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 STATE OP MICHIGAN 
 
 BULLETIN NO. 3 
 
 ISSUED BY THE 
 
 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD 
 
 LANSING 
 
 EARLY RULINGS OF BOARD 
 
 OPINIONS IN LEADING CASES 
 
 ADMINISTRATION AND PRACTICE 
 RULES OF PROCEDURE 
 
 FORMS AND BLANKS 
 
 DECEMBER, 1913 
 
 Members of Board: 
 
 John E. Kinnane, Chairman; Ora E. Reaves, James A. Kennedy, 
 
 Richard L. Drake, Secretary. 
 
/ 
 
 
STATE OF MICHIGAN 
 
 BULLETIN NO 3 
 
 issued by the 
 
 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD 
 
 LANSING 
 
 EARLY RULINGS OF BOARD 
 
 OPINIONS IN LEADING CASES 
 
 ADMINISTRATION AND PRACTICE 
 RULES OF PROCEDURE 
 
 FORMS AND BLANKS 
 
 DECEMBER, 1913 
 
 Members of Board: 
 
 * 
 
 John E. Kinnane, Chairman; Ora E. Reaves, James A. Kennedy, 
 
 Richard L. Drake, Secretary. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 PROVISIONS AND PROGRESS OF THE LAW. 
 
 This bulletin has been prepared by the Industrial Accident Board in 
 the hope that its contents will be of material assistance to those in¬ 
 terested in the operation and administration of the Compensation Law. 
 It embodies the system of administration and procedure adopted by the 
 Board, and substantially presents the experience of the Board in ad¬ 
 ministering the law from the time it went into effect, September 1, 
 1912, to the date of this bulletin, December 1, 1913. It presents under 
 the head of “Early Rulings of the Board,” the important decisions on 
 administrative and substantive features of the compensation act made 
 during the early period of its administration, and which developed to 
 a large extent the system of administration and construction finally 
 adopted by the Board. This is followed by the more formal opinions 
 of the Board filed in leading cases which were heard and disposed of 
 on Review. It also presents the system of “Administration and Prac¬ 
 tice” adopted by the Board, which is intended to cover at least in a 
 general way the methods and means of conducting and transacting 
 business before the Board in connection with cases or matters that are 
 contested, or that require judicial action. It covers under the head of 
 “Rules of Procedure” the reporting and handling of accidents and all 
 procedure in the adjustment of claims and payment of compensation in 
 cases that do not reach arbitration. It also presents copies of the 
 forms and blanks adopted and used by the Board with appropriate ex¬ 
 planations by notes and otherwise as to their use. It will be seen that 
 the leading purpose of this bulletin is to furnish to those interested in 
 the administration of the law, the means of information as to the 
 rulings of the Board, and all matters of administration, procedure and 
 practice before the Board, as well as in reporting and handling acci¬ 
 dents and the payment of compensation. The Board here wishes to ex¬ 
 press the hope that this bulletin will furnish to those interested in and 
 handling matters under the compensation law the information which 
 heretofore was conveyed by the expensive and laborious method of 
 5 answering thousands of letters of inquiry. 
 
 The Compensation Law has become a most potent factor in the in¬ 
 dustrial and social life of Michigan. More than ten thousand em¬ 
 ployers of labor have accepted the provisions of the law, thus bringing 
 under its operation practically half a million industrial workers in the 
 factories, mines, railways, shops, stores, and other industries through¬ 
 out the state. In addition to these, it also covers the employes of the 
 state itself, of the 84 counties, the 108 cities, 335 villages, 1,245 town¬ 
 ships, and 7,362 school districts of the state. 
 
 The operation of the law with particular reference to the workers 
 under its provisions is further shown by the following facts and figures 
 
4 
 
 taken from the records of the Board, viz.: Total number of accidents 
 reported to date, 21,172; of which number there were 495 fatal, 2,112 
 amputations, 7,150 major (causing disability of eight weeks or more), 
 and 11,415 minor (causing disability of less than eight weeks). It will 
 be noted that under the “Rules of Procedure” adopted by the Board, 
 only “accidents which result in disability continuing for more than one 
 full working day,” and also accidents involving the loss of a member 
 or resulting in death, are reported to the Board; and that the above 
 number of accidents does not include any injury unless its severity was 
 such as to cause at least one full day’s disability. 
 
 During the period that the law has been in operation, there have 
 been 14,413 agreements for compensation filed with and approved by 
 the Board; 266 cases of arbitration; 61 cases heard on Review before 
 the full Board, and 10 appeals to the Supreme Court. 
 
 While the immediate purpose of the law is to provide compensation 
 for industrial accidents, its influence and effect is not limited to that 
 sphere. On the contrary, it has exerted a m«st potent influence in the 
 prevention of industrial accidents. One of the most gratifying results 
 from the operation of the law is the steady decrease in the number of 
 accidents daily occurring throughout the state. One year ago the 
 average was two fatal accidents each day and 100 accidents that were 
 non-fatal. At the present time the average of fatal accidents is less 
 than one per day, and of non-fatal accidents 65. Never before in the 
 history of Michigan has the movement for accident prevention and 
 providing safety devices of every description in the factory, on the rail¬ 
 road, and in the mine, been carried forward with such zeal. Every in¬ 
 dustrial accident in Michigan now costs money, and the provision of the 
 law requiring the employer to furnish medical and hospital services 
 makes costly even the minor accidents where the disability is of such 
 short duration as not to extend into the compensation period. No 
 system for compelling the installation of safety devices and methods, 
 enforcible by penal statutes or executive orders, could bring about the 
 degree of perfection and efficiency along that line which is attained 
 today by many Michigan employers operating under the Compensa¬ 
 tion Law. The fundamental problem in the management of any busi¬ 
 ness enterprise in the industrial world, is to make it pay. Every acci¬ 
 dent now costs the business a fixed or readily ascertainable sum of 
 money, and it is not difficult to persuade the business man or manager 
 to take active measures to prevent such drain when captains of in¬ 
 dustry can see that the large sums of money which go to pay for acci¬ 
 dents can be saved and turned into the profits of the business if such 
 accidents can be prevented, or their number materially lessened, the 
 business instinct is aroused and the energy formerly directed in other 
 lines is turned to the subject of accident prevention. 
 
 Even this tells but part of the story. Employers everywhere are 
 studying the subject of industrial accidents, and are coming to regard 
 them as being largely preventable. It would be unjust to say that the 
 great change in sentiment on this subject and the state wide movement 
 for accident prevention is due solely to the desire of employers to 
 save money. In many cases they have caught the sentiment that is 
 being developed on this subject, and realizing that at best compensa¬ 
 tion is but a poor substitute for life or limb or health lost through the 
 
5 
 
 hazards of industry, they are doing splendid work for the prevention 
 of accidents from unselfish and humane motives. In fact some have 
 become real enthusiasts in the work. The workmen individually and 
 through their organizations are studying the subject of accident pre¬ 
 vention and seeking to do their full share to reduce the number of 
 industrial accidents to the minimum. The schools and civic organiza¬ 
 tions throughout the state are commencing to join the movement, so 
 that on the whole it may be said that the most substantial good re¬ 
 sulting from the law is the great reduction in the number of industrial 
 accidents and the humane spirit aroused. 
 
 For the large degree of success attained by the Compensation Law 
 in this state, much credit is due to the fine spirit shown by the em¬ 
 ployers and their hearty co-operation with the Board in the adminis¬ 
 tration of the Law; and to a like spirit and co-operation on the part 
 of the workingmen of the state. Much credit is also due to the Press 
 of the state for the wide publicity given and the hearty co-operation 
 and interest shown in the work of the Board since the inauguration of 
 the law. 
 
 JOHN E. KINNANE, Chairman , 
 ORA E. REAVES, 
 
 JAMES A. KENNEDY. 
 
 RICHARD L. DRAKE, Secretary. 
 
EARLY RULINGS OF THE BOARD. 
 
 COMMISSION SALESMEN. 
 
 It is the present opinion of the Board that a salesman receiving com¬ 
 mission only is an employe in the meaning of the Act. The fact that 
 his compensation is computed on the basis of sales made instead of on 
 days or weeks spent in the work would be unimportant, as merely being 
 a different method of computing compensation for his work. 
 
 PRESUMING DURATION OF DISABILITY. 
 
 The ruling of the Board as to estimating the duration of disability, 
 is that such estimates cannot be made a basis of settlement, and that 
 the agreement shall include and embrace the sum of the amount to be 
 paid weekly, together with the data by which the sum is arrived at, and 
 that such payments shall continue until the disability ceases. When 
 the disability ceases a final receipt and report is to be filed with the 
 Board closing the matter. 
 
 VIOLATION OF SHOP RULES. 
 
 It is the present opinion of the Board that a mere violation of rules 
 or instructions of the employer would not constitute wilful and in¬ 
 tentional misconduct within the meaning of the act. It would have to 
 be shown at least that the violation was intentional and wilful, and not 
 through inadvertance or inattention. The question as to what consti¬ 
 tutes wilful and intentional misconduct, will in most cases be a ques¬ 
 tion of fact, depending upon the nature of the act complained of and 
 the circumstances surrounding the particular accident. 
 
 POSTING OF NOTICES BY EMPLOYERS. 
 
 On the question of posting notices, no general rule can be laid down 
 that will be applicable to the infinite variety of circumstances and con¬ 
 ditions found in the various industries of the state. The employer 
 should in good faith endeavor to so post these notices as -to effectually 
 bring to the knowledge of his employes the fact that he is operating 
 under the workmen’s compensation law. The provisions directing the 
 manner and place of posting notices found in Sec. 6, Part 1 of the law 
 shall be closely followed, and will be found applicable to the situation 
 in most industries. 
 
INSURANCE COMPANY REPORTING FOR EMPLOYER. 
 
 With reference to the matter of making reports of accidents to the 
 Industrial Accident Board, the law imposes the duty upon the employer 
 .and if the insurance company does the reporting for him it does it sub¬ 
 stantially as his agent or representative. The burden of making the 
 report is placed on the employer and the liability for failing to report 
 falls also upon the employer, and in case of failure to report prosecution 
 for the penalty would have to be had directly against the employer. If 
 the insurance companies do this work of making reports for the em¬ 
 ployers with the usual efficiency and regularity with which they handle 
 business, we think the work so done would be acceptable to the Board. 
 
 POSTING OF NOTICES BY MUNICIPALITIES. 
 
 It is the present opinion of the Board that the posting of notices in 
 case of a building erected for a municipality, as stated in your letter, 
 is not necessary or contemplated by the law. The municipality comes 
 under the provisions of the law not bv election but by force of the statute 
 itself. All persons dealing with a municipality are bound to take notice 
 of this fact, just the same as they are bound to take notice of any other 
 law which by its own force becomes binding and operative. The office 
 and purpose of the notices to be posted under certain provisions of the 
 law is to bring to the employe knowledge and notice not of the law 
 itself, but of the action taken by the employer, to-wit, his election to be 
 subject to its provisions. 
 
 INJURY AGGRAVATED BY DISEASE. 
 
 Claimed by employer that injured employe was afflicted with disease which 
 aggravated wound to eve caused by flying piece of rock. Claimed that disease 
 and not injury caused loss of eye. Held, ;hat existence of disease generally does 
 not relieve employer of obligation to pay. 
 
 It is held that where a man receives an injury which results seri¬ 
 ously on account of some latent disease in the system, that the fact of the 
 existence of.such disease does not relieve the employer from the obliga¬ 
 tion to pay for the injury that results. This rule is based upon the 
 principle that we are dealing in actual business life with the average 
 man, and not with the perfect man. It is the present opinion of the 
 Board that the English and German rule should be applied in this case. 
 
 PARTIAL INCAPACITY AFTER FOURTEEN DAYS. 
 
 The employe was totally incapacitated for fourteen days and returned to work 
 on the fifteenth day at a reduction of wages. He has received 50 % of his loss 
 in salary for six weeks and the question that arises is, should he receive com¬ 
 pensation for the first two weeks, and if so, how much? 
 
 It is the opinion of the Industrial Accident Board that inasmuch as 
 
8 
 
 the incapacity resulting from the accident (part being total and rest 
 partial disability) continued for more than eight weeks, as it did under 
 your statement, the employe would be entitled to compensation for the 
 first two weeks under Section 3 of Part II of the Act. Inasmuch as 
 the disability for the first two weeks was total, it is the opinion of the 
 Board that for said first two weeks he should receive compensation 
 for total disability. 
 
 COMPENSATION NOT PAYABLE TO ADMINISTRATOR. 
 
 There is no provision of the compensation law authorizing the pay¬ 
 ment of compensation in death cases to an administrator of the estate 
 of a deceased employe. The statutes of this state commonly known as 
 the “death act” and the “survival act” expressly provide for suit and 
 recovery by an administrator in cases brought for causing wrongful 
 death, under the above acts respectively, but this right of the admin¬ 
 istrator is created by such statutes. Such administrator has no right 
 to claim or receive any compensation payable under Act No. 10 Public 
 Acts of 1912. The act expressly provides that in death cases the com¬ 
 pensation shall be paid to the dependents of the employe, and such pay¬ 
 ments shall be made direct to them without the intervention of an ad¬ 
 ministrator or trustee. In case any of such dependents are, minors or 
 mentally incompetent, a guardian may be appointed by the proper 
 Probate Court. 
 
 LIABILITY OF BOAT OWNERS. 
 
 With reference to an election under the Compensation Law, the owner¬ 
 ship of the boat set forth in your letter raises a novel question. Under 
 the Admiralty Law the boat is treated as the unit and it is held liable 
 for contracts, debts and obligations and all suits and actions to enforce 
 same are brought against the boat, irrespective of its ownership. It 
 would seem that to bring the boat under the Compensation Law, the ac¬ 
 ceptance of one or more of the part owners of the boat would not suffice. 
 The acceptance of the individual owners of undivided shares of the 
 boat apparently would have the effect of bringing such owners under 
 the Compensation Law, but there is much doubt as to whether such ac¬ 
 tions would bring the boat under the provisions of the Compensation 
 Law. If all of the owners of the boat would unite in signing an ac¬ 
 ceptance for and on behalf of the boat, of the Compensation Law, it un¬ 
 doubtedly would be valid to bring the boat under the provisions of the 
 Law. 
 
 NEGLECT TO PROPERLY CARE FOR INJURY. 
 
 In this case it was claimed that the employe received a slight cut on 
 the finger and neglected to have the same treated. Infection set in 
 and the employer applied to the Board to be relieved from liability for 
 loss of the finger or hand, as the case might be, alleging that no further 
 
9 
 
 trouble would have been experienced had the employe accepted proper 
 medical treatment. Held by the Board, that the case stated was one 
 of fact rather than law and the Board would not assume to pass upon 
 it until claim was made for the injury and a full hearing had. In most 
 cases where it is claimed that the disability or loss of a member by the 
 employe was caused by his refusal to accept proper medical treatment, 
 or to properly care for the injury, the facts are more or less in dispute, 
 and the final determination of the question will depend largely upon 
 the facts established at the hearing. No rule can be laid down in ad¬ 
 vance that will govern or dispose of such cases, as each of them would 
 have to stand on its own merits. 
 
 PAYMENTS TO BE MADE WEEKLY. 
 
 The Board has carefully considered the question raised by a consider¬ 
 able number of employers of labor in the State, as to whether payments 
 of compensation under the law may not be made monthly or bi-weekly 
 instead of being made in weekly payments. The provision of the law 
 is plain requiring such payments to be made weekly. There is no power 
 vested in the Board to suspend or modify this provision of the law or 
 to substitute for it bi-weekly, monthly or quarterly payments. From the 
 language used throughout the Act, it seems apparent that the clear pur¬ 
 pose of the legislature was to provide that compensation receivable under 
 this law should go to the persons or families entitled to the same in 
 weekly payments, and that it was the opinion of the legislature that com¬ 
 pensation paid weekly would more effectually meet the wants and relieve 
 the distress of injured employes and their families than of a greater in¬ 
 terval of time elapsed between such payments. The question of changing 
 the time of making payments is one for the legislature, if there is real 
 ground for complaint on account of the present provisions. 
 
 METHOD OF PAYING COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF MORE 
 
 THAN ONE FINGER. 
 
 Injured employe lost index (35 weeks), second (30 weeks) and third (20 weeks) 
 fingers. Question raised as to whether payment should be made at the rate of 
 50% of wages for each finger each week or 50% of salary for 85 weeks. Held, 
 that latter is correct method. 
 
 The Industrial Accident Board has considered the question as to the 
 manner of payment in a case where three fingers are lost by an accident 
 to an employe. The conclusion reached by the Board is that the rate 
 of payment in such a case is one-lialf of the weekly wages of such em¬ 
 ploye, and that the number of weeks for which such weekly payments 
 shall continue is to be determined by the number of fingers and the 
 schedule of compensation for the particular fingers lost. There is no 
 provision of law by which more than Ten ($10.00) Dollars per week 
 could be paid, and this fact would make improbable and unworkable 
 the theory that weekly payments for each finger lost should be made 
 each week, continuing until the claim of the less valuable fingers drop 
 2 
 
10 
 
 out of the account, and until the one most valuable is fully paid for. 
 The same rule would apply in case of toes or other members. 
 
 PARTIAL DISABILITY; DUTY TO SEEK EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 An employe who is recovering from an injury, and who has recovered 
 so far that the disability is only partial, cannot reasonably be required 
 in his partially disabled condition to go among strangers looking for 
 work. Such requirement would not be reasonable, and the probabilities 
 of his obtaining work if required to so seek it would be very remote. 
 On the other hand if his employer has work suitable for him to per¬ 
 form in his partially disabled condition, and which he can do without 
 causing suffering or inconvenience, and offers to give him such work, 
 then it is the duty of such employe to accept the work tendered and 
 thereby reduce the liability for compensation. That if the employer 
 has no such suitable work, or having such work fails to tender it to 
 the injured employe, the compensation cannot be reduced upon the 
 theory that there are classes of work which he is able to do and which 
 he might obtain perhaps if he diligently sought for it, and which on 
 the other hand he might not be able to obtain at all. 
 
 LUMP SETTLEMENT DURING DISABILITY. 
 
 The employe’s hand was severely injured and the ultimate result of 
 the injury uncertain. The employe and employer desire to enter into 
 an agreement as to the probable period of disability and make settle¬ 
 ment therefor by a lump sum payment. Held that the Board will not 
 approve settlement where period of disability is presumed or estimated. 
 
 As a result of the injury, the employe’s right hand has been rendered 
 practically useless, but there is a prospect of making the hand useful, 
 and perhaps as good as ever, by a surgical operation. However, the 
 Board cannot act upon probable results of such operation, and cannot 
 make an order that will discharge entirely the employer from liability 
 upon any showing as to the prospects of removing the disability that 
 now exists. Time alone will determine whether such disability can be 
 removed. The Board advises that the employer advance enough money 
 to defray the expense of the proposed operation. If such operation is 
 successful and removes the disability both the employer and employe 
 will be benefited. 
 
 RE-EMPLOYMENT NO PART OF SETTLEMENT. 
 
 After the employe in question recovered from a serious injury a settlement was 
 proposed for less than the full amount of compensation provided for in the 
 law, the further consideration for such settlement being that the employe was 
 to be reinstated by the employer to the position which he occupied before the 
 injury. When this proposed settlement was submitted by the employer, approval 
 was refused for the following reasons: 
 
 By the Board: The matter of reinstating an employe to the position 
 
11 
 
 he occupied before the injury should not enter into the matter of settle¬ 
 ment and cannot, under the law, be in any way considered by the Board. 
 When an accident occurs to an employe as in this case, causing the loss 
 of certain fingers, you immediately become indebted to such injured 
 employe for an amount fixed by the law, which indebtedness it becomes 
 your duty to honorably discharge by payment. In such case, if you 
 discriminate against the injured employe by refusing to reinstate him 
 with your company because he insisted on the payment of the amount 
 so due him for the injury, such action on your part would be morally 
 and legally wrong. 
 
 MINERS RECEIVING PART PAY IN SUPPLIES. 
 
 Miners in the coal region are accustomed to buy supplies from the company. 
 A form of ticket is issued and the amount of purchases is deducted from the 
 miner’s earnings. When supplies are purchased from time to time the amount 
 is punched in the ticket. Question: Is the rate of compensation in case of an 
 injury to a coal miner to be based on his earnings less the cost of supplies so 
 purchased? 
 
 By the Board: “As a general proposition, the amount of money the 
 miner is entitled to receive for the work he does constitutes his wages 
 or earnings. If he gets from the company during the week articles of 
 clothing, tobacco, etc., and the same are charged against and deducted 
 from his wages for that week, this would not constitute a reduction of 
 the amount of money earned by the miner during the week, but would 
 merely be the spending of a portion of the amount earned. In general, 
 it seems that this same rule would apply to other and different articles 
 furnished a miner from the company’s store and charged and deducted 
 from his wages. This might perhaps be modified by the contract or 
 scale in force between the miners and the company, if there are any 
 agreements in such scale that would have the effect of causing such 
 modification, which we do not assume to decide. There may be special 
 circumstances also in some cases, and in all disputed cases the parties 
 on both sides will be given a full hearing both on the facts and the 
 law, before the Board will render a final decision.” 
 
 MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL TICKETS. 
 
 Under the law the employer is liable for the first three weeks medical 
 and hospital service and medicine, when the same are needed. The 
 employer cannot avoid his duty in this respect by deducting from the 
 wages of his employe small sums of money at intervals to pay for a 
 hospital ticket or membership in a hospital or medical association 
 which is to furnish the above service in case of accident. The effect of 
 such procedure would be to shift the burden of paying for such service 
 from the employer to the employe. In this case the hospital ticket 
 was paid for by money deducted from the wages of the employe, and 
 when injured, the medical and hospital service was furnished through 
 said ticket and membership. The physicians and hospital have already 
 been paid through the ticket, and therefore they have no further claim. 
 
12 
 
 The employe in fact paid for the hospital and medical service, and the 
 fact that he paid for the same through a hospital ticket or some hospi¬ 
 tal organization, is no concern to the employer. The employe bought 
 and paid for it, and owned it as much as his coat or hat. It therefore 
 seems to leave the plain question of the employer paying to the injured 
 employe the reasonable value of the medical and hospital treatment 
 which he received during the first three weeks following the injury. 
 The employer is liable for the payment of the same, in the opinion of 
 the Board, and the case is not essentially different from what it would 
 be if the injured employe had in fact paid the regular rates for such 
 hospital and medical service at the time the same were furnished. 
 
 PAYMENT OF HOSPITAL EXPENSE AFTER FIRST THREE 
 
 WEEKS. 
 
 In this case the injured employe was being treated at the hospital and could 
 not be discharged at the end of the first three weeks. The hospital authorities 
 wish to know the source from which they are to be paid for further service ren¬ 
 dered. The employer writes a,s follows: “It was agreed that we withhold pay¬ 
 ment of the weekly compensation until such a time as the injured could be dis¬ 
 charged. We would then pay the first three weeks ourselves, and for the re¬ 
 maining time we would pay the hospital from the amount of the employe’s week¬ 
 ly compensation, and then turn over to him the balance, if any.” 
 
 By the Board: “The Industrial Accident Board feels that your sug¬ 
 gestion to withhold payment of weekly compensation and to pay hospi¬ 
 tal and medical charges after the'first three weeks therefrom, and then 
 turn over the balance, if any, to the injured employe, cannot be ap¬ 
 proved by the Board. If you will consider for a moment the rights 
 of the injured man granted to him by the statute, we think that it will 
 be apparent that neither your company nor the Industrial Accident 
 Board have any power to expend or appropriate the money to which 
 he is entitled for compensation. The law provides that this compensa¬ 
 tion shall be paid direct to the injured man and this Board has abso¬ 
 lutely no power to divert such payment from him or authorize it to be 
 done. We think that the payment by you of any part of this compensa¬ 
 tion to the hospital, or to the doctors or others, would be no defense to 
 a claim for such compensation that the injured man might afterwards 
 assert against you. The injured man is entitled to payment of com¬ 
 pensation without waiting for his recovery or for an adjudication of 
 the amount, and if it is paid he will in most cases be able to make 
 provision for his treatment and care.” 
 
