L I B R.AR.Y 
 
 OF THL 
 
 UN IVLRSITY 
 
 or ILLINOIS
 
 ^Al WL ^ -CW^ iW/^e.*^,^^' 2^ 
 
 THE 
 
 REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES. 
 
 A PEACTICAL PLAN. 
 
 The Franchise Bill having, apparently, got into smooth waters, 
 public attention is directed to the Redistril)ution Bill. Now, 
 therefore, is the time for believers in the principle of minority 
 representation to press their views upon the public. 
 
 Statistics prove that at the General Election of 1874, the total 
 number of votes given to Liberal candidates exceeded the total 
 number of votes given to Conservative candidates, yet a large 
 majority of Conservative members was returned. . Again, if we 
 examine the returns of the last General Election, we find the 
 Conservative party was entitled to a larger number of members 
 than it succeeded in returning. The political pendulum would 
 swing with less violence than it does at the present time, if we 
 provided for the representation of minorities. 
 
 In this democratic age, no party, either in this or any other 
 country, is free from the democratic influence. The military 
 despotisms in the east of Europe feel the influence, as well as the 
 constitutional free states in the west. Now, a true democracy, 
 that is the government of the whole people by the whole 
 people, not the government of the whole people by a 
 mere majority, is probably the best form of government 
 for a civilized country. In a true democracy, the whole people 
 assemble for legislation, the majority and the minority are 
 equitably represented. The population of the United Kingdom 
 consisting of some 35 millions, cannot assemble in a body for legis- 
 lative purposes, representation becomes a necessity, and it ought, 
 as the late lamented Mr. Fawcett said, to be the chief aim of all 
 representative reform to make Parliament a true reflex of the nation.
 
 The arguments of the opponents of minority representation are 
 chiefly directed against the three-cornered constituencies, as they 
 are called. Look at Manchester and Salford, say they. Manchester 
 is represented by two Liberals and one Conservative, and Salford, 
 the smaller town, is represented by two Liberals ; therefore, they 
 say, Manchester has really only one representative, whilst Salford 
 has two. It may be at once admitted, that if the arrangement in 
 Salford is right, that in Manchester is wrong ; but may not the 
 Salford arrangement be the wrong one 1 Surely the Conservatives 
 of Manchester are sufficiently numerous to entitle them to repre- 
 sentation. At the last general election some 24,000 votes were 
 given to the Liberal candidates, and some 20,000 to the Conser- 
 vative candidates. Ought these 20,000 men to be entirely 
 unrepresented ? 
 
 The six counties, Cheshire, Essex, Kent, Lincoln, Somerset, and 
 Surrey, each return six members to Parliament, and all these 
 members are Conservatives : that is to say, these six counties 
 return thirty-six Conservatives and no Liberal. Out of the thirty 
 members returned for Wales, twenty-eight are Liberals and only 
 two are Conservatives. In the case of Scotland, out of fifty-eight 
 members returned, fifty are Liberals and only eight are Conserva- 
 tives. The boroughs of Wales and Scotland return forty Liberals 
 and only one Conservative. 
 
 Can anyone contend that this is a satisfactory arrangement ? 
 It may be argued that if no Liberals are returned for the six 
 English counties mentioned above, still a vast majority of the 
 Scotch and Welsh members are Liberals, and therefore that the 
 one balances the other. I do not think so. It is poor comfort to 
 a Liberal county elector in Cheshire to be told that there is another 
 county somewhere entirely represented by Liberals. What does 
 he know^ about those Liberals ? He may possibly not even know 
 their names ; he very probably has never seen them. He would 
 much prefer a representative of his own, whom he has seen and 
 heard, and whom he can " heckle," as the Scotch say, when so 
 disposed. 
 
 If representation is to be in accordance with population, we find 
 for a constituency like Manchester there ought to be seven or eight 
 members. Here we are at once met by this difficulty, if minority 
 
 u,uc'
 
 representation is not provided for. Is every elector to have seven 
 or eight votes, according to the number' of members to be returned, 
 or is the cit}^ to be divided into seven or eight wards, each returning 
 one member 1 The latter plan would be the fairer of the two, but 
 surely it would detract from the dignity of Parliamentary repre- 
 sentation. Any man might well be proud to represent the great 
 and important city of Manchester in Parliament, but it would be a 
 very different thing to represent number one, two, or three ward 
 in that city. It would parochialize the representation. 
 
