STEIN’S PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION BY DARWIN ORLANDO CLARK B. A. Drury College 1896 M. A. University of Illinois 1909 THESIS Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 1921 Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2016 https://archive.org/details/steinsprinciplesOOclar \^ 1 \ C5' . ■ ■ . 4 . ( 16 ) the central control over all branches of administration. Harmony (17) * would t§nd to prevail. The departments would operate in unison (18) with like energy and mutual support and aid. It would be possible to exercise an impartial and energetic control and supervision ( 19 ) ‘ over state affairs as a whole. Rapidity of administration would characterize the executive functions of stated DEPARTMENTAL DIVI SI ONS . If (21) A second principle", says Stein, "appears to me to be the suitable division and classification of the state 's business ac- cording to the chief administrative branches, by uniting related subjects into the same department and binding the departments closely together." There are involved "the basis of division, tne internal, arrangements, and the relation to the provincial or- gans. As a basis ... .sub ject matter and territory are in use. « 9 * The application of ^ the former to the whol8 monarchy is, as far as I can see, advisable." "The smallest number possible of the cen- tral administrative officials should be at the head of simple de- partments, naturally divided according to the chief administrative branches." Thus, Stein recognized two bases for dep artmental divisions, subject matter and territory, with a decided prefer- ence for the former as best suited for administrative effective- ness. His objections to the latter lay partly in the "constant difficulty of carrying on the state’s business within so large a sphere of activity, and partly in the lack of knowledge for the details of each administrative branch and in the absence of res- ponsibility for the administration as a whole He lays special schlaese etc 5 V ? 77 Chla 1 e | e ’ J , 3 77 ; Denkschrift, II, 498. 17. vor- scnxaege etc. , 377. 18. Bericht. II. 661. 19 Rp-r-t tt ccr, 21* ieiiihr r TI Chl 6 a If ’^r ; ^ nkschrift ’ A *g- 25,' 1808, II, 128. • Bericht > II, 844 661. 22. Zweck. Bild. I, 416. 23 Veraend Verfassung, Hov. 84, 1808, II , 689; Pro Memnoria, 0ot.*16, llw* . . . : _ • • ' ' ’ — 5. emphasis upon the loss of unity and harmony, due to local partial, rather than general comprehensive, points of view;, the great dif- ficulty in adopting and executing general measures since in dif- ferent places the same administrative branch at the same time (25) was carried on with different principles; the "impossibility of a minister understanding the principles of all the various admin- istrative branches entrusted to his care and attending to each with equal interest." It is, therefore, his conclusion that more harmony and unity exist in the general departments than in the territorial; that, with supervision, they are of prime importance, as a corrective of existing evils and fundamental to effective government." Prom the correct demarcation of administrative activities depends largely the successful organization of public affairs and the pos- (27) sibility ox finding efficient public officials." "Only by this method of organization can intelligent guidance for each branch of administration and proper relations between the branches be obtained. Through the least possible number of divisions and personal conferences and presentations on the part of the heads alone can the central authority act with more effectiveness, harmony ) and vigor and organize the subordinate departments more easily." The purpose, then of organizing the public business on the basis of subject matter is to secure unity, harmony, a gen- eral point of view, uniform methods, more thorough knowledge, abler men; a sense of responsibility for the whole on the part of 24 3 leSohr^T 11 ^ 2 ’ 6 ' , Sept ' 26 ' 1808 - II. 242. 27 Tbld 6 S' D 2 b 2* eok - Bild., I, 4X9. 26. Ibid., 420. ibid., 416. 28. Bericht. II 644. . - ■ 6 . each division; supervision, control and intelligent guidance. Besides the basis of division, the character must be deter- mined. The organization is to be such as to provide for the full measure of departmental individuality and responsibility within the alloted jurisdiction. The heads of departments, "in closest connection with, the King, take charge of the branches of the public business according to the instructions imparted to them, each independent and responsible, working in harmony with similarly ( 29 ) J organized organs." Each department, as far as possible, should be put under an individual head; but so that the closest connection between the departments might be constantly maintained and each stand under the common control, yet independent and especially res- ponsible for details, each department was to be clothed "with full responsibility and the greatest possible independent activity," consistant with its connection with the other departments and the and the harmonious action of the system as a whole. TECHNICAL COMMISSIONS. The third principle was to provide for intelligent activity, scientific and technical commissions to be attached to the depart- ments, so that affairs pertaining to the common interest might be advised by experts "and accuracy of information secured?" "To avoid the disadvantages invariably existing for various adminis- trative branches in the hands exclusively of mere administrators... to combine the advantages of scientific and expert advice with those of a vigorous and regulated order of administration. .. .de- 29. Veraend. Verfass., II, 689 ."“so.” Ber icht, 661. 31. Ibid., 657. 32. Anzeige, II, 242. 7 . putations were to be created of administrators and experts. Their business was to test the latest scientific and technical principles, to ascertain their applicability to the departmental work and new legislation through a close survey of the situation (33) (34) of affairs." Each department was to consist of two parts: The one having to do with the strictly scientific principles which pertain to its special sphere; the other having charge of their application to practical administration. The necessity for this arrangement lay in the fact that "it is impossible for (mere ad- ministrators) in branches demanding very important scientific or technical knowledge to possess a wholly adequate training, or, if so on entrance into the service, for them to retain it amid the pressure of affairs and to keep abreast of the progress of science and knowledge. Even if such were the case, it would be exceptional and not worth considering. There exists, therefore, as a rule, an incomplete administration of such branches# If at times for a short while, they are advanced farther than is wont by the special qualifications of some administrator, yet on his withdrawal or superannuation, there soon ensues another non- progressive interval, which disadvantage can be eliminated only by the use of scientific experts of all kinds, as advisers to the regular administrators . On the other hand it is just as im- possible to depend on these experts for regular administrative work, as there often fails them the all round necessary training for effective administration. In part, also, it is against their inclination, as well as injurious to their special qualifications 33. Bericht, II, 645. 34. Veraend. Verfass., II, 720. - 8 . (35) to be under the pressure of routine work." "Therefore, in this plan for organization, to unite the ad- vantages of expert advice with those of a vigorous regular adminis- tration, in all departments having special scientific and tech- nical work, provision is made for such deputation of administra- tors and learned experts, to test scientific and technical prin- ciples by the most recent state of science and knowledge as to their applicability, ». .and to submit working plans and instruc- ( 33 ) tions for departmental work and legislation. There will result from this that the administration. .. .will not become so conser- (37) vative, or superannuate so early." The technical deputation was to be used in both the central (38) and the provincial administration. In the former provision was made for not more than seven deputations to be attached to the departments of Domains and Forests. Trade and Industry, Mines and ( 39 ) Mining, Public Health, Instruction, Works, and Agriculture. There exists in most respects a marked similarity between these bodies. The general character is vaguely described in such terms (40 ) as: "closely connected with the department," "performs for public instruction that which similar deputations do for other depart- \ 41 ) ments," "one of two parts into which the public health depart- H 2) (43) ment is divided," "a consultative organ," "a division of the (44) trade and industry department." The membership consists prim- 35. Bericht, II, 645. 36. Ibid., 37. Ibid., 646. 38. Anzeige, II, 242; An Schroetter, Aug. 25, 1808, II, 677. 39. Veraend. Verfass., II, 708, ’ll, ’19, ’20, ’27, »30. I^id., 41. Ibid., 711. 42. Ibid., 720. • 1 Dla. , 727 , . . * 9 . arily of scientifically and technically trained men, to which are added in some cases prominent administrators from related depart- ments, state officials, and, occasionally, consulting members* The functions are various. The members are to canvass the pro- gress of knowledge pertaining to their particular department in its special bearing upon the affairs of state; report the results to the departmental authorities; offer expert advice, and render opinions on scientific subjects in general, and special cases on request or their own initiative; entertain commissions on short notice with written or verbal ansv/ers ; make reports on the exist- ing conditions of the departments; take charge of departmental educational institutions; and examine candidates for departmental positions. Each deputation has unrestricted access to all the information and resources of its own and other departments, and to all necessary assistance from departmental functionaries and local deputations. The matter of organization is rather vaguely hinted at in the expressions that it "has the organization of the Forest deputation," or "possesses a new organization," or "forms an organ of the department," except in case of the Domains and Forest deputations which has the chief forester as its direc- tor and a counselor to devote his whole time to the work. Finally, a deputation must furnish aid to other departments than its own, that of Trade and Industry to the department of direct and in- direct taxas, or that of Agriculture to that of Forests and Do- (44) mains . Similar deputations were to be established in the provinces. "Where circumstances permit and need demands, independent depu- 44. Veraend. Verfass., II. 727 730. . 10 . tations were to be created by the General Directory. They were to be correlated with similar deputations of the central govern- ment. The General Directory was to furnish the necessary data; and might consult them as a body or summon certain members to meet with it." As a rule each War and Domain chamber should have a deputation for public health and one for public instruction. Other deputations were to be constituted as the special need oc- ( 45 ) curred. "Members of these deputations were to be summoned peri- odically; or in special cases by the General Directory for de- . (46) liberation and instruction." The relations between the central d.nd provincial deputations on the same subject is nowhere defi- nitely defined; but in general the relation in matters of public (47) health is indicated. POPULAR PARTI Cl PATI ON . "The fourth principle is.... the giving to the nation estates befitting its position and relation; and to the representatives , (48) a proper share and interest in the admi ni strati on. " This general statement is further elaborated by exhibiting the various ways in which the King, the officials, and the people as a whole or in part are to profit by its embodiment in some practical form as a part of the government. In order that this right and unrestrained power (of the King) may work the good that lies in it, it seems to me necessary to give this supreme power a means of finding out the wishes of the 45. Bericht, II, 668. 46. Ibid., 670. 47. Veraend. Verfass., II, 720. 48. Bericht, II. 646. ,< rn.Mw £,<, Ot mtm t -n i I •> * fcoia *"««« 11 . (49) people and of formulating their* desir > es. M in this manner 1 "the ruler of a loyal and selfrespecting people gains in power, for T (50) he secures all their moral and material support.” and is "kept (51) Informed of their attitude and views." Besides bringing the King into closer touch with the people and keeping him cognizant of their opinions, the participation of the people will, also, aid in correcting some very evident abuses in the administrative sys- tem, such as extravagence , partiality, red tape, difficult and halting action of the subordinate organs, and destruction of pub- lie spirit," or a "predominating mercenary spirit,.... a merely formal life, an ignorance of the district to be ruled, an indif- ference and often ludicrous disinclination to the task, and a fear of changes and new methods, because they increase the wo^*k." From the positive side, "the full participation of the estates (in the War and Domain chambers) will be useful to procure an energetic administration, a better knowledge of affairs and places, a more active interest in the district and persons ruled and an increased prestige and confidence in the ruling body! 1 "A pro- perly constituted estates constitution will, also, help the local administration of the central authorities, more easily acquaint them with the local needs and public opinion, support them in their general measures, aid them in more quickly arriving at a proper decision, and securing its exection, giving them relief from a multitude of details and through publicity furthering their (55) control over their subordinates." Reference is made most fre- th P ?hb-o^ St r en h, N0V - 24 1808 ’ 11 • 311 - 50. Bemerk., reo. cm, lbiy, v. 51. An Herrn von Schmitz, Mav 30 181B V pbt 52. Bemerk., Nov. 5. 1822. V 737. 53. Berlohtf ??,’ 646. 18i8 v?°22U tter '’ AUg ‘ 25 18 ° 8, 11 ’ 676 - 55 ‘ An Spiegal, Apr.l, . , ' . 12 . quently by Stein to the effects of popular participation in sim- plifying the administrati ve routine , in inducing a more vigorous and certain action, and, above all, in rendering the whole pro- „ (56) cess of government less costly. The estates corporations are to form a counterpoise to the to the administration to induce more order, economy, and deliberation into the processes of .legisla- tion and administration; to protect the province from the tendency to centralization and to general action without due regard or knowledge of provincial relations, and to make provincial adrninis- (58) tration cheaper and more flexible; to encourage official activity and independence without arbitrary action, and induce economical (59 ) and energetic operations; to eliminate '’the unavoidably resulting separation of the administration from the people..,, , the lack of a live, vigorous grasp of subject matter...., the merely formal conduct of business and the greater cost of administration;^ and to further the independent activity of the provincial organs, bring life into the dead frame of documents, oppose the desire of change, and render the administration more united and vigorous, and less costly than hitherto^’ concerning the effect of popular participation upon the peo- ple as a whole, or upon classes or individuals, Stein seems to have a very sanguin conception. The exclusion of the people en- tirely from the affairs of government causes their ’’sympathy with the administration, its welfare and progress, and the national $ 46, ’47,^57; Beurtheilung Aug. 20, 1816, V,86ff. An Niebuhr, Feb. 8, 1822, V, 668. 57. Bemerk. Nov. 5, 1822, V, 9 5 ?e,5 ^iH^Cappenberg, 1818, V. 298. 59. An Eichorn, Jan. 2, 1818, V, 174. 60.Bericht. Nov. 23, 1807, II, 662. 61. Bemerk. Nov., 5, 1822, V, 737; Berieht, Nov. 23, 1807, IX, 657. •odq *43 noqif no JJ •qiol***q •tBittqoq lo $'&rroocw>; 13 . welfare to suffer. There prevails an injurious indifference which breeds opposition to the administration since the people fail to understand it. Especially, the larger landowners, who by their position and training could well take an active part in public affairs, become indifferent and assume a hostile attitude. The government gradually becomes separate from the nation, a condi- t i0I1 ( 62) ali tim6S and places engendering the most unfortunate re- sults." There follows an attitude of hostility, or, at least, a lack of good will in making sacrifices for the state’s existence! But when a real share in the public business is accorded the peo- ple, the "development of the nation will be furthered, the com- ( 64 ) mon feeling awakened;" public spirit broadened and established the love of the Fatherland deepened; "there is created a bond of confidence and respect between ruler and ruled, a live interest in public affairs by the people, a public spirit, a certain prac- tical and accurate knowledge of public business; a moral and spiritual ^ development , a protection against the constant fight of factions, an acquaintance with the needs of the government, and an internal peace^and full advancement of the spirit and charac- ter of the nation." "The interests of the various classes would be looked after and protected; and the laws would cease to be partial." Stein, also, looked at the educational side of pop- ular participation in public affairs, calling "an estates const!- 62. Bericht, II, 646; An Niebuhr Feb. 8, 1822, V, 668. 63. Stein P°I. Test *» II, 311. 64. Veraend. Verfass., II, 690, Mav 3^1817 * N ° V * 5 1822 ’ V > 757 ‘ 66 ‘ Entwurf, 1831 Vi lie?’ t 647 > 5V * 67. Schlusz des Berichts J-OOI, VI, 1167. 68. An Schmitz, May 30, 1818, V, 251. 69. Denkschrift, Oct. 6 1821 V, 592. * 14 . tution and political freedom the great educational institution of the people,” "the provincial estates a good preparatory school for the greater assembly of the central estates." "the central estates a great national educational institution", and the par- ticipation of the nation in legislation and taxation. ... "a train- ing school having the most beneficial influence upon the practi- ce)) cal and theoretical life of the nation." He considered "the fric- (71) tion with the members of the Directory” as exceedingly useful. The educational influence of taking part in local affairs upon the individual is especially emphasized. "The provincial estates (72) assembly will develop, unite and enoble men." "if the (communal constitution) is so constructed that it excites in the individ- ual a free life and an energetic participation in communal af- fairs, it becomes the purest source of love of country, it at- taches him to the paternal hearth.... It assumes a true practical freedom which daily and hourly expresses its influence in every material and personal relation, and offers protection against (73) official arbitrariness and arrogance." For the practical realization of popular participation in public affairs, Stein relied upon the "Mediaeval system of es- tates," with such modifications as the times demanded. Geo- graphical constituencies were to him the height of folly. He repeatedly asserts that all progress must be based upon exist- ing institutions, with such adaptations as present circumstances demand. "The plan is to give the nation estates adapted to its 70. An Louise, Dec. 22, 1828, VI, 644; An Pertz, Feb., 20, 1827, VI, 366; An Gneisenau, Feb. 18, 1831, VI, 65. 71. An Schroet- ter, Aug. 25, 1808, II. 676. 72. An Seinen Neffen. Jan. 3, 1827, VI, 354. 73. Uber Theilnahme, Feb. 13, 1818, V, 190; Bemerk, ' ' • 15 . condition and relations, and to its representatives a suitable participation and interest in the administration. This privi- lege will be accorded more extensively in the subordinate organs of government than in the central, because the latter require special scientific knowledge and the practical habits of long experience, while in the former a close knowledge of individual local affairs and personal relations is the important matter, (74) which those in practical life possess in a high degree." with- in the estates the possessors of the franchise were to be as numerous as possible among the propertied class. "My plan was," says Stein, hitherto that each active citizen shall have the right to representation, whether he possess a hundred or one acre, pursue agriculture, manufacturing or trade, follows some (75) craft, or is bound to the state by ecclesiastical bonds." 73. (continued from previous page) Berne rk, Nov. 5, 1822, V, 750. 74. Bericht, Nov. 23, 1807, II, 647, 662; Anzeige, II, 242; An Vincke, May 20, 1818, V, 284; Stein, Cappenberg, 1818, V, 298. 75. Pol. Test. II, 311. 16 . CHAPTER II— DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRUSSIAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. SITUATION BEFORE 1604. The Prussian system of government in the sixteenth century ( 1 ) * was very simple. It was carried on by the Elector, with the ad- vice of trusted counselors, from the nobility, and the citizens, the latter being chosen for their legal knowledge. The most im- portant official was the Chancellor, since he had to do with all legal affairs, was chairman of the high court of justice and finance, and affixed the great seal to all government documents. He, also, was the intermediary between the Elector and his sub- jects in respect to all representations , decisions, and commands. The other advisers were only occasionally consulted on matters of current business, being mostly non-resident , and under obli- gation to give their opinion only on weighty matters upon request. There existed neither definite duties, common meetings and dis- cussions, nor collegiate organization. On certain occasions the body of advisers assumed temporarily more definiteness, unity, and influence. When the Elector was to be at the imperial diet, on a military campaign, or abroad, they were assembled under a chairman to act according to special instructions. Current, and especially pressing business was discharged by the council in the name of the Elector; weighty non-urgent affairs, except national defense, were referred to the Elector; affairs requir- ing immediate decision were referred to some neighboring prince. This occasional council remained long an expedient for excep- | 1. K nnd C., Staats-Rath, pp’. 79-84, V ' > ■ . . 17 . tional circumstances, until the increase of business incident to territorial growth, advancing culture, and more intimate rela- tions with other German states and foreign powers revealed the advantages of a permanently organized council. ESTABLISHMENT OF 1604. ( 2 ) The establishment came in 1604. Joachim Friedrich at his accession had begun a contest with his estates for more power over the military and financial resources of his electorate. The estates had seriously invaded even his prerogative powers while the feudal organization had destroyed the old military arrange- ments, and many sources of revenue. But he was forced to a com- promise, due partly to coming foreign complications. The impend- ing reversion of Prussia to Brandenburg involved complicated and prolonged dealings with Poland and the Prussian Estates. His eldest son's claim by marriage to Juelich-Cleves-Berg demanded attention from the ruler's critical situation. His second son's inheritance of Jaegendorf; and the strong opposition to his choice by the protestant electors as Archbishof of Strassburg involved negotiations with the Empire, France and the Netherlands. These circumstances created a need for an efficient, responsible and permanently organized body of advisers to administer affairs in the absence of the Elector, and to assume jurisdiction over the prospective acquisitions, a skilled body of men dependent upon and devoted to the Elector alone, who could enhance his personal power and aid him in securing those rights which he had lost in his recent contest with the estates. Thus the occasional council changed into a permanent privy So fi K q? ld T ! « Staats-Bath, P ,85; Droysen, Preusz. Pol. II,pt.i, pp. 386-92, Isaacsohn, Preusz. Beamt, II, 23. * 18 . ( 3 ) council, organized and empowered by the ordinances of 1604. There were to be nine members, five nobles and four citizens. Two privy secretaries took the minutes. Meetings were on Tues- days and Thursdays. The Chancellor introduced the business, the chamberlain led the discussion, the vote was taken by rank, with one exceptionally well acquainted with the subject voting first as a guide. The decision was by majority. A record of the minority arguments might be kept. The results of the delibera- tions were signed by the councillors for delivery to the Elec- tor. The reference of business was decided by the Elector, or in his absence by the Chancellor. Documents were to be taken home only by special permission. The function of the council was advisory in all matters of policy and administration such as: finance, police, imperial, commercial and military matters, church and justice being under the consistory and High Court of Justice . The council functioned very unsuccessfully at first. The ( 4 ) Elector withdrew late in life from affairs of Government, leaving them mostly to a few special confidents, who dominated the coun- cil. Even the pretense of discussion was lost, and meetings be- came very irregular. But on the accession of Johann Sigismund in 1608 the councillar constitution was reinstated with daily meetings and two special committees, one of three members for Juelich affairs, the other of two for Prussian, and to each two men well acquainted with the local provincial affairs, to pre- pare the business to be debated and decided upon in the council. 3. Bornhak, Preusz. Verwaltungg R, I, 309; Isaacsohn, Preusz, Altmann Aus g. Wrk. II, 34-38; K. u. C., Staats- Rath., 86-109 ; 299-309. 4. Bornhak, Preusz. VerwaltungsR.il, 312; K. u. C., Staats-Rath, 110, 111. ' ’ • • 20 . signing foreign papers and death warrants, and maintaining the security of the highways. TEE THIRTY YEARS WAR. ( 7 ) When the council entered the period of the Thirty-Years’ War, German conditions variously affected it, although the ordinance of 1613, with that of 1616. remained as the fundamental law, modi- fied to give an enlarged jurisdiction and special semi-indepen- dent departmental committees. The frequent prolonged absences of the Elector gradually changed the council from a merely ad- visory body to one able to render a valid decision, the controll- ing administrative body, when the Elector, finally, retired to Prussia. It paid debts: supervised domestic affairs; summoned, consulted, and enforced the decisions, of the estates; corres- ponded with foreign courts, received and instructed ambassadors; reprieved and pardoned, heard cases of injustice, and reported to the Elector. Nevertheless the general turmoil after 1619 inter- fered with the attendance and created divisions along the lines oi* the German political factions. Some were Protestants under the Chancellor, others Catholic Imperialists under Schwartzen- berg. There was, moreover, the opposition between Calvinists and Lutherans, dating from the adoption of the reformed faith by the electoral house in 1613, and persisting through the zeal of the Elector, George William, and Schwartzenberg 1 s hostility. Final- ly, the im luence and prestige of the council were impaired by the arbitrary procedure and personal government of Schwartzenberg. He filled in his favorites and excluded his opponents from the council; chased out, imprisoned, and persecuted his rivals by ^ B °^ a ^ PreUSZ * verwalt ‘ I. 313-316; K. u. C., Staats Rath, 130; 148-180. * * ' . ■ . ■ 19 . The hour of meeting was seven in the morning in summer, and eight in winter. Government papers were to remain in the council-cham- ber. CHANGES IN 1613. This attempt at reform seemed to have played out by 1613, when Margrave Johann George undertook the reorganization for his brother, the Elector Johann Sigisraund, who expected to be away a considerable time on Prussian and Juelich affairs. Weekly meet- (5) ings on Wednesday morning at seven or eight, and on Thursday, for unfinished business, were presided over by the Margrave who opened all business, except the Elector's, and guided and closed the de- bate. Government business was presented by the Chancellor, other matters by the members at the discretion of the council. Con- tentious subjects were to be avoided. There was to be a full, free j expression of opinions with a unanimous support of a final de- cision. Important documents were to be signed by the Chancellor, or other councillors. Adequate preparation was expected. The documentary material was to be preserved. To this council was given advisory jurisdiction in such af- fairs of the electoral house and territory f as, instructions and memorials, reciprocal inheritance compacts, family agreements, religious unions, boundary disputes, answers to communications, war preparations, and consideration of the Elector's objections to the council's decisions; for the Elector had bound himself never to act in matters laid before it, against the council’s unani- mous advice. There were added to these duties by the emergency (6) instructions of 1616 those of receiving and answering ambassadors, 5. Bornhak , I, 312; K. u C., Staats Rath, 113-120; Isaacsohn, 11,32. 6. Bornhak, Preusz. Verwalt. I, 313; K. u C, Staats Path, p. 120. . 21 . severe judicial investigations before special commissions, until he came to dominate the council. EARLY DAYS OP THE GREAT ELECTOR. ( 8 ) On the accession of the Great Elector, an attempt was made, at first, merely to remedy a few of the more flagrant abuses through the tentative instructions of January 9, 1641. The Elector re- sumed control of his correspondence, discontinued the signed blanks, toon: cognizance of treason trials, and demanded reports on the de- lays, or refusals, of justice. Later, the privy council was res- tored, under Chancellor Goetze, against Schwartzenberg, to be again rehabilitated after the latter’s death, March 4, 1641, through various instructions. No action was to be taken without collective consultation and decision, with a preliminary reading of all business and important ordinances before the council. Ab- sentees were to vote in writing or by proxy; meetings to be held in the accustomed place. All business concerning the Elector and the state was to be signed by him. In his absence and the lack of a chairman, the council was to act in the name of the Elector in respect to domestic and foreign correspondence, receptions of ambassadors, inspection of the electoral household, summoning of the estates, confirmation of death sentences, exercise of grace, and inspection of martial courts. (9) Meanwhile, the Great Elector had been making rather inef- fectual efforts to improve his territories. He labored under the inconveniences of an expensive court and civil service, the pay- ment of large sums to the Swedes and the Nether landers, and the difficulties of securing revenue. His authority was seriously ? ' K ‘ J 1, ^ Staats Hath, 185-190. 9. Isaacsohn, Preusz. Beamt, II 108; Droysen, Preusz. Politik, III, 2, 50. 22 . limited; for the privy council controlled the internal administra- tion of the Mark and the general affairs of the other territories, managea the current royal affairs and the political correspondence, though it showed marked defects as an administrative body, paying little attention to departments, and exhibiting internal differ- ences, strife and confusion. His scanty income, conciliar diffi- culties and loosely connected territories re&cted disadvantageous- ly upon his foreign policy and his plan to restore Prussia’s mili- tary power. Therefore, he would make such a financial, adminis- trative, and military reorganization of this government as to fill his treasury, secure prompt administration, create a center for his foreign and imperial policy, and form a territorially com- pact state. ORDINANCE OF DECEMBER 4, 1651. While the reform of finance was entrusted to a special com- mission of four officials directly under the Elector, that of administration was made by the privy council order of December 4, 1651. The council was divided into nineteen departments, partly territorial, partly subject-matter. Of the twelve members, two were without special departments, while ten were so assigned as to be each a director in one and an assistant in another, except von Waldeck who was director in the first two. All business was to be opened by the Elector, and assigned to the appropriate de- partment. The director was to present to the council a proposal previously criticised by the Elector, lead the voting, submit the result to the Elector immediately or privately, and supervise the R^J° r S ak 1 ’,r?