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 NOTES ON 
 
 BILL DRAFTING 
 
 IN ILLINOIS 
 
 Compiled and Published by the 
 
 LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU 
 
 Springfield, Illinois 
 1920 
 
 r'l, 
 
 
 [Published by authority of the State of Illinois.] 
 
 
 
 
 ' .’•V ' *, ■, 
 
 
NOTES ON 
 
 ILL DRAFTING 
 
 IN ILLINOIS 
 
 Compiled and Published by the 
 
 LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU 
 
 Springfield, Illinois 
 1920 
 
 ILLINOIS STATE LIBRARY 
 
 29 00609 1276 
 
 [Published by authority of the State of Illinois.] 
 
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU. 
 
 Governor Frank O. Lowden, Chairman. 
 *Senator Edward C. Curtis, Grant Park. 
 Senator Richard J. Barr, Joliet. 
 Representative Edward J. Smejkal, Chicago. 
 Representative William P. Holaday, Danville. 
 
 E. J. Verlie, Secretary. 
 
 * Deceased. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 This study has been prepared by DeWitt Billman. It was un¬ 
 dertaken at the suggestion of W. F. Dodd who made many valuable 
 suggestions. 
 
 It is hoped that this pamphlet will be of assistance to members of 
 the General Assembly and others who have occasion to draft legisla¬ 
 tive measures in Illinois. 
 
 In addition to the books listed in the bibliography, two publica¬ 
 tions of the Legislative Reference Bureau, Constitutional Conventions 
 in Illinois, and Constitution of the State of Illinois, Annotated, have 
 been consulted on questions of constitutional law. 
 
 Legislative Reference Bureau. 
 
 E. J. Verlie, Secretary.^ 
 
 Springfield, Illinois, 
 
 December, 1920. 
 
 ' 1 ^ 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 The Problem of Constructing a Statute. 7 
 
 Title and Singleness of Subject. 13 
 
 Subject . 13 
 
 Title . 15 
 
 When Laws Take Effect. 21 
 
 Arangement of Subject Matter. 23 
 
 Preambles .*... 30 
 
 The Enacting Clause. 32 
 
 Construction of Sentences....’. 33 
 
 Provisos . 37 
 
 Phraseology . 40 
 
 Tense .. 40 
 
 Preciseness-ejusdem generis . 41 
 
 Indefinite and uncertain standards. ^ . 45 
 
 The use of ‘‘may” and “shall” in imposing duties and vesting 
 discretion . 53 
 
 Definitions, the Construction Statute and some miscellaneous 
 matters . 58 
 
 Punctuation . 65 
 
 Effect of General Provisions Relating to Partial Invalidity, Liberal 
 
 Interpretation and Repeals . 
 
 Partial invalidity section . 
 
 Liberal interpretation . 
 
 Repeals . 
 
 Practical Eactors affecting Draftsmanship . 
 
 Amendatory Legislation .. 
 
 Amendment by reference . 
 
 Incorporation by reference . 
 
 Acts expressly amendatory. . . . ... . . 
 
 Essential Points in Bill-drafting . 
 
 Appendix 1. Eorms. ^.. 
 
 x^ppendix 11. Bibliography . 
 
 Index . 
 
 66 
 
 66 
 
 68 
 
 68 
 
 70 
 
 75 
 
 75 
 
 77 
 
 79 
 
 83 
 
 84 
 92 
 
 94 
 
THE PROBLEM OF CONSTRUCTING A STATUTE. 
 
 The discussion in the following chapters is limited to what 
 has been called the “mechanics of law making.” However, in this 
 preliminary chapter it may be useful to consider briefly the several 
 steps in the construction of a bill for introduction in the General 
 Assembly. 
 
 In a general way, the process of constructing a statute may 
 be divided into three parts : 
 
 1. The conception of the legal principle to be embodied into 
 
 law; 
 
 2. The selection of machinery or legislative expedients to 
 
 apply and make effective the legal principle; and 
 
 3. The reduction of the substance to words so as' to convey 
 
 to the mind of the reader the legal principles which were 
 
 present in the mind of the legislator. 
 
 Legislation consists at the present time in remedying evils and 
 making improvements in the body of the law, both statutory and 
 common law. Thus, by the common law, the recovery of damages 
 for a personal injury suffered by an employe during his employ¬ 
 ment depends on the principles of civil wrongs. The legislature de¬ 
 termines that recovery in such cases should not depend on the law 
 of negligence, contributory negligence, fellow-servant' rule, risk 
 of‘the employment, etc., but that there should be a scheme of com¬ 
 pensation for all injuries incurred in the course of employment, 
 and the change is the basis of a \\Trkmen’s Compensation Act. So 
 an act legal at common law may be declared an offense by statute. 
 The common law right of the employer to contract has been re¬ 
 stricted by child labor laws and other statutory regulations affect¬ 
 ing the hours and conditions of labor. 
 
 As to the conception of the evil existing or improvement to 
 be made, this is purely the legislative function. It may be sug¬ 
 gested to the mind of the legislator by his own experience, or by 
 suggestion from the experience or investigations of others, but 
 from the standpoint of the making of legislation, it emanates from 
 the mind of the legislator. 
 
 The legislature i)Ossesses all legislative power that is not ex- 
 ])ressly or impliedly withheld by the constitution of the state, or 
 by the constitution of the United States. In connection, then, with 
 the conception of the legal principle must be determined whether 
 the enactment of that principle is within the limits of the power 
 reposed in the legislature. The courts are, it is true, the ultimate 
 interpreters of the constitution, and the final arbiters as to the va- 
 
8 
 
 lidity of laws enacted by the legislature. But members of the 
 General Assembly are sworn to uphold and defend the constitution 
 of the state and of the United States, and certainly are under 
 a duty not to enact laws plainly opposed to fundamental con¬ 
 stitutional principles. This is not to say that the legislature 
 should always refuse to pass a measure deemed for the public wel¬ 
 fare because it may be of doubtful validity or because, tested by 
 some decision of the Supreme Court, it may later be declared void 
 by that court. The history of legislation in Illinois limiting hours 
 of labor for women is in point. The act of 1893 which prohibited 
 the employment of a female for more than eight hours in any one 
 day in certain businesses was declared unconstitutional by the 
 court.^ One objection made to the act was that it made an im¬ 
 proper classification and discriminated against employers and em¬ 
 ployes in certain businesses. But the act is also condemned be¬ 
 cause it is an “attempt to abridge unreasonably the right to make 
 contracts.” In the language of the court, “it substitutes the judg¬ 
 ment of the legislature for the judgment of the employer and em¬ 
 ploye in a matter about which they are competent to agree with 
 each other. It assumes to dictate to what extent the capacity to 
 labor may be exercised by the employe, and takes away the right 
 of private judgment as to the amount and duration of the labor 
 to be put forth in a specified period.” To the contention that the 
 act should* be sustained “as an exercise of the police power upon the 
 alleged ground that it is designed to protect woman on account 
 of her sex and physique,” the court replies that as a “citizen” and 
 “person”, woman “is entitled to the same rights, under the con¬ 
 stitution, to make contracts with reference to her labor as are 
 secured thereby to men. . . . The police power of the State can 
 only be permitted to limit or abridge such a fundamental right as 
 the right to make contracts, when the exercise of such power is 
 necessary to promote the health, comfort, welfare or safety of 
 society or the public; and it is questionable whether it can be 
 exercised to prevent injury to the individual engaged in a par¬ 
 ticular calling.” 
 
 It would seem that such language as this would preclude any 
 legislation limiting the hours of labor for women, but fourteen 
 years after this decision, the General Assembly enacted a law pro¬ 
 hibiting the employment of females in any mechanical establishment 
 or factory or laundry for more than ten hours in any one day, and 
 this statute was declared valid by the Supreme Court. ^ 
 
 Under the constitution, the cost of paving streets may be paid 
 by special assessments, but not the cost of sprinkling streets.^ Suppose 
 the General Assembly deems it advantageous to permit the oiling of 
 streets by special assessment. Only a judicial decision can determine 
 whether such a measure is valid or not. The General Assembly, 
 recognizing the constitutional c[uestion involved, may properly enact 
 
 1 Ritchie v. People. 155 Ill. 98 (1895). 
 
 2 Ritchie & Co. v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509 (1910); also People v. Elerding, 254 
 Ill. 579 (1912). 
 
 3 City of Chicago v. Blair, 149 Ill. 310 (1894). 
 
9 
 
 the law and leave to the court the final determination of its validity. 
 On the other hand, the legislature is clearly under a duty not to enact 
 laws plainly violative of the fundamental law and throw upon the 
 courts and litigants the burden of erasing acts from the statute book. 
 
 The second step in the construction of a bill is the selection of 
 the legislative expedients that carry into efifect the legal principle. 
 The creation of commissions and agencies to administer the law; the 
 fixing of criminal penalties and civil liabilities; the requirement of 
 oaths, bonds, etc., are statutory devices adopted to accomplish the 
 desired end. For example, in the Workman’s Compensation Act the 
 legal principle is a system of compensation for all injuries incurred 
 during the course of employment, without regard to proximate cause. 
 The questions of employment, extent of the injury, etc., might have 
 been referred to the courts, but since it was thought that most justi- 
 ' ciable questions connected with such claims had been eliminated, a 
 board was created with examiners to determine all such matters.^ 
 The Industrial Commission with its system of hearings and proced¬ 
 ure constitutes the statutory expedients of this act. 
 
 Again constitutional limitations on the power of the legislature 
 must be observed in connection with the ways and means of making 
 effective the legal principle. The provision that “no person shall be 
 deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,”'^ 
 is a procedural requirement as well as a test of the substance of legis¬ 
 lation. Not only must the object to be attained by a statute be a 
 proper one for legislative enactment, but the methods of accomplish¬ 
 ment must be within the constitutional limitations which safeguard the 
 rights of the individual. Thus, some method may be desirable to 
 compel witnesses to attend and give evidence before a notary public. 
 A statute, however, that attempts to authorize a court to punish in a 
 summary way as for contempt the refusal to obey a notary’s subpoena 
 violates the right to trial by jury.^ But the statute may authorize 
 the officer to apply for an order from the court directing the witness 
 to attend and testify, and failure to obey the court’s order may be 
 punished as contempt.”^ 
 
 The first two steps in constructing a bill—the conception of the 
 legal principle and the adoption of means to make it effective—re¬ 
 late to the substance of legislation. The third step—the reduction 
 of the substance to appropriate language to express the legislative 
 will—is concerned with matters of form. Let us consider the work 
 of the bill-drafter in connection with the several steps in making a 
 bill. It is clear that the actual drafting can be done with advantage 
 for the legislator by persons skilled in legislative expression and forms 
 best adapted to accomplish the desired ends. The aid rendered the 
 
 ^ The submission to the courts of controversial matters arising- under a -work¬ 
 men’s Compensation act was unsatisfactory because it involved a great deal of 
 administrative detail. 
 
 5 Constitution of 1870, Article II Section 2. 
 
 “Puterbaugh v. Smith, 131 Ill. 199 (1890); McIntyre v. People. 227 Ill. 26 
 (1907). 
 
 ^People V. Rushworth. 294 Ill. 45f> (1920). 
 
 See Chapter on Forms, subhe.ading Provisions authorizing hearings, com¬ 
 pelling obedience to subpoenas and extending immunity. 
 
10 
 
 * _ 
 
 legislator may, however, extend farther than the mere drafting. The 
 
 selection of legislative expedients is largely a matter of research, the 
 cohection of data, reference to existing legislation in this and other 
 jurisdictions, combined with a resourcefulness and imagination to 
 project a theory into different situations and contingencies “and to 
 foresee whether and how a ])a])er scheme will work out in practice.”® 
 A legal training and an acquaintance with the history of legislation are 
 essential. For example, in 1905 the divorce law was amended to 
 prohibit the remarriage of either party within one year.* *'^ The ex¬ 
 pedients adopted to enforce the provision are two: (1) a penalty 
 provision for violation of the prohibition; and (2) marriage within 
 that period is invalidated. Ordinarily to attach a penalty of im¬ 
 prisonment and to render ineffective the thing attempted to be done, 
 would be sufficient to secure compliance with the provisions and en¬ 
 force the prohibition. 
 
 In the statute in cjuestion there is no express provision that a 
 marriage by a divorced person within one year performed in another 
 state is invalid. The general rule is that marriages valid where per¬ 
 formed are valid everywhere unless contrary to morality and the 
 laws of nature. Statutes are not presumed to have extra-territorial 
 effect unless that intent ])lamly appears. Clearly a reasonable con¬ 
 struction of the words themselves would be to limit their application 
 to marriages within the jurisdiction of the state. But to give such a 
 construction to the statute in question renders it utterly ineffective 
 since all that would be necessary for a divorced person to evade the 
 provisions of the act and escape the penalty would be to marry beyond 
 the limits of the state. The Supreme Court, appreciating this fact, 
 refused to recognize marriages in another state of divorced residents 
 of this state who left this state merely for the purpose of evading the 
 provisions of this act.^” “To say that the legislature intended such 
 a law to apply onlv while the parties are within the boundaries of 
 the state, and that it contemplated that by crossing the state line its 
 citizens could successfully nullify its terms, is to make the act es¬ 
 sentially useless and impotent and ascribe practical imbecility to the 
 law-making power.” In effect, then, the court, by construction, adds 
 an additional expedient—invalidating a foreign marriage—in order 
 to make effective the legislative policy. 
 
 What is the practical operation of the statute with its extended 
 construction? In the first place, one unfortunate result is that two 
 persons may be legally regarded as married in one state and unmar¬ 
 ried in another. Certainlv, from the standpoint of morality, there 
 should be no such lack of uniformity in various jurisdictions as to 
 the marriage status. Then it offers an opportunity for fraud and 
 deception, absolving the guilty party and punishing the innocent one. 
 Let us go one ste]:) further. The Supreme Court says that it is “in¬ 
 tended to control the conduct of the residents of the State, whether 
 
 thev be within or outside of its boundaries.” Presumablv, the statute 
 
 * 
 
 * Tlbert. The Mechanics of Law Making, p. 110. 
 
 9 Hurd 1919 p. 1119. 
 
 19 Wilson V. Cook, 256 Ill. 460 (1912). 
 
11 
 
 would not be construed to invalidate the remarriage within one year 
 in another state of a resident of Illinois who leaves this state and 
 in good faith takes up a residence in the other state. In other words, 
 whether that marriage is valid in Illinois depends not on facts and 
 the acts of the parties thereto, but rather on their intent. The evil 
 of this result is obvious. 
 
 Let us see what other method might have been adopted to ac¬ 
 complish the desired object without the disadvantage of the present 
 statute. The leading principle is the prohibition of the marriage of 
 divorced persons within one year. Provision might easily be made 
 for an interlocutory decree which would become hnal at the end of 
 one year. Remarriage in that case is made impossible not only in 
 Illinois, but in every state and the legal status of two persons who 
 have had a ceremony of marriage performed is uniform wherever 
 they may be. In every state, too, the performance of a marriage 
 ceremony within the limit of one year would be punishable as bigamy 
 by the law of the particular state. 
 
 It might be difficult in the case of the provision concerning 
 re-marriage of divorced persons to gauge beforehand the practic¬ 
 ability of the method adopted and to foresee all the consecpiences 
 and opportunities for evasion. But the difficulty here involved and 
 all similar statutory problems evidence the advantage of expert 
 aid in selecting methods to carry out the legislative policy^ Even 
 if it is not possible to foresee the practical operation of a legis¬ 
 lative experiment it is at least possible when that experiment has 
 been tried in one state, to collect information and observations 
 as to its desirability and to give the legislator the benefit of such 
 information. 
 
 Let us return briefly to the first step in constructing a bill— 
 the conception of the leading principle. If legislation consists in 
 amending or changing the legal situation in some respect, the con¬ 
 ception of the leading principle of a bill must be based on an ade¬ 
 quate knowledge of the present status of the law. The legislator 
 cannot, of course, have a legal knowledge which embraces the com¬ 
 plete body of law and legal assistance at this point can be rendered 
 to advantage. Information collected and prepared by investigating 
 commissions, departments of government and other b'odies who 
 have conducted inquiries in s])ecialized fields may also be fur¬ 
 nished the legislator. 
 
 Mention has been made of constitutional limitations afifecting 
 both the main purpose of a measure and the methods by which it 
 is to be accomplished. The importance from a legislative stand¬ 
 point of knowing the constitutional situation as it afiPects a measure 
 has already been stated. Members of the General Assembly come 
 from all walks of life. Many are lawyers, but the practice of the 
 average lawyer does not lie within the field of constitutional law. 
 The Governor in his capacity as a part of the law-making power, 
 customarily has the advice of the Attorney General as to the con¬ 
 stitutionality of measures ])assed by the General Assembly. It 
 would seem that legal advice on these constitutional matters should 
 
12 
 
 be at the disposal of members of the legislature. Some legislative 
 reference bureaus, notably the one in \\ isconsin, make no attempt 
 to advise as to constitutional questions. In the legislative refer¬ 
 ence bureau in Illinois, however, it has been considered a part of 
 the duty of the bill-drafter to consider constitutional questions in 
 connection with a proposed measure and to acquaint the legislator 
 with possible objections. That having been done, the bill, if de¬ 
 sired, is drafted regardless of possible invalidity. 
 
 It is apparent that, aside from the actual drafting of bills, the 
 aid furnished legislators by persons with special training and ex¬ 
 perience in legislative methods may extend into every step in the 
 construction of a bill. The notes and suggestions here collected 
 are limited, however, to the discussion of statutory form. That 
 this is no unimportant part of legislation is evidenced by the state¬ 
 ments of many jurists and students of the science of legislation. 
 In an address before the American Bar Association, Judge William 
 Schofield said: “To draw a statute modifying the common law in 
 such language as to effect exactly the result intended is one of the 
 most difficult achievements of legal skill.” And John Austin, the 
 well-known writer on Jurisprudence, and the man largely respon¬ 
 sible for the form of modern English Statutes, said: “I will ven¬ 
 ture to affirm that what is commonly called the technical part of legis¬ 
 lation is infinitely more difficult than what may be called the ethical. 
 In other words, it is far easier to conceive justly what would be 
 useful law, than so to construct that same law that it may accom¬ 
 plish the design of the law-giver.” 
 
 It is to this limited but important part of the bill-drafter’s work 
 that this discussion is directed. Constitutional questions have been 
 mentioned only as they relate to the form of statutes. Even in 
 this field it is not hoped to make a complete treatment of the 
 subject but only to call attention to the most glaring faults in 
 Illinois statutes. Frequent reference by way of illustration has 
 been made to the laws of this state but it must not be concluded 
 that they are uniformly poor in the matter of form. There is 
 much that is excellent in the work of Illinois legislators as is 
 instanced by this commendation of one act by the Supreme Court. 
 
 “The elements which go to make up the offense created by this 
 section of the statute are so plainly and concisely expressed, that 
 it would be useless to attempt to make any change in the language 
 used, with the hope of presenting them in a more concise or per¬ 
 spicuous form. Indeed, the section, in both respects, may be re¬ 
 garded as a specimen of model legislation.”^^ 
 
 “Henderson v. People, 124 Ill. 607 at 612 (1888). 
 
13 
 
 TITLE AND SINGLENESS OF SUBJECT. 
 
 Subject: Section 13 of Article IV of the constitution pro¬ 
 vides that “No act hereafter passed shall embrace more than one 
 subject, and that shall be expressed in the title. But if any sub¬ 
 ject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the 
 title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not 
 be so expressed.” This requirement which is one of the most im¬ 
 portant of those relating- to the form of legislation, occurs in sub¬ 
 stance in many of the state constitutions. Any discussion of the 
 titles to statutes and unity of subject is necessarily largely devoted 
 to the question of conformity to this provision. There are three 
 separate instructions; the first two are in the nature of charges 
 to the General Assembly (1) that each act shall be limited to a 
 single subject and (2) that the title shall express the subject. The 
 third instruction is a rule of construction for the court if the sec¬ 
 ond charge is disregarded and the title fails to express all that the 
 act embraces. The first two instructions are rules for bill drafting 
 but the third is not. 
 
 Although the first two parts of the constitutional provision are 
 distinct, a provision in a statute may be objectionable to both. For 
 example, if a general title expresses the subject of an act, but it is 
 claimed that some provision in the act is so disconnected from 
 the subject that it should not have been included in the act, it natur¬ 
 ally would follow that the title would not express the matter per¬ 
 taining to another subject. As a matter of fact there are but few 
 cases. in which the court has considered the limitation relating 
 to subject apart from the provision as to title. 
 
 “Subject” as used in the prohibition against more than one 
 subject in a statute, has no mathematically precise meaning nor can it 
 be defined exactly. The provision was designed to prevent “log-roll¬ 
 ing” legislation and the court mindful of the evil aimed at, has held 
 that it should not be construed to restrict the scope of an act pro¬ 
 vided the act deals with one general subject.That is to say, an 
 act may be comprehensive, covering a very general subject and 
 that generality will not render it objectionable. “The General As¬ 
 sembly must determine for itself how broad and comprehensive 
 shall be the object of the statute. . . Indeed, the court has 
 
 commended the legislative policy of incorporating in a single act 
 the entire body of statutory law upon a general subject rather than 
 to divide it into a number of separate acts. Such broad, compre- 
 
 Rouse vs. Thompson, 228 Ill. 522 (1907). 
 
 Sutter V. People’s Gas Light Co., 284 Ill. 634 (1918). 
 
14 
 
 hensive acts as Township Organization, Incorporation of Cities, Vil¬ 
 lages and Towns, the Criminal Code, the Revenue Law and the Prac¬ 
 tice Act have been mentioned favorably by the court as illustra¬ 
 tions of this policy/^ 
 
 The prohibition against duplicit}^ of subjects is directed, rather, 
 against the joining into one measure of incongruous and unrelated 
 matters. \\ hether there is a logical connection and relation be¬ 
 tween the matters treated is the test as to unity of subject rather 
 than the extent and scope of the act. “The word ‘subject’ as 
 used in the constitution signifies the matter or thing forming the 
 groundwork. It may contain many parts which grow out of it 
 and are germane to it, and which, if traced back, will lead the 
 mind to it as the generic head. Any matter or thing which may 
 reasonably be said to be subservient to the general subject or pur¬ 
 pose will be germane and may be properly included in the law.”^" 
 
 The word “germane” has been freciuently employed by the 
 court in discussing the connection or relationship of provisions 
 to a subject. This term is considered at some length by the court 
 in condemning an act which authorized the city of Chicago to sell 
 surplus electricity and to fix the rates for the sale in Chicago of 
 gas and electricity by individuals and companies.^® 
 
 “In considering whether all the particular provisions of an 
 act are embraced iii a single subject the word ‘germane’ has been 
 a favorite one with the courts, . . . Literally, ‘germane’ means 
 ‘akin’, ‘closely allied.’ It is only applicable to persons who are 
 united to each other by the common tie of blood or marriage. 
 W hen applied to inanimate things, it is, of course, used in a 
 metaphorical sense, but still the idea of a common tie is always 
 present. Thus, when properly applied to a legislative provision, 
 the common tie is found in the tendeijcy of the provision to pro^ 
 mote the object and purpose of the act to which it belongs. Any 
 ]3rovision not having this tendency which introduces new subject 
 matter into the act is clearly obnoxious to the constitutional pro¬ 
 vision in question. It is an error to suppose that two things are, 
 in a legal sense, germane to each other merely because there is 
 a resemblance between them or because they have some character¬ 
 istics common to them both.” 
 
 A statute combining all the law concerning a broad, general 
 subject will embrace matters which considered individually are un¬ 
 related to each other but all of which are germane to the general 
 subject. If, for instance, two diverse matters from the criminal 
 code were placed in an act which covered nothing else there would 
 be an improper combination of two minor, specific subjects. But 
 the Criminal Code may collect those two and many others and unity 
 follows from their relationship to the one general subject, crim¬ 
 inal jurisprudence. 
 
 To the general rule that any matter or thing may be properly 
 included in an act if it is germane to the subject, one exception 
 
 Sutter Y. Peoples Gas Light Co.. 284 III. 634 (1918). 
 
 People V. Sargent, ■ 2.64 Ill. .514 (1912). 
 
 Sutter V. People’s Gas Light Co.. 284 Ill. 634 (1918). 
 
must be noted. This exception is created by Section H) (3f Article 
 lY of the constitution which says: “Hills makini>' ap])ropriations 
 for the pay of members and officers of the (jcneral Assend)ly, and 
 for the salaries of the officers of the government shall contain 
 no provision on any other subject,” By express terms these ap¬ 
 propriations are made an independent subject of le, 2 :islation. An 
 act creating free employment agencies cannot contain an ap])ropria- 
 tion for the salaries of the superintendents of these agencies.^" An 
 appropriation act cannot make appropriations for both the ordinary 
 and contingent expenses of the goverment and the salaries of state 
 officers^® 
 
 The rule laid down by this section of the constitution is cpiite 
 clear; its application, however, is not always easy because of the 
 difficulty of drawing a line between officers and emi)loyes. “Office’"^ 
 is defined in Article V, section 24 of the constitution as “a i)ublic 
 position, created by the constitutiou or law, continuing during the 
 pleasure of the appointing power, or for a fixed time, with a succes¬ 
 sor elected or appointed,” and “employment” is defined as “an 
 agency for a temporary purpose, which ceases when that puri)Ose 
 is accomplished.” To this definition the court has added little. In 
 the case of Fergus v. Russel,the court discusses what consti¬ 
 tutes creation of an office by law. “An office is created by law only as a 
 result of an act passed for that purpose. The mere appropriation 
 by the General Assembly of money for the payment of compensa¬ 
 tion to the incumbent of a specified position does not have the 
 efifect of creating an office or of giving such incumbent the charac¬ 
 ter of an officer . . 
 
 Title: Of the two provisions, one relating to the subject and 
 the other to the title of statutes, the second has caused the greater 
 difficulty. Like the subject restriction, this ]movision is not pre¬ 
 cise and definite. There is no sharp line dividing titles which ex¬ 
 press the subject and those which do not and since a title can not 
 inventory all the provisions of an act, the titles to many acts have 
 been attacked since this provision was incorporated in the consti¬ 
 tution of 1870. As Justice Craig expresses it; “The objection that 
 a statute includes matters which are not expressed in the title of 
 the act is one which is frequently urged and seldom sustained. 
 The reason for this is that they arc usually frivolous and without 
 merit.In spite of the fact that this provision has been consid¬ 
 ered in numerous decisions by the Supreme Court, it is not possible 
 to lay down absolute rules by which it mav be determined whether 
 or not a title sufficiently expresses the subject of an act. The 
 
 Mathews v. People, 202 Til. 389 (1903). 
 
 18 persus V. Russel. 270 Ill. 304 (lOl.'i). 
 
 270 Ill. 304 (1915). 
 
 For a discussion of the cases, sec Constitution of the State of Illinois, 
 \nnotated. nn. 99. 147. 
 
 21 People V. Stokes, 281 Ill. 159 (1917). 
 
16 
 
 cases will serve to show the purpose of this provision and, in a 
 general way, the construction placed upon it. 
 
 “The object of the constitutional provision,” the court says, 
 “was not to hinder legislation or require that the title of an act 
 should be an index to the subject matter which followed and min¬ 
 utely and exactly express ever 3 ^ related matter which was included 
 in the act, but, on the contrary, was intended to require the 
 title of the act to express in general terms the objects and pur¬ 
 poses of the act, so as to prevent surprise or fraud by the inser¬ 
 tion of provisions into the act of which the title gave no intima¬ 
 tion, and to apprise the people, through the usual course of publi¬ 
 cation of legislative proceedings, of the subject matters of legis¬ 
 lation being considered.” 
 
 The court, continuing, states the two methods by which a 
 title ma}^ express the subject: “This may be done either by ex¬ 
 pressing in the title in a brief, general statement the objects and 
 purposes of the act, or by so framing the title as to express the 
 principal features of the act more in detail. Either method adopted 
 will answer the requirements of the constitution so long as the 
 general subject matter of the legislation is fairly indicated.” 
 
 Of the two kinds of titles, one merely indicating in general 
 terms the subject of the act and the other in the nature of a 
 table of contents of the principal features, the first is to be pre¬ 
 ferred.”^ The court has said that either form is a compliance with 
 the constitutional provision and that it is for the General Assembly 
 to determine with what particularity the title shall express the sub¬ 
 ject.At the same time, the court has indicated that it favors 
 simple, general titles rather than complex and restrictive ones. 
 The Motor Vehicle Act of 1911 was entitled, “An Act defining motor 
 vehicles and providing for the registration of the same and of mo¬ 
 tor bic 3 "cles, and uniform rules regulating the use and speed 
 thereof; prohibiting the use of motor vehicles without the con¬ 
 sent of the owner and the offer or acceptance of any bonus or 
 discount or other consideration for the purchase of supplies or 
 parts for any such motor vehicle or for work or repairs done thereon 
 bv others, and defining chauffeurs and providing for the examina¬ 
 tion and licensing thereof, and to repeal certain acts therein 
 named.The court held as to this title that the “mere mention¬ 
 ing in the title of related particulars is not stating a pluralitv of 
 subjects,” but it remarks that “the subject is expressed, perhaps, 
 with unnecessary particularity^ in the title.” For a general title, 
 the court suggests, “An Act in relation to motor vehicles and to 
 repeal certain acts therein named.A revision of the motor vehi¬ 
 cle law was enacted in 1919, which follows the court’s suggestion by 
 adopting substantially the brief general title. 
 
