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 A LECTURE 
 
 ON 
 
 THE NOTION OF VALUE, 
 
 DISTINGUISHABLE NOT ONLY FROM UTILITY, 
 
 BUT ALSO FROM 
 
 VALUE IN EXCHANGE. 
 
 DELIVERED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, 
 
 IN MICHAELMAS TEKM 1833, 
 
 REV. W. r. LLOYD, M.A. 
 
 STUDENT OF CHRIST CIIURCFI, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. 
 
 LONDON: 
 ROAKE AND VARTY, 31, STRAND; 
 J. H. PARKER, OXFORD; J. AND J. J. DEIGHTON, 
 CAMBRIDGE. 
 
 1834.
 
 LONDON : 
 
 nOAKE ANO VARTY, PRINTERS, 31, STRAND.
 
 ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 It is provided in the statute by which the Pro- 
 fessorship is founded, that one Lecture in each 
 course shall be annually published. In com- 
 pliance with this provision, the following- Lec- 
 ture, delivered in Michaelmas term, 1833, is 
 submitted to the public. The author thinks it 
 necessary to state this, to account for the ab- 
 ruptness of the beg-inning", which has reference 
 to a former Lecture of the course. The pas- 
 sages, more particularly referred to, are added 
 in the Appendix.
 
 Also, hy the same Author, 
 
 TWO LECTUllES 
 
 <IX THE 
 
 CHECKS TO POPULATION. 
 
 DELIVERED BEFORE 
 
 THE UNIVESRITY OF OXFORD, 
 
 In MICHAELMAS TERM, 1832.
 
 LECTURE, &c. 
 
 In my last lecture, I treated, in the first place, 
 of the subject of utility, and afterwards proceeded 
 to consider the sense in which Adam Smith ap- 
 plied the term value, while inquiring- respecting 
 the real measure of exchangeable value. I then 
 endeavoured to show, that he could not generally 
 mean by it, the power of purchasing other goods 
 which the possession of any object conveys — a 
 meaning, which involves necessarily a compari- 
 son, and, therefore, a relation of different ob- 
 jects, while the context seemed to refer to some- 
 thing positive and absolute — to something, which 
 could be understood as belonging to a single ob- 
 ject, taken by itself and without reference to other 
 objects. From an examination of some parti-
 
 6 
 
 ciilar passages, I collected, that, in those passag-es 
 at least, he was using* the term in the sense of 
 the real importance of an object to the person 
 possessing it, and that he made this importance 
 to depend on the difficulty of attainment. I 
 now proceed to the further consideration of this 
 view of the subject. * 
 
 A question has been sometimes agitated re- 
 specting the possibility of a general glut of com- 
 modities, or, in other words, of universal over- 
 production. A glut of commodities of any one 
 species, is on all hands admitted to be, not only 
 a possible but a frequent occurrence. So, like- 
 wise, but in a decreasing degree of probability 
 and frequency, of two, three, four, or more 
 species. All, therefore, that is denied, is, the 
 probability of its extending at once to the majo- 
 rity of commodities, and the possibility of its 
 being universal. I mention this question, not 
 with the view of entering on the full consideration 
 of it at present, but only because it will be useful 
 to my purpose to draw attention to some of the 
 arguments advanced by those who maintain the 
 * See Appendix.
 
 negative side. A general glut of commodities is, 
 they say, the same thing as a general super- 
 abundance of wealth, and would indicate the full 
 satisfaction of all human wants ; but that there 
 is, in fact, no assignable limit to the desires of 
 mankind ; for when one inconvenience is re- 
 moved, others present themselves, which before 
 had never been thought of; and thus the passion 
 for wealth expands with the gratification of ex- 
 isting wants, and, if not absolutely infinite, may, 
 at least, be termed indefinite ; being capable of 
 extending itself far beyond any bounds, to which 
 the most enthusiastic imagination can believe 
 that the power of human production will ever 
 reach. 
 
 Now, though it may bo reasonably urged, that 
 these arguments do not bear immediately upon 
 the main question respecting a glut of commo- 
 dities, which is concerned rather with the remu- 
 neration of the producers than with the disposi- 
 tion to consumption, yet no one can doubt the 
 general truth of the propositions themselves. 
 Nobody, for example, can maintain, that, were 
 the aggregate incomes of all persons in this
 
 8 
 
 country to be increased tenfold, tliey would find 
 any difficulty in disposing- of them. 
 
 Nee Crocsi fortuna unquam nee Persica regna 
 SufEcient animo — (Juvenal) 
 
 is an apt quotation which I have met with in 
 relation to this subject, and contains a truth ac- 
 knowledged by philosophy and coniirmed by the 
 experience of mankind. 
 