^ Z -J erwalt -’ x - 316 ’ 318 ; Isaaosohn, Prensz. Be amt., IX, 111-116; Droysen, Preusz Polltik, III, pt. 2, pp. 50,51, * 23 execution of a favorable decision. The exact official relation of the Elector to the council is not clear. Bornhak says that the personal participation of the Elector in the consultations was confined to special occasions. Droysen asserts and Isaacsohn im- plies, that he regularly presided, opened and distributed the business, received reports, made proposals, held the vote and an- nounced the decision. The privy council became again mainly advisory, while the Elector decided, and the members executed his decision, a com- bination of collegiate advice, electoral decision, and individual execution. But this organization was rendered very ineffective by special missions, imposed upon some members of the council, and by the constant absence of the Elector. The withdrawal of the more experienced members for consultations, embassies, supervi- sion of reforms, mediation and other tasks, tended to burden the less capable with the direction of two or three departments, and the attendance upon as many more. These conditions reacted upon the council, in the attempt to equalize the work by giving each councillor, as far as possible, that with which he was most famil- iar, to make the division of departmental functions more in accord- ance with the needs of practical affairs, than with the demands of logic. The council also, as a body, continued to exercise pro- vincial functions in the Mark, in respect to taxation, adminis- trative disputes, and domain difficulties, while foreign affairs were managed by the Elector in his cabinet, with a few trusted Councillors . In October. 1652. the presidency of the council was provided for. Director Blumenthal assumed the direction of the division. ♦ ' ■ - 24 . presentation, and consideration of business, of assigning the work, and of maintaining discipline. After a vacancy of some years in 1656, or 1658 according to Bornhak, similar functions were dis- charged by Superior- President Otto von Schwerin. In 1660 von Som- nitz, a councillor, was made deputy-president. Thus, through this ordinance of December 4, 1651, and its modifications down to 1658, there was created an authority, says Isaacsohn, which in- volved the separation of military and finance administration from "privy affairs," the permanent organization of individual depart- ments, collegiate consideration of all affairs of counci liar com- petence, and the institution of a permanent direction within the council, which at the same time, assumed the obligation of medi- ation with the Elector. ( 11 ) Although it was sought to maintain the unity of administra- tion in the privy council, the referential and representative character of the directors of the departments, and the collegiate consideration and decision of all administrative questions, yet, on account of the consolidation of provincial administrations by the Great Elector and Frederick I, there gradually grew up new administrative organs for the whole state, unconnected with the privy council, collegiate ministries in connection with do- mains, police, general-commissariate, and taxation. The new de- velopment tended to reduce the privy council to much the same position as that of the separate central administrative organs for justice and the church, a collegiate ministry, a superior administrative organ only in the supervision of certain definite affairs • The administrative center of gravity was changing to the 11. Bornhak, Preusz. Verwalt. I, 318, II, 55; Isaacsohn, Preuss. Be amt., II, 250 ff., Ill, 9 ff. . ■ . . - 25 . new administrative authorities, to the destruction of the old, originally intended, position of the privy council. REFORMS OF DANKELMANN. This break in the unity of the central administration was per- ceived by Dankelmann, active privy budget and war councillor under Frederick III, president of the council in 1693, grand chancellor, superior-president and first minister in 1695. He sought to re- organize and expand the council, to establish regular meetings, joint discussion in the presence of the King, and division of res- ponsibility between the ministers. His attention was given to releaving the council of the local affairs of the electoral Mark, and to correcting the defective division of business. He reduced the number of members to twelve, incorporated the various new administrative authorities, and created a college of department chiefs. It, then, was possible for the council to give a tho- rough discussion to all matters assigned the new departments and to decide questions of jurisdiction. The department heads report- ed their affairs so as to elicit little debate and to make two or three meetings a week sufficient for the discharge of business, since daily sessions would interfere with the meetings of the var® ious departments. This plan was often interfered with, through the consideration of provincial and foreign business by the group of advisers in constant attendance upon Frederich, when abroad. Frequent meetings of the council nevertheless, took place under the presidency of the oldest member, and sought by correspondence to maintain personal relations with the Elector. ORDINANCE OF APRIL 3, 1713. Although during the first years of the reign of Frederick Wil- ■ liam I, the council was still considered the assembly of all res- ponsible department chiefs, and the King made constant use of the collegiate organization to work over his ordinances by aid of mature and trusted advisers and to find responsible instruments of execution, there intervened some important modifications. While at first, department leaders were to report their more im- portant ax fairs to the council for the King’s decision, and coun- tersign ordinances, decrees patents, rescripts, etc., later, the King passed directly upon their reports, leaving only general af- fairs to the debate and signature of the council. The ordinance of April 3, 1713. combined provincial and subject matter as the basis for the division of business. Each head of a department, presented the affairs of his jurisdiction, while to each was as- signed a territorial jurisdiction for the administration of feu- dal, dominion, and grace affairs, and to the council as a whole justice affairs. Thus, the council had the three-fold character of a state-ministry, an assembly of the heads of superior adminis- trative organs, the highest advisory body and jurisdictional court; of a superior administrative organ for feudal, dominion, and grace ax fairs ; and of a collegiate justice ministry for the administra- tion of justice as a whole, the presidents of the supreme courts at Berlin being admitted as reporters. (13) Two things, moreover, tended to give a new position to the privy council: the autocratic character of the King and the Hr* B ° r 2j ak > Preusz * Verwalt.. II. 56; Isaacsohn, Preusz. Beamt., Ill J 9 lx 4 y 12 13. Bornhak, Preusz. Verwalt. > II. 37; Isaacsohn. Preusz. Beamt., Ill, 50, 59, 116; Droysen, Preusz. Politik, IV, pt . II, 22-25. .. . 27 . bureaucratic consolidation of the special jurisdictional bodies. The King became his own minister of finance, foreign affairs, justice, etc., the supervising and determining center of adminis- tration. All military, provincial and foreign business were sub- mitted directly to his criticism, before being sent to the proper ministry for* decision and answer in accordance with the marginal notes. Only upon definite notice did he confer with his ministers. Further, he instituted a thorough and systematic reform of the state machinery, from the central government out. He exacted the same daily routine, order, and promptness, from all who served him, even the humblest. He was himself everywhere present, an- nually inspecting all the state institutions, examining accounts, noting all needs, making necessary provision for each state ac- tivity, the source of energy and initiative, the supervisory auto- crat over the whole state. ORDINANCE OF MARCH 27, 1713. The process of consolidation was begun in 1712, when the King was still crown prince, by the reorganization of the "general commissary," with its locals in the principal city of each pro- vince and the taxcommissioners in the circles. Then, by the ordi- nance of March 27 , 1713 , there were combined the superior domain and rega.lian administrations into the general finance directory, of seven councillors, and three responsible presidents, with seat and vote in the privy council, the presentation of department af- fairs to the King, and the right to countersign laws pertaining to their jurisdiction. There were daily sessions, collegiate de- cision, and local representation through the provincial government chambers, consisting of a president and six to eight councillors 28 . for finance, domain, and justice administration. With this reform, the organs of domestic administration consisted of the privy coun- cil for supervision of justice, feudal, dominion, and grace af- fairs, a nominal State’s ministry divided into subject-matter departments, with heads having direct proposal to the King; the general finance directory for domains and regalia; the general com- missary for military affairs, contribution, and excise; the gen- eral accounts chamber, under a controller-general in direct res- ponsibility to the King; three privy state and cabinet councillors, signing proposals, corresponding with envoys, assigning business and supervising the administration in the King’s absence; and three ministers, managing justice consistorial and feudal affairs. ORDINANCE OP JANUARY 24, 1723. (14) This organization lasted about ten years, during which the two finance departments developed much opposition, rivalry, and friction, due to the lack of well-defined jurisdiction, the pre- ference of the King for the general commissary, and the presence of the two discordant elements, nobles and citizens, in their mem- I bership. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to remedy these evils. Finally, the general commissary and the general finance directory were combined by the ordinance of January 24, 1723. into the general superior finance, war. and domain directory under the presidency of the King to include the entire internal administra- tion of military, police, and finance. There were five depart- ments, each under a minister in his turn chairman of the session B ?r« p reusz. Verwalt . , II, 59; Isaacsohn, Preusz. Beamt, III, 116-125; Droysen, Preusz Pol . , IV, pt. II, 349-351. 29 . of ministers and assessors, and responsible to the King. Seventeen assessors aided the ministers who filled vacancies from candidates qualified in character, general and special knowledge, and adminis- trative ability. The personal responsibility of minister, asses- sor and local official was especially emphasized for the introduc- tion of all documents before the directory and their presentation to the King, for department affairs and internal administration as a whole. It was the duty of the ministers to supervise the depart- mental officials and business, receive provincial reports, check up the war and domain chambers, undertake special commissions, pre- sent matters to the general-directory for its decision or that of the King, attend the four sessions a week at seven or eight in the morning, and forward to the King the minutes of debate, the deci- sions with reasons therefor, and all matters arising from disagree- ments or lack of instructions. The local representations of the general directory were the war and domain chambers, created from the local authorities of the finance and commissary directories, with provisions for membership similar to tnose of the general directory. The president exercised the same powers as the King and assumed the same responsibility as the five ministers of the general directory. He had charge of the business, the discipline, the reports to the general directory, and the appointment of members under the same instructions as those in the general directory. He was held responsible for the character and efficiency of his councillors, the effectiveness of the pro- cedure, the introduction of reforms, suggestions for more practical, plain, and accurate commissions, and for a wide personal knowledge of his jurisdiction. 30 . There were two departments in each chamber, that of domains for officials, forests boundaries and contributions; that of war for indirect taxes, commerce, industry, police, and military af- fairs. At the head of each was a director, the oldest being vice- president. Each was assisted by war and domain councillors, tax councillors and subordinate officials. CENTRAL ORGANIZATION, 1723-1740. Thus, the organization of the general directory for interior affairs was like that of the privy council during the first decade of the Great Elector. Its work was divided on two bases, subject- matter where no conflicts existed, and territory to solve problems of conflict. This organization remained during the rest of the reign substantially as first created. There were a few modifica- tions. The fifth department. April 5, 1739, was put under a jus- ticiar. A committee was organized, October 31, 1724, as a court of appeal and superior revision commission, the decisions of which were reported to the general directory, countersigned by the min- isters, published, and enforced. Besides the general directory the cabinet-ministry and the justice-ministry were especially prominent in the latter part of this reign. The former was the King in his cabinet for the con- sideration of foreign affairs which even under the Great Elector were not submitted to collegiate discussion in the privy council. The councillors, three in number after 1713, were known as cabi- net-ministers , their jurisdiction as the cabinet-ministry. They opened the correspondence, debated the business, acted as inter- mediary between the King and the foreign envoys, and assumed the responsibility for their actions. ■ 31 . The justice-ministry dates from the appointment in July, 1737, of Samuel von Cocceji, chief- justice , and minister in the general directory. He nominated to vacancies in his department, assumed responsibility for the administration of justice, supervised the various courts, called up cases on appeal for final decision, and presided over each justice college, when present. Under his pre- sidency judicial affairs were considered by the privy council, consisting for that purpose of the reporters of justice. This college, also, considered feudal, dominion and such grace affairs as did not come before the King in cabinet. The privy council, therefore, as a whole, no longer possessed any special jurisdiction. It now consisted of the minister of justice, the five ministers of the general directory, and the three cabinet ministers. Its competence extended to affairs affecting more than one of the three organs and questions of jurisdiction. This impaired its importance, though its main function still sub- sisted in name at least. It was a state ministry, embodying the unity of the state. But the administrative center of gravity had passed to the three special jurisdictions. It seemed, as Isaac- (15) sohn says, to maintain its collegiate constitution according to the ordinance of 1713, since at times all members in Berlin appear- ed for joint discussion and decision; but this was, to a large extent, a formality, as the settlement of the great mass of vital government business occurred elsewhere. The collegiate ministry, supposed to have been created by making the heads of departments privy councillors for the discussion and decision of all Impor- tant affairs, was constantly violated and gradually and vitally 15. Isaacsohn, Preusz. Beamt, III, 15-17. . s E ■ ■ 32. impaired by the personal interference of the King for the quickest possible settlement of business. Then each ministry was burdened with the current affairs of several departments, the King’s de- mands for plans of reform, and execution of approved projects to such an extent that it was impossible to preside over a departmen- tal session, report the business transacted to the King, and at- * tend more than one privy council meeting a week. Moreover, there was no object in referring to the privy coun- cil, affairs already collegiately considered in the several de- partments. Thus, the general directory especially impaired the Monday morning attendance upon the privy council. Finally, the subjects of discussion were much less numerous, with foreign affairs being considered in the cabinet, military and finance in the general directory and cabinet, there was left to the privy council only feudal, dominion, grace, boundary affairs and those of justice, the latter being mainly decisions on appeals from pro- vincial courts. A few hours usually sufficed for the presenta- tion, debate, and decision of thirty to forty such questions. The King seldom presided. In fact, the privy council was tending to become at most a department of justice and feudal affairs, its influence upon the general affairs of state being narrowed to de- cisions upon matters of controversy and jurisdiction between two or more departments, TIME OF FREDERICK II, 1740-86. (IS) Under Frederick II, the central organization remained, in 16 • Droysen, Preusz. Pol.* V, pt . 3, 26, 37; Bornhak, Preusz. Verwalt., II. 185-190; Isaacsohn, Preusz. Beamt., II, 211-253; 256-258; 286-288; 289-343; 360-393. .. . . pf ' . * 33 . theory, - as- it had developed under his predecessor: the cabinet, and justice ministries, and the general directory, united in the privy council through the membership of the ministers therein. But, in fact, great changes occurred through the increasing autoc- racy of the King, the importance of the secretaries, the conse- quent subordination of the ministers, the tendency of the depart- ments of the general directory to become independent, though Frederick’s great ability and close attention to business conceal- ed them. Three ministers, two for foreign and one for imperial affairs , continued, with two secretaries, to constitute the cabinet- ministry. But the initiation and conduct of foreign relations were with the King, and his cabinet- secretary, or councillor, Eich- el, the sole confident on important matters. The ministers were merely the executing authorities, carried on the current routine work with the resident and Prussian envoys, and occupied a second- ary position, often acting in complete ignorance of the concurrent correspondence of the King. The justice-ministry was still collegiate under the presidency of the chief- just ice, or grand chancellor, also, director of feudal and provincial affairs. But it began to develope independent or- gans through the nomination of presidents for the French and Luther- an superior consistories and the German Church directory who did not report to the collegiate ministry, though considered a part of it; but acted together on common affairs, as an independent cen- tral organ. Silesia was made judicially independent in 1768. On the other hand there were placed under the grand chancellor the commission on final judicial examinations in 1755, and in 1781, the law commission, to prepare new laws, give an authoritative ■ •*- , ; ■ 34 . interpretation in legal controversies, supervise the courts, and render opinions on new laws. The general-directory consisted at the beginning of the reign of four departments organized according to provinces or subject- matter, which were variously extended and reorganized to meet the needs of territorial growth, employ effectively special talents and promote efficiency. On June 27, 1740, commerce, industry, and intercourse were combined into a fifth department to which post and electoral Mark affairs were added in 1745 and colonies in 1747, being from 1749 to 1764 directly under the King, acting through a privy councillor. In March. 1742 Silesia was erected into a spe- cial department under a minister and a superior president with two war and domain chambers at Breslau and Glogau and corresponding justice colleges and consistories to meet the needs of incorpo- ration into the Monarchy. The Silesian ministry was co-ordinate with that of the general directory for a few days conference at the end of each year. By cabinet-order of February 8, 1746, magazine, provisions, mobilization, quartering, and allowance af- fairs were combined into a sixth department, the second purely subject-matter department. The first four departments were re- organized in May, 1748, partially introducing the principle of subject-matter divisions. Excise and customs were made the fourth department in 1766, and mines and mining a seventh, May 9, 1768. In 1771 a special forest department was created under a chief forest Master. Later, the chief revision college, the examination commission, and the building department were placed under the gen- eral directory. But other changes were going on in the general directory. ' . 35 . autocratic and bureaucratic as in the privy council. Individual subdepartments tended to become independent central organs im- mediately under the King. Collegiate deliberation suffered from the pressure of business and the defects of organization. The general sessions were primarily to settle jurisdictional conflicts, though subjects involving more than one department were, often, considered and settled by the interested departments. Conflicts were arising out of the two bases for the division of business, the uncertain relations between the departments and the war and domain chambers . The autocratic influences were, also, great. The King mas- tered and supervised everything, furnished the motive force, the knowledge of affairs, and the inspiration for all branches of ad- ministration. He was the point of connection, the central force, the responsible head of the state; his own minister in most de- partments, directly instructing the superior authorities, and re- ceiving their proposals and expressions of opinion. In some de- partments he took charge. His relation to the personal of his government was close and critical. Nothing escaped him, from the activity of the chambers and departmental councillors to the most insignificant irregularity of an official. The current condition of the financial administration of each province came under his observation and insight through the monthly reports of the chamber- presidents, his constant direct correspondence with them, and his numerous visits. Moreover, the long absences of the King operated equally to render ineffective any collegiate organization or dis- cussion, either in the general-directory or the privy council. The privy council still existed, but, as an active administra- ■ 36 . tive organ, had been rendered ineffective by the strong development of autocratic and bureaucratic influences. As a theoretical union of the various administrative organs it was still referred to and occasionally called into quasi-action. But its functioning was abortive. Without a decisive reaction in its favor, involving a complete reorganization of the administrative system, there seemed little hope of its revival; for a strong able King could do with- out it, and the attempt of a weak incapable ruler to restore it would depend so much on circumstances, not the least of which were personal, that his success would be uncertain. FREDERICK WILLIAM II AND HIS SUCCESSOR, 1786-1807. (17) In the reigns of Frederick William II and III the tendencies in the development of the central administration became very ap- parent, as both were wholly incapable of controlling the continued disintegration of the various organs of authority and preventing the transference of the center of gravity from the King to the small group of secret advisers, who had been the means of communication between Frederick and his ministers. This sinister development was the worst defect of that system which had gradually eliminated any organized unity other than that of a masterful able King at the head of the state. Theoretically, the privy council continued to be the sole organ of the central administration; but in reality it had disintegrated into three practically independent authorities: the cabinet -minis try, general-directory, and ministry of justice. The first continued in charge of the routine duties of for- eign affairs, and kept in touch with the envoys at home and abroad; but the King alone, or in conference with one or more of his cab- 17. Bornhak, Preusz. Verwalt, II, 309-313. # 37 . inet-secretaries conducted the foreign policy. The general-direc- tory still presented a semblence of collegiate action in its week- ly discussion of general financial affairs and those concerning more than one department, leaving all other affairs to independent departmental responsibility. Then the attempted coordination of provincial and subject-matter departments, tended to destroy the unity of administration, create endless conflicts of jurisdiction, and embarrass the subordinate authorities, especially the war and domain chambers. Finally, the tendency to disintegration was ac- celerated through the creation of the Silesian ministry till Dec- ember 3, 1799; the separation of the two Frankish principalities in 1795 under Hardenberg; the union of South Prussia with the Silesian ministry, till December 12, 1798; the assumption by the central authorities of the independent administration of the gen- eral salt monopoly from 1796 to 1805; the chief bank directory, general lottery and post-office to April 13, 1799; the superior war college, account chamber, and general road department. These grave defects did not escape the notice of Frederick William II and his successor. The former, with the best inten- tions, but waning zeal, attempted, immediately upon his accession, to restore the organization of the general-directory, revive col- legiate discussion of all important matters, and reduce minister- ial burdens by according the provincial authorities greater inde- pendence . The King was to approve all fundamental decisions, budgetary and other financial matters above a certain minimum; to decide all ministerial differences of opinion and summon the con- 18. Instructions, August 28, 1786. * . - ■ 38 . ferences. Some attempt was made to simplify the department di- visions. There were eight departments, five provincial and sub- ject-matter, and three subject-matter. Under Frederick William III, (19) it was prescribed that the weekly meetings of the full membership of the general-directory should consider general affairs and mat- ters involving more than one department. Despite these reforms the general-directory had become by 1806 very unwieldy and rather inefficient. It consisted, prim- arily, of six departments, three subject-matter and three provin- cial. Connected with it as a whole, were the building department, the chief examination commission for higher administrative officials the chief forest examination commission, general lottery adminis- tration, the directories for marine affairs and general coinage, the chief map and stamp chamber, the superior revision college and de- putation, and the commission for decision of jurisdictional con- flicts. There were, lastly, under the guidance of individual min- isters, the supreme college of medicine, sanitation, the general post-office, and chief bank presidency. The justice -minis try still consisted of the chief- justice, and three justice-ministers. To the chief- justice, or chancellor, pertained superior control of all affairs of justice, the nomina- tion of the department's officials, concurrent supervision of the administrative courts, the current chief provincial administration of justice the presidency of the law commission for the consider- ation of new laws and doubtful interpretation, and of the immedi- ate justice examination commission for higher judicial positions. 19. Instruction, March 19, 1798. ' . . .. T 39 . The first minister of justice had charge of feudal affairs, and the superior current administration of justice; the second and third looked after church affairs, except the Lutheran schools which were directly under the King, in addition there were three special jurisdictions: the superior presidency for the judicial system of Silesia; the temporary local judicial officials in Prance and South Prussia; and the military justice department, consisting of the Grand-Chancellor, the chief of the military general direction de- partment, and one of the justice- ministers for church affairs. THE CABINET COUNCIL. But another administrative organ was emerging to an important place in the central system. The most serious defect here was the lack of unity and responsibility. These had been sought in the privy council before it went to pieces in attempting to meet the exacting demands of territorial growth, foreign complications, and domestic problems. With the consequent multiplication of depart- ments and the increasingly independent relation of each with the King, the ministers were more and more confined to routine work and isolated from the head of the state, with whom communication was maintained through the cabinet-secretaries. These were the secre- taries with whom the King was wont to confer in the cabinet-minis- try on ma ^ters of foreign policy. Their employment having proven satisfactory in managing foreign relations, it was extended to other branches of the administration and gradually displaced the direct relation of the ministers to the King. Under a strong King the power of the secretaries was subservient to the head of the state, but a weak King was dominated by them. All decisions came to be made in the cabinet on their advice, although they assumed no responsibility commensurate with their great power. ' 40 . In the course of time under weak monarchs they became dif- ferentiated from the cabinet -minis try as an independent adminis- trative organ without legal standing, the cabinet-council. They partially met the demands for concentration and unity, which were lacking in the absence of a well organized privy council, or a strong King. T hey took the initiative in state affairs, determin- ed all matters of public policy. But the execution of such meas- ures and the responsibility therefor were put upon the ministers, who were remanded to a secondary position, communicated with the King in writing only, and had nothing to do with matters of policy as such, in this manner, therefore, a vicious institution had grown up which was serving to fill the real need of unity, its weakness was the strong organization of the central administrative authorities, and the inferior position of the cabinet-secretaries themselves. Yet it might show the way for a better institution, if constructive statesmanship should have to do with reforming the government . THE DEMAND FOR REFORM. But the government was not the only institution needing re- form. The whole Prussian state, social and economic, as well as political, needed a drastic and thorough going over to bring it abreast of the times. France, through its revolution, was setting the standard and sending out its disturbing influences throughout Europe. Silesia and the Prussian provinces were responding to them with insistent demands for the amend of deepseated and long persistent abuses. These were primarily social and economic; but a few demands were for governmental changes in the broad sense of the term. At the accession of Frederick William II, in 1787, the ■ 41 . call to render homage gave an opportunity to the provinces to ex- press through their estates or special envoys their demands for re- form. ( 20 ) In East Prussia the diet set forth a comprehensive program of popular participation in government affairs. The estates should be empowered to exercise control in public affairs and make known their complaints. Circle diets were to meet every year and pro- vincial every three years; both were to have permanent, standing committees, the latter meeting monthly and keeping in constant correspondence with the former. Of these demands only the perma- nent standing provincial committee was granted. There arose also 4 4.V.4 4 (21) In this reign a demand for a constitution. ( 22 ) When Frederick William III became King, the East-Prussian diet again set forth a series of reforms. None were political, though suggested by the King's request for the incorporation of the patrimonial jurisdiction into his new system of circle courts. But they show that the province was alive to the needs of the times and not discouraged by any rebuffs from the government. Another source of social and economic suggestion was the King's finance commission. Furthermore, the West, South, and New East Prussian provinces, through their representatives at Koenigsberg to do hom- age, approved in part of the demands of East Prussia. The same ( 23 ) social and economic unrest appeared among the peasants, coming to violent action in Silesia in 1793 and 1803. Lastly, the citizens 20. Lehmann's” Stein" II, 44. 21. Ibid., 34. 22. Ibid., 45 ff. 23. Ibid., 51. - 42 . of Memel, Thorn, Potsdam,, etc., were demanding the restoration of especially in urban financial affairs. ( 24 ) Despite these evidences of an intense desire for reform, Frederick William III and his cabinet held to the traditional the- ory of the state, autocratic and patriarchal. Peasant emancipa- tion on the domains was limited, general abolition of hereditary serfdom was opposed, admission of citizens to the provincial diets reiused, and education held in disfavor. The ministerial depart- ments were even more conservative, especially in respect to the emancipation of the hereditary serfs, abolition of the Guilds, and participation of the estates in administration. Further the ( 26 ) bureaucracy was in process of deterioration. For discipline, loy- alty, disinterestedness, industry and order, there was much igno- rance, indolence, corruption and inability. Positions were treated as if requiring just enough work to secure the stipulated pay, pro- motions, titles, and salary increases. The ultimate overthrow of such a system was due to the logic of events. Autocracy was more fictitious than real. The legal relation between noble landowner and peasant, common possession and villainage, tended to disappear with the use of money payments, the encumbrance and sale of estates, and the exchange of sovereign and patriarchal rights. This same process, also, affected the claim of the noble to freedom from taxes, based on cavalry service and monopoly of offices. Industry exceeded the bounds of the city; citizen and peasant were admitted to a share in government. This development was but hastened by the disasters of Jena and Auerbach. 