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 SPEECH 
 
 OF 
 
 THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, 
 
 ON 
 
 THE SECOND READING 
 
 OF THE 
 
 DISSENTERS' CHAPELS MLL, 
 
 Ox the 6th of JUNE 1844. 
 
 LONDON: 
 PRINTED BY RICHARD KINDER, 
 
 GREEN ARBOUR COURT, OLD BAILEY.
 
 A3. 

 
 DISSENTERS' CHAPELS BILL. 
 
 In rising, Sir, to propose the Second Reading of this Bill, 
 I will endeavour to make the House aware, as briefly and as 
 clearly as possible, of the objects it is intended to accomplish 
 by it ; and, Sir, I am the more anxious to do so because I am 
 perfectly satisfied, from what we have seen taking place out of 
 doors, and from the language of many of the petitions which 
 have been presented against it, that some great misapprehension 
 exists with regard to its scope and tendency. 
 
 Sir, petitions have been presented against this Bill from 
 various denominations of Dissenters who claim to have an in- 
 terest in the property which is the subject of it, and those pe- 
 titions state that the petitioners are aggrieved by this Bill, 
 because but for its provisions they would be entitled to property 
 on which the Bill is intended to operate. Sir, I will deal with 
 those allegations in another part of what I shall have to address 
 to the House. But there are petitions also from another class 
 of Dissenters — the Wesleyan Methodists. I do not see any 
 provision in this Bill which will in any way whatever affect their 
 property. I do not believe that there is any provision in the 
 Bill which can in any way touch the Wesleyan Methodists, or 
 the property of any Wesleyan congregations ; and, Sir, as 
 regards the Members of the Church of England, some of whom 
 have petitioned against the Bill, it is perfectly plain that they 
 have no interest in the question of property affected by the Bill, 
 because the provisions of the Bill are confined exclusively to 
 Dissenting chapels, and because upon this point a decision has 
 been given in that cause, of which the House will probably hear 
 
 B
 
 U SECOND READING IN THE COMMONS. 
 
 a good deal in the course of this debate — I allude to the pro- 
 ceedings which have taken place with respect to Lady Hewley's 
 charity. The cause relating to that property has now been for 
 fourteen years in litigation, and the costs of that suit have been 
 so great as almost to have destroyed the property which formed 
 the subject of it. The House of Lords have decided that the 
 Unitarians are not entitled to the benefits of that property, and 
 the House of Lords have decided also that the members of the 
 Church of England are not entitled to it. But the House of 
 Lords have not decided who is entitled to the property, and at 
 this moment it is as much a disputed question what class of 
 Dissenters are entitled to the benefit of that charity, as it was 
 when that suit was instituted fourteen years ago. I do not 
 know whether honourable gentlemen are aware of the position 
 in which that cause stands now. The parties litigating for the 
 benefits of that charity have not been content with contesting 
 their rights in the Master's office, but a fresh information has 
 been filed on behalf of the Independents, alleging that the Pres- 
 byterians do not agree in doctrine with the doctrine of the 
 foundress of that chapel, and that they are no more entitled to 
 the benefit of that charity than the Unitarians ; and therefore 
 that suit may now probably go through all its stages of litigation, 
 and may last another fourteen years, if the funds of the charity 
 are found to be sufficient, before any ultimate decision is come 
 to as to the parties entitled to the property. I refer to this case, 
 Sir, now, only for the purpose of shewing that the members of 
 the Church of England are not affected by this Bill, and that 
 they clearly have no interest in the property in question. But 
 there are petitions also from members of the Church of England, 
 and from the Wesleyan Methodists, not founding their objection 
 to the Bill upon any matters of property, but on points of doc- 
 trine. Now I have every respect for those conscientious feelings 
 which have induced these parties to present petitions against a 
 Bill which they think likely to encourage the propagation of a 
 faith the most hostile to that which they themselves profess ; 
 but, Sir, I feel at the same time that it is too late for us to be 
 now inquiring whether the Legislature have done wisely or not
 
