LIBRARY OF THE 
 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 
 AT URBANA-CHAMPAICN 
 
 355.09415 
 
 K22c 
 
 1860 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2017 with funding from 
 
 University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign Alternates 
 
 https://archive.org/details/ondefenceofirela00keat_2 
 
ON THE 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
NOTICE, 
 
 The Irish National Publishing Association Limited being 
 a Company founded on purely commercial principles, the Directors 
 desire it to be distinctly understood that they are not accountable 
 for, and the Association disclaims all connection with, any opinions 
 which may be expressed in any particular woik of which they are 
 made the medium of publication by the author or proprietor. 
 
ON THE 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND; 
 
 INCLUDING 
 
 OBSERVATIONS ON SOME OTHER SUBJECTS 
 CONNECTED THEREWITH. 
 
 BY THE LATE 
 
 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY SHEEHY KEATING, K.C.B. 
 
 [then (1795) LIEUTENANT KEATING.] 
 
 WITH NOTES, AND AN 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 ON CERTAIN MILITARY PRINCIPLES USEETTL FOR THE 
 BETTER UNDERSTANDING OE THE TEXT ; 
 
 TOGETHER WITH 
 
 A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE AUTHOR. 
 
 DUBLIN: 
 
 PUBLISHED BY THE IRISH NATIONAL PUBLISHING 
 ASSOCIATION LIMITED. 
 
 [Reprinted from the original Pamphlet printed by J. Byrne, 108 
 Grafton-street, 3795.] 
 
 1860 . 
 
Si Saraceni , mjuriis fatigati, ab eis ( Siculis ) cceperint dissidere , et 
 castelias forte maritime, vel montanas munitiones occupaverent; ut 
 hinc cum Theutonicis summa virtute pngnandum. Illinc Saracenis 
 crebris insultibus occurrendum, quid putas acturi sunt inter has de- 
 pressi angustias, et velut inter malleum et incudem constitutif 
 
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 EDITOR’S PREFACE; 
 
 (CONTAINING A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE AUTHOR.) 
 
 The Pamphlet now reprinted was first published in the year 
 1795. It attracted at the time no little attention ; and it has ever 
 since been regarded with so much interest that copies of it have 
 long been much sought after, not only by collectors of rare pam¬ 
 phlets, but by the thinking portion of the public in Ireland in 
 general. It is reprinted here, word for word,—except the Second 
 Chapter, (see p. 9,) which would be totally uninteresting to the 
 modern reader, because the observations of which it entirely con¬ 
 sists are all of them only applicable to the material circumstances 
 of a past generation, and wholly inapplicable to those of the 
 present time. An Appendix has been added, (p. 101,) containing 
 full and it is hoped simple explanations of the various Military 
 Principles alluded to in the text, and of terms which without ex¬ 
 planation would probably be found unintelligible by the unpro¬ 
 fessional reader ; and at the end of this Appendix an Additional 
 Note will be found, (p. 136,) taken from the works of the late 
 illustrious General Sir Charles J. Napier, G.C.B., containing 
 much valuable criticism and many practical observations upon 
 the same interesting subject. 
 
 Concerning the life and career of the Author of the Pamphlet, 
 the present Editor has been favoured with a Memorandum by 
 one of the most distinguished authorities upon Irish Military 
 History, the well-known author of the “ Green Book,”* and 
 Editor (for the Archaeological Society) of Col. O’Kelly’s “ Ma- 
 
 * “ The Green Book; or Gleanings from the Writing-Desk of a 
 Literary Agitator.” By John Cornelius O’Callaghan. Dublin : 
 T. O’Gorman; 1841; (480 pp.) [A Second Edition (greatly improved) 
 was published, in 1844, by Mr. James Duffy, Wellington Quay.] 
 
 — 
 
VI. 
 
 editor’s preface. 
 
 carise Excidium,”*—John Cornelius O’Callaghan, Esq.,—to the 
 completion of whose long expected “ History of the Irish Brigade” 
 the public of Ireland look forward with so much interest. Some 
 of the dates recorded, will perhaps excite surprise, when it is 
 remembered, that at the beginning of the present century, the su¬ 
 perior ranks of the British Army were closed to the Catholic sol¬ 
 dier,—and General Keating was a Catholic. It is an interesting 
 fact, that he was the first Catholic who rose to command in that 
 Army for many generations; and he did so, it is said, in conse¬ 
 quence of a mistake on the part of the Government of the day as 
 to the religion of the hero, whom they hastily promoted, on occa¬ 
 sion of extraordinary services in the East as they would have 
 promoted a Protestant officer, only discovering when it was too 
 late (for a formal announcement in Parliament could not well be 
 retracted) that he did not belong to the favoured persuasion. 
 
 The late Sir Henry Sheehy Keating, K.C.B., entered the 
 English Army, as an Ensign, in 1793, his first commission bearing 
 date Aug. 31, in that year. The dates of his subsequent promo¬ 
 tions and appointments are as follows : Lieutenant, Jan. 3,1794 ; 
 Captain, Sept. 8,1796 ; Major, Sept. 3, 1800 ; Lieutenant-Colonel, 
 Aug. 1, 1804; Colonel, June 4, 1813; Major-General, Aug. 12, 
 1819; Lieutenant-General, Jan. 10, 1837. He was named a 
 Knight Commander of the Bath in 1836; and on April 4,1845, he 
 was appointed to the Colonelcy of the 33d Foot. He died at 
 Cheltenham, in England, Sept. 12, 1847, at the age of 70. 
 
 Of General Keating’s services (to the English Crown) Mr. 
 O’Callaghan’s Memorandum notes the following : he was sent 
 with the expedition under Sir Charles Grey to the West Indies, 
 shortly after he entered the army ; he landed at Martinique early 
 in 1794 ; he was present at the affair of La Trinity, at the attack 
 of Mont Pouge, and at Mont Calabasse, where his sword-arm was 
 broken by a musket-shot; and he was also engaged at the defence 
 of Berville Camp, when, his skull being fractured by a shell, he 
 was made prisoner; he was kept on board a French prison-ship for 
 eighteen months, and he was three months afterwards still a close 
 
 * u Macarice Excidium , or The Destruction of‘ Cyprus being a 
 Secret History of the War of the Revolution in Ireland, (1688-1891); 
 by Colonel Charles O’Kelly.’’ Edited, from four English copies, 
 and a Latin MS. in the Royal Irish Academy,—with Notes, Illustra¬ 
 tions, and a Memoir of the Author and his descendants,—by John 
 Cornelius O’Callaghan. Dublin: For the Irish Archaeological So¬ 
 ciety, 1850; (556 pp.). 
 
editor’s preface. 
 
 Vll. 
 
 prisoner at Rochelle. In 1807, when a Lieutenant-Colonel, he 
 went to the East Indies. In 1809 he, with Commodore Rowley, 
 planned the attack upon and succeeded in the capture of the town 
 and shipping of Saint Paul’s, in the Island of Bourbon. In 1810, 
 in command of 5,000 men, he conquered that island, reducing the 
 garrison to be prisoners of war, and making himself master of 
 their arms, ammunition, and materiel. He afterwards commanded 
 the advance of the army in an attack upon the Isle of France 
 (Mauritius), and was wounded in the arm by a sword-thrust. For 
 his services in that part of the East the East India Company pre¬ 
 sented him with a piece of plate of the value of five hundred 
 guineas. 
 
 The Editor is further informed by Mr. O’Callaghan, that he be¬ 
 lieves Sir Henry Keating was married to a sister of the Right Rev. 
 Dr. Singer, (formerly S.F.T.C.D., and afterwards Protestant 
 Bishop of Meath), by whom he had one or two sons ;—that one of 
 Sir Henry’s sisters, married to the late Commissioner Therry, 
 was the mother of the present Hon. Roger Therry, late Chief 
 Justice of Sidney;—and that another sister, named Theodosia, was 
 in 1790 at the same school with Mr. O’Callaghan’smother, in Cork 
 Convent. Mr. O’Callaghan adds, that the late Roger Sheehy 
 Keating, who was married to a sister of Lady Kenmare, was an 
 elder brother of General Sir Henry Keating. 
 
AUTHOR’S ADYERTISEMENT; 
 
 TO THE READER. 
 
 The Author is sensible that the following sheets require more 
 correction than it has been in his power to bestow on them. The 
 observations they contain might have been arranged more metho¬ 
 dically, and deduced more coherently. Strongly impressed with 
 the perilous situation of the country, [1794,] and in the habit of 
 meditating on the train and vicissitude of human events, he is 
 convinced that there is nothing possible which may not be appre¬ 
 hended. It does not seem bad reasoning to say, that whatever 
 has happened elsewhere similar causes may produce here ; and it 
 does not appear bad sense to neglect seriously how we would act, 
 were such things to occur here as have happened elsewhere. * 
 
 In this slight sketch there are, at any rate, no wanderings of 
 imagination, no abstract theories, no inapplicable speculations? 
 none of these theoretical reveries, specious in the closet, but im¬ 
 practicable in application. There is no opinion which is not war¬ 
 ranted by fact, or by authority ; nor any inference which analogy 
 will not justify. 
 
 Time will shew whether the man who palliates and conceals 
 the imminence of danger, or he who probes the wound, and arouses 
 to the true sense of it, is the real friend of his country. 
 
 * [The Author does not say from what point of view he intends the 
 reader to regard the subjects proposed for reflection. His observa¬ 
 tions are quite general. They will be found tor the most part very 
 true,—in a sense very different from that of an English officer.] 
 
AUTHOR’S PREFACE, 
 
 The military situation of Ireland is little understood ; yet from 
 local circumstances, as well as the extraordinary turn human 
 affairs have taken within the last six years, [1789-95,*] it is likely 
 to become the scene of important transactions. Its situation be¬ 
 tween the old and new worlds, its fine harbours, and the number of 
 inhabitants which the fertility of its soil and its insular situation 
 have enabled it to maintain, have caused it notwithstanding the 
 misfortunes it has laboured under for five centuries past, to ad¬ 
 vance with rapid strides towards its proper station in the scale of 
 nations [ i.e ., between 1782 and 1794] ; yet it is little known to its 
 own inhabitants, and too little to its close allyf and sister J 
 Kingdom. It is hoped that ah humble endeavour to make both 
 better acquainted with it will, if successful, be attended with 
 mutual advantages §. 
 
 Ireland has seldom been inspected by a military eye. Those of 
 its natives who aim at the profession go where their hopes and 
 ambition have a greater field ; and the British military service is 
 not exactly calculated to encourage application or study,—for we 
 see too many instances where after an officer has devoted his life 
 
 [Shall we say, also, 1854-60 ?] f [•] t [I I] § V I 0 
 
X. 
 
 AUTHOR*S PREFACE. 
 
 (the best part of it) thereto, he finds the utmost to which he can 
 extend his hopes is : permission to retire ; that it is not in the 
 field or the closet, hut at the levee, that he ought to have employed 
 his time ; and that his application to his science has been thrown 
 away in acquiring knowledge, of which, when acquired, there is 
 no one capable of judging, and which must, therefore, in all pro¬ 
 bability remain locked up in his breast for ever. 
 
 The only real military work wrote in the English language [up 
 to 1795] is by General Lloyd. His two volumes, particularly his 
 second, contain ideas that can never be too much resolved in a 
 military man’s mind. In this light they are considered by the 
 officers of science on the continent; they prove the extent of his 
 genius. What little more has been written in English is merely 
 compilation, some of which is selected with tolerable judgment 
 from the only good school, the Prussian; the rest consists of 
 puerilities, which nothing but the gross ignorance of the [English] 
 nation in everything that regards that profession could have 
 enabled to pay for paper and printing. 
 
 However, such as they are, by dint of great names, lofty deduc¬ 
 tions, and long lists of subscribers, they contrive to hold their 
 station upon the shelves of every man who wishes to hold himself 
 forth in the light of a martinet. 
 
 The yagers, or gamekeepers, of the Austrian gentry are in time 
 of war formed into corps receiving double pay. Each corps, in 
 the Seven Years’ War, consisted of about two hundred. The 
 utility of them must be obvious. They were all men of approved 
 fidelity, and excellent marksmen; but the principal advantage 
 derived from them was that they could not be placed in a spot of 
 the German Empire with which at least some of them were not 
 intimately acquainted. Every mountain, defile, river, and pass 
 they had a thorough knowledge of, and therefore could approach 
 
author’s preface. 
 
 XI. 
 
 nearer the enemy, and watch his motions more closely and more 
 safely, than any other corps of light troops whatever. 
 
 Of these corps, during the Seven Years’ War, one was com¬ 
 manded by Lloyd, the other by a most able officer, Edward Count 
 Dalton, who served, as did several more of his family, the House 
 of Austria, for many years, with equal advantage to it and credit 
 to themselves. He finished his honourable career by a cannon 
 shot at Dunkirk. 
 
 So much has been said of General Lloyd prefatory to the intro¬ 
 duction of certain observations quoted from his writings, part of 
 which the event has proved prophetical; what has not yet been 
 proved so it is to be hoped wise measures and foresight will fur¬ 
 nish the means of contradicting. 
 
 After describing the general strength of the French frontier, 
 speaking of that part from Sedan to Dunkirk, he says: It has 
 been the scene of successive wars for nearly two centuries; the 
 most expensive, bloody, and durable of any recorded in the annals 
 of mankind. 
 
 This line is stronger by art than by nature, having a prodigious 
 number of strong fortresses and posts on it; moreover it projects 
 in many places, so that an enemy can enter it nowhere without 
 having some of them iu front and on his flanks. His depots must 
 be at Namur, Mons, and Toumay. An army of 40,000 men, and 
 another of equal force about Conde, will so bridle his operations 
 that he cannot advance a step without imminent danger ; for that 
 which we suppose on the Sombre, by masking Namur, penetrates 
 into the country of Brussels, &c., which will force the enemy to 
 retire and abandon his own frontier. In the present state of Aus¬ 
 trian Flanders, \1780,) [when Lloyd wrote], and the adjacent 
 parts of Holland, nothing could prevent the two armies from 
 overrunning the above-mentioned countries in one campaign. 
 
authoe’s peeface. 
 
 xii. 
 
 Yol. II., p. 181, Lloyd says: When the combined fleet ap¬ 
 peared on onr coast, the [English] nation, unaccustomed to see an 
 enemy so near, seemed much alarmed. I then thought it my duty 
 to examine the possible results of an invasion, and pointed out the 
 means of defeating it, (which he indeed eventually did;) deter¬ 
 mined and fixed the lines on which the enemy must have acted, 
 had he landed, and the different positions the English army must 
 have occupied on such lines, to prevent him from advancing into 
 the country, or keeping the post he had taken on our coast. 
 
 Yol. II., p. 118, speaking of Rome, he says: After the expul¬ 
 sion of their Kings it became a democracy , and every citizen voas 
 bred and trained a soldier ; it was the only trade; the time not 
 employed in war was given to agriculture ; the chief occupation 
 was war. Necessity first made that republic purely military . The 
 right was in the people, but the power really in the Senate. The 
 Senate, far from desisting from encroaching on the people, became 
 daily more wanton in their oppressions. To secure their usurpa¬ 
 tions the most proper method was to engage the people in Con¬ 
 tinental wars, and thus keep numbers of them at a distance. The 
 virtue and prowess of the soldier exalted the condition of the 
 citizen; no human reward was refused to great military merit 
 with that knowledge, the fruit of ages, and with every motive 
 which can excite a man to the vigorous exertion of his forces, 
 such a people must necessarily become finally superior to every other 
 people placed in different circumstances. This difference alone 
 rendered Rome, a military republic, superior to Carthage, a com¬ 
 mercial one. * The first species of republics must probably fall by 
 the hands of a citizen ; the last by those of a foreigner. 
 
 * [Was Keating’s object to suggest France as the Rome, and 
 England the Carthage, of the modern world ? It is worth thinking 
 of I ] 
 
ATJTHOb’s peeface. 
 
 xiii. 
 
 P. 115, he says : Carthage was often involved in wars on ac¬ 
 count of its distant settlements. Their armies were sufficient 
 against the people they contended with, when their operations 
 were confined to their islands and the coast, because their fleets 
 could co-operate with success; and had they carried their views 
 no farther, they might probably have existed many ages longer. 
 But long and distant wars, supported only by money and merce¬ 
 naries, brought on necessarily their distress and final destruction. 
 
 P. 117, speaking of a confederate army, he says: The views of 
 the different parties seldom coincide in the various points which 
 occur in a long and extensive war. When opposed to such an army, 
 temporize, use insinuations and seductions, some one or other of 
 the parties will grow tired, and fall under temptation;—or attack 
 vigorously the dominions of one of the members; this will create 
 a powerful diversion, and his defection will probably break the 
 confederacy. 
 
 If anything in the following pages can tend to convince the 
 people of these countries of their alarming situation, of the danger 
 of the enemy they are now [1795] at war with, and of the necessity 
 of a general exertion of the whole people, and that they [i.e., the 
 British] can place no reliance on foreign succour [against France], 
 the view with which they are written will be fulfilled. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Page. 
 
 EDITOR’S PREFACE; (containing a short Account of 
 
 the Author). .. .. .. .. v. 
 
 AUTHOR’S ADVERTISEMENT, To the Reader... viii. 
 AUTHOR’S PREFACE. .. .. .. x. 
 
 Chaptee I.—Of the face of the country.—Coasts.—Har¬ 
 bours.—Landing places.—Inhabitants.—Towns. 
 
 —Natural and artificial strength. .. .. 1 
 
 Chaptee II.—Of the probability of an attack by the 
 French.—In what part they would most probably 
 make it.—On the likelihood of success or failure. 
 
 —With what force. .. .. .. 9 
 
 Chaptee VI.—On an Armed Yeomanry.—Cavalry.—And 
 Chaptee III.—Of the form of debarkation—And where 
 
 it is or is not to he apprehended. .. 11 
 
 Chaptee TV.—Of the best method of opposing a disem¬ 
 barkation. .. .. .. .. 14 
 
 Chaptee V.—Campaigns of Schomberg, William III., and 
 
 Ginkle, in Ireland. .. .. .. 17 
 
 [Note.—O n the numbers, at each side, engaged at the 
 
 Battle of Aughrim.] .. .. .. 34 
 
 Free Corps of Infantry. .. .. 35 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 XY. 
 
 Chapter VII.—System of Defence by Cordons. .. 48 
 
 Chapter VIII.—Another Plan. .. .. 63 
 
 Chapter IX.—On Camps. — Positions. — And Inunda¬ 
 tions. .. .. .. .. .. 65 
 
 Chapter X.—Duty of Officers. .. .. .. 74 
 
 Chapter XI.—On the internal situation of the country. 77 
 
 Chapter XII.—On Frontiers in general.—On Descents, 
 
 and Passage of Rivers. .. .. .. 87 
 
 Chapter XIII.—On the present state of Defence of the 
 Country.—The force, and probable distribution of 
 it.—And on the expenses and necessities of the 
 
 Campaign. .. .. .. ., 91 
 
 Chapter XIV.—Finances.—Taxes.—Revenues. .. 94 
 
 Chapter XV.—Miscellaneous Observations. .. 97 
 
 APPENDIX.—[Note on certain Military Principles, 
 useful for the better understanding of Gen. 
 
 Keating’s Treatise. .. .. .. 101 
 
 I.— Strategy. —§ 1.—General considerations. .. 101 
 
 § 2.—The Base of Operations. .. .. .. 102 
 
 § 3.—The Object of Operations. .. .. .. 103 
 
 § 4.—Strategic Points. .. .. .. .. 103 
 
 §5.—Decisive Points. .. .. .. .. 104 
 
 § 6.—The Front of Operations. .. .. .. 104 
 
 § 7.—Lines of Operations. ♦. .. .. .. 104 
 
 §8.—Lines of Communications. .. .. 105 
 
 § 9.— Marches. .. .. .. .. .. 106 
 
 § 10.—Of Diversions. .. .. .. .. 106 
 
 §11.—Of the Passage of Rivers. .. .. 106 
 
 § 12.—Of Entrenched Camps. ., .. .. 108 
 
xvi. 
 
 CONTEXTS. 
 
 § 13.—Of Fortresses. 
 
 § 14.—Of Magazines. 
 
 §15.—Of Cantonments. 
 
 §16.—Of Retreats. .. 
 
 § 17.—Of Descents. 
 
 § 18.—Of the Defence of Coasts. 
 
 II. — Tactics.— § 19.—General considerations on Tactics. 
 
 § 20.—Of Defensive Battles. 
 
 §21.—Of Offensive Battles. .. .. ,. 
 
 § 22.—Of Unexpected Battles. 
 
 §23.—Of Mountain Warfare. 
 
 § 24.—Formation of Troops. .. 
 
 § 25.—Of the Dispositions peculiar to the different Arms. 
 (1.)—Infantry. 
 
 (2.)—Cavalry. .. .. 
 
 (3.)— Artillery. 
 
 III. — Marches.—Man(euvres.—§ 26.—Of Front Marches. 
 §27.—Of Marches in Retreat. 
 
 § 28.—Of Flank Marches. .. 
 
 § 29.—Of Retreats. 
 
 § 30.—Of Defiles. .. 
 
 §31.—Of Wood-Fighting. .. 
 
 ADDITIONAL NOTE ; (from the Works of the late Gen. 
 Sir C. J. Napier). .. 
 
 Popular Wars. 
 
 Commanders. 
 
 Commanders of a Regiment. 
 
 Order of Battle. .. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 [On “Physical Force/’] 
 
 PAGE 
 
 108 
 
 110 
 
 110 
 
 111 
 
 111 
 
 112 . 
 
 113 
 
 113 
 
 114 
 117 
 
 117 
 
 118 
 120 
 120 
 123 
 125 
 
 130 
 
 131 
 
 132 
 
 133 
 
 134 
 
 135 
 
 136 
 
 136 
 
 137 
 
 140 
 
 141 
 
 142 
 144 
 
ON THE 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 CEAPTEE I. 
 
 OF ITS IMPORTANCE, &c. 
 
 ©F THE FACE OF THE COIJNTEY-COASTS-HAEBOTJES— 
 
 LANDING PLACES—INHABITANTS—TOWNS—NATURAL AND 
 AETIFICIAL STRENGTH* 
 
 Ireland, situated at the extremity of the old world, has 
 for some centuries back, been hardly known to it, farther 
 than appearing an unimportant spot in the map of Europe. 
 Yet this small spot is probably more essential, not merely 
 to the consequence, but to the very existence of Eng¬ 
 land, (1) than all those exterior possessions, to retain or 
 
 (1) [“ essential . . . to the very existence of England ”—This was 
 a favourite theory, or rather a favourite statement, current among the 
 Anglo-Irish at the time of the publication of this pamphlet. It is 
 now, however, no longer a matter of question, even among the most 
 careless thinkers on the subject, that while on the one hand Ireland 
 once set at liberty would be quite strong enough of herself to preserve 
 
2 
 
 DEFENCE OF IBELAKD. 
 
 acquire which, she has been lavishing her blood and 
 treasure, and accumulating debt upon her landed property 
 for this century past. Extraordinary as it may appear, 
 with all the advantages the island in question possesses, 
 the benefits which England appears to have endeavoured 
 to derive from her have been merely negative. It seems 
 as if the object of the sister kingdom had been not to derive 
 good , but to prevent the possibility of rivalship ( 2 );— 
 witness the restrictions on her trade, taken off a few years 
 ago (3)*. 
 
 But if England thinks it necessary for her, as she ever 
 must, to maintain a navy for the defence, not only of her 
 exterior possessions, hut also of her own coast, the situa¬ 
 tion of Ireland points it out for the place of arms. (4) 
 
 her independence, on the other hand the separation of Ireland from 
 England conld by no means of itself cause the ruin of a state whose 
 wealth is certainly hut little increased in proportion even by all it 
 is able to drain from this country, and whose strength and station in 
 the world have long been probably rather lowered than exalted by 
 the connection.] 
 
 (2) [“ to prevent the possibility of rivalship.” —The whole of the 
 history of the last century proves the truth of this observation ; and 
 every one who has watched the course of English legislation and ad¬ 
 ministration in the affairs of trade and commerce as well as of mere 
 politics down to the present day, must perceive that the same prin¬ 
 ciple has still continued to govern the counsels of our masters. The 
 notorious history of the efforts of Ireland for so many years to pro¬ 
 cure the establishment of an Atlantic Mail Packet Station on her 
 western or southern coasts, and the attitude of her government even 
 to-day with respect to the Galway enterprise, may be named as 
 affording the latest examples of the fact.] 
 
 * Those restrictions were of no benefit to England, though ruinous to 
 Ireland. One or two trading towns, indeed, derived some trifling 
 advantage, but by no means such as to make it a national concern. 
 — Author's Note. 
 
 (3) [“ a few years ago.” —That is in 1782-3.] 
 
 (4) [“ the situation of Ireland points it out for the place of arms.” 
 —Had Ireland become, or were she ever destined to become, a West- 
 Britain, in imitation of Scotland, this observation would be unde- 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 3 
 
 The westerly and south-westerly winds which pre¬ 
 vail in these latitudes for nine months in the year, are 
 an insuperable disadvantage to England as a naval power; 
 and from the port of Brest, by its situation on the At¬ 
 lantic, a blow can be given to England before her fleet 
 could get out of the Channel. (5) But Cork possesses the 
 same advantages over Brest which Brest does over Ply¬ 
 mouth, not to mention the many other fine harbours on 
 our coast, whose names are hardly known out of Ireland. 
 
 Perhaps the importance of Ireland to the sister kingdom 
 will never be felt, unless it falls into the hands of an 
 enemy. (6) Should that ever be the case, the possession 
 of it would empower that enemy, from its south-western 
 and northern points, effectually to cripple the naval and 
 commercial exertions of England, and in consequence re¬ 
 duce her to as insignificant a state as the island of Sar- 
 
 niably true. But England has never allowed herself to be persuaded 
 to establish in Ireland a naval station or an arsenal, nor will she 
 do so.] 
 
 (5) [before her fleet could get out of the Channel —The force of 
 this remark is no longer of course so great, since the application of 
 steam power on so great a scale to ships of war. It is however even 
 yet to a certain extent true, and will probably continue to be so for 
 many years to come at least. Cork does still possess a great advan¬ 
 tage over Brest, and Brest over Plymouth, in a nautical point of 
 view; and Cherbourg, the greatest station of all, has since the au¬ 
 thor’s time grown gradually to fulfil even in these days of steam all 
 the conditions he imagined for Brest alone.] 
 
 (6) [unless it falls into the hands of an enemy.” —That is of course 
 an enemy to England. Mr. Keating did not perhaps think it pru¬ 
 dent, in 1795, to suggest the probability of Ireland’s existence as a 
 state neither French nor English, in which case there is no reason to 
 suppose that her harbours should be put to the sole use of those in¬ 
 to ested in destroying the trade of England. In the hands of such 
 an enemy of England as France was during the last great war, for 
 example, it is however true enough that these harbours might easily 
 (and now as easily as then) be turned to account to the utter ruin of, 
 not indeed of England as a state, but of the supremacy of England 
 on the ocean.] 
 
4 
 
 DEFENCE OF FREE AND. 
 
 dinia in the scale of European powers. In fact, if s 
 great naval power ever cultivates the advantages of Ire¬ 
 land to the utmost, that will alone insure her dictating t® 
 all the rest of Europe on the ocean. (7) 
 
 Eut we must likewise throw into the scale the great 
 supplies which this country affords to a naval power. 
 Except the article of timber, she has, or may have, every 
 other. In the article of provisions, the fertility of her 
 soil and mildness of her climate give her a decided ad¬ 
 vantage over any other country in the universe. Her 
 ports are never frozen up, as is the case in the north of 
 Europe and America; and she has none of those tedious 
 and dangerous channel navigations which all the other 
 nations of Europe, Erance and Spain only excepted, are 
 obliged to undergo. 
 
 Should Ireland by the misfortune of war fall into the 
 power of any foreign country, the separation from Eng¬ 
 land would be felt and deplored; their situations and 
 mutual wants are such as no substitute could be found 
 for (8). The linen trade which constitutes the wealth 
 of half the kingdom, and coals, so essential to our manu- 
 
 (7) [“ dictating to all the rest of Europe on the ocean ”—But Ire¬ 
 land as an independent country could not enjoy this power, nor 
 would she ever need it. If Keating’s observation he correct, then it 
 would hut follow that in the interests of France and England together 
 both ought to see that Ireland be an independent state.] 
 
 (8.) [“ such as no substitute could be foundfor. . . . A conquest 
 of Ireland . . . woidd be the greatest misfortune that could befall this 
 island .”—In the whole of this paragraph Keating appears to have 
 intended to convey but a little humorous irony. It is needless to 
 remark that we are by no means naturally so dependent on England 
 as here suggested; and the history of the last half century has 
 abundantly proved whether “ separation from England,” even at the 
 hands of “ a foreign enemy [of England],” would not at any time have 
 been, and have been felt by the great majority of the nation, rather 
 a boon from heaven than a u misfortune” in any point of view what¬ 
 ever. Of course the question is now one of a purely speculative 
 character merely.] 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 5 
 
 factures, would be for ever lost to us; for hitherto there 
 has been no reason to believe the island contains any 
 adequate supply within itself. The two most obvious 
 articles among those necessary to this country are here 
 specified. The detail might be much enlarged, but as it 
 is not at all the object of this publication to consider any 
 point not immediately connected with the military situa¬ 
 tion of the kingdom, no farther deduction shall be drawn 
 from the foregoing premises than, that a conquest of Ire¬ 
 land, and consequent separation from England, by a 
 foreign enemy, would be the greatest misfortune that 
 could befal this island. (8) 
 
 The surface of Ireland presents a great tract of fertile 
 land, in all its variations of pasture and tillage; but over 
 this are interspersed great tracts of mountain. The flat 
 and fertile lands are interspersed with great tracts of bog, 
 of which most are passable in some parts to infantry, but 
 not to cavalry or to artillery; a difficulty which is however 
 compensated, in the infinity of most excellent roads, run¬ 
 ning in all directions to and from the coast to the capital, 
 as well as cross roads, intersecting them in every point. 
 Lakes and chains of rapids are another leading feature in 
 the face of Ireland, and though the rivers are not large, yet 
 as the banks are strong and afford good positions, or if 
 not strong by elevation, are boggy, they are all of conse¬ 
 quence in a military view. Eut the great object in the 
 map of Ireland is the Shannon. This great chain of 
 lakes cuts off an entire province from the rest of Ireland, 
 and may be classed with the Elbe, and almost with the 
 Ehine, whose hanks furnish so many important events in 
 the military history of Europe. (9) 
 
 (9) [“cuts off an entire 'province .” — Certainly no longer, in a 
 military point of view, at least in case of armies provided w ith the 
 usual military equipments of modern times. Nevertheless the 
 Shannon is of course an important military feature; and in some 
 
6 
 
 DEFENCE OF IUEIAND. 
 
 The northern parts, and southwestern point, are the 
 most mountainous, the others the most fertile parts of the 
 island; these last produce that redundance of provisions 
 which we export to other countries with so much profit 
 to ourselves (10); and of course it is from these only 
 that an army, friendly or hostile, can expect to draw 
 subsistence. 
 
 Ireland has no woods; its fuel in the interior parts is 
 entirely turf, and therefore it is necessary that an army 
 should be prepared to make use of that fuel, or so provide 
 itself as not to stand in need of any, during the time of 
 its absence from its magazines. 
 
 The coasts of Ireland are in general bold, All the 
 western, north-western, and southwestern parts have fine 
 harbours, (those in the Channel are not so good) the west 
 and south-westerly winds prevail on those coasts, and the 
 tide rises everywhere to a considerable height. The coast 
 counties are in general thinly peopled, producing consider¬ 
 able quantities of cattle, but not having many mills or 
 stores, where any quantity of grain is laid up at a time, 
 more than necessary for the actual residents from one year to 
 another.*' Therefore, if an enemy landed on those coasts, 
 he w^ould be obliged to subsist from the sea until he was 
 able to penetrate into the interior of the country. Trom 
 the indentations of the coasts, they of course afford an 
 enemy positions; their coasts are generally less inclosed 
 than the interior of the country, the face of which is 
 divided into squares of larger or smaller size, by mounds 
 
 places, and at some periods of the year, it will perhaps hear out 
 General Keating’s e'ulogium even to-day.] 
 
 * As there is a considerable export, there certainly are stores at 
 the sea ports. This observation must therefore not be taken in a 
 strict, but a relative or comparative sense.— Author's Note. [In any 
 sense it is less true now, and becoming daily less and less so.] 
 
 (10) [ u with so much projit to ourselves .”—Irony again!] 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 7 
 
 of earth, a defence against any arms but artillery, and 
 which literally make every field a redoubt: and this descrip¬ 
 tion extends to all the cultivated part of the kingdom. 
 
 Its principal harbours are Cork, Eantry, [the Shannon] 
 Galway, and Lough Foyle, but the landing places are in¬ 
 numerable. These harbours have bold shores, but as the 
 tide rises so high there is always also a considerable extent 
 of beach. 
 
 The inhabitants of Ireland consist of those resident in 
 the great towns; tradesmen and manufacturers, who re¬ 
 side in dispersed cottages, in the parts of the island where 
 the linen trade is carried on; and farmers and their 
 labourers in the other parts.*' The men of property, 
 clergy and gentry, are much thinner dispersed through the 
 country than in England; or, compared to the popula¬ 
 tion, are in Scotland; and being at no pains to acquire 
 it, are possessed of very little influence over the pea¬ 
 santry. The towns are in general poor, of no natural 
 
 * Of these, the people of the lower orders in the north are of a 
 military turn, capable of being immediately formed into excellent 
 soldiers. Those of the rest of the kingdom are utterly devoid of 
 military spirit, depressed by poverty, except when they are goaded 
 to some act of desperation ; hut still capable of being made to fight 
 in defence of their homes and families, to which they are strongly 
 attached; a good militia might in time he formed of them.— Author’s 
 Note. [The testimony borne in this note to the extraordinary state 
 of depression, political and moral, in which the Catholic population 
 of Ireland was still plunged, so late as 1795, the date of Keating’s 
 pamphlet, is too interesting to allow of its omission, though the 
 author’s remark is of course wholly inapplicable at the present day. 
 A more warlike population than that of Tipperary, Waterford, and 
 Wexford, or that of great part of Cork, and of Clare, (all the CatholiG 
 peasantry of to-day,) it would he difficult to find in Europe; and 
 should Ireland ever live to be a free country, no nation possesses a 
 population better able or more willing to assert its independence 
 than that of the Catholic counties. As for Ulster, it is to-day full 
 two-thirds Catholic; and its Catholic population are to the full as 
 brave in the present generation as their Presbyterian and Protestant 
 fellow-counrymen.] 
 