27.* Ib^?? n 5.5” Steln ' ,f 11 ' svr'lir^bidireo" 26. Ibid., 53. . . ■ 43 . CHAPTER III — PRUSSIAN STATESMANSHIP. DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND MINING. Stein entered the Prussian service in 1780. After four years in the Mines and Mining department of the general-directory under Heinitz in Berlin, he went to Westphalia, as director of the mining administration, where he served for twenty years as director pre- ( 1 ) sident, and superior-president. Meanwhile, he kept in touch with Berlin through his seat and vote in the general-directory in the deliberations of which he took part the first of the year. His local jurisdiction covered the whole group of Westphalian provinces, in each of which he introduced and distributed the business, de- cided in cases of tie, countersigned all decisions, supervised the ( 2 ) revenue and made and submitted at Berlin an annual budget. In the meantime Stein was in many ways affected by the French Revolution. The Prussian lands west of the Rhine were lost by annexation. The campaigns against France imposed much extra work. The substitu- tion treaty of May 23, 1802, added new land to be organized. In all this work, Stein faithfully and ably discharged his duties, till his return to Berlin as minister in the general-directory in 1804. department of excise and factory, then of bank, marine, and salt. INFLUENCE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. Although during these twenty-four years Stein’s main con- * cern was with administrative measures, yet he was compelled to con- 1 . ------- Lehmann's "Stein", I, Inhalt. 2. Ibid., I, 55. 3. Ibid., I, 160, 167, 234, 236, 241, 377. , 44 . C8Pn himself somewhat with the general organization of the govern- ment, and the part the people might have in the admini strati on. His experience with the central administration previous to 1796 gave him no great confidence in accomplishing much in his greatly increased work and responsibility, even through the support of Heinitz, a situation he attributed to the unworthy place of the min- isters in respect to the King's cabinet. To his brother, February 8, 1797, he expressed his opinion that the ministers were limited to the role of first commissioners or clerks. Their position lacked respect, and the business of government lacked unity, which (4) conditions were in the highest degree inimical. His experience with local affairs led him to the question of simplifying govern- ment methods. In one of his instructions, as superior-president of Minden, he sets forth its advantages. Supervision will be easier, public officials less burdened by formalities and unneces- sary detail; attention centered upon subjects of general interest; and fewer officials, better chosen, and more adequately compensated, will be needed. POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT. Probably, Stein's most valuable experience was with the es- tates, especially those of Cleves-Mark, in ?/hich nobles, cities and peasants were all represented, the first having the majority, and precedence in the deliberations. There were periodic sessions, foi the grant of taxes and the making of laws, an annually elected deputation for current matters. As first director of the Cleves chamber in 1788, and first assembly commissary Stein had daily oper- 4. Lehmann’s "Stein", I, 175. 5. Ibid., I, 226. . . 45 . ation, experience, and work with popular government, in such mat- ters as, fortifications, military quotas, excise, roads, compul- . ( 6 ) sory industrial activity, etc. Here he began to form his views on the composition and competence, the rights and duties, and the relation of the estates to the bureaucracy, the people, and the province more clearly and definitely than on any other of his four points in this period. An estates assembly should be composed of large land-holders, noble, citizen, peasant, since such are influential and bound to (7) the state by indissoluable bonds. "The representation should be not very powerful nor numerous nor hard to influence." There should be an upper chamber of state officials, paid and permanent! As to competence he makes no objection to the grant of taxes, creation of funds, auditing of accounts, participation in lawmaking, and representation on official boards as exercised at Muenster and Paderborn. To Sack he writes that the estates must not be adminis- trators, but control, and act as a source of information. Else- where he says that the creation of provincial boards and the divi- sion of business among them is the uncontested right of the ruler. In an official report just before leaving Muenster in 1804 he mentions new provincial legislation, extraordinary monetary needs, representations concerning corporations and provincial affairs, and the management of certain administrative branches! The con- tested point seems to be participation in administration which he is inclined to concede. 6. Lehmann’s "stein", X, 97 253. 8 . Ibid., II, 217 . 9. Ibid., I, 253. 46 . The estates were to occupy a highly useful and necessary po- sition in the state. They were to inspire a common spirit of co- operation in the well-being of the whole community, to lay before the government the wishes and needs of the governed^ and to have the initiative in matters of national desire and need! One of the main reasons for their existence lay in their relation to the bu- reaucracy, as explained by Stein in his program of 1902, and let- ters to Schulenberg and Sack. Through them the administration was to win confidence, secure a legal source ^of information on local affairs and method of broadening its views,* administrative action was to be rendered more effective and energetic; the means was to be furnished of acquainting the inhabitants with the spirit and purpose of its measures, of acquiring and using the knowledge and experience of the great land-holders and business men, and of en- n . ^ „ (13, 14, 15.) listing the aid of public opinion. MINISTER AT BERLIN. When Stein left Westphalia for Berlin as minister, he ex- changed an intimate contact with the estate’s assembly for a closer view of the central government and its serious defects. These ad- ministrative difficulties were complicated by a rapidly developing menace from abroad. By the treaty of Basil, 1795, Prussia had as- sumed and was maintaining a neutral position in the struggle be- ( 16 ) tween France and Europe. The French Republic had yielded to the consulate and the Empire; Austria had signed at Campo Formio, 1797, 10. Lehmann's "Stein" II 217, 218. 11. Ibid., II, 419. I 'olq^ d ;’ h 2 ®?- B 13 - 14. Ibid., I, 262. 15. Ibid., Ll&I™h "StIin" r T Z i67 ahrbUe ° her - 29 ’ 1872 ’ 338 ’ 333> . . 47 . (17) and Luneville, 1801; the substitution treaty had been accepted; and Napoleon’s attack on England was resolving itself into a campaign (13) against Austria and Russia. Pitt was fanning the third coalition. Great pressure was being brought to bear upon Prussia to join, es- (19) pecially by the Czar when in Berlin, October 25, 1805. But Haug- witz had in view armed mediation between Napoleon and the coali- tion, as expressed in the Treaty of Potsdam, November 3, 1805. Then came Austerlitz, December 2, and the humiliation of Schoen- ( 21 ) brunn. In February the treaty of Paris definitely set Prussia ( 22 ) against England, and brought her within the English blockade. July, (23) 1806, Napoleon formed the Rhenish Confederation. Prussia’s posi- tion became continually more compromising, till it was rendered untenable, and isolated and unsupported she went down at Jena and (24) Auerstadt, October 14, 1806. The King fled eastward; the system of Frederick II collapsed; garrisons surrendered, officials took an oath to Napoleon, the larger part of the Prussian territory paid expenses of occupation and special war contributions. Stein did what he could to preserve the property of the Government, then retired to Danzig. Negotiations were opened for an armistice and ( 25 ) peace . Finally, an armistice, negotiated by Lucchesini and Zastrow at Charlottenburg , November 16, 1806, was submitted for ratifica- (26) (27) tion. At the ministerial conference at Osterode, November 21, 1806, Lehmann ' s "Stein ", I , 234 236, 241. 18 . Ibid. , I , 377 Ibid., I, 388. 20. Ibid. , I, 390. 21. Ibidl, I, 395. Ibid., I, 398. 23. Ibid., I. 415. 24. Ibid., I, 430. Ibid., I, 432 . 26. Ibid. , I, 436. 27. Ibid., I, 437. ' ' 48 . it was supported by all save Stein and Vosz with Beyine and Koeck- ritz, with whom the King sided. The main objection was the fail- ure to guarantee the Kingdom of Prussia. The King now repudiated Haugwitz and his policy and opened negotiations with St. Peters- (28) burg and Vienna. The post of foreign minister was offered to Stein, to be twice refused on account of a consciousness of his unfitness for the place and of seeming to endorse a system of gov- (29) ernment he had denounced without much hope of change. NEGOTIATIONS FOR REFORM. Through Niebuhr, December 3, Stein presented to the King his memoranda of April 27, 1806, and suggestion of the foreign ministry for Hardenberg. Negotiations followed for a council of ministers. The King offered, December 10, a compromise council of three members with a cabinet- councillor as secretary. Stein was joined, December 14, in further explanations by Hardenberg and Rue che 1 . On the same day the foreign ministry was offered Har- denberg who endorsed the council of three, without the cabinet- councillor. This stand meeting the approval of Stein and Ruechel arraigned them with Hardenberg, supported by the Czar, against (30) Haugwitz, Lombard, and Beyme , with the odds in favor of the former, when Zastrow arrived, December 17, with new proposals from Napoleon, prejudicial to Hardenberg. Under this influence and that of the cabinet-councillors Hardenberg was rejected as a member of the council. Stein then declared against the cabinet's underhand in- fluence, for the inclusion of Hardenberg in the council, and the _ 4 . (31) dismissal of Haugwitz, Lombard and Beyme. 28. Lehmann's "Stein", I, 440. 29. Ibid., I, 442. 30. Ibid., I, 442-45. 31. Ibid., I, 445, *46. f ■ ' STEIN'S DISMISSAL. The instruction for the council was drawn up December 17, 1806 the establishment occurred two days later, associating Zastrow, as minister of foreign affairs, with Ruechel and Stein; Beyme be- came secretary with limited functions. December 20, Stein refused a place on the council under such arrangements, the ?/hole question turning on the retention or dismissal of Beyme, as embodying the ideas of cabinet government and French alliance. The King refusing Stein's resignation, summoned him in vain to a meeting of the coun- cil to consider a certain payment to Napoleon, ordered by the King without Stein's knowledge. His persistent refusal of membership in the council brought upon him, January 3, 1807, a severe repri- mand from the King, to which he took exception. Thereupon, the King impatiently dismissed him from his service, January 4, 1807 • THE MEMORANDA OF APRIL 27, 1806. Thus, the some three. years of his first ministry came to an abrupt end under regretable circumstances; yet not unfruitful, even if the severance had been permanent. For, the fundamental defect in the Prussian system of government, with a remedy, had been point- ed out, discussed, and partly effaced. Though small headway had been made, nevertheless that was fundamentally sound. Three sources exist on the reforms necessary to make the government effective: the memoranda of April 27, 1806, negotiations with the King and Beyme, and his joint explanation with Ruechel and Hardenberg. The first, within two days after the ministerial conference on the im« ( 33 ) pending destruction of Prussia, briefly discusses cause and remedy. 32. Lehmann's "Stein," I, 445-52. 33. Ibid., I, 401. . - The government has its foundation in the privy council. This was superceded by the favorites under Frederick William II and the cabinet-secretaries under Frederick William III. The ministers propose and execute, responsible without power, the cabinet has all power, with no legal or public recognition nor responsibility. The former's dependence on the latter impairs their sense of honor and duty and renders impossible united action, subordination and obedience. The royal decisions are prejudiced by a too narrow en- vironment of inferior quality. The remedy is an immediate connection between King and minis- ters, legally and publicly chosen, definitely organized, and res- ponsible; each over one of the five ministries of war, foreign af- fairs, general police, public income, and justice; tranacting daily public business under the King's presidency and jointly advising him on all previously discussed public policies; signing and sever- aily^executing the cabinet orders, prepared by the cabinet-council- lors. Thus, stein correctly points out the difficulty and a work- able remedy; but is inaccurate in the importance given the privy council and the causes of Its decline. These date back to the time Frederick II or earlier, the autocratic and bureaucratic forces always antagonistic to collegiate organization. The negotiations with the King and Beyme deal with the evils of the cabinet, and the effectiveness of a ministerial conference to restore government efficiency, especially in his answers to Beyme 's offer of the foreign ministry, November 29, 1306, and his Plan of a ministerial 00 ^f^e, ^December 10. The responsiveness 34, Pertz -Stein, I, 333-37; Lehmann's "Stein," I, 401-405. . . I ■> !t ' ;t 51 . of the ministers to the changes of public opinion is the only new idea. A certain conformity to this influence is considered a de- (35) sirable quality to cultivate by ministerial encumbents. EXPLANATIONS OF STEIN, RUECHEL, AND HARDENBERG. In the explanations of Stein’s reform made the King, December 14, 1806, by him with Ruechel and Hardenberg, the object, respon- sibility, jurisdiction, organization, and order of business of the (36) council of state is set forth in more detail. The suggested re- organization is to make the King’s duties easier, introduce sim- plification, and unity into the administration, attain rapidity in the execution of important measures, create confidence at home and abroad and respect for the King, and secure his independence and the affection of his subjects. The ministers are to be held responsible for all matters requiring joint consultation and the King's assent, either of their own or other departments. The coun- cil is to consist of three ministers, war, finance and interior, and foreign affairs, or more at the King's "discretion", who are to keep in constant touch with him, except on journeys, when one on- ly is to accompany him; of substitutes chosen by each minister in case of absence ; other officials and councillors and persons oc- casionally summoned by King or minister as desired. All affairs must come finally before the council, except those of justice which may be presented to the minister of interior and finance. All questions of procedure, legislation, and important royal instructions must first be considered by the three ministers. Those matters needing the royal assent, are to be presented to the 35. Pertz-Stein, I, 349; 365; 366-68; 371; 376, 377; 386, 390; 566, 567. 36. Vorschlaege — Pertz- -Stein, I 377-381. ■ 52 . King at a regular or special time, determined by him, by the min- ister having them in charge in the presence of the others. Mat- ters that need preparation or further consideration by the higher officials, or immediate action, are to be discussed and assigned by the council itself. All exclusively departmental affairs must be considered in respect to the affairs of the other departments. NASSAU MEMORANDA, 1807. After his dismissal, Stein returned home, still thinking over the question of reform. The time was critical. Old Prussia had received a mortal blow. The ground was clearing for new institu- tions, though only a fraction of the territory remained. Under such circumstances Stein further developed his ideas in a document, "Con- cerning the Practical Formation of the Superior and Provincial Fi- nance and Police Offices in the Prussian Monarchy," a most notable work, though containing no complete program of administrative re- (37) form. A responsible council of state is to be substituted for the cabinet, in constant touch with the King, the point of union of the (38) various administrative branches. Centralization is further to be realized in a general state treasury under a special minister for , „ (39) income and expenditure, and ministerial credits. Special emphasis is placed upon the proper division of the state’s business into de- partments on the basis of subject-matter. This would improve ex- isting arrangements, procure more able men, make the point of view more comprehensive and the knowledge of principles more thorough and uniformity more prevalent, centralize the initiative and direc- 37 Lehmann's "Stein", II, 65. 38. Zweck. Bild., Pertz, I, 415. 39. Ibid., 422-24. .25 53 . tion of affairs, and create institutional unity independent of the King. In the examination of existing arrangements such improve- ments are suggested as the separation of worship and education, the independent administration of justice, and the substitution of cir- „ (40) cle courts for pa.trimon.ial, domain, and city courts. In discussing provincial administration, Stein approves the variety in it. the chambers aided by estates, the whole administra- tion under provincial colleges, with the estates as members, the participation of property owners in the administration through a committee chosen every six years, with renewals, by the provincial ciiet from which the King selects members of the chamber but with no share in considering public income, military affairs, police. He adduces many advantages from the presence of property owners in the service of the state: economy through fewer paid administrators; the knowledge and point of view of all classes; a lively, competi- tive, aggressive spirit; more loyalty toward the state; a national (41) sense of duty; profitable employment of powers otherwise wasted. The provincial diet was to consist of deputies chosen by the cir- cle diets. Their competence was to extend to control of educational and eleomosonary institutions, drainage, roads, waterways, internal ( 42 ) police, special funds. In the circle Stein preferred the more recent organization by which city and village were included in the same circumscription under an elected official known as the "Landrath." A diet was fa- vored y to consist of nobles, peasants and citizens in possession of 40. Zweck. Bildung, I, 416-22; Lehmann’s " Stein” , II, 75. 41. Zweck. Bildung, Pertz, I, 424-432. 42. Lehmann’s "Stein", II, 74. 43. Zweck. Bildung, Pertz, I, 429-30; Lehmann’s "Stein", II, 74. ft d 54 . property. The principal functions were to choose the "handrath" and the deputies to the provincial diet. In the municipalities Stein would have magistrates according to the population, unpaid and elected for six years, except the Rendant who was to have life tenure and a salary. The larger cities were to have, also a paid director chosen by the King from three candidates presented by propertied citizens. They were to be commissioned by the state. The electors were to be propertied citi- zens. A council, chosen by the citizens, was to confer with the magistrates on auditing accounts, leasing city property, etc. On the domains ana private estates the landed peasantry were to choose the village magistrate, or "Schulze" and court. The magistrates ana village court were to have charge of the financial resources for education, general welfare and other community needs; local ju- risdiction and police; orders of the central government; and bud- gets for the poor fund, and the income from church and community property. In the larger cities an annual statement of financial conditions was to be sent each householder and reported to the super ior audit chamber. Budget and audit were to be business of open sessions of the council. Both city and village were to come under the supervision of the chambers. National estates were to follow an interval of education in those of commune circle and province to confront the bureaucracy everywhere by popular institutions. Material was to be found in the educated and intelligent men of business capacity and practical understanding, with experience in the office of "Landrath, " in the (43) (44) 43. "Stein", II, 74. "Stein", II, 71, 74. . k ■ . 55 . fire-association, credit system, dy/ke inspections, charitable in- stitutions, and church corporations. These men must, also, possess property, landed or other kind, to qualify as political people, or ( 45 ) the nation, as Stein understood it. Thus far, Stein has three well defined political conceptions: the character of the central administrative organ; and of the peo- ple; and their part in the government. The first is a responsible collegiate council with subject-matter departments directly under the King to advise, execute, and supervise. The people are to act though advisory estates and limited membership on the administra- tive boards, with partial participation only in affairs of adminis- tration. Property and education determine the people that are to have a share in selfgovernment . All three ideas of collegiate ac- tion, popular participation, and property qualification are known to Prussia. That which was original with Stein was the manner and ex- tent of their combination and use. THE RETURN TO POWER- -1807. Meanwhile, Stein's friends v/ere working for him and the sit- uation was becoming more favorable, Niebuhr for his entrance into Russian service, Hardenberg, at head of foreign affairs since April 26, for re-entrance into that of Prussia, though without much en- couragement from the King. The alliance with Russia was renewed. Then, came Friedland and Tilsit, the alliance of Russia and France, with more humiliation for Prussia. Napoleon favored Schulenberg, Zastrow, or Stein, over Hardenberg. On July 6, 1807, Hardenberg proposed to the King to recall stein for internal, financial, and other affairs. The King consented to write Stein under pressure of 45. Lehmann's "Stein", II, 71, 76, 77. . . 56 . Napoleon's demand and that of public opinion; he advised him of Goltz's appointment to foreign affairs, Kn^sebeck's contemplated choice for military, and his for interior and finance. Others sug- gested making his own terms through personal negotiations with the King. Several appeals came from various sources to return and save his country. On receiving Hardenberg's letter, August 9, 1B07, Stein wrote the King he would accept any interior state service, without reference to his co-laborers, or other affairs, in a time of such great danger, thereby giving up Nassau and Russia for a (46) desperate struggle with Napoleon. Leaving Nassau, September, 1807, and consulting various per- sons along the route, especially in Berlin, he arrived in Memel on the 30th. At his first interview with the King, he was offered the department of civil affairs and demanded the discharge of Beyme . After rejecting Beyme 's offer to serve under him and the failure of the Queen to persuade the King to dismiss his favorite, Stein was brought to accept the compromise of Beyme' s present continu- ance in the council, with later entrance upon the presidency of the exchequer court at Berlin. The governing establishment then, con- sisted of a chief minister, Stein, spokesman to the King for the cabinet, the foreign affairs department, the general directory, an interior justice-ministry and a combined immediate commission at „ , J (47) Memel, and a commission for the treaty of Tilsit at Berlin. ECONOMIC REFORMS. On re-entering office Stein was confronted by many serious problems other than those of administrative reform, such as eco- nomic reforms, provision for ordinary expenses, war contributions, 46. Lehmann's "Stein", II, 88 ff. 47. Ibid., II, 101-108. ■ 57 . withdrawal of the French troops and rehabilitation of the evacuated provinces . For a long time East Prussia had been the seat of an agitation for freedom of industry and commerce, of land and soil, and individ- ual powers. Tbe war had brought freedom of trade. Both Schroetter and Schoen proposed the abolition of personal serfdom for the flow of capital to the land and national prosperity; Stein found much begun in his absence toward bringing about better conditions. These reforms he took up. Many were completed. The greatest was the Edict of October 9, 1807, a measure started by Schroetter and revised by Schoen, for freedom of peasantry and land. On November 24, he secured an extent! on of the moratorium of the previous Spring from business to landed property debts till 1810. In December, com- pulsory milling, brewing, personal service, and the tenth on sales was abolished on the domains. February 14, 1808, peasant property was subject to association or change into manor land. March 29, compulsory milling on private estates disappeared. July 27, Schroet- ter’s plan became law, changing domain peasant burdens, save those m kind to church, school, and charitable institutions, and general provincial, communal, and association burdens, into money payments, one fourth a landtax, the rest a gradually diminishing series of payments to 1832. FINANCIAL MEASURES. Next to correcting economic abuses Stein had to provide means for the daily routine of government and settle the amount and source of the payments to France, with an army of occupation, of- 48. Lehmann’s "Stein”, II , 268-327. _ ■ 4 58. ficials under oath to France, the revenue sequestered in the con- quered provinces, the free territory burdened with public debts, an unpaid Russian loan, and war expenses, no income from domains and forests, landtax, mines, or salt monopoly, current revenue con- fined to the excise, customs, stamps, and the Russian loan, with a deficit of twenty-eight per cent. The combined immediate commis- sion’s finance plan for August to December became the basis of Stein’s Plan of November 29, 1807. From January to April, 1808, the government ran without a budget. Then came the finance plan of February 24, providing more severe economies in the expenses of the King, his court, the civil officials and much more in military ex- penses. For the third quarter of 1808, Schoen, Klewitz, and Alten- stein drew up a plan, to cover, also, a deficit of the second quar- ter, due to the increase of French troops to guard the coast, cur- rency depreciation, and the failure of some sources of revenue, which Stein embodied, with the economies in military affairs, in the new plan of July 11, 1808. THE WAR CONTRIBUTIONS. The war contributions were a source of endless difficulties. The convention of July 12, 1807, provided for the evacuation from July 20 to November 1, and an accounting of the revenue on paymentof the contributions , and for support of the French troops, without determining the amount of the contributions, or the number of troops. This situation was complicated by new demands, hostility toward the leaders, and ill treatment of the King. Napoleon had fixed the contributions at 150,000,000 francs, made 154,500,000 by Daru to the Prussian peace commission^atjerlin, with the threat of prolonging 49. Lehmann's "Stein”, II , 136, 153, 154, 262, 263, 265. ' - ' - ' 59 . the evacuation, and the financial administration and confiscating the revenue since July 12, 1807, if the amount of the contributions were not determined by October 1, 1807. He, also, demanded an ex- tension of the occupied territory, possession of most of the do- mains, of several more cities, and the construction of four military roads. Stein argued that these losses would impair the means of paying contributions. Alexander advised him to yield at present, trusting to future concessions. In November, 1807, Prince William, sent to Pans to offer an offensive and defensive alliance and ter- ritorial compensation, with guarantees, for a reduction of the con- tributions, reasonable payment periods, and immediate evacuation, failed, since Napoleon refused to consider anything till the settle- (50) ment of the contributions. Against Daru's demands for 154,500,000 francs within a year, guaranteed by the most important forts, for part of the domains, maintenance of a small army, four military roads, and joint consider- ation of evacuation and claims, Stein offered 100,000,000 francs, within six years, two forts in Silesia, small garrisons with neces- sities, domain mortgages, and separate negotiations on evacuation and claims. By February, 1808 , only the amount of the claims and time of payment had been agreed upon. Stein, therefore, left for Eerlin with full power, February 29, to secure the advantages of a personal interview, public opinion, and immediate knowledge of the situation. While Stein’s policy was to prolong negotiations till a favorable turn in affairs and yield no more in the main points, Daru was so willing to negotiate and apparently so concessive, that, an agreement was arrived at to accept the French figures, concede 50. Lehmann’s "Stein", II, 114-126 ff; 146-152. ‘ . 4 ' ' . ' 60 . the Oder forts and military roads, account the revenue from July 12, 1807, and pay in cash, domain mortgages, and bills of exchange with- in a year, the evacuation being in proportion to the payments . But Napoleon held the amount of the contributions unimportant, the evacuation a political question to be decided by general conditions and policies at Paris and St. Petersburg, refused to account for the revenue since October 1, 1807, and demanded 50 to 60 million in ex- change within a half-year and specific guarantee of payment. Under these circumstances Stein returned to Koenigsberg, May 31 1808, to (51) meet a grave financial situation. Meanwhile, some evacuation had been going on, from Koenigs- berg, July 25, 1807, and from the rest of East Prussia in August, on the payment of the war contribution, partly in money, partly in promises. December 9, the French withdrew from the right bank of the Vistula. Ten days later Prussians occupied Grandenz and Mari- enwerder. January 16, 1808, the King and his court established (52) themselves at Koenigsberg. POLITICAL REFORMS. Amid these circumstances and activities, then, Stein worked up- on his administrative reforms. The documentary material consists of some letters to Schroetter, cabinet orders, reports, comments, plans, instructions, and his political testament; the Report of November 23, 1807, the Interim Plan of July 25^ and the Ordinance of November _24, 1808; and the city Ordinance of November 19, 1808. The first group are more apt to express Stein’s own opinions, since they were written by him for some specific purpose. The rest were largely put in shape by others, especially Schroetter of the East 51. Lehmann's "Stein", II, 223-260. 52. Ibid., II, 123, 130. / ■ . 61 . Prussian provincial department and Schoen of the Combined Inter- mediate Commission, and Altenstein, and though Stein put his final approval upon them, express more or less a compromise. This per- sonal element was reinforced by the exigencies of the times. Then, none of the three plans actually went into full and permanent oper- ation, on account of Stein's early withdrawal from affairs and Hardenberg's desire to carry out some ideas of his own. Finally, the reaction capture a Hardenberg himself and reshaped government institutions . The miscellaneous documents discuss various subjects pertain- ing to the reorganization of the administrative system, but offer no plan, except in the Comments of October 15, 1807, on Altenstein* s suggestions, including general and local institutions, and Stein's letter to Schroetter of June 27, 1808, which deals with the local institutions only. The various subjects discussed include: in gen- eral the Value ol Government Mechanism, Purposes of Government Or- ganization. Publicity of Government Affairs, Discharge of Govern- ment Officials; more particularly, the First Minister, Minister and Privy State Councillors, Ministerial Departments, Finance and Police Department, Justice-Boards, General and. Special Conferences, for the central organs; and the Superior President, War and Domain Chambers, Popular Participation in Government, Circle, Commune, and Municipal Constitutions for the local organs of the central government. Taken all together, they might be said to present a fairly well organized scheme of administrative reforms, although not so meant, since there exists no organic connection between the various documents . Of the three plans, the Report of November 23, 1807, was * 62 . drawn up by Altenstein from his Memoranda of September 11, Harden- berg’s of September 12, 1807, and Stein's of April 27, 1806, with Stein's Comments of October 15, 1807, on Altenstein's Suggestions. When finished, November 23, and December 27. 