AN EXAMINATION 
 
 OF 
 
 DR. TYLER’S VINDICATION 
 
 OF HIS 
 
 “STRICTURES” 
 
 ON THE 
 
 CHRISTIAN SPECTATOR. 
 
 BY EVANGELUS PACIFICUS. 
 
 
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 BOSTON: 
 
 PERKINS & MARVIN, 114, WASHINGTON STREET. 
 

 
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EXAMINATION. 
 
 The Rev. Dr. Spring, of New York, published a Dis- 
 sertation on the Means of Regeneration, which was reviewed 
 by the Christian Spectator. After a brief review of the 
 Dissertation, the Spectator proceeded into a more extended 
 investigation of the same subject, in the form of an inde- 
 pendent discussion. The object was to present an analyti- 
 cal view of the elementary constitutional acts substantially 
 involved in regeneration, in order to assist ministers of the 
 gospel in addressing the doctrines and duties of Christianity 
 directly and effectively to the heart and conscience. Upon 
 this Review, the Rev. Dr. Tyler of Portland published a 
 pamphlet of “ Strictures,” expressing dissatisfaction ; which 
 was reviewed by the Spectator, and also by the present 
 writer. In reply he has returned the “ Vindication,” which 
 we are now to examine. It was hoped that the explanations 
 given in the Review would prove satisfactory, but that hope 
 has not been realized. The views exhibited still appear to 
 him to “ involve principles of dangerous tendency.” We 
 are therefore compelled to prolong the discussion, not with- 
 out hopes of a result happy to the cause of truth. We shall 
 not forget that we are brethren, mutually engaged to know 
 the truth, devoted to, the same cause, and hoping for the 
 same inheritance in heaven. The proper method of ex- 
 amining a complex subject is to resolve it into its elementary 
 parts, and examine each part by itself. 
 
 MORAL PRINCIPLE. 
 
 A moral agent is a being possessing constitution, or physi- 
 cal ability, to be holy or to be sinful. All that pertains to 
 man, as a moral agent, is included in his moral constitution 
 and moral character. This proposition is nothing less than 
 an axiom in moral science. There is no tertium quid. 
 
4 
 
 What is constitution, is not character ; and what is charac- 
 ter, is not constitution. Character resides not in the consti- 
 tution of the soul, but in the use of it. Here are two things 
 totally unlike, in kind. To the one no moral quality per- 
 tains, to the other all moral quality pertains. The latter is 
 termed in theology moral principle, and includes, in the 
 strictest sense, the sum of sin and the sum of holiness. Sin 
 is one thing. Holiness is one thing. The terms moral mo- 
 tive, intention, disposition, heart, preference, design, will, ' 
 choice, disposition, &c. mean then the same one thing ; and 
 are strictly synonymous with the term moral principle. In 
 the eye of God, nothing else is sin, nothing else is holiness ; 
 it is the first and continued act of a moral agent, and the 
 only thing that is intrinsically moral action. Only distin- 
 guish between what is purely moral , and what is merely 
 mechanical , in action, and it will appear that what God re- 
 gards as moral action is solely the motive, intention, dispo- 
 sition, heart, &c. or in a word, — the moral principle. 
 
 Dr. T. asks what I mean by 4 dictating’ ? I mean, 
 prompts, excites, suggests, causes, &ic. so far as moral con- 
 stitution is concerned in moral action. In this sense, I 
 assert, that moral principle is immediately dictated, sug- 
 gested, prompted, caused, or whatever you please to term it, 
 by the moral constitution. Or in other words, man, a 
 responsible agent, prompted or excited by a constitutional 
 desire of happiness to choose something, does actually 
 choose, will, or prefer, morally right or wrong ; which 
 choice, will, or preference, is his moral principle, and that 
 for which he is responsible. 
 
 Between a moral agent and his moral principle there is no 
 tertium quid. Every thing pertaining to him, as a moral 
 agent, is either constitution or character. Is motive a ter- 
 tium quid ? This term is sometimes used to designate merely 
 an object without us. When used to designate something 
 within us, that something is either constitution or character ; 
 if constitution, not character ; if character, moral principle. 
 The same is true of intention, disposition, and will. We 
 sometimes use the term will, to designate simply the power 
 of willing, in which case we mean constitution ; and some- 
 times to designate the use made of this power, in which case 
 we mean character, or moral principle. Is heart a tertium 
 quid ? The Scriptures recognize a constitutional heart, and 
 a moral heart. Thus when they say, “ Make yourself a 
 
5 
 
 new heart,” they mean a new moral heart. When they say, 
 “ Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart,” 
 they mean the constitutional heart. When God says, “ My 
 son, give me thine heart,” he means that we should love him 
 with the constitutional powers of moral affection which we 
 possess. The constitutional heart is that which loves or hates 
 God, the moral heart is love or hatred to God. In the lat- 
 ter sense the sinner must have a new heart, in the former he 
 must love God with his heart. The agent cannot love 
 God wifh “ an unholy heart” — that is, with hatred ; nor do 
 we say any thing but tautology, to say that he loves God 
 with a “ holy heart” — which is only saying that he loves God 
 with loving God ; nor yet can he love God “ with no heart 
 at all.” The term heart, therefore, in the Scriptures, al- 
 ways designates either constitution or character ; and when 
 character, moral principle. 
 
 Thus it appears that between constitution and character 
 there is no third thing in man, and consequently, that so far 
 as the moral constitution is concerned in causing moral prin- 
 ciple, it does it immediately. And it is important to be ob- 
 served that this is the case not only in the beginning of a 
 new moral principle, but ever after ; so that the principle is 
 always the same, in its origin and kind. There is never any 
 thing back of it, but constitution ; there is never any thing 
 before it, but mechanical action. Right or wrong moral 
 principle is then the sum of character. Nothing else is 
 character in the eye of God, either before or after it, below 
 or above it. Or as before stated in the Evangelical View, 
 “ Sin is one , and one term expresses it, 1 a transgression of 
 the law ’ — a wicked moral principle ;” and also “ holiness is 
 one , and one term expresses it, 4 a fulfilment of the law .’ ” 
 
 Moral principle is the fountain of all specific subordinate 
 moral purposes and acts, which purposes and acts have no 
 character of their own, their character residing in the princi- 
 ple which dictates them. Suppose a sinful principle dictate 
 a purpose to obtain an education. This purpose is sinful 
 only as dictated by a sinful principle, for it is not sinful to 
 pursue an education from a right motive. Suppose this pur- 
 pose to continue in the soul five years, when the man aban- 
 dons it, and this same sinful principle dictates a purpose to 
 obtain wealth in mercantile business. This too is sinful 
 only as dictated by the sinful principle, for there is no sin in 
 pursuing wealth from a right motive. Suppose this purpose 
 
 
6 
 
 to continue in the soul ten years, at the end of which, failing 
 in his object, the man abandons it, and his same sinful prin- 
 ciple dictates a purpose to pursue what the Scriptures term, 
 “ the lusts of the flesh.” Reckless of mind, money, and 
 character, he resides in the city where he' is little known, 
 attends infidel meetings and theatres, gambles, picks pockets, 
 and revels in debauchery, five years, and then dies and sinks 
 into hell. This last purpose also is sinful, only as dictated 
 by the sinful principle, but this purpose and the acts involved - 
 in it cannot be dictated by any but a sinful principle, because 
 the law of God expressly forbids them ; whereas the preced- 
 ing may be dictated by either a holy or sinful principle. 
 Thus the same principle, though not the same degree of it, 
 existed from the beginning to the end of the whole twenty 
 years supposed, dictating its successive subordinate purposes 
 and acts, and they again others, and so on, like so many 
 streams and rills from the same fountain, and so far as their 
 character is concerned, resolvable into that one sinful moral 
 principle, or moral heart. It is thus that “ an evil man out 
 of the evil treasure of his heart” (this wicked principle was 
 his heart’s treasure ,) “bringeth forth that which is evil.” 
 And the disgusting pollution which flowed from his heart 
 towards the close of his life, indicate the pollution to which 
 his heart had arrived, and his uncommon preparation for 
 hell. 
 
 On the other hand, suppose the case of a religious man. 
 His right moral principle dictates a purpose to obtain an 
 education. This purpose is morally good only as dictated 
 by a good principle, for there is no moral virtue in pursuing 
 an education, but from a good motive. At the end of five 
 years, failing in health or resources, he abandons this pur- 
 pose, and his same moral principle dictates a purpose to 
 obtain wealth in mercantile business. This purpose too is 
 good only as dictated by his good principle — his intention 
 to serve God, by increasing his influence, and means of 
 promoting the cause of truth and righteousness. At the 
 end of ten years, failing in business, he abandons this pur- 
 pose, and his same moral principle dictates another, which 
 is to invest his talent, whatever of education and ability he 
 possesses, in teaching. This purpose too is morally good 
 only as dictated by his good principle — his intention to 
 serve God, by thus providing an honest support for his 
 family, and blessing the rising generation. As his heart’s 
 
7 
 
 treasure lay not in wealth, he is not less happy than before, 
 and cheerfully addresses himself to this new mode of serving 
 God. Because he loves God, he says in his heart, “ The 
 Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away, and blessed be 
 the name of the Lord 5” his losses are sanctified to him, and 
 “ all things work together for good.” If others prosper and 
 roll in chariots of wealth and splendor, he envies them not, 
 nor pines in spirit, but cheerfully treads the obscure vale of 
 poverty, walking in the serene light of God’s smile, happy 
 to serve* him in his own way, and thrice happy in serving 
 others, and scattering sweet fragrance on the rising genera- 
 tion. At the end of five years, a kind angel steals away 
 his breath — he sleeps in Jesus, and ascends to heaven. 
 Thus the same principle, in kind, existed through the whole 
 twenty years supposed, changing only its mode of operation 
 and increasing in strength, diffusing itself through the entire 
 activities of the man, in its subordinate purposes and acts, 
 like so many streams and rills from the same fountain. It 
 is thus that “ a good man, out of the good treasure of his 
 heart, bringeth forth that which is good and the high de- 
 gree of moral purity which flowed from his heart towards 
 the close of his life, indicate the degree of purity to which 
 his heart had arrived, and his uncommon preparation for 
 heaven. With what moment is it then enjoined upon us to 
 cleanse first the fountain ! 
 
 The terms principle, motive, act, &c. are sometimes used 
 to designate what is pure constitution. As for instance, a 
 principle of life, a principle of fear or dread of suffering, a 
 motive of self love, or desire of happiness, an act of breath- 
 ing. These expressions translated into another form, mean 
 simply living, dreading misery, desiring happiness, breathing. 
 A child can see that all this is pure constitution. Still I 
 must beg the reader’s indulgence, if I intreat him to be sure 
 that he clearly discriminates here. If the mind stumbles on 
 the elementary steps of the subject, it will stumble all the way 
 through ; and even men of excellent and vigorous intellect, 
 in pursuit of an object, may inadvertently stumble and fall 
 over a very small thing, when even a child, walking cau- 
 tiously, would walk uprightly. 
 
 We are now prepared to notice the two principle sources 
 of our writer’s difficulties with the Spectator. The first lies, 
 if I mistake not, in his not distinguishing, as the Reviewer 
 does, between the meaning of the terms principle, motive, 
 
3 
 
 act, he. as applied simply to constitution, or to character. 
 He thus brings together, from different parts of the discus- 
 sion, words and sentences, which in their connexion mean 
 things totally different in kind, and calls them inconsistencies 
 and contradictions. He thus practices upon himself, and 
 upon a reader that does not think cautiously and vigorously 
 for himself, an unintentional but unfortunate imposition. 
 Perhaps what is here intended will be better understood,, 
 when we come to speak of regeneration and its means. 
 
 The other source of his difficulty, if he will allow me to 
 state it, is, as I apprehend, his not distinguishing clearly 
 between moral principle , the only thing that is strictly sin or 
 holiness, and its subordinate purposes or ways of acting. I 
 shall illustrate my meaning, after a preliminary observation. 
 
 I assume then, as granted, the entire moral depravity of 
 unregenerate man. If an explanation is asked of the con- 
 nexion between the sin of Adam and that of his posterity, 
 there is none to be given. It is a profound mystery, and of 
 course unimportant. We only know the fact, that as a con- 
 sequence “ the whole world lieth in wickedness” — that the 
 whole moral race “ goes astray.” But what sin is, we 
 Jcnow, for God has informed us ; and we are not authorized 
 to modify or obscure an important thing, which God has re- 
 vealed, for an unimportant “ something,” which he has not 
 revealed. The definition formerly given of depravity, as 
 supported by the Bible, observation, and experience, is this : 
 “ Being entirely destitute of holy principle, and entirely sub- 
 ject to a selfish principle, he is entirely or totally depraved ; 
 although his depravity may exist in different degrees. This 
 is the character of all the unregenerate. It is sufficient to 
 know that such is their character, without theorizing upon 
 the manner in which they came by it.” Now we have seen 
 that moral obedience is right moral intention, motive, prefer- 
 ence, will, &c. When therefore we speak of a sinner’s be- 
 ginning to obey God, we cannot say that he does it because 
 he has a right moral intention, preference, he. for this in- 
 tention, preference, he. is obedience. The proper thing to 
 be said, and the only thing that is not mere tautology, is, 
 when referring to divine influence, that it prevails with the 
 agent, and when referring to the agent, that he obeys. 
 Truth, moral light, addressed to his moral constitution, is so 
 accompanied by divine influence, that he obeys or forms 
 right moral preference or principle in respect to it ; which, 
 
9 
 
 as a moral agent , he has power to do without divine influ- 
 ence, but as a sinner never will , and therefore as such is 
 entirely dependent upon it. The beginning of this right 
 moral preference, or principle, is the beginning of duty, and 
 that continued and increased through life, is, in the strictest 
 moral sense, the sum of duty done by him. This is holiness, 
 and the only thing that is holiness. The difference then 
 between a regenerate and an unregenerate state of the soul 
 is, that iit the one there is nothing moral but sinful principle, 
 in the other there is holy principle, and the sinful principle 
 is so far subdued, broken, destroyed, expelled, that holy 
 principle takes the lead in character. In the one case the 
 agent prefers, loves, he. the way of sin ; in the other he 
 prefers, loves, he. the way of holiness. That his holy prin- 
 ciple is often weak, and liable to suspensions, is according to 
 the experience of Christians in all ages. He is sanctified 
 but in part. His powers are not entirely devoted to God, 
 his constitution is not wholly invested in the cause of holi- 
 ness, and much of it he still wastes in sin. But let the 
 reader refer to the cases supposed above for illustration, and 
 he will perceive what is substantially the difference between 
 regenerate and unregenerate men, in their progress towards 
 eternity, though existing and exhibited in degrees, ways, 
 and modes, without number. 
 
 Love, then, is the fulfilling of the law. Right motive, 
 good moral intention, is all that the eye of God regards, 
 strictly speaking, as duty, in a moral agent. Observe then 
 how our writer reasons on this point. 44 Now if the Re- 
 viewer will tell us how the sinner can do his duty without 
 right motives, that is, without a good moral intention, in 
 other words, without doing his duty ; he will see the fallacy 
 of his own reasoning.” That is, 4 If the Reviewer will tell 
 us how the sinner can do his duty without doing his duty, 
 that is, without doing his duty, in other words, without doing 
 his duty ; he will see the fallacy of his own reasoning.’ 
 Doubtless ! 
 