 WILFUL NEGLIGENCE, WHAT CONSTITUTES. 
 
 Employers Statement: “Krause and his partner brought their car to the 
 shaft and dumped it into the skip. His partner then rang the bell and started 
 back with the empty car, supposing that Krause was following him, but instead 
 of doing so he deliberately stepped between the rails, probably not over five 
 or six feet in front of the skip, to get some water which is running down the 
 shaft, in order to fill his lamp, with the result that the skip ran over him and 
 cut off one foot. In this connection will say that it is absolutely unnecessary 
 for a man to get water where he attempted to do so as a place is provided with 
 
13 
 
 a tin can, at one side of the shaft, for the purpose of providing water for the 
 lamps the men use. In this case Krause was solely to blame for being hurt, as 
 it was in no way due to negligence on the part of the company, a fellow employe 
 or the natural dangers incident to the business of mining, and we would like 
 to know if this accident would be considered wilful and intentional misconduct." 
 
 By the Board: The question as to what constitutes intentional or 
 wilful misconduct within the meaning of the compensation law is gen¬ 
 erally a mixed question of law and fact, and no final decision upon any 
 such question could be reached by the Board until both parties are 
 given full hearing. However, the Board is of the opinion that the state¬ 
 ment of facts contained in your letter does not necessarily show inten¬ 
 tional or wilful misconduct. The injured may have stepped in front of 
 the skip through thoughtlessness or inattention, and may have been 
 imprudent in doing so or even negligent, but none of these constitute in¬ 
 tentional or wilful misconduct within the meaning of the compensation 
 law. Under a like provision in the Wisconsin statute the following 
 rule has been laid down, viz.: “To be guilty of wilful misconduct 
 which will defeat compensation, the person so guilty must have know¬ 
 ingly and intentionally done wrong. The mere doing of the wrong 
 thing, or the right thing in the wrong way will not defeat compensation. 
 It is the conscious and intentional wrong doing which constitutes mis¬ 
 conduct.^ 
 
 LOSS OF USEFULNESS OF MEMBER. 
 
 The question in this case relates to the payment of a specific amount for the 
 loss of a portion of a finger, claimed to be less than one phalange. The em¬ 
 ployer contended that the point of amputation was controlling. 
 
 By the Board: The action of' the surgeon in amputating a finger, 
 or in failing to amputate it, or in choosing the point of amputation 
 is not controlling in all cases of this kind. Each case depends for 
 its decision upon the particular facts relating to the finger, and these 
 might relate to the point of amputation, or the fact that the finger or 
 a portion thereof had been rendered useless without being amputated. 
 The statute relative to the loss of the first phalange cannot reasonably 
 be construed to apply only in cases where the finger is unjointed and 
 the amputation is precisely on the joint. The place of amputation 
 should be determined on the principles of what constitutes good sur¬ 
 gery, the controlling thought being to obtain the best result for the in¬ 
 jured person. This might result in the point of amputation being a 
 little below or a little above the first joint. If the loss, in case of such 
 amputation, is substantially the first phalange, it should be treated as 
 such even though in some cases it was a trifle more and in others a 
 trifle less. The real test in such cases is, as to whether, by reason of 
 the amputation, the injured person has lost all that is useful of the 
 first phalange. The Board is further of the opinion that in case no 
 part of the finger is amputated and the injury is such as to entirely de¬ 
 stroy the usefulness of the first phalange or the entire finger, in that 
 event the injured person has lost the first phalange or the finger, as 
 the case may be, as completely as if the same had been amputated. 
 
14 
 
 COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF MEMBERS DOES NOT DEPEND 
 
 ON LOSS OF TIME. 
 
 The injured employe lost two fingers, which under the provisions of the Michi¬ 
 gan statute is deemed equivalent to disability for 65 weeks. He in fact returned 
 to work some three weeks after the accident, resuming his accustomed occupa¬ 
 tion at the same wages as before the injury. The employer objects to paying the 
 65 weeks’ compensation, and is of the opinion that the specific amount pro¬ 
 vided for the loss of said fingers should not be paid in this case because the em¬ 
 ploye is earning the same wages as before the accident. 
 
 By the Board: “Under the statement of facts in your letter the in¬ 
 jured employe is entitled to receive $10.00 per week for a period of 65 
 weeks, such payments to be made weekly. The moment that the acci¬ 
 dent occurred, causing the loss of fingers as stated the company became 
 indebted to him in the sum of $650.00, payable weekly as above, and his 
 right to receive said sum in compensation for the loss of his fingers 
 does not depend on his loss of time and whether he returns to work or 
 the wages he receives thereafter. The law is so framed because of the 
 fact that throughout the remainder of his life he will be deprived of the 
 fingers so lost. The Industrial Accident Board has no authority to 
 either vary or waive the expressed provision of this law. The law im¬ 
 poses upon the Board the duty to see that the law is carried out in 
 every respect, and does not permit any compromises to be made. While 
 the injury may not keep the employe from his work for any consider¬ 
 able length of time, still the injury will result in his being handicapped 
 by being deprived of the fingers so lost for the remainder of his life, 
 and the law expressly fixes the sum that he is entitled to receive as 
 compensation for such loss without reference to his employment or sub¬ 
 sequent relations to his employer.” 
 
 PLACE OF MAKING PAYMENT. 
 
 Questions as to the manner and place of making weekly payments 
 under the compensation law to injured employes have arisen in so many 
 cases, a general ruling by the Board on the point seems desirable. In 
 some instances complaint is made by persons receiving compensation 
 that they are required to go an unreasonable distance to the place of 
 payment designated by the employer, and that much time and effort 
 each week is thus expended in going to and from such place of pay¬ 
 ment. The compensation law is silent as to the place of payment, the 
 language of the statute being, “The employer shall pay or cause to be 
 paid to the injured employe, etc.” The obligation to make payment 
 being imposed by law on the employer without specifying the manner 
 and place of payment, the common law rule established in Michigan 
 and elsewhere would apply, and this rule requires that payments be 
 made at the place where the person entitled to receive such payment 
 resides. 30 Cyc, page 1185; McIntyre vs. Michigan State Ins. Co. 52 
 Mich. 194. 
 
 It is the opinion of the Board that all friction on this point should be 
 avoided as far as possible by mutual arrangement between employer and 
 
15 
 
 employe as to the place of payment, and that neither should be arbitrary 
 or unreasonable in the matter. Pointing out in this manner the legal 
 rights of the employe entitled to receive weekly payments of compensa¬ 
 tion will no doubt cause the removal of any arbitrary requirements by 
 employers as to the place of payment, and thereby remove the apparently 
 needless friction that has arisen in that regard. 
 
 Some employers and some of the liability companies have already 
 adopted a payment voucher, similar in kind to those which have long 
 been used by fire insurance companies for payment of losses, having 
 attached duplicate receipts. The payee must indorse the voucher and 
 sign the receipts before the same can be cashed, and in practice the 
 genuineness of such signature is in most cases guaranteed by local banks 
 and business men through whose hands the voucher passes. When the 
 voucher is returned paid, one of the receipts can be filed by the em¬ 
 ployer and the other sent to the Industrial Accident Board. This plan 
 seems to furnish a system for making payments of compensation through 
 the mails which is apparently safe and satisfactory to all parties. 
 
 PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION TO MINORS. 
 
 The question has been frequently raised before the Industrial Acci¬ 
 dent Board as to whether a guardian should be appointed before pay¬ 
 ment of compensation can be made to an injured employe who is under 
 21 years of age. A large number of cases have arisen where the injured 
 employes are minors and in some of these cases the injuries were com¬ 
 paratively slight and the compensation would scarcely more than pay 
 the expense of a guardianship. The Board has carefully examined the 
 provisions of the statute upon this point, and has reached the conclu¬ 
 sion that in the majority of cases at least the compensation should be 
 paid direct to the injured minor. The provision of the law upon which 
 this conclusion is based'is found in subdivision 2, section 7 of part 1 of 
 the act, and is as follows: 
 
 “Including minors who are legally permitted to work under the 
 laws of the State, who, for the purposes of this act, shall he con¬ 
 sidered the same and hare the same power to contract as adult 
 employes” 
 
 The evident purpose of this provision of the statute was to avoid all 
 unnecessary delay and expense to minors in the collection of and re¬ 
 ceipting for compensation to which they might become entitled. This, 
 of course, contemplates that the payments of compensation will be made 
 strictly in accordance with the statute, in weekly installments, and will 
 go to the injured minor in substantially the same manner in which his 
 wages were paid before his injury, without the intervention of a guard¬ 
 ian or trustee. In cases where any question arises between the injured 
 minor and his parents, we think the matter can be readily arranged 
 so as to have the receipts for compensation signed by the parents as 
 well as by the injured minor. It seems to be the plain intention of 
 the act to make the payments of compensation to injured minors a 
 
16 
 
 matter as simple and expeditious as was the payment of their wages 
 before the injury. 
 
 The provisions of section 14, part 3, of the Compensation Law are 
 not necessarily in conflict with the above construction. The latter sec¬ 
 tion was intended to apply in cases where the injury resulted in the 
 mental incompetency of the employe, and in death cases where the de¬ 
 pendents are minors, as in these cases a guardian or next friend would 
 be clearly necessary. The legislature has power to fix the age at which 
 a person becomes competent to enter into contracts and transact busi¬ 
 ness, and there seems to be no legal reason why that age should not be 
 fixed below 21 years with reference to the operation of this particular 
 act and collection and receipting for compensation thereunder. 
 
 • ELECTION, WHEN EMPLOYE SUBJECT. 
 
 We have examined the provisions of section 8 as to the employe being 
 subject to the provisions of Act No. 10 of Public Acts of 1912, with 
 special reference to the thirty-day provision in subdivision 2 thereof. 
 
 Our conclusions are as follows: 
 
 That the acceptance of the employer is a first requisite to the em¬ 
 ploye coming under the act. In addition to the acceptance by the em¬ 
 ployer the following is required in order to bring the employe under 
 the provisions of the act: 
 
 (1) That employe did not at hiring give notice in writing of 
 election not to be subject to act; or 
 
 (2) In case of an old employe, whose contract of hiring ante¬ 
 dates the employer’s acceptance, such employe gives notice in writ¬ 
 ing of election to be subject to the provisions of the act; or 
 
 (3) In case of an old employe as above, after employer has 
 accepted and posted notices, continuing to work without express¬ 
 ing his election either way for a period of thirty days or more. 
 
 The evident intent of the law is as follows: 
 
 (a) Where a man comes to a factory working under the act with 
 notices posted, etc., seeks and secures employment, walks into the shop 
 and sees the posters, and does not go back to the office and sign and 
 serve a notice that he elects not to come under the act, is deemed to have 
 accepted it and acquiesced to the conditions of employment in the in¬ 
 institution where he goes to work. 
 
 (b) In case of an old employe working in a shop, and while so em¬ 
 ployed notices are posted announcing that the employer has accepted the 
 law, etc., if the foreman comes round and passes out his blank accept¬ 
 ances to be signed by the men who desire to come under it, and the em¬ 
 ploye signs it and files with the employer his written acceptance of the 
 law, then such employe is subject to the law, and becomes subject to 
 it from the time he signs and delivers to his employer such acceptance. 
 
 (c) That in case of an old employe, who when notices are posted in’ 
 the shop as above, continues to work without giving notice that he 
 
17 
 
 iinll be subject or that he will not be subject to the law, and so con¬ 
 tinues to work for a period of thirty days, then his action in continuing 
 to work for such period of time is equivalent to an actual acceptance, 
 and he is deemed subject to the law. But if he is injured after having 
 continued to work twenty days as above, then we think he would retain 
 the right to decide whether to make claim under the Common Law or 
 under the Compensation Law. If he made claim under the Common 
 Law and brought suit, the employer would retain his former defenses, 
 the same as if the employe had made his election not to come under 
 the act before the time of his injury. 
 
18 
 
 
 OPINIONS OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD IN 
 LEADING CASES HEARD ON REVIEW. 
 
 MEDICAL SERVICES RENDERED MORE THAN THREE WEEKS 
 
 AFTER ACCIDENT. 
 
 In re HARRY HART. 
 
 Claimant was injured while in the exercise of his ordinary duties, but serious 
 effects did not develop until more than eight weeks after the accident occurred. 
 Payment for medical and hospital services was disputed on the ground that 
 such services were rendered more than three weeks after the accident. 
 
 Held: 1. Sec. 4, Part 2, of the Compensation Act, an employer shall furnish 
 the injured employe medical and hospital service not exceeding three weeks in 
 point of time, and the commencement of such service should be at the time the 
 injury requires it. 
 
 2. The words, “injury” and “accident” as used in the act are distinguished 
 thus: the “accident” is the CAUSE of the “injury” and the time is computed 
 from the date of the injury resulting from an accident. 
 
 The question as to the liability of an employer to pay for the hospital 
 and medical services furnished the injured employe is involved in this 
 case. The employe, Harry Hart, on November 16, 1912, while acting in 
 the course of his employment, caught hold of and attempted to stop a 
 barrel of sugar which was rolling down a slight incline. His effort in 
 stopping it caused a strain or rupture in the groin. He experienced some 
 pain at the time, but it did not appear to be serious, and he kept on 
 at work until January 6, when the hernia became more clearly devel¬ 
 oped and its condition so serious that it necessitated an operation. The 
 operation was successful and he returned to work three weeks after the 
 sixth of January fully recovered. The doctor’s bill for the operation is 
 disputed by the employer upon the ground that it was incurred more 
 than three weeks after the injury. 
 
 The determination of this question involves the construction of Sec¬ 
 tion 4, Part 2 of the Compensation Act, which is as follows: 
 
 “During the first three weeks after the injury the employer shall 
 furnish, or cause to be furnished, reasonable medical and hospital ser¬ 
 vices and medicines when they are needed.” 
 
 The claim is made on the part of the employer that the injury having 
 occurred on November 16, the three weeks during which medical and 
 hospital service is required to be furnished commenced on that date, and 
 such three weeks’ period had expired before any part of the medical 
 and hospital service claimed for in this case was rendered. In the 
 opinion of the Board it is the clear intent of the law that in all cases 
 the employer shall furnish the injured employe hospital and medical 
 service if the injury requires such, but not exceeding three weeks in 
 point of time. That the commencement of such service to be furnished 
 
19 
 
 should be at the time when the injury requires it, which. in a vast ma¬ 
 jority of cases is immediately following the accident. There are, how¬ 
 ever, certain kinds of accidents where the injury or disability does not 
 develop or become serious until some time after the accident occurs and 
 the medical and hospital service in this class of cases is not required im¬ 
 mediately after the accident, but becomes necessary at a later time. It 
 seems apparent that it was not the legislative intent to deprive persons 
 sustaining injuries of the kind last above mentioned of such medical 
 and hospital service for the mere reason that the disability did not im¬ 
 mediately follow the accident; and from a careful examination of the 
 language of the statute we are of the opinion that such construction is 
 not required. The language used in the statute is “during the first three 
 weeks after the injury.” The word “injury” in its ordinary signification 
 is distinguished from the word “accident,” and differs materially from it 
 in meaning. The word “accident” is generally used to designate the 
 cause, and the word “injury” is used to designate the effect. The effect 
 of the accident, (which is the injury) may be and generally is immediate, 
 but in a considerable number of cases the effect of the accident (which 
 is the injury) does not immediately follow in point of time, but devel¬ 
 ops and produces disability at a later time, in some instances weeks or 
 months after the accident. It is apparent that if we give the word 
 “injury,” its ordinary significance as distinguished from accident, the 
 “first three weeks after the injury” would commence to run from the 
 time the accident in cases like this produces the actual disability re¬ 
 quiring medical or hospital service. We hold in this case that such service 
 should be paid for by the employer. 
 
 KEYES-DAVIS COMPANY vs. LEE E. ALDERDYCE. 
 
 LIABILITY FOR ACCIDENT OCCURRING OUTSIDE OF THE STATE. 
 
 Respondent was employed as a traveling salesman by applicant, and was in¬ 
 jured in Buffalo, N. Y., while in the active discharge of his duties. 
 
 Held: That respondent is not entitled to compensation, on the ground that 
 the provisions of the compensation law do not cover accidents occuring outside 
 of the state of Michigan, even though both parties are residents of this state. 
 
 Application of Keyes-Davis Company for ruling on question of injury occurred 
 in another state. Both parties stipulated the facts and waived arbitration pro¬ 
 ceedings and case was heard by full board. 
 
 • The applicant and respondent are both residents of Battle Creek, 
 Michigan. The respondent was in the employ of the applicant as a 
 traveling salesman, and was injured at Buffalo, New York, by a fall 
 received in the office of the Larkin Company, where he was on the 
 business of his employer. The sole question involved in this case is 
 whether the Michigan Workmen’s Compensation Law is operative be¬ 
 yond the boundaries of the State of Michigan. The applicant contends 
 that it is not and that there is no liability for the payment of compensa¬ 
 tion for an accident occurring outside of the state. 
 
 It is a general rule of law that every statute is confined in its opera- 
 
20 
 
 tions, to persons, property and rights which are within the jurisdiction 
 of the legislature which enacted it; and if a citizen of the state leaves 
 it and goes into another state he is left to the protection of the laws of 
 the latter state. 
 
 Black on Interpretation of Laws, Page 91; 
 
 Lewis Sutherland’s Statutory Construction, Sections IB and 14. 
 
 This, however, seems to be based upon a rule of statutory construc¬ 
 tion, rather than upon a lack of legislative power to make such a law 
 operative outside the limits of the state. Under this rule of construc¬ 
 tion there is a strong presumption in case of every statute that it is 
 intended to operate and be effective only within the limits of the state 
 or country which enacted it, and in the absence of evidence in the law 
 itself that it was intended to have an extra-territorial operation, the 
 presumption seems to be conclusive. 
 
 From our examination of the Michigan Workmen’s Compensation 
 Law we find no internal evidence of an intent that the law should be 
 operative outside of the boundaries of Michigan. The language used in 
 the act is general and broad enough to include injuries occurring with¬ 
 out the state, but under the above rule of construction such general 
 language is limited and held to be intended for application only to 
 persons, property and rights within the state. There is another feature 
 of the act which reinforces this position and indicates affirmatively the 
 intention of the legislature to so limit the operation of the law, and 
 that is the requirement in Section 8 of Part III that the hearings to 
 adjudicate disputed claims for compensation “shall be held at the local¬ 
 ity where the injury occurred.” If the act is held to be operative out¬ 
 side of the state, this requirement might make it necessary for members 
 of the Board to go to the most distant portions of the United States, 
 or even to foreign countries, to hear and adjudicate disputed claims for 
 compensation. 
 
 The fact that both parties are residents of Michigan and the contract 
 of employment was a Michigan contract will not, we think, change the 
 rule. The obligation to pay compensation is not a matter of contract, 
 or based upon contract, but is a statutory duty, created by statute and 
 existing only by force of such statute. If this is correct, and the 
 statute is inoperative at the place where the accident happens, the 
 happening of the accident creates no obligation to pay compensation. 
 
 B. W. C. C.—Yol 2, Page 1. 
 
 It is therefore held by the Board that respondent is not entitled to 
 compensation. 
 
21 
 
 DETROIT STEEL PRODUCTS CO. vs. HELEN JENDRUS. 
 
 REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO OPERATION. 
 
 Respondent’s decedent suffered an injury while in the employ of the applicant, 
 which necessitated an operation. Decedent refused to allow an operation until 
 the next day, although he was told that it was necessary. While the operation 
 was being performed decedent vomited and some of the vomit was drawn into 
 his lungs, causing pneumonia which resulted in his death. 
 
 Held: The refusal to be operated on when first requested was not so un¬ 
 reasonable as to defeat the claim for compensation, as decedent finally consented 
 when convinced that the operation was absolutely necessary. 
 
 Appeal df Detroit Steel Products Co. from a decision of an arbitration commit¬ 
 tee, awarding compensation to Helen Jendrus for the death of her husband: — 
 Affirmed. 
 
 In this case the deceased, Joseph Jendrus, was injured by a severe 
 blow on the abdomen. The doctors attending the injured man diag¬ 
 nosed the injury as a probable rupture of the intestine and advised an 
 operation. The accident occurred about 1 o’clock in the afternoon on 
 February 14. At about 8 or 8:30 in the evening the .doctors sought to 
 operate on the injured man. It appears that he could not talk English 
 and communication was had with him through an interpreter. The in¬ 
 jured man shook his head, indicating a refusal to be operated on. The 
 matter of an operation was again brought up by the doctors on the fol¬ 
 lowing morning, February 15. Jendrus, at that time, refused to sub¬ 
 mit to the operation, but consented at about 11:30 a. m. The operation 
 was performed about 1:30 p. m. on February 15. It seems that during 
 the operation the patient vomited, and vomit was drawn into the lungs, 
 causing pneumonia and resulting in his death a few days later. The 
 operation disclosed a rupture of the intestine which was not sutured, 
 and the post-mortem examination showed the same to be in process of 
 healing at the time of death. All communication with the deceased 
 after the injury was through an interpreter. 
 
 The Board is of the opinion that the refusal to be operated on when 
 first requested, and the further action of deceased in delaying consent 
 to the operation until nearly noon on the day following the accident 
 was not so unreasonable and persistent as to defeat the claim for com¬ 
 pensation in this case. He did submit to the operation after being con¬ 
 vinced that it was absolutely necessary. It seems that nearly two 
 hours elapsed from the time he gave his consent till the operation was 
 performed. It is by no means certain that an earlier operation would 
 have saved his life, nor is it certain that the operation actually per¬ 
 formed would not have resulted in his recovery were it not for the 
 fact that he vomited while under the anaesthetic and inhaled some of 
 the vomit, causing pneumonia. It- seems clear that the operation was 
 not too late to remedy the abdominal injury caused by the accident. 
 The vomiting and resulting pneumonia came as an incident to the 
 operation. The fact that the deceased was unable to speak English 
 and was unaccustomed to the ways of this country should be given 
 some weight. 
 
 The judgment and decision of the Arbitration Committee is affirmed. 
 
22 
 
 RAYNER vs. SLIGH FURNITURE CO. 
 
 OBSERVANCE OF FACTORY RULES—ACQUIESCENCE BY EMPLOYER IN 
 
 INFRACTION OF RULES. 
 
 Applicant’s decedent was employed in the factory of appellant. It was cus¬ 
 tomary for the appellant to announce the noon hour by blowing a whistle. The 
 employes were required to proceed to the end of the room in which they worked 
 and punch a time clock before leaving for dinner. On the day of his injury 
 decedent started on a run from his bench toward the time clock, which was 
 located about 150 feet away, and collided with a fellow workman, receiving in¬ 
 juries which resulted in his death. There was a rule forbidding the men run¬ 
 ning to punch the clock, but defendant’s foreman testified that it was hot strictly 
 enforced. 
 
 Held: 1. That the mere fact that such a rule was made is not controlling 
 when its general violation is acquiesced in by the employer. 
 
 2. The infraction of this rule by decedent was not such intentional and wilful 
 misconduct as to bar recovery, in view of the fact that it was the general custom 
 of decedent’s fellow employes and was tacitly permitted by respondent’s foreman. 
 
 Appeal of Sligh Furniture Company from the decision of an arbitration com¬ 
 mittee, awarding compensation to Lyda Rayner for the death of her husband. 
 Affirmed. 
 
 On November 5, 1912, Adelbert Rayner, the applicant’s husband, 
 was injured in respondent’s factory in the city of Grand Rapids. Mr. 
 Rayner was fifty-nine years of age, was of light build, somewhat active, 
 and on the day of his injury was working in the cabinet department on 
 the third floor of respondent’s factory. About 100 carvers and cabinet¬ 
 makers were employed in that room, and on the blowing of the noon 
 whistle each was required to proceed to the end of the room and punch 
 the time clock before leaving for dinner. The distance from the bench 
 where Mr. Rayner was working to the time clock was about 150 feet, 
 and when the noon whistle blew on the day of the injury, he started on 
 a run from his bench towards the time clock to punch it. After pro¬ 
 ceeding about 30 feet towards the clock he collided with one Martin 
 De Vos, a fellow-employe, fracturing or injuring one or more of his 
 ribs. Rayner continued to work after the injury, evidently thinking 
 that it was not serious and no doctor treated him for four or five days. 
 No notice was given the defendant of the injury until after Mr. Rayner’s 
 death, which occurred on December 26. It is claimed on the part of 
 the applicant that the injury to Mr. Rayner’s side and ribs punctured 
 or affected the pleura of the lungs and that from the inflammation or 
 irritation that followed the lungs became affected, resulting in Mr. 
 Rayner’s death, and that the original injury was the cause of such 
 death. The respondent contends that Mr. Rayner’s death was not the 
 result of the accident, that it did not arise out of and in the course of 
 his employment, and that he was guilty of intentional and wilful mis¬ 
 conduct. 
 
