SPEECH OF MR. BOND,'* 
 
 OF OHIO, 
 
 ON THE TREASURY NOTE BILL. 
 
 Delivered in the House of Representatives, March 18,1810. 
 
 Mr. BOND said that, after the very interesting and instructive speech of the gentleman from 
 Georgia, (Mr. King,) who had jpst taken his seat, he felt that the remarks which he was about 
 to submit would seem comparatively dull. He said he was but an humble gleaner in the field of 
 debate; and at present merely aimed to present to the committee and to the country a few prom¬ 
 inent facts, which he thought tended to illustrate the causes which have brought this nation to 
 the necessity of borrowing money to meet its ordinary expenditures! Mr. Chairman, the state 
 of our public concerns at this moment is very remarkable, if not peculiar. We have an Admin¬ 
 istration in power who profess to be friends of a hard-money currency, and invite the passage of 
 •a law requiring the collection of all public dues in coin, but propose to pay their own debts in 
 paper, the notes of their Secretary of the Treasury ! And at this crisis we are urged to provide 
 places of safety for the public money, and to create a host of new officers, with large salaries, to 
 watch over an empty Treasury ! This looks something like shutting the stable door after the 
 horse is gone! 
 
 Is not this case fairly stated? You ivould not grant this, I admit, if you look merely at the 
 last annual message of the President, and the report of the Secretary on the finances. These 
 documents come in at the first of the session, and, being always sought after and read with in¬ 
 tense interest, they are generally dressed up in holiday suits, and sent forth with the cry of “ all’s 
 well!” Many thousand copies of them are printed by Congress, at public expense, and circula¬ 
 ted throughout the country. Hence it would be unwise to insert in these papers a fact so well 
 calculated to alarm a free and watchful People, that we have an empty Treasury ! But, after 
 administering to the nation a soothing anodyne, wrapped up in the annual message and finance 
 report, and when curiosity is no longer active, Mr. Secretary Woodbury writes a letter to Mr. 
 President Van Buren, who communicates it to Congress, invoking us to the immediate passage 
 of a law authorizing the issue of Treasury notes in order to preserve the faith of the Government 
 in the payment of its debts ! » 
 
 And how will the issue of Treasury notes preserve this faith, which we all admit should be 
 kept sacred ? Iam ready to vote any sum of money which the Administration will say is ne¬ 
 cessary for the purposes of the Government, but I wish to do it directly. If money is wanted, let 
 the Government borrow it at once. By doing so, we can avoid the deception which the Treas¬ 
 ury-note system practises on the People, and, at the same time, test the practicability of the 
 hard-money currency which Mr. Van Buren professes to believe in. The country would then 
 see the amount borrowed, and the terms and cost of such loan. Then, too, the public creditors 
 would get their money, and the public faith would be preserved. 
 
 But, I again ask, how does the issue of one set of Treasury notes, to take up others previously 
 issued, preserve this faith ? We are told by the President that, since 1837, this Government 
 has issued near twenty millions of dollars in Treasury notes; and that about two millions of these 
 remain to be redeemed, falling due in March, April, and May. I should like the chairman of 
 the Committee of Ways and Means, (Mr. Jones,) who is presumed to be on the mo6t friendly* 
 and familiar terms w r ith the Administration, to inform us in what way it will preserve the faith 
 of the Government, which, having given its notes promising to pay a sum of money by the 5th 
 or 7th of March, takes up these notes by the substitution of others in their stead! It has been 
 said, indeed, that these Treasury notes are sold in the market, and the proceeds used. If so, I 
 wish to be informed of the details of these operations. If these notes are not paid directly to the 
 public creditors, but are sold in the market or pledged with banks or brokers, the terms and 
 manner of raising money on them ought to be disclosed. We have large items of expenses in¬ 
 curred in issuing these notes, and still larger expenditures for interest paid on them, amounting 
 to many thousand dollars. I desire to know where, and upon what terms, the Secretary con¬ 
 verts them into money. The Treasury-note system is a deceptive one generally; but the bill 
 now under consideration is particularly so. At a first glance, it would- seem to limit the issues 
 under it to five millions of dollars; but a careful reading of it discloses a lurking power to re¬ 
 new, from time to time, arul in effect to continue a standing issue of 'Preasury notes. This is 
 the beginning of a Treasury-bank system by a professed hard-monev Administration ! The 
 sequel will prove that Mr. Van Burcn’s professed faith in an exclusive metallic currency will 
 result, if, indeed, it was not so designed, in the destruction of all State banks, and a substitu¬ 
 tion of not a metallic, but a Government paper currency ! To all this I am opposed. 
 
9 
 
 I am ready to vote the power to borrow money, in express terms, if needed for public purpo¬ 
 ses ; but I am constrained to ask how it happens that we are reduced to this painful and mortify¬ 
 ing necessity ? Whence comes the great and extraordinary reverse, not only in our public con- . 
 cerns, but in all business and individual transactions throughout the entire country 1 Mr. Bond 
 said he was aware that it was usual with the friends of the Administration to charge the Oppo¬ 
 sition with a design to set up a cry of distress when there was really no distress in the land. He 
 denied the justice of this imputation on any past occasion, and felt assured that the country had 
 often suffered by the assaults of the past and present Administrations on the banks and currency 
 of the nation. We had, by our vigor and by our varied resources, recovered from these shocks 
 on several occasions, and then the friends of the Administration would proclaim that the whole 
 affair had been fictitious, and that a false alarm had been created. But I fear that the wolf has 
 at last come, and that the evils which the Whig party foretold would result from a continuation 
 of the assaults on the currency and credit system are about to be fully realized ! The distress of 
 the country is now admitted by the Administration. The w'orlhy chairman of the Committee of 
 Ways and Means (Mr. Jones) tells us that the revenue “may possibly be affected by the uni¬ 
 versal embarrassment which seems to have spread over the whole country .” This, then, is no 
 panic, it is sad reality, and we may well weep over the distressing reverse. What was our 
 situation, and what is it now ? The sound and uniform currency which we enjoyed when Mr. 
 Van Buren became Secretary of State in 1829 must be familiar in the recollection of the com¬ 
 mittee. At that time, and for several years afterwards, the public revenue was collected with 
 great ease, and paid over with exemplary punctuality. Specie was the basis of all the bank 
 notes of that day, whether of the United States Bank or State banks. He who held the notes 
 could readily command the specie. The business of exchange was regular and uniform, the 
 premium being often less than one-half of one per cent., and never equalling the cost of trans¬ 
 porting the specie from the place of drawing to the point of payment. The notes of the Bank 
 of the United States were equal, everywhere throughout the country, to specie, and in many 
 places absolutely commanded a premium over it. The State banks, too, justly commanded the 
 confidence of the community. Confidence is every thing in the business of life—it is credit, and 
 “ credit is money it is the poor man’s capital. The rich often need it, but the poor man re¬ 
 lies upon it. Having established “a good name,” he thereby obtains the means of prosecuting 
 any business which his capacity and enterprise may qualify him for. In this w r ay he is placed 
 on an equality, and may honorably and successfully compete with the rich. All business was 
 then conducted with ease and a steady regularity, which imparted stability to the institutions of 
 our country. Agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, with all the mechanic arts, flourished 
 in their respective spheres, and every branch of industry received its just reward. But now, how 
 changed the scene! The Administration, speaking through the chairman of the Committee of 
 Ways and Means, (Mr. Jones,) admits that a “ universal embarrassment seems to have spread 
 over the whole country.' 11 The daily accounts brought to us, from all quarters of the nation, 
 show a most alarming reduction in the value and price of every description of produce and prop¬ 
 erty. The President, in a time of profound peace, calls for financial aid; he cannot meet the 
 public engagements ! Being unwilling to borrow money openly, and thus confess an empty 
 Treasury, he asks to be allowed to beg day with the public creditors, and give them the Gov¬ 
 ernment paper promises to pay hereafter, with interest! It is true, indeed, that an attempt is 
 made to create an impression that the Treasury could meet its engagements if the banks would 
 pay up the balances which they owe the Government. But such is not the fact. The chair¬ 
 man of the Committee of Ways and Means, (Mr. Jones,) who speaks in this matter as the or¬ 
 gan of the Administration, admits that the amount due from the deposite banks is but eight hun¬ 
 dred and five th^nsr’* 3 Mars. This sum is not equal to one-half the amount of Treasury notes 
 now outstanding against the Government. Besides, this debt of the banks is in a course of pay¬ 
 ment in periodical instalments, by an arrangement with the Treasury, and could not, therefore, 
 have been relied on as a fund to pa^ Treasury notes at this time. 
 
 For this same purpose a reference is made to the United States Bank of Pennsylvania, whose 
 bond is held for the last instalment, due next September, on account of the sale made to that in¬ 
 stitution by the Government of its stock in the Bank of the United States. I will say a few 
 words on this flimsy pretext for passing this bill. Why did not the Secretary of the Treasury, 
 Mr. Woodbury, accept payment of this bond when it was offered to him? You are aware, sir, 
 
 I presume, that the Administration—in which Mr. Van Buren and Mr. Woodbury filled con¬ 
 spicuous places—did, for a series of years, decry the value of the stock in the Bank of the Uni¬ 
 ted States, and openly proclaim that the interest which the Government had in it would be lost. 
 Will you not be surprised to learn that these same gentlemen, when the charter of that bank 
 expired, actually demanded and obtained a premium of $15 58 on every share of this stock?— 
 thus making a clear gain to the Government of more than eleven hundred thousand dollars on 
 stock which the People were induced to believe would be lost! A sale was made to the United 
 States Bank of Pennsylvania, and bonds taken, payable in four annual instalments, with inter¬ 
 est. The Secretary of the Treasury was afterwards authorized, by an act of Congress, to sell 
 the two last of these bonds, the others being paid or near maturity at the time. 
 
3 32 , 5-3 
 
 
 We learn by Mr. Woodbury’s report, made on the 24th December, 1838, (see Senate Doc. 
 No. 31, 3d Session 25th Congress,) that he advertised these bonds for sale, in virtue of that 
 law, and that in due time the bank itself, through an agent, Mr. Charles McAlester, proposed 
 to purchase both bonds, and to pay therefor the principal and interest, computed in all respects 
 as the law required. Did Mr. Woodbury accept this offer? He tells us in the report just re¬ 
 ferred to that he sold the bond due in September, 1839, but concluded not to sell the other, 
 which will not be due before September, 1840. And why ? The law authorized it, and he ad¬ 
 vertised the sale of both; but, when a purchaser offers to take them on the terms provided in 
 the law , the Secretary concludes to sell only one ! Here was an opportunity to receive at once 
 the whole sum, principal and interest, due from this bank, but Mr. Woodbury absolutely refu¬ 
 sed it; and now he and the President unite in excusing themselves for urging the power to issue 
 Treasury notes because the bank does not pay this debt! It is unnecessary to dwell longer or 
 comment on these facts. 
 
 But what excuse had the Secretary for not selling the last bond, after advertising and receiv¬ 
 ing an offer for it at its par value ? T will read you his own words: 
 
 “ The Department, hoping it might be able to get through the year without the salp of more than one bond, pro¬ 
 vided the second one, due in September, was paid punctually, and in money, rather than in new Treasury notes 
 not receivable, and, if disappointed in this, that it might soon have a better offer from abroad, concluded the sale 
 unconditionally of only one bond.’’ 
 
 , Can it be possible that Mr. Woodbury exppeted to meet with any one simple enough to give 
 an advance beyond the principal and interest of one of these bonds, having qnly about two 
 years to run before it became payable, and the payment of which was not to be guarantied by 
 the seller? He was offered the whole debt, and would not take it, because he hoped to get 
 more ! I need not say he was disappointed. I cannot believe he was sincere in saying he ex¬ 
 pected to “have a better offer from abroad.” No, sir, one of the motives for suddenly declining 
 to sell or accept payment of this bond grew' out of an unwillingness to accumulate a large sum 
 of money in the Treasury, by w'hich he would have been obliged to pay over the fourth instal¬ 
 ment to the States, as the laws then in force requiped. The Executive branch of this Govern¬ 
 ment, it is well understood, were opposed to the measure of depositing the public money with 
 the States, and have done every thing which they could to prevent that law from being carried 
 into effect. But having refused to accept payment of the debt from the bank before the maturi¬ 
 ty of the bond, it is a mere pretext for passing a Treasury note bill to say that it is rendered ne¬ 
 cessary because that debt is not paid. And now, if, by any misfortune or other cause whatever, 
 in this general deluge over the business and institutions of the land, the bond in question, due 
 next September, be not paid, let the responsibility rest on Mr. Van Buren and Mr. Woodbury, 
 who refused to accept payment, though offered in strict compliance with an act of Congress for 
 that purpose expressly' passed. 
 
 Another of Mr. Woodbury’s reasons for washing a power to issue Treasury notes is found in 
 his communication to the President, and made the subject of his special message recommending 
 the passage of the bill now under consideration. 
 
 After saying that the money in the Treasury for general purposes, at the end of February of 
 this year, will be one million three hundred thousand dollars, he adds that “ not over two-thirds 
 
 * of this will be situated on the seaboard, and convenient for use to pay pensions and redeem 
 
 * Treasury notes.” Here is an illustration of the benefits of the hard-moncy system. Until 
 within a few years past, we had a system of finance by which the public money was, at a mo¬ 
 ment’s warning, paid free of charge, at any point where the necessities of the Government re¬ 
 quired it. That system lias been destroyed on a promise to furnish a better. What is the sub¬ 
 stitute ? One part of it requires our people who wish to purchase your public lands to pack 
 specie, at great personal risk and inconvenience, to the remote land offices in the far West; and 
 when it is needed for public use, the Secretary of the Treasury and President tell us, “it is 
 not situated on the seaboard, and cannot be conveniently used.”* Wherefore they ask the pow¬ 
 er to pay in Treasury notes that very portion of the public engagements which, above all others, 
 they have professed a wish to pay in hard money ; I mean the pensions due to the old soldiers. 
 But more. Having issued a large amount of Treasury notes which fall due about this time, 
 they profess to have the money to redeem them, or a part of them, at all events, but it happens 
 not to be “situated on the seaboard,” and is not “convenient for use.” So, to keep their faith, 
 they propose not to pay the money on their Treasury notes now falling due, but to redeem one 
 set of “ paper promises to pay” by a new edition of these same “ paper promises to pay,” with 
 the very “pretty pictures” on them heretofore so much ridiculed by this hard-moncy Adminis¬ 
 tration. 
 
 I fear that there is a settled purpose, indirectly but certainly, to establish a Government ex¬ 
 chequer or Treasury bank. The bill under consideration goes far towards it; and coupled as 
 it is with Mr. Woodbury’s last annual report on the finances, no one can doubt of the ultimate 
 result, if not design. 
 
 One of the chapters of that report has a most ominous caption ; it is this : “ On some perma¬ 
 nent safeguard under fluctuations in receipts and expenditures.” Under this head the Secreta¬ 
 ry says: 
 
4 
 
 “ The national pride, no less than its national honor and credit, appears to be concerned in adopting some meas¬ 
 ure on this subject—stable, efficient, creditable to free institutions, and possessing a permanent influence to pre¬ 
 serve unspotted the public faith.” 
 
 One more quotation from that ominous chapter will suffice; it is in these words: 
 
 “ It is hoped that an actual failure to furnish means to make prompt payment, under all contingencies, and thus 
 producing the very violation of good faith so much to be deprecated, will not be necessary to awaken its guardians 
 to the urgent importance of some such remedial provision; a measure without which, in the shape of an in vestment 
 or large balance on hand, or authority given to postpone certain classes of appropriation when the revenue proves 
 insufficient for the whole, or some power to borrow money, or issue on interest , when necessary, drafts or ex¬ 
 chequer bills, no financial system, in any enlightened country, has been or can be long administered with safety 
 or honor.” 
 
 Lock now at the bill upon your table, and you will find that the plan last mentioned in the 
 quotation from the Secretary’s report has been adopted. It is, in effect, a standing power to 
 Mr. Woodbury, or his successor in office, to issue Treasury notes. Is this necessary for the 
 safety and welfare of this nation 1 And is Mr. Woodbury justified in saying that the financial 
 system of this country cannot be administered with safety and honor without this power 1 Ido 
 not believe it is so. We have passed through every vicissitude—through good and through 
 evil report—during the last fifty years, without this alleged “permanent safeguard;” and the 
 experience of the last few years, and the present crisis in particular, convince me that, so far 
 from justifying this measure, the People have greater reason to fear and be jealous of it. It is 
 urged upon high and flattering considerations; our national pride, honor, and faith, are ad¬ 
 dressed by the Secretary. But I must declare my fear that it will be found fraught with as many 
 secret evils against the liberties of this country as poured forth from the body of that far-famed 
 horse which bitter enemies, under the guise of friendship, placed within the walls of Troy ! It 
 will be time enough to create this power to borrow money when it is needed; “Sufficient for 
 the day is the evil thereof.” Such has been the usage of our Government, and it has proved 
 sound. We have prospered under it. We have had experiments enough; let us try no more, 
 unless a clear necessity exists for it. Congress is in session every year, and, of late years, the 
 intervals between some of the sessions are becoming very brief. Let this power, then, remain 
 where it is, in the hands of the people, to be exercised by them, through their Representatives. 
 The Executive is already too strong ; it is grasping and is daily enlarging; its right arm, the 
 money power, should rather be weakened than invigorated ; and, if my vote can do this, it 
 shall be done. 
 
 Having examined the principal reasons of the President and Secretary for this Treasury note 
 system, Mr. B. said he would again recur to the deranged state of the currency and exchange, 
 and to that universal embarrassment which “ seems to have spread over the whole country.” 
 It is this which has brought this country to the necessity of borrowing money for its cur¬ 
 rent expenditures. AVas not this state of things foretold, and is not the sad reality now before 
 us! To avoid responsibility, or with sincerity of purpose, gentlemen may tax their ingenuity 
 to find out causes for our present national and individual distress. They may deny the propri¬ 
 ety and justice of those which I shall assign, and have already alluded to. They are at last, 
 however, brought to admit that the nation is reduced to the necessity of borrowing money to pay 
 its debts, and that “ a universal embarrassment seems to have spread over the whole country.” 
 However much we may differ about the causes of this calamity, all will agree that when, on 
 the 4th day of March, 1829, General Jackson came into power, we labored under no such evils, 
 national or individual, as it is now admitted we are suffering. In all the party conflicts which 
 immediately preceded his election, and when zealous and bitter partisans daily taxed their inge¬ 
 nuity to prefer charges, not one word was uttered which questions the system of finance, nation¬ 
 al or State, or which suggests any defect in the circulating medium, currency, or exchange. 
 That word “bank,” which has been since used as the grand lever to move the People, and 
 carry all elections, was not heard, though the “ monster” was then in full life. Indeed, so far 
 from any fault being found with this institution at that time, Mr. Ingham, the first Secretary of 
 the Treasury under General Jaclfeon, in one of his early official letters to the bank, dated the 
 29th June, 1829, used these very words : 
 
 “ I take occasion to express the great satisfaction of the Treasury Department at the manner in which the presi¬ 
 dent and directors of the parent bank have discharged their trusts in all their immediate relations to the Govern¬ 
 ment, so far as their transactions have come under my notice, and especially in the facilities afforded in transfer¬ 
 ring the funds of the Government, and in the preparation for the heavy payment of the public debt on the 1st instant, 
 which has been effected by means of the prudent arrangement of your board.” 
 
 The times I allude to filled the air with bloated accounts of useless and unnecessary clerks 
 and officers in the different departments and branches of the public business, and equally ex¬ 
 travagant representations as to the expenditure of public money, under the administration of the 
 venerable and upright, virtuous and intelligent gentleman, now a member of this House, from 
 Massachusetts, (Mr. Adams.) These things went forth to the People with shouts of promised 
 retrenchment and reform. The pretensions of the party were either false, and the People voted 
 under gross deception, or, if true, the promises have not been kept, and the people have been 
 equally deceived. 
 
 A few quotations from one of the reformers of that day will illustrate what I have just said. 
 I mean Mr. Buchanan* of Pennsylvania, then a member of this House, and now a leading 
 
5 
 
 friend of the Administration in the Senate. In the famous debate on retrenchment and reform, 
 immediately preceding General Jackson’s election, Mr. Buchanan said : 
 
 “ I believe it is necessary that all the public expenditures should be subjected to a most ritrid examination. That 
 abuses do exist which ought to be remedied, I do not entertain a particle of doubt.” * * * When (said 
 
 he) we commence the work of reform, I wish to enter upon it seriously. I wish the House to be prepared to act with 
 wisdom and with energy in cutting off the useless branches of public expenditure ” 
 
 And again he said ; 
 
 “ The power and patronage of thi3 Government have been extended, and are felt in every neighborhood of this 
 vast empire. There is now infinitely more danger of consolidation than of disunion ; and the States should now La 
 jealous of every encroachment upon their rights.” 
 
 In connexion with this sentiment, Mr. Buchanan said : 
 
 “ I have been called a federalist, and I shall never be ashamed of the name." 
 
 This name of “ federalist,” it seems, is one which Mr. Buchanan wears with ease and com¬ 
 placency, and will never be ashamed of, though the official organ of the Administration, the 
 Globe, is a daily reviler of it. But it is not my purpose to settle this difference of opinion be¬ 
 tween these two friends, Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Blair; it is their own affair, and they, no 
 doubt, understand each other. I will not lose sight of Mr. Buchanan’s promise “ to remedy 
 the abuses and retrench the public expenditures.” All this has proved but vain and empty 
 clamor. It turns out that this vaunted reformer, who made public “ proclamation that he was 
 not ashamed of being a federalist,” and declared that in due time he would “commence the 
 work of reform,” and “ enter upon it seriously,” and, with wisdom and energy, “engage in 
 cutting off the useless branches of public expenditure,” and would provide “remedies against 
 all abuses” as well as against “the power and patronage of the Government, which extended 
 and were felt in every neighborhood of this vast empire”—I say, it turns out that this very re¬ 
 former never commenced the work. Did he find it “ a most troublesome, thankless, and hope¬ 
 less task,” as, in the debate, he said “it was generally thought to bel” From December, 
 1829, to this moment, the People have been led on step by step, under the application of one se¬ 
 ductive nostrum after another in quick succession : occasionally the wretched influences of some 
 of these quack medicines were thrown off, and the vigor of the country seemed partially to be re¬ 
 stored ; but another dose, a gilded pill with its glittering lustre, was prescribed and taken ; and 
 all its sad consequences are upon us. In that same speech of Mr. Buchanan, already referred 
 to, he says : 
 
 “ It is a maxim of despots that the People should never inquire into the concerns of the Government. Those who 
 have enslaved mankind, from Ctesar to Bonaparte, have always endeavored, by presenting them with amusements, 
 and by every other means in their power, to attract the attention of the People from the conduct of their rulers.” 
 
