
 Walker, Robert J., Governor of Kan- 
 
224 
 
 INDEX 
 
 sas, career of, 22 ; appointment of, 
 22; not pleased with Buchanan's 
 appointees in Kansas, 23; trouble 
 with LeCompton group, 24; and 
 the Oxford returns, 24; political 
 ambitions of, 25; accuses the cabi- 
 net of plotting against him, 25; 
 received by Buchanan, 25. See 
 Kansas 
 
 War, discussed, 199 
 
 Washington, George, mentioned, 169 
 
 Washington, troops at, 185 note 
 
 Webster, Daniel, statesman, men- 
 tioned, 13, 201 
 
 Weed, Thurlow, politician and jour- 
 nalist, publishes an erroneous ac- 
 count of a cabinet scene in Bu- 
 chanan's administration, 75, 76 
 
 Woodward, George W., Pennsylvania 
 Judge, letter to Black, 104-106 
 
 West Point, 196 
 
 White, Andrew D., diplomat, on 
 Buchanan, 10, 11 
 
 Wigfal, U. S. Senator (Texas), plans 
 to abduct Buchanan, 89 
 
 Williams, J. W., Judge in Kansas, 
 letters to Buchanan concerning 
 affairs in Kansas, 38-47; opposes 
 policies of Republicans in Kansas, 
 42 ; fears civil war, 47 
 
 Wilmont, David, Congressman and 
 Senator, opposed by Buchanan, 17 
 
 Wilson, Henry, U. S. Senator (Mas- 
 sachusetts), and the English Bill, 
 33 
 
 Wilson, Woodrow, President of the 
 United States, death of, 114 note 
 
 Wisconsin, fugitive slave case in, 143 
 
 Wise, A. Jennings, editor, letter to 
 Buchanan, 52; mentioned, 177 
 
 Wise, Henry A., political leader, aids 
 Buchanan in 1856, 8; aids in 
 selecting Buchanan's cabinet, 35; 
 mentioned, 52, 58, 59, 62 
 
 Yulee, U. S. Senator (Florida), 158 
 
I 
 
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