 The Board has carefully examined all of the evidence and has reached 
 the conclusion that the accident above referred to was the proximate 
 cause of Mr. Rayner’s death. It is a regrettable feature of the case 
 that notice of the injury was not seasonably given the respondent by 
 
23 
 
 Mr. Rayner, but under the circumstances shown in the evidence this 
 failure to give notice would not be a bar to the applicant’s claim. 
 
 It is clear that Mr. Rayner was acting in the course of his employ¬ 
 ment at the time he received the injury. In fact there is no serious dis¬ 
 pute on this point. He was required to proceed from his workbench 
 to the time clock, and to punch the time clock before leaving the room 
 in which he was working. This was a duty imposed upon him by the 
 employer and he was in the act of performing that duty at the time he 
 received the injury, having proceeded part way from his bench to 
 the clock. We are also of the opinion that the injury rose out of his 
 employment, within the meaning of Act No. 10, Public Acts of 1912. 
 The evidence fairly shows that it was customary for the men to run for 
 the time clock when the whistle blew and crowding and collisions re¬ 
 sulted and were likely to result in going to and punching the clock 
 and leaving the room on such occasions. The evidence on this point is 
 more fully referred to in the following paragraph of this opinion: 
 
 Did the action of Mr. Rayner in running toward the time clock 
 amount to intentional and wilful misconduct within the meaning of the 
 compensation law? The evidence shows that respondent had forbidden 
 such running by rule, but it was also shown that such rule was not en¬ 
 forced. Frank Lardie, who was Mr. Rayner’s immediate foreman, testi¬ 
 fied that he had notified the men several times not to run to the clock, 
 and that only a part of the men did the running when the whistle blew 
 (R. 35), acknowledging that the rule against running is not enforced. 
 Charles Hicks, foreman of the carvers in the room in which Rayner 
 worked, testified that there was crowding and jamming at times in go¬ 
 ing to the clock; that the rule not to run to the clock was made about 
 a year before the accident, but witness would not say that the rule was 
 so enforced as to stop the running (R. 47). Martin De Vos testified 
 that people used to run to the clock most every day and that was the 
 case right up to the time Mr. Rayner was hurt (R. 47), and Mr. Land- 
 egand, another foreman of* respondent, testified that the biggest share 
 of the men ran to the clock each day, notwithstanding the rule; “they 
 insist on running. I have discharged men because they run, but it did 
 no good, the rest of them keep it up just the same. You can’t let them 
 all go. It has been the practice there to run.” 
 
 The mere fact that a rule was made forbidding running to the time 
 clock is not controlling when its general violation is acquiesced in by 
 the employer. The action of Mr. Rayner in running to the clock did 
 not differ materially from the action of a considerable number of other 
 employes, and such conduct was acquiesced in and tacitly permitted 
 by respondent’s foremen. It did not amount to intentional and wilful 
 misconduct. The decision of the committee on arbitration is affirmed. 
 
24 
 
 PIETTERNELLA VISSER vs. MICHIGAN CABINET CO. 
 
 FRIGHT OR SHOCK-ABSENCE OF PHYSICAL INJURY. 
 
 Applicant’s decedent was loading some stock on an elevator when it suddenly 
 started up. The elevator was stopped and the stock was replaced on the truck, 
 and after wheeling it about forty feet applicant fell to the floor and expired a 
 few minutes after he was picked up. A post mortem examination disclosed 
 that he was suffering from organic disease of the heart and it was the opinion 
 of the medical witnesses that while deceased received no physical injury the 
 shock and excitement resulting from the sudden starting of the elevator prob¬ 
 ably caused his death. 
 
 Held: Where death or disability results from fright, unaccompanied by any 
 immediate physical injury, no compensation can be had. 
 
 Appeal of Pietternella Visser from decision of an arbitration committee 
 refusing to make an award for the death of her husband.—Affirmed. 
 
 Gerrit Visser was working in the employ of respondent as a lugger in 
 its factory at Grand Rapids. Part of his duties required him to move 
 the unfinished stock from various floors in the factory to the lower 
 floor by use of a truck, and in passing from one floor to the other a 
 large elevator was used. On November 26, Visser was moving a truck 
 loaded with drawers from the second floor to the first floor of respond¬ 
 ent’s factory. He wheeled the truck load on to the elevator at the 
 second floor, then descended with the elevator to the first floor and pro¬ 
 ceeded to wheel the truck from the elevator. The elevator started up¬ 
 ward when the truck was partly off, causing it to tip so that some of the 
 drawers fell off. Other employes of the respondent stopped the eleva¬ 
 tor, which was large and slow moving, when it was about two and 
 one-half feet above the floor. The truck was then adjusted and the 
 drawers which had fallen off were replaced -by Visser and another em¬ 
 ploye. Visser then proceeded to wheel the truck from the elevator shaft 
 to another portion of respondent’s factory, and after wheeling it about 
 forty feet he fell to the ground. He was picked up and carried into 
 the office and died a few minutes afterward. A post mortem examina¬ 
 tion was held which showed that he was suffering from organic disease 
 of the heart. While he received no physical injury, it is apparent that 
 the nervous shock and excitement resulting from the upward movement 
 of the elevator affected his heart in its diseased condition, and in the 
 opinion of some of the medical witnesses probably caused his death. 
 
 The case presents squarely the question, whether compensation can 
 be recovered where death or disability results from fright unaccom¬ 
 panied by any immediate physical injury. Under the authority of 
 
 Nelson vs. Crawford, 122 Michigan, 486, and 
 
 Schroeder vs. Railway Company, 20 D. L. N., 251 
 
 recovery could not be had in such cases. The case of Yates vs. Colliers, 
 Ltd., 3 B. W. C. C., 419, seems to establish the opposite rule under the 
 British Workmen’s Compensation Law. The question is one of great 
 importance. If the Compensation Law is held to cover cases of fright 
 
25 
 
 or nervous shock unaccompanied by physical injury, it will bring under 
 the Compensation Law a large class of cases for which compensation 
 by way of damages has heretofore been denied in Michigan. While the 
 question is not free from doubt, we are of the opinion that our statute 
 was not intended to cover the class of cases above mentioned. We also 
 think that it is desirable to have this question finally settled by an 
 early decision of the Supreme Court. The decision of the committee 
 on arbitration is affirmed. 
 
 AGLER vs. MICHIGAN AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE. 
 
 CASUAL EMPLOYMENT—CONSTITUTIONAL BODIES. 
 
 Applicant was employed by the Michigan Agricultural College to make some 
 repairs on the roofs of some of its buildings. He was not a regular employe of 
 the college, but was merely called upon as his services were needed. While en¬ 
 gaged in one of these jobs he fell and received injuries which incapacitated him 
 for a long period. Compensation was refused because it was contended that under 
 sub. 2 of sec. 7, part 1, of the compensation law he was a casual employe. Also that 
 the Michigan Agricultural College is a constitutional body, not subject to legis¬ 
 lative control and therefore not liable to pay compensation in any case of injury. 
 
 Held: 1. That the proviso of sub. 2, of sec. 7, excluding those “whose em¬ 
 ployment is but casual,” dees not apply to employes of the state or of munici¬ 
 pal corporations within the state. 
 
 2. The Michigan Agricultural College is subject to the general laws of the 
 state with reference to its liability to others. 
 
 Appeal of Michigan Agricultural College from the decision of an arbitration 
 committee awarding Willis M. Agler compensation at the rate of $10 per week, 
 not to exceed 500 weeks.—Affirmed. 
 
 In the summer of 1912, the applicant, Willis M. Agler, was employed 
 by the Michigan Agricultural College to repair the tin, metal and slate 
 portions of roofs and porticos of the buildings on the college grounds 
 for a period of nearly three months, receiving for his work 40 cents per 
 hour. This was the first work Agler had ever done for the college, and 
 at its conclusion no arrangement was made with him for any further 
 work. In the spring of 1913, the heavy winds injured some of the tin 
 work on some of the porticos of the college buildings and Agler was em¬ 
 ployed to repair the same, he to do the work at 40 cents per hour, the 
 same as the previous summer. Mr. Agler is a tinner and roofer by trade, 
 but does not maintain a regular shop or place of business, except that he 
 has a room in his basement where his tools and stock are kept and 
 where some of his work is done. He was accustomed to take such work 
 and jobs in his line as he could procure, working generally by the hour, 
 and when he undertook to make the repairs on the porches in question 
 he knew it would require but two or three days’ work for himself and 
 a helper. He knew that he was subject to the direction of the proper 
 officials of the college and could be discharged by them at any time. 
 The college furnished the material for making the repairs, Mr. Agler 
 only furnishing part of his tools. Altogether the college has about GO 
 buildings and employs on an average 125 employes in and about the 
 grounds and buildings in addition to the faculty of the college. It does 
 not employ regularly tinners or roofers. 
 
 4 
 
On April 18, 1913, while Mr. Agler was engaged in making the re¬ 
 pairs above referred to, he fell from a ladder, fracturing his left leg. 
 The injury will probably not result in permanent disability, but it may 
 be a considerable time before the injured leg will be as well as prior to 
 the injury. Had it not been for the accident Mr. Agler would have 
 finished the work that afternoon, the total amount of time required in 
 completing the work being 41 hours for two men or something over 
 20 hours each. The respondent contends that it is not liable to pay 
 compensation because the work in which Mr. Agler was engaged when 
 injured was casual employment. 
 
 This involves the construction of Section 7, part 1 of the compensa¬ 
 tion law, which is as follows: 
 
 ‘The term ‘employe’ as used in this act shall be construed to mean: 
 
 1. Every person in the service of the state or of any county, city, township, 
 incorporated village or school district therein, under any appointment, or con¬ 
 tract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, except any official of the 
 state, or of any county, city, township, incorporated village or school district 
 therein. 
 
 2. Every person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express 
 or implied, oral or written, including aliens, and also including minors who are 
 legally permitted to work under the laws of the state who, for the purposes of 
 this act, shall be considered the same and have the same power to contract as 
 adult employes, but not including any person whose employment is but casual 
 or is not in the usual course of the trade, business, profession or occupation 
 of his employer.” 
 
 The next section of the act, being Section 8 of Part I, provides “any 
 employe as defined in subdivision one of the preceding section shaft be 
 subject to the provisions of this act and of any act amendatory thereof.” 
 The remainder of Section 8 provides in detail that any employe men¬ 
 tioned in subdivision two of the preceding section shall become subject 
 to the provision of the act by his employer accepting the same, and the 
 failure of such employe to make his election not to be subject to the act. 
 It seems clearly apparent from these provisions that two distinct 
 classes of employes are created, one of the said classes being defined by 
 subdivision one, and the other by subdivision two of said Section 7. 
 The Agricultural College being a state institution, its employes are 
 in the service of the state within the meaning of the act and fall within 
 the class of employes defined in subdivision one above quoted. The • 
 proviso which excludes from the benefit of the compensation law those 
 “whose employment is but casual” is found only in subdivision two of 
 said section and applies only to the class of employes defined in said 
 subdivision two. It does not apply to employes of the state or of muni¬ 
 cipal corporations within the state. 
 
 At the re-hearing of this case on appeal to the full Board, the point 
 was raised by respondent for the first time that it is a constitutional 
 body not subject to legislative control, and for that reason is not liable 
 to pay compensation in this or any other case. In support of this con¬ 
 tention the cases of Bauer vs. State Board of Agriculture, 164 Michigan 
 415, and Board of Regents vs. Auditor General 167 Michigan 444 are 
 cited. We have examined the above authorities and carefully consid¬ 
 ered respondent’s claim, and have reached the conclusion that the 
 position taken is untenable. The authorities referred to do not go to the 
 
27 
 
 extent of holding that respondent is not subject to the general laws of 
 the state, or that it may repudiate its obligations because it is a consti¬ 
 tutional body. The substance of the above authorities is that, being a 
 constitutional body with certain powers and functions granted and 
 fixed by the constitution, it may determine the purpose and manner of 
 expending its funds, and that the legislature may not interfere with or 
 abridge such right. The precise question decided in the Agricultural 
 College case was that the Board might use its funds to construct a 
 building in East Lansing to be leased to the United States Government 
 for a Post Office, and that such action by the State Board of Agricul¬ 
 ture in expending its funds could not be interfered with by the Auditor 
 General or the legislature. This is a very different question from the 
 one now before us for determination. The State Board of Agriculture 
 is a corporate body, an artificial person, and even though it be of a high 
 class because created by the constitution, it is subject to the general 
 laws of the state, is protected by such general laws as to its property, 
 its contracts, and the liability of others to it; and it is subjec{ to the 
 general laws of the state with reference to its liabilities to others. It 
 is conducting a large enterprise having some 60 buildings 125 employes 
 besides its corps of professors, teachers and instructors. It exists by 
 virtue of the laws of Michigan, is protected by such laws, and is subject 
 to such laws in all general matters. The award of the committee on 
 arbitration is affirmed. 
 
 JACOB EIDER vs. THE 0. H. LITTLE COMPANY. 
 
 INJURED TEAMSTER NOT REGULARLY EMPLOYED—OWNER OF TEAM 
 
 AND WAGON. 
 
 The applicant was the owner of a team and wagon, and was engaged in hauling 
 dirt for appellant, receiving for the work of himself, team and wagon $6.00 per 
 day. While so engaged he received injuries to two fingers by which he was 
 totally disabled for two and one-half months, and which resulted further in 
 causing a permanent stiffness by reason of which the applicant has only partial 
 use of such fingers. An arbitration committee awarded the applicant compensa¬ 
 tion for forty-three weeks at 50% of his average weekly wage. Appellant’s con¬ 
 tention is that Rider was not their employe within the meaning of the act, and 
 that the award of compensation was excessive. 
 
 Held: 1. The fact that the applicant worked under orders of defendant’s 
 foreman, and was required to conform in detail to the regulations and system of 
 work of defendant was sufficient to make him an employe of defendant within 
 the meaning of the compensation law. 
 
 2. The fact that applicant was totally disabled for two and one-half months, 
 and that the injury resulted in a partial loss of the use of his fingers, which 
 condition was permanent, is such as to make the compensation award a reason¬ 
 able one. 
 
 The applicant, Jacob Eider, was the owner of a team and wagon, and 
 had been engaged in the general teaming business in Detroit for a num¬ 
 ber of years prior to his injury. He had worked on and off with his 
 team for respondent during a period of about six years. He had been 
 working steadily for respondent for about seven weeks prior to his 
 injury, which occurred on November 7th, and was receiving $6.00 per 
 
28 
 
 day for himself, his team and wagon. The work in which he was en¬ 
 gaged was hauling dirt for respondent. There were from twelve to 
 fifteen teams engaged in the same work, and the wagons were loaded 
 with a mechanical device called a “clam” which was operated in prac¬ 
 tically the same way as a steam shovel. The clam would be let down 
 and filled with dirt and closed by the machinery. It would then be 
 raised and swung around over the wagon which was to be loaded. The 
 teamster would steady the clam so as to be over the portion of the 
 wagon that needed filling, and the operator of the machine would 
 then cause it to open and drop the dirt in the wagon. The in¬ 
 jury in this case was caused by the clam closing on Mr. Rider’s 
 fingers after the dirt had dropped in the manner above indicated. 
 The first and second fingers were badly broken and lacerated. 
 Defendant was totally disabled from work by the injury for two and 
 one-half months, and the injured fingers have become stiff and have 
 lost to a large degree their power of closing and their usefulness. The 
 committee on arbitration awarded the applicant compensation for forty- 
 three weeks at fifty per cent of his average weekly wages. This de¬ 
 cision is appealed from by the respondent upon the following grounds: 
 
 1. That Rider was not an employe of respondent within the mean¬ 
 ing of the compensation law. 
 
 2. That the award of compensation is excessive. It appears from 
 the evidence that Rider was licensed as a teamster in the city of De¬ 
 troit, and that he engaged in doing such various jobs of teaming and 
 transfer work as he could get to do from time to time. It is also 
 shown that he was required to have a license under the city ordinance, 
 and that such licenses are required of teamsters except in some in¬ 
 stances where firms like respondent use their own teams and teamsters 
 in their business and have their names printed on their wagons. It 
 also appears that Rider worked for respondent from time to time dur¬ 
 ing the past six years, and that he worked for respondent steadily with 
 his team and wagon from about the 14th of September until the date of 
 the injury, doing the same work as the other teamsters of respondent, 
 and doing no other work with his team and wagon during that time. 
 He was hired for $6.00 a day. It is undisputed that the regular wages 
 of a teamster for that class of work is $2.50 a day and the regular 
 wage for a team and wagon $3.50 a day, and Mr. Rider claims that he 
 was employed at $2.50 a day for himself and $3.50 for his team and 
 wagon. He worked under the orders of respondent’s foreman, who di¬ 
 rected him how to do the work, where to go, how to make deliveries, 
 and required Rider to conform to all of the regulations as to the work 
 done and the manner and system of doing it that was required of the 
 other teamsters of respondent. It clearly appears that respondent 
 through its foreman kept a close supervision over the work and move¬ 
 ments of Mr. Rider and directed and controlled the same in every par¬ 
 ticular. In the opinion of the Board, Mr. Rider was an employe of 
 respondent within the meaning of the compensation law at the time he 
 was injured, and the fact that his team and wagon was also employed 
 in the work did not make him a contractor nor in any way change his 
 status as such employe. 
 
 The fact that he was totally disabled for two and one-half months is 
 
29 
 
 undisputed, and the fact that the first and second fingers of his hand 
 are permanently injured is also undisputed in the case. In the opinion 
 of the board it is fairly shown that the injury (which is permanent in 
 its character) to applicant’s first and second fingers has caused a loss 
 to him of one-half of the use of such fingers. The board has held in 
 other cases that where the use of a finger is destroyed by an injury, 
 that it is equivalent to the loss of such finger whether the same is 
 amputated or not. That the real test is not the action or non-action 
 of the surgeon as to cutting off the finger, but it is whether the injured 
 person has been deprived permanently of the use of such finger even 
 though it was not amputated. Upon the same principal an injury 
 which destroys one-half of the beneficial use of a finger should be rated 
 as the loss of a half finger, and if that rule is applied in the present 
 case the award of forty-three weeks’ compensation will be correct. 
 Substantially the same result would be reached, we think, by treating 
 the permanent injury to the fingers as a permanent partial disability. 
 The award of the committee on arbitration is affirmed. 
 
 KONKEL vs. FORD MOTOR COMPANY. 
 
 BURIAL EXPENSES—CONTRACT FUNERAL. 
 
 An employe of respondent was killed while at work and left no dependents. 
 In accordance with Sec. 8, Part 2, of the compensation law, respondent was 
 liable for the funeral expenses not exceeding $200.00. Respondent made a con¬ 
 tract with an undertaker, the applicant, to furnish and conduct the funeral for 
 $75, and further agreed to pay $15 for the cemetery lot. Applicant presented a 
 bill for $104, stating that the extra $14 was for three carriages furnished for 
 friends of the deceased who attended the funeral. Respondent refused to pay the 
 extra $14, claiming that it was an overcharge and that the agreement practically 
 excluded carriages. 
 
 Held: 1. That the right to the custody and burial of the dead belongs to the 
 family, next of kin, near relatives and friends of the deceased, and that the com¬ 
 pensation law does not assume to take away or interfere with this important 
 right. 
 
 2. That the employer has no authority to contract for funerals with an 
 undertaker in such a way as to arbitrarily fix the number of carriages or to de¬ 
 cide in certain cases that no carriages shall be provided. These are matters for 
 the family or next of kin to decide and arrange for, provided the expense is 
 reasonable and does not exceed the limit fixed by law. 
 
 Appeal of X. B. Konkel to compel the Ford Motor Co. to pay his claim for 
 funeral expenses incurred in the burial of one of respondent’s employes. 
 
 This case involves the question of funeral expenses, the deceased 
 workman, John Ovczieneko, having left no dependents. Section 8, Part 
 II, of the act provides that in cases where the employe leaves no de¬ 
 pendents, the employer shall pay or cause to be paid the reasonable ex¬ 
 penses of his last sickness and burying, which shall not exceed $200. 
 It is claimed by respondent that it entered into a contract with the 
 undertaker, X. B. Konkel, to furnish and conduct the funeral of de¬ 
 ceased for $75, the respondent to pay in addition thereto the cost of the 
 cemetery lot, which was $15. After the funeral was had the claimant 
 presented a bill to respondent for $104, being $15 for the cemetery lot 
 
30 
 
 and $89 for the funeral. The precise claim! of respondent is that the 
 claimant had made an overcharge of $14, claiming $89 for the funeral 
 when the agreed amount was $75. The claimant admits that the price 
 agreed upon for the funeral was $75, but claims that the relatives and 
 friends of the deceased when the funeral came on required him to fur¬ 
 nish three additional hacks, and that the $14 additional charge is for 
 those hacks, which were actually furnished and used at the funeral. 
 The only relative of the deceased who resided here and attended the 
 funeral was a brother, but many friends and acquaintances of the de¬ 
 ceased attended, and some of them rode in the three hacks to the ceme¬ 
 tery. The agreement between the claimant and respondent with refer¬ 
 ence to the funeral practically excluded hacks, the precise contention 
 of respondent being stated as follows: “The deceased had absolutely no 
 family nor friends in this country, outside of his brother, and this com¬ 
 pany will not pay for pleasure carriages for funeral purposes and if 
 people desire to go for a ride or an undertaker desires his friends to go 
 for a ride, they must pay for their carriages. * * * That after an 
 
 absolute contract was made the undertaker should not go ahead and 
 incur additional expenses.” 
 
 It will be seen that this case involves the fundamental question, has 
 the employer the right to order and contract for the funeral in cases 
 of this kind, and can he limit the item of expense and the character of 
 the funeral. If he has this power then the contract entered into with 
 claimant would be controlling and the additional expense incurred for 
 carriages would be unauthorized. The Board, however, is clearly of 
 the opinion that the employer has no such power. The right to the 
 custody and burial of the dead belongs to the family, to the next of kin, 
 to the near relatives and friends. This right is inherent and univer¬ 
 sally recognized. They may make the funeral as to form, rites, pro¬ 
 cession and burial whatsoever their sentiment, judgment and traditions 
 dictate. The compensation law does not assume to take away or in 
 any manner interfere with this important right of the family and rela¬ 
 tives of the workman in death cases like this. The law merely provides 
 that the employer shall pay the expense, or cause it to be paid, and that 
 the amount of his liability for such expense shall not exceed $200. It 
 does not give him the right to contract with the undertaker, or even 
 to select the undertaker. Much less does it give him the right to arbi¬ 
 trarily fix the number of carriages, or to decide that in certain cases 
 no carriages shall be provided. These are matters for the family and 
 next of kin to decide and provide for, and if the expense is reasonable 
 and does not exceed the limit fixed by law, it should be paid by the 
 employer. In this case the extra hacks were ordered by the next of kin 
 and friends of deceased, and were used to convey his friends to the 
 place of burial. In the opinion of the Board they were reasonably nec¬ 
 essary, and the bill of claimant for $104 is allowed and ordered paid. 
 
31 
 
 KATHRYN ADAMS vs. ACME WHITE LEAD & COLOR WORKS. 
 
 LEAD POISONING—OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE. 
 
 Applicant’s decedent was employed by respondent in its red lead plant. He 
 contracted lead poisoning from the effects of which he died. Compensation was 
 refused, under the contention that his death was not the result of an accident, 
 but a disease, and therefore the case was not covered by the act. It was further 
 contended that if the act was held to apply to industrial diseases it would, in 
 that respect, be unconstitutional. 
 
