m '-S«^. Ei 1 /.l'^ ... <^ «" ccrr v%'&:;:'^^^ f , f. = rr-. L I B RARY OF THE U N I V LR.S ITY or 1 LLI NOIS fmmhM'^r^'-:^(i'. WAR WITH RUSSIA. SPEECH OP THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, (M.P. FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD,) OK THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WAR. tN TI!K HOUSE OF COMMONS, On Thursday, May 24, 1855. CORRECTED BY HIMSELF. nXTHACtr.D FROM HANSARD'S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, vol,, nxxxviii. p, 1036. 1855. LONDON : PRINTED DY WOODFALL AND KINDER, AHOKL COURT, SKINNER STbliRT. SPEECH, ETC. HOUSE OF COMMONS, TImrsdmj, May 24, 1855. PROSECUTION OF THE WAR. Mr. GLADSTONE : Sir, although 1 believe I can adopt, without exception, all the sentiments and the arguments of my hon, and learned Friend (Mr. R. Philli- more) who has just addressed the House, yet, considering the very limited time which remains at our command before the Whitsuntide recess for the discussion of this question, a question as it is of the ■widest extent and of the deepest moment, it may be for the convenience of the House that I should at once follow my learned Friend in the debate, rather than wait until a later hour. Now, Sir, whatever else may be thought of the state, and of the difficulties, of the subject before us, it will at least be ad- mitted on all hands that we have a liberal bill of fare. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckingliamshirc (Mr. Disraeli) has tendered to us a Motion which amounts firstly to a distinct and in- telligible vote of want of confidence in the Government, and secondly to a somewhat indistinct and feeble declaration of our willingness to support Her Majesty in the prosecution of the war. Upon this Motion the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Portsmouth (Sir F. Baring) has moved an Amendment, which adverts to the negotiations at Vienna, but adverts to them in language which I for one do not profess to understand. My hon. Friend and colleague in the representation of the A 2 University of Oxford (Sir W, Iloathcote) lias proposed to amend tliis Aniendtnetit by the insertion of words which would give it a tendency decidedly pacific, with- out weakening the pledge to support the Crown in the actual prosecution of the war, and has supported his proposal by what appeared to lue an admirably reason- ed speech. Lastly, we have my hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe) who, feeling apparently much as I do with respect to the language of the Men)ber for Portsmoutb, completes the part}' by pro- posing to alter his Amendment in such a manner as to give it a decidedly warlike instead of a decidedly pacific aspect. For my own part, Sir, I feel no diffi- culty in making my own choice among the numerous alternatives thus placed be- fore us. The right hon. Member for Buck- inghamshire calls on us to censure the Go- vernment because of its ambiguous lan- guage and uncertain conduct. I cannot obey his call, because it seems to me that, up to this time, and so far as we are yet informed, the ambiguity of language and the uncertainty of conduct which may be imputed to the Ministry are appearances mainly due to the peculiar state and con- ditions of the negotiation in which they are engaged ; and that it would have been a violation of public duty on their part, if, in order to obviate a censure such as that proposed, they had hazarded any of the great interests committed to their charge, by seeking to supply us with full and clear e.xplanations before the time had arrived at which, in their judgment, such explana- tions might be given with perfect safety. I am bound to add that, although I could conscientiously, as far as the mere words are concerned, join the right hon. Gentle- man in lamenting some ambiguity of lan- guage and uncertainty of conduct on the part of the Government, no Member of which I may observe has yet spoken in this debate, and though I should wish to u,uc sec a more decisive direction given to boili tlicir language and their conduct, yet it would not be the kind of impulse which the right hon. Gentleman desires to impart to them ; because with reference to the negotiations at Vienna, he is satisfied that the proper time has come for this House to declare its opinion that the season for their prosecution has passed away, while I, on the other hand, feel that, according to tlic latest information before us, these negotiations have afforded, and if rightly handled, may yet afford us, probably, at least, if not certainly, an admirable oppor- tunity for putting an end to the dangers, horrors, and miseries of war. At the same time, I must not quit the subject of the right hon. Gentleman's Motion without expressing, in the strongest terms, the gratification with which I have listened to several most important declarations that have fallen from his lips ; declarations which, representing as he does no incon- siderable section of opinion in this House, may come to exercise hereafter a weighty and a highly beneficial influence on the course of our proceedings with respect to this great subject. As respects the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ports- mouth, I confess it appears to me to be fairly open to the charge which the Mem- ber for Buckinghamshire brings against the Government, that of ambiguity. It expresses regret that the negotiations have not led to a termination of hostihties, but it leaves wholly untouched the real ques- tions — namely, through whose fault it is that the case so stands, and whether we ought still to desire and recommend that tlicy may be prosecuted with a view to bringing about that result. Considering, what no one will for a moment question, tlie frankness and straightforwardness of the character of the right hon. Gentleman, 1 could not for a moment suppose that he hud framed his Amendment in the most 6 loose and uncertain language in ofaer to combine in a deceitful show of unity per- sons holding the most irreconcilable opi- nions ; but if the Amendment had been framed with that object, it could not have been better calculated to attain it; and if it should bo adopted by the House, such and such only will be its effect. In the speech indeed of the right lion. Gentleman — and I must here say that with his speech I have very little fault to find — ho ex- pressed his wish that the Houso should give utterance to its regret that the nego- tiations had not yet led to a termination of hostilities. Sir, I confess that the little monosyllable "yet" has for me a most harmonious and soothing effect, and, if the right hon. Gentleman will only transplant those three letters from his speech into his Motion, there will not be much cause of difference between us. But if he will not do so, I must object to his Amendment because its sense is equivocal ; because it speaks of the negotiations and communi- cations respecting peace as matters that have passed away, and because difficult or even impossible as I own I find it to attach a definite signification to the mere terms which ho employs, yet I should look upon the act of its adoption by the House as a proceeding subject indeed to much doubt upon its construction, yet practically tend- ing rather to permit an improper prolonga- tion of the war than to promote the return of peace. Next, I have to consider the Amend- ment of my hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe), and with re- spect to his proposal I must say, that it is at any rate clear and explicit, and that a clear and explicit declaration of its views is the only declaration that this House ought to make ; assuming of course that the time has come when it is necessary that the sentiments of the House should be declared. It is well to postpone until the latest moment anything that savours of interference with the functions of the Executive Government. But whether it be in support of, or in opposition to, the course of the Government, you will only detract from your