THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF ALBANIA 
 1907 ■ 1920 
 
 BY 
 
 RAYMOND JAMES SONTAG 
 B. S. University of Illinois, 1920 
 
 THESIS 
 
 Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
 
 Degree of 
 
 > , 
 
 MASTER OF ARTS 
 IN HISTORY 
 
 IN 
 
 THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
 OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 
 
 1921 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Page 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 I 
 
 THE 
 
 SITUATION IN 1907 
 
 3 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 II 
 
 THE 
 
 INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN 1907 
 
 13 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 III 
 
 THE 
 
 WINNING OF AUTONOMY 
 
 21 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 IV 
 
 THE 
 
 TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND ALBANIAN INDEPENDENCE 
 
 32 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 V 
 
 THE 
 
 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE 
 
 39 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 VI 
 
 THE 
 
 GOVERNMENT OF WILLIAM OF WIED 
 
 47 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 VII 
 
 ITALY AND ALBANIA 
 
 56 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 — 
 
 
 i 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Something less than a half century ago the ablest states- 
 man of Europe, Bismarck, blandly informed Albanian delegates at the 
 Congress of Berlin that "there is no Albanian nationality." 1 Within 
 a year the Albanians had upset the treaty carefully prepared under 
 the guidance of this statesman. In 1908 Abdul Hamid acquiesced in 
 the demands of the Young Turks only when the Albanians, up to this 
 time his most faithful supporters, joined in the popular demand for 
 a "constitution," a term, as we shall see later, then connoting to 
 the Albanian approximately what we popularly connect with the word 
 "paradise." And finally, after a bewildering kaleidoscopic succes- 
 sion of events, we find the Assembly of the League of Nations in 
 December of 1920 admitting Albania to membership in the League as 
 a free and sovereign state. 
 
 It will be the somewhat ambitious purpose of this study 
 to trace the interaction of the forces at work in Albania during the 
 years from 1907 to 1920 in such a manner that the events of this 
 period — in themselves discontinuous and chaotic — may serve as 
 an historical explanation of the present status of Albania. 
 
 What might be called the external or international forces 
 active during this time arise out of the rival interests and ambi- 
 tions of neighboring powers — the strategic importance of the 
 country for Italy and Austria-Hungary; the economic needs of Serbia; 
 the historical and ethnographical claims of Greece. Within the 
 
 ^Chekrezi, C. A. ; Albania . Past and Present . N.Y.(1920). p. xv. 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2015 
 
 https://archive.org/details/politicalhistoryOOsont 
 
2 
 
 country the character of the people themselves will demand the chief 
 attention, for, as Brailsford aptly points out, one scarcely knows 
 whether to compare the Albanian to "the knight errant of the Middle 
 Ages or to the head-hunters of the Malay Peninsula." 1 This peculiar 
 Albanian mentality, of course, can be understood only when studied 
 in connection with its history and environment. Finally, the way in 
 which the external and internal forces react on each other will con- 
 stitute the most interesting and difficult part of the whole problem. 
 
 It is not necessary, I take it, to state that our sources 
 for so recent a period must at best be incomplete. For the years 
 after 1914 especially the significance of events can become abso- 
 lutely clear only when archives now closed to the historian are 
 accessible. Here the writer has been forced to rely almost entirely 
 on material which has appeared in newspapers and periodicals, supple- 
 menting and verifying these, wherever possible, by such documents as 
 have appeared. 
 
 To the writer's knowledge, there is no work on Albania 
 covering the whole period from ISO? to the present, and practically 
 all the works covering any part of the field are distinctly of a 
 propagandist nature. These have been used sparingly and only after 
 applying rigid tests to the material given. The importance of the 
 subject itself scarcely needs to be pointed out. The international 
 rivalries which center in Albania would alone be sufficient to make 
 some knowledge of the country desirable for those who wish to judge 
 international events by reason rather than by instinct. It must fur- 
 ther be remembered that the boundaries of Albania have not yet been 
 determined and promise to furnish a very fruitful source of discord. 
 
 ■^•Brailsford, H, N. ; Macedonia, its Races and their Future, p.336. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 1 
 
 THE SITUATION IN 1907 
 
 In 1907 there was scant evidence of patriotic or 
 nationalist feeling in Albania. A civilization which had been 
 practically stationary for four centuries, and a people divided into 
 two fairly distinct groups by geography, civilization, and language 
 seemed at best but very unpromising material for the making of a 
 modern state. Although the actual creation of this state was due 
 largely to the necessities of European politics, some knowledge of 
 previous Albanian history and of the people themselves is essential 
 to a real understanding of the period. 
 
 At the opening of the Christian era the Albanians, or 
 rather their ancestors the Illyrians and Epirots, ^occupied most of 
 the northern Balkan Peninsula, but by 1907 successive invasions had 
 confined them chiefly to the Turkish vilayets of Scutari and Janina, 
 with large numbers in the neighboring vilayets of Kossovo and 
 Monastir. 2 In the area within the boundaries of 1913 there were 
 about one million people, practically all of Albanian stock. 
 
 An excellent discussion of Albanian ethnography may be found in 
 Gibert, Frederick; Les Pays d* Albanie et Leur Histoire , Paris (1914) . 
 pp. 167-194; the results of the voluminous but far from conclusive 
 studies of German students in this field are admirably summarized. 
 
 p 
 
 For an account of the Albanian colonies in Greece, Italy, and 
 Sicily see Eliot, Sir Charles; Turkey in Europe , el. 2, London 
 (1908). pp. 351-55. These isolated groups are interesting because 
 of the tenacity with which they have maintained their language and 
 traditions. 
 
 3 In Dominian, Leon; Frontiers of Language and Nationality in 
 Europe. N.Y., a total of one and one-half million is quoted, in- 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 The Shkumbi River, in ancient times the boundary between 
 Illyrians and Epirote, divides the Ghegs of the north from the Tosks 
 of the south. The Ghegs have preserved in their mountain homes the 
 primitive vices and virtues of the old Albanian stock. They are 
 usually much taller and of greater physical strength and grace than 
 their southern countrymen. At home they are chiefly shepherds, but 
 the large number who, under the old regime in Turkey, sought occupa- 
 tions in other parts of the Empire, frequently secured very 
 responsible posts because of their native intelligence and loyalty. 1 
 The Tosks are of a milder temperament a3 a result of contact with 
 the more mature Greek civilization. The comparatively level and 
 fertile land of the south has also been a civilizing force. The 
 strong Greek influence, which is further manifested by the fact that 
 Greek is the language of business in southern Albania, has given a 
 basis for the Greek claim to much of this region. 
 
 The character of both Ghegs and Tosks has been distorted 
 by foe and friend alike. Some striking examples of Balkan neighbor- 
 liness may be found in the work of Dr. Georgevitch, former president 
 of the Serbian council of ministers. Here credence is given to the 
 report that the Albanians had tails as late as the ninth century, to 
 stories of wounded Albanians shooting the Serb doctors who bend over 
 to give aid, and of women drinking the blood of enemies killed in 
 
 eluding 250,000 Serbs, 150,000 Greeks, and 50,000 Bulgars. All of 
 these figures are probably exaggerated, especially that for the 
 Serbs, since the compiler of the table, M. Petrovich, is himself a 
 Serb. For the large colonies of Vlachs centering around Korcha and 
 Berat see Wace, A.J.B., and Thompson, M.S.; The Nomads of the 
 Balkans . London (1914) . pp. 213-14. 
 fcliot, Sir Charles; op.cit. p. 352. 
 
 ( 19f§ r ^?T 1 ^ cll? ^ • > ^es Albanais et le s grande s Puissances , Paris 
 

 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 the vendetta, and finally to the statement that "les tribus de 
 l'Albanie du Nord se souvient encore de leur origine slave.” Many 
 similar writings of the same tenor by Greeks or Serbs might be cited, 
 the aim of each of which is to prove the Albanian at least a first 
 cousin to his Satanic majesty, and yet a near relative to themselves. 
 
 Collectively the Albanians enjoy a very unsavory reputa- 
 tion even with many disinterested observers. Under Abdul Hamid they 
 were the scapegoats in practically every atrocity committed in 
 Turkey. On the other hand, since most of the Albanians are 
 Mohammedans, and since, to the European traveller, every Mohammedan 
 is a Turk, the Turk has got all the credit for the virtues of the 
 individual Albanians who may be found scattered through the Empire 
 in offices from the highest to the lowest. For, whatever he may be 
 at home, once the Albanian gets away from the restriction of his 
 native mountains, he shows an executive ability coupled with an 
 integrity which can be found in no other Balkan people. 1 
 
 The chief characteristic of the Albanian is an almost 
 ridiculous sense of honor. He has an inflexible code of ethics 
 which permits him to rob violently and at will, but prohibits 
 stealing; which makes the shooting from ambush of an enemy an 
 honorable act, but punishes flirting by death. 2 As a result of this 
 
 ^Brailsford had occasion to employ a large number of Albanians, 
 several of whom were former members of brigand bands, in connection 
 with the distribution of funds for relief purposes in Macedonia 
 during the years 1903-04. The favorable results of his experiences 
 with these men and with representatives of other Balkan peoples are 
 given in Macedonia . Its Races and their Future . pp. 231-28. 
 
 2 Much might be said of the interesting Albanian customs regarding 
 hospitality, marriage, mourning, etc., and about the position of 
 women in this essentially masculine country. A vivid and complete 
 picture of Albanian life and habit is given in Peacock, Wadham; 
 Albania . the Foundling State of Europe . N.Y. (1914) . 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 primitive code of honor the Albanian is continually involved in the 
 blood feud or vendetta. A single murder will often embroil a whole 
 tribe in a long and bloody strife. Gibert gives an example of a 
 feud which began in the diccese of Poulati in 1854, "a propos de 
 quatre cartouches,” lasted two years, and caused 132 deaths and the 
 burning of 1,218 houses. 1 The prevalence of this licensed private 
 warfare may be judged from the fact that the number of violent 
 deaths in northern Albania varies in the different districts from 25 
 to 50 per cent, of the population. As Gibert remarks, the fact that 
 vengeance is usually taken by a surprise attack from the rear 
 deprives the vendetta of any chivalrous character it might otherwise 
 possess . ^ 
 
 The bleak forbidding nature of most of Albania, together 
 with centuries of foreign domination, have combined to keep the 
 Albanians one of the most primitive peoples in Europe. There is 
 practically no native literature. Even the folk songs are but 
 rarely indigenous, the great majority being Slavic or oriental 
 importations. The language itself has been so corrupted by the 
 introduction of Turkish, Slavonic, Greek, and Latin words that little 
 remains which is indubitably Albanian.^ Until the present genera- 
 tion there was not even a generally accepted alphabet. The Latin 
 alphabet with modifications was officially adopted by congresses 
 
 ^Gibert; op.cit. p. 23. 
 
 |lbid. p. 20. 
 
 °The absence of literary monuments has prevented any close 
 historical criticism of the language. The results of the researches 
 made by the numerous German scholars who have studied the language 
 are given in Dako, C. A.; Albania . the Master Key to the Near East , 
 Boston (1919) . pp. 8-14. 
 
, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 held at Monastir in 1908 and at Elbasan in 1909. The Turks, 
 wishing to prevent the publication of Albanian literature in Europe, 
 fought for the adoption of the Arabic alphabet, ostensibly on 
 religious grounds. The Albanian is far from being a religious 
 fanatic, however, so this opposition was largely unsuccessful. The 
 fact that the language was until recently almost entirely unwritten 
 is one of the chief causes of the divergent dialects of the Ghegs 
 and Tosks. So different are these that the inhabitants of one 
 section can understand those of the other only with the greatest 
 difficulty . 
 
 During the last half century numerous spasmodic attempts 
 have been made by patriotic Albanians to unify the language by the 
 establishment of native schools. These efforts were violently and 
 promptly suppressed by the Ottoman government, ably assisted by the 
 semi-political Greek Church, both of which feared any move likely to 
 strengthen Albanian national feeling. In 1907 but one institution, 
 a small school for girls at Korcha, had survived the spiritual and 
 temporal thunders. Practically all the other educational institu- 
 tions in Albania were supported by Greece, Italy, and Austria- 
 Hungary as centers for propaganda. The few primary and secondary 
 schools maintained by the Turkish government were of ridiculously 
 low grade, the Koran being the center of the whole course of study. 
 Most of the wealthy Moslem children were educated in foreign 
 countries. 
 
