(o % 2 , >r± 84 Taxation of Women. Woman Suffrage a Right. Presented to this College Library BY THE Massachusetts Woman Suffrage Association. JUEIA WARD HOWE, President. EUCY STONE, Chairman Ex. Committee. 377 were freed at the close of the Revolu¬ tion. 6 adoption. So Chief Justice Shaw says, it is agreed on all hands that, if not abolished before, slavery “was abolished by the Declaration of Rights.” (18 Pick. Rep. 209.) Our fathers also declared (art. 2) : “No subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained in his person, liberty, or estate for worshipping God in the manner and season most agree¬ able to the dictates of his own conscience.” Is not the religious freedom of the women of the State as dear to them as that of men ? and can there be any doubt whatever that it is as carefully secured to them by this article as it is to men, notwithstanding this use of the word “ his ” ? 1 But if, in behalf of civil liberty, even the expression “ all men ” has been decided by the court to be broad enough to in¬ clude women, and “ his ” may be construed to mean also “ her ” in behalf of religious liberty, it would seem to be clear that the rights of women are covered and protected by the broader clauses defining the rights of the people of the State, and this although women had no more voice in the framing or adoption of the Constitution than those women had who were held in slavery, and who nevertheless were set free by its adoption. It would certainly be an amazingly narrow and forced con¬ struction of the word “ people ” which would declare that more than half the population of the State was not to be considered as referred to when the rights of the people are set forth and defined. 2 There have been various amendments of the Constitu- 1 In the construction of statutes, the following rules are required to be observed, unless such construction is inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or repugnant to the context of the same statute; that is to say,— Second, Words importing the masculine gender may be applied to females. (Gen. Stat. c. 3, § 7.) In the construction of the fundamental law of a State, the rules are even more liberal. 2 If there were any doubt about the correctness of this conclusion, I could strengthen it almost indefinitely. Do not the constitutional provisions for secur¬ ing the right of trial by jury and the writ of habeas corpus , those which pro¬ hibit unreasonable searches and excessive bail, &c., and those which uphold the liberty of the press, &c., apply to women, and secure their rights just as completely as they do those of men ? and were they not intended to do so ? 7 tion. By article 3 (adopted April 9, 1821), “male citizens” having certain qualifications, and “ no other person,” can vote in the election of Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, Senators, and Representatives. Article 16 (adopted May 23, 1855) provides for the choice of Councillors “ by the inhabitants qualified to vote for Governor; ” that is, by male citizens, and no other per¬ sons. By articles 17 and 19 (adopted at the same time) and the laws passed pursuant thereto, male citizens alone can vote in the election of Secretary of State, Treasurer, Auditor, Attor¬ ney-General, Sheriffs, Registers of Probate, Commissioners of Insolvency, Clerks of Courts, and District Attorneys (Gen. Stat. c. 10). By article 20 (adopted May 1, 1857), a voter, besides being a male, must thenceforth also “ be able to read the Constitution in the English language, and write his name.” Articles 21 and 22 (adopted at the same time) provide respec¬ tively for a House of Representatives of 240 members, to be apportioned among the counties, and for a Senate of 40 mem¬ bers, to be apportioned among the districts, according to the number of legal voters in the counties and districts respec¬ tively, equally, as near as may be, &c. The object of the 23d article is to require of a foreigner two years’ residence after naturalization, before he can vote, in addition to other qualifi- tions previously required. So that male citizens of full age, having certain other qualifi¬ cations, “ and no other persons,” can, under the Constitution, vote for Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, Councillors, Sen¬ ators, Representatives, Secretary of State, Treasurer, Auditor, or Attorney-General; and under the laws framed pursuant to the Constitution, these same persons, and no others, can vote for Sheriffs, Registers of Probate, Clerks of Courts, and District Attorneys. When we reflect that all the Judges, from the Chief Justice down to the petty Justice of the Peace, must be nomi¬ nated by the Governor and approved by the Council, and the Judges of the Supreme Court (without, however, hearing any argument), have given their opinion that a woman cannot con¬ stitutionally be appointed to any judicial office (107 Mass. Rep. 604), it seems clear that the entire government of the State, in 8 all its branches, executive, legislative, and judicial,—or, in other words, that the entire power of making, interpreting, and executing all the laws which are to affect the persons and property of every woman in the State — are exclusively vested in male citizens or their appointees. If they please to allow women to be appointed on School Committees, they may do so, — it is an act of grace and favor ; but the women them¬ selves, though declared capable of performing the duties of the office, are, nevertheless, deemed incapable of voting for persons, even of their own sex, to perform such duties. How few of us realize the injustice of this condition of things! By the last United States census (1870), the total population of the State is declared to be 1,457,351 persons (Population and Social Statistics, p. 3) ; and of these only 312,770 are “ male citizens” ! (Ib. p. 619.) According to our Declaration of Rights (art. 4), “ the sole and exclusive right of governing themselves ” is vested in the people ; and yet, under our laws, more than three-quarters of the people are entirely disfranchised, and have no voice whatever in determining who. shall govern them, or by what laws their rights of person and property shall be protected ! Does any one object that minors should be excluded, as no one contends that youth of either sex, legally incapable of contracting, should exercise the right of suffrage? But this hardly lessens the injustice. We have 398, 1 57 adult males in the State (ib. 619) ; and of the whole number of females, 426,326! must be of full age, making a total of 824,483 adult people in the State. So that nearly two-thirds of the adult population of the State is disfranchised ; and yet, as we have just seen, it is a fundamental idea of our government that the people —not a meagre fraction of it — 1 liy the last United States census there were 703,779 males and 753,572 females in the State. (Ib. p. 606.) “Up to the age of 15 the number of males in the State, at each given period, somewhat exceeds that of the females, except that there are 19 more females than males between the ages of 3 and 4.” (See General Remarks on Abstract of the State Census of 1865, p. 287.) Over 15 the females are either equal in number to, or in excess of, the males. If, there¬ fore, of the whole number of males 398,157 were 21 and upwards, we may safely infer that at least 426,326 of the females were 21 and upwards. 9 has the right to govern the State! The candidate of the Democratic party who received the highest number of votes at the recent election had hardly more votes than the number of disfranchised male adults in the State! The organization of the General Government is no more favorable to women. The Senate of the United States is composed of two mem¬ bers from each State, chosen by the legislature thereof (Const, art. i, sec. 3). So long, therefore, as these legislatures shall continue to be chosen only by male citizens, so long will the United States Senate really represent only male citizens. The Senate not only has to concur in all legislation, but without its advice and consent no treaty can be made, and it passes upon all nominations for Ambassadors, Public Minis¬ ters, Consuls, and Judges of the Supreme Court. It controls, indeed, the appointment of all other officers of the United States whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the Constitution. Though Representatives to Congress are required to be “ chosen by the people ” of the different States, the electors must “ have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature.” (Const, art. 1, sec. 2.) Consequently, only male citizens can vote for Repre¬ sentatives, and the popular branch in Congress represents only them. By Act of Congress (Feb. 2, 1872), the number of mem¬ bers of the House of Representatives is fixed at 283. Divid¬ ing the total population of ’the States (38,115,641, Census, p. 3), by this number we find 134,684 to be the number of people (men, women, and children) sufficient to entitle a State to one Representative, and we male citizens have just chosen the eleven Representatives to which the State is entitled. 1 By ourselves alone we should be able to choose only two Repre¬ sentatives, with a fraction over, and the remaining nine per- 1 By Act of Congress (May 30, 1872), nine States with large fractions are authorized to choose an additional Representative, so that the present House contains 292 members. (Rev. Stat. U. S. chap. 2, sec. 20.) 2 10 sons whom we have chosen really represent the politico power given to us by this fraction, and by the people of the State, whom we please to disfranchise. The women alone are numerous enough to entitle us to send five Representatives, with a yet larger fraction over. There are in the United States, excluding the Territories (1870), only 8,307,305 male citizens (Census, p. 619). By themselves alone they would be able to choose not over 62 Representatives, or less than one quarter part of the House. Of the remaining 230 members, 140. represent the female population of the States (Census, p. 606), 81 the disfranchised males, and 9 the additional Representatives allowed to certain States by the law of May 30, 1872, and about half of these 9 really represent the power given to the men, by the number of women in those States. The President is voted for by electors chosen by the sev¬ eral States in such manner as the legislatures thereof may direct. (Const, art. 2, sec. 1.) If these electors are said to be chosen by the people, they are, as in this State (Gen. Stat. c. 9, § 10), nevertheless chosen only by male citizens. If they are appointed by the legislature, as the latter is chosen only by male citizens, the result is the same. In case the electors fail to choose a President, the House of Representatives, representing only male citizens, has power to fill the vacancy. (Amendment, art. 12.) The President thus chosen in either mode has a veto upon all legislation, and wields the whole executive power of the General Government. He is Com¬ mander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, and has the sole power of nominating the Judges of the Supreme Court, Ambassadors, &c. So here, again, the entire power of making, interpreting, and executing all the laws of the United States which can, by any possibility, affect the person and property of every woman in the land are exclusively vested in male citizens or their ap¬ pointees. If the President please to appoint a woman to be postmistress, he can do so. It is an act of grace which has been gracefully done in several instances; but still it is a mere act of grace and favor. No woman, no matter what her qual¬ ifications for holding office may be, has any right to hold any office which male citizens are legally bound to respect. Who would imagine that this condition of things could exist under a constitution which professes upon its face to be framed by “ the people,” and to be designed in an especial manner to “ establish justice and insure domestic tranquillity,” &c. ? Does history teach us that we may reasonably hope to see a large disfranchised class receive justice at the hands of its rulers ? As Republicans, we fully believe that the ballot in the hands of the people is not only needed to secure them in the enjoy¬ ment of their personal and political rights, but it is also the great safety-valve against violence. So long as a man can vote for the redress of his wrongs, and thus get the justice he seeks peacefully, he will not be foolish enough to fight ; but, as soon as you deprive him of the power to choose rulers who will make laws for his protection, he will be ready, on any favorable opportunity, to fight for his rights. How, then, can we hope to secure domestic tranquillity so long as we deprive nearly two-thirds of the adult population of the country of all share in its government ? When we have really established justice, then, and never before, shall we have really secured domestic tranquillity. The key-note of our Declaration of Independence is, that governments derive “ their just powers from the consent of the governed.” This great idea, “ the consent of the gov¬ erned,” is the one upon which the whole structure of our government is theoretically built. Prominent among the injuries and usurpations of the King, set forth in the Decla¬ ration, “ all having,” to use its words, “ in direct object the establishment of absolute tyranny over these States,” is the fact that he has approved acts of Parliament, styled acts of pretended legislation, “ for imposing taxes on us without our consent.” Congress has power “ to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.” (Const, art. i, sec. 8.) Under this grant of power there was collected from the people of the 12 United States, in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1868, more than $160,000,000; in 1869, more than $ 176,000,000; in 1870, more than $191,000,000 (Report on Commerce, &c., 1870, p. 662); in 1871, more than $202,000,000; in 1872, more than $212,000,000 ; and in 1873, more than 184,000,000 (Report, &c., 1873, p. 718). As the last census was taken in 1870, I will especially examine the taxation in 1870. In this year $191,221,768 was collected. (Report, &c., 1870, p. 662.) These great sums were levied upon all the people, women as well as men, and upon disfranchised male adults as well as male citizens. Whoever consumed any of the articles from which these taxes were raised, paid his or her share of the tax in the enhanced price of the commodity used. Do not the women of the country feel the need of salt as much as men ? Do they rely any less than men on the use of coffee, tea, 1 and sugar ? Must they not clothe themselves equally with men in woollens, cotton, or silk ? If so, then in 1870 the women paid the United States government their full share of more than $115,000,000 raised from these sources. Indeed, if we except tobacco (which yielded through the custom¬ houses less than $4,000,000) we may go through all the prominent articles of foreign merchandise which entered into consumption in the United States in that year, and we shall find that women cannot possibly escape bearing their full share of the effects of this indirect but very effective tax¬ ation. The total value of the dutiable imports into Massachusetts alone for the year ending June 30, 1870, was $48,239,835. (Table 3, Report, &c., 1870, p. 140.) The average rate of duty on dutiable imports in the country at large during the same time was 47^ per cent ad valorem. (Report, &c., ib. p. 615.) So that the duties collected in Massachusetts during that year, reckoning them at only 47 per cent, exceeded $21,000,000, 2 1 Tea and coffee are now exempt; but probably they will soon be taxed again. 2 For the year ending June 30, 1873, $20,618,138.85, were collected as duties in Massachusetts. (Report for 1873, table 22, pp. 634, 639.) 13 or an average of over $14 for each man, woman, and child, and for the women alone about $11,000,000. It is perfectly safe for me to say, therefore, that Congress taxes the women of Massachusetts millions of dollars every year. According to our Declaration of Independence, they have no just right to do this, unless the women have con¬ sented to be thus taxed. Without such consent the mere act of taxation by itself alone is conclusive evidence of “ absolute tyranny” on the part of Congress, as much so as any of those acts which the Continental Congress could urge against King George and Parliament. When have the women given consent to any such taxation ? Never, by any vote of their own ! Nobody, indeed, has ever dreamed of asking them to say whether they consented or not. Never by their representatives, for the best of all reasons, they have not the slightest power to choose repre¬ sentatives to act for them, in reference to this or any other personal or political rights. The Congress of 1793 passed the Fugitive Slave Bill. In 1790, there were 697,681 slaves in the United States (Census 1870, p. 7), who counted as 418,608 free persons ; and allowing one Representative for each thirty thousand free persons (Const, art. 1, sec. 2), these slaves gave the masters at least 11 more votes in the House of Representatives than they were justly entitled to; and per¬ haps this added influence enabled the slave owners to secure the passage of this law. In 1850, Congress amended the Fugitive Slave Bill, pointing out an easy way in which the claimant might manufacture full and conclusive evidence of the facts needed to make the recapture of slaves easy. In 1840, there were 2,482,661 slaves in the United States (Cen¬ sus 1870, p. 7), who counted as 1,489,596 free persons, and gave the masters 21 votes. When the amended Fugitive Slave Bill came from the Senate, without having been printed, without having been committed, it was read in the House, Sept. 12, 1850; a Northern man moved the previous question, thereby cutting off all possibility of debate, and the bill was passed. But the motion for the previous question, which thus 14 compelled immediate action, was carried by only 18 majority, the slaves themselves furnishing that number; and, to our everlasting disgrace, one yea vote came from Boston! Did the slaves ever personally consent to the passage of these fugitive slave laws ? The idea of asking such consent was never dreamed of. Did they consent by the Representatives whom they thus assisted their masters in choosing, and who so materially aided in passing the law ? The idea is absurd. It is actually, as well as legally, true that the slaves had no rights which white men were bound to respect. But if the slaves cannot be considered as consenting to the passage of these fugitive slave laws, either by themselves or by Represent¬ atives, even by those Representatives who could only be chosen by their assistance, neither can the women of Massachusetts be considered as consenting to their taxation by Congress, either by themselves or by Representatives, one-half, at least, of whom we male citizens have been enabled to choose only by their assistance. The Representatives in Congress have the actual power to legislate for all persons ; but they are chosen by and only truly represent the male citizens of the country. Soon after the accession of George the Third, he resolved to introduce a new colonial system, one feature of which was, that Parliament was, by its own act, to levy on the Colonies a revenue towards maintaining their military establishment. (8 Bancroft, p. 123.) The plan was first unfolded in the House of Commons by Townshend ; but the execution of the design fell to George Grenville, who, dropping all other parts of the plan, proposed to confine the use of the parliamentary revenue to the expenses of the military establishment. The colonists interposed with the argument that, by the theory of the British government, taxation and representation are inseparable correlatives ; and Grenville, admitting the justice of their objection, and that taxation of the Colonies ought to be followed by a special colonial representation, passed the Stamp Act, but failed to provide for any such representation. When he was driven from office, the new ministers had the l S option between repealing the tax as an act of justice to the Colonies or repealing it as a measure of expediency to Brit¬ ain. The first was the choice of Pitt, and its adoption would have ended the controversy; the second was that of Rocking¬ ham. He abolished the tax, but, at the same time, declared that the legislative power of Parliament reached to the Colonies in all cases whatsoever. The Colonies denied this unqualified authority of a legislature in which they were not represented ; and, although they were told they were as much represented as nine-tenths of the people of Britain, this seemed to them no good reason for submission. Pursuant to this declared power in Parliament thus to bind the Colonies in all cases whatsoever, a law was proposed by Townshend, and passed, providing for the collection of a tax on tea, glass, paper, and painters’ colors, the preamble asserting that “ it is expedient that a revenue should be raised in his majesty’s dominions in America for defraying the charge of the administration of justice and support of civil government, and towards further defraying the expenses of defending the said dominions.” (8 Bancroft, p. 126, &c.) Grenville had pro¬ posed taxes for the defence of the Colonies ; at the same time admitting that even this taxation should entitle them to representation in Parliament. This preamble of Townshend, however, promised an ever-increasing American civil list, in¬ dependent of American assemblies, to be disposed of by min¬ isters, at their discretion, for salaries, gifts, or pensions, and without any representation in Parliament. The Colonies were unanimous in resisting the innovation, and at once avoided the taxes by agreements to stop imports from Britain. The government gave way, and repealed all Townshend’s taxes, except on tea. Lord North maintained that this duty was no innovation, but a reduction of the ancient duty of a shilling a pound to one of threepence only, and that the change of the place where the duty was to be collected was no more than a regulation of trade to prevent smuggling tea from Holland. The statement, so far as the tax was con¬ cerned, was unanswerable; but the sting of the Tax Act lay 16 in its preamble. Rockingham’s declaratory act affirmed the power of Parliament in all cases whatsoever; and Towns- hend’s preamble declared the expediency of using that power to raise a very large colonial revenue. Still collision was practically averted; for the Americans, in their desire for peace, gave up the importation of tea. No revenue, therefore, was collected; and, as Bancroft says (ib. p. 127), “ by resolute self-denial, the Colonies escaped the mark of the brand which was to show whose property they were.” At this, the King, against the opinion of Lord North, and of the East India Company, directed that company itself to ex¬ port tea to America, and there to pay the duty, hoping that a low price would tempt the Americans to buy. But the colo¬ nists would not suffer the tea to be exposed for sale; the Crown officers yielded to their unanimous resistance every¬ where except at Boston; and there 340 chests of tea were thrown overboard. 1 Singularly enough, Mr. Quincy says of this act: “ All was conducted with order and perfect submis¬ sion to government. It was a bright moonlight evening, and the British squadron lay near ; yet there was no interruption from the fleet or the troops! ” (Memoir of Josiah Quincy, Jr., p. 126.) In other words, our fathers denied the right of King and Parliament to tax them in any case whatever without their consent, or the consent of their Representatives. In their opinion, it made no difference if they were as much repre¬ sented in Parliament as nine-tenths of the people of Britain. Because nine-tenths of the people of England were wronged seemed to them, and really was, no reason why the rights of the colonists should be invaded. Neither did it make any difference for what purpose the tax was levied. The colonists denied the right to tax them even for their own military de- 1 I have condensed my account of the taxation of the Colonies from Mr. Bancroft’s most admirable history of the transaction, generally using his very words. Supposing the chests to have contained 100 pounds each (which I am advised by a tea merchant is a large estimate), the tax on this tea, if paid, would have amounted to ^425. In the year ending June 30, 1870, more than $10,- 000,000 was collected from the duty on tea alone (Report, &c., table 17, p. 608), and more than $800,000 of the amount was collected in Boston. (Ib. table 3, P-. I 3 °*) a 7 fence; much more strenuously did they resist any and all taxation which was directly calculated to place their judges and civil magistrates beyond their own control, by giving ministers in England the power of establishing and paying their salaries. The colonists preferred to judge for themselves whether the taxes to be levied here were or were not really for their own benefit, and insisted on the right to pay the salaries of their own officers. They could not even be bribed into silently admitting the principle that taxation without rep¬ resentation could ever be less than simple tyranny. They would drink no tea, the cost of which was enhanced by any tax, however small, levied by Parliament. In their judgment, it was a tyrannical act for Parliament to tax them a shilling a pound for tea, and no less an act of tyranny to tax only three¬ pence. In behalf of a principle so essential to the preserva¬ tion of their liberties, they were ready to cavil about the ninth part of a hair. 1 The women of Massachusetts, like the colonists one hundred years ago, are taxed every year by Congress millions of dol¬ lars, without either their consent or the consent of their Representatives. We may say to them, as King George’s ministers said to the colonists, You are as much represented in Congress as the 85,387 adult males in the State who are also disfranchised. (Census, p. 619.) They will reply, Because you have wronged other people is no reason why you should tyran¬ nize over us; and these men may, if they please, all become voters, — we cannot. We may again say to them, We tax you, as the Constitution authorizes us to do, “ for the common defence and general welfare of the United States.” (Const, art. 1, sec. 8.) They will reply, We prefer to judge for our¬ selves about what is or is not for the general welfare. We utterly deny your right to take our property for any purposes, 1 John Wingate Thornton, in his very valuable pamphlet on the Historical Relation of New England to the English Commonwealth (p. 51, note), remarks, " The colonists said if Parliament could tax us, they could establish the Church of England, with its creeds, titles, and ceremonies, and prohibit all other churches as conventicles and schism shops.” .See also votes of Brookline town meeting at the end of this pamphlet. 