 Is not motive, every thing in morals ? If I intend to 
 murder, and fail in the attempt, am I not a murderer ? Is 
 not he who hateth his brother a murderer ? Or if with an 
 intention to obey God, I inadvertently take the life of an 
 innocent man, am I not obedient ? What then can be the 
 meaning of such argument as this ? To the Reviewer’s 
 question, 44 What is a free moral agent ? Is he not an agent 
 2 
 
10 
 
 who can , i. e. who has natural ability so to use truth as to 
 obey it ?” — the writer replies, 44 To this I answer most un- 
 hesitatingly in the affirmative.” The Reviewer then in- 
 quires, how he can do it, unless it be with his moral consti- 
 tution, or powers of moral agency, to which no character 
 pertains. To this the writer replies, 44 With right motives — 
 with good moral intention.” That is, 4 The sinner can sp 
 use truth as to obey it, with obeying it — with obeying it.’ 
 Nothing more can be meant, unless he either denies that 
 right moral motive is obedience to truth, or supposes that 
 there are two moral motives after regeneration, and one be- 
 fore ; or at least the same existing in a feeble degree, which 
 is perhaps that imaginary spark to begin with, for which the 
 advocates of 44 generous theology” have long been searching. 
 
 He continues, 44 Will the Reviewer tell us how a moral 
 agent can do his duty, without a good intention, i. e. without 
 performing a moral act ? Does God require any such duty 
 of his creatures ?” That is, 4 Will the Reviewer tell us 
 how a moral agent can do his duty, without doing his duty, 
 i. e. without doing his duty ? Does God require any such 
 duty of his creatures ?’ Again, 44 If man is a free moral 
 agent, he is capable of doing his duty ; but this does not im- 
 ply the power of acting without a good or bad moral inten- 
 tion ; for to act thus would not be doing his duty.” That is, 
 4 If man is a free moral agent, he is capable of doing his 
 duty ; but this does not imply the power of doing his duty 
 or the reverse, without doing his duty or the reverse ; for 
 to act thus would not be doing his duty.’ Again, 44 1 have 
 not maintained that the sinner cannot do his duty from right 
 motives. I have maintained that he cannot do it without 
 right motives.” That is, 4 1 have not maintained that the 
 sinner cannot do his duty from doing his duty. I have 
 maintained that he cannot do it without doing it.’ To the 
 Reviewer’s question, 44 How on Dr. Tyler’s principle was it 
 possible for Adam radically to change his character, and to 
 choose an object which God had interdicted ? Not from a 
 sinful motive,” &e. He replies, 44 Yes, from a sinful mo- 
 tive — with a wrong intention. Surely Adam did not diso- 
 bey God without intending to disobey, and that was a wicked 
 intention.” That is, 4 Yes, from disobeying — with disobey- 
 ing. Surely Adam did not disobey God without disobey- 
 ing ; and that was disobeying.’ 
 
 Let the reader pause here a moment. In what did the 
 
 i 
 
11 
 
 disobedience of Adam consist? Was it in taking the for- 
 bidden fruit, or was it in intending to take it ? Did not his 
 disobedience in the eye of God consist wholly in his inten- 
 tion, determination, choice, preference, to take the fruit in 
 defiance of divine authority ? Suppose he had formed his 
 intention to take it, but failed in his attempt, and was smitten 
 dead. Had he not disobeyed ? The reader cannot fail to 
 perceive how the writer has inadvertently confounded moral 
 obedience and disobedience, with what is merely their mode 
 of operation. This has created confusion, and been an 
 occasion of his heaping words on words, without making any 
 progress. 
 
 He continues, 44 Now does the Reviewer really believe 
 that a man can be actually doing his duty, with no good 
 moral intention ? Surely his philosophy must sadly have 
 blinded his eyes.” That is, 4 Now does the Reviewer really 
 believe that a man can be doing his duty, without doing his 
 duty? Surely his philosophy must sadly have blinded his 
 eyes.’ Another, 44 When a man is doing his duty, he is 
 holy. When he begins to do his duty, he begins to be holy. 
 He begins to act with a good moral intention, and this indi- 
 cates a change of heart.” That is, 4 When a man is doing 
 his duty, he is doing his duty. When he begins to do his 
 duty, he begins to do his duty. He begins to do his duty, 
 and this indicates duty begun.’ 
 
 Speaking of E. P., he inquires, 44 When he says that 4 a 
 sinful principle can dictate nothing but sin, and a holy prin- 
 ciple can dictate nothing but holiness,’ does he mean, that a 
 holy being always acts with a good intention, and a sinful 
 being with a bad intention ? If this is his meaning, it is 
 doubtless true.” My answer is, this is not my meaning. 
 Perhaps I shall be better understood, if I express myself in 
 this way. 4 A sinful principle can do nothing but perpetuate 
 itself — sin on — and a holy principle can do nothing but per- 
 petuate itself— obey on— but,’ (to go through with what I 
 was then saying,) £ a moral agent, under the control of 
 neither , can put forth either , a right or wrong moral prefer- 
 ence or principle.’ I was then showing that the wrong 
 preference must be paralized, or suspended, before a right 
 one could be formed. 
 
 He continues, “ According to him, and to the Reviewer, 
 to be actuated by self love, is to be actuated by a motive 
 that is neither right nor wrong.” What then ? 44 Conse- 
 
12 
 
 quently the act which is dictated by self love is neither right 
 nor wrong — neither sinful nor holy.” Indeed ! Is character 
 the same thing, in kind, with constitution ? Here again his 
 difficulty results both from his confounding constitution with 
 character, and also moral principle with mechanical acts. 
 We had asserted that, dictated or excited by his constitu- 
 tional desire of happiness to act, a moral agent does act 
 morally, either right or wrong. Take the case just adduced. 
 Adam’s desire of happiness, or as I expressed it, “the im- 
 pelling energy in his constitution,” dictated or prompted him 
 to act morally, or as theologians say, “ electively.” Two 
 opposites are placed before him — the authority of God, and 
 the forbidden fruit. He may seek his happiness in either. 
 His preference, or choice, is moral action — that for which 
 he is responsible — sin or holiness. He preferred the for- 
 bidden fruit, and thus sought his happiness in the wrong 
 way, or directed his constitution into the wrong channel. 
 His sin did not lie in his desiring happiness. That was 
 constitution. It lay wholly in his preferring what God had 
 forbidden — in disobeying God. Nothing else is sin. Here 
 then is the distinction, in kind, wide as heaven and earth, 
 between constitution and character — between what God does 
 and what man does. 
 
 Since that disastrous event in the garden, the posterity of 
 Adam act as he did. There is this difference only, that 
 they do not obey for a time, and then begin to disobey, but 
 their selfish preference is their first. It is preference or 
 principle beginning with their moral agency and continuing. 
 W e do not then wish to destroy their moral constitution, but 
 simply their moral principle. We do not wish, if we could, 
 to abate their desire or constitutional seeking of happiness ; 
 for this would spoil their constitution, and thus defeat the 
 end of their being. But we wish to turn it into the right 
 channel. We wish to lead the sinner to seek his happiness, 
 where alone true happiness is found — in obeying God — in 
 benevolent principle. We do not therefore address the 
 gospel to his sinful principle, for we do not suppose that 
 either man or God will ever prevail on Satan to “ cast out 
 Satan ;” but to his constitution, — his desire of happiness — his 
 reason — his conscience — his judgment — his will — that, aided 
 by divine influence, it may so besiege his constitution, as to 
 induce him to abandon his wrong principle, and form a right 
 one. 
 
13 
 
 “ How can a man do either right or wrong, with no good 
 or bad intention? Will E. P. be so good as to inform 
 us ?.” That is, ‘ How can a man do either right or wrong, 
 without doing either right or wrong ? Will E. P. be so 
 good as to inform us ?’ E. P. cannot tell. 
 
 It is thus evident that his difficulty here results from an 
 assumed distinction between moral motive, intention, or 
 principle, and moral action ; whereas that is moral action, 
 in the eye of God — the identical thing, and the only thing, 
 that is sin or holiness. It appears, however, that he has 
 moved forward a trifle, since writing his “ Strictures,” for 
 then he spoke of “antecedent” and “consequent;” but now 
 to the question, “ What is that heart , with which God in his 
 law requires sinners to love him ? Surely not a heart that is 
 holy before they love him” — for this would be obedience 
 before obedience — he replies, “Very true. But with a 
 heart that is holy when they love him.” Which is the same 
 as to say, 4 With a heart that is holy, when it is holy.’ For 
 one of two things he must certainly mean, if any thing — 
 either that there is a distinction between love to God and 
 holiness, or that there is not. If he means to say that there 
 is, then he flatly contradicts the Bible. For that declares- 
 that “ love is the fulfilling of the law.” Holiriess is exactly 
 that, and nothing more or less. If he does not mean to 
 maintain that such distinction exists, then he asserts nothing' 
 but what the Reviewers do ; only in attempting to differ 
 from them, he repeats the same thing over and over again, in 
 the form of mere truisms. 
 
 SELF LOVE. 
 
 I must here beg leave to insert a former definition entire. 
 “ What is self love .?” 
 
 “ If we speak simply of the affections , the term has no 
 meaning. No man is both the agent and the object of his 
 own affections. No man loves himself. The affections are 
 always flowing — they go out — they always move from the 
 agent and terminate on some object — they may terminate on 
 friends, on wealth, on fame, &zc. any worldly object, — or on 
 God. If they terminate on God supremely, they are holy 
 affections. If they terminate on any other object supremely, 
 they are sinful affections ; for no other object in the universe 
 ought to be loved more than God.” 
 
 “ Self love, therefore, if the term be used with philosophic 
 
14 
 
 cal accuracy, designates an instinctive love of happiness , or 
 desire to he happy. It exists in every living being, implant- 
 ed by the hand of God. It excites action. Without it, we 
 should be neither happy or miserable. Without a desire for 
 happiness, even angels would not be happy ; and even devils 
 would not be miserable. Self love, therefore, or love of 
 happiness, is that in the constitution of the human soul, 
 which gives impulse to its intellectual and moral machinery.” 
 
 Let the reader observe how Dr. T. gave a new character 
 to my meaning, by taking and leaving a part of this sentence. 
 44 But let us attend a moment to E. P.’s notions of selfish- 
 ness. 4 Accurate discrimination,’ he tells us, 4 is here im- 
 portant. No man is both the agent and object of his 
 own affections. No man loves himself.’ ” Here he ex- 
 claims, 44 This surely is new philosophy and new theology— 
 a philosophy and a theology with which the apostle seems 
 to have been unacquainted, 4 In the last days perilous 
 times shall come , for men shall he lovers of their own 
 selves' ” / 
 
 It will be observed, that what he here calls 44 E. P.’s no- 
 tions of selfishness,” was taken from my definition of self 
 love , when I had just remarked that 44 accurate discrimina- 
 tion is here important.” That man is a subject of affections 
 or desires that flow , or go out from himself upon objects 
 without him, and that in this sense, no man loves or de- 
 sires himself, is what we all know. But the apostle had 
 reference to selfish principle — an entirely different thing. 
 
 Both the Reviewer and myself have repeatedly defined self 
 love to be constitutional. We have as much of it as our Crea- 
 tor inserts in our constitution, and can have no more or less. 
 Becoming holy does not increase or diminish it. And were it 
 possible to increase it to any supposable degree, it would still 
 be self love. Being totally different, in kind , from selfish- 
 ness, it can no more become selfishness by increasing in 
 quantity, than intellect, or memory, or life, can become 
 selfishness by increase. But Dr. T. says, 44 1 have no dis- 
 pute with the Reviewer as to what constitutes a free moral 
 agent; nor have I any dispute with him, in regard to the 
 distinction between self love and selfishness. Although both 
 he and his coadjutor charge me with denying this distinction, 
 I have expressly admitted it.” If he would hold to this 
 thoroughly and consistently, we should all move on the same 
 line. But it is one thing to admit a principle in words, and 
 
15 
 
 another to go by it ; for in the very next sentence he says, 
 “ I have said that in holy beings self love is a subordinate 
 principle, and is under the control of universal benevolence. 
 But in moral beings, destitute of benevolence, self love be- 
 comes the controlling principle ; and is then the same as 
 selfishness.” But according to our definition of self love, it 
 never can be “ the same as selfishness.” “ Nor have I 
 maintained, as the Reviewer has repeatedly represented, 
 that any degree of self love is selfish and sinful.” As 
 though self love had one nature up to a certain degree, and 
 beyond that another nature. Besides it is not a thing of 
 degrees, but has a fixed proportion in the constitution. “ I 
 fully believe that it is the duty of every man to love himself, as 
 well as hfs neighbor. This is enjoined in the divine law, 
 and implied in the exercise of disinterested love.” But the 
 love “ enjoined in the divine law” is a moral affection, and 
 therefore entirely another thing. “ If the Reviewer and his 
 coadjutor should appear again before the public, they are 
 desired to give a definite answer to the following question. 
 Is not the moral being who regards his own happiness more 
 than the glory of God, and the happiness of the universe, a 
 selfish being ?” A definite answer requires a definite ques- 
 tion. If by u regards” be meant a moral preference for any 
 thing to “ the glory of God and the happiness of the uni- 
 verse,” he is of course selfish. This is the Reviewer’s defi- 
 nition of selfishness. But if self love be meant, the question 
 has no meaning ; for it respects a comparison in degrees, of 
 objects unlike in kind. He might as well inquire whether 
 the man who breathes more than the glory of God, and the 
 happiness of the universe, is a selfish being ? 
 
 Before a moral agent, are placed two objects of choice — 
 one the kingdom and glory of God, the other a "private king- 
 dom and glory — one a benevolent, the other a selfish, inter- 
 est. His choice is his character. If he chooses the one, he 
 is benevolent ; if the other, he is selfish. The one choice is 
 benevolent principle, the other is selfish principle. “And 
 is it so ?” says Dr. T. “ Is it the choice of different 
 objects merely, which constitutes the distinction of moral 
 character ?” Does the Bible make character any thing else ? 
 To begin with Adam, did not his sin consist in choosing a 
 wrong object — the gratification of his taste or curiosity, in 
 preference to the pleasure of God ? And to the end of the 
 
16 
 
 Bible, is any tiling represented as character, but right and 
 wrong preference ? 
 
 Here again his difficulty evidently results from confound- 
 ing moral choice or principle with its subordinate purposes, 
 or modes of operation. For he continues, “ Suppose that 
 two individuals choose the same object from different mo- 
 tives, e. g. suppose one man chooses to be honest and up- 
 right in his conduct, from a regard to his interest or happi- 
 ness in the world, and another chooses to be honest and up- 
 right from a regard to the glory of God. Is here no dis- 
 tinction of moral character ?” Evidently. The object of 
 moral choice in the one case is worldly interest, in the other 
 it is the glory of God. These different moral choices or 
 principles dictate the same subordinate purpose. The good 
 and the bad man take the same way to promote their differ- 
 ent objects. “ Again, suppose two individuals to choose 
 different objects from the same motive. Owing to the differ- 
 ent states of society in which they are placed, one finds that 
 it will promote his interest and reputation to disregard the 
 Sabbath — the other finds that it will promote his interest and 
 reputation to pay an outward respect to this divine institution. 
 They regulate their conduct accordingly. Now does this 
 choice of different objects, prompted by the same motive, 
 constitute any radical distinction of character ?” Both have 
 the same moral choice — choose the same object, a worldly 
 interest, but they pursue it in different ways. 
 