 But whether these arguments be applicable or 
 not to the question of a ghit, they would not, I 
 think, be even true in themselves, if the objects 
 which can gratify human wants were limited in the 
 number of their kinds. It is only the multiph'cation 
 of the kinds of wants which renders the passion 
 for wealth unlimited. The wants of savages, for 
 example, are confined to a few of the most neces- 
 sary articles, such as food and clothing, and even 
 of these they have not a sufficiency. Supposing, 
 however, for a moment, that the catalogue of 
 their wants could remain invariable, it is not 
 difficult to conceive the means, by which their 
 ( xisting wants might be fully gratified. They 
 uiight be fed to satiety, and clothed to satiety.
 
 9 
 
 and thus, (all new wants being excluded by the 
 hypothesis,) the final sum of their wealth would 
 be reached, and all further production would be 
 useless. 
 
 The same would be true of more civilized 
 societies, were their wants in like manner limited 
 to any determinate number. If no books of any 
 other description had ever been wanted than 
 such as existed at the time when printing- was in- 
 vented, this art might soon have nuiltiplied copies 
 to a degree fully adequate to the supply of all. 
 The same is true of every other particidar com- 
 modity ; and thus, it is the infinite variety of 
 wants, and of the kinds of commodities necessary 
 to their gratification, which alone renders the 
 passion for wealth indefinite and insatiable. In 
 the case of each species injimay as logician.s call 
 it, the desire is limited. 
 
 It is now time to point out in what manner 
 these observations bear upon the question which 
 is directly before us. We have come to tlie con- 
 clusion, that an increase of quantity will at 
 length exhaust, or satisfy to the utmost, the de- 
 mand for any specific object of desire. Having
 
 10 
 
 reached this point, let us now inquire, what 
 happens, with respect to value, at the time when the 
 demand or want is thus fully satisfied ? It will 
 be found, that, in the case of every commodity, 
 its value vanishes at the very instant of satisfac- 
 tion. Take, for example, water. Water is value- 
 less, or nearly so, except under some special cir- 
 cumstances, by reason of its abundance. Every 
 person has at his command more than is suffi- 
 cient for every purpose to which he can wish to 
 apply it. He has, therefore, no reason for being 
 sparing- in its use. If any remains after satisfy- 
 ing the present occasion, he has no cause for 
 hoarding it, or for making a property of it, or de- 
 barring others from the use of it. I mention these 
 particulars, because, where they are present, they 
 are sure indications of value, and, according to 
 their intensity, so is the intensity of the value. 
 We are sparing in the use of a valuable object, 
 because we can thus make it last the longer ; and 
 we wish to make it last the longer, because, when 
 spent and consumed, it cannot easily be replaced 
 We hoard it, we appropriate it, we debar others 
 from the use of it, for the same reason. In the
 
 11 
 
 reasons, therefore, which exist for preserving* and 
 for retaining- the possession of an object, its value 
 essentially consists. It has with g-reat propriety 
 been defined to mean the esteem in which an 
 object is held. But to make the definition com- 
 plete and easily intelligible, some further expla- 
 nation may perhaps be necessary. 
 
 Let us suppose the case of an hung-ry man 
 having" one ounce, and only one ounce of food at 
 his command. To him, this ounce is obviously of 
 very great importance. Suppose him now to have 
 two ounces. These are still of great importance ; 
 but the importance of the second is not equal to 
 that of the single ounce. In other words, he 
 would not suffer so much from parting with one 
 of his two ounces, retaining one for himself, as 
 he would suffer, when he had only one ounce, by 
 parting with that one, and so retaining none. 
 The importance of a third ounce is still less than 
 that of the second ; so likewise of a fourth, until 
 at length, in the continual increase of the number 
 of ounces, we come to a point, when, " through 
 that infallible specific, eating," the appetite is 
 entirely or nearly lost, and when, with respect
 
 12 
 
 to a single ounce, it is a matter of indifference 
 whether it is parted with or retained. Thus, 
 while he is scantily supplied with food, he holds 
 a given portion of it in great esteem— in other 
 words, he sets a great value on it ; when his 
 suj)ply is increased, his esteem for a given quan- 
 tity is lessened, or, in other words, he sets a less 
 value on it. 
 
 Hence the appetite for food may be compared 
 to a spring, a watch-spring for example, which, 
 when fully compressed, or wound up, has the 
 greatest tendency to expansion. I3y degrees, as 
 it becomes more and more actually expanded, its 
 tendency to fly out is diminished, until at length 
 it ceases altogether. 
 
 The case is the same with respect to all other 
 commodities. There may be a certain amount 
 of convenience in having a timepiece in every 
 room of a house ; still the convenience of the 
 first, that is, the importance of having one, is 
 probably greater than that of all the rest put to- 
 gether. So, a person who has one house may 
 wish to have a second, but still the want of the 
 second is not equal to that of the first.
 
 Eacli different kind, therefore, of human wants 
 may, like that of food, be compared to a spring ; 
 and, in this comparison, the different wants, ac- 
 cording- to their several differences, will be repre- 
 sented by springs of different degrees of strength. 
 For example, the wants which food can satisfy 
 will be represented by a spring of great power. 
 So also those, to supply which water is required. 
 For representing the wants of clothing and fuel, 
 which are articles not so indispensably necessary 
 to human existence, springs of an inferior degree 
 of power may suffice. Passing on to the artificial 
 wants, we may represent them according to their 
 intensities, by lesser springs of various degrees of 
 strength. 
 