3 i8 unless we deem it to be for the general welfare. And what must we answer to these replies ? What can we answer ? Can we do any thing more than admit the fact, that, whether we judge of the rightfulness of the taxation of women by Con¬ gress, by the principles acted upon by our fathers at the risk of their lives, or the principles which we have ourselves adopted in our fundamental law, every such act is one of simple tyr¬ anny ? Taxation without representation is tyranny, according to the principles of the fathers and the Declaration of Inde¬ pendence, though the persons taxed be women. Our fathers risked death rather than pay a tax of threepence a pound on tea. We, their sons, have taxed the women of the land 25 cents for every pound of tea they consumed. If our fathers were right in resisting the attempt to extract a miserable three¬ pence, what must we think of ourselves ? It was possible, by resolute self-denial in the use of tea, for the colonists to avoid admitting the right of Parliament to tax them. But the women of Massachusetts to-day cannot thus escape the taxation imposed by Congress. Even water is enhanced in its cost by the taxes levied on the iron, tin, or lead which enters into the construction of the pipes or pumps from which it must be drawn. Incredible as it may seem, and foolish as it is, even bread, butter, flour, potatoes, &c., all are taxed. It is difficult, indeed, to find what is not taxed. Within the limits marked out by the Constitution, Congress, like Parliament, claims the right to tax women generally. By no self-denying ordinance can they possibly escape the effect of this taxation. The colonists could escape the mark of the brand which served to show whose property they were. But the women of to-day cannot thus escape. It was a very ignoble sort of man who said of his wife, — “ I will be master of what is mine own: She is my goods, my chattel; she is my house, My household stuff, my field, my barn, My horse, my ox, my ass,” &c. This is not a mere picture of the imagination. In some parts of Europe we may see, even at this day, a man driving 19 his wife and donkey yoked or harnessed together ; sometimes, it is said, he even rides in the cart himself! Many of us every year go abroad, and fall into raptures over the Dresden Madonna, and feel unbounded astonishment at the barbaric treatment of the peasant women. But, nevertheless, we men in America practise a form of tyranny over our own women which we cannot help admitting to be unjust, without repu¬ diating our own principles, and which we cannot help admit¬ ting to be mean, unless we think it generous to save our own money by seizing that of a woman without her consent. We are far too civilized to harness our women, but not at all un¬ willing to imprison them if they do not quietly submit to our tyranny. (Gen. Stat. c. 12, § 13.) It is barely possible, if women were really represented in Congress, and could themselves pass upon the nomination of civil and judicial officers, and vote to raise or reduce salaries, that the government of the country would begin to remember that it springs from the people, and that half the people are women. Perhaps the representatives of women on the floor of Congress, at some future day, seeing the enormous benefit resulting from unrestricted free trade across the Mississippi, the Ohio, and the Hudson, will fail to see why the same result should not follow from free trade across the St. Lawrence ; or, if free trade east and west across Lake Michigan is an un¬ mixed blessing, — not to five States, merely, but to the whole Union, — why free trade north and south across Lakes Supe¬ rior, Erie, and Ontario will not be equally a blessing; or why, indeed, free trade across the oceans should not do more to advance the peace, and therefore the well-being, of the human race, here as well as abroad, than all the standing armies, forts, arsenals, and custom-houses that have ever been or will be built, can ever accomplish. Besides the indirect taxation 1 of the women of Massachu- 1 I have not alluded to the taxation of women through the internal revenue department, because the evidence is merely cumulative, and the taxes which probably bear on them most have been repealed. During the year ending June 30, 1873, there was collected in Massachusetts, from spirits, $1,674,276.65 ; from tobacco, $537,471.61; from fermented liquors. 20 setts by the General Government, — a taxation which the very rich are obliged to submit to, and the very poor cannot escape, — all those who have a certain amount of property are directly taxed here. Each year a state, county, and town or city tax is levied on them. In 1871, the House of Representatives directed the Tax Commissioner to ascertain and report to the Legislature the number of females taxed directly, those who had property taxed to husbands, guardians, or trustees, and also the cor¬ poration taxes paid by them. The Report (House Document, No. 428) states that 33,961 women were taxed, and that they paid $1,927,653.11. (Ib. p. 25.) The whole tax raised that year (Aggregate of Polls, Property, Taxes, &c., assessed May, 1871, p. 25) was $22,063,946. So that in 1871 the women paid more than one-twelfth of all the sums raised by taxation in all the towns and cities of the Commonwealth. Of the whole sum thus raised, $782,753 (Aggregate, &c., p. 25) was assessed upon polls. Deducting this, it appears that the women really paid very nearly one-eleventh of the entire tax on property in 1871. (See note at end of the pamphlet.) In his preface to this Report, Charles Adams, Jr., the tax commissioner, says (ib. p. 1) : “ It is probable that the amount returned is considerably less than that actually held by the classes of persons to whom the order relates,” but that the total number of females holding property “may be over¬ stated,” as he had no means of comparing the names of those locally taxed with the names of stockholders in corporations, without a delay and an expense considered unnecessary for the purposes of the return. #638,976.51; from banks and bankers, $316,095.13; and from incomes, $392,- 387.45; besides other amounts from other sources,—the whole amount being $3,669,950.66. (Report of Comm, of Int. Rev. 1873, PP- 75 > 80, 85, 95.) The whole amount collected through this department in Massachusetts alone from 1863 to r 873, both inclusive, was $159,930,259.88 (ib. 145); and the aggregate receipts during the same years from all the States and Territories was $1,872,419,285.03 (ib. 153); the total collections from taxes on incomes, divi¬ dends, legacies, and successions alone during the same years being $361,573,- 995.67 (ib. 165). Of this latter sum women could not help paying their ful) share. 21 From this Report it seems that women were taxed more or less in every city, and in all the towns except Gay Head and Gosnold. In these places there were only 64 polls (Aggre¬ gate, &c., p. 8), and the valuation was only $178,770, or of the valuation of the State. This document, therefore, clearly proves that the taxation of women is, practically speaking, universal through the State. When I began my researches on this subject I was not aware of the existence of this Report. Accordingly, having found that the total tax in 1873 was $25,153,399 (Aggregate Polls, &c., 1873, p. 27), I sent a printed postal card directed to the assessors of every town and city 1 in the Commonwealth, desiring information as to how much of this sum was paid by women. I have received returns from 163 out of 342 2 places, or nearly one-half of the whole number. In many of the places the assessors have given me the results of their labor gratuitously, for which I render my hearty thanks ; I have, however, in every case paid what has been asked for the time and labor expended in getting the information ; and having, in years gone by, been an assessor myself, I am free to say that the sums charged have generally seemed to me to be reasonable for the services rendered. Still, the fact remains true, that the assessors in about 176 cities and towns felt too 1 Except Boston. Here I employed Mr. George E. Richardson, one of the clerks of the assessors. By accident he examined the books for 1874 instead of 1873. This of course, embraced the valuation of Charlestown, Brighton, and West Roxbury. The examination involved great labor and care on his part, and expense on mine. My returns from East Bridgewater, Dracut, Deerfield, and Templeton are also for 1874; but it hardly seemed worth while to go over the ground again in these places in order to obtain returns for 1873. The difference between the two years cannot be material,—it is a gain of only about 33,000,000 in 1,700,000,000. Mr. Richardson writes to me that his returns “ do not include any property held by executors of estates of females or property taxed in name of heirs (viz. Mary Brown’s heirs), or trustees or executors under the will of females, but only includes property taxed directly to females, or as trustees or guardians of females.” So that the sum stated in my tables as paid in Boston must be much less than the amount really paid by women; and this is half as much again as the sum stated in the Report of 1871. 2 339 after the recent annexations to Boston. 22 little interest in the matter even to be willing to take the trouble to tell me for what sum I coulcl get the information I desired. In the 163 places from which I have received returns, the whole tax paid was $21,089,409, or more than four-fifths of the whole sum raised in the State. If from this sum we deduct $526,604 paid by polls, we have $20,562,805 as the whole tax on property in these places. Of this latter sum, the women paid $1,966,601, or .095 per cent. We may, there¬ fore, from these returns, and from those of 1871, consider it as clearly proved that the women of the State, taken as a whole, pay certainly one-eleventh, and probably one-tenth, or even more, of all the tax on property in the State. Disregarding the 21 towns from which I have no returns as to the number of women taxed, I find that 18,775 women paid $1,934,638 in taxes, or an average of $103 and the equiv¬ alent of 51 polls for each woman. The cities of Boston, Chel¬ sea and Newton, and the town of Brookline, all clustered together, paid $13 079,436, or more than one-half the whole tax of the State. Of this sum ($ 13,079,436) 8,447 women paid $1,448,479, or a little more than one-tenth of the whole tax, — being an average of $171, and the equivalent of 85 polls for each woman. Each of the 7,214 women taxed in Boston paid an average of $ 179, or the equivalent of 89 polls ; and together they paid more than nine times as much as was paid by the 66,415 men in the city who only paid a poll-tax, and more than ninety times as much as was paid by the 7,032 poll-tax voters who no doubt elected Governor Gaston. In Milford, 244 women were taxed, and 1,513 men paid a poll-tax only ; and the women paid nearly three times as much as the men. In Cheshire, 26 women were taxed, and they paid eleven times as much as 152 of the men in town. In Templeton, 14 women paid more than 312 of the men. In Leominster, 13 women paid more than 628 of the men. In Barre, 12 women paid more than 249 of the men. In Westboro’, 11 women paid more than 505 men. Eight women in Kingston paid more than 129 23 men; in Medway, more than 387 men ; in Needham, more than 566 men; in Wakefield, more than 600 men; in Wal¬ tham, more than 1,103 men J and in Adams, the equivalent of 1,120 polls. Seven women in Dighton paid more than 128 men. Six women in Gardner paid more than 100 men ; and in Newton, more than 3,659 polls. In Hubbardston, 5 women paid more than 72 men ; and in Bellingham, more than no men. Four women in Swanzey paid more than 78 of the men ; in Dudley, more than 170 men; in Holden, more than 220 men ; in Deerfield, more than 295 men ; in Rockport, more than 301 men ; and in Spencer, more than 620 men. There were 3 women in Newton who paid more tax than 2,034 men in that city ; two of the women in Northboro’ paid as much as 113 men in Petersham, twice as much as 67 men ; and in Swampscott, nearly twice as much as 274 of the men. A single woman tax-payer in Dighton paid as much as 36 of the men; in Lakeville, as much as 52 of the men; in Petersham, 50 per cent more than 67 men in town; and in Deerfield, as much as 141 of the men; in Shrewsbury, there were 116 men who only paid a poll-tax, and one woman paid twice as much as the whole of them. In Newton, one woman paid as much tax as 1,424 of the men. In Brookline, there were 921 men who only paid a poll-tax; and one woman in town paid more than three times, and another more than six times as much tax as was paid by the whole of these 921 men ! There are 92 scholarships in Harvard College for the aid of poor students ; the total income is about $ 21 , 000 . It was a man who planned 22 of these scholarships, which yield more than one-quarter of the income derived from the whole 92 ; but the money by which they were established came, in point of fact, from a woman tax-payer. No young woman of the State, no matter how scholarly she may be, can, however, hope to receive any aid from the bounty of this large-hearted woman. A subscription has just been started for a new medical school building to be .connected with the College. Out of $100,700 first published as subscribed, $30,500 was contributed by women, and the largest single 24 subscription ($20,000) was by a woman tax-payer. May we not reasonably hope, therefore, that Harvard College will yet open its doors to women, when it is thus willing to receive their money ? It seems mean to exclude them from all use of the educational advantages which have been accumulating at Cambridge for over two centuries, and at the same time to urge them to contribute to increase these advantages. It does not seem to be impossible to educate female physicians in Paris, Zurich, in Boston University, or in other places. Why is it impossible in Harvard ? And yet about all that Harvard can now do for the higher education of women is to be willing to certify, after an examination, that they have been able to obtain a good education elsewhere ! I have annexed to this pamphlet eight tables prepared from returns made to me, and from the votes at the last election, as stated in the “Daily Evening Transcript” (Nov. 4, 1874). I have also added two columns taken from the Report of 1871. Although the returns of the number of men who only paid a poll-tax, and the pluralities for Governor at the last election, are not, as will be seen, entirely complete in these tables, they are probably sufficiently so for my purposes. Only 185,990 men voted for Governor last autumn (Official Vote, “ Boston Daily Advertiser,” Nov. 23,1874); 147,433 men paid only a poll-tax, 66,415 of them being in Boston ; and Gov¬ ernor Gaston’s plurality in the State was 7,032 (ib.). On the principle that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, it seems clear, therefore, that the last election was carried by poll-tax voters. Indeed, practically speaking, men who only pay $2.00 tax (and frequently even this tax is paid for them by others) make and unmake the Government. These 147,433 men paid $294,866 The 18,775 women paid more than six times as much. It will doubtless be said that some of the poll-tax payers were minors, some aliens, and some perhaps were disqualified to vote from inability to read and write. Still, minors will finally become of age, aliens may become naturalized, and those who are ignorant may learn to write their names and to read the Constitution in English (a thing 25 which nine-tenths of the men who vote have never done), and thus all these men have it in their power to become voters if they please; but none of the women, who do more than six times as much as these men towards supporting the expenses of government, have any possible chance of becoming voters without a change in the law. If the women thus taxed were allowed to vote, they are numerous enough, even now, to be of political importance. According to the Report of 1871, the women tax-payers could have overcome Governor Gaston’s plurality four times, and that of Lieutenant-Governor Knight twice, and in both cases have had votes to spare. They would not have wished to do so; but, if they had desired, they could easily enough have defeated the election of the Secretary, the Treasurer, the Auditor, and the Attorney-General, though each of these officers had over 21,000 plurality. If it be suggested that the Report of 1871 cannot be im¬ plicitly relied on as to the number of women taxed, I would say that even my partial returns show that they could have overcome Governor Gaston’s plurality twice, with 4,000 votes to spare ; and they could have thrown away 6,000 votes for Lieu¬ tenant-Governor, and yet been able to defeat Mr. Knight. My tables embrace four-fifths of the taxation of the State. If we add only one-fourth to the number of the women on my tables (which seems moderate to represent the women tax-payers in about 176 towns), we shall have 23,468 as the whole number of women tax-payers in the State, or more than sufficient to have defeated all the State officers who were chosen on a general ticket. Even this statement does not show the whole power women tax-payers ought to have. They are so scattered through the State that they would have a great influence on the choice of Representatives. The vote thrown for Governor probably reflects fairly enough the division of sentiment in the minds of the people on the choice of Representatives to the Legis¬ lature. Assuming this to be the fact, the Report of 1871 embraces 338 towns. From 22 of these I have no return of 4 26 votes ; but in 158 places the women were numerous enough to have controlled the election for Representatives ! Is it again suggested that this Report of 1871 may be too favorable to women on this point, I would say that even from my returns it is evident that they could have controlled the election in 65 towns and cities, 1 and in 10 out of the 21 wards in Boston! As a mere question of expediency, therefore, is it wise for us to rely, as we now do, for our government upon the class of voters most easily influenced or purchased, and neglect those who pay more than one-eleventh of the public burdens, and who thus would have it in their power to exercise a marked and beneficent influence on our politics ? Of what incalcu¬ lable importance it would be for the welfare of the State to be able to control or materially influence for good the choice of Representatives in such towns as Waltham, Marblehead, Mil¬ ford, Brookline, Clinton, Framingham, Wakefield, Swamp- scott, &c., or such cities as Boston, Chelsea, Worcester, Lynn, Salem, Somerville, Newton, Taunton, &c.! There is another fact connected with the taxation of women which, being a man, I am ashamed to point out, but which yet cannot be passed over in silence; and that is the inex¬ pressible meanness of the thing. We men save at least two millions of dollars every year from our own burdens by this act of injustice. If, as we have seen, the women no doubt pay more than one-eleventh of the whole tax on property, every man of prop¬ erty in the State saves more than one-eleventh of his taxes by the taxation of women. The cities and towns in table 8 pay more than half the taxes levied in the State, and the women paid more than one-ninth of the whole. So that one- half the men of property in the State save every year more 1 In speaking of the votes of all the cities but Boston, I am obliged to speak of the wards together as a unit. Probably if the voters of the cities were ana¬ lyzed by wards, my general statement in the text would have to be modified. Thus, in Boston the plurality for Governor was 8,304, and 7,214 women were taxed. They control only about half the wards, though they could have thrown seven-eighths as many votes as Governor Gaston’s plurality in the whole city. 27 than one-ninth of their taxes, by compelling the women who have no votes with which to protect themselves to pay the amount. In Dedham, the men of property save more than one-eighth ; in Brookline, more than one-seventh; in Berkley and Stockbridge, more than one-sixth ; in Cheshire, among the beautiful Berkshire hills, and in the wealthy city of New¬ ton, they save more than one-fifth of their taxes by this in¬ justice ! The men of property in Westfield saved in one year $6,000; in Pittsfield, $7,000 ; in Northampton, $10,000 ; in Dedham, $11,000; in Watertown, $13,000 ; in Fall River, $14,000 ; in Taunton, $18,000 ; in Newburyport, $19,000 ; in Somerville, $23,000; in Chelsea, $25,000 ; in Lynn, $30,000 ; in Springfield, $35,000; in Salem, $36,000; in Brookline, $49,000; in Worcester, $63,000; in Newton, $77,000; and in Boston, more than $1,200,000 by this operation! One eminent man in this neighborhood, who has been Gov¬ ernor, saved over $900 in this way in 1873. Another, who has been candidate for Governor, saved, in the same year, in this way, over $1,000 in the taxes on his property in two ad¬ joining places. The former is an advocate of woman suffrage ; the latter is believed to be willing to give the suffrage to women who own property now, but not to favor extending it to those who merely earn their living from day to day, though these latter would seem to deserve and need it most. In April next the people of Concord and neighboring towns intend to unite in celebrating the fight at the old North Bridge, where “ once the embattled farmers stood, And fired the shot heard round the world ! ” A bronze statue of a minute-man, of life size, is to be dedi¬ cated with appropriate ceremonies ; and the Committee of Arrangements have prepared a programme, including an ora¬ tion by George William Curtis, poems by Emerson, Long¬ fellow, and Lowell, and a monster procession. The President and his Cabinet, the Governor, Council, and Legislature, the Corporation and Faculty of Harvard College, and the Govern¬ ors of the New England States have been or are to 1 >vited, 28 &c. (Boston “ Daily Advertiser,” Jan. 7, 1875.) Why was it, according to those immortal lines, that the Concord farmers fired their shot a hundred years ago, except that the world might hear that taxation without representation was tyranny ? Was it merely in order that so much powder, and so many cannon and guns stored in Concord, might be saved from de¬ struction that Paul Revere was induced to take his midnight ride ? Was it not rather and solely because these same stores were intended to be used in the fight against taxation without representation, and to show to the mother country that the men of Massachusetts were too high-born to be propertied ? Perhaps Mr. Curtis may take, as the subject for his oration, the clause in our Declaration of Rights that a constant adherence to the principle of justice is absolutely necessary to preserve the advantages of liberty, and to maintain a free government (art. 18); and then proceed to show, from the Report of 1871, in how very just a way the men of Concord, Lexington, and Acton have been able to save their money and their principles. He can prove beyond all doubt that they have saved enough to pay for the statue, as they save about $7,000 a year (Rep. 1871). Is it probable that Mr. Emerson, in his poem, will call to mind the fact that he and other Concord men of property and influence have been spared every year about one-fifth of their taxes, owing solely to the fact that the women of Con¬ cord are treated in the very same way “ that made those heroes dare To die, or leave their children free ” ? We are inclined to think neither of them will make any such allusions. It might cause confusion on the faces of the Com¬ mittee of Arrangements. Nevertheless, we will venture to ask Mr. Emerson to recite on that occasion William Ailing- ham’s poem, “ The Touchstone,” as he did years since in Boston, and as only he can recite it; and then let him try to explain to his audience, if he can, why it is that woman suf¬ frage is not now, as anti-slavery used to be, the touchstone to test “ all things in the land By its unerring spell.” 29 Would it not be a far more fitting celebration of the Concord fight for us to shape our lives to-day according to the noble principles of our fathers, rather than to call attention to our degeneracy by erecting a monument in honor of their nobility ? But, if we must have a statue, let it be of brass, and on the stone-base let us have some appropriate bass-reliefs. One may illustrate the sale of Abby Smith’s cows, and the reverse the quite likely taking to jail of Abby Foster, each for the non-payment of taxes. One might show Josiah Quincy, Jr., denouncing to the citizens of Boston, from the gallery of Old South Church, the taxation of men without representation as tyranny; and the reverse might appropriately enough show their townsman, Judge Hoar, and his associates, declaring that to tax a woman who is disfranchised is in accordance with an express authority conferred by our Constitution! Considering the great disproportion between the wages paid to women and those paid to men for equally good services, and taking into account the opportunities afforded them, it seems to me that the women of Massachusetts do their full share in producing the wealth of the State. According to the census of 1870, the total product of the manufactures of the State was $553,912,568. (Census 1870, Industry and Wealth, p. 528.) The tables there given embrace 142 branches of in¬ dustry. In three of them the sex of the operatives is not stated, and the “youth” employed in all of them are not classified. Only women aged 15 and over, and men aged 16 and over are enumerated. There are eight branches, each producing over ten millions of dollars, the products of which amount to $276,257,604; and women are engaged in all, the whole number of women being 52,724, and the whole number of men 79,285. More than twice as many women as men are engaged in the manufacture of men’s clothing, and nearly double as many women as men are occupied in the manufact¬ ure of cotton goods ; and cotton manufactures stand second on the list in point of value to the State of the articles pro¬ duced. Over ten thousand women are engaged in the manu¬ facture of boots and shoes, and over seven thousand in making woollen goods. Eleven women are even engaged in some part of the work of currying leather. Out of 66 branches, each pro¬ ducing over one and less than ten millions of dollars, women are engaged in 52. Out of 65 branches, each producing less than one million of dollars, women are engaged in 43 ; the total production in 139 branches of industry being $494,- 881,855, and the producers being 153,945 men and 84,672 women. If the women of the State, in point of fact, do so much towards creating the wealth of the State; if, in point of fact, they own about one-tenth 1 of the property of the State ; if the law recognizes their ability to earn, hold, and convey property ; and if these women are numerous and scattered enough to be able to give a very important and useful aid, even now, in the proper government of the State, — as a mere question of ex¬ pediency, why should not the right of suffrage be granted to them, especially if by so doing we men escape the great scandal of selling our principles for money ? Surely, if we give them the right to acquire property, we ought also to give them the same rights to protect their property that we our¬ selves enjoy and deem essential. Who of us would consider his property safe without the right of suffrage ? What would we give for the security of our personal rights, if we wore deprived of the ballot? If, in our judgment, the rights of negro men could only be secured to them by giving them suffrage, although they were most eminently unqualified for the judicious exercise of the right; if we instinctively feel that without suffrage our own rights could hardly fail to be in¬ vaded, — with what face can we assert that the women of the State have any sufficient security for their personal or prop¬ erty rights, so long as they are deprived of suffrage ? Does any one object that suffrage is a manly right, and conferred only on those who are able to fight? We deny the fact altogether. 