I J*.**.- ■■ b fift #8 ' I I * REFORM IN PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS: 4 HOUSE OF LORDS. BY W. RATHBONE, M.P. WITH A LETTER FROM The Rt. Hon. Sir T. DYKE ACLAND, Bart., M.P. 3 Honfcon : CHAPMAN AND HALL, Limited ii, Henrietta Street. 1884. REFORM IN PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS-HOUSE OF LORDS. The accompanying Paper, reprinted at the suggestion of Sir Thomas Acland whose letter is prefixed, appeared first in the October number of the Fortnightly Review of 1881. It originally followed one on the Reform of Parliamentary Business in the House of Commons, and was prompted by no crisis or dispute between the two Houses, but simply in the interest of improved efficiency in legislation and debate. It is hoped that it may call forth suggestions for changes, which may bring the Upper House more into harmony with the wishes and opinions of the Country, and enable it, without violating its convictions, to share in the excessive and increasing labours of Parliament. W. EATHBONE. 18, Princes Gardens, London, July 1884. ?, Upper Belgrave Street, July 22, r&&4>. Dear Rathboue, If I may without presumption make the suggestion, I think that you would render a public service by re-printing your Article on the House of Lords, which appeared in 1881. That A rticle appeared at a time of special political excite- ment, and did not attract the attention which it deserved. You t>ut very clearly the tzvo defects in the Constitution of the Upper House : — 1st., That it includes a number of gentlemen who do not take interest in public affairs propor- tionate to their hereditary social position. 2ndly. — That the House of Lords lacks one condition of influence in that it is not in touch with the people at large. Whether your suggestions for the remedy of these defects are free from serious objections I will not say. The only objection I heard to your plan was that it would make the Upper House too powerful. If L remember right tliere are two points which you do not touch upon : — The obligation on a Member of the House of Commons who is heir to a Peerage, to vacate his seat ; and the fact that Liberal Scotch Peers are practically disqualified for any seat in the Legislature. I remember how keenly my friend Lord Elgin felt the fact that he belonged to a dis- franchised class. I hope you may be encouraged by others whose opinion is entitled to more weight than mine, to give wide circulation to your Article. Yours sincerely, T. D. ACLAND. REFORM IN PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS. The House of Lords. {Reprinted from the Fortnightly Review, October, 1881.) The present article is intended to be a continuation of that on the business of Parliament which appeared in the Fortnightly Review. That article sought to investigate the means which would enable the House of Commons to do its work more thoroughly ; this proposes to examine the means whereby the House of Lords may attain the same object. As things now stand, the Peers are in a position satisfactory neither to themselves nor to the nation. Possessing, as it will be allowed that many of them do, a large share of political ability, they yet complain, and not without reason, that they have little to do. The country, on the other hand, is heard to murmur that if the Lords have little to do, they fail to perform that little well ; that they so deal with measures originated in their House as to lay on the Commons the burthen of doing everything over again ; that they are not in accord with contemporary thought, as expressed in the majority of general elections ; that in consequence of all these failings, they do more to hinder than to help or guide legislation. The complaints of both parties are consistent with each other and with truth ; and it is worth endeavouring to meet them by certain changes in the organization of the Upper House. What it is proposed to accomplish sensible men of all parties agree in desiring, and it may be accomplished by reforms at once 6 Reform in Parliamentary Business* Conservative and Liberal, since the durability of an institu- tion must in our time be measured by its efficiency. It is not necessary to inquire whether the principle of an hered- itary Chamber can be justified in speculation, or to divine its fate in the constitutional history of a remote future. It is enough that in living England there works in its favour a strong sentiment, or, if you will, an inveterate prejudice. Every one is aware of the preference obtained by youthful members of the nobility in Elections to the House of Commons, and of the monopoly which they may be said to possess of an early entrance into that assembly. Such an attitude as the Peers for a time assumed with regard to their amendments on the Irish Land Act of the late session, such a temper as they displayed in their rejection of the Irish Registration Bill of the session before, may seem de- signed to court destruction ; for in both cases they betrayed a want, of that dignity and wisdom so indispensableJn an Upper Chamber. But they may rest well assured that, if they do not commit suicide, they need not fear speedy abolition. To abolish is not the English political method. The necessity is urgent. We are at this moment engaged in a struggle almost for very life with other nations, who