 Selfishness is self love operating in a selfish form, and be- 
 nevolence is self love operating in a benevolent form. To 
 insert the word “ own,” therefore, as opposed to the happi- 
 ness .of others, suggests the idea of selfish principle. For 
 instance, simple love of life is constitution. But when we 
 speak of a m&n’s loving his own life, as opposed to the life of 
 others, we speak of selfish principle. The meaning then is, 
 that there is selfish preference. Accordingly the Reviewer 
 never inserted the word “ own” in this connexion. But Dr. 
 T. in his “ Strictures” continually inserted it, when profes- 
 sing to quote the Reviewer’s meaning. In reply to him the 
 Reviewer says — “From the very constitution of his nature, 
 the perfection of man in character, as well as happiness, will 
 forever lie in promoting the happiness of others. These 
 observations show us why the expressions, “ a desire of one’s 
 own happiness,” (quoting from Dr. T.) “ his own private 
 interest,” “ his own individual gratification,” he. are so 
 
17 
 
 generally used to denote a selfish state of mind. The terms 
 44 own,” 44 private,” “ individual,” &c. in such cases, are con- 
 trasted with 44 other,” 44 general,” 44 public ;” and show that 
 the happiness in question, is sought in opposition to the hap- 
 piness of other beings. But Dr. Tyler perpetually confounds 
 these expressions, and makes them synonymous with the 
 phrase, 44 a desire of happiness.” In his Reply, Dr. T. 
 still inserts the word 44 own,” as before, and vindicates his 
 inserting it in his 44 Strictures.” He says, 44 I said in the 
 Strictures, 4 now if a man’s own happiness is the ultimate 
 end of pursuit, — he is influenced by the selfish principle.’ ” 
 To this the Reviewer replies, — 44 Dr. Tyler alters our state- 
 ment, by inserting a word which arrays the happiness of the 
 agent (the Reviewer’s expression) in opposition to the hap- 
 piness of others, and thus changes self love into selfishness.” 
 To this Dr. T. replies, 44 Now the passage here referred to 
 is the following, 4 Of all specific voluntary action, the happi- 
 ness of the agent, in some form, is the ultimate end .’ The 
 reader can judge whether I have altered his statement.” ! 
 
 Dr. T. says, 44 1 maintain that it is the duty of every man 
 to desire and seek his own happiness ; but not as his ultimate 
 end.” Not as his ultimate end ? Is happiness then a means 
 of an end beyond it ? Are not all things else means, of 
 which happiness is the end the ultimate end of being — 
 beyond which nothing is ? If then it is the duty of man 
 to desire and seek his own happiness at all, it is his duty 
 to seek it as his ultimate end ; for happiness is always an 
 end , not a means. 
 
 But by 44 ultimate end,” he probably means chief ob- 
 ject ; for he adds, 44 It is only when he prefers himself to 
 others, to all others, to the universe and to God, that he 
 is selfish and sinful.” This however is a misapplication 
 of the term, and a perversion of the meaning, when it is said, 
 that 44 of all specific voluntary action, the happiness of the 
 agent, in some form, is the ultimate end.” But to say 
 nothing of that, let us for a moment adopt this theory of Dr. 
 T., making constitution and character the same, in kind, 
 differing only in degree ; thus making it a man’s duty to 
 seek his own happiness up to a certain point, beyond which 
 it becomes selfishness. It is, then, to a certain extent, a 
 man’s 44 duty to seek his own happiness.” He must not 
 therefore be wholly engaged in promoting the kingdom and 
 glory of God, for in so doing he neglects his 44 duty.” 4 But 
 3 
 
18 
 
 it is one thing to find happiness and another to seek it, and 
 may not the good man seek the glory of God, and so seek- 
 ing find his happiness V Ah 1 but that will not do. It is his 
 duty to seek his own happiness. Besides, to pretend to be 
 seeking one thing, when he is secretly hoping to find another, 
 is hypocrisy. Nor may he sometimes neglect to seek his 
 own happiness, and be all absorbed in promoting the glory 
 of God, for he must never neglect his duty. It cannot be 
 his duty to neglect his duty. This seeking his own happi- 
 ness must be always attended to, according to its relative 
 importance. What shall be done ? The man has two ob- 
 jects to attend to — one to promote the glory of God, the 
 other to seek his own happiness. He is in a critical situa- 
 tion. If he happens at any time to give undue preference 
 to his own happiness, and do “ his duty” too earnestly, he is 
 selfish. But if, on the other hand, he forgets himself, and 
 becomes all absorbed in promoting the glory of God, he 
 neglects “ his duty.” He is in an awkward predicament- 
 calculating the relative claims of himself and his Maker, and 
 dividing his attention betwixt the two ! 
 
 The reader is entreated now to give one dispassionate and 
 penetrating thought to this subject, in the light presented by 
 the Reviewers. They place a constitutional desire of happi- 
 ness as the end of being, back of all character, among our - 
 other moral and natural instincts. They do not suppose 
 that desire of happiness, natural affections, sympathy for 
 suffering, amiable instincts, have any moral character. They 
 suppose that all character resides in moral principle ; of 
 course, that it is the perfection of character in a moral being, 
 to invest all his constitution in a benevolent object. Thus, 
 a desire of happiness in a moral agent, urging him to moral 
 action, may give rise to, or be the occasion of, a principle 
 either holy or selfish. If a man seeks his happiness in doing 
 good, then doing good is his object, and his principle is be- 
 nevolent. If he seeks it in the reward of doing good, or 
 undertakes to do good hoping to find a reward beyond the 
 identical thing, good done , then not doing good, but reward, 
 is his object of moral choice. As a moral agent, man thus 
 has a constitutional desire of happiness ; as benevolent or 
 selfish, he has a moral preference for a benevolent or selfish 
 object. It is no part of his duty to seek his own happiness. 
 
 It is his duty, in obedience to God, to pursue a course that 
 is attended with happiness, but his whole duty lies^ in pur- 
 
19 
 
 suing the right course. He is to be wholly engaged to 
 u fear God and keep his commandments, for this is the 
 whole duty of man.” God has never commanded him to 
 seek his own happiness in any degree. The constitution 
 and its Maker will take the whole charge of that matter, and 
 the moral agent — the subject of moral law — may give him- 
 self no trouble about it. He neglects no part of his duty, if 
 he never thinks of it. He may be wholly engaged, in 
 promoting the glory of God. Thus shaping his entire con- 
 stitution into a benevolent form, it is all directly expended 
 upon a benevolent object. He thus seeks, and thus finds, 
 all his happiness, in doing good, and good done. This, the 
 Reviewers claim is the perfection of character in a 
 moral agent — the directing of the entire energies of his 
 moral being, to exactly one and the right point. 
 
 Preparatory to establishing this position, they laid down 
 as a preliminary, that “ of all specific voluntary action, the 
 happiness of the agent, in some form, is his ultimate end.” 
 They also stated, that this desire of happiness, with the rest 
 of the constitution, may be sanctified by benevolent princi- 
 ple, or thrown into a benevolent form ; or that it may exist 
 in a selfish form. For constitution, Dr. T. substitutes moral 
 action — for happiness as his ultimate end of constitutional 
 desire, he substitutes his “ own” happiness, as an object of 
 moral preference — for specific voluntary action, which has 
 no character in itself, he substitutes moral principle, which 
 has all character ; — and then, after maintaining himself “ that 
 it is every man’s duty to seek his own happiness,” turns and 
 charges the Reviewers with advocating selfishness, and pours 
 out his lamentations that they are driving towards heresy ! 
 
 Duty is one. Washington was a patriot. The redemp- 
 tion of his country was his object. To this he addressed all 
 his powers — it involved all his happiness— so that he did not 
 need to seek his own happiness as one object, and this 
 as another. His happiness was all sought in saving his 
 country, all found in his country saved — sought in doing 
 good as his object, found in good done as his reward. 
 Was reward, other than good done, any part of his object? 
 honor — power — his country’s praise ? No. But his country 
 did him honor — his name was placed high on the records of 
 fame, and ever as the years revolved, a nation’s jubilee pro- 
 claimed the name of Washington. Was this his reward? 
 No ! His reward was the good done — a nation’s happiness. 
 
20 
 
 And as he looked abroad over the nation, saw thousands of 
 families reposing in peace under their own vines and fig 
 trees, saw the wilderness beginning to blossom, and millions 
 made happy— tears of gratitude sparkled in his eye, and he 
 thanked God for his existence ! 
 
 But we have a more sublime illustration than this. Our 
 glorious Redeemer looked from heaven upon a world lying in 
 sin. From his bright path on high, he bent his course 
 downward to this dark rebellious province. What was his 
 object? To redeem sinners. “For the joy that was set 
 before him, he endured the cross, despising the shame.” 
 What was this joy ? The joy of a multitude whom no man 
 can number, redeemed from sin — robed in white garments — 
 perfectly holy and happy — shining among the stars — and 
 rolling their anthems of praise over the skies forever. Their 
 happiness is all his ! He is perfectly benevolent. This is 
 “ the joy that was set before him.” He feels every thrill of 
 joy in every bosom of the redeemed, as he exclaims, “ F a- 
 ther, it is enough ; thy promise is fulfilled ; I am satisfied.” — 
 “ If our Saviour were not benevolent, he would never place 
 his happiness in making others happy. All the reward 
 which he expected, all which he desires is, the satisfaction 
 of seeing God glorified, and sinners saved.”* 
 
 BENEVOLENCE. 
 
 Benevolence is moral love. Preference for the authority 
 of God to its opposite, is obedience ; preference for the 
 promotion and happiness of his moral kingdom to its oppo- 
 site, is benevolence. They imply the same thing. The 
 benevolent man delights in the happiness of moral beings ; 
 of course he delights in the character which confers it ; and 
 of course he supremely delights in God, for the -energies of 
 his immense being are all engaged in the promotion of right 
 character. “ God is love.” All his moral perfections are 
 only different forms of benevolence. For instance, justice 
 is benevolence sustaining the authority of law ; veracity is be- 
 nevolence declaring the truth, &c. because justice, truth, &c. 
 are essential to the promotion of the kingdom of right char- 
 acter. This kingdom is called the kingdom of God, and 
 the man who makes its promotion the great object of his 
 existence, is a benevolent man. 
 
 Because God is perfectly benevolent, his benevolence 
 
 * Dr. Pay son. 
 
21 
 
 imparts perfection to his justice, truth, &c. and to his entire 
 administration over the moral universe. He will always 
 govern the moral universe in such a way as to encourage 
 and promote right character, and through that, happiness. 
 In God, therefore, the benevolent mind has perfect compla- 
 cence. And when we speak of loving God, glorifying God, 
 promoting his kingdom, seeking the happiness of our fellow 
 beings, advancing the cause of truth, &c. we always imply 
 the same thing. 
 
 Genuine benevolence equally respects the authority of the 
 Moral Governor, and the happiness of his subjects. It is a 
 two fold cord, of which not one part can exist without the 
 other. He who seeks to promote happiness in a way in- 
 compatible with the promotion of holiness, who thus seeks to 
 please the subjects of God’s moral kingdom at the expense 
 of God’s authority, is not actuated by moral benevolence, 
 but by some low impulse of animal sympathy, or by a selfish 
 prudence. Instead of conducting his fellow beings through 
 right character — through 44 the narrow way that leadeth unto 
 life” — to ultimate and eternal blessedness, he is conducting 
 them through selfish indulgence — through the 44 broad way 
 that leadeth unto destruction” — to ultimate and eternal 
 wretchedness. It is also clearly certain that mere natural 
 affections, amiable instincts, reciprocity of social sympa- 
 thies, fee. are entirely different, in kind, from that sublime 
 principle which reaches the throne of God, declaring su- 
 preme allegiance to his authority and kingdom. The latter 
 includes the former, but the former never includes the latter. 
 
 The perfection of benevolence consists in the investment 
 of the whole moral constitution in a benevolent object. One 
 of the strongest energies in the moral constitution is desire 
 of happiness. It is therefore the worst in the service of sin, 
 and the best in the service of God. This also must be in- 
 vested. Constitution reaches forth for happiness, and the 
 agent does not do his duty till he takes .that happiness, in 
 the happiness of others. He is required to gather up his 
 whole soul, and bring it into the kingdom of God. He is to 
 gather up his intellect, and bring that in, that he may 
 * meditate on all God’s works, and muse on the works of 
 his hands,’ — his memory, and bring that in, that he may 
 ‘ utter the memory of his great goodness,’ — his reason, that 
 he may 4 approve the things that, are more excellent,’ — his 
 zeal, that he may be 4 zealously affected in a good thing,’— 
 
22 
 
 and to crown the whole, he is to gather up his love of happi- 
 ness and bring that in, that he may love the happiness of his 
 fellow beings. Now his constitution is given to benevolent 
 principle, his whole soul is brought in. 
 
 It appears then that as the happiness of the agent, in some 
 form, is the ultimate end of constitutional desire, and may 
 be sought either in the happiness of our fellow beings, or in 
 some other object — either in a benevolent or a selfish form — 
 it is the nature of benevolence to have that interest in the 
 happiness of others, which makes it our own happiness. 
 This is the benevolence of our Saviour. He takes hold on 
 our happiness. Benevolence is heaven’s economy. In pro- 
 portion to a man’s benevolence, the happiness of others 
 becomes his. Just in the degree that he is truly benevolent, 
 he seeks the happiness of others as his own. This is the 
 position of the Reviewers. They have maintained that a 
 man is benevolent, when he seeks the happiness of his fellow 
 beings, “ for the happiness he expects in seeing others 
 happy.” 
 
 But Dr. Tyler pronounces this to be selfishness! The 
 Reviewers had stated that all men seek happiness, and that 
 there are two ways of doing it — one a selfish and the other 
 a benevolent way — one in pursuing wealth, honor, &c. to 
 minister to our happiness ; the other in pursuing the happi- 
 ness of others, making their happiness ours. To this he 
 replies, “ According to this statement, a man chooses the 
 happiness of others, for precisely the same reason that he 
 chooses wealth or honor ; not because he regards it as a 
 good in itself, but because it ministers to his own gratifica- 
 tion.” ! He continues, “ If no personal benefit were to 
 accrue to him from the happiness of others, he would not 
 regard it as at all desirable. Is this the nature of benevo- 
 lence ?” The reader will recollect that this “ personal 
 benefit,” as Dr. T. calls it, is the happiness of fellow beings. 
 According to his scheme, benevolence may promote the 
 happiness of others, but must have no interest in it ; for that 
 spoils it. The happiness of our fellow beings must not be 
 happiness to us ; if so, we are selfish. 
 
 All the interest he allows a benevolent man in the happi- 
 ness of others, is expressed in the following frosty sentence ; 
 a “ regard to the happiness of others, as a good in itself.” 
 Now observe how this makes a Christian’s benevolence ap- 
 pear. In the first place, it is a “ regard,” as one person 
 
23 
 
 sometimes sends his regard to another, when he has no 
 heart to send love. In the next place, the happiness of 
 others is “a” good — not good to him. In the next place, it 
 is a good “ in itself ” — neither good to him, or hardly so 
 indeed to its lawful owners. The inquiry naturally arises, 
 What that happiness can be, which is a good “in itself ”? 
 But waiving this, a more important question is here to be 
 asked. Is not the having a personal property in the happi- 
 ness of others, the very meaning and beauty of benevolence ? 
 The little pronoun, own, in this connexion, means every 
 thing ; which our writer can never find it in his heart to use, 
 except when he is telling us that “ it is the duty of every 
 man to seek his own happiness.” And yet he is sounding 
 the trumpet of alarm, and proclaiming to the “ multitudes 
 through the land,” that the Reviewers are advocating selfish- 
 ness ! 
 