1 So long as the Statute of Distributions divides the property of every per¬ son who dies intestate equally among his children, daughters and sons alike, and the females, as they always have been, shall continue to be more numerous than the males, it would seem to be clear that this fraction is altogether too 3i On the contrary, the very men who are best able to fight are not allowed to vote. In 1870, there were 298,767 males in the State between 18 and 45. (Census, Population, &c., p. 619.) This represents the fighting power of the State. Deducting from this number those who were over 18 and under 21, or 41,317, 1 leaves 257,450 as the number of males over 21 and under 45. This number (257,450), therefore, includes all voters who are supposed to be able to fight, or who are liable to be even enrolled for military duty. (Gen. Stat. c. 13, § 1.) The whole number of male citizens in the State being 312,770 (Census, &c., p. 619), it follows that 55,320 of the voters, or over one-sixth, are altogether exempt from military duty. The 41,317 young men, though physically peculiarly fitted for military duty, are not allowed to vote, because they are minors. Of the 257,450, only those who are “able-bodied” are liable even to be enrolled. (Gen. Stat. c. 13, § 1.) Those who are enrolled are “ subject to no active duty, except in case of war, invasion, the prevention of invasion, the suppression of riots, and to aid civil officers in the execu¬ tion of the laws ; ” and the active militia is not intended to exceed 5,000 officers and men. 2 (Ib. § 4, 14.) So that, so far from the right of suffrage being based upon the supposed power of voters to fight, one-sixth of those who have the right to vote are not supposed to be able to fight at all; and of the five-sixths only about are reckoned as active militia, and those of the who are able-bodied are only liable to be called out in a remote contingency. But even if it were true, as it is not, that some sort of military service ought to be considered as due from voters generally, why cannot women buy substitutes, as they were allowed to do in the Rebellion, 1 Number of males between 18 and 45.298,767 Deduct males over 18 and under 21 by last State Census (p. 3); i. e. g of those between 15 and 20.22,112 ,, » 20 and 30.19,205 - 4I>317 leaves as over 21 and under 45 liable to do military duty (approx.) 257,450 2 The active militia now numbers 436 officeis and 6,054 enlisted men; the enrolled militia, 212,147. 3 2 or pay an equivalent, or be exempted like Quakers or minis¬ ters, or act as nurses, or be employed in the manufacture or repair of clothing ? Or why, if (as the last census proves), in time of peace, nearly as many women as men can be em¬ ployed in the manufacture of ammunition cartridges (Census, Industry, &c., p. 394), or one-third as many in making tents; if, in time of peace, women may be blacksmiths or butchers, or engage in the manufacture of cutlery, edge-tools, and axes, or in the manufacture of gunpowder, fire-arms, percussion caps, &c., — why, in the name of common sense, cannot their labor be utilized in the same or some similar way in time of war ? In every town of the Commonwealth a tax is levied for the support of highways. Down to 1871, this tax might be paid “ in labor and materials ” or in “ money,” as the town determined (Gen. Stat. c. 44, § 3 and 4; Stat. 1871, c. 298); but, without a special vote that the tax should be paid in money, whoever was assessed a highway tax, woman or man, was obliged to work it out. And if women can work out a highway tax, with horse and cart or spade and pickaxe, why cannot she work for the government in time of war ? And, if she can do one kind of work by deputy, why not the other ? It is not, however, true that the right of suffrage for men is based in the slightest degree upon their supposed ability to fight. At the same time, I admit and rejoice in the fact that one of the greatest blessings we expect to flow from woman suffrage will be the cultivation of the arts of peace rather than war. But aside from and beyond all the considerations that have hitherto been urged against the direct taxation of women, we deny the right thus to tax them. By the Constitution (part 2, ch. 1, art. 4) the General Court has, it is true, power to impose and levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes upon all the inhab¬ itants of and persons resident and estates lying within the said Commonwealth; ” but the Bill of Rights (art. 23) de¬ clares that “ no subsidy, charge, tax, impost, or duties ought to be established, fixed, laid, or levied under any pretext what- 33 soever, without the consent of the people or their representa¬ tives in the Legislature.” Miss Sarah E. Wall, duly qualified to vote in every respect, except sex, was taxed in Worcester, and refused to pay her tax. No report is given of any argument in the Supreme Court on either side. She appeared for herself, and W. A. Williams for the collector. The whole opinion of the Court is contained in these two short paragraphs : — “ By the Constitution of Mass. ch. i, sec. i, art. 4, the Legis¬ lature have power to impose taxes upon all the inhabitants of and persons resident and estates lying within the said Com¬ monwealth. By the laws passed by the Legislature in pur¬ suance of this power and authority, the defendant is liable to taxation, although she is not qualified to vote for the officers by whom the taxes were assessed. “ The Court, acting under the Constitution, and bound to support it and maintain its provisions faithfully, cannot declare null and void a statute which has been passed by the Legis¬ lature in pursuance of an express authority conferred by the Constitution.” (Wheeler v. Wall, 6 Allen Rep. 558.) In other words, our Supreme Court 1 holds that the taxa¬ tion of women without representation is in accordance with an express authority conferred by our Constitution. Strangely enough, the Court does not allude to the Declara¬ tion of Rights. But is it not clear that both the clauses in the Constitution which bear on the question of taxation should be considered together ? I respectfully submit that the Legislat¬ ure has not unlimited power to tax all inhabitants and per¬ sons resident in the Commonwealth. It only has the right to tax them so far as such taxation is consistent with the Decla¬ ration of Rights, and no farther. It has no right, “ under any pretext whatsoever,” to go beyond the limit marked out by the Declaration of Rights ; and, if it does go beyond this point, it becomes the duty of the Court to pronounce the statute null and void. The Legislature is as much bound to respect the Declaration of Rights as any other part of our Constitution. 1 No one of the judges who made this decision is now on the bench. S 34 And, to use the grand words of Chief Justice Parker (2 Pick. 557), “neither will any course of years or legislative acts or judicial decisions sanction any apparent violation of the funda¬ mental law clearly expressed or necessarily understood.” Taking, therefore, the clause in the Constitution which confers the power to levy taxes, in connection with the clause which limits the power to tax, and construing them together as they should be, so that each of them may have its due force and operation, the Legislature has the power to tax those in¬ habitants or persons resident here who consent to such taxa¬ tion, either personally or through their representatives; and we deny the constitutional right to tax anybody else. The supposed intention of the framers of a written instru¬ ment has, and, properly enough, ought to have, very little weight with us in determining its meaning. Such meaning is to be sought in the words used, and not in outside evidence. Still, I confess, at the outset, it does seem to me a most un¬ likely thing that the men of Massachusetts who were then in the middle of a hot fight, undertaken in defence of the princi¬ ple that taxation without representation was tyranny, would wholly overlook the principle when undertaking to define the rights which they deemed most essential to their own security. And yet they must have, made this strange omission, if it be true, as the Court says, that women born and brought up on Massachusetts soil, and qualified to vote in all other respects, as Miss Wall was, can be disfranchised, and at the same time be constitutionally taxed. All women born on Massachusetts soil are Massachusetts citizens, and bound to bear true faith and allegiance to the Commonwealth ; and the latter is bound to protect them in the enjoyment of their rights to life, liberty, and property, just as fully as male citizens are protected. In Lynch v. Clarke (1 Sandford Ch. 584-639, as quoted 2 Kent Comm., p. 1, note), it was held, “ that the complainant, who was born in New York of alien parents during their temporary sojourn there, and returned while an infant, being the first year of her birth, with her parents to their native country, and always 35 resided there afterwards, was a citizen of the United States by birth. This was the principle of the English common law in respect to all persons born within the King’s allegiance, and was the law of the Colonies, and became the law of each and all of the States when the Declaration of Independence was made, and continued so until the establishment of the Constitution of the United States, when the whole exclusive jurisdiction of this subject of citizenship passed to the United States, and the same principle has there remained.” When our Constitution declares (part I, art. 29) that it is the right of every citizen to be tried by judges as free, impartial, and independent as the lot of humanity will admit, can there be the slightest doubt that women are to be considered as citi¬ zens, and entitled to claim the rights secured by this article just as much as men ? When the Third Amendment declares that “ every male citizen,” &c., who has paid a tax, &c., shall have the right to vote, &c., is it not quite as clear that females may be citizens as that they are debarred the right to vote ? If only men can be citizens, it is the height of absurdity to use the expression “ male citizens.” (See also, to the same purport, Const. U. S., art. 2, sec. 1; 14th Amend, ib. sec. 1.) All the women in Massachusetts who are thus taxed every year are, therefore, either citizens by birth, or they may be¬ come citizens by naturalization. Can, then, citizens be taxed without their consent ? Under the Constitution, “ no tax, &c., ought to be levied, &c., under any pretext whatsoever, without the consent of the people or their representatives in the Legislature.” This consent may be, and, as we shall see, has been, in several instances, indi¬ vidually given by the person who is taxed ; but, for the mass of the people, such consent can only be given in the way pointed out by the law for the mass of the people to use, — that is, by voting. So long as a citizen can vote in open town¬ meeting for or against his own taxation ; so long as a citizen of any city can vote for members of the city government to whom he has, under the law, intrusted the power to levy taxes on his estate; and so long as a citizen can vote for 36 Governor, Senators, and Representatives, to whom, under the Constitution, he has intrusted the power to lay State taxes, — he has no reasonable ground of complaint. Nor can he ob¬ ject to being taxed by either of these bodies, if, thus possessing the power by his vote to assent or dissent, he refrains from exercising the right. 1 In all cases, therefore, where a citizen has the right to vote, no matter whether he exercises the right or not, he virtually consents to all the State, county, city, and town taxes which may be levied upon him or his estate. When the Constitution declares that no tax can be levied without the consent of the people, it is to be understood as referring to the people who are thus taxed, and nobody else. It was of no sort of consequence to our fathers that the people of England consented to tax America. And when our Con¬ stitution says that no tax ought to be laid without consent of the representatives of the people, it is to be understood as referring to the representatives of the people who are taxed, and nobody else, — that is, those representatives whom the people who are to be taxed have the right to vote for or against, and which representatives, in this way, become authorized to consent to such taxation. But the Constitution is to be construed in a reasonable manner. The consent of every one who may be taxed cannot possibly be obtained. A citizen may become insane, and, therefore, incapable of contracting. His consent to being taxed would be worth nothing, even if it could be obtained; and he surely ought not to be allowed to vote. Therefore, although the Constitution requires the consent of every citizen to his taxation before he can be legally taxed, it must be understood to refer only to those who are recognized by the law as capa¬ ble of giving such consent, or those who are deemed capable of contracting, of earning, holding, and conveying the prop¬ erty which is to be taxed. The Constitution does not, there¬ fore, require the consent of minors to their taxation, because, being under the age of consent, they may avoid any contract 1 There were 57,356 legal voters in Boston at the last election; 29,596 of them voted, and 27,760 staid away from the polls. 37 they may make (except for actual necessaries) when they come of age, no matter how fair and honest the contract may have been. Nor does it require the consent of persons under guardianship, — as insane or spendthrifts, — for they have no greater power to contract than minors possess. But it does require the consent of every other citizen in the way above stated, before he or she may be lawfully taxed, 1 except only paupers and convicts. A citizen who is a pauper has nothing to be taxed for, and is not allowed to vote. A citizen who be¬ comes convict, as part of his punishment is deprived of the right of suffrage. An alien who resides here knows that his property is liable to be taxed. Having no natural right to remain here, if he continues to remain, by such act he con¬ sents to be taxed, within the meaning of the Constitution. This disposes of all the inhabitants or residents who can possibly be taxed under our laws, except only male and female citizens of full age, none of whom are paupers, convict, in¬ sane, or spendthrifts, and all of whom have equal right to contract, to acquire, buy, and sell the property which is to be taxed, or, in other words, precisely the same qualifications for voting, except merely sex; and the larger number of these citizens are women. Everybody else in the State, of full age, who can be taxed, either consents to such taxation, or, being legally incapable of contracting, cannot consent, or is excluded from suffrage on grounds entirely disconnected with sex ; that is, for want of property, or for ignorance, insufficient residence, or as a punishment for crime, &c. Here, then, are two classes of citizens, each possessing equal qualifications for voting ; and the right of suffrage is confined to males, but both males and females are taxed. Can any such female citizen who is thus denied the right to vote be constitutionally taxed ? In the opinion of the Judges of our Supreme Court, the 1 It does not seem necessary to specially consider the cases of those citi¬ zens who are disqualified from voting in consequence of insufficient length of residence in the town where they live, or those who cannot read the Constitu¬ tion under which they are to vote. 38 taxation of a male citizen must go hand-in-hand with his right to representation; and, if he is denied the right to vote, he cannot constitutionally be taxed. For many years prior to the adoption of the Constitution, a practice had existed of levying taxes on unincorporated plan¬ tations. Our Judges gave their opinion that article 23 of the Declaration of Rights “ would exempt from the power of taxation by the General Court all unincorporated planta¬ tions, unless some further constitutional provision ” had been made. “ It was, therefore, thought necessary (say they) either to provide some representation in the Legislature for the un¬ incorporated plantations on whom public taxes had been or were to be levied, or to abandon the usage of taxing them. To give them representatives in the House would be incon¬ venient, if practicable. But to admit them to a representation in the Senate was a provision easy to make, and the right to tax them would remain. On this ground a paragraph was introduced extending to two classes of unincorporated planta¬ tions. (Const, chap. 1, sec. 2, art. 2, par. 3.) One class com¬ prehends the plantations who were assessed to the support of government by the assessors of adjoining towns. The inhab¬ itants of these plantations, having the necessary qualifications of age and estate, were authorized to meet and vote for Senators with the inhabitants of the towns by whose assessors they were assessed. The other class comprehends the plan* tations who were empowered to assess themselves. The in¬ habitants of these plantations, duly qualified as to age and estate, were authorized to meet and vote for Senators within their plantations ; and for the purpose of receiving, counting, declaring, and returning the votes, their assessors were sub¬ stituted in the places both of the selectmen and clerks of towns. “ No provision was necessary for plantations on whose in¬ habitants public taxes were not levied.” (Letter of the Judges to the Governor, Jan. 3, 1807, 3 Mass. Rep. 569, 570.) In other words, our Supreme Court Judges, Parsons, Sewall, 39 Thacher, and Parker, declared their opinion to be that it was contrary to the Declaration of Rights to tax inhabitants who resided on incorporated plantations, unless they had, at least, the right to vote for Senators ; and that, if the Constitution had failed to provide any representation in the Legislature for the people residing on such plantations, it would have been necessary “ to abandon the usage of taxing them.” In like manner, it has been customary for many years in the general laws to authorize assessors to exempt from tax¬ ation, either wholly or in part, those persons who, by reason of age, infirmity, or poverty, may, in their judgment, be unable to contribute towards the public charges. In 1832 a question arose whether persons who had been thus exempted for two years, but who nevertheless " have the requisite qualifications as to age and residence, are entitled to vote for Governor, &c., under the third article of the amend¬ ments to the Constitution.” The Judges, in their reply to the Senate, said : “ We are of opinion that, when such exemption has extended to two years, they are not. We think it was the plain intent of this clause of the amendment of the Constitution to give practical force and effect to the maxim that taxation and representation should go together, and to secure the right of electing those who are to administer the government to those who, in fact, contribute to its support. It confines the power, therefore, in terms to those who shall have paid some tax assessed within a short period preceding the election, and, for the sake of exactness, fixes that period to two years. . . . “We think the exemption in question was intended as a benefit to those who, by reason of age, &c., are unable to con¬ tribute, and one which, if they so elect, they may waive; and in such case it would not be in the power of the assessors to omit them in the assessment or abate their taxes against their consent, with a view to affect their legal franchise.” (11 Pick. 542, 543.) In other words, in the opinion of Judges Shaw, Putnam, and Wilde, the third amendment was plainly intended to give 40 power and effect to the maxim that taxation and representa¬ tion should go together, and to secure to those who contribute to the support of government, that is, to tax-payers, the right to elect those who are to administer the government, that is, those who are to expend the sums raised by taxation. But do not women tax-payers fall within the same principle ? Do they not contribute hundreds of thousands of dollars every year to the support of the government ? Ought they not therefore to have some voice in determining who shall admin¬ ister the government ? And, if the Constitution denies them the latter right, must it not also have relieved them from the burden of paying taxes ? It is perfectly plain, therefore, under these opinions, that the only ground upon which we are able constitutionally to tax a male citizen is that he has the right to vote, and having such right, whether he exercises it or not, he consents to be taxed. But if we cannot tax a male citizen, under any pretext whatsoever, without his consent, or unless he has the right to vote, where do we find the right to tax a female citizen with ¬ out her consent, or unless she also has the right to vote ? If, according to these, opinions of our judges, we have not the slightest vestige of a right to tax one of the minority of the citizens of the Commonwealth without his consent, how can we have any greater right to tax one of the majority of such citizens without her consent ? The Constitution disfranchises women. By depriving them of the right to vote, we deprive them of the right to assent to being taxed. Have we not, therefore, deprived ourselves of the right to tax them ? The Constitution does not say male citizens shall not be taxed without their consent ; but no inhabitant, that is, no person, male or female, can be taxed without his or her consent, or the consent of his or her representatives in the way pointed out. If our Declaration of Rights means any thing, it must mean that taxation and representation for adult citizens capa¬ ble of contracting, whether male or female, ought never to be separated under any pretext whatsoever. If, under our Con¬ stitution, a minority of the citizens can deprive the majority 4i of the right of representation, and still retain the right to tax them, then our fathers fought to save their pockets, and not their principles. If we male citizens of Massachusetts can rightfully do this, then the Declaration of Independence and our Bill of Rights are a mere tissue of glittering generalities, and wholly incapable of any practical resistance to oppres¬ sion. That the right to tax male citizens is based entirely on their right to vote, is also clear from the fact that, whenever we have deprived them of the right to vote in the place where they reside, we have also relieved them from taxation in such place. In 1798 we authorized the United States to buy the Arse¬ nal grounds at Springfield, we retaining only “ a concurrent jurisdiction with the United States, &c., so far as that all State civil and criminal processes as may issue under the authority of this Commonwealth against any person or per¬ sons charged with crimes committed without the said tract of land, may be executed therein in the same way and man¬ ner as though this cession and consent had not been made and granted.” (Stat. 1798, c. 13.) In 1800 we authorized the United States to buy lands for the Navy Yard at Charles¬ town, reserving only the same concurrent jurisdiction, de¬ signed to prevent the place from becoming an asylum for criminals and debtors. (Stat. 1800, c. 26.) Other similar statutes containing the same reservation have been passed. (Stat. 1849, c - 45 > Stat. 1856, c. 100; Stat. 1868, c. 292, 293 ; Stat. 1869, c. 458.) The legal effect of these grants has been before the Court several times (8 Mass. Rep. 76; 17 Pick. Rep. 302); and finally the judges declared their opinion to be, that persons residing on such lands do not thereby acquire any elective franchise as inhabitants of the towns in which such territory is situated, and cannot be assessed for their polls and estates to State, county, and town taxes in such towns. (1 Met. Rep. 583.) In the opinion of Judges Shaw, Putnam, Wilde, and Dewey, therefore, any law which deprives a class of male citizens of 6 42 the right to vote where they practically reside, necessarily relieves them from taxation; or, in other words, a male citizen having the usual qualifications cannot be taxed unless he is allowed to vote. • It may possibly be urged that these lands, being owned by the United States, are subject to their exclusive jurisdiction, and that therefore there is no more reason why we should allow people living there to vote, or continue to tax them, than if they lived in New Hampshire ; and the judges, in their opinion, say that such residence “ for any length of time will not give such persons or their children a legal inhab¬ itancy in such towns,” so as to entitle them to support as paupers, (i Met. Rep. 583 ; 8 Mass. Rep. 76.) But this objection is without weight. In no case have we parted with our whole jurisdiction over these lands. In no case has the United States acquired exclusive jurisdiction. In the great majority of the cessions that have been made, the State has reserved an equal and concurrent jurisdiction for its process with that of the United States; and even in the restricted form followed in reference to the grounds at Springfield and Charlestown, the State reserves some juris¬ diction, and it is not in the power of the United States to withdraw its consent to such joint jurisdiction. If it does, the grants become void, and the State becomes reinvested with its former complete sovereignty. Whereas our State process has no power whatever in New Hampshire, without the consent of the latter State, and such consent may be withdrawn at any moment. In point of fact, men living in the Navy Yard who yet claim Boston as their home, and who do not seek to avail themselves of the exemption afforded by the act of cession, but on the contrary consent to be taxed, are recognized as citizens of Boston, and allowed to vote. And although persons domiciled in the Navy Yard do not acquire a settlement so as to be entitled to be supported as paupers, it is nevertheless true that they are considered as legally inhabitants of the State ; and, if they die in the yard, their estates are settled in the State Probate Court, just like 43 other “ inhabitants of or residents in the county.” 1 (Gen. Stat., c. 117, § 2.) There was, also, another class of native-born inhabitants who were deprived of the right to vote. I allude to the Indian population of the State. John M. Earle was appointed Commissioner (Stat. 1859, c. 266) to examine into and report upon the condition of the Indians. He made his report to Governor Andrew in 1861. (Senate Document 96.) From this it appears that the Chappe- quiddick, Christiantown, Gay Head, Marshpee, Herring Pond, Natick, Punkapog, Fall River, Hassanamisco, and Dudley Indians (called by him Plantation Tribes, because they con¬ stituted distinct communities, who then, or at some previous time, had either funds or reservations for their support) num¬ bered 1,241 persons. Besides these Plantation Tribes, he found 322 persons descended from the Yarmouth, Dartmouth, Mamattakeeset, Tumpum, Deep Bottom, and Middleborough Indians, and other tribes scattered through the State, most of them living in or near the places where their ancestors lived, but some of them being found by him in Boston, Lynn, Salem, Worcester, Barre, Greenfield, Springfield, and other places. Only two families of Natick Indians were found (Rep., p. 71); and Mr. Earle saw no sufficient reason for continuing the guardianship. Though the Punkapog Tribe formerly owned 5,000 acres in Norfolk County, none of this property then re¬ mained in their possession ; and he saw no good reason why the rights and privileges of citizenship, which had generally been conceded to them in the places where they resided, should not receive a legal recognition. Twenty families of Hassanamisco or Grafton Indians were found, only one of them remaining on the heritage of their fathers, and that family retained less than three acres out of their former do¬ main ; but he saw no good reason why the right of citizen¬ ship should not at once be granted to them all. 1 Hon. William A. Richardson, whose jurisdiction, as Judge of Probate, for¬ merly extended over Charlestown, writes to me (Feb. 5, 1875), “ I have no doubt that the Probate Records at Cambridge contain numerous cases of giants of administration, &c., in precisely such cases.” 