 22 People V. Stokes. 281 Ill. 159 (1917). 
 
 22 See Chapter on Forms, subheading:. Titles to independent bills. 
 2-* People V. XeLson. 133 Til. 565 (1890). 
 
 23 Laws, 1911. p. 487. 
 
 2® People V. Sargent. 254 Ill. 514 (1912). 
 
 27 Hurd, 1919, p. 2620. 
 
17 
 
 There are several objections to the table-of-contents title which 
 it may be worth while to mention. In the first place, the expres- 
 • sion of details in the title of an act limits the subject, for when 
 the title is limited to one particular only of some general subject, 
 the body of the act must be limited to the particular or special 
 subject in the title and to matters properly connected therewith 
 and the act cannot deal with other particulars of the general 
 subject. A recent decision of the Supreme Court will illustrate 
 this rule. The Deadly Weapon Act of 1881^® was entitled “An Act 
 to regulate the traffic in deadly weapons and to prevent the sale 
 of them to minors.” This title lists two principal provisions of the 
 act but it does not mention any regulation or restriction as to 
 carrying concealed weapons. Nor is this third provision suggested 
 by the two which do appear in the title. “All human activities, 
 however diverse or concerning different subjects, are in some re- 
 , mote sense related to each other, but the constitutional provision 
 requires that there must be some reasonable relation between a pro¬ 
 vision and the subject expressed in the title ...” The provision re¬ 
 lating to carrying concealed weapons was held void when it might 
 well have been included in the act under a general title which 
 merely directed attention to the subject of deadly weapons.^® 
 
 Another objection to the detailed title is, that while it may 
 successfully list all the features of the act as originally passed, if 
 it is desired to add other provisions later, it is necessary to amend 
 the title also to include mention of the additional matter. The 
 inconvenience of long, unwieldy titles is a still further objection. 
 With a simple concise title, also, the purpose of the act stands out 
 more clearly. 
 
 When the purpose of a statute and the general subject are dis¬ 
 closed by the title, the courts uniformly hold that such a title covers 
 all matters having any reasonable connection with that general sub¬ 
 ject. “When a general purpose is declared, the means by which to 
 accomplish that purpose are presumed to be intended as necessary in¬ 
 cidents. Any means which are reasonably adapted to secure the ob¬ 
 ject indicated in the title may be included in the act. If by any fair 
 intendment the provisions in the body of the act have a necessary 
 or proper connection with the title it is not objectionable. T.o render 
 a provision in the body of an act void, as not embraced in the title, 
 such provision must be incongruous with the title or must have no 
 proper connection with or relation to the title. If all the provisions 
 of an act relate to one subject indicated in the title, and are parts of it 
 or incident to it or reasonably connected with it or in some reasonable 
 sense auxiliary to the object in view, then the provision of the con¬ 
 stitution is obeyed. An act may contain many provisions and de¬ 
 tails for the accomplishment of a legislative purpose, and if they 
 legitimately tend to effectuate that object the act is not contrary tc 
 the constitutional provision. 
 
 28 Laws, 1881, p. 73. 
 
 20 People V. Horan, 293 Ill. 314 (1920). 
 
 2* People V. Huff, 249 Ill. 164 (1911), and cases there cited. 
 
18 
 
 In nearly every instance where a title has been held not to express 
 the subject of an act, the objection has been that it was too restricted. 
 Instead of expressing the general subject, it ^^ointed out only a portion, 
 of it. Of course, a title can be made so general as to be meaningless. 
 Though a title need only express the general subject, it should indi¬ 
 cate fairly that subject and afford an intimation of the true nature of 
 the measure. “While it may be a general expression of the subject, it 
 must be specific enough to accomplish the purpose for which the 
 subject is required to be expressed in the title .... The title will 
 sufiiciently conform to the command of the constitution if it be so 
 framed and worded, as fairly to apprise the legislators, and the 
 public in general, of the subject matter of the legislation, so as to 
 reasonably lead to an inquiry into the body of the bill. The constitu¬ 
 tional requirement may be interpreted to mean that the act and its 
 title must correspond, — not literally, but substantially; and such cor¬ 
 respondence is to be determined in view of the subject matter to 
 which the legislation relates. That is to say, a title may be broader 
 than the act in the sense that the body of the act need not legislate 
 respecting all the matters which might be included under the title, but 
 the title must not be so general as to be misleading and, in effect, 
 conceal the subject of the statute rather than express it. 
 
 Since an expression in the title of the general subject and purpose 
 is sufficient without reciting the means by which it is to be accom¬ 
 plished, it is unnecessary to include such phrases as “providing for 
 its enforcement”, and “providing penalties for violation.Nor is 
 it necessary to recite in the title “and to repeal a certain act therein 
 named” when the repeal of the act is germane to the subject of the 
 second act and auxiliary to the general purpose expressed.Men¬ 
 tion of a referendum provision need not be made in the title since 
 this is a means connected with its execution f nor is it necessary 
 to refer to an emergency provision. Expressions such as “et cetera,” 
 “and so forth” and “for other purposes” have been held in nearly 
 all states not to add to the title of an act or to extend its meaning 
 and the use of such phrases should be condemned. 
 
 A provision appropriating money in an act as a means of ac¬ 
 complishing the object of the measure is so clearly germane to the 
 general purpose that, from a constitutional standpoint, the appropria¬ 
 tion need not be expressly mentioned in the title. However, this much 
 may be said for its inclusion in the title,—the expenditure of 
 
 Milne v. People, 224 Ill. 125 (1906). In this case, the court held uncon¬ 
 stitutional an act of 1905, entitled “An act for the punishment of crimes against 
 children.” The act made it a felony to take indecent liberties with a child. 
 In the view of the court the title does not express the fact that the act creates 
 a new crime of a particular nature. “One reading this title would have no con¬ 
 ception of what might be expected in the body of the act.” It is well to note 
 in connection with the holding in this case that the usual method of drafting 
 an act of this nature is in the form of an amendment to the criminal code. 
 
 If that had been done, the title would have been “An act to amend ‘An act to 
 revise the law in lelation to criminal jurisprudence.’ ” This title would 
 necessarily be held valid and yet it affords far less indication of the nature 
 of the act than the title held bad. 
 
 People V. Blue Mountain Joe, 129 Ill. 370 (1889); Cohn v. People, 149 Ill. 
 486 (1894). 
 
 33 Timm v. Harrison, 109 Ill. 593 (1884). 
 
 3^ City of Virden v. Allan. 107 111. 505 (1883). 
 
19 
 
 the public money is regarded as a matter of considerable import¬ 
 ance and it may be desirable to have the title call attention to this 
 feature. The act assembling the constitutional convention'^'’' is one 
 of the few laws carrying appropriations which do not make mention 
 of that provision in the title. 
 
 The preceding discussion of titles refers more particularly to 
 independent legislation. The constitutional ])rovision as to expressing 
 the subject in the title applies also to amendatory acts.^^' It has been 
 held that if the provisions of the amending statute are germane to 
 the subject expressed in the title of the act amended, the title of the 
 amending act sufficiently expresses its subject by referring to the act 
 amended and declaring the purpose to amend or supplement it.''^' The 
 title of an amendatory act is not expressive of the subject if the act 
 contains provisions which could hot properly have been inserted in 
 the original act under its title. 
 
 If, however, the title of the amendatory act declares a ]nirpose 
 to amend certain sections of an earlier act, the body of the amending 
 act must be limited to the subject of the sections named.This rule 
 is important for two reasons: First, the titles of a majority of 
 amendatory acts refer to the sections amended; and second, it is often 
 difficult to determine whether the section as amended is germane to 
 the subject of the original sections. In case of doubt, the title of the 
 amending act should be made to refer generally to the original act 
 rather than to particular sections. 
 
 When it is desired to amend an act by provisions which are not 
 within the title but which might properly have been included in the 
 original act under a more general title, the amendatory act must con¬ 
 tain a provision amending the original title.The purpose of an 
 amendatory statute is to deal with the subject expressed in the title 
 of the act amended. If, therefore, that subject is expanded by 
 amending the title of the original act, then the title of the subse¬ 
 quent act should afford some indication of the expanded subject. 
 This can be expressed by noting in the title of the second act the 
 fact that the original title is amended. 
 
 The court when it has been able to ascertain the legislative in¬ 
 tent has given effect to several amendatory acts which did not cor¬ 
 rectly name the act to be amended. Thus, an act purporting to 
 amend “the Criminal Code” was held to refer to “An Act to revise 
 the law in relation to criminal jurisprudence.”^^ Another statute 
 which was sustained named the prior act correctly but gave to the 
 particular sections amended the numbering as it appeared in Hurd’s 
 Revised Statutes.^^ As these cases indicate, the court will endeavor 
 to effect the legislative intent but such errors should not be permitted 
 to jeopardize the validity of meritorious legislation. The titles of acts 
 
 Laws 1919, p. 60. 
 
 See Chapter on Forms, subheadingr. amendatory bills. 
 
 3" Gag-e V. City of Chicago, 203 Ill. 26 (1903). 
 
 2* Kennedy v. Le Moyne, 188 Ill. 255 (1900). 
 
 Dolese v. Pierce, 124 Ill. 140 (1888). 
 
 ^'’People V. City of Chicago, 256 Ill. 558 (1912). 
 
 People V. Van Bever. 248 Ill. 136 (1911). 
 
 « Patton V. People, 229 Ill, 512 (1907), 
 
20 
 
 referred to should be correctly stated, together with the dates of 
 approval (or of filing, if the act was not approved) and going into 
 effect.If there have, been prior amendments, this fact should be 
 indicated by adding the words, “as amended,” after the dates.In 
 the case of an act, the title of which has previously been amended, 
 the reference should be to the act by its amended title but with the 
 dates of approval and in effect, of the original act. The act is the 
 same act and the two dates remain the same even if the law, at some 
 subsequent time, is given a different title. Of course, the fact that 
 the act has been amended should be disclosed by the words, “as 
 amended.” 
 
 Frequently after the first draft has been made of a bill, changes 
 will be made, sometimes at the suggestion of the legislator for whom 
 it has been prepared. In every instance the title of the bill should 
 be checked to see whether it is broad enough to cover the changes 
 made. This observation applies equally to amendments to bills after 
 they have been introduced in the General Assembly.^” The necessity 
 of care in this regard cannot be emphasized too strongly because a 
 serious defect in the title may easily creep in and be overlooked. 
 
 In most cases, the date of approval would be suflicient to identify the 
 act, but the use of both dates has been customary. 
 
 ** From a constitutional standpoint, the reference to an act to be amended 
 is sufficient without the words “as amended” to call attention to prior amend¬ 
 ments. But this phrase should not, for that reason, be omitted. It serves the 
 useful purpose of informing the reader tha.t the reference is not to the original 
 act but to the act in its present form. 
 
 ^ See Chapter on Forms, subheading. Amendments to bills. 
 
21 
 
 WHEN LAWS TAKE EFFECT. 
 
 The constitution of Illinois fixes the time when acts of the 
 General Assembly shall become effective. Section 13 of Article 
 IV reads in part as follows: “And no act of the General Assembly 
 shall take effect until the first day of July next after its passa.s^e, 
 unless, in case of emergency (which emergency shall be expressed 
 in the preamble or body of the act), the General Assembly shall, 
 by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, 
 otherwise direct.” This language presents some difficulties in the 
 case of legislation passed by the General Assemblv less than ten 
 days before July 1, so that the period of time allowed for con¬ 
 sideration of measures by the Governor, extends past July 1.^® But 
 this is a matter of construction which does not affect the drafting of 
 measures. 
 
 In the case of some measures, it is desirable to delay the 
 time of becoming operative until a date later than July 1. Thus, the 
 Public Utilities Act of 1913 and the Motor Whicle Law of 1919, by 
 provisions to that effect, were not in force until January 1 fol¬ 
 lowing their passage. Many of the licensing acts read, “After 
 October 1, 1919, it shall be unlawful etc.” Technicalhy a measure 
 with a provision of this character becomes a law July 1 even though 
 its provisions i^ot become operative at this date. There would 
 seem to be no constitutional objection to suspendng the operation 
 of a law for a period after July .1. Glearly the purpose of the 
 provision in the constitution was to place certain restrictions on 
 laws which take effect earlier than the time fixed but not to limit 
 or restrict legislation which becomes effective at a later date. 
 Consequently to delay the actual taking- effect of an act, it is suf¬ 
 ficient to declare that it shall go into effect at a later time.^^ 
 
 For an act to become effective earlier than July I, two things 
 are necessary, first there must be an emergenc^^ (which is ex¬ 
 pressed in the act) and the act must receive a two-thirds vote of 
 all members elected to each house. The declaration of the emerg¬ 
 ency is commonly called the emergency clause. Probably the fram¬ 
 ers of the constitution intended by this language to require a state¬ 
 ment of the nature of the emergency in the acP® and a consider¬ 
 able number of emergency clauses give a short statement of the 
 
 See discussion, Constitution of the State of Illinois, Annotated, p. 96. 
 
 See Chapter on Forms, subheading:. Take effect clause. 
 
 ^*Mr. A^andeventer, the only dele.s:ate to the constitutional convention of 
 1870 who discusses the question, was of the opinion that the provision would 
 require the nature of the emergency to be clearly defined in the act. Debates, 
 Vplume 1, p, 540, 
 
22 
 
 situation which is deemed to require immediate legislation. In 
 view of the fact, however, that the court has expressly declared 
 that the legislature is the sole judge of the existence and nature 
 of the emergency and that the decision of the law making body 
 in that regard will not be reviewed,^'’ the emergency is custo- 
 marity expressed by a statement to the effect that there is an 
 emergency. 
 
 The most common emergency clause found in the statute- 
 book is in a resolution form of statement; “AVhereas, an emerg¬ 
 ency exists, therefore this act shall be in full force and effect from 
 and after its passage and approval.” This is somewhat awkward 
 in carefully drafted measures and after examining emergency 
 clauses in use in other states, the following is suggested as adequate 
 and more simple: ‘‘Because of an emergency, this act shall take 
 effect upon its passage.” 
 
 The court suggested in an earl}^ case, that the emergency pro¬ 
 vision should be embodied in a separate and distinct clause.^® Usu¬ 
 ally this clause is made a separate section. The position of the 
 emergency clause in the bill has been considered in the following 
 chapter, “Arrangement of subject matter.” 
 
 ^MVheeler v. Chubbuck. 16 Ill. 361. (1855). 
 »MVheeler v. Chubbuck. 16 Ill. 361, (1855), 
 
ARRANGEMENT OF SUBJECT MATTER. 
 
 It is a matter of some importance in the case of lengthy and 
 complex bills that the subject matter be arranged so as to present 
 the substance in the clearest and easiest manner to the reader. This 
 result will be best secured by the careful presentation of that sub¬ 
 stance in a logical and orderly development. It must be remem¬ 
 bered that since legislation presents a widely varying mass of pro¬ 
 visions, no set pattern can be made to which all bills can be con¬ 
 structed to fit. Nor can there be any set order of provisions for 
 every bill. The rules laid down here are more in the nature of 
 suggestions to be adopted, amended or discarded as convenience 
 may require. But it is hoped by an analysis of the skeleton or 
 structure of a bill to arrive at some suggestions as to the most 
 efifective arrangement of the material. 
 
 A statute is composed of a series of provisions or enactments. 
 A provision may express the leading principle of the measure or 
 some proposition subordinate to that leading principle; or it may 
 be one of a number of equal provisions all connected as to subject 
 matter but each independent. From the standpoint of the relative 
 importance of the several provisions which go to make up a statute, 
 there are three types of statutes. 
 
 1. Acts which have a principle provision supported by sub¬ 
 ordinate enactments. An example of this class is the Illinois Op¬ 
 tometry Act of 1919.^^ 
 
 2. Acts which contain several related main provisions, each 
 one of which has subordinate provisions. The Road and Bridge 
 Act of 1913®^ is an example of this third type. 
 
 3. Acts which consist of a series of related and equal provi¬ 
 sions all dealing with one subject. The Practice Act of 1907^® is 
 a series of regulations for the conduct of litigation and court pro¬ 
 cedure. 
 
 It will be noticed that the examples given for the second and 
 third types are revisions or consolidations of earlier laws. Prac¬ 
 tically all independent bills which do not revise or consolidate, are 
 concerned with a single leading principle and fall naturally into 
 the first class. Thus, in the Optometry Act, the “core” of the mea¬ 
 sure is the provision that it shall be unlawful to practice optometry 
 without a license. The provisions for examination of applicants, for 
 the issuance, refusal, revocation and renewal of licenses, and for the 
 payment of fees are the administrative machinery to make the main 
 
 51 Hurd, 1919, p. 2062. 
 
 52 Hurd, 1919, p. 2567. 
 “Hurd, 1919, p. 2275. 
 
24 
 
 provision effective. Not all bills, however, are pure examples of 
 any of these classes. Some involve combinations of any two or 
 all three. The Criminal Code,°^ as enacted in 1874, does not fall so 
 readily into any one classification. 
 
 The bill-drafter must, at the outset, visualize the elements of 
 the proposed bill and by weighing the relative importance of the 
 several provisions, determine to which class the measure belongs. 
 As has already been said, nearh^ all new legislation falls within 
 Class 1, and most of the bill-drafter’s work will have to do with 
 that form. The suggestions as to the arrangements for bills in 
 Classes 2 and 3 may l3e briefly stated. 
 
 Bills of the second type are similar to those in Class 1, except 
 that there are several main enactments instead of one. The prin¬ 
 ciples, therefore, suggested for the arrangement of the provisions 
 of bills of the first type are applicable to those of the second’ class. 
 Bills of the second class should be divided into the several main 
 divisions, each with its leading principle. Each main division with 
 its subordinate provisions should be carefully separated from the 
 other divisions and then worked out in complete detail .as though 
 it alone constituted the bill. 
 
 The arrangement of a bill that is composed of equal provi¬ 
 sions relating to a common subject must be governed by different 
 principles. Sometimes there is a natural sequence of steps in a 
 connected account and this suggests a logical order for the provi¬ 
 sions. Thus, the Practice Act of 1907 regulates procedural mat¬ 
 ters in their customary order in litigation, commencing with ser¬ 
 vice in suits and ending with writs of error and appeals. But 
 there may not be a natural sequence in the provisions and a more 
 arbitrary order must be adopted. Division I of the Criminal Code 
 in defining and punishing crimes, takes the offenses alphabetically, 
 commencing with abduction and proceeding to vagabond and wit¬ 
 nesses. 
 
 New legislation generally takes the form of bills in Class 1, 
 i. e. with a single leading principle. Because this is the most com¬ 
 mon form, the arrangement of such a bill will be considered at 
 greater length. The most important element of a bill of this char¬ 
 acter is the provision stating the leading principle and that pro¬ 
 vision should be embodied in a short concise section and placed 
 as near the beginning of the bill as possible. The advantage to 
 be gained b}^ the early statement of the principle or motive of the 
 bill is that the reader may, by reading the first two or three sec¬ 
 tions comprehend the drift of the act. It enables him to fix clearly 
 in his mind the body or “core” of the legislation. Having mastered 
 that from a concise statement, he is prepared to proceed with ease 
 to the details, exceptions and special provisions. If, on the other 
 hand, he is confronted with a mass of details without a clear com¬ 
 prehension of the body of the act, he must mentally support the 
 superstructure until he is able to discover the foundation upon which 
 it is built. 
 
 Hurd, 1919, p. 970. 
 
25 
 
 Frequently, a difficulty will arise as to whether the predominat¬ 
 ing idea is expressed in a declaration of the law as it affects the 
 individual, or in the as^ency created for its enforcement. The 
 relative importance of the two provisions must be the first consid¬ 
 eration. Thus, a board may be created for a specified purpose with 
 certain powers and duties. The administrative features are wholly 
 subordinate to the establishment of the board. Sections may be 
 required creating’ crimes and providing penalties but these are 
 merely incidental to the main purpose. The Public Utilities Act 
 of 1913^^ is an example of such a measure. The declaration of 
 the principle of law governing public utilities is section 32 of Arti¬ 
 cle IV. This section requires that service be adequate and rates 
 or other charecs just and reasonable. Why is this not the im¬ 
 portant feature? For the reason that this is merelv a continuation 
 of the common law principles regarding public utilities. There is 
 no departure from existing law in this respect. The main feature 
 of the act is not to lay down any new principles of law, but to 
 create a nejv machinery for administering the old law. The case 
 is quite different with the Illinois Optometry Act. The principle 
 of law here expressed prohibits the practice of optometry without 
 a state license. Vhthout such a statute anyone might practice that 
 profession and so this amounts to a real alteration in the govern¬ 
 ing law. So with the Workmen’s Compensation Act.^® The old 
 common law liability for damages based on negligence is wiped 
 out and a new system of compensation for injuries substituted. In 
 each of these laws, the alteration of the existing principles of law 
 is the important feature of the act and the powers and duties 
 vested in the Deoartment of Registration and Education, in the 
 one case, and the Industrial Commission, in the other, are merely the 
 machinery for administering the new principles of law. 
 
 The examples given illustrate the two extremes in which 
 either the provision stating the law or the provision creating the 
 agency for its enforcement, clearly predominates in importance. 
 Between these extremes come many bills in which these provisions 
 are more equal in importance. As to such bills two suggestions 
 can be made. * 
 
 1. If possible, place the declaratory provision first and the 
 administrative feature later. Frequentlv, the statement of the law 
 will require a reference to the agenev for its enforcement. Refer¬ 
 ential phrases such as “the board by this act created” may be used 
 to get around this difficultv. But the references may become too 
 complex and awkward to be easily carried in mind by the reader 
 and convenience and ease may then require that the order be 
 reversed. 
 
 2. Sometimes the provisions creating the agency are shorter 
 and less complicated than the declaration of the legal principle. In 
 that case it may be better to state first the more simple proposi¬ 
 tion and having disposed of it shortly, pass on to the lengthier, 
 more complex provision. 
 
 55 Hurd, 1919, p. 2324. 
 5® Hurd, 1919, p. 1450. 
 
26 
 
 However, there are some provisions which may precede the 
 statement of the leading principle. Thus, when the bill provides 
 a short title, that may properly be placed at the beginning. Such 
 a provision is short and detached from the subordinate details of 
 the bill. It does not tend to confuse or befog the statement of the 
 law, but ma}^ be dismissed from the mind of the reader as he 
 passes to the body of the bill. Occasionally a bill will have a 
 special provision which may properly precede the main provisions. 
 Thus, Section 1 of the Vocational Education Act of 1919^^ accepts 
 for the State of Illinois the benefits of a Federal Law for the pro¬ 
 motion of* vocational instruction. This provision is distinct from 
 the following sections which establish a board and prescribe its 
 powers and duties, and its brevity and importance justify its po¬ 
 sition in the arrangement. 
 
 Another consideration may justify such an arrangement; the 
 statement of the leading principle may require some explanatory 
 matter to precede it. Thus, where the terms employed in a bill ^ 
 require definitions for an understanding of the provisions, the sec-' 
 tion containing those definitions may properly come at the first of 
 the bill. The advisability of the use of definitions will be consid¬ 
 ered in a later chapter, and only their place in the arrangement dis¬ 
 cussed here. 
 
 Sometimes it is necessary to apply a law to a variety of cases 
 or a variety of situations calling for similar treatment. To save 
 the repetition of a recurring series of words, the bill may adopt an 
 arbitrary term or symbol to cover artificially, matter which it could 
 not by natural interpretation be understood to embrace. Thus, 
 the phrase “noxious weeds” mav be employed as a short cut for 
 a number of specified plants. Obviously, the explanation of the 
 artificial meaning of such a term should precede its use. On the 
 other hand, when a word is correctly and properly employed to 
 convey its accustomed meaning but it is desired to limit its appli¬ 
 cation or define it more precisely, such a definition may come after 
 its use. But in such a case, the definition should follow shortly and 
 not be placed at a distance from the language making use of the 
 word defined. 
 
 Frequently, a bill or a provision stating a principle of law 
 is not designed to be universally applicable but either affects 
 only specific situations or else provides exceptions from its general 
 operation. The -particular group of facts, conditions or circum¬ 
 stances to which the legal principle is designed to apply is spoken 
 of as the legal case. If the situation to which the law is to applv 
 is the usual and general one, and the exception is the unusual, 
 the principle may be stated generally first and the exception or 
 exemption be permitted to follow.®^ But if the law is designed 
 to operate not generally and usually, but only in a precise situation 
 or case, good draftsmanship demands either that the legal case 
 be stated before the principle of law or that some intimation be 
 
 57 Hurd. 1919. p. 2834. 
 
 5^ See the Motor Vehicle Law. Secs. 8 and 20, Hurd. 1919, pp. 2621, 2626. 
 
27 . 
 
 i^iven by reference to that ease. If the Ic^al ease is of a character 
 that can be expressed briefly it may be stated before the principle 
 and in the same section. Thus section 1 of a bill to legalize certain 
 school elections says: 
 
 “In all cases where a majority of the inhabitants of any compact and 
 contiguous territory voting on the proposition, having voted at any election 
 called for the purpose by the county superintendent of schools, in favor of 
 the organization of such territory into a community high school district, 
 and when at a subsequent election similarly called and held a board of edu¬ 
 cation has been chosen for such district. . . 
 
 But if the statement of the legal case is lengthy and involved the 
 reader should not be burdened with the details of the case before the 
 principle is disclosed. Acts conditioned on a local referendum furnish 
 illustrations of legal cases which frequently require several sections 
 for statement. A bill of this kind should contain an intimation of 
 this case by referential language and defer the statement of the de¬ 
 tails of the case until after the statement of the law. The first sec¬ 
 tion of an act providing for community consolidated school districts 
 passed in 1919 is as follows : “Subject to the conditions of sections 
 84c, 84d, 84e, 84f and 84g of this Act, any compact and contiguous 
 territory bounded by school district lines .may be organized into a 
 community consolidated school district.”®® 
 
 The subordinate provisions of a bill vary so much in character 
 and the combinations are so many that no rules can be laid down 
 for their order. However, some general suggestions can be made 
 which in particular cases may determine or influence the arrange¬ 
 ment. 
 
 1. Give precedence to the more important provisions, those of 
 normal and general application being placed first. 
 
 2. Or if the provisions of a bill, or some of them, set out suc¬ 
 cessive steps in a proceeding, the order of the provisions should follow 
 the natural sequence. Thus, a provision for the issuance of a license 
 should precede a provision for its revocation. 
 
 When a bill does not primarily create a crime but the prohibition 
 of certain acts is required as a necessary provision to make effective 
 the purpose of the bill, it may be convenient to prohibit those acts 
 as they occur in the narrative and later specifically create them as 
 crimes and provide penalties for their commission.®^ 
 
 Local, temporary or exceptional provisions, being less important, 
 should be placed at the end of the bill. Provisions which are not 
 closely connected with the narrative of the bill find a logical place at 
 the end. Thus an emergency clause, which makes an act effective 
 before July 1, or a “take effect” provision, which postpones the 
 going into effect after that date, is customarily placed at the end.®^ 
 
 5»Hurd, 1919, p. 2719. 
 
 Hurd, 1919, p. 2707; see also chapter on Forms, subheading Referendura 
 provision. 
 
 **1 See an Act in relation to the sale of farm seeds, Hurd, 1919, p. 56, and 
 Game and Fish Code, Hurd. 1919, p. 1548. 
 
 The constitution, Article IW Section 13, says the emergency “shall be 
 expressed in the preamble or body of the act.” An act of 1871-2 relating to 
 Justices of the Peace in Chicago expresses the existence of an emergency in a 
 preamble (Laws 1871-2, p. 548) but instances of this kind are rare. The word 
 “preamble” has been omitted from this provision by the constitutional con¬ 
 vention of 1920. 
 
28 
 
 If the bill includes a provision repealing acts or parts of acts, 
 this provision should follow the body of the act but precede an 
 emergency clause or ‘hake effect” provision. 
 
 The subject* matter may suggest other arrangements equally 
 proper for the individual case. It cannot be hoped to do more than 
 suggest the principles which will most frequently be useful. In the 
 working out a particular bill there will often be variations and ex¬ 
 ceptions. Sometimes the arrangement will follow a combination of 
 the principles suggested. The Criminal Code has the sections of Di¬ 
 vision I arranged in the alphabetic order; the balance of the act both 
 as to sections and divisions follows the sequence of the successive 
 steps of a criminal proceeding. It has been said with a measure of 
 truth that the rules of good drafting are the rules of literary com¬ 
 position. Certainly it is true that a careful outline of the subject 
 matter prepared in advance of the actual drafting will afford a logical 
 and intelligent treatment and lay the groundwork for lucid legislation. 
 
 The use of sections is important to make the separate propositions 
 of a bill stand out clearly by dividing the text accordingly. It is, like 
 paragraphing, a visual aid to the understanding. The length of sec¬ 
 tions, ordinarily, will be governed to an extent by the treatment of the 
 subject but the sections should be kept short not only as an aid to 
 visualization but for convenience 'in amending. A constitutional pro¬ 
 vision prohibits amendment by reference and requires that the “sec¬ 
 tion amended shall be inserted at length in the new act.”®^ Probably 
 no more forceful argument could be made for short sections than to 
 call attention to Section 1 of Article V of the Cities and Villages Act.®^ 
 This section recites in ninety-eight -clauses the powers of corporate 
 authorities of cities and villages. Few sessions of the General As¬ 
 sembly pass without the amendment of this section and to effect the 
 slightest change requires the re-enacting of the whole section cover¬ 
 ing seven or eight pages of the session laws. Section 61 of the 
 County Act is even longer, hut probably not so frequently amended. 
 In 1919 three bills amending this section were passed covering thirty- 
 three pages in the session laws.®^ 
 
 The • County Court Act®® contains an interesting treatment in 
 this respect of the terms of the various county courts. In order to 
 facilitate amendments to the enactment, one sentence is broken up 
 into a number of sections so that each dependent clause is made a 
 section. A portion of this will illustrate the form of the whole act. 
 