 SPEECH OF SIR WM. W. FOLLETT. O 
 
 in extending a complete system of toleration to all religious 
 sects. Sir, that has been the spirit of legislation in this country 
 now for some years. It was in that spirit that the Legislature 
 passed the Bill of 177V which relieved the ministers of Dissent- 
 ing congregations from the necessity of subscribing to the doc- 
 trinal Articles of the Church. It was in that spirit also that the 
 Bill of 1813f was introduced, which repealed the excepting clauses 
 of the Toleration Act against the Unitarians, and also the Act 
 of William, which made it blasphemy to deny the divinity of 
 our Lord. The same Statute also led to the passing of the 
 Act of 18l7,t for Ireland, which extended complete tolera- 
 tion to the Unitarians. The professed intention of the Legis- 
 lature in passing those Acts was to put the Unitarians upon 
 the same footing of toleration as regarded all civil rights — 
 — as regarded all civil property — as regarded all chapels — 
 as regarded all schools, and as regarded all charities, as all other 
 classes of Protestant Dissenters ; and, Sir, I cannot help think- 
 ing that we should not be acting in the spirit of that complete 
 toleration, or in the spirit in which those Acts were passed, if 
 we were to allow any feeling against the particular creed of a 
 particular sect of Dissenters to interfere with an act of justice, 
 or to prevent our legislating for them in the same spirit as we 
 do for other classes of Dissenters. I do believe, Sir, that the 
 alarm which is felt as to this Bill encouraging Unitarianism is 
 wholly unfounded. I do not think that the passing of this mea- 
 sure will have any effect one way or the other. But if there 
 were any grounds for supposing that the spread of Unitarian 
 doctrines is to be kept back by pains or penalties, or by legisla- 
 ting for them in a different spirit from that in which we legis- 
 late for other classes of Dissenters, the time when you ought to 
 have resisted toleration was in the years 1813 and 181 J, and not 
 now, after those Acts have been for so many years in operation. 
 Now, Sir, passing for a moment from that, let me call the 
 attention of the House to the circumstances which have induced 
 Her Majesty's Government to introduce this Bill. It must be 
 admitted that this Bill comes down to this House with every 
 
 * 19 Geo. III., c. 44. f 53 Geo. III., c. 160. % 57 Geo. III., c. 70. 
 
 11 2
 
 4 SECOND READING IN THE COMMONS. 
 
 recommendation. It comes down here after having received 
 the concurrent support of every legal authority in the other 
 House of Parliament — my Lord Brougham, my Lord Cotten- 
 ham, and my Lord Lyndhurst — all of whom were Judges in 
 Lady Hewley's case. It comes down here recommended also by 
 Lord Campbell, who was counsel in that case ; by Lord Den- 
 man and Lord Langdale, and by every legal Member of that 
 House. It is wholly impossible to suppose that Her Majesty's 
 Government, in adopting the Bill, could have any other possi- 
 ble object than that of doing justice — of supporting a measure 
 of peace, and of putting an end to grievous, vexatious and ruin- 
 ous litigation. 
 
 I will now state to the House the nature of the different 
 clauses of this Bill. I am told that to the first clause not much 
 opposition is made ; but at the same time I should be wrong if 
 I did not state to the House that that first clause is a most im- 
 portant one. 
 
 Now, Sir, the House will perhaps pardon me if I allude to the 
 position in which Unitarian Dissenters stood prior to the 
 passing of the Act of Toleration. Honourable Members are 
 aware that after the passing of the Act of Uniformity,* and prior 
 to the passing of the Toleration Act,t there were penalties im- 
 posed on the professors and teachers of doctrines differing from 
 those of the Church of England. Prior to the passing of the 
 Toleration Act, therefore, any gift for the purpose of founding a 
 chapel, or a school, or any charitable foundation to propagate any 
 doctrines other than those of the Church of England, would not 
 have been upheld by the courts of law — they would have been 
 held to be illegal and not to be tolerated. Before the passing 
 of the Toleration Act, every class of Dissenters — I speak not of 
 Protestant Dissenters alone, but Roman Catholics and Dissenters 
 of all denominations — stood upon the same footing. All their 
 foundations were illegal. None of them were* tolerated, and 
 none of them would have been acknowledged by a court of law. 
 Then came the Toleration Act, by which Act toleration was ex- 
 tended to Protestant Dissenters generally. There were ex- 
 * 13 & 14 Car. II., c. 4. f 1 Wm. & Mary, c. 18. g' 
 