 The People are now inquiring what has brought this calamity on the land ; and I propose to 
 state a few facts which, in my judgment, have had a leading agency in it. But I wish it to be 
 distinctly understood that, in any thing I have said or may say, it is not meant, nor do I design 
 it to be construed, as proposing to disturb the country with the question of incorporating a Bank 
 of the United States. I am confident it would have been fortunate for the People if that insti¬ 
 tution had never been destroyed. But it has been put down, and in my judgment no attempt 
 should be made to incorporate a similar institution, unless the People themselves, in their pri¬ 
 mary assemblies, so direct their Representatives. My object is simply to submit the leading 
 facts which I think brought the country to its present embarrassment. 
 
 I repeat, then, as my deliberate conviction, that the measures of the past Administration, 
 commenced while Mr. Van Buren was chief counsellor, and since continued by him under his 
 own Administration, have had the principal, if not the entire, agency in bringing this distress 
 upon the country. It is my purpose to state, in their historical order, the leading measures to 
 which I attach this responsibility. This I will aim to do with entire accuracy, by reading from 
 the several volumes of public documents communicated to and printed by Congress. If gentle¬ 
 men question any statement, as I proceed, I respectfully ask them to take the books, and read 
 and satisfy themselves. Many, if not all the documents which I intend to read have often been 
 used in this House before. I claim no novelty in the matter. It is perhaps because they have 
 been so often referred to, without producing any effect, that it may now seem idle to attach any 
 importance to them. My hope, however, is that the People of this country will, in this alarm¬ 
 ing crisis, deliberate on and consider the causes which have induced it. Whenever heretofore 
 a fear has been expressed that this dire calamity which now oppresses us would come, it has 
 been scoffed at by an appeal to our apparent prosperity. If high prices and ready sales pre¬ 
 vailed, tho cry was, “see what we have done for you by our plan for reforming the currency !” 
 But now, when the wretched influences of this promised harvest of “gold” have subsided, and 
 a “ universal embarrassment seems to have spread over the whole country,” Mr. Van Buren 
 and his friends arc unwilling to assume any of the reponsibility. When things look well, they 
 claim all the credit; but if misfortunes come, they deny that their measures contributed to bring 
 them about. They must take the bitter as well as the sweet waters flowing from the fountain 
 which they themselves opened. 
 
 I again repeat, then, that our currency and exchange wore most happily regulated and pro¬ 
 verbially sound when, in December, 1829, instead of a plan for retrenchment and reform, tho 
 
6 
 
 President, under Mr. Van Buren’s advice, commenced his attack on the currency, and, to the 
 surprise of all, said : 
 
 “ The charter of the Bank of the United States expires in 1836, and its stockholders will most probably apply for 
 a renewal of their privileges. In order to avoid the evils resulting from precipitancy in a measure involving such 
 important principles and such deep pecuniary interests, I feel that I cannot, in justice to the parties interested, too 
 soon present it to the deliberate consideration of the Legislature and the People. Both the constitutionality and the 
 expediency of tiie law creating this bank are well questioned by a large portion of our fellow-citizens, and it must 
 be admitted by all that it has failed in the great end of establishing a-unifonn and sound currency.” 
 
 Upon the delivery of this message, it was referred in the House to the Committee of Ways 
 and Means, composed of a majority of the personal and political friends of General Jackson, and 
 who had been very influential and active in elevating him to the Chief Magistracy of the nation. 
 That committee, thus composed, made an elaborate and instructive report, from which the fol¬ 
 lowing passages are taken : 
 
 “Bank credit and bank paper are so extensively interwoven with the commercial operations of society, that’ 
 even if Congress had the constitutional power, it would be utterly impossible to produce so entire a change in the 
 monetary system of the country as to abolish the agency of banks of discount, without involving the community in 
 all the distressing embarrassments usually attendant on great political revolutions, subverting the titles to private 
 property.” 
 
 “Soon after the expiration of the charter of the first Bank of the United States, an immense number of local 
 banks sprung up under the pecuniary exigencies produced by the withdrawal of so large an amount oi bank credit 
 as necessarily resulted from the winding up of its concerns—an amount falling very little short of fifteen millions of 
 dollars. These banks, being entirely free from the salutary control which the Bank of the United States had recent¬ 
 ly exercised over the local institutions, commenced that sytem of imprudent trading and excessive issues which, 
 speedily involved the country in all the embarrassments of a disordered currrency.” ~ 
 
 “ The Chief Magistrate, in that part of his first message which relates to the Bank of the United States, expresses 
 the opinion that ‘ ft has failed in the great end of establishing a uniform and sound currency.’ After giving to this 
 opinion all the consideration to which it is so justly entitled, from the eminent station and high character of the 
 citizen by whom it is entertained, the committee are constrained to express their respectful but decided dissent 
 from it.” 
 
 “ Human wisdom has never effected, in any other country, a nearer approach to uniformity in the currency than 
 that which is made by the use of the precious metals. If, therefore, it can be shown that the bills of the United States 
 Bank are of equal value with silver at all points of the Union, it would seem that the proposition is clearly made 
 out that the bank has accomplished 4 the great end of establishing a uniform and sound currency.’ It is not denied 
 that the bills of the mother bank, and of all its branches, are invariably and promptly redeemed in specie when¬ 
 ever presented at the offices by which they have been respectively issued, and at which, upon their face, they pur¬ 
 port to be payable. Nor is it denied that the bills of the bank, and of all the branches, are equal to specie in their 
 respective spheres of circulation. Bills, for example, issued by the mother bank, are admitted to be equal to silver 
 in Pennsylvania, and all those parts of the adjacent States of which Philadelphia is the market. But it is contend¬ 
 ed that these bills, not being redeemable at Charleston and New Orleans, are not of equal value with silver to the 
 merchant who wishes to purchase cotton with them in those cities. Now, if the Philadelphia merchant had silver 
 instead of bank bills, he certainly could not effect his purchases with it in Charleston or New Orleans without hav¬ 
 ing the silver conveyed to those places; and it is equally certain that he could not have it conveyed there without 
 paying for its transportation and insurance. These expenses constitute the natural rate of exchange between those 
 cities, and indicate the exact sum which the merchant would give as a premium for a bill of exchange, to avoid the 
 trouble and delay of transporting his specie. It is obvious, therefore, that, even for these distant operations of com¬ 
 merce, silver would be no more valuable than the bills of the bank; for these would purchase a bill of exchange 
 on either of the cities mentioned precisely as well as silver. If the operation should be reversed, and the planter of 
 Louisiana or South Carolina should desire to place his funds in Philadelphia, with a view to purchase merchandise, 
 he would find the bills of the branch bank in either of those States entirely equivalent to silver in effecting his ob¬ 
 ject. Even, therefore, if the bank had not reduced the rate of the exchanses, it might be safely asserted that its 
 bills would be of equal value with silver at every jxiint in the Union, and for every purpose, whether local or 
 general. 
 
 “ But it is impossible to exhibit any thing like a just view of the beneficial operations of the bank without advert¬ 
 ing to the threat reduction it has effected, and the steadiness it has superinduced, in the rate of the commercial ex¬ 
 changes of the country. Though this branch of the business of the bank has been the subject of more complaint, 
 perhaps, than any other, the committee have no hesitation in saying it has been productive of the most signal bene¬ 
 fits to the community, and deserves the highest commendation. It has been already stated that it has saved the 
 community from the immense losses resulting from a high and fluctuating state of the exchanges. It now remains 
 to show its effect in equalizing the currrency. In this respect it has been~productive of results more salutary than 
 were anticipated by the most sanguine advocates of the policy of establishing the bank. It has actually furnished 
 a circulating medium more uniform than specie. This proposition is susceptible ol the clearest demonstration. If 
 the whole circulating medium were specie, a planter of Louisiana, who should desire to purchase merchandise in 
 Philadelphia, would be obliged to pay one per cent, either for a bill of exchange on this latter place, or for the trans¬ 
 portation and insurance of his specie. His specie at New r Orleans, where he had no present use for it, would be 
 worth one per cent, less to him than it would be in Philadelphia, where he had a demand for it. But, by the aid of 
 the Bank of the United States, one-half of the expense of transporting specie is now saved to him. The bank, for 
 one-half of one per cent, will give him a draft upon the mother bank at Philadelphia, with which he can draw either 
 the bills of that bank or specie, at his pleasure. In like manner, the bank and its branches will give drafts from 
 any point of the Union to any other where offices exist, at a per centage greatly less than it would cost to transport 
 specie, and in many instances at par. If the merchant or planter, how ever, does not choose to purchase a draft from 
 the bank, but prefers transmitting the bills of the office where he resides to any distant point, for commercial pur¬ 
 poses, although these bills are not strictly redeemable at the point to which they are transmitted, yet, as they are 
 receivable in payment of all dues to the Government, persons will be generally found willing to take them at par; 
 and if they should not, the bank will receive them frequently at par, and always at a discount much less than 
 would pay the expense of transporting specie. The fact that the bills of the bank and its branches are indiscrimi¬ 
 nately receivable at the custom-houses and land offices in payment of duties and for the public, lands, has an effect 
 in giving uniformity to the value of these bills, which merits a more full and distinct explanation. 
 
 “ For all the purposes of the revenue it gives to the national currency that perfect uniformity, that ideal perfec¬ 
 tion, to which a currency of gold and silver, in so extensive a country, could have no pretensions. A bill issued at 
 Missouri is of equal value with specie at Boston in payment of duties ; and the same is true of all other places, how¬ 
 ever distant, where the bank issues bills, and the Government collects its revenue. When it is, moreover, con¬ 
 sidered that the bank performs, wfith the most scrupulous punctuality, the stipulation to transfer the funds of the 
 Government to any point where they may be wanted, free of expense, it must be apparent that the committee are 
 correct, to the very letter, in stating that the bank has furnished, both to the Government and to the People, a cur¬ 
 rency of absolutely uniform value in all places, for all the , urposes of paying the public contributions, and dis¬ 
 bursing the public revenue. And when it is recollected that the Government annually collects and disburses more 
 than twenty three millions of dollars, those who are at all familiar with the subject will atonce perceive that bills, 
 which are of absolutely uniform value for this vast operation, must be very nearly so for all the purposes of general 
 commerce. 
 
7 
 
 ‘‘Upon the whole, then, it may be confidently asserted that no country in the world has a circulating medium of 
 greater uniformity than the United States; ana that no country of any thins like the same geographical extent has 
 a currency at all comparable to that of the United States on the score of uniformity.” 
 
 Thus did the friends of General Jackson themselves describe the state of our currency, as may 
 be seen in their report, No. 358, vol. 3, Reports of Committees of the House of Representatives, 
 1st session 21st Congress. 
 
 I will now see what was done in the Senate at the same period, where all admit General Jack- 
 son, and his Administration had, at the time, entire control. The Committee on Finance in 
 that body was also composed of a majority of his political and personal friends, and they were in¬ 
 structed by a resolution passed on the 30th December, 1829, “to inquire into the expediency of 
 establishing a uniform national currency for the United States, and to report thereon to the 
 Senate.” \ 
 
 Having fully deliberated on the subject, those friends of General Jackson made their report, 
 which may be seen at large in Senate doc. No. 104, vol. 2, 1st session 21st Congress. I will 
 read from it the following passages : 
 
 “ Thp currency of the United States, the only legal currency, is gold and silver ; all debts to the Government, 
 and all debts to individuals, being received in that medium, and in no other. As, howevpr, the amount ol coin 
 requisite for these purposes would be unmanageable and inconvenient, the United States, like other commercial 
 countries, have adopted the system of making credit supply many of the cases of coin ; and numerous banking com¬ 
 panies have been established, issuing notes promising to pay, on demand, in gold and silver. The Government of 
 the United States has established one of a similar character; and. for the convenience of the community, the public 
 revenue is collected in gold and silver, the notes of the Bank of the United States, and the notes of such solvent 
 State banks as the Bank of the United States and its branches will receive as cash. 
 
 The currency, therefore, of the United States, in its relation to the Government of the United States, consists of 
 gold and silver, and of notes equivalent to gold and silver. And the inquiry which naturally presents itself is, 
 whether this mixed mass of currency is sound and uniform for all the practical purposes of the Government, and 
 the trade of the Union. That it is so will apppar from the following facts: 
 
 “ 1st. The Government receives its revenue from— 
 
 343 custom-houses, 
 
 42 land offices, 
 
 8,004 post offices, 
 
 134 receivers of internal revenue, 
 
 37 marshals, 
 
 33 clerks of courts. 
 
 “ These, with other receiving officers, which need not be specified, compose an aggregate of more than 9,000 per¬ 
 sons, dispersed through the whole of the Union, who collect the public revenue. From these persons the Govern¬ 
 ment has, for the ten years preceding the 1st of January, 1830, received $230,068,855 17. This suin has be n collected 
 in every section of this widely extended countrv. It has been disbursed at other points, many thousand miles dis¬ 
 tant from the places where it was collected, and yet it has been so collected and distributed without the loss, as far 
 as the committee can learn, of a single dollar, and without the expense of a single dollar to the Government. That 
 a currency, by which the Government has been thus enabled to collect and transfer such an amount of revenue to 
 pay its army and navy, and all its expanses, and the national debt, is unsafe and unsound, cannot readily be be¬ 
 lieved ; for there can be no surer test of its sufficiency than the simple fact, that every dollar, received in the form 
 of a bank note, in tlip remotest parts of the interior, is, without charge, converted into a silver dollar at every one 
 of the vast number oi places where the service of the Government requires its disbursement. The Secretary of the 
 Treasury, in his report of the 6th of December, 1828. declares that, during the four years preceding, the receipts of 
 the Government had amounted to more than ninety-seven millions of dollars, and that ‘ all payments on account 
 of the public debt, whether for interest or principal, all on account of pensions, all (or the civil list, for the army, 
 for the navv, or for whatever purpose wanted, in any part of the Union, have been punctually met.’ 
 
 2d. If tnis currency is thus sound and uniform for the Government, it is not less so to the community. 
 
 “ The basis of all good currency should be the precious metals, gold and silver; and, in a mixed currency of paper 
 circulating with gold or silver, and convertible into it, the great object to be attained is, that the paper should al¬ 
 ways be equal to gold or silver; that is, it should always be exchangeable for gold or silver. Such a currency is 
 perfect, uniting the convenience of a portable material with the safety of a metallic medium. Now, it cannot be 
 doubted that, throughout this whole country, the circulating bank notes are equal to specie, and convertible into 
 specie. There may be, and probably are, exceptions, because, among banks, as among men, there are some who 
 make a show of unreal strength. But it is a fact, so familiar to the experience of every citizen in the community 
 as to be undeniable, that, in all the Atlantic and commercial cities, and, generally speaking, throughout the whole 
 country, the notes ol the State banks are equal to gold or silver. The committee do not mean to say that there may 
 not be too many banks, or that insolvencies do not occasionally occur among them ; but, as every bank which de¬ 
 sires to maintain its character must be ready to make settlements with the Bank of the United States, as the agent 
 of the Government, or be immediately discredited, and must, therefore, keep its notes equal to gold or silver, there 
 can be little danger to the community while the issues of the banks are restrained from running to excess by the 
 salutary control of the Bank of the United States, whose own circulation is extremely moderate compared with the 
 amount of its capital. Accordingly, the fact is, that the general credit of the banks is good, and that their paper is 
 always convertible into gold or silver, and for all local purposes forms a local currency equivalent to gold and silver. 
 There is, however, superadded to this currency a general currency more known, more trusted, and more valuable 
 than the local currency, which is employed in the exchanges between different parts of the country. These are the 
 notes of the national bank. These notes are receivable fur the Government by the 9,000 receivers scattered through¬ 
 out every part of the country. 77 icy are., in fact, in the course of business, paid in gold or silver, though they are 
 not legally or necessarily so paid by the branches of the bank in every section of the I 'nion. In all commercial 
 places they are received, in all transactions, without any reduction in value, and never, under any circumstances, 
 does the paper, from the remotest branches, vary beyond a quarter of one per cent, in its actual exchange for silver. 
 Here, then, is a currency as safe as silver-more convenient and more valuable than silver—which, through the 
 whole Western and Southern and interior parts of the Union, is eagerly sought in exchange for silver; which, in 
 those sections, often brars a premium paid in silver; which is, throughout the Union, equal to silver in payment to 
 the Government and payments to individuals in business; and which, whenever silver is needed in any part of the 
 country, will command it without the charge of the slightest fraction of a per cpnlnee. By means of this currency 
 funds are transmitted at an expense less than in any other country. In no other country can a merchant do what 
 every citizen of the United Smtes can do— daposite, for instance, his silver at St. Louis, or Nashville, orJMew Or¬ 
 leans, and receive notes which he can carry with him 1,000 or 1,500 mile s, to the Atlantic cities, and there receivo 
 for them an equivalent amount of silver witnout any expense whatever, and in no possible event an expense l>eyonil 
 a quarter of one per cent. If, however, a citizen does not wish to incur the anxiety of carrying these notes with him, 
 or to run the hazard of the mail, he may, instead ol them, receive a draft payable to himself or his agent alone, so as 
 to ensure the receipt of an equal amount, at an expense of not one-half, and often nut one fourth, of the actual cost 
 of carrying the silver. The owner of funds, for instance, at St. Louis, or Nashville, can transfer them to Philadel¬ 
 phia for one-half per cent.; from New Orleans, generally without any charge at all, at most one half per cent.; from 
 
8 
 
 
 Mobile, from par to one-half per cent.; from Savannah, at one-half per cent; and from Charleston, at from par to 
 one quarter per cent. 
 
 “ This seems to present a state of currency approaching as near to perfection as could be desired; for here is a cur¬ 
 rency issued at twenty-four different parts of the Union, obtainable by any citizen who has money or credit- When 
 in his possession, it is equivalent to silver in all his dealings with all the 9,00'd agents of the Government throughout 
 the Union. In all his dealings with the interior it is better than silver ; in all his dealings with the comme'rcial 
 cities equal to silver; and if, for any purpose, he desires the silver with which he bought it, it is at his disposal, al¬ 
 most universally, without any diminution, and never more than a diminution of one-quarter per cent. It is not easy 
 to imagine, it is scarcely necessary to desire, any currency better than this.” * * * * * 
 
 “ After escaping so recently from the degradation of a depreciated paper currency, the committee would abstain 
 from every thing which might, however remotely, revive it.” * * * - * * * * 
 
 Under these circumstances , they deem it prudent to abstainfrom all legislation , to abide by the 'practical good 
 which the country enjoys , and to put nothing to hazard by doubtful experiments.'''' 
 
 Happy would it have been for the country if this wise and prudent suggestion had been fol¬ 
 lowed! But Mr. Van Buren and others of General Jackson’s eleventh hour friends prevailed— 
 the attack is renewed in the message of 1830, and again in that ot 1831. The counsel and ad¬ 
 vice of the early and wise friends of the President is disregarded. However, a majority is found 
 in each branch of Congress sufficient to pass a bill rechartering the Bank of the United States; 
 but the will of one man, guided by evil counsellors, defeated it. And not satisfied with this vic¬ 
 tory, as if to hurry on the sad catastrophe which has since overtaken the country, the Adminis* 
 tration continued to disturb the existing relations between the Government and the bank under 
 its charter, before the time of its expiration. And in the message of 1833 the following lan¬ 
 guage is held : 
 
 11 Such measures as are within the reach of the Secretary of the Treasury have been taken to enable him to judge 
 whether the public deposites in that institution (the Bank of the United States) may be regarded as entirely safe ; 
 but as his limited power may prove inadequate to this object, I recommend the subject to the attention of Congress, 
 Under the firm belief that it is worthy of their serious investigation. An inquiry into the transactions of the institu¬ 
 tion, embracing the branches as well as the principal bank, seems called for by the credit which is given through- 
 outthe country to many serious charges, impeaching its character, and which, if true, may justly excite the appre¬ 
 hension that it is no longer a safe depository of the money of the People.” 
 
 In this, it will be observed that the President affects to believe that the public money is 
 not safe in the Bank of the United States. He had succeeded in cutting oft’ all hope of re¬ 
 chartering the institution ; and it was then hoped that he would suffer it to proceed unmolested 
 in the discharge of its various duties for the remnant of time which remained under its original 
 charter. Here again the message just read disappointed us. He now questions the safety and 
 security of the public money in the bank, and after saying that the Secretary of the Treasury 
 had instituted an inquiry on that point, recommends the same inquiries to Congress. The 1st 
 volume of Executive documents, being doc. No. 8, House ef Reps., 2d ses. 22d Congress, shows 
 that Mr. Louis McLane, as Secretary of the Treasury, in November, 1832, appointed Mr. Henry 
 Toland, of Philadelphia, to make the examination alluded to by the President. In appointing 
 him, Mr. McLane says: 
 
 “ It is expected that the examination will be as complete as the law authorizes, so as to ascertain the security of 
 the public moneys and the solvency of the bank.” 
 
 It is well known, that Mr. Toland is a gentleman of unsullied integrity, and possesses talents 
 and qualifications eminently qualifying him for this trust. To this it should also be added, that 
 he was an early and fast friend, personal and political, of General Jackson, under whom he held 
 for several years, and until the close of his Administration, the office of Navy Agent in the city 
 of Philadelphia. These facts are mentioned to show that the report of Mr. Toland was entitled 
 to the confidence of General Jackson and his friends. What was that report! The document 
 last referred to contains it, and he there says: 
 
 “ I called on the president of said institution, who gave prompt directions to the officers to furnish me'with any 
 books or documents belonging to the institution which I might consider material to such inspection.” 
 