 The lack of education in Albania is only equalled by the 
 absence of real religious feeling. Both Islam and Christianity 
 came to the Albanians as foreign religions and neither has succeeded 
 in securing any great hold on the people. A large part of the 
 
■« 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
 country became Moslem in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as 
 a matter of expediency, but there remain large groups of Catholics 
 in the north and of members of the Greek Orthodox Church in the 
 south. 1 There is very little friction between the various faiths; 
 at least two are usually represented in every tribe except the 
 Mirdite, which is entirely Catholic. Mohammedans will swear by the 
 Virgin or light a candle in a Christian church to bring good luck, 
 and "the same boy is both baptised and circumcised, and will take 
 his chance on entering either paradise as Ali or George." 2 The 
 Mohammedans of the north are largely Sunnites, that is, followers of 
 the first three caliphs. In the south practically all of the 
 Moslems who take any deep interest in religion are members of the 
 heretical Bektashi sect, which was introduced into the country by 
 the janissaries. The priests of this faith are called dervishes. 
 They preach an idealistic pantheism which is very beautiful in 
 theory, but which, in practice, often leads its devotees to the 
 excessive use of opium and alcohol in their effort to arrive at a 
 state of religious ecstasy. Although there is no open breach 
 between this sect and orthodox Mohammedanism, the Bektashi are 
 accounted heretical. 
 
 The relative states of civilization in northern and 
 southern Albania may be judged from the fact that in the former the 
 primitive tribal system still holds sway, while a modified form of 
 feudalism has been evolved in the south. The peculiar geographical 
 
 ^The use which foreign governments make of the Christian churches 
 as instruments of propaganda will be brought out later. See p. 19. 
 
 J Brailsf ord, H. N. ; Albanians . Turks . and Russians, Contemporary 
 Review, vol. 100, p. 322. 
 

 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
 country became Moslem in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as 
 a matter of expediency, but there remain large groups of Catholics 
 in the north and of members of the Greek Orthodox Church in the 
 south. ^ There is very little friction between the various faiths; 
 at least two are usually represented in every tribe except the 
 Mirdite, which is entirely Catholic. Mohammedans will swear by the 
 Virgin or light a candle in a Christian church to bring good luck, 
 and "the same boy is both baptised and circumcised, and will take 
 his chance on entering either paradise as Ali or George. "2 The 
 Mohammedans of the north are largely Sunnites, that is, followers of 
 the first three caliphs. The south practically all of the Moslems 
 who take any deep interest in religion are members of the heretical 
 Bektashi sect, which was introduced into the country by the 
 janissaries. The priests of this faith are called dervishes. They 
 preach an idealistic pantheism which is very beautiful in theory, 
 but which, in practice, often leads its devotees to the excessive 
 use of opium and alcohol in their effort to arrive at a state of 
 religious ecstasy. Although there is no open breach between this 
 sect and orthodox Mohammedanism, the Bektashi are accounted 
 heretical . 
 
 The relative states of civilization in northern and 
 southern Albania may be judged from the fact that in the former the 
 primitive tribal system still holds sway, while a modified form of 
 feudalism has been evolved in the south. The peculiar geographical 
 
 ■^The use which foreign governments make of the Christian churches 
 as instruments of propaganda will be brought out later. See p. 
 
 2 Brailsford, H. N.: Albanians , Turks , and Russians . Contemporary 
 Review, vol. C, p. 323. 
 
. 
 
9 
 
 conditions of northern Albania have been largely instrumental in 
 preventing the development of political unity, since each tribe is 
 practically isolated from its neighbors by mountain barriers. The 
 authority of the Turkish government was very slight in this 
 inaccessible region. A tribal council conferred with the Vail at 
 Scutari concerning levies of troops and money, but there were prac- 
 tically no local representatives of the Porte. The only recognized 
 legal system in northern Albania is the unwritten code of Leka 
 Dukajini, who is supposed to have lived in the thirteenth or four- 
 teenth century. The tribal government is usually in the hands of 
 the chief and an hereditary council of elders who jointly perform 
 all the ordinary functions of government, including the administra- 
 tion of justice. Even so great a lover of all things Albanian as 
 Miss Durham admits that the tribal laws are "of a most barbarous 
 description," and that the punishments inflicted under them are 
 terrible in their severity. ^ The administration of southern 
 Albania was under the old regime largely in the hands of the great 
 land-owning Beys. The government made some pretense of really 
 ruling here, especially in and near the larger towns, but since the 
 government officials were in many cases the younger sons of the rich 
 native families, there was in reality little outside interference. 10 
 
 The brief summary of Albanian history to 1907 necessary to 
 make clear the situation at that date will serve to bring out two 
 important points. In the first place, through all this record of 
 
 ^Durham, M. E. ; Constitution of North Albania . Contemporary Review. 
 Vol . 94, p. 534. 
 
 2 Gaulis, Georges; La Ruine d'un Empire , Paris (1913) . pp. 3S0-356. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 invasions and conquests by foreign powers, periods of native rule 
 have been few and brief. This furnishes a strong basis for the fear 
 that the Albanians do not possess the qualities essential for the 
 maintenance of a self-governing state. On the other hand, the 
 observer cannot help being struck by the way in which the ethnic 
 unity of the Albanian stock has withstood long centuries of intimate 
 contact with alien peoples. 
 
 From the first to the fourth centuries Albania formed part 
 of the Roman province of Dalmatia and came under the influence of 
 Latin culture. In the third century the great invasions of the 
 Balkan peninsula began, and in the succeeding two centuries Albania 
 was overrun by the Goths, the native inhabitants taking refuge in 
 the mountains. For a short time in the sixth century the oountry 
 again came under the rule of the Eastern Empire, but the end of the 
 seventh century saw practically the whole territory in the hands of 
 the Serbo-Croats, there to remain almost continuously for seven 
 hundred years. To this day most of the place names in northern 
 Albania are of Slavonic origin. 
 
 During this period portions of Albania were at one time or 
 another under Bulgarian, Byzantine, and even Norman rule, but the 
 Serbian power was not finally broken until the death of the great 
 Stephen Dushan (1356) . After that came a period of rule by chief- 
 tains of more or less local origin. The climax of this epoch of 
 native rule and the most glorious period of Albanian history was the 
 defense of the country by George Kastriota (Scanderbeg) who fought 
 thirteen successful campaigns against the Turks between the year 
 1444 and his death in 1466. In 1499, however, the Turks took 
 Durazzo and thus completed the conquest of the country. Under the 
 

 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
11 
 
 rule of Turkey Albanian civilization practically came to a stand- 
 still. There is nothing for the historian to note during the 
 succeeding three centuries except a great movement of Albanians into 
 Old Serbia in the seventeenth century, following the migration of 
 the Serbian inhabitants into Hungary. 
 
 In the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
 there was a recrudescence of native rule, practically independent 
 dynasties being established at Scutari and Janina. Both of these 
 were overthrown by the Turks, but when an attempt was made to 
 strengthen Turkish sovereignty in Albania about the middle of the 
 nineteenth century a series of revolts broke out which soon became 
 chronic. 
 
 At the Congress of Berlin parts of Albanian territory were 
 handed around to her Balkan neighbors with scant regard for ethno- 
 graphical boundaries. As a protest an Albanian League was formed, 
 probably with the assistance of the Porte, ansi was so far successful 
 as to force Montenegro to substitute as her share of the spoils, 
 Dulcigno for the districts of Gusinje and Plava, and to compel the 
 cancellation of the clauses granting territory in southern Albania 
 to Greece. 
 
 Since the usefulness of the league to the Sultan was now 
 ended, and since its members presently began to agitate in favor of 
 autonomy for Albania, an army was sent into the country. After a 
 struggle the league forces were dispersed and its leaders deported. 
 How far this movement represented a genuine nationalist protest it 
 is difficult to say, but it is probable that the prospect of real 
 government under the Montenegrins with all the inevitable restric- 
 tions on time-honored Albanian license was a very real incentive 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
13 
 
 to action. 
 
 Within a few years Abdul Hamid discovered in these same 
 bellicose Albanians the strongest defense of his despotism. The 
 Albanian had nothing to hope for in the breakup of the Empire. He 
 already had everything which he really valued — anarchy at home 
 and the privilege of plundering his neighbors at will. In return, 
 he was only too willing to hold the nationalist movements of western 
 Macedonia in check by a constant guerilla warfare against Serb, 
 Bulgar, and Greek alike. Of more subtle, but no less valuable ser- 
 vice to the Porte was the threat of Albanian revolt which greeted 
 every Macedonian reform project of the Powers. 
 
 By 190? the situation was anything but reassuring. To the 
 north, the Montenegrin frontier was still unsettled in several 
 places, with the result that the disputed territory served as a 
 perennial battleground. In Old Serbia the remaining Slavs were 
 slowly but surely being exterminated by the Albanian immigrants, 
 while Serbia looked on in helpless rage. The marauding tactics of 
 the Albanians in Macedonia had earned for them the hatred of all 
 the races of that region. The struggle of Tosk and Greek for 
 dominance in southern Albania was going on very unostentatiously 
 but none the less bitterly. The chief weapon there was the Albanian 
 spelling-book, an object of deadly hatred to Greek and Turk alike. x 
 
 "^Woods, H. C. ; The Danger Zone of Europe , London (1811) . pp. 87-130. 
 

 
 
 
 
 * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN 1907 
 
 Of late years much has been heard about a very elusive 
 body of principles called the "Rights of Small Nations." In prac- 
 tice these "rights" have usually been just about what the Great 
 Powers chose to make them. In the case of Albania they have been 
 exactly what the Powers were forced to make them. 
 
 The geography of the Adriatic littoral has been the 
 dominating element in the international aspect of the Albanian 
 situation. In 1907 the heel of Italy was the most vulnerable part 
 of the peninsula, for on the east coast of that heel there was not 
 a single harbor worthy of the name. And directly across the 
 Adriatic, less than fifty miles from Otranto, was Valona, a squalid, 
 dirty Albanian town with a harbor which with a little development 
 and fortification could be made to dominate the entrance to the 
 Adriatic. Obviously Italy could not tolerate the occupation of this 
 key position by a rival power. The situation was equally delicate 
 for Italy's ally and traditional enemy, Austria-Hungary. Valona in 
 the hands of a hostile nation would mean a land-locked Austrian 
 Empire. The extremists in both countries hoped for even more than 
 this merely negative security. If the Adriatic were ever to become 
 an Italian lake, as the more violent of the Irredentists hoped, 
 Albania must become part of Italy; while Austria had great hopes of 
 bringing Albania under Habsburg control by means of the projected 
 Novibazar railway. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
 For Serbia also the geographical problem was of primary 
 importance. Despite the fact that the country along the Drin is 
 very rough, the natural outlet for Serbian commerce is through 
 northern Albania. The Montenegrin mountains are impassible in win- 
 ter and the building of a railway through them would present almost 
 insoluble problems. With the undeveloped Albanian ports in the hands 
 of Turkey, therefore, and with the Montenegrin coast inaccessible, 
 Serbia was forced to send most of her exports through Austria- 
 Hungary. The ignominy of this situation was brought home to the 
 Serbians at frequent intervals by Austrian embargoes on the importa- 
 tion of swine, the largest export of Serbia. Whether or not the 
 embargoes really were set up in order to prevent the spread of hog 
 cholera the Serbian farmer neither knew nor cared. But he was pain- 
 fully aware of the fact that the prosperity of his country was 
 dependent on the good will of a foreign power. Serbia was at best 
 a second-rate power, however, and economic necessity is rarely 
 considered a sufficient justification for the land-hunger of small 
 states. For this reason the Serbs to a large extent rested their 
 claim on historic grounds. 
 