44 Accordingly, on his advice, the “ Act concerning the Indians of the Commonwealth” (Stat. 1862. c. 184) was passed. Section 1 reads thus: “ All Indians and descendants of In¬ dians are hereby placed on the same legal footing as the other inhabitants of the Commonwealth, except such as are or have been supported in whole or in part by the State, and except also those residing on the Indian Plantations of the Chappe- quiddick, Christiantown, Gay Head, Marshpee, Herring Pond, Fall River, and Dudley Tribes, or those whose homes are on some one of said Plantations, and who are only temporarily absent therefrom.” This section enfranchises the Natick, Punkapog,and Grafton Indians, and those not classed by Mr. Earle among the Planta¬ tion Tribes, except paupers. The law goes on to point out a way in which other Indians may become citizens, “ and, upon paying a poll-tax,” become, to all intents and purposes, citizens of the State, not thence¬ forward to return to the legal condition of an Indian. Seven years later the “ Act to enfranchise the Indians of the Commonwealth (Stat. 1869, c. 463) was passed. Section 1 provides that “ all Indians and people of color heretofore known and called Indians within this Commonwealth are hereby made and declared to be citizens of the Commonwealth, and entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities, and subject to all the duties and liabilities, to which citizens of this Common¬ wealth are entitled or subject.” From 1780 (and, indeed, before) down to the passage of these laws, Indians, though native-born inhabitants of the State, have thus been denied the right of suffrage, and have accordingly been exempted from taxation. (Stat. 1821, c. 107, § 6 ; Rev. Stat. (1836), c. 7, § 5 ; Gen. Stat. (i860), c. 11, § 5.) The right to vote had not been withheld from them as a class because they were under guardianship. Many of them had never been under any form or kind of guardianship, either they or their ancestors ; but they had lived just where and how they pleased, like other men and women. Still ndne of these native-born men were allowed to vote ; and solely be- 45 cause of this denial of suffrage, and for no other reason which can possibly be assigned, they were relieved from taxation. As they could not consent to be taxed either by voting in person or by representatives to be voted for, it was contrary to our Declaration of Rights to tax them ; and they never have been taxed so long as the right of suffrage has been with¬ held from them. In many places, however, they have been allowed to vote before being legally enfranchised ; but in every such case tax¬ ation and representation have gone hand in hand together. If they, in individual cases, consented to be taxed, they were allowed to vote ; if they refused to be taxed, they were denied the right of suffrage. Mr. Earle enumerates 180 male Indians, who, like their ancestors, had never been under guardianship, who were scattered through 31 different places in the State, and who were allowed to vote on precisely the same terms as other male citizens. The Deep Bottom Indians, so called, seem to have been the only ones who, never having been under guard¬ ianship, did not enjoy the right of suffrage. Of them, he found four families living in a deep valley about six miles west of Edgartown, where their ancestors had lived at the first settle¬ ment of the island by the whites. Why they, also, did not vote, he does not inform us. He merely says, “ They are not con¬ sidered as entitled to the rights of citizenship.” (Rep., p. 116.) He even found some Indians belonging to tribes that had always been under guardianship, who had acquired the right to vote by consenting to be taxed. The Chappequiddick Indians occupy the northerly portion of the island of that name, lying on the easterly side of Martha’s Vineyard, and not more than an eighth of a mile from Edgartown. These Indians could neither sue nor be sued, nor make any contract without the consent of their guardian. They could not even receive wages for a voyage, if payment was forbidden by their guardians, &c. ; and yet to two families of this tribe who lived in Edgartown, though legally subject to these disqualifications, the rights of citizenship were conceded (Rep. 19, 20), because 46 they owned property in Edgartown for which they consented to be taxed. The Punkapogs were also under guardianship. Mr. Earle found that those of the tribe (about one-quarter of the whole number) who resided in Canton were not taxed, and did not vote ; but the rest of the tribe, who resided in other towns, so far as was known, stood on the same footing as other people, no reference being had to their Indian descent. (Rep., p. 73.) The Hassanamisco or Grafton Indians were also under guardianship ; and yet, nevertheless, Mr. Earle found that about one-half of them were treated as citizens in the towns where they resided. The Dudley Indians, a remnant of the Nipmugs, who were visited by the Apostle Eliot in 1663, were also under guardian¬ ship ; but the greater portion of these Indians, scattered through various towns, had acquired and exercised the rights of citizens in the places where they resided. (Rep., p. 103- 106.) “ Indians not taxed ” are excluded from the numbers which serve as the basis for equalizing the power and burdens of the different States in the Union, solely on the ground that taxation and representation should go together. Although Indians are recognized by the United States Constitution as free persons, those who are not taxed are, nevertheless, ex¬ cluded from the enumeration which forms the basis of repre¬ sentation in Congress. It is manifestly unjust that the taxes of a State should be increased in consequence of the existence of a class of free persons within its borders who are not taxed. It is equally unjust to the other States to allow one of them to count a class of persons whom it excludes from suffrage in order to increase the number of its representatives, and thereby its political power. Although, therefore, our Constitution gives the Legislature, in express terms, the power to tax all inhabitants or residents, there have been two classes of inhabitants who could not be taxed without infringing on the Declaration of Rights. We have no right to tax those who reside on lands ceded to the 47 United States, as before quoted, and Indians, prior to the passage of the laws for their enfranchisement. The State has seen fit to deprive these two classes of citizens of the right to vote; and, solely because of this denial of the right to vote, it has been held to be unlawful to tax them. But if it be thus contrary to our Constitution to continue to tax male citizens after depriving them of the right to vote, and if it be thus illegal solely because they are thus disfran¬ chised, by what authority do we deprive female citizens of the right to vote, and still continue to tax them ? The Declara¬ tion of Rights applies to women as well as to men. It was expressly framed to protect all citizens, men and women, from unjust taxation. If we cannot constitutionally continue to tax male citizens after depriving them of the right to vote, where do we find the authority to tax female citizens from whom we withhold the ballot ? We must find the right in the Constitution, if anywhere. But no right to make any such distinction can be found anywhere in the Constitution. It rests altogether on usage and custom. Women have always been disfranchised, and constantly taxed ; but, not¬ withstanding the constant repetition of the wrong every year for nearly a century, it is a plain infringement on our Decla¬ ration of Rights. Doubtless some one will say, this is all very well; but our Supreme Judicial Court has decided that Miss Wall was liable to be taxed. But all the Judges who made that decision have left the bench ; and whether another Court, differently consti¬ tuted, will make the same decision, remains to be seen. King Charles levied his ship-money on the inland towns of England, in accordance with the written opinion of twelve judges in favor of his right, which opinion is now on file in Westminster Hall. The judges, acting under the directions of Lord Keeper Coventry, charged the grand juries on the different circuits that the King was clearly in the right. But, nevertheless, John Hampden, though rated only 31^. 6 d., resisted the tax. He contended that it was arbitrary and illegal, because it was laid without the consent of Parliament. When his case 48 came before the judges, naturally enough, only four of them were found willing to decide in his favor; and it was accord¬ ingly as clearly held by the judges in England to be constitu¬ tional for the King, by his mere prerogative, to levy that tax, as it has been held by our judges to be constitutional for Worcester to tax Miss Wall. But who now doubts the illegality of King Charles’s act ? In like manner, I have the most undoubting confidence that some time or other we shall all say, in the words already quoted from Chief Justice Parker, neither any course of years, or legislative acts or judicial decisions will sanction any apparent violation of the fundamental law, clearly expressed or necessarily understood ; and that, if our Decla¬ ration of Rights means any thing, it means that no citizens, male or female (more especially the latter, as being the major¬ ity), can be lawfully taxed, under any pretext whatever, after we have deprived them of the right to vote personally, in town meeting, for or against taxation, or the right to vote for representatives who can, in their behalf, oppose or favor such tax in city government or in the Legislature. It will hardly be expected by any one, that I should find in the legislation of the State, any plain admission that the ex¬ isting taxation of women was contrary to our Constitution; and yet such an admission seems to have been made. The Constitution makes no distinction of sex in reference to taxation. A woman who is worth $20,000 is, under its provi¬ sions, to be treated neither better nor worse, but just the same as a man worth $20,000. Under our Statutes, $1,000 worth of her household furniture and her wearing apparel are exempted from taxation, just as if she were a man. (Gen. Stat. c. 11, § 5, art. 6.) If she should happen to be a farmer or a mechanic, her farming utensils, and the tools necessary for carrying on her business, will be exempted just the same. (Ib.) $2,000 of the income derived from her profession, trade, or employ¬ ment will be exempted just the same as it is for a man. (Gen. Stat. ib. § 4; Stat. 1873, c. 354.) And if, by reason of age, infirmity, and poverty, she cannot, in the judgment of the assessors, contribute fully towards the public charges, she 49 may be exempted, either wholly or in part, just the same as a man, in like circumstances, may be exempted. So that neither our Constitution, nor these general laws in reference to tax¬ ation, make any distinction of sex, — men and women are and ought to be treated alike. Why should they be treated dif¬ ferently by the Statutes, if their rights under the Constitution are equally protected ? No reason can possibly be assigned why the property of a woman should be treated by statute any differently from that of a man, so long as the constitu¬ tional rights of neither are invaded. If any difference is, therefore, made in the Statutes, and one sex is protected more than the other, the inference is unavoidable that some consti¬ tutional right of that sex has been invaded. Now, the Legis¬ lature has admitted that women have been unjustly treated in reference to taxation. In 1853, the Legislature passed “an Act to exempt the personal property of widows and unmarried females from tax¬ ation in certain cases.” (Stat. 1853, c. 355.) In 1858, the law was repealed, and “an Act relating to the exemption of the property of widows and unmarried females from taxation” was passed. (Stat. 1858, c. 43.) This law is a little more favorable to women. This latter law was re¬ enacted in i860, but in clearer language. The General Stat¬ utes (c. 11, § 5, art. 10) exempts “the property to the amount of $500 of a widow or unmarried female, and of any female minor whose father is deceased, if her whole estate, real and personal, not otherwise exempted from taxation, does not ex¬ ceed in value the sum of $1,000.” Now, as the Constitution makes no distinction between the taxable character of property on the ground that in one case it is owned by an orphan boy, and in the other by an orphan girl, why should this law exempt one and tax the other ? So long as the Constitution provides for the taxation of the prop¬ erty of widows, on precisely the same terms as that of widow¬ ers, and taxes unmarried females no more or less, but just the same, as bachelors, why should this law exempt females and tax the males ? The property rights of men, minors and 7 50 adults, are deemed to be sufficiently guarded by the Consti¬ tution, and the general laws, already quoted, passed pursuant thereto. Down to 1853 the property rights of women, minors and adults, were protected by the same general laws as those by which the property rights of men were protected. If there be, therefore, any injustice in the treatment of women which called for the passage of these laws relieving them from tax¬ ation, it must grow out of the failure to secure to them theii rights under the Constitution. Have they the same security as men enjoy under the Constitution ? Have they the one great security which is pointed out by the Declaration of Rights, and which is secured to men ? Most assuredly not! The passage of these laws, therefore, amounts to a plain ad¬ mission, on the part of the Legislature, that the property rights of women tax-payers under our Constitution have been in¬ vaded ; and, if so, they have been invaded in the only way possible, i.e., by denying them the right of suffrage. The Legislature must have passed these laws solely because they felt that women, being deprived of the ballot, did not have the same power under the Constitution to protect their rights of property that men enjoyed ; and the Legislature was right. Women never can have equal power with men to protect their property or personal rights until they possess the right of suffrage. Does any one say, these laws have been dictated by a spirit of chivalry, and a desire to help women in their struggle for existence, and not from a feeling that they did not possess already all the rights our Constitution intended to give to every citizen ? But, if they had all the rights which the Constitution gives to men, women would no more need such paltry assist¬ ance as these exemption laws afford, than men now do. They would be found quite as capable as men in the struggle for existence, and would need no more exemption from taxation than what the general law would think proper to give to men and women alike. I am not, however, obliged to rely upon any mere inference that the constitutional rights of women have been invaded 5 1 The law now recognizes, in the clearest manner, the right of women to vote, as to one class of taxes, and exempts them now from all liability for such taxes, if the right of suffrage be denied them. The Constitution recognizes two classes of taxes. The Legislature is to impose taxes for the support of government, &c., and towns are to lay taxes to maintain public worship, to support a minister, and to maintain public schools, &c. (Const., parts I, 2.) In other words, our Constitution recognizes taxa¬ tion for both civil and ecclesiastical purposes. 1 Can these taxes be constitutionally levied upon different principles ? The Constitution does not say no tax for civil purposes shall 1 As to the amount of the yearly ecclesiastical taxes there are no reliable data. By the United States Census of 1870 (p 506), the church property in Massachusetts is valued at $24,488,286. The sittings being 882,317, this would make $27.75 represent the capital invested for each seat. The value of church property in this State exempt from taxation last year was $30,242,800. The lowest tax per annum for a single seat in the Catholic Church in my town, Brookline, is $5. It is about three times as much in the meeting-house of the 1st Parish. In the Episcopal churches, the contributions for missionary and church purposes amounted last year to $511,446.35, or an average of $40.88 for each communicant. (Church Almanac for 1875, P* 83.) Among the 282 Baptist churches they amounted to $876,960, being an average of $19 for each church-member. The 279 Methodist churches contributed for benevolent pur¬ poses alone $40,063 or an average of $1.32 for each of the full members and probationers. In 473 Congregational churches they contributed $394,110.60 (Congregational Quarterly, Jan. 1875, p. 135), or an average of $4.77 for each church-member, and an average of $5.63 for each church-member, not counting absentees. In thfe case of the Episcopal and Baptist churches, these sums apparently include the actual support of the churches from which the contributions were received. But the Congregational and Methodist churches not only supported their ministers, paid for the repair of their buildings and other church expenses, but also contributed more than $434,000 in one year for benevolent purposes. This does not include the very large contributions among the Catholics, Unita¬ rians, Universalists, &c., for I can find no returns on the subject. It seems to me, therefore, highly probable that the churches in the State tax each seat at least $5 a year for their own ecclesiastical purposes. This, though only ten cents a Sunday, would make $4,411,585 as the sum raised each year for ecclesiastical purposes. That the church-members are largely women is evident. There are 25,810 males and 56,669 females, members in the Con¬ gregational churches. (Quarterly Review, p. 135.) The other church returns which I have seen make no distinction of sex. 52 be laid without the consent of the people, &c., or that no tax for ecclesiastical purposes shall be laid without such consent It simply declares no tax whatever, for any purpose, shall be laid, under any pretext whatsoever, without such consent. Al¬ though it is apparent to every one that a broad distinction, in fact, exists between the objects for which taxes may be law¬ fully laid, and although the Constitution itself provides for both civil and ecclesiastical taxes, it nevertheless pays no heed whatever to any such distinction, when defining the grounds upon which all taxation, to be legal, must be based. It simply lays down the plain, just rule that no tax, for any purpose or under any pretext, can be legally laid without the consent of the people or their representatives. Anciently, only freemen were allowed to vote, and none but church-members could be admitted freemen. (1631, Colony Laws, p. 117.) So strict were they in those early days that if a church had been gathered without the approbation of three or more magistrates, or of the elders of the neighbor churches, even its members were declared unfit to vote. Those persons who refused to attend upon public worship as established by law were “ made uncapable of voting in all civil assemblies during their obstinate persisting in such wicked ways and courses,” and until a certificate was given of their reformation. (Ib. p. 107.) We ought not, therefore, to be surprised at the elders for giving their opinion to the General Court that “ any sin committed with an high hand, as the gathering of sticks on the Sabbath-day, may be punished with death, when a lesser punishment might serve for gathering sticks privily and in some need.” (1644, ib. p. 731.) Nor do we think it strange that, in enumerating the subjects for which towns may lay and assess taxes, we find it declared that taxes shall be laid (first) “ for the maintenance and support of the ministry ; ” and after this came the appropriations for “ schools, the poor, and for defraying of other necessary charges arising within said town.” (1692, ib. p. 249.) Our fathers placed the duty of supporting an able, pious, and Orthodox minister before all other town duties. Indeed, it was expressely made “ the duty 53 of the Christian magistrate to take care the people be fed with wholesome and sound doctrine/’ &c. (Ib. p. ioi.) So inti¬ mate was the union of Church and State in those old Puritan days, and so intimate will it again become as soon as we have adopted the Christian amendment to the Constitution of the United States ! Then the ancient rule, which required a deputy to the General Court to be sound in judgment con¬ cerning the main points of the Christian religion as they have been held forth and acknowledged by the generality of the Protestant Orthodox writers (1654, ib. p. 97), or something like it, will' be again adopted ; and the committee which now passes upon the credentials of members of the Legislature, and their civil qualifications, will also be required to say whether such members are evangelical or no ! Practically speaking, therefore, the town and parish were anciently one and the same body. The same men who bal¬ loted for Town Clerk, Selectmen, Constable, &c., and who voted taxes to support highways, schools, &c., also contracted with the minister, and voted taxes for his support, or to build a meeting-house or parsonage ; and it was just as much a legal duty imposed on towns, to support an able and faithful minis¬ ter of God’s holy word, as it was to pay their Clerk, Selectmen, or Schoolmaster, &c. The same Town Constable who was directed to carry his black staff in the execution of his office, that none might plead ignorance, and who was ordered “ to take notice of common coasters, unprofitable fowlers, and other idle persons, and tobacco takers,” and to arrest, without war¬ rant, Sabbath-breaking persons (1658, ib. p. 82), was also obliged to take notice of the tax-payers of the town, and to gather all the town rates committed to him by the Select¬ men. Under these laws, all women who had property were taxed just the same as men, though they had no right to vote. Very soon, however, religious differences began ; and “ a cursed sect of hereticks, lately risen up in the world, called Quakers” (1656, ib. p. 121), began to dispute the right of a town-meeting to tax them for the support of a hireling priest- 54 hood ; and they apparently devised various ways to elude such taxation. (Ib. p.373.) They could not conscientiously attend upon the public worship of God, as established by law, and were therefore deprived of the right to vote. (Ib. p. 107.) The contest lasted a long time; but, after some temporary legislation to the same purport, it was finally enacted (1757, ib. 783) that no Quakers or Anabaptists shall have their polls or estates, real or personal, taxed towards the settlement or support of such minister or ministers, nor for building or re¬ pairing any meeting-house or place of public worship.” In other words, as a Quaker was deprived of the right to vote in ecclesiastical matters, not merely by scruples of conscience, but by express law, it was deemed unjust that he should be compelled to pay such taxes. In like manner, Episcopalians complained of being taxed for the support of divine worship in the manner established by law, while they and their families attended worship elsewhere. Whereupon it was enacted (1742, ib. 537) that they and their estates “ shall be taxed to the support of the public worship of God with the other estates and inhabitants within the bounds of any town, &c., according to the laws of the Prov¬ ince;” but the Treasurer, as he receiveth any such tax, is directed to pay it to the minister of the church at which such tax-payer usually attends worship; and “ all such professed members of the Church of England shall be entirely excused from paying any taxes towards the settlement of any minister or building any meeting-house, . . . and utterly debarred from voting any ways concerning such ministers or meeting¬ houses.” Here, again, as every sincere member of the Church of England was deprived of the right to vote on the settlement of a minister, &c., not only by his scruples of conscience, but by express law, the same law declared it to be unjust that he should continue to be taxed for these objects. After the adoption of our Constitution, various laws were passed to carry into effect its provisions. Towns were au¬ thorized to grant and vote money “ for the settlement, main- 55 tenance, and support of the ministry, schools, the poor, and other necessary charges arising within the same town ” (Stat. 1785, c. 75, § 7); and towns were also liable to be fined if they were not “ constantly provided with a public Protestant teacher of piety, religion, and morality.” (Stat. 1799, c. 87, § 2.) The support of the ministry, &c., remained one of the objects for which towns were expressly authorized to appro¬ priate money until 1836. So long as only one parish existed in a town, this union of Church and State continued, and was complete. But, when a second religious society was formed, a separation took place, and the seceding inhabitants became the Second Parish. Those who remained constituted the First Parish, and be¬ came entitled to hold the meeting-house, and other property previously held by the town for ministerial purposes. 