 “Sec. 8. The law terms of the County Court, except as otherwise here¬ 
 inafter provided, shall commence on the second Monday of the months 
 as follows, to-wit: In the Counties of— 
 
 Sec. 9. Adams, first Monday in January, May and August. 
 
 Sec. 10. Alexander on the first Monday of March, July and November. 
 
 Sec. 11. Bond, in January, June and November. 
 
 Sec. 12. Boone, in March, June and December. 
 
 Sec. 13. Brown, in January and June.” 
 
 “Constitution of 1870, Article JV, Section 13; see also Veto Messages, 1909, 
 Senate Journal. 1915, p. 1674. 
 
 •^Hurd, 1919, p. 327. 
 
 “Laws 1919. pp. 370, 381. 392. 
 
 “Hurd. 1919, p. 906. 
 
29 
 
 In the case of the longer sections it is generally an advantage to 
 paragraph as frequently as the text will permit. 
 
 Another useful aid in the clear presentation of the substance of 
 a bill is found in some cases in the breaking up of the bill into articles 
 as well as sections. The purpose of grouping sections into articles is 
 to bring together the sections which are more closely related to each 
 other and less closely connected with the balance of the bill. 
 
 Ilbert, speaking of the use of articles, cautions against excessive 
 subdivision. It seems doubtful, however, whether there is any great 
 tendency to over-subdivide. Two considerations must be borne in 
 mind in regard to the advisability of dividing a bill into articles: 
 
 1. The continuity of the thought. 
 
 2. The length and complexity of the bill. 
 
 The first consideration must be whether the thought breaks up 
 logically into related but distinct parts. An arbitrary subdivision which 
 is uncalled for by the thought itself is confusing and worse than use¬ 
 less. Just how distinct this break between the parts should be to 
 justify subdividing must depend somewhat on the length of the bill 
 and its clarity in other respects. There would be no advantage in 
 subdividing a bill of only a few short sections no matter how dis¬ 
 tinct or unrelated the provisions might be. On the other hand, as 
 the length of the bill increases, the greater becomes the need for sub¬ 
 division. 
 
 When a bill is divided into parts, each part should be numbered 
 and given a short heading descriptive of the subject matter con¬ 
 tained in it. It is obvious that headings or titles assist not only in 
 locating particular provisions but also as a table of contents to dis¬ 
 close the scope of the whole bill. 
 
 There has not been uniformity in the matter of numbering sec¬ 
 tions where the sections are grouped in larger divisions. The Cities 
 and Villages Act begins each article with a new series of section num¬ 
 bers. The section numbers in the Road and Bridge Act, on the other 
 hand, run consecutively through the act. The latter system is prefer¬ 
 able for the reason that each section is identified by its individual num¬ 
 ber without reference to the article, thereby eliminating the possibility 
 of confusing sections of difterent articles. 
 
PREAMBLES. 
 
 It was thought necessary formerly to attach to many statutes 
 a prefactory statement of explanation or argument called a preamble. 
 The preamble is generally not given a section number and consists of 
 a series of connected clauses each introduced by “whereas.’’ It 
 concludes with “therefore” followed by the enacting clause and the 
 body of the act. 
 
 The Charities Code of 1912^" has a different form of preamble. 
 Section 1 of the act states the purpose of the act in a sentence with¬ 
 out the “whereas—therefore” form. 
 
 Generally the preamble serves no useful purpose and could well 
 be omitted. It is to be presumed that the General Assembly is 
 influenced by the public interest when it passes a bill; consequently 
 a preamble to that effect adds nothing. An example of such a pre¬ 
 amble is found in an act for the enlargement of Lincoln Park®® which 
 
 rebels: Wt^ 
 
 “Whereas, the health and the best interest of the public require that 
 Lincoln Park in Chicago, be enlarged, therefore, . . . .” 
 
 A little more specific in its statement is this preamble: 
 
 “Whereas, the disease known as foul brood exists to a very considerable 
 extent in various portions of this state, which, if left to itself, will soon ex¬ 
 terminate the honey-bees; and .... 
 
 Whereas, the work done by an individual bee-keeper or by a state 
 inspector is useless so long as the official is not given authority to inspect 
 and, if need be, to destroy the disease when found, and 
 
 Whereas, there is a great loss to the bee-keepers and fruit growers of 
 the state each year by the devastating ravages of foul brood; . . . 
 
 But there can be no justification for a recital such as this stating 
 that an evil exists and is causing damage and that the measures in 
 the bill are the ones which in the judgment of the General Assembly 
 will most effectively combat that evil. Such may be presumed from 
 the enactment of the measure itself. It would seem that the reasons 
 for the establishment of a state colony for epileptics^® are so ap¬ 
 parent as to make their recital in a preamble superfluous. 
 
 The courts have held very generally that in case of ambiguity, 
 reference may be made to the, preamble to determine the intent and 
 scope of an act.'^ The preamble to a statute is no part of an act; 
 still it may assist in ascertaining the true intent and meaning of the 
 legislature.^- Lord Coke speaks favorably of the preamble as “a 
 good means to find the meaning of the statute, and a true key to open 
 
 «‘Hurd. 1919, p. 216.- 
 
 «^Hurd. 1919, p. 2101. 
 
 '9 Hurd, 1919, p. 90. 
 
 •"Hurd, 1919, p. 256. 
 
 •^ Lewis’ Sutherland Statutorj' Construction, Sec. .341. 
 
 •9 Edwards v. Pope. 3 Scammon (Ill.) 464 (1842). 
 
31 
 
 
 the understanding thereof.” Rut the fact that ])reanibles have served 
 a useful purpose to aid in the construction of ])oorly drafted acts 
 is hardly a justification for their use. The draftsman should strive 
 to state clearly his law in the body of his bill rather than to rely on 
 what amounts' to a restatement to correct the faults. 
 
 Then too, the operation of a preamble on the language of the 
 act must necessarily be uncertain. A preamble does not aid in con¬ 
 struing an act unless its language restricts or extends the scope of 
 the’ act and when its expressions diverge from those in the body of 
 the act, a contradiction results which can only be eliminated by a 
 judicial decision. 
 
 This criticism of preambles is limited to their use in general 
 statutes. There are special cases where their use is of value. 
 
 1. Some acts are based on extra-territorial happenings or facts 
 which are not of general knowledge, and are not reasonably apparent 
 from the statute itself. Thus, the preamble reciting the terms of 
 a treaty entered into between the United States and Great Britian 
 justifies and explains the act to grant the use of the canals of this 
 state to the inhabitants of the Dominion of Canada upon conditions 
 named. 
 
 2. Frecpiently in appropriation acts to individuals, a statemeni 
 of the facts, is incorporated in a preamble. 
 
 Even in such case, the statement of fact may sometimes be in¬ 
 corporated conveniently in the act itself as was done in an act for the 
 relief of Charles Watters."^. Section I reads: 
 
 “The sum of one thousand dollars is hereby appropriated for the relief 
 of Charles Watters who was seriously injured v/hile engaged in the perform¬ 
 ance of his duties as a guard at the Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet.” 
 
 If the facts can not be handled in a subordinate clause, it is 
 better perhaps that they be placed in a preamble rather than to 
 have the law enact what is purely recital. Thus, the action of the 
 Court of Claims relative to the claim or the reason why the claim 
 was not presented could not well be stated elsewhere than in a 
 preamble. Care should be taken to cut out all unnecessary matter 
 and to limit the number of “whereas” clauses. Two appropriation 
 acts of 1919'^^ have ten clauses each. Preambles of this length 
 with the constant repetition of “whereas” are ponderous and awk¬ 
 ward. 
 
 The most useful function of the preamble is in connection with 
 resolutions. These are not of a law-making character in Illinois,’^® 
 and the preamble can be used to contain the descriptive or argumen¬ 
 tative matter which prefaces the legislative expression of opinion, 
 feeling or desire. 
 
 ^3 Hurd, 1919, p. 170. 
 
 Lraws 1919, p. 128. 
 
 Laws 1919. pp. 124, 126. 
 
 ‘3 Constitution of 1870. Article IV, S'ection 11; Burritt v. Commissioners of 
 State Contracts, 120 Ill. 322 (1887). 
 
3 ^ 
 
 THE ENACTING CLAUSE. 
 
 The enacting clause or style is the short introductory phrase 
 which establishes the instrument as law. The constitution of Illi¬ 
 nois provides that “the style of the laws of this state shall be: ‘Be 
 it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the 
 General Assembly.’ An enacting clause is an essential part 
 of a law, and an enactment without it is void and inoperative.'^® 
 Whether any variation from the form specified will invalidate 
 an act has not been judicially determined, although the Attorney 
 General has held that the insertion of the words “Forty-sixth” im¬ 
 mediately before “General Assembly” in the enacting clause, rend¬ 
 ered the act unconstitutional.'® It should be noted that the court 
 has held sufficient, a substantial compliance with the forms for 
 process in Article \^I, Section 33 of the constitution. However, 
 the question is ah academic one for draftsmen, AVhether the form 
 is mandatory in the sense that a slight variation ivould invalidate 
 the act or not it is the duty of the legislator and the bill-drafter 
 to see that the constitutional charge is followed exactly. 
 
 It is customary to place the enacting clause within the first 
 section of a bill. Formerly, the subsequent sections were each 
 introduced by a shorter enacting phrase such as, “Section 2. And 
 be it further enactedLater, these enacting phrases were dropped 
 leaving only the longer one in Section 1. Logically, this is not 
 the proper place for it. Since the omissic^n of the subsequent 
 enacting clauses, the one enacting clause introduces the whole act. 
 In fact the Supreme Court has held that although included in Sec¬ 
 tion 1 it “is no more a part of Section 1 than it is a part of Section 
 49 or 50” and that the repeal of Section 1 without a saving clause 
 did not leave the remaining sections without an enacting clause.®® 
 It would have been better when the individual enacting clauses 
 were dispensed with, to have taken the remaining one out of Sec¬ 
 tion 1 and placed it ahead of Section 1 in this manner; 
 
 “Pc it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, repre¬ 
 sented in the General Assembly: 
 
 Section 1, Whoever sends, etc.” 
 
 However, the practice of including the enacting clause in Sec¬ 
 tion 1 is so firmh^ fixed that it might be difficult to substitute the 
 more logical arrangement. 
 
 ^"Constitution of 1870, Article IV, Section 11. 
 
 Burritt v. Commissioners of State Contracts, 120 Ill. 322; (1887); Wenner 
 V. Thornton, 98 Ill. 156 (1881). 
 
 ‘®'Ileport, Attorney General, 1910, p. 77. 
 
 Pearce v. Vittum, 193 Ill. 192 (1901). 
 
33 
 
 CONSTRUCTION OF SENTENCES. 
 
 It may seem elementary in discussing- bill-drafting to refer 
 to and emphasize some general rules of composition. But the 
 bill-drafter deals often with involved and intricate situations and 
 his enunciation of the legislative will must always be exact and 
 unambiguous. The elementary rules of expression have for him, 
 therefore, a peculiar importance. IMuch of the obscurity and am¬ 
 biguity of statutes is due to long and poorly constructed sentences. 
 The bill-drafter should make a conscious effort to keep the sen¬ 
 tences short. This will make more sentences and, at times, add 
 somewhat to the length of a bill but if each sentence expresses a 
 single thought, it will be easier for the reader to grasp that thought. 
 St 3 de must be forgotten and particularly the desire for well-rounded 
 periods that roll along sonorously. It does not matter if the result 
 is choppy and broken; in a task involving the difficulties of com¬ 
 plex social regulation the constant striving must be for clarity 
 and preciseness rather than a pleasant appeal to the ear. 
 
 There is frequentl}^ a tendency to compress a whole series of 
 ideas into one sentence by the use of subordinate clauses and con¬ 
 junctions. The result even if not ambiguous, is at least obscure 
 and difficult. Take for example “An Act to remedy the evils con¬ 
 sequent upon the destruction of any public records by fire or other¬ 
 wise,” approved and in force April 9, 1872. 
 
 “In all cases under the provisions of this act, and in all proceedings or 
 actions now or hereafter instituted as to any estate, interest or right in, or 
 any lien or incumbrance upon any lots, pieces or parcels of land, when any 
 party to such action or proceeding, or his agent or attorney in his behalf, 
 shall orally in court, or by affidavit, to be filed in such action or proceeding, 
 testify and state under oath that the original of any deeds, conveyances, 
 or other written or record evidence, has been lost or destroyed, or not in the 
 power of the party wishing to use it on the trial to produce the same, and 
 the record thereof has been destroyed by fire or otherwise, the court shall 
 receive all such evidence as may have a bearing on the case to establish the 
 execution or contents of the deeds, conveyances, records, or other written 
 evidence, so lost or destroyed: Provided, that the testimony of the parties 
 themselves shall be received subject to all the qualifications in respect of 
 such testimony which are now provided by law: And, provided, further, that 
 any writings in the hands of any person or persons which may become ad¬ 
 missible in evidence, under the provision of this section or of any other 
 part of this act, shall be rejected and not be admitted in evidence unless 
 the same appear upon its face without erasure, blemish, alteration, inter¬ 
 lineation or interpolation in any material part, unless the same be explained 
 to the satisfaction of the court, and to have been fairly and honestly made in 
 the ordinary course of business; and that any person or persons making 
 any such erasure, alteration, interlineation or interpolation, in any such 
 writing, with the intent to change the same in any substantial matter, after 
 the same has been once made as aforesaid, shall be guilty of* the crime of 
 forgery, and be punished accordingly; and that any and all persons who 
 
34 
 
 may be engaged in the business of making writings or written entries con¬ 
 cerning or relating to lands and real estate, in any county in this state 
 to whi-h this act applies, and of furnishing to persons applying therefor 
 abstracts and copies of such writings or written entries as aforesaid, for 
 a fee, reward or compensation therefor and shall not make the same truly 
 and without alteration or interpolation in any matter of substance, with 
 the view and intent to alter or change the same in any material matter, or 
 matter of substance, shall be guilty of the crime of forgery, and punished 
 accordingly; and any and all such person or persons shall furnish said 
 abstracts or copies as aforesaid, to the person and persons from time to time 
 applying therefor, in the order of applications and without unnecessary de¬ 
 lay, and for a reasonable consideration to be allowed therefor, which in no 
 case shall exceed the sum of one dollar and fifty cents for each and every 
 conveyance, or other like change of title, shown upon such abstract or copy; 
 and any and all persons so engaged, and whose business is hereby declared 
 to stand upon a like footing with that of common carriers, who shall refuse 
 so to do, if tender or payment be made to him or them of the amount de¬ 
 manded for such abstract or copy, not exceeding the amount aforesaid, as 
 soon as such amount is made known, or ascertained, or of a sum adequate 
 to cover said amount, before its ascertainment, shall be guilty of the crime 
 of extortion, and be punished by a fine of not less than $100, and not 
 exceeding $1,000 therefor, upon indictment in any court having jurisdiction 
 thereof, and shall also be liable in an action on the case, or other proper 
 form of . action or suit, for any and all damages, loss or injury, which any 
 person or persons applying therefor may suffer or incur by reason of such 
 failure to furnish such abstract or copy as aforesaid.” (As amended by 
 act approved and in force March 30, 1874).^^ 
 
 This sentence, after stating the case in which the law is de¬ 
 signed to operate, makes admissible certain evidence to supply 
 missing records, qualifies the weight to be given to the testimoii}' 
 of parties in interest, excludes altered writings unless the alter¬ 
 ation is explained, defines the duty of persons furnishing abstracts, 
 creates three separate crimes, provides penalties for violations 
 thereof, and adds a civil liabilit}^ in the case of one crime. These 
 various matters might better have been separated and placed in 
 several sections but even if included in one section, it would be 
 easier to grasp if each provision had been made a separate sentence. 
 Probably in this case no very serious difficulty results but the first 
 sentence in Section 2 of “An act concerning the levy and exten¬ 
 sion of taxes,’’^“ is so complicated and involved that judicial con¬ 
 struction alone can settle the meaning of some of it. 
 
 Of course, a sentence expressing a single leading principle 
 may include a number of coordinate phrases or clauses which ren¬ 
 der it complex and difficult. Thus there may be a series of subjects 
 to which one predicate applies or a number of predicates may be 
 joined to a single subject. The statement of the case in which the 
 law is to operate may involve a variety of situations. To break up 
 such a sentence so as to give to each coordinate part a complete 
 sentence would involve much repetition. A very useful expedient 
 to make apparent the relative value and position in the sentence 
 of these parts is the detaching and numbering of these clauses as 
 in the following example. 
 
 SI Hurd, 1919, p, 2447. 
 82 Hurd, 1919, p. 2543. 
 
35 
 
 “A negotiable instrument is discharged: 
 
 1. By payment in due course by or on behalf of the principal debtor. 
 
 2. By payment in due course by the party accommodated, where the 
 instrument is made or accepted by accommodation. 
 
 3. By the intentional cancellation thereof by the holder. 
 
 4. When the principal debtor becomes the holder of the instrument 
 at or after maturity in his own right. 
 
 There has been no uniformity in the matter of clesi.^natin^ de¬ 
 tached clauses. The Sales Act*^ numbers the parap^raphs within 
 the sec'tions by arabic numerals enclosed in parentheses and uses 
 small enclosed italic letters for the clauses. The School Law®’^ in¬ 
 dicates detached clauses by the words “First,” “Second” etc. The 
 Fees and Salaries Act®'’’ has a great many detached clauses without 
 any designation. The Uniform Partnership and Limited Partner¬ 
 ship Acts®^ have an individual scheme of numbering which is apt 
 to be rather confusing. The sentences in each section arc num¬ 
 bered with arabic figures, 1, 2, 3, etc. Detached clauses are in¬ 
 dicated b}^ small letters and second subordinate sets of clauses by 
 Roman numerals. If there is only one sentence and it has de¬ 
 tached clauses, there are no arabic figures but the clauses arc 
 marked with small letters. This makes it appear as though the 
 first markings are arabic figures in one section and then small 
 letters in another section. It is doubtful whether marking or 
 numbering the sentences in a section is ever necessary, and it has 
 the disadvantage of introducing an extra set of markings. If it 
 is desired to refer to a particular portion of a section, the refer¬ 
 ence can be made by a few words indicating the subject matter. 
 The reference to the subject matter is clearer and more easily car¬ 
 ried in the mind of the reader, as appears from the two examples 
 quoted. The first indicates the section by number and the par¬ 
 ticular portion referred to, by subject matter. 
 
 “Sec. 14. Each of the following constitutes a misdemeanor punishable, 
 upon conviction, by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars. 
 
 (h) Violation of the reasonable sanitary regulation prescribed by the 
 Department of Registration and Education pursuant to the provisions of 
 section 12 of this act.” 
 
 The following illustrates the “blind” reference : 
 
 “(c) A partner who has caused the dissolution wrongfully shall have: 
 
 I. If the business is not continued under the provisions of paragraph 
 (2b) all the rights of a partner under paragraph (1) subject to clause (2a 
 II), of this section.”^ 
 
 It is desirable that a uniform system be adopted for all l^ills 
 and probably as simple a method as any is the numbering of de¬ 
 tached clauses with arabic figures without parentheses. Sometimes 
 a second subordinate series occurs in the midst of the first series. 
 Small letters may be used to designate the second set as in section 
 75 of the General Corporation Act.®® If a second set of independent 
 clauses follows in the same sentence or section, the designation 
 
 Negotiable Instruments Law. Hurd, 1919, p. 2035. 
 
 8^ Hurd, 1919. p. 2654. 
 
 85 Hurd, 1919, p. 2689. 
 
 8«Hurd, 1919, p. 1500. 
 
 87 Hurd. 1919. pp. 2218, 2229. 
 
 88 Uniform Partnership Act, section 38, Hurd, 1919, p. 2226. 
 
 8»Hurd, 1919, p. 734. 
 
36 
 
 should be the arabic numerals beginning again with 1, 2, 3, etc.,, 
 as in the following section: 
 
 “Sec. 635. A person who, 
 
 1. Displaces, removes, injures or destroys any rail, sleeper, switch, 
 bridge, viaduct, culvert, embankment or structure, or any part thereof, 
 attached, appertaining to or connected with any railway, whether oper¬ 
 ated by steam or by horses; or 
 
 2. Places any obstruction upon the track of any such railway; or 
 
 3. Wilfully discharges a loaded fire-arm, or projects or throws a stone, 
 or any other missile, at a railway train, or at a locomotive, car or vehicle 
 standing or moving upon a railway; or 
 
 4. Wilfully displaces, removes, cuts, injures or destroys any wire, in¬ 
 sulator, pole, ear, dynamo, motor, locomotive or any part thereof, attached, 
 appertaining to or connected with any railway operated by electricity, or 
 wilfully interferes with, or interrupts any motive power used in running 
 said road, or wilfully places any such obstruction upon the track of any 
 such railway, or wilfully discharges a loaded fire-arm, or projects or throws 
 a stone, or any other missile, at such a railway train, or locomotive, car, or 
 vehicle standing or moving upon such railway; 
 
 Is punishable as follows: 
 
 1. If thereby the safety of any person is endangered, by imprisonment 
 for not more than ten years; 
 
 2. In every other case, by imprisonment for not more than three years, 
 or by a fine of not more than two hundred and fifty dollars, or both.” 
 
 However, more than one set of clauses in the same sentence 
 is apt to be somewhat confusing and should be avoided, if pos¬ 
 sible, by the bill-drafter. 
 
 The value of detaching clauses in long sentences is obvious. 
 But there is no useful purpose served by breaking up a short sent¬ 
 ence and detaching a single clause. One of the reasons for detach¬ 
 ing clauses is to show the relation of co-ordinate parts and this 
 reason fails when there is only one clause. In the Fish and Game 
 Code®® occurs this sentence in which the detached part might well 
 have been continued without any break. 
 
 “Section 33 Deer). It shall be unlawful; 
 
 To hunt, kill, take or destroy, or to attempt to hunt, kill, take or destroy 
 any wild deer in the state until the 10th day of November, A. D. 1925.” 
 
 »»Hurd, 1919, p. 1554. 
 
37 
 
 PROVISOS. 
 
 The practice of stating* a principle in general terms and then 
 appending- to it an additional statement designed to limit or restrict 
 or cpialify its generality has contributed greatly to the length and 
 awkwardness of legislative sentences. The qualifying provisions 
 are known as provisos and are generally introduced by the words, 
 “provided” or “provided, however.” One objectionable feature of 
 the use of provisos is the consequent tendency to state a proposi¬ 
 tion inaccurately or too broadly relying on the proviso to correct 
 and limit the principle. Thus the provision, 
 
 “Whoever shall ride or drive faster than a walk, over any bridge in 
 this state, owned or controlled, either the whole or a part thereof, by any 
 city, village or town of this state, shall, for each offense, be fined in a sum 
 not exceeding ten dollars nor less than one dollar. . . 
 
 is too general a statement to create the crime in the mind of the 
 
 legislature, as- is indicated by the proviso which follows 
 
 “Provided, that a notice shall be posted on such bridge, warning against 
 riding, or driving on such bridge faster than a walk. ...” 
 
 The crime has to do only with bridges having two qualifica¬ 
 tions. 1. They must be partly or wholly owned by municipalities. 
 
 2. They must have a certain notice posted upon them. The sen¬ 
 tence, properly constructed should have so described the bridges 
 and have dispensed with the proviso clause. 
 
 Section 20 of Division II of the Criminal Code^^ provides that 
 
 “All offenses herein defin^jd shall be prosecuted and on conviction 
 punished as by this act is prescribed, and not otherwise; and all offenses 
 not provided for by statute law, may be punished by fine or imprisonment, 
 in the discretion of the court: Provided, the fine shall in no case exceed 
 $500, and the imprisonment one year.” 
 
 There is no excuse for so phrasing the sentence to provide an un¬ 
 limited penalty and qualifying it by a proviso. It should state the 
 limits of the penalty in the first instance as “may be punished by 
 a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not longer than 
 one year.” The aim should be to define precisely the limits of the 
 particular subject matter rather than to include too much and then 
 carve off a portion. 
 
 The provision, above quoted, which penalizes riding or driving 
 faster than a walk over municipal bridges illustrates a very real 
 danger in connection with the use of provisos. Commencing with 
 “provided,” the sentence is: 
 
 “Provided, that a notice shall be posted on such bridge, warning against 
 riding, or driving, on such bridge, faster than a walk, such fine to be re- 
 
 »iHurd, 1919, p. 39 6. 
 Hurd, 1919, p. 1059, 
 
38 
 
 covered, with costs, before any justice of the peace or police magistrate 
 of the county where the offense is committed, upon sworn complaint in 
 writing, upon which a warrant for the arrest of the offender shall issue, 
 and it shall be the duty of every constable of the county, and every 
 marshal, policeman and police constable, and all other officers of such city, 
 village or town, owning or controlling the whole or in part such bridge, 
 having the power to make arrests, whenever aforesaid offense is com¬ 
 mitted in the view of such officer or officers, to forthwith take in custody 
 the person or persons so committing aforesaid offense, and bring him or 
 them before any justice of the peace or police magistrate of the county, 
 to be dealt with according to law, and such officer so taking in custody such 
 offender, or any officer of such city, village or town, owning or controlling 
 the whole or a part of such bridge where such offense is committed, may 
 make the complaint upon which warrant shall issue against the offender, 
 all fines collected under this act, shall be paid into the common school 
 fund of the county.” 
 
 Grammatically all of this portion of the sentence is dependent 
 upon the “provided” and is included within the exception. But the 
 text quite clearly indicates that only the short provision as to notice is 
 intended as a limitation of the enactment preceding the proviso. 
 We have then the arrangement of the sentence and the subject matter 
 indicating different constructions—a situation which may easily in¬ 
 volve grave difficulties. If the use of a proviso is ever justified, care 
 should be taken to exclude from it all independent extraneous matter. 
 
 The general rule, as stated before, should be to make the first 
 description accurately define the limits of the subject'matter. This 
 is not always possible or convenient. Frequently the rule is most 
 clearly put by giving it generally and then stating the qualifications 
 to that rule or the exceptions excluded from it. The use of provisos 
 in this situation is not incorrect. “The office of a proviso, generally, 
 is either to except something from the enacting clause, to qualify or 
 restrain its generality, or to exclude some possible ground of mis¬ 
 interpretation of its extending to cases not intended to be brought 
 within its purview.Take for example section 10 of Division XV 
 of the Criminal Code 
 
 “When a prisoner has been committed to the penitentiary in pursuance 
 of a sentence of imprisonment therein, or has been committed to the county 
 jail pursuant to a sentence of confinement therein, and the judgment is 
 affirmed, the time of service under the sentence of such prisoner shall 
 commence to run from the time of such commitment, notwithstanding a 
 supersedeas may have been granted: Provided, if any such prisoner is ad¬ 
 mitted to bail after such commitment, the time during v/hich he is out 
 upon bail shall be excluded from the computation of his time of service.” 
 
 If the attempt is made to state the principle without excepting 
 the situation which is defined in the proviso, the sentence becomes very 
 awkward. In other words, the rule must be stated positively and 
 then the exception negatived. But—and this is the point as to the use 
 of provisos in any case—the proviso may be stated as an independent 
 sentence and placed immediately after the rule it qualifies. If a dis¬ 
 junctive is desired, “but” or “however” or “except” may be used. 
 These words are as definite in their application as “provided” and 
 they have the advantage of being the usual and popular forms of ex- 
 
 Huddleston v. Francis, 124 Ill. 195 (1888). 
 3* Hurd, 1919, p. 1078. 
 
39 
 
 pression. Language which is peculiarly limited to legal diction should 
 be avoided in favor of ordinary and common phraseology, if the popu¬ 
 lar words convey the meaning equally well. 
 
 If the leading principle and the qualifying statements or excep¬ 
 tions are long, they may be given separate sentences instead of 
 stringing them one after the other in one long sentence. It will be 
 found that the wording can indicate the relationship clearly without 
 the’necessity for the more awkward arrangement. Section 3 of the 
 Parole Act^® furnishes an illustration of a sentence with a proviso of 
 four clauses which might well be broken up into five sections. 
 
 Attention should be called to a rather frequent misuse of the 
 proviso form in legislation. Most courts have recognized that while 
 the legitimate function of the proviso is to modify or restrain the 
 preceding enactment, it is sometimes used as an independent enact¬ 
 ment without reference to the limitations of the preceding statement 
 and where that intent is evident, have given to it that construction.^® 
 The word “provided” becomes, in such cases, a mere conjunction. 
 Obviously, there is no excuse for an arrangement which introduces 
 a conflict between the form of the sentence and the subject matter and 
 thereby furnishes a subject for judicial determination as to which 
 feature is controlling. 
 
 »3Hurd, 1919, p. 1085. 
 
 Tn re Day, 181 I’l. 73 (1899) ; Hackett v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 235 Ill. 11 fi 
 (1908); People v. Continental Beneficial Association, 289 Ill. 40 (1919). 
 
40 
 
 PHRASEOLOGY. 
 