 But he will tell us that according to his theory, it is a 
 man’s duty to seek his own happiness only in a limited de- 
 gree. So it is understood. His theory is, that every man 
 is entitled to a portion of happiness, which it is his duty to 
 seek ; and all above that, it is his duty to seek for others. 
 The fundamental principle that runs through his theory of 
 benevolence, repeated constantly and in italics, is, that it 
 regards the happiness of others as “ a good in itself 1” He 
 does not allow a man to make the happiness of others his 
 own, and so every man must have “ a good in itself,” to 
 which it is his duty to contribute a certain relative propor- 
 tion, which is emphatically “ his own happiness.” He must 
 moreover seek the happiness of others, according to their 
 relative importance, which happiness must also be “ a good 
 in itself.” 
 
 Having thus sternly denounced the selfish principle, of 
 seeking happiness “ in the happiness of others,” he inquires, 
 “ Does not the benevolent being regard the happiness of 
 others as good and desirable in itself, aside from all con- 
 siderations of personal interest ?” Observe here, “ good and 
 desirable,” — the very thing contended for. But he will tell 
 us that he was guarded in his language, and did not say, 
 “ good and desirable” to him, but “ in itself.” This how- 
 ever amounts to nothing, for the thing that is “ good and 
 desirable,” is here spoken of as the motive, which prompts 
 him to choose ; and therefore it must be good and desirable 
 to him. This brings us exactly upon the Reviewer’s ground. 
 
 i 
 
24 
 
 I shall introduce but two or three more specimens of this 
 theory of benevolence, out of many, barely enough to show 
 the reader how successful Dr. T. has been in his attempts 
 to differ from the Reviewer. I do it not for the pleasure 
 of finding fault ; but as he has condemned the benevolence 
 which the Reviewer advocates, he is willing to have us in- 
 quire whether he has propounded a better. “ Suppose that a 
 benevolent being were to know, that by sacrificing some 
 portion of his personal happiness, a vast amount of good 
 might be secured. Would he not choose to make the sacri- 
 fice ?” His own happiness is then on one side, and over 
 against it stands a vast amount of good ! And the question 
 is, whether he will relinquish some portion of the one, to 
 secure the other — whether he will sacrifice some portion of 
 his happiness, to promote that “ vast amount of good” ! 
 Can you conceive of any thing more unlike Christian be- 
 nevolence ? Do you not see, that if he has the spirit of 
 Christ, that “ vast amount of good” includes his happiness ? — 
 that he would sacrifice his happiness not to promote it ? 
 Perhaps Dr. T. will say that he meant property, ease, indul- 
 gence, he. “ He ought not surely to complain of his read- 
 ers for understanding him to say, what he actually did say.” 
 But even then, who is the benevolent man ? He who gives 
 his money as a sacrifice , to promote a benevolent object ? or 
 he who has so much of that “ personal interest,” which Dr. 
 T. calls selfishness, in the object, that it would be a sacrifice 
 of his happiness not to give ? 
 
 But he must admit that the benevolent man has an interest 
 of some sort, in the benevolent object, and expecting to differ 
 from the Reviewer, he says, “ Would it not be more agreea- 
 ble to him, more congenial with his feelings, to suffer this 
 loss of personal happiness, than that this amount of good 
 should fail ?” What is happiness ? Is it a commodity ? Is 
 it any thing other than an internal feeling? And if the 
 “ more agreeable,” the “ more congenial,” be not the more 
 happy feeling, what is ? It is impossible for us to divine 
 wherein this attempt to differ from the Reviewer amounts to 
 any thing more than the question, 4 Would he not be more 
 happy, in promoting this amount of good, by being less so ?’ 
 
 “ Is not this the nature of benvolence ? Does it not imply 
 a willingness to make personal sacrifices for the sake of a 
 greater good ?” Certainly ; if by personal sacrifices be 
 meant property, ease, he. It is however added, “ But 
 
25 
 
 what is the motive in this case ? Not the individual’s per- 
 sonal happiness, for the very thing chosen is the sacrifice of 
 personal happiness,” So that promoting this “ greater good,” 
 is sacrificing, not only his worldly interest, but his happiness 
 with it. His happiness is here assumed to lie, not in the 
 greater good, but in the interest sacrificed. Both are lost ! 
 Where then is the economy of benevolence ? And this Dr. 
 T. tells us, u is the very nature of benevolence and he 
 adds, “ If the Reviewer will test his principles by a case of 
 this kind, he will at once see the fallacy of his reasoning.” ! 
 
 Nor does Dr. T. effect any thing by his distinction be- 
 tween seeking happiness and finding it, as though we must 
 seek one thing and find another, and thus be forever blunder- 
 ing. Our Maker has not so framed our constitution. He 
 has placed the object and the end of our moral constitution — 
 duty and the end of duty — love and happiness — in one 
 line. A man is not therefore benevolent, unless he has that 
 “ personal interest” — whatever of happiness his constitution 
 craves — in the happiness of others, which makes him not 
 only find but seek , his happiness, exactly there. Benevo- 
 lence is not cross eyed. She does not look two ways, and 
 seek one thing to find another. Her eye is clear, and 
 bright, and single. 
 
 But it is suggested, that when a selfish being, hereafter, 
 shall perceive how happy the benevolent are in promoting 
 the happiness of others, he will change his character, and 
 engage in the same employment. “ So soon as he shall be 
 convinced that a greater degree of happiness is to be derived 
 from God, than from the world, will not self love immedi- 
 atefy prompt him to exchange the object of his preference ? 
 Does not. his depravity consist entirely in ignorance — in a 
 mistake of judgment ? And will not light infallibly correct 
 this mistake, and ensure his conversion to God ?” To say 
 nothing of . the fact, that the lost in selfishness are gone be- 
 yond the reach of redemption ; and of the decision of God, 
 that beyond this probation there is no change in character ; 
 this suggestion will be in season, when the world in which 
 we are , ceases to be selfish. For it is certain that selfish 
 men know now, that benevolence is the happier character. 
 
 But the “ Reviewer’s statement is unqualified. 4 As in 
 this respect he judges, or estimates their relative value, so he 
 chooses .’ ” Exactly so. The miser does not choose to 
 promote the happiness of others, for he does not judge that 
 4 
 
26 
 
 his happiness lies in their happiness — he places no value 
 there — but in money. And as he “ judges, so he chooses .” 
 The selfish being in eternity does not judge that he has any 
 interest in the glory of God, and happiness of heaven. The 
 happiness of others is valueless- to him. He would even 
 destroy it, if he could. He places no relative value on 
 this, in comparison of the gratification of his selfish envy and 
 malice ; and “ as in this respect he judges, or estimates 
 their relative value, so he chooses .” “ If this be true,” says 
 
 Dr. T. “ without qualification, (and many other similar pas- 
 sages might be adduced,) the conclusion involved in the 
 foregoing question, is inevitable. This the Reviewer cannot 
 deny.” 
 
 It will here again be perceived that the misapprehension 
 arose from confounding constitution with character, and also 
 the end with the means. Both benevolent and selfish beings 
 have self love — love the end , happiness ; but selfish beings 
 do not love the means. So in popular language we often 
 say, that a man judges one way and chooses another ; or as 
 the expression is, acts contrary to his better judgment. 
 But it ought to be remembered throughout, that the language 
 employed on this subject is not popular phraseology, but 
 definite analytical language. All men love happiness, but 
 sinners do not love the means of it. Back of the means of 
 happiness, which is duty — right moral preference — are the 
 means of inducing this preference, or what are called means 
 of regeneration. Now the point in hand was this — That 
 God makes an occasion of the end of constitutional desire, 
 to produce in the agent a choice of the true means of ob- 
 taining it. When prompted, ab intra , by his desire for 
 happiness, and enlightened and influenced, ab extra , by the 
 gospel and the Holy Spirit, the sinner is brought to prefer 
 the kingdom of God, and the happiness of his fellow beings 
 involved in it, to every other interest — that is right moral 
 choice— the beginning of holiness. Now there is evidently 
 a distinction between judging and choosing, although there 
 is no supposable priority of time. You may either say, that 
 a man chooses the service of God because he judges it to 
 be excellent, or that he judges it to be excellent because he 
 chooses it. But in an analysis of a first moral choice, it 
 seems more analogical to give precedence to the judgment, 
 and say, “ As he judges, so he chooses.” But if any prefer 
 to turn the proposition round, and say, c As he chooses, so 
 
27 
 
 he judges,’ it is presumed that no one will question their 
 clear title to all the more they can make of it. 
 
 So then it is, and from the necessity of our constitution 
 must forever be. What a moral being judges to be his treas- 
 ure, he chooses. Here lies the nerve of benevolence. The 
 benevolent man will forever judge, that the glory of God 
 and blessedness of his kingdom, is to him transcendently the 
 richest treasure in existence, and he will forever choose it. 
 But to a selfish being it is no treasure. In the boundless 
 happiness of God himself, and all the happiness of heaven, 
 he has no interest. It is all no better than fire in his envi- 
 ous spirit. As it is not good to him, he does not choose to 
 engage in its promotion ; for 44 as in this respect he judges, 
 so he chooses 5” and thus he sighs in despair, in his dismal 
 dungeon of selfishness and wo. 
 
 If we only make the true distinction between self love and 
 moral principle, and keep steadily in view that the law of 
 God is exclusively concerned in the latter, the subject of 
 disinterested benevolence is seen with great clearness and 
 beauty. It is then evidently no part of a man’s duty to seek 
 his own happiness, as a separate or distinct interest. But 
 to apply the moral law to regulate the end, instead of the 
 means — to substitute, 4 Thou shalt seek happiness,’ for 4 Thou 
 shalt love,’ leads to endless confusion, and even to the entire 
 subversion of all true benevolence. I do not by any means 
 suppose that the author of this theory does practically adopt 
 it, or any of the principles to which it leads. We have 
 excellent assurance that he never will. It certainly subverts 
 the economy of our being, and conducts, by inevitable result, 
 from all that is vital and blessed in heaven, to everlasting 
 winter and dreariness. It creates detached and separate 
 happiness throughout the kingdom of heaven, when the glory 
 of that kingdom is, that what is the happiness of one, is the 
 happiness of all. It imposes on every subject a duty to seek 
 his own happiness, in a subordinate degree, when his perfec- 
 tion consists in being wholly devoted to the glory of God. 
 It severs the golden cord that binds heart to heart, interest 
 to interest, happiness to happiness, and even the happiness 
 of the glorious God and Father of our being, must be re- 
 garded by all his subjects in no more endearing affinity than 
 44 a good in itself / It also subverts the economy of our 
 constitution, and by requiring us to do what we cannot do, 
 and ought not to attempt — repress our self love, it leaves 
 
28 
 
 us by consequence to neglect what we can do, and ought to 
 do, with all our might — love God. 
 
 Let the means be attended to, and such is our constitution 
 and economy, that the end regulates itself. The moral law 
 is wholly concerned in regulating the moral will. u Thou 
 shalt love,” is the sum of the commandment. Thus be- 
 nevolent beings, going entirely out of themselves, and loving 
 God and his kingdom with all their hearts, their constitutions, 
 unbidden, seek fulness of happiness in the happiness of God’s 
 holy kingdom. Where love is, happiness is, and the measure 
 of the end is always commensurate with the measure of the 
 means. Thus heaven is a kingdom of perfect disinterested 
 benevolence ; and thus its blessedness is immense, beyond 
 what “ hath entered into the heart of man to conceive.” 
 The mind is overwhelmed with amazement, in view of its 
 exceeding excellence, its “ eternal weight of glory.” 
 
 SELFISHNESS. 
 
 Selfishness is the opposite of benevolence. It is wrong 
 moral preference. Benevolence reveres the authority of 
 God ; selfishness contemns the authority of God. Benevo- 
 lence obeys the law of God ; selfishness transgresses the law 
 of God. Benevolence seeks happiness in the happiness of 
 others ; selfishness seeks happiness in something other than 
 the happiness of others. Benevolence is supremely kind to 
 God’s moral kingdom ; selfishness is supremely wrckind to 
 God’s moral kingdom. Benevolence seeks the glory of 
 God, and the prosperity of his kingdom ; selfishness seeks 
 its own glory, and the prosperity of its kingdom. 
 
 It will appear by this statement, that impiety, sin, and 
 selfishness, mean the same thing. As benevolence is right 
 preferring, choosing, loving, &c. selfishness is wrong prefer- 
 ing, choosing, loving, &c. The selfishness — the essence of 
 the thing itself — lies in the preferring, choosing, loving, &lc. 
 the specific object of the preference being unimportant. As 
 this object is ordinarily some worldly object, the Reviewers, 
 in imitation of Christ and his apostles, so represented the 
 fact. This representation was rebuked as not sufficiently 
 comprehensive. It was supposed that the sinner might love 
 other than worldly objects more than God. To this the Re- 
 viewers replied, that, “ with the formality of definition,” they 
 had, to avoid circumlocution, used the term “ world” to 
 denote “ all that from which man is capable of deriving hap- 
 
29 
 
 piness, and which can come into competition, as an object 
 of affection, with his Maker.” — “ So far were we, indeed, 
 from maintaining, as Dr. Tyler represents us, that the sinner 
 cannot desire exemption from future evil and the possession 
 of future good, from selfish motives, that we expressly 
 declared this to be a frequent fact. Speaking of them in 
 certain circumstances, we said, ‘ With what fervor of sup- 
 plications can the sinner now seek deliverance from the 
 wrath to come ! We have no doubt that such views and 
 such desires have prompted many a sinner, even with cries 
 and tears, to adopt what he regards as the necessary means 
 of averting a doom, so dreadful as that which awaits him.’ 
 Of these desires we added, i They are as selfish as any 
 the human heart can harbor.’ ” All this does not satisfy 
 Dr. T., and let us now hear him. “ Suppose that a man 
 has such an engrossing sense of the vanity of the world, and 
 the realities of eternity, that he goes about to establish his 
 own righteousness ?” The object preferred to God is his 
 “ own righteousness,” and is not that a worldly thing ? He 
 is preferring a creature of the imagination, a worldly phantom, 
 to the glory of God and happiness of his kingdom. “ Sup- 
 pose that he bestows all his goods to feed the poor, and 
 gives his body to be burned, for the sake of purchasing 
 eternal life ; is he not selfish ? But what worldly good is 
 he seeking ?” He is deceiving himself, preferring some 
 imaginary good conjured up from the agreeable objects of 
 the world and projected into eternity, to the kingdom and 
 glory of God. “ Suppose that he immures himself in a 
 dungeon, denies himself every worldly comfort, and inflicts 
 upon himself every conceivable torture, to atone for his 
 sins. — Is he not selfish ? But what worldly good is he seek- 
 ing ?” He is a very unwise man — preferring his own atone- 
 ment to a much better one, and some imagined benefit from 
 it, which is undoubtedly more worldly than heavenly, to the 
 glory and kingdom of God. 
 