 And, after stating the details of his examination, he adds : 
 
 “ Thus far, I consider my report as complying with that part of your letter directing the investigation, so as to as¬ 
 certain the security of the public money and the solvency of the bank, neither of which can, in my opinion, admit 
 of a doubt.” 
 
 With this report, it is proper also to mention that the inquiry recommended to be made by the 
 President was referred to the Committee of Ways and Means in the House, who, after exami¬ 
 nation, and upon proofs, reported fully. This is the conclusion of the report; 
 
 “ It appears from official documents of unquestionable authority that the specie actually in the vaults of the Bank 
 of the United States is within one-tenth of the amount held by all the other banks in the Union together, whilst its 
 circulation of paper is but one-fourth of the aggregate of theirs. In other words, the Bank of the United States has 
 now above nine millions of specie, with a circulation of notes to the amount of seventeen millions and a half, whilst 
 the aggregate of all the other banks, with specie in their vaults of from ten to eleven millions, have a circulation of 
 sixty-height millions of bank paper. If, then, the evidence herewith submitted can be relied upon, which it is for 
 the House to judge of, there can be no doubt of the entire soundness of the whole bank capital, after meeting all de¬ 
 mands upon it, either by its bill holders or the Government; and such is the opinion of the committee, who feel 
 great confidence in the well-known character and intelligence of the directors whose testimony supports the fact3 
 above stated.” 
 
 The following resolution concludes the report: 
 
 “ Resolved , That the Government deposites may, in the opinion of this House, be safely continued in the Bank 
 of the United States.” 
 
 This resolution wds adopted by the House, by a vote of 109 for it, and only 46 against it, and 
 Congress adjourned. After this repeated testimony, solemnly borne by the friends of the Ad- 
 
9 
 
 ministration, in favor of the safety and security of the bank and of the public money then on dc- 
 posite, the people of this country would gladly have had repose, but this was denied them. The 
 Administration, having failed to carry the point before Congress, now resolve to take the matter 
 into their own hands; and here commences the plan to substitute State banks for the Dank of 
 the United States. On the 23d July, 1833, the President causes Amos Kendall, well known 
 “ as a man of all work,” to be appointed to negotiate with she State banks to become the deposi¬ 
 tories of the public money. His letter of appointment says: 
 
 “ It is the opinion of the President that, hereafter as heretofore, bank agency will be found convenient in manag¬ 
 ing ihe fiscal operations of the Government; and, as he cannot, consistently with his avowed sentiments, sanction 
 any national institution organized upon the principles of the existing Bank of the United Stales, he deems it proper 
 to ascertain whether all the services now rendered by it may not be performed by the banks incorporated by the 
 several States on terms equally or more favorable to the Government.” (See Sen. Docs., 1st sess. ’23d Cong. vol. 1, 
 doc. 17, p. 19.) 
 
 Mr. Kendall accepts his appointment and enters upon his agency to decoy the State banks. 
 The particulars of his crusade I reserve for another part of my remarks. He succeeded in prevail¬ 
 ing on several of these institutions to become the depositories of the public money, and makes 
 his report to the Government. Mr. Duane, then Secretary of the Treasury, resisted the meas¬ 
 ure on the ground that Congress had just passed the resolution already referred to, and would 
 again soon be in session, when the matter could be submitted to them. But this was exactly 
 what the Executive wished to avoid. Congress, on full consideration and by a large majority, 
 had passed a bill to recharter the bank, but this failed under the Executive power. 
 
 That same Executive next insists that the bank is not a safe depository of the public money, 
 and not only directs Mr. Toland to inquire into its safety, but urges the same inquiry on Con¬ 
 gress. Both these inquiries are made, and the results were adverse to his suggestions. His own 
 personal and political friend, Mr. Duane, Secretary of the Treasury, advises against this same 
 measure, and urges the propriety of submitting it to the Representatives of the people. But this 
 is all in vain. In utter disregard of all these proceedings, and after the large vote of the House be¬ 
 fore given, the President resolved on substituting his “ sic volo, siejubeo,” asthelaw r of the land, 
 and commands a discontinuance of the United States Bank as the public depository 1 His Sec¬ 
 retary is unwilling to do it—the law made it his province, if done at all: and, being unwilling to 
 do so, he is constrained to resign. His successor, however, \ielded a ready compliance, and the 
 work was done! 
 
 This was the consummation of a series of measures which first disturbed and ultimately de¬ 
 stroyed the system of finance, currency, and exchanges, under which this country was prosperous 
 and happy. But General Jackson and his Cabinet promised and induced the country to believe 
 that a better system would be at once supplied. Two plans for accomplishing this were proposed 
 in succession—one “the State bank system,” the other “ the gold humbug!” Mr. Bond said 
 he would examine each in its order. 
 
 First, as to the State bank project. We have already seen, by the letter appointing Mr. 
 Kendall to negotiate with these banks, that he was required to ascertain whether all the services 
 rendered by the Bank of the United States could not be performed by the State banks on terms 
 equally or more favorable to the Government. Mr. Kendall, having visited most of the principal 
 cities on this mission, made his report, which may be seen in Senate document No. 17, vol. 1, of 
 the first session of the twenty-third Congress. He there says : 
 
 “ Some interesting facts relative to the currency of the country came to my knowledge on this tour, which it may 
 be important to mention.” . 
 
 After stating the facts, he gives his inference from them in these words : 
 
 i “ It is the Government, therefore, and not the bank, which gives those notes (the notes of the Bank of the United 
 States) all the general credit and currency they possess ; and the same credit and currency it can give to the |>aper 
 of any other institution.” 
 
 All who will read the official publications of that day will be convinced that the Admin¬ 
 istration in discontinuing the use of the Bank of the United States, engaged to furnish a sub¬ 
 stitute for the circulating medium and exchange which that institution had afforded to the coun¬ 
 try. Indeed, it will be seen that Mr. Secretary Taney, in the document which I shall presently 
 refer to, in assigning his reasons for the removal of the deposites, not only promised, but admit¬ 
 ted it to be the duty of the Government, to furnish this substitute. But at present let us inquire 
 what was the promised substitute of the Administration. Mr. Kendall shall answer; he is said 
 to hold “the pen of a ready writer,” and his own language shall now be employed to disclose the 
 plan ef the Administration for a system of national currency and exchange. In his report already 
 alluded to, he says : 
 
 “ A course of banking business has recently been introduced between the West and the East, which promises to 
 furnish a general currency of uniform value, without the agency of the Government. It is the making of the notes 
 of the Western Slate banks convertible into gold and silver at the great commercial points. Tito Union Bank of 
 Tennessee, for instance, keeps a deposite of one million of dollars in a bank in Philadelphia, upon which it receives 
 an interest of three per cent. It issues notes in Tennessee payable at the bank which has its dep site in Philadel¬ 
 phia. These notes perform the office of a circulating medium in the West, and, upon the current of exchange, 
 float to the East, where at length they reach the deposite prepared for their redemption. Experience indicates that 
 they will not, in general, be less than three or ihur months in performing this journey ; during which the l*mk is, 
 in fact, usin<r its capital twice over. If issued in the discount of real or accommodation paper, it obtains an interest 
 at the rate of six per cent, on that paper, and three per cent, on the deposite prepared for their redemption ; if, in 
 
 I 
 
10 
 
 the purchase of domestic bills of exchange, it obtains the three per cent, on the deposite, the six per cent, interest 
 on the bill, together with the difference of r xchange, and probably the bill will become due and be collected be¬ 
 fore the bank notes issued in its purchase arrive at the points of redemption. 
 
 “ The notes of the Union Bank of Tennessee are now a better currency in Philadelphia, and everywhere else, 
 so far as they are known, than the notes of the Nashville branch of the United States Bank, simply because they 
 are convertible into specie, and therefore pass at par at the great commercial points. They are now taken in pay¬ 
 ment of debts and on deposite by the banks in Philadelphia, but the branch notes are not. 
 
 “ The Planters’ Bank of Mississippi has made an arrangement with a bank in New York, by which it is to issue 
 notes, payable at its own counter or at the Planters’ Bank in Mississippi. Although it is not to be expected that 
 New York notes will often be presented in Mississippi for payment, yet this form'exhibits to the holder the evi¬ 
 dence of their general credit, which he would not have if they were payable only at one point. 
 
 “ The branch of the Alabama State Bank at Mobile is negotiating a similar arrangement in New York. 
 
 “ Whether any of the Louisiana banks have like arrangements I am not informed; but there can be no doubt but 
 the banks in that State and in the other interior Western States will follow the example which promises such ben¬ 
 eficial results.” 
 
 “ A similar process on a smaller scale, and originating in a different principle, has given a uniform currency to 
 New England. In that section of the Union there are about two hundred banks, upwards of twenty of which are 
 in Boston. The Boston banks, finding their circulation almost confined to the city by the abundance of country 
 paper, which was not received by the city banks, combined together to receive and cash it, with a view of opening 
 a wider field for themselves. It ended in the country banks making provision to meet their circulation in Boston ; 
 thus giving their notes as high a value as the city notes. They are, accordingly, interchaneeably received, and 
 have become of uniform credit throughout that section of the Union. If they could be cashed in New York, also, 
 the centre of a much larger circle of trade and exchange, it is obvious that their credit would become as general, 
 ceukl they be as well known throughout the United Slates as it is now in New England.” “ These facts lmld out 
 a promise of a general currency of more uniform value than that now furnished by the Bank of the United States, 
 without the aid of the Government in originating or supporting it. The same connexion between banks in distant 
 parts of the Union will also supply the place of that bank in furnishing or purchasing domestic exchange, and the 
 growing competition will reduce it to the lowest practicable rate.” 
 
 “ The quantity necessary for the purposes of trade will be materially reduced by the convertibility of the cur¬ 
 rency at the commercial point; and this circumstance will also keep down the price.” 
 
 “ Probably the period is not far distant when it will be found to be the true interest of the country and the banks 
 themselves, that the whole of the paper currency shall be payable in the great commt rcial cities.” “ The greater 
 the distance of any bank from the centre of trade, the greater interest will it have in making its paper payable 
 there, because it will take it lonser to reach the point of redemption ; and its paper will be as much better than 
 specie at home, as the difference in convenience and the expense of transporting the two articles to the great com¬ 
 mercial inlets of the country. The result will probably be that the interior banks will become little else than 
 offices of discount and deposite, keeping all or most of their specie funds in New York or PhiladelpUia ; and, the 
 greater their distance, the more decisive will be the advantage both to themselves and to the country in adopting 
 this course.” 
 
 Having made this exposition of the Administration’s plan of a system of currency and ex¬ 
 change, to take the place of that furnished by the Bank of the United States, Mr. Kendall con¬ 
 cludes his report by stating that— 
 
 “ All the real benefits conferred on the country by a national bank, in furnishing domestic exchange and a 
 general currency, are likely to be more than equalled by the new course of business already introduced, which 
 carries with it none of the concentrated power that makes such an institution dangerous to the purity of our Gov¬ 
 ernment and the liberties of the People.” 
 
 We have thus seen this famous financial scheme explained, and the means illustrated by which 
 it was to be accomplished. A brilliant scheme it is on paper, and worthy of this arch financier 
 and contriver-general! The Administration acted on it, and the old and well-tried system of 
 finance, currency, aad exchange was demolished, under its seductive and fanciful influences! 
 
 But, let us proceed with other documents tending to establish the point now under considera¬ 
 tion. Tn his annual message to Congress in December, 1833, the President says: 
 
 “ Since the adjournment of the last Congress, the Secretary of the Treasury has directed the money of the United 
 States to be deposited in certain Slate banks designated by him, and he will immediately lay before you his reasons 
 for this direction. I concur with him entirely in the views he has taken of the subject , and, some months before 
 the removal, I urged upon the Department the propriety of taking that step. The near upproach of the day on 
 which the charter will expire , as well as the conduct of the bank, appeared to me to call for this measure, upon 
 the high considerations of public interest and public duty.” 
 
 It is thus seen that the President, referring to Mr. Secretary Taney’s reasons for changing the 
 place of depositing the public money, says, “ I concur with him entirely in the view he hus ta¬ 
 ken of the subject .” I propose to take up Mr. Taney’s report, and see what his “view” “ of 
 the subject” was. Tt is found in vol. 1, Sen. Doc. No. 2, 1st sess. 23d Cong. He there says 
 that the vote of the people had been expressed against the recharter of the bank, and he could 
 not feel justified in anticipating any change in the then existing laws in relation to that institu¬ 
 tion. Next comes his “view” “of the subject,” in which the President says he “entirely con¬ 
 curred.” I read from the report: * 
 
 11 And as the act of Congress, which created the corporation, limits the duration to the 3d of March, 1836, it be¬ 
 came my duty, as Secretary of the Treasury, in executing the trust confided to me under the lavy, to look to that 
 period of time as the termination of its corporate existence. I had no sufficient grounds for presuming that the law 
 would be altered in this respect by future legislation, and a new charter be granted to the bank. It was therefore 
 incumbent upon me, in discharging my official duties, to act upon the assumption that this corporation would not 
 continue in being after the time above specified. And in this state of things, without any reference to the manner 
 in which the bank has conducted itself , it became necessary to decide whether the deposites ought to remain in 
 the bank until the end of its corporate life, or be removed at some earlier period. In forming my opinion on this 
 subject, l cotdd only inquire which of these measures would most conduce to the public good. 
 
 “ It is obvious that the interests of the country would not be promoted by permitting the deposites of the public 
 money to continue in the bank until its charter expired. Judging from the past, it is highly probable that they will 
 always amount to several millions of dollars.” 
 
 What a mistake! Mr. Taney little thought that in a few brief years his successor, Mr. 
 Woodbury, would have no money in the Treasury, and would ask to pay the public creditors in 
 Treasury notes ! But let Mr. Taney speak on. He continues : 
 
11 
 
 \ 
 
 “ It would evidently produce serious inconvenience if such a large sum were left in the possession of the bank 
 until the last moment of its existence, and then be suddenly withdrawn, when its immense circulation is return¬ 
 ing upon it to be redeemed, and its private depositors removing their funds into other institutions. The ability of 
 the bank under such circumstances to lie prompt in its payments to the Government may be well doubled, even if 
 the ultimate safety of ihe deposites could be relied upon. 
 
 “ Besides, the principal circulating medium nowin the hands of the People, and the one most commonly used 
 in the exchanges between distant places, consists of the noio< of the Bank <>f the United States and its numerous 
 branches. The sudden withdrawal of its present amount of circulation, or its sudden depreciation before any other 
 sound ami convenient currency was substituted for it, would certainly produce extensive evils, and be sensibly felt 
 among all classes of society. 
 
 “ It is well understood that the superior credit heretofore enjoyed by the-notes of the Bank of the United States 
 was not founded on any particular confidence in iis management or soli lity. It was occasioned altogether by tlm 
 agreement on behalf of the public, in the act of incorporation, to receive them in ail payments to the United 
 States ; and it was this pledge on the part of the Government which gave general currency to notes payable at re¬ 
 mote branches. The same engagement in favor of any other moneyed institution would give its notes equal credit, 
 and make them equally convenient for the purposes of commerce. But this obligation on the part of the United 
 States will cease on the 3d March, 1836, when the charter expires; and as soon as this happens,all the outstanding 
 notes of the bank will lose the peculiar value they now possess, and the notes payable at distant places become as 
 much depreciated as the notes of local banks. And if, in the mean time, no other currency is substituted in its 
 place by common consent, it is easy to foresee the extent of the embarrassment which would be caused by the 
 sudden derangement of the circulating medium. It would be too late at that time to provide a substitute which 
 would ward off the evil. The notes of the Bank of the United States in circulation on the 2d of September last, 
 (1833,) which was the date of the latest return before me, when the order for removal was given, amounted to 
 £18,413,287 07, scattered in every part of the United States; and if a safe and sound currency were immediately 
 provided, on the termination of the charter, to take the place of these notes, it would still require time to bring it, 
 into general use, and in the interim the People would be subjected to all the inconveniences and losses which 
 necessarily arise from an unsound state of the currency. The evil would be so great, and the distress so general, 
 that it might even compel Congress,.against its wishes, to recharter the bank ; and perhaps more effectual means 
 could hardly be devised for insuring the renewal of the charter. It is evident that a state of things so much to be 
 deprecated can only be avoided by timely premiration ; and the continuance of the deposites can only be justified 
 by the determination to renew tns charier. The State banks can, I have no doubt, furnish a general circulating 
 medium quite as uniform in value as that which has been afforded by the Bank of the United 'Slates, probably more 
 so. But a currency founded on the notes of State banks could not be suddenly substituted for that heretofore 
 furnished by the Bank of the United States, and take the place of it at the same moment , in every part of the 
 Union. It is essential that the change should be gradual; and sufficient lime should be allowed to suffer it to 
 make its way by the ordinary operations of commerce, without requiring a hasty and violent effort. 
 
 “ In this view of the subject, it would be highly injudicious to suffer the deposites to remain in the Bank of the 
 United States until the close of its corporate existence; anil as they cannot be withdrawn without the action of 
 the Secretary of the Treasury, it must unavoidably become his duty, at some period of time, to exercise the power 
 of removal. Laying aside, therefore, for the present, all the considerations which the misconduct of the bauk has 
 furnished, the question presented to this Department was, how long could the removal be delayed consistently with 
 the public interests ) It is a question of time only. The duty must be performed at some period, and could not be 
 altogether omitted, without justly incurring a heavy responsibility to the community for all the consequences that 
 might follow; and it is, I think, apparent that the measure was delayed as long as was compatible with the inter¬ 
 ests of the People of the United Slates.” 
 
 Mr. Taney then states that the notes of the hank and its branches on the 2d September, 1833, 
 amounted to $18,413,287 07. 
 
 “ This immense circulation (says he) pervading every part of the United States, and most commonly used in the 
 business of commerce between distant places, must all be withdrawn from circulation when the charter expires.” 
 
 The notes of the bank constituting this circulation, he says : 
 
 “ Ought to be withdrawn gradually, and their places supplied as they retire by the currency which will become 
 the substitute for them." 
 
 “ How long (he asks) will it require for the ordinary operations of commerce and the reduction of discounts by 
 the bank to withdraw the amount of circulation before mentioned, without giving a shock to the currency or pro¬ 
 ducing a distressing pressure upon the community 7 I am convinced that the time which remained for the charter 
 to run, after the 1st of October (the day on which the first order for removal took effect) was not more than was 
 proper to accomplish the object with safety to the community; and if it had depended on my judgment at an 
 earlier period, I snould have preferred and should have taken a longer time ” 
 
 Mr. B. said he thought these passages from Mr. Taney’s report fully established the position 
 he had been trying to maintain, that the Administration, in destroying the system of currency 
 and exchange afforded by the Bank of the United States, not only promised hut admitted it to 
 be their duty to furnish a substitute, and that they engaged to do so through the medium of State 
 banks. On this last part of their engagement he hoped the committee had not forgotten the fan¬ 
 ciful scheme proposed by Mr. Arnos Kendall, with his plausible illustrations of it. But further 
 and conclusive proof is found in the report of Mr. Taney already referred to. In that paper he 
 says: 
 
 “ The propriety of removing the deposites being thus evident, and it being consequently my duty to select tho 
 places to which they were to be removed, it became necessary that arrangements should be immediately made with 
 the new depositories of the public money which would not only render it safe, but would at the same time secure to 
 the Government, and to the community at large, the conveniences and facilities that were intended to be ob¬ 
 tained by incorporating the Bank of the United States. Measures were accordingly taken for that purpose; and 
 copies of the contracts which have been made with the selected banks, and of the letters and instructions to them 
 from this Department, are herewith submitted. The contracts with the ban Its in the interior are not precisely tho 
 same with those in the Atlantic c.i ies. The di.f irence be' ween them arises from the nature of the business trans¬ 
 acted by the banks in these different places. The State banks selected are all institutions of high character and 
 undoubted strength, and are under the management and control of persons of unquestioned probity and intelli¬ 
 gence ; and, in order to insure the safety of the public money, each of them is required and has agreed to give secu¬ 
 rity whenever the amount of dep «ites shall exceed the half of the capital actually mid in; and this Department 
 has reserved to itself the right to demand security whenever it may think it advisable, although the amount on de- 
 posite may not be equal to tne*sum above suited. The banks selected have also severally engaged to transmit money 
 to any point at which it may be required, by the direcii >n of this Department, f >r the public service, and to perf nn 
 all the services to the Government which were heretofore rendered by the Bank of the United States; and, by 
 agreements among themselves lo honor each other’s notes and drafts, they are providing a general currency ul least 
 as sound us that of the Bank of the United States, and will aff»rd facilities to commerce and in tho business of do¬ 
 mestic exchange, quite equal to any which the community heretofore enjoyed. There has nut been yet sufficient 
 time to perfect these arrangements; but enough has been already done to show that, even on the score of expedi- 
 
12 
 
 ency, a bank of the United States is not necessary, either for the fiscal operations of the Government or the public 
 convenience, and that every object which the charter of the present bank was designed to attain may be as effectu¬ 
 ally accomplished by the State banks. And if this can be done, nothing that is useful will be lost or endangered 
 by the change, while much that is desirable will be gained by it.” 
 
 The Administration was from time to time admonished that it had entered upon a delicate and 
 dangerous task, fraught in its consequence with all manner of mischief to the country. But the 
 admonitions were scoffed at as the work of croaking and interested politicians. The President 
 and his Secretary of the Treasury proclaimed that their grand experiment had succeeded, and 
 that the country was actually enjoying not only the same but greater advantages in currency and 
 exchange than had prevailed under the system which they had destroyed. In his annual mes¬ 
 sage to Congress in December, 1834, General Jackson says : 
 
 “ Happily it is already illustrated that the agency of such an institution (as the Bank of the United States) is not 
 necessary to the fiscal operations of the Government. The State banks are found fully adequate to the perform¬ 
 ance of all services which were required of the Bank of the United States, quite as promptly and with the same 
 cheapness. They have maintained themselves and discharged all these duties while the Bank of the United 
 States was still powerful and in the field as an open enemy; and it is not possible to conceive that they will find 
 greater difficulties in their operations when that enemy shall cease to exist.” 
 