 Held: 1. That the lead poisoning suffered by decedent in this case constituted 
 a personal injury of a serious and deadly character, although classified under the 
 English decisions as an occupational disease and not an accident. 
 
 2. That part of Sec. 1, Part II, which covers injuries, received otherwise than 
 by accident, is not such a variance from the title of the act as to render a 
 portion of this section unconstitutional. 
 
 Appeal of Acme White Lead & Color Works from the decision of an arbitration 
 committee awarding Sarah E. Adams compensation at the rate of $7.50 per 
 week for 300 weeks for the death of her husband.—Affirmed. 
 
 Augustus Adams, the husband of the applicant, was an employe of 
 the respondent, working in its Red Lead plant, so called, in Detroit. 
 On May 29, 1913, he became so affected from lead poisoning that he 
 was obliged to quit his work and on June 27 he died from the effects 
 of such lead poisoning. These facts are undisputed and the sole ques¬ 
 tion in the case is whether the Workmen’s Compensation Act covers a 
 case of death by lead poisoning arising out of and in the course of the 
 employment. It is contended on behalf of respondent as follows: 
 
 1. That lead poisoning is not an accident. 
 
 2. That Act No. 10, Public Acts of 1912, was not intended to pro¬ 
 vide compensation for diseases, but only accidents. 
 
 3. If the Act does apply to industrial diseases, it is so far uncon¬ 
 stitutional. 
 
 It seems to be established under the English cases that Lead Poison¬ 
 ing is not an accident, but is an occupational disease. It seems to 
 follow from this that unless the Michigan Workmen’s Compensation 
 Law is broad enough to include and cover occupational diseases the ap¬ 
 plicant’s claim in this case must be denied. The controlling provision 
 of the act on this point is found in Section 1 of Part II, and is as fol¬ 
 lows: “If an employe * * * receives a personal injury arising out 
 
 of and in the course of his employment,” he shall be entitled to com¬ 
 pensation, etc. It will be noted that the above language does not limit 
 the right of compensation to such persons as receive personal injuries 
 “by accident.” The language in this respect is broader than the Eng¬ 
 lish act and clearly includes all personal injuries arising out of and 
 in the course of the employment, whether the same are caused “by 
 accident” or otherwise. It is equally plain that Lead Poisoning in this 
 case in fact constitutes a personal injury, and that such personal injury 
 was of a serious and deadly character. The Board is therefore of the 
 opinion that the section of the Michigan Act above quoted is broad 
 enough to cover cases of Lead Poisoning such as the one in question. 
 
 It is claimed, however, on behalf of the respondent that the title of 
 
32 
 
 the act is such as to exclude all personal injuries excepting those re¬ 
 ceived “by accident” and that in so far as the body of the act is 
 broader than the title, it is unconstitutional. This point has been ably 
 briefed and argued on the part of the respondent and we are asked to 
 hold in this case that the portion of the provisions of Section 1 of Part 
 II which covers injuries received otherwise than by accident is invalid 
 because it is broader than the title. After a careful consideration of 
 the question, the Board has reached the conclusion that it would not 
 be justified in holding such portion of the Compensation Act to be in¬ 
 valid on the constitutional grounds urged by the respondent. The 
 award of the committee on arbitration is therefore affirmed. 
 
 HILLS vs. PEBE MARQUETTE R. R. 
 
 MASTER AND SERVANT—NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 Applicant’s decedent, an employe of respondent, was struck and killed by one of 
 respondent’s trains while on his way home to dinner. There were two ways of 
 leaving the freight yard, one by way of a public highway, known as Mill street, 
 and the other through respondent’s yard. The highway was not in good condi¬ 
 tion for travel, so it was the custom of the men, which was tacitly acquiesced in 
 by respondent, to leave by way of the yard. Decedent left by the last way when 
 he was killed. Respondent contends that inasmuch as decedent had quit work 
 for the forenoon, the relation of master and servant did not exist at the time of 
 the occurrence of the accident, and further that decedent should have left by 
 way of Mill street. 
 
 Held: 1. That an employe is still his master’s servant while leaving his 
 place of employment, or doing such acts as are incident to or connected with 
 such leaving. 
 
 2. The employment covers not only the time during which the workman is 
 engaged in his ordinary labor but also a later time during which he is passing 
 from the surroundings of his employment into surroundings unrelated thereto. 
 
 Appeal of Pere Marquette Railroad Co. from the decision of an arbitration com¬ 
 mittee awarding Leone H. Hills $4.95 per week for 300 weeks as compensation 
 for the death of her husband.—Affirmed. 
 
 Irwin E. Hills, the husband of the applicant, was killed in the rail¬ 
 road yards of the respondent at Williamston. He was employed by re¬ 
 spondent as a section hand, had worked during the forenoon, and re¬ 
 turned with the gang to their car house shortly after 11 o’clock stand¬ 
 ard time. Thereupon some of the other men including the foreman, 
 proceeded to eat their dinners at the car house, and Hills started to go 
 to his home, which was located half a block from the depot, for dinner. 
 The railroad tracks of respondent run in an easterly and westerly di¬ 
 rection through the village of Williamston, there being one main track 
 and two side tracks substantially parallel with it. The car house is 
 situated 1,934 feet east of the depot and adjacent to respondent’s south 
 track. The course taken by Mr. Hills in going from the car house to 
 his home was westward through respondent’s yard towards the depot. 
 It was possible for him to leave the railroad yards by going north on 
 Mill street which is a public highway crossing defendant’s track at a 
 point 225 feet west of the car house. This highway, however, was not 
 
33 
 
 in good condition for travel, and the men employed in the yards were 
 accustomed to enter and leave at the depot, and in going to and from 
 the car house the regular course was to proceed along the tracks in the 
 yard substantially the same as was done by Mr. Hills. A few minutes 
 after Hills left the car house a freight train came in from the east on 
 respondent’s main track and passed through the village without stop¬ 
 ping. The train was accustomed to stop at Williamston on signal and 
 was running slow as it approached the depot. No signal to stop having 
 been given and in passing through the yards between the car house and 
 the depot the train was running from 15 to 18 miles an hour. A few 
 minutes after, the train passed the body of Mr. Hills was found lying 
 by the side of the main track approximately 950 feet west of the car 
 house from which he started. The place where the body was found 
 was about 1,000 feet east of the depot. There was no eye witness to 
 the accident and all of the evidence tending to show the manner in 
 which it occurred is circumstantial. It is undisputed that the train 
 referred to was the agency which caused his death. It is claimed on the 
 part of the applicant that he was accidentally struck by the train and 
 thrown against the switch standard which was located near the track 
 and about 20 feet east of the point where his body was found. On 
 the part of the respondent it is claimed that he boarded the train which 
 was moving slowly near the car house intending to ride to the depot and 
 dropped off, and that he either jumped from the moving train, or lost 
 his hold and was killed by striking the switch standard. Respondents 
 also claim that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of 
 employment for the reason that he had quit work for the forenoon, 
 and that he should have left the railroad premises by the Mill Street 
 road instead of proceeding to the depot through the company’s yards. 
 
 After a careful examination of the evidence the board has reached 
 the conclusion that the deceased was accidentally struck by the train 
 while traveling towards the depot, and was thrown against the switch 
 standard. A severe cut was found in the back of his head and his coat 
 and clothing were torn and body bruised in the back, indicating that 
 he was struck from behind. There was a deep hole in his chest which 
 appears to have been the immediate cause of his death, and this was 
 apparently caused by his being thrown against the switch standard 
 which was freshly bent and the lamp thereon broken. The presumption 
 of right conduct on the part of the deceased and the circumstantial 
 evidence tending to show that he was accidentally struck by the train 
 while on his way to dinner established by a fair preponderance of evi¬ 
 dence the claim of the applicant as to the manner in which the acci¬ 
 dent occurred. 
 
 The only remaining question is whether the injury arose out of and 
 in the course of the employment of the deceased. Respondents contend 
 that deceased having quit work for dinner and proceeded towards his 
 home a distance of approximately 950 feet, had ceased his employment, 
 and the relation of master and servant did not exist at the time of 
 the accident. In.this connection they also claim that he should have 
 left respondent’s yards at the Mill Street highway and if he had done 
 so he would have been off their premises before the time when the acci¬ 
 dent occurred, and in a place of safety. It is shown that the usual 
 
34 
 
 route taken by the men living in the vicinity of the depot and going 
 to the car house, was to enter and leave defendant’s yard at the depot 
 and to follow the course which deceased was traveling when he was 
 killed. There is no evidence that this practice was forbidden by re¬ 
 spondent, and we think it cannot be held that the deceased was at fault 
 in doing that which respondent permitted its men to do, and which was 
 common and customary practice. We also think that deceased was 
 acting in the course of his employment at the time of the accident and 
 that the injury arose out of his employment. The question as to when 
 the employment ceases is a mixed question of law and fact depending 
 upon the particular circumstances of the case. It does not cease at the 
 instant his working time is over. The employment includes the inci¬ 
 dents of the employment, and it is generally held that the workman is 
 still his master’s servant while he is leaving the place of his employ¬ 
 ment, or doing acts that are incident to or connected with such leaving. 
 The employment covers not only the time during which the workman is 
 engaged in his ordinary labor, but also a later time, during which he 
 is passing from the surroundings of his employment into surroundings 
 unrelated thereto. Wilmarth vs. Cardoza, 176 Fed. Eep. 3. The award 
 of the arbitration committee is affirmed. 
 
 MICHIGAN WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION MUTUAL INSUR¬ 
 ANCE COMPANY vs. KATHRYN REDFIELD. 
 
 NEGLIGENCE—DEATH CLAIMED TO BE DUE TO OTHER CAUSES. 
 
 Respondent’s decedent received injuries by his hand coming in contact with the 
 gears in a carding machine in appellant’s factory. Gangrene set in and he died 
 on May 4, which was sixteen days after the injury. Appellant contends that 
 the injury was the result of the wilful and intentional misconduct of decedent, 
 by his disregarding the signs warning employees to keep their hands off the 
 machines and not to clean machines while in motion; and further, that he was 
 suffering from diabetes when injured and that his death was the result of that 
 disease. 
 
 Held: 1. That the act which decedent was performing at the time of his 
 injury, was picking off some of the cotton which had collected on the carding 
 cylinder, and that such action was necessary and ordinarily performed by and 
 required of the operator of the machine. 
 
 2. That the claim that death was due to diabetes was not sustained by the 
 proofs. 
 
 Appeal of Michigan Workmen’s Mutual Insurance Co. from the decision of 
 an arbitration committee, awarding Kathryn Redfield $5.25 per week for 300 
 weeks, for the death of her husband.—Affirmed. 
 
 On April 18, 1913, William H. Redfield, the husband of the respond¬ 
 ent, was injured in the factory of the Hr. Denton Sleeping Garment 
 Mills at Centerville, Michigan. He was employed in the card room in 
 the factory, where for many years he had worked as a carder in opera¬ 
 ting the carding machines. There was no eye witness to the accident, 
 but it appeared from the blood on the machinery and other circum¬ 
 stances that his hand was caught in a large card cylinder and the gear 
 connected with it. The hand was badly lacerated, necessitating the 
 
35 
 
 amputation of three fingers. The other injuries to the hand above the 
 fingers were dressed and treated, an effort being made to save as much 
 of the hand as possible. The injured man was taken to the hospital at 
 Kalamazoo for treatment, and while there gangrene set in and he died 
 on May 4th. It is the claim of the applicant that compensation should 
 be denied for two reasons: 
 
 1. That the deceased was guilty of wilful and intentional miscon¬ 
 duct. 
 
 2. That he was suffering from diabetes when injured, and that his 
 death was the result of the disease rather than the injury. 
 
 The claim of intentional, wilful misconduct is based on what is 
 claimed to be a violation of the factory rules by deceased. It was 
 shown that on each of the carding machines was one or more signs 
 “hands off,” and also that there were signs through the factory and in 
 the carding room to the effect that “cleaning machinery while in motion 
 is strictly forbidden.” It is claimed that deceased was in the act of 
 picking off some of the cotton which had collected on the card cylinder 
 near the gear when he received his injury, and that such act consti¬ 
 tuted a violation of the above rules. This claim, however, was refuted 
 by the testimony of the general manager and also the secretary and 
 treasurer of the Dr. Denton Company. It was shown by the testimony 
 of these witnesses that the carding machines are so adjusted that the 
 machinery operates through a system of weights and when it reaches a 
 certain weight then it dumps down upon the apron, and if any person 
 puts his hands on the machinery and disturbs the mechanism it would 
 cause the machine to dump and seriously interfere with its operation. 
 That the sign “hands off” was put up to warn people not to put their 
 hands on the machine because of producing the above results, and not 
 because the machinery was dangerous. These signs were put there by 
 the manufacturers of the machines. It was further shown by the same 
 witnesses that the sign relating to the cleaning of the machinery while 
 in motion did not refer to picking off accumulations of cotton on the 
 cards or gears but referred to the general cleaning of the machines. 
 That it was necessary in the operation of the card machine to pick off 
 accumulations of cotton while the machinery was in motion, and that 
 the employes were expected and required to do it. That every time a 
 carding machine is stopped it produces an unevenness in the work, in¬ 
 volves the loss of time and impairs the quality of the product. If the 
 accumulations were not picked off it would produce thickening in parts 
 of the product and make it unfit for use. Picking off cotton in this 
 way while the machines were in operation was in fact a part of the 
 duties of the operator. This testimony is practically undisputed, and 
 the first point must be held against the applicant. 
 
 The claim that the gangrene and the resulting death of the deceased 
 was caused by his diabetes and not by the injury must also be decided 
 against the applicant. The testimony produced in support of this 
 claim, particularly the medical testimony, fell far short of proving the 
 same, and apparently was disappointing to the applicant. 
 
 We think we should refer in this opinion to the request made by coun¬ 
 sel for the applicant, after the hearing on review before the full Board 
 and before the decision of the case, for leave to take the depositions of 
 
3G 
 
 several physicians in Detroit, who would give expert evidence tending 
 to show that Mr. Redfield’s death was caused by gangrene produced by 
 diabetes. The Board refused to grant such request. The Workmen’s 
 Compensation Law provides that the arbitration, which is the first and 
 fundamental hearing in the case, shall be held at the place where the 
 accident occurred, in order to make such hearing reasonably convenient 
 and inexpensive to the injured workman or his dependents. The wit¬ 
 nesses in such case on behalf of the workman or his dependents are 
 usually found at or near the place where the accident occurred, and the 
 same is true of the witnesses for the employer in a vast majority of 
 cases. If the board should permit a reopening of the case to take 
 such proposed expert testimony in a distant city, necessitating the ex¬ 
 pense on the part of the widow to be present at the taking of such testi¬ 
 mony and to protect her interest by cross-examination of witnesses, 
 such action would defeat one of the most important provisions of the 
 law and such practice would place it in the power of the employer to 
 make the recovery of compensation in some cases so vexatious and ex¬ 
 pensive as to compel the abandonment of claims. This is not a case of 
 newly discovered evidence, but is a request for permission to put in 
 expert and opinion evidence which would be merely cumulative. The 
 award in this case is affirmed. 
 
 ANDREWJESKI vs. WOLVERINE COAL CO. 
 
 QUESTION OF CONSTRUCTION OF LAW PROVIDING THE METHODS OF 
 COMPUTING AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE. 
 
 Claimant’s decedent was killed while employed as a coal miner by appellant. 
 
 The committee on arbitration awarded claimant $10 a week for 300 weeks, that 
 being the maximum rate of compensation under the statute. The appellant con¬ 
 tends that the coal mining industry is one that operates only for a portion of the 
 year, and that the peculiar nature of the business and the limited time of opera¬ 
 tion yearly must be taken into consideration in determining the average week¬ 
 ly wages of the miner. Respondent further claims that the average time of 
 operation of the coal miles of Michigan is 211 days, and that in computing the 
 average weekly wages in this industry, the average daily wage should be multi¬ 
 plied by 211 and divided by 52, instead of the general rule of multiplying such 
 daily wage by 300 and dividing by 52. The rule contended for would reduce the 
 rate of compensation practically one-third. 
 
 Held: That the exceptional method of computing the rate of compensation, 
 contended for by appellant, for those employed in the coal mining industry 
 is not authorized by the law. 
 
 Appeal of the Wolverine Coal Company from the decision of the arbitration 
 committee on claim of Anna Andrewjeski.—Affirmed. 
 
 This is a claim for compensation by the widow of Joseph Andrewjeski, 
 who was killed by falling slate in respondent’s mine near Bay City. 
 The sole question is the amount of weekly compensation to be paid. This 
 involves the construction of section 11, part 2 of the Compensation Law 
 providing the methods of computing the average weekly wage. It is 
 contended by the respondent that the coal mining industry is one that 
 does not continue throughout the year, and that for a part of each 
 
37 
 
 year the mines are closed and work is suspended. For this reason it is 
 claimed that the computation of the average weekly wage of deceased 
 should be made under the fourth clause of section 11 part 2 of the Act, 
 which reads as follows: 
 
 “In cases where the foregoing methods of arriving at the aver¬ 
 age annual earnings of the injured employe, cannot reasonably 
 and fairly be applied, such annual earnings shall be taken at such 
 sum as, having regard to the previous earnings of the injured em¬ 
 ploye, and of other employes of same or most similar class, work¬ 
 ing in the same or most similar employment, in the same or neigh¬ 
 boring locality, shall reasonably represent the annual earning 
 capacity of the injured employe at the time of the accident in 
 the employment in which he was working at such time.” 
 
 It is contended that the last clause of the above quotation, “in the 
 employment in which he was working at the time,” is a limitation placed 
 upon the earning capacity, and that inasmuch as the industry is one 
 that does not run the year round, the employe could not earn in that in¬ 
 dustry wages for more than the number of days it is in operation each 
 year, and that the daily wage of the injured employe should be multi¬ 
 plied by the average number of days that the industry is in operation, 
 instead of being multiplied by 300, to find his average annual earnings. 
 
 In this case the mine in which the accident occurred was actually 
 operated 148 days during the year, and coal hoisted from the mine was 
 credited to the deceased as having been mined by him on 131 days. The 
 only record that the company has or that could be produced tending to 
 show the days on which the deceased worked in the mine is the record 
 of the coal credited as above, and it is claimed that this record does 
 not accurately show the number of days deceased worked in the mine 
 for the reason that coal mined by him may be hoisted on a day when 
 he is not working and it is also possible that on some days when he 
 works no coal credited to him is hoisted. The respondent makes the 
 further claim that in determining the average daily wages of deceased, 
 the aggregate amount of money earned by him during the year should 
 be divided by the number of days that the mine was in operation, and 
 not by the number of days that coal was credited to deceased. The 
 contention is that the aggregate amount of money which deceased actu¬ 
 ally earned, $507.45 should be divided by 148, that being the number of 
 days that the mine actually ran, instead of 131, which is the number of 
 days on which coal was credited to deceased as having been mined by 
 him. If 148 is taken for the divisor, the average daily wage will be 
 $3.43, and the average weekly wage $19.70. If 131 is taken as the divisor, 
 the average daily wage will be $3.87 and the average weekly wage $22.33. 
 
 It is shown by the evidence that the average length of time that the 
 coal mines of Michigan are in operation yearly is 211 days, this average 
 being found by taking the total number of days of operation of all the 
 coal mines of the state for four years last past, and striking an average 
 for all of such mines. It is further shown that the number of days that 
 Wolverine Mine No. 2, in which deceased was killed, was operated dur¬ 
 ing the past four years, are as follows: In 1909, 248 days, in 1910, 205 
 days, in 1911, 128 days, and in 1912, 148 days. Some of the other 
 
38 
 
 mines ran as high as 281 days in a year and some as low as 75 days in 
 a year. It is contended by respondent that 211 days yearly,—that 
 being the average length of the run of all the mines in the state—, is the 
 period of operating in the coal industry, and that such period of opera¬ 
 tion places a limit upon the possibility of earnings of any miner in 
 that occupation, and therefore in computing the average annual earnings 
 of a coal miner, his average daily wage must be multiplied by 211 in¬ 
 stead of 300. Respondent contends for the general average for the en¬ 
 tire industry, notwithstanding the fact that the time of operation varies 
 largely in different mines, some being as high as 281 days and some as 
 low as 75 days in a year. It also appears from the evidence that it is 
 possible and feasible to operate the coal mines continuously throughout 
 the year, but the Michigan mines usually shut down in the summer be¬ 
 cause the market for coal is less attractive. It also appears that cer¬ 
 tain men in the mines are employed the year round, such as firemen, 
 pump-men, etc., but these are not classed as miners. 
 
 1. The computation and determination of the “average annual earn¬ 
 ings” and “average weekly wages” have given rise to many disputes, 
 and it is important to have the law governing such computation and 
 determination settled at as early a date as possible. 
 
 Section 11 of part 2 of the Compensation Law was evidently framed 
 with the purpose of avoiding disputes in computation by making such 
 computations so simple that they are mere sums in arithmetic. It is 
 further apparent that the framers of section 11, in their desire to make 
 simple and clear the methods for making computation, sacrificed accu¬ 
 racy in detail in order to make possible speedy adjustments and remove 
 grounds for disagreements and contests. For instance, the section pro¬ 
 vides in many instances that the average weekly wage shall be de¬ 
 termined by taking 300 times the average daily wage and dividing that 
 sum by 52. This is upon the assumption that the average man works 
 approximately 300 days in a year, but this assumption operates to the 
 disadvantage of the man who works more than 300 days yearly. To 
 illustrate: A man works steady for one employer seven months, work¬ 
 ing six days in a week at §2.00 per day. His “average weekly wage” is 
 actually §12.00, but having worked only seven months, which is sub¬ 
 stantially less than a full year, his “average weekly wages” must be 
 determined under this section by multiplying his daily wage by 300 and 
 dividing by 52, which makes his average weekly wages for the purposes 
 of compensation under the law §11.54 per week, instead of §12.00 per 
 week which he actually earned. It is further apparent from section 11 
 that the intent of the statute was to ascertain approximately the “aver¬ 
 age annual earnings” of the employe, using the methods of computation 
 defined in such section, and then finding the average weekly wage by 
 dividing such sum by 52. The essential and controlling factor in mak¬ 
 ing the computation is in all cases the average annual earnings, and the 
 section seems to recognize the right to include in such “annual earnings” 
 not only the money earned in the particular employment, but also in 
 other similar employments. It is apparent that death or total disability 
 involves the loss of all the earnings of the employe, whether in the work 
 in which he was engaged when injured or in any other work. 
 
 The first three clauses of the section, distinctly negative the conten- 
 
39 
 
 tion of respondent. The first clause provides for cases where the em¬ 
 ploye works steady the year round. The second and third clauses of 
 section 11 distinctly provide that the average daily wage of the employe 
 shall be multiplied by 300 to obtain the “average annual earnings,” 
 thereby distinctly negative respondent’s contention that the daily wage 
 should be multiplied by 211. In the second and third clauses of section 
 11 the daily wages which is to be multiplied by 300 is defined as the 
 “average daily wages which he has earned in such employment during 
 the days when so employed.” This language defines with certainty that 
 by average daily wages is meant the wages which the employe receives 
 "during the days when so employed” be they many or few, and then 
 directs that such average daily wage shall be multiplied by 300 and 
 divided by 52. The statute makes no exception in favor of industries 
 that do not run the year round. 
 