in becoming free have also become vigorous, intelligent, and progressive. We must put forth all our strength if we are to maintain our rank in commerce, manufactures, and agri- culture, as well as that which is most precious, our proud place as the model of free and beneficent institutions. We cannot suffer any member of the Constitution, whether for a short or long period, to remain defective and crippled. The House of Lords exists; has root in the national feeling ; how can it attain its due efficacy as a part of the legislature ? This problem must be solved by such reforms as will fur- nish the House with that practical information, those oppor- tunities, and those powers without which it cannot do its work, and which it does not now possess ; by such reforms as Reform in Parliamentary Business. J will establish a more constant and intimate connection between itself as legislating and those who have to admin- ister and obey the laws, and thus impart to it a more active sympathy with the interests, feelings, desires, and hopes of the great body of the nation. The Lords do not now debate the Bills laid on their table in such a manner as either to draw the attention or educate the opinion of the country. They do not derive from those whom the laws under con- sideration most affect the suggestions necessary to make laws practical. They resist without sympathy, they yield without conviction, and therefore with infinite loss of self- respect, and of legitimate influence. It is in reference to reforms for Ireland that their action has been most unwise and most unfortunate. Mr. Escott, in the main their panegyrist, says in his interesting book on England, vol. ii, p. 190: " In 1869 the Liberal majority in the House of Commons could have carried absolute fixity of tenure in the Irish Land Act, but it was known that the House of Lords, as an assemblage of landowners, would not submit to such a clause, and it was consequently deemed impracticable to pursue the idea." Whilst a more severe critic, the author of the pamphlet entitled " Fifty Years of the House of Lords," produces a formidable list of instances in which the Lords, either by direct action or by indirect influence, delayed remedial measures so long, that when they came, they came too late to conciliate Ireland or to re- but the charge that they were extorted by sedition. He observes, p. 14, "that no small portion of the difficulties of Irish government have arisen from the inability of the English people to secure the acceptance of just laws for Ire- land by the House of Lords, until long after the opportunity had passed when concession might have been efficacious in removing discontent." And the keenest opponent of English rule in Ireland glories in the thought that concessions which would have once been accepted as a settlement probably 8 Reform in Parliamentct7y Business. now come too late. Mr. Dillon, as reported in the Standard of August 29th, expressed himself thus concerning the second Irish Land Act: "He wished it to be distinctly understood that he never said this Bill would not confer immense benefits on the Irish people, benefits which their fathers in 1852 would have thought invaluable, and would have thanked their oppressors for having given, though, thank God, they stood now in different times." Thus it should seem that the action of the Peers relative to Irish questions has done as much to forward the views of those who aim at the separation, as to thwart the wishes of those who would preserve the union of the two kingdoms. As the Lords are now constituted, they do not so much legislate as register, and often with a bad grace, the decrees of the House of Commons. But a Second Chamber should do more than record the resolutions of the First ; it should complete and harmonise the whole of legislation. In order to do this it must be capable of a lively and intelligent sympathy with the nation at large ; and we cannot too often repeat that the creation of this sympathy should be the reformer's prime object. In the solution of our present problem let us begin by trying to conceive clearly the ends which should be sub- served by a Second Chamber. We shall then be able to see how far the House of Lords at present attains those ends, and how far it stands in need of reform. Roughly speaking, the ends for which a Second Chamber should exist are three. (1.) To check impulsive legislation. In this country Parliament seldom decides on great questions which have not been long agitated in the country. Yet its final deci- sion is often given in haste and excitement. As now constituted, the House of Lords only aggravates the evil. Often it opposes from the mere habit of opposition ; and by an unwise and pettish negative inflames the people in- Reform in Parliamentary Business. 