 To this may be added the special report of Mr. Secretary Woodbury, made at the same session 
 ■of Congress, in which he professes to have examined the whole subject connected with the use 
 of banks by the Government, and sustains the State bank system as superior to all others. This 
 report I shall have occasion to examine somewhat in detail presently; and will pass to the public 
 documents presented to Congress on this same subject in December, 1835. The message of 
 President Jackson then delivered declares : 
 
 “ The experience of another year has confirmedahe utter fallacy of the idea that the Bank of the United States 
 w T as necessary as a fiscal agent of the Government. Without its aid, as such, indeed in c’-espite of all the embarrass¬ 
 ments it was in its power to create, the revenue has been paid with punctuality by our citizens; the business of ex¬ 
 change, both foreign and domestic, has been conducted with convenience; and the circulating medium has been 
 'greatly improved. By the use of the State banks, which do not derive their charters from the General Government, 
 and are not controlled by its authority, it is ascertained that the moneys of the United Slates can be collected and 
 disbursed without loss or inconvenience, and that all the wants of the community, in relation to exchange and cur¬ 
 rency are supplied as well as they ever have been. If, under circumstances the most unfavorable to the money 
 market, it has been found that the considerations on which the Bank of the United States rested its claims to the 
 public favor were imaginary and groundless, it cannot be doubted that the experience of the future will be more de¬ 
 cisive against them.” ~ 
 
 The President thus announces to the nation the entire success of this grand experiment. And 
 what says Mr. Secretary Woodbury, in his annual report on the finances at the same session 1 
 I will give you his own words. He says: 
 
 “ This (the Treasury) Department takes great pleasure in stating that the public money continues to be collected 
 and deposited under the present system of selected banks, with great ease and economy in all cases, and with great¬ 
 er in some, than at any former period. The transfers of it to every quarter of the country where it is needed for dis¬ 
 bursements have never been effected with more promptitude, and have been made entirely free of expense to the 
 Treasury. 
 
 “ The payments to creditors, officers, and pensioners have been punctual and convenient, and the whole fiscal op¬ 
 erations through the State banks have as yet proved highly satisfactory. Incidental to this, the facilities that have 
 been furnished to the commercial community in domestic exchanges were probably never greater or at so moderate 
 rates.” 
 
 These laudatory exultations at the triumphant success of this glorious victory are repeated from 
 year to year. The President, in his last annual message in December, 1836, says: 
 
 u Experience continues to realize the expectations entertained as to the capacity of the State banks to perform the 
 •duties of fiscal agents for the Government at the time of the removal of the deposites. It was alleged by the advo¬ 
 cates of the Bank of the United States that the State banks, whatever might be the regulations of the Treasury De¬ 
 partment, could not make the transfers required by the Government, or negotiate the domestic exchanges of the 
 country. It is now well ascertained that the real domestic exchanges performed through discounts by the United 
 States "Bank, and its twenty-five branches, were at least one-third less than those of the deposite banks for an equal 
 period of time; and if a comparison be instituted between the amounts of service rendered by these institutions, on 
 the broader basis which has been used by the advocates of the United States Bank in estimating what they consider 
 the domestic exchanges transacted by it, the result will be still more favorable to the deposite banks.” 
 
 Coming in at the same time (December, 1836) with his annual report on the finances, Mr. 
 Secretary Woodbury refers to the State banks selected and used by him as the fiscal agents and 
 depositories of the Government, and says : 
 
 “ It is a source of high gratification to be able to add that, while so selected and employed, not a single dollar was 
 lost to the Government by any of them, or a single failure occurred to transfer promptly and pay out satisfactorily 
 the public money entrusted to their custody ; nor is it believed that the domestic exchanges of the country were ever 
 lower or more regular than during that period; and the large amount of them performed by thesp deposite banks in 
 ordinary purchases or discounts, equalling from one hundred and fifty to two hundred millions of dollars yearly, or 
 near a third more than those of the same kind by the United States Bank while the fiscal agent of the Government, 
 evinced the great ability and usefulness of the banks on this important subject.” 
 
 I have thus, sir, brought together the repeated declarations of the Administration party, that 
 their scheme for furnishing this nation with a sound and uniform currency and exchange had 
 fully succeeded. And so well satisfied was President Jackson that he had accomplished this 
 great purpose, that, in his farewell address, published at the moment of his retirement from office 
 .xm the 4th of March, 1837, he says : 
 
 “At the moment when I surrender my last public trust, I leave this great People prosperous and happy.” 
 
 On the 4th of March, 1837, the cry is proclaimed throughout the land, “ All’s well.” The 
 ship of State then passes into the hands of Mr. Van Buren; the morning of his power dawns 
 beautifully ; but, alas ! a brief moment scon proves to him that “the sun that rises clear may set 
 n clouds.” 
 
13 
 
 The catastrophe which followed is known to all, and need not be enlarged upon. It was sud¬ 
 den and violent; and if we were “ prosperous and happy” on the 4 th of March, 1837, it must 
 have been only that deceitful calm which sometimes precedes the mighty earthquake, or Mr. Van 
 Burcn has grossly abused and mismanaged the great power which was committed to his charge. 
 Things have been getting worse and worse, until, at last, the Administration, by its friends oil 
 this floor, declare that a “universal embarrassment seems to have spread over the whole coun¬ 
 try !” The character of that embarrassment, both public and private, is so well known that I 
 need not give its details. Let the people of this country now recur to the two reports from which 
 I read in the early part of my remarks. They will there see described our happy state and con¬ 
 dition in 1829 and 1830, and a solemn warning against any experiment or attempt to disturb the 
 system of currency and exchange wdiich we then had. Having entered fully into the whole sub¬ 
 ject, the report from the Committee on Finance in the Senate, submitted on the 29th of March, 
 1830, concludes in these words: 
 
 Under these circumstances they deem it prudent to abstain from all legislation, to abide by the practical good 
 which the country enjoys, and to put nothing to hazard by doubtful experiments.” 
 
 Had this advice been followed, we should not now be in the sorry condition in which we find 
 ourselves. And it must always be remembered that it w r as the advice of General Jackson’s own 
 original and sincere friends, political and personal. But he was urged to disregard it bv those 
 who joined him at the eleventh hour, and among these was Mr. Van Buren. The consequence 
 of this latter advice is this “universal embarrassment which seems to spread over the whole 
 country.” 
 
 The Administration even hurried its own experiment to its explosion. If proof is needed, I 
 refer to a certain resolution introduced in the Senate in April, 1835, by Mr. Benton, of Mis¬ 
 souri, by which it was proposed to reject all bank notes in payment for the public lands, and to 
 require all payments at the several land offices to be made in hard money. ’This measure found 
 so few friends that it was immediately laid on the table, by a vote of the Senate. But, to the 
 surprise of all, within three or four days after Congress adjourned, in July, 1836, that resolution 
 is substantially made the law of the land, by a circular letter from Mr. Woodbury, known as the 
 “ Specie Circular!” The will of Congress is again disregarded, and another plan devised to add 
 strength to the Executive arm. Accordingly, when, at the ensuing sessiou, a bill is passed to 
 repeal that circular, the President refused to sign it! 
 
 In all these attacks upon the currency and credit system of the country, the will of the Repre¬ 
 sentatives of the people has been trampled on, and the power of a “unit” Cabinet— the will of 
 one man —has given law to the land. This measure had a leading agency in destroying all con¬ 
 fidence in bank paper as a circulating medium. The pertinacity' with which the Administration 
 adhered to this circular justified the belief that two purposes were aimed at by them : the one to 
 reduce the surplus revenue then soon to be deposited with the States, which the Executive did 
 not approve; the other to destroy the State banks, and bring about an exclusive hard-money sys¬ 
 tem. It must be plain to all that, if the Government refuses to accept payment of its revenue in 
 any particular currency, the credit of that currency is at once impaired. 
 
 In the Western country, the great test of any bank paper is its receivability for the public 
 lands. If it will not pass in these payments, or, in the language of that part of the country, if 
 it is not “land office money,” its circulation is too circumscribed to be of any value. And yet, 
 with a knowledge of these facts and their consequences, and against the will of Congress, Mr. 
 Woodbury issued and continued this specie circular. Its tendency was to destroy all confidence 
 in bank paper—it was a just ground of suspicion. The people justly said, if the Government 
 will not take this money, we ought not to take it. The immediate consequence was to drive 
 home all, or a large proportion, of the bank note circulation. 'The banks were obliged to take 
 corresponding measures on their part to reduce their discounts, and hurry the collection of their 
 debts, to the great inconvenience of the community. But this specie circular was odious in 
 another point of view : it required the people of the Western country to pay the public dues in 
 hard money, but left the revenue on the Atlantic border payable in the ordinary paper currency. 
 Congress, by a joint resolution, forbid this; and when Mr. Woodbury was oldiged to retreat 
 from this offensive discrimination, and was afraid suddenly to bring the whole country to a hard 
 money system, he limited the receipt of bank notes in two wavs; first, by forbidding the receipt 
 of any note for a sum less than twenty dollars ; and next, by excluding from such payments all 
 bank notes which were not payable at the counter of the bank, or place where they were issued. 
 
 To prove these facts, let a reference be made to that famous specie circular of Mr. Secretary 
 Woodbury, dated the 11th day of July, 1836, and of his equally celebrated order dated the 1st 
 day of June, 1838, each of which is now on my table. This is a happy comment on that 
 brilliant plan of a “better currency” developed in the reports of Messrs. Kendall and Taney, 
 and distinctly approved in the President’s messages which have been read to the committee. It 
 was to consist of bank notes, and particularly of bank notes issued in the West, and in all the 
 different sections of the Union, payable at New York or Philadelphia , ivhere it was advised 
 that the greater part , if not all the specie of the country should be concentrated and kept / 
 And, after having induced the country to trust in the plan, and to act on this public recommen- 
 
14 
 
 Nation, the Administration is the first to repudiate this State hank paper, and expressly refuse to 
 accept in payment the very class of bank notes which the Government had advised the banks 
 to issue! This corresponds with the whole past conduct of this Administration—the profession 
 of one thing, but the practice of a different one. I give the evidence : let the people judge ! 
 
 I will next examine the other plan to supply a national currency, as held out by the present 
 and past Administrations. When their first attempt seemed likely to fail, the people were then 
 allured by golden prospects ; not silver and gold, but gold only, for a valionu.1 currency ! Is - 
 proof wanted ? It is at hand. If any one more than all others in the Union has been instru¬ 
 mental in making this promise, it is Mr. Benton, of Missouri. 
 
 Mr. Bond said he held in his hand a volume of Congressional debates, and would now read 
 from the speech of Mr. Benton, the covert father of the specie circular, delivered in the Sen¬ 
 ate in the debate on the bill to repeal that circular. He opposed its repeal, and, among other 
 things, said : 
 
 “ It was incontestable that every nation mugt have a national currency. It must have such a currency, not only 
 In name but in fact; anil nothing can answer for national currency but that which combines two properties : first, 
 uniformity of value all over the country ; second, convenient portability. Silver possesses one 01 these qualities, 
 but it lacks the other; gold possesses both, and the Constitution of the United States guaranties its use. Gold, is, 
 then, the constitutional national currency of the United States ; and he held all attempts to substitute paper in its 
 place to be unconstitutional and pernicious. Two national banks had been chartered to furnish a national paper 
 currency ; they have both been put down, after twenty years’ trial of each, by the power of the People. When the 
 first was put down, a fatal error was committed by those who did it, in not restoring gold; and that error was dou¬ 
 bled by falling back upon local State paper, anil adopting it for the currency of the Federal Government. Profiting 
 by that great error, those who put down the second national bank made it apart of their plan, and the part upon 
 the success of which every thing was to depend, that gold, and not local bank paper, should become the national 
 currency of "the Union. This was the plan , and, in pursuance of it, many steps have been taken towards ex¬ 
 cluding local bank paper from the receipts and expenditures of the Federal Government , and introducing gold 
 in its place. The largest and most essential of these steps was the Treasury order of July last; and now, the 
 present movement for the rescision of that order, and for the continuance of local paper in the receipts, and, conse¬ 
 quent! v, in the expenditures of the Federal Government, brings up the question, whether gold or local paper is to 
 be made the national currency ? 
 
 “ It brings up the question; for what the Government receives as cash it must pay out as cash, and what the Gov¬ 
 ernment receives and pays out becomes the currency of the Government also ; for the people single-handed can¬ 
 not make head against the action of the Government. The effect of the present movement, then, [the proposed re¬ 
 peal of the specie circular,] is to overturn the plan of those who put down the Bank of the United States, and to 
 substitute for the national gold currency which they promised to the country, the actual paper currencies of all the 
 States and Territories in the Union.” 
 
 T have thus given the very words of Mr. Senator Benton, the great and golden humbugger. 
 The volume containing his speech was printed for the use of Congress, and it is that from 
 which I read. Is not my point fully proved 1 Gold is here promised as the national currency. 
 
 It is avowed that the national bank was put down for that purpose, and that the specie circular 
 was intended as a means of destroying the State banks, in order to make room for gold. It is 
 both evasive and idle now' to say it was not intended by the Federal Government to put down 
 the State banks. Mr. Benton says it was intended to introduce and use gold in all the public 
 .receipts and expenditures, and that “ what the Government receives and pays becomes the cur¬ 
 rency of the country, and that the people single-handed cannot make head against the Gov¬ 
 ernment .” 
 
 One or two comments are here necessary. Was it, indeed, as Mr. Benton says, “a part 
 ©f the plans of those who put down the Bank of the United States, and the part upon the suc¬ 
 cess of which every thing was to depend, that gold, arid not local bank paper, should become 
 the national currency of the Union, and that many steps were taken towards excluding local 
 bank paper from the receipts and expenditures of the Federal Government, and introducing 
 gold into its place — the largest and most essential of which was the Treasury order ?” If this 
 were true, were the reports of Messrs. Kendall and Taney, and the President’s several mes¬ 
 sages, adopting them, sincere or hypocritical 1 If, as Mr. Benton says, it was a part of their 
 original plan to exclude bank paper and substitute gold, they concealed it, and professed to be 
 doing directly the reverse. Those who read these different papers may judge of their consis¬ 
 tency. 
 
 For my own part, I believe this gold humbug was a mere expedient hit upon when it was ap¬ 
 parent that the first plan must fail, and was designed to call oft’ public attention from its failure. 
 
 But Mr. Benton stated one thing at which we should all be alarmed. In this republic, a 
 professed Government of the people, a Senator rises in his place, and, in sustaining an Execu¬ 
 tive measure, says, “ the people cannot make head against the Government.” If not looked to 
 in time, I fear this will be our confirmed misfortune ; but the signs of the times show that the 
 people are aroused, and will not long submit to this rebuke. 
 
 This plan to destroy the uniform and sound currency which we enjoyed, and to allure the 
 people to its accomplishment by the promise of gold, may be regularly traced throughout that 
 newspaper, the Globe, the organ and mouth-piece of Mr. Van Buren and his Administration. 
 
 I now propose to read from that paper a number of its editorial paragraphs. The files are be¬ 
 fore me, brought from your Government Library, where they are carefully preserved for the 
 convenience and amusement of all the faithful ! This paper has long enjoyed the patronage of 
 the Administration, and is now in the daily receipt of immense sums of money derived from the 
 various branches of the Government. The plans and sentiments of the Administration, when 
 
15 
 
 published, first appear in this official organ, and its opinions arc always put forth “ by authori¬ 
 ty.” When the Globe speaks, the Administration prompts; and that it has spoken faithfully 
 and fully the wishes and sentiments of the Administration, the heavy largesses daily paid to it 
 by those in power would seem clearly to indicate. With this brief account of the official organ, 
 I proceed to read various of its editorial remarks, holding out a promise of a hard-money cur¬ 
 rency, and especially a national currency of gold. 
 
 From the Globe of'20th March , 1834. 
 
 When the money held by the People is gold and silver, they can never be moved by panics, or affected by the 
 difficulties of banks. With a golden eagle in his pocket on Saturday night, the laboring man may rest in perfect confi¬ 
 dence that no bank failure bn Monday will deprive him of the proceeds of his preceding week’s labor. Few 
 laboring men or farmers keep on hand for any time more than ten, twenty, to fifty dollars; and the sums they re¬ 
 ceive are generally small. If our small currency were eagles, half-eagles, quarter-eagles, and dollars, with 
 their fractions, enabling all these people to obtain payment for their labor or produce in the precious metals, they 
 would be effectually protected against all the casualties and frauds of paper money. * * * * 
 
 •Gold and silver coin, the currency of the Constitution, is Jackson money; notes, with pictures on them, promising 
 to pay, the banks’ money. Which will our farmers and mechanics have, Juckson money or bank money ? 
 
 From the Globe of \8th April , 1834. 
 
 Jackson money.— In a few days we shall have an accurate account of all the specie which has arrived at the 
 
 R rincipal ports in the United Slates since the first day of December last. We have no doubt it exceeds FOUR 
 IILLIONS OF DOLLARS. The most singular incident of the times is, that GOLD as well as silver is returning 
 from Europe! 
 
 What mechanic, farmer, or laboring man would not rather have a golden eagle than a #10 note on the Bank of 
 Washington, or any other bank 4 This is the “ SOUND CURRENCY” which General Jackson recommends. 
 
 From the Globe of 25th April , 1831. 
 
 Hard-money Currency. —A few facts are necessary to be known and kept in mind by the People, in the pre¬ 
 sent crisis, in order to understand whether the country can supply itself with gold and silver enough to serve for 
 the common currency , after the United States Bank is done with. 
 
 From the Globe of May 21,1834. 
 
 If Consress will pass the coin bills, the circulation of the country will be rich in gold and silver. The drops of 
 sweat which fall from the farmer’s brow will be turned into eagles, and half-eagles, and Spanish milled dollars. His 
 bushels of corn, wheat, &c., will not be resolved into a dirty rag in the corner of his pocket, promising to pay what 
 the issuers have not the means of paying. 
 
 From the Globe of June 11, 1834. 
 
 Since Mr. LowndesJs death, the argument in favor of a gold currency has derived an additional weight from the 
 discovery of our native goldmines. These mines are developing with a rapidity and expansion unknown in the 
 history of the world. Ten years ago, first noticed, aud producing then $5,(XX) a year; now producing above two 
 millions in a year; and no assignable limit to their extent and production. To those who talk of a NATIONAL 
 CURRENCY, we point them to the GOLD REGION in Virginia, the Carolinas, Georgia, and the contiguous 
 portions of East Tennessee and Alabama., There is a NATIONAL TREASURE! There is material for a 
 NATIONAL CURRENCY! Natio?iul in every sense of the word; for it is the product of the nation ; and cur¬ 
 rent all over the nation; and called for by every man in the nation , who is free from the chains of stipendiary 
 servitude to the United States Bank. 
 
 If Mr. Lowndes had lived, this truiy national currency would have been long since restored. The discovery of 
 the cold regions in the South would have stimulated his exertions, and consummated his purjHise. The restoration 
 of this currency is now demanded by the voice of the whole country. It is demanded from the present Congress. 
 It is the great measure of the session.' Let the nation not be disappointed. Let the GOLD BILL pass f 16 to 1 is 
 the word ! The bank men, not daring to make an open opposition, will work under ground, and endeavor to frus¬ 
 trate the measure by proposiu" all manner of fractions between 15 and 1G to 1 ; but let the gold phalanx stand firm, 
 and the paper legion will be defeated 
 
 From the Globe of June 12,1834. 
 
 We would state, for the information of the gold mining districts of the South, that a bill for raising the value of 
 gold will probably pass at this session of Congress, and if the ratio of 16 to 1 is adopted, the rise in value will be 6 
 per cent, and a fraction; therefore, no one should sell his gold at present rates, but hold it up for the event of 
 this bill. It is calculated that the passage of such a bill would be a clear profit, and, what is more, a just and honest 
 profit, of from £129,000 to £150,000 this year; with an increase for every succeeding year. 
 
 From the Globe of June 16, 1834. 
 
 The whole great West requires a circulation of doubloons. It will be their principal gold coin ; and will be got 
 In immense quantities from New Orleans. Why weigh this coin, unless clipped, or fraudulently reduced in weight ? 
 The doubloons of full weight are worth §16 and upwards, and are as well known as a dollar. The convenience of 
 commerce, and of the People, requires them to pass as requested by the Louisiana Legislature ; and surely this is a 
 case in which the voice of that Legislature should be heard. There is a difference between the Spanish and Patriot 
 doubloons in commerce but no difference in intrinsic value. The weight and fineness of both are the same. The 
 value of both is the same at the mints which issued them. They are both minted under the same regulations. The 
 reason of the difference in commerce is because the principal market for doubloons is in those dominions of Spain 
 which still acknowledge the authority of Spain, and where Patriot doubloons will not pass. It is the same reason 
 which makes Patriot dollars worth less in market than Spanish milled dollars, while the Patriot dollar really has 
 most silver in it, and is intrinsically worth most. What a blunder the United States has committed for the last 
 fifteen years, in excluding foreign coins ! Nearly all the gold and silver coined in Mexico and South America, for 
 the last 15 years, was issued by the new Governments, and therefore not current in old Spain, nor in the islands 
 which acknowledge her authority, nor in the East Indies; which was accustomed to Spanish milled coins. But 
 this money of the new Governments was just as good as the old, and would have flowed into the United Slates in 
 floods, if not driven away by our bank laws. Even now, if the gold and silver of the new Governments are made 
 current here, the influx will be immense ; for they cannot well go elsewhere. The doubloons especially will come 
 to the United States. The Patriot doubloons will nearly all come here, because they cannot find a fair market in 
 other countries. ************* 
 
 The subject has been before Congress all the winter, and every member knows how he is going to vote. There is 
 no pretext for delay ; but delay is the first trick of the bank to defeat the bill. Congress has but one question to de¬ 
 cide, and that is the relative value—the question of 16 to 1—all the. rest is matter of detail. The time is now short— 
 only two weeks; but still the coin bills are expected to puss. The design of the bank party to defeat the bills by 
 delay, or to frustrate their operation by inadequate and viciousdetails, is perfectly understood, and being undersuxxl 
 ought to be counteracted. Let the gold bill pass. ********* 
 It is computed that the Southerjr mines will yield THREE MILLIONS of dollars worth of gold this year. A rise 
 in the ratio of gold from 15 to 1, to 16 to 1, will be an advance of six and two-thirds per cent, on that amount, w hich 
 will be £190,000 on the whole. 
 