 The rivalry of Italy and Austria in the Adriatic began 
 immediately after the unification of Italy. For a time Austria more 
 than maintained her position. By the Treaty of Berlin she was con- 
 firmed in the possession of the Sanjak of Novibazar, a strip of 
 enormous strategic value and as a result insured the separation of 
 Serbia and Montenegro and opened a channel for the passage of 
 Austrian propaganda into Albania and Macedonia. The situation 
 changed, however, with the creation of the Triple Alliance. Austria 
 hoped to gain two negative but important things from this alliance: 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 freedom from the danger of hostile Italian intervention in case of 
 an Austro-Russian war, and the cessation of the Irredentist propa- 
 ganda in Italy. To what extent Austrian expectations were justified 
 it is beyond the scope of this study to determine. The important 
 point to be noted here is that Italy demanded greater and greater 
 concessions in return, practically all of which were granted under 
 pressure from Berlin. 1 * The original treaty of the Triple Alliance 
 (1882) made no direct mention of Balkan affairs. Five years later 
 Italy, Great Britain, and Austria-Hungary, undertook by an exchange 
 of notes to maintain the status quo in the Balkans, without, however, 
 as Lord Salisbury was very careful to make plain, "determining 
 beforehand the character which the cooperation . . . ought in any 
 particular contingency to take." 3 While Austrian participation in 
 this agreement was still being discussed the Triple Alliance was 
 renewed. This time Italy succeeded in securing a separate treaty 
 with Austria providing for the occupation of Balkan territory only 
 on the basis of an agreement between the two powers. 3 It is not at 
 
 1 Until very recently it was impossible to trace accurately the 
 course of Austr o-Italian rivalry in Albania. Much of the obscurity 
 has been cleared away, however, by the publication of the series of 
 treaties centering around the Triple Alliance (Pribram, A.F.; ed. , 
 The Secret Treaties of Austria - Hungary 1879-1914 . English edition 
 by A.C.Coolidge, Cambridge, 1920 . ) While this collection contains 
 only documents found in the Austrian archives, the Adriatic question 
 was of such vital importance to the Habsburg monarchy that there is 
 but slight possibility of the existence of further important 
 material. Some of the treaties in this work have been published 
 elsewhere, but for convenience in reference it has seemed best to 
 use but the one source wherever possible. 
 
 glbid. p.103. N 
 
 "... cette occupation n'aura lieu qu'apres un accord prealable 
 entre les deux susdites puissances, base sur le principe d'une 
 compensation reciproque pour tout avantage territorial ou autre que 
 chacune d'elles obtiendrait en sus du statu quo actuel, et donnant 
 faction aux interets et aux pretentions bien fondles des deux 
 
 nart lea 
 
 Ibid, n. 108 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
 all improbable that Austrian statesmen were influenced in agreeing 
 to this convention by the thought of the already consummated British- 
 Italian rapprochement . Similarly, when the third treaty of the 
 Triple Alliance was made in 1891 Austria was at a disadvantage 
 because of the increasingly manifest friendship between France and 
 Russia. Italy, therefore, was in an excellent position to secure 
 further concessions. This time the Austro-Italian Balkan agreement 
 was incorporated as an integral part of the main treaty, which was 
 now put in the general form which it retained until 1914.^ 
 
 The first direct reference to Albania in the correspon- 
 dence between Italy and Austria was made in 1900 in connection with 
 an interpellation in the Italian Chamber of Deputies. The Minister 
 of Foreign Affairs, Signor Venosta, answered the question by stating 
 that Austria and Italy were working for the maintenance of the 
 status quo in Albania. He communicated this reply to Vienna, and 
 sought confirmation not only of this statement of policy but also 
 of the oral agreement reached with the Austrian Foreign Minister in 
 1897 by which the two powers agreed to use their efforts, "au cas ou 
 l'Stat de chose s actuel ne pourrait “etre conserve, et ou des 
 changements s ' imposeraient, afin que les modifications y relatives 
 se r€alisent dans le sens de 1' autonomie . w This position, accepted 
 by Austria, was maintained through all the subsequent Balkan dif- 
 ficulties. 
 
 By these successive steps Italy had succeeded in putting 
 herself on an equal basis with Austria in the settlement of Albanian 
 
 ilbid. pp. 150-163. 
 *Ibid. pp. 196-201. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 i ■ i - ' ! -c-, v >.-r n **j i s ■ ■ \i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 affairs. Further than this neither could allow the other to go, 
 and a stalemate resulted which obtained official recognition in 
 Italy in a speech made before the Italian Chamber of Deputies in 
 1905 by Foreign Minister Tittoni: 
 
 "Albania has no great importance in itself, but 
 its littoral and its ports are all-important, as 
 they would assure to Austria or Italy, if either 
 of the two powers possessed them, the uncontested 
 military supremacy in the Adriatic. Now, neither 
 can Italy allow Austria such supremacy, nor could 
 Austria to Italy, and if ever one of them should 
 claim it, the other would have to use every means 
 to oppose it. This is the logic of the situation. 
 
 Therefore, the two states, preferring and sincerely 
 desiring peace and the maintenance of the alliance, 
 have both renounced to any eventual occupation of 
 Albania in case of the perturbation of the status 
 quo . " 1 
 
 In ISO? neither power had any pronounced advantage. If Italy had no 
 good harbor on the Strait of Otranto, the Austrian port at Cattaro 
 was unfit for naval use because dominated by Montenegrin forts. 
 Austria’s real naval center was at Pola, somewhat further from the 
 
 p 
 
 Strait than the Italian base at Taranto. 
 
 The chief opposition to the Austro-Italian policy of 
 autonomy for Albania came from Serbia and her protector, Russia. 
 Serbia herself figures only once in the net-work of treaties which 
 grew up after the Congress of Berlin. An Austrc-Serb alliance was 
 made in 1881 in which provision was made for possible Serbian expan- 
 sion to the south — excepting in the Sanjak of Novibazar This 
 
 ^■Tittoni, Tommasa; Italy* s Fore ign and Colonial Policy , English 
 edition by San Severino, Baron Bernardo Quaranta di. London (1914). 
 
 p. 18. 
 o 
 
 Peacock, W. ; Italy and Albania , Contemporary Review, vol. 107, 
 p* 362. 
 
 ^Pribram; op. cit. pp. 50-55. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IS 
 
 last provision effectively barred any Serb progress in the direction 
 of Albania. For the rest, Serbian interests were cared for by the 
 great Slav power. While the Austro-Serb treaty was being drafted 
 at Belgrade the short-lived League of the Three Emperors — of 
 Germany, Russia, and Austria — was signed at Berlin, providing that 
 "de nouvelles modifications dans le statu quo territorial de la 
 Turquie d'Europe ne pourront s'accomplir qu'en vertu d'un commun 
 accord . n x This principle governed the policies of Austria and 
 Russia until 189? when a conference was held between Francis Joseph 
 and Nicholas II. Austria at this time made an attempt to secure 
 Russian support for the creation of an independent Albania in case 
 the status quo in the Balkans should be disturbed. Russia evaded 
 the proposal by saying that this, and the larger problem of the 
 partition of Turkey in Europe, "touchent a des questions d'avenir 
 sur lesquelles il serait premature et bien difficile de statuer 
 actuellement . With this statement Austria was compelled to be 
 content. The attitude of both powers at this time showed con- 
 clusively that their interests in Albania were irreconcilable. 
 
 Russia was determined to secure a sea-coast for her protegee; Austria 
 feared the presence of a potentially hostile Slav power in the 
 southern Adriatic and wished to continue the economic dependence of 
 Serbia on Austrian good-will. 
 
 Within Albania itself Italian influence was increasing 
 steadily in 1907. Here the rivalry between Italy and Austria was 
 
 Jlbid. p. 38 . 
 
 ^Ibid. pp. 184-195. It should be noted that the conversations 
 between the Austrian and Italian foreign ministers referred to in 
 the exchange of notes of 1900 took place in 1897. See above, p. 16. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 L, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
 largely commercial, religious, and educational. Until the beginning 
 of the century the Austrian Lloyd steamers had held a practical 
 monopoly on the rather meagre commerce of Albania, but the Italians 
 were already commercially entrenched at Valona and gradually spread 
 their sphere of influence as far north as Durazzo. By the opening 
 of our period Italian was the language of trade in both of these 
 towns. 1 In the religious field Austria was not easy to supplant. 
 Treaties with both the Porte and the Vatican guaranteed her position 
 as protector of Albanian Catholics, and a large number of the native 
 priests were educated in Austria and received regular annuities from 
 the Austrian government. The Jesuits and Franciscans who had charge 
 of the numerous schools maintained by the Dual Monarchy in Albania 
 were far more active in spreading Austrian than Catholic propaganda. 
 The Church being under the control of Austria, Italy was forced to 
 rely largely on secular weapons. These proved, however, in the long 
 run to be more effective among the essentially non-religious 
 Albanians. The schools maintained by Austria were open only to 
 Catholics and in many ways tended to increase religious discord. 
 
 The Italian institutions, on the other hand, were usually under the 
 
 2 
 
 control of laymen and were attended by Moslems and Catholics alike. 
 
 The propaganda of the Greeks, because it was the most 
 successful, was perhaps the most obnoxious to the few Albanian 
 nationalists existing in 1907. Mention has already been made of the 
 educational activity of the Orthodox church, acting aa the agent of 
 the Greek government, in southern Albania. So effective were the 
 
 ^Peacock, W. ; Italy and Albania . Contemporary Review. Vol.107, 
 
 Pa 363. 
 
 floods, H.C.; The Danger Zone of Europe, London (1911). pp. 91-93. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 proselytizing methods of these institutions that few intelligent 
 Tosks graduated from the Greek gymnasia without a tincture of 
 Greek sympathy. The home language, however, remained Albanian, 
 because of the ignorance of the women. It seems very probable that 
 the Albanian cause must have been entirely lost in Northern Epirus 
 if the Greeks had been far-sighted enough to provide educational 
 facilities for women. 
 
 Largely because of its geographical position, then, 
 Albania, with its fifteenth century civilization, was by 1907, 
 altogether against the will of the Albanians, involved in the web 
 of treaty and intrigue which makes up twentieth century politics. 
 The events of the years following are merely so many more or less 
 logical and inevitable conclusions resulting from premises estab- 
 lished in the years following the Congress of Berlin. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE WINNING OF AUTONOMY 
 
 Recent Albanian writers have endeavored to give the im- 
 pression that the Albanians, or at least a large portion of them, 
 were consciously working in the direction of autonomy in the years 
 preceding the Young Turk Revolution; ^t hat " in embracing the cause 
 of the Turkish Constitution, and in allying themselves with the 
 Young Turks, the Albanians were simply abiding by the dictates of 
 their traditional policy", and, finally, that the revolts of 
 1910-12 were the expression of an almost unanimous national deter- 
 mination to secure autonomy. This is an extremely satisfactory 
 theory from the patriotic point of view, but the history of the 
 period, far from showing any traces of so complete a program, indi- 
 cates rather that there was no considerable feeling of national 
 solidarity as late as 1912. 
 
 On one point, however, all were united — in their 
 opposition to any strengthening of governmental control. As a 
 corollary to this, foreign intervention was universally feared. In 
 1903, by the Miirzsteg Program, Russia and Austria had established 
 
 1,1 Summing up, the policy of the Albanians had two distinct objects: 
 
 1. To preserve the Ottoman Empire as a means to their national 
 end, so as to gain time for the preparation of Albania. 
 
 2. To secure an autonomous administration for Albania which 
 would serve as a stepping stone to complete independence." 
 
 Chekrezi, C. A.; op.cit. p.63. 
 
 2 Ibid. p . 66. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
 foreign assessors and gendarmes in Macedonia. But foreign super- 
 vision of tax gathering meant that the taxes would actually be 
 collected, and a foreign police power meant the enforcement of 
 Turkish law, both of which results would be scandalous and out- 
 rageous infringements on traditional Albanian anarchy. The presence 
 of the excellently equipped and comparatively opulent foreign 
 soldiery, moreover, was a continual source of disaffection among 
 the numerous Albanians who were serving as junior officers in the 
 unpaid and decrepit Turkish army. 1 Both the Austrian and the 
 Russian representatives soon fell into the old game of spreading 
 the propaganda of their respective countries, so that, while they 
 remained a source of irritation, the foreigners did but little to 
 preserve order. In the eastern areas of Kossovo and Monastir, 
 
 however, spasmodic attempts were made to enforce conscription and 
 
 2 
 
 to collect taxes, with chronic unrest as the result. The Young 
 Turks found willing converts among these discontented elements. 
 
 Most of the program of the revolutionists was quite beyond the com- 
 prehension of the "single-track" mind of the Albanian; sufficient 
 for him that foreign interference was to be ended. The Turk he had 
 always been able to disobey almost at will; the "Giaours" — or 
 foreigners — were more exacting and persistent task -masters. 
 
 News of the Reval Program, with its promise of extended 
 foreign control, reached Albania in June of 1908 and acted as a 
 precipitant for the accumulated fears of the mountaineers. On 
 July 3, 1908, the revolution was really begun by the flight of 
 
 iKnight, E. F. ; Turkey , Boston (1910). pp. 87-89. 
 
 ^Eliot; op.cit. p . 3 54 . 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
 Major Niazi Bey, a Mussulman Albanian, to the hills near his native 
 village, Resna. Here the standard of revolt was formally raised 
 and the tribesmen summoned to the task of ridding the country of 
 foreign interference and internal corruption. Within a remarkably 
 short time the country between Resna, Dibra, and Monastir had been 
 won over to the Young Turk cause. 1 Other revolutionary leaders, 
 such as Enver Bey, started similar revolts in various parts of 
 western Macedonia. 
 
 The success of these more or less spasmodic and uncon- 
 nected movements was practically assured by a great gathering of 
 Albanians at Ferisovitch, called partly to protest against foreign 
 intervention in general as contemplated under the Reval Program, and 
 partly to end the vicious activities of the Austrian consul, under 
 whose protection it was believed that brothels and gambling houses 
 were demoralizing the younger men of the district. Some sort of 
 telegram was sent by this gathering to the Sultan at the instigation 
 of the Young Turk representatives. Inasmuch as the meeting was 
 held under the auspices of a supporter of Abdul Hamid, this message 
 was probably a more or less indefinite petition for reform, but by 
 the time it reached Constantinople Young Turk telegraph operators 
 
 had changed the form so that the Constitution was categorically 
 2 
 
 demanded. It was this telegram which convinced Abdul Hamid of the 
 futility of resistance; as Dr. Dillon says, "When the Sultan became 
 aware of the defection of his most loyal defenders, he probably 
 
 ^Knight; op.cit. p.133. 
 