 Let us enter a little more minutely into this 
 comparison. We can imagine a spring of such 
 strength that a weight of many tons shall be 
 required in order that its elasticity may be fully 
 and entirely confined. Yet when some play has 
 been allowed to it, a less force shall be sufficient 
 to retain it in its new position. And as it ap- 
 proaches the limit of its power of expansion, the 
 force even of the hair-spring of a watch shall be
 
 14 
 
 sufficient to keep it in its place. There are, 
 therefore, two ways in which the same two 
 springs may be compared. We may compare 
 them absolutely, as when we say that the main- 
 spring of a watch is stronger than the hair-spring ; 
 or, on the other hand, we may compare their ex- 
 pansive forces under some stated modification of 
 their actual conditions ; as, in the instance of a 
 watch which is nearly down and on the point of 
 stopping,* we may say that the main-spring has 
 scarcely more strength, that is, in its actual state 
 of expansion, has scarcely any greater tendency 
 to expand itself further than the hair-spring has, 
 when it is most contracted. 
 
 I direct your attention to these two modes of 
 comparing the same two springs, because I think 
 they may serve to illustrate the difference be- 
 tween utility and value. We estimate the uti- 
 lities of objects by the importance of the wants 
 they are capable of supplying, considered abso- 
 lutely ; in the same manner as when we say that 
 
 * I here suppose the watch to stop because the spring is 
 exhausted, not because the chahi is come to an end. And this 
 would be the case practically if the chain were made long enough.
 
 15 
 
 the main-spring of ii watch is stronger than the 
 hair-spring-. As the main-spring remains equally 
 strong whether the watch be wound up or un- 
 wound, so a difference in the degree in which 
 any want is supplied makes no difference in the 
 utility of the object which can supply it. Water 
 is no more useful in a ship at sea, where it is 
 scarce, than on land, where it is plentiful. The 
 utility of corn is the same after an abundant har- 
 vest as in a time of famine.* 
 
 But the wants, on which value depends, are 
 analogous to the tendencies of springs, which are 
 already in part extended, to extend themselves 
 further. They vary with every variation in the 
 quantity of commodities, and in the consequent 
 variation of the degree in which the absolute 
 want is satisfied, as the expansive tendency of a 
 spring varies with every variation of the degree 
 of its actual expansion. According to this mode 
 of considering the force of a spring, the force of 
 the main- spring of a watch may, as I have already 
 mentioned, be less than that of the hair-spring ; 
 and, according to the analogous mode of con- 
 * See the paragraph commencing- in p. 17.
 
 16 
 
 sldering" wants, the want of the most useful may 
 be less than that of the least useful articles. 
 Water is more wanted by a roan almost dying- 
 with thirst, than by another who has quenched 
 his thirst, and desires only to wash himself. It 
 is on want, thus estimated, that value depends. 
 It is not the same thing as the want, but it is 
 proportional to it, and arises out of it. The 
 gratification derivable from the use of an object 
 must be taken to be equal to the want of it, thus 
 estimated ; and the value, properly sjjeaking, is 
 the feeling of affection or esteem for the object, 
 arising from a sense of the loss of the gratifica- 
 tion contingent on the loss of the object. In its 
 ultimate sense, then, the term undoubtedly sig- 
 nifies a feeling of the mind, which shows itself 
 always at the margin of separation between the 
 satisfied and misatisfied wants. One point, 
 amongst others, in which it differs from utility, 
 is, that it attaches only to an object in possession, 
 while, with respect to the idea of utility, pos- 
 session is a matter of indifference. 
 
 I think that the distinction which I have 
 pointed out between the ways in which the
 
 17 
 
 forces of any two springs may be compared, will 
 be found, if considered with attention, to throw 
 great light on the difference between utility and 
 value, to mark their respective limits, and to 
 show clearly the point of contact, where the one 
 idea is apt to pass into the other, and where the 
 danger of confusion is mostly to be apprehended. 
 It must, however, be borne in mind, that the 
 analogy subsists, only between the two ways in 
 which the forces may be compared, and those in 
 which human wants may be compared ; and not 
 immediately, between the two ways in which the 
 forces may be compared, and the relation which 
 subsists between the ideas of utility and value. 
 The contemplation of this analogy will serve to 
 explain the two different ways of considering 
 human wants, and these being understood, it is 
 then easy to pass on to the ideas of utility and 
 value, which are connected with the different 
 wants, and naturally arise out of them. 
 