8 
 
 DEFENCE OF IEELAND. 
 
 strength, nor are there any fortified; those which had 
 works around them were destroyed by Cromwell. The 
 natural strength of Ireland consists in the face of the 
 country, and the nature of the climate; it has no artifi¬ 
 cial strength but what it possesses in the navy of Eng¬ 
 land. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 OF THE PROBABILITY OF AN ATTACK BY THE FRENCH-IN 
 
 WHAT PART THEY WORLD MOST PROBABLY MAKE IT-ON 
 
 THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS OR FAILURE-WITH WHAT 
 
 FORCE. 
 
 [The observations of the author on the probability and 
 means of an invasion of Ireland by the Erench, which 
 occupy this chapter, are totally useless at the present day. 
 1st. Eor example, he points out the advantage to the 
 Erench of Brest harbour (“the westerly and south-wes¬ 
 terly winds/’ he says, “which blow nine months in the 
 year, are favourable to a fleet sailing from Brest to the 
 western coast of Ireland”), upon grounds peculiar to the 
 circumstances of sailing vessels only. At the present day 
 steam has so changed the face of things that it is scarcely 
 any peculiar advantage to Erance that “Brest, taking it 
 in a nautical point of view as regards sailing vessels], 
 is nearer Ireland by near one-half than Plymouth.” 
 2d. It is no longer “ highly probable, from the present 
 state of affairs between England and Erance, that the 
 Erench will make an attack upon the British dominions in 
 Europe;” the two great powers being in fact at peace, 
 and Erance having no disposition (anymore than interest) 
 to go to war. Yet Keating’s observation is perhaps as true 
 to-day as it was sixty years ago when he says that: “it 
 is not probable that she will leave England, if she can 
 help it, in a condition . . . to do her future injury; 
 
 l 
 
10 
 
 DEFENCE OF IEEEAND. 
 
 and it will always be the object of that country to crush 
 England if she can.” And if England should ever again 
 find herself at war with Erance, “it is also probable” 
 (indeed far more than probable, since all Erance has long 
 ago laid to heart the regrets of the great Napoleon at St. 
 Helena that he had not preferred an Irish to an Egyptian 
 expedition), “that Erance may think that as Ireland is 
 the most vulnerable part of the British Empire, so a blow 
 there would be the most fatal to her.” And “if,” adds 
 the author, “the main design of the enemy was against 
 this country, their fleet would be at sea in the mouth of 
 the Channel, to detain the British in port, or prevent their 
 sending out detachments, or to give battle, in order to 
 secure the debarkation on the south-west, west, or north 
 of Ireland, while a squadron of frigates would station 
 themselves in St. George’s Channel to intercept succours 
 arriving from England.” 3d. In these days of railway 
 communication General Keating’s observations no longer 
 apply, either with respect to the probable choice of Gal¬ 
 way (as affording the shortest march to Dublin) as the 
 place of debarkation for an invading force, or the difficulty 
 now no more of suddenly concentrating at Brest (or Cher¬ 
 bourg) an army of 50,000 men, with a sufficient transport 
 fleet, without attracting notice by prolonged preparations. 
 Eor the rest, when the author concludes that ‘ 6 were an 
 attack on the coast of Ireland made, on the part of the 
 Erench, such an attack would so far succeed as that the 
 disembarkation might be effected,” he uses language in ex¬ 
 pressing opinion which to-day he would only alter by assert¬ 
 ing with positive confidence that such a disembarkation 
 could not be effectually resisted or prevented at all.] 
 
CEAPTEE III. 
 
 OF THE POEM OP DEBAEKATIOH-A HD WHEEE IT IS OE IS 
 
 HOT TO BE APPEEHEHDED. 
 
 If a fleet, haying arrived on onr coast, intends to effect 
 an absolute conquest of the country, what becomes of the 
 shipping which brought that force here is a matter of 
 little consequence to the enemy; its business is to land 
 the troops and stores, and not at all to re-embark them. 
 As the object is the complete conquest of the island, and 
 that cannot be effected until the capital is got possession 
 of, therefore they will of course endeavour to disembark 
 within as few days’ march of the capital as possible, ad¬ 
 hering to that essential rule in the military art, viz., to 
 make the line of operations as short as possible. As this 
 expression may not be intelligible, except to military 
 men, the following definition comprehends and explains 
 its meaning, in as few words as it can well be put. 
 
 The line of operation of an army is one drawn 
 between the point against which it is destined, and that 
 from whence it draws its subsistence; and this is the 
 great and main ground-work of all plans of military 
 movements, campaigns, &c. [see Appehdix.] 
 
 But the nearest part of the coast where a landing can 
 be effected to Dublin is Galway. (11) If a hostile fleet, 
 
 * 
 
 (11) [“ the nearest port of the coast. . . . Gahvay —This is 
 
 of course still partly true ; but the facilities afforded by modern rail- 
 
12 
 
 DEFENCE of IRELAND. 
 
 having on board a force such as we have stated, arrives 
 in Galway harbour, no force that could be sent against 
 it could prevent its landing and occupying the town, 
 and if necessary a position from the sea and their fleet on 
 the right, to Lough Corrib on their left; there they could 
 maintain themselves, intrench their camp, secure their 
 flanks, or indeed, if necessary, secure a retreat i: \ 
 
 Their frigates would probably make a diversion in their 
 favour, by threatening other parts of the coast. Eut the 
 march by Eantry is longer, and through a difficult country, 
 as it is also from Cork, and still more so by Lough Foyle. 
 The shortest and most eligible line of operation is by 
 Galway, as in two days’ march they are at the Shannon; 
 by getting possession of which they have all the province 
 of Connaught secured to them, and in four days’ march 
 they can be in possession of Dublin. (12) 
 
 The country through which these armies would pass ad¬ 
 mits very well of a defensive war, and like most of Ire¬ 
 land might be disputed, therefore, should the enemy make 
 a landing in this country, it were to be wished they 
 should attempt it in that part; (13) but as we cannot 
 hope much complaisance from them, it is a duty we owe 
 ourselves immediately to endeavour to secure those parts 
 which are vulnerable. 
 
 Troops Would disembark under cover of the artillery of 
 their vessels, if there was an army guarding the coast. 
 
 way communication, at almost every part of tlie coast (except 
 Bantry), are such that it would now be practically a matter of no 
 importance whatever with respect to Dublin what point it might be 
 convenient to select for the embarkation of an army of 50,000 men.] 
 
 * It is evident that several positions might be chosen there, where 
 it would be impossible to turn their flanks or rere.— Author’s Note. 
 
 (12) [“four days' march ”—Even without a railway.] 
 
 (13) [_ u it were to be icished ."—Of course on the un ierstanding that 
 the population should be friendly to the English, rather than desirous 
 to see the country well rid of them.] 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 13 
 
 If the opposition which they expected was trifling, they 
 would probably come in with the tide to the shore; but 
 if the troops appeared in force on the shore, and that it 
 was also covered with works and cannon, they would 
 then disembark and form upon the beach, and advance 
 against the coast in force. It is for this reason high 
 strong tides and extensive strands are favourable to the 
 operations of the enemy. 
 
CHAPTER IT. 
 
 OF THE BEST METHODS OF OPPOSING A DISEMBARKATION. 
 
 Maizeroy enters largely into the defence of a coast 
 against incursions, hut avoids saying anything relative to 
 an invasion in force, as such an occurrence had not, like 
 the other, come under his notice. Probably he did not 
 choose to incur the risk of reasoning on what he had never 
 ‘seen; it is much easier certainly to write satisfactorily 
 upon the one than upon the other. 
 
 Wherever a landing is to be apprehended, the whole of 
 that coast ought to be well reconnoitred, and the water 
 sounded, and the positions for opposing the enemy chosen. 
 (14). The previous arrangements having been made, on 
 his appearance on the coast, the troops destined for the 
 defence of it should immediately assemble at the appointed 
 rendezvous. 
 
 If batteries, and the other works, have not been thrown 
 up, they ought to be so. The enemy will land upon as 
 level a shore as they can, under cover of their vessels; 
 the fire from their vessels would probably be very great, 
 
 (14) [“ the whole of that coast ought to he well reconnoitred , and 
 the water sounded ”-—There is now, however, no part of the shor«i, 
 or indeed of the island itself, of which the most minute and accurate 
 maps and charts may not be had at a very small expense ; and it is 
 well known that the war-office of our continental neighbours has 
 long ago been provided with the Ordnance Survey Maps of Ireland, 
 and with all the English Admiralty Charts of our coasts and harbours.] 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 15 
 
 suppose four hundred guns; it is therefore the object of 
 the troops who defend to close upon the enemy imme¬ 
 diately on their landing, as from that time their artillery, 
 in which they will till then to a certainty he superior, 
 will be useless. Should they be driven back to their 
 boats, the batteries must again open upon and endeavour 
 to sink them. Though troops disembarking in a bay, 
 where there are several landing places possess an advan¬ 
 tage over the defending army, inasmuch as acting on a 
 smaller segment they can mask their real intention by 
 feints till it is too late to prevent them, and they act 
 from a centre, whereas their opponents act to one, which 
 is an advantage. If the enemy intrenches himself, and 
 that the troops do not arrive in time to prevent that, yet 
 before he advances, the intrenchments ought to be imme¬ 
 diately stormed, and an attack by cannon upon the fleet 
 from the heights at the same time to distract their at¬ 
 tention, and prevent their sending succours. If once 
 driven from their intrenchments, their destruction ought 
 to be the consequence. 
 
 Yet two Tuscan frigates at Algiers, by an enfilading 
 fire, contrived to save the Spanish army; the retreat was 
 covered by the grenadiers commanded by Col. O’Brien ; 
 only one shot was fired by them during the retreat, 
 though the Algerine cavalry came up almost to their 
 bayonets. 
 
 In a landing, not less than ten thousand should disem¬ 
 bark at a time; they should advance in as many columns 
 as possible, and occupy the first heights, from which they 
 should on no account whatever advance a step, but 
 intrench themselves there. 
 
 The misconduct of those who commanded our expedi¬ 
 tions on the coast of France, in Lord Chatham’s time, 
 was such that it is said they once encamped with their 
 
16 
 
 DEFENCE OF FEEL AND, 
 
 front to the sea and their rere to the enemy, probably 
 u par signe de mepris” 
 
 Such incursions answer no end but the destruction of 
 those engaged in them’ as at St. Cas, unless there is well- 
 grounded hope that the people of the country would be on 
 the side of the invader. 
 
 If the defending army can make no impression on the 
 enemy, its artillery and baggage, &c., must be sent up the 
 country; and it must divide itself for the purpose of ob¬ 
 serving the motions of the enemy, and taking positions to 
 obstruct his march to the capital until more or sufficient 
 force assembles. 
 
CHAPTEE Y. 
 
 CAMPAIGNS OF SCHOMBERG, WILLIAM in., AND GINKLE IN 
 IRELAND. (15) 
 
 William haying driven James from England, this island 
 became the theatre of the war, which was conducted with 
 considerable talents on both sides, and had not it been for 
 the pusillanimity of James it might have taken a very 
 different turn from what it did; but the mere presence of 
 that weak and headstrong monarch was sufficient to blast 
 his fortune, and his friends’ hopes. 
 
 Schomberg landed at the head of twelve thousand men, 
 in August, 1689, without meeting any opposition, in Car- 
 rickfergus Bay. With the assistance of six ships of war, 
 he took possession of that town, and on his advancing 
 into the country the positions taken by the hostile armies 
 were as follow: Schomberg occupied a position at Dun¬ 
 dalk, which he found himself obliged to fortify. Bosen 
 threatened his right flank, and James, with about thirty 
 
 (15) [“ campaigns of Schomberg,—William III.—and Ginkle , in 
 Ireland —See, for a proper understanding of these campaigns, as 
 well as of all this portion of Irish History, the Green Book , by John 
 Cornelius O’Callaghan, Esq. See also the admirable edition of the 
 * Macarice Excidiuml of Colonel O’Kelly, edited by the same accu¬ 
 rate historian for the Irish Archaeological Society; Mr. O’Callaghan’s 
 notes to this volume are of great extent, and embrace the largest 
 body of information ever collected together on the subject of this 
 war, the events of which have been nevertheless since so grossly 
 falsified by Lord Macaulay in his elegant romance entitled a History 
 of England.] 
 
18 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 thousand men, was posted on the Boyne at Drogheda. 
 Thus James had Sehomberg there in a cul-de-sac, his re¬ 
 treat cut off, his army wasting by sickness, shut up in in- 
 trenchments, and James himself with a superior army in 
 their front. He made a feeble and characteristic attempt 
 to vanquish Sehomberg by treachery, and even then, 
 when nothing more was wanting to the destruction of his 
 enemy’s army, hut James’ giving the word to attack, his 
 resolution failed, and he retired to his former position, 
 letting Sehomberg escape, and retreat umnolested. 
 
 June, 1690, William landed with 36,000 men, and 
 marched along the eastern coast toward the capital, 
 drawing his supplies from his fleet. James’s army, con¬ 
 sisting of 30,000 men, lay in their position as before de¬ 
 scribed at Drogheda, and he was now obliged, contrary 
 to his inclination, to venture an action. James’s position 
 was well chosen; his right appuye on Drogheda, which 
 he occupied, his front to the Boyne, fordable but deep, 
 with strong hanks which were intersected by mounds of 
 earth, hedges and ditches, his army presented a front of 
 about three miles, extending towards Slane, where was a 
 bridge which he neglected to occupy; the river toward 
 the centre of James’s position forms a considerable project¬ 
 ing bend, and another in reverse higher up towards Slane. 
 This is important, as the fate of the battle was in a great 
 degree decided by its locality, the effect of which, on the 
 manoeuvres of the two armies, was strongly marked in 
 the course of the day; for it is to be observed both 
 parties had neglected to occupy the pass of Slane. 
 William advanced in three columns to the opposite 
 banks of the river, reconnoitred, and adjusted 
 his plan of operation, determining to attack by the 
 right and centre. Accordingly, in the morning, he 
 detached a corps to pass by Slane; this corps arrived 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 19 
 
 sooner at its destination than that sent by James (who saw 
 his error too late) to anticipate it, which by the curve of 
 the river was forced to make a considerable detour, 
 whereby time, as we have stated, was given to William’s 
 detachment to arrive and seize the pass before them; having 
 crossed which, and formed, they advanced on the left of 
 James’s army, and, extending to the right, turned it, not¬ 
 withstanding a morass in its front, by which manoeuvre it 
 was compelled to fall back in confusion toward Duleek. 
 William had so combined his attacks that his centre 
 was to pass at the time his right should have completely 
 engaged the left of James’s army. When that, there¬ 
 fore, was seen to have taken place, his centre column 
 advanced against Old-Bridge, andhis left to the fords, which 
 having passed, and gained the opposite hank at the pro¬ 
 jecting curve of the Boyne, they there formed and received 
 an attack from the right and centre of James, which they 
 repulsed, and advanced. The Irish army fell hack above 
 two miles, to Donore, where they formed, and advanced 
 again to the charge; but William’s cavalry, having, ac¬ 
 cording to their orders, completely turned their left, the 
 fortune of the day could not be recovered, and they were 
 forced to fall hack, pursued with loss, to Duleek, behind 
 which they again rallied. 
 
 This is one of the most interesting actions recorded in 
 history. James’s position was well chosen; his great and 
 glaring misconduct was in not occupying the pass of Slane 
 with a strong corps of infantry and artillery, covered by 
 works. This was the key to his post, and had it been 
 properly guarded, William could not have forced his posi¬ 
 tion; hut when he had turned James’s left, it enabled him, 
 after his centre had crosed the Old-Bridge, to deploy it; for 
 James’s centre was obliged to fallback, seeingthe enemy’s 
 cavalry on their flank. The cavalry was not then what 
 
20 
 
 DEFENCE OF IEEEAND. 
 
 it is now, but that of both armies were much on a par.* 
 Though the country was unfavourable for that army, yet 
 they decided the day both here and at Aughrim. Had 
 Slane been occupied, William must have gone higher up 
 the Boyne in order to have passed. It appears a great 
 neglect on the part of William not to have intercepted the 
 Irish army at Huleek. They must have surrendered or 
 been driven into the sea. Probably he did not wish to be 
 embarrassed with James as a prisoner, following the proverb 
 adopted from the Spaniards, “ A Vennemi qui se retire un 
 pontd’or.” James was glad to have an excuse for fly¬ 
 ing to Versailles. From this time James’s army acted 
 without a plan; but they were reduced to despera¬ 
 tion. The resource they adopted of retiring behind the 
 Shannon was a good one; William’s followed them in a 
 disorderly manner. Grace, who commanded in Athlone, 
 had occupied the town west of the Shannon, with four 
 thousand men, supported by another corps in the neigh¬ 
 bourhood. Douglas attempted to reduce it with a battery 
 of six guns; this not succeeding to his wishes, he re¬ 
 treated with disgrace. 
 
 Meantime, William laid siege to Limerick, where Sars- 
 field performed a gallant action with a corps of cavalry. 
 He made a detour, crossed the Shannon at Killaloe, came 
 in the rere of William’s army within about seven miles, 
 
 * No success gained by James’s right and centre could alter the 
 events of that day. Had they even thrown their opponents back into 
 the river, still William’s advancing on their flank, which was un¬ 
 covered, could not be remedied. The attack by Slane was the grand 
 manoeuvre. The attacks of the centre and left were only secondary 
 ones. In this action the great system was displayed; the right at¬ 
 tacking, the left refusing itself. Two detachments sent to seize a 
 pass, the intermediate ground favours one more than the other. It 
 arrives in time to form and drive in its opponent. Had James seized 
 the pass, he could have turned William’s right, while in the act of 
 fording the river, had he ventured to do it.— Author's Note. 
 
DEFENCE OP IRELAND. 
 
 21 
 
 and intercepted and destroyed a convoy of artillery, who 
 thought themselves in perfect safety so near their own 
 camp. Limerick made a gallant defence, and "William 
 was forced to retreat. Sept. 29th, the Duke of Marl¬ 
 borough landed at Cork with five thousand men. Having 
 increased it to about ten thousand, he took Cork and 
 Xinsale. 
 
 Previous to the campaign of 1691 the Irish and their 
 French allies possessed all the country west of the Shan¬ 
 non, with the important garrisons of Limerick and Ath- 
 lone, and were entire masters of the whole of the Shan¬ 
 non. Ginkle having withdrawn into winter cantonments, 
 was obliged to confine himself solely to the protection of 
 the English frontier, as it was called, which was conti¬ 
 nually and vexatiously harassed by incursions from the 
 opposite side of the Shannon. To add to its misfortunes, 
 bodies of undisciplined and insubordinate armed men, 
 taking advantage of the unhappy times, plundered and 
 murdered on all sides, (16) under the names of Volunteers 
 and Eapparees, so called from the species of weapon 
 which they were armed with, a kind of spear or pike, the 
 first that occurs and easiest supplied. These wretches (16) 
 having been already robbed, first by James’s, and if they 
 escaped them, by William’s army, deprived thereby of 
 the means of subsistence, were forced to take to a life of 
 robbery (16), and wandered under these names in gangs, 
 
 (16) [“plundered and murdered . . . under the names of Volun¬ 
 teers and Rapparees” “ wretches . . . forced to take to a life of rob¬ 
 bery .”—The Irish reader need scarcely be reminded now of what Lieu¬ 
 tenant Keating seems to have strangely forgotten , that these men 
 were neither “wretches,” “murderers,” nor “robbers,” but simply 
 outlaws at war with the plunderers and relentless desolators of their 
 country. Mr. James Duffy of Dublin has lately published an elegant 
 little popular novel, in which the true character of the “ Rapparee” 
 chiefs is fairly delineated in the person of the celebrated Count Red¬ 
 mond O’Hanlon; a tale which will perhaps serve in some sort to 
 
22 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND, 
 
 the men armed, and followed by their wives and families, 
 whom they easily trained to the business. 
 
 James’s army, elated at having forced William to re¬ 
 treat, and indeed with reason, as it was nearly equivalent 
 to depriving him of all the fruits of his victory,—for, in 
 reality, he gained nothing by it but Dublin, and a deso¬ 
 lated country, to harass their enemy,—and also with more 
 sanguine views, projected an attack on Mullingar, and to 
 further it occupied and fortified the town of Ballymore, 
 which is situated half way between Mullingar and Ath- 
 lone; but Ginkle, thinking it necessary to prevent their 
 establishing themselves at Mullingar, advanced against 
 them and drove them from it (it has been asserted the 
 Irish pointed their pallisades the wrong way). Ginkle 
 pursued them to Grenogue, where they attempted a stand 
 in front of the town, but were driven through it, and pursued 
 to the very walls of Athlone. The whole of this conduct 
 on the part of the Irish was erroneous, as they ought solely 
 to have occupied themselves in strengthening their fron¬ 
 tier behind the Shannon, augmenting the fortifications of 
 Athlone and Limerick, and beating up Ginkle’s quarters, 
 whose army, dispirited and unhealthy, in bad winter 
 quarters, would have melted away before the campaign 
 began. 
 
 In Spring, St. Ruth, a French general, sent over by 
 that court, took the command, contrary to the feelings of 
 the gallant Sarsfield, who deserved better treatment. St. 
 Ruth was a man of abilities; like his countrymen, ardent, 
 vehement, and attached to his own opinions, with a sove¬ 
 reign contempt of the persons and talents of those with 
 whom he has to act, who were not of his nation. He 
 brought some French officers with him, who came fraught 
 
 remove the effect of mere calumnious statements such as those adopted 
 by Keating.] 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 23 
 
 with the same contempt of the natives, by whom they 
 were universally hated. It is probable they did more harm 
 to that cause than good; disunion and jealousy immedi¬ 
 ately showed themselves. Though the Trench court sent 
 officers, they did not send either money or any other re¬ 
 quisite; but James’s army, tho’ thus abandoned by their 
 allies, did not despair, but were, on the contrary, much 
 elated by their late successes. St. Ruth soon decided 
 on his plan of operations, which was to occupy the fron¬ 
 tier presented by the river Shannon, by taking his 
 position in aeentral point near Athlone. A great over¬ 
 sight was committed by St. Ruth in not withdrawing 
 his force from Ballymore, a place at that time of no con¬ 
 sequence to him; but he suffered Ginlde on his advance 
 to take a thousand of his best troops, then in garrison 
 there, prisoners; a circumstance attended with peculiarly 
 bad consequences at the opening of the campaign, as it 
 raised the spirits of the other army, and damped those 
 of his own. 
 
 Ginkle advanced towards Athlone, and reconnoitring 
 the army of St. Ruth, found it posted on a neck of land 
 between two bogs, about two miles beyond the Shannon. 
 He carried the part of the town of A thlone on the east 
 side of the river without difficulty. St. Ruth’s army re¬ 
 tired to the other, breaking down the bridges. Ginkle 
 saw the danger and difficulty that was likely to attend 
 the attempt to pass the river, under the guns of a fortress, 
 and in front of a formidable enemy. He therefore formed 
 a plan for that purpose, by stealing a march, and throw¬ 
 ing a bridge of boats over it above Lough Ree, at Lanes- 
 borough, but by his enemy’s vigilance the scheme was dis¬ 
 covered and foiled. 
 
 He then determined to force his passage in the place he 
 occupied, and after some attempts succeeded in repairing 
 
24 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 the bridge which St. Ruth’s army in their retreat had 
 broken down. Haying done which he ordered his right 
 column to attack by the bridge, and the left and centre to 
 ford the river. St. Ruth, however, burnt the bridge, and 
 Ginkle was obliged to countermand the attack; and saw 
 himself reduced to the desperate necessity of retreating to 
 Dublin, through a desolated country, exposed to the harass¬ 
 ing of an exulting enemy. It is not often that n council 
 of war gives its opinion for battle; the foreseeing and 
 starting difficulties is the affectation of superior wisdom; 
 yet it happened that Ginkle’s council did adopt the boldest, 
 and as it generally is the wisest measure, for a failure in 
 it could not put them in a worse situation than they were. 
 This was for the immediate attack. Two thousand men, 
 divided into three columns, advanced to storm the town, 
 which was defended by about an equal number. Some 
 resistance was made; but the gallantry of the centre 
 column, who passed the ford under a most heavy fire, and 
 entered the town, driving the enemy before them, enabled 
 the other two columns to establish themselves also within 
 the walls. St. Ruth committed an unrnrd nable error in 
 his neglect of this post, as the event shewed. 
 
 St. Ruth was obliged, by this success, to change his 
 position, in order to cover and keep his communication 
 open with Limerick. He therefore retreated down the 
 course of the Shannon, and took a position behind the 
 river Suck; his right toward the Shannon, occupying the 
 heights called Kilcommedin Hill, upon a front of two 
 miles; his left secured by a rivulet and a bog, which also 
 covered his front, as far as a pass on a chain of small 
 hills which lay opposite his right. Here he determined 
 to wait the attack of the British. 
 
 St. Ruth’s army consisted of about 24,000 men; Wil¬ 
 liam’s of about 18,000 [wrong ; s^Hote, p. 34.] Ginkle 
 
DEEEXCiJ OE IBELAXD* 
 
 25 
 
 having called in all his detachment, on the 12th of July, 
 1692, attached with his left; the cavalry marched by the 
 pass before-mentioned and deployed, covering the left 
 flank of his infantry, as they advanced upon the enemy, 
 who retired gradually from ditch to ditch before them. 
 As the infantry advanced in this difficult ground, where 
 their cavalry could not protect them, they began to find 
 themselves enfiladed, and flanked from behind the hedges 
 on their left; for gaps having been cut at proper inter¬ 
 vals in the banks and ditches, the enemy had by that 
 means got upon their flank. This gave them a check. 
 St. Ruth, wishing to follow up his blow there, and seeing 
 nothing to apprehend upon his left, drew away his cavalry 
 from thence, in the intention of bringing it upon the left of 
 Ginkle. There was a narrow pass by the castle of A ughrim, 
 in front of St. Ruth’s left. Ginkle ordered his right wing 
 to attack St. Ruth’s left, which was now exposed, and 
 to defile by this pass, and form on the other side; the 
 right of his infantry advancing through the bog, so as to 
 form on the opposite side, by the time the cavalry of 
 the right had formed its line. Talmash, who commanded 
 it, executed the manoeuvre with ability, and led his corps 
 in a column between the castle and the bog, formed on 
 the other side, and advanced just in time to save the 
 centre of the Rritish line of infantry, which, having 
 waded through the bog, had attacked and driven the Irish 
 line before them ; but falling into confusion in advancing, 
 the Irish had rallied, and charging them in turn had 
 driven them back with great loss into the bog. J nst at 
 this critical instant Ginkle’s cavalry showing themselves, 
 checked St. Ruth’s line, and gave time to his infantry 
 (who had gone beyond their orders, which were, not to 
 advance upon the enemy until they saw their right 
 wing of cavalry entirely passed the castle), to rally under 
 
26 
 
 DEFENCE OE IRELAND. 
 
 the ditches at the hog’s edge, and, being re-formed, to 
 advance in good order, with the cavalry upon their right, 
 upon the left of the enemy. St. Ruth, to whom the ap¬ 
 pearance of Ginkle’s right wing of cavalry so near his 
 line was a surprise, not expecting to have had both his 
 flanks attacked, was bringing up a reserve of cavalry for 
 the purpose of falling on Ginkle’s right, when he was 
 killed by a cannon shot. 
 
 This fortunate (17) shot probably caused the gaining of 
 the battle. St. Ruth had the advantage upon the right, 
 where the first attack had been made. Ginkle’s infantry 
 were exhausted by wading through a hog up to their 
 middles ; they had been driven hack into that bog with 
 loss and confusion, and St. Ruth was at that moment 
 coming down upon their right flank with a fresh body of 
 cavalry. So far everything was in his favour. 
 
 Rut St. Ruth communicated with no one; by this con¬ 
 duct he lost Athlone. To Sarsfield, his second in com¬ 
 mand, he had a particular pique. His whole arrange¬ 
 ments were confined to his own head; and Sarsfield, who 
 
 (17) \ u fortunate .”—General Keating speaks, of course, as a 
 British, officer. It is not so that any Irishman speaks of the fatal ac¬ 
 cident which alone lost Aughrim,—a field on which the Irish army 
 fought with a spirit and bravery which indeed deserved success, 
 since it was never exceeded in any of the numerous engagements 
 abroad in which the Brigade itself so often won undying laurels for 
 themselves and for their country. The brave Saint Ruth is not yet 
 forgotten in Ireland, and an interesting circumstance hut lately 
 served to show that his name is still remembered in France ; for a 
 few days hefoie the 12th of July, 1858 (the anniversary of the fatal 
 day of Aughrim), the Parish Priest of the parish in which this cele¬ 
 brated field of battle is situated received from the present Emperor 
 of the French the offering of a suit of mourning vestments with in¬ 
 structions that on that day and on every succeeding anniversary a 
 solemn Mass should be offered up for the repose of the soul of the 
 gallant Frenchman at the altar of the Parish Church. Ireland recog¬ 
 nised with warm emotion the meaning of so graceful an act of piety 
 on the part of the representative of Napoleon.] 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 27 
 
 succeeded to the command, was in utter ignorance of what 
 was going on about him, except of that which imme¬ 
 diately concerned his own post: of course, on the fall of 
 St. Euth, everything was at a stop, the officers waiting 
 for orders, and no one to give them. In consequence, his 
 army first retreated, pressed by Ginkle, and then fled. 
 The infantry, in their usual custom, to a bog,* the ca¬ 
 valry to Loughrea. Thus £nded the battle of Aughrim, 
 and with it the hopes of those who had attached them¬ 
 selves to James. 
 
 Ginkle’s position, previous to the attack, was on the 
 Suck, near Ballinasloe, opposite St. Euth’s. St. Euth’s 
 main errors, every one of which was sufficient to have 
 caused the loss of the battle, were—First, not communi¬ 
 cating with Sarsfield: Secondly, not fortifying the pass 
 on his right, which would have prevented Ginkle’s ca¬ 
 valry from passing there, and, of course, the necessity of 
 his unfurnishing his left: Thirdly, not attacking the 
 right wing of Talmash, while in the act of deploying, 
 after passing by the castle of Aughrim, a manoeuvre that, 
 by the foregoing account, must have taken up a consider¬ 
 able time. 
 
 Had the British army been defeated, St. Euth, by 
 crossing the Shannon, might have taken a position on 
 their rere, and destroyed their whole army. His position 
 was chosen with great skill, and his army seem to have 
 maintained their ground with great firmness. On the 
 other hand, the manoeuvres of William’s army were con¬ 
 ducted in a manner that evinced much talents on the part 
 of the generals. It is an extraordinary circumstance, 
 
 * A letter, giving an account of the battle of Kilrush, where Lord 
 Mountgarret’s army was defeated by the Earl of Ormond, says that 
 the adjacent bog was black (the colour of their clothing), with the 
 multitude who fled to it, out of reach of the cavalry.— Author’s 
 Note. 
 
28 
 
 DEFENCE 0 IEELAND. 
 
 that, in such ground, the event of the action at Aughrim 
 (as well as at Drogheda), should have been turned by the 
 cavalry. 
 
 St. Ruth was everywhere himself during the action, 
 hut always a little too late. He was one of those -men 
 who never think anything properly done except what 
 they do themselves. The army’s retiring to Loughrea 
 after the defeat was merely accidental. Had Sarsfield’s 
 army retired to Galway, they might probably have done 
 better than at Limerick. Probably they would have 
 compelled Ginkle to divide his force. At any rate / either 
 Galway or Limerick must have been in his rere. Had 
 Ginkle left him there, he would have lost Connaught 
 again; and had he besieged him there, the garrison of Lime¬ 
 rick might have made a diversion in his favour; besides, 
 Sarsfield’s army was still numerous. St. Ruth took one 
 precaution, which never ought to he omitted in familiar 
 circumstances. Ditches and hanks become an inconve¬ 
 nience to an army, if they cramp its manoeuvres. When¬ 
 ever the situation is such, debouchures should he cut in 
 them, in those places where they are best protected by 
 cross fire. They should he sufficiently large for troops to 
 pass on a considerable front, and might be closed against 
 cavalry by chevaux de frize. 
 
 If Sarsfield had retreated to Galway, Ginkle could not 
 have left him behind. The campaign was then far ad¬ 
 vanced, and would still have had Limerick to reduce; 
 and an advanced season in the field is always fatal to 
 foreigners in this country. 
 
 Ginkle marched by the Munster side of the Shannon, 
 and occupied the ground before Limerick, which the 
 King had done the year before, on the side of Ireton’s 
 Port. He now secured all the passes on the Shannon, 
 the necessity of which he had been taught the last 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 29 
 
 campaign. Perceiving he could not hope to take the 
 place without completely investing it, he passed in the 
 night above the town, by an island, to a part of the river 
 which is fordable, and which he gained by the connivance 
 of the officer appointed to guard it, with a corps of dra¬ 
 goons, as was the custom of that time ; for they had 
 usually a great and over-proportion of cavalry, to their 
 infantry, and were, consequently, obliged often 
 to employ the cavalry upon services to which 
 they were not adapted. As for instance, leaving 
 the entire guard of a ford to them, if attacked 
 they cannot maintain their post. A good detachment of 
 infantry, with some works mounted with guns, are the 
 proper defence of a ford as well as of a bridge. 
 
 Ginkle having completely invested, blockaded the town 
 to the 22d September. It is extraordinary, during this 
 time, no attempt was made to destroy the bridge of com¬ 
 munication and attack the forces on one side of the river, 
 when separated; but, in general, an army which is dis¬ 
 couraged by a series of ill success, Nes’occupe (as the King 
 of Prussia said of his officers) qita paver les bottes que 
 leur font les autres; observing at the same time, Maisje 
 mettrai bientot orcb'e a cela , which he did, and turned the 
 tide in his favour. On the 22d, Ginkle stormed the works 
 of Thomond bridge. On the 23d, the garrison beat a 
 parley, and by the surrender of this city, the conquest of 
 the kingdom was completed. 
 
 These three campaigns in Ireland are the only part of 
 its military history which are in any way interesting. (18) 
 
 (18) [“ the only part*of its military history .”—The Irish reader 
 will not of course be misled by this flippant observation. When the 
 history of Ireland comes to be honestly written it will tell a different 
 tale. For the rest, Keating had but the education of an English 
 officer; an education very little more accurate or more enlightened 
 in 1795 than it is even at the present day.] 
 