1807, it was entitled, "A Plan for a New Organization of the Business Methods in the Prus- sian State." The original draft was modified from suggestions of- fered by the King, Beyme , Hardenberg, etc., and Stein himself. Two obstacles were offered to the full carrying out of the provisions: refusal of the King to preside made impossible the crown council and necessary a first minister; failure of the people to second es- tates representation rendered popular participation in the govern- ment ineffectual. To the first minister Stein objected the limita- tions of an individual, the far reaching effect of his failures, despite increased power and unity, and urged the more steady course bf affairs and the various points of view of collegiate organiza— (53) tion. At the head of the administration was the King's cabinet, con- sisting of the minister of finance and interior, acting as first minister, of foreign affairs, war, and justice, with presentation within their jurisdiction; and of privy state councillors at the head of subdepartments. Departmental divisions were according to subject-matter. There were conferences of ministers and privy state councillors of finance and interior; general control over the de- partments through the first minister; general conferences, presen- tation in the cabinet, and special cooperation of certain depart- ments. Learned and technical commissions existed. Superior pre- sidents were kept, as a point of union and source of advice and 53. Lehmann's "Stein", II, 370-373; 405, '06; '15, '16. . . , 63 • control, one each over the three military districts and Berlin, with full conference at Berlin; and war and domain chambers, divisions according to subject-matter, jurisdiction over all finance and in- terior matters, president, directors, councillors, conferences, (54) technical commissions, estates representatives. The Organization Plan of November 23. 1807, was not carried out, due to the course of foreign affairs, the smallness of the ter- ritory and the expense. Consequently, a temporary arrangement was made, the Interim Plan of July 25, 1808. This, after discussing the purposes of government, provided for a cabinet; ministers and privy state councillors; general conferences; general treasury; general finance and police, provincial justice, excise customs salt and stamp, general post, foreign affairs, church school and charity departments; auditing department; military commission; bank and maritime affairs; war and domain chambers; justice boards; circle, commune, and municipal constitutions. Stein was head of general fi- nance and police and presided over the general conference, as first (55) minister . This arrangement continued during Stein's incumbency. But, when Stein found his position as first minister attacked, he sought to retain his power by modifying the Interim Plan, October 28, 1808, in favor of a less prominent position in the government. In place of the first minister there ?7as to be a privy state council. Part of the councillors were to have departments, the rest general work or special commissions. Among the latter Stein was to watch over (56) the administration. This modification did not succeed. But before 54. Lehmann’s "Stein", II, 373-404; Stein’s Bericht, Nov. 23, 1807, II, 648-69. 55. Lehmann’s "Stein", II, 421-434; Interim Plan, July 25, 1808, II, 117-128. 56. Plan of October 28, 1808, II 263; Lehmann's "Stein", II, 578-79. 64 . his final retirement the whole system of administration was reorga- nized. Ihe ordinance of November 24, 1808, covered much of the re- port of November 23, 1807, with more detail and some important chan- ges. It opens with a discussion on the purposes of governmental or- ganization and the position of the King. There is a large council of state, divided into a cabinet of ministers and state councillors, ana five departments of interior, finance, foreign affairs, war, and justice. Provisions are made for privy state councillors to aid the ministers ; departmental conferences, boards , finance and subordinates; inter-departmental relations; a superior audit chamber, state book- keeping, examination commissions and appointments; technical com- missions; methods of legislation; a central treasury; war and do- main chambers and popular participation in government. The two most striking changes are the cabinet as a part of the council of state and the omission of the superior presidency. Finally, there was the City Ordinance of November 9, 1808, providing a comparatively extensive sphere of urban activity. Work on this began soon after Stein's return from Berlin. From material, submitted by Vincke, Frey, and Stein in his Nassau Memoranda and his comments on Frey's suggestions, Schroetter and the provincial department reported a plan which was criticized by Frey in two memo- randa and by Schoen and the combined intermediate commission; dis- cussed in general conference in respect to the general law, the po- sition of the magistrates and state supervision in finance; signed ( 58 ) by Schroetter and Stein; and approved by the King November 9, 1808. 57. Ordinance of November 24, 1808, II, 689-737. 58. Lehmann's "Stein", II, 448-85. . - ■ - 65 . The city ordinance discusses the purposes of such an ordinance, the necessity of representation, and the character of popular ad- ministration. Provision is made for a magistracy and council, re- gional directors, deputations and commissions, a local police board; inter-departmental relations: unpaid public officials. Refusal to assume public office, or dismissal therefrom are considered. Rules for legislation, citizanship and citizens’ rights and state control (59 ) defined. MAIN AND SUBORDINATE ADMINISTRATIVE CENTERS. In the scheme of organization of these documents, the basis is the four principles. Unity, centralization of authority and res- ponsibility, pervades the whole system. The ordinance of November ( 60 ) 24, 1808, states that "The administrative organization will have as its center an organ in immediate subordination to the head of the state" which "will not only supervise, but take a direct active part in the administration," to create "the greatest possible unity ana energy. 1 ! The administrative subdivisions have also their cen- tral organs. The departmental divisions of the central organ act each as a unit on all questions within their jurisdiction, as Stein expressly states when he says, that the "Privy state councillors as a ?/hole constitute, under the presidency of the minister of fi- (62) nance, a council." ’Between the central and local organs of the central adminis- tration connection is established, the least complicated and most energe tic ... .securing in each province through supervision. .» .wide Ausgewaehl te Urkunden* 59. Al tmann,^ 1897 , Theil- II, 4-34. 60. Pertz-Stein, II, 689. 61. Bericht, Nov. 23, 1807, II, 643. 62. Ibid., 650. ■ - 66 . powers of execution. .« .impartial and energetic control ... .and a (63) sure source of information and advice." Further on Stein says that "it is especially important for several administrative branches to have a common organ for supervision and execution within such sub- (64) divisions as provinces. This inter-connection is the superior presidency, strengthened by the provision that, "the superior pre- sidents assemble every year at Berlin on a day to be fixed.... to on kindred subjects and attend departmental and council] ar (65) deliberations as advisors." Within each superior presidency there was to be one or more ( 66 ) centers, to unite intimately connected branches, eliminate fric- tion and neglect, and produce inter changable support and energetic J 67) . ' (68) action. Here was disposed of overlapping matters, new regulations, subjects pertaining to several departments or involving fundamen- tal principles, and reports to the higher authorities, with all ar- (69) rangements of the same. Within a province each circle in its "Land- rath", each rural commune in its "Schoeffen", and each municipality in its council found the central organ of administration. INDIVIDUAL AND COLLEGIATE ADMINISTRATIVE CENTERS. Unity of administrative activity, centralization of authority and responsioility, might be lodged in an official or a college of officials, or both, to fulfill all conditions of effective and united action, though in discussing the advisability of entrusting the supervision of the administration to a first minister or a council of stats. Sbein says, that "by means of the first minister more energy and unity are secured. .. .but the failings of the indi- 63. Bericht, November 23 660. 66. Ibid., 657. 69. Ibid., 668. 1807, II, 657. 64. 67. Ibid., 661. 68. Ibid. 65. Ibid., Ibid., 667. * ' ' ■ . . ' 67 . vidual have a too powerful influence upon affairs, while the colle- giate conduct of business assures a more stable procedure, freedom (70) from haste, and a greater variety of view-points," apparently pre- ferring more deliberate action from discussion upon different sources of information, than rapid decision ; and this in the department where we believe rapidity, decision and expedition are the highest qualities. But Stein's central organ was also an organ of deliber- ation, the King took an active share in government, previous ex- (71) perience seemed to confirm faith in collegiate administration, the Prussian tradition favored it, and military affairs were in the hands of the King, while finance did not require rapidity of deci- sion and action. Moreover, Stein would compromise by entrusting re- construction to one man and ordinary administration to a council (72) dominated by a president of preponderating influence. FIRST MINISTER. In the attempts made to create a ministerial system with unity, initiative, decision, responsibility and direct relation to the King Stein employed both individual and collective organs, supported by various inter-departmental relations. Of the individual officials (73) the most important was the first minister, in times of crisis do- minating, but ordinarily limited by a council of state under his presidency, though powerless to entertain complaints against his person or administrative methods. He, also, had direct charge of (74) the department of finance and interior. His colleagues were privy state councillors of his own nomination, to secure better disci- (75) (76) pline . He was to attend the sessions of the bureaux when necessary. 70. Pro Mem., II, 31. 71. Pro Mem., II, 31. 72. Ibid. 73. Interim Plan, II, 119. 120; Pro Mem., II. 54, 31: Bericht, II, 648; Vorschrift, II, 131-34. 74. Ibid. 75. Ibid., 643. 76. Pro Mem., II, 34. * . 68 . (77) The range and. variety of his functions in many respects re- produced those exercised by Stein when rehabilitating the monarchy. He would be in immediate connection with the King on all matters of state business, guide the deliberations of the cabinet, be pre- sent at the presentation of reports, present reports on all general matters and those of his own department. He would be at the head of the department of the interior, participate in such delibera- tions on foreign and military affairs as were general or bore di- rectly upon internal affairs, exercise control over the immediate commission, the treasury administration, bank and marine matters. He would control and supervise the other departments through refer- ence to him of their difficult problems, his power to demand any necessary information, and to draft instructions with the royal as- sent. The department of internal affairs was the basis of his power, from its intimate connection with the other branches of administra- tion. Therefore, its head was so situated, with his intimate con- nection with the King, appellant jurisdiction in administrative problems, power to acquire information, and to draft instructions, as to centralize the administration very effectively. The picture is, however, very imperfectly drawn and filled out only in part, being found only in a few references in various documents, mainly connected with the establishment of Stein’s own power as first min- ister. PRIVY STATE COUNCILLOR. A modification of the position of first minister was sketched v ( 78 ) by Stein in the Plan of October 28, 1808, when he realized that his 77. Bericht, Nov. 23, 1807, II, 648; Pro Mem., II, 31; Bericht, Oct. 3, 1807, II, 626; Cabinet Order, Oct. 4, 1807, II, 627; Vor- schrift, Aug. 25, 1808, II, 130, 131-34; Interim Plan, July 25, 1808, II, 125, 126. 78. Pertz-Stein, II, 263. ■ 69 . enemies were working to secure his retirement. He was to retain a comparatively inconspicuous position where he might direct the ad- ministration according to his ideas. "My place would be," says he, among the privy suate councillors (without a department )... .1 woulc. be able to act through participation in the deliberations of the council of state and making proposals therein, through suggestions on the maintenance of just principles of administration, and the as- sumption and execution of important commissions. I would be sum- moned to take part in the cabinet discussions of important affairs. I would preserve over men and affairs a definite influence, based upon the confidence of the King, the consideration accorded my pro- posals, and the assent to my principles of administration given by persons attached to me." This position corresponded in many respects to that of Beyrne and Lombard against which Stein contended so persistently. Both depended upon a definite, recognized status, participation in de- liberations of state affairs, initiating state business, maintain- ing principles of administration, executing important commissions, regular connection with the progress and men of affairs. Both Stein and the secretaries would, in dependence upon the King’s fa- vor, exercise the normal functions of their office, and influence the whole range of administrative activity. But they differ in mo- tive and duration. Stein sought disinterestedly to render the greatest possible public service without intrigue, relying upon the confidence of the King, consideration for his proposals, agreement with the men in power, and their personal attachment. Then, this arrangement was to meet a stress of circumstances of short duration. It was not to Stein's liking; but considered the better of two , i mfcj J . 70 . evils . SUPERIOR PRESIDENT. Next after the head of a department, a central organ of unity for the affairs of his exclusive jurisdiction is the Superior Pres- idency, of which the purpose, position, districts, and functions ( 79 ) are set forth at greatest length in the Report of November 23, 1807. ( 80 ) There are three reasons for its existence: to furnish more effi- cient administration of affairs involving several chambers, to pro- cure more accurate information on local affairs for the central government, to supplant formal, distant by strict and energizing contact with local organs. It was to take the place of the central (81 ) provincial departments. The territorial area corresponded to that ( 82 ) of tne military districts and the city of Berlin, four altogether# In the discharge of his functions, he was permanent commis- ( 83 ) sioner for the central departments, presiding over the estates, ne- gotiating with the military, looking after war operations and de- fense, conferring with post and tax officials j the supervisory (84) J authority over the local organs, attending the sessions of the cham- bers, initiating important measures, supervising the subordinate authorities personally or by means of reports: and the advisory (85) J authority on all important matters, endorsing or protesting the re- ports of the chambers, forwarding data, reports, and other useful information. Prom some points of view it might be argued that it was an unnecessary office, as the same ends might be accomplished by a chamber of larger territorial jurisdiction, by combining two or more chambers for common affairs, or referring them to the cen- Ttn Pe ^ z " stein » H> 645. 80. Bericht, Nov. 23, 1807, II, 645: 657- o58. 81. An Schroetter. June 27, and Aug. 25, 1808, 671, 675. ?!o lcht ’ Nov * 23 ’ 1807 ’ 645, '57, ’58. 83. Bericht, Nov. 23, 1807 II, 658. 84. Ibid., 659. 85. Ibid., 660. . . ' 71 . tral administration. But, as the feasibility of any arrangement depends on local conditions as much as on principles, the fact that the superior presidency now forms a part of the Prussian system in- dicates the usefulness of such an institution as a guarantee of ef- fective administration and ascertainable responsibility. CIRCLE-COUNCILLOR . The possible third case of an individual centralizing organ is the circle-councillor, over a subdivision of the jurisdictional area of the cnamber, to which he is directly responsible. From the data at hand it cannot be definitely stated just what was Stein’ idea. Yet, he endorsed him as executive authority for the circle and as an elective official, in the Nassau Memoranda of June 1807^ n (87) In a letter to Schroetter of June 27, 1808, concerning the ” organ- ization of the provincial subordinate authorities f ,' when discussing some plans submitted by Landrath von Itzenplitz and Graf von Rhe- din on the organization of the circle, he indicates that his duties ( 88 ) are executive,* when discussing von Vinke’s suggestion of modelling the circle authorities on the English system of justices of the yeace, he distinctly favors the idea, but points out certain dis- advantages of its present introduction: the difficulty of secur- ing qualified men for circle-councillors on account of inexperience and small interest in public affairs of the cultivated classes; and the need of a radical change in the present legislation. (B9) Further, in this letter, Stein's criticism of the character and position of the circle-councillor, submitted by Schroetter, seems to favor an unpaid official over a small district, well sup- T?- «v? tZ " S po In nh 429 ‘ 87’"ibZd"'ir’672. 88. Pertz-Stein, il, b/3. 89. Ibid. . " . 72 . plied with subordinates and connected with the estates, so arranged as to lead ultimately to the incorporation of the English system of (90) justices of the peace. "There must be given to the circle-council- lor circle deputies in large numbers as aids with concurrent author- ity and exclusive power over several administrative branches. The other administrative matters are reserved to be shared by the cir- cle deputies, especially those exercised by the English justices of the peace and adapted according to our laws to that end." These references, then, seem to indicate the circle-councillor as, at least tentatively, the centralizing organ of the circle. This view is (91) strengthened by the power given the chamber to summon annually or at special times, the circle-councillors of its jurisdictional area to discuss functional questions, receive oral instructions, and con- fer on uniform methods of execution, thereby recognizing the cir- cle-councillor as embodying the authority of the circle and dis- charging the representative function before the government super- visory organ of the circle. DISTRICT-MANAGER. Below this point, there are two individual centralizing or- gans, one each in the municipality and the rural commune, as may be inferred from their position and functions, though Stein nowhere mentions them as such. The first of these is the di strict -manager . (92) According to the Municipal Ordinance of 1808, "he is to be a resi- dent householder of the district, enjoying the respect of his fel- low citizens and combining experience in affairs with public spirit and sagacity. He is to be chosen by the city council for a term of 90. Pertz-Stein, II, 675. 91. Bericht, Nov. 23, 1807, 666, 670. 92. Altmann A. u. II, 24, Sec. 163, 164. .. ' 73. six years and confirmed by the magistracy. He may resign on com- pleting one half his term, if necessity or desire compel him. Neither pay nor remuneration for outlay attach to the office. In case of sickness or absence his duties are discharged by a resi- dent representative, also, chosen by the council. He is in intimate connection with the city council which chooses him, the magistracy which confirms the choice and of which he is a subordinate administrative organ, and the deputations and commissions whose instructions he is to enforce and to which he is to refer his difficult problems of administration, while all au- thority from above is exercised through him, he is the center of admini strati on within his district. Not only local affairs, con- ducive to health and comfort and best administered in small areas, but, also, affairs of interest to the .city as a whole, are to en- gage his attention. Police regulations, local public institutions, and the protection of the community are in his hands. Difficult problems are to be referred to the appropriate deputation or com- mission. He, therefore, embodies unity in his official capacity, a center towards which the lines of administration converge and from which radiate those of authority. Within his jurisdiction he represents that union of administration which is absolutely neces- sary in any effective political system. VILLAGE MAGISTRATE. The last example of unitary embodyment of authority and res- ponsibility is in the commune . Here, again, stein is not very ex- plicit. He asserts that the^rural communes are to have a suitable system of government and ruler;" and more specifically that the "ar- 93. Interim Plan, July 25, 1808, II, ‘ * T - • • - ' — 7TT” rangement of the magistrate in the rural districts is very impor- (94) tant," hut that the "present constitution is not very well known to rue, yet the oilesian, with which I am better acauainted seems to me (95) to have very much good." His conclusion is that "the Silesian system ox magistrate and court, to which are assigned the policing of the village and fields, the execution of sovereign commands, and the exercise of certain branches of local jurisdiction, appear to (96)" me very suitable for rural communes. Though lacking in detail, this is a very emphatic endorsement of a local official’s concen- trating in himself local authority and responsibility, COUNCIL OF STATE. The second method of embodying unity, responsibility, and au- thority is in collegiate organization, considered superior in re- . , (97) spect to progress, momentum, points of view, and deliberation. In the central administration collegiate organization occurs in the council of state and the cabinet, in the subordinate, in the war and domain chambers and the magistracy, and in conferences in va- rious parts of the administration. The purpose of the council of (98) state is set forth in several references. It is to form a point of union for the whole administration under the King, a clearing house for the government, an immediate connection between the head of the state and heads of the organs which guide, supervise, and control the state government in its entirety, bringing him into relation with all the public servants to the lowest provincial incumbent. It is to lighten the pressure of business upon the King, extend his horizon by contact with men of affairs, broaden his impressions and An J ohroetter, June, 1807. I, 428. 95. An Schroetter, June 17, II, 674. 96. Nassau Memoranda June, 1807, I, 428. 97 Pro 5oo.* , T °5 t *, 15 > 18 °7, II, 31. 98. Vorschrift, Aug. 25, 1808, II, 1^8; Interim Plan, II, 124; Bericht, Nov. 23, 1807, II, 649. . . * ■ , 75 . decisions and thereby increase the royal prestige and independence (99) and public esteem. Heads of departments will unite in a suitable organization, receive a public legal appointment, assume the res- ponsibility of supervising, controlling, and executing affairs final- ly decided upon by the King, a position of power, effective acti- vity, responsibility, trust and confidence, encouraging self-respect, sense of duty, broadness of view, thoroughness, healthfull rivalry, resourcefulness, and progressiveness, a spirit of obedience and loyalty from their subordinates. The composition of the council of state varied from time to ( 100 ) time. In the Exposition of April, 1806, the membership is to con- sist of the five heads of departments and the grand chancellor* in ( 101 ) the Suggestions of December 14 1806, of the three ministers with an advisor each, their officers and councillors, and such as the King or any one or all of the ministers might invite; in the Report ( 102 ) of November 23, 1807, of the four ministers with their privy state (103) councillors; in the Interim Plan of July 25, 1808, of the ministers each with a councillor from his department, the councillors of the general department, the chancellor with his councillor, the heads of the two subdivisions of military affairs, and on invitation, the heads of the subdivisions of the other departments; in the Repula- (104) tion of August 25, 1808, of the personnel of the general finance and police department and the heads of the other departments each , , (105) with an advisor therefrom; in the Plan of October 28, 1808, of the the ministerial heads of departments, and privy state coun— (106) cillors; and in the Ordinance of November 24, 1808, of the King, 99. An Beyme, Nov. 29, 1826 I. 366-68. 337 . 1C1 . Pertz-Stein. I, 379, 381. 103. Ibid., 126. 104. Ibid., 128, 130. 106. Ibid., II, 690, 692; 694. 100. Pertz-Stein, 102. Ibid., II, 649. 105. Ibid., 263. I, 336, 76. royal princes, ministers, privy state coiincillors , heads of military affairs, privy legation councillor and privy councillor of justice, and ex-ministers. The permanent elements were ministers and privy state councillors of finance and interior, with a councillor from each department. The occasional members are the royal princes men- tioned twice, heads of military affairs thrice, privy legation coun- cillors and the privy councillor of justice, twice each, ex-minis- ters once, their inclusion depending on the size of the council and the advantage of their presence. The element of flexibility is se- cured through the right of King and ministers to summon additional members, such as they think proper. The organization was very meager, as the formulation of mat- ters for presentation and finally for execution were done, the first by the initiating department, the other by the special privv coun- ( 107 ) J cillors. The only officers mentioned are a chairman and a leader* . (108) and none save a special committee. The King presides and chooses (109) a substitute when absent. Each member of the council may initiate business, the head of finance and interior presenting matters for .. T . (110) the King as well as for his own department and all general business, and being present at the introduction of all matters. All important matters must be introduced personally, other matters by cabinet councillors and submitted to the chairman accompanied by written opinions, and a full report satisfactory to the ministers. Matters , „ (HD efore the council were referred to one representative each from the 2£ di ?o?o e 0f N ? V * 24 ' 1808 ’ 11 ’ 694 • 108. Vorschrift of Aug. 25, 1808, II, 131, 156, 694. 109. Ibid., 643, '48, ! 90 f 93. IT thrift , Aug . 25, 1808, II 131, 133; Bericht Nov. 23, 1807, 11* lm o^o^ 17 25 ’ 1808 ’ 11 ’ 125 * 111 • Veraend. Ver- TT 1^0 n^L^’r 1 ? 08, 11 ’ 694 ; vorschrift, August 25, 1808, il, 132, 130, 134; Interim Plan, July 25, 1808, II, 225,126. * ' 77 . interested and allied departments, then to the department of fi- nance and interior; hut in case of the latter and the King's initi- ations the order is reversed. Matters involving two or more de- partments only are to be settled by representatives of those depart- ments, or by special conferences thereof, or by the general con- ference . The debate in the council was opened by the representa- tive of the interested department, followed by those of the allied departments, then became general, everyone being urged to partici- pate, until a full, clear and decisive conclusion. Most of the mem- bers had a vote. In case of a tie either the head of finance and interior decided, or it was negatived. The King's decision is de- livered orally to the council, drawn up in proper form, and entrust- ed to the interested department for execution. All matters during the whole procedure ?/ere carefully recorded. The functions of the council were both political and adminis- ( 112 ) trative. It determined under the King the policy and exercised a supervision and control over its execution through heads of depart- ments and superior officials and periodic reports. It enacted, amended, and repealed laws; decided departmental and inter-depart- mental matters, doubtful points of interpretation, and cases sub- mitted by the King; considered appointments and salaries, military affairs, foreign relations, general police, public income, and jus- tice; and made rules of order. Many of these functions were en- trusted to an inner circle, the cabinet of the Ordinance of Novem- ( 113 ) ber 24, 1808, consisting of the ministers, privy state councillors, two heads of military affairs, etc. 112. Veraend. Verfass., Nov. 24. 1808. II, 694, 698, 692, 693; Interim Plan, July 25, 1808, II, 125; Vorschrift, Aug. 25, 1808, II, 130, 136. • ’ o 113. Veraend. Verfass., Nov. 24, 1808, II, 695, 696. - ■ ' . 78 . WAR AND DOMAIN CHAMBERS. In local government the principal collegiate organ of unity and responsibility^ was the war and domain chambers for delibera- tion and execution. (115) The membership was to consist of the superior president; a president; two directors; councillors; and estates representatives who participate in all the business, rank immediately after the di- rectors, possess a full vote, serve on conferences with the coun- cillors, and as representatives or co-representatives in the ver- bal or written presentation of business or the expression of opin- ion. The chief forester, stallmaster, consistorial, health, forest, and school councillors and circle-councillor attended annually. Appointments were mainly with ^president of police, dismissals regulated by special rules; revenue collectors were to have scien- tific and financial^ training, and practical knowledge of taxation. Popular re rpsentatives were to have a prominent part in all the work of the war and domain chambers as a counter-poise to the bu- reaucratic element. The superior president visited, supervised and directed sever- al chambers, investigated their procedure, forwarded their reports, decided certain cases. A president of each controlled and guided the procedure and looked after the presentation of business. Two directors had immediate charge of the departments, as many as those of finance and interior grouped into two sections, each consist- of estates representatives, councillors and assessors, holding meetings for discussing their own jurisdiction. Each branch had a n^ 0 L 1 richr d B^:g, t ? 8 ^ p .T!.r!!"L t !:.r!!. o r d P" bllc OOP. II,’ 671’. A 115t 8 Berieht, 2 Hov^23 8 'l807 fiRS^fiRfi 6 ^* June 27 ’ 1808 fter, Aug. 25 , 1808, II 679. llT^Lelg;, i&f; 79. respond and hold interviews with other authorities. Subjects con- cerning more than one division or involving the administration as a whole, reports to superior authorities, and matters pertaining there- to, were to be presented to the college. Technical deputations ex- isted where necessary. Provincial consistories, school concessions, scientific and health authorities, post and excise affairs were con- (118) nected with the chambers. Matters were to be considered in division and conference. The latter met once a week and at call of the president, who was held for the presentation of all the business. The same was the duty of the directors, also, at the meetings of the divisions, once or twice a week under the chairmanship of the president. Both, also, were to preside in the subdivisions. Interdivisional rela- tions were tote maintained only by frequent conferences, and per- (119) sonal discussion. "The functions of the chambers include all subjects of finance and internal administration within the sphere of the minister of finance and interior, as far as possible." In some cases the cham- bers acted under the superior president. In Berlin they supple- mented the functions of the police-directory and superior presi- dent. Control, also, was given them over technical management. Connection with the corresponding central organs was maintained by the presence In the chambers of directors of the former with a vote and seat. Special technical deputations corresponded to those (120) of the central administration. 117. ( continued) An Schroetter, Aug. 25, 1808, II 671. 118. Be- richt, Nov. 23, 1807, II 665-668; An Schroetter, June 27, 1808, II, 671; Aug. 25, 1808, II, 677; Pro. Mem., Oct. 15, 1807, II, 35; In- terim Plan, July 25, 1808, II, 121. 119. Bericht, Nov. 23, 1807, II, 669; An Schroetter, June 27, 1808, II, 671. 120. Bericht, Nov. 23, 1807, II, 662-64; An Schroetter, Aug. 25, 1808, II 677-79; (Con. . - * . , ' - - — — — 80 . "MAGISTRAT" The third collegiate organ of unity was the municipal "Magis- trat.