9 stead of teaching it to reflect. This is the more to be regretted because the leisured class, the informal constitu- ency of a Second Chamber, are precisely those who could and should look furthest into the future, and should b^ least tempted to seek immediate advantages by means ultimately mischievous. (2.) To be a lasting guard against laws passed to satisfy an interested and active minority of the nation. Such a minority may be powerful enough to turn the scale of elec- tions in which the two great parties are almost evenly balanced. It may then impose its wishes upon a reluctant majority. To prevent such a misfortune is a most import- ant function of the Second Chamber. How important will be understood by all who have watched the working of American politics during the last forty years ; who have seen how the need of conciliating compact and selfish minor- ities made it hard, at one time almost impossible, for an honest man to be a politician ; how large a share it had in making possible a growth of local taxation almost equiva- lent (as in the city of New York) to confiscation, and in making impossible the peaceable settlement of those difficul- ties which led to the great civil war. A House of Lords which should discharge this duty well and wisely would by that service alone fully justify its existence. (3.) To assist the First Chamber in elaborating the details of measures. An Upper House may do this either by pre- paring measures in the first instance for subsequent consideration by the Lower, or by itself revising measures which have come thence. For reasons to be stated presently, the House of Lords, as it now stands, cannot properly dis- charge this office. These functions the House of Lords can never discharge as it should until it feels more confidence in its own strength, and inspires more belief in its own practical knowledge. As an instrument of legislation it labours under two capita] io Reform in Parliamentary Business. weaknesses. In the first place it does not bring to its delib- erations either the command of detail or the feeling of responsibility for labour so needed in a legislator ; in the second place it is often out of harmony with the House of Commons and with public opinion. The second of these evils attracts more attention and excites more ill-will ; but the first, as no less important and too much neglected, must first and chiefly engage us here. In order that the aristocracy and the House of Lords may render that service to the community by which alone they can justify to a democratic age their continued exist- ence, they must adopt a better division of labour. So long as men inherit legislative power there must be some law- givers who have neither inclination nor aptitude for their task. Such men may in many ways do good and exert in- fluence ; for a nobility is not limited to purely political functions. They may be generous landlords, benefactors of their neighbourhood, examples of cultivation and refine- ment, graceful leaders of county society, and active partakers in county administration ; but they can scarcely be efficient members of a legislative assembly. They have not undergone the discipline of a laborious political appren- ticeship. They are not familiar with the vast complexity of interests affected by almost all important measures. When they hasten to swell the numbers of a momentous division, they too often do so under an excitement which affords no time for reflection. Too often they are led by unwise and impetuous leaders into positions dangerous to their own order, embarrassing to everybody else, impossible to be maintained with dignity, or abandoned without peril. If, then, the House of Lords is to be efficient for legislation, such of its members as are more fitted for other functions should not be forced to take part in labours which they decline to execute with care. As for that large body of Peers who are really able and eager Reform in Parliaiizentary Business. 1 1 to legislate, if we are to get the full benefit of their states- manlike qualities, we must place them in more intimate correspondence with their fellow-citizens, and awaken in them a more lively feeling of responsibility. All fair observers will allow that, in the present position of affairs, the Lords have no adequate inducement or opportunity to show what they can perform. One of the most eloquent of living orators, in answer to the complaint that the Lords did not debate sufficiently in Committee the Bills originat- ing in their House, admitted the fact most frankly. He said that, except on a few full-dress debates, he always felt that he was considered a bore if he spoke for more than a very few minutes, and that his hearers were thinking less of what he was saying than of their imperilled dinner. And if this is the case with one capable of enchaining his hearers, what must be the feeling of able but less eloquent Peers who, though they may be practically acquainted with evils and can show how those evils may be cured, can only impart to their subject the charm of matter-of-fact clearness. Yet such men are amongst the most useful any legislature can possess. The attendance in the House of Lords is generally small. The debates, for the most part mere conversations, are short, informal, and, therefore, not easy to be comprehended by the public. No wonder that the nation cares little about discussions in which the speakers themselves seem uninter- ested. Even those who most chafe against the general in- activity in time come to feel its spell. In the Lower House most able members of the Upper have been formed. But how many promising public men have been spoilt or buried by an early transference from the House where they had by toil to win and keep the public esteem to that House in which they were not constrained to do either ; to