30 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 At that time the grand principles of war were un¬ 
 derstood; and although the improvement of tactics, of 
 which Prussia set the example, by introducing the true 
 principles of the Greeks, has within the last fifty years, 
 by its refinements and multiplied combinations, completely 
 set aside the old system of warfare, yet the great princi¬ 
 ples must ever remain, in the same manner as architecture 
 may derive benefit from the improvements of handicraft, 
 though the sublime principles of Euclid, on which its 
 rules are founded, must ever remain invariable. 
 
 In these campaigns, ability was shown on both sides. 
 William was a military monarch, commanding a veteran 
 army. James was the very reverse, commanding, or (to 
 speak more properly) at the head of undisciplined forces, 
 divided by different interests and views, while the faction 
 and animosity of individuals tore them to pieces. The 
 French affected and felt a contempt, which they did not 
 seek to disguise, for the Irish, and the Irish retaliated in 
 hatred to their haughty auxiliaries. Indeed, the Irish 
 seem to have acted better from the time the French troops 
 withdrew. (19) 
 
 A few observations upon the general conduct of the 
 campaign may not be impertinent, as they will tend to 
 throw into one view a series of military events, highly 
 interesting to the Irish nation at the present day, [1795], 
 when a formidable enemy is at their very doors, and when 
 there is reason to apprehend that, if not this, the next 
 ensuing campaign may bring the theatre of the war into 
 our island. 
 
 Schomberg landed at Carrickfergus (as Thurot after- 
 
 (19) [The statements and suggestions contained in this paragraph 
 are very much exaggerated and calculated seriously to mislead the 
 reader. But in notes like the present he can only be shortly put on 
 his guard; he cannot expect to be informed upon the whole history 
 of the period.] 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 31 
 
 wards did), without opposition, in the year 1689, with 
 about ten thousand men. Haying augmented his army, 
 he advanced to Dundalk; while James lay in an apathy, 
 with treble his force, at Drogheda. 
 
 Why James’s generals did not take a position at Hewry 
 is unaccountable; there they might have destroyed the 
 British army. Again, at Dundalk, they had them, as it 
 were, in a net. Yet even the hopes of treachery could 
 not induce James to make a real attack upon Schomberg. 
 If he had done it his correspondence with certain parts of 
 that army would have been attended, probably, with 
 good effect to him; but he did not get near enough to the 
 conspiracy to be able to make it explode ; as if there was 
 any hope of success in war, without incurring some 
 danger. 
 
 In the campaign of 1690, Schomberg was superseded 
 by William himself, who commanded a fine army of 
 36,000 men, well appointed and inured to service, and 
 who had, in addition to those advantages, the highest 
 confidence in their commander. James still occupied his 
 position near Drogheda. 
 
 William, with his superior force, was right to come to 
 an action. His opponent’s position was well chosen, but 
 the locality was not taken sufficient advantage of. The 
 saliant curve of the Boyne was not fortified; Slane was 
 not occupied. William might have been forced to have 
 looked for a passage higher up the Boyne; but though he 
 would have effected it, yet delay was injurious to him, 
 whose presence was called for in other places, and might 
 have been beneficial to James. 
 
 William could have finished the campaign in Ireland, 
 after his victory at the Boyne, by seizing the pass of 
 Duleek. Probably, had he done so, he would not have 
 been able to avoid taking James prisoner, and he did not 
 
32 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND, 
 
 wish to he embarrassed with him. It may be so inferred, 
 from the little trouble he took to follow him. 
 
 After the defeat at the Boyne, the Irish army retired 
 behind the Shannon. This was well judged. Limerick 
 was so well defended, William was obliged to raise the 
 siege. Next year Ginkle took it, for which he was in¬ 
 debted to the desperate situation of James’s affairs, and, 
 in consequence thereof, the distracted state of the garri¬ 
 son. Athlone was taken in a gallant manner, owing to 
 the infatuation of St. Buth. Still a victory was neces¬ 
 sary to give William a decided superiority, and Ginkle 
 was obliged to hazard a battle at Aughrim, where the 
 situation of the British was such, that a defeat would to 
 them have been utter ruin. 
 
 James’s army made good use of the ditches and inclo¬ 
 sures, in their positions; but the bayonet was not so well 
 understood then as it is now; and wherever troops are so 
 posted, they should be attacked with that arm. Most 
 attacks upon intrenchments have succeeded, and the 
 reason is obvious: an army is generally distributed through 
 the extent of an intrenchment, and is equally weak 
 everywhere. The assailants, on the contrary, concen¬ 
 trate their force upon certain points, which are carried 
 before the other party can throw in a sufficient force to 
 counterpoise them, and once the intrenchments are en¬ 
 tered, the flank and rere of the army is exposed; nor can 
 they make a change of position as they could in the open 
 held, but are tied down to one plan of operation. The 
 only possible way of guarding against these inconveniences, 
 is by having great reserves, but then you must contract 
 your intrenchments, and if the flanks are not secured by 
 the natural position, that is hard to be done, without 
 falling into other difficulties. 
 
 The feelings of the human mind also operate. The 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 33 
 
 man who stands behind the breast-work contemplates his 
 enemy advancing. He apprehends that if he once enters 
 the intrenchment, there is no chance of his safety but by 
 flight. He has time to make all these kind of natural 
 reflections. The assailant, on the contrary, kept in mo¬ 
 tion, is animated; he looks on his arrival in the works as 
 the period of his danger; he therefore rushes on, and 
 generally succeeds. The French have, this war (20), made 
 a gallant defence of intrenchments; but they have the ad¬ 
 vantages of artillery, science, and discipline, united with 
 incredible numbers and enthusiasm; a rare combination! 
 In general, a chain of strong redoubts and fleches (21), 
 are preferable to lines. It is more difflcult to run away 
 from them. That a fewer number can thus defend an equal 
 extent of ground, they must be so near as to support each 
 other mutually. Another advantage which attends them 
 is, that they leave the ground open for the army to 
 manoeuvre, as occasion requires. They can advance to 
 take an advantage of any confusion into which the enemy 
 may be thrown; and, if requisite, retire behind the re¬ 
 doubts again; all which, lines will not permit. 
 
 It was well judged of Ginkle after passing the bog in 
 the front of the enemy, at Aughrim, to order the infantry 
 to form under the first enclosures or ditches; but the Irish 
 committed an oversight, in leaving any such between 
 them and the bog unoccupied; as they should have levelled 
 all such, had they time enough. St. Ruth does not seem to 
 have taken much pains to strengthen his position. He lost 
 the battle of Aughrim by the same failing which had be- 
 
 (20) [“ this war”— that is the war of independance after the 
 Great Revolution.] 
 
 (21) \ u fleches” —simple earthworks of the shape of a /\ , or of an 
 arrow’s head; open behind, and not connected one with another by 
 any wall or continued line of entrenchment.] 
 
34 
 
 DEFENCE OF IKELAND. 
 
 fore lost him Athlone—a pertinacious confidence in his own 
 opinion, and contempt for the judgment of others. 
 
 [Note ; on the Numbers, at each side, engaged at the Battle 
 of Aughrim. (See p. 24.]) 
 
 [The account in the text of the numbers on both sides at the 
 Battle of Aughrim is now known to be incorrect. It is taken from 
 Story, whose loose assertion has been followed without inquiry by 
 Burnet and Le Brune. Mr. O’Callaghan (in Note 228—p. 434—to 
 his singularly erudite and copiously-noted edition of Col. O’Kelly’s 
 “ Excidium Macarice,” published by the Irish Archaeological Society, 
 in 1840,) has carefully analysed the historical evidences on the whole 
 subject; and he shows that Story’s unauthenticated assertion is at 
 variance with the evidence supplied by Captain Parker, an officer who 
 fought at the English side at Aughrim—by King James’ Memoirs— 
 by Major-General Dorrington, Colonel of King James’ Foot Guards, 
 who was made prisoner at Auschrim—by Colonel Charles O’Kelly, in 
 the “ Macarioe Excidium” itself—and by O’Halloran, who states the 
 uniform belief of the Irish on the subject in the generation which 
 succeeded the time of the Battle. Finally, Mr. O’Callaghan himself 
 examined the original records of William’s army, and has published 
 “ the complements, when perfect, in men and officers, of the British 
 and Anglo-Irish and Huguenot Regiments in William’s pay, from a 
 great mass of official and original documents in Trinity College 
 Library, Dublin, and the State Paper Office, and British Museum, 
 London.” Mr. O’Callaghan’s detailed calculations give on Ginkle’s 
 side a total, of Infantry (if perfect) 24,495 officers and soldiers, of 
 Horse (Light Cavalry) 6,837, and of Dragoons (Heavy Cavalry) 
 2,607. Consequently, he says, “the grand total of his officers and 
 soldiers, Infantry, Horse, and Dragoons, would under such circum¬ 
 stances be 33,939 men —besides those connected with the artillery.” 
 And he adds that “ the military duties to be elsewhere discharged in 
 the country, either in garrisons, or by detachments, were entrusted 
 to a numerous and well-armed Anglo-Irish militia, or yeomanry, and 
 to the 15 remaining regiments of regular infantry, and 2 regiments 
 and 2 troops of regular cavalry, that, with the 48 regiments and 14 
 troops of Ginkle’s army at Aughrim, would make up the total of Wil¬ 
 liam III.’s regular forces in Ireland for the year 1691, as stated by 
 Story, at 67 Regiments of the line —exclusive of men connected with 
 the artillery.” According to the Irish accounts the total numbers 
 under St. Ruth’s command at Aughrim did not exceed 17,000 (some 
 say only 15,000.) So that, making every allowance for casual absences 
 on the English side, by reducing the full amount of their army by above 
 8,000, out of nearly 34,000, it is certain that the real numbers on both 
 sides appear to be those given in the text by Keating, but reversed.] 
 
CHAPTER YI. 
 
 0N AN AEMED YEOMANEY-CAYALEY-AND EEEE COEPS OF 
 
 INEANTEY (22). 
 
 It were much to he wished that the plan of arming the 
 yeomanry, and forming them into corps of cavalry, had 
 been adopted; hut it ought to he with much precaution. 
 The principal precaution should he, not to have too many 
 corps, and to pay great attention to having them in good 
 hands. They should not he composed of too great a 
 number of privates; as, for instance, the residence of every 
 yeoman should be within seven miles of the place of ren¬ 
 dezvous, in the centre of the whole; nor should their 
 number he too small, as to every corps there ought to be 
 five officers, resident gentlemen of influence and property. 
 In case of the death or resignation of the captain, the next 
 officer in command should invariably succeed him. 
 
 (22) [“on an armed Yeomanry , &c.”—The suggestions in this 
 chapter are in some respects unsuited to the circumstances of more 
 recent times; it contains nevertheless so many observations of an 
 interesting character that it may be as well not to omit it altogether. 
 The reader will no doubt at once perceive that in speaking of a 
 “yeomanry” no other idea occurred to the mind of Lieutenant 
 Keating, in 1795, than that of a Protestant and exclusively Anglo- 
 Irish or West-British militia. It is also sufficiently plain that the 
 writer of the pamphlet looked upon the country to be “ defended” 
 as the mere property of an oligarchy of “ resident gentlemen,” in 
 whose eyes the Catholic peasantry, the really Irish people of the 
 South and West, were and were intended to be but serfs adscripti 
 ylebce.-] 
 
36 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 People like those of whom such corps ought to be com¬ 
 posed, would he disgusted and quit, were they to he 
 turned oyer from one commandant to another, with as 
 little ceremony as regulars; and the man who has most 
 interest at court, has not always most interest in the 
 country, however high he may represent his own consequence 
 there. 
 
 There is not a county in Ireland, which could not make 
 up two such corps of one hundred yeomen each. Some 
 could make up five hundred; but, reckoning one with 
 another, at three hundred to each county, it would make 
 up a body of nine thousand six hundred cavalry, main¬ 
 tained without expense to government, ready to take the 
 field at a day’s notice, and fit for any service cavalry 
 could he employed in. 
 
 Great care must he taken in giving the command of 
 these corps. If they were given to any but men of liberal 
 principles, it would do more harm than good ; a spirit of 
 party would govern in the selection of the corps; this 
 baneful spirit is the destruction of all security in Ireland. 
 All feasting, electioneering, and dissipation, should also be 
 avoided. The less they become either soldiers or gentle¬ 
 men the better (23). The pride and glory of England is 
 its yeomanry; it was always so since the emancipation of 
 the lower orders from villanage. In Ireland, one or two 
 counties excepted, there has hardly hitherto been any such, 
 till within this century, but they are now [1795], increas¬ 
 ing considering them as a body. In Wicklow and Wex¬ 
 ford there is a yeomanry that would not disgrace any 
 shire in England. 
 
 (23) [ a either soldiers or gentlemen ”—An observation bitter 
 enough, truly, in the mouth of a British officer that knew them ! 
 It would appear that the character of the “ British soldier” was not 
 much better regarded m 1795, than to-day.] 
 
DEFENCE OF IKELAND. 
 
 37 
 
 What makes a yeoman respectable, is the honest pride 
 of conscious independence. The sense of his happy 
 situation attaches him to his native soil, and the constitu¬ 
 tion of his country; consequently, the yeomen of England 
 have always been found the most difficult to be seduced by 
 the spirit of innovation. An observer of the Irish nation 
 will not perceive much of the foregoing character here; 
 hut it depends upon the gentlemen, not the little soi disant 
 gentleman, (the greatest tyrant and enemy the poor man 
 has,) hut the gentlemen of landed property, to create 
 them; it is only giving them a valuable interest in their 
 small farms (24). When such a thing is so easily done, 
 one would think that the example of the world, and the 
 present times, ought to make them set about it in earnest. 
 Mr. Arthur Young, in his tour through Ireland, saw, and 
 has pointedly and truly detailed the grievance, and the 
 real cause of it; and supplies some excellent hints to the 
 gentlemen of Ireland. The poor man pays the taxes and 
 tithes, his penury supports the splendour of the great, and 
 ultimately he is the man to whom the defence of the coun¬ 
 try must he intrusted; for it is evident that nothing but 
 imminent danger can arouse the rich, and that does not 
 appear to he a* strong inducement to them to take arms in 
 
 * They called la rue ducale , at Brussels, in the time of Dumourier’s 
 incursion, la rue des lievres (the street of the hares).— Author's 
 Note. 
 
 (24) [“ it is only giving them a valuable interest in their small 
 farms ."—In other words if the people are made to feel that the 
 country is theirs , they will he ready to defend it a Voutrance. Ge¬ 
 neral Keating knew as well as any mao that the Irish people have 
 been made to feel precisely the reverse ; and if he lived now he 
 would probably say that in the existing condition of the people of 
 Ireland they may be more reasonably expected to welcome than to re¬ 
 sist any invasion likely to effect a change in the existing land tenure. 
 There have been no real “ Yeomen” in Ireland; and it is too late for 
 landlords to attempt to create such a class, even were they sincerely 
 willing to do so. The peasantry of the present generation have been 
 
38 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 their hands; or if they were willing to fight for their pro¬ 
 perties, the number is too small to do it with any effect. 
 Eor their own safety they ought then to put betimes those 
 arms in the hands of a class of men, in whom they can 
 confide, and not trust their all to the honour and self-de¬ 
 nial of the outcasts of mankind, of men whose situation 
 any change whatsoever must better, and who know it (25). 
 The best defence any country can have is a happy, 
 patriotic, and uncorrupted yeomanry. A national debt, 
 and the concomitant evil of revenue laws, have not im¬ 
 proved the morals of the people of England and Ireland, 
 but are, on the contrary, it is to be feared, daily sapping 
 the vitals and the strength of the empire. 
 
 The establishment of these corps of yeomanry cavalry 
 should be as follows : (26)—To be commanded by five 
 gentlemen of property: one captain, two lieutenants, and 
 two sub-lieutenants, and to consist of one hundred rank 
 and file, composed of gentlemen, persons of independent 
 income, or in trade; farmers and their sons, or near rela¬ 
 tives, although not actually in possession of farms ; each 
 master of a horse. The arms, appointments, saddles and 
 bridles to be supplied by government; the clothes by them¬ 
 selves. Their clothing should consist of a round hat with 
 a narrow brim; a frieze coat, buttoning down to the waist, 
 and waistcoat; a frieze loose coat, carried on the pummel 
 of the saddle; leather breeches; boots coming well up to 
 
 taught by the landlords themselves to look to becoming not “Yeo¬ 
 men” hut Proprietors .] 
 
 (25) [“ outcasts of mankind, §c .”-—Another bitter description of 
 the British soldier, and all the more bitter that it is, generally speak¬ 
 ing, terribly true; at least it is most true of the class who alone in Ire¬ 
 land can be tempted to take what it was the fashion in 1843 to call 
 * the Saxon Shilling!’] 
 
 (26) [“ the establishment§c .—The system here suggested is 
 framed according to the “ aristocratic” prejudices of the time ; these 
 details, however, are, of course, quite arbitrary.] 
 
DEFENCE OE IEELAND. 
 
 39 
 
 tlie knees; a pair of strong ticken overhose, coining half¬ 
 way down the leg; a straight one-edged sword, three feet 
 from the pummel to the point, which must be sharp, in 
 an iron scabbard,* 1 like that of the Austrian cavalry, 
 hanging in a waist-belt; one long pistol in the left hol- 
 
 * Wooden scabbards break, and leather ones shrink and become 
 useless.— Author’s Note. [General Keating is quite under a mistake 
 as to iron scabbards ; they blunt, and so render useless, even the best 
 of swords. Captain Nolan (whose little work on cavalry tactics is 
 the only good book on the subject in the English language) ener¬ 
 getically condemns the English metal scabbard, and w armly advo¬ 
 cates, for practical purposes, the wooden scabbards in which to his 
 knowledge the gallant Sikhs of India preserved the edges of their 
 blades (though often but old cast blades of English make and infe¬ 
 rior steel) sharp enough to cut off English heads and English limbs 
 at a blow in such charges as Nolan describes, and in which he him¬ 
 self gained such chasacter in his profession. “When I was in 
 India,” says Nolan, “ an engagement between a party of the Nizam’s 
 irregular horse and a numerous body of insurgents took place, in 
 which the horsemen, though greatly inferior in numbers, defeated 
 the Kohillas with great slaughter. My attention was drawn particu¬ 
 larly to the fight by the doctor’s report of the killed and wounded, 
 most of whom had suffered by the sword, and in the column of re¬ 
 marks such entries as the following were numerous :—‘ Arm cut off 
 from the shoulder.’ 4 Head severed.’ 4 Both hands cut off (appa¬ 
 rently at one blow) above the wrists, in holding up the arms to pro¬ 
 tect the head.’ * Leg cut off above the knee,’ &c., &c. I was 
 astounded. Were these men giants to lop off limbs thus wholesale ? 
 or was this result to be attributed (as I was told) to the sharp edge 
 of the native blade and the peculiar way of drawing it ? I became 
 anxious to see these horsemen of the Nizam, to examine their wonder¬ 
 ful blades, and learn the knack of lopping off men’s limbs. Oppor¬ 
 tunity soon offered, for the Commander-in-Chief went to Hyderabad 
 on a tour of inspection, in which I accompanied him. After passing 
 the Kisna Eiver a squadron of these very horsemen joined the camp 
 as part of the escort. And now fancy my astonishment! The sword- 
 blades they had were chiefly old dragoon blades cast from our service. 
 The men had mounted them after their own fashion. The hilt and 
 handle, both of metal, small in the grip, rather fiat , not round, like 
 ours , where the edge seldom falls true; they all had an edge like a 
 razor from heel to 'point , and were worn in ivooden scabbards; a short 
 single string held them to the waist-belt, from which a strap passed 
 through the hilt to a button in front, to keep the sword steady and 
 
40 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 ster (27), and four pistol cartridges in a magazine with 
 the holster; in the other holster two horse-shoes and two 
 sets of nails; a haversack with a stiff leather bottom, to 
 use as a nose-hag, should he all their baggage. 
 
 These corps should assemble on Sundays (28), after ser¬ 
 vice, and on holidays, to practice moving in squadron, 
 charging, breaking into hie, and forming squadron from 
 that to right and left, front and rere. They should also 
 practice the sword, &c., the manner of posting videttes, 
 patrolling a country, escorting a convoy, repeating signals, 
 breaking, dispersing and forming, and also learn how to 
 cross an enclosed country. 
 
 When an enemy is even in the country, these corps 
 
 prevent it flying out of the scabbard. The swords are never drawn 
 except in action 
 
 “ Thinking the wooden scabbards ,” continues Captain Nolan, 
 “ might be objected to as not suitable for campaigning, I got a return 
 from one of these regiments and found the average of broken scab¬ 
 bards below that of the regulars , who have steel ones. The steel is 
 snapped by a kick or a fall; the wood , being elastic , bends. They 
 are not in the man’s way; when dismounted they do not get between 
 his legs and trip him up ; they make no noise—a soldier on sentry of 
 a dark night might move about without betraying his position to an 
 enemy by the clanking of the rings against the scabbard. All that 
 rattling noise in column, which announces its approach when miles 
 off, and makes it so difficult to hear a word of command in the ranks, 
 is thus got rid of; as well as the necessity of wrapping straw or hay 
 round the scabbards, as now customary when engaged in any service 
 in which an attempt is to be made to surprise an enemy.”—(pp. 105, 
 107, of Cavalry, its History and Tactics; by Captain L. E. Nolan, 
 15th Hussars; London, T. Bosworth, 1853).] 
 
 (27) [“one long pistol in the left holster .”—At the present day, 
 of course, the weapon employed would be a “revolver,” or rather a 
 “repeater” of Colt’s manufacture—a very satisfactory arm.] 
 
 (28) [“ should assemble on Sundays .”—And surely if Ireland had 
 her “National Guard” of Irish peasant volunteers, no better, 
 healthier, more manly and becoming as well as innocent and rational 
 recreation could be devised for the Sunday afternoon, after last Mass, 
 in every parish, than regular public military exercise, and especially 
 practise in the skilful use of the sword.] 
 
DEFENCE OF IEEEAND. 
 
 41 
 
 ought not to be called into the field. When embodied, 
 there would he full use for them in their respective coun¬ 
 ties, by employing them guarding magazines, convoys, 
 assisting the quarter-masters and officers of stores in pro¬ 
 viding forage and provisions, and in maintaining internal 
 peace. They should do orderly duty, if in the field, and 
 be also cantoned about the army, but not commanded but 
 by their own officers. They would probably in general 
 act in small corps of twenty-five each, commanded 
 by a lieutenant. While these corps remain in their 
 counties, an officer, resident in the county for the purpose, 
 and appointed by government, should make quarterly in¬ 
 spections of the troops, drawing the whole together for one 
 day; this would give them a spirit of emulation; and he 
 should report; the strength and state of each troop, and the 
 condition of their arms and appointments, for which each 
 captain should be answerable. When employed, they 
 should receive a high pay, 2s 6d a day, and draw rations 
 for themselves and horses. Such a corps would be inti¬ 
 mately acquainted with the passes, roads, &c., of their 
 respective counties, and would be invaluable sources of 
 information for the generals. 
 
 They could detect any treachery on the part of the 
 country people (29), over whom, on account of the class 
 from which they are drawn, they would have a much 
 greater influence than any troops, solely military, could 
 have. The pay seems high, but it must be made worth 
 their while to quit their homes and occupations; besides, 
 
 (29) [“ treachery on the part of the country people ”—This casual 
 observation shows pretty clearly from what point of view Lieutenant 
 Keating wrote. He is, in fact, speaking all along of an English Pro¬ 
 testant “yeomanry” garrison of Ireland, and naturally takes for 
 granted that the Catholic Irish “"country people” would sympathise 
 altogether with the enemies of that garrison, from whatever quarter 
 they might present themselves.] 
 
42 
 
 DEFENCE OF IEELAKD. 
 
 they could not in their way live as cheap, by forming 
 messes, &c., as the military do. The evolutions of such a 
 corps ought, as above stated, to be as simple as possible. 
 Everything should be done by file. The squadrons to 
 act on a small front. The formations from file may be 
 simplified as follows, and which contains every possible 
 formation:— 
 
 The squadron should always file from the right, conse¬ 
 quently have it in front. To form from file to the front, 
 each man moves rapidly up on the left of his file-leader, 
 and dresses to the right. To form to the rere, the leading 
 file of front rank turns to the left about and halts, his rere¬ 
 rank man covering him. Each file gallops on till they come 
 on his left, then turn to the left about, close, and dress to 
 the right. To form to the right, the right file turns to his 
 right, the rest pass in the rere, turn to the right and dress. 
 To form to the left, the whole have only individually to 
 turn to the left, dress, and close to the right. These 
 simple evolutions, with the charge, and wheeling in 
 squadron, and going about by subdivision, are all that are 
 necessary for such a corps to know, and this they might 
 be taught in a week. 
 
 A corps of Harlans (30), which were in the service of 
 the King of Poland, answered very well the idea of a 
 yeomanry cavalry, and their establishment might be with 
 little variation adopted here. They were Tartars and 
 Mahomedans. The gentleman served in the front rank, 
 and carried a lance with a banderole, and a sabre; 
 his servant covered him in the rere rank, armed with 
 a carbine and sabre. The use of the lance for the 
 cavalry is not sufficiently understood. Great advan¬ 
 tages may be derived from it, either in the charge 
 or pursuit. The Cossacks use them in passing rivers; 
 
 (30) [ a Hulans.” —i.e., Hussars.] 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 43 
 
 they sound the depth of the water before them with the 
 butt of the lance. 
 
 Corps of peasantry (infantry) should be formed, of 
 whom certainly, upon an average, four hundred could be 
 found, who, under proper officers, might be entrusted 
 with arms, in every county*. They might be formed in 
 corps of fifty, each commanded by three officers, to wear 
 their own clothings They should have a musket, without 
 a bayonet (31); a pouch like the new magazines, to hold 
 cartridges and balls, a powder-horn, and a sword two 
 inches and a-half broad, straight and pointed, and two feet 
 in length, handle included, in a wooden scabbard. This 
 weapon is somewhat similar to that of the Homan Le¬ 
 gionaries, and is useful in the attack of a post, intrench- 
 ment, &c. They should not quit their county, and ought 
 
 * A person who considers every grey-coated man as a Defender, 
 will shudder at the idea of arming any of the Irish peasantry. Let 
 such weigh well this calculation :—There must he at least twenty- 
 three grand jurors in every county in Ireland; what description of 
 people must these he, if twenty of that number are not of sufficient 
 consequence and influence in their county, to produce among their 
 friends, tenants and dependents, with their adherents, twenty men 
 each, to whom they would entrust arms for mutual defence P If this 
 calculation is just, the number required is completed. These corps 
 should assemble for practice on Sunday and holiday evenings ; it 
 would be an amusement, and tend to prevent idleness and debauchery. 
 Where there is a police, the constables should be enrolled in them, 
 and might act as subordinate officers.— Author’sNote. [“... shudder 
 at the idea of arming any of the Irish peasantry —In 1795, as even 
 in our own days, the English knew very well what to expect from an 
 armed Irish peasantry, and they have ever since taken especial care 
 (witness the prodigious number of Acts of Parliament passed with 
 this sole object in view) to keep the Irish peasantry unarmed. The 
 trusty u adherents” of the grand juror class in Ireland, spoken of by 
 Keating, were, of course, the Orange yeomanry exclusively!] 
 
 (31) [‘ ‘ without a bayonet.”— Certainly not; the arm now to be 
 preferred would, of course, be a light rifle (such as the Enfield), with 
 the sword described in the text fitted to be used as a bayonet at need 
 —that is, just such an arm as at present used by the English Rifle 
 regiments.] 
 
44 
 
 DEFENCE OF IEELAND. 
 
 to be commanded by persons to whom they are attached by 
 interest. When on duty they should receive a shilling a 
 day and their rations. They should be practised at firing 
 at a mark*', covering and concealing themselves, always 
 acting two together, the one not firing till the other is 
 loaded; but they should never be troubled with any 
 manoeuvre, either of tactic or parade, which always de¬ 
 stroys the energy of the human faculties, and so far de¬ 
 stroys the effect which ought to be derived from light troops. 
 
 It will be right to consider, in case of an invasion, 
 what will be the probable turn of mind of the people. 
 Some of the peasantry would remain quiet spectators of 
 the events of the war; some would join that party who 
 seemed to bid fairest for success; others will join whoever 
 invites them by an offer of plunder. Some governments 
 are afraid to put arms in the hands of 'the peasantry, for 
 fear they should turn them against those by whom they 
 were intrusted with them. It is a vain precaution, be¬ 
 cause if they are determined upon it, they will find the 
 means of getting them from the scene of war. According 
 to the disposition they seemed to be in; if they showed a 
 good will to the cause, they might be attached to the 
 army, form a chain of out-posts, get intelligence, &c. If 
 they showed also a wavering disposition, they might be put 
 at a considerable distance in the rere. They might also be 
 employed to drive the cattle up the country, though this 
 would be a precarious experiment. But then the question 
 
 * Was this system of free corps of peasantry adopted, they might he 
 invited to join the standard or ordered hack. If they were armed 
 with pieces of a larger bore and greater length, to rest in order to take 
 aim, the weight, as they have nothing else to carry, would not be of 
 consequence, and they would throw a ball double the distance of the 
 ordinary muskets.— Author's Note. [This was the weapon of the 
 celebrated “ Shelmalier” marksmen of *98. But modern improve¬ 
 ments in the rifle have quite'superseded the use of so cumbrous a 
 gun.] 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 45 
 
 to be asked is, Can the soldiers be spared for that sendee 
 at such a time ? 
 
 In the year 1778, an invasion of England by the French 
 was talked of. The instructions given by government 
 were, that the army should drive the cattle up the coun¬ 
 try, and the farmers and peasantry march down to meet 
 the enemy on the coast. It is to be supposed they meant 
 to arm them. Probably they did not choose to trust 
 them to drive their own cattle, as supposing, if a farmer 
 could get a better price for his sheep from the French, 
 than he could from his own countrymen, he would prefer 
 the former (32). Some of the depots they had fixed on 
 were not five miles from the coast; they ought always to 
 be farther than a possible day’s march: the cavalry 
 patrolled from village to village, often out of sight even of 
 the coast, in the idea of conveying intelligence of the ap¬ 
 pearance of the enemy. Fixed stations of infantry, with 
 signal staffs on the heights, are preferable. If either 
 yeomanry, cavalry, or corps of peasantry, should be or¬ 
 dered from home, their families should not be suffered to 
 go with them, but receive a maintenance from the maga¬ 
 zines ; they would be in fact a kind of hostage for their 
 fidelity. 
 
 It would be necessary to form corps of burghers, in the 
 cities and considerable towns, under the municipal officers; 
 they would not require clothing. In the time of danger, 
 with proper encouragement, every housekeeper would as¬ 
 sociate with his neighbours, for the mutual security of 
 their properties. * 
 
 It would, perhaps, be alleged, it is dangerous to do all 
 this; these people are not to be entrusted with arms, be- 
 
 (32) [!] 
 
 * These are universally formed on the continent [under the name 
 of the National Guard] ; they frequently are not clothed ; a man 
 
46 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 cause they might use them against government. But, 
 surely, the times are replete with danger; there is danger 
 in every step we can take; and all prudence can do, is, to 
 weigh these dangers well, and adopt the lesser. If you do 
 not put (it might he said to government) confidence in the 
 people, they will not put confidence in you. In the time 
 of alarm they will associate with those, who can afford 
 protection from the mob of the country. That protection 
 the enemy will offer them; they will offer them arms if they 
 were wanted, which they are not, for the country is full 
 of arms. It is better, at all events, to assume the ap¬ 
 pearance of confidence while it can be done, for sooner or 
 later the people must ultimately be recurred to. 
 
 Let us now suppose, what wilL [1795] be the probable 
 consequence of a peace; trade will open between this 
 country and France; the wants of the two nations are 
 mutual; we want many things they have, and they want 
 all the articles our country produces. Our ports would 
 be filled with their shipping, and our country overrun 
 with their people. Can it be supposed they will not im¬ 
 port their principles ? It will be answered—but they 
 must be kept down. It is just as possible to stop the pro¬ 
 gress of time, as to stop the progress of thought; now 
 that the people everywhere are beginning to discover 
 
 may do his duty as well in a brown coat as a red one ; all parade is 
 mere childishness, answering merely ad captandum vidgus. The 
 most important posts in Paris are entrusted to the citizens. One 
 would think that would convince those who can he convinced by any¬ 
 thing, of the real state of the nation with whom we are at war 
 [1795], As to the armed peasantry, it they are commanded by 
 officers who understand that service, and, of course, to teach them 
 (which they would soon learn) how to act, they would be as useful in 
 the field, in such a country as this, as the best regulars in Europe. 
 The peasantry in Brittany, of whom the Cbouans (so called from their 
 war-cry) are a part, much resemble ours in the more remote parts, 
 and we see what they were capable of doing; but they were com¬ 
 manded by able officers.— Author's Note. 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 47 
 
 their own strength, it must be admitted that the few can¬ 
 not govern the many, except by opinion.* 
 
 * This has been called the Age of Reason, ho t it ought more pro¬ 
 perly to he, of Reason ing —of Discussion and Investigation.*— 
 Author's Note. 
 
CHAPTEK YIL 
 
 SYSTEM OE DEFENCE BY COEDONS. (33.) 
 
 The King of Prussia defends [1795] the Margrayiate of 
 Erandenburgh, on the side of Saxony, by a camp at 'Wit- 
 temberg; on the side of Hanover, by the post of Werben; 
 which, as he observes, secures it. 
 
 Poland recommends, for the defence of a river, when it 
 is part of a cordon, small corps of two thousand men every 
 five miles. This, with the reserves, would constitute a 
 body of thirty thousand men, to defend fifty miles of 
 front. His account of the battle of Cassano, and passage 
 of the Adda, is very instructive. 
 
 Lloyd says, the more extensive a frontier the easier de¬ 
 fended, because those who attack can act on one line only, 
 whereas those who defend can act on several. There is 
 scarce a spot from which those who defend may not draw 
 supplies, whereas those who attack can draw them but 
 from one. An assailing army should endeavour to come 
 
 (33) [‘ 4 System of Defence by Cordons * ’—The student must not by 
 any means pay implicit deference to the opinions expressed by Gen. 
 Keating in this Chapter. In the hands of a first-rate general the 
 Cordon system may, indeed, often he made to work effectively ; but 
 it is open to the serious objection that it divides the army of defence 
 in such a manner as to risk the safety of the whole by exposing the 
 base of operations to he carried by an active enemy whose whole force 
 may be brought to bear suddenly upon that single point; and it is 
 always dangerous in so far as it is likely to afford so many opportuni¬ 
 ties to such enemy to overpower and destroy the several divisions in 
 detail. If the defending army be so numerous in comparison with 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 49 
 
 to a decisive action; a defending army should avoid one, 
 or endeavour to render it indecisive. 
 