 Further, if we are not to divide Manchester into seven or eight 
 wards, each returning one member, and if we are not to provide 
 for minority representation, what will be the result ? It has already 
 been pointed out that 24,000 electors voted for the Liberal 
 candidates, and 20,000 for the Conservative candidates, at the last 
 general election. But we must remember that in Manchester, as 
 in many other Lancashire towns, the Irish voters can turn the scale. 
 This would be a case of the minority governing in spite of the 
 majority, a result not desired by those who support minority 
 representation. 
 
 Let us examine some of the plans of minority representation. 
 In the first place, we have the three-cornered constituency, as it is 
 called, where there are three members, and each elector has two 
 votes. It is a clumsy and apparently unpopular plan, and is often 
 unsuccessful in its object. Mr. Hare, in his work on 
 " Representation," suggests the following case : — " Suppose 84 
 " voters, of whom 51 are supporters of the Ministry and 33 of the 
 " Opposition, and that there are four candidates — A, B, and C of 
 "the Ministerial party, and D of the Opposition. It might be 
 " supposed that the minority would succeed in returning D ; but 
 " this would be prevented by the majority dividing themselves into 
 "three distinct bodies of 17 each, one of which shall vote for A 
 " and B, another for B and C, and the third for C and A. The 
 "consequence would be that each of the three Ministerial 
 " candidates would have 34 votes, and all would be returned, and 
 " the 33 voices of the minority would be silenced." It may be said 
 that this is an extreme case, but in arguing out a principle, one is 
 justified in taking an extreme case ; and really it will be found on 
 examination that this is what is done in Glasgow and Birmingham.
 
 The Cumulative Vote, as in the case of School Boaid Elections, 
 is another form of minority i*epresentation. In this case, suppose 
 there are 100 electors forming a constituency, having ten votes 
 a-piece. It is clear that singly and relatively they have the same 
 power, one ^vith the other, as if they had one vote a-piece. 
 Therefore, if there are ten members to be elected, each elector has 
 as much ix>wer with one vote as with ten ; probably more, for he 
 is less likely to be manipulated by the wire-pullers. 
 
 Let us now examine Mr. Hare's scheme, of which the follo\nng 
 is a fair example : Suppose a general election to take place, and 
 that there are 1,500 candidates for election, out of whom 650 have 
 to be chosen. Each elector, instead of l^eing confined to the two 
 or four candidates who may offer themselves for his constituency, 
 may vote for any one of the 1,500 candidates. The total number 
 of votes given throughout the kingdom amounting to say 4,550,000, 
 and the total number of candidates to be elected being 650, we 
 find, if we divide the number of votes given by the number 
 of members to be elected, that there would be an average 
 of 7,000 votes for each meml^er. Each elector would be supplied 
 with a voting paper, upon which he would write do^^'n on the top 
 line the name of the candidate he wished to be elected, and every 
 candidate who obtained 7,000 votes would be elected. Noav, it 
 would very possibly happen that the more prominent politicians 
 would receive more than 7,000 votes. Men so well known as Mr. 
 Gladstone and Sir Stafford Xorthcote would receive far more than 
 the requisite number of votes. This is pro\'ided for in the following 
 way : Each elector, in addition to writing down the name of his 
 favourite candidate, may write down imdemeath the name 
 of his second favourite, and imder that the name of his third 
 favouiite, and so on. He may, in fact, write down as many 
 names as there are members to be elected. The voting 
 papers are then collected and counted. Every candidate whose 
 name appears 7,000 times ia the first place is held to be elected ; 
 and the remaining voting papers upon which his name appeal's 
 first are appropriated to swell the number of votes of the 
 candidates whose names appear second ; or when the required 7,000 
 votes have been made up, then of the third, and so on. 
 
 Here a serious objection seems to arise. In what order are the
 
 voting papers to be counted 1 Mr. Hare says this is of little im- 
 portance to the voters, but that it may be of much importance to 
 the candidates. It certainly would be of gSCat importance to the 
 candidates. Take a simple case. Brown, Jones, and Eobinson 
 each receive 5,000 first votes, and Smith obtains 10,000 first 
 votes. Brown, Jones, and Robinson each require 2,000 more 
 votes to be returned, and Smith, having obtained 10,000 votes, 
 has 3,000 to spare. Suppose that upon 2,000 of Smith's voting 
 papers the name of Brown appears second, on 2,000 the name of 
 Jones appears second, and on 2,000 more the name of Robinson 
 appears second. Evidently it is of vital importance to Brown, 
 Jones, and Robinson as to the order in which Smith's votino: 
 papers are counted. Smith's 3,000 surplus voting papers may 
 contain 2,000 votes for Brown, or for Jones, or for Robinson, or 
 may contain no votes for any of them at all. Mr. Hare suggests 
 that the voting papers might be drawn by lot, but that would be 
 very unsatisfactory, and might render the returning officers open 
 to the suspicion of acting unfairly. 
 