dignity, and diminish also your influence, if, from whatever cause, you consent in the vote to which you may come to use doubtful or hesitating language. I am glad, therefore, that my hon. Friend makes a proposal which is so perfectly clear and explicit ; but on many other grounds I must object to his Motion. I object to it, firstly, because it purports to recite as a fact what I take to be no fact at all ; for it asserts without qualification that Russia has refused to admit of any limitation of her naval force in the Black Sea. Now, even if I go too far in considering this to be untrue, it is at any rate highly disput- able, and nothing that is disputable ought to be recited in a vote of this House as if it were indisputable. And I find that, on the 17th of April, Prince Gortchakoff stated to the conference, that '* Russia would not consent to the strength of her navy being restricted to any fixed number either by treaty or in any other manner." I admit that that passage, if it stood alone, would fairly bear the construction which my hon. Friend has put upon it. But it does not stand alone. On the contrary, the same record informs us that, at the same conference, Prince Gortchakoflf went on to say — " At the same time, ho did not protend to ex- clude peremptorily the consideration of every proposal tending to the point of limitation :" which, standing thus in the English ver- sion, seems to be but a feeble rendering of the original French, which says — " se rat- tachant au principe de la limitation." But, the Russian Plenipotentiary added — *' He reserved to himself the right of re- fusing his adhesion." — [Protocols of the Conferences at Vienna, p. 54.] It may be said that under cover of this very obvious and proper reservation, he 8 intended to refuse any proposal that might be made involving limitation: but this, •which we may suspect or may suppose, we are not entitled to assert ; much less, then, are we entitled to say that Russia actually has refused to consent to limita- tion upon any terms. I therefore object to this Amendment as not consistent with the facts, and I must add, without enter- ing upon other matters of exception, that I also object to it because, while removing the ambiguity of the Amendment which it amends, it substitutes a warlike, under circumstances which in my judgment call for a peaceful declaration. It remains, therefore, for me to say that I shall support the Amendment of my hon. Friend (Sir W. Heatheote), as it ex- presses, and likewise expresses in the mildest and most prudent form, the just desire of this House to make the present negotiations, or communications, which- ever they may be called, the means of leading to a settlement of this unhappy question. And, Sir, I apprehend it is impossible to conceive a graver issue than that which is now raised. It is a grave issue for all Gentlemen, without exception, who sit in this House. It is most of all grave, after the present Ministers of the Crown, for those who have recently stood in the posi- tion of responsible advisers of Her Ma- jesty, and who were among the official authors of the present war. For them to give any opinion whatever in this House varying in any degree from that of the Executive Government on this question — to exhibit in the face of the world and of the country anything like divisions in the councils of this country — is a proceeding which, I am well aware, can only be justi- fied by the strongest conviction, and by obligation of the highest order. But that which justifies in such a case also requires and constrains; and I do not for a moment hesitate, while I own my responsibility, to admit that 1 must either be engaging in the performance of a great duty or in the perpetration of a great crime, or, at the very least, in the commission of a great error. Now, Sir, the proposition I am prepared to maintain is this — and strange enougli I might expect that it would sound in the ears of hon. Gentlemen, if I were to take my impressions of the settled opinions of this House from the current language of so- ciety, or from the tone of the public press generally, which, on the whole, is probably at the present moment not an unfaithful mirror of the state of public opinion in re- gard to the war — the proposition I hold is this, that your war was just, that you have gained the objects of your war, and that if war was just while those objects were unattained, it becomes unjust if you con- tinue to prosecute it after their attainment. I hold that you are now in danger of for- feiting and losing altogether the righteous and elevated character in which you have waged this war. I shall contend that England and France did not enter into it as particular Powers having only separate and particular interests to defend, and meeting on a footing of moral and, so to speak, juridical equality the Power against which they were to fight. Wliile, perhaps, you think only of meeting the general opinion of the public, you are in danger of being forced altogether to descend from that lofty elevation at which you com- menced this contest, and of having to take up a position both practically and morally isolated. Above all, my object in this discussion is to get at that which is the real knot of our debate ; I want to show what it is that, lying under the sur- face, is really in our minds and in our hearts — why it is, that having what, prima facie, amounts to an offer of peace, we are not going to accept it. Is it a ques- tion of terms, or is it not a question of 'Ccrms ? Is it a question of something 10 broador, deeper, higher, and larger than any of the terms before us ? If it is, in- deed, no question of this or that stipulation, but of the adoption of a policy or the re- alisation of an idea, I want to know what that policy and what that idea are ? To mo it seems that thero are two courses that may be followed, either of which has precedents in history, and may under given suppositions be made good at least in abstract reasoning. One of them is, after having taken stipulations such as the circumstances may seem to require, to bind the Power with which you have been at war to their observance by treaty. The other is to destroy, if you can, the strength of that Power, to dismember its territory, and to grind it to pieces. Either of these plans is consistent and intelligible ; but there is one plan, and I am afraid it is the plan that my hon. Friend the Member for Dorsetshire recommends — there is a plan that is neither consistent nor intelligible. That plan may be stated in words such as these — Do not dismember Russia ; do not involve yourselves in territorial enterprise ; do not attempt to tear that great empire to pieces, because it is an object beyond your power to attain. On the other hand, refuse to trust Russia — refuse to rely on treaty stipulations — but do what ? Insult her. Offer her indignities ; strike her in the face, and, having done so, then leave her with all her strength unimpaired to meditate and to watch for an opportunity of revenge. That is the policy of those who say, " We refuse to argue upon a mere question of particular terms given and refused, for the difference between them is scarcely perceptible ; but what we are determined to have is a military suc- cess." This, Sir, is a rude outline of the views with which I shall support the Amendment of my hon. Friend. And now, Sir, in the first place, let us look at the precise state of the facts before us. Four Points have been proposed as 11 the bases of negotiation. The first of these relates to the Protectorate over the Principahties, and upon that Bubject I will not waste words after the statement of my hon. and learned Friend behind me (Mr. Phillimore) — but I certainly should havo thought it was plain on the very face of the case, that if there could be a mode of procedure happily adapted to meet the exigencies of this great question, it was to substitute for the exclusive rights of Rus- sia, acquired to her by virtue of her