 % #
 
 SPEECH OF SIR WM. W. FOLLETT. 3 
 
 ceptions in that Act, and, among others, Roman Catholics were 
 excepted by name. It excepted also Unitarians, by requiring 
 all Dissenting ministers to subscribe, not the Thirty-nine Articles 
 of the Church of England, but that portion of them which em- 
 braced the doctrines of the Church of England, and it excepted 
 by name persons who denied the doctrine of the Trinity. After 
 the passing of that Act, all classes of Protestant Dissenters to 
 whom the exception did not apply could have founded their 
 schools and chapels, and could have established any charitable 
 foundation for the benefit of their own sect, and the courts of 
 equity and courts of law also would have recognized those foun- 
 dations, enforced the trusts, and given the same effect to 
 charities founded for Dissenting purposes as to foundations de- 
 voted to the promulgation of the doctrines of the Church of 
 England. It was not so, however, with regard to charities 
 founded either by Unitarians or by Roman Catholics. Now I 
 will just state the different provisions which have been passed 
 at different times to relieve the Dissenting body from those ex- 
 cepting clauses in the Toleration Act. I am extremely anxious 
 to avoid any thing which may have the appearance of leading to 
 a theological discussion, but it would appear that very early 
 indeed there was a repugnance felt by persons dissenting from 
 the Church of England to subscribe the doctrinal Articles of 
 that Church, and I find as early as the reign of Queen Anne,* that 
 an Act was passed, not indeed relieving the ministers of Dis- 
 senting congregations expressly from the necessity in future of 
 subscribing those Articles, but giving them in effect relief 
 from the penalties imposed by the Toleration Act. In 1772, a 
 Bill* was introduced into the House of Commons to exempt 
 Protestant Dissenting ministers from subscribing to the Articles 
 of the Church of England. Now it will be clear to any honour- 
 able Member who will read the debate upon the introduction of 
 that Bill, that it was introduced for the purpose of giving relief 
 to those who professed what are now called Unitarian doctrines. 
 It was discussed upon that ground, and in the House of Com- 
 mons it was resisted upon the ground that the effect of the Bill 
 * 10 Anne, c. 2. The Occasional Conformity Act.
 
 b SECOND READING IN THE COMMONS. 
 
 would be to encourage a sect who denied the doctrine of the 
 Trinity. Sir, that Bill passed the House of Commons in 1772, 
 by a very large majority, but it was thrown out by the House 
 of Lords. In 1779; it was again introduced, and then it passed 
 into a Law;* and ministers of Protestant Dissenting congrega- 
 tions are not now required to sign any doctrinal Articles of the 
 Church of England. All that they are now required to do is to 
 affirm that they are Christians and Protestants. 
 
 Now, Sir, the Act of 1813, every one knows, repeals the ex- 
 cepting clauses of the Toleration Act, and the Act of William, 
 which made it blasphemy to hold Unitarian doctrines.f After 
 the passing of that Bill, any foundation of Unitarian chapels or 
 schools would have been held legal by the courts of law, because 
 the excepting clause was gone, and those professing Unitarian 
 doctrines would stand, therefore, upon the same footing as other 
 Protestant Dissenters. But then this question arose — founda- 
 tions may have been made, as we know many were made, for 
 Unitarian purposes prior to the year 1813 ; and if you find 
 foundations prior to the year 1813, at a time when they were 
 excepted out of the Toleration Act, could you take from the body 
 which you now tolerate, which you now say is legal, and which 
 you now say may endow chapels and schools, that which it is in 
 possession of, merely because the foundation was made prior to 
 the passing of the Act, which authorized such endowments ? I 
 think it could hardly be said that you were giving full effect to 
 the Act unless you gave it a retrospective operation. When 
 the Roman Catholic Act passed, all Roman Catholic chapels and 
 schools were put upon the same footing as those of Protestant 
 Dissenters. That Act was made retrospective in its operation,! 
 and therefore foundations in favour of Roman Catholics, though 
 made prior to the passing of that Act, were held to be legal. § 
 The first clause of this Act not only puts Unitarians, but all 
 