 2 See Woods; op.cit. p.95, and Pears, op.cit. pp. 287-88 for state- 
 ments of the purpose and importance of this meeting. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
 uttered the Turkish equivalent of Caesar's 'tu quoque fili mi,' 
 and resigned himself to the ine vi table . " ^ 
 
 The formal granting of the Constitution was celebrated 
 riotously in Albania, headsmen of the tribes assembling at Scutari 
 to swear a "bessa" — the Albanian Peace of God. The Mirdites 
 alone held back. Their ruler, Prenk Bib Doda, had been a virtual 
 prisoner at Constantinople since the suppression of the Albanian 
 League. Until he should return, his subjects would have nothing to 
 do with the new government. The Young Turks, as yet unsure of 
 their position, released the Prenk at once, and the Mirdites also 
 joined the supporters of the Constitution. Gatherings were held at 
 the chief Albanian towns to arrange for the opening of native 
 schools, and a congress was called to devise a national alphabet. 
 
 A feeling of child-like buoyancy and hope was apparent everywhere. 
 Miss Durham, who was travelling through the mountain districts at 
 this time, encountered grotesquely distorted ideas of the new 
 regime : 
 
 "Every one had a huge list of things — trifles 
 such as railways, roads, factories, and above all, 
 free schools — that were desired of the government, 
 and no one had the least idea that he himself had a 
 duty towards the government. The 'Constitution' was 
 a sort of 'magic dicky' that was to create every- 
 thing out of nothing. A rumor that they might have 
 to contribute either work or money in order to attain 
 these things caused great wrath. "2 
 
 Discordant elements began to appear almost at once. 
 Officials without any knowledge of the country were appointed by the 
 
 ^Dillon, E. J.; Foreign Affairs . Contemporary Review, vol . 94, p. 389 . 
 
 ^Durham, M. E. ; Constitution in North Albania , Contemporary Review, 
 vol. 94, pp. 540-41, ~ 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
 Young Turks, and their blunders soon revived all the old animosi- 
 ties. While the festivities were still in progress in Scutari the 
 arrest of several tribesmen for an offense not punishable under 
 tribal law again put the mountaineers in a state of unrest. In Old 
 Serbia the military command was given to Djavid Pasha, who had been 
 forced to flee for his life from the tribesmen of this same area 
 but a short time before. 1 Djavid immediately and conclusively 
 proved himself unregenerate in the eyes of the Albanians by under- 
 taking an unsuccessful expedition against Isa Boletin, a popular 
 and influential chief who, like his mediaeval prototype, the robber 
 baron, had long kept his followers prosperous by periodical raids 
 on the unwarlike peasants of Macedonia. Other sources of friction 
 were all too numerous. Educated Albanians felt that their services 
 to the cause of the Revolution were ignored when administrative 
 positions were being filled; enterprising assessors undertook to 
 collect arrears in taxes in addition to the comparatively heavy 
 current levies; the attempt to destroy all fortified houses and to 
 disarm the mountaineers seemed a blow at the traditional defenses 
 of the Albanian against governmental tyranny. Most heartily 
 detested of all, however, was the order for the taking of a census. 
 The delicate Albanian sense of honor resented questions concerning 
 the feminine members of the households. Also, the tribesmen had a 
 shrewd suspicion that the census would form the basis for new taxes 
 and for conscription. Already young men were being drafted into 
 the hated Yemen, or Arabian service.^ 
 
 gWoods; op.cit. p.98. 
 
 'Brailsford, H. N. ; Albanians . Turks . and Russians . Contemporary 
 Review, vol. 100, p.335. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
 An uneasy state of peace continued until the spring of 
 1910. Then a great meeting of Albanians was held at Prishtina 
 and an ultimatum sent to Constantinople protesting against the 
 Young Turk policy of "Ottomanization” and all that went with it. 
 
 The Porte replied by sending a large army, including many Kurdish 
 troops, to the disaffected area. The unrest, the Turks claimed, 
 was entirely caused by chieftains who disliked the new regime 
 because the subsidies of Abdul Hamid were now cut off. 1 The error 
 of this statement was proved by the vigorous opposition encountered 
 by the army. The Katchanik Pass, a vulnerable point on the Uskub- 
 Mitrovitsa railway line, was occupied by the Albanians and defended 
 until the arrival of overwhelming Turkish reinforcements. The 
 revolt then degenerated into a scattering guerilla struggle which 
 only succeeded in keeping alive Albanian animosity for the Young 
 Turk. The lull, however, merely meant that the tribesmen were out 
 of ammunition. Brailsford, speaking of earlier uprisings, says, 
 "the Albanians seem incapable of the long years of preparation 
 which precede a Bulgarian revolt. They collect no war chest, and 
 they amass no magazines of ammunition. Their risings, accordingly, 
 are alarming but brief adventures, and if the Turks can survive 
 until each man has shot away his beltful of cartridges, they may 
 enjoy their triumph — until the following spring." 2 
 
 During the revolt of 1910 great numbers of Albanians had 
 fled across the Montenegrin frontier. These, in the course of the 
 
 ^Pears, Sir Edwin; Developments in Turkey , Contemporary Review, 
 vo 1 . 97, p. 701. 
 
 2 Brailsford; Macedonia , p.267. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2? 
 
 winter, gradually drifted back to their homes, bringing with them 
 confused rumors of promised Montenegrin aid against the Turks. 
 Circulars purporting to have been written by Riciotti Garibaldi and 
 promising the aid of his ’’Red Shirts" in a war for Albanian inde- 
 pendence were mysteriously distributed.* 3 " These extremely vague 
 promises of foreign help were sufficient to arouse once more to 
 action the mountain men, already incensed by the terrible blunder 
 of the governor of Scutari, who had proclaimed a Holy War against 
 
 the Christian tribes, and by the barbarous methods used by the 
 
 2 
 
 Kurdish troops in "pacifying" disaffected areas. Soon practically 
 all of northern Albania was in arms. The strength of the particu- 
 larist spirit was now clearly shown. The Mirdites, who had remained 
 inactive in the first revolt, again refused to join with the moun- 
 tain men. Even among the latter there was very little cooperation, 
 some of the tribes refusing either to give help to their fellow 
 insurgents or to receive aid from them. 
 
 The Montenegrins were furious at the premature action of 
 the Albanians, which had attracted the attention of the Powers to 
 this corner of Europe before Montenegro was ready for action. Large 
 quantities of arms and ammunition were sent more or less openly 
 across the frontier, but the Montenegrin army could do nothing, 4 
 especially when Russia declined to back the Black Mountain in a 
 
 ^Durham, M. E.; The Struggle for Scutari . London (1914). p.19. 
 
 ^Miller, William; The Ottoman Empire , 1801-1913 , Cambridge (191b). 
 p. 495. 
 
 3_ 
 
 Durham, op.cit. p.45. 
 
 orailsford, H. N.; Albanians . Turks . and Russians , pp. 329-30. 
 

 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
 proposed Balkan War. There could be little doubt as to the result 
 of the revolt now that Montenegro was barred from active participa- 
 tion. The lowlands of eastern Albania were occupied by the Turks 
 early in June, and the Sultan himself came to Old Serbia to cele- 
 brate the return of peace. An amnesty for the rebels was proclaimed 
 on the eleventh of June in connection with a great military review, 
 and five days later, before the tomb of Murad I, the Sultan 
 announced that financial aid would be given for the rebuilding of 
 devastated areas, and that the Albanian nationality would henceforth 
 receive recognition. 1 
 
 These terms were communicated to the mountaineers later 
 
 in the month, accompanied by a threat of annihilation if they were 
 2 
 
 refused. The Malissori, still blindly hoping for foreign help, 
 continued their struggle. By July, however, most of the women and 
 children of the tribesmen and a great many of the fighting men as 
 well had been forced into Montenegro. An armistice was concluded 
 early in July and continued, despite numerous violations, through 
 the whole month. By the beginning of August the patience of the 
 Montenegrins was exhausted, and the Albanians were forced to make 
 peace as best they could and to leave Montenegrin territory. The 
 Turks agreed to grant an amnesty to the rebels, to aid in the 
 reconstruction of the burned villages, to suspend all taxes for two 
 years, and to construct roads and schools. The Albanians were to be 
 given the privilege of carrying arms outside of the towns and were 
 
 ^ears, Sir Edwin; op.cit. pp. 30-21. 
 
 2 Durham, M. E.; op.cit. pp. 58-59. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 V 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 not to be forced to serve in the Yemen.- 1 There was one significant 
 omission in the agreement. All through the negotiations the 
 Albanians insisted on the necessity for a European guarantee of the 
 terms in the hope that by this expedient the benefits of foreign 
 interference might be secured without the drawbacks. The Young 
 Turks absolutely refused to accede to this suggestion, however, 
 and in the end the Albanians were forced to yield. 
 
 The winter of 1911-12 sealed the fate of the Turk in 
 Albania. The Malissori returned to their ruined homes defeated but 
 only temporarily subdued. The government made a determined but 
 tragically ineffectual effort to fulfill the terms of peace, for at 
 every turn the hopeless inefficiency of the administrative machinery 
 was glaringly apparent. Money sent to Scutari for relief purposes 
 was diverted on the way by unpaid officials. The war with Italy 
 made the importation of house-building materials and clothing 
 exceedingly difficult. As usual, the incompetence of the Turkish 
 officials complicated the situation. The difficulties with which 
 the government was forced to cope meant little to the Albanian, 
 however. He only knew that his house was burned, that there was no 
 harvest, and that the promises of the Turk were, as usual, not 
 being kept. A violent dispute arose also over the interpretation 
 of the terms of peace. The Turks claimed that they had promised to 
 restore the "maisons" only of the insurgents; the Albanian copy of 
 the agreement read "immeubles" i.e., all permanent improvements . s 
 
 ^Miller; op.cit. p.496. 
 
 woods, H. C. ; The Situation in Albania and Macedonia . Fortnightly 
 Review, vol. 91, pp. 913-14. 
 

 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
30 
 
 Then, to complete the worries of the Vali, the tribes which had not 
 rebelled poured into Scutari demanding the same indemnities as the 
 rebels, insisting, logically enough, that it was not fair to 
 penalize those who had remained loyal. Arguments were of no avail 
 against the outraged non-combatants, who left vowing that next 
 year their turn would come. 
 
 In the spring all northern Albania prepared for the 
 annual revolt. Even the Mirdites were now showing signs of dis- 
 loyalty, since the Young Turks had chosen this inauspicious time to 
 deprive Prenk Beb Doda of his suzerainty over neighboring tribes. 
 
 A perfunctory request for administrative autonomy was made by the 
 Albanians, and quite as mechanically denied by the government. The 
 usual spasmodic unorganized warfare then began. To all appearances 
 this was to be a typical Albanian revolt, ending with the usual 
 concessions which would be, again as usual, never carried out. But 
 this time the Turkish soldiery in Albania took command of the 
 situation, as in 1908. Their discontent had been growing steadily 
 as the Italian war went more and more against the Turks. The 
 government of the Committee of Union and Progress was blamed for all 
 the misfortunes of the Empire, and demands for the formation of a 
 new cabinet were openly made by the soldiers. In the latter part 
 of June several large detachments revolted, and many actually 
 joined forces with the Albanians. Largely because of this discon- 
 tent the Committee government was replaced in July by a more liber- 
 al ministry which succeeded in arranging an armistice. In August 
 the furthest demands of the insurgents were met by the granting of 
 administrative autonomy to the vilayets of Scutari, Kossovo, Janina, I 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
and Monastir, the four to comprise the province of Albania. 1 
 
 In the short space of four years, therefore, the 
 Albanians had changed from the staunchest supporters to the 
 bitterest enemies of Turkish dominion in Europe. The Young Turk 
 policy of " Ot t oraani zat ion" was the most potent factor in the 
 creation of discontent, but the inexperience and lack of effi- 
 ciency of the officials appointed by the new government, and the 
 skilful exploitation by Russia, acting through Montenegro, of 
 this favorable opportunity to weaken the Turkish power were also 
 active forces. Albanian nationalism, as a force working for 
 independence, was a negligible consideration, if it existed at all. 
 Even in the last and most successful rebellion of these years the 
 Albanians did not present a united front. The Tosks took but 
 little part in the revolt, and even some of the northern tribes, 
 despite the almost unbearable maladministration, showed but slight 
 interest . 
 