 From the Globe of June 21, 183-1. 
 
 It is due to the People of the United Slates to know that the Bank of the United States is now in the field, an 
 open combatant, opposing the restoration of the gold currency. She knows that the establishment of a national 
 
16 
 
 GOLD currency puts an end to all plea for the establishment of & national PAPER currency; and, therefore, 
 her war against gold is the last war for her own existence. 
 
 The ability of the United States to supply itself with a gold currency is beyond the reach of cavil or dispute. We 
 should, doubtless, gain five or §ix millions by the time Congress meets again, if the bill is passed before the end of 
 the present session. This belief rests upon good data. There is probably two millions now in the country, waiting 
 the issue of the gold bill. The product of the native mines is estimated at from two to three millions, of which one- 
 half may be coined. The imports of gold will doubtless be several millions. Tne gold coinage of Mexico, Guate¬ 
 mala, and South America, will flow to the United Slates as soon as gold is raised 16' to 1, for that is the ratio in all 
 those countries. We should get nearly all the Patriot doubloons, which cannot find a fair market elsewhere, and 
 would come here in shoals, if received at their own native mint value, of sixteen dollars each. By the time the 
 bank charter expires in 1836, there would be more gold in circulation than there are now of United Slates Bank 
 notes. 
 
 From the Globe of June 23,1S34. 
 
 Gold Currency.— It will be seen by our Congressional report that the gold bill has passed the House of Repre¬ 
 sentatives, and goes to the Senate to-day for their concurrence. The bank forces opposed a furious opposition, and 
 fought, like the ancient villeins, till the stars appeared in the evening. The great battle was fought on Saturday, 
 and occupied the whole day. Be it remembered that this Saturday was the‘21st day of June, just at the summer 
 solstice, when days are longest and hottest. It was evidently the tactics of the bank leaders, if men can be called 
 leaders who are themselves both led and driven by the mammon whom they serve—it was evidently their tactics, 
 first, to stave offthe bill till the next session; next, to befog it in a wilderness of mystification; and, finally, tosink the 
 relative value of gold and silver to a ratio below 16 to 1 ; which would have defeated the great end of getting cold 
 into circulation as a national currency. Upon these three tacks, the ultra-bankites made fight, and developed in 
 such force, about mid-day, as to show that time was their great resource, and that their plan was to protract the 
 struggle into the ensuing week. The friends of gold then determined upon a permanent sitting till the bill was 
 passed. They renounced all idea of adjourning at the end of the day, and evinced an invincible determination to 
 sit out the question. This brought things to ah issue, and towards sunset the triumphant vote was taken, and re¬ 
 sulted in an overwhelming majority for the just and truly American ratio of 16 to l. We say just, because it is the 
 ratio which will bring gold into common use, as common currency, and we call it truly American, because all 
 America, from Canada to Cape Horn, will now have that uniform ratio, and thus bring their whole gold coinage 
 into concord and harmony, and just as convenient for circulation as if all was from the same mint. 
 
 The bill goes to the Senate to-de,y. The strength of the bank in that body excites some little apprehension, but 
 it is impossible to believe in formidable opposition there, after the victorious vote in the House of Representatives, 
 and we feel ready to congratulate the friends of the country upon the actual establishment of a gold NATIONAL 
 currency. 
 
 This noble currency has been so long suppressed by the power and policy of the first and second United States 
 Banks, that the present generation are" almost entirely ignorant of it. We,'therefore, give the following brief enu¬ 
 meration of its advantages from Colonel Benton's speech on the currency: 
 
 Qualities of the Gold Currency.— 1. It had an intrinsic value. 2.*It had a uniformity of value. 3. It was a 
 portable currency. 4. It was indestructible. 5. It possesses inherent purity. 6. It is superior to all other currency. 
 7. It is the true regulator and equalizer of exchanges. 8. It was the master of paper money. 9. It is the true regu¬ 
 lator of bank issues. 10. It is a constitutional currency; and, therefore, the People have a right to have it, while 
 the Constitution remains, whether they can give reasons for it or not. 
 
 To all which, we add, it is the most beautiful currency in the world ; and, therefore, the most agreeable to the 
 eye, as well as the best for the pocket, that the wisdom of man has devised. 
 
 fg’We congratulate the South—the gold region of Virginia, the Carolinas, Georgia, East Tennessee, and Alaba¬ 
 ma—upon the accession to their wealth, and the stimulus to their industry, which the passage of this bill must give. 
 
 From the Globe of July 1,1834. 
 
 Gold Currency.— The great bills have passed. The triumphant measure is adopted. Gold, the cherished cur¬ 
 rency of all nations—a currency banished from the United States for a whole generation by the power of bank legis¬ 
 lation—this precious currency once more appears in our land, and, in defiance of bank power, will diffuse and 
 spread itself throughout the country, and become the familiar inmate of every industrious man’s pocket. Such is 
 one of the first fruits of the great measure of removing the deposites, and rousing a continent to its energies against 
 the oppressions of a lawless and gigantic moneyed power. What, now, has become of all those predictions that the 
 currency would be ruined—that there would be nothing but broken bank notes to be seen in the land! The new 
 law is to take effect on the 31st instant; but already gold is in circulation—already the rare and precious metal is 
 jinsding in the pockets and glittering in the hands of the People. Already many travellers have supplied themselves 
 with it, and wil 1 be able to traverse the country without the danger of receiving, or the humiliation of offering to pass, 
 the counterfeit imitations of a wretched paper currency. Strangers as our whole population are to the sight of gold, it 
 may be rmceesary to give them some information upon the value of the coins which will come chiefly into circula¬ 
 tion. Our old coinage, now in existence, will pass thus: The eagle $10 66|; half eagle $5 33J; the quarter-eagle 
 $2 31 1-6—this being the true value of the pure gold now in these coins; the new coinage will contain as much 
 less pure gold its will make the eagle and its parts pass at $10. $5, and $2 50. British gold, of which a great deal 
 will come in all along the line of the northern frontier, from Passamaquoddy bay to lake Superior, as well as on 
 the seacoast of the Atlantic, will pass thus: The guinea %5 75; the sovereign &4 84; the louis d’or of France 
 about %3 75 ; the doubloons, Spanish and Patriot, £15 60. Note— All these values suppose full weight, as the value 
 is always to be corrected by weight. The doubloons, both Spanish and Patriot, are by law- the same value, for they 
 are of the same weight and fineness; but the Spanish doubloon will generally be above the legal rate in market 
 fee exportation to Cuba, where that species of doubloons passes for %17. 
 
 There is but little gold now in the country—perhaps/a million and a half of dollars ; but by fall it will be coming 
 in plentifully, and will begin to have a sensible influence on the general currency. The great West, and all the 
 new States, will feel the golden shower. Emigrants and purchasers of public lands will all carry gold to the West 
 and to the land offices ; and of these rich accumulations the greater part, will diffuse itself among the People in the 
 expenditures of the emigrants and the disbursements of the People. ffjffNo doubt effectual measures will be taken 
 to prevent local bank notes to be disbursed for the Government when gold has been received. 
 
 Let the country rejoice. There is no longer a plea for federal bank notes ! Gold is a good enough national cur¬ 
 rency for the republicans of the United States! 
 
 We shall soon have an abundant circulation. Our native mines are yielding two or three millions per annum. 
 Commerce will bring it in from all quarters. England coined twenty-eight millions of pounds sterling of gold in 
 six years after she reformed her currency in 1832. France has coined one hundred and ninety-five millions of gold 
 since Bonaparte reformed her currency in 1803. England also coined forty-millions of silver from 1822 to 1823; and 
 France has coined four hundred and ninety-nine millions of dollars in silver since Bonaparte banished paper 
 money. With the aid of foreign coins, and the double power of the new mint of the United States, we shall soon 
 abound in gold. Such is the first fruit of the victorious issue of the great contest with the bank, growing out of the 
 removal of the deposites. 
 
 From the Globe of July 15,1834. 
 
 We can hear of innumerable anecdotes in Philadelphia, New York, and other Northern cities, where the contest 
 between gold and paper has already commenced, and gives rise to the most amusing scenes and the most redicu- 
 lous contrasts. If it goes on as it has begun, gold and paper will become badges ol parties, like the red and whke 
 roses were formerly in England. A man will soon be known as belonging to the gold party , or the paper party. 
 We understand that the new coinage will commence on the first day of August, and that instructions have been sent 
 to the mint to exert the whole power of the institution in the multiplication of gold. Unfortunately, the power and 
 wealth of the Bank of the United States will enable it to monopolize a great deal of the new coin, and to suppress 
 
17 
 
 dt for the purpose of making the People believe that a false clamor has been raised in favor of gold, and that the gold 
 bill is a mere cheat and illusion. 
 
 From the Globe of July 16, 1834. 
 
 The Gold Currency. — While every part of America rejoices—while every heart not enslaved to the scrub-aris¬ 
 tocracy of the paper system—while every independent and patriotic citizen exults in the recovery and restoration 
 of the long-lost gold currency—the West, and all Western citizens, have the deepest and greatest cause for proud 
 exultation and manly rejoicing at this propitious event. For, of all America, the West is the part which needed 
 most, anil will profit most from the circulation of gold. Happily, they have but few banks in the West, and there¬ 
 fore need gold to carry about and to travel upon. Happily, again, the greatest supply of gold will go to the West. 
 The emigrants removing to that great region will all carry gold in preference to either silver or paper, for it is 
 lighter than silver and safer than paper. The land offices will biMmme receptacles and reservoirs of gold ; whence 
 it will be distributed to the country through the Government disbursements, through the military, the surveying, 
 and the Indian departments; and wo to the officer who, having received gold from the Government, shall presume 
 or dare to offer paper to the soldiers or citizens. Then a great stream of gold will flow up the Mississippi from 
 New Orleans, and diffuse itself all over the great West. Nearly all the gold coinage of the New world will come 
 to the United States ; for, all the coinage of the new Governments of Mexico and South America, being the coinage 
 of rebel provinces, cannot go to old Spain, or to any of her dependencies, and, therefore, will come to the United 
 States as its natural and best market. This will till the West with doubloons and half joes; and, in eicht or nine 
 months from this time, every substantial citizen will have a lorfg silken purse, of fine open net work, through the 
 interstices of which the yellow gold will shine and glitter. Then travellers will be free from the pestilence of rag¬ 
 ged, filthy, and counterfeit notes. Every substantial man, and every substantial man’s wife and daughter, will 
 travel upon gold. The satellites of the bank alone, to show their servile subjection to their liege monarch, will re¬ 
 pine at the loss of paper. 
 
 From the Globe of August 4,1831. , 
 
 Jackson Gold. —We have hail the pleasure to see some of the new gold coinage of half eagles, and seldom have 
 we beheld a more beautiful coin. It is devoutly to be hoped that the mint may be able to supply all the pressing 
 demands for it, and that every independent citizen may obtain a few pieces to carry and preserve as a charm 
 against the sorceries of the mammoth. We understand that from £20,000 to £25,000 a day can be struck off. The 
 promptitude of the Treasury and the Mint on this subject will be duly appreciated by the Public. 
 
 Fro?n the Globe of August 8, 1831. 
 
 The Gold Currency— Many erroneous tables of the value of the different gold coins under the new law have 
 been published, which may lead persons into mistakes. The following table is, therefore, republished, its accuracy 
 having been carefully tested alfthe United States’Mint, and therefore to be relied on. fpj By the new law, all 
 the gold coins of England, France, Spain, Portugal, Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil, are made legal tenders, and, 
 therefore, every person should get acquainted with the names, weight, and value of each coin of each of these nations 
 The gold of no other nation is made a legal tender, but it is all raised 6 2-3 per cent, in value ; so that the holder of 
 such gold should not sell it for less, but send it to the mint, or sell it to manufacturers and workers in gold. 
 f~^Persons should save this table, and get it by heart. 
 
 Under this paragraph the official organ published a “table of gold coins,” which, it will be 
 observed, it advised all its readers to “ save and get by heart.” The office-holders throughout 
 the country no doubt followed this advice, and are familiar with all the rules for calculating the 
 value of gold. They are the only persons who seem to be enjoying the benefits of this much- 
 boasted gold bill, which was to cover the whole land with “ showers” of what the Globe called 
 “the most beautiful currency in the world.” But the people have wasted their time and money 
 in vain—the one in studying the office-holders’ “ table of gold coins,” the other in purchasing 
 “ long silken purses of fine open net-work, through the interstices of which the yellow gold was 
 to shine and glitter.” We have looked anxiously, but in vain, for the “ great stream of gold” 
 which was to “ flow up the Mississippi from New Orleans , and diffuse itself all over the great 
 West .” 
 
 From the language used, in the days of this “golden dream,” it might well have been sup¬ 
 posed that the Globe man possessed the fabulous power of Midas, and that whatever he touched 
 was thereby converted into gold. And in Blair’s own case he seems to have had something of 
 this magic power; for, since he left Kentucky, his own “worldly estate” is suddenly much im¬ 
 proved. But that which he does for himself he cannot or will not do for the people. In their 
 case, “’tis all but a dream at the last.” They cannot realize this golden age; it is useless to 
 read or again print the famous “table of gold coins.” Gold may be, as the Globe in one of its 
 articles remarked, “ the most beautiful currency in the world, and. therefore the most agreeable 
 to the eye,” but it has become so rare a thing that, in the language of a homely but expressive 
 phrase, “ the sight of it would be good for sore eyes.” 
 
 Having thus given these captivating passages from the official organ, let us again recur to Mr. 
 Benton, and hear him declare the success of the plan for a national currency of gold. It will 
 be remembered that, besides the gold»bill before alluded to, the Administration had, as a means 
 of supplying this currency, authorized the building of three branch mints: one at Charlotte, in 
 North Carolina; another at Dahlonega, in Georgia; and the third at New Orleans; the two first 
 expressly for gold coinage. In the debate before alluded to as taking place on the bill to repeal 
 the Treasury circular, Mr. Benton, in the Senate, on the 28th day of December, 1836, used 
 these words: 
 
 “ Aftpr forty years of wandering in the wilderness of paper money, we have approached the confines of the consti¬ 
 tutional medium. Seventy-five millions of specie in the country, with the prospect of an nnnaal increase of ten 
 or twelve millions for the next four vears, three branch mints to commence next spring, and the complete restora¬ 
 tion of the gold currency, announce the success of President Jackson’s great measures for the reform of the currency, 
 and vindicate the Constitution from the libel of having prescribed an impracticable currency.” 
 
 Mr. B. said if success had followed this magnificent scheme it was so short-lived and evanes¬ 
 cent that it vanished with the pompous announcement of the Missouri Senator! It is now plain 
 that the people have been more than disappointed—they have been duped and deceived. Where 
 is this promised national gold currency? If it be paid out or used in the expenditures of the 
 Government, it is among the office-holders only. The people never sec it. What has become 
 2 
 
18 
 
 of the famous gold hill which was to bring so much gold into the country, and prevent any of it 
 from being exported 1 Where are your three branch mints, and where your boasted gold mines 
 of Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia! Answers are at hand, and let the people hear and 
 attend to them. The experience of a few years has fully condemned the policy of the much 
 boasted gold bill. Two official communications, laid on our tables, sent by the President from 
 the Director of the Mint, the one at the last and the other at the present session, inform us that 
 the promised advantages of the gold bill have failed ! Its operations have been injurious , and 
 its repeal is now advised by him I Next, as to the three branch mints. During their entire 
 operation, now going on three years, they have coined altogether about five hundred thousand 
 dollars in gold! One of them, last year, the branch mint at New Orleans, coined the immense 
 sum of twenty-three thousand dollars of gold ! At another, the branch mint at Charlotte, in. 
 North Carolina, the sum of eighty-four thousand one hundred and sixty-five dollars w r as coined 
 in about thirteen months, at an expense of thirty-three thousand four hundred and sixty-six dol¬ 
 lars and sixty-six cents! That is, it actually, in the current expenses of that branch mint, cost 
 near thirty-four thousand dollars to coin the sum of eighty-four thousand one hundred and sixty- 
 live dollars—being a clear loss to the country of nearly one-half of the whole amount of coinage 
 consumed in current expenses, independent of the original expenditure for the purchase of 
 grountf, building the mint, and supplying the needful machinery ! All must see that these 
 boasted branch mints, so far from adding any thing to our national currency, have proved a 
 heavy charge on the Treasury ! It was said, in debate in this House, by a gentleman from 
 Pennsylvania, (Mr. Ogle,) that every ten cent piece coined at the branch mint in New Orleans, 
 if the interest on the capital invested in the establishment were included in the calculation, had 
 actually cost the Government thirty cents!* 
 
 The report of the Director of the Mint at Philadelphia, in my opinion, proves that the princi¬ 
 pal mint has ample capacity to do all the coinage which the United States Government and its 
 resources need, and upon much cheaper terms than can be,done at one of these branch mints. 
 The boasted supplies of gold from our own soil have dwindled to an insignificant amount. The 
 chief part of what has been coined was furnished in gold coins from other countries, principally 
 in the payment made under the treaty with France ! But take the whole together, and how far 
 does it go towards furnishing us with a national currency of gold? It is as a drop in the ocean! 
 So insignificant when compared with the extent of the want which was promised to be supplied, 
 that it is difficult to imagine that such a purpose could ever have been seriously entertained. 
 
 This grand measure, which the Globe said had “escaped the notice of all the great peace 
 statesmen ,” this great and new discovery, has proved a mere bubble, and has exploded ! The 
 people, who have been duped and are now suffering the consequences of the deception, look to 
 the Administration for relief. And what relief does the Government propose? None; none! 
 Mr. Van Buren now declares it to be no part of the duty of the General Government to regu¬ 
 late the currency and exchange of the nation. Let us contrast his opinion with that of his pre¬ 
 decessor, in whose “footsteps” he promised to “tread.” In a message of General Jackson, 
 before quoted, he not only admitted this to be a part of his official duty, but declared that his 
 State bank system had met and supplied these wants. 
 
 Contrast this message of General Jackson with that of Mr. Van Buren in September, 1837. 
 About the time that experience had established the great injury which had been done by this 
 disturbance of the old system of currency and exchange, Mr. Van Buren came into power. So 
 signal was the failure to realize what had been promised in this new experiment, that it con¬ 
 strained him to call a special session of Congress, and»in his very first message, instead of sug¬ 
 gesting something for the relief of the country in its disordered and confused currency and ex¬ 
 change, he evades this high and important duty by declaring it is not constitutional for him to 
 interfere in the matter. When all eyes of a distressed people are imploringly turned with anx¬ 
 ious solicitude towards the capital of our common country, instead of an affectionate and a kind 
 word of sympathy at such a crisis from our chief ruler, Mr. Van Buren tells the people— 
 
 “ All communities are apt to look to Governmant for too much !! £ven in our own country, where its powers 
 and duties are so strictly limited, we are prone to do so, especially at periods of sudden embarrassment and distress. 
 But this ought not to be so!!” 
 
 General Jackson, in his message, spoke of the wants of the “community,” admitted it as 
 his duty to provide for them, and thought he had done so. But Mr. Van Buren says “All 
 communities are apt to look to Government for too much ! !” And with this cold response, he 
 leaves a suffering and distressed community to take care of itself as it may, and simply proposes 
 a plan—his independent or sub-Treasury plan—by which the public dues and revenue are re¬ 
 quired to be paid by the people in hard money ! I leave him for the present in the hands of that 
 same community—that very people to whom he gave that cold and icy response ! 
 
 Mr. Bond said he would avail himself of the occasion to examine some of the leading reasons 
 now assigned by the Administration party for the failure of their own favorite State bank de~ 
 posite system. And he designed to prove that Mr. Van Buren and his friends had brought about 
 the very state of things which they now condemn. The present embarrassments were fully 
 foretold at the very onset of the Administration upon the banking and currency system in 1829. 
 
19 
 
 
 The reports made in Congress at that time, and already referred to, need not be again read to 
 prove this. We are now told that the State banks became too numerous, and that their circula¬ 
 tion expanded too much. Who induced this] Apart from its being a consequence of the ill- 
 judged attempt to improve the currency, the Administration directly encouraged and countenanced 
 these results. Among the many evidences to prove this, I will read from the official organ, the 
 Globe, of the 21st December, 1833. It is there said: 
 
 “ This new coalition, however, have labored in vain. The intelligent People of the West know how to maintain 
 their rights and independence, and to repel oppression. Although foiled in the beginning, every Western State is 
 about to establish a State bank institution. Tliey are resolved to avail themselves of their own State credit as well 
 as of the national credit to maintain a currency independent of foreign control. Mr. Clay’s presses in Kentucky 
 begin now to feel how vain are all their efforts to resist this determination of the People in the West. The Louis¬ 
 ville (Kentucky) Herald says: ‘ From the indication of public opinion, as contained in the papers from the Suites 
 around us, there is every probability that banks will be chartered in the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Mis¬ 
 souri, and that efforts will be made to charter in this State (Kentucky) not only a State bank, with four or five 
 branches, but several independent banks.’ ” 
 
 And having copied with approbation this promise of a large crop of new banks, the Globe 
 then concludes by saying: 
 
 “ So Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Kentucky are resolved to take care of themselves, and no longer de¬ 
 pend on the kind guardianship of Biddle, Clay, Sc Co.”, 
 
 Thus it was hailed as matter of rejoicing by the Administration that the States were all about 
 to engage in the work of creating banks. And that work was done under the countenance of 
 the Administration party, as may well be proved by reference to my own State, (Ohio,) where, 
 almost immediately after the Globe published that article, that party having a majority in the 
 General Assembly created new banks, with an aggregate capital of more than four millions of 
 dollars. The same thing was done by them*simultaneousIy in nearly all the Western and South¬ 
 western States, and in nearly every other State where they had power. And now they wish to 
 avoid the responsibility ! 
 