 * 19 Geo. III., c. 44. 
 
 f 9 & 10 Win. III. This Act was passed upon an address from the House 
 of Commons to the Crown of 17th Feb. 1697, complaining of the multitude of 
 Anti-Trinitarian publications, and praying to have them put down. 
 
 X See 2 & 3 Wm. IV., c. 115— The Roman Catholic Charities Act. 
 
 § Bradshaw and Tasker, 2 ; Mylne and Keen, 221.
 
 SPEECH OF SIR WM. W. FOLLETT. 7 
 
 Protestant Dissenters, upon the same footing as Roman Catho- 
 lics. It gives a retrospective operation to the several Toleration 
 Acts. It says, That which we now declare to be the law of this 
 country, we will assume always to have been the law, and we 
 will not interfere with property of which you are in possession 
 merely because you became possessed of it prior to the passing 
 of the Act. That is the first clause of this Bill, and I am at a 
 loss to know what fair objection can be raised to it. It is an 
 important part of this measure — it is a most important part of 
 the relief sought by Dissenters — it is a most important part of 
 that measure which has been sanctioned by high authorities in 
 the other House of Parliament, and I trust it will meet with the 
 unanimous approbation of this House. 
 
 Having stated to the House the circumstances which have 
 rendered it necessary to introduce the first clause, I come now 
 to the second. That clause has been introduced for the pur- 
 pose of preventing litigation like that which has occurred with 
 respect to Lady Hewley's charity. I ought to have stated with 
 regard to the first clause (because even here it is clear that there 
 has been a misapprehension), that the first clause relates to all 
 charitable foundations. It is not confined to chapels, but relates 
 to all charitable foundations for the benefit of Protestant Dis- 
 senters. The second clause of the Bill relates to Dissenting 
 chapels only, not to general charitable foundations, but to chapels 
 in the possession of Dissenters. Then with respect to the 
 existing law it is said, that as the law now stands there is no 
 lapse of time which can be pleaded where a breach of trust is 
 shewn. In one sense that statement is perfectly true, and if 
 the breach of trust be of a description which affects a charity in 
 which the public have an interest in such a way that the Attorney- 
 General has a right to interfere on behalf of the charity, then 
 the lapse of time is not allowed to be set up ; but the lapse of 
 time might be set up if the question of the doctrines taught in 
 any particular chapel were brought before the Court in a suit 
 instituted by members of the congregation, and to which the 
 Attorney-General was not a party. I shall be extremely happy 
 to be followed by any members of the legal profession who take
 