 I intimated just now that there was danger of 
 confusion. If, to a man who has already half a 
 dozen coats, you should offer to give another, he 
 might probably reply that he would have no use 
 
 B
 
 18 
 
 for it. Here, however, he would speak, not of 
 the abstract utility of the coat, but of its special 
 utility to him under the circumstance of his want 
 of coats being already so far supplied. This, 
 though not quite the same thing as value, ap- 
 proaches very near to it. The coat would be of 
 no use to him ; therefore, were he to have it, it 
 would not be valuable in his estimation. He 
 would have no reason for retaining the possession 
 of it, or, were he to lose it, to regret the loss. 
 But this is very different from the utility of the 
 coat in the general sense of utility, and ought 
 not to be confounded with it. 
 
 Perhaps the following may be a good rule for 
 distinguishing between utility and value ; and, if 
 it is borne in mind, there will, I think, be little 
 danger of confounding the two ideas. To obtain 
 the idea of the utility of an object, imagine what 
 would happen, what inconvenience would arise, 
 from the loss, not of that object alone, but of the 
 whole species to which that object belongs. Thus, 
 to obtain the idea of the utility of water, imagine 
 the predicament we should be in, were we de- 
 prived, not of a pailful which may chance to be
 
 19 
 
 before our eyes, and may stand destined to some 
 particular use, but of the whole element of water. 
 But value, as I have already mentioned, attaches to 
 an object in possession, which, consequently, can- 
 not be unlimited in quantity. To obtain, therefore, 
 the idea of value, imagine yourselves deprived, 
 not, as before, of the whole of the species, but 
 only of the possession of a certain definite quan- 
 tity. Take again, for example, the instance of 
 the pail of water, and suppose it to be over- 
 turned.' Its value would then be estimable, either 
 by the inconvenience which would be felt, sup- 
 posing- the particular want which it was intended 
 to supply to remain unsatisfied, or by the trouble 
 of going to the well again, whichever might be 
 least. I may here remark, that, though, in the 
 course of this lecture, I have spoken of water as 
 valueless, and it is the example commonly ad- 
 duced of a very useful article quite destitute of 
 value, yet this is only to be understood of ex- 
 changeable value. Water in possession has almost 
 always some value. But this value, under ordi- 
 nary circumstances, is small, and not equal to 
 the trouble of an exchange. And on this ac- 
 
 B 2
 
 count water rarely becomes the subject of 
 exchange. 
 
 I have here been incidentally led to the men- 
 tion of exchanges. But it is to be observed, that, 
 throughout the explanation, upon which I have 
 hitherto been engaged, of the nature of value, 
 there has been no need for one word about 
 exchanges. As I have explained the idea, it 
 consists in the real importance of an object to the 
 person who possesses it — a definition, which may 
 be collected from a passage of Adam Smith, as I 
 mentioned in my last lecture. And objects may 
 be of real importance to the person who possesses 
 them, as much in the case of an isolated indivi- 
 dual, such as Robinson Crusoe, as in -the case of 
 a society, such as exists in England, and in all 
 other countries with which we are acquainted. 
 The commercial intercourse, however, to which 
 we are accustomed, and in which the idea of 
 value is commonly more or less blended with 
 that of an exchange, has been so long established, 
 that it requires some effort of the imagination to 
 form a distinct idea of value by itself, disengaged, 
 on the one hand, from value in exchange, and.
 
 21 
 
 on the other, from the mere notion of utility. It 
 would be difficult to collect the necessary illus- 
 trations from the facts and occurrences with 
 which we are familiar ; and cases purely hypo- 
 thetical are less interesting" and less instructive. 
 I have been looking into Robinson Crusoe for 
 examples of value, but have not found any thing 
 so much to the point as I could have wished. 
 Still the complete separation of the idea appears 
 to me to be so necessary a preliminary, in order 
 to a clear conception of the nature of value in 
 exchange, and of the causes which determine it, 
 that I think it not amiss to read to you the fol- 
 lowing passages, which are the best that I have 
 been able to find. 
 
 I presume you to be all acquainted with the 
 life and adventures of Robinson Crusoe. It will 
 be remembered that in shakino;- out an old bajr 
 which he wanted for some purpose, he uncon- 
 sciously sowed a few grains of barley and rice, 
 which had chanced to remain in the crevices of 
 the bag. After mentioning that these took root, 
 sprung up, and ripened, the narrative proceeds 
 thus : —
 
 22 
 
 •* I carefully saved the ears of this corn, you 
 may be sure, in their season, which was about the 
 end of June ; and laying up every corn, I re- 
 solved to sow them all again ; hoping in time to 
 have some quantity sufficient to supply me with 
 bread ; but it was not till the fourth year that I 
 could allow myself the least grain of this corn to 
 eat, and even then sparingly, as I shall show 
 afterwards in its order." 
 
 In all this, he showed his sense, not merely of 
 the utility, but also of the value of his corn. 1 
 proceed, however, to another passage. 
 
 *' After I had been in my cave for some time, 
 and found no more shocks of the earthquake to fol- 
 low, I began to be somewhat more composed. 
 And now, to support my spirits, which indeed 
 Avanted it very much, I went to my little store, 
 and took a small sup of rum, which, however, I 
 did then and always very sparingly, knowing I 
 could have no more when that was gone." 
 