 Tense: One of the main faults to be charged to legislative 
 enactments is the use of archaic and stilted language which, in 
 some way, seems to have become associated with the expression of 
 legal principles. Any change which tends to replace this with the 
 ordinary and popular words of current speech, so far as practicable, 
 is an improvement in the form. Of course, technical terms and 
 legal phrases with a certain definite meaning should not be dis¬ 
 carded at the sacrifice of preciseness. It is only the useless barna¬ 
 cles of legal phraseology which are to be condemned. 
 
 The unnecessary use of the future tense furnishes an illustra¬ 
 tion of an awkward practice more or less general in legislation. 
 Every law is designed to afford a rule for a continuing present. It 
 should, therefore, speak in the present tense. The use of the future 
 tense seems to be a subconscious recognition of the fact that laws 
 are prospective in the sense that their enactment precedes the 
 acts upon which or the situation in which they are to operate. The 
 present tense is a more simple and natural form of expression, and 
 for that reason is to be preferred. This is obvious from a compari¬ 
 son of the following enactment given first as it appears in the 
 statute book with the future tenses, and then with those verb 
 
 forms replaced by the present tense. 
 
 “Any person, firm or corporation who shall send, deliver or mail, or in 
 any manner shall cause to be sent, delivered or mailed, any paper or 
 document simulating or intended to simulate a summons, complaint, writ 
 or other court process of any kind, to any person, firm or corporation, shall 
 be guilty of a misdemeanor. . . 
 
 “Any person, firm or corporation who sends, delivers or mails, or in 
 any manner causes to be sent, delivered or mailed, ... is guilty of a 
 misdemeanor. ...” 
 
 The future auxilliary “shall” disappears with the substitution 
 of the present for the future tense. “Shall” is, however, used also 
 to express a command. When used in this sense, “shall” is neces¬ 
 sary and proper. 
 
 With the discarding of the future tense, the awkward future 
 
 perfect gives way to the perfect, as in this sentence : 
 
 “In all cases where the officers who shall have canvassed the election 
 returns shall have found that a majority of the voters voting upon the 
 question shall have voted in favor . . 
 
 Using the perfect tense, the sentence reads as follows: 
 
 “In all cases where the officers who have canvassed the election re¬ 
 turns have found that a majority of the voters voting upon the question 
 have voted in favor ...” 
 
 »'Hurd, 1919, p. 1011. 
 98 Hurd, 1919, p. 1218. 
 
41 
 
 There are other objections to the use of the future and future 
 perfect tense which may be noted. The future auxiliary “shall” 
 become^ confused with the imperative “shall.” This may have 
 contributed to the weakening- of the imperative form by judicial 
 construction. In the expression, “shall Ije guilty of a misdemeanor and 
 punished” the “shall” does duty in both senses. “Shall be guilty” is 
 merely the future tense. “(Shall be) punished” is imperative. 
 
 Another objection is that there is a tendency on the part of a 
 bill-drafter employing the future tense, to slip back into the more cus¬ 
 tomary form of expression. The use of both tenses sometimes 
 
 occurs in the same'sentence, as in section 46 of the Criminal Code. 
 
 “If any two or more persons conspire or agree together, or the officers 
 or executive committee of any society or organization or corporation, shall 
 issue or utter any circular or edit . . 
 
 Preciseness—ejusdem generis: The rules of literary com¬ 
 position apply to bill-drafting as well as to other forms 
 of expression. Indeed the virtues of good English, brevity, sim¬ 
 plicity, clarity and preciseness, are even more important in legis¬ 
 lation than in other writing since by legislation must be regulated 
 and controlled all the various rights and duties of human relation¬ 
 ship. However, statutory expression is a distinct study with prob¬ 
 lems and difficulties peculiar to itself. This discussion will con¬ 
 sider particularly some of the faults that have been associated with 
 statutes and make detailed suggestions limited to this subject. 
 
 It is essential to good bill-drafting that the subject matter 
 be first mastered completely. Prolixity and indirectness are fre¬ 
 quently the result of a vague groping for the principle desired. Good 
 expression cannot follow a hazy impression. AVhen the principle 
 is clearly understood, state it without unnecessary verbiage. Make 
 each word justify its use. But in the desire for conciseness, do not 
 treat inadequately a complicated subject. Necessary length is not 
 a fault. 
 
 When a rule can be stated in general terms, that is to be 
 preferred to an enumeration of details. The section of the Crim¬ 
 inal Code concerning forgery and counterfeiting is an example of 
 a statement, which might be condensed greatly by the use of gen¬ 
 eral language. 
 
 “Every person who shall falsely make, alter, forge or counterfeit any 
 record or other authentic matter of a public nature, or any charter, letters 
 patent, deed, lease, indenture, writing obligatory, will, testament, codicil, 
 annuity, bond, covenant, post note, check, draft, bill of exchange, contract, 
 promissory note, due bill for the payment of money or property, receipt 
 for money or property, power of attorney, any auditor’s warrant for the 
 payment of money at the treasury, county order, or any accountable receipt, 
 or any order or warrant, or request for the payment of money or the deliv¬ 
 ery of goods or chattels of any kind, or for the delivery of any instrument 
 of writing or acquittance, release or receipt for money or goods, or any 
 acquittance, release or discharge for any debt, account, action, suit, de¬ 
 mand or other thing, real or personal, or any transfer or assurance of 
 money, stock, goods, chattels or other property whatever, or any letter of 
 
 «»Hurd, 1919, p. 991. 
 
42 
 
 attorney or other power to receive money, or to receive or transfer stock 
 or annuities, or to let, lease, dispose of, alien or convey any goods or 
 chattels, lands or tenements, or other estate, real or personal, or any ac¬ 
 ceptance or indorsement of any bill of exchange, promissory note, draft, or 
 order, or assignment of any bond, writing, obligatory, or promissory note 
 for money or other property, or any ticket or pass for the passage of any 
 person upon any railroad or other conveyance, or for the admission of any 
 person to any entertainment for which a consideration is required, or any 
 other written instrument of another, or purporting to be such, by which 
 any pecuniary demand or obligation, or any right in any property is, or 
 purports to be created, increased, conveyed, transferred, diminished or 
 destroyed; or shall counterfeit or forge the seal or hand-writing of another, 
 with intent to damage or defraud any person, body politic or corporate, 
 whether the said person, body politic or corporate reside in or belong to 
 this state or not; or shall utter, publish, pass or attempt to pass as true 
 and genuine, or cause to be uttered, published, passed, or attempted to be 
 passed as true and genuine, any of the above named false, altered, forged 
 or counterfeited matters, as above specified and described, knowing the 
 same to be false, altered, forged or counterfeited, with intent to prejudice, 
 damage or defraud any person, body politic or corporate, whether the said 
 person, body corporate or politic reside in this state or not; every person so 
 offending shall be deemed guilty of forgery, and shall be imprisoned in the 
 penitentiary not less than one year nor more than fourteen years.” ^ 
 
 The daiii’er in this kind of an enumeration is in the likeli¬ 
 hood of omitting’ matters which should be included. The omission 
 may be construed as a deliberate exclusion by the familiar rule of 
 construction, expressio unhis cst cxclusio alter ins. Thus, when the 
 constitution sa 3 ^s “the General Assembly may vest the corporate 
 authorities of cities, towns and villages with power to make local 
 improvements b}^ special assessments, or by special taxation of 
 contiguous property or otherwise,”- “by necessary implication, it 
 (the General Assembly) is inhibited from conferring that power 
 upon other municipal corporations or upon private corporations.”^ 
 However, the rule that the expression of one thing or one mode of 
 action in an enactment is an exclusion of all other things or modes 
 is merely a presumption to aid in determining the legislative in¬ 
 tent. In the words of the court, “the maxim . . . should never 
 be used to override a different purpose plainly indicated.”^ This 
 language was used with reference to a statute which empowered 
 cities to acquire land by “purchase, lease or gift” for certain pur¬ 
 poses. If the expressio limits rule were applied, acquisition of land 
 by any other means would be forbidden. But the court held that 
 it was not the intention of the legislature to restrict the power of 
 municipalities to the methods expressly mentioned. This suggests 
 to the bill-drafter that if an enumeration is used which is not 
 intended to be exclusive, that intent can be made clear b}'- words 
 to that effect. Article IX of the Constitution, furnishes an example 
 of a statement to the effect that an enumeration is not to be taken 
 as exclusive of objects not mentioned. Section 1 of that article 
 gives the General Assembh" power to tax “peddlers, auctioneers, 
 brokers, hawkers, merchants, commission merchants, showmen. 
 
 iHurd, 1919, p. 1012. 
 
 2 Constitution of 1870, Article IX, Section 9. 
 
 3 Updike v. Wright. 81 Ill. 49 (1876). 
 
 ■‘Helm V. City of Grayville, 224 Ill. 274 (1906). 
 
43 
 
 jugglers, inn-keepers, grocery-keepers, liquor-dealers, toll bridges, 
 ferries, insurance, telegraph and express interests or business, ven¬ 
 ders of patents and persons or corporations owning or using fran¬ 
 chises and privileges ...” Section 2 provides that “The specifica¬ 
 tion of the objects and subjects of taxation shall not deprive the 
 General Assembly of the power to require other subjects or ob¬ 
 jects to be taxed, in such manner as may be consistent with the 
 principles of taxation fixed in this Constitution.” 
 
 As a general rule, on account of the difficulty of making an 
 enumeration complete, words descriptive of a class are to be pre¬ 
 ferred to a list of the members of that class. On the other hand, 
 loose generalizations are to be avoided where complicated and 
 limited situations require a precise, exact definition. When a gen¬ 
 eral rule is laid down, all possible applications should be tested 
 to see whether their inclusion is desirable. Senate Bill No. 71 
 introduced in the Fifty-first General Assembly undertook to regu¬ 
 late the disposal of the bodies of dead animals. Section 1 provided 
 that 
 
 “After the first day of October, 1919, it shall be unlawful for any per¬ 
 son, firm, association or corporation to dispose of or attempt to dispose of 
 the body of any dead animal by burying, burning or cooking, without a 
 certificate of registration issued by the Department of Agriculture.” 
 
 The intention was to require the licensing of persons engaged 
 in the business of disposing of dead animals, but through inadvert¬ 
 ence the bill was worded so broadly that it included even a farmer 
 who desired to bury a dead horse. The bill, otherwise desirable, was . 
 tabled because the rule was too general. 
 
 Statutes.frequently contain an enumeration of particular persons 
 or things and follow this with a general term indicating a class or 
 group. Although the matter is not without difficulty in a great many 
 cases, this combination is to be avoided whenever the particular enum¬ 
 eration can be made complete or the general class can be definitely 
 and exactly defined. 
 
 The bill-drafter may employ in its full sense a general term and 
 precede it by particular words merely as examples, only to find that 
 the general phrase is limited and restricted by judicial construction, 
 to the kind or species of the specific words. This is the doctrine of 
 ejiisdent generis. Thus the term “provisions” construed broadly might 
 be held to include tobacco but it was held that when used in a statute 
 authorizing municipalities “to regulate the sale of meats, poultry, 
 fish, butter, cheese, lard, vegetables and all other provisions” it could 
 extend only to provisions of the same character as those specifically 
 enumerated and therefore meant only articles of food.® A civil 
 rights statute provided that all persons should “be entitled to the full 
 and equal enjoyment of the accomodations, advantages, facilities and 
 privileges of inns, restaurants, eating-houses, barber shops, public con¬ 
 veyances on land and water, theaters, and all other places of public 
 accommodation and amusement.” The general words were held not to 
 include a drug store.® The expression “ counterfeit or spurious coin, 
 
 ° Gundling v. City of Chicago, 176 Ill. 340 (1898). 
 
 a Cecil V. Green. 161 Ill. 265 (1896). 
 
44 
 
 forged bank notes or other forged instruments” was held not to in¬ 
 clude forged labels and trade-marks." 
 
 The rule of ejitsdem generis, however, is subject to exceptions 
 and qualifications which increase its danger to the unwary bill-drafter. 
 “This is only one of many rules of construction, all of which are to 
 be employed for the attainment of the same end, viz,, that of ascer¬ 
 taining the intention of the Legislature . . . where from the whole 
 instrument a larger intent may be gathered, the rule under considera¬ 
 tion will not be applied in such manner as to defeat such larger in¬ 
 tent.”® 
 
 The statute, defining burglary, used the words “any dwelling 
 house, kitchen, office, shop, storehouse, warehouse, malt-house, still¬ 
 ing-house, mill, pottery, factory, wharfboat, steamboat or other water 
 craft, freight or passenger railroad car, church, meeting house, school 
 house or other building.” The general term “other building” was 
 held to include a chicken house. There is no opportunity for an ap¬ 
 plication of the rule from this enumeration. “What building,” said 
 the court, “not a dwelling house, legally speaking, is of the same kind 
 as a dwelling house?” “If the particular words exhaust a whole 
 genus, the general words must refer to some larger class.Still 
 another qualification. “The ejusdem generis rule does not apply where 
 the specific words signify subjects greatly different from one another, 
 for here the general expression might very consistently add one more 
 variety; in such case, the general term, must receive its natural and 
 wide meaning.”^® So the bill-drafter,, relying on the application of 
 the ejusdem generis rule, may find his general term given a more in¬ 
 clusive meaning than intended. 
 
 Unfortunately, it is not always possible to avoid the use of a 
 combination of specific words and a general term. It may be impossi¬ 
 ble to make the enumeration compete; a general rule may be difficult 
 to express exactly and precisely. In 1903, the General Assembly 
 passed a law requiring mine owners and operators to provide mines 
 with wash-rooms.“ The Supreme Court held the act to be class 
 legislation and therefore unconstitutional. The court agreed that the 
 miner becomes “covered with grease, smoke, dust, grime and perspira¬ 
 tion ; that without an opportunity to bathe and change his attire, he 
 cannot clothe himself comfortably for his journey through cold 
 weather to his home; that these adverse conditions inevitably lead 
 to colds, consumption, pneumonia and general unhealthfulness ...” 
 But “many men in this state are employed in the foundaries and steel 
 mills who work in a higher temperature than do the miners, sur¬ 
 rounded by conditions deleterious to health and inimical to longev- 
 
 ity.”^2 
 
 As a result of this opinion an act was passed by the General As¬ 
 sembly in 1913 which made the duty of providing wash-rooms ap- 
 
 ^ White V. Wagar, 185 Ill. 195 (1900). 
 
 * Webber v. Oitv of Chicago. 148 Ill. 313 (1894). 
 
 9 Gillock V. People, 171 Ill. 307 (1898). 
 
 McReynolds v. People, 230 Ill. 623 (1907). 4 
 
 ” Laws 1903, p. 252. 
 
 ’^Starne v. People, 222 Ill. 189 (1906). 
 
46 
 
 plicable to “every owner or operator of a coal mine, steel mill, foundry, 
 machine shop, or other like business in which employees become cov¬ 
 ered with grease, smoke, dust, grime and perspiration to such extent 
 that to remain in such condition after leaving their work without 
 washing and cleansing their bodies and changing their clothing, will 
 endanger their health or make their condition offensive to the public.” 
 
 The dilemma of the bill drafter is obvious. No enumeration 
 could be made of the occupations sharing the evil this legislation was 
 designed to relieve; the general classihcation is uncertain and indefi¬ 
 nite because it merely states that the act shall apply to all business 
 where the health and comfort of the pubic require the law. The re¬ 
 sult,—a specific mention of the main occupations it was designed to 
 affect, together with a general reference, following the wording of 
 the court’s opinion, to other employments where the same conditions 
 prevail,—is not a satisfactory piece of bill-drafting. 
 
 But the court held that the ejiisdcm generis rule had no applica¬ 
 tion since the obvious intent was to meet the constitutional objection 
 to the earlier statute by adding the general term to include other oc¬ 
 cupations which needed the same sanitary regulations.^^ 
 
 Where a combination of specific terms and general words is 
 unavoidable, the only way to avoid the possibility of a restricted con¬ 
 struction of the general phrase, is to show by express words that 
 its generality is not to be limited or aff'ected by the preceding specific 
 enumeration. For example, in the “wash-room” act above discussed 
 there could have been no doubt of the proper construction to be placed 
 on the general phrase if the General Assembly had added: “The term 
 ‘other like business’ is not to be confined or restricted to the specific 
 businesses mentioned but includes all businesses of the character 
 described.” 
 
 Indefinite and uncertain standards: As has already been 
 said, simplicity is a cardinal virtue in drafting legislation. Popular 
 words with well understood meanings are to be preferred to ab¬ 
 struse terms. However in the desire for simplicity, preciseness 
 must not be sacrificed. Statutes must necessarily treat of technical 
 matters and in the various fields of human endeavor recourse must 
 be had to technical terms which have limited significations in their 
 own plane. In a statute regulating mining we may expect to find 
 a provision unintelligible to persons unacquainted with that in¬ 
 dustry such as the following: 
 
 “Every mine inspector in the regular inspection of mines shall measure 
 with an anemometer and determine the amount of air passing in the last 
 cross-cut in each pair of entries in pillar and room mines, or in the last 
 room of each division in long-wall mines. 
 
 The Practice Act was intended not for the general public but 
 for the use of the members of one profession. Consequently, it 
 is not necessary, even if it were possible, to avoid words like 
 
 People V. Solomon, 265 Ill. 28 (1914). 
 i^Hurd, 1919, p. 1972. 
 
46 
 
 habeas corpus, certiorari and the like, or to render intelligible to the 
 
 general public a provision like this: 
 
 “It shall not be necessary, in any pleading, to make profert of the in¬ 
 strument alleged; but in any action or defense upon an instrument in 
 writing, whether under seal or not, if the same is not lost or destroyed, 
 the opposite party may have oyer thereof and proceed thereon in the same 
 manner as if profert had been properly made according to the common 
 law.” “ 
 
 In statutes concerning the public generally the courts will, if 
 at all possible, give to words their usual and popular meaning.^® 
 Ordinary words should, therefore, be used in their most general 
 sense. For instance “laborer” in one sense means anyone who 
 works with his hands. That may be called a technical definition. 
 Its popular signification is an ordinary laborer or day workman. 
 The court has consequently held that when used in the Civil Ser¬ 
 vice Law it did not include a skilled artisan like a carpenter.^' 
 
 Of course, this is not an invariable rule of construction. In 
 seeking to give effect to what is deemed to be the legislative intent, 
 not only may a less general meaning be given a word but the 
 court may recognize an incorrect use of a word and let it convey 
 a meaning which it does not properly bear. Thus the Appellate 
 Court has said; “Numerous cases indicate that there has been 
 a tendency in the profession to confound the two words ‘cost’ 
 and ‘fees.’ In the ordinary sense, ‘costs are an allowance to a 
 party for expenses incurred in conducting his suit; fees are com¬ 
 pensation to an officer for services rendered in the progress of the 
 case.’ 
 
 V\diile the general rule is that words will be given their “com¬ 
 mon and popular acceptation and import,” when technical words 
 arc used in a statute the court will presume that they have been 
 used by the legislature in their technical sense.This is particu¬ 
 larly important in connection with the use of words which have 
 acquired a well-understood legal signification. Thus “actions of 
 account” is a technical term indicating a form of action and is not 
 equivalent to “actions on accounts.”^® In construing a statute 
 which used the expression “plead set-off to the action”, the court 
 says, “words of known legal import are to he considered as having 
 been used by the legislature in that known sense, or according to 
 their strict acceptation, unless there appears a manifest intention 
 to use them in their common or popular sense.“Crime” by 
 common usage is S 3 monymous with “felony,” the Supreme Court 
 has said but its legal signification and the one which the court will 
 give it in statutes is broader and comprehends all offenses against 
 the public."^ The word “family” when used in statutes has been 
 
 1'^ Hui’d, 1919, p. 2282. 
 
 i^Crozer v. People, 206 Ill. 464 (1904); Culver v. Waters, 248 Ill. 163 (1911); 
 Rufla v. Industrial Board, 283 Ill. 550 (1918); Fowler v. Johnston City Coal Co., 
 292 Ill.’ 440 (1920). 
 
 People 
 Galpin 
 ’9 Bedell 
 •-’« Bedell 
 S'teere 
 
 v 
 
 V 
 
 V 
 w 
 
 v. 
 
 Board of Trustees, 283 Ill. 494 (1918). 
 
 City of Chicago, 159 Ill. App. 135 at 166 (1910). 
 Jannev, 4 Gilman (Ill.), 193 at 206 (1847). 
 
 .Tnnnev,* 4 Gilman (Ill.), 193 at 206 (1847). 
 Brownell. 124 Ill.‘ 27 (1888). 
 
 -2 Van Meter v. People, 60 Ill. 168 (1871). 
 
47 
 
 ^iven a variety of meanings but not the popular one of parents 
 with the children without regard to residence. Unless the context 
 clearly indicates a different intent, the words “heir”, “convey 
 “person” and “action” convey a limited meaning rather than the 
 popular understanding. 
 
 A great many common words are descriptive of a quality with¬ 
 out defining its limits or fixing a precise standard. Terms like 
 “due,” “proper”, “dangerous,” “sufficient,” “extreme,” “excessive,” 
 “necessary,” “immediate,” “forthwith” do not convey an exact im¬ 
 pression but make an appeal to the judgment. Statutes should be 
 precise and certain, laying down a definite rule of conduct. Words, 
 therefore, which express a quality which may be more or less, should, 
 so far as possible, be avoided in statutory language. It is not in¬ 
 tended to suggest that this is always possible. The law relating 
 to private wrongs is built about such terms as “reasonable care,” 
 “proximate cause” and “contributory negligence” and no amount 
 of judicial definition or application to varying situations has served 
 to make them convey more than an approximate impression. Fre¬ 
 quently municipalities have prohibited the emission of “dense 
 smoke.” Obviously the adjective “dense” does not clearly define 
 the offense nor apprize the public how much smoke may be set 
 at large without constituting a violation. A criminal statute which 
 does not inform a person whether or not his act infringes the 
 law is, to say the least, unfortunate. Such an ordinance of the 
 city of Chicago was sustained against the objection of indefinite¬ 
 ness by the Supreme Court. The difficulty of giving a more 
 precise definition is well illustrated by the court’s attempt to tell 
 what “dense smoke” means. “The terms used will be understood 
 as commonly employed, and this court will understand by ‘dense 
 smoke,’ precisely what everybody else does that has ever seen 
 a volume of dark, dense smoke as it comes from the smoke-stack 
 or chimney where common soft or bituminous coal is used for 
 fuel in any considerable quantities.” 
 
 “In order to constitute a crime, the act must be one which 
 the party is able to know in advance whether it is criminal or not. 
 The criminality of an act cannot depend upon whether a jury 
 may think it reasonable or unreasonable. There must be some 
 definiteness and certainty.”"^ Two statutes of the state of Texas 
 both held void furnish examples of the use of indefinite and uncer¬ 
 tain terms. One prohibited labelling certain feed stuff v/ith a per¬ 
 centage that varied “substantially” from the actual contents. “Evi¬ 
 dently,” the court said, “different persons might differ as to what 
 would be ‘substantially’ such larger percentage. The other 
 statute prohibited the operation of motor vehicles ‘v.diose front 
 lamps shall project forward a light of such glare and brilliancy as 
 to seriously interfere with the sight of, or temporarily blind the vision 
 of, the driver of a vehicle approaching from an opposite direction.” 
 
 23 See Rock v. Haas, 110 Ill. 528 (1884). 
 
 24 Harmon v. City of Chicago, 110 Ill. 400 (1884). 
 25Tozer V. U. S. -(C. C.) 52 Fed. 917 (1892). 
 20Cogdell V. State, 193 S. W. 675 (1917), 
 
48 
 
 • 
 
 In the opinion the court uses this language: “AA^hat degree of in¬ 
 terference is serious is a matter not fixed by the Legislature; the 
 glare and brilliancy are not described by any standard that is cer¬ 
 tain, that may be known in advance by the citizen; nor is there by 
 the Legislature any rule fixed for deciding at what point they reach 
 the prohibited degree of brilliancy.”"^ 
 
 An Indiana Statute prohibited the hauling ‘‘over an^^ turn¬ 
 pikes or gravel roads at any time when the same is thawing 
 through, or is by reason of wet weather in condition to be cut up 
 and injured by heavy hauling, a load on a narrow-tired wagon 
 of more than twenty hundred pounds, or on a broad-tired wagon of 
 more than twenty-five hundred pounds.” The court in holding the 
 statute void, said: 
 
 “There must be some certain standard by which to determine 
 whether an act is a crime or not; otherwise, cases in all respects 
 similar, tried before different juries, might rightly be decided dif¬ 
 ferently . . . because of the difference of conclusions of different 
 judges and juries based upon their individual views of what should 
 be the standard of comparison of tires, derived from their varying 
 experiences, or the opinions of witnesses as to what difference 
 of width of tires would constitute one Avagon a narrow-tired wagon 
 and another a broad-tired wagon. The words ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ 
 describe, not certain, but uncertain, comparative Avidths, and, no 
 standard of comparison being proAuded by the laAAg the}" render 
 the phrases in Avhich they occur uncertain and indefinite.”"* 
 
 Almost as properly could objection haA"e been made to the 
 description of another essential element of the crime—the condi¬ 
 tion of the roads. AMiether they are “thaAving through or . . . 
 
 in condition to be cut up and injured by heaAW hauling” might AA'ell 
 be a matter upon Avhich indiAudual opinion AA"ould be at variance. 
 
 States regulating the use of motor A^ehicles have in a number 
 of instances prohibited their operation “at a speed greater than is 
 reasonable and proper.” This AA"as held A"oid for indefiniteness bA" 
 the courts of Georgia^® and Texas.**’ In Ohio*’ and Nebraska** 
 similar proAusions AA"ere sustained. The Illinois laAA" on this sub¬ 
 ject makes unlaAvful the driAung of a motor vehicle, 
 
 “At a speed greater than is reasonable and proper ha">ring regard to 
 the traffic and the use of the way or so as to endanger the life or limb or 
 injure the property of any person. If the rate of speed of any motor vehicle or 
 motor bicycle operated upon any public highway in this State where the 
 same passes through the closely built-up business portions of any incor¬ 
 porated city, town or village exceeds ten (10) miles an hour or if the rate 
 of speed of any motor vehicle or motor bicycle operated on any public 
 highway in this State where the same passes through the residence por¬ 
 tions of any incorporated city, town or village exceeds fifteen (15) miles 
 an hour or if the rate of speed of any motor vehicle or motor bicycle op¬ 
 erated on any public highway in this State outside the closely built-up 
 business portions and the residence portions within any incorporated city. 
 
 27 Griffin v. State, 218 S. W". 494 (1920). 
 
 2* Cook V. State. 26 Ind. Aon. 278 (1901 ). 
 
 2» S'trickland v. Whatley. 142 Ga. 802 (1914). 
 
 Solan and Billings v. Pasche. 153 S. W. 672 (1913). 
 
 31 State V. Schaeffer. 96 Ohio St. 215 (1917). 
 
 32 Schultz V. State. 89 Neb. 34 (1911). 
 
49 
 
 town or village exceeds twenty (20) miles an hour or upon any public high¬ 
 way outside of the limits of an incorporated city, town or village if the rate 
 of speed exceeds twenty-five (25) miles per hour, such rates of speed shall 
 be prima facie evidence that the person operating such motor vehicle or 
 motor bicycle is running at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and 
 proper having regard to the traffic and use of the way or so as to endanger 
 the life or limb or injure the property of any person.” 
 
 The Supreme Court in sustaining this provision, says: “There 
 can be no question that counsel for plaintiff in error is right in 
 arguing that in creating an offense by a statute which was not a 
 crime at common law such statute must be sufficiently certain to 
 show what the legislature intended to prohibit and punish, other¬ 
 wise it will be void for uncertainty. 
 
 If the law is of such doubtful construction and describes the 
 act denominated as a crime in terms so general and indeterminate 
 as to make the question of criminality dependent upon the opinions 
 of the individuals who may happen to constitute the court and 
 jury, and of such a nature that honest and intelligent men are 
 unable to ascertain what particular act is condemned by the State, 
 the law is incapable of enforcement and will be held to be null and 
 void. The dividing line between what is lawful and what is unlaw¬ 
 ful can not be left to conjecture. This law, however, the constitution¬ 
 ality of which is questioned, does not leave to conjecture when the 
 statute is violated. If the only provision of section 10 were its first 
 sentence there might be some merit in the argument of counsel that the 
 construction of the statute is subject to conjecture. The section further 
 provides the exact speed, which if exceeded in various classifica¬ 
 tions of localities shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of 
 the law . . 
 
 It is obvious that the same standard of preciseness is not pos¬ 
 sible in all statutes. As an example of the kind of thing which 
 can not be stated in terms mathematically exact, consider the pro¬ 
 vision in the Criminal Code relating to self-defense. 
 
 “If a person kill another in self-defense, it must appear that the danger 
 was so urgent and pressing that in order to save his own life, or to prevent 
 his receiving great bodily harm, the killing of the other was absolutely 
 necessary; and it must appear also, that the person killed was the assailant, 
 or that the slayer had really, and in good faith, endeavored to decline any 
 further struggle before the mortal blow was given.” 
 
 The question then in this, as in all statutes, is not whether the 
 rule of conduct is stated with a certain degree of preciseness, but 
 rather whether the rule is stated as definitely as possible in the 
 particular case. 
 