 8 SECOND READING IN THE COMMONS. 
 
 a different view of the question from that which I have taken ; 
 but I trust to satisfy the House that there is no violation in this 
 Bill of any principle of law, but that its provisions are in strict 
 conformity with those which the existing law applies in other 
 and analogous cases. Now, by the law of this country as it 
 stands at present, there is no doubt that a party may, if he 
 thinks fit, give money for the purpose of a religious trust, and 
 stamp on that trust, as it were, the character of permanence. 
 For instance, if a person when creating a trust said, " I found 
 this chapel as a chapel to be used by Roman Catholics, and 
 Roman Catholics alone," the will of the donor in such a case 
 would be binding. But, Sir, I do not think (and I say this with 
 great deference) that where you find a charity founded for reli- 
 gious and Dissenting purposes, and that charity is not stated to 
 be for the benefit of a particular sect of Dissenters, you have a 
 right to assume that the founder intended it to be for the benefit 
 of a particular sect, although you prove that the founder himself 
 professed to entertain the doctrines of that sect. I say you 
 have no right to assume it, and I say so for this reason. Any 
 person who knows the history of Dissent in this country knows 
 that large bodies of Dissenters have at all times repudiated sub- 
 scription to particular articles of faith and the profession of 
 particular creeds — the refusal to subscribe, or to be bound by 
 any particular profession of faith, has been the very bond of 
 union between them — and these persons would have shrunk 
 from imposing any such burthen on their successors, but would 
 have allowed to them the same liberty they claimed for them- 
 selves, and to appeal for their faith to the Bible alone ; and if, 
 therefore, you do not find upon the face of the deed itself a 
 statement that the charity is intended permanently for the 
 benefit of the doctrines of a particular sect, it is a gratuitous 
 assumption to say that the intention of the founder was that its 
 benefits should be confined to those who followed the faith 
 which he professed. But, again, where you find a congregation 
 making a purchase of land for the purpose of building a chapel, 
 and it sufficiently appears upon the face of the deed that they 
 intend that chapel to be used for the purpose of promoting the
 
 SPEECH OP SIR WM. W. FOLLETT. 9 
 
 doctrines of a particular sect, with such a chapel this Bill will 
 not interfere. This Bill will not interfere in any case where it 
 appears upon the deeds creating the trust that the trust was in- 
 tended for the furtherance of the doctrines of a particular sect. 
 I think it is quite impossible that the nature and object of this 
 Bill can have been understood. It has been said that this Bill 
 has been introduced for the purpose of allowing trustees to 
 violate their trusts, and that the effect of it will be to encou- 
 rage those who have property given to them for one purpose, to 
 apply it to another ; whereas in point of fact, as I have already 
 said, the Bill will not interfere in any case where it appears on 
 the face of the deed that the chapel has been founded with refe- 
 rence to a particular sect. Take the case of an Unitarian 
 chapel. Unitarian chapels are not founded (I speak now gene- 
 rally,) by an act of benevolence, or by parties wishing to 
 establish a particular faith. These chapels originate, generally 
 speaking — I believe I may say universally — in this way. A 
 congregation dissenting from the Church of England wish to 
 establish a place of meeting, or a chapel, for *their worship. 
 They form together a voluntary association — they subscribe 
 funds, and with those funds they purchase land and build a 
 chapel. The chapel, in the first instance, is vested in trustees, 
 and it is necessary that it should be so vested, because there is 
 no corporate body to take. But I have been told that so little 
 have the trustees of these chapels to do with their management 
 or control, that in a great majority of cases the original trus- 
 tees have died off and no fresh trustees have been appointed ; it 
 was not necessary, because the congregations do not wish to 
 part with the chapels, and rely upon their possession of them as 
 sufficient evidence of their title to them. Who is it, let me ask, 
 that appoints the ministers of those congregations ? because 
 one of the breaches of trust alleged is, that the trustees have 
 taken this property in trust to appoint ministers who should 
 profess a particular faith, and that they have handed it over to 
 ministers of a different religion, and that thus the congregations 
 have come to profess a different faith from that which it was the 
 intention of the founders to promulgate. Who appoints the
 