 ^Chekrezi, op.cit. pp. 68-69. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND ALBANIAN INDEPENDENCE 
 
 Balkan history is rarely pleasant reading; the story of 
 the years 1912 and 1913 is one of the most disgusting in all human 
 history. Twentieth century civilization loses much of its glamor 
 when the record of the modern Greek is compared with that of his 
 classical ancestor, and there is nothing to be found in all the 
 chronicles of the great Slavic invasions of mediaeval times which 
 does not seem temperate and humane when read in conjunction with 
 the starkly horrible tale of the "wars of liberation” as told by 
 impartial investigators. 1 Even in the conduct of the Great Powers 
 there is but slight evidence of any but unscrupulously selfish 
 motives. Upon almost every event of this period the Albanian 
 question had some influence, direct or indirect. The fate of 
 Albania itself, however, was determined by the attitude of the two 
 rival groups of Powers, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, 
 so that but little attention need be devoted either to the actions 
 of the Albanians themselves, or to the military operations of the 
 Balkan allies after the war was really under way. The main prob- 
 lem will be to show clearly the balancing and adjusting of rival 
 ambitions which resulted, in the first place, in the setting up of 
 an Albanian state of any kind, then in the fixing of admittedly 
 
 ■^Dotation Carnegie pour la Paix Internationale; E?nquete dans les 
 Balkans . Rapport . Paris (1914) . 
 

 ■ 
 
 
 
 | 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
 unjust boundaries for the new state. 
 
 The creation of an autonomous Albania, while not the 
 sole cause of the Balkan Wars, made war practically inevitable, 
 and hastened the opening of hostilities. The alliances between 
 Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece were made early in 1912, before the 
 Albanian revolt had assumed serious proportions. The success of 
 the uprising had a very decided effect on the policies of the 
 allies, however. As M. Guechoff, then premier of Bulgaria, 
 remarks, "tous ces evenements . . . eurent un echo si puissant a 
 Sofia, Belgrade, Athenes et Cettigne qu'il etait facile de prevoir 
 qu'ils ne manqueraient pas de provoquer des consequences graves."^ 
 The fact that all four of the western vilayets were put under 
 Albanian control was especially distasteful, since each of the 
 states hoped to secure a portion of this territory. Montenegro, 
 which had been advocating the creation of an autonomous Malissori 
 
 p 
 
 province in northern Albania under Montenegrin protection, now 
 abandoned all pretense of pacific intent and openly prepared for 
 war. The Serbian plan for the division of European Turkey into 
 spheres of influence for the four neighboring states was also 
 
 ■7 
 
 frustrated by the creation of this "grande Albanie . 
 
 The seeds of the Second Balkan War, moreover, may be 
 found in the failure of Serbia and Bulgaria to make any provision 
 against possible successful opposition to Serbian expansion in 
 Albania. In view of previous Austrian declarations on the subject 
 
 ^Guechoff, Iv.-E.; L* alliance Balkanique , Paris (1915). p.82. 
 
 ^Evans, Sir Arthur; The Drama of the Balkans, Contemporary Review, 
 vol. 102, p.775. 
 
 ^Dotation Carnegie, op.cit. p. 29. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
 it is highly improbable that the possibility of such interference 
 should have been overlooked. Rather, it would seem, the Serbians 
 relied on a combination of two factors — suddenness of attack, 
 and Russian support. The declarations of both Serbian and 
 Montenegrin military men before the war indicate that little 
 opposition was expected on the Albanian front. The Montenegrins 
 boasted of their ability to take Scutari within two weeks of the 
 opening of hostilities, and were so confident that but slight 
 opposition would be met that practically no provision was made for 
 the care of wounded soldiers. 1 It was hoped, therefore, that the 
 rapid completion of the conquest of northern Albania would permit 
 the Allies to confront Austria with a fait accompli before the 
 latter power should have time to protest; if any opposition were 
 then shown, Russia could be relied upon to back up the claims of 
 the Slav powers. Unfortunately for Serbia, neither calculation 
 was justified by the event. To be sure, the Malissori did join 
 forces with the Montenegrins, in spite of the "betrayal" of 1911, 
 but the Mirdites, bribed by the Young Turks with gifts of arms 
 and with promises of concessions, passively resisted the invasion, 
 while the Moslems showed the strength of Islam by refusing to 
 
 p 
 
 cooperate with their Christian "liberators." Delayed partly by 
 Turkish and Albanian opposition, but even more by the appalling 
 lack of efficiency in their own army, the Montenegrins did not 
 invest Scutari until late in November. The importance of this 
 
 ^Durham, M. E.; The Struggle for Scutari , pp.67, 182-83. 
 
 2 Nevinson, W. ; The Causes of Victory and the Spoils , Contemporary 
 Review, vol. 103, p.9. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 delay and of the subsequent resistance of Scutari can scarcely be 
 1 
 
 overestimated. During these precious weeks Austria was able, not 
 only to stir up a respectable amount of anti-Serb sentiment at 
 home, b it also to line up the other members of the Triple Alliance 
 solidly for an autonomous Albania. 
 
 The sentiment of the Triple Allies with regard to the 
 Albanian question was crystallized early in November by the note 
 which M. Poincare, then premier of France, addressed to the Powers 
 asking for expressions of "disinterestedness” in regard to the 
 
 p 
 
 territorial questions involved in the Balkan struggle. This 
 
 request, which was euphemistically referred to as "unfortunate” 
 
 by even the Entente press within a few days of its publication, 
 
 was received with a storm of disapproval by the Triple Alliance. 
 
 Public agitation began immediately in the Viennese press in favor 
 
 of Albanian independence, and Germany showed every sign of sup- 
 
 2 
 
 porting her ally in this policy. Premier Asquith sought to calm 
 the storm in his Guildhall speech of November S. In this he 
 pleaded against "the raising and pressing of isolated questions, 
 which, if handled separately and at once, seem likely to lead to 
 irreconcilable divergences, but which might assume a different and 
 perhaps a more tractable aspect if they are reserved to be dealt 
 
 1 ”The resistance of the garrison of Yanina to the Greeks and the 
 resistance of the garrison of Scutari to the Serbs, had more direct 
 effect on the political results of the war than all the bloody 
 battles and combats in the field. For it was the resistance of 
 these garrisons that made it possible for Europe to establish an 
 autonomous Albania.” — Courtney of Penwith, ed.; Nationalism 
 and War in the Near East , Oxford (1915) . p.201. 
 
 ^ The London Times , 1912, Nov. 2, p.5,col. 1. 
 
 ^Ibid. Nov. 4, p.S, col.l; Nov. 6, p.7, col.l. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
 with from the wider point of view of a general settlement."^ This 
 sensible suggestion had a noticeably sobering effect, but the 
 Austrian press was inclined to look somewhat askance at another 
 portion of the same speech, where, amid wild applause, according 
 to the Times . Mr. Asquith proclaimed that "upon one thing I believe 
 the general opinion of Europe to be unanimous — that the victors 
 
 p 
 
 are not to be robbed of the fruits which cost them so dear." 
 Viennese editorial comment on this might be condensed into 
 Priscilla’s demure "Speak for yourself, John," and the semi- 
 official press openly stated that Ismail Kemal Bey, later head of 
 the Provisional Government of Albania, who was then in Vienna, 
 
 had received assurances from the Austrian government that Albania 
 
 3 
 
 would be set up as an independent state. Italian governmental 
 feeling as shown in the ministerial press reflected views very 
 similar to those of Austria, and Germany, despite Socialist anti- 
 Austrian demonstrations, went to the length of securing assurances 
 from the Russian foreign minister to the effect that Russia would 
 not go to war over the question of an Adriatic port for Serbia. 4 
 
 Deserted by her traditional supporter, and confronted by 
 the united opposition of the Triple Alliance, Serbia began to 
 recede from her extreme position. On November 21, the Serbian 
 Foreign Office intimated that the Balkan Allies might consent to 
 
 5 
 
 the creation of an independent Albania. A few days later M. 
 Pashitch, the Serbian prime minister, confirmed this report, but 
 
 Jlbid. Nov. 11, 
 “Ibid. Nov. 11, 
 -Ibid. Nov. 11, 
 |lbid. Nov. 15, 
 "Ibid. Nov. 32, 
 
 p.7, col. 1 
 p.9, col. 9. 
 p.7, col.l. 
 p.5, col. 2. 
 p . 5, col . 1 . 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
 added that "it is essential that Serbia should possess about fifty 
 kilometers from Alessio to Durazzo. This coastline would be joined 
 to what was formerly Old Serbia approximately by the territory 
 between a line from Durazzo to Ochrida Lake in the south, and one 
 from Alessio to Djakova in the north." 1 The Albanian declaration 
 of independence issued on November 28 by a council of chiefs meet- 
 ing at Valona under the leadership of Ismail Kemal Bey might almost 
 be considered the Austro-Italian answer to the Serbian statement, 
 since the action of Ismail was taken only after assurances of sup- 
 port had been received from the Triple Alliance. r 
 
 Early in December, at the suggestion of England, the 
 Powers decided that the larger international questions created by 
 the Balkan War should be settled by an informal conference of their 
 ambassadors stationed at some European capital. Austrian accept- 
 tance of this plan was hastened by unmistakable indications that 
 Russia was contemplating a modification of her Adriatic policy. 
 Rumors of extensive mobilization of Russian troops persisted 
 despite repeated denials of any military activity by Russia. Just 
 before the meeting of the ambassadors the situation was made even 
 more tense by the announcement that orders preliminary to mobiliza- 
 
 ^Ibid. Nov. 25, p.8, col. 2. 
 
 ^Chekrezi, op.cit. p.78. 
 
 It is interesting, in view of the statements made by Chekrezi and 
 other Albanian writers concerning the universal desire of the 
 Albanians for independence, to note that Ismail Kemal Bey, in 
 informing the Turkish government of the action of the Valona 
 assembly, emphasized strongly the continued affection of the 
 Albanians for the Ottoman Empire and for the Caliphate and sought 
 to excuse the declaration of independence on the ground of stra- 
 tegic necessity, v. London Times, 1912, Dec. 6, p.7, col. 3. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
38 
 
 tion had been sent to all reservists of the German army, and that 
 the Austrian Minister of War and Chief of Staff had been replaced 
 by officers of avowedly militaristic sympathies. 1 The meetings of 
 the ambassadors, held at London, went on without regard to the 
 wrangling which broke out between Turkey and the Balkan Allies 
 immediately after the opening of the peace congress. All the 
 sittings of the Council were secret; even rumors concerning their 
 activities were surprisingly few. On December 20 the first 
 important results were announced in the following communique: 
 
 "The Ambassadors have recommended to their 
 governments, and the latter have accepted, the 
 principle of Albanian autonomy, together with a 
 provision guaranteeing to Serbia commercial 
 access to the Adriatic. The six governments 
 have agreed in principle on these two points." 2 
 
 This declaration marks the end of the first phase of the 
 Albanian question. In this the Triple Alliance had won a signal 
 victory, largely through the faulty diplomatic tactics of France 
 and Russia, and the even greater military blunders of the Balkan 
 Allies. Out- manoeuvred on this point, however, Russia dug herself 
 in, like the Turks at Scutari, and prepared to reduce to a minimum 
 the results of her defeat. 
 
 ^ London Times, 1912, Dec. 11, p.8, col.l. 
 2 Ibid. Dec. 11, p.8, col. 1. 
 

 
 
 
 
 . . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE 
 
 Much good ink has been wasted in hysterical damning or 
 
 praising of the Powers for the establishment of an independent 
 Albania. Many reputable writers go even farther than Miss Newbigin 
 in hinting that "some at least of the Powers foresaw that an 
 independent Albania might lead to quarrelling among the Balkan 
 Powers," and that "their motive in supporting its erection was not 
 wholly uninfluenced by this possibility." 1 Apostles of the 
 millennium, on the other hand, hailed this as the beginning of the 
 era of self-determination for all peoples. It is not necessary to 
 believe, however, either that the Powers had suddenly become disin- 
 terested philanthropists, or that there was a diabolical plot back 
 of the decision of December 20. As shown above, ^ the primary 
 interest of both Italy and Austria was to prevent the eastern 
 Adriatic littoral from coming into the hands of a potentially 
 hostile power. Greece and Serbia were not then, in themselves, 
 dangerous neighbors. But behind Serbia loomed the omnipresent 
 Russian menace, and in a Greek Strait of Corfu Italy saw a naval 
 base for any maritime power in alliance with Greece against Italy. 
 Other factors, notably Austrian resentment at the collapse of her 
 schemes to secure an outlet on the Aegean, were doubtless present, 
 
 1 
 
 I . ; Geographical Aspects of Balkan Problems , N . Y. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 but they merely strengthened a policy long since determined upon. 
 