*’ Its purpose was one with that of the whole municipal organ! - y JL W ala M sati on . S ^6 in s ideas on its constitution varied. In the memor&n— ( 122 ) da of June 1807 he condemns an elective salaried" magistrat" of per- manent tenure, in favor of an elective body of local propertied burghers, of six years tenure, without pay, except the treasurer, a life official. This choice would be confirmed by the central gov- ernment. The number of members would depend on the size of the city. (123) In a letter to Schroetter of July 17, 1808, he suggests a mayor chosen for a term by the central government, as well as a treasurer, syndic, city president, auditor, and board of public works; or the last four officials elected by the burghers under the approval of the central government. The whole body of the "magi str at '’might con- sist of ten members. The most elaborate presentation of the con- ( 124 ) stitution of the "magistrat "is in the City Ordinance of 1808. It was to consist of citizens only, men of insight and business ex- perience of at least twenty-six years. The treasurer must possess property. Twelve year members were to devote their whole time, six year part time to the work. The former must pass an examination. Close relationship by blood or marriage is forbidden. The chief mayor is chosen by the central government from three candidates pre- sented by the council, the other members by the council, confirmed by the provinial police authority. A small city had a paid mayor 120, (continued) Interim Plan. July 25, 1808, II, 121. 121. Bericht gv. 1, 1808. II, 683-85: Staedte-Ordnung, von 1808, Altmann, II, 25, * Pertz -Stefn, I, 428. 123. Pertz-Stein, II 681- 1808 18 ° 8 ’ 11 ' 682, 184 * Staedte Vdning von Mi . . 81 . and councillor as treasurer with four to six unpaid councillors; increased in a middle class city by a syndic and from three to six unpaid councillors. The large city had a chief mayor, four or five paid councillors, syndic, treasurer, with twelve to fifteen unpaid councillors. Both classes of councillors might be increased. Paid members devoted their whole time, unpaid served part time. Salaries were fixed by the council. Paid members were eligible for re-election, or for a pension at a half to two-thirds their salary* (125) Very little is said about organization. It is to be inferred that the mayor presided, or the oldest learned councillor. Pub- lic business was to be assigned to heads of departments; certain matters to deputations and commissions of the magistrate councillors, and citizens under control of the "magi str at'.' Routine work was done by a body of permanent paid officials, chosen by the magistrat. (126) The "magistrat "was the executive, the first authority in the city, under the provincial police authority. It had initiative in legislation, appointing power, reception of petitions, general ad- ministration, admission of citizens, registration of landholders, bestowal of artisan privileges, control of public treasures, ex- amination of officials, audit of accounts, general supervision and control . INTER- DEPARTMENTAL RELATIONS. (127) Unity in the third place was to be inter-departmental. The ministers maintained inter-relations through the council of state, personal communi cat ions and conferences. Certain matters must be 125. Altmann, II, 21, 23, 26, 27; An Schroetter, July 17, 1808, II, 681. 126. Bericht of November 1, 1808, II, 685; Altmann, II, 19- 32. 127. Vorschrift, August 25, 1808, II, 136-138; Ordinance, November 24, 1808, II, 698-731. • Jl . t . . . 82 presented in the council of state for the royal approval: legisla-: • t'" j tive enactments and changes, general regulations, modification of fixed rules, budgetary matters, exercises of the prerogative of grace Affairs common to two or more departments were submitted to special conferences between the departments concerned, with final reference to the council of state, if necessary. Between one minister and another the dealing was direct. Each department might enter into joint action with any other on matters within its jurisdiction, as foreign affairs with industrial police, the grand chancellor, gen- eral police. The same applied to the subdepartments of finance and interior. This relation was specified in detail or stated in very general terms, as general police was to work with industrial police, public health, public worship and instruction, while industrial police was to act with the other departments. The enumeration of relations was not to prevent other joint action if necessary. CENTRAL AND LOCAL INTERRELATIONS. (128) The connection between the central and local organs of the central administration was primarily through the superior presidents, by means of reports and annual and special visits to Berlin to con- fer with the central authorities and among themselves, and by a close relation with the chambers of their jurisdiction, residing at the city of the chief chamber, visiting regularly the others, draw- ing their secretarial force therefrom, availing themselves of the advice of the councillors and estates representatives. Another (129) connection existed through the chambers. Each chamber acted as a l2 8. Bericht, Nov. 23, 1807, II, 645. 129. Bsricht. Nov. 23, 1807, II, 662, 664, 650-53, 662-664, 669, 666, 670; Ordinance, Nov. 24, 1808, II, 705, 721, 713. - * ■X * . ♦ - • - - 83 . consistory, school authority, mining deputation, provisional health authority, local organ of domains and forests, and of general police and finance. The chambers might act in the name of, or upon the commission of, the superior president in direct connection with the central authorities, were to admit to a seat and vote a represen- tative of the central organ of certain branches of administration, such as, mines and mining, excise, forests, post affairs, etc., and to maintain a close connection with the central deputations through corresponding local organs. On the other hand the relation be- tween the chambers and the circles was through the circle -council- lors, who were to meet annually, or oftener, with the chamber of their district, discuss their special work, receive verbal instruc- tions, and confer among themselves on matters needing uniformity. The relation between the city and the central government, as stated in the Report of November 1, 1808, and the city ordinance of (130) the same year, W as that of supervision over its constitution, re- sources, and accounts, to protect the state and compel the obser- vance of the law. It involved the state’s aquisition of informa- tion on city affairs, confirmation of ordinances and choice of mem- bers of the "magistrat" , settlement of grievances, control of the "magistrat" for police purposes, and reception of reports. This gave many opportunities for interference with municipal affairs. DEPARTMENTAL DIVISIONS. (131) The second principle Stein applied in his administrative re- 130. Pertz-Stein, II, 685; Altmann, II, 5. 131. Bericht, Novem- ber 23, 1807, II, 644, 661, 668; Pro Mem. Oct. 15, 1807, II, 32; Anzeige, Sept. 26, 1808, II, 242; Interim Plan, July 25, 1808, . - . 84 . form was that of departmental individuality; that effective adminis- tration was dependent upon a separation of public affairs into well marked divisions, each under an individual official, constituting a whole as well as a part in relation with the other divisions and the subordinate authorities. Of the two bases of division, subject- matter and territory, the former seemed preferable, '^here were five different plans of division, three defining interior and finan- cial affairs and implying three other departments, and two giving (132) a more extended survey, the one as far as the war and domain cham- (133) bers, the other no farther than the central administration, but (134) very minutely. The plan suggested in the memoranda of June, 1807, is wholly confined to the general directory. There are two chief divisions, income and police, each consisting of four subdivisions on the basis of subject matter. (135) In the Comments of October 15, 1807, published soon after Stein entered office a second time, the general directory has be- come the finance and police department, the same two main divisions as in the nrevious plan, with similar subdivisions. The Interim (136) Plan of July 25, 1808, also made at the time of the French occupa- tion and temporary in character, provided for a first minister in control of the whole administration, as head of interior affairs. The general directory of the first plan and the finance and police department of the second became the general finance and police de- partment of the third, embracing everything save foreign and mill- £ps 132. Bericht, Nov. 23, 1807, II, 648-69.. 133. Ordinance, Nov. 24, 1808, II, 689-736. 134. Pertz-Stein, I, 420-22. 135. Pertz-Stein, II, 32. 136. Pertz-Stein, II, 112 ff. . “ - . ■ 85 . tary affairs and justice. This plan was actually in operation only a short time. (137) The Report of November 23, 1807, of which the previous plan was the practical application, included, as well, the superior pres- ident and war and domain chambers. There were four departments, finance and interior, foreign affairs, war, and justice, at the head of each a minister, that of finance and interior being the leader. This department was divided into eight subdepartments, each under a privy state councillor, and two subdivisions . A similar arrangement is observed in the war and domain chambers . But the most elaborate organization plan, though confined wholly to the central adminis- (138) tration, is the Ordinance of November 24, 1808. There are five de- partments, interior, finance, foreign affairs, war, and justice, with audit and technical administration depending directly upon the council. In the interior department there are six sub departments , one under the minister and five under privy state councillors; in finance three similarly arranged. This plan seems to embody Stein’s final idea of the best organization. His successors adopted it with modifications. Finally, departmental organization was employ- ed in the municipalities, as shown by scattered references as well (139) as the provisions of the City Ordinance of 1808. TECHNICAL COMMISSIONS. (140) The third principle to be applied in the reforms was that of technical deputations for the central and provincial administra- tions. In the former provision was made for seven deputations of 137. Pertz-Stein, II, 648-69. 138. Pertz-Stein, II, 689-738. 139. An Schroetter, July 17, 1808, II, 681. 140. Anzeige, Sept. 26, 1808, II, 242; An Schroetter, Aug. 25, 1808. II, 677; Ordinance of Nov. 24, 1808, II» 708, 'll, } 19, >20, >27/30. . 86 . Domains and Forests, Trade and Industry, Mines and Mining, Pub- lic Health, Instruction, Works, and Agriculture. The general cha- racter is vaguely described. The membership consists of scientifi- cally trained men, practical men of affairs, men from various other departments, state officials, and cousulting members, occasionally admitted for special advice. Their functions involve the investi- gation of their line in its bearing on public affairs, the offer of expert advice on request or their own initiative, the discharge of commissions on short notice, reports on condition of their depart- ment, cnarge oi educational institutions, and examination of can- didates for departmental positions. To each deputation is given unrestricted access to all the information, resources and assis- tance of its own and other departments. The matter of organization is rather vaguely hinted at in various expressions, but never tho- roughly explained. Finally, a deputation may be called upon to furnish aid to departments other than its own. (141) Similar deputations were to be established in the war and do- main chambers where circumstances permitted and need demanded. The necessary arrangements were to be made for their correlation with those of the central government. The necessary data were to be furnished by the war and domain chambers. Periodical conferen- ces for deliberation or instruction, or special meetings with the chamber were to be held. POPULAR PARTICIPATION- -THE ESTATES. The fourth principle of organization is that of popular parti- cipation in government affairs. The anplication of this is not elab- orated to any great extent, except in the City Ordinance of 1808. 141. Bericht, Nov. 23, 1807, II, 668, 670; Ordinance, Nov. 24, 1808, II, 720. *- . . . 87 . A few times in the various documents of the period mention is made of it, hut mostly to explain its usefulness, rather than to define its application. Yet, some few applications are made. Estates ^ . ( 142 ) representatives are to be admitted to the lav/ commission, to have a practical par uicipation and influence upon the administration, full charge of the business adapted, to their capacity, and advise and cooperate at the request of the superior president. They are to have a proper share in the activities of the chambers, partici- pate in all their business, rank next the directors, possess a full vote, serve on conferences, make verbal or written presentations of (143) business or expressions of opinion. Intelligent, experienced citi- zens make better estates representatives than learned men. Law- yers should be as few as possible. No salary should attach to mem- (144) bership in the estates. The principle of national representation should be firmly established before organizing the people in the (145) chambers. A representative system to give the nation a real par- ticipation in legislation, should be included in a general plan for (146) civil administration. Every active citizen possessing land, or interested in agricultural, industry , or commerce, has a right to ( 147 ) representation. These all refer to action by the estates or through representatives thereof on some administrative board, such as the chambers. The notices are disconnected, brief and touch on only part of the application of this principle, 142. Pro Mem. Oct. 15, 1807, II, 35. 143. Bericht, Nov. 23, 1807, II, 647, *57, '61, '62, *65, ’66. 144, An Schroetter, July 17, 1808, II, 680. 145. An Schroetter. June 27, 1808, II, 672*1 146. Anzeige, Sept. 26, 1808, II, 242; Stein's Pol. Test., II, 311. 147. An Schroetter, June 27, 1808, II, 674. . - 88 MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS. Popular participation acts, also, through city government. Ex- cepting the City Ordinance of 1808, there are some references in other documents, There are to be an elective "magistrat" of defi- nite tenure, secretary, and treasurer, citizens* representative for advice and control and defim Lte regulations . All permanent re- sidents are to have a share in the city government, except those guilty of crime; even widows managing their husbands’ business par- ticipate. Artisans should be preferred over the learned, and law- yers excluded as far as possible. The "magistral" is to consist of several members with limited tenure, except the rendant and syndi- cus ?/ho hold for life. A city president is to be chosen by the King for six years. There should be ten councillors, at least, for a better division of business. The council is to control property and finance, charity, education and police. The citizens choose the "magistrat", free the city from the tutelage of the chambers, take an active part in city administration, supervise expenditure, exact (149) an audit. They have the whole administration of their common af- fairs. The State guards its own interests and the administration (150) of the laws, keeps order, and looks after the city property, com- missions magistrates, and decides disputed points. The council, consisting of citizens chosen for three years, makes administrative regulations, chooses officers and controls them. The "magistrat" has the whole administration, under which the district president acts. Special affairs are entrusted to deputations consisting of members of the "magistrat "and citizens. The "magistrat" acts, also, 148. An Schroetter, July 17, 1808, II, 680-82. 149. Anzeige, Sept. 26, 1808, II, 243. 150. Report of Schroetter and Stein, Nov. 1, 1808, II, 685. . : . * . ' 89 . as a state board for police. These references contain many provisions of the City Ordinance of 1808. The "magistrate , council, district president, deputations are all mentioned, with their jurisdictional spheres. The politi- cal people are indicated with some definiteness. The part the cen- tral government is to play is outlined. The whole exhibits a gov- ernment of the citizens under state supervision. Much freedom and many privileges are accorded with strict regulations for their en- joyment . (151) According to the City Ordinance of 1808, a citizen is one who possesses citizen rights, capability to pursue an industry and pos- sess landed-property within the city's police-district, to take part in the election of councillors, hold city offices, and enjoy the honors incident to administration. They are bestowed upon householders of good character engaged in industry, by the "magis- tral" with concurrence of the council, on oath to maintain this or- dinance, further the best interests of the city, contribute to its maintenance, assume a share of its burdens in public office and per- sonal service. Citizenship is lost by changing residence or leav- ing ?d.thout naming a substitute or being guilty of some criminal (152) offence. The "magistral" consists of paid and unpaid members from the citizen body, serving tvrelve, six, or three years: a mayor and treasurer with four to six unpaid members in small cities; the same plus a syndicus with seven to twelve unpaid members in a mid- dle class city; and a mayor, one or two learned members, a secre- 151. Altmann, II, Staedte-Ordnung, Sec. 14 — 39. 152. Altmann, II, Staedte-Ordnung, Sec. 140, 157, 127, 169, 170, 174, 175, 177, 178, 189, 118 . . . . t‘ 90 . tary of construction, syndicus, and treasurer with twelve to fifteen unpaid members in a large city. The mayor or eldest learned member presided. Paid members were chosen and might be increased by the council and provincial police board from substantial citizens over twenty-six, except the superior mayor, chosen by the King from three candidates submitted by the council. The salary is determined by the council. The twelve-year officials receive pensions. The "magistrat" has general jurisdiction of all the affairs of the com- munity; and oversight of the whole administration and such special branches as involve peculiarly law and constitution. It is respon- sible for national laws; has the initiation of regulations; con- firms the membership of the deputations, the "magistrat", and dis- trict presidency, with a voice in choosing the citizen-members of the first, attends to all complaints, bestowals of citizenship, maintenance of the citizens-roll ; affairs of industry and transpor- tation; the treasury, budget, and audit; and the work of the depu- tations . (153) The membership of the council is determined by the "magistrat" within the number prescribed for each class of cities, with alter- nates up to a third of the councillors. The choice is by districts, every citizen on the roll, drawn up by the "magistrat" and appro- ved by the council, being compelled to vote and to accept office from his district. The tenure is three years with renewal by thirds. The time, place and manner of the election is determined by the "mag- istrat", The choice is by plurality. No salary attaches to the po- 153. Altmann, II, Staedte . Ordnung, Sec. 70-107; 117; 113-116; 119-121; 124; 129-132; 122, 123, 126, 127; 133-138. . ■ 91 . sition, only expenses and social standing. A president and secre- tary are chosen annually by the council from its members, ^here are monthly meetings, with special sessions for urgent needs. Citi- zen and councillor have the initiative, ^-wo-thirds form a quorum for discussion and decision. Committees may be named. Attendence on the sessions is compulsory. Decision is by absolute majority, the president having the casting vote in case of a tie; all deci- sions are to be signed by the president, recording secretary, and at least six other members before being sent to the "magistrat . " (154) The members of the council have power to act in the common interest on all municipal affairs and bind the citizens in respect to the common property, rights, and obligations. The council may impose upon the citizens all extra expense and burdens and author- ize their collection; create additional paid members of the "magis- trat" with approval of the provincial police body; choose in the same way the members thereof, except the superior-mayor where they submit to the King three candidates for his action; criticize the "magistrat 1 s" choice of its subordinate officials; to determine the salary of its paid members and its officials, choose the district- leader and his alternate; introduce changes in standing arrangements select members of the deputations and commissions. The council is to cooperate with the provincial and police boards only in case of conflicts between them and the "magistrat" and its deputations. All financial matters come in one way and another within its juris- diction from the budget to the audit. 154 .Altmann, II, Staedte-Ordnune?, Sec. 108-110; 111; 125, 127, 145, 152, 153, 157; 158, 163. 164, 170, 175; 177, 188; 183; 184. V 92 . ( 155 ) The district leader is to be a local resident in good stand- ing, chosen by the council and confirmed by the "magistrat" for a term of six or three years, without pay or immunities, and replac- able by a specially chosen substitute. h e serves as an under offi- cial of the "magistrat" , within his district, looking after police ordinances, streets, bridges, wells, watercourses, lighting, night watchmen, public places, safety institutions, and all public af- fairs, referring to the proper authority defects he cannot remedy. All administrative matters are cared for by deoutations and commis- (156) sions, made up of councillors and citizens, or members of the "mag- istrate, chosen by the council and confirmed by the "magistrat", without salary or other remuneration. The tenure of citizen mem- bers is six or three years. The oldest member or the "magistrat" member presides. Each has an equal vote, the president deciding in case of a tie. The deputations and commissions include within their jurisdiction church affairs, schoolmatters, charity, fire-associ- ations, security institutions, sanitary police, transportation, treasury, weights and measures, and service affairs. (157) Local police matters are placed in the hands of a special police board or the mayor, to act with higher police authorities, as organs of the central government. The expenses are to be paid (158) by the citizens. The central government exercises supervision over the city’s constitution and resources, by examination of accounts, reception of petitions, enactment of new laws, and confirmation of (159) members of the "magistrat". Both the "magistrat" and the council 155.Altmann, II, Staedte-Ordnung, Sec. 163, 164; 182. 156. Ibid., 175-77 ; 181, 185-186; 179; 180." 157. Ibid., Sec. 166-168. 158. Ibid., Sec. 1-2. 159. Ibid., 170-173. 93 . may initiate new laws. In the case of the latter the bills go to the magistral and with its opinion to the local police board for confirmation, if involving fundamental laws, constitutional pro- visions, regulations, etc. Other affairs may be confirmed by the "magi s tr at " alone . CIRCLE-COUNCILLOR . The third institution of popular participation in government (160) was the circle-councillor. Stein says very little on the subject. He discusses a conference of the circle-councillors in the Report of November 23, 1807, and several plans in a letter to Schroettsr of June 27, 1808, in which he inclines to favor the English justice of the peace system and its gradual introduction into Prussia; but the obstacles to its immediate adoption seemed to him insuperable. This official already existed in the Prussian system as the elec- ted representative of the circle-diet in which the nobles predomi- nated. He was held responsible for affairs in the circle and came under the chamber^ jurisdiction. As Stein assumes his continuance, it seems a fair assumption that his representative character will be continued. CONCLUSION. The organs of popular participation then, are the estates, provincial, circle, and eventually national, with their deputies in the chambers and the law commission, the circle-councillor, and in tne municipality the "magistrate , council, district-manager, deputations and commissions . The people might take part in govern- ment directly by choosing members of the estates and the municipal 160. Pertz-Stein, II, 666; 672, 673. ■ 94 . council, or acting on these various organs as members; or indirect- ly through the members elected or otherwise chosen. The estates were made up of three classes, nobles, peasants, and citizens who chose some of their number to act in the chambers and commissions. In the municipality one class only existed, that of citizen. Here, the council was elected and chose the members of the other organs itself or in conjunction with the "magi str at" . The state exercised over all this popular participation a strict control. The duties, especially in the city were compulsory. The activities permitted were incorporated into the existing administrative system as a check and a source of information over against the bureaucracy. Most of the services thus rendered were uncompensated. The persons admit- ted to this participation were supposed to be well enough off to give the state a portion of their time and services. For, Stein’s political people all had one characteristic in common, that of property, either landed or otherwise. During this period of service in Prussia, Stein had, there- fore, worked out his principles of government in respect to the cen- tral and local administrations and popular institutions, and at- tempted to give them practical application in some form. In this he was not uniformly successful, elaborating more minutely the in- stitutions of unity and departmental individuality, than those of technical administration and popular participation. Even then, the circumstances were so heavy against him that his work was very materially modified. Most that he will henceforth have to say Tfill be about imperial organization and popular participation. Tech- nical commissions cease to engage his attention. The needs of the empire appealed to him most strongly till the reactionary success . 95 . at Vienna. During the later years local popular institutions ab- sorbed most of his interest. SECOND DISMISSAL. ( X6X j Meanwhile, the successful popular uprising had occurred in Spain, July, 1308. Count Stadion and Archduke Charles of Austria began preparaiions against France. Stein then decided to ally with Austria, appeal to England for a loan and subsidy and interest Rus- sia and Poland. Scharnhorst, Gso.eisenau and Stein began prepara- tions in Silesia. The whole matter, with advice to join Austria, was laid before the King by Stein in July and Gneisenau in August, 1808. But he preferred to await results or ally with Russia. Yet, the patriots persisted in their plan to arouse and lead a na- tional insurrection against France. The state of affairs^n Spain caused Napoleon to withdraw from Prussia French troops, and check any tendency toward independence by demanding increase of war con- tributions, shorter times for payment, recognition of new Spanish King, joint action with France against Austria, limitation of arma- ments. But the news of French defeats and the alliance of Spain and England determined Stein to stand by the March convention, re- call Prince William, let Austria in on the negotiations with France and inform Russia of the injustice of the French demands. In September, 1808, the Czar was appealed to. He promised aid at Er- furt. But Napoleon had obtained Stein’s letter to Wittgenstein on a public loan with an exposition of the plans of the patriots, forced Prince William to sign a new treaty in August, 1808, and warned the King to let Stein go. At first both were of the opinion 161. Lehmann's "Stein" II. 548-562. 162. Ibid., 564. 163. Ibid., 569. .... . ; ! ’ t 96 . that he could remain if excluded from foreign affairs. Again, the Czar was appealed to. Later, Stein, under the conviction that he could not remain, published, September 26, 1808, for his succes- sors, the fundamental principles of the new administration; yet, assured Russia of Prussia’s immediate assistance on the first hos- tile step, and continued to further the popular uprising in Ger- (164) many. On September 29, 1808, the new treaty was ratified by the King without Stein’s knowledge. Stein proposed a modification in the organization of the central administration to provide an un- obtrusive place for himself, October 28, 1808. But by November 7 (165) ’ 1808, he was demanding his dismissal, as his work was nearing com- pletion and no attention was paid to his suggestion of October 28. Nevertheless, his advice was still followed in state affairs, though the King communicated through writing or a third person, or acted independently . Then the queen joined the opposition be- cause of his dissent to a visit to the Czar on the ground of ex- ( 166 ) pense . This extensive opposition at home and abroad now became irresi stable and finally brought the King to dismiss him, November 24, 1808, on the grounds of state necessity. A council of state was organized under Altenstein and Dohna in which Stein put some of his friends. Then, he drew up his political testament and depart- ed from Koenigsberg, December 5, 1808, to seek refuge from Napoleon. IN AUSTRIA. (167) On December 11, he was in Berlin, considering residence at Breslau, when he was warned of his proscription by Napoleon, Dec- ember 16; on January 5, 1809, he decided to flee to Austria, and 164. Lehmann’s "Stein”, II, 576. 165. Ibid., 580. 166. Ibid., 59. 167. Ibid., Ill, 13. ■ ( 168 ) 97 . appealed to the King for financial aid. On his arrival in Prague, January 16, 1809, he secured permission to reside in the Austrian dominions at Bruenn. His rather cool reception was due to his radi- calism and the anxiety concerning the possible attitude of Prus- sia toward the impending hostilities with France. For Berlin had been denouncing him at Vienna as a radical. March 27, 1809, the Austrian leaders with popular support declared war upon France • Hostilities forced the retirement of Stein to Troppau, July, 1809. In November he returned to Bruenn after the peace between Austria and France, October 14. Under the watchful care of etternick, Stein took up his res — (169) idence in Prague, June, 1810, where he corresponded with the Prus- sian leaders, and made suggestions to the Austrian concerning many matters, but without success. The Dohna-Altenstein ministry ^was inclined to continue the Austrian alliance^ pay little attention to the internal reforms; and met its overthrow at the hands of the Queen on the ground of alienating land in Silesia in payment of the French contributions. In the Spring of 1810, Hardenberg became chancellor and first minister under the approval of Napoleon* _ (171) On May 28, 1310, he published his financial plan. The opposition of the nobles and bureaucrats necessitated the support of Stein’s party. Sack was won, but Schoen and Niebuhr criticised the plan. Not being able to come to an agreement, Niebuhr, Schoen, and Har- . ^ (172) denberg appealed to Stein in June, 1810. In his reply, August 2, 1810, Stein endorsed Hardenberg’ s ministry. Much to his dissatis- 168. Lehmann’s "Stein", III, 19. 169. Ibid., 41, 42, 45, 52, 54. 170. Ibid., 54, 56. 171. Ibid., 57, 59, 61. 172. Ibid., 63, 67. W 98 . faction, however, he failed to win over Schoen and Niebuhr for Har- denberg. (173) The result was a modification of Hardenberg 's financial plan . ^ (174) in his new program of September, 1810. In his criticism of this program, September 12 and 13, 1810, Stein suggested some concessions to Niebuhr and Schoen. Finally, Stein and Hardenberg met at Herms- dorf, September 14, 1810, but there exists no record of the inter- (175) view. When completed Hardenberg’ s reforms included a council of state soon replaced by the chancellor and a cabinet; a financial plan made up of the sale of the domains, secularization of church lands with reservations for worship, schools, and charity, poll and income taxes, and extensive excises; regulations of the quartering tax; some attention to education and Catholic church reform: and promise of a national and provincial representation. (176) These reform efforts were in the main supported by Stein as th< best protection to his own work and a bulwark to the liberal ele- ment against reaction and French influence, though his cooperation with Hardenberg continued for only a short time. 173. Lehmann’s "Stein", III, 73. 174. Ibid., 175. Ibid., 82-85. 176. Ibid., 94, 95. 