ag- gressions, rights which she would really have to exercise only as duties, not alone, not of her own arbitrary will, but in con- junction with the other great Powers of Europe ; and which, as far as theDanubian Principalities are concerned, would place something as like as circumstances will per- mit to a free and independent Power be- tween the arms of Russia and the territories under the actual Government of Turkey. We come nest to the free navigation of the Danube, and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire has said to-night — I think in strange forgetfulnesa of what has passed on former occasions — that the first and second points were mat- ters totally insignificant — matters about which Russia did not care, and concessions — I forget whether this sentiment was ut- tered by the right hon. Member or by an- other hon. Gentleman — concessions of no moment made by Russia, in order to se- cure the neutrality of Austria and Germany. Well, but, many months ago, was not Russia desirous of securing the neutrality of Austria and Germany ? Was she not then, has she not all along been anxious to bid high for that neutrality ; and yet, until a very recent date, did she not refuse you the slightest concession on either of these points ? And what is the view of the right hon. Gentleman ? Surely, he is the last man who has a right to attach a cha- racter of insignificance to the concessions of Russia in opening the mouth of the 12 Danube ; because I remember, in an able speech niado by the right hon. Gentleman before the war actually began, and at a time when for the most part we contented ourselves with the discussion of much more limited views, that the riglit hon. Gentle- man pointed to the liberation of the mouth of the Danbc as one among the great but remote and little foreseen results tliat might follow upon bringing the war to a satisfac- tory conclusion. Mr. DISRAELI ; I did not treat the concession as insignificant, but I only said that I did not think there was any diffi- culty in it. Mr. GLADSTONE : I accept, not only with willingness but with pleasure, the explanation of the right hon. Gentleman, and I understand from him now that it is not disputed that this point was a point of capital importance. It stands, then, that upon the first two of the Four Points you had in view as the necessary bases of nego- tiation, your demands were actually con- ceded. And what, Sir, shall we say next, with regard to the fourth point ? Has that been agreed to or not ? In point of fact, wc cannot say that it has been conceded, or that it has not ; for this plain reason — that it has not been discussed. It was proposed by Russia, and urged by Austria, that this fourth point should be discussed pending the settlement of the third, but the Western Powers objected to enter into the discussion. What was the reason of this refusal ? Did they object to enter into the discussion because they thought it would be so thorny and difficult that it would tend to frustrate the entire purpose of the conferences ; or did they object because they had good reason to believe that tlie point would be conceded, and be- cause they apprehended that they would find Russia — to wlioni, if such were her intentions, 1 give no other credit tlian that of great sagacitv and a well considered 13 calculation of hor own interests — reaily to keep up with, and, perhaps, to outstrip, them in what they might desire with re- spect to the fourtli point? I assume, then, without fear of raising a disputable ques- tion, that, with regard to the fourth point, which involves the rights of the Greek Christians, the original' cause of the war, we, the Members of the House of Com- mons, are not under the impression that it is to be considered as being at this moment the cause of difficulties or of the prolong- ation of the war. I now come to the third point, and that divides itself into two questions for consideration — namely, the territorial gua- rantee to be given to Turkey, and the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. I set aside the question of the territorial guarantee to be given to Tur- key, because the negotiators have arrived at an agreement on the subject with re- gard to the terms on which this question might be adjusted. Therefore, in point of fact, the only question that remains unsettled is the question of the prepon- derance of Russia in the Black Sea. It has been admitted on all sides that this preponderance is to cease. The principle, then, is not in dispute, but the form in which it is to be applied. The allied Powers proposed a particular method of putting an end to that preponderance, and Russia proposed another method. Her proposal being judged unsatisfactory by England, France, and Austria, she pro- posed a second method of putting an end to that preponderance ; and the question of the difference between these various methods of putting an end to the prepon- derance of Russia in the Black Sea is the question, and in truth the only question, which is now properly before the House, if we are to vote on the transactions as we find them. My hon. Friend, indeed, the Member for Dorsetshire docs not confine himself to 14 the point at issue, or to opposing the Motion of nly hon. Fricnil and colleague ; his objections do not in truth apply to it, more than they do to the entire policy, bo far as we know it, of Her Majesty's Govern- ment. Now, Her Majesty's Government have not told us that military success is necessary, and that the question is not a question of terms. They have not told us that the fall of Sebastopol is necessary for peace; naturally enough, because the destruction of Sebastopol has never been so much as mentioned in the negotiations. And let me remind the House that, what- ever hon. Gentlemen may individually think, their private opinions cannot affect our position as a Power actually engaged in negotiations, nor can we in reference to these negotiations annul the effect of the declarations which have been made and of the principles which have been laid down in the course of them. At Vienna, wo have been dealing with this question as a question of terms ; I am therefore entitled to assume that it is such, and as such I shall therefore now proceed to consider it, 1 regret deeply what seems to me to have been the premature departure of my noble Friend the Member for London from the conferences. It was, as it appears to mo, owing to a conflict of duties, which belonged severally to the two distinct spheres which he occupied, and which were manifestly incompatible with each other. At the same time I cherisli the hope that that circumstance, together with tho departure of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as it had the effect of practically disabling the con- ference from action before tho last propo- sition of Russia was laid before it, will leave Her Majesty's Government more free to deal with the question in a spirit at once wise and comprehensive than if they had already given a binding answer to the proposal on the spur of the moment. While I shall argue that this proposal ought to have been entertained as a point of departure, I am not about to disavow or to shrink from the responsibihtics connect- ed with the origin of the war. In my opinion it is difficult to overstate the weight of those responsibilities. The amount of physical and moral evil brought about by a war of this character, and the amount of moral and physical good intercepted and prevented by it, are on the one side and on the other so gigantic that it is im- possible to exaggerate that responsibility. Nevertheless, I confess it appeared to me at the time, and it still appears to me, that we had in this instance, a cause of war, not only in itself just, but also suffi- cient to warrant our embarking in it. I will endeavour to explain shortly what this cause of war in my view was. How does the position of Russia in reference to Tur- key diflfer from many of those critical and dangerous cases of