 The line of operations, is a line drawn from the point 
 where your magazines, or subsistence, is collected. That 
 which constitutes the ultimate object of your campaign, 
 he your intention offensive or defensive, an invading army 
 must choose the shortest time of operations; that of the 
 defending army must he governed by the line adopted by 
 the attacker. 
 
 If the defending army occupies a pass in front of the 
 attacker, the latter must send a corps in the rere of it. If 
 this corps is not beaten, the defending army must retire. 
 The best way of destroying an invading army, is by acting 
 on its flanks. 
 
 Before the system of defence is proceeded on, it is neces¬ 
 sary to examine the possible routes for an enemy to take 
 
 that of the enemy as to allow of an army of reserve of fully equal 
 numbers to be held in hand in a central position, the cordon may, 
 indeed, be garrisoned by the remainder; but that is almost the only 
 case in which the 4 system’ advocated in the text can be held to be a 
 safe one. In such a case the several detachments, however, will 
 really only be outposts of more than ordinary strength. The Chap¬ 
 ter is allowed to stand here, however, as a suggestive example of the 
 author’s treatment of a military problem—and that, although the 
 railway system of the present time, as well as other circumstances, so 
 materially affect the data upon which General Keating’s detailed 
 plan was founded—the rather that it contains many observations of 
 much practical interest in connexion with the military strength of 
 Ireland as a theatre of war. But it would be out of place to en¬ 
 deavour here to explain the principles of the Art of War upon the 
 basis of which alone a sound judgment can be exercised concerning 
 the theory unfolded in the text. A careful study of either of Napo¬ 
 leon’s Italian campaigns will readily supply even an ordinary reader 
 with examples enough on the subject; and if he is disposed to go 
 deeper into the matter he must be referred at once to the great text 
 book upon the science of strategy, General Jomini’s Traite des 
 Grandes Operations Militaires, in which a military history of the 
 great Frederick’s performance in the 4 Seven Years’War’ is made the 
 means of accurately analysing and defining the true principles and 
 best practice of the Art, and see Appendix, post ,—at the end.] 
 
50 
 
 DEFENCE OF IKELAND. 
 
 to strike at the capital, which is we suppose the object of 
 his attack. 
 
 They are as follows:— 
 
 Landing in Lough Foyle, 
 
 1. Strabane 
 
 2. Omagh 
 
 3. Augher 
 
 4. Monaghan 
 
 5. Cootehill 
 
 6. Kingscourt 
 
 7. Navan 
 
 8. Dublin 
 
 Secondly, by 1. Enniskillen 
 
 2. Cavan 
 
 3. Athboy 
 
 Thirdly, by Dungannon 
 Armagh 
 Dundalk 
 
 From Sligo, by Carrick 
 
 Mullingar 
 
 From the Shannon, by 
 
 Limerick 
 Birr, or 
 Maryboro’ 
 
 i 
 
 Eight days’ march (34) 
 
 | Nine days’ march. 
 
 # 
 
 | Eight days’ march. 
 Seven days’ march. 
 
 Nine days’ march 
 
 From Cork and the S. west, by 
 Clonmel and^j 
 Kilkenny, | 
 
 or !> Ten days’ march. 
 
 Cashel and | 
 
 Durrow J 
 
 (31) [“ Eight days' march”—“nine days' march” &c.—On the 
 supposition, of course, of the absence of railway communication.] 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 51 
 
 From Galway, by 
 Roscommon 
 Lanesboro’ 
 
 Cross the Shannon 
 Mullingar, or by 
 Athenry 
 Athlone 
 
 Cross the Shannon 
 Kilbeggan, or by 
 Loughrea 
 
 Banagher orPortumna 
 Cross the Shannon 
 Portarlington 
 
 Six days’ march. 
 
 From this statement, it appears, that the line from 
 Galway to Dublin, being the shortest line of operation, 
 is that which it is most probable an enemy will adopt. 
 
 We may suppose a probable attack to be made by the 
 enemy, thus : That he has established himself at Galway, 
 and advances on his line of operation towards Dublin. He 
 advances to the Shannon, leaves an intermediate post at 
 Kilconnel, and menaces Athlone, Banagher and Portumna, 
 or Clonfert. This compels you to divide your force. He 
 attacks one pass, penetrates and advances. 
 
 We suppose a plan of defence by cordons. The first 
 cordon embracing the capital, thus: 
 
 1 . 
 
 2 . 
 
 3. 
 
 4. 
 
 5. 
 
 From that to 
 
 The Boyne to Trim, 
 Edenderry, 
 Rathangan, 
 Kilcullen, 
 
 Liffey, 
 
 Blessington, 
 
 Bray River, 
 
 Sea. 
 
 This gives a cordon of sixty miles; the extremity of 
 each flank being thirty miles distant from the centre; sup- 
 
52 
 
 DEPENCE OP IRELAND. 
 
 posing it defended by one army, posted at or near Eden- 
 derry; the sea on each flank. 
 
 SECOND CORDON. 
 
 1. Gore’s Bridge, 
 
 2. Kilkenny, 
 
 3. Roscrea, 
 
 4. Banagher, 
 
 5. Athlone, 
 
 6. Colehill, 
 
 7. Finae, 
 
 8. Kingsconrt. 
 
 Three corps would be necessary on this, pour se donner 
 mutuellement les mains. 
 
 THIRD CORDON. 
 
 1. Cork, 
 
 2. Charleville, 
 
 3. Limerick, 
 
 4. Shannon to 
 
 5. Carrick, 
 
 6. Enniskillen, 
 
 7. Dungannon, 
 
 8. Newry. 
 
 This is a line of twelve days* march (35), constituting 
 the exterior cordon, of which the Shannon is a principal 
 part of the frontier. This should be occupied by camps or 
 cantonments, and is the grand line of operation, and that 
 whereon the troops should remain until the enemy de- 
 
 (35) [ a twelve days’ march’’ &c.—This observation is, of course, un¬ 
 founded under the circumstances of the present time, for the reason, 
 so often referred to, that if the railway communications be kept up 
 there can be no difficulty in moving an army in as many hours , 
 almost, as it would have required days in 1795. The movements of 
 the French army in Italy during the late war (1859) must have made 
 every one by this time familiar with the military uses of a modern 
 railway,] 
 
DEFENCE OF IEELAND. 
 
 53 
 
 velopes his plans. This line would require the following 
 force, thus distributed, viz.:— 
 
 At Cork 
 
 .. .. .. 4,000 men 
 
 Charleville .. 
 
 .1,000 
 
 Limerick 
 
 .3,000 
 
 Athlone 
 
 .6,000 
 
 Enniskillen .. 
 
 .1,000 
 
 Dungannon.. 
 
 .2,000 
 
 Newry 
 
 .1,000 
 
 "With a strong 
 
 advanced camp | 5 000 
 
 Galway .. 
 
 Killaloe 
 
 .’. 2,000 
 
 Portumna .. 
 
 .2,000 
 
 Lanesboro’ .. 
 
 .2,000 
 
 Carrick 
 
 .1,000 
 
 30,000 Total. 
 
 The reasons why it is probable an enemy would prefer 
 Galway to any other of the possible routes, are, that those 
 by the north, as well as by the south-west of the king¬ 
 dom, are less capable of supplying his army; besides, that 
 the face of the country presents much more difficulty to 
 him, and would oblige him to proceed with more slow¬ 
 ness and caution, than the route from Galway would 
 require, which would be disadvantageous to him, in addi¬ 
 tion to the line of operations being considerably longer. 
 From Galway the country is more open. If he crosses at 
 Lanesboro’, he has afterwards the Inny to cross, which 
 affords a position. Eanagher is on a saliant bow of the 
 river, and therefore capable of defence. 
 
 Lloyd says, if a river runs along your frontier en¬ 
 deavour to occupy two or three capital points on it, with 
 good and extensive fortresses, so that you may not only 
 cover your own country, but also make it impossible for 
 an enemy to penetrate without giving you an opportunity 
 of entering his, and cutting off his subsistence. 
 
54 
 
 DEFENCE OF IEELAND. 
 
 Of a river on a frontier he also says, though it be not 
 navigable, it may be of great use in military operations, if 
 it runs parallel to the frontier and crosses the principal 
 roads, because it then furnishes good positions on its 
 banks. An army cannot prevent the enemy throwing a 
 bridge under the protection of his artillery, but it may 
 prevent him from occupying such an extent of ground as 
 is necessary for him to deploy, and may attack it in any 
 part without being exposed to his artillery. 
 
 An invading army requires the direct roads to be in 
 good order, and the cross-roads broken. A defending 
 army, on the contrary, should cause the direct roads to be 
 broken, and the cross-roads made good. 
 
 The centre of the cordons of defence, is one and the 
 same with the point of the enemy’s line of operation, that 
 is of course Dublin; the grand or exterior cordon being 
 fully occupied with its due proportion of troops, and an 
 advanced army stationed at Galway, which, for the 
 reasons before and hereafter to be specified, is most likely 
 to be the point of debarkation. Having fortresses fully 
 garrisoned on the Shannon, and a strong garrison in the 
 capital, with a camp of reserve between it and the grand 
 cordon, and able to act upon either, the island may then, 
 so far as the exterior enemy is in question, be considered 
 as able to make a stand; for it would be presumptuous 
 indeed to say, it was in a complete state of 
 defence. The troops supposed to be destined for the cor¬ 
 don, garrisons, &c., must be infantry and artillery, with 
 small detachments of light cavalry to each corps or army; 
 and hosts of the same along the coast, for which service 
 3,000 light cavalry would be sufficient; the remainder 
 of the cavalry cantoned through the counties to maintain 
 internal peace, which, reckoning three hundred in each 
 county, a low computation, would take 10,000 more; the 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 55 
 
 garrison for the capital to he five thousand, and the army 
 of reserve ten thousand. The number of troops, therefore, 
 requisite to put this country in a state of safety, would 
 thus amount to something less than sixty thousand men 
 actually fit for the field. 
 
 If the question is asked, why disperse your army in a 
 cordon ?—keep them in great bodies, able to march to any 
 point at a minute’s notice. To this it is to be observed, 
 that it is only possible to guess where the descent may he 
 made. They may threaten* five points at the same time, 
 and it shall he impossible to the stations on the coast to 
 tell which is the real attack, until they have absolutely 
 landed. Suppose five expresses to government, from 
 different quarters of the island, announce an enemy on 
 the coast. Three of these perhaps are squadrons of fri¬ 
 gates ; one an army of amusement, making a feint; the 
 other the grand army. If the army for defence of the 
 kingdom is in two camps, it is impossible that the army 
 of the south could quit its station to act in the north, and 
 vice versa . But even if it could be imprudent enough to 
 do so on the first report, what would be the consequence ? 
 The false attacks meeting no resistance would become real 
 ones. But where are the magazines to maintain together 
 a great force in one point ? How will they he supplied 
 on the march ? Either you quit your magazines to meet 
 
 * The French bring great numbers into action. Where a nation 
 has such immense force of men, it is generally misapplied; they 
 throw their numbers into such vast bodies, as to become unmanage¬ 
 able. The true way of employing them to advantage has been dis¬ 
 covered by the French, of dividing and attacking upon many points 
 at once. This forces their enemy to divide ; he is of course inferior 
 everywhere, and beaten in detail. It is never the interest of the 
 smaller force to divide, if it can keep together. An army of forty 
 thousand men may heat an army of eighty thousand, because that 
 number cannot be brought into action. But divide them into four 
 parts : the four armies of twenty thousand will invariably beat those 
 composed of ten.— Author's Note. 
 
56 
 
 DEFENCE OE IEELAKD. 
 
 the enemy on the coast, or you remain in your central 
 position (not being able to quit them), for the enemy are 
 to come to you; in that case you are obliged to act on a 
 cordon. Immediately on such intelligence as above com¬ 
 ing to the seat of government, what would be the orders ? 
 —not to march, but—report; a second report must be 
 made, and how soon? by the time the enemy have 
 actually debarked, and when they are formed on your 
 coast. Then, indeed, comes the word, march! but in 
 what form ? you meet the enemy on the coast if he chooses 
 to wait there; if he does not, where do you meet him ? If 
 it is not too presumptuous it might be said, it must be on 
 some part of the cordon, as above laid down. You come 
 to an action; if you beat him, you pursue him. Eut 
 suppose it turns out otherwise, that he comes on you with 
 superior force, or beats you, you must retreat to the 
 second cordon, to the third cordon; concentrate your 
 force there, if you can; if not, fall back on the capital. 
 
 Eut if your armies are in two great corps, your maga¬ 
 zines must be with them. If you march down then to the 
 coast, your line of operation becomes longer than your 
 enemy’s. Yet the whole of your magazines must follow, 
 or you may be cut off from them. If you cannot keep 
 the field, but must come to an immediate action for want 
 of them, you do exactly what the enemy wishes. Your 
 centre magazines would be much better supplied by sub¬ 
 stituting smaller ones in different stations. 
 
 It will be proved from experience, that the system of 
 cordons has always been adopted, and when it has failed 
 the fault was not there. The reason why the system of 
 cordons is the best, are: First, your troops are easier 
 maintained: Secondly, they are easier drawn together: 
 Thirdly, their positions must be better chosen: and, 
 Fourthly, that if the enemy, after being opposed in 
 
DEFENCE OF IEEE AND. 
 
 57 
 
 force on the cordon, succeeds and penetrates, he does not 
 get at your magazines, hut you cut off his; for when he 
 advances, the troops left on the cordon act upon the 
 flanks of his line of operations, cut off his supplies, and 
 harass his rere. If he defeats your army, your grand 
 magazines fall into his hands; hut if they are detached 
 upon the cordon, he cannot turn out of his line to seize 
 them. 
 
 That they are easier maintained, being dispersed at 
 twenty or fifteen miles distance, than if they were assem¬ 
 bled in a grand army at any one point, is pretty obvious. 
 The reason why they are easier drawn together is this: 
 their magazines are not confined to a point. Thus, for 
 example, an enemy is in the west; orders come for the 
 troops on the grand cordon to rendezvous at Athlone; the 
 orders are issued, and the post is occupied as follows : 
 
 First day, garrison consists of 
 
 That day there arrives from Portumna .. 
 
 Lanesboro’.. 
 
 At Galway.. 
 
 6,000 men. 
 2,000 
 2,000 
 5,000 
 
 There are thus brought together in one day 15,000 
 
 The second day,—from Killaloe 2,000 ) „ 
 
 Carrick 1,000 / d > 000 
 
 The third day from Dublin the army 
 
 of reserve .. 10,000 \ 
 
 Enniskillen 1,000 > 14,000 
 
 Limerick 3,000 ) 
 
 32 000 
 
 Thus 32,000 men are brought together in three days, 
 There is no difficulty for forage, &c., as they find it at the 
 several posts on their march upon the cordon. The same 
 in regard to carriages; the roads, it is supposed, they must 
 have in proper order, and be well acquainted with. The 
 
58 
 
 DEFENCE OE IRELAND. 
 
 army of reserve should be able to march, for instance, on 
 at least two columns; the troops from the cordon, being 
 fewer in number, might march on one. It would not he 
 necessary for the magazines to follow, for this reason, that 
 if there is at Athlone provisions for six thousand men (as 
 there ought) for two months, there are provisions for thirty 
 thousand for ten days; and during the interval of the 
 enemy’s being on the coast, they should forage with large 
 parties in the front of their cordon, and if possible reduce 
 it to a desart. But if the army waits the advance of the 
 enemy, whatever redundant forage is collected, should be 
 sent back at least behind the second cordon, and not more 
 than fourteen days’ provisions left with the grand army at 
 one time. 
 
 The troops on the extremity of the frontier, would at the 
 same time close inwards. A detachment from Cork would 
 occupy Limerick in three days, and from Dungannon to 
 Carrick in the same period. If the grand army is beaten, 
 those flank corps act upon the flanks of the enemy as he 
 advances; and the defending army occupies the position 
 previously ascertained on the second cordon, where its 
 magazines are ready formed. It must be observed, that 
 there are forced marches, but certainly not an unreasonable 
 calculation, for an army freed from baggage, and the 
 longest march not exceeding three days. 
 
 The positions upon these cordons, forage, and roads, 
 should be previously examined, and the state of forage 
 both in front and rere reported. Where the roads are not 
 good they should be repaired, and where wanting opened. 
 
 The advantage also of a cordon is, that byretreating you 
 concentrate your force; thus, if not strong enough to op¬ 
 pose on the first cordon, call back all your troops to the se¬ 
 cond. This will be further elucidated, by considering Dal¬ 
 ton’s cordon, between the Elbe and Iser. 
 
DEFENCE OF IEELAND. 
 
 59 
 
 If the alarm is a false one, the troops are easily counter¬ 
 manded. If the enemy lands on a flank, it of course takes 
 double the time to bring the same number together; there¬ 
 fore, the reserves should he stationed a portee of the weak¬ 
 est part, and the flanks strengthened as much as possible; 
 at all events, positions should be chosen in the rere to as¬ 
 semble on. Wherever an action is to he risked, the de¬ 
 fending army have it in their power to appoint the field, 
 which is in front of their position. This they can turn to 
 their advantage thus : if they are superior in cavalry, open 
 the ground for 800 yards front of the flanks, and occupy it 
 by the cavalry. If your army manoeuvres, give yourself 
 room. If it is composed of troops that you cannot rely on 
 in face of an enemy, occupy the hedges and ditches, 
 taking care to cut intervals in them, hut always so that 
 they are flanked with musketry. Break up all the passes, 
 roads, &c., in front of your grand cordon, except what it is 
 for your own convenience to keep. 
 
 Always forage in front. Keep not more than fourteen 
 days’ provisions in the magazines on your grand cordon ; 
 from them also on your second, and send back all your re¬ 
 dundancy there. The enemy will thus find nothing on 
 landing. The advanced corps on the coast should never 
 have more there than one week’s provisions in the maga¬ 
 zines. Dalton occupied his famous position between the 
 Iser and the Elbe, with twenty-six battalions and fourteen 
 squadrons, forming an arc of upwards of a hundred miles, 
 the mountains in his front, the curve towards the enemy. 
 
 They were cantoned as follows: 
 
 Reichenberg, 2 Battalions. 
 Lagebruch 2 
 
 Bomish Ancher 4 
 Lebenau 2 
 
 Reicbstadt & ) o 
 Leipee j 
 
 Memes & Gabel 2 
 
 Leitnerity & Teschen 2 
 Seefersdorf 2 
 
 Penkraty 2 
 
 Remburg 1 
 
 Georgethal 1 
 
60 
 
 DEFENCE OE IRELAND. 
 
 The cavalry distributed by Greisdorf, Einsiedal, Ober 
 andMeder Grand, were cantoned in the open country, 
 and in the centre of his line; his infantry in the moun¬ 
 tainous parts. Had he been attacked, his intention was 
 to take a position between Reichenberg and the Jeschkow- 
 berg As he fell back, he would have at the same time 
 concentrated his forces. The King of Prussia said his po¬ 
 sition was stronger than the citadel of Lisle By the ex¬ 
 cellence of this cordon, the hereditary dominions are 
 covered by 30,000 men effectually; but these points are all 
 studied by the Austrian and Prussian officers, in time of 
 peace, and when they go into the field, they are perfectly 
 acquainted with the strong and weak part of every posi¬ 
 tion. 
 
 M. Catinatwas obliged, in 1692, to defend a greater 
 frontier with about the same force, but failed for want of 
 magazines and carriages. An army cannot be expected to 
 act if deprived thus of locomotive powers. His line of 
 defence extended from the Lake of Geneva to the Mediter¬ 
 ranean. 
 
 Two examples of passage of a river are selected, because 
 they furnish an idea of the system of frontier war. The 
 Prince of Conti, obliged to pass the Rhine, retired to his 
 two bridges, a league below Worms, where the Rhine 
 forms an elbow. He encamped at Hordheim, the brook 
 Hoffheim to his right, the river Wirchnitz to his left, a 
 part of his army thrown back along this river to the village 
 of Yattenheim; he threw up detached redoubts, which 
 supported each other mutually along the whole front, be¬ 
 tween the two rivers, and some near the village 
 of Bolstat, a quarter of a league in his front; five 
 
 N. B.—Soldiers should learn to use shoes like the Croats, of un¬ 
 dressed leather ; by which an infinite trouble in campaigns would be 
 saved.— Author's Note. 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 61 
 
 redoubts were made round the heads of the bridges, and 
 the enemy could not pass without first taking them. The 
 baggage passed during the night. At day-break a corps 
 of cavalry showed itself, formed at Bolstat, and the army 
 crossed the Bhine. When the troops formed before Bolstat, 
 who masked the retreat, began also to retire, they were har¬ 
 assed by some irregulars, but being supported, retired in 
 order to the redoubts, covering the bridges; these checked the 
 enemy, and they were pursued and driven back to Bolstat. 
 Here the superiority of redoubts over lines proved itself. 
 The enemy could not have been pursued from the latter 
 without the army’s defiling, by which a precious time 
 would have been lost. 
 
 Montecuculi wished to penetrate into Alsace by Stras- 
 burgh, where also his magazines and bridges were. Tu- 
 renne taking a position near that city, compelled it to a 
 neutrality, and of course entrance was refused to Montecu¬ 
 culi, but it was the latter’s object to remove Turenne from 
 his position commanding Strasburgh; he therefore made a 
 feint as if he meant to besiege Philipsburgh. It was also 
 Turenne’s object to cutoff Montecuculi’s communication 
 with Strasburgh, and thereby from his magazines and 
 bridge. When therefore the latter moved towards Philips¬ 
 burgh, Turenne threw a reinforcement into that place, and 
 then crossed the Bhine, and occupied the strong camp of 
 Yilstett, by which he carried the following great points : 
 he cut off Montecuculi’s communication with his maga¬ 
 zines, carried the war out of his own country, prevented 
 any possibility of the enemy’s penetrating there, and 
 ultimately obliged his adversary to fall back and lose the 
 whole campaign, as effectually as he could have done it by 
 the most signal defeat. 
 
 This is a most instructive lesson, where the war is 
 carried on upon great rivers which are not easily fordable ; 
 
62 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 when that happens the business assumes a new face; and 
 it is necessary to watch everywhere, the grand army re¬ 
 taining a central position, a partie, to succour the whole. 
 The scene of Montecuculi’s manoeuvres was about sixty 
 miles in extent. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 ANOTHER PLAN. 
 
 Another system of defence may be, by concentrating the 
 great force of the kingdom at Athlone, and forming the 
 military depot for the whole there, leaving garrisons of 
 not less than 5,000 men in the capital, and in the north 
 and west parts of the kingdom. In this case it would be 
 necessary to have a large force in the county of Cork, as it 
 would otherwise take six days’ march for an army, in case 
 of an enemy landing there. Limerick also must be 
 strongly occupied; but if Galway were threatened at the 
 same time, the Athlone army would be held in check; 
 while an army landing in the south-west could march di¬ 
 rect by Clonmel and the Barrow, crossing that river and 
 leaving it on its left for Dublin; the whole of which route 
 the country is abundantly provided with all things neces¬ 
 sary for its support. In that case, if the Cork army acts 
 on the flank of the enemy, the Athlone army must fall 
 back on Dublin. This gives an enemy, if in any force on 
 the coast of Galway, an opportunity of landing and pene¬ 
 trating to the Shannon; then the enemy’s two armies 
 might effect a junction, as to a moral certainty; all the 
 out corps must be called in, to form and defend the capital. 
 
 If the grand army is attacked with a great force on the 
 Leinster side of the Shannon, and at the same time with 
 another force from Galway, its retreat is cut off; it can 
 occupy no position, and must if defeated be destroyed, and 
 the island conquered; therefore, it cannot in that case 
 
64 
 
 DEFENCE OE IEEEAND. 
 
 stay there, it must fall back to the third cordon; then all 
 its magazines at Athlone are lost. 
 
 If a central army marches to the south point of the 
 kingdom, it cannot protect the Shannon, and if the Shan¬ 
 non is ever gained by an enemy’s army of 40,000 men, all 
 the forces of the empire will not dislodge it; nor could the 
 army from the south fall back in time to protect the capi¬ 
 tal. At any rate the magazines ought not to be formed 
 at Athlone, but considerably in the rere. It is also certain, 
 that take what position on the Shannon you will, if a 
 hostile detachment lands either in the north or west, it is 
 on your rere; you must either beat it or retire. Nor can 
 a cordon be formed according to this plan; the communica¬ 
 tion with the capital must be maintained by an inter¬ 
 mediate post. Let the great position be where it will, 
 Lublin must be maintained, in order to preserve the com¬ 
 munication with England. This intermediate force must 
 be strong, or it is nothing; if you make it strong, you so 
 far diminish the force you oppose to the enemy. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 ON CAMPS-POSITIONS—AND INUNDATIONS* 
 
 The King of Prussia says, get good provincial charts and 
 study them, impressing on the mind the names and situa¬ 
 tions of cities, rivers, and chains of mountains. Having 
 acquired a general idea of the country, proceed to particu¬ 
 lars ; examine the direction of the roads, where an attack 
 would he likely to he attended with most ease and success, 
 and what force would be required; how far rivers are 
 navigable, and where fordable; discover if they are dry in 
 summer, or impassable in winter; observe the state of the 
 lands, and what the general produce is; by what route an 
 army can march from one city or river to another, and 
 mark the best positions on these routes. Of plain and 
 open countries we easily acquire an idea, of mountainous 
 and woody with more difficulty, yet they must be known; 
 ride into them with your map in your hand; take 
 peasants, hunters, &c., with you; ascend the highest 
 grounds, compare their answers with your map. Observe 
 how many columns could march, or if it is possible to 
 turn the enemy’s rere or dank. Mark where a defensive 
 camp could be taken, but particularly observe the gorges, 
 or debouchures. Revolve in your mind all the possible 
 contingencies that can take place in those situations, so 
 that if they become the seat of war, you may carry a 
 clear impression of the whole in your mind. This must 
 be done while you have leisure, and are unobstructed. 
 
66 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 The following circumstances are required and absolutely 
 necessary to a camp, viz., wood [fuel] and water. The 
 front should he covered, and the rere open. 
 
 The coup d’oeil consists in the following faculties; the 
 first is, to judge how many troops will occupy a certain 
 position, from examining it with the eye. The second, 
 which is a much more arduous talent, consists in being 
 able to seize at once (mentally) and decide upon every 
 advantage the locality can give. [This talent practice 
 can acquire and perfect.] An able general turns the 
 smallest height, a hollow road, a ditch, to his advantage. 
 
 The square of six miles will afford two hundred posi¬ 
 tions, and no two alike. A general's eye at the first 
 glance decides which of all of them is the best. 
 
 Nothing is so difficult (says the King) as to defend the 
 passage of a river for a considerable length. I would 
 never undertake it if it exceeded fifty miles, or was ford¬ 
 able. He remarks, that if you have a river in front, 
 your field of battle must be within half musket shot of 
 your position (36). 
 
 The King of Prussia says, in choosing a position for a 
 camp, to cover a country, it is not merely the strength of 
 that position which is to be considered, but its relative 
 situation; that is to say that it must not only be strong, 
 but it must be so situated that, notwithstanding its 
 strength, the enemy must attack it, in order to proceed 
 upon his plans (37). It cannot be expected that such a 
 
 ( 3 fi) [“ within half musket shot” &c .—It need scarcely be ob¬ 
 served that since the date of the pamphlet (and the time of the 
 celebrated King of Prussia) the improvements in fire-arms are such 
 that the u half musket shot” of those days would not be much more 
 than one-sixth of the distance which to-day might be described in 
 the same words.] 
 
 ( 37 ) [“ choosing a position for a camp ”—The principles upon 
 which the position for a camp is chosen are so inseparably connected 
 with the science of tactics that it would be impossible to make them 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 87 
 
 position should coyer every posssible road that the enemy 
 could advance on; but it must command those which are 
 most material to his grand design. It must he such a 
 one, that in case of attack, the army which defends it 
 must have no cause of apprehension, and that the enemy 
 must have great doubt of his success; and also such a one 
 that the enemy cannot avoid, without subjecting himself* 
 to the greatest risk and inconveniency,—that he must 
 make wide circuitous marches to avoid it, while I by 
 small movements can anticipate him in all his attempts. 
 
 The position at Nieustadt covers all Lower Silesia, on 
 the side of Moravia, a frontier of a hundred miles; the 
 river and town in front of the post. If the enemy attempts 
 to pass between Ollmachen and Glatz, a movement be¬ 
 tween INeufs and Ziegenhals cuts his communication off 
 with Moravia; a camp between Schomberg and Lieban, 
 guards Silesia on the side of Bohemia. An enemy 
 cannot advance on the side of Cone, if I am posted between 
 Troppau and Yagerndorff; if he does, his convoys are cut 
 off (38). 
 
 intelligible otherwise than by explaining the elementary principles of 
 that science. The inquiring reader may be referred to the Cours de 
 Tactique , par G. H. Dtjfour, (the present General-in-chief of the 
 Army of the Swiss Confederation, formerly an officer in the service of 
 the Great Emperor Napoleon, and the first authority in Europe during 
 the last thirty years upon these subjects,) a little volume published by 
 Cherbuliez, Paris, and Geneva; also to the Memorial pour les 
 Travaux de Guerre, by the same author; and to M. XJrb ain’s 
 Memorial des Camps, Arnhem, 1827 ; besides, upon the general sub¬ 
 ject of Strategy, the great works of General Jomini. In the English 
 language the best, if not the only valuable, book of reference is the 
 Aide-Memoire of Military Sciences (“framed from contributions of 
 officers of different services, and edited by a Committee of the Corps 
 of Royal Engineers in Dublin, 1845 ”), published in six parts, or vols., 
 by J. Weale, London, 1845-59 ; especially part I., vol. I. ( 1845 ), and 
 part I., vol. II. ( 1848 ).—See also Appendix, post.] 
 
 ( 38 ) [The examples in this paragraph, taken from the military 
 positions of Frederick the Great, can only be understood by reference 
 
68 
 
 DEFENCE OF IKELAND 
 
 Positions are natural fortification. All that is requisite 
 is the talent to see and to choose them. Prom the above 
 example the following conclusion is to be drawn • that 
 however necessary fortresses may he, and however ex¬ 
 pedient it is for a nation to have its most important posts 
 fortified, yet that they do not constitute the best or only 
 defence of a country ; and that it is by manoeuvring armies, 
 and able generals, that they are to be either conquered or 
 defended. 
 
 It is always prudent to intrench the camp in the neigh¬ 
 bourhood of the enemy, taking care to leave many and 
 large debouchures, that the movements of the army may 
 not be cramped. No difficult ground should intersect a 
 camp ; if there is any such, numerous passes ought imme¬ 
 diately to be made over it. 
 
 An army commands as much of a position as it is in 
 reach of in an easy day’s march, on both flanks. If the 
 enemy is ten miles in your front, you must be acquainted 
 with his movements. If he marches to your right flank, 
 you extend yourself in your position to your right; the 
 position should always describe an arc ; the curve to the 
 enemy. Two armies of ten thousand men each, will oc¬ 
 cupy a country for thirty miles (39). If it is meant for a 
 defensive position, break up bridges and roads in the 
 front, and throw chevaux-de-frize, &c., in the fords, to 
 make the advance on it difficult. If it is meant to march 
 towards the enemy, open as many roads as possible, that 
 
 to a good map of the country. With respect to these, as to all other 
 examples taken from Frederick’s career, the diligent student will do 
 well to refer to Johini’s Traite des Grandes Operations Militaires, 
 the Atlas to which contains every thing needful to the study of the 
 Seven Years’ War, and therein to the topography of the military ex¬ 
 ploits of the greatest master of the Art of War in modern times, 
 after Napoleon himself.] 
 
 (39) [“ Two armies &c.—See Note (32), ante.] 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 69 
 
 the army may be put upon as many columns as its strength 
 requires Always detach out-lying piquets and grand 
 guards beyond rivers.' If it is near you, throw up works 
 to defend the bridges or fords you leave passable, and oc¬ 
 cupy the mountains with your armed peasantry, if you 
 have them. 
 
 The mountains of Ireland are not like those of the con¬ 
 tinent, to which the King of Prussia alludes, as before 
 quoted: they hear no campaign, therefore a foreign 
 officer, reading of the mountains in this country would be 
 quite deceived if he imagined them to be rough, rocky, 
 covered with fine forests, producing grain, inhabited, and 
 with narrow defiles. Ours are wild high wastes, boggy, 
 and unfit for man or beast, but entirely open. 
 
 The bogs in Ireland are sometimes insulated, and more 
 frequently in chains. They seem to have been originally 
 formed by the casual obstruction of some small stream of 
 water, not of sufficient force to work a channel for itself, 
 and stagnating in this moist climate, where the sun has 
 not power to make it evaporate quickly, and where the 
 tendency to vegetation is very great. A spongy substance 
 forms itself, increases of course the stagnation, retains the 
 moisture, and grows from year to year. Probably if the 
 country were not inhabited, and the exertion of human 
 industry opposed to this process of nature, in a few cen¬ 
 turies all Ireland would be one vast bog. These bogs are, 
 some more and some less, to a certain degree passable in 
 summer for men, but unable to bear a horse or carriage. 
 They have generally a very gradual fall, as the principle 
 of their formation evinces, which is necessary to be ob¬ 
 served, as their use in a military light in a great measure 
 depends on this circumstance. They are generally sur¬ 
 rounded, immediately at their edges, by elevated ground 
 which commands them. 
 
70 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 The more water is obstructed, the more impassable the 
 hog behind it becomes, and where an army can have 
 ground of this kind on its front or flank, it should en¬ 
 deavour to render that part of its position impracticable, 
 wherever a head of water could by means of dams he 
 formed with most advantage. Ey doing it, these hogs 
 spread to a very wide extent, and in parts contract very 
 narrow. The narrowest point through which the stream 
 runs should be taken for making the inundation, by 
 throwing a dam from the projecting point of the high 
 ground, on one side, to that on the opposite. This should 
 he commanded, especially the lower side, by a work 
 mounted with artillery, which should rake the whole of 
 the embankment. It should be covered by chevaux-de- 
 frize, an abbatis [of felled trees inrerlaced], &c., or strong 
 pallisades; the hogs often supply timber of oak fit for this. 
 If the fall is one yard in two hundred, which is a medium 
 calculation, an embankment of this kind twenty-one feet 
 high, will inundate the position for near an English mile; 
 but it would render all the hog behind it impassable, by 
 its absorbing the water, and become too wet to bear a 
 man, especially if assisted by rains. 
 