 The defect of indefiniteness may render unenforecable any 
 type of legislative enactment but the courts have been more ready 
 to declare void statutes with penal provisions because of the general 
 rule that such statutes should be strictly construed. But from 
 the standpoint of careful bill-drafting, persons upon whom laws 
 operate are entitled to know clearly and definitely their civil rights 
 as well as criminal. The instances cited have all been criminal stat¬ 
 utes which have been declared void but whether or not a law can 
 
 People v. Beak, 291 Ill. 449 (1920). 
 ^ Hurd, 1919, p. 1024. 
 
50 
 
 survive a judicial inspection is not a proper standard for the bill- 
 drafter. That a statute has survived the constitutional objection 
 of indefiniteness means merely that it has satisfied the minimum 
 requirement for legislative enactments. The efforts of the bill- 
 drafter should be toward expressing legislation so lucidly that the 
 objection of uncertainty cannot even be raised. 
 
 Attention should be called to one type of legislation which 
 may be said to form an exception to the principle of preciseness. 
 The extension of governmental supervision over the businesses and 
 activities of individuals has enormously increased the amount of 
 regulatory provisions. In fact, so bulky and detailed has this regu¬ 
 lation become that a large part of it has been handed over to ad¬ 
 ministrative officials and boards. Section I of Article IV of the 
 constitution vests the legislative power in the General Assembly. 
 This has been construed to mean that the General Assembly cannot 
 divest itself of this power bv conferring it elsewhere.^® But as 
 was said in an early decision in this state: “While the leg¬ 
 islature may not divest itself of its proper functions, or 
 
 delegate its general legislative authority, it may still author¬ 
 ize others to do those things which it might properly, yet 
 
 can not understandingly or advantageously do itself.”^® It is not 
 a delegation of legislative power, within the meaning of this pro¬ 
 hibition, so long as the act determines the policy of the law and 
 prescribes a method for its application, and is final and complete 
 in all its terms and conditions. 
 
 People V. Board of Election Commissioners, 221 Ill. 9 (1906); Rouse v. 
 Thompson. 228 Ill 522 (1907). 
 
 33 People V. Reynolds. 5 Gilman (Ill.) 1 (1848). 
 
 3" There are two distinct but related constitutional questions involved in 
 legislation of this character. 
 
 1. Does the act attempt to delegate legislative power? 
 
 2. Does it permit a power delegated to be exercised arbitrarily by the 
 
 administrative agency? 
 
 The primary election law of 1905 authorized the county central commit¬ 
 tee of each political party to determine whether candidates for county offices 
 should be nominated by a majority or plurality vote. This was held to be an at¬ 
 tempted delegation of the legislative function. (People v. Board of Election Com¬ 
 missioners. 221 Ill. 9.) The determination of this matter is one of the sub¬ 
 stantial features of election to office and must be determined by the General 
 Assembly. On the other hand, the provisions of a gas safety appliance act 
 exempted from the act. buildings receiving less than a certain volume of gas 
 “unless the conditions under which the gas is used are such as to endanger 
 life or property . . . then in all such cases, at the discretion of said duly 
 
 authorized officer or officers, all such buildings may be required to be equipped 
 as provided for herein.” Enlike the provision in the primary law above stated, 
 this is the kind of a. duty which might properly be performed by a public 
 official. The objection is to the method by which the power is conferred. It 
 would be unobjectionable to permit such an official to exercise his discretion 
 whether in a particular instance, conditions require safety appliances when 
 measured hy some fixed standard. But no fixed rules laid down by the act 
 or required to be formulated, limit in any way the arbitrary power here at¬ 
 tempted to be conferred, and the measure was held unconstitutional. (Sheldon 
 V. Hoyne, 261 Ill. 222.) 
 
 It mav be said. then, that an act to be valid must determine the sub¬ 
 stantial features and lay down a policy as to those matters which the Gen¬ 
 eral Assembly must determine. That having been done, the application of 
 that policy may be vested in agencies if the act either itself lays down regula¬ 
 tions which govern equally its application in all cases or requires the agency 
 to adopt rules establishing a standard. (See. also. People v. Kane. 288 Ill. 235: 
 Kenyon v. Moore. 287 Ill. 2,33: Board of Administration v. Miles. 278 Ill. 174.) 
 
 It is apparent that the constitutional question is one of substance rather 
 than phraseology. The policy adopted as the legislative will may necessarily 
 be expressed in general and indefinite terms. On the other hand, an act rnay 
 be unconstitutional which uses very certain and explicit language in attempting 
 to confer a power which must be exercised by the General Assembly alone. 
 (See Constitution of Illinois. Annotated, pp. 28, 75.) 
 
51 
 
 That is, a statute may lay down general standards or prin¬ 
 ciples which constitute the law and delegate to an agency the 
 application of these principles in particular cases. 
 
 Provisions of this character necessarily are couched in flexible 
 and general terms. Rigid expressions do not afiford opportunity for 
 the exercise of discretion by those applying the law. Thus the 
 Public Utilities law^® which vests in a commission general super¬ 
 vision and ratemaking power as to public utilities provides: 
 
 “All rates or other charges made, demanded or received by any public 
 utility or by any two or more public utilities, for any product or commod¬ 
 ity furnished or to be furnished or for any service rendered or to be 
 rendered shall be just and reasonable . . . 
 
 Every public utility shall furnish, provide and maintain such service, 
 instrumentalities, equipment and facilities as shall promote the safety, 
 health, comfort and convenience of its patrons, employes, and the public, 
 and as shall be in all respects adequate, efficient, just and reasonable.” 
 
 It is apparent from the instances cited that some actions lend 
 themselves to precise definition more readily than others. As was 
 said by the Ohio court in sustaining the general and comprehen¬ 
 sive terms employed in the automobile speed law; “Absolute or 
 mathematical certainty is not required in the framing of a statute. 
 Reasonable certainty of the nature and cause of the ofifense is all 
 that is required. Some oflfenses admit of much greater precision 
 and definiteness than others, but it is quite obvious that in the 
 case at bar the statute must be sufficiently elastic and adapted 
 to meet all the dangerous situations presented, in order to ade¬ 
 quately safeguard the traveling public.”^® Take the distinction be¬ 
 tween murder and manslaughter. No amount of statutory defini¬ 
 tion can draw the line so clearly but that one jury might view as 
 murder a homicide which another jury would call manslaughter. 
 The abstract idea only is expressed by the definition in the Crimi¬ 
 nal Code. By the individual jury’s conception of that abstract idea 
 must be measured each homicide. The statement, “In cases of 
 voluntary manslaughter, there must be a serious and highly pro¬ 
 voking injury inflicted upon the person killing, sufficient to excite 
 an irresistible passion in a reasonable person” is most general in 
 character and lays down no hard and fast rule. On the other 
 hand, a statute relating to intoxicating liquor can easily draw a 
 sharp line between what liquor falls within and what without its 
 purview. The wartime prohibition act used only the words “no 
 beer, wine, or other intoxicating malt or vinous liquor” and as a 
 result the sale of beer containing 2.75 per cent, alcohol became a 
 crime in some localities but remained lawful in others. Had Fed¬ 
 eral legislation remained the same, judicial interpretation in time 
 would probably have supplied the legislative omission and fixed the 
 per cent, of alcohol which made a liquor intoxicating. In fact, 
 the Volstead act which came later, defined intoxicating liquor as 
 containing more than one-half of one per cent. The Indiana stat¬ 
 ute relating to hauling on roads, (stated above) illustrates the kind 
 of definition which can be made exact and also the kind which 
 
 38 Hurd,1919, p. 2336. 
 
 State V. Schaeffer, 96 Ohio St. 215 (1917). 
 
52 
 
 can only be stated generally. The width of “narrow tires” and 
 “broad tires” can be fixed by inches and no uncertainty remains. 
 The degree of softness of a road for hauling purposes cannot be 
 so easily defined. It should, however, be the aim of the bill-drafter 
 to make mathematically precise that which can be so made and in 
 all cases to lay down in laws as definite a standard as possible 
 for the guidance of courts and of the public. 
 
 A statute is passed as a whole and not as disconnected sections 
 and each part must be construed with reference to every other part 
 or section. Consequently when a word or phrase, is used more than 
 once in a statute a presumption arises that it bears the same mean¬ 
 ing throughout. This presumption will govern the construction un¬ 
 less a contrary intention is evident. From this rule of construction 
 two suggestions for drafting can be drawn: 
 
 1. The same word should not be employed to convey differ¬ 
 
 ent meanings; 
 
 2. Different words should not be used to convey the same 
 
 meaning. 
 
 In the Illinois statute relating to divorce the word “marriage” 
 occurs with two distinct meanings. Properly employed, it should 
 signify the entering into a legal marital relation. In the following 
 section it also has the meaning of a performance of an illegal 
 marriage ceremony. 
 
 “Sec. 3. No divorce shall, in anywise, affect the legitimacy of the 
 children of such marriage, except in cases where the marriage is declared 
 void on the grounds of a prior marriage . . 
 
 There is no ambiguity, however, nor need for judicial inter¬ 
 pretation in this case because the intent to use “marriage” in two 
 senses is obvious. But in Section I of Article V of the Cities and 
 Villages Act relating to the powers of the City Council there is a 
 somewhat ambiguous use of the word “regulate.” 
 
 Four clauses make use of this word. 
 
 95th “To tax, license and regulate secondhand and junk stores.” 
 
 50th “To regulate the sale of meats . . . and to provide for place and 
 manner of selling the same.” 
 
 81st “To direct the location and regulate the management and con¬ 
 struction of packing houses ...” 
 
 82nd “To direct the location and regulate the use and construction of 
 breweries ...” 
 
 It was contended that the word “regulate” as used in the 95th 
 clause conferred the power to prohibit within certain localities less 
 than the entire territory of the city. But the court held that in the 
 last three clauses cited, in as much as the power to fix the location 
 was conferred by additional language, the General Assembly in those 
 clauses did not regard the power to regulate as including the power 
 to fix the location and “where a word is so used in several clauses 
 as to have a clearly defined meaning, the same word, when used in an¬ 
 other clause, will be given the same meaning, in the absence of any¬ 
 thing in the context to indicate that the legislature intended it to 
 have a different meaning.”^^ In other words, the meaning of “regu- 
 
 4«Hurcl, 1919, p. 1119. 
 
 « People V. Busse, 240 Ill. 33S (1909). 
 
53 
 
 late” is determined by the context in three clauses, and that same 
 meaning will be presumed to have been intended when used elsewhere. 
 Of course if it was intended that “regulate” should have the more 
 comprehensive meaning in connection with junk stores, that intent 
 fails by reason of a non-observance of the rule suggested. 
 
 In an Appellate court decision which construes the word “pun¬ 
 ishment,” reference is made to the use of the same word in other 
 acts collected in the Criminal Code. The court says “where such word 
 appears several times in the same chapter of the statute and the sense 
 in which it is used clearly appears in some sections, that may mater¬ 
 ially aid in determining the sense in which it is used in other section.s 
 of the same chapter.Apparently, then, not only should a word 
 be used uniformly to express the same meaning throughout a bill, but 
 care should be observed to make its use harmonize with other related 
 acts which might be looked to by the courts as affording aid in con¬ 
 struing it. 
 
 The use of “may” and “shall” in imposing duties and vesting 
 discretion: The function of the predicate in a statutory sentence 
 is to confer rights and impose duties. Two distinct questions are in¬ 
 volved in the predicate. 1. Does it command .or merely permit? 
 Statutes frequently prescribe the performance of certain acts by pub¬ 
 lic officials or individuals without stating the consequences of non- 
 compliance. 2. If it is a command, then what effect will failure to 
 comply exactly, have on rights or proceedings based on the statute? 
 For convenience, a somewhat arbitrary nomenclature is adopted to 
 classify statutes in these regards. If a statute directs (or prohibits) 
 the doing of a certain thing, it is IMPERATIVE; if, however, it 
 imposes a discretion or grants permission, it is PERMISSIVE. If 
 exact performance as prescribed by a statute is essential to the validity 
 of proceedings thereunder, the statute is ^MANDATORY; if, on the 
 other hand, performance may be varied or omitted entirely, the en¬ 
 actment is DIRECTORY. 
 
 The construction of a statute may involve one or the other of these 
 two questions or both. It should be remarked that the fact that there are 
 two distinct questions is not always recognized by courts and text 
 writers. Consequently, the terms employed have been used with 
 varying meanings. Thus, the court in construing a statute which 
 provided that commissioners shall return an assessment roll within 
 forty days of their appointment, discusses whether the provision is 
 “imperative or permissive or directory.The act is clear, in that it 
 directs the manner of a certain procedure. No discretion is vested by 
 it to perform or not to perform. The question is whether if per¬ 
 formance is not had as directed, what effect will the variance have on 
 the legality of the assessment. 
 
 Gunning- v. People, 80 111. App. 174 (1899). 
 Wheeler v. City of Chicago, 24 Ill. 105 (1800). 
 
54 
 
 Imperative and permissive provisions: Nearly all the Illinois 
 statutes in which these points have been considered by the court 
 have used the auxilliaries “may” or “shall'’. Frequently, however, 
 the courts in other jurisdictions have construed equivalent phrases 
 such as “is authorized and empowered,” or “is the duty,” etc. 
 
 The usual and grammatical sense of “may” is to grant per¬ 
 mission and “shall” (except where expressing futurity) implies a 
 command. “i\Iay” and “shall” when used in statutes will be given 
 these meanings by the court unless a legislative intent appears other¬ 
 wise. Thus “may” has been held to be permissive in a statute, one 
 section of which provided for criminal prosecution and another that 
 “the fines hereinbefore provided for may be recovered in an action 
 of debt.”^'* “Any person having filed a claim for lien, may bring a 
 suit at once (before maturity) to enforce the same” was held to 
 give an option as to time of filing suit.'^'^ The following provision 
 was held merely to vest permission in the court; “the court may, at 
 the request of either party, require the jury to render a special ver¬ 
 dict upon any fact or facts at issue. 
 
 But the fact that “may” is used is not conclusive that mere per¬ 
 mission was intended to be granted. “The language of the section is 
 permissive in form, but the form of expression in that respect does 
 not determine the question of legislative intent. That form is fre¬ 
 quently used where it is plain that the General Assembly intended not 
 merely to grant permission but to establish a right. . . 
 
 No general rule can be laid down to determine the effect of the 
 use of “may” in all cases. It wdll be construed to further the intent 
 and purpose of the enactment and this intent will be gathered from a 
 consideration of the act as a whole and, sometimes, from extraneous 
 circumstances. The words of an English court aptly phrase the rule. 
 “The words ‘it shall be lawful’ confer a faculty or power, and the}' 
 do not of themselves do more than confer a faculty or power. But 
 there may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be 
 done, something in the object for which it is to be done, something 
 in the conditions under which it is to be done, something in the title 
 of the person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be exer¬ 
 cised, which may couple the power with a duty, and make it the 
 duty of the person in whom the power is reposed to exercise that 
 power when called on to do so.”^® Perhaps a slightly more definite 
 statement can be made as to the class of provisions which are liable 
 to be construed as imperative. Generally the power (which may be 
 construed to be a duty) is vested in a public official, and equities of 
 the public or of individuals are associated with the exercise of the 
 power. The court has held imperative a statute permitting highway 
 commissioners to reduce the width of roads on petition,^^ and to re¬ 
 move obstructions from roads,and a statute which authorized an 
 
 ^ C. W. & V. Coal Co. V. People, 114 Ill. App. 75 (1904). 
 
 Dawson v. Black. 148 Ill. 484 (1893). 
 
 ““Kane v. Footh, 70 Ill. 587 (1873). 
 
 People V. Commissioners of Highways, 270 Ill. 141 (1915). 
 
 Blackwell’s case, 1 Vern. 152 (1683). 
 
 People V. Commissioners of Highways, 270 111. 141 (1915). 
 
 ''O Brokaw v. Commissioners of Highways, 130 Ill. 482 (1889). 
 
55 
 
 ordinance to require all owners of lots along a proposed sidewalk to 
 construct within thirty days/"^^ In the last case cited, the court says: 
 “ ‘May’ means ‘shall’ or ‘must’ whenever the rights of the public or of 
 third persons depend upon the exercise of the power to perform the 
 duty to which it refers; and such is its meaning in all cases where 
 the public duty is imposed upon public officers and the public or third 
 persons have a claim de jure that the power shall be exercised. 
 Whenever a statute directs the doing of a thing for the sake of justice 
 or the public good, the word ‘may’ will be read ‘shall.’ ” 
 
 But the two elements found in the cases cited, power vested 
 in an official and equities of the public, are not controlling. A stat¬ 
 ute providing that “upon the filing of such affidavit, the court mav 
 continue such suit,” was held imperative.Another which said 
 “the court may, at the request of either party, require the jurv to 
 render a special verdict upon any fact or facts at issue,” was held 
 merely to vest a permission or discretion with the court.In each 
 case the power is vested in the same official and its exercise afifects 
 a litigant in court. All that distinguishes the two statutes is the 
 nature of the act to be performed. In the one case the court views 
 a continuance as a matter of right to parties litigant if thev 
 comply with the conditions laid down; in the other a special 
 verdict was deemed not to be a matter of right. 
 
 Another type of enactment is illustrated by the two following 
 provisions: “such appeal may be prayed for at any time within 20 
 days after the rendition of such judgment, order or decree;” “all 
 actions . . . against any county may be commenced and prosecuted 
 to final judgment and execution in the circuit court of the countv 
 against which the action is brought.” It is quite clear that the 
 
 permission granted is to pray an appeal or bring suit against a 
 
 countv. There is no command to exercise either of these rights. 
 “May” is used in its grammatical sense in that respect. But if it is 
 desired to exercise the power granted, then it must be exercised in 
 the manner prescribed. In other words, the statute i§ purelv per¬ 
 missive, with certain limitations on the permission granted. Al¬ 
 though these are not in fact cases of construing “may” as “shall” 
 the court has so discussed them.^^ 
 
 “Shall” like “may” in statutory language is ordinarily 
 given its grammatical meaning. In a few cases, however, 
 
 it has been construed to be permissive instead of imperative. 
 Thus, the citv court act of 1901 provided that “appeals 
 
 shall be taken in the first instance from the judgments of justices 
 of the peace or police magistrates in the city to the city court.” 
 The act also contained a blanket repeal section. Section I of the 
 act provided for concurrent jurisdiction for city courts with cir¬ 
 cuit courts in appeals from justices of the peace in the city. To 
 hold that “shall” was mandatory and excluded appeals from justices 
 
 Pierson v. People. 204 Ill. 4.56 (1903). 
 
 Ohicapro Pub. Stock Px. v. McClaup’hry, 148 Ill. 372 (189 4). 
 
 53 Kane v. Footh. 70 Ill. 587 (1873). 
 
 5^ .Tames v. Pexter. 112 Ill. 489 (1884); Schuyler County v. Mercer County. 
 4 Gilman (Ill.) 20 (1847). 
 
56 
 
 of the peace in cities to the county courts and circuit courts, would, 
 in ef¥ect, repeal provisions regarding appeals in the County Court 
 Act and the Justice of the Peace and Constable Act and conflict 
 with section I of the statute under consideration. The situation 
 permitted only one construction—that “shall” was permissive and 
 should be read “may.”®^ Objection was made to a portion of a 
 drainage act on the ground that it required the jury to return a 
 verdict which “shall produce the total sum of the estimated cost 
 of the proposed work.” The validity of the section demanded that 
 “shall” be construed to be not imperative, but permissive. The act 
 is quite clear that the jur 3 "’s return is to be based on benefits and 
 that there was no intention to require an arbitrary finding based 
 on other facts. 
 
 Another statute had a provision, imperative in form, for the 
 removal of certain dams in the Illinois riA^er. From a consider¬ 
 ation of the purpose of the act and the history of canal construc¬ 
 tion by the state, the court arriA^es at the conclusion that the legis¬ 
 lature neA^er intended to command the remoA^al of the dams but 
 merely to authorize it if certain conditions rendered them useless. 
 “Where the rights of the public or of third persons are inA^oh^ed, 
 AA^ords in the statute importing permission or authority may be 
 read as mandatory and AA’ords imposing a command may be read 
 as permissiye.^ 
 
 Apparently there is no rule of construction suggested by these 
 cases other than that a court Avill disregard the form of the legal 
 predicate Avhen a contrarA" intent is eAudent from a consideration 
 of the AATole act or AAdiere it aa^ouM lead to an absurdity or AA^ork 
 an injustice. In the case of the statute regarding appeals from 
 justices of the peace, the construction adopted for the legal predi¬ 
 cate AA'as required to ,bring the proAUsion into harmonA^ not only 
 .Avith other acts but AAuth- other proAusions of the same act. A 
 dififerent decision as to the drainage statute AA’ould mean a jur^^ 
 Axrdict dictated b^^- principles not in accord AAuth the constitution 
 and our fundamental ideas of jury trial. In the third case cited, 
 concerning the Illinois riA^er dams, imperative language is changed 
 to permissiA^e because it is not to be thought that the General 
 Assembl 3 ^ intended to destro 3 ^ state property AATich had cost a mil¬ 
 lion dollars unless it had become useless. 
 
 To insure that a measure aaoII be giA^en the desired construc¬ 
 tion in this regard, it is necessary to make that intent very clear. 
 It is important to obserAX these precautions: 
 
 1. Emplo 3 ^ “shall” and “may” in their correct sense. NeA^er 
 use “shall” to grant permission or “ma 3 "” to impose a duty. 
 
 2. If it is desired to authorize but not to command and the 
 proAusion is of the kind AAdiere a court might think that the rights 
 of somebody or other are inAmh^ed and demand that the enactment 
 be mandatory, the Till-drafter must reenforce his intent Iia^ making 
 clear be3’^ond an3^ doubt b 3 ^ express AA^ords that the intent is to con- 
 
 Bover V. Onion, 108 Til. App. 612 (1902). 
 
 Spring Creek Di.st. v. E. .1. & E. Hy. Co., 249 Til. 260 (1911). 
 
 Canal Commissioners v. Sanitary Dist., 184 Til. 597 (1900). 
 
57 
 
 fer a discretion or grant permission. In the expression, “the direc¬ 
 tor may, in his discretion” the permissive “may” is strengthened 
 by the phrase “in his discretion.” Or a separate sentence may be 
 used to make the intent very clear. “The exercise of this power shall 
 be wholly within the discretion of the director.” 
 
 The cases reading “shall” as “may” in fact are without value 
 to a bill-drafter, since they represent merely a misuse of “shall” 
 which is corrected by judicial construction. It should not be neces¬ 
 sary for the court to rewrite legislation to correct faulty English. 
 
 Mandatory and directory provisions: Mandatory and direc¬ 
 tory provisions are both commands from the law-making body. In 
 both, a duty is imposed or the commission of an act is ordered. 
 The courts have sometimes discussed provisions deemed to be 
 directory as though they were mere grants of authority,^® whereas 
 they are in fact commands which by judicial construction may be 
 varied or even disregarded. A single instance will serve to illus¬ 
 trate. A statute provides: “One engineer shall be annually ap¬ 
 pointed by the mayor in the month of April subject to confirmation 
 by the alderman for a term ...” 
 
 It is quite clear that the legislative mandate is that the ap¬ 
 pointment be made by the persons named during the stated period. 
 But “the result of holding the statute directory is that the power of 
 appointment given to the mayor is to be exercised by him as and 
 when provided by the statute but that if for any reason an appoint¬ 
 ment is not made by him during the month of April as directed 
 but at some later time, it nevertheless will be a valid appointment.”®® 
 This is simply a recognition of the fact that statutory regu¬ 
 lation must frequently lay down fixed rules even as to trivial and 
 immaterial details. Consequently, the courts have said that as to 
 such matters, some latitude will be permitted, not because the 
 legislature did not intend its directions to be followed but rather 
 because the greater good will result from relaxing somewhat the 
 rigidity of statutory regulations. The court in an early' decision 
 in Illinois said: “B}'^ a directory statute is not to be understood 
 
 that no duty is imposed to do the act at the time specified, in the 
 absence of a satisfactor}^ reason for not -then doing it, but simply 
 that the act is valid if done afterwards.”®® 
 
 The question whether a provision orders or permits some ac¬ 
 tion involves a consideration of legislative intent; whether it is 
 mandatory or director}^ is generally a question of policy to be 
 applied by the court. Of course, the language employed may give 
 an indication as to the legislative view of the importance of a 
 provision and as such will be a consideration for the judicial con¬ 
 struction. 
 
 No universal rule can be stated to distinguish directory pro¬ 
 visions from mandatory. It is impossible to group all the various 
 
 Wheeler v. City of Chicago, 24 Ill. 105 (1860). 
 
 Rutter V. White, 90 N. E. 401 (Mass. 1910). 
 
 Webster v. French, 12 Ill. 301 (i850). 
 
58 
 
 provisions on different subjects which have been held to be either 
 the one or the other. In each case the court must look to the sub¬ 
 ject matter, consider the importance of the provision, its relation to 
 the general object to be secured by the act, and the consequence to 
 the rights of the public or individuals that may result from one 
 meaning rather than another. 
 
 This is not ordinarily a matter of importance to the bill-draft¬ 
 er. That a court may permit some variation in the minor regula¬ 
 tions he has laid down, is not his concern. Nor is it desirable gen- 
 erall}^ that the minor matters and immaterial details of statutory 
 enactments should be so firmly fixed as to be be^^ond judicial re¬ 
 laxation. Occasionally if it is desired to secure exact compliance 
 with a provision, suitable language can be employed to effect that 
 result. 
 
 Mandatory provisions not only contain a command but also 
 include a prohibition against varying the terms of the command. 
 If affirmative language is used to express the provision, the prohi¬ 
 bition exists only by implication. If that ])rohibition is expressed 
 by the use of negative language, the legislative intent that the 
 provision be mandatory is apparent beyond any doubt. The pro¬ 
 visions “the commissioners shall return the assessment roll within 
 forty days of their appointment,” is affirmative and as to the time 
 of the return was held director}'. If the words, “and not there¬ 
 after,” had been added, it would have been difficult for a court to 
 hold that a valid return could be made after the forty-day per¬ 
 iod. In passing on this provision, the court said: “There are no 
 negative words used, declaring that the functions of the commis¬ 
 sioners shall cease after the expiration of the forty days, or that 
 they shall not make their return after that time.”*^^ 
 
 It has been pointed out that the distinction between mandatory 
 and directory enactments arises from the difference in the results 
 of non-compliance. Therefore, if the consequence or penalty of 
 non-compliance is prescribed, the question as to whether the act 
 is mandatory or directory cannot arise. Thus, in the statute cited 
 above, if a statement follows to the effect that “if no return is 
 made within forty days, the assessment shall be void,” or “if no 
 return is made within forty days, the mayor shall appoint other 
 commissioners,” it becomes quite clear that the return within 
 forty days is made essential and cannot be waived. 
 
 Definitions, the Construction Statute and some miscellaneous 
 matters: Some mention has already been made of the utility of 
 definitions in statutes. Frequently it is desirable either to restrict or 
 qualify the general meaning of a word or. to extend that meaning so as 
 to make it more inclusive. Or a word may have a number of different 
 meanings, and it may be desired to have it understood in only one 
 sense.- Thus, “bedding” may be used in a geological sense; it is a term 
 used in the construction of buildings; it also means stable-litter for 
 
 Wheeler v. City of Chicago. 24 Ill. 105 (1860). 
 
59 
 
 animals to sleep upon. So when the word “bedding” is used in a 
 statute relating to furnishings for beds, it is desirable that it be de¬ 
 fined to exclude other meanings.®^ 
 
 Alany words in common use are not precise and definite in their 
 meanings. The words “knowledge” and “notice”, for example, con¬ 
 vey only a general idea without exact limits, and as in the Uniform 
 Partnership Act,*^^ definitions may be used to give to these words the 
 precise shade of meaning desired. Frequently, however, definitions 
 are used in a somewhat more arbitrary manner for the purpose of 
 including or excluding matter from the general meaning of a word. 
 For instance, “bedding” properly includes sheets, spreads and ])illow 
 cases, but the act, above mentioned, which regulates the manufacture 
 and sale of bedding, is intended to apply only to bedding which is 
 stuffed with a filling, such as mattresses, pillows, etc. By definition, 
 therefore, “bedding” is made to mean only that particular kind of 
 bedding. On the other hand, “highway” in common parlance means 
 roads or streets. In the Search and Seizure Act®^ its usual meaning 
 is expanded to include “water course, lake, aerial way, railroad, road, 
 alley, path or way which is open to the use of the public.” 
 
 When Repeated reference must be made to a number of things 
 or persons, it is sometimes possible, after an enumeration has once 
 been made, to make use of a generic term in place of repeating the 
 list each time. Sometimes a word can be arbitrarily employed as a 
 substitute for a number of specified terms or a variety of cases or 
 situations. “Noxious weeds” is used in this manner in an act rela-ting 
 to farm seeds.®® Care should be observed that the relationship be¬ 
 tween the term and the class it represents is definitely established. 
 This can be done by the use of a definition of the word or a statement 
 of the way it is employed. 
 
 A number of words in frequent use in statutes are defined in an 
 act relating to the construction of statutes.®® The meaning there given 
 these words is to be applied to them unless “inconsistent with the 
 manifest intent of the Legislature or repugnant to the context.” The 
 Construction Statute contains also rules of construction to be ob¬ 
 served in the construction of statutes now in force or enacted in the 
 future, unless a contrary intent is evident. Such an act is valuable 
 since it saves the repetition of definitions and rules of construction 
 which otherwise would be incorporated in many statutes. The Con¬ 
 struction Statute in Illinois is not as comprehensive as it might be 
 made. Such an act to be really servicable, must be complete and 
 contain all definitions of a general character in legislative enactments 
 and also the most general rules of construction. 
 