1 After any such separation took place, a change became necessary in the mode of voting taxes. The town would con¬ tinue of course to vote taxes for civil purposes, because mem¬ bers from all the religious societies in town took part and 1 As illustrations of this union of Church and State, I would say that in Brookline Town Meeting the moderator would sometimes address the voters present as “the congregation.” Thus, “at a meeting of the inhabitants of the Town of Brookline, holden on the 20th day of December, 1796, for the purpose of knowing whether the congregation would concur with the choice of the church ... of Mr. John Pierce for a gospel minister to settle in this town,” after choice of moderator, Mr. Pierce was unanimously chosen, and a commit¬ tee was chosen to wait on him “ with a copy of the proceedings of the church and congregation, and invite him to settle in this town and be our minister.” Mr. Pierce was the last minister thus chosen in town-meeting. The separation of town and parish took place in 1828. Before that time, for many years, the town, at its annual meeting, after making an appropriation for highways, would proceed to vote a round sum “to pay the Rev. Jno. Pierce his salary and defray the usual expenses of the town the current year.” We now enjoy in this State the most unlimited freedom of religious belief, provided only we do “ not disturb the public peace or obstruct others in their religious worship.” We now recognize as sacred the right of private judgment in matters of religion; and yet it is true that the seed which was planted at Plymouth, the independence of churches, logically bound up in itself, as Masson says, the very principle of religious liberty which we now enjoy. (Thornton, p. 33, note.) The Puritans were not the only persons in the world who have builded better than they knew. 56 voted in town meetings. But the different parishes or relig¬ ious societies voted their own taxes for ecclesiastical purposes, each member voting for or against his own tax in his own parish or society. This separation between town and parish became finally so general that the constitutional effect of it was recognized in the law, and it was enacted, — “ No citizen of this Commonwealth, being a member of any religious society in this Commonwealth, shall be assessed or liable to pay any tax for the support of public worship or other parochial charges, to any parish, precinct, or religious society whatever, other than to that of which he is a mem ■ ber.” (Stat. 1823, c. 106.) We have already seen that, in the construction of statutes, words importing the masculine gender may be applied to females. Women having always constituted the majority of the citizens of the State, this law, which professes to be intended to secure citizens against unconstitutional taxation, must be held to protect female citizens no less than males, notwithstanding the use of the word “he/’ unless we can see that such a construction of the law “ is inconsistent with the manifest intent of the Legislature, or repugnant to the context of the sam6 statute.” (Gen. Stat. c. 3, § 7.) And how is it possible to point out any such inconsistency or repugnancy ? This law, therefore, when construed on correct legal princi¬ ples, apparently admits not only that female citizens may be members of religious societies, and entitled to vote for or against ecclesiastical taxes, but wholly exempts them from all such taxes imposed by any town, parish, or society where they are not allowed to vote. So long as town and parish continued one, it is clear that all taxes, to be constitutional, were required to be laid with the consent of the people taxed. Each man voted for or against his town and parish tax in town meeting. As the separation between town and parish gradually took place, the town con¬ tinued to impose taxes for civil purposes; and the parish, or religious society, claimed the exclusive power to tax its own members for ecclesiastical purposes. But nevertheless all such 57 taxes of both kinds, whether laid by town or parish, were still required to be laid with the consent of the people taxed ; and when, in 1823, the separation of town and parish affairs be¬ came the rule, rather than the exception, the Legislature, recognizing as a fact the frequency of this separation, en¬ forced the constitutional provision that all taxation must be based on consent, by passing a law declaring, in effect, that no citizen, male or female, can be taxed for ecclesiastical pur¬ poses, out of his or her own parish or society where he or she can vote, just as no male citizen can be constitutionally taxed for civil purposes, out of the town where he is allowed to vote. The two kinds of taxes were, it is true, to be levied by two different bodies ; but no change whatever was made, or thought of, in the constitutional basis of taxation ; and no tax can now be laid by either town or parish without consent. 1 The clause in our Constitution requiring towns, &c., to sup¬ port public worship, &c. (art. 3), was repealed in 1833, and the eleventh amendment was adopted. This gave the finishing touch to the separation between town and parish, and gives to “ the several religious societies of this Commonwealth, &c., the right to elect their pastors, to contract with them for their support, to raise money for erecting and repairing houses for public worship, for the maintenance of religious instruction, &c.; ” but all members may dissolve their connection with the society by a written notice, “ and thenceforth shall not be lia¬ ble for any grant or contract,” &c. As this amendment speaks only of “ persons ” and “ members ” of religious societies, and makes use of no words importing the masculine gender, there would seem to be no room for doubt that under it women may become members of a religious society, and have and enjoy the same rights of voting that men enjoy. Under this amendment it was enacted (Stat. 1834, c. 183),— Sect. 2. “No person shall hereafter become or be made a member of any parish or religious society, so as to be liable to be taxed therein for the support of public worship or for 1 The taxation of non-resident owners of real estate is based on the consent growing out of voluntary ownership. 8 58 other parish charges, without his express consent for that pur¬ pose first had and obtained ;” and Sect. 8 . “No citizen shall be assessed or liable to pay any tax for the support of public worship or other parish charges, to any parish or religious society whatever, other than to that of which he is a member.” If, as we have seen, the law of 1823 extends to women, and admits and protects their rights to become members of religious societies, it would seem to be clear that this law must also receive the same interpretation. More especially must this be the case when we consider this law as designed to give practical effect to the amendment, which unquestion¬ ably extends to women. In 1836 the Statutes were revised by the late Charles Jack- son and others. They reported (c. 15, § 12) that towns were authorized to vote money “ for the settlement, maintenance, and support of the ministry,” &c. But the Legislature, in passing the Revised Statutes, struck out this clause. (Rev. Stat., c. 15, § 12 ; see also Gen. Stat. c. 18, § 10.) So that as early as 1823 the separation of town and parish had become quite general. In 1836, it was, practically speak¬ ing, complete ; and from that time the right to levy taxes for ecclesiastical purposes has been confined to parish and relig¬ ious societies as such, and these societies have only been able to tax their own members or those who had the right to vote for or against such taxation. Not only has the citizen, male or female, this protection against unjust taxation for ecclesi¬ astical purposes ; but any one who is dissatisfied may with¬ draw from a religious society at any time, by giving written notice to that effect, and by thus ceasing to be a voter he or she will be relieved from all taxation. It would seem to be clear, therefore, that probably as early as 1823, but at all events since 1836, no woman could be taxed for any ecclesiastical purpose, unless she also had the right to vote for or against such taxation, or unless she had consented to be taxed by not exercising her right to withdraw from the society imposing the tax. But, as if to make this precise 59 point (according to the old phrase) “ certain to a certain in¬ tent in particular,” an act to extend membership of parishes and religious societies to women, &c., was passed. (Stat. 1869, c. 346.) The first section of this act reads, “ Any parish or religious society may admit to membership women, who shall have all the rights and privileges of men.” This law recog¬ nizes the legality of the previously existing custom, and we have now women on our parish committees, and women are also settled as ministers; but long before the passage of this law the right of women to become members of religious societies had been recognized, and as such members they have had the right to vote, even if, from social or other reasons, they have commonly refrained from exercising such right. However this may have been, beyond all doubt it is now contrary to our Constitution, to tax a woman for ecclesiastical purposes without her consent, or unless she has the right to vote for or against such taxation. It is equally beyond ail doubt that, in defining what shall constitute a legal basis for taxation, our Constitution makes no sort of distinction be¬ tween civil and ecclesiastical taxes, but requires them all to be based upon consent. If, therefore, a female citizen cannot be constitutionally taxed for ecclesiastical purposes, unless she has the right of suffrage in reference to such tax, neither can she be constitutionally taxed for civil purposes unless she has the right of suffrage in reference to such tax. We have no right to make any distinction which the Constitution does not point out. If we cannot, constitutionally, take a single dollar from a woman for a religious tax, unless she has the right to vote for or against it, we cannot, constitutionally, tax the women of the State hundreds of thousands of dollars every year, for civil purposes, unless they also have the right to vote for or against such taxation. We have seen fit to lay down in our Constitution one principle, and only one, by which to determine the rightfulness of taxation in every case. If a tax be laid either by State, city, town, or parish within its appropriate sphere, with the consent of the people who are taxed, it is constitutional; and it is of no sort of consequence 6o whether the tax be for civil or ecclesiastical purposes. But if, on the contrary, either the State, city, town, or parish undertakes to lay taxes, even within its appropriate sphere, without such consent, no matter whether the tax be for civil or ecclesiastical purposes, the tax is void; and our courts, that are all sworn to support the Constitution, are bound to de¬ clare such taxation to be void, as being an infringement of the Declaration of Rights. It may possibly be urged as “ each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property according to standing laws, and he is obliged consequently to contribute his share to the expense of the protection ” (Declaration of Rights, art. io), that whoever is thus protected may be taxed, whether a voter or not; in other words, that taxation and protection—not tax¬ ation and representation — go together. And it is true that aliens who are not allowed to vote are, nevertheless, some¬ times said to be taxed on the ground of this very protection which they receive. (Opinion of the Judges, Feb. 15, 1811, 7 Mass. 523.) The King and Parliament also proposed to tax the colonists for their own protection ; but the colonists wholly failed to see that this made any difference, or that the tax was any less tyrannical in consequence. They preferred to determine for themselves exactly how, when, and where such protection should be exerted. May not our women, properly enough, claim the same right to determine what protection they need, and are willing to pay for ? If it be argued that because aliens, having no right to vote, may rightfully be taxed, therefore native-born women who are disfranchised may also be taxed, the argument is worthless, unless we are also willing to admit that under our Constitution the property rights of more than half the citizens of the Com¬ monwealth are no greater than if they were aliens ! Who is ready to make this admission ? It may very likely be true that women, in point of fact, enjoy no more property rights than are accorded to aliens ; but it is very far from being true 6i that they ought to have no greater rights than aliens under our fundamental law, and equally untrue that they are in the actual enjoyment of all the rights to which they are entitled, by virtue of that law. The all-sufficient answer to this objection, however, is found in the very same paragraph of the Declaration of Rights, which goes on to provide, “ But no part of the property of any individual can, with justice, be taken from him or applied to public uses without his own consent, or that of the repre¬ sentative body of the people,” or without providing a “ reason¬ able compensation ” in dollars and cents, for the property so taken. (Declaration of Rights, art. x.) Until 1852 aliens could not own real estate in the Com¬ monwealth. Now, they can do so (Gen. Stat. c. 90, § 38) ; and no real estate can be taken even from an alien, for pub¬ lic uses, unless the law which gives the right to take it, also provides a way by which he can obtain reasonable compensa¬ tion. But the citizen is protected in his rights, not only by this provision requiring compensation, but also by the other provision in the same paragraph, which declares that no part of his property can with justice be taken from him, even for public uses, without his consent, or the consent of the repre¬ sentatives of the people, which representatives he has had a voice in electing. As a matter of grace and favor, we allow aliens to reside here and accumulate property, provided they submit to taxation ; and, by so residing, they consent to be taxed. As a matter of right, a majority of the people of the State, being women, live where God has placed them, and claim that under our fundamental law no part of their prop¬ erty can be taken from them without their consent, even if compensation be provided for it, or even for the purpose ot paying the expense of protecting them by standing laws. With this I finish my statement about the taxation of women in Massachusetts. I have honestly endeavored to state the case fairly, and without exaggeration. The simple truth seems amply sufficient to cause any just-minded man to blush for our short-comings. The facts alone ought to be 62 enough to arouse our sympathy, and incite us to earnest effort to remedy the great wrong. I have proved that the women of the State are compelled every year to pay millions of dollars in the way of taxes. I have proved that all taxes which are collected from them, under authority of Congress, are laid contrary to the principles for which our fathers fought, and contrary to the principles of the Declaration of Independence ; and I hope my readers will think I have succeeded in show¬ ing that the direct taxation of women under our State law, is not only contrary to these same principles, but is also an in¬ fringement of our Declaration of Rights. And may the day soon come when all of us shall be ready to admit that taxation without representation is tyranny, and nothing but tyranny, even if the persons taxed be women, and act accordingly ! BROOKLINE TOWN VOTES. “Decem’r ye 28 th 1772 At a meeting of the Freeholders & otner Inhabitants of ye town of Brooklyn on adjournment from ye 1 i th Decem’r to ye 28 th following & then met. William Hyslop, Esq’r, Chosen Moderator. The Following Votes were pased by the Town unanimously at as full a meeting as Usual Viz. . . . 3d. Voted The Raising a Revennue within this Province by an as¬ sumed Power in the Brittishe House of Commons, to give and grant our Money without our Consent & appropriating the Money so Raised for the Support of the Government of the Province and the Payment of the charges of the Administration of Justice therein so repugnant to the first Principles of a free Constitution and the obvious meaning & Spirit of the Royal Charter of this Province. 4th. Voted that an Establishment for the Support of the Govonor of the Province, and the Judges of the Superior Court, &c. (if the latter be already made as we have Just reason to apprehend) to be paid out the Monies raised as aforesaid, independent of the free Gifts and Grants of the Commons of this Province are in the Opinion of this Town leading and alarming Steps towards rendering the whole executive Power inde¬ pendent, of the People, and setting up an despotic Government in the Province. At a Meeting of the Inhabitants of the Town of Brooklyn from Friday, the 26 th , To Monday the 29 th of Nov’r (1773) To consider what was propper for this Town to do, relative to the large Quan¬ tity’s of Tea belonging to the India Company, hourly expected to arrive in this Province, Subject to any American Duty. it. The Town came unanimously into the following Resolves Viz. That the Act of the British Parliament imposing a Duty on Tea, payable in America, for the Express purpose of raising a Revenue, is unconstitu- 64 tional, has a direct Tendency to bring the Americans into Slavery, and is therefore an Intolerable Grievance. 2d. That this Grievance which has been so Justly complained of by the Americans, so far from being redressed, is greatly aggravated by another Act, passed in the last Sessions of Parliament, for Benifit and Relief of the India Company, permitting them to Export their Teas to America or Forring Parts, free of all custom and Dutyes usually paid in Great Britian, but Subject to the Duty payable in America; thus have the Parliament discovered the most glaring Partiality in making one & the Same Act to operrate for the Ease & Convenience of a Few of the most opulent Sub¬ jects in Britian, on the one hand, and for the Oppressions of Millions of Freeborn & moast loyal Inhabitants of America, on the other. 3d. That the last mentioned Act can be considered no otherwise than as Subtle Plan of the Ministry to ensnare and enslave the Americans, and that whoever shall be instrumental in carrying the Same into Exe¬ cution, is in the Judgment of this Towne, an inevitable Enemy to this Country.” 65 * In towns marked thus in these tables, either a highway tax was assessed in addition to the poll, or else the poll-tax was more than $2. t In places marked thus in these tables, the returns are for the year 1874 instead of 1873. Table I. Of Places where the Women pay or less of the Taxes. Towns. 1871. 1 1873. 1874. Number of Women. Paid by them. Whole Tax. Women taxed. Paid by them. Equal in Polls. Men who pay only a Poll-tax. Amount. Plurality for Governor. Montague . • is $756 $30,146 $212 106 42 Peru .... 6 i 33 2,875 . • . 18 9 27 * Worthington . 3 20 4,599 s 42 21 36 $72 23 $37,620 5 $272 136 36 $72 92 Table II. Of Places where the Women pay from to y^j- of the Taxes. Towns. 1871. 1873. 1874. Number of Women. Paid by them Whole Tax. Women taxed. Paid by them. Equal in Polls. Men who pay only a Poll-tax. Amount. Plurality for Governor. Holyoke ... 83 $1,568 $ 139,530 112 $2,705 i ,352 2,436 $4,872 737 Middlcfield . . 3 51 6,431 5 121 60 67 134 38 Monroe . . . 3 9 1,868 3 36 18 4 8 3 Montgomery . . 3 54 2,353 4 46 23 !7 34 10 Yarmouth. . . 86 1,280 17,479 311 i 55 60 $167,661 124 $3,219 1,609 | 2,524 $5,048 848 9 66 Table III. Of Places where the Women pay from fa to fa of the Taxes. Towns. 1871. 1873. 1874. Women taxed. Paid by them. Whole Tax. Women taxed. Paid by them. Equal in Polls. Men who pay only a Poll-tax. Amount. Plurality for Governor. Boylston . . . -9 $264 $7,614 10 $160 80 71 $142 54 Fall River . . 324 16,4x8 636,452 284 14,257 7,128 7,543 15,086 642 Franklin . . . 68 I > I 3 S 31,285 60 788 394 • . • • 26 * Hardwick . . 21 428 I 9 > 37 1 . • . 45 ° 225 14 Leyden . . . 6 231 5,281 6 107 53 17 34 7 * Lincoln . . . 33 561 11,588 12 270 135 82 164 47 Provincetown . 50 859 38,876 4 i 819 409 4 i 5 830 177 Williamstown . 36 606 22,612 . . . 488 244 58 $ 773>°79 413 $ 17,339 8,669 8,128 $16,256 1,025 Table IV. Of Places where the Women pay from fa to fa of the Taxes. Towns. 1871. 1873. 1874. Women taxed. Paid by them. Whole Tax. Women taxed. Paid by them. Equal in Polls. Men who pay only a Poll-tax. Amount. Plurality for Governor. Adams . . . 83 $ 2,599 $176,644 108 $ 5,425 2,712 230 Canton . . . 81 2,355 27,842 7°4 352 91 Carver . . . 24 222 5,259 30 163 81 73 $146 * Charlemont . . 13 429 9,121 16 263 131 45 90 124 Dover .... 13 262 7,075 13 186 93 46 92 10 t Dracut . . . 45 623 20,922 33 661 330 184 368 35 Eastham . . . 12 3 i 4 5,841 12 149 74 22 44 * Gardner . . . 4 i 713 40,084 62 973 486 513 1,026 106 Gill. 15 224 5,987 15 163 81 48 96 2 * Hinsdale . . . 22 747 i 5, 0 34 47 i 235 11 Holland . . . 3 33 2,809 3 86 43 84 168 20 Huntington . . 20 419 9,381 21 253 126 5 Lenox .... 5 ° 1,631 19,786 23 561 280 109 218 89 Leverett . . . 13 218 6,845 XI 201 100 47 94 22 Maynard. . . 14,832 . . . 389 194 3 Newbury. . . 57 1,521 11,886 20 318 159 95 190 73 Norfolk . . . 16 360 6,475 22 218 109 128 256 12 Palmer . . . 5 i 1,217 25 , 5 i 4 40 787 393 470 940 27 Sandwich... 105 2,137 21,163 42 616 308 271 542 80 Southampton . 20 396 7,767 16 231 115 63 126 45 Wales. . . . 14 250 5,609 10 161 80 102 204 52 $445,876 497 $12,979 6,489 2,300 $4,600 1,037 Table V. Of Places where the Women pay from fa to fa of the Taxes. 1871. 1873. 1874. Towns. Women taxed- Paid by them. Whole Tax. Women taxed. Paid by them. Equal in Polls. Men who pay only a Poll-tax. Amount. Plurality for Governor * Ashland . . • 46 $1,024 $25,960 32 $1,270 635 379 $758 19 Belchertown. . 53 882 T 9» 2 37 3i 705 352 *43 286 206 * Bolton.... 32 476 8,993 19 338 169 83 166 8 Brewster . . • 26 1,138 10,198 i5 435 217 46 92 Chatham. . . 47 601 12,505 54 631 3i5 107 214 Clinton . • . 61 2,280 78,828 90 3,072 i,53b 894 1,788 69 Dighton • • . 55 703 11,815 56 550 275 128 256 98 * Douglas . . . 5° 1,326 15,557 548 274 . . . . 69 * Dudley . . . 49 1,072 I9,i95 29 869 434 367 734 105 t East Bridge- . water . . . 109 2,39° 22,041 52 1,091 545 287 574 92 Essex .... 43 1,237 1,398 14,558 27 495 247 127 254 7° Georgetown . . 76 20,462 75 958 479 16 Granville. . . 15 345 9,418 14 35 1 175 62 124 80 Hadley . . . 54 1,322 23,061 869 434 22 Heath .... 9 87 5 , 55 i 15 221 no 19 38 47 Holliston. . . 86 1,860 3i,o59 76 1,114 557 438 876 24 Littleton . . . 5° 577 9,627 21 43i 215 68 136 64 Marion . . . 23 353 8,252 16 294 147 64 128 14 Natick . . . hi 3, 12 4 59,9” 2,868 x,434 62 Northfield . . 48 688 9,612 *38 386 193 93 186 33 Oakham . . . 19 188 8,107 30 348 174 54 108 Plympton . . 16 198 4,oS 4 22 176 88 37 74 23 Prescott . . . 13 206 4,853 12 188 94 24 48 9 Revere . . . 22 754 26,539 25 9 2 9 464 282 564 5i Rockport. . . 27 831 38,886 33 1,382 691 301 602 381 Somerset. . . 36 665 14,000 26 684 342 247 494 Sudbury . . . 45 607 16,129 24 730 365 108 216 9 Tyngsboro’ . . 13 258 4»47 2 18 186 93 72 144 6 Wellfleet. . . 28 905 14,550 20 539 269 116 232 102 Westford. . . 58 894 17,117 3i . 687 343 254 508 66 Westport. . . 72 95i 23,835 63 8S8 444 202 404 208 Wilbraham . . 66 948 i 8,455 43 810 4°5 170 340 9 $606,867 i j °°7 $25,043 12,521 5»i72 $io,344 1,962 Table VI. Of Places where the Women pay from -fa to ^ of the Taxes. 1871. 1873. 1874. Towns. Women taxed. Paid by them. Whole Tax. Women taxed. Paid by them. Equal in Polls. Men who pay only a Poll-tax. Amount. Plurality for Governor. About -jV Ashfield . . . 33 $667 $ 14 , 35 ° 33 $777 388 46 $92 55 Lakeville. . . 4 i 742 6,305 33 330 165 68 136 7 Scituate . . . 83 2,022 26,583 i ,332 666 63 Spencer . . . 47 1,280 4,196 42,275 35 2,121 1,060 620 1,240 61 Webster . . . 54 32,116 1,621 810 107 About iV Blackstone . . 2,471 32,173 89 1,764 882 780 1,560 179 Brookfield . . 63 2,622 24,855 38 i ,399 699 66 # Harvard . . . 84 r ,338 12,994 33 728 364 107 214 16 Sheffield . . . 35 813 14,736 36 786 393 40 Sunderland . . 14 59 ° 9 , 39 i 17 535 267 56 112 67 About iV Framingham . 155 4,217 59,102 107 3,574 1,787 761 1,522 14 Foxboro’ . . . 74 1,914 27,414 . . . 1,638 819 3 i 5 630 84 Harwich . . . 32 722 20,707 58 1,190 595 190 380 62 Holden . . . 33 838 23,196 45 1,324 662 220 440 21 Lynn .... 59 ° 29,229 53 r ,925 526 30,249 * 5» I2 4 4,982 9,964 28 * Sandisfield . . 24 448 ii ,536 30 698 349 73 146 131 Springfield . . 564 21,821 609,206 485 35,315 17,657 5,486 10,972 1,411 Stoughton . . 187 3,166 45,974 125 2,747 i ,373 464 928 147 Swanzey . . . 30 723 10,163 45 562 281 78 156 About yq Amherst . . . 151 4,327 50,845 81 3 ,i 72 1,586 275 550 87 Andover . . . 268 4,609 40,562 102 2,584 1,292 491 982 141 * Hancock . . . 13 197 4,377 . . . 268 134 36 * Hubbardston . 53 1,125 16,435 54 999 499 108 216 2 Northampton . 184 6,968 172,618 140 10,920 5 , 46 o 1,080 2,160 43 i Shrewsbury . . 37 788 16,579 40 981 49 ° 116 232 61 Somerville . . 242 13,047 388,914 268 23,649 11,824 2,735 5,470 48 So. Scituate . . 5 i 2,433 14,329 3 i 859 429 98 196 67 * Uxbridge. . . 116 2,266 22,236 107 i ,353 676 284 568 2 Westfield. . 122 4,321 102,827 146 6,419 3,209 1,223 2,446 750 About Ashby .... 48 1,on 10,947 27 742 37 i 39 78 42 t Deerfield. . . 70 2,412 28,322 54 1,854 927 295 590 88 Greenfield . . 79 3 , 55 i 56,327 69 3,735 1,867 411 822 82 Lynnfield . . 39 539 6,177 109,647 4 i 414 207 202 404 28 Pittsfield . . . 169 11,070 148 7,476 3,738 1,516 3,032 603 Sharon . . . 75 1,269 15,749 38 1,005 502 107 214 13 Stow .... 48 620 7,213 37 486 243 99 19$ 17 $2,619,105 3,n8 $155,606 77,803 23,325 $46,650 5,056 69 Table VII. Of Places where the Women pay from ^ to T \- of the Taxe 1871. 1873* 1874. Towns. Women taxed. Paid by them. Whole Tax. Women taxed. Paid by them. 1 j Squal in Polls. | Men who pay only a Poll-tax. a 3 c a < Plurality for Governor. About Belmont . • 66 # 4>328 $37,686 . . . $2,664 i ,332 49 * Chelmsford . 79 1.723 26,371 46 1,875 9.’7 310 $620 8 * Leicester. . 101 2,316 22,658 64 1,628 814 322 644 26 Sherborn. . 39 1,074 11,688 4 i 809 404 ■79 158 59 Taunton . . 392 18,164 261,821 17,583 283 18,265 9 ,i 32 3 ,24^ 6,482 204 Wayland . . 49 1,085 38 1,242 621 224 448 40 Worcester . 780 67,033 833,218 745 63,283 31,641 8,980 17,960 524 About xV Dartmouth . 76 2,511 30,159 53 2,333 1,666 163 326 75 Fairhaven . 66 1,171 23,034 . . . i ,799 899 4 i Kingston . . 104 2,714 7,256 5 i 549 274 129 258 21 * Leominster . 120 2,953 1,568 52,649 112 3,837 1,918 628 1,256 320 Marshfield . 85 18,235 87 i ,398 699 121 242 53 Princeton. . 3 i 373 14,411 32 1,136 568 79 158 30 Salem . . . 963 50,108 490,041 399 36,964 18,482 948 3,983 7,966 113 *t Templeton. 104 2,719 2,841 26,671 81 1,897 312 624 21 * Wakefield . 127 79,676 108 5 , 5 i 7 2,758 1,215 2,430 24 Waltham. . 187 8,943 125,118 218 8,935 4,467 1,730 3,460 200 Wilmington . 26 641 8,357 25 658 320 86 172 3 About * Barre . . . xog 2,251 29,026 102 2,264 1,132 249 498 4 i Bellingham . 4 i 567 8,816 54 735 367 no 220 Chelsea . . 289 16,045 318,641 399 25,725 12,862 3,330 6,660 304 Greenwich . 20 600 6,366 !7 538 269 63 126 15 Marshfield . Si 778 16,989 72 i ,433 716 265 530 87 Milford . . 199 7,598 106,940 244 8,871 4,435 i, 5 i 3 3,026 116 North Andover 143 4,888 34,068 30,078 . . . 2,985 1,492 11 Swampscott . 23 1,321 5 i 2,444 1,222 274 548 4 Townsend . 49 1,on 25,897 68 2,019 1,009 34 68 40 Tyringham . 5 197 3 , 9 n 15 337 168 25 50 1 West Springfield 58 1,831 44,966 74 3,705 1,852 544 1,088 83 About u Boxford • . 30 601 10,237 24 924 462 64 128 33 Hingham. . 168 5,497 44,502 145 3,952 1,976 5°9 1,018 106 Manchester . Marblehead . 56 197 1,566 7 , 47 ° 18,108 85,777 221 1,684 7,950 842 3,975 1,214 2,428 151 Medway . . 94 2,811 36,128 no 3,080 !, 54 ° 387 774 2 Peabody . . 156 8,383 107,478 • • V 9,740 4,870 95 Pepperell. . 75 1,526 11,608 49 1,034 517 166 332 6 Westboro’ . 107 2,823 38,104 115 3,049 1,524 5°5 1,010 134 * Westminster 46 739 21,243 87 1,978 989 141 282 67 #3,085,515 4,230 $249,236 124,618 30,995 #61,990 3,107 70 Table VIII. Of Places where the Women pay from\ to ^ of the Taxes . Towns. 1871. 1873* 1874. Women taxed. Paid by them. Whole Tax. Women taxed. Paid by them. Equal in Polls. Men who pay only a Poll-tax. | Amount. Plurality for Governor. About 1 Boston, Ward 1 547 $30,030 15,015 6,077 $12,154 33 o 208 29,019 14,509 4,959 9,918 1,785 211 27,507 13,753 3,695 7,390 642 „ 4 272 133,294 66,647 2,534 5,068 262 • • • • . . . 