 Does the fourth clause of section 11, above quoted, prescribe a differ¬ 
 ent rule for computing compensation in cases of industries not opera¬ 
 ting throughout the year, and does it exclude the application of the prior 
 clauses of the section? The fourth clause is introduced by the follow¬ 
 ing language; “in cases where the foregoing methods (referring to the 
 first three clauses) of arriving at the average annual earnings of the in¬ 
 jured employe cannot be reasonably and fairly applied, such annual 
 earnings shall be taken, etc.” It will be noted that the statutory pro¬ 
 vision does not direct the application of clause four of the section to be 
 made to any particular class of business or employes, but it provides 
 that clause 4 shall not be resorted to unless it is first determined that 
 none of the first three clauses of the section can be reasonably and fairly 
 applied to the particular case. A further examination of clause 4 dis¬ 
 closes the fact that it contains no provision for arriving at the annual 
 earnings of the employe by any process of multiplication. There is 
 also an absence of any provision by which the actual daily earnings of 
 the employe shall form a basis of the computation, and it seems appar¬ 
 ent that clause 4 was intended to apply in exceptional cases where no 
 exact or substantial basis of computation existed, and it was necessary 
 to approximate the annual earnings of the employe by comparison with 
 other similar employes engaged in the same or similar work. An ex¬ 
 ample of this is found in the case of a young man who was employed as 
 a lineman by an Electric Lighting Company without any wage being 
 fixed, and who was killed by coming in contact with a live wire fifteen 
 minutes after he commenced work. In such case it would be necessary 
 to approximate his wages by comparison with what others received for 
 the same or similar lines of work. We are of the opinion that the aver¬ 
 age weekly wage of deceased should be computed under clause 2 of sec¬ 
 tion 11 and that Respondent’s contention on this point is not sustained. 
 
 The remaining contention of Respondent, that the average daily wage 
 of deceased should be determined by dividing the amount of money that 
 he actually earned by the total number of days that the mine was oper¬ 
 ated, cannot be sustained. The rate of compensation was fixed by the 
 Arbitration Committee in this case at $10.00 per week, which is the 
 maximum amount. If Respondent’s contention on this point is sus¬ 
 tained, it would reduce the weekly compensation to $9.89 a week, a 
 difference of 11c weekly for the period of 300 weeks. Respondent has 
 no record of the days nor times that defendant worked in the mine ex- 
 
40 
 
 cept that its books show he was credited with having mined coal on 131 
 days during the year. The claim that he is presumed to have been work¬ 
 ing every day that the mine was operated will scarcely take the place 
 of proof, as the general rule is that all presumptions are in favor of the 
 deceased. The real question to be determined is how many days the 
 deceased in fact worked in the mine, irrespective of the number of days 
 that the mine was operated, and when the actual number of days that 
 he worked is determined, such number must be used as the divisor in 
 ascertaining his daily wage. We think it is satisfactorily shown from 
 the evidence that when the mine shut down in April on the expiration of 
 the scale deceased found other employment, and that he either did not 
 return to work in the mine until several days after it commenced opera¬ 
 tions in September, or if he did return when it commenced operations, 
 his wages were paid in the name of another man, and the money that he 
 earned for these days would have to be added to the aggregate amount 
 of earnings credited to him. This would bring his average wages above 
 $20.00 per week. The decision of the Arbitration Committee is affirmed. 
 
 CLEM vs. CHALMERS MOTOR CAR CO. 
 
 INTENTIONAL AND WILFUL MISCONDUCT—CARPENTER INJURED WHILE 
 DESCENDING FROM A BUILDING BY A ROPE INSTEAD 
 OF A LADDER. 
 
 Claimant’s decedent was employed as a carpenter by defendant and on the 
 day of his injury was working on the flat roof of a large building which was 
 being constructed, the roof being about 20 feet from the ground. The weather 
 was very cold and decedent and the other men were called down from the 
 roof by the foreman at about 9 o’clock in the forenoon for a hot coffee lunch, 
 which it was usual to serve to the men to mitigate the effects of the cold. The 
 means generally used for descending from the roof was an extension ladder, 
 but decedent chose to descend by means of a rope, and in some manner lost his 
 hold of the rope and was killed. Payment of compensation was refused on the 
 ground: (1.) That the injury is not one arising out of and in the course of the 
 employment, and (2) that it was the result of decedent’s intentional and wilful 
 misconduct. 
 
 Held: 1. That the act of coming down from the roof for coffee lunch at 
 
 the foreman’s call was in the course of deceased’s employment. 
 
 2. That the dangers ordinarily incident to descending from such roof arise 
 out of the employment, and this fact is not fundamentally changed by varying 
 the manner and means of descending as in this case. 
 
 3. There being no proof that any order or rule forbidding the use of a rope in 
 descending was communicated or made known to decedent, and it appearing 
 that other employes used the rope method in descending, and that deceased used 
 much care in letting himself down over the edge of the roof with such rope, 
 his act did not constitute intentional and wilful misconduct within the meaning 
 of the law. 
 
 On December 12, 1912, Charles S. Clem was in the employ of Chalmers 
 Motor Company in Detroit and was receiving an average weekly wage 
 of $20.65. He was a carpenter by trade and was working on the roof of 
 the new storage building which was being erected by the company. This 
 
41 
 
 building was approximately 160 feet long, 150 feet wide and 19 or 20 feet 
 high, the roof in course of construction being what is commonly called 
 a flat roof. The day was cold and the men employed on this roof, 25 or 
 30 in number, were obliged to w r ear gloves or mittens in their work. 
 During the few days of very cold weather at this time, the foreman pro¬ 
 vided hot coffee for the men, and at about 9 o’clock in the forenoon of 
 each day would call them down from the roof for a hot coffee lunch. 
 The ordinary means used by the men for ascending to and descending 
 from the roof of the building was an extension ladder such as painters 
 use, 20 feet in length, resting against the south side of the building and 
 tied to it by ropes. This was the only ladder provided. The heavier 
 material used by the men in their work was lifted to the roof by block 
 and tackle with rope falls, and in addition to this there were about a 
 dozen ropes from 20 to 30 feet in length which were used to pull up 
 lighter material over the cornice of the building when needed by the 
 men working on the roof. These ropes were located around in different 
 places so that when material was needed at any particular place there 
 would be a rope near at hand with which to haul it up. The ropes were 
 lying on the roof and at places where the men happened to leave them. 
 
 At about 9 o’clock in the forenoon of December 12, 1912, the foreman 
 called the men working on the roof to come down for hot coffee, and it 
 appears that they proceeded to go down by way of the ladder, one fol¬ 
 lowing another. While others were going down in this way, Mr. Clem 
 said to a fellow workman named Sekos, “Hold this rope and I will slip 
 down.” From this point Sekos tells the story as follows: “I was in a 
 hurry to get down. I wanted to get down, but I just held it (the rope). 
 Another man was behind me on the roof, but did not have hold of the 
 rope. * * * I held the rope all right; it didn’t let loose at all; it 
 
 didn’t break, and if he had hung on the rope all right he would have 
 got down safely. I guess he lost the rope; I guess his hands were cold; 
 he had mitts on his hands and so did I. * * * It was pretty cold; we 
 were so cold we were going down to get some coffee.” 
 
 The only other eye witness was Albert E. Glaser, the man who stood 
 behind Sekos when Clem started down the rope. Glaser testified in sub¬ 
 stance that Clem asked Sekos to hold the rope for him; that Sekos held 
 one end of the rope; that Clem took the other end of it, went over to the 
 edge of the roof and got down, feet first on his knees, and went down 
 backwards, with his legs down first holding onto the rope with his hands. 
 That he was careful about it, and that would be the most careful way to 
 do it; Clem had gloves on his hands; it was so cold that we could not 
 work without gloves; we were all cold at that time and fingers a little 
 stiff with the cold; a man with fingers stiffened with the cold would not 
 be able to hold onto a rope as he otherwise could. 
 
 Angus E. McDonald was subforeman, having charge of part of the men 
 working on the roof. McDonald had been a sailor and used a rope 
 instead of the ladder on going up to and down from the roof of this 
 building probably four or five times; and on one occasion when he so 
 used a rope, the general foreman cautioned him and the men then pres¬ 
 ent not to use ropes for going up and down, but to use the ladder. There 
 was no evidence that Clem was present at this time, or that the fore¬ 
 man’s order not to use the rope ever reached him. It is conceded that 
 6 
 
42 
 
 no question as to the effect of violation of shop rules or orders is in¬ 
 volved in this case. It is also conceded the “Coming down off the roof 
 for coffee lunch” at the foreman’s call was “in the course of Clem’s em¬ 
 ployment.” The issue is narrowed down to “the manner of coming 
 down” from the roof, and the means used by Clem for that purpose. It 
 is contended on behalf of the company that compensation should be 
 denied because (1) the injury is not one arising out of and in the course 
 of the employment of deceased, and (2) that it was the result of his in¬ 
 tentional and wilful misconduct. 
 
 The first objection, we think, cannot be sustained. It is a matter of 
 common knowledge that carpenters’ employes in the erection of a build¬ 
 ing must ascend and descend and change their positions on the building 
 as the work requires and that they are often required to choose the 
 means and manner of so doing. This is also shown by the 
 proofs, attention being called to the testimony of McDonald, the 
 sub-foreman, that it is not uncommon for men to go down a rope 
 if there is one there, and that he would sooner go down a rope 
 than not. We think the means and manner chosen by deceased to de¬ 
 scend from the roof, did not place his act of descending outside of the 
 course of his employment. Did his choice of the means and manner of 
 descent constitute “intentional and wilful misconduct” within the mean¬ 
 ing of the Compensation Law? Mere negligence on the part of de¬ 
 ceased will not defeat the claim of his widow for compensation. A mis¬ 
 taken estimate of the risk in descending by means of a rope, or the mere 
 choosing of means and manner of descending which were less safe than 
 the ladder, would at most be only negligence on the part of deceased. 
 There is no evidence of wilfulness except what might be inferred from 
 the naked fact of choosing the rope method of descending. The evidence 
 shows that deceased exercised much care in letting himself down over the 
 edge of the roof with the rope. There is an entire absence of any show¬ 
 ing of wilfulness by any act or word of deceased except as above, and we 
 think it may be fairly said that deceased acted in the belief that he 
 could safely descend by the rope. He fell because of losing his hold on 
 the rope. Whether this resulted from his fingers being stiffened ^vith 
 cold, or from his gloves, or for some other cause does not appear. It was 
 not impossible that by reason of frosted fingers or some other cause he 
 might have lost his hold on the ladder, had he chosen that way of de¬ 
 scending. We are of the opinion that the act complained of did not 
 constitute “intentional and wilful misconduct” within the meaning of 
 the statute, and the decision of the arbitration committee in favor of the 
 widow is affirmed. 
 
43 
 
 PHILLIP LIMRON vs. PERE MARQUETTE R. R. CO. 
 
 LOSS OF FOOT, AND OTHER INJURIES WHICH CAUSE DISABILITY, RE¬ 
 SULTING FROM SAME ACCIDENT. 
 
 Applicant suffered an accident which resulted in the loss of one foot, also 
 serious injury to the other foot and to his left shoulder, the latter injuries produc¬ 
 ing disability of uncertain duration. It is contended by respondent that appli¬ 
 cant is only entitled to award of 125 weeks, being the amount for the loss of the 
 foot, and that compensation cease at the end of that period unless the disa¬ 
 bility resulting from the other injuries continues beyond that time. 
 
 Held: That applicant is entitled to receive half wages during the continuance 
 of total disability resulting from the injuries other than the loss of his foot, 
 to which shall be added compensation for the specific period of 125 weeks, pro¬ 
 vided in the law for the loss of a foot. 
 
 The applicant, Phillip Limron, while in the employ of respondent, 
 met with an accident causing the loss of his right foot, the dislocation 
 of his left shoulder, a severe gash in his left leg and breaking some of 
 the bones in his left foot, particularly the great toe and the one next 
 to it. Aside from the loss of the right foot, the other injuries sus¬ 
 tained by the applicant have caused total disability, the same being 
 mainly caused by the injury to the shoulder. For the loss of the right 
 foot the applicant is entitled to compensation for 125 weeks under the 
 specific provisions of the law for such injury, without reference to the 
 length of time that he is actually disabled from work. For the other 
 injuries which he received resulting in total disability as above, he 
 would be entitled to receive half his weekly wages during the con¬ 
 tinuance of such total disability even if he had not suffered the loss of 
 the right foot. If he had suffered either of the injuries alone, he would 
 be entitled to receive for those causing total disability half wages 
 during its continuance, on the one hand, and for the loss of the foot 
 half wages for 125 weeks. Having in fact suffered all of the above in¬ 
 juries from one accident, is he entitled to specific compensation for the 
 loss of the foot and also compensation for the total disability resulting 
 from his other injuries? It is claimed by the respondent that the award 
 should be half wages for 125 weeks, and if at the end of that time the 
 applicant is still incapacitated by reason of his other injuries, he may 
 apply to the Board for further compensation. 
 
 If the contention of respondent is upheld, and the “other injuries” 
 of the applicant caused total disability terminating at the end of 125 
 weeks, then the applicant would receive merely half wages for 125 
 weeks which would be compensation for the total disability, but would 
 receive no compensation for the loss of his right foot. It is apparent 
 that such a construction would result in a gross injustice to the appli¬ 
 cant. It is conceded that the mere loss of the right foot would entitle 
 him to compensation for 125 weeks. It is also conceded that his other 
 injuries would entitle him to compensation for 125 weeks if his present 
 total disability continued for that period. If in addition to the loss 
 of his right foot the other injuries resulted in the loss of an arm, the 
 period of compensation for the loss of the foot would be added to the 
 
44 
 
 period of compensation for the loss of the arm, and the total compensa¬ 
 tion period would be their sum, and more, because the law provides 
 that the loss of the arm and foot together shall constitute permanent 
 total disability which would entitle the injured workman to 500 weeks’ 
 compensation. It is the opinion of the Board that in cases where a 
 workman receives injuries causing total disability, and in addition 
 thereto suffers the loss of a member as in this case, the award of com¬ 
 pensation should be so made as to fairly cover both. This would re¬ 
 quire the payment of half wages during the continuance of total dis¬ 
 ability, and in addition the payment of half wages for 125 weeks for 
 the loss of the foot, the latter to commence when the period of pay¬ 
 ments for total disability ended. Allowance should be made for the 
 disability incident to the amputation of the member, which in this case 
 is to be fixed at six weeks and is to be deducted from the 125 weeks’ 
 period above mentioned. The compensation for the loss of a foot or 
 other member is required to be paid at all events, without reference to 
 whether such loss destroys or lessens the earning capacity of the in¬ 
 jured. For example a man loses a finger and returns to work at the 
 end of ten days at the same wages. He is entitled to the specific 
 amount fixed in the law for the loss of such finger for the reason that 
 such loss deprives him of the use of that finger for the remainder of 
 his life. The handicap resulting from such loss might be difficult to 
 estimate in many cases, and it seems for this reason the law has laid 
 down a specific schedule fixing definite amounts. The award of the 
 committee on arbitration will be set aside and an order entered in ac¬ 
 cordance with this opinion. 
 
 SPOONER vs. DETROIT SATURDAY NIGHT. 
 
 EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYE: QUESTION OF BY WHOM WAS DECEASED 
 
 EMPLOYED. 
 
 Decedent was employed by the Winn & Hammond Printing Co. as engineer. 
 The plant of the Detroit Saturday Night, haying been injured by fire, temporary 
 arrangements were made with the Winn & Hammond Co. for the use of their 
 plant to get out the paper. Decedent was killed while running an elevator dur¬ 
 ing the night on which respondent was using the plant. Respondent contends 
 that decedent was not in its employ at the time of the accident, and that run¬ 
 ning the elevator was out of the course of his regular employment. It was shown 
 that respondents entered into a contract, part of which stipulated that they were 
 to furnish a competent engineer to attend to the engine while they had the use of 
 the plant. They did in fact hire a man, but decedent insisted that he do the work 
 himself. 
 
 Held: 1. That as Spooner’s work for Winn & Hammond ceased at 5 o’clock 
 in the afternoon and his pay for the night work was made by respondent, this 
 was sufficient to make him an employe of respondent. 
 
 2. That, inasmuch as he met his death while running the elevator at the 
 request of respondent’s foreman, this was sufficient to bring his act within the 
 course of his employment. 
 
 Appeal of the Detroit Saturday Night from the decision of an arbitration com¬ 
 mittee awarding compensation to Mary Spooner for the death of her husband.— 
 Affirmed. 
 
 On February 3, 1913, respondent entered into a contract for the use 
 
45 
 
 of a portion of the plant and machinery of Winn & Hammond Com¬ 
 pany, a publishing concern of the City of Detroit, respondent’s plant 
 and place of business having been rendered untenatable by fire. The 
 contract is in writing and was made between the Saturday Night Com¬ 
 pany and T. H. Collins, receiver for the Winn & Hammond Company, 
 and provides the terms and compensation for the use of machinery, 
 power and appliances in the plant and also contains the following pro¬ 
 viso: 
 
 “It is further agreed that should the Detroit Saturday Night Com¬ 
 pany wish to operate the machinery in this plant at any time other 
 than the stated working hours of the Winn & Hammond Company 
 which are 7 a. m. to 11:30 a. m. and 12:15 p. m. to 5:00 p. m., that 
 the charge for power service shall be $1 per hour in addition to the 
 prices above quoted and that the Detroit Saturday Night Company 
 agree to furnish a competent engineer to tend boiler and perform such 
 other duties as usually fall to a man in that capacity.” 
 
 The Saturday Night Company desired to operate the plant on the 
 night of February 5th to get out its paper for that week, and some 
 negotiations were had between the representatives of the Saturday 
 Night Company and Receiver Collins and Mr. Spooner, who was the 
 regular engineer of the Winn & Hammond plant, for the services of Mr. 
 Spooner as engineer that night. Objection was made by some of the 
 Winn & Hammond people to the proposal because the work would be 
 too much for Mr. Spooner, and that he would be worn out and unable 
 to do his work properly for the Winn & Hammond people the next day. 
 Mr. Williamson, superintendent for the Saturday Night Company, em¬ 
 ployed a man by the name of Leonard J. McCabe as engineer for that 
 night. Time and a half was allowed for night work and Spooner it 
 seems desired the job on that account, and it is claimed that he was 
 opposed to having any other engineer run the engine lest it might not 
 be handled properly. McCabe came to the plant that afternoon talked 
 with Spooner in the matter and left because the latter told him that he, 
 Spooner, was going to run the engine that night. It is claimed on the 
 part of the applicant that Spooner’s work for Winn & Hammond Com¬ 
 pany ceased at 5 o’clock on February 5th, and from that time he was 
 in the employ of the Saturday Night Company until he met his death 
 at about 2 o’clock in the morning following. It is further claimed on 
 the part of the applicant that Mr. Spooner was hired by the Saturday 
 Night Company as engineer and that the accident which resulted in his 
 death arose out of and in the course of his employment. 
 
 It is claimed by respondent that Spooner was not in the employ of 
 the Saturday Night Company, but was there substantially as a volun¬ 
 teer because he was unwilling to have anyone else handle his engine, 
 and that Spooner was in fact at the time of the accident in the employ 
 of the Winn & Hammond Company. Respondent further claims that 
 the work of running the elevator, at which Spooner was fatally injured, 
 was entirely outside of his duties as engineer, and that his injury did 
 not arise out of or in the course of his employment. There is no dis¬ 
 pute as to any of the material facts in the case except the question of 
 employment of Mr. Spooner as engineer that night. The place and 
 manner of the accident are undisputed. The sole question of fact in 
 
46 
 
 dispute is whether or not Spooner that night was working as an em¬ 
 ploye of the Detroit Saturday Night Company. 
 
 Death having sealed Spooner’s lips, the disputed fact must be deter¬ 
 mined from the testimony of others and from inferences that may be 
 drawn from established facts and conditions. 
 
 It is undisputed that Winn & Hammond Company ceased work in 
 the plant at 5 o’clock in the afternoon of February 5th; that the plant 
 was operated that night by the respondent in getting out its paper; that 
 Mr. Spooner was working that night running the engine which fur¬ 
 nished power and light for the respondent; that the plant could not 
 run and respondent’s work could not be done without an engineer and 
 the operation of the engine; and that Spooner was engaged in running 
 the engine with the knowledge and approval of and pursuant to some 
 arrangement with respondent. The duty of respondent to furnish an 
 engineer is fixed by the written contract above referred to, and it is 
 conceded that respondent expected to pay for Spooner’s services as 
 engineer that night, the claim of respondent being that Spooner was to 
 act as engineer that night through an arrangement made with Receiver 
 Collins of the Winn & Hammond Company, who was Spooner’s regular 
 employer. The precise claim as made by respondent is that it was 
 understood that Spooner was to work as engineer that night, that Re¬ 
 ceiver Collins would “bill respondent for him,” and that respondent 
 would pay the bill for the services of Spooner as such engineer, such 
 payment to be made to Receiver Collins of the Winn & Hammond Com¬ 
 pany. On the other hand, it is claimed by the applicant that Spooner 
 was employed as such engineer for the night in question directly by 
 respondent and was to be paid time and a half for his work, which 
 would amount to approximately $5.20. It is not disputed by respondent 
 that this amount was to be paid for the services of Spooner that night, 
 respondent’s claim being that such payment should be made to Col¬ 
 lins as receiver, and that by reason of such arrangement Spooner was 
 in fact in the employ of Winn & Hammond Company at the time he 
 met his death. There is a sharp conflict of evidence in relation to the 
 hiring of Spooner for the night in question between the witnesses of the 
 applicant and the respondent, but from a careful examination of all 
 the proofs the Board has reached the conclusion and finds as a matter 
 of fact that Spooner, at the time of his death, was working as an em¬ 
 ploye of respondent. 
 
 The engine which Mr. Spooner was engaged in operating was located 
 in the basement of the building, and the place where he met his death 
 was in the elevator between the third and fourth floors of the building. 
 It appears that it was not necessary for Spooner to remain in the base¬ 
 ment with the engine all of the time, and he came to the floor above 
 where respondent’s employes were folding papers and putting in the 
 inserts. Mr. Loeffelbein, foreman of the press room, was the man 
 charged with getting out the work, and was in charge of the work at 
 that time, respondent’s superintendent being away. Loeffelbein and 
 others desired to get some stools that were located on the fourth floor 
 of the building to use in their work of folding. There were no lights 
 on the stairways or on the fourth floor, and Spooner proposed to run 
 the men up to the fourth floor in the elevator, which he had been 
 
47 
 
 accustomed to run at times in connection with his work as engineer. 
 Loeffelbein and two other foremen of respondent thereupon got into the 
 elevator with Spooner. Spooner started the elevator and while ascend¬ 
 ing to the fourth floor was caught in the gate or some other way and 
 crushed to death. There was no light in the elevator and those with 
 him could not tell just how the accident happened. Respondent con¬ 
 tends that running the elevator in question was outside of the course 
 of Spooner’s employment, and that the accident which caused his death 
 did not arise out of his employment. 
 
 The employes of the Saturday Night Company were not familiar with 
 the building, having moved into it in an emergency caused by fire; 
 while on the other hand, Spooner was familiar with the plant and had 
 been accustomed to run the elevator frequently during his long em¬ 
 ployment with Winn & Hammond Company. It was but natural under 
 those circumstances that Spooner should volunteer to run the elevator 
 up to the fourth floor with Loeffelbein and Hussey and Wheeler, two 
 other foremen of respondent, to get the stools that were wanted. The 
 stools were to be used in doing the work of folding and putting in 
 inserts, and the proposal of Spooner to run the elevator to the upper 
 floor seems to be in the nature of a suggestion from him, which re¬ 
 spondent’s foreman might either have accepted or declined. Loeffelbein 
 was foreman of the pressroom and had charge of getting out the work 
 that night, and in the absence of respondent’s superintendent, Loeffel¬ 
 bein was Spooner’s immediate superior. Also, Spooner might naturally 
 be expected to be governed by the orders and wishes of the other two 
 foremen of respondent who went with him and Loeffelbein on the fatal 
 elevator trip. The acquiesence of Loeffelbein and the other two fore¬ 
 men in Spooner’s proposal to run the elevator for them and their ap¬ 
 proval of his action in so doing had the effect of placing Spooner in 
 the same position as if he had been ordered by his foreman to run the 
 elevator on this trip. He was merely doing what any helpful man ac¬ 
 customed to run the elevator would have done under the the circum¬ 
 stances, and was trying to further the business and work of his em¬ 
 ployer. In the opinion of the Board the injury arose out of and in the 
 course of his employment and the award of the arbitration committee 
 is affirmed. 
 
48 
 
 ADMINISTRATION AND PRACTICE. 
 