 When we use the terms world, and worldly, in religion, 
 and especially this world, as opposed to the next , and more 
 especially as opposed to God, we follow in the track of the 
 Bible, to include all the objects of desires, affections, pur- 
 poses, lusts, &c. that oppose the kingdom of God. We 
 cannot here forbear to inquire, How much has Dr. T. dif- 
 fered from the Reviewers ? 
 
 
30 
 
 The heart, estranged from God, always rests on something 
 as its portion, and when Dr. T. has succeeded to tell us of 
 something on which it more frequently rests, than some 
 worldly good, will it not be time for him to criticise the 
 language of the Bible, not less than that of the Spectator ? 
 
 Dr. T. inquires, “ Does he mean to admit, that if a man 
 regards himself more than God, and his own interest and 
 happiness more than the good of the universe besides, he is 
 necessarily selfish ?” The answer which Dr. T. volunteers 
 is, “ Certainly not,” ! “ unless I misunderstand him ; for he 
 contends, that a moral being may be destitute of benevolence, 
 and actuated by self love, and still not be selfish.” The 
 Reviewer had distinguished , between constitution and char- 
 acter, not divided ; much less did he distinguish in order to 
 divide. Coleridge remarks, “ It is a dull and obtuse mind 
 that must divide in order to distinguish ; but it is a still 
 worse that distinguishes in order to divide. In the former, 
 we may contemplate the source of superstition and idolatry ; 
 in the latter, of schism, heresy, and a seditious and sectarian 
 spirit.” 
 
 He continues, “ But, as I said in the Strictures, if such a 
 being love himself at all, he must love himself supremely.” 
 What does he mean by a man’s loving himself? Self love ? 
 He might as well say he lives supremely. Does he mean, 
 that he loves himself as an object or means of happiness, in 
 the sense that a man loves friends, wealth, honor, &c. ? In 
 this sense, as before remarked, “ no man loves himself.” 
 Only one supposition remains. Does he mean that he loves 
 some object of private interest, in preference of God ? This 
 is the Reviewer’s definition of selfishness. 
 
 “ But, according to the Reviewer, selfishness does not 
 consist in a supreme regard to self, but in a preference of 
 the world to God, or of a limited to a general good.” 
 According to the Reviewer selfishness does consist in a 
 supreme regard to self; if a selfish regard be intended. 
 It is a man preferring a “ private interest” — something 
 like “ a good in itself” — not as being, but opposing, 
 the glory of God and his kingdom. “ Why then call 
 it selfishness ? The Reviewer has attempted to answer 
 this question. He says, 4 Because he who loves supremely 
 an inferior or limited object, does it to the exclusion of a 
 greater good.’ This may be a reason why he should be 
 called worldly, but is no reason why he should be called 
 
31 
 
 selfish.” And so when you solicit charity of a miser for a 
 benevolent object, and he refuses to give, you must not say, 
 that he is selfish, but word it more to the point, and say, he 
 loves money. 
 
 Selfishness expresses opposition. The selfish man op- 
 poses himself to God and the general good, by setting up 
 in his heart a private interest. He sets himself up against 
 the kingdom of God, and he sets himself up with something. 
 He does not place himself out in vacuity, shut up his soul 
 within itself, love and hate nothing, and set himself up in 
 that way. This were setting himself down , to a lump of 
 matter. The soul loves , and hates , and therefore loves and 
 hates something. Whatever that something is, which a 
 selfish man loves in preference of God, is a selfish interest , 
 and his loving it is a selfish affection. If this selfish affection 
 is forced from one object, unless it is destroyed “ by the 
 expulsive power of a new affection,” it immediately goes 
 after another, for it neither destroys itself, or changes its 
 nature, or ascends to God. Take the case introduced for 
 illustration — When the selfish affection lost its first object, an 
 education, it went after another ; when it lost that, it went 
 after sensuality ; and when it lost that, it went down into 
 eternity, after what it finds there. It is throughout generi- 
 cally the same — the same moral principle — the same wicked,, 
 miserable spirit — selfishness. But because it exists in this 
 world in different forms, sometimes in the form of love of 
 fame, sometimes of wealth, sometimes of sensuality, he. we 
 must not say, in a word, that the man is selfish, but say that 
 he is miserly, or vain, or sensual. And further, because 
 these specific objects of selfish preference are included in 
 the world, there is no propriety in saying that the man is 
 selfish , but we must say, he is worldly. Does not the genus 
 include its species 9 
 
 The Reviewer proceeds, “ He arrays his happiness, as 
 found in that limited object, against the happiness of the 
 universe.” “ No,” rejoins Dr. T., “ he arrays his happi- 
 ness, as found in that object, against his happiness as found 
 in another object.” ! We are here constrained to inquire, 
 Can this be the best way to advance the interests of that 
 kingdom, whose elements are light and love ? After the dis- 
 tinction between constitution and character had been clearly 
 and repeatedly traced, Dr. T. takes the Reviewer’s lan- 
 guage from his pen, and by confounding the two, so alters 
 
32 
 
 his meaning, that he thus makes him exhibit the burlesque 
 of a man’s happiness arrayed against itself. 
 
 “ In both cases, according to the Reviewer’s theory, his 
 happiness is his ultimate end.” What then ? Is the man 
 who makes the happiness of others his happiness, and seeks 
 it, just such a man, as he who seeks a happiness opposed to 
 the happiness of others ? Has not the one the spirit of 
 Christ, and the other the spirit of the wicked one ? The 
 Reviewer says, “ He magnifies self at the expense of every 
 other interest.” “ No,” rejoins Dr. T., “ he does not mag- 
 nify self at all. He only magnifies the world.” ! A miser 
 then does not magnify himself against the happiness of others, 
 he only magnifies money. “ Self according to the Review- 
 er’s theory, is as much regarded by the holy being, as by 
 the sinful being.” According to the Reviewer’s theory, or 
 rather the theory of the Bible, holiness consists in the re- 
 nunciation of selfish interest, and the emptying of our entire 
 constitution into the glory of God, and the blessedness of his 
 kingdom. In the face of the Reviewer’s definition, Dr. T. 
 proceeds, “ Self then, is the grand object of regard. It is 
 exalted above God, and all the universe must pay it homage. 
 Nothing is to be loved or regarded, but as a means of ad- 
 ministering to self-gratification. Why then call the love of 
 the world selfishness, and the love of God, benevolence ? 
 The Reviewer’s reasons are to my mind by no means 
 satisfactory.” ! 
 
 But it is time to attend to Dr. Tyler’s definition. He 
 has expressed so decided dissatisfaction with the Reviewer’s, 
 informing us that he is “ by no means” satisfied, he will not 
 think it strange, if we begin to feel interested to know what 
 will be done. He begins by introducing the following ex- 
 tract from Edwards. 
 
 “ When God made man at first, he implanted in him two 
 kinds of principles. There was an inferior kind, which may be 
 called natural, being the principles of mere human nature ; such 
 as self love, with those natural appetites and passions, which 
 belong to the nature of man, in which his love to his own liberty, 
 honor, and pleasure, were exercised : These when alone, and 
 left to themselves, are what the scriptures sometimes call flesh. 
 Besides these there were superior principles, that were spiritual, 
 holy and divine, summarily comprehended in divine love ; 
 wherein consisted the spiritual image of God, and man’s righte- 
 ousness and true holiness. — When man sinned, and broke God’s 
 
33 
 
 covenant, and fell under his curse, these superior principles left 
 his heart. The inferior principles of self love and natural ap- 
 petite, which were given only to serve, being alone, and left to 
 themselves, of course became reigning principles ; having no 
 superior principles to regulate and control them, they became 
 absolute masters of the heart.’’ 
 
 It will be observed that Edwards here speaks of the 
 “ inferior principles of self love,” he. which he calls u natu- 
 ral, being the principles of mere human nature.” These 
 are what the Reviewer has called 44 nature,” 44 natural,” 
 “ constitutional properties,” &c., and what I have generally 
 expressed by the single word, constitution. Now as a moral 
 agent is prompted by the stimulating energies of constitution 
 to act, and as from the condition of his being he acts morally, 
 when one moral principle ceases, they give rise to another. 
 This is just what we mean by the suspension, and the de- 
 struction, of one principle for another. But it is important 
 to distinguish constitution, or what Edwards calls the 44 prin- 
 ciples- of mere human nature,” from the moral principle, to 
 which they give rise. The former is fixed, and the same in 
 man after a moral change as before. For this reason, the 
 language of Edwards would have been more nicely accurate, 
 had he said that the constitution became an occasion of sin, 
 instead of saying it became such. But his meaning is suffi- 
 ciently obvious. We all use language in the same way. 
 Thus we say that a man became pious ; not meaning that his 
 constitution is changed, but his moral principle. 
 
 Dr. T. proceeds to his definition. 44 Is it now asked what 
 is selfishness ? According to the theory of Edwards, it is self 
 love reigning in the unsanctified heart, with no superior princi- 
 ples to regulate and control it. If a man destitute of benevo- 
 lence loves himself at all, he loves himself supremely ; and 
 is consequently supremely selfish. Self love, which as Ed- 
 wards says, 4 was given only to serve,’ has now become 
 4 the reigning principle.’ ” But Edwards does not say 
 that selfishness 44 is self love,” &c. as Dr. T. does ; but 
 something which 44 self love, with those natural appetites and 
 passions, which belong to the nature of man,” 44 became His 
 meaning obviously is, that the same constitution — 44 principles 
 of mere human nature” — which before gave rise to holiness, 
 now give rise to sin. Besides, in professing to quote literally 
 from Edwards, Dr. T. alters his expression, and substitutes 
 the singular for the plural number. He singles out self lqve, 
 
 o 
 
34 
 
 from the remaining “ principles of mere human nature,” and 
 tells us that “ self love, which, as Edwards says, ‘ was given 
 only to serve,’ has now become ‘ the reigning principle.’ ” 
 
 The reader may not think this of sufficient importance to 
 be noticed. But perhaps he will, if he looks sharply at the 
 subject. There are three alternatives for Dr. Tyler, and as 
 it would not become us to dictate, he is left to his choice. 
 If he chooses to maintain that the “ principles of mere human 
 nature” did themselves literally become sinful principles — 
 that is, the same in kind, differing only in degree — then he 
 must take them all. He is not authorized to single out one , 
 for his accommodation, and leave the rest. He must take 
 all that Edwards includes in “ the principles of mere human 
 nature.” This would make a man have as many moral 
 principles — that is, as many characters — as he has “ princi- 
 ples of mere human nature” ! If he starts away from this, 
 and says his meaning is, that the holy principle losing do- 
 minion in Adam, left his “ principles of mere human nature” 
 to give rise to a sinful principle, which principle his posterity 
 have ; then he agrees exactly with the Reviewer, and with 
 what I suppose Edwards intended, and what is still better, 
 with the Bible. But if the last resort be taken, and it is 
 maintained that nothing more was intended, than that holi- 
 ness was entirely withdrawn from Adam, and is still with- 
 drawn from his descendants, leaving nothing in its place but 
 naked constitution, till they are renewed, then he has less 
 than half a definition of depravity. It is a lame account of 
 the matter, to say that depravity is absence of holiness. 
 The bird that sings at my window is destitute of holiness, and 
 has self love, but is not depraved. Depravity is moral and 
 positive . 
 
 Selfishness is something other and more than absence of 
 benevolence ; it is opposition to benevolence. It is totally 
 other and more, than constitution ever was or ever can be. 
 It is voluntary ; and the most appalling part of it consists in 
 its opposition to God and the blessedness of his kingdom. 
 After all Dr. Tyler’s complaints of the Reviewer’s definition 
 of selfishness — after informing the public that he is “by no 
 means” satisfied — do you, reader, candidly think that he 
 has succeeded to differ from him ? Can you conceive of a 
 stronger, clearer, more scriptural definition of selfishness, 
 than this — a man “ arraying his happiness, as found in a 
 limited object, against the happiness of the universe” ? 
 
35 
 
 REGENERATION. 
 
 By natural ability, we understand that ability which the 
 agent himself possesses to act morally right or wrong. It 
 is an ability residing primarily in his will, the instrument 
 by which lie touches and moves the whole machinery of 
 his moral constitution. Had this ability been prostrated by 
 the fall, sin as well as holiness had been prostrated with it. 
 The same constitution which invests the agent with ability, 
 by obedience, to be mighty in blessedness, invests him also 
 with ability, by disobedience, to be mighty in destruction. 
 This ability was created by the Almighty, never to cease, 
 but to sustain a relation in the vast empire of moral ac- 
 countability, and to be subject to a righteous moral legisla- 
 tion forever. 
 
 As an illustration of moral inability, to which term no 
 praise is due, the following is given. Looking into the 
 kingdom of matter, we learn that a body put in motion in 
 a given direction, will continue in motion in that direction 
 forever, unless resisted by a power not in itself. Looking 
 into the kingdom of spirit, we find that a purpose existing 
 in the soul will continue, unless subdued by energies not 
 contained in the purpose. If there is a purpose in a man’s 
 heart to obtain an object, that purpose will go on, unless 
 counteracted and subdued by influences setting against it. 
 So it is with moral principle. The first moral principle of 
 unregenerate man, moving in a deep strong current, like 
 all specific purposes, tends to perpetuate itself. Hence the 
 sinner’s dependence on divine influence. As a moral agent, 
 as an accountable being, he has of course power and liberty 
 to obey ; as a disobedient agent, as a sinner , he is depend- 
 ent on divine influence. His sinful principle will go on, 
 unless influences be applied to subdue it. It operates, at 
 times, in the form of envy, pride, covetousness, revenge, &c. 
 and is always in direct opposition to the law of God. “ The 
 carnal mind is enmity against God ; for it is not subject to 
 the law of God, neither indeed can be.” “ The whole 
 world lieth in wickedness.” Man is a fallen being — not a 
 particular tribe, or age, or nation, but “ the whole world.” 
 
 But fallen though he be, he is not utterly lost. He is 
 tn a world of probation, under an economy of redemption ; 
 and there remain principles in his constitution, on which a 
 redeeming power may act. Conscience is on the side of 
 the divine law. When the character of God, and the 
 
36 
 
 demands of the divine law, are clearly addressed to the 
 mind, there is something within which pleads in their behalf. 
 The apostles commended themselves to every man’s con- 
 science. Reason, and also understanding and judgment, 
 such as they are, still remain. In connexion with these, 
 there is also a deep and strong thirsting for happiness and 
 dread of misery. There are then principles in man, on 
 which a redeeming influence may act, and by virtue of 
 which the grace of God may yet raise him from the ruins 
 of the fall, and place him among the sons of light. 
 
 To this end the gospel is sent. By the gospel of Christ, 
 we understand the declaration of an atonement which he 
 has made for sin by his sufferings and death, “ that God 
 might be just, and yet the justifier of him that believeth,” 
 and all that is included in the sublime system of redemption, 
 commencing in this world in Eden, partially unfolded in 
 the old dispensation ; and in the new, bursting upon the 
 world in the fulness of its splendor. This gospel, in its 
 pure original character, “ is the power of God and the 
 wisdom of God for salvation, to every one that believeth.” 
 No other power, no other wisdom, is like this. Like the 
 sun in the heavens it gives, but receives nothing. The 
 gospel of Christ enlightens philosophy, but enlightened phi- 
 losophy is not the gospel ; the gospel purifies poetry, but 
 purified poetry is not the gospel ; the gospel refines the 
 taste, but the effusions of refined taste are not the gospel ; 
 the gospel gives wings to imagination, but imagination on 
 wings is not the gospel. To all these and other departments 
 of human wisdom and cultivation, it adds, but will have 
 nothing added to itself. It is the wisdom and power of 
 God, and can therefore be made neither more wise or 
 powerful. 
 