75ff, 81 • . . . r , ■ . . • 99 . CHAPTER IV — GERMAN STATESMANSHIP. GENERAL CHARACTER. The German period in Stein’s political career really begins with the popular insurrection in Spain. He most enthusiastically joined the movement to rouse the German people against Napoleon, and till the triumph of the allies, persistently pursued it, never quite giving up planning constitutional arrangements for a united Germany , Altnough the federal act at Vienna was extremely unsatis- factory to the patriots, yet they saw in it the possible realization of their plans, provided it could be developed along liberal lines for local and national institutions. Both these objects employ the interest of Stein. Most of his utterances on German affairs occur early in the period; later his attention is taken up with state constitutions and especially popular political institutions, not only in Prussia, but also in Bavaria and Nassau. The most of his material on popular participation in government dates from this period; with very little on the principles of unity, depart- mental individuality, or technical commissions. During most of this time Stein is a private citizen in close touch, nevertheless, with the leading politicians of his day, and sponsor for the first three Westphalian estates assemblies. EARLY RUSSIAN EXPERIENCES. Despite his German activities he was not fully disassociated from Prussian affairs, till rather late in his Austrian exile, from which he sought escape by making Russia the seat of his operations - ' : - . • . ( 1 ) 100 . against Napoleon, Accepting in May, 1812, the special invitation from the Czar, Stein was in Wilna by June 12. He refused £o enter the Russian service, preferring to continue the preparation for a German uprising by disseminating patriotic literature, enlisting German soldiers, forming a German legion and committee of four, issuing a proclamation, and interesting York, Doernberp, and other ( 2 ) leaders. Meanwhile, Napoleon entered Russia, June 24, 1812. Stein advised the aid of England and Sweden for landing in Germany and an understanding with Austria. A month later he had followed the ( 3 ) Czar into Moskow. By July 27, the great landholders had organized an uprising of the Russian people for defense. On August 9, he fol- lowed the Czar into St. Petersburg. The German committee was get- ting hostile to a popular uprising in Germany under Peter of Olden- (4) burg. August 30, occurred the Convention of Abo between the Czar and Bernadotte, providing for expeditions into Denmark and Germany. Despite the defeats at Smolensk, August 17 and 19, and at Borodino, September 7, the Czar proposed to continue hostilities in alliance with England, Prussia, and Sweden, At the same time, Stein handed ( 5 ) the Czar, September 18, 1812. memoranda of a German constitution. He asserts that a strong Germany is necessary for the Deace of Europe, the curbing of France and the protection of Russia, to be secured through a united German monarchy, a Prussian monarchy north and an Austrian south of the Main, or such an arrangement with allied territories. The old German monarchy was impossible, as that Y/ould involve the restoration ^ , . .. on of old territorial arrange - 1. Lehmann's "Stein", III, 128-137. 2. Ibid. ””140-148 . sL^Til^WO-IL. 4 ‘ IMd '’ 154 • 5 ’ Ibld -’ 159 PSrtZ - . ■1 mm 101 . ments and judicial institutions, or an impairment of the imperial power, through loss of the ecclesiastical lands and free cities. The most feasible arrangement was an alliance of Austria and Prus- sia with a central government of executive departments and diet for foreign affairs, finance, war, alliances, and religious affairs. Till the war should be over he suggested the establishment of an ad- ministrative council wi th unlimited powers to procure men, money, supplies, transport and to influence public opinion. Thus, Stein is from the very beginning confronted by the problem of reconcil- ing the presence of Austria and Prussia within Germany. A restor- ation of the German Imperial constitution would give comparative superiority to Austria. The solution is an alliance with a com- mon government . ( 6 ) The catastrophe of Moscow did not abate the determination of the Czar to continue hostilities. The nation offered its support. England promised aid to Sweden and Germany in money and men. Meanwhile, Stein was making plans for an Italian as well as a Ger- man state, and the union of Russia and Poland. He furthered ne- gotiations with Austria and Prussia, urged the sending of Lord Wal- pole ) secretary of the English legation at St. Petersburg, to Vienna, ( 7 ) and imparted to him, November 1, 1812, memoranda on a German con- stitution and a European rearrangement of territory. South Ger- many was to be organized into a Kingdom under Austrian hegemony and North Germany under Prussian, with constitutions. On the 17th Stein sought to encourage the Czar to seek alliance with Austria and Prussia for the immediate freeing of Germany through another 6. Lehmann’s "Stein", III, 171, 194. 7. Ibid., 194, . > - 102 . ( 8 ) memoranda. The rulers of Austria and Prussia were alone to be con- sidered in the approaching reorganization, while the others were to be treated in accordance with the best interest of the nation, freed and rendered capable to oppose France and secure Europe against the attempts of any irresponsible power. (9) Stein, then, was successful in bringing the Czar from a war of defense against France to one of offense against Napoleon to free Europe. December 18, 1812, the Czar departed from St. Peters- burg for the army, followed by Stein, January 4, 1813. Stein and the Czar were united in desiring the restoration of a European balance of power in which the nations as such were to have a share, though the former was working for a united Germany, and the latter for an independent Russia. Poland might wreck this plan through a conflict of interest in the Czar's promise of a united Poland, and the territorial interests of Austria and Prussia, both neces- ( 10 ) sary to a successful alliance against France. Moreover, the Prus- sian King and government were against a general uprising, prefer- ring an alliance of France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia on the basis of Lueneville. TAUROGGEN, KOENIGSBERG AND BRESLAU. ( 11 ) The convention of Tauroggen, De ©ember 30, 1812, between Gen- eral York of the Prussian contingent and the Russians opened up the country to the Vistula and associated Prussian troops with the Russian operations. Then Stein was given full power by the Czar ( 12 ) to go to Koenigsberg for the purpose of winning over Prussia and 8. Lehmann's "Stein',' III, 198. 9. Ibid., 201. 10. Ibid., 214. 11. Ibid., 215. ISlMcl., 219, 222, 225, 226, 230-32. . — — 103 . assembling tLe resources o i East- and est Prussia. On bis arrival, January 22, 1813, he 1 ound citizens, peasants, and many nobles for action with Russia. Despite the opposition of the nobles and bureaucracy Stein secured, January 24, the diet for February 5, 1813, to arm, an expression of thanks to the Czar, loyaltv to the King and urgency for elections from an estates convocation, volun- tarily summoned by Groeben; and the abolition of the continental system, a loan for York from the merchants, and the introduction (13) of Russian paper-money. ihe diet passed a defense law, embodying Hr. the chief provisions suggested by Stein, a revolutionary act with the full sympathy of popular opinion. On his return to Russian ( 14 ) headquarters, February 7, 1813, he proposed to go to Breslau to ne- gotiate an alliance with Prussia, while the military cleared Ger- ( 15 ) many to the Elbe. Meanwhile, the Prussian negotiations with Russia through Knesebeck for an alliance on the territorial arrangements of 1806, and a part of the Grand Dutchy of Warsaw, with an armis- tice, came to nothing through the retreat of the French to the Oder and the dominance of the Prussian war party under Scharnhorst. At (16) this time Stein set out for Breslau with letters and a plan of al- liance based on the Prussian position previous to 1806, and very high recommendations from the Czar. In respect to the alliance, Stein, February 27, 1813, was successful despite his cold reception and ill health. But his attempt to extricate the King from his re- actionary surroundings failed. 13. Lehmann’s "Stein", III, 236-40. 14. Ibid., 243, 244. 15. Ibid., 248. 16. Ibid., 251, 254-256, 269. 104 . ADMINISTRATION OP CONQUERED TERRITORY. (17) Contemporary with the Prussian negotiations, those with Aus- tria had. separated the Austrian contingent from the French army. For the disposal of the conquered parts of Germany outside Prussia (18) and Hanover, Stein suggested a central administrative board com- posed of one representative each for the allies, with unlimited power to assemble the resources of the land, limited popular par- ticipation through trusted local men; establishment , instruction and supervision of provisional administrations; division into five sec- tions, each with a civil and a military governor and militia for home defense, which plan formed part of a proclamation, March 25, 1813, inviting the princes and people to aid in freeing Germany. Of this board, Stein was made temporary president. After his re- ( 19 ) turn in March or April, 1813, to Russian headquarters, he put a se- ( 20 ) ries of questions to Gagern on the German constitution. T he first problem was to find a place for a privileged class such as the prin- ces, if they deserved perpetuation, in a free nation. Next, was to create an imperial power strong enough to exact obedience from the large states, and a judicial power able to enforce its judgements against the powerful classes. The third was that of the army and where to lodge the power to declare war and make peace.. The fourth was the making of laws and the administration of finance. Lastly, how could the whole constitution be pervaded with strength, unity, and nationality? Nothing is said about a diet, or administrative officials . 17. Lehmann’s "Stein", III, 270. 18. Ibid., 260; Pertz-Stein, III, 314-15. T9. Ibid., 272. 20. Pertz-Stein, III, 664, 665. 105 . (21) Stein now became very busy on the recently created central ad- ministrative board. In Dresden he failed to secure an alliance through the strong influence of Austria. In Mecklinburg he estab- lished a civil and military governor to raise money and troops and secure a loan, despite the Duke’s opposition; in Denmark his efforts to turn neutrality into an alliance ran counter to the Czar’s ef- forts to secure Norway for Bernadotte . Yet, the fact that Austria ( 22 ) and Denmark were still neutral on Napoleon's appearance in Germany, May 1, 1813, Saxony and Poland undecided, Bernadotte at Stockholm, military operations lagging through Russian procrastination, and that French victories established the Elbe frontier, failed to under- mine Stein’s confidence in the spirit of the troops, the hope of re- enforcements and the ultimate alliance with Austria. May 13, (23) Stadion appeared in the allied camp with assurances of aid; June 14 and 15, an alliance was made with England for subsidies for Rus- sia and Prussia; and June 27, occurred the alliance of Austria, Russia and Prussia. MEMORANDA, AUGUST- SEPTEMBER, 1813. (24) Meanwhile, Stein's influence with the Czar began to wane. Important negotiations were carried on with Austria and France with- out his knowledge; an armistice was negotiated unbeknown to him and later extended by Metternich., despite his high displeasure. In August war was decided upon by Napoleon, the Prague Congress came to an end and the provisions of the treaty of Reichenback au- tomatically began to operate. Again, reverting to the constitu- (25) tion of Germany; and acknowledging the impossibility of a unitary 21. Lehmann’s ’’Stein”, III, 281, 287, 289. 22. Ibid., 290-95. 23. Ibid., 295, 296, 301. 24. Ibid., 296, 297, 301. 25. Ibid., 309 ff.; Pertz-Stein, III, 415; IV, 125. I- o * 106 . state, Stein suggests a close alliance of Prussia, Austria, and Germany, mutually guaranteeing their integrity and constitutions. The central government had jurisdiction over justice, war, peace, army, foreign affairs, coinage, and tariffs, through the three de- partments of war, interior and finance, with sub-boards in the states. An Austrian emperor, with executive, judicial, and legis- lative functions was provided: a diet at Regensburg of three estates for legislation and taxation; a system of courts; state governments, partly imperial deputations and partly local, for interior police, education, worship, justice, finance and military affairs; princes with the same limitations as the emperor; and estates for legis- lation and taxes. Here, the problem of Austria and Prussia is met by allying them with a third power, Germany. The central govern- ment is complete in its sphere, the state governments subordinate.. Full executive, legislative, and judicial institutions are provided, as well as unity, departmental individuality, and popular partici- pation. Yet, in the presence of Austria and Prussia, no central power could be made sufficiently strong. There was too much crude- ness, too many conflicting interests. (26) After the defeat of Napoleon at Lepzig, October 18, 1813, the central administrative board, under the influence of ivi etternich and Schoen, was made a department with Stein, advised by a council of diplomats under Hardenberg, at its head. This October convention differed from the March in substituting a single person for a board, creating local institutions, encouraging popular support, and ad- ministering the conquered territory without reference to the al- 26. Lehmann’s "Stein", III, 318, 322, 336, 340. . - • : !' t ■ — 107 . liance. The consequent absences of Stein from the presence of the Czar was improved by Metternich to increase his influence. 'Hie two differed, especially, in the policy to be pursued toward Na- poleon, Stein with the war party for his overthrow, Metternich for his retention in France with limitations. To the former opinion the Czar gave his adherence after the march of the Austrians into neu- tral Switzerland. HUMBOLDT’S MEMORANDA. Amid the multiplicity of duties incident to the campaign a— gainst Napoleon, Stein still found time to discuss the constitu— (27) tional organization of Germany. In his Comments on Humboldt’s Memoranda of a German constitution, he suggests a confederation with Austria and Prussia dominating. There are to be an executive committee or directory; a diet for customs, coinage, fortresses, security police, posts and troops; local diets for legislation and taxation; personal freedom, residence and service; security of pro- perty, life and honor; independence of the courts through public trials, appointment of judges by the estates and princes, and dis- missal through judicial process. Emphasis is placed upon personal freedom and property and the assured position of the princes. This seems the better method of organization, the only one, in fact, with Austria and Prussia included. Stein’s request of the Czar for a committee to consider his suggestions was refused through fear of Austria. ( 2 8 ) Meanwhile, the allies kept advancing and negotiating. The 27. Lehmann’s ’’Stein',’ III, 347 ff. 28. Ibid., 351-361. 108 . Frankfort Manifesto, December 1, 1813, conceded the natural bounda- ries of France. The congress of Chatillon declared for the pre- revolutionary boundaries, the complete evacuation of Italy, Ger- many and Switzerland. Coulaincourt accepted these conditions for an armistice and the return of the garrisons, to be repudiated by transient successes on the Seine and Marne. The allies then re- newed their alliance at Ghaumont , a triumoh of the military party. (29) ' “ Though Stein, pushed back to Dijon, lost influence upon the Czar ana the course of affairs, yet in March the allies came out for a German confederation, the appointment of a committee by July 1, and^a constitution by December 1, 1814. On April 9, Stein was in Paris, working with Gneisenau and Humboldt to secure the constitu- tional and territorial reconstruction of Germany, but in vain. He left June 3, 1814, for Nassau. then for Frankfort to continue the government of the conquered territories. GHAUMONT MEMORANDA. Meanwhile, Stein had put forth at Chaumont, March 10, 1814, „ (31) another Memoranda of Germany's future constitution". It provided a general and several local constitutions to fix the relations of the constituent parts, their rights and obligations, interior or- ganization, and limitations of sovereignty; an assembly of the state: or diet to pass upon political interests, legislation, civil and military institutions, and a directory to guide the assembly, exe- cute its commands, and conserve the social, political, judicial, and military institutions. The diet consisted of deputies from the A. princes, cities and provincial estates, representative, with five 29. Lehmann's "Stein", III, 366-371. 30. Ibid., 372-378. 31. Pertz-Stein. Ill, 718-720. 109 . year tenure and fifth renewals, and. annual six week sessions. Its functions included federal legislation and taxation, and decision of controversies between the federal estates and between the princes and their subjects. The directory was chosen from Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Han- over. Its jurisdiction extended to the guidance of the diet, ex- ecution of the laws, supervision of the institutions, maintenance of foreign relations, and those between the estates, and between the princes and their subjects, making war and peace and keeping up the military institutions. There are placed at its disposal the Rhine frontier, coast, and such special duties as are voted by the diet. All interior duties are abolished. Each state of the con- federation v. r as to have annual estates to vote laws and revenue. The princes, counts, and mediatised nobles are members of the estates. The rights of the individual included those of a natural judge, a decision within fourty-eight hours upon a detention, of emigration, the choice between civil and military service in Germany, of pub- lishing complaints against authority. This is the most detailed and best of Stein's German constitutions up to this time, though not without grave defects. There is an executive department with its functions defined, but no administrative departments; a legis- lative department of mediaeval estates to deal with laws and finance; and no judicial department. The judicial jurisdiction of the con- federation is limited to disputes between the federal estates, and the princes and their subjects, and assigned to a legislative com- mittee which exercises, also, executive functions in carrying out its own decisions. . . . . 110 . STE IN-HUMBOLDT CONSTITUTIONAL PLANS. (32) Stein was very much disappointed over the failure of Germany to secure unity and centralization from the war against Napoleon. He appealed to the Ozar to use bis influence for the maintenance of the constitutional unity, integrity, public order, and national fortune of Germany; but without positive results. About the same time he turned to Hardenberg for aid. Before leaving for Vienna he took an active part with him in constructing plans for a new German State. In his Remarks of July 16, 1814, on Hardenberg's ( 33 ) German Federal Constitution, he repeats assertions of the Chaumont Memoranda, that the real elements of a federal constitution are the directory and diet, the relation of the members to the confedera- tion, the internal arrangements of the member states and the rights of each individual citizen. Provision must be made to punish those violating the federal act, allying with a foreign power, or making war upon a federal member. It must be distinctly stated that the sovereign power is limitated by law. The inclusion of all Austria and Prussia would include too much heterogeneous material, ^here ought to be a directory or federal committee, to supervise and ex- ecute, consisting of Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Hanover, and, per- haps, buertemberg, the first two with two, the second three with one, vote each, Austria having the presidency. There should be a federal diet to advise and decide under Austrian presedency with votes according to population, Austria’s and Prussia’s being the same. Its jurisdiction should be confined 32 •Lehmann's "Stein", III 383 385, 396.397, 403. 33. Pertz-Stein, IV, 43-48. ■ a* 111 . to general interests, war and peace, maintaining provincial consti- tutions, military arrangements and the administration of justice. There should be six circles outside Prussia and Austria for the ex- ecution of the diet’s laws, the maintenance of the military consti- tution and the operation of the courts. The estates should be heriditary and participate in legislation, grant taxes, represent the constitution before the prince and the federation. To decide controversies between estates and princes, and cases of justice de- nied is the function of the federal court, or of a committee of the directory and the diet. The mediatized princes form an hereditary estate in their place of residence with certain privileges and rights under the direct protection of the federal constitution. The gen- eral rights under the protection of the diet were those of change of residence, habeas corpus, natural judge, choice of service, se- curity of property, complaint and petition. In comparing this with the Chaumont Memoranda, the diet is not so fully explained while a better exposition of the directory occurs. The position of the mediatized princes is better defined. The circle is introduced, its jurisdiction, but not its institu- tion defined. Representation in the diet is by constituent members, rather than by estates of the country as a whole . The judicial function extends to disputes between estates and princes and is exercised by a committee of both directory and diet instead of the diet alone. Nothing is said of tenure or sessions. Constituent members, also, form the directory, and relative influence is given through voting power. No financial provisions are made. The func- tions of both diet and directory are less minutely defined while those of the former are given in part to the circle. The possibil- * V . . 112 . ity of violating the act is recognized; the elements of the consti- tution are ennumerated; certain alliances and attacking members of the federation are penalized. As a whole these two memoranda are supplemental, thus far the most ingenious solution of the problems involved in making a German state. (34) In the Stein-Hardenberg corrected outline of the principles of the German federal constitution of July 23, 1814, the executive power is vested in a council of the seven circle executives to deal with treaties, diplomatic representatives, war, peace, military and executive affairs, and a federal state in war. Foreign re- lations of an economic, political and family character should be given to the estates, but what estates is left doubtful. The feder- al assembly is to consist of a directory of Austria and Prussia, the council of circle executives, and one of the princes and es- tates, with voting power in each council in accordance with popula- tion, annual sessions, Austrian and Prussian presidency, separate deliberations and independent decisions, and all disagreements set- tled by the directory, at the next session. The functions of the assembly are legislative in respect to internal affairs of a gen- eral nature, as industry, coinage customs, and post affairs. Feder- al laws are supreme. There are to two courts, the federal consti- tuted by the federal estates, with three chambers for instruction* first and last instance, a very small membership and decrees ex- ecuted by the circle executives individually or together. Its juris' diction would extend to cases involving the federal members, the princes, and estates, personal cases and complaints against the 34. Pertz-Stein, IV, 51-63; Lehmann's "Stein", III, 387 ff. . • 113 . federal act on the part of the mediatized princes, and complaints against the federal act or an invasion of rights guaranteed by it or a refusal of justice in case of private individuals. Appeals lie from the highest court of the circle executives in certain cases involving a federal right. The circle executives form the highest court in the circle. Its jurisdiction extends to individual cases between subjects, and subjects and their prince. Gases may be transferred from one cir- cle court to another, appealed to the federal court at Frankfort; and criminal cases from the local estates may be reviev^ed. Each federal member is to have an estates assembly to consist of the heads of families of the mediatized princes and of representatives. Its functions are to include legislation, grant of taxes, defense of the constitution against the prince and the federation. Here, Stein adds by way of explanation that weighty matters concerning property, personal freedom, and the constitution must have the ad- vice and assent of the estates. The federal territory is to be di- vided into seven circles, not including Austria or Prussia. One or two executives and directors administer the federal act , decisions, and laws, the military constitution, and maintain order and security within the circle. In time of war it is to take an active part in the preparations. Finally, the citizen rights are to be guaranteed, of change of residence within the federation, judicial determina- tion of cause of arrest, security of property, right of complaint in court and before the federation, of free publication, and school attendance . In this constitution, as in the others, there appears the multiple executive, but, instead of a directory of five, the more 114 . cumbersome one of the circle executives. Stein does not favor this form, though not yet objecting to a multiple executive. Its func- tions are iabout the same as in the other constitutions. The ex- ecutive is co-ordinated as a sort of upper house, with a lower house of princes and popular representatives. A directory of Aus- tria and Prussia presides, and correlates the actions of the two houses. Federal laws are declared supreme for the first time. The most striking feature is the elaborate court system. The federal court with its three chambers, its original, concurrent, and appel- late jurisdiction, and its operation upon individuals, as well as, upon federal members, has a fairly wide range of cases. T he high- est court in the circle is its executive. Some personal rights are enumerated, as in the previous constitution, ^he mediatized princes receive considerable attention. STEIN AT VIENNA. (35) On arriving at Vienna on the Czar's invitation as his adviser on German affairs, Stein sought to procure the separation of Ger- man from other affairs in respect to constitution and territory. But the great powers reserved this to themselves. Stein-Hardenberg forty-one articles were reduced to twelve through the influence of Austria, Prussia, and Hanover, and revised by a German committee in the interest of Austria and Prussia, despite the opoosition of (36) Bavaria and Wuertemberg. Stein determined to appeal to public opin- ion, the Czar, and the small German states against Metternich. But he was only partially successful f since the newspapers were partly hostile, the Czar not fully sympathetic, and the small Ger- man states more favorable to Gagern's imperial views. Moreover, 35. Lehmann's "Stein”, III, 403, 414. 36. Ibid., 414-29. .tlA ' 115 . German constitutional affairs were further disturbed by the con- tests of the great powers on the German committee over the Saxon and Polish questions. Stein favored giving Saxony in compensation to Prussia, but opposed giving the Czar the Polish Kingdom, as too y different from despotic Russia to remain independent. He believed in local self government for the Poles with freedom of person and property. In March, 1815, Napoleon again appeared in France. On the 23d the German Federal Constitution was formulated. S 0 on there- after Stein left for home. Napoleon was captured and banished, and Louis XVIII restored. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES. While in Vienna Stein several times set forth the fundamental ( 37 ) principles of a general German government. He said that Europe was supremely interested in an independent and tranquil Germany, to be secured by a federation concentrating its powers of resistance, and by Soate institutions, protecting civil and political liberty--all under the guarantee of the federal pact. The federal council ought to have the right to declare war and make peace, decide contests between princes, and the princes and their estates, control foreign affairs, make laws on general subjects, and guarantee territorial constitutions. The territorial estates ought to protect political and civil liberty, to have the right of assenting to laws and im- posts, of supervising the administrative officials, and of guard- ing the rights of the mediatized princes, the nobles, and the com- mons in all Germany: to recognize and guarantee the political exist- ence of the federation in general and of the German princes in par- ticular. 37. Instructions, January 13, 1815; An Capodistria, January 15, 1815; Erklaerung, January 17, 1815 ;IV, 706-711; 309; 330. ' 116 . Hitherto . Stein’s general executive has been the directory or^assembly of the circle executives, which, now, he begins to aban- don. He condemns the German committee's proposal of a director- of five, as too weak to preserve internal order, or external inde- pendence, on account of its divergent views, interests, and adminis- trative methods, and commends a unitary executive. Stein attrib- utes the policy of the committee to the jealousy of the powers which prefer a weak, fluctuating rather than a strong, stable government. He brands such a policy as lacking sagacity, liberality and the feel ing of nationality. The only functions of an emperor in the present situation of Germany are concurrency in legislation, judicial administration, military direction and honorary rights. In legislating and the right of declaring war and making peace, he is to have the initia- tive as well as the diet, and the sole sanction. He appoints the presiding judge of the federal court, consisting of members appoint- ed by the diet, and has the sole execution of its sentences. H e is, in time of war, the director of the armed forces with a com- mittee of three princes, Prussia’s and two chosen by the diet, and enfoi ceo tne military regulations in the same way. He may recruit in the free cities and among the subjects of the princes that have discharged their military obligations. His honorary rights are the imperial title, hereditary headship of the confederation, giving his name to all laws^and judicial acts, letters of credance to dip- 38. establish, of the Imperial Dignity, Feb. 17, 1815 746^330-333* M3* ^ 1815 J An Hardenber S> Feb. 27, 1815; IV, 744- - * 117 . lomatic representatives, and the rank of imperial commisary to his minister in the diet. The diet is to legislate upon common affairs, military organization, foreign relations, and decide contests be- tween princes or between them and the provincial estates. Stein’s idea, then, of an effective German government includ- ed an executive, preferably unitary, with at least three adminis- trative departments; an assembly of princes, cities, and federal members, with a decisive voice in legislation, taxation, certain nominations, especially to the courts, foreign relations and con- troversies arising between the princes, and the princes and their estates; a federal court of three chambers, nominated by the ex- ecutive and the assembly, with original, concurrent and appellate jurisdiction within the sphere of general affairs. The central government functioned locally through the circle board of two or more members, which enforced the regulations of the assembly, and the orders of the head of the state, and acted as a court with a fairly extended jurisdiction. The sphere of federal administration was the affairs common to the members of the federation in respect to law, revenue, military affairs, foreign and inter-state relations decisions affecting the federal members, and at times individuals, and individual rights. Provision was made for an estates assembly, with a defined activity in each state of the federal union, as part of the already existing local governments under the princes. Though this constitutional presentation lacks many details, it gives a fair idea of Stein’s imperial Germany. Of his four prin- ciples three only are applied in his various memoranda. Unity of power and responsibility is collegiate in the directory or board of circle executives and individual in the Emperor; departmental . ' 118 . individuality is worked out very meagerly in the three department heads; popular participation finds expression in part organization of the federal diet and in the local estates assemblies. But noth- ing is said about technical administration. DEMO C RATI C TENDENCI ES . (39) The German Federal Act of June 8, 1815, was a great disappoint- ment to the patriots, in that it created a very weak central govern- ment and failed to provide local estates constitutions. Neverthe- less, it was considered capable of being developed along liberal constitutional lines. Stein in his Memoranda to the Prussian (40) Cabinet of June 24, 1815, says that the old German Empire, with its executive, legislature, courts and unity of internal arrangements • has been replaced by a federation, lacking executive and courts, and weak for common defense. Individual rights have no security save the indefinate declaration that there shall be estates, and the enumeration of certain principles. The right of any member's al- liance with a foreign state is limited only by the obligation not to combine against the federation or another member. The federal diet will function with great difficulty, since cases demanding unanimity are so numerous and so indefinately expressed, and in- variable for enacting and amending fundamental laws, making organic federal regulations, and deciding upon the rights of individuals and the matters of religion. (41) Stein, nevertheless, had decided to accept a position under it, if offered him. But he turned down Austria's offer of member- ship in the Diet, and so conditioned Prussia's by demanding leave 39 .Lehmann's "Stein", II, 467 ff. 40 .Pertz-Stein, IV, 445. 