 His rum was valuable. Now let us see what 
 he says about his ink. 
 
 *' A little after this, my ink beginning to fail 
 me, I contented myself to use it more sparingly;
 
 23 
 
 and to note down only the most remarkable 
 events of my life, without continuing- a daily 
 memorandum of other thing's." Again : 
 
 *' The next thing- to my ink being- wasted, was 
 that of my bread — I mean the biscuit, which 
 I had brought out of the ship : this I had hus- 
 banded to the last degree, allowing myself but 
 one cake of bread a day for above a year ; and 
 yet I was quite without bread for nearly a year 
 before I got any corn of my own." 
 
 In another passage he mentions finding on the 
 sea-shore an infinite variety of fowls, on which 
 he observes, 
 
 " I could have shot as many as I pleased, but 
 was very sparing of my powder and shot." 
 
 I will not stop to remark farther on these pas- 
 sages, than that all this caution in the consump- 
 tion of the different articles which he had saved 
 from the ship, indicated a sense of their value, 
 properly so called. That which has no value 
 cannot be consumed to waste, and wherever there 
 is the fear of wasting there is value. 
 
 It is justly observed by Locke, that in a man- 
 of-war silver may not be of equal value to gun-
 
 24 
 
 powder. Yet, were the silver and the gunpowder 
 on board both of them public property, there 
 would be no exchang-es, and consequently no 
 exchangeable value. And, in the same sense in 
 which the gunpowder might be more valuable 
 than the silver, we can understand how in a 
 siege or sea voyage water can be valuable, though, 
 being public property, it cannot become the sub- 
 ject of an exchange. 
 
 In general, in order to find instances of value 
 existing without exchanges, we have only to ex- 
 clude the commerce of a plurality of properties. 
 In every exchange there is a transfer of property. 
 In the case, therefore, of a solitary individual, 
 such as Robinson Crusoe, there can be no ex- 
 change, because then there would be nobody with 
 whom to exchange. Again, in a country in which 
 the division of labour is unestablished, and in 
 w^hich each man combines in his own person a 
 variety of em})loyments, and procures and pre- 
 pares for his family whatever articles they con- 
 sume, it is plain that barter and sale, and conse- 
 quently value in exchange, would be unknown. 
 Still these articles w^ould be valuable — the pos-
 
 25 
 
 session of them would be of importance to the 
 person possessing" them, though they would not 
 be exchangeable. So likewise in a society having 
 an internal community of goods and no external 
 trade, there could be no exchangeable value, be- 
 cause of the absence of plurality of properties.* 
 We may imagine such a society to supply itself 
 more or less plentifully w^th the luxuries, com- 
 forts, and necessaries of life. But these, though 
 not exchangeable, yet should they be produced 
 in a degree insufficient for the full supply of every 
 want, would not be destitute of value. 
 
 Adam Smith remarks, that man is the only 
 animal which makes exchanges. " Nobody," he 
 says, " ever saw one dog make a fair and delibe- 
 rate exchange of one bone for another, with 
 another dog." " Nobody," he continues, " ever 
 
 * Colonel ToiTcns adduces the cases of a country in which 
 the division of labour is unestablished, and of a society having 
 an internal community of goods^ as examples of the existence 
 of wealth where value is absent. In strictness, they are cases 
 in which there is no motive for exchanging ; and to me they 
 ajjpear equally well fitted to illustrate the separation of the idea 
 of value as of that of wealth from all reference to exchanges.
 
 26 
 
 saw one animal, by its gestures and natural cries, 
 sig-nify to another, * This is mine, that yours ; I 
 am willing to give you this for that.' " But we 
 may observe, that dogs have a sense of value, 
 though not of exchangeable value. Though no- 
 body has ever seen two dogs making an ex- 
 change, yet a dog has been often seen to hide a 
 bone. The dog does this from a sense of its value, 
 properly so called. He does not do it merely 
 from a sense of its utility^ or, in other words, be- 
 cause he likes a bone, but because he knows that 
 a bone is a good thing which is not always to be 
 had when wanted. In order that two dogs 
 should make an exchange, then, besides a sense of 
 value, and besides, also, other circumstances which 
 I shall hereafter explain, it would be necessary 
 that they should understand and mutually acknow- 
 ledge the rights of property. But to this degree 
 of civilization dogs have not yet attained. The 
 nearest approach to it that I know of, is in Con- 
 stantinople, where the dogs act the part of sca- 
 vengers, and, it is said, have their regular beats, 
 like beggars in London, no individual dog ever 
 presuming to trespass beyond his own territory.
 