neighbourhood among States, where it happens that a very strong Power is placed in immediate contiguity with a weak one? Russia had contrived to make her advances alternately by treaty and by violence, so that every step she took was founded on and related to some pre- vious step; and when each new act of violence was committed it was difficult to exhibit it to the world in that light, as it had acquired the character of an approxi- mation to a right ; or, at least, of some- thing that was easily to be confounded with a right. In this way Russia estab- lished throughout a long course of time relations between herself and the Ottoman empire, which more and more threatened the independence and integrity of that Power. And, perhaps, as I have just used a phrase which is at the present day constantly employed, but little examined or understood, I ought hero simply to state that without any reference to the internal state or institutions of Turkey, I conceive we are endeavouring to maintain its inte- grity and independence simply as against 16 fnroign, and of course in pjirticular as against Russian aggression. Now, Sir, the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Colonics has been greatly blamed for a passage in a despatch which he wrote as Foreign Minister in 1853, and in which he admitted that the treaty of Kainardji gave to the Emperor of Russia a right or claim to interference in the internal affairs of the Turkish Empire — an interference having reference to the reli- gious concerns of a number approaching 12,000,000 of Turkish subjects. It ap- pears to me that he has been very unjustly blamed on that score. It is rot to be de- nied, in my opinion — if plain words can convey a plain meaning — that, however justly you may say that the treaty of Kainardji is dangerous, there can be no doubt that it really imports what my noble Friend admitted. When two Powers enter into an engagement together, and one of them promises by treaty to protect the Christian religion and the Christian churches within its boundaries, it is liable to the other Power for the fulfilment of the engagement. I do not mean to Bay that it is liable in all modes and in all circumstances ; but the general principle of liability cannot be got rid of — and I understand that it was the general principle alone that my noble Friend ever intended to admit. It is quite clear that the treaty of Kainardji was a most dangerous treaty in this particular, for the Emperor of Rus- sia was placed by it in a condition, with Bomo colour, and perhaps, more than co- lour, of right, to build on it a claim to intervention in the internal concerns of the Turkish empire. In 1853 a material extension was attempted to be given, by what was called in the protocols an erro- neous interpretation, to that treaty; and it was sought to confirm, by definitions and developments, which really amounted to the acquisition of new privileges, the 17 perilous hold which the Emperor of Russia had obtained over Turkey. Was it mate- rial in the interest of European peace to prevent these aggressions ? and was it possible to prevent them, if we allowed one extension after another of these menacing rights, or claims put forward as rights, to be accomplished by the Emperor of Rus- sia ? In consequence of the previous re- sults of her diplomacy, Russia was enabled to ask for more than a neighbour ought to obtain by diplomacy from a separate Power; and she was likewise in a condition to resort to the use of material force, and to enter upon a particular portion of the Turkish territory without being liable to a charge of violence and wrong, in the same sense and degree as if she had not been ehieldcd and masked by the peculiar na- ture of her treaty relations with Turkey. Of this fact there can be no doubt. The numerous instances of the occupation of the Principalities by Russia at different times, and for different causes, with or without the partial assent of Turkey, do not prove the right of Russia in that re- spect, but they do prove the anomalous character of the Emperor of Russia's treaty rights over the Principalities and the cover which he thus obtained for acts of wrongful force, while his diplomatic in- terference was covered by the treaty of Kainardji. I recur then to my inquiry: were these aggressions of Russia compat- ible with the security of Europe ? That was the point raised in the time of the late Government by the great Eastern question. Next let me consider what were the ob- jects originally contemplated by way of defence and security for Turkey against Russia, for we thought it too much to at- tempt the total eradication of the evil by diplomatic means, and for a long time the efforts of the Four Great Powers were confined merely to narrowing its limits, and effectually hemming it in. It is very 18 well to say at this time of clay that we ought to have sent a fleet into the Black Sea at the time when the Emperor of Rus- sia occupied the Principalities. This is ono of the delusions which arise from a total forgetfulness, under circumstances of present excitement, of the former state of tilings. I do not hesitate to say, that in June, 1853, no Government, and not merely the one to which I belonged, would have ventured to take a step so rash and reckless with respect to the state of opi- nions, even in our own country. But was the state of opinion in England all that we had to take into view ? If we bad at that time thought of such a scheme, we must at once have given up all idea of the co-operation of Austria, of Prussia, or of France. It was wholly out of the ques- tion then to proceed by the method which some are now so prompt to set up as hav- ing been the only proper one. Well, then. Sir, in concert with all the great Powers we negotiated. And what were the points then chiefly in discussion ? They were these : — The Emperor of Russia asked for a certain amount, not only of ratification, but of extension for the general right granted by the treaty of Kainardji. The Porte, on the other hand, was ready, up to a certain point, both to recognise and to define that right ; and the questions at that time chiefly in debate were, whether the temporal as well as the spiritual pri- vileges of the Greek Christians were to be guaranteed ; whether the Greek Christians were to enjoy all the privileges granted to other Christians being Ottoman subjects, or all the privileges granted to any Chris- tians, even although foreigners within the Ottoman Empire; and, lastly, whether this should bo guaranteed by a separate en- gagement with Russia, or by a general engagement with the Five Powers. I am not very far from the mark, if I even say that in 1 853, these questions were the only questions in dispute between the allied 19 Powers and the Russian Government, and I most certainly shall not be contradicted if I add that every one of these objects has now long ago and completely vanished from view. There is now no question of a separate treaty, no question of the tem- poral privileges of Christian subjects of the Porte, and no question of claiming anything for the Greeks except what may bo enjoyed by other Christians being Otto- man subjects. I beg the House to record these the first assemblage of results ob- tained in this controversy. I will not detain the House with the particulars of the long, intricate, and wearisome negotiations ; but I will pass at once to the critical and decisive point. After much that was luisatisfactory in the conduct of Turkey as well as of Russia, before the close of the year 1853, a change took place in the posture of affairs. Under the presiding influence of Lord Stratford a plan was adopted at Constantinople, which obtained the preference over another plan, simultaneously framed at Vienna, and be- came the actual basis of the proposal for- mally made to the Emperor of Russia. By that proposal the Four Powers agreed to a full and perfect concession of all that Russia had any right to demand. It sti- pulated that tlie