 The Industrial Accident Board on October 9, 1912, adopted certain 
 rules relating to the reporting of accidents, settlement of claims, re¬ 
 ceipts for compensation and procedure to be followed in cases settled 
 and disposed of without contest. These are known as “Rules of Pro¬ 
 cedure” and are numbered from one to nine inclusive. Said rules and 
 the procedure marked out by them cover the uncontested cases, and 
 also the reporting of accidents and other preliminary proceedings in 
 cases that later become contested and eventually proceed to arbitration. 
 
 In the administration of the law the Board has from time to time 
 adopted rules relating to practice and procedure in connection with 
 contested cases and claims, as experience seemed to require, and the 
 same are here set forth, under the head of “Administration and Prac¬ 
 tice,” as follows: 
 
 RULES. 
 
 I. 
 
 SELECTION OF ARBITRATORS. 
 
 It is a maxim of the law that no man can act as judge in his own 
 case, and this principle extends to and excludes all persons financially 
 interested in the outcome of the case, together with their agents, offi¬ 
 cers, and attorneys. Persons so nearly related to any of the parties 
 in an arbitration case that they may be fairly deemed to be financially 
 interested in the decision are also excluded under this principle. The 
 rule is therefore established by the Board that all persons who fall 
 within any of the above named classes are disqualified from acting as 
 arbitrators in cases to be heard before committee on arbitration under 
 the Workmen’s Compensation law. 
 
 II. 
 
 POSTPONEMENT OF CASES. 
 
 The compensation law provides that arbitration be had in the locality 
 where the accident occurred. This is for the accommodation of parties 
 interested and to save expenses for travel and mileage for themselves 
 and witnesses. In all arbitration cases one member of the Board goes 
 to place of accident, frequently traveling hundreds of miles to hear the 
 case. It is apparent under these conditions that a postponement of 
 such hearings cannot be had, and it is necessary for the parties to be 
 prepared for arbitration and to proceed with the same at the time 
 and place set. Any other rule would make the administration of the 
 compensation law expensive and ineffectual. The parties must also have 
 
49 
 
 their witnesses ready at the time and place set for arbitration so as to 
 make their proofs complete. 
 
 III. 
 
 INSURER DEEMED PARTY. 
 
 When arbitration is ordered in the case of any employer who is in¬ 
 sured, notice of the time and place of such arbitration shall be given 
 both to the employer and the company or organization carrying the 
 risk; and a copy of the award or judgment on such arbitration shall be 
 sent by mail from the offices of the Industrial Accident Board to such 
 employer and also to the carrier of the risk. In all such cases if an 
 award of compensation is made it shall be against the employer and 
 also against the carrier of the risk, both of whom shall be deemed 
 parties to such proceeding. 
 
 IV. 
 
 AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS. 
 
 In all cases where an award has been made, or agreement in regard 
 to compensation entered into by the parties and approved by the Board, 
 such award or agreement, as the case may be, shall continue in force 
 until modified by the order of the Board, or by written agreement of 
 the parties approved by the Board, or by a written agreement of the 
 parties approved by the Board. The employer may not stop or in any 
 way change the rate of compensation provided for in such award or 
 agreement except as herein provided. In cases where the employe re¬ 
 turns to work at the termination of his disability the filing of the final 
 receipt for compensation will be deemed an agreement terminating the 
 period of disability. 
 
 V. 
 
 GROUNDS FOR DENYING LIABILITY TO BE STATED. 
 
 If the employer denies liability in case where a claim for compensa¬ 
 tion is filed by an injured employe or his dependents, such denial shall 
 be filed with the Board in writing by such employer and shall set forth 
 with reasonable detail and certainty the facts and circumstances upon 
 which he relies as a defense to such claim. Upon the filing of such 
 denial in the office of the Board, a copy of same shall be furnished to 
 the claimant, so that he will have such seasonable information as to 
 the nature and particulars of the employer’s defense as may be reason¬ 
 ably necessary to enable him to procure witnesses and prepare for the 
 hearing on arbitration. 
 
 VI. 
 
 WITNESSES AND PROOFS. 
 
 The arbitration is the first and fundamental hearing in contested 
 cases, and is held at the place where the accident occurred in order 
 
50 
 
 to make such hearing reasonably convenient and inexpensive to the 
 parties. The proofs should be fully taken at such arbitration, and 
 such proofs in general form the record and basis for the hearing on 
 review before the full Board. Where cases are taken before the full 
 Board for review, additional testimony may be taken when necessary 
 by deposition under the provisions of the general statutes of the state. 
 The party appealing should furnish the Board with a copy or transcript 
 of the proofs. Witnesses will not be heard orally before the full Board 
 except on extraordinary occasions, and then only in cases where per¬ 
 mission to produce and examine such witnesses has been granted by 
 the Board on application prior to the date of the hearing. 
 
 VII. 
 
 HEARINGS ON REVIEW. 
 
 Hearings on review before the full Board shall be held at the office 
 of the Board in the city of Lansing. This general rule, however, may 
 be modified by the order of the Board in exceptional cases, when 
 deemed necessary. On such hearings the time allowed to each side for 
 argument or oral presentation of the case shall not exceed one hour. 
 Briefs or written arguments may be filed with the Board at or before 
 the time of such hearing. If conditions seem to require it, the Board 
 may permit the filing of briefs or written arguments within a limited 
 time after the hearing on review. Either or both of the parties, as they 
 choose, may present their case on such hearing by briefs or written 
 arguments without being present at the hearing. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 CONTESTED MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL BILLS. 
 
 The provision of law authorizing the Industrial Accident Board to 
 pass upon bills for medical and hospital services applies only in cases 
 where there is a real, bona fide dispute. Before such matter can be 
 brought to the Board for adjustment, the parties are required to make 
 an earnest effort to reach a settlement of the matter between them¬ 
 selves, and may appeal to the Board only after they have exhausted the 
 ordinary means of bringing about such settlement. In all matters of 
 this kind which are brought before the Board, the person, firm, or 
 corporation applying must show by satisfactory proof that they have 
 made an earnest and adequate effort to reach a settlement, and that 
 the settlement failed through no fault of theirs. Where bills of the 
 above class are brought before the Board for adjustment by persons 
 objecting to same, their objections will be considered only in cases 
 where they have exhausted the ordinary means of reaching a settlement 
 before making application; and in all cases where such bills are pre¬ 
 sented by claimants without having first exhausted the ordinary means 
 of reaching a settlement, the same will be dismissed without prejudice 
 and without investigation of their merits. 
 
51 
 
 IX. 
 
 POSTPONEMENT OF REVIEW HEARINGS. 
 
 At all hearings on Review the full Board is present, and the docket 
 for such hearings is so arranged that the cases will follow each other 
 in regnla • succession. The arbitration cases require a large portion of 
 Ihe time of the members of the Board away from Lansing, and when 
 (ases are set for hearing on Review such hearing must proceed in ac¬ 
 cordance with the docket and be disposed of. Parties may not stipulate 
 to postpone such cases after the same are set for hearing, and post¬ 
 ponement will be granted by the Board only in exceptional instances. 
 In case any of the parties or their attorneys cannot be present or repre¬ 
 sented at such hearing, a reasonable time will be given to file a brief 
 or written argument in the case. 
 
 X. 
 
 LUMP SUM PAYMENTS. 
 
 It is manifest that the clear purpose of the legislature was to pro¬ 
 vide that the compensation receivable under this law should go to the 
 persons or families entitled to the same in weekly payments, it being 
 the judgment of the legislature that when so paid it would more effectu¬ 
 ally meet and relieve the wants of the injured employes and their fami¬ 
 lies, than if paid in a lump sum. This view has the full endorsement 
 and concurrence of the Board. Therefore, lump sum payments will 
 only be authorized in exceptional cases where circumstances create a 
 necessity for such action. Application for lump sum payments can 
 only be made after an “Agreement in Regard to Compensation” has 
 been filed with and approved by the Board, or an award of compensa¬ 
 tion made; and such application is required to be in the form of a 
 sworn petition setting forth in detail the facts and circumstances on 
 which application is based. Desire of the applicant to go to another 
 state or country, or to buy property, or to invest in business, etc., do 
 not constitute reasons for lump sum payment. In general, conditions 
 created by the acts of the injured employe or his dependents after the 
 accident, do not constitute ground for such payment. As a general 
 rule, the circumstances and conditions that will justify such payment 
 are those existing prior to the accident or created by it, such as mort¬ 
 gage indebtedness on the home of the employe. In such case both the 
 indebtedness and attendant conditions must be set forth in detail, and 
 if secured by mortgage, the location and description of the property 
 must be given, the name and address of the mortgagee, and the office or 
 place where the mortgage is filed or recorded. 
 
 XI. 
 
 APPEALS TO SUPREME COURT. 
 
 In case an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court by certiorari, it is 
 incumbent upon the appellant to prepare the return to such writ in 
 
52 
 
 much the same way that a bill of exceptions is prepared in cases ap¬ 
 pealed by writ of error. Such proposed return should be submitted to 
 and served upon the opposite party, or his attorney, so as to give op¬ 
 portunity to prepare and submit amendments in substantially the same 
 way as in settling bills of exceptions. The appellant at the time of 
 serving the proposed return on the opposite party should serve such 
 opposite party with notice of the time when the proposed return will 
 be presented to the Board for settlement. This practice will give both 
 parties an opportunity to be heard and to have all matters which they 
 deem important included in such return. In cases where the proposed 
 return is agreed upon between the parties, such agreement may be sig¬ 
 nified by a stipulation in writing attached to the proposed return. 
 
 XII. 
 
 FINDINGS OF FACT AND LAW. 
 
 If either party in a case desires to have findings of fact and law 
 made by the Board for the purpose of an appeal to the Supreme Court, 
 such party shall prepare and submit to the Board proposed findings of 
 law and fact in substantially the manner required by rule in non-jury 
 cases. Such proposed findings shall be served upon the opposite party 
 together with notice of the time when the same will be presented for 
 settlement before the Board. Such opposite party may draft and sub¬ 
 mit amendments to such proposed findings of fact and law, and also 
 additional proposed findings, if deemed necessary. In case of disagree¬ 
 ment on such proposed findings, the same will be settled by the Board 
 in substantially the same manner that is provided for settlement of the 
 return to a writ of certiorari. Parties will aid the Board in this work 
 by agreeing upon the facts to be found whenever possible, and in cases 
 where they are unable to agree, they will aid the Board by reducing 
 the matters in difference to the smallest possible compass. 
 
 RULES OF PROCEDURE ADOPTED BY INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT 
 
 BOARD. 
 
 Rules and system of reporting accidents and the making and keeping 
 record of adjustment and payment of compensation adopted hy the In¬ 
 dustrial Accident Board. 
 
 WHAT ACCIDENTS TO BE REPORTED. 
 
 Rule 1. All accidents which result in disability continuing for more 
 than one full working day shall be reported to the Board; all accidents 
 involving the loss of a member shall be so reported irrespective of the 
 question of disability resulting; all accidents causing death shall be 
 reported to the Board. 
 
53 
 
 WHEN TO BE REPORTED. 
 
 Rule 2. All employers subject to the Compensation Law shall make 
 reports to the Board weekly of all accidents to their employes which 
 come within the classes of accidents designated in Rule 1. Such reports 
 shall be on and in accordance with the requirements of the weekly re¬ 
 port blank, “Form No. 5-a,” of said Board. 
 
 FIFTEENTH-DAY REPORT. 
 
 Rule 3. In all cases where the disability resulting to the injured em¬ 
 ploye continues for more than fourteen days, a further report, on and in 
 accordance with the requirements of report blank, “Form No. 6,” shall 
 be made to the Board on the fifteenth day of such disability: Provided, 
 That in all cases where the accident causes the loss of a member or death, 
 such report on Form No. 6 shall be made to the Board within ten days 
 after such accident or such death, as the case may be. 
 
 IMMEDIATE REPORT REQUIRED. 
 
 Rule 4- In all cases where a claim for compensation is filed with the 
 Board by an injured employe, if it appears that the report required by 
 Rule 3 has not been made and filed by the employer on account of dis¬ 
 agreement as to the continuance of the disability or for any other rea¬ 
 son, the Board shall thereupon require such employe to forthwith file a 
 report of the accident on and in accordance with the requirements of 
 blank Form No. 6 of said Board. 
 
 MEMORANDUM AGREEMENT. 
 
 Rule 5. When an agreement in regard to compensation is made be¬ 
 tween the employer and the injured employe, the same shall be in writ¬ 
 ing on and in accordance with Form No. 10. 
 
 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT. 
 
 Rule 6. In cases where death occurs, a supplemental report will be 
 filed on Form No. 7, giving information as to dependents of deceased. 
 
 RECEIPTS FOR COMPENSATION. 
 
 Rule 7. After an agreement relating to compensation is made be¬ 
 tween the employer and the injured employe, and approved by the 
 Board; and also in cases where an application for arbitration has been 
 filed and an award of compensation made by the Board, receipts for 
 weekly payments of compensation made upon Form No. 11, signed by 
 such employe or his dependents, shall be filed in the office of the Board 
 monthly. 
 
 FINAL REPORT. 
 
 Rule 8. When the disability of the injured employe terminates; and 
 also when the payment of the compensation for the loss of a member, 
 
54 
 
 or in case of death, has been fully made, final report thereof shall' be 
 filed with the Board, on and in accordance with Form No. 7-a, together 
 with settlement receipt on and in accordance with Form No. 12, signed 
 by the employe or his dependents, as the case may be. 
 
 Rule 9. Wherever the word “employer” is used in the foregoing rules, 
 numbered from 1 to 8 inclusive, it shall be construed to cover either 
 the employer, or the insurance company carrying the risk, or the Com¬ 
 missioner of Insurance, as the case may be. 
 
 HOW TO REPORT ACCIDENTS. 
 
 On the following pages will be found a concrete case, displaying the 
 correct method of reporting an accident, and also the procedure to be 
 followed when payment of compensation is made. It will be observed 
 that ALL accidents resulting in disability of one full working day or 
 more are recorded on the weekly report form (No. 5-A). If incapacity 
 exceeds fourteen days, a detailed report on form No. 6 will be filed on 
 the fifteenth day, and the latter will be followed at an interval of ,not 
 to exceed fifteen days by an agreement in regard to compensation, exe¬ 
 cuted on form No. 10. When an “Agreement in Regard to Compensation” 
 is reached, payments are to be made weekly, and receipts taken for the 
 same upon form No. 11, entitled “Receipt on Account of Compensation,” 
 which in cases of extended disability are to be filed monthly with the 
 Industrial Accident Board. When the final payment is made, a “Settle¬ 
 ment Receipt” is taken upon form No. 12, and this is submitted together 
 with form No. 7-A, “Final Report of Accident,” showing that the case 
 is closed and completing the files of the Board. Form No. 7 will be 
 filed if death results so that information may be had as to dependents. 
 
 THINGS TO REMEMBER. 
 
 Employers, and agents who are handling the reporting and adjusting 
 of accidents, will facilitate the work of the Industrial Accident Board 
 by paying careful attention to the “Rules of Procedure” and guiding 
 themselves accordingly. 
 
 The personal signature of the injured employe, or the dependent or 
 dependents to whom compensation is to be paid, is required and must 
 always appear on the “Agreement in Regard to Compensation,” “Re¬ 
 ceipts on Account of Compensation” and “Settlement Receipts.” Type¬ 
 written signatures will not be accepted, and all papers so signed will 
 
55 
 
 be returned for correction. The mark of an employe who cannot write 
 will, when properly witnessed, be accepted. “An Agreement in Regard 
 to Compensation” must bear the signature of the injured man or his 
 dependents. It must also bear the signature of the employer, and when 
 such signature is made by an officer or agent of the employer, the sig¬ 
 nature of such officer or agent must be accompanied by an appropriate 
 designation of his official position or agency. The execution of the 
 agreement must be attested by two witnesses, as indicated in the form. 
 
 Incomplete or improperly executed reports will be returned for cor¬ 
 rection. 
 
 Illegible signatures should be written in duplicate on receipts and 
 agreements to facilitate the work of the filing department, so that 
 confusion in the indexing of cases and reference thereto can be avoided. 
 This will be helpful to employers as well as to the Board, as it will 
 insure such classification and indexing that prompt and full informa¬ 
 tion may be furnished on any case at any time. 
 
 It is particularly important that the “First Report of Accidents” 
 submitted on form No. 6 should give the correct name, address, (street 
 and number) and age of the injured employe, as well as a concise de¬ 
 scription of the accident and the nature of the injury. Reports not 
 containing this information will be returned for correction. 
 
 REPORT ACCIDENTS PROMPTLY. 
 
 IF IN DOUBT DO NOT HESITATE TO CALL UPON THE INDUSTRIAL 
 ACCIDENT BOARD FOR ADVICE. 
 
 WHEN COMPENSATION IS DUE SEE THAT THE INJURED EMPLOYE OR 
 HIS DEPENDENTS RECEIVE SAME WITHOUT DELAY. 
 
 SEE THAT INJURED EMPLOYE RECEIVES IMMEDIATELY THE MEDICAL 
 AND HOSPITAL SERVICES TO WHICH HE IS ENTITLED UNDER THE 
 ACT. 
 
 Following are given a sample report, “Weekly Report Form,” “Re¬ 
 port of Accident,” “Supplementary Report of Accident,” “Final Report 
 of Accident,” “Agreement in Regard to Compensation,” “Receipt on 
 Account of Compensation,” and the “Settlement Receipt,” properly 
 filled in on blanks of the Board, the matter constituting the blank being 
 printed in Roman type, and the matter written into such blanks in 
 making such report and preparing the same for execution is printed in 
 Italics. 
 
 FORMS FOR REPORTING ACCIDENTS. 
 
 Every accident involving the loss of one full working day or more 
 should be reported upon form No. 5-A, which is to be filed weekly and 
 which is to carry from week to week the name of every injured employe, 
 together with the full amount of time lost to date, until disability has 
 terminated. Also give medical expense when possible. 
 
50 
 
 Form No. 5A WEEKLY REPORT FORM * 
 
 Date received. For week ending January 11,1913 
 
 (Do not fill in.) 
 
 Name of Employer. Sherwood Motor Company, . 
 
 Address (Street and Town). 767-73 Water Street, Franklin, Michigan . 
 
 Nature of Business. Motor Manufacturing . 
 
 Signature of person making report. F. M. CRANDELL .Position. Accident Clerk . 
 
 Date of 
 Injury. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Nature of Injury. 
 
 Occupation. 
 
 Age. 
 
 Time 
 
 Lost 
 
 Days. 
 
 Medical 
 
 Expense. 
 
 10/14 
 
 *John K. Ledyard 
 
 Contused right foot 
 
 Grinder 
 
 29 
 
 71 
 
 $45 
 
 10/26 
 
 * Samuel Reed 
 
 Broken Arm 
 
 Tester 
 
 35 
 
 59 
 
 65 
 
 1/8 
 
 Alex Sherbrook 
 
 Broken Ribs 
 
 Trucker 
 
 40 
 
 4 
 
 35 
 
 1/7 
 
 John Flanagan 
 
 Strain of Left Wrist 
 
 Bench Hand 
 
 20 
 
 1 
 
 00 
 
 9/15 
 
 * Edward Murray 
 
 Broken Leg 
 
 Trucker 
 
 19 
 
 88 
 
 48 
 
 1/6 
 
 E. H. Cladstone 
 
 Cut on 4 th finger 
 
 Drill press man 
 
 IS 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 1/7 
 
 R. M. Huff 
 
 Lacerated scalp 
 
 Foreman 
 
 45 
 
 5 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FORWARD WEEKLY TO INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD, LANSING, MICH. 
 
 ♦Record on this form ALL accidents where injury incapacitates for full working day or longer. If 
 employe is carried forward from previous report specify by asterisk in each case. 
 
 REPORT OF ACCIDENT WHERE COMPENSATION INVOLVED. 
 
 Form No. 6 is to be filed only in compensation cases, i. e. when tem¬ 
 porary disability has exceeded fourteen days, or when an accident re¬ 
 sults in the loss of a member, or in death, or permanent disability. 
 When No. 6 is filed, it should be submitted promptly on the fifteenth 
 day following the injury, and it should be followed at an interval of not 
 to exceed fifteen days by an “Agreement in Regard to Compensation” 
 on form No. 10. 
 
 When form No. 6 is filed it is regarded as a notice that compensation 
 is involved and request for an agreement in regard to the same will 
 be made after the lapse of fiften days if form No. 10 is not then on file 
 in the office of the Industrial Accident Board. 
 
57 
 
 Form No. 6. (Sec. 17, part 3.) 
 
 Date received.. 
 
 (Do not fill in.) 
 
 MICHIGAN INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD. 
 
 Report of Accident. 
 
 (To be made only in cases involving loss of a member, or death, or disability continuing more than 
 
 fourteen days.) 
 
 1. Name of employer. Sherwood Motor Company . 
 
 2. Address of employer. 767-73 Water St., Franklin,. Mich . 
 
 3. Nature of business. Motor Manufacturing . 
 
 4. Name of person injured. John K. Ledyard . 
 
 5. Address of injured. 303 Main St., Franklin, Mich . 
 
 6. Occupation of injured. Grinder . 
 
 7. Sex..male _ 8. 'Age..29 yrs - 9. Date of accident. November 14, 1912 . 
 
 10. State amount of weekly wage*. .Average $18. . 11. Nationality. English . 
 
 12. Place of accident, in detail. Department No. 8, Sherwood Motor Company Shops . 
 
 13. Cause and manner of accident....... .Lar{fe piece of steel fell on his foot, crushing same . 
 
 14. Nature and extent of injury. Severe contusion of right foot, hones of second and third toes 
 
 broken .. 
 
 15. Did you supply medical attention. yes . 
 
 16. Name and address of physician. E. J. Parker, 121 Atwater St., Franklin . 
 
 17. Was injured taken home or to hospital. City Hospital, Saginaw St . 
 
 18. Signature of person making out report. F. M. CRANDELL .‘. 
 
 (Do not type name. Report will be returned if signature is not written.) 
 
 19. Position. Accident Clerk . 20. Date of report. November 28, 1912. 
 
 *If piece work, give average earnings; if hourly rate is given, state number of hours per day. 
 
 INSTRUCTIONS. 
 
 The time for making this report in cases where the accident involves the loss of a member, or death, 
 is within ten days after the accident. Where the accident results in disability only, this report is to 
 be made on the fifteenth day after the accident. 
 
 In case the accident causes the loss of a member, state exactly what, and the precise point of 
 amputation: For example, the index finger of the right hand at the second joint, or the left arm at 
 the elbow; the right eye, etc. 
 
 ANSWER THE QUESTIONS ON THIS BLANK FULLY. INCOMPLETE OR INDEFINITE 
 REPORTS WILL BE RETURNED FOR CORRECTION. 
 
 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT IN DEATH CASES. 
 
 The following form, No. 7, “Supplemental Report of Accident/’ is to 
 be submitted in addition to form No. 6 if death results so that knowl¬ 
 edge as to names of all known dependents and such other information 
 as desired may be on record in the offices of the Industrial Accident 
 Board. 
 
 Form No. 7. 
 
 Date received. 
 
 (Do not fill in.) 
 
 MICHIGAN INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD 
 Supplemental Report of Accident 
 
 1. Name of employer. 
 
 2. Address of employer. 
 
 3. Name of injured person. 
 
 4. State how long after injury death resulted. 
 
 8 
 
58 
 
 5. If at hospital give name and location. 
 
 6. Did you furnish all medical aid required during first three weeks?. 
 
 7. Amount of compensation paid to date. 
 
 8. No. ot weeks. 
 
 9. Date of accident. 
 
 10. Date of death. 
 
 11. Give names, ages, relationship and address of ALL dependents: 
 
 Name. Age. Relationship. Address. 
 
 12. Signature of person making report. 
 
 13. Position. Date of report. 
 
 INSTRUCTIONS. 
 
 ANSWER THE QUESTIONS ON THIS BLANK FULLY. INCOMPLETE OR INDEFINITE 
 REPORTS WILL BE RETURNED FOR CORRECTION. 
 
 REPORT AT CLOSE OF CASE. 
 