that House where industry could find no field, and labour could reap no fruit ; to that House which Lord Beaconsfield in 12 Reform in Parliamentary Business. one of his happiest touches likened to the restful Elysian Fields. Were the House of Lords much more diligent than it can ever be under the present system, it would find all its efforts hampered for want of information. That its mem- bers, as compared with those of the Lower House, have in their own persons a less varied experience of men and affairs,, is but the least part of their misfortune. The worst is, that they have no constituents. Men who are born to riches and honour are not always born to that sympathy with their fellows which is the key to true knowledge. Their best chance of becoming acquainted with the common man is the necessity of conciliating his good opinion. From that necessity the Peers are exempt. But in not having constit- uents they lose much more than this. They have to make laws without being able to derive knowledge from those whom the laws will affect. Laws as first conceived by the legislator are no more applicable to practice than mechanical contrivances as they first flash on the mind of the inventor. By the suggestions of those who have to use the machine and obey the law, both the one and the other are adapted to our necessities. Those interested in the subject receive from their representative printed copies of the Bill, read the debates, and from their practical experience furnish sugges- tions for its amendment, which, in turn, undergo the scrutiny of the House. Thus he who sits in the House of Commons for an important constituency has the benefit of all that his constituents know and feel on matters of importance. Some- times, no doubt he may receive more information than he can use. He may be vexed with contradictory or meaning- less counsel. But, if he does his duty as a representative, he undergoes a compulsory education eminently calculated to fit him for legislating. Provided with special knowledge, he can discuss great measures in a fruitful manner ; what he says is criticised by men of varied experience ; and if he Reform in Parliamentary Business. 13 does not do justice to the interests of his constituents, they are only too ready to murmur, and, if necessary, to cashier him. Every Bill laid on the table of the House of Commons finds members, who have the ability and the inducement, to improve it. Hence a constant canvassing of ideas which, by giving interest to the debates, makes them known to the public, and so indirectly as well as directly tends to their improvement. If this is so even now, much more will it be so when, by a better regulation of its business, the House is fully restored to self-respect and to the national confi- dence. But the Lords have no constituents to give them knowledge and to hold them answerable for the use of it. They have neither the special information nor the impulse to acquire it. And so long as this is the case, their discus- sions on legislation non-contentious, but important, cannot either fix the attention or advance the welfare of their countrymen. The attempt to originate and complete great measures in their House has generally failed, and will fail until they so debate details as to save th'e House of Commons the necessity of debating them all anew. Thus much concerning the one defect of the Upper House : the slight acquaintance of many of its members with the practical details of legislation and their unconscious- ness of an obligation to take pains. Of the other defect, a tendency to jar on the Lower House and on public opinion, we have no wish to say much, but we must say something. We need not fatigue our readers with a set proof of the proposition now familiar to everybody, that sovereignty, into however many parts it may be formally divided, must ever remain virtually one ; nor need we stop to explain how that Parliamentary system which fell in 1832 satisfied this requisite by giving to one class and to one interest the preponderance in both Chambers ; or to trace in detail how that interest remained supreme in the Upper House, whilst by repeated changes, it grew less powerful in the Lower. 14 Reform in Parliamentary Business. Since that old unity broke up, the House of Lords, as the representative of aristocracy, has at times been involved in hazardous conflict with the Lower as the representative of democracy, a struggle in which honourable victory is im- possible and honourable retreat scarcely less so. But the Houses of Parliament should not represent particular and sometimes hostile interests. Both alike should represent the general interests of the nation. The Upper and Lower Houses should be, not the several organs of two distinct wills, but different organs ofthe same will. One should be the complement of the other and not its antagonist. So long as the two Houses continue to be the symbols of conflicting forces collisions between them must occur. In these collisions the greater force must prevail, and the popular force, symbolised by the Lower House, overbalance the aristo- cratic force symbolised by the Upper. This does not imply the disappearance of the English nobility as leaders in public affairs ; still less that the advan- tages of rank, whether real or conventional, have ceased to