 Selfish this policy certainly was, and there is every 
 
 reason to believe with Professor Hazen that the Albanian ’’fiasco' 1 
 
 was directly responsible for the Second Balkan War.' 1 ' We might even 
 
 go so far as to say with Mr. Dominian that "the inhabitants of 
 
 Albania are totally devoid of national feeling.”^ But even then it 
 
 would not necessarily follow, as Mr. Dominian further implies, that 
 
 "under these circumstances, partition of the country between Greece 
 
 and Serbia might not have been incompatible with national aspira- 
 3 
 
 tions." Balkan history for centuries has centered around the 
 
 attempts of subject peoples to secure their emancipation. To 
 
 divide. Albania between her neighbors would be merely to start 
 
 another chapter in the bloody story. Despite the lack of national 
 
 solidarity, the strength of the Albanian hatred for Greek and Serb 
 
 had been strikingly manifest at least since the Congress of Berlin. 
 
 That the Serbs and Greeks themselves realized this is shown by the 
 
 measures taken to exterminate the Albanian elements in the areas 
 
 4 
 
 secured in 1913. 
 
 After the announcement; of December 30, 1913, there was a 
 slight lull in the discussion of the Albanian question. Early in 
 January 1913, however, Serbia began a systematic agitation against 
 the inclusion of Old Serbia in Albania. Some of the propagandists, 
 flying in the face of all reliable testimony, claimed that the 
 territory was ethno graphically Serbian; others dwelt on the fact 
 
 pHazen, C. D. ; Modern Europe , N.Y. (1930) pp.674, 677. 
 
 ^Dominian, Leon; Frontiers of Language and Nationalitv in Europe, 
 N.Y. (1917). p.194. 
 
 ~Ibid. p.195. 
 
 ^Dotation Carnegie, op.cit. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 that the wishes of the Serb majority in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 had not been consulted by Austria-Hungary in 1908.^ Much was made 
 of the idea that the Albanians were "intruders" in Old Serbia, 
 since this district was part of the old Serbian empire. Montenegro 
 also began to show signs of uneasiness when the Powers showed a 
 disposition to include Scutari in Albania. Press dispatches from 
 Cettigne reported rumors of an extensive anti-monarchist movement. 
 Using these reports as an excuse King Nicholas announced that the 
 Montenegrins would never abandon Scutari unless ejected by force 
 of arms. To surrender Montenegro’s claim to that city, he insisted 
 would inevitably mean the overthrow of the Montenegrin royal house? 
 
 The question of the boundaries for the newly created 
 state soon raised the international temperature above even the 
 fever heat of 1912. Austria fought valiantly for a line to the 
 north and east which corresponded roughly with the ethnographical 
 situation. This would put most of Old Serbia under Albanian con- 
 trol. The discussion finally focused on the disposition of the 
 town of Djakova, which, according to the best available figures, 
 contained approximately one hundred and seventy Albanians to every 
 Serb.' Serbia's claim to this area, obviously, must rest largely 
 on sentimental grounds. In March feeling in Germany and Austria 
 was further aroused by well-authenticated reports of the wholesale 
 massacre of Albanians by Serb troops. The Austrian government 
 lodged a formal protest at Belgrade and even the more conservative 
 
 ^ London Times . 1913, Jan. 2, p.7, col. 2. 
 
 -Ibid. Jan. 6, p.5, col. 2. 
 
 °Dillon, E. J. ; Alleged Plan to Extirpate Albanians . Contemporary 
 Review, vol. 103, pp. 577-81. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
 German newspapers came out violently against these "blood baths." 1 
 After the customary rumors of extensive mobilization by Russia and 
 Austria the boundary dispute was settled on March 22 by the 
 announcement that Scutari was to be Albanian, while Djakova was to 
 go to Serbia. Russia, under this arrangement, was to provide 
 guarantees for the safety and fair treatment of the Albanians in 
 
 p 
 
 Djakova and the other regions ceded to Serbia. The almost univer- 
 sal disgust expressed by the press of all the interested powers for 
 this compromise was sufficient to evoke even from the sedate Times 
 the terse comment that "if the essence of a compromise is that it 
 should be distasteful to both parties, then in this sense the new 
 frontiers of Albania may be considered an unqualified success."^ 
 Montenegro showed her opinion of the arrangement by 
 stubbornly continuing the siege of Scutari despite the verbal 
 thunders of the Powers and the more material but no more effective 
 international blockade of the Montenegrin coast. On April 26 
 Prince Danilo of Montenegro entered Scutari in triumph. Austrian 
 troops were immediately and openly massed on the Montenegrin 
 frontier. Again the situation turned on the action of Russia, and 
 again that power yielded. King Nicholas, definitely notified that 
 no aid could be expected from Russia, decided to risk the bugbear 
 of revolution, and on May 14 the Montenegrin army evacuated 
 Scutari, international troops taking its place. 4 
 
 llbid. pp. 577-80. 
 
 ^ London Times . 1913, March 24, p.6, col.l. 
 
 ibid. March 28, p.8, col. 3. 
 
 ^Martens, G. Fr. de ; Nouveau Re cue i 1 General de Traites . 
 
 Troisieme S§rie, Tome IX, Leipzig, (1919) . pp. 648-49. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 
 
 ' 
 
 
43 
 
 The northern frontier being fixed, the attention of the 
 Ambassadors was transferred to the south. The conflict here was 
 at first not so keen. Italy was willing to compromise so long as 
 her own interests were not vitally involved, while Greece was too 
 busy consolidating her position in Thrace to put up much of a 
 fight — yet. In August a tentative boundary was fixed by the 
 Ambassadors, running from a point south of Cape Stylos to the Lake 
 of Ochrida, Korcha being left to Albania. An international 
 commission was to lay down definite lines after investigation on 
 the spot.^ 
 
 While the wrangling over the frontiers was still going 
 on, the less explosive subject of internal administration was 
 settled (July 13) at London. By the terms of this "statut 
 organique , Albania was constituted an autonomous principality 
 "neutralises" under the guarantee of the Powers. The civil and 
 financial administration was to be in the hands of an international 
 commission for ten years. 4 Internal security was to be insured by 
 the presence of an international gendarmerie under Dutch officers. 
 The ruler of the new state was to be a prince appointed by the 
 Powers. Until the organization of the new government should be 
 effected the "f onotionnement des autorit^s indigenes existantes" 
 should continue. 7 
 
 ^ London Times , 1913, Aug. 12, p.7, col.l. 
 
 ^Martens, op.cit. pp. 650-51. 
 
 JIbid. Arts. 1-3. 
 
 jflbid. Arts. 4-6. 
 
 ^Swedish, in the original document. Ibid. Arts. 8-11. 
 
 Slbid. Art. 1. 
 
 Ibid. Art. 7. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
 Just what these "autorites indigenes existantes" -were, no 
 one seemed to know. At Scutari Colonel Philips was doing his best 
 to prevent friction along the very hazily defined Montenegrin 
 frontier. ^ Further south, at Durazzo, Essad Pasha had set up a 
 "provisional government" operating in opposition to the one at 
 Valona," 5 which Ismail Kemal Bey was struggling to keep from abso- 
 lute dissolution. Most of southern Albania had been occupied by 
 the Greeks. In the midst of these conflicting jurisdictions the 
 tribes went on governing themselves just about as they had under 
 the Turks, 30 that Mr. Nevinson, traveling through the country, 
 
 could report more peace and order in Albania than anywhere else 
 
 3 
 
 in the Balkans. 
 
 Now that the most acute phase of the Albanian crisis had 
 been passed, the Powers showed little interest in the organization 
 of the new state. While valuable time was being lost in the 
 search for an "available" prince, the Valona government, with prac- 
 tically no financial or military resources, was rapidly growing 
 weaker. The tribesmen began to murmur, as in 1908, at the slowness 
 
 ■^Dillon, E.J.; Albania* s Tribulations . Contemporary Review, vol. 
 
 106, p . 116. 
 
 ^Mention should be made here of the early career of Essad Pasha, 
 one of the most fascinating and puzzling figures in the whole 
 Albanian story. An enthusiastic supporter of the Old Regime in 
 Turkey until 1908, he immediately changed his position when the 
 success of the Revolution seemed assured. He was in command of the 
 defense of Scutari in 1913 and was accused by many Albanians of be- 
 traying the city into the hands of the Montenegrins. See for con- 
 flicting opinions concerning his integrity and character, Chekrezi, 
 op. cit., pp. 101, 143-46; Current History . New York Times . July 
 
 1920, pp. 622-31; Current Opinion , vol. 55, p.94. 
 
 % 
 
 °Nevinson, W. ; Land of the Eagle , Contemporary Review, vol. 104, 
 pp. 312-21. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
 of action, and the rumor was spread that Ismail Kemal was selling 
 the country to foreign business men. 1 In December, after the 
 Valona government had repeatedly declared itself unable to cope 
 with the internal situation, William of Wied was chosen "Hereditary 
 Prince of Albania." So little was known in Albania about the new 
 ruler that his aunt. Carmen Sylva of Roumania, issued a pamphlet 
 entitled "Who is He" for distribution among the new subjects of 
 
 p 
 
 the prince. According to this encomium the prince combined the 
 bravery of Lancelot with the virtue of Galahad. Other estimates 
 were not quite so fla.ttering, however. In Germany Prince William 
 had been persona non grata with both his father and the emperor 
 because of his "anarchist" friends — chiefly fellow doctrinaire 
 philosophers with simple and practical solutions for all the 
 problems of the universe. 3 Dr. Dillon, who came to know the prince 
 very well, described him as whole-hearted, generous, and chival- 
 rous, but lacking in initiative and will-power. 4 The new ruler 
 being chosen, the question of the status of the rival "provisional 
 governments" at Valona and Durazzo now arose. Ismail Kemal Bey 
 prevented a possible conflict by patriotically resigning in 
 January, forcing Essad to do likewise. 5 The International 
 Commission then took over the government until the arrival of the 
 prince . 
 
 iChekrezi: op.cit. pp. 120-31. 
 
 “Ibid. p. 1§4. 
 
 '-’ Champion of Human Freedom Who is to Rule Albania . Current 
 Opinion, vol. 56, pp. 22-22. 
 
 ^Dillon, E. J.; The Albanian Tangle, Fortnightlv Review, vol. 102. 
 p . 15. 
 
 5 W oods, H. C.; The Situation in Albania , Fortnightlv Review, 
 vol. 101, pp. 460-72. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
 In determining the causes for the failure of the new 
 Albanian state account must be taken of the practical interregnum 
 between October, 1912, when the Turkish power lapsed, and the 
 beginnings of a really national administration in January of 1914. 
 During this period the ever-present decentralizing and particular - 
 ist influences had greatly strengthened their power on the 
 Albanians, so that the new government was confronted with the 
 problem of building an entire system of administrative machinery. 
 This task, formidable enough in itself, was made vastly more dif- 
 ficult by the mistakes of the new rulers. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE GOVERNMENT OF WILLIAM OF WIED 
 
 The outlook when the International Commission took over 
 the government of Albania in January of 1914 was decidedly 
 inauspicious. The situation in the south was so strained that the 
 boundary commission appointed by the Powers had abandoned its 
 attempt to gather first-hand information and had repaired to 
 Florence, where the members were safe from physical violence, if 
 not from propaganda. The Greek army, at the command of the 
 Ambassadors, was preparing to evacuate Northern Epirus, but the 
 more radical Greek sympathizers were already promising trouble for 
 the Albanian government when it should take over the district. The 
 rest of Albania was in a state of uneasy peace, waiting, as in 
 1908, to see if the new ruler could provide a panacea for the ills 
 of the country. 
 
 The first acts of Prince William did not show any great 
 political foresight. Before accepting his new position he had 
 exacted an international loan from the Powers, but he had neglected 
 to obtain what was far more important, guarantees for the preserva- 
 tion of order within the boundaries of his realm. The second 
 blunder was probably made on the advice of Essad Pasha, who, as 
 head of the delegation which officially offered the crown of 
 Albania to the prince, had obtained great influence over the new 
 ruler. Instead of making his headquarters at Valona where the 
 support and advice of the International Commission would have been 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
 readily available, the prince set up his capital (March, 1914) at 
 Durazzo, the seat of Essad's "provisional government." Inasmuch 
 as the civil and financial administration was officially vested in 
 the Commission, this action greatly impaired the efficiency of the 
 government from the beginning. The policies of the royal govern- 
 ment soon showed all too clearly that Prince William's mind was 
 hopelessly "swathed in the red tape of a German bureaucrat."' 1 ' Early 
 in 1913 M. Philip Nogga, who was regarded by Dr. Dillon as "the 
 soul of such stable progress as has already begun to manifest 
 itself,"* had sent a note to the prince urging the necessity for a 
 paternal policy similar to that of King Nicholas of Montenegro, 
 and emphasizing the desirability of identifying the royal family 
 with the people on all possible occasions. These excellent sug- 
 gestions were ignored by the prince, who proceeded to set up a 
 court after the most approved European model. The Albanians, used 
 to the democratic and easily accessible Turkish beys, found little 
 to their liking in the ceremony and isolation of the new regime. 4 
 Within the government itself conflict soon arose between the 
 ambitious Essad, now minister of war, and the Dutch officers of 
 
 the gendarmerie, who refused to obey the orders of any one save 
 
 . , 5 
 
 the prince. 
 