141 82,218 41,109 1,268 2,536 380 „ 6 59 1 248,089 124,044 2 , 39 ° 4,780 t 480 „ 7 369 26,048 13,024 6,637 13.274 1,036 ,, 8 208 42,360 21,180 2,983 5,966 259 „ 9 493 127,441 63,720 3,290 6,580 93 ,, 10 406 73,229 36,614 3,156 6,312 254 ,, n 622 117,053 58,526 2,986 5,972 39 „ 12 620 45,229 27,614 5,666 n ,332 236 ,, 13 129 14,171 7,085 2,231 4,462 482 „ 14 • • • 488 65,112 32,556 2,826 5,652 14 ,, IS 400 64,265 32,132 4,232 8,464 708 ,» 16 594 78.706 39 353 2,684 5,368 i 3 W.Roxbury, „ 17 329 45,669 22,834 i ,439 2,878 281 Brighton, „ 19 no 12,734 6,367 972 i ,944 112 (•> 20 116 11,631 5 , 8 i 5 2,209 4,418 438 Chariest’n, {,, 21 156 13,200 6,600 2 ,i 55 4 , 3 io 167 (,, 22 204 9,681 4,840 2,026 4,052 293 Boston, with annex¬ ations .... 6,392 $870,893 $12,045,902 7,214 $1,296,693 648,346 66,415 $132,830 § 8,304 Needham . . . 160 4)463 58,879 182 5,475 2,737 566 1,132 84 Orleans.... 42 855 9,426 . . . 904 452 96 Petersham. . . 40 1,no 9,699 43 942 47 i 67 134 16 About ^ Enfield . . . - 19 1,482 8,997 27 1,007 503 „ 3S Hull. 7 265 5 ,i 94 13 582 291 15 30 II 3 * Northboro’ . . 5 i 1)384 22,126 60 2,129 1,064 114 228 53 About Newburyport . . 481 23)794 159,421 309 19,761 9,880 M* 00 3,748 27 N. Reading . . 46 1,142 7,501 37 909 454 56 Dedham . . . 307 13,920 83,581 140 11,024 5 , 5 i 2 872 i ,744 66 Mendon . . . 49 1,074 9,882 42 1,241 620 106 212 i 5 About y Brookline . . . 254 30,852 330,804 159 49,028 24,514 921 1,842 22 Watertown . . hi 7,292 94,177 65 13,164 6,582 840 1,680 103 About g- Berkley . . . 24 220 4,787 16 822 4 ii 52 104 72 Cohasset . . . 166 5,446 26,821 143 4,271 2 ,i 35 167 234 74 Stockbridge . . 73 4,393 24,608 78 4,277 2,138 172 344 5 i About * Concord ... 150 3,852 30,401 100 5 , 9 i 6 2,958 318 636 62 Cheshire . . . 25 893 16,396 26 3,433 1,716 152 304 78 Falmouth . . . 46 1,844 20,995 52 4,296 2,148 268 536 120 Newton . . . 720 51,634 384,089 675 77,033 38,516 2,034 4,068 366 $ 13 , 353,686 9 , 38 i $1,502,907 751,453 74,953 $149,906 9 , 70.3 $ The vote for Governor was a tie. This is the plurality for Lieut. Governor. § The plurality for Lieut. Governor in the whole city was 4,229. || There was a tie vote for Governor. Harris, member of Congress, had 3 plurality. 7i Recapitulation. Towns. 1871. 1873. 1874. Women taxed. Paid by them. Whole Tax. Women taxed. Paid by them. Equal in Polls. Men who pay only a Poll-tax. Amount. Plurality for Governor. Table I. . . . $37,620 5 $272 136 36 $72 92 „ II. . . . 167,661 124 3,219 1,609 2,524 5,048 848 „ III. . . 773)079 4 i 3 17,339 8,669 8,128 16,256 1,025 „ IV.. . . 445)876 497 12,979 6,489 2,300 4,600 1,037 „ V. . . . 606,867 1,007 25,043 12,521 5,172 io ,344 1,962 „ VI.. . . 2,619,105 3,n8 155,606 77,803 23,325 46,650 5,056 „ VII . . 3 )° 8 s,si 5 4,230 249,236 124,618 30,995 61,990 3,107 „ VIII.. . 13 , 353)686 9 . 38 i 1,502,907 75 i ,453 74,953 149,906 9,703 Totals 163 Towns $21,089,409 i 8,775 $1,966,601 983,300 147,433 $294,866 22,830 Note to Page 20. House Document No. 428, referred to on this page, though dated May 8, 1871, is responsive to an ordei passed March 15, 1871; and was, therefore, very probably based on the Assessors’ valuations made in May, 1870. This makes no difference, however, in the results stated in the text, as the women paid more than one-twelfth of all the sums raised by taxation, and very nearly one-eleventh of the entire tax on property in 1870. (Aggregate Polls, &c., 1870, p. 25.) The principal object of the pamphlet is to prove that the taxation of women, be it more or less, is unconstitutional. The exact amount of taxes, or the precise number of women taxed, cannot possibly be obtained by any one, by any amount of labor; and no such extreme nicety is needed for the purposes of the argument. I can, for example, prove how much is received in Massachusetts from duties; but how many of the dutiable articles are actually consumed in Massachusetts, or "how many women consume them, no one can tell, and it is of no real importance to be able to prove. I content myself with showing that about twenty millions are collected here every year; and, after making every allowance for the fact that Boston is one of the great distributing markets, the inference seems to be fair that the women alone pay millions through this channel. So in reference to the taxation under our State laws. It is very clear that the Assessors in different towns have made up their returns on different principles. Some have given me only the number of women who are taxed directly; others have included those who are taxed through Trustees, the trust being plainly declared or known to the Assessors to be for women; but all reference to a large amount of property really belonging to women, and which is taxed to Trustees, is omitted, because the books fail to show, and the Assessors do not know, for whom the trust really is. Exactness, therefore, either in the number of women taxed or the amount paid by them, is unattainable by any one, and it is of no real importance to the argument. I have, however, diligently tried to make my statements and estimates within the truth; and I believe such will prove to be the fact. It may be well to add that throughout my tables I have considered the poll-tax as $2, — the highest sum allowed bylaw, — consequently, the figures in the columns marked “Equal in Polls” are intended to be as nearly as possible one-half the amount paid by the women as taxes, and the figures in the columns marked “ Amount ” are intended to be just double the number of the men who paid only a poll-tax. Woman Suffrage a Right, not a Privilege. BY WILLIAM I. BOWDITCH. CAMBRIDGE: UNIVERSITY PRESS: JOHN WILSON & SON. 1882. Copyright , By William I. Bowditch. 1879. WOMAN SUFFRAGE A RIGHT, NOT A PRIVILEGE. Speaking in reference to men, Chief Justice Parker says : “ The elective franchise ... is the vital principle of a republican government/’ and “the right of voting in such a government as ours . . . cannot be infringed without pro¬ ducing an injury to the party.” But if suffrage for a man cannot be infringed upon even once without doing him an injury, can we deny it to women altogether and yet do them no wrong ? Why are we men sure that we ought to have the right of Suffrage ? Is it because the Statute of 1874, the General Statutes of i860, or the Revised Statutes of 1836, or any other mere law, defines the qualifications of age, sex, residence, intelligence, taxation, etc., which we possess, and which we are required to possess before we can vote ? No ! we do not admit that the right has been given to us by any Legislature. We have elected the Legislatures. They are our substitutes or agents. It is the principal who confers power, not the agent. Is it because the amendments to the Constitution define the qualifications of voters to be those which we now possess, and which we are required to possess before we can vote ? No! Amendment 3 (1821) and Amendment 20 (1857) now define the qualifications of voters for State office. 1 Neither 1 The same qualifications are prescribed by law (1874, c. 376) for voters for city, town, county, and national officers 4 of these amendments conferred on men the right of Suffrage. The men of that day elected the delegates to the Convention of 1820 which framed the third amendment, and the amend¬ ment itself had not the slightest particle of binding force or vitality until it had been submitted to a popular vote and adopted. The men of 1855 an ^ 1856 elected the two Legis¬ latures which proposed the twentieth amendment, and this amendment had not the slightest particle of binding force or vitality until it had been adopted by their votes. The men of the last century did not get the right of Suf¬ frage from the Constitution of 1780. On the contrary they elected the delegates to the Convention which framed the Constitution, and the Constitution itself had not the slightest particle of binding force or vitality until it had received the assent of two thirds of the male voters. But the men who elected those delegates, and who thus adopted and sanctioned their work, claimed and exercised the right of suffrage before that Convention was even thought of. Where then did the men of 1780 get the right to vote ? Did they get the right from the Provincial Charter or laws ? No! This Charter and these laws conferred on them the right to vote in reference to the Province, but no right what¬ ever to overthrow the Provincial government or set up the Commonwealth of Massachusetts! Did they get the right from the grace of their sovereign lord the king ? No ! The king had been graciously pleased to allow them to vote supplies for his government, but not for our State govern¬ ment, — this was treason. Besides this our fathers had already repudiated the notion of the divine right of kings to govern them as subjects. The idea of a man being born a magistrate appeared to them as “ absurd and unnatural.” (Declaration of Rights, Art. 6.) Where then did the right of the men of 1780 to vote in the behalf of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts come from ? If it came neither from the State laws nor the State Consti¬ tution, nor from the Provincial Charter nor laws, nor yet from the king’s grant, where did it come from ? The country, of course, continued to be governed. The first Provincial Congress of Massachusetts was organized, and dissolved itself in 1774. It was composed of Representatives elected to a General Court summoned by Governor Gage to meet at Salem, Oct. 5, 1774, and whom he afterwards directed not to meet, and refused to qualify. The second and third Congresses met and dissolved themselves in 1775. These bodies were chosen by men qualified according to the Provin¬ cial Charter to vote for Representatives to the General Court. Acting under a resolve of the Continental Congress (June 9, 1 775, Journals, &c., p. 359), the third Provincial Congress (June 19) issued letters to the several places in Massachusetts that were entitled to representation, requesting them to choose Representatives to a General Court. This was accordingly done, and the assembly thus chosen proceeded to elect coun¬ sellors, and this assembly and council proceeded to confirm the acts and doings of the three Congresses (Anc. Chart., 1 775, p. 687), and to exercise all the powers of government without any restriction whatsoever. This was considered as conforming “ as near as may be to the spirit and substance ” of the Provincial Charter. These Provincial Congresses, and the General Court called in this irregular way, and its successors, assembled from time to time, passed orders and enacted laws, repealing some of the old laws, adopting and continuing others, and making new ones at pleasure, even so far as to remove all the officers, civil and military, appointed by the king’s governor (1775, Anc. Chart., p. 689), and disfranchising the noxious conspir¬ ators who remained loyal to the king, and confiscating their estates. They could not possibly get the right to do these things by virtue of anything in the Provincial Charter or laws. On the contrary, they entirely disregarded both the Charter and these laws, whenever and as far as they thought best. In other words, the male voters of that day — the men who had the right to vote under the Provincial laws, the men who were in the actual possession of power — claimed that they D had an inherent right to govern themselves as they thought best, anything in the Charter and Provincial laws to the con¬ trary notwithstanding, and they did in fact thus govern them¬ selves. Now, on what ground did they think they had this right of self-government ? Listen to their language: “ The people of this Common¬ wealth have the sole and exclusive right of governing them¬ selves,” &c. (Declaration of Rights, Art. 4.) “All power residing originally in the people, and being derived from them, the several magistrates and officers of government vested with authority — whether legislative, ex¬ ecutive, or judicial —are their substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them.” (Art. 5.) “ Government is instituted for the common good, for the protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness of the people ; and not for the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of men : therefore the people alone have an incontestable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to insti tute government, and to reform, alter, or totally change the same, when their protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness require it.” (Art. 7.) The delegates to the Convention which framed these articles came from the places entitled to send members to the General Court. In the election of delegates, every freeman who was an inhabitant of the town, and was twenty-one years of age, was allowed to vote, (Resolve for Convention, June 17, 1779, Journal, &c., p. 5,) and the Constitution itself went into effect only after being approved by the votes of at least two thirds of the same adult freemen voting in open meeting. (Ibid., p. 6.) The Declaration of the Rights of the People which we have quoted must, therefore, be considered to be the language of the adult freemen of 1780. In other words, these articles must be considered to be the words used by, and to express the ideas of, the very men who then governed Massachusetts, wholly unrestrained by any charter, constitution, or law, and just as they thought best. What do they say ? 7 Do they claim, that they themselves, the adult freemen, have the sole and exclusive right of governing Massachusetts ? No! On the contrary, they declare that the People of this Commonwealth have the sole and exclusive right of governing themselves. Do they claim that all power resides in the adult male citizens having certain property qualifications, and is derived from them ? No ! On the contrary, they assert that all power resides in the People, and is derived from them. Do they assert either that the legal voters, the adult freemen, the adult male citizens possessing a certain amount of property, or that even adult men generally, by themselves alone, have a just right to institute government ? No ! On the contrary, they maintain that the People alone have a right to institute government, and to reform it at pleasure ; that government is not instituted for the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of men, but, on the contrary, is instituted for the protection and happiness of the People. Now, if the People alone have thus the right to institute government, and the People alone are the source of all the power which has been exercised in this State, when the male voters or adult freemen of 1779 elected delegates to the Con¬ stitutional Convention, and in 1780 voted for or against the Constitution proposed, they really exercised a right which inhered in them, not as adult freemen, not even as male voters, not even as men in whom the power of actual government was vested, but simply and solely because they were part of the people of Massachusetts. The men of 1780 had the right of suffrage, not because of any law or constitution or charter or grant whatever, not even because they were men, or men who were actu¬ ally in possession of power, but solely because they formed part of the people, in whom alone the power of sovereignty resided. In like manner, the men of to-day, we ourselves, have the right of suffrage, not because of any law or constitution what- 8 soever, not even because we are men, or men in the actual possession of power, but solely because we form part of the people of the State. From October, 1774, down to 1780, the male voters were under no restraint whatever in reference to the exercise of political power, except only such as was imposed by their own sense of what was right or expedient. 1 But having adopted the Constitution, by so doing they consented to all the quali¬ fications of the right of suffrage imposed by it and the laws to be passed pursuant thereto. Since 1780, the male voters have from time to time changed these constitutional and legal qualifications, and added others as have from time to time seemed reasonable (at least so far as men are concerned); but all these limitations of the inherent right of suffrage have only come into existence because either our fathers or we have consented to their creation by our votes, or have con¬ sented to their continuance until such time as they shall be constitutionally changed, by claiming and exercising the right of suffrage as it in fact exists. And if at any future time it should by any possibility so happen that the existing Constitution should obviously fail to accomplish the objects for which it was designed, the inherent right of the people to govern themselves would revive in full force, and they would have the right to reform, alter, or totally change the government, as their protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness might then seem to require. (Art. 7. See also 6 Cush. Rep. 574.) In determining the true grounds of our own right to suffrage there is still another point to be considered. Our Constitution declares that “ the body politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals. It is a social com¬ pact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be gov¬ erned by certain laws for the common good.” (Preamble.) 1 The Continental Congress had no power over the domestic policy of Mas¬ sachusetts, except so far as our fathers consented to or acquiesced in the exercise of such power. 9 But consent is essential to the formation of any voluntary association, and no sort of compact can possibly be formed without consent between the parties to the compact. So, then, the rights of each and every citizen rest upon the consent of the people. In the very words of our Con¬ stitution, “the people” did “solemnly and mutually agree with each other to form themselves into . . . the Common¬ wealth of Massachusetts.” (Frame of Government, ist para¬ graph.) There are, then, two great fundamental principles on which we must admit that our own rights as male voters depend. (i.) The people, and not men alone, are the only true and just source of power. (2.) The consent of the people, and not that of men alone, forms the only just foundation for government. But if the male citizens of Massachusetts thus derive their right to vote, not from any law or constitutional provision whatsoever, not even from the fact that they are men, or men in the actual possession of power, but simply and solely be¬ cause they form part of the people, why may not female citizens do the same ? It is true the Constitution recognizes the right of men to vote, and expressly denies the same right to women; but if the right of suffrage for men does not really depend on such recognition, why should the just rights of women be any more affected by such denial ? If the right of suffrage inheres in men simply and solely because they are part of the people, the same rights also inhere in women, simply and solely because they are part of the people. If all power really resides in the people, it surely ought to rest in the majority rather than in the minority. Instead, therefore, of denying suffrage to women, ought we not rather to consider their claim to the right as higher and stronger in its character even than that put forward by ourselves, and accordingly make haste to divest ourselves of a power so plainly usurped ? IO It will no doubt be objected, that these articles in the Dec¬ laration of Rights cannot mean what their words so plainly express, because the power therein declared to be vested in the people was not only at that very time actually exercised by male voters only, but the continuance of the right of suf¬ frage in the hands of men exclusively and for an indefinite period was provided for by the express terms of the Consti¬ tution. To add strength to this objection, it must also be admitted that the Convention itself, though chosen by male voters, resolved that it had “sufficient authority from the people” (Journal, &c., p. 22) ; and, when the qualification of voters came up for discussion, motions were made to strike out the word “male” and were defeated (Journal, &c., pp. 92, 120, 121, 136); so that really woman suffrage for members of the Legislature was actually voted down in the Conven¬ tion. Did, therefore, our fathers really mean what they said in the Declaration of Rights, notwithstanding these inconsist¬ encies between their acts and their principles ? The Convention started on its work with the avowed inten tion (expressed by a unanimous vote) “ that the government to be framed by this Convention shall be a free republic.” (Journal, p. 24.) The Constitution was drafted by a committee, of whom John Adams and Samuel Adams were members. The articles which we have quoted were actually written by John Adams, and were adopted by the committee and Convention without amendment. (See Works of John Adams, Vol. IV. pp. 223-225.) Can any of us believe that John Adams thought only of male voters when he speaks of the rights of the people in these articles ? It seems almost im¬ possible to believe it, or that any one can really doubt as to the proper meaning and force of these articles, or that they guard, and were intended to guard, the rights of the whole body of the people, so clear and unmistakable is the language used. It cannot, however, be denied that there are serious incon¬ sistencies between some of the principles laid down in the Declaration of Rights and the rules for practical affairs laid down in the frame of government. We can see these inconsistencies very clearly now. The Convention itself evidently had some of the same feeling. In their Address to the People they say, we do not offer for your acceptance “a perfect system of government, this is not the lot of mankind” (Journal, p. 217); we have found it, they said, “ exceedingly difficult, if not impracticable, to succeed in every part of it to the full satisfaction of all. Could the whole body of the people have convened for the same purpose, there might have been equal reason to conclude a perfect unanimity of sentiment would have been an object not to be obtained.” (Journal, p. 216.) It is, however, beyond all controversy, that in some of the clauses of the Declaration of Rights the word “people” is not, and cannot possibly be, treated as synonymous with male voters. Thus, in the Preamble (1st paragraph) the body politic is described to be a compact between the “ whole people ” and “ each citizen.” Government, it is said, enables “ the individu¬ als” who compose the body politic to enjoy their natural rights, &c.; and it is declared that “ the people ” have a right to alter the government, &c. By no possible construction of this preamble can the word “ people ” be fairly or honestly in¬ terpreted to mean only male voters. It most plainly includes, not only the whole body of the people, but every individual member and each citizen. The Declaration of Rights purports, in so many words, to be a statement of the right of “ the inhabitants ” of the Com¬ monwealth : not the rights of men alone, or male voters, but of all the inhabitants ; therefore, of all women as well as men; and the clauses in behalf of personal freedom, religious liberty, trial by jury, &c., most plainly secure, and were in¬ tended to secure, the rights of women just the same as those of men. Art. 29 declares it to be “for the security of the rights of the people and of every citizen” that the judges of the Supreme Judicial Court should hold office during good behavior, &c.; we cannot possibly understand the word “ peo¬ ple,” as here used, to mean only male voters, without making the article absurd. Our conclusion, therefore, is, that John Adams and Samuel Adams and the men of 1780 really meant what they said in these articles; and this, although the actual powers of gov¬ ernment were then exercised only by male voters. Does any one still object, that, as male voters have been allowed to represent the people for a hundred years, it is now too late to disturb this practical interpretation of the true meaning of these articles, or to hold that male voters have no just right to represent any persons but themselves ? We reply, a question of human rights can never be out¬ lawed. We remember the noble words of Chief Justice Parker (2 Pick. 557): “Neither will any course of years or legislative acts or judicial decisions sanction any apparent violation of the fundamental law clearly expressed or neces¬ sarily understood.” We call to mind the words of our fathers and say, “ A fre¬ quent recurrence to the fundamental principles of the Consti¬ tution, and a constant adherence to those of . . . justice, . . . are absolutely necessary to preserve the advantages of liberty, and to maintain a free government.” (Decl. of Rights, art. 18.) Now, we shall probably all admit that our fathers were of Burke’s opinion when he said, that “ government was a prac¬ tical thing, made for the happiness of mankind, and not to furnish out a spectacle of uniformity to gratify the schemes of visionary politicians.” (Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, 1 777) Our fathers were real and true lovers of liberty, and also practical men of affairs. As lovers of liberty it was impossible for them to frame a declaration of rights which did not lay down the true principles on which a republic ought to rest, and in the clearest possible manner, and this is just what they did in fact do. Being also practical men, not caring only for the enunciation of principles, but being also, and perhaps chiefly, desirous to i3 set on foot a great Commonwealth, it was equally impossible for them not to regard and defer not only to the opinions, but even to the prejudices, of the people then living. It would have been ridiculous for them to present for acceptance a scheme of government which ran counter to the settled opin¬ ions, or even the prejudices, of the people of 1780, on any very essential point. Such a scheme would be sure to fail on trial, even if it were not at once rejected. The problem before the Convention was to make as free a Republic as was consistent with the opinions then prevailing. The question for them to solve was not what form of government the people of 1820 or 1879 will probably be willing to support, not even what the people of 1780 ought to support, or would support if they were far wiser and better than they really were, but what was the best frame of government which the people of 1780, with all their prejudices and opinions, would cheerfully sup¬ port and acquiesce in, because these were the people, and these were the only people, who could make the government a success or a failure. Having regard to these opinions and prejudices, the Con¬ vention actually went so far as to limit the right of suffrage even for men. To entitle a man to vote for or against the adop¬ tion of the Constitution, he was only required to be an adult freeman ; but to be able to vote under the Constitution, a man was required to have a certain amount of property. There can be no doubt that fewer men were able to vote for members of the General Court under the Constitution than were able to do so under the Provincial Charter. Under the Charter the owner of a freehold having an annual income of only forty shillings, or the owner of other estate worth ,£50, could vote for Representatives ; but to be able to do this under our Con¬ stitution, a man was required to own a freehold estate of the annual income of £3, or other estate of the value of £ 60. Our fathers were, therefore, inconsistent with their own principles in the treatment of their own sex. Even this did not satisfy their notions as practical men. They also saw that education had been systematically denied to women, and