 Our rivers are generally small, hut with strong hanks, 
 therefore of great consequence in military operations. No 
 river is so deep or so wide, as to he relied on for security; 
 it must still be guarded. They are the most certain 
 features in the face of a country; they mark the ground 
 for military operations, and are in nature what scales and 
 degrees are on a map. If an army occupies a position, a 
 river is most advantageous on its front; if an army is in 
 march, on its flank. 
 
 A dry season may render a river passable where it never 
 was; sometimes fords are not known except to very few. 
 No river is so large, that it ought to be considered im- 
 
DEFENCE OF IEELAND. 
 
 71 
 
 passable; nor none so small, that advantage may not be 
 drawn from it. Any mill-stream may be turned to tbe 
 purpose of inundation. 
 
 The greatest position afforded in Ireland, is the west 
 bank of the Shannon; another presents itself from Ma¬ 
 guire’s-bridge to Charlemont in the North. One might 
 also be taken from Portadown to Newry; also from Bel- 
 turbet to Carrick. Prom Kilkenny to Nenagh affords a 
 chain of positions of a great extent. 
 
 Every position that it is possible could ever be required, 
 should be previously examined; its advantages and dis¬ 
 advantages noted down; the points to be fortified marked; 
 the quantity of artillery and troops it would require entered 
 down, that at a minute’s notice it might be occupied; if 
 it is to be fortified, the peasantry on the arrival of the 
 officer of engineers might be immediately set to work, in 
 case of invasion. 
 
 Instead of bat horses, two-wheeled carriages should be 
 ordered for the conveyance of the troops’ baggage; they 
 should be so constructed that they could be taken to 
 pieces, and carried over difficult passes; as also, in case 
 of a horse sinking, that they might be put on others. 
 
 It would be advisable to have flying corps, composed 
 of ten companies of grenadiers or light infantry, with four 
 field pieces, and a squadron of light dragoons; they would 
 be advanced in front of the grand army; they ought to 
 be disencumbered of all unnecessary baggage, and carry 
 an additional number of rounds of ammunition. Every 
 man should have a blanket large enough to cover his head 
 and feet, and a watch coat made as light as possible*. 
 
 * The shoes of undressed leather, used hy the Croats, might be 
 adopted to great advantage by our military, if they only used them 
 on marches. The consumption and expense of shoes is inconceivable. 
 In that case every man could make his own. All that is requisite is 
 
72 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 Gunboats on the lakes and at tbe entrance of the Shan¬ 
 non would be of use. 
 
 If two armies execute flank movements, each on their 
 respective positions, in order to pre-occupy a post, pass, 
 &c., and one has a greater length of march to perform 
 than the other, that disadvantage must be got over, either 
 by making the road more easy, or so that a greater front 
 may march on it; or, secondly, by turning the attention 
 of the enemy, by a diversion on some other point, and so 
 concealing your movement, unless there is a sufficient 
 force to be able to detach cavalry to harass his rear, or 
 light infantry to intercept him at a defile. 
 
 Whichever army occupies the pass first, the other 
 cannot force it in his presence, nor can the occupier, al¬ 
 though so far master of it, attempt the passage in the face 
 of his adversary, without the greatest precaution. 
 
 The advantages of high ground for positions, are, that 
 the enemy’s movements are all open to you, while yours 
 are concealed from him. In case of an attack, he is ex¬ 
 posed to the fire of your artillery and musketry, 
 while his has little effect on you. If an army has an 
 enemy in front, and advances, it must open roads; but in 
 flank marches, three roads are all required. If there is 
 but one made road, that should be reserved for the bag¬ 
 gage, and other roads should be opened for the two columns. 
 These flank roads should be marked out on the army’s 
 coming into its position; they should be wide enough to 
 admit a company in front. 
 
 When an army marches into a country, where it has 
 not had time to prepare the roads, for example, in five 
 columns, each column will have its guides in front, who, 
 by camp colours, will mark out the route of the column, 
 
 ft piece of undressed hide, which he cuts to the shape of the foot; it 
 laces from the toe to above the ankle.— Author 1 s Note. 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 73 
 
 according to the directions of the quartermaster-general; 
 the pioneers follow the guides and level the road for their 
 column; the baggage should, if possible, march on the 
 high road. 
 
 The army ought to have so many roads open in rere of 
 its position, as in case of necessity to be able to retreat 
 on six columns. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 DUTY OF OFFICERS. 
 
 When an officer, of what rank soever, arrives at his 
 post, he should come provided with the best general and 
 local maps he can procure. If it is on the coast, he should 
 also get a chart of it (40). These he should compare with 
 the ground, examine what depth of water there is, how 
 high the tide rises, where shipping would command the 
 shore, and where they would he commanded by it. He 
 should examine all the roads, passes, rivers, fords, moun¬ 
 tains and positions, calculate their distances by 
 his computation—for instance, by the time he takes 
 in going from one to the other. He should ex¬ 
 amine the state of the country as to forage, take the 
 number of mills, how much they usually work, and what 
 they have in store; inquire where corn and other articles 
 of provision are kept; what fairs there are, and whence the 
 cattle are brought. He should cultivate acquaintance with 
 the people of the country, and endeavour to find out their 
 temper and disposition, in order to be able to answer inqui- 
 
 ( 40 ) [ u the best general and local maps,’’ &C.-^In Ireland there is 
 no longer any difficulty about Maps and Charts. The Ordnance 
 Survey Maps give every thing ; those of the Geological Survey (an 
 inch to the mile) give even the elevations pretty well. The military 
 engineer needs but roughly sketch in the hills and hollows, and other 
 features remarkable in a military point of view, on the large scale 
 Townland Survey sheets. The “ Duty of Officers” shortly described 
 in this chapter refers to the case of the officers of a strange army in 
 an enemy’s country only.] 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 75 
 
 ries, and point them out to his superiors. He should be 
 on horseback constantly, when not on other duties; ex¬ 
 amine things with his own eyes, and not trust to reports. 
 If there are no maps of the country, he must compute 
 the distances of towns, roads, rivers, &c., from rough 
 maps from his own calculations. Where there is a posi¬ 
 tion, he should measure the distance of the neighbouring 
 heights by paces, and see if it is commanded; this know¬ 
 ledge, previously acquired, will give him confidence in a 
 time of danger. In time of harvest he should calculate 
 how much corn of all sorts is in the country, and inquire 
 whither it usually goes. 
 
 Fuel is an essential article; he should inquire what 
 stock there is of that, and if there is a sufficiency for 
 troops in case of being put in winter cantonments. All 
 this inquiry is necessary to possess an officer with that 
 general and miscellaneous knowledge, without which he 
 never can be of use. 
 
 If he is in an advanced post he must be cautious not 
 to give any unnecessary alarms, to impress the public 
 with an idea of extraordinary alertness; and not trans¬ 
 mit a report till he has examined into the foundation of 
 it himself. 
 
 The following anecdote of the great Gustavus Adolphus, 
 transmitted to us by Prince Henry of Prussia, strongly 
 authorises the principles here laid down. His words are:— 
 
 “ II dit, (Schildknecht officier d’ingenieurs) que le Mo- 
 narque Suedois etant au camp de Beerwalde, avoit pro- 
 jette de s’emparer d’un defile, pour surprendre les Impe- 
 riaux dans leur camp. Mais que comme il ne se fioit 
 jamais aux cartes gravees & qu’il etoit impossible d’aller 
 reconnoitre le terrein parceque l’ennemi Toccupoit, cet 
 ingenieur en fit le plan d’apres le rapport des habitans, & 
 le presenta aux Eoi qui dirigea sa marche en consequence, 
 
76 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 mais l’armee, ay ant d’arriver au defile, se trouva tout 
 d’un coup vis-a-vis d’un marais qui n’etoit pas 
 marque dans le plan de l’ingenieur. Ce marais 
 pouvoit etre defendu par l’ennemi, & couter beaucoup de 
 monde aux Suedois. Le Eoi rebroussa chemin, & traita 
 fort malle pauvre Schildknecht, qui assura sa Majeste que 
 le plan avoit ete fait sur le rapport d’un vieux gentil- 
 bomme & d’un ecclesiastique du lieu. Eb bein, dit le 
 Eoi en plaisantant, suivez ces braves gens, & faites vous 
 montrer ce marais pour n’en pas tromper d’autres.” (41). 
 
 ( 41 ) [“He said (Schildknecht, an officer of the engineers), that 
 the Swedish Monarch being at the camp of Beerwalde, had designed 
 to possess himself of a certain defile, in order to surprise the Impe¬ 
 rialists in their camp. But that as he never placed confidence in en¬ 
 graved maps (that is, those of the time), and as it was impossible to 
 reconnoitre the ground since it was occupied by the enemy, this en¬ 
 gineer made a map of it according to the report of the neighbouring 
 inhabitants, which he presented to the King, who directed his march 
 accordingly; hut the army, before reaching the defile, found itself all 
 on a sudden in front of a marsh, which was not marked at all on the 
 engineer’s map. This marsh might be defended by the enemy, and 
 might have cost many men to the Swedes. The King retraced his 
 steps, and spoke to poor Schildknecht very harshly; who assured his 
 Majesty that the Map had been made on the report of an old gentle¬ 
 man and of an ecclesiastic of the neighbourhood. ‘Very well,’ said 
 the King, laughing, ‘ follow these good people, and make them show 
 you the marsh, so as not to lead any one else into such a mistake/ ’*] 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 
 ON THE INTEENAL SITUATION OF THE COUNTBY. 
 
 If you have no great magazines, and live only from day 
 to day, and the people of the country are ill-affected to 
 you, and cut off your daily and casual supplies, what 
 becomes of the war ? If a country is in a state of defence, 
 there should he a year’s provision in advance in the mili¬ 
 tary magazines. If there is not a sufficiency wherever 
 the army comes, they or the people of the country must 
 starve. The consequence of starving is desperation and 
 pillage. What kind of foraging parties must you then 
 send out ? There is no country where*a good understand¬ 
 ing between the army and country people is so necessary 
 as in Ireland. At any rate your magazines ought to be 
 formed this year for the ensuing one. Suppose you are 
 obliged to take the field in March or April—such a thing 
 is impossible—where is your com, potatoes, or fuel? 
 Where forage for your cavalry before August? These 
 are serious considerations, and no one thinks of them. 
 The generality of people imagine all that is necessary 
 for an army to take the field, is to have canvas to cover 
 them (42). 
 
 (42) [It is plain that General Keating in this paragraph speaks 
 only of an English army in Ireland. If an English army were looked 
 on as friendly to the people it would he different. So in case a 
 French army should chance at any time to he welcomed as friendly 
 to the people of Ireland it would be still more different for them.'] 
 
78 
 
 DEFENCE OF IEELANB. 
 
 The business of maintaining an army, so as to keep its 
 operations unclogged, is a science by itself. It must be 
 considered, that in an emergency, the country will be 
 charged cent, per cent, more than the value. Whatever 
 is bought in the country might he paid in government 
 debentures; small ones might be struck off for that pur- 
 pose (43). 
 
 What is the loss of ten sail of the line and two hun¬ 
 dred transports to the Trench, compared to getting pos¬ 
 session of this country ? It is to be hoped government 
 will see the consequence of it in due time. In four days 
 from the appearance of an enemy on the coast, it is 
 possible for them to be in possession of all Connaught, and 
 probably a considerable part of Ulster. Imagine the 
 situation of this country with forty thousand French on 
 the west of the Shannon, and ten thousand from Belturbet 
 to bTewry. If our forces advance toward Connaught, the 
 French army of the north is in their rere; if against the 
 north, the army of Connaught is on their left and rere (44). 
 
 Immediately on landing, the enemy would most pro¬ 
 bably publish a proclamation, offering indemnity and 
 security to all who staid at home (45), and inviting the coun¬ 
 try people to bring provisions to his camp. This would open 
 a communication between them, and facilitate his means 
 of procuring intelligence. If he found the people of the 
 
 (43) [“ paid in Government debentures ”—During the late war in 
 Italy it is a notable fact that the French army paid for everything 
 its full value in gold.] 
 
 (44) [“ on the west of the Shannon —As has been already ob¬ 
 served times are so changed since Mr. Keating wrote, in 1795, that 
 an army of 50.000 men could now land anywhere, and could be in 
 the centre of Leinster, or before Dublin itself, as quickly and as easily 
 as at that time it could be at Galway or at Newry either.] 
 
 (45) [“ indemnity and security —An invading army “of libera¬ 
 tion” would offer even more, and would take measures to give prac¬ 
 tical proof of its sincerity at once.] 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 79 
 
 country ill-affected to the government (46), he would 
 deliver out arms to them, and take them in pay, form 
 pioneers, free corps, &e. 
 
 Probably no inducement could make an Englishman 
 act in concert with a Frenchman; such is their antipathy. 
 There is, as yet, no affection between the two nations 
 here, but there certainly is no antipathy to the French (47). 
 
 Any one who has seen the wealth and happiness of the 
 Dutch and Flemish peasantry, and afterwards seen them 
 run over to their invader, will he apt to inquire if there 
 are any peculiar circumstances in the case of the Irish 
 peasantry which will induce them to adopt a contrary 
 conduct. If they are not more wealthy, more happy, 
 and more independent; if they are not more attached to 
 their laws and government; if they have not more reason 
 to he so, is it probable that they vail adopt a contrary 
 conduct ? The Flemings certainly lived under a happy go¬ 
 vernment, and had no reason to dislike the house of 
 Austria. Every well-wisher to his country ought to con¬ 
 sider these points in time; in the moment of danger it is 
 too late, and we must at last recur to the peasantry for 
 protection.* 
 
 (46) [“ ill-affected to the Government .”—It appears Lieutenant 
 Keating (who was, indeed, but a Munster u Papist” after all) was 
 able to form a pretty good guess as to the dispositions of the people of 
 Ireland towards an invading army. But it is to be remembered the 
 invaders he contemplates are always the French.'] 
 
 (47) [ u no antipathy to the French .”—It would be but strange in¬ 
 gratitude if there were—and we know that for the idea of “ ingrati¬ 
 tude” there is no expression known to the Irish language.] 
 
 * The planters in the West India Islands are obliged to adopt the 
 desperate resource of arming their negro slaves, and our men of pro¬ 
 perty are afraid to trust their own tenants I If this is the case, can 
 anything be more desperate than our situation ? The French, when 
 their country was invaded, armed the whole people, and the people 
 did not betrav their trust. II ow wretched then must be the situa¬ 
 tion of those, who are afraid to recur to such an expedient, 
 and with what face will they attempt it, when it can be no longer 
 
80 
 
 DEFENCE OF IEELAND. 
 
 One cannot but be surprised, that the importance of this 
 country should have struck the world in general so little of 
 late years. Previous to the independence of America, it was 
 an obscure spot at the extremity of the old world, and 
 would probably have remained so, had America continued 
 to be peopled only with savages, ignorant of navigation, 
 and consequently incapable of coming forward in the 
 great theatre of the human race. America has as yet 
 much to do at home; probably it will be many years before 
 she will begin to show all her greatness in action, before 
 she will have her due weight in the political balance of 
 the world; but if their progress increases in the same 
 proportion that it has done, and there is every reason to 
 think it will do ev6n more, they will probably cause a revo¬ 
 lution in the affairs of the world, in which these coun¬ 
 tries will participate more deeply than any other (48). 
 
 Ireland, situated between the two continents, is, not¬ 
 withstanding the misfortunes of six centuries, now in¬ 
 creasing in wealth, in civilization, and population. Happy 
 would it be if the two former kept pace with the latter; 
 but, unfortunately, the drain of the upper classes of the 
 people and their money to England, is such as prevents 
 the country’s deriving all or near the advantages nature 
 and the times hold out to her. It is to be hoped, that the 
 connection between the two countries will be ever main¬ 
 tained (49); yet this war (50) England seems to have 
 
 avoided.— Author’s Note . [When France was invaded France be¬ 
 longed to the French .] 
 
 (48) [“ America . her due weight in the political balance 
 
 of the ivorld.” —How just was the expectation of the writer (in 1795) 
 events have pretty well proved many years before the present.] 
 
 (49) [‘‘. ever maintained.” —Had not the author been a 
 
 British officer we might suppose such a conclusion, from what imme¬ 
 diately precedes it, could only have been ironical!] 
 
 (50) [“ this war.” —The war against the Great French Revolution, 
 1793.] 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 81 
 
 ^either despised the power of Prance too much, or it 
 relied too much on the natural strength of Ireland; or, 
 finally, it was not aware of its consequence; for it was 
 left by her in what may in the most unqualified manner 
 he called an absolutely defenceless state. 
 
 Ireland contains about five millions of people of all de¬ 
 scriptions, of whom the poor are at least four million seven 
 hundred thousand (51). Ey poor is meant, not farmers 
 and tradesmen, but those who are obliged to work to earn 
 their sustenance from day to day. One reason for this 
 great proportion of poor is, that every man marries. In 
 most other countries people do not, unless they have some 
 prospect of a maintenance for their families. It were to 
 be wished that in this country, property and indepen¬ 
 dence (without a certain degree of which mankind will 
 not be at rest), were more diffused. It is true men are 
 never to be satisfied. A monarch who possesses dominions 
 larger than the rest of Europe, finds that a spot of her 
 neighbour’s territory lies convenient, and seizes it. Here 
 is no stimulus of want, but merely the love of acquisi¬ 
 tion that Providence has implanted in the human mind. 
 Can it then be wondered at, if what is commonly called 
 the mob, that part of society composed of all that is 
 wretched, all that is outcast, and all that is hopeless, 
 should turn upon the property of their wealthy neighbour, 
 when an opportunity offers. If it is said they were bom 
 and are used to their situation, that is the language of 
 unfeeling folly. That country is wretched , indeed , where 
 ninety-nine in every hundred see and feel that no change , 
 no revolution , can possibly make them worse or more miser- 
 
 (51) [ u Ireland contains ” &c.—The description in this paragraph 
 was true enough in 1795. It will probably be generally recognised 
 as equally true, at least in the main, to-day. Certainly the hint 
 contained in the last two sentences (printed above in italics) is quite 
 as much in point to-day as ever it could have been.] 
 
82 
 
 DEPENCE OP IRELAND. 
 
 able than they actually are. From such a state of thinking 
 they must look with anxiety for a change. 
 
 Where the inhabitants of a country are disunited among 
 themselves, that country cannot enjoy security. All pa¬ 
 triotism is smothered in the effervescence of private ani¬ 
 mosities and the most destructive passions. Such, happily, 
 is not the state of England; nor will it anywhere else 
 add to the strength or security of her empire. England 
 for many years engrossed the trade and wealth of the 
 universe, without a rival, and founded her splendour on 
 it; but it is not in the nature of things that it can be 
 always so ; trade will in time find its level, and all cannot 
 be gainers. 
 
 Should England decline, in proportion to her decadence, 
 the value of Ireland to her increases, the attachment of 
 Ireland should also increase, united by situation, lan¬ 
 guage, manners, and common interest (52). Such a band 
 ought to be indissoluble. 
 
 The best way to perpetuate it is by endeavouring to 
 convince both nations—that is to say, not the few but the 
 great mass of both that they are benefited by the connec¬ 
 tion ; and let not the multitude be despised by the rich 
 and great. It is that the rich may enjoy ease that the 
 poor man labours; and for their security that the poor 
 fight and bleed. In the hour of danger and distress, the 
 great, the powerful, and the wealthy, must throw them¬ 
 selves for protection on their poor neighbours, for their 
 lives, their families, and their properties. It is therefore 
 the particular interest, not of the poor but of the rich, to 
 endeavour to make the cause of the nation a common one. 
 If it is alleged that the lower orders will not believe 
 the arguments adduced in such a question, still the prin- 
 
 (52) [“ attachment ; band. . . . indissoluble ”— 
 
 Irony again!] 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 83 
 
 ciple is undeniable, and it is an additional reason against 
 procrastinating the only security of the rich until the 
 hour of danger—it is then too late. 
 
 And it will be well for those who have power to re¬ 
 member, that if the poorer classes are the people, it is for 
 the happiness of the people that power has been delegated 
 to them; that a national cause is not the cause of the few 
 but of the many (53). 
 
 La Jacquerie was the name given to a most dreadful 
 civil war, with which France was once scourged. It was 
 an insurrection of the peasantry, owing to the oppression 
 of the nobles. 
 
 The Hungarian peasantry in their last insurrection, to 
 which they were goaded by every species of oppression, 
 committed dreadful excesses, shutting up the nobility in 
 their castles, and setting fire to them, &c. Horiah and 
 Kloskar were delegated by the peasants to present their 
 petition to the Emperor. Horiah was a man of great 
 talents. It is reported the answer of the Emperor was 
 in the following words: ‘ 4 It is all your own fault .’ 9 
 
 Poland has neither strong ground, nor rivers, nor for¬ 
 tresses ; its people are dispirited by their state of vassalage; 
 they are treated everywhere with indignity. A postilion 
 exercises his whip on every unfortunate peasant with im¬ 
 punity, who is not able to get out of his way in time (54). 
 They are abject, unprincipled, drunken and licentious. 
 
 (53) . [These two paragraphs are very well put by Mr. Keating; 
 nor are the examples which follow in the least degree out of place 
 to-day any more than in 1795.] 
 
 (54) [“ exercises his whip on every unfortunate peasant with 
 impunity” &c.—It is not fifteen years since (I860, now,) we knew 
 of such a case in a populous locality in the rich county of Cork, and 
 the outrage went unpunished by the poor serfs that suffered it. As 
 if in retribution, the rich Earl has even since then been beggared, 
 and lives a miserable pauper on lands which it is to be hoped may 
 never again be possessed by one of his race.] 
 
84 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 Haying no security for property, they have no business to 
 acquire more than sustains them from day to day; and 
 their nobility are under no tie to treat them well. Yet 
 when the country was invaded, the defenders of it were 
 headed by tradesmen (shoemakers) of Warsaw, and the 
 nobility did not then disdain their station or their as¬ 
 sistance. 
 
 There is something so extraordinary in the following, 
 that the translation of it, from the original German, may 
 not be unacceptable: 
 
 “ War must be carried on, either in our own, or in a 
 neutral, or in an enemy’s country. If I had no view but 
 to my own glory, I would always prefer making my own 
 dominions the seat of war. As there, every man serves 
 for a spy, and the enemy cannot stir a step without its 
 being known, I can then send out large or small parties 
 without apprehension, and make any movement I please 
 without risk. If the enemy is beaten, every peasant be¬ 
 comes a soldier and harasses the enemy. Of that the 
 Elector Frederick William had experience, after the 
 battle of Eehrbellin, where the peasants killed more of the 
 Swedish soldiers than there were slain in the action; and 
 the same circumstance happened to me after the battle of 
 Hohenfriedberg, where the mountaineers of Silesia brought 
 in a multitude of Austrian prisoners. Where the country, 
 which is the seat of war is neutral, that party always has 
 the advantage which is able to obtain the good will of 
 the people. In such a situation the strictest discipline 
 must be observed, and plunder and marauding severely 
 punished. 
 
 “ The enemy must be charged with the worst designs 
 against the country. If it is Protestant, profess your¬ 
 selves on all occasions the defenders of the Protestant re¬ 
 ligion, and trumpet forth in the hearing of the lower 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 85 
 
 orders of the people, whose simplicity is easily imposed 
 on, the strongest sentiments of religious fanaticism. If, 
 on the other hand, the country is Catholic, your conver¬ 
 sation must run on the propriety of universal toleration in 
 matters of religion; profess the most moderate sentiments, 
 and lament that priestcraft should have caused such dif¬ 
 ference between mankind, who are all agreed in the main 
 principles of Christianity. 
 
 “ In regard to detachments, &c., all that must be en¬ 
 tirely regulated by the knowledge you acquire of the good 
 or ill disposition of the country people toward you. From 
 the untolerated religious sectaries assistance may be de¬ 
 rived ; the gentry, let them pretend what they will, will 
 betray you, so will the clergy. Eut the great ground on 
 which to put yourself is religious fanaticism. If I can 
 once succeed in exasperating a people, on the score of 
 liberty of conscience, and can persuade them that they 
 are oppressed by their clergy and gentry, you may rely on 
 them. I call this bringing heaven and hell on my side. 
 Taxes afford a good ground for agitating the people’s 
 minds; persuade them that in case of a change of govern¬ 
 ment they would be taken off,” &c., &c. 
 
 It is necessary to observe that the foregoing instruc¬ 
 tions are not written by a Democrat; but that though 
 they contain traits of the most sublime Jacobinism, they 
 are a part of the ninth article of secret instructions of the 
 great Frederick of Prussia to his officers; of Frederick the 
 King, Hero, Legislator, and Philosopher; the goodness of 
 whose heart, unchanged by greatness and prosperity, was 
 equally conspicuous in his personal friendships and his 
 regard for the happiness and prosperity of his dominions. 
 And it also appears hereby that the French have not the 
 merit of having discovered this new system of setting the 
 world in a flame, and shaking established governments, 
 
86 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 as has been attributed to them, and which they arrogated 
 to themselves. 
 
 When such measures are adopted by a character, to 
 whom they are so uncongenial, as that above-mentioned, it 
 only proves, that men’s actions and principles are de¬ 
 termined by the situations into which fortune throws 
 them. 
 
 Every suggestion which is here laid down, as proper 
 to instil into the minds of the subjects of a hostile Sove¬ 
 reign, is equally applicable to those of that Monarch from 
 whom they proceed; yet because the measure answers 
 the emergency of the moment, it is adopted without any 
 fear of a future retribution. 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 ON FRONTIERS IN GENERAL-ON DESCENTS, AND PASSAGE OP 
 
 RIYERS. 
 
 The passage of rivers is so much connected with the de¬ 
 fence of frontiers, and there is such a simplicity in the 
 conduct of a descent, and the rules to be followed in the 
 former case, that the two subjects of consideration may 
 be, perhaps, not improperly thrown together. Since 
 countries, as Poland, have no frontier that admits of de¬ 
 fence, as has before been observed, to defend the mar- 
 graviate of Brandenburgh the King of Prussia advances 
 and takes possession of Wittemberg; why ? because Bran¬ 
 denburgh is a flat open country, and not defensible, except 
 at Wittemberg. 
 
 Portugal has a weak frontier, because all the chains of 
 mountains and all the rivers run at right angles with it, 
 of course, parallel to the line of operations* of the 
 invader. 
 
 Whichever way rivers are observed to run by the map, 
 it may be inferred the mountains and positions also run. 
 In Alsace they are favourable to defend the country, and 
 the French knew how to take advantage of them. 
 
 The sea is the frontier of England and Ireland, and the 
 first defence, the British navy; but no statesman or soldier 
 would risk the existence of the nation under his care upon 
 one security. Notwithstanding the superiority of our 
 navy in every respect, there exists a possibility of France 
 
88 
 
 DEFENCE OF IKELAND. 
 
 being, at a future day, equal or superior (55). If France 
 made a descent on this country, she would not consider 
 what became of her transports. It is much to be regretted 
 Mr. Pitt’s plan of fortifying the dock-yards in the Channel 
 some years ago was not carried into effect. It is sur¬ 
 prising that the good sense of the English would not see 
 how much cheaper they might be defended by militia, in 
 works of earth, than by sailors in ships of war; or the 
 absurdity of first fitting and manning a ship for sea, and 
 then being obliged to keep her rotting in harbour to de¬ 
 fend the dock-yard. The superiority of the English navy 
 is not from exclusive resources, but from its having very 
 naturally, on account of its situation, turned its attention 
 early to the sea, and, in consequence, having got the start 
 of the rest of Europe. But America and France have as 
 good ports, as much timber, and may one day have as 
 much trade. Had Louis the Fourteenth, instead of main¬ 
 taining four hundred thousand men in arms on earth, 
 turned his thoughts to the sea, the navy of France might 
 have been as powerful now. 
 
 For these reasons it is to Jbe wished more attention 
 were paid to the defence of our coast. 
 
 A chain of telegraphs from the north, from Galway and 
 Bantry,*to the capital, would be very useful (56); 
 
 If a river is the frontier, and must be passed in face of 
 an enemy, the following rules must be adhered to as close 
 as possible, viz., choose a rentrant angle, your banks 
 higher than the opposite ones, and place batteries on each 
 flank. The night is also often a favourable time. What 
 
 (55) [“equal or superior .”—Mr. Keating’s anticipation appears to 
 be now jnst on the point of being realized, if indeed it is not actually 
 realized already.] 
 
 (56) [“ A chain of telegraphs &c.—At the present day, of 
 course, the Electric Telegraph is everywhere.] 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 89 
 
 Marshal Saxe says of intrenchments, may be applied to 
 what we have read of the passage of rivers, sometimes 
 they succeed, “Parceque la tete tourne aux hommes 
 quand il leur arrive des choses aux quel ils ne s’atteu- 
 dant pas”—the passage of rivers often succeeds, because 
 it is not imagined that it will be attempted. 
 
 The best way to defend a river, says Maizeroy, is to 
 have corps detached along it at certain distances, but near 
 enough to join at the point of attack. The usual precau¬ 
 tions to be taken in guarding a river are to break up fords, 
 destroy boats, watch the most likely places—namely, 
 where the river forms a bend towards the enemy, and 
 where another river runs into it on the enemy’s side, by 
 which they might send down pontoons, floats, &c. Where 
 there are islands raise redoubts on them, and mount 
 cannon. 
 
 Of descents, Maizeroy says, retrenchments to guard 
 against them are not only useless but dangerous. So 
 many places admit of a debarkation, it would be unneces¬ 
 sary to intrench the whole coast. The enemy will not 
 present himself at a guarded place, except as a feint to 
 divert. Every time the English descended on the coast 
 of France they did it with the greatest ease. All that 
 can be done is, when the intention of the enemy is evident, 
 assemble troops as soon as possible, they being, it is to be 
 supposed, previously arranged for the purpose, and ad¬ 
 vance toward the enemy. If he is in the act of landing, 
 he should be attacked without deliberation, and without 
 heeding the prodigious fire of the covering fleet, which is 
 not to be dreaded by troops on the shore and in move¬ 
 ment ; and once they come to close action, the enemy can 
 make no more use of his fire. If you find him landed 
 and in force, occupy some advantageous post, where he 
 may be detained till the arrival of all the troops. If he 
 
90 
 
 DEFENCE OF IEELAND. 
 
 means to establish himself in the country, he will come 
 in great force, unless he expects to find them disposed in 
 his favour. 
 
 Redoubts upon a coast, if they have not cannon in 
 them, are useless. As the enemy may disembark at low 
 water, they should be made en barbette (57), and placed 
 so as to have a cross fire. It is right to have points of 
 appui and railing, fortified up the country. It appears 
 that Maizeroy speaks only of the smaller sort of attacks. 
 He adds the following important observation. The de¬ 
 fence of a country does not consist in the number of for¬ 
 tresses, but in the zeal of the people, well-regulated 
 finances, disciplined troops, and the facility of augment¬ 
 ing them whenever necessity requires. 
 
 The manoeuvres our [English] troops are taught, only 
 serve to give them false ideas. Maizeroy says, to train 
 troops, enterprises of small importance must be under¬ 
 taken—Mais il faut prendre garde de s’y faire battre. A 
 good rule. 
 
 * The French failed in their attempt on Sardinia, because they 
 landed a very inconsiderable force, because the peasantry rushed 
 down armed upon them, and because they took panic. They were 
 defeated at Sallee, because they came up the river in their boats with 
 the tide; when it ebbed they were left sticking in the mud, where 
 they were assailed by the Moors and Arabs, and, unable to defend 
 themselves, they were cut to pieces by them with their short swords. 
 These are two strong instances of what a peasantry can do.— Author's 
 Note. 
 
 (57) [en barbette .”—A battery u en barbette ” is one in which the 
 guns are mounted not in embrasures , under cover, but upon an open 
 platform on the top, as in the Martello Towers on the Irish Coast.] 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 ON THE PRESENT STATE OF DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY-THE 
 
 FORCE, AND PROBABLE DISTRIBUTION OF IT-AND ON THE 
 
 EXPENSES AND NECESSITIES OF THE CAMPAIGN. 
 
 The forces in Ireland may be estimated at upwards of 
 thirty thousand men, of whom twenty thousand might be 
 brought into the field, in different parts of the kingdom. 
 Probably ten thousand might, in case of an attack, be 
 assembled. There is no train of artillery fit to take the 
 field, equal to the exigencies of the country, nor are there 
 magazines formed. It is supposed the cavalry could not 
 take the field for want ot forage. 
 
 There is (58) a squadron of men-of-war at Cork. 
 
 It is supposed the troops will be encamped in small 
 corps of five thousand each; one near Dublin, one in the 
 South, and one in the North. For the transporting 
 magazines, &c., the troops are entirely dependant on the 
 people of the country, having no carriages attached to 
 the army for that purpose, which is one inconvenience 
 (59). There is no corps of pontoniers, on which account 
 the army could pass rivers but on one column. It has 
 been already observed, there are no fortresses in the coun- 
 
 (58) [“ There is ”—Theresas [1795], and of course there might 
 be.] 
 
 (59) [“ Transporting Magazines” §c .—These remarks, like all the 
 other observations of the author respecting the communications and 
 means of transport, were, of course, only true before the completion 
 of the existing Railway system.] 
 
92 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 try; there are also few engineers; nor have the military 
 been in the practice of breaking ground. If it were 
 possible that the whole army could assemble to oppose 
 the enemy, and leave the country without troops to 
 maintain internal peace, protect their magazines, com¬ 
 munications, &c., such an army could not continue a 
 month together for want of provisions. 
 
 An army of twenty thousand men, with their follow¬ 
 ers, the necessary horses, and adding only the small pro¬ 
 portion of one thousand regular cavalry, would consume 
 eighteen thousand barrels of corn, of all descriptions, 
 every four weeks ; besides this, it must have turf, straw, 
 hay, and cattle. It would require fifteen thousand sheep, 
 or two thousand head of black cattle also monthly; and 
 would thus consume in that space of time, the produce of 
 four thousand acres of land, and in the course of the 
 campaign of upwards of twenty thousand acres, amounting 
 in value to upwards of two hundred thousand pounds. 
 
 An army of a nominal forty thousand men, which to a 
 certainty would not bring more than twenty thousand into 
 the field, would cost while there, the first campaign, half 
 a million sterling. If forty thousand effectives are neces¬ 
 sary for the defence of the island, sixty thousand must be 
 rated as the strength of the army, the additional expense 
 may be calculated. 
 
 The camp equipage, and the year’s stores beforehand, 
 would require a sum of two millions to put this country 
 in a tolerable state of defence. One million must be added 
 for fortifying posts; and the casualties and contingencies, 
 even the article of blankets, of which there must be a 
 hundred thousand in store, comes to a large sum, and if 
 the army are in the field, must be renewed every year. 
 A less sum of money than four millions sterling, in the 
 national treasury, would not be sufficient to carry an army 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND, 
 
 93 
 
 through the first campaign. Twenty thousand men would 
 require near two thousand horses, of all descriptions, in 
 order to move from place to place. 
 