41. Lehmann's "Stein", III, 470-472. % 119 . of absence without special permission and a colleague whom he could trust, that he failed to enter the service of the new government. This, probably, mattered little, as the re- action under Metter- nich, Hardenberg, and Wittgenstein by a severe repression of all liberal or radical tendencies, induced a very conservative develop- ment of the federal constitution, to the great discomfiture of the patriots . Though liberal in his views and urgent in his demands for popular participation in government, Stein was not in full sym- pathy with all the manifestations of liberalism. He thought the governments and princes responsible for most of the excesses of the patriots through the maintenance of the anomalous conditions of 1806. While praising the "Burschenschaft" , he condemned the atti- tude of the universities, and the "Carlsbad Resolutions." On democratic tendencies in Germany he expressed himself free- (42) ly and frequently. In his Comments on Niebuhr’s Fundamentals of the Prussian Estates’ Bodies, he denies that the German masses have a democratic tendency, the noble, the citizen and the peasant. He offers property qualifications for voting as security against radi- (43) calism. To Capodistria, August 9, 1813, he writes that the ex- travagancies of the liberals tend to destroy the moral, religious, and social order, ,and render skeptical those who wish to maintain, unimpaired, the good fortune of the race; that public opinion is shocked at the abyss into which a faction would drag mankind; that men begin to be persuade^ that the constitutional principles of 1789 are false; and that one must procede from historical beginnings to ( 44 ) improve, but not to overturn. To Humboldt, August 25, 1879, he 42. Pertz-Stein, V, 337, 338. 43. Ibid., 399. 44. Pertz-Stein, V, 402. - 120 . writes that the democratic party has injured itself in public opin- ion through the use of criminal means, anarchistic principles, mur- der, etc.; that the princes must see that their security depends upon the propertied classes; that unauthorized persons will assume the function of representatives- as long as there are no constitu- tional organs there-for in commune, circle, orovince or nation. (45) To Ouworoff, November 30, 1819, he writes that almost all the peo- ple wish quiet, order, re-establishment of the princely houses, but with representative institutions against the misuse of power. One must trust the people, strengthen the government through the union of all national interests to conquer unrest, banish mischief-makers and punish the guilty. REDISCUSSION OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUBJECTS. During the remainder of this period, Stein in private life interested himself in a variety of administrative subjects. To some already discussed, he added various points. In his Review of (46) the Ordinance for the Superior Presidency, August 20, 1816, he emphasized the point of union for several government districts in respect to common affairs, without defining its relations thereto, thorough supervision and the need for visitations, examination of important measures, and of reports on important affairs. In his (47) "Opinion on the Government Instruction of October 23, 1811," while he approves the superior president's control over the chambers, his administrative supervision, visitations, examination of reports, suspension of officials, judicial cognizance, annual conferences with the ministry at Berlin, as indispensible for a skillful and 45. Pertz-Stein, V, 446. 46. Ibid., 86. 47. Ibid., 353. 121 . active official, he suggests giving the duties of consistory and medical college to the chambers and a re-arrangement of the work. (48) In a letter to his daughter of May 2, 1828, he approves the office of circle-councillor as a very useful means of hindering the des- potic tendency of the local administration by furnishing a local supervision of influential men. In another letter he states its ( 49 ) disadvantages, as a narrow and subordinate sphere filled with de- tails and formalities, a means to greater ends, not an end in itself , and. its advantages as bringing one in touch with men and things, giving a knowledge of real life, the operation of the laws, of business, control over subordinates, the mechanism of the central organs, a valuable stepping stone to higher places. In various (5°) . (51) letters, -the best to Eichorn, January 2, 1818, he enumerates the disadvantages of a purely bureaucratic government, as expense, nar- rowness, and appearance of activity, impairment of subordination, empty formalities, arbitrary change in the administrative system, one day restriction, another free trade, to-day conservatism, to- morrow radicalism, depression of the public spirit, opposition be- tween military and civil institutions. To correct these faults there is need of commune, circle, provinial, and central estates constitutions, which function with economy, energy, co-operation, understanding, mobility, and independence, correlation with the bu- reaucracy to attain a better administrative system than either alone would give . 48. Pertz-Stein, VI, 565. 49. To a Young Friend, March 9, 1830: Pertz-Stein, VI, 855. 50. Stein’s Memoranda, Oct. 6, 1821: An Niebuhr, Feb. 8, 1822; Dec. 10, 1821; An Laubach, June 1, 1818; An Tilly 20, 1818; An Spiegel, March 2, 1822; An Merveldt, Feb. 5, 1822; An Humboldt, March 30, 1822; Pertz-Stein, V, 669, 630, 252. 285, 648, 649, 664, 697. 51. Pertz-Stein, V, 173, 174. ' 122 . LOCAL CONSTITUTIONS. The German patriots, being as much interested in the individ- ual members of the confederation as in the central government , sought to utilize the confederate constitution in obligating the several members to enact local constitutions. Stein, especially in- terested in Nassau where he had property, and Prussia where he had (52) both a property and personal interest, laid down the principle that a constitution is not invented, but developed from elements (53) existing from the beginnings of a people. To Mirbach he writes that old things cannot be wholly restored, but must serve for the basis of improvements. A constitution, he considered, an indispensible condition of the maintenance and development of Prussia. For, her lack of geographical, race, and religious unity necessitated the creation of a point of union, a national institution, as a common place for these various elements. In his "Representation to Alex- (54) ander on the Imperial Dignity", Stein asserts that it is especially imperative for Prussia to have a wisely administered constitution on account of its situation in the midst of Germany, the military weakness of the confederation, disturbances of the internal peace, (55) and limitations upon the movements of commerce. In commenting on the proposed constitution for Nassau he approved the bicameral legislature, based on property, to vote and spend taxes and legis- late; certain personal rights and parliamentary privileges; and a certain control over ministers. Though lacking in definiteness and detail, Stein seemed to have in mind for the members of the confeder- 52. Beurtheil . , Aug . 20, 1816, V, 88, 89. 53. Pertz-Stein, V, 126. 54. Ibid., IV, 330. 55. Lehmann’s "Stein", III, 398. ' . 123 ation estates constitutions, giving the propertied classes a share in the government, and local popular institutions within each mem- ber state. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. The city government was rediscussed at length in various docu- (56) ments. In a letter to the Archbishop of Coeln, May, 1826, he criti- cizes the ordinance of 1808, in two respects: a marked tendency, especially in small cities, for the rough uneducated classes to crowd into the council; and the development of opposition of the coun- cil to the "magistrat". The first defect might be met by certain educational, moral and technical requirements for admission to the citizen-body, along with an increased property qualification for the exercise of political priviliges. For the second he had no remedy to suggest. In a letter to minister von Schuckmann, March (57) 15, 1829, he points out the defects of the municipal governments of the West provinces: the councillors appointed; public spirit and life impaired; the mayors, indifferent outsiders, often neglecting public affairs to engage in various lucrative businesses. The City Ordinance of 1808, must be introduced with the election of city officials for six and twelve year terms, the councillors independent) the spirit of the citizens awakened, the governing bodies local. (58) In the same letter, he points out the defects in the City Or- dinance of 1808: indefiniteness of boundaries between the func- tions of the "magistrat" and the councillors; lack of an institu- tion for composing the differences of opinion between them; the low spiritual and moral ability of the councillors and "magistral" ; 56. Pertz-Stein, VI, 237. 57. Ibid., V, B. 248-251. 58. Ibid., B. 250-251. . . the roughness and immorality of the citizenship; the power of the council to alienate communal property and contract debts, which should be supplemented by the approval of the "magistrat" and some organ of the central government according to the amount; and the threefold classification of the cities which fails to express their relative importance . FRENCH AND PRUSSIAN CITY GOVERNMENT. ( 59 ) Continuing this letter, Stein takes up the French City Ordi- nance, objects to the nomination of the mayor and his aids by the central government and to the position of the latter in not being colleagues with joint responsibility, and assents to the choice of the council by two electoral colleges, the highest tax-payers choos- ing three -fourths, the notables, one-fourth of the councillors. For the nomination of the mayor and his aids, he would substitute election by the citizen-body, which has an interest in the result, a knowledge of the persons, confidence in them, and can exact bet- ter administration. The advantage the French have in the place they make in their city government for men of worth, service and knwoledge, through the choice of one-fourth their council by the college of notables, instead of making political privilige depend entirely upon property and industry, to which in part can be as- cribed the unsatisfactory elections, the predominance of inert over clever men, the overburdening of the few administrators and waste of time by the majority, if adopted in Prussia, would make possible the choice of a part of the "magistrate and council from judges, royal officers, physicians, those on an income, etc. 59. Pertz-Stein, V, B. 252, 254; .See An Stadtrath Kncbland, March 19, 1829, VI, 691. 125. (60) Two other things Stein approves in the French City Ordinance; prohibition of all correspondence to municipal councillors with those of other cities on public affairs, to avoid abuse of power, though thereby losing much good through inability to exchange views on important administrative questions; permission to non-resident land- owners through a representative to participate in city affairs, since they contribute to bear the city burdens. In Westphalia such an arrangement might well be introduced* for, some cities contain many farms and estates owned abroad. (61) In some correspondence with Gneisenau concerning the proposals for a city ordinance Stein especially notices arrangements for a college of umpires to pass on the differences of opinion between the '’magistrate and council as a most excellent institution to fill a long recognized want in municipal assemblies. Such an institution will be useful not only to compose differences of opinion, avoid strife, and prevent the intrusion of the central administration, but also to introduce more intelligence, knowledge of law, and busi- ness experience, and give access to city affairs to non-citizens, especially in the small cities where suitable persons are scarce. Finally, while Stein commends the deputations created by the Oity Ordinance of 1808, as indispensible in city government by bringing the citizen into close connection and acquaintance with the whole administration, creating confidence in the administrators , dispos- ing of all the talent in the city, learned or industrial, and econ- omising in expenses, he criticises the preponderence of numbers given the council, while the responsibility for administration lies 60. Pertz-Stein, VI, B. 254. 61. Jan. 22, Apr. 2, 1830, Pertz- Stein, VI, 848-50; 853. ■ 126 . with the "magistrat" , and proposes that the presiding officer of the deputation should be chosen from the "magistrat" and endowed with a casting vote. THE ESTATES ASSEMBLY- -COMPOSITION. But popular participation in government was through not only the municipal organization of one estate, but also the estates as- (62) semblv of the commune, circle, province and nation. Three classes (63) made up this estates assembly: the nobles of blood and property above a certain amount to be present in person, other nobles by re- presentatives, other large property owners*, representatives from all constitutional cities, from the larger ones one each, chosen by the citizens from the "magistrat" or council, from the smaller, one each to several groups; representatives from the peasant proprietors. For the assembling of the estates in more than one chamber, Stein urges the German usage and experience, especially in the Em- pire, less obstruction in the conduct of business, better eluci- dation of the real reasons and motives of action, the avoidance of partiality, haste, and passion, of the effects of momentary influ- ences, and the dominance of special groups. Finally, there is the necessity of organized property, tradition, and family in a union of the large landholders "to secure the person and worth of the prince from the radical middle class who seek the disparagement of the upper class and lust after the possessions of the wealthy, in as much as the official class offers no protection in a crisis. Moreover, this will insure the continued participation of the nobles in public affairs to the advantage of the masses." ‘ 1 'he division 62. An Arndt, Jan. 5, 1818, V, 169. 63. Denkschrift, May 27, 1818, V, 214, 215, 213; Entwurf, May 3, 1817, V, 134, 139, 137-169; Denk- schrift, 1818, V, B. 113, 114, 122; An Arndt, Jan. 5, 1818, V, 169; Berne rk, Nov. 5, 1822, V, 745, 748; An Landsberg, May 7, (Continued) . 127 . into three chambers has some advantages, such as, the sanction of antiquity, experience of its usefulness, the modification of the city’s menace to the land interests, the more careful preservation by each estate of its interests and peculiarity of character. Yet there is the tendency to impair the discharge of business through increased rivalries and the difficulty of arriving at a decision. Two chambers at least seem essential to avoid haste, partiality and factions. Then such an arrangement exists in most States under various appellations. The nobles of large estate and family tra- dition, together with representatives of the nobles as a whole and in Cleves and Mark those of the official class and the ecclesias- tics constitute the upper house. The lower is made up of the re- presentatives of the cities and the peasant proprietors. CHOICE, NUMBER, TENURE, RE -ELIGIBILITY, RENEWALS . (64) In the manner of choosing representatives preference seems to be given to election over appointment. In discussing the new French lav/ of the commune, Stein commends the superiority of election, be- cause of the interest of the electorate in the matter, its knowledge of local candidates, increased confidence in them, and the result- ant better administration, where the tenure depends upon the judge- ment of the electorate. In the case of the upper house life ap- pointment for a comparatively small number of members from a few families and choice by the house itself of one from several pro- 63, ( continued) —1831, VI, 1170; An Humboldt, Aug. 6, 1819, V, 402. 64. An Schuckmann, Mar. 15, 1829. V, B. 252. 254; Entscheidung, July 19, 1814, V, 70; Bemerk, Feb. 25. 1819, V, 330, 335, 337; July 16, 1814, IV, 47; An Niebuhr. Feb. 8, 1822, V, 668; An Gneisenau, Feb. 18, 1831, VI, 1107; An Schloesser, June 19, 1818, 279; An Vincke , July 20, 1818, V, 283. ’ ■ 128 . posed by the lower house find favor. Direct election is preferable to indirect either by a college constituted for other purposes, such as the provincial assembly, or by one constituted for that special purpose, since the number of electors would be too small and the danger of inimical division and influences too imminent, and the loss of interest on the part of the people would endanger the free- dom of elections. It would be better to choose by districts not large enough to embarrass the voting. In referring to the Westphalian provincial assembly, Stein avers (65) that no definite number of members characterize a legislative body. There must be sufficient to furnish the various points of view and judgements necessary for thorough and impartial deliberations and decisions, but not so many as to render the assembly unnecessarily expensive, or difficult of management. Again, the desirable num- ber must be such as to secure confidence, unity, and thorough knowl- edge. These are rather ideal than practical measures, as they leave out entirely the points of view of the electorate and politician, which in reality count most. The tenure should be for a definite term of years with re-eligibility and partial or total renewals. Stein recommended in 1822 for the Westphalian provincial assembly a tenure of six years, with re-eligibility and total renewals. Only in case of the city councillors of 1303 are alternates mentioned. We may infer that certain of the members are to receive pay, the amount of which would be small and confined to as few as possible. Members with large independent means are not to be paid. This is 65. Bemerk, Nov. 6, 1822, V, 754, 755, 756; An Vincke, July 20, 1818, V, 283; Ent s che i dung , July 19, 1814, IV, 170, . . 129 . on the principle that one of the advantages of popular participa- tion in government is public economy in salaries. The apportionment of members between the estates is about in the proportion of a half to the nobles, a third to the cities, and a sixth to the peasant proprietors. The elected members are to be chosen in districts according to population. QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS AND ELECTORS. ( 66 ) Qualifications for members include nationality, sex, residence, property, and franchise rights. The criminal and incapable are ex- cluded. Intelligent experienced artisans are preferable to learned men. The number of lawyers should be limited. A high standard of ability and knowledge of the law, the constitution, important place and personal relations, agricultural and industrial interests, a deferential moral nature, pure patriotism, and a non-partisan, unself- ish character are desirable. The most important matter is ability. A few able men would be a great help. Stein’s experience with the Westphalian diets w as not assuring in this respect, where among sixty-three members about fifteen or sixteen capable men of affairs are found; one-half the rest, perhaps, are useful in discussion on account of their local or professional knowledge; the others are of rough, unwrought material. Two remedies are suggested: to look after the city elections; to create a college of notables consist- ing of men distinguished on account of education, official or busi- ness ability whose members should be compelled by law to participate 66. Entscheidung, July 19, 1814, IV, 70; An Schroetter, July 17, 1808, II, 680; An Spiegel, April 20, 1818; Beurth., Aug. 10, 1816, V, 89; An Viebahn, Dec. 28, 1828. VI, 647; An Hueffer, Dec. 1828, VI, 648; Bericht an den Prinzen, Jan, 21, 1831, VI, 1083, 84; . . . . 130 . in commune affairs. The chief qualification for an elector is the possession of (67) real and personal property as shown by the taxes. A numerous inde- pendent propertied electorate is more impartial, free from influ- ence, and trustworthy, and maintains a better and freer relation be- tween the upper and middle classes of electors than a small electo- rate, such as a provincial assembly, which is too few in number, lacks the confidence of the non-electors and is too much exposed to bad influences. Women , officials of a certain class, non-resi- dents of small income, criminals, and those disfranchised as a punishment are to be excluded from the electorate. As high a stand- ard of character, knowledge and ability is required as that for mem- bers. This is rather high for practical application, a fault often found in men of affairs . ( 68 ) The advantages of popular participation in government would be best realized by making its chief condition the possession of landed property. Such an arrangement would not often exclude the artisan of large means on account of the nature of his industry, size of his dwelling, his factory, etc. The number available who possess intelligence, capacity, and practical experience is sufficient. They are gaining their experience in insurance and credit associa- tions, coroner, charity and church duties. The government will be strengthened by the bond attaching them to their country, their experience, suggestions of reform, leisure and abilities, the en- couragement of public spirit and patriotism, the revival of national 67. Bemerk., Feb. 25, 1819, V, 321, 322; An Vincke, July 20, 1818, V, 283; An Niebuhr, Feb. 8, 1822, V, 668. 68. Bemerk., Nov. 5, 1822, V, 738, 743; Zweck. Bild., June 1, 1807, I, 432, 427, 431-32. . 131 . honor and independence. Landed property holders are either rural large landholders and peasant proprietors, or city dwellers. The first class should include merely those having noble estates, since otherwise the nobles would lose their corporate rights, their fam- ily and hereditary postion by fusion into the mass of landholders. ESTATES OF NOBLES, CITIES AND PEASANTS. (69) The constitution of the nobles ought to be preserved, to main- tain a worthy position, useful to their country and the monarchy. Their position, based upon an inalienable heredity estate, makes them interested in the prosperity of the country, gives them a com- manding position in respect to their prince, the small landholder and the workers, determines their part in defense, administration, and representation, and conditions their aims, worth and strength as a creative moral force, justifying to the other estates their advantages through an earnest disciplined character, a warm interest i in the good, and a greater intelligence. Nevertheless, the pre- servation of the noble estates demands a re-organization in confor- mity with contemporary conditions. While maintaining their heredi- tary property, corporate character, family rights, and moral posi- tion, they must surrender or modify their freedom from, taxes, tolls and customs, render their political priviliges accessable to large landed property owners of German birth, Christian faith, ancestral integrity, or unusual military and civil services. The noble vote is to be determined by the comparative worth of the estates, peri- odically revised. The function of the nobility is to secure the 69. Berne rk., Nov. 5, 1822, V, 743-745; Feb. 25, 1819, V, 332, 333; Denkschrift, March 31, 1817, V, 127, 128; 1818, 214; Stein-Schlosser Entwurf , April 3, 1818, 227-28, 234-37; An Schlosser, V, 130; An Mirbach, May 19, 1817, V, 141, 143. . 132 . stability of the constitution and the permanance of the state, coun- terbalance the bureaucracy, prevent the development of either a bureaucratic or a democratic state, and fortify the conservative influences against the radically innovating spirit of the times. (70) The second element in the estates assembly is the city, includ- ed to secure place for the industrial and commercial forces of the state. Two conditions are laid down: a certain amount of local government and degree of public spirit; a large field of industrial activity. The city, should at least elect its magistrates, ad- minister its property, make local laws . and have a police system, even if it does not come under the full provisions of the Ordinance of 1808. As in the larger cities only is found a full industrial development and commercial activity, they alone are to have indi- vidual representation. Smaller cities of industrial importance are to be grouped into districts for joint or alternate representation. The very small cities are to be excluded altogether. (71) The peasantry form the third element, the purpose being the cultivation and maintenance of a moral, respectable, and indepen- dent class of small peasant proprietors. Possessors of various tenures are to be admitted to the franchise, such as, fee simple, hereditary usufructuary, life lease, etc. The amount required for an elector is much smaller than for a representative. There are to be districts, a seven year tenure, and re-eligibility. Protection is to be afforded peasant candidature against that of educated men, 70. Entwurf., May 3, 1817, V, 137.-139; Denk., March 27, 1818, V, 214; Bemerk., Nov. 6, 1822, V, 753, 754. 71. Entwurf, May 3, 1837, V, 137-139; Denk., March 27, 1818. V, 214; Bemerk. Nov. 5, 1822, V, 747, 754. ■ ' 133 . lawyers, and officials. V/hile these three elements are the only ones admitted by Stein into the plan of representation, he discusses two others. The (72) military participation in political affairs tends to degenerate into an aggregation of political clubs, to control the decisions of the estates, and is wholly unnecessary in a country with universal obligation of military service, since numerous individuals in mili- tary affairs have access to the estates otherwise. Besides, the number of electors is too small and the results dependent on an election too important to risk giving the balance of power to a ( 73 ) military element. T he church has had an important place in the estates assembly. While participation might be conceded to Catho- lic bishops and Protestant synodical representatives, their admis- sion to the council would serve the same purpose. No religious foundation nor priests and deacons should have representation, as it detracts from their spiritual functions. ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE. ( 74 ) The choice of officers lies with the members, as well as that of commit bees. At least a presiding and a recording officer are to be chosen. The members are to be divided into groups, committees or deputations according to the government proposals and the va- rious communications from other sources, such as, for taxes, charity and health, corrections, communal organization, etc. Character, business ability, education snd aptness are qualifications for mem- bership. There ought to be regular annual and special sessions at 72, Remerk., June, 1819, V, 384. 73. An Schlosser, June 19, 1818 V* 278; Denk., 1818, Dec. 5, V, B. 113, 114. 74. Denk., March 27! 1818, V, 217; An Schroetter, July 17, 1808, II, 681; An Viebahn, Nov. 23, 1830, VI, 1050. • ■ ■ 134 . the request of the assembly. The vote of the estate is to be deter- mined by the individuals in it; the nobles having three votes, the (75) cities two, and the peasant proprietors one. Attendence is to be compulsory. Excuses are to be secured from the president. The punishment of a fine or even expulsion may be assessed against of- fenders on account of non-attendence or disorderly conduct. (76) The procedure of a provincial assembly is minutely laid down by Stein in his "Order of Business for the First Westphalian Diet." The whole is under control of the marshall. It includes the ascer- tainment of those present; the reading, correction, and signing of the minutes; the presentation of new business; the renewal of old; the naming of committees; committee reports; the discussion thereof by the members in one speech each in the order designated by the marshal; the resume of the reporter; the vote; and the record in the minutes. Elsewhere it is noted that a case of disagreement between two chambers is to be settled by a joint session, a con- ference of deputies, or the royal commissioner. The re-introduc- tion of measures disallov/ed was strongly desired by Stein. He thought new reasons or evidence could be offered. That members might use this as a dilatory measure, he considered only a possibil- ity, very much offset by the character of the members, the judgment of the assembly, or the organization of the estates. (77) The assembly as a whole and individual members have some pow- 75. Geschaefts-Ordnung, Sec. 4, V, B, 214. 76. Geschaef ts-Ord- nung, Oct. 29, 1806, V, B, 214-218; Denk., 1818, V, B, 116; An Wincke, July 20, 1818, V, 285; Entwurf, May 3, 1817, V, 134; An Merveldt , Feb., 1828, VI, 479. 77. Geschaefts-Ordnung, Oct. 29, 1826, V, B, 214-218; An Viebahn. Dec. 28, 1828, VI, 645; An Roch- now, Feb. 20, 1827, VI, 370. t 135 . ers, though of little relative importance. The full session may assign members' proposals to appropriate committees , decide an ap- peal from the decision of the marshal on the correction of the min- utes, confirm the form of lav/, and demand a roll-call on a committee report at the request of six members, a majority for ordinary ques- tions and two- thirds for royal. A committee has power to choose its chairman, consider a measure, put it in form of an opinion or law, ana sign it. Individual members may speak once to any question reported from a committee, till nothing further is to be added. Further, Stein would provide access to public records and documents bearing upon the assembly's work and to the various administrative branches. The assembly ought, also, to be permitted to investigate through deputations the administration and expenditures of impor- tant provincial institutions. ( 78 ) The initiative in legislation was shared by three agencies. The government might make proposals for the improvement of the laws, which might receive first consideration. The members' proposals must be in writing, an expansion of the more restricted form of presenting grievances. In the same way the right to make complaints before them concerning provincial affairs, administrative abuses and illegalities, contains in itself the right to make proposals for the betterment of provincial administration, legislation, insti- tutions, and police. These petitions might be submitted to a special committee of the assembly 'to determine the form, time, and competence of the body to receive them. The report of such a com- 78. Geschaefts-Ordnung, Oct. 29, 1826, V, B, 214; Denk., March 27, 1818, V, 216; 1818, V, B, 116. ' . i_ , ca 136 • mittee would be made to the full session for final action. RELATION TO THE GOVERNMENT. (79) The difference between popular government and popular partici- pation in government is shown by the relations of the popular organs to the government. Stein was convinced that popular representation must be under strong and competent guidance during the whole pro- cess of participation, to commence even before the choice of repre- sentatives. Writing to Viebahn, December 28, 1829, apropos of the coming election in Westphalia, he remarks that "the time to choose members to replace the one-third of the diet is at hand. There should be placed in the public papers several essays concerning the duty of electors, the characteristics of candidates, and the results of bad elections . The conscience and sense of honor of both the electors and the candidates should be earnestly appealed to on both moral and political grounds." The estates once constituted are to be taken under the special care of the government. Their decisions are not to be rejected without good reasons, nor absolutely; but referred to the next session. A hearing should, also, be given the estates before rendering a decision as well as to the superior pre- sident. The publication of their procedings should not be subject to the censor. Yet, government supervision may go too far, as in Nassau "vihich guides the elections and deliberations with an un- worthy craftiness, tries to abuse the inexperience and rusticity of its members, destroys freedom of debate, and attempts to separate the estates." 79. An Viebahn Dec. 28, 1829, VI; An Rochow, Feb. 20, 1827, VI, 370; An Viebahn, Jan. 18, 1829, VI, 654; An Schlosser, June 19, 1818, V, 278. ’ 137 . ( 80 ) More specifically, the King might have a veto on the proceed- ings of the estates. The ministers might participate in the initi- ation and discussion of the laws, for the conservation of their in- fluence, the instruction, guidance, support, and information of their friends, and the knowledge and experience. They should not be representatives, since that would increase their power too much as servants of the state and impair their discipline and obedience. The superior president ought to approve proposals to be made in the estates. The government comes in direct contact with the provin- cial estates through the diet marshall, appointed by the King on the recommendation of the superior president. All masters pertain- ing to the estates pass through his hands. His speech at the open- ing should enumerate matters coming before the estates, and caution against purposely planned self-seeking ends, and religious faction. He determines the time of full sessions, guides the business, main- tains quiet and order, speed and thoroughness; introduces proposals, imparts information, names committees and directors to summon them, presentfthe business, names the reporters and alternates, and re- ports the proceedings. He decides on corrections to the minut-ss, subject to an appeal of the assembly, appoints a recording secre- tary, presides over debate, puts questions, recognizes members, per- mits an extended speech when previously requested, is addressed by the speakers, may postpone debate, till another session, appoints a member to put in form decisions of the estates for confirmation. 