 It is a message of grace and truth. Along its pages 
 the light of love kindles with a steady glowing intenseness, 
 interspersed with keen and fierce flashes of rebuke at sin. 
 While it instructs us that God has pleasure in the repentance 
 and salvation of sinners, it boldly announces that he will by 
 no means clear the guilty. Now the Saviour is seen pouring 
 forth his compassion over sinners, and exclaiming, ‘ O that 
 thou hadst known, even thou, in this thy day, the things that 
 belong to thy peace ;’ and now, upbraiding sinners because 
 they repented not, saying, 1 Wo unto thee, it shall be more 
 tolerable in the day of judgment for Sodom.’ At once he 
 
37 
 
 assures us, that ‘there is joy in the presence of the angels 
 of God over one sinner that repenteth and then, that unless 
 we repent, we shall all perish. Such is the message of 
 grace and truth, whose principle ever is, that to relax the 
 demands of moral law., is only to make sinners satisfied with 
 themselves, and to sink them deeper in sin, not to save them. 
 
 The gospel is then eminently a means of regeneration. 
 Nature and providence too, have language and influence. 
 To us, not less than to ancient saints, “ day unto day uttereth 
 speech, and night unto night showeth knowledge.” To us, 
 not less than to the Psalmist, that same sun still uttereth 
 speech, and those same stars still sparkling on high in the 
 clear night, are eloquent in praise to him who ordained them. 
 With the ancient Hebrew, we too may hear the voice of 
 God in the thunder, and mark his majestic step in the tem- 
 pest. But we need not look so high as the starry heavens, 
 or wait for those occasions on which nature trembles and is 
 convulsed by the more awful energies of God, to see abun- 
 dant exhibitions of his power, and wisdom, and love. They 
 exist in rich profusion in the humblest of his works on the 
 earth, and in the silent and uniform course of his providence. 
 The same hand which gives lustre to the stars of the sky, 
 clothes the lily of the valley with beauty ; and the Being 
 who rules amid the armies of heaven, is concerned in all 
 the events of our humble lives, dispensing correction and 
 kindness, afflictions and blessings, that by his chastisements 
 and by his goodness, he may lead us to repentance. 
 
 Thus, from the works of creation, and from the providen- 
 tial dealings of God towards us, together with the gospel of 
 Christ, there comes a combined and powerful moral influ- 
 ence. To this is added the influence of the Holy Spirit, 
 without which no sinner becomes renewed. Of the mode 
 of this influence we know nothing ; the gospel reveals only 
 the fact. All we know is, that it is a mode of influence 
 which God employs in addition to his other mode ; nor have 
 we any more authority to assert that this influence would 
 prevail without the other, than that the other would prevail 
 without this. God employs no influences in vain, and we 
 need but slight acquaintance with the Bible and with facts, 
 to learn the importance of sacredly husbanding and rightly 
 improving all of God’s influences. These are the amount 
 of influences which God employs, to regenerate and sanctify 
 
33 
 
 sinners, and the special influence of the Holy Spirit is con- 
 cerned in their regeneration.* 
 
 Regeneration is a change of moral principle, or in more 
 common language, a change of heart. It is the beginning 
 of holiness. But it is important to be observed, that holiness 
 in man, implies something other and more than holiness in an 
 angel, or in a being that never sinned. It is radically the 
 same in all moral beings — it is love to God. But in a sin- 
 ner, love is not alone. It is attended with an affectionate 
 belief in the Saviour. It implies conviction of sin, a deep 
 sense of entire dependence on divine influence for sanctifica- 
 tion, and on the grace of God for pardon. Faith working 
 by love, penitence, humility, gratitude, resignation, the peace 
 of God that passeth understanding, the spirit of adoption, are 
 coexisting acts and affections included in a change of moral 
 principle. These are called into life in the soul that was 
 dead in sin, by the gospel of Christ, applied by the Holy 
 Spirit. 
 
 Having thfis briefly considered what is implied in re- 
 generation, and the means employed by God to effect it, we 
 are ready to inquire whether the agent is himself active in 
 accomplishing this change. The principle assumed is this — 
 that the means of regeneration are addressed to his moral 
 constitution , and that it is by the activity of principles con- 
 tained in this, that the change is produced. The following 
 instances were proposed for illustration. 
 
 “ Suppose, for illustration, that a man has formed some 
 wicked purpose, and gone forth to its execution. You 
 overtake him and begin to expostulate. His purpose is 
 fixed, and at first he turns a deaf ear. You beseech his at- 
 tention. If he does not give it, he will go on with his pur- 
 pose, and involve himself in guilt and ruin. This then illus- 
 trates the sinner’s first act, towards regeneration. Whether 
 you say it has any tendency towards that result, or not, it is 
 that without which it will not take place. You then appeal 
 to his conscience, and expose the guilt of his conduct. He 
 feels a throb of anguish. He is convicted of his sin. You 
 
 * If faith in the revealed fact craves a theory to sustain it, of the many 
 now existing, it can accommodate itself. Cuique mos est. If the taste 
 scheme is preferred, discrimination is requisite between an element in a 
 theory and the fact for which it undertakes to account — between a supposed 
 relish, taste, or disposition, so called, as the proximate occasion or concomi- 
 tant of right moral motive^ and right moral motive or principle itself. Quis- 
 que sapiet. 
 
39 
 
 also address his self love. You tell him that his wicked 
 purpose will terminate in his ruin. Though it may afford 
 him pleasure now, it will ultimately fill him with anguish. 
 You present both his guilt and danger, in their appalling 
 aspect, before him, and beseech him to consider his ways. — 
 How much more happy is innocence than guilt. He does 
 consider, and the conviction deepens. This illustrates an- 
 other step, towards the sinner’s regeneration. In this pro- 
 cess of attention and consideration, which involves numerous 
 simple mental acts, his thoughts and feelings are all finally 
 withdrawn from his wicked purpose, and absorbed in the 
 subject of your address. Thus his wicked purpose is sus- 
 pended — and as it were stands still. JYow he can form a 
 new purpose, — a purpose to obey you — a purpose to return 
 home, and behave right. But until the new purpose is 
 formed , his old purpose, though suspended, is not destroyed . 
 This is done, only by forming a new purpose ; on the prin- 
 ciple of what Dr. Chalmers calls, i the expulsive power of a 
 new affection.’ If the new purpose is not formed, the old 
 purpose will resume its control, and act with more violence 
 than ever. When the unclean spirit has gone out of a man* 
 if on his return he finds the house empty r he takes with him 
 seven other spirits and they enter in and dwell there, and 
 the last state of that man is worse than the first. He re- 
 turns to his wicked purpose, like the dog to his vomit, with 
 increased greediness.” 
 
 Dr. T. also inserted the following illustration from the 
 Reviewer. “ Suppose the avaricious principle to suffer mo- 
 mentary suspensions in the breast of a miser : and the result 
 to be, that he does occasionally a generous act. Let us 
 imagine some one to account for this fact, by saying that 
 very powerful appeals were made, in these cases, to the 
 miser’s feelings of tenderness and compassion. Now it is 
 easy to see that this explanation would be wholly unsatis- 
 factory to any one, who had previously assumed that no 
 such feelings did or could exist in the miser’s bosom — that 
 all his actions were to be resolved into the single principle 
 of avarice.” 
 
 To these Dr. T. replies, “ Now these illustrations pro- 
 ceed upon very inadequate views of human depravity. It is 
 one thing for a sinner to change one sinful purpose for 
 another, and quite a different thing to give up the love of sin 
 altogether.” But the point of the illustration was not the 
 
40 
 
 strength and permanence of the selfish principle, but the 
 activity of the agent involved in its suspension and destruc- 
 tion. Regeneration, as really as a change of specific pur- 
 pose, involves the agent’s activity ; and this is naturally more 
 deep and thorough in a great change than in a small one. 
 The case supposed, was that of a man merely going forth in 
 execution of some specific purpose of iniquity, the abandon- 
 ment of which is a small thing compared with that of the 
 generic principle of sin itself. The one is transient and 
 light, on the surface of character ; the other is the deep and 
 permanent principle of the heart, and the soul must move 
 to its centre to shake it. If therefore attention and con- 
 sideration are demanded in the one case, much more are 
 they in the other. 
 
 The same is further evident from the additional in- 
 fluence concerned in regeneration. In the change supposed 
 of a specific purpose, there was only a human influence 
 demanding its corresponding ' activity ; in regeneration there 
 is also divine influence. No influence is such to a mind, in 
 the production of a moral change, except as that mind is 
 active. This is self-evident. It is only saying, that it is 
 impossible for a thing to be, and not to be, at the same time. 
 
 Dr. T. inquires, 44 What is a purpose suspended, which is 
 not destroyed by the formation of a new purpose ?” What 
 is intended is simply this, that the constitution is withdrawn 
 from the selfish principle, to be given to God. It cannot be 
 given supremely to both at once. That would imply a con- 
 tradiction. Now it is one thing to have a portion of the 
 constitution held , by an evangelical influence, and another 
 to have it actively invested , in a selfish or a holy principle. It 
 is evident that in the sinner’s acts of attention and considera- 
 tion, the vital energies of constitution may be so far with- 
 drawn from supporting the selfish principle, and held in the 
 keeping of the evangelical influence, as to leave the selfish 
 principle almost suspended ; when, if it do not go forward 
 to entire suspension, leaving the heart to be given to God, 
 as soon as the absorbing influence is removed, all the ener- 
 gies which it held will return again to support the selfish 
 principle. When 44 Agrippa said unto Paul, 4 Almost thou 
 persuadest me to be a Christian !’” the vital energies of his 
 constitution, in his acts of attention and consideration, were 
 so withdrawn from his selfish principle, and held by the 
 evangelical influence, that his heart was 44 almost ” on the 
 
41 
 
 point of yielding. Instances similar to this, exhibited in 
 various forms, are frequent in the scriptures, and they per- 
 fectly accord with this view, and with the known laws of 
 mental operation. But until the new principle is formed, 
 the selfish principle, though on the point of its suspension 
 and consequent destruction, is not actually destroyed. This 
 is entirely a different thing from a progressive regeneration. 
 You might as well say that the forest oak begins to fall, 
 when the operation of the axe at its root commences, be- 
 cause a process is commenced which results in its falling. 
 And were you to suppose that when the last blow is struck, 
 before the tree begins to fall, the operation of the axe should 
 cease, and the tree be instantly in the same condition in 
 which it was before a blow was struck, you would have an 
 illustration of what is intended, when we say that the vital 
 energies of the constitution are so withdrawn and held by 
 the evangelical influence, as to leave the selfish princi- 
 ple almost without support ; when, if the process do not 
 result in an entire suspension and the formation of a new 
 principle, as soon as the evangelical influence is withdrawn 
 the energies which it held return immediately to support the 
 selfish principle. 
 
 Let the following facts be considered. First. A change 
 of moral principle and a change of specific purpose, are in 
 nature the same — that is, they are both acts of the will. 
 But one is a more deep and solemn choice than the other, 
 and therefore engages the activity of more constitution. 
 Secondly. Both are produced, so far as ab extra influence 
 is concerned, by influence acting on something other than 
 the choice to be destroyed— either on the generic principle, 
 or the naked constitution, or both. In the case of regenera- 
 tion it is entirely on the constitution. Thirdly. Neither is 
 suspended, until the energy which supports it is withdrawn ; 
 and in both cases the instant of entire suspension, is the in- 
 stant in which the soul goes forth to a new choice. These 
 facts clearly evolve the pertinence of the illustration. 
 
 Dr. T. asserts, “ It is not true that antecedent to re- 
 generation, the selfish principle grows weaker and weaker.” 
 Assertions are cheap. The assertions of Dr. T. the present 
 writer values as highly as those of any man on the earth, 
 when they are sustained by evidence ; but the assertion of 
 no uninspired man is to be received as truth, on any other 
 conditions. 
 
 6 
 
42 
 
 By evangelical influence, the reader will understand evan- 
 gelical light, attended with the influence of the Holy Spirit. 
 Speaking of the sinner, Dr. T. says, “ No degree of light is 
 sufficient to subdue the enmity of his heart.” This too is as- 
 sertion. Of the mode of divine influence we know nothing, 
 and of course do not know but it is wholly concerned in 
 directing and making efficacious evangelical light. Such 
 appears to be the uniform representation of the Bible. We 
 know not in how many ways divine influence may thus touch 
 and move the springs of moral action, and melt the heart 
 into contrition. He has given us some poetry, in proof of 
 his assertion. 
 
 “ The devils know and tremble too, 
 
 But devils (do) not love.” 
 
 But the inquiry remains, whether Christ died for that order 
 of beings, and whether the gospel is preached to them ? He 
 adds, “ And all the light of the last day, will not subdue the 
 obduracy of the sinner’s heart.” But is the sinner then in a 
 world of probation, and redemption ? Is the gospel still 
 preached to him ? Is “ the light of the last day” evangelical 
 light? What has this poetry respecting devils, and this 
 fact respecting the sinner who has passed his probation, 
 to do with proving his assertion ? He asserts further, “ If 
 the carnal mind is enmity against God, as the scriptures 
 declare, then the more clearly the true character of God is 
 apprehended by unrenewed men, the more will the enmity 
 of their hearts be called into exercise.” But this enmity is 
 not enmity to God viewed independently of their relation to 
 his law. “ The carnal mind is enmity against God, for it is 
 not subject to the law of God.” That is the evil. The 
 “ true character of God,” viewed abstractly from the de- 
 mands of his law upon himself, the sinner sees to be excel- 
 lent. Were not this the case, there could be no genuine 
 conviction of sin. No sinner is convicted of sin any further 
 than he perceives the character and law of God to be ex- 
 cellent, and consequently that the enmity of his heart is 
 unreasonable, and morally wrong. The tendency of per- 
 ceiving this, under an evangelical influence, instead of in- 
 creasing the enmity of his heart, is to subdue it. Perceiving 
 thus how unreasonable and guilty he is, he is brought to 
 commit himself to the grace of the Saviour, thus laying hold 
 
 i 
 
43 
 
 of his redemption, and receiving the righteousness which is 
 by faith in him. 
 
 Dr. T. observes that those passages of scripture, which 
 speak of putting off the old man and putting on the new, 
 “ are Hebrew parallelisms and not philosophical distinctions.” 
 True, they are what scholars have termed “ Hebrew par- 
 allelisms,” but is not the philosophy of language the phi- 
 losophy of mind? This is eminently true of the Hebrew 
 language. It is mind throwing itself out, just as it is. That 
 there is a perfectly natural distinction between forsaking one 
 choice and forming another — between forsaking sin and em- 
 bracing righteousness — is what the mind instinctively per- 
 ceives and feels, although the one implies the other. We by 
 no means reach the bottom of the subject — or philosophically 
 account for the fact in language — by simply putting a gram- 
 marian's name upon it. These however are things to be 
 distinguished, not divided ; and the distinction itself is unim- 
 portant, except in its connexion with the other parts of the 
 discussion. 
 