 Of course, the bill-drafter should be familiar with the provisions 
 of the Construction Statute and avoid the duplication, of its contents in 
 individual acts. This would seem so obvious as not to need mention 
 but some of the provisions of the Construction Statute are continually 
 
 «2Hurd, 1919, p. 1107. 
 
 '■'^Hurd, 1919, p. 2218. 
 
 •^Hurd, 1919, p. 1248. 
 
 «'"Hurd, 1919, p. 56. 
 
 Hurd, 1919, p, 2929, 
 
60 
 
 appearing in acts enacted by the General Assembly. The act regulat¬ 
 ing the manufacture and sale of bedding,®^ enacted in 1919 contains 
 the following provision: 
 
 “The word ‘person’ as used in this act shall be construed to import 
 the plural and the singular as the case demands and shall include corpo¬ 
 rations, companies, societies and associations.” 
 
 This provision is contained in language practically the same in 
 the third and fifth clauses of Section 1 of the Construction Statute. 
 The General Corporation Act,^® a carefully drafted measure, provides 
 in Section 156 that: 
 
 “The provisions of this act, so far as they are the same as those exist¬ 
 ing statutes, shall be construed as a continuation thereof, and not as a new 
 enactment ...” 
 
 Section 2 of the Construction Statute is: 
 
 “The provisions of any statute, so far as they are the same as those of 
 any prior statute, shall be construed as a continuation of such prior pro¬ 
 visions, and not as a new enactment.” 
 
 A provision similar to Section 4 of the Construction Statute, 
 saving all rights and claims accrued and penalties incurred under a 
 repealed act, appears frequently in amendatory acts and revisions. 
 To pad statutes with such superfluous provisions is a serious mistake. 
 If the Construction Statute is to serve any useful purpose, the rules 
 laid down there should not be incorporated in each individual measure. 
 
 While the statutes quoted offend in the matter of duplicating 
 the rules laid down in the Construction Statute, instances are not in¬ 
 frequent in which statutes wholly disregard these rules and use forms 
 which are made unnecessary. Even if it were not so provided in the 
 Construction Statute, it is a familiar rule of construction that words 
 importing the singular number may be applied to several persons 
 or things and words importing the plural number may include the 
 singular.'^® There is no excuse for the awkward combination of the 
 singular and plural forms of nouns and pronouns such as is found 
 in Section 9b of Division I of the Criminal Code ‘‘any person or 
 persons who shall,” . . . “marked with his, her or their name or 
 names,” etc. 
 
 The Construction Statute also provides that “words importing 
 the masculine gender may be applied to females.” The masculine 
 pronouns “he” and “his” should be used instead of the double form 
 “he or she,” “his or her.” Possibly an exception should be noted to 
 this rule that the masculine form comprehends the feminine. Where 
 a bill treats of matters which have been customarily connected with 
 males and it is desired to include both sexes, it is perhaps safer to 
 add a statement expressly providing that the masculine form is to 
 include the feminine. A Wisconsin statute regulating admission to 
 practice law was held to exclude women because of the use of the 
 
 e^iird, 1919, p. 1107. 
 
 csHiird, 1919, p. 722. 
 
 Oeneral Corporation Act, Section 156, Hurd, 1919, p. 748. 
 
 Perkin.s v. Bertrand, 192 Ill. 58 (1901); Arnold & Murdock Co. v. Industrial 
 Board. 277 Ill. 295 (1917). 
 
 Hurd, 1919, p. 972. 
 
61 
 
 masculine pronoun Of course, if a statute applies only to 
 
 females, it should use feminine pronouns. 
 
 The act regulating the practice of nursing^^ was designed to apply 
 to both sexes. As a matter of actual fact, there are practically no 
 registered male nurses. It was felt by those instrumental in the pas¬ 
 sage of the act that the masculine pronouns, in view of the fact that 
 practically all nurses were women, were undesirable. The feminine 
 forms could not be used because they were not construed to include 
 both sexes. Consequently, a combination of both genders seemed to 
 be the most satisfactory mode of expression. This is an exceptional 
 instance, and even here the correct method probably would have been 
 to employ the masculine forms. 
 
 The Construction Act, Section 1, Fifth Clause, says: 
 
 “The word ‘person’ as well as all words referring to or importing 
 persons, may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate as 
 
 well as individuals.” 
 
 0 
 
 This makes unnecessary the use of the awkward series “person, 
 firm, association or corporation,” which is so frequently found in 
 legislation.^^ 
 
 Brief mention may be made of a number of minor matters of 
 phraseology which tend to simplify and make legislative language more 
 natural. 
 
 1. The connecting word “that” immediately following the enact¬ 
 ing clause in the first section of a bill is unnecessary and should be 
 omitted. If the enacting clause is made to precede Section 1 instead 
 of being a part of it, the uselessness of an introductory “that” be¬ 
 comes more apparent, but even if the enacting clause is kept in the 
 first section, the “that” should be discarded. In a few cases in Illi¬ 
 nois, sections other than the first section commence with “that.”‘“ 
 
 2. Statutes can be simplified greatly without weakening theii 
 effect, by omitting the grouping of synonyms and indirect expressions 
 which tend to make sentences rambling and disconnected. As was 
 said by one text-writer: “A law is usually stronger if it has few words, 
 chosen with care as to their meaning.”^*’’ Too often it is to be feared 
 authors of bills think that the multiplication of synonyms and phrases 
 tend to give a legal smack which adds to the impressiveness. The 
 continued repetition of these useless combinations of nouns, verbs, 
 adjectives and conjunctions finally becomes habitual. The word “will” 
 includes everything that is meant by “testament,” but most lawyers 
 join the two in writing a “last will and testament.” A legislature 
 cannot authorize an action without giving power, but how many 
 laws “authorize and empower” and “order and direct.” The statute 
 books abound with such redundancies as “each and every,” “any and 
 all,” “parts and portions,” “be and the same are,” “for and during,” 
 “period and term,” “do and perform,” “acts and things,” “full and 
 
 ^2 In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232 (1875). 
 
 ^^Hurcl, 1919, p. 2048. 
 
 Commercial Insurance Co. v. Mehlman, 48 Ill. 313 (1868); Ochs v. People. 
 124 Ill. 399 (1888). 
 
 Hard road act. Hurd, 1919, p. 2642; Chicago Municipal Court Act, Hurd, 
 1919, p. 925. 
 
 Jones, Statute Law Making p. 123, 
 
62 
 
 complete,” “by and with” and “shall have power and it shall be his 
 duty to.” A law does not become any stronger because it says that it 
 “shall be in full force and effect,” rather than simply that it “shall 
 be in force.” These and many other similar pairs and phrases can be 
 replaced by one word or a more simple term and they should not be 
 tolerated in careful legislation. 
 
 3. There are some words like “hereby,” “said,” “aforesaid,” 
 “such,” “any,” whatsoever” and “wheresoever” which appear fre¬ 
 quently in legal expression. Generally they are unnecessary and do 
 not add anything by way of definiteness. It is just as effective 
 to say “whoever, having a former husband or wife living, marries 
 another person, is guilty of bigamy,” as to say “whoever, etc., shall 
 be deemed guilty of bigamy.” “Shall be construed to mean” is no 
 more convincing than the word “means.” 
 
 Commands and permissions are frequently stated in an indirect 
 manner: “it shall be the duty,” “is authorized,” etc., for which may 
 be substituted such words as “shall,” “must” or “may.” 
 
 4. Ordinarily, where the creation of a simple crime is not a 
 subordinate part of a broader act, there is no necessity for reciting 
 that the thing prohibited is unlawful and that a person violating that 
 prohibition is subject to a penalty. It is sufficient to provide that a 
 person committing such an act is guilty of an offense and fix the pen¬ 
 alty. 
 
 Thus, an act forbidding the portrayal of hangings, lynchings 
 and burnings of human beings, reads: 
 
 “It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to manufac¬ 
 ture, sell or offer for sale, or advertise or present or exhibit in any public 
 place in the State, any publication or representation by lithograph, mov¬ 
 ing picture, play, drama or sketch representing or purporting to represent 
 any hanging, lynching or burning of any human being. Any person, firm 
 or corporation violating any of the provisions of this section shall be guilty 
 of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine 
 of not less than fifty dollars nor more than two hundred dollars.” ” 
 
 This can be more simply stated by providing that “whoever manu¬ 
 factures, ... is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished 
 . . .” The Criminal Code comprises a miscellaneous collection of 
 offenses and criminal provisions which are being changed and added 
 to continuall}^ and anything which tends to harmonize and unify its 
 pages is desirable. 
 
 When the creation of offenses is incidental to the main purposes 
 of a bill, it may be convenient to prohibit specific acts or require that 
 certain regulations be complied with, and group the penalty provisions 
 in a later section. Section 43 of the Motor Vehicle Act is an example 
 of the grouping of penalty provision in one section. 
 
 “Any person wilfully violating the provisions of this Act shall, except 
 as otherwise provided herein, upon conviction, be fined in a sum not to 
 exceed the amount hereinafter set forth. 
 
 For the violation of sections 8, 14, 16, 17, 18,' 19, 20, 21, 27, 28 and 40, or 
 any of them, twenty-five dollars. 
 
 For a violation of section 22, two hundred dollars. 
 
 ” Hurd, 1919, p. 1041, 
 
63 
 
 For the violation of any section or provision for which no specific 
 penalty is provided, one hundred dollars.” 
 
 Where a prohibition is expressed apart from the penalty pro¬ 
 vision, it is generally better to say “no [lerson shall” rather than “it 
 shall be (is) unlawful to.” 
 
 There is a general penalty provision for misdemeanors in the 
 Criminal Code which reads as follows : 
 
 “Where the performance of any act is prohibited by any statute, and 
 no penalty for the violation of such statute is imposed, the doing of such 
 act is a misdemeanor, and may be punished by fine not exceeding $100, 
 or imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or both, in 
 the discretion of the court.”’® 
 
 A misdemeanor for which no penalty is specifically provided may 
 be punished under this provision, ddiis plan is followed in the Crimi¬ 
 nal Code of New York. In this state, however, it has been customary 
 to attach the penalty clause to each offense, and it might not be wise 
 to omit the penalty provision in statutes creating misdemeanors. But 
 the New York method should be considered when’a revision of the 
 Criminal Code is made, because the use of a general penalty provision 
 undoubtedly tends to standardize penalties. 
 
 5. There is some tendency to avoid pronouns in statutory 
 language. This is commendable when a lack of clearness might 
 otherwise result, but there is no objection to their use so long 
 as their position indicates definitely their antecedents. 
 
 6. The conjunctions “and” and “or” arc used inaccurately 
 
 in popular language frequently, and also, in a less degree, in 
 statutory expression. The courts recognizing this inaccuracy, have 
 been obliged frequently to adopt a loose construction in order to 
 effectuate what appeared to be the legislative intent. “While they 
 are not treated as interchangeable, and should be followed when 
 their accurate reading does not render the sense dubious, their 
 strict meaning is more readily departed from than that of other 
 words, and one read in place of the other in deference to the mean¬ 
 ing of the context.”®*’ The court, though, in another case, refused 
 
 to read “and” as “or” when that construction was urged. “It is 
 
 no doubt true, that where the sense and purpose of a statute de¬ 
 mand it, the conjunction “and” may be construed as though it 
 were written “orbut in the absence of some such necessity, the 
 words of a statute are not to be so changed.”®^ 
 
 As in the case of “may” and “shall,” a readiness on the part 
 
 of the courts to depart from the general meaning of words, is a 
 
 source of danger to the bill-drafter, since he, even when he has 
 used such terms accurately, must guard against the possibility 
 of a different construction than that intended. In the first place, 
 there should be no careless use of conjunctions. As was men¬ 
 tioned in a discussion of provisos, “provided” is sometimes inaccur¬ 
 ately used to join a simple independent provision. If there remains 
 
 ^»Hurd, 1919, p. 2634. 
 
 •»Hurcl, 1919, p. 1057. 
 
 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 252; People v. VanCleave, 187 
 Ill. 125 (1900); Boyles v. McMurphy, 55 Ill. 236 (1870). 
 
 81 People v. Lee. 112 Ill. 113 (1884). 
 
64 
 
 a possibility of a conflict of ideas between the conjunctions used 
 and the context, the conjunction may be strengthened by other 
 words to avoid the possibility of the context overriding the con¬ 
 junction. Thus “either . . . or” may be employed if the idea 
 is disjunctive, and if conjunctive “both . . . and” or “and also.” 
 
 7. The Illinois statute book abounds with sample forms for 
 bonds, ballots, reports, affidavits, etc., given for the most part for 
 the guidance of governmental officials. In some cases, this is an 
 unnecessary detail which may be left to the discretion of the office 
 administering the law. A bounty act of 1877 provides: 
 
 “. . . whereupon the clerk of said board, shall administer to said 
 person, the following oath or affirmation, to-wit: 
 
 You do solemnly swear (or affirm as the case may be), that the scalp 
 or scalps here produced by you was taken from a wolf or wolves killed and 
 first captured by yourself within the limits of this county and within the 
 sixty days last past. 
 
 This could have been simplified greatly (as was done with later 
 bounty acts) by merely requiring an affidavit and stating its sub¬ 
 stance. 
 
 Section 5 of an act providing for visitation of children placed 
 in family homes contains a lengthy form of report to be made to 
 the Board of Public Charities by its visitors.®^ The Search and 
 Seizure Law®^ which in a great many respects illustrates the things 
 a bill drafter should avoid, contains six forms. It has forms for 
 carrier’s records, statement by consignees to carrier, application for 
 purchase from druggist, complaint for search warrant, search war¬ 
 rant and permit issued by the Attorney General. Generally, when 
 an action or proceeding is entrusted to one officer or department 
 of the state, it is sufficient to give that officer or department general 
 instructions as to forms. When, however, the duty is imposed up¬ 
 on a number of officials, throughout the state, if uniformity is de¬ 
 sired, it is necessary to set out in detail the forms to be used. 
 
 8. Occasionally in statutes the enumeration of several per¬ 
 sons or things is followed by a dependent clause. Section 4 of the 
 Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1911^^ has the words, “If the 
 employe leaves any widow, child or children, or parents or other 
 lineal heirs to whose support he had contributed within five years 
 previous to the time of his death . . .” Such an expression is 
 capable of two interpretations;—the dependent clause may be held 
 to qualify each member of the list preceding or it may be limited 
 to the last one. In the instance cited the Appellate court adopted 
 the first construction and held that the clause modified the word 
 “parents.”®® By care in the matter of phrasing, an ambiguity of 
 this kind can be avoided. 
 
 Hurd, 1919, p. 161. 
 
 8»Hurd, 1919, p. 279. 
 
 8^ Hurd, 1919, p. 1248. 
 
 8^ Laws, 1911, p. 315. 
 
 8® Erickson v. American W^ell Works, 196 Ill. App. 346 (1915). 
 
65 
 
 PUNCTUATION. 
 
 The matter of punctuation in statutes formerly was unimport¬ 
 ant since the early rule of construction was that statutes should be 
 read without breaks or stops and that whether words belong' to any 
 particular branch of a sentence is to be determined from the con¬ 
 sideration of the entire act.^^ But inasmuch as bills very generally 
 are printed with full punctuation before legislative action, the 
 courts have modified to some extent the old rule which wholly 
 disregarded punctuation marks. The Supreme Court of Illinois has 
 said: “Section 13 of Article IV of the constitution of 1870 provides: 
 ‘Every bill shall be read at large on three different days, in each 
 house; and the bill and all amendments thereto shall be printed 
 before the vote is taken on final passage.’ The punctuation of a 
 bill so adopted cannot be said to be the mere work of the engrosser 
 or the public printer. The punctuation is rather a part of the act 
 as adopted by the General Assembly, and while it remains sub¬ 
 ordinate to the text it may be of material assistance in determining 
 the legislative intent. Certainly it should not be disregarded un¬ 
 less upon an inspection of the whole act or section involved it is 
 apparent the punctuation operates to vary the true sense and 
 meaning of the enactment.”®® 
 
 In a later case, the court in construing the words “Board of 
 County Commissioners” in Section 17 of Article VI of the consti¬ 
 tution, relies largely on the fact that these words are enclosed 
 in quotation marks. “The quotation marks add to the preciseness 
 of expression and indicate an exact transfer of the words from 
 some other place.”®® 
 
 As compared with the text, punctuation still remains rela¬ 
 tively unimportant. But good draftsmanship will observe gram¬ 
 matical rules in this regard not only to avoid introducing an 
 ambiguity but also because correct punctuation is a valuable aid 
 to fortify and make clear the legislative intent. 
 
 s^Perteet v. People, 65 III. 230 (1872). 
 
 Commissioners of Highways, v. Ellwood, 193 Ill, 304 (1901). 
 
 People V. McCormick, 261 Ill. 413 (1914). 
 
66 
 
 EFFECT OF GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO 
 PARTIAL INVALIDITY, LIBERAL INTERPRE¬ 
 TATION AND REPEALS. 
 
 Partial invalidity section: It is quite common to incorpor¬ 
 ate in bills a section providing that if any part of the act is de¬ 
 clared unconstitutional, that shall not affect the validity of the re¬ 
 mainder if it can be given effect without the invalid portion. This 
 is merely an expression of a rule of construction which is recog¬ 
 nized by the courts. In People v. KnopP® the court said: “The 
 fact that a part of the act is unconstitutional does not require that 
 the remainder shall be held void, unless all the provisions are so 
 connected as to depend upon each other. The constitutional and 
 unconstitutional provisions may even be contained in the same 
 section and yet be perfectly distinct and separable, so that the 
 first may stand though the last fall. ... If, when the unconstitu¬ 
 tional portion is stricken out, that which remains is complete in 
 itself and capable of being executed wholly independent of that 
 which was rejected, it must be sustained.” 
 
 The valid part, to be given effect, must constitute a complete 
 act and be in accord with the legislative purpose as determined 
 from the whole act and be such that the court can say that the legis¬ 
 lature would have passed it with the invalid parts eliminated.®^ It 
 is often extremely difficult for a court to say that, if the invalid 
 portions are eliminated, the balance of the act standing alone ac¬ 
 complishes the' legislative purpose. In such a case, it might be 
 thought that a statement to the effect that the invalid portion 
 shall not defeat the remainder, would aid the court by indicating 
 the legislative desire. It is doubtful, however, whether such is the' 
 result. 
 
 The Public Utilities Act of 1913 provided for the regulation of 
 public utilities except those owned by municipalities. A companion 
 bill which was passed at the same session of the General Assembly 
 regulated the public utilities exempted from the general act. It was 
 contended that the exception in the Public Utilities Act in favor of 
 municipally owned public utilities was unconstitutional but that the 
 act could be given effect with the exception stricken* out. Section 83 
 provided that “if any section, subdivision, sentence or clause of this 
 
 People V. Knopf, 183 Ill. 410 (1900); see also Cooley, Constitutional Limi¬ 
 tations 178. 
 
 C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. V. Jones 149 Ill. 361 (1894) ; Springfield Gas Co. v. 
 Springfield, 292 Ill. 236 (1920): People v. City of Rock Island, 271 Ill. 412 
 (i916); Joel v. Bennett, 276 Ill. 537 (1917). 
 
67 
 
 act is for any reason held invalid or to be unconstitutional, such de¬ 
 cision shall not affect the validity of the remaining portion of this 
 act.” Notwithstanding this saving clause the court held that the plan 
 of the General Assembly was for one scheme of regulation for pri¬ 
 vately owned public utilities and another for those owned by munici¬ 
 pal corporations and that the Public Utilities Act with the exception 
 stricken out was not an expression of the legislative will and would 
 have not received the approval of the General Assembly. “Section 
 83,” the court says, “was not intended to nullify any rule of statutory 
 construction and must receive a construction consistent with the rules 
 of constitutional law. While this section may be some indication of 
 legislative intention, yet in construing it, we must give due considera¬ 
 tion to the rules heretofore laid down by this court in the interpreta¬ 
 tion of statutes.” (Inasmuch as the majority opinion held the ex¬ 
 ception as to municipally owned public utilities valid, the decision on 
 this point is obiter dictum.) A dissenting opinion takes the view 
 that the legislative plan was to create a commission to regulate pub¬ 
 lic utilities and that the inclusion of those owned by municipalities 
 did not destroy that scheme although it modified it in that detail.®^ 
 In a recent case in which the court held unconstitutional the primary 
 election law of 1919 it was contended that the clause repealing 
 the prior primary act was valid and effective regardless of the in¬ 
 validity of all other portions of the act. Section 80 of the act con¬ 
 tained a partial invalidity clause which provided that the invalidity 
 of any portion should not affect the validity of any other portion which 
 could be given effect without the invalid part. The court says: “The 
 provision of Section 80 is without any effect in aid of the plaintiff in 
 error’s contention for the reason that it merely states the uniform 
 rule of the courts, which upholds every valid portion of an act which 
 can be operative and effective without the portion which is declared 
 invalid.” The court then considers whether it was the legislative in¬ 
 tent that the repealing clause should in all events be valid and de¬ 
 cides that this provision was merely intended to clear the way for the 
 new act and consequently was dependent upon it.®^ About all that 
 can be said for a “partial invalidity” provision is that it furnishes 
 a basis for a decision if the court thinks that the valid portion should 
 be sustained and if not, it can be disregarded. 
 
 The difficulty as to a partial invalidity clause is that its generality 
 affords no real light on the legislative intent as to particular portions of 
 an act. If, however, a contemplated measure should contain sep¬ 
 arable parts of recognized doubtful constitutionality, and a statement 
 in the act to the effect that the invalidity of a specified portion should 
 not affect the remainder, the court would probably attach consider¬ 
 able weight to this expression of legislative desire. However no in¬ 
 stance of such a particular reference in a partial invalidity clause is 
 known. 
 
 Spring-field Gas Co. vs. Springfield, 292 Ill. 236 (1920). 
 
 S'* People V. Fox. 294 Ill. 263 (1920). 
 
68 
 
 Liberal interpretation: Another provision of a general na¬ 
 ture relating to construction is the statement to the effect that the 
 act shall receive a liberal interpretation to carry out the purpose ex¬ 
 pressed therein. To effectuate the intention of the legislature and se¬ 
 cure the most beneficial operation is a familiar rule of construction; 
 one, however, which is not supreme but which must be applied along 
 with many others which may govern in particular instances. In the 
 case of certain kinds of statutes such as penal measures and acts 
 in derogation of the common law or property rights, other principles 
 control and require a strict construction. 
 
 The provision for liberal interpretation is, therefore, of doubt¬ 
 ful value. As in the case of partial invalidity clauses, it may be 
 referred to by the court in support of a decision which would 
 have been the same without such a provision, but in a case where 
 other principles of construction must control, it is disregarded. 
 Thus, an act incorporating a theological seminary granted an ex¬ 
 emption from taxation as to all property “belonging to or apper¬ 
 taining to said seminary.” The section following provided that the 
 act “shall be construed liberally in all courts for the purpose therein 
 expressed.” But this provision was not permitted to override the 
 general rule that laws exempting property from taxation are to be 
 strictly construed and all doubts resolved in favor of the public. 
 The court said: “We do not think this language was intended to 
 or could be held to change or qualify the general rules of construc¬ 
 tion applicable to the section under consideration ... In deter¬ 
 mining what purpose is expressed in the section, resort must 
 necessarily be had to the general rules for considering such laws.®^ 
 
 But if the courts are not disposed to give much weight to a 
 general provision for liberal construction, such a provision directed 
 toward a particular action or proceeding would doubtless be given 
 effect. There are a number of such provisions in the laws of Illi¬ 
 nois. Section 18 of the Illinois Securities Law®° provides with re¬ 
 gard to the filing of statements or documents by the Secretary 
 of State and suit to compel such act, that “merely technical irregu¬ 
 larities in the procedure of the Secretar)'^ of State shall be disre¬ 
 garded. ...” The Public Utilities Act, Section 83®'’ has a similar 
 provision. “A substantial compliance with the requirements of this 
 act shall be sufficient to give effect to all the acts, orders, deci¬ 
 sions, rules and regulations of the commission, and they shall not 
 be declared inoperative, illegal or void for any omission of a tech¬ 
 nical nature in respect thereto.” 
 
 Repeals: Statutes frequently provide that “all acts and parts 
 of acts in conflict herewith are repealed,” without specifying par¬ 
 ticularly the statutes which are to be affected. Inasmuch as the 
 Supreme Court has repeatedly said that where a subsequent statute 
 
 People V. Chicago Theological Seminary, 174 Ill. 177 (1898). 
 
 9>Hiird, 1919, p. 2672. 
 
 »5Hurd. 1919, p. 2357. 
 
69 
 
 is repugnant to a former statute, or inconsistent with it, a repeal 
 of the earlier statute by the subsequent one will be implied,^^ it is 
 difficult to understand how such a provision can add anything to 
 the general rule. This is the view of the Supreme Court. “While 
 the insertion of a general provision in a statute declaring a re¬ 
 peal of all inconsistent acts or parts of acts (without naming 
 any particular act) implies that the new statute is to some extent 
 repugnant to certain laws theretofore enacted, the insertion of 
 such a general repealing clause is generally held to add nothing 
 to the repealing effect of the act. Logically, such a general re¬ 
 pealing section adds nothing to the language or meaning of the 
 act and takes nothing from it. All prior conflicting laws and parts 
 of laws are impliedly repealed by conflicting provisions of the law 
 enacted.”^® 
 
 In view of such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court, the 
 use of a general repealing clause is not advisable. The great diffi¬ 
 culty in connection with repeals by implication is the determination 
 whether an irreconcilable conflict exists between a subsequent act 
 and a prior act or a part of the prior act. A general repealing clause 
 fails to disclose the legislative purpose as to an earlier statute 
 and thereby adds to the burden of construction a question which 
 should properly be settled by the law-making body. Whether a 
 proposed measure necessitates or makes desirable the repeal of an 
 earlier act should be determined by the bill-drafter. And if the repeal 
 of an act is necessary or desirable, it should be accomplished by a 
 specific repeal provision which names the act repealed. The blanket 
 repeal clause is a slip-shod and inefficient substitute which.should not 
 be tolerated in careful legislation. 
 
 Lang V. Friesenecker, 213 Ill. 598 (1905); Merlo v. Johnston City and 
 Big Muddy Coal Co., 258 Ill. 328 (1913); People v. Wabash Railroad Co., 276 
 Ill. 92 (1916). 
 
 Hoyne v. Danisch, 264 Ill. 467 (1914); People v. City of Rock Island, 271 
 Ill. 412 (1916). 
 
PRACTICAL FACTORS AFFECTING DRAFTSMANSHIP. 
 
 In the construction of statutes courts look primarily to the 
 language employed. But the whole purpose of judicial construc¬ 
 tion—the fundamental rule—is to ascertain and give effect to the 
 legislative intent, however expressed. Consequently courts may 
 look beyond the words of a particular section or act to other con¬ 
 siderations which may disclose the desire and purpose of the law¬ 
 making body. The result may be to extend @r restrict the effect 
 of the statutory language, or even to nullify its literal purport 
 and substitute therefor a meaning in harmony with what is deemed 
 the purpose of the measure. It is true that the courts have held 
 that, “The meaning and intent of the legislature must be ascer¬ 
 tained from the words employed, and where there is no ambiguity 
 there is not room for construction. Tt is not allowable to inter¬ 
 pret what has no need of interpretation, and, when the words 
 have a definite and precise meaning, to go elsewhere in search 
 of conjecture in order to restrict or extend the meaning.’ Or as 
 the United States Supreme Court has tersely phrased it,—“the 
 province of construction lies wholly within fhe domain of am¬ 
 biguity.”^ But because the mind of the legislator cannot foresee 
 and provide for every conceivable situation and because complex 
 trains of thought must be conveyed by the imperfect and approxi¬ 
 mate symbols of words, every statute in some aspects presents the 
 necessity for construction. As a matter of fact, resort is had to 
 considerations other than the particular language even when that 
 language has a well-defined meaning. This appears from the state¬ 
 ment of the court in the case above cited. “In the interpretation 
 of statutes, words are to be taken in their ordinary meaning in 
 general or popular use, unless . . . it is apparent from the whole 
 law and other laws in pari materia that a different meaning was in¬ 
 tended.”^ Therefore, it is not enough for the bill-drafter to seek 
 merely a clear mode of expression, but he must take into account 
 such other matters as may weigh with the court in considering 
 his language. 
 
 It is a familiar principle of construction that statutes are to 
 be construed as a whole. The import of a word, a sentence or a 
 section may be changed when it is considered not independently 
 but as a subordinate part of an act, all of which refers to a single 
 
 Chudnovski v. Eckels, 232 Ill. 312 (1908). 
 ^Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U. S. 414 (1899). 
 2 Chudnosvki v. Eckels, 232 Ill. 312 (1908). 
 