 But another reason is found for the sub-Treasury bill in the allegation that it will avoid the 
 lending of the public money. 
 
 Whether the money would be used for private purposes or not, must depend on the honesty 
 and integrity of the depository. Agents must be employed, and banks are managed by men, as 
 will be your sub-Treasuries—all will depend, in either case, on the honesty of the agent. But 
 I charge that the Administration party expressly authorized and even urged the use and lending 
 of the public money by the deposite banks! To prove this, I will at once read the testimony— 
 it is full and ample—furnished by General Jackson and Mr. Taney to Congress, and printed 
 among the public documents. The first step of the Government towards lending the public 
 money for individual use is found in Mr. Kendall’s report before alluded to, made at the time 
 when he was sent, like the serpent of old, to allure and decoy the State banks from the even 
 tenor of their way. Alluding to the large amount of public money on deposite, he says: 
 
 “ Should neither the Treasury nor the bank restore a portion of this creat sum to circulation, the consequences 
 apprehended would be of the most serious kind: and the community of New York were beginning to look earnestly 
 to the Government for relief!” 
 
 The sequel will prove that this relief was attempted to be granted by lending the public money. 
 And yet, Mr. Van Burcn says, “ all communities arc apt to look to Government for too much!” 
 
 The next proof is found in General Jackson’s message to Congress, in December, 1833, where 
 he says: 
 
 “ I am happy to know that, through the good sense of our People, the effort to get tip a panic has hitherto failed, 
 and that, through the increased accommodations which the State banks have been enabled to afford, no public dis¬ 
 tress has followed the exertions of the bank.” 
 
 Mr. Bond said he would now read certain letters, written by Mr. Taney, Secretary of the 
 Treasury, to a number of the deposite or pet banks, as they w r ere called. He read as follows: 
 
 “Treasury Department, September 2G. 1833. 
 
 “Sir : The Girard Bank has been selected by this Department as the depository of the public money collected 
 in Philadelphia and its vicinity, and the collector at Philadelphia will hand you the form of a contract proposed to 
 be executed, with a copy of his instructions from this Department. In selecting your institution as one of the fiscal 
 agents of the Government, I not only rely on its solidity and established character, as affording a sufficient guaranty 
 for the safety of the public money entrusted to its keeping, but I confide also in its disposition to adopt the most lib¬ 
 eral course which circumstances will admit, towards other moneyed institutions generally, and particularly to those 
 in the city of Philadelphia. 
 
 “The deposites of the public money will tenable you to afford increased facilities to commerce, and to extend 
 your accommodations to individuals'; and, as the duties which are payable to the Government arise from the busi¬ 
 ness and enterprise of the merchants engaged in foreign trade, it is but reasonable that they should be preferred in 
 the additional accommodations which the public deposites will enable your institution to give, whenever it can be 
 done without injustice to the claims of other classes of the community. 
 
 “ I am, See., R. B. TANEY, 
 
 “ Secretary of the Treasury. 
 
 “ To the President of the Girard Bank , Philadelphia 
 
 The letter just read is found in Senate documents, 1st session, 23d Congress, 1st vol. doc. 
 No. 2, page 33, and the following letter is found at page 3G of the same document: 
 
 “ Treasury Department, October 9, 1833. 
 
 “ Sir : This Department has selected your institution as one of the dopositorirs of the public money of the United 
 States, and I send you enclosed the draught of a contract, which you will please have executed in proper form, under 
 he corporate seal of your institution, and forward to this Department immediately. After you have done this, you 
 
20 
 
 ”wiU pies* 1:1 ^ orVv artHhP enclosed communications to the public officers to whom they are directed, (they being in¬ 
 structions i. om the Department to deposite all public money in their hands, or which they may hereafter receive, 
 in your instil u tion to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States.) I also enclose to you circular instructions 
 relative -to de'p >0SItes a . nc * accounts of public officers, to which I respectfully call your attention. 
 
 u In selecting your institution as one of the fiscal agents of the Government, I not only rely on its solidity and es¬ 
 tablished oharacu er > as affording a sufficient guaranty for the safety of the public money entrusted to its keeping, 
 but I confide also l. a lts disposition to adopt the most liberal course which circumstances will admit towards other 
 moneyed institution* 1 generally, and particularly those in your vicinity. 
 
 “ The deposites of the public money will enable you to afford increased facilities to the commercial and other 
 classes of the communn'y> an u the Department anticipates from you the adoption of such a course, respecting your 
 accommodations, as will prove acceptable to the People, and safe to the Government. 
 
 “ I am, &c., R. B. TANEY, 
 
 11 Secretary of the Treasury. 
 
 “ To the President of the .Maine Bank, Portland, Maine." 
 
 In this same report, from which the foregoing letters are copied, Mr. Taney states that letters 
 similar to the one addressed to' the Girard Bank, just read, were 
 
 u Sent to the Presidents of the Commercial Bank and the Merchants’ Bank of Boston, the Manhattan Company, 
 the Mechanics’ Bank, and the Bank of America, in the city of New York, and the Union Bank of Maryland, in 
 Baltimore.” 
 
 Mr. Taney also there reports that letters, similar to the one before read and addressed to the 
 Maine Bank, Portland, were also sent by him 
 
 “Tothe Presidents of the Commercial Bank, at Portsmouth, New Hampshire; the branch of the Bank of the 
 State of Alabama, at Mobile ; the Planters’ Bank of the State of Mississippi, at Natchez ; the Union Bank of Ten¬ 
 nessee, at Nashville ; the Franklin Bank of Cincinnati, Ohio; the Bank of Virginia, at Richmond ; the branch of 
 the Bank of Virginia, at Norfolk ; the Bank of the Metropolis, at the city of Washington ; the Bank of Burlington, 
 in Vermont; the Arcade Bank of Providence, Rhode Island; the Farmers and Mechanics’ Bank, at Hartford, Con¬ 
 necticut ; the Union Bank of Louisiana, and the Commercial Bank, at New Orleans.” 
 
 In the first class of these letters Mr. Taney, as we have already seen, says : 
 
 “ The deposites of the public money will enable you to afford increased facilities to commerce, and to extend 
 your accommodations to individuals; and, as the duties which are payable to the Government arise from the busi¬ 
 ness and enterprise of the merchants engaged in foreign trade, it is but reasonable that they should be preferred in 
 the additional accommodations which the public deposites will enable your institution to give, whenever it can be 
 -done without injustice to the claims of other classes of the community.” 
 
 And in the second class of these letters the same Secretary says: 
 
 “ The deposites of the public money will enable you to afford increased facilities to-the commercial and other 
 -classes of the community, and the Department anticipates from you the adoption of such a course, respecting your 
 accommodations, as will prove acceptable to the People and safe to the Government.” 
 
 Thus we have seen, not only an official permission, but an absolute command issued from the 
 Treasury Department, under General Jackson’s Administration, requiring the deposite banks, 
 throughout the whole country, “ to increase the facilities to commerce,” and “ extend their ac¬ 
 commodation to individuals” by discounting on the public money! How do these official orders 
 and documents compare with Mr. Secretary Woodbury’s report on the finances, December, 1838, 
 where, in urging another new plan upon the country, he says: 
 
 “ The change, so far as it respects the mere collecting and disbursing officers, will have a decisive tendency to 
 preserve, not only the Government, but them and their securities, from these losses, which it was never contem¬ 
 plated they should hazard, by making loans or speculations with funds held in sacred trust for purposes entirely 
 public in their character and constant in their demands ” 
 
 “ Who shall decide, when doctors disagree'!” We find Messrs. Taney and Woodbury, 
 both of the same party, each a follower of General Jackson, in succession holding the same office 
 in his Cabinet; but their official papers cannot well be reconciled. A question may, however, 
 be justly put to Mr. Woodbury: Was he not a member ot General Jackson’s Cabinet at the date 
 of these official papers issued from the Treasury Department by Mr. Taney 1 and did he not 
 consent to them 1 Mr. Woodbury will be obliged to answer in the affirmative ; and I will only 
 add that, in these documents, another illustration is furnished of the discrepancy between the 
 professions and practice of this Administration. But still further documentary evidence is found 
 to prove that General Jackson’s Administration actually lent the public money, in discounts, at 
 the State banks. 
 
 Another reference is now necessary to Mr. Kendall’s report. One of the obstacles which pre¬ 
 sented itself in his arrangement for transferring the public deposites to the State banks, grew out 
 of some apprehension that they might not be able to transfer the moneys free of expense at 
 the various points where the Government might need it, as the Bank of the United States had 
 done. This obstacle seemed to increase, too, in the fear* that the Bank of the United States 
 might refuse to redeem, in the large cities, their branch notes paid in for revenue, and deposited 
 in the State banks. But at length Mr. Kendall, in his cunning, (as he thought at the time, but 
 which the sequel proved to be a great error,) devised a plan, in connexion with the State banks, 
 by which it was to be most unjustly attempted to compel the Bank of the United States to trans¬ 
 fer the public money as the Government desired it, notwithstanding the discontinuance of that 
 Institution as the public depository. This sage plan is thus described by Mr. Kendall in his re¬ 
 port. He there 3ays: 
 
 “ As soon as they have received a quantity of branch paper, they will demand that the Bank of the United States 
 shall place the Government funds represented by it in the places where they may be wanted ; and as they anti¬ 
 cipate, that shall be declined, they will proceed to cash the paper with all possible expedition- In that event, 
 they believe the Bank of the United States will be compelled, as the only meaDS of saving her interior branches 
 
from ruin, to place the funds wherever they may be required. In a contest with the Bank of the United States, 
 they will require little or nothing of the Treasury.” 
 
 Did this scheme, unjust as it was, succeed! No; far from it. The State banks enlarged 
 their discouuts, under orders from the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Dank of the United 
 States, in the course of its business, actually received more of the notes of the deposite banks 
 thaS they could get of the notes of that institution and its branches. And very soon the deposite 
 banks began to fear they would be obliged to pay the Dank of the United States considerable 
 balances in specie. The grand scheme to compel the bank to transfer the public moneys van¬ 
 ished ! And the very Administration that now complains of excessive bank issues, and goes for 
 a hard-money currency, then censured the Dank of the United States for desiring the payment 
 of balances from the deposite banks, which would have been a means cf a wholosome restraint 
 on the line of discounts ! Dut, in order to sustain the deposite banks in their increased discounts 
 and accommodations, the Treasury Department actually gave checks for large amounts of the 
 public money on deposite in the Bank of the United States, and placed the sapic in the deposite 
 banks. The sums thus lent were as follows : One hundred thousand dollars to the Union Bank 
 of Maryland, in Baltimore ; five hundred thousand dollars to the Girard Bank, at Philadelphia ; 
 five hundred thousand dollars to the Bank of America; a similar sum to the Mechanics’ Dank ; 
 and a similar sum to the Manhattan Bank—all in New York. Thus making upwards of two 
 millions of the public money lent by Mr. Taney in drafts on the Bank of the United States, in¬ 
 dependent of his permission and ordef, before read, to discount on the current and accruing rev¬ 
 enues of the Government. 
 
 The letters of Mr. r I>aney, transmitting the drafts for these several sums of money, may all be 
 found in Senate documents, 1st session, 23d Congress, 1st vol., doc. Np. 16, pages 331 and 330; 
 where may also be seen several letters from the officers of these banks to Mr. Taney, assuring 
 him that they had contributed to the relief of the community by enlarging their discounts in ac¬ 
 cordance with his wishes. In one of these letters Mr. George Newbold, President of the Bank 
 of North America, New York, says : 
 
 “ The extension of our loans we have considered a point of duty, and not to be avoided with propriety, under the 
 circumstances; and being furnished by you with the means of protecting in the mean lime the city” banks, and 
 the community, in case of need, we have been enabled to perform that duty without apprehension of injury.” 
 
 I leave this part of the subject, and submit*to the committee and to the country if my proposi¬ 
 tion, that the Administration authorized the lending of the public money, has not been fully 
 established. 
 
 I will again call the attention of the committee to the fact that the Administration first com¬ 
 mended the State banks as worthy of all confidence, and then determined to prostrate them. 
 To accomplish first one and then the other of these purposes, Mr. Levi Woodbury, the Secre¬ 
 tary of the Treasury, has been a leading agent and instrument. He writes in their favor and 
 against them with equal readiness and facility. He never wants facts to prove them superior as 
 public depositories to individual agents; and is equally prepared to prgve the converse of this pro¬ 
 position, if the interest of his party require it. The chairman of the Committee of Way3 and 
 Means (Mr. Jones) has told us that he justified himself in sustaining the bill now proposed to 
 be passed authorizing the issue of Treasury notes, by looking, in the formation of his opinion, 
 
 to the Secretary of the Treasury, (Mr. Woodbury,) whose position enables him to possess more 
 correct information than almost any other man. The whole subject is before him. Every 
 avenue of information is accessible to him.” This position seems just, and might be fairly used 
 if Mr. Woodbury had not made such contradictory reports upon the same subject-matter. But 
 his official communications are so contradictory and inconsistent that I cannot rely upon any of 
 them. I will now endeavor to prove this to be true. In a previous part of my remarks.it will 
 be remembered that I alluded to a special report made to Congress on the 12th December, 1834, 
 and said I would recur to it again, and examine it more at large. This I propose now to do. 
 The State banks had just then been prevailed on to become the depositories of the public money, 
 and the Administration desired to commend them to the country as safe and worthy of all 
 confidence. Mr. Woodbury was not satisfied with an honorable men tion of them in his regu¬ 
 lar annual report on the finances, but in that report promised a special communication, devoted 
 entirely to that subject This special report was made on the 12th December, 1834, and may 
 be found in Senate documents, 2d session, 23 Congress, vol. 2, doc. No. 13. I now intend 
 to read from it. In his introductory remarks Mr. Woodbury says: 
 
 “ Considering the unusual excitement that has attended the measures and discussions of the past year, connected 
 with the above subject, [the deposite of the public money,] it would probably be deemed a neglect or an evasion 
 of proper responsibility if the undersigned did not submit full information concerning the places where our revenue* 
 is now deposited and kept; the principles on which the selection of them L*y this Department is justified ; the 
 mode in which the existing system for the preservation and disbursement of the public money has been found to 
 operate; and the advantages and disadvantages which are likely to result from a return to any former one, or from 
 the adoption of any propose^'improvements in the existing system.” 
 
 It will be thus seen that Mr. Woodbury professed to report on the State bank system in re¬ 
 gard to the deposite of the public money. And having, as he said, fully examined the whole 
 subject, he comes to the conclusion that that system has proved to be and is superior and more 
 trustworthy than the agency of the Bank of the United States, or individual agents. 
 
22 
 
 I will now read from his report. After suggesting some difference in favor of the State hanks 
 over that of the agency of the United States Bank, Mr. Woodbury says: 
 
 “ Considering these differences, coupled with the fact that the selected banks, without disparagement to others, 
 are or ought to bfe chosen from the most flourishing and secure; that they can be changed whenever any circum¬ 
 stance may indicate a change to be prudent, and that collateral security can be required whenever the deposite is 
 so large gs to seem to render it judicious; that the Government possesses advantages superior in case of their em¬ 
 barrassment, and that the whole capital stock must be,lost before the deposite debt will become desperate,"here 
 certainly can be no very disadvantageous comparison in theory between the safely of the Government under the 
 present rather than under the farmer system. * * * * The losses which have formerly been sustained by 
 the General Government, through the failure of certain State banks, selected, according to the impressions of many 
 persons, principally, if not entirely, between 1811 and 1S16, or between the expiration of the old and the passage 
 of the new charter of the United States Bank, have been frequently adduced as objections to the safety of the pre¬ 
 sent system ; and, without some detailed examination and careful discrimination, are, it is freely admitted, calcu¬ 
 lated to awaken some doubt as to its ultimate practical security. But it is a memorable fact connected with this 
 inquiry, though often represented otherwise, that not a single selected State bank failed between the expiration of 
 the old charter and the grant of the new one; and that none of our losses, included in our unavailable funds, hap¬ 
 pened until some time in 1817, after the United States Bank was in operation. Then, whether ‘destroyed by an 
 exertion of the power of the bank’ alone, or, as is more probable, by numerous causes combined, it appears, from a 
 careful analysis of the unavailable funds which we now have and formerly had on hand, that some of the selected 
 banks became embarrassed.” 
 
 Mr. Bond said he would contrast various passages found in the several reports made to Con¬ 
 gress by Mr. Woodbury, on the comparative advantages and losses to the Government in the 
 use of State banks instead of individuals as depositories of the public money. Three reports 
 had been made by him, perhaps more; but three of them would now be used : the one before re¬ 
 ferred to, dated 12th December, 1834; another dated the 27th February, 1638, being doc. No. 
 191, in vol. 7, House of Representatives, 2d session, 25th Congress. The third dated the 9th 
 day of December, 1839, being doc. No. 10, House of Representatives* of the present session, 
 and to which special reference is made in the annual report (of the same Secretary) on the finan¬ 
 ces at this session. 
 
 In his report of 27th February, 1838, Mr. Woodbury 
 
 says: 
 
 “ The loss to the Treasury by taking depreciated 
 notes, in 1814, ’15. ’16, and ’17, is estimated at quite five 
 millions five hundred thousand dollars; and there is 
 now on hand of such notes then received and never 
 paid away, or collected, about eighty thousand dollars 
 more, as is more fully detailed in a report to the Senate 
 from this Department made the 1st instant.” 
 
 Extract from Mr. Woodbury's report, December 9’ 
 1839 .-Table No. 3. 
 
 “ Statement showing the amount of public money lost 
 annually by using banks as depositories, and receiving 
 their notes in payment of public dues. 
 
 1019) A 
 
 jo, a Losses on notes received, estimated in these 
 1815 i ^ our years bv Treasury Department at five 
 I millions five hundred thousand dollars!” 
 
 Extract from Mr. Woodbury's annual report, Decem¬ 
 ber, 1639. 
 
 “ Among the banks the largest losses were from 1813 
 to 1817, then consisting entirely of depreciation on notes 
 taken, and next from 1821 to lb24, consisting then chief¬ 
 ly of aeposites.” 
 
 I desire those who hear me, or who will take the trouble to compare the documents, to 
 mark the years and periods selected by Mr. Woodbury in the several passages just read, and 
 decide whether they can be reconciled, if the motive of the Secretary was, on each occasion, to 
 give the entire truth. 
 
 Mr. Woodbury tries to protect himself now by referring to Mr. McDuffie’s report, made in 
 1830. That document w r as in the Secretary’s possession in 1834, and why did he not refer to 
 and use it? Because it conflicted with tjie views he was then urging upon Congress. It now 
 suits him to present a different view of the same matter, and he seizes a paragraph from that 
 report, and holds it up in bold review, but says nothing of the great body of that report, which, 
 had it been followed, would have averted the sad calamity under which the nation now labors. 
 This alleged loss by depreciation on bank notes, now dwelt upon by Mr. Woodbury as occurring 
 during the period of war, brings up the recollection of this fact, that, during that interesting 
 period, the notes of the State banks were of greater value than the Treasury notes of the Gov¬ 
 ernment. The earnest and patriotic desire of the State banks to sustain the Government at 
 that crisis brought upon them a serious injury. Mr. Woodbury, in his report of 12th December, 
 1834, says: 
 
 In the report of 12th December, 1834, Mr. Woodbuiy 
 
 says : 
 
 “ But it is a memorable fact connected with this in¬ 
 quiry, though ofien represented otherwise, that not a sin¬ 
 gle selected State bank failed between the expiration of 
 the old charter (of the Bank of the United States) and 
 the grant of the new one, (from 1$11 to 1816;) and that 
 none of our losses included in our unavailable funds 
 happened until some time in 1817, after the United 
 States Bank was in operation.” 
 
 Extract from Mr. Woodbury's report, December 12, 
 
 1834. 
 
 “ Without reference to the indirect injury and embar¬ 
 rassment caused to our fiscal concerns, as well as to the 
 community, at the time of the short suspension of specie 
 payments by some of the State banks, it appears that 
 our greatest losses by public depositories and by una¬ 
 vailable funds of any kind occurred among the State 
 banks selected, not between 1811 and 1816, but before 
 or afterwards, and in aid of the United States Bank.” 
 
 “ The Government stocks acquired by the patriotic loans of some of the State banks during the late war were in 
 some degree sacrificed, in several instances, to enable them too early and suddenly to resume and support specie 
 payments.” 
 
 The State banks patriotically aided the Government during that season of war, and were 
 obliged to sacrifice the debt which the Government owed them. It would not command its 
 nominal amount. Here, then, the banks actually lost on those stocks, for they parted with them 
 at less than their nominal value. And it might with as great propriety be argued that the Gov¬ 
 ernment justly owed the banks a large amount for losses on depreciated stock, as that the banks 
 
23 
 
 owe the Government for losses on depreciated paper. Indeed, with greater reason: for the 
 Government put off the bank notes at their nominal amount. And although it is true that the 
 credit of the Government was lestored and fully established when peace came, and that the 
 public stocks then rose to their par value, still, before this, many of the banks, which the Gov¬ 
 ernment had contributed to weaken, by inducing them to make large advances, had been obliged 
 to sacrifice those stocks. I will proceed with contrasting other passages from the Secretary’s report: 
 
 Extract from Mr. Woodbury's report, December 1-2, 
 
 1834. 
 
 “ Justice to the State banking institutions, as a body, 
 whose conduct in particular cases has certainly been ob¬ 
 jectionable, but whose injuries to the Government have 
 been almost incredibly exaggerated, and whose great 
 benefits to it, both during the existence of our two na¬ 
 tional banks, and while neither of them existed, have 
 been almost entirely overlooked, has led me to make 
 this scrutiny, and submit its results, under a hope that it 
 w ill, in some degree, not only vindicate them from much 
 unmerited censure, but justify this Department for the 
 confidence it formerly, and in the great improvement of 
 tlieir condition and of the financial affairs of the Govern¬ 
 ment, has recently reposed in them. 
 
 “Under these circumstances, so very favorable with 
 the new security and examinations provided for, if our 
 former small losses by them, in keeping and paying over 
 the public revenue, under circumstances so very adverse, 
 are compared with our large losses, either in collecting or 
 disbursing that revenue, thfi r present safety seems to be 
 as great as is consistent with the usual operations of the 
 paper system, or with the credit which must always be 
 entrusted by Government, in some way or other, to 
 agents of some kind, in keeping the public money.” 
 