 Government should have a hundred thousand barrels of 
 corn in store in the country for the use of the army. 
 
 When the late General Edward Dalton, marched to the 
 Low Countries, at the time the Emperor Joseph II. [of 
 Austria] threatened Holland, his army was fed from the 
 opposite side of the Rhine ; a severe frost rendered it un- 
 navigable, and when the supply of bread was exhausted, 
 there was no remedy, but to disband the army, with orders 
 for every man to shift for himself. These orders were 
 actually to have been issued on the ensuing day, but a 
 thaw fortunately occurring during the night, and again 
 opening the communication, prevented the total separation 
 of the army taking place. 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 FINANCES-TAXES-REVENUES. 
 
 If the French were to get possession of this country, they 
 would probably act here, as they have done elsewhere— 
 would respect private property, but rob the public trea¬ 
 sure. The revenue they would seize here, are what 
 originate from taxes, and those of the church (60). 
 
 Reckon the Hearth Tax at .. .. .. £50,000 per annum. 
 
 The County Presentments amount through 
 the kingdom, to not less than .» .. 100,000 (60). 
 
 Tithes and Church Revenues, .. .. 450,000 
 
 £600,000 
 
 Asumof money equal to the maintenance of 30,000 troops. 
 Suppose all these taxes were, during the present war (61), 
 given up, and instead thereof two shillings an acre 
 on all arable and pasture land, laid on, to be expended in 
 the defence of the country, deducting also for the public 
 roads, necessary salaries, ecclesiastical and others. The 
 goodness of our roads is a great misfortune; it would facili¬ 
 tate in the greatest degree the conquest of the country. 
 "Why should money be expended in making roads and 
 
 (60) [“the church — (i.e., the Protestant Church Establishment). 
 This Chapter is allowed to stand only because it is so short; it is in 
 many respects inapplicable now. There is now no “ Hearth-tax 
 and the “ County Presentments” amount to a million a-year, or ten 
 times the sum named by General Keating.] 
 
 (61) [“ the present war .”—In 1795, namely.] 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 95 
 
 building bridges, when we do not know how soon we 
 must break them up ? It would only be necessary to re¬ 
 tain a tew of the principal ones. 
 
 It would be better for the opulent classes at once to 
 contribute liberally, by a free gift for the defence of the 
 country ; for what would the enemy probably do, if they 
 gained a footing here; they would abolish, by a mani¬ 
 festo, all the above-mentioned taxes, which fall in this 
 country solely on the poor, and instead of it lay a general 
 tax on all property. They would be sure in such a 
 measure to have the voice of the people with them.*' 
 
 There are many other taxes from which revenue is 
 drawn, but the above are what come particularly out of 
 the pockets of the people ; and an exoneration from which 
 would be most particularly felt and applauded by them. 
 It must be admitted, that such a change in the system of 
 any country is a very strong measure; those certainly 
 ought never to be recurred to but in times of the greatest 
 danger. People who think that is now the case, will 
 probably be also of opinion, that it is now necessary for 
 our own security, to be at least prepared to adopt some¬ 
 thing similar, if affairs do not very soon take a new turn; 
 if they do not , there is no alternative in case of an attach , but 
 submission ; for if the spirit of the people is not roused in 
 their own defence , if they are lukewarm and indifferent , it is 
 impossible for the country to be defended by any army . 
 There is no great hope from the convulsions in Prance; it 
 is now [1795,] a great military Itepublie, and will always 
 be equally formidable externally, because its force is 
 derived, not from the casual ability of a military King or 
 
 * Tithes are in great part lay property. In whatever way the 
 money is levied, the clergy must be paid. Nothing here must he 
 understoo i as trenching upon the maintenance of that body; but 
 tithes, though a tax, are a transferable property.— Author’s Note . 
 [The author was certainly a prudent spoken u Papist.”] 
 
96 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 a great Statesman, but from the spirit which pervades 
 the whole mass of the nation. Probably France may 
 ultimately fall as Rome did, but it is likewise probable 
 she may be in the meantime equally victorious. Rome 
 fought with nations, which, though barbarous, breathed 
 a spirit of patriotism, and where unanimous against the 
 invader ; but the French may say with Shakspeare, 
 4 ‘ We have met with foes who strike beside us.” 
 
CHAPTER XV. 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 An enemy’s army of 50,000 men would consume in the 
 various articles of the produce of the soil, as much as 
 would amount weekly to upwards of three thousand acres. 
 These articles of subsistence must be obtained, either 
 methodically, through the means of the constituted autho¬ 
 rities of the country, which would be attended with least 
 misery, or by means of pillage. "Whatever a re tiling 
 army may do, it is impossible an advancing one could sub¬ 
 sist a day upon the wild system of rapine. 
 
 An invader’s object is to get possession of the country 
 as soon as he can; but this is not done until the seat of 
 government is in his power. Let him have what footing 
 in the country he will, until he gains that, the vital prin¬ 
 ciple remains unextinguished, and the body will perform 
 its functions. Dublin as the capital and seat of govern¬ 
 ment, would of course be the object of attack. But there 
 is an additional reason; it would be necessary for them to 
 gain the east coast of the kingdom, fortify Dublin, 
 Drogheda, &c., and there form their frontier against Eng¬ 
 land (62). 
 
 (62) [“ necessary ” fyc .—That is supposing the invaders were not 
 provided with a N avy of sufficient force; or, wanting an overwhelm- 
 
98 
 
 DEFENCE OF IKE LAND. 
 
 Previous to Lord Howe’s action with the French, 
 though both fleets endeavoured their utmost to come to 
 it, they were three days in sight of each other, without 
 being able to do so. This proves the uncertainty of our 
 reliance or security from the sea. What might not have 
 been effected by a fleet of transports during that time ? 
 
 If this country became the theatre of war, whichever 
 party had the advantage, Ireland would he trampled to 
 pieces in the struggle (63). A very few individuals 
 make by war ; the country which is the seat of it is beg¬ 
 gared (64). 
 
 Perhaps it would be well that the Irish mob knew a vic¬ 
 torious army, as well French as any other, suffers no people 
 to pillage hut themselves; the existence of a conquering 
 army depends on the security of property, which it will 
 always protect, in order to plunder it at leisure. 
 
 On the appearance of the enemy on any part ot the coast, 
 the cavalry should immediately drive all the cattle and 
 everything moveable, behind the grand cordon (65), and 
 destroy everything which they could not remove. In 
 short, all between the grand cordon and the enemy should 
 be made a desert; but the people should be indemnified. 
 It is evident, nothing but the last necessity should induce 
 such strong measures; but in such a case it is always 
 done, and is unavoidable. 
 
 ing force at sea, were not provided with, an army sufficiently powerful 
 effectually to resist every attempt that could be made by the English 
 to effect a landing in force. If the population should turn out to be 
 friendly to an invading “army of liberation” the case would, of 
 course, be still stronger in its favour.] 
 
 (63) [“ trampled to pieces ”—Not exactly ; now, at all events!] 
 
 (64) [“ beggared”— No longer now, in these days of short and de¬ 
 cisive campaigns.] 
 
 (65) [“the grand cordon .”—See Chapter VII., (and see also Note 
 33,) ante .] 
 
DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 99 
 
 In a system of defence possibilities and not probabilities 
 alone must be guarded against Sometimes an enemy 
 will not attack in the part we think probable but on the 
 contrary, where we think impossible. But it is a 
 weakness to suppose anything impossible to an active 
 enemy. 
 
 To recapitulate in a few words that which is necessary 
 to put this country in a state of defence : the first article 
 is money: secondly, officers. 
 
 An army fully equipped, with its equipage, field ar¬ 
 tillery, corps of pontoniers, staff, and hospital properly 
 appointed; this army to consist of forty thousand effectivi 
 men (infantry), and two thousand cavalry, a corps ol 
 engineers well acquainted with the country, and a full 
 year’s provisions beforehand of all kinds of stores, with a 
 train of carriages and horses, to enable troops, artillery, 
 &c., to move, without being at the mercy of the people 
 of the country. Lastly, we should have unanimity among 
 ourselves* 
 
 Our army consists of disjointed corps, unused to the sys¬ 
 tem of acting in great bodies; nor is there any proba¬ 
 bility of a regular organisation of it taking place. In 
 addition to this, the regular troops only enter it on the 
 east side, to embark from it on the west. Manoeuvres in 
 great bodies are unknown to our trooops* 
 
 Parties of cavalry should never be sent out in this 
 country, except sustained by infantry. 
 
 It is unfortunately too true, that those men who de¬ 
 spise danger most, when at a distance, have the strongest 
 sense of it when it is at hand. Courage may be the effect 
 of constitution, but it is reflection gives firmness* 
 
 Let every person of property just resolve seriously in 
 his mind upon what he would do, on hearing an enemy 
 
100 
 
 DEFENCE OF IKELAND. 
 
 was landed in the country, and in force; and remember 
 what Marshal Saxe says : Que ia Ute tourne aux homines , 
 quand il leur arrive des choses aux quels ils ne s’attendoient 
 pas. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 NOTE 
 
 On certain Military Principles useful for the better 
 
 UNDERSTANDING OF GENERAL KEATINGS TREATISE. 
 
 [From the French Text Book : “ Memorial des Officiers D'lnfan- 
 terie et de Ca<valerie , redige d apres les documents off dels et les 
 cours professes dans les Ticoles Miiitaires (pp. 51-71; 78-83.] 
 
 I. STRATEGY. 
 
 \ 1. General Considerations. 
 
 Strategy is the art of making war on the map ; Tactics, on the 
 field. The former consists of the dispositions o'f a plan of cam¬ 
 paign, and of the great operations of war; the latter of the ma¬ 
 nagement of troops on the field of battle. 
 
 The general principle of War is to bring at once the greatest pos¬ 
 sible amount of the force at the disposal of the general to bear on 
 the decisive point of the theatre of war, or of the field of battle; 
 and to operate in such a way as to bring ably into action that mass 
 of force. 
 
 In Strategy, the Offensive presents advantages over the De¬ 
 fensive. Pie that attacks knows the object of his attack before¬ 
 hand, and brings his masses to bear so as to strike at a point pre¬ 
 determined. He that awaits an attack does not know the inten¬ 
 tions of his enemy; the separate fractions of his army are ex¬ 
 posed to be surprised and his combinations to be deranged accord¬ 
 ingly. In Tactics the advantages of the Offensive are balanced by 
 
102 
 
 DEFENCE OF IitELASTD. 
 
 the difficulty of getting at an enemy occupying a good position, 
 and prepared to defend it. 
 
 The mass of an army makes its force, that is a mass trained and 
 organised so as to act together as one ; it is the result of Order 
 and Discipline. (Mere numbers do not constitute an army ; they 
 cannot act as one mass without perfect discipline ; however brave, 
 therefore, individually, undisciplined numbers constitute not an 
 army hut an armed mob ; and an armed mob is generally, for all 
 practical purposes, even the worse for being very numerous.) 
 
 As soon as war is determined, a Plan or System of Operations is 
 drawn up, which should correspond with the object of the war, the 
 character of the enemy to he dealt with, the nature and resources 
 of the country in which the war is to he carried on, the means of 
 attack and defence, and the aid which may he expected on the one 
 side or the other. A Plan of Campaign ought to provide for 
 everything which the enemy can accomplish, and ought to em¬ 
 brace in itself the means of frustrating his efforts. The Art lies 
 in compelling your enemy to lose sight of the principles of 
 Strategy, without ever severing from them yourself. 
 
 The Theatre of Operations of one or more armies embraces the 
 territory which it is proposed to invade, and that which has to be 
 defended. It comprises the Base of Operations —the object of 
 Operations of the compaign—the Front of Operations , the extent 
 in breadth of the line occupied by the army in front of its Base 
 •—the Lines of Operations , the directions to be followed in order 
 to reach the object proposed—the Lines of Communications , which 
 connect the different Lines of Operations with one another—the 
 Obstacles, natural or artificial, to be surmounted or to be opposed 
 to the enemy—and the Places of Refuge for retreat in case of 
 reverse. 
 
 §. 2. The Base op Operations* 
 
 The frontier of a State, from which the Army is to draw its re* 
 sources and its reinforcements and which it has to defend, may 
 serve for a Base of Operations , or for a Line of Defence. 
 
 The wider the Base the less easy it is to cover it; but, also, the 
 more difficult it is to cut off the army from it. 
 
 A Base ought to be supported, as much as possible, upon ob* 
 stac es capable of stopping an enemy for some time, without tak* 
 ing away the means of making a forward march against him, 
 
 A wide and deep river, the banks of which are occupied by 
 means of good fortified towns extending on both sides of the 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 103 
 
 stream, would perfectly answer the purpose; still better if these 
 fortified towns should he large enough to accommodate the 
 Depots and Magazines, and if they should present on the side of 
 the enemy well entrenched tetes de pont. [A Tete de Pont (lite¬ 
 rally “ Bridge-head”) is a regular fortification, more or less 
 extensive, erected in front of the head of a bridge on the opposite 
 side of a river from that on which the town, country, or army to 
 be protected lies. It is properly so constructed as to be able to 
 hold an army in check, by obliging it to undertake a regular 
 siege of the works; and it is traced so as to cover or embrace 
 within it a sufficient space to enable an army crossing by the 
 bridge to form within its shelter in force.] 
 
 A Base of Operations too near the Capital of a State is a very 
 disadvantageous one. 
 
 The extent of the Base should be proportioned to the length of 
 the Line of Operations . Its Solidity, and the Security of the 
 Communications, make up the fundamental principle of a Plan, 
 whether offensive or defensive. An Army, separating itself to 
 a distance from its frontier, must adopt new Bases of Opera¬ 
 tions. 
 
 § 3. The Object of Operations. 
 
 The Object of a campaign may be the capture of the enemy’s 
 capital, the conquest of an important province, or the occupation 
 of a Front of Operations provided with fortresses. 
 
 On the defensive, the first Object is to protect the capital; after 
 that to cover a first Front, and either the Base of Operations or the 
 Line of Defence. [These definitions obviously apply more par¬ 
 ticularly to continental wars, where the frontiers of nations are 
 but imaginary lines, interrupted mountain chains, or mere rivers.] 
 
 § 4. Strategic Points. 
 
 These are those geographical points the military importance of 
 which arises from the very configuration of the country : as the 
 meetings of the principal roads and other communications, the 
 fords and crossing places of rivers, the knots in mountain chains, 
 fortresses, &c. 
 
 The possession of the Strategic Points is necessary in an offen¬ 
 sive as well as a defensive campaign; open force, or else ma¬ 
 noeuvres directed against the communications of the enemy, are 
 the sole means of gaining possession of them and of defending 
 
104 
 
 DEEENCfc OP IRELAND. 
 
 them; lastly, promptness in resolution as well as in execution is 
 one of the conditions necessary to success in every enterprise. 
 
 § o. Decisive Points. 
 
 These are those Strategic Points which are of particularly great 
 importance, and those which offer points for manoeuvring with 
 relation to the position of the enemy. These Points are at that 
 extremity at which it is most easy to separate the enemy from his 
 Base and from his reinforcements, so as to throw him hack upon 
 an obstacle, 'without exposing one’s self to the same danger. It 
 is dangerous to place one’s self between the enemy and an in¬ 
 surmountable obstacle, such as the sea, a lake, or a chain of moun¬ 
 tains ; it is advantageous, for the same reasons, to throw back an 
 enemy upon such an obstacle. 
 
 The Decisive Point is in the centre, if the enemy’s army is 
 broken up into detachments on a line too widely extended. 
 
 § 6. The Front oe Operations. 
 
 It is advantageous to restrict the Front of Operations, in order 
 that the army may be able easily to concentrate its forces either 
 to receive the enemy or to throw itself upon him. It should be 
 well supported on its flanks, and it should present easy com¬ 
 munications with all the points of the Dine of Operations. 
 
 An army in march to conquer a country should have both its 
 wings supported on neutral countries, or on great natural ob¬ 
 stacles, such as rivers or mountain chains; it may sometimes 
 happen, however, that it has only one of its wings supported, or 
 even that both of them are uncovered. In the first case, it has 
 only to take care that its front shall not be broken through; in 
 the second case, it must support itself on the covered wing ; in 
 the third, it must support itself on its centre. It should have 
 fortresses, or entrenched camps, at every five or six days’ march. 
 
 § 7. Lines of Operations. 
 
 The right selection of the Line of Operations is of great im¬ 
 portance in a plan of campaign, because it affords the means of 
 bringing into action at the Decisive Point the greatest possible 
 mass of force. 
 
 The direction of this Line depends on the geographical situation 
 and the position of the enemy. It is always either by the 
 centre, or by one or the other of the two extremities. If how- 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 105 
 
 ever one’s forces are very much, superior, one may act simul¬ 
 taneously by the centre and the extremities. In every other case 
 this would he a great error. 
 
 With equal forces it is better to act in one and the same direc¬ 
 tion, by a single line, and under one sole head, without forming 
 large independent corps, rather than to direct the march by seve¬ 
 ral lines, towards one or several objects, with two or three corps 
 operating separately. 
 
 At all times, however, the configuration of the ground may re¬ 
 quire the employment of double or even of triple lines , for the rest 
 indispensable, even, if the enemy has formed several, for a separate 
 mass must be presented to each of his. In this case their direc¬ 
 tions must be so combined as to bring the different corps in con¬ 
 nexion one with another, and to unite their movements closely, 
 before the enemy can oppose to them a superior mass of forces. 
 
 Lines are either Internal or External, according as an army 
 manoeuvres within or outside the directions followed by the 
 enemy. Concentric Lines , which set out from points distant from 
 one another but follow a direction towards a point of union, ought 
 also to be so combined as that the troops should nowhere be ex¬ 
 posed to attack in front before being in the way of effecting the 
 junction of the different corps. Eccentric or Emergent Lines, on 
 the other hand, are scarcely ever suitable except after a battle 
 gained, or when one has just succeeded in dividing the enemy’s 
 army. 
 
 The events of a war may oblige one to alter the original plan of 
 campaign, and to take Accidental Lines, different from those at 
 first determined on. A manoeuvre of this kind is a delicate one, 
 and may, according to circumstances, be productive of great re¬ 
 sults or of great reverses. 
 
 § 8. Lines of Communications. 
 
 An army ought to be ready at any moment to oppose to the 
 enemy all the resistance of which it is capable ; which requires 
 that the different divisions should be constantly in a position to 
 sustain, to support, and to protect one another; and that in the 
 camp, on the march, and at a halt, the troops should always find 
 themselves in advantageous positions for action. 
 
 An army which takes in its train a siege equipage and a large 
 supply of baggage cannot take roads too short to reach its depots 
 as rapidly as possible. 
 
106 
 
 DEFENCE OF IEELAND. 
 
 § 9. Marches. 
 
 The different columns of an army having in general different 
 distances to traverse in order to reach the point intended, it is 
 necessary to combine by pre-arrangement the moment of the de¬ 
 parture of each, and their several orders, with the consideration 
 of the distances to he accomplished, the equipment and baggage 
 of each column, the nature of the country, the obstacles which the 
 enemy may he able to oppose, and the importance of concealing 
 the movement in hand. 
 
 § 10. Of Diversions. 
 
 Diversions are those movements of bodies of men which have 
 relation to Strategic combinations; those which take place on a 
 field of battle, under the name of Demonstrations or False Attacks , 
 are such as depend on Tactics only. [See §. 1.] 
 
 With equal forces and before an able enemy a Diversion is 
 generally a dangerous error, unless indeed one can hope for a 
 powerful support in the country itself, and so occupy the attention 
 of a considerable body of the enemy. 
 
 However, a demonstrative detachment may be made in order 
 to deceive the enemy as to the direction in which it is intended to 
 inflict a great blow; but care must be taken to avoid engaging the 
 detachment in serious fighting, and to recall it rapidly towards the 
 corps designed to engage in battle. 
 
 In general Detachments bring destruction on an army, and they 
 should be avoided as much as possible. An exception must how¬ 
 ever be made in the case of portions of an army detached in order 
 to cover the Line of Operations. It is then advantageous to en¬ 
 large the Field of Operations, and to bring into action the forces 
 left in position of observation merely so as to assist in striking 
 decisive blows. 
 
 § 11. Of the Passage of Eivers. 
 
 In the selection of a point for the Passage of a Fiver one must 
 endeavour to combine Strategic advantages with the Tactical con¬ 
 veniences afforded by the nature of the locality. 
 
 The point of passage should be as little as possible removed 
 from the Line of Operations ; it should be near good roads on both 
 banks. A spot should be selected where the river forms a re¬ 
 entering angle (that is, where the projection of the corner of the land 
 
APPENDIX, 
 
 107 
 
 into the river is at the opposite side, and the line of the hank 
 forms a concave at the near side), so as to allow of the establish¬ 
 ment of batteries on one’s own side of the stream with a converg¬ 
 ing fire playing on the banks at the opposite side; the bank at 
 this side should command that of the enemy’s side, if one marches 
 in advance, and the contrary if in retreat. Scarped or precipitous 
 banks and approaches to the river on the enemy’s side should be 
 avoided. The neighbourhood of a large island near the enemy’s 
 bank affords facilities for disembarkation; [this observation only 
 applies to some of the larger Continental rivers such as the 
 Danube, the Rhine, the Po, &c.] The neighbourhood of a tribu¬ 
 tary stream enables one to conceal the preparations for crossing. 
 
 It is very advantageous if the army after its passage can take 
 its Front of Operations and its Line of Battle perpendicular to the 
 river, at least for the first few marches, without being obliged to 
 divide itself into several corps in different directions. 
 
 Diversions must be made to deceive the enemy. The army 
 should be disposed “ en echelons ,” the centre in advance, so that 
 the enemy shall not be able to attack more than the most advanced 
 column without exposing his flank. [En Echelons (literally, like 
 the steps of a ladder) ; suppose an army arranged in divisions, 
 battalions, or regiments, in line; instead of all occupying the 
 same front, suppose that the second regiment (or battalion, &c.,) 
 on the right or the left be placed a little in front of the first 
 (shoulderwise to it, as it were, but the actual front line parallel 
 though more in front), the third a little in front of that, the fourth 
 a little in front of that, and so on, then the army is said to be 
 disposed in echelons of regiments (or battalions, or divisions, as 
 the case may be)]. The light troops, particularly of the cavalry, 
 scatter themselves along the valley by the river. The first de¬ 
 tachments of the Infantry are passed over in boats, followed by 
 the remainder, to drive in and push back the enemy; the troops 
 must not open fire until after their landing. 
 
 If means be not deficent, two or three [floating] bridges should 
 be thrown across at the same time. Strong Batteries, with guns 
 of heavy metal, should be so disposed as to cross their fire and to 
 take the enemy in flank and rear; these must be covered as 
 quickly as possible. 
 
 The Bridge completed, some light field pieces must be passed 
 over, without their waggons, with the first corps of infantry; the 
 Batteries are to follow with the divisions. 
 
 The Defence of the Passage of a Fiver is difficult, because one 
 
108 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 must watch a great number of points, and one is exposed to be 
 deceived by False Demonstrations. The banks of the river must 
 be cleared and reconnoitred carefully, and the troops concentrated 
 at a central point with abundant means of transport. The 
 Cavalry, above all, will be found particularly useful. Signals 
 should be established. The Artillery should be held in reserve, 
 ready to throw itself rapidly on the point attacked ; the enemy 
 should be engaged smartly while he is yet inferior in numbers; 
 he must be sharply attacked with cross fire. 
 
 If you reach in time, place howitzers [guns throwing shells] 
 in front of the bridge so as to ricochet along it [that is to throw 
 the ball so as to hop along the ground, instead of aiming point 
 blank at an object upon it] ; batteries of guns of the largest 
 calibre [throwing solid shot] should also be placed so as to 
 batter the bridge with cross fire and to sink the boats on which it 
 rests. 
 
 § 12. Of Entrenched Camps. 
 
 'Entrenched Camps may prove of great importance in the sup¬ 
 port which they afford to an army; they should be established 
 at a point at once Strategic and Tactical: but they must be aban¬ 
 doned at once as soon as they are turned or passed. A tete de 
 pont [see § 2] is generally selected, on the opposite bank, near a 
 great fortified city which affords resources to the army. En¬ 
 trenched Camps are, above all, favourable to an army near such a 
 city, or near its Base op Operations . They are then able to support 
 themselves, even though invested, and to disquiet the enemy on 
 his rear. 
 
 § 13. Of Fortresses. 
 
 Fortresses harass the march of an enemy, compelling him to 
 make detours and to divide into detachments; they secure the march 
 of the army which is in possession of them—facilitating the de- 
 bouche of its columns, if they are on rivers covering its flanks, and 
 all movements ; and supplying it with a refuge at need. Fortresses 
 [as on the continent] are made the points of meeting of the greater 
 number of roads, rivers, and canals; they are the central points 
 from which all movements proceed. They afford important 
 means of making diversions. Napoleon has said : “ Fortresses 
 are useful in offensive as well as in defensive war; doubtless they 
 cannot by themselves take the place of an armr, but they are the 
 only means to stay, to clog, to weaken, and to disquiet a con- 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 109 
 
 quering enemy. ****** A general in chief 
 ought always to act with all his forces concentrated , and to bring 
 them rapidly to hear upon the Decisive Point of the theatre of war , 
 taking care all the while to remain himself unexposed $ and to 
 this end he ought to dot over his Line of Operations with a series 
 of Fortresses or Fortified Posts, distant the one from the other 
 not more than seven or eight days’ march at most, and to secure 
 his march and his communications by the occupation of some for¬ 
 tresses of some importance which may he found on his flanks or 
 in his rear.” 
 
 Fortresses established in good Strategical and Tactical positions 
 [see § 1.] are very useful; those on the other hand which do not 
 fulfil this condition of situation are great evils to the State, which 
 expends in them soldiers and money at absolute loss of both. 
 
 Great and populous Fortresses, great fortified commercial 
 cities, afford resources for the supply of an army; they are to be 
 preferred to small ones, above all if one can count upon the mass 
 of the inhabitants. 
 
 In mountainous countries small Forts, well placed, are as 
 valuable as great Fortresses; for the question there is but of 
 closing passes, not of supplying a place of refuge to an army. 
 
 The Fortresses of a country should be echelon'd [see § 11,] on 
 three lines, from the frontier to the centre of the State ; [this ob¬ 
 servation applies, of course, to continental nations only, see 
 { 3, &c.] 
 
 The Fortification of the Capital of a State [of Paris, for example,] 
 assures to the frontier fortresses all their value, in opposing itself 
 to a rapid system of invasion. [If Paris had been fortified in 1814, 
 or again in 1815, France would not have succumbed to the in¬ 
 vasion of the European coalition.] 
 
 An invading army should always endeavour to beat and to dis¬ 
 perse the masses which occupy the open country, and with this 
 view it may pass by the fortresses; but if it succeeds only im¬ 
 perfectly, it becomes imprudent to pursue the course of invasion 
 without limit. 
 
 An army cannot have a great river on its rear, without occupy¬ 
 ing one of the fortresses situated upon that river, so as to have its 
 line of retreat secured. It may then advance in safety, always 
 pursuing at the same time the siege of the neighbouring for¬ 
 tresses. 
 
 An army which passes by the fortresses of the country it 
 
110 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND* 
 
 invades is always obliged to blockade them, or, at least, to “ ob¬ 
 serve” them, in force. 
 
 If it decides on laying siege to a fortress, it leaves behind it a 
 corps d’armee charged with this task, and continues its march, or 
 takes up a position selected to cover the siege. 
 
 The operations of a siege are always rendered more difficult by 
 the presence of an army of assistance. The best way to cover a 
 siege is to pursue as far as possible those of the enemy’s troops 
 which endeavour to interrupt it, to throw back what remains of 
 them from it beyond some natural obstacle, and to stay there in 
 observation. 
 
 If one is not in great force, a central position must be taken up 
 which covers the approaches to the fortress, and the besieging 
 corps must be in part united with the corps of observation to 
 strike a decisive blow. In case the two armies together, the 
 besieging army and the army of observation, are only equal to 
 the enemy’s army of assistance, the entire besieging army must 
 remain within or close to its lines. 
 
 To attempt at once to besiege a fortress, to keep up one’s com¬ 
 munications, and to restrain and keep in check an army of as¬ 
 sistance bent on raising the siege, would be a false and a danger- 
 our combination. 
 
 Entrenched Lines of several miles in extent are always forced or 
 turned, the defence of such lines being necessarily too much cut 
 up in details. 
 
 § 14. Of Magazines. 
 
 The supplies ought always to be in proportion to the resources 
 of the country. They are intimately connected with Strategical 
 Operations. 
 
 The proximity of the sea affords great advantages as regards 
 supplies and reinforcements ; nevertheless there are dangers at¬ 
 tending the keeping too near the coast in warlike operations, for 
 one may be pressed back upon it without retreat. 
 
 A continental army should never neglect to have its Base of 
 Operations on the land side, and a reserve of supplies indepen¬ 
 dent of naval means, which are but too subject to unexpected 
 vicissitudes. 
 
 § 15. Of Cantonments. 
 
 The Cantonments (permanent encampment, &c.) of an army 
 should be well closed up, on a spice as deep as wide, so as to 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 Ill 
 
 avoid presenting too long a line, which it is always easy to pierce, 
 and in which it is impossible to rally; they should he covered by 
 a river, or by a front line of troops in barracks and protected by 
 field works; places of re-assembly, or rendezvous, should be 
 fixed ; the army must be well watched and sentinelled; signals 
 must be established. The essential point is to be able to bring 
 together Fifty to Sixty Thousand men in Twenty-four hours. 
 
 § 16. Of Eetreats. 
 
 There are many ways of combining a Retreat:— 
 
 To march in mass upon a single line of road. This disposition 
 is proper for an army yet untouched, and which is ready to fight 
 as soon as it receives a reinforcement or finds a good position. 
 
 To dispose the army en echelons [see § 11] on a single road, in 
 two or three corps, at the distance of a day’s march asunder; 
 which does not allow of concentrating the troops for action. 
 
 To march by several parallel roads. It is necessary that the 
 roads should be near each other, otherwise the divisions will not 
 be able to give each other assistance in case of attack. 
 
 To direct the divisions of the army, from several points distant 
 from each other, towards the same point; which supposes that 
 the different corps are at a distance from one another. 
 
 To march by several diverging roads. This would be to deprive 
 the different divisions of all mutual succour, and such a retreat 
 could only answer in cases where each corps would be capable of 
 serving as the nucleus of a national insurrection. 
 
 The passage of great rivers, in retreat, is one of the most deli¬ 
 cate of operations. It would be advisableto construct before¬ 
 hand entrenched tetes de pont [see § 2—but in this case, of course, 
 the tetes de pont would be on the side of the river prom which the 
 retreating army desired to cross to the other side,] or at least 
 some redoubts heavily armed. 
 
 A tete de pont protecting the passage of a great Eiver should be so 
 constructed as to leave an interval between it and the bank of the 
 river [see § 2,] sufficiently wide to allow the troops to defile with¬ 
 out crowding, and it should be so disposed as to cover them effec¬ 
 tually. 
 
 § 17. Of Descents. 
 
 Experience has demonstrated the difficulties of a distant expedi¬ 
 tion. A Descent (on a coast) can only be effected against colonies 
 or isolated possessions, or against powers of the second rank which 
 
112 
 
 DEFENCE OF IEELAND. 
 
 cannot be at once supported;—in order to operate a momentar j 
 diversion, or to capture a post the occupation of which, for a given 
 time, would be of extreme importance—or by way of political and 
 military diversion against a State engaged in a great war, and 
 whose troops are engaged at a distance. 
 
 An anchorage should be selected close to some narrow penin¬ 
 sula, so as to give the troops greater assurance, and to facilitate 
 the disembarkation. 
 
 § 18. Of the Defence of Coasts. 
 
 It is impossible to guard an entire coast line; even numerous 
 armies would not be sufficient for the purpose, and would not be 
 able to offer anywhere a serious resistance. It is better to have 
 the coast watched by the naval force, which is its chief guard, and 
 to confine one’s-self to defend the principal landing-places and 
 the important points by a system of fortresses, of forts, and of 
 fixed Batteries , and to form moveable corps ready to be brought 
 to bear to meet the enemy. 
 
 Fixed Batteries stay the ships for a time, and inflict some loss 
 upon them; Forts , raised on the shores favourably circumstanced 
 for a Descent, hinder a first lodgment, and, not being exposed to 
 be attacked, except with cannon of great calibre, they afford time 
 to a moveable corps to march upon the point threatened, and to 
 give battle to the division disembarked there; lastly, Fortresses 
 have for their object to place in safety from attack the great 
 naval establishments of the country. 
 
 The fortification of these Fortresses consists of a system of ex¬ 
 ternal works capable of resisting regular siege attacks, as well as to 
 prevent a bombardment, and of an enceinte continue [an uninter¬ 
 rupted circle of ramparts] sufficiently strong for protection against 
 an assault or attack by main force. The protection of man-of- 
 war roads or anchorages and of channels is secured by a system of 
 forts and batteries attached to these fortresses. Coast Batteries 
 are sufficient for the Defence of small commercial ports, of estab¬ 
 lishments of secondary importance, and of anchorages for mer¬ 
 chant vessels, the population of the country itself being bound to 
 complete their defence by light-field fortifications. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 113 
 
 II. TACTICS. 
 
 § 19. General Considerations on Tactics. 
 
 Tactics comprise the art of bringing into action tbe masses 
 which Strategy has directed on the Decisive Point of the theatre 
 of war. Every field of battle has also its own Decisive Point, 
 which is determined by the configuration of the ground, the rela¬ 
 tion ofthe locality there with the Strategical Object of the campaign, 
 and the disposition of the respective forces on both sides. The 
 Strategical Point is selected by preference (to become the Tacti¬ 
 cal Decisive Point of the field of battle,) when the nature of the 
 ground does not present obstacles too difficult to he surmounted. 
 One should so employ one’s forces as to bring the greatest mass in¬ 
 to action at that one of these points, the two extremities and the 
 centre, which affords the greatest chances of success; attack the 
 centre if the enemy’s lines are long, and thin in force ; attack one 
 of the extremities of his line if it is well closed and strong. It is 
 only with a great superiority of forces on one side that the two 
 extremities of the enemy’s line can he attacked at the same time. 
 
 Battles are divided into : Defensive Battles, or those which an 
 army gives in an advantageous position in which it awaits the 
 enemy; Offensive Battles , on the occasions of attack of a position 
 regularly examined beforehand; and Accidental or Dnforseen 
 Battles , given by armies on the march. 
 