80. Bemerk., Feb. 25, 1819, V, 336, Note; June, 1819, V, 384; Geschaef ts-Ordnung, Oct. 29, 1826, V, B., 214-219. . . 138 . COMPETENCE OF THE ESTATES. The competence of popular participation in government is con- sidered primarily with respect to the provincial estates and muni- (81) cipality. A merely advisory estates would enjoy little respect or confidence. Through lack of responsibility it would become too radical, indifferent or inactive, or embittered, discouraged, and destructive of public spirit. Through lack of independence and the support of public opinion it would tend to re -act to outside con- ditions, or whims, or surrender itself to carping criticism. If it pursue a wanton unrestrained opposition, it would secure func- tions proportioned to the desire of the nation, or breed a very dangerous unrest. It would be either an inert mass or a turbulent body; a source of satesf action to no one. Yet, the competence of the provincial estates to participate in general legislation and taxation should be limited to advice and suggestions, as the unity and strength of the monarchy would be impaired by making the central income and general legislation dependent upon the assent of the es- tates of some twenty provinces, ’^hen, their character would render them unequal to the strenuous protection of civil and political free- dom, the effective handling of national affairs and restraining the abuses of the central government, their point of view being too narrow and partial for judging the general interests. (82) The field, then, of the provincial estates, is the province, their main functions to give assent to provincial laws and taxes, 81. An Hoevel, March 29, 1819. V, 355; Bemerk,, Nov. 5, 1822, V, 735; Feb. 25, 1819, V, 325-27; An Humboldt, May 30, 1822, V, 698. 82. Theil., Feb. 13, 1818, V, 118, 189; Bemerk., Nov. 5, 1822, V, 741; Feb. 25, 1819, V, 327; Denk., May 10, 1814, VI, 720; An dem Russ. Cab., IV, 423; An Landsberg, May 1, 1831, IV, 1108. . * J 139 . to aid in administration and to audit all accounts. Taxes should be annually voted to secure annual meetings of the estates. As such an arrangement would involve a possible danger of the estates hold- ing up the government by a refusal of supplies, amid the exigency of party strife, it would be objectionable to give them the refusal of the budget, the right to render of no effect the army, the courts, the administration, the church and national credit. The budget should be as unchangable as possible. The estates should deal with new taxes, audit expenses, and make complaints, but should not be impowered to endanger the administration of government, internal security, external peace, the state's credit, and the rights of the officials, without at least an agreement of both houses, by a major- ity of two-thirds. The estates should also be capable of taking part in adminis- (83) tration, by the exclusive assumption of the work of an administra- tive branch, or under one or more professional administrators to be carried on by a joint' committee, chosen for a period of seven years, with power to act as a college, and reinforced at times by royal officials as permanent or temporary members for technical or economic questions; or through deputies on a commission of central officials; or through a supervisory power by reports submitted for approval and made the basis of proposals to the King or officials in the form of petitions. The "certain branches of the provincial administration" which might be turned over to the provincial es- 83. Denk., March 27, 1818, V, 214, 218, 219; 1818, V, B., 115; Bemerk., Nov. 5, 1822, V, 740, 741; Theil., Feb. 13, 1818, V, 189; Bericht an den P. Wilhelm, Jan. 21, 1831, VI, 1083; Schlusz des Berichts, 1165, 1166; Entwurf, May 3, 1817, V, 137. 140 . tates, include "charity, supervision and participation in municipal and circle affairs, fire insurance, roadbuilding and waterways. Those in which they might participate are administration of mili- tary affairs, raising recruits and supplies, general security, ele- mosynary and educational institutions, public health, and working up the tax-survey." The legislative competence of the estates might extend, among other things to city and rural constitutions, refor- mation of the circles, abolition of the privileged jurisdictions, land and communal taxes, justice and estates matters, general and rural police, safety, charity, health matters, immigration, cor- rections and prisons, quartering and military service, tax-survey, archives, commerce and industry, roads, ships and railroads, fire insurance, agriculture, hereditary transmission of peasant estates, rural colonization, compulsory registration of mortgages, commer- cial courts, freedom of speech, waterways and canals, price of salt, quotas of class and industrial taxes. SOME CONDITIONS OF EFFICIENCY. (84) To secure the most efficient work from popular participation, certain arrangements would be indispensible . The length of the session should be proportioned to the amount of business to be trans- acted, to avoid that haste which is destructive of ripened ideas, thorough consideration and due regard for all the interests in- volved, as well as, productive of superficial and temporary results, needing amendment almost as soon as passed. Then the contents of the multitude of petitions on various subjects should be made known before the opening of the session, to render it possible to bring an instructed and mature judgment to bear upon their consider- 84. An Hueffer, Nov. 1, 1830, VI, 1012. 1 ' 141 . ation. The privilege of securing aid from the administration, ac- cess to the public records, the appointment of members to follow the course of the administration with the object of reporting the state of affairs to the diet, should be freely accorded. (85> The general character of an estates assembly, as an effective working body, depends, also, on its homogeneity. Great differences in nationality, language, culture, and other things make an assemb- ly a doubtful problem, while identity or similarity of language, re- ligion, culture, nationality, customs, and constitutions contribute to the success of an assembly. Writing to Niebuhr, February 19, ( 86 ) 1827, about the first Westphalian diet, he complains that unity in discussion and decision, was destroyed through the differences in the various land-divisions. In a letter to his daughter Louise, (87) December 22, 1828, he says, speaking of the second Westphalian diet, "more unity has existed between the various estates, there was but little friction, the fusion of the foreign elements into uniformity will gradually complete itself.” The Schlusz des Berichts of the third Westphalian diet in 1831, indicates the working assimilation of the diverse elements by depicting the members as exerting them- selves toward the one end of securing the welfare of the Prussian Fatherland. But unity may be disturbed by party factions and spirit. This much dreaded source of disturbance seems to have made its ap- ( 88 ) pearance in the first Westphalian diet in connection with a ques- tion of finance. The lead.er of the opposition, a certain Dr. Som- 85. Bemerk., Nov. 6. 1822, V, 751; An den Herzog von Nassau, Aug. 17 1816, V, 81, 82. 86. Pertz-Stein, IV. 362. 87. Ibid., VI , 644. 88. An Schuckmann, Jan. 24 1828, VI, 488, 489. . 142 . mers, with his group of peasants, is more than once referred to as (89) rendering the estates mutually hostile. However much this troubled Stein, he considered it of much less importance than discord be- (90) tween the estates. To Gagern, he called it a destructive spirit, springing from the pride of the nobles and the envy of the citizens. It is strife under the banner of vanity. It nullifies the general interest, frustrates the ends of the assembly, and the means of finding remedies for chronic ills, as well as the development of representative institutions. He further elucidates the difficulty (91) on February 13, 1820, by asserting that party divisions are less disadvantageous than the pride of the nobles, the envy of the citi- zens, and the coarseness of the peasants with its bitterness, in- jured self-love, and violation of the constitution. In all this attitude toward party spirit in the assembly Stein was apparently in the wrong. Where freedom of action exists the tendency is to develop groups through the interplay of whose action the assembly does business and developes. But where the government keeps a strong hand on the assembly, the groups are numerous and less well defined. These two tendencies are inevitable. Personal, or even class, mo- tives do not play such a strong part in the formation and mainte- nance of these groups, as Stein would have us believe. The groups are actuated in their activities by more impersonal reasons which spring from conditions of living, working, and the public burdens imposed upon them. All European governments have to meet the prob- lem of the "bloc" system in parliament. 89. An Mereveldt, Feb., 1828, VI, 479. 90. Dec. 31, 1827, VI, 504. 91. VI, 510. . ■ 143 . The estates, finally, ought to be kept in touch with the pub- 02 ) lie by the publicity of its proceedings, especially those pertain- ing to the accounts. The full proceedings of the diet ought to be published, the reports as a whole, and the special reports on the various governmental activities, after the deliberations on them for the proposals and petitions. To these might be added some sta- tistics. Stein expected favorable results from this taking of the ptiblic into the confidence of its representatives. It would be a mutual benefit. A general interest would be aroused in the estates, which would, in turn, extend more widely the public spirit and in- terest in governmental affairs. An enlivened general interest in these things, which affect society as a whole, might furnish more solid thought for consideration at elections and debates. If the provincial inhabitants were interested in the course of local af- fairs, the information secured from the publicity of legislative proceedings would instruct them in administrative conditions, there- by preparing them for service in the estates. This would react upon the estates by increasing the number of members inspired with public spirit and versed in local affairs. 92. An Schrotter, July 17, 1808, II, 681; An Schuckmann, Jan. 20, 1830, VI, 840; An Rochow, Feb. 20, 1827, VI, 370; An Cotta, Feb., 1830, VI, 911. ' 144 . CHAPTER V- -CONCLUSIONS TIME, TERRITORIAL AND PERSONAL LIMITATIONS. These, then, were the political ideas of Stein in respect to the organization of Prussia and Germany. Considering the circum- stances under which he had to work, the sum total of his accomplish- ments was large. Only a small portion of the short time of his mi- nistry could be given to administrative reforms. Much time was, necessarily, devoted to the problems of the French occupation and contributions, as well as to the extremely difficult matter of pro- curing the means for running the government. The policy of Napoleon to make Prussia the observation ground against Russia and Austria, and the general aspects of European politics made a final settle- ment a matter of great uncertainty. Then, when the national move- ment in the Spanish peninsula afforded a chance for relief, the influence of the reforms, the hostility or the nobles, the distrust of the King, and that unlucky letter of Stein’s deprived Prussia of t a statesman competent to deal with the situation, and Stein of the time for the completion of his reforms# For, on his retirement, November 24, 1808, there were many projects in various stages still ( 1 ) requiring much further attention; such as those of the superior presidency, the chambers, the rights and duties of the bureaucracy, the rural communes, the circles, the patrimonial jurisdiction, and the provincial and central estates. 1. Lehmann’s "Stein’, II, 605. . . ar.J j XI a.' . . . 145 Besides, Stein’s reforming activities were hampered by the lack of territorial area. The monarchy had been reduced to its far north- east province and a little more. The seat of government had moved to kernel, then to Koenigsberg. This territorial limitation operated to create financial embarrassment, as the area was too small for the increased expenditures, resulting from the French occupation. Its problems, also, took time that might have been spent more profit- ably on those of more fundamental import. It had an effect upon practical measures, such as, the advisability of discharging civil officials whose further services were no longer needed since an un- ( 2 ) foreseen disaster had reduced largely the work of administration. Then, administrative measures must be arranged either for local ap- plication, with the possibility of meeting the needs of territories reacquired from the French, or for application to the monarchy as a whole, whatsoever that might be. In the latter case, the measure went into force in so far as its provisions were adapted to local conditions, being extended with the increase of territory. In either case the territorial problem would work embarrassment. For the local differences of the various provinces, in any case amount- ing to an appreciable quantity, could not be adequately discounted in advance, nor the exact extent of the re-established Prussia as- certained. Furthermore, much of the work on the reform measures was per- formed by others. The edict of October 9, 1807, was nearly ready for Stein’s signature on his second entrance into office. The ground plan of the City Ordinance of 1808, was submitted by Frey, a 2. Cabinet Order, Nov. 13, 1808, II, 286, 287. • . • . JJ - H * . . . . . . 146 councillor of Koenigsberg. it is true that btein examined it and offered suggestions, and what he approved is to be considered, in a sense, his, as no great measure, probably, has sprung wholly from one man's effort, yet this constructive work of others was a limi- tation just as much as the lack of territorial area and of time. Nevertheless, he succeeded in erecting a monumental structure, a permanent contribution to applied administration. It was not iso- lated but had various connections and relations to the past and in- fluences upon the future. It may be considered in respect to the administrative development of Prussia, to itein’s own principles of administrative organization, to the character of German political development, to subsequent Prussian administrative development, and to the principles of government in general. RELATION TO THE PAST. A collegiately organized council, consisting of the heads of various administrative departments, had been on trial for many years with a variety of fortunes, incident to an expanding and growing state. It had proved itself unequal to the exigencies of Prussian development. The increase of territory brought in new peoples, sit- uations, and institutions, induced a differentiation and multipli- city of functions, and the creation of new institutions outside the council and but loosely connected with it. The whole administra- tion became a mass of ill related institutions slightly united through the King. The confusion and inefficiency of such a situa- tion set in motion a movement to reorganize the administrative ma- chinery, which the next expansion threw into a similar condition. Throughout the whole of this development the absolutism of the King and the prevalence of the bureaucracy grew more prominent to secure . . . , . J . ' r - . 147 | . efficiency. A strong, active, energetic, able King wanted effective instruments to carry out his will. The bureaucracy offered this means. The collegiately organized council had constantly to combat this trend. Since the time of Frederick William I, the council had been relegated to an insignificant position by the General Directory, the ministry of justice, and the cabinet-ministry, although collegiate organization and ministerial responsibility could not be wholly elim- inated. Under a strong ruler the King was the center of authority and control, exercised through the cabinet secretaries. The minis- terial functions were rendered merely secretarial. Under a weak King, the cabinet secretaries took over the direction of affairs in so far as royal favorites permitted. The ministers must shoulder the responsibility, without a voice in questions of policy. The crisis of 1806, unprecedented pressure of foreign affairs gave oc- casion for the ministerial opposition which ultimately v/orked a change in the administrative system. From the wreckage of the old Stein sought to build the new. This reorganization was nothing unusual. The growing Prussian state was accustomed to meet disorganization incident to expansion by a rearrangement of the administrative institutions. A Great Elector , a Danklemann, a Frederick William had already undertaken the task, by the side of whom Stein, in a sense, ranged himself, doing what earlier organizers had tried to do under conditions peculiar to their day, to revive and to re-establish the almost discarded coun- cil of state which had been the center of all previous reforms up to Frederick William I’s triumph of absolutism and bureaucracy over collegiate administration. Stein sought to retain the cabinet and . . • . " . - . - . . . ' ■ I 148 the other two institutions of the old government to strengthen the council as the center of the administrative system. The cabinet had been a marked defect in practice because it consisted of inferior, irresponsible members, though offering the solution of a center of government under the monarch. Stein proposed to utilize this sug- / gestion by making its membership the responsible ministry in close union with the council of state and in subordination to it. Instead of incorporating the general directory and ministry of justice into the council, Stein made use of their excellent or- ganization for individualizing the five departments of the council, with such improvements as experience and observation might suggest to a practical man of affairs. It was not a violent break with the past, but a natural development preserving a characteristic insti- tution, with such modifications as would adapt it to present needs. Responsibility and efficiency were to be secured with less auto- cracy and bureaucracy through the council of state, the individual departments, and the cabinet. This was not worked out in detail, but enough was done to indicate the general character of the plan. RELATION TO UNITY AND INDIVIDUALITY. Upon this foundation of the past, Stein reared a structure, according to his principles of administrative organization, unity of power and responsibility, departmental individuality, expert ad- ministration, and popular participation in government. Of these he seems to consider the first and last the most important. The report of November 23, 1807, the ordinance of November 24, 1808, and other documents of his ministry make provisions embodying three at least of these ideas, while the fourth is to be found worked out only in the City Ordinance of 1808, though fully discussed in later . . X . . •' 11 K Y • ' ;^7 •. L f . 149 letters and documents. Unity is embodied in the organization of the council of state and the cabinet as the center of the administrative system. Then, the whole organization was connected from the coun- cil to the local director of the circle through the superior pres- idency and the war and domain chambers. Collegiate action charac- terized not only the council but every department and subgroup of officials central and local. Discussion and majority decision xi as the rule. Besides, unity v/as often embodied in an individual such as a minister president, superior president, or circle director. In this were two defects: the tendency for the cabinet to displace the council of state, as the administrative center since it was more precisely defined, smaller, contained the most impor- tant members and would meet best the demand for a small compact body of able administrators; the application of collegiate action to administration which usually requires quicker decision than ren- dered by a group, however small and able. Discussion and deliber- ation are associated with policy formation, as, decision and rapid- ity of action with execution. Yet, the power of the King, the ap- pointment of an emergency administrator , the individuality of the departments, and the fact that legislation was a function of the council rendered collegiate action appropriate for much of its work; made the expression and criticism of opinion and the arrival at decisions through compromise beneficial for the state. Departmental individuality w as maintained in various ways . Power of appointment and dismissal was accorded the department head and his immediate assistants, limited by the action of the King in appointing or confirming appointments and by the recommendations in some cases of an examining board. Very little is said about dis- • ' 1 • I 150 . missals. Some independent action is accorded in financial matters, in the arrangement of the budget of expenses, in a limited amount of expenditure beyond that of the budget. Each department has the right to exercise its judgment in respect to rules and regulations for executing the laws. Any friction or obstruction between two or more departments was to be settled by the departments themselves through conferences. Only in the last resort was the council of state to intervene. There was to be an adaptation of organization and personnel of each department to its functions and relation to the King. The interior was numerously supplied with subordinate of- ficials ranking almost as heads of departments because of the great variety of important matters. Foreign affairs ?jas in closer touch with the King, who represented the unity of the state abroad and took a more personal part in international affairs. The tenure of the judiciary was adapted to the necessary protection against ad- verse influence upon decisions. EXPERT ADMINISTRATION AND POPULAR PARTICIPATION. The requirements of the third principle, to employ experts to work with the regular government officials, were met by providing for the creation of expert commissions to aid such branches as had the most need of them. Seven such commissions were attached to the subdepartments of the Interior, others viere assigned to the war and domain chambers. Their function was to act with the regular admin- istrators in passing upon technical matters in the course of busi- ness or needing some extended deliberation. Each commission was organized under a president. The various commissions were to meet in a joint session for the consideration of matters of common in- terest or requiring more than one line of experts. The expert com- . 151 . mission is provided for only in the interior department, though Stein seems to have had a very thorough recognition of the value of expert knowledge in administrative work, from experience in West- phalia and Berlin. This may be due to his intimate knowledge of the needs of that branch of administration more than of any other, and to the variety and multiplicity of economic and social activities embraced within its jurisdiction which made a greater demand for expert administration than else¥/here . Lastly, Stein provided to a limited extent only for the par- ticipation of the people in the government. The term political people was inclusive of only a very small portion of the population, primarily propertied people, preferably those possessed of real estate, men with a stake in the country, who, having shown their a- bility to conduct successfully business ventures on a fairly extend- ed scale, might reasonably be expected to evince an equal skill in managing public affairs. They would be likely to be as careful of the people’s affairs as of their own, and would have the requisite leisure to devote to the public business. The organ through which they were to act was the estates. The mod.ern idea of representation was too closely connected with democracy and French principles and practices. The estates provincial, and ultimately, national, were to be the organ to make men of means and leisure useful to the gov- ernment in legislation and administration. The activities of the estates were to be under the control of the government. The government commissioner determined the order of business, maintained discipline, proposed the subjects for dis- cussion, picked the membership of the committees, and determined the number. Laws and financial affairs were the main business of the ' 152 sessions. Although an assent was necessary for the validity of an act, the final word lay with the King. If he refused his approval, the matter must not be reintroduced during the current session. Administrative work was to be undertaken by members of the estates in the war and domain chambers, where they were to have equal rank with the regular officials, a definite tenure, but no pay, under the same supervision as when acting with the estates. There was little idea of democracy, none of popular sovereignty. The impulse and ultimate responsibility was still from above. The government was just as absolute, as if there were no popular representatives. It might act more intelligently and in conformity with public opin- ion but the final word lay with it. This principle found only par- tial application. The city ordinance and the ordinance creating the estates of Y-estphalia owe much to his planning; but the plans of 1807-1808, do not contain provisions for popular representation due to the shortness of his ministry. In the city ordinance only one estates is involved; in the Westphalian estates, his principal work was the order of business. (3) Cavaignac criticises the idea of popular participation in the government, as having little effect upon the character of the Prus- sian state, leaving it an absolutism, or creating an oligarchy. There was needed a complete social reform. .Stein payed too much attention to mere administrative re-adjustments, when the basis of society was left feudal. The admission of the people to a share in the government would bring face to face the King and the aristoc- racy of blood and wealth in contest for the dominance. Cavaignac 3. La Formation de la Prusse Contemp., I, 336 ff. and 411 ff . . ■ . 3 - . ' < - ' , 1 i 153 . is right in saying that popular participation would have little ef- fect upon the character of the Prussian state, and, also, that this would work ultimately a change in it; but he is unjust in censuring Stein for not instituting a complete social reform, for the point of view of the two men is different. The one would have a social reform of equality, equal access to the offices of government; the other, inequality, but freedom of development for the individual, with the duty of devoting part of their time to government service under administrative supervision for those who had succeeded in managing their own affairs, conditions being so changed that all might have a chance to attain success. Gavaignac seems to think that Stein did not appreciate the French Revolution, because its re- sults were hidden for the time by Napoleon's absolutism. This may be true. But, the innate character of French and German peoples vras so different, that an appreciation would not be likely. Their at- titude toward the past was most opposite. The French would abolish past institutions for an entirely n e\i structure, although never com- pletely successful. The Germans would preserve the past, as the very best foundation to build upon. The continuity of the state in its institutional development was the conscious aim of the one, just the opposite, the purpose of the other, although there was not such an abrupt break as might seem probable. GERMAN POLITICAL CHARACTER. Stein's plan was characteristically German. Monarchical sov- ereignty was a fundamental principle of the Teutonic state. His- (4) torically, such a state had developed through a ruling family. The 4. Bornhak C-- Grundrisz der Deut. Staats K. 2nd— p. 1, ff. _ _____ . . - . . , . ' ■ /. ■ ? § $ ‘n - . • ■ ra 154 ^ | ruler exercised all powers of government in his own right, as sov- \ ereign. All power in the state emanated from him. Popular sover- eignty was wholly foreign to this idea of the state. To aid the sovereign in administration a bureaucratic civil service was creat- ed. Admission to governmental service and the official relation to the government were defined betvjeen the bureaucrat and the sover- eign, as a life-service or career, efficient and effective govern- ment was secured through monarchical sovereignty and bureaucratic administration. In the person of the sovereign was embodied the continuity of the state, reconciled with the shortness of human life by definite arrangements for the succession and the regency in case of administrative incapacity. Stein would modify this German devel- opment by organizing the administrative service collegiately to eliminate the arbitrary element inherent in bureaucracy. When the people began to make their power felt, the German states admitted them to some of the functions of government. Grad- ually the movement spread from the South German states. But none of the constitutions contained the idea of popular sovereignty which was as foreign to the constitutional monarchy as to the absolute. There occurred no change of sovereignty from the monarch to the peo- ple. The people were admitted to a well defined sphere without en- croaching upon the sphere of the monarchical and bureaucratic ele- ments. Usually, the people had to do with legislation and finance, and the validity of the law and financial measure was dependent upon their assent, but they could not bring pressure upon the gov- ernment through financial embarrassment, to secure a change of sov- ereignty. The government might not advance, but it could always hold what it had obtained. Particular pains were taken to exclude . . a ~ ' ' . . . . . - «? . . , m • ; 155 the radical element by relying upon the substantial men of property and business, with a stake in the country, to co-operate with the government. But always the monarch guided the operation of the government as a whole. Stein was wholly in sympathy with this idea. The substantial elements were to be encouraged to devote some of their time to the public welfare through regularly organized institutions of such a character that there would be no chance of securing the transfer of sovereignty from the monarch to the people. But he did not work out the organization of a central legislature. Popular participa- tion was to be exercised through provincial organs and those of the municipality. This does not mean that Stein had not in viev/ a central legislature since he makes a lengthy argument to prove that local cannot perform the functions of central estates. In the sec- ond. place, popular representatives were to enter the wor and domain chambers to perform with professionals certain functions. By work- ing under government supervision, the most could be obtained from the amateurs through skilled guidance, while the tendency to routine, unsympathetic and ignorant administration, characteristic of the bureaucrat, would find a corrective. Another characteristic of the German system w?s the tendency tovfard confederate organization for matters of common interest. Localism and state individualism long reigned dominant. From the time of Frederic II the German sovereigns increased their independ- ence legalized by the Golden Bull of 1356. and the capitulations, beginning with the election of Charles Fifth in 1519. The empire, the confederation of the Rhine, and that of 1815, successively look- ed after affairs common to the various states. In this respect ' . ' 156 (5) Stein proposed the reorganization of Germany. Well organized local states were to act as a unit in foreign and domestic affairs of com- mon interest through a rejuvinated empire. The emperor, the diet, and the circle were to be adapted to modern conditions, in a highly decentralized state, under the overshadowing protection of Prussia and Austria. Of the same tenor were the forty-one proposals of Stein and Hardenburg which were worked over for presentation to the Congress of Vienna, 1815, as the basis of a German Union. Reduced to tv/elve articles, they became the constitution of Germany. Stein had noth- ing new to offer in the way of organization. It was looked upon as the best that could be secured from a reactionary assembly; and, at first, as containing great possibilities of adaptation and develop- ment, but without change of principle. One clause enjoined upon the individual states the obligation of providing constitutions, although this provision was emasculated during the process of work- ing over the proposals. Thus, both in his several plans for re- organizing the empire and in these forty-one proposals, the point of view and the method of organization ¥