ob- tain respect. Where the transition to democracy takes place in a gradual and peaceable manner, where the Commons are proud of their past and the nobles are alive to the necessities of the present, those who once ruled will always be admitted to serve the state. But their power will not rest on the same foundation nor be itself the same. It must repose, not on the inherited faith, but on the rational conviction of the people. It must be employed, not so much to command as to guide them. Not in resisting, but in enlightening their will must it be principally manifested. The common people of all countries are only too jealous of merit in their own ranks. Englishmen are easily led by those whom they are accustomed to respect. But the nobility of England will only continue to lead if they cease to be merely obstruc- tive. To disdain influencing or leading those to whom you can no longer dictate, would be the height of petulant folly. Reform in Parliamentary Business. 15 To influence others is only possible on condition of under- standing and of sympathising with their feelings and ideas. Does the staunchest Conservative expect long life and use- fulness for the weaker Chamber when often clashing with the stronger. In such a posture of affairs does he find a school of liberality for the nobles or of deference for the Commons ? Or does he think that the Peers act agreeably either with their own dignity, the interests of legislation, or the public repose, when they refuse with arrogance what the next moment they with weakness surrender? If the failings of the House of Lords, under its present constitution, be such as above described, it will be readily conceived that the question of remedying these defects is a pressing one and within the range of practical politics. In all reforms of consequence we should, as far as possible, be guided by two principles : firstly, that of innovating only so far as is necessary to attain our end ; and secondly, that of following, wherever it can be done, the lessons of our own or of other men's experience. It is to the test of* these princi- ples that we should bring the proposals already made for a reform of the House of Lords. Sir David Wedderburn, in an article upon Second Cham- bers which appeared in the Nineteenth Century for July, gives as his opinion that " nomination for life or for a fixed period, by responsible ministers of the Crown, seems to be the best method hitherto invented for recruiting a senate which shall be in general harmony with popular sentiments, but superior to any transient popular impulse." But in order to effect the desired end life peers must be nominated in great numbers, and even then, entering a House which as a whole remained in isolation, they would be more likely to imbibe than transform its to spirit. I think that in writing this sentence Sir David Wedderburn can hardly have recol- lected that the Senate of the United States, the most effect- ive Second Chamber in the world, is not nominated but 1 6 Reform in Parliamentary Business. elected by the State Legislatures, and is wonderfully supe- rior, not only to them, but also to the national House of Representatives ; that it is the best-contrived and most suc- cessful part of the Constitution, and has frequently saved America from inconsiderate action, maintaining itself under a most democratic Government, and under severe strains. The experience of America seems to prove that secondary election is the best and simplest method of recruiting a Second Chamber. The country wishes to maintain a Second Chamber ; it also wishes to open it to the spirit of our time. It does not expect that it should change its views at every election, but it does expect that it should change them in accord with the gradual and irrevocable movement of national thought. For the attainment of these objects might not something, be done in the following manner ? Let the Peerage retain all that it now enjoys of rank and precedence, but let it appropriate to its diverse functions the diverse abilities of its members. Let it leave them free, if they so prefer, not to undertake the duty of making laws. Let all Peerages of the United Kingdom, as do now Peerages of the Scotch and Irish kingdoms, confer, not a seat in the House of Lords, but the capacity of filling such a seat. Let the House of Commons elect those Peers who shall actually sit ; but not elect them all at once or in the ordinary manner. Of their total number, let each successive House of Commons elect by the cumulative vote one-third, say fifty Peers, who shall sit during three Parliaments, a period, on the average, of fifteen years. We might reserve to the Ministers the power of nominating a limited number of eminent civil and military servants of the Crown to sit in the Upper House either for life or for a term of three par- liaments. The present law-lords would, of course, retain their seats. Finally, in order to connect the House of Lords with the nation and its whole system of local government, Reform in Parliamentary Business. 