 27 
 
 Some few examples of value, in which the idea 
 of an exchange is not concerned, might perhaps 
 be taken from common life. We can well con- 
 ceive an article made expressly for the use of an 
 individual, and to him actually both useful and 
 valuable, when to every other human being- it 
 would be absolutely useless, and when it would, 
 therefore, be altogether destitute of value in ex- 
 change. Extreme cases, however, such as this, 
 where the whole of the value is altogether per- 
 sonal, are certainly rare. But cases in which a 
 great part, though not the whole, of the value is 
 lost in the exchange, are frequent. The value, 
 to the person for whom it is made, of a coat made 
 to order, cannot be estimated by what others 
 would give for it. The same may be said of a 
 seal marked with the crest and initials of its 
 owner. Its value to the person to whom it be- 
 longs is increased by its being marked. But all 
 this increment of value, and more than this, 
 would be lost in an exchange. The same opera- 
 tion, which renders the commodity of more value 
 in the estimation of its owner, is calculated to 
 render it less valuable in the estimation of all
 
 28 
 
 other persons, and therefore of less value in ex- 
 change. 
 
 Such then is the notion of absolute as distin- 
 guished from comparative or exchangeable value. 
 It signifies the real importance of an object to 
 the person who possesses it, and in this sense it 
 is surely easy to be understood, how an object 
 can be said to vary in value without any re- 
 ference to other objects express or implied. 
 We can understand how, in a time of famine, 
 corn pei^ se may be said to be more valuable 
 than in a time of plenty ; and how, if labour 
 becomes more effective, so that commodities of all 
 kinds shall be produced in a degree of abundance 
 greater in proportion to the wants of mankind, 
 all sorts of commodities, though exchangeable in 
 the same proportions as before for each other, 
 could be said to have become less valuable. 
 
 In this sense of value, it may be remarked, 
 that to a poor man, the same things are more 
 valuable than to a rich man ; and this sense, it 
 may be further remarked, agrees with the use of 
 the term in common discourse. The following, 
 for example, is a passage I lately met with in
 
 29 
 
 an arg-ument on the inequality of pecuniary 
 punishments. 
 
 *' No one would be absurd enough to maintain, 
 that a g-uinea has the same value, and, therefore, 
 would become an equal forfeiture to two persons, 
 the one having- a thousand and the other only 
 ten of these." 
 
 And a little further on : — 
 
 " Now the possession of personal liberty is 
 equally dear, equally valuable to all, and the 
 abridgment of it would, therefore, be equally felt 
 by all ; and this reflection naturally points to impri- 
 sonment as the substitute for punishment by fine." 
 
 It may be said, and to a certain degree per- 
 haps with truth, that this notion of value, inde- 
 pendent of an exchange, is very vague and unde- 
 fined. But it is not more so than the idea of 
 utility, which nobody pretends to refer to the 
 mere relation of objects to each other. It 
 would indeed be difficult to discover any accu- 
 rate test, by which to measure either the abso- 
 lute utility of a single object, or the exact ratio 
 of the comparative utilities of different objects. 
 Still it does not follow, that the notion of utility 
 has no foundation in the nature of things. It
 
 30 
 
 does not follow, that because a thing* is incapable 
 of measurement, therefore it has no real exist- 
 ence. The existence of heat was no less unde- 
 niable before thermometers were invented, than 
 at present. So neither does it follow, that be- 
 cause the idea of the value of an object, singly 
 considered, is difficult to be g-rasped, therefore it 
 can have no independent existence. Mr. Mal- 
 thus asks very pertinently, whether in a country 
 where there is nothing but deer, a deer could be 
 said to be without value, because there would 
 be no other object with which to compare it, 
 when a man would walk fifty miles in order to 
 obtain one. 
 
 Two questions, among others, have been agi- 
 tated respecting value ; the one, whether any 
 object can have intrinsic value, the other, whe- 
 ther it can have absolute value. It is of this latter 
 question that I have been treating, and I have 
 been endeavouring to determine it in the affirma- 
 tive, that is, to show that an object can have value 
 of its own, independently of all comparison with 
 the values of other things. The question about 
 intrinsic value is different from this, though, 
 as both intrinsic and absolute are opposed
 
 31 
 
 to relative, tlie two are apt to be confounded. 
 I have maintained, that an object can have abso- 
 lute value, but it is impossible to maintain, that 
 it can have intrinsic value in the full sense of the 
 expression. Intrinsic value means value in- 
 herent in the object itself, which must necessarily 
 remain the same while the object remains the 
 same, and could be changed only by a change in 
 the internal constitution and nature of the ob- 
 ject. Nothing, however, can be called valuable 
 without reference to somebody to whom it is 
 valuable ; and, hence, according to the variations 
 in the wants of the individuals to whom we re- 
 fer, the same commodity, though retaining the 
 same intrinsic qualities, is variable in value. The 
 term value, therefore, does not express a quality 
 inherent in a commodity. It expresses, as I 
 stated before, a feeling of the mind, and is vari- 
 able with the variations of the external cfrcum- 
 stances which can influence that feeling, without 
 any variation of the intrinsic qualities of the com- 
 modity which is the object of it. It is one thing 
 to maintain, that an object may have value inde- 
 pendently of all reference to the values of other
 
 32 
 
 objects ; it is quite another thing, to maintain 
 that it can have value in itself, independently of 
 all reference to mankind. And I repeat, that it 
 is the former proposition, and not the latter, that 
 I have been maintaining. 
 