71 
 
 subject and seeks to effect only‘one purpose.The Supreme Court 
 in one instance uses the following language: “But, as already ob¬ 
 served, to construe and enforce this section according to its literal 
 terms would, in all cases of the kind supposed, defeat that class 
 of attachment liens which the act taken as a whole manifestly in¬ 
 tended to protect.”^ And in construing a section of the Road and 
 Bridge Act, the court said : “The impression upon the reading of 
 the section certainly is that the extension of the tax is to be upon 
 the assessment of the previous year. Such seems to be the literal 
 reading. But for the ascertaining of the real meaning, we are not 
 to be confined to the words employed, but may look to the former 
 law, and to other statutory provisions.”^ There are many other 
 decisions in Illinois to the effect that “the several provisions of a 
 statute should be construed together in the light of the general 
 objects and purposes of the enactment, and so as to give effect 
 to the main intent, although particular provisions are thus con¬ 
 strued not according to their literal meaning.”® 
 
 In the search for the legislative purpose in enacting a measure, 
 the court will consider what the law was at the time of its enact¬ 
 ment. Whether the law at that time was statutory or the common 
 law, it furnishes a guide as to the reason for the enactment since 
 the effect of the enactment must necessarily be to change or amend 
 the legal situation as it existed before. That this is regarded as an 
 important aid to construction is evidenced by this statement from 
 the Supreme Court. “It is universally conceded that one of the 
 most efficient means in ascertaining the legislative intent in the 
 adoption of a new statute is to consider it with reference to the 
 state of the law before its adoption, and particularly with reference 
 to the previous legislation on the same subject. A passing notice, 
 therefore, of some of the previous legislation with respect to the 
 granting of licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquors, may aid 
 us somewhat in our present inquiries.”^ 
 
 The “state of the law” is one fact of several which may be 
 considered as affording an indication of the motive in the passage 
 of an act. Other circumstances which are connected with an act, 
 the mischief which it recognizes and the remedy sought, all may 
 be looked to as indicative of the legislative will. “In determining 
 the meaning of a statute, a court will have regard to existing cir¬ 
 cumstances, or contemporaneous conditions, and also to the object 
 sought to be obtained by the statute, and the necessity or want 
 
 ® An act of 1919 (Hurd, 1919, p. 853) authorizing county memorials for sol¬ 
 diers and sailors contains an example of poor coordination in the provisions 
 relating to the referendum feature. Section 1 has these provisions. “No ballot 
 which has not a cross opposite the word “yes” or “no” shall be counted either 
 for or against the proposition. 
 
 If a ma.iority of the votes cast at such election are in favor thereof . . .” 
 The second expression has been held to mean a majority of the highest total 
 votes cast for the candidates for anv office. In other words a ballot not 
 marked is, in effect, counted against the proposition. The two statements pin 
 view of the court’s construction of the second one) are contradictory and in¬ 
 harmonious. 
 
 *Hill V. Harding, 93 Ill. 77 (1879). 
 
 “Wabash. St. Louis & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Binkert, 106 Ill. 298 (1883). 
 
 ® People V. City of Chicago, 152 Ill. 546 (1894). 
 
 ’Wright V. People, 101 Ill. 126 (1881). 
 
72 
 
 of necessity for its adoption.”* “In order to ascertain the true 
 spirit and import of an act, the courts may also consider the mis¬ 
 chiefs such act was desii^ned to remedy. “In construino' statutes 
 we must look to the intention of the law-maker, and one of the 
 means of ascertaining^ the intention is to look to the mischief that 
 existed under the old law, as well as to the provisions adopted to 
 remedy the evil.”^° 
 
 To what extent the court will consider conditions and facts re¬ 
 lating to a measure is evidenced by the opinion of the court in con¬ 
 struing the language of an act creating sanitary districts. Section 
 23 of that act reads in part: “The district constructing a channel to 
 carry water from Lake Michigan of any amount authorized by this 
 act . . . shall remove the dams at Henry and Copperas Creek in the 
 Illinois river, before any water shall be turned into the said chan¬ 
 nel.” The court reviews the building of the dams by the state at an 
 expense of a quarter of a million dollars, various measures for their 
 repair and preservation, their beneficial effect on navigation on the 
 Illinois river and decides from these outside facts that the legislature 
 did not intend what the language plainly expresses, i. e. the removal 
 of the dams, but intended merely to permit their destruction if it 
 became necessary.^^ 
 
 The effect of the prior status of the law upon a subsequent 
 statute is expressed by two rules of construction, both of which em¬ 
 body the same principle. (1) If the prior existing state of the law 
 was determined by the common law, a statute in derogation thereof 
 will be strictly construed so as not to alter the common law farther 
 than the statutory terms expressly declare.^^ (2) A statute must be 
 
 construed with reference to the whole system of which it is a part. 
 Statutes relating to the same subject should be construed in pari 
 materia as though forming one body of law and seeming inconsist¬ 
 encies should be so construed, if ]:)ossible, as to give to each its ap- 
 ])ropriate effect and operation.^* The second rule, in other words, is 
 that the law does not favor repeals of statutes by implication but 
 will adopt a construction which will reconcile the provisions of each. 
 This principle, then, is apparent in the construction of a statute, 
 whether it supersedes another act or the common law, that unless 
 it necessarily by its terms alters or displaces the prior law, that prior 
 law will influence and modify the construction of the subsequent act so 
 as to permit both to stand. 
 
 In some instances, the construction of an act itself is not in¬ 
 fluenced by other laws, but the situation to which it relates is af¬ 
 fected or controlled by other statutes so that the ultimate result is not 
 
 * Hawes v. City of Chicago, 158 Ill. 653 (1895); People v. Kipley, 171 Ill. 44 
 (1898): People v. Harrison, 191 Ill. 257 (1901). 
 
 »Soby V. People. 134 Ill. 66 (1890); Bobel v. People, 173 Ill. 19 (1898). 
 
 I'^Ball V. Chadwick. 46 Ill. 28 (1867); People v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific 
 Ry. Co., 104 Ill. 476 (1882). 
 
 Canal Commissioners v. Sanitary District. 184 Ill. 597 (1900). 
 
 Mackin v. Haven, 187 Ill. 480 (1900); Canadian Bank of Commerce v. 
 McCrea, 106 Ill. 281 (1882); Turnes v. Brenckle, 249 Ill. 394 (1911). 
 
 L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 148 Ill. 509 (1893); Devous v. Gallatin 
 County, 244 Ill. 40 (1910); South Park Commissioners v. First National Bank. 
 177 Ill 234 (1898). 
 
73 
 
 according to the statutory language. An illustration will make this 
 clear. In 1919, the General Assembly amended Section 189 of the 
 School Law to give relief to school districts hy permitting them to 
 levy a higher per cent tax rate. The law now reads that by a refer¬ 
 endum vote 2% may be levied for educational purposes. But in some 
 districts, notably Chicago, the scaling of this tax levy under the Juul 
 law^^ nullified this increase and prevented the desired relief. Any 
 tax levy not expressly exempted from the provisions of the Juul law 
 may be affected in counties where the aggregate of tax rates is high. 
 The Civil Administrative Code, Indeterminate Sentence Act, and a 
 large number of other statutes all operate generally in such manner as 
 to affect other particular measures. 
 
 Sometimes statutes are enacted which have already received a 
 judicial construction. This may be done by the legislature re-enact- 
 in'g an earlier act or by adopting a statute of another state which has 
 been considered by the courts of that state. In either case, the judi¬ 
 cial decisions are generally to be taken as a part of it. In the case of 
 re-enactments which substantially follow the language of an earlier 
 act, it is presumed that the legislature had in view the construction 
 which the court placed on the earlier act and adopted such construc¬ 
 tion as the true and intended construction to be placed on the subse¬ 
 quent one.^® “The court will not, however, follow this rule blindly 
 where the language of the new act, when construed in the light of the 
 context, indicates a different legislative intention.”^'’ 
 
 A somewhat similar principle obtains in the case of statutes 
 adopted from other states. “In adopting the statute of another state 
 it is presumed that our General Assembly intended that it should re¬ 
 ceive the construction given it by the courts of the state from which 
 it was adopted, previous to its adoption, unless such construction is 
 in conflict with the spirit and policy of our laws.”^' 
 
 There is no such thing, then, as a wholly independent statute, un¬ 
 related to other acts and speaking hy its words alone. Other laws, 
 circumstances, judicial decisions all form the background which gives 
 form and meaning to a measure. Even the words themselves fake 
 their import from these outside considerations. In a decision cited 
 above^® the court said: “In determining what is meant by the ex¬ 
 pression ‘corporate authorities of any town,’ reference may be made 
 to acts of the legislature, passed from time to time upon the subject 
 of parks and park commissioners.” In the first place, a bill should 
 be constructed as a whole, each part harmonizing with the others and 
 the whole act working single-mindedly toward a definite purpose. Not 
 only that but it should be co-ordinated to take its proper place in the 
 whole system relating to the general subject of which it forms a part. 
 Only painstaking study and investigation in the field of legislation in 
 
 An Act. concerning’ the levy and extension of ta,xes. Hurd, 1919, p, 2543. 
 
 McGann v. People, 194 Ill. 526 (1902); Kelley v. Northern Trust Co., 190 
 Ill. 401 (1901). 
 
 i^Atton V. S’outh Chicago City Ry. Co., 236 Ill. 507 (1908). 
 
 Rhoads v. C. & A. R. R. Co., 227 Ill. 328 (1907); Re Qua v. Graham, 187 
 Ill. 67 (1900); People v. Griffith, 245 Ill. 532 (1910). 
 
 1® South Park Commissioners v. First National Bank, 177 Ill. 234 (1898). 
 
74 
 
 which it is designed to operate can equip the bill-drafter to accom¬ 
 plish this even moderately well. And to succeed perfectly is beyond 
 the limits of human skill. Legislation from other jurisdictions should' 
 always be considered in connection with the construction placed on 
 it by the courts of those jurisdictions since that meaning generally 
 attaches to it when adopted in this state. 
 
 
75 
 
 AMENDATORY LEGISLATION. 
 
 In drafting a bill it must be determined whether the desired 
 result can be attained by an amendment to an existing statute or 
 whether the enactment shall take the form of an independent act. 
 The bulk of present-day legislation is directed toward the removal 
 of defects and the making of improvements in existing statutory law. 
 Only occasionally is a new field opened for legislation, and a measure 
 enacted which is unrelated to other statutes. It is important not 
 only that a provision be well constructed to accomplish the immed¬ 
 iate ends desired but also that it take its appropriate place in the 
 system of which it is a part, and that it leave the whole legislation 
 relating to the particular subject in the best possible form. Statutes 
 which are amendatory either in form or substance present some 
 distinct problems both constitutionally and from the standpoint 
 of draftsmanship. 
 
 Amendment by reference: The constitution provides that 
 “no law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title only, 
 but the law revived, or the section amended, shall be inserted 
 at length in the new act.”^® The early construction, placed upon 
 this provision by the Supreme Court limited its application to acts 
 expressly purporting to amend earlier laws, i. e., statutes amenda¬ 
 tory in form.“° Later the construction was extended to apply to 
 acts amendatory in substance. 
 
 As applied to statutes which expressly purport to amend prior 
 laws, this provision entails no difficulties for the bill-drafter. But 
 
 ^9 The reference is to Article IV Section 13 of the constitution of 1870. The 
 Constitutional Convention now in session has adopted a proposal which would 
 replace this language with the following provision. 
 
 “No Act shall be revived by reference to its title only. Any act expressly 
 purporting to amend a section or sections of an earlier law, shall set forth 
 at length the section or sections as amended.” 
 
 The purpose of this change in the language is to limit the constitutional 
 provision to express amendatorv acts and to exclude statutes which are 
 merelv amendments in effect. 
 
 20 People V. Wright, 70 Ill. 388 (1873) ; Timm v. Harrison, 109 Ill. 593 (1884) ; 
 
 School Directors v. School Directors, 135 Ill. 464 (1891) ; People v. Loeffler, 
 
 175 Ill. 585 (1898). 
 
 21 People V. Knopf, 183 Ill. 410 (1900); People v. Election Commissioners, 
 
 221 Ill. 9 (1906) ; Badenoch v. City of Chicago, 222 Ill. 71 (1906) ; People V. 
 Crossley. 261 Ill. 78 (1913) ; People v. Stevenson, 272 111. 325 (1916) ; Board of 
 Education v. Haworth, 274 Ill. 538 (1916). 
 
 An amendatory statute might comply with the constitutional provision 
 as to one section bv setting it out as amended and yet in effect by its sub¬ 
 stance amount to an amendment of some other section or act which was not 
 set out at length. This would make the amendatory act ob.jectionable from 
 a constitutional standpoint. See Galpin v. City of Chicago, 269 Ill. 27 (1915). 
 
76 
 
 by its extended construction it imperils much leg’islation and leaves 
 many statutes in doubt until the Supreme Court has passed upon 
 their constitutionality. The court has of necessity recognized that 
 “it cannot be held that this clause of the constitution embraces 
 every enactment which, in anv degree, however remotely it may 
 be, affects a prior law on a given subject for, to so hold, would 
 be to bring about an evil far greater than the one sought to be 
 obviated by this clause.”"^ And quoting the Supreme Court of 
 Michigan in People v. Mahoney, 13 Mich. 484, the court continues: 
 “If, whenever a new statute is passed, it is necessary that all prior 
 statutes modified by it, by implication, should be re-enacted and 
 published at length as modified, then a large portion of the whole 
 code of laws of the state would require to be republished at every 
 session, and parts of it several times over, until, from mere im¬ 
 mensity of material, it would be impossible to tell what the law 
 was.” Quite obviously this construction must be limited to stat¬ 
 utes which materially affect prior acts. The difficulty, however, is 
 that no rule can be formulated, no standard fixed bv which it is 
 possible to know whether a particular measure falls within or 
 without the limits of this construction. The proposition as stated 
 by the Supreme Court, only needs to be quoted to show how in¬ 
 definite and vague these limits are. 
 
 “(1) An act which is complete within itself and does not 
 purport, either in its title or in the body thereof, to amend or re¬ 
 vive any other act, is valid even though it may by implication 
 modify or repeal prior existing statutes. 
 
 (2) An act, though otherwise complete within itself, which 
 purports to amend or revive a prior statute by reference to its 
 title onlv, and does not set out at length the statute amended 
 or revived, is invalid, regardless of all other questions. 
 
 (3) An act which is incomplete in itself and in which new 
 provisions are commingled with old ones,’ so that it is necessary 
 to read the two acts together in order to determine what the law 
 is, is an amendatory act and invalid under the constitution, and it 
 is unimportant, in such case, that the act does not purport to 
 amend or revive any other statute. 
 
 There being no means of determining beyond question whether 
 a particular act offends in this regard, prudence demands that the 
 bill-drafter steer as wide a course as possible from this danger 
 zone. He will not, of course, frame as an independent act a mea¬ 
 sure which has no purpose whatever except to correct some fault 
 or make a change in a prior law. A Washington statute provided 
 that there should be exempt from execution and attachment in 
 favor of every householder, personal property to the amount of 
 81,000, in addition to the nronertv exempt under section 486 of 
 the code. This is clearly objectionable'^ and can easily be avoided. 
 
 22 -Tii-nTTi V. Hf'rris'^n. lOO nr 500 
 
 "s Per pip V Ovosplev Til. 7S (191 . Por a review of the decisions of 
 
 tPrt c:iir>vnrr.r Ooin’t and a di=!c\ission of this snbT^ct see Constitutional Converi' 
 tions in TUinois and r'on=titntidn of the Sti^te of Illinois, Annotated, 
 
 Copland v. Pirie, 26 Wash. 481 (1 901). 
 
77 
 
 On the other hand, when an act apparently attempts a complete 
 treatment of a subject, its effect on other statutes becomes of less 
 sigi'nificance and the danger of unconstitutionality is more remote. 
 Thus, if the only purpose of an act should be the abolition of the 
 State Public Utilities Commission and the vesting- its powers and ^ 
 duties in another board or department without complying with 
 this constitutional provision, possibly it would be objectionable. 
 
 But when that amendment is incidentally effected by an act which 
 has for its purpose the complete reorganization of the state govern¬ 
 ment, such as is done by the Civil Administrative Code, doubtless 
 this act would not be held to be within the rule. 
 
 The Civil Administrative Code suggests another point of inter¬ 
 est in drafting acts which affect to some extent prior laws. If the 
 measure in question operates to amend several acts rather than 
 only one, apparently the court will be less inclined to hold it within 
 the constitutional provision. Whether the fact that an act affects 
 a number of law indicates a purpose separate and distinct from 
 amending any one of them or whether the court sirnply relaxes 
 the rule in the face of the “far greater evil” of requiring the re¬ 
 enactment of a large number of laws, in several cases the court 
 has refused to apply the rule to acts of this character.^® 
 
 Incorporation by reference : Although the contention has 
 been made that the adoption of certain provisions of one act into 
 another act by a mere reference amounted to an amendment of 
 the prior act, the court has repeatedly held otherwise and declared 
 that incorporation by reference did not violate the provision in 
 Article IV, Section 13 of the Constitution.^® 
 
 The effect of such reference is the same as though the statute 
 or provisions adopted had been incorporated bodily into the adopt¬ 
 ing statute. The reference may be to a particular statute by its title 
 or it may be to the law generally which governs a particular subject. 
 Both references accomplish the incorporation of the provisions 
 of the prior act but with different results as to subseciuent amend¬ 
 ments to the adopted statute. “An act which adopts by reference 
 
 23 People V C. & W. I. R. R. Co.. 2.5(1 Ill. 3S8 (1912): People v. Van Bever, 
 248 Ill. 136 (1911). 
 
 2® Culvor V. People. 161 111. 89 (1 896) : Citv of Charleston v. .Tohnston. 170 
 Ill. 336 (1897) : Peoplo v. Crosslev, 261 Ill. 78 (1913) ; People v. Stitt, 280 Ill. 
 553( 1917): Zeman v. Dolan, 279 Ill. 295 (1917). 
 
 Inasmuch as this constitutional provision forbids the revival of a law 
 by reference, it would seem clear that a statute could not adopt by ref^i^enoe 
 statutory provisions which had been repealed before the adoption, or, if pro¬ 
 visions were amended before the enactment of the adoptine- statute, the pro¬ 
 visions as thev were before amendment. And yet in People v. Glassco. 203 
 Ill. 353 (1903): such an adoption was sustained bv the Supreme Court. Sec¬ 
 tions 24 and 25 of the Parm Drainapre Act of 1885 were amended by act an- 
 proved May 10. 1901. One da.y later. May 11. 1901 an act was approved whioh 
 incorporated these sections 24 and 25 by reference. It is quite apparent from 
 the lang'uag’e that the leg-islature in passing- the adopting- act inteoried the 
 reference to the origrinal sections and not to the sections as amended. The court 
 sustains the reference to the orig-inal sections but the opinion is devote^t to 
 ascertaining the legislative intent and apparently the power of the les-isla- 
 ture in this respect is not considered. This case. has. however been cited for 
 the proposition that the “the provisions of a repealed act may be adopted, (bv 
 reference) with the sa,me effect as if it was in force.” See Section 405. Lewis’ 
 Sutherland Statutory Construction. 
 
78 
 
 the whole or a portion of another statute, means the law as existing 
 at the time of adoption and does not include subsequent additions 
 or modifications of the statute so adopted, unless it does so by 
 express or strongly implied intent. This rule seems to be strictly 
 adhered to, where the prior act is particularly referred to in the 
 adopting statute by its title. Where, however, the adopting stat¬ 
 ute makes no reference to any particular act by its title or other¬ 
 wise, but refers to the general law regulating the subject in hand, 
 the reference will be regarded as including, not only the law in 
 force at the date of the adopting act, but also the law in force 
 when action is taken, or proceedings are resorted to.”“' 
 
 If it is desired to include future amendments to the adopted 
 statute, the reference must be general or some words must be 
 added to the particular reference to disclose that intent. Although 
 there is no Illinois decision on this point, it has been held generally 
 elsewhere that the repeal of a statute adopted by a particular refer¬ 
 ence would not affect the operation of that statute as a part of the 
 adopting statute.Since a general reference includes all additions 
 and modifications and refers to the law at the time when the rule 
 is invoked, it should follow logically that a repeal of the statutory 
 provisions adopted would repeal them as a part of the adopting 
 statute, but this precise point does not seem to have been passed 
 upon. In the case of adoption by a particular reference with words 
 indicating an intent to include subsequent amendments, it is diffi¬ 
 cult to say what effect a repeal of the adopted provisions would 
 have. Probably it would not withdraw those provisions from the 
 adopting statute since, the reference being to a particular act the 
 additional language would seem to go only to the extent of includ¬ 
 ing subsequent changes but not a repeal. 
 
 Legislation by reference has been the subject of some criticism. 
 For one thing, two or more acts dealing with different subjects 
 must be consulted in order to ascertain a legal situation. More 
 than that, frequently the adopted provisions are not wholly applic¬ 
 able to the adopting statute. This may be easily overlooked in 
 drafting the adopting act and then a judicial question is presented 
 as to what extent the provisions are incorporated. If, however, 
 the bill-drafter makes the necessary modifications, the reader must 
 apply the modifications to the adopted provisions and then apply 
 both to the adopting act. There is still another difficulty. If the 
 reference is general, amendments may be made to the adopted pro¬ 
 visions without regard to their effect on the adopting statute. If 
 the reference is particular, and amendments are made to the pro¬ 
 visions adopted, the result is that the provisions are left in two 
 forms; one, in the original for the purposes of the adopting act; 
 and two, as amended, for the purposes of the statute from which 
 they were adopted. If it should be desired to keep these provisions 
 uniform both in the statute where they occurred and in other 
 
 - , 1 
 
 27 Culver V. People, 161 Ill. 89 (1896). 
 
 2s Lewis’ Sutherland Statutory Construction Sec. 405, 
 
79 
 
 statutes which had adopted them by particular reference, it would 
 be difficult to locate and amend the adopting acts. 
 
 On the other hand, there are a number of advantages in legis¬ 
 lation by reference. It tends to reduce the bulk of legislation. If 
 every detail concerning elections had to be repeated in connection 
 with every vote, if every act providing a tax levy had to contain 
 the revenue act, the statute book would run to inordinate length. 
 More than that, each act would introduce varying details and 
 minor modifications as to similar provisions that would render 
 the law almost impossible of administration. Within certain 
 bounds, legislation by reference is proper and useful; carried be¬ 
 yond those limits, it can justify all the criticism it has had. The 
 diflerent efifects of general and particular references has been sug¬ 
 gested together with the advantages and disadvantages of each. 
 Probably less difficulty will be occasioned and fewer unforeseen 
 situations result if the reference is made to the law generally on a 
 particular subject. 
 
 Acts expressly amendatory:-®. .The constitutional provision re^ 
 quires that an amended section or act be set out at length, but it does 
 not require the section or act to be also set forth in its original form be¬ 
 fore amendment.It is therefore sufficient to provide that “Section 
 10 of (naming the act) is amended to read as follows,” and this 
 form is generally used. In repealing a statute or section of a statute 
 it is not necessary to set out at length the statute or section repealed. 
 
 A difficulty presents itself in the case of amendments to acts 
 previously amended and also in the case of amendments to void and 
 repealed statutes. Technically when a section is amended and re¬ 
 enacted “so as to read as follows,” the original section is repealed and 
 its existence ended.If the original section is no longer in exist¬ 
 ence can effect be given to an act purporting to amend the original 
 section rather than the section which has replaced it? The view 
 originally held in Illinois was that such an amendatory act was in¬ 
 valid.®’^ 
 
 See Chapter on Forms, subheading- Amendatory bills. 
 
 3" People V. Wright. 70 Ill. 388 (1873) ; City of Marion v. Campbell, 266 Ill. 
 256 (1915) ; Manchester v. People. 178 Ill. 285 (1899). 
 
 Freitag v. Union Stock Yards, 262 Ill. 551 (1914). See chapter on Forms, 
 subheading Repeal. 
 
 22 “The amendatory act declared that the statute should be amended to read 
 as therein proyided, and this operated to repeal the original section and to sub¬ 
 stitute the amendatory section.” Palmer v. City of Danville, 166 Ill. 42 (1897) : 
 see also People v. Young. 38 Ill. 490 (1865) ; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. City of East 
 St. Louis. 134 Ill. 656 (1890). 
 
 22 L. & N. R. R. Co. V. City of East St. Louis, 134 Ill. 656 (1890); Kepley 
 V. People. 123 Ill. 367 (1888). 
 
 However, in an early case. School Directors v. School Directors. 73 Ill. 
 249 (1874); the court sustained an amendatory act of 1865 which purported 
 to amend an act of 1861. The act sought to be amended was an earlier statute, 
 several sections of which were amended in 1861. The court says: “Here we 
 have a, law possessing all the requisites of a valid statute, passed by the Gen¬ 
 eral Assembly, containing clear requirements capable of being carried into 
 effect in connection with the general school law. and we have no right, simply 
 because there is a mistaken reference to a previous statute to defeat that 
 will.” This reasoning of the court shows an inclination to waive technicalities 
 in order to effectuate the legislative intention. 
 
80 
 
 In a later case, however, the court squarely abrogates the former 
 rule and announces the rule to be that “where the amendment is con¬ 
 sidered as a continuance of so much of the law as is left unchanged 
 in form or substance, or as having taken the place of the original 
 enactment and so incorporated therein, for all purposes, including 
 amendment, a subsequent statute purporting further to amend the 
 original act is to be construed in accordance with the intent of the 
 legislature, as operating on the prior amendment, and effect will be 
 given to it.”®'^ This is now the customary form of an amendatory act, 
 i. e. to amend the original sections without regard to prior amend¬ 
 ments. The reference should be to the original act, naming it, “as 
 amended,” as a recognition of prior amendments, although it will be 
 noticed that reference in the amendatory act in the case last mentioned 
 did not contain these words. It is unnecessary and cumbersome, 
 however, to name all of the amendatory acts as is sometimes done. 
 Section 1 of an act to amend section 12 of the Fees and Salaries Act, 
 is as follows : 
 
 “Section I. Be it enacted, etc.: That section 12 of an Act entitled, 
 ‘An Act concerning fees and salaries and to classify the several counties in 
 this state with reference thereto,’ approved March 29, 1872, in force July 1, 
 1872, title as amended by an Act approved March 26, 1874, in force July 1, 
 1874, as amended by an act approved April 8, 1875, in force July 1, 1875, as 
 amended by an Act approved May 21, 1877, in force July 1, 1877; be, and 
 the same is hereby amended so as to read as follows:”'*® 
 
 The courts of the different states have not been in accord in 
 passing upon acts which amended repealed or void statutes. The 
 early view and the one held in Illinois was that laws which were not 
 in existence could not be amended; therefore a repealed act, which 
 had ceased to exist as law, and a void act which legally never existed, 
 were not subject to amendment.”® The more recent view in many 
 jurisdictions ignores the technical objection to such acts and gives 
 effect, when possible, to the wish of the legislature. There have been 
 but few recent cases in Illinois touching on this question. 
 
 The court, quite evidently, does not approve of amendments to 
 repealed or void laws but is willing to go to some length to accomplish 
 the legislative intent. In an early case the court said emphatically, 
 “It is, of course, true that a void law cannot be amended.”®^ But 
 in that case the court was able to sustain the amendatory act in ques¬ 
 tion on the ground that the principal act was not void but merely 
 inoperative by reason of the failure of the electors of any county to 
 adopt its provisions within the period designated by the act. How¬ 
 ever, in a later case the court says, “The rule is . . . that even though 
 an amendatory act purports to amend a repealed statute, if the in¬ 
 tent of the legislature is clear and unmistakable this intent must gov¬ 
 ern, and the statute will be held to be enacted notwithstanding the 
 mistake of reference to a statute theretofore repealed.”®® The rule 
 
 Villag’e of Melrose Park v. Dunnebecke, 210 Ill. 422 (1904). 
 
 Laws 1919, p. 560. 
 
 See Lewis, Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 23.3. 
 
 People V. Onahan, 170 Ill. 449 (1897). 
 
 38 People V. Morrell, 234 Ill. 47 (1908); see also Patton v. People, 229 Ill. 512 
 (1907). 
 
SI 
 
 laid down is ap])lied to sustain an amendatory act of ;1907 to section 
 15a of the farm drainage law, that section having been repealed by 
 an act of 1901. 
 
 By the same reasoning, it would seem that an unconstitutional 
 law might be amended but apparently this (piestion has not been 
 presented to the court. . In one of the cases which consider amend¬ 
 ments to repealed laws the court quotes a])})rovingly the following 
 statement: “The decided weight of authority and the better opinion 
 is, that an amendatory act is not invalid, though it purport to amend 
 a statute which had ])reviously been amended or for any reason been 
 held invalid.”''’^ Probably the only occasion for amending an uncon¬ 
 stitutional law would be the removal of the constitutional defect. 
 
 Although acts amending void or rej^ealed law\s might he given 
 effect by the court, such legislation is to be condemned. Indeed the 
 court has said that they can be sustained only because “the rule for 
 the guidance of the court is to ascertain the intention of the legisla¬ 
 ture and not their mistakes, either as to law or fact.”^^ Amendments 
 to original sections rather than to prior amendments are sustained on 
 a different ground viz. that the prior amendments have merged into 
 and become part of the original act and therefore the subsequent 
 amendment should properly refer to the original act. 
 
 Attention should be called to a number of other matters con- 
 cerning amendatory bills. An amendment of a section “to read as 
 follows” operates as a repeal of the portions of the original section 
 omitted. As to the portion unchanged, in form or substance, the 
 amendatory act is a mere continuation of the original actd^ Thus 
 the Illinois corporation act of 1872 permitted the consolidation of 
 corporations with certain restrictions, one of which was that “no 
 more than two corporations nozv existing shall be consolidated into 
 one under the provisions hereof.” The section containing this pro¬ 
 vision was amended and re-enacted in 1889 but the words quoted 
 were not changed. It was held that the words “now existing” 
 in the amended section related to 1872 and not to 1889.^^ The 
 amended portion or new matter is effective from the date of the 
 passage of the amendment. An amended statute, however, is con¬ 
 strued as regards any action subsequent to the amendment, just 
 as though it had been enacted originally in its amended form.^^ 
 
 The General Assembly not infrequently passes two or more 
 bills amending the same section or sections of a prior act. In 
 1917 two bills were passed amending sections of the Workmen’s 
 Compensation Act.^^ The next General Assembly passed three acts 
 amending section G1 of the County Act.^^ Of course, the measure 
 last enacted has the effect of repealing all prior amendments of the 
 
 Patton V. People. 229 Ill. 512 (1907). 
 