evacuation of the Princi- palities was to take place as rapidly as possible ; that the ancient treaties dissolv- ed at the moment by war, including the treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople, were to be renewed ; and the third terra was, that the Sultan of Turkey should com- municate not to Russia alone, but to each of the Five Great Powers, the firman which it was to issue, and which was to guarantee to the Greek Christians of Turkey all the privileges enjoyed by other non-Mussulman subjects of the Porte. I am quite sure there are many who must listen to this statement with surprise ; I am certain it comes upon many as a reve- lation when they hear stated, what ncver- B 2 20 tlieless is unquestionable, that these, nntl these only, were the matters then disputed, and that with these concessions the Go- vernments of Fiance, England, and Tur- key, would at that time have been well contented. So far we have floated down the stream, such has been the rapid train of events, bo remote is our position at this moment from what it then was, that now, under the circumstances of an European war, we even forget what were the points in which we were at that time interested ; there seems to be a change in the scale and measure of our judgment, and we aro too ready, I think, to adopt ideas wholly novel and dangerous, with regard to the settlement of this question. Well, these were the terms proposed in the end of the year 1853. I might, I am quite sure, ap- peal to Her Majesty's Government, who are in possession of the knowledge which at that time I shared with them, to bear me out when I state that these terms, so professed before Europe, so published to the world, might, if it were prudent to carry still further the disclosures of the Government to Parliament, receive the most important and conclusive confirma- tion from documents which passed between the Powers engaged in this great struggle and between their agents. I might sup- port by the most weighty testimonies the statement I now make, but I will not pause to do so. Well, Sir, what was the manner in which these proposals were received by Russia ? And here, fortunately, it is not necessary to do more than state the heads of what occurred in the shortest manner to the House. The terms I have now read, after transmission from Constantino- ple, were embodied in a protocol signed at Vienna, and bearing date the 13tli of January, 1854. This protocol was met, not by a direct answer on the part of Russia, but by the mission of Count Orloff, who, on his arrival at "\'icnna, submitted 21 the countor-clemanda of the Emperor ot Russia, And now, having enabled you to appreciate the demands made by the allied Powers, let us proceed to observe what is not less remarkable — the tone then held, and the terms then required by Russia — and with these in your view you will have another fixed point from which you will be able to judge whether it is true, as some have said, that the objects of this war re- main as yet wholly unattained, that you have had no success in your operations, and that if you retire now from the prose- cution of the war you retire as a baffled, a humbled, and a degraded nation. These which I am about to state are the terms of Russia submitted on the 2nd of February, 1854, and I think I may say this was the proceeding on the part of Russia upon which the resolution was takeu by France and England, and taken under the direct recommendation of Austria and Prussia, to send that summons to the Emperor for the evacuation of the Principalities, which, if unheeded, was to be immediately follow- ed, and which, as it proved, actually was followed, by a declaration of war. There were, as I have said, three pro- positions offered to the Emperor of Russia, aud these were his demands in reply : — In the first place, it was to be a condition essentielle ct irrevocable that any negotia- tion which was to take place on the sub- ject matter then at issue should not be at Vienna, but at a different place, and that it should be conducted, not between the five or six Powers concerned, but between Russia and Turkey alone. And what was the place where it was to be conducted? A choice was given to Turkey ; the choice between conducting that negotiation either at St. Petersburg, under the frown of the Emperor, or else conducting it at the head- quarters of the Russian army. That was the very first condition, announced, too, as a condition essentielle ct irrevocable. The second condition was the coufirmatiou 22 full and entire of the old treaties from Kainardji onwards, including all the sti- pulations which affected the Principalities And Scrvia. The third was a definition of the protectorate over the Greek Christians; the fourth was the evacuation of the Prin- cipalities ; the fifth, the restoration of the status quo in the Principalities ; and tho sixth, that Turkey should make a new set of restrictive arrangements with respect to the reception of refugees and strangers within her territory. These were the ab- solute demands constituting the ultimatum of Russia before the war. Was there or was there not cause for war in these de- mands? The old claims which threatened the independence of the Turkish empire were maintained and extended ; to them were added other larger and more galling demands, for new and odious restrictions were to be placed upon the free action of the Turkish Government in respect to the reception within the Ottoman empire of those who might be fugitives from other countries. Such was our position before the war, and such were the terms which at that time Russia rigidly demanded ; terms pregnant with danger to the security of Europe, for they enlarged the claims and riveted the grasp of Russia upon Turkey, and greatly aggravated the dangers of a position already menacing enough. I need now only dwell upon what may be called the salient points of after occur- rences. When the war broke out, by de- grees our objects were considerably en- larged. Under the circumstances of this ease, I am perfectly ready to avow my re- sponsibility in what then took place, and to maintain the justice, propriety, and wis- dom, of that enlargement ; but, I appre- hend, I shall bo borne out by ordinary ob- servation in saying that a nation does not, as a general rule, when it draws the sword, resolve to enlarge the demands it has made before. Take, for instance, tho case of the revolutionary war in 1793. It com- 23 mcnccd purporting to be on defensive grounds, and Mr. Pitt, after the war was begun, did not declare that, though it had been commenced on defensive grounds, he would then pursue it until the restoration of the Bourbons was secured. On the contrary, the war continued to be pursued on these defensive grounds until the colos- sal power of Napoleon had given to it a character altogether new, and had involved this country in a struggle for nothing less than its independent existence against a force which threatened to swallow up the whole of European Christendom, and which left you no choice but to put down a power that could exist on no terms compatible with our security. Such is the general rule. But In this case wo extended our demands after the outbreak of the war. Accordingly a letter was written by Lord Clarendon on the 22nd of July, in which, instead of continuing to recognise the status quo, he used these words — " Her Majesty's Government have no hesitation in stating the guarantees which, in their opinion, and that of the French Government, arc essential to secure the tranquillity of Europe from future disturbances. These guarantees are naturally suggested by the dangers to guard against which they are required. Thus, Russia has taken ad- vantage of the exclusive right which she had ac- quired, by treaty, to watch over the relations of Wallachia and Moldavia with the suzerain power, to enter those provinces as if they were part of her own territory. Again, tlic privileged frontier of Russia in the Clack Sea has enabled