 To illustrate the absolute nature of value, I 
 compared it with utility, observing, that the one 
 was as much absolute as the other, and that the 
 objections arising from the indefinite character 
 of absolute value, were equally applicable to 
 utility, the idea of which was quite as indefinite 
 and as little capable of mensuration as that of 
 absolute value. To this point of similarity we 
 may add the negative one, that the utility of an 
 object is not intrinsic any more than the value. 
 Utility, like value, is predicated of an object 
 with a reference to the wants of mankind. 
 Blankets are useful in England, but they are not 
 useful, or at least not equally useful, in a hot 
 climate. Ice is useful in summer, useless in 
 winter. Still, the intrinsic qualities of blankets, 
 and the intrinsic qualities of ice, are, at all 
 times, and in all places, the same. 
 
 Besides explaining the meaning of the term
 
 33 
 
 value, I had intended, in this lecture, to have 
 also considered the question of the measure of 
 value, and to have examined the grounds on 
 which sometimes labour, and sometimes corn, 
 have been assumed to be nearly invariable in 
 their real value, and to be on that account fitted 
 for measuring" the varying values of other com- 
 modities. I find, however, that I shall not to- 
 day have time for entering on these questions ; 
 I shall therefore conclude v/ith setting before 
 you once more the doctrine against which I have 
 been contending, together with an illustration 
 of it, which appears to me to be a very unfortu- 
 nate one, though it has been used several times 
 by the supporters of that doctrine. 
 
 " We can understand, '' they say, " what is 
 meant by the value of cottons ; viz. the quantity 
 of other goods for which a given quantity of 
 cotton will exchange. We can understand in 
 what manner cottons may rise or fall in value ; 
 viz. when a given quantity of cottons comes to 
 exchange for a greater or less quantity of other 
 commodities than before ; but what is meant by 
 the value of the whole produce, or how the 
 
 c
 
 34 
 
 whole produce of the land, or labour of a coun- 
 try, or of the world, can be said to rise or fall in 
 value, is a problem of which we must leave to 
 wiser heads than our own to discover the solu- 
 tion. Value is a relative term : if it is not this, 
 it is nothing- : if any one talks about absolute 
 value, or any other kind of value than exchange- 
 able value, we know not what he means." 
 
 This is from the Westminster Review. Again : 
 M. Say observes, that " the valuation of an 
 object is nothing more or less than the affirma- 
 tion, that it is in a certain degree of comparative 
 estimation with some other specified object." I 
 quote this from M. Say, because it seems to be 
 referred to in the following- passage from an 
 anonymous writer, containing the illustration to 
 which I before alluded. 
 
 " All value is relative, as M. Say observes ; 
 and as we should more easily bear in mind, if 
 the word * exchangeable,' or * in exchange,' 
 which in this sense it always implies, were al- 
 ways uttered and expressed. Now, all motion 
 is relative : for by motion we merely mean, an 
 alteration in the distance or interval between
 
 36 
 
 two things. But we have been accustomed, to 
 save time, to use the word motion absolutely. 
 When the distance between a ship and the whole 
 mass of the country from which it set out, is 
 altered, we say absolutely, the ship moves ; and 
 if we were asked, whether the country moves too, 
 should generally answer, ' no, it is at rest ;* that 
 is, because the ship is small compared to the 
 country. Yet this same country, perhaps, at 
 the same time, alters its distance with regard to 
 the heavenly bodies, and is itself said, when 
 considered in that point of view, to move ; the 
 heavenly bodies being now said to remain at 
 rest : but we still mean, that the distance be- 
 tween these bodies and our earth, or that par- 
 ticular part of it, is altered, and that they are more 
 or larger than it. Yet from this way of speak- 
 ing, from this hcibit of saying, for shortness, that 
 the ship or the earth moved absolutely, in order 
 to express that a relative motion or change of 
 distance took place between them and some 
 other things, philosophers long maintained that 
 motion was inherent, and that if there were but 
 one thing in the universe, it might yet move : that
 
 36 
 
 the earth, for instance, might be said to move 
 absolutely, though the heavenly bodies were an- 
 nihilated ; and if they were reminded that mo- 
 tion was relative, they would then assert, that 
 the earth in such case would move relatively to 
 the parts of space ; that is, by the very definition 
 of space, relatively to nothing at all. * There is 
 nothing,' as Mr. Malthus observes in the Essay 
 on Population, * which has given occasion to such 
 a host of errors as the confusion between relative 
 and positive.' " 
 
 Now all this appears to me to be a blunder 
 arising from confounding the evidence of a fact 
 with the fact itself. Value, it is here said, is no 
 more absolute than motion is absolute. But I 
 maintain that some motion is absolute. I deny 
 that, by motion, we merely mean an alteration 
 in the relative position of two things. I main- 
 tain, that it is true what philosophers long ago 
 maintained, that if there were but one body in 
 the universe, it might yet move ; and that the 
 earth might be said to move absolutely, though 
 the heavenly bodies were annihilated. The only 
 difficulty would relate to the evidence of the
 