 Dr. T. in his “ Strictures” had placed the human soul, by 
 his philosophy, under such a mechanism of cause and effect, 
 as evidently implied a physical impossibility of his obeying 
 God. He still contended that it would be easy, if the sinner 
 had right motives. But as right motives are obedience, and 
 as he had virtually taken from the sinner all power to create 
 them, I replied, “ If a man had wings, he could fly.” To 
 this he returns some illustrations, commencing thus : — To 
 act with right motives, is to act with a good intention. When 
 we say that it would be easy for the sinner to do his duty, if he 
 had right motives, the meaning is, it would be easy for him 
 to do his duty, if he were willing to do it.” That is, 6 For 
 a man to do his duty, is to do his duty. When we say that 
 it would be easy for the sinner to do his duty, if he did his 
 duty, the meaning is, it would be easy for him to do his 
 duty, if he did his duty.’ This I am not disposed to ques- 
 tion, but find it difficult to perceive that it is making much 
 progress towards the real point at issue. I have never ques- 
 tioned what is termed moral ability, as opposed to moral 
 inability — or in other words, the tendency of right motive, 
 or duty begun, to go on. But the difficulty is to begin — to 
 get the right motive. Now as Dr. T. does not of course 
 suppose that the sinner can do it with a wrong moral mo- 
 
44 
 
 tive — or in other words, that Satan can cast out Satan ; and 
 as he does not allow that he can do it with his constitution — 
 with that which is itself neither morally right or wrong, the 
 inquiry naturally arises, What has the sinner left to do it 
 with ? 
 
 He supposes the case of a stubborn child refusing to obey, 
 and of a debtor refusing to pay his debts, pleading as their 
 excuse that they have no motive or wish to do it. To this I 
 reply, that if they had the motive, the motive would, in the 
 eye of God, constitute the moral act. 
 
 “ But, says E. P., ‘ the sinner really has natural ability 
 to become holy. But is it easy ?’ Yes, so far as natural 
 ability is concerned. Is it difficult for a holy being to love 
 God ? But what natural power has he, which the sinner 
 has not?” None. But I said “to become holy.” “‘We 
 well know,’ says E. P. ‘ that if a sinner were not a sinner, 
 it might be as easy for him to be holy as to be sinful, but 
 when we address him, ought we not as the Bible does, to 
 assume that he is a sinner ?’ Certainly — and we ought also 
 to assume, as the Bible does, that his depravity is not a 
 calamity merely, but a crime ; and instead of soothing his 
 conscience with representations which are calculated to turn 
 off his eyes from his real character, we ought to bring home 
 to his conscience the naked truths of the gospel, and throw 
 upon him the whole responsibility of continuing for a mo- 
 ment a rebel against God.” So say I, with all my heart. 
 It is with no small pleasure that I accost this spirited and 
 pointed passage. It is not in my power to frame a pas- 
 sage, which would express with more energy my views on 
 this point. We have here a very forcible illustration of a 
 fact not uncommon, which is this, — that a man of strong 
 common sense and vigorous intellect, who has, in his specu- 
 lations, done what all are liable to do, inadvertently assumed 
 an erroneous theory, when he comes to really speak and act 
 himself, will trample his theory into the dust, as inadvertently 
 as he took it up. 
 
 Thousands are waiting in stupidity for God to give them a 
 right motive — waiting as they say for God to regenerate 
 them — calling their stupidity dependence ; and the views 
 which encourage it, “ the doctrines of grace.” And although 
 taught that they have natural ability to become holy, they 
 still think that there is a mysterious something, which makes 
 
45 
 
 their renovation impossible. Others, whose minds are ar- 
 rested, instead of repenting of their sin, are mourning over 
 their constitution. Thus feeling dependence in the wrong 
 place, the worst sentiments of the heart are cherished. The 
 great point here is to make them see distinctly in what their 
 ability consists, and in what their sin consists. Let me il- 
 lustrate my meaning, by introducing the following lucid 
 passages. “ What one act of the sinner indicates that he 
 has ceased to be supremely selfish, till the act of submission ? 
 Does he think on his ways ? Yes, but he still loves his 
 sins.” Here the sin does not consist in his thinking on his 
 ways, but in his persisting notwithstanding in transgression. 
 “Does he contemplate divine truth ? Yes — but he hates it.” 
 His sin is not his contemplating divine truth, but his hating 
 it. “Does he consider what is for his highest good? Yes — 
 but he abhors the terms on which alone his highest interest 
 can be secured.” The sin does not consist in considering 
 what is for his interest, but in abhorring the terms. “ Does 
 he desire to be happy ? Yes — but not to be holy.” His sin 
 is not desiring to be happy, but not desiring to be holy. 
 “ Does he long for deliverance from future wrath ? Yes — 
 but not on the conditions of the gospel.” His sin is not his 
 longing for deliverance from future wrath, but his refusing 
 the conditions of the gospel. “Does he make efforts to 
 escape the punishment threatened against sin ? Yes — but he 
 goes about to establish his own righteousness.” His sin is 
 not his constitutional promptings to escape ruin,-, but his 
 going about to establish his own righteousness. 
 
 In every instance the line of distinction between constitu- 
 tion and character is clear and important. Now suppose 
 that this sinner, instead of having his eye turned wholly 
 upon his sin and his duty, has it turned partly upon his con- 
 stitution. He is taught that his desire of happiness, and the 
 acts of attention and consideration which it prompts, are 
 themselves his sin. His eye being thus partly turned off 
 from what constitutes his real sin, so far as this is done, in 
 the place of genuine conviction of sin there is repining over 
 his constitution. He endeavors to feel blame where he 
 cannot, and so far fails to feel it where he can — lie en- 
 deavors to blame himself, but his blame is self commisera- 
 tion — instead of remorse of conscience he feels regret, for it 
 is impossible for a man to feel remorse for desiring happi- 
 ness, though he may regret that he has it not — he settles 
 
46 
 
 back into himself, and mourns and repines, when he ought to 
 repent and love — his soul is in confusion — he does not feel 
 the force of his duty, for it is enjoined upon his constitution 
 instead of his heart — and instead of attempting with his con- 
 stitution to make a new heart, he attempts with his heart to 
 make a new constitution, until, finding this impossible, he 
 concludes that he must wait God’s time, and there it ends. 
 The next you hear of him, he has openly forsaken the ranks 
 of evangelical Christianity, and is groping in skepticism his 
 dark and cheerless way to the grave. Would that this 
 were fancy ! 
 
 On the other hand, let him know that it is constitu- 
 tionally right to desire happiness and dread misery — 
 right to attempt to escape the one and secure the other — 
 right to consider his ways and attend to the calls of the 
 gospel — but that it is not right to retain his sin and with- 
 hold his heart from God a moment — let him see his sin in 
 the clear light of the law and the gospel — let him know 
 exactly what his sin is, and be convicted of that, and that 
 only — then, instead of paralyzing the energies of the consti- 
 tution, the tendency is to rouse it to deep and intense 
 action — the soul springs to its centre — the principle of sin is 
 shaken by the energies of the gospel — until, weakened and 
 overcome, it yields, — the soul reposes in the grace of its 
 Redeemer, and Christ is formed therein the hope of glory. 
 He is a renewed man. 
 
 Let me not be supposed to say, that there is a certain 
 connexion between a right or a wrong method of addressing 
 the gospel to sinners, and a happy or an unhappy result. 
 By no means. But that a right way is better than a wrong 
 way — that pure truth is better than alloy — that the one has 
 a higher tendency to carry forward the work of grace, I do 
 earnestly maintain. It is the duty of those who are called 
 to sustain the momentous responsibilities of Christian minis- 
 ters, to labor with the apostles to commend themselves to 
 every man’s conscience in the sight of God. And it is with 
 regret that I see such an appeal as this, to a popular preju- 
 dice, “ E. P. is exceedingly delighted with this new dis- 
 covery. He thinks it * disengages (religious truth) from 
 fetters imposed by human hands’ — ‘ removes obstructions 
 and prepares the way for the naked feet of the gospel’ — 
 * removes every barrier between the sinner and the truth 
 and the Spirit of God’ — and 4 leaves the Spirit of God, with 
 
47 
 
 the freedom and might of God, to hurl the energies of the 
 truth of God, at the unprotected soul of the sinner.’ He 
 seems to anticipate glorious effects, 4 glorious victories in 
 the earth,’ from this new theological discovery.” I assure 
 Dr. T. that I consider this no 44 new theological discovery.” 
 I believe that the gospel was thus handed in its purity from 
 heaven, that it was thus preached by the apostles, that it has 
 been essentially thus preached more or less in all ages, that 
 it is thus preached now by the most evangelical and success- 
 ful ministers of Christ, whether they know it themselves or 
 not — not excepting even Dr. T. — and instead of intimating, 
 as he has expressed it, an anticipation of 44 glorious effects,” 
 I spoke of what the gospel had already achieved, and is 
 achieving. But I will now add, that I do anticipate glorious 
 effects — more glorious than the earth has yet realized, from 
 that gospel, which, in its purity, is the power and the wisdom 
 of God. I do look for the rising of the illustrious day, when 
 44 the light of the sun shall be seven fold,” and when, abashed 
 and confounded at its presence, what remains of stupid infi- 
 delity and debasing sin, will creep away together into their 
 own darkness, no more to curse the earth. I do anticipate 
 the period, and trust it is not far distant, when generations 
 intelligent, virtuous, pious, happy, shall rise up to welcome 
 the gospel of the grace of God, and do honor to that Saviour 
 whom we preach, as they tread the green turf beneath which 
 our dust is sleeping. 
 
 If the distinction is clearly made in the reader’s mind be- 
 tween constitution and character, he is prepared to perceive 
 the true source of' that imposition which Dr. T. has unfortu- 
 nately practised upon himself, to which I have previously 
 alluded. The Reviewer had asserted that no acts dictated 
 by a sinful principle, could constitute a using of the means 
 of regeneration. He then proceeded to specify another class 
 of acts, dictated by self love, which do constitute the means of 
 regeneration. Dr. T. applying his own philosophy, which 
 makes self love a sinful principle, had only to proceed with 
 dilligence to gather these different passages together, in 
 which things totally different in kind were intended, and thus 
 make up the frightful man-of-straw, at which he has dis- 
 charged two thirds of his artillery. 
 
 Respecting the time employed in using the means of re- 
 generation, it is of little consequence to inquire. That we 
 all ought to love God with the whole heart this moment, is 
 
48 
 
 certain. We ought never to have sinned, and certainly we 
 ought not to continue in sin. That the sinner uses the means 
 of his regeneration up to the point of his duty till he uses 
 them successfully, or in other words actually abandons sin 
 and yields his heart to God, is what we have ever main- 
 tained. That he performs many acts which, in a lower 
 degree, tend to that result, often through the protracted 
 period of hours, and days, and even weeks, there can be no 
 doubt. This is not saying that he ever ceases to be an 
 impenitent sinner, till he actually repents. Nothing can be 
 more absurd than the notion of a progressive regeneration, as 
 though the beginning of a thing, which is necessarily a point 
 in time, could be progressive. 
 
 In the case of the man supposed, who went forth to 
 execute a purpose of iniquity, you do not hesitate to say 
 that he ought to abandon it, the moment you address him. 
 He ought never to have had it. But suppose that you plead 
 with him five minutes before he stops, five minutes more 
 before he seriously attends to what you say, five minutes 
 more before he abandons his purpose, his sin in the mean 
 time in respect to this purpose does not consist in his stop- 
 ping — his attending — his considering — or in the constitution 
 which prompts these acts, but in his protracted purpose of 
 iniquity. He is not a renewed man in respect to that pur- 
 pose, till he actually abandons it, and forms a new one. 
 
 When the sinner is addressed by the gospel, it is certain 
 that he ought instantly to obey it. If such is the depth and 
 momentum of his sinful principle that he does not do it, and if 
 conscience, and desire of happiness, and dread of misery, 
 prompt him to acts of attention, consideration and reflection 
 upon his folly and guilt and danger, let him not be told that 
 these are his sin — this is the surest way to stifle all genuine 
 conviction, and land him in stupidity. Let him still know 
 that his sin is his protracted rebellion against God, — against 
 the constitution too which God has made — conscience — 
 reason — his own peace, — against the throne and happiness of 
 heaven, — against the Saviour who died for him, — against 
 the Holy Spirit — this is his sin, of this let him be convicted, 
 and exhorted to instant repentance. He will thus be brought 
 to feel his dependence in the right place ; it will be the real, 
 vital conviction of a sinner , feeling his entire dependence on 
 a purely gratuitous influence. It is a state of mind as dis- 
 tant from a stupid inactivity, as can be conceived. In no 
 
49 
 
 condition is the soul so alive with activity, as when feeling 
 its true dependence on God. 
 
 If, by the grace of God, he is brought to embrace the 
 gospel ; if he passes from his state of bondage into a condi- 
 tion of justification by faith, through the redemption that is 
 in Christ Jesus ; if the day dawns, and the day star arises 
 in his heart ; every emotion within him says, that it is not 
 by works of righteousness which he has done. The spirit 
 of a pure mind and of sound wisdom, is poured upon him. 
 He now knows that* a change of heart is reality, and that 
 there is a blessedness in being a regenerate child of God, 
 which infinitely transcends all earthly pleasures. He now 
 realizes his first emotions of pure happiness. His eye kin- 
 dles with new animation. Existence is become to him a new 
 and delightful reality, and with soft and light step he enters 
 upon the narrow way, that leads to life everlasting. Hence- 
 forth he is not of this world, even as Christ -fis not of this 
 world. Its pomp, and pleasure, and wealth, and fame, are 
 not the treasure of his heart. He enjoys the present world 
 with a pure relish, and is not unwilling to abide here his 
 appointed time ; — but often does he look serenely forth upon 
 immortality — often is the celestial city in his eye, where he 
 is soon to be with the multitude of the redeemed, to drink 
 with them of its crystal waters, and sing hallelujahs forever. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 Language is so imperfect a vehicle of thought, it so often 
 fails to awaken in the mind of the reader the energies and 
 perceptions intended by the writer, that on subjects like this, 
 obscurity is sometimes unavoidable. No person can know, 
 till he makes the attempt, how difficult it is to address ab- 
 stract argument to minds not accustomed to think and reason 
 in this manner, in a tangible form, and still retain its intrinsic 
 character. If, therefore, any portion of this discussion is not 
 clear to the reader’s mind, he is courteously requested not to 
 censure, till he has bestowed upon the dark spot one bright 
 hour of energetic thought, and become sure that the fault 
 is not in himself. De Alembert has observed, that conveying 
 knowledge to the mind of another is not so much telling 
 him something new, as producing a vigorous attention to 
 something already known. There is a still small voice 
 within that says, Yes, when truths having their proofs in 
 themselves are thoroughly understood. 
 
 7 
 
50 
 
 I have not hitherto given the references to the passages 
 introduced from the “ Vindication,” because most readers 
 do not take the trouble to look after them, and those who 
 do, will be sufficiently interested in the discussion to read 
 the “ Vindication” attentively for themselves. They will 
 find nearly all of the passages which I have introduced, on 
 the first thirty pages, and will do well to see them in their 
 connexion. But as I wish, in conclusion, to present a sum- 
 mary view of the five principle points in debate, as they 
 stand in Dr. Tyler’s own concessions, it may be expedient 
 to trouble the reader with the references. 
 