her to establish in those waters a naval power which, in the absence of any counter-balancing force, is a standing menace to the Ottoman empire. The uncontrolled possession by Russia of the principal mouth of the Danube has created obstacles to tho navigation of that great river which seriously affect the general commerce of Europe. Finally, tho sti- pulations of tho Treaty of Koutchouk-Kainardji relative to the protection of the Christians have become, by a wrongful interpretation, the princi- pal cause of the present struggle. Upon all these points the sMus quo ante belluin must undergo important modifications." Now, the House will see that in this communication three new beads of demand, 24 relating to tlic Principalities, to the atti- tude of Russia in the Black Sea, and to the Danube, arc added to the original question of the Greek Christians, and that the statement I have read substantially opens out into the Four Points which were the bases of the recent negotiations. It was, however, by several progressive steps that they assumed their final form. 1 need not now trouble the House with quotations upon that subject. I have shown the first stage in which they appear in the diplomatic correspondence; and now how does it appear that we have stood ia respect to this important change in the ob- jects of the war? Before the war broke out it was thought wise — and the House generally, I think, appeared disposed to ac- quiesce in the policy — to content ourselves with endeavouring to limit and restrain within bounds the dangerous rights assert- ed by Russia. After the war, however, our language was changed, and it became this — " We will not be content with limit- ing and restraining these rights, but will abolish them altogether. The treaties arc gone ; we have a right to require that they shall not be renewed, and we will demand those further concessions which seem to be necessary for the permanent peace of Europe." It seems to me that that was a wise proceeding. It rested upon the principle that these treaty-rights or treaty- claims were a cover and a cloak for both fraud and violence, that b}' abolishing them you got rid of that cover and cloak, and, instead of leaving to Russia the power of working out in the dark, and with the protection of colourable pleas, any schemes of self-aggrandisement at the expense of Turkey, you put her in the same position in ■which any other strong Power is put with regard to a weaker neighbour — namely, that you give her two alternatives — either on the one hand to discharge the duties of loyal and peaceful neighbourship, or on the other to resort to open violence, but that 25 there should no longer be a mickllo system of complex relations, under which hostile aggression might wear the mask of right, and Russia with peace and moderation on her lips might securely pursue the accomplishment of sinister designs. The changes made in our demands were jus- tified, I think, by this important principle. But, again, it is not our own position only that we must consider ; we must take also into view the position of Russia, if wc wish to arrive at a sound judgment upon this question. I have shown you the six demands of Russia in February, 1854. What has since been the conduct of that thou haughty Power ? When the first sketch of the Four Points was sent to Russia, in August of last year, permission was given to Count Buol, on the part of Austria, to refer them to St. Petersburg. Lord Clarendon writes on the 15th of August that he does not object to their transmission to St. Petersburg, upon the clear understanding, first that we were not parties to the proceeding, and, secondly, that an armistice should not take place until preliminaries of peace were signed. IIoAv were they received at St. Petersburg in August last ? And here, Sir, I must touch for a mo- ment on a most important, but collateral question. I am not now about to enter into any detailed argument in reference to the expedition to Scbastopol, but I do not shrink from my full share of responsibility in regard to that expedition. I admit the gravity of the question. I hope the time will come for its full discussion, and I am ready to defend the policy of the Govern- ment, but in the meantiine I would ask of those who say with a certain outward show of reason that that expedition has been rash and ill-considered, and that it has entirely failed — I would call upon them to observe the facts I am now goiiig to lay before them — to note the language of Russia in August, 1854, before the expc- 26 dltlon to the Crimea, and to note the acts and language of that same Power in De- cember, 1854, after that expedition. I, holding that military expeditions in time of war are not to bo regarded aa ends, but as means for the attainment of ends, am ready to defend the expedition to the Cri- mea, nay, more, I am ready to defend it, not upon the grounds of antecedent reason only, but I do not hesitate to say, even by its results. On the 26th of August, 1854, the Rus- sian reply was received to the communi- cation of Count Buol, and what was that reply ? It was a reply which I will not quote in extenso, but the effect of it was that the Four Points were terms to which Russia could not consent except at the end of a desperate struggle and a long series of defeats. That was the language of Russia in August, 1854. You will say that these are proofs of her temerity, her arrogance, and her aggressive spirit ; and I agree with the reproof ; in my opinion, it is impossible to censure too severely the tone and policy of that Court in the year 1854 ; but it is the marked change in that policy, and the adoption of a different language and a different spirit — it is the disposition which she has more recently shown to meet you, if you will not fly from her advances and refuse to meet her — these are the facts which I want to verify ; and depend upon it if we do not verify them now, and adopt the conclusions which ought to arise out of their verification, we may yet have to do so hereafter,? under circumstances, too, probably, of a far less favourable nature. Well, Sir, the answer of Russia in the month of August, 1854, to the four proposals, was an answer of prompt, decided, and even haughty rejec- tion. In December, 1854, only four months after that answer, and nothing in the meantime having intervened, that I am aware of, that could act on the mind of the Emperor of Russia except the expo- 27 tlition to the Crimea, the battle of Alma, the battle of Inkcrman, and the general cu-- .cumstances of that memorable campaign — in December, 1854, the Emperor promised an unreserved acceptance of those very terms which in the preceding August he had somewhat contemptuously and contu- meliously rejected. It was upon the 7th of January that the Russian plenipoten- tiary announced to the three Ministers of the allied Courts at Vienna that he was authorised to declare that the Emperor of Russia had unreservedly accepted the four bases of negotiation in the terms laid down by tho British and French Governments. That is the state of the facts so far ; and although I have drawn largely upon the patience of hon. Members, I hope they will see that I have endeavoured to lay these facts before them in such a way as that they may assist our discussions, for it is impossible to overrate the gravity and solemnity of the question that they raise. And now, Sir, I think it only remains for me to consider the one main point with respect to the terms asked by us, and re- fused by Russia, because I am proceeding upon the assumption that, as we are a Power engaged in solemn negotiations, we are bound — whatever the feelings of somo among us may be — to treat the negotiation seriously, and to regard the question sim- ply as a question of terms. So viewing it then, how do we stand ? You have got your first point, you have got your second point, you expect and believe tbat, when- ever you choose, you may get your fourth point, and you have got the first