i4 that women were then in a state of legal subjection to men in regard to almost every personal and property right. Hav¬ ing due regard to this state of facts, they therefore intrusted the actual powers of government to only a portion even of the men. To have done otherwise would no doubt have insured the rejection of the Constitution. That the women in 1780 were wholly uneducated is plain. Charles Francis Adams, in the memoir of his grandmother, Abigail Adams, says : “ The cultivation of the female mind was regarded with utter indifference.” (Memoir, pp. xxiii, xxiv.) In a letter to her husband, dated June 30, 1770, she says: I regret the trifling, narrow, contracted education of the fe¬ males of my own country. . . . But you need not be told how much female education is neglected, nor how fashionable it has become to ridicule female learning ; though I acknowledge it my happiness to be connected with a person of a more gener¬ ous mind and liberal sentiments, I cannot forbear transcribing a few generous sentiments which I lately met with upon this subject. If women, says the writer, are to be esteemed our enemies, methinks it is an ignoble cowardice thus to disarm them, and not allow them the same weapons we use our¬ selves ; but if they deserve the title of our friends, it is an inhuman tyranny to debar them of the privileges of ingenuous education, which would also render their friendship so much the more delightful to themselves and us.” (Letters, p. 99.) Mrs. Adams never was sent to school, and in another let¬ ter, written only a year before her death, in 1817, she says: “Female education in the best families went no further than writing and arithmetic ; in some few and rare instances, mu¬ sic and dancing.” In reference to the subjection of women, Mrs. Adams, under date May 7, 1776, writes to her husband : “ I cannot say that I think you are very generous to the ladies ; for whilst you are proclaiming peace and good-will to men, emancipating all nations, you insist upon retaining an absolute power over wives.” (Letters, p. 75.) No woman, married or single, had, up to that time, ever l 5 voted even in parish matters. At that time husband and wife were one person in estimation of law, and that one was the husband. A woman’s personal property by marriage then became absolutely her husband’s ; and at his death he could leave it entirely away from her. If he left no will, one third came back to her, and two thirds went to the children. If he left no children, one half came back to her and the other half went to his relations. By marriage, the husband became absolutely master of the profits of his wife’s real estate during marriage. If he had a living child, and survived his wife, he held all her lands during his life. She could make no convey¬ ance or mortgage of her real estate without his consent, and no will at all, either with or without his consent. He could appoint an entire stranger guardian of her children. It was not until seven years after the adoption of the Con¬ stitution that a married woman whose husband had abandoned her, and did nothing for her support, could be authorized by the Supreme Court to convey her own real estate. (Stat. 1787, c. 32.) No matter if she were really starving, prior to 1787, no married woman could sell or mortgage her own lands to procure food with, and no court could give her such power! This was the first law ameliorating the condition of married women. Not until sixty-two years after the adoption of the Consti¬ tution was she allowed to make a will even with her husband’s consent, (Stat. 1842, c. 74,) so fearful were husbands of losing grasp on the property of their wives. As lately as 1845 the first radical change was made in our law, by allowing married women to hold separate property without the intervention of a trustee, and to sue and be sued on contracts made with reference to such property as if un¬ married. (Stat. 1845, c - 208.) The next year they were allowed to give a valid receipt for their own wages, and it was not until 1874 (ninety-four years after the adoption of the Constitution) that the rights of married women to con¬ tract, to make notes or mortgages, to sell real estate, to sue and be sued, were put on substantially the same ground i6 with similar rights on the part of the husband. (Stat. 1874, c. 184.) Down to this very year, 1879, with all our supposed en¬ lightenment and liberality, and when women are declared to have all the rights they really need for their protection, the husband has legally owned his wife’s clothing, although that clothing was bought with money earned partly by her! (1876; 119 Mass. 596.) I could no doubt point out some husbands whose clothing has been bought wholly with the money of their wives ; but these wives have never had any similar right of ownership in their husbands’ wardrobe. Why ? Because men alone have had the ballot; men alone have had the making, expounding, and executing of the laws. If women had had the ballot, no court could have been found to deny them the ownership of their own clothes. 1 Such having been the subjection of women, and their almost entire want of education in 1780, is it strange that our fathers intrusted the administration of affairs to men only ? On the contrary, it would, I think, have been far stranger if they had given Suffrage to women. To have done so would have shown them to be visionary politicians rather than practical men, and would have gone far to demonstrate their unfitness to start a great Common¬ wealth. They were, however, great and noble-minded enough to proclaim the true ideas or principles upon which a republic ought to rest. They made the most ample provision for the amendment of those parts of the actual Frame of Government, which were inconsistent with these ideas of the Declaration, and then trusted serenely to time and the gradual develop¬ ment of the ideas to finally bring affairs on to a just basis. As if to help on this result, they called upon us frequently to recur to fundamental principles, and to adhere to justice in our legislation if we wished the blessings of a free government to be maintained. 1 This decision of our court has been modified by act of the Legislature so far as to allow a wife to receive dresses, by gift from her husband, not exceeding $2,000 in value. (Stat. 1879, c. 133.) i7 And with all its short-comings and inconsistencies our fathers offered to the world a very noble illustration of the most fundamental principle of our Declaration of Rights. They did not seek to place their government in the hands of men who were powerful enough to compel obedience to their wishes, for this would have been to establish slavery, pure and simple. Though they sedulously guarded the rights of prop¬ erty, they nevertheless did not place their government in the hands of those who were wealthy enough to purchase com¬ pliance with their wishes, for this would have been to secure the triumph of selfishness of the most odious kind. Though education had been favored from the very first settlement of the country, they did not place their government in the hands of educated or learned men. This would have resulted only in a more refined form of selfishness, for educated or learned men have in all ages been found willing enough to legislate for their own interests. Everybody knows that one of the greatest and wisest was also the meanest of mankind. Though anciently only church members could vote, and the men of 1780 expressly commanded the support of public worship, they nevertheless did not place their government in the hands of the so-called religious people, for all history had taught them that the greatest sufferings which have been inflicted on the human race have been inflicted by conscientious men in the name of religion. Our fathers sought rather to frame a government which should command the support of the strong and the weak, the wealthy and the poor, the wise and the unlearned, — the sup¬ port of the whole people, men and women. In their opinion, the true strength and greatness of a free people is to be found, not in its politicians, orators, poets, and historians, noble men and women though they may be; but in the faithful courage and intelligence of its unnamed and unnamable millions. Our fathers sought to frame a government which should bring about the gradual lifting up, not of man as an individual, but of human nature itself. They wished to create a government that the people should love, should be willing to work for, and, 2 i8 if need be, to die for. And how strongly has the govern¬ ment proved itself to be intrenched in the hearts of the people! How nobly the people, men and women, struggled in its defence, in the darkest hours of the war! Our fa¬ thers really and truly thought that government was insti¬ tuted for the common good, for the protection, safety, pros¬ perity, and happiness of the people, and not for the profit, honor, or private interests of any one man, family, or class of men. This was their ideal! Neither they nor we have lived up to it; but will not our Presidents compare favorably with the rulers of any other country during the last hundred years ? Abraham Lincoln was pre-eminently a man of the people. He was born of poor parents, and enjoyed none of the ad¬ vantages which wealth or culture could give ; but he was wealthy enough to give a noble life to his country. No man ever gave a nobler. If he was too unlearned to be able to read Napoleon’s Life of Caesar, he was yet, by the grace of the Almighty, orator and poet enough to give an address at Gettysburg which no one of our orators has been able to sur¬ pass, and few of them can ever hope to equal. In morals, “ Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them,” constitutes our ideal of a noble life. How few persons have ever lived up to it! and yet does any one doubt the nobility of the ideal, or our duty to strive our utmost to realize it ? Because our fathers and we have failed for a hundred years to realize their and our ideal as to what constitutes a just government, is that any reason whatever why we should doubt the truth of the ideal, or should not continue to strug¬ gle more and more towards that ideal ? Because the human race have failed for more than twenty centuries to realize the ideal of what constitutes a noble life, is that any reason whatever why we should not continue to struggle more and more to do unto others as we would have them do unto us ? Without ideals life would not be worth having, — there could be no progress. 19 “ The fiend that man harries Is love of the best,” and the best is always receding and advancing. The Declaration of Rights embodies ideals on various sub¬ jects, all directly calculated, if not actually intended, to incite us to the more and more perfect realization of a government based on liberty and justice. Though the Constitution acts as a restraint against improper legislation, it is a very inade¬ quate notion to consider it merely as a fetter. On the con¬ trary, its great truths ought to make us regard it rather as a beacon light for progress. The history of the last hundred years is the record of a continual struggle on the part of the people to conform more and more perfectly to their ideals, and a constant progress towards that end. In 1780 our fathers thought people might very properly be compelled by law to support some sort of public worship, and to go somewhere to church, and it was only after fifty-three years of struggle and growth that all such laws were deemed infringements of personal rights, and the voluntary system in matters of religion was adopted. Now, to what cause has this been owing, unless it be to the gradual unfolding of the ideal of our Bill of Rights, that each one should be allowed to worship God “in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own con¬ science,” provided only he does “ not disturb the public peace or obstruct others in their religious worship.” (Deck of Rights, Articles 2 and 3, Amendment 11, 1833.) In 1780 the rights of property were especially protected. No person could be a Representative who did not own a free¬ hold estate worth ;£ioo, or other ratable estate of the value of .£200; and no person could be a Senator who did not own a freehold estate of the value of £300, or personal estate of the value of £600; and the Governor was required to own a freehold of the value of <£1,000; so that, in point of fact, the law-making power was placed in the hands of property-holders. Although the House of Representatives was apportioned 20 through the State on the basis of ratable polls, or with some sort of reference to population, the Senate was distinctly and in terms apportioned according to the public taxes paid by the different districts. In other words, the Senate was in¬ tended to, and did, represent property in 1780. (Address of the Convention, Journal, p. 218.) It is plain enough to us now how contrary these provisions in our frame of government were to the ideal contained in our Declaration, that all power resides in the people. Never¬ theless, sixty years elapsed before the Senate was based upon population (Amendment 13, 1840), and ceased to represent property ; and sixty years of effort had to be made before we thought it safe to declare that “ no possession of a free¬ hold or of any other estate shall be required as a qualification for holding a seat in either branch of the General Court.” (Amendment 13, 1840.) In 1780 voters for members of the General Court were required to own a freehold estate of the annual income of £3, or an estate of the value of £60. It took forty-one years before we realized the inconsistency of this requirement fully enough to abandon it. The Convention of 1820 proposed what is now the present rule on this subject. To be a voter a man must, among other things, have paid a State or county tax within two years before the date of voting, and now, in 1879, after the lapse of fifty-nine years more, we are trying to realize that even this small amount of taxation is inconsistent with our ideal, and efforts are making by distinguished citizens to do away wholly and for ever with this last vestige of a property qualification for voting. To what possible cause can we attribute the great changes made in 1821, and that which is now in prospect, unless it be the gradual unfolding more and more clearly of the idea of our Declaration of Rights, that a government to be just must rest on the consent of the governed, and not merely on the consent of those who pay taxes ? Our fathers were satisfied with giving the ballot to men who possessed very little prop¬ erty even for those days. We reduced the amount to almost a nominal sum in 1821, and now talk of removing it entirely, as being of little pecuniary benefit to the State, but rather a source of corruption. The State is beginning to think to-day that every man needs the ballot for his protection, and that the poorer a man is, the more he needs the protection. In like manner, we think every woman needs the ballot for her protection, and the poorer she is, the more sadly she needs it. Now if it has taken us men, and the cause of religious liberty, fifty-three years of struggle before we were able to enjoy the measure of freedom from personal annoyance and property spoliation which we now enjoy, —if it took us men forty-one years to do away with the original property quali¬ fication for voters, and sixty-one years to do away with a similar qualification for our legislators, — why should we feel discouraged that hitherto the State has disregarded the rights of women to a proper share in their own government ? In 1780, in general, education was denied women. Now the State trusts mainly to women for the education of our future voters. We do not trust these women, as has been asserted by honorable Senators, because they can be had cheaper than men. On the contrary, we know very well that they are fully competent to do the work asked from them. It is nevertheless true, that a woman, although she may really do the same good work as a man, almost never receives the same wages. This very common fact, however, only shows how unworthily men have exercised uncontrolled power, and how much woman needs the ballot for her protection. We are able to see to-day, even more clearly than our fathers, the true meaning and force of their ideals, and, taking heart from their struggles and successes, we are content to struggle on, until all shall be willing to admit that a govern¬ ment which is declared to rest upon the consent of the people cannot, and ought not, longer to remain in the hands of less than one quarter of the people. Massachusetts governs more than a million and a half of people, a majority of whom are females. Every year she taxes nearly a hundred thousand men who have no right of suffrage. 22 Only a little over forty-four per cent of the whole male popu¬ lation are voters. 1 (Census, 1875, p. 34.) Now if we can find no just ground for the right of the State to govern us men, except only that we are part of the people, and have consented to be thus governed, where does the State get the right to govern women ? When, where, and how have they ever consented to be governed ? Some of us used to argue in antislavery days that South Carolina had not a republican form of government, because more than half the population of the State were slaves. What form of government shall we say Massachusetts has in 1879? Shall we say it is an aristocracy founded on birth ? Does any one say that the government, though administered by only a portion of the men, really represents the women ? The answer is ready : It is not true. Since 1857 the Senate and House have been apportioned according to the number of legal voters. (Amendments 21, 22.) So that the Legislature as now constituted is based upon, and only represents, legal voters. We have seen that down to 1840 (Amendment 13) the House was apportipned according to the number of ratable polls, and the Senate according to the amount of public taxes paid. From 1840 to 1857 the Senate and House were ap¬ portioned according to the number of inhabitants, or popula¬ tion. During these years, therefore, the women had the same sort of representation as the slaves used to have in Congress. The white men in the slave States used to have greater politi¬ cal power in Congress in consequence of the existence of slaves. So in Massachusetts, between 1840 and 1857 the men had more of representative power in the Legislature according as the number of women was larger or smaller in the different towns and cities. If we think that the slaves consented to the passage of the amended Fugitive Slave Bill (1850) because by their numbers they had given the white 1 Population, 1,651,912. 794,383 males, 857,529 females, 63,146 more females than males, 449,686 ratable polls, 351,113 legal voters, 98,573 men who are taxed, and who have no right of suffrage. 2 3 members from the South the eighteen votes which sufficed to carry the measure (Taxation of Women, &c., revised edition, pp. 13, 14), then we may consider that between 1840 and 1857 the women of Massachusetts were represented by the men in those years, and not otherwise. But if the government of the State is thus based upon legal voters only; if, politically speaking, the existence of women is wholly ignored as a factor in government ; if they really have no voice whatever in reference to the Constitution or the laws under which they live, are governed, taxed, and punished, — what can every fair-minded man say or do, except agree with Governor Talbot in thinking that the claims of women to the right of Suffrage have too firm a basis in natural justice to be any longer thrust lightly aside ? Let us then follow the advice of Governor Talbot given to-day, rather than the practice of our fathers a hundred years ago. Let us look at their ideal, and not their short-comings. Let us amend the frame of government so as to fully carry out the ideal of the Declaration of Rights, to the end that the People of the State, and not a meagre fraction of them, may really and truly be the source of all the power, executive, legislative, and judicial, which is now exercised, by conferring upon all adult citizens, who are able to contract, the right of Suffrage, and prescribe the same qualifications for men and women. Let us in the light of facts as they now exist, not as they were in 1780, determine what qualifications for voting will secure the best results of the wisdom and the virtue of the peo¬ ple, and apply the same rules impartially to men and women. Only by so doing can we establish justice. In no other way can we preserve the advantages of liberty and maintain a free government. In the government of a human being personal rights are of vastly more importance than rights of property; and yet among English people and their descendants the most strenu¬ ous fights for liberty have been made on questions affecting the right of taxation. With this idea in their minds, “ The Colonists said, if Parliament could tax us, they could establish 24 the Church of England, with its creeds, titles, and ceremonies, and prohibit all other churches as conventicles and schism shops.” (J. Wingate Thornton, &c., as quoted, Taxation of Women, p. 17.) The Colonists evidently thought, and with good reason, that the power to tax them involved also the power to destroy their religious liberty. “ The feelings of the Colonies,” said Edmund Burke in 1774, “were formerly the feelings of Great Britain. Theirs were formerly the feelings of Mr. Hampden when called upon for the payment of twenty shillings. Would twenty shillings have ruined Mr. Hampden’s fortune ? No ! but the payment of half twenty shillings on the principle it was demanded would have made him a slave!” (Speech on American Taxation.) In the same spirit of resistance to all encroachments on liberty, our Bill of Rights (Art. 23) declares that “ No subsidy, charge, tax, impost, or duties ought to be established, fixed, laid, or levied, under any pretext whatsoever, without the con¬ sent of the people or their representatives in the Legislature.” Only legal voters being represented in the Legislature, women have no representatives there who can consent to their taxation, and yet every year we tax them about two millions of dollars ! Under what pretext do we justify these acts of spoliation ? Solely, because we have constantly taxed them, and they have never actually rebelled ! Thousands of them have, however, each and every year, and for many years past, protested against this great wrong, and have asked, as the only real remedy for the injustice, that suffrage may be extended to them on the same terms as such right is now enjoyed by men. Thus far, however, they have had leave to withdraw their petitions. Last year some hundreds of women, many of them well known and honored in the community, asked for the passage of a law conferring upon them and other women “ who pay taxes on property the rights to vote for town and city officers, and to take part in the management of town and city affairs, 25 on the same terms on which such rights are now held by men who are tax-payers.” These, and all the other petitions for suffrage, were referred to the same committee. Hon. Albert Palmer, of the Senate, and five Representatives, constituting the majority of the com¬ mittee, were in favor of giving suffrage to women on the same terms as men, and so reported. Hon. Robert R. Bishop and Plon. Amos J. Saunders, of the Senate, and two Representa¬ tives, constituting the minority of the committee, reported adversely on both classes of petitions. One Representative, being willing to have the subject referred to the people, signed both reports. The minority of the committee declared their opposition to woman suffrage in every form, and argued strenuously against it. In special reference to the claim of women tax-payers, they said: “ If suffrage should be accorded to women, it should not be to a portion of women, on the ground of their property qualification.” (Sen. Doc. 1878, No. 122, p. 4.) On this particular point, objection to a property qualification, the committee were declared to be substantially of one mind. We agree with them in objecting, upon principle, to a prop¬ erty qualification for voting, whether the voters be men or women ; but so long as suffrage is made dependent, as now, upon the payment of a tax, citizens of both sexes should be treated alike. We allow a man to vote who pays a tax of two dollars, and never think of inquiring whether he has earned his money by the work of his hands, or has received it from the income of fifty dollars invested in United States four per cent bonds. Ought we not to treat women in the same way? It was admitted at the hearing that the Legislature had full power to confer municipal suffrage on women. If, therefore, opposition to a property qualification had really been the ground of the refusal to grant this petition, there was nothing, as we suggested, to prevent the passage of a law for assessing those women who felt the injustice of their treatment, and who desired to vote, a poll-tax (this has already 26 been done in Massachusetts), and also a tax on property (if any), just the same as men are now treated. This would have met the whole difficulty. The committee did not even attempt to prove any right to tax women for property if the ballot was denied them, although this objection was most strongly urged before them. In our argument we wholly denied the right to tax women a single dollar so long as suffrage was denied them. We presume, from their silence, that the committee failed to find any de¬ cent “pretext,” to use the words of our Constitution, for taxing women without their consent, or the consent of their representatives. We do not wonder at their silence. Why did they not, however, advise the Legislature to pass a law releasing women from taxation until such time as we shall enable them, in a constitutional and legal manner, to consent to such taxation ? This is the very least thing that we men can do, and this it would have been right and proper for us to do. But this the committee did not advise. Did they realize that any such legislation would be equivalent to voting to increase the taxes of every man in the State about one tenth, and shrink, as men, from doing this ? Possibly not. But, whatever may have been the reason for their silence, or their neglect of the opportunity to do justice to women, in point of fact, they contented themselves with dismissing the women tax-payers with a discourse on the unrepublican character of a property qualification for voting, with which everybody agrees, and still leaving women to continue to be despoiled of two millions of dollars every year, although we men are obliged to trample Article 23 of our Declaration of Rights under foot in order to be able to do it. Some one will, no doubt, raise the same objection which was urged by the minority of this same committee, that suf¬ frage is a civil, and not a natural right, and each State has a perfect right to decide for itself who shall and who shall not vote, and that therefore suffrage may be conferred exclu¬ sively on men without infringing the just rights of women. We maintain, on the contrary, that if the adult male citizens 27 of Massachusetts have any sort of right, call it or be it what you please, civil, natural, inherent, or just, in reference to their own government, the adult female citizens having the same qualifications as men ought to have precisely the same sort of right, civil, natural, inherent, or just, to a vote in ref¬ erence to their government. This committee say: “ Natural rights are such that, if their exercise is denied by government, this lays the foundation for a justifiable revolution. It will hardly be contended . . . that an attempt to overturn the existing government in Mas¬ sachusetts by force, would be justifiable in case the right of suffrage is not accorded to women. This is the test of the correctness of the proposition.” Among the natural rights, the denial of which will justify forcible revolution, in the opinion of this committee, are “the right to life, liberty, and the acquisition of property; but such is not the right to the ballot.” (Sen. Doc., No. 122, p. 5.) We prefer the definition of natural rights which our fathers have left us. They say (Decl., Art. 1): “ All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties ; that of acquiring, pos¬ sessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.” There can be no doubt that under this article the natural rights of women are intended to be protected just as fully and perfectly as the natural rights of men. And notwithstanding the fact that the property rights of women have not been as fully protected as those of men, and that women have not been allowed the same freedom as men in seeking their safety and happiness, still, speaking generally, it is nevertheless true, that the State engages to protect the natural rights of all citizens of both sexes alike. Now, the minority of this committee argue that women can have no natural right to vote, because they have no right to overturn the present government of Massachusetts by force. 