 37 
 
 fact. Yet, under certain circumstances, the proof 
 would not be desperate. When we observe the 
 daily change in the relative positions of the sun 
 and earth, we know at once that one of them has 
 moved. But there still remains the difficulty of 
 determining which of the two it is that has moved. 
 We solve this difficulty, and ascertain that the 
 earth has actually revolved on its axis, by the 
 phenomena of the centrifugal force j and, though, 
 in the absence of the sun and the heavenly bodies, 
 it would probably never occur to us to inquire 
 respecting the earth's motion, yet, if we should 
 take it into our heads to inquire about it, the 
 same resource would remain to us. Then, as now, 
 we should account for the diminution of gravity 
 as we pass from the pole to the equator, by the 
 supposition of a centrifugal force opposed to 
 gravity, and arising from rotation. We should 
 thus ascertain the absolute motion of the earth, 
 notwithstanding the absence of any other body 
 to which it could be referred. 
 
 As it is not true that all motion is relative, so, 
 I must maintain, it is not true that all value is 
 relative.
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Note to ^Jcrgre 6. 
 
 The following are the passages alluded to : 
 
 " In that original state of things, which precedes 
 both the appropriation of land and the accumulation of 
 stock, the whole produce of labour belongs to the 
 labourer. He has neither landlord nor master to share 
 with him. ? 
 
 " Had this state continued, the wages of labour would 
 have augmented with all those improvements in its pro- 
 ductive powers, to which the division of labour gives 
 occasion. All things would gradually have become 
 cheaper. They would have been produced by a smaller 
 quantity of labour; and, as commodities produced by 
 equal quantities of labour would naturally, in this state 
 of things, be exchanged for one another, they would 
 have been purchased likewise with the produce of a 
 smaller quantity. 
 
 " But, though all things would have become cheaper 
 in reality, \really less valuable,^ in appearance, many 
 things might have become dearer [apparently more 
 valuable^ than before, or have been exchanged for a 
 greater quantity of other goods. Let us suppose, for 
 example, that, in the greater part of employments the 
 productive powers of labour had been improved to ten-
 
 39 
 
 fold, or that a day''s labour could produce ten times the 
 quantity of work which it had done originally ; but 
 that in a particular employment they had been improved 
 only to double, or that a day's labour could produce 
 only twice the quantity of work which it had done 
 before. In exchanging the produce of a day's labour 
 in the greater part of employments for that of a day's 
 labour in this particular one, ten times the original 
 quantity of work in them would purchase only twice 
 the original quantity in it. Any particular quantity in 
 it, therefore, a pound weight, for example, would appear 
 to be five times dearer Yjive times moi^e valuable'] than 
 before. In reality, however, it would be twice as cheap 
 {^reduced in value by one half.'] Though it required 
 five times the quantity of other goods to purchase it, 
 it would require only half the quantity of labour 
 either to purchase or produce it. The acquisition, 
 therefore, ivould be twice as easy as before." — Wealth 
 of Nations, book i, beginning of the 8th chapter. 
 
 In this passage the word value is not indeed to be 
 found, but we find expressions equivalent to it. To 
 say that a thing is become dearer or cheaper, is un- 
 questionably the same as saying that its value is in- 
 creased or diminished. Adam Smith states that, under 
 the circumstances supposed, all things would have be- 
 come cheaper in reality, though in appearance many 
 might have become dearer; or, as he paraphrases it, 
 have been exchanged for a greater quantity of goods 
 than before. Here the opposition between real and ap- 
 parent value is clear and pointed. Where the value in
 
 40 
 
 exchange of certain commodities is actually increased, 
 the increase in value is declared to be apparent only. 
 The commodities which can be purchased or procui*ed 
 by half the labour, and, for that reason, can be ac- 
 quired twice as easily, are considered to be, therefore, 
 only half as valuable as before, though exchangeable for 
 five times the quantity of other goods. 
 
 Real value has been here assumed to depend on diffi- 
 culty of attainment. The same principle is put forward 
 in the fifth chapter. 
 
 " At all times and places," it is said, " that is dear 
 which it is difficult to come at, or which it costs much 
 labour to acquire, and that is cheap which is to be had 
 easily, or with very little labour." 
 
 Again : 
 
 " A commodity which sells for half an ounce of silver 
 at Canton, may there be really dearer, [that is, really 
 more valuable,^ of more real importance to the man 
 who possesses it there, than a commodity which sells 
 for an ounce at London, is to the man who possesses it 
 at London." 
 
 This passage implies a definition of real value, and 
 intimates that it consists in the real importance of an 
 object to the man who possesses it. Now, the real im- 
 portance of an object to the man who possesses it, de- 
 pends on the difficulty of attaining such an object. In 
 reality, therefore, in all these passages the same idea is 
 substantially put forth. 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 noAsr, AND VARTV, f51, strand.
 
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