17 we might add the Chairmen of the new County boards, when these last shall have been established. As the United Kingdom contains one hundred and fourteen counties, of which some might be grouped and others divided for pur- poses of administration, we may compute the number of Chairmen as about equal to the number of counties. Adding these to the one hundred and fifty elected Peers, and making a moderate allowance for life-peers and for law- lords, we obtain a total of about three hundred members. More numerous a Second Chamber can scarcely with ad- vantage be ; and if the nominal Upper House of to-day exceeds this figure, its working numbers fall far below. On this plan the change, though great, would be less, we believe, than any other capable of producing the result re- quired. Hereditary Peers would still be in the majority ; but they would be Peers who had sought election and had voluntarily assumed the responsibility of labour. They would be chosen by that method which, among a kindred people, has proved most propitious to merit ; so chosen as to represent all shades of opinion in the House of Com- mons, that is to say, in the nation ; so chosen as to eliminate the results of transient passion or caprice. Sitting for the space of half a generation, they would be independent enough for their own security and the common good. Amongst the Chairmen of County Boards and the members nominated by the Crown, many would have had seats under the old system ; and all would be open to the tradi- tions of a judicious conservatism. The reform would operate gradually, but, as we shall see, with the weightiest consequences. It has been suggested as an alternative plan that the connection of the House of Lords with every part of the country might be even more thoroughly secured by dividing among the several counties, in the ratio of their importance, the total of Peers to be elected. They would then be 1 8 Reform in Parliamentary Business. chosen in each province by the cumulative votes of its representatives, both those who sit for the boroughs and those who sit for the county. The smaller counties, of course, would have to be grouped for the election of Peers. On this plan, the House of Lords would share with the House of Commons the closest union with each particular district, and every Peer would have constituents to convey to him their experience and ask his aid in forwarding every local or national interest. Such a scheme is certainly more complete than the one suggested above. But the latter has the advantage of apparently greater simplicity. Whichever machinery we may adopt, the prime ends of reform are equally served. These may be stated as a proper division of labour between the various members of the nobility ; a consolidation of the imperial and local governments, and a substitution of regular and harmonious activity for the present painful and mischievous jars between the House of Peers and the Commons. We have already said, and must repeat, that a nobility has functions, not strictly political, yet worthy of the highest rank, the most exalted character, and the most distinguished talent. An instance or two will suffice to show how usefully this division of labour, according to disposition and ability, may act One of our most ancient and noble houses now gives to the nation a leader both trusted and liked by the party he leads, and eagerly coveted by the party he opposes. In his brother he has a colleague and the country a Minister who fills a most difficult and delicate office with tact, industry, and firmness. Meanwhile scholarly culture and conciliating judgment have marked the chief of the family for head at once of one of our two great ancient Universities, and of the new one which is already itself doing useful work and stimulating to more vigorous life the older institutions. His energy has founded a new town, whose rapid growth in population and industry exceeds anything we have seen Reform in Parliamentary Business. 19 in this country, and rivals similar wonders in America. Yet no farmer or tradesman of his district is a more regular and painstaking guardian of the poor — more anxious to check at its source that pauperism which is one of the most dreaded and demoralising dangers of our labouring classes — more conscientiously industrious in every local duty. Lord Derby, too, has recently shown how even a leading states- man may find refreshment in exchanging imperial for local administration, and what by advice and example he may do on that less ambitious stage for the public service. Or to take an instance from one of our ancient families not yet ennobled except by usefulness. Will any one believe that the late Sir Baldwyn Leighton could, as a member of the House of Commons, have rendered nobler service to the State than when, as a resident landowner and Chairman of his Board of Guardians, he, by wise and persistent firmness, counsel, and encouragement, almost annihilated pauperism, first in his own parish and then in the adjoining district ; surrounded himself with thrifty and prosperous labourers, each with his deposit of one hundred pounds or so in the savings bank ; and set an example which, as those interested in the subject know, has done much to improve the admin- istration of the Poor Law and to reduce pauperism in town and country. It must be remembered that legislative power under thenew constitution of the Upper House would be enjoyed not only by those Peers who can command the suffrage of the Com- mons, but also by those who have gained the confidence of any county. No Peer willing to