 1. The first and main point in question, as stated by him- 
 self, Vindication, p. 7, is, “ wdiether sinners properly speak- 
 ing ever vse the means of regeneration ?” Compare this with 
 Vindication, p. 12, “ I do not deny that there are acts of 
 theirs and states of mind, which do usually precede a change 
 of heart 5 and which may be regarded as links in the chain 
 of causes and effects by which that event is brought about 
 in the government of God.” See the following sentence. 
 Here he not only concedes the point, but goes quite beyond 
 the Reviewer. These “ acts” of sinners and “ states of 
 mind,” are not only antecedents to regeneration, but they are 
 causes. They are “ links in the chain of causes and 
 effects” ! This is the strongest possible language des- 
 criptive of the means of an end. He bestows unqualified 
 reprobation upon the ground taken by Dr. Spring, respecting 
 the acts and doings of sinners as means of their regeneration, 
 still informing us, that they are “ links in the chain of causes 
 and effects, by which that event is brought about” ! And 
 while thus conceding that these acts of sinners are “ causes” 
 by w r hich the event of regeneration is brought about, he in- 
 forms us that “ to represent sinners as usingt the means of 
 regeneration is an abuse of language,” that “ jit ought to be 
 banished from the pulpit and expunged from the system of 
 theology,” and hopes the Reviewer “ will not think it worth 
 his while to write another hundred pages” on so plain a case ! 
 
 2. What the Reviewer calls Dr. T.’s “ triplet of physical 
 impossibilities.” Dr. T. says in his Strictures, “To my mind 
 it is certain that if sinners use the means of regeneration, 
 they must use them with a holy heart, or an unholy heart, or 
 no heart at all.” But an end can never come without its 
 means, and therefore, if there is any meaning in his language 
 here, he asserts that the sinner cannot do his duty, with a 
 
51 
 
 holy heart or right intention. But in his Vindication, p. 8, 
 he tells us that he can. “Yes, with right motives, with 
 good moral intention, most certainly.” Which is the better 
 alternative ? We have heard it said, of two evils we should 
 choose the least. But when the two are equally bad — what 
 then ? If the end is the sinner’s duty, the means of the end 
 are included — pertain, to duty, and that without which duty 
 cannot be done. But certainly he cannot do it “ with a 
 holy heart,” for it is a physical impossibility for a thing to be 
 the means of itself. Certainly he cannot do it with “ an un- 
 holy heart,” for Satan cannot cast out Satan. And certainly 
 he cannot do it with “ no heart at all.” Now what is the 
 reply to this ? The sinner must do his duty “ with right 
 motives, with good moral intention, most certainly” ! Thus 
 the famous triplet discharges into the redoubtable argument, 
 noticed under the head of moral principle, that a sinner can- 
 not do his duty, without doing his duty ; and moreover that 
 when he does his duty, he does it. 
 
 3. The use of terms. Dr. T. says, Vindication, p. 14, 
 “ I observed in the Strictures that I was not satisfied with 
 the distinction made by the Reviewer between what he calls 
 the popular and theological use of the term regeneration,” — 
 the one including both the acts of intellect and will, the 
 other restricted to that of the will. In reply to him the Re- 
 viewer says, that he has “ made the same distinction and 
 admitted 6 in the fullest manner the comprehensive import of 
 the term in question.’ ” This he denies, and says it “ is far 
 from being the fact.” Vindication, p. 14. And immediately 
 adds, “ I have said that the first moral act of the new born 
 soul is an intelligent act, and consequently includes the per- 
 ception of the intellect, as well as the act of the will or 
 heart.” Observe, “ includes the perception of the intellect 
 as well as the act of the will” and still not complex ! He 
 continues, “ But I added, it does not suppose a succession 
 or series of mental acts ; nor is it a complex act, in any 
 other sense than is every other voluntary act of the mind.” 
 This is only conceding the point still, for every moral act is 
 complex. But he says, “ It does not suppose a succession 
 or series.” How many more acts than two does it take to 
 make a “ succession or series” ? 
 
 But further, Dr. T. also concedes that as many and the 
 same acts are included in every complex act of moral voli- 
 tion, as the Reviewer does. Does the one include the per- 
 ception of the object? So does the other. Strictures, p. 19. 
 
52 
 
 “ Every voluntary act necessarily implies intelligence. There 
 can be no volition without motive ; — no act of choice without 
 some object perceived by the mind.” Does the one include 
 acts of consideration and comparison ? So does the other. 
 “ To talk of volitions abstracted from intelligence is as irra- 
 tional as it would be to talk of volitions in stones or in 
 trees.” There must then be an intelligent perception of 
 the qualities and relative value of objects, or there can be no 
 choice j unless stones and trees can choose. It were easy 
 to amplify here, showing that the concessions of Dr. T. ex- 
 tend to the full length and breadth of all that the Reviewer 
 has claimed. 
 
 4. In regard to self love. Dr. T. admits, Vindication, p. 
 62, that “ self love is an essential attribute of moral beings.” 
 This is full concession of the point. But he says if a being 
 destitute of benevolence “ love himself at all, he must love 
 himself supremely.” This is palpably untrue. Every vol- 
 untary being must love happiness before he can love any 
 object supremely as the means of it. Now nothing can come 
 into competition with love of happiness. Misery cannot, for 
 no man loves misery in any degree. But misery and happi- 
 ness are the only things that belong to the same genus, and 
 of course that can be compared. Self love therefore cannot 
 be a supreme affection. It must always be pure constitution, 
 and as the Reviewer asserts, and as Dr. T. concedes, Vindi- 
 cation, p. 20, “the primary cause of moral action.” Full 
 concession of the whole point. 
 
 But still something must be wrong, and so being forced to 
 a concession of the Reviewer’s position, he attacks his lan- 
 guage. “ Still I must think that he has used language very 
 unfortunately, and in a manner directly calculated to mis- 
 lead his readers. If a man makes happiness his ultimate 
 end, as I have been in the habit of understanding language, 
 he makes self the object of supreme regard.” It were a hard 
 case then, evidently, if the Reviewer were accountable for 
 the manner in which Dr. T. has “ been in the habit of un- 
 derstanding language.” No language can be more exact and 
 true to its intention than the Reviewer’s. Happiness is 
 always an ultimate end , not a means. It is always the ulti- 
 mate good — there is no good beyond it. If Dr. T. wishes 
 for other authority, let him turn to Dwight’s Theology, Vol. 
 3, Ser. xcix., and he will find it thus written — “There is no 
 
 ULTIMATE good, but HAPPINESS.” 
 
 5. The suspension of the selfish principle. Dr. T. has 
 
53 
 
 repeatedly allowed that a selfish principle cannot dictate 
 a holy principle. It must then be dictated by self love, 
 for nothing remains but that to do it. But Dr. T. con- 
 cedes, Vindication, p. 31, “ Self love cannot dictate till the 
 selfish principle is suspended. One thing at a time.” 
 But he applies the remark to self love as engaged in 
 prompting those acts, which tend to the suspension of the 
 sinful principle. “While selfishness is dictating, self love 
 cannot get a chance to dictate those acts which involve 
 the suspension of the selfish principle.” But self love 
 is always in the constitution — always dictating — never waits 
 to “ get a chance to dictate”— it will have a chance at 
 any rate. But as before remarked it is never a su- 
 preme affection. The difficulty is that selfish affection is 
 supreme, and therefore self love, though always dictating* 
 “ cannot get a chance to dictate” a holy principle, “ till the 
 selfish principle is suspended. One thing at a time.” In 
 the order of nature, it first dictates those acts of attention and 
 consideration which withdraw the living energies of the spirit 
 from the selfish principle, leaving its agency suspended ; and 
 then it can “ get a chance” to dictate a holy principle. 
 When we speak of “ the expulsive power of a new affection,” 
 the meaning is, that as the agent acts morally, when one 
 supreme affection is suspended, self love dictates either an- 
 other or the same again ; and it is only by dictating another, 
 that it does not dictate the same again. 
 
 In his public controversy with Rayner and Thorp, respect- 
 ing the Perseverance of the Saints, Dr. Tyler had occasion 
 to show how “true Christians can fall into sin, without utterly 
 apostatizing.” He says of the true Christian, “ through the 
 remaining corruptions of his heart, and the temptations with 
 which he is surrounded, he may be betrayed into sin, and 
 sometimes into great sins, as David was.” “ A man who is 
 habitually avaricious would not obtain the name of a liberal 
 man, by a single act of beneficence,” &c. Now, let Dr. T. 
 inform us whether the sins of David, Peter, and others, to 
 which he refers, were dictated by the holy principle in these 
 good men ? And if not, whether that principle was not in 
 its influence for the time being, though not renounced, ac- 
 tually suspended ? How can he account for the sins of these 
 servants of God, without supposing either their governing 
 principle to be suspended in its active influence, or their utter 
 apostacy ? It is not a little remarkable that Dr. T. here not 
 
54 
 
 only contends for the fact which the Reviewer calls the sus- 
 pension of the governing principle, but illustrates it by the 
 very example which the Reviewer adopted for the purpose ; 
 and which Dr. T., Vindication, p. 32, pronounces to be 
 “ defective.” And on the same page he inquires, “ What 
 is a purpose suspended , which is not destroyed by the forma- 
 tion of a new purpose ?” Let him now tell us, what was the 
 state of David’s holy purpose when committing acts of adul- 
 tery and murder, which he maintains did not involve utter 
 apostacy, and of course was not “ destroyed by the formation 
 of a new purpose.” If this is not conceding the Review- 
 er’s doctrine of the suspension of a governing principle, in 
 distinction from its destruction, I know not what is. 
 
 These five points include the substance of the whole de- 
 bate ; and Dr. T. has, himself being witness, given them all 
 over to the Reviewer, with a title as full and complete as was 
 ever made out. And it is worthy of remark, that he has 
 not only conceded the whole ground, but in the most impor- 
 tant items in the debate he has even gone quite beyond what 
 the Reviewer has maintained. At what then is he directing 
 his efforts ? Cui bono ? For my life I cannot divine what 
 he is attempting to do, and it is a question whether he can 
 himself. He informs the public that the Reviewers are ad- 
 vocating “ principles of dangerous tendency.” If he brings 
 before the public such a charge as this, he is bound to sus- 
 tain it by evidence — by something definite — by laying his 
 finger on the identical “ principles of dangerous tendency,” 
 and showing wherein they are wrong and dangerous. Ran- 
 dom charges, on such a subject as this, are not what the 
 public demand. People in this country have eyes and ears, 
 and they choose to see and hear, and then judge; for them- 
 selves. And there are not a few, who believe that shaking 
 the rod is not “ the more excellent way.” 
 
 Dr. T. wonders why I should style myself Pacificus when 
 I write only on one side. The truth is, I cannot do other- 
 wise. I have desired to say something on the other side, to 
 persuade Dr. T. that I am as truly his friend as the Review- 
 er’s ; but before I could accomplish a single argument, my 
 pen would trip itself up in spite of me. Wherein he has 
 attempted to differ from the Reviewer, the ground which he 
 has assumed is absolutely untenable. No person can stand 
 upon it, and reason straight. The truest and most peace- 
 making act of Christian kindness, both to him and to the pub- 
 
55 
 
 lie, is, to expose the untenable nature of the ground on which 
 he is attempting to stand, and wage unnatural war with his 
 innocent brethren. I have no doubt that he will yet wonder 
 where he has been, and what he has been after. And when 
 he finds himself fairly back again upon the ground of the 
 Reviewers, he will be more satisfied than ever that it is the 
 best place for him — that it is solid scriptural ground ; — he. 
 will rest in peace, and allow others the same privilege. 
 
 Respecting the Reviewer’s use of language , &c. Dr. 
 T. has repeatedly intimated that he has written in a 
 loose and unguarded manner — that he has used language un- 
 fortunately, &ic. But we have seen that he has misappre- 
 hended him in the face of the most formal and explicit 
 definitions. In respect to the distinction between self love 
 and selfishness — in respect to limiting selfishness to mere 
 worldly good as its object — in respect to happiness as the 
 ultimate end of action — in respect to the comprehensive and 
 restricted import of the term regeneration— in re’spect to 
 those acts of the sinner which constitute using the means 
 of regeneration — in respect to all these, the very elements 
 of the discussion, he has been as regardless of the Re- 
 viewer’s definitions and explanations, as if neither had been 
 given. It is indeed surprising to observe such instances as 
 the following. When the Reviewer had stated that regen- 
 eration was not effected by a direct influence on the selfish 
 principle, for the very purpose of showing that it must be 
 directly on the constitution, Dr. T. took occasion to more 
 than intimate that the Reviewer denied the doctrine of a 
 direct divine influence ! 
 
 For taking liberty to review and examine these writings 
 before the public, I have no apology to offer. My eye has 
 been on the interests of religion, the happiness of man, 
 the glory of God. A disposition to expose error is not in- 
 deed tantamount to affectionate love of truth, but is included 
 in it. Evils which I have endeavored to counteract are, 
 erroneous and injurious views so propounded and identified 
 with sound Christian doctrine as to obstruct its progress ; 
 groundless prejudice against a body of Christian ministers,, 
 tending to impede their usefulness ; and an injurious senti- 
 ment towards a religious journal, which, w T hether we consider 
 the tone of its intellect, the dignity of its character, or the 
 soundness of its religion, now sustains the highest rank among 
 the journals of the age. It ought to be in the hands of every 
 
56 
 
 Christian — -it cannot fail to make its attentive readers wiser 
 and better. 
 
 It is perhaps unnecessary to add, that towards the author of 
 these writings I cherish sentiments of unfeigned Christian 
 ^affection and esteem, and that I believe him to be influenced 
 by the highest and best of motives. Nor is it by any means 
 certain that his present effort may not ultimately contribute 
 to advance the very interest which he has at heart — the 
 cause of truth and righteousness. 
 
 “ Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever 
 things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever 
 things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever 
 things are of good report ; if there be any virtue, and if there 
 "be any praise, think on these things.” 
 
 Impenitent reader ! Turn not, I beseech you, with in- 
 difference from this subject. If you have any true inter- 
 est in the universe, it lies in religion. If you ever obtain 
 real happiness, it must come from this source. The sweet- 
 est cup of mere earthly bliss is mingled with bitterness, 
 and even this will soon fail ; for the wave comes rap- 
 idly rolling from afar, that is to wash you from this shore. 
 Soon you are to be forever destitute of any treasure that can 
 impart happiness, unless while blessed with the gospel you 
 secure the treasure of a Christian spirit. You are an immor- 
 tal being ! Endless ages of happiness or wo await you. 
 You are an accountable being. You are incurring responsi- 
 bilities which you must meet at the bar of a righteous tribu- 
 nal. You are under a law making it your imperious and 
 everlasting obligation to be holy. You have no right to be 
 a sinner, either here or hereafter — no right to spend your 
 eternity in hell. You ought to glorify God an(jl promote the 
 happiness of the moral universe, by investing your powers in 
 the cause of holiness. You are now under ah economy of 
 redemption — for you a Saviour has bled — to yoy his gospel 
 is now proclaimed — others around you are pressing into the 
 kingdom of heaven — this is your golden opportunity, never, 
 never to be recalled ! — All things are now ready. 
 
 “ While God invites, how blest the day, 
 
 How sweet the gospel’s charming sound ! 
 
 Come, sinner, haste, O haste away, 
 
 While yet a pard’ning God he’s found.”