 “Final Report of Accident” is to be sent in after the last payment of 
 compensation is made and is to accompany the “Settlement Receipt.” 
 In addition to giving the date of accident and date of return to work 
 it will also contain information as to the total amount of compensa¬ 
 tion paid and the total medical and hospital cost. The latter is no 
 inconsiderable item in the cost of administering a compensation law 
 and for statistical purposes in displaying total costs is invaluable and 
 should therefore never be omitted when possible to include. 
 
 Form No. 7 A 
 
 Date received. File No. of Accident. 
 
 (Do not fill in ) (Do not fill in.) 
 
 MICHIGAN INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD 
 Final Report of Accident. 
 
 1. Name of employer. Sherwood Motor Company . 
 
 2. Address. 767-73 Water St., Franklin, Mich . 
 
 3. Name of person injured. John K. Ledyard . 
 
 4. Occupation. Grinder . 
 
 5. Wages. $18.00 per week . 
 
 6. Total amount of compensation paid. $81.00 . 
 
 7. Numb er of weeks. Nine . 
 
 8. Total medical and hospital cost. $45.00 . 
 
 (Exclusive of services of company surgeon.) 
 
 9. Date payment completed. January 16, 1913 . 
 
 10. Date of accident. .November 14 , 1912.. 11. Date of return to work. .January 16, 1913 . 
 
 12. Signature of person making report. F. M. CRANDELL . 
 
 13. Position. Accident Clerk . 
 
 14. Date of report. January 16, 1913 . 
 
59 
 
 FORMS USED IN MAKING PAYMENTS. 
 
 The “Agreement in Regard to Compensation” is to be executed in 
 all cases involving compensation. If payment is to be made for specific 
 indemnity, such as the loss of a finger, etc., so specify, giving thereon 
 the number of weeks involved. If injuries additional to specific loss 
 have been sustained specify that payment of compensation will be made 
 during period of disability, at the conclusion of which payment will be 
 made for any specific loss that may be sustained. Specific loss is not 
 limited to amputation. There may be permanent loss of function re¬ 
 sulting from the injury, and agreement should cover such permanent 
 loss, the specific number of weeks to be determined at the expiration 
 of the period of disability. 
 
 Form No. 10. Workmen’s Compensation Law. 
 
 (Act No. 10 of Public Acts Extra Session 1912.) 
 
 Industrial Accident Board. 
 
 Lansing, Mich. 
 
 AGREEMENT IN REGARD TO COMPENSATION.* 
 
 We,. John K. Ledyard .. 
 
 (Name of injured employe.) 
 
 residing at city or town of. Franklin, Mich . 
 
 and. Sherwood Motor Company . 
 
 (Name of employer, insurance company or commissioner of insurance.) 
 have reached an agreement in regard to compensation for the injury sustained by said employe while 
 
 in the employ of. Sherwood Motor Company . 
 
 . Franklin, Michigan . 
 
 (Name and address of employer.) 
 
 The time, including hour and date of accident, the place where it occurred, the nature and cause 
 of injury and other cause or ground of claim, are as follows: 
 
 The accident occurred November lJj, 1912, 10:80 A. M. Department No. 8, Sherwood Motor Com¬ 
 pany Shops. A large bar of steel fell on the foot of the injured causing a severe contusion. The bones of 
 the second and third being broken . 
 
 The terms of the agreement follow: 
 
 Here state the sum per week agreed upon, subject to the terms of the"Act; also wages earned by in¬ 
 jured at time of accident. 
 
 . Average weekly wage — 118.00 . 
 
 . Compensation agreed upon, $9.00 per week during the period of disability . 
 
 . If permanent loss of function results it is agreed to make weekly payment for same at conclusion 
 
 of incapacity .. 
 
 Witness: 
 
 . M.R. REMINGTON . 
 
 . 120 John St., Franklin, Mich . . JOHN K. LEDYARD . 
 
 (Name of injured employe.) 
 
 . A. R. BLAKSLEY . . Sherwood Motor Company . 
 
 . 917 Genesee St., Franklin. Mich . . . (Name of employer, insurance company, or 
 
 insurance commissioner.) 
 
 By.... J. C. SHERWOOD, Secy . 
 
 Dated at. Franklin .this. .28th. .day of_ November . 1912. 
 
 *Note—I f the employer, or the insurance company carrying such risk, or commissioner of insur¬ 
 ance, as the case may be, and the injured employe reach an agreement in regard to compensation under 
 this act, a memorandum of such agreement shall be filed with the Industrial Accident Board, and, if 
 approved by it shall be deemed final and binding upon the parties thereto. Such agreement shall be 
 approved by said board only when the terms conform to the provisions of this act—Section 5, part III. 
 
60 
 
 COMPENSATION RECEIPTS. 
 
 “Receipts on Account of Compensation” are to be taken when pay¬ 
 ments are made and may be submitted to the Industrial Accident Board 
 monthly when disability is prolonged beyond that period. 
 
 Form No. 11. * Workmen’s Compensation Law. 
 
 (Act No. 10 of Public Acts Extra Session 1912.) 
 Industrial Accident Board. 
 
 Lansing, Mich. 
 
 RECEIPT ON ACCOUNT OF COMPENSATION. 
 
 RECEIVED OF. Sherwood Motor Company .the sum of 
 
 (Name of employer, insurance company or commissioner of insurance.) 
 
 . Nine .dollars and. No .cents 
 
 being the proportion of my weekly wages from the. twenty-eighth .day of. November .... 
 
 1912 , to the. -fifth .day of. December . 1912, under the Michigan 
 
 Workmen’s Compensation Law, subject to review by the Industrial Accident Board, said accident 
 
 occurring on the. 14 th .day of. November . 1912, while in the employ of. 
 
 . Sherwood Motor Company . 
 
 S . 9.00 . . JOHN K. LEDYARD . 
 
 (Name of employe.) 
 
 . 303 Main St . 
 
 (Street and number.) 
 
 Date . November 6 , 1912 . 
 
 . Franklin. Mich . 
 
 (City or town.) 
 
 If the employer, or the insurance company carrying such risk, or commissioner of insurance, as the 
 case may be, and the injured employe reach an agreement in regard to compensation under this act, a 
 memorandum of such agreement shall be filed with the Industrial Accident Board, and, if approved by 
 it, shall be deemed final and binding upon the parties thereto. Such agreement shall be approved by 
 said board only when the terms conform to the provisions of this act—Section 5, part III. 
 
 RECEIPT WHEN LAST PAYMENT IS MADE. 
 
 The “Settlement Receipt” is evidence, when signed by the recipient 
 of compensation and a witness, that all payments have been made in 
 accordance with the “Agreement in Regard to Compensation,” and 
 should contain not only the amount for the current week, but also the 
 entire amount paid by the employer as relating to the particular acci¬ 
 dent. This receipt should be accompanied when sent to the Board by 
 a “Final Report of Accident,” form Jfo-. 7-A. 
 
 Form No. 12. Workmen’s Compensation Law. 
 
 (Act No. 10 of Public Acts Extra Session 1912.) 
 
 Industrial Accident Board. 
 
 Lansing, Mich. 
 
 SETTLEMENT RECEIPT. 
 
 RECEIVED OF. Sherwood Motor Company . 
 
 (Name of employer, insurance company or commissioner of insurance.) 
 
 the sum of. Nine .dollars and. No .. 
 
 cents, making in all, with weekly payments already received by me, the total sum of. 
 
 Eighty-one .dollars and. No .cents, 
 
 in settlement of compensation under the Michigan Workmen’s Compensation Law, for all injuries 
 
 received by me on or about the. fourteenth .day of. November . 
 
 1912, while in the employ of. Sherwood Motor Company . 
 
 (Name of employer, city or town, street and number.) 
 subject to review and approval by the Industrial Accident Board. 
 
G1 
 
 Witness my hand this. sixteenth .day of. January.., 1913 
 
 Witness. J.M. NORTHWA Y . . JOHN K. LED YARD . 
 
 (Name of employe.) 
 
 Address. 717 Baker Court . . SOS Main St . 
 
 (Street and number.) 
 
 . Franklin, Mich . . Franklin, Mich . 
 
 (City or town.) 
 
 If the employer or the insurance company carrying such risk, or commissioner of insurance, as the 
 case may be, and the injured employe reach an agreement in regard to compensation under this act, 
 a memorandum of such agreement shall be filed with the Industrial Accident Board, and, if approved 
 by it, shall be deemed final and binding upon the parties thereto. Such agreement shall be approved 
 by said board only when the terms conform to the provisions of this act.—Section 5, part III. 
 
 THINGS TO BE OBSERVED BY EMPLOYERS IN FILING NOTICE 
 OF ACCEPTANCE OF ACT. 
 
 An employer electing to accept the provisions of Act No. 10, Public 
 Acts, 1912, may expedite action upon his acceptance by observing the 
 following: 
 
 Secure the blank prepared for this purpose by the Industrial Accident 
 Board. 
 
 Answer each question fully, specifying average number of employes; 
 nature of business, location of plant and home office, if the two vary. 
 Give name under which business is conducted in order that acceptance 
 may be filed properly. Such acceptance must be signed by the em¬ 
 ployer, and in case where the employer is a corporation, the original 
 signature of the officer executing the acceptance is required, together 
 with appropriate designation of his official position with the company. 
 
 Specify distinctly the method adopted of providing compensation for 
 injured employes, stating whether the employer desires to carry his own 
 risk; to insure through a company authorized to transact a liability busi¬ 
 ness in Michigan; to join with other employers in a mutual insurance 
 company organized in accordance with the provisions of the act, or to 
 operate through the state insurance department. 
 
 Carry own risk: If the employer desires to carry his own risk, a 
 sworn, detailed financial statement, setting forth fully all assets and 
 liabilities and properly certified, must accompany the written accept¬ 
 ance. 
 
 Insuring in Stock or Mutual Companies : If the employer elects to 
 protect his employes through a stock or an authorized mutual in¬ 
 surance company, the name of the company should be designated, and a 
 certificate showing that the risk is fully covered should be filed by the 
 insurance company carrying the business. 
 
 Insuring in State Insurance Department: If the employer elects to 
 carry his risk through the State Insurance Department, he must make 
 application to that department and meet its requirements. He must also 
 file his acceptance with the Industrial Accident Board designating this 
 method of carrying his risk. 
 
 Change of Method for Carrying Risk : The employer may change 
 from one approved method to another at any time after the approval 
 
62 
 
 of his written acceptance upon notifying the Industrial Accident Board 
 and receiving its authority. It is the intent of Act 10, Public Acts, 
 1912, that employes covered by its provisions be fully protected at all 
 times, and the Industrial Accident Board insists that this protection 
 be continuous and that there be no interval when the employe is not 
 covered. In case of change in the manner of carrying the risk or the 
 company carrying the same. 
 
 Changes in the firm, corporation or co-partnership name should be 
 reported immediately to the Industrial Accident Board in order that 
 its files may be corrected to correspond with such change. 
 
 Acceptances specifying insurance companies not authorized to do 
 business in Michigan cannot be approved by the Industrial Accident 
 Board. 
 
 Elections upon the part of employers desiring to carry their own 
 risk will be approved only when a satisfactory financial showing is 
 made. Certainty of payment of all compensation due to the injured 
 workman or his dependents, is one of the fundamental principles of the 
 law. The compensation is required to be paid in weekly installments 
 by the employer, and in extreme cases such payments may extend over 
 a period of 500 weeks, or approximately ten years. It is therefore evi¬ 
 dent that the question to be determined by the Board in passing upon 
 the application of an employer to carry his own risk, is not the ques¬ 
 tion of his present solvency, nor the question that is usually presented 
 in commercial transactions where credits for short periods are obtained, 
 but is the question whether the employer will continue in business and 
 be solvent and responsible for the payment of compensation in case of 
 injury to his employes, for a period that may extend ten years from 
 date. The duty is imposed upon the Board to so administer the law 
 that every working man entitled to compensation will receive all of 
 his money no matter how long the period through which the payments 
 are to be distributed. In view of this duty imposed upon the Board, 
 and the inherent difficulties in the question to be passed upon (due 
 mainly to the long period of time covered by the payments), it will be 
 apparent that only those of more than ordinary financial strength can 
 be authorized to carry their own risk. The refusal of the Board to ap¬ 
 prove an application of this class is not to be considered as a reflection 
 on the present financial condition of the applicant, but should be con¬ 
 sidered in the light of the above facts and conditions, and particularly 
 the purpose of the law to provide certainty of payment to the end of 
 the period of compensation. 
 
 Following will be found a properly executed form of acceptance. 
 
 Industrial Accident Board, Lansing, Mich.—Form No. 1 (Sec. 6, Part 1). 
 
 EMPLOYER’S WRITTEN ACCEPTANCE 
 Act No. 10 of Public Acts, Extra Session 1912. 
 
 Industrial Accident Board, 
 
 Lansing, Mich. 
 
 Take notice that the undersigned employer of labor in Michigan accepts the provisions of Act No. 
 10 of Public Acts, Extra Session, 1912. 
 
 Number of employes. 276 . 
 
63 
 
 Location of place of employment. Bush and Pine Streets, Caledonia, Mich . 
 
 (If more than one plant, place of business or work place, state each fully.) 
 
 .12 th and 7th Streets, Newport, Mich . 
 
 . Congress Street, Detroit, Michigan . 
 
 Nature of employment. Manufacture of Auto Parts . 
 
 (If more than one kind, state each fully, with location.) 
 
 . Painting, Trimming and Decorating Bodies . 
 
 . Brass foundry and machine shop . 
 
 Method of providing for compensation adopted by the undersigned. Liability insurance . 
 
 (State whether Mutual Insurance [give name], In- 
 
 . with Southampton & Globe Casualty Co . 
 
 surance Company [give name], State Insurance Commissioner or carry own risk.) 
 
 Dated at.*.. Detroit, Mich., ., this.. 24 th. . day of.... March . 1913 
 
 (Home office.) 
 
 . Michigan Motor Manufacturing Co . 
 
 By. John Quincy Adams, Secretary . 
 
 . Congress Street, Detroit, Mich . 
 
 (P. O. Address.) 
 
 Note. —If emplover wishes to accept the provisions of the above law, this notice must be signed 
 by the employer and filed with the Industrial Accident Board. When so filed it becomes immediately 
 binding on the employer. If employer is a corporation, the notice should have the corporate name ana 
 seal affixed and be signed by an officer having authority to do so. 
 
 FILING OF CERTIFICATES BY INSURANCE COMPANIES. 
 
 The following form of certificate is required by the Industrial Acci¬ 
 dent Board from insurance companies showing that the insurance speci¬ 
 fied by the employer in his written acceptance of Act No. 10 is actually 
 in force. 
 
 CERTIFICATE. 
 
 To Industrial Accident Board, 
 
 Lansing, Mich. 
 
 Gentlemen: 
 
 This certifies that. 
 
 (Name of firm.) 
 
 of.is insured by. 
 
 covering the obligations imposed upon said insured by Act No. 10 of Public Acts of 1912, Extra Session, 
 commonly known as the Workmen's Compensation Law; that said insurance is written upon and in 
 
 accordance with our Policy form No. or letter.being the same in every respect as 
 
 the Policy contract form filed by the undersigned company with the Industrial Accident Board (on 
 
 and in accordance with our blank form of Policy No. or letter.and our endorsement 
 
 written upon and in accordance with our blank endorsement form No.filed by the under¬ 
 
 signed company with your Board.) 1 All changes that may hereafter be made by the company in such 
 contract of insurance will be immediately reported to your Board. 
 
 The location 2 and character of the business operations covered by said insurance are as follows: 
 
 This certificate is furnished to comply with the requirements of the Industrial Accident Board. 
 
 Dated at.Michigan this.day 
 
 of.191_ 
 
 (Name of Company.) 
 
 By... 
 
 (Name and official title of officer or agent executing certificate on behalf of Co. 
 
 1* If the Policy form covers without any attached rider, erase matter in parenthesis above; but 
 if the rider and policy are both used, let matter in parenthesis stand and erase corresponding matter 
 so as to express the fact. 
 
 2. If more than one location, so state; and if business of more than one character, state facts with 
 substantial accuracy. 
 
64 
 
 NOTICES TO BE POSTED BY EMPLOYERS. 
 
 In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 6, part I., the Industrial 
 Accident Board prepared the following, printed on cardboard, 12x20 
 inches. The section of the Act relating to same provides: “That such 
 employer so electing to become subject to the provisions of this act 
 shall within ten days after the approval by said board of his election 
 filed as aforesaid, post in a conspicuous place in his plant, shop, mine or 
 place of work, or if such employer be a transportation company, at its 
 several stations and docks, notice in the form as prescribed and fur¬ 
 nished by the industrial accident board to the effect that he accepts 
 and will be bound by the provisions of this act.” 
 
 Industrial Accident Board, Lansing, Mich., Form No. 9 (Sec. 6, Part 1.) 
 
 NOTICE TO EMPLOYES. 
 
 All workmen or operatives employed by the undersigned in or about this establishment are hereby 
 notified that the employer or employers owning or operating the same have filed with the Industrial 
 Accident Board, at Lansing, notice of election to become subject to the provisions of Act No. 10 of 
 Public Acts, Extra Sessions 1912. 
 
 (This Act is commonly known as the Workmen’s Compensation Law.) 
 
 You are further notified that unless you serve written notice on your employer of your election not 
 to come under the law, the act will immediately apply to you. 
 
 If you do notify your employer that you elect not to come under said act, you may afterwards waive 
 such claim by a notice in writing, which shall take effect five days after it is delivered to the employer, 
 at the expiration of which period the law will apply to you. 
 
 INJURY NOT RESULTING IN DEATH-NOTICE OP 
 
 An employe who has been injured in the course of his employment and whose incapacity extends 
 over a period of two weeks (Sec. 3, part 2) shall serve written notice of such injury on his employer 
 (from whom blank forms may be obtained), which notice shall be signed by the person injured and shall 
 state in ordinary language the time, place and cause of the injury (Sec. 16, part 2). 
 
 INJURY RESULTING IN DEATH-NOTICE OF 
 
 When death results from an injury received by an employe in the course of his employment, notice 
 shall be served by his dependents, or by a person in their behalf (Sec. 16, part 2). 
 
 LIMIT OF PERIOD OF NOTIFICATION. 
 
 Notice of the injury shall be given to the employer within three months after the happening thereof, 
 and claim for compensation shall be made within six months, or in case of death or in the event of 
 physical or mental incapacity, notice shall be given within six months after the death or removal of 
 such mental or physical incapacity. No proceeding for compensation under this Act shall be main¬ 
 tained unless these rules are observed (Sec. 15, part 2). 
 
 Date. 4 . 
 
 .Employer. 
 
 The Industrial Accident Board has prepared the following certificate, 
 to be executed by the employer and filed with the Board, showing that 
 such notices were actually posted as required by the section of the law 
 above quoted. This certificate should be promptly filed with the Board, 
 and the signature to the same is required to be that of the employer 
 himself or if made by an officer or agent of a corporation, the appropri¬ 
 ate designation of the official character of the person signing must 
 accompany signature. 
 
65 
 
 CERTIFICATE. 
 
 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD, 
 
 Lansing, Mich.: 
 
 We do hereby certify that on the.day of. 
 
 we posted in the most prominent places in and around our place of business, viz.:. 
 
 (Insert workrooms, mines, stations, etc.) 
 
 .printed notices of our acceptance of the provisions of Act No. 10 of Public 
 
 (Give number.) 
 
 Acts Extra Session 1912, the same being notices furnished by the Industrial Accident Board; and we 
 further certify that said notices were conspicuously posted and securely fastened. 
 
 Dated at 
 day of 
 
 19 
 
66 
 
 PROCEDURE IN DISPUTED CASES. 
 
 In cases where the parties are unable to reach an agreement in regard 
 to compensation, it then becomes necessary to take proceedings for the 
 arbitration and adjudication of the claim. All of the ordinary means 
 of reaching a settlement should be exhausted by the parties before mak¬ 
 ing application for arbitration. However, in case where arbitration 
 becomes necessary, application by mail should be made to the Industrial 
 Accident Board for the necessary blank form (known as “Application 
 for Adjustment of Claim”), being form No. 13 (reproduced on page 
 67 of this bulletin). The blank will then be mailed to the person 
 applying for the same, and when it is properly filled out, signed and 
 returned, it will be brought to the attention of the Board, and if it 
 appears that all means for reaching a settlement between the parties 
 have been exhausted, the Board will by an appropriate order fix the 
 time and place for arbitration. The usual order in such case will be 
 found on page 67 in this bulletin. Notice and letter of instruction 
 is then sent to all of the parties to such arbitration in the form shown 
 on page 68. Other forms in use in arbitration proceedings are repro¬ 
 duced on the pages following and the reader may familiarize himself 
 with the details of this procedure of the Industrial Accident Board 
 from the receipt of the “Application for Adjustment of Claim” to the 
 finding of the committee on arbitration, which is set forth in each case 
 on form No. 17, “Award on Arbitration.” This finding of the committee 
 is final unless an appeal is taken by either party in accordance with 
 Sec. 8 of part 3. The Board has prepared a form for use of parties 
 desiring to appeal to the full Board from the findings of the Committee 
 on Arbitration, a copy of which form will be found on page 72. 
 
 WAIVER OF ARBITRATION. 
 
 If both parties can agree on the facts in a case and the only differ¬ 
 ence between the parties is the construction and application of the law 
 to said facts, and the parties being desirous of obtaining a decision by 
 the full Board without resorting to arbitration, Form No. 18 (page 
 70) may be executed and submitted to the Industrial Accident Board 
 and a decision will be rendered in accordance with the law from the 
 facts displayed therein. 
 
67 
 
 Form No. 13. 
 
 Industrial Accident Board, Lansing, Mich. 
 
 NOTICE AND APPLICATION FOR ADJUSTMENT OF CLAIM. 
 
 State of Michigan, 
 County of. 
 
 Applicant. 
 
 Respondent (s). 
 
 .\.. the above named applicant, hereby 
 
 gives notice to said Industrial Accident Board that the above named parties have failed to reach an 
 agreement in regard to compensation under Act No. 10 of the Public Acts of 1912, extra session; and 
 hereby makes application to said Industrial Accident Board for the adjustment of such compensation 
 between said parties, and the adjudication and determination of the same. 
 
 Said applicant further shows that the accident upon which claim for compensation is based in this 
 
 matter occurred on the..day of.191.. 
 
 at the town of.. county of.. 
 
 and State of Michigan, and resulted in; 
 
 (State fully result of injury.) 
 
 The postoffice address of the above named applicant is. 
 
 and the postoffice address of the respondent(s) is as follows; 
 
 The above named applicant prays for the following relief in the premises, viz: 
 
 (State amount of claim as near as may be.) 
 
 Wherefore the applicant prays that a time and place be fixed by said Board for the arbitration and 
 adjudication of said matter, and that due notice thereof be given to all of the parties hereto, and 
 that an order or award be made by the Industrial Accident Board granting such relief as the applicant 
 may be entitled to in the premises. 
 
 Dated at 
 
 (Signed) 
 ..., this 
 
 (Applicant.) 
 day of. 
 
 191.. 
 
 Note. —Either party to the dispute may apply to the Board for the adjustment of the matter in 
 difference. The original notice ana application shall be sent by mail to the Industrial Accident Board, 
 Lansing, Michigan. If the accident did not result fatally, describe particularly the nature and extent 
 of the injury. If death resulted to the employe from the accident, so state, giving the full name of 
 such deceased employe. 
 
 vs. 
 
 ORDER FOR ARBITRATION. 
 
 Applicant. 
 
 Respondent (s). 
 
 The notice and application of. 
 
 the above named applicant, for an adjustment of claim in the above named matter having been pre, 
 sented to the Industrial Accident Board, and due consideration thereof having been had, and it ap¬ 
 pearing to the Board that the arbitration prayed for by said applicant should be had; it is ordered that 
 the matters in difference between said applicant and said respondent mentioned in the notice and ap¬ 
 plication filed herein be adjusted and determined by arbitration under the provisions of Act No. 10 
 
 of Public Acts, Extra Session, 1912, and that said arbitration be held at. 
 
 in the town of.. County of.. 
 
 State of Michigan, on the.day of. 
 
 , 19 .. 
 