work would be excluded because there was no room for him. If he were not found on the benches of the new House, it would be either because he preferred to serve his country elsewhere, or because he did not care to serve it anywhere. Those are no true friends of an aristocracy who would have it believe that in its bosom indolence and ignorance are safe at a time when 20 Reform in Parliamentary Business. everything has to justify itself to a critical democracy. If a privileged class is to endure, it must work with intelli- gence ; it must apportion its members each to his proper task, relieving from the duty of making laws those who habitually shun it. By admitting the Chairmen of the pro- posed County Boards, we should not only strengthen the Upper House as an instrument of legislation, but we should also meet a great necessity of our time — the consolidation of our imperial with our local institutions. Everybody is familiar with the defects of our local insti- tutions ; with the waste of public money occasioned by the number of petty authorities who, by dividing, elude responsi- bility ; with the abstention from local government of many who might bring to its service leisure, ability, and varied experience ; with the small result too often secured to the ratepayers, especially in small districts : with the unfortunate Conservatism which insists on referring to Parliament matters only interesting to a single province or to a single neighbourhood ; with the complete disconnection of the various local powers with each other, and the friction be- tween them and the Imperial Government. It is not our present business to discuss reforms in local government, but it is well to see how such reforms, if undertaken on any adequate scale, would harmonize with the proposed reform of the Upper House. When the highest rank in the provin- cial shall open a way to a seat in the national council, men of talent and position will find a wider scope in local admin- istration, and take a new interest in its labours. The tone of all local bodies will be raised ; contact in a common service will unite all classes ; connecting links will be formed between every district and every interest, as well as between the various branches of public service. A continuous ladder of political ascent will extend from the pettiest local board to the imperial legislature. Should the present Government find leisure to undertake Reform in Parlia7nentary Business. 21 a plan for the adjustment of local taxation combined with the reform of local government, we may at length hope to see in each primary area, consolidated, improved, and carrying on their work in a way which makes possible the interest and control of those for whom they govern, a single council to deal with all matters best administered on such a primary area. When County Boards, elected in part or wholly by such councils, discharge those functions which demand a wider area, then the head of the whole local system, the president of the County Board, would best con- nect it with the Second Chamber, and his rank might justly be an object of ambition to any man. Is it necessary to explain how the presence of such men so disciplined would add to the usefulness of the Upper House ; how it would receive from them and bestow on them knowledge and power and dignity. Could we impart to the nation a more potent and beneficent impulse in the direction of a truly Conservative progress? Could we more thoroughly bind into a single whole every function of legislation a'nd govern- ment, or better supply the Lords with an equivalent to the contact existing between the Commons and the country. While thus advancing the work whose necessity the statesmen of all parties admit, the work of strengthening, simplifying, and elevating local government, the plan pro- posed offers a stimulus which may save many capable men from rotting in idleness. For in the moral as in the physical sphere, not to grow and to decay are one. It is the danger of an age like ours that whilst the people grow in wants and reflection, the idle and wealthy too often grow more wealthy and more idle. In our age every really useless class must fall into contempt and disappear. The more the field of legislation narrows by the gradual amelioration of our laws, the more does the work of administration rise in relative importance. It is therefore by returning to a more active guidance and service of the people in all 22 Reform in Parliamentary Business. branches of government that, in a democracy potentially so advanced as ours, the noble and wealthy can retain Conservative power, or even justify their existence. If they refuse this labour, the nobility which so long ruled the destinies of Britain may indeed survive, but they will sur- vive as the faineant nobility of Spain survived in the ig- noble enjoyment of luxury without honour, and of wealth without power. All who feel this danger will see the ad- vantage of welding the Upper House into one piece with the organization of local government throughout the country. Nor need we fear the objection that by such reforms the Upper House would become too strong. Those who hold this language think, whether consciously or no, of an Upper House as the natural antagonist rather than as the fellow- labourer of the Lower. Too strong for its