 10 SECOND READING IN THE COMMONS. 
 
 minister ? Not the trustees, but the congregation. Who pro- 
 vides his stipend ? Who removes him ? Not the trustees, but 
 the congregation. The trustees have no more power over the 
 doctrines to be preached in Dissenting chapels than the most 
 perfect stranger. If, therefore, there be any breach of trust, it is 
 not by the trustees, but by the congregation, for whose benefit 
 the chapel was founded. Now, a Right Reverend Prelate, in 
 another place, has stated the mode in which he conceives these 
 congregations came to be Unitarian. Whether that Right 
 Reverend Prelate is correct or not in his supposition, I do not 
 profess to know : but he supposes that the congregations pur- 
 chasing ground and afterwards building a chapel, by degrees 
 relax into Arianism, and ultimately become Socinians. Now let 
 me just suppose for a moment that that is a correct statement 
 of the fact — to what does it amount ? A certain number of 
 persons purchase land and build a chapel. They appoint a 
 preacher. Father and son attend that preacher. Generation 
 after generation go on attending that chapel and subscribing to 
 pay the minister. They are all in unison. There is no dissent 
 among them, but on the death or retirement of one minister, 
 they appoint another, who preaches a doctrine different from 
 that preached by his predecessor, no one of the congregation 
 objecting to the substitution of the one doctrine for the other. 
 Suppose generation after generation continued to maintain the 
 chapel — to repair it — to buy burial-ground, and to pay the 
 ministers, and suppose it to be admitted that all this has been 
 clone by an Unitarian congregation, — would it, I ask, be con- 
 sistent with justice to dispossess them, because it could be 
 proved that a hundred and fifty years ago the original founders 
 of the chapel professed Trinitarian doctrines, although for the 
 last century the doctrines openly preached in that chapel were 
 Unitarian, and although money has been subscribed and bene- 
 factions made to support it as a Unitarian place of worship ? Is 
 it just or right, that congregations possessed of these chapels, 
 which have been handed down from generation to generation, to- 
 gether with the faith they professed, and which they contributed 
 to support, and looked on as their own, should be called upon
 
 SPEECH OF SIR WM. W. FOLLETT. 11 
 
 to hand over those chapels to perfect strangers ? And it must 
 be borne in mind also that it is not the original foundation 
 alone, which is to be taken from them, but all additions made 
 to that foundation, although made by professed Unitarians — and 
 if, therefore, money has been given for the enlargement of the 
 chapel, for the increase of the minister's stipend, for a pension 
 to his widow, and all given by professed Unitarians, and since 
 Unitarian doctrines have been openly preached in the chapel, 
 they will all follow the fate of the original foundation, and with 
 it be taken from the present possessors and handed over to 
 strangers. If this be a legal right, is it a moral or an equitable 
 one? But, Sir, I think it right to say that it ought not to be 
 assumed that the law on this subject is clear. I believe it is the 
 very uncertainty which prevails with regard to it that has in- 
 duced all the lawyers without exception, whatever may be their 
 political or religious bias, to recommend the introduction of this 
 measure. Let it not be supposed that by passing this Bill you 
 are depriving either Presbyterians or Independents of property 
 to which they are entitled. I say that the object .of the Bill is 
 to do that which is fair and right. If you have upon the face of 
 your deed a declaration that the trust shall be for Trinitarian 
 doctrines, or for the doctrines of a particular sect, this Bill will 
 not interfere with that trust. But supposing it is not so, are 
 you to assume that the founders of the chapels meant to bind 
 down all posterity to the same faith which they themselves pro- 
 fessed ? If you are to assume that, then I ask, how are you to 
 find out what that faith was ? This is one of the difficulties which 
 I know not how to grapple with. What occurred in the case of 
 Lady Hewley's charity ? The will of Lady Hewley, certain do- 
 cuments relating to her family, and certain Catechisms, were 
 produced for the purpose of showing that Lady Hewley was a 
 Trinitarian. Suppose she was a Trinitarian, — has she declared 
 that this trust shall be for Trinitarian purposes ? But is it clear 
 that such evidence is admissible ? Let me read to the House the 
 opinion of Lord Chief Justice Tindal upon this point. I have no 
 right, indeed, to refer to it as an authority, because it is merely 
 the opinion expressed by one of the Judges in the House of Lords;
 
 12 SECOND READING IN THE COMMONS. 
 
 but it is one entitled to the greatest respect and reverence. Speak- 
 ing with regard to the admissibility of evidence for the purpose 
 of showing the meaning of particular words in a deed, he says, 
 
 " The general rule I take to be, that where the words of any written instru- 
 ment are free from ambiguity in themselves, and where external circumstances 
 do not create any doubt or difficulty as to the proper application of those words 
 to claimants under the instrument or the subject-matter to which the instru- 
 ment relates, such instrument is always to be construed according to the strict, 
 plain, common meaning of the words themselves ; and that in such case evi- 
 dence dehors the instrument, for the purpose of explaining it according to the 
 surmised or alleged intention of the parties to the instrument, is utterly inad- 
 missible. If it were otherwise, no lawyer would be safe in advising upon the 
 construction of a written instrument, nor any party in taking under it ; for the 
 ablest advice might be controlled, and the clearest title undermined, if at some 
 future period parol evidence of the particular meaning which the party affixed 
 to his words, or of his secret intention in making the instrument, or of the ob- 
 jects he meant to take benefit under it, might be set up to contradict or vary 
 the plain language of the instrument itself." 
 