 § 20. Oe Defensive Battles. 
 
 The Defensive Order of Battle depends on the nature of the 
 locality and the general Object of Operations [see § 3.] Take 
 care to have the openings of the position such as to he easier for 
 those within to fall upon the enemy than for the enemy to gain an 
 entrance. See that the artillery is assured its full effect in the 
 Defence of the position. Take care to select a position on ground 
 advantageously circumstanced to conceal the movements of your 
 masses upon the Tactical Decisive Point [see § 19] ; to have your 
 retreat easy and sure; to have your flanks well supported, so 
 
114 
 
 DEFENCE OF IKELAND. 
 
 as to oblige the enemy to attack the centre. Avoid supporting 
 yourself on a river or on obstacles absolutely impracticable, for 
 fear of being driven back upon them. If your position supplies no 
 supports on the flanks, then place a double reserve column in deep 
 order behind the wing which requires protection. If you are driven 
 from your first position, take care to rally your columns sufficiently 
 far back in the rear as that the enemy shall not be able to prevent 
 them from re-forming. Resume the offensive, then, as soon as 
 the moment for doing so has arrived; arrange then your order of 
 battle as if you had been all along the attacking party; in this way 
 prevent the enemy from coming up ta disorder your flanks. 
 
 § 21. Of Offensive Battles. 
 
 The Simple Parallel Order of Battle is that in which each side 
 is arranged in a single line parallel with the other, every where 
 of equal strength, the two hostile lines set opposite one another. 
 This arrangement leaves everything to accident and to individual 
 personal bravery; it is only convenient when an army has cut 
 off the enemy’s line of retreat while covering its own : the 
 enemy has nothing for it then but to cut his way through by an 
 attack, man ,to man. 
 
 The Parallel Order on the Front , with a “ crochet ” [ i.e ., a por¬ 
 tion of the line doubled back, in front or rear, at one endt] 
 manoeuvring on One Wing, is that in which, instead of opposing 
 to the enemy a single line of equal strength everywhere, the line 
 is doubled or trebled for some distance at one of its extremities, 
 whether by a second line in front or in rear, or by an additional 
 line both in front and rear of that wing. This Order is more 
 advantageous than the former, but it supposes that the attacking 
 army is superior in strength. 
 
 The Oblique Order of Battle is that in which, instead of drawing 
 up the line parallel to that of the enemy, it is ranged so that one 
 extremity shall be nearer than the other to the enemy’s line ; in 
 which case that extremity, or wing, which is nearest to the 
 enemy, and which, of course, acts first in the attack, is generally 
 strengthened by a second line either in front or rear. This dis¬ 
 position is particularly suitable for an army inferior in strength ; 
 the retired or drawn back wing is out of reach of his arms, but 
 it keeps in check that part of his line which is not intended to be 
 attacked, while it serves as a reserve support in case of need to 
 the acting wing. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 115 
 
 The 'Perpendicular Order of Battle on One Wing is that in 
 which, instead of taking line parallel to that of the enemy, the line is 
 at right angles with his, and so that its centre shall he the nearest 
 point to one of his extremities, taking him directly in flank. This 
 Order affords nearly the same advantages as the last mentioned; 
 but it is difficult to establish one’s self on one extremity of the 
 enemy’s line without his being aware of it, in which case the 
 more distant portion of his forces can hasten up to the point 
 threatened 
 
 The Perpendicular Order on Both Wings is that in which the 
 attacking army, divided into two parts, attacks at the same time 
 both wings of the enemy’s single line in the manner la3t de¬ 
 scribed. This Order may sometimes be found useful, but the at¬ 
 tacking side must be very greatly superior in numbers. 
 
 The Concave Order of Battle on the Centre is that in which, 
 instead of taking a single line parallel to that of the enemy and 
 everywhere equally distant from it, the two wings of the parallel 
 line are advanced some distance in front though still parallel 
 to those ot the enemy, and these wings are connected with the 
 centre by oblique lines so as to leave nowhere any interval. This 
 imposition is very convenient when it is taken in the course of 
 the chances of a battle; on principle the enemy would throw him¬ 
 self in force on the wings. 
 
 The Convex Order projecting [“ saillant”] at the Centre , is 
 where the line, always continuous, forms a projecting angle in 
 the centre, the apex of which is placed opposite the enemy’s cen¬ 
 tre, the wings or extremities of the whole line being kept back. 
 This arrangement is scarcely ever adopted except -on the occa¬ 
 sion of engaging in battle at once, after the passage of a river 
 [see § 11]; in which case the wings must be withdrawn, in order 
 to support them on the river and to cover the bridges. If the 
 enemy should direct his efforts against the salient or projecting 
 centre, or against one alone of the two wings, the army would 
 be compromised. 
 
 The Order in “Echelons” on the Centre [see § 11] is that in 
 which, instead of keeping a continuous line, with the centre thrown 
 forward in a projecting angle, the line is all arranged in echelons 
 [see §11]; the centre echelon the most advanced, and those on 
 each side of it placed farther and farther back from (though each 
 always parallel to) the line of the enemy, the echelons forming 
 the extreme wings farthest back of all. This Order may 
 be successfully employed against an enemy’s line too much broken 
 
116 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 up and too widely extended, in order to cut it in two. In every 
 other case it would return of itself into the Convex Order just 
 described. 
 
 The Order in “ Echelons" on Both Wings, is the converse of the 
 last; that where the Centre is farthest withdrawn, and the Two 
 Wings equally extended, the whole line in echelons [see § 11], the 
 last on the extreme wings the nearest to the enemy’s line. This 
 Order resolves itself into that either of the “ Perpendicular Order 
 on Both Wings,” or of the “ Concave Order on the Centre.” 
 
 The Order of Attack in Column on the Centre and on One Ex¬ 
 tremity, is that in which, the line being drawn up in Simple 
 Parallel Order opposite to that of the enemy, the Centre is sup¬ 
 ported by a Column immediately behind it (disposable, of course, 
 at will during the battle,) and another Column is placed on one 
 or the other Wing, in such a manner as to be able to march at 
 once in front of that Wing to attack. This disposition prevents 
 the enemy from throwing himself on your flank, and it brings a 
 great force to bear against the extremity of the enemy’s line ; 
 it is the Order of Battle to which Napoleon has so often given 
 the preference. 
 
 A general should never have any intervals, between the diffe¬ 
 rent corps placed in line-of-battle, by which the enemy could 
 pass through it; unless it be, indeed, in order to draw him into a 
 snare. 
 
 Always seek to find out the relations which exist between the 
 enemy’s line and the Decisive Strategic Directions [see §§ 1 and 4]; 
 direct all your efforts upon the Decisive Point [see back § § 5 and 19]; 
 employ one-third of your force to keep back, to amuse, or to ob 
 serve the enemy, and throw the other two-thirds in mass upon 
 that Point. 
 
 In these different combinations there may be made either one 
 or two attacks. Double Attacks may be either contiguous or 
 separated from one another, successive or simultaneous, accord¬ 
 ing to the strength of one’s disposable forces, and the object pro¬ 
 posed to be attained. 
 
 Every Order of Battle may be formed in Squares of battalions, 
 as well as in Lines, or in Columns. 
 
 Against a very numerous Cavalry a corps darmee may be drawn 
 up in one great Square, itself formed of Squares of regiments or 
 battalions ; the light artillery is to be placed in the intervals, the 
 parks in the centre of the square. 
 
 With an army inferior in numbers, inferior in Cavalry and 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 117 
 
 Artillery, you must avoid a general battle, supply the want of 
 numbers by the rapidity of your marches, the want of artillery by 
 manoeuvres, the inferiority of your cavalry by good choice of 
 positions ; you must entrench yourself every evening, and place 
 yourself always in a good attitude of defence, positions supplied 
 by mere natural advantages of ground being no longer sufficient 
 to be depended on. 
 
 A field of battle previously examined and studied by the enemy 
 must be avoided; much more one which he has fortified, and 
 where he is entrenched. Never attack any position in front which 
 you can carry by turning it. When an army must effect its re¬ 
 treat upon a particular point, and the army opposed to it is free to 
 retire whither it pleases, the latter has all the advantages ; the 
 first must then strike heavy blows, and manoeuvre on its flanks. 
 
 § 22. Of Unexpected Battles. 
 
 Halt and form your Advanced Guard ; concentrate your forces 
 at a suitable point, having in view the object proposed when you 
 began to march. Circumstances must determine the dispositions 
 to be adopted in these unforeseen battles improvised at the 
 moment. 
 
 § 23. Of Mountain Warfare. 
 
 A great number of positions extremely strong in themselves are 
 met with, in Mountain Warfare, which one must care not to 
 attack. Encampments should be occupied on the flanks or in the 
 rear of the enemy, so as to leave him no alternative but to eva¬ 
 cuate his position without fighting and to take up another position 
 in his rear, or to march out from it to attack. Whichever side 
 attacks (in Mountain Warfare) has the disadvantage, even in 
 offensive war: the art consists in fighting none but defensive 
 combats, and in obliging the enemy to make the attack. 
 
 Surprises are the principal enterprises in this kind of war ; 
 everything must be so arranged as to effect them, and to avoid 
 those of the enemy. Beat up every defile, ravine, road, and path 
 that can be of use to him. In order to defend a valley place your¬ 
 self behind it, so as to take the enemy by an enfilade if he should 
 engage himself in it; [an enfilading fire is that in which the direc¬ 
 tion of the missile is along the length of a line (or road), not across 
 it; the proportionate amount of damage done by such a fire need 
 hardly be commented on.] Avoid placing yourself at too short a 
 
118 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 turn of the road. Take measures to beat up well the foot of the 
 heights on which you establish yourself. Keep most careful 
 watch; he on your guard against surprises ; at need cover your 
 position by entrenchments. Keep well open the communications 
 between all the parts of the position you occupy. 
 
 § 24. Formation of Troops. 
 
 There are no absolute or invariable principles concerning the 
 Formation of Troops, which varies according to circumstances 
 and according to the genius of the commander-in-chief, and 
 which besides undergoes incessant modifications during action. 
 
 Advanced Guard .—It endeavours to carry, to cut off, or at 
 least to drive in, the enemy’s posts; it occupies, in its advance, 
 all those points which could facilitate the march or the retreat of 
 the body of the troops; it provokes some attacks, from time to 
 time, without engaging so as to compromise itself, in order to oc¬ 
 cupy the attention of the enemy and to deceive it as to the dis¬ 
 positions of the army; it applies itself to reconnoitre it by means 
 of demonstrations, and by threatening to cut off its advanced 
 guard; if it should prove absolutely necessary, it engages in 
 action, always connecting itself closely with the main body. Its 
 rele lies in manoeuvres. The Advanced Guard can be afterwards 
 re-united with the main body, or placed in a convenient 
 Position. 
 
 Lines. —If the numbers of the army allow of it several Lines are 
 formed, composed of troops drawn up in Column or in Line of 
 Battle. If there are but two Lines, post some battalions in 
 Column behind the Wings of the Second Line. The Cavalry is 
 distributed in echelons [see §11,] on the Wings, and sometimes 
 at the Centre, if the ground be favourable. The Artillery oc¬ 
 cupies its own positions [see § 25, (3) ], so as to protect the prin¬ 
 cipal attacks or the retreat. 
 
 Reserve —The Reserve is placed in the rear, generally at 1500 
 to 1800 paces from the second line, either at the Centre or within 
 proper reach of the Decisive Point [see §§ 5 and 19]. It is com¬ 
 posed of the very best troops, infantry, cavalry and artillery; 
 and it should be well commanded. 
 
 Dispose everything so as to attack the Decisive Point with a 
 superior force, and cover your preparations by false attacks; on 
 the points which you do not desire to carry, present Columns which 
 may afterwards be able to throw themselves rapidly on the true 
 point of attack ; concentrate, for the same object, a body of troops 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 119 
 
 concealed from the enemy’s view either by the ground or by the 
 bodies of troops in front of them ; keep hack the enemy with the 
 smallest number of men you possibly can on those points at which 
 you have no design to make a serious attack. 
 
 The Defence, like the Attack, has its Decisive Point; all its 
 means must he there concentrated. Support your Wings, or 
 supply the want of natural supports for them by corps placed in 
 echelons [see § 11] ; take the offensive from the very moment that 
 you have succeeded in repelling the attack of the enemy, to 
 the end that you may disconcert him and that you may 
 restore confidence to your own troops. Throw a serried Column 
 rapidly upon "one of the wings or upon the flank of the enemy. 
 Attack sharply by echelons , so as not to give time to the enemy to 
 change his front or to bring up his reserves. (The different 
 echelons would of course engage in quick succession one after 
 another, the attack of each being rapidly supported by the next 
 behind it.) 
 
 On the Defensive, in order not to lose the advantage of your 
 position, and to give yourself a moral superiority in the combat, 
 you may place yourself a little behind the ground upon which 
 you design to give battle, and only bear down upon it at the mo¬ 
 ment of repelling the attack of the enemy. 
 
 In every disposition, whatever it may be, do not allow your 
 plans to be unfolded until the latest moment, and execute them 
 promptly. Take advantage of the night to bring your troops on 
 the flank or on the rear of the enemy, so as not to have to mask 
 their march by any great movement. 
 
 You may obtain great advantages over an enemy by combining 
 your attacks upon one extremity of his line, without too much 
 weakening your own line, so as to surprise and get behind his 
 flank before he has time to make his dispositions. Fall upon his 
 camp a little before daybreak. Reconnoitre well the locality in 
 which you act; give to the masses of your forces a proper Direc¬ 
 tor, both Tactical and Strategetic. [§§ 1, 4, 5, and 19.] 
 
 When you give battle you should give yourself every possible 
 chance of success; not one should be omitted or neglected. Con¬ 
 centrate all your troops ; bring all your forces into action at the 
 proper moment, and pursue your success in the most complete 
 manner possible. Detach some columns of Light Troops on the 
 flanks of the enemy, and endeavour to cut his army in two. 
 
 The Commander-in-Chief prescribes beforehand the dispositions 
 to be followed in case of failure of success, leaving, however the 
 
120 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 necessary latitude to the general officers under him. All the 
 several divisions should give mutual assistance to one another. 
 
 In case of success, the Light Troops alone should pursue the 
 enemy with celerity. The others march from position to posi¬ 
 tion, and always so disposed as to he in a condition to repel any 
 return to the offensive on the enemy’s part, and to support the 
 divisions engaged. 
 
 The Commanders of the different Divisions of the Army indi¬ 
 cate, as far as possible, the points where they are to he found 
 from time to time to receive Reports. 
 
 Officers and Sub-Officers (in the English Army “non-commis¬ 
 sioned officers”) keep the men in their ranks by all the means in 
 their power; they do not allow the soldiers to search or to 
 despoil the dead; nor to carry the wounded, unless by express 
 permission after the action. Prisoners are never to he despoiled, 
 and they are to he treated with all the respect due to their rank. 
 
 The Intendance (Medical and General Service Department) is 
 responsible for the service of the sick and the care of the health of 
 the army; it brings together the means of assistance and of tran¬ 
 sport for the wounded. 
 
 The officers of the Artillery send, alter the battle, to collect 
 the pieces, the small arms, and the belts, &c., which remain on 
 the field. 
 
 Food stores, and all effects proper to the commissariat, taken 
 from the enemy, are placed at the disposition of the Intendance. 
 
 All the Superior Officers agree, as far as concerns them, in the 
 written Report of the day. The various deeds of arms referred to 
 are certified by them. 
 
 § 25. Of the Dispositions Peculiar to the Different Arms. 
 
 (1.) Infantry. 
 
 The Defensive requires Solidity and abundant Eire ; the Offen¬ 
 sive Mobility, Solidity and Impulse. 
 
 Infantry is habitually formed in three ranks (three deep). The 
 formation in two ranks is not allowed save by way of exception in 
 case of a reduction in the effective force. (So in the French service; 
 the English use the formation in two ranks.) 
 
 File-firing (individual firing) is the most active and the most 
 killing, the true Fire in action; platoon and division Firing can 
 only be suitable to troops posted in position ; that of the battalion 
 may be employed in an offensive movement, or in retreat. No 
 fire should ever be delivered while marching. 
 
Al*PEXt)IX. 
 
 121 
 
 The Open Order on two lines , with a reserve is generally 
 used; that is where in each line a small space is left between the 
 several divisions (battalions, or brigades, &c.) of which it is com¬ 
 posed, those of the second line being so placed as to front the 
 spaces left in the first line. The distance between the two lines, 
 though variable, is about 400 paces on even and open ground 
 and in presence of artillery ; 150 paces in broken ground. 
 
 The Lines thus displayed in “ Open Order,” (each of which 
 may be considered as made up of a number of smaller Lines 
 placed in a line with one another), may be disposed (that is the 
 smaller Lines of which each is made up) in even line, chequer¬ 
 wise {“ en echiquier” —alternately in advance and retired like the 
 white or the black squares on a chess-board), or in echelons [see 
 § 11] ; but the disposition “ chequer-wise” requires the formations 
 to be in columns, in order to avoid being taken in flank by 
 cavalry. 
 
 The First Line is often deployed (i.e., drawn out into a line, in¬ 
 stead of being massed together), and the Second Line formed in 
 double columns behind it; in which case each Division (whatever 
 it may be) of the Second line, instead of being placed in line be¬ 
 hind, opposite to the intervals left between the divisions of the 
 first line, as in the “ Open Order” just described, is posted exactly 
 behind the corresponding division of the First Line, and is not 
 deployed, but massed in two equal Columns one behind each of 
 the extremities of the division in front. But this disposition 
 varies according to circumstances, and the object proposed. 
 Sometimes the Second Line is made to extend at each side beyond 
 the First in order to protect its flanks where necessary. The 
 intervals between Battalions deployed are of about twenty-four 
 paces. The intervals between Brigades or Divisions are more 
 considerable, to allow of the passage of Cavalry and Artillery. 
 
 Changes of Front, in advancing, allow of taking in flank a por¬ 
 tion of the enemy’s line. 
 
 The Order of Battle in JEchelons [see § 11] is employed in mak¬ 
 ing a powerful attack upon a single point of the enemy’s line, or in 
 order to retire slowly and gradually after a check. The Batta¬ 
 lions are either deployed, or in column, just as if they were in a 
 continued line. All the portions divided in echelons should 
 mutually flank each other at 300 paces of distance. 
 
 The formation in echelons is of little use against Artillery, un¬ 
 less the nature of the ground be such as to protect the troops. 
 
 Oblique JEchelons {i.e., the Oblique Order of Battle, but in 
 
122 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 echelons instead of in continuous line [see § 21]), may sometimes 
 be employed with success. 
 
 The First Echelon (that which is farthest back in the line) 
 should have its outer flank supported upon some obstacle. It may 
 be supported at need by a Keserve, in Column, or by some Ca¬ 
 valry or Artillery. 
 
 Against Cavalry the Infantry forms Squares, whether by regi¬ 
 ments, by several battalions, or by battalions. [These Squares 
 may be drawn up in a continuous line (each square taking the 
 space it would have occupied in line if deployed, and leaving of 
 course wide intervals between itself and its neighbours), or they 
 may be placed chequer-wise [en echiquier , see § 25 (1) in the 
 supra]; every second square withdrawn somewhat behind ; the 
 Squares themselves, also, may be formed either Straight or 
 Oblique , in the latter case presenting a saliant Angle to the enemy 
 instead of a side of the Square.] The largest Squares supply the 
 greatest Fire. They are sometimes formed by Brigades, even, 
 but this is exceptional. Lastly, Squares are disposed either liter¬ 
 ally as perfect squares, or as Long Squares (right-angled paralle¬ 
 lograms) where it is desirable to extend the Front and to increase 
 the Fire. 
 
 In order to secure facility of movement Battalions are often 
 formed, when there is room for it, in Double Columns, or in 
 Columns by Divisions, more or less deep. This formation is a 
 convenient one for the attack of a Position ; the flanks must be 
 protected by Light Infantry Skirmishers or Sharpshooters 
 (i tirailleurs) or by Cavalry. A serried or close Column, disposed 
 by Battalions, would be deficient in Fire, in Mobility, and in Im¬ 
 pulsion, and would be too much exposed to the fire of the enemy’s 
 artillery. 
 
 For the offensive, Columns of Attack are also employed, placed 
 en echiquier [“ chequer-wise,” see supra, § 25 (1)], and formed of 
 two Lines of Battalions ranged in Column by divisions on the 
 Centre, with Skirmishers in the intervals. This formation is 
 ordinarily with three ranks, in order to offer greater resistance to 
 Cavalry. It may be made with two ranks only, to give more 
 Fire [see § 24,] but in this case it must be supported by 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Take advantage of undulations of the ground to cover your 
 troops against artillery; defend all villages, woods, and other 
 obstacles situated on your front; carry them from the enemy, 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 123 
 
 but without showing too much obstinacy in fighting, which might 
 be productive of disproportionate losses. 
 
 The Sharpshooters tirailleurs) are scattered in twos; at least 
 one-third of the party remains in Reserve. A platoon of Sharp* 
 shooters threatened by Cavalry retires on this reserve and forms 
 circle. These Reserves occupy the more important points. In 
 the open plain the Sharpshooters should be supported by Infantry 
 or Cavalry in order of Battle. Turn with your Sharpshooters 
 such obstacles as are difficult to carry, while the others attack in 
 front. 
 
 When the enemy’s artillery is not sufficiently supported by 
 other troops, it is advantageous to attack it as with Sharpshooters, 
 in force, in order to avoid as much as possible its killing effects. 
 Turn the pieces against the enemy at once; carry off or destroy 
 their ammunition stores ; bring away, if possible, the pieces 
 themselves ; if you cannot, then spike them, blow up the ammuni¬ 
 tion boxes, and take the horses* 
 
 (2.) Cavalry. 
 
 The principal object of Cavalry is to finish and complete the 
 victory, to bear assistance rapidly to a menaced party, to break 
 through Infantry when shaken or in disorder, to make prisoners, 
 to carry off standards, to pursue the enemy, and to cover a retreat. 
 
 A general attack of Cavalry against a line in good order ought 
 to be supported by the Infantry. 
 
 Cavalry has good chances of success against Infantry already 
 engaged, by taking it in the rear ; it has an equally good chance 
 against Infantry disordered or cut up by Artillery; it may be 
 directed against Cavalry in order to isolate it from Infantry, or in 
 the confusion of a movement; lastly, it may be used against 
 Artillery not sufficiently well guarded. 
 
 Cavalry should be kept in the Rear or on the Wings ; do not 
 mix it with Infantry, as that would paralyse its movements. 
 Leave intervals sufficient for its free passage; keep the two Arms 
 (Cavalry and Infantry), generally separated, near enough to pro¬ 
 tect each other. Post your Cavalry at 400 paces from the point 
 where it must come into action. 
 
 Cavalry admits of the same formations as Infantry ; it should 
 however avoid long continuous lines, and should prefer those 
 ranged en echiquier [“ chequer-wise,” see supra, § 25 (1)], which 
 allow of rallying troops in disorder. The distance between 
 
124 
 
 DEFENCE OE IRELAND. 
 
 cavalry lines ought always to be from 400 to 500 paces, so as to 
 be able to remedy an unsuccessful charge, except in case of form¬ 
 ing en echiquier , when the distance m&y be less. The Second 
 Line is never to be a continuous one, that it may allow of retreat 
 to the troops of the first line. 
 
 In every Brigade of Cavalry dispose each Regiment in two 
 Lines, the second acting as Reserve to the first, and thus finding 
 itself under the command of the same officer, and more within 
 reach than if it was in the same Line. Or else, form Columns by 
 divisions behind the first line (that immediately behind each of the 
 intervals left between the divisions whatever they are, which are 
 deployed in the first Line, place another full division in close 
 Column), so as to cover its flanks and to be able to dehouche (i.e., 
 to pour out) by the intervals. 
 
 The Order in Echelons [see § 11] is very suitable for cavalry. 
 Without leaving the Open Order Deployed [see supra, § 25 (1)] 
 it economises its strength, and alternately refuses (keeps back) 
 one or the other of its wings. A First Line, beaten back, thus 
 retires readily through the flanks. 
 
 Cavalry charges in Line against a Deployed Line, in Column 
 against Infantry formed in Column or in Squares. The Squadrons 
 are formed in close Column, keeping them out of reach of the 
 enemy’s Artillery, either by distance, or by taking advantage 
 of the formation of the ground. Do not give to a Column of 
 Cavalry useless depth; form at need several attacks. Guard 
 against being attacked in flank, by means of a few squadrons 
 placed in echelons by platoons, which can thus at need show face 
 to the enemy. 
 
 The Charge is made against the angles of squares, if they are 
 not provided with artillery. The squadrons, formed in close 
 Column, take distance one after the other of double the extent of 
 their front. The first squadron is promptly followed by the 
 second, which, if the first has made a passage, throws itself into 
 the square by the two sides. If the first squadron is repelled, 
 it escapes by the right and left to reform in the rear of the column, 
 and leaves the way clear for the front of the second. The latter 
 renews the charge; and so on. The squadrons which follow are 
 sent in pursuit. 
 
 Against Artillery, Cavalry charges loosely {en fourrageurs , as if 
 engaged in foraging), unless it can turn it. A Reserve, concen¬ 
 trated, meantime attacks the neighbouring troops. In case of 
 success, see above, (directions for Infantry in similar case). 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 125 
 
 In combats between Cavalry and Cavalry, the advantage is 
 generally with that side which keeps the last squadrons in re¬ 
 serve, and knows how to throw them at the proper moment on the 
 f anks of the enemy. 
 
 You should not endeavour to rally too near the enemy. 
 
 Artillery is more necessary to Cavalry than to Infantry, be¬ 
 cause Cavalry does not return fire. Cavalry engaged in the 
 support of Artillery ought to leave it full room to act, should 
 never mask it, cut should charge on the flanks of the party at¬ 
 tacking it. 
 
 In retreat, it is proper to cover the movements of Cavalry by 
 about one-fourth Cavalry Skirmishers. 
 
 (3.) Artillery. 
 
 Officers in command of Batteries of Artillery, or of their sub¬ 
 divisions, should keep themselves in communication with the 
 general or superior officers commanding the troops and under 
 whose orders they are placed, in order to be informed of the va¬ 
 rious movement's in proper time, to be acquainted in advance with 
 the dispositions for attack and defence, the positions to be occupied, 
 and the object proposed to be attained; they are to report their 
 own observations on these matters, after having reconnoitred the 
 ground. 
 
 Keep the Reserve separate, and assign it a provisional post. 
 Halt the Batteries out of cannon shot. Assure yourself that 
 everything is in order—Form the Batteries in column by sections ; 
 if the ground allows, make them march deployed, [see supra, 
 § 25 (1)]. 
 
 Positions proper to Artilery. —When the appointed position for 
 the Batteries of Artillery is not rigorously prescribed by the 
 Order of Battle, it should be chosen according to the following 
 principles:— 
 
 The ground in front of the Battery should be as far as possible 
 flat, and should leave the enemy entirely uncovered as far as the 
 tire of the piece can reach (say 1500 yards.) You should have a 
 command over the ground of one yard in the 100 (i.e., fire from 
 a spot having only that command of elevation) ; this elevation is 
 most favourable for ricochet (i.e., tiring [see § 11], so as to make 
 the ball hop along the ground). The maximum elevation above 
 the points to be hit should not exceed seven yards in the 100. 
 When, in default of any other, or to take the enemy in reverse. 
 
126 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND* 
 
 one is obliged to occupy positions of greater elevation, the neigh¬ 
 bouring ground should be defended by pieces placed to hit point 
 blank the foot of the height. Reconnoitre the ground in every 
 direction, and if necessary, establish debouches (passages by which 
 to come out of the position easily)* Take advantage of all obstacles 
 which can stop or check the advance of the enemy, or neutralise 
 his ricochet (see above,) such as marshes, ditches, dykes, undulations 
 of ground having an elevation of half a yard to the yard, hedges, 
 brushwood, &c. Avoid rocky positions. Keep the ammunition 
 boxes and carriages out of reach of the enemy’s arms, without, 
 however, inconveniencing the service of your pieces. As far as 
 possible do not establish Batteries in front of your troops, or on 
 any slight elevation behind them; if not in the very same line 
 with the troops, they should be in front of the intervals in the 
 line. 
 
 At need, and when there is time for it, cover your Artillery by 
 means of the inequalities of the ground, especially on its flanks. 
 By night, above all, in the Advanced and the Rear Guards, put 
 your Artillery in safety against surprise by means of entrench¬ 
 ments. 
 
 Employment of ArtiVery .—The object of Artillery is not to kill 
 men or to dismount pieces in isolated positions, but to make 
 spaces in and passages through the front of the enemy, to stay his 
 attacks, and to second those directed against him. 
 
 In front of a line, never place your Batteries directly opposite 
 the points upon which thej" are to play ; dispose them always so 
 as to take them aslant, or in flank, and so that they may be able 
 to cross their fire so as mutually to protect each other.—Play on 
 the enemies Columns, however, in front; attack vigorously their 
 extensions as they deploy.^—Direct the fire of several Batteries 
 together upon those points where it is desired to produce decisive 
 effects, avoiding at the same time the concentration of a great 
 number of pieces and the placing of several Batteries in the same 
 line, in order that the enemy may not be able to enfilade them 
 [see § 23,] and take them all at once (by a ricochet fire—[see § 
 11,]).—Do not expose yourself to be taken by the enemy’s fire 
 aslant, in flank, or in reverse, unless the desired effect cannot be 
 rapidly produced.—Do not engage Artillery in combat with 
 Artillery, unless your troops should suffer too much from th© 
 enemy’s guns and that his are under cover. Separate your pieces 
 then as much as possible, or divide your Batteries ; endeavour to 
 take the enemy’s pieces by the wheels, or to concentrate your 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 127 
 
 fire on those of the centre.—When Artillery marches with an at¬ 
 tacking Column, or when the enemy is pursued, advance by 
 Echelons [see § 11,] so as to beat him without intermission. Ob¬ 
 serve the same order in retreating.—Do not discover your 
 Batteries to the enemy too soon; conceal them from the view of 
 the enemy until the moment of going into action, then form them 
 with rapidity. 
 
 The different Batteries should be always ready to change their 
 position, but should not do so without need; regulate their 
 movements so that they shall not inconvenience those of the 
 other troops, and so that they shall be always sufficiently well 
 supported. 
 
 Prolonge should not be employed except under circumstances; 
 for example, in a retreat, when it is of importance that the 
 firing should continue until the very arrival of the enemy at the 
 pieces. 
 
 If you form Oblique Squares [see supra, § 25 (1)], place your 
 Artillery between the Squares, by Batteries or Half-Batteries. 
 
 Disposition on the Offensive. —Several Batteries of Division are 
 so placed as to play with converging fires upon that portion of the 
 enemy’s line against which the principal attack is directed ; the 
 remainder are employed to check the troops opposed to them. 
 Some Batteries of Reserve, of heavy calibre, should be established 
 on the most distant positions, on heights, from which they may 
 be able to prevent the enemy from making any effectual attempts 
 against the flanks of the attack, or from which they may take in 
 reverse the position attacked. 
 
 Disposition on the Defensive. —The pieces of heavy calibre are 
 placed at those points from which the enemy can be discovered 
 the farthest off, at the weakest points, or where he would find it 
 most his interest to force his way, on the wings of the position. 
 The Batteries of Division are made to cross their fire in those 
 directions by which the enemy may advance. If the ground 
 allows of it, all the line of Artillery is so disposed as to form a 
 re-entering or concave curve, always taking care not to weaken 
 it by extending it too far. 
 
 Batteries of Reserve. —One portion of the Batteries of Reserve 
 may be engaged from the commencement of an action ; the re¬ 
 mainder should remain disposable, to be employed at need. As 
 far as possible you should not let any but the Batteries of Foot 
 Artillery enter into the plan of your original Order of Battle, and 
 you should keep your Horse Batteries for those occasions in which 
 
128 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 no substitute for them can be bad. As long as the Batteries of 
 Reserve are not engaged, they should be kept beyond the reach 
 of the enemy’s arms, and even absolutely out of his sight, and 
 they should be placed in security against a sudden dash, or coup 
 de main , by an escort or by some defensive dispositions; they are 
 to follow the corps d arm ee , always keeping the same distance 
 from it. 
 
 Movements in Advance. —If the enemy gives up the field of 
 battle, the Horse Batteries march in pursuit of him, with the 
 Cavalry, to throw him into disorder. The Batteries of heavy 
 calibre follow with the Infantry, to prevent his resisting by 
 taking advantage of any position. 
 
 Retreats. —Movements in Retreat ought, should be partial and 
 successive, and should be made in the most perfect order and at 
 quick marching pace. The Artillery which is in line retires in 
 Echelons by Batteries or Half-Batteries. Some Batteries are 
 rapidly established on positions examined beforehand, to protect 
 the troops, to enable them to rally, and to pass through defiles on 
 the way. In such a position the Batteries, unless they receive 
 orders to retire, should continue their fire to the last extremity, 
 at the risk of losing their pieces themselves. Disgrace is attached 
 to a disaster of this kind when it is caused by weakness or cowar¬ 
 dice ; it becomes honourable when one is exposed to it only by a 
 generous obstinacy in defence. 
 
 To Defend a Village, post Batteries on its flanks to fire on the 
 Attacking Columns. Keep a Reserve in the rear, to check the 
 enemy in case he endeavours to turn the village. Do not expose 
 your artillery in the village itself, unless it occupies an advan¬ 
 tageous position, unless it be fortified, or unless it must be defended 
 even to the last extremity. 
 
 To Attack a Village , throw shells into it, to set it on fire, if you 
 merely want to drive the enemy out of it; if you want to occupy 
 it, or to pass through it, throw round shot. 
 
 In Mountain Service, use shells to reach the enemy in the deep 
 valleys and cuts, and in covered places; grape shot and canister 
 against attacking bodies within easy distance. 
 
 Delivery of Fire. —The Commanders of Batteries are to deter¬ 
 mine the moment to fire, according to the distance. They are to 
 determine the direction of the aim, and the kind of projectile to 
 be used ; they are to economise carefully their ammunition and 
 not to use it without discernment, never forgetting that all the 
 ammunition of one piece (about 400 shots'^ may be consumed in a 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 129 
 
 few hours. They are to insist on all these details, if need he, 
 with the generals, because all the responsibility weighs upon them¬ 
 selves. 
 