 As the disorganization and unpopularity of the govern- 
 ment became more and more evident, the attention of Europe was once 
 
 ^■Peacock. W.; Italy and Albania, Contemporary Review, vol. 107, 
 p. 365. 
 
 2 Dillon,E. J. ; Albania's Tribulations , Contemporary Review, vol. 
 
 106, p. 120. 
 
 JDillon, E. J. ; The_ Albanian Tangle , Fortnightly Review, vol. 102, p. 11. 
 ^Peacock, op.cit. p.366. ^Dillon, E.J.; op.cit. p.l?\ 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
 more turned towards this storm center of the Balkans. The efforts 
 of statesmen, however, were entirely devoted to the task of keep- 
 ing the Albanian question from again menacing the peace of Europe, 
 while the press seemed inclined to take the new kingdom as a joke. 
 Prince William was referred to as a "candidate for suicide" and as 
 the "Lohengrin of the German court," while Albania was given the 
 sobriquet of the "comic opera kingdom. This satiric tone gave 
 way to one of frank uneasiness as the situation in Northern Epirus 
 became more and more ominous. On March 1 the Greek army had 
 officially evacuated Albania, but almost at the same time a 
 
 "Provisional Government of Northern Epirus" was formed to oppose 
 
 o 
 
 Albanian control. Even the most ardent Phil-Hellene must have 
 had some slight doubts as to M. Venizelos' "sincerity" in declar- j 
 ing that the Greek government was taking no part in the Epirote 
 rebellion when the announcement was made that the premier of 
 "Autonomous Epirus" was an ex-premier of Greece, that the minister 
 of foreign affairs was a member of the Greek Chamber of Deputies, 
 and that the secretary of war was a colonel in the Greek army. 5 
 
 ^Literary Digest, vol. 48, p.894. 
 
 ^Little can be said with certainty concerning the real causes of 
 the disturbances in Epirus, nor is the part taken by the Greek 
 government entirely clear. Chekrezi (op.cit., pp. 130-34, 139-43), 
 who was then secretary to the International Commission of Control, 
 puts the entire responsibility upon the government at Athens. This 
 statement is undoubtedly an exaggeration, but there is every reason 
 to believe that Greek soldiers and Cretan bands were permitted to 
 take a very active part in the horrible excesses which accompanied 
 the revolt . The testimony of the supporters of the Greek cause is 
 also unreliable. Ren£ Puaux's work, La Malheureuse Eplre (Paris, 
 1914), usually given as an authority, does not survive the most 
 elementary historical tests for accuracy and unbiased judgment. 
 
 3 
 
 Chekrezi, op.cit. n.131. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
 In April the standard of revolt was raised by Greek 
 sympathizers in Korcha. Within a few days all of southern 
 Albania was in arms. The Durazzo government was practically power- 
 less since the International Commission of Control, acting on the 
 theory that the lack of trained officers would lead to excesses, 
 refused to sanction expenditures for troops.^ The chiefs of the 
 northern tribes, moreover, refused to give aid to this ''Christian 
 prince and his renegade Mussulman minister. The struggle, there 
 fore, was largely between the rival factions in Epirus itself. The 
 Greek cause was aided by occasional raids across the border by 
 regular troops of the Greek army, but these unneutral acts were 
 promptly disavowed by the government at Athens. In May, after 
 frightful excesses had been committed by both sides, the Inter- 
 national Commission arranged a conference with the rebel leaders 
 at Corfu. An agreement was finally patched up, by the terms of 
 which Epirus was given practical autonomy.^ 
 
 It is impossible to determine from the evidence available 
 the extent of the desire for union with Greece among the Epirotes 
 in 1914. Some writers maintain that there was a majority of 
 Greeks, ethnically speaking, in the district. Dominian, for 
 instance, says: "according to official Turkish statistics, pub- 
 lished in 1908, the region was peopled by 340,000 Greeks and some 
 149,000 Mohammedans." 4 These figures, of course, mean nothing, so 
 
 "''Dillon, E. J. ; Albania: to be_ or_ not to be . Contemporary Review, 
 vol. 105, p. 884. 
 
 ^Dillon; Albanian Tangle , Fortnightly Review, vol. 102, p.7. 
 
 ^Chekrezi; op.cit. p.143. 
 
 Dominian; op.cit. p.197. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
51 
 
 far as nationality is concerned. "Greeks" as here used refers to 
 members of the Greek Orthodox Church. The totals given by 
 Dominian are also far from accurate, for, although official, they 
 are, like most Turkish statements of population, based on rough 
 estimates. Professor Lord is much more nearly in accord with 
 authorities such as Brailsford and Dillon in putting the number of 
 Greek Orthodox Christians at 120,000 and of Mohammedans at 80 to 
 100,000. ^ About the sentiments of the Mohammedans there was not 
 much doubt. Living in the rural districts, they were not exposed 
 to the influence of Greek culture and consequently clung tenacious- 
 ly to their Albanian nationality. Among the Christians of the 
 towns, however, there was no such unanimity. Here the language of 
 business and of religion was Greek, and Greek cultural ideas were 
 spread very assiduously by priest and merchant alike. Even here, 
 however, the language of the home remained Albanian.^ Since no 
 reliable estimate can be formed as to the number of Orthodox 
 Epirotes who retained their loyalty to Albania, the exact sentiment 
 of the majority of the people in the district cannot be known. 
 
 The one thing which can be said with certainty is that the Greek 
 
 case is not nearly so strong as Mr. Dominian, Professor Schurman, 
 
 3 
 
 and other lovers of Greece believe. 
 
 In spite of the fact that the Corfu settlement confirmed 
 the sovereignty of Albania over Northern Epirus, the Epirote revolt 
 
 ^Haskins, C.H., and Lord, R.H.; Some Problems of the Peace 
 Conference . Cambridge, 1920. p.278. 
 
 flbidL. p.278. 
 
 °"At this moment the Greeks of Epirus . . .are resisting to the 
 death incorporation in a state which outrages their deepest and 
 holiest sentiments of religion, race, nationality, and humane civili- 
 zation." Schurman, J.G.; The Balkan Wars , Princeton (1914). p. 153. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
 may be said to have given the coup de grace to the government of 
 William of Wied. While the revolt was still in progress the 
 popular opposition to Essad Pasha had been unmistakably growing. 
 The "nationalists” felt that the war in Epirus was being purposely 
 mismanaged by Essad, who feared that the incorporating into Albania 
 of the disputed area, where he was cordially detested, would be 
 follov/ed by his own downfall. The lower classes, who expected 
 that the coming of the prince would mean the partition of the 
 great feudal estates among the tenants, also laid all their 
 troubles at the door of Essad, himself a great landowner. 1 Taking 
 advantage of this discontent, the Dutch gendarmerie, which had 
 from the first resented the imperious manner of Essad, led an 
 attack on the house of the minister of war during the night of 
 May 19th. Essad was taken prisoner, although no charges were 
 lodged against him, and a few days later was exiled to Italy. The 
 other cabinet members, disgusted by the failure of the prince to 
 take decisive action against this high-handed behavior of the 
 Dutch soldiery, immediately presented their resignations, which 
 were refused by the prince.^ 
 
 As soon as the treatment meted out to Essad became 
 known, his fellow tribesmen sent a protest to Durazzo. As an 
 answer to this the Dutch officers, without any instructions from 
 either the prince or the International Commission, ordered the 
 Malissori troops to proceed against the disaffected tribe. At 
 
 pChekrezi; op.cit. pp. 143-154. 
 
 ^Dillon, E.J.; The Albanian Tangle , Fortnightly Review, vol. 102, 
 pp. 19-23. 
 
 3 Ibld. p. 23. 
 

 1 . 
 
 . -• ’!■ .[ . ' : 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
53 
 
 Shiak the mountain men joined forces with the malcontents and 
 took the royal force prisoner. The news of this action caused a 
 panic at Durazzo, in the course of which the prince committed the 
 irreparable blunder of fleeing to an Austrian battle-ship for 
 safety. A conference was arranged by the International Commission 
 with the rebels, but as the latter would hear of no terms short 
 of the abdication of the prince, who, it was claimed, had violated 
 the sacred bessa by sending troops against Tirana, no settlement 
 was effected. 1 A deadlock followed, the insurgents holding most 
 of central Albania, the government retaining a precarious control 
 of the territory around Durazzo. Mr. G. F. Williams, then United 
 States Minister to Greece and Montenegro, summed up the situation 
 as follows, after a visit to Durazzo: 
 
 "Five ostensible governments were in sight: 
 first, the six Great Powers with all the power; 
 second, the commission with control of the civil 
 administration and finance; third, the Holland 
 gendarmerie with control of the military; fourth, 
 the prince with any power remaining; fifth, the 
 ministry with no powers. Each of these govern- 
 ments was fighting every other, save the first, 
 which apparently is so discordant within itself 
 that it has abandoned all the rest to their fate. 
 All are cursing the powers for their discord and 
 helplessness, and are expecting at any moment to 
 be driven out of Durazzo. . . I found a prince 
 calling himself a king with no powers, no 
 territory, and no subjects, except his wife and 
 children . . . The Wied government has shown 
 skill and success in one respect only: it has 
 been able to prevail upon the various racial 
 and religious forces of Albania to set upon 
 each other with murderous purpose. Hundreds 
 of Albanian lives have thus been sacrificed at 
 the hands of Albanians. "2 
 
 pChekrezi; op.cit. pp. 147-48. 
 
 ''Williams, G.F.; An Open Statement , Literary Digest, vol.49,p.55. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ • 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
 The news of the outbreak of the Great War must have 
 come almost as a relief to the representatives of the Powers in 
 Albania. The concern of European diplomats with the growing 
 anarchy in the new state was actuated largely by the fear that the 
 disorders might precipitate another crisis in the European 
 political situation. Now that the long-dreaded conflict had come, 
 the Albanian problem lost its larger significance, and one by one 
 the Powers withdrew their representatives, leaving Prince William 
 to shift for himself. Without external support, however, the 
 Durazzo government proved incapable of maintaining itself. On 
 September 3, 1514, the prince also departed, after promising, in 
 a grandiose proclamation to his "beloved people" that his absence 
 would be merely temporary. ^ 
 
 The government was taken over after the departure of the 
 prince by Burhan Eddin Effendi, a son of Abdul Hamid. The 
 irrepressible Essad embraced the cause of the new government and 
 received the posts of grand vizier and commander-in-chief . ^ Within 
 a month he had himself secured the presidency, and immediately put 
 his government under the protection of Italy. After supporting and 
 abandoning four successive governments, Essad had at last realized 
 
 ^The message of the prince is delightfully ironic in view of the 
 character of his reign: "I have therefore decided, in order not 
 
 to leave unattained the work to which I desire to consecrate my 
 powers and my life, that it will be best for me to go to the 
 west for some time. But be assured that, afar just as when near, 
 
 I shall have no other thought but to labor for the prosperity of 
 our chivalrous fatherland, Albania." Literary Digest, vol. 50, 
 p. 470. 
 
 Harriot, J. A. R. ; The Eastern Question. Oxford (1918). p.472. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
 his highest ambitions. His triumph was short-lived, however. 
 
 The northern tribes, to whom the name of Essad was anathema, 
 immediately marched on Durazzo, and were prevented from taking the 
 city only by the guns of the Italian war-ships. From this time 
 until the great Serbian retreat of 1915 the power of Essad was 
 limited to the territory within range of the Italian guns. Beyond 
 this was anarchy. 
 
 Within the space of a year, therefore, the Albanian 
 
 state created. by the Powers, beginning, like Plato's circle of 
 
 life, in nothing, had likewise ended in nothing. The situation 
 
 when Prince William took control was almost hopeless; his own 
 
 blunders, the interference of outside powers, and the lack of any 
 
 # 
 
 real unity among the Albanian people themselves, had made failure 
 inevitable . 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 ITALY AND ALBANIA 
 
 During the four years of war from 1914 to 1918 Albanian 
 nationalism had opportunity for that steady and natural development 
 which the interference of the Powers had retarded rather than 
 helped. With the war itself the Albanians had slight concern, 
 despite the fact that their territory was under military occupation 
 almost from the opening of hostilities. As soon as the attention 
 of the Powers was attracted elsewhere, the Greeks openly took 
 possession of Northern Epirus. The Italians, who had already 
 (October SO, 1914) occupied the island of Saseno off the Albanian 
 coast, 1 immediately occupied Valona, under the pretense of defend- 
 ing Albanian integrity from the menace of Greece. 2 In the fall of 
 1915 began the great southern push of the Central Powers. The road 
 
 eacock, W. ; Italy and Albania , Contemporary Review, vol. 107, 
 pp. 361-67. 
 o 
 
 "By this peaceful occupation a military position was secured that 
 later became an important naval station for the Allies, as well as 
 a strategical and tactical base of such importance that had it 
 fallen into the hands of the enemy, the great military romance 
 of the Ealkans, if played at all, would have occupied a far more 
 narrow stage, and the whole of western Albania would have been 
 thrown open to the Germans." Brig. Gen. G. P. Scriven, United 
 States military observer with the Italian army, in New York Times , 
 1919, May 25. 
 