 He then speaks of exceptions to the rule, such as instruments 
 in foreign language, where terms of art are employed, and so 
 on ; and continues, — 
 
 " But whilst evidence is admissible in these instances for the purpose of 
 making the written instrument speak for itself, which without such evidence 
 would be either a dead letter, or would use a doubtful tongue, or convey a false 
 impression of the meaning of the party, I conceive the exception to be strictly 
 limited to cases of the description above given, and to evidence of the nature 
 above detailed ; and that in no case whatever is it permitted to explain the 
 language of a deed by evidence of the private views, the secret intentions, or 
 the known principles of the party to the instrument, whether religious, politi- 
 cal, or otherwise, any more than by express parol declarations made by the 
 party himself, which are universally excluded ; for the admitting of such evi- 
 dence would let in all the uncertainty before adverted to ; it would be evidence 
 which, in most instances, could not be met or countervailed by any of an oppo- 
 site bearing or tendency, and would in effect, cause the secret, undeclared in- 
 tention of the party to control and predominate over the open intention ex- 
 pressed in the deed." 
 
 I think it right to state that there is a difference, a conflict of 
 opinion upon this point, and that there is an opinion of the Lord 
 Chancellor of Ireland apparently opposed to that judgment.* 
 * Attorney-General v. Drummond. 1 Drury and Warren, p. 353.
 
 SPEECH OF SIR WM. W. FOLLETT. 13 
 
 But why do I refer to this ? For the purpose of showing the 
 uncertainty and mischief of litigation of this kind ; for mischiev- 
 ous it is in every sense of the word. In the first place, it is 
 wasting those funds which were intended to be devoted to cha- 
 ritable purposes. But besides that — although I by no means 
 mean to say that the most solemn points of the Christian religion 
 were discussed with levity — (for I believe that none of my learned 
 friends engaged in that discussion would be guilty of such an 
 act) — I do say that it is impossible to argue questions of this 
 sort in a court of law with that solemnity which ought to be 
 observed with regard to them ; the tribunal is not a fit one for 
 such discussions ; and when I find that these great questions of 
 religious faith were in the end taken back to the Master's office, 
 for discussion there, I ask whether the continuance of these 
 suits is not a scandal which every true friend to religion would 
 wish to see removed ? 
 
 Well then, Sir, what is it that is sought to be effected by this 
 Bill ? That you should not leave parties to speculate upon what 
 were the intentions of the founder, but that you should apply 
 the same certain test which you have applied to other analogous 
 cases. There is no single case of private right that is indepen- 
 dent of usage. Whether it be wise or right that the law should 
 be so with regard to charities, we are not now discussing. This 
 Bill does not interfere with that. The House will bear in mind 
 that there is no case whatever involving a private right of pro- 
 perty in this country, in which the question does not turn upon 
 usage. Twenty years' possession of your estates will give you a 
 title against all the world. Not only that, but a possession of 
 twenty years may give a title even against the Church. I do 
 not now speak of a recent law, but according to the old common 
 law, if you set up a modus against the Church, that modus is 
 supposed in law to have existed from time immemorial. And 
 how is it proved ? By modern usage — a usage for twenty years 
 will establish it. By the Act now introduced, you cannot set 
 up anything to contradict that modern usage, and a usage of a 
 certain number of years will give a title that cannot be disturbed.
 