 Never throw projectiles at an object more than 1,200 to 1,500 
 yards off,* nor grape or canister shot beyond 400 to 500 yards. 
 Throw round shot and shell against the front of a Column, 
 against a Line taken aslant, in flank, or in reverse, and against 
 Artillery. Throw shell against Houses occupied by the enemy, 
 behind Curtains, and in the open field. Throw halls (grape and 
 canister) against the Front of a Line, and against any troops, at 
 a convenient distance. Throw rather at the side of, than beyond, 
 the object of your aim ; at first slowly, at great distances ; faster 
 and faster according to the effect produced, or according as the 
 enemy draws near; as fast as possible at the approach of a 
 Charge. To pass over some 200 yards Infantry require two 
 minutes at charging pace ; Cavalry, half a minute at a gallop. 
 Fire always every shot singly, and never in salvo (or volley), so 
 as not to leave any breathing time to the enemy. Against an 
 attack, artillery should hold its ground to the very last extremity. 
 Never answer the fire of Sharpshooters, it is the part of the 
 Infantry to keep them off. If your Artillery has to oppose itself 
 to Artillery of greater calibre, let it approach it as near as possible, 
 only stopping short beyond the effective distance of grapeshot, 
 Never fire at night, unless : against a fixed object, and one previ¬ 
 ously well reconnoitred by day ; or with grapeshot at a very short 
 distance ; or to set buildings on fire with shells. 
 
 Disposition of Reserves and Paries of Artillery , and Stores of 
 Ammunition . —The Reserve of each Battery—where the Infantry 
 Ammunition is kept for use—should be always harnessed for 
 march, and provided with an escort if necessary; it takes up 
 proper positions, and follows the movements of the troops, keeping 
 itself at a safe distance from the arms and from the various at¬ 
 tempts of the enemy. 
 
 The Park of Reserve of each Corps d’Arm6e, with a strong- 
 escort, is to keep near the troops, at a distance of from three to 
 five miles, in a central position. 
 
 In Retreats all the Parks are directed, in full time beforehand, 
 to appointed positions in the rear of the Army, and, as far as pos¬ 
 sible, to proceed thither by different roads. 
 
 [* Of course this direction is to be taken as applicable only to the 
 pieces commonly in use ; not to the rifled cannon of the present day, 
 or other similarly improved weapons of modem wa-fare.] 
 
130 
 
 DEFENCE 9F IRELAND. 
 
 III. MARCHES.—MANOEUVRES. 
 
 §. 26. Of Front Marches. 
 
 The Order most favourable to the March is that which unites 
 celerity of movements with promptitude in deploying, [see §. 25 
 (1)]. The Order of March should be the same as the Order of 
 Battle to be taken on arriving on the field. Form as many 
 Columns of March as there are Corps d’Armee ; make them ad¬ 
 vance by different roads, always keeping them so much together 
 as to be able to give each other mutual assistance. There is always 
 an advantage in marching in several columns at distances suffi¬ 
 ciently wide to allow of deploying, when the ground admits of it; 
 this disposition should always precede a deployment either in 
 advance or in rear. As long as you are not advised that the 
 enemy is near and in front, each Corps d’Armee need but form a 
 single column, having a front proportionate to the smallest 
 breadth of the road or path to be passed through. 
 
 Avoid leaving any insurmountable obstacles between the 
 Columns. Take advantage of all the localities suitable for secur¬ 
 ing your flanks on the march. Occupy the debouches (passages, 
 passes, and their openings) ; take possession of the boats; destroy 
 at need the bridges and ferries. If the country be very rough and 
 unsuitable for deploying , turn the positions which the enemy may 
 take possession of, while you watch him in front. Keep up con¬ 
 stant communication between your columns; employ signals, if ne¬ 
 cessary, in order to combine their movements. Let your columns 
 be preceded by a body of Artillery, in order to facilitate their de¬ 
 ploying. When the country is open, keep together as many 
 columns as the ground allows at distances just sufficient to permit 
 them to deploy freely, so as to be able to form an Order of Battle 
 either in line of divisions or in continuous line. Examine the various 
 localities susceptible of exposing the enemy to reverses, or allow¬ 
 ing you to turn the positions which he may take up. Never en¬ 
 gage more than two columns in front in the same pass or defile, 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 131 
 
 that of the right marching left in front so as to he able to deploy 
 at the same time with the other. Redouble your precautions 
 in hollow ways (i.e., where the road, or passage, dips down be¬ 
 tween high ditches or rising ground on each side); avoid changes 
 of direction in your march. 
 
 Infantry and Cavalry should not be mixed in the same column ; 
 the Infantry is generally placed at the head; the Cavalry usually 
 marches on one wing, or behind the Infantry. In uneven 
 countries each column, being able to engage by itself, should 
 have its cavalry in the rear. 
 
 Independent of the general Advanced Guard which precedes an 
 Army, each Corps d’Armee has its particular Advanced Guard, 
 which should show face to any attack, and which is composed of 
 the three arms (Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery,) with some 
 workmen (pioneers) to open and free the way, and a light bridge 
 equipage. The effective force of the Infantry should always be 
 double that of the Cavalry; the Advanced Guard, varying in 
 strength, should be within the limits of l-10th to l-20th of the 
 Army. 
 
 The flanks are protected by scouts of light Infantry and 
 Cavalry, which are to be relieved frequently: the first, in greater 
 number, are placed at from sixty to seventy-five paces from each 
 other, so as to form a continuous chain; the horsemen keep 
 themselves in communication with the flankers of the nearest 
 column. 
 
 The rear is secured by a Rear-Guard, the force and composi¬ 
 tion of which vary according to circumstances. 
 
 The Advanced Guard should always be kept within reach of 
 being supported. Draw it near, when you make an attack, so as 
 not to discover your intentions; in marching in several columns, 
 place it in advance of that one the movement of which it is of the 
 greatest importance to cover, but so as always to be able to pro¬ 
 tect the deployment [see § 2 5 (1)] of the others. Cover the Ad¬ 
 vanced Guard by scouts ; search completely every village, every 
 defile, .&c.; dispose your troops in such Order [see § 21] as may 
 be most suitable to the nature of the country; always place some 
 horsemen at the head of your march. 
 
 § 27. Of Marches in Retreat. 
 
 In Marches in Retreat, let all the baggage be moved to the 
 front, as well as even a portion of the Artillery ; take possession 
 of all the defiles in your way, by establishing yourself on their 
 
 * 
 
132 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 flanks ; close np the enemy’s debouches (the passages by which he 
 can pour out upon you). Send forward detachments beforehand, 
 by the cross-roads, to occupy the positions which the enemy is to 
 take, so as to cover its deploying [see § 25, (1.)]. Seize possession 
 of all posts, tetes de pont [see § 2], &c., which the enemy might 
 occupy in your rear. 
 
 Retreats may be facilitated, either by making an offensive move¬ 
 ment to deceive the enemy, or by profiting by the night to con¬ 
 ceal the first moments of the march, or by passing over a river 
 and blowing up the bridges after it is passed; or, again, by 
 throwing one’s-self into defiles the entrance into which may he 
 defended with obstinacy. 
 
 The Rear-Guard, and the Flanks, stand in need of powerful 
 protection during Retreats, and should he composed according to 
 the nature ot the country and the importance of the circumstances 
 at the moment. 
 
 The Rear-Guard should halt and stand firm at all points offer¬ 
 ing support, so as to give the various detachments time to join 
 the Army. Obstruct the enemy’s march. Blow up the bridges. 
 Assume the offensive occasionally, but so as not to compromise 
 yourself too deeply. 
 
 § 28. Of Flank Marches. 
 
 Flank Marches should be avoided as being always dangerous 
 in presence of an enemy, and as being only suitable to very small 
 bodies of men. You may be surprised and cut through, not being 
 in force; an attack on the head of the columns affords little re¬ 
 medy against this. Such Marches can only be executed slowly; 
 they almost always leave the line of operations uncovered. 
 
 When you are compelled to have recourse to a Flank March, 
 each Line of Infantry [see § 24], according to the strength of the 
 Army, should form one or two columns of itself; the Cavalry, 
 exclusive of detachments, should march on the inner flank, in as 
 many columns as may be necessary to hasten the movement; it 
 keeps itself abreast with the Infantry; the several Batteries 
 follow their divisions; the Parks of Artillery form a last column 
 on the inner flank. Keep yourself continually ready to fight 
 both in Front and in Flank; have an Advanced Guard, and a 
 Rear-Guard; cover yourself by means of every natural obstacle, 
 and keep sufficiently far from the enemy; send out detachments 
 upon every point proper to cover the march; establish batteries; 
 profit by such positions as may be able to support satisfactorily 
 
 * 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 133 
 
 the inner flank; [inner flank, i.e., that farthest from the enemy, 
 across whose front you are marching.] 
 
 § 29. Of Retreats. 
 
 A good Rear-Guard should he formed, composed of the dif¬ 
 ferent arms, (Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery), supported by 
 reserves of Cavalry; it should be kept half a day or a day’s march 
 distance from the main body of the army, according to its strength 
 and to circumstances. 
 
 An Army in Retreat accomplishes its movement by several 
 roads, which should not separate far from one another, and 
 which should all conduct to the rallying point fixed. It is not 
 necessary that these roads, or directions, should converge among 
 themselves, if the retreat can he made behind a river or a chain 
 of mountains. Cover your flanks well either by means of natural 
 obstacles or by light troops. 
 
 An Army yet intact, and in but moderate force, may retreat in 
 a body by the same route. 
 
 Whatever be your manner of Retreat, conduct it slowly, con¬ 
 centrate your forces, and multiply as much as possible those 
 obstacles by which the enemy may be stayed. Take advantage 
 of a wooded country, and of one cut up by gorges, passes, ravines, 
 and defiles. Make cuts across the roads, unless at the sides of 
 them the way is practicable; obstruct them by Abattis ; [an ahattis 
 is an obstruction composed of a number of large trees, cut down with 
 all their branches on, and heaped one upon another, the entangled 
 branches turned towards the enemy; various artificial means 
 are often adopted to assist and strengthen their entanglement, 
 and to give solidity to their mass ;] break them up by hollowing 
 out pits in them, by conducting into which the water of a neigh¬ 
 bouring brook the road may soon be made impassible. Close up 
 or obstruct the passage through the Villages, by Palanques , 
 (palisade-work arranged in a particular way, formed of large 
 thick palisades or squared trunks of trees, of at least seven or 
 eight inches in diameter each), by barricades, by loaded waggons, 
 taking away a wheel, &c.; fill the last houses with combustible 
 materials and set fire to them, so as to accomplish the burning of 
 the village when the enemy is engaged in its passage; the 
 artillery should throw shells upon the houses to prevent the fire 
 from being extinguished. Destroy or break down the Bridges, or 
 merely block up the passage over them if you are likely to require 
 them afterwards yourself. Take care to carry over all the Boats 
 
134 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 to the side you occupy. Make Fords impracticable by making a 
 dyke (embankment) from the side of the river you occupy; by 
 cutting a wide trench in the middle of the river, following the 
 direction of its current; by stakes, caltrops, planks with long 
 nails stuck in them and well loaded, and harrows, spread through 
 all the breadth of the stream ; by trees fastened together and sunk 
 to the bottom by means of bags filled with stones and fastened 
 to their branches, &c.; and scarp down (i.e., cut down straight and 
 precipitous) the banks on both sides. Employ, according to circum¬ 
 stances, in fine, all the various means furnished by the art of Field 
 Fortification ; [Fortification Pas sag ere, i.e., Light or Temporary 
 Works of Fortification, as distinguished from those of solid con¬ 
 struction, upon an elaborate plan, applied to Cities and regular 
 Fortresses; this branch of Fortification is the subject of distinct 
 military education; and of distinct treatises which must be 
 studied for themselves by those who would become acquainted 
 with it]. 
 
 Prevent the decrease of the moral strength and spirit of your 
 army in retreat by well combined movements of an offensive 
 character from time to time. To hold your ground and halt 
 at the wrong time would be to complete your ruin; not to do 
 so at all would be to convert a Retreat into a Bout. 
 
 § 30. Of Defiles. 
 
 To Defend a Defile , the Advanced Guard takes an advantageous 
 position beforehand, sufficiently near the entrance of the pass to 
 be supported upon the obstacles furnished by the Defile. The 
 Reserve, and the greater portion of the Cavalry, should be posted 
 at the exit from the Defile, so as to guard it, and to protect the 
 retreat. Leave the Defile itself free, and let your Parks of Artil¬ 
 lery remain behind it. Take some positions within the Defile, if 
 possible; throw up some earth-works to cover your Batteries. 
 Occupy all the knots (centres and crossings) of communication, 
 and cover your flanks by detachments under precise and rigid 
 orders. 
 
 Cavalry is but ill fitted for this kind of service, unless it has 
 Cavalry to oppose. 
 
 In a high road, in a narrow passage of any length, effect, if you 
 have time, deep cuts, from which the earth should be cleared so 
 that the enemy should not perceive them. Establish cannon at 
 100 to 200 yards in the rear so as to cross their fire, if possible, 
 upon these cuts. Throw round shot, if your guns can play along 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 135 
 
 the Defile for a certain distance; only nse grape-shot when the 
 head of the enemy’s column is stopped by the cuts. Cross the fire 
 of your Batteries at the exit from the Defile. 
 
 If you desire to prevent the enemy from coming out of the Defile , 
 place yourself in the rear of it, and at the point most favourable 
 for attacking him both in front and flank as he comes out. 
 
 To force the passage, endeavour to turn the Defile; send out 
 Sharpshooters; make counter play, from a distance, with heavy 
 guns, upon the pieces established in the Defile ; bring light field 
 pieces rapidly to bear against the Batteries placed in the rear of 
 the Defile ; establish them in succession, within grape-shot dis¬ 
 tance, in the greatest possible number. Form Columns of Attack. 
 
 § 31. Of Wood Fighting. 
 
 Defence .—Construct Ahattis [see § 29,] at the principal issues 
 of the Wood, and at all practicable comers or projections of it; 
 open communications with your' centre of action; defend the 
 skirts of the Wood, which may enable you to discover the enemy 
 at a distance; establish Artillery at the approaches and at the 
 comers and projections. Bring up your Reserves near; employ 
 Sharpshooters skilfully; form several Lines; take good care of 
 your Flanks. 
 
 Attach. —Follow the ordinary rules for Attack on Positions; 
 cover yourself with Sharpshooters; form small Columns; sur¬ 
 prise the enemy’s Flanks ; employ heavy artillery, and cover it 
 by proper use of the inequalities of the ground, by earthworks, by 
 Fascines [long bundles of twigs and branches bound together, 
 and used either to make a sort of wall of themselves, or to 
 strengthen or line a wall of earth], and by trunks of trees ; keep 
 up a strong Rear Guard in order to protect your rear and your 
 flanks. 
 
 [As to the Passage of a River, see §11.] 
 
136 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 ADDITIONAL NOTE. 
 
 From the Works of the Late General Sir C. J. Napier. 
 
 [The following practical Observations, by one of the greatest 
 authorities on War in the present century, will be found, per¬ 
 haps, still more useful than the formal instructions in the 
 “ Memorial' for the proper understanding of General Keating’s 
 pamphlet. They are those of the late Sir Charles James 
 Napter (the first cousin of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, and a 
 general who, in India and elsewhere, proved himself not only the 
 equal, hut, perhaps, the superior of the late Duke of Welling¬ 
 ton) ; from whose Note-Book several valuable extracts have 
 been published since his death by his scarcely less distinguished 
 brother, Sir Wm. Napier, in the first volume of his admirable 
 Life of the hero. (See Life and Opinions of General Sir 
 Charles James Napier , G. C. B., hy Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. Napier , 
 K. C. B. Four vols. London: John Murray; 1857. Yol. 
 1 ; pp. 232 etseq., 243 ; 250.) It will be observed, by the dates 
 that these Notes were made during the Peninsular War.] 
 
 “ 1809. Popular Wars. —It is generally found that Wars 
 arising from popular enthusiasm have been excited by oppression, 
 bad government, or bad faith; in short, that the populace has 
 good cause for anger. Those who wish to direct popular troops, 
 and those also who are inclined to lend assistance, must be very 
 cautious, or else resign caution entirely, risking all on chance. 
 The heated imaginations of enthusiasts, who are generally weak 
 men, see no reverses; each has victory in his own plan, and all 
 will make mountains of mole-hills and mole-hills of mountains. 
 The last is indeed a minor evil, for a man may dare any danger 
 successfully , but must never forget to estimate accurately his ovjn 
 povoers. False estimates are the cause of failure in all 
 such enterprises. Those who engage in them always exaggerate 
 their numbers and resources, and to deceive yourself is to fight 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 127 
 
 for the enemy. Another cause of failure is, that when coming 
 to action every man is confident in his own particular plan and 
 will not give it up, or, at most, but coldly acts on his neighbour s 
 plan : hence dissensions, the cry of * traitors /’ and all the evils of 
 jarring interests. Military plans require despotism. Great 
 men may, when shackled by control, do much, but they would do 
 more if unshackled. 
 
 “In popular wars you must not attempt to form armies , or com¬ 
 bine movements, unless a powerful body of Regular Troops is 
 already embodied ; in which case a despotic government must 
 direct all the operations. Spain [in the Peninsular War] fur¬ 
 nishes the proof of this. Instead of attempting to meet the dis¬ 
 ciplined warriors of France in battle, she should have made a 
 partizan war.* Small corps of foot should have acted in the 
 mountains, fought in the defiles, and watched the fords; small 
 parties of cavalry should have eternally harassed the enemy’s 
 marches, and beat up his quarters when halted. At first these 
 parties could not be too small; but in the towns every house 
 should have barricades, be pierced with loopholes, and turned into 
 a redoubt which its master should defend or die. Ten towns like 
 Zaragoza or Gerona would save [have saved] Spain—one, if that 
 were Madrid. In the plains forage might be destroyed or col¬ 
 lected in towns. Cavalry could not get it in mountains occupied 
 by active partizans, who, as they acquired experience, would 
 gradually become formidable corps equal to combined movements. 
 The armies of France could then only gain ground with loss of 
 blood, and their system of concentration be unavailing. Armies 
 in mass could not pursue a hundred men, the bodily endurance of 
 the Spaniards would tell, and their losses be supplied by a pre¬ 
 sent population, while those of France could only be repaired 
 from a distance and scantily in comparison. 
 
 “1810. Commanders. —A Commander should concentrate his 
 own forces, divide his enemies, and never think himself strong 
 enough when he can he stronger. Yet he should remember that 
 additional numbers do not always give strength. 
 
 “ He should never voluntarily attempt anything where failure 
 would be ruin, whatever be the temptation: he may however be 
 
 * [Spain did do so, and admirably well; had she not, neither Wel¬ 
 lington nor Napier himself could have checked the Armies of France 
 in this War. . But she should have confined herself to this, and she 
 suffered nothing but disaster for not having done so.] 
 
138 
 
 DEFENCE OF FREE AND. 
 
 forced to do so. Attempt anything , the more daring the better , 
 if \ou can bear defeat. But: 
 
 “ Always when you do attack do it with all possible fury ; be 
 sudden and rapid, and if possible unexpected. 
 
 “ Always attack if you cannot avoid an action. 
 
 iC And when you do attack throw your whole power also upon 
 one point , and let that point he a decisive one ; the day is your own if 
 it is carried; and your other points are safe, as the enemy cannot 
 maintain his ground, much less advance, if the key of his position 
 be in your power, even though he should be successful everywhere 
 else. If the key point can be turned it is still better , and there are 
 many ways of attacking a position abstractedly. 
 
 “ Let your guiding principles be first to form plans of campaign 
 on the largest scale possible ; then to have your army compact, 
 and your movements well combined, concentric, and rapid. 
 
 “ If your enemy is strongest, fall on his weakest points and 
 avoid his strong ones. If you are more powerful, fasten on his 
 vitals and destroy him. If he is strong, provoke him to separate; 
 if he is weak drive him to a corner. 
 
 “ Never separate your own force unless your detachments are 
 equal to the enemy's $ and even then it is bad, though sometimes 
 it must be done. The fable of the bundle of sticks ought always 
 to be in a general's mind. 
 
 “ The place to strike at your enemy is not so much where you 
 are sure of success in battle, as where your blow will be decisive 
 in the consequences. Suppose an army has only one road by 
 which he receives supplies ; if he preserves that, the beating his 
 left or right „or centre may be glorious, yet will be unavailing—he 
 remains in the field : but once gain that road, and all is over. 
 These things appear simple, but how few generals do we find able 
 to act on them P 
 
 “ Is your army of Cavalry or Infantry chiefly ? 'If the 
 former, take the open plains if you can. If the latter, an intersected 
 country should generally be preferred; but that depends more on 
 your enemy’s force than your own, indeed on so many things 
 that to say absolutely what should be done is folly—circumstances 
 must direct. However the first of all objects is the Commissariat . 
 Your troops may wrest arms out of the enemy’s hands and if 
 they fail they can run, but if they want food the game is up, they 
 must surrender. The means of securing food must therefore be 
 fixed , not left to chance or promises. The general should be sure, 
 if it is in his power ; if it is not, he must give up all at once ; 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 139 
 
 unless the nature of affairs demands the risking the destruction of 
 his army. Lord Wellington did so in Portugal, whether properly 
 or not is for those who know how things stood to judge—I do 
 not. 
 
 “ Discipline should be enforced with rigour $ death is the only 
 effectual punishment on service; the life of a criminal must not he 
 thought of when it gains a point of far more importance than a 
 post, in attacking which a hundred honourable men may fall. 
 Discipline is necessary for health , for safety , for combinations, for 
 keeping up numbers , seeing that the loss of men killed or taken 
 singly from plundering and drink is inconceivable ; policy and 
 humanity to the wretched inhabitants of the seat of war command 
 that marauders should die without mercy. But the supply of food 
 must be sufficient or discipline goes , no man will starve for fear of 
 being shot :* the Commissary is the very life of an Army ; if his 
 department goes wrong the General can do nothing , disorganisation 
 and disease follow his neglect. 
 
 “ A General should also watch the Drill of his Army, hut that 
 is the easiest part of his duty. Regiments must, however, take 
 all means of perfecting and adapting it to the country acted in. 
 
 “ With these precautions a general may take the field with con¬ 
 fidence in himself, if he is also cautious, daring, active, deceitful, 
 searching his enemy with spies in all directions, hut giving little 
 credit to their stories, save when corroborated by circumstances, 
 or on proved fidelity. He should acquire accurate personal know¬ 
 ledge of the country, and make his staff departments do the same. 
 When in movement, let him he careful to prevent his troops being 
 kept standing long under arms; waiting either for quarters at the 
 end, or for orders at the beginning of a march; nothing is more 
 harassing to men and officers, nothing so likely to produce sickness 
 in hot, cold, or wet climates. Seize all intoxicating liquors when 
 they can he found, and let them he immediately distributed as far 
 as may he without injury; if that can’t he, destroy them, for to 
 guard them with English troops is impossible. [!!] 
 
 “ Guard well against surprise ; to be surprised is inexcusable in 
 a general , if it happens from his neglect of proper posts: if his 
 troops are surprised in good posts they must he in a dreadful state, 
 which can hardly be the fault of any one hut the general. 
 
 “ Never call a council ofwar $ a general is to command his officers, 
 
 * [Except Irishmen, at home, in “Famine” time, in the midst of 
 a rich and plentiful harvest.] 
 
140 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND, 
 
 not to obey them. This need notprevent his receiving the opinion 
 of any officer, or of every officer, in regard to their peculiar duties. 
 Leave every officer power and responsibility in his own post, accord¬ 
 ing to his worthiness. A general publicly avows his embarrassments 
 when he tellsinferior officers he doesnot knowwhat to do, and that 
 they do : his army loses confidence, magnifies every difficulty, and 
 either becomes panic-stricken or despises the chief, or both. In 
 council also each will believe he knows better than his neighbour, 
 and be dissatisfied if his advice is not followed. The man who 
 says, do that because I order you, is obeyed with confidence and 
 decision. 
 
 “ As to fighting battles, Marshal Saxe said they were won by 
 legs more than arms, and certainly battles are decided by rapid 
 well-directed marches more than anything else ; but I do not see 
 much wisdom in the apothegm, for it is the head, arms, and legs, 
 united that win battles , and not any one of them. The head has 
 clearly the best share, for the best legs and arms with a bad head 
 will rarely conquer , whereas bad legs and arms with a good 
 head may. 
 
 “ Commander of a Regiment .' 1 —He should he steady in system $ 
 that which demands change must be bad: change is in itself an 
 evil of magnitude. He should issue as few orders as possible $ 
 there is scarcely a greater evil than long and frequent orders. 
 He should enforce the orders he does issue ; a habit of obedience 
 is the great spring of military arrangements $ but when subject to 
 constant orders men’s minds, especially young minds, become 
 fatigued and heedless; disobedience, or, at best, inattention, 
 follows, for no commanding officer can be a constant spy on his 
 officers—nor would it become him if he could. How, then, can 
 this natural weakness of men’s minds be met? By not overloading 
 them; by short, simple, and few orders ; by seeing to their exe¬ 
 cution, and making severe examples of the disobedient in matters 
 of consequence. Sharp reprimandsfor slight neglects are neces¬ 
 sary , not because the matter signifies much in itself, but that a 
 habit of disobedience grows, and steady checking makes men 
 dread disobedience more than the trouble of duty : they reason 
 thus—the orders are few, but necessary ; I am bound in honour 
 to obey them ; and neglect subjects me to unpleasant treatment. 
 When this feeling arises, a lieutenant-colonel has little to do 
 beyond admonishing the careless; and on service he will find 
 that, while others are overwhelmed with exertion and yet diso¬ 
 beyed, he, and those under him, scarcely feel the difference. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 141 
 
 “ This is real subordination, real responsibility. It is not say¬ 
 ing to a lieutenant-colonel, * I bold you responsible/ that suc¬ 
 ceeds; the same speech goes through each gradation to the 
 drummer; and when the thing is not done, the lieutenant-colonel 
 being responsible to the general, cannot say ‘ the major disobeyed 
 me,’ for that would bring the general and the drum-boy face to 
 face to settle the matter, which would he the reverse of responsi¬ 
 bility. The colonel should he able to say to the general ; I cannot 
 see this order executed with my own eyes , hut having taught my 
 officers the necessity of obedience I will be responsible for its execu¬ 
 tion . Here is the true ‘ chain of responsibility,’ which is not to 
 be found by throwing your own duty on the shoulders of your 
 juniors. 
 
 “ Let the commander do his own duty; that is the great secret: 
 neither rewards nor punishments have so much effect as example. 
 In battle a leader who cries ‘ Forward/ may see his men fly dis¬ 
 gracefully ; but he who, sword in hand, rushes on the enemy will 
 generally be followed. 
 
 “ The fewer reprimands the fewer punishments, and more 
 effect; nothing more disagreeable to one’s-self, nothing more use¬ 
 less than scolding —it is weak and contemptible. The voice of a 
 commander should seldom be heard in anger, and then it will be 
 feared and heeded ; if frequent it will excite ridicule, often indig¬ 
 nation : its course is first teazing, then impertinent, ungentleman¬ 
 like, finally unjust and insulting ; then an apology is due to the 
 misused person, and you are no longer respected. 
 
 “ Order oe Battle. —Jomini’s method* of forming three lines 
 by dividing regiments into three grand divisions, one behind 
 another, would sacrifice fire and be unhandy. For English troops 
 the single line, two deep, has been found strong enough. If men 
 have solid nerve, that formation is sufficient; if they have not, 
 three lines will equally fail, and the rear line will be shooting the 
 front lines. If you distrust your troops the column is best to break 
 an adverse line , because disorder and flight from line is destruc¬ 
 tion ; whereas the most frightened troops can keep in a body, and 
 be able to make terms if not able to resist with effect, and in the 
 attack they force each other forward. But no general rule can be 
 given in these matters . General Jomini seems, however, to he 
 
 * [General Jomini has long been regarded as the first authority 
 on military science ; General Napier’s criticism must however, have 
 been founded on experience, at least that of an English army.] 
 
142 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 right as to keeping men more collected than they are, at least, 
 in our [i.e., the English] army. Should I ever command an 
 army* it shall be kept, so jar as the ground will admit, in a wedge- 
 like form , <which may\ according to circumstances , be compressed 
 to an oblong , or displayed as a line . When required to act, it may 
 be done by companies, regiments, or brigades, according to the 
 need. Six regiments are in line; twelve may follow in straight 
 column behind each flank, or divergent in echelon ; thus offering 
 the oblong or the wedge form as the ground dictates. Behind the 
 entire should march the reserve. This would give a pliability 
 scarcely to be attained by any other formation, seeing that battle 
 may be offered to the front, or obliquely, to the right or left, with¬ 
 out inconvenience. The artillery and cavalry must be placed 
 according to circumstances. 
 
 “ Cavalry. —Infantry grow accustomed to cavalry, but the 
 tendency of cavalry is to become fearful: this a good general 
 should take great pains to obviate. The infantry soon learn that 
 close formation and steadiness gives them safety ; they take ad¬ 
 vantage of ground, and thus gain confidence; but the cavalry 
 must lose it, because they find the foot soldiers grow firmer in 
 resistance, and delivering a closer fire. Thus attacks become 
 more dangerous for man and horse, and both become faint¬ 
 hearted until the dispute is decided by the complete superiority 
 of the musket and bayonet over the sabre, f One simple fact 
 will account for this. The foot soldier can kill his adversary at 
 some hundred yards ; the horseman cannot hurt his enemy until 
 the latter is within reach of his sword, and then six foot soldiers 
 are opposed to each file of horsemen! Is it fair to expect they 
 should cope with such odds for any length of time P 
 
 “ I do not mean that cavalry are not to charge infantry ; they 
 must charge anything they are ordered to charge, and they will 
 frequently break and annihilate infantry: moreover, it may be 
 requisite to charge with the Certainty of defeat. These are not 
 points becoming for cavalry to consider, they wholly belong to the 
 
 * [These admirable Notes were written when the illustrious 
 general was still but a regimental officer, in 1813.] 
 
 f [Since these Notes of General Napier were written great im¬ 
 provements have taken place in the musket and bayonet. The 
 present “Enfield Bide,” so long, and so light to carry, is quite easily 
 managed in fencing; and even without firing it is in dexterous hands 
 all but a match for the sword in those of a practised swordsman.] 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 143 
 
 general; my aim is to shew that infantry will have greater force 
 in battle than cavalry. It may he said that artillery will break 
 the infantry; but the latter have artillery also, and my decided opi¬ 
 nion is that infantry , even in line, may oppose cavalry ,* particularly 
 when accidents of ground cover their flanks, in want of which a 
 company wheeled back will answer the purpose. I will go 
 farther, and will, after a great deal of personal service in the in¬ 
 fantry, say that a line charged over by cavalry 'will, if the men 
 do not endeavour to escape by flight, lose very Jevj, and vjill finally 
 beat the cavalry. Artillery therefore makes little difference, and 
 solid formations are not essential, though preferable. Cavalry 
 may nevertheless act with prodigious effect accidentally—great 
 conduct, and great misconduct, will not submit to principles. 
 
 “ The great advantages of cavalry are these :— 
 
 “ 1st.—When an enemy is beaten, its use in pursuit is ad¬ 
 mitted. 
 
 “ 2nd.—If the enemy is victorious, cavalry covers the retreat. 
 On this much may be said more than these Notes will admit of: 
 their obvious services would be in flank attacks on the most for¬ 
 ward of the pursuers; ambuscades, &c. ; and also to save the rear 
 from flank attacks ; but it would require more knowledge than I 
 possess to say all that cavalry can do in a retreat. 
 
 “ 3d.—What cavalry can defend in a retreat they can attack in 
 a pursuit: superiority in cavalry will therefore be very decisive 
 in a battle or a campaign. For if the beaten army has it, by that 
 superiority the general may palliate his losses, rendering them of 
 small consequence. If the victorious general has the superior ca¬ 
 valry, he will probably gain more by the pursuit than the victory 
 itself. 
 
 “ 4th.—The greatest effect on a campaign by the skilful use of 
 Cavalry will be to employ it on the flank of an enemy, and even 
 in his rear. Two points are thus gained. Your cavalry, having 
 great tracts of ground to act in, is more easily supplied than 
 when concentrated, and requiring supplies to come up to it in¬ 
 stead of going to those supplies, meanwhile acting offensively. 
 Again: your opponent is in constant fear for his supplies, and 
 must send forces to protect them. If successful, the danger of 
 attack renders the march slow, and weakens his army more than 
 your cavalry detachment weakens you; for his can only rejoin 
 slowly with the convoys, while yours can rapidly rejoin the main 
 body, and in combined movements a junction often requires but 
 a very short march. 
 
144 
 
 DEFENCE OF IRELAND. 
 
 “ Expeditions of this kind would form, and bring out, men of 
 enterprise in every class ; offering glory for officers, and non-com¬ 
 missioned officers, sufficient to create great emulation and intel¬ 
 lectual exertion; exciting also in the privates a daring spirit for 
 personal achievements of strength and courage.’ , 
 
 [Long after writing these Notes, Sir Charles Napier was in 
 command of the “ Northern District” of England, as Major- 
 General, on the occasion of the expected Chartist Insurrection, in 
 1839. It is impossible better to conclude this Appendix than by 
 putting on record, here also, this great general’s estimate of that 
 kind of “ physical force” which is the ordinary boast of the popu¬ 
 lar “ agitator.” The following pregnant extract from his Journal 
 is taken from the second volume of Sir W. Napier’s work —p. 69. 
 
 “ August 6th.—The plot thickens. Meetings increase and are 
 so violent, and arms so abound, I know not what to think. The 
 Duke of Portland tells me there is no doubt of an intended general 
 rising. Poor people! They will suffer. * They have set all Eng¬ 
 land against them and their “ physical force.” Fools! We have 
 the physical force, not they. They talk of their hundred thou¬ 
 sands of men. Who is to move them when I am dancing round 
 them with cavalry and pelting them with cannon-shot F What 
 would their 100,000 men do with my 100 rockets wriggling their 
 fiery tails among them, roaring, scorching, tearing, smashing all 
 they come near P And when in desperation and despair they 
 broke to fly, how would they bear five regiments of cavalry 
 careering through them? Poor men! Poor men! How little 
 they know of physical force!” 
 
 So might Napier have said had he been in Dublin during the 
 “ Club” mania of 1848. “ Who is to move them , when” &c! 
 
 Numbers are not strength; they must be organised as well as 
 armed; they must be well led as well as armed and organised. 
 They must be not only brave, but disciplined; and disciplined to 
 obey $ and they must have a leader to command them. Let every 
 word in all this Appendix be read by the light of these First 
 Principles.] 
 
 * [Sir Charles Napier, remember, not only sympathised with the 
 outraged democracy of England, but deliberately agreed with them 
 upon the political principles expressed in the “Five Points” of the 
 Charter.”] 
 
 THE END. 
 
'