 Extract from Mr. Woodbury's annual report on the 
 finances , December , 13.30, and same matter repeated 
 in his special report of December, 1839. 
 
 “ Losses appear to have occurred from defaults among 
 officers in every Administration or Presidential term 
 from the formation of the present Government. Thus, 
 among disbursing officers, they are found in every term 
 since 1789; among collecting officers, in each since 1793; 
 and among deposite officers or banks, in all since 1817. 
 
 “The largest amount of loss from each class, within 
 the period described, has been by deposite officers, Cvm- 
 sisting of banks, and including, as the resolution re¬ 
 quires, the depreciation on such of their notes as were 
 taken for public dues. The loss of this class, at the low¬ 
 est estimate, has exceeded six millions and a half of 
 dollars.” 
 
 I think the discrepancies in the above passages are too striking to require any particular empha¬ 
 sis. I will read others: 
 
 Extract from Mr. Woodbury’s special report, Decem¬ 
 ber 12, 1834. 
 
 It is gratifying to reflect, however, that the credit giv¬ 
 en by the Government, whether to bank paper or bank 
 agents, has been accompanied by SMALLER losses, in 
 the.experience under the system of State banks, in this 
 country, at their worst periods and under their severest 
 calamities, than any other kind of credit the Govern¬ 
 ment has ever given in relation to its pecuniary trans¬ 
 actions.” * * * “ Thus the truth on this much mis¬ 
 
 understood and misrepresented subject appears to be, 
 not only that one failure of a selected bank did not oc¬ 
 cur within the period while no United States Bank was 
 in operation, but that of those which afterwards slopped 
 payment within three or four years, chiefly from the 
 causes before mentioned, and a part of which crises pro¬ 
 duced eight or tenfold as many failures in England, un¬ 
 der the full control and influence of a national bank 
 there as well as here, four of the number have since dis¬ 
 charged all their liabilities, and the residue of the lia¬ 
 bilities of all the others as deposite banks, in the man¬ 
 ner before estimated, is less than #35,000. This is not 
 the tithe of the sum which has frequently been lost to 
 the Treasury by the failure of individual merchants to 
 discharge only their obligations for imports; npt equal 
 to the sum frequently lost by the failure of many single 
 disbursing agents connected with the different depart¬ 
 ments of the Government, and under large bonds for se¬ 
 curity. Whether they [losses by State banks] arose 
 from an unsound policy pursued by the United States 
 Bank, or from circumstances which, under the paper 
 system, neither legislation nor caution can always avert, 
 or from less justifiable reasons and in spile of all the sal¬ 
 utary influence the National Bank could exercise, it is 
 a singular fact, in praise of this description of public 
 debtors—the selected banks—that there is not now due 
 on deposite in the whole of them, which have ever stop¬ 
 ped payment from the establishment of the Constitution 
 to the present moment, a sum much beyond what is now 
 due to the United States from one mercantile firm that 
 stopped payment in 1825 or 1826, and of whom ample se¬ 
 curity was required, and supposed to be taken, under the 
 responsibility of an oath. If we include the whole pres¬ 
 ent dues to the Government from discredited banks at 
 all times, and of all kinds, whether as depositories or not 
 and embrace even counterfeit bills, and every other 
 species of unavailable funds in the Treasury, they will 
 not excepchwhat is due from two such firms. Of almost 
 one hundred banks, not depositories, which, during all 
 our wars and commercial embarrassments, have here¬ 
 tofore failed, in any part of the Union, in debt to the 
 Government, on their bills or otherwise, it will he seen 
 by the above table [annexed to the report] that the 
 whole of them, except seventeen, have adjusted every 
 thing which they owed ; and that the balance due from 
 them, without interest, is less than #32,000.” 
 
 Extract f rom Mr. Woodbury’s report on the finances y 
 December , 1839, and the same thing repeated by him 
 in his special report , December 9,1839 
 “ The largest amount of loss from each class (of money 
 agents used by the Government) within the period de¬ 
 scribed [the same referred to in his report of December 
 12, 1834] has been by deposite officers, consisting of 
 banks, and including, as the resolution requires, the de- 
 treciation on such of their notes as were taken for pub¬ 
 ic dues. The loss by this class, at the lowest estimate, 
 has exceeded six millions and a half of dollars.” 
 
 Extract from Mr. Woodbury’s special report dated 
 February 27, 1838. 
 
 “ In answer to the first inquiry, as to the amount of all 
 balances against all banks which have been used as 
 public depositories, that is not secured, or will probably 
 be lost, adding thereto the estimated loss that has ac¬ 
 crued by taking on public account depreciated bank 
 notes. I would observe that it is computed those balan¬ 
 ces, so lost, [including the same period of time referred 
 to in the special report of December 12,1834.] will be 
 about one million of dollars, and the loss by taking such 
 notes about five millions five hundred thousand dollars; 
 making, in the aggregate, six millions five hundred 
 thousand dollars. This is without the addition of any 
 interest, as are the subsequent statements. If interest 
 were cast on the above sums, the aggregate would ex¬ 
 ceed thirteen millions of dollars.” 
 
! 
 
 24 
 
 I am constrained to make a few comments on these inconsistent, if not flatly contradictory- 
 reports of Mr. Woodbury. It would seem as if he had been “treading in the footsteps” of his 
 great prototype, Polonius, who, when asked by Hamlet if he saw “yonder cloud that’s almost 
 in shape of a camel,” replied, “ by the mass, and ’tis like a camel, indeed !” The Prince says, 
 “ Methinks it is like a weazel, and the subservient chamberlain quickly answers, “It is backed 
 like a weazel.” But when his master added, “ Or, like a ^’hale,” the flattering sycophant at 
 once pronounced it “ very like a whale!” And as the subservient Polonius, anxious to flatter 
 and deceive, humored all the caprices of his master, so does the President’s Treasury Secretary. 
 He writes up or writes dowm the same system with the same facts, as the nod of the President 
 or the interest of his party requires. All that he desires is, like the son of the Yorkshire jockey, 
 when about to exhibit the qualities of a horse, to be told, before mounting, whether he is to ride 
 to sell or to purchase the animal! 
 
 If Mr. Woodbury’s reports in February, 1833, and December 1839, are true, then he was 
 guilty of a culpable omission in his report of the 12th of December, 1834. This last mentioned 
 paper was designed to sustain the President in adopting State banks as depositories of the public 
 money. It was then necessary to prove that, in the use of this class of agents by the Govern¬ 
 ment, less had been lost than by the employment of individual agents. He professed to have 
 scrutinized the whole system, and comes to the conclusion just mentioned. If the Government 
 had, before that time, lost five million five hundred thousand dollars by the depreciation of bank 
 notes, why did he suppress the fact I 
 
 In his report of December, 1834, as we have already seen, he says, “It#is gratifying to reflect, 
 however, that the credit given by the Government, whether to bank paper or hank agents , has 
 been accompanied by smaller losses in the experience under the system of State banks in this 
 country at their worst periods, and under their severest calamities, than any other kind of credit 
 the Government has ever given in relation to its pecuniary transactions .” And in another part 
 of that same report, Mr. Woodbdry says, “ If we include the whole present dues to the Govern¬ 
 ment from discredited hanks at all times and of all kinds, whether as depositories or not, and 
 embrace counterfeit hills and every other species of unavailable funds in the Treasury, they will 
 not exceed what is due from two such firms,” (alluding to the loss the Government had met 
 with in the case of an individual debt. Here, then, we see the Secretary speak of losses “whe¬ 
 ther by hank paper or hank agents ”—of losses by “ discredited hanks at all times and of all 
 kinds, luhether as depositories or not, and embrace even counterfeit bills. He goes into all these 
 details; mentions item after item, but omits the small amount of five million five hundred thou¬ 
 sand dollars of loss by the depreciation of bank notes. 
 
 If this loss was in truth sustained, it was as well known to Mr. Woodbury in December, 1834,. 
 as in February, 1838, or December, 1839. In these latter reports, he is devoting himself to 
 writing down the State banks, and writing up the sub-Treasury plan. And we now hear him 
 report in February, 1838, “ the losses by banks as depositories (during the same period included 
 in his report of December, 1834) to be about one million of dollars, and the loss by taking such 
 notes about five million five hundred thousand dollars; making in the aggregate six million five 
 hundred thousand dollars.” And he adds, “ If interest was cast on the above sums, the aggre¬ 
 gate would exceed thirteen millions of dollars.” And again, in his report of December 9, 1839, 
 referring to these same losses, he says, “the interest is legally and equitably due ,” and “would 
 obviously double or treble the amount of many of them happening in the more remote periods.” 
 In what way, then, can Mr. Woodbury account for this glaring discrepancy in his several re¬ 
 ports 1 It is in vain for him to say that in the one he spoke of losses and depreciated bank notes, 
 and not in the others. His report of December, 1834, professes to “ scrutinize ” all losses of 
 every description, “whether by hank credit, hank paper ,” or even counterfeit bills.” And his 
 object was or should have been honestly to consider and report every incident or loss, direct or 
 indirect, which tended in any way to illu^Prate to the people the advantages or disadvantages of 
 the State bank system. If then, it is true, as he says nowin his report of December, 1839, 
 that even the interest on this alleged loss of five million five hundred thousand dollars “is legal¬ 
 ly and equitably due ” to the Government, I again ask, how can his omission to notice the loss 
 of the principal sum in December, 1834, be reconciled to just integrity and official faith 1 It is 
 clear that the truth has been suppressed at the one time, or a falsehood is suggested at the oth¬ 
 er ! This alternative seems unavoidable, and the Secretary is at liberty to make his election, 
 
 Mr. Bond said it would not be inappropriate here to state another instance to prove that the 
 documents, coming from the Treasury Department, were not to be relied on. 
 
 It will be remembered that Mr. Woodbury, at the 1st session of the 25th Congress, sent a 
 document to this House, purporting to contain the correspondence of the Treasury Department 
 with the various receivers of public moneys, and in which many delinquencies among this class 
 of agents w’ere specified. In that document is found a letter addressed to the receiver of public 
 money at Chilicothe, Ohio, charging that officer w r ith some omission of his duty. Peeling it my 
 duty to submit this document to my constituents some time in the summer of 1838, when ad¬ 
 dressing a public meeting of the people in the county of my residence, I called their attention to 
 many of these letters, aad particularly to the one already alluded to, addressed to the receiver at 
 
25 
 
 Chilicothe. The election for members of Congress and of the General Assembly was then com¬ 
 ing on in Ohio, and as the contest began to wax warm, a letter was printed by the receiver 
 “ purporting to come from the chief clerk of the Treasury Department, saying that the commu¬ 
 nication found in the aforesaid document, addressed to the receiver at Chilicothe, was not in¬ 
 tended for him, but for another receiver!” Immediately after this annunciation, the whole affair 
 was charged by the Van Buren party to be false; and I could never afterwards prevail on a sin¬ 
 gle member of that party to listen to any part of that document, though sent to Congress by Mr. 
 Woodbury under the official sanction of an oath, and by that body ordered to be printed. Other 
 documents are at hand from that same Department, in which gross errors are found. But, leav¬ 
 ing them for some other occasion, I will again proceed to contrast certain other parts of Mr. 
 Woodbury’s report of the 12th of December, 1834, with his annual report on the finances, De¬ 
 cember, 1838. In the first, it will be found, he condemns the system of individual depositaries 
 for the public money, now known as the sub-Treasury plan, and, at present, when it is the 
 wish, if not the interest, of the Administration to sustain that system, he gives it a decided pre¬ 
 ference. Let us now read from each report : 
 
 Extract from Mr. Woodbury's Report, VUh Decem¬ 
 ber., 1834. 
 
 “ In considering their (the State banks) safety, it 
 should be constantly recollected that the owners and 
 managers of banks, when properly regulated by legisla¬ 
 tive provisions in their charters, are, like other individ¬ 
 uals, interested to transact business securely ; are de¬ 
 sirous of making and not losing money; and that these 
 circuinstauces, with the preference, in case of failure, 
 belonging to depositors and holders of their bills over 
 stockholders, united with the security if not the priority 
 given to the Government, render them, in point of safe¬ 
 ty, generally much superior to individual agents of the 
 “United States. 
 
 “ Hence, unless the States and the United Slates 
 should both deem it proper gradually, and, in the end, 
 entirely, to dispense with the paper system, a (id which 
 event is not anticipated, the Government cannot escape 
 occasional losses from that quarter, and can never hope 
 to escape all losses from banks as fiscal agents, except 
 by the employment in their place of other and individu¬ 
 al agents, who will probably be found less responsible, 
 safe, convenient, and economical.” 
 
 Extract from Mr. Woodbury's R^ort on the Finan¬ 
 ces, December, 1*8. 
 
 “ But the proposed plan of an Independent Treasury, 
 with all its checks and guards, will diminish the num¬ 
 ber of risks, and tend, in several respects, to strengthen 
 the public security. By requiring the olticers now em¬ 
 ployed in collections to hold most of the money for a 
 time in deposite, it adopts only a part of the agents 
 under either of the former systems, and hence, dispen¬ 
 sing with the banks, unless it may be for a few strictly 
 special deposites, avoids most if not of all the risks and. 
 losses which have been sustained by that class of agents. 
 
 “ On the whole, it is apparent that the system of an 
 Independent Treasury is more plain and simple in its 
 arrangements than any other, and much more accord¬ 
 ant with that originally in use after the adoption of the 
 Constitution. It is more free from several formidable 
 dangers, and, under the additional guards and restric¬ 
 tions proposed, is likely to unite all attainable security 
 with efficiency and purity in the custody of the public 
 funds.” 
 
 If one can be justified at any time in relying on the political opinions of Amos Kendall, I will 
 now give his opinion in 1834, in favor of the system of deposite banks, over that of an individ¬ 
 ual agency in the management of the public money ; that is, the sub-Treasury plan. In his re¬ 
 port already referred to he says : 
 
 “ When it is seen that the managers of the State banks are willing to pledge not only the capital of those institu¬ 
 tions, but their own property and character, it will be impossible to doubt that the deposite is as safe in their keep¬ 
 ing as human agency can make it.” 
 
 At one time, Mr. Woodbury reports the loss by individual collecting officers to be from 
 $900,000 to $1,200,000; and, at another time, reports the same class of losses for the same time 
 as not much exceeding $2,000,000 !! This may be seen on reference to his report of the 27th 
 February, 1838, and that of the 9th December, 1839, as well as in*his last annual report on the 
 finances. But it must be remembered that in none of these reports does he include the great 
 loss sustained by the Government in the defalcation and fraud of Samuel Swartwout, the collect¬ 
 or of the revenue in the city of New York, an officer appointed by General Jackson, and con¬ 
 tinued in office by Mr. Van Buren. This single defalcation amounts to the enormous sum of 
 one million two hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars! Nor does he include the defalca¬ 
 tion of Price, another of Mr. Van Buren’s friends, who held the office of district attorney in the 
 southern district of New York, whose defalcation is not yet fully developed, but is supposed to 
 be fifty thousand dollars ! And to these may be added a long list of defalcating land office re¬ 
 ceivers and other collecting agents of the Government, within the last four years. These are 
 not included by Mr. Van Buren and Mr. Woodbury in their official papers, in which they un¬ 
 dertake to contrast the losses by bank depositories with those by individual agents of the Govern¬ 
 ment. If we adopt the amount of losses reported by Mr. Woodbury in his communication of 
 the 12th December, 1834, as being sustained by the Government, in the use of banks as deposi¬ 
 tories from its commencement to the date of that report, it will be found that the single loss by 
 Swartwout exceeded that sustained in the use of banks throughout that long period just mention¬ 
 ed. The amount which is represented by Mr. Woodbury as lost by the banks is $1,157,890 85 ; 
 and this in a term of near fifty years, whilst the sirigle loss by the collector, Swartout, is 
 $1,225,000, in about two years ! It should here be stated that Mr. Woodbury now reports the 
 sum of $300,000 to hanre been paid on the bank debt, which reduces the loss by banks to less 
 than $900,000. 
 
 It will perhaps be attempted to justify Mr. Woodbury in his gross discrepancies by using the 
 fact stated in his report of the 9th December, 1839, viz: “ The losses by depreciated paper of 
 the banks do not appear at all on the Treasury books, but arc given from computations made by 
 
 
 
the Department.” If Mr. Woodbury could find any data, not on his official books, on which to 
 calculate a loss of upwards of five millions of dollars in 1838, and also in 1839, why did he not 
 discover and use the same materials in 1834 1 This is a very unsatisfactory, not to say improp¬ 
 er way of communicating official information from one of the Departments of the Government. 
 It places every thing in the hands of the Secretary. He may make the loss nothing, or immense 
 in amount just as he pleases. And so Mr. Woodbury has done. At one time he made it no¬ 
 thing, and when it suits him to change his purpose, he makes it five million five hundred thous¬ 
 and dollars ! And on another occasion he adds the interest to this sum, runs it up to an aggre¬ 
 gate of thirteen millions of dollars, and declares the w hole amount to be “ legally and, equitably 
 duey If this be just, the books of yie Treasury have been strangely kept. The Secretary of the 
 Department reports a loss of thirteen millions of dollars to the Government, says that the whole 
 amount is <c legally and equitably due ,” but that no part of it “ appears at all on the Treasury 
 books !” This immense loss has nothing whatever to sustain it but Mr. Woodbury’s computa¬ 
 tions ! He could as well have made it fifty millions as five. It rests upon his conjecture, and 
 no one can contradict that. But it is a gross slander on his predecessors in office; for if the 
 sum mentioned by Mr. Woodbury, or one dollar of it, be, as he says, “ legally and equitably 
 duef the booksflfcf the Treasury ought to show it, as they do all other items of loss, and as 
 they do particularly show the details of the amount lost by the State bank depository system, 
 reported by him in December, 1834, and in all his subsequent reports. The truth is, that, du¬ 
 ring the period when Mr. Woodbury now affects to believe this great loss happened, the notes 
 of the State banks w r ere superior in value to the Treasury notes of the Government; and the 
 greater part of all the State bank notes which the Government received were again disbursed by 
 it in its ordinary expenses, at their par value. 
 
 Let us, then, take the amount of loss incident to the use of State banks as depositories for the 
 public money, so far as the same is found on the books of the Treasury, and fully reported by 
 Mr. Woodbury in December, 1834. And wffiat is it'? It was then reported to be, from the 
 origin of the Government, in 1789, to the 10th of November, 1834, §1,157,890 85. And in 
 his report of the 9th December, 1S39, he states that nearly §300,000 of that sum has been 
 paid, so that the actual loss of principal is less than §900,000. Now, compare that loss with 
 the amount of loss sustained by the Government in the use of individual agencies during the 
 same period, as reported by Mr. Woodbury. By his report of the 9th December, 1839, he 
 states the following losses to the Government through individual agents, in collecting and dis¬ 
 bursing the public revenue, from the 4th of March, 1789, to the 4th of March, 1837, viz. 
 
 Losses by collectors of the customs, 
 
 Do. do. of internal revenue, &c. 
 Do. by receivers of land sales, 
 
 Total losses by collecting officers, 
 
 Losses by disbursing officers, viz: 
 
 In civil department, 
 
 In military and naval do. 
 
 - §1,198,979 91 
 
 442,265 76 
 397,304 14 
 
 - §2,038,549 81 
 
 - §898,023 59 
 
 - 4,058,549 97 
 
 Total losses by disbursing officers, - - ' - 
 
 To these I will add the loss by S. Swartwout, collector at New York, ap¬ 
 pointed by General Jackson, and continued by Mr. Van Buren, 
 Supposed loss by Mr. Price, District Attorney at New York, appointed as 
 above, --- ------ 
 
 4,956,573 56 
 1,225,000 00 
 50,000 00 
 
 Total loss by individual agents, ------ §8,270,123 37 
 
 Amount of loss by banks, according to Mr. Woodbury’s report, 12th Decem¬ 
 ber, 1834, giving the credit of §300,000 recently reported by him, - 857,890 85 
 
 §7,412,232 52 
 
 It thus appears that the Government has actually lost §7,412,232 52 more by individual 
 than by bank agency ! And if you add the losses by the Government on individual bonds for 
 the public revenue, stated by Mr. Woodbury in his last annual report on the finances at 
 §7,500,000, it will appear that the total loss sustained by the Government, in individual agency 
 and credit, exceeds the loss by banks §14,900,000 ! To this, too, may be added other losses 
 by land office receivers, Littlebury Hawkins and others, not yet specified in detail, but exceed¬ 
 ing, together, §100,000, and making a grand total of loss by individuals beyond loss by banks 
 of upwards of §15,000,000! The losses, .as reported by Mr. Woodbury, not only show the 
 aggregate result just mentioned, but, by his official documents, it is manifest that the losses 
 have been less by banks than by collectors. They have been less by banks than by collectors 
 of internal revenue and receivers of land offices. They have been less by banks than by indi- 
 
27 
 
 vidual disbursing agents in the civil department. They have been less by banks than by dis¬ 
 bursing agents in the military and naval branches of service,^separately or jointly. They have 
 been less by banks than by individuals on their bonds for the payment of the revenue duties. 
 And if you will credit the State banks with the amount of $1,100,000 and upwards, gained by 
 the Government in the sale of the stock of the Bank of the United States, then no public loss 
 lias been sustained by the banking system. 
 
 But I must call the attention of the committee and of the country to an important fact. In 
 this effort of Mr. Woodbury to prove that greater losses have been sustained bv the use of State 
 banks than in the employment of individual agencies, (and in which, by the way, I think he 
 has signally failed,) it is not pretended that any loss was ever sustained by the Government 
 when it employed a national bank. For two terms, of twenty years each, making an aggregate 
 of forty out of the fifty years, the entire age of our Government, wc employed a national bank. 
 During each of these terms the country enjoyed a sound and uniform system of currency and 
 exchange ; and the whole amount of its revenue, being several hundred millions of dollars, de¬ 
 posited in this national institution, was again paid out on demand wherever wanted, and with¬ 
 out the loss of a single cent. And, instead of sustaining any loss by the Bank of the United 
 States, the Government actually made a profit of more than $1,100,000 by the»sale of the stock 
 which it held in that bank. But on each occasion when we have attempted to dispense with 
 such an institution, the currency and exchange have become disordered and irregular, and 
 heavy losses have followed. Comment is unnecessary. “ He that hath cars to hear, let him 
 hear.” 
 