proper business neither the House of Commons nor the House of Lords can ever be. Of strength as the condition for efficiency and the result of usefulness we cannot have too much. Such strength we desire the Second Chamber to possess. But we believe that on the scheme sketched above it would be as indisposed to evil as it would be strong for good. It would be mighty to execute, unwilling to resist, the deliber- ate will of the nation. A senate of whose members more than one-half must add to the privilege of birth the con- fidence of the representative House, and nearly another half must have won the suffrage of a large body of their countrymen, whilst both have to seek re-election — such a senate cannot be in contradiction to the spirit of the times. It may, indeed, have a most ample share in the authority attached to knowledge, experience, and public service. But of that power which rests on tried desert we are not afraid. The reformed House of Lords might sometimes oppose a barrier to the interest of a minority or the passion of a majority. But that strength which the Upper House Reform in Parliamentary Business. 23 would derive from becoming representative is a strength drawn from the entire nation, a strength unlikely to be turned against the nation, because created by, and for continuance depending on, its deliberate will. When a great measure is rejected, every one hears of the event and is interested accordingly. But very, very few know how many measures are withheld for want of time ; how many for the same reason are dropped before the end of the session ; still worse, how many are passed in haste, in contradiction with themselves and with previous legislation hard to be understood and impossible to be worked ; how much time is lost each year in cobbling the faulty productions of the years gone by ; how mischievous to everybody, except the lawyers, and irritating to the best among them, is the want of order, perspicuity, and consis- tency in our statute-book ; how little Parliament does of what it should do, how ill that little is done. Yet all this is of daily greater importance to our people. In the perod of conflict with other nations now opened we shall need the most unpopular of all virtues — the virtue of thrift ; not only the economy of wealth, but the wiser economy of time and power, especially of the time and the power devoted to legislation. Even when the House of Commons shall no longer attempt to do what other bodies can do much better, even when it shall have elaborated a reasonable method of doing its proper business, even then it will find its time, industry, and information severely taxed by what still remains to do. We may get rid of obstruction, but we cannot do without fulness of debate. The more the sphere of government is extended, the more closely must the action of government be scrutinised. Legislation from year to year grows more difficult, touches on a greater diversity of interests, and gives birth to more manifold consequences. In modern legislation, too, all parties must be heard. The House of Commons, therefore, will, as time 24 Reform in Parliamentary Business. goes on, debate not less but more. But the House of Lords has not enough business to occupy its powers. If both Houses were brought to their highest pitch of efficiency, the work of one would not have to be done again in the other. Each House could devote most time to Bills originated in itself. For it is a mistake to suppose that the majority of measures raise a constitutional issue. An economical and social revolution for which no man is re- sponsible has involved an immense mass of purely regulative legislation. It is of prime importance that this legislation should be the ripe result of thought and knowledge. At a time when our trade and manufactures have begun to feel the keenest competition ; when our agriculture seems in danger of succumbing ; when our people, crowded into vast cities, are threatened with novel dangers to health and character ; when our foreign policy involves us in ever-re- curring complications ; when the defence and government of India become daily more laborious ; when there moves on the face of the earth a spirit of change so penetrating that no man can see how much things have altered, so much has he altered himself ; at a time like this our Legislature needs the unfettered use of all its strength and all its wisdom, to provide for each emergency as it appears ; to modify the ever varying relations of agriculture and com- merce ; to strengthen our municipal and provincial institu- tions ; to raise the efficiency and lower the expense of our adminstration ; to wage continual war against pauperism, disease, and ignorance ; and to afford to all Europe, to all civilised men, the glorious example of a nation transformed without tumult, retaining all the freshness of youth united with the majesty of age, and now and hereafter, as of old, leading our race in the search after a happier, better, and nobler existence for all. Whiting & Co., Limited, 30 & 32, Sardinia Street, Lincoln's Inn Fields, London, "W. C. C. JubVr Equator A. Manna-, S 7 ^ B . The end, of -English Miles Frontier Station of the. Soudan, HkwigatiUm, cut Stanley Falls . Sr-.tK/b: ,./.'■ ,tv, •,?' hr'ah' $** •&*•* Ml $r- jP • *'. \,^£ ■ 1 W"t ■ w. , v_ > b V 'A