moiety of the third point ; but you are quarrelling about the last moiety. What is it, then, that forms the subject of our quarrel ? We are quarrelling because the Western Powers, in conjunction with and supported by Austria — and I have not the least wish to weaken tho force and value of that support — have proposed to Russia tliat she shall come under an European engagement 28 to limit the number of her ships in the Black Sea. Now that proposal is no part of the essence of the third point — let that be borne clearly in mind. The third point lays down a principle, but it leaves en- tirely open the mode of its application, and even states broadly a reason why the mode of application could not but be left open. The principle which it lays down is that the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea shall cease. It requires that in some manner a relation shall be esta- blished between the naval force of Russia in the Black Sea and other naval forces, which shall be such as not only to dimi- nish, but to destroy, Russian preponde- rance. The mode of applying tiie princi- ple, however, is perfectly open, and, there- fore, I understated my own case when I said that you were quarrelling for half of the third point — in fact, you are not doing so, but in reality upon the mode of con- struing one portion of the third point. Now let us look closely at the two modes of construing that moiety of the third point ; for that is the most grave and serious question upon which, reduced ap- parently WMthin such narrow dimensions, nothing less depends than the effusion wholesale of blood and treasure, and the happiness or misery of multitudes of men. Russia has given to us a certain propo- sal, I mean her second, not her first ; she speaks in substance as follows : — " Let the law of Europe, with regard to closing the Black Sea, remain as it is in all re- spects but one ; and let that one be that Turkey, instead of having no discretion whatever with reference to the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, shall be perfect mis- tress in the case, and shall have absolute discretion to open them or close them pre- cisely as she chooses from time to time, according to her own estimate of what her safety upon any occasion may require." That is the Russian proposal — a proposal capable, of course, of discussion and im- 29 provemcnt ; a proposal which Austria says we ought not to have rejected, but to have discussed with a view to a settlement. What is the other ? It is that the Russian fleet shall be cut down to four sail of the line in the Black Sea ; that the Turkish fleet shall be limited to four sail of the lino inside the Black Sea, but that Turkey may have outside as many as she chooses ; that the other Powers shall be at liberty to have two sail of the line each within the limits of the Black Sea ; and, in fact, that there shall be established something like an ostensible or pretended equality of force, although, I fear, that it might prove to be nothing more than pretended. Now, I begin by making a preliminary statement. I think that it is obviously desirable to establish an arrangement with respect to the naval power in the Black Sea, and I do not shrink from my share of responsibi- lity in the language of Lord Clarendon, which I quoted just now, when he said that, in his opinion, the military and naval establishments of Russia, in the absence of any counterbalancing force, must be looked upon as a standing menace to Turkey. But, upon the other hand — for though gusts of passion may sometimes find their way here, yet I well know that an appeal can always be made with safety to the calm and dispassionate reflection of the House — upon the other hand, I think that we must all perceive that this ques- tion of the Black Sea is one of great and, in fact, of insurmountable difficulty. It is not, I think, in the wit of man — at least, I have heard of no suggestion which has proceeded from the wit of man, and which furnishes a perfectly satisfactory arrange- ment with respect to the Black Sea. If the Black Sea were a perfectly open sea, like the Mediterranean, you would know what to do. If it were a perfectly close water, like the American lakes, then, also, you would know what to do. You need have had no difficulty if you had been deal- 30 ing with Powers that shared the possession of the coasts of this sea had it been en- tirely shut in, and not accessible to vessels of great draught of water ; but, unless we could, by some miracle of engineering skill, contrive to convert the straits of the Black Sea into a mere canal, which can bo navigated by small vessels only, we cannot completely dispose of the political difficulty upon that side ; and, upon the other side, I fully grant that to treat the Black Sea as an open sea, in consequence of its accessibility to vessels of all draughts, would be equally dangerous, because of the situation of Constantinople upon the shores of the Straits, because of the weakness of the Turkish Government, and its inability to maintain its position by its own re- sources, and because of the importance to Europe of preventing aggressions upon the Ottoman Empire. That is, I hope, a fair statement of the case, and it is manifestly one surrounded with difficulties. You may adopt one suggestion or another, but I do not think that any suggestion can be made which is not open to a very great deal of objection, and with respect to which you will not be compelled to admit that it affords but an imperfect remedy for the past, im- perfect justice as between the parties, and an imperfect security or guarantee for the future. Thus, Sir, we have to take our choice between several plans, all of which are im- perfect. Sir, so far as Parliament is aware, my right hon. Friends near me, together with myself, left office pledged to nothing except to the principle of destroying Rus- sian preponderance; but, for my part — and I am sure that in this point I speak the sentiments of my right hon. Friends who sit near me — I do not for a moment shrink from avowing the fact that our responsibi- lity proceeds beyond the strict letter of the papers which have been presented to Par- liament, and that, whether right or wrong, we are responsible, in conjunction with my 31 noble Friend at the head of the Govern- ment and our other colleagues under the Earl of Aberdeen, for having proposed to Russia a limitation of her fleet in the Black Sea. Now, Sir, if I am asked what I think of that plan, I shall say, that I always thought it a defective plan, but that I became a party to proposing it be- cause I was aware of no other. In becom- ing parties to the proposal of that plan, however, I apprehend that we did not pre- clude ourselves from profiting by expe- rience, and by the discussions into which wo were about to enter, and that it waa perfectly free to us in common with our colleagues, had we continued in the Go- vernment, either to persevere in that plan of limitation, or to adopt any other plan which in the course of the negotiations wo might think equally good, or preferable, for accomplishing the end we had in view, and bringing about a satisfactory peace. Now, what has been the reception of tho plan of limitation in this House upon tho very first night on which it has been dis- cussed ? I am bound to say that I think the Government will feel that its reception here has been most unfavourable. I havo heard several Gentlemen rise in this House to defend the war. My hon. and chivalrous Friend the Member for Dorsetshire (Mr. Ker Seymer) I am sure is ready to go all lengths ia this sense, and others have spoken in terms similar to his ; but it is a most extraordinary fact, that I havo not yet heard one Member of tho House say, " I am determined to continue tho war if the limitation is refused ; I am prepared to make peace if tho limitation is granted." I may be wrong, but I do not believe that in this crowded House there are twenty Gentlemen who are ready to hold that lan- guage. There