 The following plan, I think, obviates this difficulty, and is more 
 simple. Suppose the country divided into constituencies according 
 to population varying from 150,000 to 250,000 inhabitants each, 
 with three, four, or five members each, that is, one member 
 for each 50,000 inhabitants. Let each elector have one vote 
 and no more. In this way a minority of one-third, or one- 
 fourth, or one-fifth, according to the number of members to 
 be returned, would be able to elect a candidate of its own choice. 
 It may be contended that this is not a perfect sj'stem of minority 
 representation. AYell, the lawyers have a maxim, De Minimis Lex 
 noil cAirat. We need not trouble about a minority of less than one- 
 third, or one-fourth, or one-fifth of the constituency. In advocating 
 minority representation I have in view the 20,000 Conservative 
 electors in Manchester, and the 20,000 Liberal electors in Li^er- 
 pool, who, but for minority representation, would be practically 
 disfranchised. 
 
 The reason why it is suggested that constituencies should contain 
 a population varying from 150,000 to 250,000 each, instead of 
 equal electoral districts, is because the former plan fits in very 
 conveniently with the present population of the counties. It is
 
 better that a member should represent Bedford or Berks, rather 
 than Square 1 or 2 on the ordnance map. Now, it will be found 
 on examination that Vvery English county, with the exceptions of 
 Hereford, Huntingdon, Rutland, and Westmoreland, has a popula- 
 tion of at least 150,000, and as Hereford very nearly has, it might 
 be counted with the rest. The other three counties have a consider- 
 ably smaller population, and they might be added to the adjoining 
 counties, or, better still, left alone with one member each, without 
 any minority representation, as " awful examples " to posterity of 
 our present system of representation. 
 
 There are eleven counties in England varying in population 
 from 150,000 to 250,000 each. These would form single con- 
 stituencies returning three, four, or five members, according to the 
 population. There are fifteen counties and ridings in England 
 varying in population from 250,000 to 500,000. These would be 
 divided into two constituencies, which might be called East and 
 West, or North and South, just as we now have the constituencies 
 of East and West Cornwall, North and South Durham, and each 
 division would return three, four, or five members, according to the 
 population. There are six counties with a population varying 
 from 500,000 to 750,000. These would form three constituencies. 
 There are three counties with a population varying from 750,000 
 to 1,000,000. These would form four constituencies. There 
 remain four counties with still larger populations, viz., Surrey 
 with 1,500,000, West Riding of York with 2,250,000, Middlesex 
 with 3,000,000, and Lancashire with 3,500,000. The constituencies 
 of these counties would be too numerous to be described by names 
 derived from the points of the compass, but they might each take 
 the name of the chief town in their midst. 
 
 These four counties in themselves form a powerful argument 
 in favour of minority representation. If the voting qualifica- 
 tion throughout boroughs and counties is to be the same, 
 and if every vote is to have an equal value, we must have 
 equal electoral districts for an equal number of members to 
 be returned. Surrey has now 13 representatives ; according to 
 population it ought to have 28. The West Riding has 22, it 
 o^ight to have 42; Middlesex has 18, it ought to have 56; 
 Lancashire has 33, it ought to have 67. These four counties thus
 
 require, according to population, 107 additional members, in all 
 193 : four counties with more than' one fourth of the entire 
 representation of the United Kingdom. 
 
 The plan described above would fit in fairly well with Ireland. 
 In Wales and Scotland, where the population is less dense, 
 adjoining counties might be united so as to form one con- 
 stituency. 
 
 Since writing the above the Government's Eedistribution Bill 
 has appeared, and is a great disappointment to the advocates of 
 minority representation ; for not only is that principle not 
 extended, but even in those constituencies where it is now applied, 
 it is to be abolished. The counties everywhere are to be 
 divided into constituencies, each returning one member, and the 
 large towns returning more than two members are to be divided 
 into wards, each returning one member. There will be about 
 sixty Metropolitan boroughs, each returning one member. Any 
 plan more calculated to deteriorate the tone of Parliament, than 
 this Bill, it would be difficult to devise. 
 
 JOHN HEYWOOD. 
 
 The Pike, Bolton, 
 
 3rd December, 1884.
 
 
 ^r^ /pS^S'X A
 
 ^. 
 
 '44^ 
 
 
 ./.^'