 Shortly after the Italian occupation of Valona most of northern 
 Albania, including Scutari, was occupied for a short time by the 
 Serbs and Montenegrins, but the attack of Austria on Serbia in 
 1915 compelled the Slav states to withdraw their troops. 
 
 V. Chekrezi; op.cit. p.158. 
 

 
 . 
 
 . 
 
 
5? 
 
 to Salonika being closed by the Bulgarians, the Serbs were forced 
 to retreat through Albania, closely followed by the Austrians . ^ 
 
 By the spring of 1916 all of Albania north of a line from Valona 
 to Lake Ochrida was in the hands of the Central Powers, there to 
 remain for over two years. 
 
 During the period of deadlock an almost continuous 
 struggle for control of the area under Allied occupation went on 
 between Italy and Greece aided by France. The French, with head- 
 quarters at Salonika, gradually moved northward until December 
 (1916), when they reached Korcha. In order to secure control of 
 this city the French commander agreed to recognize the independence 
 of the "Autonomous Albanian Province of Korcha." A government com- 
 posed largely of Albanians was set up, and the limits of the new 
 "province" were extended as the French advanced.^ As soon as the 
 French felt themselves firmly established, however, the Albanian 
 government was dissolved and the district practically turned over 
 
 3 
 
 to the Greeks. The Italians had started a movement to the south 
 about the same time that the French began to push northward, and, 
 despite Greek protests, had taken possession of all of southern 
 Albania by the end of 1916. 
 
 Again, as in 1913, the conflicting aspirations of the 
 Powers proved the best safeguard of Albanian interests. No sooner 
 
 ^For a vivid description of this terrible march, see Labry, Raoul; 
 Avec 1* Armee Serbe en Retraite , Paris (1916) . Shorter accounts 
 may be found in Waring, L. F. ; Serbia , London (1913). pp. 232-248, 
 and in Devine, Alex.; Montenegro, London (1918). pp, 74-83. 
 
 2 
 
 3 Chekrezi; op.cit. p.160. 
 
 Durham, M.E.; Albania and the Powers, Living Age, vol. 302, 
 p.389. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
had the Italians occupied Northern Epirus than rumors began to 
 circulate concerning the contents of the infamous Treaty of London. 
 Italy, fearing that her good faith might be in some degree com- 
 promised in the eyes of the Albanians by the knowledge that she had 
 secretly agreed to the partition of Albania while her statesmen 
 were proclaiming that the preservation of the integrity of the 
 Albanian state was one of the Italian war aims, decided to act 
 in advance of the publication of the treaty. 1 On June 3, 1917, 
 General Ferrero solemnly proclaimed, "in accordance with the 
 orders of His Majesty, King Victor Emmanuel, the unity and 
 independence of the whole of Albania, under the shield and protec- 
 
 o 
 
 tion of the Italian Kingdom.” During the following year every 
 effort was made by the Italians to strengthen their hold in 
 Albania. Military roads were constructed all through the occupied 
 area, schools were opened, public improvements were made in the 
 
 3 
 
 cities, and aid was given to farmers. 
 
 \ioderwell, H. K.: Two Wavs with Albania, Nation, vol. 111. 
 pp. 399-400. 
 
 2 
 
 '"’Chekrezi; op.cit. pp. 161-63. 
 
 Chekrezi believes this action to have been taken merely as a ful- 
 fillment of the war aims of the Italians. The coincidence between 
 the announcement of June 3 and the publication of the Treaty of 
 London, and the subsequent actions of the Italians would both seem 
 to preclude any such lofty motives. 
 
 3 Scriven; op.cit. 
 
 Mr. N. J. Cassavetes, director of the Pan-Epirotic Union of 
 America, an organization favoring the union of Northern Epirus with 
 Greece, replied to this interview with a vitriolic diatribe against 
 the Italian rule in Albania: "Italian occupation assumed the form 
 of persecution of Greek nationalism. It first attacked the Greek 
 schools, which were native institutions, reared and supported 
 solidly by native Christian Northern Epirotes . . .The gendarmerie 
 was recruited from Mohammedans and commanded by leaders of Albanian 
 bands who ground down the Greek peasants and committed crimes and 
 outrages without name.” New York Times , 1919, June 24. 
 

 ‘ . - - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 •• 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
 The great Allied drive in the Balkans began in June of 
 1918. By the middle of October practically all of Albania was in 
 the hands of the Italians, who remained in possession of the 
 country pending the action of the Peace Conference. 1 
 
 In order to understand the history of Albania after the 
 armistice it is necessary to go back to the negotiations which 
 preceded the entrance of Italy into the Great War. In April of 
 1915 the representatives of the Central Powers and the Italian 
 government drew up a treaty which was to serve as the basis for 
 Italian participation on the side of the Teutonic Powers. By this 
 agreement Italy was to secure Valona in full sovereignty, while 
 Austria agreed to "cease completely to take any interest in 
 
 p 
 
 Albania." At the last minute Austria refused to accept the terms 
 of the proposal unless their execution were deferred until after 
 the conclusion of hostilities. This arrangement was not acceptable 
 to the Italians, who at once came to terms with the Entente. Two 
 articles of the resulting Treaty of London referred to Albania: 
 
 "Art. 6: Italy will secure in absolute property 
 
 Valona, the Island of Saseno, and as much 
 territory as would be required to secure 
 their military safety . . . 
 
 "Art. 7: Italy ... is not, in the case of the creation 
 of a small autonomous state in Albania, to 
 resist the possible desire of France, Great 
 Britain, and Russia to distribute among 
 Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece the northern 
 and southern parts of Albania . . . "3 
 
 ^Current History, New York Times, Aug., 1919. p,211. 
 
 "Ibid. Nov. 1919. p.250. 
 
 ^Ibid. Nov. 1919. p.353. 
 
 This is the text as published by the Bolshevist government. Its 
 accuracy, therefore, is not assured, but inasmuch as the subsequent 
 action of the Powers indicates the use of similar ideas as a basis 
 for action, there is every reason to believe that the terms as here 
 given are substantially correct. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
 By 1918 the contents of the Treaty of London were gener- 
 ally known in Albania. After the armistice a statement of the 
 Albanian policy of Italy was eagerly awaited. The action of 
 General Ferrero in 1917 was at first regarded as a modification of 
 the 1915 agreement, but when the Italian government maintained an 
 ominous silence, the Albanians began to take alarm. Late in 
 December a more or less informal gathering of Albanian notables 
 formed a cabinet at Durazzo despite Italian opposition. In 
 January this body was recognized by the Italian government. 1 At 
 the Peace Conference, however, Italy declared herself the 
 representative of Albanian interests and refused to grant pass- 
 ports to the delegates appointed by the Albanians themselves. 
 Friction gradually developed within Albania between the natives 
 and their Italian "protectors.” In April a revolt began which 
 dragged on through the summer. In December the Supreme Council 
 handed down its dictum on the Albanian question, providing for a 
 frontier rectification to the south in favor of Greece, and an 
 Italian mandate for the rest of the country. The Jugo-Slavs were 
 to be allowed commercial rights and the privilege of building 
 railways in northern Albania. This arrangement not only met with 
 the inevitable objections of the Albanians, but also provoked the 
 determined opposition of the Serbs, who refused to tolerate the 
 continued occupation of Albania by Italy. ^ Again, as in 1913, 
 Albania profited by the jealousies of her neighbors. A second 
 
 ^New York Times, 1919. January 25. 
 
 "Ibid. May 1. 
 
 ^Woods, H.C.; Some Adriatic Problems , Contemporary Review, vol. 
 pp. 641-42. 
 
. 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
 attempt at partition was made in January (1920), approximately 
 following the lines of the Treaty of London. But the Slavs again 
 
 bargaining destroyed the good feeling towards Italy which had 
 grown up in Albania during the war. As soon as the terms of the 
 proposed agreement between Italy, Jugo-Slavia, and Greece became 
 known, the Albanian assembly met at Lusknja and elected a new 
 
 Durazzo being held by the Italians, the new government made 
 Tirana its capital. Essad Pasha, who had for once misjudged the 
 trajectory which the proverbial cat was to make in jumping, sent 
 his followers against Tirana, where they were decisively defeated. 
 All other native opposition then subsided. Aided by a large force 
 of Albanians who had been trained in the service of Italy during 
 the Great War, the Tirana government gradually extended its control 
 over practically all the interior of Albania. By June the 
 irritating and effective guerrilla warfare carried on by the 
 Albanians had compelled the Italians to withdraw from the interior 
 of the country to the coast towns. A series of carefully planned 
 uprisings in these towns was so successful that by the middle of 
 June Valona alone remained in Italian hands. ^ 
 
 Opposition to Italian rule in Albania now began to 
 appear in a new quarter. On June 26 a battalion of troops which 
 
 ^Chekrezi, C. A. ; Italy and Albania at Loggerheads . Current History, 
 
 objected to the prospect of having Italy for a neighbor. 1 
 
 The willing participation of the Italians in this 
 
 cabinet, which- 'was pledged to work against foreign domination. 2 
 
 "Ibid, p.584. 
 
 ^Chicago _ Daily News, 1920. July 2, p.5. 
 
- ■ : ; 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 , ; 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
 was embarking at Ancona for Valona mutinied. When an effort was 
 made by the military authorities to enforce disciplinary measures, 
 rioting began which assumed such serious proportions as to 
 precipitate a crisis in the Italian Chamber of Deputies. The 
 Socialists took up the cause of the recalcitrant soldiers and 
 began a general campaign against the Albanian "adventure" which, 
 they asserted, was "dragging the country into fresh slaughter."" 1 
 In view of the delicate industrial situation, the Giolitti govern- 
 ment was forced to promise that no more troops would be sent to 
 Albania and that peace would be made . 
 
 A commission was sent late in June to negotiate with the 
 Tirana government, but failed to effect an agreement. A second 
 effort succeeded, however, and on August 5 a protocol was signed 
 between the two states. By this agreement Italy gave up her 
 claims in Albania under the Treaty of London, recognized the 
 independence and integrity of Albania, and surrendered the city of 
 Valona. The island of Saseno at the mouth of the Bay of Valona 
 
 p 
 
 was retained by Italy as a naval base. 
 
 Now that the Italian menace in the south had been 
 
 removed, the Jugo-Slavs began to encroach on Albanian territory 
 
 3 
 
 from the north, but without any definite gains. Despite this 
 trouble and the fact that the government was technically without a 
 head, the Tirana ministry succeeded in completing the organization 
 
 pV. documents in Contemporary Review, vol. 118, pp. 276-80. 
 ^ Chicago Daily News , 1920. August 7. 
 
 ''’According to the latest reports (April, 1921) there is still 
 friction along the northern frontier. Chicago Daily News, 1921. 
 March 30. 
 

 . 
 
 
 
 
 
63 
 
 of Albania into a national state during the summer of 1930. In 
 December the new Albania was officially recognized by admission 
 into the League of Nations. 1 
 
 The future of Albania is as uncertain as its past is 
 chaotic. Despite the fact that membership in the League of Nations 
 is technically a guarantee of territorial integrity, the northern 
 and southern frontiers are still contested by Serbia and Greece. 
 
 The question of a ruler is beginning to promise trouble. The 
 probabilities are that the Albanians themselves have not reached 
 political maturity. The strength of character and tenacity of 
 purpose of the Albanians, however, have been clearly demonstrated 
 by the heroic and successful struggle which they have made for the 
 protection of their liberties against Turk, Slav, Greek, and 
 Italian alike, while the success of the attempt made by the Tirana 
 government to unite the whole country against the Italians, indi- 
 cates that the traditional forces working against union have been 
 overcome. If this spirit of national unity endures, and if the 
 country is given an opportunity to develop naturally and peacefully, 
 the ultimate prosperity of the Albanian state seems assured. 
 
 n The committee (on admissions) also decided against the admission 
 of Albania, but the efforts of Lord Robert Cecil, who pointed out 
 that the situation in Albania differed from that in Armenia in 
 that Albania was not surrounded by hostile states (.’ ) , led the 
 Assembly to set aside the report of the committee and Albania was 
 admitted by a unanimous vote.” Fenwick, C. G.; Am. Pol . Sci . 
 
 Rev . , vo 1 . 15, p. 106. 
 
I ' f* I 
 
 * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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