are many who think that you ought to ask a great deal more than a limitation, or a closing or opening of tho Straits, or anything else of the sort, but that is not the question raised in the con- 32 fcrcncc3 — that is not the ground upon which you stand before Europe in the responsible position of carrying on a war. The ground upon which you stand, that is, upon which your Government and your ne- gotiator have placed you, before Europe is this ; that you are ready to make every concession which ought to be made, and to refuse evciything which ought not to be accepted, and that the dividing line ought, in your judgment, to be between limita- tion of the Russiau fleet to a certain num- ber of vessels on the one hand, and the discretional power of opening the Straits upon the other. If the House of Commons gives a vote in the sense of the right hon. Member for Portsmouth, and adopts the Motion which he proposes, I say that that, unless in so far as it may bo qualified by the rejection of the Amendment of the Member for Kidderminster, is the legiti- mate Parliamentary sense of the vote, be- cause when we vote upon papers before us, which have been presented to us by the Crown, we cannot escape the responsibility of the knowledge which those papers con- vey to us. If the Government had chosen to keep those papers in their own posses- sion, our hands might have been free, and we might have retained our private convic- tions ; but we have now become cognisant of the fact that conferences were held, that they were pursued to a certain point, that no insuperable difficulty arose except one, that that one was limitation upon the one hand, and the discretional power of Turkey over the Straits upon the other — that upon that point, and that point alone, the con- ferences are in danger of becoming a total failure, and that that is the issue upon which, for this great juncture, everything depends. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire has recorded upon this subject declarations which, in my judgment, are most important ; and, if I refer to them, it is with no invidious mo- 33 tivc, but because I think that they are as historical facts worthy to be recorded, that they will be heard of in future discussions, and that, considering that he may well be presumed to speak for others besides him- self — they may probably exercise a sensi- ble influence hereafter upon the course of affairs. What was the language of the right hon. Gentleman with regard to the doctrine of limitation ? It was that of unmeasured condemnation. He found fault with my noble Friend for having recog- nised the honour of Russia as something which it was well to keep in view, if not as a primary, still as a secondary consider- ation ; and then he said that, after thus recognising the honour of Russia — which was a superfluous, and indeed spurious, act of benevolence — " you proceeded to propose to her terms that were nothing less than most outrageous ;" and he then went on in language varied and diversified, but no less strong, to say that these were terms which the noble Lord ought to have known " it was impossible for Russia to accede to." The chastisement of the right hon. Gentleman is certainly severe — I think he denounced the plan of limitation in terms which are too strong, but I own I feel myself in some degree justly reproved. The more I have considered the plan of limitation, the more 1 feel the enormous difficulties of carrying it into anything like real or full effect, the more I despair of the ends at which limitation aims being gained by forcing it upon Russia, and the more I feel the extreme indignity which, if so forced, it inflicts upon her ; and there is no policy, I think, which is so false and dangerous as to inflict upon Russia indig- nity without taking away strength. Let us suppose for argument's sake that we had obtained limitation, although at this time appearances hero and elsewhere are such as to make it very questionable whether it will be attained ; but if it were, what, what good or what evil, should wo c 34 liave accomplished ? Wo should, in the first place, have recorded against the Rus- sian Government, in the face of the Rus- sian people, a standing insult to that Go- vernment — a standing deprivation of its own natural powers of defence — the first and most essential powers which belong to a Government as such. Sir, I must con- fess I feel that it is impossible for us to insist upon treating the Black Sea as if it were a lake. Suppose France had a quar- rel with Russia, suppose England had a quarrel with Russia, and the Baltic were frozen, so that we could not carry on operations in that quarter, do you think wo should not find our way through the Straits into the Black Sea, in order to get at Odessa and destroy it, or for any other purpose of injury which we thought fit ? [An Opposition Member : " Why, have we not done so already ?"] I really want a reply to this question. IIow am I to an- swer the Russian when he says to me, " Turkey, by your own confession, is weak ; she has not suflScient power to close the Straits without foreign assistance ; and liow, therefore, is it to be supposed, if it suits your purpose at any time, or you think you have a legitimate cause of quar- rel with, and you obtain admission into the Black Sea — as you would by force or otherwise — that Russia is to consent to meet you there under a treaty stipulation only to keep up four ships of the lino ? It may be said that war would dissolve this stipulation ; but would war create for us upon the instant twenty ships of the line? " Although I should have rejoiced if, there- fore, acceptances of limitation by Russia had given us peace, I must own it is a proposition which I scruple to enforce at the point of the sword. Nor has any satisfactory answer been made at the conferences to the argument of the Russian Plenipotentiaries, who showed that in one and the same breath they were required to guarantee the integrity of 35 Turkey, and to limit to four ships of the line the means of affording her naval aid. Russia, however, haa made known to us another arrangement ; and perhaps it may be asked, why did you not yourselves pro- pose that other arrangement to Russia ? Speaking for myself, I can give a frank answer to that question — because that other arrangement is one so entirely in favour of Turkey, it so manifestly relaxes the law of Europe in her favour, giving her a control practically absolute over the Straits, and allowing her a perfect com- mand of them for any purpose relating to her security, that I think any Power which had proposed that arrangement to Russia would have been liable to be met by un- answerable objections to it, founded upon its patent and singular inequality. But I own that those objections lose very much of their force the moment that plan is adopted and proposed by Russia herself. If Russia chooses to propose that plan as the best mode of settling the differences which exist, then arise these two questions — first of all, is there, or is there not, any reason to believe that the Russian plan may be upon the whole even a better basis than the plan proposed in opposition to it ? and, secondly, if it is not the better but the worse basis, is there such a difference between it and our plan as to justify us in the position which we may soon hold in the eyes of Europe — that of a Power which has broken off negotiations for peace because the principle of limitation was re- fused to us, and nothing but the principle of a discretionary power over the Straits, vested in Turkey, proposed in its stead ? I can have no hesitation as to the answer to be made to those questions, and if I understand aright the language of the right hon. Gentleman opposite, he can have as little. lie has denounced this principle of limitation in the strongest terms, as the ground of the very difKcul- ties which all must see in the liabilities it c 2 36 ofTcrs to evasion, in its cfTcctivonrps, nnd in the clcro