28 Our fathers neither declare nor deny suffrage to be a nat¬ ural right. They do not, to be sure, profess to enumerate all the rights which may fairly be considered natural. Still, as they deny suffrage to women, there is ground for the objec¬ tion that suffrage was not, in their opinion, a natural right. What, however, does this objection and argument really amount to ? Let us suppose that men and women have changed places in Massachusetts. This change will not affect the natural rights of persons of either sex in the slightest degree. All the natural rights which government engages to support and protect will remain, and will be supported and protected pre¬ cisely as they now are. The change having been effected, less than one quarter of the People, composed of women, will exercise all the powers of government, and the large majority of the People, although men, will have no political rights what¬ soever in reference either to themselves or women. Does any one doubt, would this committee contend for a single mo¬ ment, that under any such circumstances the men would have no right to overturn the government by force ? Every man of us, the committee included, would admit the right. But if, under such circumstances, men would have the right to overturn the government by force unless suffrage was ex¬ tended to them, the committee, on theft theory, must admit that suffrage for men is a natural right. If so, then as nat¬ ural rights know no sex, the committee are also compelled to admit that suffrage for women is a natural right. Women must be fully justified in seeking to overturn the government to-day, because the men would be justified in so acting if they were in the subordinate place now held by women. This objection or argument of the minority of the commit¬ tee has, therefore, no real weight whatsoever. At first, men will use argument to obtain any right which is denied them, and, if argument fails, they will use force, if the occasion seems to justify it. And this method has frequently worked out good results. On the other hand, women will pursue a better course. They will seek to obtain their rights by per- 2 9 suasion and argument, and, we hope, never by force. We have already had too many appeals to force in the government of the world; the less we have of them, in future the better. Women seek to obtain their rights by appeals to reason, and the sense of justice in men ; and when the right of suffrage shall be finally granted to women for these reasons, as it can¬ not fail to be, the community, being ready to receive it, will work out a nobler Free Republic than the world has ever seen. May we not hope that the next time the men composing the minority of this committee shall be called upon to consider this subject, they will say that, according to the true test, suf¬ frage must be considered to be a natural right under our form of government; — because women, being largely in the major ity, have an undoubted right (just as undoubted as men would have if situated as women now are), by arguments and appeals to reason, and, if these shall fail, by the use of force, to resist a government which takes their property by taxation without representation, and governs them without their consent, for taxation without representation, and government not based on consent is tyranny, and never can be anything else, and tyranny fully justifies revolution, whether the governing power be in the hands of men or women. In further support of fheir objection, the minority of this committee quote Judge Story as saying, “ The truth seems to me that the right of voting, like many other rights, is one which, whether it has a fixed foundation in natural law or not, has always been treated in the practice of nations as a strictly civil right, derived from and regulated by each society accord¬ ing to its own circumstances and interests. It is difficult, even in the abstract, to conceive how it could have otherwise been treated/’ They also refer to what they describe as “ a recent and very thoroughly considered case in one of the most respected State courts ” (23 Maryland Rep. 531), where the court say that the elective franchise “ is a privilege conferred on the citizen by the sovereign power of the State to subserve a general public 30 purpose, and not for private or individual advantage; that, as against the power conferring it, the citizen acquires no in¬ defeasible right to its continuance or enjoyment; and that the people of the State, in the exercise of their sovereign power, may qualify, suspend, or entirely withdraw it from any citizen, or class of them, providing, always, that representa¬ tion of the people, the essential characteristic of a republican government, be not disregarded or abandoned.” These committee-men also refer to a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States (21 Wal. 162), to the effect “ that suffrage was not, and never had been, one of the necessary rights of citizenship ; and that, therefore, a pro¬ vision in the constitution and laws of a State denying its exercise to women was valid.” Doubtless other decisions of courts and quotations from text-books of the same kind can be produced, for the fact is plain enough that, though all the States claim to have a repub¬ lican form of government, they all, including Massachusetts, unite in denying suffrage to women by their constitutions, except, possibly, in some few of them where the women enjoy the right of suffrage as to school matters. Our Constitution denies suffrage to women ; and as our Supreme Judicial Court cannot declare this or any other clause in the Constitution to be invalid, it must necessarily decide that the denial of suffrage to women is constitutional, and therefore that suffrage is a mere privilege which may legally be withheld. We are, however, now discussing the nature of suffrage on what should be considered as the fundamental principles of a republic. We admit readily enough that women have not got the right of suffrage now. We admit readily enough that the courts will unite in deciding that women may be denied the ballot by a constitutional provision in the State where they reside, and so of course all writers of text-books will say. Our question, however, is, What right have we men to im¬ pose such a constitutional restriction on women ? And we seek to answer this question on what we ourselves 3i admit to be fundamental grounds, not so much on what exists as on what ought to exist; not on what the courts feel obliged to support, but on what they ought to support; and if it be, as this court in Maryland says, the truth, that repre¬ sentation of the People is the essential characteristic of a republic, and cannot be disregarded, we must ask whether the People are really and truly represented in this sense when only about one quarter of them have any power whatever in relation to government. What just right, therefore, have the male voters of Massa¬ chusetts by their Constitution to deny suffrage to those women who are qualified to vote in all respects as themselves, merely because they are born women ? If we male voters have any such right it must come from, — (i.) The consent of the women to be governed by us; or,— (2.) The right of men to govern women, whether they con¬ sent or not ; or, — (3.) The actual possession of the power by men without regard to right. If women had ever consented to be governed by us, our rule over them would of course be just. But women have never given any such consent. On the contrary, it has only been after long years of effort and struggle on their part against all sorts of ridicule and opposition on the part of men, that the women of the State have finally wrung from our un¬ willing hands the measure of property right which they now possess. The existing subjection of women is merely what remains of the former universal slavery of women, and the slavery of women at the time of its existence was deemed by the very best and noblest of men to be as natural a state for women as their present state of subjection is now deemed by any of us men to be their natural condition. We male voters can therefore claim no right to govern women on the ground that they consent. Have we a right to govern women whether they consent or not ? It is true enough that men have so governed women in 3 2 all ages, and now do so in Massachusetts ; but have we any right to do so merely because we are men ? The idea of a single man being “ born a magistrate, law¬ giver, or judge,” appears to us to be, and is most manifestly, “absurd and unnatural.” (Decl. of Rights, Art. 6.) Is it any less absurd or unnatural to hold, as these objectors and the minority of this committee must do, that no one can be a magistrate, lawgiver, or judge in this State who is not born a man ? According to our Bill of Rights, “ all men are born . . . equal”; and our Supreme Judicial Court having decided that the word “ men ” as here used is equivalent to mankind, and therefore includes both men and women, we must hold that men and women are born equal, that is, with equal rights before the law. (Decl. of Rights, Art. i ; 4 Mass. Rep. 128 ; Taxation of Women, revised ed., p. 5.) Therefore men have no more just right than women to be born magistrates, lawgivers, and judges. We men cannot therefore claim any just right to govern women in this State, as we do, in the character of magistrates, lawgivers, and judges, simply because we are born men. We are therefore driven to rest our claim of right to govern women merely on the fact that we hold the reins of govern¬ ment, and have control of the physical power of the State. In a recent debate in our State-House, Hon. Senator Winn admits this, when he professes to answer the question which he said was often asked by women : “ Who gave you (i. e. men) the power to decide for women ? ” His answer was, “ No matter who gave it, we have it” ! (Woman’s Journal, April 5, 1879.) King George and his adherents also held the reins of govern¬ ment and controlled the physical power of Great Britain. Did our fathers think that these facts gave him or Parliament any right to govern them without their consent ? The persons who bring forward this objection, the Hon. Senator Winn and the minority of the legislative commit¬ tee, are therefore really disbelievers in the true idea of a republican form of government. They may cover up their real meaning so that this disbelief shall not be very apparent 33 perhaps even to themselves ; but nevertheless a free republic can only rest on consent, it can never tolerate an aristocracy of birth, and must resist until death a government supported only on force, especially when, as in Massachusetts, this aristocracy and this force rest only with one quarter part of the people. We have had great and learned discussions about the repre¬ sentation of minorities, as if now the majority had any voice whatever. Let us rather seek to found a republic where the majority shall be represented. It never yet has been done. Does any one say Suffrage is a manly right, and is not exercised except by those who can fight, — that behind every ballot stands a bullet ? We deny the fact. We have 48,436 young men in Massachusetts between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. They constitute the best of our fighting material, and they are not allowed to vote because they are minors. Of those who possess the ballot, 97,136 are over forty-five years of age and are incapable of fighting. 248,977,'if “able-bodied,” (Gen. Stat., c. 13, §§ 1,4, 14,) are enrolled in the militia, and may possibly be called on to fight, though they never have been ; but they all vote, and it makes no sort of difference in their right to vote whether they are able-bodied or sickly. Not more than 5,000 are allowed to volunteer to do all the fighting needed, and they have no more rights at the ballot- box than those who are incapable of holding a gun. 1 Now, if the best fighters are not allowed to vote, and the best class of voters are incapable of fighting, and not more than one fiftieth of the voters who are even liable to be en¬ rolled are allowed to volunteer to fight, or to be in readiness if necessary, and no difference whatever is made in the right of the forty-nine fiftieths to vote, whether they are able-bodied or not, it cannot be said with truth that Suffrage depends at all on the ability to fight. Who would propose to disfranchise the gallant color-ser- 1 Compendium of Census, 1875, P* 39 - l 34 geant who lost both arms in supporting the flag ? Where is to be found the man with soul so dead as to dream of dis¬ franchising General Bartlett, even when he lay on the bed of death ? But if it were true, as it is not, that the right of Suffrage depends at all on the ability to fight, the Constitution ex¬ pressly recognizes that an equivalent may be given for per¬ sonal service. Government engages to protect the people in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property, and each individual is required “to give his personal services or an equivalent when necessary.” (Decl., Art. io.) Quakers are not called upon to fight, and yet they are allowed to vote. They are exempted on moral grounds, and are allowed to furnish an equivalent for personal services. Why cannot we place women on the same ground as men over forty-five, and deem them incapable of fighting ? or treat them as Quakers, and allow them to furnish an equivalent for personal service, or require them to furnish substitutes, as we begged them to do in the war, or oblige them to do as they volunteered to do in the war, — serve on Sanitary Commissions, and in hospitals as superintendents, or doctors, or nurses ? Few of us realize how much the women of the country did, by real hard physical work, to secure the efficiency of our army as a fighting body. Abraham Lincoln said, at the open¬ ing of the Sanitary Fair in Washington: “I am not accus¬ tomed to the use of language of eulogy. I have never studied the art of paying compliments to women ; but I must say, that if all that has been said by orators and poets since the creation of the world in praise of women were applied to the women of America, it would not do them justice for their conduct during this war.” (U. S. San. Com., p. 282.) Government does not, however, rest on physical, but on moral force. In the language of the Constitution, it rests on the “ wisdom and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused gen¬ erally among the body of the people.” (Frame of Government, c. 5, § 2.) The army and navy, the police and constables, all have their use, but it is the people of the country who sup- 35 port them, not they the people, — for a law cannot be long enforced by all of them combined, unless sustained by the moral sense of the people. It requires the services of about four millions and a half of men, and costs about a thousand millions of dollars, every year, for the so-called Christian nations of the world to support their armies and navies even on a peace footing! This is the best result of civilization carried on by men alone, for now nearly nineteen centuries. Must the human race forever go on in this blundering, wasteful, and brutal way, or cannot some better way be found ? What would be the effect if the Chris¬ tian world should spend every year a thousand million of dol¬ lars in helping people to live happy and useful lives, instead of throwing it away in organizing means of destruction ? May we not reasonably hope that the influence of women, as voters, will tend to lessen this enormous sacrifice of life and the means of happiness ? Finally, does any one say suffrage is not a womanly act ? This seems to be the opinion of the minority of the legislative committee, and to be a great, if not the greatest, objection to our claim, for they say, woman suffrage proposes “ a revolu¬ tion contrary to the order of nature, in which the household and the family would, to a great extent, be sacrificed to public duties and political life.” Cannot we safely leave to the women themselves the determination of what is and what is not womanly, — what will and what will not sacrifice families ? Formerly, when men met together by themselves for feas.ting and pleasure, drunkenness and debauch were the invariable results ; and to this day all such gatherings of men alone are not apt to be favorable to the highest and best purity in con¬ versation. The mere presence of women at these scenes has been sufficient to change all this disgusting excess. No longer can men in the best society be seen crawling down the door-steps of a private house too drunk to walk upright! Have women become any less womanly in consequence of doing away with these things, or have they only succeeded in making men more human by their mere presence ? 3 6 “ The study of political questions, the forming an estimate of the character of public men or measures, the casting a vote which is the result of that study and estimate, certainly have in themselves nothing to degrade the most delicate and refined nature,” as Senators Hoar, Mitchell, and Cameron well say. If men now frequently conduct themselves at the polls as they used formerly to do at social gatherings, and exhibit coarse¬ ness and brutality, and thus show, if anything, their own un¬ fitness to vote, why may not the mere presence of women at the polls have as purifying an effect there as it has already had over social entertainments ? Such has been the actual result in Wyoming. \ The object of voting is to give voice and practical effect to the wisdom, knowledge, and virtue diffused among the people. Do we men possess all the wisdom, knowledge, and virtue which is worth making use of ? Women now vote in parishes and religious societies, and in corporation meetings. They now act as overseers of the poor, serve on school committees, and as school supervisors. They act as executors, adminis¬ trators, trustees, guardians, accountants, book-keepers, &c., and in all these relations they are constantly called upon to act with men. We find women among the clergy. Dr. Collyer has just publicly thanked Miss Eastman for the help¬ ful words she had just uttered from his pulpit. Women act as physicians and surgeons, as authors and artists. More than six times as many women as men are teachers, and those in our High Schools are qualified to teach young men about “ the civil policy of this Commonwealth and of the United States.” (General Statutes, c. 38, § 2.) More women than men are engaged in the manufacture of carpetings, cotton goods, and paper; twice as many in the manufacture of worsted goods, three times as many in the manufacture of silk goods, and five times as many in the manufacture of clothing. On the other hand, five times as many boys as girls are in reformatories. More than five times as many men as women are convicts. More than twice as many men as women are 37 paupers, and about seventy times as many men as women are engaged in the manufacture of liquor, — the nurse of pauper ism and crime! Is it not clear that the average woman, with equal opportu¬ nities for education and development, will show about as much wisdom, knowledge, and virtue as the average man ? If general Woman Suffrage has been proved by the very best witnesses, and beyond all possible doubt and cavil, to be a success in Wyoming, as it has, why cannot we safely and wisely try it here ? If limited municipal and school suffrage is actually exer¬ cised in England by some of the best and noblest women there, without impairing in the slightest degree their womanly character, our women can do the same here. Suffrage in reference to school matters, thank God, is already in actual use in Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, and New Hampshire, and we propose to try it here also. Half the school-children are girls, more than six sevenths of the teachers are women. What possible ground can there be, except mere prejudice, for denying them the right to vote for school appropriations, and about school studies and govern¬ ment, in any of the States ? 1 Men drink, and women suffer. With manhood suffrage, according to Judge Pitman, we spend for drink six times as much as we do for education every year. Cannot we pru¬ dently call on the women to help us by their votes, so that we may at least expend as much for the education as we do for the brutalization of the race ? Does any one object that woman suffrage exists in Utah ? It is difficult to say what vagaries, and even immoralities, men and women may not be led into from religious teachings or enthusiasm. A generation or more ago there was a great revival of religion in the Orthodox Church in New England, the outcome of which was the establishment of a sect of Christians, called Perfectionists, made up of earnest men and women who believed it was possible for them to live here on earth perfectly sinless lives. 3 § These Orthodox Christians, though breaking no law of the State of New York, have a system of complex marriage, really no marriage at all, as the world commonly understands that term. The Mormons, in defiance of the law of the land, have what they call plural marriage, — really polygamy. Now when it is objected that woman suffrage exists in Utah, it should be borne in mind that it exists only in con¬ nection with a government which, until very lately, has been wholly in the hands of the Mormon Church. Wherever the supreme power of the state is in the hands of a church, no matter what, whether Christian or Mormon, the government can hardly fail to be bad. No suffrage can save such a gov¬ ernment from producing evil results. I have nothing to say in defence of these systems in refer¬ ence to marriage, except this, that even plural marriage, where, as in Utah, the man feels it to be a religious duty to support all his children and their mothers, or even the system of com¬ plex marriage, where, as at Oneida, the person of a woman is declared to be sacred, and all the men profess to feel under a sacred religious obligation to support and protect all the women and save them from compulsory or undesired child¬ bearing, bad as they may seem to be, are both of them, to say the least, as favorable to the women and children as the sub¬ stantial toleration of the social evil, which now exists in this community governed only by male voters, and infinitely better than that still more wicked and cruel outrage on women called the State Regulation of Vice, one or the other or both of* which methods of treating this evil are the only ways thus far devised by men. May we not reasonably hope that, with Woman Suffrage, uncontrolled by misguided or perverted religious enthusiasm, we may be able to find out some better way than either of these, — some way that shall really protect the purity both of men and women ? As matters now stand in the world at large, instead of seeking to protect or strengthen their own purity, men seek rather to protect themselves in sinning, even though in so doing they crush women. 39 There is not a good or beautiful feature of the prevailing social life which Woman Suffrage will not expand and cherish. There is not a bad feature which it will not frown upon and finally extirpate. We have endeavored to show that we men rest our claim of right to the ballot, not on any State law or Constitution, not on any Provincial law or Charter ; not on any grant from the King; not even on the fact that we are men, or men in possession of power, but simply because the right to govern ourselves inheres in us as part of the people, and women as part of the people may make the same claim, and, as the ma¬ jority, they ought to have a better right than we. Our fathers proclaimed the only true ideal of a republic to be power based on the consent of the people. We may excuse their inconsistency in intrusting the actual government to men, because at that time women were wholly uneducated, and in a state of legal subjection to men in almost everything. But as this subjection, so far as property rights are concerned, is now mainly done away with, and the State, instead of dis¬ regarding women as wholly uneducated, now relies mainly on them to educate the future voters ; we cannot longer excuse ourselves for not living up to our ideal: — That, the government of the State now being in the hands of less than one fourth of the people, we have hardly any more right or claim to be called a republic than South Caro lina had when a majority of the people of that State were actually slaves. That the government of this State only represents legal voters; the taxation of women therefore ought not to be con¬ tinued by us “ under any pretext whatsoever,” until we give them representation. Whatever other principles we may for¬ get or ignore, let us never forget that taxation without repre¬ sentation is tyranny, even if the persons taxed be women. That Suffrage is a right which belongs to, and inheres in, the people governed ; that is, in all the adult citizens, men and women, subject only to such reasonable qualifications of the right (capable of attainment by both sexes) as shall 40 secure to the State the best results of the wisdom, knowledge, and virtue in the people. That Suffrage does not depend in the slightest degree on the ability of the voter to fight. Those who are best able to fight cannot vote, and the best voters are unable to fight. On the contrary, the right is in fact enjoyed by any man who is physically incapable just as freely as it is by the young man who volunteers to shoulder his musket. And finally, — That Suffrage is neither a manly act nor yet a womanly act, but the act of a human being, who, as part of the people, has an inherent right to express or refuse consent to the form of government under which he or she lives, because it is, and ever must continue to be, a self-evident truth, that gov¬ ernment derives its just powers from the consent of the governed, men and women, and from no other source under heaven.