 Pewis’ STutherlanct. Statutory Construction, Sec. 233, quoted in Patton v. 
 People, 229 Ill. 512 (1907). 
 
 People V. Zito. 237 Ill. 434 (1909). 
 
 •‘2 Barrows v. People’s Gas, Light & Coke Co., 75 Fed. 794 (1895). 
 
 Holbrook V. Nichol, 36 Ill. 161 (1864). 
 
 ■‘'‘Laws 1917, pp. 490, 505. 
 
 45 Laws 1919, pp. 370, 381, 392. 
 
82 
 
 same section or sections whether enacted at the same session or 
 by an earlier General Assemblyd® 
 
 Under the Senate and House rules “it is made the duty of 
 any member introducing a bill proposing an amendment to any 
 statute law of this State to underscore the word or words, compris¬ 
 ing the proposed amendment, and no bill^ shall be printed until 
 such word or words are underscored. All parts of bills which are 
 underscored shall be printed in italics”. The evident purpose is 
 to acquaint the reader with the changes in the section as proposed. 
 The difficulty is that this expedient goes only half way. Fre¬ 
 quently amendments to legislation are accomplished by omission 
 rather than by adding new parts. And if a substitution of new 
 matter for old is made, it is impossible to know exactl}^ the extent 
 of the alteration. Some law-making bodies adopt the further ex¬ 
 pedient of printing omitted portions with-a line drawn through 
 or enclosed in brackets. Substitutions can be shown by printing 
 old matter crossed with a line above the substituted portion which 
 would be italicized. However, the objection can be made that a bill 
 printed in this, manner is somewhat more difficult to read. 
 
 The passage of two or more bills at one session amending the same act 
 is apt to cause some difficulties. The later act repeals the earlier only as 
 
 to the sections which are set out and re-enacted in the second measure. If the 
 
 first amending act amends sections not contained in the subsequent measure or 
 adds new sections, these sections are not expressly repealed. Thus the House 
 bill amending the workmen’s compensation act adds a new section numbered 
 3^/2. The senate bill, approved later, makes no mention of section It. 
 
 therefore, was not repealed by the Senate bill but became effective July 1 
 
 following its passage. But an inspection of section 3^^ shows that it is not 
 in harmony with the Senate bill that became law. In its first sentence it says, 
 “If the plaintiff in any action mentioned in section 3 shall . . . allege that 
 
 the employer has filed notice of his election not to provide and pay compensa¬ 
 tion according to the workmen’s compensation act . . But section 3 as 
 
 last amended applies the provisions of the act automatically and without elec¬ 
 tion to the employers named in that section. Is section 3i/4 repealed by im¬ 
 plication or can it be given effect as a procedural provision applying to causes 
 of action accrued before section 3, as last amended, became effective? 
 
83 
 
 ESSENTIAL POINTS IN BILL DRAFTING. 
 
 Each proposed measure has its own problems and special fea¬ 
 tures. But there are general considerations applicable to bill-drafting 
 which must constantly be borne in mind by the draftsman. The im¬ 
 portance of these points warrants a brief mention. If the draftsman, 
 in constructing a legislative measure, has worked with the following 
 points in mind, his bill at least can become an effective law even 
 though imperfect in form. 
 
 Is the object of the proposed measure within the power of the 
 General Assembly to enact ? 
 
 Do the methods by which the object is sought to be accomplished 
 conform to constitutional requirements? 
 
 What is the present state of the law on that subject? 
 
 Can the desired result be effected by an amendment to some exist¬ 
 ing act ? 
 
 What existing laws will be affected by the proposed legislation? 
 
 Is the proposed measure limited to one subject and purpose? 
 
 Does the title adequately express that subject? 
 
 If the bill is amendatory in form, does it correctly refer to the 
 act amended? 
 
 Do the sections amended in an amendatory bill work an amend¬ 
 ment in effect in other sections not set forth? 
 
 Do the amendments made by an amendatory bill, necessitate an 
 amendment to the title of the original act? 
 
 Is the enacting clause in proper form? 
 
 Does the measure accomplish the legislative purpose? 
 
 If the act is amendatory is the new matter in the amended sections 
 underscored as required by the rules of both Houses of the General 
 Assembly ? 
 
APPENDIX I. FORMS. 
 
 A number of forms for titles and various provisions have been col¬ 
 lected in this chapter for reference purposes. It is not intended to 
 suggest that the examples given are perfect or incapable of improve¬ 
 ment. Some have been taken without change from Illinois statutes. 
 In other cases, the form given is thought to be an improvement. 
 
 Reforms in statutory form are necessarily gradual. The bill-drafter 
 is not always free to use the phraseology he thinks best adapted to the 
 purpose. Always he must reckon with the power of custom firmly 
 established. This seems particularly true in the case of amendatory • 
 bills. There is an established phraseology for the titles and enacting 
 parts of such bills which seems unne.cessarily cumbersome. For ex¬ 
 ample, the usual title for a bill which adds sections to a prior act has 
 been: ‘‘A Bill for an Act to amend an Act entitled, ‘An Act to revise 
 the law in relation to counties,’ approved and in force March 31, 1874, 
 as subsequently amended, by adding two new sections, to be known as 
 Sections 162 and 163.” It may be worth while to point out in detail 
 some possible changes which simplify this language without weakening 
 its effect. 
 
 1. Omit* “newsections added to a statute are necessarily new. 
 
 2. Omit “subsequently”; any amendments must have been subse¬ 
 quent to its passage. 
 
 3. In place of the words, “by adding two sections, to be known 
 as Sections 162 and 163” insert, “by adding Sections 162 and 163.” 
 The last expression means exactly the same as the first. 
 
 4. Since the addition of sections necessarily amends an act, in¬ 
 stead of the words “An act to amend an Act entitled ‘an Act etc.,’ 
 by adding etc.,” say “An Act to add Sections 162 and 163 to an Act en¬ 
 titled, ‘An Act etc.’ ” 
 
 5. Omit the words “an Act entitled.” Refer to the act amended 
 directly by its title in place of making the reference to an act “en¬ 
 titled ‘An Act etc.’ ” The title with this phrase omitted becomes: 
 “A bill for an xA.ct to add Sections 162 and 163 to ‘An Act to revise the 
 law in relation to counties,’ approved and in force March 31, 1874, as 
 amended.” 
 
 Some of the suggested changes may seem radical departures from 
 the usual phraseology and for that reason in the forms for amendatory 
 bills, alternative forms are occasionally given to accomplish the same 
 result. The examples are, after all, merely suggestive, to be im¬ 
 proved rather than to be followed. Uniformity is undoubtedly desir¬ 
 able but it should not be a uniformity of useless and awkward phrase¬ 
 ology. 
 
Titles to Independent Bills. 
 
 A BILL 
 
 For an Act to establish the Illinois State Police. 
 
 A BILL 
 
 « 
 
 For an Act to regulate the exhibition of motion pictures. 
 
 A BILL 
 
 For an Act in relation to corporations for pecuniary profit. 
 
 A BILL 
 
 For an Act to revise the law in relation to deadly weapons. 
 
 Amendatory Bills. 
 
 % 
 
 1. Bill to amend sections,—two forms. 
 
 A BILL 
 
 For an Act to amend Sections 160 and 161 of “An Act to revise 
 the law in relation to counties,” approved and in force March 31, 1874, 
 as amended. 
 
 Section 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, 
 represented in the General Assembly: Sections 160 and 161 of “An 
 Act to revise the law in relation to counties,” approved and in force 
 ’March 31, 1874, as amended, are amended to read as follows: 
 
 Sec. 160. No territory transferred ... 
 
 Sec. 161. The county board . . . 
 
 A BILL 
 
 For an Act to amend Sections 160 and 161 of an Act entitled^' 
 “An Act to revise the law in relation to counties,” approved and in 
 force March 31, 1874, as amended. 
 
 Section 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, 
 represented in the General Assembly: Sections 160 and 161 of an Act 
 entitled “An Act to revise the law in relation to counties,” approved 
 and in force March 31, 1874, as amended, are amended to read as fol- 
 . lows: 
 
 Sec. 160. No territory transferred . . . 
 
 ( 
 
 Sec. 161. The county board . . . 
 
 The second form retains the phrase “An Act Entitled.” These words 
 have been omitted in the other forms for amendatory bills. 
 
2. Bill to add sections,—tzvo forms. 
 
 A BILL 
 
 For an Act to add Sections 7 and 8 to the Game and Fish Code 
 of Illinois^* approved June 24, 1919, in force July 1, 1919. 
 
 Section 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, 
 represented in the General Assembly: Sections 7 and 8 are added to 
 the Game and Fish Code of Illinois, approved June 24, 1919, in force 
 July 1, 1919, these sections to read as follows: 
 
 Sec. 7. It shall be the duty . . . 
 
 Sec. 8. Whoever, hunts, takes or destroys . . . 
 
 A BILL 
 
 For an Act to amend the Game and Fish Code of Illinois, ap¬ 
 proved June 24, 1919, in force July 1, 1919 by adding Sections 7 and 
 8 thereto. 
 
 Section 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, 
 represented in the General Assemby: The Game and Fish Code of 
 Illinois, approved June 24, 1919, in force July 1, 1919, is amended by 
 adding thereto Sections 7 and 8, to read as follows: 
 
 Sec. 7. It shall be the duty . . . 
 
 Sec. 8. Whoever hunts, takes or destroys . . . 
 
 3. Bill to repeal sections. 
 
 A BILL 
 
 For an Act to repeal Sections 168, 169 and 170 of “An Act to 
 revise the law in relation to roads and bridges,” approved June 27, 
 1913, in force July 1, 1913, as amended. 
 
 Section 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, 
 represented in the General Assembly: Sections 168, 169 and 170 of 
 “An Act to revise the law in relation to roads and bridges,” approved 
 June 27, 1913, in force July 1, 1913, as amended, are repealed. 
 
 4. Bill to amend sections and add sections. 
 
 A BILL 
 
 For an Act to am.end Sections 161 and 162 of “An Act to revise 
 the law in relation to roads and bridges,” approved June 27, 1913, in 
 force July 1, 1913, as amended, and to add Section 183 thereto. 
 
 Section 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, 
 represented in the General Assembly: Sections 161 and 162 of “An 
 Act to revise the law in relation to roads and bridges,” approved June 
 27, 1913, in force July 1, 1913, as amended, are amended, and Section 
 182 is added thereto, the amended and additional sections to read as 
 follows: 
 
 Sec. 161. The commissioner of highways . . . 
 
 Sec. 162. In all counties . . . 
 
 Sec. 183. No contract so made .... 
 
 In this instance, the act amended provides a short title by which it may 
 be cited and this short title is used for the reference. 
 
87 
 
 5. Bill to amend some seetions and repeal others. 
 
 A BILL 
 
 For an Act to amend Sections Hil and 162, and to repeal Section 
 183 of “An Act to revise the law in relation to roads and bridges,” 
 approved June 27, 1913, in force July 1, 1913, as amended. 
 
 Section 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, 
 represented in the General Assembly: Sections 161 and 162 of “An 
 Act to revise the law in relation to roads and bridges,” approved June 
 27, 1913, in force July 1, 1913, as amended, are amended to read as 
 follows: 
 
 Sec. 161. The Commissioner of highways . . . 
 
 Sec. 162. In all counties . . . 
 
 Section 2. Section 1*83 of said Act is repealed. 
 
 6. Bill to amend sections and title.^^'^ 
 
 m 
 
 A BILL 
 
 t 
 
 For an Act to amend Sections 2 and 3 and the title of “An Act 
 to revise the law in relation to roads and bridges, approved June 27, 
 1913, in force July 1, 1913, as amended. 
 
 Section 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, 
 represented in the General Assembly: Sections 2 and 3 of “An Act 
 to revise the law in relation to roads and bridges,” approved June 27, 
 1913 in force July 1, 1913, as amended, are amended to read as fol¬ 
 lows : 
 
 Sec. 2. When any part . . . 
 
 Sec. 3. If it shall appear . . . 
 
 Section 2. The title of said Act is amended to read as follows: 
 
 “An Act in relation to roads and bridges.” 
 
 7. Bill to amend sections and title and add and repeal sections. 
 
 A BILL 
 
 For an Act to amend Sections 6 and 7 and the title of “An Act to 
 revise the law in relation to roads and bridges,” approved June 27, 
 1913, in force July 1, 1913, as amended, to add Sections 8 and 9 
 thereto, and to repeal Sections 3 and 4 thereof. 
 
 Section 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, 
 represented in the General Assembly: Sections 6 and 7 of “An Act 
 to revise the law in relation to roads and bridges,” approved June 27, 
 1913, in force July 1, 1913, as amended, are amended and Sections S 
 
 When an amendatory act amends the title of the original act, it prob¬ 
 ably would be preferable to refer to the original act by its title rather than 
 a short title. 
 
88 
 
 and 0, are added thereto, the amended and additional sections to read 
 as follows: 
 
 Sec. G. The terms of the . . . 
 
 Sec. 7. On the first Monday. . . . 
 
 Sec. 8. The nomination . . . 
 
 Sec. 9. The additional judges . . . 
 
 Section 2. The title of said Act is amended to read as follows: 
 “An Act in relation to roads and bridges.” 
 
 Section 3. Sections 3 and 4 of said Act are repealed. 
 
 Amendments to bill after introduction. 
 
 1. AMENDMENT TO PRINTED SENATE BILL NO. 351. 
 
 Amendment No. 1. Amend printed Senate Bill No. 351,®® on 
 page 3, section 2, line 51, by striking the words “twenty cents,” and 
 inserting in lieu thereof the words “seventy-five cents.” 
 
 2. AMENDMENTS TO PRINTED SENATE BILL NO. 117 IN HOUSE. 
 Amendment No. 1. Amend the title of printed Senate Bill No. 
 
 117 in House to read as follows: 
 
 “A bill for an y\ct for the relief of Fred H. Gillett and Thomas 
 J. Sheridan, and making appropriations therefor.”®^ 
 
 Amendment No. 2. Amend printed Senate Bill No. 117 in 
 House by adding thereto Sections 3 and 4, to read as follows: 
 
 “Sec. 3. The sum of $2,000 is appropriated . . . 
 
 Sec. 4. The Auditor of Public Accounts ...” 
 
 Conference Report. 
 
 REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE ON HOUSE BILL NO. 754. 
 
 JUNE 19, 1919. 
 
 To the Honorable: 
 
 The President of the Senate, and 
 
 The Speaker of the House of Representatives. 
 
 We, the undersigned committee of conference, appointed to con¬ 
 sider the differences between the two Blouses in relation to the 
 Senate Amendments to Plouse Bill No. 754, “A bill for an Act, etc,” 
 
 It is customary for each amendment to name the bill amended even though 
 the amendments are given a general title which indicates the bill amended. 
 When there are many amendments to one bill, this repitition becomes tire¬ 
 some. A more desirable form of amendment would be : 
 
 “On page 3, section 2. line 51, strike the words ‘twenty cents,’ and 
 insert in lieu thereof the words ‘seventy-five cents.’ ’’ 
 
 The amendments recommended in the conference report are in this second 
 form. 
 
 If the change made in the title is small, the amendment may strike, insert 
 or add woixls in place of setting out in full the amended title. 'The same 
 thing is true of amendments to the body of a bill. If there are a number of 
 amendments in a comparatively short section, the most convenient form of 
 amendment may be to set out the amended section in full. Several amend¬ 
 ments can sometimes be handled together by striking a line or several lines and 
 inserting new matter. In each instance the form of amendment selected must 
 be determined from a consideration of the particular case. The bill-drafter 
 should keep the amendments as short and simple as possible and at the same 
 time make it easy for a person comparing the bill and its amendments to dis¬ 
 cover the changes that have been made. 
 
89 
 
 beg leave to report that we recommend the following as the action to 
 be taken by the Senate and the House of Representatives, respec¬ 
 tively : 
 
 We recommend that the Senate recede from Senate Amendments 
 Nos. 1, 5, etc. 
 
 We further recommend that the House of Representatives con¬ 
 cur with the Senate in Senate Amendments Nos. 2, 3, 4, etc. 
 
 We further recommend that printed House Bill No. 754 in Senate 
 be amended as follows : 
 
 First: On page 2, section 1, paragraph 4, line 2, strike out 
 “twenty cents” and insert in lieu thereof “fifty cents.” 
 
 All of which is respectfully submitted. 
 
 Dated this 19th day of June, 1919. 
 
 Committee on the part of the Senate. Committee on the part of the House 
 
 of Representatives. 
 
 Provisions authorizing hearings, compelling obedience to subpoenas 
 
 and extending immunity. 
 
 Sec. — The Department may conduct investigations and hearings, 
 subpoena witnesses, issue subpoenas to require the production of books, 
 papers, records and documents which may be needed as evidence of 
 any matter under inquiry, and may administer oaths and affirmations. 
 In the conduct of any investigation or hearing, the Department shall 
 not be bound by the technical rules of evidence, and no informality 
 in the proceeding or in the manner of taking testimony shall invalidate 
 the decision or order of the Department. Service of subpoenas shall 
 be by any sheriff, constable or other person of full age. 
 
 Sec. — If any person who has been properly served, refuses or 
 neglects to appear and testify or to produce relevant books, papers, 
 records or documents, the Department may petition the circuit court 
 of the county in which the hearing is being held for an order re¬ 
 quiring the witness to attend and testify or produce the documentary 
 evidence. The circuit court shall hear the petition and, if it appears 
 to the court that the witness should testify or should produce the 
 documentary evidence may enter an order requiring the witness to 
 obey the subpoena. The court may compel obedience to its order by 
 attachment proceedings, as for contempt of court. 
 
 Sec. — No person shall be excused from giving evidence in any 
 investigation or hearing ordered by the Department, upon the ground 
 that the evidence may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a 
 penalty. But no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to a penalty 
 for any transaction or matter concerning which he has given evidence 
 
90 
 
 
 before the Department. This immunity however, shall extend only 
 to a natural person, who in obedience to a subpoena, gives testimony 
 under oath or produces documentary evidence under oath. 
 
 Sec. — Whoever wilfully testifies falsely to any material fact at 
 any hearing or investigation is guilty of perjury and shall be pun¬ 
 ished accordingly. 
 
 Referendum provision. 
 
 Sec. — Subject to the provisions of Sections — of this act, any 
 town may levy an annual tax of not to exceed three mills on the dol¬ 
 lar for the purpose of etc. This tax shall be levied and collected 
 in the same manner as other general taxes. 
 
 Sec. — Upon the filing with the town clerk of any town of a 
 petition containing the names of not less than fifty legal voters of 
 the town praying that the question of levying this tax be submitted 
 to the voters, the question shall be submitted at the next regular 
 town election, if there is one more than twenty but less than ninety 
 days after the filing of the petition. If there is no regular town 
 election within that period, a special election shall be called not less 
 than thirty nor more than sixty days after the petition has been 
 filed. 
 
 Sec. — The ballots for use in this election shall be in sub¬ 
 stantially the following form. 
 
 For a tax levy of not more than three mills on the 
 dollar for the purpose of etc. 
 
 
 Against a tax levy of not more than three mills on 
 the dollar for the purpose of etc. 
 
 
 If a majority of those voting on the question of levying a tax for 
 the purpose of etc., vote in favor thereof, an annual tax of not to ex¬ 
 ceed three mills on the dollar shall be levied and collected for that 
 purpose. 
 
 Penal provision. 
 
 Sec. — Whoever steals any motor vehicle of a value greater than 
 fifteen dollars, or buys, receives or conceals any such motor vehicle 
 knowing that it has been stolen and with the intent to defraud the 
 owner, is guilty of a felony and shall be fined in any sum not ex¬ 
 ceeding five hundred dollars and imprisoned not less than two years 
 nor more than fifteen years. 
 
91 
 
 Provisions containing prohibitions or imposing duties with penal¬ 
 ties grouped in a later section. 
 
 Sec. — Every owner of a vehicle of the first division shall, within 
 ten days after acquiring it, file in the office, . . . 
 
 Sec. — No motor vehicle or motor bicycle shall be operated . . . 
 
 Sec. — No person shall drive a motor vehicle or motor bicycle 
 upon a public highway in a race. 
 
 Sec.—-Whoever violates the provisions of this act is guilty of 
 a misdemeanor and shall be fined in a sum not to exceed the amounts 
 set forth: 
 
 For a violation of Sections 4, 6, 7 or 8, one hundred dollars. 
 
 For a violation of Section 5, twenty-five dollars. 
 
 Sec. — In case of a continuing violation of any of the provisions 
 of this act, each day’s continuance thereof is a separate ofifense. 
 
 Appropriation provisions. 
 
 Sec. — The sum of $50,000.00 is appropriated to the Depart¬ 
 ment of Public Works and Buildings to carry out the provisions of 
 this act. 
 
 Sec. — This appropriation is subject to the provisions of “An 
 Act in relation to State Finance,” approved June 10, 1919, in force 
 July 1, 1919. 
 
 Take effect clause. 
 
 This Act shall take effect on the first day of*January, 1922. 
 
 Emergency clause. 
 
 Because of an emergency, this Act shall take effect upon its 
 passage. 
 
 Repeal. 
 
 “An Act to secure the enforcement of the law for the prevention 
 of cruelty to animals,” approved May 25, 1877, in force July 1, 
 1877, as amended, is repealed. 
 
92 
 
 APPENDIX II. BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 A Legislative Handbook, Ashton R. Williard; the most useful 
 discussion of American legislative practice, now unfortunately out of 
 print. 
 
 Statute Lazu Making, Chester Lloyd Jones; largely a restatement 
 of Williard and Coode. 
 
 Legislative Methods and Forms and Mechanics of Lava Making, 
 Sir Courtenay Ilbert; two works which constitute the most author¬ 
 itative statement of modern English legislative methods. Of distinct 
 value in this country on many points. 
 
 Practical Legislation, Lord Henry Thring, Parliamentary Coun¬ 
 sel preceding Ilbert: discussion of composition and language of acts 
 of Parliament, 
 
 Theory of Legislation, Jeremy Bentham; of interest chiefly as 
 the first effort along scientific lines to formulate principles for legis¬ 
 lative drafting. 
 
 On Legislative Expression, George Coode; early exposition on 
 the phraseolog}^ of English statutes. 
 
 Statute Lava, William Eeilden Craies; largely a discussion on 
 the interpretation of statutes with some remarks about statute making. 
 
 Statutory Construction, J. G. Sutherland, second edition by John 
 Lewis; the standard work on construction of statutes. 
 
 Constitutional Limitations, Thomas M. Cooley; the standard work 
 on the extent of the power of American legislatures. 
 
 Reports of the Special Committee on Legislative Drafting. This 
 committee of the American Bar Association has been engaged for a 
 number of years in the collection of data concerning style, language, 
 arrangement, operation, methods of regulation, remedial and en¬ 
 forcing provisions and administration. A topical plan for a manual 
 for legislative drafting was prepared some time ago and recently re¬ 
 vised. This plan was an outline with chapter headings. Several of 
 these chapters were written, the subjects being, “Administrative Regu¬ 
 lations”, “Penalties”, and “Provisions for Licensing and Certifica¬ 
 tion”. The committee has discontinued the collection of data and is 
 preparing a final report on the material already collected. 
 
 Statute Lazv Making in lozva. This is the most comprehensive of 
 a number of State publications, a list of which follows. These are 
 mainly of value in the particular State where compiled. 
 
 California, 
 
 Legislative Manual and Form Book. 
 
 Hints on Dravaing Legislative Bills, 
 

 Indiana, 
 
 iS Legislative Bill Drafting. 
 
 Hints on Bill Drafting. 
 
 Scientific Lazv-inaking. 
 
 
 Maryland, 
 
 Scientific Assistance in Lazv Making. 
 
 North Dakota, 
 
 Statute Lazo Making zvitli Suggestions to Draftsmen. 
 
 South Dakota, 
 
 Titles of Laws. 
 
 % 
 
94 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 AMENDATORY LEGISLATION, 75 
 acts expressly amendatory, 79, 85 
 amendment by reference 75 
 incorporation by reference, 77 
 titles, 19, 85 
 
 AMENDMENT BY REFERENCE. 75 
 
 AMENDMENT OF BILLS, 88 
 
 APPROPRIATION 
 form, 91 
 
 mention of, in title, 18 
 
 ARTICLES 
 
 division of bill into, 29 
 headings for, 29 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY, 92 
 
 BILL-DRAFTING 
 essential points, 83 
 general scope, 7 
 
 CONFERENCE REPORT, FORM, 88 
 
 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
 affecting bill-drafting, 7, 9, 11 
 amendatory legislation, 75 
 emergency, 21 
 enacting clause, 32 
 laws effective July 1, 21 
 salary of State officer, 14 
 sidxject, 13 
 title, 15 
 
 CONSTRUCTION STATUTE, 58 
 
 DEFINITIONS, 58 
 
 DETACHED CLAUSES, 34 
 
 DIRECTORY PROVISIONS, 53, 57 
 
 EJUSDEM GENERIS RULE, 41 
 
 EMERGENCY CLAUSE, 21, 27, 91 
 
 ENACTING CLAUSE, 32 
 constitutional provision, 32 
 location, 32 
 
 ESSENTIAL POINTS IN BILL-DRAFTING, 83 
 
 EXPEDIENTS, SELECTION, 7, 9 
 
 EXPRESSIO UNIUS RULE, 42 
 
 FORMS, 84 
 amendatory bills, 85 
 
 amendments to bills in General Assembly, 88 
 conference report, 88 
 provisions 
 appropriation, 91 
 authorizing hearings, etc., 89 
 emergency, 91 
 penal, 90, 91 
 referendum, 90 
 repeal, 91 
 take effect, 91 
 titles 
 
 amendatory, 85 
 independent, 85 
 
 IMPERATIVE PROVISIONS, 53, 54 
 
 INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE, 77 
 
 INDEFI-NITE AND UNCERTAIN STANDARDS, 
 45 
 
 LEGAL PRINCIPLE, CONCEPTION, 7 
 LEGISLATIVE POWER, LIMITATIONS, 7, 9 
 LIBERAL INTERPRETATION PROVISION, 68 
 MANDATORY PROVISIONS, 53, 57 
 “MAY” AND “SHALL”, 53 
 PARTIAL INVALIDITY SECTION, 66 
 
 PENALTIES, 18, 27, 62, 90, 91 
 PERMISSIVE PROVISIONS, 53, 54 
 
 PHRASEOLOGY,'40 
 construction statute, 58 
 definitions, 58 
 expressio imius rule, 42 
 indefinite and uncertain standards, 45 
 “may”, “shall”, 53 
 penal provisions, 18, 27, 62, 90, 91 
 preciseness-ejusdem generis, 41 
 tense, 40 
 use of 
 
 “and”, and “or”, 63 
 
 indirect expressions, 62 
 
 masculine and feminine, 60 
 
 “said”, “such”,* “whatsoever”, etc., 62 
 
 sample forms, 64 
 
 singular and plural, 60 
 
 synonyms, 61 
 
 “that” at beginning of section, 61 
 
95 
 
 
 INDEX—Concluded. 
 
 PRACTICAL FACTORS IN BILL-DRAFTING, 
 70 
 
 act construed as whole, 70 
 influence of other acts, 71, 72 
 influence of common law, 72 
 influence of judicial decisions, 73 
 influence of extraneous facts, 71 
 
 PREAMBLES, 30 
 form of, 30 
 in resolutions, 31 
 when proper, 31 
 
 PRECISENESS, 41 
 PROVISOS, 37 
 PUNCTUATION, 65 
 REFERENDUM, 90 
 REPEALS 
 
 form, 91 . 
 
 general, 68 
 position in hill, 28 
 
 SALARIES OF STATE OFFICERS 
 constitutional provision, 14 
 
 SECTIONS 
 
 division of hill into, 28 
 length, 28 
 ' numbering, 29 
 
 SENTENCES 
 construction, 33 
 detached clauses, 34 
 
 “SHALL” AND “MAY”, 53 
 
 SHORT TITLE, 26 
 
 STATUTES 
 
 problem of constructing, 7 
 
 SUBJECT MATTER, ARRANGEMENT, 23 
 definitions, 26 
 emergency clause, 27 
 equal provisions, 24 
 leading provisions, 24 
 natural sequence, 24, 27 
 repeals, 28 
 short title, 26 
 
 statement of legal case, 26 
 
 . subordinate provisions, 27 
 take effect provision, 27 
 
 SUB.JECT, 13 
 
 salaries of state officers, 14 
 singleness, 13 
 
 TAKE EFFECT PROVISION, 21, 27, 91 
 
 TENSE, 40 
 
 TITLE, 13, 15, 85 
 amendatory,’ 19, 85 
 amendment of 19, 87 
 mention in 
 appropriation, 18 
 penalties, 18 
 referendum, 18 
 rejieal, 18 
 short, 26 
 
 WHEN LAM’S TAKE EFFECT, 21 
 after July 1, 21 
 emergency, 21 
 
 9 
 
 

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