68 
 
 commencing at.o’clock in the.noon, 
 
 and that.of the Industrial Accident Board 
 
 be and he is hereby appointed and designated as chairman of the committee to be formed for such 
 arbitration. It is further ordered that due notice be given to said applicant of the time and place of 
 such arbitration, together with request and notice for said applicant to select one member of said 
 arbitration committee; and that like notice be given to said respondent together with like notice and 
 request that said respondent choose one member of said arbitration committee. 
 
 (Seal.) 
 
 Dated and entered this 
 
 day of 
 
 Chairman. 
 
 , A.. D. . 19... . 
 
 State of Michigan 
 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD 
 
 OAKLAND BUILDING 
 
 Lansing 
 
 I herewith enclose you copy of the application for adjustment of claim and notice of arbitration of 
 the same; also a blank form on which you are to designate your member of the arbitration committee 
 which is to hear and decide the matter. Please select one man as your member of the committee of 
 arbitration, write his name in the blank at the place indicated, date and sign the same and return to 
 the Industrial Accident Board in the enclosed stamped envelope. 
 
 You are required under the law to make selection of your member of the committee of arbitration 
 and to notify the Board of your selection in the manner set forth in said form within seven days. In 
 case of your failure so to do it becomes the duty of the Industrial Accident Board to make the selection 
 of such member. It will be necessary for both parties to be present at the time and place fixed for this 
 arbitration, and that they be prepared to proceed with the matter. 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 Secretary. 
 
 Form No. 14. 
 
 Industrial Accident Board, Lansing, Mich. 
 
 NOTICE OF HEARING 
 
 OF APPLICATION FOR ADJUSTMENT OF CLAIM 
 
 Applicant. 
 
 Respondent (s). 
 
 To the above named parties and each of them: 
 
 Notice is hereby given that on the.day of.191.., 
 
 notice and application for adjustment of claim for compensation in the above entitled matter was filed 
 with the Industrial Accident Board at its office in Lansing, Michigan, and that a true copy of said 
 notice and application is hereto attached. 
 
 You will further take notice that the arbitration of said claim in accordance with the provisions o^ 
 
 Act No. 10 of the Public Acts of 1912, extra session, will be held on.day of 
 
 .at. 
 
 in the town of.. county of..., 
 
 State of Michigan, commencing at.o’clock in the.....noon 
 
 of said day; and that said applicant(s) and said respondent(s) are each required to name one member 
 of the committee of arbitration provided for in said act within seven days after receiving this notice, 
 and to give notice of such selection to the said BoaTd at its office in the city of Lansing. 
 
 You are further notified to be present at the time and place fixed for said hearing and arbitration, 
 and to be prepared to proceed with the same. 
 
 Dated at Lansing, Michigan, this 
 
 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD, 
 
 By. 
 
 Secretary. 
 
 day of.. 191.... 
 
69 
 
 Form No. 15. 
 
 Industrial Accident Board, Lansing, Mich. 
 
 NOTICE OF APPOINTMENT 
 
 OF MEMBER OF COMMITTEE OF ARBITRATION 
 
 VS. 
 
 Applicant. 
 
 Respondent (s). 
 
 To the Industrial Accident Board, 
 
 Lansing, Michigan. 
 
 Gentlemen: 
 
 You are hereby notified that. 
 
 whose postoffice address is. 
 
 has been chosen as a member of the committee of arbitration in the above entitled matter by the un¬ 
 dersigned. 
 
 [Applicant] [Respondent (s)] 
 
 Dated at.this.day of.. 191.. 
 
 Note. —If this blank is filled out by the applicant, the word “ respondent (s)” should be crossed out 
 under the signature. If filled out by the respondent(s), the word “applicant" should be crossed out 
 in the manner above indicated. Please fill out the above blank and forward to the Industrial Accident 
 Board, Lansing, Michigan, in the enclosed envelope within seven days after it is received by you. 
 Write the full name of the member of the committee of arbitration chosen by you as plainly as possible. 
 
 Iii a large majority of cases the parties can and do procure the at¬ 
 tendance of their witnesses without the use of the subpoena. However, 
 in some cases a means for compelling attendance of witnesses is neces¬ 
 sary, and on application the Board will issue witness subpoenas in the 
 following form, viz.: 
 
 State of Michigan 
 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD 
 
 OAKLAND BUILDING 
 
 Lansing 
 
 Form No. 16. 
 
 Industrial Accident Board, Lansing, Mich. 
 
 WITNESS SUBPOENA. 
 
 STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 County of. 
 
 To. 
 
 .... GREETING. 
 
 In the name of the people of the State of Michigan: 
 
 You are hereby required and commanded to be and appear before. 
 
 ..of the 
 
 Industrial Accident Board of Michigan, at the. 
 
 in the city of.. county of.. State of 
 
 Michigan, on the.day of.A. D. 191.., 
 
 at..o’clock in the.noon, then and there to give evidence in a certain 
 
 matter pending before said... 
 
 .wherein 
 
 .is applicant 
 
 and...is 
 
 respondent or respondents, as the case may be. Hereof fail at your peril. 
 
 Given under the hand and seal of said Board this.day of 
 
 .A. D. 191. 
 
 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD OF MICHIGAN. 
 
 By. 
 
 Member of Board. 
 
70 
 
 Form No. 17. 
 
 Industrial Accident Board, Lansing, Mich. 
 
 AWARD OF ARBITRATION. 
 
 Applicant, 
 
 Respondent (s). 
 
 Notice and application for adjustment of claim for compensation having been filed with said Board 
 in the above entitled matter, and thereafter said Board having requested both of the parties to appoint 
 their respective representatives on the committee of arbitration, and said committee of arbitration 
 
 having been duly formed, consisting of. 
 
 representing said applicant, and. 
 
 representing said respondent (s), and. 
 
 member of the Industrial Accident Board, as chairman thereof; and said matter having come on to be 
 
 heard before the aforesaid arbitration committee at. 
 
 in the city of.. county of. 
 
 and State of Michigan, on the.day of. 19...., at. 
 
 o’clock in the.noon, and after hearing the proofs and allegations of the said applicant(s) 
 
 and said respondent (s), and said committee having made careful inquiry and investigation of said 
 matter and being fully advised in the premises, doth find, determine and adjudge that the said ap¬ 
 plicant, .. 
 
 is.entitled to receive and recover from said respondent (s)..’. 
 
 the sum of.dollars per week for a period of. 
 
 weeks, from the.day of.. 191.., and that said applicant.. 
 
 is entitled to receive and recover from said respondent (s) on this date. 
 
 dollars, being the amount of such compensation that has already become due under the provisions of 
 
 law, the remainder of said award to be paid to said. 
 
 applicant, by said respondent(s) in weekly payments, commencing one week from the date of the award. 
 
 Committee of Arbitration. 
 By. 
 
 Chairman. 
 
 Dated and entered this.day of.A. D. 19- 
 
 In a considerable number of cases, the facts surrounding the injury 
 are not in dispute, the only matter of uncertainty being the application 
 of the law to such facts and conditions. Frequently in such cases the 
 parties desire to submit to the Board directly the legal questions in 
 dispute, waiving arbitration and obtaining a speedy decision of the full 
 Board thereon. For the purpose of facilitating this practice the Board 
 has prepared the following form for stipulating the facts and submitting 
 the matter directly to the full Board, viz.: 
 
 Form No. 18. 
 
 Industrial Accident Board, Lansing, Michigan. 
 
 STIPULATION, AND WAIVER OF ARBITRATION. 
 
 Applicant, 
 
 vs. 
 
 Respondent (s). 
 
 The facts in this case being undisputed and the only matter in difference between the parties hereto 
 
71 
 
 being the construction and application to said facts of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, being Act 
 No. 10, Public Acts 1912, extra session, and the parties hereto desiring to obtain a decision of said matter 
 by the full board without resorting to arbitration, do hereby stipulate and agree as follows: 
 
 1. That the accident to the employe, upon which the claim for compensation in this cause is based, 
 
 occurred on the.day of.19.. 
 
 in the town of.county of. 
 
 State of Michigan, and that the same arose out of and in the course of his employment. That the 
 
 character and nature of the injury and the result thereof is as follows: . 
 
 » (State in detail the nature of 
 
 the injury, disability or death resulting, etc.) 
 
 2. That the facts relating to the wages of 
 said employe are as follows:. 
 
 If average weekly wage is undisputed, so state; if disputed, state all material facts relating to same... . 
 
 3. The other material facts in said cause not included in paragraphs 1 and 2 are as follows: 
 
 4. That the arbitration of the matters in difference between the parties hereto, provided for in said 
 Workmen’s Compensation law, be and the same is hereby waived, and the decision of said matters is 
 hereby submitted to the Industrial Accident Board, sitting as a full board, the same as if this cause 
 had proceeded to arbitration under said law, and the decision on arbitration therein had been appealed 
 from and said cause thereby brought before the full board on appeal from such decision. It is further 
 stipulated and agreed that the decision of said board in this cause pursuant to this stipulation, and based 
 upon the facts set forth herein shall be valid and binding, and shall have the same validity, force and 
 effect as if said cause had proceeded to arbitration in due course, and was brought before the full board 
 on appeal duly taken from the decision of an arbitration committee therein. 
 
 In witness whereof the parties hereto have signed this stipulation at.^... in 
 
 the county of.State of Michigan, this 
 
 day of.191.. 
 
 (Applicant.) 
 
 Signed in presence of 
 
 (Respondents.) 
 
 STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 County of. 
 
 On this.day of.19.. 
 
 before me.. a notary 
 
 public in and for said county personally appeared.•• 
 
 known to me to be the persons described in and who signed the foregoing stipulation, and acknowledged 
 that they signed the same as their free act and deed. And I further certify that I read over all of said 
 stipulation to said persons, and fully acquainted them with the contents thereof before the same was 
 acknowledged and signed by him (them). 
 
 Myjcpmmissioa expires^the 
 
 day of 
 
 Notary Public. 
 .19_ 
 
72 
 
 STATE OF MICHIGAN, j 
 
 County of.J 
 
 On this.day of.19_ 
 
 before me.. a notary 
 
 public in and for said county personally appeared.. 
 
 known to me to be the person who signed the foregoing stipulation on behalf of. 
 
 .the employer therein mentioned, and 
 
 acknowledged that he executed the same on behalf of said. 
 
 being duly authorized so to do, and that the same is his free act and deed as. 
 
 (State position or office.) 
 
 for said employer. 
 
 Notary Public. 
 
 My commission expires on the.day of.19_ 
 
 APPEAL FROM DECISION OF ARBITRATION COMMITTEE. 
 
 The decision of an arbitration committee will stand as the decision of 
 the Industrial Accident Board unless a claim for review is filed by 
 either party to the cause within seven days. The act, however, gives 
 the Board power to grant further time in which to claim such review 
 if sufficient cause be shown. The Board has prepared the following 
 form for making application for review: 
 
 Form No. 19. Workmen’s Compensation Act. 
 
 STATE OF MICHIGAN 
 
 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD 
 
 Lansing 
 
 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW OF CLAIM BEFORE FULL BOARD. 
 
 To the Industrial Accident Board, Lansing, Mich. 
 
 Gentlemen:—The undersigned, as provided in Part 3, Sec. 8, of Act No. 10, Public Acts 1912, makes 
 
 application for a review of the findings of the Committee on Arbitration in the claim of. 
 
 .vs. 
 
 This claim for review is based on the following grounds: 
 
 Dated at.this.day of.. 19.... 
 
 Section 11. Part 3. If a claim for review is filed, as provided in part three, section eight, the in¬ 
 dustrial accident board shall promptly review the decision of the committee of arbitration and such 
 records as may have been kept of its hearings, and shall also if desired hear the parties, together with 
 such additional evidence as they may wish to submit, and file its decision therein with the records 
 of such proceedings. Such review and hearing may be held in its office at Lansing or elsewhere as 
 the board shall deem advisable. 
 
 Section 12. The findings of fact made by said industrial accident board acting within its powers, 
 shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive, but the supreme court shall have power to review ques¬ 
 tions of law involved in any final decision or determination of said industrial accident board: Pro¬ 
 vided, That application is made by the aggrieved party within thirty days after such determination 
 by certiorari, mandamus or by any other method permissible under the rules and practice of said 
 court or the law of this State, and to make such further orders in respect thereto as justice may re¬ 
 quire. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 10 
 
OPINIONS IN LEADING CASES HEARD ON REVIEW. 
 
 INDEX TO CASES. 
 
 Page 
 
 Acme White Lead & Color Works, Kathryn Adams vs.. 31 
 
 Chalmers Motor Car Co., Jessie B. Clem vs. 40 
 
 C. H. Little Co., Jacob Rider vs. 27 
 
 Detroit Saturday Night, Maud Spooner vs. 44 
 
 Detroit Steel Products Co. vs. Helen Jendrus. 21 
 
 Ford Motor Co., X. B. Konkel vs. 29 
 
 Harry Hart. 18 
 
 Helen Jendrus, Detroit Steel Products Co. vs. 21 
 
 Jacob Rider vs. C. H. Little Co... 27 
 
 Jessie B. Clem vs. Chalmers Motor Car Co. 40 
 
 Joe Andrewjeski vs. Wolverine Coal Co. 36 
 
 Kathryn Redfield, Michigan Workmen’s Compensation Mutual Insurance Co. vs. 34 
 
 Kathryn Adams vs. Acme White Lead & Color Works.'. 31 
 
 Keyes-Davis Co. vs. Lee E. Alderdyce. 19 
 
 Lee E. Alderdyce, Keyes-Davis Co. vs. 19 
 
 Leone Hills vs. Pere Marquette R. R. Co. 32 
 
 Lida Rayner vs. Sligh Furniture Co. 22 
 
 Maud Spooner vs. Detroit Saturday Night... 44 
 
 Michigan Agricultural College, Willis M. Agler vs. 25 
 
 Michigan Cabinet Co., Pietternella Yisser vs. 24 
 
 Michigan Workmen’s Compensation Mutual Insurance Co. vs. Kathryn Redfield. 34 
 
 Pere Marquette R. R. Co., Leone Hills vs. 32 
 
 Pere Marquette R. R. Co., Philip Limron vs. 43 
 
 Philip Limron vs. Pere Marquette R. R. Co. 43 
 
 Pietternella Yisser vs. Michigan Cabinet Co.. 24 
 
 Sligh Furniture Co., Lida Rayner vs. 22 
 
 Willis M. Agler vs. Michigan Agricultural College. 25 
 
 Wolverine Coal Co., Joe Andrewjeski vs. 36 
 
 X. B. Konkel vs. Ford Motor Co. 29 
 
GENERAL INDEX. 
 
 A. 
 
 Page 
 
 Absence of physical injury. 24 
 
 Acceptance of Act; things to be observed. 61 
 
 employer’s written. 62 
 
 Accident outside of state; liability for. 19 
 
 Accidents; forms for reporting. .-55 
 
 what to be reported. 52 
 
 when to be reported. 53 
 
 fifteenth-day report. 54 
 
 how to report. 53 
 
 immediate report required. 53 
 
 supplemental report. 53 
 
 Administrator; compensation not payable to. 8 
 
 Administration and practice: 
 
 1. Selection of arbitrators. 48 
 
 2. Postponement of cases. 48 
 
 3. Insurer deemed party. 49 
 
 4. Agreements and awards. 49 
 
 5. Grounds for denying liability to be stated. 49 
 
 6 Witnesses and proofs. 49 
 
 7. Hearings on review. 50 
 
 8. Contested medical and hospital bills. 50 
 
 9. Postponement of review hearings. 51 
 
 10. Lump sum payments. 51 
 
 11. Appeals to Supreme Court. 51 
 
 12. Findings of fact and law. 52 
 
 After first three weeks; payment of hospital expense. 12 
 
 Agreement; memorandum. 53 
 
 Agreements and awards. 49 
 
 Appeal from decision of arbitration committee. 72 
 
 Appeal to Supreme Court. 51 
 
 Application for adjustment of claim. 67 
 
 Appointment; notice of. 69 
 
 Arbitration; order for. 67 
 
 Arbitrators; selection of. 48 
 
 Average weekly wage; method of computing. 36 
 
 Award of arbitration. 70 
 
 Awards and agreements. 49 
 
 B. 
 
 Boat owners, liability of. 8 
 
 Burial expenses. 29 
 
 C. 
 
 Cases; postponement of. 48 
 
 Casual employment. 25 
 
 Certificates filed by insurance companies. 63 
 
 by employers. 65 
 
 Commission salesmen. 6 
 
 Compensation; receipts for. 53 
 
77 
 
 Page 
 
 Compensation where loss of foot and additional injuries. 43 
 
 not payable to administrator. ; . 8 
 
 for loss of member does not depend on loss of time. 14 
 
 for loss of more than one finger; method of paying. 9 
 
 Contested medical and hospital bills. 50 
 
 Constitutional bodies. 25 
 
 Contract funeral; burial expenses. 29 
 
 Construction of law average weekly wage.. 30 
 
 D. 
 
 Death claimed to be due to other causes. * . 34 
 
 Denying liability: grounds for to be stated. 49 
 
 Disability; presuming duration of. 6 
 
 Disease; injury aggravated by. 7 
 
 Disease; occupational. 31 
 
 Duty to seek employment; partial disability. 10 
 
 E. 
 
 Early rulings of Board. 3-17 
 
 Election; when employe is subject. 16 
 
 Employed; injured teamster not regularly. 27 
 
 Employer; posting of notices by. 6 
 
 acquiescence of in infraction of rules. 22 
 
 insurance company reporting for. 7 
 
 Employers: notices to be posted by. 64 
 
 certificates to be filed by. 65 
 
 Employer and employe; question of by whom was deceased employed . .. 44 
 
 Employment; casual. 25 
 
 duty to seek when partially disabled. 10 
 
 F. 
 
 Fact and law; findings of. 52 
 
 Factory rules; observance of. 22 
 
 acquiescence of employer in infraction of. 22 
 
 Final report. 53 
 
 Findings of fact and law. 52 
 
 Finger; method of paying compensation for when loss of more than one. 9 
 
 Forms for reporting accidents— 
 
 Weekly report form. 56 
 
 Where compensation involved. 57 
 
 Supplemental report. 57 
 
 Final report. 58 
 
 Forms used in making payments— 
 
 Agreement in regard to compensation. , 59 
 
 Compensation receipts. 60 
 
 Settlement receipt. 60 
 
 Fright or shock; absence of physical injury. 24 
 
 Funeral contract; burial expense. 29 
 
 G. 
 
 Grounds for denying liability to be stated. 
 
 49 
 
 H. 
 
 Hearing; notice of. 68 
 
 Hearings on review. 50 
 
 postponement of. 54 
 
 Hospital bills; contested medical and. 60 
 
 tickets, medical and. 12 
 
 expenses; payment of after first three weeks. 12 
 
 How to report accidents. 54 
 
78 
 
 I. Page 
 
 Incapacity; partial after fourteen days. 7 
 
 Injured teamster not regularly employed. 27 
 
 owner of team and wagon. 27 
 
 Injury aggravated by disease. 7 
 
 neglect to properly care for. 8 
 
 absence of physical. 24 
 
 Insurance company reporting for employers. 7 
 
 companies; certificates to be filed by. 63 
 
 Insurers deemed party. 49 
 
 Intentional and wilful misconduct. 40 
 
 L. 
 
 Law; provisions and progress. 3 
 
 findings of fact and. 52 
 
 Lead poisoning; occupational disease. 31 
 
 Liability of boat owners. 8 
 
 for accident occurring outside of state. 19 
 
 grounds for denying to be stated. 49 
 
 Loss of usefulness of member. 13 
 
 of more than one finger; method of paying compensation for. 9 
 
 of member; compensation for does not depend on loss of time. 14 
 
 of foot and other injuries from same accident; compensation for. 43 
 
 Lump settlement during disability. 10 
 
 sum payments. 51 
 
 M. 
 
 Master and servant; negligence. 32 
 
 Medical and hospital bills; contested. 50 
 
 and hospital tickets. 11 
 
 services rendered more than three weeks after accident. 18 
 
 Member; loss of usefulness. 13 
 
 compensation for loss of does not depend on loss of time. 14 
 
 Memorandum agreement. 53 
 
 Method of paying compensation for loss of more than one finger. 9 
 
 Miners receiving part pay in supplies. 11 
 
 Minors; payment of compensation to. 15 
 
 Misconduct; intentional and wilful. 40 
 
 Municipalities; posting of notices by. 7 
 
 N. 
 
 Neglect to properly care for injury. 8 
 
 Negligence, wilful; what constitutes. 12 
 
 master and servant. 32 
 
 death claimed to be due to other causes.. 34 
 
 Notice of hearing. 68 
 
 of appointment. 69 
 
 and application for adjustment of claim. 67 
 
 Notices; posting by employers. 6 
 
 posting of by municipalities... . . 7 
 
 to be posted by employers. 64 
 
 O. 
 
 Observance of factory rules. 22 
 
 Occupational disease; lead poisoning. 31 
 
 Operation; refusal to submit. 21 
 
 Opinions of Board in leading cases heard on review. 18-47 
 
 Order for arbitration. 67 
 
79 
 
 P. Page 
 
 Part pay in supplies; miners receiving. 11 
 
 Partial incapacity after fourteen days. 7 
 
 disability; duty to seek employment. 10 
 
 Party; insurer deemed. 49 
 
 Payment of compensation to minors. 15 
 
 of hospital expense after first three weeks. 12 
 
 Payments; lump sum. 51 
 
 to be made weekly. 9 
 
 Physical injury; absence of. 24 
 
 Plan of making payment. 14 
 
 Poisoning, lead; occupational disease. 31 
 
 Posting of notices by employer. 6 
 
 of notices by municipalities. 7 
 
 Postponement of cases. 48 
 
 of review hearings. 51 
 
 Presuming duration of disability. 6 
 
 Procedure in disputed cases— 
 
 Notice and application for adjustment of claim. 67 
 
 Order for arbitration. 67 
 
 Notice to parties. 68' 
 
 Notice of hearing. 68 
 
 Notice of appointment. 69 
 
 Witness subpoena. 69 
 
 Award of arbitration. 70 
 
 Stipulation and waiver of arbitration. 70 
 
 Appeal from decision of arbitration committee. 72 
 
 Proofs; witnesses and. 49 
 
 Progress of the law. 3 
 
 Provisions of the law. 3 
 
 Q. 
 
 Question of by whom was deceased employed. 44 
 
 R. 
 
 Receipts for compensation. 53 
 
 Re-employment no part of settlement. 10 
 
 Refusal to submit to operation. 21 
 
 Report; final. 58 
 
 of accident where compensation involved. 56 
 
 Reporting; insurance companies for employer. 7 
 
 Review; hearings on. 50 
 
 hearing; postponement of. 51 
 
 Rules; violation of shop. 6 
 
 factory; observance of. 22 
 
 acquiescence by employer in infraction of. 22 
 
 Rules of procedure adopted by Board: 
 
 1. What accidents to be reported. 52 
 
 2. When to be reported. 53 
 
 3. Fifteenth-day report. 53 
 
 4. Immediate report required. 53 
 
 5. Memorandum agreement. 53 
 
 6. Supplemental report. 53 
 
 7. Receipts for compensation. 53 
 
 8. Final report. 53 
 
 Rulings of Board; early. 3-17 
 
 S. 
 
 Salesman; commission. 6 
 
 Selection of arbitrators. 48 
 
80 
 
 Page 
 
 Settlement; lump sum during disability. 10 
 
 re-employment no part of. 10 
 
 Shop rules; violation of. 6 
 
 Stipulation and waiver of arbitration. 70 
 
 Supplemental report. 57 
 
 Supreme Court; appeals to. 51 
 
 T. 
 
 Team and wagon; owner of injured. 27 
 
 Teamster injured; not regularly employed. 27 
 
 Things to remember... 54 
 
 V. 
 
 Violation of shop rules. 6 
 
 W. 
 
 Waiver of arbitration. 70 
 
 Weekly payments. 9 
 
 wage, average; method of computing. 36 
 
 report form. 56 
 
 What accidents to be reported. 52 
 
 Wilful negligence; what constitutes. 12 
 
 Witness subpoena. 69 
 
 Witnesses and proofs. 49