 14 SECOND READING IN THE COMMONS. 
 
 If you want to find the contents of a lost deed or charter relating 
 to any right of any sort or kind, how do you do it ? If I show 
 a usage under that deed or charter for twenty or thirty years, or 
 farther back, the Court will assume it. Take the ordinary case 
 of a lost deed. You prove it by usage. I understand it has 
 been said in another place, that if you want to show by usage 
 what are the contents of a deed, it would be much better to 
 show what took place twenty years after the execution of the 
 deed than what took place twenty years prior to the present time. 
 No doubt it would be better, if you could get such evidence. 
 But why does the law take the last twenty years ? First, be- 
 cause the law does not suppose that parties will slumber over 
 their rights ; and, in the next place, because modern usage 
 affords the only criterion to which the contending parties can 
 refer. That being the principle adopted in other cases, why 
 should not the same principle extend to the case now under the 
 consideration of the House, and why should there not be the 
 same test of modern usage to which parties might have recourse ? 
 There is this advantage in passing such a measure — that you do 
 not disturb existing interests — there is this advantage, that you 
 do not take from congregations those places of worship of which 
 they have been in possession now for centuries —there is this 
 advantage, that you do not take from congregations the benefit 
 of those sums of money which they have themselves expended 
 on their chapels, or contributed for the support of their minis- 
 ters. But I am told that the consequence of passing this Bill 
 may be, that property now possessed by Presbyterians, or other 
 Dissenters from the Church of England, may in the lapse of 
 time fall into the hands of Unitarians. But how could it be so? 
 — because by this Bill the usage must be the usage of the con- 
 gregation, and not a portion of them. Let me suppose for a 
 moment that there is a trust for the benefit of Trinitarians — if 
 the minister went into the pulpit and preached Arian or Unita- 
 rian doctrines, any single member of that congregation might 
 immediately apply to have that minister removed. Unless, there- 
 fore, the congregation itself sanction the appointment and the 
 doctrines preached by a minister, no such case as that appre-
 
 SPEECH OF SIR WM. W. FOLLETT. 15 
 
 hended could arise, and Trinitarians could not be ousted, and 
 have their property handed over to Unitarians. 
 
 One word more, and one only, I think it right to say. I 
 certainly think there is a total misapprehension on the part of 
 the Wesleyan Methodists, if they suppose that this Bill applies 
 to them ; and with regard to the wording of the Bill, I may say 
 that the promoters of it will be ready to receive and take into 
 consideration any suggestion which may be for the purpose of 
 making more clear the principles upon which the Bill is founded. 
 I repeat, that as the Bill now stands, if upon the face of the 
 deed it appears that the original intention was that in any chapel 
 the doctrines of any particular faith or sect should be taught, to 
 such a case this Bill does not apply. 
 
 I have now stated to the House — I fear but imperfectly — the 
 principles upon which this Bill rests, and 1 think I may venture 
 to ask the House whether the measure is one which is open to 
 those charges which have been made against it — whether it be 
 not a Bill which Her Majesty's Government were justified in 
 bringing forward, in the belief that it was founded on justice ? 
 I do hope it is a measure which will meet with the concurrence 
 of the House, as being one which would benefit the great body 
 of Dissenters in this country, by putting down that spirit of 
 litigation which has been engendered among them, and which 
 must be so fatal to these charities. 
 
 With respect to the third clause of the Bill, and whether it 
 should be rendered applicable to existing suits, I should say 
 that that would be more properly a subject for discussion in 
 Committee than on the second reading of the Bill. There are 
 no suits now pending in England to which this clause will apply, 
 and the facts relating to the suits which have been instituted in 
 Ireland are stated in the paper now before the House, and they 
 certainly do seem to make out a strong case for interference on 
 the part of the Legislature, because I understand that, as re- 
 gards one of those cases, Unitarian doctrines have been taught 
 for the last sixty years, and as regards the other, for about a 
 century.
 
 16 SECOND READING IN THE COMMONS. 
 
 Sir, I will not in this stage of the Bill do more than move 
 that it be now read a second time, and I feel confident in doing 
 so, that it will meet with the concurrence of the House.
 
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