 Mr. B. said he would now hasten to the conclusion of what he had to say, and, in doing this, 
 would allude to one or two things which he thought had materially contributed to impoverish 
 the public treasury and embarrass the community. The disastrous experiment upon the cur¬ 
 rency was forced upon the nation against the advice of many of the most intelligent and firm 
 friends of General Jackson and his Administration. The reports from the committees in the 
 'Senate and House, already referred to in the early part of my remarks, establish this proposi¬ 
 tion. But the obstinate fiat of party prevailed. It was openly declared on this floor that credit 
 and commerce might both perish, rather than the Administration should abandon their measures 
 against the Bank of the United States. And we have at length nearly realized this state of 
 things. The credit system is prostrate, and our commerce has dwindled until the revenues de¬ 
 rived from it are not adequate to meet the current demands upon the Treasury. The Adminis¬ 
 tration is now urging the passage of the bill under consideration, authorizing them to pay the 
 public creditors in Treasury notes. 
 
 But our Treasury has been impoverished by the extravagance of the past and present Ad¬ 
 ministrations. They came into power professing great economy, and promising equal retrench¬ 
 ment and reform; but, from year to year, the public expenditures have been increasing, until 
 they equalled in one year the aggregate amount of three years of the public expenditures under 
 the Administration of Mr. Adams. It was now indeed very convenient to avoid responsibility 
 for this extravagance, by charging it upon Congress, as if the Administration party had not the 
 power in Congress as well as in the Executive departments of the Government. This is a mode 
 of dodging responsibility which I trust the people of the country will understand and rightly ap¬ 
 preciate. The Administration had the power of this House at their command ; their own 
 Speaker presided here, and appointed all the committees, during those years of such unprecedent¬ 
 ed extravagance ; and, if they had disapproved! of the appropriations, they could have voted 
 them down. But they did not disapprove of them ; on the contrary, on one occasion when the 
 Opposition wished to deposite the surplus revenue with the States, certain leading members of 
 the Administration party were ingeniously contriving all manner of appropriations in order to 
 reduce the amount which would go to the States. That the Administration approved of these 
 appropriations was well known; and without referring to other testimony, I will read what Mr. 
 Bextox said on the subject in the Senate on the 28th December, 1836. On the occasion re¬ 
 ferred to he was justifying the Administration in having so large an amount of unexpended ap¬ 
 propriations on hand, and-said • 
 
 “ All the work of the last session to create the surplus was distinctly seen by the country; every body knew that 
 every branch of the public service was suffering for money, and clerks raising money at usurious interest to live 
 on, and officers raising money on their own credit, while the two Houses of Congress resounded with the cry of sur¬ 
 plus millions, and so many labored to stave off, cut down, and defeat appropriations, in order to create surplus for 
 distribution.” 
 
 After this, let us hear no more of the appropriations by Congress not being the work of the 
 Administration. We are charged, when a particular end is to bfattained, with striving to 
 “stave off, cut down, and defeat appropriations.” And, again, if the Administration wish to 
 avoid all responsibility, they instantly change front, and declare that we passed all these ex¬ 
 travagant appropriations.* I have too much confidence in the good sense of the American peo¬ 
 ple to suppose that they can be gulled bv this shallow artifice. These chamelion changes of Mr. 
 Van Buren and his friends must soon lose their magic deception. 
 
 I will not detain the committee by going into all the details of these extravagant expenditures, 
 but will name one or two which have recently attracted my notice. The Secretary of the 
 
28 
 
 1 
 
 Treasury sent us a document, No. 17 of the present session, giving “ the sums annually paid 
 under each material head ef expenditure,” for the years 1835 to 1838, inclusive. He there 
 states the contingent expenses of the Senate paid in the year 1838 to be $127,823 10. A 
 similar communication, embracing a detail of the annual expenditures of the Government from 
 the 1st of January, 1817, to the 31st of December, 1834, was made to Congress by this same 
 Secretary on the 4th January, 1838, and constitutes document No. 39 of this House, in the 
 1st session of the 24th Congress. I am thus particular in referring to these documents, because 
 I intend to contrast a few of the expenditures in Mr. Adams’s Administration with those under 
 Mr. Van Buren. The materials for the comparison will be taken entirely from these documents* 
 furnished, under the official sanction of the present and past Administrations, by the same Ex¬ 
 ecutive officer. 
 
 By document No. 17, already mentioned, Mr. Woodbury states the amount paid in 1838, for 
 f the contingent expenses of the Senate, at - - - $127,823 10 
 
 By document No. 39, before mentioned, he states the amount paid for the 
 
 contingent expenses of the Senate in 1828, at - - - 41,200 00 
 
 • _ 
 
 Thus exhibiting an excess of ----- - $86,620 10 
 
 in one single item of expenditure in the second year of Mr. Van Buren’s professed economic 
 cal Administration beyond the amount of expenditure for the same item in the last year of Mr. 
 Adam’s alleged extravagant Administration ! 
 
 Again. The contingent expenses of the Senate, as before stated from Mr. Woodbury’s docu¬ 
 ment No. 17, for 1838, are ------ $127,823 10 
 
 The contingent expenses of the Senate, as stated in his document No. 39, for 
 
 the years 1825, 1826, 1827, and 1828, are - 103,295 17 
 
 Excess, ------- $24,527 93 
 
 Thus proving that, under Mr. Van Buren’s Administration, the Senate, with a large and de¬ 
 cided majority in the body in favor of his Administration, paid for their contingent expenses in 
 one year, (1838,) the sum of $24,527 93 more than was paid for the same item in that body 
 during the whole four years of Mr. Adam’s Administration. 
 
 In document No 17, Mr. Woodbury states the amount paid in 1835, for tl 
 penses of the House of Representatives, at - 
 
 In document No. 39, he states the amount paid for the same item in 1825, at 
 
 Excess against the Administration in one year, - 
 
 In document No. 17, contingent expenses of the House for 1836, are stated at 
 In document No. 39, same item for 1826, - - - - - 
 
 Excess against the Administration, - - - - 
 
 In document No. 17, contingent expenses of the House for the year 1837 
 are stated at - -- -- -- - 
 
 In document No. 39, same item for 1827 - 
 
 Excess against the Administration, ------ 
 
 In document No. 17, contingent expenses of the House for the year 1838 are 
 stated at -------- 
 
 In document No. 39, same item for 1828, - - - - - 
 
 Excess against the Administration in one year, - - - - 
 
 In document No. 17, contingent expenses of the House for 1838 are stated at 
 In document No. 39, same item for 1825, 1826, 1827, and 1828, four years 
 together, stated at - -- -- -- 
 
 Excess, ------- 
 
 contingent 
 
 ex- 
 
 $199,950 
 
 00 
 
 54,500 
 
 00 
 
 $145,450 
 
 00 
 
 $200,000 
 
 00 
 
 59,000 
 
 00 
 
 $141,000 
 
 00 
 
 $225,000 
 
 00 
 
 90,735 
 
 12 
 
 $134,264 
 
 88 
 
 $373,960 
 
 00 
 
 80,000 
 
 00 
 
 $293,960 
 
 00 
 
 $373,960 
 
 00 
 
 284,235 
 
 12 
 
 $89,724 
 
 88 
 
 Again proving that, under Mr. Van Buren’s Administration, the House of Representatives, 
 with a majority of the friends of the President so large that they elected their Speaker (Mr. Polk) 
 on the first ballot, paid in one year, for their contingent expenses, the sum of $89,724 88 more 
 than was paid for the same item in that body throughout the entire four years of Mr. Adam’s 
 Administration 1 
 
29 
 
 In looking after some of the items of these contingent expenses, Mr. Bond said he turned his 
 atttention to the Official Register, commonly called the Blue Book, recently laid upon the tables 
 of members. This book is printed under the direction of the Secretary of State, and is designed 
 by Congress to afford correct official information to the people; but I am fearful it can be as little 
 relied on as the official documents from the Treasury Department. Indeed, I am now beginning 
 to suspect almost every official communication that comes to us. This Blue Book purports to 
 give information in matters connected with its contents, for the term of two years. In the item 
 of printing for Congress, say from October 1837, to October, 1839, the whole amount there stated 
 as paid to Blair and Rives, as printers to the Senate, is $19,591 80. ’ This is a gross error— 
 whether designed or inadvertent, is immaterial; it proves that this official volume, sent to us by 
 the Secretary of State, cannot be relied on. On referring to document No. 17 of this House at 
 the present session, it appears that $51,823 04 was paid for the printing of the Senate in 1838. 
 This sum, then, for one year of that very time included in the statement of the Blue Book, is 
 largely more than double the amount there stated as paid for a period of two years. How much 
 more than $51,000 w T as paid Blair and Rives during the time, I have not inquired ; probably near 
 another $50,000. But the sum, in an official document, is reduced down to $19,591 80, and 
 so goes forth to the country. However, even with this suppression, or error, if it be such, this 
 Blue Book contains a sufficient display of Executive patronage to call public attention to the 
 source of alarm. You may there see the numerous and large sums of money paid by Mr. Amos 
 Kendall, the chief of the Post Office Department, to the various newspaper publishers through 
 out the United States, who are daily advocating the cause of the Administration, by casting the 
 vilest calumny and grossest personal abuse upon every one who happens to question any of the 
 measures of Mr. Van Buren and his followers. Many instances could be designated, but I will 
 content myself by naming one in my own State, (Ohio.) This volume, no doubt, furnishes 
 similar instances in other States. The Blue Book exhibits different sums of money paid by Mr. 
 Kendall, in the course of the two years ending in October last, to Medary & Brothers, amount¬ 
 ing to very near ten thousand dollars. If I have made no error in the addition, the'exact sum is 
 $9,848 21. These individuals publish a paper called the Ohio Statesman, the leading Adminis¬ 
 tration journal in the State, in which, I will venture to assert, there is generally contained as 
 much vile calumny and personal abuse of the opponents of the Administration as can be printed 
 on the dirty sheet which they issue. They are paid both by the General Government and State 
 administration. How it happens that Mr. Kendall has so much work for printers at the seat of 
 Government in Ohio, I know not. But the publishers of the Statesman can perhaps tell. They 
 are in the enjoyment of this patronage, and more. The Administration party being in power in 
 Ohio the past winter conferred upon these same individuals, or on one of them, the office of 
 State printers, without reducing the price of the work, when, at the very moment, several re¬ 
 sponsible practical printers expressly offered to do the same work at rates varying from 15 to 20 
 per cent, less than then allowed the publishers of the Statesman. We have had a similar scene 
 in this House this session. The friends of the Administration, both here and in Ohio, suffered 
 an opportunity to escape by which large sums of money might have been saved ; and I am sure 
 that both our National and State Treasuries need relief. 
 
 Since retrenchment and reform seem not to be practised by Mr. Van Buren and his friends, 
 whatever may have been the professions of the party, let me inquire, what measure of relief is 
 proposed by them 1 The only one which I have heard of is the bill establishing a sub-Treasury. 
 And is this indeed a measure to heal our ills and relieve the wants of the people ? A measure 
 which has strangely united certain politicians, heretofore openly discordant and hostile ! We find 
 Mr. Van Buren recommends and Mr. Calhoun sustains it. Their political relations are too 
 well understood to require any illustration at my hands. Let us hear what the official organ 
 (the Globe) said of Mr. Calhoun when he was resisting Executive power. The article appears 
 in the Globe of the 30th January, 1834, and that paper speaks the Language of the Court. It 
 is in these words: 
 
 “ Ncllifier.— We have seen a caricature in which Mr. Calhoun is designated by a label 1 Nulla fide* It 
 points out an apt derivation for the party name with which he has distinguished his partisans. In plain English, it 
 would warn us that ‘ no trust' is to be reposed in the wearer of the label. Certainly no man ever nullified truth 
 with so little remorse as Mr. Calhoun. A thousand instances could be given; but a particular instance in which 
 he distinguished himself by an unusual pertinacity in pressing a statement which he knew to be untrue, will bo 
 given.” 
 
 The instance is then given, but the parties, now being friends, must decide upon its justice. 
 
 Again : In the Globe of the 31st of August, 1836, the following editorial remark is found, viz : 
 
 “ Mr. Calhoun, who never told the truth when a falsehood would serve his turn.” 
 
 Having thus shown what the Administration organ said of Mr. Calhoun, let us state the ac¬ 
 count per contra , and see what Mr. Calhoun said of Mr. Van Buren. In a debate which hap¬ 
 pened in the Senate, whilst Mr. Van Buren was its presiding officer, Mr. Calhoun said : 
 
 “General Jackson would soon be out of power, and the Administration that may succeed him could not keep the 
 South divided. He would tell the coming Administration to beware. If there be any who eamected the President’* 
 nominee (Mr. Van Buren) could successfully play the game which he has, ho would be wofully mistaken. With 
 
30 
 
 all his objections to the President, he (Mr. Calhoun) would not deny him many high qualities; he had courage and 
 tirmness ; was bold, warlike, audacious, though not true to his word or faithful to his pledges. He had, besides^, 
 done the State some service ; he terminated the late war gloriously at New Orleans, which has been remembered 
 greatly to his advantage. His nominee (Mr. Van Buren) had none of these recommendations; he is not of the 
 race of the lion or the tiger; he belonged to a lower order—the fox and the weazel; and it would be in vain to ex¬ 
 pect that he could command the respect or acquire the confidence of those who had so little admiration for the 
 qualities by which he was distinguished. By the dexterous use of patronage, for which he and his party were so 
 distinguished, an individual here and there, who preferred himself to the country, might be enlisted; but the great 
 mass—all that were independent and sound in the South—would be finally opposed to him and his-system.” 
 
 Mr. Bond said he thought there was a great deal of truth in this paragraph; and he would 
 leave it for others to say whether Mr. Calhoun had not himself furnished an illustration of his own 
 prophecy. I do not know (said he) what estimate Messrs. Van Buren and Calhoun intended 
 the public should place on their mutual illustrations of character, but it is now certain that 
 neither has taken any personal offence at what was said by the one or the other. It is under¬ 
 stood that “ Montague and Capulet have shook hands.” “Good Heavens! what sweet tempers 
 politicians have!” 
 
 The country, however, may well be alarmed; for out cf this union the sub-Treasury has 
 grown. It is not the first time that the union of discordant matter has produced a monster in 
 the world. 
 
 By means of this union we are to have the happy privilege of paying up all taxes and revenue 
 to the General Government in hard money ! And is this hard-money currency, which has op¬ 
 pressed the farmer, the mechanic, and the laborer of the old world wherever it has prevailed, 
 proposed for the people of this country in their daily and common transactions I Yes, sir, even 
 so; to this “complexion has it come at last.” Let the country hear Mr. Benton speak the 
 sentiments of the Administration on this subject, and submit. He says, “ Gold is the constitu- 
 “ tional national currency of the United States, and all attempts to substitute paper in its place 
 “ are unconstitutional and void.” At the same time he proclaimed that, “ After forty years of 
 “ wandering ih the wilderness of paper money, we have approached the confines of the consti- 
 “ tutional currency,” which he held to be gold. 
 
 Let us see (said Mr. Bond) what effect this hard-money system has on the wages of labor in 
 France, the nation whose currency Mr. Benton so much approves, and desires this country to 
 adopt. Recent works on the subject thus state the wages in France: 
 
 “ Wages in France. —Calais, common laborers 7 \d. per day, with board and without dwelling; Boulogne, od. 
 per day do. do.; Nantes, Qd. per day, without board and without dwelling; Marseilles, Ad. to 7d. per day, with 
 board and without dwelling. The food in some districts, ‘ consists in rye bread, soup made of'millet, cakes made of 
 Indian corn, none and then some salt provisions and vegetables ; rarely, if ever, butcher's meat’’ In others ‘ wheaten. 
 bread, soup made with vegetables, and a little grease'or lard twice "a day, potatoes or other vegetables, but seldom 
 butcher’s meat.’ n 
 
 And this same depressed state of labor pervades every other part of the known world in which, 
 a hard-money currency holds the sway. 
 
 To this I will add a passage, for which I am indebted to the instructive report prepared by the 
 worthy, accomplished, and intelligent gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Sergeant,) when a 
 member of the Committee of Ways and Means: 
 
 As to fluctuations in price, they were far greater in former times, when there was nothing deserving the name 
 of commerce, no credit, and a currency entirely of gold and silver, than they have since been. And they were in¬ 
 finitely more distressing; for they fell directly, and with all their weight, upon the necessaries of life. From a 
 table compiled by Mr. Jacob, in his ‘ Inquiry into the Production and Consumption of tho Precious Metals,’ it 
 appears that the variations in England were such as to produce intense suffering. In the 12th century, the price of 
 wheat varied from 2s. a quarter (money of that time) to 18s. 8 d. In the 13th century, it varied from Is. 6d. in 1213, 
 to 11. 4s. in 1257. In 1258, it rose to 21 .; ‘ a great famine,’ Jacob says, £ when many "people were starved.’ In 1270, 
 it rose to 4 1. 16c l .—‘a famine,’ it is added, ‘ when provisions were so scarce that parents did eat their own children,’ 
 and sometimes was sold at 6(. 8s. In 1288, it was down to Is. 6 d .; and in 1289, to Is. 4 d., and to Is. 8 d. In 1317, 
 it was at 21. 4s. before harvest, and after harvest at 14s. In 1557, before harvest, the price was 21. 13s. 4 d., and after 
 harvest 5s. Mr. Jacob very well remarks that ‘the instances of the variations in prices which are recorded in 
 former times will excite surprise in those readers who have not paid attention to the subject, and outrht to make us 
 all grateful to that Providence which has brought us into life in a period much less exposed to suffering than that 
 in which our forefathers lived.’ 
 
 “As commerce and credit have grown, the comforts of mankind have been in the same proportion increased. 
 Crime and disorder have diminished, and the condition of all classes of society lias been improved, but especially 
 of the laboring classes. And hence also the average duration of life is greater than it was by some years. A sum* 
 mary comparison, collected from various authors, may be found in McCulloch’s Statistics of the British Empire. 
 To suppose, then, that credit is an evil, and to suppose that a currency ent irely of gold and silver will be a security 
 against fluctuations, is a great mistake. To propose to legislate and to act upon such a supposition, is to advise a 
 retrograde movement towards barbarism and its hideous calamities. It cannot be necessary to argue against it. 
 We ought rather to feel grateful, as Mr. Jacob suggest, that we have come into life in so good a period, and endeavo 
 to preserve the blessings of civilization, commerce, and credit.” 
 
 And yet, with all the experience and practical illustration of history before us, it is seriously 
 proposed to legislate this nation into an exclusive hard-money currency, with all its “barbarism 
 and hideous calamities.” 
 
 Will the freemen of this country sleep at such a crisis? Vigilance—eternal vigilance—is the 
 price of liberty ! We were in the full enjoyment of national and individual welfare at the mo¬ 
 ment when the jealousies of the people were most unjustly excited against those who adminis¬ 
 tered our Government in 1828. At the instant when that same reformer, Mr. Buchanan, was 
 engaged in exciting those jealousies and suspicions, he admitted the country to be prosperous and 
 happy! 
 
31 
 
 He (Mr. Buchanan) spoke of the money which th*cn “flowed into the Treasury” without 
 burdening the people; and ho “admitted that the then Administration applied it correctly.” 
 But he said it was in just such times that the “ republic is always most in danger.” 
 
 “ It is,” said he. “ in the halcyon days of peace and prosperity, when the jealousy of the people slumbers, that 
 abuses are most likely to steal' into the Administration of your Government. When the clouds of adversity am 
 lowering over the country, and when direct taxation becomes necessary for the support of the Government, tho 
 People are watchful and jealous, and will then attend strictly to their own concerns.” 
 
 Having warned the people not to delay their measures of reform in those their “halcyon days 
 of peace and prosperity,” he said : 
 
 “ I thank Heaven that in these days a ; military chieftan’ has arisen, whose name is familiar to the lips of even 
 the most humble citized of this country, because his services live in their hearts, who will be able, by the suffrages 
 of the People, to wrest the power of this Government from the hands of its present possessors. No one else could 
 at this time have successfully opposed the immense patronage and power of the Administration.” 
 
 By these persuasions of Mr. Buchanan, and others combined with him, the people did “wrest 
 the power of the Government from the hands of its (then) present possessors,” and tho “mili¬ 
 tary chieftain” alluded to was made President. But Mr. Van Buren became and continued his 
 chief counsellor. And what have wc realized ? “It is the maxim of despots that the people 
 “ should never inquire into the concerns of the Government. Those who have enslaved man- 
 “ kind, from Caesar to Bonaparte, have always endeavored, by presenting them with amuse- 
 “ ments, and by every other means in their power, to attract the attention of the people from 
 “ the conduct of their rulers.” 
 
 The money no longer “ flow's into our Treasury “ the jealousy of the people has slumber¬ 
 ed and at such a time “abuses are most likely to steal into the administration of your Gov¬ 
 ernment.” “The halcyon days of our peace and prosperity have past.” “ The clouds of ad¬ 
 versity are lowering over the country,” and Treasury notes are called for to avoid “ direct taxa¬ 
 tion for the support of the Government.” But, sir, in the day of adversity “the people con¬ 
 sider.” At such a season they are “ watchful and jealous, and will then attend strictly to their 
 own concerns.” And “I thank Heaven that in these days” another “military chieftain has 
 arisen,” prudent in Counsel and firm in purpose, who, to great, perilous, devoted, and patriotic 
 services in war, adds signal practical experience in the business of civil government; one 
 “ whose name is familiar to the lips of the most humble citizen of this country, because his ser- 
 “ vices live in their hearts, and who will be able, by the suffrages of the people, to wrest the 
 “ power of this Government from the hands of its present possessors. No one else could, at 
 “ this time, have successfully opposed the immense patronage and power of this Administra- 
 “ tion.”